


Can Canada Still Be Considered a Middle Power?

Zimbabwe and Canada's Declining Global Role

by
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*Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
Masters of International Studies at the University of Stellenbosch*



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March 2011

Declaration

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Abstract

Canada between 1945 and 2010 has been classified as a prominent "middle power." At the same time its relative standing among nations has been declining and it has less regard in the world than it once did. Middle power theory seeks to classify those nations who in the wake of the Second World War were neither great powers nor non- great powers.

The idea of middlepowermanship greatly appealed to Canadians and they undertook initiatives to separate themselves from the non-great powers. Canada is often seen as the exemplary case for observing middle power status. Through the post war era and the Cold War Canada was both economically and politically powerful. By getting involved in a plethora of multi-lateral bodies such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth while promoting peacekeeping and mediation, Canada was able to exert its growing influence on the world order. Throughout this time Canada worked hard to build its reputation as a mediator and specialized in ending quarrels. This is true of Canada's involvement in the Commonwealth in the 1960s and 1970s with regard to the Rhodesian question. On two separate occasions it was the Canadian contingents that prevented the Commonwealth from dissipating. This further bolstered Canada's rise to prominence in the world order.

Over the years, as Canada took on more initiatives resources became very thinly spread. With an economic slow down and new commitments to national policies (universal healthcare and pensions) the Canadian budget was rearranged and priorities changed. No longer were there the same resources available to middle power initiatives or the military. This has greatly impacted Canada's ability to participate in international projects.

Recently, Canada's position in the world has come into question, asking whether or not it truly is still a middle power. By looking at various traditional middle power elements including the economy, peacekeeping, official development assistance and involvement in multilateral bodies it can be seen that Canada's prominence is waning. Using the case study of Zimbabwean/ Canadian relations through the 20th and 21st centuries, the decline of Canada's middle power performance can be traced. Combining these different themes with hard and soft power theory it is clear to see that Canada no longer holds the same position of middle power it once did. It also shows that Canadians are holding onto an image of Canada, which is dated, and it is time to redefine Canada's position within the world order.

Opsomming

Tussen 1945 en 2010 is Kanada geklassifiseer as 'n prominente “middelmag.” Terselfdertyd het Kanada se relatiewe posisie ten opsigte van ander nasies begin afneem en minder aansien in die wêreld geniet as voorheen. Die middelmag-teorie poog om daardie nasies te klassifiseer wat na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog nóg grootmagte, nóg kleinmagte was.

Die Kanadese was aangetrokke tot die idee van middelmagkap en hulle het inisiatiewe onderneem om hulself van ander nie-grootmagte te onderskei. Kanada word dikwels gesien as die toonbeeld van die middelmag rol. Gedurende die post-oorlog era, asook tydens die Koue Oorlog was Kanada beide ekonomies en polities invloedryk. Deur betrokke te raak in multi-laterale instellings soos die Verenigde Nasies en die Statebond, en terselfdertyd vredeskepping en bemiddeling te bevorder, kon Kanada sy groeiende invloed op die wêreld orde uitoefen. Gedurende hierdie tyd het Kanada hard gewerk om sy reputasie as bemiddelar gestand te doen en te spesialiseer in die beëindiging van dispute. Laasgenoemde word veral waargeneem in Kanada se betrokkenheid in die Statebond met betrekking tot die Rhodesië-vraagstuk in die 1960s en 1970s. Op twee verskillende geleenthede was dit die Kanadese invloed wat verhoed het dat die Statebond ontbind. Dit het gesorg dat Kanada se prestige en prominensie in die wêreld orde toegeneem het.

Oor die jare het Kanada meer inisiatiewe aangegaan en het die hulpbronne verminder. Dit, tesame met 'n stadige groeiende ekonomie en nuwe nasionale verpligtinge soos universele gesondheidsorg en pensioenfonds moes die Kanadese begroting herrangskik word en prioriteite moes verander. Daar was nie meer dieselfde hulpbronne beskikbaar vir middelmag- inisiatiewe of die weermag nie. Dit het grootliks Kanada se vermoë beïnvloed om aan internasionale inisiatiewe deel te neem.

Onlangs het Kanada se posisie in die wêreld onder die loep gekom, en dit word bevraagteken of Kanada nog werklik 'n middelmag is. Deur te kyk na verskillende tradisionele middelmag-elemente soos die ekonomie, vredeskepping, amptelike ontwikkelingsbystand en die betrokkenheid in die multilaterale organisasies, word dit waargeneem dat Kanada se prominensie afneem. Deur gebruik te maak van die gevallestudie van die Zimbabwe/Kanada-verhoudinge deur die 20^{ste} en 21^{ste} eeu, kan die afname van Kanada se middelmag-funksie waargeneem word. Met die kombinerings van reeds genoemde temas met die teorieë van harde en sagte mag, kan dit duidelik gesien word dat Kanada nie meer dieselfde posisie van middelmag beklee wat dit eens gehad het nie. Verder wys dit dat die Kanadese aan 'n beeld van Kanada vasklou wat ouderwets is, en dat dit tyd is om Kanada se posisie te herdefinieer in die huidige wêreld orde.

Acknowledgements:

I would like to thank the following people for their help and support along the way:

- Prof. Janis Van Der Westhuizen who despite great geographical distances guided me through the entire thesis process.
- My parents who gave me unconditional support whenever necessary
- Mads Berg who pushed me through to the end
- Salomé Teuteberg for all of her wise words.

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List of Abbreviations

AAP- Africa Action Plan
BSAC- British South Africa Company
CIDA- Canadian International Development Agency
DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo
DFAIT- Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
ECOWAS- Economic Community of West African States
EU- European Union
G8- Group of Eight
G20- Group of Twenty
GDP- Gross Domestic Product
GNI- Gross National Income
GNU- Government of National Unity
IMF- International Monetary Fund
MDC- Movement for Democratic Change
NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO- Non- Governmental Organisation
NEPAD- New Partnership for Africa's Development
NIBMAR – No Independence Before Majority Rule
OAS- Organization of American States
ODA- Official Development Assistance
RPF- Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC- Southern African Development Community
SADCC- Southern African Development Co-Ordination Conference
SWAPO- South West Africa People's Organization
UDI- Universal Declaration of Independence
UN- United Nations
UNEF- United Nations Emergency Force
UNOSOM I- United Nations Operation in Somalia 1
UNOSOM II- United Nations Operation in Somalia 2
UNAMIR- United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
WEF- World Economic Forum
ZANU-PF- Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front
ZAPU- Zimbabwean African People's Union

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Middle power theory has been an ever-changing field of study since it emerged to prominence in the post World War Two era. Canada has often been regarded as the exemplary case when investigating middle power status. Through its middle power position in the world order Canada has acquired a very comfortable place over the past sixty years. However, Canada's philosophy of middlepowermanship is quickly vanishing. Often thought of as a 'fat cat' by developing nations (North-South Institute, 1977) Canada is now struggling to maintain its middle power status. As a nation, Canada likes "to look good at international conferences but without straining our economic relations with the major western powers... We stumble along with bits and pieces of programs with the various departments of government operating from totally different perspectives" (North-South Institute, 1977). This notion of trying to look good on the international stage, without the actions to support that image has become a reoccurring theme in Canadian foreign policy, severely undermining Canada's middle power status.

By examining middle power theory it is clear to see that Canada once fit very comfortably in the middle power position. However, in the 21st century using the same theory, it is clear to see that Canada is relying on its past record and good deeds to hold on to its middle power persona. In actuality, Canada is contributing less and less to international initiatives. This decline began decades ago, but is only now being felt by Canadians. Using typical characteristics of traditional middle power: peacekeeping and official development aid, it is becoming increasingly clear that Canada no longer can assume the same middle power position within the world order. This is only furthered by in-depth analysis of the relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe; that when a nation is facing a severe crisis the nation known as the helpful fixer is not able to help.

To assess whether or not Canada remains a traditional middle power it is necessary to investigate themes which have often been associated with middle powers. By looking at the example of Zimbabwe and other aspects of traditional middle power behaviour such as peacekeeping, official development assistance and involvement in multilateral bodies it becomes clear that Canada's position as the poster child of middlepowermanship has come to an end. The relationship that Canada has shared with Zimbabwe is exemplary to looking at Canada's waning middle power status. It gives understanding to how the Canadian government worked tirelessly to find a middle

power status by getting involved in many multi-lateral initiatives through to today, where there is little to no involvement in Zimbabwe.

1.2 Background of the Study

Canada has consistently been seen as a middle power, a helpful fixer and a nation that supports good governance and peacekeeping. This is a reputation that Canadians hold dear and are proud of. When looking at Canada's history of middle power successes there are many events to be proud of, such as substantial peacekeeping contributions and a steadfast support of democracy all over the world spanning many decades. Upon further investigation, it has become increasingly clear that Canada's reputation as middle power has been diluted and holds onto memories of the past.

Since the emergence of the term middle power the world order has changed greatly. The strengths that propelled Canada into middle power status in the Cold War no longer exist. Throughout the Cold War there was a strategic importance to Canada, because of its North Atlantic geography, acting as the connection between Europe and the United States, and between the USSR and the USA, on the flight path of enemy aircrafts or missiles. But since the Cold War ended twenty years ago there is no longer the same importance to the landmass which separated the Soviet Union and the United States.

Specifically, by tracing Canada's involvement with Zimbabwe this perception becomes clear. On the 30th anniversary of Zimbabwe's independence, the country which was once full of hope and prosperity, has fallen into a dire situation. Poverty, political violence, disease and corruption are just some of the widespread problems which plague this poorly managed country. The relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe is long but varied. At one point in time, the Canadian government stood up for the rights of Zimbabweans and helped bring the Commonwealth into consensus against the racist minority regime in Rhodesia. But now, in the 21st century, Canada is entirely insignificant to the Zimbabwean cause. Rather, the Canadian government has adopted the same direction as other western governments, enacting targeted sanctions against Robert Mugabe and the leading ZANU-PF heavyweights, while contributing very little to alleviating the widespread crisis in Zimbabwe.

1.3 Research Problem

The research problem evolved out of examining Canada's middle power status with regards to Zimbabwe, asking whether or not Canada can still be considered a traditional middle power?

Looking at the relationship shared between these two former colonies in the 20th and 21st centuries it has become clear that Canada can no longer be thought of as a traditional middle power in the global sense. On the surface Canada does seem to fill the role of a middle power. As a nation it is not as large and powerful as a great power but not as small and minor as the non- great powers, and simply sits in the middle between the two. In true middle power character Canada has made a committed effort to join as many international bodies as possible showing some semblance of interest in many different causes.

By examining the declining involvement that Canada has had in Zimbabwe despite the increasing severity of the crisis, it became increasingly clear that Canada has been lessening its commitments to international initiatives. This narrowed the focus of research to ask whether or not Canada can be considered a traditional middle power, using Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe as a case study.

1.4 Research Methodology

The research design is of a historical/ comparative nature. By using a combination of both qualitative and quantitative information it becomes easier to look at trends and patterns in Canadian middle power history. Since it is an explanatory case study most of the information used was retrieved from secondary sources including: journals, newspapers, books and databases. There were three interviews conducted to help contextualise the study and give insight to the issues being examined.

Middle power theory plays an important role in assessing Canada's position in the world order. Many different theories of middlepowermanship were studied and evaluated on their strengths and deficiencies. The strongest middle power theory (presented by Eduard Jordaan) was then applied to the case study of Canada and Zimbabwe, proving that Canada's middle power status is declining.

Using a case study adds value to the research because it allows for third party observation from afar; similarly, it is an example of certain behaviours and patterns. The case study of Canadian-Zimbabwean relations throughout the 20th and 21st centuries gives a wide range of behaviours and patterns which can be observed throughout an extended period of time. The downside of using a case study for behaviour analysis is that it is not always reliable when compared to "surveys and experiments" (Babbie, 1995:303). Due to the exploratory nature of the study, both surveys and experiments would not be of value, as it is difficult to quantify behaviours. Using a case study to examine Canada's waning middle power behaviour was the most relevant option.

The interviews conducted gave an unprecedented insight into the relations between Canada and Zimbabwe, painting a picture of what it was like to live and work in Zimbabwe over the past couple of decades. The interviewees were firstly selected on their knowledge and experience within Zimbabwe. Secondly, they were selected on their availability for an interview. All three interviews took place in Ottawa over one weekend in April 2010. Two of the interviews took place in person while the last was done over the telephone. All three interviewees had extensive knowledge of both Canada and Zimbabwe. Two of the respondents were former high commissioners to Zimbabwe stationed in Harare during different time periods, Charles Basset and Ann Charles. The last interviewee, Linda Freeman, is one of the foremost Canadian scholars on issues pertaining to Southern Africa; she had a particular interest and field experience in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. The interviewees had varied areas of expertise and interests giving insightful opinions on life in Zimbabwe. The interviews added a personal element of understanding to the situation in Zimbabwe. It allowed for a better understanding of what day to day life entailed for Canadian diplomats but also a Canadian diplomat researching. Similarly, the interviewees were able to give first hand accounts and opinions on some of the political turmoil which has plagued the nation in the past decades.

1.5 Limitations

The choice of Zimbabwe might seem like an odd example to evaluate Canada's waning middle power status. However, there are many more complexities in the relationship between the two countries than initially meets the eye. Both nations shared a colonial past with conflicting populations within their borders. Canada acted as a voice for Zimbabweans in the Commonwealth trying to convince other white nations of the importance of majority rule. The evolution of Canada's middle power status coincides with its relationship with Zimbabwe. Today the relationship between the two nations is chilly, signified by economic sanctions.

The most significant limitation, which was met while undertaking the study, was the lack of resources available on the specific relations between Canada and Zimbabwe. Since the relationship between Zimbabwe and Canada has never been a major focus of Canadian foreign policy there is not a large amount of information available. From a historical sense it was hard to gauge where the two nations stood in the pre- World War Two world order. Instead of looking at the relationship shared between Canada and Zimbabwe throughout the entire twentieth century, we begin in the period after 1945. One of the drawbacks of this is that the analysis has been significantly narrowed

to the limited recorded events between the two nations, mostly through the lens of the Commonwealth. In more recent history there has been increasing interaction between the two nations but multi-lateral bodies continue to play an important role between the two nations. Canada and Zimbabwe's relations through multilateral bodies have shaped the study in terms of time frame and the lens used to explain Canada's declining middle power status.

Additionally, this has made researching the specific policies between Canada and Zimbabwe difficult, especially since there is a plethora of information pertaining directly to the relationship between South Africa and Canada. Many of the facts about Canada's relationship with southern Africa are based on South Africa itself and oftentimes only make little reference to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. However, by examining the general relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe as an illustration of Canada's middle power decline does give a general overview of how the two nations interacted. By doing interviews with two former Canadian diplomats and looking at news publications have provided enough information to gain enough insight to analyse the relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe with regards to Canada's waning middle power status. One of the limitations of an interview process is that the respondent will pose some form of bias. By no means were the three respondents' experiences in Zimbabwe indicative of the overall Zimbabwean way of life.

The focus of the case study was centred around Zimbabwe as opposed to larger multi-lateral bodies. Looking at larger multi-lateral bodies such as the Commonwealth and the Kimberley Process as an exercise of Canada's middlepowermanship would have given a more in-depth and varied account of its waning middle power status. However, due to time and length constraints such an extensive review was not possible at this time. As a result the focal point of the study remains Zimbabwe and Canada's waning involvement with the crisis-ridden nation.

1.6 Overview

The structure of each chapter mostly follows a chronological order, contextualizing issues in which the time period they arose, leading to analysis in the latter parts of each chapter. The second chapter provides an overview of the middle power concept, contextualises the era in which the term emerged, and its importance in the global world order. Different middle power perspectives, such as functional middle power, behavioural middle power, normative middle power and hierarchical middle power are presented and their strengths and weaknesses are evaluated. The latter part of the chapter studies Eduard Jordaan's middle power framework identifying the main characteristics of

his approach. Lastly, the chapter looks to the future of middle power theory and the development of a new classification of middle power- emerging middle powers, again using Jordaan's middle power analysis.

The third chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section looks at Canada's rise to middle power status and how the country began a love hate relationship with the term. One of the main themes present in this section is Canada's involvement with multi-lateral bodies. This is a reoccurring theme when exploring Canada's commitment to middlepowermanship. Clarifying Canada's middle power status from the post war era to the end of the Cold War provides the base needed to deconstruct the notion of Canada as a traditional middle power. This section also examines elements of both hard and soft power, showing how the two are necessary to maintaining a middle power role.

The second part of the chapter discusses why Canada can no longer be considered a middle power and what factors have contributed to its decline. By explaining that Canada's middle power decline is linked to a cooling of its economic performance while drawing attention to two elements of power: both hard and soft and how the two are necessary to maintain middle power status. The last part of the chapter examines two themes affecting Canada's middle power status after the economic cool down: the military/ peacekeeping initiatives and Official Development Assistance (ODA). Canada's levels of official development assistance and commitment to peacekeeping in the recent decades with regards to the impact of declining indicators of hard and soft power. Through these examples it becomes clear that Canada can no longer hold its middle power status.

Chapter four gives a brief overview of Zimbabwean history and then goes on to explain the situation in Zimbabwe and its evolution into crisis, targeting some of the key events and themes which have brought it to its dire state. The second section of the chapter provides an in-depth analysis of Canadian- Rhodesian/Zimbabwean relations through the twentieth century until today. The relationship is examined in a large part through multilateral bodies the Commonwealth, the United Nations, the G8 as well as multi-lateral initiatives such as the Kimberley Process. It traces the impact that Canadian leaders had in both the multi-lateral bodies and as individuals with regards to the situation in Zimbabwe. The final section of the chapter looks at current policies and the dwindling commitment to Africa as a whole but also Zimbabwe.

The last chapter gives an overview of all the different themes discussed, drawing the conclusion that Canada can no longer be seen as a traditional middle power. Zimbabwe can be seen as a test

case for Canadian middlepowermanship from the 1960s to the present day. By exploring some of the contributing factors to the crisis in Zimbabwe it becomes clear that it is a very far-reaching and complicated crisis. The crisis is further complicated by the lack of support from middle power nations such as Canada. The Zimbabwean population on a daily basis is faced with the uncertainties of their unstable nation. The crisis in Zimbabwe also shows the necessity not only of Canadian membership in multi-lateral bodies but also the necessity of working with other nations to get things done. By looking at the economic slowdown of the Canadian economy, which led to decreased spending on hard power initiatives, Canada has lost out on its soft power. The budget cuts, which the military has taken, have directly impacted Canada's ability to aid in peacekeeping. The financial constraints of the late 20th century also negatively affected the government's ability to send money abroad as development aid to countries like Zimbabwe. Finally, the chapter ends with some recommendations for further research in to Canada's declining middle power status.

Chapter 2: Theory and Literature Review

Understanding the theory and previous literature behind the concept of middle- power is essential to further dissect and analyze the validity of the concept. This chapter introduces the emergence of the middle power theory, and then looks at the importance of middle powers to the global order. Afterwards, the chapter seeks to introduce various forms of middle power analysis and evaluate their effectiveness. Lastly, the chapter examines how middle power theory has evolved most recently having a wider scope and including more countries who do not fit into the category of small power, great power or even traditional middle power; drawing conclusions that the era post cold war was very similar to the post second world war two era. This chapter sets the stage to evaluate Canada's role as a middle power status and ask the question whether or not Canada can still be considered a traditional middle power.

2.1 Conceptualization: Middle Power

The concept of a middle power evolved out of necessity, at a time when the world order was changing significantly. With the process of decolonization in the early 20th century and the aftermath of both World Wars, many countries were experiencing a global shift between the great and the non- great powers. Some nations were coming to the realization that they did not fit into either of the established categories very well. There were many countries which were breaking away from the smaller states but still had not achieved 'great power' status. The Cold War acted as an ideal platform for a new conception of power status. The emergence of middle power as a basis of classification needs to be understood in the context of the "transitory nature of the international system, caught between the erosion of the old post-1945 order and an ill- defined new order" (Cooper, 1997:1). After the war ended the traditional 'great powers' infrastructure was destroyed. Great Britain and the rest of Europe needed to rebuild themselves from the ground up. These former imperial powers found themselves in a new position economically and politically. There was a newfound reliance on the new world to help rebuild the world order. This is when nations such as Canada were able to prosper. Countries like Canada and Australia did not need to worry about rebuilding they focused on expanding economically, socially and structurally.

A new space was created for nations who were not regionally relevant but were strong economically and politically. These nations had not featured prominently on the world stage previous to the wars but now yearned for a stronger presence. The idea of middle powers emerged out of a need to classify these countries who were in-between the great and not- great powers. "A

middle power, in its most basic form, is a state which is neither a great power nor a small power” (Chapnick, 1999: 73). The most basic definition of a middle power puts those countries in a very unassuming place which is neither good nor bad, just sitting in the middle. It was a combination of capabilities coming together to define or denote the standing of a nation in the post war era (Keating, 2010: 5). “The idea of a middle power did not rest on rank alone, but, and especially in the context of the early years of the UN, also included a combination of capabilities and commitment” (Keating, 2010:5).

Throughout the Cold War the world was divided between two powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, it therefore became essential to have countries that stood in the middle to try and mediate peace. Middle powers did not only act as a mediator between the United States and Soviet blocs but also within their own alliance. Yet during the cold war they were “powerlessly caught in the standoff between the two superpowers [which] resulted in a foreign policy highly concerned with military and political issues” (Jordaan, 2003:171).

These new middle powers were essential to upholding the global order by emphasizing “coalition building and cooperation- building” (Cooper, 1997:9). Specifically, it was the hostile Cold War climate which allowed for middle powers to rise to prominence. They were able to survive in part by “a network of international associations or regimes, in part by a system of international law, and in part by timely and effective diplomatic interventions by countries like Canada with an interest in preserving this order” (Keating, 2010:7). The Cold War made the middle powers important to the super-powers. For the Americans middle power nations were essential to keep NATO alive and to uphold its position at the top of the global order. They acted as a stabilizing force in an uncertain world. They did not aspire to be great powers but did pose “wide-ranging political and commercial interests” (Keating, 2010:6) while promoting global initiatives through international bodies. Middle powers sought to uphold, not disrupt, the international order. Specifically, Canada did this by getting involved in NATO, the UN and the Commonwealth by maintaining international lawfulness and promoting peacekeeping.

In its basic theoretical form, middle power theory serves as a valid way to understand the changes in global order and how countries like Canada contributed and continue to act as stabilizers to the global order. Middle powers “regularly act beyond [their] legal territory, pursuing, like most nation-states, engagements shaped by foreign policy, global institutional structures, and the more contingent needs of specific circumstances” (Authers, 2009:782). By looking at the various middle

power theoretical frameworks its clear that middle powers especially through the Cold War were essential to the world order.

With the end of the Cold War a need for a new reclassification has emerged once more. This brings the idea of “emerging” middle powers to the forefront. Similar to the post World War Two era, there has been a shift in the global order and a greater distinction needs to be drawn amongst different kinds powers, but this time the distinction needs to be drawn within the middle power arena. Despite many differences between traditional and emerging middle powers many theoretical similarities can be found. Generally speaking all middle powers have a “tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide diplomacy’ (Cooper *et al.*1993: 19). Whether the nation is perceived as a traditional middle power or emerging middle power these characteristics are present. By looking at various conceptualizations of middle powers it can be seen that Canada epitomized the traditional middle power persona throughout the post war era up until the end of the Cold War.

2.2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

There are many different forms of middle power analysis; each theory has its strengths but also carries deficiencies, which often outweighs its strengths. There are five different modes of analysis explored and both their advantages and disadvantages are discussed. Out of the five, the mode of analysis presented by Eduard Jordaan offers the most far reaching and concise framework. Jordaan has the ability to pinpoint trends which are present throughout all middle powers and then distinguish between what constitutes an emerging middle power and traditional middle power. Jordaan has been largely inspired buy Robert Cox. He is able to identify and then differentiate between two types of middle powers which other models have not done.

2.2.1 The Importance of Middle Powers in the Global Order:

Robert Cox in his 1989 article “Middlepowermanship, Japan and the Future World Order” poses a valid question “what is the essence of the middle power’s functional relationship to the world order?” (Cox, 1989:825). Before delving into the theory behind middle powers it is important to understand why they are so important in the world. Middle powers have acted as a stabiliser and neutraliser, especially during the Cold War, middle power countries acted within the interests of their bloc to neutralise the tension, “or urging restraint on the alliance leader, or resisting renewed

tendencies towards isolationism on the part of the bloc leader”(Cooper *et al.* 1993:20). “The middle-power role is to affirm the principle of adherence to acceptable rules of conduct by all powers, great and small” (Cox, 1989:834). Middle powers are able to affirm this world order through various international institutions based on a post- Westphalian political structure and a decentralization of global hegemony (Cox, 1989:835).

In the era after the Second World War when the Great Powers had been decimated a new grouping of powers began to emerge. A country like Canada who was very involved in the war through industry, finance, technology and manpower came out on the other side with a new place in the global order. No longer was Canada a former colony or a nation pretending to be its own country; rather, as a nation Canada had an important impact. Perhaps most importantly, the Canadian economy was stronger than ever at the end of the war. Since Canada was not a ‘great power’ like the United States or Britain but was no longer a small power a new place in the world order needed to be sought out. This is where the evolution of middle powers began.

After the Cold War ended there were new opportunities for middle powers. They were not needed to try and keep a stable world order; there were new initiatives they were able to participate in. Since the Soviet Union and the United States were no longer caught in a constant power struggle and there was no longer the same divide between east and west and as a result, “middle powers had greater freedom of action thrust upon them in terms of their diplomacy” (Cooper *et al.*1993: 21).

Middle powers have the ability to come together through multi-lateral bodies such as NATO and the UN to uphold “the norms and rules of the international system and perform certain tasks to maintain and strengthen that system” (Cooper *et al.* 1993: 21). Throughout the 1980s with the United States’ declining resources middle powers were poised to take on a more active role in the international arena (Cooper *et al.*1993: 21).

2.2.2 Different Forms of Middle Power Analysis:

Through the development of middle power theory, different forms of analysis have emerged. It is important to see how different scholars view middle power theory to see how the subject has evolved since its emergence. Chapnick (1999), Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (1993) and Cooper (1997) explore different forms of middle power: functional middle power, behavioural middle power, the hierarchical model and a normative lens of middlepowermanship. All theories draw on different information to analyse the successes of different middle powers. Each theory possesses some

strengths and can be applied to examples of middle powers, however, their application can only be completed within a niche and is not widespread. Many of the different theories presented appeal to certain elements of middlepowermanship and fail to characterise them on a general scale without losing sight of their importance to the world order. Some are far too general while others have a narrow focus on one or two elements. This is where Eduard Jordaan's framework gains strength. Jordaan is able to draw on the strengths of the various forms of middle power analysis and bring them together to create a unique framework.

2.2.2.1 Functional Middle Power

Functional middle power theory is the most widespread and perhaps easiest to understand. The theory is based on the desire of nations to distinguish themselves from the countries who do not have the same capabilities as the great powers but would like to be distinguished from those countries with little to no capabilities in the world order. Functional middle power status "identifies states which are capable of exerting influence in international affairs in specific instances, and differentiates them from all the rest" (Chapnick, 1999: 74). When the Second World War ended functional middle power theory was able to answer the call to nations such as Canada and Australia who wanted a better classification system of global power.

Cooper (1997) argues, "functionalism is the core organizing principle in the patterned behaviour of the middle powers" (Cooper, 1997:4). By using 'functionalism' there were benefits to the middle powers "symbolically, the approach provided these countries with enhanced status in the international system...[and] instrumentally, it offered the possibility of building up a constructive role in a fashion which distinguished them from the great powers" (Cooper, 1997: 5). Countries were able to do this by creating a narrower focus on their international initiatives by directing "their attention towards the domains where they held a high degree of resources and reputational qualifications" (Cooper, 1997:5).

"Functionalism legitimized the application to issue- specific strengths and skills possessed by individual countries" (Cooper, 1997:5). It allowed middle power countries with different strengths to rise in the world order in different capacities. Instead of trying to have an all-encompassing theory, functionalism allows analysis on an issue-specific area (Cooper, 1997:5).

The downside of using functional middle power is that it can be "imprecise" (Chapnick, 1999:75). Since a state's capacities are continually fluctuating especially with regards to certain issue areas

there is “no objective way to differentiate small states that might sometimes qualify for middle power status from those that will never qualify” (Chapnick, 1999:75). Even though functional middle power theory is the most widely used it does not gauge the constantly changing world order and therefore is not always precise in terms of analysis. Even though functional middle power theory is very straightforward it cannot conform to the changing capabilities of a nation, especially within a more narrow scope. The theory is valuable to understand on a broader platform and to gain a general understanding of middle power theory on the whole, however, when doing further investigation to middle power analysis it is not the best method.

2.2.2.2 *Behavioural Middle Power*

The behavioural middle power definition appears to be more contemporary. Instead of looking at the capabilities of states it looks at the actions of the middle power to classify them. The three elements characterize the behavioural model are: “multilateralism, conflict management and moral power” (Chapnick, 1999: 75). There is a greater focus on “a particular style in international politics” (Cooper *et al.*1993:19). This method has greater appeal because it is more flexible to accepting new middle powers and seems to fluctuate more than the definition of functional middle power. On the other hand, some argue that this definition might be too flexible. States are able to behave *like* a middle power without actually being one. The problem with this concept is that almost any state would have these features at one time or another, which renders the concept ineffective.

Overall, using the behavioural model makes it difficult to actually peg down a concise definition with examples. Behavioural middle power cannot “define middle powers objectively because its list of middle power behavioural characteristics is neither the same across the literature, nor tangibly measurable” (Chapnick, 1999: 76). Since states’ behaviour is constantly fluctuating from one issue to the next there is no real way to measure its middle power status though its behaviour. Another problem with the behavioural model is that it cannot separate the self- interest of middle powers with an actual feeling of selflessness. Though behavioural lens might seem progressive, especially when compared to functional lens; it is too far reaching and can encompass all nations based on their middle power-like stance on certain issues.

2.2.2.3 Hierarchical Model

Perhaps the most straightforward form of analysis of middle power; the hierarchical model is based on a middle powers position in the international order. The hierarchical model was born out of a need to distinguish between great and small powers. In the wake of the Second World War ‘small powers’ were becoming stronger and no longer fit their small roll but were not considered to be great powers either. The hierarchical model is based on quantifiable attributes such as “area, population, size, complexity and strength of economy, military capability and other comparable factors” (Cooper *et al.* 1993:17). The main problem with using the hierarchical model to distinguish between different powers is that it is difficult to actually quantify power (Cooper *et al.* 1993:17). Also the main attributes of the hierarchical model are continuously fluctuating constantly which makes it even more difficult to try and classify middle powers.

2.2.2.4 Normative Middle Power

Unlike the hierarchical model or functional model, normative middle power is perhaps the most emotionally charged theory. The normative lens puts traditional middle powers on a pedestal. Normative middle powers are seen as “wiser or more virtuous than the states positioned ether ‘above’ them or ‘below’ them” (Copper *et al.* 1993:18). The problem with this form of analysis is that states can take a superior attitude when dealing with other nations, often exerting a very high level of self satisfaction, with often very little having been done.

Another problem pointed out by Cooper *et al.* (1993) is that only a small number of states would be seen as middle powers through the normative lens; “mainly states that are like-minded’ developed northern states of middle size” would be considered a middle power such as Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and Canada (Cooper *et al.* 1993:18). The theory does not allow for flexibility towards other states who have not traditionally fallen into the middle power category such as Brazil, India or Nigeria. The failure of the normative lens lies in that it is unable to adapt to the changing global landscape and account for new trends within world order. Through the normative lens, nations adapt a very strong sense of self- fulfilment. This can detract from the overall global perception of a middle power, if a nation is too confident in itself and gives itself too much credit where it is not due can have negative effects on its notability.

2.3 Theoretical Framework: Eduard Jordaan

When the concept of traditional middle power is presented a few countries immediately come to mind: Canada, Australia and the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway and Denmark). These countries have many commonalities: they are generally wealthy, “stable, egalitarian, social democrats and not regionally influential” (Jordaan, 2003: 165). Middle powers acting as a stabiliser is a persistent theme in Jordaan’s analysis: “middle powers are stabilisers and legitimisers of the world order” (Jordaan, 2003:167). This shows the direct influence of Cox’s theories on Jordaan’s work. Cox believes that:

a middle power supports the process of international organization because of its interests in a stable and orderly environment, rather than to seek to impose an ideologically preconceived vision of an ideal world order. By implication, therefore, a middle power is one active in international organizations and supports the objectives of international peace and security, as one of its defined national interests, which leads to a more stable world order (Flemes, 2007:8-9)

Cox and Jordaan’s ideas on the role of the middle power state within the global order are similar and draw on the same themes for constructing a middle power identity. Middle power behaviour on a global scale also plays an important role in identifying key attributes in upholding the global order. Middle powers are often “identified by their foreign policy behaviour, which leads to the identification of similarities in the constitutive features of middle-power states” (Jordaan, 2003:166). Middle powers foreign policy is often shaped by domestic values and a feeling of social responsibility to help other nations in need.

Jordaan emphasizes that all traditional middle powers have high standards of living and can be found in the upper echelons of the United Nations Development Index. Other similarities that traditional middle powers share is that they have well established democracies, are the core of the world economy and have a propensity for conflict reduction (Jordaan, 2003). Similarly, traditional middle powers emerged in the wake of the Second World War; rising to prominence while Eastern Europe was rebuilding itself.

Despite being located in very different places geographically the traditional middle powers share many similar characteristics. It is widely acknowledged that traditional middle powers do not carry much regional influence and that they are constantly struggling to exert themselves regionally. By themselves, traditional middle powers do not exert great influence generally they have “weak and ambivalent regional orientation, [and work to construct] identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform” (Jordaan, 2003: 165).

Take, for example, Canada in comparison to the United States or Norway in comparison to the EU. Both yield very little power regionally but have made a strong name for themselves internationally despite relatively small populations.

Middle power foreign policy is characterised by a desire to act as a stabiliser to the world order. By aligning themselves with like-minded states on issues through multi-lateral bodies middle powers can find resolutions to global issues. Their solution is to seek “multilateral solutions to international problems, for advocating compromise and for, in general, being part of the solution to problems at international level”(Jordaan, 2003: 166). Multilateral bodies such as NATO and the United Nations are essential for middle powers’ survival in the global order. Through multilateral bodies middle powers are able to act on international issues which might not directly pertain to them. The arguments that Jordaan presents seem to fall into the trend of how other scholars view middle powers that middle powers “usually support multilateralism, and make alliance with other middle powers to give their voices some weight, where often only the powerful matter” (Hynek & Bosold, 2010: 142). By joining these larger bodies middle powers are upholding the hegemonic order by stabilising and perpetuating the already established order.

Foreign aid is as important as multilateral behaviour. By giving out official development assistance (ODA) middle powers are able to project a form of influence outside of their own borders whilst helping out another state. Traditional middle power foreign aid “is a transposition of domestic approaches to economic justice and equality to the international sphere” (Jordaan, 2003: 174). ODA is a way to transpose influence from a regionally unimportant nation on a global scale to elevate its global standing.

Lastly, Jordaan explains that “during the initial appearance of states appearance as middle powers, the role performed by national leaders seems disproportionately important compared with later in the lifespan of middle powers” (Jordaan, 2003:175). This is a trend which can be seen with many traditional middle powers from Lester B. Pearson in Canada to Olaf Palme in Sweden, the leaders in the post war era were integral to carving out a middle position for their small states and often it is the personality which dominated the political scene.

The strength of Jordaan’s article lies in its wide range, dissecting many trends to apply to the traditional middle powers. He shows both the positive and negative aspects of the title ‘traditional middle power.’ Jordaan outlines a broad reaching but valid theory on middle powers. He is able to link middle powers through themes which have not been widely explored. He notes that attitudes

towards regionalism, democratic stability, leadership, foreign policy, membership to multi-lateral bodies, foreign aid and identity are key factors to examining the middle power state. The middle power role in the world order is to act as a stabiliser and to perpetuate the established world order. Middle power states have done this through the themes outlined in his article.

2.4 The Future of Middle Power: Emerging Middle Powers

The term 'middle power' is constantly changing and "should not be evaluated as 'a fixed universal' but as 'something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system'" (Cox, 1989b). In recent past there has been a growing distinction between different types of middle powers- traditional and emerging. Similar to the end of the Second World War, the end of the Cold War presented a new opportunity of classification for many countries. Much like traditional middle powers, emerging middle powers are seeking to carve out a position for themselves in the ever-changing world order. The term 'middle power' is ambiguous with no concrete definition; therefore it is important to create a distinction between 'traditional middle power' and 'emerging middle power.' By doing this it allows for a broader range of countries to be recognized for their varying capacities.

As the world has evolved and states assume new places in the world, old terms such as 'middle power' need to be adjusted and adapted to include states who are neither great powers nor small powers but do not fit the characterisations of being a traditional middle power. The idea of an 'emerging middle power' has become useful when trying to define countries like South Africa, Brazil or India. These countries have moved into a more prominent position from the periphery and much like traditional middle powers in the post war era, they found themselves at odds with the current categories of classification. Emerging middle powers have been on the rise since the end of the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a global movement towards social and economic issues as opposed to a focus on the military. This "has created a favourable environment for semi- peripheral states seeking to raise issues of global economic equality and justice" (Jordaan, 2003: 178). Often times, emerging middle powers act as the voice representing other disadvantaged countries on global issues (such as poverty). States like Brazil and India now had the ability to carve out their own niche similar to Canada and Australia in the post Second World War era.

Traditional middle powers are noted for their contributions on the international scale, emerging middle powers are "first of all, regional powers and in addition middle powers (with regard to their power resources) on a global scale" (Nolte, 2007:10). This is in stark contrast to traditional middle

powers. Emerging middle powers or “the new global ‘middle’—is already giving rise to the reordering of actual global relations and highlighting the need to rethink definitions and practices of global governance” (Shaw *et al.* 2009:29). This rings true especially in Africa,

in terms of ecologies, economies (informal and formal, illegal and legitimate), societies and states—as well as a global context, with active diaspora communities in Europe and North America. The new global middle appears to be acting as a ring of magnets, attracting migrants from failed or fragile states, and in turn resulting in growing remittances (Shaw *et al.* 2009:30)

This gives greater significance to the emerging middle powers, for their attractiveness to immigrants and the shifting patterns of migration. With migration patterns changing a new focus on the emerging middle powers appears but there is also a change the regional economic structure.

In almost all ways emerging middle powers differ from traditional middle powers, but still yield power internationally. Emerging middle powers are “usually semi- peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recent democratic states which exercise great regional power and self- association” (Jordaan, 2003: 165). Unlike traditional middle powers, emerging middle powers thrive on their regional strength. They lean towards regional integration through trade agreements and multi-lateral bodies; such as South Africa and SADC or Nigeria and ECOWAS. Emerging middle powers “are keen participants and often initiators of regional integration and cooperation” (Jordaan, 2003: 172). However, outside of their immediate region they tend to be less influential. Emerging middle powers like South Africa prided themselves on being a regional voice on global issues and drawing attention to regional issues on the world stage.

Emerging middle powers are characteristically only recently democratised. They are in the process of transitioning to a fully democratic system. This adds a certain aspect of instability to the new democracy in the state, which is in contrast to traditional middle powers. “Democracy in some emerging middle powers often seems of a poorer quality than found in traditional middle powers, considering, for example, commonplace human rights abuses in Nigeria, Malaysia and Turkey and one-party domination in countries like South Africa and Malaysia” (Jordaan, 2003:171).

Another unique characteristic of emerging middle powers is that they possess a very skewed distribution of wealth. Countries who fall into the classification as emerging middle powers have the largest gaps between rich and poor on a global level (Jordaan, 2003:172), such as in South Africa which is home to some of the greatest dichotomies between rich and poor.

2.5 Conclusion

Tracing the development of traditional middle powers gives insight into the importance of the world order. It shows how relatively 'neutral' nations are integral to maintain the peace and mediate through crises. As the global order is constantly shifting it is important to be able to classify emerging middle powers in the same manner as traditional middle powers like Canada, Australia and Sweden. As in 1945, the world is recognising the distinct differences between the not great and the great countries but perhaps on a more specific scale. New and more accepting categories are developing to keep up with the constant change in the world order. Some of the frameworks discussed cannot keep up with the shifting global landscape. The hierarchical model is dated and is based on an out of date way of quantifying power based on population and military capabilities. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the behavioural model is too flexible and can classify some states as middle powers when they only act *like* a middle power, but are not necessarily a middle power through and through.

After examining the various types of middle power analysis it is clear that Jordaan presents the best framework. Inspired by Cox and Gramsci, Jordaan highlights characteristics essential to both emerging and traditional middle powers while applying them to relevant examples. Furthermore, Jordaan has also created a strong distinction between emerging and traditional middle powers, showing how the theory is flexible and can keep up with the shifting global order.

Chapter Three: If Canada Speaks and No One Listens, Does it Make a Sound?

3.1 Introduction

Tracing Canada's emergence as a middle power in the post World War Two era through to today shows how Canadian middle power status has shifted greatly. By examining the characteristics and the process in which Canada attained the middle power role makes it much easier to analyse whether or not Canada can still be considered a traditional middle power in the 21st century. Historically speaking, Canada has been seen as the prime example when analysing middle power status. In the past Canada has been renowned for its commitment to peacekeeping and giving foreign aid. Pierre Pettigrew, a former minister of foreign affairs, has argued that "Canadian foreign policy is 'an outward expression of our society' a manifestation – through a slippery conceptual intersection between ideas of the individual, the national, and the international – of the personal desires of those Canadians who, 'more than ever, want to make a difference globally'" (Authers, 2009: 783). For a long time the term 'middle power' proved to be an acceptable term to describe Canada's position in the world. For decades now politicians and scholars alike have been arguing whether or not this is an appropriate term to describe Canada. From Pearson to Harper, Prime Ministers have tried to prove that Canada is a middle power or *not* a middle power. Former Prime Minister Paul Martin thought that the idea of Canada being a middle power "imposes an unnecessary ceiling on what we can do and be in the world" (Martin, 2005). Despite various Prime Ministers' sensitivity on the classification of Canada as a middle power it "has played a useful function in locating Canadian foreign policy in the harsh environment of global politics" (Keating, 2010:3).

The Canadian economy felt strong growth after the Second World War but by the 1970s the economy was cooling and the same level of growth was not felt again. There are a few contributing factors to this which are examined, the effects of the economic slow down had effects on many facets of Canadian policy making. The second element undermining Canada's middle power status is the country's involvement in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping has been controversial over the past decades. Canada once the strongest peacekeeping nation in the world has fallen behind and its peacekeeping efforts have been tainted by two major scandals in the 1990s. Lastly, Canada's ODA can be seen as a contributing factor to the decline of middle power status. There has been less money going towards ODA especially compared with other middle power nations (Norway and Sweden). These three factors are a clear indication of Canada's waning middle power status.

Regardless of the current opinions on Canada's role in the world, it is clear that in the past, they described a traditional middle power. Canadian foreign policy has followed a pattern of "Canadian values, including a belief in peace, order, and good government, human rights, and a diverse society, [and] are said to not only prompt international engagement, but also to determine its form" (Authers, 2009:792). The attitude and the desire to uphold Canadian values since the end of the Second World War has helped create a unique position on the world stage. Canada's middle power status has been used to create a voice in multilateral organizations, "leadership in international initiatives, and consultation within Canadian officials on matters of concern to the international community. Canada has used the middle power concept to further its foreign policy aims and to promote nationalism through an internationally recognized identity" (Chapnick, 2000:188). However true, this is characteristic of decades past, Canada no longer holds the same middle power position as it once did.

This chapter begins with looking at some of the characteristics of middle power status outlined by Jordaan and to Canada: foreign policy, leadership and identity. This is followed by an in-depth examination of characteristics which are now seen as disproving the scholarship upholding Canada's middle power status. The three main elements examined are, the economy, military and peacekeeping, and lastly, ODA. These are three elements essential to upholding middle power status and they have been in steady decline in recent decades. They also draw on elements of both hard and soft power which is essential to maintaining a middle ground.

3.2 Canada's emergence as a traditional middle power: Largest of the Small Powers or Smallest of the Large Powers?

Characteristically, like many other traditional middle powers, Canada's rise to middle power status occurred after the Second World War. The evolution from colony to middle power began during the First World War. The manpower that Canada sent to help the Allied powers was significant. After the war ended, the Canadian government felt it best to join the League of Nations as a separate nation from Great Britain. This started the separation between Canada and Great Britain on the international stage. However, during the interwar years Canada accepted its position as a 'non-great power.' Other monumental actions in the interwar period for Canada included "the ability to send Canadian diplomatic representatives abroad, and the ability to sign its own international treaties" (Nossal *et al.* 2011: 51). Canada's diplomatic autonomy was finally granted through the Statute of Westminster in 1931. At first, during the 1930s, Canada used its autonomy to reinforce its position within the British Commonwealth, while ducking or avoiding as far as possible any kind of

prominent role in the League of Nations or other international fora. As Nossal suggests, Canadian leaders “accepted the division of the international system into a simple dichotomous hierarchy” (Nossal, 1997:53).

One of the greatest turning points for Canadian symbolic independence was with the onset of the Second World War. When Britain went into the war the Canadian government did not automatically join but waited one week before declaring war on Germany. Similar to the First World War, Canada contributed substantial manpower to the war relative to the small Canadian population (1.1 million people, about 10% of the then population). More importantly, Canada developed economically during the war, becoming the third industrial power on the Allied side – granted, far behind the Americans and the British. No longer was the government concerned with recognition as a separate state, “rather, Ottawa wanted the great powers to recognize its war effort- a sizeable one for a state with a small population and limited resources” (Nossal, 1997:54).

Canada began to feel increasingly aware of the growing differences between the great and non-great powers. As a country, Canada knew it was not a great power but felt a growing difference with other smaller nations. The non- great powers had very different capacities and the Canadian government felt that these differences should be recognized. During the war, the British and Americans found the emergence of such powers to be a nuisance: claims to a new status could wait until after the war.

It was not only Canadian politicians who were starting to take note of the shift in power. In 1943 *The Economist* drew an interesting parallel trying to classify Canada’s position on the world stage. They wrote:

If Canada is prevented by the smallness of her population from taking rank with the Great powers, she has in the last three years made a category for herself all of her own. Relative to her resources her effort is second to none. In absolute terms the distance which separates Canada from the Great Powers is less than that between her own achievements and that of any other of the small powers (*The Economist*, 1943 in *as cited in* Chapnick, 2000:192)

When the Second World War ended Canada was still trying to navigate a new global position, one which was entirely separate from its British mother. Canada’s integral role in the war was not going unnoticed, but it became difficult to find a proper place in the world order for this post-colonial nation. Canada was not alone with these sentiments: Australia was also seeking a new position in the post war global order. Cooper calls Australia and Canada “the first followers of the post-1945

international order” (Cooper *et al.* 1997:27), playing integral roles in building new institutions and “strengthening development in the South” (Cooper *et al.* 1997: 27).

It was not until 1945 that the term “middle power” was slowly introduced into the Canadian government’s vocabulary. The increasing use of the term developed through a growing disdain for the simplistic division between ‘great’ and ‘non-great’ powers (Nossal *et al.* 2011: 53). Initially the term ‘middle power’ was begrudgingly used “with the prefix ‘so-called’” by Canadian parliamentarians (Nossal *et al.* 2011: 53). This signalled the beginning of the love- hate relationship with the term.

With the onset of the Cold War Canada began to play a new strategic role in world politics. It is “sandwiched” between the United States and the Soviet Union and became an important land mass (Nossal *et al.* 2011: 27). With the United States as next door neighbour Canada strengthened its military to help protect the continent, but only up to a point. In Nossal’s opinion for Canada “it was as much (if not more) a question of sovereignty rather than security” (Nossal *et al.* 2011: 28). The government wanted to move in a direction of mediation and peacebuilding as opposed to traditional ‘hard power’ through the military.

Canada throughout the Cold War did not mediate between the great powers but rather, within the western bloc (Nossal *et al.* 2011: 55). Two examples of this are: is its role in the Suez Crisis in 1956 and then its role in the Commonwealth over the Rhodesian question. The Canadian government was very concerned with smaller more contained conflicts. The government was “keen to help reinforce international mechanism for conflict management- particularly those associated with the United Nations. As a result, Canada became a strong supporter of international peacekeeping and truce supervision” (Nossal *et al.* 2011:56). This signalled Canada’s shift towards peace building and conflict resolution, which would help solidify its role as a middle power in the world order.

3.3 Upholding the Middle Power Reputation

The post- war era was ideal for Canada to make a name for itself externally as a middle power. It has acted as legitimiser, peacekeeper, proponent of conflict reduction and supporter of multilateral solutions with like-minded states. From the outset there are some elements of middle powermanship which are more obvious than others. Jordaan presents many attributes necessary for a nation to be considered a middle power. Some of these characteristics are easily applied when examining Canada’s middle power status of the past including: regional significance, identity, foreign policy

participation in multi-lateral bodies and leadership. Since Canada has an “inability... to unilaterally and single handedly shape global outcomes in any direct manner” it is essential for them to participate in multi-lateral bodies and have a strong foreign policy (Jordaan, 2003:169). As a result, Canada has acted as a legitimising force to the current world order upholding the middle power reputation.

3.3.1 Regional Significance

Canada is a middle power but not a regional power, fitting with Jordaan’s framework. Next door to the United States, Canada is regionally insignificant. Canada cannot measure up financially or militarily and is largely dependent on the American economy. With the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 Canada became even more dependent on the United States (Welsh, 2004). Until recently, more than 80% of Canada’s exports went to the United States, which is thought to have changed the traditional “east- west trading axis to a north-south trading axis” (Welsh, 2004: 590). Canada has become accustomed to a comfortable position without having to think about the issue of security. Brysk (2009) characterizes Canada’s position as one of a “protected middle power, freed of the security dilemma by U.S. hegemony- at the price of perpetual junior partnership in an involuntary alliance” (Brysk, 2009:84). Regionally, Canada carries little clout and often needs to fall in line with the neighbour to the south. This is in keeping with the traditional middle power characteristic set out by Jordaan.

3.3.2 Canadian Identity?

The idea of national identity (or lack thereof) is a very sore spot for many Canadians. Due to the lack of regional significance Canada has constantly been struggling to create an identity solely its own. Since traditional middle powers are not regionally significant they try very hard to create a unique identity different from the super powers. Canadians dwell on any aspect of how they are different than Americans and try to base their national identity on how they are dissimilar to Americans. Henry Kissinger is quoted saying: “We are so big, whatever identity they have, they get in opposition to us” (Bothwell, 2007:314). On top of the insecurity due to the more significant neighbour to the south, there are many other internal factors which take away from a unified Canadian identity. A 2005 article by Robert Cox titled “A Canadian Dilemma: the United States or the World” describes Canada’s current position as struggling against being part of the functional empire (Cox, 2005: 684).

The strength of Cox's argument lies in the idea that Canadians are "free to be different" highlighting the unique position that middle powers possess. Since Canada is struggling to find an identity solely its own it "wants to immerse itself in all parts of the world and be part of the experience of the world's developing diversity" (Cox, 2005: 684). Historical factors contribute to this multicultural identity. Since the first Europeans came to Canada over five hundred years ago there has been a mix of English, French and First Nations influence coming together to create a distinct identity. Unfortunately, the coming together has not been harmonious and has been controversial since the beginning. In recent history, Canada has become a "microcosm of the whole world" with people immigrating from all over the world (Cox, 2005:679). This has added to confusions Canadians have about their own identity, not knowing what being Canadian actually means.

Canadians relish the multicultural comparison between the United States; the cultural mosaic versus the melting pot. American immigration is often characterized by the 'American Dream' and the attempt to fulfil "common expectations, aspirations, and behavioural norms" (Cox, 2005: 679). As opposed to Canada where "new immigrant groups have been more likely to retain their cultural identity to become part of a larger society that has been described as a 'community of communities'" (Cox, 2005: 679). In an attempt to further distinguish themselves from the Americans, Canadians embrace their "community of communities" and have accepted an "ethos of multiculturalism" as an essential part of the Canadian identity (Cox, 2005: 679). Taking all of these unique identities and feelings of inadequacy compared to the United States it is clear why Canadians find it so difficult to have their own unique identity to uphold its middle power image.

3.3.3 Canada and the World

Foreign policy is a nation's tool to interact with the rest of the world and Canadian foreign policy is no different. For a middle power foreign policy is extremely important as a means to convey its values to the rest of the world. Currently, Canada maintains 270 missions in 180 countries (Cohen, 2003:16). This is a tool to keep lines of communication open with the rest of the world and to maintain some form of prominence.

One element of foreign policy that Canadians view as extremely important is foreign aid or ODA. By projecting an image of giving 'generously' (actually about .3 % of the GDP, Graph 3) Canadians view themselves as "good international citizens" and it offers "domestic approaches to economic justice and equality to the international sphere" (Jordaan, 2003:174). As part of Canadian

foreign policy the government uses the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to conceive and then administer its ODA. In 2003 Canada spent \$2.4 billion on aid (Cohen, 2003:18). In 2005 Canadian foreign policy outlined three themes consistent with middle powers: “the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of our security within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture” (Hillmer & Granatstein, 2007:6). As Jordaan (2003:166) outlines, middle powers (like Canada), main tenant of foreign policy is its “proclivity for seeking multi-lateral solutions to international problems, for advocating compromise and for, in general being part of the solution at the international level.” Meaning they rely on their foreign policy and membership to multi-lateral organizations to contribute to the world order and maintain their middle power status.

“No one belongs to more clubs” (Cohen, 2003:15). A bold statement, and one that rings true for Canada. Being a member of a plethora of multilateral bodies is something the Canadian government is strongly in support of as a middle power. Many of the “clubs” Canada is a member of it was also a founding partner, such as the G20 and UN. Canada takes pride in belonging to the larger multi lateral bodies such as the UN, NATO, IMF and OAS but also in smaller (perhaps dated) bodies of both the Commonwealth and la *Francophonie*. By being a member of so many bodies Canada is able to voice an opinion and have influence on a variety of different issues which do not directly affect them. This is consistent with maintaining the current world order and perpetuating their middle power status.

3.3.4 Leaders

Canada’s rise to become a middle power can be attributed to the influential role many of its leaders played in building up the position. Though Canada’s ascent to middle power status began well before Lester B. Pearson’s time, he is looked upon as setting the benchmark for Canadian foreign policy. He worked tirelessly to help advance Canada’s position as a separate entity from Britain. Once Canada was ensured of its own place internationally, Pearson moved his sights to trying to make the world a more peaceful place, and in doing so he won the Nobel Peace Prize. Pearson’s impact was so great that “no prime minister since has failed to evoke his legacy or tried to escape his shadow” (Cohen, 2003:3). Directly through his efforts he helped create the “architecture of the post- war era [and] how our benefactors laid the foundation of the world’s first aid program” (Cohen, 2003:3).

Having one very influential leader help bring a nation into middle power status at the outset is characteristic of many emerging and traditional middle powers. There is a president or prime minister who “during the initial appearance of states as middle powers, the role performed by national leaders seems disproportionately important compared with later in the lifespan of middle powers” (Jordaan, 2003:175). It has been suggested that Pearson, and to a lesser extent, two of his colleagues, Hume Wrong (the Canadian ambassador to the United States) and Norman Robertson (high commissioner to Great Britain and clerk of the Privy Council) gave “shape to a restless nation shedding its colonial past and pursuing an independent role in the world” (Cohen, 2003:7). This is one of the few-shared characteristics between emerging and traditional middle powers.

Presently, the current government actively supports Canada’s middle power status which has been developed over the years. Prime Minister Stephen Harper believes that middle powers “step up to the plate to do their part...[are] willing to assume responsibilities, seek practical, doable solutions to problems and who have a voice and influence in global affairs because they lead, not by lecturing but by example” (Nossal *et al.* 2011: 60). In an echo of Canada’s past economic prominence, Harper has also expressed his desire for Canada to become an energy super-power. He expects Canada’s petroleum, uranium and waterpower potential to enhance Canada’s position in the world. Thus far this has not been successful. Alberta’s oil producing tar sands have caused controversy globally, being the subject of an environmental outcry. The current government’s attempts to try and further Canada’s position within the global order are at best ambiguous in its effect.

3.4 Canada’s Decline From Middle Power Status

Canada’s identity as a Middle Power is outdated and uninspiring to a growing number of Canadians. The concept fails to reflect how Canadians have evolved while the global hierarchy upon which it is premised has eroded. To be effective on the international stage Canada needs an identity that speaks to these important changes (Canada 25, 2004).

Since the middle power concept has become so integrated into political and academic vocabulary the government has become self-conscious about being pigeon holed into a distinct category. Even though the definition of ‘middle power’ is not set in stone many scholars have begun to question the categorization and whether or not it is an appropriate classification of power. Canada’s role as a middle power has been in decline for three major reasons. Most obviously, other economies have grown faster than Canada’s. In response to a slower growth rate, Canadian governments have reined in both military expenditures and ODA, Canada thus has a smaller presence in the world, both absolutely and proportionately.

The question is therefore asked; is Canada is upholding the middle power status it worked so hard to create? Canadians still see their country as a “mediator, a peacekeeper, a driving force for the attempt to expand the realm of democracy and the rule of law, of individual rights and freedom, of peace, order and good government and also of sustainable economic well being” (von Bredow, 2009:169). These different themes have developed into a Canadian middle power identity correlating with the main themes of middlepowermanship. As outlined by Jordaan (2003), the promotion of Canadian values abroad is thought of as essential to maintaining middle power status. Being a mediator and orchestrating peace are essential to fill the role of being a middle power, but within the past twenty to thirty years these roles have become largely a memory. The current government rests on the reputation Canada gained decades ago.

3.4.1 Economy

The end of the Second World War was important to Canada for a number of reasons. Politically, it made Canada a pillar upholding world order. In economic terms it allowed Canada to expand its markets while the traditional economic centres in Europe were rebuilding from the ground up. Increasing economic integration with the United States enhanced prosperity. In the 1950s, when compared to the rest of the world, Canada’s standard of living was second in the world “behind the Americans, but far ahead of anybody else- including the British” (Bothwell, 2007:107). This economic boom that Canadians enjoyed in the post-war period launched Canada into many economic initiatives, from jet engines to atomic reactors. The strength of Canada’s economy was another indicator that it had reached middle power status.

It is a truism that an independent nation, Canada has never “been wholly self- sufficient” (Nossal, 1997:29) relying on other nations to bolster its economy. The reliance on trade for Canada’s GDP has been a continual theme throughout Canadian political history. Some have even argued that Canadian “foreign policy *is* trade policy” (MacLaren, 1997:30). Accordingly Canada is extremely sensitive to the American market and “virtually all foreign policy issues become linked to Canadian- American relations” (Nossal, 1997:33).

Canada’s fruitful economy meant it could afford to belong to many international bodies, and could offer generous foreign assistance. Many Canadians believed that “development assistance could help lay the foundations for steady economic growth by promotion of the commercialization of agriculture, boosting domestic consumption, and raising the level of savings and capital investment” (Tomlin *et al.* 2008:157). Initially, development aid was seen as a wise investment

which would be profitable for the Canadian economy, in terms of promoting Canadian goods and services abroad. Under Pearson there was an immediate shift in the character of the government's development policy. As opposed to infrastructure and agricultural development there was movement towards social investment such as education and healthcare. When Trudeau became prime minister the policy was focused on the poorest countries, but pressure was mounting on the development policy to focus on economic developments which would have a greater impact on the Canadian economy.

The Conservative Mulroney government shifted its aid policy towards one of direct domestic economic benefits. As a result, the government's priorities moved "in the direction of supporting Canadian trade and investment abroad by channelling development assistance to those middle-income, developing countries where economic fortunes were rising" (Tomlin *et al.* 2008: 159), as opposed to the least developed countries.

While the Canadian economy continued to grow and the Canadian standard of living continued to rise until the early 1970s, Europe and Japan had rebuilt their economies which were, inevitably, larger than Canada's. Domestically, the Canadian government redirected some of its resources, on, for example, universal health care and a comprehensive pension system. As a result of the change in government policy, the budget had to be adjusted to accommodate the expenses of healthcare so there was simply less money to be sent abroad. Despite the increased spending on healthcare in the budget, the first five years after medicare was introduced the Canadian budget was in surplus. The 1970s brought economic slowdown for many nations, including Canada. What was happening at the time was a combination of stagflation and national revenues reaching a plateau. All of these factors contributed to Canada's lessening ability to maintain the same level of commitment and to the decline in its middle power ranking.

The Mulroney era of the 1980s was characterised by economic belt-tightening. Nevertheless by the end of Mulroney's term the deficit had grown substantially. The end of the Cold War brought more changes in foreign policy, in part because the great enemy of forty years was no longer there, but also because the end of the Cold War coincided with a sharp recession and a debt crisis in government finance. When Mulroney left office in 1993, there was a significantly greater deficit than when he came into office in 1983. The newly elected Liberal government needed to deal with not only the growing deficit but the interest it accumulated. "An aggressive approach to deficit reduction throughout much of the 1990s effectively decimated government resources devoted to international activity" (Keating, 2010: 4). This also had a great impact on Canadian military

spending. On the whole, the idea of spending less on the military pleased the Canadian population, but most Canadians did not realise that the cutbacks in military spending would have consequences for Canada's role as a middle power, especially in terms of peacekeeping.

3.4.2 Global Economic Bodies and Canada's Decline as a Middle Power

The economic slow-down of the Canadian economy also affected Canada's participation in multi-lateral bodies. Being a member of multi-lateral organizations is an integral part of being considered a middle power. Canada is a member of many organizations, which require both attention and money. More to the point, membership does not necessarily mean importance or significance. When Canada joined the G7 in 1976, the Canadian economy really was the world's sixth largest, ahead of Italy. By the 1990s this was no longer the case. Wisely, the Canadian government redefined its foreign policy goals from the G7 to the G20, where Canada could still legitimately claim a place. This initiative was particularly identified with Paul Martin, finance minister in the 1990s and prime minister from 2003 to 2006.

The G20 incorporates emerging economies such as India, China, Brazil and South Africa.¹ These emerging economies, especially China and India have gained increasing importance to the global economy while Canada's role has been lessening. The motivation behind the creation of the G20 was obvious. Canada was no longer the sixth, seventh or even eighth wealthiest economy in world terms. It was only a matter of time until Canada's position in the G8 was questioned, and former prime minister Paul Martin tried to avoid the question by redefining the terms of the meeting and incorporating these emerging economies.

Today, the G8 still meets and coexists with the G20 but is now seen as an elitist enterprise which fails to incorporate the shift in the global order. The G8s influence has been lessening with fewer programs actually materializing. The stagnation of global initiatives like the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD, discussed in Chapter 4) which was introduced at the G8 summit in 2002, can be seen as an example of the declining political and economic influence of not only the G8 but Canada's influence within the body. NEPAD is an initiative aimed at the improvement of many elements of African society based substantially on support from G8 members. Since its inception it has fallen short of its target goals.

¹ The G20 was started in 1999 and is comprised of: South Africa, Canada, Mexico, United States, Argentina, Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Australia.

Current Prime Minister Stephen Harper is the acting President of the G8 for 2010. Canada, most recently hosted both the G8 and G20 summits in Toronto and despite best efforts it turned out to be a disastrous meeting. The total cost was about 1 billion dollars, spent on security, lavish accommodations and marketing Canada to the world. In the end what made global headlines was not the content of the summits but rather the protests, the price tag and riots in Toronto.

By holding a worldwide economic conference Canada attempted to uphold its middle power status. But spending 1-billion dollars on the conference enraged the population and created a larger chasm between the government and its electorate. Having such a large international conference with an immense price tag where very little was accomplished did not place Canada in a good light to the rest of the world. At the same time, Canada's Conservative government found itself at odds with the summit's most important member, the United States. Returning to Washington, American delegates expressed disgust with the summit and the summit process (Private Communication, 2010 citing Strobe Talbott).

American president Barak Obama said that he did "not like the form or the substance of the G8 and G20 meetings. Indeed, he left convinced that bilateral and other group meetings were more useful" (English, 2010). The focus of the Summit was economic, centred on job creation, financial growth and stability. The Millennium Development Goals were discussed in brief, but were not a central focus of the event. The issue of Maternal Health was something that Stephen Harper pushed for and was met with substantial controversy. The Maternal Health strategy "strives for care before and after birth, family planning including contraception, reproductive health, treatment and prevention of diseases, prevention of mother-to-child transmission of disease, immunization and nutrition" (CBC, 2010). Despite the government's best intentions, the Maternal Health initiative turned into a very public debate over the right to abortion instead of the actual policy aimed to helping new mothers and children. In the end, it was the gross overspending and the controversy around the Toronto summit undermined its actual purpose. The Canadian government was extremely misguided in the organization and spending towards the G8/20 summits which has further weakened its middle power stance. Today, the legacy left behind in the wake of the summits is discontent and mismanagement- not the subjects discussed.

The Canadian economy was once the "second highest income in the world after the Second World War [but] now has the twelfth-largest economy and seventh-highest per capita income" (Cohen, 2003: 26). Throughout the post-war era Canada experienced unprecedented economic growth.

Unlike its European counterparts, Canada did not need to rebuild itself from the ground up giving it an economic advantage. It was only a matter of time before the gap between Europe and Canada closed. One of Jordaan's crucial characteristics of middle power status was a stable economy. Canada through the past decades has shown a substantial economic slow down and the strength of its economy is being confronted by some new challengers- the emerging middle powers. The emerging nations of China and India are growing exponentially in terms of economic growth which pushes Canada further down the list of economic bigwigs in the world order.

3.4.3 Decline of Hard Power, Leading to the Decline of Soft Power

The concepts of both hard and soft power are integral to examining Canada's declining status as a middle power. Nye (1990) points out that it is necessary for a country to possess *both* hard and soft power for it to maintain relevancy in the world. He gives the example of the United States having the most hard power but also "has the soft ideological resources to preserve its lead in the new domains of transnational interdependence" (Nye, 1990:171). In the past decades Canada has moved towards a soft power ideal, by doing so they have moved away from the basic tenants of hard power adding to its middle power decline.

Middle power status and soft power are complementary concepts. Middle powers engage in 'soft power' activities such as joining multilateral bodies, peace initiatives while trying to disassociate themselves from hard power activities. This concept is something Canadians appreciated in the 1990s and the 2000s. Unfortunately, these two elements cannot easily be separated. "The 'hard power' of military dominance and economic coercion is both maintained and transcended by the 'soft power' of attraction and emulation" (Cox, 2005: 672-673); while, "the protective role of military force is a relevant asset in bargaining among states" (Nye, 1990: 160). With the waning of economic resources the government has refocused its foreign policy towards a more 'soft' approach but has found itself in a tough predicament. The Canadian government wanted to use the "powers of persuasion through the mobilization of ideas, rather than coercion or economic inducements" (Granatstein & Hillmer, 2007:5). However, without the appropriate levels of funding to the military, Canada's peacekeeping abilities decline significantly.

Currently, the Canadian military is "among the weakest in the industrialized world, and the weakest since the post-war re-armament" (Cohen, 2003:27). A decline in the resources being provided to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has meant Canada's ability to participate in international initiatives has been downsized. When Canada "seeks to be active,

Canadian influence on key international events and issues appears limited” (Nossal, 2003:12). Canada’s prominence in bodies such as the G8 is no longer as important as it once was, there is also less funding towards defence, and development assistance. These are factors which are detracting from Canada’s middle power status on a continual basis. DFAIT does not have the same capacity as it once did, its initiatives have been scaled back significantly and it no longer has the same abilities as it once did.

Canadian soft power does not derive from the size of the military “but rather from the attractiveness of Canadian values: human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes” (Welsh, 2004:587). Lloyd Axworthy, one the most notable of the post-Cold War Ministers of Foreign Affairs, was attracted to the idea. By use of soft power in foreign policy Axworthy attempted to propel Canada back into the forefront of the middle power pack. He introduced some very valuable initiatives such as the Ottawa Treaty, a convention to ban the use of landmines and led a campaign against the use of child soldiers. Due to the intense economic pressure the country was facing, “Axworthy tailored soft power to fit a climate of continuing fiscal restraint and “middle-power possibility.” ... Canada could lead through its moral example and the cultivation of relationships in the international sphere” (Granatstein & Hillmer 2007: 9). But like many other elements of the Canadian infrastructure, the department of foreign affairs was also subject to a major downsizing and there was not the same degree of funding available to soft power initiatives. Although Axworthy did his best to compensate for a tight budget, and indeed won some prestige for Canada through his efforts, it was not enough to offset the limited resources his government made available for foreign, aid and defence matters.

Although Axworthy was a very influential Minister of Foreign Affairs, he did have many critics. Some view his middle power initiatives as “on the cheap,” employing the “squishy notion” of soft power to justify reductions in defence spending” (Granatstein & Hillmer 2007: 15-16). The idea of ‘soft power’ had become chic and something which could be easily touted to the Canadian public with little resistance; “if soft power is the order of the day, who needs the expensive tools of traditional hard power?” (Granatstein & Hillmer 2007: 16)

3.4.4 The Decline of Canadian Hard Power: The Military and Peacekeeping

Granatstein and Hillmer (2007) ask if: “soft power, moreover, all “soft” and no “power,” [is] a pretext for the depletion of Canada’s hard power resources and for the neglect of the Canadian


Forces?” Granatstein is especially discontented with the depletion of the Canadian military. Has the shift to soft power as opposed to hard power directly led to the dwindling of the Canadian military?

There is evidence to support Granatstein’s concerns. Though Canada undertook high profile commitments in Croatia, Bosnia and the Kosovo campaign in the 1990s, maintaining them was a strain on the military. This was true even though the garrison in Germany and the Canadian contingent in the UN mission in Cyprus were scrapped. By sending troops to Afghanistan in 2001 and keeping them there for a decade (until 2011, when the commitment expires), Canada has placed its military under severe strain. Some of the soldiers in Afghanistan are on their fourth rotation – or even more.

All this contrasts with the utopian ideal of a peacekeeping nation which is often seen as a “beacon of Canadian collective identity” (Bosold & Hynek, 2010:xix). So much so, that images of peacekeepers are depicted on the ten-dollar bill. For many years this representation was true; Canada contributed the highest ratio of peacekeepers to the United Nations of any country in the world. Canadian peacekeepers were once part of every single peace keeping mission and made up about “10% of overall peacekeeping personnel” (Welsh, 2004:585). However, this is not the case today, Canada’s ranking as a contributor country is consistently plummeting “and [it] has to turn down a series of requests to send its forces to war torn countries” (Welsh, 2004:585). Since the United Nations first deployed peacekeepers in 1948, Canada has contributed over 125,000 peacekeepers to various areas of conflict. Unfortunately Canadian “military officials now acknowledge that they simply do not have the resources to commit to any new missions” (Foreign Policy, 2004: 15).

The trend can be seen most clearly in examining the long-term progression of Canadian force levels and military spending. Military spending remained the single largest item in government budgets until the end of the 1960s. Because Canada was so very prosperous during that time, high military expenditures actually declined as a proportion of GDP, while force levels rose to their peacetime high of 123,000 in 1961.

Graph 1



(Chart IV Robinson & Ibbott, 2003:9).

At the time, Canada could easily undertake the complicated mission of managing the logistics and specialized troops necessary for the large UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai after 1956 (UNEF). Pearson described peacekeeping as an “intermediate technique between merely passing The mission in the Suez Canal showed the world “the adaptability and skill of the armed forces, then relatively well-equipped with transport aircraft and all the accoutrements of a mini great power” (Granatstein, 1970: 414). Though on the decline, Canada’s military at that time was still substantial. This gave Canada the hard power needed to uphold its middle power position while acting as peacekeepers.

But then in the 1960s as universal health care and comprehensive pensions began to bite into the budget, military spending began to shrink. Even though there has been an increasing need for peacekeepers all over the world, military spending has been on the rapid decline since the 1960s and has now evened out at a very low level (Graph 1 and 2), directly affecting Canada’s ability to take part in peacekeeping missions.

Throughout the Trudeau era (1968-1979, 1980-84) he “relegated peacekeeping to last place in [Canada’s] defence priorities, placing emphasis on needs closer to home” (Holloway, 2006:105).


Despite this, Canadians were still a strong contingent in peacekeeping missions. and were known for their “special competence in logistics, communications and air transport” (Holloway, 2006:106). This was a reputation that Canadians liked and soon enough Canadians were urging the government to send in peacekeepers to areas of conflict, such as the Congo in 1960 (Granatstein, 1970:415).

In the decades after Suez Canal, Canada’s commitment and abilities were already being questioned. A mere fifteen years later the Canadian forces were coming under question. “Why should a nation of less than twenty million keep a military apparatus of a microcosmic great power? Why should a small country spend almost \$2 billion each year to keep up appearances?” (Granatstein, 1970:415).² Perhaps Canada’s heyday of peacekeeping dissipated almost as quickly as it began and was over in the mid 1960s.

The end of the Cold War also signified a shift in the type of conflict globally. No longer were the majority of conflicts occurring between separate states, they were occurring within states. Naturally, this changed the formation and tactics of UN peacekeepers. This new form of peacekeeping within states is often referred to as second generation peacekeeping (Hynek & Boslold, 2010, Nossal *et al.* 2011). As opposed to separating the opposing forces and creating a place of neutrality there has been a shift towards peace building operations (Hynek & Boslold, 2010). This coincided with another shift in government spending. Since the deficit had grown throughout the 1980s and early 1990s the new government under Jean Chretien had to refocus its budget. Military spending felt the effects of the reduced budget. As a result, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy shifted his policy to embrace a policy of soft power distancing himself from the military. Axworthy said in 1998, “the use of soft power- rather than coercion, powerful ideas rather than powerful weapons, public diplomacy rather than backroom bargaining- is an effective means to pursue the human security agenda” (Rigby, 2001:41). The lessening of funds to the military throughout the 1990s had dire effects on Canada’s abilities to remain a significant contributor to peacekeeping missions.

² It should be noted that over Dr. Granatstein’s career he changed his stance on Canadian issues. His opinions in 1970 differ from the opinions he holds currently.

Graph 2



(SIRPI, 2009)

Looking at both Graphs 1 and 2 it is clear to see that military spending has continually been on the decline. In 2008 Canada spent about 1.28% of its gross domestic product on defence. Graph 2 shows the downward trend of Canadian military spending in real terms. Meaning that when adjusted for the increase in the price level (inflation) actual spending has decreased over the period shown by the trend line. This upholds similar findings from the Canadian forces showing that there has been a negative growth in military spending from 1986-2006 at a level of -0.4 % in real terms (in nominal terms the growth was 2.2%) (National Defence, 2008:11). The numbers show how Canada has been committing less and less to the military and as a result less is going to peacekeeping initiatives. Today Canada has the “34th largest population in the world, but its regular armed forces are 56th largest, and it has the 77th largest reserve” (Cohen, 2003:27). However, Graph 2 does show that military spending is on the rise, especially since 2006 when the Conservative government took office.

Recent history attests to the failure of Canadians as mediators and peacekeepers, especially within Africa. Two major conflicts one right after another in the 1990s not only tarnished Canada’s reputation for peacekeeping but resulted in massive loss of life. Perhaps the most famous- the Rwandan genocide -- has left one particular Canadian general scarred by the lack of resources available to Canadian peacekeepers but also the ability for the United Nations to turn its back on the

slaughter of close to one million civilians. The previous conflict in Somalia led to global embarrassment on behalf of Canadian peacekeepers, military and the general population. The two peacekeeping disasters which occurred in Rwanda and Somalia are representative of Canada's lessening abilities to send peacekeepers abroad. The events in both countries have greatly questioned Canada's abilities as a traditional middle power.

3.4.4.1 Canada's Foray into Somalia

Canada's peacekeeping involvement in Somalia tarnished its reputation as protectors and mediators. The civil war in Somalia was particularly brutal: it started after the Somali president Mohamed Siyad Barre was ousted from power in 1991. This sparked a clan-based battle that prevented agricultural activity. The UN was sent in to provide the population with "desperately needed food and other relief supplies to the war-torn famine stricken country" (Thakur, 1994:388). The United Nations Operation in Somalia 1 (UNOSOM I) was created in 1992 and was comprised of peacekeepers from all over the world. UNOSOM II was created to replace UNOSOM I at the end 1992 due to the "growing conviction that the existing course of Unosom would not be an adequate response to the tragedy" (Thakur, 2004:395).

UNOSOM II had a strong Canadian contingent of about 1,400 troops mostly from the Airborne regiment. Within six months of their deployment the soldiers were called back to Canada. While stationed in Somalia three Somali civilians lost their lives at the hands of Canadian soldiers. Pictures and video of these events found their way to international media outlets and caused both international and national outcry. Within weeks of the soldiers' return the Canadian Airborne Regiment was disbanded and a public inquiry was called. Not only was this a tragic event for Somalis it also enraged the Canadian population. The middle power nation "who knew themselves officially as peacekeepers of the world, as nonracist, and as uninvolved in conquest and other imperial acts confronted in a dramatic way the possibility that the reality was otherwise" (Razack, 2000:128).

The enormous failure of Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia exposed the world to a darker side of Canada. It revealed the extent to which the forces were overstretched, and the personnel from the airborne regiment were only sent because "the army, with troops in the Former Yugoslavia and in other peace support operations, was so overstretched that it had no other available unit—despite fears that the Airborne's personnel and leadership were below the requisite standard" (Granatstein

& Hillmer, 2007: 25). Those involved in the killings and beatings were charged with crimes and dishonourably discharged from the military but what these individuals had done was much more than just that. They had embarrassed a middle power which prided itself on its good governance, fairness and above all its reputation as a global peacekeeper. This tragic event in Somalia unfortunately was the first of two of a major crisis for Canadian peacekeepers, the second only to follow two years later.

3.4.4.2 Canada's Mismanagement in Rwanda

When the wounds of the Somali affair were still fresh Canada participated in another peacekeeping mission in Africa (perhaps an attempt to rebuild its tarnished reputation), but this time in Rwanda. The genocide in Rwanda not only questioned Canada's role but "diminished even more the world's expectations in traditional peacekeeping as well as the United Nations' mechanisms to cope with the kind of organized violence that had surged in Central Africa"(Von Bredow, 2009:170).

The Rwandan genocide took place within 100 days between April and July 1994. In that short amount of time somewhere between 800,000 and 1 million people were executed. "The conflict had pitted the Rwandan government, favoured by the Hutu majority, against a rebel movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), made up of mainly refugees from the Tutsi minority" (Holloway, 2006:109). The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was sent into negotiate a power sharing agreement in 1993. When the peace process ended in April 1994 Hutu extremists encouraged genocide against the Tutsi minority.

UNAMIR was a relatively small mission with just over 2,500 troops mostly from Belgium, Ghana and Bangladesh but led by a Canadian general, Romeo Dallaire. Initially the RPF targeted the Belgians which resulted in ten Belgian peacekeepers being killed. Consequentially, all Belgian and Bangladeshi peacekeepers withdrew from the mission reducing UNAMIRs numbers and capacity. Dallaire called upon the UN and the Canadian government to send in more resources but neither stepped in. Since the missions capacity was reduced so much Dallaire and his peacekeepers watched the genocide occur right in front of them (Holloway, 2006:110). Hundreds of thousands if not one million people perished in a short amount of time despite Dallaire "campaign[ing] to increase international response to the Rwanda genocide" (Brysk,2009:85-86).

"The Rwandan genocide happened because the international community – if I may be brutal, as the genocide was – didn't give one damn for Rwandans because Rwandans don't count. Rwanda is of no strategic value to anybody, and has no strategic resources." – Romeo Dallaire (CBC News, 2004)

What happened in Somalia and Rwanda represents a significant shift in the capabilities of international system. It showed that a “new international security landscape [had emerged] with new threats, risks, and dangers”(von Bredow, 2009:170). These new threats demonstrate how difficult it is to contain and manage modern conflict. Both failures showed the holes in the international peacekeeping regime which is not only strongly upheld by Canada but also, in part developed by Canada.

The decline of Canada's middle power status is directly linked to the decline of Canada's military spending. This has resulted in a lessened capacity to commit peacekeepers. Starting in 2006, Canadian military spending has risen (as a percentage of the GDP), however, it is still at levels below 1988.

To maintain a status of middle power “it is not enough for a country to have attractive values and ideas. It also needs the capacity to disseminate and, more importantly, implement them” (Welsh, 2004: 588). Without the proper funding of the military it has been increasingly difficult for Canada to find the proper balance between hard and soft power. With a lack of funding and manpower Canada can no longer be seen as a peacekeeping nation in the same capacity. However, Canadians remain “attached to peacekeeping roles, almost as if these were an outward expression of the Canadian character as well as a commitment to international responsibilities” (Granatstein & Hillmer, 2007:26).

Canada was once the largest contributor of peacekeepers up until 1992. In 2005 only 83 Canadian military personnel were a part of UN peacekeeping missions despite the increased global demand for UN peacekeepers (Robinson, 2009:6-7). Today Canada sits “58th behind Uganda and just ahead of Zimbabwe. Canadian participation in peacekeeping now consists of only 99 policemen, 37 military experts and 24 soldiers” (Leger & Lemay-Hébert, 2010). Where the Canadian military was once able to offer intelligence, manpower and technology they are no longer able to help in the same capacity. The disasters which took place in Somalia and Rwanda are a reflection of Canada's limited capacity both to get troops to Africa and, probably more important, Canada's inability as a middle power to mobilize an international coalition that could do it.

3.4.5 Canada's Official Development Assistance

Official development assistance (ODA) has often been seen as a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy and is a good indicator of how Canada's middle power status is declining. This section examines Canada's history of ODA, then compares its commitments to ODA compared to other traditional middle powers in the 20th and 21st centuries.

ODA has been a way for Canada to fulfil its role as a middle power by contributing to global development. Canada's ODA "came to be seen as a vital instrument of foreign policy and as a tool to promote democracy and stave off the threat of Communism in the newly decolonized states of the developing world" (Tomlin *et al.*2008:156). Though some aspects of ODA have changed over the years its underlying goals have generally remained the same. Generally, the goals of ODA are to try and help alleviate poverty, promote democracy, and uphold security. Both the population and the Canadian government view ODA as a way not only to maintain middle power status but to also be a helpful fixer and help protect Canadian values. Canada's ability to help others abroad and allows some Canadians feel like they are making the world a better place. For many citizens it was not as much about the economic and geopolitical factors it was more about the "ethical responsibility towards those people beyond their borders who were suffering severely" (Waisová, 2009:82).


The post September 11th era posed new challenges to Canadian international assistance. The security threat was very close to Canada and forced the government and population to rethink its stance on international development. A "weakening of the moral motivations and humanitarian aspects of ODA" (Waisová, 2009:83) had occurred which resulted in a shift occurred from humane internationalism to a more security dominated foreign policy.

Canada's official development assistance program started in 1950 with the Colombo Plan in 1950 (Smillie, 2009:184). This initiative helped lay "the foundation for 'Co-operative Economic Development' in South and Southeast Asia" (Tomlin *et al.*2008:156). By the end of the Colombo plan Canada had given \$331million in aid. By the end of the 1960s foreign aid became an important theme in Canadian foreign policy "spreading beyond its initial half-dozen Asian programs to Africa and the Commonwealth Caribbean" (Smillie, 2009:183). Pearson was clear that ODA was meant to "reduce disparities and remove inequalities [so that] the poorer countries can move forward...so that the world will not become more starkly divided between the haves and the have-nots" (Pearson, 1968). Pearson in 1969 attempted to set an international benchmark of .7% of the GNP to go

towards ODA (Brysk, 2009:75). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s ODA grew substantially. ODA reached its peak in 1975 when it reached .53% of the GNP. Throughout the 1970s there was continued support of ODA by Canadians but its support was waning (Tomlin *et al.* 2008:173).

During the Cold War security and warding off communism was of the utmost importance. The threat of communism was very real and western powers wanted to keep it contained. ODA was a way to try and help uphold Canadian security interests abroad through promoting development in Asia or Africa. Aid also filled economic interests it “allowed underdeveloped countries to buy something from Canada, and not from somewhere else” (Bothwell, 2007:113).

Since its creation in 1968 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has managed between 75-80% of Canada’s ODA (Smillie, 2009:184). CIDA itself has had problems since its inception. A revolving door of presidents and board members has created substantial confusion and a lack of transparency. Since ODA is not managed by the government directly but rather through a development agency (who only sometimes has a minister in the federal government) it is not seen as a high priority as it once was. Due to the mismanagement and red tape Canada is now “a significant but underperforming provider of humanitarian aide and good governance assistance at both the global and bilateral levels”, further undermining its middle power status (Brysk, 2009:75). Despite this, Canada still sits in the top ten providers in the world. As we saw earlier (above, p.38) there is a problem with Canadian aid, which is often tied “to Canadian providers and too focused on middle-tier potential trade partners rather than the neediest states” (Brysk, 2009:75). Canada clearly has put its economic interests first, tying its aid and shifting priorities from the least developed countries.

Graph 3: ODA 1960-2009

Source: OECD.Stat (2010).

By observing the ODA percentage compared to Gross National Income (GNI) for Australia, Sweden, Norway and Canada, it is clear that both Canada and Australia's level of commitment is steadily declining. While Canada and Australia are on the decline both Norway and Sweden are on the rise having kept commitment levels above the .7% goal since the 1970s.

Using the GNI versus the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) gives a more accurate reading of the percentage which is actually going towards ODA. The GNI is best explained as the GDP minus taxes, operational costs, and property costs (UN, 2009).³ The reason why ODA is measured in comparative terms against the GNI and not the GDP because GNI is the measure of the total available income for a country. From Graph 1, it is clear to see that Canada is falling far behind the standard set out by Pearson decades ago, and if the trend continues then it will just be falling further from the target of .7%.

Compared to other traditional middle powers (Norway and Sweden) Canada has struggled to keep up. At no point in time since the 1960s has Canada reached the benchmark set out by its own

³ The United Nations Statistics definition of GNI is: "GDP less net taxes on production and imports, less compensation of employees and property income payable to the rest of the world plus the corresponding items receivable from the rest of the world (in other words, GDP less primary incomes payable to non-resident units plus primary incomes receivable from non-resident units)" (UN, 2009)

former prime minister Pearson. The closest Canada has ever come to hitting the benchmark of .7% was in 1975 (at approximately .5%) and since that time the trend has been going downward.

In 2002, Canada committed to doubling its foreign aid by 2010-2011. After this target was reached in 2010 the government promptly froze its foreign aid commitments, and redirected them to the Americas. The 2009 budget showed “Africa to be the biggest loser... with eight of 14 nations no longer on the list, including Cameroon, Kenya and Rwanda” (CBC, 2009b). On the surface Canada has reached a milestone, the goal it set for itself of doubling its aid commitments in 8 years. On the other hand, the government has not committed itself to any new targets. This also affects Canada’s ODA to GNI percentage. As Canada’s GNI will continually increase, the ODA stays the same but the percentage of ODA to GNI will decrease perpetuating the trend set out in Graph 1.

In 2007 the Conservative government made waves with the passing of bill C-293 or colloquially known as the “Better Aid Bill.” The bill itself speaks to Canada’s middle power legacy “ensur[ing] that all Canadian official development assistance abroad is provided with a central focus on poverty reduction and in a manner that is consistent with Canadian values, Canadian foreign policy, sustainable development and democracy promotion and that promotes international human rights standards” (House of Commons, 2007). At the time this bill was seen as pivotal, especially for upholding Canada’s reputation as a middle power. In the three years since this bill has passed little else has been done with regards to ODA or furthering the aims of the bill. What could have been a step in the right direction to upholding Canadian middle power status has fallen short of expectations and continues the trend of Canada’s declining middle power status. It is becoming clear that Canada is going in the reverse of what the better aid bill set out to do, there is a freeze on development aid, less countries are receiving aid and there are no plans for change in the future. In contrast to the symbolism of the bill, the government though its foreign policy has been systematically dismantling its middle power status.

With the current budget and government it is unclear where Canada is headed with regards to foreign aid and development. This is in contrast with the many middle power initiatives that Canada has been a part of in years past. It does not appear that Canada is committed to achieving the .7% ODA set out by its own former prime minister. By comparing Canada’s commitments to Sweden and Norway it is clear to see that Canada is not living up to its middle power reputation through its foreign policy and development assistance.

3.5 Conclusion

Throughout the second half of the 20th century “Canada’s internationalist foreign policy was rooted in a number of middle power characteristics, a combination of material conditions the expressed ideas and commitments of policy officials, and the support of Canadian society” (Keating, 2010:10). It is understood that Canada was once “an agent of influence for moderation in the geopolitical middle; a crossroads and entrepot, politically, ideologically culturally, commercially and spiritually” (Molot & Hillmer, 2002:9). On the other hand, by looking at key elements of middlepowermanship such as the economy, the military/ peacekeeping and ODA it is clear that Canada is not able to uphold the middle power reputation it worked so hard to build up.

Conceivably the beginning of the decline started in the Mulroney era, when the Conservatives added significantly to the national debt. When the next government came into power in 1993 they were burdened with a much larger deficit than expected (Nossal, 2003). Some even claim that Canada as a traditional middle power is a “myth” (Chapnick, 2000). Perhaps “myth” is too strong a word because in fact Canada was once a strong middle power, acting as a global citizen. Without trying to disparage the efforts of past Canadian governments it is important to see that in present day there is not the same commitment to international initiatives, whether they be exercises of hard or soft power. The current government maintains that Canada is still a middle power and has even gone to the extent to say that they might be, one day, an energy superpower (based on the potential of the Alberta Tar Sands and newly discovered gas deposits in eastern Canada). However, Canada’s lack of enthusiasm and funding for international initiatives stands in the way of middle power status.

The reality of the latter half of the twentieth century is catching up with Canadians today. The economic boom in the post war era gave Canadians the impression that they could do anything, which in reality it could not. In the post war era through the Cold War until the end of the century the government was faced with many challenges. After the ravages of the Second World War the Canadian government had no interest in investing in a military to keep up appearances. When European economies caught up, Canada was no longer uniquely prosperous. With a softening economy the government needed to decide how to allocate the budget. The government was faced with a choice, either keep on investing in the military and foreign policy initiatives at the same rate or universal healthcare and extended pensions. The Canadian government chose the latter. It turned inwards and focused on Canada as opposed to other nations. This has had adverse effects on the

external capabilities of Canada for both hard and soft elements of power. Yet both government and people hold fast to the illusion that Canada's standing is what it was a generation ago.

It is not just a decline in levels of military or development expenditures. The softening of the Canadian economy in the 1970s, the recessions of 1981 and 1990, not to mention the recent 2008 downturn, have slowed Canada's overall growth significantly. By looking at specific aspects of traditional middlepowermanship, such as peacekeeping and official development assistance it is apparent that Canada's status as a traditional middle power is weakening. Traditionally, "development assistance – along with peacekeeping- was viewed as the cornerstone of Canada's middle power, internationalist vocation" (Tomlin *et al.* 2008:173). Today, these cornerstones are crumbling. It is clear that with the decline of hard power comes the decline of soft power and that the two are integral.

As a result, on a national level the population and the government have given into an idea of "nostalgic mythology" (Cooper,1997:7) of Canada's influential past. This has allowed many Canadians to "exaggerate the significance of their past performances in world affairs" (Stairs, 2003:1). Unfortunately, it is thought that Canada is now "exactly in the position that our diplomatic service worked so hard to avoid in the 1940s through the 1970s" (Stairs, 2003:2).

Canada's weakening commitment to upholding its middle power status has shown that despite its "firm attachment to multilateralism and international institution building, their actual policy behaviour reveals that they have, at best, an uneven commitment to multilateralism" (Cooper *et al.* 1993:22). There has been a magnification of the role that Canada has had in international organizations, conflicts and peacekeeping missions. Today that same position is slipping away. This is best understood through the relationship Canada and Zimbabwe share, where once Canada -the champion of human rights - held the commonwealth together over the Rhodesian question, has now, shied away from helping the crisis-ridden country.

Chapter 4: Canada and Zimbabwe

4.1 Introduction:

Canadian foreign policies since the end of the Second World War have been constantly changing from realistic to idealistic policies, especially when it comes to foreign aid and development. There are two political parties who dominate Canadian politics: the Conservatives and the Liberals. Both have shown strengths and weaknesses throughout their time in the Prime Minister's Office. The transformation from John Diefenbaker (1957-1963) to current Prime Minister Stephen Harper has shown Canada's intermittent policy towards Southern African and Zimbabwe.

By tracing the relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe from the end of the Second World War to present day gives a concise example of how Canada's middle power status grew to be strong and then subsequently faltered. The history between the two countries through the Commonwealth, the UN through to independence, the 2008 elections with many important events dotting the landscape in-between shows the interconnected relationship between the two countries. While the severe humanitarian crisis has been occurring in the past decade Canada has taken a backseat. The Canadian government has failed to help the people who are in dire need while taking a moral high ground by imposing targeted sanctions as opposed to actually helping.

In the beginning both nations were creations – colonies -- of the British government. Canada, as a dominion, was a more senior colony, and by the 1930s was effectively completely autonomous or independent, while Southern Rhodesia, smaller and less economically evolved, had only internal autonomy. But Canada and the other dominions were seen as the model that Southern Rhodesia was expected to follow, and in that limited political-cultural sense relations were close. In many ways the relationship between the two has been an example of how the Canadian government has used their 'middle power' to portray a position of helping other countries in crisis, where in reality, Canadian policy has very little impact on Zimbabwe- in terms of political, historical or economic relations.

Regionally, Canada does have stronger ties with South Africa but has maintained relations with Zimbabwe through its own development agencies and international bodies. However, Canada's presence in Zimbabwe has diminished. Throughout the 1960s under John Diefenbaker and Lester B. Pearson, Canada acted as initiators and orchestrators to encourage the struggle against minority rule. Interest in Rhodesia fitted Canada's general interest in directing its foreign aid to the African

members of the Commonwealth, and it could be anticipated that Rhodesia, when independent under majority (African) rule, would join the collection of Canada's aid recipients. After Pearson left office, Canadian policy towards southern Africa moved towards indifference. In the late 1970s-1980s the policy shifted once more, to grand gestures and little action. Throughout the 1990s and until the switch to the current Conservative government there were some last efforts to salvage the Canadian reputation of good governance and peacekeeping in consistent with their middle power status. With the escalating instability in Zimbabwe the Canadian government has moved to enact smart sanctions towards Mugabe and government officials in ZANU-PF, but has done very little to help those who are most in need, helping diminish Canada's middle power status.

When examining Canada's decline from middle power status in the world order, it is important to examine the actual events to which the policy responded, or against which it was set. Canada shares some history with Zimbabwe, as it does with other former colonies, making a case study possible. This chapter seeks to investigate the decline of Canada's middle power status by using the relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe as a case study. Starting off with an account of Zimbabwe's history is followed by an overview of some of the elements contributing to the current crisis in Zimbabwe, setting the stage for analysis of the relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe in the 20th and 21st centuries. The last section of the chapter looks to the future and asks: where has Canada gone? and what might be in store for the future between Canada and Zimbabwe.

4.2 History of Zimbabwe

Once seen as the most prosperous country on the African continent, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe spawned first a civil war that gained worldwide attention, and then an economic catastrophe with international repercussions. To understand Canada's engagement, how it changed, and how it diminished, it is necessary to explain the current crisis in Zimbabwe and how things have become so dire so that one can fully understand the severity of Canada's inaction in the country. This section examines Zimbabwean history from pre-colonisation to the struggle for independence and the initial success of post- independence Zimbabwe. Then the section examines some of the important factors which contributed to Zimbabwe's slide into crisis: the death of Sally Mugabe, the war veterans, the participation in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the fraudulent elections of 2002 and 2008 and the rise of the opposition. Lastly, this section looks at the current government which is a partnership between the two largest political parties.

4.2.1 Pre- Colonisation to Independence

Unlike Canada and South Africa which were colonised by Europeans beginning in the 16th and 17th centuries Zimbabwe was not officially colonised until the end of the 19th century by the British. Until then it was a backwater trading with the Portuguese colonies on the coast. The creation of Rhodesia is seen as one of the last attempts of colonisation on Great Britain's part, and part of the last European partition of Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:40). The British government gave Cecil Rhodes a charter creating the British South Africa Company (BSAC), permitting trade with local kings. BSAC was a commercial- political entity that focused on the exploitation of economic resources..." and the creation of a new atmosphere for further British political and economic expansion (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 46). BSAC was a colonising power in itself, able to raise its own police force, open banks, build roads - almost anything that the British government was able to do. In the late 19th century, when Rhodes was disappointed by the failure to find gold deposits he granted farms to white settlers.

In 1896 the Shona and Ndebele came together to fight the British. The coming together of these two conflicting peoples, it is claimed, "eventually formed the basis of mass nationalism and future imaginings of an independent Zimbabwe" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 49). From the beginning the BSAC constructed a "colonial state permeated by a 'caste' division between the settler (white Rhodesians) and the indigene (Ndebele and Shona)" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 59). The framework had been laid for a deeply racist and fractured country.

In the post World War One, era many more white settlers came to Rhodesia looking for farmsteads in addition to the returning soldiers who were taking up farms as a part of a British Government Settlement Scheme (Mlambo, 2009: 76). In 1923 Responsible Government was granted. The influx of white settlers only added to the racial tension present, and eventually the clash between white and black produced violence. But for over thirty years the colony grew, and was considered an asset to the Empire. The short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland attracted very positive attention as late as the 1950s. But the break-up of the Federation and the creation of independent Zambia and Malawi was an indication of trouble to come.

4.2.2 The Struggle for Independence

In 1964 Ian Smith became Prime Minister of Rhodesia. He believed that the "The white man is the master of Rhodesia, has built it and intends to keep it." (*Time*, 1964) Smith proclaimed unilateral

independence, provoking a sixteen-year clash between his regime and the British government, which was still the controlling power over Rhodesia, and a civil war between his government and insurgent black guerrillas. Eventually, with Mozambique independent, and the economic basis of white rule eroding, the Smith government gave way to a transitional regime. At that point, Smith had changed his tune: "I had always hoped we could avoid black majority rule in my lifetime. But you have to change your tactics in this game, and we came to the conclusion that if we didn't change, we couldn't survive" (*Time*, 1979).

4.2.3 Independence: The Creation of Zimbabwe

When Zimbabwe became an independent state under black majority rule in 1980 hopes were high that it would succeed politically, economically and socially. For a long time under the supervision of Robert Mugabe it did succeed that those three elements. Despite being under one party rule, the country seemed to be going in the right direction with the right person leading the way for a smooth transition. In 1980, Zimbabwe was poised to succeed and be a leader for the continent due to its diversified economy, middle income status and a solid human resource base (Sachikonye, 2002: 13).

Throughout the 1980s Zimbabwe continually was growing stronger especially in terms of the education and social sectors, the economy was growing and Zimbabwe found itself being the regional breadbasket. In comparison to its SADCC neighbours Zimbabwe was a pillar of strength and stability. Many countries in Southern Africa were struggling to meet basic human rights to their citizens, while many Zimbabweans were enjoying high levels of education and healthcare. When comparing Zimbabwe today to itself twenty-five years ago one must ask what happened? Why did this country, which was seen as being prosperous and stable, somehow get it so wrong?

4.3 The Zimbabwean Crisis

Zimbabwe, for which the entire world had high expectations, has fallen into cyclical despair. From the top down the country has been mismanaged and subject to ostracism from the world. The 'crisis' in Zimbabwe is far reaching to all facets of society. There is a continual food crisis which estimates 1.7 million Zimbabweans will need food aid in 2010/2011 (Tsele, 2010). There is also a massive humanitarian crisis where people are denied the most basic necessities to get by, a political crisis, which is, marred with violence and corruption also a health crisis where rates of infection, disease and death are rising drastically.

Unfortunately, the once prosperous country has become a point of contention in the world. What should be done? Who will fix it? But most of all- *why*? Why did this happen and how did it happen? On the surface it is easy to point the finger of blame directly on one person- Robert Mugabe but there are so many more complex elements than just one person. Investigating the decline of Zimbabwe is like peeling back the skins of an onion. It must be done carefully and gingerly. The historical imprint left by the days of colonisation is still very apparent. The ideals of the revolution are not forgotten and with the population struggling to survive things are only getting worse. Starting from the time of colonialism the seeds were sown for conflict up until today where the population is denied the most basic of necessities.

Zimbabwean politics centred round one man, Robert Mugabe. In this personalised system, it is not surprising that events in Mugabe's circle should be seen as having profound impact, either symbolising or even causing profound change. When asking some ex-pats, academics and diplomats who were once stationed in Zimbabwe what the turning point in Zimbabwe was they came up with one answer: the death of Sally Mugabe.⁴ Though Sally was from Ghana and was met with some suspicion by the Shona people her personality and dedication to Zimbabwe had earned her great respect. When she died in 1992 the entire country mourned along with Mugabe. She was able to help him act rationally and keep him grounded, something that his mistress and second wife Grace could not do. After Sally's death Grace divorced her husband and married Mugabe. Not long after Mugabe's second marriage Zimbabweans realised that Grace did not possess the same dedication and love for Zimbabwe as Sally had. The new first lady "personified the rapid increase in corruption amongst Mugabe's inner circle and their lack of concern for the plight of the common man" (Meldrum, 2004:81). Soon after the marriage between Grace and Robert Mugabe the reality of political and economic corruption became apparent to all facets of society.

4.3.1 The Continuous Slide into Crisis: War Veterans

Mugabe's increasingly dictatorial tendencies required the mobilization of non-traditional support, such as the War Veterans' movement. Given the necessity of maintaining political support, Mugabe was willing to downgrade other factors, such as economic stability. The economy went into reverse. The help that was being given by the IMF and the World Bank were not helping the quickly

⁴ This question was asked to Linda Freeman, Professor of African Studies Carleton University, Ottawa; Charles Bassett former Canadian High Commissioner to Zimbabwe until 1993 and Ann Charles former Canadian High Commissioner to Zimbabwe from 1997-2000.

destabilising economy. Instead the loans given only “increased the debt, leading to further economic decline... the Zimbabwean economy collapsed, with the currency loosing 74% of its value in a single day” (Adelmann, 2004: 250). This was a direct result of the money being promised to the War Veterans. The amount was unsustainable and the value of the currency plummeted. Today, Zimbabwe is ranked number one in the world as the most indebted at a rate of 304% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (CIA, 2010).

4.3.2 War in Democratic Republic of Congo

Zimbabwe chose to get involved in the conflict in DRC in 1997 as part of a SADC initiative to try and stabilise the conflict. When looking back to Zimbabwe’s decline its involvement in DRC is seen as major contributor to the despair felt today. The Zimbabwean forces and government were able to exploit the vulnerable situation for profit. Particularly, “the state encouraged entrepreneurs to penetrate the DRC market, citing the ‘attractiveness of low-cost, commercially useful, networks established by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces’” (Raftopoulos, 2010:203). The resources necessary to keep Zimbabwe in DRC were far too expensive for the fragile economy. In addition to the inflation the country was facing this only furthered its economic problems.

4.3.3 The Land Question: Farm Land and Redistribution

The land redistribution program is another main factor into Zimbabwe’s slide into crisis. During the struggle for independence land ownership was a controversial issue. The redistribution of land from the white minority to the black majority is a sensitive subject in many parts of southern Africa, but especially in Zimbabwe. Even though land redistribution had been on Mugabe’s agenda his entire time in office, he initially promised the white farmers a fair price for their lands. But, by the late 1990s little had been done and land redistribution was increasingly an issue. Mugabe demanded of the British government to help pay for the seizure of land “because it was in charge when the problem was created. [Mugabe also pointed] out that the colonialists did not compensate Africans when they first took the land” (BBC, 2000). Mugabe was able to justify his actions by declaring he was finishing “unfinished business” left over from the revolution (Freeman, 2005: 148).

By mobilising ‘war veterans’ Mugabe wanted to fix the colonial legacy left behind. Through the land redistribution program he was able to gain great support from the rural population “who hoped for economic empowerment, but also from parts of the ruling class, who managed to acquire a substantial number of farms. Undoubtedly, the violent land reform and the break- down of

democracy and of the rule of law exacerbated the economic and political crisis.” (Adelman, 2004:250). By 2002 “over 80 percent of Zimbabwe’s 4,500 white- owned commercial farms had been forcibly seized”(Bauer & Taylor, 2005: 177).

Initially, Great Britain was a willing participant in the land redistribution program. They agreed to buy out white farmers/ landowners so that the majority of the farmland could be redistributed to the majority of the population. It was agreed that the UK would pay out £44 million but in the end came shy of £4 million. In the beginning the program was run in the appropriate manner but over time it “degenerated into a hand-out to ZANU politicians rather than to the smallholder farmers who were the intended beneficiaries” (Lipton, 2009: 337). The farm takeovers became very violent and often went to allies of Mugabe, or war veterans (or in many cases young people posing as war veterans). Great Britain refused to endorse these takeovers and withdrew funding. At this time an unfortunate trend began to occur. Mugabe blamed the western world and especial Great Britain for all of Zimbabwe’s problems. It also became very apparent that “Mugabe generated the land crisis in his attempt to win the parliamentary elections in June 2000 and retain the presidency in elections in 2002” (Freeman, 2005: 165).

The effects of the land redistribution program was being felt as early as 2001, just one year after it began. Finance Minister Simba Makoni warned of imminent food shortages as early as July 2001 (BBC, 2010). Less than one year later in April of 2002 a state of emergency was declared as there were serious food shortages and famine all over the country.

4.3.4 The Rise of the Opposition:

With the decline in the Zimbabwean dollar Mugabe and the ZANU-PF continually lost support, making room for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to evolve, led by Morgan Tsvangirai. The MDC arose “out of a range of civic struggles, in particular the labour and constitutional movements...” (Raftopoulos, 2009: 209). Since Mugabe was quickly losing his iron grip on the country (especially in urban areas) he turned to unsavoury methods of gathering support for his party which became increasingly violent.

Tsvangirai was able to transform the quiet trade workers union into “the country’s most potent challenge to government” (Meldrum, 2004:115). MDC gained momentum especially in Harare, for once there was an alternative to ZANU-PF. This alternative was offered at a high price though.

Tsvangirai has been beaten, imprisoned, his followers killed, beaten and imprisoned and people live in fear of supporting the MDC.

4.3.5 Elections

Post independence Zimbabwe has encountered election irregularities since 1980. Coercion and political intimidation were tactics utilised. The new Zimbabwean government “never created conditions for [elections] to be free and fair and gave the opposition parties very little space to campaign” (Muzondidya, 2009:177). ZANU-PF was able to use its power to use state resources for campaigning; radio, television, the military and police were at the disposal of the ruling party, creating a severely uneven playing field for the opposition.

Recent elections have been marred with irregularities and have drawn international condemnation. Though Zimbabwe has never been classified as a one party state *per se*, any challenges to the ruling ZANU-PF party have always been overcome. As the years have progressed election scandals have become increasingly worse. In the 2002 election the rampant corruption was so wide spread that the international community paid close attention. Initially the results were deemed ‘free and fair’ by both the South African president Thabo Mbeki and the Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo. As a result of these elections, marred with irregularities and violence Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth.

The elections in 2008 saw two main parties running, both ZANU-PF and MDC. The initial results showed that MDC triumphed over ZANU-PF but elections are only as good as the willingness of all parties to accept the results. By any reasonable standard, Tsvangirai won and Mugabe lost, but, holding all the levers of power, Mugabe stayed in office. Eventually a fragile accord for power sharing was cobbled together, after considerable external pressure.

4.3.6 Hope for the Future The Government of National Unity (GNU)

In 2008 ZANU-PF and MDC agreed to come together and attempt to create some sense of viable democracy “that demonstrated respect for democratic values and human rights” (HRW, 2009: 4). A renewed sense of hope was found not only within Zimbabwe but by the rest of the world; a newfound optimism which had not been present in the past decade. The GNU could hopefully breathe into the former regional powerhouse and renew confidence. Two years later the political situation is still very bleak.

For many, Mugabe is the embodiment of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle and despite the policies of the past thirty years they still see him as a valued leader. Unfortunately for Zimbabweans the west views him as “an aged despot with a taste for excess” (Barber, 2005: 1094) who takes little account to the needs of the population. Mugabe is unable to acknowledge that due to his political missteps the country is in a state of crisis. He blames the west for the problems which Zimbabwe has had since independence in 1980.

From the death of Sally Mugabe through the economic ruination of the country to the lack of political freedoms Zimbabwe is still in a state of crisis. In spite of veiled attempts to make the country more transparent through the introduction of a power sharing agreement it has not been successful. There is systematic corruption through all facets of government:

The judiciary is stocked with pliant judges who answer to the ruling party. Police no longer uphold the law, and sometimes participate in breaking it. Ruling party militias roam the country as formal and informal security forces and, acting as agents of the regime, frequently terrorize opposition supporters (Bauer & Taylor, 2005: 171).

What makes the situation direr is that there is no end in sight and the population continues to suffer. The crisis in Zimbabwe is all consuming ranging from widespread hunger, absolute poverty, systematic corruption, lack of transparency and lastly, the absence of political freedom. Mugabe and the ZANU-PF have ruined the hope that the world once had for Zimbabwe. Mugabe has “spoiled what we had consoled ourselves was a good-news story of postcolonial redemption, and turned it against us in a vindictive and retro spirit of revived post-colonial bitterness and racial antagonism” (Kinsman, 2008).

4.4 History of Relations Between Canada and Zimbabwe

Since the end of colonialism, both Canada and Zimbabwe have developed into very different entities. Canada through its ties to Great Britain and the Commonwealth has had continuous interaction with Rhodesia and Zimbabwe. After World War One Britain placed tariffs on trade between former colonies. As a result, at the Imperial Economic Conference held in Ottawa in 1932 a bilateral agreement was developed between Canada and Rhodesia. Canadians also advised on the short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the 1950s.

At the beginning of the 1960s, Canada embraced the view that the age of empires and white domination in Africa was coming to an end. Accordingly, Canada approved the break-up of the

Federation that it had previously advised on the principles of federalism. Canadian aid was promptly forthcoming to Zambia and Malawi, which could be seen as indirect pressure on the remaining white-ruled enclave, Rhodesia. Soon after, Canada supported the British government in its efforts to influence and then to confront Rhodesia, both before and after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).

Overall, the Canadian/ Rhodesian relationship was sporadic which seems to be characteristic of Canada's Southern African policy throughout the Cold War era. Freeman suggests that "Canadian activities in Africa can best be understood less as the product of major interests of immediate concern to Canada than of a number of structural and ideological factors in both the domestic and the international contexts" (Freeman, 1980: 794). Especially throughout the Cold War Canada acted as a middleman to help contain Chinese and Russian expansion into the African continent. Often this support was given out secretly through the "remaining white-ruled states in Southern Africa and occasional tokens of support for black liberation" (Freeman, 1980: 795).

In the post World War Two era Canada was still finding its footing and carving out its position as a middle power. The Cold War was instrumental for Canada to make a name for itself as a middle power. Even though its aid at this point in time was irregular, it showed that Canada had the intentions of becoming a good international citizen. Since Canada was still relatively new to Southern Africa and Rhodesia it did not take the initiative to start aid programs but rather helped previously established programs (Freeman, 1980). At the time Canada had a minute relationship with Rhodesia partially due to the few economic interests present for Canadians in Rhodesia.

On the whole Canadians did take an interest in Rhodesia because it was part of the Commonwealth family and was birthed by the same British legacy as Canada. Perhaps the turning point for Canadian relations in Southern Africa was the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960. Even though the massacre took place in Johannesburg it is seen as a turning point in Canadian perception of racist government regimes in the region. The Massacre was highly publicized and for one of the first times it showed the cruel nature of racist minority regimes. Images of the Massacre were splashed all over newspapers and the news creating a strong visual impact. The Canadian outcry over the events that occurred in Sharpeville carried over into the Canadian view of Rhodesia. At this point Canadian NGOs and churches began to provide Zimbabweans with support for their struggle by providing food aid and other forms of aid. Public Canadian attitudes towards the minority regime in Rhodesia became more pronounced throughout the 1960s.

As time wore on there was an increasing presence in both Southern Africa and Rhodesia through the sporadic offering of assistance. Development aid was seen as a useful instrument enabling Canada “to gain a presence inside many African countries in order to serve Western interests and to promote its own prestige” (Freeman, 1980:797). Canada’s presence in Southern Africa and Rhodesia acted as a tool to help promote Canada’s identity as a middle power showing its ‘commitment’ to promoting stable development and human rights.

4.4.1 Canada and Rhodesia: Relations Through Multi-Lateral Bodies

4.4.1.1 *The Commonwealth*

The Commonwealth was the lynchpin of Canadian Rhodesian relations. Throughout the 1960s the Commonwealth was a body that still carried influence in the world. Strategically Africa was an important concern, especially with the increasing presence of the UN and the Commonwealth, along with other multi-lateral bodies. “Canada was inescapably drawn to the African imbroglio, as a member of the commonwealth and of the United Nations, where African votes had a clear political weight” (Bothwell, 2007:305). There was a strategic allure of being involved within Africa and maintaining a good relationship. Since Africa had strength in numbers it was necessary for Canada to create a good working relationship with many African nations. The Africans had the weight of numbers behind them, and any time they wanted could force Rhodesia onto the agenda. African leaders were now able to put pressure on international bodies such as the Commonwealth to produce a Rhodesian policy. Since Canada did not have a direct policy on Rhodesia it became necessary to create one. This was a strategic move on Canada’s part. As a middle power, the more international allies they had within multi-lateral bodies meant more support for Canadian initiatives. Canada would have more votes and a stronger say in issues on the international level.

The Commonwealth had the potential to act as a platform for Canada to influence change within the body and have a stronger presence in the third world. Diefenbaker was one of the first white Commonwealth leaders to take a stance against minority rule, but was not until after South Africa withdrew from the commonwealth that the Rhodesian issue was brought up. The Rhodesian question dominated or at least strongly influenced Commonwealth meetings throughout the remainder of the 1960s and through the 1970s. As a result, there could not be “direct” relations until Majority Rule, which did not occur until 1980.

Canada's "relations" with Rhodesia were mostly through support of British efforts to impose sanctions and through UN activity. In 1959, a Canadian and an Australian were appointed to a British commission to investigate Rhodesia's political prospects. When Lester B. Pearson came to office in 1963 he was ready to "try and persuade the Rhodesians to liberalise the franchise so as to ensure an African majority in due course" (Miller, 1974:190). The Rhodesian government was not open to majority rule and did not pay attention to what other Commonwealth members suggested. The British were beginning to feel the pressure, many Commonwealth countries were pressing for "majority rule in spite of the Rhodesian government's disagreement" (Miller, 1974: 190).

Traditionally, Canada aligned itself with Great Britain on the Rhodesian issue, as Canada always acted multilaterally especially with its senior allies. The Canadian government explained that because there were talks occurring between London and Salisbury and did not want to interfere in the Rhodesian question, "From 1962-1964 Ottawa had given it unreserved support to British policy, abstaining on all Rhodesian questions in the UN on the grounds that such action would interfere with consultations between London and Salisbury" (Freeman, 1997:30). But it was in 1964 when the Canadian government's attitude changed and they began veering away from traditional British policy. Canada took a stance on Rhodesia, which no other white former colony of Britain had taken. In the wake of the Sharpeville massacre Canadians were becoming increasingly aware of the inequalities of Southern Africa and as a result, the government worked to separate itself from the British stance. Aligning with traditional middle power theory Canada was standing up for humanitarian rights and trying to act as a mediator within the Commonwealth.

Since relations between Canada and Rhodesia had been few, Rhodesia sought to expand them in the early 1960s. Canada was reluctant. If Canada were to accept accredited representatives in Ottawa and send representatives to Salisbury (now Harare) "this could easily be construed as showing approval of Rhodesian policies" (Watts, 2007: 338). Instead, Canada wanted to make a good impression with the newly independent African states. The only way Canada was prepared to reconsider its position within Rhodesia was if "the Rhodesian Government implemented progressive policies [and only then] Canada [would] be disposed to review its policy" (Watts, 2007: 338).

In 1964, the Commonwealth was comprised of twenty countries, eight of which were African. "With an African dimension came new expectations that the association would work towards resolving racial problems such as the one in Southern Rhodesia" (Hayes, 1982: 141). Even before the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers took place in 1964, Rhodesia was being discussed.

Members asked whether or not Rhodesia should be invited to the meeting. In the end it was thought that if Rhodesia was invited to the meeting then its presence might overshadow the rest of the conference (Watts, 2007: 329). There was also opposition from many Commonwealth nations such as Pakistan and Kenya to the idea of Rhodesia attending. These became the ‘unofficial’ reasons for why Rhodesia was not invited. Officially, the British government stated that: “because of the size of the Commonwealth, only representatives of fully sovereign states should attend the Prime Ministers’ Meeting” (Watts, 2007: 330). This set a sombre tone for the Commonwealth meeting later that year.

Lester B. Pearson, one of Canada’s most celebrated Prime Ministers (1963-1968), brought the issue of Rhodesia forward within the Commonwealth. Pearson had an instinctive sense of looming political trouble. It was obvious to him that the Commonwealth with its Afro-Asian majority could split on the Rhodesian issue. Instinctively too, the Canadian prime minister defaulted toward mediation as a technique. Mediation required calm, and calm required hope. Pearson was an optimist and believed that utilizing methods of soft power and looking towards a better – was better than reverting to confrontation and walk-outs by the aggrieved African members, on the one hand, or by the British, on the other. If it were not for Canada’s efforts at the Commonwealth meetings through his tenure the body might have dissipated. When Ian Smith was elected Prime Minister in Rhodesia in 1964, with an uncompromising demand for independence it was clear that the Rhodesian question was no longer avoidable.

At the Commonwealth meeting that year the British, Australian and New Zealand contingents did not want to interfere on the issues of a “self governing colony as long as the government remained within the bounds of constitutional action” (Freeman, 1997:30) and wanted to leave Rhodesia off the agenda. This avoidance came to a boiling point. Black African leaders became infuriated with the inaction occurring in Rhodesia began to threaten to leave the commonwealth if the “principle of racial equality was not honoured” (Freeman, 1997: 31). Canada became an anomaly within the Commonwealth and seemed resistant to the “differences over Britain’s approach to the Rhodesia issue [which] had developed along colour lines” (Hayes, 1982:143). Canada did not want divisions over racial lines, but rather wanted to be an inclusive body. Pearson drafted a communiqué stating that:

The Commonwealth has a particular role to play in the search for solutions to the interracial problems which are threatening the orderly development of mankind in general and of many particular areas in the world today.

As a community of many different races, the Commonwealth is itself an almost unique experiment in international co-operation among peoples of several races and continents. Within their own borders many of its members have faced and are facing issues raised by the coexistence of different cultures within a democratic society...

The Commonwealth should be able to exercise constructive leadership in the application of democratic principles in a manner which will enable the people of each country of different racial and cultural groups to exist and develop as free and equal citizens (Hayes, 1982: 143-144)

Wilson knew that much of the white British population sympathized with white Rhodesia and he therefore was nervous to take definitive action against the colony. Many African leaders, such as Milton Obote of Uganda, Abubakar Balewa of Nigeria wanted the British government to take military action within Rhodesia as they had in other former colonies. The problem, however, was that Rhodesia was a much more formidable military entity than three of Britain's ex-colonies [Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika] where the British had briefly but effectively intervened early in 1964 in support of their governments against mutinous troops. Canada did not agree with the use of force to secure majority rule in Rhodesia. This was an issue which Pearson was not flexible on, believing that "nothing but chaos would come from attempting to use force to change the situation, whether this was military force, or even political or economic force used prematurely" (Hayes, 1982:150).

Canada supported racial equality and majority rule, two elements which were not present in Southern Rhodesia under Ian Smith. Pearson called for the "release of African leaders from detention and letting Smith know that the Commonwealth would neither recognize a unilateral declaration of independence nor give such a regime diplomatic support in the UN" (Freeman, 1992:31). This only further bolstered Canada's position as a middle power – it bolstered its image as a country that was committed to the rule of law and equal rights. Following in a true middle power path, Canada did not support military action in Rhodesia to try and bring down the oppressive government.

4.4.1.2 Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the United Nations

In 1965, Ian Smith declared Rhodesia to be an independent state through the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) the global community reacted quickly to deem it illegal. UDI would have entrenched racist minority rule further, without any opportunity for the black majority to gain democratic rights. On November 11, 1965 Smith and his cabinet ministers declared independence but maintained an allegiance to the crown. The next day the United Nations passed resolution 216 condemning “the unilateral declaration of independence made by a racist minority” (UN, 1965). Furthermore, the resolution called on “all states not to recognize this illegal racist minority regime... and to refrain from rendering any assistance to this illegal regime” (UN, 1965). The United Nations viewed UDI as an act of rebellion and having no legal validity (UN, 1965a). Canada under allegiance to the Crown and the United Nations adhered to this resolution.

After Resolution 216, Pearson became more vocal in his opposition to white Rhodesia urging, as a first step, moderate but very firm measures against Smith. Six months after Resolution 216, the Security Council recalled 216 and brought forth Resolution 221 calling “all States to do their utmost to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum” (UN, 1966). This was the first time in its history the United Nations enacted sanctions against a state to try and bring down a government (*Time*, 1966). The sanctions forbade the then 122 UN members from selling “oil, arms, motor vehicles or airplanes to the rebel territory or to provide it with any form of financial or other economic aid” (*Time*, 1966). Though the sanctions might have seemed appropriate there was very little which could be done to enforce these sanctions. South Africa was actively undermining the sanctions by providing oil and supplies to Rhodesia and other countries such as France believed that the issue should be left to Great Britain and not the UN (*Time*, 1966).

In conformity with the United Nations’ stance, the Canadian government enacted both political and economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Pearson had hoped that this would make military intervention unnecessary. The government wanted to avoid any military intervention at all costs as it viewed military action as a last resort scenario. At this point in time Canada’s military spending was already on the decline (Graph 1) and the government had shifted its focus to peacekeeping as opposed to engaging in conflict. In the post war era Canada also had NATO commitments in Europe which it was bound to uphold. There was neither the ability nor the interest to start a conflict in such a far off and remote location which did not directly affect Canada. Despite Canada and Pearson’s best efforts to try and help the situation in Rhodesia through diplomacy, by the late

1960s many black African leaders thought of Pearson as a lot of talk and little action. One of the problems with enacting sanctions against a country so far away is that there is no way to actually enforce the policy. Meanwhile, Britain was continuously undermining the United Nations efforts to isolate Rhodesia. In 1966, the government allowed British petroleum companies including British Petroleum (of which the government held a 51% share) to bring oil into Rhodesia from South Africa and Beria Mozambique (Freeman, 1997:33). Since petroleum was still being imported through South Africa and Mozambique attempts to isolate Rhodesia through sanctions were not successful.

4.4.1.3 UDI and NIBMAR

No Independence Before Majority Rule (NIBMAR) was a policy that advocated the implementation of majority rule in Rhodesia. The policy was created to ensure the democratic rights of the entire population of Rhodesia were awarded before gaining independence from Britain. Initially, Britain was very hesitant to accept the policy and it was up to Pearson and the Canadian government to convince the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to accept because it was seen as a very controversial undertaking. NIBMAR was an example of how Canada was stepping away from Britain and supporting genuine majority rule. The British government would not agree to this idea, though they did agree with Canada that military intervention could be disastrous. Pearson had to manoeuvre in-between the Afro-Asian contingent of the Commonwealth and the British trying to find a middle ground everyone could agree with. Eventually due to Pearson's steadfast efforts, which swayed Wilson to accept NIBMAR and UN Security Council Sanctions against Rhodesia. Pearson played a very important role in upholding Canada's middle power position "he was the one representative of the old Commonwealth who was able to meet the new Commonwealth half-way and thus to preserve some semblance of unity" (Freeman1997: 34).

4.4.2 Trudeau Era: 1968-1979

Known as Canada's most charismatic Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau was elected to office in 1968, taking over the helm from Pearson. He took a slightly different approach to Canadian foreign policy, based on Canada's limitations, while defining foreign policy as "the extension abroad of national policies" (DFAIT, 2008). Despite a more nationally focused policy Trudeau did take a similar stance to Pearson on Rhodesia and NIBMAR. Similar to Pearson's efforts at the Commonwealth meeting in 1964, Trudeau needed to mediate between Great Britain and the Afro-Asian bloc in the Commonwealth. In his opinion, many African leaders were growing tired of the

often Eurocentric nature of the Commonwealth and the British government's failure to "deal firmly with Ian Smith's rebellious and unconstitutional unilateral declaration of independence" (Head & Trudeau, 1995: 99). The Commonwealth once again almost collapsed over the issue of racist regimes and minority rule. Trudeau stood up against "racial discrimination" within Southern Africa (Freeman, 1997:39). Trudeau was successful in bringing the Commonwealth back together and recognized that "racial prejudice as a dangerous sickness.. and an unmitigated evil" (Freeman, 1997:40).

Overall, Trudeau's position on Rhodesia wavered, in 1975 he said he would not support a black war of liberalization, however, "he could understand the armed struggle of black freedom fighters" (Freeman, 1997:41). Conversely to his predecessor, Trudeau said that he would settle for something less than NIBMAR if it had guarantees which would lead to diplomatic equality in the future. Members of the opposition parties were incensed by this statement seeing it as a betrayal of Canada's middle power role and could damage the Commonwealth in the future (Freeman, 1997: 36). The opposition would rather a firm plan guaranteeing rights at the moment as opposed to an ambivalent date in the future. The Canadian government's waning support towards Rhodesia became increasingly frustrating not only for those suffering within the borders but also to the region. The lack of commitment and vagueness of Canadian policy was detrimental to Canadian relations within the region. Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere who held great respect for Trudeau was disappointed in Trudeau's "stonewalling" by the mid 1970s (Freeman, 1997:41).

It was within this time the public began to mobilize. Since the Canadian government was not being consistent in its approach to Southern Africa, groups of citizens including church groups, NGOs, academics, trade unions and university students came together to oppose the oppressive regimes in Southern Africa. There was strong support for SWAPO in Namibia and the Zimbabwean cause (Freeman, 1997:70). These groups were extremely effective in persuading general public opinion and businesses on Southern African issues and even released a *Black Paper* "as a critique of the government policy of 'balance' arguing for a greater priority to social justice" (Freeman, 1997:69). Through public persuasion Canadian banks quietly ended their financing towards South Africa. In 1978 the Royal Bank of Canada announced that it had not made any new loans to South Africa since 1976 (Freeman, 1997:70). Private investors were selling their stocks and ensuring that their money was not supporting a minority government like those found in Rhodesia and South Africa. One civilian sold \$400,000 worth of stocks of a Canadian based mining firm Falconbridge who had interests in Namibia (Freeman, 1997:70). This shows the sway that the Canadian public had over business and government practices.

Overall, the Canadian governments policy toward Southern Africa in the 1970s is thought of as a 'soft' answer to the regional problems. Instead of contributing directly to assist the struggle or aid those most in need the government took a different approach. The government was apprehensive to give aid to black southern Africans, so instead they invested in international education programs with no direct ties to Africa (Freeman 1980:85). From 1973-1978 no budget was assigned specifically to fund educational training programmes for black southern Africans "and authorities made every effort to minimize direct assistance to the liberation movements" (Freeman, 1980: 805). Instead of establishing programmes to help those who fell victim to the oppressive governments the Canadian government waited for other nations or organizations to invite them to join. The indirect investment in southern Africa shows Canada's waning middle power status. The Canadian government was allocating just enough aid to come across as making a difference without actually making one.

The Canadian government's waning middle power stance is especially evident towards the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. As a middle power Canada was against the use of violence, "counselled moderation, and provided minimal support" (Freeman, 1992: 42) even though Trudeau himself expressed his understanding for the movement. Canada's tactics through the 1970s were to create a credible name for itself through multi-lateral bodies while offering minimal support to black Africans so that they could try to "ameliorate the effect of Canada's continuing economic relations with South Africa" (Freeman, 1992: 45). The reasoning behind Canada's lack of support for the Zimbabwean movement was its "adherence to the principle of non-violence" (Freeman, 1980:805). Though the government easily turned a blind eye to "the character of the white-ruled states against which these groups were fighting and with whom Canadian companies continued to do business" (Freeman, 1980: 805). Trudeau lost the election in 1979 and Liberal reign over the government was briefly interrupted for one year. It was during this year that Canada's attitude towards the Zimbabwean struggle shifted.

In the brief period where Joe Clark was Prime Minister (1979-80), full economic sanctions were put into place against Rhodesia. After the sanctions were in place aid to ZAPU and ZANU was seen as "acceptable" (Freeman, 1997:124). When the Canadian government officially acknowledged the Zimbabwean struggle in 1979, it was met with public a mixed reaction. There were large groups of people who had been supporting the Zimbabwean cause for years but there were also citizens who accused the government of supporting "violence, embracing chic causes, abuse of aid money, as well as support for terrorists and 'communists'" (Neal *et al* 1992:123). It was difficult for the

government to try and appease all parties. After decades of indecisiveness on the Rhodesian question Canada was finally supporting the struggle to try and end oppression. By 1979 the Rhodesian government understood that it had no hope to win the endless war and the transition to independence began. By this time, Zimbabwe was fully into its transition and Canada's backing of ZAPU and ZANU was irrelevant.

4.4.3 Canada and Post- Independence Zimbabwe

Canada like most countries in the world had a strong sense of optimism for the success of Zimbabwe after its independence. After independence in 1980, the Canadian government did establish diplomatic missions in and also launched "a major program of development assistance in the region" (Freeman, 1992: 43). When the Cold War ended Canadian aid policies became more transparent. CIDA stepped in and donated substantial time, energy and money into the stabilization of Zimbabwe and Southern Africa, especially in the face of crisis.

As the implementer of ODA, CIDA acted as the middleman between Canada and Southern Africa. Money for development programs grew from under \$1 million CAD in 1970 to \$150 million in 1988-89. Canada supported SADCC to create a more stable Southern Africa in the wake of South Africa's systematic promotion of instability (Freeman, 1992:43). This was a way of Canada "expressing its social justice values, to balance the desire to have economic growth through continuous trade and investment with South Africa" (Freeman, 1992: 45). Canada's commitment to Zimbabwe and other Southern African nations throughout the 1980s can be seen as a gesture towards the region. Despite the social and political consequences for doing business in South Africa Canada was still present in the apartheid regime. By contributing to the region the Canadian government was trying to offset its substantial economic involvement in South Africa.

On numerous occasions Prime Minister Mulroney partnered with Mugabe in their stance against South Africa. At the Commonwealth Meeting in 1985 Mulroney worked with other Commonwealth leaders including Mugabe to try and convince Great Britain to use sanctions against South Africa. As a monumental gesture, in 1987 Prime Minister Mulroney was the first Western head of government to visit independent Zimbabwe. His trip to southern Africa is often seen as the "high point of the Canadian government's commitment to strong action in South[ern] Africa" (Freeman, 1997:164). This was undertaken not only through the Commonwealth but had a loose aim to increase bilateral relations with Zimbabwe. However, a concrete relationship between the two nations never evolved.

Canada appeared to stand in solidarity with Zimbabwe against apartheid in South Africa. Despite efforts on the surface to distance itself economically and politically from South Africa, Canada maintained strong economic ties. There were a series of sanctions which the Canadian government had passed in the 1980s which covered a range of activities from banning agricultural products, to forcing South African Airlines to close up shop in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. In reality these sanctions were not enough to make a great difference.

Privately owned companies found a loophole and ignored “the government’s ban on new investment in South Africa” (Freeman, 1997:163). Mining companies such as Falconbridge continued to invest and expand in South Africa, undermining the sanctions which many nations tried to enforce. Throughout this time period trade between Canada and South Africa increased, despite the public displays of solidarity against apartheid with Mugabe and other leaders in Southern Africa. The trade figures between Canada and South Africa for 1988 showed a rise of 68% on imports and a rise of 44% on exports compared to 1987 (Freeman, 1997:221). The post-independence relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe was two-faced. On the outside Canada seemed to uphold the ideals of middlepowermanship. Canada as a stable democracy was supporting democracy and human rights, following the characteristics of middlepowermanship. By engaging in talks with Mugabe and working with the Commonwealth to try and isolate South Africa Canada portrayed itself as a traditional middle power. Meanwhile, Canada was not acting on the same ideals it was trying to uphold. By engaging in trade despite the sanctions, which Canada in many ways helped, the picture was contradictory. The trade that occurred between Canada and South Africa helped contribute to the economic destabilization of the region.

Again the theme of Canadian talk and little action came into play. South Africa was weakening the region’s economic stability; former Zimbabwean foreign minister Nathan Shamuyeria estimated that there was \$35 billion in loss due to the effects of South Africa’s regional destabilization (Freeman, 1997:222). Even though Canada had pledged solidarity with Zimbabwe in opposing South Africa there was minimal action. The Zimbabwean government became increasingly impatient with Canada’s continued business dealings with South Africa. Despite the fact Canada spearheaded Commonwealth sanctions against South Africa they were indecisive and the sanctions were only optional and did not put a complete end to business between the two. If sanctions against South Africa were ever to be effective, they had to be implemented, and really enforced, by all of the major economies, not only the Commonwealth but also the Europeans, Japanese and Americans.

Unfortunately, this did not happen so Canada's quiet diplomacy initiative failed to make a substantial economic impact on the destabilization of the region.

Nearing the end of Mulroney's tenure as Prime Minister he scrambled to gain more notoriety as a champion of human rights and good governance. Increasingly he spoke out against South Africa's apartheid government and talked more about increasing aid to the region. "Canada would 'increasingly be channelling our development assistance to those countries which show respect for fundamental rights and freedoms' " (Freeman,1997:252). This enraged Mugabe and he felt that it would be "wrong to buy the policies of the government, to try and change them through aid" (Freeman, 1997:253). But Mulroney attached stipulations to the donation of aid and said that Canada is "entitled to decide what takes place with the money of the taxpayers of Canada" (Freeman, 1997:253).

By the end of Mulroney's time in office in 1993 substantial financial strain was put on the Canadian economy. When the newly elected Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien came to power he was faced with a very large deficit. The resulting belt-tightening did not leave much room for middlepower pretensions. This had effects on all facets of foreign policy, and even on the relationship between Canada and Zimbabwe.

4.4.4 The 2002 Elections , Canada, NEPAD and the G8

As Canada was trying to preserve the last vestiges of its middle powermanship they held the 2002 G8 summit in Alberta. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) was a significant theme throughout the G8 Summit. NEPAD is an initiative started in conjunction with the African Union to promote economic stability and better governance throughout Africa. What is unique about NEPAD is that it is more of a philosophy and a guideline than an actual policy. NEPAD itself it not a concrete structure or body it is a "a strategic vision that asserts many truths about what needs to change" (Herbert, 2002:93). NEPAD was inspired by South African policy on the African Renaissance, and to give African solutions to African problems. The goals of NEPAD are very broad aspiring to unite the continent by bringing accountability, good governance and bring down poverty. NEPAD aimed to achieve its goals by "bringing about peace and political stability, instilling respect for human rights and political freedom, enshrining good economic and political governance and launching programs to address Africa's shortcomings in infrastructure, education, and health" (Herbert, 2002: 97).

NEPAD was to be officially launched at the G8 Summit that year but its commencement was hindered by the elections in Zimbabwe. Canada had intentions to fully support NEPAD. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien helped spearhead the multi-billion dollar Africa Action Plan initiative to work multilaterally with other nations for positive development on the continent. Chrétien is quoted as saying "Today we have a deal and a deal that represents a new beginning and fresh hope for the African continent" (BBC, 2002).

For NEPAD to succeed multilateral support was required. As the host of the G8 summit where NEPAD was presented Canada was instrumental in developing the initiative. Chrétien pledged \$6 billion over five years to help reduce debt in Africa (CBC 2002a). There was one issue, which hindered the ratification of NEPAD-- the 2002 Zimbabwe elections. The legitimacy of the recent Zimbabwean elections became a vital point for NEPAD to proceed; South Africa and Nigeria's stance on the elections was essential for NEPAD to pass. Initially both South Africa and Nigeria deemed the Zimbabwean elections fair despite many countries rejecting them. Since Mbeki and Obasanjo were two of the main engineers of NEPAD they risked G8 support for the initiative. For Canada this was pivotal, as it was a Canadian by the name of Robert Fowler⁵ who orchestrated donors, stakeholders, development partners and multi-lateral organizations on top of the G8 to support NEPAD (CBC, 2009a). Eventually both Obasanjo and Mbeki criticized the Zimbabwean elections allowing for NEPAD to be discussed in full at the G8 Summit.

By the end of the G8 Summit its members announced their commitment to the G8 Africa Action Plan (AAP). The AAP "includes over 100 specific commitments to Africa which mirrored the priority areas identified by the NEPAD framework document" (DFAIT, 2009). This led to the commitment to African Peace and Security endorsed by the G8 at the 2003 Evian summit. Canada's position within the G8 allowed the government to exert its middle power status launching initiatives to advance development in Africa.

⁵ Robert Fowler was Canada's longest serving permanent member to the United Nations, Canadian ambassador to Rome, Prime Minister Martin and Harper's Representative for Africa. In 2000 he headed a commission which released a report citing the links between diamonds and conflict in the third world (known as the Fowler report). His report led to the creation of the international diamond certification scheme, the Kimberley Process. In 2008 he was asked by the Secretary General Ban Ki- Moon to lead the UN special envoy in Niger. In December 2008 he was abducted by al Qaeda and held hostage for five months; his release has been shrouded in controversy

4.4.4.1 Chrétien and Zimbabwe

The 2002 elections were a turning point in Canadian- Zimbabwean relations. Initially the Canadian government held hope for the elections, that is, that they would be held in a free and fair manner in accordance with international standards. Chrétien himself did not want to be too quick to judge before results had been tabulated. But he must have had his suspicions, for he told the press "If the observers tell me that it was an unfair election, that Mugabe has won, stolen the election ... (then) suspension [from the commonwealth] is clear in my mind." (CBC 2002c). The Canadian contingent at the Commonwealth even went so far to allow Zimbabwe to stay within the body until the official Commonwealth election report was finalized. Unfortunately, the elections were deemed unfair and shrouded with irregularities, intimidation and violence. Chrétien condemned the elections directly, adding that Mugabe or any of his officials were no longer welcome in Canada. Additionally, Chrétien said that aid would no longer be sent to Zimbabwe.

After the G8 summit Chrétien went to South Africa for United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development where he approached the issue in Zimbabwe directly. Chrétien made clear that he was opposed to the Mugabe regime and stated that Mugabe should "sit down with the opposition and make a government of national unity that will bring back more stability and more prosperity in the country" (CBC, 2002b). Much like Mulroney, Chrétien struggled to leave a positive legacy when left office. He wanted his legacy to include upholding Canadian moral standards by acting as a middle power to help secure human rights, democracy and put an end to poverty. This is clear through his passion for NEPAD and denouncing the Mugabe regime. In the end, his efforts were too little too late and a lot of talk and very little action, further discrediting Canada's middle power status. The impact of the 2002 Zimbabwe elections was felt all over the world, the stories of political violence were heard as far away as Canada. If South Africa and Nigeria had not questioned the legality of the elections then NEPAD would not have come into effect. Canada was instrumental in getting NEPAD off the ground, however, with respect to Zimbabwe not much was done. The G8 is an example of the waning power of the body, and represents the declining power that Canada as a middle power yields. Canada could have taken a stronger stance against Mugabe and Zimbabwe and used this global forum to call attention to the widespread problems of the country. Instead, the G8 did draw attention to the crisis in Zimbabwe but did not help to implement a long-term solution.

4.5 Current Relations Between Canada and Zimbabwe: A Failure of Middlepowermanship

Unlike other nations whose slide into ruination has also led to a slide into obscurity, Zimbabwe continues to make waves in the western world, even in Canada. Britain took a strong stance towards Zimbabwe and Canada closely followed suit (in the same fashion of the past). There are many reasons why Zimbabwe has become an international issue of such great magnitude. Since Canada is an active member of many multi-lateral bodies such as the United Nations, G8/ G20, and the Commonwealth it is customary for a middle power such as Canada to follow the path of the larger bodies. Another reason why Zimbabwe stands out is its close proximity to South Africa. Many international news agencies have their African headquarters in South Africa, which lies just next door to Zimbabwe. This allows for unprecedented media access into Zimbabwe (Adelman, 2004:250). As an English speaking country with a shared British history it is easy for Canadian citizens to sympathize with the plight of Zimbabwe. It also makes it much easier for Zimbabwean politicians to be heard on the world stage as opposed to an interpretation. Former South African president Thabo Mbeki argued that the west was obsessed with the crisis in Zimbabwe which contrasted with the west's "lack of interest in larger and more destructive conflicts in Rwanda, Sudan, Angola and the DRC. In these cases, millions have died compared to several hundred in Zimbabwe" (Mbeki 2002). In his view the only reason why the crisis in Zimbabwe has garnered so much attention is "because white people died (about 12), and white people were deprived of their property" (Freeman, 2005: 153).

4.5.1 The 2008 Zimbabwe Elections

In the wake of the 2008 Zimbabwean elections the G8 decided to come together to propose sanctions against Zimbabwe. The two leaders in the proposal, the United States and Great Britain lobbied the G8 to come together to put forward a resolution against Zimbabwe through the United Nations. The United Nations sanctions would have targeted officials along with Mugabe and also included an arms embargo. Zimbabwean Information Minister Sikhanyiso Ndlovu charged that the sanctions were a "colonial and racist campaign against our country and government, [and that] this campaign[s] ultimate goal is to have their puppets in power,"(Chinaka, 2008). At the meeting July 11th 2008 nine countries voted in favour while five voted against (South Africa, Russian Federation, China, Vietnam and Libya) and the resolution did not pass (Security Council, 2008). The United Nations resolution would have condemned the elections and the government's

...campaign of violence against the political opposition and the civilian population, which has resulted in scores of deaths, thousands of injuries, and displacement of thousands of civilians,

making it impossible for a free and fair election to occur, and expresses strong concern with the decision of the Government of Zimbabwe to go forward with the 27 June elections (Security Council, 2008)

On September 4th 2008 the Canadian government officially imposed targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe in the aftermath of its controversial elections. The Foreign Minister at the time, David Emerson, cited electoral fraud and “violence against opposition supporters” (Ibbitson, 2009) as the reasoning behind Canada’s choice to enact sanctions. On behalf of the government, Emerson said, “Canada does not consider the result of the June 27 election to be, by any reasonable standard of democracy, a credible outcome. This ‘election’ is illegitimate and will not be accepted by the Government of Canada” (Brach, 2008). The Canadian government maintains that egregious human rights offences are taking place by the hand of the government, which is helping to perpetuate the economic, and humanitarian crisis occurring in Zimbabwe.

As a result of the Canadian government’s condemnation of the elections, the “Special Economic Measures (Zimbabwe) Regulations (SOR/2008-248)” came into effect. The elections “marked [an] escalation in human rights violations and violence directed at the political opposition, a stolen election, the denial of a peaceful democratic transition and a worsening humanitarian situation” (DFAIT, 2010). This forced the Canadian government to stand up and take action against Zimbabwe. The measures of the sanction include:

- A ban on the export of arms and related material to Zimbabwe or to any person in Zimbabwe;
- A prohibition on the transport of arms and related material to Zimbabwe aboard a Canadian vessel or aircraft;
- A prohibition on the provision of technical or financial assistance or services relating to arms and related material, including the provision, transfer or communication of technical data, to Zimbabwe or any person in Zimbabwe;
- Requirement on any person in Canada and Canadian outside of Canada to freeze the assets of listed Zimbabwean persons and entities;
- A prohibition on Zimbabwean aircraft from flying over or landing in Canada.

(DFAIT, 2010)

The “targeted” or “smart” sanctions only apply to a certain group of people and organizations. They do not have a great effect on the entire population. With smart sanctions only those who have direct connections to the ruling ZANU-PF party are being targeted. In theory Canadian sanctions on Zimbabwe are used to increase “pressure on President Robert Mugabe and his colleagues to cease

human rights abuses and remove other blockages to democratization in the country” (Bomba & Minter, 2010).

Since there are no formal trade sanctions business is still being conducted between Canada and Zimbabwe. The mining sector is the strongest example of the strong Canadian business interests in Zimbabwe. Firms such as New Dawn Mining Corporation owns and operates two gold mines the Turk and Angelus Mines. This ‘junior’ mining company generated USD\$3.97 million in revenue for the 2009 fiscal year (New Dawn, 2010). Another mine outside of Bulawayo has been owned and operated by three Canadian based mining companies since 1965, Falconbridge, Kinross and now Caledonia Mining Corporation. The Blanket Gold Mine generated USD\$4.15 million in revenue in the second quarter of 2010 (Caledonia, 2010). Both New Dawn and Caledonia are based in Toronto and are publicly traded companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Based on the profits of just two Canadian mining companies in Zimbabwe it is clear that there is still substantial business being conducted between both nations. The targeted sanctions have not affected these Canadian based multi-national mining companies, though Canadians cannot formally conduct business with certain ZANU-PF members. It is unclear who exactly the Canadian sanctions against ZANU-PF members targets but it does include: “past or present senior officials of the Government of Zimbabwe, their families, entities that are owned or controlled by past or present senior officials or their families, and persons engaged in activities that undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law” (Sonsow, 2008). Similarly to the past, it is very difficult to enforce sanctions between Canada and Zimbabwe. This is especially true if it is not a global initiative.

There is only one recent example of Canada actually being able to follow through with its targeted sanctions. In 2008, Mugabe requested to fly through Canadian airspace following a speech at the United Nations to which the government declined. This can be considered a “smart sanction,” but it is so minute that even the symbolic impact is unclear.

Mugabe is able to mobilize his followers to react against the sanctions and fuel the fire of anti-westernization in the country. He insists the dire state Zimbabwe is currently in is the west’s fault. He accuses the west of using sanctions “as part of a plot to impose their political will on the southern African nation” (*Times Live*, 2010c). In reality, the sanctions put in place against key ZANU-PF members do not have a grave effect on the general population. In truth, it has been the international community (with Canada included) that has fed the country since the constitutional crisis.

Most recently, in 2009, Canada along with twenty other nations released “a statement commending the progress undertaken by the transition government and urging the government to take additional steps to demonstrate its commitment to reform” (Government of Canada, 2009). If Zimbabwe shows a sustainable change towards a transparent and fair government Canada will reconsider its economic and political sanctions towards the country.

4.5.2 CIDA and Zimbabwe

Though the Government of Canada is no longer officially helping the government of Zimbabwe through its ODA, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) continues to help Zimbabweans who are in dire need of basic necessities. CIDA is active in numerous African countries including Sudan, Ethiopia, Mali, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. In 2008 the Canadian government contributed CAD\$2.1 billion in official development aid overall. In 2002 the government promised to double its commitments to ODA by 2010, which it did but then promptly froze.

Canada’s \$34 million contribution to Zimbabweans is rather basic. It helps them to access water, healthcare, education and food. Overall, the commitment of funds to aid in Zimbabwe is to “prevent a further decline in peace, order, and governance in Zimbabwe...[while encouraging] respect for the rights of the individual” (CIDA 2010a). There is no money allotted to the government for fear it might go into the pockets of the ZANU- PF. For the year 2010 there are approximately 44 operational projects that Canada is involved with in Zimbabwe, either supported or headed by Canada (CIDA, 2010a). The money allotted through CIDA is a bare minimum to try and help the population survive through various forms of aid such as food aid. On the surface Canada is maintaining its middle power position, by providing minimal support whilst taking a political stand against Zimbabwe through its targeted sanctions.

Under Stephen Harper it has become increasingly clear that the government is doubtful of commitments to global development. The minister responsible for CIDA, Bev Oda, is not even part of the Cabinet. The agency itself is bound by endless red tape. On average, it takes about 43 months for a project to gain approval through CIDA (Stewart, 2009). “CIDA time and again is suffocated by a political management system that rewards weakness and indecision, while shunning imagination” (Stewart, 2009). In the past ten years there has been a new minister in charge of CIDA every two years, just adding to the lack of direction and confusion plaguing the fledgling body. It is clear that the government has been taking less and less interest in its own international development agency,

cutting recipient countries and freezing the budget. It has become apparent that the Canadian government does not value the middlepower stance that Canada was once lauded for.

4.5.3 Zimbabwe and the Kimberley Process: The Last Vestiges of Canadian Middlepowermanship?

Official involvement between Canada and Zimbabwe is limited. There is, however, the Kimberley Process that engages both. The Kimberley Process is a global certification scheme which aims to put “extensive requirements on its members to enable them to certify shipments of rough diamonds as ‘conflict-free’ and prevent conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate trade” (Kimberley Process, 2010). Canada takes a keen interest in the upholding of the Kimberley process because of its integral part of creating the diamond certifying process. Canada uses the Partnership Africa-Canada (PAC), a non- governmental organization, dedicated to ending the trade of “conflict” diamonds. PAC in 2009 recommended that Zimbabwe be suspended from the Kimberley Process as they violating the rules of accord. In a recent gesture of futility, the Canadian minister of foreign affairs Lawrence Cannon urged the Zimbabwean government to adhere to the Kimberley process.

Since Zimbabwe’s suspension in 2009 it has drawn substantial global controversy about the diamond fields. After investigation into the diamond producing regions of Zimbabwe it was discovered that the government was not adhering to the regulations set out by the Kimberly Process. Workers were being forced into labour, torture and killing of local civilians around the area of the Military controlled mines. The illegal control over the diamond mines is seen as “helping to prop up Robert Mugabe's repressive and violent regime and the military seems bent on keeping control of the Marange diamonds for their own personal needs, regardless of the needs of the local population” (PAC, 2009). Zimbabwe’s suspension from the process has enraged the octogenarian ruler and his cronies. They see the ban on diamonds from Zimbabwe as another tactic of the west to bring down Zimbabwe and enforce western ideals in the country.

There is overwhelming evidence that the government and military are systematically undermining the Kimberley Process. Recently, the sale of diamonds from disputed mine has been allowed. This mine “was blocked last year by the international regulator after it found that Zimbabwe had failed to comply with human rights standards” (The Times, 2010b). The government has spoken out against the Kimberley Process and seem to be disinterested in upholding the international standard. Even though Zimbabwe is a member of Kimberley Process the Minister of the Mines Obert Mpofu said that "We are going to benefit from our diamonds whether with the KP or not" (The Times, 2010b).

As a traditional middle power and one of the creators of the Kimberley Process Canada has taken the stance to bar Zimbabwe from the process. By barring them there is hope that larger companies and other diamond traders will not buy the diamonds, as they are not certified as conflict-free. Canada's involvement through the Kimberley Process is quintessential middle power action; they have joined forces with like-minded states to set an example for the diamond industry. However, this attempt at middlepowermanship has been ineffective. The Kimberley Processes is suffering and losing integrity, there is a "lack of political will to punish a country that condones violence and smuggling within its diamond industry. Such a failure is not only a massive blow to its credibility, but puts the entire process in jeopardy" (Campbell, 2009).

One of the driving forces behind the Kimberley Processes, Ian Smillie, the former director of PAC has become critical of its effects. He argues that "the whole point of the Kimberley Process was to make sure that diamonds were clean, [and] that they're not hurting people...When you see serious human rights abuses taking place in diamond fields then surely it's a no-brainer [that something is wrong]." (Campbell, 2009). Canada's involvement in the Kimberley Process is one of its most recent forays into middle power diplomacy. Its involvement in the creation of the certification scheme was essential. However, Mugabe and his ZANU- PF cronies are consistently undermining the once lauded process. "If there are no consequences to violating the Kimberley Process, what incentives do other nations have to comply?" (Campbell, 2009). The Kimberley Process is another example of Canada's all talk and little action behaviour. Despite the fact Canadians worked very hard to get the Kimberley process off the ground it has not been nearly as successful as had hoped.

The Zimbabwean government and military are not concerned with what the potential consequences of not adhering to the Kimberley Processes might be. The diamond industry in Zimbabwe exemplifies the rampant corruption and violence present under ZANU- PF. Mugabe emphasises the importance of the diamond industry to Zimbabwe's recovery, however, in the long term it is not that essential. It has been estimated that the diamond industry contributes only \$33 million USD per year to the economy (PAC,2009). "Zimbabwe is the test for the Kimberley Process to show the world it cares about human rights and is working to keep consumer confidence in the purity of diamonds" (PAC, 2009). This is an initiative that Canada can get behind to show its middle power and steadfast commitment to protecting human rights and democracy and upholding Canadian values. The Kimberley Process is a clear example of middle powers "utilizing and asserting themselves through international organizations, relying on the authority afforded [in] these institutions in order to manage and maintain the prevailing world order" (Jordaan, 2003: 169). By

creating and attempting to enforce a global protocol with regards to the diamond trade middle powers are trying to help keep consistency within the world order.

The diamond trade might seem like an insignificant theme when examining the crisis in Zimbabwe but in reality it is very important, not only for Canada but for also examining the crisis as a whole. What is occurring presently can be mirrored with the choice of sending troops to the DRC. Similar to the conflict in DRC, the government stands to profit by illegal activities. Through the diamond resources in the northwest ZANU-PF stands to profit greatly, upholding corruption and the standard of living which Mugabe and his cronies have become so used to. By Canada's involvement in the Kimberley Process they are trying to prevent history repeating itself. Even though the Kimberley process is not officially attached to the Canadian government it does represent an initiative which Canada is a part of. It also shows Canada's commitment as a middle power to try and uphold human rights.

Canada as a traditional middle power advocates human rights and democracy. Since trade sanctions with Zimbabwe do not impact the Canadian population directly, it easy for the public to support. The population agrees with basic human rights, equal access to goods and political rights, and assumes rather than understands the consequences on Zimbabwe. The Kimberley process is an example of how "the strength and/or legitimacy of [an international] organisation [has been] quickly undermined" (Jordaan, 2003: 170). Canada and other traditional middle powers had the intention of creating a more transparent protocol and safer way of mining diamonds. However, like many internationalist initiatives it has left Zimbabwe unable to deal with problems such as "starvation, growing inequality, environmental degradation" (Jordaan, 2003: 170). Canada's involvement in the Kimberley Processes is another example of its good intentions and little outcome.

4.6 Conclusion: Looking to Future, Where Has Canada Gone?

It is difficult to see where Canadian- Zimbabwean relations are headed in the future. Since Mugabe is vehemently anti- western there is "little room for negotiation on the bases of western- based conceptions of liberal rights and freedoms" (Black & Wilson, 2004: 41), and Harper will not change his policies unless he sees concrete change. At the World Economic Forum held in Davos 2010 "Tsvangirai said he had been told by Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper in a bilateral meeting at the WEF that the perception will remain "very negative" as long as Mugabe remains in

power” (Reuters, 2010). Unless the GNU can prove that there has been drastic improvement Harper will stand firm on his positioning against Zimbabwe.

Canada will continue in its (somewhat) middlepower role by orchestrating basic aid through CIDA and working with other multi-lateral bodies. Recently, Canada has decided its foreign aid will be mainly focused on South America and has significantly decreased its presence in Southern Africa. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has chosen a path towards “stimulating economic growth” (CIDA, 2010c) which means a lessening of focus on Africa as a whole. This has been characteristic of the current Conservative government’s initiatives and trying to bring relations closer to home, where more of an impact can be seen. Even former Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney argues that Canada is able to make a difference in Zimbabwe and that improving targeted assistance to southern Africa “makes sense” (Mulroney, 2008). Until Zimbabwe shows signs of major improvement in terms of electoral, governmental and humanitarian reform Canada will remain diligent on its current sanctions. However, the Canadian government tries to remain optimistic towards Zimbabwe, hoping that the government will continue to show signs of improvement so that sanctions can be lifted towards the country.

Canada’s future relationship with Africa as a whole is a large question mark, let alone Canada’s relationship with Zimbabwe. As years have passed less and less countries are on the receiving end of Canadian aid and development. In 2009 it was announced that only 20 countries would be the recipients of Canadian aid. Under previous governments, there were 14 countries in Africa who received aid from Canada but now that number has been stripped down to 7.⁶ The Harper government wants to turn its focus on “‘our neighbourhood’ in the western hemisphere” (Kinsman, 2008). This also means that many of the least developed countries in the world will not be receiving the ODA they so desperately need.

Both Canadians and Africans are concerned about where the partnership is headed in the future. Canadians have a history of investing in Africa and “despair how that the prime minister has publicly appeared to downgrade the very countries they have laboured to build” (Schram, 2010: 181). Other countries such as China are snatching all possibilities to invest in anywhere in Africa, even in Zimbabwe here it is extremely resource rich (Bassett, 2010). It is difficult to see why the government is pulling so much of its resources out of an entire continent when there is so much potential for return on investments.

⁶ The seven countries in Africa who are receiving ODA from Canada are: Sudan, Senegal, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique and Tanzania (CIDA, 2010c)

Botchwey (2010) suggests three reasons for Canada's lessening role in Africa: the shift in political landscape, the global economic crisis and a lessening of Canada's visibility in the global arena. All three themes have validity. Canada in the past has prided itself on a good reputation and promoting human rights and democracy. Currently, the government's focus has been turned inwards with a focus on monetary results. The declining economic position of Canada in the world plays into this, the rising unemployment rates at home makes the government wary of sending taxpayer's money elsewhere. Lastly, there has been a shift in political landscape. Even though both Liberals and Conservatives have played a role in the focus of foreign policy the current Conservative government is fast-tracking Canada to be one of the least generous countries in the world. With a freeze in spending the government will not embark on new and risky projects.

In the subsequent decades after the Second World War, the Canadian government was a keen voice for African issues, especially the Rhodesian question. Since that time both Liberal and Conservative governments' participation and investment in Africa has dwindled, despite some 'monumental' attempts to increase funding. It has been suggested that current Prime Minister Stephen Harper "takes little interest in Africa" (Schram, 2010: 182). This could be a result of a shaky minority government whose primary concern is with the United States and that has little knowledge or understanding of global issues (Schram, 2010: 182).

There is also the issue of Canadian public opinion. African issues with relation to Canadian opinion are broad and shallow- lots of vocalization but never a priority. Canadian opinion is often influenced by opinion in other countries, and if there is a moral issue involved the public tends to make demands that are disproportionate to the Canada's abilities. This was true in the 1980s under Mulroney, through the 1990s with Chrétien and is most certainly true now with Stephen Harper. Throughout his multilateral commitments such as NEPAD it seemed as if Chrétien did have an interest in Africa. Unfortunately there was neither the proper funding nor the strong public opinion to support his ideas.

By looking at Canada's ODA relative to the GDI (Graph 3) it is clear that its middle power position is declining steadily not only with regards to Zimbabwe, but also the rest of the developing world. The ODA ratio has steadily declined in the past 20 years. Throughout the Trudeau and Mulroney years Canada's ODA hovered around .5 percent; today it stands at about .32% (Bassett, 2010). Unfortunately, this number will only decrease from now on. Jean Chrétien promised to double aid to Africa by 2010, this has been completed and promptly frozen. Since the Conservative

government took over fewer countries have been recipients of aid. By the time this freeze has worked its way through the system the ratio will lie at .32% (less than half of the .7% goal). Canada's GNI is rising but the aid being given is not.

Looking at Canada's relationship with Zimbabwe exemplifies its declining status as a middle power. Once a country, who championed human rights, multilateralism and peace has fallen from its pedestal. With this in mind it makes Canada's future partnership with Africa bleaker. There is less funding going to the entire continent. Additionally, there is a long confusing bureaucratic backlog which further discourages initiatives. If it takes roughly 43 months for a project to be approved people will get frustrated and not want to use the once important body. Canada's future in Zimbabwe and the other 52 African countries is uncertain, there is little time, energy and money for CIDA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) to create a new plan or Africa (Schram, 2010: 186).

If the current government puts so little value in CIDA and the help it gives to those across the continent it will only be a matter of time before Canada's helpful reputation is lost. With the current government, there have not even been any symbolic gestures towards the African continent, furthering the growing pessimistic view of Canada. Historically Canada acted with the Commonwealth or the UN to promote change within Zimbabwe- something it could not do alone. Canada cannot be an independent variable in the Zimbabwe crisis but a leader of change and reform. The willingness or availability of other powers is crucial to our being able to do anything. Even with both the G8 and the G20 summits being held in Canada in the summer of 2010 there was little to no attention paid to Africa. It is almost impossible to see Canada's middle power status being regained any time soon. Its lacklustre commitments and declining middle power status have made them less relevant in the global order.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

The focus of this thesis was to examine Canada's evolution into middle power status and assess whether or not it has been upheld in the current global order. By using Jordaan's framework it is easy to see that Canada did at one point fit the role as a traditional middle power, but now falls short of fitting into the theoretical framework Jordaan created.

As Chapnick argues (2000), even in 1945 Canada might have overestimated the importance of its contribution to the world order. However, using some of the indicators outlined by Jordaan, between 1945 and 1957 Canada was genuinely important in terms of its relative standing economically, and also militarily. Canada cultivated alliance skills and made a very important contribution to the NATO alliance, in the Commonwealth and at the United Nations. Canada came to specialize in ending quarrels (among others) and boosting alliance spirits. There is no doubt that Canada championed the middle power persona in the post war era and through parts of the Cold War. Today, however, its place as a middle power is in doubt.

In the end, the decline of Canada's middle power status was inevitable. The government made the choices it did and only now people are asking why Canada no longer has the same political clout as it once did. The slowdown of the economy paired with the recovery of Europe, the choice to invest in universal healthcare and pensions refocused the country domestically, as opposed to internationally. The lack of military funding led to a decreased capacity for peacekeeping. The financial retrenchment of the 1990s had repercussions for the military and ODA. This impacted the hard and soft power Canada was able to exert in the world order. Canada's involvement in Zimbabwe illustrates its waning middle power behaviour. Canada once was the only white member of the Commonwealth arguing for better governance in Rhodesia. Today, Canada has stood back and barely contributes to trying to resolve the devastating crisis in Zimbabwe. The global order is shifting and Canada can no longer sit comfortably in the middle. Many of the countries who relied on Canadian assistance to maintain that order are no longer looking to Canada for help.

The question remains, where is Canada going? Unfortunately it is not headed in the direction of a traditional middle power. Canada has shifted its development policies to focus within the Americas as opposed to the least developed countries in other parts of the world. It is increasingly clear that there is an economic agenda underneath its development policies, as opposed to being a helpful

fixer. In the eyes of many Canadians, Canada is the beacon of good governance while remaining “generous, affluent, engaged and important, that it is fulfilling its promise in the world” (Cohen, 2003:21). This perception of the traditional middle power has become an outdated legacy.

Similarly, the subject of whether or not Canada can be considered a traditional middle power has become increasingly relevant, especially in recent years, as Canada has made attempts to reassert itself on the world stage. Canada as a member of many multi-lateral bodies has tried to show its middle power influence, by hosting the G8/20 summits in 2010 Canada has proven that it is not up to fulfilling the role. With the recent failure of Canada to gain a coveted seat on the Security Council, Stephen Harper is faced with a difficult predicament. He either needs to “acknowledge this rebuke from the global community and rethink how his government presents Canada to the world, or ignore it and accept an outsider status unique in this country’s history” (Ibbitson & Slater, 2010).

The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the thesis putting forward some of the main points discussed. The second part of this chapter traces the progression of the thesis, from the formulation of the research question, to examining the different theories of middle powers, to the final analysis. Finally, recommendations for further research are then advanced.

5.2 Progression

The thesis progressed from the initial question of whether or not Canada can still be considered a middle power. The first step to answering the question began with an investigation into different concepts of middle power theory. After this each concept’s validity was examined, based on their strengths and weaknesses. The strongest middle power theory was chosen as a base of analysis. This theory, presented by Eduard Jordaan, gave the best platform for further research. Many of the other middle power theories were not effective in analyzing Canada’s middle power status, especially when using Zimbabwe as a case study. Some of the theories could not be transposed on either a global scale, or a smaller specific scale. Similarly, these older theories of middlepowermanship did not take into account the changing global order to accommodate emerging middle powers. After understanding middle power theory it became much easier to contextualize the emergence of middle power status and understand why they are important in the world order.

This led to the application of Jordaan’s middle power theory to Canada, looking at specific

elements which have contributed to Canada's emergence as a middle power in the post war era. Once the main characteristics of Canadian middlepowermanship were identified it became easier to direct the research towards dissecting Canadian middle power status in the 21st century. Elements of hard and soft power were reoccurring within the literature; they were included and applied to middle power theory to understand how elements of both are necessary to uphold middle power status.

Three themes were then chosen to show exactly how and why Canada's middle power status has been declining over the past decades, starting with the economy. The economic slowdown that Canada experienced in the 1970s paired with the introduction of universal healthcare helped lessen its middle power status. This slowdown had ripple effects all over the Canadian government; the military was receiving less money and as a result was not able to participate in as many peacekeeping missions as before. When Canada did participate in two missions in the 1990s they were understaffed and underfunded and both missions turned out to be catastrophic endeavours. Another ripple effect took place in Canada's ODA; over the past decades (Graph 3) Canada has been contributing less and less when compared to other traditional middle powers. These factors contributed to the waning of Canada's hard and soft power- two essential elements for upholding the middle power persona.

The final step in the research began with investigating Canada's relationship with Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. While its position in the world order was on the rise, Canada was able to harness its newly found power in the global order to promote change and human rights especially through the Commonwealth. Post independence, Canada supported Zimbabwean initiatives, such as denouncing apartheid in South Africa or Prime Minister Mulroney visiting Zimbabwe in 1987. When the country slid into a state of crisis Canada did not adopt its role as a helpful fixer for those in need, by enacting targeted sanctions against the ZANU- PF. The Canadian government did not use its middle power in global bodies or on its own to help people caught in the middle.

Through the research done on Canadian- Zimbabwean relations in the 20th and 21st century it became increasingly evident that Canada was no longer able to uphold its middle power position. Despite the role the Canadian government worked so hard to build up throughout the 1960s the government has not been able to maintain its middle power status. By choosing Zimbabwe as the focal point of research, it clearly shows the evolution of how Canada was able to rise to middle power status and then its subsequent decline.

The relationship shared between Canada and Zimbabwe exemplifies the decline in Canada's middle power status. Canada was once very involved and vocal within the Commonwealth to support the Zimbabwean cause. But in recent years the Canadian government has done less to help the people in Zimbabwe as the crisis has become more severe. By passing sanctions, and withdrawing ODA the Canadian government has separated itself from the crisis. Further research shows that Canada has committed less and less to nations who are in the direst need; instead ODA has been targeted to 20 nations mostly within the western hemisphere. Canada's relationship with Zimbabwe shows that Canada can no longer commit itself to upholding the middle power status it worked so hard to solidify. This led to the conclusion that Canada can no longer be considered a traditional middle power.

5.3 Areas for Further Investigation

Questioning Canada's role as a traditional middle power is an emerging trend that goes against decades of scholarship in Canada (Chapnick, 2000). By using Jordaan's framework it becomes clear that Canada's middle power status has been on a steady decline for a long time. However, by using the same theoretical framework, the research also confirms that Canada was in fact, once a middle power. The thesis incorporates both new and old analysis to show the evolution of Canadian middlepowermanship.

The results of the research show that Canada can no longer be viewed as a traditional middle power. This fact impacts the way in which Canada is classified and raises further questions of where exactly it fits in the world order. Based on Jordaan's theory Canada does not possess any of the attributes of an emerging middle power. On the other hand, Canada is losing many of its characteristics which Jordaan points out are essential for a traditional middle power. This opens up a space for further research- finding out where Canada fits in the 21st century global order. By further examining middle power theory (both emerging and traditional), might shed some light on where Canada's current and future standing as a middle power might lie. Also, a more in-depth investigation to the debates surrounding the idea of emerging middle powers and asking what role in the global order they play would further strengthen the paper.

When examining Canada's waning middle power role, future research should focus exclusively on Canada's roles within multi-lateral bodies and processes, such as the Commonwealth, G20, the UN

or the Kimberley Process. Multi-lateral bodies are a good example of how the government reacts to issues within a controlled environment and implements its policies through another body. By examining which issues a country gets involved in within a global body, especially issues which do not directly pertain to that country can gauge a nations commitment to middle power initiatives. Canada's role in the creation of the Responsibility to Protect, the set of principles that aims to enforce a global set of responsibilities, in the area of human security would be another valuable avenue to explore as an example of Canada's commitment to middlepowermanship. This thesis provides a good overview of Canada's relationship with Zimbabwe through many different facets of interaction, but it would be stronger (if space permitted) if it were based on an in-depth examination of one or two multi-lateral bodies such as the Commonwealth and the Kimberley Process.

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