Contemporary and past dynamics in Japan’s relationship with sub-Saharan Africa: the role of aid

by

Abraham Mlombo

Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (International Studies) in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University

Supervisor: Prof Scarlett Cornelissen

December 2012
Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author hereof (unless otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any copy rights and that I have not previously, in its entirety or in part, submitted it for any other qualification.

Date:.....................................
Abstract

The Japanese-African aid relationship has evolved since World War Two. The majority of studies on Japan’s role in Africa have focused on the economic aspect, while Japan’s aid relationship with Africa remains a relatively underexplored area of enquiry. This thesis aims to contribute to the study of Japanese-African relations by focusing on the role of aid in Japan’s involvement with the continent. The research question focuses on the evolution of Japan’s aid relationship with sub-Saharan Africa and the factors that have shaped this relationship. The study is qualitative and exploratory in nature and makes use mostly of secondary sources. Theoretically, the study analyses the aid relationship with reference to three sources of motivation for the provision of aid, namely economic, political and moral rationales.

The findings of this study highlight the fact that, before 1990, Japan’s aid relationship with Africa was motivated by all three rationales. From an economic perspective, aid served as security for resources from Africa especially after the oil crisis of 1973. From a political perspective, Japan’s aid relationship served a number of objectives that changed over time. The study highlights these changes, suggesting that, from a political perspective, Japan’s aid in respect of Africa initially served to play a critical role in the Western camp in its anti-communist struggle on the continent. It was also used to curb criticism directed at Japan by African countries for its pro-Pretoria policy.

After 1990, Japan’s aid relationship with Africa from political perspective served Japan’s ambition to be recognised as a political power, most importantly to receive the support from Africa that would allow Japan to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council. From an economic perspective, it served to secure strategic natural resources for Japan that would sustain its growing economy and help to achieve its ambition of attaining global economic supremacy. From a moral perspective, the aid relationship served to promote a development path for Africa similar to that experienced in Japan’s Asian neighbourhood.
Japan’s aid relationship with sub-Saharan Africa can be explained from a realist perspective, since the country’s national interests played a key role in the distribution of aid in this region. It has been important for Japan to maintain its momentum regarding global economic prominence and influence and for it to try to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. By distributing aid to Africa, it has hoped to improve its chances of achieving its economic ambition and importantly its elevation to the Security Council. The study thus suggests that political ambitions have been the primary motivating factor in the distribution of aid in sub-Saharan Africa.

The areas for further investigation, as highlighted by the findings of this study, are as follows: Japan’s aid relationship with Africa remains a relatively new area of inquiry and more research could therefore be done given the available data. The study also highlights the political perspective as the primary motivating factor for Japan’s aid relationship with Africa. This served Japan’s ambitions of being recognised as a global political player that would find its greatest expression in securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council with the assistance of African nations. Future studies could investigate whether Japan has managed to achieve its global political ambition and whether African countries played a significant role in this process. Finally, future studies could study the effectiveness of the TICAD process and whether Japan’s non-Western approach to development remains a popular model.
Opsomming

Die hulpverhouding tussen Japan en Afrika het sedert die Tweede Wêreldoorlog ontvou. Die studie van Japan se rol in Afrika het tot dusver grootliks op die ekonomiese aspek gekonsentreer, terwyl Japan se hulpverlening aan Afrika’n betreklik onderontginde studieveld bly. Hierdie tesis wil tot die studie van Japan-Afrika-betrekkinge bydra deur op Japan se hulpverlening aan die vasteland te konsentreer. Die navorsingsvraag handel oor die ontwikkeling van Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika suid van die Sahara, en die faktore wat hierdie verhouding gevorm het. Die studiemetodologie is kwalitatief en verkennend, en maak hoofsaaklik van sekondêre bronne gebruik. Wat teorie betref, ontleed die studie die hulpverhouding aan die hand van drie motiverings vir hulpverlening, naamlik ekonomiese, politieke en morele beweegredes.

Die studieresultate toon dat Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika voor 1990 deur ál drie bogenoemde beweegredes aangevuur is. Uit ’n ekonomiese hoek het hulp as sekuriteit vir hulpbronne uit Afrika gedien, veral ná die oliekrisis van 1973. Uit ’n politieke hoek het Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika ’n aantal oogmerke help bevorder wat mettertyd verander het. Die studie beklemttoon hierdie veranderinge, en doen aan die hand dat, wat politiek betref, Japan se hulpverlening aan Afrika aanvanklik belangrik was in die Westerse kamp se stryd teen kommunisme op die Afrikavasteland. Dit is ook gebruik om Afrika-kritiek op Japan se pro-Pretoria-beleid te smoor.

Ná 1990 het die hulpverhouding met Afrika Japan op politieke gebied help naam maak en veral Afrikasteun help werf om ’n permanente setel vir Japan in die Veiligheidsraad te bekom. Uit ’n ekonomiese hoek het dit as waarborg gedien vir strategiese natuurlike hulpbronne wat Japan se groeiende ekonomie kon ondersteun en tot sy strewe na wêreldwyse ekonomiese heerskappy kon bydra. Uit ’n morele perspektief wou Japan Afrika ’n soortgelyke ontwikkelingsroete as dié van Japan se Asiatiese bure laat inslaan.

Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika suid van die Sahara kan aan die hand van die realistiese perspektief verklaar word, aangesien die land se nasionale belange ’n kernrol in die
verspreiding van hulp na hierdie streek gespeel het. Vir Japan was dit belangrik om sy stukrag in die strewe na wêreldwyse ekonomiese statuурn en invloed te behou en ’n permanente setel in die Veiligheidsraad te probeer bekom. Deur hulp aan Afrika te verleen, het Japan gehoop om sy kanse op sukses in sy ekonomiese strewes en veral ook sy verheffing tot die Veiligheidsraad te verbeter. Die studie gee dus te kenne dat politieke ambisies die hoofbeweegrede was vir hulpverlening aan Afrika suid van die Sahara.

Gebiede vir verdere navorsing wat uit die bevindinge van hierdie studie spruit, is soos volg: Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika bly ’n betreklik nuwe studieveld met min beskikbare data, dus is verdere navorsing daaroor nodig. Meer bepaald beklemtoon die studie die politieke perspektief as hoofbeweegrede vir Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika: Dit het Japan as internasionale politieke speler help vestig, en Afrikelande sou Japan uiteindelik help om die gesogte permanente setel in die Veiligheidsraad te bekom. Toekomstige studies kan verken of Japan in sy internasionale politieke strewe geslaag het en watter rol Afrikalande daarin gespeel het. Laastens kan verdere studies ook ondersoek instel na die TIKAO-proses en of Japan se nie-Westerse benadering tot ontwikkeling ’n gewilde model bly.
Acknowledgments

I wish to extend my gratitude to the following people who have encouraged and supported me in the completion of this study:

- I want to thank my supervisor Prof. Scarlett Cornelissen for the help, sincere supervision, patience and the feedback which I have received in the completion of this study.
- I also want to thank the University and particularly the Department of Political Science for giving me the opportunity to complete this study.
- I want to thank my friends and family for the encouragement and support I have received, not only in the writing of my thesis but throughout my academic years.
Table of contents

Chapter 1: Introduction and problem statement 1
1.1 Background and rationale 1
1.2 Research question 4
1.3 Literature review 4
  1.3.1 Japanese Foreign Policy 4
  1.3.2 Japanese-African Relations 8
1.4 Theoretical literature on foreign aid 12
1.5 Conceptualization 14
1.6 Research methodology 15
1.7 Limitations and delimitations 17
1.8 Outline of remaining chapters 17

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 19
2.1 Introduction 19
2.2 The rationale behind foreign aid 19
  2.2.1 The moral rationale 20
  2.2.2 The political rationale 20
  2.2.3 The economic rationale 20
2.3 International Relations (IR) and foreign aid 21
2.4 Realism in IR 23
2.5 Conclusion 26
Chapter 3: History of Japan-Africa relations and the emergence of Japanese ODA in Africa

3.1 Introduction

Section I: Japanese Aid and Political relations: 1960-1973

3.2 The background of Japanese ODA to SSA

3.3 Japan’s aid diplomacy towards SSA (in the International context)

3.4 Historical Overview of Japanese/SSA relations

Section II: Japanese aid and political relations: 1974-1990

3.5 Japan’s aid diplomacy towards SSA (1974-1990)

3.6 Pre-1990 Japan ODA disbursements to SSA

3.7 Japanese aid and South Africa: 1960-1993

3.8 Conclusion

Chapter 4: Japanese aid towards Africa: patterns and motives

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Post-1990 ODA policy to Africa

4.2.1 Background

4.3 Japan’s political mark on the African continent

4.4 Post-1990 ODA data for SSA

4.5 The G8 Summit process

4.5.1 The G8 Summit 2000

4.5.2 The G8 Summit 2005

4.5.3 The G8 Summit 2008

5.1 The post-TICAD III process 60
5.2 Japanese ODA disbursement 61
5.3 Japan-SSA Africa relations and China 67
5.4 Japan and South Africa post-1990 69
5.5 Japan and SSA: 2011 and beyond 72
5.6 Analysis 73
  5.6.1 Analytical Perspective 73
  5.6.2 Theoretical Perspective 76
5.7 Japan and South Africa 78
5.8 Conclusion 79

Chapter 6: Conclusion 81

6.1 Introduction 81
6.2 Context, aims and rationale 81
6.3 Discussion of findings and their implications 82
6.4 Areas for Further Investigation 85
6.5 Conclusion 86

Addendum 87

ODA Charter 1992 87
Bibliography

List of Tables and Figures

Table 3.1  Japan’s Bilateral ODA to SSA, 1969-1990  39
Table 4.1  Japan’s Bilateral ODA to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 1990-1998  50
Table 4.2  ODA Performance of G7 countries (in billion dollars)  52
Table 4.3  Japan’s ODA Performance Pre-1990  53
Table 5.1  Japan’s Bilateral ODA to SSA, 2004-2007  61
Table 5.2  ODA (USD billions) to SSA from top 5 donors by total volume and Japan  66

Fig 4.1  Japan’s ODA: Flows by Type  54
Fig 5.1  Sectoral shares of Japanese ODA to SSA between 2005 and 2009  64
Fig 5.2  Sectoral shares of other donors’ ODA to sub-Saharan Africa between 2005 and 2009  65
Fig 5.3  Top 10 SSA recipients of Japanese ODA, 2005-2009  67

List of Abbreviations

ANC  African National Congress
AU  African Union
DAC  Development Assistance Committee
EPSA  Enhanced Private Sector Assistance
EU  European Union
FREMILO  The Liberation Front of Mozambique
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>The Group of Eight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>The New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Official Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVA</td>
<td>Private Voluntary Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>The Mozambican National Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South-West African People’s Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TICAD</td>
<td>Tokyo International Conference on African Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Introduction and problem statement

1.1 Background and rationale

Japan’s fortunes in the aftermath of World War Two (WWII) changed dramatically and impressively. This was due to the spectacular expansion of its economy which inevitably entered the 21st century as the second-largest economy in the world. Significantly, Japan has been, and remains poor in natural resources and it would not be unreasonable to ask what the basis for its rapid economic transformation was? Japan has always been of strategic importance to the West especially to the United States of America (US). This was most evident during the Cold War era, where, for a considerable time after WWII, Japan’s engagement with the world was determined by the Western bloc. As Tishehyar (2010:91) observes, “the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign relations from 1945 through today is the United States which provides Japan’s military security, its largest market, and sponsorship in the world economy”.

Japan’s foreign policy propelled her recovery from the ruins of the Second World War (WWII) to become a fully industrialised country by the end of the 20th century. The country’s foreign policy pursued the path of diplomacy, which began after Japan’s entry into the United Nations in December of 1956. “The three pillars of Japanese diplomacy centred on Japan conforming to UN diplomacy, being a key role player in the Asian region, and aligning with the capitalist West” (Tishehyar, 2010:92).

Japan’s diplomacy, as expressed in the first issue of its Diplomatic Blue Book in 1957, specified economic diplomacy as one of the main pillars of its foreign policy. It was in the light of this that Japan began to develop economic international relations. During the late 1950s and 1960s, Japan’s rapidly growing economy demanded that the country seek new markets to secure the necessary resources to sustain her energy-deficient country. This propelled Japan to enter a relationship with sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as the region was rich in natural resources which Japan has always needed.
Post-WWII, economic diplomacy was not the only factor driving Japanese foreign policy. As it was aligned with the West, consideration of international circumstances throughout the second half of the 20th century influenced Japan’s foreign policy, especially during the Cold War’s anti-communist struggles. Humanitarian considerations were also given some expression and with these two other important influence in foreign diplomacy the role of aid emerged. “Japan’s foreign aid programme included the ‘development of developing countries’ and ‘support for her self-help efforts towards economic and social development” (Eyinla, 1999:409).

SSA has been a recipient of Japanese aid throughout the 20th century, but especially during the Cold War when exchanges between the two partners increased. According to Eyinla (1999), Japan’s aid policy was meant to serve three objectives. First “to complement and reinforce America’s geo-strategic and ideological interest within the framework of the United States/Japan co-operative strategic aid policy. Second, it was used as an instrument for securing access to raw and mineral resources. Lastly, aid became the most useful diplomatic instrument for placating the African states for the rising criticism against Japan for its position as the leading trading partner to apartheid South Africa” (Eyinla, 1999:413). One can, therefore, draw from this source that Japan’s aid relationship with the continent was not without its complexities in an international context and it was one of the challenges which Japan had to consider in its foreign policy.

From the 1950s Japan had to confront and address a great number of issues in the relationship with SSA despite the surge of contact and exchanges between them. Over time, Japanese/sub-Saharan African relations were monitored in economic terms and it appears that an asymmetrical relationship developed where the financial purse of Japan influenced the nature of the relationship and made it difficult for Africa to assume a position of parity. This was driven by Japan’s fast growing economy and poor natural resources and SSA’s abundance of natural resources and poor economic position. When Japan began to develop relations with the continent in earnest, it was also an important time for Africa which was going through decolonisation. At the time, the former colonial masters were still established on the continent - something which Japan had to be mindful of in its engagement with Africa. From
the 1970s especially, this was the context in which foreign aid began to play a more significant role. This period will be covered in greater detail in later chapters.

It is hoped that the examination of aid as a tool of Japanese foreign policy in Africa will give insight into how this helped the Asian country to uphold and maintain its relationship with the continent. Previously, minimal attention was given to the subject of aid in Japan’s ties with Africa, but as this has increasingly become an important part of the relationship, this study intends to address this-lack of focus. It is hoped that new data used in the study will provide a deeper understanding of these ties.

The limited research on Japanese-SSAfrican relations is partly due to the fact that this is a relatively new area of enquiry. Significantly, much of the literature focuses mostly on the diplomatic and economic ties between these partners and less on aid. Japanese economic interests with the continent and its dual policy towards colour (race) and culture have been given considerable focus. While there is data on Japan’s relationship with South Africa as an economic and diplomatic partner there is a lack of data on the aid relationship between the two countries. It is important to consider - South Africa in Japan’s aid relationship with the rest of Africa as it was one of the strongest relations Japan had with the continent.

The rationale for this study is to address the deficiencies in the literature with a relatively new area of enquiry. This will bring a new element: understanding that aid has been used as a diplomatic as well as political instrument. By so doing this thesis aims to establish an important shift in thinking about the way aid is used as a tool for political and diplomatic gain. It is worth pointing out here that Japan, as the only major industrial nation not to have colonised in Africa, was able to develop a unique relationship with SSA in the post-colonial era.
1.2 Research question

The thesis will focus on the following questions:

1. How has Japan’s aid relationship with the African continent evolved and what are the factors which have shaped this relationship?

The research shall be narrowed down to address the following sub-questions:

1.1 What are the patterns in Japanese aid to Africa and the factors that shape them?

1.2 What is the place of aid in Japan’s strategic relationship with the African continent?

1.3 What are the intentions regarding Japanese aid to Africa post-2012?

It is important to establish the time frame when raising these questions. For this study, the aid relationship between Japan and SSA from the 1960s to 2011 will be examined but more attention will be given to the period 1990 to 2011. The reason for the focus on 1990 – 2011 is firstly; that the data available covers this period and it is also a time when Japan’s aid policy was clearly articulated. Therefore, objectives could be measured consistently. Also, during this time, Japan increased its visibility on the continent by developing several close links.

1.3 Literature review

1.3.1 Japanese Foreign Policy

The evolution of Japanese foreign policy was influenced considerably by the Second World War and the Cold War. Kosaka (1977) puts forward the notion that Japan’s defeat in WWII and the influence of the Cold War which followed, temporarily clarified Japan’s international position: defeat in the war weakened the country, and the Cold War firmly attached Japan to the West. In addition, with a weak military force during the Cold War and the heavy reliance on raw material imports, there were limits to the country’s bargaining power. Tishehyar (2010) argues that Japan’s foreign policy hinged upon the Japanese/American alliance. He observes that Japan’s foreign policy from 1945 up to the present day was based on its relationship with America which provided Japan’s military security, its largest market, and sponsorship for the world market. However, its foreign policy differs in that the basis for Japan’s international relations was its separation of economics and politics (seikei bunri) which emphasises economics relations without political interference. It was this principle of
separation of politics and economics that emerged in the relationship with SSA and was also particularly significant in Japan’s relationship with South Africa (which will be discussed in the latter part of this thesis). Tisheyar’s work does well to highlight these two factors - the importance and influence of the U.S. on Japanese foreign policy and the separation of politics and economics in Japan’s international engagements. In the process of answering the primary question, this study will elaborate further on both factors.

The work of Scalapino is another study discussing a widely recognised phenomenon of Japan’s post-war foreign policy. He notes Japanese foreign policy has, from the start, placed economics at the centre of its objectives. However, the author does not claim this to be the only aspect but regards it as - one through which many attempts are made to understand its complexities. The assumption for this, as Scalapino (1977) states, is from the American tradition. The author draws attention to the economic relations between the Western industrial powers under US leadership and the underdeveloped world by highlighting both the implicit - and often explicit premise in the policies of all post-war Japanese governments - that economics and politics are separated in foreign policy. Therefore, the one-dimensional approach to the complex subject is avoided by this author as he is responsive to both domestic and international circumstances in the policy’s evolution.

Green (2001) highlights Japan’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. He draws attention to, and recognises Japan’s essential relationship with the US as the indispensable core of Japan’s position in the world. Green examines how the US and Japan interact in relation to the rest of the world and he provides several case studies to show how Japan’s foreign policy takes its bearing from Washington. The author does well to emphasize this phenomenon as it lends a broader perspective to the relationship between Japan and SSA. Another important factor he highlights is that Japanese foreign policy continues to rely primarily on economic tools to achieve power and influence. These tools range from foreign aid and contributions to international organisations. This economic factor, especially in terms of foreign aid will be a focus of this study.
The importance of economic tools in Japan’s foreign policies is also highlighted by Togo (2010). As economic assistance - known as Official Development Assistance (ODA), is said to be the most consistent and effective tool of Japanese foreign policy, the historical analysis of foreign aid makes this author’s work particularly relevant for this study. However, Togo does not elaborate on the relationship between Japan and SSA and does not discuss all the aspects of Japan’s foreign policy.

Inoguchi and Jain (2000) present a comprehensive picture of Japan’s foreign policy and its development throughout the 1990s. They point out that Japan’s initiative, political leadership and a genuine desire to assist international communities evolved in some policy areas such as ODA, humanitarian assistance, and global environmental policy. The study shows that Japan, as the second largest global economy at the time was also being urged to play a constructive role in international affairs. In moving away from the established discussions regarding Japan’s foreign policies the study deals at length with a particular subject, from a particular time frame and, what the authors manage to establish is that Japanese foreign policies are expressed not only through economic factors, but also through humanitarianism.

Given that the independent aspect of Japan’s foreign policy is expressed through its ODA volume and disbursement, Akiko (2000) examines the past five decades of Japan’s economic assistance from recipient to provider. The author discusses Japan’s engagement in economic assistance especially ODA, which made Japan the top donor in the 1990s. The emphasis here is on the link between Japan’s economic recovery and the provision of ODA. As such, through Akiko one gets an appreciation of the evolution of Japan’s economic assistance policies and an understanding that often provision of aid or any other form of economic assistance is greatly influenced by a nation’s economic might.

Chan (1992) looks more closely at Japan’s bilateral aid programmes in an effort to gain greater insight into Japan’s economic and political statecraft. The author analyses the distribution pattern of Japanese foreign aid yen in an attempt to infer the concerns and goals that motivate its leaders. The central hypothesis the author makes is that Japan has pursued two broad goals in allocating foreign aid: the maintenance of the capitalist world order and
the enhancement of the Japanese position in it. This emphasis on international stabilization and sectarian advantage has led to certain ambivalence in Tokyo’s foreign policy.

Otopalik (2010), in a journal article, assesses the degree to which Japan’s aid provision conforms to the expectations of recipients. The findings in the study demonstrate that on a macro-level analysis, Japan has indeed made good on its pledges. However, investigation of several cases of some specific country’s poor or declining performance reveal inconsistencies between pledge principles rewarding positive performance in aid provision.

Further aspects of Japanese foreign policy are by different scholars. Drifte (2000) - focuses extensively on the domestic context of foreign policy-making and the interplay between the economic, political and security factors. Furthermore, the author highlights Japan’s calculations in the complex relationships it has with much of a significant part of the world. Cooney (2007) presents a change in Japanese foreign policy in his analysis on what the Japanese elite and public believe to be their country’s best role for their domestic security.

The importance of all the above is that they offer some background to understand Japan’s approach to international relations: what its primary motivations are; the history of Japan’s engagement with the world; whether these characteristics appear in its relationship with Africa; and whether the reasons which have inspired Japan’s approach on the continent remain the same. This research by these authors also reveal that it is without question that the Japanese/American alliance had an influence on Japan’s post-war foreign policy but it was unique in the principle of separating politics and economics in its foreign policies. The authors cited above deal extensively with these factors, although they are not only issues in the complex study of Japan’s foreign policy.
1.3.2 Japanese-African Relations

Ampiah (1997) states that, “the study of Japan’s relations with SSA is virtually a new area of inquiry in the analysis of Japan’s international relations” (Ampiah, 1997:1). One factor which shaped much of Japan’s foreign policy in Africa was timing. African states were undergoing a time of change to independence and democratisation on the continent (started from mid-1950s) and as the former colonial masters no longer assumed control over their African territories, the newly independent states now had to develop their own political, economic and diplomatic relations. As a result greater exchanges between Japan and the continent began.

Ampiah (1997) provides an account of Japan’s relationship with South Africa. He also gives considerable attention to Japan’s investment and aid to Nigeria and Tanzania respectively. After an empirical analysis of political, economic and diplomatic factors that contributed to Japan’s relationship with Africa, Ampiah argues that the Japanese concept of security was key to its relationship with SSA from 1974 to 1991. He contends that relations between Japan and each of these countries were determined differently. In the case of Tanzania, for example, Japanese aid was primarily to develop good relations with a frontline state. As such, Tanzania was chosen because of its status and political leadership at the time. The relationship between Japan and Nigeria, however, was driven primarily by Japan’s need to secure access to markets for its growing economy but Ampiah says “Japan was also well aware of the constraints that came with this relationship regarding uncertainty over government policy and erratic macro-economic environment in Nigeria” (Ampiah, 1997:196).

Ampiah finds that the relationship with South Africa, however, was shaped by Japan’s need to secure specific strategic natural resources which made it difficult for Japan to take a firm stance against South Africa for its apartheid policies. The study confirms this by closely examining Japan’s voting patterns on this matter at the United Nations. The core argument made is that Japan was attending to the interests of the minority regime of South Africa, while also fulfilling certain diplomatic responsibilities to its other relationships on the continent. It was significant, the author points, out that Japanese foreign policy was
successful in addressing these two antithetical issues and, therefore, he considers Japanese diplomacy on the continent to have been largely successful.

Adeleke (2010) focuses on the historical development of Nigeria’s relationship with Japan during the first 46 years of Nigeria’s independence (1960-2006). This author points out that colonial Nigerian-Japanese relations were essentially economic because the intent was to satisfy the economic well-being of the then British colonial government (1914-1960). Nigeria’s independence, however, brought cultural and political dimensions into the relationship. Adeleke contends that, as a less-developed country, Nigeria can learn a number of lessons from Japan’s own quest for development.

Other relationships between Japan and SSA add more to the discussion of Japan’s aid policy on the continent. Carvalho (2011) compares Japan’s aid policies to Angola and Mozambique since 1950 and asserts that Cold War rivalry prevented Japan from dispatching aid after 1975 to these communist-led countries after independence, but following the Cold War period (1947-1990) Japan then assisted both countries transition from war to peace as part of a peaceful nation-building approach. This approach had originated in Japan’s traditional development cooperation in Asia. Carvalho’s paper affirms that such decision-making reflects Japan’s international pressures and concludes that the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) approach is very applicable to aid in Africa for, peace building and human security. This final point as part of Japanese foreign policy will be dealt with in more depth in chapter five.

Morikawa (1997) contributes to the literature by providing a historical account of Japan’s African diplomacy stretching as far back as the end of the 19th century. The author sheds light on Japan’s relationship with South Africa (even at the height of UN sanction against the country) while it simultaneously engaged with a number of SSAfrican countries. Japan’s dual diplomacy policy in Africa served its economic interests in Africa while foreign policy enabled Japan to become the largest ODA donor for many years on the continent. As ODA was the means by which Japan delivered foreign aid commitments on the continent this will be the theme of this study.
Another work by Morikawa (2005) discusses a further two key points. Firstly, he examines the factors that make an enquiry into Japan’s African diplomacy difficult. Secondly, he looks at the current status of Japan’s diplomacy in the post-Cold War/post-apartheid era and the participation of Japanese citizens in formulating and implanting foreign policy into South Africa. The author concludes by suggesting that there is a significant gap between words and actions in Japan’s African diplomacy. This study will endeavour to examine this claim about Japan’s foreign aid commitments to the continent.

Sono (1993) provides further insight into Japanese-Africa relations. He gives a historical background of the ties between Japan and Africa as he “examines the nature of African-Japanese contacts from the 1500 to the early 1990s” (Sono, 1993:1). The author, well aware of the general void in information about Japanese-African relations and exchanges presents the earliest contacts between the two partners to allow a greater insight. He focuses primarily on trade, aid and diplomatic relations: the emphasis throughout being that Japan-Africa relations stretch over many centuries and are complex by nature.

Other scholars such as Kitagawa (2003) also provide historical accounts of Japanese-African relations as well as focus is on economic interests. Kitigawa’s work on the pre-WWII period using Japanese Consular Reports covers Japanese trading relation with South Africa. Through the reports it is established that during the inter-War period Japan attempted “to carve a niche for itself in a region from which she was essentially excluded but one which was increasingly seen to be a lifeline for her national economy” (Kitigawa, 2003:39). The circumstances of the inter-War years gradually helped expand exchanges with SSA and it was during this period that the term economic diplomacy first began to define Japanese-African relations.

Alden and Hirano’s (2003) insights of economic relations between South Africa and Japan focus on what effect their economic and political ties had on their respective areas of influence. In this regard, the authors essentially give a critical analysis of the various dimensions in the relationship between Asia and Africa. They argue that a new trend of quiet diplomacy grew as Africa became an important investor destination for Japan and as Japan provides Africa with development assistance. They maintain that quiet diplomacy is
increasing its impact on African affairs and they say that the relationship which exists between Japan and South Africa illustrates this trend. However, Love (1999) observes that the increase in ODA to South Africa, following its transition to majority rule, was largely at the expense of other countries in the region. Significantly, he asserts while this refocusing of aid was aimed at disadvantaged black groups, it has also reinforced the regional dominance of the South African economy in Africa.

Many researchers provide insight into Japan’s outlook on Africa. By shedding light on the evolution of Japan’s economic interests in Africa, Kazuo (2003) says that from the 1960s to early 1990s Japan’s standard view of Africa was that it was a market for Japan’s industrial output and a supplier of mineral resources. By the middle of the 1990s, however, this traditional diplomatic approach to Africa became outdated. The author explains that Japan’s economic and regional crisis during the 1990s jeopardised the enthusiasm to carry the Asian experience to Africa. Demachi (2009) also observes that Japanese foreign aid was closely intertwined with Japanese economic activities especially in Africa and this relationship significantly bolstered Japanese aid.

Previous literature on Japan’s ODA policy carries a number of other explanations. Hook and Zhang (1998) show the impact of domestic political interests on the ODA decision-making process by examining sets of diplomatic discourses, one of which asserts that the use of aid was to advance Japan’s economic interests; and another argues for the use of aid to support Japan’s international diplomacy. Katada (2002) emphasizes what the author terms the “two-track aid” approach: one track affirms that aid provision is shaped by domestic business and the other affirms that it is influenced by Japan’s reaction towards international criticism. Katada argues that the existence of these two tracks is due to domestic institutional constraints and budgetary limitations. Hirata, however, offers another reason for Japanese foreign policy decision-making by suggesting that Japan is not monolithic in its organizational outlook, but instead reflects diverse views and opinions.
Overall, as stated earlier, it can be seen that the literature on Japanese foreign policy towards SSA contributes a great deal of understanding to the economic relationship. This study, however, will continue to draw out the foreign aid aspects and by so doing, hopes to contribute more to the literature.

1.4 Theoretical literature on foreign aid

Since the first launch of Japan’s ODA programmes in the 1950s, aid provision has proved to have been motivated by three criteria: “There is an economic rationale, there is a political rationale, and there is a humanitarian motive” (Black, 1968:15). However, other literature on the topic suggests more than three main motivating factors for aid provision: political, economic, humanitarian and a moral rationale. Hattori (2003) for one believes that the moral rationale for aid distribution draws on Aristotelian ethics deeply rooted in Western philosophy and reason. However, the political rationale for the provision of aid is the most recognized and Black (1968) insists that the primary goal for aid is political: assistance is given to developing nations to attain their potential. As aid originated under the complex political circumstances of the Cold War, it is not surprising that aid provision has mostly been associated with political objectives.

Black and other researchers, however, also argue that there is an economic rationale which is directed to secure and promote economic development. “The basic, long-range goal of foreign aid is political. It is not economic per se. The primary purpose of foreign aid is to supplement and complement the efforts of developing nations to enhance their strength and stability” (Black, 1968:18). In other words, they suggest that economic aid is both a benefit to the donor and the recipient as it strengthens the economic development of both. The economic rationale not only means that “foreign aid programs of the U.S. and other donor nations help to maintain the security of and promote the economic development of the less developed nations” (Black, 1968:17) but that within this rationale there is the trade-off between developed and less developed nations in which the industrial nations are reliant on raw material from less developed nations and in return, less developed nations require goods from industrial nations.
International Relations (IR) provides three theoretical perspectives to explain the concept of foreign aid. The first is that of political realism. As the oldest theoretical perspective in IR, it explains foreign aid as a voluntary practice by donors in a materially unequal world between donors and recipients. Hattori (2001) stresses this point, adding further that the hierarchical political order in the world reflects a skewed distribution of resources. The political realism view, therefore, highlights an anarchic world order in which foreign aid reinforces the imbalances of resources between donors and recipients. This anarchic world order refers to the absence of a “world police government” and therefore governments are not accountable to a political structure beyond their borders. Political realists see “aid presupposing a clear inequality between donor and recipient, which is conditioned by the superior military strength and economic capability of donors, [and which] identifies the conflict between the superpowers as the direct cause of foreign aid” (Hattori, 2001:641). As a result of this condition during the Cold War, the conflict between the superpowers spilled over into the underdeveloped areas of the world, and as such nations, have had to align themselves during the cold war. It was this process that drove foreign aid to become an important instrument for Japan.

The other two theoretical perspectives used to explain foreign aid are liberalism and the world system theory. “Liberalism refers to foreign aid as a set of measures which promote the advancement of political and socio-economic development in the recipient country” (Hattori, 2001:634). Liberals believe in human progress and that foreign aid can be used as a tool to speed up this process. “Material inequality between donor and recipient is the condition under which aid emerges; where aid is seen as a tool which bridges the gap between donors and recipients” (Hattori, 2001:639).

The world system theory gives another perspective. This is one that considers foreign aid as a hindrance to the development path of recipient countries. “According to world system theory, it is a means of constraining the development path of recipient countries, promoting the unequal distribution of capital in the world” (Hattori, 2001:634). The world system theory does not support foreign aid as a means of positive change in the recipient countries, but rather as reinforcing economic domination of the core industrial nations towards the periphery. The proponent in the literature makes the point that foreign aid does not address
the existing gaps between donor and recipient but rather contributes to its deterioration. “It is the basic operational factor behind the expansion of world capitalism, constraining the recipient’s development path to a dependent role in the world market” (Hattori, 2001:639).

1.5 Conceptualization

Foreign aid, in its current form, was originated by the US in the aftermath of WWII. However, in spite of the analysis of foreign aid (or foreign assistance) being dogged by controversies and contradictions the concept used by most aid outlets is defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) “as financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities that are (1) designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective (thus excluding aid for military or non-development purposed); and (2) are provided as either grants or subsidized loans” (Radelet, 2006:4).

The DAC provides three broad categories which classify aid flow. Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the largest, which is composed of aid provided by donor governments to low-and middle income countries. Official Assistance (OA) and Private Voluntary Assistance (PVA) complete the categories. “Private voluntary assistance includes grants from non-government organizations, religious groups, charities, foundations, and private companies” (Radelet, 2006:4). ODA can be classified “into bilateral (given directly by a donor country) and multilateral (given to international institutions like the World Bank for distribution). In most studies on aid, it is bilateral ODA that is examined” (Lahiri, 2005:5).

If aid is to be categorised as ODA, it has to meet three important criteria:

- it has to be undertaken by official agencies;
- it has to have the promotion of economic development as the main objective; and
- It has to have a grant element of 25% or more (Lahiri, 2005:5).
As Japan has become a major donor of foreign aid especially in recent times, this study will focus on this trend. In the case of Japan, foreign aid appears in different forms. “Japanese aid appears either as loans, grants, technical support and multilateral contributions” (Akiyama & Nakao, 2005:9). This study will focus on the four components.

1.6 Research methodology

The nature of this study is mostly exploratory and qualitative. The exploratory aspect is as a result of the unchartered character of the research topic. As stated by Ampiah (1997) this field of study is relatively new and as such, it will also take a qualitative approach which means “by the term ‘qualitative research’ we mean any type of research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of quantification” (Snape & Spencer, 2003:3).

Though an explanation is provided above in how this study understands by what is meant by qualitative research, providing a precise definition is no easy task. However, as the existing literature attempts to provide working definition scholars do attempt to capture the characteristics of qualitative research. “In particular, there is fairly wide consensus that qualitative research is a naturalistic, interpretative approach concerned with understanding the meanings which people attach to phenomena (actions, decisions, beliefs, values etc.) with their social worlds” (Snape & Spencer, 2003:3). Some key points where there is also wide consensus regarding qualitative research which provides its distinctive character are as follows: aims at providing an in-depth and accurate understanding of the social world through the understanding of social and material conditions, providing information that is well researched, rich in data and far-reaching. Generally qualitative research emphasises the value of human beings to observe the social world and the ability to interpret and understand the phenomenon being studied.

Qualitative research has got its advantages and its drawbacks. The advantage that this research method generates is that it provides in-depth and detailed body of work. Qualitative research by nature is deductive and therefore its contents are rich and extensive which can be
used to generate hypotheses. Other advantages are that qualitative research studies phenomena that are in its natural setting which as a result yield answers which are applicable to real life and generalisations are possible to similar phenomenon. The drawbacks regarding this research method is that unless similar phenomenon is observed generalisations are difficult to make. Qualitative research can be a time consuming process and therefore the study is often narrow. Finally, through this method the researcher is often heavily involved in the process which can lead to the researcher taking a subjective view regarding the data gathered and therefore can lead to a skew interpretation of the data.

Since the aim is to feature - the evolution of the aid relationship with SSA and to highlight what has shaped it, a qualitative approach allows for a broad method procedure and for a diverse collection of data for a deeper understanding of Japan’s developing aid relationship with the continent. The emphasis, however, is not so much on gathering data about the factors involved, but providing an understanding of this aid relationship. As such, qualitative methodology is used since “the primary goal using this approach is defined as describing and understanding rather than explaining human behaviour” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 270).

As the interest of this research lies in understanding and describing an evolutionary approach the method is also useful in that as the key feature is “its focus on process rather than outcome [with], the primary aim [being] in-depth descriptions and understanding of actions and events and the main concern is to understand social action in terms of specific context rather than attempting to generalize to some theoretical population” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 270). Qualitative research is deemed appropriate in that it aims to be flexible about how and where data is gathered, and as there is no set procedure followed from the outset and the study will deal with the topic as it unfolds.

This study uses both secondary and primary sources. Primary sources, such as official documents and speeches mostly originate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) and they deal with matters pertaining to Japanese-African relations. Japan’s ODA Annual Reports also feature as one of the primary sources. Both are seen as important for this study in that they provide data released by Japanese officials giving reasons for decisions
taken, declaring commitments they may have made, as well as some hard statistics. Secondary sources – most of the data used - will comprise academic journal articles, books, publications and media reports.

1.7 Limitations and delimitations

As this study focuses on the evolution of Japan’s aid relationship with Africa and the factors shaping it, the research will seek to provide an in-depth analysis of this topic to provide its rationale. The limitation is that the study does not attempt to make comparisons with other donor nations for any generalisations. Such generalisations are best suited for studies that seek to make comparisons.

Japan is notably one of the major donor nations, outside the Western bloc, to have provided aid to SSA. As it offers a non-Western approach to development, it has assumed a position of great interest for scholars. The focus of this thesis, however, is not to compare Japan and the West on matters of development for the continent but rather to promote a greater understanding of Japan’s aid provision and to give attention to the factors which have, over time, been most evident in shaping this aid relationship. The rationales which will be the focus of this are the political, economic and moral factors.

Apart from providing a historical perspective, the time-span covered by this thesis will be from the 1960s to contemporary times. Although the links between Japan and SSA go beyond aid with the substantial economic, political and diplomatic factors the focus will be only on the aid relationship as the cornerstone of these links.

1.8 Outline of remaining chapters

The remaining five chapter of this study will be separated into chapter two, which provides the theoretical framework for this study as it undertakes to provide an IR theory background of foreign aid. Chapter three covers a brief historical account of early Japanese-African
relations from the 1960s to early 1990s. This chapter also gives the background to past relations and sets the context for analyses made in the next chapter.

Chapter four focuses on the period 1993-2003. It is essentially descriptive of the early stages of the relationship post-1990, as it reveals the foundations of the post-Cold War links between Japan and the continent and what role aid would play. This chapter goes some way to answer the question of why aid was so prominent in Japan’s ties with the continent and how this shaped the relationship. It brings clarity to the distribution and patterns of aid and the motivations behind this. It also provides the context for Japan’s decision to make aid available to the continent.

Chapter five covers the 2004-2011 periods with a more in-depth description of patterns of aid distribution. The context of the unfolding trends and the motivations and objectives are explained. This helps to answer the question of how Japan’s aid relationship evolved with SSA and what factors have shaped it. The focus is on Japanese initiatives for aid in SSA where aid is of utmost importance – and on measuring how the aid was instrumental in achieving successful returns on those initiatives. These processes and initiatives are essential to this study as they give clarity to Japan’s diplomacy on the continent.

Chapter six provides the conclusion for this study. It outlines the main findings and reflects on their implications in relation to relevant theoretical perspectives. The chapter ends with a discussion of areas for further research.
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

2.1 Introduction

The concept of foreign aid has been in existence for a considerable time, its motivation defined as assistance is given, by those who wish to provide aid as donors. But it was not until 1949 that it was first used as a tool of national policy. Pronk (2004), Black (1968), and Hattori (2003) are among those scholars who agree that it was after President Truman’s Point programme launched in 1949 that development assistance became part of foreign policy in the United States. “This made it the policy of the United States to aid the efforts of the economically underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and their living conditions. The launching of the programme is often considered the beginning of international development assistance” (Pronk, 2004:1).

The rationale behind the provision of aid varies from state to state. However, from the time it was first used as a tool of national policies a number of factors have remained consistent across the donor community: the political, economics and moral reasons. However, while these three rationales are considered the mainstay for donor provision the moral rationale has largely been dismissed by some IR scholars. This chapter seeks to examine the basic rationales of foreign aid provision and review the theoretical perspectives of IR concerning aid. Then the literature will be assessed to find out which theoretical perspective has been considered the most significant.

2.2 The rationale behind foreign aid

The three main reasons for the provision of foreign aid which concern this study are the moral, political and economic rationales. They are generally the most conspicuous, although not the only reasons for aid determined by policies of the donor country.
2.2.1 **The Moral Rationale**

The moral rationale for the provision of aid is that “such assistance was a moral action that embodied a vision of international peace and prosperity” (Hattori, 2003:229). Although the ethical justification of foreign aid has been rejected by a number of IR scholars, aid remains a moral obligation for many donors either for basic humanitarian reasons or responsibility of former colonial powers to share resources for crimes committed under colonisation. Whatever the case, humanitarian aid remains the underlying basis of the moral school. The practice stems from the US aid programmes where assistance of others was seen to serve America’s best interests. “In the words of President Johnson ‘the pages of history can be searched in vain for another power whose pursuit of that self-interest was so infused with grandeur of spirit and morality of purpose’” (Black, 1968:20). Hattori (2003) summarizes the moral dimension of foreign aid in the post-war era as the donations of states to multilateral grant-giving.

2.2.2 **The political rationale**

Black (1968:18) suggests that the basic, long-range goal of aid is political and “not economic development per se. The primary purpose of foreign aid is to supplement the efforts of the developing nations, to enhance their strength and stability and to defend their freedom” (Black, 1968:18). The political rationale for aid may vary according to donors, but it is often granted for political or strategic objectives. In some cases foreign aid can be seen as upholding and maintaining the status quo between two partners or that of the international system. Yet while ODA is designed to achieve political objectives it also is meant to increase prosperity in recipient countries.

2.2.3 **The economic rationale**

One of the most important reasons, put forward in the literature, for the provision of foreign aid is economic - specifically the promotion of economic development. As Black (1968) states, “the foreign aid programs of the U.S. and other donor nations help to maintain the security of and the economic development of the less developed nations” (Black, 1968: 16-17).
Such a view might explain the distribution of aid from developed to less developed countries but paradoxically it is also seen as insufficient to ensure full economic development. This implies that political implications are a more important rationale as Griffin points out: “the fact that the motive of foreign aid is political rather than economic does not necessarily imply that the consequence of aid is not beneficial to economic development” (Griffin, 1991:649). Unlike a purely political rationale, an economic reason is not only about the interests of the donor as it is relevant to both the donor and recipient: by promoting trade and increasing the number of exchanges between the countries involved ensures long-term prosperity for both.

### 2.3 International Relations (IR) and foreign aid

In IR, the concept of foreign aid is explained from the vantage point of three theoretical perspectives. Firstly, the approach of political realism explains foreign aid as “a policy tool originated in the Cold War to influence the political judgements of recipients in a bi-polar struggle” (Hattori, 2001:634). Hattori (2003) further highlights the dismissive position taken by scholars for the ethical justification of foreign aid. He asserts that during the Cold War political realists understood foreign aid to be a euphemism for strategic interests in these new African states as the threat of nuclear war shifted the competition between the superpowers to the Third World.

As much as donor states might claim foreign aid to be voluntary, such foreign aid arises from material inequalities between the donor and the recipient. As Hattori 2001 points out: “for political realists, the material inequality between donor and recipient is embedded in a large political hierarchy determined by the bi-polar distribution of strategic capabilities during the Cold War” (Hattori, 2001:639).

In using a political realist’s perspective, it can be argued that foreign aid has actively reinforced the underlying material inequality of that era. Political realism exposed the anarchy of an international world struggle (the Cold War) whereby security was essential for a state’s survival. In this system foreign aid reinforced the powerful by applying pressure on
the less powerful states to take a position for the own survival - thereby maintaining the material imbalance between the powerful and less powerful.

The two alternative explanations of foreign aid are the perspectives of liberalism and the world system theory. Liberalism can also be referred to as idealism. The perspective differs from political realism which sees foreign aid as a policy tool to influence the political judgements of the recipients. Liberal internationalism, however, “is a set of programmatic measures designed to enhance the socio-economic and political development of recipient countries” (Hattori, 2001:634). The liberal position implicitly affirms the desire of recipients who strive for improvement and growth. Liberals believe in the progress of human nature and foreign aid is the tool used to achieve and accelerate this progress at the international level.

Like political realism, liberal internationalists understand that the condition from which foreign aid emerges is based on the material inequality between the donor country and the recipient. But they differ in that for liberalism “the gap between an advanced and less advanced condition of economic development will be mitigated over time by the expansion of international trade and finance” (Hattori, 200:639). The difference for liberal internationalists is that foreign aid is primarily viewed as a policy tool to influence the material inequality of recipients, but it can also influence their political policies.

There is an element of moral obligation for foreign aid in the liberal tradition. The literature suggests three ethical justifications. “The first identifies foreign aid as an ‘imperfect obligation’ of the industrialised to the less developed states to provide ‘basic needs’ which are identified as fundamental human rights. The second ethical justification for foreign aid is a moral response to problems that can be remedied with technical expertise. Finally, foreign aid is identified as embodying the ideal humanitarianism” (Hattori, 2003:230). There is, however, a suggestion that these ethical justifications are idealistic and that “aid cannot only be explained on the basis of economic and political interests of donors but that the significance of humanitarianism also influences the provision of aid” (Hattori, 2003:231).
Finally the world systems theory highlights foreign aid as “a means of constraining the development path of recipient’s countries, promoting the unequal accumulation of capital in the world” (Hattori, 2001:634). Later, Hattori (2003) elaborates more strongly that this perspective of foreign aid misinterprets an equally harsh reality of economic domination and exploitation of the core industrial states over the peripheral states. The world systems theory, however, emphasises that foreign aid contributes to the deterioration of the basic material inequality between donor and recipients. “For world system theorists, foreign aid is the operational factor behind the expansion of world capitalism, constraining the recipients’ development path to a dependent role in the world market” (Hattori, 2001:639). In other words foreign aid is seen as an impediment to the development of the recipients and contributes significantly in exacerbating the gap between the donor and recipient. Foreign aid is deemed as the tool which reinforces a system which maintains the status quo. A system considered by world system theorists only serving a few nations the core, those nations which are wealthy and developed over the poor and underdeveloped nations.

2.4 Realism in IR

Realism has been selected for this study as the most appropriate IR perspective for a better understanding of Japan’s foreign aid to SSA. While there is no single school of thought in realism, they do share a number of important characteristics. Nicholson (1998:67-68) suggests five: firstly, the main actors in realism are states; secondly, the nature of the system in which states find themselves are anarchical; thirdly, the “power security” principle is the leading mode of interaction; fourthly, although for some states defensive security is a primary goal, other states will become predators and force concessions from a weaker power; lastly, internal politics and external politics are considered to be separate.

Kenneth Waltz’s (Theory of International Politics, 1979) work has mostly been credited with having the most considerable impact in the neo-realism school of thought. According to this source anarchy defines the international system and states’ are compelled to secure security for their survival. Authors such as Buzan, Jones and Little (1993,) who have contributed to neo-realism thinking, provide essentially three points to show structural realism as an offshoot from the realist tradition. These are that:
• There is an emphasis on the dominance of the political sphere.
• The state is still considered as the most important actor in the international system, though it remains essential not to disregard other actors also for the purpose of this paper.
• The close link between actors and structures does not just only apply to the continuation between structural realism and realism traditions.

Some discussion about Japan’s complex relationship with SSA using foreign aid as a tool is the next focus. One of the questions that this thesis addresses is motivated by how aid fulfils a role of appeasement in its relationship with Africa. The first argument for this approach is firstly that it was to ensure Japan’s economic survival. Secondly, after WWII policies were adjusted and so was the pattern of aid distribution during changes taking place in the international environment and in African states. The focus shifted more towards humanitarian needs and development assistance.

Foreign aid has been a controversial issue throughout the industrialised world, and this has gained momentum in the post-Cold War era. The great conundrum has been about what role it ought to play and further, whether donor countries can continue to provide funds and what attachments there are to those funds. The realist paradigm helps shed light on Japan’s approach to the continent.

Realists understand and assume that aid policies are driven essentially by the strategic interests of nation-states. Nations are firstly jostling for position in a Hobbesian sense. Under this condition it becomes imperative for states to reach a point of security and self-preservation “as such foreign aid is perceived as only minimally related to recipient economic development and the humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed. Neorealist however has underscored the equal if not greater importance of understanding the economic dimensions of national security” (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998:3). The difference occurs between classical realist and neo-realist in that “classical realist aid priorities are seen essentially driven by the political-military relevance of the recipient country whereas
neorealists emphasise the recipients’ economic potential in understanding the ever changing world” (Schraeder et al. 1998:3).

Economic self-interest is widely regarded as the primary motivational factor of Japan’s foreign aid policies after WWII. The most noticeable aspect of Japan’s aid policy at this time was that “Japan clearly thought to use foreign aid in its quest for global economic supremacy. According to Stirling, Japan conducted a ‘business foreign policy’ in which overlapping groups of governmental and corporate actors have actively coordinated an ‘industrial policy’ targeted at enhancing exports through concessional aid” (Schraeder et al 1998:4).

Scholars such as Scalapino point out that Japan was among the first nations to articulate its national interests and survival through economic initiatives. Schraeder et al. (1998) suggest that, in short, Japanese policy makers were able to pursue a neo-mercantilist foreign aid strategy that concentrated on securing Japan’s regional geo-economic interests while skirting any political entanglements. “This literature overwhelmingly supports the notion of economic self-interest (kokueki) as the key determinant of Japan’s foreign aid policies in the aftermath of the Second World War” (Schraeder et al. 1998:9).

Nester (1991:31) concurs “that Japan’s neo-mercantilist strategy was also a major factor on Japan’s relationship and policy towards Africa”. Within the Cold War era, Japan sought to enhance its rapidly growing economy in search of economic supremacy. Relations with SSA were essential in achieving and maintaining the momentum and essential partners were sought across the continent to meet the needs of Japan’s economy. It is the economy which was deemed as vital to national security, as the US-Japan alliance provided Japan military protection which essentially left Japan to pursue its economic interests for its national security.
The focus on economic self-interests in foreign aid policies with the continent is also consistent with the apolitical nature of Japan’s foreign policies. Economics underscores Japan’s interests in SSA. According to Nester (1991) recipients of Japanese aid can be categorised as follows:

- they are important sources of raw materials vital to Japanese industry;
- they are potentially a source of materials in the future;
- they are big economic markets able to absorb Japanese goods”.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided some insight into the basic motivations for aid provision using three widely practised theoretical perspectives. President Truman’s Point Programme of 1949 launched a widely observed phenomenon which uses aid as a tool of national foreign policy. It was first launched to address economic underdevelopment of the developing world and improve living conditions. The motivations for the provision of aid vary from state to state but they are consistent across the donor community as political, economic and moral rationales.

As previously stated IR provides an explanation of foreign aid from three theoretical perspectives - political realism, liberalism, also known as idealism within the context of IR, and world system theory. All three theoretical perspectives provide conditions under which foreign aid addresses the challenges. This chapter’s conclusion is that political realism is considered the most appropriate theoretical perspective for this study for the role it has played in Japanese-SSAfrican aid relations.
Chapter 3: History of Japan-Africa relations and the emergence of Japanese ODA in Africa

3.1 Introduction

Several scholars including Ampiah (1997) and Sono (1993) provide in depth accounts of Japan’s relationship with Africa. Sono (1993) provides the most comprehensive account of Japanese-African relations which revisits the ties between the two partners from the earliest contacts in the 16th century. Relations have evolved since this time which has mostly been determined by consideration of European control over the continent. The end of WWII changed the direction of Japan for good and it was to emerge as one of the biggest and most powerful economies in the world by the end of the 20th century. Much of this transformation is owed to Japan’s increasingly close links to Africa. “Japan has emerged since the 1960s as an important trading partner and it became a relevant player in African political affairs during the 1980s” (Morikawa, 1997:1).

The relationship between Japan and SSA is determined through number of factors: commercial trade, diplomacy, and aid. Aid has been the last to emerge in the development of links between these partners. Its emergence - as Japanese ODA – was first used to address Japan’s legacy and participation in the war. “Historically, Japan’s ODA started as a form of war reparation to Asian neighbours. However, as the Asian countries started to graduate from ODA recipient, Japan was urged to shift its aid towards Africa as a last frontier of Japan’s ODA” (Motoki & Masumi, 2010: 3).

The aim of this chapter is to provide firstly, the emergence of Japanese ODA in SSA, and secondly, to give an account of the historical relations between Japan and the continent. As ODA is Japan’s most recent policy link with SSA, its study is relatively new, particularly for the period from 1960 to 1990 which covers Japan’s vastly expanding relationship with the continent.
This chapter is separated into two sections: Section I provide an overview of Japanese-African aid relations from 1960-1973. Section II covers Japanese aid relationship towards SSA from 1974 until the early 1990s. The chapter concludes by discussing Japan’s relationship with South Africa.

Section I: Japanese Aid and Political relations: 1960-1973

3.2 The background of Japanese ODA to SSA

ODA has been a strong component of Japan’s relationship with the world. The idea of development assistance was best understood by Japan after WWII when it needed to rebuild itself from the ruins of WWII and needed assistance to realise this objective.

Japan assumed its role as an aid provider beyond its Asian neighbourhood as early as the 1950s. In the 1950s, Japan’s role as a major donor to Africa grew when it became a member in the Colombo Plan which served to stimulate regional cooperation among members of British Commonwealth in Southeast Asia. The year 1954 “saw the very modest commencement of Japan’s ODA in the form of technical assistance when it joined the Colombo Plan of the British Commonwealth. Japan also started to provide aid to Asian countries that had resigned the claims on similar terms as reparations” (Watanabe, 2005:4).

Japan’s economic progression has also contributed significantly to its aid policy particularly from the 1960s when aid was directed at generating economic benefits sustaining economic growth. “Accordingly, Japan’s ODA was often used for obtaining resources, trading market share, and inexpensive labour forces” (Watanabe, 2005:50).

In the following decade the emergence of the global oil crisis of the 1970s and Japan’s rise as an economic force and ally of the West also propelled Japan to spread ODA across regions beyond her own. The trend would continue and would elevate Japan as a global donor leader to gain entry to the league of middle powers. This meant Japan at this time could inject a
degree of influence in this region through its ODA programme without the prestige of being described as a superpower or great power. It was at this period of the oil crisis of the 1970s where aid activities came in the shape of structural adjustment loans.

Japan’s new status and shift in foreign policy served the country well as it became aligned with the members and standards of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The political strategy also accelerated the move away from Japan’s obsession of acquiring resources to signalling the need to promote the path to democratisation in Africa. This was made clear with collapse of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology.

The growth of Japanese aid is attributed to can be two factors by Cornelissen (2004:118) who states firstly, that Japan’s economic importance is attributed to US influence and subsequently contribute to international burden sharing and Japan used aid programmes as a response to the pressure applied by the US. Aid was used to attain middle-power status which increased rapidly with the country’s heightened activism.

The era of the Cold War, however, cannot be understated in developing Japan’s foreign policy considerations in SSA. It is evident that during much of this era, Japan’s aid policy was wholly devoted to serving three objectives as Eyinla points: “First to complement and reinforce America’s geo-strategic and ideological interests within the framework of the United States/Japan co-operative strategic aid policy. Second, it was used as an instrument for expanding export markets. Lastly, in the 1980s, aid became the most useful diplomatic instrument for placating the African states for their rising criticism against Japan for its position as the leading trading partner to apartheid South Africa” (Eyinla, 1999:413).

The start of Japan’s aid relationship with SSA was motivated by economic reasons. Japan’s aid relationship with SSA had started primarily for economic reasons which were to serve Japan’s rapidly growing economy. ODA was delivered to SSA states rich in natural resources. This aid was, however, also intended to support Africa’s development as shown by Sato where “bilateral aid to African countries increased in ten years from 1970 to 1980 by
nominally 27.5 times. It is thus apparent that Japan embarked on aid to Africa primarily motivated by long-term economic security considerations” (Sato, 2005:73-74).

In the course of the Cold War escalating in the decades of the 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s, the realism perspectives remained ever present in Japan’s ODA in Africa. And as Japan’s responsibilities changed so did the political dynamics. The result of Japan’s increasing influence as a global economic power and the more active role she began to play internationally meant “Japan gradually came to see African countries as possible Japanese supporters in the international political scene, particularly at the UN meeting” (Sato, 2005:74).

These developments in the 1970s and 1980s can be considered political. African nations, breaking off the yoke of colonialism, were vulnerable to the pressure to take strategically important positions for the protagonists in the Cold War. In this political climate, Japan’s role to partner the United States and its allies resulted in economic might with which it assumed a position of a middle power.

It appears, then, that all three rationales featured in Japan’s aid relationship with SSA in the period 1960-1973. Significant political, economic and moral motives emerged during the reparation experience in South East Asia; as a result Japan’s expanding post-war economy and international pressure to play a greater role in international affairs are significant factors for Japanese aid provisions to SSA.

### 3.3 Japan’s aid diplomacy towards SSA (in the International context)

This period 1960-1973 was crucial for Japan’s emerging aid policy towards the continent because Japan pursued a path of diplomacy with aid as its principal tool. The context is important to highlight; colonisation was ending on the continent but also there was growing repudiation of the apartheid system in South Africa.
Japan’s engagement with SSA during this period was informed to a large degree by Japan’s historical experiences and cultural practices, the latter which “have created specific but variable Japanese identities and interests over time. More often than not, Japan pursued ad hoc diplomacy in Africa even if this diplomacy sometimes boiled down to one of indifference” (Adem, 2009:3).

Japan’s conflict resolution approach reveals the role that Japanese culture played in its aid diplomacy. “Japanese tradition of conflict resolution emphasizes the formula of ‘victor without vanquished’. Japanese believed, or gave the impression, that Apartheid could not be brought to an end just by isolating the regime. As it continued trade with South Africa, Japan had also continued in cultivating better relations with the rest of Africa” (Adem, 2009:3). It was as a result of this diplomatic behaviour that African nations began to voice their displeasure at Japan attempting to play both sides of the conflict. On the part of Japan such behaviour was a form of cultural logic as much as it was to achieve its objectives.

Japan’s diplomacy throughout this period towards SSA established a number of goals. According to van Wyk, (2007:16-17) “Japan’s main diplomatic goals were to promote its prosperity, to ensure the country’s security and to become the world’s leading economic power. Thus, it can be argued that Japan’s earlier ties with Africa were much more based on economic interests than any political gains or influence on the continent”.

Furthermore, Japanese diplomacy in this period served to meet a number of strategic objectives. “Since the 1960s the diplomatic objectives of Japan in Africa have changed periodically – but the changes were never – clear cut. In other words, the pursuit of strategic, economic and political objectives has remained the pillars of Japan’s diplomacy in Africa. However, the emphases have changed from time to time” (Adem, 2009:5).

Japan’s engagement with the continent was balanced by the global political context at the time. Japan’s ambition of becoming an economic power was at its earliest phase. Crucially in this period, Japan had to contend with a number of issues on the international stage which
had significant ramifications for Japan’s diplomacy in SSA. This included the “Cuban missile crisis (1962), the Vietnam War (1965), and the ‘Nixon shock’ (1971). It must be noted that the suggestion here is not that Japan completely disregarded its economic interests during this period. This phase reflected a diplomatic orientation to support the West in curbing the spread of communism in Africa. The major diplomatic objective of Japan was to help entrench African countries in the Western camp” (Adem, 2009:5-6).

Japan’s aid diplomacy at this time was all about balancing its economic ambitions and its responsibilities as an ally of the West in the bi-polar world struggle of the Cold War. As suggested by Adem (see quote above), aid relations with the continent were weighted a great deal towards the political rationale because it was directed at curbing communism on the continent when colonisation was drawing to an end. However, the importance of economic motivations should not be underestimated as the rationale was more about Japan’s economy than SSA renewal.

### 3.4 Historical Overview of Japanese/SSA relations

The rationale behind the relationship between Japan and SSA has mostly been understood in economic terms. It is after all the oldest motivation for the link between the island nation and the continent. This relationship has often been termed asymmetric where “Japan wants Africa’s raw materials; Africa needs Japan’s market, economic aid and investment, the asymmetric nature of interdependence between the two is not only there for all to see but the gap is also widening considerably” (Adem, 2001). The relationship from the outset has favoured Japan greatly and continues to widen.

Japan has since the end of the 19th century (at the time the African continent was being partitioned) explored new markets on the continent which in many ways provided strategically important resources for their hungry growing economy. The economic relationship between the two was not acknowledged until the 1930s, where “the term ‘economic diplomacy’ was first used within government documents and the Japanese media
to describe the process by which Japan wanted to gain greater access to European dominated markets in Africa” (van Wyk, 2007:17).

It was not until the 1960s when Japan/SSAfrican relations began to accelerate, that Japan had to confront a number of perplexing issues which had enormous ramifications for its economic links with Africa. A pattern of dealing with the continent developed at this time. Japan had to address its close economic ties with South Africa which had, generated criticism – especially from African states. A dual diplomacy emerged, whereby the importance of securing resources of national importance, and the issues that threatened this resulted in the establishment of Japan’s ‘Black Africa’ policy and ‘White Africa’ policy. Japan’s most important commercial partner on the continent was South Africa and although the relationship was plagued with difficulties, it never deterred both countries from having close commercial relations. In spite of UN sanctions placed against South Africa for its apartheid policy, economically its trade with Japan remained healthy, as Morikawa notes, “in 1962 the total value of Japanese-South Africa trade amounted to $ 178, 974, 000 , in 1968 it $ 551, 591, 000, and by 1980 it had climbed to $ 3, 593, 738, 000. This represents a twenty fold increase in less than 20 years” (Morikawa, 1984:134).

The 1960s saw Japan begin to form its own identity on the continent. Its dual diplomacy was heavily influenced by its internal need to expand its economy and play a more significant role for its allied partners during the Cold War. On the African continent white minority regimes, particularly South Africa was an ally of the West in the anti-Communist bloc. Another consideration was that South Africa provided strategically important resources for Japan as Owoeye notes, “South Africa has the world’s largest known deposits of the four key minerals – uranium, manganese, vanadium and platinum – groups metals and therefore in terms of sources of supply, South Africa is strategically more important to Japan than any other African country” (Owoeye, 1984: 284-285). It is for this reason that Japan had to build strong links with the region and therefore show a measure of support for the apartheid government at the time.
The ever growing close links between the island nation and Africa was broadened further by the growth in foreign aid. In a time where securing resources was of great importance, aid was seen as a way as to ensure resources for its economy. This led to Japan distributing aid to countries which were largely of strategic value, as Nester (1991) argues: “Japanese aid is targeted toward countries in which it has extensive economic interests where the main recipients of aid have either large markets or natural resources, although considerable aid has flowed to Tanzania because of ex-President Nyerere’s diplomatic prestige” (Nester, 1991).

Aid had successfully worked for Japan as war reparations to its Asian-neighbours. Its use towards SSAfrican nations in the initial stage had much to do with its own domestic objectives as it did with its alliance with Western powers, particularly the US. This means that both economic and political rationales were in effect at this time. Once again, it appears economic motives were important as to ensure resources for its own economy and directed to countries with large markets on the continent. Politically, aid was directed to SSA to curb the spread of communism and thereby contributing and assisting its Western allies.

Japan’s establishment of its geo-economic interests with aid disbursement created a dilemma for the recipients as it implied an inherent dependency and this brought about some difficult political problems. “In fact Japan’s first aid to Africa followed after Nigeria’s decision in August 1963 to restrict Japanese imports while Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda threatened to do the same” (Nester, 1991). The restrictions in imposed by Nigeria were intended to direct Tokyo not to extract resources out of the country without any meaningful returns to Nigeria and other African countries particularly through long-term investment. However, Japan found long-term investment a problem in Africa. Japanese business cited many reasons why it held such a pessimistic view regarding investment in the region “in order of importance, political instability, and difficulties in raising capital, poor quality of labor, economic instability, and difficulties in collecting information. Other difficulties cited include poor transportation and communications infrastructure, government corruption, inefficiency and red tape, and fears that Africans simply perceived the Japanese as "economic animals” (Nester, 1991). It was in this context that restrictions were introduced by African states on Japanese imports where in return Japan first began to address its problems and promote its interests on the continent through aid.
The evolution of Japan’s aid policy coincided with the increase in power and the economic might of Japan. The relationship between Japan and SSA which initially was dictated by the West has changed and thereby the use of aid has subsequently changed. The change in the nature of this relationship has led to Japan become a significant contributor of foreign aid and as such seen Japan become the lead donor country. By the 1980s Japan was providing its most industrious ODA work to date – which was again accelerated in this decade to secure natural resources in naturally endowed regions of the world. By the end of the Cold War in 1989/90, Japan had emerged as the world’s leading ODA donor. “Japanese leaders also pledged to become better ‘aid citizens’ by not only supporting economic development, but also social and political reforms in developing countries, including African countries. This was a significant foreign policy strategy of Japan to accentuate itself as an emerging middlepower” (van Wyk, 2007:31). The role of aid remains enormously relevant in Japan’s foreign policy which at its core follows the basic principles of global diplomatic pacifism and international cooperation.

Section II: Japanese Aid and Political relations: 1974-1990

3.5 Japan’s aid diplomacy towards SSA (1974-1990)

This period of Japan/SSA relations should be studied with knowledge of Japan’s basic objectives of its diplomacy. These can be discerned from official sources. As stated in the Diplomatic Bluebook of 1974: “In order to secure its own peace and progress, Japan must promote the maintenance and strengthening of international peace, stability and cooperation. The need is for, Japan to conduct an active multilateral diplomacy on a global scale through cooperation and dialogue. In conducting such a multilateral diplomacy, it is first of all fundamentally important for Japan to maintain and develop its traditional relations of friendship” (Diplomatic Blue Book, 1974).

The Diplomatic Bluebook also highlights the importance for Japan’s need to develop relations beyond its neighbourhood. “Japan also needs to pursue mutual understanding and cooperation with other regions of the world, such as Africa and Central and South America,
from the standpoint of promoting broadly-ranged international cooperation” (Diplomatic Blue Book, 1974).

The relationship between Japan and SSA at this time reached an important milestone. Foreign Minister Kimura visited five African countries of Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire, Tanzania and Egypt late in October through November, an epoch-making event. The first official visit to Africa by a Japanese Foreign Minister in office was timely because it took place at a time when the problem of Portuguese colonies was drawing to an end and shortly before the Lusaka Conference, which marked a shift in South Africa's position to one of easing tensions. The exchange of views at a high level meeting with the leaders of the host countries greatly promoted mutual understanding between Japan and Africa.

As a result of the exchanges taken place with the Prime Minister’s tour (1974), Japan took a series of concrete steps as mentioned below to substantiate its position.

- Japan decided not to conduct exchanges with South Africa in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions.
- Japan continued to strengthen its cooperation in the economic and social development of African countries.
- In connection with international relief activities, Japan contributed 500 million to the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization. The Japanese aid was highly appreciated by the African countries concerned and it helped improve the image of Japan among the African nations” (Diplomatic Blue Book, 1974).

Japan’s presence on the continent since this time and through this exchange has increased. Economic factors were the primary motivation for the increased presence especially after the oil crisis of 1973 which prompted Japan to search for secure resources but political factors should not be overlooked.

The tours to Africa were significant in that they were the first of their kind and a number of countries were targeted for the visit. Toshio Kimura visited a number of countries and explained later how the ‘oil shock’ of (1973) “forced him to recognise the vulnerability of the Japanese economy and to consider the need for a wider approach to
international relations. After the second ‘oil shock’ of 1979, Toshio Kimura’s successor
Naoshi Sonoda visited Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal in West Africa and Tanzania and
Kenya in East Africa. Whatever the reasons, Japanese ODA to Africa multiplied by
2,3% between 1973 and 1984; already by 1981, Africa’s share of Japanese ODA had
increased to 9,3%” (Seddon & Sato, 1997:155).

The tour to Africa in 1974 by Toshio Kimura held a number of objectives. “Kimura primarily
used the visits to announce Tokyo’s doubling of its African aid that year to 5,2% of its total
aid. Japanese aid is targeted toward countries in which it has extensive economic interests.
The main recipients have either large markets or natural resources, although considerable aid
has flowed to Tanzania because of ex-President Nyerere’s diplomatic prestige” (Nester,

The situation in SSA in 1974 saw significant change evolving around the long-standing
question of southern Africa. Two important documents can attest to the changing
circumstance in this region. The Lusaka and Nkomati Accords both had the intention of
addressing the unstable situation the region found itself in at the time. South Africa entered
these two agreements with both Mozambique and Angola in 1984. “The Nkomati accord
pledged Mozambique to expel the ANC, from its territory and to work in conjunction with
South Africa to this end” (Price, 1985:534). South Africa in exchange pledged to stop its
support for the Mozambique National Resistance which challenged the government of the
time.

The Lusaka accords on the other hand “commits the government of Angola to preventing the
South-West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) from using its territory as a base for
attacks into South African controlled Namibia” (Price, 1985:534). In exchange for this South
Africa agreed to remove its forces in Angola. In the meantime, Japan's diplomacy towards
SSA made great progress and it can be said that its relationship with SSA entered a new era.
Japan from this time increased visibility on the continent especially after the first tour by a
Overall this period suggest that economic and political rationales were at play throughout this process. The tour on the part of Japanese officials led directly to increase of ODA, directed particularly to countries which it had extensive economic interests. Politically the anti-communism momentum was in full swing and also for Japan, it was important to pursue its appeasement strategy on the continent in the wake of widespread criticism directed against it by African nations for its perceived close relations with apartheid South Africa. Once more Japan at this time continues to play a balancing act between economics and political interests.

3.6 Pre-1990 Japan ODA disbursement to SSA

Japan’s aid policy has evolved over time as a result of its foreign policy which has undergone change. Japanese aid or articulated as ODA “has been one of Japan’s primary foreign policy tools since its rapid economic development in the early 1950s had been economic assistance, ODA. There are three determinants of Japanese ODA which are mercantilist factors, humanitarian reason and U.S. motivated” (Tuman, Strand & Emmert, 2009:220).

The first period (1960-1973) formed part of Japanese aid policy to Africa. The second stage of Japan’s aid diplomacy to Africa falls under the second period (1974-1990). The motivation for Japan at this time through its aid policy towards the continent was shaped considerably by economic interests. At this time Japan also began to see SSA as an important ally especially through multilateral institutions. Japanese Foreign Affairs has worked hard to gain trust of SSA which in time may be crucial in Japan’s future international ambitions. For Japan the difference in these two stages “is that in the former Japanese aid was motivated by economic security considerations, and its prime target was the recipient countries. In the latter stages, the Japanese prime target was fewer recipients than other donors who demanded Japan to increase its financial contribution to international development” (Sato, 2005:74).

The overall picture concerning ODA disbursement to Africa suggests a steady incline from the 1960s to 1990 though there were exceptions to the steady incline of disbursements. Table 3.1 highlights this trend:
Table 3.1:

Japan’s Bilateral ODA to SSA, 1969-1990

(Net disbursement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ODA TO SSA (US $ million)</th>
<th>SSA Share of Total Japanese ODA (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>6,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>9,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>11,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>9,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>11,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>10,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>8,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>9,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>10,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>9,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>13,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>15,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>11,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cornelissen, 1997:42

Overall, Japan’s disbursement performance in the pre-1990 period reflects Japan’s diplomacy of the time. The performance of Japanese ODA must also be understood against the objectives of its aid policy to SSA. “First, it served the strategic and ideological interests of
the United States. Countries that were important in terms of countering the spread of communism and the influence of the Soviet Union were recipients of ODA. Second, Japan’s aid policy was aimed at securing resources and expanding its export markets” (Nel, 2005:6-7).

The final objective served Japan outside the Japan/America alliance. It sought to address Japan’s increasing criticism for its relationship with apartheid South Africa. Japan’s approach as a result distributed aid to a finite number of countries. “Between 1960 and 1990 eight countries shared more than 70 per cent of total aid to Africa. The countries were Kenya, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia. Countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia continued to be major recipients of Japanese aid through the 1990s” (Nel, 2005:6-7). The pre-1990 aid distribution from Japan to Africa has two primary motivations that of economics and politics.

3.7 Japanese aid and South Africa: 1960-1993

As a whole South Africa and its neighbours presented Japan with both pleasure and pain throughout this period. On the one hand, economics and commercial trade between the two partners had many advantages: natural resources for Japan in a time of global uncertainty, and for South Africa, Japan provided a market to sell those resources. On the other hand, the political and diplomatic difficulties deprived a sustainable healthy relationship between the partners. South Africa was a problematic partner to have at the time because of its status as a “pariah state” whose domestic policy was increasingly becoming repugnant across the world. In spite of South Africa whose reputation was deeply tarnished at the time, it remained important to Japan - as reflected by the trade numbers of a twenty-fold increase from the 1960s to end of 1980s.

South Africa and its close neighbours were of great importance to Japan in comparison to the rest of the continent. The reasons for this are:

(1) Southern Africa was diplomatically important in demonstrating Japan’s opposition to apartheid in the Republic of South Africa;
(2) some countries were suitable for ODA activities in term of others considerations

- security (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana),
- friendliness to Japan (especially Zambia), and
- language (for most Japanese, English is the best foreign language in which to communicate)” (Motoki & Taichi, 1999:71).

The pattern of aid, after majority rule was achieved in in the region, was granted no longer as a traditional political gesture but for humanitarian purposes. The relationships between Japan and the region were, however, influenced by Japan’s relationship with the Republic of South Africa which, as has been shown, was a troubled one.

Any form of exchange - particularly that of aid to not only South Africa but also the SSA region - was bound to be shaped considerably by Japan’s stance towards South Africa. Motoki and Taichi explain: “Japan formally declared itself against apartheid and supported the UN sanction policy. Due to the relatively strong economic relationship between South Africa and Japan, however, Japan was somewhat ambivalent. In 1987, Japan became the top trader with the racist South African government. To neutralize this impression, Japan resorted to reinforcing ODA leaders of frontline states, namely Zambia and Tanzania” (Motoki & Taichi, 1999:72).

In terms of the patterns of ODA, it differed when directed to South Africa compared to the region and the continent at large. When it came to South Africa it is clearly evident that the flow of ODA from Japan during this time was non-existent. Strong commercial links, criticism of apartheid, and political and diplomatic ties are some of the factors that have influenced relations between the two partners. The most noticeable aspect of this relationship with South Africa at the start was the lack of ODA. This arose from Japan’s historical understanding and relationship with South Africa – rationale that Morikawa outlines as follows: “The Republic of South Africa is not covered by Japan’s ODA policies. This is because the Japanese bureaucrats concerned have historically treated South Africa as being a developed nation, notwithstanding that it was a country that legalized racial discrimination. Another reason is that Japan has in the case of South Africa had the benefit of large-scale stable trade, direct private investment and technology transfers” (Morikawa, 2005:493).
As Japan’s aid provision to SSA is based on political, economic and moral rationales, it is particularly noticeable that the moral rationale given for the aid which flowed to South Africa at this time was directed to previously disadvantaged groups - a humanitarian motive. Previously, Japan had not deemed South Africa suitable for aid as it regarded South Africa as a developed nation.

The initial lack of ODA given to South Africa from Japan cannot be understated. Its commercial links largely flattered South Africa’s status in the eyes of Japanese bureaucrats who saw tremendous benefits from this relationship. Morikawa explains “according to the Japanese governments ‘Diplomatic Blue Book’, Tokyo and Pretoria announced on 1 March 1961 that they agreed to establish diplomatic relations and would implement them as soon as the necessary internal procedures on both sides could be concluded” (Morikawa, 1984:133).

This agreement on March 1961 would begin Japan’s most controversial period post-WWII. ODA featured infrequently in this relationship with South Africa but the limited ODA which was provided was no different in its objectives as it was to some of the other recipients on the continent in that it was not based on humanitarian needs (which it became at the end of this period) but rather political needs - to prolong the arrangements with Pretoria. It was the foundation of what is termed as Japan’s ‘White Africa’ policy because “the place of South Africa in this overall picture was different. It was given high priority in Japan’s foreign policy as it was regarded as a self-proclaimed champion of the anti-communist struggle in Africa and maintained an intimate relationship with the United States” (Morikawa, 1997:9-10).

Throughout this period, aid had served Japan’s political and economic objectives of securing resources, appeasing significant voices on the continent, behaving in accordance with UN resolutions and ensuring Japan’s own economic survival. However, the aid directed to South Africa – was based on Japanese bureaucrats understanding of the country. “It regarded South Africa despite having a black majority and a policy of apartheid as an advanced free-world country on par with Australia or Canada” (Morikawa, 1997:9) and was therefore not regarded as an aid recipient.
South Africa was deemed to be a developed nation which was believed not to be in need of aid. The commercial links cannot be said to have provided the buffer that distracted Japan ODA away from the magnitude of the problems underway in the Republic. Aid of any significance from Japan arrived after majority rule was achieved. The aid granted moved away from the traditional political gesture to that of humanitarian need. This alteration from the start of the 1990s was significant. “From 1990, Japan began to provide aid to anti-apartheid groups in South Africa through international NGO’s and other organisations. After the inauguration of the ANC government in 1994, Japan pledged a large aid package” (Sato, 2005:155-156). The move on the part of Japan to distribute aid to South Africa post-1994 suggests the importance South Africa is to Japan on the continent. With the fall of the apartheid regime, aid to South Africa served a different role, to secure Japan’s most important relationship on the continent which would provide the foundation for it to pursue its interests on the continent. For Japan, aid to South Africa meant that a strong primarily economic and political relationship is established as South Africa was considered at the time the gateway into the continent.

3.8 Conclusion

Chapter 3 has given some insight into Japan-African contacts and relations that span over centuries. Japanese interests on the continent accelerated at the time of Africa’s partitioning where Africa was deemed to have an endless reservoir of resources and a potentially lucrative market for Japan and the West. It was only until the 1960s where Japan began to establish strong links with the continent. The Cold War and the anti-Communist struggle, a fast growing Japanese economy, securing resources of national security are some of the reasons for Japan’s new interest on the continent.

Japanese foreign aid policy evolved over time and the relationship with SSA has experienced this change. ODA became a part of Japan’s foreign policy and began in earnest at a time when Japan held large commercial relations with South Africa who at the time was its most important partner on the continent. The two rationales that dominate Japan’s aid relationship at this time are economic and political. Both were of great importance to Japan’s SSA and international relations. One can conclude that ODA as a form of realpolitik was vital to
secure interests for its own national security. In closing South Africa was of great importance to Japan and ODA featured less prominently in this country as a result of strong commercial links and how Japan perceived South Africa at the time as a developed nation.
Chapter 4: Japanese aid towards Africa: patterns and motives

4.1 Introduction

In recent times, ODA has received much attention in Japanese foreign policy. Since ODA’s early introduction, particularly to the African continent, the intended use was not explicitly articulated, reflecting Japan’s *ad hoc* foreign policy. However, the post-1990 period presented new circumstances in which Japan was pressed to revisit its foreign policy engagements. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin brought this change, not only to Japan but to many of the world’s powers. For Japan, this subsequently led a new interest in Africa and Japanese aid began to feature prominently in Japan’s diplomacy on the continent. The shift can be traced by analysing the flow and pattern of Japanese aid to Africa.

In this chapter the primary question addressed is: Why did the continent receive aid from Japan? The literature indicates that since the 1950s, aid which first began as a diplomatic tool in Japan’s foreign policy, significantly increased in the late 1970s and 1980s in SSA. The increase in aid can be attributed to greater visibility of Japan on the continent especially after the first foreign visit by a Japanese minister to the continent in 1974. By the post-1990 era, however, aid had become more important as a pillar in Japan’s diplomacy towards Africa. This chapter and the one that follows aim to shed light on this change. The key feature to be discussed is how and why, since the early 1990s, the ODA Charter became the fulcrum of Japanese diplomatic relations. In Africa, Japan promotes a different form of development to the Western model which means that considerable attention has been given to promote self-help efforts and a self-ownership for Africans in their own development. Like the West, however, the policy also aims to promote peace and stability on the continent. Clearly in considering all these factors, Japan’s intention has been to distinguish itself on the international scene and on the African continent.

Without a colonial past with the continent, Japan’s engagement with SSA is such that it is strategically well placed to pursue different political aims. These unique features will be the focus of chapter four and chapter five in which the Tokyo International Conference on
African Development (TICAD) process and G8 Summits will be analysed to assess Japan’s foreign aid objectives. This chapter begins with the first decade of the TICAD Process as well as the G8 Summits insofar as it concerns Japanese/SSAfrican aid relations.

Chapter five studies the second decade of the TICAD process and the challenges confronting this process. The arrival of China on the continent and the implications this may have on Japan’s aid relationship with SSA will also be discussed. Finally, Japan’s aid relationship with South Africa is examined.

4.2 Post-1990 Japanese ODA policy to Africa

4.2.1 Background

According to Sunaga (2004) “Japan’s post-1990 foreign policy was deeply influenced by the international context of the time and also the domestic climate where a balance had to be found between these two factors”. We have seen that the geopolitical circumstances affecting Japan’s policy outlook of the late 1980s at the Cold War brought about Japan’s advancement as a major economic power. Japan’s new path on the international stage began one in which its foreign policy was to promote “peace, freedom and prosperity as common objectives that Japan should pursue together with people of other nations” (MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook: 1992). Clearly from the outset strong political reasons were given to promote Japan’s foreign policy. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc Sunaga notes “with this development, states particularly those highly involved in the “conflict” had to reconsider their aid policies, since at the time a great deal went to Third World countries” (Sunaga, 2004:1).

From 1990 Japan’s ODA gained considerable attention as first clear indication of what Japanese foreign policy intended in the post-Cold war era. While ODA dispersed by Japan is no different to that of other donor nations, primarily on an inter-government basis the ODA report of that year reveals three other significant roles for aid in Japan’s international relations.
• “First, Japanese aid plays an important role in the maintenance and promotion of friendly and cooperative bilateral relationships between Japan and recipients of its aid. In other words, aid is a component of Japanese foreign policy.

• Secondly, Japanese aid is substantially influenced by trends in the international political situation.

• Third, by using its economic strength to foster international stability and prosperity, Japan can make a major contribution to the international community” (ODA Annual Report, 1990).

At that time exchanges between individuals and between states were at an unprecedented high level due to better and quicker methods of interaction especially in information technology and more person to person exchanges. However, these exchanges also exacerbated the gap between rich and poor, and wealthy nations were pressed to play a greater role in bridging this gap. In 1992, Japan, as one of the wealthy nations, was intent on reducing this gap and it was within this context that ODA Charter was drawn up. As stated the significance of studying aid in Japanese diplomacy is that it is important to distinguish it from the traditional economic and commercial motives. In fact, aid has become an incredibly complex factor in the study of any foreign policy and for Japan it is no different.

4.3 Japan’s political mark on the African continent

The flow of aid to the continent attracted a great deal of interest in terms of its implications. Japan’s first major commitment was as a result of humanitarian considerations in Mozambique. As Sato notes, “In 1993 the Japanese sent the SDF [Self-Defense Forces] to Mozambique for participating in the UN peace-keeping operation after the ceasefire between the Frelimo government and the RENAMO forces backed up by Apartheid South Africa” (Sato, 2005:76).

The second political commitment was the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process. Japan’s post-1990 relationship with SSA is largely expressed through TICAD, which has become one of two key pillars of Japan’s relationship with
Africa; the other being Japan-South Africa relations. Both commitments reflect a political rationale aimed at bringing about a level of stability in the region at a time of global political change.

The establishment of TICAD in 1992 demonstrates Japan’s new found energy towards SSA as the instigation of this international conference with various stakeholders in African development was to develop new goals. Lehman (2005) gives three reasons for Japan’s decision to hold this conference. “Japan clearly saw the humanitarian need in Africa and, given Japan’s economic wealth; it realized it could create a positive environment. Second, Japan desired to be treated as a major global power and as a latecomer in providing aid to Africa, Japan needed a strong presence on the continent to present itself as a leading donor country” (Lehman, 2005:427).

Lehman’s further point relates to Japan’s past experience in Asia which motivated the aid relationship with Africa. He elaborates that “part of its strategic plan to position itself as a major Asian power, Japan used TICAD as a platform to put forward the so-called Asian development model” (Lehman, 2005:427). Japan’s aid provision to the continent was heavily motivated by politics. Aid distribution to Africa at this time would serve Japan’s political ambition to be recognised as a major political power.

The TICAD framework was different to other international frameworks in that it encouraged mutual interaction between members. The importance of this political commitment for Japan was that it allowed for the initiation of a development strategy in Africa for Africa. The following TICAD conference, held five years later in 1998, continued on the platform established by the first conference by providing new developmental initiatives. What can be seen in TICAD I, was that the whole process was more of a symbolic manoeuvre by all stakeholders as there were no established mechanisms to monitor the actualisation of the established targets. Lehman defines “the first TICAD conference as marking Japan’s interest in claiming its role and increasing its visibility in Africa. Japan’s criticism of conventional structural adjustment policies and neo-liberalism emerged at this time. These criticisms led to the promotion of Japan’s own ‘Asia model development’” (Lehman, 2005:429-430).
The United Nations has been a co-organiser alongside Japan since the inception of the TICAD process which aimed to promote ownership on the part of African states concerning their own development path, with support of the international community. Gambari notes that the process has also allowed “for a forum where exchanges concerning development strategies are discussed between the continent and developmental partners with the goal at contributing to poverty alleviation by means of economic growth” (Gambari, 2003:1).

TICAD has identified a number of objectives: the three pillars that comprise Japan's initiative for assistance to Africa. They are “human-centered development”, “poverty reduction through economic growth” and “consolidation of peace” as outlined by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA, 2003:116). These pillars also correspond to the priority areas laid out by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

The first two TICAD processes instigated some new developments: firstly, it meant that the continent remained on the international agenda. This can be attributed to Japan being at the heart of the creation of the process in 1992 “involving the donor community and non-governmental organisations” (Lehman, 2005:427). Secondly, the process was also successful in highlighting the need for development in SSA, where Japan has crucially highlighted this point internationally. However, Japan’s commitment in the first two TICAD have raised questions about many objectives established through the TICAD process lacked substance and commitment in terms of what Japan is willing to contribute and how these contributions would be measured and monitored. There was also the question about the true intentions of Japan: Was it really committed to SSAfrican development, or is it committed as far as it is beneficial to the island nation? On the whole TICAD was about creating an environment suitable to address the development challenges on the continent. As such, it can be said the economic rationale was also significant in getting this process underway.
4.4 Post-1990 ODA data for SSA

Japan’s post-1990 ODA programme is remarkable. The most significant period is post-TICAD I from 1990-1998 which reveals a proactive stance and increased visibility for Japan in SSA. In terms of volume, the ODA programme in this period reflects Japan’s initiative and enthusiasm to support development in Africa (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Japan’s bilateral ODA to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 1990-1998
(Net disbursement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ODA Total (US $ million)</th>
<th>SSA’s Share of Total Japanese ODA (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>11,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>10,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>858,81</td>
<td>10,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>11,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1144</td>
<td>11,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1332,93</td>
<td>12,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>12,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>12,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>11,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Total (1990-1998)</td>
<td>8823,74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japan’s ODA after TICAD I was significant for many reasons. Quantitatively, SSAfrica’s share of total Japanese ODA remained the same in relative terms but considerably larger in volume compared with the 1970s and 1980s figures. ODA to SSA throughout the 1990s reflects Japan’s global position and significantly, its commitment to SSA. Significantly, Table 4.1 reveals the pattern of aid distribution has globalised Japan’s aid policy from what it had been with only the Asian region in consideration. It is clear since TICAD I, Japan created an international role for itself as a global power and leading donor in SSA where it can assist in addressing humanitarian needs for the African continent using its Asian developmental model. This is what Japanese foreign policy hoped TICAD would achieve with Table 4.1 indicating a quantitative growth in ODA distribution. In addition, as Demachi observes there was also a “desire to strengthen political relationship with African countries in order to gain support for Japan’s goal to win a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations” (Demachi, 2009:3). Therefore, it can be said that Japan was to benefit politically from an increased performance in African ODA disbursement during this period where permanent membership on the Security Council of the UN was the goal.

This data shows that all three rationales have been enacted for ODA to Africa. Humanitarian reasons, economic reasons (particularly for development purposes on the continent) and the desire to be treated as a global power politically are the stated motivations for aid distribution. The increase in the quantity of ODA at this time speaks of the importance and the urgency to meet the Security Council objective.

In the same post-TICAD I (1994-2003) period Japan has managed to outperform other major international donors, a position it has maintained from the end of the Cold War until the year 2001. Table 4.2 demonstrates this trend where Japan’s share of 20% in bilateral ODA has been the highest throughout the first two TICAD processes. In Table 4.2, the “of which” figures indicate to government loan proportion of ODA in the case of Japan.
Table 4.2: ODA performance of G7 countries (in billion dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>101.9</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>110.9</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loans(Japan)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.U.</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>292.8</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7 Total</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>416.3</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Total</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>560.3</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Akiyama & Nakoa, 2005:6

Japan’s ODA performance prior to the period covered above is seen in Table 4.3. The data is significant in that it confirms Japan’s position as a top donor by the end of the Cold War but as the table shows (Table 4.2), Japan lagged behind in its efforts of being a major donor prior to its turnaround in the post-1990s and the decade thereafter.
A comparison of Japan’s ODA performance in the pre-1990 and post-1990 periods suggests that Japan raised its aid distribution profile worldwide in the latter part of the 20th century. The volumes which began to increase at the end of the Cold War were to mature to far larger amounts in the period thereafter. As a result, Japan has risen in ranks and has outperformed other major donor countries.

Figure 4.1 below, illustrates the kind of aid distributed from the era of the Cold War through to the end of TICAD II (1990-2002) by Japan. This ODA, as stated comprises four components: grant assistance, loans, technical assistance and contributions to international organisations.
As discussed in Chapter 3, Japan has had to confront considerable changes in international politics throughout the second half of the twentieth century. This is reflected in Fig. 4.1 which shows how Japan began to feature more prominently as an ODA donor post-1990. Since the turn of the century, as the world’s largest ODA donor much of Japan’s ODA disbursement has been done multilaterally through TICAD process and other gatherings such as the G8 Summits. This strong multilateral showing by Japan suggests a moral rationale approach to its distribution efforts.

4.5 The G8 Summit process

Since 1990 the G8 Summit has become the most recognisable process in which the world’s most industrialised and wealthiest nations come together annually to discuss and help assist the underdeveloped parts of the world. Among the many discussions held at these meetings, Africa remains at the heart of development discussions and, the outcomes have important
consequences for the continent. Japan’s role in this multilateral group will be examined especially its position towards SSA. Only three G8 Summits will concern us here as these summits have focused considerably on Africa than others.

4.5.1 The G8 Summit 2000

The G8 Summit of 2000 hosted in Kyushu-Okinawa was momentous for Japan. In the discussions, attention was given to Africa by the official statement that the group was “deeply concerned about the growth of armed conflict on the continent of Africa. Africa must mobilise the political will to prevent and resolve armed conflicts. We stress the rule of law; good governance and democracy are indispensable elements to achieve that goal. We reaffirm our strong commitment to help. We also reaffirm our commitment to support Africa’s quest for peace and stability” (MOFA, 2000:3).

Significantly, Japan’s initiative to invite the Heads of States (Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, and the Prime Minister of Thailand) for discussions that ran concurrently with the Summit was applauded by all the G8 Leaders. The forum for exchange of opinions also included representatives of the World Bank, the World Health Organisation, the United Nations Development Programme and information technology businessmen. The meeting hosted by Japan’s Prime Minister, Yoshiro Mori, was the first of its kind. It was recorded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “The keyword during the meetings was ‘partnership,’ with the developing countries stressing both a ‘global partnership’ and ‘action oriented partnership.’ The former points the importance of North-South dialogue, and the latter stresses commitment through action as opposed to rhetoric. The need for action was a strong desire that emanated from the developing countries” (MOFA, 2000).

Apart from the fact that Japan’s gesture to invite leaders from the developing world included Africa, this summit’s advantage for SSA was that it gave them another platform for promises (albeit with plenty of rhetoric) to provide assistance and direction for Africa on areas which they needed to address.
4.5.2 The G8 Summit 2005

The G8 Summit of 2005 was another important step for Africa’s development. It marked the end of the ten year timeframe for countries to meet their Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) where the focus was placed on Africa - which at the time, was not on track to meet the MDGs. In the process, all G8 countries committed themselves to providing aid to SSA and in joining Japan’s financial commitments made at the summit. One of the resolutions of this Summit at Gleneagles noted that: “Japan intends to increase its ODA volume by $10 billion in aggregate over the next five years. Japan has committed to double its ODA to Africa over the next three years and launched the $5 billion 'Health and Development Initiative' over the next five years. For the 'Enhanced Private Sector Assistance (EPSA) for Africa' facility, Japan will provide more than $1 billion over 5 years” (Gleneagles Summit, 2005).

The international response towards Africa’s renewal was based not only on recommitting to past agreements but on what was further agreed during the summit. The conclusion reached for SSA was that “the G8 re-committed itself to partnering with African nations to achieve their vision of sustainable growth, development and active participation in the world economy. The G8 set out concrete measures that will have a real impact on bettering the lives of African people” (The White House, 2005).

The significance of this cannot be understated. The meeting was based on two targets: poverty in Africa and climate change. The most significant aspect which developed from the summit was that an additional 50 billion US dollar aid package would be allocated and directed towards poverty alleviation. For Japan, it was a forum in which it pledged to double the amount of aid going to Africa for the next three years. In terms of Japan’s aid performance by 2005, 11% of Japanese ODA was already directed towards Africa.
4.5.3 The G8 Summit 2008

Like many G8 Summits before, this summit held in Japan, discussed Africa’s development. The outcome for SSA was that the world leaders at the summit, rather than making new pledges, reiterated pledges made previously in 2005 on issues of development, Africa and food security. In addition a pledge was made to increase ODA to Africa by 25 billion US dollars a year by the year 2010.

The reaction particularly by the Africa Progress Panel acknowledged the efforts particularly of the Government of Japan for including and engaging African governments throughout the summit. The Africa Progress Panel confirmed this by stating “the G8’s renewed commitment to deliver the pledges at Gleneagles is a welcome. The Panel calls for G8 countries to specify both how and when they will deliver on the undertaking they have given to their own electorates, the peoples of Africa and the broader international community” (Africa Progress Panel, 2008).

One of the key statements of the G8 Summit on Africa suggests commitment to Africa. “The G8 has long been committed to Africa’s development. The G8 and other donors are delivering on the ODA pledges to Africa and other developing countries made at Gleneagles in 2005. Of the $25 billion additional aid projected to accrue to Africa by 2010 as a result of these commitments, more than $12 billion of additional aid has been delivered by the DAC donors since 2004. This indicated substantial progress” (MOFA, 2008:1). But in spite of these pledges made by developed nations - including Japan, these countries have been increasingly criticised for failing to meet their commitments. Thus far, reality and rhetoric remain somewhat apart.

However, these three G8 Summits represent a platform upon which Japan pursued it goals and intentions, established through TICAD to promote and maintain Africa’s agenda on the international scene and in the process it strengthened multilateral support for Africa’s development. There can be no doubt that by playing a greater role internationally, Japan
benefited not only Africa but also enhanced its own prestige and significance on the world stage.

For Japan, the G8 Summit process reflects both moral and political rationales while at the same time economic rationale is implied. While the process itself was borne out of a moral rationale, addressing and attending to the plight of the poorest of nations on the planet - it was also a stage on which Japan could further establish its political commitment towards the African continent. TICAD was promoted through the G8 process in the hope that, apart from a commitment to Africa, it would improve Japan’s prestigious position amongst the world’s powers an equal both economically and politically. Japan no longer wanted to be known just as an economic power but as capable of being a world political power. For Japan, it was hoped that this would ultimately lead to a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council.
Chapter Five focuses on the post-TICAD III period and the role Japanese aid played at this time. The first point to highlight is that the start of TICAD III marked a decade out to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2015. Japan has always declared its supports for the MDGs and continues to encourage the need for the international community work together to achieve the set goals.

A crucial moment in the development of the MDGs was undertaken in 2000, where eight MDGs were embraced by world leaders who each committed to their achievement by 2015. The MDGs have since had an effect on global development, where the goals can be monitored successfully but on the tenth anniversary of the MDGs in 2010 Japan’s ODA was in decline by 40%. At this point Japan had relinquished its position as the top ODA donor, where “its ODA is around half of the U.S’s, lower than the U.K’s and only slightly above France’s and Germany’s ODA. In 2006, Japanese ODA was US$ 11.6 billion, of which $3.1 billion was debt relief” (End Poverty 2015, 2006). At this time Japan also ranked rather low among the group of 22 OECD donor countries, where its aid efforts were far below the OECD average.

Overall, Japan considers MDGs to be an important concept of goals, through which the international community should work in unison in order to achieve its objectives. Japan has contributed in the provision of ODA both bilaterally and multilaterally for the improvement of human security, a point which Japan has always advocated strongly. Japan has confirmed that it will continue its “assistance to Africa in accordance with the pledges made at TICAD IV while making all-out efforts for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The pledges referred to here are the doubling of ODA without debt relief by 2012 including doubling bilateral grants and provide up to 4 billion USD of loans to Africa over 5 years” (MOFA, 2010). This chapter will now focus on whether Japan has met its pledges. The objective is to determine whether Japan’s rhetoric is reflected through its performance.
5.1 The post-TICAD III process

TICAD III was launched in 2003 commemorating the tenth anniversary of the TICAD process, and this third conference was one of the most important dedicated to African development. In the opening address Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi reviewed the three pillars of the ODA Charter which would guide Japan’s assistance to Africa, consolidating peace, reducing poverty through economic expansion; and promoting human-oriented development. He also made the commitment of providing one billion US dollars in grant aid towards the continent. The conference covered three important areas. “First the conference reaffirmed TICAD commitments over the past decade, and discussed the future orientation of the Process including the support of NEPAD. Second, it expressed for stronger ties between TICAD and NEPAD and finally human security as the underlying framework for poverty reduction” (MOFA, 2003).

The fourth TICAD conference was on 28-30 May 2008, held in Japan was significant in that the conference was to be followed by the G8 Summit – also to be held in Japan - so whatever concerns about Africa which emerged from TICAD IV were sure to filter through to the summit which also concerned itself with African development. The participants at TICAD IV committed themselves to working together towards achieving the four interrelated goals:

- “Boosting economic growth
- Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (which include ensuring human security, education and health)
- Peace consolidation and good governance
- Addressing environmental issues and climate change” (Ampiah, 2008).

TICAD IV also reaffirmed the contributions of the TICAD process to African development over the past 15 years by acknowledging the improvements African countries were making particularly in consolidation of peace, good governance, economic growth, and social development. The major achievement of the conference was the Yokohama Declaration which confirmed the political commitment of Japan to SSA’s development. The authorities of Japan also managed to secure development assistance to the value of four billion US dollars in soft loans to SSA as well as committing to the doubling its grant aid and technical
assistance to the continent. In spite of all these commitments, however, questions remained whether Japan’s rhetoric would measure up to reality.

5.2 Japanese ODA disbursement

The flow of Japan’s ODA between 2004 and 2007 is shown by the data in Table 5.1 below. It illustrates Japan’s efforts at this time.

Table 5.1: Japan’s Bilateral ODA to SSA, 2004-2007

(Net Disbursement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ODA Total (US $ million)</th>
<th>SSA’s Share of Total Japanese ODA %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1731</td>
<td>19,25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2318</td>
<td>17,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4730</td>
<td>38,46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2897</td>
<td>33,68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Total (2004-2007)</td>
<td>11 676</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data Report, 2011

The Data Report (2011) on the flow of aid at this time points out “that Japan has delivered its commitment to double bilateral assistance to Africa. Despite reading its 2007 target, Japan’s aid level in 2007, in real terms, was still less than its ODA to Africa in 1989/90. According to OECD figures, Japan’s bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 was $ 1,61 billion, thus surpassing the 2007 target for bilateral assistance of $ 1,22 billion” (Data Report, 2011).
In quantitative terms, Japan has been successful in doubling its aid efforts which, at face value, suggested an economic driven aid disbursement. However, on further examination, Japan’s aid performance at this time speaks a great deal about the political commitment which TICAD suggests it to be. It also appears from this, that the importance for Japan’s relationship with SSA with respect to its UN Security Council ambitions cannot be underestimated.

The next significant phase in the TICAD process was in 2008. TICAD IV was hosted in May of that year - again a month prior to the G8 Summit. In the course of the TICAD IV event Japan made several announcements concerning its assistance to Africa one of which was that Japan committed itself to doubling its average ODA to the continent for the period (2008-2012). It was the same pledge made in 2005. In addition to its commitments, Japan’s other announcements addressed matters that had to do with infrastructure, investment, agriculture, health and education. These commitments expressed at TICAD IV further confirmed Japan’s consistent political obligations to African development, a commitment consistent since TICAD I.

As the undertaking to African development is based on its ODA Charter and the TICAD process as well as the hope to be more effective than the traditional Western approaches to Africa’s development, Japan regards African economic growth as an effective mechanism for reducing poverty, and great emphasis is placed on development like building infrastructure and basic services. But this is not all. The advantage for Japan is that while meeting these international obligations Japan’s visibility in Africa has been maintained and in the process strong bilateral relations have been established as in the creation of TICAD as an inclusive body has activated important links with the UN.

Africa’s political importance is important to Japan because as a group of nations it is a powerful union which accounts for 25% of the UN General Assembly. Simply put, Japan seeks a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and Africa is instrumental at achieving this goal. Economically, while Africa’s raw materials have also been important to Japan, they also ensure, among other things, the steady and concrete outcomes of TICAD IV. Overall
Japan’s ODA is an important factor in Japan’s diplomacy. ODA remains a tool of Japanese diplomacy, a consistent trend since the 1950s – and it is for Japan’s traditionally non-Western approach to African development. In conclusion Japan’s upward trajectory of its ODA disbursement to Africa reflects Japan’s political commitment and meeting its international obligations.

Japan’s ODA objectives have focused on distributing debt packages. This was given some attention at the G8 Gleneagles Summit, where a point raised about debt forgiveness (debt relief) observed that as loans make up a large portion of Japan’s ODA disbursement would hurt Japan’s foreign aid strategy of promotion of self-help if recipient governments were not to follow through in their commitments. Where Japan has distributed ODA loans to highly indebted countries, it should expect that the process might not always bear the intended domestic economic benefits for these countries. It can be said that Japan’s need to play a greater role in humanitarian and poverty reducing efforts, was also inspired by having the need to respond to international criticism and pressure.

Japan’s engagement with SSA is shaped by a number of key principles, of which aid flows is intended to target the promotion of self-help efforts, utilise local knowledge and to have a non-interventionist approach, lessons drawn largely from its experience in Asia. In considering all these factors Japan’s ODA performance throughout this period reflects considerable effort at addressing debt relief on the continent and an investment in infrastructure and basic services as the figure 5.1 suggests.
**Figure 5.1:** Sectoral shares of Japanese ODA to SSA between 2005 and 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Basic Services</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Infrastructure</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Growth and Productive Sectors</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Government, Civil Society, Conflict, Peace, Security</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Environment and Multisector</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Emergency, Humanitarian, Food aid</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. General Budget Support</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Debt Relief</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In comparing Japan’s performance at this time (Fig 5.1) with other major donor nations (see Fig 5.2 below) it can be seen that debt relief has been a major focus of Japan’s ODA disbursement.
Figure 5.2: Sectoral shares of other donors’ ODA to sub-Saharan Africa between 2005 and 2009

Some of the reasons why it has performed so differently to other major donors at this time, was firstly, Japan was displaced as the world’s leading donor country as a result of the country’s recessionary period and financial deficit, which have impacted negatively on Japan’s aid (excluding debt relief) to Africa. However if one includes, debt relief, Japan has continued to increase its ODA disbursements, where there has been a closer monitoring of aid flow and its effectiveness. However, the overall picture has it that Japan still lags behind other major donors as Table 5.2 indicates.
Table 5.2: ODA (USD billions) to SSA from top 5 donors by total volume and Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000-2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Institutions</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Japan has historically distributed its aid to a number of countries on the continent, covering all the major regions. However, as the literature cautions, it should also be remembered that Japan has taken a different route to other donor countries. It has given priority to certain countries for various reasons addressing humanitarian problems, maintaining security of its own resources and partnering with Africa in achieving certain objectives. Japan regional or country focus with regards to aid operates on “a key countries approach, giving priority status to certain countries based on a range of factors, including their interdependence with Japan, resource deposits and levels of poverty” (Wild, Denney, Menocal & Geddes, 2011:24). Fig 5.3 reflects this process with Japan’s top ten major partners in Africa.
5.3 Japan-SSA relations and China

Japan has gained a great deal of approval among African nations for its role in maintaining the issues of Africa on the international stage. For the most part, it was Japan’s non-Western approach towards SSA which has received the most media, diplomatic and academic attention since the launch of TICAD. “With frequent news coverage and publications, not only people who have been involved in aid, diplomacy, trade and research in and with Africa, but also the general public has also come to know some more about this continent” (Yamada, 2010).

However, in recent years Japan has also been criticised by African states about the role of its ODA. This has centred mainly on Japan’s failure to meet its objectives and commitments. The feeling that Japan has not met its objectives and commitments emanates from a growing criticism by African states towards Japan, that there is a growing gap between rhetoric and reality. In addition to these pressures directed at Japan, the increased visibility of China on...
the continent has made Japan’s favourable or rather special position less secure in the minds of Africans. The Chinese development model is gaining favour in African countries as “China’s development of state-driven development without political reform is attractive since some of the Washington consensus reforms have not always reduced poverty in Africa” (Kurlantzick, Shinn and Pei, 2006).

China’s presence on the continent has received a great deal of interest in recent times. It has been observed that for China, presence in African indicates firstly, that relations with the continent are being tested to see how China will develop as an international power, and what its role will become in the world, and secondly China’s entry into a region where interests have been secured for some time and if China is to have success on it, it will have to cooperate with various actors. What is meant by this is that though colonialism has come to an end in Africa, former colonial powers still have close relations with their former colonial territories therefore China needs to be aware of this condition.

Chinese interests on the continent appear to hold similar goals as other countries. It is concerned with securing energy resources for itself which Africa can provide; and it can negotiate political risks other nations would not be willing to accept such as funding a development path without making political demands. In addition China may appeal as model of development for many African states, and finally “Chinese aid has the benefit of decreasing the threat of China directly competing against African nations” (Kurlantzick, Shinn and Pei, 2006).

China’s declared strategy towards Africa has five components. “First, China stresses that it is a different type of global power, one that understands Africa’s development needs. Secondly, China also cultivates African nations which do not have significant pre-existing international relations, either those that have become pariah or recovering from conflict, thirdly it stresses that China-Africa relations is a win-win situation, fourthly, China does not interfere in African domestic politics and finally Chinese travel to Africa to get acquainted with the continent more so than other major countries” (Kurlantzick, Shinn & Pei, 2006).
Like many other countries, China uses aid as a tool to assist in implementing its strategy in Africa. However, it has a different approach in disseminating its aid through decisions it makes unilaterally rather through multilateral organisations. China has also made its mark on the continent culturally by promoting its language, so making an impression on the political fraternity in various African countries. China also makes investments to promote trade and strengthen ties with the continent.

Chinese aid to Africa has received a greater prominence while Western aid donors have contributed enormously but have produced little in terms of returns on aid programmes. However, China has to some extent attempted to fill this void by moving more quickly and swiftly producing tangible results from their engagement with the continent. In comparison with the other non-Western donors to the African continent like, Japan, Olander notes that “Beijing asks for very little in return from its African partners in the form of political accountability and transparency” (Olander, 2010).

China’s interactions with the continent is from a different position to that of Japan’s more concrete commitments through the TICAD process and G8 Summits on multilateral levels with clear objectives such as promoting self-help efforts on the continent, promoting peace and stability in the region and the world, emphasising the importance of Africa’s renewal and significantly bringing Africa’s issues on the international scene. Japan’s consideration of the political context to which it wishes to distribute aid has always been careful not to direct aid to governments and equivalent bodies. China on the other hand pursues a far less interventionist path, it does not behave multilaterally, and it does not probe into the political context of a recipient state and has no forum through which it makes its commitments clear regarding aid to Africa and its intended purpose.

5.4 Japan and South Africa post-1990

Present ties with Africa rest on Japan’s second key pillar in foreign policy - its relationship with South Africa. Japan and South Africa share a long and significant relationship and a long and difficult history. The diplomatic difficulties emerged from a long-standing economic
partnership which came under great scrutiny during the apartheid years made all the more significant as a result their strong commercial links during the apartheid years. In the post-1990 era re-energised relations between the two countries began with the end of apartheid and the birth of democracy in South Africa. Japan has since embraced South Africa as its core partner on the continent.

During Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori’s first-ever visit to Africa in 2001 (see chapter three) he made South Africa the first stop and gave reason for Japan’s desire to establish a new starting point between Japan and the continent. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs data records that “although South Africa is very far from Japan, Prime Minister Mori pointed out that the desire to hold an exchange of views from a wide perspective on such issues as a blueprint for Africa’s renewal, international community’s support toward the continent, and the future direction of international society” (MOFA, 2001).

South Africa was also one of the few developing countries invited to the G8 Summit of 2000, as a representative of the developing world. Also South Africa was a major player in the construction of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), which provides a framework for the long-term development of Africa. The establishment of this framework was done in conjunction with TICAD which requires the input of Japan. On his tour to South Africa in 2001, Prime Minister Mori added his support to the African Renaissance headed by President Thabo Mbeki and in the process made a major acknowledgement to the part of the President’s active role in creating a safer world and a fairer world order through South Africa’s example of racial reconciliation. As such South Africa has been acknowledged as having an important role to play in Japan’s diplomatic objectives particularly towards SSA.

Prior to 1994 the pattern of ODA disbursement was directed specifically to South Africa’s non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and anti-apartheid organisations but post-apartheid South Africa has attracted a great deal of aid from Japan and other powers. Although South Africa may be Africa’s largest economy at present, indicators have shown that the country qualifies to be a recipient of aid as it ranks low in terms of development profile and in terms of social indicators such as health, education and sanitation and is among the highest in terms
of economic inequality. The legacy of Apartheid has left a skewed socio-economic mark on the country, a challenge which the new dispensation has yet to address adequately.

Aid disbursement by Japan to South Africa had its beginnings in 1990 and began initially targeting particular entities, most of which were anti-apartheid groups and NGOs. Post-apartheid South Africa was further rewarded by Japan which is recorded in the ODA data as follows: having witnessed South Africa’s triumphant embrace of democracy, Japan has announced its aid policy to assist that nation totalling $300 million, the majority of which is devoted to easing the severe living conditions facing many of South Africa’s non-white citizens. In April 1996, the first ODA loans to South Africa were provided in order to fund a long-scale effort to reform the enterprises supplying water to certain residential areas heavily populated by non-white citizens” (ODA Annual Report, 1996:69).

In terms of Japan’s ODA disbursement pattern to South Africa, “Japan gave more technical assistance than grants. From 1994 to 1998, Japan devoted 25.12 % of its technical support compared 20.46 to grants. Between 1999 and 2001, 48.48 % of Japanese ODA was technical assistance compared to 42.31% for grants” (Ewing & Guliwe, 2004: 34). Clearly the pattern of aid disbursement was significantly accelerated as a result of the arrival of democracy in South Africa.

Since 1994, the disbursement of aid has been on an upward trend. In 2002 South Africa’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affair Aziz Pahad confirmed Japan’s ODA commitment: South Africa is happy to note the considerable ODA funding Japan has been made available to South Africa. On the occasion of inauguration of President Mbeki in June 1999, Japan announced a second ODA package for South Africa in the amount of US $ 1,5 billion dollars for socio-economic projects largely targeted at the previously disadvantaged in South Africa” (DFA, 2002). This trend is certainly a reflection of Japan’s ODA Charter philosophies and principles. Most importantly “the ODA commitment was mainly intended for the previously disadvantaged communities in South Africa in sectors such as education, sanitation, and the provision of medical and water facilities. Japan has also supported South Africa’s human resources development programme and the auspices of the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA). Many South Africans have participated in these very important and advantageous training programmes in Japan” (SA Embassy Japan, 2011).

South Africa remains Japan’s most important commercial partner in Africa but aid has remained a low-key feature in the relationship since the turn of the century as modes of exchange were established between the two partners. As stated by Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori on his visit to South Africa, the country is seen by Japan as important to Africa’s renewal. This means that Japan’s ODA to South Africa reflects much of Japan’s diplomacy towards the continent, serving commercial interests, support of Africa’s development, and meeting international obligations. Overall one can deduce that Japanese aid to South Africa though directed for development issues was of greater significance for Japan. It was to establish Japan’s overall political commitment to Africa. No place was more important to send such a message than South Africa, as it was deemed an important partner to promote Africa’s cause internationally as it could partner Japan in addressing the continent’s developmental challenges.

5.5 Japan and SSA: 2011 and beyond

The year 2011 has been particularly difficult and challenging for Japan. As the third largest economy in the world at this time, it has had to address the difficulties and challenges which the global financial crisis has instigated. Other challenges were the effects of the massive earthquake and tsunami which the country experienced at the start of 2011. The implications these unfortunate events would have on Japanese aid to SSA remains an issue of interest. In 2010 Japan had successfully met its bilateral target and it nearly reached the volumes needed to meet its pledge to double bilateral development assistance to the continent by 2012, but no commitment has been made beyond this year.

In spite of the many challenges Japan has had to confront, aid to SSA remains a goal to which it is committed. Tokyo has indicated that in spite of the massive reconstruction needed in the country, it remains steadfast in delivering all development aid to Africa. Japanese spokesperson, Satoru Satoh raised this point at the development meeting with African
ministers in Dakar, when he stated, “in spite of the disaster Japan is committed to continue our contribution to the international community and its contribution to peace, prosperity and development in Africa” (Bureau Report, 2011).

Another confirmation of Japan’s commitment was that in spite of experiencing the effects of the earthquake on March 11, 2011, Tokyo committed not to cancel the TICAD meeting to show its obligations not only to Africa but also to the world. There remains Japan’s ambition to have a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and as a political bloc Africa remains in Japan’s opinion, significant in engineering change at the council while boosting Japan’s chances of being a member.

5.6 Analysis

5.6.1 Analytical Perspective

The TICAD process was instituted by Japan with the purpose of alerting the international community on African matters. From its formation, Japan has been successful in conceiving, proposing, preparing and hosting conferences pertaining to African development. In the process Japan was successful to have partners from different backgrounds, all with the intention of focusing on African development. The TICAD process has received a great deal of support especially from Africa but questions remain about its purpose and intention and who does this process truly serve. The most consistent issue raised has been the gap between rhetoric and reality. This issue has its roots from the Cold War where Japan’s rhetoric about its policy to South Africa was criticised when it was measured against the economic reality of the time.

It is without a doubt that Japan has increased its visibility on the continent through TICAD and with it; a number of directives were established. Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, in his 2001 speech during his tour to South Africa, highlighted the basic directions which were to be taken: [a] comprehensive approach that includes the establishment of political stability, etc., ownership by Africans themselves and the building of partnerships with members of Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
international society, as well as promotion of south-south cooperation” (MOFA, 2001). In addition, Mori highlighted a number of points for future TICAD processes. They ranged from confirming Japan’s commitment to TICAD (specifically as a forum for Africans to discuss matters for development); the improvement of south-south cooperation; matters on how to fight infectious diseases; and also cooperation on information technology.

It is imperative to understand what TICAD processes, intentions and achievements were. It represents a forum in which international discussions are held. Its main focus is on Africa’s development, with attention given to the African Union (AU) and NEPAD, which has features of African self-help efforts. In the process, development aid continues to be the central policy measure of Japan’s diplomacy to Africa for the enhancement of economic development and the general welfare of the recipient states. This reflects an economic rationale for aid to the continent. ODA is important to Japan’s efforts as it solidifies its international efforts and stature and in the process advances improved bilateral relations and thereby develops Japan’s diplomatic position in the world.

As Morikawa (2005:488) states, Japan’s goals are to emphasize its appeal to the international community as a nation with ‘the will and capability to contribute to peace and development as a global power,’ and to have Japan accepted as a major political power. This intent is reflected, for example, in the Japanese government’s claim for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Japan reminds its diplomats of the importance of cultivating countries in the United Nations to increase support for Japan. As African support represents a voting bloc of over 50 countries, Japan needs to repair the deep-seated criticism and distrust of African nations caused by their past promotion of a pro-Pretoria policy during Cold War era. In respect, TICAD has been an effective tool helping to repair Japan’s image.

Although TICAD was created to counter aid fatigue at the time and also to initiate for consensus building around African issues, the process has also raised Africa’s suspicions about Japan’s indifference. They question whether the TICAD Process has achieved its objective at least to the satisfaction of Africans is raised. They have also questioned whether the idea of Africans taking ownership of their development is making an impact. The rise of
China and its increasing presence sends a message that Japan no longer holds the reign as the sole provider of a non-Western model of development for Africa. Ampiah asserts that “TICAD is no longer alone in terms of Asia-based fora focused on Africa...the action-oriented approach, and the aggressive, highly-visible character of some of the other initiatives to have emerged over the past few years [make] it clear the TICAD Process risks being overshadowed - especially in terms of delivery and effectiveness on the ground” (Ampiah, 2008).

What is certain is that the TICAD process has shown Japan’s continuous adjustments of its engagement with Africa. It has played an appeasement game to secure its national interests and also to meet Africa’s expectations. Therefore, its ODA disbursements are continuously sensitized to the changing environments, and China has, in recent times, reserved the right to be included in this changing environment. Japan can meet Africa’s expectation only by contributing more aid to the region, and addressing the debt problems through annulment. Japan, however, does not seem to possess the political desire at present for these challenges. As such, Japan is left with the option of continuing rhetoric of, promoting self-help efforts for Africans, providing aid for humanitarian purposes, and going on the offensive in seeking support from the international community. The aid indicators reveal these are all just words with not a great deal to back up the intentions. As Morikawa states “Japan’s ODA budget peaked in 1995 at USD 145 billion. By 2003, it had dropped as much as 40% to USD 89 billion. In other words, contrary to the strong impression Japan’s aid to African nations has actually decreased” (Morikawa, 2005: 492).

The ODA performance of Japan post 2003 reflects the same patterns since the first TICAD in 1992. Japan has certainly met the pledges it made in 2005 to double its bilateral assistance, although as the data shows, a lot more could be done by Japan as it is still been outperformed by other major donor nations. “Despite reaching its 2007 target, Japan's aid level in 2007, in real terms, was still less than its ODA to Africa in 1989/90. Moreover, Japan's total level of ODA for Africa actually declined by 8% between 2006 and 2007. Even though bilateral assistance increased between 2006 and 2007, multilateral assistance to Africa was cut by 48%” (Data Report, 2008).
In conclusion, the TICAD process has presented itself as a process with many faces. The general understanding is that TICAD is not an aid pledging conference but a forum for exchanges of principles and strategies for Africa’s development. However, it is true to say that while TICAD has focused its consultations on a select number of African countries well (as suggested in Figure 3) the rest of the continent has only generated secondary interest from Tokyo. This has not gone unnoticed and has raised the ire of many African nations who have voiced their concerns through TICAD. Such a scenario is not surprising according to Morikawa (2005) who suggests that in the context of the four-layer structure of Japan's Africa policy, the he fourth and bottom layer is made up of around 30 countries while the third layer down is made up of just over a dozen countries being given preferential treatment. The second layer comprises Japan's regional partners like South Africa and Nigeria. The top layer of this structure systematically integrates the former colonial powers such as the U.S., the U.K. and France, as Japan's global partners.

5.6.2 Theoretical perspective
The TICAD process and the goals which Japan wished to achieve through the process can be explained by IR realism. One of the five characteristics of realism is that the state remains the major but not the only actor in international relations. With this understanding questions have been raised about Japan as the initiator of the TICAD process, of whether its intentions are genuine through the TICAD process or whether it is mere rhetoric for Japan’s foreign aid.

Aid continues to be the measure of Japanese diplomacy on the continent and the TICAD process is at the centre of discussions regarding Africa’s development where aid is seen as the tool to ensure economic development and the welfare of the recipients. The political realism perspective can explain Japan’s position. Firstly, realists understand the condition under which foreign aid emerges is about the basic material inequality between donor and recipient. Japan which is an industrialised and developed country assumes the role of donor and condition of recipients on the African continent provides the reasons for aid distribution. Japan’s position has been that aid ought to improve economic and social development. However, it is important to note that as realists understand aid policies are driven essentially by the strategic interests of nation-states, for Japan, ODA is also important as it strengthens
its international efforts and stature which it wants to assume for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

As stated, economic self-interest has been one of Japan’s primary motivating factors since the end of WWII when, Japan sought to use foreign aid in its quest for global economic supremacy. It has yet to deviate from this position as it is consistent with Japan’s apolitical nature, separating politics from economics, and it also defines national security in economic terms, using economic tools to secure economic objectives. This allowed Japan to have relations with South Africa during the Cold War in spite of the political pressure to which both countries were subjected too. The TICAD process then allowed Japan to play an appeasement game on the African continent to establish its own national interests. This study has argued that Japan’s primary interest for national security was to expand its economy and continue on the path of global economic supremacy. Part of using economic tools with aid was to secure economic and political objectives, and ODA from Japan to SSA has therefore increased in volume since the start TICAD Process, and the trend is likely to continue in spite of the difficult domestic issues the country has experienced especially in 2011.

Although Japanese presence has increased on the African continent particularly under the TICAD process, Japan’s intentions for meeting the commitments in African aid raises more questions than answers. However, as realists would suggest, despite intentions to assist Africa it should not be underestimated that Japan’s national self-interests and the importance of state survival are taking priority over aid distribution.

The patterns of aid to Africa are made from a strategic calculation that only a number of states have received aid from Japan who has some political and economic influence on the continent. This may be seen as serving both Japan’s push for global economic supremacy and better for improving its international stature. Aid, as realists asserts is a tool which originated in the Cold War era to influence the political judgements of recipients. This on-going trend continues to explain much of Japan’s aid distribution to Africa as it appears to be more about
Japan seeking to appease Africa, rather than reducing the material inequality between donor and recipients.

This study has tried to show that overall Japan’s aid relationship with SSA has been driven by three rationales. The prominence of each appears to have depended on the challenges of the time. Economic development and humanitarianism feature prominently in the aid relationship with the continent. Both are declared goals in Japan’s post-Cold War ODA Charter. However, aid distribution to Africa motivated by both economic and moral rationales could not be achieved without the consistent political commitments made on the part of Japan. Pre-1990 Japanese aid distribution to Africa was fundamentally shaped by Japan’s commitment to the anti-communist struggle although economic and moral rationales at this time were a means rather than an end in Japan’s relations with the continent.

Post-1990 has seen Japan assume a more visible position in Africa and as a promoter of Africa’s development agenda on the international stage. However, as with the patterns of the past, Japan has long sought to be recognised as a global power economically and politically and its efforts in Africa are suggestive of promoting and securing a long-time desire to be recognised as a global power for its UN ambitions. This study, therefore, suggests a political motivation to be the most prominent factor that has shaped Japan’s aid relationship with SSA.

5.7 Japan and South Africa

The relationship between Japan and South Africa in the context of Japanese-SSAfrican relations has always generated a great deal of interest and it can be labelled as an anomaly. Japan’s long and strong links with South Africa were based on economic terms whose economic influence remains profoundly unchanged even after the arrival of democracy to South Africa in 1994. Although Japan portrayed itself as a champion of anti-racism especially with regards to South Africa, Tokyo and Pretoria have continued to have close relations, and it can be claimed South Africa was Japan’s most important partner on the continent. In the Cold War era, the influence of ODA in Japan-South Africa relations barely existed
Post-Cold War ODA policies towards Africa do not extend to South Africa owing to the trend of strong economic ties remaining intact thereby reducing the need for Japan’s aid transfers to South Africa. South Africa is more the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy towards Africa and occupies a role of coordinator, organiser and exchange for Japan’s diplomatic objectives towards Africa.

5.8 Conclusion

Japan’s foreign policy has undergone considerable change over the last five decades and Africa has experienced its effects. This study’s analysis has demonstrated five major motivations behind the substantial shift in policy. Firstly, Japan saw long-term economic interests as the path to pursue especially in securing resources for a country which lacked the resources needed for its economy and security. Secondly, there were strong political motivations which were to secure a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. Thirdly, Japan was pressured by the Japanese community - within and without the country to consider its many humanitarian challenges globally. Fourthly, aid to Africa in the Cold War era was part of the strategy to counter the criticism directed to Japan for its commercial relations with South Africa. Fifthly, the disbursement of aid to Africa took into account the reaction it might generate from African states.

Undoubtedly, post-1990 aid patterns changed enormously and were inspired by Japan’s new found energy after the ODA Charter of 1992 shifted Japan’s African policy. The Charter embedded some of Japan’s political goals and intentions, which surfaced through TICAD. The six items of the ODA Charter, articulate Japan’s African policy as it deepened and widened Japan’s political commitment to the continent. Since then, ODA has become the principal tool of Japan’s diplomacy towards Africa, the patterns of which are reflected by ODA disbursals. However, these disbursals have failed to meet expectations and African states have raised many questions concerning commitments which did not materialize as increased aid over this period. This study has shown that the resource dependency factor cannot be underestimated as helping Africa had benefits for Japan’s economy and its political ambitions. The processes of TICAD and the importance of the G8 Summits, have not completely erased African suspicions of Japan’s intentions in Africa, however, when Japan’s
ODA falls short of meeting the goals in the ODA Charter and becomes nothing more than Japan’s lip-service it can be said that it fails to inspire the self-help efforts it advocates. Unfortunately, although Japan’s TICAD initiatives intended to create a development strategy for Africa, today it reflects less of declaration to Africa and more of Japanese political rhetoric.

South Africa has maintained its importance to Japan even after democratisation although not as a major aid recipient. While it is without question that democracy, human rights and good governance have all been important political variables that see South Africa meeting all the criteria for its donors - including Japan it is South Africa’s political and economic stature on the continent that has been significant to Japan and has been instrumental in Japan’s ODA disbursement in Africa. Investment, trade and overall commercial links have resulted in Japanese aid being confined to special cases for South Africa as the country is deemed capable of addressing its own socio-economic challenges. Rather than being solely an aid recipient, therefore, South Africa is considered by Japan as crucial to Africa’s renewal due to its capacity to contribute alongside Japan at achieving this objective. In other words, Japan holds South Africa to be an important partner in achieving Africa’s development.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

Japan’s foreign policy has undergone considerable change over the last fifty years. With that been established, the distribution and pattern of aid from Japan has been affected in such a way that it reflects and compliments these changes in policy. Aid has been a great indicator of understanding foreign policy because it has been used as a tool in Japan’s foreign policy.

Japan’s foreign policy possesses a number of features that guides its international engagements. These features are arrived at after taking into account a whole range of factors. This holds true with regard to Japan’s foreign policy to Africa. Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa post-WWII pursued the path of diplomacy, and aid as a tool. The disbursement and pattern of aid to Africa have been closely studied, but the reason why aid was given considerable importance in Japan’s diplomacy towards the continent remains an important area of enquiry. This study was particularly interested in the evolution of Japan’s aid relationship with SSA and the factors that have shaped it.

This chapter will conclude this study by revisiting the essential factors that have guided this study. Three key aspects that will be revisited through the course of this chapter are the aims, rationale and context, discussing the findings in the empirical chapters, and finally the chapter will discuss areas for further investigation which will conclude the chapter.

6.2 Context, aims and rationale

Over the second half of the 20th century Japan’s economy grew extremely well and maintaining this momentum was something Japan had to constantly contend with. It also had to address a number of issues as to allow her to return to the international community as a peaceful nation. Appeasement became of great importance especially within its own neighbourhood, maintaining good relations with its ally, the US, which guaranteed Japan’s security and the search for new markets as to maintain the momentum of its growing economy were some of the issues it had to contend with. These factors were of great
importance for Japan to its readmission into the international community as a peaceful nation. Its relationship with SSA was plagued with many challenges. Its relationship with South Africa, which was considered as the cornerstone of its policy to Africa was heavily criticised especially during the Cold War. Foreign aid was absent in the Japan-South Africa relationship at this time.

This study has focused on the volume and disbursement of Japanese foreign aid to Africa as a tool in Japan’s relationship with the continent. The study is set up as such that foreign aid is deemed as an indicator of Japanese foreign policy towards SSA. The literature concerning Japanese/SSA relations shares a great deal on Japanese economic interests on the continent and its dual policy and a great deal of time has been spent on Japan-South Africa relations. However, this study contributes in broadening the literature on Japanese-African relations by focusing on the aid relationship.

Aid flow towards Africa served certain interests for Japan and the study emphasises that until democracy arrived to South Africa, it was used firstly to maintain its economic momentum, (see end of Chapter) to appease and minimise criticism from African countries for its relationship with Apartheid South Africa and to curb the spread of communism for its Western allies. The aim of this study was to highlight these trends where aid was a Japanese tool to maintain its interests and serve its foreign policy objectives on the continent. The rationale is to contribute to the study of Japan-African relations and explore this new element in the literature by linking the literature and theory on aid as a diplomatic and political instrument. The study of aid flow from Japan to Africa has yet to be exhausted where much work needs to be done.

6.3 Discussion of findings and their implications

The empirical section highlights a number of factors that address the primary questions in Chapter 1. The question raised to get the empirical sections underway is why aid was an important factor in Japan’s relationship with SSA. Japan’s policy towards SSA during the Cold War was understood to be Japan’s dual policy towards the continent. Existing
scholarship on Japan and Africa relations makes this position very clear, most notably through the study of Jun Morikawa (1997). Japan’s policy was categorised into two policies: Japan’s ‘Black Africa’ policy and Japan’s ‘White Africa’ policy, for which it received a great deal of criticism for its close ties with Apartheid South Africa. Pre-1990 Japan-African aid relations were motivated by all three rationales. From an economics perspective, aid served as security for resources Japan desperately needed for its expanding economy. Africa was deemed a suitable candidate for the security of these resources particularly after the first oil crisis in 1973 where aid to the continent began to grow. From a political perspective, aid towards the continent served a number of objectives. As a growing economic force Japan was pressured by the United States to play a greater international role. As such its role on the continent was to assist the Western bloc in curbing the spread of communism. Japan also had ambition of being recognised as a global power. Thereby by promoting peace and stability on the continent this would serve its greater ambitions. From a moral perspective, aid to SSA at this time was for humanitarian purposes. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union brought a whole set of challenges particularly on the continent.

Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy was established through the ODA Charter and the pillars which form the Charter. Japan’s position with regards to intentions towards the continent finds its expression through the TICAD Process. Japan expressed its position through the TICAD Process where it contributed in creating a framework where discussions could be held concerning Africa’s development. The objectives of the process were articulated during Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori’s tour to South Africa in 2001, where it was stated that a comprehensive approach at establishing political stability, promoting African ownership in its own development and promoting south-south cooperation were the motivating factors for this Process.

The position of aid in Japan’s relationship with SSA is important as one can measure whether Japan meets its objectives. As TICAD became the platform upon which Japan was to express its policy position towards the continent, the position of aid would also be made clear through this process. As such, development aid held the position as the best central policy measure of Japan’s diplomacy towards SSA. The overall position of Japan concerning the role of aid is that it hopes to achieve an improvement in the economic development and general welfare of
recipient states. ODA is deemed important to Japan’s efforts; its international stature and efforts in the process advance bilateral relations. TICAD advances above all Japan’s national interests. The emphasis on improving its international position has much to do with past wrongs which stretch at least to WWII. In Africa, it was deemed important for Japan to repair deep-rooted criticism and distrust by African nations especially for its pro-Pretoria stance during the Cold War era. TICAD was therefore seen as an effective tool to repair this tarnished image. At the same time Japan pushed ahead with its ambitions of being a global power, which meant a permanent seat at the Security Council. Africa was seen as an important partner that could help at securing this ambition.

The TICAD Process has on the part of recipients raised more questions than given answers and has highlighted the divide between rhetoric and reality on the part of Japan. TICAD was initially created to counter aid fatigue and also to promote consensus building around African issues. The rhetoric on the part of Japan concerning its outright support for Africa’s development and promoting African issues on the international community measured against its aid disbursement towards the continent has raised many questions on the side of Africans about Japan’s true intentions for the continent. From the mid-1990s to the end of the second TICAD Process, Japan’s ODA budgets had decreased as much as 40%. Post-2003, Japan’s ODA performance followed a similar trend in spite of the many pledges made by Japan. To close with regards to aid, TICAD was not an aid pledging conference, but a forum to hold discussion on Africa’s development. The pattern of Japanese aid proved to favour a number of countries as highlighted in Fig. 5.3. However criticism of Japanese behaviour has emerged, and questions have been about her intentions and if aid was used as a tool to serve its appeasement strategy and benefit as a result.

The position of Japan and its aid toward SSA is understood and explained through the realist perspective. It is an IR theoretical perspective that explains foreign aid as a part of national policy originated during the Cold War to influence political judgements. For realists, aid arises from a basic material inequality between donor and recipient and aid is deemed at reinforcing the underlying material inequality. It also pressurises countries to assume a position for its survival in a divided and un-policed political world. For Japan, national interests were the underlying factors for aid distribution to SSA. It had to firstly maintain the
momentum towards global economic supremacy which has long been its objective and as such maintain the survival of its economic position in the world. Other aspirations are for it to become an international peace player and seek a permanent seat on the Security Council. Through aid distribution to SSA, it hoped to improve its international stature, repair deep-rooted suspicion of the country by African states, and finally to outcompete its economic rivals to achieve economic supremacy. Japan’s aid behaviour reflects most of the five characteristics of realism; that of its own survival and security which is expressed mostly in economic terms, its policy behaviour and distribution of aid is done in an un-policed and anarchical global system, the separation of politics and economics has been central to Japan’s foreign policy and is a reflection of Japan’s long-held apolitical position and gives some direction to its close ties with Apartheid South Africa.

In terms of Japanese motivation for aid distribution to SSA, one can deduce that political ambition has been the most consistent reason for Japan’s aid relationship with SSA. Though it has ambitions of promoting Africa’s renewal and addressing humanitarian needs, Japan has played an instrumental role in the TICAD Process, a declaration one may say of its political commitment to the continent.

6.4 Areas for Further Investigation

New areas of enquiry can expand on the political motives for aid distribution towards SSA. The political aspects of this relationship have yet to be exhausted and as available data permits it should remain an area of enquiry. It would be important to closely study Japan’s political goals in the distribution of aid to the continent. What should be studied closer with regards to African-Japanese relations is the effect of the global financial crisis has had on aid disbursements towards the continent. The increased presence of China on the continent will continue to have implications for Japan’s relationship with the continent. Future studies should give attention and compare aid processes of China and Japan towards the continent and establish which of the non-western development model finds favour on the African continent.
6.5 Conclusion

To close this chapter and bring an end to the study, the study has highlighted Japan’s foreign aid relationship with SSA. This chapter has highlighted the factors which have guided the study, providing the aims, rationale and context of the study, discussions held pertaining to the empirical chapters and the findings disclosed and also areas for further investigation. This study contributes to the literature regarding Japan-African relations and by addressing the primary question in Chapter 1, foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy was used primarily as an instrument to advance Japanese political and also economic objectives on the African continent.
Addendum

ODA Charter 1992

The ODA Charter of 1992 was deemed a significant new step in Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy. Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter Annual Reports of 1992 provides other reasons for this new path by stating that “as a major economic power, Japan is obligated to meet the expectations placed on it by international society, and is working to increase the quantity and quality, and to carry out this aid more effectively and efficiently” (ODA Annual Report, 1992:3).


These are defined further as:

1) **Basic philosophy**

The Charter provides a number of basic philosophies to which Japan subscribes. It supports and promotes environmental conservation, the recognition of interdependence and humanitarianism as basic philosophies. Also as part of its efforts to uphold these philosophies, Japan, as a major economic power, has the goal of assisting poor nations with aid to develop their countries so that it may lead to peace, prosperity and stability. “Japan also reaffirms its stance that aid is meant to support self-help efforts” (ODA Annual Report, 1992:44-45).

2) **Principles**

The principles of the ODA Charter are established in accordance with the principles of those of the United Nations but it avoids interference in the domestic affairs of foreign states. The ODA Charter is in accordance with the following principles.
• “Any use of ODA for military purposes or aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided.
• “Full attention should be paid to trend in recipient countries’ military expenditures as to maintain and strengthen international peace and stability.
• “Full attention should be paid in efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of market oriented economy in the recipient countries” (Diplomatic Bluebook. 1992).

The Charter also stipulates that “since aid is intended to assist the economic and social development of developing countries to improve the well-being of their inhabitants, the materials obtained with that aid must not be used for military purposes. This has been consistent policy of Japan in its aid programs” (ODA Annual Report, 1992:46).

3) Priorities

For Japan, the historical, geographical, political and economic tie with Asia means that this region remains a priority for Japanese assistance. At the same time, Japan remains aware of other areas of the world including Africa which are also in need of assistance. “In Africa many countries are earnestly moving toward democratization and structural adjustment. It is necessary to continue providing cooperation in the area of basic human needs (BHN) and in easing poverty through humanitarian assistance” (ODA Annual Report, 1992:47-48).

4) Measures for the Effective Implementation of Official Assistance

The Charter provides fifteen key points as measures for effective implementation of ODA and for upholding the principles of the Charter.

5) Measures to Promote Understanding and Support at Home and Abroad

The dissemination of information and the strengthening of public relations and development education are the foundations of this objective.
6) **ODA Implementation Systems**

To ensure that ODA meets its objectives, it is not only imperative to increase the level of ODA but to ensure that the implementation process allows for aid to be effective and efficient. The implementation system ensures an improvement in ODA, both in the increase of quantity and, if necessary, of increased personnel engagement in ODA activities.
Bibliography

Books and Journals


### Internet Sources


The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2000. Summit Meeting in Tokyo Among President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, President Thabo Mbeki of the


