South Africa and Japan – A Bureaucratic Policy Analysis
A study of selected government agencies relevant to South African – Japanese relations

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Declaration

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Date: 31 July 2013
Abstract

This study applies a modified bureaucratic policy process model to analyse contemporary South African – Japanese relations, particularly in regards to a proposed Economic Partnership Agreement, and the experiences of Japanese agencies within South Africa.

South Africa and Japan are major trade partners, and the Japanese government has a significant presence in the African aid scene via the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), and through the works of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). South African – Japanese relations have been documented in a modest but respectable fashion by a range of researchers, including Alden, Skidmore and Osada.

The bureaucratic policy process model has been used in an array of studies on international relations and decision making, notably by Graham Allison. However, it has not been previously applied to South African – Japanese relations. As a result, there is a dearth of information on how bureaucratic dynamics affect Japanese – South African relations. In response to this, a modified bureaucratic policy process model is used to analyse contemporary South African – Japanese governmental relations.

A literature review of primary and secondary sources is undertaken, consisting of a historical review of South African – Japanese relations. Following this, a brief overview of contemporary literature on South African – Japanese relations is performed. This includes both secondary sources and primary sources relating to government bureaucracies current priorities and strategies. Material on TICAD is included in this section.

Interviews with government officials from both the Japanese and South African governments are carried out using a modified snowball sampling system. The interviews provide insights into the different bureaucratic organization’s priorities and programmes, as well as their relationships with other organizations.

From this data, two emergent themes are addressed: the failure of a contemplated Free Trade Agreement / Economic Partnership Agreement and the way in which Japanese agencies, particularly JICA, operate within the South Africa context.
It is found that the FTA failed due to welfare concerns from the South African Department of Trade and Industry, as well as greater complications relating to trade agreements in general. These greater complications stem from the involvement of regional bodies such as the South African Customs Union. Japanese agencies are found to be constrained within South Africa by a lack of resources as well as by the independent and somewhat sceptical attitude of South African government agencies towards Japanese aid efforts.

It is proposed that the relevance of extra national bureaucracies to the decision making process surrounding the FTA has implications for deploying the bureaucratic policy process model, which has generally only considered national bureaucracies in discussing how decisions are made. It is further suggested that South African trade deals are complicated by the country’s location within the South African Customs Union and the South African Development Community, and the consequent need to consult and negotiate with third parties who are likely to be impacted by such deals. Finally, it is suggested that because both South Africa and Japan face significant, but different economic challenges, they should prioritise improving their economic relations.
Opsomming

Hierdie studie het ’n aangepaste burokratiese beleidsprosesmodel gebruik om die hedendaagse betrekkinge tussen Suid-Afrika en Japan te ontleed, veral wat betref ’n voorgestelde ekonomiese vennootskapsooreenkoms tussen die twee lande en die ervarings van Japaniese agentskappe in Suid-Afrika.

Suid-Afrika en Japan is groot handelsvennotes, en die Japaniese regering handhaaf ’n beduidende teenwoordigheid op die Afrika-hulptoneel deur middel van die Tokiose Internasionale Konferensie oor Afrika-ontwikkeling (TICAD) en die werk van die Japaniese Internasionale Samewerkingsagentskap (JICA). Verskeie navorsers, waaronder Alden, Skidmore en Osada, het die betrekkinge tussen Suid-Afrika en Japan al op beskeie dog aansienlike wyse beskryf.

Die burokratiese beleidsprosesmodel is al in ’n rits studies oor internasionale betrekkinge en besluitneming gebruik, in die besonder deur Graham Allison. Tog is dit nog nooit voorheen op betrekkinge tussen Suid-Afrika en Japan toegepas nie. Dus bestaan daar weinig inligting oor hoe burokratiese dinamiek die betrekkinge tussen hierdie twee lande raak. In antwoord hierop is ’n aangepaste burokratiese beleidsprosesmodel dus gebruik om die hedendaagse staatsbetrekkinge tussen Suid-Afrika en Japan te ontleed.

Eerstens is ’n literatuuroorsig van primêre en sekondêre bronne onderneem wat uit ’n historiese oorsig van betrekkinge tussen Suid-Afrika en Japan bestaan het. Daarná is ’n oorsig van kontemporêre literatuur oor die verhoudinge tussen die twee lande onderneem. Dít het sowel sekondêre as primêre bronne met betrekking tot die huidige prioriteite en strategieë van staatsburokrasieë ingesluit. Hierdie afdeling sluit ook materiaal oor TICAD in.

Onderhoude met staatsamptenare van die Japaniese sowel as die Suid-Afrikaanse regerings is met behulp van ’n aangepaste stelsel van sneeuvalsteekproefneming gevoer. Die onderhoude bied insig in die verskillende burokratiese organisasies se prioriteite en programme, sowel as hul verhoudings met ander organisasies.
Twee temas wat uit hierdie data na vore gekom het, is vervolgens bespreek: die mislukking van ’n beoogde vryehandel-/ekonomiese vennootskapsooreenkom, en die funksionering van Japanse agentskappe, veral JICA, in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks. Daar word bevind dat die vryehandelsooreenkomms misluk het weens welsynsbesware van die Suid-Afrikaanse Departement van Handel en Nywerheid, sowel as groter komplikasies met betrekking tot handelsooreenkomste in die algemeen. Hierdie groter komplikasies hou verband met die betrokkenheid van streeksliggame soos die Suider-Afrikaanse Doeane-unie. Voorts blyk Japanse agentskappe in Suid-Afrika aan bande gelê te word deur ’n gebrek aan hulpbronne, sowel as Suid-Afrikaanse staatsagentskappe se onafhanklike en effens skeptiese houding jeens Japanse hulppogings.

Die studie doen aan die hand dat die relevansie van bykomende nasionale burokrasieë in die besluitnemingsproses oor die vryehandelsooreenkomms bepaalde implikasies inhou vir die gebruik van die burokratiese beleidsprosesmodel, wat meestal slegs rekening hou met enkele nasionale burokrasieë se rol in besluitneming. Voorts blyk dit dat Suid-Afrikaanse handelstransaksies bemoeilik word deur die land se lidmaatskap van die Suider-Afrikaanse Doeane-unie en die Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsgemeenskap, en die gevolglike behoefte om oorleg te pleeg met derde partye wat waarskynlik deur sulke transaksies geraak sal word.

Laastens word aangevoer dat aangesien Suid-Afrika en Japan met beduidende dog verskillende ekonomiese uitdagings te kampe het, die verbetering van ekonomiese betrekkinge tussen die twee lande nou voorrang behoort te geniet.
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Contents
Declaration ........................................................................................................................................... i
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................... ii
Opsomming ................................................................................................................................. iv
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... vi
Acronyms ......................................................................................................................................... x

Chapter 1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Contextualization and Rationale for the study ........................................................................ 1
  1.2 Problem Formulation and Research Questions .................................................................... 9
  1.3 Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................................... 9
  1.4 Research Design and Methodology ....................................................................................... 11
    1.4.1 Sampling ..................................................................................................................... 12
    1.4.2 Interviews ................................................................................................................... 14
  1.5 Limitations and Delimitations ............................................................................................... 15
  1.6 Thesis Layout ......................................................................................................................... 17

Chapter 2 Theoretical and Conceptual Issues .............................................................................. 19
  2.1 Realism ..................................................................................................................................... 19
  2.2 Liberalism ............................................................................................................................... 21
  2.3 Critical Theory ......................................................................................................................... 23
  2.4 The Bureaucratic Policy Process ............................................................................................ 27
    2.4.1 Limitations of the Bureaucratic Policy Process ........................................................ 32
  2.5 Model 1: Japan as a Reactive State ......................................................................................... 34
  2.6 Model 2: Japan as a Neo-Mercantilist State .......................................................................... 41
  2.7 Model 3: Japan as a Middle Power ......................................................................................... 43
  2.8 Application and Synthesis ..................................................................................................... 47
  2.9 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................. 51
# Chapter 3 Literature Review – Japanese Engagement with South Africa

3.1 Japanese Foreign Policy: A brief history ......................... 53

3.2 African-Japanese Relations: A historical review ..................... 55
  3.2.1 Official Development Aid to South Africa: The early years ....... 67

3.3 TICAD: Old wine in new bottles? ........................................... 70

3.4 Continuations and Departures ............................................ 80

3.5 Limitations and Gaps .......................................................... 82

# Chapter 4 Findings and Analysis - Recent Bureaucratic-Level Engagements between Japan and South Africa

4.1 Mandates and priorities, strategies and programmes ................ 87

4.2 South Africa as an operating environment for Japanese agencies .... 99
  4.2.1 Assertiveness and Ownership .......................................... 102

4.3 The Economic Partnership Agreement ................................... 108
  4.3.1 Regional Organizations and trade agreements: Additional complications .... 112
  4.3.2 Other actors: JETRO and COSATU? ................................. 118

4.4 Conclusion ................................................................. 122

# Chapter 5 Conclusion

5.1 Key issues for investigation .................................................. 124

5.2 Summary of the key findings ............................................... 124

5.3 Theoretical Implications ..................................................... 125

5.4 Implications for future Japanese – South African relations ........... 128

5.5 Areas for future investigation ............................................... 130

5.6 Japan and South Africa: The road ahead ............................... 131

# Bibliography

................................................................. 134

# Appendix A

................................................................. 154

# Appendix B

................................................................. 158
List of Tables and Figures

Figure 1.1 Selected exports from South Africa to Japan, 2001 to 2011 .............................. 5
Figure 1.2 Selected exports from Japan to South Africa, 2001 to 2011 .............................. 5
Figure 4.1 Selected precious metal exports from South Africa to Japan, 2001 to 2011 .......... 89
Acronyms

ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nations
AU     African Union
BNLS   Botswana Namibia Lesotho Swaziland
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Dirco  Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DTI    Department of Trade and Industry
TDCA   Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
IOR-ARC Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
JBIC   Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JETRO  Japan External Trade Organisation
JICA   Japan International Cooperation Agency
METI   Ministry for Economic, Trade and Industry
MITI   Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MOFA   Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NEPAD  New Economic Partnership for African Development
ODA    Official Development Assistance
REC    Regional Economic Community
SACU   South African Customs Union
SADC   South African Development Community
TICAD  Tokyo International Conference for African Development
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Contextualisation and rationale for the study

This thesis had its genesis as a response to certain gaps within the literature on Japanese–South African relations. Very little work has been done on the bureaucratic dimensions of this relationship, and some of the work in this field is relatively dated. This thesis seeks to address this by both updating the literature in a modest fashion, and by examining Japanese–South African relations using a hitherto underutilized approach, namely that of the bureaucratic policy process.

A review of the literature on Japanese–South African relations indicated that much of the work in the field is relatively dated. Since the last major review of this field by Christopher Alden and Hirano Katsumi in 2003, events have taken place which may have reshaped the relationship somewhat. These include the election of a new government in Japan, the continued rise of China and its increased involvement in Africa and, possibly, the earthquake in north east Japan.

However, it has also become clear that the current literature does not effectively examine the relevant bureaucracies involved in the relationship. The extant literature focuses on broad state-state relations, with little reference to the interactions between the agencies and organizations that make up the governments on both sides. For example, Skidmore's (1999; 2004) work discusses the relationship exclusively at the level of state-state relations, with little reference to the national bureaucracies on both sides. Similarly, Nel (2005) discusses the state of South African-Japanese trade and economic relations, but again he uses an approach that assumes the existence of the State as a unified rational actor, not a conglomerate of bureaucracies and sub-national actors.

Studies have been done on the way in which Japanese bureaucracies inform foreign policy, but these have usually been in the context of Japanese–United States relations, or foreign policy in some other sphere. One example of this kind of scholarship, *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, edited by John Scalapino, (1997) is a comprehensive and authoritative source on Japanese bureaucracy, with detailed chapters on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
and what was then the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Unfortunately, it is quite dated and is written from a US perspective.

In this tradition, there is a distinct school of writers who argue that bureaucracies are unusually important in Japanese politics. In *Japan's Political System* Robert E. Ward emphasizes the importance of the Japanese bureaucracies in decision-making. As he explains, “bureaucracy in Japan is deeply involved in politics for several reasons” (Ward 1978: 166). Among these, he mentions that “such involvement is a solidly entrenched part of the Japanese tradition” (Ward 1978: 166).

Kazuki Iwanaga notes that this point has been extended to an argument that the bureaucratic policy process mode of analysis is particularly suited to Japan. He cites Inouye as claiming that “due to structural differences in the political system and the way it is operated, Japanese politics is more amenable than American politics to the application of the concept of actors presented by the bureaucratic politics model” (Inouye 1987, quoted in Iwanaga 1993: 21). It should be noted that there is a debate over this matter. Iwanaga takes issue with Inouye's argument, dismissing it as hastily developed (Iwanaga 1993: 22). Similarly, other analysts argue that “the dominance of the Japanese bureaucracy in the political process has been grossly exaggerated” (Pempel, T. J. and Fukui, Haruhiro, cited in Haley 1987: 344).

However, even if this scepticism is justified and Japan is not peculiarly amenable to bureaucratic analysis, so little has been written about this aspect of South African – Japanese relations that it would appear to be a grossly underused departure point. The value of a bureaucratic policy approach to foreign policy is well documented by writers such as Allison (1971), Allison and Halperin (1972) and Hilsman (1990), as the theoretical section of this thesis will show, but with the exception of one study by Chris Alden (2002), very little work using this level of analysis has been done in relation to Japanese-South African relations. Furthermore, even though Alden has examined this aspect of the relationship, he has not developed it as an explicit framing device to the level that this thesis will.

The value of a bureaucratic approach to this relationship lies in the way it can make the intricacies of decision-making more intelligible. As the theoretical chapter of this thesis

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1 Subsequently renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
demonstrates, bureaucracies can significantly affect the way in which foreign policy is made and carried out. Although the impact of high level decision-makers cannot be underestimated, it must be understood that much of the minutiae and complexity of foreign policy is impacted by bureaucratic structures as result of the various agendas, modes of operation and concerns that they bring to the issue. Consequently, while documenting the specifics of these bureaucracies has value in itself, by understanding the bureaucratic dynamics involved it may also be possible to formulate answers to questions around Japanese-South African relations that have significant explanatory heft.

In short, there is a deficiency of work on and understanding about the way in which bureaucratic dynamics affect the relationship between the two countries. These bureaucratic dynamics encompass the specific linkages, interactions and priorities of the bureaucracies involved in this relationship. In other words, which bureaucracies work together the most? What are their priorities? What do they see as their responsibilities? How does this affect the relationship? Understanding these bureaucratic dynamics will generate new insights into Japanese-South African relations.

However, it has been necessary to carefully delineate the topic of study. Conventionally, the bureaucratic policy process analytical approach is generally used in relation to specific case studies or issues. While this study was not initially developed around a case study, economic ties were used as a departure point for initial investigations. This was thought to be one of the most interesting aspects of the relationship, largely because it is one of the most developed points of contact. Japan and South Africa have a significant history of trade\(^2\), and this has continued to remain a significant factor.

As of 2011, after China and the United States, South Africa's third largest export destination was Japan (Department of Trade and Industry 2011). According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [MOFA] this trade largely consists of minerals and automobiles (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). In a paper on Japanese – South African trading patterns, Sandrey notes that “Japan was South Africa's single most important export destination in 2005. These exports are concentrated in precious stones and metals [platinum] and motor vehicles” (Sandrey 2007: 1).

A brief review of recent trade data supports these assertions. As Figure 1.1 demonstrates, precious metals (C14) are by far the largest export category from South Africa to Japan. These exports grew significantly from 2001, reaching a peak in 2008, right before the global recession.

As can be seen in Figure 1.2, South Africa largely imports vehicle components (C23) and assembled vehicles (C17).

This data also suggests that trade relations resemble a fairly typical “North-South” relationship, with South Africa exporting significant amounts of raw materials, and Japan exporting finished goods. There is some heterogeneity to this trading pattern, however, as evidenced by South Africa's import of vehicle components, largely for assembly into automobiles. Some of these vehicles are in fact exported to Japan, although this kind of trade has not grown as rapidly as that in platinum ore.
Figure 1.1: Selected Exports from South Africa to Japan, 2001 to 2011. Graph is denominated in Rands.
Source: Department of Trade and Industry.

Figure 1.2: Selected Exports from Japan to South Africa, 2001 to 2011. Graph is denominated in Rands.
Source: Department of Trade and Industry.
These trade figures must be placed against a historical backdrop of trade relations. Japan's involvement in the South African economy has a significant history, with commentators such as Morikawa (1997) seeing Japan's activities in Africa as being heavily oriented around protecting and maintaining access to South Africa's mineral resources. Post-1994 this relationship has remained important, with Japan maintaining a position as one of South Africa's top trade partners. As Skidmore noted in 2004, “Japan has consistently been South Africa's third- or fourth-largest trading partner in recent years” (Skidmore 2004).

However, despite this history and these trade relations, South Africa has recently downplayed relations with Japan, in favour of continued South-South co-operation and building ties with China. Indeed, in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation [Dirco]'s strategic plan for the time period 2010 – 2013, Japan received barely a mention (Department of International Relations and Cooperation 2010). Skidmore also noted this pattern, suggesting that “While South Africa views Japan as a strategic country and an important trading partner, it can be argued that Japan is not yet viewed as a strategic partner for South Africa” (Skidmore 2004:2). The distinction that Skidmore makes here is important, and is rooted in documentation from the Department of Trade and Industry [DTI] dating back to 2001. As she explains:

“For a country to be considered a strategic partner, there has to be a clear convergence of interests on issues related to both development and multilateral and geopolitical strategies. In this regard, its economic potential is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the designation. A strategic country is a country that does not share similar perspectives on the issues given above but is of major significance in the global economy” (Skidmore 2004: 3).

Taken together with the most recent Dirco strategic plan, this would suggest that although Pretoria is naturally aware of Japan's significant economic capabilities, closer ties have not been a major strategic priority recently, and this has not changed recently. It must be emphasised that this is a relatively recent state of affairs. Traditionally, Japanese corporations have had a significant presence in the South African economy, generally via subsidiaries such as Toyota and Nissan. During apartheid, the Japanese government avoided completely severing ties with South Africa (despite pressure to do so), and in the immediate
In the post-Apartheid time frame the Japanese government offered significant aid packages to South Africa.

More recently, in 2012, the Japanese government approached the South African government with a proposal to sign an Economic Partnership Agreement, which would include a Free Trade Agreement. This proposal was unsuccessful, but this proposal, and the reasons for its failure, became a major part of the findings of thesis.

At an intellectual and rhetorical level, Japanese aid initiatives on the continent are driven by the Tokyo International Conference on African Development [TICAD], which has been held five times since 1993. The latest conference, TICAD V, took place in mid-2013.

This multilateral conference on aid and development issues in Africa represents an important forum for South Africa and Japan to engage around African developmental issues. TICAD includes delegates from different African countries, the United Nations, the European Union and of course, Japan. Some commentators have suggested that this is due to a desire to generate political support for Japanese initiatives within the UN Security Council (Skidmore 2002; Dwinger 2010). An interrogation of these motives is not part of this thesis, but it is useful to bear in mind when discussing Japan's aid projects on the continent.

These projects are generally carried out by JICA, the Japan International Cooperation Agency. Established in 2008 as an umbrella body for Japanese aid initiatives, JICA claims to be the world's largest bilateral aid agency, with an annual budget of over 10 billion US dollars (Japan International Cooperation Agency 2008).

South Africa's concerns in international relations can broadly be seen as developmental and Afro-centric, with a strong emphasis on South-South co-operation. In the Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s 2013 Strategic Plan, Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane wrote that

“Our struggle for a better life in South Africa is intertwined with our pursuit of a better Africa in a better world. Our destiny is inextricably linked to that of the Southern African region. Regional and continental integration is the foundation for Africa’s
socio-economic development and political unity, and essential for our own prosperity and security” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation 2013: 2).

Further on she stated:

“Partnerships with countries of the South continue to be critical to advancing not only South Africa’s own development needs, but also that of Africa and to create political, economic and social convergence for the fight against poverty, underdevelopment and the marginalisation of the South. We will promote the strengthening of South-South cooperation and support the Agenda of the South through participation in the activities of all South-South fora” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation 2013: 3).

By virtue of its central role in conceiving and implementing the TICAD process, it is clear that Japan has some interest in aid issues in Africa. This creates an interesting space in which to explore the interactions of the two states. However, in doing so it is important not to lose sight of the potential problems that can arise during the foreign aid process. Indeed, aid relations between South Africa and Japan have quite a troubled history, and some of the dimensions of this are discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

By contrast with these significant trade and aid relations, South Africa and Japan have virtually no points of contact in security matters (Alden 2002: 379 – 381).

Consequently, this project will discuss trade and aid issues between South Africa and Japan. They are developed, important and on-going aspects of the relationship between the two countries.

In order to reliably interrogate these issues, it has become necessary to modify the bureaucratic policy process' analytical model somewhat. This is because discerning the true agendas and interests of a bureaucracy requires extremely deep insight into their discussions, decision-making processes, and internal culture. Allison's study of the Cuban Missile Crisis,

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3 Sato (2005) discusses the history of Japanese aid initiatives, which started as what was effectively a reparations programme in Asia, but later expanded to include African nations. For a discussion of Japanese aid in Africa and South Africa, see Chapter 3.2 and 3.3 of this thesis.
for example, involved large numbers of interviews, analysis of thousands of documents and enormous amounts of research. In addition, it was only possible because of the extraordinary levels of access and trust that high level officials granted to the researchers involved (Allison 1971). This project’s scope is somewhat less ambitious – it seeks to gain an understanding of the linkages, interactions and priorities of the various bureaucracies involved in the relationship. This is simpler and more feasible than attempting to uncover the deep and often not entirely obvious agendas and interests that bureaucracies have. Concentrating on these aforementioned bureaucratic dynamics lends this project both practicality and epistemological soundness, by comparison with attempting a comprehensive bureaucratic policy analysis of the relationship.

1.2 Problem formulation and Research Questions

The importance of bureaucracies in international relationships has been well documented by writers such as Allison and Hilsman. Bureaucratic dynamics clearly affect foreign policy and international relations. However, it is unclear how this link expresses itself in terms of South African-Japanese relations. This leads to the primary research question:

How do bureaucratic dynamics, such as organizational linkages, dynamics and priorities affect the relationship between South Africa and Japan?

From this, two additional questions emerged during the research process:

How have Japanese agencies within South Africa adapted to the specific pressures, demands and peculiarities of working within this country?

How did bureaucratic dynamics affect the proposed Economic Partnership Agreement?

1.3 Theoretical Framework

In chapter 2 a discussion is provided of the three major paradigms of international relations, namely Liberalism, Realism and Critical Theory.

Following on from this, the chapter discusses the bureaucratic policy process, which has been adopted as the central theoretical model for this work. Graham Allison (1971) has extensively
documented the relevance of bureaucracies in generating policy in international relations. In
his landmark work, *Essence of Decision*, he developed a model known as the bureaucratic
policy process model, which sought to explain decision making during the Cuban Missile
Crisis in terms of the bureaucratic organizations within the Soviet and US governments.
Working from this, he argued that bureaucracies have a clear impact on policymaking. Allison
noted that, in contrast to the generic, singular ‘national interest’, different bureaucracies have
different interests. They see their organizational ‘mission’ as being paramount to the nation’s
security and interests. Different organizations also tend to see different aspects or “faces” of

All of this results in a more complex view of the policy and decision making process. Instead
of seeing policy and decision making as a centralised, rational process, typified by the rational
actor model, theorists such as Allison (1971) and Hilsman (1990) see it as a complex,
contested process involving different agendas, concerns and inputs from the various
government organizations involved.

Chapter 2 considers the three major models of Japanese foreign policy. The first, developed
by Calder (1988), is known as the reactive state, wherein Japan tends to formulate its foreign
policy in response to external pressure. The second, held by writers such as Heginbotham and
Samuels (1998) and Nester (1991) is the notion of Japan as neo-mercantilist state. This model,
which falls within the realist paradigm, holds that Japanese foreign policy is driven by the
need to maximise its economic power.

The last major model discussed is that of Japan as a middle-power. Developed by the critical
theorist, Robert Cox (1989), this model considers Japan as a moderately powerful nation
which seeks to define new norms and standards for international relations. This model is also
deployed by thinkers such as Cornelissen (2012).

None of these three theoretical models are explicitly adopted for the purposes of this thesis,
although they are referenced in relation to specific phenomena. Rather, the central theoretical
concern of this thesis is how to apply the bureaucratic policy process to certain contemporary
issues in South African-Japanese relations. The key topics within this relationship that will be
addressed within this framework are the attempted Economic Partnership Agreement, and the
way in which South Africa acts as an ‘operating environment’ for Japanese government agencies – namely, how it impacts on their activities, strategies and operations.

1.4 Research design and methodology

This research project involved qualitative research into the relationship between ‘bureaucratic dynamics’ and the relationship between South Africa and Japan. ‘Bureaucratic dynamics’ was conceived of as a set of independent variables consisting of: stated organizational priorities, relationships between government organizations, and organizational perceptions of other organizations. The relationship of these dynamics to the nature of the South African – Japanese relationship was then investigated.

The research process was two-fold. Firstly, a literature review was conducted. Secondly, a series of interviews with officials from relevant government agencies was carried out.

The literature review involved large amounts of secondary and primary sources, in order to generate grounded, informed questions for the interview. The theoretical paradigm concerning the bureaucratic policy process was largely built upon works by Graham T Allison (1971) and Roger Hilsman (1990).

In relation to Japanese-South African relations, historical works by Masako Osada (2002), Themba Sono (1993) and Jun Morikawa (1997) represented the anchors of the literature review. Works by Christopher Alden (2002), Kweku Ampiah (1990, 2003, 2005) and Natasha Skidmore (1999, 2004) discussing more contemporary relations were used to bring this historical view up to date.

The primary sources consulted included documentation from both Japanese and South African government agencies, including the DTI, Dirco, MOFA and METI. In particular, strategic policy documents and TICAD documentation helped inform the interviews by generating an overview of the various organization’s stated policy objectives and priorities.

The centrepiece of this study consisted of semi-structured interviews with representatives of key Japanese and South African government organizations, selected via a modified snowball sampling method. This was buttressed by additional correspondence with auxiliary
organizations whose relevance emerged during the study, as well as primary and secondary documentation.

Semi-structured interviews are “organised around a set of predetermined questions” while “[o]ther questions emerge from [the] dialogue” (Whiting 2008: 36).

By contrast with this method, Leech explains that structured interviews tend to be used most in mass opinion surveys, and are best suited to situations where the researcher knows a lot about the topic, and is seeking very specific information. On the other hand, unstructured interviews are “more conversations than interviews” that are “best used as a source of insight, not for hypothesis testing” (Leech 2002:665).

This format was chosen because it was necessary to both maintain a focus on the topic at hand (the linkages, interests and agendas of the various institutions) while avoiding excessive prejudgement on what themes may emerge within this context.

During these interviews certain broad topics were developed from the beginning. However, significant additional themes and issues emerged during the interview process.

1.4.1 Sampling

In selecting organizations to contact, at least one significant divergence from the original sampling scheme took place. Originally, the intention was to seek out individuals from both the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. The data from their interviews would then be compared, in the hopes of discovering differences between the two organizations. However, logistical considerations resulted in one interview conducted with an employee from the Japanese Embassy in Pretoria. As a result of this, instead of analysing MOFA and METI separately, the scope of the study was altered, and the Japanese Embassy was introduced as an organization in its own right. The Japanese Embassy does not generate its own policy prescriptions, naturally, and the majority of employees in the Japanese Embassy are seconded from other departments, such as METI. The specific interviewee at the Japanese Embassy was in fact an employee of METI, who was attached to the Embassy. Another interviewee was seconded from a METI think tank to the Development Bank of South Africa.
At the individual level, the initial intention was to use 'snowball' sampling, so from each interview further leads would be developed and additional sources sought out. Snowball sampling is “[a] technique for finding research subjects. One subject gives the researcher the name of another subject, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on” (Vogt, 1999 quoted in Atkinson and Flint 2001: 2). This method is often used in the social sciences for hard to reach populations, such as drug addicts or gangsters (Atkinson and Flint 2001: 1–2). However, its applicability is much broader than this: it has been used with groups ranging from nurses involved in medical administration errors (Shuh-Jen Sheu et al 2007) to Israeli backpackers (Noy 2008).

A slightly more mathematical explanation of the process is given by Leo Goodman, which involves selecting a random sample of relevant individuals, and asking each individual to name $x$ number of other individuals with certain parameters ($\textit{viz.}$, those that the researcher is interested in). These new individuals are contacted, and also asked to name $x$ individuals with the same parameters. Repeated individuals are eliminated from the list, and the process is repeated until the sample size is large enough (Goodman 1961: 148).

It was thought that this sampling method would lend itself well to this project for two reasons. Firstly, this study concerns itself with a small number of organizations, each of which will have a limited number of people working in this field. Consequently, interviews were held with a select number of people of interest, most of who are professionally connected by at least one or two degrees. Consequently, any relevant individual should be well aware of the work done by at least some of their colleagues and counterparts, and as a result would be well positioned to suggest other pertinent individuals to interview.

Secondly, this method would help overcome concerns around access to the relevant individuals. It was anticipated that accessing the relevant individuals would present some difficulty, largely due to gate-keeping issues. In order to mitigate this, snowball sampling was used predicated on the logic that individuals within government agencies would be more inclined to respond favourably to approaches for interviews when the researcher was introduced or recommended to them by a colleague or counterpart. Indeed, this may have particular relevance for interviewing Japanese subjects. As one researcher has noted, “With
living authors or indeed with any Japanese of distinction, it is generally best to do things the way any Japanese would have to do it, by obtaining a proper introduction” (Smith 2005).

Admittedly, snowball sampling is not an entirely unproblematic approach. The key weakness foreseen was that of potential selection bias (Atkinson and Flint 2001: 4). One way to avoid this difficulty was to compare the sample that emerged with what was known about the population before starting the interviews. In the case of this study it was important that a good balance of employees from the different agencies was selected.

Ultimately, a ‘pure’ snowball sampling method was not used. This was largely due to logistical constraints. Approaching one individual, completing an interview and then seeking further individuals based on their recommendations, arranging the new interviews and then following up on their responses would have resulted in a significant amount of time elapsing between interviews. Additionally, most of the subjects were located in Pretoria, whereas the researcher was based in the Western Cape. As a result, it was more efficient to travel to Pretoria once and do multiple interviews over a short period of time.

As a result of these factors, a 'quasi-snowball' approach was used. Multiple individuals were approached telephonically or via email, in parallel. In this initial stage some of these individuals did in fact recommend other individuals for interviewing, and these recommendations were followed up. In other cases, the researcher was referred to people that he had already interviewed. This helped confirm the validity of the initial sampling. Whether people are recommended to the researcher before or after their interview, their relevance as a subject remained the same. A retroactive recommendation helps confirm that they were in fact a relevant subject for the study. This 'reverse snowball' effect suggested that the individuals selected were in fact good subjects for interviews.

**1.4.2 Interviews**

Six organizations were selected, and nine individuals were personally interviewed, in seven interviews. (Some interviews involved two individuals at once.) One preliminary interview was undertaken with the Japanese Consulate in Cape Town with the intention of gaining an initial appraisal of the organization of the Japanese diplomatic corps in South Africa, as well
as developing leads on further individuals for interviews.

Interviews ranged in length from slightly under an hour to nearly two hours, depending on the amount of time available. Most interviews were slightly longer than an hour.

The initial plan called for recording the interviews and creating transcripts of the interviews, in order to ensure maximum clarity and accurate coding. However, early interviewees indicated that they would prefer it if the researcher did not record the discussions, and in response to these concerns notes were taken by hand. Following each interview a summary of the interviews was written up, using the notes.

The first interview was with the Japanese Consul in Cape Town during May 2012, and it was followed by a series of closely spaced interviews one month later. All of these later interviews took place in Pretoria between the 4th and the 7th of June in the same year.

During the research project, six different organizations were surveyed. Representing the Japanese government, these were the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), JICA, the Japanese Embassy and its satellite Consulate in Cape Town. An additional interviewee was included who was not a direct member of any of these organizations, in the form of a TICAD advisor who had been seconded to the South African Development Bank of South Africa. The DBSA was not included in the study, but his interview helped shed light upon the dynamics of the Japanese agencies operating within South Africa.

On the South African side, the DTI and Dirco were included in the study.

Upon completing the interviews, additional information was sought out from two more organizations: the SACU Secretariat and COSATU. These organizations were selected based on their emergence as relevant actors during the interviews. They both responded to brief email inquiries with information on their relationship to the issues raised.

A copy of the original interview questions is available in Appendix A.

1.5 Limitations and delimitations

One of the major limitations of this thesis involves the complexity of the analysis involving the interface of theoretical concerns and actual findings. As is discussed in Chapter 2, there are multiple contested models of Japanese foreign policy, namely the reactive, neo-
mercantilist and middlepower models. Making strong claims as to the validity of any of these models as a result of the fieldwork in this study would be misguided for two reasons. The first is that of analytic complexity. There are many elements of Japanese-South African relations that resonate with the different theoretical models presented. Mineral exploration and mining is often quite legibly discussed from a neo-mercantilist perspective, as in the analysis by Van Der Spuy and Glinzler (2003). Aid initiatives such as the Tokyo Conference for International Development (TICAD) could be seen as a departure from the reactive state, or, alternatively, as an example of Japan rising to the challenge of middlepowership. As a result of such analytical complexity any claims as to the validity of any of these models are extremely limited, and have been heavily caveated. Furthermore, the limited scope and depth of the fieldwork in this study means that it would irresponsible to claim that any given model is comprehensively rebutted or supported by this thesis.

Another difficulty of interaction between theoretical and practical findings lies in that of the demands of the bureaucratic policy process model. As is noted later, the full bureaucratic policy process model is demanding, in that it requires tremendous amounts of insight into, and data about, different bureaucracies. The broad logic of the bureaucratic policy process has been adopted: Bureaucratic dynamics affect international relationships and understanding this process is important. However, this thesis does not and cannot claim to be an exhaustive and complete account of the different bureaucracies.

This thesis was specifically delimited to only include employees from government organizations within South Africa. Although the South African Treasury and the Presidency have an impact on policy, they were explicitly excluded from the study due to logistical and gatekeeping issues. Additional funding and time would have allowed for the inclusion of these organizations, and would have strengthened the findings of this thesis. However, this was not possible. As a result of this decision, the findings in this paper must be approached with caution. They are based on an incomplete sample of the bureaucratic organizations involved within foreign policy, and as a result cannot be treated as comprehensive or authoritative. Rather, they should be seen as indicative findings, or partial findings. For ease of explanation and discussion, this paper often speaks in general terms of South African – Japanese relations, but the limited scope of the study must be kept in mind. This may be a particular factor in relation
to discussions around ODA and aid, since the Treasury may be significantly involved in this field.

Initially, the research project planned to interview employees from both MOFA and METI, and to analyse them separately as organizations in their own right.

However, logistical considerations resulted in one interview being conducted with an employee from the Japanese Embassy in Pretoria. As a result of this, instead of analysing MOFA and METI separately, the scope of the study was altered, and the Japanese Embassy was introduced as an organization in its own right.

Further limitations included a limited number of subjects. Ideally, interviewing multiple employees from each organization would have resulted in a denser, more comprehensive view of each bureaucracy. Unfortunately, time constraints meant that it was difficult to arrange multiple interviews at each organization, and still interview all of the remaining organizations. At some organizations two people were interviewed (in the same interview), while at others only one interviewee was available.

Finally, this thesis was conceived in early 2012, and much of the research was done in the same time frame. As a result, developments, resolutions and statements from TICAD V, held in June 2013 have not been included, and these may impact on some of the findings.

1.6 Thesis layout

Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of the various theoretical paradigms that have come to inform scholarly discussions of Japanese-South African relations. It addresses the broad theoretical paradigms of Liberalism, Realism and Critical Theory, but it also discusses the implications of the bureaucratic policy model for foreign policy, as well as various models of Japanese foreign policy.

Chapter 3 is a background chapter that also serves as a literature review. This section examines the historical debates, trends and changes in Japanese-African relations in general, and in Japanese-South African relations in particular.
Chapter 4 contains the findings and analysis resulting from the interviews. It begins with a review of the various agencies and organizations involved in the study, examining their stated priorities and agendas. This is intended as a precursor to the main findings of the thesis, which examine how certain bureaucracies have operated within and impacted on South African-Japanese relations.

This chapter is anchored on two main points. The first involves a discussion of South Africa as an operating environment for Japanese agencies, and how they have had to adapt to working in South Africa. Issues of 'ownership' in aid discourse are discussed, and how this may impact upon the work done by Japanese aid agencies in the country.

The second point discusses a proposed South African – Japanese Economic Partnership agreement, and the concerns, perceptions and policies of the various role-players involved, including the South African Customs Union [SACU] secretariat. During the study it emerged that this bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement had been proposed by the Japanese government, but had not been successful. This was subsequently taken up as one of the major issues of the study, and it was possible to develop a clearer picture of how the decision making process unfolded, who the key players were, and why the ultimate decision was made not to take up the EPA.

Chapter 5 is the conclusion. It briefly recaps the major findings, and discusses their theoretical implications, as well as the implications for future Japan – South African relations. It also makes some tentative recommendations as to future courses for organizations on both sides, as well as possible future avenues of study that have emerged from the thesis.
Chapter 2: Theoretical and conceptual issues

This chapter introduces the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings upon which the rest of the thesis is constructed. It begins with a discussion of the chief competing paradigms in International Relations, namely Realism, Liberalism and Critical Theory. It then moves on to a discussion of the Bureaucratic Policy Process model, which is foregrounded due to its importance to this thesis.

Next, the chapter reviews some of the most popular claims and assumptions in the field of Japanese foreign policy analysis. This is done by presenting the debate between the three main models of Japan's foreign policy: Japan as a 'reactive state', a 'neo-mercantilist state' or a 'middle-power'. Conveniently, these three models each fall within a different major paradigm. The reactive state model borrows heavily from liberal notions of domestic actors and institutionalism. Neo-mercantilism has been developed by realists to account for problems with the conventional, structural realist account of Japanese foreign policy, while the notion of Japan as a middle power has the flavour of critical theory, based upon its development as a 'map' for Japan to chart a course within the hegemony of the United States.

Following this review of the debate between the major models of Japanese foreign policy, the implications of these theoretical issues for this thesis are assessed. The only theoretical model that is explicitly and continuously adopted for the purposes of this thesis is the bureaucratic policy process model, although specific elements of the various models are highlighted for examination in later sections of the thesis.

2.1 Realism

In his chronological survey of international political theory, Hedley Bull discusses the rise to prominence of the realists during the 1930s and 1940s. He argues that this was broadly as a reaction to liberal approaches, which had fallen out of favour as appearing naïve during the violent international environment of the 1930s and 1940s. In Bull’s account, realists sought to “rediscover the lessons of the past…the positive functions of state sovereignty, secret diplomacy, the balance of power and limited war” (Bull 1972: 60).
These “lessons of the past” were first expounded by writers such as Thucydides of ancient Greece, and Machiavelli of Italy, so they were by no means original to the 20th century. However, in the early and mid-20th century they came into vogue again as a way of thinking about international relations.

How, then, do realists perceive the world? Steve Smith states that “[f]or realists, the international political sphere is one of necessity, regularity and danger” (Smith 1995: 10). Realists subscribe to a view that the world is an anarchic and dangerous environment in which states must all strive to further their interests in the face of hostile competition. As Forde puts it, “among states, power is the predominant currency and self-interest the predominant motivation” (Forde 1995: 143).

In the realist account, states are autonomous, rational and self-interested entities, who seek to maximize their own power. At best, any state hopes to achieve domination of the world order. At worst, it wishes to simply avoid annihilation by its rivals.

It should be understood that there is some nuance to this rather pessimistic view of the international order. Smith notes that:

“[S]ome classical realists, such as Kennan, Morgenthau and Niebuhr, did sometimes speak of the international sphere as one suitable for moral reasoning, but they also spoke of the preponderance of power-political considerations and warned against the dangers of a moral foreign policy.” (1995: 10)

In other words, morals are all very well, but ultimately they are superseded by state interests. Of course, states do co-operate with each other from time to time. Realists do not deny this. However, in a realist account, they only co-operate with each other to the extent that their interests dictate. This notion is encapsulated in the words of the British statesman Lord Palmerston: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow” (Henry John Temple 1848, quoted in Heath 1969).

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4 See Forde (1995) for a discussion of Machiavelli and Thucydides’ respective takes on realism.
One of the consequences of realist thinking is that it results in an account of states that are all highly similar. There may be superficial differences, but in reality all states are driven by the same motives, and have the same ultimate nature – that of a self-serving unit, beholden to no one but themselves. They may vary in capabilities – one state may be a strong hegemon, while another may be a weak vassal – but they ultimately have much the same motives and tools. It is merely their relative ability to impose their will in any given situation that varies from state to state.

As Linklater explains, this relationship between capabilities and functions was elaborated on extensively by the structural or neo-realist Kenneth Waltz, but for the time being it is important to highlight the notion that for realists, states differ primarily not in their motives but in their abilities and powers (Linklater 1995: 253).

Ultimately, a realist posits a world in which all states strive to further their own interests. Cooperation and institutions may emerge, but these never supersede the laws of self-interest.

Post-war Japan has been viewed as a particular challenge to realism, due to its seeming lack of interest in deepening its military capacities (Heginbotham and Samuels 1998). In response to this problem, realists such as Heginbotham and Samuels (1998) have deployed an alternative explanation known as neo-mercantilism. Neo-mercantilists hold that Japan's behaviour can still be understood as realist provided one confines this to the economic realm. Their argument is that post-war Japan no longer sees power in terms of military capabilities but as a function of economic power. As a result, Japan's behaviour, while seemingly atypical, is in fact driven by the desire to maximise its economic capabilities and to protect its domestic economy and industrial base.

2.2 Liberalism

As a theoretical basis liberalism is an extremely wide departure point, which means that using it as a theoretical construct requires extreme parsimony and care. Indeed, Jorgensen notes that liberalism is such a broad field of thought that “some simply identify liberalism with Western civilization” (Jorgensen 2010: 57).
However, even when one confines the discussion to issues of international relations theory, liberalism remains a “rich tradition of thought” (Jørgensen 2010: 57). Indeed, Jørgensen identifies at least three strands of liberalism in international relations theory. These are interdependence liberalism, republican liberalism and neo-liberal institutionalism (Jørgensen 2010: 63–65).

Each of these has significant depth, and there is inadequate space to fully unpack all these aspects of liberalism here. However, it may be possible to briefly highlight some of the key features of liberal theory in international relations.

For the purposes of this discussion, there are two elements of liberalism that need to be highlighted. The first is its philosophical emphasis on progress. The second, and perhaps the most important, is its explanatory emphasis on the linkages between sub-national politics, and international politics. This second element is significant due to its implications for the value of a bureaucratic analysis in assessing foreign policy.

Philosophically, liberal approaches to IR are normative, rather than explanatory. Liberalism is based on a fundamental notion of progress and improvement in human affairs. That is not to say that liberalism holds progress as a given, but rather that liberalism holds that humans can “obtain progressively better collective outcomes” (Sterling-Folker 2006: 55).

Indeed, for Sterling-Folker, liberalism is “the exploration of what prevents progress from being achieved, with the underlying assumption being that progress could be realized if we could uncover the barriers to collective action and promote their resolutions” (2006: 55).

The second underpinning element of liberal IR theory lies in the way that it treats states. Liberal IR theory emphasises the genesis of state policy and interests by appealing to the interest groups, organizations and institutions that affect or generate policy.

For Moravcsik, “The central insight distinguishing Liberal international relations theory is that states are embedded in domestic and international civil society…which places structural constraints on the behaviour of the state by shaping the underlying preferences on which its foreign policy is based” (1992: 22).
Similarly, Jorgensen explains that “liberals focus on state-society linkages and claim the existence of a close connection between on the one hand domestic institutions and politics and on the other international politics. These two spheres…do not exist separately and should not be analysed separately” (2010: 58).

In the liberal case, states are not the only actors worth considering. Indeed, according to some theorists, it is not clear that they can be meaningfully thought of as autonomous actors at all. Moravcsik argues that “[T]he state is not an actor but a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors” (2008: 518).

Consequently, in the liberal analysis states are no longer internally inscrutable entities that differ only in their external properties – rather, they each have their own attributes, all of which arise from the demands of the various groups and individuals that reside within them. This is particularly important in light of the concept of bureaucratic policy processes in international relations, which also seeks to challenge the notion of the state-as-monolith. The value of this aspect of liberal theory lies in how well it links with a bureaucratic policy process analysis of South African-Japanese relations. After all, Moravcsik's “social actors” (2008: 518) could well include the different agencies and organizations of and within the South African and Japanese government.

As is explained further on, one of the most prominent models of Japan – that of the “reactive state” - resonates with the liberal perspective on statehood, institutionalism and the way in which social actors generate policy.

2.3 Critical Theory

Bohman (2005) identifies critical theory as having both “a narrow and a broad meaning in philosophy and in the history of the social sciences.” He discusses the history of critical theory in the ‘narrow sense’, as originating in the Frankfurt School, a group of Marxist thinkers and scholars from Western Europe. Beginning in 1929 with the opening of the Institute for Social Research, Bohman explains that the notion of critical theory originated in this Frankfurt School, but came to encompass a broad family of social science theories, all of which shared a couple of basic tenets.
In its broad sense critical theory can be thought of as a set of theoretical approaches which both interrogate and reject the underlying assumptions of received theories, such as realism and liberalism. This is not a 'miscellaneous' category. Rather, it is a family of theories oriented on the notion that “theories of the social world can have the ideological effect of aiding the perpetuation of arrangements that benefit some members of humanity while disadvantaging others” (Linklater 2007: 55). Examples of these theories include neo-Marxism and feminism.

In effect, the argument of critical theory is that conventional theories both reproduce and perpetuate themselves by failing to interrogate the world of IR in a normative sense. For example, by assuming the existence of anarchy and struggle between states as a given, realist theories in fact help to perpetuate such a system. This is closely linked to the notion of ‘knowledge’ abetting power, in a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Robert Cox, one of the major critical theorists, famously claimed that “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (1981: 128).

One of the fundamental distinctions that Robert Cox attempts to make is that between problem-solving, on the one hand, and critical theory, on the other. In his account, problem-solving theory “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action” (Cox 1981: 128).

From this, it attempts to “make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble...the general pattern of institutions and relationships is not called into question” (Cox 1981: 129).

For Cox, this was problematic, and he argued for an alternative approach, which would question the validity of these “institutions and relationship[s]” (Cox 1981: 129). As Linklater explains:

“Cox argued that problem-solving approaches take the world for granted and ask how it can be made to function as smoothly as possible. This method informs neo-realism, which maintains that international anarchy is unalterable which asks how order can be maintained in the face of geopolitical competition and rivalry...By contrast, critical
theory asks how current global arrangements came into being and whether they are changing, not least because of political contestation and struggle” (Linklater 1995: 55).

Similarly, Bieler and Morton state that “Rather than a problem-solving preoccupation with the maintenance of social power relationships, a critical theory of hegemony directs attention to questioning the prevailing order of the world” (Bieler and Morton 2004: 86).

Linklater has coined the term “emancipatory project” (1995: 48), to describe this process of challenging and questioning the status quo. This “emancipatory project” is at the heart of critical theory.

Another key contributor to the field of critical theory is Alexander Wendt, one of the foundational scholars in the field of social constructivism. First coming into vogue in the 1980s, social constructivism was seen as an intellectual response to the new, “fluid and open” realities of the post-Cold War era (Jackson and Sorensen 2013: 209 – 210). In his pivotal and much cited paper on this theory, Alexander Wendt (1992) discusses the way in which the concept of national self-help within an anarchic system is an institution, which has arisen from previous state interactions and experiences. For Wendt, an institution is “a stable set or “structure” of identities and interests” (1992: 399), and self-help, as presented by realists, is one of these institutions. Consequently, instead of accepting self-help as an a priori necessity, Wendt argues that it represents an institutionalised response to the problem of an anarchic society. For Wendt, there are three different ways in which anarchy can become institutionalised: The Hobbesian anarchy of all-against-all, the Lockean anarchy of equal but sovereign nations, and finally the Kantean anarchy, in which different states work together towards an equal and free society. None of these types of anarchy are a given fact of the international world. Rather, they arise out of the collective reality that states construct, by their responses to the world. In effect, the (anarchic) world is not ‘as states find it’. Rather, it is “what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992).

As a critical theorist and neo-Marxist, Cox’ chief preoccupation is with hegemony, the ways in which it shapes discourse, and how it might be challenged. This, in turn, is based on the works of Antonio Gramsci, the early 20th Century Marxist. As Gupta explains, Gramsci was reacting to the rise of fascism in Italy, and sought to understand how such a defeat for Communism could have taken place. Consequently:
“It is this...idea of hegemony that provides the key to Gramsci's formulation that the strength of a system lies not in the apparatus of violence, but in the acceptance by the ruled of a conception of the world which belongs to the rulers and which, filtered through a series of layers of consciousness, emerges as the common sense” (Gupta 1988: 1621).

This approach is deeply rooted in the logic of ‘historical materialism’, which, as Cox explains, [by contrast with the realist perspective],” has a concern with the relationship between the state and civil society” (1981: 134). Cox has adopted this notion from Gramsci’s thought, and indeed, he writes that: “Gramsci contrasts historical materialism, which recognises the efficacy of ethical and cultural sources of political action, with what he called historical economism or the reduction of everything to historical and material interests” (1981:134)

As Bieler and Morton (2003) point out, Cox’s work is strongly influenced by Gramsci’s notions of hegemony. In his seminal paper Social Forces, States and World Orders – Beyond International Relations theory, Robert Cox discusses at length the connection between “social forces”, “forms of state” and “world orders” (1981). One of the central elements of his argument is that “Changes in the organization of production generate new social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure of states; and the generalisation of changes in the structure of states alters the problematic of world order” (Cox 1981: 138).

Cox is not presenting a linear account of international relations, however, and he stresses that “The relationship among the three levels is not, however, simply unilinear” (Cox 1981: 138). Rather, it is a multi-directional effect. States may respond to international events by reorganising themselves, which can lead to the unleashing of new social forces. Alternatively, new technology can lead to new modes of production, which results in a restructuring of society, and thus a new international world order.

One of the best examples, for Cox, is:

“the incorporation of the industrial workers...as participants within western states from late-Nineteenth century, accentuated the movement of these states toward economic nationalism and imperialism...which brought about a fragmentation of the world
economy and a more conflictual phase of international relations” (Cox 1988: 138).

Within this framework, Cox argues for a ‘triangle of forces’, comprised of ideas, material capabilities and institutions. These three elements interact with each other in a multidirectional fashion (Cox 1981: 135 - 136). None can be stated to be analytically prior, but for the sake of this discussion, it is institutions that are of particular interest. For Cox, “Institutionalization is a means of stabilising and perpetuating a particular order” (1981: 136). Institutions “reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations” (136).

Importantly, “there is a close connection between institutionalization and what Gramsci calls hegemony” (137).

In addition to developing critical theory, Robert Cox has also made significant contributions to theoretical discussions of Japanese foreign policy. Cox has appropriated notions of 'middlepowership' in order to consider how Japan might relate to an American hegemony, either by supporting it or, conversely, by challenging it via carving out an alternative path within the ‘world order’.

As is explained later on, Cox’ discussion of Japan as a middle power is not merely categorising it as 'neither big nor small'. Rather, he is seeking a specific analysis of Japan's potential role within (or against) the current world order. He explicitly discusses and analyses several separate future scenarios in the light of world hegemony, and their implications for its continuation or failure.

2.4 The Bureaucratic Policy Process

In *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* Graham T. Allison (1971) dissects the Cuban Missile Crisis using different theoretical models. The value of this process comes from his ability to make cogent observations about the predictions and explanatory value of the different models by applying them to the same questions around US decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The first model, the Rational Actor Model, is well known. In this model states are presented as a unitary body that makes choices in a unified, rational fashion. They seek to maximise their gains, and they use such tools as they have at their disposal to do so (Allison 1971: 10–12).

This model has its advantages. In particular, it provides an easy 'short cut' when thinking about why certain options were chosen, or not. It allows researchers and analysts to quickly consider what a given government is likely to do in a certain situation, and enables the generation of neat narratives of actual and possible events. As Allison explains, in the context of international military strategy “it provides an inexpensive approximation by letting the analyst think about what he would do if he were the enemy” (Allison 1971: 19).

However, Allison also presents alternative models. These two models are the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Policy Model. They both seek to explain the actions of any given state as the aggregate result of the bureaucracies and agencies that comprise it, although they emphasize different aspects of these governmental sub-units.

The implications of this point are significant. In the broader theoretical paradigm, this places both these models squarely within the liberal paradigm. This kind of model largely derives its basic postulates from liberalism. A realist perspective tends to discount sub-state actors, due to the modelling of the state as a single unified actor. However, a liberal theory of international relations considers sub-state groups as essential actors, and their behaviour is an indispensable part of explaining the behaviour of the state. Consequently, it is possible to trace a direct lineage from the liberalism as an overarching paradigm, to the bureaucratic policy process as a theoretical model. As Welch points out:

“The crucial respect in which Model II represents a revision of Model I, therefore, is its understanding that governmental behavior is constrained by the routines of the organizations of which the government is composed” (Welch 1992: 117).

Historically, this kind of approach is heavily informed by earlier research into organizational choices, processes and dynamics. This began in management and business studies that attempted to explain how firms made decisions as a result of internal dynamics. These studies were subsequently expanded on and applied to international relations. The 20th century giant
of social science Herbert Simon is widely credited with developing some of the key ideas that would lead to this mode of analysis (Hudson and Vore 1995: 211, Allison 1971: 71).

In his critique of Allison's work, Freedman explains that “In Model II, or the Organizational Process Model, policy is seen to be the output of large, inertial organizations” (Freedman 1976: 435).

However, as he points out, this Model later ends up being effectively merged with Model III, the Bureaucratic Policy Process, stating that “the...alternatives appear to have been narrowed down...with Model II having suffered a take-over bid from Model III” (Freedman 1976: 435). Indeed, in another paper by Allison and Halperin, they simply speak of “a bureaucratic politics model”, having comfortably folded the two into one (1972: 43). This is perfectly allowable, as the differences between them are not large. Model III seeks to emphasise policy as the outcome of an active, contested political bargaining process between different agencies and interest groups, whereas Model II concentrates on stylistic concerns – how the different bureaucratic styles, approaches and processes affect policy formation. In other words, the differences are a matter of emphasis – the bureaucracies as actors versus the bureaucracies as institutions.

Consequently, it is acceptable for us to accept this merger, and proceed using the Bureaucratic Policy Process Model.

One key feature of this approach is the emphasis it places on the specificities of any given situation. To understand a decision, one must understand the decision makers who make it and the context in which they operate. As Hudson and Vore explain “First and foremost, the decision-making approach of [Foreign Policy Analysis] breaks apart the monolithic view of nation-states as unitary actors” (Hudson and Vore 1995: 210).

Similarly to Hudson and Vore's notion of 'breaking apart the monolith', Hilsman deploys an extended metaphor of states as 'boxes' to explain the bureaucratic policy model. In the Rational Actor Model:

“[T]he analyst does not need to know what goes on inside the boxes. Working outside the boxes, analysts can deduce the nature of their intentions from how they act on the
world scene and so design policies for their own state to counter the movies the others
or to adjust and adapt to them. Some scholars, however, have been unhappy...and have
opened up the boxes to see if a better explanation of state behavior can be developed by
studying what goes on inside” (Hilsman 1990: 53).

Hilsman then goes on to discuss what happens when an analyst opens the American and
British 'boxes', and the implications that this has for foreign policy analysis of these two states
(1990: 53). Thus, many actions can be explained in terms of the sub-national individual or
agency that carries it out, rather than as another decision by the unified state.

Aside from the fact that many actions are carried out by sub-national groups with their own
organizational styles, it is also important to recognize that policy is very often the result of a
bargaining process between different bureaucracies and agencies. Agencies have their own,
specific interests and agendas. These include “maintaining autonomy and organizational
morale, protecting the organization's essence, maintaining or expanding roles or missions, and
maintaining and increasing budgets.” (Allison and Halperin 1972: 48)

Additionally, “[m]embers of an organization come to believe that the health of the
organization is vital to the national interest. The health of the organization, in turn, is seen to
depend on maintaining influence, fulfilling its mission, and securing the necessary
capabilities” (Allison and Halperin 1972: 48). Finally, they often “come to see different faces
of the issue” (Allison and Halperin 1972: 48). As a result, these different organizations with
different priorities and perspectives will be forced into a bargaining process, the outcome of
which strongly shapes or decides what policies will be adopted.

Of course, a government is a hierarchical structure, but it is not perfectly so, and high level
decision makers can be utterly frustrated by bureaucracies and agencies lower down in the
system. The important point to understand is that decisions made by national leaders must still
be carried out and executed by departments and bureaucracies that can and do thwart higher
level decisions, either intentionally or as a result of simple disinterest and resistance to a
policy that may not align with their agendas or interests. Even where there is no particular
controversy over a course of action, it must still be implemented by bureaucracies which all
bring their own concerns and issues to the process. In a bureaucratic policy analysis of the
American decision-making process in the time frame leading up to the first Gulf War, Holland
points out that while President George H Bush had very specific objectives and ideas about the war, these still had to be transmitted and executed via the chain of bureaucracy. In her own words, “even where there is minimal slippage between a president's choice and its implementation, the [bureaucratic policy process] model alerts us to the efforts the president must go through to get the executive bureaucracies to deliver” (Holland 1999: 221 – 222).

In short, bureaucratic power often goes beyond simply frustrating or facilitating the decisions of heads of state. A vast amount of policy is generated by decisions made within agencies and bureaucracies. Bureaucracies often make key decisions, either because such decisions have been effectively ceded to them by default, or because making such decisions falls explicitly within their remit as laid down in applicable legislation.

Beyond the contested bargaining process, and the very real power of the bureaucracy, another key concept in this type of analysis is that of bounded rationality. In the classical model the actor is always rational, and always chooses the best option for maximising their preferences after thoroughly evaluating every option available. However, this is not in fact how human decision-making really works. Always engaging in a perfectly rational, exhaustive and thorough evaluation of all choices is the kind of behaviour that we might expect from Spock of Star Trek fame, rather than a human being. Rather, the first 'good enough' option is usually chosen, often after a short and hasty period of evaluation. This system is known as satisficing, and it is largely driven by the fact that decision makers operate in real time, with limited opportunities to evaluate multiple options. As Hudson and Vore (1995: 211) put it, “People satisfice rather than optimize”.

Hilsman presents a good example of this kind of analysis in his discussion of the chain of events within the US government that led to the dropping of the atomic bomb at the end of World War 2.

Hilsman makes the initially counter-intuitive argument that the 'decision' to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was not really a 'national decision' at all, but rather the outcome of pure bureaucratic momentum and inertia. Within the logic of the US government at the time, once there was a bomb, the next logical action was to drop it. According to Hilsman there was no serious debate or consideration of the matter within the US government – the bomb had been constructed, so the next question was “Where to drop it?” as opposed to “Should we drop it?”
The building of the bomb was a matter for serious consideration that concluded with an important decision by President Roosevelt, whereas the use of the bomb was largely seen as a technical matter that was dealt with by a committee who spent most of their time considering the most appropriate location for its use (Hilsman 1990: 66 – 68).

These two examples are instructive. They both neatly undermine the central decision maker hypothesis of the Rational Actor Model.

With Hilsman's history of the decision to drop of the atomic bomb, we can see how bureaucratic inertia and momentum can simply carry through a certain course of action, in the absence of any clear higher level directives.

### 2.4.1 Limitations of the bureaucratic policy process

Having established the value of the bureaucratic policy process model, it is important to understand its limitations. Despite exciting analyses such as those by Hilsman and Allison, it is important not to overstate the explanatory value of this approach. As Iwanaga notes, "the bureaucratic model of decision making has suffered from a variety of critiques" (1993: 20). One of the first problems that arise is that this model has been developed and used extensively within an American context. Freedman points out that:

"[A]nalysts examining other industrial countries will find this model extremely culture-bound." (Freedman 1976: 436). This is a significant issue, which cannot be dismissed lightly. This paradigm cannot be transposed in an orderly or easy fashion, as large amounts of the work done in this field is only valid in its original context. Studies on, say, the culture of the US State Department have minimal relevance in a discussion of Japanese – South African relations. Consequently, using this model in a new context will require caution, and it will be necessary to be restrained about the conclusions that are developed using this approach.

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5 Hilsman claims that “1 hour of a 6 hour session was devoted to the question of dropping bombs on Japan”(1990: 67). He then presents a potted history of the Manhattan Project in which he contrasts the 'national decision' to make the bomb, which was characterized by vigorous discussion, lobbying and a final definitive decision by President Roosevelt with the almost perfunctory nature of the 'decision' (or non-decision) on whether to drop the bomb (Hilsman 1990: 66 – 68).
It should be mentioned at this point that this element of the bureaucratic policy process has already been theoretically predicted by liberalism. As mentioned earlier, liberal theorists see the state as being subject to the various interest groups and organizations that comprise it. This emphasis on the sub-units that comprise the state means that liberal theorists necessarily vest a great deal of importance in understanding the specificities of any given state. Consequently, it is unsurprising that this same issue has emerged within the bureaucratic policy process. Specificity is a key element of the liberal paradigm and its sub-theories.

Another issue is the bureaucratic policy model's disregard for the importance of executive decision-making. Although this critique has been developed within the American context, this issue undoubtedly carries over to other political systems. Even though bureaucracies must a) carry out executive decisions and b) sometimes get to make them (as Hilsman points out), the simple fact is that bureaucracies are not usually delegated to make key decisions in foreign policy matters. Indeed, as Iwanaga notes, it has been suggested that the more important the decision, the more likely it is to be directly a matter for the President (or other top decision maker). By contrast, bureaucrats usually have greater autonomy in less important matters (Iwanaga 1993: 22).

Of course, Hilsman challenges this notion with his account of the 'decision' to drop the atomic bomb. However, it is possible to argue that this is not in fact an adequate counter-example. The 'decision' to drop the bomb became automatic because Roosevelt did not pay particular attention to the issue. It is precisely because the President did not intervene and make a "national decision" (Hilsman 1990: 66 - 68) that it became a matter for the bureaucracy. In effect, there was no 'national decision' because the President did not choose to make a second 'national decision'.

A second set of problems lies in the practicality of using this approach. In order to understand a decision or policy, the theory goes, we need to understand the bureaucracies involved in. However, gaining the kind of insight and understanding of these policies that will allow us to ascertain, with confidence, how the nature of these bureaucracies led to the nature of the policies involved is a challenging task. It requires deep insight into bureaucratic policies, cultures, objectives, agendas and interests. Ascertaining these is a complex task, and working from there to an explanation of specific policies and actions adds an entire new layer of complexity.
In order to handle these issues, it has been necessary to refrain from making overly definitive conclusions about the bureaucracies involved. Rather than attempting to ascertain bureaucratic agendas, objectives and interests, it has become necessary to consider bureaucratic dynamics. By this, I refer to the interactions, linkages and relationships between the different organizations involved. Additionally, by understanding their stated priorities and how they intend on pursuing them, it becomes possible to learn about these bureaucracies without overreaching in the conclusions that can be developed about them.

2.5 Model 1: Japan as the reactive state

It is necessary to preface this discussion of the “reactive state” model of Japan by briefly explaining its genesis within the liberal paradigm. Naturally, the debate over Japan as a reactive or proactive state does not entirely fall within the liberal theoretical paradigm. Potter and Sueo (2003: 321) cite Green (2001), for example, as weighing in on the debate with the conclusion that Japanese foreign policy is that of reluctant realism.

However, the explanations for Japan's reactivity, as put forward by Kent Calder, owe a great deal to liberal models of the state and its institutions. As mentioned previously, liberal theorists often view the state as a complex array of actors and forces, which seek to control the state apparatus for their own ends (Moravcsik 2008: 518). Consequently, many of the explanations for Japan's alleged reactivity bear a strong liberal institutionalist flavour, and this results in the location of this theory within the liberal paradigm. Calder's method is fairly clear – he observes a phenomenon (Japan's reactivity) and he seeks explanations for it within Japan's institutions and internal politics.

In the scholarly literature, one of the most powerful explanatory theories of Japanese foreign policy is that put forward by Calder of Japan as a reactive state. In a discussion of Japanese economic policy, Calder characterises the reactive state as responding to external pressure or gaiatsu, rather than generating its own initiatives due to its own strategic impulses. Specifically, "the state fails to undertake major independent foreign economic policy initiatives when it has the power and national incentives to do so; and (2) it responds to outside pressures for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely" (Calder 1988: 519).
Calder is not claiming that Japan never acts strategically, or that it acts without concern for its own interests. However, he is arguing that Japan very rarely generates any major initiatives. Rather, it waits until external events or pressures require it to respond. Calder notes that small European and East Asian states are often seen as reactive, but that Japan is a significant outlier – its historical and demographic profile, in Calder's view, is closer to that of states such as Germany, rather than Austria or Taiwan. In a careful comparison, he notes that “the Japanese state has been consistently more cautious in taking international initiatives than most major European governments” (Calder 1988: 520). Consequently, its hesitation to combine its demographic and economic strength into forceful international diplomacy was a source of some confusion for observers of Japan's trajectory through the Cold War. Indeed, during the 1970s and 1980s it appeared possible that Japan was about to begin forging an aggressive, independent path, and would emerge as a world power, with a substantially larger military and possibly even nuclear weapons. However, despite being one of the largest world economies for some decades, Japan has never made such a transition.

Calder does acknowledge that this general lack of initiative is offset by a certain flexibility, which allows Japan to respond when external pressures become significant. This is facilitated by the existence of 'cross-cutting interests' in which domestic groups make alliances with international groups. Calder cites Japanese flexibility over trade negotiations with the US as support for this notion. "On the one hand, it finds independent initiatives difficult. Yet, on the other hand, it is often pragmatically flexible under outside pressure" (Calder 1988: 537).

It is important to note that Calder's explanation of the reactive state is centred on Japanese foreign economic policy. However, the concept of Japan as a reactive state has gained popularity among analysts in the field, with papers being written on various aspects of Japan as a reactive state in fields such as maritime strategy (Manicom 2010) and bilateral relations with Vietnam (Hirata 1998). Indeed, as Hirata notes “The dominant view of Japan's international behavior is that it is essentially reactivist” (Hirata 1998: 1). At this stage it is worth noting that not all analysts are entirely convinced by Calder's account of Japan's reactive state – indeed, Hirata (1998) specifically challenges the notion that Japan is particularly reactive in its relations with Vietnam, arguing that Japanese policy only shifted from an initial period of proactivity to a reactive mode due to pressure from the United States.
In a more recent discussion of Japan's foreign policy, Calder (2003: 606) lists four major explanations for it being a reactive state. The first three are all internal to Japan, and are essentially variations on the theme of political culture and institutions giving rise to Japanese foreign policy being reactive. The last is external, in that it claims that Japan's reactive nature is a product of its environment.

The first explanation holds that, following the brutal defeat of Japan in World War 2, Japanese popular sentiment towards international relations has becoming retiring and pacifist, eschewing an assertive, major international role.

The second is institutionalist, and it points to the Japanese Constitution and the structure of the military as the major causes for Japan's lack of international assertiveness.

The "third, constructivist school of interpretation provides a hybrid explanation, emphasizing institutionalized norms that allegedly determine the parameters of foreign-policy behavior and domestic foreign-policy debates" (Calder 2003: 606).

Finally, the last argument that Calder presents is partially external to Japan, in that it holds that the international environment keeps Japan from undertaking major initiatives, in conjunction with the institutionalist argument noted earlier (Calder 2003: 607).

Clearly, a significant number of the conventional explanations involve Japanese institutions and society. What, then, are these institutions, and how do they keep Japan in a reactive state? According to Calder, one of the most important domestic causes for Japan being a reactive state is that "the fragmented character of state authority in Japan makes decisive action more difficult than in countries with strong chief executives, such as the United States or Fifth-Republic France" (Calder 1988: 528).

Calder acknowledges the power of MITI and the Ministry of Finance (1988: 529), but argues that this is limited to specific areas where they have clear authority and technical proficiency. By contrast, "on broad, complex questions of economic management...ministerial jurisdiction is often unclear, and internal conflict over how to proceed is often strong" (Calder 1988: 529).
One of the major elements of the constructivist explanation lies in the Japanese electoral system. The Japanese electoral system is designed in such a fashion that it favours politicians who can consistently cobble together small groups of supporters into an alliance. This makes it crucial that politicians remain responsive to their electorates, and encourages politicians to forge alliances with interest groups. Calder explains that

"Japan's system of medium size electoral districts forces as many as five members of the largest political parties...to run against one another in the same electoral district; thus, extremely small shifts in the total vote become critical to a candidate's election prospects. As a result, LDP legislators tend to be highly sensitive to constituency pressure, especially from relatively well-organized grassroots pressure groups such as agriculture and small businesses" (Calder 1988: 530 – 531).

This issue abuts directly onto a second but related cause, which is the limited foreign policy expertise of top politicians. As noted, the most prominent and powerful Japanese politicians tend to specialise in domestic politics and interest groups. This effect naturally becomes prominent at the Prime Ministerial level, with most incumbents having limited foreign policy expertise.

As mentioned previously, the last reason put forward for Japanese reactivity involves its external environment. This is not exclusively external to Japanese politics – rather, "it is the degree of stability that prevails in the world surrounding Japan, and how favorable the actions of major foreign powers such as the United States and China are to Japanese interests" (Calder 2003: 607) in conjunction with the fact that "Japanese institutions are so poorly suited for proactive foreign policy" (Calder 2003: 607) that results in Japan maintaining its reactive state. As a result, this claim cannot be said to be purely external, but rather another hybrid school of thought – it is Japan's environment, in conjunction with its institutional inertia, that results in its reactivity.

Calder assesses Japan's continued existence as a reactive state in a more recent paper, written in 2003. He argues that Japan is in a transitional period, and that the reactive state has come under pressure. Among other causes for this he argues that "A new electoral system, in place since 1994, is giving politicians strong incentives to cultivate broad popular support, and to do so through active foreign-policy initiatives" (Calder 2003: 611).
In this vein Calder points to various Japanese initiatives as examples of deviations from the reactive state. For example, Japan is the single largest aid donor in Asia, and was the first country to resume development assistance to China post-Tiananmen Square, despite US unhappiness over this. Additionally, Japan attempted to start an Asian Monetary Fund in 1997, although this initiative was abandoned as a result of pressure from the US (Calder 2003: 611 – 612).

He argues that despite these failures of national government led foreign policy initiatives, NGO, local government and big business foreign policy initiatives have been somewhat more successful.

However, Calder concludes that despite these developments, and despite the transitional nature of Japanese politics, "the dominant pattern in Japan’s relations with Asia at the national level remains a more futile one of reactive diplomacy and stalled initiatives" (Calder 2003: 614).

This is primarily for domestic reasons. "Just as the reactive-state literature has long maintained, the important remaining constraints on Japanese diplomacy, as the burden of history recedes, are Japan’s own domestic institutions" (Calder 2003: 614).

However, this is not to dismiss the importance of US pressure:

"U.S. diplomacy can usually forestall Japanese initiatives and force Japan back into the paradigm of the reactive state, to the extent that the United States moves to preempt or to oppose nascent Japanese initiatives...Where U.S. opposition is absent, however, it is much easier and more attractive politically for Japan today to become more proactive than usual" (Calder 2003: 615 – 616).

If read correctly, the reactive state literature is convincing, although it has come under attack by various analysts as being incomplete or inadequate. For example, Hirata (1998) argues that while the reactive model is valid some of the time, it has been overused, and fails to adequately deal with counter-examples.
“The main problem with the reactivist model is its premise that changes in Japanese foreign policy occur only as a result of *gaiatsu*. This model neglects proactive policy initiatives by Japan and instead postulates that the reactive, passive, minimalist style prevails at all times any places. Previous studies, however, prove that Japan does indeed take indigenous initiative to pursue its interests” (Hirata 1998: 6).

Hirata's criticism in this area is, perhaps, somewhat harsh. A model of Japan as a reactive state does not have to hold that Japan is always reactive, all the time. Indeed, Calder laces his discussion of his model with caveats (Calder 1989). It is perfectly coherent to view Japan as a *mostly* reactive, or *usually* reactive, without denying the existence of interruptions to, or departures from the reactive state.

Of more consequence, perhaps, is Hirata's argument that

> “Another significant problem of the reactivist model is its failure to clearly delineate Japanese foreign policy at times when Japan does not face *gaiatsu*, particularly from the United States” (Hirata 1998: 7).

This critique is perhaps more convincing, given that while Japan does undoubtedly come under pressure from the US, this is not always the case. Attempting to account for Japan's foreign policies and actions in areas where the US is not involved may require looking further afield for other theoretical models. TICAD presents a particular case. Although past Japanese aid projects have been notionally linked to its role in the US led Cold War alliance, it is not clear at all that current Japanese aid is tied to US aspirations or projects on the continent.

Aside from Hirata, there are additional challenges to the reactive model, many of them coming from the first decade of the 21st century. Potter and Sueo (2003) summarise some of the key challenges in their paper “Japanese Foreign Policy: No Longer Reactive?” Among others, they cite scholars such as Hirata (1998), Hook *et al* (2001), Green (2001), Yeung (2001), and Miyashita and Sato (2001) as posing various challenges to the reactive state thesis. After reviewing these challenges, they consider a few alternative explanations for

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6 As noted previously, *gaiatsu* means external pressure.
Japanese foreign policy, ranging from Green's reluctant realism (2001), to quiet diplomacy (Hook et al 2001) to indirect leadership (Blechinger and Legewie 2000).

Many of the complaints of the 'proactive' school are similar to those advanced by Hirata. However, perhaps the one major thread that can be discerned is that these arguments often emphasise Japanese leadership in Asia as being different from that of the US hegemon, but by no means non-existent. These authors emphasise modes of Japanese diplomacy such as building consensus, quiet diplomacy behind the scenes and multilateralism. For example, Potter and Sueo select the following passage written by Dennis Yasutomo to highlight this:

“Japanese multilateral diplomacy in the late 1990s, though low-key, is not stagnant. We can still identify activism. The question is whether this activism constitutes leadership. If we define leadership as setting the international agenda and establishing the rules of the game, Japan has a long way to go. However, it can try to establish footholds in niches such as multilateral institutions, the Asian region, and the environment” (Yasutomo 1995: 145 quoted in Potter and Sueo 2003: 319).

However, despite these various explanations – including one from Green that holds that Japan is in fact pursuing a realist policy, albeit haltingly – Potter and Sueo note that there appears to be a clear consensus that Japan has not embarked on a path involving a vigorous and unified foreign policy. This is for two reasons. The first is financial:

"The enormous loss of domestic economic resources and the pressures created by massive official debt mean that there are fewer official economic resources to commit to foreign policy objectives, especially in the case of foreign aid. Japan lost its prestige position as the top bilateral donor to the USA in 2001, for the first time in a decade, a change with significance beyond development assistance itself." (Potter and Sueo 2003: 328)

Potter and Sueo note that this goes beyond merely constraining the amount of resources that can be applied to foreign policy. In their account, Japan has lost a great deal of prestige since the East Asian Miracle has been called into doubt. As is noted in Chapter 3, TICAD documentation holds up the Japanese model of development as a role model for developing
nations, but the longstanding stagnation of Japan's economy naturally makes such calls seem less than convincing.

The second reason is that Japan still lacks any clear domestic sources for a vigorous and unified foreign policy. The institutional and domestic issues that Calder and others have expounded upon in such depth still remain. Without changes in these factors, Japanese foreign policy will remain at best hindered, and at worst, paralysed.

Naturally, the reactive – proactive debate is not the only school of thought on Japanese foreign policy. There are alternative explanations for, and models of Japan's general foreign policy stance. The next model comes from the realist school of thought, and seeks to recast Japan's military diffidence as a result of its focus on economic might, rather than an abandonment of the independent pursuit of power.

2.6 Model 2: Japan as a neo-mercantilist state

As Heginbotham and Samuels (1998) point out, Japan's reactive state presents a challenge to structural or neo-realists, given its refusal to develop a military capability commensurate with its economic and technological status. They systematically undermine the structural realist model's applicability to Japan by dint of appeal to multiple counter-examples demonstrating that Japan has failed to develop a significant autonomous military capability. The implication of this failure to develop the military is significant. As Heginbotham and Samuel explain, according to structural realists "States prefer to maintain independent military capabilities" (1998: 174). In an anarchic environment, states that are capable of doing so prefer to forge their own militaries instead of relying upon their allies. After all, allies can potentially defect, and even the closest alliance can fracture or be found wanting in a crisis. In an uncertain world, a state can only truly rely on its own capabilities.

However, Heginbotham and Samuels are not challenging the structural realist argument in order to generate a constructivist or institutionalist account of Japan's reactive nature. Nor are they abandoning the realist paradigm altogether in order to develop an argument sited within a liberalist or critical theory space. Rather, they make the case for an alternative realist model, that of mercantile realism. In mercantile realism, economic strength and the maintenance of domestic manufacturing and an industrial base are the key goals of the state, which are often
pursued instead of greater military power. They argue that Japan has followed this strategy and has essentially abandoned military force as a major part of its strategic toolbox. They make this argument by appeal to a discussion of Japan's pursuit of close economic ties with China, despite the fact that China poses a potential military threat to Japan, as highlighted by perennial disputes over the Senkaku Islands, and the anti-Japanese rhetoric that inevitably follows.

There is certainly recent empirical evidence supporting their assertions that Japan has simultaneously pursued close economic ties with China, despite territorial disputes. Since Heginbotham and Samuels wrote their paper, Japanese – Chinese trade has not slacked off, and neither have the geopolitical disputes. As Calder (2003: 609) notes: "Following China’s entry into the World Trade Organization at the end of 2001, Japanese manufacturing investment began surging into China in unprecedented fashion, centering on the auto industry." Indeed, it would appear that this pattern has continued since then, with a major re-emergence of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue in 2012. China has also utilised its control of global rare earth metal supplies to exert pressure on Japan, with a temporary ban on exports of rare earth metals to Japan in 2010 (Armstrong 2011).

The Japanese government has responded to this Chinese manoeuvre by drafting a strategy that calls for seeking alternative supplies of rare earth metals in locations such as Africa and India, but despite this, there is no evidence that Japanese corporations are generally seeking to decrease their investments in China, or that Japanese policymakers intend on substantially decoupling the two economies. In fact, in 2011 Japanese FDI to China surged dramatically, by "nearly 50 per cent" (Dickie 2012).

This surge in investment took place after the Chinese engaged in rare metal production cuts due to the Senkaku Islands dispute, which provides supporting evidence for Heginbotham and Samuels' claim that Japanese policymakers do not generally seek to limit trade with China, despite geopolitical rivalries.

By contrast, when it comes to the United States, Heginbotham and Samuels argue that Japan maintains protectionist policies and trade barriers even when they risk harming their military alliance. Heginbotham and Samuels conclude their discussion of this phenomenon by stating that
"From the beginning of the U.S. occupation in 1945 until today, Japanese strategists have been more willing to accept U.S. military on their soil than they have U.S. bankers or manufacturers" (Heginbotham and Samuel 1998: 200).

This mercantile realism is perhaps the most significant realist perspectives on Japan's involvement in Africa, and it serves to provide a significant, alternative perspective to Calder's reactive state. Indeed, other analysts such as Nester (1991) have argued that:

“Japan's relationship with sub-Saharan Africa provides a textbook case study of its foreign policy toward every developing region. Tokyo has followed a "neomercantilist" strategy of concentrating on securing Japan's regional geoeconomic interests while skirting any political entanglements…The result is a classic dependency relationship whereby the African country increasingly relies on Japanese goods, services, and capital for its economic livelihood, while Tokyo minimizes its own potential dependence on that country by spreading its economic bets across the developing world” (Nester 1991: 31).

Where reactive state proponents generally see Japan as a being constrained by its internal institutions and political culture, realists in fact argue that it is still operating under the age old precepts of power-seeking and fear of its peers. However, they have recast 'power' as a matter of economic, rather than military might.

2.7 Model 3: Japan as a middle power

The last perspective on Japanese foreign policy is that of middlepowership. Robert Cox (1989)\(^8\) appropriates notions first developed by John Holmes in relation to Canada's role as a 'middle power'. Holmes argued that while nations such as the US and the Soviet Union had dominated the creation of the post-war international order, Canada had also been a role player in this system, and had influenced the state of the post-war international order in specific ways, most notably through supporting the establishment of mechanisms that would regulate and harmonise global relations in order to allow them to pursue their interests. This notion is perhaps best encapsulated by Cox' argument that:

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\(^8\) This perspective on Japan as a middle power is not unique to Cox, and Japan has been depicted as a middle power by other scholars such as Yoshihide Soeya (2012, 2005).
"International organization is a process, not a finality, and international law is one of its most important products. The middle power’s interest is to support this process, whether in the context of a hegemonic order or (even more vitally) in the absence of hegemony" (Cox 1989: 826 – 827).

It should be noted that for Cox this process can be clearly distinguished from the way in which hegemons seek to impose their will on the world. As he explains, “Commitment to the process of building a more orderly world system is quite different from seeking to impose an ideologically preconceived vision of the ideal world order” (Cox 1989: 827).

This distinction is important, for this particular discussion of Japan as a middle power can only clearly be understood in the context of Cox’ occupation with hegemony and world order as concepts within neo-Gramscian thought.

As a neo-Gramscian and critical theorist, Cox considers Japan as a potential middle power in order to ask how such a middle power might challenge hegemony within the current world system. In order to construct a ‘post-hegemonic world’, Cox argues that certain ‘normative goals’ need to be attained: “(1) greater social equity and (2) a greater diffusion of power” (1989: 834)

Where a hegemon seeks to mould world order to become aligned with its interests, middle powers are somewhat more modest – they wish to carve out a niche in this hegemony within which they can operate safely. International law is of value to middle powers because it creates a space within which they can operate and advocate for their own interests, without directly challenging powerful states that outstrip them in military and economic might (Cox 1989: 824).

Cox claims that middlepowership comes with certain requirements:

"An ability to stand a certain distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a sufficient degree of autonomy in relation to major powers, a commitment to orderliness and security in interstate relations and to the facilitation of orderly change in the world system are the critical elements for the fulfilment of the middle-power role" (Cox 1989: 826 – 827).
It is important to distinguish between Cox' notion of middlepowership as a matter of behaviour and goals, as opposed to middlepowership as a matter of size, wealth and concrete capabilities.

As Cornelissen notes:

“One approach to middlepowership lays emphasis on its enumerative components: a middle power is one that possesses a certain level of military and economic capability and on an international scale, occupies a middling position. A second, contrasting approach defines middle powers by what they do and their role in the international system, rather than by what they are. It accentuates in other words the behavioural aspects of states (Hamill and Lee, 2001)” (Cornelissen 2004: 4).

In this case, Cox is quite clearly taking the second approach. While he does discuss Japan's candidature as a middle power as a function of its military power and wealth, he in fact argues that Japanese capabilities are not in line with middlepowership – it is too rich and, in his estimation, too militarily powerful for this (1989: 837). Indeed, Cox goes so far as to say that “By no standard of capabilities can Japan be considered in the middle range” (Cox, 1989: 837).

Despite this, Cox (1989: 838) believes that Japan clearly has potential as a middle power. He believes that that the fundamental determinant of Japanese middlepowership (or otherwise) lies in its development assistance, United Nations initiatives and involvement in regional conflict resolution.

This is visible in two respects. The first is its lack of commitment to a significant military force. Japan's distancing from major conflicts is readily apparent, as the earlier discussion of its defensive military posture and limited direct involvement in the Gulf War demonstrate so clearly. The second is in its commitment and interest in international institutions (Cox 1989:

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9 Cox goes into some detail over how different accounting systems result in different values for Japanese military expenditure. I would argue that while Japan's military capabilities are quite large, this is almost incidental. This capability is more a function of Japan's wealth and technological sophistication rather than any coherent attempts at constructing significant military capabilities. 1% of GDP is a relatively small amount to spend on the military, but if that GDP is extremely large – as in Japan's case – then a powerful military is the ultimate result.
Perhaps the best general evidence for Japan's status as a middle power lies in its United Nations initiatives. Japan's record of United Nations activism and its relevance to Japanese diplomacy in Africa is briefly discussed in the literature review of this thesis, and is taken up by Cornelissen (2004) in her discussion of Japan as a middle power in relation to its African foreign policy. For the sake of this discussion it is enough to note that Japan has consistently dedicated a significant amount of diplomatic effort to improving its position in the United Nations, particularly in its attempts to secure a position on the United Nations Security Council.

Additionally, Japan's contributions to international development assistance have been historically significant. Indeed, during the 1980s it led the world in expenditure on humanitarian aid and development assistance (Cox 1989: 838). Again, Cornelissen takes this up in her consideration of Japan's middle power role in Africa.

However, in contrast to Japan's contribution to international institutions, and its distancing itself from major modern conflicts, Japan's autonomy from the United States is perhaps more questionable. Indeed, as Cox points out, this is also one of the debates that has emerged in relation to Canada's status as a so-called 'middle power', with one school seeing Canada as a satellite state, while another stresses Canadian autonomy (Cox 1989: 824).

Certainly, during the Cold War Japan was very firmly aligned with the US, and while it does not always accquiesce to US demands, its reluctance to embark on independent initiatives, as spoken of by Calder, is a significant problem for its status as a middle power. It is debatable whether Japan has yet attained the neccessary independence to exert the middle power role that Cox speaks of. Some Japanese aid initiatives such as TICAD could certainly be seen as an attempt to fulfill this role. Their effectiveness in this regard is unclear, however.

Cox concludes his paper by engaging in a long discussion of the changes in Japanese political culture that would have to take place in order for Japan to truly embrace a role as a middle power. He generally concurs with the notion that at the time of writing Japan had not demonstrated enough independence from the US in constructing its foreign policy, and argues that ultimately,
“For Japan to embrace middlepowermanship would require a transformation in its political culture, a repoliticization of Japanese society. Past experience seems to negate this possibility” (Cox 1989: 856).

The implications of this should be noted. At the time of writing, Cox was not proposing that Japan has effectively or entirely taken up a middle power position. Rather, he held that in certain aspects it conformed to the behaviour expected of a middle power, while in others it had not yet taken up the mantle of middlepowership.

Cornelissen (2004) adopts Cox' concept of middlepowership and attempts to apply it in the realm of Japanese foreign policy in Africa. Cornelissen does so in an attempt to break free of the reactive – proactive debate. Arguing that “looking at Japanese foreign policy by the degree of proactivism or reactivism it exhibits does not provide sufficient understanding of the nature and motivations of Japan’s engagement with the African continent” (2004: 12), she turns to middlepowership in search of an explanatory model. Cornelissen makes the claim that Japanese actions in Africa are in line with middlepowership in that they fall in line with conception of a middle power as a catalyst, or a creator of new norms and values within the international system. According to her, Japanese initiatives on the continent can be seen as a middle power initiative in two ways, both fall of which within Japanese development assistance efforts. The first is in how Japanese ODA attempts to promote notions of the 'Asian miracle' as a development model for Africa and the rest of the developing world. The second lies in the Japanese promotion of notions of 'ownership' and 'self-help' within their development assistance programmes (Cornelissen 2004).

2. 8 Application and synthesis

Thus, we can see three different models of Japanese foreign policy, springing from different theoretical perspectives. Conveniently enough, these models each fall into the different paradigms. The reactive state borrows heavily from liberal theory, particularly in its stress on internal institutions such as the Constitution, and the importance of sub-national interest groups and the political system in forming a seemingly passive foreign policy. The neo-mercantilist state speaks to notions of realism and, indeed, was developed by realists who were dissatisfied by the way in which conventional realist accounts explained (or failed to explain) Japan's overall foreign policy stance. Finally, the middle-power notion, although not
initially clearly part of critical theory, has been developed in relation to Japan, by Robert Cox, one of the pre-eminent critical theorists in the person of. Thinkers such as Soeya (2005, 2012) and Cornelissen (2004) have also adopted the notion of Japan as a middlepower. However, Cox’s emphasis on hegemony, and middlepowership as an alternative to hegemony, suggests that in relation to Japan this model can be thought of as a critical theorist perspective.

The first two models are perhaps the most immediate, in the sense that they attempt to explain Japanese foreign policy to date whereas Cox’ original account of Japanese middlepowership is more of a prediction than an explanation. However, Cornelissen's deployment of this concept in contemporary Africa adds explanatory heft to the notion of Japan as a middle power.

Applying the logic of these different theoretical notions to Japanese – South African relations is an extremely complex project. To begin with, it must be made clear that the analyses in this thesis are conducted using the bureaucratic policy process model. This is not because the other paradigms are ineffective, but because parsimony requires a perspective that results in limited variables and considerations. There are many elements of Japanese-South African relations that resonate with the different theoretical constructs presented above. Mineral exploration and mining is often discussed from a neo-mercantilist perspective, as in the analysis by Van Der Spuy and Glinzler (2003). Aid initiatives such as the Tokyo Conference for International Development (TICAD) could be seen as a departure from the reactive state, or, alternatively, as an example of Japan rising to the challenge of middlepowership.

Even when this level of parsimony is applied, the project remains complex. Despite this, a few notions can be immediately carried through and applied. Firstly, if we accept the implications of the bureaucratic policy model, it would appear that what exists between Japan and South Africa is not simply a bilateral relationship between two perfectly unified entities. Rather, we have complex relationships between two allied groups of organizations.

To continue Hilsman's earlier 'box' metaphor, what do we find inside the South African and Japanese boxes?

Within the South African government there is the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, and the Department of Trade and Industry. Similarly, within the Japanese government, there are several different organizations. At the level of government Ministries,
foreign affairs of state are handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), while trade and the economy fall under the purview of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). When operating abroad, MOFA and METI both occupy space within the Japanese Embassy.

Aid is handled by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) while the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) attempts to promote Japanese trade relations, and Foreign Direct Investment into Japan. JICA and JETRO operate as independent government agencies, receiving funding and direction from various Ministries, but not operating as direct subordinates of them. All these organizations come equipped with their own goals, priorities and operating styles.

The earlier example of the way in which the dropping of the Hiroshima bomb was so strongly framed by institutional concerns is highly suggestive. It is anticipated that, just as in these cases, South African and Japanese bureaucracies have their own institutional ideas, agendas, interests and approaches that strongly impact on the relationship between the two countries. Decisions and policies are at least partially made as a result of the particular inter-agency dynamics and contests.

Indeed, Schwartz' account of the bureaucracies within the Japanese government strongly supports this notion. According to him “[T]he Japanese bureaucracy is riven by sectionalism...with their compartmentalized structure (tatewari gyosei, or “vertical administration”) every bureau, division and section jealously protects its jurisdiction over some particular policy domain.” (Schwartz 1998:20)

He then quotes Muramatsu Micho as stating that “What actually exists is not bureaucracy, but bureaucracies...The interests of every ministry and agency are different, and they participate on the stage of political competition.” (Schwartz 1998: 20)

According to Schwartz this territorial mentality has been particularly inflamed by an increase in “broad, complex problems that straddle or fall outside traditional administrative boundaries, sparking heated turf battles” (Schwartz 1998: 20). Citing a litany of cases, he argues that these conflicts and factionalism have actually weakened the bureaucracies within the government system. Politicians have managed to seize the opportunities presented by
playing different bureaucracies off against each other in these turf wars (Schwartz 1998: 20 – 21).

This discussion of factionalism within the Japanese government resonates strongly with Allison's account of policy as the result of a contested bargaining process. This is particularly interesting because it would suggest that the theory of the bureaucratic policy process does in fact correspond with findings in the field.

Within the context of this study, this kind of topic will have to be approached gingerly, and with care. Certainly, any conclusions must be made with caution. However, it may be possible, through careful inquiry, to probe the question of whether there are indeed any divisions between different Japanese government bureaucracies within South Africa. Conversely, the same inquiries may be made of the DTI and Dirco. How unified are they in generating policy and carrying out their mandates? To what level do they seek to actively co-ordinate policy?

On a similar note, different organizations within the same government often see different aspects of any given issue. Applying this to the situation at hand, it becomes clear that in order to understand where, say, the DTI stands on Japanese relations with South Africa, it is very important to understand their position within the South African government, their priorities and mission, and how this relates to their specific positions on Japan as a trading partner. It is important not to make assumptions, such as “Because Japan is a major trading partner, they are important to the DTI.” The DTI is no doubt cognizant of Japan's relative importance as a trade partner, and as a result they may strongly prioritize closer relations with Japan. On the other hand, they may see Japan as a long term stable trading partner that is no longer in need of particular cultivation. If the DTI is busy prioritizing China as the 'next big thing', they may be generally leaving the questions of closer ties with Japan to Dirco or other parties.

Similarly, it is important to understand the nature of JICA's relationship with its counterparts and co-agencies, and how JICA's internal priorities affect their position on South Africa. Again, this requires close study and developing significant insight into the organizations involved.
Another issue for consideration is that of the relationship of bureaucracies to elite decision makers. As mentioned earlier, the prominence and relevance of bureaucracies in the decision-making is often seen in contrast or in tension with that of elite decision-makers. Where executive power is prominent, the relevance of bureaucrats recedes, and vice versa.

As a result, inquiry into this element of the relationship may also prove fruitful. How do the different bureaucrats and diplomats view their relationship to elites? How much intervention by the executive branches of the respective governments is there in South African – Japanese relationships? How does this affect the autonomy and effectiveness of the bureaucracies involved?

Perhaps one of the chief theoretical debates is that between the “reactive state” and the “mercantile realist” perspectives on Japan's activities. This is particularly relevant in South Africa, where Japan has a long history of seeking natural resources to fuel its domestic manufacturing economy. Historically this has been a significant issue, with an extensive debate over Japan's role in Africa during colonial times, and its relationship to the Apartheid regime. Examination of the evidence may well lead to some revelations in this regard.

An additional theoretical issue that may be worth inquiring into is that of the limitations to the reactive state. Calder (2003) mentioned initiatives by Japan that appear to represent departures from the reactive state. The TICAD process and JICA's aid activities may be fresh examples of the reactive state beginning to give way to a new mode of activity. Alternatively, they could be considered in the light of Japan as a middle power. Indeed, at first glance the generation of new forms of discourse and dialogue that has been one of the results of TICAD seems to resonate with the conception of middle power states as generating new international norms and practises.

2.9 Concluding remarks

In conclusion, the theoretical toolbox for examining Japanese foreign policy is well stocked, and there are a plethora of paradigms, perspectives and models that can be applied. This chapter has reviewed the chief paradigms in International Relations (Liberalism, Realism and Critical theory) and placed the chief explanatory models for Japanese foreign policy within
these paradigms. In addition, the chapter has explained the pertinence and value of the bureaucratic policy process model, which will be the central theoretical framework of this thesis. Reference to specific models of Japanese foreign policy, such as the reactive state and neo-mercantilism will be made from time to time as particular elements of these theories resonate with the findings of the thesis. However, this thesis does not seek to explain all its findings in terms of any one of these models. The key analytical map for this thesis will be the bureaucratic policy process model. However, despite its value, it is a demanding and complex method of analysis. Consequently, while it will be used as the central theoretical framework of this thesis, it has been necessary to apply it as a general guide to the process of understanding South African and Japanese bureaucracies, rather than a rigid and unyielding formula.
Chapter 3: Literature Review – Japanese engagement with South Africa

This chapter begins by providing a brief history of the Japanese economy and foreign policy, from World War 2 onwards. Next, this chapter discusses the literature on Japanese-South African relations, beginning with historical accounts of the relationship. Tracing diplomatic and trade relationships from their earliest precursors, it examines the ambivalence and complexities that marked Japanese–African relations during the Cold War. Historically, this debate is generally oriented around the morality and expediency of Japan's role in South Africa. On the one hand, analysts such as Jun Morikawa see Japan as collaborating with colonial powers and contributing to the survival of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. On the other hand, writers such as Masako Osada and Themba Sono see Japan in a more benign light, arguing that its responses were driven by economic necessity. Of course, these viewpoints are not mutually exclusive, but the general debate over the morality of Japan's actions remains. Broadly, it can be seen that Morikawa is Japan's fiercest critic, while Sono defends its record in Africa. Osada holds roughly the middle ground in this debate, although she leans towards the argument that Japan acted out of economic necessity.

Moving on from these historical debates, this review unpacks the dimensions of Japanese post-Cold War policy in Africa, particularly as this is expressed through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. Finally, this chapter discusses post-Apartheid ties between South Africa and Japan, in particular the ways in which the relationship between Japan and South Africa shifted following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Apartheid.

3.1 Japanese foreign policy: A brief history

Following its defeat in World War 2, Japan was occupied by the United States for seven years. During the course of the Occupation the victorious Allies implemented significant reforms. Notably, Japan was left with a pacifist Constitution that banned the maintenance of a standing military and prohibited stationing any troops abroad. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution reads:
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” (1946: Chapter 2)

Although imposed by an outside power, pacifism was not an unpopular proposition in Japan. Following the devastation of World War 2, the Japanese populace was generally eager to avoid future military conflict, and anti-militarism has remained a popular sentiment in Japanese political culture (Berger 1993).

The Occupation ended with the Treaty of San Francisco in 1952. From this point on, Japanese foreign policy was largely dominated by its relationship with the US. Instead of breaking with the US and forging an independent path, Japan opted for a role as a junior partner within the US-led alliance during the Cold War. Under the US security umbrella the Japanese government bent its efforts towards rebuilding and developing its economy, while maintaining an extremely truncated military force. In order to keep its place beneath the US security umbrella, Japan agreed to provide and fund bases for US troops. This approach is often referred to as the Yoshida doctrine, after Yoshida Shigeru, an early post-War Prime Minister of Japan, and a major figure in Japanese political history (Tang 2007: 118 – 119).

This approach paid dividends, with the Japanese economy growing at a phenomenal rate from the 1950s to the 1970s. As the economist Takatoshi Ito notes, "at the height of the postwar miracle, Japan's real GDP expanded four fold in fifteen years, from 1958 to 1973" (Ito 1996: 206). In the early 1970s Japan's 'miracle' came under pressure due to the “Nixon shock” caused by the US leaving the Bretton Woods gold standard, followed by the oil shock of 1973. Sinha points out that:

10 Despite Article 9 banning any standing military force, Japan does have the Japanese Self Defence Force (JSDF). It is equipped with a broad array of military hardware, and can be seen as a military in all but name – however, it maintains a highly defensive posture and structure. While its budget is high in absolute terms (61 billion dollars in 2012) it is still kept at approximately 1% of GDP, which is substantially less than the US (4.7%) or China (2.2%). See Mizokami 2011.
“Events following the October 1973 cutback in supplies to the West shook the very foundations of the high growth economy of Japan whose extreme vulnerability, due to her great dependence on imported fuel and particularly oil, earned her the nickname of the 'Fragile Blossom' (Sinha 1974: 335).

However, despite these obstacles the economy underwent a further boom in the 1980s, fuelled by cheap credit and surging real estate prices. This boom was unsustainable, and by the 1990s the markets had collapsed and Japan's economy stagnated (Itoh 2010). Since then the economy has failed to regain its earlier dynamism. This is exacerbated by a rapidly ageing population. Indeed, Japan has been described as “the fastest-ageing society on Earth” (Tricks 2010), with one of the highest median ages of any nation on the planet.

Perhaps one of the most severe threats to the Yoshida was the first Gulf War of 1990. Japan came under serious pressure to assist in repelling the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a critical source of oil for Western nations as well as Japan. Despite calls to send troops, Japanese policymakers opted to confine themselves to a financial contribution of $13 billion dollars to the Allied coalition. Once hostilities had ended, Japan also sent mine sweepers to the Gulf (Tang 2007).

However, as Tang points out, these contributions were not met with applause or gratitude. Instead, Japan was criticised heavily for “shirking its international responsibilities” (Tang 2007: 121 – 122). As a nation heavily reliant on Middle Eastern energy, Japan was expected to contribute significantly to the Gulf War, and its failure to send troops was seen as 'free riding' on the efforts of the US and other nations.

Since then, Japanese foreign relations have been further complicated by the rise of China as a major power, and a threatening North Korea. The commitment to the Yoshida doctrine of non-involvement has slipped further, with Japan contributing a modest number of troops to the occupying forces in Iraq, following the Iraq war of 2003. (Watts 2003)

3.2 African – Japanese relations: A historical review

Themba Sono provides a unique and detailed history of Japanese – African relations, going back to the days of feudal Japan and the first Africans brought to South East Asia by their
Portuguese slavers. His discussion of pre-20th century Japanese – African interactions is unique in its depth and detail (Sono 1993).

Following the forcible ending of Japan's period of isolation in 1853 by the American mission led by Commodore Matthew Perry, Japan embarked on a rapid project of modernisation and Westernisation. This led to contact with Africa, which at the time was largely dominated by European powers, following the scramble for Africa. In Sono's discussion of Japan's involvement of colonial Africa, he stresses the contrast between the colonising European powers, and Japan's so-called “clean hands” approach, during which they limited themselves to trade, as opposed to colonisation and exploitation (Sono 1993: 97). During the pre-war period the Japanese were able to make significant commercial gains in Africa. The European powers, alarmed by this competition, then attempted to exclude them from the commercial sphere. Sono demonstrates this turn of events by discussing the Japanese / Indian / East African cotton trade in some detail (cf. Ampiah 1990).

Proceeding to more recent times, Sono discusses the history of Japanese relations with African countries following World War 2. He notes the general tendency of Japan to pursue its economic interests in Africa, and defends it against charges of collaborating with colonial powers at the time.

In her book Sanctions and Honorary Whites: Diplomatic Realities and Economic Realities in Relations between Japan and South Africa (2002), Masako Osada provides an excellent history of Japanese - South African relations before and during Apartheid. This book is hinged on two key concepts: sanctions, and the 'honorary whites' status of Japanese in Apartheid South Africa. She re-treads much of the same material in her article “Japanese-South African Relations during the Apartheid Era” (2003). Sanctions and Honorary Whites is particularly valuable for the way it provides a clear and methodical examination of relations between Japan and South Africa during the Apartheid era. This is by contrast with Sono's work, which attempts to document relations between Japan and all of the countries in Africa.

Osada begins with a discussion of trade ties in the period before WW2. She documents a surge in trade during World War I, followed by a rapid retraction as Japan found itself unable to compete with European products, due largely to the 1913 Immigration Act (Osada 2002: 37). Following the Great Depression of 1929, Osada notes that “the Union suddenly became
more conciliatory towards Japan's requests for more favorable treatment of its citizens in South Africa” (2002: 39), and that this resulted in some concessions in migration procedures in favour of Japanese citizens. Despite strong tariff barriers, trade increased and when Australia entered into a trade war with Japan in 1937, SA-Japan trade received a strong boost (Osada 2002: 42). However, as World War 2 got under way relations froze over, and South Africa officially declared war on Japan in December of 1941, immediately after Pearl Harbour (Osada 2992: 43).

Providing an alternative source of data, Kitagawa engages in a short discussion of the Japanese perspective on this trade by examining Consular Reports from the same period. He notes that in the era from 1912 – 1932, Japanese firms faced significant obstacles to market penetration in South Africa. This was largely due to the 1913 Immigration Act, which prevented Asians from settling in or doing business in South Africa (Kitagawa 2003: 28).

Jun Morikawa's review of Japanese-African relations is distinct from Osada and Sono's in two regards. Firstly, he is strongly critical of Japanese actions in the context of Colonial Africa and the apartheid regime. Secondly, he sees post-1950s Japan as having constructed a completely bifurcated, economically oriented policy in Africa. Although Sono and Osada both acknowledge this, Morikawa has developed this concept to a much greater degree.

In Morikawa's account this dual-track policy differentiated between the newly independent states (Black Africa) and the remaining colonies as well as South Africa (White Africa). In order to deal with the tension resulting from maintaining relations with these mutually antagonistic groups a strategy was developed in which Black Africa was soothed with platitudes and development aid while White Africa was appeased and human rights abuses were ignored in favour of trade. He locates this strategy very firmly within the context of the Cold War and Japan's place as a subordinate ally of the United States of America. This was based on the “guiding principle” of "anti-Communism and economic expansionism" (Morikawa 1997: 10).

In pursuit of this, Japan followed a strategy of “supporting colonial regimes, and securing rare metals” (Morikawa 1997: 120). Both Sono and Osada concur on the importance of rare metals as a strategic objective (Osada 2002: 106 – 107, Sono 1993: 334). However, Morikawa believes that as part of this strategy, Japan made efforts to protect South Africa, a key source
of these aforementioned rare metals, from the Communist threat. The divergence from Sono's reading of the situation, in particular, must be noted here. Both analysts note that Japan needed South Africa's resources, but Morikawa paints Japanese diplomacy as an active attempt to support and protect South Africa from anti-colonial sentiment on the continent, as part of its strategy of securing a steady supply of critical resources. Sono sees Japan's position in this matter as being a necessary evil rather than a 'pro-South Africa' strategy.

Generally, Morikawa believes that Japan tended to favour a 'key states' approach, in which important states were identified and used as anchors of Japanese diplomacy and trade in Africa. He supports this contention by appeal to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's research documents which explicitly discuss the selection of “important” states (Morikawa 1997: 22), as well as by documenting the patterns of Official Development Aid (ODA) distribution to these key parties. Morikawa sees South Africa as being the centre of Japan's involvement in “White Africa” (Morikawa 1997: 22 - 23).

Following the 'key state' strategy in 'Black Africa', states were chosen for being “opinion leaders, resource holding nations and those necessary for stability in Southern Africa” (Morikawa 1997: 22). The list of key states included Zaire, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Niger, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Gabon. In this context, Japan followed a strategy of maintaining relations with pro-Western countries, securing resources and pursuing export markets. (Morikawa 1997: 120) Where Black African countries had already 'fallen' to Communism, Japan followed a strategy of “confrontation and dialogue” (Morikawa 1997: 13)

An interesting consequence of this argument is that it claims that the Japanese Black Africa strategy was fundamentally subordinate to its White Africa strategy. Japan adopted its Black Africa strategy as a way of limiting the fallout from its unpopular and morally questionable relationship with South Africa. In effect, Japan prioritised its relationship with the strategically important apartheid regime over its relationships with the rest of the African countries. This can be seen in the fact that one of the criteria for choosing key 'black African' states was their importance for maintaining Southern African stability. In other words, black African states were chosen at least partly on the basis of their value as a buttress for Japan's 'white Africa' strategy. This implies that the 'black Africa' strategy was subordinate to and defined by the 'white Africa' strategy.
During this time Japan was also particularly interested in gaining support from African nations for its bid to gain seats in the United Nations Security Council. This was another aspect that underscored the importance of mollifying 'black Africa' in order to gain their support for Japanese United Nations initiatives.

One of the key points of contention over the history of Japanese involvement on the African continent is in its moral standing. Themba Sono, Jun Morikawa and Masako Osada all discuss the difficulties that Japan experienced in maintaining relations with both Black and White Africa, and they all acknowledge the internal tension of Japanese policy towards Africa. However, their readings of Japan's motivations and the attached moral calculus of treating with the Apartheid government differ greatly. This issue became particularly pertinent following the oil crisis of the mid 70s, with Ampiah and Nester (1989) documenting the specifics of Japan's global response to this event in detail. Morikawa and Sono both see Japan as being jolted into a sudden (re)action by this event, but again they differ in their interpretations of Japanese actions at the time. Indeed, this debate is a constant theme throughout their writings, both on Japanese policy in broader Africa, and on Japanese policy in South Africa. The same broad debate over expediency and morality is reproduced in the discussion of Japanese-South African relations.

As Osada explains, during Apartheid, Japanese policy towards South Africa suffered from significant internal tension. On the one hand, South Africa was a pariah state that the Japanese government wished to stay detached from. On the other hand, South Africa was an incredibly useful source of important raw materials, including minerals such as platinum and manganese, which are considered critical for modern industry. South Africa was also a market for Japanese goods (Osada 2002: 106 - 107).

In effect, the Japanese government wished to maintain trade ties with South Africa, while distancing itself from apartheid policies. This distancing was necessary in order to deflect criticism from African countries, whose disapproval of Japanese ties with such an odious regime threatened Japan's UN ambitions.

In practice this was carried out through various mechanisms. As Seiro Kawasaki explains, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in South Africa by Japanese companies was officially
forbidden. In addition, Japan maintained a long standing arms embargo on South Africa (Kawasaki, 2002: 28). These measures were by no means comprehensive or impenetrable. Businesses such as Toyota were allowed to establish independent South African subsidiaries. Japanese firms transferred patents, technology, processes and management expertise to South African firms, who supplied capital and local expertise. This circumvented bans on FDI, while allowing Japanese corporations to invest in South Africa. Despite the arms embargo, dual-use technology was exported without let or hindrance, and this was particularly useful to the apartheid regime (Morikawa 1997: 130 - 132).

This tension between wanting or needing South Africa as a trading partner and wishing to distance Japan from South Africa as a pariah state is often said to be expressed through the policy of *seikei bunri*, or the separation of business and politics. Osada argues that while the Japanese government did, in fact, wish to trade with South Africa, and was unwilling to engage in serious sanctions against the apartheid government, *seikei bunri* is a separate and specific concept developed to deal with economic difficulties around maintaining trade with Taiwan despite pressure from the People's Republic of China. Specifically, “Japan adopted [seikei bunri] to justify its China policy of keeping trade relations with Taiwan without recognizing it diplomatically. Therefore, this should not be confused with Japan's standard policy” (Osada 2002: 110).

Developing this argument in a separate discussion, Osada points out that “*Seikei bunri* was never an overall official external policy of Japan. Nor did the Japanese government adopt *seikei bunri* as a policy toward South Africa during apartheid” (Osada 2012, personal communication).

Osada partly buttresses this argument by appeal to the fact that the Japanese government did take up (admittedly limited) sanctions against South Africa, which can hardly be said to be following a policy of separating politics and economics. After all, sanctions are inherently political.

Despite Osada's challenge to the narrative of the *seikei bunri* policy in South Africa, it should be noted that many observers of Japan see it as a broadly consistent trend in Japanese foreign policy. Ravenhill described Japanese policy as “all things to all people” (Ravenhill 1982 quoted in Sono 1993). Similarly, Payne (1987) in his discussion of Japanese policy towards
South Africa deployed the term as an explanatory device for Japan's muted response towards Apartheid. It has also emerged in discussions of Japanese foreign policy in regions ranging from ASEAN (Singh 2002: 278) to the Middle East, with one analyst stating that “Over the years, Japan's commitment to *seikei bunri* is unflinching” (Tang 2007: 123). It appears that despite the origin of *seikei bunri* as a means of handling the difficult Japan – Taiwan – China relationship, it has become a popular explanation for Japan's methods in handling politically difficult choices while still maintaining all-important trade ties.

Of particular note in this discussion is the 1980s, a period during which trade with South Africa became more and more controversial. At this time trade between the two nations boomed, with Japan becoming a major destination for South African goods. As Kawasaki points out:

“In 1981, [Japan] was second only to the United States of America [as an export destination], and in 1982, second to none” (Kawasaki, 2002:31). In 1986 and 1987 Japan was South Africa's largest trade partner, and this attracted particular censure from the international community (Osada 2002: 197). Japan responded with a diplomatic offensive which included requests for restraint from companies, sending funds to a small trust that would assist victims of Apartheid, and encouraging the ANC to open an office in Tokyo (Osada 2002: 77-78). Notwithstanding this public relations blitz, in 1989 Japan was still South Africa's second largest trading partner (Osada 2002: 78). Although this took pressure off Japan, the generally high volume of trade at this time casts doubt on the sincerity and vigour of Japan's actions.

In this context there were naturally serious questions about Japan's responsibilities and obligations as a member of the UN, bound, in principle at least, to treat South Africa as a pariah state at the time. Kawasaki documents criticism within the UN, particularly from the Ghanaian government, in some detail (Kawasaki, 2002:28-29).

As previously noted, Morikawa is fiercely critical of Japan's involvement with South Africa. While acknowledging the importance of resources and trade for Japan, he points to Japan's failure to cultivate alternative sources as betraying a lack of political will to act against the Apartheid government. Indeed, Morikawa goes even further, and argues that Japan aggressively courted South Africa, citing Japanese efforts to increase trade with South Africa during the 1970s (Morikawa 1997: 120 - 123).
For Morikawa the oil shock of 1973 raised the stakes, but did not fundamentally change anything about Japan's African 'dual Africa' policies. Morikawa dismisses Japanese sanctions against South Africa as “mere diplomatic lip-service” (Morikawa 1997: 132). He notes that Japan implemented quite effective sanctions against the Soviet Union when it became necessary, which in his view suggests that it was not impossible for Japan to implement sanctions when it could find the political will to do so. Finally, he picks at the argument that South Africa was a critical trade partner by pointing out that many non-essential commodities, such as eggs, were traded in large amounts (Morikawa 1997: 79 – 80).

Themba Sono is perhaps Japan’s most vigorous defender in this regard, making the *tu quoque* argument that plenty of other nations (including African nations) were quite happy to trade with South Africa and to encourage economic ties where it suited their interests. In his account, it would be unfair to single out Japan in any particular fashion for engaging with the Apartheid regime at the time (Sono 1993: 344).

In a similar vein, Osada argues that: “Japan’s sanctions measures against South Africa were as strict as those by other trading partners for South Africa. At the same time they were extremely weak, selective and passive, but no less ineffectual than those taken by other nations” (Osada 2002: 110).

According to Osada, Japan's efforts to restrict trade with South Africa, and the related sanctions on cultural and sporting activities were overwhelmingly triggered by external pressure. Within the concept of Japan as the “reactive state” (Caldwell 1988), Japan never initiated sanctions, but only acted when external events made the costs of maintaining ties with South Africa too great.

Sono also takes issue with Morikawa's characterization of Japan's African policy as being utterly hypocritical. In Sono's account, following the oil shock Japan shifted from a 'benign diplomacy', in which Japan sought economic relations without particular vigour, to an 'active resource diplomacy', in which Japan began to pursue ties with African countries in order to safeguard access to resources (Sono 1993: 111 – 113). Sono argues that this policy was driven by an understanding of the need to inject a “more human factor in the hitherto impersonal relations between the Celestial Empire and the Far Continent” (Sono 1993: 113).
This was in order to “create new cultural and interpersonal ties, the so-called heart-to-heart changes” (Sono 1993: 114). Indeed, Sono argues that the Japanese had in fact already been very slowly developing a more human centred policy towards Africa from the 1950s, and the oil crisis merely accelerated this process. The new active resource diplomacy evolved and broadened into a general concern with human security in Africa, as Japan realised that merely focusing on the economic dimension of the relationship was inadequate.

Generally, Sono underlines the "distinction between European colonial rule and Japanese commercial role in Africa" (1993: 60). He criticizes Morikawa as “confus[ing] this Japanese commercial presence with the precolonial role of a collaborator”, (Sono 1993: 60) arguing that “all [Japan] did was merely look after her interests” (Sono 1993: 62).

Ultimately, there is no satisfying conclusion to the debate over Japanese involvement in Africa. It is clear that Japan was not much worse than other major Western bloc nations, who similarly collaborated with the apartheid government in their quest to contain Communism on the African continent. Where they did implement sanctions, their effect was limited. For example, the US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was comprehensive in name rather than fact. It did not include import bans on “[s]trategic materials, diamonds, and most forms of gold” (Levy 1999: 7), which were a major part of South Africa's export profile.

Having said that, at no point can Japan be said to have shown any kind of leadership or initiative in the movement against apartheid. For example, their implementation of sanctions in 1986 only came after the European Community led the way (Levy 1999: 7). Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Japanese 'sanctions' was the simple fact that they did not usually involve any real restrictions on trade, and can more accurately be considered requests for restraint from Japanese businesses. (Osada 2002: 178) A 'request for restraint' has none of the force of a legal restriction on trade, and really cannot be considered in the same light.

Japanese civil society was largely unresponsive to Apartheid. As Morikawa explains, the Japanese anti-apartheid movement was centred on an NGO called the Japan Anti-Apartheid Committee (JAAC) (Morikawa 1997). In his summary of their activities, he notes that JAAC was able to punch above its weight by networking and campaigning intelligently via the media, but that generally, “it was relatively unknown nationwide. This was partly due to
organizational weakness, but the greatest problem was the general indifference of Japanese society to the issue” (Morikawa 1997: 200).

In any event, during the early 1990s it became plain that apartheid was crumbling, and a new dispensation was inevitable. During this transitional period from 1990 to 1994, there were multiple visits by keidanren\textsuperscript{11} representatives to South Africa. These missions were privately funded fact finding missions in which representatives of major Japanese conglomerates visited South Africa in order to gather information for future enterprises.

Ampiah recounts the history of these trade missions in his article *Japanese investments in South Africa 1992 – 1996: The State, Private Enterprise and Strategic Minerals* (2003). He takes particular care in unpacking the relationship between the keidanren and the Japanese government. Building upon earlier work by Chalmers Johnson, he argues that a key aspect of the modern capitalist state is a mutual dependence between the state and business. The state is dependent on private capital to acquire strategically necessary materials, while private capital relies on the state to assist and protect it in its endeavours. This relationship is particularly important in Japan, where resources to sustain the domestic manufacturing sector must be acquired from abroad. Consequently, Japanese business relies on the Japanese government to provide it with support and assistance in successfully acquiring strategic resources abroad. As Van Der Spuy and Glinzler put it:

“...succinctly captures Japan's strategy, claiming that since the early 1990s, a functional symbiosis seems to be in operation between the Japanese government, Japanese bureaucratic apparatus and Japanese private enterprise with regards to Southern Africa” (Van Der Spuy and Glinzler 2003: 85).

However, Ampiah suggests that this has in fact gone beyond a symbiotic relationship, and in Japan the balance of power has tipped in the favour of private business. In his analysis of various interactions between the keidanren and the Japanese government he makes the argument that the keidanren has successfully used the strategic importance of rare metals as leverage to force the government to make excessive concessions. This unequal relationship mean that the Japanese state is obliged to extensively subsidise the entry of Japanese mining

\textsuperscript{11} The keidanren is a large organisation that represents Japanese business, in much the same fashion as a Chamber of Commerce.
corporations into foreign markets through diplomatic support and Official Development Assistance.

In order to address the dimensions of this Japanese ODA to South Africa, and the greater TICAD project which encompasses most Japanese aid activities in Africa, it is necessary to first briefly review the general history of Japanese ODA, beginning with World War 2.

Makoto Sato (2005) divides the history of Japanese aid into 5 separate phases, stretching from 1954 to the 2000s. This begins with an initial 20 year phase during which Japan concentrated on Asia. Next came a 'post oil shock' phase in the 70s, which saw a modest shift to Africa and a concentration on gathering African support for Japan's UN initiatives. The third phase involved a massive surge in aid volumes up until the 1980s, which saw ODA volumes increase significantly despite Japanese austerity measures (Seddon and Sato 1997: 153).

The fourth phase involved Japan consolidating its position as the apex aid donor. From 1989 to 2000 Japan was the single largest international donor, eclipsing even the US. This time period also saw the genesis of TICAD, and increased "political commitment" by Japan (Sato 2005: 85).

Finally, the last phase extends from the 2000s until the present, and involves a significant retraction of Japanese aid due to its extended economic woes. This phase sees Japan attempting to remain relevant as a donor in the face of budget cuts and greatly increased volumes of aid from the US, as well as the steady rise of China in Africa (Seddon and Sato 1997, Sato 2005).

Without necessarily interrogating this history in detail, it is possible to flag certain specific shifts and trends, based largely on aid composition, volume and geographic distribution. In composition, Japanese aid has a history of being strongly oriented towards loans. Izumi Ohno speaks approvingly of this, stating that "Japan is also unique in offering a relatively large share of loans in bilateral aid. Because loan aid can mobilize larger resources (e.g., for financing large-scale infrastructure projects or supporting reforms), it can be very effective in promoting broad-based growth if combined with a good growth strategy" (2003: 6).
However, in recent times this approach has been compromised by pressure from the rest of the donor community. Sato (2005) points out that at the Gleneagles G8 summit, Japan reluctantly endorsed a loan forgiveness scheme pushed forward by its peers. In Sato's analysis this demonstrates that Japan has finally abandoned loan aid as its primary method of ODA. In terms of geographical distribution between Asia and Africa, the pattern is fairly clear. Japan's early ODA was heavily focused on Asia, and over time, it slowly moved away from Asia and into Africa. As Seddon and Sato explain:

"Japanese aid began in the 1950s essentially as post-war reparations to Asian countries. Even in 1970, over 98% of Japanese aid went to Asia" (Seddon and Sato 1997: 154).

This pattern changed somewhat as a result of the 1973 oil shock, following which more aid was directed to Africa to support Japan's strategic resource acquisition efforts. Under pressure from the United States to increase the proportion of its aid to Africa, Japan continued to shift its aid allocations throughout the 1980s until the amount of aid going to Africa reached a peak in 1989 (Sato 2005: 74). However, in 1990 East Asia was still receiving more aid than Africa, and indeed, it was only as recently as 2005 that Japan sent more aid to Africa than East Asia (Hirano 2012: 195).

In terms of volume, Japan's commitment to the ongoing provision of high levels of ODA was largely dictated by its role in the US-Japanese alliance. Post-war Japan did not have a significant military presence, due to its pacifist constitution, and consequently it adopted aid as a major tool of international diplomacy. In effect, it could not contribute militarily to the Cold War, so it took up the slack with strategic aid diplomacy.

By 1991, Japan had become the world's largest aid donor - a position it was to maintain over the next five years, despite the end of the Cold War (Seddon and Sato 1997: 153).

However, Japan's dominance of the aid landscape declined, and from 2000 to 2003 the Japanese government decided to make significant cuts. In 2001 the US replaced Japan as the

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12 From the 1970s onwards a large portion of this aid was directed to the People's Republic of China. Japanese aid towards Asia is a more complex topic than Hirano's work shows, with the Japanese government making a distinction between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, and shifting aid flows between the two regions over time (Personal Communication, Professor Scarlett Cornelissen, 10 February 2013). Putting these complexities aside, the point remains that taken collectively, Africa did not receive as much annual aid as Asia until quite recently.
top international aid donor. As Ohno (2003) points out, this dwindling ODA budget was the result of Japan's extended economic woes. At the same time the US greatly increased its international aid budgets under the Bush administration, as part of its international counter-terrorism strategy.

3.2.1 Official Development Aid to South Africa: The early years

Alden documents the history of post-Apartheid South African-Japanese relations in both the first chapter of *A Distant Mirror* (2003) and *The Chrysanthemum and the Protea* (2002). In particular he unpacks the dynamics surrounding the major ODA packages in the post-Apartheid government, and the significant frustration and complications that ensued during this time period.

As Alden explains, following 1994 the internal Japanese tension about relationships with South Africa was resolved. South Africa was no longer an odious-but-necessary trade partner, and it would appear that engagement should have become a much more pleasant prospect for the Japanese government. At this point, Tokyo – or some of the institutions in Tokyo - expected South Africa to fall into the standard ‘aid recipient’ pattern of other African countries (Alden 2002: 381).

However, this expectation was not matched on the South African side. Alden notes that “Ironically it was not the Japanese who were keen on highlighting the special nature of South Africa ...but rather the push came from South African sources.” (Alden 2003: 16)

He claims that the ANC felt that South Africa, as an economic, political and even military outlier on the African continent, was owed special recognition and treatment from foreign donors such as Japan. Alden characterises this notion as resulting in a “South African foreign policy with a sense of hubris and entitlement that raised expectations as to the state's status on the world stage.” (*Alden 2002*: 16)

At this time, Japan proceeded with two major packages. The first was presented in 1994, during the Mandela administration. The second was put forward in 1999, during Mbeki’s inauguration (Van der Spuy and Glinzler 2003: 89-90).
The first package was particularly large. Alden (2003) characterizes it as “consisting of US$500 mln export-import loans, US$300 mln in grants and US $500 mln in investment credits for Japanese business” (17). The size of the package must be put in context. As Van Der Spuy and Glinzler point out,

“When these figures are compared with Japan's total ODA disbursement, they do not seem all that large. However, if one compares these figures to the figures for Tanzania, South Africa's ODA is almost ten times as large as that of Japan's largest aid recipient in Africa prior to 1990” (Van Der Spuy and Glinzler 2003: 89).

The contents of this package are of particular interest. As Ampiah (2003) demonstrates, it was largely designed to support Japanese private sector investment in South Africa, particularly in the extractive industries. Among other elements, the package included $300mn of untied funding for Eskom, the power state corporation, and $260.9mn for Transnet, the transport parastatal. This was quite clearly intended to support Japanese companies in the extractive industry by improving the infrastructure upon which they rely (Ampiah 2003: 67).

In any event, despite being of such an unusual size, the first package was met with disinterest and even suspicion by the South African government. The South African government viewed the package as a self-serving public relations exercise, primarily because of the conditions that came attached to it, and an insistence on using Japanese firms for much of the work (Alden 2002: 379). This first package was also heavily loaded towards yen loans, which is consistent with Japan's standard aid practises. The South African government of the time was resistant to the notion of taking up large yen loans over concerns that exchange issues would cause costs to increase greatly. Interestingly enough, recent fieldwork suggests that this is still a problem, with yen loans bringing significant costs along with them (Interview, TICAD Advisor, 5 June 2012).

This disinterest was the source of considerable surprise and dismay on the part of the Japanese, with Alden stating that “The unwillingness of Pretoria to consider utilising the ODA...came as a shock to Japanese officials” (Alden 2003: 17).

Given that Ampiah's analysis of the package suggests that it was largely intended to serve Japanese interests, the lukewarm South African response may not be that inexplicable. Alden
believes that South African officials were overrating the importance of South Africa in the grand scheme of things, but this is not necessarily the case. For recipient countries to demand that aid packages meet their needs may not be arrogance so much as a matter of good policy. Indeed, discourses and declarations around 'ownership' often argue that recipient countries should be the key decision makers in matters of aid, including the composition and type of aid. This concept has been developed thoroughly by writers such as Morrisey and Verschoor (2003), who demonstrate fairly conclusively that recipient involvement in and control of aid processes is an important and necessary part of effective aid regimes. Indeed, 'ownership' became a major part of the rhetoric around TICAD, as this review will demonstrate shortly. Taking this into account, dismissing South Africa's assertiveness on this issue as 'arrogance' is, perhaps, overly hasty.

The second ODA package, in 1999, was at least partially rebuilt to address these concerns, but it was still met with a tepid response from South African officials. Alden claims that some of this was because of:

“the difficulties experienced during South Africa's extended transition, the economic slowdown in Japan and, more generally, continued misunderstanding and misinformation fuelled by domestic bureaucratic political considerations between the two countries”(Alden 2002: 377).

On the other hand, Skidmore suggests that the general lack of enthusiasm on the part of South Africa may also have been because of the Japanese government’s refusal to fund the ANC during the apartheid years. Quoting Alden, she notes that Nelson Mandela had approached the Japanese government about funding in 1990, despite Tokyo’s attempts to head off any such request pre-emptively. The Japanese had declined to assist the ANC with funding, and in her analysis this may have resulted in the later disinterest in offers from the Japanese (Skidmore 2004: 9).

It is difficult to be certain that this was a decisive factor, although the ANC does have a ‘long memory’ in terms of choosing allies internationally. States that were ideologically aligned with or that built relationships with the ANC during the struggle, such as Cuba, have generally found it relatively easy to maintain relationships with South Africa post-1994, while nations that were not (such as Israel) have found it harder to build cordial ties. Alden differs
strongly from Skidmore on this matter. Indeed, he directly contradicts her account, claiming that “far from being a legacy of the past, the difficulties experienced by the Japanese and South Africans in shaping a constructive relationship are rooted primarily in domestic bureaucratic politics and its impact upon the foreign policy process” (Alden 2002: 366).

This case study is a good example of how considering the sub-state structures can help explain issues within South African - Japanese relations. The question is clear - Why did the ODA packages fail? Skidmore's explanations, while not being without merit, rely on making certain assumptions about the ANC's motives and earlier relationships, without being able to convincingly demonstrate the existence of said motives. On the other hand, Alden expresses the notion that the institutional arrangements on both sides hampered the package. Alden can make this point because of his analysis of MOFA, METI and the manner in which they construct aid packages, via a contested bargaining process.

3.3 TICAD: Old wine in new bottles?

Post-Cold War Japanese ODA discourse has been dominated by TICAD, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. TICAD is perhaps the most important Japanese diplomatic initiative in Africa, and as a result is essential that Japanese aid efforts in Africa be contextualised within this framework. Writing in 2012, Ampiah and Rose see the TICAD process as a major break from Japan's previous African aid initiatives, which, in accordance with Morikawa's reading, were centred on securing Japan's natural resource collection efforts in Africa, and persuading African countries to mute their criticism of Japan's collaborationist tendency (Ampiah and Rose 2012: 154).

Ampiah (2005) and Lehman (2005) both discuss the history of the first three TICAD iterations. A comparison of their approaches provides some interesting insights into the history of this process.

Cornelissen (2012) discusses the ramifications of TICAD IV in some detail. Like Ampiah (2005), she sees it as a departure from the patterns of previous TICADs. However, she also sees TICAD IV as a reaffirmation of Japan's commitment to Africa as an important source of natural resources. Cornelissen alerts us to the fact that TICAD IV, while developed in consultation with African states, is firmly underpinned by Japanese "domestic and strategic
priorities” (2012: 201). Cornelissen further notes that with TICAD IV, Japan has developed its strategy of linking its African diplomatic and economic initiatives with developing Africa's ability to exploit its natural resources (2012: 211 - 212).

Kweku Ampiah (2005) and Howard Lehman (2005) recount the history of TICAD through its first three iterations. Ampiah begins by tracing it back to its inception in 1991 and points out that, “despite the international inflection of the TICAD process, there is no doubt that it is the invention of Japan, and it is the Japanese government which orchestrates it” (Ampiah 2005: 98). In a separate, more recent paper he argues that “The transformation in Japan’s relations with Africa since the 1990s manifests a clear departure from the nature of Japanese foreign policy towards the region in the previous decades” (Ampiah 2012: 171).

Lehman concurs with the notion of TICAD as being a Japanese creation, but also argues that TICAD’s formation was motivated by a desire for Japan to forge a different path from the Washington Consensus governed programmes of the World Bank and the IMF. Although Lehman notes that the Japanese ODA charter calls on recipient states to “agree to promote democratization, the introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the securing of basic human rights,” (2005: 426) he claims that “The divergence between Japan’s objective of a development assistance strategy and that of the World Bank is significant” (Lehman 2005: 426). Relying heavily on work by Stein and Ohno, Lehman makes the case for TICAD as a means by which Japan could undertake a development agenda that would be distinct from the extant World Bank inspired programmes. In Lehman's account, some of the unique features of TICAD are its emphasis on self-help and the importance of the Asian experience in development (Lehman 2005: 425).

As he puts it, “TICAD became a vehicle by which Japan could respond to the pressures of globalization by strategically and financially positioning itself as an independent and influential leader” (Lehman 2005: 427).

This notion is not exclusive to Lehman. Izumi Ohno makes the claim that:

“Japan does not wholly accept the mainstream thinking by Western aid community about development. Japan continues to believe that East Asian development experience, which is widely regarded as a “success story,” and to which Japan itself made
significant contribution through aid, trade and investment, has also been a good model” (Ohno 2003: 4).

In his history of TICAD I–III Ampiah unpacks the bureaucratic dynamics that underpinned the TICAD process, explaining how the different Japanese government ministries were involved in the process (Ampiah 2005).

He depicts the construction of TICAD as a collaborative process, demonstrating how different organizations such as METI, MOFA and the Ministry of Finance all brought their own interests and concerns to the process. Ampiah notes that the keidanren, possibly backed by METI, maintained its focus on the economic benefits of Africa, and determined to maintain its investment focus on South Africa. Meanwhile, on matters such as preferential access to Japanese agricultural markets, METI and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries maintained a protectionist stance. (Ampiah 2005: 100).

Discussing TICAD I, he notes that the most novel theme expressed was “Asian experience and African development” (Ampiah 2005: 102). This was the notion that African countries could learn from Asia, by following the precepts of rational macroeconomic policy and maintaining political stability. Additional investment in education and human resource development would help African countries to develop.

Lehman sees TICAD I as being more image than effect, with little of substance being achieved. Despite this lack of concrete action, "African countries got a positive impression of Japan’s initiatives and aid philosophy" (Lehman 2005: 429). Lehman believes that this public relations aspect was of particular value to Japan's UN initiatives, in particular the campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Although this campaign did not bear fruit, Japan was still successful in other fields. Lehman notes that:

"In 1996, Japan relied on Africa’s bloc voting to win the Asian region non-permanent seat on the Security Council, the election of Shigeru Oda as Justice of the UN International Court of Justice, and the election of Sadako Ogata as head of the UN High Commission for Refugees. But more importantly, these initiatives underscored Japan’s willingness to pursue its strategic objectives by positioning itself as an alternative to the dominant ODA institutions" (Lehman 2005: 430).
In his account of the motivations for launching TICAD, Ampiah seeks to tie it to Japan's national economic agenda, and Japanese business interests. As mentioned previously, he emphasizes the influence of Japanese business on the formation of Japan's foreign policy. Ampiah begins by highlighting the system of tied aid, in which Japanese ODA projects come with preconditions mandating the use of Japanese businesses and supplies. In effect, this results in development projects subsidising Japanese corporations instead of assisting businesses in recipient countries. Consequently, "a substantial amount of Japanese grant aid to the African countries creeps back to Japan" (Ampiah 2005: 111). Concerns such as these, of course, were part of what brought the Mandela aid package to grief.

Of particular interest is a sidenote in which Ampiah mentions that an African request for assistance with a major internal transport network to facilitate African integration was turned down, allegedly on the grounds that Africa has inadequate population density to warrant such an initiative (2005: 111). Ampiah mentions that:

"many African diplomats in Tokyo seem hopeful that the restructuring of the JICA as an autonomous institution will relieve it from the pressures that the questionable relationship between Japanese private companies and aid policy-makers brings to bear on the country’s ODA programme" (Ampiah 2005: 111).

It would appear that JICA’s reorganization has borne fruit in this regard, since JICA has in fact reversed this earlier decision13.

Continuing with this theme of economic self-interest, Ampiah argues that in the early 1990s Japan was in search of new markets for its corporations, which would help it recover from its economic woes following the contraction of its economy in the 1980s. A stable and friendly Africa would constitute a valuable market for Japanese corporations.

13 JICA was reorganized in 2008, and has been funding a major internal SADC transport network, including One Stop Border Posts intended to facilitate internal trade in Africa. Although not a major part of this thesis, see Chapter 4, p 110 - 112 for more on this.
In a similar vein to Lehman, Ampiah also notes the value of the African bloc to Japanese initiatives in the UN. He particularly highlights Japan's campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (2005: 110).

Discussing TICAD II, Ampiah writes that:

“In the main, the agenda concerned itself with three broad areas: (i) social development (education, health and population, and other measures to assist the poor); (ii) economic development (private sector development, industrial development, agricultural development, and external debt); and (iii) the basic foundation for development (good governance, conflict prevention and post-conflict development)” (Ampiah 2005: 104).

In the process, Ampiah emphasizes the importance of inter-session meetings and conferences, as part of its drive towards the concept of ‘ownership’ in development:

“The extent and depth of these working level meetings in between the conferences are also indicative of Japan’s attention to detail, with a view to avoiding the mistakes made by other donor countries. They are also a demonstration of Japan’s determination to fulfil its commitment to the idea of African ‘ownership’ of their development processes as well as evidence of the international community’s support of such ownership” (Ampiah 2005: 105 – 106).

Ampiah links this to Japan's involvement in the Bandung Conference in 1955, seeing the TICAD initiative as an “extension of the spirit” of that process (Ampiah 2005: 107).

Similarly, Lehman notes the importance of the concept of ownership at TICAD II. Citing the Tokyo Agenda for Action, he notes that “the underlying principles of TICAD II were ownership and partnership” (Lehman 2005: 428) but argues that it later became problematic, because it meant that “Japan waited for those governments to take “ownership” of their development needs, decide on targeted projects, and then approach the Japanese aid agencies” (Lehman 2005: 428).

This emphasis on the importance of ownership can be traced back to the early stages of Japanese ODA in Asia. According to Sato (2005), Japanese aid to its neighbours was
particularly contentious following World War 2, due to the violent and ugly history of Japanese imperialism in South East Asia. As a result, MOFA developed the principles of ‘on-request’ aid and ‘self-help’ in order to maintain its aid programmes without attracting backlash by appearing intrusive. ‘On-request’ aid requires that recipient countries approach Japan with their own proposals and projects, to which Japan assigns aid. ‘Self-help’:

“implies that, although Japan gives assistance financially and technically at the initial stage, once the project is started, the recipient countries themselves assume all the responsibilities not only for economic management but also for social, political and other related matters, which may happen thereafter” (Sato 2005: 72).

In any event, Ampiah argues that by the end of the third conference, the TICAD process had largely been a triumph of style over substance, with much talk and little action. Criticising the amount of financial support for TICAD projects, he points out that Asia still attracts the plurality of Japanese Official Development Aid, concluding that “there is as yet no convincing evidence that the TICAD is a serious commitment to the development of Africa” (Ampiah 2005: 110). Furthermore, he notes that Japanese FDI, which was one of the major promises of TICAD, has remained concentrated in South Africa. Indeed, “the trend in investment appears to be downwards, with 2000 an outlying and exceptionally low year” (Ampiah 2005: 112).

Lehman’s assessment of TICAD at the same point in its existence is mixed. He acknowledges that TICAD has significant problems, noting that:

“Ten years of the TICAD process have also revealed a pattern of shortcomings. In most of the documents written over the last decade, the goals of TICAD are decidedly broad, ambitious and unclear” (Lehman 2005: 441 – 442).

Additionally, Lehman criticises TICAD for failing to produce concrete financial commitments from donor countries. The concurrent crisis in the Middle East, in the form of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq exacerbated this problem.

However, despite these problems, Lehman argues that TICAD “offered many contributions to African development,” (2005: 440) largely at the conceptual and public relations level. It
increased awareness of African development issues, and it “jumpstarted greater and more effective international coordination amongst multilateral aid agencies, non-governmental organizations and African governments” (Lehman 2005: 440).

Perhaps most importantly, he claims that it allowed Japan to develop and articulate an alternative development discourse to the existing one. This development discourse included concepts such as ownership and partnership, managed to enter the mainstream development discourse at events such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development, and multiple consecutive G8 meetings. Finally, it managed to re-introduce the concept of the state as a central role player in development (Lehman 2005: 440 - 441).

By the end of TICAD III, it is clear that TICAD had managed to contribute to development discourses, and had allowed Japan to articulate its vision of development issues in Africa. However, there had been little concrete action, and there was serious doubt as to whether their would be another TICAD conference. Interestingly, Ampiah and Lehman offer a similar prognosis, although they approach it from different directions. Lehman believes that despite its failings, TICAD I - III was a valuable process. Ampiah is more pessimistic, arguing that despite its value, TICAD I - III suffered from severe shortcomings.

Things changed significantly with TICAD IV. The African nations involved pushed for the inclusion of measurable, solid objectives, and for the speedy implementation of projects. These efforts were rewarded. TICAD IV is generally seen as the TICAD of delivery, in which grant aid, yen loans and infrastructure projects were given high priority, and substantive, firm commitments were made (Ampiah 2012: 176 - 177).

Indeed, as Ampiah notes in the same paper, Dr Jean Ping, then-Chairman of the African Union, stated in a key-note address at a symposium in Tokyo that "[t]he 5-Year Yokohama Action Plan to emerge from TICAD IV, together with the TICAD Follow-Up Mechanism, served to distinguish TICAD IV from all its predecessors in terms of providing concrete, time-bound and measurable outcomes" (Ping 2010: 9). Similarly, Cornelissen notes that TICAD IV was a significant break from earlier iterations in the process due to its creation of tangible structures for implementation of its promises (Cornelissen 2012: 201 - 202).
However, Cornelissen goes somewhat further, and argues that one of the main directives that emerged from TICAD IV was that of resource driven development. This is particularly pertinent in Southern Africa, which already has a special relationship with Japan, due to the size and breadth of the South African economy, but also due to the abundance of valuable mineral resources in South Africa. Cornelissen argues that Japan is particularly interested in maintaining access to strategic raw materials such as rare metals, particularly due to the emergence of China as a major rival on the African continent. Interestingly enough, although he does not engage in an extensive discussion of China's role in Africa as a rival to Japan, Hirano (2012) believes that China's use of rare metal resources in a political fashion – ie, its tendency to use the threat of discontinuing supply in order to gain concessions – has helped spur Japan's engagement with South Africa. This would provide Japan with an alternative, politically reliable supply of rare metals.

In any event, JICA has been collaborating with regional organizations such as COMESA and SADC in constructing infrastructure. This infrastructure project has a heavy emphasis on transport links, with new roads, rail links, port facilities and improved border posts, all of which are intended to boost regional trade. A good example of this is the Nacala Corridor, which begins in Zambia, and runs east and then south through Malawi. In central Malawi it branches and the main line runs east through Mozambique, terminating at the port town of Nacala, in northern Mozambique.

Primarily consisting of upgraded roads and rail links, the Nacala Corridor involves large sums of money being disbursed to improve the infrastructure. This project is by no means exclusively funded by JICA, with multiple donors, including the World Bank, European Union and the Danish International Development Agency all helping to finance the project (Weidner et al 2010). As of 2009, the African Development Bank was the largest financier, driving the project with a loan of US$ 181mn. At the same time, JICA contributed some US$ 63mn (Business Monitor 2009), in addition to financing studies on upgrading Nacala port. In early 2012, Japan and Mozambique announced that they were discussing the possibility of JICA funding the Nacala port construction itself (Reuters 2012).

As Cornelissen explains, Japanese corporations have embarked on numerous resource extraction and processing projects in Southern Africa, including manganese mining in South Africa, aluminium smelting in Mozambique and a major nickel mining project in Madagascar.
Additional port facilities and transport infrastructure would naturally be of great value to projects like these.

Although Nacala port is in the wrong location to affect most of these projects, Tete province in northern Mozambique is home to the Moatize deposit, a massive coal formation. Northern Mozambique has become the target of major exploration and resource mining efforts by multinational corporations. Two of these corporations are Japanese: Nippon Steel Corporation is currently exploring for coal in Tete Province, while Mitsui Corporation has discovered the “second-largest natural gas reserve in the world” at the Rovuma basin, off the coast of northern Mozambique (Yomiuri Shimbun 2012, Nederlandse Ambassade 2011).

In a news report from 2012, the managing director of Vale Mozambique, a local subsidiary of a major international mining corporation, is quoted as saying that the Nacala rail link was the best option for exporting coal mined in Tete province, and that it in fact “makes the project viable and allows for expansion of coal mining activities in Moatize” (Transport World Africa 2012a).

From this evidence it is quite clear that the Nacala Corridor will significantly facilitate the exploitation and export of local natural resources.

In terms of the relative distribution of ODA, Hirano (2012) also provides a brief but useful and up-to-date assessment of the level of Japan's engagement with Africa in this regard. By appeal to historical statistics he demonstrates that historically, East Asia took up the vast majority of Japan's aid disbursements, but that recently this has changed, with Africa now receiving more ODA from Japan than any other region. Additionally, Japan has shifted the emphasis of its ODA from loans to grant aid. These changes have brought Japan's aid levels and configuration into line with “Germany, France and the UK” (Hirano 2012: 196).

This formulation should be read in conjunction with Cornelissen, who notes that

“Although Japan was at one point the top aid donor to sub-Saharan Africa, since the late 1990s there has been a steady decline in Japanese aid disbursements to the continent, which paralleled trends in Japan’s global aid contributions” (Cornelissen 2012: 203).
In addition to these trends, Hirano traces the rise of the Private Public Partnership (PPP) in Japan's ODA, another 'traditional donor' trend that he sees as developing in Japanese ODA practises (Hirano 2012).

Turning from these aid issues to economic ties, Hirano notes that South Africa has been Japan's largest trading partner on the African continent. As of 2008 this trade was largely dominated by automobiles and platinum. This trend has continued, although the volume of trade has decreased dramatically as a result of the economic crisis.

In a discussion of Foreign Direct Investment trends, Natasha Skidmore notes a significant increase in Japanese FDI since 1994, but argues that there are some key obstacles to greater Japanese investment. These include the usual problems: HIV/Aids, crime, poor public service, low productivity and the Zimbabwean crisis, which was in full swing at the time. However, she also highlights the amount of FDI that is being drawn to China, arguing that South Africa needs to become a more competitive investment destination if it is to attract Japanese investment in the face of China’s popularity as an investment capital (Skidmore 2004: 20).

Similarly, Philip Rudolph Nel considers South African – Japanese economic relations, and gives a prognosis of possible future prospects for investment in South Africa by Japanese firms. Nel largely comes to the conclusion that despite plenty of positive pronouncements from political leaders, South Africa has not generally seen a massive surge of FDI from Japanese businesses, with the exceptions of the automotive industry, and a major joint investment in aluminium smelting in Mozambique (Nel 2005: 1, 28 – 29, 31). He argues that the situation is not likely to change, unless South Africa and Japan focus on developing long term ties, through mechanisms such as TICAD, as well as bilateral trade forums (Nel 2005: 45–47).

More recently, Fiona Dwinger (2010) reviews the recent history of South Africa and Japan, providing some helpful context. Dwinger is focused on geopolitical issues and jockeying for United Nations Security Council seats and in this vein she notes that “some critics assert that [Japan] is actively utilising its foreign aid policy and TICAD to entice African states into supporting Japan's bid - in exchange for economic and technical assistance” (Dwinger 2010).
3.4 Continuations and departures

Perhaps the largest overall shift in Japan's stance towards Africa lies in the implementation of TICAD, as Ampiah argues, stating that “The transformation in Japan’s relations with Africa since the 1990s manifests a clear departure from the nature of Japanese foreign policy towards the region in the previous decades” (2012: 171). Evidence from the field also suggests that TICAD is seen as a significant and original achievement, in that it involved a significant departure from the earlier, Cold-war dominated aid structures\(^\text{14}\). Within the TICAD process, perhaps the largest shift was during TICAD IV, with the implementation of concrete projects finally dominating the agenda. Having said that, much of the discourse of TICAD has remained consistent, with the notion of 'ownership' and the 'Asian experience' remaining as insistent themes throughout the conferences.

It cannot be denied that TICAD has significant links to Japan's national interest. Furthermore, although Japan is no longer attempting to confront and contain the Communist 'threat' in Africa, it is still very much aware of its own status as a resource-poor nation, and the value of Africa as a valuable supplier of resources. Indeed, TICAD IV represents an increased emphasis on this perspective, as both Cornelissen and Hirano suggest. (Cornelissen 2012, Hirano 2005)

However, it can definitely be seen that Japan's ODA in Africa has moved away from its Cold War roots in a very real fashion.

The emphasis on ownership throughout TICAD, and the fairly serious implementation of this creed as evidenced by Japanese support for NEPAD infrastructure projects is particularly interesting. The One Stop Border Post project is not designed to support resource exports: It is intended to facilitate trade between African countries. Japan's robust support for this project suggests that current Japanese aid schemes, while laid out with an eye to self-interest, are also greatly informed by the plans, demands and policies of the recipient countries. The NEPAD infrastructure development project was previously dismissed by JICA officials as unnecessary, but is now apparently being championed by JICA. Furthermore, Japan is no

\(^{14}\) In an interview a Dirco official remarked that TICAD was one of the first uses of aid in a "political but not ideological" fashion (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). This is suggestive of a perception of TICAD as a departure from Cold War era aid patterns as well as the Washington Consensus.
longer obliged to mollify African states in order to contain diplomatic fall out from supporting the Apartheid government. Despite this, Japanese aid to Africa is greater than its aid to any other region.

It is clear that there has been a shift in Japanese-South African relations, occasioned by the end of the Cold War and the fall of the apartheid regime. However, although Japan no longer acts on the basis of a 'white Africa' and a 'black Africa', it was still wedded to the 'key states' strategy post-1994, as well as the importance of South Africa as a source of strategic resources. One sign of this continuation can be seen in the way in which Japan offered ODA packages of such significant size to South Africa, immediately following the fall of apartheid. Clearly, South Africa was still a critical element of Japan's strategy in Africa, and this resulted in its ODA distribution being weighted accordingly. The way in which the first package was so clearly linked to resource extraction also strongly supports the notion that at the time the Japanese state was still invested in South Africa as a source of strategic resources. Nearly 20 years after the first ODA package and 40 years after the resource crisis of the 1970s, Japan remains eager to maintain a steady stream of natural resources from South Africa. Japan is fundamentally a resource-poor, import dependent nation, and South Africa is still a provider of resources that are critical for Japan's industry, and consequently its economic survival.

It is possible that Japan's ODA patterns have shifted somewhat, however. The 'rebuilding' of the second package in 1999 is particularly interesting, and suggests a modest departure from the earlier strategy of using ODA as merely being direct support for the extractive industries, or as a corporate welfare scheme for Japanese conglomerates. Admittedly, this shift was in response to South African complaints about the first package, which would suggest that Japan had fallen back into the mould of the reactive state and was simply acting under external pressure. However, JICA's involvement in African regional infrastructure initiatives suggests that this trend continued, and that Japanese ODA is becoming more responsive, and more oriented towards the needs of recipient nations.

This falls in line with the emphasis on 'ownership' during the TICAD process, and may be linked with the way in which TICAD IV finally resulted in a flurry of implementation and delivery. This trend is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
3.5 Limitations and Gaps

Considering this body of literature, it is clear that the history of the relationship is fairly well covered, although not in exhaustive detail. Some of this may be related to the fact that the relationship is limited, as bilateral relationships go. For example, Japanese – US ties are extensive and deep, and there is a staggering amount of literature available on this, working at all levels of analysis. On the other hand, South African – Japanese relations are rather less extensive, and there is consequently less to research and write about.

Within the historical corpus of work, the role of the bureaucratic organizations is subjected to a fairly comprehensive treatment. For example, Osada acknowledges bureaucratic relations as an analytical issue in her history of South African-Japanese relations and discusses the historical aspects of both South African and Japanese foreign policy making systems. Osada argues that historically, South African foreign policy has been dominated by the executive, with Prime Minister or President “holding overwhelming executive power” (Osada 2002: 6-23). By contrast, the Japanese foreign policy was dominated by bureaucrats. In the Japanese system, progress through the ranks of the ruling party is only made by allying with local interest groups, which militates against foreign policy expertise or decision-making becoming a priority for Japanese prime ministers (Osada 2002). Additionally, the general weakness of Prime Ministers in Japan and a very high turnover rate in Japanese Prime Ministers tends to prevent them from becoming experts on foreign policy issues or making close connections with foreign leaders (Osada 2002: 12).

Similarly, Morikawa devotes multiple chapters of Big Business and Diplomacy to a discussion of Japanese foreign policy making structures, and in particular the various contests between MOFA and MITI. Additionally, he discusses the influence of the keidanren in some detail.

In contrast to this fairly well-documented history, analysis of this aspect of contemporary South African - Japanese ties is still inadequate, with little being written since Alden's work. Of this work, almost all of it is written using a state centred level of analysis. Skidmore's analysis of the ODA package is a good example of this: She considers the situation in terms of 'Japanese' and 'South African' actions, with little reference to the fact that both governments consist of multiple departments and agencies that may have different agendas, cultures and priorities. Alden certainly speaks to this aspect, which is why his arguments have more
explanatory vigour, but he does not thoroughly explain the basis for his conclusions. Alden explains the 'why' of the ODA package failure (misunderstandings between bureaucracies) but he does not greatly speak to the 'how' of these failures. How did these misunderstandings arise? What were the exact miscommunications or misperceptions that led to them? How did these arise from the different organizations agendas, interests and organizational cultures? These are the kinds of questions that could have been addressed through a bureaucratic analysis of such an issue.

It should also be noted that even this work is somewhat dated. *A Distant Mirror* was published in 2002, while *The Protea and the Chrysanthemum* was published in 2003. A decade has elapsed since then, and fresh work on the field, taking into account the most recent developments, is definitely called for. These recent developments include the re-organization of JICA and the introduction of the TICAD process (entering its 5th iteration in June 2013). Japan has also embarked on a strategy of seeking trade deals with strategically chosen countries around the world.

South Africa, meanwhile, has embarked on a new strategy of regional integration and fostering South-South relations, culminating in its entry into the newly formed BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) coalition in 2011. The current South African administration is focused on developing value added industries in South Africa, particularly through the development of the mineral processing industry, which will undoubtedly impact on the way in which Japanese resource extraction corporations will do business.

These major policy thrusts are all relatively recent, and will likely have a significant impact on the relationship between Japan and South Africa.

In conclusion, the major historical questions in Japanese African relations lie around the Japanese role in Africa, and its moral expediency. The end of the Cold War and the resultant

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15 Dirco’s 2010 strategic plan emphasises African integration, regional integration and South-South cooperation. See Chapter 4.1 for more on this.
16 Mineral beneficiation was referenced in both the 2012 and 2011 State of the Nation speeches by President Jacob Zuma. Its importance was underlined in interviews with both DTI and Dirco representatives (Interview, DTI Official, 7 June 2012; Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). Again, Chapter 4.1 discusses this in greater detail.
shift in aid patterns have brought about a new regime which came to be exemplified in TICAD. TICAD, while initially failing to deliver on concrete projects, helped to popularise and mainstream concepts such as 'ownership' and 'self-help'. The value of this at least partially tempers the criticisms of TICAD as a mere talk-shop. A talk-shop can have value, even if only in that it can lay the foundation for effective future action. To some extent this has been realized with TICAD IV being seen as the TICAD of delivery. In this TICAD, the general discussion was around Japan's national interest, and what this said about Japan's commitment to ODA in Africa. However, self-interest is a necessary element of most aid programmes, and it is also possible that Japan's self-interest has managed to result in speedier action on earlier promises. It is possible that TICAD IV's success was also partly caused by Japan's desire not to continue losing ground in the face of China's diplomatic initiatives in Africa, such as FOCAC, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. However, it is also important to consider that if TICAD is a process, then TICAD IV may well represent one of the more recent products of the process. Thus, viewed broadly, TICAD can be said to have moved from discussion to action in a 'mere' 20 years.

Additionally, there is some contemporary evidence that the concept of recipient 'ownership' of aid has indeed borne fruit. This is further addressed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4: Findings and Analysis - Recent bureaucratic-level engagements between Japan and South Africa

As the culmination of the thesis, this chapter lays out the various findings of the field research, coupled with an analysis of these findings. To contextualise these results, the chapter begins with a discussion of the various organizations that were selected for examination, including a review of the official mandates and stated priorities of these bureaucracies. It then presents the major outcomes of the interviews and goes on to discuss the themes and issues that emerged during this process.

By way of review, these interviews involved inquiry into the different perceptions, connections and stated priorities of some of the various government agencies involved in Japan-South African relations. As explained previously, the rationale behind this method of inquiry is that in the field of Japanese-South African relations, understanding of the different bureaucracies and their impact on the relationship is lacking. In order to rectify this matter, a bureaucratic analysis was deemed necessary. This would help develop a better understanding of the different bureaucracies and their roles in the relationship.

On the South African side, the key concern of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was found to be regional integration and job creation, primarily via mineral beneficiation projects. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (Dirco) was also concerned with finding trade partners to support beneficiation, as well as fostering greater regional integration and forging partnerships with strategic countries. This concern for regional integration can be linked with the broader drive for integration by the African Union, and the various African Regional Economic Communities, such as the South African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

From the Japanese side, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) both seemed to be concerned with maintaining Japanese competitiveness through signing Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) or Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with selected countries. This would maintain market access for Japanese products and ensure the supply of raw materials for the Japanese economy.
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was primarily concerned with maintaining its relevance in the South African donor 'marketplace', but it was also focused on supporting regional integration efforts through providing financial support for regional infrastructure programmes. At least some of these infrastructure programmes would also assist in the export of materials to other nations, including Japan.

The results of the interviews were examined via two particular avenues or themes. These avenues of research emerged during the research process as a means of interrogating the various elements of how Japanese and South African bureaucracies have interacted, and how this has impacted on the relationship. Both of these themes have been emergent, in that they appeared as significant factors or issues worthy of discussion during the field work phase. This was largely determined by noting which issues seemed to emerge during multiple interviews, and how different organizations seemed to speak to these same issues in different ways.

The first theme was a discussion of South Africa as an operating environment for Japanese agencies, in particular the way in which the interplay of South African assertiveness has impacted on JICA's activities. This is considered in conjunction with the principle of 'ownership', which has been a consistent theme in Japanese aid discourse in the context of Africa and TICAD. It became apparent that South Africa presents unique challenges to Japanese agencies, largely due to the greater assertiveness and independence of the various South African government agencies, by comparison with other African countries. JICA has responded to this environment by altering the scope and nature of its operations to conform to this environment.

The next theme for interrogation was the history of the proposed South Africa – Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, and the possible causes of its failure. The EPA is read as a departure from the much touted 'reactive state', and represents an element of a broader Japanese thrust for increased bilateral agreements, in order to maintain its global economic competitiveness.

While the negotiation process did suffer from issues caused by bureaucratic misperceptions or miscommunications, the true reasons for the EPA's failure were found to be largely bound up in concerns over the value of the trade deal for South Africa, and the complexities of
negotiating such an agreement within the context of SACU and SADC. Additionally, SACU capacity constraints contributed to the demise of the EPA.

4.1 Mandates and priorities, strategies and programmes

Within the South African government, Dirco operates as a facilitating and intermediary organization, with the responsibility of articulating South African policy to foreign groups, as well as arranging meetings between South African government organizations (such as the DTI) and relevant external parties (such as potential investors). Additionally, Dirco is responsible for organising structured bilateral meetings between the South African and Japanese governments. Ministerial visits and meetings, however, are organized by the Ministry of the Presidency (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012).

Internally, Dirco is separated into Branches, which are broken down into Chief Directorates, which subdivide into Directorates. Directorates are organised geographically. For example, the Central and East Asian Directorate handles issues involving the various "-stans" (excluding Afghanistan and Pakistan) and Korea and Japan. Naturally, a large amount of the substantive work is handled by missions abroad. Dirco offices in South Africa provide support for this work (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012).

Inter alia, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation's general strategic priorities as laid out in their 2010 strategic plan are to "promote programmes aimed at regional economic integration, prioritise the implementation of NEPAD...strengthen the AU and its structures [and] continue to invest...in the promotion of peace, stability and security among countries of Africa" (Dirco 2010:2).

In relation to Asia, Dirco's stated policy is to "place [a] high priority on the strategic partnership between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and intensify economic relations with Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as selected countries of Central Asia" (Dirco: 2010: 14 - 15).

In the context of aid:

"South Africa will also continue to engage these countries to direct development
assistance to the national priority areas of the South African Government. The emphasis in bilateral and multilateral engagements within the context of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC), Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) and the Korea-Africa Forum (KAF) will be on the implementation of the various development initiatives for Africa, particularly to ensure that they are aligned to the NEPAD and REC priority programmes" (Dirco 2010: 15).

During interviews, a Dirco representative indicated that two major issues that Dirco was concerned with were maintaining South Africa's international economic competitiveness, and seeking out partners who would facilitate beneficiation projects. He indicated that they were highly interested in encouraging trade and investment that would support beneficiation efforts. This links with the emphasis placed on beneficiation by the DTI, but Dirco was also particularly concerned with maintaining issues of market access and competitiveness. Australia was specifically mentioned as a potential rival to South Africa, in the sense that Australia sold large amounts of raw resources to Asian countries, although Australia had specifically steered clear of any beneficiation strategies (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012).

Meanwhile, the Department of Trade and Industry's priorities, as laid out in their medium term strategic framework for 2010 – 2013, are articulated through multiple projects intended to generate employment and alleviate the effects of the global financial crisis. The DTI derives this mandate from the government's Medium Term Strategic Framework, "which identifies the creation of decent work as the primary objective of South Africa’s economic policy" (Department of Trade and Industry 2010).
In this vein, beneficiation and the subsequent development of manufacturing has been a major priority for the DTI. DTI Minister Rob Davies, in a press conference held in Tokyo, made the argument that:

“while we've been growing, we also need to develop...And I think we know that there's been no case anywhere, at any time in economic history, of any country that has gone from being poor to rich without developing value added products, that we cannot continue to grow just on the basis of producing and exporting primary products, and importing and consuming products that are made elsewhere” (Japan National Press Club, 2012: 8:29).

These beneficiation efforts are clearly explained in a strategy document released by the Department of Minerals and Energy, entitled “A beneficiation strategy for the minerals of
Although released by the Department of Minerals and Energy, this document “was a product of an interdepartmental task team consisting of representatives from the DME, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department of Science and Technology, the Department of Public Enterprises, the National Treasury, and the Presidency – highlighting the need for a collaborative effort to successfully implement this strategy” (Van Der Merwe 2009). So, while an interdepartmental initiative, the beneficiation strategy is clearly a major part of the DTI's priorities and strategic thinking. This was confirmed by DTI officials (Interview, DTI Official, 7 June 2012). The final beneficiation strategy document states that, "The beneficiation strategy provides a framework that seeks to translate the country’s sheer comparative advantage inherited from mineral resources endowment to a national competitive advantage" (Department of Minerals and Energy 2011: iii). Briefly stated, beneficiation involves attempts to boost the local economy and generate employment by encouraging local processing of raw materials and subsequent manufacture of goods from those raw materials. For example, instead of exporting raw platinum ore to be processed abroad, beneficiation would see the platinum being processed locally and then made into car components or jewellery in South African factories. Currently precious metals comprise South Africa's largest export to Japan. As Figure 4.1 clearly shows, of these precious metals, platinum is by far the greatest. Other precious metals and gemstones are exported in virtually negligible quantities.

As part of this beneficiation strategy, specific sectors have been identified for interventions, including automotive components such as catalytic converters, which are produced using platinum (Department of Minerals and Energy 2011:18). This element of the beneficiation strategy would have implications for Japanese automotive corporations such as Toyota and Mitsubishi, and by extension, broader trade with Japan. The beneficiation strategy also explicitly mentions Japan as a target for jewellery manufacturing, in which the same strategy of encouraging the local manufacture of finished products would be implemented (Department of Minerals and Energy 2011: 18). It should be noted that despite the DTI's support for this programme, South Africa has struggled with the beneficiation process, and has had to resort to various measures in an attempt to support it. For example, in 2007 the

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17 Van Der Merwe is discussing the 2009 draft strategy. The final strategy is dated June of 2011.
18 See Chapter 1, Figure 1.1 for general exports from South Africa to Japan.
South African government proposed banning the export of raw chrome ore in an attempt to prop up the local ferro-chrome industry, which was suffering heavily from competition with Chinese ferro-chrome manufacturers (Hill 2007). As of 2012 the chrome processing industry was still struggling, with "raw chrome ore exports smashing the chrome industry" (Creamer 2012).

Significantly, the beneficiation strategy states that "South Africa’s trade agreements, both current and future, must seek to support the beneficiation policy of government" (Department of Minerals and Energy 2011: 11). This position has been reiterated in a speech by Mineral Resources Minister Susan Shabangu (Sabinet 2011). As is discussed later, this position may have had implications for the proposed Japan – South Free Trade Agreement.

Another key priority that the DTI articulates is the development of South-South relations, specifically with China, India and Brazil. Within Africa, "efforts will continue to consolidate the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC’s) Free Trade Area (FTA) as the anchor of regional economic integration, while also pursuing integration with the African continent and the Trilateral FTA between SADC, the East African Community and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa" (Department of Trade and Industry 2010).

At least one of the strategies for fostering regional integration has been through improving transport infrastructure that will assist in regional trade. South African Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies also discussed this at the press conference in Tokyo, during which he said, in reference to the COMESA-EAC-SADC region, that “We need to build infrastructure that connects our countries so that we can trade, one with another” (Japan National Press Club 2012: 11:55).

In another statement from the same press conference, Minister Davies was asked about what the South African government expected from Japanese companies in the realm of infrastructure. In his response the Minister emphasised the importance of “the infrastructure that is going to link up our countries”, explicitly contrasting this with the extant infrastructure, which primarily facilitates the export of resources from the African continent (Japan National Press Club 2012: 27:45).
These statements strongly support the contention of analysts such as Skidmore (2004) that, at the rhetorical level at least, South Africa's economic diplomacy remains focused on South-South diplomacy and regional integration.

This quest for integration is largely premised on the notion that better connectivity will foster regional integration, and assist in increasing regional trade. Khandelwal explains that:

“Regional integration has long been seen in Africa as a means of achieving industrialization and modernization through encouraging trade and securing economies of scale and market access...Several studies (see Iqbal and Khan, eds.,1997) have pointed out that African trade has been hindered by distorted trade regimes and high transaction costs owing to inadequate transport, information, and communications infrastructure” (Khandelwal 2004: 6).

These notions are by no means peculiar to the South African government. Rather, this can be seen as a persistent and continuous theme, laid out in policy statements and founding documents from the African Union, as well as RECs such as COMESA and SACU.

For the AU, this integration drive is underpinned by the Treaty of Abuja (1991), which set the ground for these integrative efforts. As a recent Status of Integration in Africa report explains

“The Abuja Treaty lays the ground work for the creation of the African Economic Community (AEC), whereby the economies of the Member States of the AU will be fully integrated. The goal of the AEC is to transform the fifty three economies of Africa into a single economic and monetary union, with a common currency, free mobility of capital and labour. It is the desire of the leadership of the continent as stipulated in the Constitutive Act to have an African Central Bank, an African Monetary Fund and an African Investment Bank in place when the AEC is fully functional” (African Union Commission 2009: 8).

The report goes on to note that:

“Regional integration in Africa has been the main focus of African Countries since the establishment of the then Organization of the African Unity (OAU). A number of
declarations have been made by Member States to move the integration process in Africa forward. Similarly, the Abuja Treaty, Lagos Plan of Action, African Private Sector Forum among others, emphasize the need to promote regional integration in Africa” (African Union Commission 2009: 11).

In line with this goal, the various RECs that fall within the AU have all generated their own plans and schemes for furthering regional integration. As COMESA’s strategy website explains:

“COMESA’s ultimate objective is to create a fully integrated and internationally competitive and unified region in which goods, services, capital and persons move freely. The principal route that has been chosen in order to realise this goal is development integration through development of trade and investment. The primary instrument for achieving trade development is trade liberalisation and the freeing of market forces” (COMESA, no date).

Similarly, the SADC Treaty explains that SADC has been founded to “promote regional economic welfare, collective self-reliance and economic integration” (SADC Treaty 1993: 1). This is informed by the notion that:

“Integration is fast becoming a global trend. Countries in different regions of the globe are organising themselves into closer economic and political ties. These movements towards stronger regional blocs will transform the world, both economically and politically. Firms within these economic blocs will benefit from economies of scale provided by large markets, to become competitive both internally and internationally” (SADC Treaty 1993: 2).

The South African thrust for regional integration has clearly not developed in a vacuum. The SADC treaty hearkens back to 1993, and it references an even older declaration made by then-member states in 1980 (SADC Treaty 1993: 1). A clear link can be seen between this broader programme, and the DTI and Dirco’s stated mandates to further integration.

Recently Japanese government agencies have begun placing significant emphasis on Africa as a resource provider and potential market. In relation to South Africa, Japan's interests also fall
under their broader economic diplomacy strategy of signing EPAs and FTAs with foreign nations. The Ministry of Foreign Affair's Blue Book outlines Japanese foreign policy priorities and positions from year to year. Although it often lacks detail, it is an excellent indicator of Japan's public, considered positions on a range of topics.

The 2011 Blue Book's section on Africa is not extensive, but it does state that "Africa is becoming increasingly important for Japan’s diplomacy" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 16). Among other reasons, the Blue Book mentions that "it is also important for Japan’s economy to strengthen economic relationship with Africa, a potentially huge market which is endowed with abundant natural resources" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 16).

The document goes on to state that "Japan continued to actively advance its policy on Africa in 2010", emphasising its developmental and humanitarian activities on the continent (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 16).

This Blue Book also lays out broad Japanese external economic policy as follows;

"Japan needs to actively advance economic diplomacy to strengthen its economy as the economic conditions inside and outside the country become increasingly severe, with a more fluid international situation, declining population, ageing society with a low fertility rate, and large fiscal deficit. Specifically, Japan will actively advance efforts in the fields of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), natural resources, energy and food, international promotion of infrastructure systems, and inbound tourism and Japan Brand” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 24).

Finally, the Blue Book states that:

"Actively supporting Japanese enterprises has become particularly important in recent years, with the advance of economic partnership worldwide and the rising demand for infrastructure" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 29).

The Ministry of Economy, Training and Industry's 2012 White Paper supports this notion, with the role of EPAs/FTAs being highlighted. This comes in a context of increased
international competition, and an increase in the number of FTAs with high levels of trade liberalization. Among others, the White Paper cites the US-Chilean Free Trade Agreement of 2004, and the US-Australian FTA of 2005 (METI White Paper 2012: 637).

The White Paper goes on to warn that:

“If Japan falls behind in taking initiatives toward EPA and if Japan’s trade and investment environment should pale compared to those of other nations, the locational competitiveness and export competitiveness of Japan will be damaged, bringing loss of employment opportunities. In particular, the lagging of Japan in taking initiatives will cause significant impact on Japanese companies’ competitiveness in correlation with South Korea” (METI White Paper 2012b: 641).

This notion is not original to the 2012 White Paper. For example, in 2010 the Japanese Cabinet released the “Basic Policy on Comprehensive Economic Partnerships”, which states, inter alia:

[I]f Japan’s trade and investment environment becomes less attractive than the environment in other countries, there is a possibility that future employment opportunities will be lost. In order to achieve the “strong economy” described in Japan’s New Growth Strategy (endorsed by the Cabinet on 18 June 2010), it is necessary to deepen economic relationships with Asian and emerging countries whose markets are expected to grow, and with Western and resource-rich countries (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2010).

From this, it appears that Japanese economic priorities in South Africa will encompass greater resource access and promoting Japanese business interests. Japanese policy makers appear to have been infected with a sense of urgency. They believe Japan needs to sign EPAs and FTAs in order to maintain its competitive edge against other manufacturing economies such as South Korea.

The value of the MOFA Blue Book, the METI White Papers and the Basic Policy on EPAs is that they consist of high level, carefully considered policy statements, which gives them particular value in drawing conclusions about Japanese mandates and overt priorities. Field
research in the form of separate interviews with DTI, Dirco and Japanese Embassy officials indicates that at least one of these stated agendas has clearly been acted upon, in the form of the proposed EPA\(^\text{19}\) between Japan and South Africa (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012; Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 2012).

Current Japanese strategy involves an integration of efforts between different Japanese government agencies. During the Mining Indaba in February of 2012 METI Senior vice-Minister Tadahiro Matsushita gave a speech entitled "Kizuna\(^\text{20}\) – New Ties between Japan and Africa". In this speech he highlighted Japanese aid initiatives in Africa in the context of corporate social responsibility, and the potential benefits of Japanese corporations investing in Africa. He also pledged Japanese government support for Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives, stating that "The Japanese government will be pleased to support [CSR] projects through the utilization of ODA and other aid measures" (Matsushita 2012: 4).

Another example of this integration of developmental initiatives with economic agendas can be seen in the joint statement released by Japan and South Africa DTI Minister Rob Davies’ visit to Japan. In a joint statement with METI Minister Yukio Edano, both countries emphasized the facilitation of trade and developmental initiatives, particularly "supporting Africa's development plans, [and] preparing for the fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICADV)" (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2012). In conjunction with Matsushita's speech at the Mining Indaba, this statement suggests that while METI's focus is naturally on economic and trade issues, it is clearly aware of the importance of developmental and aid issues in the South African context (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2012; Matsushita 2012).

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (Dokuritsu Gyousei Houjin Kokusai Kyouryoku Kikou, "Independent Administrative Institution for International Cooperation") is the key mechanism by which Japan dispenses humanitarian aid abroad. Previously the overseas cooperation arm of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, it has been spun off into its own entity. Assigned in 2008 as an umbrella body for Japanese aid initiatives, JICA claims to be the world's largest bilateral aid agency, with a budget of over 10 billion dollars (Japan International Cooperation Agency 2008). A report by Africa-Asia Confidential explains that

\(^{19}\) See 4.3 for a more detailed discussion of this proposed agreement.

\(^{20}\) Kizuna is a Japanese word meaning close bonds or ties between people or a group of people.
"In October 2008, the whole aid system was reformed with JICA now handling yen loans and much of the grant aid," (Africa-Asia Confidential 2008). Prior to this the responsibility for technical cooperation, Official Development Assistance loans and grant aid were spread between JICA, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the Ministry for Foreign Aid (Interview, JICA Representative, 6 June 2012).

The Japan External Trade Organization (Nihon Boueki Shinkou Kikou, “Japan Foreign Trade Promotion Organization”) is another independent administrative agency. It is primarily funded by METI, with some additional funding from the Japanese Ministries of Finance and Agriculture (Interview, JETRO Representative 6 June 2012; Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry 2012a).

According to JETRO's official website, "Originally established in 1958 to promote Japanese exports abroad, JETRO's core focus in the 21st century has shifted toward promoting foreign direct investment into Japan and helping small to medium size Japanese firms maximize their global export potential” (Japan External Trade Organization 2012).

In South Africa, JETRO's mission is to increase trade and investment between South Africa and Japan. Allegedly, this is bilateral in direction, with JETRO supporting both Japanese companies seeking to invest in South Africa, and South African companies looking to invest or trade with Japan. The specific ratio of Japanese to South African companies that JETRO assists is unknown, however, and it would be somewhat surprising if JETRO did not, in fact, direct most of its assets towards assisting Japanese companies with market access in South Africa. Of late, as commodity prices have increased, JETRO has prioritised the promotion of market access for Japanese companies in South Africa (Interview, JETRO representative, 6 June 2012).

JICA has some level of organizational independence, while JETRO is rather more dependent on the Japanese embassy for diplomatic and organizational support. This is not due to differing levels of legislative autonomy, but rather due to their different sizes and capacities – within South Africa, JICA is somewhat larger than JETRO, and consequently has more organizational capacity. In particular, when it comes to matters of access to South African government officials and agencies, JETRO tends to rely on the Japanese Embassy to assist it with access, whereas JICA usually handles its own liaison activities. JICA and the Japanese
Embassy do still coordinate closely however, with regular meetings.

Within South Africa, almost all Japanese policy is coordinated through the Japanese Embassy. The Embassy acts as a “gate-opener” in South Africa. It assists Japanese businesses and government agencies such as JICA and JETRO in gaining access to government officials and in resolving issues such as problems with permits and other bureaucratic processes (Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 2012).

The Japanese Embassy is well suited to assisting JETRO by liaising with the South African government, since it also helps individual Japanese businesses with navigating the South African government bureaucracies. This assistance becomes necessary when, for example, a mining business has applied for an exploration permit but has not received any response from the government. Generally, although JETRO could be involved in such matters, Japanese corporations often prefer to approach the Embassy directly, in order to maintain confidentiality when it relates to matters such as exploration permits (Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 2012).

Internally, the Japanese Embassy hosts staff members from the Japanese MOFA, METI, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and MEXT, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Technology (Interview, Japanese Consul, 15 May 2012). As a result of this integration, it was decided to treat the Japanese Embassy as a singular entity, which can be expected to take its cues from the stated objectives of both MOFA and METI.

In Cape Town the Japanese Consulate operates as a satellite organization. However its distance from Pretoria results in the Consulate receiving some de facto autonomy, although it is still very definitely a subordinate entity to the Japanese Embassy. Staffing and resource constraints affect the Japanese Consulate significantly. Combined with a limited mandate, this results in the Consul generally confining itself to three areas: offering consular assistance to Japanese visitors, promoting Japan as a tourism destination and implementing cultural exchange programmes (Interview, Japanese Consul, 15 May 2012).

As part of this public diplomacy the Japanese Consulate has arranged exhibitions of art by Japanese school children at locations such as George Museum in the Western Cape, and at the
Japanese Consulate in Cape Town (George Museum 2012).

Due to Parliament being located in Cape Town, however, the Japanese consul also meets with Members of Parliament (MPs) in order to discuss South African - Japanese relations, and to provide MPs with information on Japanese topics, such as reconstruction efforts following the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami. Higher level meetings, such as with Ministers, take place exclusively through the Japanese Embassy, although the Japanese Consul may meet with provincial officials. When the Japanese Ambassador visits Cape Town to meet with MPs or other high level officials the Japanese Consul usually sits in on those meetings (Interview, Japanese Consul, 15 May 2012).

The Japanese Consulate has a very limited amount of engagement with trade issues. Occasionally the Japanese Consul meets with JETRO at business forums hosted in Cape Town, but it is clear that JETRO's primary relationship is with the main Embassy in Pretoria (Interview, Japanese Consul, 15 May 2012).

4.2 South Africa as an Operating Environment for Japanese Agencies

Japanese agencies in the study consistently reported adjusting their operations to suit South African conditions. For example, the Japanese Embassy restructured their internal organization to mirror the South African structure at the departmental and ministerial levels, in order to facilitate bilateral communication and cooperation. Additionally, JICA has had to significantly adjust the nature and type of its operations 1) to meet its internal mandates in relationship to South Africa's nature as a middle income country, 2) as a result of specific issues raised by the South African government (Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 2012; Interview, JICA Official, 6 June 2012). As mentioned earlier, METI has also clearly internalised the importance of at least making positive statements on aid and development issues in relationship to South Africa, and integrating these notions into its economic diplomacy. (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2012)

These adjustments have been made necessary by the peculiar demands and circumstances of South Africa and its development trajectory, as expressed by the vigorous and assertive responses of the South African government to Japanese projects and actions. It is also possible that the relative distance of the two countries, and the limited size of the Japanese community
in South Africa has had an effect on Japanese operations: Officials at JETRO felt that the Japanese government had a limited footprint in Africa, with insufficient resources and few organizations to promote Japanese interests. The Japanese Embassy also cited resource constraints as impacting on their operations (Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 2012; Interview, JETRO Official, 6 June 2012).

South Africa's relative wealth compared to its neighbours (and indeed, most of sub-Saharan Africa) also means Japanese aid agencies have had to engage South Africa in a significantly different fashion to that of other African countries. As mentioned previously, assertiveness, relative bureaucratic complexity and a tendency to challenge perceived North-South patterns of development, trade and aid have been hallmarks of the South African approach to ODA from Japan (Alden 2002, Skidmore 2004).

Additionally, South Africa's political location within SADC and SACU has presented specific challenges for the Japanese diplomatic community in their quest to deepen economic ties through the signing of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). This was demonstrated by the foundering of the EPA initiative, which is discussed in some detail later on.

In ODA matters, JICA has experienced South Africa as being a significantly more challenging operating environment than its neighbouring countries, and as a result, has had to adapt quite significantly to South African conditions. (Interview, JICA official, 6 June 2012). Financially, of course, South Africa is quite a different case to its neighbours. It is categorised as a Middle Income country by JICA, which affects the nature of aid that is provided. Specifically, direct grant aid of the type disbursed to countries like Mozambique is no longer generally sanctioned, in favour of loans and technical cooperation (Interview, JICA official, 6 June 2012). These loans, however, are also restricted. They are only permitted in cases where the host government (South Africa) provides a loan guarantee, which further complicates matters. According to at least one source, the SA government has been traditionally reluctant to provide loan guarantees, unless the loans were made to government parastatals such as Eskom (Interview, TICAD advisor, 5 June 2012).

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21 JICA takes its cue in determining this from the World Bank and the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
In this vein it is instructive to compare recent JICA funding profiles for South Africa and Mozambique. In FY 2010 JICA made grant payments of 48.91 million USD to Mozambique. In the same year South Africa received grant aid payments of a mere 1.21 million USD. Technical cooperation to Mozambique in 2010 cost 13.28 million USD, while technical cooperation to SA totalled 7.13 million USD (JICA 2012; JICA 2012a). These statistics would suggest that JICA disburses significantly more money in Mozambique than South Africa. This spending is largely driven by regional infrastructure projects including road and rail links, such as the Nacala Corridor, mentioned in Chapter 3.

By contrast, JICA’s projects in South Africa have been built around skills transfer and training projects. Education has been of particular centred on assisting with teacher training, and providing volunteers to assist in skills transfer in areas such as agriculture and Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises. JICA has held workshops and training programmes featuring programmes in areas such as nutrition and education. HIV/AIDS has featured prominently, but as noted earlier, JICA has focused on developing niche capabilities in HIV/AIDS work, primarily in the fields of monitoring, evaluation and training officers (Japan International Cooperation Agency 2012. Interview, JICA Official, 6 June 2012).

These differences are almost certainly largely driven by the fact that South African infrastructure is currently developed to a significantly greater extent than its neighbours. However, JICA has demonstrated some appetite for funding infrastructure inside South Africa, as shown by their apparent interest in funding a high speed rail system.22 Admittedly, it is quite unclear why JICA is interested in this particular project, and it is equally unclear how advanced any discussions around this project are. Although JICA co-hosted a conference with JETRO on improving rail systems in South Africa, it is not evident that this has resulted in any real momentum. As a result, it would be unwise to place too much emphasis on this initiative. JETRO’s involvement in this rail system suggests that it may have something to do with simply marketing Japanese rail systems to South Africa, as opposed to any form of integrated development scheme.

The construction of regional infrastructure however, is clearly in line with the priorities of the AU and RECs, such as SADC and COMESA, who have been prioritising infrastructure that

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22 See page 117 – 118 for more details on this proposed rail project.
will support integration. As noted earlier, integration is a major issue for the RECs, and they seek to support these efforts with the construction of transport infrastructure. The construction of One Stop Border Posts, which lower waiting times at borders and facilitate transnational trade, can be seen as supporting this drive for integration. It is certainly true that developments such as the Nacala corridor would have direct benefits for Japanese corporations seeking to extract and export mineral products and natural gas. However, improving links between SADC countries will also assist in developing regional trade and transport. A better, quicker border post between Zimbabwe and Zambia cannot really be seen as merely a tool for hastening resource extraction and the export of Africa’s mineral wealth. Rather, it appears to be an earnest effort to assist the region with one of its key priorities, namely, better regional integration. This is particularly interesting given the long history of ‘ownership’ as an element of Japanese aid discourse

4.2.1 Assertiveness and ownership

As mentioned previously, one of the key phenomena that emerged during the interview process is that South Africa is seen as having a more assertive, independent attitude than other sub-Saharan African countries in which JICA operates. This is particularly interesting in light of the observation by Alden that "post-apartheid relations with South Africa have been marked by dispute, disregard and controversy" (Alden 2002: 366). In particular, Alden notes that South Africa has a record of not uncritically accepting aid offers from Japan, but rather having quite an independent approach to development and aid programmes (Alden 2002: 379).

Similarly, Skidmore argued that "South Africa is also trying to use Japanese ODA to change the fundamental, typically North-South pattern of the economic relationship" (Skidmore 1999: 3).

Discussions with JICA and Dirco officials suggest that this pattern is still in place, with one JICA official complaining that South Africa demanded 'complex' bureaucratic procedures be followed, and had a very independent attitude. South Africa was contrasted with other African countries which apparently accepted aid offers with much less demur and with fewer complications (Interview, Deputy Representative, JICA, 6 June 2012).
For example, the DTI has engaged vigorously with JICA over skills transfer programmes. Initially, these programmes did not include agri-processing training, and this was one of the DTI's key priorities. The DTI raised these issues with JICA, and convinced JICA to send experts in agri-processing to South Africa to assist with skills development in this field. There have been further complications, due to the fact that Japanese agri-processing expertise is not always entirely suitable for South African agriculture. However, DTI officials very clearly felt that convincing JICA to send agri-processing experts was a significant 'win' for South Africa in this matter, largely because it dovetailed with DTI's goal of prioritising beneficiation projects (Interview, DTI Official, 2012).

It is valuable to compare the notion of South Africa as 'difficult' with the view at Dirco. An official from Dirco, during a discussion around TICAD, stated that South Africa was particularly good at contributing to and engaging in the TICAD process, by contrast with other African states that, in his view, had a more passive approach to the situation (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012).

This is a curious notion, given the long history of Japanese aid in Africa. As is explained below, Japanese aid discourse has a long history of valuing ownership, self-help and request based development, in which recipients are ostensibly responsible for determining priorities and making decisions about what kind of aid is needed, and how it should be delivered. Given South Africa's late entry as a recipient of Japanese aid, it is worth considering that some of the difficulties may have arisen as a result of insufficient experience on the part of both parties. South Africa may be inexperienced at handling Japanese aid, due to insufficient familiarity with the self-request system and ownership. Japanese aid agencies may have been more familiar with modalities and patterns of aid that, while appropriate in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, are not suited to South Africa. Indeed, as was mentioned by one interviewee (Interview, TICAD advisor, 5 June 2012), South Africa is no longer eligible for the kind of direct financial assistance that has been provided to other sub-Saharan African countries, by virtue of its position as a middle income country. Consequently, this limits JICA's activities to technical assistance, as opposed to direct grant aid.

It must, however, be considered that nearly 20 years have elapsed since the original Mandela aid package. Of course, the second aid package of 1999 was rebuilt based on lessons learnt following the failure of the first package, but it is unclear how much has been learnt following
that. It certainly appears that JICA has responded by redirecting its energies into lower profile aid initiatives. This is also partly driven by financial constraints (Interview, JICA Official, 6 June 2012).

In relation to ownership, TICAD places a lot of emphasis on the importance of recipient countries taking 'ownership' of aid processes (Interview, TICAD Advisor, 6 June 2012). Official TICAD documentation supports this notion, with ‘ownership’ featuring prominently in TICAD’s rhetoric.

The 10th anniversary TICAD Declaration by MOFA, following TICAD III, states that:

“the TICAD process has consistently promoted African development from the standpoint of African countries and peoples by assisting Africa to enhance its ownership of its development programs and reviving international partnership in support of such programs” (MOFA 2003).

Morrissey and Verschoor (2003) argue that ownership has a venerable history in development literature, citing extensive literature as supporting the necessity of ownership in development processes. Ohno and Shimomura also discuss the concept of ownership in aid process at length, depicting two different pertinent scenarios (Ohno and Shimomura 2005: 3 – 5). They first deploy a scenario of strong ownership, in which the recipient country generates its own development plan, decides on priorities and liaises with donors in order ensure that their programmes fit in with the overall thrust and priorities of the national development scheme. This is by contrast with weak ownership, in which the recipient country lacks planning capacity and is forced to share planning and priority allocation functions with donors. In this scenario, “Development management increasingly becomes a process of donor coordination, rather than government coordination of aid resources” (Ohno and Shimomura 2005: 4).

Renzio, Whitfield and Bergamasachi argue that ownership is a term that is often abused by donors, who claim great interest in ownership at the outset of projects, but in practice tend to begin sliding away from it as soon as they encounter difficulties:

“Ownership is often used by donors to mean commitment to policies, regardless of how those policies were chosen. This contrasts with ownership defined as the degree of
control recipient governments are able to exercise over policy design and implementation...while many aid agency officials start out with a commitment to ownership defined as control over policies, as soon as there is some disagreement over policy choices they tend to fall back on a definition of ownership as commitment to their preferred policies” (Renzio, Whitfield and Bergamaschi 2008: 1).

This concept of ownership is readily apparent in the TICAD literature and discussions. As is mentioned in the background chapter, both Ampiah (2005) and Lehman (2005) see ownership as being a significant and enduring part of the rhetoric around TICAD, starting back in TICAD II.

This concern for ownership appears to be replicated in the Japanese aid community in South Africa. A TICAD advisor and expert on Japanese aid and development went to great lengths in the interview to emphasize the importance of ownership in Japanese aid in Southern Africa (Interview, TICAD Advisor, 5 June 2012). This concept of ownership must be understood within the longer history of ownership and self-help within Japanese aid discourses. As Ampiah argues, the notion of 'self-help' has a long history within Japanese thought, dating back to the Meiji Period (Ampiah 2012: 168), and it can easily be ascertained in both Japan's ODA charter, and in various TICAD declarations and papers (Ampiah 2012 168 - 170).

However, as Ampiah shows, this notion of self-help has been conflated with concepts of ownership in Japanese aid discourses. Furthermore, Ampiah is unconvinced that the value of self-help in the context of national development has been demonstrated (Ampiah 2012: 170).

Having said that, Ampiah still sees Japanese ODA as clearly contrasting with Western approaches. Ampiah writes that:

“In regards to Africa, however, broadly speaking Japan has operated within the framework of the luminaries of the donor regime, and therefore has largely subscribed to the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, especially in the 1980s. Essentially, the policymakers behind Japanese ODA to Africa endorsed demands of the World Bank and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) for Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP), good governance, and human rights in the African countries (as a condition for economic assistance). All the same, operating in the interstices of such prescriptions
Japan tended to offer a different kind of economic assistance to the African countries.”
(Ampiah 2012: 168)

For Ampiah, this “different kind of economic assistance” is readily visible in Japanese aid programmes in Ghana, where “Japan (as a donor) was less intrusive in policy matters”
(Ampiah 2012: 169).

References to this notion can be found in MOFA’s official ODA Report from 1997, which states that:

“The goal of development is "people-centered"; in other words, the goals of development must be focused on improving the quality of life for individual human beings. This requires stress on both "ownership" - i.e., the primary responsibility of the developing countries themselves to seek to improve their own status - and "partnership" - i.e., ties with industrialized countries that support developing countries in these efforts. In particular, the idea that serious self-help efforts by developing countries are the most important element in development's success is based on Japan's own postwar experience and on the experience of the Asian countries that primarily Japan has supported in their development efforts. ” (MOFA 1997: 8)

This section of the report concludes by stating that “The most important key to the NDS is respect for the developing countries' "ownership." ” (MOFA 1997: 8)

Clearly, there is a dialectic emerging from South Africa's assertive posture towards JICA and the TICAD process. It would appear that JICA sees South Africa as being an assertive and possibly even difficult partner. On the other hand, when questioned, a Dirco official saw South Africa as being much more effectively 'engaged' in the TICAD process, by contrast with other African countries which were less inclined to 'take ownership' of projects, and occasionally unfortunate tendency to merely accept what was given and then make further demands (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012).

This view should be considered in the light of Ampiah's discussion of ownership in Japanese aid discourses, as mentioned above.

Additionally, as Ampiah notes:
“the African Diplomatic Corps (ADC) in Tokyo formed a TICAD IV Committee in October 2006 in an attempt to calibrate the TICAD process by bringing more African agency into it, since they felt the African voice could be more effectively represented in its operations... Consequently, in its proposals for TICAD IV the ADC affirmed the twin concepts upon which TICAD is based, namely ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’ but then questioned the ownership ideal enshrined in it.” (2012: 176).

In other words, Ampiah documents a significant push for increased ownership from the African Diplomatic Corps. It is entirely possible that the Dirco official was not aware of this, or simply had a different perspective on these events.

In any event, from Dirco’s perspective, South African engagement with Japanese aid processes would appear to be a positive and necessary trend, with South Africa taking an active role in aid-related decisions – the very 'ownership' that TICAD calls for. However, this does not mean that the process becomes easier for JICA. By demanding more engagement from aid recipients, TICAD aspirations could in fact make aid processes more demanding for the giver as well as the receiver, since instead of merely handing over aid as usual, they are drawn into a much more complex, contested relationship.

It would appear that the South African government takes the concept of ownership very seriously, and has adopted it with significant effect. Aid proposals from JICA are evaluated in terms of South Africa's developmental priorities and agendas. Where they are deemed inadequate or ill fitting, they are rejected, or JICA is pressured to alter them. It is unknown how deftly or otherwise this is expressed, and how this kind of engagement is handled. It is also unclear precisely how much of this phenomenon simply arises from South Africa's vigour in taking ownership of the aid process. If, as JICA reported, bureaucratic systems are impeding legitimate and valuable aid processes, this is a matter that would be worth looking into.

Internally, JICA's general priorities in South Africa have been HIV/Aids, unemployment and regional infrastructure, but until now JICA has generally steered clear of or been unable to implement infrastructure initiatives. During August 2011 JETRO and the Japanese embassy hosted an information session in Gauteng about Japanese train systems, titled the "Japan –
Southern Africa Railway Conference”, (JETRO 2011) and at the moment JICA is also involved in a mooted high speed rail project between Durban and Johannesburg, apparently through assisting with development planning or (potentially) offering loans (Interview, JICA Representative, 6 June 2012). However, there is no evidence that this rail project is in fact going to be realised, or reach a serious planning stage. Additionally, it is unclear how much institutional muscle JICA has managed to bring to the project.

Such a project would represent a significant deviation from JICA's previous activities in South Africa and would be worthy of scrutiny. Quite why JICA would be interested in taking on such a project is unclear, although the involvement of JETRO in hosting the conference suggests that it was seen as an opportunity for Japanese corporations and contractors to do business on the continent. This could be facilitated by offering tied loans, so that the trains and/or infrastructure were supplied by Japanese corporations.

In relation to HIV/Aids JICA has generally been forced to seek niche projects, where it can make a difference through monitoring and evaluation programmes. This is partly due to funding constraints, and partly because JICA has had to navigate a larger and more 'competitive' aid sector in South Africa (Interview, JICA Representative 6 June 2012). If we conceptualise the HIV/Aids oriented humanitarian aid systems and programmes within South Africa as an ecosystem, it appears that JICA has had to adapt to this ecosystem as a non-apex donor.

Beyond JICA’s experiences it is clear that South Africa has presented some specific and particular difficulties to the Japanese diplomatic establishment. As mentioned earlier, the Free Trade Agreement was significantly complicated by issues surrounding the involvement of SACU, and South Africa's seeming reluctance to sign any agreements without SACU’s involvement.

4.3 The Economic Partnership Agreement

In February of 2011 Japan sent a formal proposal to South Africa for an Economic Partnership Agreement23, which would include a Free Trade Agreement. The story of this FTA and how it

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23 It's worth noting that most of the interviewees seemed to use the phrases “FTA” and “EPA”
came to be perceived by different groups and was ultimately declined is particularly interesting because it sheds light on the differing perceptions, priorities and relationships among the agencies involved. This narrative was, at times, fragmented and even contradictory. This reflects the differing perceptions, priorities and explanations given by the various actors involved.

The offer for the FTA originated on the Japanese side. According to at least one Japanese official there was a lengthy period of silence before it was formally declined in November 2011 (Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 2012). This was quite possibly because of an extensive consultation process that had to take place on the South African side, involving Dirco, DTI and the South African Customs Union. It is not clear if the Japanese Embassy was aware of this process.

At least some voices within Dirco were quite positive about the prospect of an FTA, largely on the grounds that it would help secure market access for South Africa within Japan, and by extension, ASEAN+3 or any future Asian trading blocs that include Japan. South Africa faces significant competition within the SEA region from countries like Australia and Chile (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). Australia exports significant amounts of raw materials, particularly minerals, to Japan and is currently negotiating a trade agreement with Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs 2012). Chile has a similar export profile to South Africa and signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan in 2007 (Xinhua.net 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012, Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012).

Seen in this context, it would appear that signing a trade agreement to maintain market access is an important part of maintaining South Africa's competitiveness. South Africa would be able to maintain its access through this trade agreement and compete effectively with its rivals.

However, there are differing perspectives on and analyses of the situation. Opposing views on

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interchangeably. The clearest statement on this was from a Japanese Embassy official who stated plainly that it was an FTA, rather than an EPA (Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 5 June 2012). For a brief discussion on the difference, see MOFA 2003: III.

24 Minerals (primarily copper) and agricultural products. This is not congruent to South African exports, but it bears enough similarity that it is worth making the comparison.
the FTA usually approach this from a cost-benefit approach at the level of specific exports. In other words, regardless of the broader context, the concern is that South Africa will lose out due to its relative disadvantages in various economic sectors.

Initially, it was unclear who made the ultimate decision to reject the EPA, or even what the decision-making process looked like. The Japanese Embassy's perception was that the DTI had analysed the results of a Free Trade Agreement and had decided that it was not in South Africa's best interests (Interview, Japanese Embassy official, 5 June 2012). Similarly, there was a belief at Dirco that the rejection of the trade deal had been engineered by the DTI (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). However, officials at Dirco were under the impression that this was a result of the DTI's concern that any FTA would harm mineral beneficiation efforts, which have been a key part of recent economic strategy (Department of Minerals and Energy 2011).

This is not inconsistent with Allison and Halperin's (1974) theoretical notions of decision-making as a contested bargaining process between different organizations or agencies. The chief difficulty is that the initial narrative as to the bargaining or discussion process was somewhat confused.

Curiously enough, the Japanese Embassy believed that beneficiation was a non-issue when it came to the proposed FTA, largely on the basis that tariffs were not levied on mineral exports in any case. If (and only if) the FTA contained a clause banning export taxes that might create problems, but the Japanese Embassy believed that such a clause could be dealt with, and was not necessarily fatal to the prospect of an FTA between South Africa and Japan (Interview, Japanese Embassy Official, 6 June 2012).

Ultimately, the precise implications of the beneficiation strategy for South African trade deals are not clear, largely because the government has not clearly articulated (in a public forum) what precisely the impact of the beneficiation strategy on trade deals might be. It is reasonable to assume that this would probably entail avoiding signing onto any regimes that would increase exports of raw materials at the expense of manufactured goods. Having said

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25 This statement assumes, of course, that there was a single, ultimate deciding agency. Without making this claim specifically, there were conflicting reports as to which organisation(s) vetoed or opposed the FTA. Ultimately it was a larger issue than any one organisation.
that, the fact that the SA government has explicitly articulated this as a strategic element when considering trade deals makes it puzzling that the Japanese Embassy discounted it so readily. It is possible that the Japanese Embassy were simply unaware of the importance of this element of the South African government’s thinking, or, more likely, that they felt that the proposal as presented steered clear of such issues. This was not an entirely unreasonable proposition, since any threats to beneficiation could be dealt with in bilateral negotiations. However, in the long run it appears that beneficiation was not the only problem with the Free Trade Agreement, and broader concerns around regional integration and SACU were also deciding factors.

As it turns out, there had been at least one South African analysis of the impact of a trade agreement with Japan. However, according to the DTI this analysis was performed by the SACU Secretariat, and not the DTI. The DTI contacted and consulted with them, but claim that it was the SACU Secretariat who conducted the cost-benefit analysis and effectively vetoed an FTA. Additionally, concerns were apparently raised about the difficulty of implementation of an FTA by SACU members. The EU-South African TDCA was specifically mentioned as an example of the difficulties in implementing an EPA (Interview, DTI representative, 7 June 2012). Interviewees at the DTI specifically cited the length of time that it took many SADC and COMESA countries to implement EPAs, with some of them taking “years” (Interview, DTI representative, 7 June 2012).

An interesting issue that arises from this discussion lies in the way that different sectors of government perceived the potential costs and benefits of FTA. Dirco saw it as an issue of market access and trade relations, in a context of competition with other potential trading partners. The DTI, by contrast, was interested in the immediate impacts on local manufacturing and the South African economy. In interviews DTI officials explicitly raised concerns around vulnerable sectors, such as paper and textile industries (Interview, DTI Representative, 7 June 2012). This approach apparently discounts Dirco’s more international strategic approach, focusing on the specifics of how such an agreement would affect the immediate competitiveness each South African economic sector. However, DTI concerns are clearly linked with those of the Department of Mineral and Energy, who have developed the beneficiation strategy.
In order to examine SACU’s perspective on the potential Japanese-South African EPA, it is necessary to interrogate SACU’s history and perspective on trade affairs. In order to address this matter, it is very important to understand the patchwork of regional organizations in Southern Africa. It is also important to understand how previous EPAs and FTAs have related to this, and the dynamics that have arisen. From this brief history, it will hopefully become possible to understand the regional dynamics that may have impacted on the Japan – South Africa FTA.

4.3.1 Regional Organizations and trade agreements: Additional complications

Lorenz and Cornelissen discuss the history of SACU, SADC and the EU EPA negotiations in detail. In a separate paper, Lorenz discusses the way in which regional dynamics affected the negotiated EPAs between the EU and SADC, and the EU and EAS. Indeed, Lorenz argues that "the different outcomes in the EPA negotiations are rather determined by regional dynamics instead of by the EU’s role in the EPA negotiations" (Lorenz 2012: 24). This argument emphasizes the importance of SACU and SADC, noting that despite the best laid plans of the EU, the key determinant in these trade deals is the complex interplay between the different countries in the regional bodies of Southern Africa.

Lorenz and Cornelissen seek to reconceptualise SADC and SACU beyond the traditional notions of International Relations theory "as an institutionalised group of mutually exclusive territorial states with clearly demarcated geographical boundaries" (Lorenz and Cornelissen 2011: 241). Rather, they recast regionalism as "a relational arena produced through interactions between various actors beyond fixed geographical, political, economic, or any other boundaries" (Lorenz and Cornelissen 2011: 241 – 242).

The value of this approach lies partially in the way that it attempts to comprehend the region and its integration as an on-going process that arises from interactions between a host of actors, including government ministries, NGOs, private business and labour organizations. Additionally, as Lorenz and Cornelissen explain, Southern Africa hosts a complex, overlapping set of economic organizations and groupings, including the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) (Lorenz and Cornelissen 2011: 245). Significant overlap exists
between these groups, and this highly complicated arrangement has been criticized as potentially hindering regional integration (Lorenz and Cornelissen 2011: 247).

BNLS is not a formal organization *per se*, but refers to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland and is usually considered in this light as the non-South African members of SACU. As Kirk and Stern note "The defining characteristic of the SACU is the economic dominance of South Africa in contrast to the size of the other four members" (Kirk and Stern 2003: 171 – 172). In other words, BNLS are significant in terms of their relationship to South Africa and the operation of SACU, in which South Africa, as the regional hegemon, tends to be viewed as the dominant player. However, despite being grouped in this fashion, "the performance and management of the smaller SACU economies differs markedly from each other and South Africa." (Kirk and Stern 2003: 172) and it is important not to exaggerate their unity as a political bloc.

One specific issue arising from this multitude of regional organizations lies in the 'spaghetti bowl effect', a term first coined by the economist Jagdish Bhagwati in 1995. This can be thought of as a trade distortion caused by rules of origin resulting in organizations such as corporations seeking to maximise their benefits by preferentially sourcing their goods from within the trade bloc. However, it is not merely corporations that are involved in this issue: Lobbyists, trade organizations and politicians spend an inordinate amount of time manipulating rules of origin in order to achieve their desired outcomes (Bhagwati 1996).

As Akira Kotera (2006) puts it:

“"The presence of complex rules of origin (determining a country from which a product comes), would make it difficult to determine the country of origin, resulting in higher business and administration costs. When different complex rules of origin apply to different FTAs, things are even more complicated: both companies and governments would find them more difficult to understand and more costly to use.”

According to Fergin, this notion has been expanded beyond rule of origin issues and has spawned several related concepts, all under the umbrella of the 'spaghetti bowl' term. These include overlapping agreements complicating trade (Fergin 2011: 12).
Tavares and Tang discuss this problem in detail, noting that “Indeed, African countries that belong to more than one regional institution find themselves burdened with the technical, administrative and financial challenges of multiple memberships” (Tavares and Tang 2011: 224). An AU audit is cited as arguing that “multi-membership in different regional organizations leads to ‘irrational configurations, negotiating positions, and inconsistencies in harmonization and coordination of trade liberalization and facilitation’” (Tavares and Tang 2011: 32).

According to Tavares and Tang, “The several drawbacks of overlapping membership in African regional integration arise from the contradictory or conflicting obligations that numerous memberships entail for countries and regions.” (Tavares and Tang 2011: 224) They go on to document this overlap thoroughly, noting that “On average, 95% of the members of a regional economic community belong to another community” (Tavares and Tang 2011: 225).

One of the most useful examples of the way in which these regional complexities impact on South Africa signing a trade deal is probably the EU–South African Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). This must not be confused with the European Union's proposed EU-Southern Africa EPA, which is a separate multilateral agreement between the EU and Southern Africa that comes with its own set of important complications and issues.

In the wake of the signing of the SA-EU TDCA, SACU's non-South African members suffered quite significantly, and felt rather aggrieved by the process and the outcomes. Palollo Michael Lehloenya's discussion of SACU's reaction to the TDCA with the EU is instructive. As he points out, "Right from the start, however, some concerns were raised regarding the impact the TDCA would have on the BLNS countries, which effectively became parties to the agreement due to their economic integration with South Africa under SACU...Among the main setbacks experienced by the BLNS states after the signing of the TDCA was having to forgo an estimated 30 per cent of their tariffs on goods originating from the EU, while they received no new concessions from the EU in return" (Lehloenya 2009: 122).

Lehloenya explains that due to the common external tariff, the TDCA improved the EU's market access to BNLS, while not providing as great a benefit to SACU members as intended. EU companies did not significantly relocate their production facilities to South Africa, as had
been hoped for, and investment into Southern Africa did not greatly increase. However, the BNLS countries lost customs revenue due to EU products entering the SACU marketplace tariff free.

Additionally, they were exposed to increased competition with subsidised EU agricultural products.

Finally, as Catherine Grant points out "In a further negative twist, due to the rules of origin provisions in the TDCA, the BLNS will not be able to take advantage of the preferential access to the EU market provided for South Africa. The result of the TDCA could therefore be described as 'lose-lose' for the BLNS" (Grant 2006: 4).

In response to these concerns, the EU and South Africa responded by making concessions to BNLS, largely in the form of financial aid (Lehloenya 2009: 122).

In the case of the Japanese trade deal, an additional complication cited by the DTI lay in difficulties of implementation. As mentioned previously, DTI officials noted that SADC members had difficulties implementing earlier EPAs, such as the EU-TDCA.

This perspective gels with SACU's own analysis of the situation. Apparently the "SACU Council previously made an in-principle decision not to enter into a new negotiations until the current negotiations (WTO, SADC-EC EPA, India and COMESA/EAC/SADC Tripartite FTA) have been concluded" (Personal Communication, SACU Secretariat, 7 September 2012). This was largely due to a lack of negotiation capacity. The proposed EPA did not have enough apparent upside to offset these concerns, and consequently SACU declined to enter into negotiations around an EPA (Personal Communication, SACU Secretariat, 7 September 2012).

In this vein SACU, either in collaboration or in parallel with the DTI, made the calculation that the trade deal was not valuable enough to South(ern) African economic interests to make it worth further straining SADC negotiation capacities and rejected it.

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26 Early notification of the India-SACU Preferential Trade Agreement has been made to the WTO, and India and South Africa agreed to an early finalisation of the negotiations (Trademark Southern Africa 2013).
However, the nature of this calculation does depend on which specific benefits and losses are taken into account. In other words, the rationality of this calculation relates to a specific perspective in which broader strategic issues of market access are discounted in favour of an immediate cost-benefit analysis for individual market sectors. It could be argued that the importance of long term market access to any Asian trade blocs including Japan trumps the immediate downside of the EPA as presented. Indeed, as mentioned before, at least one official at Dirco emphasised the importance of market access as an issue for South Africa. These differences between the DTI and Dirco’s approaches to this matter resonate strongly with Allison’s perspective on policy as the outcome of a bargaining process between different bureaucracies (Allison and Halperin 1972: 43).

SACU’s influence on this process also supports this conception of the policy production process. In this case we can see that the response to the FTA was the result of a fairly complex process during which inputs arrived from the DTI, Dirco and SACU.

It is plain that SACU makes South Africa’s entry into new trade deals somewhat more complicated. Not only must South Africa consider the internal impacts of any new trade deal, but it is necessary for South Africa to consult with the other members of SACU as well, who must also develop their own positions, respond to any new deal, and then communicate these positions to South Africa. Following their experiences with the TDCA, it is doubtful if BLNS would be enthusiastic about a new trade deal, which could carry similar potential risks for them.

Ultimately, according to the SACU trade negotiator, there were two reasons for not entering into negotiations around the EPA. The first was based on an analysis of the products currently being traded. This analysis "revealed that most products showing potential could already be exported to Japan at duty free levels" (Personal Communication, SACU Secretariat Official, 7 September 2012). Agricultural products that did have potential and that were subjected to duties were also subject to other non-tariff barriers, such as strict phyto-sanitary regulations that would hamper exports.

As a result of this analysis, "when looking at existing trade only and the tariffs applied, there is an imbalance of tariff concessions in favour of Japan that SACU would face should it enter
into an FTA with the former” (Personal Communication, SACU Secretariat Official, 7 September 2012).

The second issue was that SACU felt its negotiating capacity was severely strained. As mentioned previously, according to a SACU Secretariat official, "The SACU Council previously made an in-principle decision not to enter into new negotiations until the current negotiations (WTO, SADC-EC EPA, India and COMESA/EAC/SADC Tripartite FTA) have been concluded” (Personal Communication, SACU Secretariat, 7 September 2012).

Evidently these regional complications and cross cutting loyalties and agendas extend beyond SACU. SADC presents an important additional layer of complexity and further problematizes trade issues.

It is important to understand that this difficulty in signing an EPA with SACU is not unique to Japan. Aside from the experiences of the EU-TDCA and the mooted US-SA FTA, the example of the (very brief) discussions with Turkey regarding an FTA is instructive. In August of 2011 the Turkish Foreign Minister visited South Africa. As part of the activity around this visit, it was announced that there would be a discussion of a Free Trade Agreement (Trading Economics 2011). This was followed by a visit by the Turkish Prime Minister in October, but by November the South Africa Cabinet announced that a Free Trade Agreement would not be signed, due to the potential for "destructive competition". Rather, South Africa would work towards a "mutually beneficial, cooperative and balanced approach to building trade and investment relations with Turkey" (Manyi 2011).

The phrase ‘destructive competition’ suggests that the chief concern among the Cabinet was damage to certain manufacturing sectors. Turkey is a major textile exporter\(^\text{27}\) and there may have been fears that an FTA with Turkey would exacerbate problems with the already weakened domestic textile industry, which has suffered greatly from Chinese exports.

In conclusion, it is safe to conclude that SACU was a significant complicating factor in the South African – Japanese trade deal. When this notion was put directly to the DTI they denied it (Interview, DTI Official, 7 June 2012), but it is fairly clear from the evidence, and the

\(^\text{27}\) Major exports are: textiles and clothing, automotive, iron and steel, white goods and chemicals and pharmaceuticals’ (Trading Economics.com 2012).
example of the TDCA, that SACU does increase the number of actors that need to be consulted with and propitiated in the event of South Africa considering a new trade deal.

4.3.2 Other actors: JETRO and COSATU?

Curiously enough, JETRO perceived the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) as being a significant stumbling block in the process (Interview, JETRO representative, 6 June 2012). No one else in the entire research process mentioned COSATU in any way shape or form, and JETRO's worry about COSATU seemed completely singular. Quite why this is the case is not perfectly clear. In fact, it is not clear that COSATU made any specific representations during the negotiations around this EPA.

JETRO representatives did point to COSATU's opposition to the Wal-Mart/Massmart merger as being evidence of COSATU being likely to oppose the FTA. It would appear that JETRO perceives COSATU as being generally against free trade and consequently a likely opponent of any free trade agreement involving Japan.

A review of COSATU's position on other trade agreements suggests that JETRO's fears may have some validity. As far back as 1999, during discussion of the SADC protocol on trade COSATU made calls to the DTI to "urgently conduct impact analyses which quantify the projected effects of the Protocol on specific sectors of our economy, both in terms of negative effects and possible job losses, and expansion opportunities" (COSATU 1999). In addition, they also stated that "As a trade union federation we cannot support job loss for South African workers, particularly given the extremely high unemployment rate we are currently faced with" (Ibid).

On the EU-SA TDCA, COSATU stated that "We are not convinced that jobs generated from increased exports to the EU will outweigh job losses from increased imports, although we do indeed hope that this will be the case" (COSATU 1999a). In addition, COSATU stated that "While it would be simplistic to reduce [job losses] to the only benchmark for evaluating policy, COSATU asserts that job creation and the prevention of job losses needs to be the primary criterion informing policy" (COSATU 1999a).
From these, JETRO could have come to the conclusion that COSATU has a tendency to be cautious towards trade deals. However, this has also been emphasized by COSATU’s tendency to stress the importance of integrated regional development, as opposed to separate bilateral trade agreements. Going back to 2009, COSATU has vigorously criticised so-called 'breakaway' trade agreements, in which individual SADC members sign trade agreements with external nations, saying that "Cosatu condemns these countries for sacrificing regional integration and the future of African integration in return for short-term benefits by increasing their exports to the [European Union]" (South African Press Agency 2009).

Despite all of this speculation and extrapolation, when contacted directly, COSATU denied making any inputs on (or even being aware of) the Japanese trade deal, and made the comment that it would probably hold the same stance on such a deal that it would on the Chinese trade deal (Personal communication, COSATU Official, 27 August 2012).

Quite where JETRO got their information from is still not plain, but it is clear why JETRO would have come to the conclusion that COSATU would not be particularly amenable to a South Africa – Japanese FTA. It is also possible that JETRO simply does not have good information about specifics of the political situation, due to not having a strong inside perspective on the progress of the trade agreement. Indeed, JETRO representatives indicated that they had difficulty gaining access to representatives of South African government (Interview, JETRO Official, 6 June 2012).

To sum up, JETRO was in favour of the FTA provided that there was an FTA, but JETRO also believed that the political environment was not conducive to the success of such an initiative. They saw COSATU as being opposed to the FTA, but it is unclear that COSATU had formulated any such position (although it was not impossible that they might).

One issue of significance was the question of an FTA's impact on South African manufacturing. Both JETRO and the Japanese Embassy were cognizant of this. JETRO saw it as a process that would result in some short term losers, but believed that the benefits of additional collaboration between Japanese and South African companies would more than offset this, arguing that an FTA represented an opportunity for increased joint ventures, greater collaboration and additional investment to flow into South Africa. On the other hand
the DTI were not as sanguine, perceiving the FTA to be a potential threat to both beneficiation and local manufacturing.

In summary, we can see at least three different extant perspectives on the proposed EPA. These are Japan-positive, SA-positive, and SA-negative. From the Japanese side, both JETRO and the Japanese Embassy were in favour of an FTA. Since the Japanese Embassy proposed the EPA, it is quite understandable that they would be in favour of it. JETRO can best be dubbed broadly trade-positive – they exist to promote trade between South Africa and Japan, and they are clearly in favour of increased investment and pro-business policies. Consequently, it is fairly clear why they are in favour of the EPA.

On the South African side matters become somewhat murkier. The pro-EPA arguments are largely around maintaining market access in a strategic context. The anti-EPA position is partially driven by concerns about the value of the proposed EPA, and partially by the complexity of entering into trade agreements as a member of SACU. However, there are at least two separate but abutting reasons for suspicion of the EPA. The first lies in SACU’s analysis, which holds that in most areas where Southern Africa holds a competitive advantage, tariffs are not an obstacle. The second is specific to the DTI, and lies in concerns around how South African industry, particularly the manufacturing sector, will fare in the face of increased Japanese competition. It is possible that memories of the severe damage dealt to South African textiles by Chinese imports have helped inform this position.

The problems with the FTA must be seen in the context of SADC and SACU as a trade bloc, and the way in which they impact and complicate South Africa’s priorities and operations.

These complications are significant. When considering the Japan FTA, any analysis must take into account not just the effects of the FTA on local manufacturing, but the possible effects on South Africa’s relationship with its neighbours in SACU. In addition, it is clear that signing external FTAs and EPAs can significantly complicate regional integration, which South Africa is (allegedly) committed to.

It is not clear that the Japanese Embassy could have achieved a different outcome from the EPA proposal. SACU’s involvement in so many negotiations is clearly straining its negotiating capacity, and its principled decision to not enter into additional negotiations is a significant
obstacle.

It is possible that if the EPA had been proposed at an earlier date, before SACU became enmeshed in other negotiations, SACU would have been more amenable. Additionally, if the EPA had come with better conditions attached, SACU may have been more inclined to consider it. However, this is all largely speculative. What is clear is that the Japanese Embassy would have had to present a highly effective diplomatic offensive in order to push an EPA past SACU's objections. As has been mentioned previously, SACU is wary of entering any FTA or EPAs at this point in time. An additional source of worry for any potential Japanese-South African EPA is that some of the areas of greatest interest to SACU, such as agriculture, are subjected to serious non-tariff barriers in Japan, including government subsidies. This would increase the difficulty of convincing SACU to endorse any FTA with South Africa.

On the South African side, the desire to protect the local manufacturing sector is another initial complicating factor. None of these issues are unique to the Japan-SA FTA, and in retrospect, it would have been surprising if they had in fact managed to resolve them and come away with a comprehensive EPA. Indeed, other countries such as Turkey and the US have struggled to conclude a fully-fledged FTA with South Africa for many of the same reasons.

In ODA matters, it is clear that Alden and Skidmore's accounts of dissension and difficulty have not been entirely resolved. As one interviewee noted, ODA is a “difficult matter” about which “much is said but little is done” (Interview, Dirco Official, 4 June 2012). However, JICA is still carrying out projects in South Africa in accordance with its priorities, and while it has been obliged to adapt significantly, it has become cognisant of this challenge and has managed to adapt to local conditions.

In conclusion, it appears that some of Alden's points about bureaucratic misperceptions continue to have relevance, although this must be heavily contextualised. Admittedly, it appears that in preparing the EPA the Japanese embassy had either imperfect information, or did not manage to adequately communicate the value of the EPA to South Africa. However,

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28 Japan protects domestic agriculture through a blend of tariffs and subsidies, as Marcus Noland (1993) explains. For a more recent evaluation, see the USDA’s report on Japanese agricultural policy (2012). Recent discussions over a mooted Trans Pacific free trade agreement have been hampered by farmers concerned over the potential loss of their subsidies (Tabuchi 2010).
this cannot be considered the ultimate cause of the EPA’s failure. Rather, this is eclipsed by the greater complexities and regional dynamics of SADC, as well as a lack of capacity and the unfortunate history of the EU TDCA.

More prosaically, simple concerns about the welfare benefits of an EPA with Japan assisted in its demise.

This project began premised on the notion that the literature on South African – Japanese relations has limitations which needed to be addressed in some fashion. It has done so, in a modest fashion, by attempting to understand the bureaucracies involved, and their impact on this relationship.

The literature review covered the major dimensions of this historical relationship, while the theoretical section reviewed the chief theoretical claims about and models of Japanese foreign policy. It also examined the bureaucratic policy process, and how it has been used in the past as a tool to analyse decision-making and policy formation within states.

What was not foreseen, and what had some notable implications, was the way in which the SACU secretariat would impact on this relationship. This was perhaps the most significant new variable, and it serves to highlight the growing importance of regional organizations and regional integration in modern politics and trade. Japanese South African relations are undoubtedly complicated and are mediated through their relative positions, both within the world economy, but also within their regional structures. Japan has begun a major economic offensive, seeking to regain lost ground in Africa, and to restart its once vibrant economy. This initiative can be seen as another of the departures from the reactive state discussed by Calder (2003) and more recently, Cornelissen (2012). The EPA proposal was a part of this offensive, but it fell victim to SACU’s lack of interest in further EPAs/FTAs, and a simple lack of welfare benefits for the South African economy. This lack of interest can be traced to the problematic results of the EU TDCA, and worrying internal capacity issues. While addressing the effects of the TDCA would be difficult at best, the internal capacity issues should be addressed by the SACU secretariat as a matter of urgency. An inability to negotiate potentially valuable deals is a problematic state of affairs, since it may prevent SACU from taking up or properly considering valuable opportunities.
Japanese-South African ODA relations have been troubled. This is unsurprising, given their history. JICA has, however, managed to adjust fairly successfully to the realities of the South African aid environment, through focusing on specific areas within which it can be effective. This is a good example of the kind of thinking that is needed in the Japanese aid community. If JICA cannot compete in terms of sheer resources, concentrating on quality of aid may be a way of staying relevant.

Disseminating information on the successes of past Japanese aid efforts, and the Japanese dedication to self-help and ownership may be one path by which JICA can continue to improve its position in this sphere. Another approach would lie in showcasing JICA’s support for AU and REC efforts towards regional integration, with the understanding that regional integration is a key priority for the South African government as well. The work that JICA has done on One Stop Border Posts is laudable, and should be highlighted as a case of JICA’s operations dovetailing well with the priorities of host countries.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

This chapter will review the trajectory of the thesis, discussing the key questions that emerged, the central findings and the implications of said findings for understanding the relationship between South African and Japan. This will be followed by a brief discussion of the theoretical implications of these findings, and will conclude with a description of potential areas for future investigation.

5.1 Key issues for investigation

This thesis has investigated how certain bureaucratic dynamics have impacted on the relationship between Japan and South Africa. After investigating the stated priorities and strategies of the various organizations, the relationship between these bureaucracies was examined via two thematic ‘lenses’ or perspectives. The first consisted of an inquiry into how factors peculiar to South Africa have affected Japanese government agencies. The second part involved an investigation into the history of the proposed EPA / FTA, and discussed the reasons for its ultimate failure, and how bureaucratic arrangements, perceptions and organizational dynamics affected this agreement.

5.2 Summary of the key findings

In relation to the first issue of investigation, the central finding was that South Africa has been a challenging environment for Japanese government agencies. The South African government’s assertiveness and perceived willingness to challenge extant systems and aid modalities has been a challenge for JICA. JICA has also had to adapt its operations to South Africa’s relative wealth vis-a-vis other African countries. Within a context of general distance between South Africa and Japan as well as resource constraints, these factors have all resulted in JICA having a relatively low profile presence in South Africa.

JICA has responded to this by seeking to develop specific competencies and niche sectors within which it can fulfil its mandate. Currently, it specialises in training officers in HIV/Aids
Regionally, it has funded infrastructure development programmes, which has assisted Southern African countries in developing regional transport infrastructure in their quest to further regional integration and increase internal trade.

The Japanese Embassy has also faced challenges during its work in South Africa. Again, some of this is the result of resource constraints.

The Embassy’s greatest test was in the form of the proposed EPA/FTA, which it pursued as part of Japan’s broader strategy of signing Free Trade Agreements with various countries around the world in order to expand market access and support Japanese economic growth.

In the case of the EPA / FTA the proposal was largely defeated by welfare concerns, particularly on the part of the DTI, as well as broader issues of regional integration. These welfare concerns can be seen against the backdrop of a general reluctance on the part of the South African government to enter into new trade deals. This general reluctance appears to be at least partly informed by the difficulty of simultaneously managing regional (SADC/SACU) integration with external free trade agreements.

Importantly, these issues transcended and were of fundamentally greater importance than questions around bureaucratic dynamics and (mis)communications. In the final analysis, it is doubtful that an alternative bureaucratic arrangement or a differently couched EPA/FTA proposal would have altered the outcome of this affair.

5.3 Theoretical implications

In relation to the theoretical issues, it can be seen that Allison's model of a contested bargaining process has definite merit. The process of discussion over the EPA/FTA is an excellent example of this, with not only different ideas, but a contested narrative emerging, suggesting that interviewees from different organizations had different perspectives on and information about the EPA/FTA decision.
As noted previously, the different organization's positions on the EPA abutted on their broader mandates and perspectives. For example, Dirco was interested in maintaining South Africa's broad, global access to trade blocs and competitiveness. The DTI, which naturally is involved in the specifics of local production, manufacturing and domestic industry, was quite clearly concerned about the specific and immediate impacts of any FTA on local industry.

This would appear to support Allison and Halperin's assertion that different agencies “come to see different faces of the issue” (1974: 48).

The DTI saw the 'face' of local employment and manufacturing. Dirco saw the 'face' of trade access and international competition with nations such as Australia and Chile. They were both cognizant of issues such as supporting mineral beneficiation processes, but the extent to which they weighted these issues in importance varied.

Consequently, there was a decision-making process that involved inputs from these different perspectives. However, the SACU Secretariat's involvement in the EPA issue is of particular interest, because it diverges slightly from the original Bureaucratic Policy Process as put forward by Allison, Halperin and Hilsman. Their discussions of bureaucracies and agencies exclusively involved internal organizations. Thus, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison was concerned with how American agencies related to other American agencies. Similarly, Hilsman discusses how the different internal government agencies of the US defence establishment made the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

However, in the EPA negotiations, the pertinent organizations were not merely national, but extra-national, in the sense that the SACU secretariat cannot be thought of as part of the South African government. Despite this, the SACU secretariat's perspective on this trade deal was still a significant factor, as can be seen by the way in which the DTI took care to consult them, and the fact that their analysis was clearly taken seriously by the DTI.

The relevance of “supranational” or “extra national” bureaucracies in the form of the SACU Secretariat is a new and intriguing factor, which needs to be considered in discussions of trade issues involving South Africa. This may suggests that in cases where the bureaucratic policy process model is adopted, it may also be necessary to consider external organizations such as
RECs and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) as additional variables, if they are pertinent to the topic at hand.

In terms of the three models of Japanese foreign policy (neo-mercantilist, reactive and middle power), no evidence was found to strongly confirm or refute any of these three approaches. However, it is possible that the findings can be used to add nuance or depth to any one of these three views.

In relation to Cox’s notion of Japan as a middle power, it is worth noting the way in which Japan has sought to use TICAD, particularly TICAD IV, to popularise and develop notions such as ownership and self-help within international aid regimes. Cox’ notion of the way in which middle powers attempt to generate new regimes and international law in order to provide them with space in which to operate resonates with the way in which Japan has sought to exert influence via the TICAD process.

Linking notions of middlepowership to Japan’s drive to sign trade agreements is a challenging proposition, however, and it is unclear how one would go about such a proposition.

If one applies a narrow reading of the reactive state model, it is plausible to read Japan’s recent drive to sign EPAs and FTAs as a departure from Calder’s reactive state. In effect, Japan is being pro-active rather than reactive – it is taking the initiative in order to further its economic agenda. However, as Hirata (1998) argues, one of the major limitations of the reactive model is that it does not explain Japanese foreign policy in situations where “Japan does not face gaiatsu, particularly from the United States” (Hirata 1998: 7). The US has no apparent input on Japan’s general drive for EPAs/FTAs, and as a result, it may be unwise to attempt to construe this as a departure from the reactive model. Instead, this EPA/FTA can be seen as highlighting the limits of the reactive model, in that it fails to explain Japanese policy in matters removed from US influence.

In terms of the neo-mercantilist model, it is certainly possible to see the EPA/FTA as part of a drive to secure market access and sources of raw materials. This is particularly important if Japan is to stay economically relevant in the face of heated competition from South Korea and China. While Japan enjoyed a long period of growth and prosperity following World War 2, observers generally agree that its economy has failed to impress in recent years, and Japanese
policy makers are likely to keenly feel the need to restart its growth. To this end, aggressive resource and economic diplomacy would appear to be one way of supporting efforts to revive the moribund Japanese economy.

5.4 Implications for future Japanese - South African relations

At the outset, it should be noted that material from TICAD V was not included in this study, and as a result, the resolutions, dialogue and decisions made at that conference may impact on this relationship. However, there are many aspects of the study that are still relevant.

Bureaucratic 'misunderstandings' have been cited in South African-Japanese relations, going back to Alden's work and the Mandela - Mbeki aid packages. However, although the EPA did not ultimately fall prey to these, it is not clear that enough institutional 'learning' has taken place since then to avoid future misunderstandings. Certainly, there were indications that Japanese – South African aid relations are not entirely harmonious, and this has to do, at least in part, with the differing expectations of and attitudes towards the aid process. Curiously enough, although South Africa's 'aggressive' attitude was noted by various Japanese respondents, it would appear that, in principle at least, there could be room for this within the logic of TICAD and the 'ownership' discourse. It is worth noting that although Japanese aid discourse stresses ownership, there was very little awareness of this commitment to ownership by the South African interviewees within the study. Quite how this dynamic has developed is unclear, and it is also unclear if the interviewees quite understood this, given the significant differences in their explanations of the situation. Sustained and intense dialogue on this matter would appear to be in order. Whether TICAD V will have had any impact on this situation is also unknown.

It became clear throughout the research phase that beneficiation was a major part of the thinking of South African officials, particularly at the DTI. Proposals for economic partnerships, new initiatives and closer linkages are all likely to be assessed in the light of how well they align with beneficiation projects. As a result, future Japanese policy makers may get better results if they couch their proposals in a way that they will align effectively with beneficiation projects, or at the very least, not be seen as a threat to beneficiation. Similarly, large auto manufacturers such as Toyota should keep a close watch on beneficiation
issues related to the extraction and processing of platinum and other relevant metals, such as chrome. While the beneficiation projects have not been uncomplicated, the South African government’s continued insistence on the importance of future economic projects aiding in the mineral beneficiation process should be taken into account by other roleplayers in this sector.

From the South African perspective, more attention should be made to ‘marketing’ beneficiation effectively to potential partners in Japan, both at the government and corporate levels. Perhaps one of the most important elements of this is demonstrating to potential partners that beneficiation does in fact make economic sense, and that South Africa is a cost-effective location to process minerals and manufacture components. While chrome beneficiation has been beset with difficulties, there have been some successes in South African manufacturing, particularly in the automotive industry. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to assess the plausibility of South African beneficiation efforts, but it may be worth examining whether the successes within the motor industry can be exported to other parts of the economy. Furthermore, if beneficiation is going to be such a major linchpin of South African economic policy, very serious consideration needs to be given to the question of how local manufacturing can be made into an attractive proposition for foreign investors.

Another issue that arose during the investigation is the impact of South Africa's regional integration on trade deals. It is clear that South Africa's position in SACU complicates its accession to free trade deals. At a minimum, it increases the number of organizations that need to be consulted (the SACU secretariat, for example, was consulted during the consideration of the Japan-SA EPA). However, it also means that South Africa must pay particular attention to how its trade deals will impact upon its neighbouring countries. The fallout from the EU-South Africa TDCA is a powerful object lesson. Not only did it take an extremely long time to implement, due to capacity constraints in SADC countries that were involved, but it resulted in a significant backlash from the BNLS countries, who felt that their economic interests had been significantly affected by the simultaneous loss of customs revenue, increased competition from EU goods, and a lack of reciprocal market access to the EU (Lehloenya 2009; Grant 2006).

As a result of these complexities, organising future trade deals is likely to be a complex affair,
and one that will not meet with easy success. In response to this issue, South African policy makers should seriously apply themselves to creating a framework or process that will a) streamline policy decisions around free trade deals and b) take into account the concerns of its regional partners, and effectively address them. Quite how such an arrangement would work is a complex matter, but at a minimum, it might be worth considering the formation a working group that considers each potential trade deal and liaises with organizations such as the SACU secretariat and other affected parties in making a decision.

If Japanese policy makers wish to remain relevant in the African context, they will need to increase the capacity of their agencies on the continent, both in the shape of JICA and JETRO. Increasing the size and resources of their diplomatic corps will also be necessary. All of the Japanese agencies polled stressed their limited capacity and resources. While this may be simply part of a general feeling that 'more is always' better\textsuperscript{29}, it is worth taking this claim seriously, particularly given that all of the Japanese respondents brought this up in their interviews.

\textbf{5.5 Areas for future investigation}

This investigation was a limited one, as has been noted in the first chapter. It was subjected to logistical constraints and specific delimitations, including a decision to exclude certain government organizations (such as the Treasury), and to avoid making certain organizational distinctions (such as between MOFA and MEXT).

However, despite these (de)limitations it has managed to expose certain issues for further investigation, and discussion.

Given that it was unsuccessful, the outcome of the EPA/FTA proposal, gives rise to the question of whether there is any future prospect of Japan and South Africa entering into a trade agreement. At the time of the study, this appeared unlikely, but this could change, if South African officials were to alter their opinion on either the welfare implications of such an agreement, or were to shift to a more ‘pro-trade’ stance, such as that held by certain officials

\textsuperscript{29} Allison and Halperin (1972:48) argue that bureaucracies tend to continuously seek greater resources for their organization, since they see their mission as vital to their country's interests.
at Dirco, who were generally in favour of the FTA/EPA on the basis of market access to any potential future Japan trade-bloc being a goal worth working towards.

More broadly, it is worth asking what are the key determinants of SA entering (or not) into a Free Trade Agreement or an Economic Partnership Agreement? What kind of deals will SA accept, and what will it reject? This is complicated by the issue of South Africa’s regional integration, and how this would affect potential FTAs and EPAs.

Another question worth investigating is that of the impact of SADC on South African trade with the rest of the world. Given that South Africa had to consult extensively with SADC while considering the trade deal, it is worth inquiring into whether regional integration is a complicating factor for South African bilateral FTAs, and to what extent this should be ameliorated or ignored.

An additional avenue for investigation lies in the DTI’s prioritising of regional integration and local mineral beneficiation, and how this aligns with JICA’s work on regional infrastructure. Can Japanese technology and infrastructure expertise be synergised with the regional transport integration initiatives? Is it possible to align the Japanese desire for closer trade ties with South Africa’s insistence on developing local beneficiation projects?

A topic that may well re-emerge in the future is that of South African high speed rail. At this point in time, it is an extremely vague notion, but if it were to move towards fruition, it would be worth examining what strategies Japanese companies (assisted by the Japanese government) use in order to attempt to secure tenders for rail infrastructure and rolling stock (Smith 2013). The involvement of JETRO and JICA in hosting a conference on high speed rail shows that they are proactively preparing the ground for such a process.

5.6 Japan and South Africa: The road ahead

By the time this thesis is published, the 5th iteration of TICAD will have been completed. No doubt there will have been an outpouring of documentation, statements and resolutions, all of which will be subjected to scrutiny by academics and researchers. However, the fundamental shape of South African – Japanese relations is likely to be much the same, based on the
continuity of their respective mutual interests and priorities. Similarly, the bureaucratic arrangements on both sides will endure, and will continue to affect the relationship in various subtle, but noteworthy ways. As a result, analysis of the bureaucratic dimension of this relationship will continue to have relevance for the future of the relation between these two countries.

Japan is seeking to maintain its competitiveness, and position itself in a favourable location vis-a-vis future trade partners. Given the rise of China in the background, and the continued economic competitiveness of South Korea, it would appear that this is a wise decision. Japan's continued location as the most advanced economy in Asia is certainly in doubt, and this is exacerbated by internal economic woes, and demographic shifts within its population. However, despite these serious issues, the Japanese economy is still of an extraordinary scale, and cannot simply be dismissed. Furthermore, Japanese elites have shown an abiding ability to reinvent their country. In 50 short years – from 1853 to 1905 – Japan moved from being a closed off, technologically backward country, to a regional power. Similarly, Japanese society was able to rebuild in an incredible fashion after WW2, and by the 1980s Japan was a major world economic power. As these events indicate, ‘writing Japan off’ is never a safe exercise.

However, in a world where China continues to grow, and the Japanese economy remains moribund, Japan's diplomatic and development communities will need to adapt and improvise to remain relevant in Africa. Greater flexibility, adaptation and better communication of Japan's values, goals and strengths will be needed.

South Africa is at an entirely different location on its development trajectory, and has a vastly different economy. However, South Africa has an urgent need to develop an economy that can generate employment and wealth for its people. Failure to do so will risk severe social unrest. This need is reflected, both in the drive for beneficiation, and in the caution around signing on to trade deals that could impact on the already fraught local manufacturing industries.

However, beneficiation cannot be imposed by fiat. Local manufacturers must, at some level, be competitive if the government wishes to bank on them to create employment. In this regard, it would be worth revisiting the historical trajectory of nations that have rapidly industrialized – such as Japan - and seeing what lessons can be gleaned from their
experiences. Closer ties can help, not just in learning such lessons, but also through technology transfer and the development of deeper economic ties.

Furthermore, while trade deals can have a negative impact on local employment, trade access is an important element of staying competitive. States that wish to export need to have markets to export to. Consequently, it is important for South Africa to maintain its ties with as many potential markets as possible, including Japan.

As a result of these intersecting priorities, it is important that both states develop their ability to understand and respond to each other's concerns, approaches, and proposals. Allowing the possibility of mutually beneficial economic ties to 'fall through the cracks' of bureaucratic misunderstanding or misperceptions would be a disservice to the people of both South Africa and Japan. While bureaucracies are not glamorous or high powered, they are essential to the smooth working of states, and the broader machinery of international relations and commerce.
Bibliography


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Appendix A: Interview Questions

South African interviewee

<Start with pleasantries and an explanation of the research project. Check if using a tape recorder is acceptable.>

Hello, it's good to meet you. My name is Mayibuye Magwaza.
I wanted to ask you some questions about your job, about South African-Japanese relations, and particularly how your organization works with other organizations. You see, I'm trying to understand more about how the structure and relationship of different government organizations affects South African-Japanese relations, and it would be very helpful to hear about your perspective on this, since you're working in the field.

Basic information

Just for the record, could you tell me your name again, and your job title?
Could you tell me about your job? What exactly do you do?
Who do you report to? How do you fit into Dirco/DTI's structures?

Organizational priorities

What are your organization's priorities when it comes to relations with Japan? (What are you hoping to accomplish?)
Does your organization have any specific strategies for this?
Is this going well?
I heard that there was some tentative talk of working towards some kind of free trade agreement with Japan – do you know anything about that? (If no) Who would be able to tell me about that?

Linkages and organizational structure

Does your organization work with people from other organizations in the South African
government?
Can you tell me more about this? Which organizations do you work with the most? (Eg, Dirco/DTI/Office of the Presidency etc) Do you have regular meetings? Do you ever personally work with people from these other agencies?

(Ask for concrete examples, based on 1) the free trade agreement discussions and 2) their job description and title.)

If no – Why not? How do you coordinate strategy? Are there any liaison structures or forums?

On the Japanese side, who does your organization usually work with the most? If 'no one' – Does anyone else meet with them regularly?

Do you work with anyone else? Are there any regular forums or meetings to discuss issues with the Japanese?

Additional people for interview (snowball sampling)

Do you know of anyone else who works in the field that I should I talk to? Can you suggest anyone else I should interview?

<Get contact details, thank them for their time. Ask if it's OK to send further questions or issues of clarification to them.>

Japanese interviewee
<Start with pleasantries and an explanation of the research project. Check if using a tape recorder is acceptable.>

はじめまして、マイブイエマグワザです。ステレンボス大学の研究者です。質問があります。すみません、日本語はちょっと弱いですねー英語もいいですか？
I wanted to ask you some questions about your job, about South African-Japanese relations, and particularly how your organization works with other organizations. You see, I'm trying to understand more about how the structure and relationship of different government organizations affects South African-Japanese relations, and it would be very helpful to hear about your perspective on this, since you're working in the field

Just for the record, could you tell me your name again, and your job title?
Could you tell me about your job? What exactly do you do?

(If it is not immediately clear from the discussion or arrangements for the meeting.)
So, which Japanese government agency do you work for? MOFA/METI

How did you come to do this job?

Priorities and goals

What are your organization’s main priorities when it comes to relations with South Africa? (What are you hoping to accomplish?)
Does your organization have any particular strategies for this?
Is this going well?

I heard that there was some tentative talk of working towards some kind of free trade agreement with Japan – do you know anything about that? (If no) Who would be able to tell me about that?

Linkages

Who do you usually work with, on a day to day basis?
Do you ever personally work with people from other agencies?
Does your organization work with people from other parts of the Japanese government? How do you work with them? Do you have regular meetings with them?

Potential followup: What can you tell me about these other agencies?
Which South African government organizations do you work with?
- Which agencies do you work with the most?
- Do you have regular meetings?
- Can you tell me more about this?
- What about non-governmental organizations?

<Get contact details, thank them for their time. Ask if it's OK to send further questions or issues of clarification to them.>

Additional questions (Varies depending on the person being questioned):

EPA:
I heard that there was some tentative talk of working towards some kind of free trade agreement or EPA between Japan and South Africa – do you know anything about that? (If no) Who would be able to tell me about that?

TICAD:
Is your organization involved in the TICAD process? How are you involved? How important do you think TICAD is, in South African – Japanese relations?

Loans: In the context of TICAD, JBIC has been involved in a lot of loans and projects. Do you know a lot about this? Where could I find out more about this process?
## Appendix B: List of Interviewees

### Primary Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Japanese Consulate</th>
<th>DIRCO</th>
<th>Japanese Embassy</th>
<th>DBSA (^{30})</th>
<th>JETRO</th>
<th>JICA</th>
<th>DTI</th>
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<td>5 June</td>
<td>6 June</td>
<td>6 June</td>
<td>7 June 2012</td>
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<tr>
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<td>In person – semi-structured</td>
<td>In person – semi-structured</td>
<td>In person – semi-structured</td>
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### Auxiliary Interviews

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<tr>
<td>Interview Method</td>
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<td>Email – brief questionnaire</td>
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\(^{30}\) The Development Bank of South Africa was not an organization of interest, but an advisor seconded from METI to the DBSA was interviewed based on recommendations from other interviewees, and was able to provide insights into issues surrounding various Japanese – South African issues.