


THE MARK OF A SILENT LANGUAGE

The way the body-mind draws

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ABSTRACT

The thesis deals with the notion that individuation in drawing provides visible evidence of experiential cognition as embodied action. It asserts that trait as enaction signifies constructive and inventive processes that involve the body-mind. Trait emerges as non-representationist, non-expressive component of drawing that marks the pre-conceptual as conceptual. Therefore, drawing functions as a complex interface between drafter and world that unifies antinomies such as inside and outside; convention and invention; remoteness and intimacy; body and mind; and subject and object.

The thesis outlines drawing as a self-reflexive research process that constructs and invents. An understanding of trait as invention, the thesis proposes, can aid the drawing facilitator at higher education level to develop individual student drafters' creativity. The thesis therefore argues for a form of drawing facilitation that is responsive to the complex interaction between the self and the world. Responsive mediation develops and celebrates diversity in socio-cultural heritage, personal history, and individual differences.

OPSOMMING

Die idee dat verpersoonlikte trekke in tekenkuns sigbare aanduiding van enaktiewe vergestaltung van kognisie is, vorm die onderwerp van hierdie tesis. Die tesis stel dit dat vergestaltende ervaringskognisie, as die tekenaar se ervaringsbetrokkenheid, geïndividueerde begrip, vaardigheid, sintese en betekenisvorming moontlik maak en ontwikkel. Verpersoonlikte trekke in tekenkuns blyk van non-representatiewe en non-ekspressiewe oorsprong te wees aldaar dit die pre-konseptuele as die konseptuele merk. Dit ondersteun die gedagte dat tekenkuns as 'n komplekse koppelvlak tussen tekenaar en omwêreld funksioneer. As koppelvlak word die tekenkuns verwesenlik as 'n sigbare samevloeiing van dualiteite soos binne en buite, die gewone en verdigting, afstand en intimiteit, subjek en objek, liggaam en gees.

Ingevolge 'n enaktiewe beskouing van die tekenkuns kan die tekenhandeling beskryf word as 'n selfrefleksiewe navorsingsproses wat kreatiwiteit ondersteun. Sodanige beskouing van die tekenkuns, lui die argument, kan die fasiliteerder op 'n hoër onderwysvlak help om individuele tekenstudente se kreatiwiteit te bevorder. Daaruit vloei die voorstel vir 'n vorm van fasilitering wat gevoelig is vir die ingewikkelde interaksie tussen die self en die omgewing. 'n Vorm van mediasie wat dit in ag neem, skep nie alleen ruimte vir diversiteit wat betref sosio-kulturele herkoms, persoonlike geskiedenis en individuele verskille nie, maar ontwikkel en vier ook dié soort diversiteit.

Dedication

To Frans

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to my supervisor, Professor Lize van Robbroeck, for her generous support and thoughtful guidance.

CONTENTS PAGE

Preface	1
Introduction	7
Problem statement and goals	7
Methodology and Theoretical framework	10
Theoretical point of departure	26
Chapter Layout	27
Chapter One	
Facades: emulation or self-originativity	32
1.1 Problems in drawing facilitation	33
1.2 Focus: trait	40
1.3 Contemporary discourse in drawing	47
1.4 Conclusions	68
Chapter Two	
I mark self: interaction and enaction	78
2.1 The framework: definitions and relationships	79
2.2 A transcending and generative framework	89
2.3 The unconscious: habitus as a facility that merges antimonies	95
2.4 Enaction	100
2.5 Reversibility	102
2.6 Converging theories	107
2.7 Practice, temporality, spatiality	108
2.8 Self as trait	109
2.9 Conclusions	110
Chapter Three	
A measure between: self as trait trait as self	114
3.1 Trait	114
3.2 Gesture as preverbal symbolicity in drawn gesture	116
3.3 The self	121
3.4 Drawing as interface	125
3.5 Development and meaning	126
3.6 Trait as gesture	127
3.7 Stasis	129
3.8 Emulation versus enaction	129
3.9 Facilitation: passage from unknowingness to knowingness	130
3.10 Trait and process	131

Chapter Four	
I mark self and self marks I: circular pathways	133
4.1 A misleading divide in drawing	134
4.2 Pathways	137
4.3 Integration of pathways with habitus, enaction, and the transcendental	149
4.4 Conclusions relating to facilitation	161
Chapter Five	
Trait as invention	164
5.1 A pathway of development: from sight to vision	165
5.1.1 Memory	165
5.1.2 The turning point: conjecture and invention	166
5.1.3 Trait as field of observation	168
5.1.4 Two possible pathways	169
5.1.5 Conjecture of the invisible	174
5.1.6 Visibility and invisibility: a generative duel	175
5.1.7 Lateral mutuality as impetus	179
5.2 Conclusions	184
5.3 Overarching conclusion: The genesis of trait	185
Chapter Six	
To show the self: auto-deixis	186
6.1 Auto-deixis as concept: a desire to show self	187
6.2 The concepts and processes that frame auto-deictic drawing	189
6.3 The auto-deictic founding perception	200
6.4 Applications	207
6.5 The auto-deictic drawing process as a research process	217
6.6 A comparison between auto-deictic drawing and emulation	224
6.7 Overarching conclusions: The significance of trait	225
Chapter Seven	
The facilitation of drawing: Conclusion	227
7.1 A facilitatory framework	227
Post script	238
Bibliography	239

Addenda

Addendum A: Illustrations: Practice

List of illustrations

Addendum B: Glossary

Illustrations in text

Illustration i(a)

Thokozani Mpotsha. Untitled. 2009.

42

Illustration i(b)

Nathan Gates. Untitled. 2008.

42

Illustration ii

Anne-Marie Schneider. *Vertige d'Amour*. 2005.

42

THE MARK OF A SILENT LANGUAGE: THE WAY THE BODY-MIND¹ DRAWS.

PREFACE

The language of drawing is a quiet language, its silence borne by the muteness of gesture. While distinct from the clamour of voice and speech, it corresponds to these in source and in resource, springing, like speech, from our interaction with the world. It exceeds word in effectiveness since, while it functions equally well to denote and connote meaning with grace and eloquence, revealing the mind's extensive range of perceptualising and conceptualising capabilities, it is, unlike words, capable of disclosing the unsayable.

If drawing, as medium for the creation of metaphor, allegory, analogy, or homology, is a product of the versatility of the human mind, its genesis deserves regard. In an educational context, drawing demands understanding of the range of visual expression it can produce at every phase of its development. In this thesis, I propose that drawing interfaces between soma, intellect, emotion, psyche, and environment, always offering the potential for developing a personalised, yet diverse, grapheme in making sense of lived 'reality'. The thesis reveals, tracks, and documents those conductive paths that intermediate between the drafter, her world, and drawing. This implies that the language of drawing is a language of individuation,² speaking of the self and its personal history, milieu and socialisation, aesthetic, knowledge, understanding, and experience.³ Through these processes, I

¹ This term dispels a mind and body dualism, in which mind is regarded as superior to body. I explain this in more detail under 'body-mind', 'non-dualist', and 'non-representationist' in the Glossary (Addendum B) and also in Chapters 1 & 2.

² As I explain in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B), I apply 'individuation' consistently to suggest the developmental dynamics and generative modes in which a drafter unconsciously maintains identity in drawing and which defines difference between the drawings of two or more drafters.

³ 'Experience', in this context, refers to a personalised history of social and cultural interactivity that contributes to human understanding of lived 'reality' and that, as I will argue, would ultimately

argue, it also promises navigation across cultures, class, and gender in a far more accessible way than spoken language. As a visible text of individuation, drawing can provide an efficient vehicle for those interactive dynamics that communicate across social and cultural boundaries.

A viewing audience that stringently adheres to an 'ideal' vision (sourced from a single culture), as the only existing standard for appraising drawing, will disregard the numerous and compounded significations of a diverse range of individual consciousness and their discrete chapters of development. Likewise, in an educational context, an assessor who rigidly adheres to her own vision and abilities as the only existing measures for evaluating the drawings of a diverse range of drafters⁴ will become blind to the multiple significations that accompany individualised experience in drawing.⁵ I propose that a teacher who perpetuates emulative frameworks hinders the creative cerebration that drawing facilitates – a creativity that, I argue, creates and renews its own norms continuously and dynamically.

While evaluation of drawing in the institutional context is not my primary concern, the thesis nonetheless points at a central problematic in the ways we teach drawing at tertiary institutions. I propose that limited and conventionalised expectations manifest in the criteria that we employ when we evaluate drawing. Some contentious issues regarding evaluation are inconsistencies and discrepancies between the expectations of educators and those of student drafters.⁶ Situations in which the particular aesthetic sensibility of an examiner functions as a closed

contribute to the conception of form in a durational drawing process. See also 'Experience' in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B).

⁴ I apply the word 'drafter' consistently throughout the thesis to denote a person who draws. I use it to avoid the gender specific discrimination suggested by 'draftsman', and to avoid the awkwardness of the neutral but lengthy 'draftsperson'.

⁵ 'Experience' suggests the "real-time process" that Norman Bryson (1983: 117) discusses in *The Gaze and the Glance*. I argue in the thesis that the drafter's experiencing of drawing contributes to her conception of form "as matter in process ... the impress on matter of the body's internal energy, in the mobility and vibrancy of its somatic rhythms; the body of labour, of material practice" (Bryson. 1983: 131). See also 'Experience' in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B).

⁶ Robert Sternberg (1997: 12) describes a similar discrepancy between the Learning and Thinking Styles of learners and teachers, "As a society, we repeatedly confuse styles with abilities, resulting in individual differences that are really due to styles being viewed as due to abilities. The result is that people whose styles don't match the expectations of their parents, spouse or lover, colleagues, or boss are derogated for all the wrong reasons. What is seen as stupidity or intransigence may actually be nothing more than the style of another".

aesthetic system⁷ (and, by extension, knowledge system) that pre-determines criteria for evaluating drawing, could have unfortunate results. Not the least of these is that students tend to suppress individuated self-consciousness and distinctiveness in gestural expression, resulting in the concomitant suppression of the desire to experience first hand, to experiment, or to explore by investigating varied options. Students prefer, in fact seek out, to work according to a single canon, conveniently provided by the assessors' regular critique⁸ on their work, in which she articulates her own restrictive preferences, which results in the misconception amongst students that only one 'correct' manner of working is acceptable. Students quickly reconstruct this perceived 'correct' manner of working into a convenient formula that guarantees success and high marks.⁹ This type of negative dynamic inevitably becomes a counterproductive force in a learning process where actualisation of individuated consciousness, creativity, versatility, and diversity¹⁰ are essential goals; indeed the very goals any balanced drawing programme should nurture.

It is my opinion that, if applied as a closed system,¹¹ normative¹² evaluation can become a form of exclusion, which perpetuates a relentless elimination of diverse aesthetic or cultural input. Evaluation that excludes in this way, upholds formulae for successful performance in the drawing studio. Such a situation leads to institutionalised dogma and mannerisms that obstruct rather than advance the development of creativity in a diverse student profile. This leads to stagnation and persistent frustration for those students of drawing who still find themselves categorised not only as 'below standard', and also implicates non-conforming students as 'other'. In such cases, 'the other' is not necessarily distinguished according

⁷ Bourdieu (1996: 286) explains this problem with reference to the art analyst, "This means that they [the analyst] effect, unwittingly, a universalization of the particular case, and in the same way constitute a particular experience, situated and dated, of the work of art as a transhistoric norm of all artistic perception". In the context of this thesis, I relate the notion to evaluators or examiners of art in educational institutions. Note that Bourdieu contrasts 'particular experience' with 'norm'.

⁸ By this, I do not shun 'in general' critique of the work of student drafters. I am, however, critical of critique that dictates canonised method, or that dictates at all.

⁹ I must point out that I refer here to my subjective experience. If these observations assume negative criticism, it is intended only towards my own facilitatory experiences and myself. I elaborate on these observations in Chapter 1.

¹⁰ Variability in form, quality, appearance. See also the Glossary of key words (Addendum B).

¹¹ 'Closed' not only as an assessor- or institution-centred aesthetic, but also as a system of knowledge and skills.

¹² Where an assessor- or institution-centred aesthetic (rather than drawing and/or drafter-centred learning) serves as a norm against which the assessor formulates criteria and evaluates drawings.

to race,¹³ but according to the particularities and individuation of their style language in drawing. Divergences between the assessor's enclosed expectations and those of the student drafter often determine the judgement. Divergence, in this context, pertains to the difference¹⁴ between the stasis of enclosure and the dynamic and sanguinity of disclosure.

A more encompassing form of instructional mediation¹⁵ that accommodates a varied spectrum of cultural input has become necessary for additional reasons. The increasingly diverse student profile that is becoming the norm in university art programmes is also potentially a fertile source for the advancement of more visual art forms and the development of a diversified identity in our national visual art expression. To accomplish this, it would be necessary to revisit the potential of the art of drawing as an intermediary that influences emergent visual art. The cultivation of derivative or emulative drawing practices sacrifices the ability to conceptualise visually through drawing, and reflects institutionalised expediency at the cost of student drafters. If not encouraged to make connections between the varied devices and the underlying dynamics immanent in the act of drawing – between experience and thought – student drafters will acquire little ability to synthesise; they will obtain minimal analytical or critical skills, and will fail to understand or create even the most basic dimensions of connotative meaning attainable in drawing. These abilities are essential to visual literacy in the higher educational context of extended visual art practices.

The extent to which first year university students lack proficiency¹⁶ in drawing is evident in the drawings that applicants submit annually for admission to this

¹³ Although race, as signified through socio-cultural norms in South Africa, is often implicated.

¹⁴ I apply the word 'Difference' to suggest its general meaning as something displaying "characteristics that distinguishes it from another" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. 1979: 315), rather than intending any philosophical connotations.

¹⁵ I use the word 'mediation' to deliberately imply the role of a drawing teacher as someone who functions in an intermediary fashion between the student and her drawing practice, a teacher who facilitates, rather than dictates. Therefore, I often use the terms 'mediator' or 'facilitator' to replace 'teacher' or 'lecturer'. See 'mediation' and 'facilitation' in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B).

¹⁶ Given the diversity of first year visual arts students in South Africa, in the context of this thesis, 'proficiency' denotes meaning as wide as the grace of any god. It enfolds all individual and collective levels of competences that could be subjectively associated with and objectively aligned to all different levels of knowledge, intelligence, ability, and skill as these attributes relate to age and socio-cultural background.

university's¹⁷ art programme. These drawings show that photographic and digital images often enjoy preference as source material. The admission portfolios also display an indiscriminate repetition of content, style, and manner and copying or tracing of existing images in drawing (and other visual art disciplines) as generally accepted practice. Apparently, current systems of assessment in schools legitimise such practices to the extent that they become the norm. To my mind, they represent poor substitutes for the gradual accrual of convincing drawing skill, which is a far more difficult and demanding process both in facilitation¹⁸ and in execution. Unfortunately, teachers allow these examples of emulative practices in drawing before the individual drafter attains a reasonable degree of skill.

Apart from the fact that such an approach to teaching displays indifference towards drawing's potential function as a key initiator of individuated visuality and its potential significance, I also perceive it as an enduring disregard for the notion that the process of learning to draw is centred in the individual drafter. Furthermore, it disregards those processes and dynamics that inform not only skills-development in drawing, but also creativity in the visual arts domain.

The armature of this study comprises the student drafter, her drawing and her world, and the relationship between them. The individual student is the centre of cognition and perception in this relationship and, therefore, necessarily also central in her development in drawing. Issues around individuation and its import in reflexivity¹⁹ are clearly also relevant. An indisputable relationship between individuation and development suggests generative interactivity²⁰ as central aspect of drawing. In an educational environment, acknowledgement and understanding of the entire progressive path of interactivity that operates between an encompassing socio-cultural space (world) as source and resource, the drafter, and the

¹⁷ Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa.

¹⁸ The term 'Facilitation' replaces 'teaching' in the educational system known as 'Outcomes Based Education'. Since my intention is not necessarily to propose the principles of this specific educational system as ideal, I use 'facilitation', 'mediation', and 'teaching' interchangeably. Please refer to 'facilitation' and 'mediation' in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B).

¹⁹ *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (1979: 964) explains the word as the concept of being "directed or turned back on itself", and "relating to, characterised by, or being a relation that exists between an entity and itself". Please refer to the Glossary of key words (Addendum B) for further explanations of its usage in the context of this thesis.

²⁰ I intend the meaning of 'interaction' as it is explained in *WNCD* (1979: 596), namely as "a mutual or reciprocal action or influence". Please refer to the Glossary of key words (Addendum B) for an indication of the evolution of this word's meaning in the context of this thesis.

cerebrative²¹ processes behind her particular drawing mark, emerges as a crucial concern. As I will explain in the Introduction, this armature delineates the scope and context of the inquiry. The difference between an emulative and a reflexive framework for the teaching of drawing outlines the central problematic that the thesis deals with.

²¹ Synonym for generative. I apply the two words interchangeably through-out the thesis.

INTRODUCTION

Problem statement and goals

Problem

As an experienced drawing teacher, I have come to believe that the legitimisation of emulated style language in drawing represents a problematic foundation for the development of drawing as a constructive rather than mimetic process. I argue that, for the art of drawing to accomplish its key functions as generator of creative ability and an efficient *visuality*,²² its teaching requires the acknowledgement and implicit harnessing of individuation in drawing. This problem underscores the principal questions that I pose: Where do we find the genesis of individuation (trait) and why would its genesis be of any consequence in the drawing of student drafters? What are the processes that give body to trait and what are the processes that erode it? Does trait hold any significance for the development of creativity or skills-development in drawing?

Focus

The problem statement poses a key concept, namely individuation in drawing (trait), which becomes the focus of this inquiry. Individuation in students' drawing entails personalised stylistic aspects that reveal as visual 'difference' between the works of individual student-drafters (see **Addendum A, Illustration 3, and Illustrations i(a) & i(b) in Chapter 1**). I explain my perception of individuation in drawing in Chapter 1.

Scope

In order to understand the origin of trait in drawing, I must form an understanding of how and why drafters register, process, construct, and represent *differently*: in other words, why they deviate even from their own preferred ways of drawing. To my mind, these questions point primarily to those processes of perception, conception, and synthesis *through practice* that could also possibly underscore unpremeditated drawing form (trait) and conversion of the gestic into visible form that drawing

²² 'Visuality' refers to the ability to convert understanding, observation, and experience, whether real or imagined, concrete, abstract, material, or immaterial, into visual form.

facilitates. These processes therefore determine the scope of the study and delimit discussions to the originative and formative aspects of drawing-trait. Discussions largely exclude the meaning- or language-related aspects of trait, which would involve its symbolicity, connotative, and semiotic value. I do not deny or refute the inseparability between trait's symbolicity and its originativity, but the thesis does not enter into, for example, analyses or descriptive dissections of style languages, since the language of trace²³ as representation would merit enough material for a second thesis.

In summary, the pervasive appearance of trait in the drawing of students defines the scope of the *style-related* categories of drawing that I relate. This scope is encompassing – it does not isolate, nor fixate only on, for example, observational drawing, or only on imaginative drawing. With the exception of two instances (*Illustration ii*, and **Illustration 10 in Addendum A**), I limit my discussion of specific drawings to the scope that student drawing offers and then only to selected drawings that I obtained from the drawing programmes that I teach.

Goals

Given the central problem, and its focus, an imperative of the study, then, is to explore the above-mentioned processes of perception, practice, and production that support and realise individuation in drawing. I presume that those interactivities of the conscious and unconscious that seat perception also seat ability and creativity and this notion suggests another imperative of the study. I set as overarching goal an exploration of the relationship between individuation in drawing (trait) and the development of skill in drawing, as well as the development of creativity.

Individuation in drawing consistently stands as one tier in more relationships, because the notion of difference in drawing suggests facilitatory acknowledgement of diversity in both the student-drafters' personal histories and socio-cultural backgrounds, as well as in the experiential cognition that constitutes individuated visual registration and drafteric construct during the act. Further aims, therefore, are

²³ Drawing marks. Refer to the Glossary (Addendum B), (under 'trace' and 'trait') for further explanations regarding the distinctions I make.

to explore the role that the individual drafter's current and historical socio-cultural engagement plays in her experiential cognition in drawing.

In a tertiary educational context, these goals necessitate the exploration of a form of facilitatory mediation that would bring the potential of individuation in drawing to fruition. The 'potential of individuation' – the significance of trait – that which its materialisation involves, but can also conceal or erode, is one of the main concerns of this thesis. I aim to find not so much a new way of drawing, or a new programme for teaching drawing, as an effective approach to its facilitation that would promote and maximise creativity. It follows from this that I should consider an instructional method that could indirectly *employ* individuation in drawing,²⁴ provided the thesis finds the significance of trait.

Rationale

I demarcate individuation in drawing as object of study with a view to finding an appropriate approach for the facilitation of drawing on tertiary educational level – an approach that would be encompassing insofar it effectively reaches a diverse student profile. I anticipate that such an approach potentially would embrace not only the diversity that individuated drawing implies, but also diversity in relation to socio-cultural background. Diversity – in more than one sense of the word – remains a loaded issue in South Africa. Notwithstanding, a diverse student profile that represents a wide range of socio-cultural origin continues to necessitate, for example, shifts in the assessment of portfolios that students annually submit for admission to tertiary level courses in the visual arts. From experience, I know that such shifts are not forthcoming as a matter of course, while they remain essential to the administrative systems that facilitate admission, which in the South African milieu also serve socio-cultural representativity in the tertiary student profile.

An implication that flows from the goals I set out above, is that the acknowledgement of what is often called 'a personal voice' (trait) in drawing can support culturally diverse students in not only developing creativity, but also in

²⁴ It must be noted, however, that The Art of Drawing, as knowledge discipline, does not 'contain' individuation as concrete and explicit subject content and that I do not intend articulating it as such. In any form of mediation, individuation is either encouraged or discouraged.

accomplishing recognition of their full status and potency as drafters. The implications of this idea in the context of a culturally diverse student profile could be significant.

Furthermore, if the originative processes of personalisation in drawing produce *unforeseeable* form (given a blind, yet individuated hand in their emergence), I argue that they also will not repeat the norms that institutionalised style poses, nor will they necessarily obey the restraints of acceptability in any context. The study, therefore, also implies individuation as a form of deviation from institutional norm that challenges its constancy, while bringing renewal.

Context

The context of my delineations, which entails first year level of tertiary studies, implies a particularly susceptible phase in the development of drawing ability for the rebellious nature of individuated drawing to be effective. All South African first year students, although diverse in socio-cultural background and origin, have a number of disadvantages in common. An unexplained, hidden and general purpose of the first year projects (**Addendum A, Illustrations 1-6, 8 & 9**) is to break through those forms of acceptable drawing that got them through high school and admitted into higher art education. This happens at a time when all first year student drafters are equal in the sense that they share total unfamiliarity with the course content that I offer, with the demands of the course, with the medians of a new institution, and with each other's abilities. Another undisclosed purpose – and one that flows from this stripped state that renders all equally vulnerable – pertains to the construction of a road that leads to discovery of a personal voice in their drawing. Notwithstanding their various cultural or educational backgrounds, drawing habits, and ingrained aesthetic, drawing ability or prior skill and learning, all perform on a clean slate. Such a clean slate also enhances their potential receptiveness.

Methodology and the theoretical framework

The goals that I set above indicate three fields of study, namely drawing, philosophy, and sociology that could provide material appropriate to the problem.

These divergent fields of study suggest the employment of research methods that interrelate and complement each other – in other words, an interactive methodology (Maxwell. 1994). In the following section, I list the fields of study that I select for this purpose, with the exception of drawing, which I discuss later. I explain what I select from the fields of study that do not fall within the visual arts domain of knowledge. I explain how I perceive their involvement to function in generating reflection and discussion in relation to the constructive processes of drawing.

Philosophy

The directness of drawing – a practice that necessarily involves and utters sensory, somatic, intellectual, and psychological experiencing – resonates in some of the expositions that both phenomenological and cognitivist philosophies dealing with perception offer. Some of the expositions of phenomenology and cognitivism reflect on the ways in which things are presented in perception. In other words, they deal primarily with direct human perceptual experiencing of the world (Mautner. 2005: 464), which intones *experiential* cognition and, consequently, enaction²⁵. In this field, I have chosen to concentrate on Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a phenomenologist, and Francisco Varela, a cognitivist, for reasons that I discuss in due course.

Sociology

To my mind, it is impossible to ignore the irretrievable involvement of historical, socio-cultural, and lived-world mediation in perception and in experiential cognition, and therefore by extension, in drawing. This notion justifies exploration of the related expositions that sociology offers. In this field, I have chosen to concentrate on Pierre Bourdieu, a sociologist.

Rationale for adopting an interactive methodology

The reasons for adopting these diverse fields to compose a framework are simple. Although none of the relevant landmark texts offered me a pertinent explanation of the origin of *trait per se* during my preparatory research, intersections between their

²⁵ Francisco Varela (1992: 173): “The enactionist approach consists of two points: (1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided”. It is necessary to distinguish between ‘enactment’ and ‘enaction’. ‘Enaction’ involves the direct utterance that a conflation between action and perception brings forth and it is non-representational. ‘Enactment’, a different concept, suggests a pre-existing ‘script’ – that of personal, societal, or cultural code and memory – that interferes also during enaction and that is representational, or interpretational.

various contributions regarding perceptual processes in practices hold potential answers to the central questions. Bourdieu, for example, claims the origin of *the self* in habitus, which leads me to speculate that the individual self, in complicity with the particularities of her embodied dispositional make-up, could plausibly shape trait in drawing. A possible inseparable tie between the individual self and the dispositions she expresses *during* her practices emerges as a pivotal notion that leads to Varela's notion of the self-as-being versus the self-as-nothing. The complexity of such ties soon becomes evident and they circle out to incorporate a distinction between representationist and non-representationist concepts, as well as between a dualist and non-dualist understanding of body and mind.

Moreover, habitus enfolds the embodied self and her enactions, concepts that Francisco Varela focuses on and that represent his contribution to finding the origin of trait. In particular, disposition enfolds embodiment, while dispositional practice in part relates to enaction, all of which indicate the complex unions of trait's originative playing grounds. The alignment of their theories with the terms of psychology, leads Bourdieu and Varela to confirm that habitus and enaction function in the unconscious, rather than only in the conscious. Therefore, the seemingly unconscious, unthinking and almost automatic way in which trait irrupts in drawing promises to be explained by habitus, embodiment, and enaction, which both support self-originativity, thus supporting a close tie between the self and drawing trait. I consolidate this close tie in Chapter 3.

As such, an interactive methodology generates insights that come from the process of finding some intersections between Bourdieu and Varela's thinking. Because such insights can be unexpected, they also challenge the pre-planned structuring of the thesis and can therefore be valued for their generativity. In the end, these intersections also support the collaborative and unifying role of drawing (as labour) between drafter, world, and experience. Hence, the tripartite approach, as well as the emphasis on theoretical intersections and convergences.

At the same time, although not overtly, I perceive the selected landmark texts to also plot a path towards postmodernist thinking where Jacques Derrida (1993)

pertinently offers an exposition on the origin of drawing, which casts light on the origin of trait (as I perceive it).

An interactive methodology

My employment of an interactive methodology (Maxwell, 1994) firstly entails a selective extraction of salient aspects from the above-mentioned fields, such as cognition, perception, and societal interaction. As becomes clear in my brief demonstration above under *Rationale for adopting an interactive methodology*, I relate intersections between these fields to drawing in order to articulate my understanding of drawing's constructive processes. Therefore, the methodology also entails a close reading of contemporary discourses in drawing that concern visual perception and conception, and the effects that societal interaction has on drawing's constructive facilities.

Finally, the methodology entails reflection on and consideration of drawing practice that I indirectly draw from my drawing practices (as a more tacit and perceptive source of knowledge) and more explicitly derive from my teaching experience. In this leg of the methods I combine, students' drawings play a key role, which I explain later in the Introduction. I largely rely on my experiential knowledge of drawing in a self-reflexive fashion, a reliance that determines decision-making. 'Relating' the above-mentioned salient and intersecting aspects involves their 'superimposition' on the act of drawing in order to begin to understand the individual drafter's experiential engagement with the world.

A three-tiered methodology allows a recursive²⁶ accrual of understanding (through inevitable yet incremental repetition) of those theories dealing with the interactionist relationship between individual (drafter), environment (world), and practice (drawing).

As a theoretical framework, my selections from philosophy and sociology reference a number of theories with interactionism as common denominator, which supports the play and movement between the respective members in such a relationship. Self-reflexivity and the notion of interactivity central to it become possible in such a

²⁶ Please refer to the Glossary, Addendum B.

framework. These facilities both determine and regulate the three-tiered methodology, because it supports *while* it structures them. In this sense, the methodology resembles the process of drawing, which accrues to reveal and does not spurn decentred reiteration, because with each echo exponential, if unpredictable, proliferation ensues. It does so *not* with the stripped articulation of positivist and scientific texts, nor with the linear and logical elegance of a philosophical text, nor with the orderly eloquence of academic rigour. Rather, the method actively engages *and* functions with the disruptive labours of revelatory accumulation. Such accumulation inevitably involves fragmentation and discontinuity, yet its durational harnessing is generative. This implies that the method stacks, collapses into each other, and layers those conventions of academic writing that order, systemise, categorise, and reduce. I deliberately employ the methods of drawing, which coat and recoat to gain nuance and palimpsest.

An interactive methodology necessarily makes for an unconventional thesis that amasses while it awaits – indeed, *relies* on – insights to *materialise* from the process of writing itself, which entails a form of production that closely nestles next to drawing. Thus, the writing process in itself – with which I literally replace drawing – in a reflexive fashion brings intuitive, tacit, and pre-conceptual understandings to conceptualisation.

Graeme Sullivan describes such a methodology in the *visual arts* – which this study after all comprises – as “reflexive research *practice*” (2005: 100). Sullivan explains that reflexive research practice entails the *simultaneous* utilisation of various research methods. Such an endeavor, exactly because of the intricacies and struggles it *durationally* provokes, necessarily has to garner, connect, and sanction the strains and pulls between reflection, labour, and production. According to Sullivan, such a methodic generates the probability of considering experiences in new ways (2005: 100), which in the case of this study involves considering drawing (as experience) in new ways. By literally replacing the drawing process with a reflexive writing process, I hope to uphold the notion that drawing, as much as writing (both productive acts that convert the pre-conceptual into the conceptual) constitutes a research process that produces new knowledge.

In summary, my explorations are interactive, emergent, and revelatory. As such, discussions accrue along the way, but emphases are non-linear, even chaotic, and full of discontinuities and discordant interrupting of the self. Although it eventually distills, discourse traces an open-ended or even interminable path from the chaos of not knowing to coming to know. Therefore, the strain and voice of the discourse is one of reflection, speculation, probing, and searching, certainly more so than of linear logic, conclusive argumentation, or debate.

Defining the theories that constitute the framework

The following section provides definitions of and preliminary amplifications on some of the central concepts that also decisively establish the theoretical framework. Reviewing the relevant literature inevitably intrudes upon the following discussion, because I begin to indicate how I believe each thinker possibly contributes to answering my questions. These indications further explain my rationale for adapting such a tripartite approach. This section also begins to *demonstrate* how the methodology allows for recursive accrual.

The three components of Bourdieu's theoretical structure that I select as relevant to the concerns of the thesis, Varela's notion of enaction, and Merleau-Ponty's notion of reflexivity (or reversibility) warrant brief definitions at this point, because, as I explain above, they demarcate a theoretical framework. I discuss these selected components more extensively in Chapter 2 and in Addendum B. In these definitions, I also continue to point out intersections pertaining to interactivity. Furthermore, the following section introduces the primary texts – both verbal and visual – that I utilise as source material.

Habitus

'*Habitus*' constitutes generative 'schemata' of classification, perception, and discrimination that, in interactive processes of socialisation, become *embodied* as *dispositions* in individuals. As a result, people exhibit those dispositions in their behaviour and physical and mental *practices* (Nash. 1999: 176). Bourdieu defined habitus as follows: "The habitus is a system of durable, transposable *dispositions* which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices" (1979: vii).

Field

Bourdieu defines his idea of '*field*,' as "any structure of social relations" (1996: 181). A subject (or 'knowledge discipline') such as the art of drawing in the visual arts would qualify as *field*. Individuals, by means of competitive *practice*, position themselves in a field, thus establishing the legitimacy or value of their practices, while they also develop competence in such practices. Depending on the field in which it exists, the products of their practices can be simultaneously valuable and of no value at all (Mahar et al. 1990: 8-10). The concept of 'positioning' oneself in a field *by means of practices* as the vehicles of participative involvement and experience in objective structures is of particular relevance, since it alights on the concept of interactivity between subject and object.

Practice

I interpret Bourdieu's idea of '*practice*' to imply those practices and activities that allow such participation to materialise as the means *and* products of interaction. As such, the act of drawing, I believe, represents a practice in which the drafter, leagued with her socio-cultural voice and history, is central to the creation of the product, to its nature, material form, standard, and quality. Drawing as act conflates the concepts of practice and production²⁷ in one process, a process that, I argue, mediates "internalization of externality and externalization of internality" (Bourdieu. 1977: 72). This notion binds interaction and enaction so that it would be truthful to say they necessarily function in tandem, an understanding I explain in Chapter 3.

Rationale: Bourdieu's contributions to the thesis

In search of the origin of *trait*, I set out by exploring Pierre Bourdieu's habitus theory, because it seems to offer explanations for the forming (in a socio-cultural context) of the habits, preferences, dispositions, and tendencies of humans. I closely (and in self-reflexive partisanship) associate 'habit', 'tendency', and 'disposition' – characteristic manner – with *trait*. I therefore interpret habitus (Bourdieu's contribution to possible resolutions on the central questions) to conceivably indicate

²⁷ I therefore use the word 'practice' (in relation to drawing) consistently in the thesis to include and signify both production (*poiesis*) and practice (*praxis*).

an explanation for the origin of trait and the processes that construct its materialisation.

More importantly, however, Bourdieu poses his habitus theory as a *generative* structure and this notion serves as a central motivation behind my employment of the theory. Generativity suggests creativity, which is an imperative in drawing, and possibly in the genesis of trait. Bourdieu's theory of habitus comprises more such crucial concepts that could develop the study and underpin my argumentation. I superimpose the theory's integration of interactivity between habitus, field, and practice, onto those interchanges that flow back and forth between drafter, her sensory experiencing, socio-cultural history, environment, and the in-phase experience of drawing. I argue that if the drafter internalises externality by means of interaction, drawing (as reflexive practice) presents an authentic and visible externalisation of that internality, because the drafter *enacts* her *disposition* (habitus) in *reversibility*. This argument proposes the genesis of individuated drawing partly in socio-cultural history, which does not exclude world, and partly in durational perceptual experiencing by the self, who is necessarily centred in the drafter as body-mind, yet cannot exclude world.

Practice, which Bourdieu's expositions clarify extensively, constitutes drawing in the context of the thesis, thus forming another contribution. The principle of drawing as core and common *practice* amongst a group of diverse individual drafters, interacting with habitus and interfacing reflexively between habitus, experience, and objective structures, is an obvious imperative in the thesis.

Enaction

The concepts of interactivity and the centrality of a person in her practices and actions are crucial to Varela's concepts of *embodied action and enaction*. The concept of interaction in itself suggests two-way activity – *active reciprocity* between at least two entities that implies a form of shared engagement between them. Neither perceiver, nor world, exists independently from one another – the one shapes the other. To explain his theories, Varela (1992: 172-173) states that “cognition²⁸ depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various

²⁸ Refer also to the Glossary of key words (Addendum B) for further explanations on the word.

sensorimotor capacities” and “these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context”. Moreover, with the inseparability of perception and action as premise, Varela’s concept of cognition enfoldes the notion of an autogenous production through enaction in practices. He formulates enaction as “perceptually guided action”, where perception constitutes “cognitive structures that emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided” (Varela.1992: 173).

Rationale: Varela’s contribution to the thesis

The notion of *perceptually guided action* directs my understanding of perception – and the nature of its functioning during the act of drawing – to a non-representationist²⁹ hypothesis, which I clarify in Chapter 1, further discuss in Chapter 2, and consolidate in Chapter 3. Varela states, “the reference point for understanding perception is no longer a pre-given, perceiver independent world, but rather the sensorimotor structure of the perceiver (the way in which the nervous system links sensory and motor surfaces)” (1992: 173). In other words, if applied to observational drawing, for example, the drafter’s perception would primarily determine a drawing’s outcome in self-originate *stylistic* structures too, rather than the world she observes determining its outcome in representationist structures. Perception does not recover pre-given properties from the world; rather, it enacts the perceiver’s understanding of the world. A concept that is crucial to the development of the thesis emerges from this, namely that the drafter is the locus of her perception of that world.

Reflexivity

Varela’s non-representationist approach in understanding perception as embodied action resonates in the thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Although I employ only one aspect of his work in the thesis, it is significant that interaction and enaction have much in common with his theories regarding visual perception. He defines the interactive events of sensory experiencing (such as sight, hearing, taste, and touch)

²⁹ See also the Glossary of key words (Addendum B).

as “reversibility”³⁰ or a “lateral transcendence” between world and human (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 131, 227-228) (Evans. 2008: 188).

Merleau-Ponty’s expositions on visual perception present it as a reflexive activity that binds viewer and world – a bond that constitutes circular interaction. He develops the idea that “our bodies and the world are two aspects of a single reality” (Evans. 2008: 188), where the seer passes into the visible and the visible into the seer, a notion of reversibility or reflexivity³¹ that finds resonance in Bourdieu’s notion of “the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality” (1977: 72). Reversibility and reflexivity as interactivities constitute a central concept common in the thinking of Bourdieu, Varela, and Merleau-Ponty, despite their relatively divergent fields of study.

Rationale: Merleau-Ponty’s contribution to the thesis

Merleau-Ponty’s contribution entails a particular explanation of perception as reversibility that confirms as foundation for Varela and Bourdieu’s theories regarding reflexivity. Reflexivity, and in particular self-reflexivity, is an irretrievable component of drawing. I explore its relation to individuation in drawing.

Moreover, Merleau-Ponty’s thinking forms a link between representationist and non-representationist, as well as modernist and postmodernist thinking. The words of Thomas Baldwin (2004: 28) suggest this link:

So we see Merleau-Ponty, ... poised to move beyond ‘modern’ thought to postmodernism – but not quite taking the step. But to say this is not to say that these lectures do not present, in the incomplete and sketchy way of modern art, a sketch of a philosophy whose value is ‘solid and lasting’.

³⁰ In this thesis, the term specifically refers to the notion of perceptual experience bending back on itself as in Bourdieu’s phrase ‘the internalisation of externalities and the externalisation of internalities’. Merleau-Ponty (1968: 131) reflects the notion of reversibility in his words “My body model of the things and the things model of my body”, as I explain in Chapter 2 (See also the Glossary of key words (Addendum B)).

³¹ ‘Reflexivity’ refers to the concept that habitus turns back on itself. As I explain in Chapter 2, habitus contains consciousness of one’s own existence - the locus of self. Essentially, such locus refers back to itself in understanding of self. While habitus is central in constructing self, it also grasps those formations that constitute its existence and its development recursively and reflexively. Also, see ‘Reversibility’ and ‘Reflexivity’ in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B).

Merleau-Ponty, according to Baldwin, upheld “his existentialism” as absolute – “a truth of all time” – denying any possibility of error in his resolves (2004: 28), thereby refusing to acknowledge the revocability of his thinking, and by extension, any potential development beyond its resolutions. In this, Merleau-Ponty differs from Bourdieu and Varela, because he perpetuates in Derridian terms the ‘metaphysics of presence’, while Bourdieu and Varela settle securely in the open-endedness of postmodern thinking and the ‘metaphysics of difference’. Apart from informing my understanding of that small window of immediate, reciprocal, and simultaneous confrontation between eyes, hand, mind, and world, it would be fair to say that Merleau-Ponty, through this difference, also contributes by directing my searches to Jacques Derrida. In this way, he orchestrates a shift that has significant influence on the thesis’ evolution.

Implications: bonding dualities

The above definitions and their embedded concepts put forward some implications that have bearing. Because of interactivity between subject and object, habitus also envelops field in cultural space. Cultural space constitutes the habitus of culture and environment. This notion, as I explain in Chapter 2, dispels a subject–object duality.

Mark Johnson completely erases a duality between body and culture in the notion of ‘the cultural *body*’. He asserts that, “Our environments are not only physical and social”. Cultural artifacts, practices, institutions, rituals, and modes of interaction that transcend and shape any particular body and any particular bodily action constitute them also. “These cultural dimensions include gender, race, class, aesthetic values, and various modes of bodily posture and movement” (Johnson. 2007: 277). Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘flesh’ invokes a similar lateral mutuality between body-mind (as subjectivity) and culture, society, or world (as objectivity).

To summarise, only intersecting aspects of relevant selections from Bourdieu, Merleau-Ponty, and Varela form the main theoretical frame of the thesis. While I draw on an eclectic array of theories for this thesis, they all share a non-dualistic³²

³² As I explain in the Glossary (Addendum B), the word refers to the belief that dualisms such as (for example) mind-over-body, form and content, concepts and intuitions, being and becoming

conception of body-mind and a non-representationist theory of mind that sustain interaction and reflexivity. A number of additional sources, which I list and briefly discuss below, relate.

Additional contributors

I refer in the thesis to two of Jacques Derrida's texts, namely *Memoirs of the blind, the self-portrait and other ruins* (1993) and *The truth in painting* (1987). Derrida regarded phenomenology as "metaphysics of presence"³³ and its stress on the "immediacy of experience" as "the new transcendental illusion"³⁴ (Reynolds. 2002, citing Derrida. 1967: 66-68). The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, according to Derrida, assumes the likelihood of a complete subjectivity, which would attach primacy to immediacy, or to the 'now' moment. As an alternative, Derrida argued that vestiges of prior experience always compromise the experience of a 'now' moment and that such vestiges always divide the self. Therefore, we are always barred from being in a completely self-contained moment (Reynolds. 2002, citing Derrida. 1967: 68). Our grasp of 'reality' differs from 'reality', because we can never subsume it with unswerving continuity. The systems of language, schemata of representation, beliefs and ideologies, accumulated knowledge, the political and cultural structures of society, and so forth, constantly interfere. Moreover, the unconscious and the conscious, being separate spheres of the mind, divide the self. Although constantly together, the unconscious and the conscious do not share the same rhythms and therefore are not always in a constant and unifying harmony with one another.

Insofar as I understand the particular selections I draw from Bourdieu and Varela, however, they do not deny or contest such a divided self, nor indeed the vestiges of prior experience. On the contrary, Bourdieu (1991: 39-45) declares the self a

(Blackburn. 2008: 104), and object and subject are, when thought of as separate entities, misconceptions. Please refer to the Glossary for further explanations.

³³ According to Mautner (2005: 388), 'metaphysics of presence' is an "expression used by Derrida for an assumption which is said to underlie the Western philosophical tradition, viz. that ultimately reality is a unity, and that differences are not ultimately real. This view, which implies that (ultimately) everything is identical with everything else, is rejected by Derrida. But his rejection of this view seems also to include a rejection of the entirely different (and entirely plausible) view that everything is identical with itself. The two views are not equivalent".

³⁴ According to Mautner (2005: 623), 'transcendental illusion' can be defined as "the illusions of traditional metaphysics; they are illusions, natural and inevitable (in the same way as the large appearance of the moon at its rising), arising from the inherent tendency of human reason to trespass beyond its boundaries. The aim of the Transcendental Dialectic is to expose their illusory character".

social *construct* that retains the vestiges of prior experience in a *habitus*, an internalised personal history, or in the tales that one tends to tell of oneself in efforts to capture and assert the self, which usually proves to be a rather elusive entity.

We will see that Varela's notion of enaction does not advocate complete subjectivity. Varela (1992: 63-70) divides the human sense of 'having' a self into "five aggregates that constitute the psychophysical complex": – forms, feelings sensations, perceptions, dispositional formations, and consciousness. Varela's expositions on cognitivism and human experience clearly reveals that,

(1) Cognitivism postulates mental or cognitive processes of which we are not only unaware but of which we cannot be aware, and (2) cognitivism is thereby led to embrace the idea that the self or cognizing subject is fundamentally fragmented or nonunified (Varela. 1992: 48).

As I explain above, Merleau-Ponty asserts the notion of 'flesh' (body-between), which indicates a reversible mutuality between self and world. Yet, as I understand it, the self and world 'contain' one another, which does not imply that they are identical or that they resemble one another. The self is in the other and the other is in the self – always divided, never springing from a single centre. Such mutual containment – "intertwining" – between the self and world leads me to understand that, although the world enfolds our bodies and our bodies enfold the world, body and world remain different entities (Diprose & Reynolds. 2008: 187). While one cannot be perceived without the other, each remains identical to itself. As I understand it, they have existence in common. The self recognises her existence in the existence of the other. The fact that both exist, does not imply they are the same.

Whether such thinking adheres to the metaphysics of presence rather than to the metaphysics of difference³⁵ requires a more in-depth understanding and knowledge of philosophy than the deliberately selective and rather discriminatory incorporation of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology into this thesis warrants. What does concern my

³⁵ Being not even mildly acquainted with these foibles of philosophy, I nevertheless provide the explanations of Mautner (2005: 160-161) in this regard too: The notion challenges similarity and identity as priority in the Western metaphysical tradition. As example, Mautner poses the apparent fact that Plato positions "the self-identity of the Forms" as "basic", while "empirical reality is understood in terms of its difference from these ultimate realities. Deleuze and Derrida, drawing upon Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud, have sought to displace this 'metaphysics of identity' (or 'presence') in favour of a metaphysics of difference".

discussions, however, is that, despite his avowed adherence to the metaphysics of difference (Mautner. 2005: 160-161) rather than to phenomenology's metaphysics of presence, Derrida³⁶ acknowledges the influence of Merleau-Ponty's theories of visual perception on his own thinking in *Memoirs of the Blind* (1993: 51, 52, 53). This acknowledgement alone leads to incorporating Merleau-Ponty and Derrida into my discussions on the drawing process, especially in Chapters 5 and 6. Derrida's acknowledgement of Merleau-Ponty, to my mind, signals interconnectedness between modernist and postmodernist thinking that I mention above and which the thesis employs.

Notwithstanding the philosophers' grappling with its metaphysics, 'difference' in the context of this thesis denotes a very ordinary meaning – namely that of dissimilarities between the characteristic drawing of student drafters. Yet, such dissimilarities denote differences that do not imply irreconcilability between viewer and drawing, nor between drafter and doing (Mautner. 2005: 160). Similarly, the word 'presence' mostly denotes its ordinary meaning in this context, namely that of 'being *there*', or 'being *in place*', rather than identicalness.

At this point, I speculate that drawing trait, as utterance of difference, constitutes the multiplicity of performance (enaction) between drafter and world. This speculation warrants investigation. The material matter – mark, line – of its representation alone hardly defines trait in drawing. We cannot reduce trait to only being evident in mark making. Rather, I would speculate at this point that the various configurations between making, seeing and thinking, the union by which differences come into being, might prove to give a faceted body to trait as difference. Therefore, rather than asking 'what is trait?' my central question addresses the whereabouts, playgrounds, and makings of its beginning. Even emulation of style language in drawing, in other words, inevitably involves these unions of difference.

Varela (1992: 3, 4, 15, 19-20) (2002: 106, 122, 129, 131, 276) and Mark Johnson (2007: 4, 20, 79, 264, 275) – another philosopher that features in my

³⁶ Note that Derrida refers extensively to Merleau-Ponty in *Memoirs of the blind* (1993: 51 – 53), where, despite his criticisms of phenomenology and its adherence to 'metaphysics of presence', he proposes a "program for an entire rereading of the later Merleau-Ponty" (1993: 52). In this thesis, I discuss these concepts in more detail only insofar they relate to my propositions regarding drawing and its facilitation.

discussions – also note the invaluable contribution of Merleau-Ponty’s body-mind-based phenomenological approach on their fields. Added to this, I interpret Norman Bryson’s insights regarding visual perception and vision in drawing to intersect with Bourdieu’s theories. Bryson (1983: 174, notes 3 & 4), an art historian and theorist, specifically positions the habitus theory of Bourdieu as foundation for his reflections on naturalisation in vision.

Bryson (1983: 14-18) directs my probes away from “naturalisation in vision” as feasibly encompassing explanation for individuation in drawing, to also include the enactionist, non-representationist theories of Varela. Bryson purports that the relational method of verification that sociology depends on to prove its theories of naturalisation, is not adequate for explaining the varied effects that individuated chronicling has on image making (Bryson. 1983: 15). Nor can cultural relativisation entirely explain the effects of the drafter’s individuated manner in utilising the technical means of a material practice such as drawing (Bryson. 1983: 15-17). Such relativisation, he claims, “has no means of testing whether the image in fact represents that which the theory of naturalisation claims it does, a view of the habitus from the inside” (Bryson. 1983: 17).

Society and culture *alone* are not accountable for the renewal that drawing brings to the visual arts. If drawing can afford us a glimpse of “the habitus from the inside” (Bryson. 1983: 17), understanding how the body-mind of the drafter functions in drawing, is imperative. I address this imperative in Chapter 4. Recent literature on drawing suggests the feasibility of this notion.

To investigate current discourses in drawing and to track drawing’s faculty for self-originitive renewal, I incorporate relevant literature on drawing. Apart from Bryson (1983, 2003) and Derrida (1993, 1987), I mainly refer to Simon Downs et al (2007), Catherine de Zegher (2003), and Laura Hoptman (2002). Derrida resonates in the writing of all these contributors, as he does in my own reflections on drawing. In the later chapters that specifically focus on drawing, I mainly apply Jacques Derrida and Norman Bryson’s models of drawing processing to formulate drawing as a possible common measure, but also as an understanding of drawing that presupposes the drafter to freely deviate from derivative style languages. The

notion of drawing as common practice³⁷ places the germination of individuation in drawing as act *through* drawing as subject of learning,³⁸ thus inextricably linking a characteristic mark to drawing processing, which includes processes that generate understanding and syntheses (or learning).

I refer to instructional literature on the art of drawing that specifically emphasises an approach to teaching drawing that bases its mediation and task design on self-affirmation through independent production, self-reliant problem solving, and peer-critique (Betti and Sale. 1997). It is my opinion that the approach of Betti and Sale supports the cultural and individual responsiveness that Ian Moll (2004: 4-7) explains.

To further illustrate individuation in drawing, I include drawings by students in **Addendum A**. These drawings serve as primary material that originally elicited my interest, but in the thesis underpin my arguments. I collected all the drawings with the exception of those in **Illustrations 7 and 10** from the first two projects I set first year student drafters. A post-graduate student made the drawings in **Illustration 7**. **Illustration 10** shows two of my own drawings and their photographic source material to demonstrate difference between image and field of observation.

I selected the drawings in **Addendum A** to illustrate the concepts and processes that I discuss in the thesis, such as, for example, individuation, accrual, withdrawal, recursivity, erasure, and development. All the drawings in my selection illustrate what I perceive as trait – distinctive qualities that render the drawings identifiable with an individual and specific student drafter. I selected the drawings in a spirit of indifference to trend and acceptability that institutional trends may possibly dictate. Availability of work, rather than highest quality and standard, determined my selections.

As the volume and variety of primary sources on drawing suggests, it is crucial to understand that, although I find aspects from the different fields that intersect to shape a theoretical framework, the study remains firmly seated in the visual arts,

³⁷'Common practice' refers to drawing as practice amongst a group of diverse student-drafters in an educational environment.

³⁸Drawing as knowledge discipline, an external structure.

and particularly, in drawing. In other words, this is not a study of philosophy, sociology, or cognitive science. I do not apply their respective methods. It is a study of drawing, and specifically, of trait in drawing as personalised form that displays as difference. Therefore, I choose to apply an interactive methodology and theoretical framework that would integrate theory and practice, as would be appropriate and relevant in the visual arts.

Theoretical point of departure

The theories comprising the theoretical framework hold forceful implications, namely those of the active reciprocalities – such as enaction, interaction, reversibility, and reflexivity – that mobilise and aid generativity, as it would relate to a driving motivation in drawing.

The reversible or reflexive aspect of the *habitus* triad lies in the argument that, if habitus generates practice, the possibility that practice provides verification for habitus follows – an understanding that obviously points towards reflexivity.³⁹ To explain, or even demonstrate, such inherent reflexivity in the habitus, field, and practice triad, Bourdieu (1977: 72) literally reflects the notion of ‘bending-back-on-itself’ in his words “internalization of externality and externalization of internality”. Such reflexivity occurs between the individual (agent) and her environment (structure) through shared interaction. Interaction seats itself in practices, actions, sensory experiencing, and their accompanying perceptualisation and conceptualisation, as would be the case in drawing. Thus, this interactive aspect of the habitus, field, and practice theory, with emphasis on its inherent reflexivity, serves as premise for the study.

The theoretical framework that I outline above and the premise that underpins my inquiry support my argument that drawing represents visual materialisation of interactivity between diverse habituses in a field (drawing) to achieve diverse but non-conformist drawing as both outcome and verification of habitus.

³⁹ In other words, we see the person in her practices, the way we recognise an artist in her mark, or a person from her handwriting.

Consequently, my positioning of habitus – inclusive of interaction, reflexivity, reversibility, and enaction – as source and genesis of individuation in drawing and of diversity in “the cultural heritage of different ethnic groups”, allows my argument that socio-cultural background inevitably becomes “legacies that affect learning” (Moll, 2004: 5).

Based on these arguments, I assert that a critical viewing audience can recognise the significance of individuation in drawing, because it is possible to verify trait (individuation) as inextricable emanation from habitus. I argue that individuation in drawing, as such, and as unpremeditated and unpredictable, yet constructive contributor to style language, diversify to create an open system of practice and of knowledge. I propose that it is possible to achieve such an open system through an instructional approach of deliberate responsiveness⁴⁰ to individual student drafters. The implicit recognition of the habitus, a generative structure, in enaction and in applying abilities becomes a self-affirmative legitimisation of student drafters’ individual visualities. In the multi-cultural South African context, this approach could result in interesting expression through drawing that could also feed into the broader visual art domain. My assertion is that the most appropriate means and place for cultivating such an interactive and generative visuality, is in the art of drawing. This positions drawing as a vital practice in the generation of non-conformist visual art.

Chapter layout

Chapter 1

The chapter regards the following question: what is the origin and nature of the central problem that I pose in the thesis? I explain why and how the central problem stems from my experiences as a drawing teacher. I describe the relevant problems of student drafters that I encounter, thus explaining my thinking behind how the overarching questions were formulated.

⁴⁰ ‘Responsiveness’ denotes its general meaning, but also refers to Curricular Responsiveness. Please refer to ‘responsiveness’ in the Glossary (Addendum B).

These discussions lead to discussions on the focus of the thesis, namely trait. In this regard, a question regarding the nature of trait pertains (what is trait?). I explain my understandings of trait and the emulation of style language as contrast, and define them as they apply in context.

Explaining the object of study of the thesis automatically defines by omission what I do not address, such as the narratives and rhetoric of trait, its symbolicity or signification as language, and the intentionality of the drafter (hence, the inappropriateness of, for example, purely phenomenological, or semiotic frameworks and methods).

As regards the facilitation of drawing and in accordance with my explications above, I address the contrast between drawing- and drafter-centred originativity on the one hand, and the emulation of style languages in the work of student drafters on the other hand. The purpose of such juxtaposing is to continuously filter those constructs that I perceive as trait in drawing – thus beginning to craft a eventual discovery of the originative playgrounds of trait. Additionally, such initial positioning of these contrasting poles introduces and sets the scene for carrying the problematic forward into the following chapters.

I include in this chapter reflections on relevant literature on drawing in order to align my research problem with current drawing discourses. To ensure the bearing and pertinence of the facilitatory contributions I wish to develop, it is imperative to determine the viability of the central problem I pose against the wider sphere of the work that contemporary visual art practitioners produce, their approaches to drawing, and the range of issues they deal with. I also include an extended review of literature that relate research in the wider applications of drawing, such as drawing and visual perception, drawing and cognition, drawing and education, and instruction in drawing.

Chapter 2

In opening the central question that regards the genesis of trait, I introduce and explain in this chapter the theories that also frame ensuing discussions. The purposes of the chapter are to explain the critical framework, to inform, and thus, to

demarcate the scope of the thesis. The chapter *initiates* a generative device or method, namely the superimposition of drawing (as I understand it) on the theoretical foundation with a view to finding the drafter's play between the conscious and unconscious, a play that constitutes the constructive facilities of drawing.

Chapter 3

This chapter poses a question regarding the intimate relationship between the self and trait. Its purpose is to interpret the buildups of the preceding two chapters in order to discover the nature and possible intimacy of such a relationship. Thereby, the chapter conclusively establishes those interpretations that address the central questions. In other words, as an interpretative act that also consolidates, this chapter functions to incorporate my reflexive processing of the relevant theoretical delineations and the accruals they orchestrated. To an extent, it serves as a bridge between the divergent fields of study that I demarcated as framework on the one hand, and the art of drawing on the other hand. Therefore, the chapter informs further discussion and focus. I address the role of the self in drawing. Thus, and in conjunction with the preceding two chapters, this chapter introduces and begins to address a non-representational theory of mind as basis for discovering the origin of trait and for exploring the drawing process.

Chapter 4

In this chapter, discussion shifts exclusively to drawing, the perceptual processes, and the reciprocities that the drawing act involves, thus largely leaving the theorists behind and only incorporating what I gleaned from them. The chapter poses the question, how does trait emanate from body-mind, or how does trait formation involve body-mind? Answering this question begins to craft possible answers to the second central question, namely, what is the significance of trait?

In particular, a purpose of the fourth chapter is to represent in descriptive terms the perceptual processes that support cerebration or generativity in the act of drawing. As I explain above, my own experience as a drafter implicitly contributes here to consolidate the theoretical accumulations from former chapters. The chapter distills trait in relation to a non-representational theory of mind and body. As such, it

discusses mind and body as unified entity that shapes understanding as anterior to trait-formation in drawing. The reciprocities that facilitate development in drawing relate, because a thorough understanding there-of is necessary for forming an appropriate drawing facilitatory approach.

Chapter 5

In this chapter, I continue to address the question I pose in Chapter 4, regarding the 'how' of trait realisation in drawing. I address the problems around such realisation. I also discuss *shifting* passages from the unconscious to the conscious, or the discontinuities and dissonances between the two that prevail during the drawing process. The purpose of the chapter is to discover *the turning point* in which the student drafter turns away from emulation towards self-originitivity and its implications regarding invention, diversity, and renewal. Additionally, I reflect on the advent of trait as new form in the context of a self-reflexive research process. Discussion in this chapter enables my conclusive interpretation of the genesis of trait.

Chapter 6

In Chapter 6, I pose the following question: how does the teacher facilitate the realisation of trait in students' drawing? Answering this question provides more answers to the second central question, namely what is the significance of trait? I present an interpretative synthesis that I derive from all former reflections. Such interpretation articulates the foundation (drawn from previous discussions in all former chapters) and nature of the drawing instruction I present in class. The chapter serves to motivate, if not substantiate, the credibility of such instruction. Discussion in the chapter culminates in consolidating the significance of trait.

Chapter 7

In Chapter 7, I speculate on a way forward by proposing an additional answer to the question I pose in Chapter 6. I focus on Ian Moll's notion of responsiveness in mediation and facilitation. I explain my interpretation of Curricular Responsiveness and I show how it relates to mediation in drawing. I speculate on how, and to what effect, responsiveness would accommodate and deploy self-reflexive drawing. A purpose of this chapter is to suggest scope for studies that could emanate from this

one. The applicability of the notions that I propose in Chapter 6 within the framework of Curriculum Responsiveness indicates their soundness.

CHAPTER ONE

FACADES: EMULATION OR SELF-ORIGINATIVITY

Introduction

In this chapter, I set as purpose the identification of problems in the field of drawing facilitation. The question therefore, regards the origin and nature of the central problem. To this, I add the questions, what is trait, what erodes it, and how does my problem relate to current practices in drawing in the context of contemporary visual arts?

I draw from observations and experience that I have accumulated over a period of twenty-five years as drawing facilitator at further and higher educational levels, and as a drafter in own right. I centre on trait as a personalised stylistic aspect⁴¹ of drawing that counteracts effacement⁴² of individuation in style language. I also centre on a phenomenon that is often encouraged in the facilitation of drawing, which I perceive and think of as re-utilisation (as opposed to creation) of style language. I position here the latter aspect as a pivotal problem that can motivate shifts in facilitation.

Conventions of facilitation

Conventionally, the main frameworks for defining the importance of drawing in educational visual arts programmes entail the norms of perceptualist, conceptualist, or formalist approaches. A 'perceptualist' facilitatory framework poses drawing as a descriptive process particularly applied in figurative work. It requires the mastering of formal drawing conventions to describe material 'reality'. A second

⁴¹ In this instance, and even generally in the context of the thesis, the word 'aspect' refers to 'a specular' ('a-spect'). In other words, in this instance, it refers specifically to the visible evidence of style in drawing.

⁴² 'Effacement' is a concept that I borrow from Norman Bryson (1983: xiii, 87-131, 88, 89) who argues that "Western painting is predicated on the disavowal" of self-reflexivity in a "disappearance of the body as site of the image", thus effacing all signs of self and its body in mark making to rather paint with "bardic disengagement".

facilitatory framework acknowledges the facility of drawing to transcribe information that is not necessarily tangible, but 'conceptual'. This framework still utilises the formal conventions of drawing to represent idea. A formalist framework emphasises the formal elements (line, colour, tone, texture, shape) of drawing as devices that the drafter manipulates. In any of these frameworks, the drafter could learn to represent the material world by applying appropriate formulas for its description. If this occurs, a style language, as objective structure, largely determines the outcome of images.

The problem that I pose is that in all these approaches, the style languages or modes of dominant style categories – their mere *facades* – seem to have also become the object of perpetuation in the facilitation of drawing. These approaches promote mimesis of style, rather than experiential cognition or durational experience,⁴³ or at the very least, mimesis of cognition.⁴⁴ The chapter also deals with a general discussion on contemporary drawing practices that delineates further development of the thesis.

1.1 Problems in drawing facilitation

False divides

In my experience as drawing facilitator, I perceived conflictive perspectives where none probably existed. This perception silenced alternative and more conciliating

⁴³ Although I base formulation of this problem on personal observation over a period of many years as facilitator in a number of South African institutions, I do not produce concrete evidence in the form of drawings of learners or students, reserving the right not to do so on ethical grounds. However, Norman Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 154 – 155) attests to the same phenomenon in his discussions on the work of Alexander Cozens. He describes a “set of templates or hieroglyphs” that serve as received schemata, mainly provided by “the academy”, and collectively agreed upon as legitimate visual language. Consequently, Bryson purports, “all academies look very much the same”. Downs et al (2007: xi) also differentiates two forms of mimesis that supports my observation, “The first relates to perception and to the habitual modes of mimesis that imitate appearance via observation. The second relates to thinking: the rational and the aesthetic concept” of drawing. The problem, as I perceive it, arises when student drafters imitate the appearance of style via observation, in other words, they copy style, thereby largely bypassing conceptualisation and demonstrating Bryson’s further observation, “Such glyphs emanate from no one’s inner sensorium” (2003: 155). Discussions on mimesis and the fine line between mimesis of objectivities as style or as lived experience come to fruition in Chapter 5 of this thesis and trait proves to play an interesting role in a somewhat subversive conceptualisation of mimesis, deviating possibly also from the ‘cognitive mimesis’ that Downs et al. put forward. Such subversion is one that the thinking of Derrida reveals (1993: 45).

⁴⁴ Downs et al. asserts the notion of “cognitive mimesis” (2007: xx), denoting the process in which the dynamic of drawing depends on the cognitive operation of the drafter, which occurs in splintered and intermittent actions of seeing, tracing, and thinking.

possibilities to develop in my mediation. Misconstruing the relationship between denotation and connotation as discordant rather than as emerging from unifying processes of interactivity that yield renewal, I perceived a discourse of opposition. Posing denotation and connotation in conflictive stance influenced my methods of facilitating drawing as knowledge discipline.

On the one hand (and in very broad terms), I perceived denotation as the perceptual *recording* facility of drawing, and as having to do with perception alone. I associated this category with Perceptualism, which, as I saw it, concerned the development of drawing skill and refined observation in descriptive representation. In such Perceptualism, visual description and the appearance of objects would fit each other like a glove. Such a fit, as sole objective and outcome, would also be sufficient as regards the student's accomplishment.

On the other hand, I perceived the connotative as the 'conceptual' aspect of drawing, seeing it as skill in conceptualisation, which I categorised as Conceptualism and as the 'environment of the mind' alone. In this environment, the drawing student could engage only in the immaterial world of ideas.

Thus, I perceived perceptualisation and conceptualisation as mutually exclusive, assigning separately defined languages of style to each. As a result, I permitted an implicit divide to develop in my facilitation of drawing. In this divide, one voice dismissed the other as anachronistically conservative and conformist, or as anachronistically grandiose and abstruse. One voice accused the other of adhering to conventions of a removed objectivity in representation, and of perpetuating an obsolete⁴⁵ Perceptualism that can only apply formalist language, while the other was accused of adhering to obscure and elitist content, doggedly perpetuating the polished, inaccessible 'narcissism' of Conceptualism.

The dilemma was enhanced by the situation here, on the southern tip of Africa, where I perceived another discourse that accused the distinctive visual modes and norms of both so-called perceptualist and conceptualist approaches as rarefied

⁴⁵ This is an allusion to Modernism as progressive revolt against mimesis, which culminated in a lasting suspicion of Perceptualism as conservative stronghold.

(Eurocentric) languages of exclusion that sustained only elitist drawing practices. To my mind, the divide came to carry innuendos of insularities and a 'neo-segregation' that, with South Africa as its political and social space, also presented the danger of perceiving its manifestations as well as possible resolutions along cultural and racial lines. Such a perception would deny the potential that a drafterically⁴⁶ diverse student profile could pose.⁴⁷

Facades: style languages

An observation drawn from this divide between perceptualisation and conceptualisation triggered an impetus that would also challenge its validity. I realised that since both 'conceptualist' and 'perceptualist' drawing provided clearly defined style languages – the properties of which are easy to imitate – the facilitation of drawing could realise the superficial copying of style language, rather than the *creation* of style language. Such emulation of style language, rather than a divide between perception and conception, presents a serious problem to consider in devising appropriate facilitation. Yet, the notion that some relationship exists between stylistic emulation and the perceptualist and conceptualist divide remained mysterious and therefore provocative.

Any style (whether it be Formalism, Conceptualism, Perceptualism, Realism, or Expressionism), as a coded visual language, becomes a contained set of configurations that are decipherable and therefore easy to re-utilise and represent for any reasonably talented art student or learner. In his essay *The Expressive Fallacy*, Hal Foster (1990) discusses the same issue with reference to Expressionism. He states:

As specific styles, German and abstract expressionism can now be used by artists chiefly in two ways – conceptually as second-degree image-

⁴⁶ With reference to drawing, regarding drawing, or in relation to drawing.

⁴⁷ Here I allude to the debate that positions, on the one hand, the idea that university courses should become "less embedded in and referenced against international academic debates, and more responsive to putatively unique African realities" (Moll in Griesel. 2004: 12 – 13, recounting Bodibe, 1992, 1996). Moll is critical of this point of view. Such a viewpoint, according to Moll, likens "'universal' with 'Eurocentric' or 'Western' knowledge claims". On the other hand, the debate positions a call for indigenisation in knowledge disciplines that "cut across national borders" as paradoxical. "Indigenisation does not have to invoke and adopt the ethnocentrism that it seeks to destroy" (Mashegoane, 1998: 60, cited by Moll in Griesel. 2004: 13). Rather, one should attempt to find a way of inserting indigenous experience into universal theory, a viewpoint that this thesis supports.

repertoires, or ahistorically in a way that betrays false consciousness (Foster. 1990: 60).

He poses '*using*' – secondhand utilisation – against sincere 'consciousness', which I construe as also referring to a mediated in-phase consciousness that functions during the process of drawing. Such consciousness, his words suggest, would necessarily influence style.

The facilitation of drawing accommodates – and legitimises – the emulation of style language, since such emulation expedites production in situations where limited time is a real problem. The only stylistic aspect of drawing that does not emulate is its individuated quality, or drawing-trait – in other words, the visible difference between a self-originate style language and an emulation of it. It would therefore be necessary to discover the genesis of drawing-trait to devise appropriate or improved facilitation.

Drawing-trait – characteristic form – can only be ascribed to an individual drafter. Already at this point it is possible to say that trait does not adhere with coherency or consistency to the characteristics of any particular art 'Style' (such as Expressionism, Impressionism, or Illusionism), or to any particular genre of drawing (such as illustration, or informational, schematic, pictorial, and so-called objective and subjective drawing) (Betti & Sale. 1997: 13-19). Although drawing marks express, drawing-trait is not necessarily always expressionistic; although it can establish itself with the least possible means in drawing, it cannot be labeled as minimalist. Trait does not answer to the requirements that would label it as any specific style language, yet it always characterises style languages. As such, it is possible for a drafter to draw in any style of her choice, yet it will be possible to distinguish any one drafter's expressionism or minimalism from that of another. Trait is what makes a drawing identifiable with an individual drafter.

The notion that drawing-trait emanates from a drafter-centred, yet hidden sphere that does not necessarily 'express' is not implausible, because before appearing in a drawing as 'individuation', it has no visible match – not even as 'mind-picture' – in the same way that the 'inner mind' of the drafter has no visible match. Yet, it is important to understand that I do not perceive trait as unmediated. The notion that

trait is a drafter-centred emanation does not suggest that it originates from a completely enclosed, undivided self as 'inner sensorium' that constructs the world. Drawing-trait, as I perceive it, does not suggest or enclose a complete subjectivity.⁴⁸ If so, and if it has no resemblance to anything that exists in a 'concrete reality', "independent from our perceptual and cognitive capacities" (Varela. 1992: 172), drawing-trait does not represent an independent world. If it cannot be said to originate from objective structures, it cannot be explained as objectivist either.⁴⁹ Drawing-trait, if considered by its operational closure,⁵⁰ seems to only originate from the individual. The notion of trait as representation or as expression therefore becomes questionable. Both representation and expression require scripts that forego them, be it in the form of subjective structures such as emotion or notion, or in the form of objective structures such as the material world.

This notion steers me towards the enactionist view of Francisco Varela, a biologist and cognitive scientist.⁵¹ Enactionism, although only partly consistent with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and with the sociological views of Pierre Bourdieu, similarly offers a middle way between objectivism and subjectivism. Such a middle way involves, as reference point for understanding perception, the sensorimotor structure of the perceiver. Although it originally was Norman Bryson's notion of the durational activity of the drafter's "inner sensorium" (De Zegher. 2003: 155) that motivated my first probes into an 'inner mind' as origin of trait, my searches were soon directed towards a middle way that explains experiential cognition, since mark making tracks cognitive experiences durationally. Drawing-trait, as mark and as a product of drawing (which is a *practice*), and of the *individual* drafter, directed my searches to Pierre Bourdieu.

⁴⁸ A completely enclosed subjectivity refers to the notion that the human mind is the only and ultimate ground for constructs of the world. In other words, subjectivity suggests an understanding of the world as 'inside', independent of the "surrounding biological and cultural world" (Varela. 1992: 172). I discuss the relevance of the subjectivity/objectivity and subject/object antinomies in due course.

⁴⁹ Varela explains objectivism as the notion in which "the world out there has pre-given properties. These exist prior to the image that is cast on the cognitive system, whose task is to recover them appropriately (whether through symbols or global subsymbolic states)" (1992: 172).

⁵⁰ Varela explains that "A system that has operational closure is one in which the results of its processes are those processes themselves" (1992: 139). It remains to be seen whether the irruption of drawing-trait can be categorised as such.

⁵¹ Before his death in 2001, Francisco Varela was Director of Research at the *Centre National de Recherche Scientifique* and Professor of Cognitive Science and Epistemology, CREA, at the *Ecole Polytechnique* in Paris.

Bourdieu puts forward the notion that interchange brings about assimilations between the individual agent, lived 'reality' or 'world', and practice. Such interchange, according to Bourdieu, is *generative* (Bourdieu in Mahar et al. 1990: 33-34). Mahar explains that Bourdieu wished to "apprehend and reintroduce the practice of the individual as well as the capacity for individual invention and improvisation" (1990: 35). She states further that,

Bourdieu's concern was to develop a method which could show active intention and inventiveness in practice; to recall the creative, active, generative capacity in individual social life and to demonstrate that the subject of practice was not as a transcendental subject in the idealist tradition (Mahar et al. 1990: 35).

These readings supplemented those notions above with the concepts of inventiveness, generativity, and improvisation. The notion that, in a drawing process that entails little more than the regurgitation of a style language, the *generative* properties of the drafter's body-mind in interchange with world largely remains under-utilised or unrevealed, constitutes a central concern. At a time in the student drafter's development when the ability to synthesise is crucial, skill in the highly complex processes of creative invention or the creation of new form, is neglected. This concern elicits the notion that the practice of emulating style language effaces (rather than empowers) the student drafter. No personal voice develops and the student drafter sacrifices individuation – the drafter 'hides' her face. The result is stasis, rather than the renewal that emerges from a multi-faceted drawing process that directly engages in the mediations of act, the self, and world.

Hal Foster (1999: 60-61) confirms that the practice of emulating style language effaces, and that this phenomenon occurs in both objectivist and subjectivist frames:

According to Louis Martin, the material elements in classical painting (especially, the traces of the artist) tend to be "concealed by what the painting represents, by its 'objective reality'". In expressionist painting, another type of transparency is operative: the material elements tend to be subsumed by what the painting expresses, by its subjective reality. Both types of representation are codes: the classical painter suppresses nonnaturalistic marks and colors so as to simulate (a staged) reality; the expressionist "frees"

such marks and colors of naturalism so as to simulate direct expression. And as codes both types are based on substitution (and thus on absence).

Effacement

In the academic drawing studio itself, in critique, studio discussion, and practical production, more examples of 'substitution' and its accompanying effacement appear. Students strive towards achieving some mythical correct answer, or one perfect way of resolving a drawing. Overnight, they want to accomplish a satiated state where they will have mastered drawing ability that is wholly complete and final. What is more, they believe the facilitator or institution determines this state of sated accomplishment as constant norm that is securely defined and cast in concrete. Implicit to this, is the perception of student drafters that the facilitator carries this in her mind as *the* norm. As facilitator, someone who purportedly has already accomplished repletion, she represents an official and therefore greater norm. Such norm is already legitimised by the visual arts academic society and by the wider field of visual arts in which they will one day have to perform. The facilitator, student drafters believe, measures all efforts against this legitimised norm as an absolute. They find unfathomable the notion that they can create or develop norms themselves. To attain the 'perfect picture', the one solution, an entirely accomplished quality, therefore becomes the students' single aim. Upon finding such endeavour to be ever elusive, their dejection becomes a destructive force.

The ease with which students adopt the facilitator's drawing style supports this. To avoid this, I often refrain from using my habitual drawing style in demonstrations, only to find that students just as easily appropriate any alternative manners as 'ideal'. Copying style language becomes habit and in the process, student drafters never develop their own ways of working.

The impulse to conceal one's own personal style as inferior to another's sanctioned style also emerges when most students in a group start to work in the manner of a fellow student whose work has been praised by the facilitator as exemplary or good. If the facilitator admires diverse student-drawings that display divergent styles or content as equally good, confusion reigns amongst those members of the

group who need predetermined and proven external structures to copy and who could only deal with one such structure at any given time of drawing. Their confusion does not necessarily compel self-reliance and the potential disclosure of an 'inner sensorium' grows more remote.

Self-origination versus self-effacement; trait versus emulation

From the above discussion, I derive the issue that the thesis will deal with: the copying of style language and the effacement that such practice brings about. To my mind, the difference between copying a style language and creating it suggests individuation (trait) in drawing as a possible indication of the 'individual invention and improvisation' that Bourdieu explained. As I suggest above, this notion opens a possibility that pertains to the durational experience immanent in the labour of drawing as the basis for emergent stylistic endeavour.

The facilitator faces a choice between perpetuating stylistic effacement on the one hand, and, on the other hand, implementing a process of facilitation that would deliberately nurture the status of the individual student in the drawing process. If copying impedes the development of a personalised style, the student drafter's full potency in self-origination of personalised stylistic practice should receive recognition and legitimisation.

It would be reasonable to assume that skills-development in stylistic endeavour forms part of processes of synthesis in drawing. The gravity of this notion – its implications for the development of drawing skill – may sway the facilitator to challenge existing conventions in drawing facilitation.

1.2 Focus: trait

Drawing-trait, as a stylistic aspect of drawing, constitutes a common factor between some of the relative elements, which I earlier introduced (individuation, durationality, experience, practice). The notion that drawing-trait is 'enaction', as opposed to 'address' – primary, rather than linguistic – necessitates exploration. I propose that trait in drawing indicates an appropriate entry point and directive in considering more options for the facilitation of drawing, because it demands understanding of the distinctions I discuss above. Drawing style, and in particular trait, becomes the

focus of the thesis. To amplify my discussion above (under **Facades: style languages**), I now provide a *description* of *what* I perceive trait to be, or what its materiality visibly constitutes.

Trait versus emulation: what is trait?

Trait, in the context of the thesis, constitutes idiosyncratic stylistic manifestations in drawing that the drafter seems to *unwittingly shape* – without premeditation or conscious manipulation. The provocative notions that trait has no script or blueprint and that it therefore does not represent or express anything – not visible information drawn from lived ‘reality’, nor the drafter’s emotions or thoughts – confound. If the viewer perceives trait to express or represent, the perception prevails in the eye of the beholder.

Any effort to define trait conclusively in verbal terms, seems to only demonstrate its elusiveness and its intangibility as form, as well as its contradictory complexities. My personal idea of *what* trait in drawing is would be best explained by example. In the context of the thesis, I limit the meaning of the word trait to denote what I illustrate and explain here.

The illustrations below demonstrate individuation (**See Illustrations i(a) & i(b), below**) and emulative style language (**See Illustration ii, below**). I suggest that the drawings of Thokozani Mpotsha and Nathan Gates (**Illustration i(a) and i(b)**), both South African visual arts students, display individuation (trait). These drawings were the products of the same line exercise, done in the same medium, although subject matter differed. Yet, they visibly display differences in line character, line application, selections for notation, degrees and quality of constructive figuring, and rhythms between mark and non-mark, or regard and disregard. Thokozani, for example, more willingly explores inner contours, while Nathan prefers to concentrate on outer contours. Nathan’s hesitance and uncertainty is evident in rigid and separated limbs, while Thokozani integrates the flow of line with the organic animation that his facial features hold.

Illustration i(a) Thokozani Mpotsha. 2009. Blind contour line exercise. Charcoal on notebook paper.




Illustration i(b). Nathan Gates. 2008. Blind contour line exercise. Charcoal on paper.





Illustration ii. Anne-Marie Schneider. 2005. *Vertige d'Amour*. Graphite on paper (Downs et al. 2007: 81).



It comes as a surprise to see that their work seems to *stylistically* resemble the drawing of Anne-Marie Schneider (*Illustration ii*), a presumably accomplished and sophisticated European artist. At the same time, it is possible to identify differences between the line-work in Schneider's work and that of the two students. I will allege, for argument's sake, that Schneider's work demonstrates emulation of style language, but that trait even surfaces in emulated work, although to a lesser degree.

I admittedly *presume* a deliberately deskilled grapheme in Schneider's work – a conscious 'miming' of the crude qualities that an unskilled drafter would demonstrate. (Of course, Schneider has never seen the work of these specific students, but a deskilled grapheme is easily sourced from the depths of our earliest memories to make marks during infancy. It is a style language in itself, and easy to affect for the mature drafter). This miming of a style language enables a stylistic consistency in each new drawing, while such consistency would also enable the drafter to 'hide' (efface) a more naturally informed and versatile hand. The stylistic simplicity and crudeness of Schneider's drawing has also become her 'signature' (see more of her drawings in Downs et al. 2007: 80-83) – she has appropriated stylistic elements as a 'style language' to the extent that she can effortlessly repeat it. In other words, Schneider has *learnt* it.

'Signature', therefore, does not wholly constitute trait, nor does trait wholly constitute signature. However, we will see that signature can contain trait, and trait can influence signature, as well as 'autobiographic mark making'. The discerning eye will also find differences between Schneider's line work and that of Gates or Mpotsha. Such differences could afford the viewer glimpses of Schneider's individuated drawing form. Such paradoxical inherency makes it difficult to conclusively define or isolate trait. Although Schneider's emulations are similar to the line-work of Gates and Mpotsha, they are not wholly similar. Furthermore, her work differs in content and meaning, thus rendering imperfect (different) even the similarities between their line-work.

For the purposes of this thesis, the differences between the drawings of any two drafters, notwithstanding corresponding style languages, subject matter, intention, or purpose, constitute trait. As such, the differences between the drawings of the two students (*Illustrations i(a) & i(b)* above), as well as between their work and Schneider's (*Illustration ii*), demonstrate trait. Trait is perhaps more evident in the student drafter's drawings because of absence of emulation during the process of making them. The nature of the drawing exercise⁵² prevents emulation, since it places no emphasis on style language whatsoever. In oblique fashion, it begins to direct the drafter's awareness of her own hand and eventually it directs her focus towards trait.

Based on the above comparisons, I will continue to contrast the unpremeditated or self-originate shaping of drawing form (which I call 'trait') against the conscious emulation of style language (*See Illustration ii, above*). I do this, because such juxtaposing visibly reveals – and to an extent clarifies by means of degrees of effacement – individuated drawing form. From experience, I also know that in teaching drawing an emphasis on trait prevents emulation.

Implications of style language in context

Upon viewing these drawings, some implications of style language in different contexts come to the fore. In an educational context, what I call individuation in the student drafters' drawings also could be perceived as a lack of drawing skill. Therefore, it is interesting to note that, despite the visible stylistic resemblance between Schneider's and the student drafters' work, their drawing could cost them high marks in the examination, or worse, entry into tertiary educational institutions. In stark contrast, Schneider's drawing gained publication in a reputable European academic journal and numerous exhibitions in Europe as a respected artist (Downs et

⁵² The particular drawing exercises shown in *Illustrations i(a) & i(b)* entail the deliberate bracketing-out of viewing and reviewing of the drawn display. In this exercise, the eyes remain constantly on the field of observation. The drafter synchronises the speed at which the eyes move with the line's progress. The movements of the drafter's eyes lead line. The technique dispels the conscious interferences of forethought, deliberation, and negotiations between correctness and wrongness. As a result, their distortions are not deliberate, nor pre-planned, and the hand finds its paths in isolation from sight – hand and line are 'blind'. One of the functions or purposes of the exercise is to make the student aware of the fact that our already integrated understandings of what we represent influence our drawing by imposing their doctrines as corrections of the hand's wayward movements. I will discuss this notion in more detail in Chapter 6.

al. 2007: xxiv, 80-83). Schneider's work is in the public domain, a context that symbolises acknowledgement, respect, success, admiration – and exactly for these reasons, drawing teachers could easily justify teaching Schneider's style language. I argue that, by doing so, they opt for fostering in the student drafter the achievement of a superficial and mimetic drawing process rather than the ability to source drawing's constructive facilities.

I draw several questions from the implications of this observation. In the context of South African art education, should students not develop a degree of "visual literacy" (Betti & Sale.1997: 4) and productive drawing ability that would enable them to jump between style languages to their heart's desire? Would such proficiency not also enable them to gain the recognition that Schneider enjoys, as well as the fulfillment of their various but obvious desires to become artists? What quality or standard of work at entry level indicates the potential for developing such degrees of visual literacy?

More to the point, however, would be the question whether the pre-advent unknowability of trait could drive the arrival of advanced proficiency, ability, and standard in student drafters' work. Could those aspects of Mpotsha and Gates' work that label it as lacking skill and ability (when viewed in the traditionally Western critical framework that we tend to apply) not also form guidelines along which the drawing teacher could facilitate the particularity of their development? It is surely impossible to predict where their work could go and what their advanced levels of proficiency could turn out to be. This notion implies the possibility of yet unknown paradigms of the nature, standards, and assessment of South African students' art. Therefore, to my mind, an understanding of individuation in drawing seems vital.

Although the thesis will not attempt direct answers to all the tributary questions that the above illustrations elicit, the reasonable surfacing of such questions reveals the potential and gravity of their footing – namely, the problem and consequent area of focus that I delineate in the Introduction.

Divergence from norm

I propose that, instead of consigning the idiosyncrasies of individuation in drawing to “the underside” (Bryson. 1983: 87-89) of facilitation, it might be worthwhile to investigate its potential for challenging the stasis that institutionalised redistribution of style language creates. If individuated drawing constitutes an enactionist reflex that is mediated by personal history and in-phase⁵³ labour, a diverse student-profile should bring about unpredictable renewal in the visual arts. Drawing-trait could serve as *an individual student drafter’s departure from institutionalised norm*.

Furthermore, I propose that the repression of personalised manner counteracts productive processes. The obliteration of all signs, for example, of struggling in drawing, a process that is typically marked by dense labour, destroys any possibility of disclosing the unknown, unpredictable potentialities that the drawing process holds. A drawing in which the drafter strives for an ideal by erasing mistakes, would never develop a palimpsest narrative of its own. If mistakes are not erased, the drawing partakes in a dialogue with the drafter, because it holds such narratives. These narratives reveal drawing’s processes and history of making as much as it reveals the student’s development (**see Addendum A, Illustration 2**).

If the student drafter can grasp that the drawing is capable of eliciting responses in its maker, she also becomes aware of additional discursive pathways that the act of drawing enfolds and that I explain in Chapters 3 and 4. Such awareness could direct the development of the drawing away from deliberate and inhibitive concealment of personalised marks. In other words, if the student allows the drawing to take one of the leading roles in its own creation and knows its labour to be another partaker in a reciprocal discourse between herself, world, and her own emerging inscriptions, a palimpsest, revelatory drawing emerges.⁵⁴ Instead, self-effacement erases all significant participants in a circularity comprising self, practice, and product.

⁵³ ‘In-phase’ refers to durational doing and production in drawing. Please refer to the Glossary of key words (Addendum B).

⁵⁴ It must be noted, however, that palimpsest, currently made fashionable by the internationally renowned South African artist, William Kentridge, could easily become a style language in itself.

Facilitatory shift

For the facilitator, this understanding significantly shifts emphasis away from style language as facilitatory framework or reference. Drawing as a drafter-centred, self-originate process comes to the fore. This emphasis would involve the potency of the individual drafter's self, as well as her enactionist and reflexive labour as generative of mark. If this seems self-evident, why do style languages, as objective structures of meaning, so easily replace both knowledge disciplinary content and self-originate mark making? I accept as given the "apparatus and discipline of drawing" (Bryson in De Zegher. 2003: 152-155) as a constant component and content of facilitation, but a possibility of facilitating the drawing process as formative instrument in the development of individuated creativity, suggests the realisation of dimensions beyond the disciplinary aspect of drawing. At the very least, it elevates drawing beyond the mechanical execution of technique and beyond the reductive objectives of mechanical representation or emulation of style.

Since the insecure student herself upholds the tendency towards self-effacement, an attempt to bolster the student's own and full status as self-reliant drawing individual and cerebrate agent is valid. Moreover, the notion of self-effacement in drawing compels the question: *How* would drawing be self-revelatory rather than self-effacing? In the context of this discussion, 'self-revelation' infers the potential of the drafter and her drawing process to reveal the 'self' of the drafter as drawing-trait, rather than self-expression.

1.3 Contemporary discourses in drawing

A purpose of the following discussions is to substantiate the delineation of drawing-trait as focus. Contemporary drawing is very diverse in scope and characterised by an unprecedented heterogeneity in content and style. Literature on drawing reflects this diversity and is often contradictory as regards interpretation of the quirks and idiosyncrasies of the practice.

Relevant texts

I therefore glean from writings on contemporary drawing only those features that I deem salient to my thesis. The publication titled *The Stage of Drawing: Gesture and*

Act, edited by Catherine de Zegher (2003) includes essays by Norman Bryson and De Zegher that contribute profoundly to the development of the thesis. Another publication that I employ is, for example, the MOMA publication titled *Drawing Now: Eight Propositions*, edited by Laura Hoptman (2002). This publication should not be confused with the publication titled *Drawing Now: Between the Lines of Contemporary Art*, edited by Downs, Marshall, Sawdon, Selby and Tormey (2007), which I also interpret extensively. These three publications prove to be crucial to the thesis. While Hoptman presents some contrasting views, I largely rely on and endorse the views of De Zegher (2003) and Downs et al. (2007), with particular reference to those views pertaining to drawing as an enduring metaphorical and representational medium of constant renewal.

Contradictions that provide range and variety

In viewing the drawings in these recent publications, it becomes clear that contemporary drawing wears many masks. Viewing audiences are presented with representational art ranging from hyperrealism to naturalism. Contemporary drawing is projective of imagination, while it also generates out of process. Its languages convey ambiguous pensiveness and laborious attentiveness, sparseness, and excess with equal ease, eliciting significations that compel and bore, touch and rebuff, grasp and purge.

Such heterogeneity and diversity is characteristic of postmodernism, which appropriates indiscriminately from past and contemporary forms. Downs et al. states that contemporary drawing “reflect[s] postmodern preoccupations of appropriation, fragmentation and indeterminacy... express [-ing] in contrasting ways through gesture and allegory and ... challenge [-ing] what might be considered aesthetic” (2007: ix).

Despite this heterogeneity, however, writers agree about the primacy⁵⁵ of drawing. They regard primacy as an essential factor that enables immediacy in communicating the in-phase experience of the drafter.

⁵⁵ ‘Primacy’ refers to the facility of drawing to “make us grasp ‘reality’ in an immediate way” (Downs et al. 2007: x), as opposed to what Deanna Petheridge describes as “a dumb line”, meaning “a line which is not eloquent in the language of drawing” in *The Primacy of Drawing* (1991: 52 cited in Downs et al. 2007: x).

Rebel

Drafters explore the practice with involvement that ranges from intense obsession to lighthearted frivolity, in ways that might seem contradictory, yet reveal the variety of human experience while providing the practice with its reputation of rebelliousness. Indeed, an important justification for viewing drawing as formative instrument in the development of individuated creativity is the notion that “drawing provides an opportunity to escape traditions of both mode and language” (Downs et al. 2007: ix-xi). Although drawing integrates itself seamlessly into the visual arts as a mediator of thinking, planning, and developing ideas for employment in the full range of art-making processes, and as autonomous genre in itself, it also succeeds in detaching itself selectively (with both undiscerning indifference and deliberate rebelliousness) from discourses of contemporaneity⁵⁶ or tradition. While it values (even relishes) its integration into the visual arts field, it also protects its roles as jester, devil’s advocate, and dissenter.

Discipline

Having long ago renounced its inherited roles as perceptual scribe and as studious and astute rhetor, drawing still does not deny its properties as “a discipline, a set of methods and procedures, an apparatus” (Bryson in De Zegher. 2003: 152). This adherence to its disciplinary conventions has different consequences. Drawing can find fruition through processes of laborious effort and industry while, in contrast to this, it can compel to equal measure with minimalist sparseness and swiftness. Downs et al. concede that drawing possessively maintains its reputation as discipline upon which “deliberations of technique and complexities of medium intrude minimally” (2007: x).

Drawing upholds more contradictions through the variedness of its denotations. In this era of technological ultra-sophistication, drawing teases with allusions to a technology-as-other that can draw (Downs et al. 2007: x-xi). In other words, we see in contemporary drawing a machine-like ‘other-of-mind’ that disturbingly has mastered some abilities of mind (Downs et al. 2007: x-xi). At the same time, contemporary drawing poses in jealous pride as the anti-form of the barren and

⁵⁶ I apply the word ‘contemporaneity’ to suggest a narrative that exists or occurs in the same period of time as when ‘drawing detaches or distantiates itself’ from such narrative by, for example, ignoring it or challenging it through disinvestment from trend.

alien elegance of technology. In its dialectic between the sophistry of technological aid, intervention, or reproduction, and the comparative rawness and ease of facture,⁵⁷ drawing reveals its facilities for relating the variability of the thinking and cognitive experience of drafters. In the process, drawing reiterates its distinctive attributes (Downs et al. 2007: x-xx) as much as it reveals the drafter's hand. As such, drawing often displays both a deliberately deskilled grapheme *and* extremes in obsessive and pristine skill-of-hand. In both instances, drawing counteracts the expediency of technology.

Interface

The tendency for drawing to range widely in simplicity *and* in complexity richly furnishes *and* contradicts its facility for primacy and directness (Downs et al. 2007: x-xi). This paradox realises in the uncanny ability of drawing to make furtive and elusive ideas visible and understandable by formulating them in visible constructs – the complexity of which equals and even exceeds that of speech and language. As such, drawing facilitates a transformation from the gestic to inscription. This notion suggests drawing as an interface between drafter and world. This facility of drawing tantalises with allusions to a peculiar intimacy between the drafter and her mark.

Deviational function

The ability of drawing to challenge while it explores, implies that drawing upholds its contradictory searches as a form of deviation from norm. It often seems to confirm current thinking and trends in the visual arts, while denying or challenging them at the same time, which has a particularly deconstructive effect. This notion is confirmed by the two publications *Drawing Now: Between the lines of contemporary art* (Downs et al. 2007: x-xi) and Hoptman's *Drawing Now: Eight propositions* (2002).

Through their similar titles ('Drawing Now'), both publications implicitly claim contemporaneity and the representativity of their collections, but for different reasons. They underscore their claims with different typicalities in their two collections. According to Downs et al. (2007: ix-xx), it is possible to regard

⁵⁷ The 'hand-made' quality of drawing.

contemporary drawing as “particularly suited to contemporary aesthetic assumptions as its characteristics are typically poststructural”. Downs et al. assert typical qualities such as ambiguity, doubt, dissent from collectivity, denotation of dissimilarity, divergence from universal values, an obstinate rejection of enclosed resolution in form and integration of the concept of unmarking (erasure) as characteristics that assigns to contemporary drawing a post-structuralist aspect. These qualities render contemporary drawing suitably versatile and flexible to justify its simultaneous accommodation of contradictory ideologies (Downs et al. 2007: ix-xx).

By contrast, Laura Hoptman, editor of *Drawing Now: Eight Propositions* (2002: 15-28), does not hesitate to publish a collection of drawings that propose documentary description of the outer appearance of things in exaggerated realism as a contemporary occupation of drawing. According to Hoptman, these drawings impart a denunciation of process (2002: 15-28). In contrast to the drawings in *Drawing Now* (Downs et al. 2007), the drawings in Hoptman’s publication display kinship with nineteenth-century drawing. The drawings were deliberately selected for their obstinate adherence to finish and representation. Therefore, and in very general terms, the drawings in her collection differ distinctly from those in the Downs et al. collection. The difference between their underlying processes of making can explain this distinction, which also explains the difference between projective generativity and process-based generativity as ‘*in-the-act*’ drawing.

In the introduction, Hoptman clearly states that the drawings in her book are “projective” in their depictions of imagery that had been conceived before they were drawn, “as opposed to being found through the process of making” (2002: 12). Her statement also serves as definitions of the two processes as conceptually separate from one another.

In ‘projective drawing’, the drafter describes a pre-conceived image unassisted by durational observation of concrete ‘reality’. Thus, the drafter necessarily employs the configurations of a known, mastered visual language. In a process-generated drawing, the drafter would allow durational experience, perception, visibility, and

memory⁵⁸ to participate in shaping visuality in unpremeditated fashion. If, in drawing, the re-utilisation of a ‘mastered’ language necessarily implies emulating the conventions, norms, and even formulae of a visual language, the drafter becomes a historian, telling of the experiences of other drafters. This notion recalls Foster’s statement above regarding the regurgitation of expressionism “conceptually as second-degree image-repertoires, or ahistorically in a way that betrays false consciousness” (1990: 60).

The drawings in Hoptman’s publication share qualities of projectivity, probably because they are extracted from a variety of sub-fields in drawing – namely from scientific illustration and architectural drafting, ornamental design, argotic⁵⁹ illustration, comics, animation, and fashion illustration (Hoptman. 2002: 167). Each category, therefore, provides series of formulae for acceptable execution. Such formulae enable categorisation in the confines of sub-fields, as much as it provides the appropriate language for execution.

Yet, in many ways, these drawings challenge conventional categorisation of drawing as either part of the so-called higher echelon of a mainly fine art genre, or as a service discipline in which technical drafting, ornamentation, and illustration would occupy lower ranks as ‘inferior’ subcategories. Although I do not dispute their equal status in a non-hierarchical categorisation, I do note projectivity in these drawings as a generative process that necessarily requires the mediation of a *known* (and often formulaic) language to happen at all. To my mind, projective drawing that necessitates the re-employment of formulae, would also lend itself more easily to stylistic repetition, which more easily disallows the effects of durational experiencing on drawing.

I must note that although I draw from these publications the notion that drawing upholds flexibility and tolerance, which enable divergence from norm (if it ever

⁵⁸ ‘Memory’: Throughout the thesis, I intend the word to denote “The power or process of reproducing or recalling what has been learned and retained especially through associative mechanisms; the store of things learned and retained from an organism’s activity or experience as evidenced by modification or structure of behavior or by recall and recognition” (WNCD. 1979: 710).

⁵⁹ I interpret the displays of vernacular or ‘argotic’ illustration to convey the “slang, idiom, or jargon of a particular group or class” in society, thereby defining and asserting their status as subculture (ODE. 2005: 83). See for example the work of Barry Mcgee, Yoshitomo Nara, and Takashi Murakami in *Drawing Now: Eight Propositions* (2002: 129-165), where Hoptman indeed categorises their work as a “subculture” (2002: 128).

acknowledges norm at all), I also draw from the difference between their respective understandings of what contemporary drawing constitutes. This difference suggests a broad distinction between projectivity and process in drawing. I interpret such distinction to mirror Foster's⁶⁰ *implicit* division between the secondhand utilisation of existing style language (e.g. expressionism) and the initiation of a visualising language. I employ both Foster's differentiation and the difference between projective and process-generated drawing to support my differentiation between the re-utilisation of style language and drawing-trait as invention of individuated style. I do not challenge either one – both exist. The question is, are projectivity and process-generativity mutually exclusive?

Projectivity and process: Noun and Verb

Hoptman declares – with a finality that encloses completely – that “drawing is a **noun**”, an autonomous entity (2002: 167). Despite a declared kinship with nineteenth-century conventions of drawing in the collection, she claims deviation from parallel formalist norms, saying that drawing has “burst the boundaries of [its] traditional definitions”, because its narrations and descriptions have denounced the “old criteria having to do with form, finish, and manner of execution, or by the designation of fine or avant-garde art”. She positions these aspects as liberating dynamics, declaring the autonomy of drawing as an encompassing art making process in its own right with her words, “drawing is all you need” (Hoptman. 2002: 167). Hers is therefore an autonomy that relates to genre – assigning to drawing the status of separateness from conventional categorisation under either fine art or service discipline.

Yet, had drawing *only* noun status, another form of autonomy is suggested. Such autonomy places the operation of drawing as purely in the objective world, outside the drafter, who can only employ norm and formula as appropriable language (2002: 167).

As such, the formulae and norms of, for example, illustration, architectural and technical drawing, would completely pre-determine their outcome and recognisability as type. Yet, as we distinguish between types, we also distinguish

⁶⁰ *The Expressive Fallacy* (Foster. 1999: 59-77).

between, for example, the illustrations of different artists. Although such distinction is possibly less reliable in the case of technical drawings, all the other sub-fields mentioned above recognise the individuated contributions of their drafters. The oppositional stance that Hoptman posits between process and projectivity implies that she endorses formulae and noun-status as the preferred form or manifestation of worthy contemporary drawing. I contest this notion, as I contest a noun-status of drawing as its only ascription. In process, (to my mind) the pre-determination of external norm or formulae is arguably, not definitely, absent. Norms inevitably become embodied and could therefore act as mediators in the genesis of a visualising language. More such mediators include socio-cultural context, the constructs of the body-mind, perception, and the unconscious. Likewise, these mediators can also come into play in projective drawing, as they do in the utilisation of language, thereby crediting such drawing with individuated qualities that can be attributed to specific artists.

Indeed, Catherine De Zegher aligns drawing with memory, thinking, and ideas in *The Stage of Drawing* (2003). Memory, thinking, and idea would include the norms of drawing, as much as the norms it draws from society. She sees drawing's processes as "a generative space of thought" (2003: 267), in which formulae or norm could mediate as much as the visibility of things and socio-cultural history and experience. Thereby, she implies that the labour and process of drawing are generative of thinking, and that this occurs for the duration of drawing. Drawing, she purports, "acknowledges the significance of fragmented moments of consciousness, of spaces of uncertainty" (De Zegher. 2003: 267). Who is to say that such fragmented consciousness is not indiscriminate and varied? Could the durational thinking that drawing generates not employ, misemploy, or unemploy all forms of mediation and interference, whether it entails formulae and norm, perception, conception, memory, or in-phase experience? To my mind, this chaos devises the flexibility and tolerance of drawing, while it also devises the generativity of process in drawing. Rather than consigning oppositionality or a complete division between projectivity and process, their possible generative capacity in intermittent or constant confluence with each other should be explored. I propose that in projective drawing, process cannot be absent, nor can projectivity be absent in process-generated drawing, unless it is consciously discarded.

The drawings in De Zegher's book, dating from the eighteenth century to the late twentieth century, highlight the kind of drawing that derives from reflection (De Zegher. 2003: 267). Reflection, surely, if not almost involuntarily, incorporates and utilises all facets of memory, concurrent experience, and the immediacy of perception. Both De Zegher and Downs et al. purport that, rather than focusing only on the appearance of objects, drawing also deals with thinking that occurs in a conscious sphere durationaly, or *while* scrutinising the visibilities of lived 'reality', where they speak as determinedly of the enactions of an embodied unconscious. Added to these forms of mediation, the visibility of the field of observation contributes an obvious form of involvement, namely that of visual perception. Vision and sight, perceiving the visible while drawing, generates thinking in a process that conflates experience, norm, memory and the complexities of socio-cultural mediation through the process of doing.

Indeed, in contrast to Hoptman, De Zegher does not denounce the drawing process as such an informative and formative participant, but rather acknowledges an intertwining and transitive generativity in the mediations of memory, thinking, seeing, and the labour of drawing, as does Downs et al.. De Zegher indirectly acknowledges a merged body and mind as being active in the drawing process. She declares, for example, the aim of the collection of drawings in her book to "reflect upon the ongoing processes of the mind that drawing evidences at every stage of its appearance" (2003: 267). Thinking *during* drawing, thinking generated *through* drawing and looking, in other words, at every stage of the appearing of marks: "always in the present tense, always becoming" (De Zegher. 2003: 267), not *after* the fact of thinking, nor *after* the act of scrutiny. Temporality as concept and as manifest in durational drawing is clearly involved here, as much as the mediations of memory, consciousness, and in-phase experience.

De Zegher refers to the element that I refer to above as 'socio-cultural mediation'. She explains it as contemporaneous context, as the spirit of the time, or (for example) the social or cultural realms within which a drafter draws. Such 'spirit' is entrenched in the mind space or memory of the drafter, a notion that is certainly

supported by Bourdieu's habitus theory and Varela's theory of embodied action.⁶¹ The drafter inevitably translates such entrenchment into her drawing: "Drawing as an embodiment of contemporary spirit" (2003: 267). Added to this notion of embedding 'social space', or 'the spirit of the time' (as externality) into drawing, she implicitly acknowledges internality, the body-mind of the drafter and its miscellany of memory and in-phase experiencing. They constitute influences from the past and the present, such as a personalised history, norm, perception, and vision (and possibly a view there-of⁶²) that contribute to the unfolding of a drawing (2003: 269).

The gestic as pre-meaning

De Zegher and Avis Newman, the selector of the drawings for this book, delve back into the gestic⁶³, to the "initial moment of tracing" to reflect on the origin of mark making (2003: 267), which mirrors my focus on drawing-trait in this thesis. De Zegher purports that the spatial movement of the hand in the act of drawing resembles the variety and range of dramatisation and the theatrical aspect of play-acting. In this acting out, gesture admits the unconscious and psyche of the drafter, and in its trace, endows the drawing with such mediation. By acting out, the hand creates⁶⁴ what words cannot describe and what the eyes do not perceive. This phenomenon enunciates "the movement and moment in space anterior to what is

⁶¹ I explain these theories in Chapter 2.

⁶² As will become clear later in the thesis, only once trait has irrupted, does it gain presence in the world of visibility, where the drafter interacts with trait too in recursive flow for the duration of the unfolding of the drawing.

⁶³ In the thesis I apply the words 'gestic' and 'gesture' to refer to the movements of the hand or the whole body as *enaction*, rather than *expression* of meaning, which could include the technique known as 'gesture drawing', although not necessarily so. A point of distinction would be the deliberate mindfulness inherent to gesture as technique or exercise, as opposed to its functioning in the realms of pre-language, in muteness or in the unconscious sphere where cognition also functions. I apply 'drawn gesture' in further discussions mostly as denoting conversion of such muteness into mark without mindful pre-consideration or pre-deliberation.

⁶⁴ I understand the conversion of the gestic into trace to inscribe the legibility of the body, a facet of drawing that Norman Bryson (1983: 122) describes as "relegated to the category of the profane, of that which is outside the temple" and that "proposes desire, proposes the body, in the durée of its practical activity". While this specific metaphor could be interpreted to allude to body as separate in a body and mind duality, his discussions (1983: 87-131) suggest a dialectical interchange between mindfulness and the corporeal in which the body (hand, eyes) proposes or hypothesises, while the mind responds and inhibits with antithesis or synthesis. Derrida posits such interchange in a more intimate bond between body and mind as the "hypothesis of sight" that comprises "believing and seeing, between believing one sees [*croire voir*] and seeing between, catching a glimpse [*entrevoir*] - or not. Before doubt ever becomes a system, *skepsis* has to do with the eyes. The word refers to a visual perception, to the observation, vigilance, and attention of the Gaze [*regard*] during an examination. One is on the lookout, one reflects upon what one sees, reflects what one sees by delaying the moment of conclusion" (1993: 1-3). Derrida equates the 'hypothesis of sight' with "the hypothesis of intuition" (1993: 60).

drawn and articulated in the trace” (2003: 267). From this, I surmise that mark emanates from a ‘mute’ place that invents. I also interpret De Zegher’s explanations and those of Downs et al. to fall within a postmodern framework that would denounce expression as a possible explanation for the irruption of drawing-trait on paper. If trait is not expressive, and does not represent any style language, it could possibly relate closer to the gestic and gesture.

De Zegher refers to Giorgio Agambem’s explanations of gesture (2003: 268, citing Agambem, 1999: 78). Agambem defines gesture as the muteness that emanates from “the other side of language”. Such muteness originally gave rise to the development of speech and language. Gesture remains a potent supplement to speech that enhances articulation. This legitimates and confirms not only its intimate bond with language, but also its generative facility.⁶⁵ Agambem asserts that, “gesture is not an absolutely nonlinguistic element” (1999: 78, cited in De Zegher. 2003: 268), which implies that it is equivocally linguistic. Agambem explains that the human urge to exchange meaning produced gesture and language simultaneously. *Gesture is language and language is gesture-with-voice*. Gesture, according to Agambem, does not so much indicate gestural comprehension with a content of its own as a precedent to language. Gesture, he suggests, rather constitutes ‘the other’ of language. Gesture in speech signifies the muteness inherent to the advent of language. He explains gesture as a form of pre-meaning that has “its speechless dwelling in language” (Agambem. 1999: 78, cited in De Zegher. 2003: 268). Likewise, gesture in drawing regards in ‘blindness’⁶⁶ as pre-meaning in vision or, as Derrida would have it, as the unbeseen, the unknown, in looking, as “reading listens in watching” (Derrida. 1993: 2). Drawn gesture,⁶⁷ as a product of gesture, is borne by a *generative* intimacy between opposites – blindness and sight.

⁶⁵ Hence the phrase ‘The mark of a silent language’ in the title of the thesis.

⁶⁶ Derrida (1993: 3) states, “A hand of the blind ventures forth alone or disconnected, in a poorly delimited space; it feels its way, it gropes, it caresses as much as it inscribes, trusting in the memory of signs and supplementing sight. It is as if a lidless eye had opened at the tip of the fingers, as if one eye too many had just grown right next to the nail, a single eye, the eye of a cyclops or one-eyed man. this eye guides the tracing or outline [*tracé*]; it is a miner’s lamp at the point of writing, a curious and vigilant substitute, the prosthesis of a seer who is himself invisible”. Thus, the nature of the relationship between gesture, perception, and trace in drawing becomes clear.

⁶⁷ As I also explain in the Glossary (Addendum B), I apply this phrase specifically to distinguish trait from ‘gesture’ as physical gesticulation before its appearance as mark on drawing surface, and from the technical application in drawing of the word ‘gesture’ as line ‘type’, suggesting ‘gestural line’. ‘Drawn gesture’ s specifically the line, trace, or stroke that irrupts from gestic conversion and enaction, which could be any type of line in drawing, such as for example, ‘gesture’, ‘contour’,

Dialectic

De Zegher connects gesture and the self by concluding that gesture is a primeval feat of self-awareness and that, as trace on paper it demonstrates a bond between drafter and world as externality (2003: 274). She also identifies a dialectical relationship – interplay between oppositions, such as between participation and differentiation. Gestural mark, by demonstrating this bond, discriminates (and defines) simultaneously by omission, by marking only a fraction of such bonding. As opposing forces, marking and omission, bonding and separation beget signification for the duration of the act of drawing as the drafter demonstrates “sensations beyond language” through gesture (De Zegher. 2003: 274). The process of turning gesture into trace is the genesis of meaning and it captures this meaning in a continuous present.

De Zegher purports that the twentieth century return to gesture mirrors an “eighteenth century intuition that gestural language was the true means of original expression and verbal language was a late and limited manifestation of it” (2003: 274). She cites Julia Kristeva who asserts that gesture, as “a preverbal symbolicity” introduced into language the notion of “pre-meaning” as a dissident (nonconforming) aspect that positions “the subject and its verb” on unequal footing. The conception and conversion of sense from gesture to speech, to language, or to writing, created, and continue to create, expanding structures of language and systems of cerebration (Kristeva. 1989: 305-306, cited in De Zegher, 2003: 274).

In *Drawing Now, Between the Lines of Contemporary Art* (2007), Downs et al. also mention a contemporary tendency towards direct employment of the gestic in drawing. Such a tendency continues to sustain both “the performative and the speculative” in contemporary drawing (2007: ix-xx). This debate acknowledges that the process of drawing contributes to its content, a concept that it describes as performative. Performativity implies that the labour of drawing becomes the subject matter. Downs et al. emphasise process in acknowledging drawing as “becoming rather than being” (2007: xii). They play on a dichotomy between appearance and

‘organisational’, ‘lyrical’, ‘structural’, ‘implied’, ‘constricted’, ‘blurred’, ‘aggressive’, ‘mechanical’, ‘dumb’, or ‘eloquent’ line.

disappearance that remain immanent in drawing and that function as a self-generative impetus *during* the ‘doing’ or labour of drawing. Their view resonates with De Zegher’s notion of participation and differentiation as opposing but generative forces in drawing.

The view that generativity emanates from oppositional or contradictory forces recalls the concepts of dialectical interplay and infraconscious and infralinguistic complicity in the interactivities between habitus, field and practice that Pierre Bourdieu formulated (1998: 79-91). It also resonates with the concepts of visibility and invisibility that Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1968: 246-248) formulated as well as with Derrida’s metaphoric discussions pertaining to interplay (‘duel’) between the visible and the invisible as a realising apparatus in drawing (Derrida. 1993: 45-53).⁶⁸

Downs et al. (2007: xii) virtually demonstrates a similar dialectic. They apply John Berger’s explanation of how drawing *unfolds* in process through a generative dialectic between appearance and disappearance. In this context, I interpret the word ‘appearance’ to refer to both the exterior manifestation of object, and to the advent and development of drawn display on the drawing surface, in other words, its ‘gradual becoming apparent’. By alluding to the convergence of these two meanings in one word (both in ‘unfold’ and in ‘appearance’), Downs et al. succeed in reflecting the drawing process itself in verbal terms:

Drawing plays with appearance; it oscillates between seeing, thinking, remembering and imagining, controlling and being controlled as the image emerges. It is continuously and simultaneously shifting itself in the course of its making (2007: xii).

Berger (2004: 112, cited in Downs et al. 2007: xii,) explains *how* generativity emanates from opposing forces, “Drawing works to abolish the principle of Disappearance, but it never can, and instead it turns appearance and disappearance into a game [which] can never be won, or wholly controlled, or adequately understood”. According to Berger, three aspects typify the drawing

⁶⁸ Derrida acknowledges Merleau-Ponty’s contributions to these insights (1993: 52 -54). I explain these concepts and their relevance in more detail in Chapter 3.

process, namely observation, idea, and memory. Each of these aspects “speaks in a different tense” and each temporal space requires “a different capacity for imagination”. Memory occupies the past, observation and labour occupy the present, and idea occupies the future. These temporal elements generate the drawing through a continuous interchange between one another, thus constituting a process in drawing that generates the gradual appearance of drawn display (Downs et al. 2007: xii).

If, as I mention above, appearance also implies the ‘look’ of something, or the visual information that something projects, the drafter conducts in simultaneous observation and inscription a complex process that encompasses practical and theoretical reasoning, thinking, idea, memory, the somatic, action, cognition⁶⁹ and recognition. The capacity for memory that the drafter can accomplish through observation aids durational generation of idea, which in amassed form could constitute the advent of imagination. The drafter cites memory in all forms of drawing processes, not only in observational drawing. The drawing process assembles images from a variety of sources, from fantasy to memory and personal history, and even in processes of rigorously representational drawing, the drafter unconsciously recalls and cites such sources. In this way, the gradual appearance of the drawing is the result of fluctuations, subliminal dialectic, and convergences between thinking, imagining, seeing, labouring, and remembering that all activate simultaneously and in-phase with the act of drawing. Contrary to Hoptman’s declaration of drawing as a noun, Downs et al. therefore implicitly pronounce drawing to be a verb too, alighting on the temporality and spatiality of the labour and the fields of reference of the drafter as inescapable influences on the advent, process and outcome of a drawing (Downs et al. 2007: xii).

Extended review of literature

To situate the thesis relative to other studies on drawing, I discuss here some of the texts that have direct and indirect bearing on its development. I provide here only a very broad outline of a number of additional terrains of study in which drawing plays a pivotal role.

⁶⁹ Refer also to the Glossary (Addendum B) for Varela’s definition of the concept.

Visual perception: difference

Drawing plays an important role in scholarly investigations of visual perception and representation. John Willats, for example, provides insight regarding representational systems in pictures. His contributions incorporate a wide range of referencing, reflecting intersections in the fields of art historical, linguistic, psycholinguistic, and positivist cognitive and perceptual studies. In *Art and Representation* (1997), he claims the formulation of a new and exact terminology for describing such systems.

Willats arrives at his lexis by drawing a distinction between the marks in a picture and the features of the scene that these marks represent. This notion, which I construe as the difference between the drawn image and the field of observation (see **Illustration 10, Addendum A**), will play a key role in the thesis. However, Willats positions a drawing-centred impetus as pivotal, while in contrast, I will position a drafter-centred impetus as interface in the development of drawing skill. The distinction that Willats draws between the features of the field of observation and the marks in drawing enables him to analyse the development of drawing skill in very positivist terms. He concludes, for example, that the various functions and consequent diversity in the nature of representational systems are accountable for the developmental changes that occur in children's drawings. This thesis explores the 'diversity in the nature' of representational systems.

Grapheme / primitives

In an article titled *Ambiguity in Drawing* (2006) Willats suggests that particular drawing systems or denotation systems that prevail in perception result in the ambiguities of drawings. He asserts a further distinction, namely between the "picture primitives in drawings and the marks used to represent them" (Willats. 2006: 8-9). Patrick Maynard also asserts this distinction in *Drawing Distinctions* (2005: 95-108). This distinction presents a workable framework for understanding the gravity of the notion that drawing constitutes invention, which I propose.

Willats purports that, "The primitives of a system are the smallest units of meaning available in a representation, and in pictures the denotation system define the relations between scene primitives and picture primitives" (2006: 8). This definition

of ‘primitives’ corresponds with my understanding of the word ‘grapheme’ in relation to drawing. To my mind, grapheme indicates the drafter’s unconscious or perceptual distinction between mark as physicality and mark as abstraction. The drafter conceives grapheme and applies it to present an abstraction as mark or unmark. Perception, conception, and marking occur in simultaneity. Physical mark making, as product of this form of conception, marks an invention. My idea of what trait constitutes also rests on such a distinction and the ‘relations between’ the drafter’s perception, conception and making the mark points towards where I perceive trait to originate from, as well as to the purposes of its functioning. The notion of the simultaneity of these processes asserts the notion of a possible further distinction that I assert in the thesis. Such distinction lies between presentation and representation.

Drawing as a constructive process

In *Drawing Distinctions: the Varieties of Graphic Expression* (2005), Patrick Maynard presents an enormously wide appraisal of drawing in systematic and philosophical terms. He references a spectrum of drawing practices ranging from the earliest drawings by humans to the intricate procedural diagrams that modern technology uses in an effort to “argue the great importance of drawing and to advance our understanding of it as an autonomous activity” (Maynard. 2005: xv). He tracks the “course of drawing” in its developmental phases from the first marks a child makes to the drawings of “masters”. In the process, and by considering the practical uses of drawing, Maynard conceives drawing as “a tool-kit of devices” that we apply and use to distinctly construct for multiple purposes and reasons (2005: xvii).

Of particular interest is his repudiation of the notion of representation as the mechanical simulation of visual appearances. The concept of drawing as a ‘tool-kit’ containing a myriad of different tools that serve diverse purposes inherent to different categories of drawing also suggest numerous and various forms of constructiveness inherent to drawing. This idea dismisses the notion of representation in drawing as mere imitation of the visible world as its only value or purpose. He states that “drawing is a constructive process, where – as is clear from drawing practices – the instruction to ‘imitate appearances’ is useless” (2005: xviii). This notion relates to the significance of trait – its role in the constructive processes of invention. As I explain above, to my mind, emulation constitutes imitation of style

language, which, in the context of learning to draw, reflects little more than mechanical regurgitation, which indeed “is useless”. I will argue that, in contrast, the unforeseeable irruptions of trait represent visible evidence of the constructive facilities of drawing.

Drawing as knowledge

An understanding of drawing as constructive of knowledge rather than imitative of visible appearance comes to the fore in an article published on TRACEY, an online journal of contemporary drawing research (<http://www.lboro.ac.uk>. 2006). Patricia Cain explores the role of embodiment in the construction of knowledge through the drawing process. Cain asserts that she could “identify that knowledge which accumulated during the process of drawing occurred in a manner which led from ‘not knowing’ to ‘coming to know’, and was less to do with problem solving and more to do with problem finding” (2006: 2).

As I initially did in my efforts to understand trait, Cain sets out to “equate” drawing to “modes of thinking” (2006: 2-3), which also refers to a specific subfield in educational psychology known as Thinking Styles.⁷⁰ Such an equation, however, would suggest visible resemblances between the specific characteristics that the different Thinking Styles entail and manners of drawing. As Cain rightly points out, such a comparison can only prove to be limited, since it would merely serve to “indicate how drawing might be identified in relation the context of its use, whereas both artists and architects use drawing styles out of context” (2006: 2), and, might I add, each one uses them differently.

With the certain knowledge that any reasonably gifted or proficient drafter can draw in any style, albeit by means of imitation and emulation of style, I also rejected this equation. Moreover, as I will explain in Chapter 7, the neatly compartmentalised categories of Thinking Styles, each rigidly limited to specific characteristics for particular styles, also suggest a form of determinism that refutes the unforeseeable nature of trait irruption and the ambiguities it brings to the languages of drawing. In the tertiary drawing studio, the application of Thinking

⁷⁰ Robert Sternberg explains, “They [thinking styles] are ways in which we *organize our cognitions* about the world in order to make sense of the world” (1997: 150).

Styles would imply testing a group of student drafters to determine their Thinking Styles and expecting each individual drafter to draw according to his or her 'style of thinking'. Such a facilitatory methodic would presuppose conscious thinking as prescriptive script for drawing, rather than the in-phase initiation and cerebration of thinking in interplay with the unconscious.

Cain's shift in thinking from problem solving to problem finding in relation to drawing is significant to this thesis. It indicates the generative processes of drawing as the seat of knowledge acquisition and generation as much as the seat of skills-development in drawing. The significance of drawing in a comprehensive visual arts programme involves the generation of skilled drawing as much as the generation of critical, inventive, and constructive thinking that forces the boundaries of the different categories of drawing. Therefore, rather than defining problems at the outset, which would, as Cain points out (2006: 3), involve a process in which all directives for resolve would also be pre-determined, drawing processes constantly find and create problems for the duration of its progress. Moreover, drawing speculates, rather than verifies – it remains open-ended, rather than completely resolute, hence its capacity for constant renewal and adherence to fallibilism.

Although Cain refers to it as 'enactivism'⁷¹ (2006: 5-31), she also finds in Varela's notion of *enaction* a feasible basis for understanding the processes of drawing that are complicit with the phenomenon of 'not knowing' before setting out on paths of revelatory discovery through the labours of a practice. Cain (2006: 5) refers to a parallel in processes of writing that Galbraith explains in *Writing as a Knowledge-constituting Process* (1999), and in *Knowing what to write: Conceptual Processes in text Production* (1999), which also supports the methodology I adopt for writing this thesis (see above). Galbraith, according to Cain, asserts a "knowledge constituting'

⁷¹ Please see footnote 25. It should be 'enactionism', 'enactionist', or 'enactionistic'. Varela deliberately uses the neologism 'enaction', which he formulates, as opposed to 'enactment' or 'enactivism' to clearly denote a fusion between perception and action, which *together, when fused*, becomes responsible for unpremeditated utterance (as action) that is characteristic. In contrast, 'enactment' suggests the subject's subjective interpretation, representation, and imposition of existing or embodied codes and languages as they relate to production. The difference, which admittedly is difficult to distill, resides in the difference between 'embodied action' and 'enaction of embodiment', and 'enacting embodiment'. In other words, 'embodied action' also occurs during 'enacting embodiment'. Therefore, people 'perform' the same acts, such as making blind contour lines, differently (see *Illustrations i(a) & i(b)* above). This concept supports the difference between enaction and performativity, as I will apply it in the thesis.

or ‘dual-process model’” that can account for the covert “decision-making lying behind what seems like a spontaneous process” (2006: 5; Cain quoting Galbraith, 1999: 139).

It transpires that the drafter can find knowledge in the residues of experience that supplement, through embodiment, experiential cognition. According to Cain, Galbraith assumes that problem solving, as initiator of action, cannot access such tacitly stored knowledge. Moreover, such tacit knowledge is not stored in an identical way from one writer to the next – it spreads itself over the discordant rhythms of the individual writer’s divided self. Therefore, the generation of knowledge has to rely on the ‘dispositional dialectic’ that a divided self has to conduct in and through experiential cognition. Galbraith locates such a generative and dispositionally regulated “dialectic between the writer’s implicit disposition and the emerging text” (2006: 5; Cain quoting Galbraith, 1999: 46). Similarly, I will describe such a generative relationship between the self, the process of drawing, and the emerging drawn display.

In Chapter 4, I will find and relate this generative pathway as one of more such layered and crossing paths between drafter, drawing, and seeing. This relationship implies the omnipresence of the drafter, who remains pivotal in creating new form. The drafter regulates this production of new form from within and it leads, rather than follows its maker (Cain, 2006: 5; quoting Galbraith, 1999: 141). This notion resonates in Varela’s theory of self-originativity that I mention above and discuss in the thesis in relation to drawing.

Drawing and cognition

In an article titled *Eye Movements in Portrait Drawing* (2001, August), by John Tchalenko, he focuses on those processes that enable artists to transfigure the visible world into visual images. Tchalenko comments that, although they put a great deal of research into visual processes and into perception of finished artwork, cognitive psychologists, and art-historians neglect the actual “picture production process” (2001, August: 2). Employing a positivist and quantitative methodology, he painstakingly describes his documentation of an artist’s eye movements during drawing, which he compares to the artist’s eye movements while not drawing. He

records (or documents) these eye movements with the aid of an “eyetracker”, which entails a head-mounted device that delivers a detailed video image of the pupil of one eye (2001, August: 4).

Tchalenko offers five conclusions drawn from his meticulous observations. Firstly, visual information is captured systematically – “detail by detail” (Tchalenko. 2001, August: 11), each element being essential to a production that progressively adds to a preconceived whole. Secondly, the depiction's evolution effectively determines the drafter's movements. Rather than responding to stimulus, the drafter consciously controls her actions to serve an artist-centred purpose. “Thus his next glance at the model is for the purposes of advancing whatever he is drawing at the time”, states Tchalenko (2001, August: 11).

Thirdly, Tchalenko concludes that training and experience has an effect on technical and observational dexterity, since only a practiced artist that participated in his study demonstrated specific eye and eye-hand skills. His fourth “remark” concedes that his reduction of the drawing process to mere “eye and eye-hand skills alone” does not provide enough grounds for fully understanding the drawing process. This is so, because other artists would produce completely different drawings, even if they were to draw the same model in the same style (realism) (Tchalenko. 2001, August: 11). This insight also directs my focus in this thesis while it outlines my perception of trait.

Finally, Tchalenko suggests that, apart from the fact that all drawing lines are constructs, each individual artist's conscious preferences and dispositions will prevail to affect the product. Although he does not explore the artist's unconscious mind, Tchalenko, in his final observation, remarks that although the realist artist's reactions are dominated by the visual input to the retina, more complex forms of mediation interfere during the drawing process (Tchalenko. 2001, August: 11). In another article, Tchalenko acknowledges that scientists only partly understand why the eye is in constant motion during drawing. The sharp movements of the eyes (“microsaccades”) remain a mystery. Thus far, scientists apparently have been unable to discover a relationship between the functioning of microsaccades and our ability to see (Tchalenko. 2001, November: 4).

Drawing and education in South Africa

A particularly South African context, where I also intend the thesis to be of some value, offers little, if any, literature on drawing and education, thereby providing an obvious need for such inquiry. The educationist theory of Curriculum Responsiveness originated in South Africa (Griesel. 2004: 1-16) and, although it remains unimplemented, it holds very relevant and appropriate ideas that promise solutions to a very dire situation. Although the theory does not specifically relate drawing as subject discipline in its possible applications, I will focus on Curriculum Responsiveness as a particularly appropriate approach to teaching drawing (Griesel. 2004: 1-16). Of specific significance in Ian Moll's explanations of a responsive approach in teaching, is his acknowledgement of the individual as centre of experience in the practicing of any knowledge discipline. The relationship that he sketches between individual, cultural heritage, and knowledge discipline (subject), once again finds a parallel in the drafter (individual), world (cultural environment), and drawing (knowledge discipline) relationship. The teacher's responsiveness to these components also implies sensitivity towards the interactivities that would sustain such a relationship. Implicitly, responsiveness in a mediatory context is a form of interaction in itself – it entails empathetic interactivity between student and teacher that facilitates the student's enactionist engagement. As a relationship that is generative of learning, the alliance between individual, cultural, and subject responsiveness find their parallel in the generative structure that Pierre Bourdieu poses.

Drawing instruction

An influential text on drawing instruction is of particular relevance and merits a mention in this review, because I align concepts regarding facilitation in the thesis with the approach that Betti and Sale assert. *Drawing: A Contemporary Approach* by Claudia Betti (1997) offers a facilitatory system that emphasises the above-mentioned constructive processes of drawing. It utilises the basic elements of drawing as devices for representation in drawing – reminiscent of the 'tool-kit'-concept that Maynard proposes. Drawing as a versatile and constructive process that supports and configures thinking, knowledge, and invention through the labour of drawing shapes their approach to drawing instruction. The internal logic of Betti's

system supports the particular ways individual students process, store, recall, assimilate, and produce visual information that shapes their drawings. Betti and Sale (1997) advocate an open rather than closed system in a postmodern framework that delineates the scope of knowledge disciplinary (or 'subject-specific') practice, for example, in their accommodation of multiple solutions to the drafteric problems they pose. They regard all possible solutions as being of value, rather than a single optimally 'correct' solution that would enforce conformation to any one existing dogma, aesthetic norm, or style language.

1.4 Conclusions

I conclude that literature on drawing generally articulates its functions as a constructive process versus drawing as mimesis, or as a process in which the visible world is imitated. Such constructive processes locate in perception and cognition. Consequently, I can position the various investigations that the thesis will conduct in relation to drawing and cognition, visual perception, education, and drawing as constructive process. Its contribution will firstly lie in the links it proposes between individuation and drawing's constructive functions. Secondly, it will contribute in terms of a possible realisation of these functions through the facilitation of individuation in drawing. These notions indicate the path forward for this thesis.

I draw from this chapter some of the conclusions that will become central to the thesis. Although I draw to begin with from the relevant literature on drawing the notion that in drawing, gesture (body) and thinking (mind) relate closely, it is the writings of Varela, Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty that expand my understanding on the relationship between gesture, phenomenon, and computation. The implication that the cerebral (mind) and the somatic (body) are interdependent as generative forces in drawing indicates a relationship between drawing-trait and body-mind that involve a subject-object relationship. By extension, this relationship requires understanding of subjectivity, objectivity, and action.

Whether gesture *is* trace, or *compels* trace, I perceive in the action of trace making (drawing) a body-mind fusion, which suggests that gestic conversion merits a feasible explanation of perception's role in trait formation. If the drafter turns the gestic into trace as new form, it suggests an urge in the drafter to gesture, which

entails body as much as mind as constructive partners. A complex ‘simultaneity’ is involved in gesture that includes experiential cognition, the computational processing of both input and output, and the concurrent lived ‘reality’ of the agent. Gesture ‘indicates’ outwards, while also deriving from lived ‘reality’ (as construct) to realise as indication. An interactivity, or reflexivity, between the drafter and her engagement in lived ‘reality’ seems evident in such simultaneity. To support these explanations, I quote Varela (1991: xv-xvi):

We hold with Merleau-Ponty that Western scientific culture requires that we see our bodies both as physical structures and as lived, experiential structures – in short, as both ‘outer’ and ‘inner’, biological and phenomenological. These two sides of embodiment are obviously not opposed. Instead, we continuously circulate back and forth between them. Merleau-Ponty recognized that we could not understand this circulation without a detailed investigation of its fundamental axis, namely, the embodiment of knowledge, cognition, and experience. For Merleau-Ponty, as for us, embodiment has this double sense: it encompasses both the body as a lived, experiential structure and the body as the context or milieu of cognitive mechanisms.

If the drafter turns gesture into “‘the other’ of language that concerns itself with the unsayable” (De Zegher. 2003: 274), namely into drawn gesture, the process would also entail interaction in a very intimate, hidden sphere – either ‘from’, or ‘towards’ the unconscious, or both. At this point, I can place this interaction only between the drafter’s unconscious and the experiential cognition that the concept of embodiment upholds. What becomes clear from these reflections is that the *physical* act of gesticulation that produces a mark, although it evokes meaning, has its material genesis in the individual drafter.

If the *intimacy* between the drafter and her language schemata is involved in constructing trait, converting the gestic into drawn gesture as ‘extroversion’⁷² or in conversation with world, – the *carrying outwards* of internality that reveals inner intimacies – is also of concern in the process of drawing. I conclude that, were drawn

⁷² I use the word ‘extroversion’ because it has ‘version’ in common with ‘con-version’, and ‘vers(e)’ in common with ‘conversation’. I play on the innuendo that ‘conversion’ insinuates a ‘transitive’ or ‘in-between version of self’, while ‘conversation’ insinuates a ‘spoken version of self’, and ‘extroversion’ confirms both as an ‘outer version of self’, a play that underpins the concept of simultaneity that I want to convey.

gesture not meant as a communicative mediator with intention that sources and carries back and forth between, to and from the inside and the outside, it would not have been necessary to draw in the first place.

Notwithstanding these notions, I must emphasise again that *trait* in drawing and its genesis intrigues me and constitutes the focus of the thesis, rather than the semantic value of *trait* as a language, the meaning of which invites interpretation from the outside. At this point, I understand the act of drawing to integrate (or incite) experiential cognition, the conscious, and unconscious of the drafter, and world. This confluence results in trace (*trait*) production, rather than in the ‘picturing’ of meaning, as ‘meaning’ would pertain to language and discourse. Bryson explains that, “What we have to understand is that the act of recognition that painting galvanizes is a production, rather than a perception, of meaning” (1983: xiii). I do not construe drawing-*trait* as meaning (e.g. expressive or descriptive meaning) that emanates from the individual, but rather as pre-meaning.

The notions above delineate the focus of the thesis, which occupies a passage between the unconscious and the conscious, but nonetheless *inside* the drafter. To more effectively delineate and clarify the focus of the thesis as drawing-*trait*, it is perhaps necessary to equate voice and its particular sound, timbre, or acoustic quality with drawing-*trait*, and to equate spoken (voiced) language with a drawing as object, or as a culmination of *trait* and trace, which as an objective arrangement, conveys meaning, rhetoric, or discourse. Voice, its resonance, and its utterance locate in the individual body-mind, and therefore voice is individuated.⁷³ Voice appropriates and employs tone, speech, and word as language – its semantics and meaning – which sustains discourse or rhetoric. Discourse centres in the objective world and in the play of signifiers. In looking for the genesis of *trait*, my concern must necessarily focus on the durational “experience and cognition” (Varela. 1992: 42) as I understand it to occur in the act of drawing. This constitutes the “basic, perceptual modalities” (Varela. 1992: 42) that are involved in the making of a characteristic mark.

⁷³ There is no way that one person’s voice can issue from another person’s mouth, but they could speak one another’s language.

Avis Newman boldly expresses the self-as-being⁷⁴ as 'I' immanent in drawing: "to gesture outwards is not only the 'I exist,' but 'I exist in relation to someone else'" (De Zegher. 2003: 274). I see 'I' ('self') as the 'intimacy' between experiential cognition, inner schemata of understanding and embodiments that drawing as practice carries outwards as embodied actions. Avis Newman's words evoke 'I' as a 'first person voice' in an address outwards, as trait in drawing, while also alighting on the notion of 'I' stating the 'self' *in* responding to and *in* addressing 'you'. In a simultaneous perception of other and of self, the 'I' states itself in a relationship of equity and communion between 'I' and 'you', in which both enter the bridge of mutuality⁷⁵ in being to meet the other in the middle⁷⁶. I construe this as self-consciousness revealing itself in self-cognition and in simultaneous self-recognition of 'you', an enaction over and above an interactivity that reveals itself in such intimacy.

The drawn mark as gesture, and the drawing becoming itself, traces that delicate conversion into 'extroversion' as a coming-into-consciousness, so much so that the *drawing becoming* and the *coming-into-consciousness* of the drafter merge to unfold as one process. The drafter positions the specificity of self in the generality of social space and collectivity, affirming her existence while demonstrating her conception of being self in the social realm. She converses with an audience and with herself. In drawing, she conducts a continuous process of *becoming* and in the process *projects* the self, rather than *illustrates a projection of self*.

⁷⁴ I draw this term from Francisco Varela's discussions on the world versus the self as reference point (1992: 3-130). He concludes, "...but even when we could not find [self], we never doubted the stability of the world. How could we, when it seemed to provide the setting for all of our examinations? And yet when, having discovered the groundlessness of the self, we turn toward the world, we are no longer sure we can find it. Or perhaps we should say that once we let go of a fixed self, we no longer know how to look for the world. We define the world, after all, as that which is not-self, that which is different from the self, but how can we do this when we no longer have a self as a reference point? (Varela. 1992: 130). Like Merleau-Ponty, Varela finds a central mutuality of existence between world and self that proposes enaction as possible "middle way" (Varela. 1992: 217-235).

⁷⁵ I apply this word to refer to Merleau-Ponty's (1968: 131, 227-228) (Evans. 2008: 188) concept of the laterally transcendental in perception. He often uses 'flesh', 'chiasm', and 'reversibility' as synonyms for the laterally transcendental. Also, see 'Reversibility' and 'Reflexivity' in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B).

⁷⁶ It is interesting in this regard to refer to Derrida's telling of such reversibility, "Drawing comes in the place of the name, which comes in the place of drawing: in order...to hear oneself call the other or be called [by] the other", and "From one blindness, the other. At the moment of the autograph, and with the most intense lucidity, the seeing blind man observes himself" (1993: 57).

This ‘projection’, I propose, rather implies an *irruption*⁷⁷ that has its origin in unknowingness of the self, which is similar to pre-meaning, but speaks of the “recognition that it [the subject] can never be primary, transcendent, whole” (Foster. 1999: 62). Despite the fact that the self, as Hal Foster asserts, “reveals that [it] is never anterior to its traces, its gestures, its ‘body’” (1999: 62), he explains further:

Whether unconscious drives or social signs, these mediated expressions “precede” the artist: they speak him rather more than he expresses them. (Seen in this way, “the artist” is less the originator of his expression than its effect or its function – a condition that expressionism at once reveals and disavows).

The notion of an enactionist irruption suggests a presentation of the sensing self by means of action or practice, such as drawing could constitute. The self in practice elicits *enaction* by and of the self as affirmation of her existence. In this sense, an alternative to the notion of illustrating a projection of the self would be constituted by an enaction of the self. Enaction, as embodied action, locates itself indisputably in the experiential cognitions⁷⁸ of the individual engaged in activity (Varela. 1992: 48-49; 172-180).

‘Enactionist irruption’ does not mean expressionistic irruption. As I explain above, ‘*the expressive*’ in drawing suggests either expressionistic style language or the drafter’s emotional intent as blueprint (Foster. 1999: 59-77). In either case, these blueprints exist before mark or line complies to re-present them, after the fact, as it were – the *fact*, then, being the ‘*I*’. The ‘*I*’ involves the psychological, and biological, or ‘body-related’ facets that do not appear as *visible* aspects in the mind.

⁷⁷ As I explain in the Glossary (Addendum B), I intend the word to imply the unpremeditated ‘coming into being’ of the characteristic mark, which, as the thesis explains, appears on paper without having any visible precedent, neither in the drafter’s mind, nor in objective structures – in other words, ‘blindly’.

⁷⁸ Varela states: “What implications does this cognitivist research program have for an understanding of our experience? We wish to emphasize two related points: (1) cognitivism postulates mental or cognitive processes of which we are not only unaware but of which we cannot be aware, and (2) cognitivism is thereby led to embrace the idea that the self or cognizing subject is fundamentally fragmented or nonunified. These two points [are] considerably intertwined” (1992: 48).

I propose, therefore, that expression is *re-presentational*,⁷⁹ similarly implying pre-existing scripts written by memory and style language, which the drafter interprets and recounts. I interpret 'enaction' as an implicit and inherent impulsion that, with unscripted immediacy, marks itself as the self, not only as 'presentative'⁸⁰ of ego or personality, but as self-being inclusive of its unconscious, conscious, physical, biological, and psychological facets. I propose that the durational labour of drawing interweaves the self, a bond that necessarily *produces* trait.

As became clear above, recent literature on contemporary drawing frames the various practices and manifestations of the field in a postmodern framework, which contends with a decentred self. The familiar word 'self-consciousness' suggests the self's residence in consciousness alone – a single sphere of mental processing that conveniently evokes the supposition "that to be a self is to have a coherent and unified point of view, a stable and constant vantage point from which to think, perceive, [cognise], and act" (Varela. 1992: 50). Moreover, a self seems so close during drawing – a process in which both thinking and experiential cognition seems to occur in simultaneity – that it is easy to believe that consciousness and cognition alone orchestrate self-awareness. In fact, a self seems so entrenched in the act of drawing that the possibility of a non-existent self seems absurd. Similarly, a sense of self is so constant to us that its veracity seems to render unnecessary (if not unfathomable) the notion that its revelation requires a reflexive bending back onto itself.

What sustains experiencing of the self in drawing? Varela asks, "What is the cognizing subject?" (1992: 50). Is the self centred only in consciousness, or only in cognition? According to Varela,

Cognitivism runs directly counter to this conviction: in determining the domain of cognition, it explicitly cuts across the conscious/unconscious distinction. The domain of cognition consists of those systems that must be seen as having a distinct representational level, not necessarily of those systems that are

⁷⁹ It is perhaps appropriate in this regard to refer to Derrida's words, "It's just that one must know [*savoir*], and so one just has to see (it) [*voir ça*] – i.e., that the performative fiction that engages the spectator in the signature of the work is given to be seen only through the blindness that it produces as its truth" (1993: 65).

⁸⁰ Rather than 'representative'.

conscious. Some representational systems are, of course, conscious, but they need not be [conscious] to have representations or intentional states. Thus, for cognitivists, cognition and intentionality (representation) are the inseparable pair, not cognition and consciousness (1992: 50).

Representation and experience intermingle on conscious and unconscious levels to shape a sense of self, which mediates in productive activities such as drawing. It is possible to cognise without necessarily being self-conscious. Similarly, we can be self-aware without conscious cognition. In other words, we can be unconsciously self-aware, or self-awareness also incorporates the unconscious (Varela. 1992: 50-52). Indeed, Varela asks, “If cognition can proceed without the self, then why do we nonetheless have the experience of self?” (1992: 51). Experiential cognition, inclusive of its representational schemata, also plays a role in the constructs that constitute a self.

Yet, Varela speculates, “if someone were to turn the tables and ask us to look for the self, we would be hard pressed to find it” (1992: 50). The self is divided, and this dividedness also manifests as continuous series of varied constructs – a physical organ does not house it, nor does the brain constitute the self. Bourdieu (1991: 39-45) declares the self to be a social construct, suggesting that the objective structures of society and culture mediate in one’s idea of self. Although the self undeniably exists, we cannot find it in physical form. We draw from both the inside and the outside to construct a self, yet we perceive and experience it to exist on the inside.

Therefore, the self is also divided between inside and outside – it does not constitute a “coherent and unified” entity “amid the furious storm of subpersonal activity” (Varela: 1992: 51). The notion that ‘subpersonal activity’ incorporates representational systems – schemata that orchestrate understanding and that both implore and shape intent, purpose, and meaning – warrants further exploration. “Unconscious symbolic computation” suggests the participation of “a computational mind”, while a “phenomenological mind” suggests the participation of “conscious experience” and “experiential cognition” in constructing the self (Varela. 1992: 52).

How does the computational mind (which computes symbols on conscious and unconscious levels) relate to the immediacy of experience that a phenomenological

mind draws in? A 'phenomenological mind' includes sensorial involvement – seeing, touching, hearing, tasting, and so forth – in other words, it involves the domain of the body-mind. In drawing, cognition seems to be directed towards the field of observation in a way that intimately engrosses perception. Varela states that cognition “is directed towards the world *as we experience it*” (1992: 52), or as we live it – a *lived* 'reality'. In drawing, we perceive movement, colour, surface, texture, tonal values, and so forth, perceptions that entail phenomenological experience. The drafter does not see the field of observation “as composed of subatomic particles” (Varela. 1992: 52).

These 'two minds' – the computational and phenomenological minds – must surely have access to one another, since the drafter instantaneously creates the symbols that a computational mind purportedly processes and produces in conjunction with her body-mind. The notion of pathways that grant confluence between these two minds and body (mind-mind-body) so that we experience 'understanding' as a complex, yet unified phenomenon, emerges. Varela posits embodied action – enaction – as such reciprocal confluence (1992: 173), or a “middle way” (1992: 20-21, 221, 228). Reciprocity between these 'two minds' and body employs and deploys embodiment by means of embodied action. Yet another participant is involved, namely action, activity, or *doing* (bodily labour) that orchestrates both transformation and production – such as the act of drawing constitutes. Through such action, enaction *becomes* cognition – cognition *constitutes* embodied action. The drafter perceives, understands, thinks, and makes a mark in simultaneity.

The computational mind does not project its computations to organise or inform cognition, nor does the phenomenological mind project its experiences on the computational mind to determine computations. In other words, the subject does not reduce the world to awareness of it, nor is experiential cognition redundant in the subject's understanding of the world. Between these 'two minds' and the body, a situated embodiment orchestrates a sense of mutuality that serves both. At this point, I propose that the computational mind and the phenomenological mind, with embodied action as reciprocity between them – a confluence that has a hand in constructing the self – also constructs the mark as presentation rather than representation. Enaction, as such a reciprocity, and as a notion that also represents

a middle way between subjectivism and objectivism, therefore suggests that drawing-trait does not *only* emerge or function as a form of address that displays the presence⁸¹ or absence of the subject. Nor does it *only* represent a discourse of the other (language). The notion emerges that drawing-trait⁸² originates from a place that directly presents before it complies with language.

The credibility of such a notion and of the construct of a self as 'immersed' in trait, or of trait as an enaction of the self, requires further exploration. Is it so that drawing-trait, as an enaction of the notion that '*I exist*', is also rooted in the facility of drawing to convert pre-meaning into drawn gesture? If trait is borne by a conviction in the self, it suggests that trait is not *expressive* of the self, or of the ego, but that the self – an ever-elusive non-entity – becomes entrenched in drawing-trait not as projection, but as irruption. This notion leads to my perception that drawing-trait involves a *self-presentational* aspect that accesses pre-meaning, body-mind, and the reciprocal passages between the conscious and unconscious. Such self-presentation *suggests* itself as intimately interwoven with the ability to simultaneously access *and* construct meaning⁸³ – a notion that supports the mediation of a 'computational mind' even on the unconscious level.

As my research questions suggest, I seek the origin of trait in order to understand trait as individuated, drafter-centred emanation. Thereby, I hope to discover the significance of drawing-trait. I do not censure observation of the outer appearance of things (as a site of experiential cognition, or visual perception) in drawing. I rather explore the concepts of appearance, enaction, and performativity as active, yet merged, participants in drawing. I propose that the drawing act sustains interplay between the appearance of things and performativity to join and augment self-awareness, the labour, and the thinking of drawing. At this point, I hypothesise that such interplay manifests as trait or drawn gesture.

⁸¹ Note that I use 'presence' as opposite of 'absence', and not as the opposite of 'difference'. This is not a reference to the 'metaphysics of presence'.

⁸² I refer here to drawing-*trait*, specifically, which does *not* mean or indicate drawing in general.

⁸³ I must stress that I base all further discussions on the assumption that interplay is constantly active between presentation and representation. In later chapters, I construe this interplay as similar to interplay between enaction and interaction. I do not declare drawing as purely enactionist or purely interactionist, nor do I position these notions as a negation of performativity in drawing. Performativity I associate with enaction.

As I explain in the Introduction, this thesis is also concerned with a perceived failure (in an educational context) in avoiding self-effacement and redistribution (emulation) of style language by student drafters. It is easy to recognise self-effacement in drawings. Understanding the operations of self-assertion as the opposite of self-effacement in drawing, however, is not so simple. As is clear from the above discussion, self-effacement would prevent fruition of all the intricacies and intimacies of drawing that emerge from a divided self in enactionist engagement. In accordance with this notion, my inquiry into some of the literature on drawing suggests a versatile and generous complexity in drawing that indicates involvement of the drafter's *divided* self in a *fused* body-mind. In summary, at this point, I propose that drawing involves enactionist (presentational) and interactive (representational) processes, both of which will structure the rest of the thesis.

In the following chapters, I will further unpack these processes as inward- and outward-bound 'intimacies' between the drafter and her own drawing, which do not necessarily include exploration of the constructs of language that consolidate meaning. I suggest that drawing, as a system made up of trace and trait, reveals the hidden as the invisible. From the variety that drawing displays – its ranges from tenacious rigour to wild deviation – it is evident that it conveys a playful delight in a very human diversity that indicates the hand of the individual self.

The conclusions above require a more expanded understanding of the theories of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu informs about interactive processes in cognition and recognition. I also turn to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who asserts "the body as the ground for experience" (Diprose. 2008: 8-9), and to Francisco Valera's cognitivist formulations around enaction. I employ their writings to construct a framework for further inquiries into the nature, significance, and potentialities of trait in drawing. In such a diverse framework, I suggest that drawing can constitute pronoun, verb, and noun, composing a full sentence that renders drawing individuated, yet diverse, communicative, dynamic, generative, and layered in signification and meaning. In words, such a sentence would read *I mark self*.

CHAPTER TWO

I MARK SELF: INTERACTION AND ENACTION

Introduction

Bourdieu's habitus, practice, and field theoretical formation constitutes a *generative* structure. As I explain in the Introduction, the concept of the internalisation of externalities and the externalisation of internalities underpin Bourdieu's theory of habitus. This concept deconstructs subject-object or agent-structure dualities. The purpose of this chapter is to relate drawing to these notions.

Bourdieu's complete volume of work is enormous and involves much wider explorations into the complexities of human engagement in social and cultural spheres. I focus here only on those aspects relating to the problem statement (see the Introduction) and in particular to cognition and perception in drawing. My discussions here, therefore, centre on habitus as perceptive facility of the drafter. This facility is also accountable for conception and improvisation in an interactive relationship of generativity with drawing as a practice, and with the wider field of drawing as a visual art.

Another purpose of this chapter is to relate the concepts I identified in the previous chapter to enaction as embodied action and to the drawing experience. Such concepts include, for example, a circular ambit between the unconscious and the conscious, and between agent and structure. Enaction incorporates facets beyond the social, namely the psychological, biological, and physical experiencing of socio-cultural interaction. As such, enaction includes cognitive processing, which also constructs a self. I relate these concepts to Merleau-Ponty's concept of reversibility between subject and object in an attempt to explain the self as construct, thus adding consideration of the significance of body-mind and subject-object unifications. These unifications may eventually bring comprehension of the cerebrate processes proposed by Bourdieu, which comprise the unified *subjective*

*doxic modality*⁸⁴ and *somatic legibility* in drawing. I propose that such unified modalities play a role in the forming of drawing-trait.

The chapter, therefore, begins to pose the overarching questions: What is the genesis of trait, or where are the constructive playgrounds from which trait could possibly emanate? Answering this question could lead to understanding the significance of trait.

2.1 The framework: definitions and relationships

I derive the following explanation from Bourdieu's expositions on the *genesis* of dispositions (1996: 181, 235, 238, 256, 264-267).

Bourdieu's perspective suggests that a person's existence involves a number of forces. The unified mind and body stands in a dynamic spatial and temporal relationship to the world as 'lived reality'. Many aspects of life present themselves as externally objective, impartial, or neutral configurations (for example, environment, culture, and society). Although a person lives temporarily in-phase with such structures, they are 'objective', since they surpass one's temporal existence and they will presumably continue to exist and change beyond one's own passage through time and life.

Living through life entails reciprocity between person and the world, which implies that objective structures can shape a person's life as much as a person can influence objective structures. In the life of an individual person, such reciprocity culminates into a continuous flow of chronicles, which tell time- and place-specific stories of unification between subject and object. For the individual, these chronicles become a private record, a personal history that is active on conscious and unconscious levels, and which orchestrates and articulates reciprocity as embodiment. The mind constantly consolidates these chronicles to enact fragments of them reflexively in day-to-day behaviour, engagement, and practices. In consolidating perceptions, the

⁸⁴ The phrase suggests that the particularity of trait in drawing, for example, would be implicit of and influenced by beliefs that are entrenched in the unconscious self to the extent that the drafter is hardly aware of them on a conscious level. Please refer to the Glossary (Addendum B).

body-mind process experiences to recursively⁸⁵ store them in their adjusted (consolidated) state as memory. Thus, each individual becomes the embodied locus of her own perceptions of lived 'reality'. The contributions of life remain flexible and changeable constructs in the mind for future exemplification in all practices. Their storage is indeed not passive. They change constantly and form cryptograms for continual disposing of 'self'. The self conducts, in this way, an empowering and affirmative form of self-governance. This crusade ensures continued progress through life. These cryptograms constitute complex schemas of dispositions, tendencies, inclinations, or proclivities to conduct practices in particular ways. However flexible these preferred ways, they become identifiable with an individual. As such, the dispositional self constantly partakes in external and internal ambits, which leads to the acquisition of ever more skill, competence, and ability. These aspects in turn feed back into the expansion of her experiential and internal realms. With the self as pivotal centre, these processes perpetuate reflexive circularity as internalisation and externalisation.

Thus, the individual's passage through life, her personal history, and her experience of all facets of environment, culture, and society, converge. This convergence articulates as *habitus*, which manages her behaviour, body postures, gestures, and ways of thinking. Pierre Bourdieu formulated the notion of habitus.

2.1.1 Habitus

In his theory of habitus, Pierre Bourdieu appropriates the Aristotelian notions of *doxa* and *hexis* (Bourdieu. 1996: 179). A dispositional self enfolds *doxa* and *hexis* as whole. Bourdieu describes *hexis* as

...a certain durable organisation of one's body and of its deployment in the world. Bodily *hexis* is political mythology realised, embodied,⁸⁶ turned into a

⁸⁵ Simon Blackburn explains recursivity as "a procedure that is applied once, and then applied to the result of that application" (2008: 309).

⁸⁶ The concept of 'embodiment' is entrenched in Bourdieu's habitus formation, as is reflexivity. 'Embodiment' includes a cognitive scientific sphere in the work of Varela and I derive later discussions in this chapter from his notion of 'embodied action'. (I introduced 'embodied action' in the previous chapter). The simple notion that hand and eye affect trait (where 'eye' implies both sight and vision, and where 'body' represents physically experiential construct that effects the embodiment of knowledge), requires focus. In being (existence), the subject enfolds intellect and somatic, the non-physical and the physical. As social space informs actions, so 'body as the context or milieu of cognitive mechanisms' informs gestic conversion that involves sight and vision.

permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking and thereby of feeling and thinking (Bourdieu. 1996: 352, note 51).

Doxa, in a social context, constitutes the constructs of mind rather than those of body. Bourdieu explains, “Primary experience of the social world is that of *doxa*, an adherence to relations of order which, because they structure inseparably both the real and the thought world, are accepted as self-evident” (1984: 471). It realises in a broad spectrum of uniform principles in any given society, for example lore and myth, idiomatic sayings and wisdom, beliefs regarding ethics, morals, respect, disregard, and all that encapsulates “the given cultural norm” (Bryson. 1983: 75). Society’s objective configurations engender systems of thought that people experience as innate and obvious. They regard such thinking as intrinsic to their way of life. The automatic recognition of such systems of thought serves as enabling guide to ensure confident and appropriate movement through life.

The term Bourdieu formulated for dispositional ‘cryptograms’ or schemas of mental organisation is ‘*habitus*’ (1996: 179-180, 214-215, 352 note 34, 362-363 note 81). *Habitus* is a system of understanding and practice that transcends the *doxa* and *hexis*, or mind and body duality. In other words, the body forms as much part of dispositional structuring as does mind.

Bourdieu explains the *origin* (genesis) of dispositions in the individual as a complex process that involves dynamic interaction between the individual and for example, those linguistic, educational, political, social, and cultural structures that exist objectively in society (1984: 123). This interaction constitutes processes of socialisation and learning that, as I mention above, enable the individual to relate and function in an environment, a community, and a society. In the individual-to-group and individual-to-environment (subject to object) relationships, the individual receives information, responds to it, and starts to attach value to objective structures, phenomena, or information of any kind (Bourdieu. 1984: 246-250). Moreover, Bourdieu purports that,

The habitus enables ... an intelligible and necessary relation to be established between practices and a situation, the meaning of which is produced by the

habitus through categories of perception and appreciation that are themselves produced by an observable social condition (1984: 101).

The input between individual and lived 'reality' is enormous. In all practices, it implies interactive dynamic between agent, practice, product, and world. It is various, complex and undergoes constant change. Therefore, it also implies constant cognitive reception and processing. This results in progressively accumulative integration of a multitude of evaluations, ideas, and information within already existing internalised organisational schemas. Such accommodations include processes of comparison, relation, and elaboration that, in a recursive fashion, fit their contribution into existing schemas. These processes recursively adjust and stack internalisations to *create new schemas of organisation*.

Evaluatory processes, for example, result in the rejection or retention (Bourdieu. 1984: 250) of values or beliefs. This happens to the extent that retained beliefs and disbeliefs exert influence on the individual's behaviour. Once habitual, such behaviour turns into 'characteristic' behaviour. Bourdieu regards repeated manifestations of such behavioural characteristics as 'disposition'. In this way, interaction results in the formation of dispositions. According to Bourdieu, dispositions become encoded⁸⁷ in perception to direct and shape practices (1983: 313).

Bourdieu formulates his definition of habitus in various ways. I repeat all of them here, because each formulation adds nuances that point to the complexity of habitus. In *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Bourdieu.1977: 78), he defines habitus as follows: "Habitus is the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations". In *Reproduction* (Bourdieu. 1977: 31-32), he explains habitus as "the product of internalization of the principles of a cultural arbitrary capable of

⁸⁷ Embodied code, as inner consolidation, is of the utmost importance as formative and transformative apparatus in cognitive experience. This embodiment brings about understanding, or appropriation, and application of knowledge, as well as mode and manner in musculature employment. Bryson asserts that the "habitus may involve explicit cultural knowledge, such as codes of justice or articles of faith, as well as the patently enculturated domain of art, where this is socially institutionalised; it may equally involve implicit cultural knowledge that exists nowhere in codified form, but remains at a tacit level" (1983: 14). Tacit social and cultural codes play a role in material practices (such as drawing) to effect, even determine, modes or manner. Bryson asserts, "Habitus is understood materially, as a mode of practice" (1983: 174). Such codes would also be active during gestic conversion, during the process of converting pre-meaning into meaning in mode, a stylistic aspect of drawing that would include trait.

perpetuating itself after PA [pedagogic action] has ceased and thereby of perpetuating in practices the principles of the internalized arbitrary". Here, and in a later publication, he defines habitus as "a system of durable, transposable dispositions which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices" (Bourdieu. 1977: 33, 41, 47) (Bourdieu.1979: vii). In *Distinction* (1984: 101-102), Bourdieu describes habitus as an "objective relationship between two objectivities that enables an intelligible and necessary relation to be established between practices and a situation". He further defines habitus as that facility in humans that produces meaning and understanding "through categories of perception and appreciation that are themselves produced by an observable social condition". In *The Rules of Art* (1996: 352, n43), he defines it as "a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, perceptions, and attitudes which are regular without being consciously coordinated or governed by any rule".

From Bourdieu's definitions of habitus, it is possible to surmise that habitus constitutes a deep-seated, unconscious array of personalised dispositions that function as an enabling system of perception and conception in the mind and in the body. The mind inculcates dispositions by drawing from those externalities that are characteristic of cultural and social spheres, from a socio-cultural habitus, as it were, where the individual interacts. As a result, generations transmit dispositional information (*phylogenesis*) from one to the next in a way analogous to the transmission of genetic information (*ontogenesis*) (Bourdieu.1996: 286). The mind inculcates dispositions continuously and concurrently with practices, always deriving them from its own subjective cultural and societal engagement.

Dispositions therefore are always subject to development and change. Because the mind always applies and sustains habitus as a consistently characteristic perceptual framework, it accomplishes dispositional development and change through the subjective formulation or conversion of concurrencies between objective structures, in-phase experience, and personal history. Self-reflexivity is possible in formulating concurrent experiences, because personal history in itself, as a derivative and resultant location from where formulation springs, already contains (or is 'embodied') and therefore pre-constitutes layers of formerly accrued dispositionally

assimilated formulations (Bourdieu. 1996: 286-289). The subject, therefore, is situated.

Subjectivity emphasises *infraconscious and infralinguistic complicity*⁸⁸ in formulating concurrencies between self and externalities (Bourdieu. 1998: 79). Subjective formulation could also constitute *improvisation* as conception in practices, by inference of a generative mobility forward, a physical and cerebrally based potential for proliferation of conception and inventiveness that suggests added dimensions to transformation. This dimension also adds potentialities for optional reactions and actions in formulations. As such, dispositional reactions and actions has the freedom of “*the space of possibles*”, which would comprise for example *dissent from, compromise in or compliance with* convention as arbitrary in the first place, thus enabling transformation or transcendence of institution (Bourdieu. 1996: 270-271).

I employ these notions to explain differentiation *in* practices, as they would logically explain differentiation *between* practices. Bourdieu asserts, “...there are thus as many fields of preferences as there are fields of stylistic possibilities” (1984: 226).

Habitus and difference

(See Addendum A, Illustrations 3, 9, & 10)

Personalised habitus is accountable for difference in practices that also involve production, such as drawing. Differentiation in practices pertains to diversity in a practice (e.g. different ways of standing); it pertains to diverse practices (the difference between standing and sitting); it pertains to the finest distinction, namely individuation in a practice (differences in one way of standing between different individuals). As such, different ways of drawing exist; drawing differs from painting; and *different individuals draw differently*, as much as they perceive lived reality in different ways. The latter distinction also manifests in the difference between the drawn image and the source material (**see Illustration 10, Addendum A**). The difference between the drawing and the perception of individuals is of interest. I

⁸⁸ I interpret ‘infra-’ here to suggest ‘within’ or ‘below’ the sphere of inner conscious awareness and ‘within’ or ‘below’ those systems of subjective, inner linguistic frameworks that construct meaning subjectively, rather than on the ‘outside’ or within the impositions of objective frames of language or lived ‘reality’.

point out *trait*,⁸⁹ as a quality that displays as difference between the drawings of individuals in **Illustrations 3 & 9, Addendum A.**

2.1.2 Field

In Bourdieu's thinking, the 'field' concept implies an *external structure*, a realm of practice, of production, and of objective relations. People participate and compete for position in a field (1996: 83, 100-103, 181, 231-234, 235) (1984: 226-230). It is a concept that entails influential dynamism in externalities – it constitutes an externally based mobilisation of forces in contrast to interaction with the *internally* based generative dynamic of habitus. Yet, field stands in an augmentative relationship to habitus. "The *field of production*", says Bourdieu, is "a space of objective relations" (1996: 181).

In secondary sources, field is often qualified as a "field of forces" (Harker. 1990: 8). As such, I associate it with the pursuit and action of a *game*, rather than with the stillness and captivity of a fenced-in field. Bourdieu, in an interview with Mahar, emphasises that a proper understanding of field necessarily requires "thinking in terms of a *system and relationships*" and he explains that, "society can be seen as a *system of fields within the social space*", a system that resembles "a planetary system, because the social space is really an integral field. Each field has its own structure and field of forces, and is set within a larger field, which also has its own forces, structures, and so on. As it develops, it is weaving a larger field" (Bourdieu in Mahar. 1990: 36. Emphasis PB).

It is clear to me that Bourdieu's concept of field constitutes interrelated territorial accruals that grow in dimension and extent in mobilised interplay between habitus, practice, and field. Social space encapsulates and integrates, for example, the artistic field, a field that incorporates the visual arts field and where, in turn, the field of drawing is located.

⁸⁹ For Derrida, *trait* accommodates a range of meanings, such as feature, line, stroke, or mark (1993: 2). I apply the term in this thesis to denote personalised features in drawing that includes line, trace, stroke, or mark, but also personalised applications of the conventions of drawing, such as composition, colour, subject, theme, or idea, and so forth. I must emphasise that my applications of the word 'trait' refer specifically to distinctive idiosyncrasies in drawing and, notwithstanding the exploratory and theoretical parallels that I draw between drawing and habitus, I by no means equate trait in drawing to personality trait that refer to human character or person.

If one applied such interactive reverberations to drawing, it would be reasonable to say that drawing, therefore, would weave a discursive network outwards in visual display and reference that could reach the fullest extent of the social space in which it is practiced. The components (or fields) of such a social space simultaneously weaves a network inwards that informs the field of drawing and the habituses of its practitioners. In metaphorical terms, these fields grow in reach and accrual to interconnect along diagonal, vertical, and horizontal lines or they spin in concentricity around a common axis, rather than moving separately in exclusionary circles.

Habitus and the *field of forces*, both products of history, stand in interactive relation to one another. This relationship produces *practice* (production or action⁹⁰), an activity that is centred in the individual (Bourdieu. 1990: 36). A dispositional urge in individuals to partake, to “struggle”, and “strategise” for position in the field, sustains this productive inter-dynamic. Bourdieu claims, “These struggles are seen to *transform* or *conserve* the field of forces” (1983: 312), because the agent conforms to norm, either rebels against it, or finds a compromise between the former two options.

‘Struggle’ and ‘strategising’ are the operative verbs in the individual’s participation in the field (Bourdieu. 1996: 197-198). In drawing, such struggle comprises its labour as crossing point between the self and objective structures. Such labour integrates an aesthetic idiolect,⁹¹ technical competence, and creativity. The student drafter fights constantly for a balanced accomplishment in all these dimensions to avoid either superficiality or rejection from the field. Here in lies additional interchanges and strategising, namely those between the display of trace and

⁹⁰ Philosophy distinguishes between practice and production. ‘Poiesis’ denotes ‘production’, “an activity which results in creating a product”. In contrast to this, ‘praxis’ denotes ‘practice’, suggesting “doing something” (PDP. 2005: 475 – 476). This contrasting of the two concepts also distinguishes ‘practice’ as requiring ‘virtue’, and ‘poiesis’ as requiring ‘skill’. Skill requires practice and virtue requires knowledge. I assume a conflation of the two meanings in my interpretation of Bourdieu’s term ‘practice’ to enclose all these nuances and I apply it as such in the thesis, or as a generic term that enfolds production and practice. In Chapter 3, I explore the simultaneity and ambiguity of the two concepts as they manifest in drawing.

⁹¹ Umberto Eco (1979: 271-273) identifies a corpus-idiolect comprising the aesthetic-, the work-, the movement-, and the period-idiocets, each positioning itself in a generative hierarchy of conceptualising paradigms that are accountable for individuated performances.

technique, and those between individual drawing practice and the field of forces. Such interchanges also involve evaluatory activities in critical reviewing and redrawing that would enable and increase possibilities of syntheses in drawing, an assumption that Bloom's taxonomy of the cognitive domain confirms⁹² (Swebok. IEEE. 2004; 1-8) (Bloom. 1956: 38, 39, 62-197).

The difference between having to comply rigidly to a game-plan that dictates strict rules according to which the game must be played, and having to 'struggle' and 'strategise' for position in the field as modes of interplay and engagement is important. The former option implies the dominance of objective structures in pre-determining the modes of engagement by subjects. The second option implies interactivity in which influence between objective structure and agency is reciprocal. Activities of struggle and strategising imply that the engagement of the subject is one of reflexivity, subjectivity, and self-reliance that bring about open-ended development of adeptness and variability in her engagement in the field. In contrast to this, rules require development only up to the point where the subject accomplishes sufficient compliance with such rules. Were the subject to disturb or challenge those structures of the game that the rules protect in any way, such structures would reject her to ensure their continued existence and stability.

Dissent, compromise, compliance

I interpret the relationship that Bourdieu describes between habitus and field as one that accommodates or facilitates development of both subject and objective structure. In contrast, the subject's dogged obedience to the rules that objective structures pre-determine would result in the stagnation of both subject and object.

⁹² Benjamin Bloom (1956: 62-187) organised the cognitive domain into five categories for purposes of defining educational objectives in curriculum design. These five categories constitute knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation – those abilities that are required in learning (1956: 201-207). They stand in a hierarchical relationship to each other and function recursively in intellectual development. It is, for example, not possible to comprehend without knowledge, to apply without knowledge and understanding, to analyse without application, understanding, and knowledge. Synthesis and evaluation, the highest orders in the cognitive domain, require knowledge, comprehension, application, and analysis. Synthesis and evaluation imply self-reflexive and therefore heterodox deviations from conventions (however minuscule in terms of deformation). Synthesis, as a cognitive ability, lies on an equal level with evaluation (Bloom. 1956: 185-187). Synthesis constitutes creation, where "the student originates, integrates, and combines conceptions into a product, plan, or proposal that is new to [her]" (Bloom. 1956: 162-164). In drawing, such a description would correlate with a drawing that is in no way a repetitive redistribution of existing form or the prevailing norms. As a framework for curriculum design, Bloom's taxonomy withstands the test of time perhaps because it accommodates renewal.

The interactive subject engages by means of a generative habitus and its deployment effects objective structure, which indicates pliancy and dynamism. Thus, a subject's participation in a field allows her habitus to generate innumerable strategies, because she has to respond to countless possibilities and configure constantly. I propose but three categories of such 'innumerable strategies', namely those of, for example, dissent, consent, and compromise. I see them as broad strategising categories with numerous subcategories that the subject can apply to varying degrees. In my discussions, I apply them to drawing in order to explain its potential for deviation from norm (see **Illustration 8, Addendum A**).

It is possible to see the functioning of the field of forces as twofold. It entails *partly* objective structure, which represents as the constraints of convention and norm. If individual competes for position in these structures, she gains position and her habitus engages in interaction with conventions. This interaction also indicates her agency in engagement that represents the second component in the field's functioning. This component entails self-conscious, habitus-based, involvement where transformation or conservation of convention would transpire in personalised qualities in practices. Bourdieu explains;

The probable future of a field is inscribed, at each moment, in the structure of the field, but each agent makes his own future – thereby helping to make the future of the field – by realizing the objective potentialities which are determined in the relation between his powers and the possibles objectively inscribed in the field (1996: 272).

As such, the drafter, when engaging in interplay with the conventions and structures of drawing, contributes to either transformation or progress in the field of drawing, or to repetitive conservation of its conventions or style languages.

2.1.3 Practice

In defining habitus and field and their interrelatedness, the concept of practice defines itself, literally emerging in demonstration of its genesis. The struggles and strategies for position in the field constitute the very engineering of practice. Individuated positing and positioning becomes possible as a result.

Practice entails “a dialectical production, continually in the process of reformulation” (Harker in Mahar et al. 1990: 101). This conception of practice is particularly consistent with a flexible and open understanding of its mechanisms as opposed to an inhibitive, restrictive understanding that would rather support a notion of law-bound redistribution of form (or norm). It centres the agent as generative manufacturer and practitioner who does not doggedly follow the *rules* of the game. Bourdieu’s deliberate deviation from ‘rule’ to ‘struggle’ and especially to ‘strategy’ in practice demonstrates a decisive break from structuralist logic, utilitarianism. It nullifies the notion of an agent as detached from objective structures in complete subjectivity (Mahar. 1990: 15).

I propose that in drawing, no rule should impose itself in the processes of production and labour, but that the labour itself, in its cerebrate orchestrations, participates in generating new form. To “struggle and strategise” in practices imply self-reliant decision-making processes that might result in dissent from, compromise in or compliance with norm or convention, a difference that constitutes the irrefutable involvement of *personalised choice* and *decision making* in dialectical exchange (Bourdieu. 1998: 79-85). In the next chapters, Bourdieu’s notion of practice provides foundation for my explorations of drawing.

2.2 A transcending and generative framework

The above discussions necessitate explanation of the habitus, practice, and field theoretical formation as a transcending framework. This framework supports and explains the body-mind conflation that I have already begun to incorporate into discussions. The formation, its particular relational arrangements, transcends several dualities in conventional social and cultural theory. Such dualities include not only the body versus mind duality,⁹³ but also agency versus structure, objective versus subjective, inner and outer, and unique (idiographic) versus universal (nomothetic⁹⁴)

⁹³ In a Cartesian framework, body and mind are separate, as John Cottingham explains in the *Dictionary of Philosophy* (2005: 153), “Perhaps the most controversial part of Descartes’s metaphysics, however, is the claim (made in the Sixth Meditation) that the nature of the mind as a pure thinking substance is entirely distinct from the nature of body, or extended substance, and hence ‘it is certain that I am really distinct from the body, and can exist without it’”.

⁹⁴ ‘Idiographic’: “relating to the study or discovery of particular scientific facts and processes as distinct from general laws” (ODE. 2005: 861). ‘Nomothetic’: “relating to the study or discovery of general scientific laws” (ODE. 2005: 1195)

antinomies. In the following section, I explain Bourdieu's erasure of such dualities in relation to drawing.

Habitus, practice, and field: a non-hierarchical formation

In his theoretical formation, Bourdieu centres habitus as originative, activating and bonding mediator between itself, practice, and field. In this way, Bourdieu locates the individual as centre of perception. He also locates the role of objective structures as a kind of framing device that can be both inhibitive and expansive or liberating, depending on the response habitus engenders. As we have seen, habitus can *transform* objective structures or *conform* to such structures by means of strategy and struggle. Objective structures, likewise, conform to habitus and practice. As such, the framing schemata of field are subject to change by habitus and practice. In such transformative interactivity between habitus, field, and practice, determinism is impossible, because both internal and external structures are subject to change. Dialectic and recursive interchange⁹⁵ as generators of interactivity *embed* in processes of synthesis and in practices. If the modes of exchange comprise dissent, consent, or compromise, objective schemata cannot remain static. Habitus, therefore, sustains flexible and versatile armature in which cerebration and externalities converse on a reciprocal basis. Thus, objective structure (field) and subjective agency (habitus and practice) merge. So do body and mind (habitus and practice), and the universal (field) and the unique (habitus and practice). Not habitus nor field or practice enjoys supremacy in any of the planes of their interrelatedness.

Habitus, practice, and field: a generative structure

As a theoretical formation, habitus, practice, and field hold a dimension that is imperative to understanding its versatility and relevance to the problem statement. This dimension entails its *generative function* that locates internally in habitus and practice and with partial externality and internality in field. In his definitions of habitus, Bourdieu relates it directly to self-generative production in structured practices. The originative, mediatory, and generative aspects of the formation lie in equal measure in interactivity and interchange. As such, mobility between agency

⁹⁵ 'Recursive interchange' suggests complicity between infraconscious and infralinguistic schemata of the habitus to structure meaning (Bourdieu. 1998: 79-80). See also the Glossary (Addendum B). Simon Blackburn explains recursivity as "a procedure that is applied once, and then applied to the result of that application" (2008: 309).

and structure dispels an artificial opposition between objective structures and subjective representations. Bourdieu applies the term “generative structuralism” to this notion. In its capacity as mediator, habitus describes a way of thinking and a manner of approaching problems to account for the *genesis of the person*. This conceives habitus, the perceptive and conceptive apparatus of a person, as accountable for her perception, her self-perception and for the practices and trajectory of her self in practices (Bourdieu. 1984: 100-102).

Bourdieu’s habitus theory leads to the notion of *generativist proliferation*, which pertains to incremental expansion of proficiencies, intellect, and the self, as well as to expansion of objective structures. Habitus is a *system*. Bourdieu calls habitus a ‘scheme’ of dispositions. Secondary sources on the subject puts forward several similar terms, such as ‘set’, ‘apparatus’ (Mahar, Harker & Wilkes.1990: 4, 10, 12, 15), ‘schema’, and ‘structure’ (Codd in Mahar et al. 1990: 138) (Mahar in Mahar et al. 1990: 35). These terms suggest a regularly *interacting* or *interdependent* apparatus that, in the agent, consists of a multitude of dispositional components. In their functioning, such dispositions form a unified whole that conflates perception, cognition, and conception. These different dispositional components of the habitus function in *equilibrium* with each other when subjected to related forces of intellectual inquiry, practices, or physical activity. Thus, they coordinate to operate and perform vital functions in a productive or generative capacity, because they also have a purpose in common in productive activity (such as drawing). Dispositions, as varied generative components of this facility, function as principal, but also compounded, agents of classification, categorisation, and organisation. In the process, they produce understanding and direct practices that are *identifiable* with the set of dispositions that evoked them, yet variable.

The above brings home the understanding that Bourdieu’s theories are ontological.⁹⁶ In his terms, the self is a social construct. It is necessary here to dwell a moment on the meaning of ‘ontological’ and my further applications of the word. I interpret it to suggest awareness of being in the capacity of being, which includes awareness of the being of self. As I mention above, this sense of self is inclusive of a situated and

⁹⁶ See also ‘ontological’ in the Glossary (Addendum B).

embodied cognition.⁹⁷ Its relation to time and space in a socio-cultural environment sustains embodiment. The self cannot shed the past, or history, of such cognition. Nonetheless, the self can, in the present, play out the spectre of an embodied cognition's development and future. Compilations of accrued and current mental and physical event *recursively* influence the practices of the self, which it enacts continuously in *ontological* involvement.⁹⁸

Drawing and individual-centredness

I would assume that the habitus of the drafter, in its interplay with drawing practice and field as a site of struggle and strategy, functions from the embodiment of *the drafter's* experiential cognition and enables *the drafter's* recognition in its references to *the drafter's own* accrued history. I would also assume that the generative paths of the drafter's habitus orchestrate convergent and associative connections between the immediacy of her *in-phase* perceptions and her memory. A consolidation between the two (experience and memory) brings forth conception and syntheses, which include evaluation (Bloom. 1956:163-165). The drawing competence she acquires in this way constitutes progressive levels of knowledge, understanding, application and analysis to enable syntheses that belong to her (Bloom. 1956: 62-63, 89-91, 120-123, 144-145, 163-168, 185-187). As such, they reflect individuated, separate contributions. Her syntheses in drawn display therefore have genuine constitutive power that relates to her "full status and potency" as drafter (Bourdieu. 1984: 466-467), the products of which contain the *potential* of eventually "represent[ing] themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after" (Bourdieu. 1977: 178).

⁹⁷ "Embodied cognition", Mark Johnson (1999: 119) asserts, "is the result of the evolutionary processes of variation and selection; is situated within a dynamic, ongoing organism-environment relationship; is problem-centered and operates relative to the needs, interests, and values of the organism; is not concerned with finding some allegedly perfect solution to a problem but, rather, one that works well enough relative to the current situation; and is often social and carried out cooperatively by more than one individual organism".

⁹⁸ *Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy* (2005: 442) defines 'ontology' as "inquiry into, or theory of, being qua being", in other words, being in the capacity or character of being. The ontological involvement that Bourdieu asserts as a determining factor in practices, I therefore interpret as inferring the complicity of self-as-being in practices. See also 'ontology', 'ontic', and 'qua' in the Glossary (Addendum B).

Diversity

It becomes clear why a drawing class that comprises diverse individuals produces various and ever-changing ranges of individuated trait, unless they are taught to repress trait in favour of stylistic emulation or formula. We see why the drawing facilitator must assume that each drafter will utter the self in an individuated manner. Disposition manifests in people as consistently recurrent, yet *evolving* modes of mental and physical behaviours and habitual practices. This means that individual student drafters will also constantly adapt and change their understanding and syntheses. This concept contributes to the complexity of the educationally based drawing studio situation. Habitus as a basis for a *facilitative* concept and apparatus renders drawing practice quite fickle and volatile for both student drafter and facilitator. A range of habituses that cannot but produce *diversity* as ever-changing understandings of 'reality', produce diverse and ever-changing drawings. This situation leaves the notion of a rigid, constant 'reality' impossible to accept as a gauge of quality and standard. To reduce lived 'reality' to formula would make the facilitator's assessment easier, but it would destroy the potential creativity of the student drafters.

'Reality'

Bourdieu pronounces 'reality' to be that against which "we measure all *fictions*", and cautions that this 'reality' constitutes the "guaranteed referent of a collective illusion" (1977: 13). In other words, 'reality'⁹⁹ is a construct. In visual imagery, it is a recognised and *re-assimilated* perception; an illusion once removed from what was delusion in the first place, albeit a collective one. Individuated gesture in autonomous representations, as differentiated contributions, can never be mere recordings of perceptions that would only have to maintain the repetition of one unshakable¹⁰⁰ 'reality' in imagery. In each drawing process that a student drafter

⁹⁹ I also interpret this to mean that the images that student drafters produce would emerge from a sphere of mutuality, or "a coincidence" (Bryson. 1983: 13) between the conversions that their own habitus construct in drawn display, and 'a collective illusion' or 'delusion', as it were. Bryson confirms habitus as such a 'mutuality' in his words, "Culture produces around itself a 'habitus' which, though discontinuous with the natural world, merges into it as an order whose join with Nature is nowhere visible" (1983: 14).

¹⁰⁰ I refer to the notion of an absolute and unanimous visual experience that serves as unshakeable norm to which drawings should conform, albeit in various degrees of fidelity that depends on observational skill and accuracy. In sociological terms, this would relate to the notion that humans experience a drive to 'naturalise' a constructed 'reality', and in drafteric terms, that a range of possible fidelities exist between two extremes, delusional construct on the one end and absolute, immutable 'reality' on the other end. In other words, although cultural norm or social interactivity may

undertakes, habitus reiterates the past, but also iterates¹⁰¹ anew, upon which it changes and adapts to repeat again in new sequences of layered iterations, a dynamic flow in which both habitus and practice proliferate and evolve.¹⁰² Bourdieu explains that such habitus-governed practices tend to reproduce the memory of regularities in the original objective conditions, while adjusting to current habitus-governed perceptions of external circumstances as continuously changing (1977: 78).

As individuated drawing never accomplishes a supreme state of completeness and since individuation evolves and develops along various levels of sophistication and skill (**see Illustrations 8 & 9, Addendum A**), individuated gesture can also not adhere to the notion of a 'reality' in stasis. In contrast to this, reproduction of style language demands adherence to a static 'reality'. It demands from the drafter a representation that would dispel any possibilities of diverse syntheses.

My interpretations above of Bourdieu's habitus formation and its explanation of 'reality', underpin the difference between utilising and creating style language in drawing that I discussed in the previous chapter. Creating style language entails diverse syntheses in drawing, while in contrast, the re-utilisation of style language constitutes stagnation – "which betrays false consciousness" (Foster. 1999: 59-60).

We see that, in Bourdieuan terms, 'reality', as flexible phenomenon, sheds its powers of conformity and formula. If applied to drawing, these terms imply that the drafter's syntheses can be as variable as her understanding of 'reality' (**see Illustration 2, Addendum A**). Moreover, such variable presentation promotes further proliferation of syntheses, because the processes of drawing contain the very

lead to a constructed 'reality', the drafter would attempt, in her imagery, to convert her construct to conform to a perceived Absolute Creation that has existed as unchangeable absolute since the beginning of time, or to a single Truth that is just as absolute and immutable.

¹⁰¹ I try here to predict the role of enaction, a concept which I introduced in the previous chapter in relation to presentation and representation and on which I elaborate below.

¹⁰² Here I hope to bring home the understanding of habitus as interactive facilitator in the drawing process. It creates a collective illusion, it fills a sphere of mutuality between lived 'reality' and mind, and it enables a mode of practice. Since it is encompassing, it functions to unify dualities. No seam, no join exists between the drafter's mind and her grasp of visibility, between the labour of drawing and nature. Irruption of trait in drawing, could be seen as 'natural' in relativist and sociological terms, yet such terms do not explain "a view of the habitus from the inside" (Bryson. 1983: 17), as I noted in the Introduction.

workings of cerebrative diversity, in which the advent of creativity also resides. Cerebration is self-based, as is perception of 'reality'.

However, if the drafter perceives 'reality' as an unvarying phenomenon, it becomes constrictive with its edicts of fidelity – edicts that necessarily contain formulae that ensure faithful mimesis. In drawing, the “ritual repetition” (Bourdieu 1996: 180) of style language does not produce new language. Those past and concurrent assimilations, which entail “a critical systematization of acquisitions from all quarters” (Bourdieu 1996: 180), remain absent during the repetition of style language. Bourdieu (1996: 180) expresses the notion as follows:

...a religious fidelity to such and such a canonic author (which inclines one to *ritual repetition*) ... is a forbidding of what appears to me the only possible attitude to theoretical tradition: *an inseparable assertion of both continuity and rupture*, through a critical systematization of acquisitions from all quarters.

2.3 The unconscious: habitus as a facility that merges antinomies

With his words “*an inseparable assertion of both continuity and rupture*”, Bourdieu (1996: 180) refers to the notion that the habitus logically dispels a number of antinomies. Bourdieu locates habitus in the *unconscious* mind. He asserts that such unconscious regulation (habitus) stretches through both physical and mental human practices. In *Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste* (1984: 466) Bourdieu asserts:

The schemes of the habitus, the primary forms of classification, owe their specific efficacy to the fact that *they function below the level of consciousness and language, beyond the reach of introspective scrutiny or control by the will*. Orienting practices practically, they embed... in the most automatic gestures or the apparently most insignificant techniques of the body – ways of walking or blowing one's nose, ways of eating or talking – and engage the most fundamental principles of construction and evaluation of the social world.

Doxic modality (particular, self-directed *modes* in which a person thinks), and musculature, (particular modes in which a person uses her body (*hexis*)), function as

inseparable facilities. Such inseparability between body and mind erases more dualities.

This transcending of antinomies pivots on *habitus*, which contains the schemata that regulate both perception and conception. Similarly, the same schemata are accountable for cognition and recognition. Without cognition, recognition is not possible, and vice versa. The same is true for perception and conception. These confluences achieve a greater subject and object conflation. *Habitus*, because of its non-hierarchical relationship with practice and field, unites subjective and objective structures.

Understanding constitutes a modally transformative process that regulates the mobility between cognition and recognition. In his book *Practical Reason* (1998: 81), Bourdieu describes this merging process as the moment when the “embodied structures and the objective structures are in agreement, when perception is constructed according to the structures of what is perceived” and when that happens “everything seems obvious and goes without saying”.

Bourdieu also professes here that it is to *this experience of belief* – to such agreement between the *habitus* and lived ‘reality’ – that one assigns supreme credibility. The agreement, as perfect fit, becomes tacit to the extent that one does not perceive it as a *belief*. It becomes *embodied*, to be spontaneously and artlessly enacted. It is therefore our understanding of the world – how we perceive and conceive it – that amalgamates us with world.

As a drafter, I believe that such a ‘match up’ between inner structures of *habitus* and outer structures of *habitus* comes close to describing the experience of making a mark. Only in hindsight is it possible to understand that the making of a mark occurs in the complete acceptance of the mark’s contextual credibility, relevance, and aptness (if not its accuracy that, as an absolute, would not be possible in any case). The conscious knowledge that a ‘fit’ has occurred does not accompany the action of making a mark. Only once it has appeared, its fit is evident within context. For this reason, I think of specific forms of mark making in drawing as *autogenous*. They seem to irrupt without verification or *before* conscious verification. Mark making

seems to interface as *habitus*, or vice versa. Even the credibility of marks goes unchecked. On an unconscious level, the drafter seems to understand their credibility almost automatically. The conscious speculation that, if they are not credible immediately, they probably will be so at some later stage in the drawing occurs after the fact, if at all. In this sense, mark making is an activity that flourishes in unknowingness and that gains conscious knowledge through recursive accrual.

The above-mentioned 'fit' (between conscious perceptions, unconscious perceptions, and objective structures) suggests a *habitus* both in the mind of the individual and in lived 'reality'. Indeed, Norman Bryson says,

Culture produces around itself a 'habitus', which though discontinuous with the natural world, merges into it as an order whose join with Nature is nowhere visible. If the context of animal species is the habitat, the *habitus* of the human species consists not only of the physical environment, but of a whole assemblage of maxims, morals, proverbial love, values beliefs, and myths which will ensure for the members of a given social formation the coherence of their experience, and will secure for them the permanent reproduction of the regularities of their cultural process (1983: 14).

In Bourdieu's account (1977: 164), the term *doxa* describes this process of understanding as conformity between internality and externality (between dispositional schemata and objective structures). It explains the moment of grasping something on a tacit plane, of understanding something in complete resolve and acceptance, because it coincides with existing or assimilated structures of cognition. If one considers the concepts 'orthodoxy' as conforming to *doxa* and 'heterodoxy' as dissenting or deviating from *doxa* into multiplicity, the particularity of *doxa* as intrinsically central concept becomes clear. Neither heterodoxy as concept, nor orthodoxy as concept would have been possible without *doxa* as central measurement. *Doxa* underpins doxic modality and refer to those schemes of thought and perception that external social structures produce in interactivity, but that seem so self-evident that people take such tacit understandings for granted. *Doxa* constitutes all those systems of classification that constrain cognition, but also produce dissent from or consent to the arbitrariness of their origin and foundations (Bourdieu. 1977: 164).

In a practice like drawing, the compliance of doxic and somatic modality to objective structures occurs to turn around upon it. In this reflexive way, drawing becomes the subjective enactions of the drafter. Doxic modality and somatic gesture occur as drawn gesture.

In light of the above, it is clear that Bourdieu's theory of habitus does not support a defined dualism between mind and body in which an exalted "unconscious mechanism" presides over a lesser bodily action, mannerism, or behaviour. Bourdieu posits his explanation of habitus as "a transubstantiated concept, a concept where the implicit dualism of mind and body are transcended so that even the body can be seen as a memory" (1977: 94). Likewise, mind, memory, and habitus occupy the brain, a bodily organ that also regulates sense-impressions such as sight, smell, tactility, hearing, and taste. Habitus, according to Bourdieu, constitutes "a socialized body, a structured body, a body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a world or of a particular sector of that world – a field – and which structures the perception of that world as well as action in that world" (1998: 81). Practices unify mindfulness and the somatic, which are entrenched in modal conversion. In the act of drawing, the hand largely moves without the conscious mind directing or commanding it to move. I assign the word 'autogenous' to marks that irrupt on the drawing surface in such a way and I relate it to habitus as incorporative body-mind that engages (through drawing practice) in interaction, but perhaps even more so to the notion of enaction.

Although I will rely on the drawings in **Addendum A** to demonstrate it, I do not explore in any depth the 'mechanics' and nature of somatic modality and its influence on self-knowledge and self-transformation or in transfiguring one's inner sense of self, but Richard Shusterman (2008: 15 – 48) confirms the body's essential role in personal development. He conceives three fundamental branches, analytical, genealogical and pragmatic, in the field of 'somaesthetics', inferring a defined relationship between physical experience, practice, and the development of, for example, a mindful aesthetic awareness in his book *Body Consciousness, A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics* (2008). He notes that,

Besides the traditional topics in philosophy of mind, ontology, and epistemology that relate to the mind-body issue and the role of somatic factors in consciousness and action, analytic somaesthetics also includes the sort of genealogical sociological, and cultural analyses that Foucault so powerfully introduced into contemporary philosophy and that has helped shape the somatic theory of Pierre Bourdieu and feminist theorists such as Judith Butler and Susan Bordo (2008: 23).

Somaesthetics, he purports, “offers a way of understanding how complex hierarchies of power can be widely exercised and reproduced without any need to make them explicit in laws or to enforce them officially; they are implicitly observed and enforced simply through our bodily habits” (2008: 21-22). A connection, for example, could exist between the habitual bodily posture of the working student drafter, and her perpetuation of an assumption that the facilitator represents authority. The drafter demonstrates her perception of the facilitator’s drawing style as exalted, on a higher level, superior, and therefore inevitably a sanctioned norm to be copied or mimed, in bodily posture. The student drafter ‘bows down to’ authority, she works in a lower, seated position, hiding behind her easel, refusing to put her whole body into gesture. When the facilitator criticises copying or self-effacement, the body of the student drafter reacts in the form of tears, blushing, cringing in mortification, laughter of embarrassment, a hand furtively covering the mouth, a head that bows in shame, all consistent with somatic training that performs respect for authority. Shusterman asserts that,

Any successful challenge of oppression should thus involve somaesthetic diagnosis of the bodily habits and feelings that express the domination as well as the subtle institutional rules and methods of inculcating them, so that they, along with the oppressive social conditions that generate them, can be overcome (2008: 22).

This would relate to a mediator’s efforts to diminish the power of legitimised style by emphasising the power of trait to deviate, to renew, and to enhance creativity. Somaesthetics suggests also, however, an aesthetic already entrenched and therefore prescriptive in terms of gestic conversion, resulting in automatic conformity in mark making (Shusterman. 2008: 23 – 24).

Bourdieu dispels such potential pre-determinism by erasing antinomies between the universal and the unique, between body and mind, and between habitus and practice. If a drafter constructs a particular drawing so that its display and content is meaningful, recognisable, or viewable, it ceases to be particular despite its display of individuated trait. This is so, because it displays the enactions of the drafter's habitus, which carries the influences of interchange with drawing as field and with the socio-cultural space where her viewing audience resides. The viewing audience and the drafter hold visual schemata in common. Although the drafter conforms, transforms, or deforms the conventions of such visual schemata to provoke connotative value, to interweave and invoke referencing even further afield, common ownership of it renders her work accessible to a wider audience (Bourdieu. 1992: 75-77). Although gesture and trace in drawing can be individuated and specific to an individual, it is at the same time generalised as common language. *Infraconscious* and *infralinguistic* complicity in practices imply both the *individuated* and *generalised* nature of a person's practices, because such complicity is also active on *inter-linguistic* and *inter-conscious* levels.

2.4 Enaction

Varela completely dispels any antinomy between perception and conception in practices, as much as between body and mind. In Chapter 1, a brief discussion on the divided self already indicated "unconscious symbolic computation and conscious experience" as two components of cognition. (Varela. 1992: 52). According to Varela, these two aspects of cognition entail intentionality¹⁰³ and consciousness in perceptual engagement and actions. Varela poses the following question: "How, then, if intentionality and consciousness are fundamentally distinct, does cognition come to be about the world as we consciously experience it?" (1992: 52). As I explained in Chapter 1, he poses a 'middle way' that also pertains to objectivist versus subjectivist views of the world.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Mautner defines intentionality as "the property of mental phenomena whereby the mind can contemplate non-existent objects and states of affairs" (2005: 307). Mautner also cites Brentano, who defines intentionality as "the distinctive characteristics of mental phenomena" (2005: 307).

¹⁰⁴ I explained in Chapter 1 that, according to Varela, the objectivist view positions the world as 'out there', a preordained objective 'reality' with pre-given properties that a person recovers through cognition. Varela states that, "These exist prior to the image that is cast on the cognitive system,

Strongly akin to Bourdieu's theories regarding interactivity, Varela poses this middle way as a confluence that enables "world and perceiver [to] specify each other" (1999: 172). Such a middle way implies a "mutual specification", such as interaction would elicit, as active core between objectivist recognition and subjectivist cognition as deterministic *pre-given*. *Cognition*, Varela asserts, *is neither recovery, nor projection*. Both such recovery and projection make for representation. Rather, cognition is *embodied action* (1999: 172-180). The word 'embody' refers to his assertion that physical experiences, actions, or practices form and develop cognition. Cognition, therefore, is contingent upon the *actions* of the body. The body has sensory facilities and motor facilities, enabling it to impart motion. It has "sensorimotor capacities". Cognition "depends on the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities" (Varela. 1999: 173).

The context within which cognition functions to be productive, therefore, does not only include the socio-cultural sphere, but also biological and psychological spheres. By using the term '*action*', Varela intends "to emphasise that sensory and motor processes, perception, and action are fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition. Indeed, the two are not merely contingently linked in individuals, they have also evolved together" (1999: 173).

Varela assigns the term "*enaction*" to a union between these two concepts. He formulates enaction as a process in which "perceptually guided action" encloses perception and "cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided" (Varela. 1999: 173).

The point of departure in his thinking shifts focus to a unified body-mind and, by extension, to the local situation of an individual's perception. It would explain how the drafter, as perceiver, could conduct and funnel her traces in drawing. As such, his theory could possibly account for the legibility of the body (as idiosyncratic drawn gesture) in trace creation. He positions enaction as the body's participative

whose task is to recover them appropriately (whether through symbols or global subsymbolic states)" (1999: 172). The subjectivist view, as opposite extreme, posits the possibility that the human "cognitive system projects its own world", and that "the apparent 'reality' of this world is merely a reflection of internal laws of the system" (Varela. 1999: 172).

engagement in perceptual stimuli.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, Varela (1999: 173) asserts that these local stimuli diverge and change constantly because of the perceiver's activity. This notion, he says, shifts the reference point for understanding perception from a pre-given, perceiver-independent world to the sensorimotor structure of the perceiver, which locates itself in the way that the nervous system links sensory and motor surfaces. Varela asserts that this constitution forms the manner in which the perceiver is embodied, and it regulates how the perceiver can act and how environmental events can modulate her actions.

Varela's postulation offers divergence, changeability, and transformation as the elements that distinguish embodied action or enaction from objectivism and subjectivism (1999: 172-173). These elements constitute the capacity of trait to diverge in its transformations. This capacity enables deviation from norm – even when trait itself becomes norm.

The oppositional contrasts I set between diversity in syntheses through trait and the redistribution of style language as well as emulation find a parallel here. Such parallel constitutes the representationist understanding of cognition that both an objectivist and subjectivist mind theory pose, in contrast to the presentationist understanding of cognition, which offers the flexible divergences of an enactionist, embodied cognition. The parallel acquires another dimension, namely that of stasis versus self-reflexive proliferation.

2.5 Reversibility

Bourdieu's theory of how interactivity is sustained and Varela's theory of enaction converge with certain aspects of the theories of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, particularly those that resolve antimony between an objective–subjective duality. Bourdieu acknowledges that habitus “fulfills a function which another philosophy consigns to a

¹⁰⁵ Hence, the notions of in-phase experience (see the Glossary, Addendum B) and the presence of self (see Chapter 3). Varela relates embodied action to the notion of first-person events as the “I of the storm” as situated between “selfless minds and human experience” (1992: 57). He explains, “By first-person events we mean the lived experience associated with cognitive and mental events. Sometimes terms such as ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and even ‘qualia’ are also used, but it is natural to speak of ‘conscious experience’ or simply ‘experience’. These terms imply that the process being studied (vision, pain, memory, imagination, etc.) appears as relevant and manifest for a ‘self’ or ‘subject’ that can provide an account; they have a ‘subjective’ side” (2002: 1-14).

transcendental conscience” (1998: 81) and he poses habitus as mediator in interactivity along a pathway back and forth between subjective and objective structures. I draw together interaction and enaction as genitive foundation of trait irruption.

I emphasise the transcendence of a duality between object and subject, whether by interactivity, enaction, or lateral mutuality, because it challenges the (objectivist) notion that drawing should function as a passive recording of perceptions. It also challenges the notion that a drafter cannot change her manner of drawing, which, according to a subjectivist view, would be cast in concrete by genetic pre-determination. Because of its acknowledgement of practice-based divergence, an enactionist view seems more appropriate as framework for explaining the foibles of trait in drawing. The enactionist approach, that Bourdieu, Varela, and Merleau-Ponty frame, would suggest the origin of trait in the drafter as being embodied. As such, the drafter enacts *through* drawing, a productive activity of transformation, her conviction in self-as-being.

Merleau-Ponty postulates the notions of reversibility, chiasm, and a lateral transcendence ('flesh') between object and subject to dispel a duality between the two. Distinguishing between the “visible” and the “nonvisible”, Merleau-Ponty alights on the “transcendental” as an eclipse between subject and object. He describes conception of the “invisible” as *going beyond* understanding objects as *being in themselves* to the *nucleus of being* that the self and environment hold as *mutuality*. This involves “suppressing the model *In itself*: there is no longer anything but representations” (1968: 226). He asserts that these representations, their “inevitable inconsistencies...and their lateral implication in one another are the ‘reality’, exactly: that the ‘reality’ is their common framework (*membrure*), their nucleus” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 226). Reality, like the self, is a construct.

This description of ‘reality’ echoes Bourdieu’s description of ‘reality’ as the consensual referent of a *collective* illusion. An object, in other words, *represents* itself when the subject views it. The subject’s vision *represents* her, and as such, her view is *subjective*. She sees the object in a way that is unique to her understanding of it, which carries the spores of her embodied personal history. “*Being* is their common

inner framework”, – a mutuality, a common existentiality that I interpret to reside between drafter, world, and the act of drawing. The drafter enacts the subjective and tacit understanding of this, without consciously knowing it, as “lateral transcendence”, as the “invisible”, a mutuality-of-being between herself and her subject matter (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 227-228).

Merleau-Ponty assigns the term “flesh” to this “common inner framework of being” as a transcending mutuality, or nucleus, between seer and seen, and he associates it with his notions of “chiasm” and “reversibility”¹⁰⁶ (Evans. 2008: 188). Merleau-Ponty asserts that such nucleus is active between seers and seen. He also turns it around, to assert that the seen sees the seer, or “our seeing objects can change into their seeing us” (Evans. 2008: 188).

In a literal frame of mind, one could interpret this as Merleau-Ponty assigning a rather dubious ability to the objective world to see, as a form of physical merging between the visible and the observer. Merleau-Ponty suggests, however, a merging between the visible and the invisible on a subliminal level. I interpret this subliminal ‘merging’ to indicate the observer and the seen as two interacting aspects of an inclusive but multiple ‘reality’. In such interaction, the seer does not recover the visible, nor project the visible. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty purports:

The visible about us seems to rest in itself. It is as though our vision were formed in the heart of the visible, or as though there were between it and us an intimacy as close as between the sea and the strand. And yet it is not possible that we blend into it, nor that it passes into us, for then the vision would vanish at the moment of formation, by disappearance of the seer or of the visible. What there is then, are not things first identical with themselves, which would then offer themselves to the seer, nor is there a seer who is first empty and who, afterward, would open himself to them – but something to which we could not be closer than by palpating it with our look, things we could not dream of seeing ‘all naked’ because the gaze itself envelops them, clothes them with its own flesh (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 130-131).

¹⁰⁶ The literary concept of *chiasmus* suggests the reversed order of words that also inverts their meaning, as for example in the phrase “to stop too fearful, too faint to go” (Evans. 2008: 188).

Existence, an intimate mutuality between viewer and world, acts with two-sided reciprocity, or rather, reversibility, between the two. In a rather strange fashion, Merleau-Ponty reflects this notion of reversibility in his words, “My body model of the things and the things model of my body” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 131). Fred Evans explains that Merleau-Ponty wants to come as close as possible to enunciating an interactive exchange between the two that would eliminate subject and object as duality (2008: 185). This intimate exchange reflects the accomplishment of a total unification, a complete transubstantiation between subjective and objective structures.

Mute and blind pivot

My interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s notions suggests a plane of experience in looking at something in which the sense of being self recognises, or finds its match in the existence of world – the mutual existentiality between self and lived ‘reality’. This experience is mute. I perceive such muteness as a silent¹⁰⁷ space, empty of thought, yet infused with a subliminal sense of mutuality. The seer cannot account for it in visible form, but only in cognition (and then not even in thought).¹⁰⁸ I propose that the drafter can account for it in visible form only if she marks it in simultaneity. The point where reversibility pivots is where (and when) mark making occurs. Gestic conversion in drawing, I believe, activates and intensifies this ‘mute’ or ‘blind’ pivot, although it does not dwell there for very long. For the drafter, I propose, the activation of such mute pivot is self-originative mark making, and her pivot is blind, rather than mute. In other words, the drafter seeks to fill this void with visibility, rather than with audibility.

In this sense, or rather, in this void, trace denotes self-as-being, but it does not dwell in one place very long, because once it occurs, the self reveals itself as static. Thereby, trace enters the sphere of a language of visualisation, going beyond blindness to show the self, rather than holding it in captivity or promoting belief in its

¹⁰⁷ Hence the phrase ‘*The mark of a silent language*’ in the title of the thesis.

¹⁰⁸ To corroborate the interpretation, I quote Derrida (1993: 53): “The aperspective thus obliges us to consider the objective definition, the anatomico-physiology or ophthalmology of the ‘*punctum caecum*’, as itself a mere image, an analogical index of vision itself, of vision in general, of that which, seeing itself see, is nevertheless not reflected, cannot be ‘thought’ in specular or speculative mode – and thus is blinded because of this, blinded at this point of ‘narcissism’, at that very point where it sees itself looking”. In drawing, this space, empty of thought, enacts pure solipsism, pure narcissism – “to touch oneself, to see oneself, accordingly, is not to apprehend oneself as an object, it is to be open to oneself, destined to oneself (narcissism)” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 249).

non-existence. “Nor therefore, is it to reach oneself, the self in question is by divergence...*Unverborgenheit* of the *Verborgen*” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 249).

Derrida purports:

- I'll agree that, at its originary point, the trait is invisible and the draftsman is blind to it, but what about afterwards, once the line has been traced? – Let's look now at the second aspect. It is not an aftereffect, a second or secondary aspect. It appears, or rather disappears, without delay. I will name it the withdrawal (*retrait*) or the eclipse, the differential inappearance of the trait (Derrida. 1993: 53).

'Differential' and 'divergence' are key concepts in this, as much as 'being' and 'not being'. Trait must differentiate between appearance and disappearance, or between the hidden and unhidden. In order to appear, trait diverts from disappearance; to become unhidden, it diverts from the hidden. Trait diverts from self-as-nothing,¹⁰⁹ to reveal the other of self – self-as-being.

The reversible laterality that Merleau-Ponty defines, locates itself in the unconscious, as does Bourdieu's interactive habitus and Varela's enactionist cognition. As my discussion above suggests, drawing fulfills the role of a dialogical and two-sided engagement with the objective world that is furnished by the conscious and unconscious. Drawing (gesture as trace and trait) could be seen as an act that bridges the chasm between drafter and object. As such, drawing as a creative form of interchange or engagement between drafter and environment, constitutes an entwinement in itself.

¹⁰⁹ The fundamentally nihilistic notion of a non-existent self is a view that Varela opposes radically in his discussions on the work of Minsky and Papert in cognitive science, because such notion denies human experience or embodiment as contributive and formative dynamic in the creation of both understanding and meaning (Varela, 1992: 105-130). Varela concludes that, “The deep problem, then, with the merely theoretical discovery of mind without self in as powerful and technical a context as late-twentieth-century science is that it is almost impossible to avoid embracing some form of nihilism. If science continues to manipulate things without embracing a progressive appreciation of how we live among those things, then the discovery of mind without self will have no life outside the laboratory, despite the fact that the mind in that laboratory is the very same mind without self. This mind discovers its own lack of a personal ground – a deep and remarkable discovery – and yet has no means to embody that realization” (Varela. 1992: 127). Self is essential to embodiment, embodied action, embodied cognition, and to self-reflexivity, as will become clear in due course.

2.6 Converging theories

Varela acknowledges convergences between his theory of enaction and those of Merleau-Ponty that pertain to an eclipse between object and subject. Like Merleau-Ponty, he positions the commonalities or legitimate convergences between sensory and motor systems of the body as influential participants in perceptually guided action. As I explain above, this implies a perceiver-dependent world and a world-dependent perceiver (Varela. 1999: 173). Bourdieu does the same by conflating the doxa and hexis duality as one into his formulation of habitus – a habitus that mediates interactively between subject and object. Merleau-Ponty purports that humans contribute to the constitution of form in practices and interactions, while environment can determine behaviour.

In *The Structures of Behavior* (1963: 13), Merleau-Ponty says, “The properties of the object and the intentions of the subject...are not only intermingled; they also constitute a new whole”. He says that it is impossible to determine which occurs first in exchanges of stimuli and responses. External influences always condition all movements of the human body and it is therefore possible to assert that behaviour is an effect of the milieu. This could be turned around,

Since all the stimulations, which humans receive, have in turn been possible only by its preceding movements, which have culminated in exposing the receptor organ to external influences, one could also say that behavior is the first cause of all the stimulations (1963: 13).

Merleau-Ponty adds to this, “the form of the excitant is created by the organism itself, by its proper manner of offering itself to actions from the outside” (1963: 13). Humans themselves choose the stimuli in the physical world to which they are sensitive. “The environment (*Umwelt*) emerges from the world through the actualization or the being of the organism” (1963: 13).

Varela concludes that, in such an approach, environment embeds in perception and enforces constraints on perception. Perception also contributes to the enactment of the surrounding world. Therefore, enaction itself manifests as reversibility between subject and object. The person enacts self as the history of her interactions with the

surrounding world, while the surrounding world continues to impose upon her enaction. “Thus”, Varela states, “as Merleau-Ponty notes, the organism both initiates and is shaped by the environment. The organism and environment are bound together in reciprocal specification and selection” (1999: 174).

As we have seen, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus occupies the convergence between dualities; habitus constitutes cognition, the facility that draws subject and object together. In practices, the person and her habitus are absorbed in her *doing*. Habitus is “present at the coming moment, the doing, the deed, the immediate correlate of practice which is *not posed as an object of thought*, as a possible aimed for in a project, but which is inscribed in the present of the game” (Bourdieu. 1998: 80).

2.7 Practice, temporality, spatiality

With these words, Bourdieu poses the *temporality* of practice, the *in-phase* activities, as incorporative of both body and mind. For the duration of the act of drawing, for example, the gesture and trace that the body enacts, if ‘*not posed as an object of thought*’, is directly instrumental in its ‘look’ and visibility. If the muscles of the hand are tense, the enacted line will recount such tension. If the concurrent subliminal encounter is one of tension, such tension will show itself in enacted line. If the physical inclination or disposition of the body is one of rounded exuberance or harsh sparseness, one of ease and comfort, or injure and anxiety, the enacted line it produces will display traces of its disposition. The dispositional body is as legible in its tracings as is mind and thought. This notion suggests that the legibility of the habitus-governed body-mind displays itself as both individuation and signification in gesture, and its typicality relate trait.

This connection between practice, temporality, and spatiality (the subject’s physical position in space) exists in relation to future: firstly as *projection*, (possibilities that might ensue from the practice) and secondly, as *protension*. Protension constitutes pre-perceptive anticipation, “a sort of practical induction based on previous experience, a relationship to a future that is not a future, to a future that is almost present” (Bourdieu. 1998: 80).

This understanding is of interest, because pre-perceptive anticipation also entails *affiliations of credence*. In drawing, the suggestive language of gesture is complex and stratified. The drafter may trace her interpretation of the outline of a three-dimensional object as an illusion of that object on a two-dimensional surface. Although only two dimensions of the object might be visible in the drafter's representation of it in image, the drafter (and viewer) 'fills in' a third dimension, because she perceives the third dimension automatically as an affirmation of her belief in this dimension. The hidden dimension is therefore insinuated as present in the image. Both drafter and viewer understand this dimension to be present.

In a more complex example (but based on the same principle), the drafter could employ line that suggests what the viewer already knows. A mutual script, shared by viewer and drafter, already exists. The type of line that conveys aggression, lyricism, constriction, or whim, and so forth (Betti & Sale.1997: 155-159) can communicate these qualities only if the viewer can connect the expressive language of line with the corresponding form of the line. This constitutes what Bourdieu calls "a relationship of belief" (Bourdieu. 1998: 80) that would pertain to drawing as a language of visualisation.

According to Bourdieu, belief, or credence – a wider sphere than the materially visible – is that which we accord to something we perceive. It constitutes the connotative in denotation, where the drafter leaves room for association or imagination, and where the viewer gains space for playing out her imagination. The two-dimensional inscription obtains illusionary three-dimensional qualities as well as wider expressive and enactionist (trait-related) meanings. Similarly, the viewer achieves understanding by recognising her own doxa and musculature in the doxa and musculature of the drafter.

2.8 Self as trait

Within this framework of pre-perceptive anticipation, it is possible to assume at this point that the variability of the drafter's self could realise as trait in her drawing. In other words, the viewer can perceive or believe the drafter's 'self' to be in the

drawing, because individuated gesture as irruptive from an “immediate correlate of practice” insinuates a self-originativity that precedes the visualising language that is drawing.

Furthermore, in processes of gestic conversion, pre-perceptive anticipation and their affiliations of credence also become entrenched in cerebration and doxic modality that, with musculature, could account for trait in drawing. The following explanation of Merleau-Ponty relates:

...no *Wahrnehmer* perceives except on condition of being a *Self of movement*. One's own movement (*mouvement propre*), attestation of a *thing-subject*: a movement like that of the things, but movement *that I make* – Start from there in order to understand language as the foundation of the I think: it is to the I think what movement is to perception. Show that the movement is *carnal* – It is in the carnal that there is a relation between the Movement and its 'self' (the Self of the movement described by Michotte) with the *Wahrnehmung* (1968: 257).

Because we know it in our-selves (the self), we recognise it in the other. However, as I suggest in Chapter 1, the quality that I construe as trait in drawing can also serve as script for re-utilisation by more drafters, in which case the individuated style language of a drawing would be representative and recognisable and its emulation would be possible.

2.9 Conclusions

Discussions in this chapter confirm the circular continuum between subject and objective structures that I introduced as interaction and enaction in the previous chapter. Now we see that forces in this circular continuum can flow in several directions. As I speculated in Chapter 1, the subject can influence the structures of the external world, while this dynamic can reverse itself so that objective structures can influence her actions. The continuum fuels itself in several ways in its circumnavigations along several ambits that, in fact, unify. Enaction, interaction, a lateral eclipse, or reversibility mobilise their orbits in circular continuity between subject, agent or perceiver and objective structures in lived 'reality', usually involving some form of practice or action as circumnavigator.

It is also clear that these mediatory dynamics, whether enactionist, or interactive, expand the mental capacities, abilities, and proclivities of the person to sustain learning and the acquisition of skills. It develops cognitive enaction in the process of sustaining it.

This continuum constitutes the premise of the inquiry, namely “the internalization of externalities and the externalization of internalities” (Bourdieu. 1977: 72). In the first chapter, I concluded the drafter-centredness of trait. Human perception is the *pivotal axis* in the continuum that enaction and interaction conduct. Although I explore the implications of this notion further, I approach all further constructs with drafter-centredness as basis. An implication of this notion is that habitus generates practice and that *all practices provide verification for habitus* (Nash. 1999: 18, 19, 20), an implication that I also apply to explain the self as trait, or trait as an enaction of the self in drawing. If habitus operates in the unconscious, I argue, trait formation is an unconscious act.

In the context of this inquiry, the above notions suggest that the viewer should regard individuation in drawing practice as the product of interaction between habitus and the field of drawing (as component of the wider field of visual art). The explicit indication of interaction between habitus, field, and practice translates into the interaction between socio-cultural environment, drafter, and drawing practice. It also translates into the ambit that defines circularity inwards – namely between the self as a gauge against which the drafter measures trait as the other of the self – hence the notion that all practices provide verification *for* habitus, and equally, might I add, verification of habitus.

The implicit recognition of the premise of diversity in a practice, as represented in the drawing practice and habitus of individual student drafters, also directs reflection towards gestic conversion and trait in drawing as the enaction of the self, who engages in a bid for recognition and the freedom to assert her voice, and for a conviction in the self-as-being. Such exploration promises to have some bearing on the significance of trait in drawing, since it examines the difference and variation in “the technical means whereby the changing nature of the real is registered” (Bryson.

1983: 15). The interest of the thesis is in this changeability and variety of individuation in drawing form, rather than in a history or understanding of society. The notion extends to the implied meaning of diversity in *embodiment* (as stated in the premise). Embodiment indicates multiple schemata of diverse dispositions (as both somatic and mental proclivities) that direct the inscriptions of the individual drafter.

Theoretically, I accept that externality is internalised by means of habitus, cognition, or perception. I propose that drawing presents an authentic and visible externalisation of present and past internalities.

In conclusion, it is possible to say that, in drawing (or individuated gestic conversion), the '*Self of movement*', embeds *durationally*.¹¹⁰ This alights on *temporality* as imperative in relation to individuated drawing. It is only in the present time that both musculature and mind verify their simultaneity and instantaneous enaction. Trait cannot be a conscious object (or objective) of drawing. Rather it 'happens' or irrupts spontaneously, entering the world of visibility in an unpremeditated, abrupt way. Logically, it materialises only in the duration of the drawing act, and does not display as observable information on the object under scrutiny or as a pre-formed picture in the realm of idea.¹¹¹

A theory of mind that deals with a representationist processing of information – whether in objectivist or subjectivist stance – would therefore not account for the genesis of trait. Rather, a 'middle way', or the notion that cognition is experiential, and that it is an enactment of a body-mind that enfolds networks of understanding, which are recursively and progressively accrued through the physical and mental feats that living requires, would account for the genesis of trait.

¹¹⁰ Claudia Betti and Teele Sale in *Drawing, a Contemporary Approach* (1980: 31), also describe a relationship between time, presence, and movement in drawing. Although they do not relate it to the originality and significance of trait, they do point out that the relationship is irrevocably part of the process: "The mark that records the movement of the artist's implement, a two-dimensional movement in space, is the most basic feature of drawing. In addition to this spatial notation, drawings evoke a time response – the time required to make the movement that creates the mark. Time is also involved in seeing and in scanning objects in space. Think of the movement of your eyes as they dart back and forth, focusing and refocusing on different objects at different times as you glance about the room. So movement and time are two of the most essential features in making and looking at a drawing".

¹¹¹ This understanding has obvious bearing on copying and mimesis, which I discuss in due course.

An enactionist (non-representational) theory of mind, such as Bourdieu, Varela and Merleau-Ponty assert, relates. Practice and enactionist cognition suggest direct and reflex self-presentation in drawing practices. Self-presentation (albeit a divided one¹¹²) pivots reflexively on cognition as nucleus of the self. The notion that trait in drawing, in other words, is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind, but rather the direct presentation of an actively enactionist self – self-presentation – emerges.

Divergence, changeability, and transformation – the facilities that set an enactionist theory of mind apart from the stasis of a representationist understanding of cognition – are imperative to solving the problem I pose. These facilities account for trait's ability to deviate from norm. Direct presentation of the self necessarily implies both deviation and difference.

Habitus, as a system of dispositions shaped by a multiplicity of environmental and experiential influences, is crucial in shaping the particular *experiencing* of drafters. It is therefore also crucial in shaping their ways of assimilating and converting both visual information and the pre-conceptual into mark as constructs.

These conclusions give rise to the syntheses I formulate as foundation in the next chapter. In Chapter 3, I seek to explain the relationship between habitus and the self. I attempt to consolidate the habitus, enaction, and reversibility (or reflexivity) theories, as they would apply to drawing, and specifically to trait in drawing.

¹¹² I do not suggest the immanence of a completely self-contained moment in the drawing act.

CHAPTER THREE

A MEASURE BETWEEN: SELF AS TRAIT | TRAIT AS SELF

Introduction

In this chapter, I draw a number of syntheses from the previous chapters that I pose as propositions in relation to drawing. These syntheses have bearing on the unfolding of the thesis and they underpin a central synthesis that I pose in Chapter 6. This chapter (3) establishes the unconscious as the origin of trait formation.

In an attempt to answer a question regarding what the relationship between the self and trait in drawing entails, my discussions centre on the following proposition: As an embodied habitus regulates body-mind modalities in practices, embodied action *presents* such modalities in enactions. If drawing entails enaction, drawing marks constitute materialised '*flesh*' – the *enactionist* way in which the drafter *perceives, experiences, and directly presents* existence as mutuality, yet difference, between the self and her drawing mark.

3.1 Trait

Trait as individuated drawing form suggests the intimate relationship between drawing and the self that an enactionist theory of mind proposes. As persistent consistencies, discernable trait in the drawing of students reveals inclinations to work in certain ways that imply deep-rooted (though flexible) dispositions. On the face of it, such dispositions materialise as idiosyncratic mark making and style (see **Illustrations 3, 8 & 9, Addendum A**).

Trait and the unconscious

Bourdieu asserts that socially constructed dispositions always mediate in processes of art perception (1968: 589) (1996: 295-301, 313-314, 391, note 8). He also asserts that the process of making art is a human facility that “rests on cognition and recognition” (Bourdieu. 1998: 85). With this as prescience, and with the notion that

cognition and recognition constitute habitus, it follows that the habitus also regulates drawing. Bourdieu establishes that the involuntary tendency to work (practice) in a preferred way involve particularity in dispositional organising activities (habitus) that are so entrenched in the *unconscious* that the person remains largely unaware of applying them. We know now that, in drawing, such idiosyncrasies appear in an unpremeditated way, as though from the unconscious. This suggests an intimate connection between the unconscious *enaction* of habitus (as embodied entity) and trait as materialised *enaction*.

In very general terms, the fact that it is impossible to deliberately teach characteristic qualities in students' drawings supports the unconscious as genesis of trait. Although the teacher can encourage trait by positive reinforcement after irruption, the knowledge disciplinary content of drawing does not articulate trait as a defined element that forms part of its contents. This is so, obviously because trait is drafter-centred, but also in fact, because it logically manifests without precedent, a notion that I further unpack in Chapter 5.

It becomes clear in the discussions of the previous chapter that a dispositional habitus constitutes *individuation* (difference). Moreover, habitus generates practices from an *individuated* unconscious. Its organising actions, as previously and concurrently assimilated properties are therefore accountable for characteristic distinctiveness in drawings¹¹³ (Bourdieu. 1984: 466). The concept of enaction as influential in gestic conversion, however, enables more distinctions within a generalised understanding of the unconscious that have bearing on the significance of trait – enaction constitutes deviation from norm. If both habitus and embodied action involve a unified body-mind, how does trait formation in drawing involve both body and mind? Answering this question would clarify intimacy between the self and trait.

To answer this question, I pose gesture – a mute “primordial act of consciousness” (De Zegher. 2003: 274) – as a point of departure, because it implies inclusion of

¹¹³ In support of this, John Codd asserts the following in relation to the genesis and delivery of dispositions (habitus) and confirms the aptness of the path of inquiry: “They also enable the development of artistic competences and at the same time shape the manner of applying them” (1990: 145).

the multiplicity of how “the changing nature of the real is registered” (Bryson. 19983: 15).

3.2 Gesture as pre-conceptual in drawn gesture

The enaction of embodiment involves gesture. I distinguish between ‘gesture’¹¹⁴ as issuing from the unconscious as pre-conceptual – or “preverbal symbolicity” (Kristeva cited by De Zegher. 2003: 274) – and ‘drawn gesture’. Drawn gesture, as the simultaneous irruption of gesture on the ‘outside’, manifests as traces on paper that result from those cerebrate processes that convert gesture (as primordial act) into drawing marks. These cerebrate processes hold the key to the significance of trait, and answering the question above would necessitate their unpacking. Drawing marks (whether in complex groupings or stripped to their most basic grapheme) tell of the *musculature* evident in *facture*.¹¹⁵ The somatic merges with the immateriality of perception in gestic conversion as material inscription of self. Such inscriptions, as signifiers of individuation, would reveal the potency of a *personal voice*.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ I perceive ‘gesture’ to be the same as the ‘grunt’, which is the primordial act of consciousness that relates to the origin of speech and language.

¹¹⁵ ‘Facture’ refers to the hand-made quality of something, or the mark of the hand in manually created objects. It is interesting to recall the word ‘manufacture’, in which ‘manu’- derives from ‘manual’, or ‘manus’ (Latin for hand), to be joined with the notion ‘facture’, which denotes both production and manual labour.

¹¹⁶ Umberto Eco’s concept of an aesthetic idiolect that he explains in *A Theory of Semiotics* (1979: 271-273) supports the notion of such a personal voice. In the context of drawing, an aesthetic idiolect would comprise those stylistic variants that an individual drafter uses consistently, but without stagnation or stasis in any visual art practice. Eco assigns the shaping or the coming into being of an aesthetic idiolect to an inner scheme, a corpus-idiolect, of interrelated structural relationships between subject and object, a system of underlying competences that situate themselves in the person’s mind. Eco’s “inner system of underlying competences” reminds of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus as “a system of durable, transposable dispositions which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices” (Bourdieu. 1979: vii). Eco asserts that a particular configurative arrangement in these structural relationships that actualises as the distinguishing attributes of drafteric form activates during the act of making art (Eco. 1979; 271). My construal of the formation of individuated gesture and its significance in drawing facilitation, I believe, carry the genesis of that which contribute to the external manifestation of such internally stratified processes, or what Eco calls an “underlying competence” (1979: 272). As Bourdieu emphasises the entrenchment of habitus in perception and in practices, placing them in irretrievable relationship to each other and to self, Eco relates competence to practice by stating that “the individual performance of an underlying competence” constitutes an “idiolect”. Eco identifies a corpus-idiolect comprising the aesthetic-, the work-, the movement-, and the period-idiolects, each positioning itself in a generative hierarchy of conceptualising paradigms as accountable for individuated performances. I interpret ‘performance’ as largely synonymous with Bourdieu’s ‘practice’ or ‘action’ and with De Zegher’s ‘act’ as gesture in drawing (De Zegher. 2003: 267-278). Eco states pertinently that their collective cooperation allows for individuated performance (Eco. 1979: 272). He also states that “competences allow performances and that performances also establish new forms of competence” (Eco. 1979: 272). With these words, Eco clearly indicates an implicit developmentally cerebrate process that

3.2.1 Enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture

The concepts of interaction¹¹⁷ and enaction¹¹⁸ lead me to distinguish (in theoretical terms rather than in discernable quality) between ‘enactionist’ or ‘enacted drawn gesture’, and ‘interactive drawn gesture’ in drawing. I propose that, while some facets of discernment and doing in drawing or in making a mark can and do interactively and unconsciously cite socio-cultural habitus and personal history, pursuing an argument for interaction as wholly accountable for trait, could not bear out. In support of this notion, Norman Bryson asserts that such an argument would end up in tracking and endorsing an evolutionary redistribution of the Essential Copy (1983: 15-16). Society and culture cannot *entirely* explain how the individual drafter’s *labour* in drawing and particular “registration of reality” (Bryson. 1983: 14-16) – as individuated physical and sensory involvement – influence her drawing.

Discernment and doing in drawing can also enact embodiment directly and unconsciously. Indeed, Jacques Derrida states that drawing constitutes more than one point of view that “cross paths, but without ever confirming each other, without the least bit of certainty, in a conjecture that is at once singular and general” (1993: 2). In an interpretation of my own, I associate “conjecture” with trait, and “singular” as inferring enaction, while “general” indicates the structures of visual language that a socio-cultural situatedness maintains interactively to ensure understandability. Agency, therefore, implies an additional facility that is individual-centred.

I propose that interaction and enaction *continue the embodiment process in-phase*, while the drafter simultaneously enacts already assimilated embodiments. This suggests that the drafter directs her drawing partly by tacit memory and partly by self-originative enaction in “unconscious execution” (Derrida. 1993: 48) to convert the gestic into marks that have no precedence or conscious specularity before irruption. Habitus and enactionist cognition would underpin both and both would irrupt durationally in the temporal labour of drawing.

resonates in Bourdieu’s generative structure. Eco’s corpus-idiolect resembles Bourdieu’s habitus formation in its compliance with body and mind as continuity.

¹¹⁷ In the Bourdieuan sense.

¹¹⁸ As Varela defines it. Please see, Chapter 2, under ‘Enaction’.

My proposal above suggests that, on the one hand, (the drafter's) enactionist drawn gesture relates the "immanent tendencies of the game in her body, in an incorporated state: *she embodies the game*" (Bourdieu. 1998: 81). This embodiment realises through embodied action in trace.

Interactionist drawn gesture

On the other hand, it suggests that drawn gesture cites *and* references "a socialized body, a structured body, a body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a world or of a particular sector of that world – a field – and which structures the perception of that world as well as action in that world" (Bourdieu. 1998: 81). Such marks would display spectres of past interactivity in the field of forces and in social space, the forces of which influence the drafter's durational enaction in drawing. To understand "the technical means whereby the changing nature of the real is 'registered'" (Bryson. 19983: 15), however, requires more. As should be clear, I believe that enaction supplements this interactive aspect of the forming of trace.

Enactionist drawn gesture

I propose that enactionist drawn gesture arises from that place in the body-mind of the student drafter that is largely unblemished by *conscious* stylistic affectation or deliberately appropriated aesthetisation. In other words, trait as enactionist drawn gesture materialises, I believe, when no *deliberate, conscious* effort to conceal or repress it interferes. This is so exactly because primordial gesture is borne by an unpremeditated and subliminal desire to communicate the meaning that preverbality wishes to symbolise. It is body-mind; it is intellect and body as one (Bryson. 1983: 122). Similarly, interactionist drawn gesture arises from a place in the mind of the drafter that has absorbed the forces of the field into the unconscious, beyond conscious control, yet habitus-governed. Moreover, if interaction between habitus and field continues for the duration of drawing, it incorporates both enaction and interaction into drawn gesture. As such, drawn gesture can be both reflexive and immediate, both unchecked mental and musculature enaction and interaction.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ 'Trait' refers to drawn gesture, and 'drawn gesture' includes enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture, unless qualified by either one. Both trait and drawn gesture are part of world, or of outside structures. Please refer to 'trait', 'trace', and 'drawn gesture' in the Glossary (Addendum B)

I propose that an interchangeability, rather than dividedness, prevails between enactionist and interactive *gesture* in a unifying action that irrupts as *drawn gesture*.¹²⁰ I base this proposal on the interchange that unifies body and mind. It is possible to distinguish between drawn gesture and marks that have precedents in objective structures, where such precedents determine the material appearance of their (re) making. The drafter *reads* such marks as *text*. If she *replicates* them, the dialectic I describe above does not occur. Rather, the drafter conducts a monologue. One voice remains quiet, and it is usually the enactionist one.

Projective drawing

Also distinct from drawn gesture, is 'projective' gesture – gesture that the drafter pre-conceives in the *conscious* mind to trace 'as idea', 'from memory', or 'from imagination'. These traces also bear no precedents, and nothing prevents them from *irrupting in enactionist or interactionist drawn gesture*.¹²¹ Even in 'projective' drawing, the labour-based process of illustrating pre-conceived ideas will produce characteristic mark making. Thus, the process of *doing* continues progressive renewal, which results in imagery that does not necessarily fit their blueprint or formula perfectly. In other words, the self continues to embed in interchange between the drawing process and the schemata of meaning in the *process of drawing* projectivity. The self does not take flight during projective notation. This notion answers the question whether projectivity and process-generativity are mutually exclusive that I pose in Chapter 1.

Derivative drawing

The possibility remains, however, that trait-embedded drawn gesture of another artist could serve as field of observation in processes of derivative mark making. This would produce a re-interpretation of marks that already exist in an established paradigm or scheme of meaning. For the drafter who engages in derivative drawing, there could be no '*punctum caecum*' where pre-meaning and the self meet

¹²⁰ Here, in particular, the word 'gesture' denotes pre-meaning, while 'drawn gesture' denotes gesture as mark. In contrast to 'gesture', 'drawn gesture' denotes already irrupted mark. As such, it is part of objective structures, of world, unlike 'gesture', which denotes pre-meaning.

¹²¹ It must be noted, however, that projective drawing does not shun formula. Yet, I base this proposal on the notion that the drafter as centre of cognition dominates in this distinction, and that she will apply dissent, consent, or compromise according to her system of embodied dispositions.

to simultaneously create trait and allow it to venture forth in new schemata of meaning that enfold the experiential engagement of the self.

Yet, I must note that even in derivative drawing the possibility that the drafter can interpret self-reflexively remains. The main contrast that I distinguish is between mechanical copying of style-language and self-reflexivity in drawing.

In my construal of gestic conversion as convergence between habitus and embodied action, I propose that the irruption of individuated drawn gesture (trait) functions beyond conscious control of the will or “*beyond the reach of introspective scrutiny*” (Bourdieu 1984: 466). In-phase *enaction* would therefore result in marks that could be *artlessly* unstructured, and even ‘wrong’. They would not yet bow to critique, or to meaning. Therefore, a conscious desire to conform to any rule or dogma would not have manipulated them. Such rule or dogma could constitute the formulae of representation, realistic accuracy, descriptiveness, or any institutionally authorised styles.

If interactionist drawn gesture acknowledges the inhibitive edict of convention, ‘enacted’ gesture responds in dissent from such edicts, or in *self-reflexive* compliance and compromise, which also constitute forms of deviation or dissent. I propose that divergence from norm has its roots in such responses. Because of self-reflexivity, even compliance or compromise are never pure, never a completely exact repetition. Interactionist drawn gesture is always reliant on the influence of enactionist drawn gesture, and vice versa. The confluence between enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture that I propose above indicates simultaneity and interchange between the two, which the labour of drawing brings about. Apart from its properties of conversion, therefore, drawn gesture also holds potential for deviation (or even subversion) that challenges convention and norm.

I must emphasise that not all drawings must (or even could) only consist of trait as ‘enacted’ drawn gesture, but rather that self-originative and interactive marks, as *theoretically* distinctive types of gesture, can also relate dialectically. This process contributes to a generative dynamic that occurs for the duration of the drawing process. Moreover, drawn gesture as trait seats itself in the stylistic aspect of

drawing, but drawing style does not comprise trace only. It also comprises non-trace, or erasure and ground as ‘unmarking’, which I discuss in due course. The idiosyncrasies of enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture manifest in drawing form as unconsidered deformations of formal elements, conventions, and content of drawing, because they also derive from idiosyncrasies in disposition.

3.3 The self

Trait and the self as nucleus of cognition

Enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture, I propose, irrupt from the same realm of the ‘unbeknownst’ in which one *is* self and which frustratingly yields neither a true nor a full picture of the self. The intermittent and sparse glimpses of the self that this unbeknownst affords one in personally experiential engagement in life leave in their wake awareness of an enormous but concealed void. If the self constitutes a void, such a void would also compel continued delving that would give form and coherency to its mystery. With this unspecified void as incentive, the desire to *grasp* and denote the ever-present, yet ever elusive, haunting remainder¹²² of the self, *trait* becomes a *self-affirmative enaction* – a small grasping gesture that attempts to fill the void. In this way, the drafter continuously, but never conclusively, inscribes the self.

The self-as-being versus the self-as-nothing

Considering the above, it is possible that self-as-nothing in opposition to an achievable self-as-being is a fundamental dialectical impetus that compels the production of trait and the act of drawing. From the above discussions, I surmise the unconscious as basis or source of enaction and interaction, which implies self-reflexivity, with the self as pivotal point of return in any form of productive practice. Thus, this relationship between the self-as-nothing and the self-as-being underpins, paradoxically, the union between trait and the self.

¹²² If trait, as inscription, constitutes the self, it constitutes a materialised, ‘enacted’ self in the world. Such inscription, however, leaves the rest of the self behind in the unconscious – still not inscribed; yet unrevealed, therefore non-existent. Thus, the ‘remainder’ of the self stays unbeknownst to the act of drawing.

A simple comparison demonstrates another reason for associating the self and trait. When comparing the work of different drafters, trait emerges as the difference between the works of two or more drafters (see **Addendum A, Illustrations 3 & 9**). Similarly, the self emerges as the difference between two people. If I want to deny the existence of trait in drawing, and by extension, the existence of self, I would have to find only resemblance rather than difference between the works of two or more drafters. I would have to say that all drafters could have made all drawings, which would simply not be justifiable against the volume of evidence to the contrary. The self is a gauge, albeit an unstable one, against which we measure our existence in the world (as 'other'). Thereby, we affirm the existence of both the self and the world. Trait is a gauge against which the drafter measures lived 'reality' as *there* – existing – while she simultaneously confirms her own existence. Similarly, the self is a gauge against which the drafter measures trait as the other of the self.

Moreover, if the disturbing spectres of solipsism, narcissism, and subjectivism appear when the drafter does this, forcing her to remove the self from the equation, surely the equation would also disappear. In this case, would the world not disappear with the equation? (Varela. 1992: 130). The drafter enacts the self, or her personally experiential awareness of *her* self. This irrupts as trait and its enaction augments her drawing. Were the self absent, would the drafter draw? Do we not look as much for the self as we do for the world when we draw? Varela speculates:

And yet when, having discovered the groundlessness of the self, we turn toward the world, we are no longer sure we can find it. Or perhaps we should say that once we let go of a fixed self, we no longer know how to look for the world. We define the world, after all, as that which is not-self, that which is different from the self, but how can we do this when we no longer have a self as a reference point? (1992: 130).

In support of this and in order to understand the 'self' in 'self-originative' drawn gesture, Bourdieu too offers clarification that has particular bearing on self-reflexivity in practices. Habitus as a schema of dispositions tells a personal history of identity-construction that poses self-identity as construct. This construct is continually organised by an inherent habitus, which in itself contains the information that would be formative and informative of self-perception.

Habitus generates and enfolds the state of being singular in one's person; it regulates the shape of individuation in practices; its responsibility for distinctiveness in a person and her practices is a given. In the individual, habitus constitutes a singular and *identifiable* "manner of thought or a permanent mode of thinking" (Bourdieu in Mahar. 1990: 33-35). This mode of thinking accounts for an individual's "active intention and inventiveness in practice" (Bourdieu in Mahar. 1990: 33-35). More importantly though, Bourdieu describes the notion of habitus as central to his efforts "to describe and analyse the genesis of *one's person*" (Bourdieu in Mahar. 1990: 33), in other words, *one's self*.

As related in earlier discussions (see Chapter 2), habitus tells of the genesis and evolvment of habitus in a social sphere. The person it inhabits, therefore, *reflexively* constructs a socially defined sense of self.¹²³ To reiterate, one's understanding of the self is a construct, continuously engendered by and inherent to habitus. The habitus contains information concerning the being of self, its locus. It pivots back to itself in understanding, utterance, enaction, or 'practicing' of the self.

The same schema of dispositions that direct and shape practices (such as drawing) not only forms the person's idea of self, but also her conduct, and physical application of the self. If this does not entail the "registration of reality" (Bryson. 1983: 14-16), it at least partly explains particularity of manner in drawing. Nevertheless, while habitus is central in self-construction, it also grasps those formations that constitute its existence and its development *recursively and reflexively*. Therefore, self-reflexivity emerges as imperative in practices.

The self-reflexivity immanent in the relationship between the self, habitus, and the world, collapses the self and habitus into one, as much as it collapses agent and structure into one. The void that constitutes unawareness of the self (or the self-as-nothing) diminishes through practices. The individual person becomes personally and experientially aware of the self (the self-as-being) through the fused mind-body schemata of understanding that habitus holds and enaction entails in practices.

¹²³ Embodied action involves the biological and psychological spheres in such a construct.

Synthesis

The self of the drafter assumes position in the drawing through mind and hand – in other words, through enacting directly her interactively entrenched habitus. What one could perceive as two processes and two locations, become one – a place and process locating simultaneously inside and outside, producing its individuated traces in-phase with the self and her personally experiential engagement in drawing. With reference to the question above: How does trait formation in drawing involve both body and mind? – this is *how* a conflated body and mind orchestrates the formation of trait in drawing.

Proficient drawing contains a culmination of idiosyncratic qualities uniquely affiliated to the drafter as individual. The drafter accomplishes *this* distinctiveness through the *process* of drawing – not through pre-planning. This notion suggests an identity as symbolic form that manifests in drawn gesture, an identity that is not outside, but *entrenched in* drawing-trait. It evokes an awareness of difference in doing so, and establishes (in individuated drawn gesture) a visually evident self-revelatory path that implies self-reflexivity as active in *durational* practice. While it becomes a product of integrated and proficient practice, the student drafter's drawing could therefore be seen as an 'enacted' document of the self in conversation with the self, with lived 'reality', with a viewing audience, field, and with social space. The self, self-reflexivity, dispositional embodiment, and embodied action, to my mind, underlie individuated gesture in drawing.

In the discussions that follow, therefore, I advocate an erasure of the body and mind duality in drawing too. Such erasure acknowledges the *in-phase*, concurrent and correlative involvement of somatic and doxic modality and memory in shaping idiosyncratic, unpremeditated drawing traces. In the *drawn* mark, the trace, the eyes, and hand as extensions of both body and mind – as completely engrossed memory – reveals itself. A drawing mark possesses as much the strong impetus that facture and stroke (the *hand-as-mind*) creates, as it possesses the sway of innuendo that the *mind-as-hand* simultaneously interleaves. The flow and force of the trace relates everything that the viewer can see or conjecture about the drafter's body: its absence and its presence, its particular way of moving, its manner of delivering a stroke that leaves trace in its wake, whether touching drawing ground or not

(Bryson. 1983: 117). From trace and trait, the viewer can ascertain or conjecture what and how the drafter has conceptualised behind the mark, that which is unknown or heretofore unseen.¹²⁴

3.4 Drawing as interface

The self and reflexivity

Merleau-Ponty draws a particularly intimate bond between self-affirmation and idiosyncrasies that appear in practices. Above, I demonstrate almost graphically his notion of reversibility in ‘*hand-as-mind*’ / ‘*mind-as-hand*’, suggesting that the unification of the gestic and meaning echoes unification between the ontic¹²⁵ and the intentional self. He says,

...this drawing together, by the subject, of the meaning diffused through the object, and, by the object, of the subject’s intentions – a process which is *physiognomic perception* – arranges round the subject a world which speaks to him of himself, and gives his own thoughts their place in the world (Merleau-Ponty. 1962: 132).

In Merleau-Ponty’s account, the drafter would not consider herself as supreme in a hierarchical relationship to the field of observation, nor would she regard the world as primary, or as an already fully determinate thing imposing itself as determinant upon her formulations. Rather, the drawing act of the drafter would be the chiasmic eclipse between the being of her self and the being of the object in a process of “drawing together...of the meaning diffused through the objects”. Simultaneously, for the drafter, the object would be, or exist as beseeching her scrutiny in a transitory disclosure of such simultaneity through the act of drawing it.

¹²⁴ Eco’s concept of the aesthetic idiolect can be applied here, since it relates the musculature of mark making in the movement- and work-idiolects, while incorporating the aesthetic- and social-idiolects too. Such systems explain those aspects of drawing that serve to direct the flow of individuated gesture as encoded and recognisable signs in its discourses with an outer, wider sphere, the social space of participation.

¹²⁵ Being; existing; the material existence of something that possesses outer appearance; the existential self, the phenomenological self. Please refer to the Glossary (Addendum B).

This intimate sense of mutuality between the drafter and her world evokes the sense that the act of drawing *is* the mutuality, the ‘flesh between’. The creative engagement between drafter and objectivity, the continual exchange in which the drafter converts her understanding of world into drawn gesture, becomes an individualistic way of *being* in relation to the world. This happens in a sphere of mutuality, an internal world externalised (and vice versa) in drawn gesture. This world is inherent to the drafter, hence Merleau-Ponty’s words, “physiognomic perception... arranges round the subject a world which speaks to him of himself” (Merleau-Ponty. 1962: 132). This sphere of mutuality represents the drafter’s particular *hold* on it. It is a world that belongs only to her. The drafter unconsciously implies this sphere of mutuality as immanent in the embrace of her body – “a process which is physiognomic perception”. The drafter *is* her body-mind and she enacts its grip in her traces. She grasps with her mind, eyes and hand the mutuality of being as much as she grasps for it through and in drawn gesture.

Synthesis

Therefore, I propose drawing as an *interface*, which constitutes the enaction of the self as the interplay (‘flesh’, ‘chiasm’) between the drafter as subject, her personalised history, and the external world. I also propose drawing as interface of the reversible effects of such interplay on drawing skill and habitus.¹²⁶ In other words, such an interface could orchestrate *development* in the continuous in-phase engagement of the drafter.

3.5 Development and meaning

“Development by definition comprises continuity and transformation” (Slonimsky & Shalem. 2004: 91), both in the drafter and in her drawing practices. Those underlying processes of transformation that constitute development, anticipate the significance of trait in drawing. Drawing *practice* would serve as *interface* of the interplay between the habitus of the drafter and her participation in the field of drawing. Simultaneously, it serves as continuous enaction of a unified somatic and mental self that enacts embodiment and her notion of lateral mutuality. In this way,

¹²⁶ This is not a repetition, but an application of the circularity that I found in the previous chapter.

drawing serves as action-based process (practice) that constructs meaning experientially.

What I perceive as internal self-world – the self-as-being – that gains concreteness in drawn gesture, which becomes tantamount to the unknown intricacies of an individual self, Derrida calls “night”, “chasm” or “abyss” (1993: 41-45). Merleau-Ponty calls it “chiasm” or “lateral transcendence”. Having its genesis in such diaphanous void, gesture (as drawing) interfaces between the void and lived ‘reality’ and world, in an effort to uncover the meaning of this relationship. Individuated drawn gesture insinuates the existence of this relationship as a vast and complex realm that is both borne by and clarified through the labour of drawing.

3.6 Trait as gesture

Strangely, trait seems to originate from its own advent. It functions in that sphere of tension between the drafter and the world that creates the impetus and compulsion to draw. This compulsion has its roots in the primal desire to make something visible, to give it form in order to know and understand it. It is not only the object, but also the unknown internal self that attempts to become knowable. To give externality form in order to know it is tantamount to projecting the self or at least asserting the self in relation to objectivities, thus giving form to both internality and externality simultaneously.

Synthesis

I propose that the *difference* between the visible object and the drafter’s experience of it (her particular, but unconscious desire to *grasp* object as subject) compels idiosyncratic inscription. The drafter does not only desire expanded knowledge of the objective properties of her subject matter. She also desires experiential encounters with her own invisibilities and unbeknownst, with her self as the only possible originative source of that which could occupy the gestic and the self. That which self’s inner sense of being confines to invisibility can be drawn, and in revealing itself in drawn form, outer self (the one who stands with one foot in field) tricks her own inner self into exposure, thereby revealing habitus as the self.

Jacques Derrida offers support for this interpretation. According to him (1993: 45), the *difference* between the drawing and the object (this chasm entailing the unbeknownst) comprises two ambits. Firstly, the drafter's memory of past observations, the "anamnesis of memory itself" (Derrida. 1993: 45), occupies it. The drafter processes past observations (and the anticipation of future observations) as image schemata or visual code that, according to Bourdieu, embodies perception, and which Varela suggests, we enact in embodied action. Here, Derrida's notion certainly resonates with Varela's concept of embodied action and Bourdieu's habitus concept of a complicitous personal history. More importantly, it confirms the concept of interactionist drawn gesture. In other words, trait constitutes gesture that cites history while it irrupts involuntarily.

The second ambit occupying the chasm is that which is completely and conclusively alien to the material world (Derrida. 1993: 44-45). I interpret this as relating to the notion of pre-meaning that *is* gesture, or the other of language (Kristeva. 1989: 305 – 306 cited in De Zegher. 2003: 274). In drawing, gesture emerges as visible trace and trait, rather than voiced word, as a conversion of pre-meaning into its other. Enactionist drawn gesture, to my mind, transcends 'muteness' (Agambem. 1999: 78 cited in De Zegher. 2003: 267-268) as pre-meaning in speech and language, which would be parallel to 'blindness' as pre-meaning in seeing. It designates that which cannot be seen or said, but is sensed nevertheless, such as the remainder of self. Enactionist drawn gesture, I propose, taps the self.

Derrida (1993: 41-50) describes these notions as "the transcendental" and "sacrificial" of drawing. The transcendental he defines as "the invisible condition of the possibility of drawing", which "could never be posited as the representable object of a drawing". I interpret the "sacrificial" to be that which the drafter sacrifices to drawn gesture as new visibility. It constitutes what she consequently reveals of the self in *conviction* of the self-as-being. In its transcendental and sacrificial spheres, drawing becomes an operational system – a practice, an enaction that assists in making the self and its particular memory visible. In such a process, cumulative development of cognitive and re-cognitive competences (that

include conceptualisation and synthesis) would necessarily be active. In processes of mechanical reproduction, such development would not be active.

3.7 Stasis

Emulation opposes or denies an embodied self (Varela. 1999: 79). This means that, theoretically, the sacrificial cannot be a product of the remainder of the self, and enaction cannot be an involuntary uttering of embodiment. The self sacrifices nothing to drawn gesture in processes of copying, because the drafter simply replicates trait belonging to another creator, whether human or machine. The drafter *re*-enacts the embodiment of another artist. Such trait already relates their original maker's idiosyncrasies. Reproducing it would constitute mere repetition of style language.

Synthesis

I pose such repetition as problematic, because I believe it would exclude those cerebral processes that convert 'preverbal symbolicity' into drawn gesture, as it would render unnecessary any desire to access the remainder of self. A self that is *another*, rather than the *other of self*, is already spilt.

3.8 Emulation versus enaction

Sacrificing the self to the drawing surface '*in the first person*' – or as trait – leads to understanding trait as *self-originate* phenomenon. It irrupts as unpremeditated, almost involuntary reflex while the subjective mind focuses simultaneously on converting, and inscribing conception. In this way, drawing conflates intention, thinking and doing. Drawing sustains a generative interplay between '*enactionist*', '*performative*' and '*interactive*' gesture – interplay that spans the conscious and unconscious minds.

Synthesis

If it is so that drawing is the visuality of *self-originate*ity, its significance in a three-tiered relationship between the self, practice, and product seems central to self-

reflexivity and self-generativity. Consequently, this notion poses drawing-trait as significant in creativity and in revelatory¹²⁷ research.

3.9 Facilitation: passage from unknowingness to knowingness

Discussions in this chapter at least prepare the ground for facilitating drawing as *self-reflexively* cerebrative process. Although this would disturb the conventions of drawing facilitation as convenient re-distributor of style language, as a process of recording visual perception, or as a vehicle for illustrating observation and idea, it does not limit cerebration to the unconscious sphere alone. Rather, it positions drawing as a process in which the drafter stands central in enacting her unconscious self through trait, to reveal unknowingly before expressing knowingly.

Synthesis

I therefore propose trait as a *visibility* of the meaning that gesticulation conveys, and as being capable of carrying the subliminal from the covert to the overt.¹²⁸ This facility of trait unifies a potential split between drawing as verb and drawing as noun, since it does not denounce or censure either one. If trait, as enactive¹²⁹ of a disposition that occupies the unconscious, flows from invisibility to become visibility, it reveals and perpetuates *reflexivity* on the outside. Once out in the conscious or 'visible' spheres, *should the drafter engage recursively through sight with trait as visibility in itself*,¹³⁰ she will discover those structures that can also facilitate metaphorical cerebration, because the drafter has "neural mechanisms for metaphorically extending image schemas as we perform abstract conceptualization and reasoning" (Johnson. 2007: 141).

¹²⁷ I apply the word 'revelatory' here in the specific context of art practice as research, a term that indicates a type of research methodology. Sullivan explains this form of research as "dynamic, reflexive, and revelatory as creative and critical practices are used to shed new light on what is known and to consider the possibility of what is not" (2005:191-192). It differs from conventional methodologies, because rather than being "linear, iterative, and confirmatory" as in quantitative studies, or as "cyclical, emergent, and discovery oriented" as in qualitative studies, it is self-reflexive and "revelatory" (Sullivan. 2005:191-192). I explore this notion further in the last two chapters.

¹²⁸ Covert to overt - or hidden to unhidden, the *Verborgten* to *Unverborgenheit*, or invisibility to visibility (Merleau-Ponty. 1968).

¹²⁹ I intend the application of 'enactive' here deliberately as either noun or verb, signifying both 'enacting' and 'enaction'.

¹³⁰ I perceive 'self-generativity' and amassment to be active in this practice in drawing, a practice that involves 'drawing as generative partner'.

3.10 Trait and process

It is possible to posit drawing as a practice that unfolds, and that the self is intimately complicitous in its unfolding. Rather than only employing – in detached analytical or logical reasoning – the computational mind, drawing employs the intertwined computational and phenomenological minds, which draws not only embodiment in, but also the body. Therefore, in drawing, the drafter does not pre-conceive knowingly or cogently the outcome of a drawing. For the *duration* of her labour, her drawing unfolds with expansive recursivity. *Each trace may incur* dissent, compromise or consent by the self with trace, and with drawing as field. Those extended discursive probes implicit to participation in a field and in social space remain present for the duration of the drawing's unfolding.

In her exchanges with sight, site, and time, the drafter does not pose objectives that demand conformity to formulae. In each drawing, the drafter delivers herself anew to an unknown and unprecedented outcome in which the possibilities are endless and disclosure is never final or fulfilled. Such drawing practice does not consciously set as goal a visual 'effect' or a style language, because such projection would constitute a pre-determined outcome (*with enclosed end*). Such outcome, once accomplished, would remain captive as convincing proof of its conformity to a projected outcome (Bourdieu. 1998: 79-80).

When starting a drawing, the drafter might derive at most a sense from former experiences that would pose inklings of what is to come, but she would not – *could not* – envisage its fulfilled form *beforehand*. This is so, because those multitudes of accrued visual schemata and in-phase sensibilities will always intervene again to enact experience, or reconstruct 'reality', but will do so anew and in unpredictable form. In this, drawing-trait cannot exist until the drafter creates it. Even in extremely realistic work, the drafter deconstructs 'reality', and the idea of 'reality', and through drawing, she constructs it once more through enacting her integrated interactions. For the drafter, one 'reality' does not exist as an end in itself in any current drawing: as there is no single 'reality', there is no supreme vision, not even of self. For the drafter, there is no essentialist veracity in the world. There is no single end to a drawing; there is no single end in drawing.

Synthesis

I propose that the student drafter should develop an empowered doxic modality of her image schemata as self-presentation. In a drawing course, the student drafter should have the opportunity to modify her image schemata incrementally and recursively. With each enactionist modification, the drafter strengthens a first person voice. By recursively building on or extending self-originate schemata of gestic *conversions*, she creates new form. I propose that the labour of drawing as in-phase and continuous generator of self-originate gesture, of enactionist trait, or of interactionist drawn gesture, can thus provide fertile ground for the genesis of creativity, developing along identifiable pathways that are activated by the process of drawing. I propose that this facility could verify itself in the visibility and language of trait. I attempt articulation of such 'pathways'¹³¹ in the next chapter to further discover *how* trait formation in drawing involves both body and mind.

¹³¹ I apply 'pathways' as a figurative or abstract demarcation of processing in drawing, not as a literal mapping there-of.

CHAPTER FOUR

I MARK SELF AND SELF MARKS I: CIRCULAR PATHWAYS IN DRAWING

Introduction

While the previous chapters speculated on the relationship between the self and drawing-trait, this chapter focuses on drawing in general terms. It continues to relate my perception of *how* trait formation in drawing involves both body and mind – a question I asked in the previous chapter. In simple terms, I need to know what happens ‘inside’ during drawing. As such, the self, as locus of creativity, and the articulations between the self, subject matter, the act of drawing, and the drawing as object form a framework for discussion.

I propose that *difference* between the drawn image and the field of observation (whether actual objects or ideas), between image and trace, and between image and founding perception represent a number of experiential pathways in drawing.¹³² These paths also chart passages back and forth between the unconscious and the conscious in drawing, where drawing serves as crossing point or interface, and where enaction and the self operate. I attempt to map such pathways to unpack cerebration in the originative production and recursive processing of trait. In this, I utilise my own understanding of the drawing process, while at the same time I try to find some particularities of habitus in drawing.

The facilitation of drawing necessitates acknowledgement that drawing in itself, (as interface for those ambits in the continuum that I established), interweaves several dualities. One such duality is between perception and conception in the mind of the

¹³² The relationships I refer to here are best formulated in the words of Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 152), in which we see the “convergence of three real-time operations: the artist’s visual idea, in the time of its coming into the world; the always present-tense work of the line in space; and the always ongoing work of viewing. A fusion between the artist’s mind, the artist’s hand, and the beholder’s Gaze: drawing as an art of presence and transparency”.

drafter. In such a framework, the facilitator would allow the in-phase drawing process – its facture, or labour – to produce new form.

I position trait as new form, because it holds *no visible precedent*. (I only touched on this notion in a previous chapter, but it is elaborated on in due course). Drawing facilitation that encourages trait as new form, or at least new contribution, opens the possibility that student drafters can challenge or transform current or institutionalised norms. Such facilitation would implement the student drafters' self-reflexive enactment of disposition in gestic conversion, which, I propose, can be held accountable for trait. Facture as the focus of facilitation would not only involve the realm of enaction, but would also permit a model for self-affirmative presentation. Discovery of those processes that constitute such enaction and presentation as deviation from norm, are of concern here.

Ultimately, this chapter attempts a literal tracking of the advent of trait. Understanding the advent of trait will reveal the contrast between trait and emulation of style language. Thereby, I try to discover the exact point in the drawing process at which the student drafter turns to either self-originitivity or repetition. In Chapter 5, I will interpret this point in the terms that this thesis produces. This chapter, therefore, also provides groundwork for Chapter 5.

4.1 A misleading divide in drawing

Before discussing the pathways, I must clarify the drafteric application of a theoretical strand that evolved in the previous chapters. This entails a return to circularity, which I raised in Chapter 2.

This side and the other side

In Chapter 2, it became clear that *practice*, in Bourdieu's terms, interfaces between internalisation and externalisation in the mobilisation of habitus. It would be wrong to assume that, in drawing as *practice*, such an interface entails two 'sides' – one on either side of the act of drawing – an 'inside' (internality) and an 'outside' (externality). One could easily assume that, in such a dualistic understanding of the

premise,¹³³ both sides would provide ‘information’ that the drafter either represents or reformulates. Furthermore, were it so, the social referencing that Bourdieu explains would, in the drawing process, not provide information for underpinning self-originitive trait. We know now that an enactionist theory of mind tells it differently. If, on both sides, varying degrees of drafter-centred cerebrate processing occurs in interchanging reciprocity, *presentation* rather than *representation* occurs, because embodiment is also involved. Drafter-centred practice is the unifying factor, as I explained in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3.

I perceive this interchanging reciprocity to occur in the processes of drawing. On one side, (what I call ‘*this*’ side), the imposing and inhibitive restraints of arithmetical edict, observation, coherency, and stability reign. In representationist terms, it is therefore possible to construe *this* side as ‘information’. On the ‘*other*’ side, however, the surge and chaos of the somatic and the conscious and unconscious mind hold sway. This surge includes the ‘muteness’ that dwells in language, the gestures of the body-mind. It includes the fragmented ‘sensing’ of lateral mutuality that the mobility of the eyes produces. The splintered intermittencies of self-as-nothing as opposed to self-as-being contributes to this upsurge. One cannot construe the *other* side as ‘information’ that can be ‘represented’ or ‘reformulated’, unless it irrupts as mark. Between these two sides, the strategising and struggles of habitus play themselves out. On *this* side, paradigmatic reason, the impositions of coherency, or rather the denotation of visual schemata, are always restraining the disorder and spontaneity of syntagmatic flow from the *other* side, and vice versa.

Although the two sides seem to be in opposition to each other in the way I describe them here, an enactionist theory of mind says that they in fact intermingle in the ebb and flow of their interchanges. I proposed in the previous chapter that drawing *interfaces* to capture and resolve the oppositional stances that this plane of interchange (where remainders from both sides merge in ebb and flow) absorbs. Ebb tide carries its flow to the sea, leaving remnants from the land in its wake, while flow tide carries its waters to land, sacrificing creatures from the sea to the shores. As interface, drawing, in conjunction with the drafter, also entails a unifying factor.

¹³³ I must note that the premise circumscribes circularity: the internalisation of externality and the externalisation of internality.

Presentation versus representation

In accordance with an enactionist theory of mind, a fused *this* and *other* side suggests *presentation* merged with *representation*, *conversion* merged with *interpretation*. (As I explained in the previous chapter, I perceive trait to originate from such an enactionist space).

Bourdieu asserts a confluence between perception and disposition. He argues that aesthetic codes, *embodied* in aesthetic dispositions, *interconnect* between the “conditions of artistic production” and the “conditions of artistic reception”. He maintains that this mediation occurs at cognitive and perceptive levels when he says that “*painting... is a mental thing*”, or when he refers to “*the norms of perception immanent in the work of art*” (Bourdieu. 1968: 594). By extension, a person’s innate ability to construct meaning (or information) visually¹³⁴ in drawing occurs or stands in a transubstantive relationship to *acquired* sensibilities and dispositions to become embodied. An enactionist theory of mind asserts that from such embodiment, the drafter presents, rather than represents.

Bourdieu’s model suggests that, in drawing, production entails *dialectical* interchange. Such dialectic comprises the infraconscious and infralinguistic interchanges ensconced in doxic modality (Bourdieu. 1998: 79). Additionally, interchange between visual schemata and syntagmata occurs. In these interchanges, the oppositional forces of dialectic are at play, thus creating complexities in modal processing that result in deviation from the norm, however marginal.

Deviation

It is the norm, for example, to give students real objects to draw in observational drawing. The visual inscriptions of the drafter observing and drawing concrete ‘reality’ will necessarily deviate from such ‘reality’. The modal processing that drawing necessarily implies will always frustrate all efforts by the drafter to represent ‘reality’ with absolute accuracy, or to comply completely with its dictates.

¹³⁴ Here, I refer to the ability known as visuo-construction that explains the cognitive and perceptual processes in which visual information is received and processed through complex cerebral activities of synthesis to make graphic representation possible. A number of such cognitive models for drawing processing exist (See Van Sommers, 1986; Guèrin, Fanny et al. 1999).

Visual inscription, in other words, can never resemble 'reality' completely. In this sense, *deviation* denotes varying degrees of *subversion* and of *compliance* to 'reality'. Because it can never be absolute, even compliance constitutes rather than contradicts deviation. In addition to subversion and compliance, compromise represents a modal result in visual inscription. The drafter reaches some form of *compromise* between subversion and compliance. Visual inscription, therefore, is necessarily transformative and developmental.

As such (and in the terms that Merleau-Ponty and Varela posit), *enaction* and *in-phase labour* in practices simultaneously and interactively not only add to *skills-development* in that practice, but also to the *expansion* of dispositional embodiment that would sustain such practice. Such is the case in drawing practice too, and this reflexive and reciprocal expansion between habitus and skills-development entails integration between *this* side (the outside) and the *other* side (the inside), rather than a divide.

4.2 Pathways

In the following section, I discuss certain pathways that I have identified as instrumental in the merger between this and the other sides. The pathways that I propose comprise the drafter as centre in relation to trace and facture (labour), to subject matter, to founding perceptions, to image or display, and to visuo-constructive ability and disposition.

The movements of the drafter's eyes map the pathways I identify. The drafter's eyes move back and forth between mark making, and the field of observation (Tchalenko. 2001, August: 1-11). Norman Bryson describes the process as follows:

The drawn line involves a constant shuttling back and forth between the sitter's features and the corresponding mark on the surface, in a kind of zigzag from the point of the drawing tool to the point of observation, and back. The interplay between these two points is dynamic and mutually defining (De Zegher. 2003: 154).

These eye movements seem simple in their furtive probing; yet, the scope and depth of body-mind experience that they enfold are far more complex. I therefore create multiple categories of pathways as purely metaphorical constructs. I differentiate between them only in order to explain the complex layers of perceptualising and conceptualising flow that occurs during the act of drawing.

I envisage these pathways to exist within the overarching “two different kinds of space” that the drafter occupies, according to Norman Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 154). The “surface of the representation” (*this side*) is visible from the outside. The drafter’s body-mind-based processes of conversion (the *other side*) are, however, not visible. These body-mind-based processes create “the depth of the represented scene” as trace.

Apropos Bryson’s words above, this ‘interplay’ between the mark or the surface and the object perceived, is of particular interest. Its “mutually defining” facility – the notion that schemata enable labour while labour generates schemata – confirm a conflation between *this side* and the *other side* of the drawing act. This conflation defines drawing as interface between interior (the drafter’s body-mind, invisibilities, such as sensations, sensibilities) and exterior (paper, mark, visibility, and world). This can only happen for the *duration* of the act of drawing.

I propose that this space of interplay envelops founding perceptions,¹³⁵ which the drafter forms with each back and forth movement (“zigzag”). Bryson defines the founding perception as the fraction of a moment in which the drafter converts three-dimensionality into two-dimensional form. The drafter does this along all the pathways I describe in this chapter – or rather; to my mind, these pathways *constitute* founding perception. Bryson also states that,

As the draftsman’s eye travels away from the point of the drawing tool and toward the sitter, the work of observation is necessarily shaped by the line it

¹³⁵ Bryson (1983: 118-119) describes the founding perception as the artist’s gaze into three-dimensional space, the artist’s durational consulting with source material: “Yet the harmonic device that plays simultaneously on the three dimensions of the founding perception and the two dimensions of the canvas and the moment of viewing, this pattern of two against three is the underlying compositional figure of the realist tradition: composition under realism is this shifting of forms between two and three dimensions, subject always to the Gaze, the fused epiphanies, in which both sets of dimension equally participate: in the Gaze, the image is both the depth of the founding perception, and the flatness of the picture plane”.

leaves behind. The drawn line conditions or models the selections from the field of observation; it launches observation along a particular direction or path. And conversely, what is seen determines how the next line is to continue, in a perpetual and recursive interaction that unfolds in ongoing time (De Zegher. 2003: 154).

4.2.1 A pathway between labour and schemata

Schemata

I employ the writings of Mark Johnson (2007) and Norman Bryson (1983, 2003) to clarify the relationship between the labour of drawing and visual schemata. In Bourdieuan terms, this relationship constitutes the schemata of habitus, and practice – in other words, the understanding and skills-development that drawing generates while employing them simultaneously. I argue that image schemata, which I perceive as a ‘substance’ of habitus, sustain enaction as systems of understanding that integrate drafter and lived ‘reality’. As embodied cognition, they function on the drawing surface as a pathway between labour and drafter.

Johnson (2007: 136) defines ‘image schemata’ as “a dynamic, recurring pattern of organism-environment interactions”; as “precisely these basic structures of sensorimotor experience by which we encounter a world that we can understand and act within”. Johnson also draws interaction, enaction, and embodied action into his definition:

The patterns of our ongoing interactions, or enactions (to use the term from Varela, Thomson and Rosch 1999), define the contours of our world and make it possible for us to make sense of, reason about, and act reliably within this world (Johnson. 2007: 136).

For the duration of drawing, habitus facilitates interchange between image schemata and mark making. Habitus, as a pre-perceptive, cognitive, perceptive, and conceptive *field of reference*, harnesses the schemata of understanding that the drafter shares with others. These schemata enable recognition and communication between viewer and drawing.

Schemata as shifters

Bryson asserts that such schemata function as “shifters” (1983: 117-119) between drafter and world. The drafter applies shared schemata to clarify a relation of comparison and differentiation between mark and world. In linguistic and mathematical terms, differentiation would comprise, for example, relative conceptions such as ‘similar to’, ‘equal to’, ‘smaller than’, ‘greater than’, and so forth. The drafter applies and employs her previously amassed visual schemata, drawn from personal history and socio-cultural environment as subjective constructs, in the same way as the structures of language and gesticulation assimilate them to make her traces recognisable to the viewer.

Schemata as paradigm

Norman Bryson (1983: 122) explains that visual schemata function in the same way that the concept of ‘paradigm’ functions in language. ‘Paradigm’ refers to the phenomenon in speech where two or more words form mutually exclusive choices in particular syntactic roles. In other words, it is possible to replace one word with another without disturbing the grammatical coherence of the sentence in which they appear. In drawing, similarly, visual schemata produce particular formations of marks that create “topographical” shape and form that is recognisable notwithstanding the nature of the line as trait, or of its grapheme, albeit to varying degrees (Bryson. 1983: 122).

Schemata as generativity

As a regulator of practices, habitus harnesses dispositional schemata to function generatively, helping the drafter to ‘make sense’ of her world. In the process, she creates new form, or synthesis. In *The Meaning of the Body* (2007: 135-154), Mark Johnson explains the assimilation of gesture (or gesticulation), physicality, into linguistic structures of understanding and communication. He relates the schemata of the habitus to describe a progressive pathway from phenomenal perception to metaphorical syntheses that provides explanation for a developmental path that, I believe, also manifests in drawing.

Three aspects of visual schemata

Johnson emphasises three important aspects of shared visual schemata that orchestrate the genesis of meaning.

Body-related experience

Firstly, image-schemata are partly responsible for the fact that we assign meaning to our bodily experiences. Our sensorimotor experience is continuous, and in such flow of visual 'imprints', sensory sensations or stimuli occur in repetitive patterns that eventually begin to *specify* meaning. Such meaning-structures in visual schemata, known as the *cognitive unconscious* (Johnson. 2007: 139), typically function below the plane of conscious responsiveness. They enable discriminatory understanding of the physical form of bodily orientation and experience (Johnson. 2007: 139). In other words, on an unconscious level, they centre body-mind diffusion as axiomatic point of reference in all ranges of human activity. The drafter seats such axiomatic reference in hand, eye, and mind, a relationship that delineates her capacity for visual reconstitution, formulation, and improvisation. Such capacity is infinite.

To employ a very simple example, the concept 'in' and its opposite 'out' (as in '*located in*', '*into*', '*outside*') that she shares with her viewing audience would enable her to draw objects in containers in such a way that the container will overlap the object to reveal *her* location in space, *her* viewpoint or perspective. Johnson calls this type of image-schema the 'container' schema and suggests that it enables understandings of far more layered complexities pertaining to concepts of boundaries, which would demarcate interiors from exteriors. Interaction with or utilisation of various and specific types and sizes of containers will elicit various and specific applications, or possibilities for extended application (2007: 139), thereby co-extensively broadening systems of understanding, analysis, or application.

There are numerous arrays of more such image-schemata, of which I explain a few here only in very brief terms. They comprise, for example, the *centre-periphery*, *verticality*, *compulsive force*, *scalarity*, and *source-path-goal* schemata (Johnson. 2007: 136-138). I understand that habitus encompasses these schemata.

The centre-periphery schema entails our perception of ourselves as pivotal point of focus that recedes towards an undefined, vague horizon of “possible experiences that are neither currently in focus nor at the centre of our conscious awareness” (Johnson. 2007: 137). In other words, it comprises a horizontal field of tacit reference, of lateral awareness and extension, that always hovers around the self as locale of focus and that reaches through time into the past (memory) and possible future (anticipation).

Our continuous physical encounters with forces that push and pull us provide us with schematic structures that enable our understanding of compulsion, attraction, rejection, flight, attraction, blockage of movement and more such “force dynamics” (Leonard Talmy, 1985, cited in Johnson. 2007: 137).

Our ability to stand erect in the gravitational field of the earth forms and enables schemata of verticality, our understanding of ‘up’ and ‘down’, rising, falling, leveling, stability, and balancing. The verticality schema provides understanding of the kinaesthetic sense of our own motions through space. It also provides a tacit sense of bodily centrality that constitutes a sense of the position and movement of our body parts in relation to each other and in relation to spatiality.

Our physical experience of rectilinear motion gives rise to the inferences we draw about straight-line movement and different inferences about curved motions and deviating motions that relate the source-path-goal schema (Cienki 1998, cited in Johnson. 2007: 137-138).

The scalar intensity schema accounts for our qualitative experience. Because we continually monitor our own bodily states (hunger, coldness, warmth, thirst), we can discriminate between delicate degrees of emotion, visibility, audibility, taste, olfactory awareness, tactility, or temperature. These experiences shelter the foundation of our sense of the scalar intensity of such qualities. Habitus organises these experiences into the scalarity schema. In other words, because the qualities (blueness, darkness, anxiety) of our experiences vary continuously in intensity, we develop a scalar gauge that we apply to every aspect of our qualitative

experience (Johnson. 2007: 136-138), judging for example an irruption of marks in drawing as good, bad, inadequate, wrong, or right, and so forth.

Cross-modal shifts

A second aspect of visual schemata that Johnson (2007: 136-138) raises, is that these body-related structures of meaning generate cross-modal shifts that result in additional complexity in meaning. A body-mind that exists in time and space produces visual schemata to hold *logic* that enables *transitive* activity amongst schemata in relation to time and space.

This *logic* in visual schemata sustains abstract thought and enables inference. The drafter will not only transcribe container and object as overlapping, but she will also recount them along common schemata of spatial understanding. They will recede or advance in spatial relationship to her; in perspective, or as she 'sees them through space', thus demonstrating the centre-periphery schema in conjunction with the container and source-path-goal schemata.

The drafter transcribes the tacit senses that all the schemata afford her as, for example, gestural, organisational, perspectival, vertical, horizontal, or diagonal lines. In relation to each other, these lines encode infinite ranges of concepts such as penetration of the drawing surface or a contrary emphasis on its flatness, for depth, containment, boundary, distance and so forth. A drawn line could symbolise division¹³⁶ between, for example, interior and exterior, thus delineating a boundary between space and object, between negative and positive, between object and ground. Its direction and gesture could imply movement or stasis, its curve or lack there-of, shape and volume. As such, the tacit senses of the drafter enter a material sphere on *this* side of the drawing act in the symbolic form of line and trace, while

¹³⁶ Derrida describes the complex symbolic value that such 'division' may elicit, "One should in fact not see it ...insofar as all the colored thickness that it retains tends to wear itself out so as to mark the single edge of a contour: between the inside and the outside of a figure. Once this limit is reached, there is nothing more to see, not even black and white, not even figure/form, and this is the trait, this is the line itself: which is thus no longer what it is, because from then on it never relates to itself without dividing itself just as soon, the divisibility of the trait here interrupting all pure identification and forming...inaccessible in the end, at the limit, and de jure", and "The outline or tracing separates and separates itself; it retraces only borderlines, intervals, a spacing grid with no possible appropriation. The experience or experimenting of drawing (and experimenting, as its name indicates, always consists in journeying beyond limits) at once crosses and institutes these borders, it invents ...this circumcision of the tongue, of language, to the death sentence" (1993: 53-54, 55).

they repeat, translate or artlessly enact, albeit it in an unknowingness, the logic innate in visual schemata.

Such 'enacted' 'logic' leads to the formation, development, and embodiment of metaphorical, homologous, analogous, or allegorical structures that relate the understanding of the viewer in common contextual reference. Johnson (2007: 279-280) asserts,

Human beings are metaphorical creatures. Conceptual metaphor is a nearly omnipresent part of the human capacity for abstract conceptualization and reasoning. There are other imaginative structures involved in abstraction, but conceptual metaphor shows up in virtually all of our abstract thinking. The power of conceptual metaphor is that it permits us to use the semantics and inferential structure of our bodily experience as a primary way of making sense of abstract entities, relations, and events.

As such, the drafter can encode in her line-work an equally wide range of concepts such as dividedness, abjection, contradiction, ambiguity, and negation (to name but a few). The drafter's facility for and experience of non-representational enaction of the unconscious mind in the drawing act enables her progression to *symbolic enaction*. As such, she provides, for example, metaphorical, allegorical, or symbolic information (subject, of course, to interpretation). This transitive action is possible, because she possesses those neural means for creating simile, for metaphorically, symbolically or allegorically extending schemata in the act of performing abstract conceptualisation and reasoning (Johnson. 2007: 141). In this way, the drafter erases a division between *this* side and the *other* side of the drawing act by means of embodied action, or enaction.

With this explanation, Johnson (2007: 112) deviates deliberately from a "representational theory of mind". The embodied mind does not operate on internal representations of ideas, concepts, or images that can represent external objects and events. A non-dualist understanding of body-mind pre-supposes an embodied mind that operates cognition as mediatory action, rather than mental mirroring of an

external ‘reality’¹³⁷ (2007: 120). Johnson asserts that this explains how, “increasing levels of complexity within organisms can eventually result in the emergence of progressively more reflective and abstractive cognitive activities, activities we associate with the mind” (2007: 140).

Body-mind realm

Johnson’s third assertion converges with transubstantiation of body and mind as asserted by Bourdieu, Varela, and Merleau-Ponty. Johnson explains that visual schemata do not belong to *either* a bodily realm or a mental, cerebral realm. They constitute, in a complete unity, the contours of a body-mind realm. It is not viable to see visual schemata as purely abstract conceptualisations or only as a formal cognitive structure, because such view would deny its embodied origin and its physical dimensions of interaction. Nor is it viable to see the formation of visual schemata as a purely bodily or sensorimotor process, because it can never be devoid of abstract conceptualisation and thought (Johnson. 2007: 141).

Johnson’s formulations around the functioning of image schemata serve to clarify the pathway between labour in drawing and the drafter’s employment of image schemata. Later in this chapter, I draw from them some conclusions that also support earlier discussions on interactive and enactionist drawn gesture.

4.2.2 Pathways between schemata and object

In her in-phase labour, the drafter sustains a number of interchanges. One of these operates between common meaning structures and object (as ‘field of observation’). A second one constitutes a pathway between visual cognition of object and already interrupted trait. Both paths generate transitive symbolisation as formulation. The following explanations therefore focus on the drafter’s observation of an object (subject matter) and of her own drawing as object. Both subject matter and already interrupted trait become fields of observation.

¹³⁷ Merleau-Ponty (1968: 226, 227) states: “The content of my perception, microphenomenon, and the large-scale view of the enveloping phenomena are not two projections of the In itself: Being is their common inner framework. Each field is a dimensionality, and Being is dimensionality itself”, and “what replaces the antagonistic and solidary reflective movement (the immanence of the ‘idealists’) is the fold or hollow of Being having by principle and outside, the architectonics of the configurations. There is no longer consciousness, projections, In itself or object. There are fields in intersections”.

Token schemata

As in the schemata-labour relationship I describe above, the drafter has little (if any) *conscious* notion of what the historical, memory-based exchanges between the viewer's visual schemata and recognition would entail. The drafter does not consciously structure on paper the field of observation to conform to viewer-related understandability. Rather, she labours – on a tacit plane – the dialectic and complexities of her own experiential and unconscious cognition. By searching, researching, testing, and trying out *token*¹³⁸ visual schemata (as languages that will enable recognition, while it enacts idiosyncrasy) she will discover the fluke of experimentation.¹³⁹

Token schemata relate the visual schemata that, according to Mark Johnson, (2007: 136-138), also bring with them logic. They function as reason, judgment, and sense that enable inferences of deduction, supposition, conclusion, suggestion, insinuation, conjecture, and so forth. These schemata issue tokens as mutual cryptograms, symbols, and signs. It is possible to say that viewer and drafter have such configurations of code in common that enables the drafter to impart her vision.

However, to effect communication that approximates paradigm (for example, an aesthetic paradigm) and the understandability it brings for the viewer, entails a dialectic that harnesses oppositional forces. On the one hand, the drafter offers token schemata, which have a curbing or inhibitive function. On the other hand, the drafter enacts the unruly syntagmata, the libidinous surges of somatic flow.

¹³⁸ Like 'deictic', 'token' has its origin in *deiknynai*, meaning to show. 'Token' infers "an outward sign or expression"; a "symbol"; a "distinguishing feature"; "a small part representing a whole" (WNCD. 1979: 1218). Refer to the Glossary (Addendum B) for further explanation. I also relate 'token' to Derrida's notion of the 'sacrificial' in drawing, which denotes that which the drafter sacrifices to visibility – an always-incomplete offering to the outside. I discuss this in more detail in the previous chapter.

¹³⁹ With 'the fluke of experimentation', I allude to Derrida's phrase 'appropriation of excess', which I interpret as creative extension beyond mere representation. To corroborate, I cite again Derrida's words, "and experimenting, as its name indicates, always consists in journeying beyond limits" (1993: 54) to infer experience, appropriation, and trait as invention beyond. I apply the word 'appropriation' consistently to suggest the inclusion of self-reflexivity in creative extension. (See 'appropriation', and 'experience' in the Glossary, Addendum B).

Dialectic and deviation

The dialectic between token schemata and syntagmata resonates as interplay between cognition and recognition, ability and disposition, norm and deviation, form and reformation, repetition and self-originitivity. The pathways along which dialectical interchanges occur, amount to opportunities for enactions that accumulate recursively. As such, *demonstrated* formulation or formation (marks) comprises transformation. The generative facility of the Bourdieuan theoretical formation resides in these *recursively dialectical* interactivities.

For the moment, I focus on the dialectic between the schemata that the drafter shapes recursively, and the schemata she shares with her audience. This ongoing discourse of opposition and generativity also forms the basis of deviation from norm. Although the decipherability of the drawing decrees its effectiveness in terms of communication and in terms of its enclosure into a realm of legibility, the drafter may challenge the norms of such enclosure. Although the encodings of the drafter must be decipherable and the decoding of the viewer always hovers in sanguinity while she works, it should not necessarily be a magnanimous or accommodating partnership. Whether the language and intent of the drafter be one of abstract display, of figurative description, of illusionistic waywardness, of pure sterile grapheme in analytical dissection, of symbol, metaphor or allegory, her own complexities which her image-schemata have accrued over time (and which in-phase practice continues to accrue and generate) can spell rebellion.

Such 'rebellion' occupies two main spheres. The drafter's enactionist conversions and formulations present approximate or recognisable resemblances and definitive differences between her vision and that of the viewer. They also present approximate resemblances and differences between image and object.

In the act of drawing, dialectic between image schemata and object is dense, various, and deceptive. The mark making that irrupt from this dialectic *deforms* in its simulation. It de-essentialises and it grafts imperfectly. The enactions of the drafter can never fit the restrictive impositions of common visual schemata (that demand conformity as communicative enabler). This is so, because even her efforts to conform in these interchanges will display the conversions of enactionist modalities

as her embodied habitus orchestrates them durationally. Such enaction deforms *in order to* form. In tokenism, the drafter reduces, filters, and cites for the fulfillment her own agenda, which she enacts instantaneously. Resemblance is therefore never perfect (and for added reasons that relate to technicalities such as musculature, media, and surfaces). Rather, they absorb degrees of excess or underplay in the somatic modalities of the drafter.

As such, resemblances (as imperfect ‘fittings’ between inner and shared schemata) reveal themselves as general differences, thus creating dialectics between possible degrees of resemblance and wayward difference. The drafter finds degrees of resolution between these two unstable poles. As such, habitus *modifies, diverges, and transforms* in its discourses of consent, dissent, and compromise. The closest the habitus of the drafter can come to visual materiality, is in this dialectical occupation between recognisability (approximate resemblances) and differences. For these reasons, individuated drawing form inevitably deviates from norm and it is never absolute, never resolved.

Summary of the pathways

The drafter enacts modal transformation recursively between numbers of ‘poles’ in the networks of experiential interaction that I summarise here as follows:

Firstly, enactionist and interactionist interventions inform and amass *visual construction* and *habitus*. Such *trans*-actions inform the relationship between *object* and *habitus* in gestic conversion, and between *image* and *habitus* in gestic conversion, in both cases deploying the individuated nature of the body-mind in denoting these interchanges.

Secondly, and in recursive relationship to the above, habitus informs *and* constitutes drafter-centred schemata. Drafter-centred visual schemata engage in dialectical interaction with *shared visual schemata*, conducting *trans*-active interchange from the *other* side (body-mind) to *this* side (drawing). In this way, the drafter forms ‘tokenistic’ approximations on the *interface*, thus conflating this and other side as drawn gesture. Here, conversions realise in ‘grafting’, or ‘fitting’ habitus-governed *inner schemata* over *shared schemata* and vice versa – once again deploying the

individuated nature of the mind-body to denote the overlay as symbolic, as ‘the other’ of language, and the other of self.

Thirdly, this ‘fitting’ or ‘grafting’ constitutes understanding. Understanding mobilises interchange between drafter and her habitus, drawing act and *field*, *social space* and *viewing audience*. The drafter conducts these interchanges along laden pathways of *recursion* and of *return* via the interface in a cyclical continuum, which amasses cerebration and enaction both from the inside outwards and from the outside inwards.

4.3 Integration of pathways with habitus and enaction

Pathways realise as difference

The pathways between schemata and object, and between schemata and mark, deform in order to form. This notion suggests firstly that realism, as an absolute resolve between schemata and object, is impossible. Secondly, it suggests that no two marks in the in-phase drawing process are the same. Difference realises in mark making as contradiction, opposition, and distortion – general deviation from visibility as norm. As such, enactionist drawn gesture materialises as the difference between accumulating trace and the information that the drafter’s continuous array of glances¹⁴⁰ offer in their readings of trace and subject matter.

It is important, here, to *visualise* the significant differences that exist between a drawn image and its corresponding ‘lived reality’, which served the drafter as a field of observation (see **Addendum A, Illustration 10**). Upon doing so, conceive of those *differences* as visible materialisation of self-specific style or trait, as well as invented information. We, as viewers, see that *recognisability*¹⁴¹ displays itself in various forms and degrees of difference in drawing. No two drafters’ demonstrations are the same. According to Derrida, difference constitutes the

¹⁴⁰ I call the back and forth movements of the eyes ‘glances’, to indicate that the resulting visions (or sights) do not exist as ‘mind-prints’ or ‘pictures in the mind’. It is nothingness, exactly the muteness that the drafter wishes to convert to meaning. It is not a representation of anything. Yet, Derrida calls it *mémoire d’yeux*, ‘eye-memory’ (1993: 54, note 2).

¹⁴¹ Here, ‘recognisability’ refers to that which is made possible by shared schemata that the drafter offers as tokens, but also to recognisability that makes differentiation between the works of two drafters possible.

transcendental in drawing (1993: 41) and according to Bourdieu; the transcendental constitutes the habitus (1998: 81), which I related to Varela's notion of enaction in the earlier chapters. Hence, I draw a direct relationship between self-originate mark making and habitus, and the cognitive unconscious.

If the drawing were not image, but rather wayward display only, the difference would be discernable between the drafter's founding perception,¹⁴² and the drawn display. For the viewer, such access to the drafter's experience would not be possible, even if such experience could attain specular form in the drafter's mind.¹⁴³

Yet, comprehension of difference is possible, and can be applied to an interchanging pathway that I propose between drawn display and an ever-changing continuum of experience¹⁴⁴ that the drafter achieves in the splintered flow of observation and in the wayward whims of musculature, thought, and imagination. This interchanging circularity is not absent in representational drawing or in the making of figurative images, but constitutes another interfering window where enactionist conversion and formulation irrupt as trace. Even in so-called representational (realistic or naturalistic) drawing, in which stringent observational skill and acumen play strong roles, a pre-formed mind-impress (or 'pre-print') does not exist, and the same dialectic would handicap unambiguous perceptual recording. The endeavour of indifferent, purely objective recording of perception therefore becomes impotent (Derrida. 1993).

Habitus and embodiment

Conducting a practice in *subjective complicity with the self* or in an ontological context of infraconscious and infralinguistic complicity necessitates understanding of habitus as an *embodied* schema of dispositions that the drafter enacts in drawing practice as a conviction in (dispositional) self. Dispositions entrench themselves in cognition and perception to engender recognition and synthesis in practices, where

¹⁴² It does not occur as pictorial 'eye' memory. In Chapter 6, the founding perception is discussed in more detail.

¹⁴³ In this regard, I cite Norman Bryson (1983: 17), "there is no way to discriminate between what might indeed be a perfect registration of the view of the habitus 'from inside', and an imperfect registration, or to distinguish either of these from parody, or hallucination".

¹⁴⁴ Please refer to 'Circularity' in the Chapter 2.

habitus functions in an embodied continuum. I suggest that this parallels with idea of the self, and with the ontological complicity that it engenders according to Bourdieu.

Varela's notion of enaction points to the genesis and development of perception and conceptualising as *emerging from* bodily and embodied mind in action and durational *experience*. The understandings above suggest that the very possibility of abstract conceptualisation and reasoning relies unequivocally on a non-dualist body-mind. Enaction seems to play the pivotal role of individuation in gestic conversion and it functions in the blind pathways – those that are not accessible to viewers – between schemata and labour, which encloses the drafter-centred founding perception. In linguistic terms alone, the meaning of the word 'enaction' infers a direct bringing into being. In itself, this suggests the individuated *process of making* the drawing, with *nothing* but glance between gesture and drawn gesture, and the hand-habitus action of the drafter herself. The labour of drawing (the '*manus*' (hand) and *facture* of '*manufacture*', the process of *making by hand*) indisputably contributes to style and manner.

Both a Varelan and a Bourdieuan framework, if applied to drawing, suggest that drawing practice demonstrates continuous enactionist experience in interaction with lived reality. Enaction in drawing explains a point at which abstraction, conceptualisation, and *trans-actional*¹⁴⁵ symbolisation form in the cognitive *unconscious* before the drafter calls "upon disembodied mind, autonomous language modules, and pure reason" (Johnson. 2007: 141). In this, enaction challenges a divide between perception and conception. Enaction differs from the concept of performativity by proposing a direct, almost involuntary irruption. In drawing, such presentation would suggest action without script, rather than performance according to script. To corroborate further, I cite Norman Bryson (1983: 142):

Against the theory of pleasure Barthes and with even stronger emphasis Julia Kristeva propose a counter-term for which we will find no immediate equivalent in Marr: the disruption of quotation (*plaisir*) by bliss (*jouissance*);

¹⁴⁵ I borrow this term from Downs et al. (2007: xvii), who cite Katrinka Wilson from an unpublished PhD-thesis titled *Mimesis and the Somatic of Drawing: In the Context of 20th Century Western Fine Art Practice* (Loughborough University, 2004): "What the performance implicitly tells us is that the drawing process enacts a simultaneous physical contradiction that, as Katrinka Wilson determines, is a transaction between appearance and thought".

and at first sight, the aesthetic of disruption would seem to mark a rejection of the Marrian doctrine of art as repetition of that which has been pre-established, and the emergence of the first stages of a theory of practice, of practical consciousness.

In drawing, the genesis of conception in perception implies *transcription* that is irrefutable *inscription*. Enaction certainly centres body-mind fusion as axiomatic point of reference in drawing, a notion that I regard as foundational to the manifestation of trait in drawing. The incorporation of the body in enaction suggests the *legibility* of the body in drawing. It implies the genesis of idiosyncrasy in mark making as the irruption of a voice that is entrenched intimately, bodily, and irretrievably, though dynamic, in the individual who enacts it. Enaction in such mark making provides “a view from within”, “a first person event” that *designates* the “lived experience associated with cognitive and mental events” (Varela. 2002: 1).

Moreover, while interaction points to the significance of *experience* that the drafter accrues in lived reality, enaction points to the significance of *in-phase* experience in drawing, alighting on the inextricability of the spatial and temporal in the labour of drawing and on the inextricability of the interaction between drafter and social space. The genesis of trait is seated in both enactionist and interactive gesture. Both emanate from the unconscious.¹⁴⁶ Enactionist drawn gesture is more wayward in its libidinous irruptions, while interactionist drawn gesture displays the curbing of its learned reference more readily. The difference between enactionist and interactive¹⁴⁷ drawn gesture, however minuscule, generates interplay in drawing that, I suggest, is pivotal in creativity. It sustains wide-reaching dialectic between the labour of drawing and convention. Such dialectic materialises as self-reflexive conversion and modality by the drafter that clarifies and generates meaning, while it deviates and transforms.

¹⁴⁶ To emphasise the auto- and self-origintivity of enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture and to distinguish between such marks and imitated marks, I ascribe the qualifying term ‘autogenous’ to drawn gesture. I apply the word to denote a conflation between ‘enactionist’ and ‘interactive’ drawn gesture.

¹⁴⁷ To reiterate, the distinction I made between the two was done purely for purposes of analysis, rather than to assert that this is observable in trait or trace. Below, I further explain the distinction under ‘Unifications in drawing’.

In *envisaging* the differences between ‘reality’ and image, it becomes possible to gain understanding of the visible materiality of *individuated trait* and the invisibility of its origin, which entails both the musculature of the body and the unconscious cerebrate facilities of the mind-body unification (enaction). Distinctiveness realises in individuation in drawing. Trait constitutes the materiality of individuation. I accept that such visible difference reflects that which has been unseen before and remains unseen unless drawn.

If an individuated body-mind reveals as difference in style and manner, it also reveals as difference in intent, both of which shape the individual drafter’s constructs of lived ‘reality’, of the self, and of her drawing. A single, fixed grip on such ‘reality’ remains as elusive as local colour.¹⁴⁸ This is so because each viewing action or reference that occurs during the process of drawing foregoes, accompanies and remembers numerous actions of pre-viewing, viewing and reviewing and their corresponding irruptions of tracing. Habitus-governed readings move back and forth between subject matter and transcription, constantly reading both the object under scrutiny and the drawing, while dialectic runs along all their paths of interchange.

Process and a multiple ‘reality’

Each viewing and reviewing action carries attendant facture and trace, each time subtly adjusting and applying a newly organised system of organising actions to it to construct notation anew. Improvisation (or synthesis) – not truthful replication – evolves constantly and in accordance with these actions. This happens during the processes of visuo-construction, interchange, and labour in visual inscription.

The mark of the body-mind is not true – it automatically violates and disturbs. Hence, the drafter’s drive to re-organise with each ‘take’ or glance and, hence also,

¹⁴⁸ As a result of the effects of light, the extent to which it is absent or present, it is not ever possible to perceive local colour. Only tonal colour is perceivable. Furthermore, Varela relates a study in the perception of colour to explain embodied action, in which he states, “for color indicators can be obtained solely on the basis of luminance and contrast levels. This simplicity betrays, however, the equally important fact that color is always perceived within a more encompassing visual context. All of the subnetworks work cooperatively; we never see color as an isolated item” (1992: 162-163). He concludes later, “We have seen that colors are not ‘out there’ independent of our perceptual and cognitive capacities. We have also seen that color is not ‘in here’ independent of our surrounding biological and cultural world. Thus color as a study case enables us to appreciate the obvious point that chicken and egg, world and perceiver, specify each other” (1992: 172).

the notion of *dialectical* interchange. The pathways I construct and explain above suggest that the amassing, chaotic readings of the eyes and the in-phase tracings of the hand are in constant dialogue with one another. They challenge the order that denotation and visual schemata impose on them.

If disposition allows, such perpetuated re-organisation reflects the refusal to accept a single option, an inquisitive compulsion to reconsider and re-articulate, to appropriate or defy numerous options, to finish or disrupt, to perfect or to scar. Provoked awareness of more possible options in itself implies a retained history of homologous recognitions, a memory of previous and multiple structures, assimilations or organisations, all potent references whether homologous or analogous. This *is* the interactive, enactionist process of drawing.

Dissatisfaction or satisfaction with any one specific organisation of the trace and the elements of drawing trigger an intervening response. Complete contravention might decrease or eliminate dissatisfaction or satisfaction, decrease or increase dissent, consent, or compromise. This side converses with the other side. In this conversation, inhibitive curbing constantly tries to silence the back-chatting, carnal, libidinous, somatic flow. Somatic flow, in turn, constantly seeks to disturb with its disorderly behaviour and manner, with its wayward mind, eyes and hand. This dialectic also merges body and mind as one in drawing.

Likewise, dissatisfaction with any specific organisation of mental assimilations will trigger or demand contravention. Complete or varying degrees of contravention could eliminate or decrease dissatisfaction. In this way, contravention (as intervention) challenges even the code that guides method, as well as the dictates of aesthetic acceptability. Added to this is the always-present possibility that dissatisfaction might increase rather than decrease because of contravening responses, to trigger yet more rounds of intervention, which will defy or verify, disrupt or sustain, violate or respect. Such dialectic between satisfaction and dissatisfaction, between construction and destruction, between construct and deconstruct, could become in itself the object of drawing.

Furthermore, dissatisfaction, destruction, and deconstruction represent but a few such triggers of disturbance. The human mind and its embodied dispositions offer a rich diversity of such stimuli (as subcategories of dissent, consent, or compromise). Such stimuli trigger demonstrations of recursive enactions in any possible form. Bourdieu's notion of 'strategy' and 'struggle' for position in the field, demonstrates its flexibility in the sense that dissent, consent or compromise constitute processes through which the drafter can demonstrate an infinite range of differences. In this sense, the drafter is agent or subject, "who, far from reacting mechanically to mechanical stimulations, respond to the invitations or threats of a world whose meaning [she has] helped to produce" (Bourdieu. 1984: 467).

The act of drawing, if thought of as a process of *literal* and *practice-based* struggling and strategising, includes continuous interchanges. Such interchanges comprise those between possibilities and counter-possibilities, speculatively positioning, opposing and repositioning, marking, unmarking and remarking – continuous interchanges between somatic and doxic modalities and denotation or schemata. At any point during these processes, any arbitrary or non-arbitrary arrangement of mark making and unmarking may reveal themselves as a resolution, never as completely conclusive, but rather as the "hypothesis of sight"¹⁴⁹ (Derrida. 1993: 60), or the presupposed form of sight.

Consequently, such a point does not necessarily signify closure, but rather may trigger the entire process within new sets of possibilities, *ad infinitum*. On paper, the process reveals itself in seemingly random arrangements of mark making and unmarking. Some areas may be densely inscribed; some may show straggling sparseness and some complete emptiness. Thus, they create altercations between creation and destruction that, as a fragmented yet amassed entirety, will convey meaning.

¹⁴⁹ For Derrida, the "hypothesis of sight" comprises "believing and seeing, between believing one sees [*croire voir*] and seeing between, catching a glimpse [*entrevoir*] - or not. Before doubt ever becomes a system, *skepsis* has to do with the eyes. The word refers to a visual perception, to the observation, vigilance, and attention of the Gaze [*regard*] during an examination. One is on the lookout, one reflects upon what one sees, reflects what one sees by delaying the moment of conclusion" (1993: 1-3). Derrida equates the 'hypothesis of sight' with "the hypothesis of intuition" (1993: 60).

A drawing could be a direct inscription of completely self-generated exchanges between mind, eye, and hand, mirroring those mental processes beneath the visual interplay between idea and mark, conception and facture, vision, sight, and blindness. The drawing retains traces of every phase of these altercations, charting their history in a signifying tale that speaks fluently of 'not-knowing' and knowing, resonance and dissonance, the void of the 'Verborgen' and the form of 'Unverborgenheit' (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 249). As such, drawing becomes a perpetual surveyor of itself, constantly contemplating its own potential for deviation and subversion, as much as it becomes a pursuit of self-as-being, a conviction in self.

Blindness and muteness that offer nothing to mime

These notions clearly mirror Bourdieu's concept of habitus and practice as transubstantiating vehicles between body and mind that enable differentiation. Interaction and enaction, as operative verbs, suggest two central concepts. Firstly, they imply expansive *interactive generative processing* that, secondly, enables *generative production*. They are essential elements in those processes of cerebration that lead to trait. Benjamin Bloom positions synthesis as supreme in his hierarchical organisation of the cognitive domain (1956: 185-187). I believe it is such syntheses (improvisation or conjecture) that the drafter inscribes eventually as an aesthetic idiolect, which constitutes an encompassing and paradigmatic visual articulation of individuation (Eco. 1979: 270-272).

The notion of enaction suggests that, when starting a drawing, the drafter's mental image of what the drawing is going to look like cannot constitute any fully formed *image* or display of *marks* that would resemble the final drawn image as object. Accordingly, Derrida (1993: 2, 45-46, 68) says that trait strays from itself and from deliberation to display as traces of the muteness from where it irrupts, also insinuating an axiomatic muteness even in the processes of projective drawing. Whether 'an idea' or the visibility of objectivity serve as founding impetus for drawing, it remains implicit and anticipatory during the act of drawing. As perceived 'visualisation' or 'image' in the mind, it seems to recede to the 'back of the mind', or rather completely, as soon as pencil touches ground (Derrida. 1993: 68).

What astonishes is the fact that this pre-drawing ‘mental image’ does not exist or pre-exist at all, not as an enclosed finality, nor as ‘blueprint’ or ‘plan’. The particularities of its possible formation are evasive, refusing to reveal them unless the act of drawing sustains their appearance durationally (Derrida. 1993: 68). Although it is quite possible to conjure up some vague idea of what the drawing should look like, this idea usually evaporates the moment one starts drawing. It loses even its visibility-status of “eye memory”, or “idea memory” and mostly represents a measure of emptiness of mind that resembles a lack of understanding or a state of “not knowing”, or “blindness” (Derrida. 1993: 3).

From gesture (or gesticulation) as preverbal muteness, to the appearance of its trace, dialectic develops between vacuity and the advent of trait. The objective visibility of things augments this dialectic further, creating equivocal dialectics between appearance as advent or as visibility, and disappearance as vacuity or as bareness of drawing surface. Vacuity counters the advent of trace, which with its own appearance counters disappearance. While trace attempts simultaneously to resemble objective visibility, it only manifests in difference that evokes, in the remainder of its potential resemblance, a hauntingly unattainable state.

Not even a specular pre-image can predict or determine the ‘look’ of the trace that the in-phase legibility and understanding of the body-mind will bring to it. Reproducing such a pre-image (were it at all possible) would resemble mechanical copying, rather than generative drawing. The durational imperative in this perception of the act of drawing implies that a non-dualist body-mind enacts nonrepresentational structures of meaning. Johnson calls such structures patterns of “integrated interaction that constitute experience” (Johnson. 2007: 117).¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰ Mark Johnson (2007: 113 – 134) points out a foundational difference between the concept of embodiment of mind and the representational theory of mind: “Mind/body dualism often generates what are known as representational theories of mind and cognition. Representationalism in its most general sense...is the view that cognition (i.e. perceiving, conceptualizing, imagining, reasoning, planning, willing) operates via internal mental ‘representations’ (e.g. ideas, concepts, images, propositions) that are capable of being ‘about’ or ‘directed to’ other representations and to states of affairs in the external world. The technical term for this ‘aboutness’ relation is intentionality”. (See note 108 regarding ‘intentionality’). He contrasts embodiment of mind as follows: “The key to this reconceiving of mind is to stop treating percepts, concepts, propositions, and thoughts as quasi-objects (mental entities or abstract structures) and to see them instead as patterns of experiential interaction. They are aspects or dimensions or structures of the patterns of organism-environment coupling (or integrated interaction) that constitute experience. The only sense in which they are ‘inner’ is that my thoughts are mine (and not yours), but they are not mental objects locked up in the theater of the

Mechanical copying does not allow such patterns to interfere in the drawing process, thereby under-informing the act of drawing. Therefore, mechanical copying limits the potential of the drawing to become new form, which would hold more dimensions of meaning than its founding state could predict.

If trace is not knowable before its irruption, *individuation* pertaining to body-mind inscription are also not knowable before the act of trace irruption (Derrida. 1993: 45). Meaning – the rhetoric of trait – reveals itself *through* drawing. The act of drawing also develops *ideas* recursively, building its becoming with gradual amassment. Even when in materially drawn form, knowledge and understanding of display remains open-ended, and never accomplish the state of finish or completeness that brings absolute closure.

When the drafter stops working on it, the drawing represents a level of understanding that stands in direct relationship to the degree of labour-related inquiry that goes into it. Therefore, it is comparable to the field of observation only in materialised form, meaning that even if the drafter manufactured two or more versions of the same field of observation, the drawings would display once again differences between one another (see **Addendum A, Illustrations 2 & 3**).

Trait in drawing is also individual specific in the sense that it will only materialise as far as the individual is willing to take it or is capable of taking it, which in turn depends on formerly integrated interactions, or as it were, already acquired knowledge, skill, or sensibilities (see **Addendum A. Illustration 1**). Therefore, it would be more truthful to say that the initial pre-drawn and tacit idea the drafter holds of the object of work serves as motivation for discovery, as excitant, because it is either unknown or at best unclear. It will evolve or reveal itself in more clarity through the *process* of drawing. The drafter accomplishes fuller comprehension and improvisation as new visibility of invisibility through the *labour* of drawing.

As understanding transforms to become increasingly explicit as the drawn image emerges, the drawn display itself also starts to serve as a gradually emerging

mind, trying desperately to make contact with the outside world. As we will see, thoughts are just modes of interaction and action. They are in and of the world (rather than just being about the world) because they are processes of experience”.

comparative measure. Now, this measure reflects the other of self, not another self. Thus, the display itself fulfills a crucial role in an interactive process between three components: visual construction and *habitus* in relation to *field* and accumulating trace, or the *labour* of drawing as image or display. This encompassing relationship¹⁵¹ enables re-conceptualisation and re-appraisals that the drafter directs towards the act of drawing, the context of the drawing and the evolving meaning of the image. In this way, the *process of manufacturing* starts to generate conceptual meaning and content, while it also responds, re-appraises and comments on its materialised enactions, technical development, and applications.

As understanding or knowledge of the *thematic* material, whether material or immaterial, gradually increases as the drawing develops,¹⁵² its content develops beyond the thematic material's phenomenal value. The evolving self-reflexive inquiry and constantly engaged dispositional exchange that are concurrent with irruption, inform the drawing exponentially and recursively. Understanding of the object of work (whether literal material object or imagined) becomes not only clearer or more accomplished in technical and visually descriptive terms, but it could simultaneously gain allegorical, conceptual or symbolic meaning through the drawing process, which engenders such significance by means of more amassments of dispositional interchange between *habitus*, practice and *field*.¹⁵³ The dialectic between tacit understanding or knowing and the act of drawing intensifies experiential involvement.

The production of drawing is one of *interdependency between habitus, field, and practice*. The cognitive, perceptual, and conceptualising interplay and dispositional dialectic that occur in conjecturing and counter-conjecturing, knowing and 'not-knowing', or positioning and 'unpositioning', would not be possible without the cerebration that body-mind gesture engenders. Nor would it be possible without the experiential interaction that the act of drawing elicits.

¹⁵¹ A relationship of circularity, with reference to Chapter 2 (See 'Circularity').

¹⁵² Varela states, "The central insight of this nonobjectivist orientation is the view that knowledge is the result of an ongoing interpretation that emerges from our capacities of understanding. These capacities are rooted in the structures of our biological embodiment but are lived and experienced within a domain of consensual action and cultural history" (1992: 149).

¹⁵³ Varela states further, "to reiterate one of our central points, the neuronal network does not function as a one-way street from perception to action. Perception and action, sensorium and motorism, are linked together as successively emergent and mutually selecting patterns" (1992: 163).

Unifications in drawing

All the above pathways point at unification in drawing that transcends dualities. It is clear that, in the context of drawing, enaction challenges a divide between perception and conception, and between representation and presentation. *Enaction* of perception encloses conception, so that a 'representation' of what is to appear in trace, does not precede its irruption.

These unifications are inherent to 'enactionist' and 'interactionist drawn gesture', a synthesis that I proposed in Chapter 3. An understanding of perception and conception, representation and presentation, as unifications rather than dualities, form the difference between enactionist drawn gesture and performativity in drawing. As I explain in Chapter 3, enactionist drawn gesture proposes a direct, almost involuntary irruption that would suggest unscripted action. Downs et al. (2007: xviii) states that, "The term 'performance' can sometimes indicate a mimetic representation that suggests a passive operation where the participant actualises something already determined".

I propose that, in drawing, enaction constitutes the simultaneous *demonstration*¹⁵⁴ of process and of idea. Irrupting as trait, it has nothing to mime and it pronounces its own feat by marking the self as 'I'.

For this reason, I distinguish in the following chapters between 'enactionist' drawn gesture and 'interactive' drawn gesture as formative elements of trait. I retain the notion of interactionist drawn gesture, because as a drafter I can attest to 'remembering'¹⁵⁵ (consciously or unconsciously) the styles of other drafters and to the unavoidable absorption or even conscious translation of those styles into my own work. However, it is seldom possible to recall such styles with accuracy. The drafter deforms them further through self-inscription, which constitutes, after all, the blind, mute, involuntary enactionist drawn gesture that I propose. Thereby, the drafter both sheds and adds in the 'translation' of remembered style. For the same reason,

¹⁵⁴ I choose to use 'demonstration' deliberately, because it signifies an active and direct outward show of inner understanding. I contrast it in this to 'representation'.

¹⁵⁵ I do not assert that such 'remembering' is pictorial or exists in the form of 'mind print', but rather that it comes from an understanding of the underlying methods, technical or otherwise, that could produce such style language. Moreover, such understanding comes from a tacit realm.

the drafter knows that, by transcribing style, she also internalises such styles¹⁵⁶ to store them on some tacit plane in her mind where they could have a hand in forming or transforming existing dispositions¹⁵⁷ that would eventually result in deviatory self-inscription.

4.4 Conclusions relating to facilitation

Passage and development

From Mark Johnson's expositions regarding the enactionist and embodied cognitive unconscious, I extract an essential proposition of the thesis, namely that drawing constitutes a defined development from phenomenal appropriation to metaphoric enunciation. The pathway that the student drafter conducts from gesture to drawn gesture mirrors the cerebrate complexities that entail passage from description to enunciation and from simile to metaphor.¹⁵⁸

Trait and diversity

The generative facility of habitus puts forward another concept that is crucial to understanding the approach to drawing facilitation that I propose in the final chapter. Understanding Bourdieu's theoretical formation as a generative structure enables understanding that each student drafter integrates, applies and reformulates conventions in drawing differently, creating endless varieties of syntheses in a multiple understanding of lived 'reality'. The variability of individuation in drawing stands in direct relation to the diverse range of individual drafters that comprise a drawing class at first year university level. For the facilitator, this situation represents complexities that demand the accommodation of all forms of diversity in her mediation.

¹⁵⁶ Derrida remarks, "Yes, it [observation] associates scopic attention with respect, with deference, with the attention of a Gaze or look that also knows how to look after, with the contemplative gathering of a memory that conserves or keeps in reserve" (1993: 60).

¹⁵⁷ Regular or constant viewing of drawings do have influential visual impact on a drafter's work, a phenomenon that Bourdieu describes as 'cultivated habitus' a notion that also suggests interaction as laterality. Bourdieu (1977: 78) says, "Habitus produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus".

¹⁵⁸ In Chapter 5, I focus on this passage as the moment when invention occurs as mark making.

It becomes clear that an enactionist and ‘enacted’ habitus in relation to drawing as field and as practice serve as conceptual indicators, if not tools, that will bring flexibility to the facilitator’s expectations of the range of drawings that result from her mediation. Diversity and versatility in this (and in the number of solutions to problem solving tasks she might set in her instructions) become a foregone conclusion, a predisposition in itself that could *affect* local response to norm, and that could *effect* deviation from norm on a wider level.

Drawing also from discussions in the previous chapters it is clear that, along the pathways of perception and enaction that I describe, *difference* defines the self-specificity of stylistic features.¹⁵⁹ The pathways suggest *how* this happens. The product is trait. As such (and with reference to the facilitation of drawing), it becomes an imperative to understand that each student drafter’s dispositional modalities imply personalised or individuated assimilations.

The drafter’s *self-reflexive* involvement in gestic conversion implies that either application (compliance or compromise) or challenging (deviation from) of the conventions of style will result in different degrees of self-specific stylistic features. Yet, even while compliant with norm in this sense, such stylistic features could underplay (efface) or assert the self-as-being.

Although interaction could also play an inhibitive role if the drafter allows the imposition of the norms of legitimised formula, the point is that concurrent experience of social or cultural circumstances always forms schemata that are crucial and necessary frameworks of reference for the drafter in the construction of meaning. Such frameworks enable the drafter to extend her work into allegorical, metaphorical, and symbolic meaning by means of more complex denotation (Johnson 2007: 138).

These understandings enable me to conceptualise trait as a vehicle for a seemingly forgotten capacity of drawing, namely that of facilitating the type of cerebration that cultivates and sustains creativity. I conclude that those cerebrative processes in drawing that engender individuation also engender synthesis, or possibly constitute

¹⁵⁹ Enactionist drawn gesture.

synthesis, and that the ability to synthesise underpins creativity. The interchanging and dialectical paths along which interactivity and enaction mobilise themselves in the durational labour of drawing, namely those between the self and habitus, drawing as practice and the trace, image, or display as pivotal components in a generative conceptualising apparatus that draws recursively on the pre-conceptual and the durationally formed conceptual. For the facilitator, these notions should indicate the significance of trait.

CHAPTER FIVE

TRAIT AS INVENTION

Introduction

In this chapter, I secure the understandings that emerged from the previous chapters in a focused application on trait as *invention*. I employ the expositions of Derrida to unpack, firstly, the nature and secondly, the significance of mark as invention. If invention is integral to drawing-trait, I propose that trait significantly supports creativity. I chart the drafter's deviation from emulation, a deviation that accomplishes invention. I relate how the facilitation of drawing can shift focus to the drafter's ability to invent, rather than submitting to the order and stasis of memory. Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 153) describes the effects of both the stasis of memory and the stifling dictates of academy in his words,

Faced with a new scene and the task of drawing it ... the artist mobilizes the sum of schemata that have been learned so far. Testing those schemata against visual 'reality', the apprentice artist discovers a new aspect that he or she does not yet know how to resolve. Going through the repertoire of solutions housed in tradition, or in the pedagogy of the academy, the apprentice learns the new schema that is adequate to the present task, and adds it to the storehouse of acquired techniques. Learning to draw, then, is a process in which the dead hand of tradition lays itself over the unformed hand of the artist, and guides the line that it makes from the outside. To those iron protocols, all who seek to draw must submit in the same way and to the same degree.

In this chapter, I shift discussion to answer the question of 'how' trait realises in the drawings of student drafters, and the problems it may present.

I propose that, just as the drafter's memory can internalise the dictates of academy, so can her memory internalise the visuality of trait. Both can become recipes for

repetitive application, both can become mere superficial and dictatorial style language. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the crucial purpose of this chapter is to delineate with reasonable accuracy the fine line that exists between habitual utilisation of style language and deploying the renewing facilities of trait.

I also propose that the passage from the unconscious to the conscious that I discussed in the previous chapter constitutes the drafter's subliminal drive to negate the self-as-nothing,¹⁶⁰ a negation that realises as an affirmation of self-as-being. Trait, I propose, marks self-affirmation. I base this proposal on the significances of Merleau-Ponty's 'ontic mask'¹⁶¹ and its 'invisibility' (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 227-229). In answer to the question that the thesis poses, this proposal also constitutes 'the accomplishment of trait' – invention – as the significance of trait.

5.1 A pathway of development: from sight to vision

5.1.1 Memory

I proceed firstly to the mnemonic faculty of habitus. As the drafter forms syntheses, she commits to memory, and to habitus, her gains that are both mindful and skillful. Such gains, while continuing to consult with objective structures, also increasingly turn inwards. They become memory, which is essential to the generative facilities of trait formation. Eventually the interplay between memory and trait formation informs a visuality that becomes encompassing. Memory aids cerebration as much as enaction does, and enaction cannot function without memory (see **Addendum A, Illustration 2**).

The emergence of such a cerebrative memory in drawing, defines a *path of development* (see **Addendum A, Illustrations 1 & 2**). Eventually, the drafter can draw with progressively decreasing dependence on the inhibitive schemata of formula and norm, while focusing on the technical devices that relate to subject

¹⁶⁰ Self, in the nihilistic terms of cognitive science, could be construed as non-existent because "it does not distinguish between the idea or representation of a Self and the actual basis of that representation, which is an individual's *grasping* after a self" (Varela.1992: 107, 124).

¹⁶¹ The 'ontic mask' refers to the material visibility of things, or their outer shell of visible materiality as indication of their existence.

content. The drafter conceives each mark as a generalised construct that sustains compliance to ‘universal’ understandability without destroying its aspect of trait. She conceives each mark as a unique entity in its own right, namely as the trace of synthesis.

5.1.2 The turning point: conjecture and invention

(See Addendum A, Illustration 8)

As I explained in the previous chapter, I envisage a pathway between the labour of drawing and the drafter-centred schemata of understanding. In this pathway, the drafter unconsciously enacts embodied or tacit memory. The scrutiny of the will does not operate here. We know now that such enactments merge in the interface with concurrent gleanings from the field of observation and with gleanings from already existing trace. Embodiments merge with new inputs. The interface, a point of reflexive turning back and forth, must capture remnants of both. The marks that result emerge as new demonstrations of invisibilities – the invisibility of the self and the invisibility of the other that self recognises as resembling her own.

The drafter’s marks become alternative and altered visibility – different, nonstandard, and diverse (see **Addendum A, Illustration 3**). For the drafter, her ‘invisibility’ now reaches to an ostensible¹⁶² ‘reality’, the objectivity and visibility of which she has regarded all along with doubt and disbelief or with curiosity (Derrida. 1993: 1-3). On the face of it, she starts to find her own vision more believable and she reveals it with skill and self-confidence. Her conviction in the self-as-being grows correspondingly. Beneath ‘the face of it’, in her unconscious, she deploys her unbeseen to find the unbeseen of the ‘other’ of self-as-being, *something that has no “ontic mask”* (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 229, also cited in Derrida. 1993: 52).

¹⁶² Simon Blackburn (2008: 263) once again provides clarity regarding this term, “A definition that proceeds by ostension, or in other words by simply showing what is intended, as one might ostensively define a shade such as magenta, or the taste of a pineapple, by actually exhibiting an example. It relies on the hearer’s uptake in understanding which feature is intended, and how broadly the example may be taken. A direct ostension is a showing of the object or feature intended, whilst in deferred ostension one shows one thing in order to direct attention to another, e.g. when showing a photograph to indicate a person, or a thermometer to indicate the temperature”. Please also refer to Chapter 2, “reality”. See Illustration 2, Addendum A.

Thus, the drafter experiences a *turning point* in her approach to drawing. Instead of seeking norm and formula to dictate from the objective world, she begins to trust the constructs of her vision and self as sources that are more credible (see **Addendum A, Illustration 8**). She confidently senses the invisible in her as the invisible of the other and she deploys her drawing tool to grant visibility to both. Mark, therefore, orchestrates confluence between the self and the other.

However, now she confronts blindness – rather than *know* the specular form of mark, other, or self beforehand, the drafter can only find specularity for this confluence in drawing-trait (see **Addendum A, Illustration 4**). She has no choice – she can only replace blindness with conjecture. Derrida offers the following description of such a turning point, a description that brings us full circle to the labour of drawing:

Or more precisely still, he [the drafter] begins to *represent* a drawing potency at work, the very act of drawing. He *invents* drawing. The *trait* is not then paralyzed in a tautology that folds the same onto the same. On the contrary, it becomes prey to *allegory* (1993: 2).

Pause, withdrawal¹⁶³

This invention requires a slight hesitation during which she anticipates self's conjecture to irrupt instantaneously. It is clear that a strange overlapping of contradictory events occurs in this turning point. While the drafter anticipates, she also precipitates. While she willingly *awaits* the appearance of trait, the drafter allows the irruption of her marks to precipitate norm or formula (see **Addendum A, Illustration 8**).

To 'await' irruption implies withdrawal or pause during the process of drawing. Indeed, the turning point I describe above brings hesitation, but clearly, it is hesitation filled with anticipation. For barely discernable moments, the drafter works

¹⁶³ In the next chapter, I focus on withdrawal in drawing, where I discuss its nature in more detail. I also use the term 'hiatus' to indicate withdrawal. Hiatus literally occurs when the drafter lifts her pencil away from the drawing surface to leave no-thing, no mutuality, in its wake. Derrida purports that this occurrence resembles writing without seeing, when writing "gives itself over to anticipation" (1993: 3-4). Likewise, hiatus in drawing indicates a period of 'not notating', a period of waiting to think about what should happen. Yet, this event is not separate from irruption and should not be perceived as a dragged out period of passivity. During hesitation, the gestation of mark irruption continues.

“without the eyes” (Derrida. 1993: 2). Despite occurring ‘without the eyes’, these hesitations do not suspend the present, in-phase correlate of visual perception and observation. Rather, they engross the self deeper into the act of drawing, thereby intensifying the possibility of trait.

These pauses, in other words, are still active in doing,¹⁶⁴ but during them, the drafter subconsciously enters deeper into the amassments of her mind. During withdrawal, the drafter allows invisibility (the unbeseen, the unconscious, this layered sphere of her habitus) to direct the drawing. In this, she sustains a continuum in which trait carries the traces of its heritage and the spores of its future. The preceding chapters tell us that this simultaneous referencing of its past and anticipation of its future entails a self-generative facility.

5.1.3 Trait as field of observation

In previous discussions,¹⁶⁵ I referred to trait as former invisibility that has become visible, sitting on *this* side. Once outside and literally visible, the mark gains objective status and gains new ‘invisibility’ (see **Addendum A, Illustration 5**). Because trait enjoys as much scrutiny as does the field of observation in predicting the advent of more traces,¹⁶⁶ it also acquires phenomenological invisibility. As such, the drafter’s viewings of return set off another continuous series of responses and conversions that overlay and intermingle with references to the object (or to imagination). We know now that trait and trace are the constructs of her body-mind. Continual viewing and reviewing of such constructs generate and assimilate new constructs, all of which also emanate from her body-mind to irrupt on the drawing surface. Such a flowing continuum enables the advent, development, and actualisation of layered conjecture, imagination, and creativity (by no means an easy endeavour).

¹⁶⁴ In Chapter 6, I explain in detail how withdrawal in drawing remains active in doing.

¹⁶⁵ See **Illustration 10, Addendum A**.

¹⁶⁶ Recall Bryson’s words quoted in Chapter 4, “... the work of observation is necessarily shaped by the line it leaves behind. The drawn line conditions or models the selections from the field of observation; it launches observation along a particular direction or path. And conversely, what is seen determines how the next line is to continue, in a perpetual and recursive interaction that unfolds in ongoing time” (De Zegher. 2003: 154).

5.1.4 Two possible pathways

In such very active hiatus, the drafter could adopt two possible pathways – one of stasis in memory (see **Addendum A, Illustration 8, Series 8.2**), or one in which she engages in continuous “appropriation of excess”¹⁶⁷ (Derrida. 1993: 47). I interpret ‘an appropriation of excess’ to resemble Bourdieu’s notion of formulation as self-presentation.

In a Bourdieunian framework, as we have seen, the drafter interacts with external structures in dissent from, compliance with, or compromise between the self and the visible (see **Addendum A, Illustration 8**). In this way, she deploys trait in the unlimited innovation that it grants. Bourdieu describes a moment “when the embodied structures and the objective structures are in agreement, when perception is constructed according to the structures of what is perceived” and, at this moment, Bourdieu asserts, “everything seems obvious and goes without saying” (1998: 81). If, in drawing, self-presentation occurs as transformation, such transformation, Bourdieu purports, occurs within a space of potentialities that encloses “the possibilities of *infinite invention* it provides” (1996: 270) (see **Addendum A, Illustration 7 & 8, Series 8.1**). The drafter’s engagement entails a dialectical interplay between dissent, compliance and compromise, rather than opting only for one of these possibilities to the exclusion of the others. Such interplay constitutes generative engagement that, in drawing, would result in multiplicity and layered irruptions, or the appropriation of excess. In such a process, appropriation does not imply any form of derivation.

In this process, the drafter begins to ‘see’ beyond the visible present. Her momentary withdrawals suspend visual perception of the object (or visualisation of idea) in an empowered, informed enaction of habitus through trait. As such, trait escapes the world of visibility until it gains it only in drawn form (Derrida. 1993: 45-47). In the framework of habitus, I interpret the generative construction of trait itself as invention, but it is this form of trait – its conjectures that ‘see beyond’ – that

¹⁶⁷ Derrida describes the ‘appropriation of excess’ as ‘seeing beyond sight’ or as ‘visionary’, namely the ability to think ahead or to imagine. He elaborates, “the (no)-more-sight..., the visionary vision of the seer who sees beyond the visible present, the overseeing, sur-view, or survival of sight” (1993: 47). Trait in itself, because it is pure invention, is such sur-view.

the facilitator should seek (see **Addendum A, Illustrations 2, 5, 7 & 8**). Trait becomes a sustained poetic language when the drafter develops the ability to uphold a habitus-governed continuum of dialectical interchange between the self and the visible as an objective structure (see **Addendum A, Illustrations 2, 5 & 7**).

Appropriation

Memory can take drawing into two directions. On the one hand, it can lead to a facility for the above-mentioned ‘appropriation of excess’. In such appropriation, the drafter’s cerebrative interchanges circle out – beyond mnemonic storage (see **Addendum A, Illustration 5**). If habitus comprises memory and generativity, it also comprises concurrent *restoration* and *regeneration*. These facilities of the habitus, when active in drawing as field,¹⁶⁸ formulate and conjecture anew with each trace in each drawing endeavour. They do so, always retaining the reservation that both the memory of visible trait and trait as remnant of the invisible are subject to *transformation*. Drawing (practice) embeds the work of the hands¹⁶⁹ in habitus, which restores anew to such practice the technical mechanisms it needs – the skill, and somatic play of it – which produce anew, rather than replicate (see **Addendum A, Illustration 1**).

This notion of appropriation is consistent with the circularity that sustains self-reflexivity (see **Addendum A, Illustration 8**). Finally, it stores in habitus the detail and generalities, “the selected, chosen, and filtered” (Derrida. 1993: 47), of that

¹⁶⁸ One should keep in mind that, as I explained in the Introduction, field in cultural space is also enveloped in habitus, the habitus of culture and environment, and that this thesis does not acknowledge the subject–object duality. I repeat Bryson’s words, “Culture produces around itself a ‘habitus’ which though discontinuous with the natural world, merges into it as an order whose join with Nature is nowhere visible” (1983: 14). Mark Johnson erases a duality between body and culture completely in the notion of ‘the cultural body’. He asserts that “our environments are not only physical and social. They are constituted also by cultural artifacts, practices, institutions, rituals, and modes of interaction that transcend and shape any particular body and any particular bodily action. These cultural dimensions include gender, race, class, aesthetic values, and various modes of bodily posture and movement” (2007: 277). Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘flesh’ invokes the same lateral mutuality between body (as subjectivity) and culture (as objectivity).

¹⁶⁹ Derrida (1993: 4-5) says, “If to draw a blind man is first of all to show hands, it is in order to draw attention to what one draws with the help of that which one draws, the body proper as an instrument, the drawer of the drawing, the hand of the handiwork, of the manipulations, of the maneuvers and manners, the play of work of the hand – drawing as surgery”, The translator comments in a note: “Derrida is himself indulging in a certain *jeu de mains* by playing on the hand in *manipulations*, *manoeuvres*, and *manières*, as well as in the word “*chirurgie*” – surgery – which comes from the Greek *kheir* (hand) and literally means the “work of the hands”” (Derrida. 1993: 5).

which is visible in lived ‘reality’ and that which is ontologically experienced in social space in the very correlate of its doing,¹⁷⁰ to alter it as subjective memory.

Habitus, with this capacity for changeability and flexibility, upholds its side of a pact in which it also reserves the right to change both itself and its assets. As such, the treasury of habitus becomes a body-mind sphere that does not restrict possibilities – a richly furnished source for future explorative probes – probes that should carry with them more possibilities for further amassment and transformation. It emerges then that what these probes unearth from habitus becomes, on their return journey to the crossing point, pure conjecture, inference, and speculation – invention.

Stasis of memory

On the other hand, memory can orchestrate stasis. The drafter might find in memory a pleasing recipe that could lead to repetition (**see Addendum A, Illustration 8, Series 2: 8.2.1-6**).¹⁷¹ In such a case, the drafter’s delivery becomes mannerist. If the student drafter channels memory wrongly, it could manifest as a plateau, or stagnancy.¹⁷² The student drafter, having achieved trait and having received approval for such idiosyncrasy in her work, consciously normalises it as style. She sticks to it to ensure continued approval and it becomes a safety niche. The student drafter terminates, in other words, dynamics of interplay and dialectic to repeat idiosyncrasy as a formula that brings acceptability. She mimics, in effect, herself.

The personal voice (trait), as invisibility, does not offer the security and credibility of trace as prescriptive directive, or as visible objective form. It commands courage from the student drafter to suspend any norm in order to gain faith and trust in trait

¹⁷⁰ I cite Bourdieu in Chapter 2, under ‘Converging theories’, “present at the coming moment, the doing, the deed, the immediate correlate of practice which is not posed as an object of thought, as a possible aimed for in a project, but which is inscribed in the present of the game” (Bourdieu. 1998: 80).

¹⁷¹ **Illustration 8 (Addendum A)** contains two series of drawings. The second series to a certain degree demonstrates mannerism or repetition, while it also demonstrates constructive characteristics, which I explain in the text that accompanies the two series of drawings. The two series, when compared to one another, demonstrates the difference between constant process-based renewal (series 1) and mannerism (series 2) clearly.

¹⁷² To explain further, I also refer to Richard Shusterman (2008: 24): “In contrast to analytic somaesthetics whose logic (whether genealogical or ontological) is descriptive, pragmatic somaesthetics has a distinctly normative, prescriptive character by proposing specific methods of somatic improvement and engaging in their comparative critique”.

as materialisation of the self. If trait, or the legibility of one's body-mind, remains unbeseen until its irruption, the uncertainties of such a prospect also create anxiety. Indeed, there is nothing to mime and the student drafter has to confront the understanding that the unbeseen "is there without being an object, it is pure transcendence, without an ontic mask". If this means that visible objects, "are only centered on a nucleus of absence", anxiety grows (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 229, also cited in Derrida. 1993: 52). 'Reality' – world – as nothingness is a daunting idea and is often met with resistance. The drafter "does not want to be done with mourning it" and therefore "begins to go blind simply through the fear of losing [her] sight" (Derrida. 1993: 48).

Obsessive description

Often, the student drafter seeks consolation in two options. Firstly, she could compensate with obsessive descriptions of visible detail. The mnemonic faculty of habitus itself elicits a duel between the desire to capture every minute detail, and the desire to filter, select, and store information according to unconscious preferences.

The duel poses yet another threat of effacement, where excessive detail could smother trait,¹⁷³ should the drafter persist in exclusively seeking fidelity to capture visibility. The reading and faithful recording of visibility, in all its seductive and profuse detail, remains just that – a recording that attests only to the degree of its fidelity to visibility. Usually in such cases, the young drafter assigns to each detail the same degree of weight and importance, so that the most insignificant trifling of detail seizes complete absorption. Thus, the drafter assures her escape into consummate impartiality, and into an intense battle to keep both conjecture and the individuated modalities of hand at bay.

Such escape constitutes effacement similar to that which I describe in Chapter 1, since it presupposes a hard and fast 'reality' 'out there' that exists independently from the drafter's perceptual and cognitive capabilities or in-phase experience. A

¹⁷³ Here, I refer to a situation in which extreme objectivity – a restrictive faith only in the ulterior visibility of things – effaces 'enacted' gesture marks. Similarly, extreme subjectivity would realise in a smothering appropriation of expressionistic style language, or 'expressive' mark making, which would also efface 'enacted' gesture marks. The discussion that ensues also applies to so-called 'expressive' mark making.

'hard and fast' 'reality' that consists of pre-given properties dictates or determines the outcome of her drawn images. Thus, it stifles interactive play between the drafter, her habitus, and her observational and drawing skills and the visible world. In such engagement, she merely records her knowledgeable¹⁷⁴ memory as a replica of the thin sheet of visibility that the objective world bestows.

The order of memory

Secondly, the student drafter could fixate on "the order of memory" (Derrida. 1993: 45-51) to regain security, but here, once again, habitus is the trickster. The phenomenon that arises in the drawing studio as a display of the sanitised order of memory needs to be carefully distinguished from the accomplishment and confident enabling capacity of trait.

To reiterate the discussions in the previous chapters, the 'accomplishment of trait' comprises both generative and inventive interchange between traces as the conjecture of the invisible, and the somatic play of skill and dexterity. It comprises the intimate and generalised conversions of visibilities, yet does not exclude context or social space. Therefore, continuous, constantly active interplay between object and subject is crucial to the students' drawing.

Although habitus absorbs information on an unconscious level, its processes of filtering and selection can also function to organise such information systematically in the *conscious* in order to make it manageable. The only purposes of ordering that the drafter contains in the sphere of consciousness, are those of stability and of regulatory organisation reminiscent of rule-governed¹⁷⁵ formula. In drawing, such ordering would lead to certain stagnation and the sterile face of perfection.

¹⁷⁴ Please refer, Chapter 1, 'Process versus projectivity; verb versus noun', where I explain in a footnote that 'knowledge of the concrete world, as preconceived idea, interferes with observation during drawing, so that a very realistic drawing projects such knowledge, rather than durational, experiential cognition of the field of observation'. The explanation above does not contradict this statement. Rather, it explains the difference between drawing what one 'knows' as opposed to drawing what one 'sees'. Sight, rather than knowledge, involves experiential cognition, which elicits enaction.

¹⁷⁵ Above, I allude to the contrast between 'rule' as deterministic objective structure and the 'strategising' and 'struggling' that Bourdieu proposes instead to explain confluence between agent and structure.

Habitual and formulaic practices meet with obstruction in the form of the in-phase generative and inventive faculties of the drawing process. Indeed, when trait turns into a repetitive pattern, it becomes deterministic, since it rests on a fallacious perception of ‘reality’ as a hard and fast entity of pre-given properties. It offers the young student drafter a niche of safety, but it leaves no room for interchange and exchange along the developmental pathways of drawing that I described in Chapter 4. Therefore, the order of memory can hardly bring forth amassed syntheses, let alone creative or recursive extension of syntheses. It misses the “unconscious execution” (Derrida. 1993: 48), the blindly spontaneous irruption of trait.

Thereby, the flesh as the very “eclipse between the two”, the “phantom” between the visible and the invisible, eludes the drafter (Derrida. 1993: 48). The continuum in which traces recursively anticipate their successors¹⁷⁶ disintegrates. In Bourdieuan terms, and to reiterate, the stasis of memory obstructs the generative facility of interplay between the internal forces of habitus, its consent, dissent, or compromise, and the external forces of field by means of practice. As a result, the drafter also does not develop the ability to sustain generativity in “the *rhetoric* of the trait” (Derrida. 1993: 56), nor does she accomplish any more “possibilities of infinite invention” (Bourdieu. 1996: 270). In cases like this, trait functions, or rather paralyses itself, “in a tautology that folds the same onto the same” (Derrida. 1993: 2).

5.1.5 Conjecture of the invisible

Contrary to the stasis of memory, and to return to the alternative, we see therefore that drawing bears the potential for sustained conjecture of the invisible. However, in doing so, it distributes its attention between the invisible and the visible, albeit in varying, chaotic, or even conflictive degrees of balance, imbalance, and clashes between the two (see **Addendum A, Illustration 4**). Similarly, it spreads its

¹⁷⁶ Once again, I refer to Bryson’s words, “..the work of observation is necessarily shaped by the line it leaves behind. The drawn line conditions or models the selections from the field of observation; it launches observation along a particular direction or path. And conversely, what is seen determines how the next line is to continue, in a perpetual and recursive interaction that unfolds in ongoing time” (De Zegher. 2003: 154).

attention between denotation and connotation, albeit unknowingly, and creates dialectical interplay amongst the two. These distributions are not even, precisely because they envelope enactionist drawn gesture in unifying interplay with interactionist drawn gesture to the benefit of all three players – the self, drawing and display.

5.1.6 Visibility and invisibility: a generative duel

Drawing can sustain interplay along all those pathways that ensure blind irruption, as well as generativity. In this, it demonstrates its ability to nurture the appropriations of trait that surpasses sight. To explain this, and to verify my assertion in the preceding discussions that trait is the invisibility of things, it is necessary to dwell a moment on invisibility in relation to visibility.

I regard Derrida's notion that the difference between object and image (**see Addendum A, Illustration 10**) constitutes 'the invisibility' an apt variation on the "possibilities of infinite invention" that Bourdieu asserts (1996: 270). As I explained in previous chapters, Bourdieu's concept of habitus locates the source of invention in a body-mind that interplays in social space. I therefore understand habitus as the creator and treasurer of invisibility. Habitus appropriates invisibility by transforming it into visibility.

Duel

As generative facilities in drawing, it emerges that interactivity and enaction engage in a duel between the ontic mask (the visible), and the hidden face beneath the mask (the invisible). In this duel, the sword (as drawing tool) unmask the ontic in order to reveal the hidden face beneath the mask. Such unmasking by a sword implies scarring. Indeed, the drawing tool leaves scars, yet they are *revealing* scars. The drawing tool deforms and wounds on the drawing surface. It does not preserve in minutest detail the hidden face of the ontic mask, nor does it seek to escape in the sterile impartiality of obsessive description.

The imagery that this metaphoric application of 'sword', 'sheath', 'mask', and 'face' offers, bring some clarity to the constructs I pose in the thesis. The empty hollowess

of a sheath, its inside, forms the negative shape of a sword, its non-visibility – the sword itself being its positive, its visibility. Similarly, the inside of a mask is the non-visible negative of the face, or invisible spectre (ghost) of a face. This non-visible negative in itself is the visible positive of the back of the mask. In both cases, the comfortable fit of the visible positive into the nonvisible negative suggests an inevitable intertwining as well as interchanging reciprocity.

The image recalls the Derrida's "eye graft": "Here is the second hypothesis then – an eye graft, the grafting of one point of view onto the other: a drawing of the *blind* is a drawing of the blind" (1993: 2-3). The image also recalls the fit between the somatic surge of the labour of drawing, and the norms of common schemata, in which the drafter inscribes 'excessive' layers of meaning in trait, that I discuss in the previous chapter. At the same time, the image indicates the appropriateness of the idea of chiasmus and dialectical interactivity as transitional or migratory path between the unconscious and conscious during the act of drawing. Derrida says, "But like all production, that of the abyss came to saturate what it hollows out" (1987: 33). To ensure a smooth inter-filling fit or graft, the mask sacrifices matter to hollowness, which receives the corresponding materiality of the face and its convex planes. So too does the sheath in receiving its sword. These images project simultaneous interactivity, intertwining, reversibility, and chiasmus that, as metaphor, alight on the difference between Bourdieu's conception of dialectical interactivity and Merleau-Ponty's notion of chiasmus between subject and object. One is a migratory path back-and-forth, the other an instantaneous fit, graft, or drawing-together, but both occupy a unifying middle way between extreme objectivism and extreme subjectivism.¹⁷⁷

In drawing, we see that the sword destroys the mask to scar the face, thus recreating the face by means of disfigurement that both inscribe the movements of the hand and shapes a new face, the other of its negative. As such, an interactive dialectic between destruction and construction is evident. The new face reflects the 'other' of the mask's negative rather than that of its front, which wore a completely

¹⁷⁷ Both in meta-analytic terms and in terms of describing the moment of conjecture that creates trait - or that trait creates conjecture.

different face of duplicity. In this, I see ‘another’ (the duplicitous face)¹⁷⁸ destroyed in interactive violence to reveal the other¹⁷⁹ of the nonvisible negative, which as a mould would have engendered its positive again. While the image suggests both the dialectics of interplay and a mirroring chiasmus or reversibility, a third element, namely the nothingness, the diaphanous film between convexity filling concavities and concavity enveloping convexities, appears. This thin plane between the two surfaces of the negative mould and its positive casting meets each facing surface as an ambilaterality, which poses such a tight mutuality that the only form it can take on, is that of gridirons of line, of scarring as drawing. There in, for me, lies trait, both as invisibility and as ‘enacted’ disposition of mind-body.

Derrida proposes that drawing traces are the “absolute invisibility” – implying that the drafter becomes completely seduced by her own reach towards the invisible. In an about-turn that reflexivity orchestrates, the drafter becomes the hunted¹⁸⁰ (1993: 51-52). In the construct that I am trying to formulate here, the drawing (the scars left by the sword) becomes the ‘other’ of the invisible, rather than ‘another’ visible. There in lies the challenge and captivation of the accomplishment of trait for the drafter. The desire to find the other of preverbal symbolicity¹⁸¹ (gesture, invisibility, or the pre-conceptual) could become irrepressible, because its eerie strangeness, its otherness, brings forth the *wonder* of constant discovery.

Although a drawing can materialise away from the visible to ‘recite’ another visible – the way one would recite verses written by another poet – such a drawing would merely redistribute style language without the drafter experiencing the wonder of gestic conversion. Drawing yields the other of self-as-being as the other of invisibility, which is invention. Drawing, therefore, should not abandon the visible completely, because the absence of visibility would render its unmasking

¹⁷⁸ This description of ‘the duplicitous face’ as ‘another’ alludes to copying or the redistribution of style language in drawing.

¹⁷⁹ While ‘other’ refers to trait as the other of the gestic, of the ‘muteness that dwells in language’.

¹⁸⁰ Derrida (1993: 51) relates this as follows, “the draftsman would be given over to this other invisibility, given over to it in the same way that a hunter, himself in relentless pursuit, becomes a fascinating lure for the tracked animal that watches him”.

¹⁸¹ As I explain in Chapter 1, De Zegher cites Julia Kristeva who asserts that gesture, as “a preverbal symbolicity” introduced into language the notion of “pre-meaning”. The conception and conversion of sense from gesture to speech, to language, or to writing, created, and continue to create, expanding structures of language and systems of cerebration (Kristeva. 1989: 305 – 306, cited in De Zegher, 2003: 274).

unnecessary, impossible, and mute – there would be no cries of pain that elicit more probing or scarring in this duel of interplay, and alas, no rhetoric.

In drawing, the invisible needs the visible, whether in the form of memory, in the form of the loss of that memory to the unconscious, in the form of subjective conception, or in the subjective experience of viewing, feeling, and touching an object. Experiential cognition entails, in drawing, arrays of founding perceptions¹⁸² that the drafter experiences in a continuous flow. Each founding perception retains traces of its precedent, thus building on one another recursively as subjective constructs of the mind.

Non-visibility

If, at the outset of drawing, non-visibility, or ‘idea’, were to posit itself as subject matter, the lack of visibility that is typical of idea, gains visibility through trait irruption. In such a situation, trait formation engages in a duel with its precedents, thus bringing forth visibility as the other of both the invisibilities of preceding trait and of the self (see **Addendum A, Illustrations 2 & 7**). In this resides another duel. The subjective ‘reading’ by habitus of already irrupted trait, engages in a duel with conversions that continue to irrupt as trait. These irruptions display as partial restoration of the visible (already irrupted trace) and partial regeneration of the self as invisible.

Bloom’s taxonomy of the cognitive domain (1956: 62-187) tells us that conception has to rely on perception in order to bring forth syntheses. Rudolf Arnheim, in his book *Visual Thinking* (1969: 27) says, “In the perception of shape lies the beginnings of concept formation”. This also suggests Varela’s notion of unifying interdependency between perception and conception. To *experience* the visible, means entering the sphere of its invisibility, upon which the drafter enacts her access to it as trait. Habitus interacts with the field of forces through practice in order to generate invention. In drawing, the invisible irrupts from unconscious memory of seeing the visible. The ‘nucleus of absence,’ upon which Merleau-Ponty consigns the

¹⁸² Bryson (1983: 17) defines the founding perception as the fraction of a moment in which the drafter converts three-dimensionality into two-dimensional form. The drafter does this along all the pathways I describe in Chapter 4 - or rather; to my mind, these pathways constitute the founding perception.

visible, pertains to the visible as a construct and *experience* of the body-mind, of habitus, of cognition, and unification between perception and conception. Once a construct, it is no longer an object. As a construct, it is “there, without being an object”. He explains this further by stating that; “One has to understand that it is visibility itself that involves a nonvisibility” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 247, cited also in Derrida. 1993: 52).

Middle way

As such, drawing, by its oblique¹⁸³ insistence on trait, seeks and finds a pathway between the lived ‘reality’ of the world as projective of “pre-given properties” and the “cognitive system projecting its own world”, where the appearance of ‘the real’ is “merely a reflection of internal laws of the system” (Varela. 1992: 172). It finds this in Bourdieu’s concept of interactivity, in Merleau-Ponty’s flesh, and in Varela’s concept of enaction.

These three concepts have in common the notion of unifying activity amongst two poles that create a whole. This recalls my employment in Chapter 4 of the metaphor of the ebb and flow of the tidal movements of the sea to locate trait in the debris collecting on the shore, but emanating from both sea and land to illustrate an overlap in the middle. The debris that ends up in this overlapping territory represents trait, and the overlapping area represents the drawing ground as crossing point. Drawing acknowledges both the visible (the land) and the invisible (the sea) as sources of trait, thereby capturing this middle ground. It does so, right from the blindness of enactionist drawn gesture in a continuum of recursivity that eventually reveals.

5.1.7 Lateral mutuality as impetus

In the phenomenological terms of Merleau-Ponty, drawing produces a sense of self-as-being that recognises (or finds its match in) the ‘beingness’, the existentiality of

¹⁸³ ‘Oblique’, because in facilitating drawing, the forming of trait is never presented as the objective of a task. In its facilitation, emphases are on the drafter as individual and on drawing as knowledge discipline (see the last chapter). I also state in Chapter 2, under ‘Points of further focus’ that, “Although it can be encouraged by positive reinforcement after the fact, drawing, as a knowledge discipline, does not articulate trait as a defined element that forms part of its contents. This is so, because trait (or signature), in fact, manifests without precedent”.

lived 'reality'. This happens in muteness, a space seemingly empty of thought, yet infused with a sense of affinity, that the drafter cannot account for in specular form, but only in mental recognition, and then not even in thought. The drafter gestures from this in-between plane.

Between cognition, recognition, and the possibility of the gestic as specular form, a duel erupts. It is a duel between nothingness and something, which erupts on paper as trait. This notion suggests that it is impossible to capture the essence (nucleus) of the visible. Therefore, trait departs from essence, and this departure already starts at the point of its founding. From there onwards, it generates the dynamics of amassment in deviating conversions that constitute a form of invention that surpasses, entirely, the visible. This evokes Derrida's words, "It is like a ruin that does not come *after* the work but remains produced, *already from the origin*, by the advent and structure of the work" (1993: 65. Emphasis JD). Such initiative – the very founding of visual perception, however deeply hidden it is as simulacrum – is the point from where dialectical, reversible and enactionist chains emanate.

The drafter wants to savour that point, and exactly *because* it proves to be blind, she cannot resist the *possibility* of seeing it. Therefore, she draws the mutuality between the self and world as she conceives or imagines it as hers alone, forming it in her own hand as a fiction, as her other. This phenomenological and experiential recounting of how trait forms in drawing, once again resonates in Derrida's words, "that the performative fiction that engages the spectator in the signature of the work is given to be seen only through the blindness that it produces as the truth" (1993: 65).

In drawing, the drafter experiences such a plane in which it becomes irresistible to blend the visibility, the tactility, and her common 'aboutness' as superimpositions on paper. In this experience, the drafter largely eliminates her distance from the visible world, her perspective, her viewing through space, to 'level' her with things on an 'aperspective' plane, or on a plane without any perspective, a cavernous evenness of mutuality.

In the drafter's experience, her being constitutes one element, lived 'reality' another element, and her irrupting marks on paper, a third. It must be evident here, that she would then turn to an objective formulation of a *mute spot* in her perception that "cannot be thought in a specular" (Derrida. 1993: 53) form and therefore is 'blind'. The drafter could also construe this experience as a void, a nothingness to which she will never have access, unless she draws it. If she gave this nothingness a name, – invisibility – the drafter assigns some consciousness, some concreteness to it. She does this by drawing it (**see Addendum A, Illustration 10**).

Thereby, the drafter transports this muteness and blindness to 'superimposition on paper' – to trait as inscription of self-as-being. The visibility of self-as-being is also unknown until it almost seems to shape itself, enact itself, on this plane without perspective. There, at the point of its origination, trait is no form, but rather a future form. The drafter cannot know it until she makes it a form of the here and now. Therefore, she wants to convert all of its 'no-formness' into specularity, thus giving it meaning only she can consign it. Yet, different viewers will interpret it in various ways.

To reiterate, drawing seeks to retain the rhythm between visibility and invisibility, between the unconscious and the conscious, between the layered dispositions of body-mind. The 'ontological' in drawing practice implies incorporation of the visible and the invisible, as well as the self in relation to the world, and (through the act of drawing), world in relation to self. Complicity implies interplay between several accomplices in drawing practice, namely between unconscious and conscious, between a self-consciousness immersed in lived 'reality' and lived 'reality' immersed in self-consciousness. Complicitous reversibility¹⁸⁴ between the being of subject and the being of object dispels their antimonial relationship.

¹⁸⁴ Derrida (1993: 68) tells of the experience of drawing the self and the emergence of the self in drawing, literally in drawing a self-portrait and figuratively in drawing any other subject, "In the beginning there is ruin. Ruin is that which happens to the image from the moment of the first gaze. Ruin is the self-portrait, this face looked at in the face as the memory of itself, what remains or returns as a specter from the moment one first looks at oneself and a figuration is eclipsed. The figure, the face, then sees its visibility being eaten away; it loses its integrity without disintegrating. For the incompleteness of the visible monument comes from the eclipsing structure of the trait, from a structure that is only remarked, pointed out, impotent or incapable of being reflected in the shadow of the self-portrait. So many reversible propositions. For one can just as well read the pictures of ruins as the figures of a portrait, indeed, of a self-portrait".

As drawing functions as interface between drafter and world, it also devises transitivity between the unconscious and conscious spheres. Accordingly, drawing harbours a desire to show the self, but it is hardly a conscious desire. Rather, drawing constantly maintains an underlying dimension, namely sensing the self as being. The self-as-being constitutes existentiality – *not similarity or identity* – in common between the self and environment.¹⁸⁵ To show the self (through trait) as mutual with environment is not to comprehend the self as an object or as someone with a defined, static calligraphy who must consciously enforce it as signature. Rather, sense of self-as-being comprises “‘reflectedness’ (*sich bewegen*), it thereby constitutes itself in itself” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 249). Trait as self-as-being embodies the self-reflexivity of drawing. This sense of self-as-being is what ‘I’, as drafter, allow to go into exile onto the drawing surface. As self-perception is a perception-of-being-self, so is trait. Merleau-Ponty says, “the self-perception is still a perception, i.e. it gives me a *Nicht Urpräsentierbar* (a non-visible, myself), but this it gives me through an *Urpräsentierbar* (my tactile or visual appearance) in transparency (i.e. as a latency)” (1968: 249-250). Trait reflects such transparency. In trait, self gets the closest to seeing or feeling the self, in other words, in accomplishing a sense of self-as-being. In looking for its own visibility, it achieves new invisibility on the condition that it perceives its visibility.

As stated before, the accomplishment of trait, therefore, should never be the conscious object, or objective of drawing. As soon as it is either of these, it mimes itself. Trait irrupts in the unknowing of itself, or in what Derrida calls blindness and Merleau-Ponty, the blind spot (*‘punctum caecum’*). Trait is a ghost, the nothingness of invisibility, of being. As soon as the pursuit of this ghost becomes a conscious endeavour, it withdraws its flow and spontaneity to reflect only its closure upon itself

¹⁸⁵ Merleau-Ponty (1968: 253) explains this as follows, “What I want to do is restore the world as a meaning of Being absolutely different from the ‘represented’, that is, as the vertical Being which none of the ‘representations’ exhaust and which all ‘reach’, the wild Being. This is to be applied not only to perception, but to the Universe of predicative truths and significations as well. Here also it is necessary to conceive the signification (wild) as absolutely distinct from the In Itself and the ‘pure consciousness’ - the truth as this Individual upon which the acts of significations cross and of which they are cuttings. Moreover the distinction between the two planes (natural and cultural) is abstract: everything is cultural in us (our *Lebenswelt* is ‘subjective’) (our perception is cultural-historical) and everything is natural in us (even the cultural rests on the polymorphism of the wild Being). The meaning of being is to be disclosed: it is a question of showing that the ontic, the ‘*Erlebnisse*’, ‘sensations’, ‘judgments’ – (the ob-jects, the ‘represented’, in short all idealizations of the Psyche and of Nature) all the bric-a-brac of those positive psychic so-call ‘realities’ (and which are lacunar, ‘insular’, without *Weltlichkeit* of their own) is in ‘reality’ abstractly carved out from the ontological tissue, from the ‘body of the mind’”.

in a meaningless repetition of its stasis, thus effacing self-as-being, the ambilateral mutuality it holds with self-as-nothing.

As invisibility, however, the ghost must haunt its visibility “to the point of being confused with it” (Derrida. 1993: 51). I recognise in these words of Derrida the generative rather than repetitive facility of dialectical interplay. His words evoke a sense of a feverish chase forward that the ghost elicits in self-as-nothing to urge her on in her attempts to find her visibility in self-as-being. This haunt recalls the generative tension emanating between the waywardness of enactionist drawn gesture and the inhibitive curbing of interactionist drawn gesture.

Through trait, the drafter recursively creates new visibilities upon new non-visibilitys. As such, trait is “the singular body of the visible itself, *right on* the visible – so that, by emanation, and as if it were secreting its own *medium*, the visible would produce blindness” (Derrida. 1993: 51-52).

What we never see first-hand, is the phenomenal essence of the visible, as we do not ever see local colour. Nor do we ever see first-hand the phenomenal essence of the drafter. It dies in the blind, mute pocket¹⁸⁶ where trait is born. We see trait as ‘the singular body of the visible’ or what remains of it in the sword’s scarification. The conscious can only speculate about the unconscious through conjecture. Its conjecture is gestic conversion – trait borne by the dialectics and confusion of consciousness trying to ‘see’ unconsciousness. In this way, unconsciousness comes to the fore and enters the visible world as a conjectured appearance.

In the phenomenological relationship between visibility and invisibility, sight is a given, as it is in drawing. The drafter cannot retrieve a sense of the self from sight, visibility (and their opposites, blindness and invisibility), or from the ability to invent. Downs et al. states that the drafter cannot draw “without sight or hindsight, memory or consciousness of resemblance” (2007: xii). I uphold and acknowledge this in my construct of ‘interactionist drawn gesture’, which also involves recognisability¹⁸⁷ as interactivity between habitus, practice, and field.

¹⁸⁶ The ‘punctum caecum’ (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 247, cited also in Derrida. 1993: 53).

¹⁸⁷ Refer, Chapter 4, ‘Token schemata’.

At the point of making a mark on paper, however, the ambivalence inherent to the meaning of ‘appearance’¹⁸⁸ mirrors an interesting and generative interplay between trait irruption and sight. This interplay exceeds dialectic between a “will to imitate” and a “will to invent”, a notion that Downs et al. also support (2007: xii). Who other than the self-as-being upholds either the will to imitate or the will to invent? An extra pathway of generative interplay – the appropriation of excess only the self-as-being can achieve – supports the centrality of sight in the drawing process. More importantly, however, it defines the significance of trait in drawing. Sensing and enacting an existential mutuality between the self and lived ‘reality’ is the necessary gateway to surpassing the invention that trait enfolds. Enaction of such mutuality turns the experience of drawing for the drafter into ‘self-as-lived-reality’. In such blind ‘sense’, which is an *experience* too, *trait* replaces self-as-nothingness. However, it also exceeds replacement.

5.2 Conclusions

This chapter leads to the conclusion that the self-as-being, with all its diverse facets and depths of complexity, presents those endless possibilities that can enrich invention. Embodied action *brings forth* in action also that which is not consciously remembered, but stored so deeply, that it is rather immured, embedded, entrenched, or absorbed completely in body-mind or in the ‘lie’ that is ‘self’. The wealth of what remains hidden or embodied drives the drafter’s urgent and constant refutation of self-as-lie or self-as-nothingness to find the complexities of self-as-being. Such complexities spill over the limits of invention. These concepts are enfolded in the construct I call ‘enactionist drawn gesture’.

The appearance of something (including style language) may very well elicit a ‘will to imitate’¹⁸⁹ it. In a previous chapter, I concluded, however, that *the idiosyncratic*

¹⁸⁸ As I state in Chapter 1, I interpret the word ‘appearance’ to refer to both the exterior manifestation of object, and to the advent and development of drawn display on the drawing surface, in other words, its gradual becoming apparent. The drafter’s viewing of appearance of the field of observation and the gradual appearance of image on drawing surface, therefore, stand in a relationship of interplay.

¹⁸⁹ This is not in radical opposition to the views of Downs et al., but rather assert an interpretation of Derrida’s explorations that lie slightly off-centre from those of Downs et al. I cite above from an account of their interpretation of Derrida’s hypothesis of sight (Derrida. 1993). To clarify my deviation, I repeat Derrida’s clear assertion regarding the advent of trait, “Even if drawing is, as

gesture that the drafter intends as imitation in trace-form in fact invents, rather than imitates. Moreover, that which the idiosyncrasy of such gesture encompasses, its irretrievable affiliation to a belief in self-as-being, a self that is also *unique* in being, creates the flow of conjecturing marks. Such flow conveys the whole of trait, its invention, and its excesses (rhetoric). There proves to be only ‘nothing’, ‘the hidden’, ‘invisibility’, to imitate, a nothingness that *is* in fact the self, a self-as-nothing that *is* self-as-being. At the point of perception, *conjecture* yields drawn gesture. Thus, this clash between contradictory excitants¹⁹⁰ urges a flow of drawn gesture. The gradual appearance of drawn gesture (which constantly insinuates more ‘nothingness’ anew) constitutes the ‘disappearance’ that remains to be marked in order to appear. In my constructs, therefore, I replace (or augment possibly) “the will to imitate” with a ‘will to reveal the self’ or ‘a desire to show the self’, a notion that I discuss in the next chapter.

5.3 Overarching conclusion: The genesis of trait

It is now possible to summarise the main insight regarding the origin of trait that emerges from this chapter and the previous chapters.

Trait in drawing does not represent. While it does not recover pre-given properties from the visible world, it also does not mirror a pre-formed picture of the world. Nor does an inborn and unchangeable genetic structure pre-ordain the particularities of its visibility. Yet, it exists, and its existence is, like that of the self, only ever perceivable as well as do-able in a measuring between something and nothing. As such, drawing-trait is borne by the body-mind experience of the world, which incorporates both interaction and enaction.

they say, mimetic, that is, reproductive, figurative, representative, even if the model is presently facing the artist, the trait must proceed in the night. It escapes the field of vision. Not only because it is not yet visible, but because it does not belong to the realm of the spectacle, of spectacular objectivity – and so that which it makes happen or come [advenir] cannot in itself be mimetic” (1993: 45). My emphasis on trait, on idiosyncrasy, rather than on a generalised conception of the nature of drawing, directs my thinking into an interpretation that deviates very slightly from that of Downs et al. Moreover, the difference between “experience of cognitive mimesis” (Downs et al. 2007: xx), and ‘enaction of embodied cognition’ constitutes my argument. This difference, to my mind, comprises the description of ‘trait’ as that which ‘proceeds in the night’ and that has nothingness to mime.

¹⁹⁰ The ‘contradictory excitants’ are self-as-non-existent, on the one hand, and a conviction in self-as-being on the other. Added to this contradiction, the contradiction between appearance and disappearance as simultaneous process in drawing is involved, as is the unbeknownst and the known, and the unbeseen and the seen.

CHAPTER SIX

TO SHOW THE SELF: AUTO-DEIXIS

Introduction

As an expansion drawn from the explorations of the previous chapters, I propose the notion of auto-deixis,¹⁹¹ a word I invent, and a concept I derive from the relationship between habitus, enaction, interaction, and the notion of trait as the product of embodied action. If trait constitutes the self-as-being in drawing, auto-deixis frames trait and trace as *autogenous enactions* that manifest as a *desire to show the self* in drawing. I employ those theories I explored in the first five chapters to explain the significant status of trait in auto-deictic drawing, which also motivates its status in drawing facilitation. I derive the synthesis in particular from the notions of enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture.

As such, the chapter continues an attempt to answer the question of *how* trait realises in drawing, while, in addition, it attempts to find answers to the question of how the realisation of trait is sustained in the educational studio situation. Answering these questions require understanding of the relationship between the theories that the thesis investigates and practices. To demonstrate this relationship, I propose a series of processes inherent to auto-deixis that I translate into broad outlines for task design in its facilitation. I provide illustrated descriptions of such processes and explain their realisation in practice.

I propose that the processes mentioned above also distinguish drawing as a form of creative research with self-reflexivity at its core. I position convergences between the theories that I discussed before as foundation for conceptualising drawing as a self-reflexive research process.

¹⁹¹ Refer also to the Glossary (Addendum B).

Since all the previous chapters underwrite this chapter, it also draws significantly from preceding chapters, especially with reference to drawing-trait. Therefore, repetition is hard to avoid. The differences between an enactionist deconstruction of drawing-trait and the more conventional understandings (which are also more dismissive of drawing-trait) are deceptively small and often rely on reallocation of nuance only. This not only considerably complicates discussion, but also necessarily requires the repeated incorporation of terms and explanatory phrases that were newly formed within the context of the thesis. To an extent, a pattern-language has formed, which also reads as repetition.

6.1 Auto-deixis as concept: a desire to show the self

The words: 'autogenous' and 'deixis'

'Auto' I derive from 'autogenous', meaning that gestic conversion originates from within. 'Deixis', from the Greek *deiknōnēi*, meaning 'to show', refers to speech utterances that contain information concerning the locus of utterance, the self (Bryson. 1983: 87).

I apply the word 'autogenous' to suggest the understanding that trait stems from an individuated body-mind or self. 'Deictic' suggests a desire to show the self¹⁹² by

¹⁹² Bryson (19883: 87 – 89), places the visual manifestation of the artist's presence in a spatial relationship with her painting and with viewer in the classical posture known as "Eloquentia" that appeared in European paintings dating from medieval times and the Renaissance. Eloquentia shows a human figure as narrator, as orator, with his or her hands in positions that became canonic or formulaic standards. The left hand usually turns inwards, towards the body, while the right hand stretches outwards, gesturing towards the viewer. In order to elucidate my perception of visible presence and invisible presence (presence in absentia) in auto-deictic drawing, I will dare to deviate slightly from Bryson's equalising assimilation of artist as present in which he posits the artist as the Eloquentia figure. The Eloquentia figure was intended to symbolise the artist as narrator, thereby rather allocating a role of aloofness to the artist. Not only was it never a portrait of the real artist, it also never revealed any trace of the artist's own physical presence in the form of individuated mark making. Consistent with conventions of the time, knowing full well that the figure was supposed to symbolise him, the painter did not grace the figure with his own face, but adorned the figure with a tranquil, wise, but anonymous face, simultaneously defacing himself and elevating himself as serenely removed narrator, an imaginary luminary, separate from self. Ironically, and contrary to intention, in this way Eloquentia suggests that the maker of the painting, the painter, is not the narrator of the painting, in other words, the painting is not the site of its maker's body. That elevated place belongs to some higher institution (the church's voice with the artist as mediating rhetor of religious dogmas, for example), or to an abstraction in which the artist plays the role of a wise orator or preacher. The signification of the narrator's gesture, painted in the polished, smooth technique and style typified by the total eradication of the anonymous artists' personalised marks, not revealing any secrets as to

asserting self-as-being in the present time. As such, deixis occurs in the correlate of making the trace, in which 'I' mark self and self marks 'I'. In such a process, the hidden self comes into play with the hidden 'self' of her subject matter. Through trait, the drafter inscribes this coming together,¹⁹³ rather than describing the objective existence of her subject matter.¹⁹⁴ Both enaction of self and the sense of an eclipse between the self and object dwell in trait irruption.

According to the *Oxford Dictionary of English*, the Greek word 'deiktikos' and 'deiktos' mean "Capable of proof". The same source indicates 'deiknynai' to mean, "to show". I draw from this the word "deictic"¹⁹⁵ (ODE. 2005: 458). The English word 'deictic' relates to words and expressions "who's meaning is dependent on the context in which they are used" (ODE. 2005: 458). A linguistic framework also reveals the coincidental elements of spatiality and temporality in relation to self and body in discursive exchange that recounts the desire to establish the speaker's own spatial and temporal being (Bryson. 1983: 87-89). Such elements manifest in words that refer to the position of their speaker. Words like 'near', 'far', 'here' and 'there', for example, indicate the speaker's relative position during speaking. In the same way, words like 'now', 'then', 'yesterday', 'soon' or 'late' contain information regarding relative temporality to their speaker's position in time (Bryson. 1983: 87-89). Words like 'myself', 'me', 'my', 'mine' recount the speaker as self, also implying added dimensions of the implied visibility of the speaker and her powers of possession, either of self or of objectivities. What they all have in common is their intrinsic acknowledgement of a "self-reflexive" speaker (Bryson. 1983: 87-89).

their isochronistic significations, mirrors my perception of the concept of self-effacement quite literally. The viewer learns about an artist twice removed, serenely masked in muted mark, literally defaced, and figuratively effaced. This indeed also points to the origin of a long and revered tradition of self-effacement in Western representational painting. With this deviation, I want to explain that, although auto-deixis does not refer to literal self-portrayal, it does reside in shamelessly exposed self-originative, auto-originative, and self-reflexive trace that irrupts in the correlate of its doing as trait.

¹⁹³ Please refer to Chapter 2, 'The transcendental', and to Chapter 5, 'Middle way', and 'Lateral mutuality as impetus'.

¹⁹⁴ Please refer to Chapter 5, 'The turning point: conjecture and invention'.

¹⁹⁵ I also explain the word 'deictic' in the Glossary of key words (Addendum B) to point out its connection with 'token' and 'autogenous' (Please refer). In my applications of the word, I intend it to denote the concept 'to show' (*deiknynai*), rather than 'to say' (*deiktikos*) in a first person voice. I apply its meaning 'to show' as 'showing in a first person mark'.

Drafteric equivalent

I propose an equivalent in the context of drawing that invokes a subliminal 'attendance' of the self in the labour of drawing as a desire to *show self*, which relates a subliminal recognition and assertion of self-as-being. To elucidate the notions of showing the self directly, as proof of the attendance of one's own body and mind in a practice, the term '*auto-deictic drawing*' would be apt. I propose that individuation in drawing constitutes the drafter's autogenous desire, compulsion, or disposition to *show the self-as-being*. In the previous chapters, it became clear that such showing is about enaction of the self, a self-reflexive assertion and uttering of the self that realises as difference (rather than 'presence'). The word 'auto-deixis' would literally translate as trait as proof of the unique (rather than similar) existence of self-as-being.

Preliminary explanation

The aspect of trait that auto-deixis brings forth, is a self in dialogue with self and other. In other words, it is a dialogue between self-originative action and both self- and world-reference. Trait becomes the other of the self in this dialogue. Thus, I describe interactive and enactionist drawn gesture as 'auto-deixis', 'auto-deictic gesture', and 'auto-deictic drawing'. Auto-deictic drawing is drawing that realises through embodied action.

6.2 The concepts and processes that frame auto-deictic drawing: a summary

In this section, I summarise a number of constructs that I derive from the explorations in former chapters. These concepts underpin the formation of trait, which is the main objective of auto-deictic drawing. I propose, therefore, these constructs as a structural framework for the facilitation of auto-deictic drawing.¹⁹⁶

Cerebration

The previous chapters lead to the understanding that cerebration constitutes interplay between habitus and practice that produces trait formation. Such interplay

¹⁹⁶ Circularity (rather than linearity) structure the interrelatedness of these concepts. They bend back on themselves, which becomes apparent in my efforts to describe them with some semblance to linearity. Because this section also serves as summary, repetition is unavoidable.

unifies perception and conception. The understanding that perception and conception are not mutually exclusive follows logically. I base this understanding on the interfusion between perception and conception in trait irruption that I discuss in Chapter 4.

Time and space: the in-phase aspect

Three aspects are inherent to the unification of perception and conception – drafter, time, and space. Auto-deictic drawing functions in the physical, spatial, and temporal *existence*¹⁹⁷ of the drafter. It is successful in the degree to which its marks articulate the difference of its drafter. The degree to which its marks articulate difference¹⁹⁸ equals their distinctiveness to a self, and such a self is identical only to itself. Trait is not similar to the world it nevertheless portrays. The body-mind unification, which enfolds unification between perception and conception, relates to *making* the drawing stroke as it occurs in real time and with the drawing surface in spatial relation to drafter and trace.

Drawn gesture and autogeny

Flowing from such non-dualist understanding of body-mind, perception, and conception, the concepts *drawn gesture* and *autogeny* fuse enaction and interactivity into gesture. As the previous chapters explain, enaction and interaction relate so closely that it would be truthful to say drawing is a process that enacts all-pervasive interactivity, and that it interacts through enaction. The one becomes the other, interfusing completely through the labour of drawing, which supports the notion of drawing as interface between the self and the world.

Gestic conversion and conversion

Gestic conversion constitutes a cerebrative and transitive passage from unconscious to conscious, from the indistinct to the distinct, from invisibility to visibility, and from blindness to sight. Drawn gesture, as trait, is the materialisation of these passages. The concept of '*conversion*' is crucial. It suggests a process of transforming the gestic

¹⁹⁷ "Line can no more escape the present tense of its entry into the world than it can escape into oil paint's secret hiding places of erasure and concealment. Drawing always exists in parallel to that other, permanently present time – that of viewing. For viewing, too, is condemned to the present, to a work of exploration that never quite ends – it is always possible, at a later date, that we will see more in the image than we see now" (Bryson in De Zegher.2003: 150).

¹⁹⁸ The notion of self-as-being resonates in Bryson's expositions on the Gaze and the Glance (1983: 87-131), which enfold the 'presence of self'.

into mark that is enactionist and not representational. Mute or blind gesture¹⁹⁹ is the object of transformation, not a picture in the mind.

Irruption²⁰⁰

The notion of irruption implies 'conversion'. It indicates a phenomenon in which the materialisation of marks happens in an abrupt, eruptive way. If trait, as self-inscription, comes into being in an unpremeditated way, no visible scripts can exist for trait – neither in the drafter's mind, nor in objective structures. In the previous chapter, we saw that as soon as they start to serve as script in their visible form, the drafter runs the risk of falling into repetitive redistribution. In auto-deictic drawing, the aim is to avoid even this form of repetition.

Trait

As a phenomenon of invention, trait encapsulates, to my mind, all the above. The notions that trait has its genesis in the unconscious, in body-mind as the self, and that trait is therefore self-originative, form the core and foundation of auto-deictic drawing.

The self as locus of utterance

The self is the origin of self-originativity. A confluence of body and mind suggests self-originativity through enaction, where self takes an assertive stance in a conviction of self-as-being, thus not only asserting its unique existence in practices, but also developing the ability to surpass sight. Differences between the enactions of individual drafters emanate from individuated embodied habituses entangled in the labour of drawing to reveal and affirm the hidden self (or self-as-nothing proved as self-as-being).

Self-reflexivity confirms the self-as-being

Trait carries all these constructs along two main ambits in a dialectic that demonstrates reflexively. The first ambit comprises the possibility of self-as-being in opposition to the possibility of self-as-nothing (Varela. 1992: 105-110). The second

¹⁹⁹ Tantamount to the 'preverbal symbolicity' and 'pre-meaning' that I discuss in Chapter 1 (Kristeva. 1989: 305-306, cited in De Zegher, 2003: 274), the transformation from gesture to mark is comparable to the transformation of a grunt into word.

²⁰⁰ Note that irruption relates two contradictory processes that occur in virtual simultaneity, namely anticipation and precipitation.

ambit comprises the *self-originitivity* of gestic conversion. The drafter's drawn gesture is identifiable with her body-mind as self. The two, gesture and self, reflect one another.

Remnants of self and of world

Nevertheless, self-as-being never accomplishes complete possession of itself in trait. Jacques Derrida suggests that emanations from a passage between the self and world are not complete or exact representations of the self as their origin, or of the world with which the self interacts. Rather, such passage more resembles a transaction²⁰¹ between self and world, a process that involves trade and 'sacrifice' from both (Derrida. 1993: 41). Such a transaction as transitive action – also suggested by Downs et al (2001: xvii) – combines in drawing mere *remnants* of self and of the world.

Trait, as inscription of the self, is therefore never complete, nor is experience, interpretation, or description of the world ever fulfilled. Both trait and experience sacrifice only partially, which becomes an incentive in drawing that creates the momentum that drives it forward. If invisibility, the unbeseen, is unattainable as full visibility, it remains for the drafter an ever-elusive [im]-possibility.

Drawing divides

Drawing traces divide.²⁰² If each separate trace does not inscribe the self in complete containment, a single trace can never reveal the full potency of what is to

²⁰¹ I borrow this term from Downs et al. (2007: xvii), who cite Katrinka Wilson from an unpublished PhD-thesis titled *Mimesis and the Somatic of Drawing: In the Context of 20th Century Western Fine Art Practice* (Loughborough University, 2004): "What the performance implicitly tells us is that the drawing process enacts a simultaneous physical contradiction that, as Katrinka Wilson determines, is a transaction between appearance and thought".

²⁰² This is a deliberately ambiguous statement, since both 'traces' and 'divide' can be both verb and noun. Nevertheless, Derrida (1993: 54-55) says, "The outline or tracing separates and separates itself". Here I allude to duels between appearance and disappearance, visibility and invisibility, etc. that also extends into presence and presence in absentia, self, and the other of self that appears as trait. Derrida's words, "The linear limit I am talking about is in no way ideal or intelligible. It divides itself in its ellipsis; by leaving itself, and starting from itself, it takes leave of itself, and establishes itself in no ideal identity. In this twinkling of an eye, the ellipsis is not an object but a blinking of the difference that begets it, or, if you prefer, a *jalousie* (a blind) of traits cutting up the horizon, traits through which, between which, you can observe without being seen, you can see between the lines, if you see what I mean: the law of the inter-view. For the same reason, trait is not sensible". This implies such a pivoting between two oppositional stances, behind the drawing tool's blind tip, nothingness, in front of it, the advent of trace, its appearing takes it away from nothingness. On the drawing surface, it divides space from shape (e.g.), while it also divides appearance from disappearance and self from its other. This affords the irruption of trait (or vision) "from-since" the unbeseen,

come. This notion underpins the following concepts, while they reveal how trait materialises in blindness.

Memory: lost

To notate a glance, the drafter also has to break that glance, thereby losing sight of the viewing object. The *memory* of what she saw also recedes almost immediately. These searching glances constantly try to capture such receding memories of sight. A single glance in itself marks²⁰³ the beginning of a form of searching ahead. Efforts to capture evaporating sightings drive this form of searching.

Blindness

Although the drafter can therefore only notate the *nothingness* of sight, each notation anticipates further sight,²⁰⁴ just as its irruption into trait always promises insight while it invents. Both the effort to capture the fleetingness of sight and the promise of insight create the flow in drawing that makes the exceeding of invention possible. Such flow realises as Varela's notion of the assertion of the self-as-being, as opposed to self-as-nothing (1992: 107).

Derrida's explanation of the role sight (or rather blindness) plays in the forming of trace in drawing supports the notion of 'losing sight' or of blindness in gestic conversion (1993: 45):

"before" and "from since", being on either side of the "punctum caecum". Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 149) citing Paul Klee, "A walk to a walk's sake. The mobile agent is a point, shifting its position forward", also touches on the 'from-since'

²⁰³ Literally *making a mark* on paper – in other words, creating trace.

²⁰⁴ Derrida (1993: 1-2) suggests sight that "presupposes" (the *hypothesis* of sight): "One is on the lookout, one reflects upon what one sees, reflects what one sees by delaying the moment of conclusion...The judgement depends on the hypothesis". He continues to explain as follows: "No longer beneath each step, therefore, as I set out, but always out ahead of me, as if sent out on reconnaissance: two antennae or two scouts to orient my wanderings, to guide me as I feel my way, in a speculation that ventures forth, simply in order to see...", and, "Here is a first hypothesis: the drawing is blind, if not the draftsman or draftswoman. As such, and in the moment proper to it, the operation of drawing would have something to do with blindness, would in some way regard blindness [*aveuglement*]. In this *abocular* hypothesis (the word *aveugle* comes from *ab oculis*: not from or by but without the eyes), the following remains to be heard and understood: the blind man can be a seer, and he sometimes has the vocation of a visionary. Here is the *second hypothesis* then – an eye graft, the grafting of one point of view onto the other: a drawing of the blind is a drawing of the blind. Double genitive". I surmise from this that each glance carries the memory of sight and a subjective perception of concurrent sight, each presupposing the other in a clash that produces trace as ever inconclusive. Trace is a mere probe, a tentative search that can never find conclusively, truthfully, or accurately, yet continues to try.

Whether it be improvised or not, the invention of the *trait* does not follow, it does not conform to what is presently visible, to what would be set in front of me as a theme. Even if drawing is, as they say, mimetic, that is, reproductive, figurative, representative, even if the model is presently facing the artist, the *trait* must proceed in the night. It escapes the field of vision. Not only because it is *not yet visible*, but also because it does not belong to the realm of the spectacle, of spectacular objectivity – and so that which it makes happen or come [*advenir*] cannot in itself be mimetic.

We know now that the moment the drawing tool strikes the drawing surface, a conflation of multiple influences mediate in the irruption of mark. Yet, *trait* is blind – its mediation is not in visible form in the mind – and it does not find its origin in the world. Apart from challenging the notion of mimesis and a representationist mind-theory, Derrida's assertions that “*trait* must proceed in the night” and that “it escapes the field of vision” capture the unconscious origin of *trait*, a dark and blind abyss in which the self as body-mind resides.

The ‘blind’ (and mute) origin of *trait* also leads to the understanding that the difference between interpretation and enaction is pivotal. The drafter does not react gesticulation in drawing merely to project the gesture. She *enacts* the self-originate or personalised meaning that the self consigns to gesture durationally.

Trait as difference

Trait realises as difference. A transactional exchange of conciliation and trade between visibility (‘beseen’) and invisibility (‘unbeseen’) does not generate truth, or accuracy. As a result, the difference between the world and the drafter’s drawn enaction is vast. This *difference* between visibility and invisibility constitutes trace and *trait* as visibilities.

Dialectic

Dialectic as generative process is a recurring theme in the thesis. As I explained in Chapter 2, dialectic entails infralinguistic and infraconscious complicity between the drafter (*habitus*), drawing (*practice*), and world (*field*) (Bourdieu. 1998: 79-91). As such, dialectic between sophistry and primacy, participation and differentiation,

projectivity and process, expression and enaction, embodiment and schemata, blindness, sight and insight,²⁰⁵ visibility and invisibility, appearance and disappearance, between dissent, compliance and compromise can all be traced in the overarching dialectic between the self-as-being and the self-as-nothing. Each form of dialectic runs its course through processes of experiential cognition that enclose analysis, application, evaluation, and synthesis²⁰⁶ in gestic conversion.

Presence | absence

A form of dialectic, namely one of *presence and absence* (Norman Bryson. 1983: 116-119, 163-164), remains open to exploration in relation to auto-deictic drawing. In a linguistic context, the term 'deictic' refers only to the time concurrent with speaking, "the deictic present of practice", meaning 'in-phase' with practicing speech (Bryson. 1983: 120). In a drafteric context, the same term would refer to that phase in drawing when the body is *instrumental* in its execution – in other words, the body is the hand's touch on paper, which irrupts as difference. Bryson's term would exclude, however, those times when the body is purported to be absent, when the hand withdraws to leave 'nothing' in its wake. Contrary to Bryson, I propose that such absence, however, also constitutes presence and that both presence and absence continue to orchestrate difference.

The notion of a fused body-mind supports my proposal. The mind and everything implicit to mind cannot be absent from the somatic memory in trace making; and the desire to show the self remains behind in the withdrawal of the hand. The presence/absence dialectic, therefore, is pertinent to auto-deixis in a different way. Absence now starts to refer to a form of presence that recalls Merleau-Ponty's concept of 'flesh'. Interchangeability between presence and absence is equivalent to that between visibility and invisibility. Absence becomes an ever-present absence.

²⁰⁵ This is a reference to Derrida's expositions of the process of trace irruption as being 'blind'. "A hand of the blind ventures forth alone or disconnected, in a poorly delimited space; it feels its way, it gropes, it caresses as much as it inscribes, trusting in the memory of signs and supplementing sight. It is as if a lidless eye had opened at the tip of the fingers, as if one eye too many had just grown right next to the nail, a single eye of a cyclops or one-eyed man. This eye guides the tracing of outline [tracé]; it is a miner's lamp at the point of writing, a curious and vigilant substitute, the prosthesis of a seer who is himself invisible. The image of the movement of these letters, of what this finger-eye inscribes, is thus sketched out within me" (Derrida. 1993: 3). I suggest that blindness accompanies the muteness of language that entails gesture.

²⁰⁶ In this statement I recall Bloom's taxonomy (1956: 62-197), but I must emphasise that I separate and apply such processes here in theoretical and analytical terms. By its very nature the process of drawing, one of chaos rather than sequential linearity, interfuses them.

Trace symbolises presence as difference, but areas empty of trace symbolise *visible* absence, which recalls the activity of the drafter in as material a way as does trace, and which equally orchestrates her presence as difference.

This interchangeability becomes clear when one focuses on the gestural irruption as it occurs in drawing. When making a mark on a drawing surface, the drawing tool strikes the paper in the middle of a continuous movement of the hand. Before it strikes the surface, the hand anticipates its motion and when it lifts away from the paper, the movement of the hand continues, already carrying the conception of its next gesture.

In this continuity lies a rhythmic altercation between a perceived ‘absence from’ and ‘presence on’ the drawing surface of the drafter’s hand. While touching paper, the body is physically ‘present’ in gestural stroke, in its trace and on drawing ground. Before touching and when lifting away, the body is ‘absent’ from ground, but not from the stroking action, or the gesticulation, nor from mind. Yet, we know now that the self constitutes a confluence between body and mind. Therefore, the body-mind sustains this rhythm.²⁰⁷ The body-mind creates a continuum of absence and presence in which only the body (hand) becomes absent and then only when it propels trace into space. For the duration of its propelled state and its absent state, the mind carries body as part of the motion, while already knowing where it will go next. Rather than ever being absent, body therefore remains present in absentia, while mind remains present in absentia for the duration of trace irruption. Because it constitutes the body-mind, the self inserts into this continuum both its physical and mental dispositions. There are no breaks or pauses in dispositional insertion during these rhythmic interchanges back and forth. The conception of a stroke outside paper already anticipates the stroke by hand; the body’s knowledge of it precedes the stroke. The projection beyond retains body-in-mind in a simultaneous steering of hand that anticipates its next stroke.

²⁰⁷ Drawing can also be described as touching that moves, or movement that touches, or movement that is touched, in order to feel self, a notion that underpins these descriptions. Self, touch, movement, as experience in drawing, recalls Merleau-Ponty (1968: 254-259), “But what I will never touch, he does not touch either, no privilege of oneself over the other here, it is therefore not the consciousness that is the untouchable – ‘The consciousness’ would be something positive, and with regard to it there would recommence, does recommence, the duality of the reflecting and the reflected, like that of the touching and the touched. The untouchable is not a touchable in fact inaccessible – the unconscious is not a representation, [is] in fact inaccessible. The negative here is not a positive that is elsewhere (a transcendent) – it is a true negative, i.e. an *Unverborgenheit* of the *Verborgenheit*”.

To reiterate, we see therefore that the withdrawals of the hand, its visible absences,²⁰⁸ between traces do not exclude the body from the drawing. Nor does the presence of the hand exclude the mind. The presence (trace) and the withdrawal of the hand precipitate, leave, and anticipate both mark and non-mark (ground between traces) as 'difference'. Furthermore, the hand's withdrawals are those of mind too, as will become clear in due course. Therefore, drawing marks constitute *visible absence* and *visible presence*.

Visible absence, like visible presence, marks itself in real time. The body-mind unification that sustains drawing therefore merges the presence and absence duality that Bryson explains (1983: 116-119, 163-164), to converge as difference. As a result, '*presence and presence in absentia*', or '*visible absence*' and '*visible presence*', seem to be more appropriate as descriptions of the phenomenon. Absence is presence, and presence is absence – culminating in difference.

Waywardness | inhibition

The same argument that sustains the body-mind confluence and the presence/absence (as difference) confluence, sustains my proposal of interchangeability between waywardness and inhibitive dynamisms in mark making. The interchangeability I proposed between interactive and enactionist drawn gesture contains this interchangeability between wayward and inhibitive mark making. If the drafter sustains this dialectic, tension between waywardness and inhibition drives a cerebrative drawing process.

As I explained in Chapter 1, effacement results from a drawing process in which the drafter regards the waywardness of the body (if perceived as a separate entity from mind) as wrong and the drafter deliberately inhibits it by imposing formula (as exalted properties of the mind) (Bryson. 1983: 87-131). The notion of interactionist drawn gesture deviates from emulative imposition. Rather, it purports interactivity between field and drafter. Field, in itself, is a flexible space of dynamic changeability. If the socially constructed, *interactive* self incorporates remnants of

²⁰⁸ Visible absence constitutes withdrawal and hiatus, as will become clear in due course. Please refer to 'hiatus' in the Glossary of terms (Addendum B).

socio-cultural norm, she can measure or reference her drawings against such norms, despite their deviations.

The *enactionist* aspect of the self (which enfolds the sensory, temporal, and spatial immediacy of experience, of execution, and of visibility) adds an additional dimension to its expansion and its embodiment. This dimension includes the unpredictable diversity of a fused body-mind that suggests both individuated intellect and the somatic in the aesthetic²⁰⁹ that the self devises in drawing. It would be reasonable to say that such individuated aesthetic embeds in both the particularity of the self-specifying drawing process, and in the generality of cultural and contextual norm. Thus, it remains expansive and appropriative of both.

Dialectic between presence and absence and between waywardness and restraint form the basis of my formulation of *naissance* and *hiatus* as confluent processes in auto-deictic mark making. I discuss this in due course.

Recursivity and amassment

Recursive amassment is a crucial concept in auto-deixis. The drafter engages in a layering of enactions, in which each new layer incorporates fragments of its precedents. In the same way, she *stacks* fragmented incidents of 'lost sight' to counter and replace blindness. At each point of pivoting back and forth, the drafter creates anew upon previous inventions, without replacing them. Once distended in her relentless journeying back and forth, becoming more and more swollen with signification, the drafter's accumulations start to reveal trait as inscribable synthesis, an 'other' of self, rather than another self.

In this, a path of *recursive* irruption becomes evident. As mentioned before, Simon Blackburn explains recursivity as "a procedure that is applied once, and then applied to the result of that application" (2008: 309). The result, therefore, articulates traces of preceding actions, the sum of which nevertheless represents new

²⁰⁹ Somatic aesthetics: The particular stylising "technologies of the self" that Richard Shusterman draws from Michel Foucault to combine in the term 'somaesthetics' the notion of the body's role in human understanding, appreciation and practice of aesthetics. He defines somaesthetics, an autonomous discipline, as "the critical meliorative study of one's experience and use of one's body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation (aesthetics) and creative self-fashioning" (Shusterman, 2008: 15, 19).

form. Likewise, in drawing, upon each incident of marking, scope for reaching beyond the current founding perception opens up exactly because it dialogues with preceding irruptions, memory and the visual schemata²¹⁰ that meaning prescribes or demands.

Drawing and withdrawing occur in gradual processes of recursive conversion with incrementally more expansive and incisive articulations. Traces irrupt in unplanned, durational articulation, while the perspective that withdrawal brings continues to contribute in the form of articulations that also reference schemata.

Incremental internal logic

I interpret such recursivity also to relate the drafter's development of an internal logic in the drawing too. She does this by placing each trace in augmentative relation to its predecessors, creating constructs that make sense to her. Although this augmentation develops gradually along a path that can also be rocky,²¹¹ the drawing eventually incorporates external schemata of meaning. The drafter creates a drawing-text that converses inwards and outwards, between trait and drafter as much as between drafter, viewer, and social space.

Recursivity and invention

Thus, the *invention* that trace constitutes also expands recursively. The ability to surpass invention that I explain in Chapter 5 develops through recursivity and its incremental additions. The notion of recursive expansion, however, also suggests *looking back* to what came before in durational drawing. This 'looking back' forms part of a withdrawal in gestic conversion. The drafter pauses to scrutinise already irrupted trace, which now resides in the world. The drafter needs to do this in order to assess the possibilities her traces offer in conjunction with knowledge, reference, and memory. In addition to in-phase trace, drawing as field²¹² affords reference

²¹⁰ Norman Bryson recommends 'schema' as visual art-related equivalent of 'paradigm', which is a term that relates the same meaning in linguistics (1983: 122).

²¹¹ This is a reference to Bourdieu's concepts of 'struggle' and 'strategise' for position in the field as opposed to rule. A dispositional urge in individuals to partake, to "struggle" and "strategise" for position in the field sustains the productive inter-dynamic of practices. Bourdieu claims, "These struggles are seen to transform or conserve the field of forces" (1983: 312). I limit the concept's application here to the struggles of understanding and technical execution in a drafter-specific context.

²¹² In the Bourdieuan sense.

and dictates convention, which is never far from the drafter's mind. She glances back to such memory too in order to measure and anticipate the next trace.

Deviation

In other words, the drafter measures against an existing personal history (ingrained in habitus as her disposition), remnants of which now dwell in current traces, and against a field that restricts with its conventions, yet is susceptible to change. She is familiar with all three – knowledge, reference, and memory – as varied forms of convention and her familiarity with these three spheres enables her to conform, to compromise, or to rebel.²¹³ In order to challenge it, such familiarity with convention is crucial. Trait and the individuated creativity it implies, challenges convention automatically – thus challenge is as much part of the drafteric continuum as is mark making.

Drawing as an interface that functions recursively, suggests that trait functions as an agent of constant renewal. The drafter brings about such renewal by means of the facility of trait to challenge convention and norm. These aspects also explain the significance of trait. Trait constitutes individuated creativity.

6.3 The auto-deictic founding perception

In this section, I discuss naissance and hiatus as enactionist, rather than representationist realisations of the founding perception. The “founding perception” (Bryson. 1983: 118) entails those fragmented fractions of seconds in which the drafter ‘reads’ or perceives the field of observation during drawing.

Naissance and Hiatus

As it is impossible to separate perception and conception in the drawing process, it is also impossible to divide glance and withdrawal in the experiential engagement of drawing. Nevertheless, for purposes of explaining the intricacies of drawing as complex interface between drafter and world, I distinguish here between glancing

²¹³ This is a reference to Bourdieu's field concept, in which the agent determines the nature of her participation. Bourdieu poses these possibilities (consent, dissent, compromise) in the struggling and strategising that comprise participation in a field (1998: 79-85).

and withdrawal as two processes enfolded in the founding perception. Hiatus, or withdrawal, does not necessarily indicate the physical withdrawal of the hand from paper, or of the eyes from the field of observation. Rather, I interpret hiatus to accommodate a 'shifting-between' in processing and in act, which conflates conception and perception in mark making. This 'shifting' that, contradictorily, also conflates, occurs between the 'two minds' that I discussed in Chapter 1, and it constitutes enaction and interaction on all those levels that I explained in the preceding chapters.

Firstly, during her glances back and forth, the drafter *perceives* the three-dimensional field of observation (and of the gestic, and of idea). She simultaneously *conceives* the irruption of her traces, which also occur in three-dimensional space. Secondly, and in a seemingly contradictory way, *withdrawal* (Derrida. 1993: 2) occurs during perception. I interpret withdrawal to entail momentary distanciation that brings conception as employment of the ability to transform perception (or idea, or the gestic) into articulated materialisation on a two-dimensional surface. Both these processes simultaneously irrupt as the conversion of gesture into drawn gesture.

The word: 'naissant'

The meaning of the word 'naissant' suggests the idea of mark issuing from within (autogenously), a speculative and explorative initiating action. The *Oxford Dictionary of English* (2005: 1166) explains the word as "To issue from", particularly inferring its Latin root *nasci*, meaning, "To be born". 'Naissant' (or 'naissance') includes the meaning of its close relative, 'nascent', imparting the notion of a process just "coming into being and beginning to display signs of future potential" (ODE. 2005: 1170). In auto-deictic drawing, the *simultaneous* action of looking, perceiving, conceiving, and tracing entails exactly that: the birth of trace-in-glance, from which flows glance-in-trace, to give birth to trace-in-glance again, perpetuating transformative chains of both drawing marks and glances back and forth between drafter, drawing, and world.

Hiatus²¹⁴ in naissant conversion

Hiatus is pause; it is withdrawal and the pre-emption of re-drawing. Hiatus engages the embodied body-mind as much as does naissance, but its contribution to conversion involves memory and computation. It thinks, remembers, curbs, and gauges. What I propose as ‘interactionist drawn gesture’ gestates in hiatus. It *enactionistically transforms* three-dimensionality and gesture into two-dimensional inscription (drawn gesture). Its enactionist gestation, however, incorporates the naissance in irruption. As intertwined and single action, both naissance and hiatus convert glance into mark – hence, the concept of ‘naissant conversion’.

Hiatus can result in turning away from imitation and emulation, while it can also result in turning towards such processes. In conjunction with naissance, however, it would rather choose the first option – turning away – while, at the same time, it also turns away from *representing* only the concrete or visible materiality of the object. To avoid imitation, it immediately returns to the unconscious, or to the invisibility of the self. Ultimately, hiatus and naissance invent together. Yet, hiatus engages in subjective recognition that ensures recognisability and outward interaction. It involves the schemata that the drafter shares with the viewer.

Hiatus merges with naissant conversion in the continuum of discernments that the self conducts in dialectic between self-specification²¹⁵ and generality. Neither hiatus, nor naissance can embrace complete impersonalised generality. Hiatus depersonalises only partly and only to assist recognisability of conversions.

The articulations of naissance and hiatus

The distinction I propose between naissance and hiatus mirrors and supports a distinction between *wayward* and *restrained* articulation,²¹⁶ and between enactionist

²¹⁴ Derrida explains the inseparability of withdrawal, the founding perception and trait in drawing as follows, “Blindness pierces through right at that point and thereby gains *in potential, in potency*: the angle of a sight that is threatened or promised, lost or restored, given. There is in this gift a sort of *re-drawing, a with-drawing, or retreat [re-trait]*, at once the interposition of a mirror, an impossible reappropriation or mourning, the intervention of a paradoxical Narcissus, sometimes lost *en abyme*, in short, a specular *folding or falling back [repli]* – and a supplementary *trait*” (1993: 3).

²¹⁵ Enaction.

²¹⁶ Norman Bryson (1983: 87-131) identifies such a split that manifests mainly in temporality of mark making. Bryson frames a distinction between the “Gaze” and “Glance” in linguistic terms (as does Derrida (1993: 1)). Bryson positions, on the one hand, the “subversive, random, disorderly” behaviour of the Glance, and on the other hand, the “vigilant, masterful, spiritual” (1983: 93) behaviour of the Gaze. I want to suggest that the wayward articulations of enactionist drawn gesture are

and interactively drawn gestures. Such dialectic generates the *articulations* of auto-deictic drawing, which, as a result, are speculative and without resolve.

Self-affirmative reflexive articulation

On the one hand, an unruly body-mind directs the probes of naissance. It is unthinking, intimate with the self, and irrupts from nothingness. It can also be wayward, because the processes of understanding and synthesis that it articulates are fragmented and chaotic. At each point of pivot in the eyes' movements back and forth, a view is broken as much as it is captured. As a result, marks require positioning and repositioning that may or may not form coherency.

These marks also articulate how their maker enacts her 'state of mind' or mental encounters during the time in which they irrupt. Apart from revealing the splintered flow of thought and sight, these articulations contain innuendos of palpable uncertainty, tension, unease, confidence, dissonance, resonance, insight, ease, pleasure, curiosity, mistrust or trust or whatever the concurrent inner encounter might be – typical of in-phase dealings between self-as-being and the material or immaterial world at the time of experiential engagement.

The instant of their placement at once captures and creates their potential significance, each mark referring to its place in a chaotic and broken sequence of irruptions. The flow of marks (between reflexive naissance and disclosure) displays itself in such a manner that it exceeds essentiality and the stasis of closure. Instead, the marks suggest ambiguity and diversity in their auto-originate enaction of self.

approximate to Bryson's Glance, and the restraints of hiatus (or interactionist drawn gesture) approximate Bryson's Gaze. Bryson's distinction between the Gaze and the Glance mirrors a distinction between an objectivist and subjectivist view. The Gaze holds the sterile distance of an objectivist view that refines its idealistic vision at a distance from the object under scrutiny, also without observing it directly or durationally. The Glance, however, involves temporality in its observations that implies in-phase sensory experience in practice that allows for subjective enactionist input. Theoretically then, an enactionist view would hold only for the Glance. The concept of interaction, as explained with regards to interactionist drawn gesture, however, draw the two together in auto-deixis, as will become clear in this chapter. Although the Gaze is not exempt from formulaic practices in drawing, it is not completely devoid of observation either. Rather, it observes and remembers, and in remembering, reduces, while in formulaic practices, observation remains mute, if not completely absent. In its hunt for the lasting form, the Essential Copy, it designs and regards formula as ideal. Bryson proposes a radical division between the two – he does not suggest the possibility of an interactive relationship or a dialectic between the Gaze and the Glance (1983: 87-131), a relationship that I assert in auto-deictic drawing.

Such drawing often results in deformations and inconclusive deviations from the ideal, something that the viewing audience often perceives as ugly or bad drawing (if such audience refrains from delving into its connotative value, or fails to consider the context of its irruption²¹⁷). In fact, however, it articulates the development of conversion and synchronisation between hiatus and naissance.

On the other hand, hiatus brings perspective. Hiatus recursively constructs the internal logic of the drawing-text. In hiatus, the drafter performs. She consciously and unconsciously articulates those scripts afforded by drawings past, by personal history, by underlying competence and by field and social space. In hiatus, the drafter articulates enaction in relation to interaction. This 'relational' process of fuses trait as invention, which manifests as meaning (or an internal logic of the drawing-text). Trait not only shapes it, but also gives it potency.

The drafter conducts such incremental development in a flow of irruption and disruption that Derrida describes as the "rhetoric of trait" (1993: 56). Each gesture layers itself upon preceding appropriations and articulations, thereby amassing rather than subsuming.

Self-erosive articulation

The conceptualisation that engenders articulation between naissance and hiatus can be erosive of the self too. Self-effacement as disposition slowly wears away all signs of self-specific diversity that challenge norm. Conformation to norm becomes priority. When this happens, student drafters tend to work in an over-reductive manner or technique in which 'corrections' or more detailed and 'refined' layers destroy or reduce naissant conversions. Ironically, this could be a destructive rather than a constructive process if viewed in the context of what I envisage in auto-deictic drawing.

Working in an erosive flow pursues the ideal accomplishment of absolute fidelity to norm, to the ideal as conclusive effect (Bryson. 1983: 120-122). It is uncompromising in its final resolve and seeks to eradicate any inaccuracies, any misjudgments in

²¹⁷ In an educational context, for example, even drawing that is perceived as weak, constitutes a certain point in developmental progress towards the unbeknownst that, I believe, should remain open-ended in its promises of a future, rather than measuring it against the enclosure of an ideal.

subjective settlements between credibility and fidelity.²¹⁸ Even if it does perceive the heterogeneity of the invisible in relation to the visible, it self-destructs before employing the invisibility as subject.²¹⁹

The relationship between these two categories of articulation can turn into a battle between self-affirmation and self-effacement, which constitutes the duel I discuss in Chapter 5. Self-as-nothing wins when and if self-effacement dominates. This battle, therefore, could be destructive.

More often than not, student drafters seek to glean from a very evanescent and fragmented process the elusive, but ever enduring perfection, the security, and stability of the ultimate and only solution, the ideal (as 'right'). In such work, *hiatus* brings the disposition to conform to acceptability, thus destroying the waywardness of *naissance*. Conformity denies a fruitful *hiatus* as *interactive* window of contemplation. It also renders the drafter mute in its conclusiveness.

By masking the entire durational course of irruptive materialisation of their own idiosyncratic marks (as 'wrong'), students often silence the urgency of their own voices. Contrary to this, they would extend and intensify cerebrative interchange if they allowed themselves to durationally experience both the act of drawing and self-as-being in its delineations of enactionist and interactionist drawn gesture.

Auto-deixis as an alternative form of articulation

In auto-deictic drawing, I propose that the drafter does not allow the serenity of *hiatus* to overpower the contribution of enactionist drawn gesture, nor does she allow *hiatus* to slip away. Gestic conversion in auto-deictic drawing articulates

²¹⁸ Hence the 'Gaze', indicating "-gard" in "regard", meaning "to arrest" (Bryson. 1983: 93) (Derrida. 1993:1).

²¹⁹ Bryson suggests complete obliteration or lasting imprisonment. The Gaze, Bryson says, captures its target with "violence", a penetrating and destructive fierceness that freezes its victim into a defined and final stance; while the Glance "preserves and intensifies" the forceful attack of the Gaze, never completely attaching to it the limiting finality of perfected definition (1983: 93). The Glance gives life, while the Gaze freezes it. Bryson also points out the phenomenon of self-effacement. According to him, the self-effacing painter seeks to extort from the confinements of the Gaze the lasting form. A form that 'lasts', according to Bryson's arguments, is temporally and spatially removed from the struggle of creating it. The Glance is active during the struggle of creating an image, while the Gaze takes place elsewhere and at a time removed from the immediacy of visual reading and capturing. This removal allows the Gaze to dominate the Glance, and indeed, it destroys the struggles of the Glance.

physical and mental understanding in enactionist drawn gesture. It presents knowledge of 'body-mind-ness' – its supple agility and its warm and bloody liveliness that relax the inhibitive curbing of hiatus.²²⁰ At the same time, auto-deictic flow does not seek to obliterate the curbing of external structures either. Rather, it seeks a merging between the two that asserts self-as-being and spreads her constructive drawing activity evenly.

Yet, such endeavor is not conscious or deliberate. It relies completely on a celebration of trait and its unifying functions. The resulting articulations could range from competitive overpowering to quiet balance. It would present, however, new form rather than repetitive style language.

The accomplishment of self-as-being

Self-engagement

A moment of making a mark is a moment of self-engagement – a moment of entering Derrida's abyss in a compulsion to expose it. It is neither neutral, nor removed. Rather, it suggests a localised confrontation that converts pre-meaning in enactionistic fashion. The traces that the drafter produces directly articulate the ephemeral fleetingness of her understanding. Each mark is isochronously²²¹ convertive, revelatory, and irruptive on the drawing surface as crossing point between internalities and externalities.

Durational engagement

For the duration of the drawing, the present is continuous, always projecting into the future while referring to the past. Its course seemingly runs through all moments in time, always in isochronistic synchronisation with any viewing of the drawing. Self-reflexive articulation in drawing almost seems to seek the assurance that at any unknown moment of being viewed in the future, the concurrency between

²²⁰ In Bryson's terms, it comprises the immediate presence of the drafter's exigency and exuberance in the Glimpse on the one hand. On the other hand, it entails the serenity of the Gaze (Bryson. 1983: 87-131) that could also, in my mind, bring the necessary distanciation of hiatus, where interaction incorporates the embodied edicts of lived 'reality'.

²²¹ Marks indicating that their irruption occurred during the same period, drawing, or virtually at the same time. They relate to each other in a clear and visually defined way. ODE (2005: 918) explains 'isochronous' as "a line on a diagram or map connecting points relating to the same time or equal times". All these concepts relate in this context.

discernment, conversion, and trace and the ineffaceable process of the drawing's making, will endure in their allusions to more potential interpretations and disclosures.²²²

Unenclosed engagement

The indefiniteness and immediacy of auto-deictic marks as enactions imply the possibility of attaching to them a myriad of potential interpretations at any other given point in time and place, whether by their own maker or by any other viewer. They convey the idea that 'this is how 'I', the maker of these marks, mark the self, now and here in this drawn inscription of *my* mind-body encounters; in half-a-second's time, or tomorrow in another drawing, it could change to be unrecognisably different'. As a result, auto-deictic enactionist drawn gesture exposes itself with generosity to the drafter and the viewer, conveying the idea that both are free to perceive and interpret them in any way.

6.4 Applications

I describe here the main applications of auto-deictic drawing by amalgamating concept, process, and function. Although it effectively realises in a wider sphere, I focus on those aspects that lead towards framing auto-deixis as a self-reflexive research process, which I discuss in the section that follows. I provide examples of student drawings that also illustrate those applications I selected for description. I limit my selection to the development and learning on entry-level drawing.

6.4.1 Process: development

(See Addendum A; Illustrations 1 & 2: Development; and Illustration 3: Trait)

Previous chapters proposed that the formative processes²²³ of trait irruption grant passage in a transitional continuum between the unconscious and the conscious, between internalisation and externalisation, between cognition, conception, and

²²² I wish to add to this, however, that if the desire to conceal self is a concurrent 'state of mind' of the drafter, such desire will also reveal itself coincidentally in mark making. Even then, however, the reigning norms of drawing should not conceal its encounter with such a self.

²²³ I intend 'formative processes' to refer to both the development of the self, habitus, and to the development of drawing skill.

conjecture. I suggest that, in auto-deictic drawing, these passages sustain development, learning, and invention. Therefore, trait – as the core of auto-deictic drawing – is a gift for the facilitator. With trait as covert point of departure, she can engage the students in a developmental process that allows individual improvement.

The integration of the concepts and processes I discuss above culminate in drawing constructive skills-development that eventually displays in diversity and fosters creativity. As such, it should gradually signify a visual eloquence in the utilisation of its ‘vocabulary’ and grapheme. Vocabulary and grapheme become consolidated in versatile visualisation and visible-making skills without turning mute in absolute resolve. Eventually, it integrates form, fluency, identity, and idiolect.²²⁴

Significance

Trait is therefore significant as interface between the self-as-being and the development of drawing skill. Along the road to self-confident practice, technical, observational, visualising, and inventive abilities grow. If trait becomes progressively affirmative of the drafter’s concurrent doing, skills-development inevitably develops gradually in a way that is subject to constant change.

In practice

All the drawing exercises in the illustrations (**Addendum A**) principally seek a direct route to the pre-conceptual by avoiding any opportunity for emulation. When instructing the students, I provide no examples as indications of standards, methods, or ideal. I deliberately avoid showing examples to also avoid direct imitation of gesture as a style language.

The series of drawings in *Illustrations 1, 2, & 3* illustrate a *process of gradual development*. To initiate this development in practice, I facilitate a series of gesture drawing exercises that train the student drafters in searching out underlying, hardly visible ‘movement’ in the subject matter, as well as underlying structure. I explicitly relate the concept of ‘gesture’ to a range of understandings. The students begin to

²²⁴ Eco (1979: 271-273) identifies a corpus-idiolect comprising the aesthetic-, the work-, the movement-, and the period-idiolects, each positioning itself in a generative hierarchy of conceptualising paradigms as accountable for individuated performances.

understand gesture as both the movement of the drafter's hand and the movement immanent in the subject matter. Once they begin to grasp that they can sense, imagine, or understand such movement in the subject matter because of their own bodily experience of it, which they simultaneously enact by doing the exercises, gesture begins to facilitate additional and conscious understanding in its flow. Instead of integrating conscious pre-planning, they see, compose, and organise simultaneously. Since one is aware during physical activities of the structures of one's body that enable and facilitate movement, the student drafter gradually starts to seek out the underlying structures of her subject matter during gesture exercises, thus continuing to exercise an interactive process of recognition between self and object. Since the exercises are quick, little time for *conscious* sourcing from memory exists, and the drafter must develop and run with a grapheme as she goes along. With repetition – a continuation of large numbers of quick drawings of the same subject – that serves only intuitive recognition and cognition, the drafter's understanding of underlying structures and gestural description there-of, improve. Often this intuitive sensing does not immediately enter conscious levels of understanding, yet they become internalised, as **Groups 1.3 & 1.4 of Illustration 1 (Addendum A)** show.

I further discuss the benefits of gesture drawing in the text that accompanies **Illustrations 1, 2, & 3 (Addendum A)**.

6.4.2 Process: drawing as generative partner

As I explain above, the auto-deictic drawing process involves several dynamics of interchange, one of which is dialectic of erasure (disappearance) and mark making (appearance). This dialectic manifests as tension between drawing ground and mark making. These processes both form and inform themselves through the gradual accrual of mark making and unmarking. The processes that I describe here insinuate rather than pre-determine their outcome for the full duration of their unfolding.²²⁵

²²⁵ Derrida (1987: 240), remarks, "Within the generic structure that I've tried to formalize (it's already not simple) the simulacrum of reference to the former model is affected with supplementary folds or deviations".

Significance

In the drawings that I include in **Illustrations 4 and 5** (see **Addendum A**), the simulation that a mark conveys depends on the drafter's characteristic manner and the way in which she deploys her body-mind. Because such deployment occurs in-phase, the drafter develops skill through practice, while she simultaneously creates form without any precedent. The mark itself, the trace, never bars. It is never erosive or destructive of its predecessors; it never denies its genesis, or its heritage. As such, erasure acquires meaning in context.

Erasure

(See Addendum A; Illustration 4: Erasure and recursivity)

In deliberate erasures (as unmarking), the drafter destroys. The drafter is intent on assigning to such areas the same value as areas without mark. As the drawing surface receives the traces of the self-as-being, it begins to involve its playmates in a game. The drawing surface begins to mock the self. It flaunts its power to *unmark* the self as present. Traces of the drafter's erasures begin to read as damage, rather than absence. Thus, the drawing surface preserves her difference as unmarked. It preserves the drafter's hand as different despite a desire to be similar. The drawing surface abandons the drafter to a state of spectral difference in deliberate erasures.

In auto-deictic drawing, erasure simply unmarks rather than removes. The unmarked remains in spectral form, evocative of the memory of the erased marks. Eventually, they display as visibly discarded propositions. Thereby, drawing ground implies the drafter's desire to be absent as the 'other' and therefore different. It projects the drafter in two states of being that function in altercating tandem with one another in a continuum of trace and erasure as marking and unmarking of a self that also enfolds self-acceptance and self-rejection, assertion and abjection.²²⁶

²²⁶ Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 151) states the opposite, "Yet drawing has always been able to treat the whiteness of its surface in a fashion unique to itself, as a 'reserve': an area that is technically part of the image (since we certainly see it), but in a neutral sense – an area without qualities, perceptually present but conceptually absent". I do not deny emptiness as neutrality in drawings, nor does Bryson deny the conceptual value of emptiness or of unmarking. I do insist, however, on the conceptual value and meaning that drafters consign to unmarking and to edges, for example, where drawn line meets emptiness, or divides shape from ground, positive from negative, and where such a transition signifies a floating weightlessness. In other words, the 'emptiness' of white paper would

In practice

The exercise in **Illustration 4 (Addendum A)** deliberately incorporates several conflictive stances in which the drafter has to engage in such a way that she has to alternate as creator between stances in any one of the conflicts (*fore and against*). Above, I describe an obvious one between marking and unmarking, or applying line and erasure. More conflicts emerge automatically: one between fidelity to ‘reality’ (presence) and deliberate disturbance of such fidelity (difference); between stasis and flow; between capturing and destruction; and between ‘empty’ ground and ‘filled’ ground. The automatic, almost logical, emergence of these conflictive situations force the drafter to follow the flow of the language that emerges from the drawing process, while she simultaneously position herself against it.

The drawing is built up in several layers of different media and techniques that connote and signify both application (charcoal in slow contour line drawing) and destruction (eraser in blind contour drawing), marking (charcoal in slow contour) and unmarking (white conté in blind contour), and so forth. Upon completion of a drawing of the head from one angle, the drafter shifts to change her point of view in the next drawing of her head. In this way, conflict grows between the notion of ‘capturing’ a true likeness and the elusiveness of such likeness in a drawing process that compels its language, facture, and flow in intimate complicity with the self. With each new layer of drawing or ‘undrawing’, the drafter equally disrupts previous lines and ground, thus creating unplanned grapheme that requires unforeseen response. If such response would include the desire to correct, for example, only the pointlessness of any effort to order the line-work would become evident. Creating order would only enhance disorder, thus further highlighting the generative dialectic between presence/absence and difference.

then signify a conceptual abyss or chasm, to name but one example. Drawing can do this without observing the “law of the all-over – the set of pressures deriving from the four sides of the surface” (Bryson in De Zegher. 2003: 151), without binding the entire drawing surface into a totality or without regarding the entire sheet of paper as constituting an imposing and inhibitive composition. Drawing can employ the emptiness of white surface both as “reserve” and as weighted with meaning, as ‘ghost marks’.

The purpose of the exercise is to sustain generative dialectic in recursive fashion. I further discuss the exercise as practical realisation of the theories that underpin auto-deictic drawing in the text that accompanies **Illustration 4 (Addendum A)**.

Ground

(See Addendum A; Illustration 5: Ground)

A second generative process that merits discussion involves dialectic between ground (disappearance) and mark making (appearance). The placement of the auto-deictic mark can immediately involve its ground as an active participant in signification. In such cases, ground becomes both explanatory and affirmative of the drafter, time, and place and their collective significations, as much as mark does.

Mental discernment merges ground and mark into one on the drawing surface. This reveals the drawing ground as augmentative partner in the drawing process. Ground becomes an oppositional, but constructive co-drafter in the dialectic between appearance and disappearance. As in erasure, drawing ground receives trace as meaning, while it coextensively discloses the traceless areas as meaning in emptiness, in absence. Hence, a spatial relationship between negative and positive shape develops. This relationship also reveals as dialectic between presence and presence in absentia.

In practice

The student drafter, Thokozani Mpotsha (2009) made the series of drawings in **Illustration 5, series 5.1 (Addendum A)** in a lined notebook. Each turning of a page therefore literally hides a drawing on the preceding page, while it simultaneously presents the drafter with the clean slate that the newly opened page provides. In this way, the notebook creates a spectre of disappearance and appearance that mirrors the same dialectic in the drawing process.

Such a literal experience of appearance and disappearance leads to a growing awareness of appearance, as it relates to making a line and disappearance, as it relates to empty ground. Soon, the drafter starts to play with disappearance as much as with appearance, a game that is evident in Thokozani's deliberate

placement of one half of his face on the edge of one page and the other half on the nearest edge of the next page.

This deliberate placement was in breach of the instructions, which involved blind contour drawing. As I explained in Chapter 1 (see note 52), in blind contour, the drafter may not turn her eyes to the drawing for the duration of applying a continuous line that describes both inner and outer contours of the subject (in this case, a self-portrait). For Thokozani, however, the drawing surface evidently became as self-affirmative as line-application. He almost seems to have attempted a rebellious disavowal *and* confirmation of both appearance and disappearance by spreading his face over two pages. Such a spread, after all, includes a space between two pages that widens or narrows, depending on opening any one of the two pages and closing them upon the previous or next pages.

In order to explain further the constructive functions of this exercise as practical realisation of auto-deictic theory, I provide accompanying text to **Illustration 4** in **Addendum A**, which also includes the work of two additional students (**series 5.2**: Nathan Gates (2008), and **series 5.3**: Emma Keet (2008)).

6.4.3 Process: deviation, divergence

(See Addendum A; Illustration 6: Deviation)

Concurrent revelation

The drafter surrenders composition to recursive and concurrent revelation. In this process, trait – which has its mute, dumb, and blind hand in body as much as in mind – interferes with the ordered language of formulae, styles, or the codes of trend, and institutionalised aesthetic to dominate and change them as norms. In this, shifting emphasis to trait effects subversion from an entire history of accepted compositional and aesthetic formula. An enactionist understanding of trait (as invention) implies drawing marks as completely unprecedented configurations. This, in itself, functions as a mechanism of deviation from norm. Deviation is inherent to trait.

Significance

If facilitation encourages trait, despite reigning standards and against the dictates of current trends, invention and deviation could develop to become constant and habitual dispositions. Understanding deviation as inherent to trait also defines a significance of drawing-trait. The student drafter parts with stasis to turn into an unconventional route in the narrow demarcation between self-effacement on the one hand and revelatory self-generative and self-originate drawing on the other hand. If trait is revelatory of the self as a changeable construct, trait cannot become limited or stagnant, because enaction constantly expands both trait and the self through practice.

In practice

In practice, the self as a changeable construct serves as the subject of the exercise that appears in **Illustration 6 (Addendum A)**. This is accomplished through the layering of self-portraits in the manner that I describe above under **Erasure (In practice)**.

Since the first layer involves blind contour (see note 55), the drafter initially has no control over the placement of the first self-portrait, while it determines the development and positioning of further layers. Such layers involve slow contour. Slow contour differs from blind contour in that the drafter may look at the drawing while applying a continuous line to describe both inner and outer contours. In slow contour, therefore, 'composition',²²⁷ or the placement of the image in relation to the size and shape of the drawing paper, could be deliberate and considered. A conscious decision would determine where the drafter starts the continuous line. All contours would be drawn in relation to each other, thus creating credible proportions between parts, which would enhance the drawing in terms of conventional composition. In blind contour, this is not possible, and all the regarded parts of the field of observation lose their bearings.

The unified process of producing this drawing involves oscillation between blind and slow contour, both of which then will always disrupt former slow and blind

²²⁷ Please refer to **Addendum A**, where I provide detailed amplification on the practical realisation of auto-deixis as concept, with particular reference to composition, in the text that accompanies **Illustration 6**.

placements and their recursive amplifications or embellishments. Thus, formal composition, for example, becomes an unlikely objective and the drafter has to leave it to the happenstance that the process sustains.

6.4.4 Process: unfolding | enfolding

(See Addendum A; Illustration 7: Unfolding | enfolding)

A process-based drawing partly structures itself. It sustains its own development in both the recognition and the retention of unpremeditated and unpredictable denotation. As such, durational discernments and conversions in the act of drawing articulate a path of self-specifying and drawing-originate discovery, as **Illustration 7 (Addendum A)** demonstrates. The development of the drawings in this series constitutes conversion that unfolds upon itself, “withdrawing in memory of itself” (Derrida. 1993: 3). In the process, it generates its own course and its innovation. Derrida describes this process of ‘unfolding upon itself’ as generative impetus in retreat (hiatus, withdrawal, or presence in absentia), for the “intervention of a paradoxical Narcissus” (1993: 3), a solipsist eccentric, in which the intricacies of an individuated aesthetic idiolect interfere and each intervention brings its construct as ancillary trait.

As a self-generative force, such unfolding occurs along fragments of viewing and reviewing, taking and retaking, searching and researching, marking and unmarking. All these fragments bring forth numerous surprising and seemingly irrelevant revelations and interfering patterns of conversion in between. Any one mark, at the instant of revealing itself, provokes in its making a riposte that will address itself both back to any one, or the mere memory of any one of its splintered forerunners and forward to unknown but possible successors, always heralding a known or unknown next, always implying the yet undisclosed in its innuendo.²²⁸ In this way, it creates its own paths and if the drafter allows, unknown directions for more discoveries open up.

²²⁸ “The outside mark on paper leads as much as it is led: it loops inward from the paper to direct the artist’s decision concerning the line that is next to be drawn, and it loops back out, as a new trace in paper, sewing the mind into the line, binding mind and line in a suturing action where the threads grow finer and tighter in the passage from the initial mark to the final outlines circumscribing the scene’s legible form” (Bryson in De Zegher. 2003: 154).

Significance in practice

In practice, this series displays an integration of the processes of development, generativity, deviation, divergence, and self-reflexivity, above explained under 6.4.1; 6.4.2; 6.4.3, and below under 6.4.5. The drawing itself becomes an active participant in a process that can lead to spontaneous, unplanned disclosure. Difference evolves not only between the works of individual students, but also between consecutive drawings of one student, as is very evident in the first group of drawings in **Illustration 7 (Addendum A)**. In this way it demonstrates how trait forms, how its forming is synonymous with the durational forming of constructs, the development of such constructs and of figuring skill, and trait's role in sustaining a generative impetus or drive in drawing.

6.4.5 Process: self-reflexive articulation

(See Addendum A, Illustrations 8 & 9: Self-reflexivity).

The auto-deictic drawing process articulates in self-reflexivity. All conversions retain self-affirmative and self-empowering value, if not their entire visibility. Trait serves as a narrative of a uniquely situated history. All in-phase strokes or traces serve to affirm the physical and mental difference of their own maker in the drawing. The resulting volume of amassed drawing marks implies the difference of the drafter's body-mind. It affirms the hand of the self-as-being as being in the act. The labour of such drawing claims the drafter's difference by means of the temporal and spatial relation of trait to herself and to the viewer (Bryson. 1983: 89-116).

Significance beyond

In practice, the first year students produce a final series of self-portraits that combine the processes that I describe above under 6.4.1; 6.4.2; 6.4.3, & 6.4.4. Self-reflexivity is inherent to all these processes and they all serve the purpose to nurture and enhance self-reflexivity.

Discussions on these processes lead to the notion that those competences that give rise to auto-deictic response in drawing can progressively develop into becoming a creative research process (see 6.6 below) that harnesses reflexive action. Once the

student achieves that, those cerebrative processes that assist and facilitate creativity in drawing can also support her further in reassigning such creative ability to more visual art making processes.

6.5 The auto-deictic drawing process as a research process

(See Addendum A, Illustration 7)

Self-reflexive articulation implies the constructive processes of research. The dance between fragmented sight and impending full sight that I describe above becomes a generative play between searching, researching, and revelatory insight. Derrida asserts that drawing resembles the posing of hypotheses that may lead to unknown discoveries – the *presupposition* of sight (1993: 2). As such, naissant conversions function in “speculation that ventures forth, simply in order to see” (Derrida. 1993: 2). As a form of searching ahead, ‘simply in order to see’, processes of *searching* and *research* come to mind.

I propose that auto-deictic drawing holds what Slonimsky and Shalem (Griesel. 2004: 90-94) refer to as four “strands of activity constitutive of academic practice”, namely distantiation, appropriation, research, and articulation. The generative relationship between naissance and hiatus that produces trait as new form, and the recursive processes of expansion that characterises auto-deictic drawing, lead me to find this parallel between drawing and research.

Trait as invention constitutes new form, which in the terms of conventional research implies new knowledge. In the previous chapter, it emerged that trait irruption, in interplay with an ever-elusive visibility, sustains the advent of invention, as well as development beyond invention. In auto-deictic drawing, such invention entails an inconclusive resolve between subjective understanding of self in relation to the world and self in relation to mark.

Distantiation

I propose the notion of hiatus, as I explain it above, as parallel to the concept of “distantiation” in academic practices (Slonimsky & Shalem in Griesel. 2004: 91).

During hiatus, the drafter scrutinises trace as much as idea or field of observation to disturb the possibility of stylistic repetition. The notion of hiatus implies that the drafter's experiential cognitive engagement simultaneously coordinates "cognitive distance" (Slonimsky & Shalem in Griesel. 2004: 91). Furthermore, as I explain above, hiatus entails momentary distances from the self and from trace, which enables contextual perspective.

According to Slonimsky, this form of perspective – a judging or contemplation of understandings against a wider field of reference – constitutes distantiation in research. Slonimsky and Shalem (Griesel. 2004: 91) define distantiation as a "key condition of possibility for the conscious reflection on...established knowledge". In the case of drawing, such perspective also entails a measuring of anticipated traces against establishments in the field²²⁹ and against other and better traces and drawings. Thus, this distance provides reference against which the drafter can gauge possible scope for making even finer distinctions for articulation and synthesis in drafteric terms. If hiatus, as small incidences of distantiation, anticipate and enable insertion of internal logic into the drawing-text (as it does of the self), it means that the drafter constructs a new frame for exploring subject matter. Such a new frame comprises new knowledge in conventional research.

A new frame suggests new meaning. If trait is invention, it cannot be meaningless. The internal logic that the drafter develops reflexively in a drawing, suggests the constructive facilities of trait that would pose the resulting drawing as a new frame for meaning. Mark Johnson states that, "Meaning involves the blending of the structural, formal, and conceptual dimensions on the one hand and the pre-conceptual, non-formal, felt dimensions on the other" (Johnson. 2007: 273). This explanation of the construction of meaning has bearing on the confluence between interactionist drawn gesture and enactionist drawn gesture that I proposed in Chapter 3. It is possible to frame this confluence as the merging between drawing technique, schemata, and construction on the one hand, and gesture and the self on the other hand.

²²⁹ In the Bourdieuan sense.

Appropriation

Appropriation stems from distantiation, but it also represents the obverse of distantiation (Slonimsky & Shalem in Griesel. 2004: 92). I explained this application of appropriation in drawing in Chapter 5, under 'Appropriation'. These explanations clarify appropriation as obverse of distantiation by contrasting it to the stasis and order of memory. Whereas distantiation serves to differentiate existing knowledge, appropriation serves to acquaint the drafter with new knowledge.

Research

Another element typical of academic practices that I discern in auto-deictic drawing is that of research. "Research is a form of distantiation and appropriation" that requires amongst other things, "interwoven operations" (Slonimsky & Shalem in Griesel. 2004: 93). In the drafteric terms that I formulated in the previous chapters, I construe interactionist drawn gesture as incidents of insight that the drafter achieves (and marks) through self-reflexive enaction and interaction, which entail 'interwoven operations'.

The thesis explains how dialectic and recursivity function in reflexivity (and in particular in self-reflexivity) to sustain drawing. Graeme Sullivan describes reflexive research practice as "a kind of research activity that uses different methods to 'work against' existing theories and practices and offers the possibility of seeing phenomena in new ways" (2005: 100). He identifies four types of reflexive practices – self-reflexive practice, reflection, responsiveness, and dialectic.

Self-reflexive practice

According to Sullivan, self-reflexive practice,

...describes an inquiry process that is directed by personal interest and creative insight, yet is informed by discipline knowledge and research expertise. This requires a transparent understanding of the field, which means that an individual can 'see through' existing data, texts, and contexts so as to be open to alternative conceptions and imaginative options (2005: 100 – 101).

The traces that *naissance* produces, the information that the drafter reads in a glance, her field of observation comprising both her own past drawings and those of other artists, constitute the ‘existing data’ Sullivan mentions. The processes of in-phase enactionist conversion would necessarily constitute alternative conceptions. We know now that drawn gesture *per se* constitutes alternative conception – not only an alternative to words, written text, or speech as the other of pre-meaning, but also invention as alternative conception to repetition.

Above, I explained appropriation as immanent in *naissance*. I also explained distantiation as immanent in hiatus and I suggested that they play defined roles in effecting gestic conversion. I explained that the drafter applies them in simultaneity, yet poses them in relation to one another. Research, as ‘a form of appropriation and distantiation’ would therefore be inherent to drawing, a process that, as we have seen in earlier chapters, interweaves numerous forms of dialectic.

Reflection

Derrida provides support for reflective processes in drawing – those of speculation, skepticism, anticipation, and memory (1993: 1-3). Glances probe speculatively and with skepticism, “as if sent out on reconnaissance” (Derrida. 1993: 2). In this way, the drafter *notices*, yet, she does not believe. She does not believe, because her own transformative contribution, trait, is not out there in the world, *nor yet visible* to her on paper. *Notation* brings partial credibility, which, although subjective, also brings the possibility of belief in a self-as-being.

This enables the drafter to consider or reconsider more approaches that would result in approximate²³⁰ resolution. The drafter’s reflexivity elicits reflection, speculation, or anticipation. The wider sphere of reference that she draws in also involves meta-analytic focus (Sullivan. 2005: 101) in social space. Sullivan explains this notion as follows:

Second, in responding to empirical understandings, a visual arts researcher will reflect on information gathered so as to review conceptual strategies used

²³⁰ ‘Approximate’, because, although the drafter may be engaged in problem-centred tasks in processes of enaction and interaction, she will not seek “some allegedly perfect solution to a problem, but rather, one that works well enough relative to the current situation” (Johnson. 2007: 119).

and consider other approaches. This reflective practice is meta-analytic in focus and reveals the plurality of new views, much in the same way a gallery curator does when reassembling a collection so as to present a different reading of artworks (2005: 101)

In the context of this thesis and its concern with trait formation, the visual schemata²³¹ that I discuss in Chapter 4 provide the structures that facilitate ‘meta-analytic’ focuses. As I explained in Chapter 4, drawing sustains a ‘drawing together’ of shared visual schemata and the deviations of trait. Notwithstanding the drafter’s own deviatory schemata – or trait – which she inserts into her drawing, she must also achieve understandability in order to communicate. Self-reflexive framing contains trait and visual schemata as permutations that emerge as new form. Sullivan identifies and defines this activity as reflexive practice in visual art practice as research (2005: 101).

Dispositional responsiveness to change

He adds another dimension that pertains to dispositional development and embodiment. A reflexive practitioner, he purports,

...will question content and contexts as problematic situations are revealed within particular settings. Issues-driven inquiry of this kind not only identifies problems, but also opens up areas whereby participants become responsive to potential change (Sullivan. 2005: 101).

As a parallel to this notion, I propose that auto-deixis has the potential to challenge self-effacement as problematic issue in drawing. I believe that auto-deixis can help the student drafter to challenge norm. Once the drafter becomes aware of this potential for deviation, she becomes more ‘responsive to potential change’ in a wider context. She absorbs the concept of change as *disposition* – a disposition that

²³¹ As I explained in Chapter 4, such visual schemata entails ‘image schemata’. Mark Johnson (2007: 136) defines visual schemata as “a dynamic, recurring pattern of organism-environment interactions” as “precisely these basic structures of sensorimotor experience by which we encounter a world that we can understand and act within”. Johnson also draws interaction, enaction, and embodied action into his definition: “The patterns of our ongoing interactions, or enactions (to use the term from Varela, Thomson and Rosch 1999), define the contours of our world and make it possible for us to make sense of, reason about, and act reliably within this world”.

can also serve other visual arts practices. She starts to see the self-affirmative facility of auto-deixis – the particularity of her mind-body intervention – to bring about deviation from norm. Thereby she tests, practices, and verifies her own voice as carrier of change. As such, auto-deixis in itself becomes a form of questioning of the norm – be it the drafter’s own norms or the reigning norms of stylistic trends in general.

Dialectic

The dialectic in which the drafter engages also sustains drawing as a reflexive research process that challenges stasis. This would comprise, for example, the syntagmatic flow of enactionist drawn gesture as opposed to the inhibitive curbing of interactionist drawn gesture.²³² The constant dialectic in drawing between naissance and hiatus (intimacy and distance, drawing and withdrawal, absence and presence) that I describe above relates, as does the dialectic between appearance and disappearance that Berger²³³ describes. The drafter’s struggle to find likeness between image and the viewing object, a process that can only ever produce difference, provides further exemplary support.

In auto-deictic drawing, these dialectical interchanges enable the drafter to *reveal* her dialogue *with* and *in* drafteric language and information – the drawing itself is evidential of the intensity, density, quality, and plausibility of the dialogue. Sullivan posits the capacity of the drafter for conducting such dialogue as another form of reflexive practice: “This means that significance of meanings derived from a process of inquiry is subject to debate and discussion as dialectic between the researcher and the researched takes place” (2005: 101). Once revealed in drafteric terms, the

²³² I explain this notion in Chapter 3 as follows: ‘The concepts of interaction and enaction lead me to distinguish (in theoretical terms rather than in discernable quality) between ‘enactionist drawn gesture’, and ‘interactionist drawn gesture’. I propose that, while some facets of discernment and doing in drawing or in making a mark cite field and history interactively and involuntarily, other dimensions enact embodiment directly and involuntarily. Such interaction continues the embodiment process in-phase, while the drafter simultaneously enacts already assimilated embodiments. The drafter directs her drawing partly by recall or memory and partly by self-originate enaction in “unconscious execution” (Derrida. 1993: 48) to convert the gestic into marks that have no precedence or mindful specularly that precedes irruption’.

²³³ Dialect assists generativity. As I explain in Chapter 1, under ‘Temporality’, Berger asserts, “Drawing works to abolish the principle of Disappearance, but it never can, and instead it turns appearance and disappearance into a game [which] can never be won, or wholly controlled, or adequately understood”, According to Berger, three aspects typify the drawing process, namely observation, idea, and memory. Each of these aspects “speaks in a different tense” and each temporal space requires “a different capacity for imagination” (Downs et al. 2007: xii, citing Berger 2004: 112).

dialogue enters social space and the discourses and debates that social space affords the field, activate in reciprocity. This notion demonstrates Bourdieu's concept of field in interplay with habitus and practice, an interplay that weaves a larger field of increasing amassments, circling outwards in an integral social space that returns or feeds back into field, practice, and habitus.²³⁴

As we have seen, dialectic serves a *generative purpose* in drawing, both in enactionist and in interactive dynamics. Reflexivity is essential to the development of dialectic, and the enactionist aspect of ontological complicity²³⁵ in such development ensures multiplicity in outcome. Reflexive conversion, a process in which the drafter is central, produces enactionist, and interactionist drawn gesture, as discussed in Chapter 3. Sullivan corroborates this notion as follows:

Reflexivity arises when the different elements or levels are played off against each other. It is in these relations and interfaces that reflexivity occurs. This approach is based upon an assumption – and implies – that no element is totalized; that is, they are all taken with a degree of seriousness, but there is no suggestion that any one of them is the bearer of the Right or Most Important Insight (2005: 101, citing Alvesson & Sköldbberg, 2000: 249).

Sullivan points out that a significant concept – namely that of its “emancipatory interest” (2005: 101) – results from such reflexive practice. Self-reflexivity as a form of questioning, as challenge and dialogue, affords ‘emancipation’ from norm in a new form that also displays enaction of “artistic, social, political, educational, or cultural change” (Sullivan. 2005: 101). To reiterate, an individual's deviation from norm can expand into wider contexts that bring about change in more spheres of field and social space.²³⁶

²³⁴ As I explained in Chapter 2, under ‘Field’, Bourdieu's concept of field constitutes amassment of interrelated layers that ‘grow in dimension and extent in mobilised interplay’. Also refer to ‘Recursivity and amassment’ in this chapter.

²³⁵ Bourdieu explains enaction as emerging from ‘ontological complicity with infraconscious and infralinguistic structures’ (1998: 79-80). I explain the term in the glossary (Addendum B) and discuss its reach in Chapters 2, under ‘Relational thinking’, and in Chapter 5, under ‘Appropriation’ and ‘Conclusion’. The notion acknowledges self-as-being – self and its habitus are inextricably part of the internalisation of externalities and the externalisation of internalities.

²³⁶ In this regard, Richard Harker (1990: 100-101) explains that, “the addition of time [temporality] to objectivist formulations allows one to perceive the dialectical relations between objective structures and practices, thus providing a theoretical level which can account for change (including resistance)... practice cannot be reduced to either habitus or through habitus to objective structures, since historical

Articulation

Slonimsky and Shalem (Griesel. 2004: 90 – 94) identify a fourth strand “constitutive of academic practice”. They define this component of research as ‘articulation’ and I interpret it to pertain to those notions of Sullivan regarding reflexive practice in research. Above, I explained this aspect of the research process under ‘The articulations of naissance and hiatus’ (please refer). The processes of naissance and hiatus that I describe above as ‘Applications’ constitute clarification on articulation.

6.6 A comparison between auto-deictic drawing and emulation

In conclusion and to return to trait as self-reflexive articulation, I can now define its weight against the repression of self-reflexivity in student drawing. I will now draw a comparison in broad and conclusive terms between auto-deixis as opposed to emulation of style language.

Originality

Because auto-deixis is not conceivable on a conscious level until it exists, it is unpremeditated, eruptive in its irruptions. It brings to the surface gesture as the pre-conceptual. It proceeds from this basis, allowing the mystery of its emerging spectacle to partake in shaping and reshaping its future or its flow of trace.

In contrast, the emulation of style language requires a blueprint. Existing form prescribes, pre-determines, to enclose the image in fidelity to that existing form. The flow of its execution and its labour is therefore unavoidably systematic and repetitive. The drafter measures the drawing against its blueprint as norm and such measurement requires the criteria of emulative fidelity only.

‘Reality’

Even when labour ends, auto-deictic form remains sinuous and unenclosed. In this, it recognises the myth of a single ‘reality’ and perceives it as subject to individuated reflexive interpretation. In emulative drawing, the only object is to draw in a similar

circumstances play their part in its generation. Nor can it be reduced to specific historical circumstances or forces, since the perception of these social forces is filtered through the habitus. We are left with practice as a dialectical production, continually in the process of reformulation”.

way to someone else, which, by extension, implies a similar vision of 'reality' between all student drafters. Ultimately, then, everyone sees 'reality' in the same way, implying as imperative in drawing the preservation at all costs of a constant 'reality'. In contrast, auto-deixis implies difference.

Body-mind / constructive process

Consequently, auto-deictic drawing relies on the continual changeability of the student-drafter's body-mind gesture, her continuous flow of "thought-feeling" (Johnson. 2007: 273). In contrast, emulative drawing inhibits the drafter's own body-mind by obeying traces of another's body-mind. If drawing carries the pre-conceptual to the surface and to conceptualisation, if it functions in this way to construct, emulation of style language would also inhibit its constructive function.

6.7 Overarching conclusions: The significance of trait

From the development of my arguments throughout this thesis, the significance of trait can be summarised as follows:

The significance of drawing-trait constitutes invention – a form of invention that can only occur in the drawing interface, which involves the temporal and spatial presence of the drafter and her engagement in world. From nothing, it brings something, turning the no-meaning of the no-thing into the some-meaning of the some-thing. In this way, the drawing act *distills* the self's engagement in lived 'reality'. Trait therefore provides *marked* evidence of individuated experiential engagement, both in lived 'reality' and in drawing itself. Trait provides evidence of the transformative processing that the drafter draws from such engagement.

In its extensions, trait signifies the appropriation of knowledge, the development of understanding, and of application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation (Bloom. 1956: 62-187) as constructive processes in a self-reflexive realm. These processes occur as an inherent wavering between the self-as-nothing and the self-as-being. This 'wavering' of the drafter between these two poles, her skepticism, and speculation, fulfills an important function that enhances development. The drafter's grasp for the

self-as-being facilitates passage from experiential cognition to drawn trait and from gesture to invention. The ability to invent underpins the development of creative ability.

Those dialectic processes that sustain cerebration recursively between self-originitivity and practice-originitivity develop the schemata of understanding that drawing-trait carries. The thesis shows that gestic conversion constitutes processes that change pre-meaning into *visibility*, and by extension, into *understanding*. In this, the body-mind of the self, the labour of drawing, drawing display, field, and social space generate in unification. I conclude that trait, as invention, constitutes *new form* as visible demonstration of synthesis. The complexity of such synthesis does not necessarily exceed that of the emulation of style language, but the diversity of its materialisations provide more potential for the development of creativity.

A significance of trait resides in its capacity to deviate from norm, because it defies emulation of style language. The self-reflexivity inherent to those recursive and discursive pathways along which gestic conversion unfolds brings about diversity in conversion. Trait is difference and it articulates diversity in understanding and diversity in gestic conversion. It is diverse as a matter of course, and it integrates change. The norms of drawing influence, but do not constrain trait as new form. The same is true for an inhibitive adherence to resolute and perfect descriptive resemblance, which would be impossible were trait to describe it. (In this sense, the term 'realism', as ascribed to style in drawing, is deceiving). Difference becomes drawing in all its contradictory and various manifestations.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FACILITATION OF DRAWING

CONCLUSION

Introduction

My notion of auto-deictic drawing does not profess a radically new, unconventional, or revolutionary technique, method, manner, style, or form of drawing. Rather, it is meant to function largely in the facilitation of drawing at university level. Essentially, it proposes one shift in approach – a shift towards recognising the student drafter's self-as-being. It is especially in such an educational context that it can open a generative, actively developing; yet consummate system of practice and knowledge. I present it as resolution to the problematic that the thesis poses – as a challenge to the repetitive redistribution of style language. Its facility and expansive capacity for individuated cerebration, its enactionist and interactive dynamics that create trait and its adherence to process in a non-representational framework makes the concept of auto-deixis ideal for application in the facilitation of drawing.

In this conclusion, I arrive at a number of insights regarding auto-deixis that pertain to principles of mediation and facilitation.

7.1 A facilitatory framework

Individual responsiveness

Trait brings to the drawing studio a diverse range of legacies comprising personalised constructs of socio-cultural habitat, history, heritage, and dispositional differences in thinking and doing. The student drafter – namely, her self as an

individual with a cultural legacy – thus opens the facilitatory framework to establish individual responsiveness as a cornerstone. Such facilitatory focus, which centres on the student drafter, finds support in Ian Moll's theory of curriculum responsiveness (Moll in Griesel. 2004: 1-38). Moll defines 'individual' responsiveness as '...responsiveness of the teaching entailed in the curriculum to the needs of the learner' (Moll. 2004: 7). The needs of the learner involve, for example, the particular thinking styles²³⁷ and learning styles²³⁸ that the individual students prefer to apply in their processes of learning.

Regarding the facilitation of drawing, however, I am of the opinion that such 'style'-models could also run the risk of becoming deterministic models for drawing. If employed as a facilitatory tool, the problem of determinism and prescriptive instruction in pre-conceived stylistic manner and content again raise their ugly heads. Because it encourages each student's particular way of using abilities, it also predicts stasis, or a particular way of drawing as an *ideal* that the drafter should practice for a lifetime, once mastered. Even more problematically, the notion of

²³⁷ Robert Sternberg defines the concept of Thinking Style as 'a preferred way of thinking' or the manner in which a person 'prefers to use abilities', therefore he also calls them 'mental preferences' (1997:19, 134). Mental preferences interact in the learning experience (Sternberg. 1997:25-6, 107-12, 145-6, 155). Mental preferences are personality-based rather than cognition-based; and they interface between ability and personality. An individual's interaction with the environment shapes his or her mental preferences (Zhang & Postiglione 2001: 1333-1346). In turn, people also shape their environments – the influence, according to Sternberg, is 'interactive and reciprocal' (1997:153). The concepts of thinking styles and learning styles seem to resonate with Bourdieu's theories in that they also identify interaction between individual, environment, and practice, specifically relating to the learning process. However, if they are not seen as cognition-based (as is *habitus*), but rather as emanations of 'personality', it would require a further and rather positivist study to explore their impact on enaction and interactivity.

Although Sternberg expounds four points that suggest the modifiability of certain components in the learning process, they do not offer the unpredictable and open-ended, or irresolute aspects of enaction, as I perceive it to apply in auto-deictic drawing. He argues, firstly, that thinking styles and cognitive ability are two of the determining factors in a successful learning process (Sternberg 1997: 133, 134, 141). Secondly, he asserts that the legislative style of thinking is more conducive to creative ability (Sternberg and Lubart 1999: 3-15). Thirdly, he confirms the modifiability of creative abilities (as is true of all abilities) (Sternberg and Lubart 1995). Finally, he maintains that thinking styles are situation-dependent and subject to influence from the environment (Sternberg 1997: 83, 84). According to Sternberg, cognitive ability and thinking styles are also interactive (1997: 107, 112). It could therefore be argued that drawing, a cognition-based ability, could interact with mental preferences, which in turn are shaped by environment.

²³⁸ Learning styles can be described as the more or less consistent ways in which people perceive, conceptualise, organise, and recall information. A theoretical framework for learning styles proposed by Kolb provides for four types of learning styles: converging (preference for abstract conceptualising & active experimentation), diverging (preference for concrete experience & reflective observation), assimilating (preference for abstract conceptualising & reflective observation), and accommodating (preference for concrete experience and active experimentation (Sternberg. 1997: 145 citing Kolb 1974; 1978).

thinking and learning styles proposes an essentialist understanding of a unitary subject, which conflicts with the complex, dynamic embodied subjectivity I proposed by enaction and auto-deixis.

Chapter 5 explains the fine line that divides durational self-origination (or enaction) from deterministic stasis. With auto-deictic drawing, I try to overcome deterministic, prescriptive facilitation. In order to assert it, the thesis attempts an explanation of the role that the unconscious and experiential cognition play in the genesis of trait. In contrast, Thinking Styles function only in personality, in ego, not in the unconscious. Sternberg explains, “They [thinking styles] are ways in which we *organize our cognitions* about the world in order to make sense of the world” (1997: 150). To ‘organize one’s cognitions’, to my mind, is reminiscent of the ‘order of memory’. It implies the danger stasis holds for trait, a stasis in which trait could become also repetitive mannerism. Moreover, it is exactly the ever elusive and hidden that is revealed as surprise and that creates the wonder of a self-as-being, which the drafter continually tries to grasp in order to deny the self-as-nothing. Revealing the hidden, promises ever more hidden depths of unrevealed self. The range of un-premeditated, diverse, and ever-changeable irruptions that such surprising revelation sets off in drawing carries potential for the development of creative extension beyond presentation.

I interpret individual responsiveness to also imply that mediation should acknowledge the drawing and drawn contribution of the individual as meaningful and *appropriable* in its own right. Offering trait as an *interactive* bequest, the individual student drafter extends meaning communally, thus continuing interactivity into field and social space in a studio context. A mutual disposition (one that all student drafters bring with them) is one of interaction. In a group of student drafters, the meaning (and manner) of an individual’s contribution communicates and extends to others who will draw from it too. This being applicable to each student drafter, such interactivity between self and others becomes a facilitatory aid and tool in itself.

The reflexive aspect of the habitus theory ensures that, while it develops and transforms the body of knowledge, it also influences the person. Task design in

drawing facilitation should therefore incorporate broad-based, non-insular problems, diverse but of mutual interest in order to be accessible, meaningful, and interpretable to a diverse range of individual student drafters. Tasks should bring about interchange between socio-cultural encoding and decoding. They should engage the students in issues and problems that relate the educational, cultural, psychological, and social contexts that they are experiencing and dealing with, without ignoring the legacies of heritage.

The student drafter derives her *particular needs* from socio-cultural background, a context of the past, to carry them into the alien university-based context of the first year drawing studio. The facilitator should respond to the needs of the student drafter by guiding her along a new interactive pathway that will also proliferate into new enactions. In this new context, her needs could become a multi-faceted partner in an interactive trio, the other partners being the demands of drawing as discipline, and her successful participation and absorption into the new environment of institutionalised culture.

Responsive task design

Task design enfolds considerations that include, yet exceed those of trend, volume, level, quality, and punctual delivery. In a South African context, such task design becomes particularly interesting and layered. A task dealing with the concept of 'transformation', for example, could be dealt with on several levels of experience that mirror the multi-layered meanings of the word. Given the country's history, all members of its society find transformation very relevant in the spheres of daily political, educational, environmental, social, and cultural experience. On a more personally individual (and psychological) level, the first year student has to deal with the transformative processes that accompany the transition from school to university – those of, for example, independence, self-reliance, self-discipline, accountability, and so forth. On the drawing-related subject disciplinary level of experience, the student has to begin to understand her own role in transforming her body-mind experiencing into a visible language that can effectively reach a very diverse audience. In terms of image making, transformation can be explored in the very literal terms of, for example, metamorphism or anthropomorphism. In this way, the broadness of the concept of transformation enables the student's own

explorations into wider yet related themes and issues, such as the relationships between humans and animals, environment, and so forth. At the same time, the theme is wide open to strategies of execution that employ symbolism, metaphor, allegory, analogy, or homology as content.

Designing a task in such a way that it will ensure the incorporation of the self, the self's situatedness in the objective structures of current politics, socio-cultural and ecological environment and historicity, as well as the development of skill in the techniques of drawing, would bring about reciprocity in inter-cultural decoding. This is so, because, while drawing's encodings would be self-reflexively diverse, common structures of visualisation would necessarily have to be deconstructed and reconfigured as a matter of course. In the particular situation that is South Africa, this notion becomes significant.

Apart from technical skills-development in transforming idea into the languages of drawing – languages that now incorporate self-originitivity – such a task would also require effective research skills. Efficiency in all these spheres would be practiced without omitting or denying self-reflexive responses to the issues at hand. If the tasks pose broad, yet experientially relevant themes, they provide ample room within which the individual student can identify any number of possible strands of exploration, as well as the manner and medium of their realisation. With the added freedom of self-originitive mark making in the labour of drawing, process and content will carry equal weight as opportunities for creative practice and production. These considerations in task design promote the student's development of self-reliance, innovation, and self-confidence.

Rhythms of learning

In order to ensure the student drafter's constructive interaction the facilitator should "adjust her instructional strategies to 'the rhythms of learning'" of the individual student drafter (Moll in Griesel. 2004: 8). The facilitator should be sensitive to the "tensions and emotions of learning" as the individual student drafter experiences and enacts them (Moll in Griesel. 2004: 8). The facilitator should respond to the needs of individual student drafters by "teaching them in terms that are accessible

to them” and she should “assess them in ways that they understand” (Griesel. 2004: 8).

A ‘tension of learning’ that reveals itself repeatedly in the first year drawing studio, is indeed one of transition from a past sphere of interactivity to a new sphere of interactivity, a tension that also acts as a great *equaliser*. In Bourdieuan terms, the student drafter now enters a new social space, namely that of university level education, where she must struggle and strategise anew for position in the field. The student drafter enters first year still secure in experiencing and apprehending (and in many cases also drawing) her lived ‘reality’ through a system of beliefs. She functions within a habitus that she has accrued and internalised over eighteen years – just to find that her systems of beliefs are challengeable, if not inadequate. When confronted with new systems of belief, she finds that other and more ways of doing things exist.²³⁹

The self, albeit a lost self (a temporary self-as-nothing), necessarily becomes an important focus in the first year drawing studio. The situation provides an ideal opportunity for introducing auto-deictic drawing, which places strong emphasis on a search for one’s own voice.

The temporary abandonment of (and by) the self-as-being, which confronts all first year students, “entails *learning*”, because, “it also carries with it a crucial dimension of individual change. It entails the *transformation of individuals*”²⁴⁰ (Moll in Griesel. 2004: 11). In other words, it entails the enormous task of interactively integrating a profoundly different and alien externality. Such integration will influence the self-as-nothing enough to reverberate in her drawing practices as the self-as-being. In this regard, it would not be far-fetched of the drawing facilitator to assume that

²³⁹ Lisa Delpit, as cited by Moll, relates this tumultuous and often traumatic experience in her words, “To put our beliefs on hold is to cease to exist as ourselves for a moment and it is not easy. It is painful as well, because it means turning yourself inside out, giving up your own sense of who you are and being willing to see yourself in the unflattering light of another’s angry gaze. We must learn to be vulnerable enough to allow our world to turn upside down in order to allow the realities of others to edge themselves into our consciousness” (Delpit cited by Moll in Griesel. 2004: 11).

²⁴⁰ I intend here an allusion once again to the transformative aspect of the labour of drawing that Bryson purports, namely his expositions on “transformation through labour”, to alight on or connect trait as irruptive from the labour of drawing where processes of conversion occur that not only deviate from norm-bound style language, but also effect drawing skills-development and personal habitus.

everyone in a given group of first year student drafters could be “under-prepared” and therefore on equal footing with one another (Slonimsky & Shalem in Griesel, 2004: 90).

Moreover, their introduction to the principles and demands of auto-deictic drawing serves as a further equaliser. Since auto-deictic drawing deviates strongly from the familiar and known dictates of a usually single and privileged account of what should or should not constitute drawing form and content, it offers *no* style language to mime. The familiar past offers no recourse, nor yet does an open-ended, irresolute present. For a short while there in first year, the future seems darkly unknowable. In this too, all first year student drafters are at an equal disadvantage and, for the same reason, lost.

The understanding that successful and productive performance requires self-reflexivity and self-reliance does not seem to come easily. At entrance level, self-reflexivity is still an alien concept, and self-reliance often seems to be even more so. Auto-deixis, with its refusal to be prescriptive and with its insistence on self-originitive specification, calls for discovery and articulation of a seemingly lost self or at least misplaced self-as-being, by shifting initiating impetus to the student drafter. Indirectly, auto-deictic drawing represents a practice-based explorative process that stimulates independent thinking and doing.

The *self-reflexive* aspect, underpinned by the habitus theory, of the auto-deictic drawing process (that I describe in Chapter 6) provides a convincing motivation for individual responsiveness in an effective facilitatory framework. This aspect represents a radical shift in facilitatory approach. It offers potential solutions to problems regarding redistribution or derivation of style language. In any form of self-reflexive practice, trait is essential. For it to function effectively, it should nurture a *desire to show the self*, which boldly displays shortcomings and aptitude with equal willingness. As we have seen, both shortcomings and aptitude hold infinite potential for innovation.

The thesis shows that self-reflexivity is inherent to the processes that form trait. Self-reflexivity is inherent to auto-deictic drawing as an explorative or ‘research’

process. Auto-deictic drawing implies that the drafter displays her desire to show the self in *speculative* practice. Speculative practice realises as new form through recursive interplay between cognitively experiential enaction and aesthetic disposition. Self-reflexivity always implies the self-as-being, process, and production (poiesis) – a trio that at least carries the potential for creating new form.

Knowledge disciplinary responsiveness

In a Curriculum Responsive framework, the facilitator's responsiveness to drawing as knowledge discipline (Moll in Griesel. 2004: 5-7) forms the second component of a facilitatory framework.

Apart from the technical and discipline-based processes that comprise the contents of drawing as a subject, I propose those processes that I discussed in Chapter 6 as points of focus that should underpin the facilitator's *responsiveness to drawing as a knowledge discipline*. Such processes would include, for example, the cerebrative unifications of dialectic, the constructive proliferation of recursivity, and the divergences of invention. I propose two more processes – firstly, the construction of meaning through drawing, which I discussed under 'Distantiation'; and secondly, auto-deictic drawing as a self-reflexive research process. In summary, I propose that the auto-deictic process produces revelatory knowledge. The sight-induced cerebrative flow of traces that the auto-deictic process creates proposes and hypothesises. Its introspective discourses and ambivalences create doubt, mistrust, and skepticism. This impels the drafter to question, both in distantiation and durationally. In auto-deictic drawing, withdrawal brings distance, while naissance articulates durationally in drawn gesture. In the processes of its consummation, it therefore includes four elements of academic practice, namely distantiation, appropriation, research and articulation, while the process by which it generates knowledge, is one of revelation.

These discussions make it clear that the self needs the knowledge disciplinary aspects of drawing to reveal not only the self, but also the meaning of trait-as-the self. The auto-deictic drawing process functions as a form of direct "inter-animation" between the self and the world. According to Mark Johnson, (2007: 273) *meaning* emanates from such inter-animation as experiential engagement. The thesis explains

that the conversion of gesture (as pre-verbal symbolicity) into meaning incorporates the musculature, the biological, psychological, and cognitive aspects of self-as-being. These aspects engage with the technical, structural, formal, and conceptual dimensions of drawing. In this inter-animation between the self and process, the duel that I discussed in Chapter 5 acts as generative and signifying impetus. To a duel between the self and gestic conversion, it is now possible to add the practical technicalities of drawing. Such a duelist triad fuses experience, thinking, and doing, the intellect and the somatic, unconscious, and conscious, and perception and conception in auto-deictic drawing. While this duel (*trial*) engages in disordered organisation, it dispels dualities. As such, *trait* becomes central to process, construct, and meaning as a new frame of knowledge.

Shifts

The accommodation of the above-mentioned processes brings about the shifts in drawing facilitation that I introduced in Chapter 1. These shifts, in turn, bring about an additional change, namely one from a closed knowledge system²⁴¹ to an open knowledge system of constant renewal and self-generativity. While auto-deictic drawing creates a process of *revelation*, emulation of style language, in contrast, constitutes a closed knowledge system. A closed knowledge system remains in stasis, because it resolutely adheres to “canonical norms”, the rules of tradition, and to “collegially recognised authority” (Moll citing NCHE, 1996: 4, in Griesel. 2004: 12).

In contrast, auto-deixis reveals the self-specifying body-mind of everyone. Each body-mind is inevitably distinctive. Thus, each individual student drafter contributes to a dynamic and ever developing, never stagnant whole. As such, diversity contributes to the dynamic development of the knowledge discipline. At the same time, it contributes to a progressive dynamic in collectivity, or to cultural capital²⁴² in

²⁴¹ Bryson (De Zegher. 2003: 153) describes (and criticises) the practice of drawing that would resort under a ‘closed system of knowledge’ as “all those myriad protocols of line” that “supplies a set of formulae that, as they are mastered and internalized by the practitioner, enable the transcription onto paper of something that precedes and drives the drawing ... First comes the source, ... then its transposition into the image”. This represents a sequence “in which line is always secondary”, and “drawing exists as a body of techniques that lies emphatically outside the self. The actual learning process consists in slowly incorporating into the habits of the hand and the eye those forms of line that are housed in convention and tradition”.

²⁴² According to Bourdieu, ‘cultural capital’ presents itself in society in three forms. Firstly, cultural capital in its embodied form comprises those culturally transferred and acquired resources that form, enrich, and inform the self. Cultural capital also exists in objectified form as, for example, works of art. Embodied cultural capital empowers a person, through the enabling process of education and

a wider society. Auto-deictic drawing acknowledges diversity as contributor and defined element of visual art.

Cultural responsiveness

In terms of responsive mediation and facilitation, this characteristic of auto-deictic drawing presents the facilitator with an interesting situation. Responsiveness to the student drafter as *individual* member of any socio-cultural extraction logically implies *cultural* responsiveness. If, in other words, the facilitator responds to the individual student drafter, she responds as a matter of course to the individual's cultural heritage and origin – individual and cultural origin cannot be divided. This is so, since the individual self also constitutes the complexities of the self as socio-cultural construct. Since cultural specificity can obviously be associated with the individual, the difference is that the individual drafter is free to practice, reveal, or disclose her ethnocentric heritage in her particular manner of drawing. In the auto-deictic drawing process the individual can cite or enact her personal history freely, thus 'drawing in' references to cultural specific background. In Curricular Responsiveness as mediatory framework, conflation between individual and cultural responsiveness is therefore possible.

The facilitator must not collapse cultural responsiveness into knowledge disciplinary responsiveness (Moll in Griesel. 2004: 1-16). Drawing as a knowledge discipline – its devices as formal content that enables its practices – serves as enabling, but common denominator amongst culturally diverse drafters. In other words, as soon as the facilitator teaches the stylistic specifics of any ethno-centric drawing style as the language of convention that constitutes the Art of Drawing (as subject or knowledge discipline), the students will readily practice such style language as a convention that is specific to the knowledge discipline. Thus, a culturally diverse profile of student drafters would merely regurgitate a single cultural-specific style language "in two ways – conceptually as second-degree image-repertoires, or ahistorically in a way that betrays false consciousness" (Foster. 1999: 59-60). It would mean that the facilitator promotes or even enforces not only the emulation of style language, but also cultural insincerity.

social dynamic, to understand or appreciate cultural objects and through this process, cultural objects are 'symbolically' transformed into cultural capital. Once an institution recognises such capital held by an individual, it exists in its institutionalised form (Mahar et al. 1990: 10-15).

Auto-deictic drawing as process that centralises the 'sincere' consciousness of experiential engagement – the spatial and temporal labour of the individual student drafter – would function as a practice that is neutral in terms of socio-cultural referencing. Its processes achieve this neutrality through their inherent accommodation and acknowledgement of diversity in production. This understanding alights on the significance of those shifts that auto-deictic drawing brings about both in product, and in the facilitation there-of. It demarcates the close relationship between auto-deictic drawing and its facilitatory framework. The way in which student drafters enact trait as syntheses in auto-deictic drawing also structures the way in which the facilitator should mediate drawing.

The meeting between the processes of auto-deictic drawing and its facilitatory framework that emerges from discussion in this chapter orchestrates and encourages both the drafter's consciously sincere and involuntary enactions as self-originative drawing-trait. A student body that is diverse in socio-cultural heritage would produce diverse style languages that would also freely cross-pollinate. The diversity of the student drafters' enactionist and interactionist involvement would both anticipate and furnish creativity.

Post script

The thesis regards the emulation of style language versus self-originative drawing-trait. Its explorations focus on a very small window between drafter and world, which comprises the self's fluctuations between the unconscious and the conscious; from the pre-conceptual to the conceptual; from the gestic to drawn gesture. Trait proves to be as elusive as the self is; the self as elusive as trait is. In drawing, as much as in this thesis, characteristic form hinges on such elusiveness.

My contention is that trait, as self-originative drawing form, enfolds inventive yet dissonant rhythms between the unconscious and the conscious of the individual drafter, thereby yielding trait as difference. As such, trait orchestrates diversely proliferate, non-conformist drawing form. Difference renders drawing a constructive process that outweighs its emulative facilities. If trait presents as difference that can never know its face until irruption, difference signifies the intricate innuendos of every drafter's body-mind.

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ADDENDUM A

ILLUSTRATIONS

Practice

List of Illustrations

(Addendum A)

Practice

1. Developmental pathway
2. Development: recursivity, amassment, accrual
3. Individuation: difference
4. Erasure and recursivity
5. Drawing as a generative partner: ground
6. Deviation
7. A solipsist eccentric: trait unfolds
8. Self-reflexivity: a turning point
9. Hiatus: withdrawal
10. The difference between field of observation and drawing

ILLUSTRATION 1

DEVELOPMENTAL PATHWAY

This series of drawings illustrates a *process of gradual development* in the work of a student drafter. To compile this illustration, I selected key drawings from several series of drawing exercises, each series comprising up to twenty-five drawings. My selection purposely tracks the student drafter's development over a month. In these drawings, the drafter's references to objective structures are initially schematic. Her shifts from three-dimensionality to two-dimensionality (founding perceptions) become gradually more informed, less schematic, to show eventually a rounded head that sits well in its surrounding space. In the first drawings, the drafter creates a flat mask, thus illustrating her understanding of the head as a face only. The eyes of the mask are almond-shaped, the mouth harshly outlined to appear stuck-on and resembling a paper cutout. Gradually, these features change to become integrated, voluminous, and fleshy. Eventually, a fully perceived, rounded head replaces the mask so that the final group of drawings in the series shows self-portraits that differ hugely from the first group of self-portraits.

Illustration 1. Group 1.1. Catherine Benjamin. 2008. Charcoal on paper. Dimensions variable.



1.1.1 *Line gesture*

A very early line gesture drawing that clearly shows schematic drawing of the eyes, nose, and mouth, stuck onto the mask-shaped face.



1.1.2 *Continuous line gesture*

A continuous gestural line begins to draw things together, advancing understanding of the features as integrated with face. This extends still, however, only to the face, while the face, as integral to head is not yet evident. The facial features are still schematic to a very large degree.



1.1.3 *Line gesture*

Centred awareness of the face as perception of head with the facial features as 'stuck-on' is still very evident in this drawing, although the line work shows less rigidity. The facial features, especially the eyes and mouth, are less schematically drawn, showing improvement when compared to the previous drawings.



1.1.4 *Line & mass gesture*

The mask is still evident, yet not as harshly outlined as in the first three drawings. The absent, or at least diminished, outline of the face begins to suggest an understanding of something beyond the face. Although the features still dominate, they are less schematic. The drafter starts to treat the inherent characteristic qualities of her facial features as subject, albeit not yet in a very skilled way.

Group 1.2

1.2.1 *Line & mass aesture*1.2.2 *Line & mass aesture*1.2.3 *Line & mass aesture*1.2.4 *Line & mass aesture*

An awareness of the head and face as 'whole', and of the head as a continuous shape that extends beyond the facial 'mask' begins to appear in this group of drawings. The drafter starts to experiment with a three-quarter view, turning the whole head in space and drawing it from an angle other than frontal. She still oscillates between schematic drawing of especially the eyes and mouth, and more realistic drawing of those features. Schematic drawing becomes less prominent in the third drawing, while in the fourth drawing of this group less schematic outlining is evident.

Group 1.3



1.3.1 Mass gesture

1.3.2 Mass gesture

1.3.3 Mass gesture

1.3.4 Mass gesture

In further discovering the masses of the head, the drafter progresses from mask to a rounded head and she begins to include the neck as integral to head. She now replaces schematic drawing of the facial features to draw them as integrated shapes. She begins to perceive the head as a complex, voluminous shape that consists of intricate planes fitting into each other, but arranged at different angles to one another in three-dimensional space.

Group 1.4

1.4.1 *Mass gesture*1.4.2 *Mass & line gesture*1.4.3 *Sustained gesture*1.4.4 *Sustained gesture*

In these self-portraits, the shifts from three-dimensionality to two-dimensionality are generally better informed. Although traces of schematic drawing and the mask are still present, they do not dominate. The drafter understands the roundedness of the head and its intricate planes to the extent where she can also suggest them, rather than necessarily drawing them explicitly. All these self-portraits also seem to begin to convey information that reaches beyond the mere descriptive. In comparison to those in Group 1.1, these drawings are generally much advanced from where the student started out.

ILLUSTRATION 2

DEVELOPMENT: RECURSIVITY, AMASSMENT, ACCRUAL

The interplay between memory, practice, and trait formation gradually informs an advanced visuality. Memory is essential, as is appropriation – both aid cerebration as much as enaction does, and enaction cannot function without memory and appropriation.

These drawings, arranged here in different categories of line exercises, illustrate the concepts of amassment, accrual, and recursivity that materialise as the development of skill and technique. Amassment comprises accrual of, for example, visual schemata, aesthetic sensibilities, in-phase observational skill, in-phase problem-solving skills, technical skill, and control of medium. Additionally, the student accrues knowledge about the functioning of line in its spatially descriptive capacities and, in applying such knowledge through the drawing process; processes of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation follow logically. All these aspects, to name but a few, contribute to in-phase generativity that expands incrementally for the duration of the drawing process. Such generativity becomes clear in this series, where it materialises as difference between stages in the different categories, and between the categories themselves. Students produce numerous drawings in each category before developing a final series of self-portraits in which they combine these techniques arbitrarily (see 'sustained gesture' below). For this illustration, I selected only a small number of key drawings from the work of one student. The categories of different exercises, namely line-, continuous line-, scribbled line-, mass-and-line-, and sustained-gesture (Betti & Sale. 1997: 33-50), are arranged in the order that they were executed.

Illustration 2. Group 1. Categories 1 & 2. Line- and continuous-line gesture

The differences between the first and last drawings in this group provide some visible evidence of a process of recursive amassment that occurs durationally in the process of drawing. The series relates a gradual progression from perceiving the head as mask-like face to perceiving the head as a whole that enfolds hair, neck, and so forth. The first two rows of drawings in Group 1 already show a diversion from focus on outer contours (outline) only. The second row shows the drafter starting to explore the inner planar structures of the head. This shift from outer to inner contours entails development from schematic description to observational drawing that sustains inscription. Through the intensified line work that accompanies such a shift, the drafter starts to create focus areas, which interact with their 'opposites' – white ground and more tranquilly drawn areas – to create the illusion of dimension and voluminous shape. This development carries added dimensions. In the last drawing, for example, the drafter begins to utilise *suggestion* by selective description and strengthened inscription. Outer contour is largely absent, yet it is possible to perceive the side planes of the head. By emphasising its inner planes, the drafter causes the face to advance, while the neck and hair recede. Thereby she 'suggests' those dimensions of spatial depth that the foreshortened side planes of the head represent. She 'suggests' outline in the region of the neck, leaves it out around the face, and picks it up again around the ears to drop it again until she touches some outline in the hair. Thereby, she also begins to integrate drawing ground (as 'space', 'ground', or 'background') to assign it inscriptive value almost equal to that of line. All these factors testify to an understanding of the head as whole that improves gradually. The developmental progression that is evident in this series suggests that the founding perceptions that were involved in creating these drawings became gradually and recursively more informed. Gesture drawing, by its very nature, develops understanding of the movement of shape and it relates such movement utilising the movement of the drafter's hand and body. The drafter's gestural conversions, her in-phase labour, generate the additional comprehension that the technique brings about. Marlene Steyn, a first year student, made the series of drawings in 2008. All drawings are in charcoal on newsprint or cartridge. Categories 1 to 5 is size A5, while the sustained gesture drawings in category 6 are size A2.

2.1.1



2.1.2



2.1.3



2.1.4



2.1.5



2.1.6



2.1.7



2.1.8

Group 2. Category 3. Scribbled line gesture


In this exercise (scribbled line gesture), students draw from the centre of a shape outwards towards its outer planes. The technique augments the understandings I describe in Group 1 above with an understanding of the (unobservable) inner dimensions of things, or with the hidden structures that create outer planes. In this way, founding perceptions (the drafter's shifts between three- and two-dimensionality) become informed also by imagination, conjecture, or construct. In these four drawings, continued recursivity and amassment seem evident in the gradual amplification of line work both in terms of quality and of number, suggesting that each application (whether successful or not) builds on its precedent.




2.2.1



2.2.2



2.2.3



2.2.4


Group 3. Categories 4 & 5. Weight and mass gesture

The concept of giving visibility to weight and mass is central to mass-gesture and mass-and-line gesture drawing techniques (Betti & Sale. 1997: 41-45). In these exercises, the students had to rely on the drawing process (and specifically on line) to discover those marks that would communicate mass and weight convincingly. The exercise deliberately incorporates touch, tactility, as 'drawing tool'. The students are encouraged to use their fingers, smeared with charcoal dust, to create the strokes that also suggest weight and mass. Touch as sensory experience creates an almost concrete (tactile) sense of mutuality between self and the material world. When touching something, the brain interchanges between perceiving self as touching object and object touching self, thus realising Merleau-Ponty's concept of mutuality with a directness that is less perceivable through the other senses. Each row of three drawings in this compilation shows development in relation to its preceding row(s), while each individual drawing shows improvements on the one preceding it. Such development comprises the accrual of a number of different skills and applied comprehension, albeit in increments that vary. Progress from a generalised and apparently vague understanding of the masses of the head in the first row to more structured descriptions of such masses in the second row is quite clear. Although the 'mask' is less evident in this student's work, the differences between rows 1 and 2 and between drawings 9 & 10 still show a degree of oscillation between mask and whole head. From the second drawing onwards, the drafter clarifies with more confidence her distinctions between mass and non-mass, and between weight and non-weight, thus engaging in a generative dynamic similar to one between appearance and disappearance. She improves her perception of dimensionality by integrating weight and mass with volume. She distinguishes between mass and non-mass, weight and non-weight by assigning to them corresponding distinctions between light and dark tones, thereby also beginning to incorporate tonal values (albeit arbitrary tones rather than real tones) in spatial relation to structure, shape, volume, mass, weight, and line. The improved integration of all these aspects becomes more evident in the last row of drawings in Group 3.

2.3.1



2.3.2



2.3.3



2.3.4



2.3.5



2.3.6



2.3.7



2.3.8



2.3.9



2.3.10



2.3.11



2.3.12

Group 4. Category 6: Sustained gesture: mass, line, continuous line, scribbled gesture combined

Perhaps the most significant shift that the preceding gesture exercises bring about is an increased lenience towards 'ugly' drawing. These self-portraits show the drafter's willingness to deface and destroy in order to discover and construct. The drafter has convincingly shed a former agenda of conformity. She deviates in these drawings from the inhibitive edicts of 'good' or popular drawing to produce remarkably revealing (albeit not pleasant) self-portraits.



2.4.1



2.4.2



2.4.3



2.4.4



2.4.5

ILLUSTRATION 3

INDIVIDUATION: DIFFERENCE

It is easy to take individuated trait in drawing for granted, thereby failing to see its potential significance precisely because it is so intrinsic to the practice (in the same way that one perceives it to be integral to handwriting). Its relationship with an individuated body-mind, with *habitus-as-self / self-as-habitus*, accounts for the fact that, by means of mere facture and drawn gesture, it almost seems to incorporate a spectre of the imagination of the student drafter. The phenomenon fascinates precisely because of its ambiguous insinuations of dormant, undiscovered, unsayable, yet faceted meaning. In the first place, it foretells or at least promises discovery of an intricate yet elusive centre of a fellow human being. It also affords the viewer a glimpse of someone's mind, which intrigues because of an implicit promise of accessing the complex minutiae of another person in a way that could throw some light on the viewer's own unsay-abilities, or complexities of the unbeknownst to self about self. Individuated trait and a mysterious self-being, whether that of drafter or as projected by the viewer, seems interrelated as a mutual "unbeknownst" (Derrida. 1993: 45), a chiasmic reversibility between viewer and drafter, viewer and drawing. Added to this, the potential of trait to deviate from norm, its almost effortless prevention of the creative stasis of repetitive redistribution of form and norm designates its merits. In these very basic drawing exercises, a number of line techniques (serving as 'common denominators') bring about diverse applications. Despite instructions being detailed (and rather prescriptive regarding subject, method, medium, and format), enormous differences emerge between the object of drawing and the drawing itself. Although I utilise these differences to develop the students' eventual understanding of how line functions as 'language' and in relation to other drawing elements, it is another form of difference that is of interest here. The differences between the students' subjective applications of the different techniques become evident in an arrangement that enables comparison (see below).

These drawings clearly display individuated mark making that conveys varied interpretation, levels of understanding, and skill in application. Hence, my understanding that trait (as facture and gesture) seems 'to incorporate a spectre of the imagination' of each student drafter. This arrangement of the drawings also illustrates the potential of trait to deviate from norm and its almost effortless prevention of emulation. Both these aspects also suggest the potential of trait for generativity and development of proficiency in drawing. A horizontal comparison shows the *differences between* the drawings of individual students. A vertical reading shows characteristic consistencies (trait) in the drawings of individual students. All the drawings were made in 2008, using charcoal and the approximate size of each is A5.



3.1. Nathan Gates. Continuous line gesture.



3.2. Catherine Benjamin. Continuous line gesture.



3.3. Marlene Steyn. Continuous line gesture.

3.4. Nathan Gates. Mass gesture.



3.5. Catherine Benjamin. Mass gesture.



3.6. Marlene Steyn. Mass gesture.





3.7. Nathan Gates. Line & Mass gesture.



3.8. Catherine Benjamin. Line & Mass gesture.



3.9. Marlene Steyn. Line & Mass gesture

ILLUSTRATION 4

ERASURE AND RECURSIVITY

Trait, in its enactively presentational capacity, deforms, rather than recovering outer visibilities as perfect replicas. It cannot be said that trait re-projects a pre-formed, mindful version of itself. Derrida calls it blind, because it 'cannot be thought in the specular'. It irrupts into becoming, rather to be the other of the mutuality it pursues. It presents the 'other' of invisibility to gain its own visibility. For brief moments, there in the chaotic non-linearity of drawing, the drafter guides her actions locally within an interaction between her sensory frame of reference and their relative connections in the unfolding of the drawing. As such, the unfolding drawing as object becomes a component that can also influence the dynamics of interaction and transformations between itself and the drafter.

Drawing traces form in contradictory positing and in subliminal play between opposites (1987: 186-193). In forming trait, the drafter deforms. In the placing of a mark, the drafter displaces. In composing a drawing, the drafter enacts her splintered vision as decomposition. Every appearance implies disappearance; each irruption hides its implosion. Every mark she banishes to outer territory suggests another remaining, yet to be revealed or not at all. Her *ductus* is one of reduction and deduction, doxic simplification, and somatic legibility that read as stylisation, as trait, yet its reach stretches to excess and creative extension. Her deductions appear on the drawing surface as the remains of repletion in *ductus*, the remembered versus the forgotten (Derrida. 1987: 193).

This drawing further investigates the concept of recursive amassment. They combine hiatus as pre-emptive to re-drawing, naissance, and recursive naissance and, in this way, increase focus on a drawing-centred and drawing-originative narrative. Blind and slow contour drawing techniques were used with charcoal, white conté and erasure as media. Such a narrative starts to turn away from representation or even

expression, to develop focus in a self-reflexive labour that turns back on itself as source material for incremental development of the drawing. The process comprises a continuous flow of irruption that is literally disrupted by erasure and layering, thus creating display that has no precedent in concrete reality, or in mind. Each gesture beyond disruption is layered upon preceding articulations, albeit disturbed articulation. In this way, the student drafter amasses rather than subsumes excess. Even when labour ends, auto-deictic form remains sinuous and unenclosed. In this, it recognises the myth of a single reality, rather perceiving reality as subject to individuated interpretation and as an unknown construct that becomes possible to disclose, rather than as veracity beyond the labour of revealing it. With each drawing act and in each active interchange in drawing, the drafter invents both drawing and reality anew. By contrast, redistribution of form in drawing deliberately *conceals* its processes of labour to achieve final and irrefutable closure in its preoccupation with material reality.

Marlene Steyn. 2008. Untitled. Charcoal, eraser, white conté on paper.



ILLUSTRATION 5

DRAWING AS A GENERATIVE PARTNER: GROUND


In blind contour line drawing, the pathways between the drawing and the drafter are deliberately broken to disturb the drafter's conscious incorporation of the drawing as partner and participant. In the process of revealing itself, the drawing cannot 'talk back' to the drafter, because she ignores it. The drafter does not challenge a drawn phenomenon, a visual fragment, as one proposition to counter it with more propositions, all of which require constant incidences of evaluatory judging and attendant decision-making processes. As a result, the drawing seems to form itself and, only once done, can the drafter read its language, the forming in which she had no conscious hand. The deliberate dismissal of the pathways between drafter and drawing, however, also emphasises their generative role, as well as the emergence of language on the outside.

In this dialectic, the first infinitesimally small removal, withdrawal, or hiatus – as the site of the language of the other – also begins to play and continues to participate as a formative contributor. Blind contour line is at once intimate with and at a distance from the self – once outside, it seems, for a moment, alien. The line appears slowly, and its pace, in conjunction with the physical contact between hand and surface, force the revelation of empty ground as present and as signifying materiality too. As visibility, blindly drawn contour line can shock with its unfamiliar appearance. Therefore, it almost seems to reach out, trying to find a new intimacy in the wide aridity of drawing ground. The impositions of understandability and norm create degrees of disappointment, satisfaction, indifference, respect, or disdain that the drafter can now also 'know' and consciously experience in relation to naissance. This process could develop into drawing ground gaining equal value as line in denotation, as is the case in these series.

The errant ways of slow and blind contour drawing (Betti & Sale. 1979: 56, 150) serve as effective and interesting tools for challenging norm and convention. These techniques make it impossible to pre-determine conclusive form. The unpredictable movement of a 'blind' line over surface, which often slips *off* the drawing surface, dispels any formal or pre-planned compositional intentions. In blind contour drawing, the line roams anywhere, because the drafter does not look at the drawing surface and the paths her hand follows there. A constant struggle to remain on the surface enhances awareness of the drawing ground as a participant in the drawing process. The juxtaposition of blind and slow contour (and gesture in the second series) emphasises a contrast between them that concerns the differences in the ways in which they involve drawing ground. The tensions between line and non-line begin to generate flow in the development of a composition that gradually unfolds in without pre-meditation. This 'tension' emanates from the interaction between paradigmatic encoding (Bryson. 1983: 122) (line or mark that denotes the appearance of 'face') on the one hand, and those areas that constitute 'nothingness' or disappearance (white 'space') on the other hand. Line and nothingness, face and space, bounce off each other to disclose signification and new form, albeit in an unpremeditated way. The gradual appearance of both 'face' and 'space', and their particular positions in relation to each other, orchestrate rather unconventional composition. Composition, therefore, also bows to body-mind inscription rather than to formula or repetition of style language. The process of doing it also reveals the gradual unfolding of the series. Therefore, the drawing process becomes a generative partner.

Refer also to the text that accompanies Illustration 6.

Series 5.1. Thokozani Mpotsha. 2009. Charcoal on paper. *Self-book*.




Series 5.1. Thokozani Mpotsha. 2009. Charcoal on paper. *Self-book*. (Continued)



Illustration 5. Series 5.2 & 5.3


In the following two series of drawings by Nathan Gates (5.2) and Emma Keet (5.3), spontaneous, unpremeditated incorporation of trait is evident. After doing numerous drawings in the various line-types (**Illustrations 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5.1**) in which the students also become aware of the language of line, they have to apply it. Using blind and slow contour only, they must utilise these line-types to function according to their nature and 'look' in subject matter of their own choice. They may combine only two objects or 'characters' in a narrative or in any form of serial progression. In series 5.2, Nathan Gates very appropriately incorporates his characteristic manner (see **Illustrations 3.1, 3.4, 3.7, 9.1 & 9.3** and their accompanying text), which roughly comprises simplified and schematic figuration in rather diffident, even timid line, with improved confidence in a very interesting narrative on violence. In series 5.3, Emma Keet comments on consumerism. She chooses to use the more fluid slow contour line for the shopping trolley, which acquires an almost ominous presence in relation to the human figures, which she styles as doll-like figures. The continuous slow contour lines in which the shopping trolleys are drawn, suggest the seductive elegance and sophistication of the materialistic culture of shopping and constant acquisition. In contrast, the more static, stylised line in which she draws the human figures suggest their senselessness and powerlessness, triggering the notion that they are in fact the ones that are being consumed. During the preceding line exercises, both students unwittingly discovered their own 'hand' as versatile and flexible tool that can insert surprising meaning into line. Both students successfully started to use line for its connotative value.

Series 5.2. Nathan Gates. 2008. Pen and ink on paper. Untitled.





Series 5.3. Emma Keet. 2008. Pen and ink on paper. *Shopping Trolley.*



Series 5.3. Emma Keet. 2008. Pen and ink on paper. *Shopping Trolley* (continued).

ILLUSTRATION 6

DEVIATION

The strewn legerdemain of enactive marks implies their probable impotence in creating those structures that bring to drawing recognition and various degrees of conciliation with the viewers' vision, or with normative visual schemata. An example would be a coherent application of the understanding of spatial relationships between the formal elements of drawing. More conventions of drawing, such as composition, proportion, foreshortening, perspective, and colour, would provide examples. It would not be wrong to doubt the facility of enactive mark making to reveal coherency in, for example, descriptive or figurative drawing. If the general assumption were that the conception of structured coherency in all the components and elements that usually comprise a drawing could not be possible in a process where the fragmentary, wayward accrual of enactive drawn gesture drives the formative unfolding of the work, it would not be off the mark. After all, we can argue that, were mark making its only purpose, and the unbeseen its only theme, all drawing and all of a drawing would consist only of series of local discoveries, traced in-phase with its labour, yet delimited by the four-sided frame of the drawing paper. Although I do not denounce the possibility of this as a very compelling option, it is important to consider that the form of drawing displays in multiplicity, which, by its very nature, asserts equity in accommodation of drawing form. In practice, flow in mark making struggles to construct formal or formulaic compositional coherency in-phase since the path of the drafter's eye naturally wants to be irregular and unpredictable, its readings splintered between all its paths of movement. Enaction and interaction irrupts from the darkness of the unconscious and of memory forgetting itself. As a result, perception is fragmented and recognition is intermittent, chaotic, rather than comprehensive, rational or consistent with a framework that imposes meta-structure. Bryson asserts that, although a degree of understanding of coherency in compositional structure will emerge during the course of the drawing, it will attain conceptual spectacle and status only (Bryson. 1983: 121).

One could argue that it would be exactly such 'conceptual status' that would also direct it away from the absolute resolution that pre-determined composition impose, because it would not be able to determine conclusive form ahead of its development. Unconsidered

composition that is not 'designed' or 'composed' beforehand, if the drafter allows it to develop in-phase and in relation to the development of other aspects of the drawing, can indeed bring to the work surprise and fluke. It demands courage to allow a convention as structural as composition to disclose itself eventually rather than sooner, if at all, although it is quite possible. The interplay that I perceive between enactive and interactive drawn gesture provides the answer, an answer that resonates in the words of Derrida (1993: 56), "Wherever drawing is consonant with and articulated by a sonorous and temporal wave, its rhythm composes with the invisible".

In this drawing exercise, concurrent revelation of composition is an objective, rather than pre-planned composition. Another objective is to allow enactive invention to reveal the unfolding of the drawing, rather than the meta-structural conventions such as pre-meditated composition or perspective that would represent norm. The overall objective is to deviate from norm. Another exercise that deals with these objectives appears in Illustration 5.

6.1 Marlene Steyn (2008). Self-portrait. Size A1 cartridge. Charcoal, white conté, and eraser on cartridge.




ILLUSTRATION 7

A SOLIPSIST ECCENTRIC: TRAIT UNFOLDS

Unfolding | enfolding

Group 7.1: In numerous drawings (brush and ink) of her own face, the student gradually generates the necessary skill, ideas, and specific drawing language that eventually forms the characterisation for a postgraduate illustration project. Her trait is consistently present, while each portrait is unique, because trait irrupts with resourcefulness and flexibility. In this way, she achieves an enormous range in variation and characterisation that unfold through process. In the work of an older student, the constructive development that is evident in Nathan Gates' work between the line exercises in **Illustrations 3.1, 3.4, 3.7, 9.1 & 9.7** and the series in **Illustration 5.2**, occur more quickly to become more evident from one drawing to the next. As a result, Aletta's accruals are denser and wider, especially from **Illustration 7.2** and beyond. For example, she spontaneously documents wayward thoughts and contemplative moments by indiscriminate insertions of extra, seemingly unrelated words and images (see **7.4 & 7.6**). In **7.4**, the Afrikaans word "Teken" (draw, sign, or signification) suggests not only a conscious awareness of process, but also of ambiguity as it manifests in word and in image. In **7.6**, a definite narrative starts to unfold in the background and in a somewhat dissonantly comic relation to her in the foreground.




7.1 Aletta Dorfling, 2008. Self-portraits. Brush and ink. Sizes vary.



7.2 Aletta Dorfling. 2008. Self-portraits (continued). Brush and ink.

In these self-portraits, the student develops characterisation more. She notates ideas as they occur, even if in a splintered and unpredictable way.

7.3 Aletta Dorfling. 2008.
Self-portraits (continued).
Brush and ink.





7.4 Aletta Dorfling. 2008. Self-portraits. Brush and ink.



7.5 Aletta Dorfling. 2008. Self-portraits (continued). Brush and ink.



7.6 Aletta Dorfling. 2008. Self-portraits (continued). Brush and ink.

ILLUSTRATION 8

SELF-REFLEXIVITY: A TURNING POINT

Varying degrees of advancement and recession of naissance, hiatus, and recursivity are evident in these two series of self-portraits by first year students Marlene Steyn and Brandaan Huigen (2008). Although all traces irrupted in the durational labour of making the drawings, it is especially in Series 8.1 (Marlene Steyn) that the tendency to imitate trait as style language is successfully challenged. The drafter articulated relational referencing and incorporation of preceding mark making and of self as object, but she also maintained constant changeability. Varying degrees of *compliance*, with the field of observation and with former mark irruption, result in recognisability and coherency. *Dissent* from object and from marks resulted in variety, involuntary enaction, and in unprecedented form. *Compromise* between the two adds to both sides. Because of recursive amassment, naissance and hiatus become indistinguishable in terms of their inherent descriptive or signifying value. The drafter assigned all marks equal value, avoiding deliberate erasure of 'mistakes'. As a result, the history of the drawings remained in the drawings to become part of their language.

The second series (8.2) display a degree of comfort that the student found in his manner of drawing. Although the drawings clearly demonstrate levels of skill, pathos, and connotative value, they display less variation and progress in the labour of their execution from first to last drawing when compared with Series 8.1. Because the student engaged less in the dynamics that I describe above, a heightened degree of stasis is apparent in the series.

Series 8.1. 8.1.1. & 8.1.2. Marlene Steyn. Self-portrait. Charcoal on paper. Size A2



8.1.3 & 8.1.4. Marlene Steyn. Self-portrait. Charcoal on paper. Size A2



Series 8.2. 8.2.1 % 8.2.2 Brandaan Huigen. Self-portrait. Charcoal on paper. Size A2



8.2.3 & 8.2.4 Brandaan Huigen. Self-portrait. Charcoal on paper. Size A2



8.2.5 & 8.2.6 Brandaan Huigen. Self-portrait. Charcoal on paper. Size A2




ILLUSTRATION 9

HIATUS: WITHDRAWAL

The idea of hiatus - a withdrawal that contemplates already irrupted trait and the field of observation - engages the drafter in continued naissance, but along an additionally augmentative path. Self-reflexive hiatus orchestrates recursivity - a shift back and forth between drawn gesture (irrupted naissance) and more gesture - thus protracting a 'narrative' of the drawing process itself. As I explain in the thesis, this process also develops into extended conversion recursively to enter a sphere where conversions begin to accumulate. In these early exercises, students combine two types of gestural line techniques, namely mass- and line-gesture. They combine the two line types interchangeably rather than systematically. The student drafters become aware of layered complexities in the 'making' of line, and in its languages of application and interpretation by engaging in technique-centred generativity and responding to the back-chatting nature of line. In this arrangement of drawings by two student drafters, trait displays once again as difference. In the second row (9.2), marginal development between the first and the last drawings is evident, while development is quite distinct in the first row's (9.1) drawings. In both cases, however, the expressive and connotative languages of the drawings in the final rows (9.3 & 9.4) enter a sphere rich with connotative potential.

To understand hiatus as self-reflexive distantiation, as a period during which the drafter draws from personal history and plots solution according to disposition, the differences between the degrees of construction in which each student draws, may enlighten. Nathan, for example, simplifies in schematic shapes: the egg-shaped head strongly outlined, the almond-eyes stuck onto the face. Stacey does not use schema. She integrates facial features, hair, and head as whole. Vertical comparison between the rows reveals more such differences in constructive sophistication, as well as trait as difference.

9.1 Nathan Gates. 2008. Charcoal on paper. Size A5 (each)



9.2 Stacey Doman. 2008. Charcoal on paper. Size A5 (each)

9.3 Nathan Gates. 2008. Charcoal on paper. Size A5 (each) (Continued)



9.4 Stacey Doman. 2008. Charcoal on paper. Size A5 (each) (Continued)



Illustration 10 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FIELD OF OBSERVATION AND DRAWING



Elizabeth Gunter. 2004. Elephant fetus. Charcoal on paper. 70 x 145 cm.
Right: Photographic source material. 10x4 cm.



Elizabeth Gunter. 2005. Baboon fetus. Charcoal on paper. 70 x 145 cm.
Right: Photographic source material. 10x4 cm.

ADDENDUM B

Glossary of key words

A number of key words form coherency in my discussions, although I do not always apply them strictly according to their specific scholarly or knowledge disciplinary conventions. In the hope of preventing confusion or ambiguity, I explain here such words and their specific meanings in the context of this thesis.

Appropriation:

To take possession of, or to internalise, and integrate, for example, information, knowledge, or skill into embodied action, or into one's cognitive apparatus, to the extent that one can apply such knowledge or skill extensively. See also '*derivation*' below.

Autogenous:

My application of the word has particular bearing on individuation in drawing. It suggests processes of gestic conversion that abstract from within, or from a body-mind that allows the pre-conceptual to surface as conceptual. In the sterile language of cognitive science, there is "no room for a truly existing self" (Varela. 1992: 107), which makes for a computational mind alone, rather than interacting phenomenological and computational minds. Autogeny in drawing, to my mind, opposes such a notion and, because the drafter cannot give up a conviction in 'a truly existing self', she bows constantly, in the labour of drawing, to an almost obsessive urge to reveal self. I interpret and apply generally the notions of 'self-origination' and 'auto-origination' to be enfolded in the words 'autogenous' and 'autogeny'. Autogenous mark making implies 'enaction' from within that presents self as 'being', rather than as replication or representation.

Auto-deictic, auto-deixis:

I invent this term in the thesis. The concept relates directly to my subjective understanding of autogeny in drawing (see above). The dialectic that is active autogenously during drawing between a potentially non-existing and existing, or between a hidden and unhidden self, constitutes in drawing, as I perceive it, an irrepressible desire to show self through the *in-phase* labour of drawing in which the involuntary forming of *trait* is

recognised to be *enaction* of body-mind. An experiential, practice based mediatory activity, such as drawing, seeing, or speaking is central to the notion. Without knowing it consciously, the drafter seeks, through idiosyncratic mark making (trait), to resolve a subliminal tension between an ever-elusive self and the possibility of no self at all. In principle, the notion is based in self-specification.

Body-mind / mind-body:

I use these terms interchangeably to replace 'mind' in acknowledgement of the involvement of both body and mind in perception and conceptualisation. It supports a non-dualist and non-representationist approach to understanding perception. I apply the word to denote Mark Johnson's (2007: 117) explanation that also explains the body-mind and non-representationist relationship:

The key to this re-conceiving of mind is to stop treating percepts, concepts, propositions, and thoughts as quasi-objects (mental entities or abstract structures) and to see them instead as patterns of experiential interaction. They are aspects or dimensions or structures of the patterns of organism-environment coupling (or integrated interaction) that constitute experience. The only sense in which they are 'inner' is that my thoughts are mine (and not yours), but they are not mental objects locked up in the theater of the mind, trying desperately to make contact with the outside world. As we will see, thoughts are just modes of interaction and action. They are in and of the world (rather than just being about the world) because they are processes of experience.

See also '*experience*', '*non-dualist*', and '*non-representationist*' below.

Cerebrative, cerebration:

I apply these words as synonymous to generative and generation.

Cognition:

In the context of my discussions, the word also envelops the notion of *embodied action*. In order to convey the intended meaning of the word appropriately, I cite Francisco Varela (1992: 172 – 173) directly,

Cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and these individual sensorimotor capacities

are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context. By using the term action we mean to emphasize once again that sensory and motor processes, perception and action, are fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition. Indeed, the two are not merely contingently linked in individuals; they have also evolved together.

To my mind, such understanding of cognition would hardly sustain a computational mind theory, but would rather be closer to a phenomenological theory of mind that would completely enfold experiential human involvement.

Deictic, deixis:

In my application of the word, I relate it directly to its Greek origin of *deiknynai*, meaning to *show*, rather than *deiktikos*, which would suggest the verbal version of ‘show’, namely, to ‘say’ in a first person voice. I apply its meaning ‘to show’ as ‘*showing in a first person mark*’. I bind these meanings to indicate ‘self’ as that which the drafter shows as trait in drawing. The ‘desire to show self’, as I explain this notion above in relation to ‘autogenous’, ‘auto-deictic’, and ‘cognition’, or embodied action, obviously relates. I intend the origin of ‘deictic’ (that it has in common with the word ‘token’ (*deiknynai*)), to bear significant meaning as underlying interactive logic that draws together those discussions around ‘token visual schemata’ and ‘auto-deixis’ in the thesis.

Derivative:

In my applications of the concept as it relates to drawing, its meaning suggests a direct and conscious transcription or transposition of existing drawn or visual forms into current drawing practice. I *contrast* this conceptually to ‘appropriation’ that implies, to my mind, ‘taking possession’ to integrate or embed on an unconscious rather than conscious or mnemonic level. Derivation in drawing implies a removal that replicates, rather than presents autogeny directly. Derivative form would not constitute new form. See also ‘*appropriation*’ above.

Dialectic:

Generally, I adhere to the Hegelian framework that the Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy (2005: 158) asserts,

Hegel used the term dialectic to designate a process, which brings forth an opposition, between a thesis and an antithesis, which has within it an urge to be

resolved by a synthesis, a combination in which the conflicting elements are preserved and somehow reconciled. One example is the opposition between being and not being, overcome in its synthesis, becoming. Every synthesis will in turn bring forth a new opposite, and so on.

I connect this notion with the notions 'amassment' and 'recursiveness' or 'recursivity' in the drawing process. To clarify further, I cite from the same source the notion that, "The resolutions were conceived both as thought-processes in which two contrary concepts are absorbed into a new concept" (PDOF. 2005: 158), which has bearing on the concept of new form in drawing.

I apply the word to imply the opposition that exists between self-as non-existent and self-as-being, an opposition that, to my mind, brings forth drawing trait as synthesis in drawing. This opposition realises in more opposition, such as that between marking and unmarking, and so on. In my constructs that pertain to the drawing process and its pathways and passages of recursive and discursive interchange, self is always present, it 'takes side' or occupies position, in oppositional positing, and the syntheses always imply self-reflexivity, or visible presence of self in drawing, which constitutes trait. The oppositional positing that I envisage in such dialectic could be between contradictory or conflictive stances, such as between presence and absence, or between appearance and disappearance, construction and destruction, and so on. It could also be between propositional stances, as would be the case in clauses such as 'what if', 'imagine if', or 'suppose that', which would propose, rather than enclose.

Difference:

I apply the word to suggest its general meaning as something displaying "characteristics that distinguishes it from another" (*Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*. 1979: 315) (Henceforth indicated as WNCD).

Discursive interchange:

Rather than literally implying speech, or conversations, that the self conducts on a conscious level, discursive interchange, in the context of the thesis, suggests complicity between infraconscious and infralinguistic schemata of the habitus to structure meaning. In drawing, the structures of language also play a role in the creation and communication

of meaning, and the 'grafting' between the visible and the verbal occur on an unconscious level too.

Diversity:

Diversity denotes variability in identity – i.e. difference; variations in the mode in which identity is maintained; differing from one another having various forms or qualities.

Doxic modality:

'Doxa' in Greek means 'belief' and I apply 'doxic modality' (in gestic conversion) as implicit of and influenced by beliefs that are entrenched in the unconscious self to the extent that the drafter is hardly aware of them on a conscious level. 'Beliefs', to my mind, do not necessarily pertain to 'truth'. I perceive doxic modality as different from conscious modality or from conscious, representable, or representational knowledge that one would for example draw from memory (See *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*. 2008: 105). I also distinguish such knowledge from 'truth'.

Drafter:

A drafter is a person who draws. I apply this word consistently to avoid gender specific discrimination, and to avoid the awkwardness of the neutral but lengthy 'draftsperson'.

Drafteric:

I apply the word to denote drawing related aspect, something regarding, or with reference to drawing.

Drawn gesture:

I apply this phrase specifically to distinguish trait from 'gesture' as non-irrupted or pre-irrupted, physical gesticulation, and from the technical application in drawing of the word 'gesture' as line 'type', suggesting 'gestural line'. 'Drawn gesture' indicates specifically the line, trace, or stroke that irrupts from gestic conversion and enaction, which could be any type of line in drawing, such as for example, 'gesture', 'contour', 'organisational', 'lyrical', 'structural', 'implied', 'constricted', 'blurred', 'aggressive', 'mechanical', 'dumb', or 'eloquent' line.

Durational:

See 'in-phase' in this glossary.

Experience:

In the thesis, I usually intend the word to mean, "The [durational] state of being engaged in an activity" (WNCD. 1979: 399), unless otherwise explained in a footnote.

Enaction:

Since I consistently intend the word as Francisco Varela (1992: 173) explains it, I cite him directly:

The enactionist approach consists of two points: (1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided.

Facilitation, facilitator:

These terms replace 'teaching' and 'teacher' in the educational system known as 'Outcomes Based Education' (adopted in South Africa as educational principle/framework). The difference between the two 'sets' of terminologies constitutes the difference between imparting with knowledge, on the one hand, and mediating learner-centred knowledge generation on the other hand.

Gestic:

I intend the word to mean 'the gestural' as generic or collective. According to the *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (1979: 478) the word denotes "relating to or consisting of bodily movements or gestures".

Grapheme:

I apply the word to mean, in a drafteric context, a unit of a drawing or a drawn line that is made up of any number of such units characterising the line or drawing with relatively ordered or chaotic diversity in form. WNCD explains 'grapheme' as "a unit of a writing system" (1979: 497).

Hiatus:

I apply the word in a way that is particular to the context of the thesis. In auto-deictic drawing, 'hiatus' implies a passage from the unconscious to the conscious without discernable pause or break in continuity. Although the hand might or might not be absent from the drawing surface during hiatus, mind-body remains present to sustain continuity, hence its inference of 'presence *in absentia*', or 'visible absence', which, in this thesis, are both perfectly intentional contradictions in terms.

Individuation, individuate:

I apply these words consistently to suggest the developmental dynamics and generative modes in which a drafter unconsciously maintains identity in drawing and which defines difference between the drawings of two or more drafters.

Interaction, interactivity:

I intend the meaning of 'interaction' as it is explained in WNCD (1979: 596), namely as "a mutual or reciprocal action or influence", but I reserve preference for the concept of *mutuality* implicit to the notion, rather than that of *reciprocity* for reasons that should become clear in the thesis. I position past and current interactivity **between** self and socio-cultural environment as influential on the irruption of trait or drawn gesture in the drawing by such self, while I position enaction **as** body-mind irruption of drawing-specific trait or drawn gesture. Interaction holds a dual action or sphere of functionality, namely one as activity in the unconscious body-mind, and one as activity in the conscious body-mind.

In-phase:

This phrase refers to *durational* doing and production in drawing, meaning the drafter produces as she practices and that her production is *concurrent* with practice, they occur *simultaneously* and for the *duration* of making a drawing. The phrase suggests *temporality, time, and durationality* in relation to the labour of drawing, as well as the experience of drawing.

Irruption:

I apply the word consistently in relation to mark making in drawing. I intend the word to imply the unpremeditated coming into being of individuation in mark, which, as the thesis finds, appears on paper without having any visible precedent, neither in the drafter's mind, nor in objective structures – in other words, 'blindly'. Both the *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (1979: 607) and the *Oxford Dictionary of English* (2005: 916) explain the word as denoting an action of 'breaking into', or making a sudden, abrupt entry.

Labour of drawing:

I borrow the phrase from Norman Bryson (1983: 141) and I apply it variously and generally to include trace-creation, stroking, mark making, as well as enactionist and durational irruption, and gestic conversion. I specifically intend the phrase to include or imply those cerebrate processes of practice that enable what Bryson calls "*transformation through labour*". By extension, such transformation or conversion also implies, to my mind, *deviation* from the norms of style language, if interaction and enaction are immanent in such drawing practice.

Mediation, mediator:

In an outcomes-based educational system (OBE), these terms replace 'teaching' and 'teacher'. The inference is that, while a teacher imparts knowledge gleaned from 'objective structures', a mediator facilitates student-centred learning. Also, see 'facilitation' above.

Mimesis:

In this thesis, my application of the word implies 'imitation'. Like Derrida (1993: 45), I believe that in drawing cannot be mimetic, since it has nothing to imitate. It irrupts in the process of its making, and does not exist before its irruption in any form, not even as 'mind-print' or idea-picture.

Modality:

By this term I mean "a particular form of sensory perception" (*Oxford Dictionary of English*. 2005: 1128) (Henceforth indicated as ODE) that, in drawing, would *inhere* habitus as enactionist and interactionist in mark making, thereby assigning meaning to the

mark as originative from fused realms of thought and physicality, each mark constituting gestic conversion inclusive of its hypotheses of sight.

Mutuality:

I apply this word to refer to Merleau-Ponty's (1968: 131, 227-228) (Evans. 2008: 188) concept of reversibility in perception. He often uses 'flesh', 'chiasm', and 'reversibility' as synonyms. Also, see '*Reversibility*' and '*Reflexivity*' below.

Naissance, naissant:

"To issue from", particularly recalling its Latin root *nasci*, meaning, "to be born", and inclusive of the meaning that its close relative, 'nascent', imparts, namely a process just "coming into being and beginning to display signs of future potential" (ODE. 2005: 1166, 1170).

Non-dualist:

The word refers to the belief that dualisms such as for example mind-over-body, form and content, concepts and intuitions, being and becoming (Blackburn. 2008: 104), and object and subject are misconceptions. Blackburn states that there are many "philosophers who insist that the way forward is to transcend these dualisms". The belief challenges the notion that physicality and non-physicality, for example, are "two radically different kinds of properties belonging to the same brain or human being" (Mautner.2005: 170). See also '*body-mind*' above.

Non-representationist:

Varela (1992: 173) explains a non-representationist approach as follows:

The reference point for understanding perception is no longer a pre-given, perceiver independent world, but rather the sensorimotor structure of the perceiver (the way in which the nervous system links sensory and motor surfaces).

I apply the word to denote such meaning. In other words, perception does not recover pre-given properties from the world; rather, it enacts the perceiver's understanding of the world. The drafter is the locus of her perception and her conception or syntheses of that world.

Moreover, the habitus, functioning as a forceful coordination of dispositions during practices, could initiate a progression of actions towards accomplishing a goal (such as amassing and assembling marks to create a drawn image) without the brain in any way representing those actions or the ultimate goal in advance of accomplishing it. Autobiographical drawing marks do not exist in the mind, or in the outer world, until their making or their irruption on paper.

Ontology:

The *Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy* (2005: 442) defines 'ontology' as "inquiry into, or theory of, being qua being", in other words, being in the capacity or character of being. See also 'qua'.

Punctum caecum:

Latin: *blind spot*. It refers to the very point between looking from the inside out – a view from within, towards the outside – or to the instantaneousness of perception, the point where sensory experience meets the world. Merleau-Ponty (1968: 247-248), explains that this 'blind point' exists between every visibility and invisibility. It constitutes "a ground which is not visible in the sense the figure is" and "... is born in silence under the Gaze ... hence, if one means by visible the objective quale, it is in this sense not visible, but *Unverborgen*". In other words, it relates to perceptual awareness – when self is not literally seen by self, but is unhidden from self – when one is aware that 'I' knows about her own existence. Once again, I cite Derrida in this regard, "... of that which, seeing itself see, is nevertheless not reflected, cannot be 'thought' in the specular or speculative mode – and thus is blinded because of this, blinded at this point ... at the very point where it sees itself looking" (1993: 53).

Qua:

"(Latin, insofar as, or in the capacity of). Commonly needed in philosophy to distinguish the powers or operation of one thing under one aspect as opposed to those under another" (ODP 2008: 301). To my mind, being *in the capacity of* being strangely denotes being *being* being, as in 'existence *is* being', 'existence *being* existence', or 'being *is* existence'.

Recursive, recursivity:

I intend the meaning that Simon Blackburn offers: “a procedure that is applied once, and then applied to the result of that application”, (2008: 309). In the thesis, I associate the same meaning with the word ‘amassment’. In contrast to ‘stratification’, which would relate the rigidity of layered ‘strata’, I intend the fluctuation, fluidity, and flexibility associated with amassment and recursivity.

Responsiveness:

Invariably in this thesis, I intend the word to refer to the meaning Ian Moll (2004: 3) formulates as “If someone or something is responsive, he, she, or it is responsive to some state of affairs by doing something: X is responsive to Y by doing Z”. The emphasis is on response that constitutes a form of action (doing).

Reversibility:

In this thesis, the term specifically refers to the notion of perceptual experience bending back on itself. In *The Visible and the Invisible* (1968: 254-257), Merleau-Ponty provides a primary example of reversibility. In the sensory experiences of touching and being touched, reversibility constitutes the interactivity (or interplay) between the two experiences. Such interactivity constitutes a continuous experience in which the sensation of being touched turns around upon itself to turn into the experience of touching, and vice versa. Both sensations unfurl in the same body-mind. He states, “reversibility is the idea that every perception is doubled with a counter-perception ... [touching] is an act with two faces, one that no longer knows who speaks and who listens” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 264-265). He relates the same phenomenon to more sensory experiences:

There is vision, touch, when a certain visible, a certain tangible, *turns back upon* the whole of the visible, the whole of the tangible, of which it is a part, or when suddenly it finds itself surrounded by them, and through their commerce [interactivity], is formed a Visibility, a Tangible in itself (1968: 139).

In this way, he explains reversibility as “perception forms itself in the things themselves” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 264-265). He consigns the word ‘flesh’ to the same concept, and explains it further as “a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being” (Merleau-Ponty. 1968: 139 – 140). In other words, it brings personalised style and individuation to practices (and to their practitioners).

In other words, it may be better to explain ‘reversibility’ as the perceptual experience that articulates the *pivot* on which turns the ordinary and familiar experiencing or sensing of an inner versus an outer, an exterior existence versus an interior existence, or a sense of self versus a sense of other.

Reflexivity:

WNCD (1979: 964) explains the word as the concept of being “directed or turned back on itself”, and “relating to, characterised by, or being a relation that exists between an entity and itself”. Where reversibility indicates such relation between self and other, or between subjective and objective structures, reflexivity denotes pivoting (a hinging) between a being and itself, between subject and habitus, or self and perception. However, the concept of *habitus*, as perception in humans, does not exclude such a relation between subject and objective structures (reversibility).

As I explain in the Introduction of the thesis, the word denotes the concept that perception turns back on itself, as it would, for example, in perceiving the self, in self-awareness, or in gaining knowledge of self-as-being. Perceptual experiencing carries with it the information regarding knowledge of self and its existence – the locus of self. Essentially, such locus refers back to itself in understanding of self. While habitus is central in constructing the self, it also grasps those formations that constitute its existence and its development recursively and reflexively. Also, see ‘reversibility’ above.

Token schemata:

Like ‘deictic’, ‘token’ has its origin in *deiknynai*, meaning to show (please see above). ‘Token’ suggests “an outward sign or expression”; a “symbol”; a “distinguishing feature”; “a small part representing a whole” (WNCD. 1979: 1218). In ‘token schemata,’ I intend all these meanings as they relate to drawing marks that emanate from a ‘graft’ between shared visual schemata and subjectively formed visual schemata. They are newly formulated enactions that the drafter sacrifices to visibility. These sacrifices are gifts from the self or from what could be nothing (the whole of self) until ‘becoming’. They reveal as drawing marks (small parts of a possible whole that, in the case of drawing, constitutes nothingness that becomes being), another contradiction in terms that is intentional and apt.

Trace:

I invariably apply this term to refer to drawing marks in general, rather than to specify individuated drawing. As 'trait' (see below), trace could denote line, stroke, or mark. Although drawing trace can include trait, I do not intend 'trace' to denote trait to the exclusion of other marks (See 'drawn gesture' above).

Trait:

The word refers in particular to idiosyncratic elements of style or style language in drawing, particularly but not exclusively immanent in trace. The drafter could employ untraced, unmarked, or empty areas in idiosyncratic ways, which would also imply trait (as I perceive it). In this thesis, the word 'trait' refers exclusively to idiosyncrasies in drawing, not ever to idiosyncrasies of person or personality. Contrary to Derrida, I do not apply the word to imply a variety of meanings "from a trait or feature to a line, stroke, or mark" (Derrida. 1993: 2. Translator's footnote) (See also 'trace' and 'drawn gesture' above).