SOLIDARITY PATTERNS IN A MINORITY GROUP:
A STUDY OF THE INDIAN COMMUNITY
OF THE CAPE PENINSULA

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Views and conclusions put forward in this study are those of the writer and not the responsibility of the National Council for Social Research or the Department of Education, Arts and Science.
Dedicated to MY FATHER

from whom I first learnt
that it is only those
who are inwardly free
who can be both principled and tolerant
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The research for this thesis was largely done in the period 1962 to 1963. Due to other commitments it was, however, not possible to complete the project until now. The description and analysis of the Cape Indian population should, therefore, be taken as reflecting the situation as it existed at the time during which the fieldwork was done.

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INTRODUCTION

The Indians have been in South Africa for more than a hundred years. Although they were initially confined to Natal, small Indian communities are found today in virtually every sizable town or city outside the Orange Free State.¹ The Indian community found themselves in a cultural milieu totally different from their own. Apart from the relatively small Malay community at the Cape, they were the only other people of Eastern extraction in the country. They were not only set apart from the rest of the South African population by virtue of their distinctive cultural characteristics such as general way of life, language, and religion, but a social distance inevitably arose from the already existing normative patterns governing White - non-White relations in general at the time of their arrival. Nevertheless the changed physical, cultural and social environment had to have a considerable influence on their adaptation in the new situation in the long run. It has often been noted by students of immigrant communities across the world that there are numerous conflicting forces operating toward facilitating assimilation of the immigrant community into the host society on the one hand, and toward the building up of a resistance to such assimilation on the other. In South Africa these factors have been extremely complex in character owing to the heterogeneity of the population and to historical developments. In spite of indications of increasing assimilation, interest has constantly been aroused by the way the Indians in South Africa have succeeded in maintaining their ethnic identity. Indians in various parts of the country have reacted differently to the complex of forces affecting them. Where their numbers, ecological distribution and group homogeneity

¹) This is due to early restrictions on the entrance of Indians into the erstwhile Republic, and later Province, of the Orange Free State. Cf. pp. 39-40.
geniety made it possible, they formed relatively exclusive and self-sufficient communities. This was, however, not always the case.

The Indians resident in the metropolitan region of greater Cape Town are in this respect one of the most interesting cases. A number of variables seem to be of special significance here, such as the presence of the older Moslem Malay community, the fact that the Indians constitute a very small numerical minority, and have not shown the tendency so common to immigrant communities to settle in segregated "pockets". There is the further question as to what the possible effects of future compulsory segregation, as a result of the Group Areas Act, might be.\(^2\) A number of sociological issues present themselves immediately: the extent to which the Indians in Cape Town constitute a socially integrated and self-conscious community; the main factors influencing intra-group and inter-group divisions and relations; the degree of cultural and biological integration that has already taken place with the rest of the population. The above issues may rightly be considered aspects of the more general phenomenon of social solidarity.

The total absence of earlier recorded research on the basic characteristics of these people, led the writer to abandon his original intention of attempting a delimited highly structured investigation into the solidarity patterns of the Cape Indians. Such a study would necessarily be open to serious inadequacies and bias because of a lack of essential background data and perspective. Because of these and more theoretical considerations, due to the highly tentative nature of most minority group "theories", the present study developed very much in the direction of a general exploratory investigation concerning the South African Indian and minor-

\(^2\) Cf. p. 44.
ity relations in general. It is hoped to further systematic knowledge of these phenomena, and to arrive at a few specific hypotheses concerning social solidarity in minority groups. These could then be tested through subsequent more controlled observation.

An attempt is first made at a clarification of the major concepts which will be employed. These concepts must be drawn together in a tentative theoretical framework within which observations are to be presented. It will be followed by a brief account of the political, social and economical history of the Indians in South Africa up to the present day. The ensuing chapters sketch the chief characteristics of the Indian population in the Cape Peninsula against the background of broader ethnical relations in South Africa. In conclusion it will be attempted to formulate tentative generalisations concerning the integration of the Cape Indian community, thereby arriving at specific hypotheses having wider applicability in connection with solidarity in minority groups.
CHAPTER I
MINORITY GROUPS

1. The Concept of Minority Group

The study of minority groups, sometimes also referred to as inter-group, inter-cultural, or ethnic relations, has already risen to the status of a recognised speciality in sociology. The failure to reach consensus as to what precise definition should be ascribed to the term minority group, is one of the factors that have undoubtedly contributed to the difficulties encountered in delineating the boundaries and contents of this speciality and codifying the plethora of empirical findings into a coherent theory of minority groups.

There nevertheless seems to be unanimity on one point, namely that the distinction between majority and minority does not necessarily carry a numerical connotation. There are many instances, of which colonial territories and South Africa are cited most often, where numerical minorities actually occupy a dominant position. Undoubtedly the numerical strength of a group plays a part, especially as a power factor in certain marginal situations. It is a significant fact that dominant groups which constitute numerical minorities, often try to secure their position in the power hierarchy by increasing their numbers, either through immigration or by encouraging a higher birth rate, especially when they consider their position to be threatened.

Greater clarity concerning the concept of minority group might be attained by making an inventory of the properties commonly ascribed to minority groups in social science literature, and endeavouring to identify those which are generic to minority groups. Such a procedure should enable us to differentiate this concept more adequately from, and state its relationship to, cognate sociological categories.
(i) Perhaps the most emphasised quality of minority groups is a set of overt characteristics, whether physical and/or cultural, distinguishing them from other groups. These may include any of the following: racial features, religion, language, nationality, state allegiance, or characteristic "way of life" based on a differential norm and value pattern. The relative significance and combination of these characteristics differ vastly from one situation to another, and they are therefore not very useful as a basis for a sociological classification of minority group types. These features only attain importance as and when they become symbols of the "otherness" of a minority group, and serve as criteria for stereotyped categorising of individuals or as basis for differential and unequal treatment. They have no inherent sociological significance: it must be imputed to them.

(ii) Harris emphasises the fact that collectivities are in some instances relegated to a minority position even in the absence of any clearly distinguishable characteristics of the above-mentioned kind. Assimilated German Jews, who were in other respects indistinguishable from the rest of the population, were prosecuted during the Nazi regime, merely because they could genealogically be proved to be Jews. Another case in point would be some Coloureds in South Africa, who are hardly distinguishable from the Whites both in appearance and culture, but are nevertheless reckoned as Coloureds on grounds of descent or association. (At the present, group affiliation is, of course, officially determined by the administrative procedure of racial classification.


tion.) It would therefore seem necessary to add to (i) above, the further distinguishing factor of ancestral provenience, or the principle of descent. In this respect the minority group then resembles a special type of expanded kinship group. Here again sociological significance need to be imputed to this principle, such as inherent differences or inferiority. In spite of the fact that the boundaries of minorities become relatively permanently established due to this factor of descent, there occur exceptional, but nevertheless limiting cases, in which some individuals may be reckoned members of a minority group purely on the ground of association. Once minority group status has been imposed it is virtually inescapable and is perpetuated by the principle of voluntary or enforced (either socially, or legally as in South Africa) endogamy.

(iii) In both the above paragraphs it has been emphasised that the attitude of the dominant group toward, and its evaluation of the status of the minority group (on whatever basis) is of central importance. Such attitudes may vary from a conception of the minority as being "different, but equal in some respects", to outspoken prejudice and various forms of discrimination.

(iv) Minority group responses to dominant attitudes and treatment vary greatly. Two aspects of this response should be taken into consideration: the inner-directed and the outer-directed. The in-group evaluation may vary from intense group pride to a strong sense of inferiority and self-hatred. A subjective attitude of subservience, rather than the objective position of the collectivity, is viewed by many writers as one of the determining characteristics of a minority group.4)

No doubt this is the most common psychological reaction to minority group status, but it does not take a number of limit-

ing cases into consideration.

The responses toward the out-group (we are referring here mainly to the dominant group) range from identification with dominant group values and aspiration to complete assimilation with the out-group - a phenomenon usually referred to as marginality - to an attitude of complete rejection or militant aggression. Louis Wirth's well-known typology of minority groups is largely based on such social-psychological reactions to an ascribed inferior position. 5)

The emergence of certain in- and out-group attitudes depends on a complex of interrelated conditioning factors which arise from the specific dominant-minority situation. We shall discuss these at a later stage.

(v) Although we have up to now continually been referring to minorities as "groups", this term has not been used in the sense that face-to-face interaction actually takes place between all the members of the collectivity. It is, however, a feature of minority groups that they develop a strong sense of belonging, "we-feeling", or group consciousness, as a result of the fact that they are singled out for differential treatment or as a result of a self-consciousness of differences and a valuation of identity on the basis of religious, historical, and/or ideological factors. Simpson and Yinger point out 6) that individual members of minority groups tend to identify themselves primarily with their group, and then only with a certain occupational group, socio-economic class, religious denomination, etc. This means that the minority serves as the primary reference group. The extent to which this is true, is again determined by numerous situational factors, such as the intensity of inter-group conflict etc., to which we shall be returning again.

5) Ibid.
(vi) It appears that minority groups in most cases occupy a subordinate position in the power structure of the larger society of which it is part. Both King 7) and Schermerthorn 8) emphasise the fact that the relation between dominant and minority groups is primarily a power relation - power then defined as the generalised capacity to get things done, 9) which includes the ability to control the behaviour of others. On the highest level, power is exercised in the political sub-system 10) of society, though it is a "commodity" which is generated in any collectivity for the attainment of collective goals, chiefly through the process of legitimation. There is a marked and institutionalised difference in the access of dominant and minority groups to power, and consequently, to the opportunities and rewards of society. The legitimation of certain group actions and behaviour is dependent on the group goals and values. Other variables affecting the generation of power in collectivities, include the motivation of members to attain group goals, the numerical strength of the collectivity, and in the last analysis, the ability to exercise physical force. Once a group is in a dominant position it tends to perpetuate its dominance by limiting the opportunities of the minority group to exercise power, by manipulating the political and administrative machinery or denying the minority access to the means of exercising physical power. It should be pointed out, though, that some minority groups, while generally in a disadvantageous position, can exercise considerable power in certain institutional spheres, for example, the econ-

10) The political sub-system, as also the economy, is differentiated on another level than concrete collectivities as functioning sub-systems.
nomy. In most cases they would then attempt to use this limited power as a lever to improve their general political position.

(vii) The power hierarchy usually coincides with the pattern of status or prestige stratification. These two aspects should, however, be clearly distinguished, since they might also vary independently. In spite of the fact that minorities might be conceded to be "equal in certain respects", there is a general tendency for dominant groups to assume superiority and impute inherent inferiority to minorities, as has already been implied earlier.

We have now come to a stage where we can venture to formulate a sociological definition of minority groups. But before doing so a few points should be noted in connection with the properties of minorities listed above:

(a) These properties are closely interrelated, but an attempt has been made to distinguish them systematically with the view of gaining greater clarity.

(b) They vary qualitatively from physical characteristics such as appearance and descent, to socio-cultural or more psychological categories.

(c) Most of these properties are variable and can therefore not be employed as defining characteristics in any absolute sense.

(d) There has been no attempt to spell out these properties in their full implications, with reference to every possible limiting case, or with explication of every necessary qualification.

(e) There are other societal sub-systems which display a number of these characteristics in common with minorities and which are therefore closely related to the phenomenon we are studying. Social class, as it is commonly called, may be
cited as an example. Some classes have definite distinguishing characteristics such as a peculiar manner of dress, speech and behaviour, they favour endogamy to some extent, are relegated to an inferior position, display oppression neuroses, etc. Furthermore, stratification of power-positions is a phenomenon common to virtually all groups.

The distinguishability of minority groups must therefore lie in the unique configuration of, and the interrelations between, these properties.

We can now define a minority group as a collectivity characterised by group consciousness, which is subjected to an institutionalised difference in access to societally valued opportunities and privileges on the ground of imputed otherness and/or inferiority, which is derived directly from a set of real or imagined differences in appearance, cultural characteristics and/or descent.

2. The Genesis of Minority Groups

A sociological analysis of minority groups would primarily entail a study of the structural-functional and dynamic aspects of these groups as functionary sub-systems of interaction within a more comprehensive social system. This would require attention both to the internal structure of the group, including the relations between the sub-systems of which it consists, and the interrelations between the group and other sub-systems in the larger society (such as other minorities, organised groups, and the dominant group).

This approach requires that it should be possible to delineate the boundaries of what constitutes a minority group. All empirical social systems are open systems. We refer to a structure and can delineate its boundaries, as soon as a

related set of phenomena develops a measure of stability and permanency. The relative closure of the system is of central importance. This may vary from a point where the group is culturally and otherwise so far removed from the larger society, that it actually ceases to form part of it, and becomes a self-contained society of its own, to a point where it is integrated to such an extent with the larger society that it loses its cultural identity and is completely merged with it. It should therefore be fruitful to study the processes by means of which minority groups come into being, maintain themselves, or are absorbed into larger systems.

According to Francis 12) "minority groups come into being when new patterns of social interaction arise, resulting from the transfer of a sufficient number of individuals from one society to another", either by way of migration or by shifting political frontiers. A number of sociologically relevant issues suggest themselves immediately for further investigation in this connection, e.g. the respective cultures of the "host" society and society of origin, and discrepancies in the value-orientations of these societies; whether the members of the minority had known each other or actually constituted a community in the sociological sense of the word, before they immigrated or were annexed, and therefore entered the host society as an already functioning system; or, if this was not the case, the conditions under which they grew into a distinguishable self-conscious entity. Francis advances the hypothesis that if members of a parent society are transferred as individuals into a host society which is not isomorphic with the parent society with regard to the important elements of social organisation, the individuals transferred will not be able to take their place directly in the

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host society, and will therefore tend to form segregated ethnic communities, which often take on the character of a minority group.\(^13\) The two most important axes of social organisation which he distinguishes with regard to which the two societies can be isomorphic or not, is the rural or the urban, and the solidaristic or the individualistic. These distinctions logically give rise to four possible types, though empirically it is more often limited to three: the urban predominantly individualistic (U(I/S)), the rural predominantly solidaristic (R(S/I)), and the rural predominantly individualistic (R(I/S)).

The circumstances and social situation within which a minority group comes into existence undoubtedly influence the stability and closure of the group as system, or stated otherwise, it affects the solidarity of the group. We now propose to study this aspect of group structure more closely.

3. Solidarity in Groups

Since Durkheim introduced the concept of solidarity in his analysis of the effects of the division of labour in society,\(^14\) it has been commonly used in sociological literature. Durkheim himself nowhere defined this concept formally, and it has been attempted very rarely since. A specified content will, however, have to be given to this term before it could serve as a tool for empirical observation and analysis.

The term "social cohesion", which is often used interchangeably with the term solidarity, has received considerable attention in group dynamics. There have been repeated attempts to establish a set of reliable indicators for measur-

\(^13\) Ibid., p. 10.

\(^14\) Emile Durkheim: Division of Labour in Society, trans. G. Simpson, 1933.
ing cohesion in small groups. 15) No satisfactory scale has emerged to date, though in this respect much more clarity has been reached than with the concept of solidarity, which has not gone much beyond the stage of originating observations, or "conceptual imagery". 16)

If, of course, these two concepts could be proved identical or the one could be so expanded as to include the other, it would simplify the problem considerably. Cohesiveness has generally been applied to the study of small groups; solidarity has more often been used with reference to larger collectivities, such as societies and communities, conveying some meaning of "one-ness". Equating these terms would imply that the various processes operative in the integration of small groups are the only ones operative in the integration of societies and larger collectivities, and that they function in identical manner. Or, to put it in another way, it would imply that studying the internal cohesion of primary groups would be sufficient to enable us to eventually explain the coherence of total societies - a proposition which cannot be accepted unquestioningly at this stage.

If we view solidarity as a property of large-scale social systems such as societies and communities, it would refer to the coherence of the collectivity as a distinct system. Basically it is related to the ability of the collectivity to maintain a relatively stable and integrated structure, even


in the face of disruptive forces, over a course of time. As a property of systems of human action in the broadest sense of the word, it has both social, cultural and personality dimensions. Numerous predictive indicators \(^{17}\) of solidarity operative within these three systems could be isolated and described. We shall, however, only treat the most important here, without discussing their full implications.

Culturally, solidarity is induced by a common system of norms and values. The particular value system need not be exclusive to the collectivity in question, but it should operate as an effective binding force on the highest level. Naturally these common values would be variously specified at different levels of the system such as the institutional and the role differentiation levels.\(^{18}\) In addition to the dominant value profile it is likely that each society would also have numerous variant or substitute profiles, as Kluckhohn has demonstrated.\(^{19}\) It must be noted in this respect, that systems differ in the degree to which they display and allow such variant values. Turk in fact advances the proposition that "the cohesion of a structurally differentiated system rests on some tolerated variability in the values to which its various parts are oriented." \(^{20}\) This is of course, true up to a point, since there has to be certain principles or standards defining the tolerable variability. Without consensus on this, solidarity would hardly be possible.

A common normative system ensures compatibility between the

\(^{17}\) Ibid., pp. 50-51.


goal-directiveness of the collectivity and the different sub-orders of the collectivity, and thus controls dissention and conflicting interests. On a lower level it stabilizes the interactional system by ensuring complementarity of role expectations.

Solidarity is manifested in the social system in the stability of social organisation and the co-ordination and interdependence of activities that exist. Durkheim emphasised that the division of labour increases such interdependence; (cf. his concept of organic solidarity). In such cases "society ... is a system of different, special functions which definite relations unite." 21) Solidarity is not a direct result of differentiation per se, but is mediated through other institutional structures, notably that of law and contract. A fact which Durkheim did not state as clearly, was that these institutions in the last analysis go back on a "collective conscience", which might not be so totally different from that governing repressive sanctions. We may in fact venture to say that a measure of mechanical solidarity is a precondition for the development of organic solidarity, although the collective conscience (or superseding value system, in action theory terms) might in the latter case be more generalised and not constitute such an impelling "moral force", that is to say, it would permit more heterogeneity on lower levels, and would not be internalised to the same degree by the individual members of the collectivity. 22)

If we accept Durkheim's main thesis, with the reservations flowing from the above-mentioned remarks, it follows that the


22) Durkheim refers to what we would today call internalisation in the following terms: "... repressive law ... attach the particular conscience to the collective conscience directly and without mediation, that is the individual to society." Ibid., p. 115.
dependence of one collectivity on another would weaken its internal solidarity. Putting it the other way round, we could say that solidarity is to some extent a function of the self-sufficiency of the system. Much depends, however, on the nature of the relations flowing from this interdependence. Material or economic dependence would, for instance, constitute a less realistic threat to the solidarity of a system, than would dependence on another collectivity for individual rewards and gratification.

Solidary systems also display a number of other social characteristics. There is greater frequency and closeness of in-group social contact, because of the behavioural security and compatibility of individual and group goals which it offers members. Social sanctions are singularly effective in solidary groups. The strict control exercised by the group and the internalisation of group norms and values, make for a high degree of conformity. Thibaut and Kelley note the fact that small cohesive groups direct more communication to deviates. When they fail to join consensus they are also rejected more emphatically.23) These observations would probably be valid for larger collectivities as well, though the mechanisms of control would not necessarily function in the same manner. This could also account for the observation that solidary groups have more success in inducing change in their members.24) More power is generated in the collectivity for the attainment of collective goals, due to the high degree of legitimation of these goals. Consensus and stable organisation enable the group to take effective concerted action both toward the realisation of common goals and


Psychologically, solidarity is manifested in the degree to which individuals in a collectivity identify themselves cognitively, affectively and conatively with the collectivity as a whole. They are positively emotionally oriented to in-group rather than out-group members, have a strong sense of belonging and show a desire to remain in the group. The greater the solidarity the more individual behaviour is group-oriented rather than self-oriented, and the more members tend to take the total collectivity rather than sub-groups, as reference group. This positive identification with group values and norms leads to conformity with standardised expectations and a high level of motivation to attain common goals. In the last instance, the individual would also look to the group as his primary source of rewards and social gratification.

The categorising of all these indicators of solidarity under the heading of the three systems of action is, of course, an analytical operation, since they are in close interrelation in empirical systems. In our discussion of the Indian population of the Cape Peninsula, we shall concentrate chiefly on the social characteristics of these people, although reference will also be made to the cultural and psychological aspects of their position as minority group.

4. Levels of Organisation of Social Structure

We earlier tentatively posed the question whether the factors pertinent to the phenomenon of solidarity, function in an identical manner in small groups and large collectivities respectively. Seen from a structural-functional point of view, small groups constitute a category of interrelated units of which the larger system is composed. The same
elements of social behaviour \(^{25}\) which could be observed in small groups operate also in the larger society, though clearly in more complex interrelations. There are variables common to all categories of social behaviour. In spite of this fact, society could never be reduced to a mere conglomeration of primary groups. Interaction between sub-orders of society give rise to processes and relations which are not reducable to the sub-orders themselves. It would, however, be of little consequence to acknowledge the existence of such higher-order social processes without being able to analyse and explain them in some way. This again would not be possible without clarity as to what the constituent parts of society are. We would agree with Parsons that "one of the weakest aspects of sociological theory has ... been the systematic analyses of the structural components of large-scale and complex societies in terms of their relations to one another." \(^{26}\)

Parsons himself distinguishes four levels of structural organization, viz. the "primary" or "technical" level, the "managerial" level, the "institutional" level, and the "societal" level. He continues as follows:

The four levels of organization of social systems ... may be said to constitute a structural 'hierarchy' in four different respects. At the same time they constitute a series extending from the most highly 'unified' level at the top to the most highly differentiated and segmented levels at the bottom. At the 'bottom' of the structure the social system is rooted in the concrete human individual as a physical organism acting in a social environment. This individual, as personality, participates in the processes of social interaction through his various roles. Roles are organized and aggregated to form collectivities, and these in turn are regulated by higher and higher orders of generalized institutional norms. At the 'top' of the system

\(^{25}\) Compare George Homans' now commonly known "elements" of interaction, activity, and sentiment. \textit{The Human Group}, 1951, pp. 34-40.

is the society as a total system, in the modern case organized as a single political collectivity, and institutionalizing a single more or less integrated system of values. Because there are often many millions of concrete individuals in a society, it must be enormously differentiated and segmented at the lower levels. But if it is to have unity as a system it must also have a common culture, a highly generalized institutional system, and some concrete collectivity organization as a whole. The various levels under discussion may be interpreted to constitute intermediate structures which are necessary for adaptation simultaneously in terms of the particularity and diversity required at the lowest level and the unity and integration necessary at the highest level. 27)

The first respect in which an order could be said to constitute a structural hierarchy is that of the levels of generality of the normative patterns and culture. On the lower levels of the social structure norms and values are highly differentiated and apply only to limited units. On the other hand, institutionalized norms and values, which are couched in such general terms as to apply to all the sub-units of the system, exist in every society.

In the second instance, decisions taken at progressively higher levels of the organizational system are binding on larger and larger sectors of the social structure.

Thirdly, the facilities available on different organizational levels differ in their generality or range of effective applications and use, as is the case, for example, with various categories of technical and economical means.

In the last instance the organizational levels constitute a hierarchy with respect to the inclusiveness or extensiveness of the range of solidarity. Parsons does not specify in detail as to what he understands under "solidarity". He does, however, state that the four major functional problems of social systems which he distinguishes, viz. the adaptive, goal-attainment, integrative and latent pattern-maintenance

27) Ibid., pp. 7-8.
functions, are applicable to all four levels of structural organization. It would seem that the concept of solidarity is closely related to the functional problem of integration, and, to a lesser extent, also to that of latent pattern-maintenance. Parsons, Bales, and Shils' description of the phase of integrative activity corresponds pretty well with certain of the contents we attributed to the concept of solidarity:

The attitude toward the object is affectively toned, and the relation to the object is particularistic. Successful integration involves a determinate set of relations among member units of the system such that it retains and reinforces its boundary-maintaining character as a single entity. Expressive activity associated with the integrative problem involves a discrimination between social objects which are system members, or, with regard to non-social objects, those which are and are not possessions. It involves a generalized and durable affective attachment to the system members in place of universalistic assessment of properties shared with non-members. Hence the relation to the object is marked by particularism and affectivity. 28)

The above formulation portrays a more social psychological and microscopic perspective, owing to the insights contributed by Bales and other group dynamicists. In a recent statement, Parsons, taking a more macroscopic view, stresses the importance of certain integrative institutions which operate on societal level, such as law and the courts. 29)

On the primary or technical level individuals are involved in face-to-face interaction in a co-operative effort to "produce" something or other. The output of these primary systems might vary from physical commodities to decisions or any form of socially gratifying behaviour. We would classify such diverse concrete collectivities as families, committees, industrial work-teams, social or sports clubs, etc. in this

The more differentiated societies become and the more mobile available resources, the greater the need for a minimum of control and management of primary systems and the exchanges of inputs and outputs between them. This gives rise to a higher level of organization which Parsons terms the "managerial". There is a strong tendency to develop differentiated roles and collectivity structures which specialize at this level. The study of formal organizations and bureaucracy, as it is commonly referred to, has focused primarily on this field. An important part of "business" organizations is devoted to this category of functions, as also the "administration" of large-scale organizations, whether they be churches, hospitals or universities. According to Parsons there are three primary foci of operation on this level viz. the "marketing" of the output, the procurement of the necessary facilities for the system, and internal "supervision". The chief difference between the technical and managerial levels lies in the "emergence into full institutionalization of special generalized media of the facilitation and regulation of the processes of input-output interchange." 30)

Managerial units can in turn, not be left uncontrolled or "unsupervised". This brings us to the third level of organization. Some kind of board of "directors" or "trustees" tend to be institutionalized, which do not as a rule directly control, or exercise "line authority" over the managerial organization(s) in question, but rather "define broad limits to what they may legitimately do and give them relatively broad community support in doing it." 31) Various types of organizations function primarily at this level, such as school

boards for example, and many types of voluntary associations. Parsons also adds banking and insurance in the financial field to this category.

The highest level of organization could be called the social. In modern societies it focuses in the political system, or concretely, in government.

There has to be a single focus to which all primary integrative problems can be brought. Through its trusteeship of the legal system, its relation to national security, and a variety of other functions, government at the national level provides the essential framework of organization at this level. . . . government has certain supervisory, regulative, and supportive functions relative to all the lower levels of organization in the society. 32)

Parsons treats these four levels of structural organization only in broad outline, but it seems to offer a very sound basis for the systematic analysis and comparison of the solidarity existing in various systems.

It is apparent that there would be a very close mutual relation between the degree of solidarity prevalent on the different levels. The solidarity of the total system would be a function of both the "horizontal" solidarity existing on each level, as well as the "vertical" integration of all four levels.

Viewed from the highest level "down", maximization of solidarity on the societal level would be a function of maximization of solidarity on the lower levels, while at the same time it would reciprocally increase solidarity on the lower levels. It therefore acts simultaneously as cause and effect of solidarity on the lower levels (the inverse being also true). Solidarity on the societal level would thus increase both the horizontal and the vertical integration of the total system. The opposite is, however, not valid to the same extent.

Maximization of solidarity on the primary level would only

32) Ibid., p. 15.
be functional to the solidarity of the total system, if it is accompanied by increased solidarity on the intermediate and, ultimately, societal levels. Unless this is the case, there would be a tendency toward segmentation of the system and a corresponding decrease in solidarity. The same generalization would hold true, to a lesser degree, for the two intermediate levels.

Two types of divisions, detrimental to the solidarity of the system, could occur. The first arises when important social and cultural divisions cut horizontally through the social structure coincidentally with any of the four levels. In some cases a section of the population may, for example, largely dominate the managerial, institutional and societal levels, while another section, or sections, are relegated to the primary level, especially with regard to the control over facilities and the decision-making processes.  

The second type of division could be called vertical segmentation. It takes place when a sociologically distinct group develops an exclusive structure within the larger system, embracing progressively higher levels of organization. It becomes an increasingly self-sufficient and closed structure, and might eventually secede from the original system, forming a new solidary structure alongside it.

In the line of our argument we would then suggest that both

33) This is one possible empirical case which was, amongst others, commonly found in the former colonial territories. Another possibility occurs in societies where minorities are allowed considerable scope on the three lower levels (often on an institutionally segregated basis), but are barred from effective participation on the societal level. This is by and large the position of the Coloured and Asiatic populations in present-day South Africa.

34) This is apparently what the present South African Government envisages for the Africans with its policy of "separate development", which it intends enforcing statutorily.
the terms *cohesiveness* and *solidarity* be retained: the former referring to a property of small groups, or integration on the primary level, while the latter is viewed as being applicable to larger collectivities, such as total communities or societies. Solidarity would therefore be mediated mainly through integration on the institutional and societal levels. Seen in this way, the concepts would be closely related, but not identical.

Up to this point we have mainly set out a broad framework for the structural analysis of solidarity in social systems. We shall now also have to pay attention to the dynamic aspects of this phenomenon.

5. **Solidarity in Minority Groups**

Perhaps the most poorly developed aspect of minority group theory is the specification of the conditions under which such groups come to form closely-knit entities, or otherwise, become assimilated into larger systems and eventually lose their identity completely. Pin-pointing the complexity of causal factors responsible for these processes is, admittedly, an even more unmanageable task at this stage, than measuring solidarity itself. Provisionally, we would only try to point out certain related variables which seem to suggest avenues for further investigation.

The mere fact that minority groups are singled out for differential treatment, fosters group consciousness and a sense of identity with others who share the same fate as being objects of discrimination. Precisely because the dominant group tends to view the minority as a relatively homogeneous category, and directly associate their imputed inferiority with certain rather obvious physical or cultural characteristics, minority group members are immediately aware of their
identity, and are constantly reminded of it by the behaviour of the dominant group toward them.

As Francis suggests, the nature of the society of origin as well as that of the host society should be taken into account. The less compatible the two cultures are, the greater the tendency on the part of the immigrants to form segregated ethnic communities, and the greater the probability that the host society would, because of ethnocentrism, treat them as a minority group. As has been stated before, the fact whether or not the minority already constituted a community, in sociological sense, before immigrating, will have important implications for the solidarity of the group. This is especially true in the initial stages of their settlement.

The internal structure of the minority is of considerable importance. Homogeneity in terms of values, language, religion, "way of life", level of educational and economical advancement, and class interests, would generally further group solidarity. The structure of the kinship system and community organization, the resources at the disposal of the group, as well as the nature of its leadership, should also be taken into account. A common response to discrimination is the development of protest groups and social movements which tend to bind the group together. Such movements are either escapist in nature, or seek to take more effective concerted action against the dominant group.

The ecological factor and availability of effective means of

35) Cf. Par. 2.

36) "Ethnocentrism means the tendency of group members to judge other cultures by the standards of judgement prevailing in their own culture." This definition of Lundberg, Schrag and Larson is quoted by W.R. Catton in "Functions and Dysfunctions of Ethnocentrism", Social Problems, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 20.

communication would significantly effect the possibility of frequent in-group contact, which would generally promote solidarity.

The effect of out-group relations on in-group solidarity has up to now received most attention. Amicable relations between dominant and minority groups are rare. Conflict tends to be established because of the minority's rebellion against its inferior position, and the dominant group's resentment of its attempts to attain more power and recognition in society.

The minority's hostility is not necessarily directed against the dominant group only. It may be projected on the group itself, in which case the minority is characterised by a conspicuous lack of solidarity and a high incidence of intra-group conflict as a result of a feeling of inferiority, self-hatred and reciprocal prejudices. Under such circumstances the dominant group usually becomes a positive reference to minority members, who try to emulate the behaviour of dominant group members and aspire toward acceptance in their ranks.

The only limiting case in which an inferior position is accepted forthright, occurs in a rigidly stratified structure, such as the Indian caste system (caste religions represent in our terms a special type of minority situation). The caste system, which is legitimised in terms of the general value system, does not make any provision for social mobility. In such a case sharp internal divisions are, in fact, functional to the stability of the total system.

In an open class system which emphasises social mobility, the minority feels it is unjust that they should be forced into an inescapable inferior position. Their feeling against the dominant group, however, more often turns into resentment, i.e. hostility mingled with (secret) attrac-
In his valuable work on *The Functions of Social Conflict*, Coser points out that in many instances inter-group conflict could be functional with regard to the solidarity of groups. It serves to establish and maintain the identity and boundaries of societies and groups. If group members are denied the opportunity of venting pent-up feelings of hostility against the out-group, the solidarity of the in-group will further increase. This seems to be corroborated by Thibaut's observations in small groups, which lead him to conclude "... that if two groups interact with differential status and the hostility deriving from discriminatory treatment remains unexpressed, the original cohesiveness of the group increases. If the hostility is expressed through acts of aggression against the favoured group, the cohesiveness of the group returns to approximately its original value." Coser continues to state that "conflict with another group leads to the mobilisation of the energies of group members and hence to increased cohesion of the group." Centralisation is likely to occur in highly differentiated groups, especially when they face a crisis which requires immediate and efficient action. Despotism on the other hand, seems to indicate a lack of solidarity. The findings of Sherif's elaborate experiment with two groups of boys broadly substantiates the above propositions: "... in competitive ... and ... frustrating situations, which members of one group perceived as being caused by the other group, (the reaction)

38) "(The responses) do not indicate genuine rejection of the values or groups against which these negative feelings are directed, but rather a 'sour grapes' attitude: that which is condemned, is secretly craved." Lewis A. Coser: *The Functions of Social Conflict*, 1956, p. 36.

39) Ibid., p. 38.


was first to solidify the in-group belongingness and solidarity, to enhance in-group democracy, and to strengthen in-group friendships."  

A further qualification needs to be added at this stage. Sherif observed that during a period of repeated defeats suffered by one of his groups, the boys belonging to this group started showing signs of disorganization and internal feuds. Robert Hamblin, after studying group integration during a crisis, concludes that integration decreases if a likely solution to the crisis problem is unavailable. If, however, a likely co-operative solution to the crisis problem is present, integration will increase. If a minority group's efforts toward the betterment of its position therefore meets with prolonged failure and disappointment, it can be expected to show increasing signs of internal dissention.

We have already noted that cohesive groups are more intolerant toward deviates. This factor co-varies with the intensity of the inter-group conflict. Stringent sanctions are applied on those who endanger the group unity, even to a point of complete ostracism.

We could conclude with Coser's observation that group members who in conflict, see themselves as being representatives of their group and the ideals for which it stands, tend to be much more radical and merciless than those who are fighting for personal interests only. Intense conflict may even bring together previous antagonists, and lead to the establishment of new rules and norms for their association. Such coalitions and associations, however, tend to be of a temporary nature in cases where the interests involved are

It follows from the above that conflicts arising out of deep-rooted ideological differences between minority and dominant groups, are often the most severe.

6. The Assimilation of Minority Groups

In spite of all the forces which act on minorities tending to strengthen in-group solidarity, it is a general phenomenon that most minorities are in the long run assimilated completely into the larger system of which it formerly was a part. Group boundaries become blurred, and eventually the minority ceases to exist as a distinct entity. The rate at which an "outflow" of members is taking place - in the sense that they associate, and identify themselves primarily, with other groups or the total system - is often a significant indicator of the break-down of solidarity in a group.

A number of terms are commonly used with reference to this process, such as "absorption", "acculturation", "integration", "amalgamation", etc. It would be advisable, for clarity's sake, to reduce this profusion of terms to the minimum. To start with, two at least seem to be indispensable, viz. integration and assimilation. For our purposes Simon's definition of these concepts appear to be the most satisfactory. According to him "assimilation refers to the replacement or modification of cultural characteristics as a consequence of out-group contacts. Integration refers to the extent to which a minority actually forms a part of the body politic of its society." 46)

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46) Up to now we have, for lack of a better word, employed the term integration in a wider sense, conveying a general meaning of "interlocking", or "forces operating toward greater unity". Here, although it conveys the same notion, it is ascribed a much more specified content.
Assimilation would result in a changed system of values, attitudes and behaviour patterns. In this respect it corresponds closely with the concept of acculturation generally employed by anthropologists, though it must be borne in mind that the process of assimilation also embraces important social and psychological aspects. The assimilation of minority groups is, of course, by no means a one-way process. Not only is the character of the minority radically changed, but it very often has a considerable impact on the nature of the larger system into which the minority is absorbed. The extent of this impact will be determined largely by the original characteristics of the two systems involved, as well as the relation that existed between them before fusion took place. It is likely that if the one group is technologically and culturally more advanced than the other group, its nett contribution to the common culture will also be proportionately greater.

Integration, as defined, is a process which is effected mainly on the societal level. Although these concepts are related, they are by no means identical. They vary jointly in many instances, but may also vary independently. Minorities move mostly from integration to assimilation, though numerous examples could be cited, where minorities were all but assimilated before being integrated with the total system on societal level. These two concepts further differ insofar as assimilation is a latent social, cultural and psychological process, which takes place virtually unconsciously, while integration must, under normal circumstances, be induced statutorily.

The assimilation of minorities broadly embraces the following aspects, which could in certain cases even be viewed as "stages", though the process must never be thought of as ta-
king place in linear fashion. Once an attitude of ressentiment is established, group members slowly move into a position of marginality. Although their attitude is typically ambiguous, they identify themselves increasingly with dominant group values (or, if sufficient interaction is lacking, initially only with dominant behavioural patterns). At this stage the minority members will, however, avoid to seek contact with the dominant group too obtrusively, for fear of eventually being rejected by both groups. Positive identification with dominant group values leads to the switching of reference group in certain situations, i.e. the minority group member begins to evaluate certain social situations primarily in terms of dominant group norms and values.

This interchange of reference group is closely interrelated with the process of re-socialization, or the recasting of individual role orientations as a result of exposure to dominant group values and norms under certain conditions. Such exposure could take place in the course of personal contact, or through the media of mass communication, and participation in social groups and associations of various kinds. Of these, two categories, viz. the peer group and institutionalized socializing agencies, such as the school, might be mentioned. Taking everything into account, the latter is perhaps the most important single assimilating institution, although it takes at least a generation before producing a noticeable effect.\(^47\)

As assimilation progresses, the minority gradually loses its cultural distinctiveness, and the members their group consciousness. This might result in intermarriage, which is usually taken to be the final phase, and the most reliable

There is some danger of an oversimplified conception of intermarriage as being only the natural result of advanced assimilation, since it might either operate as a dependent or an independent variable. It has been found to be a function of such non-cultural factors as an unbalanced sex ratio, as well as more sociological variables such as residential propinquity, similarity of economic and educational status, etc. Under certain conditions these factors would probably facilitate assimilation, but at the same time it is likely that intermarriage acts as a mediating variable resulting in accelerated assimilation. This applies especially to individuals who are ostracised as a result of out-group marriage. The social alienation that results makes the individual more susceptible to out-group influences, seeing that he is seeking social reintegration into new groups.

Assimilation, being a two-way process, normally also implies a change of attitude on the part of the dominant group. When inter-group conflict is acute, assimilation is minimized, since the minority tends to form a solidary closed group in the face of dominant group antagonism and discrimination, thus perpetuating its distinguishing cultural characteristics. The greater the degree of acceptance on the part of the dominant group, on the other hand, the more the minority could

48) This does not of necessity flow from our definition of assimilation, though intermarriage could of course be viewed as the most intimate form of out-group contact! Some prefer to speak of the process of intermarriage as "amalgamation" (William C. Smith: "The Process of Assimilation", Barron: Op. cit., p. 433), though there seems to be no reason why the word intermarriage should not suffice.


be expected to gravitate socially and culturally toward the dominant group. The measure of integration that has already taken place on the highest level, is very often a significant indication of the attitude which the dominant group holds toward the minority, since the dominant group, in most cases, control the legislative and administrative machinery, either directly or indirectly, and are therefore in a position to "regulate" integration.

Assimilation between a minority and a dominant group is, however, not the only possibility that has to be taken into account. Assimilation often takes place between various minorities, especially where minorities are totally rejected by the dominant group and the social distance between them and the dominant group is considerable. After studying the assimilation patterns of Hindus in California, Dadabhay concludes that "... when individuals of an ethnic group find obstacles to participation in the dominant culture and are isolated and prevented from forming their own ethnic community, they participate in the sub-culture of another minority group which is more accessible and into which they are accorded a more ready acceptance." 51)

In a multi-group situation, the question arises as to which group(s) a minority would be attracted most, and whether the rate of assimilation could be predicted with any measure of reliability. Warner and Srole devised the now well-known "scale of sub-ordination and assimilation" for American immigrant groups. 52) Although their scale was specifically developed in terms of the American setting, the fol-


lowing general hypothesis, applicable to a wider range of cultural situations, could be deduced from it: In any given situation where a plurality of culturally distinct groups interact on more or less equal terms, those groups which resemble each other the most with regard to their principle racial and cultural features, are the most likely to become assimilated to each other. It is necessary to add the qualification that the contact has to be on a basis of more or less equal status, since inter-group hostility and discrimination would naturally affect assimilation adversely. This proposition would, moreover, only hold true for societies in which racial features, such as skin pigmentation, are held to be of some significance. This is virtually universally the case.

7. Conclusion

In this chapter an attempt has been made to explicate the major concepts which will be employed in this study, as well as setting forth in very general terms, a theoretical framework for the analysis of solidarity in minority groups. Before continuing to apply this framework specifically to the Cape Indian community, it would seem necessary to first sketch the social, economical, and historical background against which the present position of the Cape Indians should be evaluated. This is done in Chapter II.
CHAPTER II

THE INDIAN IN SOUTH AFRICA

1. Early History

The arrival of the first Indians in Natal dates back to the adoption of certain proposals made in a memorandum to the British Parliament by Sir J.P. Grant in 1842, whereby indentured Indian labourers could be exported under certain safeguards to British colonies which were exceptionally hard hit by the abolition of slavery. A number of colonies, especially the West Indian Islands and Mauritius, took advantage of this new scheme. The young colony of Natal was experiencing a serious labour shortage at the time, mainly because the indigenous Bantu were found to be unfit for wage-labour on the sugar plantations. As early as 1855 a deputation was sent to Sir George Grey requesting the importation of "coolies" to Natal. After lengthy negotiations between the Natal authorities and the British and Indian Governments respectively, a Bill was passed in the British Parliament in 1859, allowing the importation of indentured labourers. The first shipment of these Indians arrived in Durban at the end of 1860. Apart from being designated to the sugar plantations, the imported labourers soon entered a variety of other fields of unskilled employment. A Protector of Indian Immigrants, whose responsibility it was to see that the terms of contract were adhered to by the parties affected, was appointed in Natal.

1) The contents of this chapter is drawn largely from the following sources:


Mabel Palmer: "Economic and Political Background to the History of Indians in Natal", The Indian as South African, 1956.


Although these were often vague, and numerous amendments were continually being introduced, the following could be listed as the most important: the labourers were to be paid 10/- a month, in addition to the provision of living quarters and rations; the period of indenture was fixed at five years (initially it was three years) after which the labourer could either be re-indentured for a further period of five years, remain in Natal as a "free" Indian, or receive a free return passage to India. In the case of re-indenture, he would also be entitled to a free passage back to his homeland, or could as an alternative receive a small tract of crown land in Natal.

The importation of coolies was halted in 1866, mainly because of adverse trade conditions which hit the planters at that time, but large-scale immigration was resumed in 1874. Henceforth the Natal Government also contributed £10,000 annually toward the cost of importing Indians.

It was during this time that a steady flow of non-indentured Indians, better known as passenger Indians, started entering the colony. They came on own initiative and expense, first from Mauritius, but soon also from the Indian mainland. Their main motive seemed to have been the quest for economic expansion, such as opening a new branch of an established family concern, or starting anew on their own. While the majority of Indians who immigrated to the Transvaal and Cape — mostly at a later stage — were of the "passenger" type, they are estimated never to have constituted more than 10% of the Natal Indian population.  

Some uneasiness was created amongst the Whites by the presence of the passenger Indians as well as the fact that the vast majority of "free" Indians did not avail themselves of

2) Statistical report of the Protector of Indian Immigrants, 31st March, 1953.
the opportunity to return to India, but preferred to settle in the country after their term of contract had expired. They were viewed as being potentially dangerous concurrents to the Whites in the economic field. As a result of the report of the Wragg Commission of 1884, a tax amounting to £3 was levied on each individual who had been indentured after a certain date. It was hoped that this would serve as a further inducement to repatriate, although Indians who did not pay this "licence fee" were not liable to criminal proceedings. Until this tax was abolished, no more than a third of the Indians who were subject to this provision, actually paid the required fee.

Three years after the granting of responsible government to Natal in 1893, a Bill was passed which denied franchise to all persons coming from a country where parliamentary institutions were not in force. Only a small number of Indians had qualified for the vote up to this stage, and although they were not specifically mentioned, it was clearly directed against them. This Act, not being retrospective, led to the gradual elimination of Indian voters.

The nineties introduced a period of increasing racial conflict which arose on the one hand from the opposition of the Whites to unlimited Indian immigration, and from the growing dissatisfaction of the Indians with their treatment and disprivileged position in Natal, on the other. Ghandi arrived in Natal in 1893, and it was especially after his second visit to the colony in 1897, which coincided with mass demonstrations of Whites against the landing of two shiploads of free Indians at Durban, that he increased his "passive resistance" campaign against what he claimed was the various injustices suffered by the Indians. In the same

3) The Indian population of Natal had shown a five-fold increase - from 6,787 to 35,763 - in the fifteen years prior to 1891.
year the entry of Indians was limited indirectly by a Natal Government Act stipulating that all persons who were unable to write out an application in an European language, would be regarded as prohibited immigrants. The annual subsidy of £10,000 for the importation of labourers was withdrawn, and attempts were also made to limit the trading rights of Indians within the colony.

Indentured immigration was finally stopped by the Indian Government in 1911, while the Government of the Union of South Africa passed the Immigration Regulation Act in 1913, giving the Minister of Interior the power to prohibit the entry of "any person or class of persons deemed by the Minister on economic grounds or on account of standard or habits of life to be unsuited to the requirements of the Union or any particular Province thereof". Such orders have subsequently been issued with respect to the Asiatics by the various ministers on assuming office.

A certain number of women and children had accompanied the immigrants to Natal. The required proportion of women as against the men was eventually fixed at 50%, but the actual percentage was nearer 45%. Although it is not known how many of the indentured men were married, it appears that many of them left their wives behind, marrying ex-indentured women in Natal after expiry of their contracts.

Passenger Indians who initially came on their own, usually brought their families across as soon as they could afford it, or returned to India to look for a bride there. This, as well as the fact that they often had their children married in India, tended to strengthen their ties with the mother country.

The first Indians entered the Transvaal Republic after 1881.

These were both "free" Indians from Natal, as well as passengers who came directly to the Transvaal. Complaints were soon raised by the burghers against the presence of these strangers and their alleged "insanitary way of living". This led to a whole series of restrictive measures which were introduced specifically with regard to residential, trading and land ownership rights of the Indians in the former South African Republic. Act 3 of 1885 determined that they were neither entitled to citizenship of the Republic, nor to own fixed property or reside in areas or locations other than those set aside by the government for such purposes. These measures were never strictly enforced, mainly because of British opposition to this law. The Indians also found various ways of circumventing the provisions of this Act, such as having their trading licences and even property registered on the names of white "nominees". The Gold Law of 1898 further prohibited any coloured person from being a mining licence-holder or owning any residential or trading property in proclaimed areas. It did not, however, prohibit such persons from holding licences to trade on the diggings.

The majority of the 17,000 Indians resident in the Transvaal left at the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899. Most of them, as well as a considerable number of other illegal Indian immigrants, returned at the end of the war, and once more attempts were resumed to enforce the proclaimed restrictions. Compulsory registration was introduced in 1907, while the Gold Law of 1908 now also attempted to forbid the letting of premises for any form of occupation, to Indians outside areas set aside for them. This regulation was, however, partially set aside by a court ruling in the same year.

The Republic of the Orange Free State took an even firmer line in an Act passed in 1890 ("Wat tot Tegengaan van de In- stroming van Asiatische Kleurlingcn") which forbade Asians
to voluntary repatriation, were further ratified by the Smuts-Gandhi agreement in 1914. Although both General Smuts and Mr. Gandhi had hoped that this would be a final settlement of the prolonged dispute, dissatisfaction flared up again on both sides at the close of World War I. The Lange Commission of 1920 proposed that in future trading licences should only be granted to Indians in their own areas. This was ignored by the Government and it only implemented the Commission's proposals in connection with voluntary repatriation.

In the meantime new restrictive measures were introduced in Natal between 1922 and 1924. This included the withdrawal of municipal franchise from the Indians and the curtailment of the right of Indians to own and occupy property within certain areas in the old city of Durban.

A round-table conference between the Indian and South African Governments was called in Cape Town at the end of 1926, resulting in the Cape Town agreement. It provided for the appointment of an Agent General by the Indian Government in South Africa, and repatriation under much more favourable conditions. The South African Government also undertook to take steps to raise the general standard of living and education of the Indians in the country.

Most of the Whites still regarded the Indians as aliens and intruders, often demanding that compulsory repatriation should be instituted. The South African Government, however, never acceded to this, but offered various assisted repatriation schemes, under more attractive conditions as the years passed. None of these schemes had spectacular success. Between 1920 and 1940 a total of 29,029 Indians availed themselves of assistance offered by the State for repatriation. Only a few thousand wives and children

came out to South Africa during this time, but the rapid natural increase of the Asiatic population more than counterbalanced the outflow. The Asiatic population of the Union in fact rose from 152,094 in 1911 to 219,691 in 1936, which represents a 44% increase.

In spite of the various Acts and regulations which were aimed at confining the Indians to certain areas both for residential and commercial purposes, and repeated attempts to apply these laws more stringently, the Indian Penetration Commission (also known as the First Broome Commission) of 1941 and the Second Broome Commission of 1943, revealed that Indian penetration in certain White areas was assuming increasing proportions. Constant pressure was being brought to bear on the Government by the Whites to put an end to this state of affairs. In an attempt to "freeze" the situation until a more permanent solution could be reached, the Trading and Occupation of Land (Transvaal and Natal) Restriction Act, No. 35 of 1943, more often referred to as the "Pegging Act", was passed in Parliament. Transfer of property rights as between Whites and Indians was prohibited for a period of three years, subject to special Ministerial permission. Most of the provisions of this Bill were re-enacted on a permanent basis by the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Bill of 1946. The limited indirect representation offered to Indians in parliament under this Bill, seemed to have been intended as an appeasement of the violated Indian public opinion. Before Indian representatives were actually elected to parliament, the Nationalist Party came into office in 1948 and this Act was repealed. Nevertheless it was primarily this Act which gave rise to the withdrawal of the Indian High Commissioner in South Africa, a trade boycott of South African goods by India and a dispute before the United Nations in which the Indian delegation alleged that "the Union Go-
vernment's discriminatory treatment ... of Indians on the
ground of race, constitutes a denial of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms”.

Very soon after Dr. Malan's Government had taken over, it
became evident that the repatriation of Indians, either on a
voluntary or compulsory basis, was still seen as the chief
solution of the so-called Indian problem. A number of at-
ttempts were made to arrange proper consultation on this and
other matters pertaining to the treatment of the South Afri-
can Indian community, between the Governments of Pakistan,
India and South Africa, but these broke down when India with-
drew from a proposed round-table conference, as a result of
the introduction of the Group Areas Bill by the South Afri-
can Government in 1950. This Bill, which subsequently went
through numerous amendments in Parliament, prohibited any
member of a specified group from owning property, occupying
premises, or trading in any other area than that proclaimed
as such for his group, unless he was exempted by special per-
mit. Three main racial groups were distinguished for the
purposes of this Act, viz. Whites, Africans and Coloureds,
thus linking it up with the Population Registration Bill
(No. 30/1950), according to which each citizen had to be of-
officially registered and "classified" into one of these
groups. The two latter groups could also be sub-divided,
and the Asiatics are in fact, where their numbers justify
it, mostly treated as a separate entity under the Coloured
category.

The impracticability of a substantial reduction in the In-
dian population by way of mass repatriation was gradually
realised, and although it still remained official policy for
some time, the Indians were increasingly accepted as an in-
tegral and permanent part of the greater South African so-
ciety. With the institution of the Department of Indian
Affairs and the acknowledgement by the Prime Minister, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, in August 1961, that the Indians would have to be accommodated politically, this tacit assumption received official sanction. In contrast to the numerous earlier laws which applied only to Indians, most of the differentiating legislation passed through Parliament after 1948 affected all non-Whites, treating the Indian on par with the other non-White groups. This holds true, amongst others, for the prohibition of mixed marriages between Whites on the one hand, and all non-Whites on the other (Act No. 55/1949); the Immorality Act (No. 23/1957); the Separate Amenities Act (No. 49/1953); the creation of separate university facilities as provided for by Act No. 45/1959, and the already-mentioned Group Areas legislation.

A final immigration restriction was issued by the Nationalist Government in 1953, when the further entry of wives from India was forbidden, with February 1956 set as a deadline. This lead to a considerable influx of women and children in an attempt to "beat the ban".

3. The Present Position of the Indians

(i) Demographic characteristics:
According to the provisional results of the 1960 census, the Asiatic population in South Africa amounts to 477,125, or 3% of the total population of 15,982,664. Only a negligible proportion of the Asiatics in South Africa are non-Indians. Table I gives the distribution of the Asiatics according to the four provinces.

8) Unless otherwise stated, all figures quoted in Section 3 refer to the provisional results of the 1960 census as published in the following official sources: Special Report No. 234; Sample Tabulation 2: Industry Divisions, Age Groups, Home Languages; Sample Tabulation 3: Major Occupational Groups; Sample Tabulation 4: Income.
Table I: Provincial distribution of Asiatics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Province</td>
<td>18,477</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>394,854</td>
<td>82.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>63,787</td>
<td>13.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free State</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>477,125</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than four-fifths of all Asiatics are therefore resident in Natal. 231,385 (or 48.5%) of the total South African Asiatic population in fact live within the metropolitan area of Durban.

The Asiatics are a highly urbanised group. In this respect they are second only to the Whites, 83% of them being resident in cities or larger towns, whilst the corresponding figure for the Whites is 84%. The rate of urbanisation varies as follows according to province:

Table II: Rural-urban distribution of Asiatics according to province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>% Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Province</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free State</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: Republic</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growth of the urban Asiatic population has been more rapid than that of any other racial group since the previous census in 1951, when only 77.5% of the Asiatics were urbanised. There has in fact been a nett increase of 40% in the urban Asiatic population since 1951.9) The biggest increase in the rate of urbanisation has taken place in Natal.

Their nett rate of increase (33.5 in 1961) is also the highest of all racial groups. It is to be expected that the rapid population growth of Asiatics will continue for some time, seeing that they are a predominantly "young" population: 44.56% are under 14 years of age. According to certain estimates, they should number 1,382,000 in the year 2000.10)

(ii) Education:
There has been a spectacular advance in the general educational level of the Indians. In Natal the number of children at school rose from 61,333 in 1952, to 106,978 in 1960,11) which means that the figure must, approximately, have doubled during the fifties. Because of a high incidence of early school-leaving, the numbers, especially of girls, drop sharply in the senior standards. Furthermore a high rate of failures occur. Out of 540 entrants for the Natal Senior Certificate in 1960, only 316 passed, of whom roughly 50% gained matriculation exemption, enabling them to enter a university. A considerable proportion of these continue with higher education. In 1960 there were 414 students enrolled at the Springfield Teacher Training College, while there were 446 Indian students in the non-White section of the University of Natal and 100 at the non-White Medical School. The University College for Indians was founded on Salisbury Island in 1960. In 1963 its enrolment already totalled 416, while a further 718 were extra-mural students connected with the University of South Africa in Pretoria.12) There are still some Indian students at the erstwhile "open" Universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand, while some wealthier families prefer to have their

children educated overseas (mostly in India or the United Kingdom). The majority take up either teaching or degrees leading to higher-status professions such as Law and Medicine. Lately a few have also qualified in other fields, and it is in fact considered an exceptional distinction to achieve success in a field previously unexplored by the Indian in South Africa. The choice of a specific profession does not only reflect upward social mobility, but more often a desire for social and financial security, and the realistic appreciation of the fact that there are hardly any occupational opportunities for Indians in certain fields in commerce and industry, no matter how good one's qualifications. This is both due to the existence of an official colour bar in certain industries in the form of so-called "job reservation", and, more often, to institutionalised social barriers. There are indications that the limited range of avenues of employment and the prevalent differential wage scales, serve as sources of severe frustration to the fast-growing corps of Indian intellectual élite.

There exists, none the less, a very keen desire for educational advancement, and families and individuals are willing to make tremendous sacrifices in order to gain higher education.

(iii) Economic position:
The general economic position of the Indian is characterised by great extremes. A fifth (21.4%) of all economically ac-

13) It was estimated a few years ago that while 20 out of every 10,000 Indians enjoyed university education, the corresponding figure for the Coloureds and the Africans was 4 and 2 respectively. Cf. Meyer: Op. cit., p.67.
14) In 1958 there were approximately 2,000 Indians in professions in Natal, of whom more than 1,800 were teachers, some 70 doctors, 25 lawyers, 3 dentists, 1 surveyor and a few social workers. Cf. Hilda Kuper: Op. cit., p.67.
16) This was made possible by the Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 28/1956.
tive Indians are unemployed. It is doubtful whether this high number could only be attributed to seasonal unemployment, since most Indians are not employed in industries which are subject to major seasonal variations. It was estimated in 1954 that at least 70% of the Indians in Durban had an income below the "poverty safety limit", or poverty datum line, of £10 per month per person.\(^{17}\) An important factor here is the high dependency ratio of Indian families. According to the Natal Regional Survey the average household in Durban numbers about six persons.\(^{18}\) Their dependency ratio must therefore be considerably higher than that of South African Whites which is 2.9. The dependency ratio of Indians in Pretoria is for example put at 4.4.\(^{19}\) 46% of the gainfully employed earn R400 or less, per annum.

On the other hand there is a relatively small proportion of the Indians falling within the higher income brackets: about 3% are earning more than R2,000 p.a. In Natal there is also a number of comparatively wealthy land-owners, although they still own only a fraction of the property owned by Whites (in Durban it is a sixth of the total property value). The median income of gainfully employed Indians is R424.44, which is only 27.6% of the Whites' (R1,538.8), though, on the other hand, it is substantially higher than that of the Coloureds (R198.9).\(^{20}\)

It is therefore apparent that the income distribution between the various occupational sectors is very uneven. The

\(^{17}\) C.A. Woods: The Indian Community of Natal - Their Economic Position, 1954, p.56.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., p.55.

\(^{19}\) J.G. Marais: A Background Study for the Design of Townships for Indians in the Transvaal, (no date) p.58.

\(^{20}\) There is not such a big difference between the median incomes of urban Coloured males (R358.2) and urban Indian males (R489.4). The discrepancy between the two racial groups could therefore be partially ascribed to the Asiatics' higher rate of urbanisation.
professional category, who form 4.1% of the total Indian labour force, form the highest income group, with a median income of Rs877.4 p.a., as against the service workers (11.1% of the economically active) whose median annual income only amounts to Rs22.36.

26.4% of the Indian population are economically active. Of these the majority are males: 46.6% of the men are gainfully employed, while the figure in the case of women is only 5.6%.

The occupational distribution is given in the following table:

Table III: Major occupational groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational group</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Craftsman, production worker</td>
<td>33,869</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>3,377</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales worker</td>
<td>20,901</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service worker</td>
<td>11,411</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2,503</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer, fisherman</td>
<td>9,241</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical worker</td>
<td>7,867</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport worker</td>
<td>7,471</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical</td>
<td>3,909</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative, executive</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miner, quarryman</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No occupation stated</td>
<td>15,465</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>3,388</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>125,890</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When analysing industry divisions, manufacturing (26.2%), commerce (21.8%) and services (17.7%) also emerge as the three dominant categories. There are, however, substantial variations in the relative strength of the different occupational categories in the various provinces. While craftsmen and production workers constitute about a third of the total labour force in Natal, and service workers and farmers are also largely confined to that province, sales workers (which include owners of wholesale and retail establishments) predominate in Transvaal (48.3%) and the Cape Province (50.4%). No recent figures are available, but accord-
ing to estimates for Natal for 1951, considerably more than a third of the total income of Indians came from commerce, while only a seventh of the labour force was engaged in this sector of the economy.21)

Viewing the position of the Indian in the total economic structure, it appears that he is subjected to economic pressure from two directions: on the one hand the Indian experiences competition in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories from the African worker, who is better suited to that type of labour and prepared to work for a much lower wage. Much of the unemployment amongst Indians must be attributed to this fact. On the other hand, as has already been pointed out, the better educated and qualified Indian finds himself seriously handicapped when competing with Whites for higher paid jobs.

It furthermore seems likely that the Group Areas legislation, as also previous restrictive laws, have adversely affected the economic advancement of the Indian, notably in the commercial field. Although the Government has been applying this law only gradually, and, on the whole, discreetly, the uncertainty and insecurity created by these measures, must have inhibited a large amount of potential capital investment.

Important changes have taken place in the occupational structure of the Indian community in South Africa. The indentured came out as labourers with very little means. After serving their term many of them turned to market-gardening or hawking, while others took up traditional crafts. Eventually a small core developed into a wealthy business and professional élite. The passenger traders with more capital at their disposal, progressed more rapidly. As a group

they have to a certain extent retained a lead. This is borne out by the fact that the mean annual income of Gujaratis (mainly passengers in origin), English-speaking Indians (mostly Christians), and the Urdu-speaking section in Durban, is considerably higher than that of the Hindi, Tamil or Telugu groups, which are predominantly of indentured origin. 22)

The rapid industrialisation taking place in South Africa has also had its impact on the Indian community 23) in various ways. The steady drift of a large number of labourers from agriculture and service occupations to semi-skilled and white-collar jobs in secondary industry, has resulted in a progressive abolition of the original straightforward economic dichotomy between the indentured labourers and the passenger traders. 24) This process necessarily had to have a considerable influence on the general value orientations of the Indian community as well. We will return to this later on.

(iv) Political trends

Reference has already been made to the numerous differentiating laws affecting the Indians. It only remains to mention the present position with regard to franchise. It is only in the Cape Province that the Asiatics enjoy limited franchise. Together with the Coloureds they are entitled to elect four (white) representatives to the Assembly, and two to the Provincial Council, on a separate voters roll. Municipal franchise for Indians on a common voters roll is also limited to the Cape Province.


23) The term "community" is not used here in any strict sociological sense of the word.

24) The proportion of gainfully employed in industry has risen from 22.4% in 1936 to 26.2% in 1960. There has also been a considerable increase in the numbers employed in commerce: from 13.8% to 21.8% during the same time. On the other hand the 27.8% employed in agriculture in 1936 dwindled to 7.6% in 1960.
The Indians developed a political consciousness at an early stage and soon took corporate action in an endeavour to improve their position. Initially this was confined to the passenger traders who were most affected by the early legislation. The Natal Indian Congress was founded as early as 1894 by Ghandi. His influence in this organisation, and in Indian political life in general, remained pervasive in the following two or three decades, though other leaders, such as A.J. Kajee, S. Rustomjee, Dr. Dadoo, and Dr. J.M. Naicker, came to the fore in later years.

The years before, and during the Second World War, were characterised by conflict and keen competition for leadership between the various Indian interest groups, resulting in the founding of a number of diverging political bodies and organisations. The Natal Indian Congress emerged as the strongest once more, now organised as a national body with affiliated branches in the other provinces. It was increasingly dominated by left-wing radicals after the war, which led to the succession of a more moderate group in May, 1947. They founded the Natal Indian Organisation, which also grew into a national body, though its main strength remains in Natal to this day.

The Organisation's leadership is largely in the hands of a number of prominent Moslem businessmen of passenger origin, who take most of the initiative in private capacity, seeking to gain its ends through a pragmatic approach of "limited co-operation". The Congress, on the other hand, has a diverse and "popular" leadership, which is more radical and ideological in its approach, demanding the complete abolition of every form of racial discrimination. The Organisation is also more sectional in nature, while the Congress has closely associated with other radical organisations, such as the Congress of Democrats, the African National Congress and
the Coloured People's Organisation (a number of these organisations have now been banned by the Government).25)

It must be borne in mind that, although organised political action has long been a feature of Indian life in South Africa, a large number of Indians have remained apathetic to broad political issues, apart from, perhaps, such matters as directly affect their daily living. At no time has any Indian political organisation had more than 30,000 - 35,000 members, the majority preferring to leave action in the hands of a small but dynamic political élite, who are drawn mostly from the professional class.

The ultimate political future of the Indian in South Africa is uncertain at this stage. A Department of Indian Affairs has recently been brought into being to preside over all matters pertaining specifically to the Indians. It is the Government's declared policy to transfer various services, such as welfare, education, and local government, to this Department, so that in time it can become subject to the control of the elected Indian Representative Council which is envisaged.26) The autonomy of such a Council will of necessity have to be limited to certain "community" matters. According to a statement by the Prime Minister, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, it is not the intention of the Government ever to grant Indians direct parliamentary representation.27)

4. Conclusion

We have tried to highlight the more important phases in the history of the Indians in South Africa, as well as


In 1964 a "temporary" council of 21 appointed members was announced by Mr. Maree, the Minister of Indian Affairs. Cf. Ibid., Tuesday, February 4, 1964.

27) "Die Burger", Friday, April 26, 1963.
giving a brief account of their present socio-economic position in the larger South African social system. Some of the major cultural characteristics of these people, such as religion, language, and persisting caste divisions will be touched on again in the chapters that follow in which we will turn to a more detailed description and analysis of the Cape Indian community. This community differs from most Indian communities in Natal, for example, in important ways, such as the scattered residence of its members, their predominantly passenger origin, the fact that the Moslems outnumber the Hindus by far, and in the proportionate representation of the different linguistic groups. While we shall study the Cape Indians against the background sketched in this chapter, we shall, therefore, pay special attention to the unique features which set them apart from their ethnic kin elsewhere in the country. The next chapter presents a programmatic outline of how we shall concretely set about such an analysis with the aid of the concepts developed in the first chapter.

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28) There is some doubt as to whether the South African population could be termed a social system according to the definition of action theorists, namely in that they share a common more-or-less integrated value system. It is here used in the sense that the South African population, heterogeneous as it may be, does share a common economical, legal, political (until such time as complete territorial segregation materialises), and, in increasing measure, cultural framework. Some of the racial groups in the country could in this sense then be viewed as functioning sub-systems within a less integrated social system of a higher order.
CHAPTER III
AN OPERATIONAL PROGRAM FOR THE ANALYSIS OF
SOLIDARITY IN THE CAPE INDIAN COMMUNITY

It follows from our discussion up to this stage that a systematic analysis of the degree of solidarity that exists in the Cape Indian community would require attention to at least the following factors: 1)

(i) The origin of the Indians in Cape Town, and the nature of the society from which they emanate, would directly affect their adjustment as a group to the new cultural milieu in which they find themselves. We shall have to determine to what extent the hypothesis holds true "that if members of a parent society are transferred as individuals into a host society which is not isomorphic with the parent society with regard to the important elements of social organization, the individuals transferred will not be able to take their place directly in the host society, and will therefore tend to form segregated ethnic communities, which often take on the character of a minority group." 2) The fact whether these immigrants were related or were members of the same community in India, also merits attention. Finally, the Cape Indian community could not be studied in isolation, but has to be viewed against the background of Indian communities settled elsewhere in South Africa. The extent to which they identify themselves with other Indians in the country, and in Cape Town, should indicate to what extent they are merely a population category, or in fact constitute a conscious minority group.

(ii) It would be necessary then, to set forth the defining characteristics of the Cape Indians as a minority group;

1) We are attempting here, at some risk of repetition, to present a more concise and structured operational program, distilled from the preceding two chapters.

2) Cf. pp. 11-12.
that is, we shall have to determine in which respects the Indians as a group conform to our definition of a minority group.

(iii) The ecological distribution of Indians within the metropolitan area of Cape Town would be an important factor to consider, since it would significantly affect the patterns of in-group and out-group contact. The possible effect of the implementation of the Group Areas Act, and the residential segregation resulting from it, should also be taken into account.

(iv) It was suggested in the first chapter \(^3\) that the solidarity of a large-scale social system would depend on the cohesion, both "horizontally" and "vertically", of the various structural levels of the system. An analytical investigation into the structural solidarity of the system would then require the following:

(a) The first step would be to distinguish and classify as far as possible, the empirical social systems, that is, the collectivities and organizations, functioning on the various levels. The internal cohesion of these systems as separate entities will then have to be determined from the lower levels upward. Under normal circumstances it will only be possible to do this with a limited number of groups, which should then be as representative as possible of the range of collectivities found in the particular community. As has already been pointed out, the measurement of the cohesion of primary systems has received most attention, though with limited success. No such controlled measurement was attempted in this study, and our observations with regard to this will be based mainly on interviews and the attendance of meetings of a few such groups. Conclusions will therefore have to be regarded as being of a fairly tentative nature.

(b) Secondly, and in conjunction with (a), the extent of membership overlap and the interdependence, organizationally and otherwise, of these groups will have to

\(^3\) Cf. Paragraph 4.
be examined (again, on each respective level, as well as between the various consecutive levels). Special note should be taken of instances where group boundaries coincide with relatively persistent social or cultural divisions, since this would have important implications for the solidarity of the total system.

(c) Finally, the degree to which all these collectivities are structurally incorporated in an all-encompassing organization or "government" on the societal level must receive attention. In the South African case, the implication of the fact that the Indians have no direct representation on this level, as well as the possible impact of the present government's projected policy of "parallel development" whereby the Indians will eventually be granted a certain measure of community self-rule, should be examined.

(v) It is only on an analytical level that these structural aspects of the solidarity of social systems could be separated from the dynamic or functional aspects. A "purely" structural analysis is hardly possible, as will soon be apparent when we start applying our theoretical scheme to the analysis of the Cape Indian community. But the distinction seems to us to be indispensable for a systematic discussion of the phenomenon. The chief dynamic categories to be considered then, are the following:

(a) Both the frequency and character of interaction between Indians of various groups, as well as the amount of control exercised over both individuals and groups from higher levels down, has been indicated to be of some importance. The extent of the pressure which is brought to bear on deviants, and the effectiveness of sanctions that are applied, is an important indication of the solidarity of the system.

(b) Since our distinction between the various structural levels pertains to the social structure of systems, it is obvious that certain psychological and cultural variables would operate simultaneously (though not necessarily identically) on all four levels. With regard
to the former, the intensity of the commitment of the Cape Indians to the whole community and/or to certain sub-groups in the community, should be noted. No attempt was made in this study to measure the degree of identification that exists, though the broad patterns of reference groups were traced as far as possible.

(c) With regard to the cultural aspect, the extent to which the Indians share common values and norms which form an internally consistent system would be of central importance to the solidarity of their community. Furthermore, the more exclusive these values are to the community, the more it would tend to evolve into a closed system. As we have argued, a differentiated value system would only be conductive to solidarity if the nature of the system is such that it permits differentiation and if a basis for the integration of these variant values on a higher level actually exists. In other words, the value system must allow for a minimum of compatibility.

(d) The effect produced upon the solidarity of the Indian community by the relations between the Indians and the White dominant group, as well as changes in these relations over time, will also have to be traced. We shall not attempt to classify the reactions of the Indians within an exhaustive typology, but shall merely indicate the range of reactions encountered in the community.

(e) In a plural society it is, however, not only the dominant-minority relations that are of importance, but also those between different minorities, such as in Cape Town between the Indians on the one hand, and the Africans, Coloureds, and Malays on the other.

(vi) Finally, indications of the breakdown of solidarity and the extent of assimilation with other groups will have to be examined. This requires attention to changes in the value and norm pattern, as well as in other more obvious cultural characteristics of the Indians as a result of out-group contact; to evidence of psychological marginality, and lastly to the incidence of intermarriage between Indians and members of other groups. In this respect it is important to deter-
mine why the Indians are attracted to some of these groups rather than to others, and to investigate the hypothesis that "in any given situation where a plurality of culturally distinct groups interact on more or less equal terms, those groups which resemble each other the most with regard to principle racial and cultural features, are most likely to become assimilated to each other." 4) 5)

This outline of the factors pertinent to the solidarity of the Cape Indian community requires a few further comments. It is clearly only a very sketchy account of the more salient variables involved. An adequate investigation into the relation between any one of these variables and the phenomenon of solidarity would require a much more detailed specification of the issues bearing on this relation, and a carefully outlined research design to measure the variables in question, in order to be able to determine the nature of the existing relation. This was not intended and is clearly impossible in a study of this scope. Since it had to be, in the nature of the case, an exploratory study, an attempt was made to conceive of it in the broadest possible terms and to allow for a maximum of flexibility.

Actually, research in this field needs to go even further. It has been noted that a comparative analysis of the ways in which East Indian immigrant communities have adapted themselves in various foreign societies may yield valuable returns toward a better understanding of minority relations in general. 6) But there is also some need for a consolidation

4) Cf. p. 34.
5) Walter Simon (op. cit., pp. 10-11) has suggested a spiraling series of five interlocking specific propositions regarding intergroup integration and group identity, which could serve as important indicators of the degree of assimilation that has already taken place.
6) Cf. p. 61.
of the findings of the profusion of excellent empirical studies that have been done of minority groups the world over.\(^7\)

No satisfactory synthesis has been achieved to date, nor has a general theory adequate to the widest range of minority group behaviour emerged.\(^8\)

We shall now proceed to give a more detailed account of the research procedure followed in this study.

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\(^6\) Cf., for example, Raymond Firth's comments in his introduction to an issue of the *British Journal of Sociology* devoted to the discussion of "Factions in Indian and Overseas Indian Societies", 1957, Vol. 8, pp. 291-295.

The most notable monographs that have been published on overseas Indian communities other than in South Africa, or on societies in which they constitute a notable minority, are:

- Usha Mahajani: *The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and Malay*.


Milton Gordon: *Assimilation in American Life*, 1964, gives an overview of the theories which have been current in American literature on the subject, and also shows up some of their inadequacies.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH DESIGN

1. Delimitation

For the purposes of this study anybody who originated from India or Pakistan, including those whose immediate ancestors came from these countries, was taken to be a member of the Indian group. Owing to the fact that it was of some importance to inquire into both the extent and effects of assimilation on the Indian community as a whole, any person who had one parent qualifying as Indian according to the above definition, was also included in this category. This means that our study included some people who would not necessarily be classified as Indians (or Asians) in terms of the Population Registration Act. 1)

The four magisterial districts of Simonstown, Wynberg, Bellville and Cape Town were taken to comprise the Cape Peninsula. This area covers what is accepted, for census purposes, to be the metropolitan area of greater Cape Town. 2) There were 8,975 Asians resident in this area at the time of the 1960 census. 3) This number would include a small number of Chi-

1) In Proclamation 334 of November 1, 1957 (cf. Art. 10 of the Group Areas Act of 1957) the Indian group was defined as "any person who in fact is, or is generally accepted as a member of a race or tribe whose national home is in India or Pakistan, other than a woman between whom and the person (other than a white man) who is not in terms of this paragraph a member of the Indian group, there exists a marriage, or who co-habits with such a person, and any woman to whatever race, tribe or class she belongs, between whom and the person who is, in terms of the above paragraph a member of the Indian group, there exists a marriage or co-habits with such a person; any white man between whom and a woman who is in terms of the above paragraph a member of the Indian group, there exists a marriage, or who co-habits with such a person."

2) Cf. Appendix A, Map 1. We shall refer to this area interchangeably as "the Cape Peninsula", "Cape Town", or merely "the Cape". If we want to refer to either the magisterial district of Cape Town, Cape Town City, or the Cape Province, we shall designate it as such.

3) Revised Special Report No. 234.
inese, who according to reports, number roughly between 200 and 250 people. It should be pointed out that these figures in all probability represent an under-enumeration for the following reasons: a considerable number of Indians who have immigrated illegally to the Cape, either from India or from other provinces in South Africa, would have reason to conceal their presence or identity for fear of being prosecuted, and secondly, a certain proportion of the Indians have, according to substantial evidence, probably been enumerated as Malays. Some Indians have tried to "pass" as Malays, and have in fact officially been classified as such, because of certain advantages resulting from it under the Group Areas Act, such as being allowed to reside and trade in proclaimed "Coloured" areas. In spite of the fact that there is no evidence of any substantial emigration of Indians from Cape Town, the nett increase of this population group since the 1951 census is surprisingly low. At the beginning of 1962 the office of the Population Registrar in Cape Town in fact calculated that there were 10,434 Indians in the metropolitan area of Cape Town.

4) The Immigration Regulation Act of 1913 (cf. p. 38) also restricted the free movement of Indians from one province to another.

5) While the South African Indian population showed an increase of nearly 30% over the 1951 census in 1960, the Indians in Cape Town increased by only 10.8%. Even if we assume that the Cape Indians have a lower birth rate because of their higher standard of living, it could hardly account for the magnitude of this discrepancy (especially if we bear in mind that there has been a considerable inflow of Indians, notably women, after 1950; cf. Table VIII). The number of Indians in the Cape Town magisterial district have, in fact, decreased from 4,216 to 3,790 between 1951 and 1960. The latter could partially be accounted for by the fact that a large number of the families who moved to the proclaimed Indian areas were from this part of the Peninsula, but the low overall rate of increase of the Cape Indian population must probably be ascribed to the number of them who were enumerated as Malays in the 1960 census, and to possible errors in the actual census counts.
2. **Gathering of Data**

Two sets of data were required for our purposes, viz.:

(a) Basic sociographic data concerning the Indian population of the Cape Peninsula;
(b) Data bearing more specifically on the solidarity patterns in this community.

Most of the data had to be gathered in the field because of the limited amount of analysed census data that is available, and the absence of any previous recorded research on the Cape Indians. After interviewing a number of the Indian leaders in Cape Town, a questionnaire, which attempted to cover both the above-mentioned categories of data, was constructed. 6) This questionnaire was administered to a selected sample of Indians by means of personal interviews. An attempt was made to keep the interviews as flexible as possible, following up any valuable lead that might occur. Several unstructured interviews were also conducted with prominent members of the Indian community, as well as various municipal and government officials who often have to deal with Indians in their administrative capacity. Finally, the researcher moved as much as possible among the Indians in informal capacity, attending a number of social gatherings as well as formal meetings.

3. **Sampling Procedure**

Owing to the unstructured nature of the greater part of the inquiry, selecting a strictly representative sample was not altogether essential. Gathering reliable sociographic data did, however, require a sample survey from which generalizations could be drawn with some confidence. Furthermore, since the ecological variable could have a significant influence on the solidarity patterns, it had to be controlled as far as possible. Sample selection created some problems,

6) Cf. Appendix C.
since no inventory of all the Indians resident in the Cape Peninsula was available anywhere. It was eventually decided to use the detailed 1960 population analysis for the census tracts, or sub-districts as they are sometimes called, which was obtained from the Bureau of Census and Statistics in Pretoria, as a basis for a sample of each city ward and municipality within the four magisterial districts of the Cape. Such a tract usually comprises only a few street blocks, depending on the density of the population, and the figures therefore offered a fairly accurate indication of areas in which Indians were concentrated, provided, of course, that no large-scale migration of population had taken place between the time of the census and the first half of 1962 when this survey was launched. There was no indication that such major movements had occurred, apart from a small number of families - mostly Hindu - who had moved to the proclaimed Indian group areas at Rylands Estate and Cravenby, Elsies River.

It was decided to exclude Wards 3, 5, 6, 7 of Cape Town City from the survey, since a later more detailed and structured investigation is envisaged on the basis of the insight gained from this exploratory study. These wards coincide roughly with the densely populated, predominantly non-White residential areas immediately surrounding the city centre, commonly known as the Malay Quarter, District Six, Woodstock and Salt River. At the time of the 1960 census, 2711 (or 30.2%) of the total Asiatic population of the Cape Peninsula were resident in these areas. Although no sample was drawn from these wards, several open interviews were conducted with prominent Indians residing there.

The method of operation was to cover the whole field systematically, attempting to interview approximately 10% of all

7) Cf. Appendix A, Map II.
the Indian families in each ward or municipality. 8) In this way the ecological variable could to some extent be accounted for. The sampling technique was largely of the so-called "snowball" type, whereby a few initial contacts were used to obtain the names and addresses of other Indians in a specific area. The task was facilitated somewhat by the fact that a large number of Indians are in small business and normally have to display their names somewhere outside their establishments.

The nuclear family (i.e. normally consisting of husband, wife and children) was taken as the basic unit of study as far as the collection of the required sociographic data is concerned. Single adults boarding with families were treated as separate units, or technically speaking, as constituting "family units" of their own. There were, however, only six such cases in our sample of 112. Interviews were normally conducted with the family head, but this was not always possible, since the father was sometimes not available for some reason or other (such as being abroad on a visit to India) or might be deceased. In such cases the wife, or eldest son, who usually takes over the responsibilities of the father, was approached.

It is a common pattern among the Indians for more than one related nuclear family to live together. 9) This meant that more than one interview could theoretically often be conducted within a single household. This was, however, consistently avoided in order to include as wide a variety of people as possible in the sample.

The final sample consisted of 112 cases (106 families and 6 single men) which represents 644 persons, or 10.38% of the

8) Cf. Appendix B for the exact size of the sample drawn from each.

9) Cf. Chapter VI, par. 1 A.(i).
Asiatics resident in the area that was sampled, or approximately 7.3% of the total Asiatic population of the Cape Peninsula (i.e. including the four wards which were not sampled).

4. Limitations arising from Sampling and Research Techniques
The question arises as to what measure of confidence we can confer upon generalizations drawn from our sample regarding (a) the Indian population of the area from which it was drawn, and (b) the Indian community of the whole of greater Cape Town. Firstly, it must be pointed out that our sample is a relatively small one. Although it represents 644 persons, it consists of only 112 units out of a universe of probably between 1,100 and 1,200 nuclear families (if we assume that the average family size of our sample is typical of the whole area). Although the sample might not be too small when taken as a proportion of the total number of Indians in the area covered, the possible margin of error increases in direct proportion to the decrease in the number of cases in each category when cross-tabulation is done. The size of the sample was, however, mainly a function of the extent of the area that had to be covered (more than 150 square miles) and the limited resources, both in terms of time and money, at the disposal of the researcher.

An effort was made to include Indians from as large a variety of religious, occupational and linguistic groups as possible. The sampling technique which had to be used, however, probably tended to direct us to Indians who are fairly well known for some reason or other, or to those upon whom one would "stumble" most easily. The Indian shops, which are in most cases situated along the main thoroughfares, especially in or near non-White residential areas, are, for example, relatively easily identified. This might partially account for
the fact that sales workers seem to be over-represented in our sample (cf. Table VI). In short, the sampling procedure which we were forced to adopt, did not ensure that the units would be strictly randomly selected, even though the utmost caution was exercised. Since we employed a non-probability sample of rather small absolute size there would not be much point in applying statistical tests of significance in our analysis. 10) We ignored any marginal differences which showed up, and followed up only those which seemed to be sufficiently clear-cut to allow conclusions to be drawn with some measure of confidence.

It was mentioned earlier that it was not possible in all cases to interview the husband in the family. Six of the 106 families in our sample were incomplete owing to the death of the father, and in one case, as a result of divorce. Ninety-one (or 81.2%) of the interviews were conducted with the father, 11 seven (6.3%) with the mother or wife, and thirteen (11.6%) with an elder son or daughter in the family, and in one instance in which the father was not available and the mother could speak neither Afrikaans nor English, with a niece who was staying with the family. Most of the data, being straightforward information on the family itself, could not be influenced much by this variation of respondents. It was nevertheless important to check the possible influence of the sex and generation variables on the responses to the few opinion-type items in the questionnaire.

The number of cases involved are too small to draw any defi-
nite conclusions, but on the whole there seems to be very little difference in the responses of the three main categories, viz. husbands, wives, and children, with possibly the following exceptions: Although more or less an equal proportion of the husbands and children who were interviewed, stated that they were not in favour of a sectional Indian political organization, a greater number of the second-generation respondents explicitly stated that they prefer integrated or non-racial political organizations. There were two indications that wives tend to be more conservative than their husbands: a larger proportion of them were in favour of separate organizations, and they tended to show a greater social distance with regard to Africans (57% of them declared that they would prefer Africans to live outside their neighbourhood as against only 21% of the men). We can state, however, that the fact that we had to interview members of the family other than the husband in some instances, should on the whole not have influenced the findings of our study to any great extent. Where it did, it should be duly taken into account.

Finally, we need to evaluate the implications of the fact that we excluded the four Cape Town City wards from our sampling population. It should be apparent that the exclusion of 30.2% of the total Indian population of the Cape from our universe would seriously affect the degree of confidence with which we could generalize from our sample to the whole population, unless we have reason to believe that this 30.2% are similar to the Indians in the rest of the Peninsula in every major respect. If it is possible, on the other hand, to establish the major differences which do exist, we could make some projections as to how the inclusion of these wards would have affected our sample. We can partially achieve this by comparing three of the items which were included in our ques-
tionnaire, viz. that on home language, religious affiliation, and occupation, with certain available census data. This is done in Tables IV - VI. A few facts should be noted concerning the comparability of the data: (a) The data on home language would not appear to be fully comparable since the census units are individuals, while our unit of analysis in this case is the family. The percentages of our sample would, however, only be unreliable if the average family size of the various language categories differed appreciably. If anything, those speaking an Indian dialect at home, might have slightly bigger families. Calculations based on Table V showed, however, that although Hindu families tend to be smaller than Moslem families, it made very little difference whether we employed individuals or families as units when calculating percentages. (b) The data on religious affiliation is also somewhat unsatisfactory, since the only analysed census data available at that stage of the investigation dates back to 1951, with the result that there is a time interval of 11 years between the two sets of data which we are comparing. (c) In Table VI we are comparing the proportion of all economically active males in the different occupational categories at the time of the 1960 census with data from our sample which only accounts for the occupation of family heads and not for those of their grown-up sons as well. Again it is doubtful whether it would have made any great difference if we had included the latter (apart from one possible affect which we shall note later). (d) The data from the 1960 census is based on sample tabulations, so that allowance also has to be made in this case for sampling error.

13) Sample Tabulations No. 2 and 3, op. cit.
### Table IV: Comparison of home language:
1960 census and sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home language</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English and Afrikaans</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>3275</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>2470</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian language</td>
<td>2945</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng./Afr. &amp; Ind. lang.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8975</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table V: Comparison of religious affiliation:
1951 census and sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>5769</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>1065</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8099</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table VI: Comparison of occupation:
1960 census and sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical and related worker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative, executive, and managerial</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical worker</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales worker</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker in transport and communication</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsman, production worker, labourer</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service, sports and recreation worker</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No occupation stated</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14) Cf. p. 72.
15) Cf. p. 72.
Taking into consideration the possible margin of sampling error in both sets of data, we would nevertheless venture to make the following observations from the above tables:

(i) Our sample seems to have contained a higher proportion of families who still speak their native dialect (such as Tamil, Gujarati, Kokni, etc.) at home. Even if we exclude those who stated that they spoke one of the European languages and their own language equally often at home, it appears that about 50% of our sample still chiefly spoke an Indian dialect at home, as compared with about a third of the total Indian population. If we accept the adoption of a "foreign" language as an index of assimilation, it means that our sample is still biased toward the less assimilated section of the Indian community in spite of definite attempts to include partially assimilated families into our sample. This bias might be due to the fact that other Indians were less inclined to direct one to such cases, since they are not such "good" Indians and "would not be able to tell one so much about Indian customs and the life of the Indian community in Cape Town in general". The discrepancy between our sample and the census figures could further be accounted for by the fact that the densely populated residential areas surrounding the city centre were excluded from the sampling population. There is reason to believe that Indians in these areas have been assimilating more rapidly and that more of them have therefore already ac-

14) These were Indians who stated that they spoke English or Afrikaans and their native tongue equally often (in most cases the latter was spoken between the husband and the wife while they spoke either Afrikaans or English with their children). There was no provision for such a category in the census data.

15) This category includes working proprietors, shop assistants, "commercial travellers", manufacturers' agents, etc.

16) This includes five cases where the husband was deceased and the business was being run by the wife and/or sons of the deceased.
cepted Afrikaans or English as their home language. There are several factors which might facilitate assimilation in this case: the ecological factor, or mere density of population; the presence of a greater number of second- and even third-generation Indians (the majority of the earlier Indian immigrants settled in these areas); and the fact that large parts of Salt River, Woodstock, District Six, and the Malay Quarter consists of slums. There is often a higher degree of anomie, or normlessness, prevalent in such areas, which makes the inhabitants more amenable to cultural change, and therefore also to assimilation. In this respect the said areas are ideally suited for a later more detailed inquiry into the dynamics of assimilation.

(ii) There are indications in Table V that there is an under-representation of Christians and an over-representation of Hindus in our sample. The former impression is probably correct, since the majority of Roman Catholic Christians, who constitute more than half of all the Indian Christians in Cape Town, are resident in the areas which were not included in our study.

The proportionate representation of Hindus in our sample is in all probability nearer to their actual numerical strength vis-à-vis the Moslem section of the population at the present time, for the following two reasons: Firstly, there has been a greater influx of Hindus - especially from Natal - since the 1951 census. (16% of the Hindu men in our sample came to the Cape after 1950, as against only 4% of the Moslem men.) Secondly, most of the Indians who have "crossed the line" into the Coloured/Malay community, have been Moslems, so that their proportionate strength in the Indian community has probably decreased between 1951 and the time of our study.

17) U.G. 38/1959.
(iii) We have already mentioned that the over-representation of sales workers in our sample might be attributed in part to our method of sampling. The fact that the census data includes all economically active males while the analysis of our sample only refers to the occupation of the family head, might also account for the under-representation of some of the other categories, such as clerical and transport workers. Most of the older Indians are still in the traditional family occupation, which in the Cape is mostly small business and crafts such as shoe repairing, tailoring etc. The members of the second and third generations have, on the other hand, tended to go into a greater diversity of occupations. It is also possible that this tendency is more marked in the areas which we did not sample, since there would probably also be a greater proportion of second and third generation Indians.

From the above we can conclude then that our sample cannot be taken to be representative of the whole Indian population of the Cape. It is more homogeneous than the total population would be, and might be somewhat biased toward the less assimilated section of the population.

Various other difficulties encountered in the course of the study need to be mentioned. A considerable number of the Indians who were approached showed distinct reluctance to cooperate, and tried to evade the investigator in various ways, pretending that they were too busy (even on consecutive visits), were on the point of going out, or insisting that he should see the man further down the street "who is much better informed", and the like.18) Such refusals to cooperate were more common among Indians who had migrated from India fairly

18) It was difficult to keep an exact count of such refusals, but it probably constituted 15-20% of all those who were originally approached.
recently and were staying in predominantly non-White areas where they had little contact with Whites, which seemed to have made them more suspicious of the intentions of the investigator. This factor might have had the exact opposite effect on our sample than the exclusion of the four wards surrounding the centre of Cape Town City, viz. causing the elimination of some of the least assimilated Indians from our sample. It appears, then, that a number of both the most assimilated and the least assimilated families were cut off from our sample, so that the intermediate cases are better represented, although there might be a larger proportion of families included which one would place on the slightly less assimilated side of the spectrum, judging according to Table IV.

It was difficult to convince some of the respondents of the bona fides of the investigator. Some of them confessed that they had initially suspected him to be a "government agent" or an official who was collecting information under false pretences. It is difficult to establish rapport and obtain reliable responses under such circumstances. This is especially true in the cases where items could be interpreted to have a political nuance, or were related in some way to restrictive legislation, such as the duration of stay in Cape Town. Some of those who had migrated illegally to the Cape were clearly reluctant to disclose their date of arrival in the city. On questions such as the desirability of a purely Indian political organization, there was a very high return of "Don't know" responses (39.3% in this particular case).

In a few instances there were also some problems in communicating with respondents who were not sufficiently conversant in either English or Afrikaans to be able to understand some of the questions. This necessitated a lot of explanation.
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that the interviews were not always conducted under ideal circumstances. It often had to be done over a shop counter with numerous interruptions to allow the shop owner to serve some customers who had entered in the meantime. The presence of people might have influenced some respondents in their answers to specific items.

5. Conclusion

We cannot claim our sample to be strictly representative of the total Indian community of the Cape Peninsula, nor even of the Indian population from which it was drawn. This does not, however, render the data which we gathered useless. Since this study is exploratory in nature, its main aim was to establish the basic characteristics of the Cape Indian population, especially as they affect the solidarity of the Indians as an ethnic community. Owing to the fact that our investigation was not limited to interviews with the selected sample of families only, and the fact that some supplementary information was available, we were able to introduce certain correctional measures in our analysis of the sample data, which should enable us to get a more satisfactory picture of the salient features of this community.
CHAPTER V

THE INDIANS OF THE CAPE PENINSULA AS A MINORITY

Following the scheme which we briefly set out in Chapter III, we shall try to determine first to what extent the Indian community of the Cape corresponds to our definition of a minority group. (The sequence of our scheme is not of particular importance, and we shall not necessarily adhere to it strictly.)

We have pointed out that the numerical relation of a population group to the larger population does not as such have immediate significance for its position in the social, and especially power structure of the society in question. It is apparent, though, that the Cape Indians are a very distinct numerical minority, seeing that they constitute only 1.13% of the population of greater Cape Town. What are, then, the characteristics which typify them as a sociological minority?

1. The Indians as a Minority Group

(i) (a) The Indians are physically, socially and culturally relatively distinct from the rest of the South African and Cape populations. They are easily identifiable as a separate racial type, the Malays being the only people who are somewhat similar to them. There are, however, differences within the Indian population between those from Southern India who usually have a darker complexion (and are mainly represented in the Cape by the Tamil group), and those from the Central and Northern Provinces of India.

(b) The majority of Indians are either Hindus or Moslems. According to preliminary sample tabulations of the Bur Census and Statistics for the 1960 census, 65.1% of the In-
diens in South Africa were Hindus, 20.6% Moslems and 7.2% Christians. The proportion of Moslems to Hindus in Cape Town is more or less inverted (Table V): probably about two-thirds are Moslems. But they again only constitute about 10% of the total Moslem community of Cape Town, which numbered 52,428 in 1951. 1) The majority of the Cape Moslems are descendants of Malay slaves who came to the Cape during the 17th and 18th centuries, though they now also count a considerable number of Coloured converts in their ranks. By now the Hindus probably outnumber the approximately 1,000 Christian Indians who are mostly adherents of the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches.

(c) Language is another distinguishing characteristic of at least the adult generation of Indians in Cape Town. About a third of the Cape Indians still speak their native dialect at home (Table IV). Among the Moslems, Kokni (also spelled Kokanie or Kanakay) and Urdu is the most common (36.3% of the Moslems in our sample spoke Kokni as home language and 10% Urdu) and among the Hindus, Gujerati (about half of our sample of Hindus spoke it at home). Although there are a considerable number of Tamil families in Cape Town, most of them have already adopted English as home language. We may add, parenthetically, that it is interesting to note that the majority of Moslems who have adopted a European language, spoke Afrikaans at home, whereas in the case of the Hindu families it was mostly English. This could possibly be due to the fact that such a large number of the latter originate from Natal where Afrikaans is not spoken commonly. The Moslem Indians, on the other hand, associate more often with the predominantly Afrikaans-speaking Malays and Coloureds, with whom they share a common religion.

1) U.G. 38/1959.
Virtually all the men could speak some Indian dialect, and a large proportion of them even two or three. About 80% of the adult Moslem men could, for example, speak Urdu, 75% Kokni, 30% Marathi, and so on. Among the Hindu men, about 75% could speak Gujarati, 60% Hindi, 27% Tamil, and so forth.\(^2\)

The women were generally less versatile in this respect, both with regard to their mastery of the two official South African languages (this was more true of the Hindu than the Moslem women), and the number of Indian dialects which they could speak. It must be borne in mind, though, that most of them immigrated to South Africa some years after their husbands, that they have generally had less formal education than the men, and participate less actively in social and public life, because of the traditional household-centred role assigned to the Indian woman.\(^3\)

(d) Most of the Indians can still be distinguished by a number of other overt characteristics, such as their dress, lifestyle, etc. The Moslem men are conspicuous because of the red or black fez that most of them wear out of doors. Some of the older Hindu and Moslem women also still prefer the Indian sari, and would wear oriental jewelry and the like. It is, however, only on special festive occasions, such as marriages, religious celebrations, or at funerals, that this traditional garb is still commonly seen. The change to Western dress on the part of the younger generation is virtually complete.

The majority of the Indian traders live in houses directly attached to their shops. Most of these buildings are in Western style, and it is only in a few private homes that

\(^2\) Some of these dialects are rather closely related, such as Marathi and Kokni, or Urdu and Hindi which have a somewhat similar vocabulary although the script differs.

one can still detect some Oriental influence. Once you enter the house, however, you are often struck by the strong smell of incense as well as the decorations on the walls and elsewhere: in Moslem homes these will usually consist of illustrations with Arabic inscriptions of Mecca and the Kaaba, or of the local mosque. In Hindu homes the household shrine will often be noticed through an open door, and the walls would be adorned by depictions of Hindu deities, and apart from some family portraits, a photograph of Nehru or Gandhi. Indian houses and shops are often marked by their crowded nature. The cluttered appearance of the small Indian general dealer's establishment has, in fact, become almost proverbial.

There are a variety of other behavioural patterns connected with Moslem and Hindu religious belief, which still persist to a greater or lesser degree among the Indians: marriage customs, the abstention from alcohol (by Moslems mainly), fasting at set times, following certain dietary restrictions, and the like. Some of these customs — such as the one mentioned last — is falling away rapidly, and is conscientiously adhered to by only the most orthodox individuals.

If we review the more salient physical, social and cultural characteristics of the Cape Indians, which we have briefly discussed here, it is immediately apparent that they are by no means a completely homogeneous group. They could roughly be classified into a few major categories according to the two main features, viz. language and religion, which operate more or less as ascriptive attributes of the individual, since one is usually (though not necessarily) born into a specific language and religious group. The major groups are the Kokni-Moslem, the Gujerati-Hindu, the Tamil-Hindu,

4) Cf. p. 81.
5) Cf. p. 81.
and the Christian Indians, who are drawn mostly from the Hindu section of the population. There are a number of Indian families in Cape Town who do not belong to these categories, such as the Gujerati-Moslems, those Indians who have migrated from Mauritius and East Africa and have drifted apart from their original language groups, and the Memon, Sikh, Parsee, and Pathan families. We shall see later that these religious and language divisions play an important part in the social life of the Indians of the Cape Peninsula, and as a result have direct consequences for the solidarity of the group as a whole.

(ii) Since the introduction of the Population Registration Act in 1950, which makes provision for the official classification of all South African citizens into various racial and ethnic categories, the principle of descent has come to be of crucial importance. It means that once a person, or his parents, have been classified as a member(s) of a specific group, it will be very difficult for him or his offspring to be reclassified into another group at a later stage. This will have important implications for his right to residence in certain areas, the university his children will be able to attend, etc., depending on how strictly the government implements its policy of separating the various non-White groups. It does, however, make White status inaccessible to the Indians, as to the other non-White groups.

(iii) We emphasized earlier that we are only interested in such characteristics as we have discussed, insofar as socio-

4) This category would include a small number of Urdu and Marathi speaking families. We also include in all of these categories those Indians who originally spoke one of these dialects predominantly at home, but have now adopted English or Afrikaans.

5) We would include here the few Telegu families who represent another related South-Indian language group, since they identify closely with the Tamil population at the Cape.
logical significance is imputed to them. In the case of the Indians they, in fact, soon came to be associated in the minds of the Whites with minority status. It might be fruitful to review the development of the attitudes of the Whites toward the Indians briefly at this stage.

By the time that the Indians arrived in South Africa, a fairly definite pattern of White-non-White relations had already emerged. Dark skin pigmentation had in the minds of most Whites become synonymous with paganism, semi-barbarism, and the subordinate position of manual labourer (especially after the importation of slaves to the Cape from the end of the 17th century). Although the British administration and some individuals in the Cape and Natal took a somewhat more liberal line, the attitude of the majority of Whites is well summarised in Article 9 of the Transvaal Republic's constitution: "Het volk wil geen gelijkstelling van gekleurden met blanke ingezetenen toestaan, noch in Kerk noch in Staat."

This attitude toward dark-skinned persons naturally had to affect the Indians, particularly because most of them originally came to the country as illiterate labourers, thus fitting into the popular image.

There is evidence, however, that the Whites drew some distinction between Asiatics and the other non-White groups, owing to the fact that they were a singularly "strange" element entering on to the South African scene. Their cultural distinctiveness borne out by their religion, language, kinship system, and "Eastern" way of life was often emphasized, and still is today. These overt differences soon served as a ba-

sis for various stereotypes of the Indian, as is evidenced by the numerous statements that were made before, and even by, the early commissions of enquiry, referring inter alia to their "unclean and insanitary way of living", "dishonesty", and "the threat they constitute to European civilization in this country".

After the arrival of the passenger Indians and the entry of the "free" Indians into trade, the brunt of White anti-Indian agitation was directed towards this emerging commercial class, whose comparative success in the retail field amongst Indians, Africans and lower-class Whites, was viewed with misgiving and envy. It was not uncommon for Indians to be refused trading licences, and proposals were even made to the effect that Indian trading rights should be completely withdrawn within ten years. 7) Later the Indian penetration into traditionally "White" areas in certain urban centres caused much dissatisfaction and resulted in a series of Acts and Ordinances restricting their rights of freehold and occupation in delineated areas.

It appears, therefore, that while the Whites initially held ambiguous views with regard to the Indians, being in need of their labour, and even acknowledging their contribution to the expansion of the country's economy, they became progressively suspicious of the Indians' presence in the country, demanding their repatriation and the curtailment of their trading rights in South Africa. The antagonism directed against them seems to have been more severe than that directed against other non-White groups, because the Indians' rapid advance in the economic, and to a lesser extent the educational and political fields, constituted at that stage a more realistic threat to the position of the Whites.

This complex was probably reinforced by the fact that the claims of South African Indians were often backed up in later years by the governments of India and also Pakistan, who were continually threatening South Africa with economic and other sanctions. Their attempts to intervene had important latent functions for the position of the local Indian population. The fact that these governments still accepted a measure of responsibility for the Indians in South Africa, must have done much to perpetuate the image in the minds of the Whites that the Indians are aliens and intruders. It has been an oft-repeated complaint that the Indians enrich themselves at the cost of the less privileged classes in South Africa, only to send the greater part of their earnings to their kin in India. It is then pointed out that their claim to South African citizenship is merely a matter of expediency while their true allegiance remains to be with their home country.

Some important changes occurred after World War II, both in the attitudes and the policies of the Whites toward the Indians. Whereas the Indians had initially been the principal "shock absorbers" of racial feeling on the part of the Whites, especially in Natal and Transvaal, they now receded into the background because of the upsurge of African nationalism which increasingly demanded the Whites' attention. Furthermore, there was a significant switch in policy after 1948, in so far as the Indians (and to some extent, Africans) were no longer singled out so much for differential treatment, but were all levelled down to one non-White category for the purposes of most racial legislation. This was accompanied by a gradual acceptance of the Indians by the Whites as part and parcel of the South African people. As we shall point out later, these developments on their part again affected the attitudes and reactions of the Indians.
If we turn to the Cape, some differences with the earlier conditions in Natal and Transvaal become immediately apparent:

(a) The Indians have up to now constituted such a small proportion of the total population of the Cape that they have at no time posed a serious threat to the economic or political position of any significant section of the White community. It is even probable that some of the Whites have remained virtually oblivious of the presence of the Indians in Cape Town (or have otherwise taken them to be Malays) because of the limited informal interaction that takes place between many Whites and members of the other races, as well as the fact that such a large number of Indians are self-employed.

(b) The Cape has generally been known for being more liberal in its racial attitudes than most of the other parts of the country. This might be due to the presence of the large number of Cape Coloureds who resemble the Whites more closely in terms of their standard of living, predominant value orientation and other cultural characteristics (as well as their physical features), and are therefore also more acceptable to them. We have seen that the Whites tend to hold somewhat generalized views with regard to all non-White peoples, and it is possible, therefore, that their attitude with regard to the Coloureds has also influenced their perception of the other races. Another important factor might have been the fact that the majority of the Indians who came to the Cape were "passengers" who went into business, and are today considerably better off than many of the descendants of the indentured labourers in Natal, which again makes them more acceptable to the Whites.

9) Cf. p. 86.
in which a number of the Indian businessmen played an important part.

On the basis of the fairly well established prejudice-interaction hypothesis,\textsuperscript{10} which suggests that in the absence of other conflicting issues, egalitarian contact between members of various groups results in a reduction of out-group prejudice, we can state with some confidence that the measure of equal status contact that has existed between Whites and Indians in the Cape, has probably lessened inter-group prejudice and hostility.\textsuperscript{11}

(d) The Indians have furthermore enjoyed a more favourable political position in the Cape than elsewhere. Until 1956 Indian males enjoyed a qualified franchise together with Coloured males and Whites on a common voters role. As a result of an amendment which legalized the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951, the Coloureds and Indians in the Cape Province were put on a separate voters role, enabling them to elect four White representatives to Parliament and two White councillors to the Provincial Council. To date they have also retained municipal franchise on an equal basis with the Whites.\textsuperscript{12} In this case non-Whites may also be elected to office, and for a considerable time Indians have, in fact, been serving on the Cape Town City Council, Goodwood Town


\textsuperscript{11} It is difficult to tell what the impact of such contact will be in the long run. According to a study by Russell of an interracial neighbourhood in Durban (reported by P.L. van den Berghe: "Some Trends in Unpublished Social Science Research in South Africa", International Social Science Journal, 1962, Vol. 14, No. 4) interaction amongst neighbours led to friendliness and more favourable attitudes, but these feelings were not generalized to include non-Whites outside the neighbourhood, because of societal attitudes and norms.

\textsuperscript{12} Act 19/1951 of the Cape Municipal Ordinance.
Council and other councils.

We can conclude therefore, that relations between the Whites on the one hand, and the Coloureds and Indians on the other, have been less marked by antagonism and conflict in Cape Town than in most of the other urban centres of South Africa. The Cape has known little of the agitation in connection with the occupation and property rights of Indians, which has been such a common feature of Indo-White relations in Durban and the Transvaal. Apart from a few minor scuffles with the police at mass political gatherings, there has also been a conspicuous absence of large-scale riots or disturbances involving any number of Indians or Coloureds.

Speaking of the country as a whole, the unique racial and cultural features of the Indians have nevertheless served to emphasize their "otherness" in the eyes of the Whites, an image which was undoubtedly linked with a conception of inferiority in the earlier stages. Not only were the Indians subjected to a host of differentiating laws, which tended to become discriminating in application, but extensive efforts were also set afoot to remove them totally from the scene by means of mass repatriation. In the past decade or two they have gained gradual acceptance on the basis of being "equal but different" (with the corollary that they therefore have to be segregated in accordance with the prevalent South African racial pattern).

(iv) Since the founding of the Natal Indian Congress at the end of the previous century, the Indians have been drawn together in sporadic, but nevertheless vigorous, protest against the discriminatory treatment which they have received at the

hands of the Whites in the country, only to be divided again into dissenting and competing camps. At the basis of such rifts were usually religious differences or the original passenger-indentured dichotomy, which has, to some extent, evolved into a class division. The majority of Indians have, however, remained apathetic toward broader political issues, and have left the responsibility of action to a small but dynamic leadership. Both these typical minority tendencies toward withdrawal on the one hand, and scapegoatism, in-group conflict, and hostility on the other, increased among the Indians as most of their attempts to improve their position politically and otherwise, seemed to be doomed to failure.

Since these are all aspects which are closely linked up with the solidarity of the Indian community, we shall have to discuss them in greater detail in the next chapter.

In terms of Wirth's typology it appears that the Indians have predominantly been a pluralistic minority, seeking only to be accepted and recognized as a different group in the South African context. (In the course of our interviews a number of Indians stressed the contribution the Indians with their age-old Eastern culture could make to the diversity of cultures in South Africa.) In their political action they have, however, increasingly pressed for an equalization of opportunities in every field. An increasing proportion of them, especially in the Cape, have also been showing a stronger assimilationist tendency, allowing intermarriage with other minority groups, but at the same time desiring full acceptance and integration into the dominant group.

Finally, there has also during the past two or three decades emerged a militant minority within the ranks of the Indians,

who favour a common cause with the other non-White groups in the country, in order to try and establish a non-White majority rule in South Africa. This tendency has been especially marked in the leadership of the Natal Indian Congress since the war, and in the Cape among the few individuals who have identified themselves actively with the Coloured Peoples' Congress and similar movements.

(v) We mentioned a strong sense of identification as being one of the characteristics of most minority groups. Since this aspect is also closely related to the solidarity of the group, it is one of those which will be considered in greater detail in the next chapter. A few introductory remarks should therefore suffice at this stage.

Firstly, to what extent do the Indians of the Cape Peninsula feel themselves to be part of the total South African Indian community? There does seem to be some contact between Indians on a national basis. Quite a number of the Indians in Cape Town were born elsewhere in South Africa (in our sample, 11% of the adult men, i.e. family heads, and 17% of their spouses) and many more have relatives across the country. Many parents have also been forced to look elsewhere for suitable marriage partners for their children, especially after the "importation" of wives from India was declared illegal. Contact with friends and relatives in other provinces is further maintained through regular visits. The important fact about such inter-provincial contact is that it still takes place primarily within specific religious, linguistic and caste groups, and not on an ethnic basis, seeing that it is largely limited to kin. This means that it does not necessarily foster a sense of identity with the total Indian group. The fact that the Cape Indians have hardly been influenced by political currents among Indians elsewhere in the country also
points in this direction.

In the Cape Peninsula itself, the Indians identify themselves with their religio-linguistic group (and in some instances with their broader caste group), rather than with the Indian population as a whole. The indications are that the larger ethnic group only serves as the chief point of reference in a limited number of situations, which raises the fundamental question whether we can, in fact, speak of the Cape Indians as a minority group. The answer must be both negative and affirmative: in certain situations they act as a unified group, while in others their primary allegiance is with certain religious minorities.

(vi) It is obvious that the Indians occupy a distinctly inferior position in the South African power structure. Their opportunities in the political, economical and occupational spheres have been limited compared to that of the dominant group. The Cape Indians have generally had greater access to the means of exercising power through the limited franchise that they possess. In reality they have, however, exercised little influence on decision-making on the administrative and governmental levels, partially because of their small numbers, but also as a result of their failure to act unitedly.

(vii) Finally, the Indians also occupy an inferior status-position within the caste-like South African social system, although again it is relatively more favourable in the Cape. It is difficult to generalize concerning their position relative to the other minority groups, but while they are usually ranked higher than the Africans, in the Cape they occupy a position at least on par with, if not higher than, the majority of the Coloureds.

We can conclude, then, that the Indians of the Cape Peninsula
qualify in almost every respect as a minority category. It is, however, questionable whether we can at this stage speak of them as being a group or community in any strict sociological sense of the word, viz. in that they constitute socially and culturally, a fairly integrated and self-conscious whole. We shall therefore have to consider what the forces are which operate either toward greater solidarity, or toward increased fission within this ethnic division.

2. The Origin of the Cape Indians

We suggested that an examination of the circumstances under which a minority group comes into existence, may yield valuable insights into the structure of such a group as a system, and its relation to the larger system of which it forms a part. In our case, it was a direct outflow of the migration of a large number of indentured and other "passenger" Indians to South Africa as result of a variety of economic and social pressures in their own country. These immigrants were a highly heterogeneous group, representing a large number of regions, various religions, as well as language and caste groups.\[15\] This did not prevent them from forming a fairly integrated plural community of their own, especially in Natal. This community necessarily had to differ somewhat from their home society, since the rigidity of the caste system, which is such an important factor in Indian society, was partially destroyed by the circumstances under which they migrated. The fact that they developed rapidly into a distinct minority must be ascribed to the great difference which existed between their culture and that of the dominant group, and the impermeability of the latter, which, as we have seen, arose from the then already firmly institutionalized racial pattern.

15) Cf. Chapter II, Par. 1.
The Indian population which settled at the Cape was less heterogeneous than that in Natal, since migration was more selective. But the very homogeneity of the various sub-categories within this population, led to less overall unity within the community. Let us turn first to the birthplace of the adult men and women (we are referring only to the husbands and wives) in our sample:

Table VII: Place of Birth of Adult Indians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>Husband</th>
<th>Wife</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of South Africa</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere 16) / not spec.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears from the table that the majority of the Indians in our sample were born in India, and, according to most informants, migrated directly to the Cape. (If we had also sampled the four wards which were excluded, the proportion of Cape Town born Indians would probably have been higher.) Many of the Indian men only married after arrival at the Cape, which explains the higher proportion of Cape Town born women. In our sample 13 (or 12.4%) of the latter were, in fact, Cape Coloured or Malay, or of mixed Indian descent. Only 6 (or 5.7%) of the men, most of them of mixed Indian descent, fell in this category.

If we compare the major linguistic and religious categories of the Cape Indian population with regard to their origin, a number of significant patterns emerge. Whereas more than half of both the Hindu men and women in our sample were born

16) These were two men who had migrated from Mauritius and East Africa respectively.
in South Africa, this is only true of a fifth and a third of the Moslem men and women, respectively. The Tamil Hindus were virtually all from Natal, and the Gujerati-speaking Hindus either from the town or district of Surat in India, or from Cape Town and the other major cities in the Cape Province. The majority of Kokni-speaking Indians came directly from the province of Bombay (or Maharashtra, as it is known today) to Cape Town, and especially from the coastal area of the two districts immediately to the North and the South of Bombay, viz. Kolaba and Ratnagiri. This whole area is also sometimes known as Konkan. The majority of them were from the rural villages and smaller towns within this area, such as Morba, Chiplun and Ratnagiri.

A few Indians who had served in various capacities with the British forces during the Boer and First World Wars, settled in the Cape after these wars, but further migration was largely spontaneous and, in most cases, probably prompted by economic hardship. Immigration to the Cape seems to have taken place by means of a "chain" effect: Indians who had already made Cape Town their home opened up opportunities for some of their relatives or acquaintances to join them by providing them with passage money, offering them employment, or loaning them money to start a business of their own.17) The composition of the Kokni community, which constitutes roughly two-

17) Very similar cases of chain migration have been documented elsewhere. J.S. and L.D. MacDonald ("Urbanization, Ethnic Groups, and Social Segmentation", Social Research, 1962, Vol. 29, pp. 433-448) describe the formation of "little Italies" - clusters of Italian immigrants from the same home town or region - in many American cities as a result of the assistance rendered by "padroni" to prospective migrants from their own home area. Adrian C. Mayer (cf. A Report on the East Indian Community in Vancouver, 1959, p. 11) also found Indians in Vancouver to be mainly from four districts, and furthermore from a limited number of villages within these districts owing to a process of selective migration very similar to the one in Cape Town.
thirds of the Cape Indian population, illustrates this. Many of them are related, they come from a number of villages within a limited area, and are virtually exclusively Moslem, even though one expects a substantial Hindu population in that area.\(^{18}\) The selective nature of migration has had a profound effect on the structure of the Kokni community in Cape Town. Most members of the community would know where an individual comes from, what his kinship ties are, and from which circle he would therefore be able to choose his spouse.\(^{19}\) In this way the Koknis in Cape Town have been able to maintain a group structure which is still modelled to a large extent on their home society in India.\(^{20}\)

The following table gives an indication of the period the Indians in our sample had already been resident in Cape Town at the time of this study:

**Table VIII: Period of Residence in Cape Town**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of arrival</th>
<th>Husband N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Wife N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Since birth</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1910</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-44</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-54</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-59</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain / not specified</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>106</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18) Even though they probably constitute a numerical minority today, a greater concentration of Moslems could be expected in this area, since the early Moslem invaders from the North settled mostly on the coast.


20) Cf. p. 96.
According to the above table most of the men (62.3%) arrived in Cape Town between 1920 and 1944, while the majority of the women followed a little later (51.5% of them between 1940 and 1954). The fact that more women than men were born in Cape Town must be ascribed to the fact that a substantial proportion of these Cape Town born wives are Malay or Coloured women. Apart from the considerable influx of women, the only major migration since 1950 has apparently been that of some Hindu families from Natal.

If we keep in mind that the 1913 legislation was intended to curtail further immigration from India as well as migration between the provinces, it is evident that the extent of illegal immigration to the Cape must have been considerable, unless the authorities were fairly lenient in granting immigration permits. It was difficult to determine the extent of such illegal immigration, since most of the respondents were reluctant to speak about this. It is quite possible that some of them might also have given false information on their date of arrival in the Cape - perhaps more than the number of obviously unreliable cases which were classified as "uncertain". Some informants admitted, however, that illegal migration was fairly common. Indians in Cape Town would, for example, give the names of very distant relatives in India as being their children, and in this way acquire immigration permits for them. Some of the light-coloured Indians who migrated from other parts of South Africa could have gained access to the

19) About 60% of the Koknis in our sample were, in fact, married to women from their own home village or local area. Compare also in this regard Morris' discussion of Patidar marriages in East Africa which are still contracted in terms of village exogamy and family rating in India; H.S. Morris: "The Indian Family in Uganda", American Anthropologist, 1959, Vol. 61, pp. 779-789.

20) I have been told that rural Koknis who move to cities such as Bombay also maintain such "home boy" cliques, which provide them with a basis for identity and security in the new urban environment.
Cape Province by passing as Malays.

Most of the Indians have maintained regular contact with their home country. Of the men, 76% and about half of the women in our sample had returned to visit India once or more during their lifetime, spending a total median time of 2.7 years in the country. Of the men, 15.1% had spent a total of 9 or more years in India since birth, or their arrival in South Africa, as the case may be. The women visited India far less frequently than the men, and nearly 50% of them had never gone back there since the time they had settled in South Africa. In about a third of the families some or all of the children had also been to India some time or another. Comparing the various sub-categories within our sample, it appears that the Kokni-speaking population visit India much more regularly and generally for longer periods of time. Only 8% of them had never returned to India, compared to, for example 27% of the Gujeratis. None of the Tamils who were interviewed had ever been to India.

Most of the respondents stated that they had gone to India to visit their family or relatives, or "for business purposes". About 20% of the men had also spent some time studying in India. Many of the Indians who can afford it apparently still prefer to have their children educated in India.

Altogether 50 respondents were questioned on whether or not they received any Indian newspapers (i.e. printed in their own dialect or any of the newspapers published in English in Natal predominantly for Indian readers, such as "The Graphic" or "The Leader") and listened to short-wave radio programs from India (these items were not included in the questionnaire). The latter seemed to be quite popular. Of those questioned, 84% said that they listened to Indian broadcasts
at times. I was told that certain daily programs are so popular that family members would leave whatever they are busy with to cluster around the radio. Among those who followed the news regularly, the local English dailies seemed to be the most widely read. Of those questioned, 30%, however, also read one or more of the South African Indian newspapers, while 18% received such papers or magazines from India. It is interesting to note that the closer ties of Tamils and Gujeratis with Natal and India respectively, is borne out by the fact that the former proportionately read more Natal Indian newspapers than any of the other groups, and the Gujeratis, again, more papers from India itself. It is nevertheless striking that only 10% were exposed to neither Indian newspapers or radio programs.

Many of the Indians were reluctant to discuss the extent and influence of the bonds that are maintained with India, since this has constantly been used as an argument for repatriation by some Whites in South Africa. It is clear, however, that there are large differences in the degree of contact that is maintained with the motherland. Some might still support a wife and family in India, although, if they are Moslems, they will often also marry in South Africa according to religious law. They will nevertheless visit their family in India as often as possible, spending a considerable time there. One Kokni respondent actually still served on a local committee in his home village. Some apparently also send regular contributions to needy relatives in India. There are undoubtedly South African Indians who have retained a strong attachment to their home country, such as the one who declared: "India is my home: I would like to go and die there, if possible."

On the other hand, many have lost all contact with, and per-
haps affinity for their national home. One Tamil who was interviewed objected to being called a Tamil: "I am no more an Indian than you are. I am a South African!" Another Tamil complained about the fact that they "are treated the same as Indians who still have their one foot in India."

Many Indians realise, however, that the situation is changing rapidly. A business-man, who is already a third-generation Indian in Cape Town, described the process of assimilation that is taking place as follows: "My grandfather came to South Africa with totally different aims than those which I have: just to collect a few hundred pounds and then to return to India to spend it there. He never brought his family to South Africa, neither did my father. My father visited India perhaps twenty times. I shall probably not visit India more than, say, five times in my lifetime. My children will probably never see India. They have Coloured and Malay playmates, go to school with them, and so forth. In twenty years' time there will be very few Indians left in Cape Town."

Many second-generation Indians also admitted the difficulty they had in adapting themselves on their first visit to India, which testifies to the measure of assimilation that has already taken place in South Africa. A young Gujarati girl who had just returned from her first visit to India, remarked: "They were shocked at the things I said and the clothes I wore ... The Gujarati I speak is trash compared to that which is spoken in India."

If we review the origin and immigration patterns of Cape Indians, it is clear that the present structure of the community has been influenced to an important extent by these factors. The Tamils who migrated mostly from Natal, have been in the country for the longest period of time. Although they are in some respects more assimilated than the other
Indian groups, they largely transplanted the type of community structure which exists among Hindus in Natal to the Cape. The majority of Gujeratis originally came from the district of Surat (probably mostly from towns such as Surat and Bulsar), while the Koknis who settled in the Cape were by and large of rural origin. In Francis' terms, they moved from a rural predominantly solidaristic background into an urban predominantly individualistic milieu. This entailed a transfer from a particularistic ascriptive oriented society into a much more universalistic and achievement oriented type of society. If one further takes into account the vast differences which exist between the "host" society and the society of origin in terms of overt cultural characteristics, as well as the institutionalised racial barriers which had already become part of the South African scene at the time of the arrival of the Indians, it is not surprising that they soon developed into fairly closed communities wherever they settled. Our study therefore lends broad support to Francis' hypothesis that segregated ethnic communities tend to come into being when members of a parent society are transferred as individuals to a host society which is not isomorphic with the parent society with regard to the important elements of social organization, with the only difference being that in our case the Indians did not always immigrate strictly as individuals. The fact that they came from a few limited areas in India and South Africa, were in many cases related to each other, and tended to keep regular contact with their home communities, led to the formation of fairly tightly-knitted groups based on differences in regional background, language, and religious affiliation, rather than on wider ethnic affiliation.
3. Ecological Distribution

One of the first things that strikes one about the Cape Indian population is the fact that they did not settle in segregated pockets, as is often the case with immigrant communities all over the world. There are three major factors which have to be kept in mind when one tries to explain the present ecological pattern of the Cape Indians: (a) the occupational structure of the community; (b) the traditional Indian pattern of working and living on the same premises; and more recently, (c) the proclamation of Indian "group areas" in Cape Town.

The majority of Koknis and Gujaratis were either traditionally traders or started making a living in Cape Town after arrival by means of petty business or hawking. The Hindus were mostly trained in some craft linked with their specific sub-caste, such as shoe repairing, tailoring, etc. Most of the Indians have remained in these traditional occupations and it is only fairly recently that the better educated among them, especially in the younger generation, have been moving into a wider diversity of jobs and professions. Owing to the fact that there is only a limited demand for most of the occupations within which they make a living in a specified area, they were in a certain sense forced to disperse all over the Peninsula. They further tended to prefer to live on the same premises on which they practice their trade or occupation. This pattern is still prevalent today, the only exceptions being Indians who own fairly big concerns in built-up business areas, or who own or operate more than one establishment, in which case they may either stay at one of these, or in a part of the city where they are conveniently located with regard to their different businesses. When questioned about the reasons why they prefer to live directly
adjacent to their shop or establishment, most of them explained that it was to protect their property from burglary, and that they would not get any insurance against theft unless they stayed on the premises. Others also mentioned the inconvenience and cost of commuting daily to their business.

The fact that most of them are in business also accounts for the fact that such a large proportion of them are living along the main thoroughfares in densely populated non-White residential areas where they often control the bulk of the retail trade. This is true of the non-White areas of Retreat, Wynberg, large parts of Athlone, District Six and Salt River, certain areas in Maitland and virtually the whole of Windermere and the non-White sections of Elsies River. A glance at the maps in the Appendix shows, however, that they nowhere form a significant proportion of the total population — in none of the city wards or municipalities in fact more than 4%. There is a higher concentration of Indians in certain smaller areas, but only in three of the few hundred census tracts or sub-districts of the Cape Peninsula is the percentage of Indians to the rest of the population in excess of 10%. The highest was 43%, in a sparsely populated census tract of 309 people which falls within the proclaimed Indian area at Cravenby, Elsies River.

Even though Indians who belong to the same religious group, and apparently also those from the same home village or district, tend to congregate in the same general area, they more often than not, still live fairly far apart. This scattered nature of the Indian population has further contributed to the fragmentation of the community since regular

21) This was the impression gained from our sample. The sample was, however, too small to judge whether this was due to other factors or happened to be mere coincidence.
social contact tends to take place mainly within the kinship group, and to some extent, the wider caste or language group. It is interesting to note that A.C. Mayer similarly found in Vancouver that residence has little influence on the patterns of association among Indians.\(^{22}\) On the whole, then, the ecological factor has not encouraged contact between Indians on an ethnic basis. It would, in fact, be easier for most Indians to associate with the other ethnic groups among whom they are living. While some preferred to keep aloof of their neighbours, their physical proximity to members of the other racial groups has undoubtedly had some assimilative effect on them. It has already been mentioned that the Indians who, for example, do business in areas where they have regular White customers, were more approachable and at ease during interviews and appeared to be more "westernised" (depending, of course, also on other factors, such as length of residence in the Cape, level of education, etc.) The majority of Indians, however, live in predominantly Coloured or Malay neighbourhoods and tend to associate more closely with them.

The ecological picture has begun to change since the passing of the Group Areas Act and the proclamation of Cravenby and Rylands Estate (which immediately adjoins Athlone) as Indian areas. These two areas are calculated to be able to carry a population of about 12,000,\(^{23}\) although less than 10% of the total Indian population of the Cape are living there at the moment. Most of these are Hindus, the majority of them Tamils, who are working in service industries and other

\(^{22}\) He found that "visiting follows lines of kinship and common interest rather than mere propinquity. The closeness of contacts which an East Indian may have with other East Indians can vary greatly, and depends on the degree to which he attends the temple gatherings far more than on his place of residence." A Report on the East Indian Community in Vancouver, 1959.

\(^{23}\) This figure was quoted by an official of the Department of Community Development.
skilled and semi-skilled jobs and live away from their work according to the modern industrial pattern. Although the Group Areas Act was originally intended, inter alia, to prevent members from any race to own and run businesses outside their own areas, the present government seems to have accepted tacitly that this is, for the time being at least, not feasible as far as the Indians are concerned, owing to the fact that such a large number of them are economically dependent on trade. Since few of the older Indians are trained in other skills it will be very difficult for them to find an equally remunerative occupation at this stage. For this reason a large number of Indians have been granted permits which allow them to continue to trade (and live, in most cases) outside their own areas. It is, however, virtually impossible for them to acquire new property and expand their businesses in these non-Indian areas, because of the legal restrictions placed on this under the Group Areas Act.

Hardly any of the respondents interviewed were wholly in favour of Group Areas. The most positive comments came from those who stated that while the Group Areas are now an accomplished fact, the Indians should co-operate with the government to make the best of the situation. Others, however, complained that the improvement of the economic position of the Indians was being hampered by the provisions of the Act; that those who had to sell their property in order to move to an Indian area had to accept very low prices or were insufficiently remunerated for it by the government; that roads and other facilities such as public transport, street-lighting and sanitation were lacking in the Indian areas, especially Rylands; that if they went there, they would be

24) Normally, a person can only be forced to move to a "group area" if the housing there is at least as good, or better, than that which he is occupying at that moment.
forced to live with some Indians who have a lower socio-economic level than their own, or who might be more orthodox and intolerant religiously, etc. Few, however, objected to the fact that Hindus and Moslems will be thrown together in this way. The most general reaction to the Group Areas seemed to be one of insecurity. Many appeared to be living in a constant fear that they might suddenly be told to evacuate their home or business to move to an Indian area.

If political and other conditions in South Africa allow the full implementation of the Group Areas Act, the Indians of the Cape Peninsula will eventually be residentially segregated into two relatively small townships. Since it is unlikely that all the Indians of working age will be able to find employment, or sustain themselves economically, within these areas, it will, as far as the majority of economically active individuals are concerned, lead to a separation of locality of work and of residence according to the modern industrial pattern. Such a development can be expected to have far-reaching consequences for the social structure of the Indian community. It will probably lead to a weakening of the solidarity of the family system, as well as its close links with other institutional systems (particularly the economic). This will increase the already established tendency toward occupational diversification within the community, and, possibly, a greater participation of Indian women in the labour force. On the whole, this can only accelerate the assimilation of the Indian community into the "Western way of life" on the cultural level, not so much as a result of social or other forms of contact, but because of the di-

rect impact of urban and industrial processes. On the other
hand, the Indian population, or at least the Hindu and Moslem
sections of it, may become increasingly integrated and homo-
geneous communities in themselves because of the close social
contact and the fact that they will have to co-operate in
matters of local government, welfare, education, and so forth,
according to the intentions of the present government. In
spite of the assimilative impact of these economic and social
forces, it will, however, still take a long time before the
different barriers of language, regional origin, and caste
are completely broken down within the Indian community, that
is, if it ever happens. In the last analysis there are too
many uncontrollable variables which might in time intervene
to change the situation totally. The socio-cultural pat-
terns which do emerge as a result of assimilation are, never-
theless, less likely to represent the common denominator of
elements found in the different sections of the Indian popu-
lation, than some new set of institutional patterns which
show as much the impact of elements and forces — essentially
"Western", as this term is commonly used — from outside the
community. To the extent that such emerging patterns come
to resemble those found in, say, the South African Coloured,
or even White, community, a situation of mere institutional
duplication will arise: i.e. one in which institutional ar-
rangements within the Indian community will be essentially
similar to, but socially and physically separated from, those
in other sections of the South African population.
CHAPTER VI

SOLIDARITY PATTERNS
IN THE CAPE INDIAN COMMUNITY

It should be clear from the preceding discussion that the Cape Indians by no means constitute a single unified and homogeneous ethnic group, but that there are a complex set of intersecting identities and loyalties which both serve to unite and divide the community. In this chapter we shall turn to a more detailed analysis of these, often shifting, bases of alignment, first investigating the structural patterns of solidarity and then inquiring into the dynamic factors operating to maintain or change such patterns.

1. Structural Solidarity

A. The Primary Level

A very wide range of primary social systems exist in the Cape Indian community which form the basis for the cohesion of the larger collectivity. It is important for our purpose to note to what extent the boundaries of such concrete primary groups coincide with, or cut across, other crucial socio-cultural variables. We shall consider three major categories of groups on this level viz. (i) the family and wider kinship group; (ii) voluntary, "social" and recreational associations which operate chiefly through the medium of small intimate groups; (iii) primary religious and educational groups; and (iv) work groups.

(i) Family and kinship: Without doubt, the family is the most fundamental solidary unit among Indians. Together with language and the institution of caste, to which kinship is closely related, "it gives meaning and supplies the basis to all other aspects of Indian culture." 1) The joint family

1) Cf. p. 108.
has traditionally been the basic household and kinship unit in India, and this family pattern has also been transplanted to overseas territories where Indians settled in any appreciable numbers, though often in a somewhat modified form. 2)

Ideally the joint family consisted of related family members (usually a married couple with their married sons and other unmarried children) living under one roof, sharing one kitchen, holding common property and operating on one budget, having centralized authority (normally vested in the father or oldest male in the household) and exercising common worship. Often married sons would also live in their own homes immediately adjacent to the parent home and within the same compound. 3)

The joint family still appears to be of some importance among the Cape Indians. Of the households in our sample, 43% consisted of complex units, that is, were composed of more than only a single nuclear family. About a third of these cases had a single relative attached to the household. In a number of instances non-relatives were also reported to be boarding with the family. Most of these were shop-assistants working in the family concern, and they were probably either remotely related to the family in question, or were from the same home village. They always seemed to be of the same religo-linguistic group as their hosts. Probably the same situation existed in the single case in which two unrelated families were reported to be sharing the same living accommodations.

1) I. Karve: Kinship Organization in India, quoted in Aileen D. Ross: The Hindu Family in its Urban Setting, c1961, p. 3.


Of the total sample, 17% could be classified as joint families consisting of more than one related nuclear family within one household. The proportion for Hindus and Moslems was more or less the same. The figure seems to be high in view of the fact that the study was done in an urban area in which living accommodations are designed for relatively small family units, and in an environment in which the pattern of joint family habitation is not at all common, or is, in fact, frowned upon. The relatively large size of Indian families should also be taken into account. The average number of children per nuclear family who are living with their parents turned out to be 4.2 in our sample. But it is precisely because the Indian family has continued to be viewed not only as a consumption unit, but also as the major production unit in both retail trade and the traditional crafts, in which family members and relatives are an economic asset, that the joint family pattern has showed such remarkable resilience even in a largely "Western" urban setting. In our case it was probably also reinforced by the whole process of migration, the dependence of new arrivals on help from established members in the Cape Indian community, and their lack of other skills needed for participation in a differentiated industrial economy. Since the passing of the Group Areas Act it has also been very difficult, if not impossible, for Indian families to find housing outside the proclaimed Indian areas, which, however, have until recently remained largely undeveloped. This might have induced some married couples to prefer the inconvenience of a crowded existence rather than moving out to Cravenby or Rylands, particularly if that meant living far from the family business or the husband's job.

4) Generally speaking the Moslems seemed to have larger families than the Hindus; 36.7% of them had five or more children, whereas this was true of only 22.2% of the Hindu families.
The Indian family in Cape Town is undoubtedly a very cohesive unit. The children would spend virtually all their time outside school hours at home since they are expected to help in the family business or trade, which, in the case of produce markets and small cafés, may operate from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m. Neither are children, as a rule, allowed to go out without an escort. Parental control over young unmarried girls is particularly strict. One such young woman related to me that she was not allowed to receive any telephone calls from male acquaintances. Young men, however, are accorded considerably more freedom and there are indications that norms with regard to parental control are changing rapidly. Generally speaking, the wishes of the parents concerning their children's education, occupation, and marriage partner nonetheless play an important, and often decisive, role in determining the life course of the individual until such time as he establishes a home of his own.

The traditional role of parents in choosing a spouse for their child is well known. It seems that at present some Indian parents in Cape Town still take full initiative in this regard. While the son or daughter involved would undoubtedly be consulted, or would even pass a hint to the parents concerning some eligible person in whom he/she is interested, the parents would take responsibility for negotiating the whole matter with the parties involved. Children would rarely proceed with a relationship which is not sanctioned by their parents, although the incidence of unions contracted without the parents' approval is probably on the increase as the marriage-for-love ideology gains ascendancy.

It appeared that children from second or third generation Cape Indian families who reside in the older Coloured and Malay neighbourhoods (such as the Wards excluded from our sample) were allowed more latitude with regard to virtually everything. Parents tend to take a "what else can we do" type of attitude toward this phenomena.
One Kokni remarked laconically: "It is not what the parents choose, but what the heart desires."

Rules of endogamy and exogamy are of particular importance for primary group cohesion within the family context since it is the most basic determinant of group exclusiveness. Although the absolute numbers involved do not appear to be great, the table below shows a consistent increase until 1950 in the incidence of intermarriage in South Africa between Indians and Coloureds 6) (this latter category, as we have noted, includes Malays):

Table IX: Average annual incidence of Indian/Coloured marriages in South Africa 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Indian women/ Coloured men</th>
<th>Indian men/ Coloured women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925-29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-39</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-54</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-57</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the increase in mixed marriages between 1930 and 1950 is more or less offset by the increase of the Indian population during the same period, it should be borne in mind that the initial unfavourable sex ratio improved greatly, in the case of Cape Town, particularly since 1940. 8) One would therefore also have expected a corresponding decrease in the

6) Since there are relatively few Coloureds resident in both Natal and the Transvaal, it is reasonable to accept that the majority of these marriages were contracted in the Cape.

7) Bureau of Census and Statistics: Marriages (all races), U.G. 38/58.

8) As we have pointed out in the previous chapter (cf. Table VIII), the majority of Indian women in our sample, for example, arrived in Cape Town during or after World War II.
pressure to marry non-Indian women on the part of both single Indian men, as well as Moslem Indians contemplating a second union. The rectification of the unbalanced sex ratio within the Indian community might partially explain the apparent decline of intermarriage between Indian men and Coloured women in more recent years, though the fact that this trend only becomes evident after 1950 makes it more plausible to believe that it is due to the increasing number of Indians who are "passing" as Malays, or classified as such under the Population Registration Act. Since those entering into mixed marriages are likely to seek such classification or claim themselves to be "Coloured", an increasing proportion of such marriages are probably not being reported. In fact, we encountered much evidence, verbal and otherwise, which indicated that intermarriage was on the increase, particularly in the Cape between Kokni-speaking Moslems and Malays. One respondent even claimed - with obvious exaggeration - that "today 80% of the Moslem Indians are married to Coloureds and Malays." Of the couples in our sample, 14.3% constituted a mixed marriage in the sense that one of the partners were either non-Indian or had a non-Indian parent.9) Thirteen of these sixteen cases involved Moslems. Of the Koknis interviewed, 30% further claimed that they had close relatives10) who were married to non-Indians.11) In fact, inter-racial marriages seemed to be much more common among Koknis than

9) It should be mentioned, however, that mixed couples might be over-represented in our sample since an effort was made to locate such couples in order to get a better insight into the dynamics of the process of integration. At the same time, the fact that the areas which probably have the highest rate of intermarriage were excluded from our sample, should be kept in mind.

10) This was defined as being within two degrees.

11) This figure should, of course, not be taken to represent the statistical incidence of interracial marriage since a number of our respondents might have been, and probably were related, and would therefore have been referring to some of the same cases of "mixed" marriages.
unions with other non-Kokni-speaking Indians, which points to the predominance of the principle of religious endogamy over that of racial or ethnic endogamy. Even the instances of unions with Coloureds could not be viewed as a breach of the principle of religious endogamy in any strict sense of the word, since such marriages are usually contingent on the condition that the Christian Coloured party (in most cases this involves a woman) accept Islam. It appeared that even though Kokni parents would resent their children marrying outside their own ethnic group, they usually accepted it in the long run if the above provision was met. The same tendency therefore seems to be apparent in Cape Town as in Malaysia, where Indian Moslems have merged into the Islamic Malay community with little difficulty.  

As a rule, however, marriage in the Cape Indian community takes place within the limits set by religious, language and broad caste divisions. Many Koknis would also prefer to take origin and occupational-status considerations into account when reviewing a prospective spouse for their child.  

It appeared that the Gujarati-Hindus were least tolerant of violations of religio-linguistic and caste barriers, as well as, to a lesser extent, of gothra-relations and the principle of village exogamy. Because of the small size of the Gujarati community in Cape Town it is common practice for parents  

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13) It was difficult to determine the role of caste distinctions, since virtually all Kokni respondents vehemently denied the existence of such distinctions, usually concluding their denial with a recitation of the Islamic creed of the equality of all men. One respondent claimed that Mukkadam (traditionally an elite warrior caste) still largely marry within their own group. He also related how another Kokni "bragged about his descent" in his presence. He continued: "So, I told him: 'Don't be sectional. We live in the twentieth century, a democratic age.' So he asked: 'Can't I be proud of my ancestors?'" The issue of contention here might have been caste descent.
to seek spouses for their children in Natal or the Transvaal. 14) Most of the Gujeratis in Cape Town are from the Vaishya caste, but even within this broad division most marriages are contracted within the same jat (or jati). Of these caste sub-divisions the Mochi group (traditionally the shoe-maker's caste) is numerically the strongest and also otherwise the most influential group within the Hindu community of Cape Town. The Mochis, Hajams (traditionally hairdressers), and Danjees (tailors) each have their own mandal or association which holds monthly meetings to discuss matters pertaining to the welfare of their group, such as financial assistance to members, the education of their children, and religious matters. The cohesiveness of even these sub-castes among the Gujeratis is illustrated by the Hajam mandal, which, although it represents only about twenty families, according to one informant, still functions regularly. He claimed that there had as yet not been any marriages outside their caste and that anybody who would do so would definitely be ostracised. Another Mochi girl revealed with some bitterness that she had to "give up" a boy-friend of a higher caste, but then added: "In five years I shall probably be able to marry such a person." 15)

Hilda Kuper notes that the Gujeratis in Natal are likewise the only Indian group organised according to caste principles and adhering to some extent to traditional caste ideas. This is due to the fact that they came to South Africa as "passengers" and being economically better off, were in a position to maintain their ritual exclusiveness, retain close contact

14) This might, of course, also be a preference - or at least to find a suitable wife in a different city, since it is highly likely that most Gujeratis of a given caste in a city like Cape Town would know each other fairly well and come to look upon each other as "by-family" constituting an exogamous unit.

with their kin in India, and protect the relatively privileged position of their respective communities. 16)

Although the rules of endogamy operating in the Tamil community seem to be less stringent, marriage usually takes place within the same Varna or major caste division, such as Brahmin, Vaishya or Sudra. 17) In the Cape there is evidence of racial intermarriage within this group. Of the nine Tamil household units in our sample one represented a union between a Tamil man and a German-St. Helena woman, while five other respondents reported that they had close relatives (within two degrees) who were married to non-Indians. 18) Instances of intermarriage are, however, hardly accepted by the community as a whole. The man involved in the "mixed" union to which we referred above, was disinherited by his family as a result of it. He had not visited them since, although he said that his nephew sometimes looked him up. He immediately added: "But you see, he is of the younger generation."

Another Tamil respondent related that his mother was very upset when his brother married a Malay girl. The latter would, however, visit his home now and then, and even bring his wife along on occasion.

It would seem, then, that the family remains a very important and powerful primary unit in all sections of the Cape Indian community. It is noteworthy that racial intermarriage is apparently more common than that between people of different linguistic, religious or caste affiliations. In the family context - in which resistance is the greatest - assimilation

16) Ibid., pp. 30-33.

17) One survey in Durban revealed that 113 out of 120 Tamil marriages took place between people of the same Varna. Ibid., p. 31.

18) Two of these were Coloureds, one Malay, one White, and one was not specified.
thus appears to take place not by means of a graduated process, but by a clean break. One can hardly speak of any overlap of membership either within the Indian community or between it and other groups on this level, since those who intermarry more often than not effectively cease to be members of their group of origin and are actually "recruited" into their spouse's group or merely become members of the ill-defined "coloured" population. Only in the case of the Koknis and the Malays is there evidence of gradual assimilation through intermarriage, although the Kokni culture usually tends to remain dominant for some time.

A word remains to be said about the Christian Indians in Cape Town. Owing to the fact that only three Christian families were included in our sample, we shall risk only the following two preliminary impressions: Firstly, only the Roman Catholics seem to be numerous enough to form a relatively self-contained social group. According to informants their preference was to marry within this religo-ethnic group. Secondly, the rate of assimilation and intermarriage of Indian Christians particularly with the Coloured community, seems to be higher than is the case with the other groups. It is important to remember in this connection that some of these converts (most of them are ex-Hindus) have already been adherents of the Christian faith for a generation or more and that many of them had to face more or less complete ostracism on becoming Christians. The consequent need for reintegration into meaningful social relationships undoubtedly facilitated assimilation and the formation of separate communities wherever they were present in large enough numbers.

(ii) **Voluntary, "social" and recreational associations:**

All voluntary, sporting, "social" and like associations which exist to fulfil an immediate concrete purpose for its own
members, and which have as primary focus the satisfaction of specific needs - individual and collective - by means of face-to-face interaction, could be classified within the "primary" category. Some associations may be exclusively primary in nature while others may merely form a part of a larger organization comprised of a variety of additional non-primary structures. As we mentioned in Chapter I, that which is "produced" by such primary associations may vary from a marketable commodity to relaxation or "fun". This category, however, excludes associations which have as primary function the control of, or policy-making for, lower-level "executive" systems. Such associations would, of course, be classified in the institutional category.

Membership and participation in a variety of voluntary organizations is an important feature of the Cape Indian community. In approximately half of the cases interviewed one or more members of the family belonged to at least one such organization. This involved mostly the heads of households, although older sons sometimes also held independent memberships. Women were rarely involved. The overall incidence of membership, however, seems to be high in the light of comparable figures which were published recently for a number of other countries. In large samples drawn in five countries the proportions of membership in voluntary associations varied from 57% and 47% for the United States and Great Britain respectively to 25% for Mexico.

The profusion of voluntary organizations may be accounted

19) There were a few conspicuous and important exceptions to this. One Tamil woman was an executive member of several prominent organizations and had earlier served a term on the Goodwood Town Council. Another well-known and controversial woman had been member of the Cape Town City Council.

for in a number of ways. The ethnic and linguistic diversity within the Indian community itself, their allegiance to their respective cultural groups and resistance to assimilation, as well as the prevailing policy of segregation, were all factors that contributed to the emergence of a multiplicity of separate organizations. Coming from "solidaristic" backgrounds 21) and being largely excluded from participation in the larger society it seems logical that a need would develop for identification in small group relationships. Furthermore, sectional rivalries were often exploited by individuals with personal ambitions, to create separate associations. 22)

Considerable variation in associational membership showed up between different categories. While Koknis largely supported different Islamic religious and educational organizations as well as Traders' associations, Gujeratis, on the other hand, were more likely to support caste-based associations, other Hindu groups, and sports and recreational clubs. Indians from the younger age group who had settled in Cape Town after 1940 were much more likely to belong to associations. More than 60% of them claimed to hold membership in at least one organization compared to about 40% of those who had arrived in the Cape prior to 1940. The former group were also more likely to belong to non-sectarian associations such as charities, sports clubs, and "social" groups, in contrast to more narrowly religiously or group based organizations.

On examining specific types of associations more closely, it appeared that about a quarter of those in our sample who held membership in some body were involved in a sports or recreational club. Most of these clubs started out as exclusively

21) Cf. Chapter I, par. 2.
Indian organizations, but during the past fifteen years have opened their ranks to members of other races, notably Coloureds and Malays, and are today affiliated to major provincial or national non-White sporting bodies. Such changes are also reflected in new names for clubs as in the case of the erstwhile Western Province Indian Football Association which became the Western Province City and Suburban Football Club, or the Western Province Indian Cricket Union which became the United Cricket Club. Only a few bodies, such as the Universal Sports Club which is supported by Gujerati Hindus, are still exclusively Indian. Nonetheless, these clubs would on certain occasions compete with other non-White teams. While it was difficult to determine to what extent presently integrated clubs are still dominated by Indians, it would seem that sport undoubtedly is one of the areas in which the greatest number of contacts have been established on the primary level across racial, religious and linguistic barriers.

Few explicitly "socially" or "culturally" (in the more popular sense of these terms) oriented associations were reported which were not religiously based. Instances that did turn up, such as "The Young Morba Debating Society", "Sevasthra Orchestra", or Tamil Cultural Society, however, seemed to be sectional, based in a specific locality, and often very loosely and informally organised. They would easily dissolve when the members - generally a group of young men - drifted apart as a result of moving out of the area or getting married.

(iii) Primary religious and educational groups: In spite of the fact that the majority of associations among Cape Indians are ultimately related in some way to the major religious groupings among them, few primary groups exist which have immediate and explicit religious or educational aims.
some of the mosque societies, discussion groups which invite
speakers to lecture on Moslem theology, and smaller groups of
worshippers who meet in intimate surroundings, such as the
Sunday home meetings of members of the Divine Life Society.
It is important to note, however, that religious or education-
al activities which are attended by large numbers of indivi-
duals as a congregation, audience or student body, often pro-
vide the setting for face-to-face contact and the development
of closer friendships. Such contact would then be main-
tained on an informal basis at home, and, in the case of
youngsters, on the school playground or in front of the cor-
ner grocer's shop. These settings of potentially large-
scale contact, therefore, assume some importance in terms of
the extent to which they generate divisive forces on the one
hand, or integrative forces on the other, within the Cape In-
dian community as well as the larger local non-white commu-
nity.

Looking at education, it is clear that the secular public day-
schools which virtually all Indian children attend, unless
their parents send them abroad for education, constitute im-
portant channels for inter-ethnic assimilation between non-
whites.\(^{23}\) The South African educational system is largely
egalitarian and undifferentiated - both in terms of status
and curriculum - within the prevailing pattern of segregation.
This is symbolised, for example, in the "uniform", or stan-

\(^{23}\) Since most of the Africans are residentially segregated
in "locations" and most of their children attend schools
there, this applies mainly to Indians, Coloureds and Mal-
leys. It is possible that at least the Coloureds, Afri-
cans and Indians will be segregated "out" into separate
schools in the future (as is already the case to a
larger extent in Natal) in keeping with the overall po-
licy of the government of bringing independent central-
ised Departments of Education into being for the major
racial groups. It seems, however, as if it would still
be some time before a separate school, or schools for In-
dians in the Cape, would be feasible, even if only be-
cause of their dispersed pattern of residence.
standard outfit of distinctive clothing, that all pupils are required to wear at many primary and secondary schools. This somewhat democratic educational atmosphere seems to have encouraged social contact across group boundaries within schools. A number of Indian parents remarked that their children have a number of – or even largely – Coloured and Malay playmates whom they have met at school or in the neighbourhood. Some of these friendships are maintained after students leave school, notably in the case of young unmarried men who, in the first place, are likely to have developed more inter-ethnic ties owing to the greater freedom of movement and association allowed them by their parents.

The Habibia Moslem Educational Institute is the only large government accredited day-school catering to some extent for sectional interests. The various Indian sub-communities, who are generally aware of the assimilative pressures on the young, have, as soon as their numbers and resources enabled them to, founded separate vernacular and religious schools which operate in the late afternoons after public school classes. These schools are financed by members of the local community, usually administered by an appointed or elected board, and staffed by vernacular teachers from Natal or India. The Ghandi Memorial School came into being in this way in Newlands to serve the Hindu community, and, more recently, the Tamil school in Rylands. Although the Ghandi Memorial School is reported to be open to all Hindus and Moslems it is virtually exclusively supported and run by the Gujerati

24) This requirement has undoubtedly been one of the factors which have contributed to the fact that so few of the younger generation of Indians still wear traditional dress as a matter of course.

25) This represents Moslem rather than Indian interests, since a large proportion of the students are, again, Coloured and Malay. Indians, however, have a prominent part in the school's controlling board.
The approximately 150 enrolled students take lessons in Sanskrit, Gujerati, Hindi, in addition to regular religious instruction.

The Moslem equivalent of the Hindu vernacular school is the madressa (or madrissa) where instruction is given in elementary Islamic theology, Koranic literature, Arabic, and, in some of those attended by Indian children, Urdu. As a rule the madressa is run by the local imam (Moslem priest) as an adjunct to the mosque. As in the case of the mosques themselves which are attended by all Moslem males, Indian children in many madressas probably constitute a minority among the Malay and Coloured children who attend. Unlike earlier years when certain mosques were exclusively Indian, most mosques are now "integrated", although one or two like the Chapel Street mosque are, according to informants, still predominantly patronised by Indians.

As can be expected, Indian Christians are exposed most to contact with other ethnic groups within the religious context since the majority of them attend predominantly Coloured churches. The Hindu community, on the other hand, have up to this time been the most isolated of the Cape Indian groups due to the fact that their religion is not shared by members of any of the other ethnic groups. Even the Gujerati and Tamil Hindus generally still each go their own ways, though they cooperate on occasion. Sometimes this is out of necessity. I attended a Tamil wedding at which a Gujerati priest was officiating because there was no qualified Tamil person in Cape Town who could take charge. There are also recent indications that the religious exclusivism of the Hin-

26) A small church centre built specifically for Indians has been opened in Rylands by the Dutch Reformed Church since the completion of this study.
(iv) Work groups: Since the majority of Indians are engaged either in a family concern or some relatively independent occupation, few opportunities arise to develop extra-familial primary relationships on the job. The family and occupational structures, being so closely related, actually reinforce each other. The only situation of any consequence in which closer work relationships can be established, and, in fact, have apparently already been, exists in the catering trade in which a considerable number of Hindus have been employed as waiters. Since the few hotels and restaurants which hire Indians seem to rely mainly on them, while other employers hire Coloureds, there is little likelihood that an inter-ethnic occupational solidarity based on primary contacts will develop here.

B. The Managerial Level

When one turns to examine the next of Parson's four levels of structural organization, one finds that few differentiated roles and collectivity structures have developed in the larger Indian community specifically for regulating the different types of social interchange between the primary systems we have described, or between them and other systems in the society. The main factors which seem to be responsible for the fact that coordinating functions of the managerial type

27) Cf. pp. 138-139.

28) At the first open meeting of the Cape Indian Peoples' Alliance in 1962 the Hindus in the catering trade, although not explicitly mentioned, and particularly their acknowledged leader and spokesman, who was mentioned by name, were a frequent target of the predominantly Moslem leadership of C.I.P.A. who denounced them as "traitors". A few supporters of this faction who repeatedly tried to defend themselves were either shouted down, or motioned by the chairman to sit down. In a private conversation a member of the C.I.P.A. executive referred to these workers with obvious disdain as "plate slingers".
have either been poorly developed or largely unnecessary, are the following: firstly, the small and relatively undifferentiated character of most primary systems in the Indian community as well as their internal cohesion; secondly, the isolation of these groups from each other and from the rest of the population, which obviates the necessity of mediating functions; and, thirdly, the fact that such a large proportion of the Indians are self-employed, i.e. are working in a small family business or practicing an independent profession, and are therefore not in job situations which tend to develop bureaucratic super-structures. Finally, most of the lower-level governmental managerial functions are, at this stage, still fulfilled "for" the Indians by the Department of Community Development, increasingly by the Department of Indian Affairs, or the particular local municipal authorities of the areas in which they are resident. It is, of course, the declared policy of the present government that this should change as the principles of separate development are implemented.

In the religious and educational spheres one finds that the different mosques, organizations, and schools supported or controlled by Indians are generally small enough to be run at the "executive" level by one or two individuals. The same is true of the larger Indian-owned stores, dry cleaners' and other concerns, in which a relative or otherwise a person from the same religo-linguistic group as the owner would most commonly hold the position of manager. In instances where Indians are involved or employed in larger organizations, "managerial" control is usually in the hands of either a mixed non-white staff, as for example, in the Habibia School, or in the case of hotels, restaurants, and other businesses, held by Whites. This constitutes the first important horizontal inter-level division coinciding with racial
and economic differences.

C. The Institutional Level

In contrast to the managerial level one finds a large variety of policy-making bodies in the Indian community. The most obvious characteristic of the majority of these bodies is, again, that they have come into existence to attend to the needs and interests of the religo-linguistic sub-groups, and in the case of the Moslems, a broader religious group. The different Hindu mandals, their parent organization, the United Hindu Association, the Tamil Cultural Society and the Cape Tamil Institute have already been mentioned. To this list the Cape Town branch of the Kokkie Moslem League has to be added, as well as the numerous mosque committees, the trustees of the Habibia Orphanage and of different community scholarship and educational aid funds, the Moslem Propagation Centre, and the editorial committees of the "Muslim News" and other lesser Moslem publications in Cape Town. It also appeared that Kokkies coming from the same town or village in India have, in some instances, formed associations to support certain community projects at home. Examples of this is the Dapoli Muslim Educational Society and the Daswell Educational and Welfare Society of Cape Town, which, according to one informant, has a membership of close on 300 persons.

The prime function of the majority of these organizations is the protection and maintenance of the core values of the group they serve, even though the range of their activities vary greatly.29) They, therefore, help to preserve the se-

29) In reply to a question as to what the functions of the mandals are, a respondent, for example, replied that, amongst others, the mandal would "take action" if it seemed that a Gujarati youth is drifting into delinquency. (He, however, did not explain what kind of "delinquency" would prompt action, and what such action would entail.)
parate identities of the different Indian communities, and were, in certain instances, called into being specifically for this purpose. It appears that as soon as the numbers of a particular sub-group increases to a point where this is possible, they would set up different organizations to serve their sectional interests and counteract incipient assimilational pressures. The founding of the Tamil school, and the other communal activities which go with it, as soon as a sufficient number of Tamil families had moved to Rylands, is a case in point. A member of the community justified it as follows: "You see, it is like this. Being a minority we stand in danger of eventually disappearing as a group if we intermarr.y with other groups" (he was, incidentally, here referring to intermarriage with non-Tamil Indians). Their sensitivity to the measure of assimilation that has already taken place, was also brought out by an argument between a father and his son which the investigator overheard, in the course of which the latter insisted that there were very few of his generation who could speak Tamil, while his father maintained that most of them could, but were only reluctant to use it in the company of their peers for fear of ridicule.

Reference has been made a number of times to the fact that the various Moslem bodies are more inclusive than most of the other sectional Indian organizations. It is important to note, however, that Moslem Indians, and notably Koknis, play a dominant role in Moslem organizations, or at least a role out of proportion with their numbers. One of them admitted

30) H.S. Morris notes the same phenomenon in Uganda: "Whenever the numbers of a particular caste or sect grow large enough for the members to consort with one another, it is not long before they emerge as a distinct "community" group in matters other than purely recreational ones, and the community's organisation begins to take over tasks formerly undertaken by (a) united Indian organisation." Cf. "Communal rivalry among Indians in Uganda", British Journal of Sociology, 1957, Vol. 8, pp. 306-307.
that "... Indians, being generally better off financially (than Coloureds and Malays), contribute more to the efforts of religious bodies and as a result often control them."

The same is true of the number of traders' associations which have come into existence in the Cape. The largest of these, the Cape Indian Traders' Association, changed its name in 1962 to the Cape Peninsula Traders' Association, thus removing the label "Indian" and throwing "its doors ... open to all traders, irrespective of race, creed or colour." 31) Yet, on this occasion only one non-Indian, a Malay who is a leading figure in the Cape Moslem community, was elected to the executive of six members. 32) The Moslem Butchers' Association and other local bodies like the Athlone-Crawford Traders' Association and Grassy Park Shopkeepers' Association, are all largely controlled by Indians. It has to be kept in mind, though, that this does not necessarily point to a general dominance of Indians in non-White organizations, but may merely reflect the fact that the bulk of the retail trade in certain non-White residential areas is in the hands of Indians.

A few prominent Indian community leaders are also taking an active part in certain "open" non-White, or completely non-racial, associations which function largely on the institutional level, such as CAPDA (representing a welfare organization: The Cape Flats Distress Association), the Cape Concert Club, the Eoan Group, 33) and the country-wide non-racial National Council of Women. This indicates an in-

31) "Muslim News", June 1, 1962.

32) The larger committee of 45 traders, with one or two exceptions (one of them a Tamil man), were all Moslems, which means that the Gujarati shopkeepers were not represented at all.

33) This is a very successful non-White arts and performing group located in Cape Town, which annually offers a number of opera, ballet and other musical presentations.
creasing integration of a small core of Indian elite into the larger social and cultural life of the Cape and the growing acceptance of universalistic rather than particularistic status-criteria.\textsuperscript{34)} This broader involvement as yet only effects a few individuals from the Tamil and Kokni communities, and has little impact on the Indian community as a whole, even though these individuals are all prominent members of their respective groups. Their participation represents more the social mobility of a few persons who "commute" between different institutional structures, than the actual contact of these structures with each other. The influence of this process on assimilation between the larger groups can therefore easily be over-emphasized.\textsuperscript{35)}

The only other participation of Indians in non-sectarian bodies on the institutional level worth mentioning, is that of some Moslems who serve on the school committees of a few non-white public schools which are otherwise predominantly Coloured.

D. The Societal Level

This level of organization concerns the political and legislative units exercising regulative functions within an autonomous political whole, in modern times typically the nation-

\textsuperscript{34)} This process has undoubtedly gone much further in Natal, which should be ascribed, at least partially, to the greater proportion of Indians who have enjoyed some higher education. Cf. Chapter II, Par. 3; Hey: Op. cit., and Hilda Kuper: Op. cit., Chapters III-IV.

\textsuperscript{35)} Morris points out that many Indian leaders in East Africa who have gained influence within their own caste and sectarian organizations, would use their position as a springboard to gain access into an East African "upper class" which transcends the boundaries of sectarianism, ethnicity and race. As is the case in the Cape, however, they do not seem to be in the vanguard of a process of wholesale integration, since they continue to play a dual set of roles. Cf. H. Stephen Morris: "Indians in East Africa: A Study in a Plural Society", British Journal of Sociology, 1956, Vol. VII, p. 210.
state. It includes not only centralized legislative and administrative authorities, but also the various levels of regional and local government, because of their relationship to national political units to which they are directly or indirectly responsible.

Non-whites are, of course, more or less excluded from effective participation in government on the national level in South Africa, since they hold no franchise in elections for the central parliament. The only exception to this are the Coloureds and Indians in the Cape, who, as we have noted, can elect four white representatives on a separate voters' role. It is as yet too early to tell what role the National Indian Council will play and what measure of autonomous authority will be granted to it. When he announced the first members of the Council, the Minister of Indian Affairs, Mr. Maree, indicated clearly that the Council as it is constituted at present should only be looked upon as a temporary advisory body until such time as a permanent elected council can be brought into being. He, however, did not indicate the limits of authority such a permanent statutory body would have. Two Indians from the Cape Peninsula were appointed to the interim council of 21 members, the one a well-known Tamil woman and the other a Gujerati businessman.

The Coloureds and Indians in the Cape have also retained municipal franchise and can be elected to office in local government. The woman mentioned above served for some years on the Goodwood City Council, and the Cape Town City Council has for many years had at least one Indian councillor. Because of the relatively small number of Indians in the Peninsula and their scattered residence it would be virtually im-

36) Chapter II, Par. 3 (iv).
possible for a candidate to be elected in any of the municipal electoral divisions only on the basis of an Indian vote along ethnic lines. Thus, campaigning Indian candidates have had to seek support from other predominantly non-White ethnic groups in order to be elected. It is, therefore, not surprising that Indians who have been active in local politics have also been those who participate most actively in non-sectarian and non-racial associations, since this offers the opportunity of building up a wider range of social and political alliances.

Although the Indians have no representation in the national legislature there have been several Indian political organizations in the Cape, which, like the ones in Natal, have claimed to speak for the Indian people and have pressed for an extension of political rights. They have addressed themselves mainly to matters of national policy and seeing that their concerns therefore pertain chiefly to the societal level they can be discussed here.

In Chapter II we reviewed the history of national Indian political organizations up to the present. Most of them originated in Natal, which was also their chief locus of activity and support. Few of the early movements seem to have affected the Indians in the Cape, probably because of their small numbers and the relatively more privileged political position which they shared with the Coloureds at that time. A branch of the Indian Congress was, however, established in the Cape between the two world wars. In the forties Cape Indians supported the passive resistance campaigns of Indians

38) It was difficult to get complete and reliable information on political movements among Indians in the Cape since there are hardly any documentary sources one can refer to, leaving the memories of early participants in these movements as the only source of data.
in the Transvaal and Natal against the 1943 "Pegging Act" and the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946. At about the same time that the split between the Congress and Natal Indian Organization occurred in Natal, the Cape Indian Congress, which unlike its Natal counterpart, seems to have been taking a line too "soft" to the liking of a number of Indian leaders, was replaced by the Cape Indian Association under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed Zamaneah of Pretoria. It, however, became defunct after his death in 1949. With the wave of new legislation in the early fifties under the Nationalist government a new organization was once more brought into being, this time called the Cape Indian Assembly. It specifically sought to fight the threatened removal of Coloureds (and Cape Indians) from the common voters’ role as well as Group Areas legislation, both acts which affected Indians in the Cape more directly than any earlier segregatory legislation. The Cape Indian Assembly was affiliated with the Natal Indian Congress which was becoming increasingly radical during these years, causing some of the Indian leaders in the Cape to withdraw their support from the Assembly. Within a year or two this organization, however, also appears to have died a natural death.

It was not until 1962 when the government announced its intention to found a national Indian council, and the newly created Department of Indian Affairs started contacting a number of prominent Indians in the Cape for consultation, that a new movement arose. In March the Cape Indian Peoples' Alliance was founded to oppose the formation of the National Indian Council. Hindus were poorly represented at the first open meeting of C.I.P.A. which was attended by approximately 400 people. Among the twelve executive members who were elected only two were Hindus (one, again, being a Tamil
man), and virtually all the others Kokni Mosleems. At the time of the founding of C.I.P.A. emotions ran high, but after a few months it was already apparent that it would probably suffer the same fate as its predecessors, none of which were officially dissolved, but merely became defunct for lack of sustained interest and support. Those organizations seem to have had two further features in common: they were all founded around specific and immediate political issues and as soon as they proved to be unable to exercise any effective influence on the outcome of these issues they died a slow death. Thus, although they were basically opposed to overall government policies and at variance with the ideology on which it is based, at least in the case of the Nationalist government, they were unable to attain any long-run political goals since they had no effective means of implementing such goals. Secondly, most of the impetus in these organizations came from a relatively small group of leaders who easily became divided among themselves as a result of personal or group differences.

It should be mentioned here that a few of these Indian leaders have also been active in local inter-racial anti-Group Areas committees or took a part in the now banned Coloured Peoples' Congress and the wider left-wing Congress Alliance movement.

Excluding the one or two Indian councillors in Cape Town, the government and administration of Indians, on both the local and national levels, is therefore in the hands of non-Indians, whether it be the "White" parliament, the Department of Indian Affairs which as yet only employs Indians in the lower administrative echelons, or local municipal councils which in the Cape, though predominantly White, are non-racial (excluding Africans). It is only in the latter case that In-
dians who qualify can exercise political influence through their vote. It was also clear that, apart from the fact that Indians have very little opportunity for participation on the societal level, the bulk of them in the Cape Peninsula also manifest very little sustained political interest, if at all. This lack of interest is in all probability not unrelated to the limited opportunity for direct participation.

E. Summary

We have largely limited ourselves in this section to a discussion of the formal structural lines of division running through the Cape Indian community, as manifested by membership and participation in more or less organized collectivities which function within different structural levels of society. The picture which emerges from such an investigation is a highly complex one. A few general and important observations, however, impress themselves upon one. They concern both the "vertical" and the "horizontal" structural solidarity of the Indian community in its "internal" aspects as well as in its relation to the larger South African society.

Looking at the Indian population of the Cape separately from the larger context, one is struck by the fact that it constitutes neither an integrated nor a completely developed social system in the "modern" or Western sense of the term. More specifically, important vertical divisions run through the Indian population across the primary and institutional levels, as well as, to some extent, the managerial level. We have seen that these coincide largely with religious and linguistic divisions. Furthermore, looking only at the Indian population, one notices that regulative functions are poorly developed, or even absent, on both the managerial and societal levels; or, to put it in another way, that it hard-
lly seems to have organizations which have differentiated out on these levels. We have noted some features of the Indian community which might explain why large-scale managerial organizations have not yet developed within it. However, looking at any population group "separately from the larger context" in which it is lodged in an age of nation-states and large-scale political units, such as these remarks imply, is an artificial analytical exercise of doubtful value. It obscures the fact that the Indians are related to a larger political and social whole and that the majority of regulative functions on the societal level are fulfilled, or effected, by Whites. Insofar as individual Indians are employed in larger organizations, this is also true on the managerial level. There are, therefore, important horizontal cleavages separating the societal and managerial levels from the other, primarily along racial lines. On the managerial level the cleavage is tied up with the traditional as well as present occupational structure of the various sections of the Indian population, which has resulted in the fact that most of them are self-employed as independent craftsmen or petty tradesmen; their level of education and training in particular skills, which qualifies few of them for executive positions; and, of course, the whole legal and political structure of South African society as a whole. On the societal level it is more directly related to the limited political privileges granted to non-Whites, including the Indians.

We have seen that the horizontal cleavages, although significant, are not as clear-cut as the above remarks would imply, since Cape Indians, together with the Coloureds, have some indirect representation on the societal level, and in local government, direct representation on a non-racial basis. This situation may change soon since the government has al-
ready indicated that it intends to withdraw these limited common voting rights in exchange for such measure of self-govern-ment as will be possible for Indians and Coloureds under the policy of separate development.

It has furthermore, been indicated that Indians also partici-pate in a number of integrated non-White managerial struc-tures, particularly in the Moslem community. It is, further-more, only in this religious community, which to some extent overlaps with a section of the Indian population, that there was evidence of less distinct horizontal cleavage along eth-nic and economic lines, insofar as the Kokni Indian Moslems seem to take more initiative and exercise a greater amount of control in Moslem organizations, schools, etc. This has also been true in non-White trading associations and the va-rious abortive and more or less powerless political movements, in which Moslem Indians have played a leading role.

A closer look at the "vertical" divisions running through the Indian community, reveals that at some points the structural boundaries of the main religo-linguistic groups are, like- wise, not as clearly drawn as would appear on first inspec-tion. As can be expected, diversity is most apparent on the institutional level owing to the crucial importance that structures on this level have for maintaining the cultural identity of the various groups. Among Gujerati Hindus a limited measure of separation is even maintained on this le-vel by the different castes represented in Cape Town. Mos-lem Indians, on the other hand, tend to identify more close-ly with co-religionists than with fellow-Indians, giving rise to a considerable amount of ethnic assimilation.39) We have also noted that a small group of leading individuals

among the Indians participate actively in the life of the relatively small non-racial "middle-class" of the Cape Peninsula.

With respect to the primary level we noted the importance, and resilience, of the kinship system. There are indications, however, that the solidarity of kinship units are being eroded among Tamil and Kokni Indians as a result of inter-ethnic friendship contacts, particularly among the younger generation, and the accompanying decline of parental authority. Such contacts are established in the neighbourhood where Indian families live, on the school playground, at the bioscope, in sports and recreational clubs, and, in a few instances, on the job. We shall have occasion to examine the extent of social mixing more closely in the section that follows. Nonetheless, one is struck not so much by the extent of the assimilation that has taken place, but rather by the fact that there has not been a greater measure of assimilation, taking into account the forces one would expect to be generated by the contact that is occurring daily.

It has been noted by several students of overseas Indian communities, amongst others by Leo Kuper in connection with the Indians in Natal, that when caste divisions cannot be maintained, their function is often taken over by cultural and linguistic divisions, which then become the main endogamous units.40) In Cape Town, however, there appears to have been

39) It was not possible to investigate the situation with regard to the small group of Gujarati Moslems, whose position, one would suspect, is much more complex. While they attend the regular mosques, and some of their children probably receive vernacular instruction at the Ghandi Memorial School, one would not expect them to identify too strongly with either the Gujarati Hindu community or the Cape Moslem community.

more cases of inter-ethnic than inter-caste marriage. It might be added that judging by our evidence, religion seemed to be a more important principle of endogamy than language, with broad caste affiliation being about as important as language. The greater readiness of Indians in the Cape to make a radical break with their community by marrying outside it, might be explained in several ways. Not only is there a wider range of choice of prospective partners for the marginal Indian who is willing to consider the possibility of marrying outside his particular caste group, but there is also the presence of the large and somewhat ill-defined Coloured community with which such a person could identify and in which he and his spouse could be socially accepted with little difficulty. On the other hand, a person who marries outside approved caste boundaries (and these have, of course, also changed in the Cape) but still within his religo-linguistic community, is not likely to find many other fellow-deviants who would be able to lend social support to his newly founded household primarily because of the relatively small numbers of these religo-linguistic groups in Cape Town. At the same time, the small size of the caste communities facilitates tighter social control of the members, so that an individual might prefer to step clear from this control in one move as it were, rather than to continue to be subjected to it partially by staying within the larger religo-linguistic group.

A last remark needs to be made here concerning the interlevel structural integration of the various sections of the

41) That is, if we consider only the broader caste divisions. It is difficult to tell whether this is actually the case among Koknis, owing to the absence of information on the role of caste distinctions in their community (cf. footnote 13, p. 113). One suspects, however, that caste intermarriage would in all probability be as widespread as the incidence of inter-ethnic marriage.
Indian population. We have noted that the Tamil community has few organizations which have differentiated out on the institutional level. Until recently the integration of this community was therefore largely dependent on the solidarity of social units on the primary level. In the case of the Kokni-speaking population less exclusive primary units have been linked with equally, if not more, ethnically integrated institutional organizations, particularly religious ones. In contrast, one has to ascribe the greater resistance that Gujaratis have shown to assimilation to the greater interdependence of primary systems, on the one hand, and religious and caste based institutional organizations, on the other, as well as to managerial systems, insofar as they exist. In this community structures on the different levels reinforce each other to a greater extent than is true in the other Indian groups. Nonetheless, cracks are already appearing in the solidary facade which the Gujarati community presents. During the period that this study was being conducted, the recognized leader of the Gujaratis, who for a long time had been the President of the United Hindu Association, the parent organization of the various mandals and a generally conservative body, relinquished his office to accept the position of President of the Divine Life Society, a reformist and more progressive religious group which has a few Tamil and also non-Indian members in Cape Town, even though the majority of its supporters are Gujaratis. This movement originated in India and has a considerable following in Natal, but it only started gaining noticeable support in the Cape during the late fifties after a Brahman adherent who came from Durban started organizing weekly prayer and worship meetings at various localities in the city. While this movement's philosophy is primarily based on Hindu principles, especially those of Yoga, it also urges followers to "study systematic-
ally ... the Bible, Imitation of Christ, and the Koran" next to the Hindu scriptures, and to "keep spiritual diary and self-correction register as Benjamin Franklin did." It still remains to be seen, however, what effect this split on the institutional level between orthodox and more progressive Hindus will have on other structures in the Gujarati community.

Having discussed the principle structural features of the Indian community at the Cape, we are in a position to turn to a more detailed consideration of the dynamic processes which are constantly shaping and reshaping these structures. Some of these processes have already been referred to briefly, since it is often difficult to understand social features identified in a formal structural analysis without relating them to the dynamics of the system, or systems, involved. In order to set the stage for a discussion of the processes of social conflict, accommodation, and assimilation affecting Cape Indians, some aspects of the patterns of cultural integration and of identification will first be examined.

2. Patterns of Cultural Integration

Indians differ in their views as to which the major cultural units are to which they belong. Some spoke vaguely of the "Eastern" culture they represent and of the contribution it has made, and is making, toward enriching the South African cultural scene. Tamils referred with pride to the fact that they were of "Dravidian stock", or to the level of sophistication that South Indian music has attained. Moslems, again, related the history of their forebears who invaded North In-

dia and converted many Hindus to Islam. Yet others, obviously sensitive to the prevailing views among Whites concerning "apartheid", emphasized that they were South Africans first and foremost and that the day would probably arrive when Indians would be indistinguishable as a group from other non-Whites.

In spite of such opinions the observer is struck by the fact that within the Indian population cultural differences exist which approach in magnitude those existing between Indians and other sections of the population. These differences, as we have pointed out, stem from the dichotomy between rural and urban origin, variations in regional background (including the broad distinction between Northern and Southern India), and, above all, differences of religion and language. In order to examine the influence of the latter factor, inquiry was made into the proficiency of Indians in languages other than those which they speak at home.\(^{43}\) The majority of Moslem Indians could also speak Urdu (in fact, more than two-thirds of the men) as well as one or both of the two regionally based dialects related to it, viz. Kokni and Marathi. Only 18% of the respondents in this group, however, could speak Hindi, compared to 60% of Hindu respondents. It was, nonetheless, the two South African official languages which were most commonly known and spoken next to the respondent's home languages. In the families that were included in our sample who did not speak one of these as home language, more than 95% of the adult men (family heads) and 80% of their wives spoke English, and 85% and 80%, respectively, Afrikaans. The men more or less have to know either Afrikaans or English for business reasons and to be able to serve as a link between their family and the "outside world", but the ability

\(^{43}\) Concerning home languages, cf. Chapter IV, Table IV and Chapter V, par. 1(c).
on the part of Indian women to speak these languages, particularly those who were not educated in South Africa, is a more significant indicator of actual social and cultural assimilation. It is important to note in this respect that more Kokni women could speak Afrikaans and/or English than either Gujerati or Tamil women.

Most of the Tamil-speaking Indians who had migrated from Natal, could also speak Zulu, while in the Cape a number of Kokni traders who have a large African clientele have learnt to speak Xhosa. As one would expect, therefore, members of the different language groups within the community have tended to learn to speak the other commonly used South African languages rather than each other's languages, apart from the few Gujeratis who know Urdu and the Koknis who know Hindi.

The fact that Hindi and Urdu is somewhat more widely spoken is, however, due to the status which these two languages have in India rather than to association between Indians of different groups in Cape Town. In fact, the tendency to learn other South African languages rather than each other's dialects is indicative of the wider trend among Indians to be assimilated into the larger South African society rather than to each other.

If one examines the proficiency of children in languages other than the one most commonly spoken in their home, the generational difference with respect to this aspect of cultural assimilation becomes immediately apparent. In only 14% of the families in which Kokni was not the principle language there were children who could speak Kokni while in a total of 18% of all families (with children) there were children who could speak Urdu, including the few families who had this

44) Most of these cases were, of course, families in the Kokni community who had adopted English or Afrikaans as home language.
as their home language. The comparable figure for Hindi was 4%. Very few children in the Tamil community could actually speak Tamil. On the other hand, nearly four-fifths of the children in our sample from the Gujerati community could speak their native dialect. The over-all tendency for the children to know Afrikaans and English rather than another Indian dialect is, of course, understandable in the light of the fact that the study of the official South African languages is compulsory for all children of school-going age. There are, however, other indications of the more rapid assimilation of the younger generation such as their manner of dress and cultural tastes. The manager of a cinema which shows Indian pictures from time to time commented that interest in them is declining among the youth. On visiting their homes it was also apparent that many of them prefer to switch from Indian broadcasts to listen to the latest hit tunes on the local commercial station or Lourenco Marques radio.

At this point we may recall that more than 80% of fifty adults who were questioned said that they listened to Indian shortwave broadcasts. Many children would be exposed to these broadcasts, or at least to the music if they cannot follow Hindi or the language of the broadcast, in the shop or their home where the radio is playing. In the cohesive family setting and, in some cases, through visits to India many aspects of Indian culture and of the traditions of particular sub-communities are transmitted to the younger generation. Nevertheless, while one is impressed by the resilience that Indian culture has shown in this foreign setting, there


46) It was noted earlier (Chapter V, p. 97) that in about a third of the families in our sample there were children who had already visited India.
is little doubt that the general trend, particularly on the part of the generation that is presently growing up, is toward increasing cultural assimilation.

It was interesting to note that, in spite of this general trend, a considerable proportion of the children were receiving some form of religious and/or vernacular instruction. Many of their parents (about a third in the case of the fathers) had been educated in India, but about 30% of them had never received any specifically religious or vernacular training either in India or in South Africa. This was true of 45% of the Hindu fathers, for example, while only in 15% of their families the children had not, or were not receiving such instruction. There was an important difference here between the Gujerati families, in which most of the children were attending the Ghandi Memorial School even though 50% of their parents had not received comparable instruction, and the Tamil families in which virtually all of the parents had been to vernacular schools while only about 30% of their children were attending such schools. This might be accounted for partially by the fact that the Tamil school in Rylands was only founded a year before this study was done, and it is possible that from now many more might receive such an education.

Virtually all Moslem children seemed to be taught the rudiments of Islam at some stage, but since there were only a few Urdu teachers and vernacular instruction in this case

47) Differences in opportunities for such education has, of course, to be taken into account in such a comparison, as well as the fact that what today is achieved by more or less formal schooling might have been affected a generation ago through more informal instruction at home.

48) It should be noted that in most Hindu schools vernacular and religious instruction go hand in hand, which is not true of the Moslem madrissas since the latter mostly emphasise religious education and the recitation of the Koran.
was not centralised, it turned out that in only 8% of the Kokni families the children were also being instructed in Urdu.

Judging by the amount of sacrifice that both parents and children were willing to make, it was evident that the matter of religious and vernacular training carried considerable weight with them. Not only was there some cost involved and the inconvenience of commuting considerable distances, but these classes had to be run in the late afternoons after public school classes, which meant that the children did not return home until six or seven o'clock. The period of attendance seemed to differ from individual to individual, but some children attended madrissa classes for as long as six to eight years.

Respondents were also questioned concerning their attendance of religious meetings or other occasions which hold some religious significance. On the whole such functions were widely attended. Of the Moslems, 72% declared that they attended the weekly mosque services "regularly" or "often". Only 2.5% said that they never attended such services, in contrast to 30% of the Hindus who apparently never participated in religious activities other than on special occasions. These occurred with Hindu festivals like Diwali, on days commemorating saints, or on the occasion of weddings and burials which would be momentous gatherings attended by great numbers in the community. Moslems also attached great significance to similar special gatherings. For many Hindus and Moslem Indians participation in such meetings constituted the only social activity they engaged in outside their homes. On the whole, however, the range of participation of Moslems was wider than that of Hindus. More than 50% of them attended special religious lectures from time to time. Once or twice a year up to 10,000 Moslems would gather at the Green
Point Track on the occasion of a religious holiday or to wit-
ness a debate, as happened once, between a Christian mission-
ary and a Moslem spokesman from Durban.

Some of the smaller Indian communities were also reported to
be celebrating their own festivals, such as when Koknis com-
memorate their special saints, or when the Tamils celebrate
their New Year. Christian Indians, of course, participate
in celebrating regular Christian holidays.

The wide range of religiously related activities which take
place might easily create the false impression that Cape In-
dians maintain a dynamic socio-religious life. There were
indications that orthodoxy is on the wane among the Hindus,
a fact which most community leaders seemed to be aware of.
The rise of a sect like the Divine Life Society is probably
related to the religious vacuum that has been created by the
decreasing influence of orthodox Hinduism. Nevertheless, a
skeleton of core values from the Hindu tradition has remained
as the prime integrative cultural factor.

Moslems, on the whole, did convey the impression of maintain-
ing a more active religious life. The first part of the
sixties has, in fact, witnessed something of the proportion
of a religious awakening among Cape Moslems. And there is
little doubt that Moslem doctrine has had a significant im-
pact on the shape of life of its adherents at the Cape. The
universalistic creed of the equality of all men which it es-
pouses has become a powerful slogan among those who actively
oppose the government policies, and has also made them more
self-conscious about existing sectionalism among Indians, as
well as the non-White population of the Cape in general.
The trend away from Indian exclusivism among the Koknis must,
in part, be attributed to this factor.
If one reviews, then, the total situation in the Indian community, it is clear that they can in no way be looked upon as sharing a common system of values other than on the most abstract, even mystical, level of some hypothetical "Eastern" culture. The Tamils have been greatly affected by two or three generations of residence in South Africa. Some of the Gujeratis and Koknis share a common rural background in India, but, again, more of the Gujeratis had had some urban experience before migrating. It seems, then, that the goals and norms of each section of the Indian population is still largely defined in terms of their particular religious views, their linguistic and regional background, or even, in the case of Gujeratis, by their caste membership. As we shall point out below, the resulting cultural diversity accounts for the fact that terms for handling internal conflict have not yet evolved in the larger Indian community.

The only significant common cultural elements which could be detected were essentially "Western". These lay either on the more "concrete" level of culture as represented by the type of homes Indians live in, their manner of dress (particularly of the men), the cars in which they drive around and their more or less common ability to communicate in English or Afrikaans; or, on the other hand, were manifested in the acceptance of some very general Western values, such as the recognition of Western education as a means of enhancing individual status and the acceptance of certain economic and success values. There has also been a slow advance in the over-all status of women within the community.49) The younger generation are increasingly becoming urbanites in the Western sense of the term, but the adult Indian population to a large degree still represent villagers living within

49) Cf. p. 147.
3. Ethnic Identity and Attitudes

Two simple questions were asked of respondents to determine their attitude with regard to the Indians as a distinct ethnic group. The first of these concerned the desirability of a national Indian "cultural" organization. Twenty per cent were unable or unwilling to express an opinion on this. Twenty-five per cent were opposed to such an idea on the grounds that too much de facto integration existed already ("We have become so mixed up with the Coloureds" one said) or because they saw integration as the desirable direction, such as the respondent who replied that attempting to promote sectional cultures would be contrary to the worldwide trend toward the constant meeting of strong cross-currents of Eastern and Western cultures. Forty-four per cent were in favour of an organization which could promote "Indian culture", which could see to it that the "deeper philosophical and religious roots are carried on from generation to generation", and could foster the study of Indian languages. It was clear that many still saw a hypothetical organization of this nature as a possible vehicle for furthering the interests of their sub-group. More than five per cent of the respondents, in fact, specified that they would rather see such a body being founded on a religious ba-

49) Although very few Indian women in Cape Town hold jobs outside their homes, a Tamil female respondent declared that there would be little opposition to such a thing, and related the example of two Indian girls who had just started working in a garment factory. One obstacle to this kind of employment, she said, was the unwillingness of employers to supply separate toilet facilities for female Indian employees. This respondent might have been speaking in name of a small part of the Tamil community, but otherwise one had the impression that there would be considerable resistance in other sections of the Indian community against women taking up jobs of this kind in commerce or industry.

50) Cf. Appendix C.
sis. A few, however, saw in it a possibility for counteracting the extreme fragmentation of the Indian community. Another 4.5% stated flatly that although they would be in favour of it they did not consider it a feasible proposition owing to the immutability of present divisions. It might be mentioned here that about twice as many Hindus as Moslems were in favour of such an organization, while many more of the latter registered an "undecided".

Responses were also solicited concerning a second very similar question relating to the desirability of a separate political organization for Indians on a national basis. It was pointed out to them that several organizations had claimed to speak in the name of all South African Indians, but that few of them had actually operated on a national scale. A high 39% were again unwilling to express an opinion on this matter. This manifests the general reluctance which was encountered among respondents to make any pronouncement concerning "politics", perhaps because they feared that this might have further repercussions. Some undoubtedly were sensitive to the fact that a positive answer to this and the preceding question might be interpreted as a condemnation of the policy of separate development in general and the founding of a Department of Indian Affairs in particular. The fact that there were once more a greater proportion of non-responses among Moslems is probably due to the larger number of recent Kokni migrants who had difficulty in expressing themselves and were also much more suspicious of the researcher's intentions. Nonetheless, 37% of those questioned declared themselves to be against a separate Indian political body, some pointing out that this is particularly unnecessary in the Cape where Indians are treated politically on a par with the Coloureds. Without being probed, a
third of those who answered in the negative stated that they would rather be in favour of integrated or non-racial political parties and organizations. It might be mentioned that considerably more South African-born respondents (53%) than Indian-born respondents (30%) were against a separate organization.

Twenty-two per cent of the respondents declared themselves in favour of an exclusively Indian political organization. Hindus were again more conservative on this issue. Forty per cent of them answered positively compared to only 16% of the Moslems. Many in this category were nonetheless quite explicit about the fact that they would view such a measure as a temporary one which should only be adopted for the sake of expediency, the political situation being what it is. They explained that since the government is treating them as Indians they have to respond as Indians, but that the need for this would disappear as soon as a multi-racial government is established with "one man, one vote".51)

The issue of factionalism was once more brought up by a number of persons. A Tamil youth complained that the problem with many organizations like C.I.P.A. is that they are not fully representative and cater mainly for the Moslems' interests. A Gujerati veteran of many earlier political movements confirmed that the Cape Indians had never had a body which represented them adequately. He added that there was no solidarity in C.I.P.A., there being factions even among the Koknis themselves, partially because most individuals,

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51) Essentially the same issue was raised with the founding of C.I.P.A. when it was suggested by some that the designation "Indian" be dropped from the name of the organization. Leaders of the organization pointed out that since their intention was to fight the founding of a Department of Indian Affairs, they had to act as Indians opposing a measure affecting Indians.
he claimed, are only seeking publicity for themselves.

It should be noted that in many instances a positive attitude toward a separate cultural body did not necessarily mean that the person was also in favour of an Indian political organization. Judging by the answers that were given it appears that many more were in favour of integration on the societal level than actually desired the cultural assimilation of Indians.

To summarise, we might repeat that Cape Indians did not seem to identify themselves strongly either with the larger Indian community at the Cape, the Indian population of South Africa as a whole, or with India as their country of origin. Both locally, nationally and with respect to India most individuals manifested a greater sense of unity with their kinship, linguistic, and greater caste group, as well as, in some cases, the particular town or village in India from which they originated. An important qualification has to be introduced here with respect to the Moslem Indians. In the few years before this study was done, and even while it was in progress, an increasing identification with pan-Islamism could be perceived among Cape Moslems. This appears to have started with a greater solidarity which developed among Cape Moslems themselves for reasons which we shall discuss in the next section, and the founding of the fortnightly "Muslim News" in Cape Town. This little paper started out carrying mainly religious articles and news which would be of interest to South African, and particularly Cape Moslems, but soon picked up a growing international flavour, which was already noticeable in most of the other Moslem magazines in circulation in South Africa. This was evidenced, amongst others, by a great interest in the

progress and prowess of Moslem countries such as Pakistan and Egypt and the measure of success that Moslem proselytising movements have had in some Western countries. Most Moslem Indians spoke with great pride of the history of their religion, its teachings, and its continued expansion.

In spite of this group consciousness on the part of the Moslems, most Indians in the Cape did not appear to concern themselves overly much with the recurring conflicts between India and Pakistan. Respondents, however, voiced contradictory opinions on this matter. The majority claimed that the earlier, and present, conflicts in India had little effect on relationships locally and that Moslems and Hindus get along well together at the Cape. Hindus, on the whole, showed a greater awareness of the traditional rift between the two groups (perhaps because they are a minority vis-à-vis the Moslems at the Cape) and in the case of some Tamil respondents one sensed outright animosity. One of them explained: "Moslem Indians want to be called Pakistanis.53) Since the proclamation of the Group Areas many want to be Malays, or call themselves Arabs; they have never been that." Another group of Tamil youngsters claimed that the Moslems are fighting for supremacy even in Cape Town and added: "They are fair-skinned and financially stronger, and they practice hatred here in Cape Town. It is they who started with prejudice." They continued to draw attention to all the exclusive Moslem organizations, schools, etc. to substantiate their claim. Another Tamil said that if he was forced to move to Rylands and live with Moslems, he would go back to Natal.

53) According to the investigator's experience this is not generally true. This statement seems to reflect more an imputed stereotype which has come to be accepted by some Hindus.
There was, however, little that one could glean from responses to the Bogardus scale that was applied, concerning Hindu-Moslem relations. A slightly higher proportion (20%) of Moslem Indians indicated willingness to marry a Hindu, than vice versa (14.8%), but this difference might not be significant owing to the relatively small size of our sample and the added fact that one had the impression that Moslems usually take it for granted that such a marriage partner would, at least nominally, accept Islam, while the converse might not be true for Hindus.

On the whole, the results of the Bogardus scale turned out to be somewhat disappointing and care should be exercised in their interpretation. Firstly, it appeared that the order of two questions should be reversed. More respondents proved to be willing to work beside members of an out-group in the same job than declared themselves willing to have several families of such a group live in their neighbourhood. Attitudes in this regard probably reflect the realities of the South African situation in which a high degree of economic integration is coupled with an increasing measure of residential segregation. Secondly, it is difficult to judge what degree of reliability can be attached to the responses that were given, due to the sharp ideological conflict surrounding the "apartheid" issue and the fact that the investigator was a White person. Many who were interviewed seemed to be afraid of conveying the impression that they share the prejudices which they feel the Whites are guilty of, and framed their responses against the background of a sweeping assertion that any individual is acceptable to them, regardless of "race, creed, or colour". The fact, however, that 44% were ready to declare that they are willing to marry, or have their children marry a White person, probably indicates
not only tolerance, but that the respondents were indeed being remarkably "honest" in their replies, since such a thing is currently forbidden by law and one could therefore expect the issue of marrying a White to be a rather touchy one.

With very few exceptions Indians seemed to be willing to have Coloureds, Malays, Whites and members of other Indian groups as speaking acquaintances, to share the same neighbourhood with them and to work next to them in the same concern. It is only with regard to Africans that they manifested a significant degree of social distance. Of the respondents, 23% declared that they would prefer not to have Africans living in close proximity to them.\(^{54}\) Out-group members were acceptable as marriage partners in the following order: Malays (54%), Whites (44%), Coloureds (39%) and Africans (15%).

Differences again showed up in the attitudes of different sections of the Indian population. Contrary to what one would expect, more Gujeratis than Tamils were willing to marry outside the Indian group,\(^{55}\) in spite of the fact that there were indications that more intermarriage was actually taking place in the case of the Tamil community. They also showed a greater inclination to want to keep Africans at a distance. More than half of the Tamil respondents preferred not to have Africans live in close proximity, whereas only one Gujerati (out of 23) reacted in this way. In fact, Gujeratis were more willing to accept residential integration.

\(^{54}\) Although no rigorous check was made on this matter, the investigator had the impression that it was those Indians who were already living in highly integrated areas which have some African residents, such as Windermere and parts of the Cape flats, who were also most ready to accept Africans, which would confirm the prejudice/interaction hypothesis (cf. Chapter V, p. 87).

\(^{55}\) These conclusions should be viewed as being only tentative ones, owing to the fact that there were only 9 Tamil families included in our sample, which raises questions regarding the significance of these differences.
with Africans than Koknis of whom 24% preferred not to have Africans live in their neighbourhood. On the other hand, a more or less equal proportion of Koknis and Gujeratis were willing to countenance intermarriage with Africans (15% and 13% respectively). Koknis showed greater readiness to marry Malays (69%), Whites (51%), and Coloureds (48%) than any of the other Indian groups. Members of small Indian groups, such as Sikhs, Pathans, Punjabis, etc. 56) also showed a greater willingness to associate with, as well as marry, non-Indians.

It furthermore appeared that Indians who settled in the Cape after 1940 were more willing to accept other groups than those who were born in the Cape or settled there earlier. There are probably two factors involved in this, viz. the age or generational difference accompanying length of residence in Cape Town in many instances, and the fact that a considerable proportion of the Indians who migrated to the Cape after 1940 came from Natal where Indians have already been exposed to Western values for a number of generations. While there seem to be additional assimilative forces at work in the Cape, the fact that recent migrants seem to respond more positively to them indicates that mere length of exposure does not constitute a sufficient condition for such assimilative pressures to take effect.

Keeping in mind that some of the responses might have been "loaded" as a result of a reaction on the part of many against current government policies in South Africa, it nevertheless appears that the readiness to accept certain forms of assimilation, at least as far as our sample is concerned, 57)

56) Nine families from this "mixed" category were included in our sample.

was ahead of the actual or existing measure of assimilation. This generally positive psychological orientation toward other sections of the host society is likely to reinforce the assimilative tendencies which have already emerged, unless stringent application of the principle of separate development reverses this trend, which seems unlikely, particularly at the Cape. To classify the Indian community as a whole as assimilationist would, however, be an oversimplification and misrepresentation of the situation. Many respondents manifested a distinct pluralistic orientation, judging by the opinions which they expressed concerning the desirability of separate Indian cultural and political organizations. Others were very ambivalent and expressed several contradictory opinions in the course of one interview. Perhaps this is due to the fact that it had become increasingly difficult for those who favour a pluralistic situation to defend it in the face of existing antipathy towards government policies. One had the impression that many were trying to say: "We would prefer our group to retain its identity, but we would not like to have this come about the 'apartheid' way."

Attitudes toward the various non-Indian groups likewise differed. There appeared to be little social distance between Indians on the one hand and Coloureds and Malays on the other. The attitude of Indians toward Whites was typically that of resentment, i.e. veiled hostility coupled with some admiration and a covert positive identification in many cases, as evidenced by the large proportion who declared themselves willing to marry Whites and the obvious pride with which some

57) It should constantly be kept in mind, as we have pointed out, that there is reason to believe that our sample represents a less assimilated section of the Cape Indian population.
spoke of their White associates and friends, or referred to the fact that, say, their late uncle had been married to a White woman. It is only with respect to Africans that Indians manifested considerable social distance or even antipathy. In a few private discussions concerning the possibility of African rule in South Africa some Indians expressed the same fears, misgivings and prejudices, such as the inability of Africans to participate in democratic government, which one is accustomed to hear from Whites.

We have seen that variations emerged within the Indian population. Indian Moslems in general, and Kolmis in particular, were not only already assimilated to a larger degree, but also appeared more ready to be. The Hindu groups manifested a greater degree of in-group identification, sectionalism, and were, on the whole, more traditional and afraid "to disappear into" the larger society. An interesting question centres around the fact that the Tamils, who tend to pride themselves in the fact that they are more "progressive" as a group and have, in the other provinces, developed a larger professional class, at the same time were more inclined to show out-group hostility. One might conjecture - and at this point it will have to remain at that - that they do not only feel themselves a small and economically disadvantaged minority among the Indians at the Cape (and it is true that they are generally less well off than either the Gujeratis or the Koknis), but also feel themselves the potential butt of a greater measure of racial prejudice in a highly colour-conscious society, due to their darker complexions. Perhaps it is for this very reason that they find it necessary to dissociate themselves more strongly from the Africans.

We can conclude, then, by saying that by and large Indians tend to identify primarily with their particular religio-
linguistic group, while at the same time being favourably oriented toward the culture and values of the larger society, and in particular that of the dominant group. At very few points do Indians as a race emerge as major focus of identity.

4. Patterns of Association, Co-operation, Conflict and Control

In this concluding section we shall review the major social processes associated with the culturally and psychologically based factors affecting solidarity. In some cases this will mainly involve summarising and making explicit facts which should already have transpired in the preceding discussions. The processes in which we are interested concern the range and frequency of the actual informal social contacts which Indians maintain; co-operation among individuals and groups; the extent of social control which is exercised over group members within the community; and, finally, indications of inter-group and intra-group conflicts involving Indians. It has been pointed out in Chapter I that such processes have a direct bearing on the measure of solidarity which exists within a minority group.

Respondents were questioned concerning their association with persons of a different ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation than themselves, as well as concerning such social visitors as they might have received during the week immediately preceding the interview. It was clear that some did not understand what was meant by social visiting. When it was explained that this referred to visiting "close friends", respondents tended to reply either that they have "many friends from all different groups", or that they find very little time for such visiting. Others had difficulty

58) Cf. Appendix C.
in recalling all the visitors they had received in the preceding week and answered in very vague terms.\(^59\) It was furthermore clear that many were not distinguishing between business and other types of casual contacts on the one hand, and friends on the other. It seemed wise, in the light of all this, only to analyze the responses in terms of very broad categories.

Many Indians complained about the long hours they have to spend in their shops and the fact that this leaves them little time for social activities, or any form of relaxation for that matter. A number seemed to be totally isolated socially, having, possibly, only one or two distant relatives at the Cape and highly sporadic contact even with members of their own religo-linguistic group.\(^60\) As can be seen in Table IX nearly a third of our sample had received no social visitors during the preceding week or had only been visited by relatives. About the same proportion reported that they had been visited by members of other religious, linguistic and/or racial groups than their own. Even if this represents a measure of over-reporting or includes persons who had

\(^59\) The large "not specified" category in Table IX reflects this.

\(^60\) Most typically this kind of respondent would be a shopkeeper (more often than not a Kokni) on the Cape Flats who would be spending his days and evenings behind the counter of his dimly lit café-shop, by all appearances subsisting on the meagre profits he can garner from selling bread, sugar, "cokes" and penny "ice-suckers" to customers who are equally as poor as himself. Now and then his wife or one of his older children would drift in to relieve him for a while. He would move around quietly making only the most necessary exchanges in broken Afrikaans or English even with familiar customers. Not having acquired the most basic social skills for effective and relaxed association in a new social and cultural setting, he would view every stranger entering the shop with suspicion from behind a two or three day old stubble. Quite obviously many of these "villagers" are in the city, but not of the city, having been unable to replace the social ties they had to break on leaving their home environment with meaningful new alliances.
not come on purely social visits, it indicates that Indians at the Cape are involved in a significant degree of inter-ethnic social mixing. In fact, nearly 70% of our respondents claimed that they had friendship contacts with members of other religious, linguistic and ethnic groups. For the reasons set out above this figure is in all probability also exaggerated.

Table IX: Visitors received during week preceding interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visitors</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only relatives</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only from same religo-linguistic group</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some out-group visitors</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>112</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, there still seems to be more frequent inter-ethnic contact at the Cape involving Indians than is the case in Natal, at least, judging by a survey that was done among a sample of secondary school pupils in a Natal North Coast community by Van den Berghe and Miller. In response to a question concerning the most frequent visitors to their home only 5% reported regular inter-racial contacts and 25% said they were visited often by one or more persons of a different religious persuasion than their own. A third, however, only mentioned visitors from their own language group.

Somewhat contrary to what one would expect, the Moslems in our sample reported fewer out-group contacts than the Hindus. This is probably related to the fact that they are less in-

volved in informal social visiting as such. Thirty-three per cent of them - closer investigation reveals that this mainly represents Koknis - had not received any visitors during the preceding week compared to 7% of the Hindus. The investigator's impression was, however, that this 33% represents either the older generation of less assimilated Koknis or more recent immigrants from India who are still isolated socially, and that the established and economically better off second generation Koknis were, in fact, socially more active, and were also exposed to a wider range of out-group contacts, than most of the Hindu Indians. Putting it in different terms, this means that in this regard there is a much greater range of variation within the Kokni group than among Hindus, and that merely taking the average for the whole Kokni group therefore gives a somewhat misleading impression. Thus only 66% of the Koknis claim to have out-group friendship contacts, compared to 90% of the Tamils. 

Once more, Indians who had settled in the Cape after 1940 also reported more out-group friendship contacts and visitors than earlier settlers.

Summarising the most typical patterns of informal association among Indians, one might say that the most frequent contact probably takes place among relatives, followed by association between members of the same religo-linguistic group (our data indicates that there is more frequent in-group contact of this kind among Hindus than Moslems). Association with out-group members, including inter-racial contact,

62) This apparent anomalous, or at least unexpected, finding concerning the wide-ranging contacts of Tamils raises a whole series of questions to which we shall have to return in the final chapter, keeping in mind, though, that not too much reliance can be placed on these figures due to the small size of our Tamil sub-sample. These findings are, therefore, in particular need of more adequate substantiation through further research.
is, however, quite common, and probably more so than in most other South African Indian communities. The younger generation of Indians, of course, mix freely with other non-White peers at school, on the street, going to cinemas, and, in some cases, in the better known non-White restaurants like the Naaz in Woodstock. This contrasts sharply with a minority of Indians, most of them Koknis, who are socially isolated in virtually every way, other than attending an occasional religious meeting.

Along with the frequency of in-group as opposed to out-group association, the extent of co-operation in various spheres is also an important indicator of the degree of solidarity in any community, or sections of it. We have already indicated that although many attempts have been made in this direction over the years, effective political co-operation has never really been attained for any significant period between all sections of the Indian community. Economic ties play a much more important part, but then, once more, largely within the framework of the various religo-linguistic groups.

The general situation is exemplified by the Kokni who confessed that although he might go to a Hindu businessman whom he knows well for financial assistance, he would prefer to approach a fellow-Kokni first. Another Kokni remarked: "We all start bankrupt", meaning that most of the Kokni immigrants come to Cape Town with virtually nothing. In most cases a new immigrant would begin by working as a shop assistant for another Kokni. In the course of time he might "take over" a shop from his boss or from another Kokni friend or relative, either paying monthly "goodwill money" or rent, or acquiring ownership of the whole concern over a long period of time. Our informer estimated that only about 25% of the Koknis who are engaged in retail trade actually own
shops or property, and that the rest operate through some arrangement with one of these owners or "capitalists". He also explained that if a person goes on a visit to India he would usually leave his shop in the hands of another Kokni who would pay him a regular "goodwill fee" in return. This mutual economic dependence of Indians on each other, and particularly of members of the several groups on fellow members, undoubtedly contributes to the solidarity of the different sub-communities. On the other hand, one also suspects that some of the wealthier Indian businessmen at the Cape have had to seek economic alliances and aid in a wider circle in the quest of expanding their interests, a factor which would foster increased over-all integration into the larger society.63) It is furthermore clear that such a situation of close and sometimes forced dependence within a community leaves considerable opportunity for exploitation, more so now under the Group Areas Act which makes it more or less impossible for an Indian to acquire a shop or property outside the Indian areas, which themselves have a limited economic potential, at least as far as retail trade is concerned, because of the relatively small number of people who are envisaged to eventually settle there. Indians were very sensitive about the whole issue of "blackmail" on the part of some wealthy Indian landlords or shop owners, who are reported to demand exorbitant "key" money annually from occupants over and above regular rents just for the right of such tenants to continue occupying premises. A few informants, however, tacitly admitted

63) Morris has, for example, pointed out what the impact of a British-type legal system, and the Partnership and Limited Liability Company enactments in particular, has had on economic arrangements between Indians in Uganda, and the way in which it has tended to change the whole family structure within their community. Cf. H.S. Morris: "The Indian Family in Uganda", American Anthropologist, Vol. 61, 1959, pp. 786-788.
that exploitation did take place, and immediately laid the blame for anything of this kind at the door of the government Group Areas laws. Whatever the actual state of affairs may be, the matter of interest to us is the fact that the friction which is due to arise from any such exploitative dependence would in most instances be detrimental to the solidarity of a community.

It is important to keep in mind that conflict can both foster solidarity in a group, as well as break down existing solidarity, depending on who and what is involved in the conflict. To the extent that conflict is defined as being with an out-group, such conflict tends to strengthen in-group solidarity. We have already indicated that Indians have only been prompted to close their ranks and react as a group at times when they were confronted with disagreeable laws affecting them as a group. It is only when they were being treated as a racial group that they responded as a racial group. This happened with the "Pegging Act" in the forties, with Group Areas legislation in the early fifties, and again recently with the announcement of the Department of Indian Affairs. Conflict with a White government has, however, not as yet resulted in any lasting unity of the Indians as a total group, though it is possible that they might increasingly accept the projected image of themselves as being a single racial entity in the face of consistent treatment as a separate group with certain assumed common socio-cultural features.

It appears that the increased solidarity of Moslems and the resurgence of orthodoxy on their part during the past few years is also directly related to inter-group conflict. During the latter part of the fifties several Christian denominations, notably the Anglican and Dutch Reformed Churches,
stepped up their proselytising activities among Moslems at the Cape, inter alia appointing full-time "missionaries" to Moslems. News concerning this quickly spread among Moslems. With the founding of the "Muslim News" the activities of these Christian missionaries received wide publicity, and several leaflets that had been distributed by them were refuted at great length in its columns. Some small groups of Christians and Moslems met in heated discussion sessions debating the claims of their respective religions. All this activity culminated in a massive public debate at the Green Point athletic stadium between a Dutch Reformed Church minister and a Moslem leader who had been brought down from Durban for the occasion.

It is significant that once the immediate confrontation with Christians passed out of the public eye, certain latent controversies broke out again amongst Moslems. Several polemics developed in the columns of the "Muslim News" concerning, for example, the status of women, or the position of the Ahmedia sect which came under heavy fire from various quarters, only a few months after one of their leaders had actually been chosen to present the Moslem position at the Christian/Moslem debate mentioned above. At this time it appeared as if the more orthodox faction, particularly as represented by the Moslem Judicial Council in Cape Town, was re-establishing itself in a position of authority, at least in the short run.

It was pointed out in Chapter I that in-group conflict in minority groups is often related to two factors: the turning of aggressive attitudes on other members or factions within the group as a result of latent feelings of inferiority and self-hatred which have been bred by prolonged exposure to prejudice and discrimination; and, secondly, the
frustration and disappointment which arises when a "solution" to conflict with another group or groups does not seem to be in sight, nor any prospect of improving a strained situation, as in-group members perceive it. Under such circumstances internal feuds and mutual scapegoating tend to become increasingly common. While the immediate reason for some of the conflicts which we have cited in the Moslem community lie in theological differences, the tensions generated by the larger socio-political situation in South Africa have undoubtedly also played a role in precipitating such conflicts. One might also speculate that the increasing identification of Moslems during and after this time with pan-Islamism, arose at least in part, from a growing despondency concerning the possibility of gaining equal political rights in South Africa and the consequent need to identify with an expanding and highly successful universal movement.  

It would be difficult to explain the bitterness of some of the feuds within the larger Indian community without reference to the strains arising from the clash of political goals and ideologies in the country, and the growing feeling of hopelessness on the part of those who are determined to oppose government policies. We have already alluded to evidence of conflict among factions of the Indian population at several junctures: for example, that between some sections of the Tamil group and other Indians, and the bad feelings between some of the Kollis and the workers in the catering trade, who are mostly Hindus, with the formation of the C.I.P.A. But one actually had to attend some of the politi-

64) This is probably not the only factor, since Benedict (Op. cit.) notes a similar return to orthodoxy and an identification with the larger world of Islam among Indian Moslems in Mauritius, which was also experiencing considerable political upheaval and change, though with a totally different outcome than in South Africa.

65) Cf. p. 166.
cal meetings to appreciate the acrimony that accompanied many of these differences; to observe the vehemence and the bitterness with which "sell-outs", or any Indians who had in the slightest way showed themselves willing to negotiate with the government, were denounced; or to witness how quickly and sharply tempers could flare in debate.

An Indian who has lately withdrawn somewhat from this hectic arena, remarked: "I do not like the bullying tactics being used now-a-days. We used to fight it out in elections in those days with Sam Kahn 66) and those lot, but it was a good clean fight, and we all enjoyed it. But today it is different. Those who do not agree are intimidated (i.e. by other non-Whites and Indians who oppose government policies). They even employ the hooligan element. I myself have received phone calls threatening that my house will be burnt down .."

Reports like this confirmed impressions of increasing tension within the Indian community.

We also noted earlier that inter-group conflict is usually accompanied by a more stringent control of deviants, since

65) In referring to "factions" here, we have in mind the more loosely ordered alignments of interest and opinion which tend to crystallise in opposition to each other around issues which are being contended, in contrast to more permanent structurally based divisions running through a society or community. (Cf. the Dec. 1957 issue of the British Journal of Sociology and Raymond Firth's introduction to this issue in particular: Op. cit.) In the Cape some of these conflicts have tended to involve large segments of some of the major Indian sub-communities, but rarely have they been looked upon, or defined to be between these groups as such, i.e., between, say, Hindus and Moslems, or Gujeratis and Tamils, etc. It is, of course, true that under conditions of prolonged conflict, conflict can come to be associated with relatively permanent, and easily identifiable, groupings in the society or community. Depending on the course of events in South Africa (and perhaps India and Pakistan), this might also happen in the Cape Indian community.

66) He is referring here to a prominent local political figure - and an acknowledged Communist - of the early post World War II years.
such deviants threaten to divide a group at a juncture when they feel that they can least afford it. Hence the degree of intolerance toward deviance co-varies with the intensity of conflict, which also tends to lead to an increase of in-group solidarity. Some of the tensions which we have mentioned above sprung immediately from attempts to keep those who were endangering the efficacy of the protest to government policies, in line.

The pressure toward conformity is, however, not only confined to the political arena. Since sanctions operate in the community first and foremost within the circles of informal association, control is perhaps most effective on the primary level. We have indicated the wide-ranging influence that elders in the family still exercise over the behaviour of youths and children within the Indian community. In some cases, the force of sanctions might also be felt throughout a communal group. It is interesting, for example, to note how the various groups react toward individuals in their midst who marry outside the accepted boundaries. We have seen that these boundaries have been changing, amongst others as a result of group members who contravene them. Yet a norm exists within each community as to what would constitute a "correct" marriage. Here we are interested in how strictly this norm is enforced. We have noted that although the older generation of Koknis prefer marriage to take place within the group, the numerous instances of intermarriage with Malays and Coloureds have by now been accepted as a fait accompli by most, and among the younger generation there is, in fact, very little resistance to this kind of thing. Among Tamils neither broad inter-caste (i.e. between different varnas) nor inter-racial marriages are condoned, though they do take place. In most instances of the latter kind
that the investigator encountered the transgressing party had been more or less effectively ostracised from the community, though he/she might still retain some contact with one or two close relatives. Ostracism seemed to be even more severe in the case of the Gujarati community. A Gujarati who had married a Coloured woman and who has become quite widely known in non-White circles in Cape Town through newspaper work, testified that he had to leave his home town in the Eastern Cape after marriage. He said that he now rarely associated with Gujaratis, and concluded: "If we had to go and live in an Indian (i.e. group -) area and I should die, nobody would care for my wife and children, since they are not Indians."

There were indications that there was a latent resentment, even among Moslem Indians who tend to be most tolerant with regard to the matter of out-group marriage, toward those Indians who had sought to be, or had actually been, classified as Malay or Coloured since the passing of the Population Registration Act. A few complained that those who had done this for the sake of expediency "... are not willing to stand by us." This denial of Indian identity was undoubtedly not favourably looked upon and it is indicative of the degree of solidarity that still remains, even among those who could otherwise be classified as "assimilationist".

Having reviewed a wide range of factors which in some way or another bear on solidarity patterns among Indians at the Cape, we are now in a position to summarise, in a little more formal and systematic way, their import for the internal integration of the different sections of the Indian population and the survival of these groups as separate sociocultural entities. By formulating our conclusions in terms of more widely applicable hypotheses, we might, however, also be able to draw attention to some of the important substan-
tive and theoretical deficiencies in our knowledge concerning minority groups in general, and at the same time indicate a few of the most promising areas for possible future research with regard to the Cape Indians.
CHAPTER VII
CORRELATES OF SOLIDARITY

The purpose of this study was not only to determine the chief socio-cultural characteristics of the Cape Indian population, but also to assess the extent to which this immigrant group constitutes a self-conscious, well-defined and coherent social community. Investigation revealed that the Cape Indians would only qualify as a "community" in the most marginal sense of the term. They can be looked upon legitimately as a social unit only to the extent that they respond as Indians to other members, or segments, of the South African population, who treat them as a relatively homogeneous group of immigrants from the East who share the same national origin; or to the extent that they react unitedly to legislation which is directed to, or affects them as a group. Actually, the only common activity they would engage in spontaneously as a larger group, other than political protest against governmental policies, proved to be the annual celebration of the national independence of the Republic of India. Even then, only a relatively small proportion (a "few hundred" according to informants) of the total Indian population would attend this occasion every year. On the whole, they showed little awareness of having a separate racial identity. The common concept of "the Indian community", therefore, represents little more than a convenient administrative abstraction. Throughout this study the term community, when used with respect to the Indians as a total group, was intended to connote nothing more than a population category. Likewise, when they are described as a minority group reference is being made to their social, legal, and political position within the larger South African setting and the fact that they see themselves as a group only when orienting themselves
to this larger setting. Viewed from a strictly sociological standpoint it might be more appropriate to speak of the existence of several fairly self-contained groups or communities, some of which may extend beyond the boundaries of the Indian population. Such is the case with the Kokni community which is as much, or more, "Moslem" than it is "Indian".

From the standpoint of the individual, group boundaries are, of course, rarely singular or completely fixed. The definition of such group boundaries vary according to the situation confronting a person. To put it in different terms: individuals can switch from one "reference group" to another with little difficulty. 1) This means, for example, that a Kokni can, depending on the occasion, variously look upon himself as being a member of a particular family, or of an immigrant group from a certain village; or as being one of a community of small merchants in Cape Town, an adherent of Islam, an Indian, or a member of the disadvantaged non-White population of South Africa. Among the Cape Indians these increasingly inclusive reference groups do not constitute neat concentric circles which represent less and less important foci of identity and solidarity as one moves outward. For most individuals several of these "circles of identity" only overlap partially. In the course of this study particular attention was paid to the way in which solidarity patterns affect the larger social units in which Indians live the greater part of their social lives, which in the Cape turned out to be the various religo-linguistic groups.

At this stage the various factors associated with the degree of solidarity found in the different sections of the Indian

1) The best known single discussion of the concept of "reference group" is to be found in R.K. Merton: Social Theory and Social Structure, 1957, Chapters VIII & IX, pp. 225-384.
minority at the Cape may be summarized in a more formal fashion, while at the same time drawing out further implications of some of our more important findings. The hypotheses which follow describe a series of "associated states" which emerged from our study. Some can clearly be identified as antecedent states, and therefore as possible explanatory variables, with regard to the phenomenon of solidarity, whereas others can either be a cause or result of solidarity, or both. It is for this reason that we cannot speak of anything more than correlates or associated states at this point. Many of our findings are in accord with those of other students of immigrant and other minority groups, and lend support to hypotheses which they have developed. Yet we cannot claim to have "proved" anything, since this project was of necessity conceived as a descriptive one and the canons of scientific validation require a much more stringent testing of explanatory insights than was possible under the study design that had to be adopted.

A final remark is in order before our major conclusions are stated: unless otherwise stated, all our hypotheses are of the "other-things-being-equal" type. That is, they are formulated for conditions under which all other relevant factors or forces are assumed to be invariable. We shall, therefore, not attempt to state all the possible limiting conditions at each point, although some of these limiting conditions will appear in the form of subsequent hypotheses. Having said this we can proceed with the chief purpose of this chapter.

(i) Our investigation confirmed the extent of the influence that the background and origin of immigrant groups have on the social structures which emerge in the new environment. Owing to the fact that all Indian migration to the Cape was
voluntary it was also highly selective. Those who came directly from India as "passengers" were in most instances following relatives or acquaintances from their own region or home town, which made it easy for them to re-establish pre-existing social patterns with their arrival on new soil.2) As a result the Koknis and Gujaratis were able to form new solidary communities in the Cape with little social disruption taking place as a result of the process of migration. The general hypothesis which suggests itself here is that migrants are more likely to reconstitute themselves into distinct communities in the host country if the individuals who migrated were members of the same, or similar social units in their country of origin.

(ii) There is also some evidence that immigrants from an urban and culturally heterogeneous background would manifest a greater degree of cultural resilience in an environment of the same kind in the long run, and hence an ability to maintain a distinctive and cohesive community structure under conditions of cultural strain. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that situations of cultural contact and change are conducive to the development of a greater degree of adapta-

2) Very often it is more appropriate to view such immigrant groups as extensions of their home society, rather than as social sub-systems of the host society with which they may only have the most attenuated economic and political ties. Wolfram Eberhard has referred to social systems of this kind which transcend political and geographical boundaries as social "layers" ("Concerns of Historical Sociology", Sociologus, 1964, Vol. 14 (New Series), p.7.) The Cape Indian groups have already been integrated too much into, and changed by, their new setting to justifiably be looked upon in this way. The Patidar community in East Africa may be a better example of an extension of such a social layer. Morris indicates that marriages among them are still contracted in terms of village exogamy and family rating in India, and that it is often true that the "strongest sanctions governing a Patidar's behaviour in East Africa, are the opinions of other Patidars in India" owing to frequent visiting between East Africa and India and the gossiping accompanying it (cf. "Indians in East Africa", Op. cit., p. 205.)
bility and consequently, resilience. 3) When speaking of cultural resilience the reference is here to the ability of a community to maintain and perpetuate institutional patterns in the face of strong assimilative pressures. 4) Although it was not possible to determine exactly what proportion of each of the Indian groups at the Cape came from either a predominantly urban or predominantly rural background, the indications that a greater number of Gujeratis had urban experience prior to settling in South Africa might offer one explanation of why they were better able to maintain their cultural identity in both Durban and Cape Town. Evidence from the Kokni community, again, suggests that rural immigrants, while tending to resist change, also seem to be subject to more complete cultural breakdown when put under severe strain. The relative importance of this factor, nevertheless, remains to be clarified through further research.

(iii) Together with the two aforementioned factors a third, but difficult to measure, quantity seems to be worthy of note, viz. the amount of "cultural baggage" that immigrants bring with them to their new home. The relevant hypothesis here might be stated as follows: if an immigrant community, or a sufficient number of highly esteemed members within such a community, possesses a well developed, integrated and relatively autonomous culture which is firmly institutionalised

3) That is, if cultural patterns do not disintegrate and disappear completely. What is essentially at work here is the principle of the "survival of the fittest."

4) It is probably true that no institution is completely static and that a particular institutional pattern undergoes numerous smaller changes in the course of time, precisely in order to be able to maintain itself. If changes of a greater magnitude occur the problem then becomes to determine at which point the institution can no longer be said to maintain itself. With "assimilative pressures" is meant here the exposure to viable alternative institutional patterns.
and internalised, it is also more likely to be able to maintain its distinctive value and behaviour patterns in a situation of cultural contact. In the case of Indian migrants the role of the Islamic and Hindu faiths as highly developed super-ordinate value systems can hardly be over-estimated. One is struck in this regard by the potential cohesive power of Islam as an articulate, well integrated and yet, relatively rigid religious and socio-cultural system, over against the flexibility of a more eclectic and accommodating system as one finds in Hinduism. The different ways in which these two systems function to integrate the respective religious communities and their cohesive potential as compared to each other, however, still need to be examined and specified.

Three further qualifications should be noted: firstly, individuals or groups who occupied a position of high status in their community or society of origin are more likely to be strongly committed to the core values of their group, since "successful" members of society can be expected to be more positively oriented to the system within which they have risen to a position of security and prestige than deprived members. This might also be a factor partially explaining the greater cultural resilience of passenger communities such as the Gujaratis, as compared to indentured groups among whom a larger proportion were from the lower castes or were actually social deviants who were trying to escape the control of their home communities. Secondly, it should be kept in mind that a small leadership core who are highly committed to their group's cultural heritage, even if many other members are not, can play an important part in helping a commu-

5) Successful internalisation of goals and normative expectations implies a motivation on the part of individual members of the collectivity in question to conform to such cultural standards.
nity to maintain its distinctive ethnic identity. The communal leaders, as well as the religious and vernacular teachers who were "imported" from India or, at the Cape, from Durban, undoubtedly have been fulfilling such a function in the various religo-linguistic groups. Thirdly, perhaps a central finding of our study is that there are several distinct and relatively autonomous cultural traditions which are represented among the Cape Indians. This largely explains why they have not emerged as an enduring and solidary racial community, but were rather consolidated into a few small communities organized along lines of religious and linguistic affiliation. The early migrants did not share common elements of culture (such as only now seem to be in the process of developing in terms of a "national culture" in India itself) essential for their integration into a single tightly-knit social system. The common cultural patterns which are emerging among them at present reflect adopted Western-South African value elements rather than anything indigenously "Indian".

(iv) As Francis has noted, it appears that even if individuals did not have any relationship to each other in their country or community of origin and migrated independently of each other, they would tend to form separate communities in their new environment to the extent that their culture is at variance with that of the host society or communities. It seems probable that there were some Indians who migrated independently to the Cape, particularly among those who first lived in another part of South Africa before finally settling in Cape Town, and yet they were taken up with little difficulty into the different language groups. The principal cultural differences between the Indians and the rest of the South African population are not only connected
with religious differences, but also with the fact that the majority of the migrants emanated from a rural, solidaristic-type peasant culture whereas the environment into which they moved had already been significantly influenced by a more individualistic urban-industrial culture.

The obverse of the above hypotheses was also supported by our findings, viz. that immigrant groups would tend to assimilate with those sections of the host society which resemble them most closely in terms of their principle physical, social and cultural features. It is in this light that one has to interpret the relative ease with which the Koknis have been fusing with the rest of the non-White Moslem community at the Cape.

It is, however, not only the compatibility of the immigrant and host culture(s) which determines the rate of assimilation, but also the permeability of the various sections of the host society. In view of the aspiration of a seemingly increasing number of Indians to be accepted by the Whites, one would expect a greater degree of "Westernisation" to have taken place by now, had there not been so many institutionalised barriers preventing contact and social integration.

(v) The possibility of communal reconstitution is contingent on an important condition, namely that a sufficiently large number of individuals from a particular social unit settle close enough to each other to enable them to live a fairly "complete" social life within the boundaries of this unit. This means that such a migrant group has to be large enough to form a relatively self-sufficient community. 6) Evidence suggests that if there are not enough migrants from a particular unit to enable them to sustain an adequate range

of communal functions and activities, the next largest social unit will serve as the focus for communal reconstitution in terms of such socio-cultural patterns which the various sub-groups within the larger unit have in common. 7) Thus it appears that if a particular sub-caste or language group was inadequately represented among the Indians, a more inclusive caste category, or the larger religious or regional group, became the focus of communal reorganization. In Cape Town, for example, the Telegus being too few to form a separate community, have linked up with the larger South African group. One might speculate that the only way in which a truly Indian community could have come into existence at the Cape would have been if a small number of individuals from a large variety of social backgrounds had migrated independently to Cape Town. Even then they might have preferred to integrate with the rest of the population rather than remaining socially dependent on each other as Indians.

The numerical factor bears a variable relation to group solidarity. Below a certain group size no sustained communal solidarity is possible simply because the group is rendered vulnerable by the extent of its dependence on other social systems. A point of maximal solidarity potential seems to be reached when the community is large enough to attain a

6) It goes without saying that no modern community can be completely self-sufficient since it requires at least certain minimal economic and political ties with the larger society within which it is lodged. When speaking of self-sufficiency we have in mind the ability of a collectivity to adequately sustain a series of functions basic to the maintenance of the collectivity as a relatively independent social system, such as providing a wide enough range of informal association, making the transmission of core values of the group possible, as well as the enforcement, formally or informally, of important norms.

7) One might speak here of the principle of "the highest common socio-cultural denominator." Practically, it means that finer social distinctions which can no longer be maintained are "collapsed" into each other.
high degree of self-sufficiency, yet is small enough for effective social control to be exercised over the behaviour of members, as well as for a large proportion of the members to be in direct contact with each other from time to time. Once a community, however, grows too large it becomes increasingly difficult to control the behaviour of deviant members who can seek out one another's support and form the vanguard of dislocating change within the community.

A look at the Cape Indian population reveals that a number of religo-linguistic or "tribal" groups such as the Parsis, Sikhs, Pathans, and Gujerati Moslems are only represented by a handful of families who are consequently unable to form separate communities of their own. It was, however, not possible to investigate the social networks in which they are involved in this study, although an investigation of the direction that assimilation among them is taking should provide a useful test of some of the hypotheses that have been put forward here. The number of Tamil migrants have only recently grown to a point where communal reconstitution seems possible. Such reconstitution is in progress at present in spite of the lack of leadership resources in the community. The fact that a stable group structure has not yet evolved might explain partially the measure of anomie that seems to be prevalent among Tamils. The Gujeratis and Koknis, on the other hand, appear to have already passed this phase - the Koknis, in fact, to a point where their group boundaries are beginning to be redefined radically, so that they conceivably might merely become a part of the larger non-White Moslem community in time. Yet both the Gujerati and Kokni communities are small enough to maintain a high level of solidarity and to meet virtually as a whole on some oc-
(vi) As we have already indicated in the opening paragraph of this chapter, the more a group of migrants (or any category of people for that matter) are treated by others as a single unitary group who have certain assumed common characteristics, the more such a collectivity can be expected to develop a group consciousness and hence, a latent solidarity. If, in addition, it is assigned an inferior status in society, such a group might, however, over a longer period of time show increasing tendencies for internal dissention and scapegoating, particularly if other more durable historical or social and cultural bonds which may unite the group are lacking. There was evidence of both these contrary tendencies among the Cape Indians.

(vii) In most instances out-group conflict would heighten in-group solidarity, unless such conflict continues over a long period of time without any solution apparently being in sight. Each successive wave of differentiating legislation has indeed witnessed a consolidation of Indian opinion and popular sentiment, although there are increasing signs of internal conflict as a result of the continued failure of protest movements to influence the course of events in any way. On the whole, however, the fact that Indians have only had limited opportunity to vent their hostility against the dominant Whites, has certainly increased solidarity amongst them.

It should be added here that any kind of threat to the security of a group is as likely to increase the level of solidarity as direct conflict with an out-group. Thus the threat of impending economic disaster, which the Indians ex-

8) One young Kokni respondent declared: "I don't think there is a Kokni in Cape Town who does not know my father."
pected to result from the application of the Group Areas Act, undoubtedly served to unite them further.

(viii) The more contact a group has - whether through the radio, press, sporadic visiting or another means - with a larger stable and powerful social unit or movement, with which such a group may identify itself, the more it should be able to present a solidary front in the face of disintegra-tive and assimilative pressures on the local scene. As corollary to this hypothesis might be added the fact that the more a group is assigned minority status in society, the more it would manifest a need to identify with a larger collectiv-ity or movement which it views as being successful or pres-tigious. In the case of migrant communities the object of identification might be the society of origin, a supra-national religious or ideological movement, or even a mytho-logistical ancestry which may serve as a source of pride and inspiration. The national independence of India and Pakis-tan, the close contact that many Indians have been able to maintain with their home communities, as well as the influence of pan-Islamism, have all been factors which have contribu-ted to the solidarity of the various Indian groups in South Africa.

(ix) It must be concluded from this investigation that the ecological factor need not play an important role as deter-minant of solidarity. Visiting among the Cape Indians seemed to follow lines of kinship and religo-linguistic group affiliation rather than being determined by physical proximity. There was some indication which, however, was difficult to confirm with certainty, that migrants who were acquainted with each other and belonged to the same communal group preferred to live in the same general area and would
associate more frequently. In large areas of the Cape Peninsula, for example, there are no Hindus. In other tracts or municipal areas, again, they are as well represented as Moslem Indians. Nonetheless, it is not uncommon for an Indian to operate two shops which are twenty miles apart. Since most Indians do not live more than 30 minutes away from each other by car or other means of public transport, the ecological variable seems at most to act as a limiting factor which only gains importance to the extent that it operates in combination with other variables.

(x) It is, furthermore, clear that the more often interaction takes place between members of a community, and the greater the proportion of the total membership who are at some time engaged in a mutual relationship, the higher the degree of solidarity within the community can be expected to be. More simply, one might just say that solidarity co-varies with the number of social links within a community. We indicated that all of the Indian groups at the Cape are still small enough so that a large proportion of the membership of each community can associate with each other on a face-to-face basis at one time or another. We have seen, however, that there are some Cape Indians who have remained more or less socially isolated.

Mutual relations of dependence are of particular importance for the solidarity of a group. The present investigation revealed the widespread economic dependence of Indians, notably in the merchant class, on each other. The friction that has been caused in some quarters by exploitation perhaps requires that a limiting condition be added to the generalisation we have just made, viz. that in order to increase solidarity, relations of mutual dependence should be
entered into by a common agreement of such a nature that the one party does not hold an undue measure of power over the other, lest dependence lead to resentment.

The obverse of the hypothesis stated here is self-evident: the larger the number of out-group relations as compared to in-group relations in which members of a community are involved, and the more they look outside their own circle for needed social, economic, political and other forms of support, the more such a community can be expected to be integrated with other groups in the society, with deleterious consequences for its solidarity as a separate social system. One possible result of the consistent application of Group Areas legislation in the Cape might be that the Indians would become less dependent on the rest of the population socially and politically, while, at the same time, becoming more dependent economically insofar as more of them will have to seek employment as individuals in non-Indian concerns as soon as they are denied trading rights outside Indian areas.

(xi) We have already made passing reference to the matter of social control in terms of its relation to the numerical size of a community. Now its relation to communal cohesion can be more formally stated as follows: the greater the degree of solidarity in a community, the more stringent and effective social control can be expected to be within such a collectivity. This hypothesis would also seem to hold true in inverted form. The effectiveness of sanctions needs emphasis here, seeing that a community might attempt to exercise very tight control over the behaviour of its members, but if they do not respond to it this would obviously be an indication that the sources and agents of control no longer have sufficient legitimacy in their eyes, which on its part
portends the disintegration of the system unless it is capa-
ble of effecting major adaptive changes. Of the three In-
dian groups at the Cape to which we paid particular attention,
the Koknis showed the greatest measure of tolerance to de-
viance and the Gujeratis the least. The latter have, in
fact, preserved their solidarity amongst others by effective
ex-communication of the most extreme deviants in their eyes,
i.e. those who have married outside approved boundaries.

Before continuing to make some concluding observations, it
might be appropriate to pause to consider a few of the theo-
retical issues that are raised by the presentation of a series
of hypotheses such as the foregoing. We have been largely
focusing out attention on socio-cultural variables, even
though several other empirical correlates of solidarity, no-
tably ones pertaining to psychological and attitudinal vari-
ables, could be added to our list. We have refrained from
doing so owing to the fact that it was difficult to assess
the reliability of the little data (much of it of an inferen-
tial nature) that could be gathered on these aspects, as well
as the fact that few clear-cut relationships emerged within
this area. The following should be noted concerning the
set of generalised relationships that have been suggested:
firstly, one would expect most of them to be applicable to
a wide range of different immigrant situations, including,
for example, the case of rural or tribal populations which
have migrated to cities within the same country. Secondly,
some of our hypotheses would hold true not only for large
relatively self-sufficient communities, but also for smaller
and more limited social systems. In fact, some of these
principles were first formulated with regard to the cohesion
of small groups, as we indicated in Chapter I. A task which
remains is to specify which additional forces come into play
when one considers the solidarity of larger social units, other than the obvious ones of size, relationships to larger societal collectivities and agencies, and the like. It was not possible to give detailed consideration to these matters since our study did not entail a systematic comparison of small group cohesion, on the one hand, and community solidarity on the other. Thirdly, it should be kept in mind that a number of generalised statements do not by themselves constitute a theory. One could only speak of a theory if the interrelations between several such hypotheses are adequately spelled out in terms of one, or a few basic and explicit theoretical principles, and the conditions under which each one of them would hold true are sufficiently specified. In terms of the first requirement one would, for example, need to have a clear picture as to what the analytical links are between concrete patterns of association and, say, the foci of individual and group identity, or specific configurations of cultural integration. Moreover, causal priority would have to be assigned to certain variables, seeing that they can occur in many different empirical combinations. Ideally, it should be possible to construct a "solidarity profile" for any community in order to assess both the existing degree of internal cohesion, as well as to predict what the likelihood is that it would be able to "stick together" over a period of time, given certain conditions. In the case of an immigrant population such as the Cape Indians, different research situations would call for different theoretical models. In the early stages of the process one would need a model to assess the cultural resilience of the immigrants and the likelihood that they would be able to reconstitute themselves into a separate community, or communities. Since new variables come into play after a community has actually been formed, one would later focus more on determining and
explaining the existing measure of solidarity and the direction that possible assimilative trends might be taking.

Whichever way one looks at it, it should be clear that no single variable can serve as an adequate "explanation" or predictor of communal solidarity. A number of apparently anomalous findings from this study would be sufficient to illustrate this. If one had to order the three major Indian groups at the Cape on a solidarity scale by approximation, the Gujeratis would undoubtedly rank as the most cohesive, followed by the Koknis and the Tamils who as groups both manifest complex and changing characteristics. While the Koknis are rapidly being incorporated into the more inclusive, yet highly solidary Moslem community, the Tamils are only now in the process of constituting a community of their own. In spite of the greater solidarity of the Gujeratis who form the bulk of the Hindu category, our data shows that Hindus had more out-group social contacts at the Cape than their predominantly Kokni Moslem Indian counterparts, even when taking into account the latter's contacts with non-Indian Moslems. Similarly, Gujeratis were more likely to express a willingness to integrate residentially, and marry, with members of other ethnic groups, than the Tamils who showed a greater social distance with respect to other groups, notably Africans, even though the actual state of affairs indicates that the Tamils are relatively more assimilated to, and integrated with the rest of the non-White population. This fact does not only point up the very common discrepancy which is found between people's attitudes and the "real" situation, but may also be indicative of the important influence that the stability and security of a group has on its attitudes toward outsiders. It would seem, therefore, that the Gujeratis as a well-established and stable group, can af-
ford to be more "liberal" in their attitudes toward out-group members. Finally, it might be pointed out that even though the Koknis visited India more frequently and for longer periods of time, they appeared to be less conscious of their Indian-ness than Gujaratis. This indicates the dominance of the religious variable over that of contact with larger "source" or identity groups. It is in such more limited comparisons that the relative importance of different operative variables have to be established.

In conclusion, two important trends which became apparent among Cape Indians ask for further comment. The first of these concern communal reaction to incipient assimilative tendencies, and the second a seeming reaction of the Indians to the minority status that they have come to occupy in South Africa. Given the presence of certain communal resources, one would expect to see certain counteracting tendencies emerge as soon as assimilative pressures are felt by an immigrant population. The large proportion of Indian children attending vernacular and/or religious schools as compared to the percentage of their parents who had any such education seems to be indicative of such a counteracting measure. Observing the rapid assimilation of their children to other elements of the local non-White population, parents have come to attach great importance to the fact that their children should receive some formal religious and/or vernacular instruction, even if only for a few years. The proliferation of organizations on the institutional level appears to be a similar attempt to protect sectional values and interests, since their representation tend to follow the major lines of cleavage within the Indian population. A number of these organizations furthermore seem to have been called to life specifically to counteract the declining commitment of members,
and the youth in particular, to the common values and cultural heritage of their particular community. In the light of this the following general principle might be formulated: As soon as incipient assimilative tendencies appear within a solidary group which threaten to change its very nature, certain developments which are aimed at buttressing and maintaining the cultural heritage of the group can be expected.

It would seem, however, that the proliferation of "institutional" organizations among the Cape Indians is fundamentally related to their minority status as a group.9) The structural organization of the respective communities had a striking "top-heavy" character noted for large unwieldy committees which operate chiefly on the institutional level with very little active "grass-roots" support on the primary level. New organizations would typically start with a show of frantic activity and an impressive flourish surrounding the statement and publishing of aims, and the election of a large executive, supported by a committee which might have as many as thirty or forty members.10) However, in some cases the elected committee would never meet again as a whole, and the organization would die before it had been properly conceived. Otherwise, a single or a few individuals might carry the whole burden of implementing the aims of the constituted body in question. Together with these phenomena one was struck

9) Hilda Kuper declares on the basis of her study of Indians in Natal that "(voluntary associations) ... are the main units making for internal cohesion in a minority group excluded from the central power of the state, and are to some extent comparable to the corporate groups which in certain tribal societies without central administrative machinery interact in such a way as to maintain the social whole." Op. cit., p. 83.

10) The social recognition extended to an individual in being thus elected seemed to be important in itself. In terms of the actual role a person would subsequently play this often did not represent much more than a symbolic "tip of the hat" indicating communal respect.
by the extent to which Indians are excluded from active participation on the managerial and societal levels, which are also the power levels over and above such power as is exercised informally in primary groups. There is little doubt that the multitude of institutional organizations, and the ritual actions surrounding them, function as surrogates for the exercise of real power within the larger Indian community as well as beyond the boundaries of this group.

This, then, is the impression that the Cape Indian population leaves with the investigator: that of a number of truncated communities; communities that are "incomplete", partly by internal development (or the lack thereof), and partly by force of external circumstances. The present investigation, however, does not provide adequate grounds for any firm predictions concerning the future. Both time and more detailed analyses would be needed for this.
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APPENDIX A
MAP II

INDIAN POPULATION
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION

- 0 - 49 %
- 5 - 99 %
- 1.0 - 1.99 %
- 2.0 - 2.99 %
- 3.0 - 3.99 %
## APPENDIX B

### SAMPLING PERCENTAGES ACCORDING TO AREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magisterial District</th>
<th>Ward or Municipality</th>
<th>Total Asiatic pop.</th>
<th>Sample N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPE TOWN</td>
<td>Ward 1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward 2</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward 4</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward 5</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>10.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward 9</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WYNBERG</td>
<td>Ward 9</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward 10</td>
<td>1319</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>10.54</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ward 11</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.82</td>
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<td>Ward 12</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward 13</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11.22</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ward 14</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward 15</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10.81</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Grassy Park</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ottery</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strandfontein</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.84</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Constantia</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIMONSTOWN</td>
<td>Simonstown</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steenberg, Lakeside, Muizenberg,</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kalk Bay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELLVILLE</td>
<td>Goodwood</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9.85</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Elsies River</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7.79</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parow</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.07</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bellville</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>6205</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>10.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE TOWN</td>
<td>Ward 3</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward 5</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward 6</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward 7</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE TOWN, WYNBERG, SIMONSTOWN, BELLVILLE</td>
<td>Miscellaneous+</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>8990+</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ This includes areas which had such a negligible number of Indians that they could hardly be "sampled".

++ These are based on the unrevised figures.
APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Code No. ........................................
Ward ...........................................
Mag. district ..................................
Date ...........................................

1. Composition of larger household ........................................

2. Number of children in family
(a) total .............
(b) resident with parents .............

3. Occupation: Husband ........................................
Wife ...........................................
Child(ren) ....................................

4. Ethnic caste/affiliation: Husband ....................................
Wife ...........................................

5. Religious affiliation: Husband ....................................
Wife ...........................................

6. Home language ........................................

7. Which other languages and/or dialects can you speak?
Husband ........................................
Wife ............................................
Children .....................................

8. Did you ever attend a religious or mother-tongue school in South Africa? ....................................

9. Do, or did, your children attend such schools? ....................................

10. Have you or your children visited India or Pakistan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Husband</th>
<th>Wife</th>
<th>Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of visits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total duration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2/ ....
11. Place of birth: Husband .........................................................
    Wife .................................................................

12. Year of arrival in Cape Pen.: Husband .......................
    Wife .................................................................

13. Do you ever visit people of other religious affiliations socially? .................................................................

14. Do you ever visit people of other language groups socially? .................................................................

15. Do you ever visit people of other ethnic groups socially? .................................................................

16. (a) How many (social) visitors have you had during the past week? .................................................................
    (b) What were their:
        (i) religious affiliation? ............................................
        (ii) home language? ..................................................
        (iii) ethnic affiliation? .............................................

17. (a) Are there any members of your family who are married to non-Indians? .................................................................
    (b) Ethnic and religious affiliation of the marriage partner: .................................................................

18. Attendance of religious meetings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reg.</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lectures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Festivals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Of which cultural, sporting, religious and/or political organizations are you a member? .................................................................

3/ ....
20. Are there other which you patronize? ...........................................

21. What is your opinion considering the desirability of a large country-wide cultural organization for all people of Indian origin? ...........................................

22. What is your opinion considering the desirability of a separate political organization for Indians? ...........................................

Bogardus scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moslem Ind.</th>
<th>Hindu Ind.</th>
<th>Malay</th>
<th>Col.</th>
<th>Bantu</th>
<th>Europ.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Would marry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Would work beside in my job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Would have several families in my neighbourhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Would have merely as speaking acquaintances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Would have live outside my neighbourhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Would have live outside my country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks: .................................................................

No. of persons covered by quest: .........................

Asiatic pop. of ward ...... Progressive sample ......
Asiatic pop. of sub-distr. ...... Progressive sample ......