


AFRIKANER NATIONALIST POLITICS AND ANTI-COMMUNISM,

1937-1945

by

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Supervisor:

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## Declaration

I the undersigned hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and has not previously in its entirety or in part been submitted at any university for a degree.

## Précis

This study is an analysis of the origins and early evolution of the conception of a communist menace in South African politics.

While anti-communist sentiments in the South African political arena does not know any racial or ethnic bounds, it was in the context of white and, more specifically, Afrikaner nationalist politics that the conception of a communist menace, during the latter half of the 1930's, developed a stature and character which placed it on a level distinctively different from earlier references to this perceived menace. Chapter One discusses some of the functions of remarks on communism before 1937.

Of importance in this analysis is not simply anti-communism as a political sentiment or an indication of political preference, but rather the origins of a specific kind of anti-communism which developed into an organic part of the larger ideology of Afrikaner nationalism. In this regard attention is focussed on the content, place and role of anti-communism in the main political embodiments of Afrikaner nationalism between 1937 and May 1945, viz. the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party, the Ossewa-Brandwag, New Order and the Greyshirt-movement.

Relating to the content, place and role of anti-communism in the aforementioned organisations, the evolution thereof was affected by a multiplicity of factors which, included, inter alia, the following: World War II, a variety of ideological elements relating to communism as well as other ideologies, differences between Afrikaner nationalist oppositional groupings, campaigns against Smuts and the ruling United Party and specific campaigns e.g. the colour question. Chapters Two, Three and Four discusses some of these elements.

Chapters Five and Six discusses the three main component parts of the campaign against communism, namely the Colour Question,

Jewish Immigration and the promotion of Christian-nationalist trade unionism as alternative to the perceived communist approach. While the campaign against alleged Jewish compassion for communism had already reached a climax prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, the struggle for the "soul" of the Afrikaner working class and the integration of the 'red menace' (communism) and the 'black peril' (the colour question) progressively grew in stature. Particularly the integration of overt anti-communism and the colour question serves to illustrative the earlier referred to character of anti-communism as an organic part of the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism.

In conclusion, some remarks are presented on the functional role of anti-communism in Afrikaner nationalist as well as South African society between 1937 and 1948. Given the fact that this dissertation is a study of conceptions and does not aim to evaluate the factual content or even fairness of remarks attributed to communism, these comments, by nature, will have to be of a tentative nature.

\* \* \* \*

## Précis

Hierdie verhandeling is 'n studie van die oorsprong en vroeë ontwikkeling van die konsep van 'n kommunistiese bedreiging in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek.

Ofskoon anti-kommunistiese uitsprake in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek nie gebonde is aan enige ras- of kleurgrens nie, was dit tog binne die kader van blanke politiek en, meer spesifiek, die ontwikkelende Afrikaner nasionalisme, waar die konsep van 'n kommunistiese bedreiging, gedurende die dertigerjare, 'n statur en karakter van sy eie ontwikkel het. Hierdeur is anti-kommunisme verhef tot 'n vlak wat fundamenteel verskillend was van vroeëre uitsprake. Hoofstuk Een bespreek van die funksies van owerste anti-kommunisme voor 1937.

Van belang in hierdie studie is nie net anti-kommunisme as politieke sentiment of as aanduiding van politieke voorkeur nie, maar veel eerder die oorsprong van 'n spesifieke soort anti-kommunisme wat ontwikkel het tot 'n organiese deel van die groter geheel van Afrikaner nasionalisme. In dié verband word aandag geskenk aan die inhoud, plek en rol van anti-kommunisme in die meer prominente politieke bewegings wat hul vereenselwig het met die ideale van Afrikaner nasionalisme, nl. die Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party, Ossewa-Brandwag, Nuwe Orde en die Gryshemp-beweging.

Met verwysing na die inhoud, plek en rol van anti-kommunisme in bovermelde bewegings, is die ontwikkeling daarvan beïnvloed deur 'n verskeidenheid van faktore wat, onder andere, ingesluit het die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, 'n verskeidenheid elemente wat betrekking gehad het op kommunisme sowel as ander ideologieë en spesifieke beleidsaspekte bv. die kleurvraagstuk. Hoofstukke Twee, Drie en Vier bespreek van hierdie faktore.

Financial support from the Institute for Research Development (IRD) of the Human Sciences Research Council are hereby gratefully acknowledged. Opinions expressed in this study and conclusions drawn are those of the author and should not be attributed to the IRD or Human Sciences Research Council.

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## INTRODUCTION

This study was borne out of a fascination with the dynamics of the total (communist) onslaught - complex in contemporary South African politics. While the conception of a communist onslaught against South Africa, which reached a climax under the government of P.W. Botha, and measures supposedly aimed at the suppression thereof have had many functions over the years, sufficient for the immediate aims of this study is to note that both in terms of foreign policy and internal politics, overt anti-communism, since 1948, have had an all-permeating influence.

This dissertation started out as an analysis of the origins and consequences of the **Suppression of Communism Act** (Act 44/1950). Relating to the origins of the aforementioned Act, this study inadvertently had to include an investigation into the historical roots of the perception of a communist menace in South African society. While no attempt have been made to come to terms with specifically this issue in scholarly analyses, analysts, broadly speaking, explain the evolution of the perceived communist menace in the framework of the post-1945 era.<sup>1)</sup> During research it was found that the origins of the conception of a communist menace was neither to be found in the immediate post-World War II era nor did it first come to the fore in the years immediately following the National Party's May 1948 election victory. In lieu of this, the year 1948, as point of departure for an analysis dealing with measures aimed at the suppression of a perceived menace, did seem somewhat inconsequential and clinical. Hence it was decided to undertake a study into the origins and early evolution of the perceived communist menace in (white) South African politics. This, then, in broad terms, is the issue at hand in this dissertation.

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1. See, for example, W.N. Botes: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Beleidsformuleerders se Persepsie van die Kommunistiese Bedreiging teen Suid-Afrika. Unpublished M.A.-dissertation, RAU, 1985.

This theme demands immediate and further clarification. As a first point it needs to be noted that the origins of the conception of communist onslaught are to be found in that all-fascinating decade of South African politics, namely the 1930s. This fact is important as it immediately puts to rest the erroneous impression that the conception of a communist menace/onslaught, in pure historical terms, is either a post-1945 or post-1948 phenomenon. The earliest indications of an explicit overt anti-communism in South African society can be traced back to the period preceding the outbreak of World War I in 1914.<sup>2)</sup> However, in terms of the creation of an enemy image, as will be argued, manifestations of anti-communism, prior to 1937, largely served to bring into focus elements not normally associated with the evolution of a conception.

This last remark leads to the second and third points: Firstly, anti-communism reared its head amongst black oppositional groups long before it did so in white circles. Sol T. Plaatje reportedly condemned the 'Black Bolshevists of Johannesburg',<sup>3)</sup> while many of the tribal chiefs within the hierarchy of the African National Congress rejected Bolshevism as an anti-royal ideology which posed a threat to the indigenous royal classes.<sup>4)</sup> Given the predominance of race in South Africa, however, the decision-making process have always been the near-exclusive domain of the white man. Hence, a study of the evolution of the perceived communist menace in South Africa, as a result of the peculiarities unique to this society, will have to be a study of white perceptions.

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2. See W.P. Visser: Suid-Afrikaanse koerantberiggewing en -kommentaar t.o.v. Arbeiderspartye, Sosialistiese Partye en ander radikale groepe en bewegings, 1908-1915. Unpublished M.A.-dissertation, US, 1987.

3. See B. Willan: Sol Plaatje: A Biography, 1872-1932, p.224.

4. One of these chiefs warned: "The Tsar was a great man in his country, of royal blood like us chiefs and what is he now? ... If the ANC continues to fraternise with them (the communists) we chiefs cannot continue to belong to it. See F Meli: South Africa belongs to us, p.78.

Secondly, in the context of the 1930s and during the 1940s, the conception of a communist menace evolved within the framework of the struggle between Afrikaner nationalism and British Imperialism. While Afrikaner nationalists - irrespective of ideological orientation/affiliation - repeatedly stressed the existence of an alleged communist menace, all such allegations were denied by Jan Smuts and the ruling United South African National Party. This last development, for the aims of this analysis, means that attention will largely be limited to Afrikaner nationalist conceptions of communism.

Relating to Afrikaner nationalist conceptions of communism, it needs to be emphasized that no single organisation had a monopoly on the ideological construction or evolution of overt anti-communism. On the level of politics, all of those movements aspiring to provide political leadership to Afrikaner nationalists were involved in the debate surrounding anti-communism. A multitude of other organisations/institutions outside of the formal political terrain also contributed to the evolution of the perceived menace of communism. While these different categories of organisations and the movements in themselves fundamentally influenced one another on the theme of anti-communism, in the context of this dissertation attention will be limited to those attempting to embody the political ideals of Afrikaner nationalism. The limited attention afforded to the process of cross-pollination between the different sectors (cultural-religious-intellectual vs political) comprising Afrikaner nationalism in this study is a definite drawback. A meritorious examination of this issue, however, demands a separate study and different analytical framework.

This dissertation, then, focusses on the origins and early evolution of the conception of a communist menace in Afrikaner nationalist politics. The introductory chapter examines the place and role of perceived communism in Afrikaner and South African society prior to 1937. The second, third and fourth chapters analyse the evolution of the perceived communist menace in the main political embodiments of Afrikaner nationalism in the period between 1937 and May 1945. These

organisations are the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party, the Ossewa-Brandwag, the New Order and the Greyshirt-movement. Chapters five and six focus on the three main component parts of the campaign against "communism" over this period, namely the Jewish Question and Immigration, the Colour Question and the struggle for the "soul" of the Afrikaner proletariat. The concluding chapter, in drawing together the previous five chapters, discusses the functional role of overt anti-communism in Afrikaner nationalist and South African politics in the years between 1937 and 1945.

The chronological limitation of this study, as will henceforth be explained, is a logical division. The year 1937, as indicated, marked the advent of the evolution of a perceived communist menace in the ranks of Afrikaner nationalist political organisations. In May 1945, Nazi Germany, following the suicide of Adolf Hitler, surrendered to the Allied Forces. Regarding the conception of a communist menace, the period between 1937 and May 1945, in spite of many adaptations, does reveal a certain continuity. The changed character of international politics, following the demise of Germany, introduced a new frame of reference to international and locally-held conceptions of the modii operandi and vivendi of communism. Most important in this regard was the bipolar division in the international arena which progressively came to the fore from 1945 onwards. South Africa, in siding with the West in this battle for international ideological hegemony, as elsewhere in the world, were fundamentally affected by it.

Research for this dissertation was undertaken at various institutions throughout the country. These included the J.S. Gericke Library at the University of Stellenbosch, the African Studies Centre at the University of Cape Town, the Institute for Contemporary History at the University of the OFS, the Ferdinand Postma Library at the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, the William Cullen Library at the University of the Witwatersrand, the provincial archives in Cape Town, Bloemfontein and Pretoria and the national archives depot in Pretoria. Although a wealth of information was

uncovered on the different aspects of the 'red menace'; relative to the evolution thereof in Afrikaner nationalist political movements, this search, frustratingly, proved less rewarding. A single example will illustrate this: The archives of the Ossewa-Brandwag (OB) in Potchefstroom, while helpful in the sense that it contains some important policy statements on the subject of 'communism', are incomplete and reveal very little about the different aspects of the OB's campaign against this perceived menace.

The main sources of research material ultimately turned out to be newspapers, official press-organs, and, in the case of parliamentary-based organisations, parliamentary debates (Hansard). Newspapers used were Die Burger and Die Transvaler - for the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party, the New Order (in the pre-1940 period) and other 'befriended' organisations. Official press organs included Die Waarheid-The Truth (the Greyshirt-movement); Die O.B. (the Ossewa-Brandwag); Die Kruithoring (the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party); and Die Anti-Kommunis (the New Order).

Other sources used, apart from those already identified, are indicated in the text.

This study, while not aspiring to any great heights, will, by being the first in the field, hopefully stimulate further research into this fascinating topic. On another level, themes have been identified which demand further elucidation. In the context of this introduction, perhaps three possible future fields of research should be highlighted:

Firstly, the bilateral and multilateral cross-pollination between the various volkseie [literally endemic to the people] cultural, religious, economic, intellectual, and political organisations/institutions in the evolution of the conception of a communist onslaught against South Africa.



Secondly, the integration of the 'red menace' (communism) and 'black peril' (the colour question) in South African politics. Astonishingly, this issue has been ignored thus far in academic writing.

Finally, the contribution of the perceived communist menace in the promotion of Afrikaner nationalist trade unionism and, on a broader level, the role of this issue in South African labour history. While several studies have appeared on the Christian-nationalist onslaught on the established (white) labour movement, these studies either ignore the role of overt anti-communism as a contributing factor or accept the existence of a communist menace as a given reality. Two of the few authors who have thus far partially attempted to come to terms with the role of perceived communism in South African labour history are H.L. du Plessis<sup>5)</sup> and M.A. du Toit<sup>6)</sup>. Both studies, however, are incomplete and outdated.

Many people contributed towards this study. While impossible to mention them all, I would like to single out the following: Firstly, my parents for their invaluable and continuous support. Secondly, my dissertation-supervisor, Prof. P.H. Kapp and co-examiner, Prof. P.R. Nel. Without their guidance, valuable comments and encouragement this study would never have been completed. Various other academics also commented on different drafts and parts of this study. In this regard I would like to extend a special word of thanks to Prof. Rodney Davenport of the University of Grahamstown, Dr. Ian Phillips of the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg and Prof. Hermann Giliomee of the University of Cape Town. Gratitude is also due to Mrs. Doris Conradie for her typing of the manuscript.

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5. See H.L. du Plessis: Die Vakbondwese in Suid-Afrika met spesiale verwysing na die Klerewerkersunie. Unpublished M. Comm-dissertation, PUCHE, 1955.
  6. See M.A. du Toit: Vakbondontwikkeling en -beleid in Suid-Afrika. D.Comm.-thesis, US, 1971.

The Unit for Soviet Studies deserves a special mention. Apart from supporting this project financially, Prof. Nel was also of great help in locating and acquiring research material. This study forms part of a larger HSRC-sponsored project on South African conceptions of the Soviet Union and communism. In this context, the hope is expressed that this study will provide new insights.

André Van Deventer

Stellenbosch  
March 1991.

## CHAPTER ONE

### AFRIKANERS AND COMMUNISM - THE EARLY DECADES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

This chapter has two objectives: First, it aims at providing an analysis of remarks on communism by individual Afrikaners during the first two and a half decades of the twentieth century. In this regard attention will respectively be focussed on a lecture by D.F. Malan on Socialism in 1913, a speech by J.B.M. Hertzog on Bolshevism at the Transvaal Congress of the National Party in 1919 and J.C. Smuts' remarks on communism at the time of the Rand Revolt in 1922. Remarks on communism by these individuals will be considered as representative of the major conceptions prevalent in Afrikaner-ranks at the time.<sup>1)</sup> The second objective is to trace the course of the debate on the subject of communism within the two main (white) political parties of the period, viz. J.B.M. Hertzog's National Party and the South African Party under the leadership of J.C. Smuts. Although Hertzog's and Smuts' remarks on communism in 1919 and 1922 are also taken into account, in this particular section of the chapter attention will be restricted to the period between 1927 and 1930. The reason for focussing attention on this period is the argument that prior to the enactment of Section 29 of the Native Administration Bill in 1927, remarks on communism, within the aforementioned parties, largely served to bring into focus elements not normally associated with value-systems which are indicative of political/ideological preference. Chapter One will serve as background to and form the basis for the main body of this study.

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1. It needs to be emphasized, however, that, within the framework of this analysis, no attention will be afforded to remarks on communism by Afrikaners sympathetic to the socialist cause.

### 1.1. D.F. MALAN ON SOCIALISM, 1913

Socialism formed the topic of a lecture delivered to a meeting of the Graaff-Reinet Literary Society by D.F. Malan during the second half of 1913.<sup>2)</sup> Malan, at the time, was Minister of Religion at the local Dutch Reformed Church.<sup>3)</sup> Malan's perspective in the presentation of his discourse was largely determined by his training as both philosopher and Calvinist theologian. Although Malan may have been a supporter of either Hertzog or Botha/Smuts, political persuasion, given the non-contentious nature of Malan's speech at the time, were arguably of less importance than motivations of a religious-theological nature. If Socialism had indeed been a divisive issue in Afrikaner politics at the time, a speech with obvious political overtones would have been suicidal for Malan's position as minister of the Dutch Reformed Church.

In his discourse Malan distinguished between two forms of Socialism, viz. 'Anarchism' and 'Christian Socialism'. This distinction, albeit of a very special nature, must be seen in the context of the period. In modern day-terminology this distinction seemingly refers to respectively Marxian-Socialism and a form of Social Democracy. Although 'Anarchism' (read also communism) was adjudged to be "... comparatively insignificant [and] ... need not further be discussed ..."4), it is fundamentally important to note that Malan considered both 'Anarchism' and 'Christian Socialism' to be offshoots of one ideology. In his exposition Malan was dealing with this larger body of thoughts.

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2. Complete copies of Malan's lecture, originally published in 1913 by the Graaff-Reinet Advertiser, can be found in the D.F. Malan-Archives, J.S. Gericke Library, University of Stellenbosch and the G.W.U.-Collection, William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand.

3. See B. Booyens: Die Lewe van D.F. Malan, pp.252-254.

4. D.F. Malan: Socialism, p.16.

Malan described Socialism as "... a movement which aims at nothing less than the reconstruction of society on an entirely new basis. This basis must be an equal opportunity for all human beings and an equitable share for all in the wealth and the culture of this world."<sup>5)</sup> This analysis will concern itself mainly with Malan's evaluation of his subject.

In his appraisal of the theoretical principles of Socialism, Malan stressed three aspects:

- i) **Social reform:** Malan lauded Socialism for its exposure of imperfections in society. This had resulted in the "... awakening ... [of a] slumbering sense of social responsibility ..." <sup>6)</sup> within humanity at large. In his criticism, however, Malan was intent on indicating the limited value of this doctrine. Malan put the question whether private ownership did not provide a powerful incentive for initiative to remove social impediments under the existing order. Malan thus contended that Socialism should be credited for the awakening of a positive social consciousness, but in as far as the removal of observed deficiencies were concerned, he was more doubtful of its success.
  
- ii) **Materialism:** Malan criticised the 'extreme narrowness' of Socialism in believing "... that man can live by bread alone."<sup>7)</sup> According to Malan an analysis of society based on the premise of a purely economic substructure represented a humiliation and debasement of man:

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5. Ibid., p.5.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., pp.17-18.

"If [Socialism] ... is to be the light of the world and illuminate the dark places of all ages, it can not be wholly identified with any perishable scheme, suitable to a particular age, but must look, like the sun, from its all comprehensive point of view at all the problems of this world from above."<sup>8)</sup>

iii) **Private and public ownership:** Malan indicated that stability and social order was preferred to the breaking up of family life and the consequent dissolution of society which may result from the destruction of private ownership.

Malan stressed that the convertibility of Christianity and Socialism was untenable. Resemblance was limited to a mutual acknowledgement of the potential of religion as a force affecting positive social change. Socialist interest in the Creator was selective, one-sided and suffered a lack of vision. This, according to Malan, had resulted in "... undisguised contempt, even hatred for the Christian Church as it is, especially in as far as it emphasises the greater importance of the spiritual world and the life to come."<sup>9)</sup>

In illustrating this incompatibility, Malan paid attention to the scope and method of respectively Christianity and Socialism. Malan contended that Socialism had as single objective the rearrangement of society. This limited perspective stood in sharp contrast to Christianity where social reform, as such, was merely one of a number of aims: "... He [God] fixed his eyes not on any particular scheme for social improvement, but on an end in which all social questions will find their solution."<sup>10)</sup>

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8. Ibid., p.17.

9. Ibid., pp.9-10.

10. Ibid., p.17.

Socialism with its aggressive external methods and Christianity, with its aim of influencing society from within, provided another example of this incompatibility for Malan.

Malan came to the conclusion that Socialism "... needs Christianity as a corrective. We may hope and pray that Christianity and Socialism may be so guided in their future development that the deep yearning, the wide-spread movements, and even the passions and the violence of the age may prove to be but the birthpangs of a better social world."<sup>11)</sup>

Although Malan's treatise on Socialism may have had a bearing on the later campaign by the **Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party** (G/HNP) against the perceived menace of communism, the drawing of correlations between these events should best be avoided. An analysis of Malan's 1913 speech, in the context of the G/HNP's latter campaign against perceived communism, albeit interesting, does not take into account the irrevocable passage of time between these two sets of events. This, then, would prove to be unhistorical. Furthermore, such an exercise largely negate the actual religious-theological perspective of Malan's lecture and faultily place it in the context of a speech exclusively motivated by political considerations.

The importance of Malan's speech is to be found in three other areas. Firstly, this speech was one of the earliest attempts by any Afrikaner to provide a coherent analysis of some of the principles underlying Socialism. Secondly, while Malan, in his treatise of 1913, attempted to explain some of the fundamental tenets underlying Socialism, he was equally concerned with providing an elucidation of his conception of the place, role and effect of Socialism vis á vis other ideologies in the future socio-political deployment of South Africa. Important, however, is to remember that this was done from a religious-theological perspective. Finally, and of special significance for the aims of this study, is to note that Malan's appraisal of Socialism (positive and negative) corresponded with remarks

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11. Ibid., p.18.

by Christian-Socialists on the European continent who, like Malan, accepted elements of Marx' theory of a class based society and exploitation of the poor by the rich, and, like Malan, could not identify with the political and economic consequences of orthodox Marxist theory. In short, Malan's speech was thus representative of a particular conception of Socialism to which a number of Afrikaners would ascribe.

In closing it needs to be emphasized once more that Malan, in his treatise, was dealing with a composite body of thoughts collectively referred to as Socialism. Socialism, for Malan, included both 'Anarchism' and 'Christian Socialism'. In the next three sections attention will be focussed on a single variant of Socialism, viz. Communism or, as was the case with Hertzog in 1919, Bolshevism.

#### 1.2. J.B.M. HERTZOG ON BOLSHEVISM, 1919

During November 1919 J.B.M. Hertzog, then leader of the National Party (NP), touched on the subject of "Bolshevism" at the Transvaal Provincial Congress of the NP. This created a minor upheaval amongst Afrikaners and Hertzog was under fire from friend and foe alike.<sup>12)</sup>

Hertzog described Bolshevism as "... de wil van het volk om vry te zijn, zelf te regeren en niet aan 'n vreemde veroveraar onderwerpen te zijn."<sup>13)</sup> Hertzog acknowledged that this ideology contained certain basic deficiencies, but, for him, these deficiencies were of secondary concern. In the final analysis Bolshevism was essentially virtuous.

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12. See letter from F.C. Eloff to J.B.M. Hertzog, 26.11.1919. (Cited in F.J. Spies et. al.(eds.): Die Hertzogtoesprake, IV, pp.146-147.)

13. Spies et. al.(eds.): op.cit., p.141.



Hertzog warned against an undue fear for Bolshevism. Bolshevism was opposed because "... volksvrijheid ...",<sup>14)</sup> which formed an integral part of this ideology, would result in the destruction of capitalism and imperialism. Bolshevism was part of a universal social revolution motivated by "... HET RECHT VAN BESTAAN ALS MENS ..."<sup>15)</sup>(emphasis in the original). The ideology of Bolshevism represented so powerful a force that not even the great armies of the world were able to check its progress.

Seen in isolation, Hertzog's words may have been cause for some concern in certain quarters of South African political life. Perspective, however, can only be gained when an analysis of this speech is made as part of Hertzog's wider political beliefs and placed against the backdrop of South African involvement in the Great War of 1914-1918. Finally, Hertzog's speech should also be viewed in the context of the early Bolshevik emphasis on self-determination for the various peoples of the Czarist Russian Empire.

The establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 initially held the promise of a politically united Afrikanerdom. The majority of Afrikaners believed that their national and political aspirations would be realised within the ranks of Louis Botha's South African National Party (SAP).<sup>16)</sup> Less than three years later cohesion had erupted into disunity and uncertainty with the establishment of the National Party (NP) under the leadership of J.B.M. Hertzog. A comprehensive discussion of all the variables which contributed to the development of this state of flux in Afrikaner politics is not a prerequisite for this inquiry. Attention will rather be focussed on those factors which had a direct bearing on South African participation in World War I.

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14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. D.W. Krüger: The Making of a Nation, p.54.

The Union constitution of 1910 did not provide for a South Africa sovereign and independent in all respects. South Africa was still bound by decisions of the King on matters of war and peace. The retention of South Africa's status as an integral and permanent part of the British Empire was a non-negotiable element in Botha's political credo. Botha's death in August 1919 and the resultant take-over of the Party chair and Government-leadership by Jan Christian Smuts led to an increased accentuation of the importance of this imperial tie.

From 1912 onwards Hertzog embarked on a campaign to assert South Africa's right to control her own international destiny. In popular terms this principle became known as Hertzog's doctrine of "South Africa First". Important is to note that Hertzog did not rebel against South Africa's constitutional position as part of the British Empire. Rather, he contended that if, in a hypothetical situation, South African interests were in conflict with those of the Empire, local considerations should be given priority.

When war was declared in London in 1914, South African participation was a logical consequence brought about by her constitutional position. Hertzog foresaw local involvement to be essentially defensive in nature if - and only if - the Union's limited sovereignty and territorial integrity were violated by external threat. Involvement in German West- and East Africa and ultimately on the European continent proved to Hertzog that Botha was willing to employ an offensive strategy in furthering the Union's war effort. This and the lingering memory of the Anglo-Boer War, to mention but two factors, convinced Hertzog that the War was fought in the interests of the British Empire. As such it was irreconcilable with his stated doctrine of giving precedence to national interests.

Davenport indicates that support for the war effort by Sir Thomas Smartt and his Unionist Party, normally associated with the Witwatersrand mining magnates by Afrikaners, led to a

revival of anti-capitalist sentiments in Afrikaner ranks.<sup>17)</sup> By nature, the war had now become an act of imperialist aggression which would only benefit, at least in South African terms, a small number of capitalists. It is interesting to note that in portraying the War in these terms, a number of Afrikaners aligned themselves with the stance adopted by the International Socialist League (ISL), the main forerunner of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA).

Partly as a result of ideological and tactical considerations, Russian Bolsheviki initially placed particular emphasis on the right to self-determination for the different nationalities in Czarist Russia.<sup>18)</sup> The Russian Provisional Government, in June 1917, had been urged by the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets to issue a declaration recognising the right to self-determination for all nations in Russia to the point of secession. The Council of People's Commissars, during 1917, adopted as principle in this regard: "THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA TO FREE SELF-DETERMINATION UP TO SECESSION AND THE FORMATION OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE"<sup>19)</sup> (italics in the original). Finally, in a declaration adopted by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets in January 1918, it was declared that "... all the nations of Russia ... [have] the right of unfettered decision whether and on what basis to participate in the federal government and in the other federal Soviet institutions."<sup>20)</sup>

Even before the cessation of hostilities in 1918, different statesmen had expressed themselves on a possible post-war status quo. Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of

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17. T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa - A Modern History, p.175.
18. See E.H. Carr: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, I, pp.265-281 and R. Medvedem: Let History Judge - The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, pp.49-55.
19. See M. McCauley (ed.): The Russian Revolution and the Soviet State, 1917-1921 - Documents, pp.191-193 ("Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia").
20. Cited in Carr: op.cit., p.269.

America, mentioned in vague terms the right of self-determination for small nations. Remarks, in similar vein, had also been made by Lenin's Bolshevik government in relation to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany.<sup>21)</sup> A resolution on peace adopted by the Congress of Soviets in January 1918, for example, called for peace without annexations. Annexation was defined as meaning "... any union of a small or weak nationality with a great or powerful state without the precisely, clearly, and willingly expressed consent and desire of that nationality."<sup>22)</sup>

Wilson's remarks, in particular, found a spring-board amongst supporters of Hertzog according to Krüger.<sup>23)</sup> After the war Hertzog and other leaders of the NP went to the Paris Peace Conference to lobby for the restoration of independence to Transvaal and the Orange Free State.<sup>24)</sup>

Hertzog's words in 1919 must be interpreted against this background. Hertzog's description of "Bolshevism" may just as well have been a declaration dealing with a possible prospective independent Transvaal and Orange Free State. Being in favour of such an arrangement, Hertzog may have equated the Party's striving with the October Revolution of 1917.

As indicated earlier, Hertzog ultimately perceived World War I to be an act of imperialist aggression. South African participation thus represented a flagrant repudiation of his doctrine of "South Africa First". In participating South Africa had foresaken her own interests and paid lip-service to the wishes of imperialist capitalists. Hertzog found a similar situation in the continued criticism levelled at the Soviet

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21. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, concluded between Soviet Russia and Germany in March 1918, terminated Soviet participation in World War I.

22. See E.H. Carr: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, I, pp.268-269.

23. Krüger: op.cit., pp.106-110.

24. Ibid.

regime. The alleged negation of national interests in favour of the interests of another state was a contention which had appeared in various nationalist circles the world over.

In a speech at Smithfield Hertzog presented a clear exposition of this belief.<sup>25)</sup> Hertzog contended that he was in possession of positive and irrefutable evidence which indicated that South African capitalists had furnished the imperial Russian regime with a loan totalling £6 000 000 to assist them in preparing for participation in the War. Rumours of a willingness to sign a peace accord with Germany - which would have resulted in great losses for the capitalists - moved these same people to instigate a revolution in order to remove the czar from office and thereby guaranteeing Russian involvement in the conflict. "Maar, helaas, de revolutie, sterker dan zij vermoed hadden, rukten hun, zoals wij vandaag allen weten, de handen uit, en in steden van hun geld verzekerd te krijgen ... kwam de Regering van Rusland te landen in de handen van 't Russiese volk zelf ..."<sup>26)</sup> Continued criticism of Bolshevism, therefore, was an attempt by capitalists to mobilise public support for their venture to destruct the Soviet state. This undertaking, once again, was motivated by economic exploitation.

In analysing Hertzog's 1919 speech, two different explanations may be offered: Firstly, Hertzog may have honestly believed that the drawing of comparisons between local conditions and those in Soviet Russia - at least in as far as it pertained to the striving towards self-determination - was indeed a plausible endeavour. Communism, in terms of Hertzog's perspective the guiding force underlying this striving in Soviet Russia, therefore had to be evaluated in a positive manner. Communism and the striving towards national autonomy, at least in Russia, were thus intimately interlinked. However, if the above explanation is accepted, it must immediately be

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25. Spies et. al. (eds.): op.cit., p.156.

26. Ibid., p.155.

added that Hertzog's knowledge of events in Russia during 1917 was obviously limited, superficial and even outdated.

The second explanation views Hertzog's speech as an example of his opportunism. It is argued that Hertzog consciously ignored the actual historical context of his allegations and, selectively, proceeded to glorify elements of the October 1917-revolution and subsequent developments. In this way Hertzog construed a model of Bolshevik Russia which provided the striving towards national autonomy with an international rather than sectional character. This, in turn, could provide extra stature to the NP's own agenda of volksvrijheid and self-determination. The ideology of communism, in this context, was of secondary importance.

Irrespective of whether a realistic interpretation of Hertzog's speech is to be found in any one or a combination of the two explanations cited above or whether it was merely, in the words of Oberholster, "... 'n naïewe verdediging van die beginsel van self-determinasie vir nasies "27), fundamentally important for the aims of this analysis is the role of communism, as an ideology, in this regard.

Communism/Bolshevism, in all three instances, is afforded a character of secondary importance. Hertzog's primary concern in 1919 was the promotion of his treatise on self-determination and the right of every nation to be allowed to determine its own destiny. Selected events in Soviet Russia - when seen in isolation and if interpreted from a Bolshevik-point of view - did indeed lend support to Hertzog's thesis on self-

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27. A.G. Oberholster: Die Randse Staking van 1922, p. 66.

determination.<sup>28)</sup> In utilizing these and other developments to illustrate a given point, Hertzog may have associated Communism/Bolshevism with the dormant and embryonic Afrikaner nationalism. In promoting the NP-ideal of self-determination on the perceived example of another country, care had to be taken not to demonise the alleged force behind this striving in the country quoted. The point bears stressing, however, that the promotion of volksvrijheid and full national autonomy was of uppermost importance in Hertzog's mind. Bolshevism, in this context, was of relative insignificance and served to illuminate Hertzog's arguments in favour of full national autonomy.

Against this background, Hertzog's remarks on Bolshevism can hardly be afforded a character normally associated with political/ideological value-systems.

### 1.3. J.C. SMUTS, THE RAND REVOLT OF 1922 AND COMMUNISM

The Rand Revolt, its causes and consequences have been well documented in recent studies.<sup>29)</sup> Discussion in this analysis will be limited to Smuts' evaluation of the involvement of Communists/Bolshevists in the dispute and related developments.

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28. A single example will serve to illustrate this point: World War I, in Bolshevik-phraseology, was also described as an "Imperialist War". Lenin, following the October 1917 Bolshevik take-over, issued a Decree on Peace which called for the signing of an immediate and unconditional armistice between all combatant-nations. This decree was in accordance with an intensive propaganda campaign undertaken by Bolsheviks between July and November 1917 aimed at the immediate withdrawal of Russia from the war. (See [Anon]: History of the USSR, II, pp.56-58 et.seq. and G. Stephenson: History of Russia, 1812-1945, pp.302-303).

29. See N. Herd: 1922: The Revolt on the Rand; B. Hessian: An Investigation of the Causes of the Labour Agitation on the Witwatersrand. (unpublished M.A. dissertation, UW, 1957); A.G. Oberholster: Die Randse Staking van 1922 and F.J. van Heerden: Die Randse Staking van 1922 (unpublished M.A. dissertation, PUCHE, 1965).

Smuts contended that the Witwatersrand strike of 1922, initially a purely industrial dispute, had deteriorated into a situation reminiscent of the French Revolution. This transformation, according to Smuts, was made possible by the capture and eventual replacement of the constitutional labour movement and labour organisations by "... forces of violence and anarchy ..." <sup>30)</sup> These "forces of violence and anarchy" were identified as being a small number of international Communists who had "... come from abroad ... [and who were] opposed to all the traditions of South Africa." <sup>31)</sup> Communists, in their striving to establish a Soviet Republic in South Africa, as proven by the strike, were ably assisted by certain people. Smuts maintained that these people largely consisted of recently urbanised Afrikaners. <sup>32)</sup>

Certain deductions can be drawn from Smuts' appraisal of the role of communists in the strike of 1922:

- i) Communism was anathema to the existing status quo. Smuts contended that this ideology had a foreign origin and stood in direct conflict with local traditions. Especially repulsive for Smuts was the violent nature of communism, which, for him, represented an integral part of this ideology.
- ii) Smuts provided an indication of those social groupings whom he considered to provide fertile soil for communist propaganda. In this regard he stressed the urbanised white proletariat in general and more specifically Afrikaner workers.
- iii) In dealing with "communists", Smuts displayed a willingness to employ even the harshest possible measures. On this occasion he made use of brute force. In so doing

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30. Cape Times, 1.4.1922.

31. Ibid.

32. Cape Times, 24.4.1922.



Smuts laid down a dangerous precedent successive administrations could easily follow.

The CPSA, by its own admission, was indeed involved in the Rand Revolt of 1922. Oberholster convincingly proves that the secretary of the CPSA, W.H. (Bill) Andrews, assumed a prominent role both in public and behind the scenes during the strike.<sup>33)</sup> While it would be wrong to assume that communists, in the words of Walker and Weinbren, "... had as little to do with the 1922 tragedy in South Africa as the Transvaal Miners' Association had to do with the Russian Revolution in 1917" <sup>34)</sup>, it must equally be noted that the leading and dominant role afforded to communists by Smuts also represented an oversimplification of a much more complex issue. The Communist Party, although having a high visibility because of the prevalence of banners and slogans attributed to 'communism' during the strike, was, at most, merely one of a number of ideologically diverse groupings who either participated in the strike or, on a non-participatory level, supported the demands of the striking workers. Thus, while communists were involved in the strike of 1922, this strike was neither communist-inspired nor communist-controlled.<sup>35)</sup>

Similar to Hertzog's speech at the 1919 Transvaal Congress of the NP, care must be taken not to overemphasize the significance of Smuts' remarks on communism during the 1922 strike. Irrespective of whether Smuts' evaluation of the situation was realistic - in the sense that it may have been based on information which made no other deduction possible - or whether the portrayal of the Rand Revolt in "total onslaught"-terms was a conscious misinterpretation of facts on

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33. Oberholster: op.cit., p.153.

34. I.L. Walker and B. Weinbren: 2 000 Casualties - A History of the Trade Unions and the Labour Movement in the Union of South Africa, p.128.

35. For a more detailed analysis of the role of communists in the 1922 strike see Oberholster: op.cit., pp.133-140 and Van Heerden: op.cit., pp.81-89.

the part of Smuts, imperative for the aims of this analysis is to note that Smuts, in explaining the use of force against the striking mineworkers<sup>36)</sup>, relied almost exclusively on the alleged menace of communism.<sup>37)</sup> The conception of a communist menace, in this sense, thus served to rationalise the adoption of a specific mode of behaviour (violent repression), rather than being illustrative of a particular principle or set of principles. References to communism by Smuts and other SAP-functionaries following the suppression of the 1922 strike and up to the defeat of the SAP at the 1924-general election tend to support this contention. During this period, as will be indicated in the next paragraph, remarks on communism either served to further rationalise the use of force during the Rand Revolt or were employed by the SAP in an attempt to gain advantage over its political opponents. The point in focus, however, is that Smuts' remarks on communism, once again, primarily served to illuminate an aspect of behaviour not normally associated with political/ideological preference.

Apart from blaming communists for the strike, Smuts and other members of his administration, at various times, also ascribed the Rand Revolt to workers allegedly being misled by opposition parties.<sup>38)</sup> Most often referred to in this regard were Hertzog's National Party and in particular its Transvaal leader, Tielman Roos. Smuts described Roos as a "villain" who attempted to gain political benefit from the strike.<sup>39)</sup> Henry Burton, SAP Minister of Finance, in referring to the Rand Revolt and rumours of an electoral pact between the NP and Labour Party (LP), was reported as having said at a public meeting in Robertson early in August 1922:

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36. See M. Lacey: "Platskiet-politiek: The Role of the Union Defence Force, 1910-1924" in J. Cock and L.Nathan: War and Society - The Militarisation of South Africa, pp.80-96.

37. Cape Times, 22.3.1922.

38. A.G. Oberholster: Die Randse Staking van 1922, p.170.

39. Cape Times, 22.2.1922.

"Die onlangse ongelukkige moeilikheid in Transvaal is 'n bewys dat die opposisie-partye probeer [om] op 'n agterbakse manier te verenig en nie openlik soos die ander partye gedoen het nie. Die opposiesie probeer die sterkte van verdediging teen Bolsjewisme omver te werp, wat soveel skade in Rusland berokken en soveel ellende veroorsaak het. Hy is oortuig dat ons volk nie begerig is dat hul lewe lange vryheid omver moet gegooi word ten gunste van Bolsjewisme nie. Daarom is dit die plig van sy hoorders om daarteen te waak om te organiseer en werk om die vryheid wat hul nou onder 'n grondwetlike bestuur geniet te handhaaf. Hul moet aan die ou vlag getrou bly en voortgaan soos hul begin het."<sup>40)</sup>

Following the announcement of an electoral pact between the NP and LP in 1924, newspapers supportive of the government and SAP-speakers actively attempted to establish a link between the NP/LP-pact and communism. In the run-up to the 1924 general election Smuts made use of this tactic in an attempt to gain political advantage on his opponents. These tactics set the scene for a dangerous trend in South African politics other parties could easily adopt.<sup>41)</sup>

In closing, it needs to be noted that the conflict between labour and capital in South Africa provides a third possible explanation for Smuts' remarks on communism and communist involvement in the Rand Revolt of 1922. The convergence of interests between the state and mining capital in the first decade after unification have been highlighted by several authors.<sup>42)</sup> Given the importance of the gold mining industry as a source of direct and indirect state revenue, concern over the productivity of the mines was shared by the state and mining management. More important, however, was the gradual convergence of the state's interest in establishing its

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40. De Burger, 7.8.1922.

41. For a discussion of the tactic of 'linkage' in the election of 1924, see J.P. Brits: Die Totstandkoming van die Pakt-Regering van 1924, pp.83-142.

42. See R.H. Davies: Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa, 1900-1960, pp.43-145; N. Levy: The Foundations of the South African Cheap Labour System, pp.99-161 and D. Yudelman: The Emergence of Modern South Africa, pp.52-164.

political control with management's interest in getting white organised labour to comply with its measures to limit labour costs - the crucial factor in the cost accounting of the gold mines.<sup>43)</sup>

The origins of the Witwatersrand revolt, in this context, can be traced back to the decision of the Chamber of Mines to lower production costs in the mining industry by introducing cheap (black) labour. This brought the interests of capital and labour in conflict. Smuts, as agent of the capitalist class, had to clamp down on worker militancy to protect and defend the interests of "Hoggenheimer" and the (capitalist) state.

The involvement of members of the CPSA in the strike, in this regard, proved doubly useful for Smuts. First, it provided him with the opportunity to portray the Rand Revolt in "total onslaught"-terms; thereby mobilising support for a specific mode of behaviour and, in effect, suppressing worker militancy. Secondly, this portrayal also assisted in making the use of force more palatable for the electorate; thereby drumming up support for the interests of Hoggenheimer. This, in turn, further institutionalised the privileged and dominant position of big capital in the South African state.

#### 1.4. LEGISLATION DIRECTED AGAINST COMMUNISTS, 1927-1930

##### 1.4.1 Native Administration Bill, 1927

In 1927 J.B.M. Hertzog, in his capacity as Minister of Native Affairs, launched through Parliament a Native Administration Bill aimed at the tightening of control and management over native affairs. Davenport indicates that this Bill extended

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43. See Yudelman: op.cit., pp.164-166.

over Africans<sup>44</sup>) in every province except the Cape the authoritarian powers enjoyed by the Governor-General in Natal under the Natal Native Code of 1891.<sup>45</sup>) Of special significance for this study is the authority extended to the Minister of Native Affairs under the controversial Section 29, which provided for the "[p]revention of dissemination of certain doctrines amongst Natives."

The importance of this section calls for a verbatim extraction:

**"Prevention of dissemination of certain doctrines amongst Natives**

29. (1) Any person who utters any words or does any other act or thing whatever with intent to promote any feeling of hostility between Natives and Europeans shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to a fine of one hundred pounds, or both.

(2) If it appears to a magistrate on information made on oath that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is upon any premises within his jurisdiction -

(a) anything as to which there are reasonable grounds for believing that it will afford evidence as to the commission of any such offence; or

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44. The terms 'blacks' and 'Natives', in the context of this study, are used interchangeably to denote a single and specific element in the South African population mosaic. The term 'Coloured', where used, refers to people often described in other societies as mixed race, mulattos or half castes. 'Coloured' is spelled with a capital C to avoid confusion with 'coloured' as meaning black. 'African' and 'non-white' is used in the general sense of all those people not 'white'.

45. T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa - A Modern History, p.206.

(b) anything as to which there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is intended to be used for the purpose of committing any such offence, he may issue his warrant directing a policeman or policemen named therein or all policemen to search such premises and to seize any such thing if found and take it before a magistrate. If any magistrate before whom any such case is brought is satisfied that it is anything which may reasonably be calculated to cause or promote any feeling of hostility between Natives and Europeans he may by writing authorize the destruction thereof or its confiscation to the Crown but no such order shall be carried into effect until a period of one month has elapsed after the date of such order and the decision of the magistrate in that behalf shall be subject to review.

(3) The Governor-General may order that, during a period specified in the order, a person convicted under sub-section (1) -

(a) if he is not a Native, and if the offence was committed in any area included in the Schedule to the Natives Land Act, 1913 (Act No. 27 of 1913), or any amendment thereof, shall not enter to be in any such area; or

(b) if he is a Native, and if the offence was committed outside any such area, shall not enter or be in any place outside any such area.

(4) Any person acting in contravention of any such order shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year and to be removed from any place where such order prohibits him from being.

(5) If any person (not being born in any part of South Africa which has been included in the Union) has been convicted of any offence under sub-section (1) of this section, the Minister may, having regard to the circumstances connected with the offence, deem such person to be an undesirable inhabitant of the Union and may, by warrant under his hand, cause him to be removed from the Union and pending removal to be arrested and detained in custody."<sup>46</sup>)

Before discussing the relation between Section 29 of the Native Administration Bill and the issue of communism, some introductory remarks need to be presented on the position of native affairs in South African politics and the evolution thereof during the Hertzog-era. Hertzog's policy on native affairs, as will become apparent, had important implications for the debate on communism in South Africa.

Prior to 1924 Union politics were largely dominated by the twin questions of South Africa's constitutional position as part of the British Empire and the relationship between Afrikaner and Englishman in the newly established state. Hertzog's election as Prime Minister in that year marked the introduction of an increased emphasis on a third element, namely black-white relations. These three questions, by 1936, came to dominate the South African political arena.

Davenport asserts that the insistence on white political and economic hegemony by successive SAP-administrations determined black-white relations under both the Botha- and Smuts-administrations.<sup>47)</sup> While legislation and other measures gradually extended the pattern of racial segregation to most walks of life, little was done to deal with counter-pressures resulting from the rapidly increasing rate of economic integration and other social factors. This essentially laissez faire-approach, rather than providing for a serious attempt at finding and providing solutions for complicated problems, inadvertently led to the suppression of black discontent. A case in point is the "Bucket Strike" of 1918 in which black municipal sanitary workers, in emulating the example of white workers at the Johannesburg power station, came out on strike for higher wages.<sup>48)</sup> Whereas white workers had their demands met, the African strikers were arrested for breaking their

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47. Davenport: op.cit., p.197.

48. D.W. Krüger: The Making of a Nation, p.128. See also J. Pampallis: National Struggle, Class Struggle - South Africa since 1870, p.94 and L. Callinicos: Gold and Workers, pp.59-63.

contracts and sentenced to two months hard labour, doing their previous work for no pay under armed guard. Black and white, needless to say, were subjected to the same economic forces which brought about the original strike by workers at the Johannesburg Power Station.

While both the SAP and NP disapproved of racial miscegenation, the SAP's comparatively non-doctrinaire native policy stood in sharp contrast with the ideological politicians who took over the reins in 1924. Central to the new administration's colour policy was the belief that 'South Africa had to be made safe for the white man'.<sup>49)</sup> In the realization of this goal, Hertzog propagated two principles, viz. racial separation and white trusteeship.

Hertzog's policy of white trusteeship was based on the premise that the two racial groups in South Africa represented fundamentally different and irreconcilable entities.<sup>50)</sup> This not only related to skin pigmentation, but more importantly, standard of civilization and advancement.<sup>51)</sup> Hertzog contended that blacks were members of a "child race", standing on the threshold of an age-old evolutionary and mechanistic growth process whites had already passed through.<sup>52)</sup> As such, they were in need of protection and guidance by 'right-minded' whites.

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49. For a detailed analysis of Hertzog's native policy see H.B. Kruger: Die Politieke Aspekte van Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog se Naturellebeleid vanaf Unifikasie tot aan die einde van sy Parlementêre loopbaan, pp.20-46.

50. Hertzog's concept of white trusteeship must not be seen as a new principle in South African politics. The term 'white trusteeship' represented the formal linguistic embodiment of a principle, the development of which could be traced back to an era long before unification.

51. Krüger: op.cit., p.150.

52. Ibid., p.206.



The entitlement of Section 29 of the Native Administration Bill is misleading in as far as it provides an indication of the objective of this particular section of the Bill. The explicit reference to "doctrine" would seem to indicate that Hertzog's legislation was aimed at persons identified with a certain body of thought. Hertzog, however, dismissed this in stating that he had no intention of prosecuting persons who preached "... another ideology different from ours ... I do not want to be unfair to any man ... simply because I differ from him and think he may be wrong."<sup>53)</sup> In presenting the Native Administration Bill to Parliament, Hertzog described the aim of Section 29 as follows:

"What I am after of course - I do not care whether it is bolshevism or what it is - is to get these people who really iniquitously go about trying to stir up hatred between white and black."<sup>54)</sup>

The guiding principle of Section 29 was thus of a general nature, providing for the prosecution of all persons who promoted "... any feeling of hostility between Natives and Europeans ..."<sup>55)</sup>

Hertzog's description of the aim of Section 29 renders it impossible to establish the political/ideological affiliation, if any, of those persons he wanted to prosecute. In all probability Section 29 was intentionally defined in such broad terms so as to find application under the widest possible range of circumstances.

Judging from the speeches of other members of Parliament on both sides of the House, it is clear that members of the CPSA were perceived to fall within the scope of Section 29. The names of Bill Andrews and Charles G. Glass, both members of the Communist Party, appeared with relative prominence in the

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53. Hansard, 28.4.1927, col.2913.

54. Ibid.

55. Clause I, Native Administration Bill.

columns of Hansard on this occasion. This related to speeches made by Andrews and Glass at a mass meeting of African workers in Newtown, Johannesburg towards the end of March 1927.<sup>56)</sup> Andrews, on this occasion, pleaded with his audience for the establishment of working class unity across racial lines. This, according to Andrews, would empower the working class "... to take possession of this country ... as the Russians have of their country ..."<sup>57)</sup>

Sir Drummond Chaplin (SAP) loathed the attitude of Andrews and went on to speculate about the presence of agents from so-called Communist/Bolshevist organisations in South Africa who were directed from either London or Moscow.<sup>58)</sup> H.B. Papenfus (SAP) interpreted the words of Andrews as being an invitation to bloodshed affecting the welfare of the State.<sup>59)</sup> Hertzog concurred that the utterances of Andrews and Glass were indeed punishable under Section 29.<sup>60)</sup>

J.S. Marwick (SAP) referred to 'the alleged presence of Communists in Clements Kadalie's Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU).<sup>61)</sup> This occurred in spite of the fact that the ICU National Council had already decided in December 1926 to ban all communists from holding office in the Union.<sup>62)</sup> In all fairness it must be noted that prior to their eviction, individual communists did indeed play a notable part in the

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56. R.K. Cope: Comrade Bill, pp.306-307.

57. Ibid., p.306.

58. Hansard, 29.4.1927, col.2957-2958.

59. Ibid., 2.5.1927, col.3017-3018.

60. Ibid., col.3046.

61. Ibid., col.2992-2995.

62. See P.L. Wickins: The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa, pp.106-109. In Parliament Morris Alexander (SAP) and Arthur Barlow (LP), during speeches preceding and following that of Marwick, referred to this fact. Marwick, however, either ignored or did not believe the words of Alexander and/or Barlow.

activities of the ICU. Michael Harmel, former executive member of the CPSA, notes the "... irreplaceable part ... played by the Party and its members in building the ICU."<sup>63</sup>) The names of John Gomas and Bill Andrews, both of whom were Party members who figured in the activities of the ICU, were mentioned by Marwick in this regard.<sup>64</sup>)

While general unanimity was reached in Parliament on the necessity of having legislation to deal with agitation aimed at subverting racial harmony between white and non-white, individual members of the SAP called for the extension of this principle in order to deal with sedition between all classes, groups and races in society as opposed to sedition between exclusively black and white under Section 29. Smuts referred to this in the following terms: "I agree ... that it is highly necessary to have ... a sedition law, a law against people and practices subversive to the institutions of this country and law and order of this country ... Let us have a general law for both black and white. Do not let us give the impression that on a matter of cardinal importance like this we see only with one eye. What is urgently required is a law to deal with people who try to subvert the existing state of affairs by illegal means and by poisoning public opinion."<sup>65</sup>) In practical terms this would have meant the removal of Section 29 from the Native Administration Bill and the introduction and redefinition of this principle in separate legislation aimed at sedition per se. Morris Alexander, in this regard, called for the enactment of the Prevention of Disorders Bill that was withdrawn at the end of the previous parliamentary session.<sup>66</sup>)

Smuts' proposal, however, was not even supported by all members of his own party. Alexander, apart from calling for the

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63. A. La Guma (ed.): Apartheid - A Collection of Writings on South African Racism by South Africans, p.210.

64. See Hansard, 2.5.1927, col.2993-2994.

65. Ibid., 28.4.1927, col.2919-2920.

66. Ibid., 29.4.1927, col.2946.

enactment of the Prevention of Disorders Bill, also contended that the principle contained in Section 29 had already been provided for in terms of the Rioutous Assemblies and Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (Act 27/1914).<sup>67)</sup> Hertzog defended the inclusion of this principle in a Bill providing for native administration by stating that the serious state of affairs and the even more serious implications warranted the current form and content of this Bill.<sup>68)</sup>

The guiding element in this legislation could be traced back to the concept of white trusteeship. Hertzog referred to this principle in the following terms: "I feel it is absolutely necessary, if we are really to protect the natives properly, that we should protect them from these influences which are being brought to bear with the evil design, not of assisting them, but ... of creating mischief."<sup>69)</sup> Smuts' personal support for the concept contained in Section 29 - in as far as it referred to black-white relations - was also based on the concept of white trusteeship. In noting the necessity of having this form of legislation on the statute book, Smuts agreed that the "... vast mass, millions of natives, are to-day where they were 20 years ago, or 100 years ago."<sup>70)</sup> In terms of the Hertzog-perspective, the mentality and understanding of the African - who was essentially still in the affective stage of mental development - did not provide for an ability to distinguish between dangerous and healthy doctrine. The white man, as protector of Africans, had the innate responsibility to distinguish between good and evil on their behalf.

Hertzog thus contended that the activities of "agitators", amongst whom he may have counted communists, endangered racial order and harmony in the state. In as far as Section 29 provided for the prosecution of individuals, this was to be

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67. Ibid., col.2946-2947.

68. Ibid., 2.5.1927, col.3045.

69. Ibid., 28.4.1927, col.2913.

70. Ibid., col.2914.

done on the basis of them having endangered black-white racial harmony. This applied equally to both communist and non-communist. Words and deeds thus served as criteria for prosecution, not ideological affiliation. To put it differently: Communists were considered eligible for prosecution not because of their ideological beliefs, but on the basis of their perceived actions.

The enactment of the Native Administration Bill (Act 38/1927) in July 1927 proved in no uncertain terms that members of the CPSA were eligible for prosecution. Stanley Silwana, John Gomas and Bransby Ndobe, all members of the Communist Party, were amongst the first people to be prosecuted under Section 29.<sup>71)</sup> Roux also refers to Sam Malkinson and Bill Andrews.<sup>72)</sup>

#### 1.4.2. Rioutous Assemblies Amendment Bill, 1930

The formulation of Section 29 left room for conflicting interpretations in a court of law. This was particularly the case in so far as the first clause of this section affected members of the Communist Party. The relevant clause placed the onus on the State in proving that a defendant had intentionally fomented feelings of hostility between the two races. Hertzog's statement that he did not consider protagonists of another ideology liable for persecution further complicated the issue. Initially, as indicated, persecution of communists did take place under Section 29. The case of Rex vs. Bunting,<sup>73)</sup> however, brought this to an end.

S.P. Bunting, CPSA candidate for the electoral division of Tembuland during the election of 1929, addressed a public

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71. H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, p.346.

72. E.R. Roux: Time Longer than Rope, p.203.

73. See R.P.B. Davis (general ed.): The South African Law Reports [1929] Eastern Districts Local Division, pp.326-330.

meeting in Umtata early in March 1929. At this meeting Bunting was alleged to have said :

"The natives were driven off the land by the Europeans and were compelled to live in locations, and important chiefs were also compelled to go to locations ... General Hertzog should be thrown into the sea; the white man has no right in these Territories; the natives are not getting a square deal from the white man; in Russia they have an institution known as the Duma with the Mobile as well which is presided over by the Czar of Russia, and if there is any trouble with the people, the Czar sends his Mobile out to quell it; you have a similar institution in the Territories known as the Bunga and a mobile squadron as well."<sup>74)</sup>

As a result of these words and on the basis of similar 'inflammable' pamphlets distributed during the meeting by Rebecca Bunting and Gana Makabeni, S.P. Bunting and his two co-accused were convicted and sentenced by the magistrate of Umtata under Section 29 of the Native Administration Act. An appeal for the conviction to be set aside was made to the Supreme Court in Grahamstown. The Supreme Court found that the preaching of a recognised doctrine, in this case the recognised doctrine of Communism, if bona fide, was no offence under this clause. S.P. Bunting and his co-accused were found not guilty and acquitted on these grounds.

The acquittal of Bunting resulted in a new offensive against communists which eventually found expression in the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) Bill of 1930.

During the parliamentary session of 1929 Smuts warned against the alleged dangers of communism. The explicit reference to a "... real communist movement ..." <sup>75)</sup> amongst Africans stood in sharp contrast to the vague remarks on black and white

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74. Cited in Ibid., p.335. The applicability of Bunting's comments to the USSR, in a purely historical sense, are highly questionable.

75. Hansard, 8.8.1929, col.575.

agitators less than two years earlier.<sup>76)</sup> Although agreeing with Smuts that Communism had the potential of becoming a menace, Oswald Pirow, Nationalist Minister of Justice, asserted that this ideology was "... at present merely a nuisance ..."<sup>77)</sup>

Smuts motivated his call on the Government for sterner measures by pointing to the alleged detrimental effect of this ideology on race relations. Smuts' motivation, once again, stemmed from his support for the principle of white trusteeship:

"The natives of this country ought to know that they are going to get justice and fair play from the white people, but they ought also to know on their side that they are expected to give obedience to the law, and that any movement of a subversive nature will be severely dealt with by the public authorities."<sup>78)</sup>

Hertzog concurred with Smuts on the gravity of the situation. Hertzog indicated that he did not believe that a remedy would be found in a redefinition or further extension of Section 29. Hertzog believed that a solution would be forthcoming if the Governor-General was allowed even greater authority over Africans.<sup>79)</sup> This, according to Hertzog, would empower the Governor-General to take steps at any time to prevent crimes.

Following Hertzog's promise that provision would be made to deal with the new circumstances brought about by the acquittal of Bunting, Pirow, as responsible Minister, presented to Parliament in February 1930 the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) Bill.<sup>80)</sup> This Bill provided, mutatis mutandis, for the following:

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76. See Ibid., 28.4.1927, col.2919-2920.

77. Ibid., 8.8.1929, col.577.

78. Ibid., col.576.

79. Ibid., col.576-577.

80. See Appendix A.

- i) Cession of authority to the Minister of Justice to prohibit any public gathering which, in his opinion, could engender feelings of hostility between whites and any other section of the community.
- ii) Authority for the Minister to prevent an individual from attending such meeting or being physically present within the borders of a designated area for a specified period of time. The Minister was obliged to furnish reasons for his decision when requested to do so by the individual affected. This, however, depended on whether, in his opinion, public safety warranted disclosure of such information.
- iii) Assignment of powers to the Governor-General to prevent the publication or other dissemination of any documentary evidence which, in his opinion, could enflame relations. 'Documentary evidence' was defined as "... any book, foreign magazine, pamphlet, manifesto, foreign newspaper, handbill or poster, or any article or advertisement, cartoon, picture or drawing in any periodical publication or newspaper."<sup>81)</sup>
- iv) Deportation of foreign-born nationals if convicted under any of the foregoing provisions.

Scholtz asserts that the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) Act can be regarded as South Africa's first anti-Communist legislation.<sup>82)</sup> This claim, however, is not supported by the stipulations of the Act. Similar to the Native Administration Act of 1927, the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) Act provided for the apprehension of any individual, irrespective of party-political or ideological affiliation, who engendered 'feelings of hostility' between the different races.

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81. See sub-section ii).

82. See G.D. Scholtz' biographical description of Oswald Pirow in C.J. Beyers (ed.-in-chief) and J.L. Basson: Dictionary of South African Biography, V, p.595.



Oswald Pirow's presentation of the Bill to Parliament, however, proved in no uncertain terms that it was primarily directed against members of the Communist Party. Judging from Pirow's presentation, this Bill was brought about as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in the Bunting-case and, coupled to that, the rapidly ascending level of what was believed to be communist propaganda.<sup>83)</sup> Pirow's presentation does not provide a clear indication of whether this 'communist propaganda' had developed as a result of the Supreme Court's decision or whether it was part of a continuous process which had only recently taken on an amplitude which necessitated legislative intervention. Pirow's remarks during the previous parliamentary session at which time communist activities were described as insignificant, would seem to support the latter possibility. However, on this occasion (1930), he repudiated his earlier statement by acknowledging that Smuts' warning against Communism, in 1929, "... were in no way exaggerated ..."<sup>84)</sup>

Pirow's depiction of 'communist activities' took the form of a grand exposé of its international and local dimensions to illustrate this ideology's perceived aims and the extent to which it was promoted amongst the African population. Pirow's objective in the presentation of this speech, by his own admission, was not to explain a huge involved Bolshevik conspiracy against South Africa.<sup>85)</sup> The effect his words nevertheless had in certain parliamentary circles is aptly illustrated by the remarks of Karl Bremer, fellow NP-member, on the role of the courts in dealing with this situation:

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83. Hansard, 24.2.1930, col.725. According to Pirow the ruling of the Supreme Court had rendered Section 29 of the **Native Administration Act**, as a mechanism for the curtailment of agitation amongst Africans, practically useless.

84. Ibid., col.729.

85. Ibid., col.737.

"If the danger threatening us was entirely a danger from within, then the courts of the lands (sic!) and their slow process might well be depended upon, but when the danger that threatens us is so obviously engineered from without our borders, then, I say, it becomes absolutely necessary to take ... [alternative] powers."<sup>86)</sup>

An evaluation of the factual basis of Pirow's assertions is important for the purpose of this analysis, mainly for two reasons: Firstly, it will allow for the contextualisation of Pirow's allegations and, secondly, serve to determine whether Pirow was justified in making the assertions which he did. In other words, how realistic was Pirow's conception of a communist menace? The difficulties to be encountered in this sort of evaluation, however, must be noted from the outset. The banning of the South African Communist Party (SACP),<sup>87)</sup> in 1950, which was lifted only recently, seriously limit opportunities for research into topics perceived to be related to national security. Conversely, the secretive nature of the Communist Party does not allow for an opportunity to juxtapose Pirow's allegations against transcripts from the Party's archives.

In dealing with the international dimension, Pirow focussed on the CPSA's affiliation to the Third (Communist) International Workers' Organisation.<sup>88)</sup> Whereas the Comintern had initially shown little interest in South African affairs,<sup>89)</sup> recent developments, according to Pirow, have proven this to be no longer true. Amongst these developments Pirow counted the alleged visit to South Africa by a certain Paul Merker, the alleged financial assistance to the Party and the establishment of the League of African Rights (LAR). These individual

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86. Ibid., col.2350-2351.

87. The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) became known as the South African Communist Party (SACP) after 1953.

88. Hereafter referred to as the Third International, Communist International, Comintern or CI.

89. Hansard, 24.2.1930, col.730.

episodes were important, especially in as far as it proves that Pirow's perception of the changing role of the Comintern and subsequently the danger of communism for South Africa were based on actual events.

Pirow perceived the alleged visit by Paul Merker, apparently an agent of the Comintern, as symptomatic of this organisation's new interest in South African affairs. Apart from conferring with the CPSA on the Party's future strategy, Merker, according to Pirow, had "... actually corrected the election manifestoes of Bunting and Walton (sic!)".<sup>90</sup> No confirmation could be found to establish whether such a visit did indeed take place.

Financial support for the Party, according to Pirow, could positively be traced back to 1928. This allegation was based on a letter apparently sent to the CPSA by the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI).<sup>91</sup> An evaluation of Pirow's contention will depend on whether the existence of such a letter can be confirmed. Attempts to trace the letter were not successful, nor did intensive research provide any solid evidence in support of Pirow's assertion.

Pirow's reference to the so-called 'Merker-mission' and remarks on alleged financial support for the CPSA by the CI suggest that the CPSA was both controlled and directed by the Third International. In other words, the Comintern's interest in South Africa amounted to not only a meddling in the ideological line taken by the Party, but even more important, a direct and active involvement in the day-to-day running of the Party's affairs. Bremer's remarks, referred to earlier, serve to illustrate this belief within the NP.

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90. Ibid. S.P. Bunting (Tembuland) and D.G. Wolton (Cape Flats), contested the aforementioned seats on a CPSA-ticket during the election of 1929.

91. Hansard, 24.2.1930, col.729. In this letter a detailed financial report for the fiscal year October 1928 to September 1929 was requested from the Party. Such a statement, according to the letter tabled in Parliament, was required so as to determine the Party's subsidy from the CI for the first quarter of 1930.

In July 1921 a number of organisations amalgamated to form the Communist Party of South Africa, which became the South African affiliate of the Third International. Affiliation was made possible through acceptance of the 21 Conditions of Admission as adopted by the Second Comintern Congress in 1920. The future relationship between the Party and CI was determined by Clause 16 of the 21 Conditions: "All the resolutions of the Congresses of the Communist International as well as resolutions of the Executive Committee, are binding for all parties joining the Communist International."<sup>92</sup>) Affiliation, therefore, did not only amount to an identification with the spirit and goals of the Comintern, but, even more important, a willingness to comply with all directives and resolutions issued by the Third International.

The importance of the Comintern tie was well grasped by the CPSA. The first national conference of the Party, held in July/August 1921, noted the "... great strength and inspiration ..."<sup>93</sup>) it was to derive from affiliation to the Third International.

The exact implications of the principle of democratic centralism, to which the Party subscribed in terms of Clause 16 of the 21 Conditions, progressively came to the forefront in the course of the 1920's. Two directives dealing with South Africa emanated from the Third International during 1928. The first resolution, which was accepted by the Sixth Congress of the CI in July 1928, formed part of a general resolution entitled "Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies". According to Brian Bunting the entire section on South Africa comprised a single paragraph in a 63-

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92. See [B. Bunting (ed.)]: South African Communists Speak, pp.58-62 ("The Twenty-one Points - Conditions of Admission to the Communist International").

93. See Ibid., p. 64.

page document.<sup>94)</sup> The second resolution, under the title "The South African Question" and dealing specifically with South Africa, while also discussed during the main proceedings of the Comintern congress, was adopted as a directive by the ECCI after this meeting.

The essential difference between the two documents relate to the proposed aim the CPSA was to emulate. Whereas the general resolution merely called for the "... creation of an independent native republic, with simultaneous guarantees for the rights of the white minority ...",<sup>95)</sup> the special resolution on South Africa contemplated the formation of "... an independent native South African republic as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' republic, with full equal rights for all races, black, coloured and white".<sup>96)</sup> The mere political rotation envisaged under the general resolution stood in sharp contrast to the staged political and social revolution foreseen in terms of the specific directive.

The directive dealing with South Africa was contested by the CPSA-delegation to the Sixth Congress on the basis of it being a misrepresentation of the South African reality.<sup>97)</sup> Local communists contended that the eradication of all forms of national- and race discrimination and oppression could only be realized through class struggle and the achievement of Socialism under the leadership of the CPSA.<sup>98)</sup> In other words,

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94. B. Bunting: Moses Kotane - South African Revolutionary, p. 32. According to Bunting even this paragraph was missing from the initial draft of the thesis.

95. [B. Bunting (ed.)]: South African Communists Speak, pp.90-91 ("Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies").

96. Ibid., pp.91-97 ("The South African Question").

97. This delegation consisted of S.P. Bunting, his wife Rebecca and Edward Roux.

98. B. Bunting: Moses Kotane - South African Revolutionary, p.35.

the CPSA delegates insisted that class, not national issues, were uppermost in South Africa.

The Native Republic-slogan was finally adopted by the CPSA at its seventh annual congress in 1929. In as far as acceptance related to the position of the CPSA vis à vis the Third International, Bunting, as chairman of the Congress, ruled that all motions involving the rejection or modification of this thesis were out of order under the CI statutes.<sup>99)</sup>

Although the Native Republic-thesis and the manner in which it was finally adopted by the CPSA have resulted in much controversy, two remarks are important for the aims of this analysis: Firstly, this slogan constituted the formal embodiment of a renewed interest in South African affairs by the Comintern. Secondly, while the Native Republic-thesis may not have been unilaterally forced unto the CPSA by the CI, Clause 16 of the 21 Conditions nonetheless ensured the inclusion of this thesis in the Party Programme. Pirow's accentuation of a revived interest in local affairs by the Third International was thus indeed correct.

In presenting the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) Bill to Parliament, Pirow, however, provided little indication of being aware of the causal relationship between the Comintern's renewed interest in South Africa and the Native Republic-thesis of 1928. This thesis, according to Pirow, "... did not appeal to the masses ... [and] left the average native "stone cold"<sup>100)</sup> The relative insignificance attributed to the Native Republic thesis by Pirow may well be explained on the basis of two possible arguments: Firstly, Pirow's limited knowledge of the modus operandi of the CPSA may have resulted in him underrating the significance and importance of the Native Republic-thesis. Pirow may have adjudged this thesis to be nothing more than a (unsuccessful) slogan employed by the

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99. See [B. Bunting (ed.)]: South African Communists Speak, p.99.

100. Hansard, 24.2.1930, col. 732.

CPSA in an attempt to rally support behind its cause. Secondly, Pirow may have consciously underplayed the significance of this slogan in an attempt to avoid giving it a greater status or to divert attention from it.

Irrespective of whichever of the above arguments are accepted, this, however, is not to say that Pirow did not consider the Native Republic-thesis to be part of the CI's renewed interest in South Africa. What does seem fair to assume is that Pirow did not consider this thesis to be of particular significance in his treatise on the strategy and tactics of the CPSA.

Pirow's main reason for emphasizing the Comintern's new interest in South Africa related to the founding of the League of African Rights. Whereas the alleged financial support for the CPSA and the visit by Merker in themselves did not "... constitute a menace which would call for very drastic legislation",<sup>101)</sup> the founding of the LAR was an event, "... the seriousness of which can hardly be over-emphasized".<sup>102)</sup> A report to the Third International by its South African affiliate on the formation of the LAR provided sufficient evidence for Pirow to contemplate Comintern involvement.<sup>103)</sup>

To Pirow the LAR did not only represent proof of the Third International's revived interest in South Africa, but was also an example of the CPSA's strategy towards South Africa. Pirow interpreted this strategy as containing two basic elements:

- (i) The CPSA's exclusive involvement in African politics. Pirow did not provide an indication of whether this development was related to the increased CI interest in

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101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. It must be emphasized once more that no trace of such a report could be found in the course of research. This, however, is not to say that Pirow's argument was a fabricated one.

South Africa or whether it had been a feature of the Party's activities since 1921.

- (ii) The CPSA's aim to create auxiliary organisations which could promote its cause in South Africa.<sup>104</sup>) The innocent features of these organisations, according to Pirow, made participation by non-communists possible. Participation occurred without any knowledge of communist involvement. Referring to the involvement of organisations other than the CPSA in a mass demonstration in Johannesburg on 16 December 1929,<sup>105</sup>) Pirow noted that this was "... clear proof ... [of] how far the communists [had] succeeded, whether these other people know it or not, of embracing them in a campaign throughout the whole of the country".<sup>106</sup>) Apart from the LAR, Pirow identified a number of other active organisations in South Africa which were allegedly related to the CPSA and CI.<sup>107</sup>)

Prior to 1929 CPSA and ISL involvement in South African affairs were largely determined by the thesis-antithesis of capital and labour. On the basis of this approach the CPSA participated in both 'black' and 'white' politics. Two examples will serve to illustrate this point.

In 1919 a large number of African mineworkers on the Witwatersrand came out on strike. The ISL,<sup>108</sup>) in an attempt to

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104. Hansard, 24.2.1930, col.736.

105. This demonstration was held under the joint auspices of the CPSA, LAR and ICU (H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, p.423).

106. Hansard, 24.2.1930, col.739.

107. These organisations were: Educational Workers' International; International Red Aid; Universal Negro Improvement Society and African Communities League and the Ligue de Defence de la Rasse Negre [League for the Defence of the Negro Races] (see Ibid., col.735-736).

108. The International Socialist League was the main forerunner of the CPSA.



mobilise support for the striking workers, issued a leaflet aimed at white workers. The leaflet declared, inter alia:

"White Workers! Do you hear the new Army of Labour coming? The native workers are beginning to wake up. They are finding that they are slaves to the big capitalists."<sup>109)</sup>

Participation in the Rand Revolt by local communists were complicated by the obvious racial overtones of this strike. The Communist Party's insistence on working class solidarity did not allow for any form of racial prejudice. Bunting rationalised communist support for the strikers in The International, official mouthpiece of the Party:

"This strike is sometimes called a strike against the abolition of the colour bar. But although anti-colour feeling run high, the true issue is not racial. Essentially it is a strike against the further lowering of wages which the capitalists of the whole world are trying to enforce; essentially it is not a strike of white men as whites; it is a strike of workers as workers ..."<sup>110)</sup>

Already prior to the formation of the CPSA certain individuals who came to be associated with the Party acknowledged the essentially disadvantaged position of Africans. In December 1915 David Ivon Jones, first secretary of the ISL and leading ideologue, wrote in The International:

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109. Cited in A. Lerumo [Brian Bunting]: Fifty Fighting Years, p.36.

110. Cited in E. Roux: S.P. Bunting - A Political Biography, p.52.

"Slaves to a higher oligarchy, the white workers of South Africa themselves in turn batten on a lower slave class, the native races. Himself kicked by his Capitalist masters, the 'correct' and accepted attitude towards the 'nigger' is to kick him, to teach him his place, and to stand no impudence. Gingerly attempts to show him that in the extension of freedom for the native lies the only salvation of the white worker invariably aroused storms of execration. And thus has the South African labour movement grown up, more intolerant towards the native slave than any other working class in the world, and consequently more parasitical than any other."<sup>111)</sup>

The reaction of the first national conference of the ISL to an attempt by Bunting to include a Bill of Rights for African workers in the League Programme is indicative of the attitude of these early international socialists to what came to be referred to as the national question. Although there were no shortage of support for the belief that the black man was entitled to freedom, the majority of delegates agreed that "there was no Native problem [in South Africa], only a workers' problem".<sup>112)</sup> Attempts to deal with the national question were thus underplayed in favour of the relative safety of ideological dogmatism.

The establishment of the CPSA found a continuation of this tradition of ideological complacency. This was most prevalent in the Party's attempt to affiliate to the all-white Labour Party and an almost unqualified support for the Nationalist-Labour Pact in the general election of 1924. Even though 1924 marked the beginning of an era where both the racial complexion and scope of activities of the Party were to change,<sup>113)</sup> this did not result in any immediate adaptation in so far as the national question was concerned.

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111. Cited in B. Bunting: Moses Kotane - South African Revolutionary, p.18.

112. Roux: op.cit., p.30.

113. Lerumo: op.cit., pp.62-63.

The absence of any consistent attitude towards the national question may well be explained in terms of the socialist movement's origin within the white labour movement. The majority of those individuals who broke away from the Labour Party to form the ISL were the very same founders and leaders of the labour movement of the organised white working class.<sup>114)</sup> The slogan "Workers of the World Unite" was interpreted as referring to white miners, tramwaymen, artisans and so on. While white workers were perceived as being the main revolutionary force, Africans were simply disregarded.\*) Occasionally, where the minority 'negrophilist' section of the ISL were able to force the issue, the necessity of working class unity - irrespective of race, colour or creed - was acknowledged. However, both the more progressive and reactionary sections of the League refuted the allegation that the unique position of the African indicated the existence of a separate question. Ivon Jones, in a report to the ECCI in March 1921, stressed that the "... national and class interests of the natives cannot be distinguished the one from the other".\*.)

As indicated, the turn to the African masses and the increasing 'Africanisation' of the Party failed to bring about a change in CPSA-policy on the national question. Whether the dichotomy between the racial composition of the Party-membership and the

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114. The first leadership of the ISL reads like a who's who of the Labour Party. The Chairman of the ISL was Bill Andrews (former chairman of the LP); the vice-chairmen J.A. Clark and A.F. Crisp, both LP members of the Transvaal Provincial Council; G. Weinstock, past treasurer of the LP, was treasurer, and the secretary, David Ivon Jones, had been the Labour Party's secretary. See E. Roux: S.P. Bunting - A Political Biography, p.25.

115. Ibid., p.63.

116. Cited in [B. Bunting (ed.)]: South African Communists Speak, p.54.

CPSA leadership<sup>117)</sup> - a phenomenon which had developed as a byproduct of the shift in Party policy - affected thinking on this matter, falls within the realm of speculation.<sup>118)</sup> Some of the more prominent white members of the CPSA did develop an understanding of the principles of Marxist Socialism while part of the white labour movement.<sup>119)</sup> Consciously or unconsciously, the legacy of white labour may have influenced their conception of the national question. Rank and file members of the Party may have equated the views expounded by these individuals with the seniority of their positions in the Party. In this way they

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117. African members of the Party, from a minority in 1924, comprised the overwhelming majority by 1928 - 1 600 out of a total of 1 750 members. This transformation did not reflect in the Party's leadership. Even though the fifth national conference of the Party had elected E.J. Khaile, T.W. Thibedi and Gana Makabeni to the Central Committee, whites were to retain their hold on the more senior positions in the Party hierarchy for years to come. Whereas more than 90% of the Party membership for 1928 consisted of Africans, whites laid claim to two-thirds of the positions on the Central Committee for the period December 1928 to December 1929. The delegation appointed to the 1928 Comintern Congress consisted exclusively of whites, in spite of the numerical preponderance of blacks in the Party. (See D.J. Kotzé: 'n Analise van die Ideologie van die Suid-Afrikaanse Kommunistiese Party, 1950-1984, p.208; A. Lerumo: Fifty Fighting Years, p.57).
118. A recent article by Robyn Kelley argues in favour of this interpretation. According to Kelley African and white members of the CPSA perceived the revolutionary tasks of the Party in fundamentally different terms. Whereas whites, according to Kelley, joined the Party as orthodox Marxists, "... Africans joined the [CPSA] as [militant] nationalists ..." (italics in the original). Thus, whereas white communists rejected nationalist slogans on the basis of it being counter-revolutionary and reformist, African members of the Party adjudged national liberation to be an integral part of the struggle against capitalism. Through their dominance of the leadership positions in the CPSA, whites - according to Kelley's hypothesis - were able to control official thinking on the national question. See R.D.G. Kelley: The Third International and the Struggle for National Liberation in South Africa (Ufahamu, vol. 15(1-2), 1986).
119. S.P. Bunting and Bill Andrews provide excellent examples. Bunting retained his seat on the Central Committee uninterrupted from the Party's inception right through to 1929/30. Andrews was to remain prominent in the Party up to his death in 1950.

could have been indirectly responsible for their own unique brand of 'white trusteeship'. The resignation of Charles Glass following the victory of the negrophilist section at the December 1924 conference of the Party, provides an indication of this possibility. Referring to the victory of the negrophilists, Glass was reported as having said that Africans "... could not possibly appreciate the noble ideals of Communism".<sup>120)</sup>

Acceptance of the Native Republic-slogan in 1929 did not imply a cessation of all activities within the white labour movement. The importance of promoting working class solidarity between white and black was stressed by the Party Programme.<sup>121)</sup> In later years white members of the CPSA were not only active in the white trade union movement,<sup>122)</sup> but also in a number of other organisations.<sup>123)</sup>

Pirow's contention that the CPSA had been involved in the founding of the LAR was correct. Simons and Simons indicate that S.P. Bunting took the initiative in organising an all-in conference in August 1929 from which this organisation evolved.<sup>124)</sup> Bunting's action was in accordance with the Party Programme which allowed for the devotion of "... special

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120. Cited in E. Roux: S.P. Bunting - A Political Biography, p.68.

121. Ibid.

122. Danie du Plessis, an Afrikaner member of the Party, initially played a prominent part in the all-white Building Workers' Industrial Union (BWIU).

123. Party members Jack Hodgson and Cecil Williams held leading positions in the Springbok Legion, a servicemen's association, during and after World War II. (A. Lerumo: Fifty Fighting Years, p.72.)

124. H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, p.417.

attention to the national cause of the native people as such ..."125)

The emphasis on national (African) liberation was in accordance with the CPSA's objective of a classless society. The CPSA Programme of January 1929 explained the relationship between national liberation and class emancipation in the following terms:

"... 'Labour solidarity' cannot mean ignoring race discrimination or subjection. Moreover, modern capitalism typically treats colonial races, at any rate in Africa, as constituting, en bloc, reservoirs of labour. South African imperialism helotises the whole of the native people as a race as providing a national labour breeding and recruiting ground. Again, unity postulates equality. If we are to achieve real labour unity we must first remove the greatest obstacle to it, viz. the unequal, subjected, enslaved status of the native workers and people. Hence race emancipation and class emancipation tend to coincide. Hence too the conception and realisation of native rule merges into that of the Workers' and Peasants' Republic, non-imperialist, non-racialist, classless and in effect Socialist."126)

Pirow was thus once more correct in assessing that the Communist Party had "... decided to place in the forefront some of the intermediate stages on the march to world revolution".127) The limited objectives of the LAR also coincided with the specific demands made in the Party's programme.128)

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125. [B. Bunting (ed.)]: South African Communists Speak, pp. 100-106, ("Programme of the Communist Party of South Africa adopted at the seventh annual conference of the Party on January 1, 1929").

126. Ibid., p.102.

127. Hansard, 24.2.1930, col.732.

128. Compare the aims of the LAR and CPSA as found in respectively P. Walshe: The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, p.177 and [B. Bunting (ed.)]: South African Communists Speak, pp.100-106.

The importance of the LAR, as an organisation allowing for CPSA participation, was emphasised by a Comintern directive in 1929. The instruction read: "The Party should remain a small and select body of trained revolutionaries working through a large mass body."<sup>129</sup>) For all practical purposes, judging from this directive, the League was to become a front organisation, its usefulness limited to that of a vehicle propounding CPSA interests. Theoretically, from a Party point of view, this was indeed possible. The League had established a mass following and its leadership contained, apart from CPSA members, a cross section of prominent individuals from the two most powerful African movements of the day - the ICU and the African National Congress (ANC).<sup>130</sup>)

The potential of the LAR as a movement affecting positive socio-political change was never realized. Roux indicates that a large conference had been planned for 16 December 1929. "In the midst of it all a telegram arrived from Moscow ordering the dissolution of the League."<sup>131</sup>) This order was dutifully carried out by the CPSA.<sup>132</sup>) The proposed conference never materialised. In all fairness it should be mentioned that on this day a demonstration was held in Johannesburg under the joint auspices of the League, ICU and CPSA.<sup>133</sup>)

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129. D.J. Kotzé: Communism and South Africa, p.209; E. Roux: S.P. Bunting - A Political Biography, p.113.

130. The executive of the LAR were made up of the following people: J.T. Gumede and N.B. Tantsi (ANC); S.P. Bunting, E.R. Roux and A. Nzula (CPSA) and Doyle Modiaghotla (ICU). See Roux: op.cit., pp.113-114 and H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, p.417.

131. Roux: op.cit., p.114. See also H.J. and R.E. Simons: op.cit., pp.421-422.

132. According to the ECCI the League had to be disbanded because it was putting up reformist demands, thereby turning the masses away from the 'revolutionary' road (see Roux: op.cit., pp.114-115; B. Bunting: Moses Kotane - South African Revolutionary, pp.52-53).

133. H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, p.423.

Pirow's assertions relating to the LAR was based on an alleged letter and report to the Comintern by respectively Bunting and the CPSA.<sup>134)</sup> Roux makes mention of a letter sent to the ECCI which was drafted by him and endorsed by the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Party.<sup>135)</sup> The report presented to Parliament may have been a copy of this letter by Roux. If so, the overwhelmingly apologetical tone and the emphasis on the prospective importance of the LAR for the Party, prevalent from Pirow's report, can be explained in terms of Roux's letter. The letter by Roux represented a final attempt to ensure the continued existence of the LAR.

Simons and Simons hold that a letter by Bunting, dated 29 October 1929, was sent to the Colonial Commission of the British Communist Party.<sup>136)</sup> Bunting also dealt with the importance of the LAR in CPSA strategy in this letter. The letter quoted from by Pirow may have been the very same letter Simons and Simons refer to. The contents of this letter can also be explained in terms of the CI directive calling for the disbandment of the LAR.

Roux's reference to the Comintern directive which ordered the disbandment of the LAR has been noted. Judging from this, it seems clear that the Comintern resolution was received by the Party already before the proposed conference of 16 December 1929. Whether the directive resulted in an immediate suspension of Party involvement in the activities of the LAR is not clear. Participation by the CPSA in the Johannesburg demonstrations provides for conflicting interpretations. Involvement was either made possible by the banner of the CPSA or through LAR affiliation. The second possibility does not concur with Lerumo's emphasis on the Party being a disciplined affiliate of the CI.<sup>137)</sup> Both Edward Roux and Bunting indicate that the CPSA

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134. See Hansard, 24.2.1930, col.732-735.

135. E. Roux: S.P. Bunting - A Political Biography, p.115.

136. H.J. and R.E. Simons: op.cit., p.421.

137. See A. Lerumo: Fifty Fighting Years, p.59.



did not question the ECCI decision to dissolve the League.<sup>138)</sup> Important to note is that CPSA involvement in the LAR was terminated in the course of December 1929. CPSA strategy in 1930 did not provide for participation in African politics by means of auxiliary organisations. A pass burning campaign in December 1930 took place under the banner of the Party and not that of any other movement or organisation.<sup>139)</sup>

While Pirow agreed that it was impossible to ascribe all African unrest to "... communist intrigue or bolshevist guile ..." <sup>140)</sup>, he stressed that "... all the native unrest taking place must be viewed against the background of the rapidly increasing and cunningly adapted communist propaganda ..." <sup>141)</sup> Furthermore, Pirow perceived black discontent to be limited to the urbanised minority. Any attempt to merely redress grievances "... without taking up a firm attitude towards the seditious propaganda would undermine the position of the white man".<sup>142)</sup> In other words, while Pirow acknowledged the existence of discontent amongst the African population, this was relatively insignificant compared to the perceived menace of communism.

Pirow's entire analysis of the Communist Party's modus operandi in South Africa hinged on the LAR. If the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) Bill had been presented to Parliament three months earlier, the factual content of Pirow's allegations would indeed have been relevant and, even more importantly, he would have had a strong case in support of the contention that the CPSA had "... decided to place in the forefront some of the

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138. Roux: op.cit., p.114; B. Bunting: Moses Kotane - South African Revolutionary, p.53.

139. Roux: op.cit., pp.119-120.

140. Hansard, 24.2.1930, col.729.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid., col.740.

intermediate stages in the march to world revolution."<sup>143</sup>) However, by February 1930, when this Bill was introduced into Parliament, the Party's involvement in the League had ended.

There are two possible explanations for the absence of any reference to the termination of the CPSA-LAR connection in Pirow's remarks. Pirow may have conveniently and blatantly ignored this development. Blatantly, because, as Pirow himself acknowledged, his analysis of the modus operandi of the CPSA was based on information gained from allegedly confidential Party documents. If indeed the South African security establishment did find it possible to intercept incoming and outgoing Party mail, it is difficult to accept that a Comintern directive, given the emphasis placed by Pirow on the CPSA's subservience to the CI, would have escaped their attention. Furthermore, as indicated by Brian Bunting, the Comintern resolution was published in Umsebenzi, official mouthpiece of the Party, towards the end of 1929.<sup>144</sup>) A report in a public journal dealing with an obvious sensitive issue such as the LAR surely demanded clarification. Deliberately because if communists had indeed withdrawn from the LAR, Pirow's argument would have lost its applicability and may have required a re-evaluation of the role of the CPSA; acknowledging that they were a lesser evil than originally perceived. This, in turn, could have resulted in a casting of doubt on the perceived need for the Riotous Assemblies (Amendment) Bill.

This argument may have some value in providing an explanation for Pirow's exposition of the modus operandi of the CPSA, but it fails to take into account two further possibilities:

- i) The LAR, despite the withdrawal of communists, may have continued to exist for some time. Pirow, despite being aware of the CI directive, may have equated the continued existence of the LAR with CPSA involvement. Conversely,

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143. Ibid., col.732.

144. Bunting: op.cit., p.52.

Pirow may have believed that the LAR had been reconstituted in another form and/or under another name which provided for continued participation by Communist Party members. The CI directive, in this sense, was of no particular significance and ultimately served as a pretence to hide continued CPSA involvement in African politics.

- ii) Legislation is normally prepared well in advance. Those individuals responsible for the drafting of the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) Bill may not have been aware of the CI directive or considered it to be of such insignificance that it did not warrant a reformulation of the original Bill.

The motivation underlying the introduction of this Bill was essentially the same as had been the case with the Native Administration Act of 1927. Pirow referred to this principle of white trusteeship in the following terms:

"A speech which is absolutely innocent as far as Europeans are concerned, may have disastrous results when addressed to the natives, and we must recognize that the security of this country and white civilization is based on the prestige of the white man."<sup>145)</sup>

The alleged actions of white vigilantes at black protest meetings<sup>146)</sup> provided Pirow with a second reason which

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145. Hansard, 24.2.1930, col.737.

146. At a protest meeting in the Potchefstroom township addressed by Edwin Mofutsanyana and J.B. Marks, both members of the CPSA, during 1929, a revolver was seemingly fired at Mofutsanyana by a white bystander. The shot missed Mofutsanyana and hit Herman Lethebe - another member of the CPSA - who died as a result of his wounds. Joseph Weeks, secretary of the Potchefstroom School Board and brother of the township superintendent, was put on trial for murder, but acquitted. Eight other accused were convicted on charges of public violence, but also released with a warning by the magistrate. See H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, p.423 and Umsebenzi, 20.6.1930; 4.7.1930 and 18.7.1930.

necessitated a speedy enactment of the proposed legislation. Pirow interpreted these isolated incidents as indicative of a possible future reaction by the white population if their 'authority' were to be provoked. Failure to place this legislation on the statute book, according to Pirow, would result in the white population defying "... the law in an organized and armed manner with disastrous results."<sup>147)</sup>

Patrick Duncan, acting parliamentary leader of the SAP in the absence of Smuts, illustrated his party's support for the principle of white trusteeship and the necessity of taking steps against 'communist propaganda' in the following words:

"We realize the very serious position into which this country may be brought at any moment if this propaganda continues unchecked. We realize we are dealing with a population only slowly emerging from barbarism, which cannot weigh words as an ordinary civilized man can, and with people who are swayed by appeals to their sentiments. A powerful organization is working from outside for the overthrow of civilization in South Africa, and we are prepared to co-operate with the Minister to see how far powers can be given to him ... to deal with this propaganda."<sup>148)</sup>

Opposition was limited to a questioning of the dictatorial powers allowed for the Minister of Justice and other state officials under the proposed Act and the bypassing of the courts.

The motivation underlying the enactment of both Section 29 of the Native Administration Bill and the Rioutous Assemblies Amendment Bill, as indicated, related to the principle of white trusteeship. The NP's conception of communism and more specifically its perception of a communist menace must therefore be interpreted and analysed against the backdrop of this principle. Although Pirow made mention of the alleged long-term objective of communism as being a world-revolution,

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147. Hansard, 23.4.1930, col.2152.

148. Ibid., 24.2.1930, col.746.

this remark, given the belated emphasis on the perceived menacing implications of this ideology for race relations, seems to be of relative insignificance.

Communism was adjudged to be a menace because of the involvement of protagonists of this ideology with racial issues. Important to note, however, is that opposition to perceived communism was based on the expected implications for harmonious race relations resulting from the activities of communists rather than a principle or set of principles perceived to be central to or underlying this ideology. While the identification of communists with poor race relations ipso facto provided for the inclusion of principles allegedly adhered to by communists in this 'enemy image', more important is to note is that this was the result of a perceived set of activities by the proponents of this ideology and not the other way round.

By involving themselves with racial issues, communists were challenging the authority of the "right minded" whites as sole and accepted interpreters of non-white interests. By disturbing the existing status quo in race relations, communists - according to both the NP and SAP - were also subverting the interests of the white man. The term communist, used in this fashion, thus came to be equated to the term communism. By opposing and limiting the activities of communists, so the NP and SAP may have believed, provision would ipso facto be made for the curbing of communist philosophies. If this hypothesis is accepted, it needs to be stressed once again that the curbing of communism was to result from the steps taken against proponents of this ideology. The emphasis on the CPSA's affiliation to the Third International, apart from casting suspicion on the objectives of communists in involving themselves with racial issues, also may have served to create the impression that the Union's internal autonomy and territorial integrity was being subverted by an outside

organisation/power.

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Relative to the continued evolvement of Afrikaner nationalism during the 1930s and 1940, this overt anti-communism of the 1920s is important and even significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, within the context of developing Afrikaner nationalism, Hertzog and more specifically Pirow, in connecting African discontent to perceived communist machinations, laid the ideological basis for the primary tradition of anti-communism, viz. the belief that non-whites were 'corrupted' by foreign ideologies primarily aimed against whites. This belief could easily be harnessed by the successors of Afrikaner-nationalism, the **Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party**.

Secondly, overt anti-communism, as 'strategy for political mobilisation, also dates back to the 1920s. Both Smuts and Hertzog, for very different reasons, made use of this strategy.

Finally, the identification of specifically communism as phenomenon threatening the continued survival of South Africa as a white man's country, also dates back to the 1920s.

In closing, it needs to be noted that under Smuts' and Hertzog's administrations, communism was portrayed as potentially hazardous for the fortunes of specifically the state. Both Smuts and Hertzog portrayed communism as potentially menacing for the interests of the state. The **Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party** and other Afrikaner nationalist oppositional groupings, as will be argued in succeeding chapters, while still stressing the perceived dangers inherent to this ideology for the state, proceeded to lay greater emphasis on the menace of communism for the volk.<sup>149)</sup>

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149. See Chapter Two.

## CHAPTER TWO

## THE GESUIWERDE/HERENIGDE NASIONALE PARTY AND COMMUNISM

This chapter aims at analysing the content, place and role of anti-communism in the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party between 1937 and May 1945 with the formal surrendering of Nazi Germany at the end of World War II. Such an attempt, by nature, demands a chronological approach. The factors which influenced the stance adopted by the Party are identified and described but not discussed although some remarks relating to them will of necessity be made. The same must be said for an analysis of the three main component parts of the campaign against the perceived menace of communism, viz. Jewish Immigration, the Colour Question and (white) labour organisation. These aspects will be discussed more comprehensively in succeeding chapters.

## 2.1. INTRODUCTION

The Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party [Purified National Party] (GNP) was formally and officially established in the course of 1935 following a major realignment in South African politics. Under the leadership of D.F. Malan, the GNP represented the main opposition force to the ruling United South African National Party (UP).<sup>1)</sup>

Following the defeat of his neutrality motion in September 1939, J.B.M. Hertzog and his supporters disassociated themselves from the UP. The resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism, as one of a number of factors, brought Hertzog and Malan together in an attempt to forge Afrikaner political unity. An agreement, providing for parliamentary cooperation, was concluded between Malan's GNP and Hertzog's newly established Volksparty [literally People's Party] in January 1940.<sup>2)</sup> The contemplated aim of volkseenhed [literally volksunity] was seemingly realized with

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1. Hereafter referred to as the United Party.

2. J. Cope: South Africa, p.15.

the founding of the Herenigde Nasionale Party of Volksparty [Reunited National Party or People's Party] (HNP)<sup>3)</sup> later in the same year. However, as a result of personal animosities and irreconcilable differences in principle, this fragile unity was soon after shattered. Hertzog retired from active politics. Some of his former supporters reconstituted themselves in the Afrikaner Party (AP) under N.C. Havenga.<sup>4)</sup> A second group, under Oswald Pirow, broke away in September 1940 to form the New Order-movement. Malan retained the leadership of the HNP.

## 2.2. ANTI-COMMUNISM: DEFINEMENT, REDEFINEMENT AND CONSOLIDATION, 1937 - JUNE 1941

Prior to the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the GNP's conception of communism had developed through two distinct phases. Both in terms of content and applicability as well as in the mechanisms identified for opposing this ideology, significant adjustments had occurred.

### 2.2.1. Communism - The Intra-Racial Perspective

Initial GNP interest in communism was closely related to the continued proletarianisation of the traditionally agrarian Afrikaner society. The Afrikaner nationalist assault of the 1930s on the organised labour movement fomented Party interest in 'communism'. Specifically this development marked the first occasion where the GNP, as a political party, was to involve itself with the subject of communism.

It would however be wrong to assume that the term communism represented a new concept for the broad leadership element of the Party. D.F. Malan had been a member of Hertzog's cabinet with the enactment of the Riotous Assemblies (Amendment) Act in 1930. This

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3. The Herenigde Nasionale Party, in 1953, following an amalgamation with the Afrikaner Party, became known under its current name, the Nasionale Party. Throughout this analysis, the historically-correct name of the Party will be used.

4. J.H. le Roux (ed.): Generaal J.B.M. Hertzog, II, pp.736-737.



Act, as indicated in the previous chapter, was ostensibly directed against members of the Communist Party. With the exception of two names, all of the rebel MP's who broke with Hertzog's party in 1934 to form the GNP,<sup>5)</sup> supported the enactment of this Act. By 1937, more than 85% of these individuals were still active as GNP parliamentarians.

The Nasionale Raad van Trustees [National Board of Trustees] (NRT) was founded in October 1936 with the expressed aim of integrating Afrikaner workers into the volk on a Christian-national basis.<sup>6)</sup> The most viable method for the realization of this goal was considered to be the formation and organisation of 'right-minded' trade unions. The mining sector in general and specifically underground miners were identified as important points of departure. An Afrikanerbond van Mynwerkers [literally Afrikaner League of Mineworkers] (ABM) was established to oppose the then existing South African Mineworkers' Union (SAMWU).

The motivation underlying Afrikaner nationalist interest in (white) labour organisation will be discussed more comprehensively at a later stage. In this chapter attention will be focussed on comments from within the Party on this subject in as far as it related to the perceived menace of communism and, subsequently, the activities of the NRT.

De Kock indicates that the formation of the NRT was welcomed by the GNP in 1936.<sup>7)</sup> Following attempts to link the establishment and activities of the NRT to the GNP, the Party aligned itself openly with the NRT and ABM. While denying any knowledge of or involvement in the founding and/or functioning of the NRT, Party members stressed the necessity of supporting the principle of Afrikaner nationalist labour organisation. C.R. Swart (GNP MP for

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5. For the names of those individuals who left Hertzog's party to form the GNP see Parliamentary Register, 1910-1961, p.66.
  6. INCH [Institute for Contemporary History]. PV 632: J.D. Vorster. File 1/2/29/7/1: "Konstitusie van die NRT".
  7. L. de Kock: Die Stryd van die Afrikaner in die Suid-Afrikaanse Mynwerkersunie, 1936-1948, pp.55-56.

Winburg) described the NRT as "... an Afrikaner organisation which concerns itself exclusively in (sic!) the cultural and economic interests of the Afrikaner without identifying itself with any political party ..."8) Malan rationalised GNP support for the ABM by stressing that the Party's actions were not motivated by political considerations:

"We act in this matter not as a political party, but as Afrikaners, and as Afrikaners we have the fullest right to call on all Afrikaners to stand together for Afrikaner interests."9)

Members of the GNP, against this background, addressed themselves to the issue of communism.

Initially, GNP statements on communism were more the exception than the rule. In welcoming Afrikaner trade unionism, Die Burger commented on the leadership of the existing labour movement in stating that, from the outside, these elements seemed to be propounding communism within their respective organisations.<sup>10)</sup> Important to note is that this editorial acknowledged that Die Burger was concerning itself with speculation and, as such, was hesitant to convey a definite impression on both issues. Swart also referred to communism in defending the ABM in Parliament. The SAMWU, according to Swart, was controlled by a strong 'communistic' element, while the ABM represented an attempt to "... save the workers from that communistic flood ..."11) With the exception of Swart and J.H.H. de Waal, none of the other prominent leaders of the GNP addressed themselves to this subject. Such was the case both in Parliament and on public platforms.

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8. Hansard, 8.4.1937, col.4483-4484.

9. See Malan's speech before an audience in Stellenbosch as reported in Die Burger of 12.4.1937.

10. Die Burger, 8.1.1937: "Afrikaanse Vakverenigings" [editorial].

11. Hansard, 8.4.1937, col.4474.

GNP sympathy for the ABM turned into open support following a decision by the Chamber of Mines (CM) to introduce the "closed shop"-principle in the mining industry.<sup>12)</sup> This development also gave rise to an increase in remarks on communism. A significant percentage of the subsequent propaganda correspondingly related to the alleged presence and influence of respectively communists and communism in the SAMWU.

Apart from focussing on the SAMWU, the GNP also concerned itself with other 'communist' movements and individuals involved in white labour organisation. This ranged from a general remark by the Orange Free State leader of the Party,<sup>13)</sup> to a specific identification of 'communistic' persons and organisations. Prominent amongst the latter were E.S. (Solly) Sachs and his Garment Workers' Union (GWU) and A.A. Moore and the South African Trades and Labour Council (SATLC). C.R. Swart described Moore and Sachs as "... the leading spirits of the communistic movement, and their objective is to make declared communists of the Afrikaans population."<sup>14)</sup>

Sachs and the GWU were isolated for preferential treatment. In describing Sachs as a communist, excessive use were made of

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12. In terms of the "closed shop"-agreement between the Chamber of Mines and SAMWU, the SAMWU was to become the sole recognised labour movement for underground mineworkers. The SAMWU thus achieved a monopoly in organising and representing this category of miner. Even more important was the authority granted to the SAMWU in co-determining, through the granting of union-membership, which individuals could be employed by mine management. The ABM, under this agreement, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. The provisional agreement, announced on 8.4.1937, was to come into operation on 1.6.1937. See Die Burger, 9.4.1937.

13. N.J. van der Merwe stated in Parliament on 23.4.1937: "The trade unions in South Africa have of late adopted a course and a direction which undoubtedly has a communist tendency." (Hansard, 23.4.1937, col.5350) Van der Merwe did not qualify this statement by identifying those organisations he was referring to. His statement may thus be interpreted as applicable to all trade unions in (white) South Africa. Even the all-Afrikaans Spoorbond, impossible as it may seem, qualified in terms of Van der Merwe's definition.

14. Hansard, 23.4.1937, col.5350.

Pirow's action against Sachs in 1932-33 under the **Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) Act.**<sup>15)</sup> The majority of GNP members were seemingly either unaware of or consciously ignored the fact that Sachs had been expelled from the CPSA in September 1931 following its own series of purges.<sup>16)</sup> Where indeed this was acknowledged, individual Party members attempted to underplay any significance it may have had. N.J. van der Merwe, in this regard, alleged that "... a pretence ... [was] apparently made of kicking [Communist Party members] out in some way or other. I have already heard some years ago that this is one of the methods of the communist party in South Africa which works in the dark to suddenly kick people out ..."<sup>17)</sup>

For the GNP the person of Solly Sachs was also indicative of Jewish involvement with communism. The expression "Communistic/Bolshevistic Jew" appeared with an almost monotonous regularity in this regard. Referring to the SAMWU, Swart agreed that the majority of the executive consisted of Afrikaners, but added that, despite this, "... the fact remains that they are all

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15. Pirow, as Minister of Justice, issued orders in November 1933 declaring members and former-members of the CPSA persona non grata on the Witwatersrand for a period of twelve months. Sachs was one of those individuals affected. Following a contravention of his banning order, Pirow instituted legal proceedings against Sachs to have him deported. After Fusion, Smuts, as Pirow's successor, overturned these orders. (See H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, pp.460-461)
  16. Ibid., p.447 and B. Bunting: Moses Kotane - South African Revolutionary, p.55. Important is to note that the suspension of Sachs from the CPSA did not, ipso facto, imply the termination of his support for philosophies and dogmas considered to be atypical of Marxism. What can well be stated is that as a result of him falling out of favour with the Stalinist leadership of the CPSA, Sachs was expelled from the Communist Party.
  17. Hansard, 23.4.1937, col.5367. As indicated, the withdrawal of Sachs from the CPSA did not imply an immediate and irrevocable termination of support for Marxist philosophies. Van der Merwe, however, interpreted the termination of Sachs' membership of the CPSA as being of little material significance.

dupes of a small number of Bolshevistic Jews ..."<sup>18)</sup> Malan connected the presence of 'communistic Jews' in the labour movement to the larger question of Jewish immigration.<sup>19)</sup>

Unanimity was reached on the ultimate goal communists in the labour movement were striving to attain. Karl Bremer described this perceived aim as follows: "The leaders of most of the trade unions are striving after a communistic state which they want to establish here."<sup>20)</sup> Important is to note that under this description communism was perceived to be ultimately a threat to the South African state. Relative to labour organisation, this implied that communists, by virtue of their alleged authoritarian positions within the labour movement, would prove able to mobilise their respective labour unions in support of this goal. Afrikaner workers and ultimately all white workers affiliated to trade unions were thus to be actively involved in the process of 'bolshevisation'.

This exposition serve as background to the motivation presented by the GNP for opposing communism. While Bremer noted in a general remark that communism implied "... [the] destruction of most of the things which we in South Africa stand and are striving for"<sup>21)</sup>, C.W.M. du Toit explicitly referred to the negative implications of this ideology for the Christian dogma.<sup>22)</sup> According to Swart, once an Afrikaner had become involved with communism, he was "... lost to his nation, [becoming] an internationalist who repudiates his own people."<sup>23)</sup> Swart thus contended that communism endangered national-, i.e. volksidentity.

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18. Hansard, 8.4.1937, col.4485.

19. See Die Burger, 12.4.1937.

20. Hansard, 29.4.1937, col.5726.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., col.5725-5726.

23. Ibid., 8.4.1937, col.4048.

Conspicuous is the fact that occasions where concern was voiced over specifically communism (as an ideology) were largely isolated. Judging from Hansard and Die Burger, it seems as if the GNP was more concerned with exposing the presence and influence of 'communists' and 'communism' in the white labour movement than with combating this perceived menace. Furthermore, as illustrated in the previous paragraph, the concern voiced on these occasions were diverse in nature. Communitality was only provided by the joint opposition to the concept of communism. No attempt was made to present a coherent view of this ideology - even if predominantly negative. Karl Bremer was the only GNP member who indicated that the above possibility did indeed exist.<sup>24)</sup> According to Bremer, however, such an analysis, for the immediate, was uncalled for. Bremer's remark is indicative of the overall approach by the Party.

To the GNP's essentially haphazard approach towards the theoretical suppositions underlying Marxist dogma must immediately be added two further dimensions: Firstly, communism, from 1935 onwards and particularly after 1937, were, for a variety of reasons, summarily and forthwith rejected by many circles in Western countries.<sup>25)</sup> This rejection was never clearly substantiated. The relative absence of remarks on the principles underlying Marxist Socialism, within the framework of the GNP, was thus in accordance with accepted international practice.

Secondly, the GNP's references to communism have to be analysed in the context of its interest in Afrikaner nationalist labour organisation. Similar to Hertzog's campaign of 1929/30 against

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24. Bremer noted that there was "... a good deal in communism which may be good and may be Christian, possibly more than in the existing order ..." See Ibid., 29.4.1937, col. 5726-5727.

25. These reasons, inter alia, included the following: The decision by the Third International, at its 1935 Moscow Congress, to foment a world-revolution; the successive purges undertaken under the leadership of Joseph Stalin; and the initial rejection, by Western powers, of an alliance with the USSR against Germany. For a detailed examination of the Comintern decision of 1935 and the different purges undertaken by Stalin, see, for example, I. Deutscher (ed.): The Great Purges.

communism, which, in effect, largely served as a springboard for the promotion of the NP's native policies, the GNP, in commenting on the alleged communist menace, was primarily concerned with the promotion of Afrikaner trade unionism. The relative absence of a detailed and in-depth evaluation of the theoretical suppositions underlying communism is understandable and to be expected when viewed against this background. Bremer's remark on the inopportune occasion for an evaluation of communism must be interpreted in this context.

In analysing the role of anti-communism in the GNP's attempt to promote the cause of Afrikaner nationalist labour organisation, two explanations may well be applicable: Firstly, references to communism were without any ideological merit and primarily served to promote the cause of Afrikaner nationalist labour organisation. The second explanation, on the other hand, does attribute a normative value to remarks on the alleged menace of communism. The validity of these contentions will henceforth be evaluated.

The first explanation, in terms of which references to communism are adjudged to be part of a tactical initiative, does not offer a comprehensive interpretation. If all references to a perceived communist menace had to be analysed in terms of the immediate value it may have had as a propaganda tool, it would be expected for such remarks to disappear over time. This did not happen.

Although remarks on communism by GNP members served an obvious tactical goal, this, however, still does not imply that all such pronouncements were, by definition, propagandistic. Elements which are indicative of ideological value-judgment may well have been embedded in these remarks. In other words, the normative element in criticism of perceived communism cannot simply be discarded in favour of an exclusivist tactical explanation. Against the background of a comparison between the connotations attached to this ideology by respectively Pirow and the GNP (communism as an inter-racial phenomenon vs communism as an intra-racial phenomenon), the question may well be asked whether, if indeed this was merely a propaganda strategy, it would have achieved any success. Furthermore, such an explanation negate the influence of

a variety of cultural, economic and religious organisations who identified themselves, like the GNP, with Afrikaner nationalism.

In all probability the conception of a communist menace did figure in the GNP's support for Afrikaner trade unionism. Judging from the emphasis placed on the perceived goal that communists in the labour movement were allegedly striving to attain, it seems as if the GNP perceived the formation of 'right-minded' trade unions as a realistic and viable alternative for a potentially explosive situation. By supporting the NRT and its affiliates, the GNP - or so members of the Party may have believed - was indirectly involved in the curbing of communism.

What exactly was meant by communism, however, is not clear. Given the remark by Swart on possible volksalienation and the emphasis on labour organisation, it may have been that the predominant characteristic of communism was adjudged to be international intra-ethnic proletarian solidarity. References to atheism, within this context, seems to be of secondary importance.

A comparison between Pirow's remarks on communism in 1930 and those of the GNP during the early months of 1937, reveal that on these two occasions this ideology was perceived in fundamentally different terms. Whereas Pirow stressed the supposedly detrimental effect of this ideology on race relations, the GNP, by 1937, accentuated the presence and influence of alleged communists and communism in the white labour movement. GNP propaganda initially made little mention of 'communist involvement' in either non-white trade unions or with the African community.<sup>26</sup>) This indicate that whereas the NP in 1930 perceived communism to be a menace limited

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26. In a speech at Stellenbosch, Malan stated that " [d]aarby stel die Joodse Kommunis hom teen rassediskriminasie van enige aard, wat in Suid-Afrika beteken dat die kleurlyn uitgewis en alle rasse een moet wees." (Die Burger, 12.4.1937) Malan, however, made this remark in passing and mainly linked it to the perceived influence of this ideology on the Afrikaner worker. No indication was provided whether he thought it to have had an effect on the African or whether this principle was or had been propagated amongst the non-white population.



to inter-racial affairs, by 1937 the GNP stressed the essentially intra-racial nature of this phenomenon.

### 2.2.2. Anti-Communism - The Inter- and Intra-Racial Perspective

Following unsuccessful attempts to move the Hertzog-administration into opposing the proposed agreement between the CM and SAMWU, GNP statements on communism became more widespread. Even though there may exist a causal link between the "closed shop"-agreement and the increase in pronouncements on communism, care must be taken not to overemphasize the importance of this development. Such an attempt ignore the implications of other developments in the wider socio-political arena.

In terms of continuity, renewed emphasis were placed on the alleged involvement of Jews with communism and the role of perceived communists in the white labour movement. Allegations of Jewish support for communism gained fresh momentum following E.H. (Eric) Louw's return to South Africa<sup>27)</sup> and his decision to join the GNP. It needs to be noted, however, that the campaign against communism and its linking with Jewish immigration was closely related to the upsurge of anti-Semitic feeling in South Africa.

In dealing with communism in the white labour movement, the GNP, as before, remained supportive of the NRT. Apart from regularly publishing reports on its public meetings, Die Burger also called upon the volk to support the NRT in its endeavour to promote Afrikaner nationalist trade unionism.<sup>28)</sup> The resumption of the NRT's campaign against the SAMWU, marked by the founding of the Hervormingsorganisasie binne die Mynwerkersunie [literally Reformist Organisation inside the Mine Workers' Union] in February

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27. Eric Louw was South African diplomatic representative in Washington, Rome and Paris consecutively from 1925 onwards. See biographical sketch of Louw in M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African Opposition 1939-1945, p. 212.

28. Die Burger, 21.6.1937: "Die Kommunistiese Veldtog" [editorial].

1938, was well documented in Die Burger and Die Transvaler.<sup>29)</sup> The same goes for the campaign against Sachs and the GWU.

The emphasis on communism in the white labour movement was another element already present in the GNP's conception of communism. Relative to the white population, this implied that the influence of communism was perceived to be limited to a particular social class. The revitalised interest of the GNP, however, allowed for an extension of this conception to include those sections of the 'white' community hitherto excluded.<sup>30)</sup> Die Transvaler proceeded to 'expose' the strategy allegedly employed by the Communist Party in gaining disciples from social classes other than the white proletariat.<sup>31)</sup>

An interesting element in this regard is the fact that the emphasis on the perceived menace of communism outside of the labour movement was initiated by Party newspapers. In other words, campaigns by Die Burger and Die Transvaler initiated the broadening of the Party's conception of communism - or at least in as far as it related to the white population. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, references to this aspect were generally limited to the columns of Party newspapers.

The single most important element in the GNP's redefined conception of communism related to the position of non-whites. The origin of Party statements in this regard, as before, could also be traced back to developments associated with the labour movement. Reacting to a racially-mixed social function organised

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29. An excellent example of this is provided by De Kock's analysis of the struggle for supremacy in the SAMWU. A significant percentage of her research is based on reportage emanating from Die Burger and Die Transvaler. See L.de Kock: Die Stryd van die Afrikaner in die Suid-Afrikaanse Mynwerkersunie, 1936-1948.

30. See for example editorials in both Die Burger and Die Transvaler: Die Burger, 29.9.1938, : "Propaganda teen Neutraliteit"; Die Transvaler, 28.4.1939: "Uitgebreide Veldtog om Kommuniste te Propageer" and Die Transvaler, 15.8.1939: "Die Kommunistiese Gevaar".

31. Die Transvaler, 28.4.1939 and 2.5.1939.

by the Cape Federation of Trades, D.F. Malan stated that this could partially be ascribed to 'communist' influence.<sup>32)</sup> Addressing the 1937 Cape Provincial Congress of the GNP at Uitenhage, Malan stated that the Third International had declared that the South African worker would only be able to attain his fullest rights via the black man.<sup>33)</sup> Taking its cue from Malan, Die Burger declared that it was an important objective of the Communist Party to organise black workers.<sup>34)</sup>

Judging from statements by GNP members, it seems as if initially there existed some uncertainty in applying the term communism to people of colour. This applied equally to both groups, i.e. Coloureds and blacks, as well as social classes within a given group. Malan, in his speeches, had indicated that he perceived communism to be particularly prevalent amongst the African working class. Malan's description was not limited by ethnic definition, i.e. between blacks and Coloureds, nor did it encompass all social classes of the non-white population.

Louw, on his return to South Africa, stated that "... die Unie se naturellebevolking verskaf vrugbare grond vir ... [kommunistiese] propaganda ..." <sup>35)</sup> Louw's description does not allow for the inclusion of the Coloured population. In so far as it provided for the black population, Louw may have perceived workers to represent merely a sub-section of a larger entity without any apparent or particular significance.

The Uitenhage conference marked the first occasion where a provincial congress of the GNP adopted a resolution on communism. In as far as this resolution referred to communism and the non-white population, it provided, albeit in vague terms, for both

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32. See Malan's statement to the press as reported in Die Burger, 7.5.1937.

33. Die Burger, 19.8.1937.

34. Die Burger, 23.9.1937: "Kommunistiese Bedrywigheid" [editorial].

35. Die Burger, 2.8.1937.

what may conveniently be referred to as the Malan- and Louw-perspectives.<sup>36)</sup> Following the Uitenhage Congress, however, Louw's approach on intra-racial group applicability progressively came to be adopted by the Party. Disturbances in the townships of Vereeniging towards the end of September 1937, which resulted in the death of two white policemen, solidified this approach. At a protest meeting organised by the GNP, N.J. van der Merwe alleged that the disturbances in Vereeniging were born out of "... agitatie en kwaadstigting deur sekere kommuniste ..."<sup>37)</sup> Malan, in this regard, stated that the black man, because of his traditionalist life-style, proved to be highly susceptible to communist propaganda.<sup>38)</sup>

Conversely, but less conspicuous, Malan's emphasis on inter-ethnic group applicability also came to be adopted by the GNP. Discussing a predominantly Coloured protest march on the Houses of Parliament in May 1939, GNP parliamentarians were adamant that this march had taken place under the leadership of 'communists'.<sup>39)</sup> By partaking, Coloureds - according to the GNP - had proven their susceptibility to communism. Later in the same year Louw stated that blacks and Coloureds were prime objectives in the Communist Party's overall strategy.

A speech by D.F. Malan in August 1937 represented the only occasion throughout the course of the period under discussion where a GNP speaker was ostensibly concerned with providing an analysis of the theoretical suppositions underlying communism. Malan, in a speech before an audience in Stellenbosch, acknowledged that communism was an improvement on the then existing status quo in South Africa.<sup>40)</sup> Malan, however, failed to expand on this observation or identify those positive elements of

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36. See Die Burger's (19.8.1937) report on the Congress.

37. Die Burger, 28.9.1937.

38. Ibid., 11.10.1937 and 12.10.1937.

39. See Die Transvaler's (27.3.1939) report on the debate in Parliament.

40. Die Burger, 28.8.1937.

communism he was referring to. He was primarily concerned with highlighting the perceived shortcomings and negative attributes of this ideology. In this regard emphasis was placed on four aspects:

- i) **Anti-Nationalism:** Malan contended that communism did not recognise any national boundaries.<sup>41)</sup> Malan, once again, did not expand on this observation. Furthermore, he failed to provide an indication of what exactly he was referring to. Against the backdrop of his earlier statements on the continuing Spanish Civil War, it may well have been possible that Malan was addressing himself to alleged communist involvement and/or propaganda which transgressed national boundaries. Conversely, he may have been voicing an opinion on the concept of proletarian internationalism. This last remark must be seen in the context of Malan's statement of possible inter-racial labour solidarity at the Uitenhage conference less than a week before. A third possibility allows for a synthesis of both sets of arguments.
- ii) **Materialism:** Malan stated that the materialistic character of this ideology had to be explained in terms of the abnormal emphasis placed on economic forces.
- iii) **Atheism:** The rejection of religion, according to Malan, was the natural result of communism's materialism.
- iv) **Equality:** Malan noted that communism accepted the principle of political, social and economic equality. The striving towards equality, according to Malan, had to result in "... strakke uniformiteit ..."42) Although Malan did not explicitly mention racial equality, there can be little doubt that this was indeed what he had in mind.

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41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

In motivating their opposition to communism, GNP members and Party newspapers referred to a number of aspects which it perceived as characteristic of this ideology and, as such, reprehensible.

Most prominent amongst the GNP's criticism of communism was the refusal of this ideology to heed the colour bar. Malan formulated his concern in explicit racial terms by stating that if communism found applicability in South Africa, this had to result in the obliteration of all differences between "... blanke, 'kaffer' en kleurling ..."<sup>43)</sup> Die Burger commented that communism's refusal to take cognisance of the colour bar had rendered it impossible to provide a positive appraisal of any other aspect of this ideology - even if such an aspect was indeed meritorious.<sup>44)</sup> The "... onbeperkte verbroedering ..." between different races figured prominently in Die Burger's reportage of the May Day meeting on the Cape Parade in 1938.<sup>45)</sup>

The interconnectedness of atheism and communism provided another major concern for the GNP. P.W. Botha, then organiser of the Cape GNP, stated that this ideology was intent on undermining the very foundations of Afrikanerdom.<sup>46)</sup> The GNP's opposition to communism, according to C.W.M. du Toit, was self-evident from the Party's "... Christelike fondament[e] ..." <sup>47)</sup> Die Transvaler, in referring to the interest shown by Afrikaans Protestant Churches in the alleged communist menace, stated that this ideology's atheism necessitated intervention by the Church.<sup>48)</sup>

A third major element in GNP protestations over communism related to this ideology's perceived internationalist character. What

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43. Die Burger, 30.10.1937.

44. Die Burger, 20.8.1938: "Drie Stelsels" [editorial].

45. Ibid., 2.5.1938.

46. Ibid., 20.8.1938.

47. Die Transvaler, 19.1.1939.

48. Die Transvaler, 15.8.1939: "Die Kommunistiese Gevaar" [editorial].

exactly was meant by internationalism, however, is not clear. Furthermore, the interpretation attached to the concept of internationalism was severely qualified. With the exception of a single editorial in Die Burger,<sup>49)</sup> the Party failed to address itself to the ultimate question of the relationship between nationalism and internationalism. In spite of a comment by Die Transvaler that "[e]en van die fundamentele karaktertrekke van kommunisme ... [is] die onvoorwaardelike verwerping van die kleurslagboom in 'n poging om alle bevolkingsgroepe te verenig in die internasionale strewe na materiële gewin",<sup>50)</sup> the GNP, in dealing with internationalism, was primarily concerned with the possible implications of this construct for the working class. Even then, this was limited by racial definition to the white working class and ultimately the Afrikaner proletariat.

Die Burger declared that the aim of communism was class struggle instead of national unity. Class consciousness, it was stated, would result in the alienation of workers from the volk.<sup>51)</sup> This particular statement can be traced back to the belief that the volk was an organic entity where all members - irrespective of economic status or social standing - were bound by ties of tradition, blood and culture. Working class solidarity, in terms of this perspective, was sectional and, as such, a direct challenge to Afrikaner volksunity. A broadening of this description gradually evolved so as to accommodate all white

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49. Die Burger, 14.5.1938: "Nasionalisme en Internasionale" [editorial]. While this editorial emphasized the irreconcilability of nationalism and internationalism, this was presented in such a manner so as if to say that the construct of internationalism was a theoretical possibility which ultimately belonged to the past. According to Die Transvaler: "Eerbied vir eie nasionaliteit het die wêreldleuse van ons tyd geword." Interesting to note is that Die Transvaler did expect a new status quo to come into being which was also referred to as internationalism. This 'internationalism', however, was constructed in economic rather than political terms and resembled more a form of economic holism than internationalist socio-political integration and uniformity.

50. Die Transvaler, 13.5.1938.

51. Die Burger, 21.5.1937 and 21.6.1937.

workers irrespective of ethnic affiliation on a national level. In motivating its opposition to communism's 'denationalisation', Die Burger noted that by becoming a worker, "... hou 'n man nie op om burger te wees nie en word sy belange in die lewe en in die volkslewe nie tot sy diensvoorwaardes beperk nie."<sup>52)</sup>

The resolution adopted at the Cape Provincial Conference of the Party in 1937 provides an important point of departure in examining the place and role of anti-communism in the GNP. As the largest and most influential of the four provincial congresses, the resolution adopted at Uitenhage may be considered as representative of the general approach by the Party.

The importance of this resolution allows for a verbatim extraction:

"Die kongres vestig die aandag van die Regering op die steeds toenemende kommunistiese gevaar in Suid-Afrika en eis dat dit bestry moet word deur

- (1) Strenger immigrasiewette,
- (2) Strafbaarmaking van ongewenste propaganda deur deportasie en andersins,
- (3) Strenger toepassing van die Wet op Oproerige Byeenkomste, en
- (4) Gesonder nywerheidswetgewing."<sup>53)</sup>

The mechanisms identified for the curtailment of the alleged communist menace, as indicated, consisted of a series of administrative and legislative measures. Important to note is that the proposed measures allowed for far more than merely opposition to communism. Judging from these measures, it seems as if the GNP perceived the eradication of communism to be co-dependent on and ultimately interlinked with a remodelling of existing legislation. The propagation of its own principles, so the Party may have believed, allowed for the limitations of existing legislation to be redressed. This corresponded with an acknowledgement by D.F.

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52. Die Burger, 2.11.1937: "Vyande van die Vakbonde" [editorial].

53. Die Burger, 20.8.1937.



Malan during August 1937 that one ideology "... kan alleen ... geneutraliseer of teengegaan word deur 'n ander stroming."<sup>54)</sup>

Remarks on communism subsequently came to be intertwined with other elements of the Party Programme. In this regard generally three aspects were involved, viz. Immigration, Neutrality and the Colour Question. The linking of protestations over communism to one or more of these elements had important implications for the utilisation of anti-communism by the GNP. The Party may have believed that the propagation of the one was an important and fundamental prerequisite for the successful realization of the other. This, then, would be in accordance with the seemingly integrated approach decided on by the Uitenhage Congress. Conversely, however, the remarks on communism may have primarily served as an added emphasis for a campaign aimed at promoting the related principle(s) or some other objective. From the outset it must be noted that the distinction between anti-communism as respectively a principle and strategy, attempted here, represents an oversimplification of a much more complex issue.

The Uitenhage Congress, as indicated, identified the passing of stricter immigration laws as an important and necessary mechanism for the curtailment of communism. Eric Louw, on his return from Europe, declared that "[o]ngewenste vreemdelinge en hulle wat deelneem aan kommunistiese propaganda moet onmiddellik gedeporteer word ..."<sup>55)</sup> Louw's emphasis on 'undesirable aliens' corresponded with Article Eleven of the GNP's Programme of Principles as

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54. Ibid., 28.8.1937.

55. Ibid., 2.8.1937.

adopted in 1936.<sup>56)</sup> Die Burger supported Louw's contention that the enactment of stricter immigration laws was imperative to avoid a further increase in the number of 'communist agitators' already present and active in South Africa.<sup>57)</sup> At Uitenhage Louw repeated his warning in introducing discussions on the topic of communism.<sup>58)</sup>

Criticism of his remarks on communism by Morris Kentridge,<sup>59)</sup> and the dormant tide of anti-Semitism within South Africa provided Louw with the opportunity to link his warnings on communism and immigration to the Jewish Question. Louw contended that Kentridge, himself a Jew, was acting as spokesman of the Jewish community and, as such, his criticism was "... betekenisvol ..."<sup>60)</sup> By association, Kentridge - according to Louw - had thus illustrated Jewish support for communism. Although Louw's reaction coincided with the Uitenhage Congress and even though a resolution on the Jewish Question was adopted by the conference, this particular resolution did not make any mention of communism.

The GNP's election manifesto for the May 1938 election explicitly referred to immigration and the Jewish Question. Once again, as before, no mention was made of communism.<sup>61)</sup> Malan, however, in

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56. "11. Die Party verwelkom die versterking van die blanke bevolking deur die immigrasie van gewenste persone. Hy verklaar hom egter teen enige immigrasie op staatskoste. Verder dring hy daarop aan dat van staatsweë sodanige maatreëls geneem word dat geen onwenslike persone die land binnekom nie en dat immigrasie soveel moontlik beperk word tot elemente wat deur die Suid-Afrikaanse volk geassimileer kan word en wat nie deur hul aanwesigheid of die stoflike lewenstandaard of die sedelike peil van die blanke bevolking sal verlaag nie." Cited in J.H. le Roux and P.W. Coetzer: Die Nasionale Party, III, pp. 637-638.

57. Die Burger, 4.8.1937: "Kommunisme" [editorial].

58. Die Burger, 19.8.1937.

59. See Kentridge's criticism of Louw's statement as reported in Die Burger of 3.8.1937.

60. Die Burger, 19.8.1937.

61. See the GNP's election manifesto as published in Die Burger of 3.8.1937.

one of his first campaign speeches, connected the continued immigration of Jews to the Party's emphasis on the perceived menace of communism.<sup>62</sup>) Given the preponderance of remarks on the alleged involvement of Jewish communists in the labour movement and the actuality of the Jewish Question, this development was to be expected. The ensuing campaign reached a climax with the introduction into Parliament of a Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill under the name of Eric Louw in February 1939. Although introduced as a private member's motion, this Bill had the full support of the GNP.<sup>63</sup>)

In as far as Louw's proposed Act related to communism and the Jewish population, the following sections are relevant:

"4.(3) The ... [Immigrations Selection Board] may authorize the issue of a permit to enter the Union for the purpose of permanent residence therein, to an alien who has applied therefor ... and who is, in its opinion, a desirable immigrant. The granting or withdrawing of such authority shall be entirely at the discretion of the board: Provided that the board shall not authorize the issue of such a permit unless the applicant therefor - ...

(b) is likely to become readily assimilated within a reasonable period after his entry into the Union: Provided that no applicant who is of Jewish parentage shall be deemed to be readily assimilable; and

(c) is not likely to be harmful to the welfare of the Union and is not known to be or to have been a member or supporter of any communist organization, or to have espoused or professed the principles of communism ...

8.(4) If the holder of a permit issued in accordance with the provisions of section four ...

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62. Die Burger, 19.8.1937.

63. G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, p.126 and P.F. van der Schyff: Eric H. Louw in die Suid Afrikaanse Politiek tot 1948, p.450.

(b) has been proved to the satisfaction of the Minister to be or to have engaged in communistic activities, or in activities likely to disturb harmonious relations between the European and non-European sections of the population of the Union,

the Minister may at any time direct that a notice in writing be addressed to that holder, whereby that permit is cancelled and whereby he is ordered to leave the Union within a period stated in the notice, and upon the expiration of that period that permit shall become null and void."<sup>64)</sup>

Judging from the proposed legislation, it would seem fair to assume that Jews and communists were adjudged to be two separate categories of undesirable immigrants. Analogies, therefore, were to be more the exception than the rule. Louw, in the presentation of his Bill to Parliament, however, indicated in no uncertain terms that he was referring to a single, coherent grouping of prospective undesirable immigrants, viz. Jews. Louw described the acceptance of the unsuitability of the Jewish 'race' for immigration purposes as the outstanding feature and leading principle of the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill.<sup>65)</sup>

In dealing with communism, Louw argued that Jewish involvement with this ideology was a historical legacy. Although it was acknowledged that all Jews, by definition, were not communists, Louw stated that "... Jode die mense [was] wat die begrip van kommunisme bedink het en dit is deur Jode dat kommunisme beheer word en vandag nog bestuur word."<sup>66)</sup> According to Louw this was a natural phenomenon given communism's internationalism and the Jewish community's alleged international outlook.

In so far as the emphasis on communism related to the GNP's campaign against immigration, indications are that the alleged communist menace were utilised as both a principle and strategy.

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64. See Statutes of the Union of South Africa, 1937 and Union Gazette Extraordinary, no. 2596, 6.1.1939.

65. Hansard, 24.2.1939, col.838.

66. Ibid., col.843.

Malan's attempt in 1938 to link continued Jewish immigration to communism may be interpreted as referring to the then upcoming general election as well as the question of Jewish immigration. Seen in the context of the election, it may be argued that Malan's immediate objective was to maximise potential voter support for the Party. Both communism and Jewish immigration, given their actuality, were ideally suited for such a campaign. Anti-communism, in conjunction with the stressing of the perceived negative implications of Jewish immigration, thus served as a vehicle for the mobilisation of popular support.

In the presentation of his Bill to Parliament, Louw - as indicated - acknowledged that the words communist and Jew did not represent interchangeable terms.<sup>67)</sup> Louw was primarily concerned with ending the perceived influx of undesirable immigrants. The emphasis on communism and communists was an integral part of this campaign. Judging from his speech in Parliament, it seems as if Louw believed that by limiting Jewish immigration, provision would ipso facto be made for the barring of a significant percentage of communists from entering South Africa. In this manner the twofold aim of terminating Jewish immigration and eradicating communism could simultaneously be realised.

Conversely, however, the opportunity also existed for the utilisation of the alleged communist menace with the exclusive aim of promoting the GNP's campaign against Jewish immigration and ultimately the enactment of the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill. This must be seen against the backdrop of what Cuthbertson typifies as the "... growing Anti-Semitism which had found sanctuary within the Purified Nationalist Party of Dr. D.F. Malan ..."68)

The emphasis on communism, in dealing with Neutrality and the Colour Question, were utilised in much the same fashion as was the case with the GNP's campaign against Jewish immigration. Given the

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67. Ibid.

68. G.C. Cuthbertson: Jewish Immigration as an Issue in South African Politics, 1937-39 (Historia, vol.26(2), 1981).

stressing of the rejection of the colour bar as a distinguishing feature of communism, it was to be expected for elements considered to be atypical of this ideology to play a prominent role in the Party's dealings with the subject of race relations. Through the propagation of its policy of rigid racial separation which, from 1948 onwards, became known as apartheid, the GNP may have believed that it was providing a viable alternative to perceived communism. Conversely, the emphasis on the perceived menace of communism provided an added incentive for and a useful tool in promoting the GNP's insistence on racial segregation.

The GNP's emphasis on the need for neutrality increasingly became a topical issue in South African politics partly as a result of the rapidly deteriorating international situation. Although, prior to the outbreak of World War II, the issue of neutrality pertained more to the Union's constitutional position vis á vis Britain than actual participation in an international conflict, rumours of war and tension in world politics contributed to the actualisation of the neutrality-issue.<sup>69)</sup> Furthermore, given the absence of a definite and clearly-defined policy in this regard within the ruling United Party, the issue of neutrality also held short-term benefits for the GNP in the party political struggle for the allegiance of white voters.

Neutrality, in time, also came to be connected to the perceived menace of communism. The stressing of communism's alleged international connotations potentially allowed for the linking of the 'communist menace' and the issue of neutrality. Prior to the outbreak of World War II this conception was already present in certain quarters of the GNP. Die Transvaler epitomised the relationship between Joseph Stalin (and by implication the Soviet

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69. Important, however, is to note that while the question of neutrality did attain a new momentum in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of World War II and although the stressing of this issue held immediate and short term benefits for the G/HNP, this issue, in a manner of speaking, did not appear out of the proverbial blue on the Party programme. Neutrality, or rather the emphasis on national autonomy, had been an integrated element in Afrikaner nationalist ideology even before the outbreak of World War I. See Chapter One.

Union), the Third International and South African communists in the following terms: "Stalin het gesprek, die Komintern gaan handel en in Suid-Afrika sal sy (Stalin) se woorde ook weerklank hê."<sup>70</sup>)

At first glance, the GNP's initial conception of the relationship between communism in general and the Soviet Union was ill-defined. The expected forthcoming international conflict, according to Malan, was in all probability going to take place between "... kommunisme en ... fascism (sic!) - dit wil sê tussen Duitsland en Italië aan die een kant en Engeland, Frankryk en Rusland aan die ander kant."<sup>71</sup>)

In defence of Malan's comment must be added that between 1937 and 1939 a possible agreement, providing for cooperation between the Soviet Union, Britain and France, was high on the international agenda and no less than 30 schemes were proposed in this regard. Malan's intention, in referring to a possible international conflict between the USSR, Britain and France on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other, may well have been to gain political advantage on the UP by once again bringing into focus the question of neutrality and in particular whether South Africa was going to partake in a future conflict on the side of Britain.

Following negotiations between British and Soviet diplomats and rumours of an imminent pact between London and Moscow,<sup>72</sup>) the emphasis on alleged Soviet involvement with communism internationally and the subsequent necessity of not becoming involved in the conflicts of Europe came to be presented in a more coherent manner. Die Transvaler declared that it was generally accepted that with the advent of friendship between the Soviet Union and any other state, this was perceived by the USSR as an

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70. Die Transvaler, 17.2.1938: "Die Bedreiging van Kommunisme" [editorial].

71. Die Burger, 6.10.1937.

72. For an analysis of British diplomatic overtures aimed at the establishment of an Anglo-Soviet Pact, see A. Werth: Russia at War, 1941-1945, pp.27-39.

opportunity for the spreading of communistic doctrines within the host country.<sup>73)</sup> Louw contended that friendship between the USSR and another country was only the first step towards communism's ultimate goal of a world-revolution.<sup>74)</sup> Diplomatic contact between London and Moscow, by definition, thus represented the groundwork for the spreading of communist propaganda in Britain. South Africa, by reason of the imperial tie and the perceived lackey-status of Hertzog and Smuts, were ipso facto also to be affected.

The Union, according to the GNP, was particularly vulnerable given the alleged susceptibility of the African population to communism. Malan stressed that if "... die leer van Rusland eers 'n houvas op Suid-Afrika gekry het, sal Suid-Afrika ophou as om witmansland te bestaan."<sup>75)</sup> The Party thus contended, albeit in rather simplistic fashion, that by not becoming involved in the squabbles of Europe and more specifically in an alliance with the Soviet Union through Britain, provision would automatically be made for a restriction of opportunities for communism to gain a foothold in South Africa.

Simultaneously, however, the focus on the Soviet Union as allegedly collaborating with local communists in spreading this ideology, served to promote the GNP's insistence on neutrality. The absence of a clearly defined or definite attitude towards involvement in potential international conflicts as well as on the topic of national autonomy within the ruling UP<sup>76)</sup> accentuated the advantages to be reaped from propagating a policy of neutrality and non-participation.

Finally, it needs to be remembered that while the issue of neutrality did attain a new momentum in the period prior to the outbreak of World War II, Neutrality was first and foremost a

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73. Die Transvaler, 8.4.1939: "Kommunisme" [editorial].

74. Ibid., 8.7.1939.

75. Ibid., 27.6.1939.

76. Smuts and Hertzog differed fundamentally in their understanding of the meaning attached to national autonomy. See P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux (eds.): Die Nasionale Party, IV, pp.230-259.



constitutional issue relating to the relationship between South Africa and Britain.<sup>77)</sup> Neutrality, in so far as it served to reflect on the perceived disadvantages of some kind of entente with the USSR, was of secondary importance and indeed subordinated to the question relating to national autonomy. This distinction between the primary and secondary dimensions of neutrality must be seen in its proper perspective.

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Following the defeat of Hertzog's neutrality motion in September 1939, references to communism figured less prominently in G/HNP statements. This subdued emphasis remained in place for a significant portion of the early war years. The alleged menace of communism only regained its former prominence following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and the subsequent siding of Stalin with the Allied Forces.

In as far as the subject of communism did appear in Party statements during the above period, this generally related to South African involvement in World War II. The emphasis, as before, was on the Soviet Union and the suspected role of this country in fomenting the spreading of communistic doctrine. More striking than the content, however, was the infrequency of these remarks.

In spite of the lack of consistency, it does seem as if the Party's conception of the distinguishing features of communism essentially remained unchanged during this period. As before, the emphasis on class struggle, racial equality and atheism figured with varying degrees of intensity at different times in G/HNP statements.

Generally speaking, the early war years - in so far as it related to the subject of communism - can be described as a period of consolidation. Rather than explaining the unexpected German-Soviet

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77. See exposition in Chapter One.

non-aggression pact<sup>78)</sup> in the context of its treatise on communism, the Party preferred to focus on elements already referred to earlier. In this way preconceived ideas were consolidated and strengthened while simultaneously allowing for the inclusion of Nazi Germany as part of the campaign against communism.

### 2.3. ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE WAR YEARS: CONVERGENCY AND DIVERGENCY

Anglo-Soviet military cooperation, which had come about as a result of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, triggered a new wave of protestations over communism from the HNP. Malan stressed that specifically this development necessitated a hundredfold times over the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South Africa from the war.<sup>79)</sup> Die Burger stated that "[n]og nooit was die gevaar van die kommunisme so aktueel, so onmiddellik dreigend, vir die wêreld, en ook vir Suid-Afrika, as juis nou [nie] ..."80) In explaining its position, the Party focussed on the perceived long-term and short-term implications of the 'alliance' with the Soviet Union.

Relative to the first aspect, members of the HNP contended that if the joint forces of the Anglo-Soviet alliance did succeed in overrunning Germany, the victory would ultimately be that of the Soviet Union. An impoverished and exhausted Britain, according to the HNP, would prove unable to check "... die kommunistiese vloedgolf wat Europa sal oorstroom."<sup>81)</sup> That this was indeed what the Soviet Union had in mind, the Party deduced from the alleged declared aim of communism to stir up revolution internationally. Malan summarised the implications of continued South African involvement in the war in the following words: "... [B]olsjewisme

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78. The non-aggression treaty between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany was known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

79. Die Burger, 25.6.1941.

80. Die Transvaler, 7.7.1941: "Pro-Kommuniste" [editorial].

81. Die Burger, 25.6.1941: "Nou Eers Daaruit" [editorial].

sal nie net Duitsland oorstroom nie, maar ook Europa ... en Engeland ... en dan die Vloedgolf."<sup>82)</sup>

Interesting to note is that in time it came to be accepted that a transposition of this argument to include Germany and exclude the Soviet Union was indeed possible. Subsequently, on a number of occasions, it was acknowledged that a German victory would result in the 'nazification' of Europe.<sup>83)</sup> Continued German war successes on the battlefronts of Europe in the course of 1941 and 1942 made the possibility of a German war-victory even more relevant. Little evidence, however, was forthcoming on how the HNP expected such a state of affairs to affect South Africa. Specifically Malan, however, did call on Hitler to provide an indication of his objectives with South Africa.<sup>84)</sup>

Relative to the possible eventuality of a German victory and a British defeat, a high degree of opportunism was present in HNP commentary. Malan argued that in the event of a German victory, Hitler could well decide to support the republicanist striving of Afrikaner nationalists - as embodied by the HNP. German support for the HNP could thus ensure the establishment of a Christian-National Republic in South Africa.<sup>85)</sup> Of fundamental importance, however, is to note that the Party referred to this in the context of its campaign against the British imperial connection. Potential support from Germany did not point to ideological concurrence or support for the German war effort, but represented a form of idealistic opportunism in the striving towards republicanism.

The focus on the short-term implications of the Anglo-Soviet alliance primarily related to how this development was perceived to affect South Africa internally. Prior to the formal announcement of the British-Soviet agreement in mid-July 1941,

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82. Die Burger, 25.6.1941.

83. See Ibid., 11.2.1942: "Ondergang" [editorial].

84. See Malan's speech at a public meeting in Epping as reported by Die Burger, 27.2.1941.

85. See D.W. Krüger: The Making of a Nation, pp.211-212.

Party newspapers warned the Smuts-administration against underplaying or ignoring the already existing 'communist menace' in favour of the promotion of Anglo-Soviet military cooperation.<sup>86)</sup> Important to note is that the Party organs were speculating on a hypothetical possibility and not stating a conviction. On the same day as the agreement was announced in Die Burger,<sup>87)</sup> Malan, however, contended that "[h]y (Smuts) sal dit nie waag om aktief teen die kommunisme in die land op te tree nie, want Suid-Afrika kyk saam met Engeland na Rusland as 'n redder."<sup>88)</sup> Die Burger went as far as stating that Smuts' refusal to act against this ideology served as quid pro quo for Soviet aid to the British Empire.<sup>89)</sup> Although it was acknowledged that the UP, in principle, abhorred communism, the absence of preventative action against this ideology was perceived as further proof of its status as lackey of 'British-Jewish imperialism'.

Anglo-Soviet military cooperation, South African participation in World War II and Smuts' perceived willingness to negate local interests in favour of those of the Empire represented the basic framework for the HNP's continued campaign against communism. Relative to the remaining war years on the European continent, this campaign can roughly be divided into two phases, viz. the period prior to the general election of July 1943 and the period between this election and the final submission of Germany early in May 1945. Although not a watertight division, the campaign against communism during the aforementioned periods contain characteristics which allows for a distinction to be made. These two phases, which will respectively be referred to as the periods of convergency and divergency, are to be discussed separately.

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86. See Die Transvaler, 25.6.1941 and Die Burger, 27.6.1941.

87. Die Burger, 16.7.1941.

88. Die Transvaler, 16.7.1941.

89. Die Burger, 11.11.1941: "Die Teenstelling" [editorial].

### 2.3.1. Anti-Communism - The Period of Convergency

For the duration of the first period, the basic features of the background against which this campaign took place, remained essentially unaltered. As before, the uncalled for involvement of the Union in World War II remained the basic point of departure. In this sense the participation of the Soviet Union in the war on the Allied side did not mark the beginning of a new era, but merely further complicated an already unwanted situation. Although the HNP contended that the involvement of Soviet Russia created a new and serious situation for the spreading of communism, it should be noted that the withdrawal of South Africa from the continuing conflict remained the most obvious and requisite antidote against 'communism'.<sup>90)</sup>

Throughout the period of convergency, the HNP's campaign against communism was characterised by more of a reactive than active approach. If remarks on communism did not relate to some aspect connected to participation in the war, it was the result of developments within the South African socio-political arena. A decision by the Smuts administration in March 1942 to arm non-white members of the Union Defence Force under certain conditions was followed by a HNP campaign to illustrate alleged non-white susceptibility to communism and how the spreading of communism was going to be promoted by such a step.<sup>91)</sup> Although the HNP took the initiative in 1943 in introducing into Parliament a motion calling on the Government to act against communism,<sup>92)</sup> this motion can directly be traced back to the tactical defeat suffered at the hands of Oswald Pirow and his **New Order**-movement during the

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90. See Malan's statement to the press following speculation on Anglo-Soviet military cooperation (Die Burger, 25.6.1941) and editorials in Die Transvaler and Die Burger over the next two days.

91. See the statement issued by the provincial leaders of the HNP on 18.3.1942. Published in Die Burger and Die Transvaler on 19.3.1942.

92. Hansard, 26.1.1942, col.458.

previous parliamentary session.<sup>93)</sup> The motion introduced into Parliament by Louw during January 1943, apart from focussing attention on the perceived communist menace, may well be interpreted as a face-saving exercise and an attempt to regain the initiative for the HNP as the most viable organisation for opposing communism. In spite of the reactive approach, indications are that this campaign was developing a momentum of its own, progressively constituting broader entities than before.

Louw's motion of January 1943 and its predecessor, introduced into Parliament eleven months earlier as an amendment to Pirow's motion, are significant for a number of reasons. Ostensibly this represented the first occasion where a campaign against specifically communism was launched by the HNP. More important, however, was that in doing so, the perceived distinguishing features of the Marxist ideology came to be presented in a more detailed and structured manner than had previously been the case. A similar observation can be made with regard to the HNP's conception of the applicability of alleged communist propaganda to the South African racial and social mosaic. Finally, a more detailed presentation of the mechanisms/strategy favoured by the HNP to curb/combat perceived communism were provided. These issues, in reverse order, will henceforth be focussed upon.

Relative to the curtailment of communism, the most obvious step in combatting this ideology pertained to the Union's continued involvement in World War II. The HNP argued that the ultimate goal of communism, and by implication that of the Soviet Union, was the spreading of a world-revolution. By participating in the war, South Africa was indirectly promoting a process which could eventually lead to its own destruction. The Union's participation in the Anglo-Soviet alliance served to accentuate such a possibility. By withdrawing from the conflict, South Africa - according to the HNP's perspective - would not fall prey to communist imperialism. Relative to the presence of communists inside the Union, this implied that the alleged umbilical chord

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93. See Ibid., 12.2.1943, col.1766-1786.

between local communists and those of the Soviet Union was to be severed.<sup>94)</sup>

Concurrently, however, the emphasis on the alleged implications for South Africa of Anglo-Soviet cooperation and, after December 1941, also that of American-Soviet cooperation,<sup>95)</sup> served to promote the HNP's declared policy of neutrality and non-participation in World War II and the Union's right of secession from Britain. The stressing of withdrawal from the war as antidote against communism is reminiscent of the HNP's campaign against communism prior to the outbreak of World War II.

Apart from this all-embracing approach (withdrawal from World War II as a requisite antidote against communism), the HNP also propagated the adoption of specific measures which were perceived to provide for the eradication of communism. Whether these specific measures were intended as complimentary to the campaign on the macro-level, is debateable. Conspicuous, however, is that the propagation of these specific measures were largely limited to the parliamentary sessions of 1942 and 1943. Quantitatively, this would seem to indicate that the 'total strategy' was considered to be a more viable mechanism for opposing communism. Although there may be some element of truth in this statement, it needs to be noted that the total strategy allowed for the propagation of much more than merely anti-communism.

As indicated previously, two motions on the subject of communism were introduced into Parliament during the course of 1942 and 1943

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94. Allegations of an intimate relationship between South African communists and Moscow progressively came to the forefront following the announcement in January 1942 that permission had been granted to the Soviet Union to establish a legation in South Africa. Reacting to this announcement, Die Burger, for example, declared that a "... [t]akkantoor van die Moskouse organisasie ter bevordering van die Bolsjewistiese wêreld-revolusie sal tans in die Unie geopen word." See Die Burger, 26.1.1942.

95. The Japanese attack on the American naval station of Pearl Harbour on 7.12.1941 paved the way for American participation in World War II. See P. Johnson: A History of the Modern World, pp.388-391.

by the HNP. Although similarly constructed, these motions differed significantly in terms of composition, applicability and scope. The first motion, originally an amendment to Pirow's resolution of February 1942, reads as follows:

"Dat die Regering versoek word om dadelik die nodige stappe te doen -

(1) om alle kommunistiese organisasies onwettig te verklaar en kommunistiese propaganda te verbied;

(2) om geen immigrante, ditsy vir vaste of tydelike verblyf, die Unie binne te laat nie van wie dit bekend is dat hulle kommuniste is of die kommunistiese leer voorstaan;

(3) om alle vreemdelinge, wat bekend is as kommuniste of wat meedoen aan kommunistiese propaganda, te deporteer;

(4) om 'n verbod op die druk, publikasie of verspreiding te plaas van boeke, nuusblaaie, tydskrifte, pamflette of ander leesstof, asook op die vertoon van rolprente wat bedoel is of bereken is om die kommunistiese saak te bevorder of om kommunistiese propaganda aan te moedig en om die invoer van sodanige leesstof en rolprente te verbied;

(5) om paspoorte aan Unie-burgers te weier wat afgevaardig word na kommunistiese kongresse oor see of wat na Rusland gestuur word om kommunistiese propaganda te bestudeer; en

(5) om die pas aangeknoopte konsulêre betrekkinge met die Sowjet-regering af te breek."<sup>96)</sup>

The motion introduced into Parliament in January 1943 by Eric Louw proposed:

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96. Hansard, 13.2.1942, col.2047-2048.



"Dat die Raad sy ernstige verontrusting uitspreek oor die toenemende groei van kommunistiese propaganda en bedrywighede in die Unie, en oor die reeds sigbare uitwerking daarvan, soos getuig die onlangse onluste,<sup>97)</sup> asook die uittartende houding van nie-blankes teenoor blankes; dat die Raad daarom oortuig is dat die aanvaarding van kommunistiese leerstellings deur die nie-blanke bevolking 'n noodlottige uitwerking sal hê op die verhouding tussen die blanke en nie-blanke rasse, en eindelijk die voortbestaan van die blanke bevolking in Suid-Afrika sal bedreig; dat die Raad derhalwe die Regering versoek om die noodsaaklikheid te oorweeg om onmiddellike stappe te doen -

(a) om die Kommunistiese Party en alle organisasies wat kommunistiese leerstellings propageer of aanmoedig, as onwettig te verklaar;

(b) om die propagering of aanmoediging van kommunistiese leerstellings; ditsy deur toesprake, verspreiding van leesstof, vertoon van rolprente, of deur enige ander middel, te verbied; en

(c) om vreemdelinge wat die kommunistiese leer verkondig of propageer, te deporteer, en om geen immigrante in die Unie toe te laat van wie dit bekend is dat hulle kommunistiese leerstellings propageer of voorstaan nie;

dat die Raad verder die mening uitspreek dat die bewapening van nie-blanke soldate, en die teenwoordigheid van die U.S.S.R. se diplomatieke verteenwoordigers in die Unie, bydraende faktore tot die groei van kommunisme is, en derhalwe die Unie-regering versoek om die bewapening van nie-blanke soldate te staak, en om bestaande konsulêre verhoudings met die U.S.S.R. te verbreek."<sup>98)</sup>

In comparing the above resolutions, the far more detailed approach of the latter is conspicuous. This not only relate to the formulation of the actual motion, but also to its contextualisation and relevancy for South Africa. Whereas the first motion may have been applicable to any one of a number of

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97. A reference to the Pretoria riots of December 1942.

98. Hansard, 26.1.1943, col.458.

diverse countries, the second left no uncertainty about its origin or efficacy. An excellent example of this is provided by the absence of any reference to race in the first motion and the abundance of such references in the second. Subsequently, whereas the first motion was in a sense merely a collection of proposed measures against communism with near-universal applicability, the second motion intimately tied in with the existing state of affairs in South Africa.

Relative to the measures proposed to combat communism, elements of both continuity and change are perceptible between these different motions. Superficially, most conspicuous is the absence of any reference to the withholding of passports from persons "... wat afgevaardig word na kommunistiese kongresse oor see of wat na Rusland gestuur word om kommunistiese propaganda te bestudeer ..." in the second resolution. An explanation for the absence of this article in the second motion may well be found in the broader implications of placing restrictions on the individual's freedom of choice. At the same time, however, the changed formulation of sub-section (1) of the 1942-motion, which appeared as sub-section (a) in Louw's second motion, brought a potentially even more contentious issue to the forefront.

Whereas the 1942-resolution called for the banning of "... alle kommunistiese organisasies ...", the 1943-motion demanded that "... die Kommunistiese Party en alle organisasies wat kommunistiese leerstellings propageer of aanmoedig ..." (italics mine) be declared illegal. Although it may be reasoned that the HNP, under the first motion, had in mind more than one organisation,<sup>99)</sup> it must be noted that this resolution specifically referred to "... kommunistiese organisasies ...". The scope of the 1943-resolution, on the other hand, differed substantially from that of the earlier motion. No longer had an

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99. The reference to "kommunistiese organisasies" corresponded with remarks relating to organisations/movements other than the CPSA. Reacting to a fund-raising campaign organised by the Friends of the Soviet Union, Die Transvaler (7.11.1941) described the FSU as "... omtrent die bedrywigste liggaam vir die verspreiding van kommunistiese leerstellings in die Unie ..."

organisation to be declared "... kommunisties ..." to 'qualify' for banishment, but potentially all movements perceived to be cooperating directly or indirectly with the cause of communism were to be declared illegal.

The implications of applying this definition to South Africa were far reaching. Organisations, hitherto acknowledged not to be 'communistic' were potential victims of this clause. One possibility was the ruling United Party. As indicated previously, the HNP contended that the Smuts-administration did not dare to venture any preventative steps against communism. This unwillingness, according to the HNP, were borne out of fear for the possible negative impact such measures could have on Anglo-Soviet cooperation. Although not supportive of communism, the UP, in this way, allegedly aided the growth and spreading of the Marxist dogma. In terms of sub-section (a) of the 1943-motion, the UP, on this basis, may well have qualified for banishment.

By referring to the arming of non-white soldiers as a contributory factor in the spreading of communism, the HNP, consciously or unconsciously, linked these specific measures to the campaign on the macro-level against 'communistic doctrines'. Subsequently, in protesting against communism, this could either be done in focussing on the perceived implications of continued South African involvement in World War II or propagating those specific measures - or variations of it - contained in the 1942- and 1943-resolutions.

Following the introduction of the 1942-motion in Parliament, the first of these alternatives progressively came to be adopted by the HNP. In the run-up to the general election of July 1943, the topic of communism were regularly touched upon at Party gatherings. In dealing with the eradication of communism, HNP speakers repeatedly referred to the necessity of disengagement from the war. Malan, at a pre-election meeting in Vredendal, for example, stated that it was far more acceptable for Britain and the USA to be defeated in the war than to have the opposite, "... omdat Rusland die oorlog vir hulle sal wen en daarna die leer

van kommunisme op die wêreld gaan afdwing."<sup>100)</sup> J.G. Strijdom, Transvaal co-leader of the HNP, dealt more explicitly with the implications of an Allied victory for South Africa: "'n Russiese oorwinning sal beteken ... dat Suid-Afrika 'verkaffer' sal word."<sup>101)</sup>

Relative to the perceived susceptibility of certain races and ethnic groups to communism, HNP-speakers and Party newspapers, as before, stressed the susceptibility of blacks to this ideology. This belief gained fresh momentum following the announcement on the limited arming of non-white members of the Union Defence Force. This announcement resulted in a series of protest meetings.

At one such meeting Strijdom stated that by arming non-whites, Smuts was providing communism with "... 'n stoot soos nog nooit tevore ..."<sup>102)</sup> Die Burger speculated that Smuts' decision to arm non-European soldiers may well have been the result of pressure by communists.<sup>103)</sup>

Although more subdued, references to communism within the white community did not altogether disappear from HNP statements. As before, reference was made to the alleged presence of communists in the white labour movement.<sup>104)</sup> Louw also made mention of the perceived affinity of Jews for communism.<sup>105)</sup> Compared to the preponderance of remarks on the alleged susceptibility of non-whites to communism, however, these contentions were of secondary importance.

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100. Die Transvaler, 1.5.1943.

101. Ibid., 31.5.1943.

102. See Die Burger and Die Transvaler, 28.3.1943.

103. Die Burger, 23.3.1942.

104. See Strijdom's remarks on the GWU and SAMWU in Parliament (Hansard, 13.2.1943, col.2069) and B.J. Schoeman's exposition of the HNP's labour policy at a public meeting in Johannesburg (Die Transvaler, 19.10.1942).

105. Hansard, 12.2.1943, col.1478-1479.

In so far as protestations over communism did relate to the white community, two aspects are nevertheless of significance: Firstly, it came to be accepted that poor socio-economic circumstances and general discontent promoted the cause of communism. Possibly as a result of this acceptance, warnings were subsequently issued by the HNP on the implications of the alleged discontent in the South African armed forces, resulting from poor remuneration and the arming of non-white soldiers, for the spreading of communism.<sup>106)</sup> The Party also referred to the opportunities for communistic propaganda to succeed within the context of the rapidly expanding poor white community.<sup>107)</sup> These warnings contrasted sharply with a statement by Eric Louw in August 1937 that communism's growth had to be explained in terms of intensive propaganda rather than poor social circumstances.<sup>108)</sup>

The second significant development pertained to the HNP's contention that there was in existence a grouping, encompassing not only the HNP, who had a natural aversion towards communism. This grouping was described as "Afrikanerdom" which, according to Die Transvaler, proved to be "... eenvoudig onvatbaar vir die leer van die kommunisme."<sup>109)</sup> The Afrikaner's philosophy of life, according to this editorial, were irreconcilable with the principles of communism. Less than six weeks later the same newspaper stated that "... kommunisme sal nie 'n houvas kry op daardie Afrikaners wat Christelik-nasionale beginsels bely nie."<sup>110)</sup> On another place in this editorial, Die Transvaler

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106. In introducing his 1943 motion on communism into Parliament, Louw warned that communists were intent on exploiting the 'discontent' amongst soldiers returning from the North. See Hansard, 12.2.1943, col.1494.

107. Ibid., 12.3.1943, col.3333. See also Die Burger, 19.8.1942: "Selfbedrog" [editorial].

108. Die Burger, 2.8.1937.

109. Die Transvaler, 1.8.1941: "Pas die Wet Toe" [editorial].

110. Die Transvaler, 10.9.1941: "Imperialiste word ook Kommuniste" [editorial].

described this entity as the "Nasionaalvoelende Afrikanerdom" (nationally conscious Afrikanerdom).

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World War II, generally speaking, made a significant impression on the HNP's conception of the characteristic features of communism. Although the origin of many of those elements described as atypical of communism could chronologically be traced back to earlier periods, the continuing war situation perceptibly moulded these elements into a new, complex and integrated whole. Developments associated with South African participation in the war were subsequently utilised to not only illustrate other elements of HNP-policy, but also to emphasize the alleged communist menace.

The first perceived feature of communism to be stressed by the HNP can best be described by the term "internationalism". Although this primarily related to communism's alleged objective of promoting a world-revolution, it simultaneously encompassed references to the perceived unity in purpose between communists internationally and the alleged dictatorial role of Moscow in this regard.

In introducing his 1943-motion in Parliament, Louw quoted extensively from a diverse range of publications to illustrate communism's ultimate goal of "... 'n kommunistiese wêreld-revolusie, wêreld-kommunisme en wêreld-diktatorskap."<sup>111</sup>) In the international arena, according to the HNP, the organisation primarily responsible for the promotion of the concept of a world-revolution was the Third International. Die Transvaler alleged that the promotion of the world-revolution was the central task of the Comintern.<sup>112</sup>) Furthermore, the CI was perceived as having no identity separate and independent from that of the Soviet Union. Louw, in addressing himself to this matter, declared that the

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111. Hansard, 12.2.1943, col.1473.

112. Die Transvaler, 4.6.1942: "Die Russiese Konsulaat" [editorial].

Comintern was under the authority of the Soviet regime of which the master was "... Josef Stalin, die diktator van Rusland."<sup>113)</sup> This, according to Louw, indicated that all communist propaganda outside of the Soviet Union was directed and controlled by the ECCI, the Kremlin and, ultimately, Stalin.<sup>114)</sup> In propagating communism, 'communistic' organisations were thus ultimately promoting the interests of the Soviet Union as defined by Stalin.

World War II and the resultant abnormalities in international relations, according to the HNP, did not alter the existing state of affairs. Louw contended that the communists perceived the continuing war as a conflict waged in favour of capitalistic objectives and that World War II ultimately facilitated the communistic world-dictatorship.<sup>115)</sup> Allegations that the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1941 had effectively and officially terminated the imperialistic objectives of the Soviet Union and communism in general were refuted by Louw. Louw stressed that allegations of this sort were based on "... onwetendheid ... òf [was] die gevolg van politieke oneerlikheid en politieke skynheiligheid."<sup>116)</sup> Relative to South Africa, this implied that by participating in the war, the Union had become the ally of both Soviet Russia and communism.<sup>117)</sup> By involving South Africa in the World War II Smuts was thus promoting the cause of the international communist revolution.

Following the announcement in January 1941 that a Soviet diplomatic mission was to be established in South Africa, the HNP progressively came to emphasize the alleged involvement of local communists and Soviet diplomats in the spreading of the dogma of a world-revolution. The Soviet mission was subsequently described as

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113. Hansard, 12.2.1943, col.1471.

114. Ibid., col.1468.

115. Ibid., col.1475.

116. Ibid., 5.3.1943, col.2946.

117. See Strijdom's speech at a public meeting in Brits as reported in Die Transvaler of 5.1.1942 and Die Burger of 6.1.1942.

both a source and incubator of communism.<sup>118)</sup> In illustrating this contention, the HNP employed two integrated yet separable strategies. Both strategies stressed the predominant role of Moscow, the Kremlin and ultimately Stalin in fomenting the spreading of communism. However, whereas the first strategy primarily focussed on the institutional framework and authoritarian hierarchy which allegedly ensured and enforced the propagation of a world-revolution, the second strategy accentuated the perceived unity in purpose between communists internationally. The CPSA's affiliation to the **Third International** and the perceived nature of the relationship between the Communist Party and CI initially provided for the utilisation of both strategies.<sup>119)</sup>

Following the disbandment of the Comintern in May 1943, however, greater emphasis came to be placed on the second strategy. Attempts were nevertheless made to underplay the significance of the disbandment of the CI. Louw, in a letter to Die Transvaler, stated that the decision to disband the Comintern was "... niks meer as 'n taktiese set nie ...", aimed at the appeasement of Britain and the United States.<sup>120)</sup> For the sake of perspective it should be noted that this was indeed the case.

Closely connected to this first aspect was the contention that the planned for revolution implied, by definition, a violent overthrow of the existing status quo. Malan summarised this belief in the following words: " Kommunisme is agressief in sy hele wese en optrede; die metode wat hy volg is die metode van revolusie."<sup>121)</sup> The element of violence in this ideology, judging from Louw's exposition in Parliament during 1943, was an integral part of a well-rehearsed campaign. With the exception of a few isolated remarks by Malan, however, not much attention was paid to the

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118. Hansard, 11.3.1942, col.3546 and 12.2.1943, col.1490.

119. An excellent example of this dual utilisation is provided by an editorial in Die Burger, 3.6.1942: "Die Russiese Inval".

120. Die Transvaler, 4.6.1945.

121. Hansard, 5.3.1943, col.2910.



implications of the perceived violent nature of communism for specifically South Africa. Malan largely connected this aspect to the CPSA's campaign for the arming of non-white soldiers. The aim underlying this campaign, according to Malan, was to prepare the non-white soldiers of the revolution "... om witmense ... te skiet."<sup>122</sup>)

The ultimate goal of the communist world-revolution, according to the HNP, was the establishment of a 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Communism's refusal to heed the colour-bar served as a basic point of departure in the application of this construct to South Africa. It is important to note that the concept of proletariat was not limited by racial definition. P.J. Hugo, MP for Paarl, referred to the non-racial proletariat in the following terms: "Daarom doen die Kommuniste alles in hul vermoë om ons [blankes] te verneder tot 'n klas waaraan ook kaffers en kleurlinge kan behoort ..."<sup>123</sup>) In spite of the theoretical equality between the white and non-white working classes under the communist system, the HNP stressed that the African proletariat would eventually dominate under a communist system in South Africa.<sup>124</sup>) This deduction, as a matter of course, allowed for the propagation of the belief that communist propaganda, by definition, endangered the continued existence of the European civilization in South Africa. Malan accordingly stated that internally communists "... voorsien ... 'n swart proletariaat - dit beteken die einde van Blanke Suid-Afrika."<sup>125</sup>)

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122. See Malan's speech at Springbok (Die Burger, 3.5.1943 and Die Transvaler, 4.5.1943).

123. Hansard, 13.2.1942, col.2053-2054.

124. No set indication was provided of whether the possibility of a 'Black Republic' in South Africa under a communistic system was going to be the result of the numerical preponderancy of Africans or ideological considerations. Both possibilities were included in HNP-argumentations. See Malan's speech to an audience in Zeerust (Die Burger, 28.5.1943) and Louw's parliamentary treatise of 1942 (Hansard, 13.2.1943, col.2040-2042).

125. Die Transvaler, 21.6.1943.

The striving towards racial equality was adjudged the most disturbing feature of communism. Even more directly than the emphasis on the perceived implications of a proletarian dictatorship for South Africa, this aspect allowed for the continuous propagation of the belief that communism would result in the destruction of white South Africa. With this in mind Malan may have stated in rather dramatical fashion that the HNP would struggle to the proverbial end to preserve the white race in South Africa.<sup>126)</sup> The contentious nature of this assertion was well utilised within certain quarters of the Party. In a detailed exposition, R.A.T. van der Merwe, attempted to illustrate how communism, with its policy of racial equality, had originated from British Imperialism.<sup>127)</sup> Strijdom went even further in stating that both communism and British imperialism propagated equality between all peoples.<sup>128)</sup> Smuts and his administration, allegedly proponents of British imperialism, were ipso facto included under this description.

In terms of frequency referred to, protestations over the atheistic nature of communism ran a close second to remarks on this ideology's policy of racial equality. Developments associated with South African participation in World War II were once again utilised to illustrate and accentuate communism's aversion towards religion. Malan greeted the announcement on Anglo-Soviet military cooperation with a reference to communism's atheism.<sup>129)</sup> A statement by Jan Smuts in 1939 that World War II was a Holy Crusade for the freedom of small nations was interpreted as contradictory to his then present behaviour of "... omhelsing ... van die godlose Sowjet ..."<sup>130)</sup>

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126. Hansard, 5.3.1943, col.2879.

127. Ibid., 12.3.1943, col.3337-3338.

128. See Strijdom's speeches in Cape Town and Nylstroom as reported in Die Transvaler of 27.2.1943 and 3.5.1943.

129. Die Burger, 25.6.1941.

130. Die Burger, 14.7.1941: "n Verwyte Ontleed" [editorial].

Although less prominent than other aspects, individual HNP members also referred to communism's perceived objective of eradicating private ownership from society. Louw described this striving as one of the fundamental tenets underlying Marxist dogma.<sup>131)</sup> Malan stated that the abolishment of private ownership implied that all people were to be degraded to labourers and squatters of the State.<sup>132)</sup>

### 2.3.2. Anti-Communism - The Period of Divergency

The UP's landslide victory in the general election of July 1943 initiated the beginning of a new phase in the HNP's campaign against communism.

Heard has indicated that the central issue in the election of July 1943 was the question of continued South African participation in World War II.<sup>133)</sup> Whereas the UP propagated a pro-involvement slogan, the HNP, as before, adjudged participation to be contrary to South Africa's best interests. The immediate and unconditional withdrawal from the war remained the most immediate objective of the Party. This was to be followed by secession from the British Empire which would serve to guarantee full South African autonomy under any given situation. Although the outcome of the election

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131. Eric Louw identified three cardinal principles underlying the socio-economic suppositions of communism:

1. Communal possession of land;
2. Communal possession of the means of production and distribution; and
3. Abolishment of private ownership. See Hansard, 12.2.1943, col.1473.

It must be noted that in spite of Louw's distinction and with the exception of a few isolated references to the third principle, none of these elements were described as characteristic of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism by other HNP members.

132. Die Transvaler, 1.5.1943 and Die Burger, 3.5.1943.

133. K.A. Heard: General Elections in South Africa, 1943-1970, pp.15-16.

did not end the HNP's striving towards a republic or the propagation of neutrality and non-participation in World War II, it did result in a de jure acknowledgement of the then status quo of South African participation in World War II and the continuation thereof.

This acceptance had important implications for both the campaign against communism and the future propagation of Party principles. D.F. Malan, in his opening address to the Cape Provincial Congress of the HNP in November 1943, provided an indication of the directional change in Party policy:

"Ons vergader hier op 'n allerbelangrikste tydstip. Dis 'n tydstip waarop die oorlog nader is aan sy einde as aan sy begin. Daarom spreek dit vanself dat sakende rakende die oorlog meer en meer op die agtergrond raak en na-oorlogse sake des te meer aandag [sal] geniet."<sup>134)</sup>

Following this Congress the outcome of the war and the expected impact thereof on South Africa did come to receive more attention than before. This new approach was formalised in 1944 with the adoption of a new socio-economic policy by the various provincial congresses of the HNP.

Speculation on the outcome of World War II and the post-war balance of forces co-determined the broader context of the HNP's continued campaign against communism. Initially, however, these remarks were infrequent and regularly overshadowed by other developments. A speech by Jan Smuts in late-November 1943 not only provided new momentum to HNP speculation, but also steered this speculation into a more definite direction.

Smuts, in a speech before British parliamentarians in London on 25 November 1943, declared inter alia:

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134. Die Burger, 10.11.1943.

"Great Britain, the United States and Russia now form the trinity at the head of the United Nations fighting for the cause of humanity. And as it is in war, so will it have to be in peace. We shall have to see to it that in the new international organization<sup>135)</sup> the leadership remains in the hands of this great trinity of powers. These three powers must retain the leadership in war and in peace, and be responsible in the first instance for the maintenance of security and for the preservation of world peace.

Russia is the new colossus of Europe - the new colossus that bestrides this continent. When we consider all that has happened to Russia within the last twenty-five years, and we see Russia's inexplicable and phenomenal rise, we can only call it one of the great phenomena of history. It is the sort of thing to which there is no parallel in history, but it has come about ... What the after effects of that will be nobody can say. We can but recognise that this is a new fact to reckon with, and we must reckon with it coldly and objectively. With the others down and out, and herself mistress of the Continent ... Russia will be in a position that no nation has ever enjoyed in the history of Europe."<sup>136)</sup>

Smuts' 'explosive' speech, as indicated, initiated a new interest in the post-war era. In the HNP this was aptly illustrated by the introduction of a motion into Parliament in January 1944 based for a large part on those thoughts uttered by Smuts less than three months before.<sup>137)</sup> Prior to the formal surrender of Germany in May 1945, generally five aspects were stressed by HNP speakers and - newspapers in this regard:

- (i) An Allied victory in World War II would ultimately result in a triumph for the Soviet Union;
- (ii) The Soviet Union will be the dominant power in post-war Europe and the world;

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135. A reference to the proposed United Nations Organisation (UNO).

136. Cited in J. van der Poel (ed.): Selections from the Smuts Papers, VI, pp.456-468.

137. See Hansard, 25.1.1944, col.78-79.

- (iii) With the rise to ascendancy of the Soviet Union, Great Britain will be demoted to the rank of third-rate power;
- (iv) The destruction of Germany and other central-European nations implied the destruction of historically-accepted bastions against communism;<sup>138)</sup>
- (v) Tension and conflict - actual or potential - between the Anglo-Saxon nations and the Soviet Union will be the order of the day. This, according to the HNP, could well prepare the way for World War III.

Needless to say, not all of these aspects figured simultaneously at any given point in time in Party statements. The rapidly changing war fortunes of the Allied nations between July 1943 and May 1945, to mention but one example, allowed for the minimum of consistency and continuity. Intimately connected to all of these aspects, however, was the adoption of a "I told you so"-approach by the Party. The HNP, in this regard, emphasized the correctness of its decision in September 1939 not to become involved in the perceived squabbles of Europe.

No detailed analysis of the implications of the expected post-war status quo for specifically South Africa was presented by the HNP. Relative to the perceived menace of communism, the Party primarily connected these expectations to the often referred to contention that Smuts and the UP were ultimately mere extensions of British imperialism. The belief that South Africa, together with Britain, were creating the conditions for the establishment of Soviet hegemony on the European continent was regularly stressed by the HNP in this regard. Relating this to the HNP's "bastion-theory", A.J. Stals declared that Smuts had surrendered Europe and the Far East to communism.<sup>139)</sup> Strijdom alleged that South Africa was sponsoring communism in Europe to the tune of 450 million

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138. For the aims of this analysis, this contention will be referred to as the "bastion-theory".

139. Die Burger and Die Transvaler, 6.12.1943.

pounds.<sup>140)</sup> Smuts' refusal to act against communism internally and his unwillingness to detach South Africa from World War II, according to the HNP, had to be explained in terms of his perceived status as handyman of the British Empire. In equating Smuts with Alfred Milner, Die Burger declared that the former was and would be used as a pawn in the struggle for supremacy between Russia and the Anglo-Saxon powers.<sup>141)</sup> This, together with the shift in the balance of world-power, had to have significant implications for South Africa. Not only was the Union going to be affected by the post-war dominance of the Soviet Union, but also, and even more importantly, South Africa - due to the perceived puppet status of Smuts - was to become an active participant in World War III. Malan, in this regard, declared that Smuts was ready to declare war against anyone, "... selfs teen [die planeet] Jupiter."<sup>142)</sup>

During the parliamentary session of 1945, Malan stated that the awakening of "... Suid-Afrika ... uit sy imperialistiese doodslaap" was a prerequisite for the eradication of communism.<sup>143)</sup> Although no explicit reference was made to secession, there can be little doubt that Malan was indeed referring to this.

The connection between anti-communism and the adoption of a redefined version of Hertzog's original policy of "South Africa First" did not represent a new element in HNP thinking on the subject of communism. Already prior to the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, GNP members stressed the benefits to be gained from a policy whereby precedence would be given to local interests. The period of divergency differed from earlier periods in terms of the relative importance attached to specifically republicanism and/or secession as a measure to combat communism -

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140. See Strijdom's speech at Wakkerstroom as reported in Die Transvaler on 1.6.1943.

141. Die Burger, 26.3.1945: "Die Handlanger" [editorial].

142. Die Burger, 30.9.1944.

143. Hansard, 14.2.1945, col.1398.

albeit indirectly. Prior to the election of July 1943 and with regard to the war years, it was accepted within the Party that full national autonomy was ultimately the only guarantee for non-participation in future wars. As a matter of course this would also alleviate the menace of communism for South Africa. The immediate objective, however, remained the unconditional withdrawal of South Africa from the war. In other words, compared to the emphasis on withdrawal from World War II, secession was of secondary importance. Following Smuts' 'explosive' speech and the HNP's resultant interest in post-war developments, a reversal of this argument occurred. Progressively the question of disassociation from the war came to be underplayed in favour of a more direct pro-secessionist approach.

The emphasis on the imperial connection not only related to the perceived international menace of communism, but also served to illustrate the alleged danger of this ideology internally. Similar to what may be described as the campaign on the international level, Smuts' alleged willingness to give precedence to the interests of the Empire served a basic point of departure in this regard.<sup>144</sup>) However, whereas the HNP predominantly focussed on the anticipated post-war status quo to illustrate the perceived menace of communism internationally, both the reality of World War II and expected post-war developments served to accentuate the Party's remarks on the presence of communist propaganda within South Africa.

In focussing on the continuing war, the HNP, as before, contended that the promotion of Anglo-Soviet friendship ruled out the possibility of preventative steps against communism internally by Smuts. Relative to the expected post-war status quo, it was alleged that Britain followed a policy of appeasement towards the Soviet Union in an attempt to avoid future conflict with Moscow.<sup>145</sup>) Smuts, in accordance with his status as "lackey" of

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144. See Malan's speech in Parliament on 21.2.1945 (Hansard, 21.2.1945, col.2017-2018) and editorials in Die Burger, 6.7.1944: "Vriende van Stalin" and 24.1.1945: "Suid Afrika en Pole".

145. Die Burger, 7.9.1944: "Rusland: die Vyand" [editorial].



British Imperialism, slavishly adopted this approach decided on by Whitehall.<sup>146)</sup> Reacting to warnings by Smuts on indiscriminate verbal attacks on the Soviet Union,<sup>147)</sup> Die Burger stated that "... sy (Smuts se) kruiperigheid voor die Russiese kolossus ..." had already affected South Africa's internal policies.<sup>148)</sup>

Apart from the focus on secession from the Empire, Malan identified two further measures which he deemed integral to any attempt to eradicate communism from South Africa, viz. the implementation of "... 'n deurtastende skema van bestaansbeveiliging" and the finding of a solution for the Colour Question.<sup>149)</sup> The HNP's Programme of Principles, as may be expected, allegedly provided for both aspects. The HNP's socio-economic policy, adopted in the course of 1944, provided the basic framework for the implementation of the proposed 'scheme of social security'.<sup>150)</sup> Relative to the colour question, Malan stressed that this could only be solved on the basis of apartheid.<sup>151)</sup> The HNP's conceptualisation of the interrelatedness of the 'red menace' and 'black peril', however, had not yet reached the same level of practical enunciation as was the case with its socio-economic policy.

Needless to say, the measures proposed by Malan provided for much more than merely opposition to communism. If it is accepted that the implementation of apartheid and the HNP's socio-economic policy would have resulted in the complete eradication of communism from South Africa, it must be noted that these proposed measures implied a simultaneous and thorough reshuffling of the

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146. See Strijdom's speech at Volksrust (Die Transvaler, 8.5.1944).

147. Hansard, 14.2.1945, col.1397-1398.

148. Die Burger, 22.2.1945: "Die Kruiper" [editorial].

149. Hansard, 14.2.1945, col.1397-1398.

150. A detailed exposition of the HNP's socio-economic policy was published in Die Kruithoring, propaganda organ of the Party, in August 1944.

151. See Hansard, 14.2.1945, col.1398.

Union's social and economic substructure and the reorganisation of race relations. In attempting to find an explanation for the propagation of specifically these measures, one is forced to fall back on the earlier referred to argument of anti-communism being utilised within the Party as both a principle and strategy.

The HNP's socio-economic policy is also significant in as far as it represented the first conscious attempt by the Party to characterise its own ideology of Christian-nationalism vis á vis communism and capitalism. In the introduction to its "Economic Plan for South Africa", the HNP referred to this aspect in the following terms:

"... die HNP [is] nóg kapitalisties nóg kommunisties ... Hy is Nasionaal. Onder die kapitalistiese stelsel domineer die winsmotief, en word die swakkere ekonomiese eenhede en seksies, en veral die werkers, uitgebuit. Rykdom en armoede, met onverskilligheid aan die een en bitterheid en wanhoop aan die ander kant, staar mekaar dan in die gesig. Onder die kommunistiese stelsel weer, met sy leuse van "die diktatorskap van die proletariaat", het slegs een ekonomiese seksie, nl. die werkersklas, reg van bestaan. Alle ander word vernietig.

Die HNP handhaaf die verskillende ekonomiese seksies in hul reg en hul funksies soos die aparte lede van dieselfde liggaam. Hy erken die reg van privaat besit en privaat inisiatief. Maar daarby beskerm hy ook deur 'n stelsel van doeltreffende staatsbeheer elke seksie teen die uitbuiting van elke ander"<sup>152</sup>) (emphasis in the original).

As indicated in the above paragraph, this "Economic Plan for South Africa" represented the first conscious and coherent attempt by the HNP to position its own ideology against that of capitalism and communism. Relative to specifically communism, it may be argued that many of these principles emphasized as indicative of Christian-nationalism were indeed irreconcilable with the suppositions underlying Socialism. Prior to the publication of the HNP's socio-economic blueprint for a future South Africa, however, no coherent attempt was made to relate these principles to the ideology of communism. On occasion where one or more elements of

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152. Die Kruithoring, 2.8.1944.

the Party Programme were propagated in conjunction with the emphasis on the perceived menace of communism, this was generally connected to a set of predetermined and preconceived premises and arguments. Excellent examples of this is provided by the HNP's conception of communism and the propagation of neutrality and non-participation in the perceived wars of Britain, stringent immigration measures and rigid racial separation. These subjects will be returned to in succeeding chapters.

In focussing on manifestations of communism within South Africa, the HNP accentuated two aspects:

(i) **The prevalence of communism and communist propaganda amongst non-whites:** In explaining this, the HNP, as before, stressed the perceived susceptibility of Africans to alleged communist propaganda. Subsequently it was accepted that - in the words of Malan - "... 'n groot deel van die nie-blanke bevolking onder die leiding van en die heerskappy gekom het van kommunistiese agitators van die ergste graad."<sup>153)</sup> A wide variety of developments in the South African socio-political and economic arena were referred to as indicative of the extent to which elements of this ideology were being propagated amongst the African population. Die Burger and Die Transvaler, in this regard, repeatedly referred to labour unrest, the upsurge in the crime rate and developments in non-white politics as allegedly illustrative of the influence and effect of communism.<sup>154)</sup> Die Burger, in commenting on the support for CPSA-candidates in the Cape Peninsular constituencies during the 1943-elections, declared that Coloured voters, in these constituencies, had voted en bloc for the Communist Party.<sup>155)</sup>

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153. Hansard, 14.2.1945, col.1384.

154. See Die Burger, 23.6.1944: "Naturelle en Misdade" [editorial]; Die Transvaler, 7.11.1944: "Die Regering se Eie Skuld" [editorial]; Die Transvaler, 7.11.1944: "Amokmakery se Lewe" [editorial] and Die Transvaler, 24.1.1945: "Kommuniste Probeer Behoort te Kry ons Adviesende Raad".

155. Die Burger, 3.8.1944: "Die Kleurling Kiesers" [editorial].

(ii) **Indications of communism within the white community:** In addressing itself to alleged manifestations of communism amongst whites, the HNP adopted a seemingly contradictory approach. On the one hand the perceived invulnerability of the white population to communist propaganda was repeatedly stressed. Die Burger, for example, declared that unless "... 'n selfmoord-neiging die blanke bevolking van hierdie land oorkom ", communism would fail to make an impact on (white) South Africa.<sup>156)</sup> This observation is reminiscent of earlier remarks on the existence of a natural counter-weight to communism. Conversely, however, the HNP continued to stress the prevalence of propaganda connected to this ideology within the white labour movement. A strike in a Germiston clothing factory during November 1944 by members of the GWU and the resultant expulsion of two Union members by the GWU-executive<sup>157)</sup> once again brought this aspect to the forefront. Allegations regarding the spreading of communism amongst 'defenceless Afrikaner daughters' and the dictatorial action by the 'Sachs-clique' in expelling its own members figured prominently in HNP statements.<sup>158)</sup> Arguably, the HNP would not have continued to stress the perceived dangers inherent to the propagation of perceived communism in the labour movement had it not adjudged a section of the white community to be potentially susceptible to this propaganda. The reference to 'defenceless Afrikaner daughters' is illustrative of this.

In addressing itself to the perceived characteristics of this ideology, many of those aspects which had come to receive attention prior to the general election of July 1943 were once again returned to by the Party. Communism's atheism, its perceived revolutionary and atheistic nature, the twin principles of 'proletarian internationalism' and 'dictatorship of the

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156. Die Burger, 10.12.1943: "Nie Veel Invloed" [editorial].

157. For Sachs' account of the strike and the expulsions see E.S. Sachs: Garment Workers in Action, pp. 119-123.

158. See Hansard, 17.3.1944, col.3479-3787 et.seq.; 13.5 1944, col.7455-7463 and 19.3.1945, col.1493-1499.

proletariat' and this ideology's negation of private ownership and -initiative were regularly focussed upon by members of the HNP. In terms of intensity and frequency referred to, communism's perceived goal of a world-revolution came to receive the largest share of attention during this period. In many ways this was to be expected given the preponderancy of remarks on Soviet hegemony on the European continent as an expected post-war development.

Relative to the perceived leading role of the Soviet Union in fomenting this world-revolution, significant adjustments had occurred within the HNP over this period. Prior to the 1943-election, the HNP stressed the alleged role played by the Third International and, within South Africa, Soviet diplomats in fomenting the idea of a world-revolution. The dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943, as indicated, resulted in less emphasis being placed on the perceived directorial role of the Soviet Union in this regard. Solidarity between communists internationally now came to be accentuated. Following the election, however, the HNP once more returned to the alleged domineering role of the USSR in the fermentation of this world-revolution. Louw, as before, contended that the dissolution of the Comintern "... was 'n bluf.'<sup>159)</sup> Louw's conviction, however, was not shared by other members of the HNP. The majority of Party members focussed on the policies of the Soviet Union in illustrating the perceived connection between Moscow and the goal of a world-revolution. In this regard the alleged dichotomy between the USSR's internal and external policies were stressed.

Within the Soviet Union, according to the HNP, internationalist slogans were underplayed in favour of patriotism and nationalism.<sup>160)</sup> This development, however, had not filtered through to the sphere of international relations. The Soviet Union, in this regard, continued with its aggressive imperialistic

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159. Die Kruithoring, 26.4.1944. See also Louw's remarks on the Third International in Parliament (Hansard, 24.5.1944, col.8733 and 19.3.1945, col.3794).

160. See Malan's speech in Parliament in January 1944 (Hansard, 25.1.1944, col.81-83).

policy of spreading - directly or indirectly - a communistic world-revolution.<sup>161)</sup> Developments in particularly Eastern Europe were repeatedly referred to as exemplary of direct Soviet involvement in attempts to establish communistic dictatorships. Within South Africa the USSR was allegedly promoting the cause of a communistic revolution through its consular personnel, the CPSA and pro-Soviet friendship organisations. Die Burger subsequently reacted to the announcement that a South African-Soviet Friendship Congress was to held in Johannesburg during July 1944 with a reference to "... valse front-organisasies ..."162)

In closing, it must be noted that following Smuts' November 1942-speech in London, the HNP's campaign against the perceived menace of communism progressively came to take on more of a active than reactive character. The Party was no longer merely reacting to developments it perceived to be connected to communism, but rather propagated principles which allowed for the inclusion of anti-communism. To put it differently: The HNP's campaign against communism, after November 1942, was no longer predetermined by external stimuli over which it had little or no control, but rather principles which was not only the creation of the Party, but also controlled and manipulated by the HNP. The HNP's socio-economic policy, in this regard, was of fundamental importance in as far as it determined the basic parameters of both the campaign against communism and, conversely, an alternative policy.

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161. A series of editorials in Die Burger provide an excellent exposition of the HNP's contention regarding the apparent discontinuities in Soviet policy. See 21.12.1943: "'n Uitgediende Leuse" and 22.12.1943: "'n Nuwe Lied".

162. Die Burger, 11.7.1944: "Valse Front" [editorial].

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE OSSEWA-BRANDWAG AND COMMUNISM

Chapters three and four are a continuation of the previous chapter in as far as it aims at providing an analysis of overt anti-communism in movements who, like the G/HNP, were opposed to the ruling UP and, like the G/HNP, identified with Afrikaner nationalism. However, whereas the G/HNP largely came to be identified with mainstream Afrikaner nationalism, these organisations - rightly or wrongly - were associated with different variants of National-Socialism. Although it is not a distinctive objective of this analysis to typecast those organisations involved in the debate surrounding anti-communism, the Ossewa-Brandwag, New Order and Greyshirt-movement, in opposing communism, did so on a more direct, overt and integrated level vis á vis their own respective ideological agendas than was the case with the G/HNP. A discussion of anti-communism in the Ossewa-Brandwag, New Order and Greyshirt-movement therefore necessitates a broader evaluation of the ideology espoused and principles propagated by these organisations.

#### 3.1. INTRODUCTION

The Ossewa-Brandwag [literally Ox-wagon Sentinel] (OB) was born out of the emotional fervour which swamped the centenary celebrations of the 1838 Great Trek. Formally constituted in February 1939, the OB initially presented itself as a socio-cultural front for Afrikaner nationalists.<sup>1)</sup> The promotion of Afrikaner-volkseenheid, amongst other things, were included as an objective shared with other organisations. J.C.C. Laas, in

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1. See M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African Opposition 1939-1945, pp.73-74; G.D. Scholtz: Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner, VIII, pp.148-149; A.J.H. van der Walt: 'n Volk op Trek, pp.5-15.

October 1940, was ousted from the Commandant-Generalship, the highest position of authority within the OB and replaced by the then Administrator of the OFS, J.F.J. (Hans) van Rensburg.

The initial relationship between the OB and G/HNP can best be described as cordial and, at times, even heartily. The OB, with its emphasis on the socio-cultural organisation and mobilisation of the volk, was perceived as holding no threat for the political activities of the Party. Indeed, the overlap in membership of and support for these organisations indicate that in many instances the OB and G/HNP were perceived as parallel movements, representing, albeit at different levels, the same body of people.

The Cradock-agreement, concluded in October 1940 between Malan and the OB-leadership, constituted an attempt to formalize and cement this tentative relationship by demarcating the spheres of influence and activity of respectively the OB and HNP.<sup>2)</sup> Under this agreement, according to the announcement made by Malan at the HNP's Cradock Congress, the activities of the Party were to be limited to the "... party-politieke terrein ..." and those of the OB to "... die nie-politieke terrein ..."<sup>3)</sup> Fourie has indicated that the actual formulation of the Cradock-agreement did not provide for the demarcation as insisted on by the HNP.<sup>4)</sup>

Tension between the OB and the HNP progressively came to the forefront following the appointment of Van Rensburg as Commandant-General in January 1941. Less than a year later the once cordial relationship between the OB and HNP had

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2. Roberts and Trollip: Op.cit., p.76.

3. Cited in L.M. Fourie: Die Ossewa-Brandwag en Afrikanereenheid, 1939-1942, pp.93-94.

4. Ibid., p.94.



degenerated into open political warfare.<sup>5)</sup> Sufficient for the immediate aims of this analysis is to note that by January 1942 another centrifugal force, this time in the form of the OB, was beginning to make its presence felt in South Africa's intra-ethnic politics.

Although the OB can be described as initially being a populous movement, it failed to maintain this stature.<sup>6)</sup> By the end of 1944, this organisation had lost its position as a serious contender for the vanguard position in Afrikaner nationalist politics.

### 3.2. ANTI-COMMUNISM IN THE OSSEWA-BRANDWAG

The OB's campaign against communism can chronologically be divided into two broad phases, viz. the period before the formal establishment of the OB Arbeidslaer [Labour Front] in November 1943 and the period following this event. Prior to the formation of the Arbeidslaer, the OB's campaign against communism was characterised by the inclusion of the widest possible range of events/developments in both the national- and international arena which could directly or indirectly be related to the perceived menace of communism. Following the establishment of the Arbeidslaer, the campaign against communism came to be characterised by a continuation of this erstwhile process of horizontal diversification on the one hand, and, on the other, vertical stratification.

The perceived menace of communism, in this last instance, was made applicable to a particular social class, viz. the recently

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5. For a description and analysis of the development of this schism between the OB and HNP prior to the general election of July 1943, see M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African Opposition 1939-1945, pp.73-148; F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.273-318.

6. D.F. Malan, in Parliament on 4.2.1941, estimated the numerical strength of the OB to be between 300 000 and 400 000 members. See Hansard, 4.2.1941, col.2196.

urbanised (predominantly white) proletariat. The rearrangement of the OB's campaign against communism corresponded with a general acceptance of the potential importance of the white working class as a factor in South African politics. Relative to the OB, a greater emphasis subsequently came to be placed on a more dogmatic approach towards communism.

From the outset it needs to be stressed that the formation of the Arbeidslaer did not mark the advent of the ideological construction of the OB's anti-communism. Between March and November 1943 there were indeed numerous occasions where the campaign against this 'menace' came to take on more of an ideological character than ever before. The establishment of the Arbeidslaer, however, marked the beginning of a concerted effort to link the eradication of communism more directly to both the national and social objectives of the OB credo.

Rather than attempting to provide a purely chronological analysis of the OB's campaign against communism, this discussion will take the form of a functional enquiry underlined by a chronological framework. Although the two campaigns - particularly after November 1943 - came to be intimately intertwined, the adoption of this approach will eliminate undue repetition and provide for a more coherent analysis of the issue of overt anti-communism.

It needs to be stressed that both these analyses will suffer from definite and obvious deficiencies. This can largely be ascribed to the adoption of a policy by HNP-associated newspapers in the course of 1941/42 whereby the existence of organisations such as the OB and New Order were simply ignored. Correspondingly, the absolute minimum and then only negative reportage on these organisations emanated from the HNP press. Particularly the OB attempted to counter this through the publication, from 1941 onwards, of its own newspaper called Die O.B. Although the official history of the OB contends that Die O.B. immediately had "... 'n leserskring ... groter as enige

Afrikaanse dagblad ",<sup>7)</sup> the weekly editions of this newspaper, as a vehicle for the presentation, promotion and dissemination of OB points of view, had obvious limitations both in terms of time and space. As such it failed to provide a realistic and competitive alternative for the mass-circulated organs of the HNP. Neither Die O.B. nor the OB's archives in Potchefstroom provide the same amount or depth of 'insight' as came to be expected from Die Burger and Die Transvaler relative to the topic of anti-communism in the HNP and other befriended organisations and institutions.

The main spokesperson within the OB on perceived communism prior to March 1943 was J.F.J. van Rensburg. The inclusion of P.J. Meyer in the OB-executive (the Grootraad), initially as Chief of Information and after November 1943 also that of acting leader of the Arbeidslaer,<sup>8)</sup> resulted - as indicated - in a diversification of the OB's campaign against communism.

Van Rensburg and Meyer acted not only as interpreters of OB-policy towards communism, but also, and even more importantly, played a significant role in the formulation thereof. The structuring of the OB along the lines of the traditional commando system and the prominence of the leadership-principle within this hierarchial structure provided par excellence for autocratic decision making.

P. de Klerk, in a recent study on the ideological orientation of the OB, acknowledges that the leadership-principle potentially allowed for imposition of policy from atop. In practice, however, according to the De Klerk, the OB Grootraad [literally Grand Council] was the main decision-making and policy-determining body within the OB.<sup>9)</sup> In other words, collective decision making rather than autocratic and

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7. A.J.H. van der Walt: 'n Volk op Trek, p.123.

8. See Footnote 39.

9. P. de Klerk: Afrikanerdenkers en die Beginsels van die Ossewabrandwag. Journal for Contemporary History (vol. 14 (1), 1989), p.45.

unilateral policy-imposition from atop was the normal practice in the OB. In support of this contention, De Klerk argues that important policy documents were either issued by or under authority of the Grootraad.

An evaluation of the policy-formulating function of respectively the Grootraad and individual personalities such as Van Rensburg and Meyer, in the context of the campaign against the perceived menace of communism, shows that elements of both autocratic and collective decision-making may well have been present in this process. The strongest argument in support of collective policy-formulation by the Grootraad is indeed the fact that the basic principles underlying Van Rensburg's and Meyer's remarks on communism could in some way be traced back to important policy documents "... [wat] goedgekeur en/of uitgereik [is] deur die Grootraad."<sup>10</sup>) This was particularly so with regard to the Ossewa-Brandwag's social campaign against the perceived menace of communism. A policy document issued by the Grootraad in November 1943 determined the basic parameters of this campaign.<sup>11</sup>)

However, many of those ideas which came to be regarded as synonymous with OB-policy on communism, had already been expounded by Meyer prior to November 1943. Statements made by Meyer in his capacity as acting leader of the Arbeidslaer could also be traced back to the period preceding November 1943. The earlier referred to policy document issued by the Grootraad in November 1943 which, as indicated, determined the basic parameters of the OB's social campaign against communism, in this context, may well have been formulated and drawn up by Meyer.

Another example is provided by Van Rensburg's speech on communism at Crosby early in March 1943. Van Rensburg's speech came to be regarded as the sine qua non in any exposition of

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10. Ibid., pp.46-47.

11. Ibid., p.46.

OB-policy on communism.<sup>12)</sup> No evidence could be found to indicate that this speech was sanctioned by the OB-executive prior to its presentation. The Grootraad only adopted a resolution on communism after Van Rensburg's Crosby-speech. This resolution - as will be indicated - both corresponded and differed significantly from Van Rensburg's Crosby-speech.

### 3.3. THE OB AND THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMMUNISM

The first public reference to the perceived menace of communism by the OB took the form of a unitary circular issued by Van Rensburg early in July 1942.<sup>13)</sup> Rather than providing an exposition of the OB's conception of communism, this circular was more of a warning against passivity and indifference and a call to all Afrikaners to oppose this ideology "... onverbiddelik en konsekwent ..."<sup>14)</sup> Remarks on the perceived characteristics of communism and the implications of this for (white) South Africa appeared only in passing. Even then, compared to the emphasis placed on the necessity of coherent opposition to communism, these remarks were of secondary importance. Indeed, seen in isolation and compared to remarks on communism by HNP members over the same period, the ideas expressed by Van Rensburg on this occasion may just as well have emanated from the HNP. The importance of this circular therefore does not lie so much in its contents, but rather in the seemingly conciliatory approach and time of release.

Against the background of Pirow's and Louw's parliamentary motions on communism earlier in the same year, this circular

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12. The first major policy document issued by the OB in the post-war period was published under authority of the Grootraad in May 1946. In explaining the OB's policy towards communism, Van Rensburg's speech of 5.3.1943 was extensively quoted from. See Iets oor die Ossewa-Brandwag, pp.65-78.

13. See Die O.B., 8.7.1942.

14. Ibid.

may well have been released with the primary objective of promoting the concept of a "... nasionale en anti-kommunistiese front ..."15) If indeed so, this represented the first tentative attempt by any cultural/political movement to promote the idea of a broadly based coalition of forces to jointly oppose the perceived menace of communism.

Van Rensburg's initiative must also be seen against the backdrop of the OB adopting an own political programme less than three months before.<sup>16)</sup> This programme placed the OB on an ideological and political level independent from that of any movement connected to or associated with Afrikaner nationalism. The emphasis on the perceived menace of communism provided Van Rensburg with the opportunity to move closer to the ideological terrain unobtrusively. This, in turn, relayed the impression that the evolution of the *Ossewa-Brandwag* from a purely cultural movement to an organisation with explicit political aims constituted a shift in emphasis rather than a dramatic change in paradigm. Furthermore, and almost needless to say, this initiative validated the fact that Van Rensburg perceived the future role of the OB in explicit political terms.

Interesting is to note that Van Rensburg had already indirectly promoted the concept of coherent opposition to communism during his tenure as Administrator of the OFS. In a speech to the Fourth Annual Congress of the *Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond* [literally Afrikaans National Student League] (ANS) at Potchefstroom in October 1937, Van Rensburg described communism as "... ['n] non-partypolitieke en inderdaad non-kontensieuse volkswessie."<sup>17)</sup> Although it may well be argued that the primary motivation underlying Van Rensburg's comment on coherent opposition to communism was a plea in favour of the belief that communism should not become a divisive issue in

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15. Ibid.

16. This declaration of policy was published in the form of a pamphlet. See Die Ossewa-Brandwag : Vanwaar en Waarheen.

17. [N. Diederichs and P. Meyer (eds.)]: Hedendaagse Staatkundige Strominge, p.28.

Afrikaner politics, it nevertheless, ipso facto, also provided for coherent opposition to communism. Communism, according to Van Rensburg, were not aimed at any particular political party, but against the state as such. Information regarding the modus operandi of communism - the topic of Van Rensburg's speech on this occasion - therefore had to be supplied to "... almal wat deel van die Volk, die draers van die Staat, uitmaak."<sup>18)</sup>

Conversely, failing success in this endeavour or even if the OB had never contemplated such a strategy, the attempted association with conventional elements of Afrikaner nationalism may well have been intended as a stalling tactic. This provided the OB with the opportunity to formulate a more definite policy towards 'communism'.

Following the publication of this circular, the issue of communism appeared even less prominently in OB circles. Indeed, prior to February 1943 no statement on this subject was forthcoming from either Van Rensburg or the OB-executive. Remarks on communism were limited to isolated references in Die O.B. Even then - in the majority of cases - the perceived menace of communism were primarily utilised to illustrate a related contention. The emphasis, in this regard, was generally placed on Smuts' alleged subservience to British imperialism.

Die O.B., in September 1942, identified four interest groups which had allegedly supported the pro-war stance of Smuts in September 1939.<sup>19)</sup> According to this editorial, Smuts' perceived willingness to give precedence to the interests of the British Empire, as illustrated by the first three war-years, were incompatible with the original motivation presented by these groupings for supporting the Union's participation in World War II. In the case of three interest groups the subject of communism - and by implication the Soviet Union - were utilised to illustrate the aforementioned contention:

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18. Ibid., p.29.

19. Die O.B., 9.9.1942: "Na Drie Jaar" [editorial].

- i. The involvement of Jews and Bolshevists were incompatible with the sentiments uttered by those who had rationalised their pro-war stance on the basis of Christianity;
- ii. The participation of "... 'n Russiese diktator ..."20) did not concur with the pro-democratic slogans of the pre-war period; and
- iii. The laissez faire and even tutelary approach of the Smuts-government towards communism21) were irreconcilable with the emphasis on personal freedom as factor which necessitated support for the war effort.

Less than two months later Die O.B. referred to evidence which, so it was alleged, conclusively indicated that the Smuts-government was in effect a continuation of British rule. The connection with communism was described in the following terms:

"As ons verder let hoe Engeland en die ander Britse Dominiums geleidelik aan die kommunistiese agitatie met betrekking tot beperkings op hul bedrywighede toegegee het, en ons sien hoe die kommuniste in ons land agiteer vir die bewapening van naturelle, kan ons tot geen ander slotsom kom nie as dat die oomblik aangebreek het dat die swarte hordes van Afrika in belang van Engeland se oorlog ingespan gaan word - altans so sal die Britse mentaliteit dit graag aanvaar."22)

On the solitary occasion where Die O.B. did refer to communism other than wholly connecting it to Smuts and/or British imperialism, this related to the perceived negative effect of this ideology on race relations. However, even then it was stated that communists were only partially responsible for this

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20. Ibid.

21. A second article which dealt in totality with the alleged protectionism afforded to communism by the Smuts-government was published in Die O.B. on 27.1.1943. The CPSA, in this article, was described as the "... blou-oog seun ..." of Smuts and his administration.

22. Die O.B., 4.11.1942: "Die Groot Gevaar" [editorial].



"... toestand van fermentasie ..." in race relations, the other culprit being the Smuts-government.<sup>23)</sup>

The lull in remarks on communism over this period is possibly once again to be explained in terms of the two arguments referred to earlier. On the one hand the relative disinterest in communism may have only served as cover-up for an intensive behind the scenes-planning process aimed at the formulation of a definite policy towards this ideology. Conversely, this may have been a continuation of the attempt to promote 'united front'-tactics in opposing 'communism'. The perceived negative impact of this ideology on race relations and Smuts' alleged liberal approach towards communism were generally agreed on by the majority of forces identifying with Afrikaner nationalism. Accordingly, agreement on this issue could have served as a point of departure in establishing a common front against perceived communism. Alternatively, the covert alignment with other forces by way of references to aspects on which consensus existed, provided the OB with a further opportunity to formulate a separate policy towards communism.

An extensive speaking-tour by Van Rensburg in the course of February 1943 marked the beginning of a new phase in the OB's campaign against communism. Van Rensburg's meetings, of which the primary objective was "... om die Afrikanervolk te waarsku teen die gevare van die kommuniste ..." <sup>24)</sup>, received little attention in the OB press. An analysis of the OB's conception of communism, based on Van Rensburg's speeches, therefore proves impossible. However, during the second week of this campaign a press statement on "... die Regering se beleid ten opsigte van die kommuniste en die Ossewabrandwag se standpunt daarteenoor ..." <sup>25)</sup> was issued by Van Rensburg. According to Die O.B. this statement was unanimously adopted as "... duidelike gids ..." by many of those meetings addressed by

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23. Die O.B., 27.1.1943.

24. Ibid., 24.2.1943.

25. Ibid., 10.2.1943.

Van Rensburg.<sup>26)</sup> It will thus be accepted that Van Rensburg's statement to the press was a synopsis of the most important points touched upon by him during his extensive speaking-tour.

Van Rensburg's statement to the press, in so far as it was intended as analysis of Smuts' alleged policy towards communism, consisted of a series of allegations and accusations. Most prominent in this regard was the contention that Smuts' 'unprincipled' stand towards communism had to be explained in terms of his war declaration against the Axis powers and him (Smuts) yielding under pressure by communists.

The perception of the implications of a Soviet victory in Eastern Europe not only dominated Van Rensburg's exposition of the OB's 'standpoint' towards communism, but, for all intents and purposes, was the only element in it. Little attention, and then only in passing, was paid to communism as an ideology.

The battle in Eastern Europe - according to Van Rensburg - involved a life-or-death struggle between Bolshevism and those forces opposed to "... die anti-nasionale Komintern ..."27) Van Rensburg, although failing to identify the 'anti-Comintern' forces, aligned the OB with them. The implications of a defeat for this grouping was indicated in the following terms:

"'n Bolsjewistiese oorwinning sou oor die hele aardbol heen die einde beteken van beide nasionalisme en die Christendom ... En almal weet dat die bolsjewisering van Europa die 'verkaffering' van Afrika beteken."<sup>28)</sup>

In as far as remarks on communism as an ideology did appear in this statement, reference was made to the perceived anti-national and atheistic character of this ideology.

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26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Die O.B., 10.2.1943.

In a sense Van Rensburg's press release was more of the proverbial 'storm in the tea-cup' than a document of fundamental importance. Remarks relating to Smuts' alleged policy towards communists/communism had already appeared in earlier editions of Die O.B. Allegations concerning the implications of a Soviet victory in the war, judging from the available material, was indeed a new element in OB-thinking on communism. However, by connecting it to OB support for the 'anti-Comintern' (read also Axis) powers, Van Rensburg 'undermined' the significance of this element. As a result this particular statement may just as well be interpreted as a covert declaration of support for the Axis alliance.

### 3.3.1. Crosby, 6 March 1943

Van Rensburg presented his first major speech relating to the perceived menace of communism during a public meeting at Crosby (Johannesburg) early in March 1943.<sup>29</sup>) Van Rensburg's speech was not only the first detailed policy declaration on this topic by an OB functionary, but also provided the basic theoretical framework for the OB's continued campaign against 'communism'. Many of those ideas expressed by Van Rensburg at Crosby came to be refined even further over the ensuing period.

Van Rensburg stressed two contentions: Firstly, the necessity of distinguishing between national- and international forms of Socialism and, secondly, the eventuality/inevitability of one of these forms of Socialism becoming the accepted status quo in all countries of the world. In explaining this last allegation, Van Rensburg made use of an interdependent almost dialectical approach whereby man's striving towards political- and material emancipation were connected to and equated with the historical evolution of systems of government and the perceived excesses of capitalism.

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29. Two complete copies of Van Rensburg's Crosby-speech exist: This speech was published in full by Die O.B. on 17.3.1943. Another copy, this time in Van Rensburg's own handwriting, can be found in the OB-archives in Potchefstroom (See OB-archives, KG II/7/49).

In the historical development of systems of government, Feudalism - according to Van Rensburg - had to make way for a system of "... burgerlike demokrasie ..." <sup>30)</sup> The implied severe restriction of civil liberties under Feudalism (thesis) stood in sharp contrast with the unlimited freedoms of democracy (antithesis). Indicative of the latter part of this statement was the interchangeable usage of the terms 'liberalism' and 'democracy'. The unqualified libertarianism underlying democracy, however, had resulted in this system's "... vinnig[e] en onvermydelik[e] ontaard[ing] in kapitalisme." <sup>31)</sup> 'Liberal democracy', with its emphasis on unfettered freedoms (thesis), had thus degenerated into a 'capitalist democracy' (antithesis) where "... die geldadel (i.e. kapitalisme) in die plek gekom het van die geboorteadel (i.e. feudalisme) ..." <sup>32)</sup> According to Van Rensburg the excesses and deficiencies of both these systems were to be reconciled in a new world order (synthesis). Socialism therefore had to predominate in the post-capitalist phase of world history:

"Die keuse in die toekoms gaan nie wees tussen sosialisme of kapitalisme nie. Die keuse is net tussen nasionale vorms van sosialisme of die anti-nasionale vorm, die kommunisme." <sup>33)</sup>

Van Rensburg identified the OB with the 'national forms of Socialism'. This alignment figured prominently in Van Rensburg's conception of the position of communism in the international ideological arena as well as the expected implications of this ideology for South Africa. World War II, in both instances, served as a basic point of departure.

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30. Die O.B., 17.3.1943.

31. Van Rensburg described the relationship between democracy and capitalism in the following terms: "Demokrasie is soos die weelderige Savoy-hotel in Londen. Dit is vir almal oop en vry - mits jy kan betaal." (See Ibid.)

32. Die O.B., 17.3.1943.

33. Ibid.

Van Rensburg described World War II as "... 'n bloedige wêreldstryd ... [tussen] die nasionale gedagte en die anti-nasionale gedagte ..." <sup>34)</sup> Important to note is Van Rensburg's conception of the composition of these two opposing sides: The 'national' faction, according to Van Rensburg, consisted of "... die Duitse militêr met sy bondgenote en met sy vrywilligers uit besette en neutrale lande." <sup>35)</sup> This conglomerate of forces, needless to say, corresponded with the composition of the Axis alliance. Given the reality of World War II and the reference to the Axis alliance, it was to be expected for the 'anti-national' forces to consist of the Allied nations. Van Rensburg, however, did not refer to the Allied nations; thereby, in effect, underplaying the existence of such a grouping. <sup>36)</sup> This may have been deliberately done in favour of an added emphasis on the alleged role of the Soviet Union as the promotor-in-chief of communism. World War II was thus portrayed as predominantly a bipolar ideological struggle between the forces of nationalism and anti-nationalism/internationalism.

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34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Although Van Rensburg, as indicated, did not dispute the existence of the Allied alliance, he attempted to underplay the significance of British and American involvement in the Alliance. In this regard two strategies were employed: On the one hand the **Third International**, and by implication the Soviet Union, was described as "...die "senior partner" in hierdie oorlog." Although not explicitly stated, the implications for the positions of the USA and Britain relative to that of the Soviet Union is self-evident from this statement. Conversely, the sheer physical distance between Britain and the United States on the one hand and the battlefronts of Eastern Europe on the other - according to Van Rensburg - ruled out the possibility of significant involvement in the war by them. In support of this contention Van Rensburg referred to his earlier thesis on the world-wide evolution towards Socialism. The "... sogenaamd[e] demokratiese empires, Engeland en Amerika ..." in this context, were "... verbygaande verskynsels ..." (See Die O.B., 17.3.1943).

The continuing struggle in Europe was perceived as affecting South Africa directly and indirectly. Van Rensburg, in this regard, stressed the outcome of the battle for Eastern Europe and the implications for South Africa of her involvement in the Allied alliance. Relative to the first aspect, Van Rensburg subscribed to the "bastion-theory" in stating that the German Wehrmacht stood between South Africa and Soviet/communistic imperialism. The collapse of the Nazi Wehrmacht therefore had to pave the way for an all-out communist onslaught on South Africa.

Van Rensburg's remarks on the Union's pro-Allied war stance must be seen against the backdrop of his earlier referred to contention that the Soviet Union was the dominant force in the Allied alliance. Because of the Union's involvement in the entente with the Soviet Union, the 'vanguard' of communism, according to Van Rensburg, had already reached the shores of South Africa.<sup>37)</sup> Van Rensburg failed to indicate the actual composition of this 'vanguard'. Given the emphasis on the alleged unity-in-purpose of communists internationally, it is possible that Van Rensburg may not have considered a distinction between communists in the different national states to be of any particular significance. Communists all over the world were literally brothers-in-arms with only one loyalty and aim, namely the promotion of the interests of the Soviet state.

Within South Africa, according to Van Rensburg, the Smuts-government were yielding under pressure of this communist 'vanguard'.<sup>38)</sup> The selective application of War Emergency Measures and the recognition afforded to the CPSA as a bona fide political party were allegedly illustrative of this.

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37. Van Rensburg referred to this aspect in the following terms: "As u lees of hoor van die geweldige gebeurtenisse in Oos-Europa, moenie dink: "Ag wat, die Rooi leër is 8 000 myl van my vaderland af!" Nee, onthou dat sy voorste patrollies alreeds hier is. U kan hulle hoor en hulle sien in elke stad van die Unie, veral in elke lokasie en elke kafferstat." (Die O.B., 17.3.1943).

38. Die O.B., 17.3.1943.

Van Rensburg, in focussing on communism as an ideology, emphasized two aspects which he perceived as fundamental to this ideology, viz. internationalism and atheism.

Van Rensburg's conception of internationalism, however, did not only relate to proletarian internationalism, but also included remarks on the alleged existence of a central 'nerve' centre which controlled, coordinated and directed this ideology internationally. Important to note is that Van Rensburg adjudged communism's striving towards racial equality to be an integral and inseparable part of the broader characteristic of proletarian internationalism. This contrasted sharply with the HNP approach where communism's negation of the colour bar was adjudged to be a distinctive characteristic; separate and independent from remarks on internationalist proletarian solidarity.

Communism, according to Van Rensburg, "... beoog om die wêreld te verower in belang van een klas, die werkersklas."<sup>39</sup>) The objective underlying this initial goal was the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Van Rensburg referred to the national - and racial-composition of the proletariat in the following terms:

"En alle arbeiders is een. Duitser, Zoeloe, Rus, Indiër, Afrikaner, Engelsman, 'Hotnot'<sup>40</sup>) - almal een. 'n Afrikaner-arbeider op die Spoorweg staan nader aan die kleurling-arbeider op die Spoorweg as aan sy eie vader, of sy eie moeder wat 'n stukkie grond besit. Rasse is somer onnodige grense, net die klas tel - so leer die kommunisme."<sup>41</sup>)

Van Rensburg adjudged communism's 'colour-blindness' to be particularly menacing for the prolonged survival of (white) South Africa. The dictatorship of the proletariat implied not only the dominance of society by the working class, but also

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39. Ibid.

40. Afrikaans slang-term for people of racially-mixed origins - so-called Coloureds.

41. Die O.B., 17.3.1943.

the removal of all other classes from society. Given the alleged stratification of classes along racial lines in South Africa, this may have implied that whites were going to be removed from society in a repetition of the classical bourgeois-proletariat struggle. The advent of communism in South Africa therefore had to result in the total and inescapable destruction of Afrikaners as a socio-cultural entity.

The second constituent element of internationalism related to the alleged pyramidal structure inherent to this ideology:

"Agter die kommunisme staan nie argumente en debatte nie. Agter hom staan magspolitiek. Agter die kommunisme staan die Komintern met die Rooi Lëer. Die Komintern, die wêreldwye federasie van kommunistiese partye en die Rooi lëer wat hamer, met mokerhoue hamer, aan die poorte van Europa en die wêreld."<sup>42)</sup>

Relative to the CPSA and CI, this implied the existence of a intimate relationship which could ultimately be traced back to Stalin, as commander-in-chief of the Red Army. The activities of communists in South Africa were thus linked to the innermost chambers of the Kremlin. The exact function of the Red Army within this relationship was not dwelled upon by Van Rensburg. Against the background of World War II, the intention may well have been to attribute to the Red Army a function complimentary to that of the Third International. In this manner the perceived link and unity in purpose between communists internationally could once again be stressed.

While there was no factual evidence in support of Van Rensburg's contention that the CPSA, the Comintern and the Red Army were all intimately involved in a perceived onslaught against specifically South Africa, it should be noted that the Red Army was of central importance in the USSR's overall strategy to enforce its hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe in the period immediately before and after the end of World War II. Thus, while Van Rensburg's argument could not be

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42. Ibid.



applied to South Africa, in the context of the period it was not far fetched.

Atheism was described as the second major characteristic of communism. In stressing this perceived feature, Van Rensburg referred to the well-known Marxist slogan of religion being opium for the masses. However, so as to relate this slogan more directly to the South African context, it was adapted to the following form: "Godsdiens is opium vir die volk"<sup>43</sup>) (*italics mine*).

The significance of Van Rensburg's speech becomes even more apparent when seen against the backdrop of Louw's parliamentary motion on communism less than three weeks before. Louw's motion, if accepted, would have resulted in the adoption of a series of administrative- and legislative measures to provide for the eradication of perceived communism from society. Important is to note, however, that these proposed measures were to be both adopted and implemented within the framework of the then existing constitutional structure.

Van Rensburg, on the other hand, was neither concerned with the adoption of measures to combat communism, nor did he feel himself bound by the limitations of the Westminster-type democracy of white South Africa. Van Rensburg's exposition did not make provision for democracy (read also capitalist democracy) as being the final phase of international ideological development. At most this was an intermediate stage in the final evolution towards Socialism. Communism could only be opposed effectively during this final phase.

In other words, whereas Louw and the HNP propagated the adoption of a series of measures which supposedly provided for the eradication of specifically communism, Van Rensburg stressed the necessity of a single ideology which would allow for the neutralization of communism as well as other ideologies.

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43. Ibid.

The topic of communism, following Van Rensburg's maiden policy-speech, gained even more prominence in the OB-hierarchy. This is most vividly illustrated by the adoption of a motion on communism by the Grootraad less than a week after Van Rensburg's Crosby-speech. This motion, which was released to the press, reads as follow:

"Die O.B. neem met besorgdheid kennis van die groeiende en onbeteulde Kommunistiese gevaar in ons land, wat dreig om die blanke bevolking hier te vernietig.

Die O.B. is sterk onder die indruk van die feit dat die regering aan die een kant kommunistiese propaganda oogluikend toelaat, indien nie begunstig, selfs onder nie-blankes, terwyl aan die ander kant die burgerlike blanke bevolking, selfs op die platteland, deur ontwapening weerloos gemaak is. Die O.B. eis derhalwe beveiliging van die blanke bevolking deur die onderdrukking van alle Kommunistiese organisasies, of anders die reg van die blanke burger om homself te herbewapen."<sup>44)</sup>

The influence of Van Rensburg's speech shows clearly from this resolution, particularly with regard to the damning criticism of the Smuts-government for allegedly allowing and even promoting communism. Important to note, however, is the relative absence of controversial ideological elements - which formed the basis of Van Rensburg's speech at Crosby - from this resolution. The insistence on repression as a mechanism to curtail communism corresponded in principle with those measures propagated by Louw and the HNP. White rearmament as an alternative for repression was indeed controversial. This was even more so given the implied utilisation of force as a mechanism to quell communism. The controversy in this instance, however, relate more to the proposed mechanism as such rather than the ideological rationalisation underlying it. Furthermore, care should be taken not to overemphasize the significance of rearmament per se in this resolution. Against the background of Smuts' decision to disarm certain categories

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44. INCH. P.V. 158: J.D. Jerling. File 13: "Notule van 'n Vergadering van die Grootraad gehou te Bloemfontein, 11-12/3/1943." This resolution was unanimously adopted on the first day of the meeting.

of the white civilian population, the OB may have attempted to capitalise on the unpopularity of this decision; thereby bolstering its own membership figures. The inclusion of rearmament in a public statement provided an ideal opportunity for this.

### 3.3.2. Crosby and its Aftermath

Prior to the formal surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945 and relative to the OB's national campaign against communism, the perceived dangers inherent to this ideology were regularly touched upon by Van Rensburg and Die O.B. Many of those remarks on communism made after March 1943, as indicated previously, could in some way be traced back to Van Rensburg's Crosby-speech. This period will be discussed by way of four aspects referred to by Van Rensburg in his Crosby speech. Of particular importance is the manner in which these elements came to be refined after March 1943.

#### a) The Eventuality of a Socialist World-Order

As before, the irreversible eventuality of a world wide rotation towards Socialism was accentuated. Van Rensburg, during May 1943, once again stressed the "... onverbiddelike noodwendigheid ..." <sup>45)</sup> of a socialist world-order. In a pamphlet aimed at the English-speaking population, this 'phenomenon' was explained in the following terms:

"We, the generation of to-day, are living in the birth-pangs of a Social World-Revolution. He would be a rash prophet who tried to delineate the post-war face of the world. But one thing can be said with certainty, namely that the Old-World, the pre-war world of liberal Capitalism is gone - for ever and a day. And in its stead there looms the new-socialist order for all to see." <sup>46)</sup>

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45. OB-Archives, KG II/7/49. A summary of Van Rensburg's speech was published in Die O.B. of 12.5.1943 - nearly a fortnight after its initial presentation.

46. Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwag, p. 29. Important to note is that this pamphlet was published in June 1944.

Die O.B. repeatedly referred to this expected international rotation.<sup>47)</sup> Protagonists of conventional party politics were vehemently criticised in an editorial during June 1944 for promoting the cause of a 'tottering' system such a democracy. This, according to Die O.B., only promoted communism.<sup>48)</sup>

Concurrently, however, elements which came forth from the OB's social campaign against communism were added to this 'national' campaign. The inclusion of these elements were inconspicuous and created the impression of it being a further refinement of the OB contention relating to the eventuality of a socialist world-order.

The eventuality of a socialist-dominated world, as indicated, was generally agreed on within the OB. Within the context of this final phase of international ideological deployment, so it was alledged, two forms of Socialism would predominate, viz. 'national' and 'anti-national'. Following Van Rensburg's speech at Crosby, the concept of a 'counter-revolution' came to be propagated as a measure to rid society of the 'anti-national' form of Socialism (read also communism). Van Rensburg, in January 1945, defined this concept:

"Deur kontra-revolusie bedoel ek 'n algehele maatskaplike omwenteling en die herinrigting van die volk se hele lewe volgens die sosialistiese diensmotief. Ek bedoel nie dat alle stabiliserende ankers losgeruk moet word nie. Ek wil nie die bande van kerk, familie en besittings vernietig [sic!] nie, ook nie die internasionalisme, ateisme en materialisme van die kommuniste aanvaar nie. Ek wil 'n volkstaat hê, daargestel deur 'n eengesinde en gedissiplineerde volk, met mag om alle onheile van die volk af te wend en met genoeg sosialisme om die volk in sy bestaan te beveilig en te beskerm."<sup>49)</sup>

This description of the proposed counter-revolution, seen in isolation, concurred with the general structuring of Van

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47. See for example Die O.B., 21.6.1944 and 10.1.1945.

48. Die O.B., 28.6.1944: "Word Noodwendig Bondgenote" [editorial].

49. Die O.B., 10.1.1945.

Rensburg's Crosby speech. Within the context of Socialism allegedly constituting the final phase of international ideological deployment and -development, this description, thus, consisted of, firstly, an identification of those qualities of communism (internationalism, atheism and materialism) adjudged to be perilous and, secondly, a compilation of the broad objectives of the OB's anti-internationalist form of Socialism.

In practice, however, the elimination of communism progressively came to be linked to the eradication of liberalism, capitalism and democracy. The setting of preconditions (the elimination of liberalism, capitalism and democracy) for the eradication of communism did not concur with Van Rensburg's original treatise on the perceived inexorable eventuality of Socialism.<sup>50</sup>) In terms of the argument forwarded by Van Rensburg in his Crosby-speech, capitalism or a capitalist democracy would already have had disappeared prior to the commencement of the "final struggle" (read also counter-revolution) against communism. Arguably the finest exposition of OB-thinking on the perceived linkage between capitalism and communism was provided by a pamphlet published in June 1944:

"No, let us regard Communism not as a new thriller but as a fungus springing from the evils of capitalism. A review of the facts teaches that Capital accumulates Capital and that this accumulation can only be done by taking away from the weaker competitors who then fall under the subjection of the stronger. This is an age-old truth and long before Marx it was said that from him that hath not shall be taken even that which he hath. Briefly, capitalism breeds its antithesis, the poverty-stricken proletariat. And out of the proletariat arises the Communist vanguard.

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50. Van Rensburg's exposition of the dialectical evolvement of Socialism will, for the aims of this analysis, be considered both valid and representative of OB-thinking on this issue.

Recognising this we seek the fault not with the proletariat who is acting in self-preservation, but rather do we seek it in the hopeless subordination of labour to capital, of the "have nots" to the "haves". Only if we can break the stranglehold of soulless capitalism can we face Communism with a clear conscience and with a determination to stamp out ruthlessly this threat to the preservation of white South Africa. To leave the money-power intact and to fight the man or woman who, in communist organisations, has sought refuge from capitalist exploitation, is to confuse cause and effect - to put the cart before the horse.

Therefore we regard the smashing of capitalism by a nationally orientated Socialism as a vitally necessary stage in the final line-up against the most deadly threat the white man has ever faced in our country - Communism. Communism and a Black Soviet Republic"<sup>51</sup>) (*italics mine*).

Rather than acknowledging the ideological adaptation of Van Rensburg's original treatise on communism, this was presented as a refinement of earlier OB points of view. The terms 'revolution' and 'counter-revolution' proved particularly helpful in this regard. On several occasions during the course of the war-years, the expected evolutionary movement towards Socialism was described as the "Revolution of the Twentieth Century".<sup>52</sup>) Relative to anti-communism, this concept, following the introduction of anti-capitalism as an integral part of the campaign against communism, was applied divergently - through the utilisation of the terms 'revolution' and 'counter-revolution' - to provide for both communism and capitalism. Die O.B., in discussing the concept "Revolution of the Twentieth Century", provided a fair indication of the

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51. Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwag, pp. 31-32.

52. See F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.124.

manner in which this divergent approach was employed:

"Nie alleen wil die O.B. as sosialistiese beweging die kapitalisme vernietig nie, maar ook as volksbeweging wil hy die kommunisme teengaan. Die rewolusie van die twintigste eeu gaan teen die kapitalisme - as sulks is die O.B. 'n deel van hierdie rewolusie en is hy rewolusionêr. Maar die rewolusie van die twintigste eeu het ook 'n ander aspek - een wat spesifiek teen die kommunistiese rewolusie gaan. Hierin deel die O.B. ook, daarom is hy ook kontra-rewolusionêr. Die taak van die O.B. is nie alleen om die kapitalisme te beveg nie, maar ook om te verhoed dat kommunisme sy plek sal inneem. Daarom moet die O.B. 'n kontra-rewolusie uitvoer."<sup>53)</sup>

#### b) World War II and Communism

Van Rensburg and other OB-functionaries, in relating their warnings on communism to the continuing war, continued to stress, on the one hand, the expected outcome of the battle for Europe and, on the other, the implications of a Europe dominated by the USSR for specifically South Africa. Compared to Van Rensburg's Crosby-speech, however, significant adjustments had occurred on both counts. Most distinctive was the gradual evolvment away from indications of tacit support for the Axis war effort. In time this came to be replaced by an increased emphasis on the "bastion-theory" and the implications of a Soviet dominated Europe. The centrality of Germany's position in both instances, however, was never questioned. Nonetheless, no longer was the emphasis placed on the defeat of the German Wehrmacht, but rather on the possibility of a destruction of Germany per se.

Relative to communism and the outcome of World War II, the "bastion-theory" and the implications of a Europe dominated by the Soviet Union, when utilised, normally appeared in tandem. Smuts' 'explosive' speech of November 1943, needless to say, provided the ideal opportunity for the inclusion of remarks relating to the expectation of a Soviet dominated post-war Europe. Van Rensburg, in reacting to this speech, welcomed

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53. Die O.B., 23.2.1944. See also editorial "Die Kontra-Revolution" in the same edition.

Smuts' frankness, but also criticised his perceived defeatism for wanting to divide the post-war world into "... een ateisties-kommunistiese en ... twee kapitalistiese Empires ..."54) The destruction of Germany, "... die sterkste en ... enigste Europese bolwerk teen Kommunisme ...",55) would only hasten the eventuality of Soviet domination. According to Van Rensburg the fall of Germany would result in the establishment of "... a Soviet-controlled confederation stretching from the furtherst harbour in East Asia, Vladivostok, deep into Central Europe and, ere-long, to the Channel Ports of France and Flanders."56)

South Africa, described by Van Rensburg as an outpost of Europe, was ipso facto also going to be affected by the destruction of Germany as a historical bastion against communism.

South African involvement in the Allied alliance and the implications of this for the spreading of communism figured far less prominently in OB circles than had been the case with Van Rensburg's Crosby-speech. This applied both in terms of the perceived position of the Soviet Union within the Allied alliance as well as the direct implications of this for South Africa. Although Smuts' alleged liberal approach towards communism were still ascribed to his original decision to involve South Africa in the war, the Allied alliance and the Union's connection with it did not appear as a separate, identifiable element within the framework of this hermeneutic model.

On the solitary occasion where Die O.B. did indeed connect the spreading of communism to the Allied alliance, the content and structuring of this allegation differed significantly from Van

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54. Die O.B., 15.12.1943.

55. Ibid., 18.10.1944.

56. See Van Rensburg's speech in the Johannesburg City Hall on 30.4.1945. Published in pamphlet form under the title "The Communist Colossus in Europe and South Africa".



Rensburg's speech at Crosby.<sup>57)</sup> Whereas, on both occasions, it had been alleged that the Soviet Union was abusing its membership of the Allied alliance to promote communism, the motivation which allegedly made this possible differed in both instances. While Van Rensburg, in November 1943, ascribed this to the perceived absolute dominance of the alliance by the USSR, Die O.B., a year later, contended that Allied dependency on Soviet military support had resulted in an unwritten agreement in terms of which the Soviet Union was allowed a free hand in the propagation of communism in the allied states. This 'freedom' was grudgingly agreed to.

Within South Africa, according to Die O.B., the Smuts-government was "... ernstig bekommerd oor die kragdadige toename in ... [kommunistiese propaganda] ..." <sup>58)</sup> This differed significantly from the Grootraad-press statement of March 1943 which afforded the Smuts-administration a more active role in the spreading of communism.

### c). The UP-administration and Communism

Prior to May 1945, the OB, in relating the subject of communism to the UP-administration, adopted a dualistic approach. On the one hand the Smuts-administration, as before, was accused of favouritism towards the CPSA and of consciously promoting the cause of communism. Alternatively, as indicated in the previous paragraph, it was acknowledged that Smuts and his government were indeed concerned about the spreading of 'communism' in South Africa. However, even then the UP-administration was severely criticised for failing to adopt the required measures to tarnish the spreading of this ideology. In many ways these approaches represented different strategies, the utilisation of which depended on the broader context of the specific reference to communism.

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57. See Die O.B., 31.5.1944: "Stalin is reeds Diktator van Suid-Afrika" [editorial].

58. Ibid.

The first of these strategies were generally employed on occasion where the broader objective was to promote the cause of specifically the OB as a counter-force to communism. C.F. (Colin) Steyn, Minister of Justice, was the individual most often referred to by the OB as allegedly the leading protagonist of the communist cause within Government-circles. As before, examples of the alleged selective application of War Emergency Measures were repeatedly pointed to as indicative of Steyn's prejudice in favour of communism.<sup>59)</sup> Although care was taken not to describe or accuse Steyn of being a communist himself, the question of whether this was never implied remains a matter for speculation. A good example of this is provided by Van Rensburg's remarks on Steyn's involvement with the FSU:

"But as I explained, ... [Colin Steyn] is not merely Minister of Justice. He is also official patron of the communistic "Friends of the Soviet Union". In this latter capacity his hostility towards the OB is to be understood. Because the OB is par excellence the counter of Afrikanerdom to communism."<sup>60)</sup>

The second strategy was selectively employed on occasion where the concept of coherent opposition to communism was referred to by the OB. Although the idea of a broad coalition of forces to oppose the perceived menace of communism figured with varying degrees of prominence in OB-circles during the course of the period under discussion, the possibility of members of the ruling party being included in this alliance was referred to only once. This was done by way of an editorial in Die O.B. during July 1944.<sup>61)</sup>

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59. Van Rensburg repeatedly referred to particularly two examples: The dropping of charges against M.M. (Moses) Kotane, general secretary of the CPSA and the release of Y.M. (Yusuf) Dadoo, member of the CPSA's executive, from internment. See Van Rensburg's speeches at the Florida Lake in Johannesburg during May 1943 (reported in Die O.B. of 12.5.1943) and Crosby less than a year later. (OB-archives, KG II/7/53). At Florida Kotane was described as "... die gunsteling van die Minister van Justisie".

60. "The Communist Colossus in Europe and South Africa" [pamphlet].

61. Die O.B., 19.7.1944: "Red Suid-Afrika".

Of significance is the criticism levelled at the Smuts-government for failing to take concrete steps to combat the perceived menace of communism. Die O.B., in this regard, forwarded two explanations which, according to it, might well explain the absence of preventative measures to combat the perceived menace of communism. On the one hand it was alleged that the expected post-war dominance of the Soviet Union may have forced Smuts into a position where he was forced to take the lead in the 'bolshevisation' of the Union. This, according to Die O.B., would not be done out of sympathy with the communistic cause but constituted a desperate attempt to ensure his and the UP's prolonged survival as the ruling elite in South Africa. Alternatively, in a continuation of his holistic striving, Smuts' aim may well have been to replace England with "... die groter en meer kragtige Russiese kolossus"<sup>62</sup>) as 'interpreter' of South African interests. In the realization of this objective - according to Die O.B. - care had to be taken not to offend the Soviet Union by instituting repressive measures against communism.

#### d) Communism as Ideology

Atheism and internationalism, as before, were repeatedly referred to by Van Rensburg as characteristic of communism. Relative to the proletarian aspect of internationalism, Van Rensburg continued to emphasize the racial stratification of classes in South Africa. An important addition in this regard related to the alleged involvement of Jewry with communism. Although indications are that the connection between Jews and communism were already made prior to November 1943<sup>63</sup>), the formation of the Arbeidslaer resulted in a more coherent application of this contention. In time Jewry came to be

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62. Ibid.

63. Van Rensburg, in a speech at Pretoria-West during November 1943, described communism as "... hierdie Joodse aborsie ..." (OB-archives, KG II/7/49).

connected to both capitalism and communism:

"En wie is nou hierdie leiers van die kommunisme? ... Ons weet uit eie ervaring dat die Jood oor die algemeen nie deurgaans as 'n hande-arbeider nie. Hulle word getel onder die kapitaliste. Dat Jode die regeerders van Rusland is, is juis 'n bewys dat ons hier met die mees absolute vorm van kapitalisme te doen het."<sup>64</sup>)

Given the perceived reality of race as a determinant of class in South Africa, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Union would have to be - in the words of Van Rensburg - "... 'n naturelle proletariaat met 'n Joodse algemene staf."<sup>65</sup>)

Important, however, is to note that alleged Jewish affinity for communism held little prominence as a separate and unique contention in OB circles. Quantitatively speaking, on occasion where Jewry was connected to existing dogmas, this related more to the perceived Jewish nature and -origins of capitalism than alleged Jewish support for communism. The deduction to be drawn from this is that within the framework of the OB's campaign against specifically the alleged communist menace, Jewish communism and support for communism by Jews had little significance other than being an element of propaganda.

The alleged highly centralized system of control inherent to communism was also stressed by the OB. An interesting development in this regard related to the contention by Van Rensburg that the CPSA campaign for the arming of non-white soldiers could directly be traced back to a directive issued by the Third International. This directive, according to Van Rensburg, was as follows:

"Die triomf van die proletariaat veronderstel die bewapening van die proletariaat en die ontwapening van die burgerlike element."<sup>66</sup>)

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64. Die O.B., 19.7.1944: "Kolossale Bedrog" [editorial].

65. See Van Rensburg's speech at Grosby on May Day 1944 (OB-archives, KG II/7/53).

66. Ibid.

Van Rensburg's argument relating to the interdependence of race and class shows clearly from this quotation.

The seemingly violent and revolutionary nature of communism was described as another distinctive characteristic of this ideology. Van Rensburg, in quoting from Stalin's Problems of Leninism, summarised this characteristic in the following terms: "... it is evident that the Communists are aiming at a revolution by violence and that it is their duty to further this violent revolution. And ... this revolution is to be the prelude to a long period of many years of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."<sup>67</sup>)

Within South Africa, given the racial stratification of classes, the dictatorship of the proletariat implied the establishment of "[a] Jim Fish republic with Amalaita-gangs as shock-troops."<sup>68</sup>) This particular feature and its relevancy for South Africa was subsequently also utilised to promote the cause of specifically the OB as an extra-parliamentary resistance movement against communism.

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Intimately connected to all of these aspects were remarks on the most effective manner to oppose communism. In practice this boiled down to the question of whether the OB per se or a broadly constituted coalition of forces provided the best alternative for opposing communism. In attempting to find a satisfactory answer to this question, the OB adopted a dualistic approach whereby both possibilities were selectively stressed.

Less than three weeks after his maiden policy-speech on communism, Van Rensburg again referred to this topic at a

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67. See "The Communist Colossus in Europe and South Africa" [pamphlet].

68. Ibid.

public meeting in Cape Town. Relative to the opposing of communism, it was declared that "[d]ie Ossewabrandwag as buite-parlementêre volksbeweging is dan ook die enigste mag wat die kommunisme in Suid-Afrika kan beveg."<sup>69)</sup> Simultaneously, however, Van Rensburg connected the perceived menace of communism to the called-for establishment of a volksfront [literally people's front] before the coming general election of July 1943. Although Van Rensburg did not elaborate on the composition and function of the proposed volksfront, the reference to this concept, against the backdrop of remarks on communism, indicate that Van Rensburg perceived the eradication of communism to be an important motivation for the creation of such a front. Less than a year later Die O.B. went even further by stating that the campaign against communism could only be successfully executed "... as die hele volk opstaan en hulle soos een man aangord tot die stryd."<sup>70)</sup> In other words, whereas, in 1943, the OB identified the alleged menace of communism to be an important motivation for the creation of a united front, by 1944 it was alleged that a unified Afrikanerdom was a prerequisite for effectively opposing communism.

Following Van Rensburg's Cape Town speech, a continuation of this dualistic approach evolved. In so far as the proposal for coherent opposition to communism was concerned, this subject was touched upon at two occasions during the course of this period. In July 1944 Die O.B. delivered a highly emotional plea for the establishment of "... 'n gemeenskaplike front teen hierdie buitelandse bedreiging ... [van kommunisme]."<sup>71)</sup> This front were to consist of "... alle Christelike en nasionale groepe ... [in Suid-Afrika]."<sup>72)</sup> Relative to the participation of political movements, Die O.B., stressed that all political parties, including the UP, had to be represented in this front.

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69. Die O.B., 31.3.1943.

70. Die O.B., 19.7.1944: "Die Kontra-Revolusie" [editorial].

71. Die O.B., 19.7.1944: "Red Suid-Afrika" [editorial].

72. Ibid.

Party political divisions and other divisive factors were of secondary importance compared to the necessity of joint action against this perceived common danger.

Van Rensburg, in accordance with a Grootraad-resolution, in February 1945, launched another attempt to promote the concept of united front-tactics in opposing communism. This campaign took the form of a concrete and formal proposal whereby the leaders of each of the HNP, Afrikanerparty, NO and Greyshirt-movement were invited to "... eventuele samesprekings met die doel om teen gemeenskaplike gevare 'n gesamentlike ... front te stig ... "73) Communism was identified as one of an unspecified number of dangers demanding coherent attention. Van Rensburg added two preconditions for OB participation: Firstly, all of the movements participating in the front should be allowed to retain their own separate identities and, secondly, the proposed front would have to be so broadly constituted as to allow for the inclusion of "... alle elemente wat mik om los te kom van onnasionale en kapitalistiese magte wat tans regerings maak of breek."74)

Care must be taken not to overemphasize the importance of the 1945-initiative. Roberts and Trollip indicate that this venture should also be seen against the background of the OB experiencing a serious loss of support.<sup>75)</sup> The ultimate objective underlying this "... half-hearted gesture"<sup>76)</sup> may thus well have been to ensure the continued survival of the OB as a factor in Afrikaner nationalist politics. Anti-communism, within the context of this aim, may well have served as a slogan for the potential rallying of support. Van Rensburg's

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73. OB-archives. KG II/5/28: Letter Van Rensburg-Pirow, 26.2.1945.

74. Ibid.

75. M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African Opposition, 1939-1945, pp.168-169.

76. Ibid.

and the Grootraad's 'peace-plan', for the sake of completeness, was rejected by all approached.

Simultaneously, and even after the 1945-initiative, the OB continued to emphasize the more exclusivist approach. In motivating this strategy, two aspects were regularly referred to:

- (i) The interdependence of race and class in South Africa demanded extra-parliamentary action to combat communism. The OB, with its declared aversion of conventional party politics and its "commando spirit" were ideally suited for such a venture.
- (ii) Both organisationally and ideologically the OB represented the most viable counter-force to communism. Ideologically because the socio-political programme of the OB was the natural counter-balance to communism. Organisationally because the eradication of communism demanded coordinated and effective reaction. The OB, organised along the lines of the traditional commando system, provided par excellence for this.

Van Rensburg summarised these 'positive attributes' of the OB in rather dramatic fashion:

"... die dag sal kom, en spoedig ook, waar die Afrikanerdom die Here sal dank dat Hy ... betyds 'n Volksbeweging laat ontstaan het wat die Volk saamgesnoer het vir buiteparlementêre afweeraksie; wat vinnig en beslis kan optree, dwarsdeur die land, nie net elke vyf jaar nie dog elke dag en elke nag van elke jaar. 'n Organisasie wat nie in kiesafdelings en kongresse gedeel is nie, dog in weerbare kommandos onder offisiere wat oor die drie jaar lank al teen 'n oormag moes veg. 'n Organisasie wat ideologies en organisatories in ons volk die sterkste teenvoeter is teen Kommunisme, naamlik die Ossewa-Brandwag.."77)

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77. See Die O.B., 10.2.1943.



### 3.4. THE OB AND THE SOCIAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMMUNISM

The social campaign against communism - as indicated previously - was facilitated by the elevated importance attached to the white working class as a factor in South African politics. This 'awareness' was not only limited to the OB, but included a broad spectrum of movements, institutions and organisations ranging from the three Afrikaans Protestant Churches to the Afrikaner-Broederbond [literally Afrikaner League of Brothers] (AB). The increased emphasis on the white working class within the OB was part of a larger process aimed at widening the range of appeal of the OB by making special efforts to gain converts from particular sections of the South African population.<sup>78)</sup> Although the motivation underlying this step falls outside the scope of this study, it must be noted that the fortunes of the OB were intimately tied up with the course of the Axis war effort. By November 1943 the Axis alliance had clearly lost the initiative in the continuing war and were rapidly retreating before the Allied onslaught.<sup>79)</sup>

The formation of the Arbeidslaer marked the advent of the OB's social campaign against communism. Although indications are that the concept of the Arbeidslaer may have been promoted within the OB prior to November 1943, it was only in the course of that month that the establishment of this front was formally agreed to by the Grootraad.<sup>80)</sup> Relative to the sanctioning of the concept of the Arbeidslaer, this would be in accordance

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78. Apart from the white working class, special attention was also paid to members of the Union Defence Force and English-speaking whites. This, according to Roberts and Trollip, was done by de-emphasizing the 'revolutionary' aspects of the OB's creed in favour of "... a constructive social programme which should be both Nationalist and Socialist, but which would be less obviously than before National-Socialist." (Roberts and Trollip: op.cit., pp.157-158).

79. G.D. Scholtz: Die Onwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner, VIII, pp.240-241.

80. See Van Rensburg's annual report to the Grootraad in September 1944 (OB-archives, KG II/8/56).

with De Klerk's argument on the Grootraad being the main decision-making forum within the OB. Indeed, on this occasion, the function of the Grootraad was not only limited to a sanctioning of the Arbeidslaer-concept, but a major policy document issued by it in the same month determined the basic parameters of the policy to be expounded by the Arbeidslaer. Conversely, as indicated previously, the "Ten Point Policy Declaration", may well have been the work of Meyer. Important for the aims of this analysis, however, is to note that this document causally affected the OB's social campaign against communism.

This document, which will conveniently be referred to as the "Ten Point Policy Declaration", also addressed itself to specifically communism:

"10. Neither Capitalism nor Communism. Capitalism, with its international control, particularly as regards the mines, industries, trade and the money market must be done away with. The prices, profits and losses of production are to be controlled; speculation with the land, housing, food and clothing of the people is to be prevented. Godless and raceless Communism is to be overcome by a Christian and national Socialism"<sup>81</sup>) (*italics in the original*).

It needs to be stressed that Section Ten must be read in conjunction with the remainder of the Ten Point Policy Declaration. Relative to the subject of anti-communism, this document provided a diagnosis of the 'ailment' ("[g]odless and raceless Communism") in the final point while the remainder of the document provided an explication of the proposed remedy ("a Christian and national Socialism").

Most prominent in the Arbeidslaer was P.J. (Piet) Meyer.<sup>82</sup>) Van Rensburg officially launched the Arbeidslaer at a public

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81. Some facts about the Ossewa-Brandwag, p.100.

82. This statement is validated by a transcription of an interview with a former member of the Arbeidslaer, G.H. Beetge. See "Onderhoud Gevoer met mnr G.H. Beetge van Pieter Neethling-gebou, Pretoria" (Interview no.90, OB-archives, Potchefstroom).

meeting in Pretoria-West during November 1943. Prior to May 1945 Van Rensburg regularly referred to the perceived role of the Arbeidslaer in the counter-revolution against communism. Meyer, as acting leader of the Arbeidslaer, was not only responsible for the functional- and organisational deployment of the front, but also - and even more importantly - the explication of Arbeidslaer-policies.

Meyer progressively came to assume the role of leading theoretician in the ideological construction of the OB's anti-communism. Prior to his inclusion in the Grootraad,<sup>83)</sup> Meyer had already written extensively on the expected ideological restructuring of the twentieth century world. Relative to anti-communism, Meyer, in his writings, paid special attention to the perceived connection between capitalism and communism and the position of the working class vis á vis this connection and the expected new socialist world-order. Meyer's inclusion in the Grootraad and his appointment as acting leader of the Arbeidslaer provided him with a further opportunity to expand, refine and ultimately propagate his ideas to a wider audience. In so far as the Ten Point Policy Declaration may have been intended as a framework for the functional and ideological development and -deployment of the Arbeidslaer, Meyer's philosophies were atonable with the principles identified by this document. Indeed, if it is considered that Meyer had already expounded the majority of those ideas which came to be regarded as synonymous with OB-social policy prior to the formation of the Arbeidslaer, it may well have been that Meyer was the architect-in-chief of the Grootraad Ten Point Policy Declaration. For the aims of this analysis it will be accepted

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83. Meyer, like so many other G/HNP-supporters, had been a member of the Ossewa-Brandwag since its inception in 1939. In the period preceding the hostilities between the OB and HNP, Meyer was a member of the Transvaal executive of the OB. As a result of the schism between the OB and HNP, Meyer, according to Hans van Rensburg, was forced to withdraw from the public activities of the OB. Meyer, in his private capacity, however, "... het ... sy pligte as Brandwag steeds getrou nagekom." (Die O.B., 10.2.1943) The possibility of Meyer being influenced in his writings by OB-policy can therefore not be excluded.

that Meyer did indeed play a leading role in the ideological construction of the OB's anti-communism.

### 3.4.1. The Ideological Construction of the OB's Anti-Communism

Central to the ideological construction of the OB's anti-communism was the concept of an 'organic volksunity'. Afrikaners, in terms of this concept, formed a single coherent entity, the unity of which was fundamentally more important than the constituent elements making up this entity.<sup>84</sup>) Explicitly defined in ethnic terms (initially even ethnolinguistically), the concept of an organic volksunity had to reflect the inner unity in purpose of the volk. The proposed Christian-National Authoritarian State, in its constitutional-, political- and economic structuring, had to embody this living organic volksentity. Van Heerden refers most effectively to this belief in stating that "... die staat ... [is die] draer van die volk se persoonlikheid."<sup>85</sup>) Socially, the organising and mobilisation of the volk on the basis of this organic entity represented a microcosm of and substructure for the establishment of the proposed republic. Van Rensburg, in his Crosby-speech, provided an indication of the social objectives of the OB and the connection thereof with the proposed

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84. For a more detailed exposition of this statement see the family policy of the OB as published in brochure form under the title "Gesonde Huisgesinne Bou 'n Lewenskrachtige Volk!" See also P.J. Meyer: Die Vooraand van ons Vrywording, pp.18-20.

85. F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.134.

republic:

"A man's, or a woman's, class or vocation is an incidental ... [and] can change overnight, but his blood, his race, is something given him by God, something which he can not escape as long as he lives. It is his Self. The Authoritarian National State sees in each member of the national community the bearer of the blood ... One and all, irrespective of the class of their parents, they are the future of Afrikanerdom, the nation of tomorrow.

Every generation, and also every individual is merely a link in the chain of generations. And the whole chain, not a particular link, is Afrikanerdom. The past generations are as much a part of our national make-up and the future- and present generation is merely a link, a means to an end, not an end in itself.

But a chain is never stronger than the weakest link. And for this reason it is our desire and our interest to see to it that all links are equally cared for and equally healthy, irrespective of the class or vocation in which that link is placed. For the sake of the whole chain.

The National Authoritarian State desires to weld them all into one totality, not to divide them into groups, parties or classes. A non-party state, because divisions are a luxury for fair-weather days and not for the period of storm and stress which is now sweeping the earth."<sup>86)</sup>

The organic unity of Afrikanerdom as an entity-in-totality served as yardstick in the evaluation of other ideologies. Particularly important for the aims of this analysis is the ideologies of Liberalism, Capitalism and Communism and the alleged existence of a causal relationship between them.

Liberalism, which Meyer described as the "... grootste en mees kragtigste vyand ..." <sup>87)</sup> of the volk, allegedly contributed fundamentally to the dissension and disunity within Afrikanerdom. Compared to the Volkscentrism of the OB's Christian-national ideology, liberalism - according to Meyer - attached a pivotal importance to the interest of the individual

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86. Cited in Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwag, pp.39-40.

87. P.J. Meyer: Die Vooraand van ons Vrywording, p.7.

per se. Under this ideology, volk, according to Meyer, was defined as "... die som van selfonderhoudende individue wat, afgesien van ras, taal of kultuur, saamgegroepeer word in 'n eenheidsstaat met die doel om die eiebelang van elk te beskerm."<sup>88</sup>) In the South African context, this volk would thus comprise "... Engelse, Jode, Afrikaners, kleurlinge en naturelle ..."<sup>89</sup>) Each subject-member of this 'liberal' state had a wide range of rights and freedoms, but only one obligation, namely the promotion of his own particular interests.

In South Africa, according to the OB, liberalism had manifested itself in the British imperial domination of South Africa which, in turn, was carried by the system of parliamentary democracy. Meyer explained the perceived connection between liberalism and democracy in stating that in the course of the nineteenth century a synthesis had occurred between liberalism as a philosophy of life and democracy as a method for politico-constitutional ordination. Democracy, as a result of this synthesis, had acquired a strong liberal character with the consequent compartementalisation of the powers of state in legislative, executive and judicial branches. These limited powers of state guaranteed individual rights and freedoms to the detriment of the volk. The primary task of the liberal-democratic state was thus to protect and serve the rights of the individual through the adoption of legislative measures and their application by the other branches of state.<sup>90</sup>)

Political parties, the primary actors in the system of parliamentary democracy, were made up of "... groep[e] van ... enkelinge, met min of meer ooreenstemmende belange ..."<sup>91</sup>) who,

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88. Ibid.

89. P.J. Meyer: Afrikanereenheid (Wapenskou, vol. 2(2), 1941), p.20.

90. P.J. Meyer: Demokrasie of Volkstaat? (Wapenskou, vol. 3 (4), 1942), pp.5-15.

91. P.J. Meyer: Afrikanereenheid (Wapenskou, vol. 2(2), 1941), p.20.

in organising themselves into a political party, were promoting their own sectional interests. This, once again, was detrimental to the collective interests of the volk. Meyer, in 1944, subsequently declared that the system of parliamentary democracy was merely another example of the British divide-and-rule strategy to ensure the perpetual subjugation of Afrikanerdom.<sup>92)</sup> On a number of occasions it was noted that a significant portion of Afrikaners who, for all intents and purposes, should have been part of the OB's organically defined volksbeweging [literally movement of the people], had been converted to the 'liberalistic cause'. Liberalism in general and more specifically the system of parliamentary democracy were thus factors which divided Afrikanerdom nationally or horizontally.

Concurrently, capitalism also came to be connected to liberalism and the system of parliamentary democracy. Capitalism, according to Meyer, was a manifestation of British imperialism (read also liberalism) in its economic form.<sup>93)</sup> The unqualified and unfettered freedoms of liberalism on the politico-constitutional level had thus been duplicated in the economic sphere. The application of the capitalist system had resulted in the socio-economic partition of the organic volk into two opposing sides, namely those who possessed capital or wealth (referred to as employers/bosses) and those who were dependent on the aforementioned group to earn a living (proletariat/workers). In practice this had led to a situation where, as a result of exploitation, the relationship between the working class and capitalist minority had deteriorated into militant class struggle. Subsequently, according to Die O.B., the term 'worker' has been degenerated into "... 'n kapitalistiese woord wat iemand van 'n minderwaardige sosiale stand moet aandui."<sup>94)</sup> Liberalism in general and more

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92. P.J. Meyer: Die Stryd van die Afrikanerwerker, p.15.

93. Ibid., p.10.

94. Die O.B., 26.1.1944.

specifically capitalism were thus factors which divided Afrikanerdom socially or vertically.

Apart from contributing to the social dismemberment of the organic volksunity, capitalism allegedly also played a part in promoting the horizontal alienation of members of the volk. Although Meyer typified capitalism as the economic equivalent of political liberalism, it was also stated that within the capitalist system of bosses and workers, both classes of people had developed into political classes which played a significant role in the political ordering of the whole.<sup>95)</sup> Relative to the form and extent of this alleged influencing, different opinions were susceptible within the OB. Apart from noting a "... enge eenheid ..."<sup>96)</sup> between capitalism and democracy, Meyer did not elaborate on this contention. A.J.H. van der Walt (member of the OB-Grootraad), in a speech at Stellenbosch in October 1942, stated that the organised geldmag [literally money-power], through its control of the printed media, was able to influence the electorate in supporting their interests.<sup>97)</sup> In this manner the geldmag was able to influence the decision-making process.

Die O.B., however, went further than anyone else in this regard. In all democracies, according to the OB-organ, capitalists controlled and directed the government of the day.<sup>98)</sup> In ensuring its behind-the-scene dominance, the geldmag employed classical divide-and-rule tactics in partitioning the volk into political parties. World War II, against this background, was described as a war to ensure the continued domination of the world by "[d]ie internasionale geldmag

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95. P.J. Meyer: Arbeidsordening in die Volksbeweging en Volkstaat, p.3.

96. See P.J. Meyer: Die Stryd van die Afrikanerwerker, p.10.

97. See F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.142.

98. Die O.B., 23.2.1944.



..."<sup>99</sup>) Irrespective of whichever stance reflected the majority opinion in the OB, the connection between democracy and capitalism had the added advantage of, when linking the eradication of communism to that of capitalism, the term capitalism not only referred to an economic system whereby the forces and means of production were controlled by private initiative, but also included the system of parliamentary democracy.

Communism, in terms of origin and growth, was causally connected to capitalism-liberalism. The division of people into classes and the resultant class-struggle were - as indicated earlier - respectively an 'invention' and product of the liberal systems of capitalism and democracy. Communism, according to the OB, depended on the continued existence of this schismatic division and the class struggle for the promotion of its principles. Communism was therefore a creation of liberalism and, as such, the latter "... het die weg van rewolusionêre ondermyning en verbokkeling van die Afrikanereenheid vir die kommuniste voorberei."<sup>100</sup>) Meyer even proceeded to state that "[i]n ons land is die kapitalisme en kommuniste as bondgenote teen die Afrikanereenheid gerig. Ons erken hulle as ons gemeenskaplike vyande."<sup>101</sup>) Subsequently, and as a result, the eradication of communism came to be linked to that of capitalism.<sup>102</sup>) Indeed, in many ways, the destruction of capitalism came to be perceived as a prerequisite for the annihilation of communism from society.

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99. Ibid., 5.1.1944.

100. P.J. Meyer: Afrikanereenheid (Wapenskou, vol. 2(2), 1941), p.21.

101. Ibid., p.22.

102. This contention was repeatedly referred to by Meyer and other OB functionaries. See for example Meyer's speeches, in his capacity as member of the OB-executive, at Pretoria (21.4.1943) and Cape Town (8.5.1943) as reported in Die O.B. of 5.5.1943 and 26.5.1943.

Apart from being causally connected to capitalism, communism - according to the OB - was both a refinement of and logical conclusion to liberalism-capitalism. On the one hand, in so far as it contributed to the alienation of specifically the Afrikaner-proletariat from the organic volksunity, communism was a continuation of liberalism. However, whereas the individual as such served as point of departure in liberalism, communism linked up with "... die abstrakte som van alle enkelinge."<sup>103</sup>) Communism was thus 'collective liberalism'. In this regard Meyer stated that "[d]ie verskil [tussen kommunisme en kapitalisme/liberalisme] ... [is] 'n verskil van omhulsel en nie van wese nie. Daarom die hartlike en noue samewerking van Britse liberalisme en Russiese kommunisme <sup>104</sup>) ten spyte van uiterlike omhulserskille wat albei graag wil handhaaf."<sup>105</sup>) Furthermore, although liberalism propagated equality between black and white, in practice, it did not implement this conviction. Communism, on the other hand, both preached and practiced racial equality. Communism was thus "... konsekwente liberalisme."<sup>106</sup>)

Closely connected to this last aspect was the contention that whereas liberalism, in its economic casing, envisaged a 'private capitalism', State socialism (read also communism) would, "... in sy mees konsekwente vorm tot Staatskapitalisme [lei]."<sup>107</sup>) Workers, in the communist state, would thus become the wage slaves of the state as opposed to being wage slaves of a group of individuals under the capitalist order.

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103. P.J. Meyer: Afrikanereenheid (Wapenskou, vol. 2(2), 1941), p.22.

104. A reference to the Anglo-Soviet war alliance.

105. P.J. Meyer: Afrikanereenheid (Wapenskou, vol. 2(2), 1941), p.22.

106. Ibid.

107. P.J. Meyer: Die Stryd van die Afrikanerwerker, pp.92-93.

The Ossewa-Brandwag, compared to the private capitalism of liberalism and state socialism/capitalism of communism, envisaged and propagated Afrikaner Volkssocialism.

### 3.4.2. Volkssocialism and the Arbeidslaer: The Ideological and Organisational Counter-Balance to Communism

Van Rensburg, in his 1944-annual report to the Grootraad, described the modus operandi of the Arbeidslaer in the following terms:

"Die doel van hierdie front is om die stedelike blanke werker - die deurslaggewende magsfaktor van die toekoms - en die plattelandse volksgenoot deur middel van die [Ossewa-Brandwag] ... hegter aanmekaar te snoer om sodoende volksverdelende invloede (Kommunisme ens.) teen te werk en tergelykertyd die slaankrag van die O.B. te verhoog. Die metode is, benewens ideologiese bearbeiding van werkers, om die werker se vertroue en toegeneentheid te wen deur O.B.-steun aan hom te bied sonder om hom te vra om sy vakunies of ander organisasies te verlaat of te verswak"<sup>108</sup>) (*italics in the original*).

Van Rensburg's description of the purpose and method of the Arbeidslaer will, for the aims of this analysis, serve as point of departure in discussing the OB's Volkssocialism and its implications for the topic of anti-communism. As indicated earlier, the OB perceived the eradication of communism to ultimately co-depend on the simultaneous destruction of capitalism. Relative to the social campaign against communism, attention will therefore also have to be focussed on those elements of anti-communism which encompassed the twin 'menace' of capitalism and communism.

Of pivotal importance in the ideological construction of the OB's anti-communism, as indicated, was the concept of an organic volksunity. Although Meyer traced the striving towards volksunity back to the nineteenth century Great Trek, "... 'n

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108. "Ossewa-Brandwag. Verslag van Kommandant-Generaal aan groot Raad. September 1944" (OB-archives, KG II/8/56).

nasionale en sosiale volksbeweging ...",<sup>109</sup>) this striving, particularly in the early part of the twentieth century, was an exclusivist national struggle against imperialism which did not take account of or encompass the social struggle against capitalism. The OB, as an all-inclusive volksmovement, not only had to reflect the changed social composition of Afrikanerdom, as brought about by capitalism (read also industrialisation and urbanisation), but the newly created urban (white) proletariat, together with the more traditional rural elements of Afrikaner-society, had to be submerged in a single organic entity. Announcing the establishment of the Arbeidslaer, Die O.B. referred to this essentially symbiotic relationship in the following terms:

"Die werkers is 'n groep mense wat in werklikheid in die volkslewe bestaan en die kern van die volk vorm ... Die Afrikanervolk, sonder die Afrikanerwerker, is niks en sal ook nooit iets wees nie ... Maar dit is net so waar dat Afrikanerwerker sonder die Afrikanervolk niks is nie en ook nooit iets sal wees nie."<sup>110</sup>)

In terms of broad objectives, this implied - in the words of Van Rensburg - "... 'n nasionalisme wat sosiaal is en ...['n] sosialisme wat nasionaal is."<sup>111</sup>)

Organic volksunity, as concept, was divided into two further natural entities, namely that of the family and work-circle. Meyer explained this division:

"Within the organic life of the volk may be distinguished two core associations [kernverbande], namely the family, which is linked to a house, and the work-circle [arbeidskring] which is linked to a work-place. Every member of the volk is a member of a particular family and ... work-circle ...

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109. P.J. Meyer: Demokrasie of Volkstaat? (Wapenskou, vol. 3 (4), p.30.

110. Die O.B., 22.9.1943.

111. See Van Rensburg's speech at Pretoria-West on 13.11.1943 (OB-archives, KG II/7/49).

The volk as family-unity is an organic unity of blood, language, culture, genesis, tradition and destiny, a unity of inner spiritual community, the bearer of its own political regulation of authority and organisation.

The volk as work-unity is a creative and productive unity of work-force (spiritual, psychic and physical), which is the bearer of the welfare and spiritual material regulation of the interests of the volkslife as a whole."<sup>112</sup>)

The sphere of the family was thus the organic root of nationalism, while the work-entity formed the basis of the OB's Volkssocialism. Both spheres were complimentary, mutually interdependent and directly subordinate to the larger organic volksunity:

"Insoverre die Volksbeweging (read also OB) die volksgemeenskap as 'n familie-eenheid (of nasionale eenheid) verteenwoordig, is dit die draer van die volkbeleid ... soos dit neerslag vind in die karakter, tradisie en bestemming van die volk. Insoverre die Volksbeweging die volksgemeenskap as arbeidseenheid (of sosiale eenheid) verteenwoordig, is dit die draer van die voorspoed van die volk ... Beide hierdie sfere, nietemin, vorm 'n onverbreekbare eenheid onder die leierskap van die ... [Ossewa-Brandwag]."<sup>113</sup>)

Of special importance for the aims of this analysis is the organisation of the volk in terms of the work-circle principle.

The OB's blueprint for the social restructuring of the volk was based on three fundamental principles:

a) Afrikanerdom, in its national and social context, was essentially a labouring community. The Ten Point Policy

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112. Cited in T.D. Moodie: The Rise of Afrikanerdom. Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion, pp.230 - 231.

113. Die O.B., 7.7.1943.

Declaration made special mention of this:

"Unemployment is a reflection on the State and not on the Unemployed. The essence of our social policy is ... ensuring healthy families and good employment. Unemployment can not be tolerated and the worker is taken into the national life to insure him against the vicissitudes of the labour market. Only the working Afrikaner is regarded as a full Afrikaner and the real strengthening of every volk basically consists of the strength of its workers, its farmers and its soldiers, in other words those elements furthering production and those defending it."<sup>114)</sup>

b) The volk as a work-unity, was an organic entity. This organic principle had to be reflected in the composition, structuring and internal make-up of the volk. Van Rensburg identified the guiding principle in this regard:

"The sort of Socialism which answers with an emphatic 'yes' to the age-old question "Am I then my brother's keeper?" Where the Afrikaner, man or woman, labours for his or her daily bread, in the mines, on the roads, in the factories, in the stores and on the farms - there the Ossewa-Brandwag seeks him and seeks her and calls: 'My brother, my sister'."<sup>115)</sup>

c) Labour was a service to the volk (volksdiens) with mutual benefits and obligations for both the individual and family on the one hand and the volk on the other:

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114. Cited in Some facts about the Ossewa-Brandwag, p.100.

115. Cited in Ibid., p.82.

"Arbeidsdiens is wesenlik volksdiens. Deur volksdiens te verrig dra ons by tot die groei en ontwikkeling van die volksgemeenskap. Hoe hoër die ontwikkelingspeil wat die volkslewe bereik, hoe meer is die geleentheid vir selfverwesenliking wat aan elke volkslid gebied word"<sup>116</sup>) (*italics in the original*).

The Arbeidslaer, as the organisational manifestation of Volkssocialism, was primarily responsible for the promotion of the OB's social policies. The Arbeidslaer, in turn, concentrated on the organised white labour movement for the furthering of this objective. Judging from Van Rensburg's 1944-report to the Grootraad, the Arbeidslaer, in this context, was a self-appointed guardian (made up of all Afrikaners, irrespective of class-affiliation) whose primary task it was to guard over Afrikaner-interests in the trade union movement. Support for the OB's social policies - which Van Rensburg referred to as "... ideologiese kultivering ..." - and membership of the Arbeidslaer (and by definition the OB) would be a natural spin-off resulting from this guardianship role.<sup>117</sup>) In a May Day-speech at Crosby in 1944 Van Rensburg compared the role of the Arbeidslaer in this regard to that of

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116. Die O.B., 28.7.1943.

117. Van Rensburg, in his 1944 report to the Grootraad, referred to this aspect in the following terms: "Ons eventuele beloning lê in die feit, dat as die werker eenmaal landswye O.B.-steun in sy stryd geniet het, dan word dit 'n vanselfsprekendheid by hom om ook verder daarop te hoop en om op die O.B. in sy berekeninge te bou. Onvermydelik moet dit dan 'n geval wees van "een hand was die ander". Die werker sal die O.B. sterk maak om self sterk te wees. En daardeur word die O.B. se seggingskap groter en sy beleid in steeds wyer kringe aanneemlik" (*italics in the original*). See "Ossewa-Brandwag. Verslag van Kommandant-Generaal aan die Groot Raad. September 1944" (OB archives, KG II/8/56).

a waterfall:

"A waterfall, tumbling ceaselessly over the rocks, may be utilized by the enterprising and intelligent man to provide power. He harnesses the dynamic force to a turbine or to a waterwheel and with this force he runs a mill and grinds his corn and wins his bread and feeds and clothes his family. And in due course around the mill, at the foot of the waterfall, a community arises, with houses and schools and places of worship and recreation. All this because of the waterfall, the force of which has been utilized. But the waterfall itself asks nothing in return. It is indifferent to the fact whether men have harnessed its power or failed to do so. Because, wheel or no wheel, the cascade falls of its own [a]ccord, that is the law of its being.

And whether shortsighted or suspicious Trade Union officials fail to harness the social potential of the Ossewa-Brandweg to the worker's struggle or not, that can affect the OB as little as the waterwheel does the waterfall. It is the essence of the OB, the law of its being ..."<sup>118</sup>) (*italics mine*).

Undoubtedly, the cause of the OB in general and more specifically that of the Arbeidslaer may have indeed been promoted by the unilateral support for certain groupings within the organised (white) labour movement.<sup>119</sup>) Conversely, however, the OB employed the same divide-and-rule tactics communists were accused of. This was done through the appointment of OB 'operatives' who had to infiltrate the different labour organisations without revealing their true political identities.<sup>120</sup>) Although no empirical evidence exists by which

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118. See OB-archives, KG II/7/53.

119. This may have been particularly the case following the suspension of two of its members by the Garment Workers' Union in February/March 1944. Van Rensburg, in his 1944 report to the Grootraad, noted that the Arbeidslaer played a significant role in this regard. Apart from the GWU, the Building Workers' Industrial Union (BWIU) was also named as a 'recipient' of OB aid. (See "OB Kommandant-Generaal se Jaarlikse Verslag, September 1944", OB-archives, KG II/8/56.)

120. See undated document (in Meyer's handwriting) entitled "Werksmetode van die O.B. Arbeidslaer" (OB-archives, GR I/3/30). Apart from the BWIU, the GWU and MWU, this document indicate that OB operatives were also active in the leather-, steel- and transport industries.



the success of these endeavours can be measured, Moodie speculates that the NRT, following initial successes, may have been moribund until interfused with the OB-Arbeidslaer.<sup>121)</sup>

Volkssocialism and Communism were irreconcilable on the following major points:

- a) **Ethnicity and Racialism:** Ethnocentrism, as was the case with the G/HNP, NO and Greyshirt-movement, played a decisive role in the formulation of OB-policy. The term volk had to embody and direct the principle of (white) ethnic exclusivity within the OB. Volk, a term initially employed to denote inter-ethnic cultural diversity, in time came to be regarded as a political concept which, rather than exclusively denoting cultural differences between Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites, emphasized the uniqueness and irreconcilability of white and black and the striving of the former towards continued self-determination (read also domination) and national autonomy. The term volk thus came to take on a similar meaning as that of nation.<sup>122)</sup>

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121. T.D. Moodie: The Rise of Afrikanerdom. Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion, pp.232-233.

122. Volk, in the context of this chapter, is used as referring to both a cultural and national identity. Meyer's exposition of the social- and economic ordering of Afrikanerdom (see P.J. Meyer: Arbeidsordening in die Volksbeweging en Volkstaat) utilised the concept 'Volk' in its more conventional context as referring to a cultural community (see for example Meyer's definition of the Volk as a family-unity). Official OB policy, however, referred to this concept in its twin context (see for example Van Rensburg's speech on the OB's policy towards the English-speaking 'Afrikaner' at Potchefstroom during January 1941 - cited in Some facts about the Ossewa-Brandwag, pp.53-58). At other times the term volk was deliberately replaced by that of nation. The Ten Point Policy Declaration, in its Afrikaans-original, set out the conditions for absorption into the volk and State:

"4. Net Volksgenoot kan Burger word

Although it was acknowledged that the Union's population were made up of all individuals dwelling inside the geographic borders of this country, the South African nation (read also volk) consisted of white 'nationally minded' Europeans. As members of a superior civilization, the (white) South African volk had to follow a policy of trusteeship towards the non-white population with the eventual aim of realizing complete racial and territorial segregation and differentiation. This policy, which by January 1945 was referred to as apartheid<sup>123</sup>), had to be reflected in the economic ordering of South Africa. A policy document which circulated amongst members of the Grootraad, formulated this objective in no uncertain terms: "Ons moet dus 'n 100% blanke ekonomie, met 'n parallelle nie-blanke ekonomie, territoriaal afgeskei, as langtermyn doelstelling voorop stel."<sup>124</sup>) Integration

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Slegs volksgenote of potensieële volksgenote - dws slegs blankes wat assimileerbaar blyk, kan burgers word. Dus, benewens Afrikaans- en Engelssprekende burgers van vandag, ook ander van Europese afkoms. Maar burgerskap is afhanklik van onverdeelde trou teenoor Suid-Afrika. Ander blanke persone geniet wel gasreg, dog g'n burgerreg nie" (*italics in the original*). (Iets oor die Ossewa-Brandwag, p.12.)

The English equivalent reads as follows:

"4. Only Members of the Nation can become National Citizens.

Only Afrikaners or potential Afrikaners can become nationals. In other words, only assimilable white elements. That is to say, over and above the Afrikaners and English-speaking nationals of today we include other people of European descent. But nationality is founded on undivided loyalty to our Fatherland. Other Europeans only enjoy national hospitality - not national citizenship." (Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwag, pp.97-98.)

123. Die O.B., 17.1.1945.

124. "Die Arbeidsbeleid in die Nuwe Staat" (undated document). OB-archives, GR I/3/30.

could under no circumstances be allowed:

"Ten einde die bloedsuiwerheid van ons volk te handhaaf, is dit noodsaaklik dat daar ook in die arbeid geen gelykstelling en geen vermenging tussen blank en nie-blanke mag wees nie ... Tot tyd en wyl algehele segregasie deurgevoer is, moet arbeidssegregasie van blanke en nie-blanke werkers as 'n vereiste in alle bedrywe gestel word."<sup>125)</sup>

Communism, for which "... 'societas' nie die volk [is] nie, maar wel 'n internasionale proletariaat van werkers, van alle kleure en geure",<sup>126)</sup> thus undermined the very foundations of the OB's ethnically defined and racially constructed ideology. As a result of its negation of the colour bar, communism not only endangered white civilization, but also, and even more menacing, the continued existence of the South African volk as a nation. Hence it was repeatedly stressed that Bolshevism implied 'kaffirisation' in Africa.<sup>127)</sup> Relative to labour organisation, the volk, as an organic work-unity and as a matter of course, was also going to be affected by communism's striving towards racial equality. Indeed, with the possible exception of volksunity, communism's negation of the colour-bar was the strategy most often employed by the OB in its social campaign against the perceived menace of communism.

Relative to the perceived involvement of communists in non-white labour organisation, OB-speakers stressed that these individuals were motivated not by concern for the interests of the non-white worker, but by directives issued from Moscow.<sup>128)</sup> On the more general theme of

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125. Die O.B., 22.3.1944.

126. Ibid., 23.2.1944.

127. See Die O.B., 1.3.1944.

128. Ibid., 22.3.1944.

alleged non-white susceptibility to communism, the OB, as opposed to the repeated references by HNP speakers, made little mention of Africans allegedly providing fertile soil for Marxist philosophies. Meyer was the exception to the rule. However, while it was acknowledged that communism may have had some effect on the non-white proletariat in the past, Meyer stressed that the non-white trade union movement, in time, developed a character which differed fundamentally from that of communism.<sup>129)</sup> Meyer described this separate consciousness as 'native-socialism'.

- b) **Volksunity:** Volksunity, as indicated, was of central importance to the ideological construction of the OB's anti-communism. Relative to the volk as an organic work-entity, communism and capitalism were perceived to be equally menacing. Capitalism, with its emphasis on individual economic exploitation, had initiated a process whereby the organic volksunity were schismatically divided into two opposing sides, each with its own sectional interests. Communism supposedly utilised the class struggle between workers and 'bosses' for the promotion of its doctrine of proletarian internationalism; thereby strengthening existing divisions between members of the volk. Hence the interdependence of communism and capitalism.

The OB had as objective the destruction of this fictitious and man-made division between volksmembers. Die O.B. identified the OB's basic plan of action in this regard:

"Die redding van die blanke werker lê nie in die wegbreek van sy volk en die aanskakeling by die **workers of the world** nie; dit lê in die terugkeer tot en opname in die volk!"<sup>130)</sup> (*italics in the original*).

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129. P.J. Meyer: Die Stryd van die Afrikanerwerker, pp.64-65.

130. Die O.B., 8.12.1944.

Meyer, as architect-in-chief of the OB's social policy, drew up an elaborate and complex plan which had to provide for the restoration of the natural organic unity of the volk. In terms of 'labour' organisation, Meyer proposed a functional structure which, in both its horizontal and vertical construction, would reflect the organic composition of the volk. The work-circle, according to Meyer, was composed of four natural spheres of activity, viz "... die staatkundige en regsbedryf, die geestelik-intellektuele en opvoedkundige bedryf, die maatskaplike bedryf en die ekonomiese bedryf."<sup>131</sup>) The volk, as an organic work-unity, were collectively organized along the lines of these four fields of activity. Horizontally, all of the spheres were equipollent and complimentary. Given the belief that the Afrikaner volk was essentially a labouring volk, it is important to note that volksarbeid [literally labour for the people] were composed of not only economic activities, but included all activities which served the interests of the organic whole. In terms of vertical construction, each sphere was inclusive of all individuals - and on an equal footing - who were active in a given field. All members of the volk, irrespective of their position or function within the work-circle, were thus equal contributors to the creation of wealth. Wealth, however, was not defined in terms of capital, but rather in the context of service to the volk.

Within the context of volksunity, the OB's labour policy was described in the following terms: "Die [Ossewa-Brandwag] ... se arbeidsorganisasie is daarom geen arbeidersorganisasie nie, maar die organisasie van alle mense wat deelneem aan die skeppings-, vormings- en produksieproses van die volk ... nieteenstaande of die

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131. P.J. Meyer: Arbeidsordening in die Volksbeweging en Volkstaat, p.11. In a further document, these "natural" fields of activity were reduced by one (See "Arbeidsadel - Arbeidsorganisasie van die Ossewa-Brandwag" [undated document], OB-archives, P.J. Meyer 1/3).

persoon 'n werkgewer of 'n werknemer is nie."<sup>132)</sup> Meyer described the terms worker and employer as 'class-concepts' which did not reflect the organic composition of Afrikanerdom. As such it was replaced by the term "labour-doer" [arbeidsverrigter]:

"'n Predikant, 'n onderwyser, 'n padwerker, 'n mynbestuurder - almal is arbeidsverrigters binne 'n bepaalde en natuurlike arbeidsverband."<sup>133)</sup>

- c) **Individual vs Class vs Volk:** Each of these principles, in terms of the OB's credo, were respectively the guiding principles of liberalism-capitalism, communism and Volkssocialism. In terms of social and economic organisation, capitalism had led to large-scale exploitation of the majority by the minority. Labour, under this system, had become "... 'n blote gebruiksartikel, die prys waarvan bepaal word deur die skommeling van vraag en aanbod in die arbeidsmark."<sup>134)</sup> Van Rensburg, while acknowledging that communism was in a limited sense an improvement on capitalism<sup>135)</sup>, stressed that by forcing the worker to choose between communism and capitalism was "... soos om te kies tussen die duiwel en Bäl. Dit is dieselfde ding."<sup>136)</sup> On the one hand, in as far as the prominence of the working class in the ideological construction of communism was concerned, communism, in its logical conclusion, would lead to State capitalism where the interests of the proletariat - as was the case with capitalism - would be determined by a small

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132. Die O.B., 12.1.1944.

133. "Arbeidsorganisasie" [undated document] (OB-archives, GR I/1/11).

134. P.J. Meyer: Arbeidsordening in die Volksbeweging en Volkstaat, p.9.

135. Die O.B., 31.3.1943.

136. See Van Rensburg's presidential speech at the ANS Workers Congress in 1944 as reported in Die O.B. of 15.11.1944.

group of individuals. Conversely, on those occasions where it was acknowledged that communism represented some form of socialism, it was noted that this ideology, through its materialism (which corresponded with capitalism), had "... sosialisme verneder tot 'n leer van die loon en die maag."<sup>137)</sup> Apart from similarities, communism and capitalism were thus the antithesis of one another and, in the final analysis, sectional.

Volkssocialism, on the other hand, provided equally for both sections of the community. The interests of the volk, and not that of the individual, the proletariat or the State, would predominate in the OB-constructed labour-community.

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137. Ibid., 8.12.1943

## CHAPTER FOUR

## THE NEW ORDER, THE GREYSHIRT-MOVEMENT AND COMMUNISM

## 4.1. INTRODUCTION

The New Order (NO) was established in September 1940 under the ideological guidance and functional leadership of Oswald Pirow.<sup>1)</sup> Initially an organised pressure grouping within the HNP, the NO, in broad terms, had as objective the establishment of a Christian, white, National-Socialist republic, separated from the British Crown and based on the principles of state authority [literally Staatsgesag] and national discipline. As a 'party-within-a-party', the NO's most immediate aim was the transformation of the HNP into an all-inclusive volksmovement which would eventually reflect NO-principles and -goals.<sup>2)</sup>

Similar to the OB, the initial development of the NO depended more on outside developments than a particular set of ideological principles. Commentators, in this regard, agree that the NO was a product of World War II in general and more specifically German military successes during 1940.<sup>3)</sup>

Apart from German war successes, the cause of the NO was also promoted by the near-unanimity amongst Afrikaner nationalist

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1. Prior to its withdrawal from conventional party politics in July 1943, the NO referred to itself under a number of different titles. Initially known as the **Christian Republican South African National-Socialist Study Circle**, this was changed to **The New Order Study Circle** by July 1941. (M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African Opposition 1939-1945, p.80) In time the NO became known as simply **The New Order**. This last title, for the sake of expediency, will be used throughout this analysis.
  2. See Pirow's speech at Brits as reported in Die Transvaler of 14.6.1941.
  3. F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.153; D. Prinsloo: Die Johannesburg-Periode in Dr. H.F. Verwoerd se Loopbaan, pp.258-259.



political leaders that, universally, there was an irrevocable movement away from the proverbial ancien regime towards a 'new order'. Within the HNP, this belief was expounded by individuals such as Malan and Louw and the Free State organ of the Party, Die Volksblad.<sup>4)</sup> Pirow provided this term with a definite ideological content - which Malan, Louw and other Party functionaries largely failed to do - thereby annexing the concept of a 'new order' as the near-exclusive property of the NO. Pirow's success in this endeavour is illustrated by the fact that the NO's Programme of Principles, first published in December 1940, went through no less than seven editions between this date and May 1941.

Although the principles contained in the NO's Programme of Principles were in many ways a continuation of beliefs expounded by Pirow since 1934, it also reflected influences from sources within specifically the HNP. Of particular importance in this regard is a pamphlet entitled "Die Nuwe Suid Afrika - Die Rewolusie van die Twintigste Eeu" [The New South Africa - The Revolution of the Twentieth Century] and published by J.H.O. (Otto) du Plessis, then editor of Die Oosterlig. Van Heerden indicates that the contents of this pamphlet were known to the leadership-core of the HNP prior to its publication date of September 1940.<sup>5)</sup> The NO's Programme of Principles, as indicated, was only published in December 1940. Pirow's and Du Plessis' publications, when compared, does reveal a number of striking similarities.

The presence of the NO as a separate grouping within the HNP was initially endured by the Party. Malan, in adopting a conciliatory approach, declared in March 1941 that "... omtrent 80 tot 85 persent van die 'Nuwe Orde' [se beginsels] ... is vervat in die program van die Party ..."<sup>6)</sup> The relationship between the HNP and

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4. See Van Heerden: Op.cit., pp.156-159. The Ossewa-Brandwag referred to the concept of a new order as the 'Revolution of the Twentieth Century'.

5. F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1939-1948, p.159.

6. Die Burger, 15.3.1941.

NO, at first, proved to be mutually advantageous. Apart from continuing with the internal restructuring of the Party, HNP platforms and Party controlled media (particularly in the OFS) provided the NO with a further opportunity to propagate its philosophies to a wider audience. Conversely, given the schism which had developed between Hertzog and the HNP and the fact that the NO were largely composed of former Hertzog-supporters,<sup>7)</sup> the HNP was not only ensured of stronger electoral standing in Parliament but also the prospect of luring politically undecided Afrikaners to the Party.

These advantages, however, were short-term - particularly for the HNP. The continued presence of differently-minded persons and the public espousal of principles differing from that of the official Party line could only divide the HNP-membership, blur the definition of its policy, and drive supporters of the Party into other channels of political expression. Gradually, the advantages of a political party with a monolithic character came to overshadow the benefits to be gained from a party bearing the identity of an ideological 'fruit-cake'. On the sixteenth of August 1941 Pirow and seventeen other parliamentarians disassociated themselves from the HNP whereupon the New Order was formally constituted as a parliamentary-based opposition grouping independent from the HNP.<sup>8)</sup> Important to note, however, is that the NO refused to describe itself as a political party. An identification with or support for conventional and parliamentary-based politics would be irreconcilable with the NO's declared objective of an organic volksstate free from political parties.

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7. F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.153; T.D. Moodie: The Rise of Afrikanerdom, pp.209-210.

8. For a discussion of the development of the conflict between the NO and HNP prior to 16.8.1941 see M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African Opposition 1939-1945, pp.79-86 et.seq. and Prinsloo: op.cit., pp.258-265. For the names of those parliamentarians who broke away from the HNP under the NO-banner see B.M. Schoeman: Parlementêre Verkiesings in Suid-Afrika sedert 1910, pp.244-245.

The NO, as a force in Afrikaner politics, was of no great or particular significance. This movement failed to maintain the initial interest shown in its activities and, as indicated by Van Jaarsveld, had a following that is of academic importance.<sup>9)</sup> The resignation of Pirow and his compatriots from the HNP marked in many ways the advent of the NO's demise. Furthermore, although this organisation had established its own journal entitled "Die Anti-Kommunis" [The Anti-Communist] prior to the resignation of its leadership from the HNP, the NO, apart from Die Anti-Kommunis, could theoretically rely on Parliament as a forum for the presentation and propagation of NO points-of-view. However, towards the end of March 1943 the New Order-caucus released a statement in which it declared itself opposed to any future participation in the system of parliamentary democracy. Indirectly this particular decision further contributed to the sinking into obscurity of the NO. After July 1943, this movement, for all intents and purposes, had disappeared from the political scene.

#### 4.2. THE NEW ORDER AND ANTI-COMMUNISM

Overt anti-communism, as indicated by the title of the NO-organ, played an important part in this movement. Opposition to communism, however, was not only motivated by the conception of a communist menace, but ideological motivations vis á vis the New Order's own socio-political agenda also had a prominent role in this regard. Although the NO, within the cadre of Afrikaner nationalist politics, was essentially a splinter-grouping, its involvement in the anti-communist debate is important for a number of reasons:

- (i) During its formative period, the NO, as indicated, adjudged its most immediate task to be the evolutionary remodelling of the HNP into a volksmovement which would eventually reflect and embody NO principles. While this was expected to be a one-sided process, in practice it turned out to be a bilateral conversion. This was particularly the case relative

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9. F.A. van Jaarsveld: Van Van Riebeeck tot Verwoerd, p.249.

to the conception of a communist menace. In this regard many of those elements described as characteristic or indicative of communism by NO personalities were simultaneously stressed by HNP members. Although it is not the aim of this analysis to trace the origin of a particular statement, it must be noted that a process of cross-pollination was and had been taking place between ideologically diverse groupings within the cadre of Afrikaner nationalism.

(ii) Whereas the HNP and OB respectively proposed mainly repression and the adoption of another ideology to combat/oppose 'communism', the NO propagated both repression and ideological counter-balancing.<sup>10)</sup> This strategy provided the NO with the required scope to either support the campaign against communism, as defined by the HNP, or to develop an own campaign independent from that of the G/HNP. In time the second of these strategies progressively came to be adopted by the NO. However, during its period of parliamentary participation, the NO, while favouring the adoption of a separate ideology, never rejected repressionist tactics per se. Indeed, as will be indicated, even active participation in HNP campaigns occurred.

(iii) Relative to the strategy of ideological counter-balancing, both the OB and NO continually stressed the desirability of such a step. Although similarly constructed, the NO's and OB's proposed blueprints for the creation of a new socio-political order differed fundamentally in certain respects.

In discussing anti-communism within the NO, attention will primarily be focussed on this movement's conception of communism and the NO's proposed scheme for ideological counter-balancing. Related aspects such as the course of the debate on communism within the NO during its period of involvement in conventional party politics and the applicability of this debate to particular social/ethnic/racial groupings will also be referred to. From the outset, however, it must be noted that the campaign against

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10. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.8.1941.

communism by the NO, as was the case with all other movements and institutions under discussion, was a continuous process of redefinment, reassessment and redeployment. By May 1945 none of these processes in any of the movements/institutions involved in the anti-communist debate had been fully completed.

#### 4.2.1. The NO's Campaign Against Communism

The inclusion of the Soviet Union in the Allied alliance and Smuts' overt support for the Soviet war effort, as indicated in a earlier chapter, unleashed a frenzy within the HNP. The NO, by July 1941 still an active participant in the affairs of the HNP, was not only influenced by this near-hysteria, but also came to utilise it for the promotion of its own socio-political agenda. Against this background the entitlement of the NO's journal (Die Anti-Kommunis) is significant. Initially a weekly publication, Die Anti-Kommunis, from its inception, paid particular attention to the perceived menace of communism. Following the decision by the NO executive to embark on an extra-parliamentary course, anti-communism and Die Anti-Kommunis came to fulfill a pivotal position in the the promotion of the NO's Afrikaner National-Socialism.

The NO launched its first public campaign against communism by way of a motion introduced into Parliament by Oswald Pirow during the second week of February 1942. Pirow's motion called for the appointment of a Select Committee "... om ondersoek in te stel na en verslag te doen oor kommunistiese bedrywighede in die Unie ..." <sup>11)</sup> Six months earlier Pirow had already motivated the perceived necessity of a campaign against communism. On this occasion (July 1941) Pirow connected his warning on communism to the Riotous Assemblies (Amendment) Act of 1930 which supposedly had to provide for the eradication of communism from society. <sup>12)</sup> As a result of changed circumstances, communism, according to

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11. Hansard, 10.2.1942, col.1766.

12. It is important to note that Pirow, as Minister of Justice, was responsible for the steering of this Bill through Parliament in 1930 and the subsequent administration of this Act. See Chapter One.

Pirow, which in 1930 was "... niks meer as 'n hinderlike oorlas vir die polisie [nie]...",<sup>13)</sup> had become a menace for the Union. Pirow identified three 'sets of circumstances' which had allegedly contributed to the escalation of the communist menace in South Africa:

- (i) **The 'Soviet - South African' war alliance:** Because of this alliance, according to Pirow, Jan Smuts did not dare venture any steps to combat or oppose communism. In introducing his 1942 motion on communism in Parliament, Pirow utilised this same assertion - albeit in a different form - to portray Smuts as a lackey of both British imperialism and the Soviet Union. This was done by stating that because of his subservience to the interests of the Empire, Smuts was doing everything possible to ensure a stable and amiable relationship between London and Moscow. Hence the absence of preventative measures against communism. The connection with the USSR was made in stressing the perceived aggressive and imperialistic nature of communism and, by implication, that of Moscow.<sup>14)</sup> Although care was taken not to accuse Smuts of being a communist himself, he was nevertheless contributing to the spreading of communism in South Africa. Ultimately Smuts thus proved to be the archetype of the proverbial "useful idiot".<sup>15)</sup>
- (ii) **The prevalence and prominence of 'communist' organisations in South Africa:** Whereas the propagators of communism in 1930

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13. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.9.1941.

14. Hansard, 10.2.1942, col.1773.

15. Speaking in support of Pirow's motion, S.W. Naudé (NO MP for Potgietersrust) did identify 'communists' within the House of Assembly. These 'communists' were D.B. Molteno (Native Representative), D.B. Burnside, W.B. Madeley and S. Miles-Cadman (all Labour Party MP's). See Ibid., col.2059. Important to note is that in spite of the fact that Walter Madeley held the portfolio of Labour in Smuts' cabinet, no UP members were included on Naude's short-list of 'communist parliamentarians'.

were "... hoofsaaklik blanke mislukkinge ...",<sup>16)</sup> the propagation of this ideology had become better structured, organised and more composite. Apart from the CPSA, Pirow initially identified only one other organisation supposedly involved in the spreading of 'communist' propaganda, namely the Left Book Club. During his parliamentary tirade of 1942 the FSU, Christian Book Circle, International Red Cross and an unspecified number of predominantly white trade unions were added to this list.<sup>17)</sup>

(iii) **The vulnerability of certain sections of the population to communism:** Pirow distinguished between white and non-white susceptibility to communism. All non-whites, irrespective of ethnic affiliation, were potential victims of this ideology.<sup>18)</sup> This contention may well have been a remnant of the NO's HNP past. Pirow contended that whites suffering from moral indignation and material degradation were vulnerable to communist propaganda.<sup>19)</sup> Significantly, the origin of these "social maladjustments" were traced back to the liberal systems of capitalism and democracy.<sup>20)</sup> S.W. Naudé (NO MP for Potgietersrust) subsequently declared that "... [k]ommunisme ... is soos koue water vir 'n dorstige en vermoeide siel."<sup>21)</sup>

An important element of the NO's campaign against communism revolved around the strategy best suited to oppose this ideology. The NO, as indicated, favoured both the adoption of another ideology and repression as counter-measures to combat communism. Pirow perceived both measures to be initially applied in tandem. Ultimately, however, ideological counter-balancing would prove to be the most effective mechanism in combating communism. Pirow

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16. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.9.1941.

17. Hansard, 10.2.1942, col.1780-1783.

18. Ibid., col.1777.

19. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.9.1941.

20. O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid Afrika, p.7.

21. Hansard, 13.2.1942, col.2061.

motivated this by stating that because communism was more than merely a mechanism for economic and political ordering, but an all-encompassing philosophy of life, it could only be opposed effectively through a diametrically opposing philosophy.<sup>22)</sup> The NO's brand of National-Socialism, needless to say, were supposedly ideally suited for such an endeavour. G.P. Brits (NO MP for Brits), in seconding Pirow's 1942-motion, referred to this aspect in the following terms:

"Kommunisme kan ons nie aanvaar nie en die enigste alternatief is Nasionaal-Sosialisme. Nasionaal-Sosialisme gee nie aan ons die ewels van kommunisme nie, maar gee aan ons meer as wat demokrasie aan ons gegee het, en daarom sê ons dat die enigste toekoms in Suid-Afrika, saam met die orige deel van die wêreld, is geleë in Nasionaal-Sosialisme. Nasionaal-Sosialisme sal aan ons godsdiensvryheid gee. Nasionaal-Sosialisme erken rasselyne, en Nasionaal-Sosialisme sal op ekonomiese lyne die volk help. Ek besluit met te sê dat Nasionaal-Sosialisme is die enigste bolwek teen die ewels wat ons volk bedreig. Dit is die enigste wat in die plek van demokrasie kan kom en bolsjewisme bestry ..."<sup>23)</sup>

Simultaneously, however, the NO continued to stress the perceived potential effectiveness of repression as strategy to curb the growth of communism. NO MP's not only voted in support of Louw's motion on communism in 1943, but Pirow even proceeded to put forward a further resolution to be added to Louw's original motion. This resolution proposed that the "... Regering [moet] onmiddellik onttrek van die (onheilige) bondgenootskap, en/of enige ander vorm van samewerking met Sowjet-Rusland."<sup>24)</sup> The announcement on the NO's withdrawal from Parliament seemingly provided for a continuation of support for repressionist tactics or, alternatively, the HNP's campaign against communism: "... [In] the forthcoming elections (July 1943), the New Order will exert

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22. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.9.1941. This remark corresponded with Malan's total strategy approach of 1937/8.

23. Hansard, 10.2.1942, col.1787. See also Die Anti-Kommunis, no.59, 29.2.1944.

24. Ibid., 26.2.1943, col.2958 and 2960. The section between brackets was withdrawn from Pirow's original motion following a ruling to that effect by the Speaker of the House.



all its strength unconditionally against General Smuts and Communism."<sup>25)</sup>

An explanation for the apparent at random usage of repression and ideological counter-balancing is possibly to be found in both ideological and tactical considerations. The emphasis on ideological opposition to communism ipso facto provided the NO with the opportunity to promote its own ideological agenda. Alternatively, for public exposure or in an attempt to ensure inclusion in the mainstream movement against perceived communism, the NO may have considered it necessary to put forward, or to be associated with, repressionist tactics.

#### 4.2.2. Communism According to the New Order

Within the context of the NO's thesis on the irreversible rotation of the world towards a 'new order', it was stated that both communism and Afrikaner National-socialism were products of this essentially evolutionary process. Afrikaner National-socialism, in turn, was diametrically opposed to communism. In spite of the supposition that both communism and Afrikaner National-socialism were incarnations of the 'new order' and thus the opposite of 'old order'-systems, it was emphasized that in the case of communism, the 'old order' - meaning capitalism and democracy - actively contributed (in a negative sense) to the development of this ideology.<sup>26)</sup> G.P. Brits declared that "... [d]ie groot rede waarom kommuniste uitbrei is omdat demokrasie uitgedien is en onpopulêr geword het."<sup>27)</sup> Communism, according to Die Anti-Kommunis, accepted the old order not only as a given historical reality, but it also formed the basis for the proposed state communists aimed

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25. Cited in N.M. Stultz: Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, p.84.

26. For a discussion of the perceived contribution of the 'old order' and specifically capitalism to the development of communism see Die Anti-Kommunis, no's 47-48, 11.9.1942-2.10.1942.

27. Hansard, 10.2.1942, col.1787.

at establishing.<sup>28)</sup> Apart from the irreversibility of the 'new order', no connection - either negative or positive - were made between the NO's brand of National-socialism and the 'old order'.

Pirow and the New Order, in addressing themselves to communism, stressed three aspects:

- (i) The origins of and development of communism;
- (ii) The characteristics of communism as an ideology; and
- (iii) The modus operandi of communism.

Of importance for the aims of this analysis is the second of these categories.

In analysing communism as an ideology, the NO employed a complex and integrated strategy whereby selected aspects of its own ideological agenda were not only juxtaposed against those elements described as fundamental to communism, but also served as basic ordering principles. Mainly two aspects were accentuated in this regard, viz. nationalism and Christianity. Furthermore, in assessing the contemplated moral, social and political implications of communism, the NO, apart from creating its own theoretical constructs, preferred to focus on the Soviet Union rather than South Africa in illustrating and vindicating its contentions. The expected implications specifically for South Africa were either implied, referred to in passing or not referred to at all. Exceptions on the rule, however, did occur.

Relative to Christianity, communism - according to the NO - was not only opposed to religion, but proved to be both anti- and un-Christian. As ordering principle, this statement was sufficiently defined so as to encompass a whole series of features described as characteristic of communism.

As a collective characteristic, communism's aversion of religion and its negation of Christian principles were ascribed to the materialistic philosophy underlying the Marxist dogma. Die Anti-Kommunis referred to this aspect as follows: "Die

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28. See Die Anti-Kommunis, no.48, 2.10.1942.

grondleerstelling van die Marxistiese materialisme is die geloof dat ... ekonomiese begrippe ... oppermag voer, nie slegs in die maatskaplike aktiwiteite van die mensdom nie, maar ook in sy godsdiens, sy filosofie en in sy kunsskeppinge."<sup>29)</sup> Particularly religion, according to the NO, was regarded as a fraudulent phenomenon. Die Anti-Kommunis, in this regard, declared that for the communist "... bestaan daar g'n God nie, g'n geestelike wêreld, g'n hiernamaals nie. Jou hemel en jou hel is uitsluitend hier op aarde, en die mens se geluk hang uitsluitend daarvan af hoeveel hy van die stoflike dinge van hierdie wêreld kan geniet."<sup>30)</sup>

Communism's aversion towards religion was repeatedly referred to as a fundamental characteristic of this ideology. This was done by portraying atheism as either a characteristic-in-isolation or placing it within the context of this ideology's materialistic striving. Relating to the ideological irreconcilability of communism and religion, ample use were made of quotations attributed to, amongst others, Marx, Bukharin and Yaroslavsky.<sup>31)</sup> Measures allegedly adopted to eradicate religion from Soviet society served to illustrate the practical implications of this ideology for South Africa. Allegations regarding the assertion that the USSR's constitution provided for freedom of worship was described as an attempt "... om die buitewêreld te mislei ..."<sup>32)</sup>

Apart from illustrating its opposition to communism, the emphasis on particularly religion had a further advantage in so far as it provided the New Order with the opportunity to promote its image as a 'Christian' movement. Given the Afrikaner's strong self-conception as being part of a Christian volk and the prominence of religious leaders in Afrikaner society, a statement by the Transvaal Synod of the Gereformeerde Kerk [Reformed Church] in

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29. Ibid., no.6, 19.9.1941.

30. Ibid., no.2, 19.8.1941.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., no.3, 26.8.1941. See also Pirow's speech in Parliament on 10.2.1942 (Hansard, 10.2.1942, col.1772).

January 1941 in which the NO was categorised as un-Christian on the basis of its "... vergoddeliking van die Staat en die ophemeling van die nasie per se"<sup>33)</sup> (italics in the original) undoubtedly seriously jeopardised the continued relevancy of this movement for mainstream Afrikaner nationalist politics. Following this declaration by the Transvaal Synod of the Gereformeerde Kerk, the NO actively attempted to prove the opposite.<sup>34)</sup> The campaign against communism and particularly the parliamentary phase of it provided an ideal opportunity for such an exercise.

As indicated, communism - according to the NO - was not only aimed at the annihilation of religion, but also envisaged the destruction of all Christian principles and civilized norms in society. Communism, therefore, was both anti-Christian and un-Christian. In juxtaposing its own 'Christian' principles of "... liefde, selfverloëning ... [en] vrywillige sosialisme" against communism's "... haat, vernietiging en moord ...",<sup>35)</sup> the NO also portrayed other aspects of this ideology as anti- and un-Christian. Apart from the materialistic striving of communism, most prominent in this regard was the class struggle propagated by Marxism-Leninism and the implications of this ideology for family-life.

Relative to family-life, it was asserted that communism had as objective the eventual destruction of the family.<sup>36)</sup> This destruction, according to the NO, did not only imply a physical diaspora, but communism envisaged a complete moral and ethical restructuring of the conventional conception of family-life. According to Die Anti-Kommunis, matrimony, in communist society, was not regarded as a sacred institution, but every man had the

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33. F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.174.

34. For a description of some of these attempts and an analysis of the place of religion in NO-ideology, see Ibid., pp.174-178.

35. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.2, 19.8.1941.

36. Ibid., no.6, 19.9.1941.

'right' to every other man's wife.<sup>37)</sup> The solemnising and dissolution of marriages were quick, easy and ultimately depended on the State. In the event of divorce, the custodianship over children born from wedlock were determined by "... politieke oorwegings ..."<sup>38)</sup> In communist schools children were allegedly encouraged to undermine parental authority and to promote "... die bolsjewistiese gees in die gesinslewe ..."<sup>39)</sup> The Soviet Union, as before, served as model to illustrate these and other contentions.

Communism, with its dogmatic fractionisation of the community into two opposing and irreconcilable arch-rivals, was not only un-Christian in basing these divisions on strict materialistic notions, but also proved to be anti-Christian by emphasizing 'hate' (as opposed to the NO's perceived Christian principle of love) in promoting class struggle. In so doing, according to the NO, communism failed to recognise that every nation was a creation of God where an injustice to or impairment of a certain group, section or class endangered the whole nation.<sup>40)</sup> Within the communist system man was merely "... 'n ingewikkelde masjien met 'n sekere hoeveelheid arbeidskrag ... wat net soos ander ... masjiene brandstof gebruik, werk verrig en verslyt."<sup>41)</sup>

Similar to the stressing of Christianity, communism, by being international, proved to be both anti-national and un-national. Internationalism, in this context, not only referred to internationalist proletarian solidarity or the perceived imperialistic objectives of this ideology, but also included remarks on communism's striving towards racial equality. The last of these elements, as was the case with atheism, were either presented as a characteristic-in-isolation or in the broader context of communism as an ideology-in-totality.

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37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.8.1941.

40. See O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.3.

41. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.48, 2.10.1942.

Naudé summarised the internationalist objectives of communism in the following manner:

"Kommunisme staan vir die algehele en algemene broederskap van die mensdom ... [Kommunisme] staan vir gelykstelling, vir broederskap, en ons vind daardie idees ook terug in die Franse Rewolusie: Vryheid, gelykheid en broederskap."<sup>42)</sup>

The striving towards equality, and particularly racial equality, was described by Pirow as "... een van [die] fundamentele beginsels van Kommunisme ..."<sup>43)</sup> For South Africa the implications of such a step was adjudged to be especially menacing. Not only did it run counter to the Afrikaner's "... hele lewensbeskouing"<sup>44)</sup> and thus proved to be unnational, but it was also irreconcilable with the NO's understanding of the concept volk (nation). Although it was generally agreed that the advent of communism would result in the destruction of the South African nation (as a national and racial entity), no clear-cut explanation was provided of the manner in which this was expected to be achieved. Die Anti-Kommunis declared that the "... [p]roletariaat moet regeer en by ons is dit die Naturel!"<sup>45)</sup> This would seemingly indicate that the division of classes in South Africa corresponded with and were based on racial lines. Pirow, however, forwarded two other explanations: First, given the numerical supremacy of blacks, the establishment of a black Soviet Republic in South Africa would be the result of 'swamping-by-numbers'. Alternatively, the CPSA's slavish subservience to the CI and the 1929-thesis on South Africa, ensured the establishment of a black Republic in the Union. In other words, the establishment of a communist state in South Africa was going to be the result of the CPSA's ideological complacency.

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42. Hansard, 13.2.1942, col.2059.

43. Ibid., col.1770.

44. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.1, 12.8.1941.

45. See Hansard, 10.2.1942, col.1770.

Relative to communism's perceived imperialistic objectives Pirow stated that "... die hele rede vir die bestaan van die kommunistiese stelsel ... [is] die gedagte ... van 'n wêreldrewolusie ..."<sup>46)</sup> In promoting this world-revolution, communism - according to Die Anti-Kommunis - hoped to establish "... 'n Wêreld federasie van Sowjet Sosialistiese Republieke."<sup>47)</sup> The Soviet Union, as the personification of communist philosophies, was to be an active participant in this process. Under titles such as "Die Moord van die Tsaar en die Keiserlike Familie" and "Stalin: Hoe Hy Slag en Suiwer", Die Anti-Kommunis subsequently proceeded to indicate the alleged vanguard role of the USSR in promoting a 'World Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics'.<sup>48)</sup> While it was acknowledged that the 1941 Anglo-Soviet alliance had resulted in an adaptation of Soviet foreign policy, this adjustment - within the context of communism's declared objective of a world-revolution - took the form of a change in tactics rather than principle.<sup>49)</sup>

One alleged characteristic of this ideology which did not fit into the NO's explanatory model related to communism's perceived opposition to and negation of private ownership. Although it may well have been argued that the socialisation of private property was both 'un-Christian' and 'anti-national' as far as it was contrary to existing South African traditions, the NO would have found this difficult to explain given its own policy of selective nationalisation. This may well have been the primary motivation for the presentation of communism's alleged opposition to private property as a separate yet interconnected characteristic of this ideology. In communist society, according to Die Anti-Kommunis,

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46. Ibid., col.1776.

47. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.4, 5.9.1941.

48. See Ibid., no.15, 21.11.1941 and no's 21-26, 16.1.1942-20.2.1942.

49. See for example Pirow's speech on occasion of his 1942-motion on communism in Parliament (Hansard, 10.2.1942, col.1776-1783) and Die Anti-Kommunis, no. 4, 5.9.1941.

the State would nationalise the assets of both the large capitalist and small landowner.<sup>50)</sup>

#### 4.2.1. Afrikaner National-Socialism: The Ideological Counter-Balance to Communism

Underlying the NO's proposed Christian, Nationalist-Socialist republic was the following propositions:

- "(a) Elke nasie [is] 'n gedagte van God ...;
- (b) dit die Godsbestemming van elke volk is om die hoogste en beste in sy eie kultuur te verwesenlik en te bestendig;
- (c) die nasie 'n organiese eenheid vorm en dat verontregting of beskadiging van 'n deel (klas of groep) lei tot die ondergang van die geheel;
- (d) dit iedere individu se reg, nee, sy plig is om na die aard van sy aanleg of vermoë sy deel by te dra tot die verwesenliking van die Godgegewe bestemming van die nasie as geheel;
- (e) selfbewuste en gelukkige nasies, wat vry is om binne hulle eie historiese lewensruimte 'n eie bestemming te dien, die enigste waarborg is vir wêreldvrede."<sup>51)</sup>

Through the propagation of these principles and their actualisation by way of practical and attainable goals, communism and the liberal system(s) of capitalism-democracy - the alleged facilitator(s) of communism - would be eradicated from society. As was the case with the OB's Volkssocialism, this discussion will concentrate on those elements of NO-ideology which directly related to its conception of communism.

The NO's emphasis on spiritual values and Christianity, as opposed to communism's alleged atheism and materialism, speaks for itself. The nation (read also volk), in terms of NO-ideology, was adjudged to be a supra-individual and God-determined organic entity. The future republic, as the geo-political embodiment of this divine unity, had to reflect the Vox Dei-principle in its constitutional and political structure. Pirow referred to this aspect in the

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50. Ibid., no. 1, 12.8.1941.

51. O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, pp.3-4.



following terms:

"[Dit] ... volg in die eerste plek dat die Nuwe Orde in Suid- Afrika christelik sal wees - christelik in die sin dat die etiese waardes van die christelike dogma die deurslaggewende faktor in alle aspekte van die volk se lewe sal wees."<sup>52)</sup>

Understandably, given the criticism levelled at it by Afrikaans Churches, the NO paid special attention to the place and role of religion in general and the Christian religion in particular in the proposed state. Sufficient for the aims of this analysis is to note that, apart from the emphasis on religious freedom (within the realms of the Christian dogma), the NO stressed the Christian foundations of its ideology and proposed state.<sup>53)</sup> Of special significance for the topic of anti-communism is a remark by Oswald Pirow that "... anti-christelike en ... onchristelike elemente geen sê in die Staat sal hê [nie]."<sup>54)</sup> Although never stated explicitly, this implied that all communists - by definition of their perceived sacrilegious tendencies - were to be excommunicated from political life in a future society.

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52. Ibid., p.11.

53. See Die Anti-Kommunis, no.17, 5.12.1941 and no.20, 9.1.1942.

54. Pirow: op.cit., p.11.

The NO's conception of nation (volk)<sup>55</sup>) did not provide for a multi-racial or international structure as was supposedly the case with communism. The South African nation, in terms of the NO-perspective, were composed of 'national' minded white inhabitants of the Union. While acknowledging the near-universal applicability of the 'new order' and even pointing to different manifestations of this new order, the NO repeatedly stressed the unique character and nature of each of these manifestations. Die Anti-Kommunis explained this uniqueness and universality in the following

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55. Judging from Pirow's exposition of the NO's principles in December 1940, the concept "volk", while on the one hand referring to a cultural entity, was at times also regarded as synonymous with the meaning attached to "nation" as a geo-political entity. Pirow's first explication of the principles underlying the NO-ideology (see O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.5) would seem to indicate the more conventional utilisation of these concepts. In explaining the application of NO propositions in a future society, Pirow, in a sense, continued with this initial distinction. This was done by stressing the lingo-cultural equality of the two main component parts [volksdele] of the South African nation. (Ibid., p.34) However, to this was added an important precondition, namely the "... eersgeboreneg van Afrikanerdom." (Ibid.) In other words, in the event of a conflict between the two volksdele, the cultural and linguistic rights of the Afrikaner would receive priority over that of English-speakers. Undoubtedly, this precondition affected the inter-ethnic construction of the nation as a political entity. Concurrently, however, the concepts "volk" and "nation" were utilised as interchangeable terms to give effect to the inner structure of this political entity. An example of the indiscriminate usage of these terms is provided by the emphasis on the "[d]issiplinerig en Opleiding van die hele Volk tot nasiediens ..." (italics mine) (Ibid., p.31).

manner:

"Kommunisme het die demokratiese lande van Europa maklike prooi gevind totdat 'n nuwe idee, of liever 'n verjongde en ware herlewing van 'n ou gedagte 'n einde gebring het aan sy momentum ... Teen die internasionalisme van ... [kommunisme], het individuele state van Europa 'n nuwe nasionalisme gestel wat, volgens die aard en karakter van die besondere volk, homself gemanifesteer het as Nasionaal-sosialisme (Duitsland), Fascisme (Italië), Falangisme (Spanje) en Christelik Nasionaal-sosialistiese republikanisme (Suid-Afrika); teen die beoogde uniforme Sowjet-wêreldstaat staan vandag die nuwe nasionale state van Europa, almal gegrondevs op dieselfde breë grondplan, maar elkeen 'n interessante nasionale variasie van daardie wêreldorde."<sup>56)</sup>

The South African nation, while allowing for selective and limited inter- and intra-ethnic absorption, did not provide for any form of racial affiliation other than by whites. Africans, for all intents and purposes, were regarded as non-nation elements. While the future state had to remain 'white' "... in die sin dat die behoud van die blanke beskawing en die gesag van die Blanke ... onder alle omstandighede beskerm moet word ...",<sup>57)</sup> non-whites, by definition of their physical presence inside the Union, would nevertheless have to be accommodated in the planned republic. Although the NO failed to provide an indication of the manner in which this would be achieved, Pirow identified the basic parameters of NO-policy in this regard: "Wit Christelike Trusteeskap oor alle nie-blankes gebaseer op die beginsels van totale segregasie en ontwikkeling langs eie lyne onder regeringssupervisie."<sup>58)</sup>

Significantly, prior to the formal publication of the NO's Programme of Principles in December 1940, Pirow, in explaining NO-objectives in an edition of Die Vaderland during November 1940, omitted the section "... onder regeringssupervisie" in favour of

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56. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.4, 5.9.1941. See also no.48, 10.8.1942.

57. O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.12.

58. Ibid., p.21.

"... ooreenkomstig Nasionaal-Sosialistiese beginsels."<sup>59)</sup> This may have indicated that, apart from the South African nation as an exclusively defined racial organy, the future republic would consist of at least one other 'nation'. Although inferior in status, this second 'nation' would seemingly be constructed along similar lines as that of the dominant nation.

The nation, as an organic entity, was not a mechanical corpus composed of a single class or mutually antagonistic classes, but represented "... een groot familie waarin die verskillende groepe en lede elk hulle plek het, en elk geleer moet word om uit liefde vir hulle hele volk, die belange van die geheel bokant die belange van die enkeling te stel."<sup>60)</sup> These principles of shared interests and collective responsibility had to be reflected in all spheres of community life. Of significance for the topic of anti-communism is the application of these principles to the economic sphere.

As opposed to the perceived strict materialism of communism and capitalism, the NO emphasized the "... HERSTEL VAN ETIESE WAARDES EN MORELE OORWEGINGS IN DIE VERHOUDING VAN BURGER TOT BURGER EN VAN DIE VOLK TOT DIE STAAT"<sup>61)</sup> (*italics in the original*). Relative to the economic sphere, this implied that all labour had a national and ethical value rather than being a purely commercial commodity. In NO terms:

"Vir die nasionaal-sosialis is arbeid veel meer as broodwinning, dis vir hom 'n behoefte tot sy groeiende wesendheid, dit is vir hom [<sup>\n</sup>] middel tot selfuitdrukking en self-ontplooiing."<sup>62)</sup>

Labour was thus also an important determinant of national identity. Die Anti-Kommunis went as far as stating that the future national-socialist state had to be a labour state [literally

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59. Reprinted in pamphlet-form under the title "Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika" by Die Handhawersbond.

60. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.2, 19.8.1941.

61. Pirow: op.cit., pp.19-20.

62. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.55, 1.8.1943.

arbeidsstaat].<sup>63)</sup> Within the context of the NO's theorem on the nation as an organically constructed entity, this furthermore implied that all labour, if not equal in value, were at least equally important. Antagonism between the different forces comprising the national labour-unity would therefore contribute to not only the destruction of this organic entity, but also - and even more importantly - endanger national identity.

The NO's Programme of Principles made special provision for the elimination of class struggle from society. Pirow proposed two strategies in this regard: First, in what was to be the most favoured strategy, Pirow suggested negotiations between the competing factions with mediation by the state. Alternatively, failing success or in the event of heightened tensions, "... sal deur Staatsdekreet 'n regverdige en onpartydige oplossing geskep moet word ..."<sup>64)</sup>

Relative to socio-political accommodation in the future state, the NO adopted a dualistic and seemingly contradictory approach vis á vis its emphasis on Christian- and national principles as opposed to values allegedly embraced by communism and 'old order'-systems. The NO's conception of the social structure of the organic community were based on economic concepts. In this regard a distinction was made between three classes, viz. those who were "... so arm dat hulle voorsien moes word van gratis mediese en ander hulp van die Staat ...", those who were "... so ryk dat hulle die bekommernisse van die lewe sonder vrees in die gesig kon kyk ..."<sup>65)</sup> and those who were "...nóg brandarm nóg skatryk ..."<sup>66)</sup> This last grouping, the largest of the three, was also referred to as the middle-class(es). This distinction, made on the basis of economic welfare and status, was already a negation of the NO's declared aversion towards materialistic notions. In the future republic, the middle class would not only be another

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63. Ibid.

64. See O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.37.

65. Ibid., pp.14-15.

66. See Die Anti-Kommunis, no.57, 14.10.1943.

interest-grouping, but ultimately the only one. Pirow explained this in the following manner: "[Die middelklas] ... is die ruggraat van elke volk. Hulle standaard van beskawing is die van die nasie. Op hierdie mense sal die Nuwe Staat gebou moet word ..."67) As opposed to official NO policy whereby precedence supposedly would be afforded to the interests of the whole nation, this approach was obviously sectional, as opposed to national.

Furthermore, by emphasizing the necessity of a form of vocational representation (over and above that of normal parliamentary representation)<sup>68</sup>), the NO ensured the continued hegemony of the middle-class. The elevated importance of a section of the South African nation corresponded in principle with communism's perceived preference for the working class. Pirow, at the time when the NO's Programme of Principles were first published, voiced his opposition to this particular principle: "In teenstelling met kommunisme, wat gebaseerd is op klassestryd en die uiteindelijke dominerend van een klas oor alle andere, streef Nasionaal-sosialisme daarna om nasionale belange bo alle groeps- of individuele belange te verhef"<sup>69</sup>) (*italics mine*).

Conversely, in what was a continuation of the organic tradition of shared national interests and collective responsibility, the NO seemingly made no special provision for the working class per se. Such was the case in both the NO's ideological programme and in terms of the future socio-political order. Relative to the social order, workers were "... doodgewoon ... [d]eel van die

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67. Pirow: op.cit., p.5.

68. Provision for parliamentary representation in the future state once again contradicted the NO's exclaimed opposition towards 'old order'-systems like democracy. Vocational representation would take the form of a guild-system in terms of which workers in the same industry or trade was believed to have common interests which could best be promoted in a communal context. The guild-system was a continuation of the organic tradition of the nation being one large family. See F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.178-180.

69. O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.4.

middestand ..."70) The inclusion of the white proletariat in the middle class corresponded with the NO-principle of giving precedence to national- instead of sectional- or class interests. In NO-ideology, however, the middle class was the social and political elite. By being a composite part of the privileged elite, the working class automatically had to have an elevated importance in the future society. Once again, this contradicted official NO-policy of not giving preference to the interests of any section, group or class.

Two other elements of NO ideology which were irreconcilable with this organisation's conception of communism pertained to private ownership and the importance of family-life. The family, according to the NO, was not only a microcosm of the future state, but a fundamental precondition for the realization of the national-socialist republic.<sup>71)</sup> As the smallest entity in community life, a contented and happy family - according to the NO - would guarantee the happiness of larger organic unities in the state and community. In terms of its status as the microcosm of the planned national-socialist state, Die Anti-Kommunis declared that the family was the "... belangrikste kweekplek ... waarbinne die arbeidskrag, die skeppingskrag, die denkkrag en die daadkrag van die nasie tot hoogste ontwikkeling gebring moet word."<sup>72)</sup>

Closely related to the importance of family-life was the emphasis on the necessity of private ownership in the future state. Private ownership was described as "... een van die belangrikste karakterbouende faktore in die lewe van 'n nasie ..."73) The volk, in NO-terms, therefore had to be a propertied volk. Private ownership

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70. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.57, 14.10.1943. In spite of the relative insignificance of the white proletariat in NO-ideology, Die Anti-Kommunis did come to pay particular attention to the European working class. See Ibid., no.47, 11.9.1942; no.55, 1.8.1943 and no.63, October 1944.

71. Pirow: op.cit., p.5.

72. Die Anti-Kommunis, no.24, 6.2.1942. See also no's. 22-23, 23.1.1942-30.1.1942.

73. Ibid., no.26, 20.2.1942.

served as guarantee for social security, a contended family-life and economic and political stability. In practice, however, the application of the principle of private ownership would be limited by what can best be described as 'national interests'. The NO, in this regard, proposed state ownership and -control of certain industries and institutions.<sup>74)</sup> This selective nationalisation, judging from the NO's Programme of Principles, were to be implemented so as to avoid further exploitation of the volk by capitalists.<sup>75)</sup>

#### 4.3. LOUIS WEICHARDT AND THE GREYSHIRT-MOVEMENT

The Greyshirt-movement, founded in October 1933, was the first local manifestation resulting from the advent of National-socialist philosophies in Europe in general and specifically the coming to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany.<sup>76)</sup> In terms of long-term objectives, this movement proposed the founding of a "... Jew-free organic Volksstate, a national-socialist republic in

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74. The NO identified four categories of industries/institutions which would be nationalised in the future state:

1. The gold-mining industry;
2. All other key-industries;
3. The banking- and financial sectors;
4. All large property holdings used for speculative purposes. See O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, pp.20-21.

75. See Pirow: op.cit., p.20.

76. Between October 1933 and its final dissolution in May 1950, this movement existed in a number of forms and under a variety of titles. Initially known as the **Suid-Afrikaanse Christelike Nasionaal-Sosialistiese Beweging** [South African Christian National-Socialist Movement], it was transformed into a political party, the **Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Party** [South African National Party] in April/May 1937. Following another name-change and organisational transformation in March 1939 (the **Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionaal-Sosialistiese Bond** [South African National-Socialist League]), this movement, from March 1947 onwards, was known as as the **Blanke Werkersparty** [White Workers' Party]. In the lingua franca, however, this movement became known and remained known as the Greyshirts. The term 'Greyshirts', within the context of this organisation, was in actual fact the name for the uniformed activist spearhead of this movement. This entitling, for the aims of this analysis, will be used when referring to this organisation in all and any of its forms. See F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.365.



content and form; based on responsible leadership and established on a corporative foundation."<sup>77</sup>) Save the overt emphasis on the Jewish element, this movement and the NO, in broad terms, shared corresponding objectives. However, whereas the NO were marginally successful in gaining converts on the basis of a collective ideological agenda, the Greyshirt-movement gained notoriety for its anti-Semitic utterances and activist behaviour in this regard. As indicated by its own general secretary, I.J. (Isak) la Grange, the Greyshirts' came to be associated with "... Jode-haters en -slaners ..."<sup>78</sup>) Anti-Semitism, or rather the emphasis on the perceived unassimilative, anti-Christian, anti-social and parasitical character of the Jewish 'race' per se, was, in theory, merely a section of the Greyshirts' total socio-political programme.

The cause of the Greyshirt-movement, similarly to that of the NO and OB, were initially promoted by developments not related to a particular set of ideological principles. Relative to the Greyshirt-movement, most prominent in this regard was the rising tide of animosity towards Jews within South Africa.<sup>79</sup>) Weichardt and his Greyshirts utilised this animosity, provided it with a deeper ideological content and steered the 'enriched' apprehension in a new and complimentary direction. To put it differently: The Greyshirt-movement acted as catalisator whereby antagonism towards Jews, up to then seemingly predominantly of economic nature, were provided with a definite and explicit racial content. With the advent of the Greyshirts, economic antagonism towards Jews thus gradually evolved into virile and racist anti-Semitism. This

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77. G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, p.112.

78. INCH. PV 29: L.T. Weichardt-collection. File 122: [I.J. la Grange]: "Wie en Wat is Weichardt?" (undated pamphlet).

79. Important to note is that this animosity was not only limited to Afrikaners, but included a significant portion of English-speaking whites. Relative to the Greyshirt-movement, Van Heerden indicates that the publication of this organisation's mouthpiece, Die Waarheid-The Truth, was made possible through capital supplied by both Afrikaans- and English-speakers. (Van Heerden: op.cit., p.146) The first edition of Die Waarheid-The Truth was published on 16.12.1933.

explanation, needless to say, is an oversimplification of a much more complex and multi-faceted process.

Shimoni claims that the Greyshirt-movement, made considerable inroads amongst Afrikaners.<sup>80)</sup> An evaluation of this statement is crucial in determining the place and role of this movement in Afrikaner nationalist politics.

The international context, together with the state of flux in Afrikaner politics, undoubtedly proved beneficial in paving the way for Greyshirt-propaganda. The benefits to be reaped from these factors, however, were limited. The relative absence of a mass-circulated organ to propagate Greyshirt-points of view and the success of the GNP with its own brand of ethnic mobilisation, to mention but two factors, resulted in the Greyshirts' developing into even more of a peripheral movement than the NO.<sup>81)</sup> Shimoni's claim, in as far as it refers to the stature of the Greyshirt-movement as an organised grouping within Afrikaner nationalist politics, thus deserves a re-examination. This organisation, at most, was merely one of a number of inconsequential movements who identified themselves with the political and constitutional objectives of Afrikaner nationalists.

On another level, however, Shimoni's statement is possibly a fair reflection of the influence of sentiments which came to be regarded as atypical of Greyshirt beliefs on Afrikaner nationalist conceptions of the place and role of Jewry in society. The Greyshirt-movement, in this regard, did indeed exert an influence which corresponded with neither its numerical strength nor stature within the organised sphere of Afrikaner nationalism. This was particularly apparent in the case of the G/HNP. F.C. Erasmus, Cape Provincial Secretary of the GNP, for example, declared in November 1937:

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80. Shimoni: op.cit., pp.110-111.

81. For a discussion of other factors which limited the success of Greyshirt-endeavours see F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.83-85.

"Before concluding our correspondence, my party is glad to give expression to its sincere appreciation of the useful work done by the Greyshirts' in one important respect, viz. that they have pertinently drawn the attention of the volk to the Jewish problem, which indeed has assumed very threatening dimensions. Although this fact has not figured prominently in this correspondence, we consider that a service has been done to the volk, which deserve recognition and perpetuation."<sup>82)</sup>

Malan echoed this sentiment during the electoral campaign leading up to the general election of April 1938.<sup>83)</sup> Shimoni goes as far as stating that by 1937 the differences between the GNP's and Greyshirts' conception of the Jewish Question had become negligible.<sup>84)</sup> Although this may well be somewhat of an overstatement, it is important to note that assertions of a similar nature were not uncommon during the latter half of the 1930s. In Morris Alexander's biography, for example, mention is made of a November 1937-editorial in the Cape Argus in which it was stated that "... the [Purified] Nationalist Party [had] gone over, lock, stock and barrel, to anti-semitism ..."<sup>85)</sup>

#### 4.3.1. The Greyshirt-movement and Anti-communism

Intimately connected to Greyshirt-remarks on the Jewish Question were references to the perceived menace of communism. On many an occasion the twin elements of anti-communism and anti-Semitism functioned in close proximity - the one being an important prerequisite for the other. Within the GNP, as indicated in a previous chapter, antagonism towards Jews and anti-communism were also presented at times as interrelated elements. In this analysis

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82. G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, pp.120-121. See also Die Transvaler, 4.11.1937.

83. See Malan's speech at Porterville on 26.1.1938 as reported in Die Burger, 27.1.1938.

84. G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, p.122.

85. E. Alexander: Morris Alexander. A Biography, p.165.

attention will exclusively be focussed on the Greyshirts' conception of the alleged connection between Jewry and communism.

However, even then, this analysis will primarily relate to the period prior to the outbreak of World War II. The motivation underlying this chronological limitation is three fold:

- (i) Whereas the NO, at different times, could either rely on G/HNP-platforms, symphathetic media, Parliament or Die Anti-Kommunis for the promotion of its cause, the Greyshirts' had a severely restricted number of options available to them. Although the Greyshirt-movement contested parliamentary seats during the 1938-general election and even nominated candidates in earlier by-elections, no success was forthcoming from these endeavours. Parliament, as a forum for the presentation and promotion of Greyshirt-points of view, thus remained a non-realizable option. In spite of incidences of cooperation between supporters of this movement and those of the GNP in the 1938-general election, Party platforms and media controlled by the G/HNP remained inaccessible for the Greyshirt-movement. As was the case with the NO and OB, Die Burger and Die Transvaler only reported on Greyshirt-activities on occasion where the G/HNP stood to benefit from such reportage.<sup>86)</sup> For all intents and purposes the Greyshirt-organ, Die Waarheid-The Truth, remained the only medium for the dissemination of Greyshirt-policies. Die Waarheid-The Truth, however, ceased publication in July 1938. This analysis, for a large part, will be based on reportage emanating from the Greyshirt-organ.

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86. An excellent example of this is provided by the attention afforded to a court case involving Weichardt following a brawl between Greyshirts and Jews at a Greyshirt-meeting in Cape Town during June 1939 (See Die Transvaler and Die Burger, 23.6.1939-29.6.1939). Apart from perhaps reflecting negatively on the person of Louis Weichardt, this court case also provided the Party with the opportunity to bring into focus its own policy towards Jews and, subsequently, under public attention.

(ii) Closely connected to this first aspect was the rapidly decreasing number of opportunities for continued and fundamental intra-G/HNP influencing by the Greyshirt-movement. Prior to November 1937 this movement was theoretically in a position to openly propagate its philosophies within the Party without being seriously hindered by the G/HNP-leadership. During the course of this last month, however, protracted negotiations aimed at the establishment of a common electoral front with a view of contesting the 1938 general elections were unilaterally broken off by the GNP. In spite of the official rejection of Greyshirt-overtures by the Party, active cooperation, as indicated by Shimoni, did indeed occur between supporters of the GNP and Greyshirts during the aforementioned election.<sup>87)</sup> Cooperation, however, were limited to isolated constituencies and did not occur on a national or even provincial level.<sup>88)</sup>

Furthermore, it may well be argued that cooperation were initially brought about by a common objective - keeping the United Party out - rather than being indicative of ideological accord. At the Cradock Provincial Congress of the GNP in October 1940 Malan sharply criticised group-forming within the Party.<sup>89)</sup> The Greyshirt-movement interpreted this as proscription and Weichardt subsequently declared that answering Malan's call for a return to the Party would be equal to treason.<sup>90)</sup> Van Heerden has indicated that the Cradock Congress effectively eliminated the Greyshirt-

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87. Shimoni: op.cit., pp.125-126.

88. In the Natal constituency of Vryheid, for example, candidates of the Greyshirt-movement and GNP opposed one another during the 1938 election.

89. F.J. Van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.136.

90. INCH. PV 29: L.T. Weichardt-collection. File 123: [L.T. Weichardt]: "Was die Gryshembeweging ooit dood?". See also File 133: "Geskiedkundige Oorsig van die Nasionaal-Sosialistiese Volksbeweging (Die Gryshemde)".

movement as a potential force in Afrikaner nationalist politics.<sup>91)</sup>

(iii) Although the conception of a connection between Jews and communism did come to attain a momentum largely independent from organisational control and/or -manipulation, the 1940 Cradock Congress, together with the pivotal role of Louw in in the Party's campaign against communism and immigration provided the G/HNP with the necessary leverage to at least minimise Greyshirt-input in this regard. Even though Louw's remarks regarding the alleged connection between Jews and communism corresponded in many ways with traditional Greyshirt-sentiments, his physical absence from the Union prior to August 1937 largely precludes this movement as a possible source of influence. The chances of Louw being influenced by essentially a peripheral movement following his return to South Africa seems unlikely.

#### 4.3.2. Anti-Communism and Anti-Semitism: The Greyshirt Perspective

Central to the Greyshirts' conception of the alleged connection between communism and semitism was the belief that Jews were organised internationally in an insidious world-conspiracy aimed at the destruction of all Gentile states. In a series of "... [q]uestions to be answered by South African Politicians" Die Waarheid-The Truth provided an explication of this belief and its relevancy for South Africa:

"1. Are you aware that the Jews in South Africa are not a religious community as they falsely pretend, but that they form a political organism or State of a secret nature, totally distinct from the South African State and with an independent Constitution, Government and Laws ?

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91. Van Heerden: op.cit., p.273.

2. Are you aware that the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, which has its headquarters in Johannesburg, is the Central Governing Body of this secret Jewish state; that both in structure, function and authority it bears all the characteristics of a State Government; that, like other State Governments, it is divided into Departments, e.g. a Department for Political Affairs, a Department of Legal Affairs ...?

3. Are you aware that the authorities of this secret Jewish state are the actual rulers of South Africa, and that the South African Government seldom, if ever, dares to take any step of which these authorities disapprove?

4. Are you aware that that similar secret Jewish states exist in almost every country [of the world]?

5. Are you aware that, over and above the secret Jewish states established in the different states, there exists a secret International Jewish State, of which every Jew throughout the world is a member?

6. Are you aware that the laws of this secret International Jewish State forbid its subjects to recognise any non-Jewish authority, and require them to work unceasingly, though with foresight and cunning, for the undermining and destruction of all non-Jewish states?

7. Are you aware that the act of any Jew in becoming naturalised as a citizen of a non-Jewish state is merely a fraudulent device to enable him to promote more effectually the interests of World-Jewry?

8. Are you aware that Jews, so naturalised in the different non-Jewish states, always play in one another's hands, and that they constantly provoke animosities and wars between these non-Jewish states, according as Jewish interests dictate?

9. Are you aware that it is through their international organisation that the Jews have succeeded, by every foul and corrupt means, in seizing the reins of power in almost every part of the world?

10. Are you aware that the salvation of South Africa and of every other country, together with the maintenance of international peace and good-will depends primarily on the destruction of ... Jewish power everywhere?"<sup>92)</sup>

Communism and capitalism, within the context of this international Jewish conspiracy, were the twin elements of a perceived integrated strategy aimed at the subjugation of non-Jewish states. Communism, according to the Greyshirt-perspective, was a Jewish product both by nature and in terms of origin. In explaining this assertion, the Greyshirt-movement made use of a complex and all-embrasive strategy whereby communism was connected to and integrated with (Jewish) capitalism, Jewish internationalism and,

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92. Die Waarheid-The Truth, 19.6.1936.

collectively, the perceived hidden agenda for Jewish world-domination. The Soviet Union, in turn, served as point of departure in illustrating these and other allegations.

In explaining the perceived Jewish origins of communism, the Greyshirt-movement employed three interconnected strategies: First, the ideology of communism was formulated by Karl Marx - originally a Jew by the name of Mordechai. Through the association with Marx, communism had thus become "... essentially Jewish."<sup>93</sup>) The conception of Jewish involvement with communism by way of the perceived Jewish background of this ideology, however, was not only limited to Greyshirt-circles, but included individuals in the more influential quarters of Afrikaner nationalism. An excellent example of this is provided by Nico Diederichs. Diederichs, prominent in Afrikaner intellectual and cultural circles, published in 1938 one of the first monographs on the subject of communism in the Afrikaans language. In Die Kommunisme - Sy Teorie en Praktyk, Diederichs paid specific attention to the Jewish background of Marx - the "... vader en grondlegger ..." of communism.<sup>94</sup>)

The second strategy related to the alleged hidden agenda for Jewish world-domination. Johannes von Strauss von Moltke, then leader of the South African Gentile Socialists<sup>95</sup>), alleged, in a series of public meetings during March/April 1934, that he was in possession of incontrovertible proof which indicated the existence of a secret plot by world-Jewry to destroy Christianity and civilization. Von Moltke's proof consisted of a 'secret' document allegedly stolen from a synagogue in Port Elizabeth by H.V. (Harry) Inch, Eastern Cape leader of the Greyshirts. With regard

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93. Ibid., 12.11.1937.

94. See N. Diederichs: Kommunisme - Sy Teorie en Praktyk, pp.11-14.

95. A splinter-movement identifying strongly with German national-socialism.



to communism, this document declared:

"We [Jews] stand for world communism, for dictatorship of the proletariat. Our Imperialism of Pax Judaeica is one for the downfall of western civilization and its replacement by the eastern or Japanese system. We have seen the progress of the U.S.S.R. since 1917 when our agents, Lenin, Stalin, etc., murdered the Tzar ... As we have got control over Russia, so we will also control the Union ... Such is the mission of Judah."<sup>96)</sup>

Shimoni indicates that this document was an adaptation of the notorious Protocols of Zion.<sup>97)</sup> Following the institution of legal proceedings against Inch, Von Moltke and a third defendant, the Supreme Court in Grahamstown awarded the Rev. A. Levy the sum of 1 775 pounds for defamation.

In spite of a ruling by the Supreme Court that Inch "... had either concocted the document or connived at its concoction ...",<sup>98)</sup> Die Waarheid-The Truth, less than four years later, once more returned to the infamous Protocols in explaining the Jewish origins of communism. Communism, according to the Greyshirt-organ, were based on the Protocols and "... 'n wetenskaplike verwerking daarvan deur die Jood Karl Marx."<sup>99)</sup> Significantly, on this occasion the concepts Socialism and Communism were described as interchangeable terms for the same set of ideological belief-systems. No explanation was provided for the manner in which this related to the Greyshirt-endorsement of a variation of Socialism.

The third strategy pertained to the perceived role of Jews in Soviet society. In this regard two aspects were referred to, namely the role of Jews and Jewish capital in the Russian

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96. Cited in The South African Law Reports [1934] Eastern Districts Local Division, p.299.

97. G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, p.112.

98. South African Law Reports [1934] Eastern Districts Local Division, p.296.

99. Die Waarheid-The Truth, 18.3.1938.

revolution of October 1917 and the alleged dominance of contemporary USSR by Jews. Regarding the first of these aspects, it was continually stressed that the 1917-revolution were both financed and undertaken by Jews. Die Waarheid-The Truth, in February 1936, stated that the "... Bolsjewistiese rewolusie in Rusland was die werk van 387 persone, waarvan 371 Jode was."<sup>100)</sup>

Assertions were also based on quotations attributed to Jews and other sources of information. An example of the latter is a reference to an alleged investigation undertaken by a United States Government agency in which it was "... established beyond a possibility of doubt that the Bolshevik Revolution [had been] financed by Jewish bankers and banking houses in Europe and America."<sup>101)</sup> Indicative of quotations attributed to Jews was the reference to a statement by a certain J. Hermalin in which he was alleged to have said - during 1917 - that "[t]he Russian Revolution was made by Jews. We Jews have created secret societies, have planned the reign of terror. The Revolution succeeded by our convincing propoganda and our mass assassinations, in order to form a government truly ours."<sup>102)</sup>

The perceived predominance attained by Jews in the immediate post-1917 period, according to the Greyshirt-movement, continued to exist in the then present day Soviet Union. Die Waarheid-The Truth alleged that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the dominant force in Soviet society, were made up of 56 Jews and three (non-Jewish) Russians.<sup>103)</sup> Members of this latter group (Stalin, Lobov and Ossinsky), however, were allegedly also married to Jews. These marriages, so it would seem

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100. Ibid., 7.2.1936.

101. Ibid., 12.11.1937. A number of Jewish capitalists who had allegedly been involved in financing the 1917-revolution were identified. These included Rothschild, Israel Lazarevich Helphand [whose pseudonym was Parvus] (12.11.1937), Schiff, Kuhn and Loeb (7.2.1936).

102. Die Waarheid-The Truth, 3.12.1937.

103. Ibid., 24.4.1936.

in terms of the Greyshirt-perspective, only served to ensure the continued dominance of Soviet society by Jews.

Another allegation which appeared with an almost monotonous regularity in Greyshirt-publications related to the position of M.M. (Maxim) Litvinov.<sup>104</sup>) Litvinov, according to the Greyshirt-perspective, was the personification of Jewish involvement with and domination of communism. In a pamphlet issued during September 1938, Litvinov was referred to as "... Litvinoff-Finkelstein-Wallach ..." <sup>105</sup>) The name-change decided on by Litvinov and other Jews, according to the Greyshirt-organ, was in accordance with the Jewish strategy of 'camouflage' and served to disguise the ultimate objective of world-Jewry, viz. world-domination.<sup>106</sup>)

In explaining the perceived Jewish nature of communism, the Greyshirt movement once again returned to the alleged hidden agenda for Jewish world-domination. Although no detailed or complete exposition was provided at any one time, sufficient evidence exist for a broad reconstruction of this argument.

Central to this contention was the allegation that communism was not "... a Movement of the People, but a Conspiracy of Jewish International Capitalism against Humanity."<sup>107</sup>) On another occasion this ideology was described as " ... die triomf van die ... [Joodse] Kapitalisme."<sup>108</sup>) The emphasis on communism as being a form of Jewish capitalism corresponded with the Greyshirt-conception of world-domination being the ultimate objective of the

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104. Litvinov, originally a Jew by the name of Meyer Wallach, rose to prominence under the Stalin-regime and became Soviet representative at the League of Nations between 1934 and 1938. See The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of World Biography, VI, pp.519-522; Great Soviet Encyclopedia, XIV, p.606.

105. INCH. PV 29: L.T. Weichardt-collection. File 122: [L.T. Weichardt]: "Manifes".

106. Die Waarheid-The Truth, 23.7.1937. See also Ibid., 12.11.1937.

107. Ibid., 12.11.1937.

108. Ibid., 18.3.1938.

Jewish 'race'. Although differing perspectives were identifiable with regard to the perceived role of international Jewish economic hegemony in the striving towards world-domination,<sup>109)</sup> it is important for the aims of this analysis to note that both communism and capitalism were perceived as integrated and causally-connected elements in the striving towards world-domination.

Van Heerden indicate that capitalism, according to the Greyshirt-perspective, was a Jewish product by origin.<sup>110)</sup> In pursuance of its objective of world-domination, international Jewry allegedly utilised capitalism as a mechanism to spread animosity between nations and sow discord between groups and individuals within a given nation. This prevented international concurrence and the establishment of a united front in opposing the perceived intentions of world-Jewry. Furthermore, because of the degenerative influence of liberalism, the character of democracy had been changed, which, in turn, provided capitalism with the opportunity to continue with its destruction.<sup>111)</sup> Die Waarheid-The Truth subsequently described the Union's political system as "... 'n Joodse stelsel, wat deur middel van die volk te verdeel, Jode-Kapitaal in staat stel om 'n ekonomiese despotisme oor die nasie

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109. Without going into any detail, these different perspectives may be summarised as follow: Firstly, economic hegemony equalled political domination and, secondly, economic hegemony was a prerequisite for political domination. Although the differences between these perspectives relate more to the manner in which Jews would allegedly attempt to control the political process (manipulation vs direct control), the inclusion of both perspectives in the Greyshirt-strategy allowed for an extension in and intensification of propaganda in this regard.

110. F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.57.

111. Given the assertion that capitalism was a Jewish product and the belief that Jewish capitalists attempted to dominate in all countries of the world, this may have implied that British imperialism, if not controlled, were at least inspired by Jews. This lends support to Shimoni's assertion that, in terms of Greyshirt-propaganda, "... the Jew made the Boer War[s], and it is he who incited the 'Kaffirs' against White civilization." See G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, p.113.

te voer."<sup>112</sup>) Indicative of the alleged international influence of Jews, according to this movement, was the whipping up of emotions against Hitler and national-socialist Germany. This was done because Hitler had uncovered and foiled a plot by Jew-communists to bolshevisise Germany and Europe.

Communism, ostensibly the antithesis of capitalism, was in effect a continuation of the "... Joodse politiek van 'verdeel en heers'!"<sup>113</sup>) This was also the final step towards Jewish world-domination. Whereas Jew-capitalists, through the accumulation of capital and control over powerful trusts and cartels, attempted to subjugate and pauperise the small independent businessman and entrepreneur - "... die ruggraat van die nasionale besigheidswêreld ...",<sup>114</sup>) Jew-communists envisaged the extension of Jewish control over and possession of respectively competing (non-Jewish) cartels and non-Jewish possessions. A socialisation of the means of production under the communist system thus implied a transfer and even more intensive monopolisation of wealth by the Jewish 'race'. Die Waarheid-The Truth, in juxtaposing the Greyshirt-ideology to that of communism, referred to this aspect in the following terms:

"National-Socialism upholds Private Property, but subjects the same to control so that it may be utilised for the common good. Marxian-Socialism upholds State ownership of all things, and so concentrates the entire wealth of the community in the hands of the state-rulers who, doubtless, will be Jews."<sup>115</sup>)

The strongest argument in favour of this contention, and indeed so acknowledged by the Greyshirt-movement, was the perceived predominance of Jews in the Central Committee of the CPSU. Although never stated explicitly, this furthermore implied that the Soviet Union, within the international arena, was a microcosm

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112. Die Waarheid-The Truth, 10.9.1937.

113. Ibid., 8.7.1938.

114. ICH. PV 29: L.T. Weichardt-collection. File 146: "Die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Party (Gryshemde)" (undated pamphlet).

115. Die Waarheid-The Truth, 17.1.1936.

of the Jewish supra-national and super-state referred to in Die Waarheid-The Truth of June 1936.<sup>116)</sup>

Within the context of the Union, according to the Greyshirt-organ, communism was "... the chief-weapon by which the International Jewish Money-Power is seeking to destroy the white Christian South African Nation and State and to set up a black Atheistic Republic under Jewish control."<sup>117)</sup> The operative words in the above quotation are "... under Jewish control." As indicated by the Inch-document of 1934, the slogan 'South Africa and Africa for the black man' was merely an element of the camouflage strategy aimed at obscuring the actual objective of world-Jewry. Whereas Jewish domination of (white) Gentiles was in accordance with the alleged prophecies of the Protocols of Zion, (atheistic) Africans and the slogan of a Black Republic merely facilitated eventual world-domination by Jews. Inch's document referred to these aspects in the following manner:

"The Nordics in our eyes are in no wise (sic!) different to the Chinese Dogs or Turks. They are all our destroyers, our enemies. The Christian religion is wrong. Christ, in the Jewish sense, was a false prophet born of the womb of a foul bitch whose husband was in our eyes never married to Joseph [sic!]. In our Talmud Torah and other holy books it does say that the Gentiles will be made to drink the piss and eat the dung of the Jews.

It is our plan to give South Africa to the natives ... However, we have the prospect in view that if South Africa is given to the Sons of Ham, we shall not be in any way molested ... The natives are of no account. They are as brainless as their Teutonic cousins - rapers (sic!), blackguards, thieves and spies."<sup>118)</sup>

In the campaign leading up to the 1936 parliamentary by-election in the constituency of Port Elizabeth-North, Weichardt went to

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116. See "Ten Questions to be answered by South African Politicians." Die Waarheid-The Truth, 19.6.1936.

117. Die Waarheid-The Truth, 12.11.1937.

118. Cited in The South African Law Reports [1934] Eastern Districts Local Division, pp.300-301.

considerable lengths in attempting to explain the 'true' meaning of the Black Republic-slogan to the non-white electorate.<sup>119)</sup>

Within South Africa, according to the Greyshirt-movement, significant progress had been made in attempts to convert the Union into a Jewish-communistic state. The continued immigration of Jews to South Africa served to bolster the ranks of communistic organisations already active in South Africa. Weichardt declared that an intimate and fraternal relationship existed between newly-arrived immigrants and the Jewish-Bolshevistic government of the Soviet Union.♣) Under the direct supervision of the Comintern-centre in "... Johannesburg, met takke in Kaapstad en Durban ...",<sup>121)</sup> these immigrants were under orders to reap havoc in the Union. Examples of this havoc allegedly included the death of the two policemen in the Vereeniging-townships during 1937.

Examples of the divide and rule-tactics employed by Jewry in furthering their objective of world-domination were allegedly also prevalent within South Africa. This applied to both the inter- and intra-ethnical level. In welcoming the formation of the Afrikanerbond van Mynwerkers, Die Waarheid-The Truth declared:

"Die [Joodse] kapitalistiese-kommunistiese stelsel maak van ons mense 'n werkersklas. Ons is geen klas nie, maar volwaardige mense. Ons moet vergeet dat daar klasse is. Die ... vakverbonde ... moet afgebreek word en in die plek daarvan moet kom een groot volksorganisasie wat op Christelike-nasionale grondslag staan."<sup>122)</sup>

Reacting to rumours of attempts by the CPSA/CI to establish non-racial structures in South Africa, the Greyshirt-organ declared

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119. See for example Die Waarheid-The Truth, 19.2.1936.

120. Ibid., 21.8.1936.

121. Ibid., 11.9.1936. In the same edition, Die Waarheid-The Truth identified thirteen sets of instructions newly-arrived Jewish-communist immigrants allegedly had to adhere to. These instructions included blackmail, spying, etc. etc.

122. Die Waarheid-The Truth, 26.3.1937.

this to be a ploy aimed at the obstruction of the continued development of the nascent Afrikaner-nationalism.<sup>123)</sup>

Another element frequently touched upon by Die Waarheid-The Truth and Greyshirt-speakers related to the perceived dominant role of Jews in the South African economic sphere. The emphasis on the Jewish 'race' as constituting an economic force inherently hostile to the welfare and progress of the volk argueably provided the ideal vantage point from which to mobilise support for Greyshirt-objectives. Furthermore, capital accumulation by world-Jewry, in terms of the Greyshirt-perspective, was the first stage of the Jewish striving towards world-domination. This, in turn, was a starting point for the linking of Jews and communism. Even before the formation of this movement, Weichardt, in a speech at Cape Town, stressed the alleged imbalance between Jews and Gentiles in the organised professions and the former's predominance in certain sections of trade and industry. This assertion was also utilised at times to rationalise and even underplay the Greyshirts' anti-semitism. Die Waarheid-The Truth, for example, declared in an editorial in February 1935:

"We attack the Jew because and only because he is the world's arch-exploiter and oppressor ... we are well aware of the fact ... that many of the biggest and most successful rogues in South Africa have been, and are not Jews at all. But this we do say: The Jews are the organized exploiters and oppressors *par excellence*, and moreover their organization is international"<sup>124)</sup>  
(italics mine).

Potentially the most far-reaching of all Greyshirt-allegations was the assertion that Jewish capitalists-communists, through the monopolisation of wealth, had succeeded in influencing Government-policy. Smuts, in 1937 Minister of Justice in the Hertzog-cabinet, was branded a 'friend' of the Jews, who, in refusing to adopt preventative measures against communism, ignored the "...

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123. See Ibid., 23.7.1937.

124. Cited F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.39-40.



uitdruklike wense van die volk ..."<sup>125)</sup> Following the outbreak of World War II, this supposition was made applicable to the whole of the Smuts-administration. Allegations of this sort, apart from contributing to the conception of a 'link' between Jewry and Communism, also served to further demonise Smuts and his administration in the eyes of Afrikaner nationalists. By allegedly giving precedence to the interests of the Empire, Smuts was promoting not only British imperialism, but ultimately Jewish imperialism. Smuts' perceived refusal/inability to act against Jewish communism, in terms of the Greyshirt-argument, may thus have stemmed from his enslavement to Jewish interests. Although primarily of a propagandistic value, variations of this argument were also used in the course of the 1940s by the HNP to explain Smuts' perceived unwillingness to adopt repressive measures in opposing communism.<sup>126)</sup>

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125. Die Waarheid-The Truth, 11.6.1937. See also Ibid., 9.4.1936.

126. See Chapter Two.

## CHAPTER FIVE

THE COMPONENT PARTS OF ANTI-COMMUNISM: THE COLOUR  
QUESTION

Chapters five and six will present a more detailed analysis of the main component parts of the campaign against what was adjudged to be communism, viz. the Colour Question, Jewish Immigration and developments related to (predominantly white) labour organisation. This analysis will take the form of an examination of the first two issues; thereby focussing attention on their evolution up to May 1945, structural adaptations and changes and the degree of pollination between the various movements/organisations under discussion. These analyses will also serve as background to the final chapter of this dissertation in which the utilisation of overt anti-communism as respectively a principle and strategy will be investigated. The third element of the campaign against perceived communism, namely the struggle for the "soul" of the Afrikaner worker, will evolve around the functional role of anti-communism in the evolution of the concept of an organic volksidentity.

## 5.1. THE COLOUR QUESTION

Race and colour in South Africa, as vindicated by the ever-increasing body of literature, have received much more than mere casual attention in scholarly analyses. The same observation, however, cannot be made for impact of the perceived menace of communism on the colour question and vice versa. While it has come to be accepted that the 'red menace' (i.e. communism) were progressively interfused with the 'black

peril' (i.e. the colour question) under apartheid ideology,<sup>1)</sup> little attention has been afforded to the origins and nature of this interfusement.

Where remarks have been made on the linking of the 'red menace' and 'black peril', these comments relate to isolated incidents and, as a rule, appear in the framework of an analysis dealing with a different issue. Furthermore, such remarks are generally made applicable to the post-1948 era - i.e. the period after Malan's *Herenigde Nasionale Party* had come to power. A case in point is the *Suppression of Communism Act* (Act 44/1950). Promulgated in 1950, this Act ostensibly had as objective the curbing of communist propaganda and the eventual elimination of the perceived communist menace. This was to be done by way of a series of repressive measures.<sup>2)</sup> Mokgethi Mothlabi, in dealing with the evolution of black opposition to apartheid, views the *Suppression of Communism Act* as merely the first in a series of measures aimed at the villification and persecution of anti-apartheid activists.<sup>3)</sup> Gail Gerhart, on the same theme, concludes that this law and other measures enacted afterwards promoted an "... instinctive solidarity" between some of the more prominent actors in anti-apartheid politics.<sup>4)</sup>

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1. See G.M. Gerhart: Black Power in South Africa - The Evolution of an Ideology, pp.91-92; M. Mothlabi: The Theory and Practice of Black Opposition to Apartheid, pp.29-32 et seq and N.M. Stultz: Afrikaner politics in South Africa, 1934-1948, pp.121-123.
  2. For a more detailed account of the different provisions and implications of the *Suppression of Communism Act*, see W.N. Botes: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Beleidsformuleerders se Persepsie van die Kommunistiese Bedreiging teen Suid-Afrika, pp.42-46; B. Bunting: The Rise of the South African Reich, pp.163-169; T.G. Karis: *South African Liberation: The Communist Factor* (Foreign Affairs, vol.65(2), 1986), pp.274-276 and H.A. Wessels: Die Stryd van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika teen "Kommunistiese" Imperialisme - 'n Staatsfilosofiese Studie, pp.82-124.
  3. M. Mothlabi: Op.cit., pp.28-29.
  4. G.M. Gerhart: op.cit., pp.91-92. Gerhart possibly refers here to the alliance strategy in anti-apartheid politics.

The majority of studies dealing with South African politics during the war years regard the colour question as having played a relatively insignificant role both in government policy and Afrikaner nationalist politics.<sup>5)</sup> Questions of race and colour in government policy, according to this argument, were overshadowed by the prerogatives of the South African war effort.<sup>6)</sup> Groups identifying with Afrikaner nationalism, on the other hand, were involved in a battle on two fronts, viz. the campaign against South African participation in World War II and the struggle for ideological hegemony and homogeneity in their own ranks.<sup>7)</sup>

While both interpretations are valid in the sense that the colour question were indeed overshadowed by more immediate and pressing issues, this, however, is not to say that the colour question altogether disappeared from view for the duration of the war. Some of the basic tenets of apartheid philosophy, enthusiastically pursued by successive administrations after 1948, can, within the G/HNP, be traced back to period prior to the outbreak of World War II. Relative to the integration of the colour question and the perceived menace of communism, the years between 1939 and 1945 saw this issue coming to the fore in a manner more aggressive than ever before.

One author who does make mention of integration between the colour question and the alleged communist menace before May 1948 is Newell M. Stultz. This observation is based on a pamphlet written by Eric Louw which, according to Stultz, was

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5. See, for example, the limited attention paid to this issue in works by D.W. Krüger: The Making of a Nation, 1910-1961, pp.199-225; M. Wilson and L.M. Thompson (eds.): The Oxford History of South Africa, 1870-1966, pp.402-405 and G.D. Scholtz: Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner, VIII, 1939-1948.

6. One author who does attempt to come to terms with UP race policy during the war years is Rodney Davenport. See T.R.H. Davenport: Racial Policies of the Smuts Government, 1939-1948 (unpublished paper).

7. See G.D. Scholtz: op.cit., pp.363-364.

published by the HNP "[e]arly in 1948 ..."8) While, as will be argued, Stultz' contention is a fair observation, it should be noted that the pamphlet in question, entitled Die Kommunistiese Gevaar/The Communist Danger, had in actuality already been published in 1943. Furthermore, this pamphlet was a revamped and updated version of Louw's speech on communism presented to Parliament earlier in the same year. Based on this pamphlet and the argument of previous chapters, it may well be stated that the enmeshment of the 'red menace' and 'black peril' were already well underway by 1943.

This chapter, in dealing with the colour question as a component part of the campaign against the perceived menace of communism, will be divided into three sections. The first section will present an overview of race policy in South Africa under Hertzog and Smuts and, after 1935, the standpoint of the G/HNP as proposed alternative. This first section will serve as background to and form the context for the remainder of the chapter. The second section will relate to Afrikaner nationalism and the colour question after 1937, concentrating on indications of continuity in policy between the G/HNP, NO, OB and Greyshirt-movement. The integration of the 'red menace' and 'black peril' and the evolution thereof will be discussed in the final section.

## 5.2. RACE AND COLOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1924-1945

Before discussing particular aspects of policy vis à vis the colour question, four remarks of a more general nature needs to be made:

Firstly, while various administrations, from 1910 onwards, laid claim to different principles in the formulation and actualisation of colour policy, one element consistently present in all of these initiatives was the protection and preservation of white interests. The safeguarding of white

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8. N.M. Stultz: Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 1934-1948, p.122.

interests thus determined the basic parameters of native policy.

Secondly, ethnicity, as a central component of what T.D. Moodie has described as the Afrikaner's "Civil Religion",<sup>9)</sup> was not only based on ethnocentric prejudice, but also contained, amongst other things, elements of a religious-theological nature and norms by which civilization was judged. The perceived difference between Christian and heathen in South Africa largely corresponded with racial differences between people. Similarly, perceived differences in civilization also found stratification in racial terms. Hence, the concept 'Western civilization' also became an interchangeable term for 'white man's civilization'.

Thirdly, the philosophy of segregation-trusteeship, as defined by different administrations, did not entail a radically different approach towards the colour question. As indicated previously, it was rather the continuation - albeit more systematic - of a policy whose origins were firmly embedded in an earlier century.

Finally, whereas phenomena such as urbanization and industrialisation and, generally speaking, the dynamics of economic development systematically undermined the declared status quo vis á vis racial policy,<sup>10)</sup> Afrikaner nationalist oppositional groupings, by exploiting white fears and prejudice, proceeded to introduce a greater element of dogma into colour policy. Such was the case in both the 'black peril' election of 1929 (won by Hertzog) and the defeat of Smuts and the UP in 1948. Concurrently, the greater emphasis on dogma contributed towards the

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9. See T.D. Moodie: The Rise of Afrikanerdom. Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner "Civil Religion".

10. Smuts, for example, declared with regard to colour policy in January 1942: "... I am afraid that segregation has fallen on evil days." (Cited in P. Walshe: The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, p.269).

demonisation and subsequent alienation of more liberal schools of thought on the colour question from the South African polity. The dwindling fortunes of Hofmeyr-style liberalism may well serve as example in this regard.<sup>11)</sup>

The principles of segregation and trusteeship - particularly as it evolved under Hertzog - have been sufficiently dealt with in an earlier chapter. Ignored thus far, however, is the relative positioning of Coloureds vis á vis these concepts.

In terms of Hertzog's understanding, Coloureds and whites, by sharing a common historical heritage, language and set of customs, could not simply be classed apart.<sup>12)</sup> In spite of social inequalities and the tradition of a segregated community life, Coloureds and whites, politically and economically, were thus full equals. Translated into practical political objectives, this implied that qualified participation in the central decision-making process, traditionally enjoyed by Coloureds in the Cape Colony, had to be applied on a nationwide scale. Both in philosophy and in terms of practical objectives, Hertzog and successors of the Cape liberal tradition, in this regard, shared a common conviction.<sup>13)</sup>

Hertzog, following the coming to power of his National Party in 1924, started applying his theories to practice. The perceived fundamental differences between black and white - an integral part of his philosophy - found near immediate application in

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11. See P. Lewsen: "Liberals in Politics and Administration, 1936-1948" in J. Butler, R. Elphick and D. Welsh (eds.): Democratic Liberalism in South Africa, pp.98-115 and P.B. Rich: Liberalism and Ethnicity in South African Politics, 1921-1948, (African Studies, vol. 35(3-4), 1976), pp.229-251.

12. See G. Lewis: Between the Wire and the Wall - A History of South African 'Coloured' Politics, pp.39-42.

13. D.W. Krüger: The Making of a Nation, pp.149-150.

the policy of "civilized labour".<sup>14)</sup> This principle was also to be found in the Immorality Act of 1927 - aimed at the prohibition of miscegenation across the colour bar. Relative to the colour question itself, Hertzog, in July 1926, introduced four Bills into Parliament which, according to Hepple, had as underlying motive the clear establishment of the "... principle that the government of the country must be in white hands and strongly safe guarded against any encroachment or weakening by non-whites."<sup>15)</sup> These proposed Acts were the Representation of Natives Bill,<sup>16)</sup> the Native Council Bill,<sup>17)</sup> the Native Land Bill<sup>18)</sup> and the Coloured Persons' Rights Bill.<sup>19)</sup>

Differing opinions on the colour question within his own party and the politicised nature of this issue prevented Hertzog from

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14. For a discussion of this policy, its embodiment in various legislative and other measures and the impact thereof on the broader socio-political arena, see R.H. Davies: Capital, State and White Labour In South Africa, 1900-1960, pp.179-245 and D. Yudelman: The Emergence of Modern South Africa, pp.221-224.
  15. A Hepple: A History of South Africa, p.108.
  16. The Representation of Natives Bill proposed the removal of blacks from the common voters roll in the Cape Province; thereby bringing the Cape in line with the status quo in the three northern provinces. As compensation, blacks, through their traditional structures, would have the right to elect seven white representatives in the House of Assembly and four in the Senate. See T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa - A Modern History, pp. 248-249 and D.W. Krüger: The Making of a Nation, pp.150-151.
  17. This Bill had as objective the creation of a Native Council composed of 50 blacks; 35 of whom were to be elected along lines similar to those proposed in the Representation of Natives Bill and the remainder nominated by the State. Although this body would have legislative power, only Ordinances could be passed by it and these would be binding only on Africans. See T.R.H. Davenport: op.cit., p.206.
  18. The Native Land Bill sought to consolidate trust land to be identified in terms of the Land Act of 1913.
  19. This fourth Bill proposed the extension of Coloured voting rights in the Cape to the three other provinces; thereby placing Coloureds and whites on an equal political footing. See Krüger: op.cit., p.151.



introducing the proposed legislation into Parliament. While the outcome of the 1929 election strengthened Hertzog's position in both Houses, the extra voting power still proved insufficient for the two-thirds majority constitutionally required to carry his policy into effect.<sup>20)</sup> The only major piece of legislation enacted during this period which related to the colour question was the **Native Administration Act** of 1927. This Act, and particularly the controversial Section 29, have already been dealt with in an earlier chapter.<sup>21)</sup>

While the colour question may not have been the most important contributory factor in promoting coalition between Hertzog and Smuts,<sup>22)</sup> it was a definite stumbling block on the road to Fusion. The seven points agreed on by Smuts and Hertzog during March 1933, which formed the basis for Coalition, referred to the colour question in vague terms:

"The Bantu question would be solved in such a way as to safeguard white civilization. The Bantu would however not be deprived of the right to develop. The political development of white and black would be separate."<sup>23)</sup>

Fusion and the establishment of the UP, while bringing greater clarity on the new administration's policy towards the colour question, also retained the potential of a continued division in the party on this issue.<sup>24)</sup>

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20. See T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa - A Modern History, p.207.

21. See Chapter One.

22. See Le Roux and Coetzer's discussion of the reasons for Coalition. J.H. le Roux and P.W. Coetzer: Die Nasionale Party, III, pp.289-299.

23. Cited in D.W. Krüger: The Making of a Nation, p.165.

24. The Programme of Principles of the UP, as adopted by its inaugural congress in December 1934, declared with regard to native policy:

Hertzog's Bills of 1926, after serving for several sessions before a parliamentary Select Committee, came to the fore again during May 1935 in the form of a report by this committee. This report proposed the retention of two of the original three Bills, and, on the question of Coloured political rights, suggested this issue to be dealt with separately.<sup>25)</sup>

The Native Representation Bill and the Land and Trust Bill, following a willingness by Hertzog to compromise, were finally enacted during the 1936-parliamentary session. The Native Representation Act, while not suspending the black franchise in the Cape altogether, did result in black voters in the Cape being placed on a separate electoral roll. Furthermore, black voters in the Cape were now divided into three constituencies, each one electing one white member to the House of Assembly. Provision was also made for the election, through traditional structures, of four white senators (one for the Transvaal and

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"(a) An earnest endeavour will be made to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the Native question along lines which, without depriving the Native of his right of development, will recognise as paramount the essentials of European civilisation.

(b) It is recognised that a solution of the political aspect of this question on the basis of separate representation of Europeans and Natives, or otherwise, being fundamental in character and not having hitherto been a matter of party division, should as far as possible be sought through agreement and should be left to the free exercise of the discretion of the individual members representing the party in Parliament.

(c) The recognition of the Natives as a permanent part of the population of South Africa under the Christian trusteeship of the European race is accepted as a fundamental principle of Native policy, together with a definite avoidance of race intermixture, and the promotion of a spirit of goodwill and mutual confidence between the two races as being in the best interests of South Africa." (Cited in D.W. Krüger: South African Parties and Policies, 1900-1960, p.87).

25. D.W. Krüger: The Making of a Nation, p.175.

OFS, one for Natal and two for the Cape Province) to represent black interests in Parliament. Finally, this Act also brought about the creation of the Native Representative Council - a body largely made up of blacks and which had a purely advisory and consultative function.<sup>26)</sup>

The position regarding Coloured political rights remained unaltered. While the Commission set up to investigate this issue recommended an extension of the Coloured franchise to all provinces on a basis equal to that of whites, anti-Coloured feeling amongst whites and the lack of solidarity on this issue within the UP resulted in the Coloured Persons' Rights Bill being "... quietly dropped"<sup>27)</sup> by Hertzog.

Officially, Government policy on the colour question remained unchanged during the war period. While Smuts, on the one hand, was committed to segregation, little attempt was made to systematically develop on it. In many ways, as noted by Davenport, the policy of segregation was allowed "... to run down ..." <sup>28)</sup> Remarks by Smuts and others <sup>29)</sup> and the appointment of several committees to investigate post-war reform may have even indicated a contemplated reversal in this regard.

The Programme of Principles of the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party, as adopted in 1936, declared with regard to the "Colour

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26. For a more detailed discussion of the different provisions of this Act and black and liberal white opposition to it, see T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa - A Modern History, pp.218-222; D.W. Krüger: The Making of a Nation, pp.176-180 and E. Roux: Time Longer than Rope, pp.286-298.

27. Krüger: op.cit., p.180.

28. T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa - A Modern History, p.239.

29. See footnote 10.

## Question":

"14. Die Party erken die Christelike voogdy van die Europese ras oor die naturelle en kleurling-bevolking en verklaar hom beslis teen die menging van die blanke en nie-blanke rasse. Hy wil aan die nie-blanke rasse die geleentheid verskaf om hulself op eie terrein te ontwikkel ooreenkomstig hul natuurlike aanleg en vatbaarheid.

Hy verklaar hom ten gunste van die territoriale en politieke segregasie van die naturel en van die aparte politieke verteenwoordiging van die kleurling. Op industriële gebied verklaar hy hom ten gunste van segregasie tussen blankes en nie-blankes.<sup>30)</sup>

The GNP's approach to the colour question was in one sense a continuation of traditional Hertzog principles. Differences in policy with the UP evolved not so much around the goal of territorial segregation or the principle of white trusteeship, but related rather to the proposed extent of segregation and the manner in which this objective would be realized. Whereas Hertzog, as indicated, perceived segregation as comprising a political separation of black and white, the GNP, while agreeing with this, also wanted political separateness to be extended to Coloureds.<sup>31)</sup>

Furthermore, within the context of ethnocentrism as motivation for segregation, Hertzog, at times, displayed a certain pragmatism in the realization of this goal. Hence, for example, he was willing to accept a compromise-solution in the enactment of the Native Representation Bill. Conversely, Malan and the GNP adopted an exclusive 'white perspective' in promoting its

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30. Cited in P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux: Die Nasionale Party, III, p.639.

31. In the parliamentary discussion of Hertzog's Native Representation Bill, for example, Malan proposed an amendment to remove both Coloureds and blacks from the common voters roll. See P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux(eds.): Die Nasionale Party, IV, pp.48-51.

brand of segregation.<sup>32)</sup> This perspective also prevented the GNP from lending its unequivocal support to the Land and Trust Bill.<sup>33)</sup>

The G/HNP, from 1938 onwards, enthusiastically pursued the propagation of its colour policy. At times, as was the case during the general election of May 1938, the GNP made the colour question one of the pillars of its election campaign.<sup>34)</sup> While the course of events in Afrikaner nationalist politics during the war years and the war in itself brought a decreased importance to the colour question, the G/HNP's approach towards this issue never lost its dogmatic ideological content. Smuts and the UP's lacklustre approach towards the colour question in

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32. Speaking in support of Malan's amendment to Hertzog's Native Representation Bill, N.J. van der Merwe declared with regard to segregation: "Daarop wil ek met nadruk sê dat die rede waarom ons hierdie soort wetgewing wat 'n kleurlyn beoog, indien, tog uit gronde daarvan is dat die vrees in ons land toeneem dat, as ons hierdie vraagstuk nie langs hierdie lyn oplos nie, dit die voortbestaan van die Blanke ras as sodanig in Suid-Afrika in gevaar sal stel. Dit is 'n stryd om die sefbehoud van die Blanke ras in Suid-Afrika. Dit is nie 'n stryd on die naturel te verdruk nie of om die kleurling die voet op die nek te sit nie, maar dit is 'n stryd om die bestaan van die Blanke ras in Suid-Afrika te handhaaf. Daar word gevoel dat as daar eenmaal politieke gelykstelling is, dit nie daar sal bly nie. Dit sal verder gaan en deurwerk op ekonomiese gebied en sosiale gebied ... [so] kry jy later vermenging van bloed en die ondergang van die Blanke ras." (Hansard, 13.2.1936, col.60-61).
33. While stressing that the GNP was not opposed to the consolidation of land for use by blacks, Strijdom, for example, also noted that whites were in greater need of land than non-whites. See Hansard, 15.4.1936, col.2881.
34. For a discussion of the place and role in the colour question in this election, see P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux (eds.): Die Nasionale Party, IV, pp.149-158 and J.H. le Roux: Die "Gesuiwerde" Nasionale Party, 1935-1940, pp.387-394. The GNP's election programme, with regard to the colour question, included the following objectives: Separate living areas, labour organisation and, where possible, segregated places of work for whites and non-whites; separate representation in legislative bodies for enfranchised Coloureds in the Cape ; and the extension of the 1927 Immorality Act to all non-whites and the prohibition of mixed marriages. See Die Transvaler, 5.4.1938.

many ways prepared the way for the electoral triumph of the HNP in 1948.

### 5.3. THE COLOUR QUESTION IN AFRIKANER NATIONALIST POLITICS

The colour question, particularly during the war years, did not fulfill a prominent role on the overall agenda of each of the Ossewa-Brandwag, New Order or Greyshirt-movement. The OB's first manifesto, as issued by the Grootraad in April 1942, did not even make mention of the colour question.<sup>35)</sup> While Van Rensburg did refer to the colour question in several of his speeches, it was only in November 1943 that specific mention was made of this issue in an OB policy document. The "Ten Point Policy Declaration", referred to earlier, declared in this regard:

(4) Only members of the nation can become national citizens - Only Afrikaners or potential Afrikaners can become nationals. In other words, only assimilable white elements ...

(5) We aim at a White South Africa - Non-Europeans are to be gradually segregated out of European territory to promote racial purity and the unhindered spontaneous national development of each element. Economic requirements to receive due consideration ...

(6) Christian Nationalism instead of Liberalism - The national development of our people and also of the Coloured and native people on the basis of Christian Nationalism ... by [the] eradication of anti-Christian and anti-national propaganda, whether of miscegenation or of racial antagonism ..."<sup>36)</sup> (italics in the original).

Oswald Pirow described the goal of the NO's colour policy as being the "... onverbiddelike handhawing van die Blanke beskawing in die Unie en sover dit deur onderhandeling en

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35. See Die Ossewa-Brandwag - Vanwaar en Waarheen, pp.3-6.

36. Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwag, pp.97-99.

beïnvloeding moontlik is, ook elders in Afrika."<sup>37)</sup> In the realization of this declared aim, a policy of "Blanke Christelike voogdskap oor alle nie-blankes gegrondves op die beginsel van algehele segregasie en die ontwikkeling langs eie lyne onder staatstoësig"<sup>38)</sup> was proposed. In terms of practical and attainable goals, however, little serious attention was afforded to the colour question. Similar to the NO's policy on Jewish Immigration, Pirow only proceeded to elaborate on this issue after May 1945.

While the Greyshirt-movement, as was the case with the NO, only attempted to come to terms with the colour question after 1945,<sup>39)</sup> during the war years this movement's approach formed part of its broader nationality policy. Already in 1936 Die Waarheid-The Truth had described the South African nation as being composed of "... all persons of pure European and Aryan descent who look upon South Africa as their only home and who make 'South Africa First' the guiding rule of all their social, economic and political activities."<sup>40)</sup> While Jews did not form part of the NO-constructed nation as a result of their non-Aryan background, Africans, on the basis of their non-white ancestry, were also disqualified from holding citizenship in the proposed state. No indication, however, was provided of whether non-whites would be dealt with in a similar manner as provided for Jews.<sup>41)</sup>

Had it not been for other differences in ideology and strategy, colour policy may well have served as a provisional basis for cooperation between the G/HNP, New Order, Ossewa-Brandwag and Greyshirt-movement. All of these organisations, be it openly or by implication, agreed on the untenability of racial

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37. O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.20.

38. Ibid., p.21.

39. Ibid., pp.70-71.

40. Die Waarheid-The Truth, 23.7.1936.

41. See Chapter Three.

integration and foresaw an elevated and dominant position for whites in society. Pirow, who had once been a supporter of Hertzog's ideal of Coloured enfranchisement, stressed the need to segregate "... alle nie-blankes ..."42) (emphasis in the original). As indicated previously, both the HNP and the Ossewa-Brandwag, towards the end of World War II, referred to their respective race policies by using the term apartheid. Prospects of cooperation with the HNP may well have been an important contributory factor for the inclusion of articles relating to specifically the colour question in the the OB's "Ten Point Policy Declaration" of November 1943. This must also be seen against the backdrop of Van Rensburg's and the Grootraad's campaign, launched in 1944, to establish a Volksfront.

In practice, however, the possibility of concurrence on the colour question and, resulting from that, cooperation, were overshadowed by other differences. By being the largest and having the greater visibility, to mention but two factors, the G/HNP, on occasion where it did refer to the colour question, had an almost complete monopoly in influencing and guiding Afrikaner nationalist popular opinion. Hence, the greater part of this chapter will be devoted to the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party.

#### 5.4. THE INTEGRATION OF THE 'RED MENACE' AND 'BLACK PERIL'

The causal linking of issues/phenomena in South African politics did not start with Afrikaner nationalism's campaign against perceived communism. Decades of racial animosity and antagonism, together with differing perceptions of the place and role of respectively black and white in society, provided an ideal breeding ground for the future linking of the colour question with some other phenomenon. Unification, in so far as it brought together different strands of thinking on the colour question, dramatically increased this potential.

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42. O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.30.



The question may well be posed whether Smuts had not laid the tactical groundwork for the later connection between the colour question and perceived communism. In vindicating the use of force against striking mineworkers, Smuts, as indicated, alleged that the Rand Revolt had broken out as a result of (white) workers being misled by a small number of foreign communist agitators.<sup>43)</sup> Although Smuts' analysis of the situation was a factual misrepresentation, the point in focus is the supposed ability of a small number of foreign agitators to manipulate the behaviour of a larger body of people to the detriment of the state.

The first actual linking of the colour question and "... certain doctrines ..." took place in 1927 under Hertzog's administration. While communism was not explicitly identified as 'unhealthy' doctrine, little doubt existed about the eligibility of communists for prosecution under Section 29 of the Native Administration Act.<sup>44)</sup> Pirow, in 1930, specifically identified 'communism' as a major contributor to the perceived state of fermentation in race relations.

Apart from the historical significance of Section 29 of the Native Administration Act and the Rioutous Assemblies (Amendment) Act in the linking of communism and the colour question, these measures also have had a functional significance vis à vis the integration of the 'red menace' and 'black peril'. Section 29, in retrospect, was the institutionalisation of the primary tradition of anti-communism in South Africa, viz. the belief that blacks would be perverted by a perceived unhealthy doctrine which was primarily directed against white hegemony in society. 'Unhealthy doctrine', by 1930, was explicitly identified as 'communism'. Hertzog's administration in many ways paved the way, ideologically speaking, for the integration of perceived communism and the

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43. See Chapter One.

44. Ibid.

colour question in Afrikaner nationalist thinking. This issue will be returned to later.

Pirow, in 1930, also paid particular attention to the alleged machinations of the Comintern and activities of foreign (communist) agitators as factors allegedly contributing to the perceived state of fermentation in race relations. The emphasis on foreign involvement corresponded, in principle, with Smuts' allegations, five years before, that the Rand Revolt was a product of foreign (communist) agitation. Furthermore, on both occasions, it was adjudged to be detrimental to the interests of the state.

Afrikaner nationalist portrayals of the perceived communist menace, from 1937 onwards, also relied heavily on the perceived communiality in objectives between communists internationally and the vanguard role of Moscow and the CI in this regard. Important is to note, once again, the principle of foreign involvement and the perceived ability of mass misleading by an in effect miniscule grouping.

#### 5.4.1. The Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party, Communism and the Colour Question : The Pre-War Period

The linking of the colour question and communism, within the GNP, only started following a social function in Cape Town during May 1937. While the above occasion, given communism's perceived aim to obliterate the colour bar and the GNP's insistence on a rigid separation of black and white, proved an ideal vantage point for the linking of the 'red menace' and 'black peril', it was only the first in a series of developments and events over the next two and a half years which could be exploited to focus attention on either the colour question or the alleged impact of Marxist dogma on non-whites. Furthermore, the overall prominence of colour policy in South African politics in general and specifically on the GNP's political agenda over this period provided added incentive for the linking of the perceived menace of communism and the colour

question and, even more importantly, contributed towards the integration thereof.

Finally, together with the GNP's emphasis on racial equality as a distinguishing feature of communism, the linking of the 'red menace' and 'black peril', as it evolved between 1927 and 1930, cannot be discounted as contributory factor in this regard. This aspect will be returned to later.

As indicated in an earlier paragraph, a series of events and developments between 1937 and 1939 provided the GNP with the opportunity to promote its colour policy and, in the context of this study, the perceived connection between communism and the colour question. These events, their utilisation by the GNP to promote its colour policy and the alleged connection with communism were:

- (i) **Racially mixed functions and meetings:** Functions and meetings attended by people of different races, irrespective of whether it was organised by the CPSA or not, were more often than not described as either the result of communist propaganda or initiated by communists. While Malan, in commenting on the earlier referred to social function of May 1937, was primarily concerned with the actual mixing of races, he also stressed that this had come about as a result of "... die geweldige ommekeer wat daar onder kommunistiese ... invloed half ongemerk in die laaste tyd plaasgevind het."<sup>45</sup>) Reporting on a similar function held in Cape Town two years later, Die Transvaler, while cautious not to describe it as a communist-organised event, nevertheless noted that "[d]ie blankes wat met die nie-blankes gedans het, was meestal dié wat groot bedrywigheid op kommunistiese vergaderings aan die dag lê."<sup>46</sup>) The obvious antedote, for the GNP,

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45. Die Burger, 7.5.1937.

46. Die Transvaler, 26.5.1939. See also reports on similar occasions as reported by Die Burger, 24.9.1937 and 2.5.1939 and Die Transvaler, 6.5.1939.

was, firstly, a separation of black and white as proposed in its Programme of Principles and, secondly, the strict application thereof. Malan, in 1937, compared the GNP's policy of segregation with the perceived 'communist' policy of integration:

"Die ou Voortrekker-idee van rassesuiwerheid en van die witman se voorgdyskap as die draer en die waarborg van die Christelike beskawing word oor boord gegooi en in plaas daarvan word die uitwissing van alle kleurgrense openlik bepleit."<sup>47)</sup>

(ii) The killing of two white policemen in Vereeniging during September 1937: For the GNP there was little doubt that these killings had been the result of communist agitation.<sup>48)</sup> The impact of this perceived communist agitation on race relations was indicated by N.J. van der Merwe: "In die verlede, ondanks al die wanvoorstellings van die negrofiliste en kommuniste, het die Afrikaner goed met die naturel klaargekom en was daar tevredenheid by die kaffernasie."<sup>49)</sup>

(iii) The Coloured protest march to Parliament, 25.3.1939: Not only did this march allegedly vindicate the often referred to GNP contention "... dat die Kleurlinge nie [teen kommunisme] immuun is nie",<sup>50)</sup> but also, and even more importantly, that Coloureds were thus also in need of protection and trusteeship by 'right-minded' whites. In terms of colour policy, this implied, as propagated by the

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47. Die Burger, 7.5.1937.

48. Die Burger, in this regard, declared that "... die bloed van daardie vermoorde konstabels [is] op die hoofde ... van die kommunistiese agitators wat die onbeskaafde naturelle ophits." See Die Burger, 11.10.1937: "Allow Things to Develop" [editorial].

49. See Van der Merwe's speech at a GNP protest meeting in Bloemfontein as reported by Die Burger on 11.10.1937.

50. See Die Burger, 13.7.1938: "Parade-opstokery" [editorial].

GNP, that segregation - especially political - also had to be extended to include Coloureds. Malan, in this regard, stressed that the "... protes van die Kleurlinge gemunt (sic!) is teen die segregasie-beleid van die Regering en ook dié van die [Gesuiwerde] Nasionale Party."<sup>51)</sup>

(iv) The general election of May 1938: The colour question, next to neutrality, was the most prominent issue on the GNP's election manifesto. On numerous occasions during the course of this election campaign, GNP speakers referred to the perceived menace inherent to communism for the continued survival of South Africa as a 'white man's land'. D.F. Malan, for example, stressed the existence of a "... kommunistiese aksie ... met die uitgesproke doel ... om rasse- en kleur-gelykstelling in alle opsigte te verkry ..."<sup>52)</sup>

(v) The extraordinary congress of the GNP, November 1938: This extraordinary congress, held in Bloemfontein, was exclusively devoted to the colour question. The role of the GNP in solving the colour question and the manner in which it had to be done was indicated in no uncertain terms: "Die [Gesuiwerde] Nasionale Party is die enigste party vandag wat die kleurskeidslyn wil trek. Die [Gesuiwerde] Nasionale Party wil die naturel se stem heeltemal wegneem en die stem van die kleurling ook wegneem van die van die blankes."<sup>53)</sup>

Communism was identified as a complicating factor which prevented the solving of the colour question. Malan referred to this exacerbating effect in the following

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51. Die Transvaler, 27.3.1939.

52. See Malan's speech at Porterville as reported by Die Burger and Die Transvaler, 5.4.1938.

53. Die Transvaler, 9.11.1938.

terms:

"Daar is magte waarmee ons te kampe het, nl. die van kommunisme ... Die kommunisme verkondig die leer van gelykstelling. Daar moet geen kleurskeidslyne op alle gebiede wees nie ... As kommunisme in ander lande 'n gevaar is wat bestry moet word, dan is dit hier dubbel 'n gevaar, want dit sny diep in die bestaan van ons blanke bevolking."<sup>54)</sup>

Important to note is that communism's rejection of the colour bar, in GNP circles, was adjudged to be a distinguishing feature of the Marxist ideology. Die Transvaler, for example, declared that "... die onvoorwaardelike uitwissing van die kleurslagboom ... [e]en van die wesenselemente van die kommunisme [is] ..." <sup>55)</sup> (italics mine). Malan, prior to the outbreak of war, regularly stressed this distinctiveness. <sup>56)</sup>

The conception of racial equality as being a distinctive feature of communism is important for a number of reasons. On one level, as indicated, it proved the ideological correctness of Hertzog's and Pirow's approach during the latter half of the 1920s and early 1930s in explaining the then existing state of affairs in race relations on the basis of it being affected, in 1927, by "... unhealthy doctrine ..." and, during 1930, by specifically "... communism ..." The GNP, as the "true" and

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54. Ibid.

55. Die Transvaler, 13.5.1938.

56. See, for example, Malan's speeches at the opening of the Cape Provincial Congress of the Party in Uitenhage during August 1937 (Die Burger, 19.8.1937); at Oudtshoorn less than three months later (Die Burger, 30.10.1937); in Bloemfontein during the GNP's national congress in November 1938; and, during 1939, at public meetings in Citrusdal (Die Burger, 27.6.1939) and Krugersdorp (Die Transvaler, 23.8.1939).

legitimate inheritor of the ideals of Afrikaner nationalism,<sup>57)</sup> was the party best suited and had the innate responsibility to continue with the tradition of warning the volk against the perceived apocalyptic effect of what was adjudged to be communism. Needless to say, this perception, on its own, was a powerful motivation for the integration of the 'red menace' and 'black peril'.

On a second level, and in more actual terms, racial equality, as a perceived distinguishing feature of Marxist ideology, formed the basis for the connection to be made between the colour question and perceived communism. This also contributed towards the integration thereof. Finally, in propagating racial separation on the basis of white trusteeship, as opposed to the 'communist policy' of racial integration, the GNP was not only providing a solution for the colour question, but also, and even more importantly, proved itself to be in the forefront of the struggle against perceived communism.

The emotional atmosphere resulting from and created by those events and episodes referred to earlier, against the backdrop of the colour question as a prominent issue in South African politics, promoted and solidified the integration of the 'red menace' and the 'black peril' in GNP thinking. Two examples will serve to illustrate this: Colour policy, as indicated, figured prominently in the GNP's 1938 election campaign. In

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57. An important element in the G/HNP's overall strategy to legitimise its existence evolved around the ideals of Afrikaner nationalism. These ideals, for the G/HNP, had initially found expression in Hertzog's original **National Party**. Smuts' **SAP**, on the other hand, was depicted as the embodiment of the British imperial tradition and therefore inherently opposed to the ideals of Afrikaner nationalism. Fusion, in the words of Malan, was thus "... die vereniging van onverenigbare elemente ..." (Cited in J.H. le Roux and P.W. Coetzer: Die Nasionale Party, III, p.616) The establishment of the **Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party**, on the other hand, did not imply the formation of a new party, but was a continuation of the old **National Party**. The Party was 'new' insofar as it had been purified from so-called anti-national and imperialistic elements. Not the GNP, but rather the UP, in terms of this argument, was thus a splinter grouping.

focussing attention on this issue and in particular the perceived menaces inherent to mixed-race marriages, the Party made use of an election poster depicting a neglected white woman and her black husband in front of a dilapidated house with a black child and white child playing in the foreground.<sup>58)</sup> The inscription on this poster read: "Die hoop van Suid-Afrika spreek tot u en sê: Stem vir die [Gesuiwerde] Nasionale Party en beskerm my volk en my nageslag teen Gemengde Huwelike wat die Verenigde party nie wil belet deur wetgewing nie."<sup>59)</sup> In 'exposing' the alleged communist menace, Die Transvaler, shortly before election day, related communism to this election poster:

"Dieselfde gevaar wat deur die [Gesuiwerde] Nasionale Party op sy verkiesingsplakkaat voorgestel word en wat die roekelose propagandastormloop van die kant van die Verenigde Party-pers tot gevolg het, bekruipt die volk van Suid-Afrika ook langs 'n ander weg - die weg van die kommunisme."<sup>60)</sup>

The 1939 Coloured march to Parliament, while directed against political segregation,<sup>61)</sup> was portrayed by the GNP as communist-sponsored agitation. In portraying the march in this fashion, Malan, for example, alleged that it had taken place "... onder leiding van erkende kommunistiese blankes."<sup>62)</sup> At a public meeting in the Transvaal some months later, J.J. Hayward (GNP MP for Bloemfontein District) identified the leaders of this march as allegedly having been three communist Jews.<sup>63)</sup>

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58. This poster created a furore in white politics at the time. For a discussion, see P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux: Die Nasionale Party, IV, pp.150-153.

59. Cited in Ibid., p.151.

60. See Die Transvaler, 13.5.1938.

61. P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux (eds.): Die Nasionale Party, IV, p.70.

62. Die Burger, 29.3.1939.

63. See Die Transvaler, 8.8.1939.



A third series of factors which contributed towards the integration of the colour question and the perceived communist menace related to cited examples of communist involvement in non-white affairs. These factors can be divided into two categories, viz. perceived subjective conditions within the non-white community which promoted susceptibility to perceived communist influencing and perceived actual examples of communist involvement with non-whites.

Relative to the first category, this mainly evolved around the concept of white trusteeship. Communism, in terms of this concept, was adjudged to be equally menacing for both white and black. In the case of whites, this ideology endangered the survival of the volk, particularly in so far as it threatened the hegemonic position of the white man vis á vis race relations. For people of colour, as members of a perceived child-race, this ideology held the potential of causing havoc. Alleged non-white susceptibility to communism were subsequently stressed. Words used in this regard included "... onbeskaafde naturelle ..."64) and "... swart heidendom ..."65) Die Transvaler even proceeded to state that communism "... het 'n besonder geil bodem in die naturellegemoed gevind ..."66)

While it was accepted, with near uniformity, that blacks were in need of white protection/guidance, differences in opinion, as indicated, existed on the perceived applicability of this paternalism to the Coloured population. The GNP, as opposed to the UP, stressed that Coloureds could not be dealt with as a unique entity, separate from other non-whites. Relative to alleged Coloured susceptibility to communism, the GNP went to considerable lengths to illustrate this conviction. The Coloured protest march to Parliament in 1939, as indicated,

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64. Die Burger, 11.10.1937: "Allow Things to Develop" [editorial].

65. Die Burger, 23.9.1937: "Kommunistiese Bedrywigheid" [editorial].

66. Die Transvaler, 18.7.1938: "'n Les uit die Spaanse Burgeroorlog" [editorial].

was portrayed as having taken place under the influence and leadership of communists. Support for this contention came from an unexpected quarter in the form of a comment by Morris Kentridge, UP candidate for the constituency of Cape Town Castle during the 1938-election, who, in having a public meeting of his in District Six broken up by rowdy elements, attributed this to communist agitation.<sup>67)</sup> Commenting on Kentridge's contention, Die Burger subsequently declared:

"Volkome waar, maar nie nuut nie. Die [Gesuiwerde] Nasionale Party en die Nasionale koerante het al by herhaling op daardie gevaar gewys, maar adv. Kentridge se leiers het die waarskuwings voorgestel as somer 'n gogga van die Nasionaliste."<sup>68)</sup>

Malan, in the course of the period under discussion, also referred to one other alleged characteristic or 'innate feature' peculiar to blacks which supposedly made them even more susceptible to communist propaganda. Speaking at the opening of the Uitenhage Congress of the Cape GNP in 1937, Malan declared that the African provided fertile soil for the spreading of communism "... omdat [hy] ... uit die aard van sy tradisie 'n voorstander van stambesit van grond is ... "<sup>69)</sup> Communalism, in this case the common ownership of land, for Malan, thus represented a form of primitive or proto-communism. Important, however, is to note that Malan did not repeat this contention, nor did he find any support for it amongst Congress delegates.

The second category of factors related to perceived actual examples of communist involvement with non-white affairs. While Die Transvaler declared that this involvement was the result of ideological considerations (the racial stratification of class

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67. See report on this meeting and interview with Kentridge as published in Die Transvaler, 22.4.1938.

68. See Die Burger, 25.4.1938: "Opsweping van Kleurlinge" [editorial].

69. Die Burger, 19.8.1937.

in South Africa),<sup>70)</sup> this remark represented the exception rather than the rule.

Judging from the available material, perceived communist involvement with non-whites, if not based on actual observation,<sup>71)</sup> was accepted a priori as a given reality. At first, remarks on the alleged involvement of communists with non-white affairs pertained to the organised labour movement. While this may well have been a remnant of the GNP's initial interest in the issue of communism, equally important is to note that several GNP speakers and newspaper articles connected this to the emphasis by Marxist ideology on the proletariat. Die Transvaler, for example, declared that "... hierdie klasseverdeling vorm die fundamentele uitgangspunt van die kommunisme."<sup>72)</sup> Possibly as a result of this, Die Burger may have been led to note that "... die stedelike naturellewerkers ... 'n vrugbare veld vir kommunistiese bedrywigheid uitmaak ..."<sup>73)</sup> In terms of actual examples of communist involvement in black trade unionism, J.H. Conradie (GNP candidate for the constituency of Gordonia during the 1938 general election), in a speech to a public meeting at Maitland,

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70. See Die Transvaler's 'exposé' of communist activities as it appeared in the edition of 13.5.1938. See also an editorial in Die Burger on 23.9.1937: "Kommunistiese Bedrywigheid".
71. Two examples of alleged factual observations need to be mentioned in this regard: Eric Louw, in a speech at a public meeting in Springs during August 1939 stated that he was in possession of documentary evidence which indicated "... kommuniste in Suid-Afrika se strewe om naturelle van die land teen die bestaande orde te organiseer ..." (Die Transvaler, 9.8.1939) Two years earlier, at the Uitenhage Congress of the Cape GNP, Malan had also made an assertion of a similar nature. The 'factual' basis of Malan's contention, on this occasion, however, was based on an alleged instruction which had emanated from the Communist International. See Die Burger, 19.8.1937.
72. Die Transvaler, 13.5.1938. See also Louw's interview with Die Burger on 2.8.1937 on his return to South Africa and Malan's speech at the Uitenhage Congress. (Die Burger, 19.8.1937)
73. Die Burger, 21.10.1937: "Onbelangrik?" [editorial].

stated that out of the seven trade unions formed in Cape Town during the preceding months, four were headed by known communists.<sup>74)</sup> Relating this activity to the Witwatersrand, Die Transvaler declared:

"Daar bestaan aan die Rand vandag nie minder as 20 kommunisties georiënteerde naturellevakverenigings nie, en die propaganda-veldtog duur steeds voort."<sup>75)</sup>

Die Tranvaler, in its earlier referred to 'exposé' of communist activities, made mention of two further spheres of perceived communist activity amongst non-whites. The first sphere, which seemingly had as objective the transformation of non-whites from passive onlookers to active proponents of communism, was the regular holding of 'educational classes' in the Johannesburg head office of the CPSA. Membership of the Communist Party depended on the passing of a test: "Die toets neem die vorm aan van 'n kommunistiese toespraak op 'n soort van massavergadering."<sup>76)</sup>

The second sphere related to the propagation of perceived communism amongst blacks in country districts. This, according to Die Transvaler, took place under the guise of religion for which particularly the Independent Black Churches proved to be well suited for.<sup>77)</sup>

Intertwined with all of these allegations was the contention that non-whites merely served as pawns in the communist grand strategy. These 'helpful idiots' would be discarded after they had served their function. Die Transvaler, in an editorial during September 1937, referred to this aspect in the following terms:

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74. See Die Burger, 12.11.1937.

75. Die Transvaler, 13.5.1938.

76. Ibid. See also Die Transvaler, 28.4.1938.

77. Ibid., 13.5.1938.

"Die naturelle-arbeiders moet georganiseer word. Is hulle eenmaal goed georganiseer, kan hulle gebruik word om 'n toestand te skep wat op die bolsjewisering van die land moet uitloop ... Weer is dit nie die belange van die naturel wat beoog word nie, wel om die naturel as 'n middel te gebruik vir die eintlike einddoel, 'n bolsjewistiese Suid-Afrika."<sup>78)</sup>

In similar vein, as indicated earlier, the Coloured protest march of 1939 was depicted as having taken place under the leadership of white, Jewish communists. Apart from contributing to the integration of the 'red menace' and 'black peril', this allegation also had the function of vindicating the perceived correctness of the GNP's colour policy.

While it would be wrong to assume that that the concepts 'red menace' and 'black peril' had become interchangeable terms by 1939, the period between 1937 and the outbreak of war were characterised by several developments which contributed towards the interfusement of the colour question and the perceived communist menace. Ideas and patterns of thought which came to the fore during this period were either consolidated or further refined during the war years. In the next section these processes of consolidation and development will be analysed and discussed.

#### 5.4.2. Communism and the Colour Question during the war years: Integration, Consolidation and Development

Between 1939 and 1945, three series of events in particular triggered a new wave of protestations over perceived communism from the G/HNP. In chronological order these events were the decision to involve South Africa in World War II, the participation of the Soviet Union on the side of the Allied Forces in the war and the arming of non-white members of the Union Defence Force. To this can be added a further factor, viz. the dilution of orthodox native policy under Smuts' administration.

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78. Die Burger, 23.9.1937.

These events and developments, according to the G/HNP, contributed towards the propagation of communism, particularly amongst non-whites, in the following manner:

Firstly, World War II and South African involvement therewith subjectively promoted the cause of communism. On the one hand, participation in the war gave rise to and would continue to promote, as termed by Die Burger, "... valse verwagtings ..."79) Applied to non-whites in South Africa and translated into practical objectives, this implied, according to the G/HNP, a striving towards full racial equality. The cause of communism, the proponents of which were in the forefront of this striving, would, as a matter of course, be promoted by this. Conversely, the general socio-economic imbalance resulting from and created by an extended war would also favour the cause of communism.80) Important is to note that this last deduction was initially made applicable exclusively to non-whites.

Secondly, the inclusion of the USSR in the Allied Alliance supposedly placed Smuts under moral obligation to allow communists a proverbial free hand in the propagation of their ideology. There was little doubt that the non-white population would be a preferential target and that this

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79. Die Burger, 8.1.1943: "Die Nuwe Opstokery" [editorial].

80. Die Burger, in this regard, declared in August 1942: "'n Lang oorlog beteken onder meer dat ontsaglike ekonomiese moeilikhede vir ons land, die ideale toestand vir die verspreiding van kommunisme. Laat daarom die kommunistiese agitators voortgaan soos hulle nou doen, en dit is te voorsien dat hul agitatie nog tydens die oorlog tot nie-blanke onrus en ontevredenheid van die allergevaarlikste aard gaan lei." (Die Burger, 19.8.1942: "Selfbedrog" [editorial]) See also Louw's reference to this issue in his 1943 motion on communism (Hansard, 12.2.1943, col.1495).

agitation would largely comprise propaganda in favour of racial equality.<sup>81)</sup>

Finally, the arming of non-white members of the Union Defence Force proved doubly beneficial for the propagation of communist doctrine. The participation of people of colour in an alleged white man's war<sup>82)</sup> placed non-whites on par with whites and, in certain instances, even elevated above whites. The impact this supposedly had on non-whites was indicated by Die Burger: "Bloot deur hom in dieselfde uniform met dieselfde kentekens as die blanke soldaat te steek, is al genoeg om 'n kleurling [of naturel], veral van die swakste klas, sy balans te laat verloor."<sup>83)</sup>

Regarding perceived non-white susceptibility to communism, J.G. Strijdom, in a speech at Nylstroom during May 1943, declared: "Dit (bewapening) maak hulle vatbaar vir die kommunistiese leerstelling van gelykwaardigheid ..."<sup>84)</sup> Apart from contributing to perceived non-white susceptibility to communism, the arming of non-white

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81. Commenting on perceived communist propaganda in South Africa and the alleged role of Smuts as facilitator in this regard, Die Burger (5.7.1943) declared: "Die akker van ontevredenheid ... word tans ywerig deur die kommuniste bewerk met die medewete en verlof, so nie met die aktiewe medewerking en goedkeuring van hierdie oorlogsbewind wat Suid-Afrika se toekoms as witmansland daardeur aan die verskriklikste gevare blootstel. Om hul strewe draai die kommuniste geen doekies nie. Hulle eis gelykstelling tussen blank en gekleurd op elke gebied ..."
82. Malan and others, on a number of occasions, described World War II as a struggle between white and white. See, for example, Malan's speech at Zeerust in May 1943 (reported in Die Transvaler on 28.5.1943) and an editorial entitled "Smutsvrugte" in Die Burger on 30.12.1943. Interesting is to note that even with the participation of Japanese forces - according to the HNP members of an Asiatic race - in World War II, the Party made little attempt to revise its characterisation of the war.
83. Die Burger, 25.3.1943: "Net die Simptoom"[editorial].
84. See Die Transvaler, 3.5.1943.

soldiers allegedly also aided the cause of communism in so far as those individuals, according to the HNP, could be used as perceived shock troops for the planned communist revolution in South Africa. Malan, as indicated in an earlier chapter, on occasion referred to the arming of non-white soldiers in this context.

While the above events provided the outer framework for the linking of communism and the colour question, the integration thereof continued to be determined by premises and assertions which had already appeared earlier. The basic premise for the linking and subsequent integration of communism and the colour question continued to be this ideology's perceived striving towards racial equality. A dualistic approach evolved in this regard. On the one hand, as before, the negation of the colour bar was typified as unique to communism. A.J. Stals (HNP MP for Hopetown), for example, referred to this as "... die derde hoeksteen van Kommunisme ..."85) while Die Burger noted that "... die uitwissing van kleurgrense is 'n grondbeginsel van die kommunisme."86)

Conversely, while still referring to the striving toward racial equality as distinctive from other perceived characteristics of Marxist ideology, HNP speakers indicated that this striving was not unique to communism. Strydom, in particular, took the lead here.87) The striving towards racial equality, in this regard, was also made applicable to the ruling United Party. Racial equality, however, was depicted in such a manner so as to create the impression that opposition to the colour bar remained a trait indicative of the perceived communist

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85. Hansard, 25.1.1944, col. 113.

86. Die Burger, 11.7.1944: "Valse Front" [editorial].

87. See, for example, Strydom's speech in Parliament on 13.2.1943 (Hansard, 13.2.1943, col.2071-2072) and his address to a public meeting in Cape Town less than a fortnight later (Die Transvaler, 27.2.1942).



approach. In Parliament, for example, Strijdom declared:

"... wat die kleurvraagstuk betref is daar tussen die leerstellings van Kommunisme en die leerstellings van die Eerste Minister absoluut geen verskil nie. Kommunisme se leerstelling is gelykstelling tussen wit en swart en dit is die sielsoortuiging van die huidige Eerste Minister."<sup>88)</sup>

The alleged focussing of communist propaganda on specifically the non-white population, as before, was accepted as a given reality.<sup>89)</sup> At other times, however, the G/HNP attempted to explain this on the basis of a perceived historical tradition or by way of an indiscriminate usage of conventional Marxist/Socialist rhetoric. Relative to the first aspect, Strijdom, for example, traced perceived communist propaganda amongst non-whites back to the period before 1930.<sup>90)</sup> Louw also attributed a historical character to communist involvement with non-whites in referring to an unspecified Comintern directive.<sup>91)</sup>

At other times, when explaining this perceived preference against the backdrop of Marxist terminology, it was done in such a manner that no other deduction was seemingly possible. Louw, in presenting his 1943 motion on communism to Parliament, identified several reasons which allegedly explained why communists paid special attention to non-whites in the dissemination of their propaganda. One of those reasons cited by Louw referred to the concept "masses" as allegedly used in

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88. Hansard, 13.2.1943, col.2071.

89. See Eric Louw's letter as published in Die Transvaler on 27.6.1941 and editorials in Die Burger on 7.8.1941 ("Bondgenote") and 5.5.1944 ("Hulle Verleen Hulp").

90. Hansard, 13.3.1942, col.2067 and 2069.

91. See Ibid., 12.2.1943, col.1480.

communist ideology. According to Louw:

"Die ... naturelle is by uitstek in Suid-Afrika [die] "massas". Dwarsdeur die kommunistiese leerstellings kry ons die idee van die massas. Die 6 000 000 naturelle in Suid-Afrika is die massas en daarom word die propaganda veral aan hulle gerig."<sup>92)</sup>

At other times HNP members analysed the concepts "bourgeoise" and "proletariat" in almost exclusive racial terms. Class struggle, in the South African context, thus implied a race war between white and black - according to the HNP. Stals referred to this contention in the following terms:

"[Kommunisme wil] ... sy doel ... bereik deur die beginsel van klassestryd. Waar in Suid-Afrika die blanke man, altans die grootste deel van die blankes as bourgeois kan beskou word en al die ander in die oog van die Kommuniste beskou word as proletariaat en waar hulle die stryd wil voer tussen die bourgeoisie en die proletariaat, dan is daar geen vooruitsig vir die bestaan van die blanke man as daardie grondbeginsel eenmaal posgevat het nie."<sup>93)</sup>

Irrespective of the motivation presented to validate claims of a similar nature than the above, the G/HNP was primarily interested in 'exposing' the alleged extent of perceived communist propaganda amongst the non-white population. This, in turn, could serve as basis for the promotion of the Party's Christian-Nationalist cause.

Regarding perceived non-white susceptibility to communism, the years between 1939 and 1945 were characterised by both continuity and change. In terms of continuity, the alleged normative differences between black and white and, consequently, the receptiveness of the former grouping for communist influencing were further solidified in G/HNP

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92. Ibid., col.1484.

93. Ibid., 25.1.1944, col.113. Malan also referred to this belief in a public speech at Paarl during June 1943. Malan stated: "Hier beoog die Kommuniste 'n swart proletariaat - dit beteken die einde van 'n blank Suid-Afrika." (Die Burger, 19.6.1943)

thinking. Commenting on the decision to arm non-white soldiers, Die Transvaler summarised those "primitive" traits:

"Die feit dat die nie-blanke nog maar 'n halfbeskaafde wese is, dat dit hom aan 'n juiste oordeel oor sake ontbreek, dat hy hom in 'n groot mate deur sy drifte laat lei ... is dinge wat deur die Regering in sy huidige beleid volkome oor die hoof gesien word."<sup>94)</sup>

Words used at other times included "onbeskaafde naturelle" and "onkundige naturelle".<sup>95)</sup>

Primitiveness and the African's 'inborn' ignorance, according to the HNP, thus served as basis for the propagation of communism amongst non-whites. Furthermore, it virtually guaranteed the success thereof.<sup>96)</sup>

Communalism in traditional communities, as a form of proto-communism, also appeared with greater regularity in Party

94. Die Transvaler, 14.12.1942: "Die Groot Gevaar"[editorial].

95. See editorials in Die Burger (20.10.1942: "Ontwaak Suid-Afrika!") and Die Transvaler (29.1.1945: "Steun die Besluit") and a report in Die Transvaler (13.3.1944) on the Natal Provincial Congress of the HNP in 1944.

96. This issue particularly came to the fore again following a series of strikes on the Witwatersrand during 1942/3 and, coupled to that, the announcement in May 1942 that Smuts' administration was considering a de jure recognition of the black labour movement. The former was ascribed to perceived communist machinations while Die Burger declared that non-white trade unions would evolve into instruments for the propagation of communism. (Die Burger, 22.1.1943: "Hulle Speel met Vuur" [editorial]) On both counts the HNP made use of the alleged inherent primitiveness of the non-white to explain its contention/policy. Strikes by trade unions were ascribed to workers being misled by communists. Die Burger proceeded to explain the modus operandi employed by perceived communists to 'infiltrate' black labour organisations. (See Die Burger, 21.12.1942: "Die Kommunis Lag" [editorial]) The Party's policy on non-white labour organisations was explained by Die Transvaler: "Die standpunt van die Afrikaner teenoor hierdie gedagte is dat die naturel nog geensins daardie trap van ontwikkeling bereik het dat hy hom nou al in vakbonde kan verenig nie" (*italics in the original*). (Die Transvaler, 24.1.1944: "Naturelle-Vakbonde" [editorial]).

circles. Eric Louw described traditional communalism as one of the main reasons why communists were focussing their propaganda on specifically the non-white population.<sup>97)</sup> Malan proposed the introduction of a system of private property; thereby suspending communalism and, indirectly, curbing susceptibility to communism:

"Hulle moet geleentheid tot private besit in hul gebied hê. Nou is daar net stambesit. Die kaffers sal dan 'n meer gevestigde bevolking wees, meer tevrede en minder vatbaar vir kommunistiese invloede."<sup>98)</sup>

In spite of the wide-spread appearance of this contention, it did not find approval within all sectors of the Party. While agreeing that tribal communalism did represent a form of primitive communism, particularly P.O.(Paul) Sauer (HNP MP for Humansdorp) stressed that tribal communalism differed fundamentally from Marxian Socialism. According to Sauer: "Ons ... moet dit nie uit die oog verloor nie dat die soort Kommunisme wat in die land verkondig word, is nie dieselfde soort natuurlike Kommunisme wat ons in die naturellelewe vind nie. Maar dit kom in botsing daarmee. Dit is iets nuut vir hulle."<sup>99)</sup> Furthermore, the retention of traditional tribal structures inhibited the spreading and growth of perceived communist propaganda. Thus, according to Sauer, susceptibility to communism was particularly applicable to detrribalised natives and, secondly, traditional structures represented the proverbial first line of defence against communism and thus had to be protected. Sauer referred to these two aspects in the

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97. Hansard, 12.2.1943, col.1485. See also Louw's remarks on this issue during the previous parliamentary session (Ibid., 13.2.1942, col.2050).

98. See Malan's speech at the Paarl as reported by Die Transvaler on 25.5.1943.

99. Hansard, 17.3.1942, col.3949-3950.

following terms:

Ek dink dat almal sal aanneem dat die natuurlike waarskynlik in die hele wêreld, en sekerlik in Suid-Afrika die vrugbaarste teelaarde is vir kommunistiese propaganda, veral en feitlik uitsluitlik in die geval van ontstamde natuurlike, die kaffers in die groot stede. Dit is kaffers wat weggebreek het van hul stamgewoontes en hul stamtradisies ... Waar dit die posisie is en wanneer enige persoon wat hierdie saak kalm en bedoord wil beskou, moet erken dat as die kaffer sterk kommunisties word in Suid-Afrika, dit 'n baie groot gevaar kan wees, sal hy ook moet saamstem dat een van die beste maniere om kommunistiese propaganda onder ons natuurlike teen te gaan, is om niks te doen om die stamtradisie van ons natuurlike af te breek en te verswak nie."<sup>100)</sup>

Important is to note that Sauer found strong support for this contention from the influential Cape mouthpiece of the Party, Die Burger.<sup>101)</sup>

The war years, however, were also important for the appearance of allegations which were founded and based upon arguments relating to alleged non-white susceptibility to communism. The first of these pertained to the perceived role of the Smuts government as facilitator of communism. Allegations, in this regard, not only related to Smuts' seemingly lackadaisical attitude towards communist propaganda, but encompassed a broad series of issues.

As indicated earlier, particularly the arming of non-white soldiers, which, according to the HNP, ran counter to accepted norms vis à vis the position of non-whites in South African society, was portrayed as promoting the cause of communism.<sup>102)</sup>

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100. Ibid., col.3950-3951.

101. See editorials in Die Burger on 3.1.1942 and 6.4.1945 entitled, respectively, "Gevaartekens" and "Die Naturel se Probleem".

102. At a mass meeting in Melville, organised to protest against the arming of non-white soldiers of the Union Defence Force, one of the HNP speakers described this decision as a communist policy. See Die Transvaler, 23.3.1942.

Perceived communist agitation in favour of racial equality was also described as having found its origins in the decision to arm non-white soldiers. Die Burger declared in this regard: "Deur sy bewapening van kleurlinge en naturelle, deur hulle in dieselfde uniforms as die blanke soldate te steek en hulle selfs as gewapende wagte oor blanke krygsgevangenes te stel, het die Regering die grondslag vir hul eis om gelykstelling gelê. En op daardie grondslag bou die kommuniste ywerig voort."<sup>103</sup>) Important is to note that Smuts' policies, for the HNP, were based on invalid assumptions and a negation of the native's 'true' nature, which, in turn, had 'exposed' non-whites to communist machinations.

Participation in the war, according to the HNP, also increased non-white susceptibility to communism. Smuts and the UP-government, once again, were to blame: Firstly, Smuts, by involving South Africa in the war, had and were placing a heavy burden on the Union's resources so as to promote his war policy. This allegedly evoked discontent amongst a broad section of the South African population. Within the non-white community, this discontent, together with the non-white's perceived inner gullibility, were mobilised by communists to promote their cause. Secondly, participation in the war by non-whites gave and would give rise to unrealistic expectations. These expectations, coupled with the 'shortsightedness' of natives in grasping the 'true' intentions of communism (as opposed to the 'positive' qualities inherent to trusteeship), made non-whites and communists natural allies in the striving towards racial equality. Finally, as indicated in an earlier chapter, HNP propaganda intermittently portrayed Smuts as a hand-maiden of both Whitehall and the Kremlin in explaining his unwillingness to institute perceived preventative measures against alleged communism. In terms of this portrayal Smuts and his government were thus once again contributing to the spreading of communist dogma.

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103. Die Burger, 1.7.1943: "'n Onheilige Verbond" [editorial].

The UP's approach towards the colour question was also portrayed as having contributed to non-white susceptibility to communism. Die Burger, in an editorial early in January 1942, identified two elements in this approach which allegedly promoted the cause of communism, viz. the absence of a clearly formulated policy on the colour question and the presence of elements within the UP who propagated a "... sieklike sentimentele liberalisme ..."104) Liberalism, within the context of race policy, implied, for the HNP, an unqualified striving towards full equality between white and black. Against this background, the presence of liberal strands of thinking on the issue of race policy within the UP, implied a convergence in aims between communists and the ruling party. Particularly Strijdom, as indicated earlier, attempted to portray liberalism - in so far as it related to the colour question - within the United Party as being the result of communist influencing.105) Collectively, the HNP's campaign against communism also came to include the UP. On the eve of the 1943 general election, Die Burger, with unusual candour, declared:

"Die stryd teen die kommunisme, die stryd om die voortbestaan van Suid-Afrika as witmansland word derhalwe ook 'n stryd teen die kommuniste se bondgenoot, die Smuts-party ... En in hierdie stryd om selfbehoud is daar geen neutraliteit nie. Geen Afrikaner kan opsy staan en meen dat die dreigende en vernietigende magte by hom en sy nageslag verby sal gaan nie. En geen Afrikaner, as hy die kant van sy volk wil kies, durf vir 'n oorlogskandidaat stem of van die stembus wegbly nie. Daardeur stel hy huidige en toekomstige geslagte aan die gevaar van 'n tweede Bloedrivier bloot."106)

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104. See Ibid., 8.1.1943: "Die Nuwe Opstokery" [editorial].

105. Die Burger, towards the end of 1942, also declared in this regard: "Die kommuniste in Suid-Afrika is, verder, die ywerigste propageerders van die uitwissing van die kleurskeidslyn. Hulle wil blank en swart op gelyke voet stel en geen onderskeid maak nie. Ook van hierdie kommunistiese "aspirasie" is die Verenigde Party ... ook geen vyand nie!" See Die Burger, 9.11.1942: "Ook Binnelands Geswore Vyande" [editorial].

106. Die Burger, 5.7.1943: "Na die Stembus" [editorial].

The significance of the above commentary for the utilisation of overt anti-communism as a strategy for political mobilisation speaks for itself.

A second major allegation, based on alleged non-white susceptibility to communism, related to the perceived ability of communists to mobilise existing grievances for the creation of new or complimentary patterns of discontent; thereby promoting the cause of their ideology. Particularly important for the HNP, in this regard, was the portrayal of white trusteeship as repressive by 'communists'.<sup>107)</sup>

In commenting on this portrayal and the proposed alternative (full equality between races), the Party adopted a dualistic approach. On the one hand, reaction, as had to be expected, evolved around downright denial. S.M. Loubser (HNP MP for Malmesbury), for example, declared in Parliament: "Ek mag verder aan die Minister sê dat hierdie propaganda ... 'n baie nadelige uitwerking het. Dat dit 'n gevoel van ontevredenheid ... skep, sonder dat daar rede is. Daar is geen rede vir ontevredenheid nie ..."<sup>108)</sup> Interconnected with this were allegations relating to the utilisation of unorthodox methods by perceived communists in the spreading of their ideology. Louw, in his 1942 motion on communism, made specific mention of "... [k]ommunistiese agente onder die dekmantel van kafferpredikante."<sup>109)</sup> Die Transvaler, towards the end of January 1945, devoted a whole article to the alleged cunning methods used by perceived communists to gain control over native advisory committees on the Witwatersrand.<sup>110)</sup>

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107. Die Burger, during January 1942, noted in this regard: "Die tradisionele Afrikaanse beleid van voogdskap oor die natuurlike en van geleidelike opvoeding en opheffing met behoud van soveel moontlik van die stamverband en wat mooi is in die eie natuurlike-gewoontes, stel hulle (i.e. communists) voor as 'n beleid van onderdrukking." (Die Burger, 3.1.1942: "Gevaartekens" [editorial])

108. Hansard, 16.4.1942, col.6324.

109. See Ibid., 13.2.1942, col.2049.

110. Die Transvaler, 24.1.1945.



Relative to non-white conceptions of trusteeship, this may have implied that white paternalism were willy-nilly accepted. Communists, so as to promote their cause, therefore, together with native's inner gullibility, had to rely on unconventional strategies and methods to promote their cause.

A second reaction, significantly, was the acknowledgement that racial equality, as alternative to white trusteeship, was indeed attractive.<sup>111)</sup> Racial equality, as propagated by perceived communists, however, had to be seen in its supposedly 'proper' context. The Herenigde Nasionale Party, accordingly, set out to warn against the 'actual' intentions of communist propagandists and, coupled to that, the 'virtues' of paternalism. Die Burger declared in this regard:

"Die wesentlike gevaar van die kommunisme vir die Unie is egter in sy gelykstellingsbeleid wat blank en nie-blank betref. Dit kan maklik as aantreklik voorgedhou word aan die nie-blankes wat die voorgedyskapbeginsel van die Voortrekkerbeleid nie verstaan nie. Hy wat nie beseft hoe onder laasgenoemde daar behoorlike sorg vir ras- en familie-genote sal wees nie hunker maklik na 'n gelykstelling met die blanke sonder om te beseft dat dit eintlik 'n dwaallig is wat hom eintlik in 'n moeras sal laat beland. Die nie-blanke word immers nie veel kans gegee om te beseft dat sowel die imperialis as die kommunist hom wil gebruik vir hul eie oogmerke en hom daarna gevoelloos links sal laat lê nie. Sodra hul selfsugtige oogmerke bereik is sal hy nie enige sorg ervaar nie, soos onder die voorgedyskap-beginsel outomaties beoog word."<sup>112)</sup>

Finally, as opposed to the opportunism and invalid assumptions which found expression in the UP's colour policy and communist exploitation of black 'primitiveness', the HNP, as the legitimate inheritor of the historically-valid Voortrekker point of view and thereby the true interpreter of the native's culture, was ideologically best equipped to deal with the

111. See a speech by Bremer in Cape Town as reported by Die Transvaler on 30.5.1945.

112. Ibid., 14.6.1941: "Die Kerke Waarsku" [editorial]. See also Die Transvaler, 13.3.1945: "Die Geknakte Riet" [editorial].

colour question. In terms of practical differences, these different approaches found application in diametrically opposed policies. Malan, in April 1944, categorised these differing policies:

"Daar is twee standpunte. Die een is: maak die nie-blanke los van sy eie gemeenskap, sy taal, sedes en gewoontes. Maak van hom 'n Europeaan! Hoe eerder hy die blanke se beskawing aanvaar, hoe beter. En gee hom dan oral volkome gelykstelling met die blanke. Wis die kleurgrens uit. Dit is die een beleid.

Die ander is die van segregasie, van apartheid waardeur die naturel en blanke apart gehou word, elkeen op sy eie terrein. Laat die naturel op sy eie gebied ontwikkel. Laat daar geen vermenging wees nie. Hou die ras suiwer. Handhaaf die kleurgrens, en laat die naturel en die blanke apart na hul aard ontwikkel. Dit is die ander beleid - die beleid van die Voortrekkers"<sup>113</sup>) (*italics in the original*).

Furthermore, as opposed to the integrationist-perspective, which, for the HNP, was either communist-inspired or served to promote communism, the Party's policy of segregation was also the only effective means by which to 'curb' non-white susceptibility to communism and thus combat the spreading of communism. Particularly from 1944 onwards, as indicated in an earlier chapter, a policy called apartheid came to be advanced as the only effective and comprehensive antedote against perceived communism. Die Burger, towards the end of 1944, related apartheid to the perceived spreading of communism in the Coloured community:

"Want in die geval van die kleurling veral kan alleen apartheid en die geleenthede wat dit vir die kleurling sal skep om sy mense te dien in werk en betrekking tans buite sy bereik, vir hom red van die vretende gevoel van frustrasie wat hom vandag 'n gewillige en geesdriftige slagoffer van die kommunisme maak."<sup>114</sup>)

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113. Die Burger, 17.4.1944.

114. See Ibid., 13.10.1944: "Hulle Keer Verniet" [editorial].

While a diverse number of specific examples could be cited to illustrate the integration of the 'red menace' and 'black peril' during the war years, more functional - in terms of illustrating some of those arguments and allegations referred to above - is the focussing of attention on Die Burger's analysis of Coloured voting patterns during the 1943 general election and the 'perceived relationship between 'African restlessness' (strikes, civil protests, etc.) and perceived communist influencing.

In the case of the former, Die Burger, in a series of editorials, came to the conclusion "... dat die kommuniste die Skiereilandse kleurlinge vir meer as 50 persent verower het ..."<sup>115</sup>) Two fundamental premises, as identified earlier, underpinned this allegation: Firstly, communists, in the propagation of their ideology, primarily had in mind the non-white population and, secondly, non-whites were particularly susceptible to the Marxist dogma. This second allegation was referred to in the following terms: "Dit ly weinig twyfel dat die groot meerderheid van die Kommuniste se ondersteuners [in die verkiesing] uit kleurlinge bestaan het."<sup>116</sup>)

Next, in identifying the culprits, both the ruling UP and 'communists' were to blame. On this occasion, however, Die Burger proceeded to attribute more blame to the UP. The UP had not only contributed to the creation of conditions which aided the spreading of communism (e.g. the arming of non-white soldiers), but Smuts' perceived lackadaisical attitude towards communist propaganda and the absence of a clearly defined colour policy actively promoted the cause of communism. Finally, and in particular with regard to integration, Die Burger, in proposing 'remedial action', identified two sets of prospective solutions. The most immediate 'solution', as may be expected, was the unseating of Smuts and his government:

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115. Die Burger, 10.12.1941: "Nie Veel Invloed". See also Ibid., 1.7.1943: "'n Onheilige Verbond" and 3.8.1943: "Die Kleurling-kiesers."

116. Die Burger, 3.8.1943: "Die Kleurling-kiesers" [editorial].

"En die Afrikaner, aan watter party hy ook al behoort dan of hy aan geen party behoort nie? Wil hy die kommunisme vir nog vyf jaar laat voortwoeker? Wil hy die gif vir nog vyf jaar onbelemmerd deur die nie-blanke massas laat trek en sodoende ons kleurvraagstukke so goed as onoplosbaar laat word? Die oorlog sal verbygaan en veldm. Smuts sal die weg van alle vlees opgaan. Maar Suid-Afrika sal die bittere oes moet insamel van die saad wat die Smuts-regering die kommuniste toelaat om te saai."<sup>117)</sup>

The 'final' solution, however, judging from Die Burger, would have to be the rearrangement of colour policy and, relative to political rights for Coloureds, their removal from the common voters roll.<sup>118)</sup> Significantly, in terms of integration, is to note that a series of editorials which initially ostensibly had in mind the explanation of Coloured voting patterns on the basis of perceived communist influencing evolved into a propaganda onslaught which centered around the solving of the colour question. Furthermore, according to Die Burger, communists were not so much to blame for this perceived state of affairs, but rather Smuts and his government. This, once again, brings to the fore the function of overt anti-communism as a strategy for socio-political mobilisation.

A diverse range of strikes, discontent and even crimes, as indicated previously, were also attributed to communist influencing of the non-white population. Once again, in terms of integration, and particularly so after the general election of 1943, proposed solutions came to be defined far less in terms of direct measures vis à vis alleged communist propaganda, but rather evolved around the colour question. Die Transvaler, for example, in attributing a crime wave on the Witwatersrand to communist influencing, proposed the following

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117. Die Burger, 1.7.1943: "'n Onheilige Verbond" [editorial].

118. See Die Burger, 3.8.1943: "Die Kleurling-kiesers" [editorial].

solution(s):

"Beter arbeidsbeheer, gesonder ekonomies-maatskaplike toestande, en verstandiger behuisingsmaatreëls, plus 'n sterk genoeg polisie diens en 'n toepassing van die gesonde voorgedyskapbeginsels, met verwerping van liberalistiese en kommunistiese inmenging, sal alles nodig wees voor die natuurlike-werker in die stad gelukkig en maatskaplik aangepas kan word. Dan eers sal dié misdaadvlae verminder. Dan eers sal diegene wat deur hul oorlogsbeleid en valse liberalistiese natuurlikebeleid regstreeks verantwoordelik is vir die wantoestande, nie meer daarvoor hoef te murmureer nie."<sup>119)</sup>

The linking of communism and the colour question, specifically after 1943, was also in accordance with the HNP's broader strategy of adopting a more active approach (as opposed to the reactivity of earlier) in its campaign against perceived communism. This approach, together with the posing of apartheid as alternative to (communism's) racial equality ipso facto provided for the further integration of these two elements. Integration of the 'red menace' and 'black peril', especially after 1948, attained a momentum all of its own and continued unabatedly for many years.

Whereas the G/HNP, for reasons discussed earlier, took the proverbial lead in the linking of perceived communism and the colour question, other organisations referred to in this study did not lag behind. Judging from the available literature, particularly within the Ossewa Brandwag a similar process of integration was in progress. As indicated earlier, communism, for the OB, found stratification in racial terms. This belief had already appeared on occasion of Van Rensburg's policy

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119. Die Transvaler,  
[editorial].

18.3.1942:

"Naturelle-misdaad"

speech on communism at Crosby during March 1943.<sup>120)</sup> Furthermore, against the backdrop of the broader strategy of ideological counter-balancing, the interlinking of the 'red menace' and 'black peril' was to be expected. Indicative of this is the 'solution' proposed by Die O.B. for the curbing of perceived communist agitation amongst African workers:

"Om blanke heerskappy in hierdie land te handhaaf en om bestaansveiligheid vir elke witman te waarborg, sowel as om sosiale regverdigheid aan die natuurlike te laat toekom, moet 'n beleid van territoriale segregasie aanvaar en uitgevoer word. In sy eie gebiede, afgeskei en onder voogdyskap van die blanke kan die naturel nie alleen sy nasionale organisasie uitbou nie, maar ook sy arbeidsorganisasie."<sup>121)</sup>

Finally, in portraying communism as a menace for the volk/state, an important adaptation was in the process of taking place. Whereas, between 1927 and 1930, the perceived dangers inherent to communism - in so far as it pertained to race relations - were presented as more menacing for state order than for any particular section of the white electorate, the G/HNP, from 1937 onwards, while still stressing the perceived dangers of communism for the state,<sup>122)</sup> gradually proceeded to lay greater emphasis on the destructive nature of communism for specifically the volk. While this was obviously the result of tactical considerations (the G/HNP as opposition party vs. Hertzog's National Party and the later United Party as governing parties), it nevertheless held important implications for the utilisation of overt anti-communism as

120. At Crosby Van Rensburg declared: "Where Communism says "No God, no Nation and no Fatherland" the Ossewa-Brandwag says in its motto "My God, my Nation, my Fatherland, South Africa" ... Where Communism knows a class and no distinction of race, there we know a race and no distinction of class - the white race which acknowledges South Africa as its one and only home - Afrikanerdom". (Cited in Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwag, pp.89-90)

121. See Die O.B., 22.3.1944: "Aan die Kommunistiese Front" [editorial].

122. See, for example, Malan's remarks on the Coloured protest march to Parliament in September 1939 as reported by Die Transvaler on 27.3.1939.

mobilising factor in the broader context of Afrikaner nationalist politics. This issue will be returned to in the final chapter.

## CHAPTER SIX

### THE COMPONENT PARTS OF ANTI-COMMUNISM: IMMIGRATION, THE JEWISH QUESTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE "SOUL" OF THE AFRIKANER WORKER

#### 6.1. IMMIGRATION AND THE JEWISH QUESTION

Although the Jewish Question falls for a large part outside the framework of this study, it nevertheless had, as indicated, points of contact with the issue of 'communism'. The presentation of some introductory remarks will thus be in order. Particularly important is the motivation underlying the opposition of certain groupings and individuals to continued Jewish immigration to South Africa and the connection between this opposition and the perceived menace of communism.

Commentators, in addressing themselves to the aforementioned issues, generally adopt one of two points of view: The first grouping, which may well be described as the "ideologists", explain Afrikaner nationalist opposition to Jewish immigration on the basis of a nativistic version of anti-semitism. This Afrikanerised version of anti-semitism, so it is alleged, had an all-permeating impact.<sup>1)</sup>

The second grouping, the "economic pragmatists", acknowledge the existence of organisational manifestations of anti-semitism within the cadre of Afrikaner nationalist politics. However, to this is added an important provision, namely that anti-semitism had a

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1. See G.C. Cuthbertson: Jewish Immigration as an Issue in South African Politics, 1937-1939 (Historia, vol. 26(2), 1981), p.119; M. Cohen: Anti-Jewish Manifestations in the Union of South Africa during the 1930's, pp.8-10; L. Rubin: South African Jewry and Apartheid (Africa Report, February 1970); pp.22-23; E.S. Sachs: Rebel's Daughters, pp.130-131; G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, pp.109-112 and N.M. Stultz: Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, pp.44-45.



limited impact on Afrikaner politics.<sup>2)</sup> Most often referred to in this last instance is the G/HNP. In this regard it is stated that the Party's continued opposition to Jewish immigration have to be explained against the backdrop of the Afrikaner's righteous struggle for a place in South African economic life. The G/HNP's opposition to Jewish immigration, according to this perspective, was thus motivated not by racial anti-semitism, but - as typified by Leslie Rubin - a form of "... economic anti-Semitism ..."<sup>3)</sup> Van Heerden goes as far as explaining the racial qualities of anti-semitism within the G/HNP on the basis of this 'economic' anti-semitism:

"... Hierdie [evolusie] ... van die veldtog teen die Jode vanaf 'n ekonomiese stryd [na 'n rassestryd] was 'n ... natuurlike ontwikkeling, want in Suid Afrika het die rassestryd nog altyd gewentel om ekonomiese [sake]. Hierdie ver-Afrikaniseerde weergawe van rassehaat teenoor die Jood, nietemin, moet onderskei word van die Duitse weergawe. In Suid Afrika is die Jood, as ras, gehaat omdat hy geassosieer was met die ekonomiese sowel as politieke verslawing van die Afrikanervolk ... In Duitsland, aan die ander kant, het die veldtog teen die Jood as ekonomiese mag verander na 'n veldtog teen die Jood as 'n biologiese gevaar vir die voortbestaan van die suiwer Ariese ras."<sup>4)</sup>

The same divergence in view regarding the connection between the Jewish Question and the alleged menace of communism, exist between the ideologists and economic pragmatists. The ideologists, as may be expected, explain this connection on the basis of a rigid anti-semitism and manipulation of the masses by the proverbial

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2. See F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.376-378; G.D. Scholtz: Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner, VIII, pp.482-485; P.F. van der Schyff: Eric H. Louw in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek tot 1948, pp.480-483; P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux:(eds.): Die Nasionale Party, IV, pp.77-79 and J.H. le Roux: Die Nasionale Party tot 1938, pp.340-343.
  3. L. Rubin: Afrikaner Nationalism and the Jews (Africa South, vol. 1(3), 1957), p.28.
  4. F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.53.

"heavyweights" in Afrikaner nationalist politics. E.S. Sachs declare in this regard:

"The earlier nationalism of the Afrikaners was in large measure replaced by a new and narrow Nationalism that [had] much in common with Nazi doctrines. Yet many of its supporters were probably unaware of the character and source of the changes which were brought about, for at heart the Afrikaners are individuals and dislike dictatorship and excessive discipline intensely."<sup>5)</sup>

This issue is particularly problematic for the economic pragmatists. Coetzer and Le Roux only refers to it in passing and thus effectively ignore it.<sup>6)</sup> Van Heerden treats the G/HNP's opposition to Jewish immigration and the emphasis on the alleged communist menace as two separate issues.<sup>7)</sup> Van der Schyff, in commenting on the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill of 1939, acknowledges that Louw's remarks on the perceived menace of communism cannot be divorced from the context of the Jewish Question. Once again, however, Van der Schyff also favours 'economic' anti-semitism in explaining the connection made between Jewish immigration and communism.<sup>8)</sup>

## 6.2. AFRIKANER NATIONALISM AND 'JEWISH COMMUNISM'

### 6.2.1. The Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party and 'Jewish Communism'

Eric Louw's 1939 Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill, as indicated, marked the climax of the G/HNP's campaign against

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5. E.S. Sachs: Rebel's Daughters, p.131.

6. See P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux (eds.): Die Nasionale Party, IV, pp.77-86

7. Van Heerden: Op.cit., p.380.

8. P.F. van der Schyff: Eric H. Louw in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek tot 1948, p.481.

Jewish immigration and perceived Jewish communism.<sup>9)</sup> Without going into any great detail, two observations need to be made on the general issue of opposition to Jewish immigration within the GNP at the time:

Firstly, in motivating its opposition to Jewish immigration, two schools of thought were discernable within the GNP. The one school, which included Malan and the Transvaal leader of the Party, J.G. Strijdom, concentrated almost exclusively on the alleged predominance of Jews in South African economic life. In other words, economic protectionism, together with self-preservation, according to this school, explained the Party's call for a moratorium on Jewish immigration.<sup>10)</sup> This approach was seemingly in accordance with the proscribed Party line.<sup>11)</sup>

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9. Indicative of the importance of the Jewish Question on the GNP's overall agenda is the publication of Louw's speech, in introducing the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill in Parliament, by the Party in pamphlet form under the title "Die Jodevraagstuk in Suid-Afrika/The Jewish Problem in South Africa"
10. One example will serve to illustrate this: The August 1937 Uitenhage Congress of the Cape GNP adopted, unanimously, the following resolution on the Jewish Question: "Ten einde ons volk, asook die Unie as geheel te beskerm op sowel ekonomiese as finansiële gebied, eis hierdie kongres dat alle Joodse immigrasie stopgesit moet word. Wat die huidige Joodse bevolking betref, is die kongres van mening dat handels- en ander lisensies op proporsionele basis aan Jode toegeken moet word en dat besighede bedryf moet word onder die geboortenaam van die eienaar." (Die Burger, 19.8.1937)
11. The roots of economic anti-semitism, both internationally and in South Africa, are to be traced back to the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s. The distinguishing features of the G/HNP's 'economic' anti-semitism may be summarised into four points:
- (i) Jews constitute an economic power inherently inimical to the interests of the volk;
  - (ii) The Jewish community, in the above sense, form a state-within-a-state (imperium in imperio);
  - (iii) Jewry control commerce and industry, dominate the organised professions and, as a result of this, influence Government; and

The second school, including, amongst others, Eric Louw, P.J. van Nierop (GNP MP for Mossel Bay) and A.L. Werth (GNP MP for Kroonstad), on the one hand, as was the case with the supporters of Malan, stressed the actual/potential domination of South African economic life by Jews. On the other hand, emphasis was placed on the perceived covert and even overt political objectives of international Jewry. Although the structure and general content of this second allegation did not differ fundamentally from some of those arguments forwarded by other Party members during the previous two years, its importance lies, firstly, in the division in opinion on this issue within the GNP and, secondly, the integration with the Malan-associated argument of 'economic' anti-semitism.

The second observation relate to the integration of the aforementioned arguments.

While Malan and his supporters concentrated almost exclusively on the perceived dangers inherent to the Jewish 'race' for the economic survival of the volk<sup>12)</sup> and made, for all intents and purposes, no mention of the perceived political aims of world-Jewry, Louw and his supporters utilised both sets of arguments as either being the primary or secondary motivation underlying the GNP's policy on the Jewish Question. Hence, for example, Van Nierop attempted to illustrate, on this basis, his conviction that Jews were directly responsible for the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War: Economically, because they attempted "... om met

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(iv) Jews, as a separate economic entity, did not favour manual labour [handearbeid], but aimed at filling the managerial positions in commerce and industry. (See P.W. Coetzer and J.H. le Roux (eds.): Die Nasionale Party, IV, pp.77-79 and G.D. Scholtz: Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner, VIII, pp.482-485)

12. Malan did make mention of Jewry as being "... 'n politieke mag..." during the parliamentary session of 1939. (See Hansard, 17.3.1939, col.1997) This, however, was an isolated remark and did not fall into the pattern of Malan's general argument. No special significance can therefore be attributed to this comment.

geld ... die ou [Transvaalse] Volksraad om te koop" and politically because they rebelled "... teen die ou republikeinse staat, verwek opstootjies en ... [werk] selfs geweld in die hand ..."13)

The alleged connection between communism and Jewry provide an excellent example in illustrating the division in opinion within the Party on the Jewish Question and the integration of this issue with arguments relating to 'economic' anti-semitism. Louw, in introducing the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill to Parliament, placed particular emphasis on alleged Jewish compassion for communism. Speaking in support of Louw's Bill and on the Jewish Question in general, neither Malan nor Strijdom made any mention of Jewish support for or affinity towards communism.<sup>14)</sup> Newspapers supportive of the GNP continued with this second approach. Die Burger, in announcing the publication of the Aliens (Amendment) Bill, presented this Bill as being illustrative of Party policy on two separate issues, viz. Jewish immigration and communism.<sup>15)</sup> Following the introduction of this Bill into Parliament, neither Die Burger nor Die Transvaler, in its editorial columns, initially referred to communism or the perceived connection between this ideology and Jewry.<sup>16)</sup> Die Burger continued with this approach; its remarks on the alleged connection between Jews and communism limited to a factual reportage of parliamentary debates and speeches by Louw.<sup>17)</sup>

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13. See Hansard, 14.4.1939, col.2954-2957.

14. See Ibid., 17.3.1939, col.1996-2003; 16.5.1939, col.4899-4902.

15. Die Burger, 7.1.1939.

16. See Die Burger, 27.2.1939: "Die Jode-debat" and Die Transvaler, 27.2.1939: "Debatteer Saaklik".

17. See, for example, Die Burger's (25.3.1939) report on the debate in Parliament on this Bill and reports on Louw's speeches in Johannesburg (8.8.1939) and at De Aar (12.8.1939) during August 1939.

Die Transvaler, as opposed to Die Burger, adopted a far less consistent approach in relation to 'Jewish communism'. Towards the end of April 1939 this newspaper published an article in which it was declared:

"Die siel van [die] kommunisme in die Unie is 'n paar Jode wat self nooit op die voorgrond tree nie, dog 'n aantal Afrikaners en Engelse gebruik om die massa te bereik, gewoonlik teen 'n betreklik gesproke hoë salaris. Hul organisasies vul mekaar aan. Daar is omtrent tien sulke verenigings aan die [Witwatersrand], maar hul lede is almal onderling met mekaar verbind en die organisasies word weer deur 'n federale raad saamgevoeg, sodat die werksaamhede nie oor mekaar gaan nie."<sup>18)</sup>

Following the siding of the Soviet Union with the Allied Forces, Die Transvaler, in its editorial columns, continued to deal with the Jewish Question. Relative to the perceived connection between Jewry and communism, this was either explicitly referred to<sup>19)</sup> or not mentioned at all.<sup>20)</sup>

Indicative of attempts to integrate arguments regarding Jews as respectively an economic and political entity is a remark by Louw relating to Jewry as allegedly being supportive of both capitalism and communism:

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18. Die Transvaler, 28.4.1939.

19. Die Transvaler, 18.2.1942: "Dit keer al teen hulself"; Die Transvaler, 16.2.1943: "Kommuniste Beoog Kafferrepubliek" and Die Transvaler, 21.3.1945: "Blanke Selfmoord".

20. See Die Transvaler, 4.2.1943: "Waarsku Betyds!".

"Maar dan word gevra hoekom daar aan die een kant gesê word dat die Jode kommuniste is, en aan die ander kant dat die Jode kapitaliste is. Ek weet, dit skyn 'n paradoks te wees, maar een van die vernaamste doeleindes van die kommunisme is die kontrole van die produksie en van die distribusie. Die kommuniste bedoel daarmee die kontrole van distribusie en produksie deur amptenare en die amptenare is gewoonlik weer Jode wat vir hulle eie sakke sorg."<sup>21)</sup>

Relative to the parliamentary debate on the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill, this remark by Louw was more the exception than the rule. The general strategy employed by the Louw-faction during this debate was of a less obvious nature, concentrating more on the perceived connection between communism as an all-embrasive ideology with obvious implications for the existing status quo and the alleged radical transformation of society-in-totality as sought by Jews. The impression of interconnectedness created by the accentuation of shared objectives was unobtrusive and seemingly a natural deduction.

#### 6.2.2. Eric Louw, Jewry and Communism

Although the introduction of Louw's Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill marked the first occasion where the alleged connection between Jewry and communism was presented in an organised and coherent manner from a GNP-platform, this did not mark the advent of the campaign against 'Jewish communism' - either within the Party or by Louw.

Louw, following his return to South Africa from Europe in 1937, had already made mention of alleged Jewish involvement with communism. The motion on communism adopted by the Uitenhage Congress of the Cape GNP in 1937 explicitly provided for a

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21. Hansard, 14.4.1939, col.2998.

connection to be made between Jewry and communism.<sup>22)</sup> The section on "Immigration and the Jewish Question" in the GNP's manifesto for the 1938 election was once again sufficiently widely formulated so as to allow for a connection to be made between Jews and communism.<sup>23)</sup> However, in spite of this and in spite of remarks by Malan along similar vein in the course of 1938,<sup>24)</sup> no attempt was made by Louw to repeat or expand on his 1937-contentions.

Within the GNP, remarks on the alleged menace of 'Jewish communism' can also be traced back to 1937. This topic, as indicated in an earlier chapter, figured prominently in the period immediately preceding and following the introduction of the "closed shop"-principle in the mining industry. Although closely related to Louw's remarks of the post-1938 period, it will be argued that the motivation underlying these comments may well have differed fundamentally from those of 1939.

The cause of Louw's campaign against perceived Jewish communism was aided by the increasing topicality of the Jewish Question. A diverse range of factors contributed towards this actuality and

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22. The first article of this resolution proposed the adoption of "[s]trenger immigrasiewette ..." as a measure to combat communism. Louw was responsible for the introduction of this motion. See Chapter 2.
23. This section reads as follow: "While the party in general welcomes the immigration of suitable assimilable Europeans, it will, with an eye to South Africa's specific problems, take steps to put an end to further immigration of Jews, to oppose the changing of names, to exercise stricter control over naturalization and to bring into existence an occupation permit system for unnaturalized foreigners such as that which exists in England, France and other counties." (Cited in G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, p.125. See also Die Burger and Die Transvaler, 5.4.1938).
24. Malan, on occasion of the November 1938 unitary congress of the Party at Bloemfontein, was reported as having said: "Daar is nog 'n mag, en dit is die verenigde mag van die Jodedom. In alle lande is hulle in die minderheid, maar hulle verstaan die kuns om meer te kry uit die volk as wat hul getalle regverdig. Hulle gebruik nie alleen hul ekonomiese mag nie, maar verkondig in alle lande die kommunistiese en imperialistiese leer, omdat dit staan vir gelykstelling" (Die Transvaler, 9.11.1938).



ensured an initial positive response to the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill - even from quarters not normally associated with the G/HNP. These factors, without going into much detail, can be divided into three broad categories:

- (i) **The European context:** The upsurge of different variations of National-Socialism on the European continent undoubtedly had its ramifications within South Africa. Shimoni declares in this regard:

"It so happened that Afrikaner nationalists provided fertile soil for the seeds of National-Socialist ideas. Their acute race consciousness, their seething anti-British sentiments, the economic frustrations of their urbanisation, the political frustrations they experienced in a parliamentary system whose rules had been prescribed by the British tradition, a vague sense of affinity with Germany by Afrikaners of German stock - all these attributes rendered a considerable segment of the Afrikaners amenable to influence by German National-Socialism ..."<sup>25)</sup>

(ii) **The South African context:** Within South Africa, a number of individuals and organisations also contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of animosity towards Jews; thereby ensuring, at least initially, a positive response to Louw's Bill. In terms of organised groupings, most prominent was the Greyshirt-movement. Negotiations between representatives of this organisation and the GNP with the aim of establishing a common electoral front for the 1938-elections has been noted. The presence of Greyshirt-elements in the structures of the GNP, in spite of occasional misgivings and criticism from different quarters of the Party, remained a real possibility up to the latter half of 1940. Prominent amongst individuals connected to then existing political movements were Eric Louw and Louis Weichardt.

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25. G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, p.108.

(iii) A third category of factors, although not to be discussed comprehensively within the framework of this dissertation, which also made an important contribution in paving the way for Louw's Bill, relate to the diverse number of cultural, religious and social organisations/institutions, individual intellectuals and other prominent personalities who were also identified with the aspirations of Afrikaner nationalism. The absence of a meaningful discussion, however, should not be interpreted as meaning that these individuals, organisations and institutions were of lesser importance compared to those organisations and individuals already mentioned.

In many ways these organisations/institutions acted as "watchdogs" of the collective Afrikaner conscience, thereby providing an added credibility to the campaign against Jewry. The example of Nico Diederichs has been cited. To this can be added, amongst others, the names of Manie Maritz <sup>26)</sup> and even prominent literary figures such as N.P. Van Wyk Louw.<sup>27)</sup> Relative to the Afrikaans Protestant Churches, the Transvaal

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26. See M. Maritz: My Lewe en Strewe. Prior to 1939 Maritz had already acquired a semi-martyr status in the eyes of many an Afrikaner as a result of activities in the Second Anglo-Boer War and his maverick escapades at the time of the First World War. Following a decision to invade the then German territory of South West Africa, Maritz, an officer in the Union Defence Force, and a number of militia crossed into this territory to join the German para-military force stationed there. This, together with the Rebellion of 1914, were expressions of an increasing animosity which had systematically been building up in the ranks of Afrikaner nationalists since 1902. (For a detailed account of Maritz' escapades and the Rebellion of 1914, see T. Cameron (ed.): New History of South Africa, pp.236-238 and D.W. Krüger: The Making of a Nation, pp.85-98). Although the rebellion was suppressed and Maritz finally brought to trial at the beginning of 1924 - only to be released from goal a number of months later by Hertzog - the point in focus is the elevated stature achieved by Maritz through the course of events as a martyr for Afrikaner nationalism. Through his "struggle" against British imperialism, Maritz, in a sense, achieved a moral and historical authority to speak on a diverse spectrum of events. The alleged connection between Jewry and communism was one of those issues addressed by Maritz.

27. See a most interesting article by Gerrit Olivier: NP Van Wyk Louw en die Afrikaner-Nasionalisme (Die Suid-Afrikaan, no.25, February 1990).

Synod of the Nederduits Hervormde Kerk (NHK), in a resolution on the Jewish Question, declared, inter alia, in April 1937:

"... vervolging van enige seksie van die gemeenskap dra nie goedkeuring [van die Sinode] weg nie. Waar anti-Joodse bewegings georganiseer word vir ekonomiese en ander oorwegings, laat die Sinode dit oor aan die Christelike gewete van sy lidmate om te besluit in welke mate die bestaan van sodanige bewegings geregverdig is, met inagneming van die belange van die volk."<sup>28)</sup>

A pamphlet, issued under authority of the general synod of the NHK, explicitly referred to the presence of 'communistic Jews' in the South African labour movement.<sup>29)</sup> In this sense mention must also be made of the NRT and in particular its campaign against Solly Sachs and the GWU. In a letter to Sachs in October 1938, D.B.H. Grobbelaar, then NRT organiser for garment workers, stated:

"Met kommunisme wil ons volk niks te doene hê nie en met Jode - die Priesters daarvan - nog minder. Die dag wanneer ons Afrikaners begin afreken met julle Jode sal jy vind dat Duitsland 'n Joodse paradys is in vergelyking met wat Suid-Afrika sal wees!"<sup>30)</sup>

Louw's allegations regarding alleged Jewish affinity for communism hinged on three sets of arguments, viz. the person of Karl Marx, the role of Jewry in perceived communist organisations and what was termed "Jewish internationalism".

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28. See Die Burger, 27.4.1939. This resolution, needless to say, could be interpreted as both supportive and critical of the campaign against Jews.
29. H.P. Wolmarans: Kommunisme en die Suid-Afrikaanse Vakunies, pp.25-29. Interesting to note is that a nephew of this self-same H.P. Wolmarans, J.L.P. Wolmarans, was one of the first Afrikaner labour leaders to visit the Soviet Union in an official capacity. This visit took place in the early 1930s.
30. Records of the GWU. Bcc 1.10: Letter Grobbelaar-Sachs, 27.10.1938.

The argument relating to the alleged Jewish nature of communism as a result of the connection between this ideology and the person of Karl Marx, as indicated, was an oft repeated contention in various quarters. Louw formulated his version of this argument in the following terms: "Maar ek sê tog dat die Jode die mense is wat die begrip van kommunisme bedink het ... Kommunisme het sy oorsprong gevind in die leer van Karl Marx wat 'n Jood was."<sup>31</sup>) Important, however, is to note that this contention was not a kingpin in Louw's overall repertoire of arguments regarding alleged Jewish compassion for communism. Reacting to allegations that Marx was a converted Jew, Louw, for example, pleaded ignorance and acknowledged "... dit is besmoontlik [so]."<sup>32</sup>)

A second argument forwarded by Louw evolved around the actual involvement of Jews in organisations adjudged to be communistic. In the international context this was related to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917<sup>33</sup>) and Louw's own experiences in Europe.<sup>34</sup>). Within South Africa, the "... twee leiers van kommunisme ... [is] mnre. Solly Sachs en [Eli] Weinberg."<sup>35</sup>) Speaking in support of Louw's Bill, Werth stated that "... die Jood [is] by uitstek die Kommunistiese Propagandis in Suid-Afrika."<sup>36</sup>)

The stressing of perceived examples of Jewish involvement with communism were in many ways the closest to reality of Louw's three sets of arguments. Prior to 1940 Jews had indeed figured

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31. Hansard, 24.2.1939, col.843.

32. Ibid., 14.4.1939, col.2997.

33. Louw identified the following Jews as allegedly having played "... 'n groot en leidende rol ..." in the revolution of 1917 (Jewish name in brackets): Trotsky (Bernstein), Zinoviev (Appelbaum), Kamenev (Rosenfield), Kaganowitz, Bogandor (Silberstein), Verdlov, Marlov, Radek, Litvinov, Glagonsov, Steklov, Gonev, Meskousky and Garin (Hansard, 14.4.1939, col.2997).

34. Referring to an unspecified meeting of the League of Nations, Louw stated that the Soviet delegation present consisted of "... sewe Jode en een Rus." (Hansard, 24.2.1939, col.2994).

35. Hansard, 24.2.1939, col.843.

36. See Ibid., col.879.

prominently in left-wing politics, progressive trade unions and radical organisations. The Labour Party (LP), which initially constituted the majority segment of the political Left, continued to attract Jewish support even in the years of decline after 1929. GNP-speakers and -newspapers, on a number of occasions during the run-up to the general election of 1938, referred to the LP as being either wholly communistic or near-communistic.<sup>37)</sup>

Jews also constituted a sizeable percentage of the CPSA's active white cadres and played an important role in the CPSA's ideological development and -deployment. This is most vividly illustrated by the series of purges within the Communist Party during the 1930's.<sup>38)</sup> H.M. Basner, another Jew alleged to be a communist by Louw, did indeed contest a parliamentary seat under the banner of the CPSA during the general election of 1938.<sup>39)</sup> Sachs, as indicated, had been expelled from the CPSA during the early part of the 1930's. Neither the official history of the CPSA/SACP nor other sources identifies Eli Weinberg as either ever

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37. In a speech before an audience in the Pretoria City Hall, D.F. Malan, relative to the LP, stated: "Die Arbeidersparty het ver weggedryf van sy fondament[e]. Hy het geblyk die werktuig te wees van die georganiseerde jodedom en was in noue voeling met die kommuniste" (Die Transvaler, 28.4.1938). See also Die Burger, 16.11.1937: "Arbeidersparty se Rol in die Verkiesing" [editorial] and Die Transvaler, 3.1.1938: "Die Koers van die Arbeidersparty" [editorial].

38. The trio of Bolshevik dogmatists responsible for the expulsion of 'right-wing deviationists' from the CPSA were Douglas and Molly Wolton and Lazar Bach. Douglas, a gentile of Yorkshire, was married to Molly, originally a Jewess from Lithuania. Lazar Bach was also a Jew originally from Latvia. (H.J. and R.E. Simons: Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, pp.446-448 and J.Cope: Comrade Bill, pp.319-322.) The Woltons and Bach were supported by another Jew, Louis Joffe. Victims of these purges included S.P. Bunting and his Jewish wife Rebecca and two other Jews: Ben Weinbren and Fanny Glass (né Knelerman).

39. See Hansard, 24.2.1939, col.845 and G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, p.157. For the sake of completion it must be noted that Basner's candidature was defeated by the liberal, J.D. Rheinalt-Jones.

having been a member of the Communist Party or having participated in its activities.<sup>40)</sup>

Apart from its obvious propagandistic value, the stressing of actual examples of alleged Jewish involvement with communism were also important for two further reasons: Firstly, Louw's contention corresponded in principle with remarks made by other GNP members during 1937 on the perceived presence of "Jewish communists" in the labour movement.<sup>41)</sup> This served to indicate a continuity in Party policy between 1937 and 1939 and, even more important, acted as an extra legitimising device in ensuring the acceptance of and support for Louw's argumentation on this issue within the Party.

Secondly, whereas, in 1937, emphasis was placed on the perceived prevalence of (Jewish) communist propaganda amongst certain social classes (the Afrikaner proletariat) within the framework of South Africa, Louw and his supporters, by 1939, stressed the prominence of alleged Jewish communists in all social strata the world-over.<sup>42)</sup> In this manner Louw and his compatriots may have attempted to elevate, both in terms of stature and scope, their warnings on the alleged connection between Jewry and communism. Ultimately this served to further internationalise the Jewish Question in the minds of Afrikaner nationalists.

The single most important explanation cited by Louw for the perceived connection between Jewry and communism related to "Jewish internationalism". What exactly was meant by this concept, however, is not clear. At first Louw explained this concept and the connection thereof with communism as "... heeltemaal verstaanbaar, want die kommuniste is internasionaal en die Jood is

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40. See A. Lerumo [B. Bunting]: Forty Fighting Years; H.J. and R.E. Simons: op.cit. and P. Walshe: The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa.

41. See Chapter 2.

42. Louw, in Parliament, noted the existence of "... kommunistiese verenigings, organisasies wat onder die dekmantel van liberalisme probeer om hulle met liberale oortuigings in die kommunistiese sfeer in te trek" (Hansard, 24.2.1939, col.844).

internasionaal in sy uitkyk."<sup>43)</sup> This, then, would seem to indicate that as a result of shared internationalist goals/characteristics communism and Jewry shared corresponding aims and an inner unity-in-purpose. However, whereas, with regard to Jewry, this internationalism was related to a broad and general construct (Jews as supra-national entity), in the case of communism it was based on specific characteristics and goals. Stressed in this regard were communism's aim of a world revolution, internationalist proletarian solidarity and, on an organised level, the CPSA's affiliation to the Third International.<sup>44)</sup>

To this internationalist unity-in-purpose came to be added a further dimension, namely the anti- and unnational nature of both communism and Jewry. Relative to communism, Louw stated: "[K]ommunisme is absoluut die teenstelling van nasionalisme in sy wydste sin."<sup>45)</sup> Although this was a logical and to be expected deduction, it is important to note that while, in the case of Jewry, these anti- and unnational attributes were only implied, in the case of communism it was openly and directly stated.<sup>46)</sup>

### 6.2.3. The Jewish Question and Communism: Unilateral, Bilateral and Multilateral Influencing

In explaining the actuality of the Jewish Question, two general spheres or streams of influence can be identified which initially played a facilitatory role in this regard. In chronological order these streams of influence were animosity towards Jews which largely had a local origin and content and dogmas more readily connected to a European source. Although the latter and

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43. Ibid., col.843.

44. See Ibid.

45. Ibid., col.843. Indicative of the perceived anti-systemic qualities of communism, according to Louw, was its opposition to "... instellings van die Westerse beskawing, ... godsdiens, die gesin en privaat-eiendom."

46. See Hansard, 24.2.1939, col.844-845.

particularly the German form receive more attention in the literature for obvious reasons, care must be taken not to overemphasize the significance/importance of German Nazism in explaining anti-Jewishness in Afrikaner nationalist politics. Furthermore, neither an Afrikanerised form of antagonism towards Jewry nor an overseas version of anti-semitism can be interpreted as complete and mutually exclusive explanations. Different organisations depended on either existing prejudices or the example of another country to promote their own policies. Within this context, influencing - irrespective of whether it be unilateral, reciprocal or multilateral - was a real possibility which cannot be discounted. The same must be said for the alleged connection between Jewry and communism.

In this section attention will be focussed on the position of the different movements vis à vis the perceived connection between Jews and communism relative to influencing.

Some of the earliest attempts to establish a linkage between communism and Jewry emanated from the Greyshirt-movement. The manner in which this was done has been sufficiently dealt with in an earlier chapter. Important for the aims of this section is the Greyshirt-movement policy towards Jews as a subdivision of a broader ideological identity and the relative positioning of this organisation with regard to the increasing topicality of perceived Jewish communism in Afrikaner nationalist politics.

The Greyshirt-movement, as indicated, gained notoriety for its policy towards and activist behaviour regarding Jews. The Greyshirt standpoint on and resultant policy towards Jewry was contained in this movement's Programme of Principles, issued shortly after its founding in 1933:

"Ten opsigte van die Jode is die [Gryshemp-beweging] ... se



standpunt:-

(i) Dat die Jode, van Oosters-Semitiese oorsprong, 'n aparte, afsydige, onassimileerbare, nie-christelike rassegroep is, wat op internasionale grondslag georganiseer is en sy tradisionele godsdienstige en rasse-identiteit orals handhaaf.

(ii) Dat hulle daarom as groep nie deur die Volksgemeenskap geassimileer kan word nie en dus 'n onnasionale, anti-nasionale en vreemde element in die volksliggaam sal bly.

(iii) Dat hulle belange in Suid-Afrika dus alleen individualisties, materialisties of groepbeskermend is, en nie volksgemeenskaplik nie, en hulle daardeur 'n toestand skep wat die ewewig van die volkslewe op byna elke terrein, ekonomies, maatskaplik, sowel as kultureel, versteur.

(iv) Dat die Jode weens hulle wêreldverspreidheid en die kapitalistiese mag waaroor hulle in elke land beskik, inderdaad 'n internasionale volk is wat deur middel van die Joods-kapitalistiese pers, die vernaamste propagandiste (vir hulle eie voordeel en veiligheid) van die sogenaamde liberalisme, kosmopolitanisme, kapitalisme en denasionaliserende internasionalisme (kommunisme) is.

(v) Dat die Jode uit 'n staatkundige oogpunt dus nie 'n selfonderhoudende groep is nie, maar lewe en teer op die arbeid, produksievermoë, lewensgeleenthede en bestaansregte van ander - m.a.w. parasities floreer op die Volksgemeenskap - en as sulks 'n nadelige gewas in die volksliggaam is.

DAAROM aanvaar die [Gryshemp-beweging] ... en verbind hy hom tot die uitvoering van 'n beleid van:-

(a) Strenge wetgewing om voortaan alle Joodse immigrasie tot die volkstaat te belet.

(b) Algehele vernietiging van die huidige Joodse dominasie en beperking van Joodse invloede op elke terrein.

(c) Wetgewing waardeur die posisie van sodanige Jode aan wie vergunning gegee word om binne die gebied van die Staat te bly woon, sosiaal, ekonomies en staatkundig bepaal sal word as vreemdelinge wat alleen geduld sal word solank as hulle die sedes van die volk eerbiedig, die landswette gehoorsaam en aan die eise van die volksgemeenskap voldoen.

(d) Bestraffing en deportasie sover moontlik van alle Jode wat hulle aan rasseskending skuldig maak, of skuldig gemaak het."<sup>47)</sup>

The radical reversal of Jewish emancipation, as proposed in this policy document, was in accordance with Greyshirt nationality policy. The proposed organic Volkstaat [literally State of the people] were to be made up of two categories of people, viz. those who were of "... suiwer Europese en Ariese afkoms ..." and those who did not qualify for citizenship under the above definition or were Aryans who owed their loyalty to another state. Whereas the first group would enjoy the full privileges of citizenship, members of the second grouping were to be debarred from holding citizenship. The latter grouping's continued presence in the state depended on their subservience to certain authoritarian measures.

Apart from those dissipated Aryans who owed their loyalty to another state, this second grouping would also encompass descendants of non-Aryan peoples - in practice non-whites and Jews. Greyshirt-ideology, as indicated, held that Jews were members of an "Oosters-Semitiese ras". Furthermore, whereas non-whites, as members of 'child-race', were easily manageable, Jews, for a multiplicity of reasons, positively constituted a menace. Harsh measures, as identified earlier, was therefore a requisite necessity in dealing with this situation. Communism, also described as "denasionaliserende internasionalisme", was identified as one of those measures employed by Jewry to subjugate Gentile-states and perpetuate existing patterns of domination.

In dealing with the perceived interconnectedness of Jewry and communism, the Greyshirt-movement could count on the presence of

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47. Cited in F.J van Heerden: Nasionaal Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.77-78.

three sets of variables which either automatically favoured its cause or could be manipulated to such effect:

(i) Within the cadre of then existing national-socialist organisations, the Greyshirt-movement held the advantage of being one of the first organisational embodiments of this ideology in South Africa. Although the number of national-socialist movements active in the Union mushroomed after 1933,<sup>48</sup>) the Greyshirt-movement retained the dubious honour of being one of the earliest. On a different level, the Greyshirt-movement was also the first organisation, in the broader context of Afrikaner nationalist politics, to connect the 'communist menace' to the 'Jewish peril'.

(ii) Closely related to this historical advantage were the benefits to be gained from an already-in-existence propaganda structure, a comprehensive and fully completed Programme of Principles and functioning regional and national organisational structures. A single example will serve to illustrate this point: Although all of those pre-1939 national-socialist movements supposedly had their own separate mouthpieces, in the majority of cases the publication of these organs were seemingly irregular and the circulation thereof limited to listed members. This, needless to say, placed a damper on activities and severely curtailed recruitment. The Greyshirt-movement, being the exception rather than the rule, could, at least up to October 1938, count on the nationally circulated and regular editions of Die Waarheid-The Truth. This, in turn, ensured the propagation of Greyshirt-philosophies to a much wider audience.

(iii) Of special importance, however, was the ability of the Greyshirt-movement to mobilise existing prejudices towards

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48. These included: The South African National Democratic Party which emerged in August 1934, Die S.A. Nasionale Volksbeweging (The S.A. National People's Movement - more commonly known as the Blackshirts), The People's Movement and the South African Gentile Socialists.

Jewry for political gain - especially in relation to the subject of 'Jewish communism'. The manner in which this was done, importantly, should not be seen as a development whereby Greyshirt-beliefs were unilaterally superimposed atop existing animosities. Such an explanation views Afrikaner nationalism as an ideologically homogenous construct. Ultimately this turned to be a process, characterised by continuous integration where the actual content of existing prejudices were of fundamental importance in the creation of new and complimentary forms of antagonism.

Through the presence of the above three factors, the Greyshirt-movement, in many ways, achieved an early monopoly on both the Jewish Question and perceived Jewish communism. This applied to different levels. On the one hand, as indicated previously, the Greyshirt-movement was the first of several national-socialist organisations active in the Union as well as within the narrower framework of Afrikaner nationalist politics vis á vis the Jewish question. Conversely, remarks on the Jewish question related to not only Jewish immigration, but encompassed a whole series of related contentions. The same deduction can be made relative to the perceived interconnectedness of Jewry and communism. In various ways this placed the Greyshirt-movement in a particularly strong and favourable position regarding future influencing on both issues.

The possibility and even probability of the G/HNP being influenced by the Greyshirt-movement on the Jewish Question have been noted. Sufficient for the aims of this analysis is to note that with the outbreak of war in September 1939, three different interest groupings - relative to the Jewish Question - could be identified within the Party, viz. Malan's grouping, Louw and his supporters and those whose primary ideological allegiance lay with Greyshirt-philosophies. The presence in GNP structures of the latter 'grouping' was partly the result of Weichardt's successful

membership-application in January 1939.<sup>49)</sup> Even if the influence of the Greyshirt-grouping, relative to the other two sections, was limited to a non-ideological level, it nevertheless had an important part to play. F.C. Erasmus, as indicated, acknowledged the facilitatory role of this movement in bringing the Jewish question to the attention of the Party.<sup>50)</sup>

Regarding to points of view associated with Louw, the Greyshirt-movement may well have fulfilled an important function in paving the way for a positive reception of the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill.

The origins and ideological orientation of both the New Order and Ossewa-Brandwag also allowed for influencing from other sources on the perceived connection between Jewry and communism. The OB and G/HNP, as indicated, were at first closely related. The initial absence of a separate politico-ideological identity, the ostensibly cultural objectives of the OB and the phenomenon of dual membership provided for unlimited influencing from G/HNP circles on the Jewish Question. The same may well be said for Oswald Pirow and his New Order. Conversely, the presence of differently-minded elements in the G/HNP and the ensuing campaign against those 'alien' elements strengthened the position of the Malan-grouping in the struggle for supremacy on the issue of 'Jewish communism' within the Party. This aspect will be returned to in the following section.

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49. In announcing his decision to join the GNP, Weichardt also called on his supporters to follow the example set by him. See Die Transvaler, 20.1.1939. Although little information is available on the extent of Greyshirt reaction to Weichardt's call, it must invariably be accepted that such a grouping - even if unorganised and miniscule - may indeed have existed within the Party. While Weichardt did not remain a member of the G/HNP for very long, the point to be made relates to the existence - albeit in theory - of a fundamentally different-minded grouping within the Party. The existence of such a body of people within the Party may have continued until October 1940.

50. See Chapter Two.

Although the OB's political philosophy was couched in somewhat diabolical terms, resulting in what Shimoni has described as "... deliberate ideological vagueness ..."51), this organisation's conception of 'nation' - particularly after 1942 - bore unmistakable marks of national-socialist influencing. While, even during its initial phase as cultural movement, the OB permitted only white members, "Omsendbrief 1/41", issued in July 1941, provided the first indication of citizenship in the OB's future republic to be limited to particular sections of the white population.52)

A manifesto issued by the Grootraad in June 1942 qualified this issue even further by identifying "assimilability" as the basis for citizenship.53) Jews were openly identified as being unassimilable. Although the concept of assimilability was not explained on this occasion, Van Rensburg and other OB-ideologues, at different times, in referring to the future republic and nation, made use of terminology such as bloedsuiwerheid [blood-purity], die bande van bloed [the bonds of blood] and bloed en bodem [blood and soil].54)

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51. G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, p.128.

52. Omsendbrief 1/41 was a copy of the draft-constitution for the future South African republic as decided on by the Afrikanereenheidskomitee [literally Afrikaner Unity Committee] (AEK). The AEK was an amorphous body composed of, inter alia, leaders of the HNP, OB, FAK and Reddingsdaadbond (an affiliate of the FAK dealing with economic matters) and set up to coordinate Afrikaner nationalist activities over a broad front. See M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African Opposition, 1939-1945, pp. 85-90. The publication of the draft constitution by the OB marked the beginning of a definite parting of ways between the OB and HNP. In terms of citizenship, this circular declared that nationality, besides being reserved exclusively for whites, would only be accorded to "... subjects of whom it can be expected that they will act as up-builders of the nation." See Shimoni: op.cit., p.129).

53. See Die Ossewa-Brandwag - Vanwaar en Waarheen, p.5.

54. See Ibid.; Die Ossewa-Brandwag - Konstitusie and J.F.J. van Rensburg: Lewensbeskrywing en Drie Toesprake.

An even more explicit indication of racist anti-semitic patterns of thought within the OB is provided by a document on racial policy issued by one of the OB Studielaers [literally Study-laagers - policy-study committees].<sup>55)</sup> This document identified five racial groupings in the Union, viz. whites (composed of English- and Afrikaans-speaking whites), Jews, Africans, Coloureds and Indians. Referring to specifically the Jewish 'race', this document, inter alia, declared:

"In die rassebeleid ten aansien van die Jode moet uitgegaan word van die standpunt dat dit 'n nie-Europese (Semitiese), nie-assimileerbare en volksvreemde ras is wat in hierdie land as uitheemse minderheidsgroep behandel en onder beheer gestel moet word ... Die gronde [hiervoor] is die volgende:

1. Die Jood het in sy are die bloed van 'n voor-Asiatiese ras en nie die bloed van die Europese ras soos die Afrikaners en Engelse dit in hulle are dra nie. Omdat hy die draer van vreemde bloed is, moet hy ook nie deur die Europese ras van hierdie land geassimileer word nie ..."<sup>56)</sup>

Against this background, as illustrated, the OB also proceeded to connect the presence of Jews in South Africa to the perceived menace of communism.<sup>57)</sup>

Nevertheless, two important observations need to be made with regard to the alleged connection between Jewry and communism made by the OB. Firstly, although references to perceived Jewish communism may well be afforded a character independent of remarks on any other issue, it must be noted that more often than not this aspect was integrated with remarks on "Jewish capitalism". Indicative of this is an editorial comment by Die O.B. on the

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55. OB-Archives. GR I/1/1: "Rassevraagstuk: Algemene Uitgangspunt" (undated document).

56. See Ibid.

57. See Chapter Three.

leaders of the perceived communist movement:

"En wie is hierdie leiers van die kommunisme? Is dit werkers? 'n Engelse skrywer beweer dat die 49 kopstukke van die Kommunistiese Party in Rusland 'n paar jaar gelede op drie na almal Jode was. Van die ander drie was twee - onder wie Stalin self - met Jodinne getroud. Ons weet uit eie ervaring dat die Jood oor die algemeen nie deurgaans as 'n hande-arbeider nie. Hulle word getel onder die kapitaliste. Dat Jode die regeerders in Rusland is, is juis 'n bewys dat ons hier met die mees absolute vorm van kapitalisme te doen het."<sup>58)</sup>

To this can also be added Van Rensburg's comment of 1944 that communism and capitalism was "... the same thing."<sup>59)</sup>

Secondly, remarks on the alleged connection between Jewry and communism did not figure prominently in the OB's overall propaganda strategy and, compared to the emphasis placed on alleged Jewish attempts to monopolise private capital (the so-called Joodse Geldmag)<sup>60)</sup>, these remarks were of relative insignificance.

The NO, on the other hand, while also never attempting to deny its national-socialist orientation, paid only scant attention to the Jewish Question. The NO's Programme of Principles referred only indirectly to the Jewish Question and, even more importantly, this took place within the framework of a general statement on the status of members of the future National-Socialist Republic.<sup>61)</sup> Although a more detailed elucidation of NO-policy towards Jewry

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58. Die O.B., 19.7.1944: "Kolossale Bedrog".

59. See Van Rensburg's speech at Crosby on May Day 1944 (OB-Archives, KG II/7/53)

60. See, for example, Die Ossewa-Brandwag: Vanwaar en Waarheen, pp.35-39 and Die O.B., 5.1.1944: "Die O.B.-Arbeidslaer" [editorial].

61. Point P of the New Order Programme of Principles declared: "Hersiening, gesien uit die oogpunt van Nasionale belang, van die status van alle persone, genaturaliseer of nie, wat die land binnegekom het sedert 4 Augustus 1914 en die restourasie van alle naamveranderinge [na sy oorspronklike vorm] wat plaasgevind het sedert hierdie tyd." (O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.34)



evolved after World War II, this falls outside the ambit of this particular study. Significantly, nevertheless, is to note that even then NO-policy was not atypical of conventional National-Socialist belief systems.<sup>62)</sup>

#### 6.2.4. The Rise and Fall of "Jewish Communism"

Although the loss in stature of the perceived connection between Jewry and communism was closely related to the reduced prominence of the Jewish Question in general, within Afrikaner nationalist ranks this development was also affected by the struggle for political/ideological leadership within certain movements and between organisations of different ideological hue. In this section attention will be focussed on the struggle for hegemony on the Jewish Question within the G/HNP and, following that, the general decline of the perceived connection between Jews and communism.

Initially, following the unsuccessful promulgation of the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill, remarks on 'Jewish communism' continued almost unabatedly in certain quarters of the GNP.<sup>63)</sup> Simultaneously, however, indications were that this issue was starting to lose its popularity and prominence in the upper echelons of the Party. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, for example, GNP-speakers, in Parliament, continued to stress the necessity of an immediate moratorium on Jewish immigration. On all of these occasions, without exception, no reference was made to alleged Jewish affinity for communism.<sup>64)</sup> Even Louw, on the solitary occasion where he also contributed to the on-going

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62. For a discussion of NO-policy towards Jewry in the post-1945 period, see F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, pp.168-169.

63. See speeches by Louw in Johannesburg (Die Burger, 8.8.1939) and De Aar (Die Burger, 12.8.1939); P.O. (Paul) Sauer (GNP MP for Humansdorp) at Messina (Die Transvaler, 7.8.1939) and J.J. Hayward (GNP MP for Bloemfontein District) in Pretoria (Die Transvaler, 8.8.1939).

64. See, for example, J.G. Strijdom's speech in Parliament on 16.5.1939 (Hansard, col.4899-4922).

debate, did not make mention of the perceived connection between Jewry and communism.<sup>65)</sup>

The period following the outbreak of the World War II was characterised by a marked decrease in remarks on the Jewish Question. The same can be said for the alleged connection between Jewry and communism. Although a wide range of specific factors contributed towards the decreased importance of these issues, all were in some way related to the striving towards volkseenheid and, following the failure thereof, the state of proliferation in Afrikaner nationalist politics. Relative to the struggle for ideological hegemony on the perceived connection between Jewry and communism within the G/HNP, particularly two series of events fundamentally affected this issue after September 1939:

- (i) **The campaign for ideological homogeneity within the G/HNP:** The presence of differently-minded groupings and individuals within the G/HNP increasingly resulted in criticism from and tension within Party structures. Following an initial period of grace and attempts to win these individuals over to actively support all aspects of Party policy,<sup>66)</sup> the G/HNP, from 1940 onwards, launched various campaigns against volksvreemde elemente [literally elements alien to the people] in the Party. Of special importance for the positions of respectively the Malan-grouping and Eric Louw and his supporters vis á vis perceived Jewish communism were the campaigns against elements of the Greyshirt-movement and, to a lesser extent, the NO and OB.

Malan, at the Cradock Congress of the Party in October 1940, as indicated, criticised the presence of groupings in the GNP who subscribed to agendas differing from that of the declared

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65. Hansard, 16.5.1939, col.4877-4892.

66. Relative to the NO, for example, Malan, in spite of continued criticism from personalities such as J.G. Strijdom, initially underplayed the structural differences between the ideology of this organisation and the HNP in order to promote volkseenheid. See Chapter Four.

and accepted Party-line.<sup>67)</sup> This resulted in the withdrawal from the Party of Greysht-shirt-members.<sup>68)</sup> The alienation of the G/HNP and Greysht-shirts' resulted in a serious restriction of opportunities for the propagation of beliefs/philosophies in the Party which were perceived to be directly or indirectly related to the Greysht-shirt-movement. Relative to the alleged connection between Jewry and communism, this, in turn, arguably restricted the continued propagation thereof in Party circles and, even more important, immeasurably strengthened the position of the Malan-grouping vis à vis Louw and his supporters on this issue.

While Louw and his compatriots, in a hypothetical sense, may have continued to stress alleged Jewish affinity for communism from HNP platforms, the withdrawal of Greysht-shirt-elements from the Party, as indicated, seriously affected the acceptability of this form of propaganda in so far as it may have been perceived to be closely related to orthodox Greysht-shirt-beliefs. Although Louw may well have been influenced in his thinking on this issue by sources unconnected to the Greysht-shirt-movement, the issue of 'Jewish communism', within the framework of the G/HNP, retained its aura of being a by-product of the Party's Greysht-shirt-legacy. A continued and even intensified stressing of perceived Jewish communism may well have resulted in an open schism developing within the G/HNP on this issue. The eviction of Louw and his supporters from the Party, on the basis of them being opposed to the official Party-line, would have been the next logical step. Malan's comment on the untenability of group-forming within the Party at the Cradock Congress, which was endorsed by all delegates present, provided the precedent which could have made such an eviction indeed possible. Furthermore, if Weichardt could indeed count on an almost unqualified loyalty

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67. See F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.136.

68. As indicated, the Cradock Congress and the decision to withdraw from the Party, marked the demise of the Greysht-shirt-movement as a separate and independent entity in Afrikaner nationalist politics.

from his supporters and even if he had sizeable support in G/HNP ranks prior to October 1940, the decision to disassociate himself from the Party deprived Louw of a valuable source of support from within the HNP.

Although the OB paid scant attention to 'Jewish communism', the HNP's campaign against this movement - particularly from 1942 onwards - deprived Louw of another ideologically receptive source of support. The same may well be said for Oswald Pirow and his New Order-movement.

- (ii) **The consolidation of Malan's position within the Party:** As a result of political confusion and amid indications of a growing tension between the Party on the one hand and the NO and OB on the other, the HNP called for an extraordinary unitary congress to be held in Bloemfontein during June 1941. The Congress unanimously adopted a motion which conferred on Malan the title of "Volksleier" [literally leader of the people] and, more importantly, voted him extraordinary powers over the Party-machine.<sup>69)</sup>

Without going into any detail, Malan, following the Bloemfontein Congress, was afforded a near-monopoly over most functions of the Party. This included the formulation of Party policy and control over membership.<sup>70)</sup> In the exercise of these powers Malan was responsible to only the HNP executive and the sole criterion to abide by was that adjudged by him to be "... necessary in the interests of the unity and efficiency of the Party."<sup>71)</sup> Although the rationale behind the actual voting of these powers to Malan related more to the striving towards volkseenheid and the activities

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69. See M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African Opposition, 1939-1945, pp.84-86 and Van Heerden: op.cit., pp.216-217.

70. For a more detailed elucidation of those powers afforded to Malan by the Bloemfontein Congress, see Die Transvaler, 4.6.1941.

71. M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African Opposition, 1939-1945, p.85.

of the earlier referred to Afrikanereenheidskomitee,<sup>72)</sup> the implications for the position of the Malan-grouping vis à vis Louw and his supporters relative to the topic of 'Jewish communism' were equally far-reaching.

Even if Louw and his supporters had decided to intensify the propagation of perceived Jewish affinity for communism, Malan, under the authority extended to him by the Bloemfontein Congress and on the possible grounds of Louw's propaganda being counter-productive to the interests of the Party, may have decided to veto or actively oppose any such propaganda. Furthermore, as indicated, the near-authoritarian powers voted to Malan provided him with a monopoly on intra-Party policy formulation. Any and all attempts to alter the existing Party policy on the Jewish Question could thus effectively be halted.

Of special significance for the aims of this study is to note that the Bloemfontein Congress directly contributed to the placing of Malan and his supporters in a position far superior to that of the Louw-grouping in the struggle for hegemony on the issue of 'Jewish communism'.

Collectively, and on their own, both these factors had an important part to play in the restoration of ideological homogeneity in thinking on the Jewish Question within the G/HNP. Illustrative of this restoration and the increasing domination of beliefs associated with Malan is the HNP's policy on "Immigration and the Jewish Question" as it appeared in the 1941-adopted "Programme of Principles, Programme of Action and Constitution":

"a) The repatriation of all illegal and undesirable immigrants.

b) The party favours in general the immigration of suitable assimilable white European population elements.

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72. See Footnote 17.

c) In view of South Africa's specific problems, the [P]arty recommends the immediate cessation of all further immigration of Jews and further of all elements which cannot be assimilated by the South African nation or which are a hindrance or dangerous to society.

d) It further has in view:

i) exercise of stronger control over naturalization; [and]

ii) introduction of a vocational permit system for unnaturalized foreigners as exist in many other countries.

e) The Party wishes to take all possible steps to fit South Africa's own original White population elements for earning a living in every sphere and to protect them against unfair competition."<sup>73)</sup>

Although it may well be possible to argue that point a) of the above policy-declaration, in so far as it referred to "... undesirable [Jewish] immigrants", continued to provide for a connection to be made between Jewry and the perceived menace of communism, more important is to note that those ideas originally associated with Louw became increasingly isolated within the framework of the Party. The overwhelming majority of HNP parliamentarians who had earlier supported Louw's contentions relating to 'Jewish communism', now made no mention of it.<sup>74)</sup> Some of the more vocal supporters of Louw's 1939 Bill, for example Louis Weichardt, had already left or was forced to leave the HNP.

Louw himself, however, continued to stress alleged compassion for Marxist philosophies by Jews. During his 1943-parliamentary motion

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73. Cited in G. Shimoni: Jews and Zionism - The South African Experience, p.134.

74. A case in point is the example of Paul Sauer. Addressing a public meeting in Messina during August 1939, Sauer explained in great detail the perceived Jewish nature of communism (Die Transvaler, 8.8.1939). Speaking in support of Louw's 1943-motion on communism, Sauer made no reference - either directly or indirectly - to 'Jewish communism'. See Hansard, 5.3.1943, col.2936-2938.

on communism, for example, Louw paid detailed attention to alleged examples of Jewish involvement with communism.<sup>75)</sup> Sufficient is to note that Louw added a number of not-before mentioned names to his 1939-list of perceived leading South African Jewish communists.<sup>76)</sup>

Important to note, however, is that these remarks were isolated in the sense that Louw found no support for his contentions from other quarters within the HNP. In many ways this resulted in the campaign against 'Jewish communism', at least within the context of the G/HNP, being changed from a campaign with tacit sanctioning by the Party to a personal crusade by Louw without any formal support.

Furthermore, compared to the Aliens (Amendment) and Immigration Bill of 1939, the structure of Louw's argumentation had also changed noticeably. Whereas, during 1939, Louw had employed three different sets of arguments to validate his claims, by 1943, no reference was made to the alleged communiality of objectives and other parallels between Jewish internationalism and the internationalism attributed to orthodox Marxism. This last argument, as indicated previously, was seemingly the most important of Louw's 1939 allegations. The emphasis on actual examples of perceived Jewish involvement with this ideology was less contentious than the above argument and, even more important, largely devoid of overt indications of belief-systems connected to National-Socialism.

Invariably, the question arises that if, after 1941/42, Louw's emphasis on alleged Jewish involvement with communism was not atypical of the accepted HNP stance on the Jewish Question, why he was allowed to continue with the propagation thereof under the Party banner. Two explanations possibly provide an answer: Firstly, Louw's emphasis on actual examples of alleged Jewish involvement with communism - even if only in a strict historical

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75. See Hansard, 12.2.1943, col.1478-1479 and 5.3.1943, col.2940.

76. To the names of Sachs, Weinbren and Basner were added: Harry Snitcher, Ikey Wolfson, Issy Diamond, Eli Weinberg, [Michael] Harmel and [Sam] Kahn. See Hansard, 12.2.1943, col.1478.

context - may still have enjoyed considerable support in various quarters of the Party.<sup>77)</sup> Disciplinary action against Louw, taking place against the backdrop of the Party recouping from the losses suffered as a direct result of its campaign against volksvreemde elements (read OB, NO and Greyshirt-movement), could have resulted in a mass exodus from the Party. Secondly, compared to the demagogic and other favourable qualities of Louw, the HNP may have adjudged the prospective inconvenience to be had from a continued stressing of perceived Jewish communism to be minor, temporary and even negligible.

Within the broader context of Afrikaner nationalist politics, the Jewish Question in general and in particular the alleged connection between Jewry and communism had virtually disappeared by the end of 1943. Generally speaking, the reduced topicality of this issue was the result of two interconnected factors, viz. the aura of National-Socialism which clung to the Jewish Question and the rapidly worsening position of Germany in the continuing war. By 1943, with the turning of the tide against Germany<sup>78)</sup> and the effectiveness of propaganda in linking policies of retribution towards Jews with National-Socialist influencing, the price to pay for this 'idealistic opportunism' had become too costly.

Regarding the connection between communism and the Jewish Question, the virtual disappearance thereof from the platforms of the HNP, Greyshirt-movement and, to a lesser extent, the Ossewa-Brandwag, were unobtrusive and in the majority of cases overshadowed by other developments. Following the outbreak of World War II, this issue was overshadowed by the HNP's emphasis on the necessity of neutrality and, after the 1943-general election, expected developments in the post-war era. Concurrently, the

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77. That this may have indeed been possible is illustrated by the repeated references to the alleged presence of Jewish communists in the labour movement, even from overtly apolitical cultural organisations such as the NRT and FAK. In this regard, for example, see the highly tendentious publication by Louis Naudé: Dr. A Hertzog, die Nasionale Party en die Mynwerkers, pp.14-16 et. seq.

78. See G.D. Scholtz: Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner, VI, pp. 240-241.



eventuality of an Allied defeat and the possible favourable implications resulting from this for the republicanist striving was shifted from its centrist position in HNP-propaganda to a standing with peripheral importance.

Important to note, however, is that in spite of the above situation, the Party's declared policy on the Jewish Question never lost its place on the HNP's Programme of Principles. Illustrative of this is a letter by H.F. Verwoerd, then editor of Die Transvaler, to Strijdom during October 1947 in which it was stated that "... [ons] moet eenvoudig aanvaar dat ons Joodse beleid bestaan en dat niks verder daarvoor geskryf hoef te word nie."<sup>79</sup>) Furthermore, the ban imposed on Jews from becoming members of the Party in the OFS and Transvaal remained in place for a considerable period, even after the war.

Finally, with the turning of the tide against Germany in the war and the triumph of the HNP in the struggle for the loyalty of the volk, National-Socialism also lost its potential attractiveness as a socio-political and economic alternative. Proponents of this ideology subsequently also ceased to attract meaningful support from Afrikaner nationalist circles. Concurrently, the alleged Jewish nature of communism also lost its credibility as a slogan behind which to rally mass support.

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79. See F.J. van Heerden: Nasionaal-Sosialisme as Faktor in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1933-1948, p.381.

### 6.3. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE "SOUL" OF THE AFRIKANER WORKING CLASS

Several studies have appeared on the Christian-Nationalist assault of the 1930s and 1940s on the established trade union movement.<sup>80)</sup> While none of these analyses, for a variety of reasons, provide satisfactory insight into the different facets of this onslaught (e.g. the utilisation of overt anti-communism to further the cause of this campaign), for the aims of this dissertation it will be accepted that these different studies provide sufficient background-information. No attention will thus be afforded to the course of the campaign for the establishment of Afrikaner nationalist trade unions.

Important, for the aims of this chapter, is the contribution of the perceived communist menace to the deployment of a collective, organic Afrikaner volksidentity.<sup>81)</sup> The striving towards volksunity and -identity, similar to the utilisation of overt anti-communism for the promotion of Afrikaner nationalist trade unionism, have been neglected thus far by analysts. A comprehensive analysis of this issue, almost needless to say, demands a study on its own. In the context of this dissertation,

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80. See L. de Kock: Die Stryd van die Afrikaner in die Suid-Afrikaanse Mynwerkersunie, 1936-1948; D. O' Meara: Analysing Afrikaner Nationalism: The 'Christian National' Assault on White Trade Unionism in South Africa (Historical Abstracts, vol. 25(B), 1979); D. O' Meara: Volkskapitalisme; D. O' Meara: "White Trade Unionism, Political Power and Afrikaner Nationalism" in E. Webster (ed.): Essays in South African Labour History; L. Naude: Dr. A. Hertzog, die Nasionale Party en die Mynwerkers; R.H. Davies: Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa, 1900-1960; and L. Witz: Servant of the Workers: Solly Sachs and the Garment Workers' Union.

81. From the outset it needs to be emphasized that the concept of an organic volksidentity was neither a product of the 1930's nor did it come to the fore as reaction to the perceived volksdivisive character of communism. While the origins of the conception of an organic volksidentity is debateable, the point to be made is that the striving towards volksidentity and -unity was not a causal product of overt anti-communism. The alleged menace of communism, in the context of the 1930s and 1940s, was perceived as constituting a further threat to the organic unity of the volk. In this regard, in terms of the perception of a "menace", it was closely associated with capitalism.

some introductory remarks will be presented on the evolution of an organic volksidentity and the possible functional role of overt anti-communism in this regard. These comments could serve as basis for a more detailed analysis.

#### 6.4. ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE EVOLUTION OF AN ORGANIC VOLKSIDENTITY

The conception of a communist menace, at first glance and in the context of the 1930s, played a decisive role in the further evolution of the conception of an organic volksidentity. The G/HNP, NO and OB, in referring to this concept, repeatedly did so in the context of a warning on communism. The NO-mouthpiece, for example, declared in August 1941:

"En so sien ook die Nasionaal-sosialisme die samelewing, nie as 'n meganies saamgestelde liggaam van noodwendig vyandige klasse nie, maar as een groot familie waarin die verskillende lede en groepe elk hulle eie plek het, en elk geleer word om uit liefde vir hulle hele volk, die belange van die geheel bokant die belange van die enkeling te stel. So staan Nasionaal-sosialisme dan vir 'n rewolusie van liefde en selfverloëning teenoor die kommunistiese rewolusie van internasionale haat en selfsug."<sup>82)</sup>

A portrayal such as the above, however, is excruciatingly one-sided. The functional role of overt anti-communism in the evolvment of the concept of an organic volksidentity, so it will be argued, is difficult to determine. "Internationalism",<sup>83)</sup> both in terms of the content attributed to it and the contextual utilisation of this concept, may indeed have referred to the Marxist dogma.<sup>84)</sup> If so, however, this was hardly of a conventional nature. Furthermore, internationalism - in so far as

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82. Die Anti-Kommunis, 19.8.1941.

83. The diametrical opposite of the organic volksunity concept.

84. My understanding of the term internationalism, in the context of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, is based on predominantly three works. See, in this regard, T. Bottomore (ed.): A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, pp.231-233; M. Jaworskyj (ed.): Soviet Political Thought, pp.506-538 and L. Kolakowski: Main Currents of Marxism, I, pp.262-398.

it included remarks on a mechanistic division of the volk - may equally have referred to capitalism. Finally, the concept of an organic volksidentity, while finding explication in the credos subscribed to by the various movements under discussion, these organisations were not the only actors involved in the ideological construction and elucidation of this concept. The presence of particularly cultural entrepreneurs of Afrikaner nationalism and, subsequently, the probability of multilateral cross-pollination further complicates this issue.

Some of these contentions will henceforth be discussed.

#### 6.4.1. Internationalism and the Class Struggle

"Internationalism", as indicated in earlier chapters, was described as a distinctive feature of communism. This term, firstly, referred to the perceived ideological and functional manipulation of South African 'communists' by Moscow. Secondly, communism's declared goal of a world-revolution and, finally, this ideology's perceived objective of a proletariat-dominated world. Important, for the aims of discussion, is the internationalist content of this last interpretation and, connected to that, the meaning attributed to Marxian class struggle.

The G/HNP, as illustrated in the second chapter, initially portrayed communism as an intra-racial phenomenon. While little mention was made of internationalism per se, given the abundance of remarks on organic volksunity (the diametrical opposite of internationalism and the class struggle), it may be stated that this term, for the Party, referred to a racially homogenous internationalist workers grouping. Die Transvaler declared in this regard: "... 'n verenigde werkende klas-beweging ... [is] die aanvalskreet van die gevaarlike kommunisme. Die oogmerk is klassestryd in plaas van nasionale eenheid. Grondeienaars<sup>85</sup>) word

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85. Read also capitalists.

as 'n klas beveg. Selfs teen die nasionale trots van die Afrikanerdom word te velde getrek."<sup>86)</sup>

From 1938 onwards, at times, a definite internationalist content was added to this concept. J.H.P. Serfontein (HNP MP for Boshoff) declared in Parliament during 1944:

"Kommunisme staan op die grondslag van die diktatuur van die proletariaat. Hy sê dat alle onderskeidslyne moet uitgewis word en alle werkers moet verenig word, afgesien van hul ras of kleur of nasionaliteit of wat ook al."<sup>87)</sup>

The NO and OB, in similar vein, also noted the internationalist content of the concept of internationalism. Van Rensburg, in his Crosby-speech, stressed that "... all workers are really one. German, Zulu, Russian, Indian, Afrikaner, English - all are one ... Racial divisions are artificial, only class hatred is fundamental ..."<sup>88)</sup> Die Anti-Kommunis noted that "[v]ir die kommunis bestaan die hele mensdom uit twee groepe of klasse."<sup>89)</sup>

Portrayals such as the above, however, were more the exception than the rule. Particularly the G/HNP and OB, in relating the term internationalism to the class struggle, did so in the framework of the South African racial mosaic. Two elements are of importance in this regard:

Firstly, in terms of the racial stratification of classes in South Africa, the terms proletariat and bourgeoisie did not refer to two non-racial socio-economic entities, but rather, a division based on racial differences. Van Rensburg explained

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86. Die Transvaler, 21.5.1937: "Aanvalskreet van die Kommunisme" [editorial].

87. Hansard, 13.5.1944, col.7455.

88. Cited in Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwag, p.35.

89. Die Anti-Kommunis, 10.8.1942.

this conception in the following terms:

"The Comintern aims at the dictatorship of the Proletariat. In Germany the proletariat - the labouring class - is German, English in England, Swedish in Sweden. But in our Fatherland the proletariat is not white but black, neither Briton nor Boer, but Bantu. In our Fatherland the class-war must logically and inevitably develop into race-war. If the labouring class must become the ruling class - the dictatorship of the proletariat - the racial implication can only be the debacle of the whites before the onrush of the Bantu"<sup>90</sup>)  
(italics in the original).

While the G/HNP, in theory, may have recognised the non-racial complexion of the working class and, thereby, also the internationalist identity of the proletariat, whites, in the majority of cases, were identified as in effect belonging to an élite grouping. Concurrently, little mention was made of the traditional internationalist slogan of "Workers of the World, Unite!".

Secondly, irrespective of whether the above contention does prove to be relevant, given the fact that the overwhelmingly majority of the working class in South Africa was adjudged to be black, class struggle, in the Union, had to imply a race battle between white and black.

While it could indeed be argued that the portrayal of internationalism in terms such as the above, given the dire implications of racial equality for Afrikaner nationalism's declared ethnic exclusivity, was a deliberate function of strategy, the point in focus is the unconventional utilisation of this concept to promote a largely unrelated point of view. Hence, the term internationalism, on the basis of the content attributed to it by Afrikaner nationalist groupings, was hardly atonable with the more orthodox meaning afforded to this concept.

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90. See Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwag, p.38.

All being said, however, this still does not imply that internationalism - in so far as it referred to a mechanistic division of the volk on the basis of materialistic notions - did not have a part to play in the evolution of the concept of an organic volksidentity. However, internationalism, in this context, as will be illustrated in the next section, may well have referred to both capitalism and communism.

#### 6.4.2. Internationalism: Communism vs Capitalism

The Ossewa-Brandwag, as indicated, subscribed to a dialectical model in explaining the evolution of systems of government and socio-economic development. In terms of this argument, communism was the antithesis of capitalism. The latter, in giving precedence to the interests of capital, alienated the working class which, in turn, had given rise to the class struggle. Marxist ideology, in giving preference to the interests of labour, utilised the alienation emanating from capitalism; thereby actively promoting the class struggle.

While the G/HNP did not make use of a similar argument, striking was the fact that the Party's "Economic Plan for South Africa", issued in 1944, also noted the diametrically opposed aims of respectively capitalism and communism. Under capitalism "... word die swakkere ekonomiese eenhede en ... veral die werkers uitgebuit", while, under communism, "... het slegs een ekonomiese seksie, nl. die werkersklas, reg van bestaan. Alle ander word vernietig."<sup>91</sup>)

Relative to organic volksunity, communism and capitalism, by dividing the volk, could thus prove to be equally menacing. Die O.B., in February 1944, declared in this regard: "Die kapitalisme en die kommuniste het ooreengekom om die volk in twee te verdeel, en elkeen het vir hom 'n deel gekies waarmee hy oorlog voer teen die ander. Die een het vir hom die besitters gekies en die ander die besitloses. Watter een van die twee dele ook al wen, die volk

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91. See Die Kruithoring, 2.8.1944.

as sulks moet verlore gaan."<sup>92)</sup> Meyer, repeatedly, stressed that "[o]ns erken [kapitalisme en kommunisme] ... as ons gemeenskaplike vyande."<sup>93)</sup>

The G/HNP, once again, while never depicting the perceived relationship between capitalism-communism and organic volksidentiteit in terms which equalled that of the OB, indications are that a similar conception may well have been present within the Party.

Apart from being overly critical of capitalism,<sup>94)</sup> principles supposedly adhered to by the Party were also irreconcilable with the perceived features of capitalism. Relative to the conception of an organic volksidentiteit, important are two elements: Firstly, capitalism actively contributed to the division of the volk along economic lines. Under the heading "Volkseenheid en Verantwoordelikheid", the HNP's "Economic Plan

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92. Die O.B., 23.2.1944: "Die Kontra-Rewolusie" [editorial].

93. See, for example, P.J. Meyer: Afrikanereenheid (Wapenskou, Vol.2(2), 1941), pp.22-23.

94. Karl Bremer, for example, emphasized during December 1940 that "... Suid-Afrika hom moet voorberei om ná die oorlog 'n nuwe stelsel te aanvaar waarin die kapitalisme geen rol sal speel nie." See Die Burger, 3.12.1940. Traditional Afrikaner nationalist anti-capitalist sentiment also came very much to the fore during the course of the war years. The HNP, at its 1941 unitary congress in Bloemfontein, adopted, unanimously, the following proposal: "Die kongres eis die omskepping van Suid-Afrika in 'n vrye, onafhanklike republiek, gebaseer op Christelik-nasionale grondslag en beliggamende in wese en karakter die beste wat die Boerenasie in die verlede op hierdie gebied te voorskyn gebring het ooreenkomstig sy eie volksaard en tradisies ... Losgeruk uit die boeie van die kapitalistiese geldmag en parasitiese uitbuiting met sy nasleep van grootskaalse volksarmoede moet hy diensbaar gemaak word aan die geestelike, sedelike, liggaamlike en ekonomiese opbouing van die volk." (See Ibid., 4.6.1941).



for South Africa" declared as alternative principle:

"Die volk is 'n morele en ekonomiese eenheid. As sodanig besit hy die volle reg op die toegewyde diens van elkeen van sy lede. Maar aan die ander kant dra hy ook die volle verantwoordelikheid vir die versekering van 'n menswaardige bestaan aan elkeen van hulle."<sup>95)</sup>

Secondly, the emphasis on bread-and-butter issues by capitalism were also in conflict with the inner organic unity of the volk. Die Transvaler, in February 1943, commented on the impact materialism had had on sections of the volk: "Die kapitalistiese instelling het 'n klein klompie Afrikaners in 'n verhewe posisie geplaas omdat hulle in staat gestel is om skatte vir hulself te vergader, dikwels buite alle verhouding tot verdienste. Onder dieselfde stelsel bring rykdom noodwendig voorrang mee, maar ook 'n byna onweerstandbare versoeking om die lewe uit 'n wanperspektief te sien en om met neerbuigendheid, indien nie minagting nie, op te tree teenoor diegene wat moeiliker 'n bestaan vind. Juis omdat 'n kapitalis as sodanig geen plek het in die Afrikaner volkslewe nie, volg dit byna vanselfsprekend dat baie gegoedes onder ons hulle ook van die gewone Boer afskei. Aan diegene wat in die proses ... ontstam het, is daar nie meer salf te smeer nie."<sup>96)</sup> Malan, in setting out the HNP's election manifesto for the 1943 general election, explained the proposed alternative: "Ons sosiaal-ekonomiese beleid berus op vier grondpilare ... Die tweede is die inagneming deur die staat van menslike waardes bokant bloot finansiële belange. Die skatkis is daar vir die volk en nie die volk vir die skatkis nie."<sup>97)</sup> The same principle found explication in the 1944 "Economic Plan for South Africa":

"Dis die plig van die Staat om by die uitoefening van al sy funksies menslike waardes in ag te neem bokant bloot finansiële belange."<sup>98)</sup>

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95. See Die Kruithoring, 2.8.1944.

96. Die Transvaler, 19.2.1943: "Vet Passasiers" [editorial].

97. See Die Burger, 15.6.1943.

98. Die Kruithoring, 2.8.1944.

Capitalism's impermissible qualities and the proposed alternatives, almost needless to say, may just as well have been made applicable to perceived communism. The centrifugal impact of this latter ideology on organic volksunity, as illustrated in the second chapter, played a prominent part in initial G/HNP protestations over communism. Party members and supportive newspapers, intermittently, also referred to the materialistic basis of the communism. Shortly before the outbreak of war in September 1939, Die Burger, in counterposing materialism and the idealism of a 'new' world-order, declared with regard to communism:

"Na die [Eerste] Wêreldoorlog het dit gelyk asof die Marxisme nou die beskaafde wêreld sou verower. Alleen die ontstentenis van enige idealisme het sy triomftog gestuit. Beter 'n lewe vol teleurstelling as 'n lewe sonder ideaal. Hierdie sinspreuk het die mensheid weer vas gekry. Van die grofste materialisme het die mens teruggegaan na 'n bestaan vol ontberings, maar met idealisme. Selfs die bolsjewisme kan nie sonder idealisme nie. Daar is in Rusland honger, koue en armoede gely; alleen die ideaal dat dit alles nodig was om 'n beter, 'n skoner, lewe deelagtig te word, het die volk opgebou. Sê nie dat idealisme in die grond 'n droombeeld is nie. Dit is die sout van die lewe. Stel die idealisme as 'n plig. Die idealisme sal niks daardeur verloor nie, en die plig sal baie daarby wen. Dit het die leuse van die Marxisme vervang ... Die mensheid weet vandag weer dat niemand die ideaal in die hand het nie, maar dat die mens wat die idealisme nie in die oog het nie, soos 'n skip sonder stuur is."<sup>99)</sup>

While it may be argued that the drawing of comparisons and parallels between G/HNP protestations over respectively capitalism and communism - in relation to the concept of an organic volksidentity - does not prove anything of substance, fundamentally important is to note that in the context of the 1930s and 1940s, the "enemy" (in lieu of organic volksunity) was not only identified as being communism, but also included, inter alia, capitalism, liberalism and imperialism. Remarks on the perceived destructive nature of communism, against this backdrop and in the context of the near-unanimity in Afrikaner nationalist

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99. Die Burger, 24.6.1939: "Die Mens Lewe nie van Brood Alleen nie" [editorial].

ranks on the irreversible rotation towards a new world-order, could thus equally have related to communism. The Ossewa-Brandwag, as illustrated earlier, accepted that the destruction of communism was intimately interlinked to a destroyal of communism. Volkssocialism, which encompassed the concept of an organic volksunity, would only be realized after such a process.

While the G/HNP's initial comments on the perceived apocalyptic impact of perceived communism on the organic unity of the volk could be interpreted as having played a part in the evolution of the concept of an organic volksunity, there is no guarantee that it was not intended to reflect on capitalism as well. Rhetoric on communism, initially without much substance, turned into the proverbial avalanche following Hertzog's refusal to oppose the introduction of a "closed shop"-principle in the mining industry. Subsequent propaganda pertaining to the labour movement, apart from stressing the presence of perceived communists in trade union-structures, also referred to cooperation between the then existing labour organisations and organised capital. Die Burger, in commenting on the introduction of the "closed shop"-principle in the mining industry, declared in this regard: "Die mynbase tree as bondgenote van die Mynwerkersunie teen die Afrikaanse vakverbond op."<sup>100</sup>) Relative to the trade union movement, Naudé stresses the following:

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100. Ibid., 10.3.1937: "Bondgenote?" [editorial]. The United Party, even before this incident, had already been portrayed as an ally and even "puppet" of capitalism. Malan, for example, described Fusion in the following terms: "Samesmelting is die bedrog wat die ou bekende groep van imperialistiese en kapitalistiese uitbuiters agter die skerms reggekry het om op die trouhartige en goedgeelowige Afrikanerdom af te speel ..." See Die Transvaler, 5.4.1938.

"Maar die Afrikanermynwerker het sy vyande leer ken. Hy het byvoorbeeld geleer dat die Verenigde Party die party van die geldmag en ryk kapitalis was en daarom vanselfsprekend aan die kant van die Afrikanervyande gestaan het. Die mynwerker het geleer dat die hand van die Verenigde Party altyd teen die werker gelig sal wees. Hy was in die greep van die groot geldmag en daarom moes hy sy aan sy met hierdie geldmag teen die Afrikaner veg. Dit kon nie anders nie."<sup>101)</sup>

The point to be made, once again, is that remarks relating to organic volksunity and, more specifically, the divisive impact of certain ideologies on the striving towards volkseenheid, could have been aimed at either capitalism or communism. Thus, rhetoric, ostensibly aimed at communism, could also be intended as a reflection on capitalism.

While the concept of an organic volksidentity found application in the various Programmes of Principles adhered to by the different organisations under discussion, other entrepreneurial agencies were also involved in the ideological construction of this concept. Apart from institutions of a religious-theological nature, particularly important in this regard were socio-cultural organisations such as the Afrikaner-Broederbond, Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings, Reddingsdaadbond and the Nasionale Raad van Trustees. Multilateral influencing vis á vis the concept of organic volksunity, in this context, was a real possibility which cannot simply be ignored. Striking was the fact that whereas remarks on the concept of an organic volksidentity reached a climax in the OB during the war years, the HNP, over the same period, hardly referred to this theme. This applies equally to both capitalism and perceived communism. Influencing from sources unrelated to political life, relative to the HNP, was thus an even greater possibility.

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101. L. Naudé: Dr. A. Hertzog, die Nasionale Party en die Mynwerkers, pp.179-180. On the eve of the 1938 general election, C.W.M. du Toit, in similar vein, stated: "Genl. Smuts, wat sy bevele kry van die Kamer van Mynwese en sy oorleen vir die Joodse Raad van Afgevaardigdes, kan nog alleen 'n kaartjiesvergadering toespreek aan die Rand." See Die Transvaler, 17.5.1938.

In lieu of all these factors, an analysis of the functional role of overt anti-communism in the evolution of the the concept of an organic volksunity will prove to be a highly complex issue. An attempt to do this in relation to exclusively the G/HNP, NO, OB and Greyshirt-movement, will prove to be a self-defeating exercise and, ultimately, without much academic value.

Ultimately, the point remains that irrespective of whether the conception of an organic volksidentity was related to either capitalism or communism, two elements, in lieu of the aforementioned ideologies, determined Afrikaner nationalist behaviour on the striving towards a collective volksidentity:

Firstly, class struggle was adjudged to be irreconcilable with the striving towards an organic volksidentity. The origins of such a mechanistic division of the volk could have been attributed to either capitalism or communism.

Secondly, internationalism, which may have related, once again, to either capitalism or communism, negated the centrality of volksidentity and volksunity in the national striving of the volk. Ultimately, both were thus opposed to the interests of the volk.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM: PRINCIPLE VS STRATEGY

This concluding chapter, in drawing together the previous five chapters, will discuss the functional role of overt anti-communism in Afrikaner nationalist and South African politics between 1937 and May 1945. In doing so, an integrated strategy will be employed whereby attention will be focussed, interrelatedly, on both tactical considerations and considerations of a principled nature.

However, as stated earlier, this dissertation is mainly an analysis of Afrikaner nationalist conceptions of communism up to May 1945. With the exception of the introductory chapter, no attempt have been made to evaluate the correctness, applicability or even fairness of conceptions pertaining to the alleged menace of communism. Such an endeavour demands a study on its own. The implications of this for the aims of this particular chapter are two-fold:

Given the fact that this study does not aspire to provide an evaluation of the factual content of conceptions vis á vis communism, remarks made on the functional role of overt anti-communism in Afrikaner nationalist and South African politics will thus have to be of a tentative nature.

Attention, in this dissertation, have been limited to conceptions of communism in organisations aspiring to provide political leadership to the volk. Afrikaner nationalism and the issue of communism in particular, however, were not only the domain of political actors. A diverse range of other agencies contributed to the evolution of Afrikaner nationalism in general and, in particular, the construction of perceived anti-communism. The absence of a meaningful discussion on overt anti-

communism in organisations and institutions making up this latter grouping as well as an analysis dealing with influencing between the various embodiments of Afrikaner nationalism, in the context of this chapter, will affect any discussion aiming to come to terms with the functional role of perceived anti-communism in Afrikaner as well as South African society.

## 7.1. THE PERCEIVED DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF COMMUNISM

### 7.1.1. Atheism vs Metaphysical Notions

Broad consensus existed over the perceived sacreligious nature of communism. Communism not only scorned religion, but the materialistic foundations of this ideology, together with the emphasis on militant class struggle were irreconcilable with the declared Christian traditions embedded in Afrikaner society. This theme and variations thereof, at various times, were referred to by all those movements/organisations under discussion.

The counterposing of atheism (communism) and religious fervour (Afrikaner society) while, for reasons to be discussed later, having obvious tactical value, an explanation for this counterposing must first and foremost be sought in the realm of principles. Important in this regard are the prominence of metaphysical notions and theocratic tendencies in the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism.<sup>1)</sup> An in-depth examination of these tendencies does not fall within the scope of this study. However, in explaining opposition to communism on the basis of

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1. While no detailed and authoritative examination of these issues have as yet been made, worth mentioning are four studies: W.A. de Klerk: The Puritans in Africa; A.B. du Toit: No Chosen People: The myth of the Calvinist origins of Afrikaner nationalism and racial ideology (American Historical Review, Vol. 88(4), 1986); I.R. Hexham: Dutch Calvinism and the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism (Collected Papers, vol.1, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, 1974) and I. Hexham: The Irony of Apartheid: the Struggle for National Independence of Afrikaner Calvinism against British Imperialism.

a secular volksidentity, three sets of comments need to be made:

Firstly, elements of religious fundamentalism in Afrikaner society can be traced back to the nineteenth century.<sup>2)</sup> Initially couched in vague providential language, these ideas, with the onset of the twentieth century, came to be immersed in an all-encompassing weltanschauung. Political embodiments of Afrikaner nationalism reflected this secular volksidentity. Concurrently, given the fact that the family of Afrikaans Protestant Churches were expressions of an explicit religious volksidentity, these institutions attained an elevated position in Afrikaner nationalist society.

The second observation relate to the propagation and evolution of religious qualities in those movements under discussion. On the one hand, as indicated earlier, the ideological construction and evolution of Afrikaner nationalism was not the exclusive domain of organisations aspiring to reflect the political ideals of Afrikaner nationalists. Several organisations and institutions contributed to the development of Afrikaner nationalism. Apart from influencing one another, all of these organisations and institutions (both political and overtly apolitical) consciously reflected a definite religious orientation. Consequently, apart from the general impact of religious-oriented thinking, specific agencies and individuals also manifested an influence in certain organisations. Notable in this regard was the influence of Gereformeerde Kerk [Reformed Church]-intellectuals from Pothefstroom on the Ossewa-Brandwag during the latter part of the 1930s and early 1940s. The writings of prominent Afrikaner intellectuals, schooled in Europe (particularly Germany and the Netherlands) in the Calvinistic tradition,

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2. See De Klerk: Op.cit., pp.160-165 and S. Patterson: The Last Trek: A Study of the Boer People and the Afrikaner Nation, pp.34-37.



also had a part to play in the evolution of religious concepts. Names to mention here are those of Piet Meyer<sup>3)</sup> and Nico Diederichs.<sup>4)</sup>

Conversely, religious qualities not only found embodiment in the philosophies espoused by the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party and other movements, but individuals within those organisations and the organisations in themselves actively propounded such belief-systems. D.F. Malan, for example, who had left the pulpit to become editor of Die Burger, occasionally referred to the concepts of divine intervention and -predestination.<sup>5)</sup> Predikante-cum-politicians were also prominent in the New Order and OB, e.g. C.W.M. du Toit in the NO and C.R. du Toit in the OB.

The third set of comments relate to the content of those religious qualities which found explication in the ideologies of the G/HNP, NO, OB and Greysshirt-movement. Prominent in this regard was the belief that God had ordained separate nations, each with a separate, unique and divine destiny. Malan, in his political autobiography, summarised this belief: "Agter ons Suid-Afrikaanse volksbestaan en geskiedenis sit daar 'n doel. Daarvan moet

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3. See, for example, P.J. Meyer: Die Vooraand van ons Vrywording, pp.16-20.
  4. Diederichs published a major study on nationalism in 1936. In Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing en sy Verhouding tot Internasionalisme, religiosity was described as a distinctive trait of 'true' nationalism. Diederichs wrote in this regard: "Nasionalisme is noodwendig godsdienstig omdat dit elke nasie beskou as maaksel van die Hoogste Skepper, bestemd om 'n roeping te vervul en 'n deel by te dra tot verwesenliking van die God-bepaalde doel van die heelal. Sonder hierdie ewige doel sou die nasie-bestaan sonder sin en betekenis gewees het. Meewerk tot die vervulling van die nasie-roeping is meewerk tot die verwesenliking van die plan van God. Diens aan my nasie is deel van my diene (sic!) aan God." See N. Diederichs: op.cit., p.63.
  5. See, for example, Malan's speech at Redelinghuis in December 1938 (Die Burger, 3.12.1938).

ons volk bewus wees, en dit na die beste van ons vermoë probeer uitleef."<sup>6)</sup> The NO's Programme of Principles declared unequivocally that "[e]lke nasie ... 'n gedagte van God [is] ..."<sup>7)</sup> This belief also found application in the ideologies of the OB and Greyshirt-movement.<sup>8)</sup>

The permeating influence of the conception of a divine volksidentity and -destiny speaks for itself. Not only did it lead to volksdeification in the case of the NO and Greyshirt-movement,<sup>9)</sup> but also served as rationale for the propagation of specific elements of policy. Propaganda in favour of organic volksunity by the OB and NO, at most times, also assumed a metaphysical character. A policy document issued by the Grootraad in June 1942 explained this concept in the following terms: "Ons hoef dus nie na die ou filosofie van die Grieke of na die hedendaagse filosofie van die buiteland te gaan om daarvandaan die begrip oor te neem van 'n organiese groepseenheid nie, ons het die begrip reeds in ons eie Christelike leer en ons ken dit goed in ons eie nasionale lewe: Dit is, 'n Christelik-Nasionale begrip en werklikheid."<sup>10)</sup> Religious qualities, inclusive of all those movements under discussion, were also present in remarks on colour policy.

Based on the perceived anti- and un-Christian qualities thereof, opposition to communism, against this background, can hardly be afforded a mere tactical character. Opposition to the

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6. D.F. Malan: Afrikaner-Volkseenheid en my ervarings op die pad daarheen, p.240.
  7. O. Pirow: Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika, p.3. See also Die Anti-Kommunis, 26.8.1941.
  8. Izak le Grange, leading ideologue of the Greyshirt-movement, for example, declared: "[Die Gryshemde] ... gaan uit van die standpunt dat die begin en einde van alle dinge in God, die Almagtige is." See I. le Grange: Die Organiese Volksbeweging - Waarheen en Hoe, p.1.
  9. See Die Anti-Kommunis, 5.12.1941 and I. le Grange: op.cit., pp.1-5.
  10. See Die Ossewa-Brandwag: Vanwaar en Waarheen, p.27.

atheistic qualities of the Marxist ideology was of a fundamental and principled nature. The vociferous damnation of Smuts by particularly the HNP for involving South Africa in an alliance with the Soviet Union must also be explained, primarily, in the context of this Calvinistic volksidentity. For many South Africans, and not only Afrikaner nationalists, the USSR was not merely a faraway state, but the incarnation of all that was evil. Relating to religiosity, the Soviet Union was portrayed as the destroyer-in-chief of norms and principles considered to be inherent to Christian society.<sup>11)</sup> An alliance - albeit indirect - implied thus not a strategical and temporary war-time measure, but rather, as termed by Eric Louw, an alliance "... with the anti-Christ."<sup>12)</sup> South Africa, given the imperialistic objectives of the Marxist ideology and supplemented by a perceived aggressive and expansionistic Soviet foreign policy, would therefore be a victim of Smuts' 'shortsightedness'. The Christian culture, as one of many qualities inherent to the Afrikaner, would be destroyed in this process.

In the context of the post-1943 HNP scenario of a rampant USSR in a war-ravaged world, special attention, once again, was afforded to the implications of this for the continued survival of a Christian culture; both internationally and in South Africa.<sup>13)</sup>

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11. Allegations relating to religious persecution and the general trend of affairs regarding religion in the USSR fulfilled a prominent role in parliamentary motions on communism. Speaking in support of Pirow's 1942 motion, G.P. Brits alleged that a statue had been erected in Leningrad for Judas Iscariot (Hansard, 10.2.1942, col.1786). The NO, at other times, paid special attention to the alleged destruction of traditional family life and conventional conceptions of matrimony in Soviet society. See Chapter Four.
  12. See Louw's speech at Warmbad during July 1941 as reported by Die Transvaler on 2.7.1941.
  13. See, for example, Malan's comments on the Yalta-agreement in Parliament during February 1945 (Hansard, 14.2.1945, col.1391-1396). Similar scenarios were also advanced by the Ossewa-Brandwag. See Die O.B., 20.9.1944.

All being said, however, this still does not imply that all references to the perceived sacreligious character of communism have to be attributed with a normative content. Remarks on the anti- and un-Christian qualities of perceived communism, on occasion, may have been of a definite tactical nature. This is partly illustrated by the prominence afforded to the Afrikaans Protestant Churches in the campaign against 'communism' by the G/HNP, NO, and OB.<sup>14)</sup> Initiatives by the Church against alleged communism were continuously referred to.<sup>15)</sup> These references, both in terms of a general theme and regarding overt anti-communism, served to solidify the patriarchal status of the Church in Afrikaner society. Commenting on the troublesome state of affairs in the Garment Workers' Union during 1944 and the involvement of the Church therewith, J.J. Serfontein (HNP MP for Fauresmith) categorised this patriarchal role:

"Ons wil ten sterkste protesteer teen die aanranding wat plaasgevind het op die predikante van die Hollandse Kerk wat ... [daar is] om te waak oor die belange van 'n blankedom wat van Bo hier geplaas is, daardie predikante wat in Suid-Afrika 'n roeping het om te vervul, wat ook al die kommuniste daarvan sê."<sup>16)</sup>

This patriarchal identity and, more specifically, the inclusion of the Church and values espoused by it in campaigns against communism by Afrikaner nationalist political groupings held important implications for the utilisation of overt anti-

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14. While the G/HNP, NO and OB included references to the Church in its own respective campaigns against perceived communism, it needs to be noted that the family of Afrikaans Protestant Churches were, in their own right, also involved in a "struggle" against perceived communism. From 1937 onwards, numerous publications dealing with the perceived menace of communism were published by or under authority of the Church. Memoranda and delegations were also sent and despatched to the State.

15. Such was the case with the 1942 motions of Louw and Pirow as well as Louw's motion of 1943. See Hansard, 10.2.1943, col.1781-1786; 13.2.1942, col. 2074-2075 and 12.2.1943, col.1391-1396. The OB also noted these initiatives. See, for example, Die O.B., 15.9.1943.

16. Hansard, 17.3.1944, col.3481.

communism in the realisation of aims of a tactical nature. Firstly, the identification with Christendom may have afforded an elevated stature to the various initiatives against what was adjudged to be communism. This, in turn, could have served to convey the impression that the campaign against perceived communism was not merely a party-political affair, but were imbued with qualities which elevated it above the arena of ordinary politics. Already prior to the outbreak of war in 1939 Die Transvaler stressed that the Church's campaign against communism had nothing to do with politics:

"Waar die staat besig is om sy plig in verband met [kommunisme] ... te versuim, is dit goed dat die kerk op die gevaar wys. Niemand sal kan beweer dat die kerk met hierdie saak besig is om hom op die politieke terrein te begeef nie, want die kommunisme is nie net 'n gevaar vir die bestaande staatsorde nie, maar ook vir die Christelike godsdiens."<sup>17)</sup>

Although the G/HNP never attempted to describe its own campaign against perceived communism in similar terms, the point in focus is the supra-political qualities added to it by way of association with religious values.

Secondly, and on a more controversial level, the metaphysical character of the various campaigns against perceived communism may have played a part in the process of ethnic mobilisation. Smuts, by involving South Africa in an alliance with the USSR (which was criticised by the Church<sup>18)</sup>) and, even more importantly, his refusal to institute so-called preventative measures against 'communism' (following representations by the

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17. Die Transvaler, 15.8.1939: "Die Kommunistiese Gevaar" [editorial]. This idea was repeated in a second editorial less than two years later. See Ibid., 29.7.1941: "Afrikaanse Kerke Aangeval".

18. See memoranda sent to the State on this issue as published by Die Kerkbode (mouthpiece of the Nederduits-Gereformeerde Kerk) on 28.1.1942.

Raad der Kerke [literally Council of Churches]<sup>19)</sup>), constituted an act both ignorant and in contravention of a divine-instituted authority. To put it differently: By refusing to act against the communist menace, Smuts was ignoring the wishes of the Church. A remark by Serfontein illustrates this point:

"Die Hollandse kerke in Suid-Afrika waak vir wat heilig en dierbaar vir ons volk is ... en daarom het hulle na die Minister [van Justisie] gekom om hulle te help om hierdie [kommunistiese] gevaar af te weer ... As die Minister sy plig versuim: daar sal magte ontstaan wat geïnspireer word deur die verlede van ons volk, wat die Minister sal weggee as hy nie sy plig teenoor die volk wil doen nie."<sup>20)</sup>

On the level of party politics, depictions like the above may have served an explicit mobilisatory function. Particularly the G/HNP, as the largest and most influential grouping in opposition politics, stood to gain from a shrinking of the United Party's support base.

Finally, as noted earlier, specific elements of policy, e.g. colour policy, were also afforded a divine character at times. Such characterisations contrasted sharply with the portrayed anti- and un-Christian qualities of perceived communist policies. This element of divinity, in relation to anti-communism, once again may have functioned as vote-catching strategy.

#### 7.1.2. Segregation vs Integration

In terms of colour policy, unqualified equality between races, if not distinctive to communism, was described as a distinguishable characteristic of Marxian Socialism. This ideology's striving towards racial equality was agreed on by

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19. A consultative body made up of representatives of the Nederduits-Gereformeerde Kerk, Gereformeerde Kerk and Hervormde Kerk and representing the interests of their members.

20. Hansard, 12.2.1943, col.1514.

all those movements under discussion. Consensus, furthermore, existed over the applicability of a policy of segregation or apartheid (as termed by the HNP and OB in the post-1943 period) for the regulation of race relations in South Africa. The counterposing of these different approaches to the colour question, albeit controversial, may have been indicative of both a principled and tactical approach vis à vis communism.

On the normative plain, as indicated in the introductory chapter, white racial superiority was and had been part of Afrikaner political culture for many decades. Moodie states in this regard: "From the beginning of the eighteenth century ... white racism has been a constant factor in Afrikaner history."<sup>21</sup>) The belief that there was to be no equality between white and black in any area where the Afrikaner had his say found clear explication in the philosophies propagated by various political embodiments of Afrikaner nationalism. The OB's 1943 "Ten Point Policy Declaration", under the heading "We aim at a White South Africa", for example, declared: "Non-Europeans are to be gradually segregated out of European territory to promote racial purity and the unhindered spontaneous development of each element."<sup>22</sup>)

In view of this, communism was perceived as a real and actual menace for the survival of Western values (read white values) in South Africa. The stressing of racial equality not only endangered white hegemony, but potentially even more hazardous, the total existence of the white race in the Union. Furthermore, equality between white and black would prevent the Afrikaner from fulfilling his perceived historically-determined and divinely-inspired role as protector of the 'lesser-breeds' (non-whites). Finally, communism, in so far as it propagated racial equality, also negated the Divine Will. For many Afrikaners, as noted by Moodie, the Covenant of Blood River

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21. T.D. Moodie: The Rise of Afrikanerdom, p.245.

22. Cited in Some Facts about the Ossewa-Brandwaq, p.98.

was, after all, proof that God favoured the establishment of a white civilization in South Africa.<sup>23)</sup>

The emphasis on racial equality as a unique/distinguishing feature of communism, especially in so far as it was made applicable to the UP's haphazard approach towards the colour question, may have also served a definite tactical function. Particularly the G/HNP and OB, as illustrated in an earlier chapter, portrayed official race policy as either identical or closely related to that of communism. In the case of the former, the deduction to be made was that the ruling UP and 'communists' shared a common conviction. In the latter case, this served to imply that liberals were in the process of taking over the UP or, as a result of Smuts' perceived blind subservience to foreign interests (a whole range of 'menaces'), other forces were determining race policy in South Africa.<sup>24)</sup> The attempted association of the UP with communism had as overriding objective the mobilisation of voter support against the government of the day. The HNP, once again, and particularly so at election time, liberally made use of this strategy to promote its own cause. Already some time before the

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23. T.D. Moodie: op.cit., p.247. At Day of the Covenant-celebrations in 1942, Malan declared: "It is through the Will of God that the Afrikaner People exists at all. In [H]is wisdom [H]e determined that on the southern point of Africa, the dark continent, a People should be born who would be the bearer of Christian culture and civilization ... God also willed that the Afrikaans people should be continually threatened by other Peoples. There was the ferocious barbarian who resisted the intruding Christian civilization and caused the Afrikaner's blood to flow in streams. There were times when as a result of this the Afrikaner was deeply despairing, but God at the same time prevented the swamping of the young Afrikaner People in the sea of barbarism." Cited in Ibid., p.98.

24. The possibility of references to parity in race policy between the ruling United Party and 'communists' serving a tactical goal must also be seen in the context of the G/HNP as opposition party vs the UP as ruling party. Attempts to align the UP with alleged communist organisations on the basis of race policy potentially held explicit tactical benefits from which the G/HNP could only gain.



general election of July 1943, Die Transvaler, for example, declared with regard to colour policy:

"Nog nooit het die paaie so klaarblyklik uiteengeloop as tans nie. Die Afrikaanse kerke verhef steeds die stem teen die ontsettende gevaar van die verbreiding van die kommunisme onder die nie-blankes. Die [Herenigde] Nasionale Party-leiers toon aan dat die huidige kleurbeleid daarop gemunt is om van Suid-Afrika 'n swartmansland te maak. Maar die Regering gaan goedsmoeds voort op sy ingeslane weg. Hy help selfs mee om die grondslae van ons blanke beskawing te ondergraaf en om die volk op 'n ramp af te stuur. Waar gaan dit eindig, indien blank Suid-Afrika nie betyds uit sy droom gewek word en indien elke Afrikanerkieser nie aanstaande jaar sy selfrespek behou deur sy stem teen hierdie roekelose Regering uit te bring nie?"<sup>25)</sup>

A measure of the short-term success of this endeavour is provided by the the results of the general election of 1948. Colour issues and the role of the alleged communist menace in South Africa figured prominently in HNP propaganda at that time. As was to be expected, Smuts and the governing UP were portrayed as active contributors to the growth of this perceived menace.<sup>26)</sup>

### 7.1.3. Internationalism vs Organic Volksidentity

Internationalism, occasionally described as a distinctive feature of communism, and the conception of an organic volksidentity, the diametrical opposite thereof, have been sufficiently dealt with in the previous chapter.<sup>27)</sup>

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25. Die Transvaler, 30.11.1942: "Geen Kleurslagboom" [editorial].

26. See W.A. Botha: Die Parlementêre Verkiesing van 1948 - 'n Ontleding van die Faktore wat die Verkiesing Beïnvloed het, pp.92-94; 147-148 and T.D. Moodie: The Rise of Afrikanerdom, pp.256-257.

27. See Chapter Six.

## 7.2. ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE PROMOTION OF SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF POLICY

The perceived menace of communism was also connected to the specific elements of policy. The G/HNP, for example, attempted to establish a linkage between the curbing of perceived communism and the implementation of its colour policy and approach towards Jewish Immigration. Similarly, stress was initially also laid on the promotion of Afrikaner nationalist trade unionism as alternative to alleged communist labour organisation and, from 1944 onwards, with the publication of the HNP's "Economic Plan for South Africa", broad economic policy. The Greyshirt-movement, occasionally, also explained its anti-Semitic policies on the basis of the 'red menace'. The menace of communism, in the case of the NO and OB, was connected to the socialist objectives of their respective ideological credo's.

The linking of communism and one or more elements of policy, as will be argued, may have had both tactical value and served to illuminate a principled approach vis á vis perceived communism. On the level of tactics, the connection between alleged communism and particular elements of policy may have served a variety of goals. Without going into any great detail, some of these aims may be summarised as follow: Firstly, given the actuality of remarks on this topic, a linking of communism and some element of policy (as alternative) may have served to provide an added prominence to such a policy-element. Secondly, by attempting to focus attention on specific elements of policy, the particular organisation/movement may have hoped to attract popular support. Finally, in the context of parliamentary politics, the G/HNP, in propagating a more radical version of segregation as alternative to 'communism's' goal of racial equality may have attempted to throw suspicion on the motives of the ruling United Party.<sup>28)</sup> Almost needless

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28. See footnote 24.

to say, a strategy such as this held important implications for the process of electoral mobilisation.

As opposed to the tactical benefits to be gained from a propagation of overt anti-communism and some element of policy, the counterposing thereof was also indicative of principled opposition to alleged communism. In propagating alternatives to 'communism', all of those movements under discussion may have believed that they were indirectly involved in the curbing/combating of communism. This observation corresponds with the declared strategy of ideological counter-balancing as propagated by the NO, OB and, occasionally, the G/HNP. Furthermore, the posing of alternatives to an approach identified to be inimical to the interests of a certain grouping indicate, in any case, the existence of a value-judgement of a certain menace; in this case the ideology of communism.

### 7.3. ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE ATTEMPTED VILLIFICATION OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS

Overt anti-communism, in expressing the distinctive features of what allegedly represented communist dogma, and in presenting a diametrically opposed alternative, represented both a principled and strategical approach. The utilisation of references to this ideology in an attempt to discredit political opponents served an explicit tactical function. In the context of this discussion, however, no attention will be afforded to propaganda aimed at the CPSA and other 'communists'. The CPSA and allied organisations/individuals were 'natural' and to be expected targets for any propaganda onslaught. Rather, in this section, anti-communist propaganda directed against other, less conventional targets will be discussed.

Colour policy, as illustrated previously, was a major element in particularly the G/HNP's propaganda strategy to have the ruling UP identified/associated with perceived communism. If

official colour policy did not correspond with that of communism (as alleged by Strijdom<sup>29</sup>), it was either closely related thereto or, as a result of the influence of liberal strands of thinking on the United Party, in the process of being transformed to a perceived communist approach. It needs to be emphasized, however, that this last remark and commentary by Strijdom on parity between communists and the UP on colour policy must be seen in the context of the G/HNP as opposition party aiming to strengthen its support base. Remarks of a similar nature were also made by members of the NO and OB.

Apart from being identified with communism on the basis of specific policy-elements, Smuts and his government, in a variety of ways, were also connected to the promotion of this ideology in South Africa and, conversely, the destruction of "traditional" values. The G/HNP, as the largest and most influential grouping in Afrikaner nationalist politics and, consequently, the party who stood to gain the most from such a strategy, took the lead in this attempted villification. While it would prove near-impossible to discuss the different elements of this strategy because of the integrated character thereof, a viable alternative would be the presentation of a single case study, namely the Allied alliance with the Soviet Union in 1941.

Smuts' decision to involve South Africa in an alliance with the USSR, as illustrated in the second chapter, unleashed a series of vicious attacks from the HNP. In doing so, Smuts, as termed by Malan, was not only providing communism with a push like never before, but this alliance endangered the very foundations of the volk. Commenting on this last aspect, Die Kruithoring,

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29. Hansard, 13.2.1942, col.2071-2072.

in August 1942, declared:

"Solank veldm. Smuts hand om die nek sit met Satan Stalin, so lank sal die kanker van Kommunisme vreet aan die fundamente van ons volksbestaan; so lank word die Calvinistiese grondslag van ons volkslewe met sy liefde vir die Christelike godsdiens, sy sterk gevoel vir kleurskeiding en sy geloof in die apartheid van die Boerevolk bedreig."<sup>30)</sup>

A similar apocalyptic scenario, as indicated in the previous chapter, was forwarded in relation to the arming of non-white members of the Union Defence Force. The decision to arm non-white soldiers was partly explained in the context of the 1941-alliance and, for the HNP, once again vindicated Smuts' couldn't-care-less attitude towards communism. The status of Smuts as hand-maiden of British imperialism was allegedly also proven by the alliance with the USSR: In giving precedence to the interests of another entity which, in the context of World War II, implied the promotion of Anglo-Soviet friendship, Smuts not only negated South African interests but, in lieu of communism, actively promoted this ideology. Die Burger, in this regard, stated:

"Dit word haas pateties soos veldm. Smuts se hele beleid op die bevordering van Engeland se belange gerig is. Maar daarby word hierdie beleid ook steeds ramspoediger vir Suid-Afrika. Die Suid-Afrikaanse handlangers van Moskou lê hy geen steen in die weg nie. Hulle mag hul verderflike leerstellings van elke verhoog aan die swart massas verkondig, en nie omdat ons Britse veldmaarskalk enige toegeneentheid jeens die kommunistiese leer koester nie, maar omdat hy selfs die moontlikheid van vertroebelde Brits-Russiese betrekkinge wil vermy. Dit is alleen Brittanje se belange wat by hom tel; belange wat blykens sy dade ... verg dat die Kommuniste in Suid-Afrika vrye teuels moet geniet."<sup>31)</sup>

Furthermore, Smuts' refusal to institute repressive measures against perceived communism, according to the HNP, had to be explained against the backdrop of the war alliance with the

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30. Die Kruithoring, 7.8.1942.

31. Die Burger, 20.8.1942: "'n Nuwe Naam Nodig" [editorial].

USSR and his status as lackey of British imperialism. Die Transvaler, in connecting the absence of repressive measures on communism to the 1941-alliance, declared during May 1944:

"Met die toetrede van Rusland tot die oorlog het die Smutsregering al die maatreëls gestaak wat die ondergrondse kommunisme voor die oorlog verhoed het [om] van Suid-Afrika se natuurlike op te rui. Oop en bloot het kommuniste - hoewel soms onder die dekmantel van ander organisasies as 'n kommunistiese party - hulle sedertdien gewend tot die naturel ... Dat sowel blanke as naturel in Suid-Afrika hieronder gaan ly, hinder hulle min. En die Verenigde Party-regering was te swak of te oorlogsdronk om hieraan paal en perk te stel."<sup>32)</sup>

Finally, the original decision to involve South Africa in an alliance with the USSR was, by implication, also included in the HNP-propagated post-war scenario of a rampant and imperialistic Soviet Union. According to the Party, this implied that South Africa herself could well be destroyed. Smuts, once more, had to be blamed for such a future destruction of the volk. Reference, repeatedly, was also made to the possible destruction of perceived historically accepted bastions against communism on the European continent. Smuts and his government, once again, were the culprits.

Collectively, the portrayal of Smuts and the UP in terms such as the above had as primary aim the mobilisation of popular support. The perceived menace of communism proved to be an ideal stepping-stone for political mobilisation.

References to communism, at times, also appeared in relation to the Labour Party (LP). Prior to the general election of 1938 the LP was repeatedly described as a communist party. In a speech to a public meeting in the Johannesburg City Hall during November 1937, J.G. Strijdom declared: "Die Arbeidersparty is niks anders as 'n tweelingbroer van die kommunisme nie en hoewel hul leiers dit ontken, skerm hulle tog by elke

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32. Die Transvaler, 26.5.1944: "Die Rooi Gevaar" [editorial].

geleentheid vir die kommunisme."<sup>33)</sup> A variety of opinions, however, were expressed on the particular ideological trait or element of policy which supposedly testified to the communist identity of the LP. Indeed, remarks on this issue can be divided into two periods. During the initial period, the alleged communist identity of the LP evolved around the concept of an organic volksidentity. Malan, for example, stated: "Van Arbeiderskant is daar vrees dat die Afrikaner voeling sal behou met sy volk en besiel sal wees met die gees van Suid-Afrika en nie met die gees van Moskou nie. Hy sal sy politieke heil elders as in die Arbeidersparty soek."<sup>34)</sup> Based on this remark and similar comments by other GNP speakers over the same period,<sup>35)</sup> it may be argued that the connotation with communism, in so far as it related to the LP, was provided by the perceived sectional working class identity of the latter grouping.

From March 1937 onwards, however, no further reference was made to the sectional identity - as allegedly indicative of communism - of the Labour Party. In so far as remarks on communism did appear in relation to the LP, a variety of issues were touched upon. Most prominent was the contention that the LP, in allegedly propagating racial equality, provided ample proof of its so-called communist orientation.<sup>36)</sup> Die Burger, by way of an editorial during January 1937, also referred to the perceived internationalism espoused by the LP. Internationalism was described as meaning that "[d]ie huidige Arbeidersparty is ... meer geïnteresseer vir (sic!) die lot van werkers in lande soos Duitsland as wat hy is vir die belange van Suid-

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33. Die Transvaler, 1.11.1937.

34. See Malan's speech at Stellenbosch as reported by Die Burger on 12.4.1937.

35. See speeches by Karl Bremer at Graaff-Reinet (Die Burger, 13.7.1937) and N.J. van der Merwe in the Paarl (Ibid., 22.3.1937).

36. See speeches by Malan at Boshof (Die Burger, 28.7.1937) and in Pretoria (Ibid., 28.4.1938).

Afrika."<sup>37)</sup> Albeit a poor description of international proletarian solidarity, important is to note that this typical socialist feature was interpreted as referring to the concept of proletarian internationalism (in the context of orthodox Marxist dogma) and, subsequently, utilised to equate the LP with communism. Finally, the LP was also identified with communism on the basis of its support for labour organisations. As a result of this support, according to Die Burger, "... het die Madeley-groep meer en meer links georiënteer[d] geraak"<sup>38)</sup> and would continue to do so until it was 'wholly communist'.

At first glance, particularly in so far as the concept of an organic volksidentity was posed as the diametrical opposite of a mechanistic class identity (perceived to be common to both communism and the LP), references to communism in the Labour Party does seem to be of a principled nature. Perspective, however, can only be gained when remarks on communism - in relation to the LP - are seen in the context of the period in which they were made. References to communism, based on the LP's perceived proletarian identity, have to be analysed, firstly, against the backdrop of the campaign for the establishment of Afrikaner nationalist trade unions and, secondly, in the context of the 1938 general election.

The GNP, by supporting Afrikaner nationalist trade unionism, particularly stood to gain in terms of electoral standing on the Witwatersrand. The Labour Party prevented the realisation of this goal in more ways than one: Firstly, the LP had traditionally been the strongest political grouping in blue collar-constituencies. Secondly, for electoral support, the LP counted on the labour movement. A divided working class could thus end the political monopoly of the Labour Party on the Witwatersrand. The menace of communism, in an attempt to villificate the LP in the minds of the urban electorate,

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37. Die Burger, 13.1.1938: "Arbeiders en Smelters" [editorial].

38. Ibid., 16.11.1937: "Arbeidersparty se Rol in die Verkiesing" [editorial].



provided an ideal vehicle for such an endeavour. The importance of the working class in South African politics were repeatedly stressed by G/HNP speakers from 1937 onwards.<sup>39)</sup>

The attempted identification of the Labour Party with communism, based on the perceived striving towards racial equality of the latter, must also be explained in the above context. Racial equality, by being portrayed as a communistic striving, could serve as strategy to villify the LP in the minds of the urban (Afrikaner) electorate. Prior to the general election of 1938, both Die Burger and Die Transvaler, in giving prominence to the resignation of certain individuals from the LP, paid special attention to the "... onafrikaanse filosofie ... van die Arbeidersparty ... " as motive for those resignations. "Onafrikaans", in this context, included, inter alia, the "... toekomstdroom [van] 'n swart Suid-Afrikaanse republiek."<sup>40)</sup>

Indicative of the essentially propagandistic nature of these remarks are the changed content of references to the Labour Party during the war years. Whereas, prior to the election of May 1938, the LP was described as either communistic or near-communistic, after 1939, with it becoming involved in a coalition with the UP, this party, according to the HNP, had

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39. See, for example, a speech by H.F. Verwoerd (Die Burger, 20.2.1937) and Malan's address to a mass meeting at Voortrekkerhoogte during the centenary celebrations of the Great Trek in 1938 (Die Burger, 18.12.1938). The HNP, in the general election of 1943, launched a concerted effort to attract support in urban, working class constituencies. Thirty-three candidates were nominated in constituencies on the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria, Durban, Port Elizabeth and the Cape Peninsula. See Die Transvaler, 12.6.1943. However, as indicated by David Welsh, the Party, by 1944, held only four seats in major urban areas. See D.Welsh: Urbanisation and the Solidarity of Afrikaner Nationalism (The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.7(2), 1969), pp. 271-272. Well known is the fact that the swing in voter support for the HNP in traditional mining constituencies on the Witwaterstrand made possible the victory of the HNP in the general election of May 1948.

40. Die Burger, 28.7.1937.

evolved into a capitalist-oriented grouping. Die Transvaler declared in this regard:

"Oral in die land sien die werkers op na die Herenigde Nasionale Party as die enigste party met 'n ekonomiese beleid wat die werkersbelange kan beskerm en wat die skreiende kapitalistiese uitbuiting van die werker in Suid-Afrika doeltreffend kan bestry. Die Arbeidersparty wat onder dié vaandel wou veg, het met die kapitalistiese luislang vrede gesluit en is deur hom opgesluk."<sup>41)</sup>

Furthermore, while, before 1938, the LP was adjudged to be communistic as a result of its working class-identity, from September 1939, in aligning itself with the UP, this party had, as termed by Malan in April 1938, "... ver weggedryf van sy fondament[e]."<sup>42)</sup> The HNP, as alleged by its leaders, was thus the only true representative and interpreter of worker-interests.<sup>43)</sup>

#### 7.4. OPPOSING COMMUNISM: IDEOLOGICAL COUNTER-BALANCING VS REPRESSIVE MEASURES AND IDEOLOGY VS IDEOLOGY

Anti-communism, in so far as it related to the strategy best suited to oppose this ideology, proved to be a divisive issue in Afrikaner nationalist politics. Relative to the topic under discussion, differences in opinion on this issue falls into a special category. On the one hand, as will be illustrated, the lack of coalescence on the method best suited to oppose communism had definite tactical value. This relates to both a general approach as well as the promotion of specific elements of policy. On the other hand, differences in opinion on this issue as well as the ideological substructure underlying a

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41. Die Transvaler, 31.12.1940: "Geweeg en te Lig Bevind" [editorial]. See also editorials in Die Burger on 28.4.1943: "Vir die Geldmag 'n Bate" and Die Transvaler, 14.6.1943: "Die Werker Ontnugter".

42. See Malan's speech in the Pretoria City Hall as reported by Die Burger on 28.4.1938.

43. See, for example, an editorial in Die Transvaler on 1.5.1943 entitled "Stryd in Arbeiderskringe".

particular approach reflected basic and fundamental differences in ideology between the various movements under discussion.

The G/HNP, between 1937 and 1945, in addressing itself to the means most effective to oppose communism, hovered between the strategies of ideological counter-balancing and repression. Malan, as indicated, noted in 1937 that one ideology (communism) could only be opposed through another ideology (the GNP's Christian-nationalism). Although never repeated in such explicit terms, G/HNP-members, in referring to communism, proposed specific elements of policy as required counter-measures. Malan, for example, argued in February 1945 that a policy of apartheid and "... 'n omvattende skema van bestaansbeveiliging ... " were the only guarantees against perceived communism.<sup>44</sup>) While this approach served obvious tactical goals (e.g. the propagation of the HNP's colour policy), it was, as argued in an earlier chapter, the logical and to be expected approach given the abnormality of the war situation. At other times, especially when the Party launched parliamentary campaigns against what was adjudged to be communism, it revealed a distinct preference for repressive measures. Compare, in this regard, the measures proposed in Louw's 1942 and 1943 motions against 'communism'.<sup>45</sup>)

While the NO supported the HNP's 1943 parliamentary motion against communism, this identification with repressive measures was more the exception than the rule. Generally speaking, this organisation favoured a strategy of ideological counter-balancing in opposing perceived communism. Furthermore, in referring to the ideological content of this last strategy, the NO was the first organisation to contest the relevancy and functional applicability of approaches by movements associated

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44. Hansard, 14.2.1945, col.1397-1398.

45. See Chapter Two. For the sake of completion it needs to be noted that the HNP, following its coming to power in 1948, exclusively favoured repressive measures vis á vis communism. Indeed, draconian measures, instituted in the name of opposition to communism, became a trademark of National Party-rule in the period after 1950.

with conventional parliamentary politics. Oswald Pirow, in this regard, declared at a public meeting in Pretoria-North during August 1941: "Die kommunisme kan ook nie met die partyprogram beveg word nie, want wilde diere kan nie met programme beveg word nie. Die kommunisme is 'n lewensbeskouing en kan alleen beveg word deur 'n beter lewensbeskouing, die nasionaal-sosialisme."<sup>46</sup>) To this was added during 1943:

"Maar waarmee moet die Kommunisme beveg word? "Met die Program van die Herenigde Nasionale Party" sê die een. "Met 'n Republiek" sê 'n ander. "Met die Gees van Paul Kruger" sê 'n derde.

Kon Italië iets uitrig teen die [k]ommunisme met 'n party program? Kon Duitsland die Bolsjewisme onderdruk deur 'n republiek. Het Spanje se groot verlede hom in sy stryd teen die rooi gevaar gehelp? Kon Portugal, Hongarye [en] Griekeland iets uitvoer met daardie middel. Nee, my vriende, honderdmaal nee. 'n Lewensbeskouing soos Bolsjewisme kan alleen beveg word deur 'n ander en beter lewensbeskouing. Daardie beter lewensbeskouing was in al die lande wat ek genoem het die Nasionaal-Sosialisme. En in al daardie lande het die Nasionaal-Sosialisme die Kommunisme soos kafgeloop (sic!) dat hy nooit weer sy kop sal optel nie. In Suid-Afrika sal ons netso te werk moet gaan.

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46. Die Transvaler, 6.8.1941.

Daar is maar een wapen waarmee Kommunisme in Suid-Afrika doeltreffend beveg kan word, naamlik die Afrikaner Nasionaal-Sosialisme. Daardie feit lê 'n dringende verpligting op ons wat Nuwe Orde-ondersteuners is, naamlik die verpligting om die Nuwe Orde beskikbaar te stel vir die Afrikaner-Volksfront<sup>47)</sup> in die stryd teen die kommunisme. As die [Herenigde Nasionale] Party nie kans sien om van hierdie aanbod gebruik te maak nie en liever sy eie - volgens ons mening minder doeltreffende - party-politieke wapens wil gebruik sal dit ons onverdeelde trou en lojaliteit teenoor die Party nie in die minste raak nie. Maar aan die ander kant sal dit ook nie die verpligting van ons afneem om die Kommunisme deur middel van die Afrikaner Nasionaal-Sosialisme te beveg nie. Die Nuwe Orde beskik oor die enigste doeltreffende wapen wat teen die Kommunisme aangewend kan word en ons gaan derhalwe in die stryd teen daardie internasionale verpesting die voortou neem."<sup>48)</sup>

The Ossewa-Brandwag, in similar vein, vehemently criticised the proponents of a 'tottering' system such as democracy in believing that it provided a riposte against perceived communism. Die O.B., in an editorial during June 1944, declared:

"Kommunisme of Ossewabrandwag. Dit is die keuse waarvoor elke blanke in Suid-Afrika vandag staan, want die ou orde met sy partystelsel is iets van die verlede ... "Bevryde" Italië lê vandag in die dood[s]greep van die kommunisme. Watter sterker bewys is dan nog nodig vir ons stelling dat dat die keuse vandag in ons land nie lê tussen demokratiese partye nie, maar tussen die wêreldbeweging van kommunisme en die volksbeweging van die Ossewabrandwag?"

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47. A reference to the proposed and perceived end result of the NO's internal subversion of the HNP.

48. INCH. PV 18: C.R. Swart. File 7/1/7 : [O. Pirow]: "Kommunisme, Nasionaal-Sosialisme en Suid-Afrika" (undated pamphlet).

Maar laat ons kyk hoe die demokrate in ons land die pad vir die kommunisme voorberei net soos die demokrate dit in Europa besig is om te doen. Deur die demokratiese politici en hul pers word reusagtige pogings aangewend om die Ossewabrandwag deur boikot of laster te vernietig ten einde die demokrasie waarop hulle hul magsposisies gebou het, van ondergang te red. So word O.B.-lede dag na dag uitgenooi tot "volkseenheid" binne die geledere van 'n demokratiese party - 'n demokratiese party wat weens sy geankertheid aan die demokrasie saam met die demokrasie sal verdwyn soos alle politieke partye in Europa reeds verdwyn het.

Hierdie politici verkondig aan die sosialisties-aangelegte Afrikaner dag en nag demokrasie, terwyl hulle die sosialisme waarna elke Afrikaner vandag hyg verwerp. Nou kom die kommunisme met dieselfde slagspreuk van demokrasie, maar hulle bied ook sosialisme aan. Diegene wat deur die demokratiese partypropaganda aan die invloed van die Ossewabrandwag ontruk word, aanvaar nou die "demokrasie" van die kommunisme omdat hulle deur die sosialisme daarvan aangetrek word. Elkeen wat die kommunistiese koerante lees, word vandag getref deur die ywer vir die "demokrasie" wat daarin geopenbaar word. The Guardian<sup>49)</sup> praat gereeld van die "demokratiese magte" wat in Suid-Afrika en Europa vooruitgang maak. Hy praat die taal van die politici, om dan met sy sosialisme die werker te vang. So berei die politici deur hul stryd teen die volksbeweging vandag die veld voor vir die kommunisme in ons land"<sup>50)</sup> (*italics in the original*).

In relating this contention to the HNP, L.J. du Plessis, leader of the OB's Social-Economic Front, postulated in March 1945:

"Maar dr. Malan wil dan juis die kommunisme met sy demokrasie keer! Hoe kan die duiwel beëlsbub uitdryf? Nee, op daardie pad lê die rooi rewolusie, soos die hele wêreld vandag bewys. 'n Demokratiese koalisie gaan vanself oor in kommunisme, of anders gooi die kommunisme hom omver omdat hy nie demokrasies genoeg is nie.

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49. A Johannesburg-based newspaper supportive of the CPSA.

50. Die O.B., 28.6.1944: "Word Noodwendig Bondgenote" [editorial].

Demokrasie beteken tog regering deur die massa, en die massa in Suid-Afrika is swart, en kommunisme staan mos vir die swart republiek!

Nee, dr. Malan en dr. Bremer, met demokrasie gaan u nie die kommunisme keer nie. Demokrasie loop uit in kommunisme, en dit is die rewolusie, en in Suid-Afrika die swart rewolusie. Demokrasie is die rewolusie! En as u anti-rewolusionêr is, dan moet u die demokrasie laat vaar, dan moet u die massaheerskappy en die volksverbrokkeling laat vaar en kies vir volkseenheid en volksregering.

Die enigste middel teen die rewolusie wat ons van die Noord-Ooste bedreig, is anti-demokrasie; dit is die enigste doeltreffende anti-kommunisme. Dit beteken om in plaas van die mensgemaakte vryheid en gelykheid wat wanorde en rewolusie is, terug te keer tot die orde wat God en die natuur gestel het in die geskiedenis: die gebondenheid van die mens in groepe, die ongelykheid binne en tussen die groepe, die gesag wat berus op die bestemming van die verskillende groepe"<sup>51</sup>) (*italics in the original*).

The counterposing of different strategies, together with the ideological content of a particular strategy, could have been a function of strategy. This may have been especially the case in so far as it affected the battle for ideological hegemony within Afrikaner nationalist ranks. Both the NO and OB may have adjudged the lack of solidarity on the strategy best suited to oppose perceived communism - against the backdrop of the near-unanimity of opinion in Afrikaner nationalist ranks on the irreversible rotation towards a new world order - to provide an ideal opportunity for the promotion of their respective causes. Overt anti-communism, in this sense, thus served to diminish the ideological attraction of old order (read parliamentary-based) movements.

Oswald Pirow's remarks on opposition to communism must also be seen in the context of the course of World War II. Between 1941 and 1943, when these comments were made, the Axis war machine was in the ascendancy. Many people, inclusive of Afrikaner

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51. See *Ibid.*, 28.3.1945.

nationalists, interpreted this latter development as signifying the proverbial beginning of the end for the Allied alliance. The propagation of ideological counter-balancing as measure to combat communism, in this context, may have been interpreted as a windfall by Pirow and his compatriots for the propagation of the NO's cause.

In the case of the OB, as illustrated in a previous chapter, the issue of communism particularly came into focus on occasion when mention was made of the Arbeiderslaer. Volkssocialism and the Arbeidslaer, as the ideological and organisational counter-balance to a mechanistic division of the volk, were propagated as elements of an all-embracing counter-strategy to oppose communism. Furthermore, as indicated by Roberts and Trollip, Volkssocialism, as the alternative to communism, may have also had a part to play in OB attempts to gain converts from particular social classes.<sup>52</sup>) Ideological counter-balancing, as strategy to oppose 'communism', thus, apart from attempting to belittle parliamentary-based movements, also served as mechanism for the attempted mobilisation of working class allegiance.

On another level, differences in opinion on the strategy best suited to oppose communism reflected fundamental differences in ideological orientation. Sufficient to note in this regard is that while the OB and NO appealed to so-called universalistic qualities of the National-Socialist ideology to legitimise their respective ideologies, the Gesuiwerde/Herenigde Nasionale Party stressed the exclusivity of its ideological agenda. Relative to the opposing of communism, the origins and content of ideologies, as illustrated by earlier quotations, played a decisive role. Particularly the HNP, in reacting to Pirow's remarks on opposition to communism, stressed the 'foreign' content and character of the NO ideology. J.G. Strijdom noted in this regard: "Toe Rusland in die oorlog kom het adv. Pirow skielik die gevaar van die kommuniste aangegryp en die

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52. See M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip: The South African Opposition, 1939-1945, pp.168-169.



nasionaal-sosialisme voorgehou as lewensbeskouing om die Russiese lewensbeskouing te beveg. Ons is trots op ons eie lewensbeskouing en wil dit vir niks ter wêreld verruil nie."<sup>53)</sup>

A more lucid exposition of this argument was to be found in the editorial columns of Die Transvaler.<sup>54)</sup> For the sake of clarity, a lengthy quotation from one of these editorials are provided:

"Na ons oordeel is adv. Pirow se stelling dat die kommunisme (omdat dit 'n lewensbeskouing is) alleen bestry kan word deur nasionaal-sosialisme (omdat dit 'n beter een is) heeltemal verkeerd wat die Afrikaner betref. Dan verval ook sy bewering dat die Nuwe Orde-groep die enigste wapen sou besit om die kommunisme doeltreffend te bestry en dat die Herenigde Nasionale Party en sy program daartoe onmagtig is. Dit is trouens nie alleen 'n onregmatige aanval op die Party nie, maar sluit in hom in 'n diepe belediging aan die Afrikanervolk.

Dit is waar dat die nasionaal-sosialisme in Duitsland op staatkundige en geestelike gebied 'n bolwerk teen die kommunistiese gevaar opgewerp het. Hier in Suid-Afrika is die posisie egter heel anders. Die Afrikanerdom het geen ingevoerde lewensbeskouing nodig vir staatkundige of geestelike weerstand teen die kommunisme nie. Van die armste tot die rykste dra hy geslagte lank al in hom dié geloof, dié lewensbeskouing wat dit onmoontlik maak vir die kommunisme om by hom ingang te vind!

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53. See Strijdom's speech at Brits during January 1942 (Die Transvaler, 3.1.1942).
54. See Ibid., 7.8.1941: "Trek Binne die Span" and 8.8.1941: "Verdere Redeneringsfoute".

Ten eerste is sy diepgewortelde godsdienstige geloof 'n geweldige wapenrusting daarteen. Daarby kom tweedens sy trou en innerlike gebondenheid aan die Voortrekkertradisies. Om een voorbeeld te noem: Sy algehele verwerping van enige kleurgelykstellingsbeleid maak hom nie alleen onvatbaar vir die kommunistiese lewensbeskouing nie, maar bring hom geestelik en andersins in die kragtigste verset daarteen. Derdens is sy nasionalisme, sy republikaanse, nie maar net so 'n versamelinkie van opportunistiese beleid nie. Vir die Afrikaner is dit 'n alomvattende politieke geloof. Dit is self lewensbeskouing"<sup>55</sup>) (*italics in the original*).

#### 7.6. ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL

Overt anti-communism, at times, may have also served to promote the image of and/or extend the continued relevancy of particular Afrikaner nationalist political movements. This statement, generally speaking, holds true for all of those movements under discussion. In the case of the NO and OB, however, it had a special significance. The entitlement of the New Order-mouthpiece, Die Anti-Kommunis, was not simply coincidental. Given the actuality of the alleged communist menace (partly the result of Anglo-Soviet cooperation), the NO, in naming its journal the way it did, may have attempted to exploit the almost pathological fear-complex for communism in Afrikaner nationalist ranks; thereby promoting its own cause as the movement best suited to oppose the 'red menace'. The same observation may well be made in connection with Pirow's 1942 parliamentary motion on communism.

While the NO, in disengaging itself from conventional party politics, lost a valuable platform for the propagation of its philosophies, Pirow, initially and in spite of attempts aimed at the marginalisation of the HNP, continued to align the New Order with the Party's campaign against communism. In announcing its withdrawal from the arena of conventional party politics, the NO caucus, for example, declared that in the

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55. Die Transvaler, 7.8.1941: "Trek Binne die Span".

general election of July 1943, "... the New Order will exert all its strength unconditionally against Gen. Smuts and Communism."<sup>56</sup>) Pirow, as indicated earlier, also supported Louw's 1943 motion against communism. This identification - either directly or by way of association - with the mainstream movement against communism, once again, may have served to bring into focus the continued relevance of the NO as actor in South African politics.

The Ossewa-Brandwag, from 1943 onwards with the formation of the Arbeidslaer, launched a concerted effort to gain converts from the ranks of the white working class. Overt anti-communism, as indicated previously, played a prominent role in this regard.<sup>57</sup>) The aimed at mobilisation of white working class support and, for the aims of this chapter, the functional role of anti-communism must be seen, foremost, in the context of the OB possibly experiencing a serious loss of support. The menace of communism, against this background, may thus well have served as strategy to ensure the political survival of the OB. Furthermore, as indicated in chapter three, the OB, in the period under discussion, attempted to establish so-called volksfronte in opposing communism. While, for various reasons, none of these initiatives paid off, the point in focus is the attempted utilisation of communiality in opinion (in this case over the menace of communism) to retain legitimacy as relevant actor in Afrikaner nationalist politics.

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In conclusion, in spite of the deficiencies of this particular chapter, it may be stated that overt anti-communism, in all of those movements under discussion, served both a tactical function and indicated a principled approach vis á vis the perceived menace of communism. The utilisation of anti-

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56. Cited in N.M. Stultz: Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, p.84.

57. See Chapter Three.

communism, for whichever strategy, depended on a range of factors. Finally, anti-communism not only served to indicate opposition to perceived points of view identified with Marxism-Leninism, but, as strategy, were utilised to reflect on both the ruling United Party as well as other contenders for the political loyalty of the volk.

## APPENDIX A

### RIOUTOUS ASSEMBLIES (AMENDMENT) ACT (ACT 19/1930)

Be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate and the House of Assembly of the Union of South Africa, as follows :-

(1) Section one of the Rioutous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1914 (Act No. 27 of 1914), is hereby amplified by the addition thereto, at the end thereof, of the following provisions:-

(4) Whenever in the opinion of the Minister there is reason to apprehend that feelings of hostility would be engendered between the European inhabitants of the Union on the one hand and any other section of the inhabitants of the Union on the other hand -

(a) by the assembly of any public gathering in any public place to which the public has access; or

(b) if a particular person were to attend any such gathering,

the Minister may prohibit in the manner provided in sub-section (1) any public gathering in any place to which the public has access within an area and during a period specified in the notice prohibiting such gatherings, or he may by notice under his hand addressed and delivered or tendered to that particular person, prohibit him from attending any public gathering in any place to which the public has access within an area and during a period specified in such notice.

(5) The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of any gathering prohibited under sub-section (4).

(6) Any person who, in contravention of a notice delivered or tendered to him in terms of sub-section (4) attends any public gathering, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to the penalties provided in sub-section (2).

(7) Whenever the Governor-General is of opinion that the publication or other dissemination of any documentary information (as defined in sub-section (11)) is calculated to engender feelings of hostility between the European inhabitants of the Union on the one hand and any other section of the inhabitants of the Union on the other hand, he may by notice in the Gazette and in any newspaper circulating in the area where the said documentary

information is made available to the public, prohibit any publication or other dissemination thereof.

- (8) Whenever the Governor-General in terms of sub-section (7), prohibits the publication or other dissemination of any documentary information contained in a periodical publication, the Minister shall in addition to the notice referred to in sub-section (7) cause to be delivered or to be posted in a registered letter to the editor of such publication, or to any other person responsible for its issue, a copy of such notice, bearing his signature.
- (9) Any person affected by a prohibition under sub-section (7) may, within fourteen days after the first publication of the notice containing such prohibition, apply to the Provincial or Local Division of the Supreme Court having jurisdiction within the area referred to in sub-section (7) to set such prohibition aside, and if he proves to the satisfaction of such Division that the documentary information to which such prohibition applies is not of such a nature that the natural and probabal result of its publication or other dissemination will be to engender feelings of hostility between the European inhabitants of the Union on the one hand and any other section of the inhabitants of the Union on the other hand, such Division may set such prohibition aside.
- (10) Any person who, in contravention of a notice published in terms of sub-section (7) publishes or otherwise disseminates any documentary information or publishes or otherwise disseminates any matter contained therein, in any form, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to the penalties provided in sub-section (2).
- (11) In sub-sections (7), (8), (9) and (10) the expression "documentary information" means any book, foreign magazine, pamphlet, manifesto, foreign newspaper, handbill or poster, or any article or advertisement, cartoon, picture or drawing in any periodical publication or newspaper.
- (12) Whenever the Minister is satisfied that any person is in any area promoting feelings of hostility between the european inhabitants of the Union on the one hand and any other section of the inhabitants of the Union on the other hand, he may by notice under his hand, addressed and delivered or tendered to such person prohibit him, after a period stated in such notice being not less than seven days from the date of such delivery or tender, and during a period likewise stated therein, from being within an area defined in such notice:

Provided that the Minister may at any time withdraw or modify such notice or grant such person permission in writing to visit temporarily any place where he is not permitted to be in terms of such notice.

- (13) If any person to whom a notice has been delivered or tendered under sub-section (12) requests the Minister in writing to furnish him with the reasons for such notice, and with a statement of the information which induced the Minister to issue such notice, the Minister shall furnish such person with a statement in writing setting forth his reasons for such notice and so much of the information which induced the Minister to issue such notice as can, in his opinion, be disclosed without detriment to public policy.
- (14) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (12) any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any notice delivered or tendered to him in terms of sub-section (12) shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to the penalties provided in sub-section (2) and he may at any time after the expiration of the period of not less than seven days stated in such notice be removed by any member of the police force duly authorized in writing by any commissioned police officer from any area wherein he is prohibited to be in terms of sub-section (12).
- (15) Whenever any person who has received a notice in terms of sub-section (12) is necessarily put to any expense in order to comply with such notice, the Minister may in his discretion cause such expense, or any part thereof, to be defrayed out of public funds and may, further, in his discretion, cause to be paid out such funds to such person a reasonable subsistence allowance during any period whilst such notice applies to him.
- (16) Any person convicted of any offence under the preceding provisions of this section who was born outside the territory comprising the Union and who is deemed by the Governor-General to be an undesirable inhabitant of the Union may be removed from the Union and, pending removal, may be detained in custody in the manner provided for the detention, pending removal from the Union, of persons who are prohibited immigrants within the meaning of the Immigrants Regulation Act, 1913 (Act No. 22 of 1913), or any amendment thereof, and thereafter such person shall, for the purposes of that act or any amendment thereof be deemed to be a prohibited immigrant.

2. Section twenty-one of the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1914 (Act No. 27 of 1914), is hereby amplified by the insertion therein immediately after the word "prohibited" of the following words: "or any person has been prohibited from attending a public gathering or from being within any area or has been dealt with as a prohibited immigrant, or the publication of any documentary information has been prohibited".

3. This Act may be cited as the Riotous Assemblies (Amendment) Act, 1930.

Source:- Statutes of the Union of South Africa, 1930.

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