


THE SEMANTIC FIELD "SALVATION" IN PAUL'S MAJOR EPISTLES:  
A COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS OF HIS SOTERIOLOGICAL METAPHORS.

by

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*To: My late father,  
and my mother;*

*Ingrid,  
André, Jacques and Louis.*

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The birth of a baby is usually a joyful event. It fills the hearts of the parents with deep-felt gratitude. It is an experience, no doubt, in which the love and the assistance of others play such an important role. The expertise of the doctors and midwives, the support of one's family, the kindness and aid of one's environment (even during the time of pregnancy), create the setting for a happy delivery.

No wonder, then, that my heart is also filled with gratitude at the birth of this child of my investigation. It is an event that would never have materialised without the active involvement of a score of other parties.

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growth in my theological understanding. (By presenting this dissertation in English - which is, of course, my second language - I therefore also want to acknowledge my indebtedness to the church in Malaŵi.)

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was the one to polish my English.

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and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. SOLI DEO GLORIA.

### FORMAL SPECIFICATIONS.

The Harvard reference system has been implemented consistently in this thesis. Killian's guide for the use of this system - *Form and style in theological texts* (1985) - was a constant companion in this connection. Following her advice, the use of footnotes (or endnotes) has also been restricted to an absolute minimum. That is to say, if a piece of information was deemed necessary for the substantiation of an argument, it was incorporated into the text itself, rather than being added in an endnote.

In references within brackets, and in the list of works that were consulted, a variety of *abbreviations* have been employed. The following key to those abbreviations is therefore required:

#### Biblical books:

Gn; Ex; Lv; Nm; Dt; Jos; Jdg; Ruth; 1 Sm; 2 Sm; 1 Ki; 2 Ki; 1 Chr; 2 Chr; Ezr; Neh; Es; Job; Ps; Pr; Ec; Can; Is; Jr; Lm; Ezk; Dn; Hs; Jl; Am; Ob; Jnh; Mi; Nah; Hab; Zph; Hg; Zch; Ml.

Mt; Mk; Lk; Jn; Ac; Rm; 1 Cor; 2 Cor; Gl; Eph; Phlp; Col; 1 Th; 2 Th; 1 Tm; 2 Tm; Tt; Phlm; Heb; Ja; 1 Pt; 2 Pt; 1 Jn; 2 Jn; 3 Jn; Jude; Rv.

#### Translations of the Bible:

AV	- Authorised Version
GNB	- Good News Bible (Today's English Version)
JB	- Jerusalem Bible
KJV	- King James' Version
LB	- Living Bible (paraphrase)
NAB	- New Afrikaans Bible (Nuwe Afrikaanse Bybel)
NAmB	- New American Bible
NASB	- New American Standard Bible
NEB	- New English Bible
NIV	- New International Version

- RSV - Revised Standard Version  
 RV - Revised Version

Modern publications:

- BDF - Blass, Debrunner & Funk (cf bibliography)  
 BiTr - Bible Translator  
 BJRL - Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester 1903ff  
 BNTC - Black's New Testament Commentaries, London 1957ff  
 BTB - Biblical Theology Bulletin  
 BZNW - Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche  
 Wissenschaft, Berlin, 1896ff  
 CNT - Commentaar op het Nieuwe Testament, Kampen 1954ff  
 EKK - Evangelisch-Katolischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament  
 ET - Expository Times  
 EvTh - Evangelische Theologie  
 Helps - Helps for translators  
 HThK - Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament,  
 Freiburg in Breisgau, 1953ff  
 ICC - International Critical Commentary  
 Interp. - Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology  
 JBL - Journal of Biblical Literature  
 JSNT - Journal for the Study of the New Testament  
 JTS - Journal of Theological Studies  
 JThSA - Journal of Theology for Southern Africa  
 KEK - Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neuen Testament,  
 begr von H A W Meyer, Göttingen 1832ff  
 KuD - Kerygma und Dogma, Göttingen 1955ff  
 MTS - Marburger Theologische Studien, Marburg 1931, NF 1963ff  
 NBC(rev) - The New Bible Commentary Revised, ed by D Guthrie &  
 J A Motyer, London 1970  
 NBD - The New Bible Dictionary, ed J D Douglas, London 1962  
 NGTT - Nederduits Gereformeerde Teologiese Tydskrif  
 NIC - The New International Commentary on the New Testament,  
 Grand Rapids 1951ff  
 NICOT - The New International Commentary on the Old Testament  
 NIDNTT - The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology

- NIGTC - The New International Greek Testament Commentary
- NTD - Das Neue Testament Deutsch... Neues Göttinger Bibelwerk, Göttingen 1932ff
- NTS - New Testament Studies
- PNT - De Prediking van het Nieuwe Testament, Nijkerk
- POT - De Prediking van het Oude Testament, Nijkerk
- SBT - Studies in Biblical Theology, London I 1950ff; II 1967ff
- SNTSMS - Society of New Testament Studies Monograph Series, Cambridge 1965ff
- TDNT - Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed by G Kittel & G Friedrich; Eng tr by G W Bromiley, Grand Rapids London 1964ff
- TDNTa - Abbreviation of TDNT by G W Bromiley
- Thev - Theologia Evangelica
- ThLZ - Theologische Literaturzeitung
- THNT - Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament, herausg van E Fascher
- TNTC - Tyndale New Testament Commentaries, London-Leicester 1960ff
- TTh - Tijdschrift voor Theologie
- UMI - University Microfilms International
- UTB - Uni-Taschenbücher, Basel *et al*
- ZNW - Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
- ZThK - Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche

General:

- c - colon
- cs - colons
- HSRC - Human Sciences Research Council
- NTSSA - New Testament Society of South Africa
- RGN - Raad vir Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing
- UBS - United Bible Societies
- UNISA - University of South Africa
- vs - verse
- vss - verses
- § - paragraph
- = - is equal to

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1.

SECTION A.

GAINING ENTRANCE TO THE BIBLE.

CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION.

Here I arrive with my flute, a bit late. I know that someone may have played my tune before me. If this has happened, I am delighted. I have a friend with whom to play a duet. There is another possibility, however, that my music might sound strange. Indeed, this is something to be expected: my inspiration came from reconciliation songs from other parts of the world. But I know that this will not be a problem, if we have a taste for the polyphony of life: there is always room for a new variation, provided that the dream of reconciliation continues to sound, as an unfaltering *cantus firmus*...

(Alves 1984:240)

The semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles is the subject of this study. No doubt many people will feel that this is such a worn-out topic that one can hardly say anything new; and surely it is true that salvation has been the subject of numerous studies in the various disciplines of Theology. Not only in the field of Biblical studies (Old and New Testament), but also in Systematic Theology (Dogmatics) this topic has been scrutinised from so many different angles. Indeed, '...someone may have played my tune before me.'

Yet this study is undertaken under the conviction that there is still room for a new variation on this same old theme. Behind this conviction there lie, of course, a number of motivations. Let us then, first of all, have a look at these motivations.

1.1 The need for a study of this kind:

The conviction that a study of this kind ought to be undertaken,

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was born out of the convergence of three principal motivations, namely:

- The desire to re-establish the true semantic value of the various terms involved;
- The awareness that the application of some valuable new insights gained from Semantics and Semiotics may produce a rather different picture of this field;
- The fresh breeze blowing through this whole field by looking at it from a metaphorical point of view.

### 1.1.1 Words can lose their true semantic value:

When we deal with salvation, we are obviously concerning ourselves with one of the most central issues of the Christian faith. This is, in a certain sense, what the Christian faith is all about. The faith in Jesus Christ as the *Saviour* of the world lies very close to the core of Christianity.

Though it might sound strange, this very fact may contribute towards an erosion of the semantic value of the different terms involved. Through frequent and repeated use, these terms and the expressions in which they function, may very easily become clichés, devoid of clear semantic distinction. They may become part of the theological 'jargon', which we use without really communicating meaningfully.

Baudler (1982:70) defines a cliché as an expression '*...das einmal ein bedeutungsvolles Symbol war, nun aber vom Menschen, der mit ihm umgeht, nicht mehr in seinem ursprünglichen Bedeutungskern verstanden und empfunden werden kann, sondern nur einen routinhaften, blinden, ritualistischen Umgang ermöglicht.*' In the same line Silva (1983:160) also points out that clichés '*...are generally considered stylistically weak (they carry less "information" or "mean" less) precisely because they are frequent and relatively predictable.*' So too, Lyons (1968:89) suggested that '*...the more predictable a unit, the less meaning it has.*'

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If it could therefore be demonstrated that the various terms and expressions pertaining to salvation are in the process of becoming clichés, there would be a real need to try and re-establish their original semantic value, so that they may once again be understood and experienced as vividly as before.

Frankly, there seems to be ample evidence in support of the thesis that this process of 'jargonisation' has already been allowed to develop to a point where it may be regarded as a real and serious hindrance to proper communication within the church. We have become so 'familiarised' with this area of meaning, that it can no longer produce the same striking effect that it would doubtlessly have exerted in its original context.

Unfortunately it has to be stated that Theology itself (and in particular Systematic Theology) has played no minor role in facilitating this process. Because of its tendency towards fixation, a particular understanding of the issues in question may very easily become 'canonised' within the tradition, and thus the flexibility and vitality of the original may be totally obscured (cf Degenaar 1970: 308). The firmer the dogma, the more acute the danger of it becoming a meaningless cliché, which will in the end be repeated by rote, in an almost ritualistic way, not being capable of touching the heart. Then the stage is reached of which Alves (1984:246) is complaining when he says: 'But a new explanation is possible: that our love for the right doctrine creates a closed symbolic universe, where there is no room for those who like to play a "variation". Polyphony becomes mono/tony.'

This study was therefore, in the first place, motivated by the realisation of the dire need to 'revitalise' the church's channels of communication concerning salvation. Perhaps it is a little presumptuous to think that one can still come up with something new in this respect. Yet there seems to be reason enough to believe that there is indeed still another angle from which one can approach this centre of the Christian faith; an angle, I believe, which has not been awarded due attention before. The following two motivations, underlying the conviction that there is a need for this study to be under-

taken, concern more specifically the particular angle from which the whole issue will be approached.

### 1.1.2 The effect of some new insights gained from Semantics and Semiotics:

When we start talking about a study in connection with salvation, most people would probably think in terms of a study relating to such Greek terms as *σῶζω* and *σωτηρία* together with their cognates. That would, of course, be the traditional approach to the topic under consideration.

However, since the appearance of De Saussure's *Course in general linguistics* (originally in French), there has developed an ever-increasing and growing consensus that the semantic value of a particular lexical unit ought to be determined in relational terms. As it was stated by De Saussure himself (1959:114): 'Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results from the simultaneous presence of the others, ....' Later on this idea was elaborated and implemented by Jost Trier, among others. In his study concerning German words for cognition, Trier (1973:3ff) took the following stand: 'Die Bedeutung des Einzelwortes ist abhängig von der Bedeutung seiner begrifflichen Nachbarn.' A little further on he comes to a rather challenging conclusion, namely that,

Das Wortzeichenfeld als Ganzes muss gegenwärtig sein, wenn das einzelne Wortzeichen verstanden werden soll, und es wird verstanden im Masse der Gegenwärtigkeit des Feldes. Es 'bedeutet' nur in diesem Ganzen und kraft dieses Ganzen. Ausserhalb eines Feldganzen kann es ein Bedeuten überhaupt nicht geben.

This kind of approach (to which we shall pay more detailed attention in the following chapter) was for a long time more or less ignored by theological scholars in their study of the vocabulary of the Bible. It was only at the beginning of the 1960's that James Barr voiced his very sharp criticism of the theologians' failure to relate their work to the semantic methods of general linguistics. His book, *The semantics of Biblical language*, inaugurated a new era (Vorster 1979:xv). Subsequently it became impossible to enter the

field of lexical studies related to the Bible without taking cognisance of Barr's views.

Although the idea of the 'semantic field' is only touched upon in Barr's book mentioned above, it is presupposed throughout his work on the Biblical words for time, which followed suit (1962) (cf Tangberg 1973:303). Subsequently, quite a number of other Biblical scholars also made use of the 'semantic field' approach, notably the following: Burrell (1970); Sawyer (1972); Erickson (1980), Silva (1980); Poythress (1981).

In addition there is also a *Greek-English lexicon of the New Testament based on semantic domains* forthcoming (ed by Louw & Nida). It will be working with the same principle of 'semantic fields' or 'semantic domains' (cf Louw 1979b:108-117; also Nida, Louw & Smith 1977:139-67). In this case the idea of the 'semantic domain' is closely associated with the method which is usually described as 'componential analysis of meaning'. According to this view, 'A semantic domain consists essentially of a group of meanings (by no means restricted to those reflected in single words) which share certain semantic components.' (Nida 1975b:174). While sharing some 'common components', the units within a particular semantic domain are at the same time distinguished from one another by certain 'diagnostic components' (cf Nida 1975b:32-9). Beekman and Callow (1974:77) prefer to call the latter 'specifying components'.

When taking into consideration all the possibilities opened up by this new approach to lexical studies, it seems quite obvious that they leave a wide open space for yet another study concerning salvation. Notwithstanding the fact that more than twenty years have gone by since the publication of Barr's epoch making book, and even though a number of scholars have tried their hand in this field, it still remains a novelty; only the surface has been scratched thus far.

In the South African theological context fairly little has been done in this field - with the obvious exception of Louw's contribution to the new lexicon mentioned above. There is another lexical

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study, of course, in which the application of sound semantic principles was taken seriously, namely the study by Vorster (1979) on *αἰσχύνομαι* and its cognates in the New Testament. For one thing, the 'componential analysis' method was applied in a well-founded and responsible way. It is, however, rather surprising that he does not take advantage of the possibilities provided by the idea of the 'semantic field', even though he acknowledges the existence of such possibilities. He says:

Die fokus word in die lig van die talle probleme wat opduik rondom die betekenisveld van *αἰσχύνομαι* en stamverwante terme in die Nuwe Testament in die literatuur wat hieroor handel, op die betekenisveld en nie op die semantiese domeine gerig nie. Laasgenoemde aspek kom slegs sydelings ter sprake.

(Vorster 1979:13-14)

In so doing, he is, to a certain extent, failing to escape the danger of 'atomism' (cf Erickson 1980:112; also Vorster 1971:145). Even though he takes as his point of departure the Saussurean principle that any language (including the Greek of the New Testament) forms a coherent and well structured system, even on the semantic level (cf 1979:11), he fails to honour this principle by isolating one element from the system, thus extracting it from the surrounding structure within which it can really find relief.

This is exactly the need the present study would like to fulfil, namely to demonstrate the value of a structural approach in which the related meanings of different lexical items, rather than the different meanings of a single unit, are brought into focus.

### 1.1.3 Seeing salvation in terms of metaphor:

A third contributing factor towards the development of the conviction that this study about salvation is necessary, is to be found in the realisation that the Bible (including the apostle Paul) is actually using metaphors to communicate the good news concerning God's saving acts in Jesus Christ. Without going into too much detail at this point (in chapter 3 of this section we shall come back to the interpretation of metaphor), some of the incentives leading to this con-

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clusion may be briefly stated.

The following statement by Theissen (1974:282) may serve as a point of departure:

Soteriologie ist Rede von Erlösung, Verkündigung einer Wende vom Unheil zum Heil. Paulus verkündigt diese Wende mit Bildern, die er dem vertrauten Leben entnimmt, um sie auf einen Prozess zu übertragen, der dies vertraute Leben radikal umformen soll: Er entnimmt dem menschlichen Leben Bilder der Befreiung, Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, des Gestaltwandels, des Lebens und Todes und der Vereinigung. Und diese Bilder überträgt er auf das Heilsgeschehen. Seine Soteriologie ist somit metaphorisch. Sie ist es in einem grundsätzlichen Sinne; denn sie widersetzt sich jeder Überführung in nicht-metaphorische Rede. Weder wird das Heil unabhängig von übertragenen Bildern beschrieben, noch sind diese Bilder zu Begriffen verblasst, aus denen Reflexion und Gebrauch allen metaphorischen Sinngehalt vertrieben haben.

If this statement is correct - as I believe it to be - it would involve some very important implications with regard to our understanding of this whole field. A metaphor is notably susceptible to misunderstanding by being taken as a literal statement. This is in fact due to the very character of metaphorical language. Fawcett (1970:52) draws attention to this fact when he says:

The metaphor appears to declare not merely a likeness but an identity, and in this lies both the strength and the weakness of metaphorical language. The weakness of metaphor, or the danger that lurks within it, results from the hiddenness of the analogy and the possibility that the comparison will be taken literally.

Unfortunately this is exactly what seems to have happened with the salvation terminology. It is likely that they were originally meant as a form of recommendation: 'Try and think of it like this, then perhaps you will understand.' (Gorringe 1983:8). Thus these metaphors really served as a powerful tool for the communication of the message in that original setting. However, as the gap, separating us from the original cultural setting, grew wider and wider, it became more and more difficult to appreciate the full force with which these images must have struck the people in the time of Paul.

When metaphors are considered within a cultural situation to which they did not originally belong, misunderstanding is likely. The clear analogical character of the metaphor which was

apparent to the original hearers may no longer be apparent to a later age.

(Fawcett 1970:52)

Eventually this whole process results in the position where these metaphors are no longer treated as metaphors; they are 'reified'; they are regarded '...as referring to a historical objectifiable transaction.' (Gorringe 1983:10). Thus they become 'dead metaphors'. Caird (1980:152) describes this process in the following words:

Not all metaphors, however, are living metaphors. When a creative mind has observed a fresh and illuminating affinity and captured it in a metaphor, more passive minds will repeat it until it becomes a stock metaphor. Through constant use it then becomes a faded or worn metaphor, and finally a dead one. This last stage has arrived when speaker and hearer are unaware of the duality of vehicle and tenor, and treat the word as a new literalism.

It is, however, one of the conditions determining the usefulness of metaphors that they *remain* metaphors (Gorringe 1983:9). A failure to observe this rule will therefore inevitably lead to confusion, as has already happened, (and is indeed still happening) with regard to the spectrum of metaphors employed by Paul (and other Biblical authors) in order to describe salvation.

Given this state of affairs, there can hardly be any doubt as to the sensibility of yet another study in this field. There is, in my opinion, a very urgent need for these 'dead metaphors' to be revived. Somehow they need to come to life again, so as to enable the church to communicate the message of salvation meaningfully *and vividly*.

Part of the task this study is setting out to accomplish, is therefore the revivification or revitalisation of Paul's soteriological metaphors. In order to reach this goal, it will at least be necessary to uncover the original cultural contexts within which these metaphors were meaningful and functional. This is what Caird (1980:153) has in mind when he says: 'Terms such as justification and redemption, for example, have become technical terms of a theological jargon, but may be revitalised by recalling their original setting in law court and slavery.'

This aim, it seems, can in any case be achieved in close conjunction with the semantic approach envisaged above. According to Kittay and Lehrer (1981), the linguistic notion of the semantic field can serve as a very useful and appropriate tool in the interpretation of metaphor. Certainly the combination of these two vantage points ought to produce a picture of Paul's view on salvation that will be rather new, and even quite different from the one to which we are so accustomed.

### 1.2 Gerd Theissen and the soteriological metaphors of Paul:

Of course the idea to undertake this study did not just fall from the air. In the previous pages it has already been indicated how certain observations concerning the issue in question gradually gave rise to the conviction that a study of this kind is called for.

However, in a discussion of the various motivations behind this study, it seems necessary to single out one particularly strong influence - the one that came from a study by Gerd Theissen. In 1974 he published an article in *Kerygma und Dogma* under the title: 'Soteriologische Symbolik in den paulinischen Schriften: Ein strukturalistischer Beitrag.' This article has certainly exercised a rather profound influence on the present study. To a certain extent the present study is simply drawing out the consequences contained in that article.

To start with, it should be noted that Theissen's article also combines the two elements I should like to see combined in the present study (as indicated above). On the one hand, Theissen is also stressing the metaphorical (or symbolical) character of Paul's language pertaining to salvation. (Even though he uses the term 'symbol' rather than metaphor, he does state explicitly that he has in mind what would more generally be called 'metaphor' - cf p282, footnote 2.) On the other hand, he is also employing a 'structuralist' method, issuing into a 'map' of the 'structure' of the particular 'field' under discussion. (On pp 301-4 he comes to a synthesis

of his results by drawing up 'die Feldstruktur soteriologischer Symbolik'.)

This study is indebted to Theissen, however, not only as far as the grand structure is concerned, but also with regard to some points of detail. For one thing, his sub-division of this 'field of soteriological symbols' provided a significant clue for the arrangement of chapter five of the present thesis, even though it was by no means followed slavishly. It will nevertheless be worthwhile reproducing his outline of this field for the sake of reference and comparison. In order to avoid any misrepresentation, his full diagram is quoted as in the German original:

SOZIOMORPHE INTERAKTIONSSYMBOLIK

Befreiungssymbolik: Heil als Befreiung von versklavender Macht durch Erlösung und Loskauf

Rechtfertigungssymbolik: Heil als Freispruch von Schuld durch den Fluchtod des Erlösers

Versöhnungssymbolik: Heil als Versöhnung von Feindschaft durch die Liebeshingabe des Erlösers

PHYSIOMORPHE VERWANDLUNGSSYMBOLIK

Gestaltwandelsymbolik: Heil als Überwindung der Endgültigkeit menschlichen Wesens durch die Gestalt des Erlösers

Tod-und-Leben-Symbolik: Heil als Überwindung der Endlichkeit durch Mitsterben und Mitauferstehen mit dem Erlöser

Vereinigungssymbolik: Heil als Überwindung der Eingeschlossenheit des Ich durch die Einheit im 'Leib Christi'.

(Theissen 1974:303)

A glance at the table of contents preceding the present study will immediately reveal (as far as chapter five is concerned) a certain degree of similarity, as well as a degree of dissimilarity with the diagram quoted above.

The *similarity* is mainly seen in the following:

11.

- The idea of relating the various symbols (or metaphors) to particular 'cultural spheres' (such as the spheres of social interaction and physiological transformation) was copied.
- All six of the 'metaphors' included in Theissen's field, have also been taken up into the structure proposed for the present study.

The *dissimilarity* is evident in the following:

- The 'cultural spheres' to which the various metaphors are related, are not restricted to the two areas mentioned by Theissen. The whole idea is rather taken a step further by introducing some other relevant spheres such as the cultic and ritual realm, as well as the technical sphere of life.
- The number of items included under each of these 'cultural spheres' is also greatly enhanced. In all fairness it must however be stated that some of the additional items taken into my list, do also occur in Theissen's treatment of the field, but only as subordinate features of the six 'symbols' he took into consideration. Even though the interrelatedness of some of these metaphors is by no means denied in the present study, it nevertheless seemed necessary to make a clear distinction between them, so as to bring out the particular contribution of each one of these items to this field of related meanings. In fact, Theissen's way of dealing with this interrelatedness creates the uneasy feeling that he is imposing a kind of a preconceived and prefabricated logical structure on the material, thus failing to do justice to the text itself. Therefore the present study is opting for an alternative, in the expectation that it will leave more room for the text itself to speak.

Apart from these obvious dissimilarities that can be seen at a glance, there are also some other differences lying at a more profound level. In particular, cognisance should be taken of the differences as far as the method of analysis is concerned. Although a 'structuralistic' method is employed in both instances, the present study will take advantage of the possibilities provided by

the idea of a 'componential analysis of meaning' in the attempt to map out the semantic field "salvation", in the hope that a much clearer picture of the structure of the field will emerge in this way. Theissen's diagram, for that matter, is not all that illuminating.

In addition the idea of a 'discourse analysis' will also be utilised in the present study. Since some of these metaphors function as metaphors on the discourse level (cf Kittay & Lehrer 1981:32), this approach seems to be a necessary complement to this study. It will, at the same time, facilitate a concentration on the value of the text as text in the determination of meaning (cf Louw 1976:117-25). (All these questions of methodology will still be discussed more fully in the following two chapters. Therefore we may leave them aside for the moment.)

Enough has been said, however, to show the stimulating role Theissen's article has played with regard to the present study. On the other hand, it should be clear that the present study is going far beyond Theissen's article in quite a number of respects.

### 1.3 Modus operandi:

Having looked at some of the reasons and motivations justifying and underlying this study of the semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles, we may now turn to the 'plan of action' to be followed in the remainder of this study. The preceding discussion has already brought some of the burning issues within the context of this study into focus. These, however, must now be arranged into a proper 'modus operandi'.

On the 'macrostructural' level, this study will be divided into three major sections. Being, in the first place, a theological study with theological interests, the main emphasis will fall on the middle section, in which an attempt will be made to allow the Bible to speak for itself with regard to the topic of this study. This section will therefore bear the title: DOWN TO THE BIBLE, and it will

consist of three chapters.

In the first of these chapters, the material to be examined will be delimited. Such a limitation of the material is obviously a necessity. It is not only demanded by the particular approach to be used in this study (namely that of the 'semantic field'), but it is also required as a condition for the manageability of the study.

The second chapter of section B (i e chapter 5) will get down to the analysis of the material delineated in the previous chapter. This chapter is the very heart of the whole thesis; the crux of the matter. If this heart should fail to pump blood into the veins of this study, it will inevitably result in a rather pale picture. However, there is reason to believe that the study may eventually show us a kaleidoscope of salvation. Surely the fact that salvation will be viewed from nearly thirty different angles in this chapter, is quite a thrilling idea. When thirty different metaphors, borrowed from a whole spectrum of everyday-life experiences, meet at the point of salvation, one can expect a picture throbbing with life. It is to be hoped that the analysis to be undertaken in chapter five will indeed produce a picture so lively and vivid, that it will enable us to 'see' more clearly what God's saving act in Jesus Christ is all about. In order to achieve this goal, however, each of those metaphors will have to be brought into focus, one by one. With the aid of some analytical procedures, such as 'componential analysis of meaning' and 'discourse analysis', the particular contribution of each metaphor will have to be illuminated. In other words, the stress will be on the analytical side, and on the details. The chapter will therefore be titled: "Salvation" from various perspectives.

The last chapter of section B (i e chapter six) will then supply a 'synthesis of the results'. It means that this chapter will try to embrace all the details of the previous chapter, so as to mould them into one unified structure. The grand picture of the semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles should emerge at this point. It ought to culminate in a graphic representation that will enable one to see at once both the interrelatedness and the dis-

tinctness of all those different metaphors belonging to this one field by virtue of their common connection with "salvation".

Having said all this about section B, it is of course perfectly true that one cannot just dash in and study the Bible without giving account of the hermeneutical 'keys' you are using. Whether we like to admit it or not, all of us are using some kind of key by which we gain entrance to the Bible. Therefore, in order to go about this study in a scientifically justified way, this 'key' will first have to be examined, so as to ascertain its acceptability and usability. Obviously this has to be done even before we get to that main section as described above. This very first section of the thesis may thus be circumscribed by the title: GAINING ENTRANCE TO THE BIBLE, and will also consist of three chapters.

The first chapter of section A is of course the present one. It is meant to be a general introduction to the study, serving not only to justify the need for this particular study, but also to provide an outline of what is to follow.

The remaining two chapters of section A will deal with the methodological and hermeneutical questions pertaining to this study. In other words, that 'key' will be examined in these two chapters. Two chapters will be needed for this purpose, because of the fact that there are basically two complementary factors playing a determinative role in the process of coming to an understanding of the field in question. On the one hand there is the semantic factor, which requires a linguistic approach. Chapter two will be dealing with this side of the issue. Chapter three, on the other hand, will provide a view on the stylistic factor, involving a literary approach.

In chapter two, then, the theory of 'semantic fields' will enjoy priority, as this is the basic tool to be used in the rest of the study. Attention will also be paid, however, to the other supporting linguistic procedures, such as the methods of 'componential analysis of meaning' and 'discourse analysis'

Chapter three will mainly be concerned with metaphor as a literary

question. Obviously a general consideration of the working of the metaphor as a stylistic device will be required in the first place. From this orientation the value of this kind of literary approach will have to be demonstrated. Particularly the claim that this approach can be combined with the 'semantic field' approach will have to be substantiated by a thorough explanation. Then the analysis, interpretation, translation and revitalisation of metaphors will also have to be considered.

These two chapters ought to provide the necessary foundation for the exegetical work which will follow in section B. The application of sound linguistic (semantic) and literary principles will allow us to come to sound theological conclusions. Selfevidently that is one of the major targets of this study, namely to come to sound theological conclusions. However, it is not the only aim.

These days there is a growing interest, even in linguistic and literary circles, in the pragmatic dimensions of a text (cf Combrink 1983:10). The *effect* of communication rather than its mechanics is being shifted into the focus of attention (Lategan 1984:4). In the so-called 'pragmatics' the questions to be answered in relation to a text, are of the following kind: What can be *accomplished* by way of a particular utterance? What is the intention behind the words? (cf Schenk 1984:19).

In the light of these recent developments this study would certainly be incomplete without a section in which the practical implications of the research are explicitly stated. Section C of this thesis is meant to fulfil this obligation. The title of this section will therefore be: FROM THE BIBLE TO THE PRESENT. It will consist of only two chapters.

The first of these will focus on the contribution of this study towards various theological disciplines, such as the study of the New Testament, Systematic Theology and Practical Theology. Its value for the related science of Biblical Lexicography will also be demonstrated. In all this the pragmatic dimension of Paul's metaphorical way of speaking will receive due recognition. Hopefully it will enable

us to halt - and even to reverse - the process of these metaphors becoming empty clichés. This, together with the benefits accruing from the 'semantic field' approach, may conceivably have a forceful effect on soteriological thinking in general. Thus it may create new channels for the meaningful communication of the good news about God's saving act in Jesus Christ.

In chapter eight the whole study will be wound up in the form of a summary and conclusion.

CHAPTER 2.

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION.

We are confronted with a paradox: the concomitant familiarity and obscurity of the New Testament, which requires the search not simply for more data, but for more adequate methods of relating and interpreting the data already possessed.

(Burres as quoted by Erickson 1980:69)

In order to go about this study in a scientifically justifiable way, priority should be given to a clear definition and description of the various methods and procedures to be employed. The need for such a theoretical orientation is even more urgent in the present case. This study is purporting to be a venture in the application of new and relatively unknown ways for the exploration and interpretation of New Testament material. Therefore, the acceptability and usability of the methods and procedures in question will certainly have to be established.

On the other hand, one should also keep in mind the fact that the main interest of this thesis is not the methodological and hermeneutical questions as such, but rather the value of their application to the New Testament. Even though we may agree with Burres as quoted above, that a search is required '...not simply for more data, but for more adequate methods of relating and interpreting the data already possessed', it should nevertheless be clear that this study will focus on the application of these new methods, rather than on the methods themselves. We are in the fortunate position that the way has to a certain extent been opened by a few other Biblical scholars, so that we may conveniently refer to their contributions for an introductory orientation with regard to some of the basic methodological issues. In relation to the present study, one may perhaps single out the contributions made by Sawyer (1972), Vorster (1979:11-17), Erickson (1980) and Poythress (1981).

Nonetheless, it is not possible to escape a certain amount of methodological clarification. After all, this study presents a particular

brand of this 'structural' approach. More especially it may be said that the particular *combination* of 'structuralistic' methods to be employed in this study, marks a rather unique contribution in this field. This 'multi-faceted approach' will therefore have to come under scrutiny before it can be applied to the New Testament material.

## 2.1 Semiotics and the study of the New Testament - a multi-faceted approach:

One of the very fruitful recent developments in the field of New Testament studies is the realisation that these written documents should be treated from the point of view of *communication*. This applies not only to the narrative texts of the New Testament, but also to the letters. Even Paul's major epistles, to which this study is directed, should therefore be seen as a means of communication.

For the purpose of this study, it is not necessary to indulge in a lengthy discussion concerning a theory of communication. It may, however, be taken for granted that there are at least three basic elements in any communication: the source, the message, and the receptor (cf Nida s a:2). 'In the most elementary communication model, these three are placed in a linear relationship to one another, with all possible kinds of further interrelations.' (Lategan 1984:2).

The process of communication starts with the source - in the present case the apostle Paul - who 'encodes' a certain message. According to Nida (s a:2) this message begins with some concept, which is then expressed in a certain combination of words. (There are of course many non-verbal ways of communication too, but these may be left out of consideration in the present context, since we are only dealing with a particular written text, as it was handed to us in the Christian canon). This verbal message then, is received at the other end of the communication process by the so-called 'receptors', who '...identify the verbal units or message as a whole, and finally become aware of at least similar concepts (Nida s a:2).

Even though this description may be regarded as a rather over-simpli-

fied version of the communication process, it may help us to identify some of the numerous factors involved in the interpretation of a particular written text, as a piece of encoded message. In fact, Lategan (1984:3-4) argues convincingly that it is possible to relate major shifts in the history of New Testament research and interpretation to the various sectors of this elementary communication model. In the initial stages of New Testament research as a scholarly enterprise, questions of origin dominated the scene (the historical-critical method, for instance, has mainly been concerned with that 'source-sector' of our model). Then, with the advent of structuralism, the attention became firmly fixed on the text itself (the 'message-sector'), in some extreme cases even to the exclusion of all other influences. Finally, however, there is at present a massive movement (cf Lategan 1984:4) towards the right-hand sector of that model. In other words, the spotlight is now turned on the receptor and the process of reception.

In the nature of the case, the research to be conducted in this thesis will mainly concentrate on the message-part of the communication process in which the Biblical text is involved. Therefore the application of 'structuralistic' methods will form an integral part of this study. It is, however, of the greatest importance *not* to exclude the other communicational factors from consideration. In fact, the message can only be properly understood if it is constantly treated against the background of this whole process of communication. 'In the long run it has become clear that neither theoretically nor empirically the isolation of the text can be maintained indefinitely.' (Lategan 1984:4). For this very reason a 'multi-faceted' approach seems to be an indispensable requirement.

It is here then, that the science called 'semiotics' steps into the picture. This discipline (or perhaps discipline-to-be, cf Eco 1976: 7) is namely trying to provide '...a unified approach to every phenomenon of signification and/or communication.' (Eco 1976:3). It is working towards '*...a general semiotic theory, able to explain every case of sign-function in terms of underlying systems of elements mutually correlated by one or more codes.*' (Eco 1976:3)

In other words, signification and communication take place by means of signs (or sign-functions, as Eco prefers to call them). These signs, however, acquire meaning by virtue of their being part of certain culturally conventionalised systems or codes. Therefore, as it was pointed out by Nida and others (1982:2), '...the basic relationships in semiotics are not ... a straight line between a sign and its referent, but a triadic relationship involving a sign, a referent, and the system of signs which makes possible that identification of a particular sign with its referent.' Elsewhere Nida calls the latter the 'interpretant', and then explains this term as '...the structure of the code itself which makes possible the relation of the sign to the referent.' (Nida s a:15).

Approaching the present study from a semiotic point of view would thus suggest that at least the following factors ought to be taken into consideration:

#### 2.1.1 The identification of all the relevant signs:

Recently Louw (1985:103) has made the observation that 'A semiotic approach to a discourse takes cognisance of all possible signs, linguistic, para-linguistic and extra-linguistic, that may be relevant to understand and to interpret a text.' Indeed, the fact has to be recognised that, even in the case of a written text, there may be a multiplicity of signs involved. 'Any utterance involves a complex network of layers, one of which is the lexical level, another the syntax level, another the level of reference, another that of the context, etc.' (Louw 1985:102).

Even though a study of 'the semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles' will selfevidently concentrate on the semantic level, it is quite obvious that this semantic level cannot be studied in isolation. All the different sign-functions mentioned above, and even more, will have to be taken into account.

In accordance with the metaphorical character of the particular field under discussion, special attention will certainly have to be paid,

for instance, to the stylistic side of the piece of communication involved. In other words, the identification and interpretation of 'rhetorical signs' will definitely have to be incorporated in the study (cf Nida et al 1983:1-21).

### 2.1.2 The value of the context and setting in the interpretation of a text:

In some structuralistic approaches the tendency has been '...to isolate the text as a self-contained world which should then be analysed on its own terms without recourse to "external" factors.' (Lategan 1984:4). Certainly this tendency can be explained as an understandable and very timely reaction to the neglecting of the text itself (as we have it before us) in the preceding era of Biblical interpretation, as exemplified by the historical-critical method (cf Petersen 1978:19, 25). Of course, very often such reactions tend to be one-sided. Therefore it comes as no surprise that yet another turning of the tide had to follow (cf Combrink 1983:9). As it was pointed out by Thiselton (1977:79): 'To try to cut loose "propositions" in the New Testament from the specific situation in which they were uttered and to try thereby to treat them "timelessly" is not only bad theology; it is also bad linguistics. For it leads to a distortion of what the text *means*.'

A renewed interest in matters relating to the context and socio-cultural setting of the text was therefore bound to come about. De Villiers (1982) even speaks in terms of the 'renaissance of the sociological text analysis.' (cf also Rowland 1985:358-64; and Theissen 1982).

It should, however, be emphasised that this new approach is by no means to be equated with a recurrence of the procedures of the historical-critical paradigm. The value of a structural approach in which due attention is awarded to the Biblical text as we have it before us, is not likely to be suspended (Du Toit 1981:5). The text must therefore enjoy the priority (cf De Villiers 1984:73), and '... wanneer die teks werklik sentraal staan, kom genoemde buite-tekstuele

faktore juis op grond van die teks self, ter sprake.' (Combrink 1983:9). The texts themselves '...often carry traces of the author and his world and reflect aspects of the world from which they originated (cf Polyani 1981:97-112) by the codes (e.g. language usage) and semantic function or purpose of communication.' (Vorster 1984:110).

This last statement by Vorster may be taken as a confirmation of the fact that attention for the context and socio-cultural setting is indeed demanded by the semiotic approach. There is nowadays, we presume, little doubt about the fact that, for instance, the language code used in communication is largely a matter of social and cultural convention (cf Thiselton 1977:85-8). In fact, Eco (1976:66-8) defines meaning as a cultural unit. He says:

What then, is the meaning of a term? From a semiotic point of view it can only be a *cultural unit*. In every culture 'a unit ...is simply anything that is culturally defined and distinguished as an entity. It may be a person, place, thing, feeling, state of affairs, sense of foreboding, fantasy, hallucination, hope or idea....

(Eco 1976:67)

This contention leads him to the following conclusion:

Recognition of the presence of these cultural units (which are therefore the meaning to which the code makes the system of sign-vehicles correspond) involves understanding language as a social phenomenon.

(Eco 1976:67-8).

From this point of view, surely, the socio-cultural setting will be of vital importance for the interpretation of a particular text (as a piece of encoded message). But then, of course, it is essential to know what we are talking about when we refer to the context and the setting. Certainly we may agree with De Villiers (1984:69) and Vorster (1980:121-2) that there is little use in concerning ourselves with the traditional irrelevant discussions on authors, places of origin, readers and so forth. A more profitable approach to the issue would rather be to see the context (or setting) as '...all the extralinguistic factors relating to the text or joined to the text which the reader has to take into account in an attempt to interpret

what the text communicated. In the words of Halliday and Hasan (1976: 21), "...the external factors affecting the linguistic choices that the speaker or writer makes." (Vorster 1984:110).

Again it has to be said that this aspect of the semiotic approach (as the previous one discussed in §2.1.1 above) acquires special relevance in view of the metaphorical character of the field in question. Metaphors, it seems, are perhaps more context-bound than most other parts of the language code. In order to be effective, the descriptive term applied to the matter it aims to illuminate, must have a common currency at least in the circle to which it is addressed; it is therefore likely to be taken from 'daily life' (cf Gorringe 1983:9; also Theissen 1974:282). As such it is usually very closely tied to the culture concerned. Hence the remark of Fawcett (1970:52):

When metaphors are considered within a cultural situation to which they did not originally belong, misunderstanding is likely. The clear analogical character of the metaphor which was apparent to the original hearers may no longer be apparent in a later age.

The disturbance in communication resulting from the historical, time-bound character of the Biblical texts with their culturally determined expressions, which is, according to Rossouw (1980:22-5) the basic hermeneutical problem, finds its culmination point, so it seems, in the analysis and interpretation of metaphor. Here the cultural gap separating us from the apostle Paul creates an acute hermeneutical problem, challenging us to launch a special effort in this study to recover at least part of the vigour these metaphors must have possessed in their original cultural setting.

### 2.1.3 The recognition of the various structures involved in the process of communication:

The third element deserving attention in a semiotic approach is the existence of various structures (or codes) by which meaning is assigned to the different signs. As far as the present study is concerned, this element is certainly the most important part of the whole approach. Right from the start it must have been apparent that

this thesis is built on a structural foundation, and that it is interested in the application of 'structuralistic' methods. It has to be emphasised therefore, that the other elements of this multi-faceted semiotic approach, as mentioned above, will only be treated in their relation to this structural approach.

Since the various 'structuralistic' methods and procedures to be employed in this thesis will be discussed in more detail in the following sections of this chapter, we may restrict ourselves at this point to a consideration of some of the basic linguistic principles underlying these methods. Adding to this restriction, only those principles relevant to our research will be taken into account. These are the following:

#### 2.1.3.1 Syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations:

From a structural point of view, 'One of the most striking characteristics of language, ...is that its units are not given in a positive and unequivocal fashion but must be discovered and defined in relational terms.' (Culler 1974:xx). In other words, a particular linguistic unit cannot be appreciated in isolation, on its own; it has to be seen as part of a whole (the language as a self-contained system), and it is only through their mutual relation to each other and to the whole that all the different parts function and acquire value (cf Baskin's introduction to De Saussure 1959:xxviii). Lyons (1977:231-2), in defining the central thesis of structuralism, expresses the same idea in a slightly different way. According to him that central thesis is this:

...that every language is a unique relational structure, or system, and that the units which we identify, or postulate as theoretical constructs, in analysing the sentence of a particular language (sounds, words, meanings, etc.) derive their essence and their existence from their relationships with other units in the same language-system.

De Saussure was, of course, among the first to see and to emphasise this point. He gave pointed expression to the view by saying that, 'Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of

each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others, ....' (De Saussure 1959:114). Obviously that is the reason why Lyons (1977:230) refers to this form of structuralism as Saussurean structuralism, in contrast to the post-Bloomfieldian version of structuralism. De Saussure was indeed the founder (cf Lyons 1977:231) of the type of structural linguistics serving as a basis of the present study.

It must of course be remembered that structuralism is not just something restricted to the field of linguistics (cf Thiselton 1978:329-35). It actually includes in its scope all human social phenomena, and therefore finds application in the whole range of social sciences such as anthropology, sociology, politics, economics, psychology, literature, history, linguistics and even the fine arts (cf Lane 1970:13; also Lategan 1978:23). In all these areas the logical priority of the whole over its parts acquired a new importance. Thus, as Lane (1970:14) has pointed out, the structuralists '...insist that the whole and the parts can be properly explained only in terms of the *relations* that exist between the parts. The essential quality of the structuralist method, and its fundamental tenet, lies in its attempt to study not the elements of a whole, but the complex network of relationships that link and unite those elements.' The essential thing to be grasped with regard to this structural approach is therefore the vital importance of the various *relations* existing between the elements within a particular structure or system.

Now, in the field of linguistics the two principle relations between the various elements of the language system are the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations. (In De Saussure's own terminology they were known as syntagmatic and associative relations: cf De Saussure 1959:122-7.) Thiselton (1977:82) calls these two relations '...a major pair of categories which are fundamental and central in modern linguistics, ....' And according to Lyons in an earlier publication (1968:75) the axiom that '...linguistic units have no validity independently of their paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations with other units', is to be regarded as one of the two 'defining characteristics' of modern structural linguistics (cf also Brekle 1972:81-4).

Firstly then, a linguistic unit has a *linear* relationship with other units with which it is chained together. 'In discourse,' says De Saussure himself, '...words acquire relations based on the linear nature of language because they are chained together.' (1959:123). Such a combination with other units on a linear level constitutes a syntagm or construction, and therefore this relation is described as a *syntagmatic relation*. 'For example, the lexeme "old" is syntagmatically related with the definite article "the" and the noun "man" in the expression "the old man"; ....' (Lyons 1977:240).

This type of relation is important not only on the level of word combinations, but for all linguistics units, including the combination of particular sounds (phonemes), as well as the combination of particular meanings, etc. 'From a semantic point of view, if "eat" stands in syntagmatic relationship to "bread", "meat" and "cheese" but not to "water", "tea" or "beer", this contributes to establishing its *meaning*, as the ingestion of solid food.' (Thiselton 1977: 82). Obviously therefore, a semantic study, such as the present one, will have to take these relations into consideration.

However, the relation which is of a much more crucial importance to the present study, is the one which is usually described as the *paradigmatic relation*. According to Thiselton (1977:83), 'This is the relation between a word or linguistic unit and another such unit which is *not* present in the actual utterance, but which might have been chosen *in its place*.'

A single example may again serve to clarify the issue. In the sentence, 'The sinner is justified by grace', 'sinner' stands in paradigmatic relation to 'transgressor', 'evil doer', 'enemy of God', etc. In the same way the phrase 'is justified' contracts a paradigmatic relation with other similar but contrasting expressions such as 'is saved', 'is reconciled', 'is liberated', etc., as well as expressions such as 'is condemned', 'is rejected', etc. (being its opposites). 'By grace' could also be replaced by a number of expressions such as 'by God's favour', or 'by works', etc.

From this example it must be clear that the notion of paradigmatic

relations is closely related to the semantic axiom that meaning implies choice (cf Silva 1980:186-9; Thiselton 1977:83; Lyons 1963:25). In any given syntagm (combination of linguistic units) one is exercising a choice between related units that are substitutable for one another (cf Lyons 1977:241).

Of course, the relation between these substitutable linguistic units may take a variety of forms. According to Nida (1975b:15-20) there are four principal ways in which the meanings of different semantic units may be related to one another: inclusion, overlapping, complementation, and contiguity (cf §2.2.4.8.). Other authors prefer a different terminology for the description of this spectrum of paradigmatic relations, but essentially they cover the same area (see for instance Lyons 1977:270-317).

The main concern of this thesis is with the *contiguous paradigmatic relations* between the great variety of semantic units employed by the apostle Paul in his major epistles in order to describe "salvation". These different units are not really overlapping in meaning (in other words, they are not really synonymous; cf Nida 1975b:16), and yet they are closely related in meaning. They do share certain components of meaning, and yet each meaning is distinctly set off from other related meanings by at least one important feature (cf Nida 1975b:18). Therefore they can be said to constitute a particular *semantic field* (or semantic domain). This issue, however, will be discussed more fully in the following section of this chapter.

Though the spotlight will be turned on the contiguous paradigmatic relations within the semantic field "salvation", the other paradigmatic relations, as well as the syntagmatic relations cannot be overlooked. Especially in the determining of the 'components of meaning' of each of the semantic units in question, it may for instance be necessary to take a close look at their opposites (the relation of complementation in Nida's terminology; cf Nida 1975b:17). As far as the syntagmatic relations are concerned, one cannot ignore the remark made by Silva (1983:120):

Finally, it should be noted that the syntagmatic combinations play the determinative role in language. While the paradigmatic

relations alert us to the potential for lexical expression in a particular language, this potential becomes 'actualized' only when words are in fact combined with one another by a specific speaker or writer to form sentences.

### 2.1.3.2 Synchronic and diachronic approaches to Language:

A second linguistic axiom which is of major importance with regard to the general make-up of the present study, is the Saussurean distinction between synchrony and diachrony. This distinction is closely related to the structural tenets outlined in the previous paragraph.

For a definition of these two approaches, we may again refer to Lyons (1977:243). He says:

By the synchronic analysis of a language is meant the investigation of the language as it is, or was, at a certain time; by the diachronic analysis of a language is to be understood the study of changes in the language between two given points in time.

This distinction stands in a direct relation to the Saussurean notion of language as relational structure or system within which the value of the various elements is determined by their mutual relations, as well as their relation to the whole. De Saussure himself explains this notion with reference to a game of chess. In chess, the respective value of the pieces depends on their position on the chessboard. In the same way, according to De Saussure (1959:88), '...each linguistic term derives its value from its opposition to all the other terms.' And, in order to '...understand the *state* of a game it is unnecessary and irrelevant to know how the players arrived at it. A chess problem is simply set out by describing the state of the board.' (Thiselton 1977:80). In terms of this illustration then, De Saussure understood diachronic linguistics as the study of language from the point of view of its *historical evolution* over a period of time, whereas synchronic linguistics was seen as the science of *language-states* (cf De Saussure 1959:79-100).

Obviously this illustration underlines the priority of the synchronic approach to language. The speaker, it must be noted, is aware only of the present state of the language. In the words of De Saussure (1959:81):

The first thing that strikes us when we study the facts of language is that their succession in time does not exist insofar as the speaker is concerned. He is confronted with a state. That is why the linguist who wishes to understand a state must discard all knowledge of everything that produced it and ignore diachrony. He can enter the mind of speakers only by completely suppressing the past. The intervention of history can only falsify his judgment.

Of course, one has to be careful not to infer from this statement that De Saussure was opposed to every form of diachronic linguistics. Thiselton (1977:80) observes that, 'Saussure's point is not, as is occasionally thought, that one of these methods is right and the other wrong, but that the two methods are fundamentally *different*, and perform different tasks.' Therefore Ullmann (1957:145-6) contends that '...some judicious combining of the two methods to the mutual advantage of both would be quite consonant to Saussure's outlook.' However, in his proposal for the combination of the two methods Ullmann includes an important proviso, namely that '...combination does not lead to confusion and that the two methods are used side by side with the sole and unambiguously formulated purpose of throwing light on one another.'

Even with this concession, however, the absolute priority of the synchronic approach ought to be maintained as one of the axioms of modern linguistics. In an attempt to understand and interpret a particular written document, such as one of the apostle Paul's letters (as a manifestation of a particular language-state) there is no compelling reason to insist on the inclusion of historical background material. In other words, there is no justification for a statement such as the one made by Hill (1967:19) that '...no study of a word in the New Testament is adequate without investigation of its use and meaning in the literature of Classical Greek and of later pre-New Testament Greek, especially the Septuagint.' It should rather be said with Silva (1983:48) that,

*...historical considerations may be of synchronic value, but only if we can demonstrate that the speaker was aware of them. For example, if a New Testament writer using the word εκκλησία could be shown to have made a conscious reference to the root of the word, then the idea of 'calling out' must be taken into consideration.*

Evidently, therefore, this principle strikes at one of the procedures that used to be very popular among theologians, especially in connection with word studies, namely etymologising. The aim of this procedure is to investigate the history of a word so as to discover its etymological or root meaning, which is then regarded as the 'basic' or 'proper' meaning of the word. This view was subjected to Barr's severe criticism (cf 1961:107-60). In particular he emphasised the point that '...the etymology of a word is not a statement about its meaning but about its history.' (Barr 1961:109). It may therefore be regarded as a fallacy (the 'root fallacy') if the meaning of a word in a particular context is understood in terms of its origin. In a later language-state a particular word may no longer have anything to do with its origin or history. In any case, if one would like to ascertain the exact relation between a word and its origin, it would be necessary to conduct two (or more) independent studies of the respective language-states within which that particular word has occurred in the course of time (cf Vorster 1979:12). Only then a comparison can be made, and the development can be traced.

In the present study, however, the choice was made in favour of the other option, namely to make use of a thorough-going synchronic approach. In other words, the attention will be focussed on the four major epistles of Paul as a manifestation of a particular state of the Koine Greek spoken in the Hellenistic period. The relations between the various semantic units describing "salvation" within that very specific context will carry the day, rather than their relations with their antecedents in history. The exception to this general orientation will of course be those cases where the text itself indicates that historical considerations may be of synchronic value.

As Theissen (1974:284) has already shown, this approach may gain a considerable profit. For one thing, it may lead us out of the blind

alley of endless speculations concerning the historical development of the various elements belonging to this semantic field. To underline this point, we may take an extensive quotation from Theissen (1974:284);

Es interessiert daher weniger die Vorgeschichte der einzelnen Elemente, etwa die wichtige Frage, ob die Vereinigungssymbolik aus gnostischen, mysterienhaften oder anderen Überlieferungen abzuleiten sei. In einer strukturalistischen Untersuchung kann man diese Fragen aus methodischen Gründen suspendieren. Schliesslich hat Paulus diese Elemente als geistiges Eigentum übernommen, aus welchen Quellen sie ihm auch immer zugeflossen sein mögen. Dass ihm übernommene Traditionen unwichtig wären, ist unbelegbar.

According to Theissen (1974:284) this approach may even guide us to a fresh view on the old question regarding the relation between the juridical-ethical and the mystical interpretations of Pauline soteriology. Rather than limiting Paul's own contribution to the former (the juridical-ethical), and ascribing the latter (the mystical) to the assimilation of foreign tradition, one may, from a synchronic, structuralistic point of view, come to an appreciation of the whole field in its interconnection as the special contribution rendered by Paul.

Denkbar ist, dass die Intention paulinischer Soteriologie in keiner einzelnen Symbolik und Thematik liegt, sondern im Beziehungsgefüge aller Symbole, in der Struktur eines umfassenden Feldes soteriologischer Sinneinheiten.

(Theissen 1974:284)

## 2.2 Basic orientation - the theory of semantic fields:

The application of the structural linguistic principles outlined above inevitably leads one to the theory of semantic fields. In fact, the idea of semantic fields certainly originated from, and lies in the direct extension of the structural notion of paradigmatic (and syntagmatic) relations existing between the semantic units of a particular, synchronic language-state.

For the purpose of this study it is not necessary to discuss all the

details concerning the development of and the variety of opinions pertaining to the field theory. Even though Erickson (1980:91) may be right in judging that some common knowledge about the theory of semantic fields cannot yet be taken for granted within the circle of Biblical studies, it may nevertheless be accepted as a matter of principle that there are so many excellent discussions of this topic available, <sup>1)</sup> that yet another repetition of the basic material would indeed be superfluous. It is sufficient, therefore, to discuss only those elements of the theory which are absolutely essential for the understanding of the material contained in this thesis.

### 2.2.1 Two main streams - Trier and Porzig:

Although Trier and Porzig were by no means the only, and not even the first scholars to concern themselves with the notion of semantic fields (cf Geckeler 1971:86-93), they can with good reason be taken to represent the two main streams of this method of semantic description. A great number of studies followed in their wake, criticising them on a variety of issues, but still taking their ideas as a point of orientation.

In essence the distinction between the views of Trier and Porzig regarding the matter of semantic fields, can be described in terms of the Saussurean dichotomy between paradigmatic and syntagmatic semantic relations. Trier concentrated on the former, whereas Porzig turned to the latter. At first these two directions were thought to be in conflict, and therefore a lively controversy got going as to which of the two theories was more fruitful and illuminating. However, as it was observed by Lyons (1977:261),

There can no longer be any doubt that both Trier's paradigmatic relations and Porzig's syntagmatic relations must be incorporated in any satisfactory theory of lexical structure; and Trier and Porzig came to accept that their originally sharply opposed views were complementary, rather than being necessarily in conflict (cf Kühlwein, 1967:49).

The present study, nevertheless, will proceed in the direction stipulated by Trier, without necessarily excluding all syntagmatic

considerations (cf §2.1.3.1 above). In other words, these syntagmatic relations will be taken into account, but only in as far as they may contribute towards the establishing of the semantic field "salvation" in a paradigmatic sense. This, selfevidently, does not amount to a rejection of the kind of approach advocated by Porzig and his followers, but it does claim validity for an approach focusing on the paradigmatic relations, thus proceeding along the line of investigation introduced by Trier, Weisgerber and their followers. Surely the ideal thing would be to pay equal attention to both sides of this coin, but unfortunately the nature of the field in question does not allow for such a comprehensive approach. It would namely include such an abundance of material, that one would not really be able to cope with everything within the bounds of this thesis.

It must be evident, though, that adhering to the Trier/Weisgerber<sup>2)</sup> version of the theory of semantic fields does not necessarily imply that one subscribes to every detail included in their theory. In fact, many of the criticisms brought in against some of the tenets underlying Trier's views, have to be maintained. A cursory look at some of those criticisms may serve a double purpose: while introducing us to some of Trier's ideas in connection with semantic fields, it may at the same time facilitate the delineation of the theory which is to function as the basis of the present thesis.

Lehrer's brief summary of Trier's approach (cf 1974:15) may be taken as the point of departure; she says that,

Trier distinguished between lexical and conceptual fields, whereby the lexical field divides the conceptual field into parts, like a mosaic. A word acquires its meaning by its opposition to its neighbouring words in the pattern....

A little further on she adds that,

...Trier believed that linguistic fields are not isolated, but rather that they 'join together to form in turn fields of higher order, until finally the entire vocabulary is included....

(Lehrer 1974:17)

Even from this meagre outline one can gain an impression of the comprehensiveness and rigidity of Trier's field theory. As a matter of

fact, these have been the two major points of criticism against Trier (cf Erickson 1980:120). So, for instance, the rigid idea that the lexical items in any given field divide up the conceptual space like a mosaic, without any gaps and overlaps, has suffered constant criticism as being in conflict with the real facts of language (cf Geckeler 1971:134-44). The same criticism applies equally to the related idea that these lexical fields join together, so that the whole vocabulary forms a 'lückenlose' mosaic (mark the comprehensiveness) (cf Ullmann 1962:249).

One cannot but agree with Lyons (1977:268) in saying that, 'Neither of these assumptions appears to be theoretically essential; and descriptive semantics can get along quite well without them.' For the purpose of the present study it certainly is essential to acknowledge the fact that gaps and overlaps do indeed exist in the various (semantic) fields; that the items belonging to a particular field cannot be regarded as constituting a closed set. The possibility must be left open that these sets are either open or indeterminate (Lyons 1977:268). In fact, one is obliged to leave room for 'fuzzy sets' (cf Nida, Louw & Smith 1977:147; also Louw 1979b:109). A rather lengthy quotation from the article by Nida, Louw and Smith may serve to summarise the stance to be supported in this study about "salvation":

While most attempts at semantic analysis stress the systematic nature of meaningful relations, it seems much better to reckon fully with the multidimensional and nonorthogonal elements. ...an examination of a broad segment of vocabulary in any language soon reveals the fallacy of Trier's concept (1931) of a neatly arranged mosaic of meanings covering in a relatively systematic way the totality of experience. The classification of meanings inevitably involves a number of what mathematicians call 'fuzzy sets', that is, units that in certain respects belong to more than one set. Furthermore, there are holes in semantic structures and numerous relations, so that one simply cannot construct neat binary outlines of superordinate and subordinate categories into which to insert the various meanings.

(Nida, Louw & Smith 1977:146-7)

There is a likelihood, it seems, that the semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles may turn out to be a rather 'fuzzy set'. Due to its metaphorical character, this field is by nature a combina-

tion of elements from many different semantic fields.

Another aspect of Trier's field theory, against which much criticism has been raised, is his apparent neglect of actual linguistic usage. According to Erickson (1980:121), '...his data tend to be based on semantic considerations alone without sufficient attention being paid to linguistic usage, to the actual syntactic and other formal relations holding for the lexemes in question.' This was in fact the most important factor motivating Porzig to develop an 'alternative' theory. Porzig sought to remedy this deficiency in Trier's method by proposing his syntactically oriented 'essential semantic relations' (in German: 'wesenhafte Bedeutungsbeziehungen'): pairs of words which imply one another, such as *dog-bark*, *tooth-bite*, *tree-fell*, *blond-hair*. His suggestion apparently had little immediate influence, but the 1960's saw some revival of interest in this early experiment (cf Ullmann 1972:373). In the meantime it has become accepted as a necessary complement to Trier's theory. In his discussion of semantic fields, Berger (1977:138), for instance, writes:

Welche Wörter als zusammengehörig (oder als entgegengesetzt und in diesem Sinn zusammengehörig) betrachtet werden dürfen, entscheidet sich nicht nach unserem Sprachgefühl oder nach unseren inhaltlichen Massstäben, sondern allein nach dem faktischen Vorkommen.

This remark (of Berger) also draws the attention to another charge which is often brought against Trier (mostly coupled with the criticism raised against his neglect of actual linguistic usage), and that is the accusation that he was delimitating the boundaries of the lexical field in an aprioristic way. Paying closer attention to the syntagmatic relations (ala Porzig) would then afford the basis of some empirical techniques for the deciding of these boundaries (cf Erickson 1980:122).

Without denying the value of such techniques, and of paying attention to syntagmatic relations, the validity of an approach akin to that of Trier will be defended in the present study. This I hope to do, however, without exposing myself to the charges of apriorism and a neglect of the actual text at hand. In order to achieve this end, however, the analytical procedure known as 'componential analysis'

will have to be introduced (cf §2.2.4 below); a technique, of course, not yet 'available' to Trier.

This, in any case, is the way in which such well-known scholars as Nida and Coseriu are dealing with the question of semantic fields. In commending the views of Coseriu (as opposed to the approach of Katz and Fodor), Geckeler (1971:230) states:

Bevor man sich also entschliesst, eine Semantik der syntagmatischen Strukturen auszuarbeiten, ist es notwendig, zuerst eine Semantik der paradigmatischen Strukturen aufzubauen. Die Wortsemantik muss der Satzsemantik logischerweise vorausgehen.

In his review of Geckeler's book, Ikegami (1974:109) gives credit to this view, but on the condition that it should be taken to mean '...that a semantic description of a sentence will never be complete without an adequate amount of work having been done on the semantic analysis of individual lexical items....'

In Coseriu's work this primary concentration on the individual lexical items is achieved by focussing on the paradigmatic relations they contract with other items within the same lexical field. His definition of the lexical field, then, is the following:

Ein *Wortfeld* ist in struktureller Hinsicht ein lexikalisches Paradigma, das durch die Aufteilung eines lexikalischen Inhaltskontinuums unter verschiedene in der Sprache als Wörter gegebene Einheiten entsteht, die durch inhaltsunterscheidende Züge in unmittelbarer Opposition zueinander stehen....

(Coseriu & Geckeler 1974:149)

Although identification with Coseriu's approach is a possibility to be considered, its application seems to be too complicated and restrictive (cf Ikegami 1974:110). Metaphor, for one thing, has to be excluded from consideration if Coseriu's restrictions regarding lexical fields are to be taken seriously. Therefore, obviously, we are bound to opt for the closely related alternative presented by Nida. His approach, according to which a semantic field (or domain) '...consists essentially of a group of meanings (by no means restricted to those reflected in single words) which share certain semantic components' (Nida 1975b:174), affords us with a method, not only to delimitate the field in question, but also to describe the

relations between the semantic units within that field, in a way that will stand the test of scientific validity. (In due course more detail concerning this approach will be supplied).

In the meantime, however, we need to come back to yet another critical assessment of Trier's theory of semantic fields. It is important to acknowledge the fact that one can hardly go along with Trier's radical statement that a word's meaning is due *only* to its position within the field ('Es "bedeutet" nur in diesem Ganzen und kraft dieses Ganzen. Ausserhalb eines Feldganzen kann es ein Be- deuten überhaupt nicht geben.' - Trier 1973:5). This extreme, surely, cannot be maintained with a view to the semantic field to be studied in the present dissertation. Even though the different units within this field may certainly be regarded as interdependent, mutually limiting and determining each other's semantic 'value', they cannot be said to be void of all meaning outside this field. In fact, being metaphors, all of them simultaneously belong to other semantic fields. Therefore they can and they do exist independently of the specific semantic context of "salvation". (Of course, even then they are not totally independent. When they are considered apart from the "salva- tion" context, they should obviously be seen in relation to those 'donor fields' - cf Kittay & Lehrer 1981:32 - in which they normally function.)

A more lenient (and less rigid!) version of this aspect of Trier's field theory would therefore be more acceptable. In other words, one can maintain the view that words generally owe their meanings to the semantic fields they belong to, just as long as the qualification *only* is not added.

### 2.2.2 Terminological distinctions:

Trier's unorderly use of terminology is probably one of the weakest points in his whole theory, and it is therefore also one of the aspects of this theory that has attracted a fair amount of criticism. Geckeler (1971:107), for instance, who is generally quite sympa- thetic in his discussion of the subject, comes up with a rather

critical remark when referring to this issue by saying, 'Das Definieren seiner Termini ist nicht gerade Triers Stärke.' Lyons (1977:250-1) joins in with this criticism by pointing out that Trier '...in different works and in different parts of the same work, employs a variety of terms, and it is not always clear in what sense he is employing them.' So too, Erickson (1980:127) observes that,

Although field theorists since Trier have been more precise about terms than he was, numerous distinctions and other necessities, real and imagined, have called forth a veritable plethora of field vocabulary; one could profitably carry out a semantic field study of semantic field terminology itself.

By just mentioning a number of this 'plethora of field vocabulary', one will immediately come under the impression of the potential for confusion created by this state of affairs. Consider the following: 'Sinnfeld, Wortfeld, Sprachfeld, Bedeutungsfeld, Zeichenfeld, Begriffsfeld, Teilfeld, Sinnbezirk, Sinnbereich; semantic field, associative field, lexical field, conceptual field, linguistic field, ....' (Erickson 1980:127).

In this light the need for clear distinctions concerning terminology is selfevident. In other words, it will be a matter of necessity to state very clearly why and in what sense we are using the term *semantic field* as part of the title of the present study. In order to achieve this end, however, it will certainly also be necessary to contrast this term with other possibilities within the same sphere, so as to highlight its special contribution (a micro-semantic field study will in other words have to be conducted!). Possible substitutions for *semantic field* should at least include *associative field*, *lexical field* and *conceptual field*.

Firstly, one ought to take notice of the fact that Trier himself avoided the term 'semantic field' ('Bedeutungsfeld'), which was employed by Ipson, Jolles and Porzig (cf Geckeler 1971:107). He showed a preference for distinctions such as 'das sprachliche Feld' (= linguistic field?) (cf Trier 1932; 1934), 'Wortfeld' (= lexical field?) and 'Sinnbezirk' (= conceptual field?), but used them interchangeably and indiscriminately.

In other circles a major line of distinction was drawn between

semantic fields ('Bedeutungsfelder') and lexical fields, the former being applied to the different meanings of a single lexical unit, and the latter to the related meanings of different lexical units (cf Van Heerden 1965:109-41; also Vorster 1979:13-14).<sup>3)</sup> Obviously this distinction will not work in the present context, since we are concerned with the related meanings of different semantic units, and yet preference is given to the term 'semantic field'.

In explaining this preference, we may take a start from the three distinct levels at which structural semantic researches are being pursued according to Ullmann (1972:367-78). These are:

- 1) That of the single word and its associative field;
- 2) That of lexical fields, dealing with different spheres of experience;
- 3) That of the entire vocabulary.

Evidently the present study is to be classified under the second level. For that reason the idea of an *associative field* deserves only a very brief consideration - mainly to provide relief for the understanding of the other field terms.

One scholar who made explicit use of the idea of an associative field in his research concerning Hebrew words for salvation (sic!), is Sawyer (1972). From him we have the remark that an associative field '...would include all the words associated in any way with a particular term.' (1972:30). According to him this kind of field is to be distinguished from a lexical field in the way that,

While a word's associative field includes terms related to it at all levels (for instance synonyms, opposites, terms that rhyme with it or look like it), a lexical group consists only of words very closely related to one another.

(Sawyer 1972:30)

As for the present study, it is in these more closely related units that we are interested, rather than just a loose conglomerate of vaguely related units. (Perhaps this vagueness might have been one of the reasons moving Silva - 1983:162 - to such a negative assessment of Sawyer's contribution as being largely formalistic and as telling us relatively little about semantic content.)

However, coming to the second level of Ullmann's differentiation, it should immediately be stated that it is not, in the first place, the lexical fields that we are after, but rather the semantic fields. Even though both the lexical fields and the semantic fields, as well as the idea of conceptual fields belong to this second level of structural semantic research, there is an obvious and urgent need to draw the distinctions between them very clearly. It is exactly because they are so close to each other, functioning in more or less the same sphere, that the danger is all the greater that they might be confused.

In the sense that the notion of a *conceptual field* will be employed in the context of this dissertation, it will be taken to denote the particular theological idea underlying both the lexical field and the semantic field of "salvation". This theological idea (or concept), to be sure, is but a theoretical construct, postulated in explanation of observed phenomena (cf Erickson 1980:129). That does not imply, however, that the postulating of such a concept is an unverifiable and unscientific procedure. Even though caution is essential at this point, so as to avoid the kind of conceptualism criticised, for example, by Lyons (1977:113), and also to prevent the kind of blunder found in so many of the articles in Kittel's *Theological dictionary of the New Testament* (where '...it is often not clear whether the author is defining the meaning of the word at the head of the article, or discussing the concept which it sometimes denotes' - Sawyer 1972:32), the existence and value of such concepts, especially in its relation to the study of a semantic field, can hardly be denied (cf Church 1964:442).

Now, this kind of concept usually finds expression in a variety of ways. In an article on *Words and thoughts*, Nida (1974:340) makes the following statement:

Very frequently one can identify the same concept by more than one verbal device. One may, for example, speak of a *triangle* or of a *three-sided geometric figure*. The lexical units are different but the concept is essentially the same. Languages abound in different ways of symbolizing the same concepts.

This, I claim, is indeed what happened to the theological concept

of "salvation" during the time when the New Testament was written. In fact, at that time this idea of the divine intervention on and through Jesus Christ was so strongly charged with feeling within the 'cultural' circle of the church, that it stimulated a significant development on the lexical and semantic levels. This is in accordance with the 'semantic law' put forward by Sperber (1965:67) who argued that '...if at a certain time "a complex of ideas is strongly charged with feeling", this will affect semantic development.' (Sawyer 1972:41; cf also Ullmann 1964:83). 'Sperber's law' applies more specifically to the enrichment of a particular semantic area by way of metaphorical transference (cf Ullmann 1964:83-4; Sawyer 1972:41) - a fact which is obviously of direct interest to the present study. Various metaphors may in other words serve to express the same concept.

These metaphors, however, are represented by particular lexical units<sup>4)</sup>, and, in turn, these lexical units will evidently stand in a certain relation to each other. Thus they will constitute a *lexical field*. A lexical field, according to Erickson (1980:129), '...is a set of terms belonging together by virtue of their syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships.' In other words, in this case the focus is turned on the relations existing between various *lexical units*.

However, behind these lexical fields, there are certain semantic relations. It is because they are related in *meaning*, that some lexical units belong together within a particular lexical field. Since these meaning-relations form the primary interest of this thesis, preference is given to the term *semantic field*. The main aim is therefore to describe the relations between the various *semantic units* (rather than just the lexical units) covering the conceptual field of "salvation" in Paul's major epistles.

Louw (1982:44) states as a matter of principle that '...our starting point must be *meaning* rather than *words*.' The implication is that '...linguistically it is important that we must analyze meanings and the words signifying them rather than words and the meanings they have.' (Louw 1982:45).

If this approach is to be followed, one is immediately under pressure to answer the question as to what meaning really is. Nevertheless, on account of the fact that this question has been discussed in virtually every book dealing with the topic of semantics, it will be sufficient if only a very brief statement of the stance to be supported in this investigation, is inserted at this point.

Now, the views of Nida concerning this issue seem to fit in very well with the basic orientation of the present thesis. The paradigmatic relations between various units within a semantic domain (or semantic field) can also be regarded as a central concern of his approach. Therefore, his 'definition' of meaning seems very appropriate for the purposes of the present survey. He says:

In other words, the meaning consists of that set of necessary and sufficient conceptual features which make it possible for the speaker to separate the referential potentiality of any one lexical unit from that of any other unit which might tend to occupy part of the same semantic domain.

(Nida 1975b:26)

Of course, the reference to *conceptual* features may cause many to think that this approach is actually working with the idea of 'mental images' in the determination of meaning. Nida (1975a:14-15) is, however, quick to point out that '...the concepts the semanticist talks about when he speaks of meaning are sets of features defined by contrasts.' That is to say, the delineation of a particular meaning is not just a matter of putting together certain mental intuitions which are arrived at rather arbitrarily. On the contrary, it requires the rigorous application of procedure~ such as substitution and classification, in which constant attention must be paid to synonymity (equivalence of meaning in certain contexts), antonymy (complementary meanings), and hyponymy (inclusion of meanings, one within another) (cf Nida 1975b:196). Through the application of these procedures certain semantic units can be contrasted with each other, so as to highlight their common features of meaning, while at the same time the features distinguishing them from one another are clearly identified.

From this perspective, it seems, the relevance of Nida's previously

quoted definition of a *semantic domain* (being equal to what I prefer to call a *semantic field*) is quite obvious. He says:

A semantic domain consists essentially of a group of meanings (by no means restricted to those reflected in single words) which share certain semantic components.

(Nida 1975b:174)

Several aspects of this 'definition' will carry weight as far as the present thesis is concerned. A few of its most important implications are the following:

- The semantic field "salvation" will essentially consist of a group of meanings sharing certain semantic components.
- Priority shall therefore be awarded to meanings, rather than to the words signifying those meanings. The analysis of those meanings, however, will pave the way for the recognition of the relevant words signifying the particular meanings. Thus the analysis of the semantic field will eventually yield a picture of the lexical field involved.
- Nevertheless, the meanings to be analysed will by no means be restricted to those reflected in single words. On the contrary, it is likely that some meanings will be deduced from the description provided by some relevant pericope in its entirety. It is even possible that a pericope may not supply a specific 'catch word' for the particular meaning it conveys. In such a case a descriptive term will have to be coined in order to mark the meaning in question. (Evidently this point underlines the need for the inclusion of the method of 'discourse analysis' in the whole process of analysing semantic units - cf Louw 1982:91-158).
- The 'definition' also provides an important criterion for the delimitation of semantic fields. The limits of a semantic field, so it implies, are set by certain features (or components) of meaning common to all the semantic units within that field.

All these aspects, to be sure, are in need of some further explication. Because of its logical priority, we may first of all turn our attention to the last of these aspects.

### 2.2.3 Criteria for the delimitation of semantic fields:

Two areas that cannot be avoided in any attempt to study a specific semantic field, are, on the one hand, the delineation of the field in question, and on the other hand, the description of the relations between the various items within that field. So, for instance, the biggest portion of Erickson's study on the semantic field of *cognition* in the Pauline corpus (1980) is devoted to these two issues. They can hardly be dodged in the present discussion of semantic field theory. (For the second of these aspects, cf §2.2.4 below.)

In trying to determine the criteria for setting limits to a particular semantic field, one soon comes to the realisation that it is a rather tricky area. It is not quite so simple to decide what should be included, and what should be excluded from a particular field. In fact, many of the scholars who have thus far attempted a study of some semantic field within the Biblical cadre, openly admit that this decision is usually made on a rather intuitive basis. Even Barr (1968:12), in his article on 'The image of God in the book of Genesis', explicitly recognises that there is '...no absolutely objective criterion to guide us....' in assembling a group of words which could be considered the appropriate one for the semantic field of 'image, likeness, similarity'. Silva (1980:187) goes yet a step further by stating that, since the vocabulary itself has no clear-cut divisions to guide us in determining the boundaries of the semantic field, '...in the very nature of the case *any decision must be arbitrary.*' (his emphasis). So too Sawyer (1972:33-4) is quite open in admitting that, 'The criteria for building up this far larger field are in the last resort intuitive.' He does not experience this as a problem, however, seeing that '...intuition, imagination and hypothesis, far from being written off as "unscientific", are now being acknowledged more and more as essential factors in scientific progress.' (Sawyer 1972:34).

There are, of course, certain built-in precautions when this kind of intuitive approach is followed. Sawyer (1972:34), for one, stresses the point that '...intuition is only a starting point for semantic analysis, and no more.' The initial choice can always be altered, if

the following inquiries would indicate that some of the items are not as closely related to the others as they were deemed to be. For that reason Silva (1980:187) also prefers to include '...a broader sample of the material.' According to him it seemed better to err on the side of fullness of information (cf 1980:189).

In addition, this intuition does not stand opposed to, or even unrelated to scientific knowledge. On the contrary, they are very closely related. Therefore Sawyer (1972:34) claims that it is his knowledge of Hebrew that renders him competent to recognise words of related meaning intuitively.

Another precaution is to be found in Silva's insistence (1980:187) that the relevant items constituting a semantic field can only be discovered by a careful reading and re-reading of the text involved. Detailed attention must also be paid to the context (Silva 1980:187).

This last suggestion may perhaps be regarded as the first step in the direction of the measures proposed and employed by Burres (1970) and Erickson (1980) in an attempt to find an *empirical* method of establishing a specific semantic field. Even though Erickson (1980:152) acknowledges the fact that one can hardly expect to do away with intuition completely, he remains of the opinion that one can come much closer to an empirically verifiable semantic field by the implementation of Burres' 'extrapolation procedures'. These procedures are based upon the assumption that lexical items which are semantically related, will share certain 'selection restrictions' (or co-occurrence restrictions), so that it is likely that they will usually be found in similar syntactic 'environments' (cf Erickson 1980:154-5). Since these syntactic 'environments' are much more amenable to empirical treatment than the paradigmatic relations between various lexical units, they may be utilised with good effect, according to Burres and Erickson, in the establishment of semantic fields. Following this principle, Erickson starts with the two Greek verbs εἰδέναι and γινώσκειν, and then builds up a long list of lexical items occurring in the same syntactic 'environments' than these two.

Now, although their desire for empirical verification may be appreciated (it also corresponds with the desire to minimise the interference from our own cultural preconceptions in the determination of the meaning of ancient texts), and although it may be granted that syntagmatic relations are important in semantic analysis (cf §2.1.3.1 above), it remains difficult to escape the feeling that this method is drawing the boundaries of the semantic field in question so wide as to render it insignificant. In the end it becomes hard to recognise meaningful semantic relations between such a magnitude of items, and consequently many of them have to be ignored again, so as to reach a more manageable number of items to analyse. In fact, this is exactly what has happened in the case of Erickson's study (cf 1980: 275ff).

For the purpose of delimitating the semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles, Nida's suggestion in this regard (cf 1975b: 174) seems to be much more suitable and profitable. He states the principle in a straightforward manner: 'For any language, semantic domains consist simply of meanings which have common semantic components.' Even Erickson (1980:151-2) acknowledges this way of going about the issue as one of the promising and suggestive possibilities in this regard, since it involves the consistent application of a formal, structural criterion. In so doing it lends itself to empirical testing and verification.

It is obviously true, though, that this approach presupposes a prior componential analysis of all the items to be included in the set. Yet a componential analysis is not supposed to be done on any semantic unit in isolation; the necessary and sufficient features of meaning can only be determined in contrast with other items of related meaning (cf Nida 1975b:32). The implication is that a number of items have to be selected even before the process of analysis can commence. Thus we are forced to acknowledge that somehow the inclusion of items on the basis of 'scholarly intuition' can hardly be avoided. Once the analysis is conducted, however, it will immediately afford the information facilitating either the rectification or the verification of that initial choice.

Moreover, there are also some other factors that may serve as an aid in the selection of the appropriate items for a particular semantic field. It was Lyons (1963:41) who suggested that entry can be made into the semantic system of another language by way of the measure of *cultural overlap* in existence between one's own society and that within which a particular document was written. Of course, one has to be extremely careful not to impose the semantic distinctions of your own language and your own culture onto Paul's, for example. That would inevitably lead to a disastrous distortion of Paul's intentions.

With regard to the semantic field "salvation", however, one would probably be rather safe in assuming a certain measure of cultural overlap. "Salvation" being one of the most basic tenets of Christianity, one may reasonably expect that it would at least retain part of its original meaning and significance through the ages. That amount of 'overlap', so I claim, is sufficient to authorise the use of our own theological conception of "salvation" as one of the indicators in the delineation of the semantic field to be investigated.

Together with all the other factors mentioned above, and subject to all the necessary safeguards, this procedure ought to enable one to demarcate the field in question in a relatively simple way. Evidently, though, that would only be a starting point, and no more. Only the subsequent analysis will show whether the various items do indeed belong to the same field by virtue of their common semantic components.

#### 2.2.4 Mapping out the semantic field - componential analysis of meaning:

Once the tentative demarcation of the field has been completed, one can proceed with the more important task of describing the relations between the various units within that field. These relations, to be sure, are indeed vitally important, seeing that, in a certain sense, they can be regarded as the backbone of the whole semantic field

approach. The very core of this approach is namely to be found in the conviction that meanings should not be understood in isolation, but rather in *relational* terms (cf §2.1.3.1 above). In other words, within a specific semantic field all the different units acquire their meaning by virtue of the relations of correspondence and contrast they contract with each other.

In order to 'map out'<sup>5)</sup> these relations, however, many prominent scholars are nowadays making use of the method of componential analysis (cf Lyons 1977:317; also Botha 1981). In fact, according to Kempson's observation (1977:18), 'Many linguists have turned to what has been called componential analysis to give explicit representation of the systematic relations between words.' And, even though she herself remains sceptical about this method on various scores, she does concede that it can be made viable, and that it does provide a much more explicit, clear and economic way of characterising these relations (cf Kempson 1977:86-102).

Basically this approach to the description of meaning rests upon the thesis that meaning can be broken down into a set of its minimal distinctive features (cf Leech 1974:96). In other words, 'On this view the meanings of words are analysed not as unitary concepts but as complexes made up of components of meaning which are themselves semantic primitives.' (Kempson 1977:18). A very simple example of this may serve as an illustration (cf Leech 1974:96). If the meaning of the lexical items *man*, *woman*, *boy*, *girl* is analysed in terms of components of meaning, one finds that they are characterised from at least three different dimensions. They all share the component of being 'human', but they are distinguished from one another by the component of sex (they are either 'male' or 'female'), and the component of adulthood (in contrast to *man* and *woman*, *boy* and *girl* have not yet reached this stage). From this analysis it follows that the meaning of the lexical item *man* can be characterised in terms of the components of meaning 'human', 'male' and 'adult'. These three features are 'sufficient' to distinguish the meaning of *man* within the semantic field constituted by the four lexical units mentioned above.

According to Lyons (1977:317-8) we ought to distinguish between a European and an American version of componential analysis. The former started with the work of Hjelmslev and Jakobson, and was developed by people like Greimas, Pottier, Prieto and Coseriu. The American version, on the other hand, appears to have developed independently. There it was initiated by anthropologists (rather than linguists) as a technique for describing and comparing the vocabulary of kinship in various languages. Goodenough (1956:195-216), for example, wrote a leading article in which he formulated some general principles for the study of meaning in the light of the results he had obtained by applying the method of componential analysis in a research programme on Truk kinship terms. Some years later the work of these anthropologists was taken up and elaborated on by such scholars as Nida (1964, 1975b) and Weinreich (1972), as well as by Katz and Fodor (1963). Each of them, evidently, put their personal stamp on this componential approach. Even though they do have much in common, there are also quite a number of differences between them. For the purpose of this thesis, it is not necessary to discuss these differences. At this point a choice was made in favour of Nida's brand of the method of componential analysis (for a variety of reasons; cf Wilss 1976), and therefore we're going to stick to a discussion of his views in this regard. Only where necessary, reference will be made in passing to the variant views of these other scholars who share the conviction concerning the usefulness of the componential approach to meaning.

#### 2.2.4.1 Types of components:

The three types of components mentioned by Nida, are the following:

- Common components;
- Diagnostic components;
- Supplementary components.

The differentiation between these three types of components, it seems, goes hand in hand with the different functions they fulfil with regard to the various relations between the semantic units

within a particular semantic field. Thus the *common component* is an expression of that relation of correspondence between various units within the field. That is to say, these units have a certain element (or elements) of meaning in common, causing them to be regarded as belonging together in a single, coherent semantic field. There are, however, also some other components of meaning by which these different semantic units within the field are distinguished from one another - these are the *diagnostic components* (diagnostic, in the sense that they serve to distinguish). The third type, namely the *supplementary components*, are (as is indicated by their name) those semantic features that do belong to the meanings of the units of a particular set, although they cannot be regarded as essential in distinguishing the various meanings included in that set. In a certain context they may, however, be foregrounded, and thus become crucially important for the semantic analysis.

Beekman and Callow (1974:76-7) have the same three kinds of components in mind, but prefer to call them by other names. These alternative names may perhaps shed some additional light on our explanation above. According to them we should distinguish between *generic components* (generic in the sense that they are shared by all the units in the field); *specifying components* (they specify the contrasts between the various meanings in the field) and *incidental components* (incidental, because they are present in some contextual usages, but not in all).

Even Katz and Fodor's distinction (cf 1963:187) of *semantic markers* and *distinguishers* shows some resemblance to the distinction of common and diagnostic components outlined above. According to them, 'the semantic markers assigned to a lexical item in a dictionary entry are intended to reflect whatever systematic semantic relations hold between that item and the rest of the vocabulary of the language. On the other hand, the distinguishers assigned to a lexical item are intended to reflect what is idiosyncratic about its meaning.' Lehrer (1974:49) reminds us, though, that this distinction has come under a great deal of criticism, and that Katz seemed to be rather hesitant in using the notion of distinguishers, although he defended the distinction weakly in later works. For our purposes, we may

therefore leave this view aside, and continue to concentrate on the distinction proposed by Nida.

#### 2.2.4.2 Ordered relations between components:

In the example mentioned above, according to which the meaning of the lexical item *man* can be analysed in terms of the components 'human', 'male' and 'adult', there is obviously no need to arrange these components in a specific order. Nida (1975b:34) shows, however, that in many instances '...the components of a meaning have very important internal relations of order, of which temporal and logical are the most common.' He uses the lexical unit *repentance* as an example where the temporal order of the three diagnostic components is rather important. According to him *repentance* has the following components of meaning: (1) Some prior wrong behaviour, (2) contrition with respect to such behaviour, and (3) change or determination to change this pattern of behaviour.

This observation may prove to be essential with regard to the analysis of the various meanings involved in the semantic field "salvation". The same kind of temporal ordering of the components may well turn out to be one of the salient characteristics of this field.

#### 2.2.4.3 Differences in the roles of diagnostic components:

Closely coupled with the aforementioned, it should also be remembered that diagnostic components can function in different roles. Nida (1975b:38) suggests that these differences can be best designated as (1) implicational, (2) core, and (3) inferential.

According to Nida the *implicational components* '...are those implied by a particular meaning, though they do not form an essential part of the core meaning.' In the example mentioned above, the first component of meaning of the lexical item *repentance* is such an implicational component. The meaning of *repentance* always involves the implication that the person in question did something wrong.

The *inferential components*, on the other hand, '...are those which may be inferred from the use of an expression, but which are not regarded as obligatory, core elements.' (Nida 1975b:38). When we use the lexical unit *shot* in the expression *the policeman shot the thief*, the inferential component of the meaning of *shot* would normally be that the thief was killed. It is possible, however, to deny this inference by saying, *the policeman shot the thief, but didn't kill him*. This possibility clearly proves the point that these inferential components are not obligatory or essential to the meaning in question.

Obviously, the *core components* are those which are essential in order to distinguish the particular meaning from others in the same field.

#### 2.2.4.4 'Necessary and sufficient' components of meaning:

One of the regular points of criticism against the method of componential analysis, is the assertion that, 'There is, in theory, no limit to the number of markers that can be established.' (Palmer 1981:113 - 'markers' in the quoted sentence are equivalent to what we have termed 'components of meaning'.) This allegation is made on the assumption that '...any piece of information can be used to disambiguate and can thus function as a marker.' (Palmer 1981:113). According to Palmer this is the major drawback of the theory of componential analysis.

This problem arises, however, where the twin-theories of componential analysis and semantic fields (cf Lyons 1977:326) are separated from one another. Where their close relationship is acknowledged, it is quite possible to limit the number of components to those that are 'necessary and sufficient' in order to distinguish the particular meaning from others in the same field. Nida (1974:65) provides the following explanation:

The contrastive features may be said to include those particular components which are 'necessary and sufficient' to define the differences between the respective meanings. By this is

meant that if even one of the components is absent, the particular meaning could not exist: the components are necessary. Further, no other components are necessary to distinguish a particular meaning from others in its set: these components are sufficient.

For example, in the case of the semantic field including the lexical items *man*, *woman*, *boy*, *girl* (cf p 48 above), three components of meaning are 'necessary and sufficient' in order to define the differences between the respective meanings within that specific set. One can add a lot of information concerning each of these lexical items, but in order to distinguish *man* from the other three items in this set, you need no more, and no less, than the information provided by the components which we have already listed, namely 'human', 'male' and 'adult'.

#### 2.2.4.5 The notation of the components:

Another problem in connection with the componential approach, is the question as to how these components should be rendered. In linguistic circles it has become more or less customary to make use of capital letters in square brackets for the formal representation of these features of meaning (cf Kempson 1977:88-92; also Leech 1974:103). In addition, binary oppositions are commonly indicated by '+' and '-' signs (cf Lyons 1977:322-5; also Kempson 1977:88-92). All in all an attempt is made to keep the description of these components as brief and economical as possible. In any case they are supposed to be 'semantic primitives' (cf Kempson 1977:18). According to some, like Katz (1972:38), they can even be regarded as something like universal concepts which we do not really need to analyse further.

However, in my opinion it would be hard to maintain this assessment of the theoretical status of the components. It seems better to go along with the view advocated by Weinreich (according to Lehrer). Lehrer (1974:47) states:

Weinreich (1962) argues that there is no difference between the object language and the metalanguage - that is, the words

used in definitions of terms are no different in principle from the words defined.

Eco (1976:100) seems to be in agreement with this line of thought, where he emphasises '...how difficult it is to imagine a finite and universal set of theoretical constructs able to explain any shade of semantic difference.' Therefore he introduces the idea of an *interpretant*, originating from the philosopher, Peirce. According to Eco (1976:68) the interpretant should be conceived as another representation which is referred to the same 'object'. He explains:

In other words, in order to establish what the interpretant of a sign is, it is necessary to name it by means of another sign which in turn has another interpretant to be named by another sign and so on. At this point there begins a process of *unlimited semiosis*, which, paradoxical as it may be, is the only guarantee for the foundation of a semiotic system capable of checking itself entirely by its own means.

(Eco 1976:68)

This observation, I reckon, ought to be taken into consideration with a view to the notation of the components. In a certain sense, these components of meaning can be regarded as the interpretant of the semantic units in question. One should therefore not be unduly alarmed if they, in turn, are in need of an interpretant. And consequently there is no reason to refrain from using longer phrases in defining the components of a particular meaning. Nida's rendering of the meaning of *repentance* in terms of the components, (1) some prior wrong behaviour, (2) contrition with respect to such behaviour, and (3) change or determination to change this pattern of behaviour (1975b:34), is therefore quite in order. (Nida, for that matter, also refers to Peirce's notion of the interpretant, with the comment that '...much of what we are able to do in the analysis of meaning is dependent upon a feature of language which Charles Peirce called "the interpretant".' - Nida 1975b:26).

It seems likely that components similar to those used in analysing the meaning of *repentance* above, will have to be employed in describing the meanings of the various units belonging to the semantic field "salvation".

#### 2.2.4.6 Basic semantic classes:

Although the idea that components of meaning are to be understood as universal concepts, does not seem to hold water, Nida's contention about four basic semantic classes to which all meanings belong, appears to be perfectly sound (cf Nida 1975a:150-9). These four classes are the following:

*Objects, events, abstracts and relationals.*

Beekman and Callow (1974:68) label the same four classes as Thing, Event, Abstraction and Relation (abbreviated as T,E,A,R). They don't use the terms 'object' and 'abstract', in order to avoid confusion with the grammatical categories 'object' and 'abstract nouns'.

Nida (1975a:152) argues that, 'These four basic semantic classes not only exist in all languages but appear to be fundamental to the analysis of the meaningful relationships between all types of lexical forms.' Therefore the determination of these classes forms a very important element in the semantic analysis of lexical units (cf Nida et al 1983:75; also Beekman & Callow 1974:68-9).

Two things should be carefully noted in this regard. Firstly, it is important not to confuse these semantic classes with the syntactic classes, like nouns, verbs, etc. 'There is an obvious parallelism between semantic classes and syntactic classes, but by no means complete correspondence.' (Nida et al 1983:76). Thus many nouns may, for instance, express events, such as *forgiveness, redemption* and *pardon* (cf Nida 1975a:152).

The second thing to be kept in mind, is the fact that a particular lexical item may simultaneously have meanings belonging to more than one basic class. Nida (1975a:153) mentions *sanctify* as an example. It may namely be described as having a meaning which belongs to both the event and abstract classes, being equivalent to 'make holy'.

Both of these two factors are of direct relevance with a view to the semantic field "salvation". In fact, the noun *salvation*, as we have

it in the title of this thesis, is to be understood as referring to an event. So too with all the semantic units to be investigated. In all these instances the event side of the meanings will be brought into focus.

#### 2.2.4.7 Procedures in analysing the components of meaning:

According to Nida (1975b:64), 'The actual linguistic procedures employed in componential analysis consist of four types: naming, paraphrasing, defining, and classifying.' As far as the present study is concerned, two of these will acquire special significance, namely paraphrasing and classifying. The other two seem to be of a more limited applicability. We tend to agree with the following statement made by Loubser (1980:67):

Nida se suggestie dat mens gebruik behoort te maak van die referente van die objekte ten einde die diagnostiese betekenis daarvan vas te stel, lyk (myns insiens) slegs na 'n wenk met baie beperkte gebruiksaanwending. Buitendien is hierdie 'n maatstaf wat van buite die taal aan die woord/begrip self opgelê word....

Naturally, this critical remark may as well be taken to apply to the process of *naming*.

*Paraphrasing*, on the other hand, will certainly be playing a significant role in the componential analyses to be done in the rest of this dissertation. This procedure is namely closely related to the notion of an interpretant, discussed in paragraph 2.2.4.5 above (cf Nida 1975b:65). It may, once again, be illustrated with reference to *repentance*. For *repentance*, says Nida (1975b:65), '...one may employ a paraphrase: *he felt sorry for what he had done and determined to change his way of life.*'

Since *defining* is but '...a highly specialized form of paraphrase...' (Nida 1975b:65), there appears to be no urgent need for its implementation in this thesis.

The process of *classification*, however, deserves more attention.

According to Nida (1975b:66),

It involves a triple procedure: (1) lumping together those units which have certain features in common, (2) separating out those units which are distinct from one another, and (3) determining the basis for such groupings.

The last step, especially, is of vital importance. In our example concerning the set of lexical items *man, woman, boy, girl*, it is essential to determine on what basis they are grouped together, and on what basis they can be distinguished from one another. In other words, only if one is able to discover the fact that you need the dimensions of sex and adulthood in order to describe the meanings of these lexical items in their mutual relation, only then the point is reached where a proper classification can be done.



#### 2.2.4.8 The results of componential analysis:

Having determined the components of meaning in the ways suggested above, one ought to be able to draw that 'map' of the semantic field in question. That is to say, with the help of the components of meaning, one may be expected to characterise the relations between the various units within the particular field in '...a much more explicit, clear and economic way.' (Kempson 1977:86).


Now, from the analyses conducted by other people, it has become clear that there are '...four principal ways in which the meanings of different semantic units may be related to one another: inclusion, overlapping, complementation, and contiguity.' (Nida 1975b:15). Each of these relations, then, involves a specific combination of the components of meaning we have been discussing.

In the case of *inclusion*, the included meaning always adds at least one extra semantic component to the components of the meaning that includes it. It can therefore also be designated as *hierarchies* of meaning (cf Nida et al 1983:77-8), or as *hyponyms* (cf Lyons 1968: 453-4; also Leech 1974:101). In the hierarchical set *animal, mammal, cat* and *tiger*, the last unit shares all the semantic features of a specific meaning of *cat*, but it also has some extra component(s) of

meaning (cf Nida 1975a:32). The same goes for the relation between *cat* and *mammal*, as well as *mammal* and *animal*. One may diagram these relations, either as a set of concentric circles, or in the form of a tree diagram:




The *overlapping* relationship exists between meanings which would traditionally have been called synonyms. According to Nida (1975a:31), 'Overlapping meanings often have the same common and diagnostic components, in the sense that the related meanings may have referents possessing the same features, e.g. *father* and *daddy*, but they differ in certain emotive features.' They can also have the same components, but differ in the degree of such components, as in the case of *big* and *mammoth*. The following diagram may represent these relations:




When meanings stand in a *complementary* relation to each other, they usually share a number of semantic features, but on the other hand they show certain marked contrasts, even to the extent of being opposites (cf Nida 1975b:17). In a newer publication, Nida and others (1983:78) choose the name *contrastives* as designation for this relation. There are three major types of these contrastive sets of related meanings:

- positive/negative contrasts (or oppositions), like *good/bad*; *high/low*; *much/little*; *open/shut*; *here/there*, etc.
- reversives like *tie/untie*; *death/resurrection*; *alienate/reconcile*;
- reciprocals (or conversives), like *buy/sell*; *lend/borrow*; etc.

A possible diagrammatical representation of these relations may be the following:



The last, and certainly the most important of those four relations between semantic units (in any case, as far as the present study is concerned), is that of *contiguity*. Nida has used the more straightforward term *clusters* in order to characterise this relation (cf Nida et al 1983:77). Contiguous meanings cluster together in the sense that they are so closely related that they occupy a well-defined, restricted semantic field (cf Nida 1975b:18). In other words, they do share a number of common components, but they also differ significantly from one another in at least one crucial distinctive (or diagnostic, or specifying) component (cf Nida 1975a:30). The following diagram may serve as an illustration of this relation:



All these different ways in which semantic units can be related to each other, are important in the context of the present study. Even though the attention will be concentrated on the contiguous paradigmatic relations holding between the great variety of semantic units belonging to the semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles (cf §2.1.3.1 above), one cannot really determine the semantic components of those units, without paying some attention to the other relations as well. Finally, however, the synthesis of the results of the present investigation ought to show up a picture of this field which will at least resemble the diagram of the cluster of contiguous meanings above.

#### 2.2.5 Discourse analysis - aid to the scientific study of meaning:

It has already been indicated that the meanings to be investigated in this study, will by no means be limited to those reflected in single words (cf p 43 above). It is rather to be expected that a number of the meanings to be considered, will be those finding expression in longer stretches of Pauline discourse, even to the extent of paragraphs and pericopae.

The fact that the study of meaning should be concerned with much more than just the study of the meaning of words, and even of sentences, is nowadays almost unanimously recognised by New Testament scholars in South Africa, due to the leadership of Professor J.P. Louw in this field (cf Lategan 1978:27). He played a major role

in developing what has come to be known as the South African discourse analysis (cf Louw 1973; 1978; 1979a and 1982). Since this method has been explained in a variety of publications<sup>6)</sup>, and since practical illustrations of its application can be found in several editions of *Neotestamentica (Journal of the New Testament society of South Africa)*,<sup>7)</sup> no more than a very brief statement of its value for the present study is required at this point.

Louw (1982:95-6) explains the essence of this approach to meaning in the following way:

Discourse analysis based upon the use of colons is nothing more than a technique for mapping the form of a text in such a way that the syntactic relationships of the constituent parts can be most readily recognized. The syntactic relationships are crucial since they point most clearly to the semantic content. Thus by recognizing the colons as the first step in procedure, one can advance systematically to uncovering the meaningful units which may be said to 'flow out of' or 'emerge from' these syntactic structures. By analyzing not only the internal structure of individual colons, but also the relationships between colons, one can determine in a significant way the manner in which meaningful units cluster together and thus provide a satisfactory basis for a semantic interpretation of a text.

From this statement one may draw the following implications relevant to our study:

#### 2.2.5.1 The colon as unit of analysis:

The first step, then, in applying the method of discourse analysis to a particular passage, is to mark out the so-called *colons*. This procedure involves the recognising of units of a certain *syntactic structure* on the surface level of the segment of discourse to be analysed (cf Combrink 1979:3-4). The colon can namely be defined in syntactic terms as  $S \rightarrow NP + VP$  (Lategan 1978:27), with all the possible 'embeddings' that can be added to both the noun phrase (NP) and the verb phrase (VP), as long as it remains a single grammatical construction (cf Du Toit 1977:1). As such the colon constitutes a very useful unit of analysis, since, on the one hand, it can be easily identified, being a closely linked complete construction, and

on the other hand, it can be readily linked to other colons to form important semantic groupings, seeing that from a semantic point of view it is essentially equivalent to a so-called proposition (cf Louw 1982:96).

#### 2.2.5.2 Colon clusters, paragraphs and pericopae:

Having divided the passage into its constituent colons, the next step will be to establish the patterns (or structures) of coherence according to which those colons are bound together. It can namely be stated as a matter of fact that '...colons always cluster together to form larger thematic units.' (Louw 1982:116). This is probably due to the fact that, 'Anyone using language - except in the case of an unsuccessful expression of language - is naturally applying structuring.' (Du Toit 1974:55). Very often one does this without even being aware of it; it may, however, also be deliberately executed.

The criteria used in grouping the colons together, it seems, are still in need of a more thorough formalisation. Even though Vorster (1977:14) remarks that text cohesion is determined with the aid of formal categories, it is probably more true to admit with Du Toit (1981b:4) that the whole process is to a certain extent being conducted on a rather intuitive basis. Although the use of 'thematic markers' may be quite valuable, they can certainly not be regarded as sufficient.

Some attempts have nevertheless been made to put these criteria on a stronger footing. Louw (1982:116), for one, suggests that paragraphs are '...often marked in a formal way, for example, by transitional particles, repeated words, parallel or chiasmatic structures, or introductory and/or terminal statements.' In his study Loubser (1980:27-39) adds a number of other factors to be taken into account. The most important, probably, is that he takes advantage of a system developed by Nida for the classification of semantic relations in secondary semantic configurations (cf Nida 1975a:50-65). According to

this system there are basically two types of semantic relations between sentences, (or shorter clause-like constituents), namely, coordinate and subordinate relations. However, these can again be subdivided into a number of subcategories. Loubser avails himself of this classification system in order to show how colon clusters (and even larger units) are built up according to a 'binary-hierarchical' pattern. Even though one may beg to disagree with Loubser's views on the existence of the so-called 'binary-hierarchical' structures, his application of Nida's classification system seems to afford a very valuable contribution towards a more regulated criterium for the establishment of colon clusters and even larger units of discourse.

In passing we need to mention the fact that the term *cluster* will in this thesis be employed to describe the grouping of a few colons, whereas *paragraph* will be used for the combination of two or more clusters, and *pericope* for the combination of two or more paragraphs.

#### 2.2.5.3 Discourse analysis and the determination of meaning:

Louw (1982:95) states explicitly that semantics is the ultimate aim of the type of discourse analysis he is advocating. Even though it is true that one is, to a large extent, working with syntactic categories, like the colon, when applying this method of analysis, the primary interest lies with the meaning of the text. As it was observed by Lategan (1978:27), 'This syntactic unit is used to map out the basic structure of the text in order to prepare a controlled transition from the syntactic to the semantic level.'

Discourse analysis, it seems, can assist in the determination of meaning in several ways (cf Du Toit 1974:72-5). Two of those ways are particularly significant in relation to the present study. On the one hand, it may serve as an aid in pinning down the meaning of a specific lexical item, or of a phrase or a sentence (cf Du Toit 1974:74). The importance of structure to semantics, says Du Toit (1974:56), '...appears, inter alia, from the fact that, the more firmly a section has been structured, the easier the meaning of a speci-

fic component can be determined because it is clearly outlined and defined by the structure.'

On the other hand, discourse analysis may be instrumental in coming to terms with the meaning of an entire section of discourse. Meaning, as we have already stated, is not necessarily vested in single lexical units; a long explanation is sometimes needed in order to express a very specific meaning. Therefore Nida (1975c:188) also indicates that '...new concepts are almost always symbolized by phrases before they are symbolized by words. In fact, at the very first instance a new concept may require a whole paragraph or even an entire article in a scientific journal for a satisfactory identification.' In the same trend Du Toit (1974:56) observes that, 'It is not the individual words and even sentences that convey the intention of the speaker or writer, but the ordered whole within which these words and sentences function.'

Since some of the meanings to be investigated in this thesis do indeed fall in this last category, there is little doubt that this method will be utilised. It will be done in the expectation that this type of analysis will yield the kind of results which can be scientifically defended. By this we do not mean, however, that discourse analysis is the only scientifically defensible method of semantic investigation. In fact, I tend to agree with Vorster (1982: 138) when he says:

Precies zoals door middel van andere methoden slechts bepaalde vragen die men aan de tekst stelt, beantwoord worden, zo is het ook met de *diskoersanalise*. Deze kan slechts gebruikt worden om het samenstel van een tekst, zijn binding en zijn samenhang, te bepalen. Tevens kan worden vastgesteld wat de semantische implicaties van deze structurering zijn. Dit betekent niet dat de *diskoersanalise* beschouwd kan worden als een alomvattend uitleggingsproces. Evenals de *Formgeschichte* en de *Redaktionsgeschichte* of welke andere methode ook is de toepassing beperkt tot het doel waarvoor deze is ontworpen. Het belang van deze methode is dat de autonomie van de tekst gehandhaafd blijft.

ENDNOTES.

- 1) From the vast spectrum of literature available in connection with the theory (or rather, theories) of 'semantic fields', the following few may be recommended as being particularly useful for the purpose of a general orientation and introduction: Trier (1973a: 1-26; 1973b); Öhman (1951:72-90); Ullmann (1957:152-70); Van Heerden (1965:70-141); Geckeler (1971) Ullmann (1972:370-4); Lehrer (1974); Vasilyev (1974:79-93); Coseriu & Geckeler (1974:114-29); Nida (1975b:174-93); Lyons (1977:250-60); Nida, Louw & Smith 1977: 139-67); Berger (1977:137-59); Coseriu (1978:53-77); Erickson (1980:112-33).
- 2) 'After J. Trier had ceased publishing on field theory, L. Weisgerber continued these ideas in the spirit of their founder, so that nowadays we can quite correctly speak of the Trier-Weisgerber field theory as of one single conception.' (Coseriu & Geckeler 1974:118). Cf also Lyons 1977:250.
- 3) In all fairness it must, however, be admitted that the Afrikaans translational equivalents might well cause some confusion at this point. The Afrikaans word 'betekenisveld' (= 'Bedeutungsfeld') has no exact equivalent in English, except for 'semantic field'. Therefore, if Vorster (1979:13), for instance, distinguishes between 'betekenisveld' and 'semantiese woordvelde' (which become 'semantiese domeine' on the next page), the distinction is clear enough in Afrikaans, but in English it falls away. Both 'betekenisveld' and 'semantiese domein' become 'semantic field' in English.
- 4) Because of the ambiguity in the use of the term *word*, it will as a rule be avoided in this thesis. The terms *lexical item* or *lexical unit* will be employed instead. In linguistic circles this is more or less common use nowadays. For an explanation of this preference, we may refer to a statement made by Kempson (1977:79-80): 'On the one hand, one might say that there is one word *tap* having various different meanings, as in the expressions *to give someone a tap on the shoulder*, and *a water tap*; but on the other hand, one might say that these expressions contain two different words *tap*. Words, in this latter sense of *word*, are often referred to by the term *lexical item*, and from now on I shall use this separate term, and shall, in general, restrict the term *word* to the phonological complex.' Cf also Lyons 1968:197-8.
- 5) In his discussion of the relation between words and conceptual domains, Nida (1975c:189) employs the figure of a *map*. He says: 'Instead of relating words to thoughts as one does the two sides of a single coin, it is better to conceive of words as constituting a set of maps of conceptual domains. First of all, a map is not the domain. It belongs to an entirely different dimension. Furthermore, it does not include all the details nor does it specify the content of each identified area or place. But most important of all, a map only marks off the boundaries and as such merely shows the limits of certain territories in relation to others.' This, it seems, would also be a good way of explaining

the goal we would like to accomplish by means of componential analysis: it will help us to 'map out' the semantic field "salvation"; that is, it will enable us '...to mark off the boundaries...' by drawing '...the limits of certain territories in relation to others.'

- 6) Apart from the works of Louw already cited, one may find some further orientation in this field by consulting the following publications: Du Toit (1974:54-79); Vorster (1977:12-17); Lategan (1978:18-30); Combrink (1979); Du Toit (1981b:4-6); Riekert (1981:7-17); Vorster (1982:127-52). Loubser (1980) also makes use of this method, but then in his own peculiar way. A more critical assessment of the method can be found in Deist (1978:260-71) and Van Rensburg (1982:83-9). The latter proposes a related, but alternative method.
- 7) The following editions are of special significance in this regard: *Neotestamentica* 11 (1977) and 16 (1982) (cf their addenda for a discourse analysis of the Greek text of the entire Gospel of Matthew); also *Neotestamentica* 13 (1979) (its addendum provides an analysis of the Johannine letters). In relation to the present study *Neotestamentica* 15 (1981) deserves to be mentioned specifically; its title is: *Salvation by faith. Aspects of Pauline soteriology in Romans*; and it contains several discourse analyses of passages from Paul's letter to the Romans.

CHAPTER 3.

METAPHOR.

A memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate for the one as a lens for seeing the other....

(Black 1962:236)

In the previous chapter we took a close look at some of the linguistic principles and procedures required for the analysis and explanation of the semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles. It is now the time, however, to turn our attention to that other factor expected to play a determinative role in the process of coming to an understanding of the field in question, and that is namely the literary and stylistic issue of metaphor.

The fact that Paul's language pertaining to "salvation" should be understood in terms of metaphor, has already been suggested in the introductory chapter of this thesis (cf §1.1.3 above). Some of the problems arising from the very nature of metaphoric language were also mentioned in passing. It is obvious, nevertheless, that a much more thorough investigation of the whole matter is now called for. On the one hand, it is necessary to get a clear impression of the essential nature of metaphor. That will have to include an attempt at relating it to the linguistic principles outlined in the previous chapter. This relation, it seems, can be stated in terms of the theory of semantic fields, but also with reference to the notion of 'components of meaning'. Then, on the other hand, the requirements of the present study demand that we pay closer attention to the problems involved in the translation and revitalisation of metaphors. Finally, a brief discussion of the use of metaphor in speaking about God and his actions will serve as a bridge facilitating the transition from the theoretical and methodological section to the substantial section of this thesis.

### 3.1 General orientation - the essential nature of metaphor:

Metaphor has been the subject of scholarly investigation ever since the time of Aristotle, and even before that (cf Bohnen 1984:97). As a result, a whole range of theories have been proposed in the course of time, characterising the essential nature of metaphor in an astonishing variety of ways (cf Shibles 1971a:295). As far as the present study is concerned, there is no need to consider all those different theories in detail. A mere outline of some of the possibilities may, however, serve to distinguish the particular view to be supported in this thesis more clearly.

#### 3.1.1 Different theories of metaphor:

Although general consensus concerning the classification of the various theories of metaphor appears to be elusive, one will probably find considerable agreement on the one presented by Mooij (1976:29-38). It may therefore be taken as a guideline.<sup>1)</sup>

Mooij (1976:31) differentiates between the theories on account of their evaluation of the referential capacity of metaphor. Those allowing for a dual reference in metaphorical words, are called *dualistic* theories, and those finding only a singular (abnormal and non-literal) reference in the metaphorical word, are called *monistic* theories. In terms of this basic distinction, the following scheme emerges:

- A. *Monistic theories*: loss of reference to literal extension in metaphorical expressions.
  1. Connotation theories: meaning of metaphorical words taken to be explainable on the basis of part of their literal meaning ('connotations').  
Examples: A. Reichling, M.C. Beardsley, Jean Cohen, Robert J. Matthews.
  2. Theories according to which the meaning of metaphorical words is explainable on the basis of other features of their literal use.  
Example: the substitution view.
  3. Theories according to which the meaning of metaphorical words is not explainable.  
Example: Martin Foss (supervenience view).

B. *Dualistic theories*: reference to literal extension is maintained in metaphorical expressions.

1. Comparison theories.

Example: Paul Henle.

2. Interaction theories: There are two subjects in a metaphor, one of which is conceived in terms of the other.

Example: Wilhelm Stählin, Karl Bühler, I.A. Richards, Max Black.

(Mooij 1976:37)

Of late the last of these different possibilities seems to be the one favoured by most of the prominent scholars (cf Bohnen 1984:104). Seeing that it is also particularly suitable with the view to the requirements of the present field of research, we need to focus the attention for a while on some of the salient features of this view.

### 3.1.2 Notable characteristic of the 'interaction theory' of metaphor:

Richards (1965:93) posits one of the fundamental tenets of this perspective on metaphor with his statement that,

...when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a result of interaction.

Obviously this statement implies that there are at least two essential ingredients in a metaphor: on the one hand, the co-existence of two thoughts about different things (for the description of which the two terms *tenor* and *vehicle* were introduced by Richards - cf 1965:97), and on the other hand, the constitution of meaning by virtue of the *interaction* between those two thoughts (the tenor and the vehicle).

Max Black, one of the strongest proponents of this view in recent history (cf Boshoff 1979:55), qualifies this interaction in terms of the functions of a lens, or a filter. His statement, already quoted right at the beginning of this chapter, gives pointed expression to his conviction, namely that,

...metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly

appropriate for the one as a lens for seeing the other...

(Black 1962:236)

In other words, using the terminology coined by Richards, we could say that the vehicle is used in order to gain perspective on the tenor; the tenor is seen through the lens (or filter) of the vehicle.

We may refer to the often quoted metaphorical expression, 'man is a wolf', in order to illustrate the point. In this expression 'man' (the tenor) is seen through the lens of 'a wolf' (the vehicle). In fact, the meaning of this expression is obviously constituted by the interaction between these two elements. A transaction takes place, even a transfer of contexts (cf Boshoff 1979:56). As it is stated by Stählin: 'Es findet ein Austausch der Merkmale, eine Vereinigung der beiderseitigen Sphären, eine Verschmelzung von Bild und Sache statt.' (cf Mooij 1976:74). According to Bühler this process may be characterised as 'a screening of spheres' ('Sphärendeckung'), and even as 'a fusion of spheres' ('Sphärenmischung') (cf Mooij 1976:76).

It is evident, of course, that there is a certain amount of *tension* between the tenor and the vehicle in the expression 'man is a wolf'. If only the standard lexicon meanings of 'man' and 'wolf' would be considered, the statement would indeed seem to be incongruous. This tension, however, is one of the essential features of a true metaphor, according to Ricoeur. A real metaphor is supposed to meet one with some kind of a shock, as a logical absurdity (cf Shibles 1971:66-9), which Ricoeur (1975:78) prefers to call a 'semantic impertinence'. This semantic impertinence is due to what Gilbert Ryle described as a 'category mistake' (that is: 'The presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another.' - cf Degenaar 1970:297). In the case of metaphor, however, this 'category mistake' is deliberately committed; in other words, it may be regarded as a 'calculated error' (Ricoeur 1975:78; cf also Degenaar 1970:297). In this way one is challenged to see the subject (the tenor) from a new perspective. Therefore,

Metaphorical interpretation consists in transforming a self-defeating, sudden contradiction into a meaningful contradiction. It is this transformation which imposes on the word a

sort of a 'twist'. We are forced to give a new meaning to the word, an extension of meaning which allows it to *make* sense where a literal interpretation does not make sense.

(Ricoeur 1975:78).

In this whole process only a selection of relevant features from the sphere of the vehicle are brought to bear on the meaning of the tenor. In the case of the example quoted above, for instance, only some of the semantic components of the lexical item 'wolf' can be regarded as applicable to 'man' (such as being cruel and ferocious, etc.). Often these are the so-called supplementary components of meaning (cf §2.2.4.1 above); that is, incidental features which are not essential to the delineation of the central meaning of that lexical unit. Black refers to these as '*...the system of associated commonplaces.*' (cf Mooij 1976:79). Among others, like Reichling, they are known as 'connotations' (cf Boshoff 1979:57). In discussing the use of *father* as a name for God, Nida (1975b:35) therefore also says that,

The potentiality for using a term such as *father* in these extended meanings depends primarily not upon the existence of certain diagnostic components but upon certain supplementary components of meaning, called 'connotative features' in some systems of semantics. Figurative extensions of meaning are based either on supplementary components and/or reinterpreted diagnostic components.

(As far as the present study is concerned, the latter possibility seems to be the appropriate one.)

The basis upon which the interaction between the tenor and vehicle of metaphor takes place, is usually taken to be that of *resemblance*. In other words, we can say 'man is a wolf', since man, as a matter of fact, resembles a wolf in certain respects.

Resemblance, however, seems to be more specifically associated with the so-called 'substitution theory of metaphor' (cf Ricoeur 1977: 173-87). (Selfevidently it will also play a significant role with regard to the 'comparison view'.) When metaphor is taken to be a mere substitute for a more literal expression (or word), there is clearly but one way to account for this substitution, and that is by pointing

to their likeness or similarity. And, in accordance with the 'comparison view', metaphor is sometimes characterised as an abbreviated simile (i.e., a simile without the explicit mentioning of the fact that the one thing *is like* the other - perhaps Caird 1980:144-59 comes rather close to this view).

What, then, is the relation between the 'interaction theory' and the idea of resemblance? It seems as though adherents to this view are a bit more careful in their estimation of the value of resemblance in its relation to metaphor. Richards, for example, even goes to the point of arguing that the interaction between tenor and vehicle does not necessarily come about on account of their resemblance. He contends that,

...there are very few metaphors in which disparities between tenor and vehicle are not as much operative as the similarities.... The peculiar modification of the tenor which the vehicle brings about is even more the work of their unlikeness than of their likeness.

(Richards 1965:127)

Ricoeur (1977:173-215), on the other hand, recognises the fact that even in the 'interaction theory' there is room for the idea of resemblance, but then it should be carefully noted that metaphor, rather than just registering a resemblance, is actually instituting one. The work of resemblance, says Ricoeur (1975:79) is to render close what was 'distant'. By means of that 'calculated error' (cf p 70), '...metaphor discloses a relationship of meaning hitherto unnoticed between terms which were prevented from communicating by former classifications.' (Ricoeur 1975:79).

Thus it becomes clear that metaphor is much more than a mere stylistic figure. Contrary to the purely rhetorical conception of metaphor, where it is taken to be a simple substitution for a more literal expression, Ricoeur (from the point of view of the 'interaction theory') sees metaphor as '...a veritable creation of meaning....' (1975:79). In essence it is to be regarded as a *semantic innovation*. It is not just an ornament in discourse which can be replaced without any significant loss of meaning. It is, *par excellence*, the tool to be used in the description of new experiences for which there is no ready-

made linguistic resource available.

Against this background Ricoeur (1975:80) comes to the conclusion that metaphors give birth to new semantic fields. In his own words:

Metaphor has more than an emotional value. It includes *new information*. In effect, by means of a 'category mistake', new semantic fields are born from novel rapprochements.

Obviously this last statement is of particular importance for the present study. The reference to semantic fields provides a direct link with our discussion in the previous chapter. And it is precisely in this connection that Kittay and Lehrer (1981) have come up with suggestions which may render a valuable service in the development of our argument in the rest of this thesis.

### 3.2 Semantic fields and the structure of metaphor:

In a recent article Kittay and Lehrer (1981:31-63) make a deliberate attempt to relate the linguistic notion of a semantic field (explained in §2.2 above) and the interaction theory of metaphor (discussed in §3.1.2 above). They state the following as a central claim in their paper (which is more illustrated than argued for):

...that in metaphor the lexical items from one semantic field are transferred to another semantic field and that the structure of semantic relations of the first field (which we will call the *donor* field) provides the structure or reorganizes some previous structure of the second field (which we call the *recipient* field).

(Kittay & Lehrer 1981:32)

Coupled with this claim, they also propose '...to construe the unit of metaphor in terms which require the analysis of larger portions of discourse.' (1981:31). They believe the word, and even the sentence, to be insufficient as units of metaphorical meaning. At least three consequences may be drawn from these seminal statements:

#### 3.2.1 Interaction between semantic fields:

Hitherto the main concern of the interaction theory of metaphor has

been with the measure of interaction taking place between the tenor and vehicle of a particular metaphorical statement. Even though Ricoeur (1977:65-100) has undertaken a complete study about 'Metaphor and the semantics of discourse', it must nevertheless be said that even this study hardly goes beyond the limits of the sentence.

It is obvious, therefore, that Kittay and Lehrer are introducing the notion of a semantic field in order to broaden the basis of interaction. According to them it is not just a case of singular elements interacting with one another; it is rather a case of a whole bundle of related items being brought to bear upon another field of meaning.

In this regard we should take note of the fact that the semantic fields, as they are understood by Kittay and Lehrer, are constituted by both the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic relations holding between various lexical items (cf 1981:33). Evidently the implication is that their fields are very broadly structured. (As for the present study, of course, it has been decided to put the emphasis on the paradigmatic relations, without necessarily excluding all syntagmatic considerations - cf §2.1.3.1 above).

### 3.2.2 The influence of the donor field on the recipient field:

In their paper Kittay and Lehrer submit a rather convincing demonstration of the fact that the structure of the semantic relations in the donor field tends to impose a particular structure on the recipient field. This is so because of the fact that the various lexical units belonging to the donor field maintain their semantic relationship even when they are transferred to another field. Therefore Kittay and Lehrer may rightfully state that, '...a significant portion of a lexical field is transferred from one domain to another and imposes a structure on the recipient domain. It is not the case that each word is transferred independently.' (1981:34). To illustrate the point, we may perhaps quote their example in full:

For example, *hot* and *cold* are antonyms in the temperature

domain. When transferred to athletics, a *hot* basketball player is one who shoots accurately and a *cold* one misses his shots. The antonymy of the pair is preserved. Moreover, other terms in the first domain, *warm* and *cool*, are also available for transfer. A *warm* player would be interpreted as one who made most of his shots and a *cool* player as one who missed many but also made some.

(Kittay & Lehrer 1981:33-4)

This peculiar conduct of related lexical items was in fact observed by Hans Sperber quite a long time ago (in 1923), when he formulated the following law:

Wenn zu einer bestimmten Zeit ein Vorstellungskomplex so stark affekbetont ist, dass er *ein* Wort aus den Grenzen seiner ursprünglichen Bedeutung hinaustreibt und es veranlasst, eine neue Bedeutung anzunehmen, so ist mit Bestimmtheit zu erwarten, dass derselbe Vorstellungskomplex auch andere ihm angehörige Ausdrücke zur Überschreitung ihrer Verwendungssphäre und damit zur Entwicklung neuer Bedeutungen treiben wird.

(Sperber 1965:67)

Caird (1980:153-9) is also working in the same direction when he refers to the high or low *development* of a metaphor. He defines development as '...the extent to which in any given instance elements of the vehicle are exploited by the user.' (1980:154). According to him,

Some metaphors readily lend themselves to high development because they belong to a metaphor system, i.e. a group of metaphors linked together by their common origin in a single area of human observation, experience or activity, which has generated its own peculiar sub-language or jargon.

(Caird 1980:155)

Obviously this idea of a 'metaphor system' (or a group of metaphors) comes very close to the notion of a semantic field.

Some Biblical examples of such a high development of metaphor, as quoted by Caird (cf 1980:156-7), may be mentioned in passing. He pertinently refers to the metaphorical use of Exodus language (in relation to 'redemption'), as well as the language of sacrifice and the law-court. The latter, for instance, as a metaphor for the relationship between God and his people, was developed to include references to the judge, who condemns the wicked and upholds the

cause of the weak and helpless, but also to the advocate, the litigant, the witnesses, etc.

Without doubt, it seems, this aspect of the relation between metaphor and the theory of semantic fields, will have to be taken into consideration in our attempt to analyse and understand the soteriological metaphors in Paul's major epistles.

### 3.2.3 Larger portions of discourse as units of metaphorical meaning:

The third consequence to be drawn from Kittay and Lehrer's suggestions, namely that metaphor should be analysed in terms of larger portions of discourse, also seems to fit in remarkably well with the kind of approach advocated in the previous chapter of this thesis (cf §2.2.5 above). In fact, the method of 'discourse analysis', which is to be implemented at various points in the remainder of this dissertation, may even be said to provide a firmer basis for the proposals of Kittay and Lehrer - a basis which they themselves did not take into account, of course.

The point at stake, for Kittay and Lehrer, is the fact that, in some instances, a larger unit of discourse is required in order to decide whether a particular sentence is literal or metaphorical. According to them, the insistence of recent thinkers, like Max Black and his associates, on the fact that only sentences can properly be said to be metaphors, is not yet sufficient. They can namely claim by the same argument '...that sentences are not always the smallest unit of metaphor for there are entire sentences which can be read as literal or metaphorical.' (cf 1981:31-2). As an example they choose the sentence, *The rock is brittle with age*. In the context of geological processes, this sentence is obviously literal, but it is metaphorical if applied to an ageing professor.

It must therefore be accepted that the literary context is a factor to be considered in the recognition and interpretation of metaphor.

In any case, as Kittay and Lehrer (1981:32) observe, 'The analysis of metaphor as it appears in these larger units is particularly amenable to treatment in terms of semantic field theory.'

### 3.3 The translation and revitalisation of metaphor:

In view of the specific task we have set out to accomplish in this thesis, we cannot avoid a discussion of two of the most difficult problems confronting us in connection with metaphor, namely its translation and revitalisation. Seeing that this thesis is being written in English (and not in Koine Greek), translation will inevitably be required. On the other hand - as it has already been stated in the introductory chapter (cf §1.1.3) - many of the Pauline metaphors in the semantic field "salvation" have become part of the theological jargon, and therefore need to be 'revived'. Somehow these two problems may be treated together, seeing that a good 'dynamic equivalent translation' (cf Roberts 1974:7-20) can make a valuable contribution towards the revivification of some of the Biblical metaphors.

That the translation of metaphor poses a very serious problem, hardly needs to be proved. Ricoeur (1976:52), for example, claims outrightly that real metaphors are not translatable. Even De Waard (1974:111), in an article about the translation of Biblical metaphors, concedes that '...very frequently, the translation of metaphors as such, with the exception of loan-metaphors, appears to be impossible.'

One may assume that there are many different reasons for this state of affairs. The most important one is probably the fact that metaphor is very often based on culture-bound supplementary components (cf Loewen 1975a:229). Obviously, being tied so closely to culture, one experiences numerous difficulties in trying to transfer it to another language. Most likely the culture of that other language will require that the same idea be expressed in a totally different way (cf Loewen 1975b:434-5).

The problem of cultural differences, however, remains a factor even

in those instances where the metaphor is based on reinterpreted diagnostic components of meaning (rather than the supplementary components - cf Nida 1975b:35). Even the diagnostic components may namely be culturally determined, although, in general, they are not as closely tied to the culture as the supplementary components.

This problem, of course, becomes more and more acute as the cultural gap widens (cf Fawcett 1970:52). The further we are removed from the time that the metaphor was originally created, the bigger the cultural differences, and the more difficult it becomes to translate that metaphor.

Moreover, culture is not the only factor hampering the translation of metaphors. According to Ricoeur (1976:52) the very fact that metaphor is essentially a matter of semantic innovation, renders its translation almost impossible. That creation of a novel relationship between two apparently unrelated semantic fields, so characteristic of true metaphor, can hardly be duplicated with the same vigour in another language.

Yet, we have no choice but to try and translate the Biblical metaphors. The question is therefore how it can be done with a minimum loss of impact. Loewen (1976:201) offers the suggestion of four basic types of adjustment a translator can make (cf also De Blois 1985:209-14):

1. He can retain the biblical figure in the translation.
2. He can fill in the missing parts of a figure that is not complete in the Bible.
3. He can replace the biblical figure with a different but equivalent figure from the language he is translating into.
4. He can restate the meaning of a figurative expression in plain words.

Looking at these possibilities, it is clear that only the first and the third will yield a metaphor in the 'receptor language' (cf Beekman & Callow 1974:21). The first, however, is viable only as long as it does not give rise to a semantic distortion (cf De Waard 1974:112). Nevertheless, for metaphors based on reinterpreted diagnostic components it remains a strong possibility. (At this point it should

be noted that we expect the metaphors under discussion in this thesis, to be of this kind.)

The third possibility mentioned by Loewen also deserves favourable consideration, but then one ought to be very careful not to introduce any negative or unwanted components of meaning (cf De Waard 1974:115). In any case, according to De Waard (1974:115) this procedure must always be given priority over the possibility of replacing the figure by a non-figure.

The second and fourth of Loewen's alternatives amount to a 'demetaphorisation', which implies, of necessity, a considerable loss of impact of the message (cf De Waard 1974:112). In fact, Loewen himself concedes that, even though changing a figurative expression into a non-figure may result in a readily understandable translation, it causes the expression to lose its 'punch' (1976:205). Therefore he strongly recommends that,

...if one has to render a number of biblical figures as non-figures, there should be a compensating effect in which non-figures of the original are now rendered as figures in the translation.

(Loewen 1976:205)

The second of the possibilities mentioned above may also include the procedure of changing a metaphor into a simile (cf De Waard 1974:114). This method, it seems, is rather frequently employed by some newer translations, such as the *Good News Bible*. As the fourth alternative, it is, however, equal to what Ricoeur (1976:52) takes to be a paraphrase of metaphor. After stating that a tension metaphor is not translatable, he remarks: 'This is not to say that they cannot be paraphrased, just that such a paraphrase is infinite and incapable of exhausting the innovative meaning.' (Ricoeur 1976:52).

If it is possible, then, as we suspect, to make a translation in which Paul's figures in connection with "salvation" are retained, one thing ought to receive careful attention, and that is namely the use of 'translational equivalents' (or 'translational substitutes' - cf Vorster 1979:14-5) capable of bringing out the metaphorical quality of the expressions in question. In other words, the translation can

help to resist the tendency in metaphors to lose their vitality and freshness, thus becoming dead metaphors. And where this process has already gone through, a well-chosen 'translational equivalent' may even serve as a catalyst in the reversing of the process.

If the translation of a metaphor is a problem, then its revitalisation is perhaps even more so. Yet we believe it to be possible.

In this regard, it appears to be necessary to take another look at some further suggestions made by Kittay and Lehrer in their article on the relation between the notion of semantic fields and the structure of metaphor. According to them,

The liveliness of the metaphor is more likely a function of the degree of the sustained difference between two fields (a difference which is exploited in the process of reordering one field by means of another) than a function of the time of its initial utterance.

(Kittay & Lehrer 1981:56)

In other words, as long as there is some kind of a tension between the donor field and the recipient field, the various metaphors involved will remain lively. But as soon as the use of the metaphors in the recipient field no longer causes one to recall the donor field, the writing is on the wall for those metaphors. Or, to quote yet another statement by Kittay and Lehrer (1981:56), one can also say that '...a metaphor remains a live (and lively) metaphor as long as the domains of the two fields employed in the metaphor are structured differently in some significant manner....'

The important question is now: how can that tension be revived in cases where it has completely faded, or where it is in the process of fading away? How do we manage to reinstitute that interaction between the donor field and the recipient field?

Various answers can be given to this question. The obvious one, though, is to say with Caird (1980:153) that, 'A dead metaphor may be revived by restoring it to the original context of its vehicle...'. It is obvious because, as we have already seen, metaphors are often very closely tied to the culture in question. Caird (1980:153) uses the terms justification and redemption as an example of dead meta-

phors (since they have become technical terms of a theological jargon), and says that they may be revitalised by recalling their original setting in law court and slavery.

To say this, however, is actually to say that some sort of a paraphrase should be undertaken. Having quoted Ricoeur's remark in this connection, we ought to realise that such a paraphrase is not very likely to produce the required effect. It can, of course, be done in a sermon, but to a certain extent it will always lack that 'punch'! As Goldingay (1977:358) has observed, 'It is not enough to *explain* what atonement, sacrifice, substitution are; a metaphor that needs explaining is thereby shown to have lost its force.'

Another possibility, which has already been mentioned above, is that of a well-chosen 'translational equivalent'. Referring to the same example quoted by Caird (namely justification), one may for instance think of the way in which it is rendered in the new Afrikaans translation of the Bible. At various places the 'translational substitute' which is supplied for δικαιοσύνη is 'vryspraak' (= 'acquittal' - cf Rm 1:17). Now, assuming that the 'original setting' of justification is indeed the law court (there are of course some commentators who deny this fact), this would actually be a well-chosen 'translational equivalent'. Whereas 'justification' or 'righteousness' hardly conjures any association with the law court (for the ordinary Christian in any case), the term 'acquittal' immediately brings the law court to mind. Thus it may really be functional in the creation of meaning.

As for the procedure to be followed in this thesis regarding the revitalisation of Paul's soteriological metaphors, it may just be said that a combination of the possibilities mentioned above will have to be implemented. It is hard to choose the one or the other.

### 3.4 The use of metaphor in speaking of God and his actions:

In his treatment of the theological relevance of metaphor, Jüngel (1974:110) remarks: 'Die Sprache des Glaubens ist durch und durch

metaphorisch. *Gott* ist ein sinnvolles Wort nur im Zusammenhang metaphorischer Rede.' Although this may seem to be quite a radical statement, we cannot but agree with it. In fact, it has to be fully acknowledged that man has but one way to speak of God and his actions, and that is in terms of the tangible reality around us (cf Berkhof 1973:68-75). Caird (as quoted by Fawcett 1970:30) expresses this truth by saying,

Faith speaks, and necessarily speaks, in the language of one world, the world of sense and sight, concerning the things of another world, the world unseen and eternal. It presents the spiritual to us through images borrowed from the sensible and external.

This is true of the Bible as a whole. There is no special language in the Bible which is reserved for the description of God and his deeds. It is rather the case, as it is observed by Fawcett (1970:31), that the '...symbolic language of the Bible constantly appropriates images derived from sense experience and uses them as windows on the transcendent reality which is its concern.' Therefore one may also endorse the statement made by Van Es (1979:162) saying, 'We hebben gezien, dat in God-talk een zaak aan de orde komt die ons niet buiten de metaforen om bekend is. Als er een zaak ("God") is, komt die zaak in de metaforen ter sprake.' He even goes to the point of saying that '...literal assertions that can be made about God are empty. If one wishes to give them content, then that must occur by way of metaphors.' (Van Es 1979:184).

In the light of the preceding discussion on metaphor, it must of course be emphasised that these 'images' that are being used as 'windows on the transcendent reality', are not to be regarded as mere ornaments in the discourse, or as a matter of pictorial illustrations. They are true semantic innovations (cf §3.1.2); as metaphors they are, in the words of Wilder (as quoted by TeSelle 1975:37), '...works of the imagination, loaded, charged and encrusted with every kind of figurative resource and invention.' Like all other metaphors, these too are their creator's '...way to try and define something for which there is no dictionary meaning; ...his or her attempt to be precise and clear about something for which ordinary language has no way of talking.' (TeSelle 1975:39).

This observation, it seems, finds special application in the New Testament witness to Jesus Christ. His advent to this world, and more especially his death and resurrection, inaugurated such a completely new dispensation in the history of salvation, that the authors of the New Testament, and Paul in particular, had to harness all the power of their imagination in order to describe its meaning and significance. But, once again, they had to do it with the common, ordinary language and the 'images' well-known to the people of their own day. However, by putting these familiar words and phrases in a new context, metaphors were created by which new meaning was generated. As TeSelle (1975:37) remarks, 'There are no "technical" words in the New Testament, no words with special meanings; there are only words which have been made to mean more than they usually mean.' This same idea is well formulated by Jüngel (1974:77) in the following (rather lengthy) quotation:

Für Luther galt es als notwendig und gewiss, *omnia vocabula in Christo novam significationem accipere in eadem re significata*. In diesem theologischen Grundsatz spricht sich die allgemeine hermeneutische Erfahrung aus, dass Wörter ihre Bedeutung aus dem Zusammenhang beziehen, in dem sie gebraucht werden. Für die Theologie entsteht damit aber ein besonderes Problem. Denn *in Christo* ist gegenüber *allen* Zusammenhängen, in denen Wörter sonst gebraucht werden, ein eschatologisch neuer Zusammenhang gegeben, der allen in *diesem* Zusammenhang gebrauchten Wörter notwendig eine neue Bedeutung gibt. Der Zusammenhang, der durch den Namen Jesu Christi angesagt wird, ist aber, da er keine eigenen Wörter zur Bezeichnung der ihm eigenen Sachverhalte mit sich bringt, auf Wörter aus anderen Seinszusammenhängen angewiesen, die dann in dem gegenüber allen Weltzusammenhängen eschatologisch neuen Zusammenhang *ἐν χριστῷ* als Metaphern fungieren müssen. Die Sprache des Glaubens ist durch *μεταφορα* konstituiert.

Looking at the semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles from this point of view, one soon discovers that he is indeed using a great variety of familiar 'images' and ordinary experiences in order to 'interpret' the good news about this action of the triune God for the believers in the different congregations. Obviously not all his metaphors are original with him. In fact, quite a number of them could probably be described as 'stock metaphors' (Caird 1980: 152) supplied by the long Old Testament tradition regarding the saving activities of Yahweh. No doubt this was a well-established, and also a well-developed tradition in the history of Israel. Bearing

this fact in mind, one should of course be on the lookout for the trap of an 'over-translation' (cf De Waard 1974:113). In other words, if something had already been a dead metaphor when it was employed by Paul, we should not try to revive it.

On the other hand, one may certainly infer from Jüngel's statement quoted above, that even those stock metaphors were invested with a new vigour and vitality when they were applied to the redeeming actions wrought in Jesus Christ. That is, it may be assumed that Paul himself was, in a certain sense, busy with the revitalisation of well-known metaphors! Metaphors, not only from the Jewish and Old Testament tradition, but also from the other cultural circles to which the young congregations belonged.

Furthermore, Paul was evidently not just involved in the revivification of stock metaphors, but also in the creation of new ones. This we hope to demonstrate in the following section of this thesis.

In these different ways, I contend, an entirely new semantic field was born (cf Ricoeur 1975:80). It is a field consisting of elements taken from an amazing variety of other fields, with which they still maintain a relation of interaction. Yet, they do have certain semantic features in common, by which they can be identified as belonging to this new field. In this thesis, as it must be obvious by this time, this particular 'cluster of metaphors' (cf Porter 1983:33-42) will bear the title: 'the semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles'. It is to the delineation and explication of this field that we now proceed.

ENDNOTES.

- 1) There are of course quite a number of other possibilities with regard to the classification of theories of metaphor. To mention but a few alternatives, we may refer to the following: Shibbes (1971b:13-14 - containing a discussion of W.M. Urban's criteria for the classification of different theories); Ortony (1980:2); Ricoeur (1974:46).
- 2) Ricoeur's basic views concerning the semantics of metaphor are more or less repeated in the following of his publications: 1974:46-9 (in German); 1975:75-88 and 1976:46-53. The full explanation of these views is of course supplied in his well-known book *The rule of metaphor* (1977).

86.

SECTION B.

DOWN TO THE BIBLE.

CHAPTER 4.

DEMARCATIION OF THE SEMANTIC FIELD "SALVATION" IN PAUL'S  
MAJOR EPISTLES.

The first step in procedure for any such analysis involves a tentative selection of meanings which appear to be closely related, in the sense that they constitute a relatively well-defined semantic domain by virtue of sharing a number of common components.

(Nida 1975b:54)

The stage has now been reached where we can really get down to the Bible. Having considered a whole range of methodological and hermeneutical questions pertaining to the study at hand, we may now proceed with their application to the New Testament material subject to our investigation.

First of all, then, it is evidently important that we should outline the field to be taken into consideration. Both the semantic field approach and the procedure of componential analysis require that the research be commenced with a selection of the meanings to be studied in conjunction with each other. It remains essential, even though we have to admit that this selection often takes place on a rather intuitive and even arbitrary basis (cf §2.2.3 above). Its importance is namely connected to the fundamental semantic principle that meaning should be analysed in relational terms, and not in isolation (cf §2.1.3.1 above).

One must, nevertheless, keep the fact in mind that this initial selection is only tentative (cf Nida 1975b:54). It must therefore be evaluated for what it purports to be, namely as a starting point and no more. Only the analyses to be conducted in the next chapter will reveal if the selection has been properly executed (cf §2.2.3 above).

Since the formal criteria for the delimitation of semantic fields have already been discussed in paragraph 2.2.3, no further comment is required in that regard. Before the outline of the field can be drawn, however, a few matters relating to the substance of the semantic field "salvation" in particular, have to be given some thought. The first of these, is the term "salvation" itself.

#### 4.1 "Salvation":

There is an obvious need for a proper qualification of the term "salvation" as it is found in the title of this thesis. Common sense warns us that this is a term susceptible to too many interpretations. Precisely because it is such a central component of Paul's theology (cf Pelser 1985:242), and of theology in general, different people may attach different values and different interpretations to this term. Therefore it has to be stated quite emphatically that the term "salvation" will be used in this thesis in a very specific meaning.

The particular meaning to which the term "salvation" will render a service in the present study, may be qualified in the following ways:

- It is to be understood as an *event word* (cf §2.2.4.6 above). In syntactical terms, of course, the lexical item *salvation* is to be qualified as a noun, but semantically speaking, it can either be employed as an event word, or as a state resulting from an event. In the context of the present deliberations, however, the event side will persistently be in the centre of our concern. Consequently only those texts in Paul's major epistles dealing with "salvation" as an event, will qualify for consideration.
- The basic *semantic components* (cf §2.2.4.1) of "salvation" as an event are the following (cf Van Deventer 1977:57):
  - a) Someone finds himself in a *distressful situation* (this is of course an implicational component - cf §2.2.4.3 above).
  - b) A *change* in this situation is effected by the *intervention* of someone else (this is the core component of this meaning).

c) Negatively the *distress is relieved*, and positively the person *is brought into a blissful position* (this may be regarded as an inferential component - cf §2.2.4.3).

Although these features may be described as the diagnostic components of "salvation" in this particular meaning, they may well turn out to be the *common components* shared by all the different semantic units belonging to the semantic field "salvation". As such, they will most likely play an important role in identifying the different meanings to be included in this semantic field (cf §2.2.3 above).

- For the clear distinction of the meaning in which the term "salvation" will be used in the present context, it is also necessary to specify that it is by *God's intervention* that the change in the distressful *religious* situation of man is brought about. In other words, this meaning which is generally applied in the field of ordinary human interaction, now becomes a 'lens' through which the interaction between God and man is viewed. By this 'reinterpretation' of diagnostic components, two distinguishable semantic fields are brought to bear upon one another, and thus a *metaphor* is created (cf §3.2 above).
- The fact that the change from a distressful to a blissful religious position is effected by the intervention of *God*, will also serve as a limiting factor in the demarcation of the field in question. That is to say, only those meanings will qualify for consideration in which God is directly involved as the *Author of the change*. But then 'God' must be understood in terms of the Trinity (cf §4.2.2 below). There are, nevertheless, also some other exceptions to this general rule. For example, when Paul says in 1 Corinthians 9:24 that he has become all things to all men, that he might by all means *save* some, he is obviously thinking of the same event of "salvation" outlined above, but he is certainly not thinking of himself as the real author of that event. He is but the agent through whom God himself is accomplishing that change (cf 1 Cor 9:17 and 2 Cor 5:20). Therefore this instance, and similar ones, may also be included in the same field of meaning.

- Lastly, it must also be stressed that the term "salvation", as it occurs in the title of this thesis, and as it has been explained above, should actually be understood in a very broad way. It is namely supposed to cover the whole conceptual domain of "salvation". However, that is not to say that it is vague. On the contrary, it is well-defined, but it is broad in the sense that it *includes many other meanings*. Therefore its diagnostic components may serve as common components for a whole cluster of other related meanings. In each of these other meanings some component(s) is/are added to these basic ones which they share. This fact further implies that "salvation", as it is used here, should not be equated with the meaning of such Greek lexical items as σωζω and σωτηρία, even though they may sometimes serve as vehicles for this particular meaning. In the present context, however, the term "salvation" should first and foremost be seen as a common denominator for the whole range of metaphors depicting God's intervention in order to bring about a radical change in our relation to himself.

Seen in this light, the term "salvation" itself provides a number of significant clues for the delimitation of the semantic field to be investigated. It will namely guide us to all those meanings in which God himself is the Author of an event in which the religious position, or the religious state of sinful man, is radically transformed.

One should, of course, take note of the fact that the field to be formed in this way, will essentially be a field of *paradigmatically related* semantic units (cf §2.1.3.1 above). In other words, it will focus on one aspect of the whole process of salvation; it will concentrate on the many different ways in which Paul is describing *God's contribution* in the saving event. Even though the human 'contribution' of faith cannot be completely ignored, it will inevitably receive only minor attention. The whole problem of the role of faith in the process of salvation will not even be addressed. In the same way, (and for the same reason), the other means of salvation (like the cross), and even the results of salvation (like eternal life), will not really be taken into consideration. It is inevitable, therefore, that the study will be 'one-sided'; but it is so by choice!

#### 4.2 Other theological considerations in relation to this particular field:

When one comes to the examining of the semantic field constituted by the term "salvation" as it was defined above, you are immediately forced to take cognisance of at least some of the basic structures by which the 'theology' of Paul (in general) is characterised. Two such fundamental theological structures which are of direct relevance to the study of "salvation", are the following:

##### 4.2.1 The eschatological frame of reference:

In his article on the soteriological symbolism in the writings of Paul (cf §1.2 above), Theissen (1974:282) takes the stand that there is no need to distinguish between salvation as an already accomplished fact, and that which is still to come. The basis for his argument in this connection is a particular view on Paul's eschatological frame of reference. He says:

Im folgenden wird nicht zwischen schon realisiertem und zukünftigem Heil unterschieden. Eschatologie ist futurische Soteriologie. Und es sind dieselben soteriologischen Bilder, die Gegenwärtiges und Zukünftiges meinen können.

(Theissen 1974:282, footnote 1)

This thesis of Theissen will be supported in the present study. In other words, no major distinction will be drawn between salvation as a reality of the present, and salvation as a future prospect. The same metaphors, I claim, are employed to characterise the saving event wrought by the intervention of the triune God, both in the present and in the future.

In order to back up this claim, however, a brief explanation of that 'eschatological frame of reference' is certainly required. What particular view of this 'fundamental structure' (cf Ridderbos 1975:44-53), underlying even Paul's idea of salvation, are we to uphold?

When Paul's 'eschatology' is considered, the reference is obviously

not just to his treatment of the so-called 'last things'. Eschatology, in the sense in which it has become a crucial factor in the field of New Testament interpretation during the twentieth century,<sup>1)</sup> does indeed concern itself with the end-time, but then in a very special way. It is namely asserted that, in the eyes of Paul in any case, Christ had inaugurated the end-time by his coming to this world, and more especially, by his death on the cross and his resurrection. Through these events, thus Paul believed, God's promises in the Old Testament had been fulfilled; the time of the ἔσχατον, which was so eagerly awaited by the true believers, had dawned; the Kingdom of God had come (as the synoptic Gospels would have stated it). Therefore Paul could for instance say: 'The hour of favour has now come; now, I say, has the day of deliverance dawned.' (2 Cor 6:2 - NEB).

Yet, on the other hand, one can hardly doubt that Paul was also fully aware of the fact that the final judgement and the final resurrection, the final wrath and the final bliss, were still outstanding. In other words, he knew perfectly well that the end had not yet finally come. Thus his eschatology was characterised by a certain amount of tension between the *already* and the *not yet* (cf Ridderbos 1975:52-3).

This 'tension', it seems, arose from the conflation of two very important factors that had exerted their influence on Paul, namely the redemptive-historical scheme of contemporary Judaism (and of the Old Testament), on the one hand, and the Christ-events on the other. Kümmel (1973:145) reckons that,

...Paul took over the eschatological expectations of contemporary Judaism, but in consequence of the primitive community's belief in the resurrection of Jesus Christ has reshaped it so that a contradictory conjunction of future expectation and belief in the present eschatological salvation results.

Ridderbos (1975:51-2) is essentially in agreement with this view, but puts a very strong emphasis on the fact that the first of these factors was *completely reshaped* by the second. In his own words:

What is so remarkable about Paul's eschatology is that although he avails himself of all kinds of traditional terms and ideas, yet it is distinguished from all forms of the contemporaneous Jewish eschatological expectation and bears a completely inde-


pendent character. Now this has its origin in the fact that Paul's eschatology is not determined by any traditional eschatological schema, but by the actual acting of God in Christ. This is the fundamental christological character of his eschatology.

(Ridderbos 1975:51-2)


Bornkamm (1971:198) shows forth the same sentiment when he says that '...the eschatology which Paul took over he conscripted into the service of the gospel; he did not reinterpret the gospel in the light of tradition, but the latter in the light of the saving event.'

Several attempts have been made to compare the traditional Jewish schema of the history of salvation with that of Paul in diagrammatic form (cf Cullmann 1951:82; Ladd 1974:68-9). Further to these attempts, Coetzee (1985:324-5) provides the following rather illuminating diagrams:

\* Diagram 1 - *The Old Testament and rabbinic view of the aeons:*



\* Diagram 2 - *The Pauline (and New Testament) perspective of the aeons:*



According to Coetzee (1985:325) the main difference between these two perspectives (as depicted by the diagrams), is to be found in the fact that '...the revelation in Jesus Christ has made it known that the great "day" of the Lord's eschatological coming in and through his Messiah is *actually a two-phase coming*, whereas the Old Testament prophets and Judaism looked for it as a single day.' (his emphasis; cf also Venter 1985:40-1). The main consequence of this difference is of course bound up with the fact that it clearly involves an 'overlapping' of the two *aeons* during the time between Christ's first and second coming. During this time between the resurrection of Christ and his *παρουσία*, the so-called 'present evil age' and the expected 'age to come' can be said to co-exist. As it is formulated by Ladd (1974:369):

Within the history and the world as it exists in the old age, redemptive events have taken place *whose essential character is eschatological* in the sense that in all previous thought they belonged to the Age to Come. (his emphasis).

In this light, one may presume, it is evident why I can claim that Theissen (1974:282) is justified in taking the stand that he does. The metaphors which are customarily employed with reference to the 'Age to Come', can as well be used for the saving events of the time we now live in, seeing that the 'new age' (or the *ōlām habbā* in Jewish terms) was actually inaugurated by the resurrection of Christ (cf Ladd 1974:370), even though the 'old age' continues to exist.<sup>2)</sup> Therefore Paul can, for example, on the one hand say that we *were saved* (ἐσώθημεν - Rm 8:24) or that we (you) *have been saved* (ἐστε σωθησόμενοι - Eph 2:8), and on the other hand that we *shall be saved* (σωθησόμεθα - Rm 5:9, 10). He can also treat justification as an accomplished fact (cf Rm 3:24; 5:1), or as something to be expected (cf Gl 5:5). In view of his eschatological frame of reference, so I judge, this could have happened with any of his soteriological metaphors, even though the same thing cannot be demonstrated in all the cases from the material available. The indications are in any case sufficient as to validate its being taken into account as far as the structure of the present study is concerned.

#### 4.2.2 The trinitarian perspective:

Without getting involved in a full-fledged discussion of the trinitarian problem, and even without trying to define the intra-trinitarian relationships, it may be assumed as a matter of fact in the present context that, according to Paul, Father, Son and Holy Spirit are all three very intimately involved in the whole saving event. This assumption can be made on the ground that, even where there is considerable divergence in the views of scholars concerning the trinitarian *nature* of God, there is widespread agreement on the fact that God is revealed as the triune God in his *actions*.<sup>3)</sup> It is namely true that the doctrine of the Trinity was not developed as a result of some speculations concerning the nature of God, but rather in response to his revelation of Himself in the actions of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit (cf Durand 1976:71-6). According to Wainwright (1962:6),

The early Christians were more interested in the message of salvation than metaphysics, and their theology reflects this interest. They were concerned with the activity rather than the nature of God. ...they expounded the divinity of Christ partly by describing the functions which he fulfilled. The trinitarian problem was presented and answered by reference to Christ's activity towards mankind.

Looking at the issue of the Trinity from this perspective, normally serves as a safeguard against speculation. Actually it underlines the fact that, even though some of the 'concepts' used in connection with the Trinity (such as 'the one Substance' and 'the three Persons') may appear to be speculative, the essential scope of this doctrine is not liable to the same suspicion. By way of this doctrine, one may argue, the church essentially wants to bear witness to the fact that God himself, in the very essence of his being, lives, acts and reigns as the one and only God, but in a threefold manner. This is also the conclusion with which Durand (1976:76) closes his chapter on the Trinity. He says:

Al doen die begrippe spekulatief aan, die skopus van die trinitariese belydenis is dit allermins. Ten slotte wil dit nie meer sê nie as dat God self in die eintlikheid van sy God-wees van ewigheid af en daarom ook in sy openbaring, drievuldig as die Een, Enige leef, handel en regeer.

(Durand 1976:76)

Even from this single statement about the issue, it is already evident that the trinitarian perspective bears in itself certain consequences for the present study. For one thing, it must be stressed that, even though we usually draw a definite line of distinction between the roles of the Father, the Son and the Spirit in the 'economy of salvation', one ought to be very careful not to 'overplay' this distinction. In fact, it may even be stated that, where the Son is active, there the Father is also involved, and where the Spirit is present, there He, so to speak, re-presents the Father and the Son.

If it is true, then, as it was observed by Wainwright (1962:260), that Paul '...accepts a threefold pattern of Father, Son, and Spirit by which he describes the activity of God....', one must still be aware that, in Paul's mind, only one God is involved. Wainwright (1962:257-8) draws attention to the fact that this threefold pattern is found, not only in isolated formulae, but also in the outline of some of Paul's writings. Particularly in the outlines of Romans, 1 Corinthians and Galatians (which are more carefully planned than Paul's other letters), clear traces of the triad Father, Son and Spirit can be detected (cf Wainwright 1962:258). So, for example, Wainwright (1962:257) provides the following division of the first eight chapters of Romans:

Introduction, 1.1-17.

The judgment of God upon Gentiles and Jews, 1.18-3.20.

Justification through faith in Jesus Christ, 3.21-8.1.

Life in the Spirit, 8.2-30.

Concluding paragraph, 8.31-9.

Even if one would prefer to divide these chapters in a different way, the fact remains that Father, Son and Spirit alternatively play the major roles in the respective sections. With reference to "salvation" in particular, (and when not only the letter to the Romans is considered), these different roles would traditionally have been labelled in the following way: the Father - planning the salvation from eternity; the Son - executing that plan of salvation; the Spirit - applying the benefits to the individual believers. It could also be described in terms of the initiative by the Father, the justification by the Son, and the sanctification by the Spirit.

However, as it has already been stated above, the *unity* of the Trinity will find due recognition in this thesis, in the sense that activities ascribed to the Father, or the Son, or the Spirit, will all qualify for inclusion in the semantic field "salvation", as long as these activities comply with the distinguishing features of this particular set of meanings, as it was defined above. Pelser's statement (1985:244) in connection with the functional identity between God's acts and those of Christ, seems to lend support to this line of interpretation. In his discussion of God as the initiator of salvation in the Pauline soteriology, the following remark catches the eye:

...it is clear that *functionally God's acts and those of Christ were identical*. Paul certainly upholds the conviction that in the action God took the initiative, yet he acted in no other way than through Christ, and in this context 'through Christ' means that in it all Christ was actively, willingly involved.

In the same way, one may add, the Spirit's salvific activities may also be regarded as functionally identical with those of the Father and the Son, in the sense that they form part of that intervention by which God is transforming the religious situation of sinful man.

#### 4.3 Why only the major epistles?

The title of this thesis pertinently specifies that only the restricted field of Paul's four major epistles will be taken into account. In other words, only the letters to the *Romans*, the *Corinthians* (both of them), and the *Galatians* will be examined so as to find out what they contribute in the line of the semantic field "salvation". One should pose the question, however, as to whether this procedure is justified.

When scholars concentrate on a particular author, they usually seem to try and include as much of his work as they have available (cf Silva 1980:189). Seeing that, in the case of a New Testament study, we are anyhow tied to a 'closed text' (cf Erickson 1980:139), people feel that we need to get as representative a sample as possible. Otherwise one might in certain instances lack some critical material required for the proper distinction of related meanings. Where the

examination of synonyms, for example, is limited to a particular corpus, '...it may very well happen that the corpus contains only contexts in which two words are interchangeable and not the CRITICAL contexts in which they are not.' (Lepschy, as quoted by Erickson 1980:141).

Although these considerations cannot simply be brushed aside, there seems to be sufficient reason to believe that the particular approach to be followed in the present study leaves room for the proposed restriction. The following factors may serve to justify this supposition:

- In the forthcoming study we intend to focus the attention on *meanings*, rather than just on lexical items (cf §2.2.2 above). These meanings will then be described in terms of semantic components (cf §2.2.4) - a procedure by which the relations between contiguous meanings can be identified in a much more explicit, clear and economic way. For that reason already, a very extensive sample may prove to be rather unnecessary.
- In determining the components of a particular meaning, longer stretches of Pauline discourse will sometimes have to be considered (cf §2.2.5 above). This fact in itself may necessitate the limitation of the material, seeing that it will involve the examination of entire pericopae.
- In general it must also be stated that, even with the imposition of the suggested restriction, the field in question will border on the unmanageable. Being the one field that was very strongly 'charged with feeling' (cf Sperber 1965:67) in the early Christian community, it was naturally inclined towards semantic development.

It must of course be conceded that such a limitation of the material to be investigated, will inevitably have some negative consequences. The following one deserves to be mentioned:

- Obviously the study can then not be said to cover the entire seman-

tic field "salvation". In the other Pauline epistles there may be some other related meanings qualifying for inclusion in this field. Moreover, on a still wider basis, the Koine Greek, as spoken in the time of Paul, may very well have comprised a number of meanings belonging to the same field, but not attested in the letters of Paul. In other words, we'll not be able to claim that Paul's *langue* (his competence in the use of Koine) has been investigated; the study will basically concern itself with an analysis of his language in the sense of *parole* (his performance in the use of Koine) (cf Lategan s a:109-12).

There are, nevertheless, a number of advantages too in restricting the field of investigation as proposed. The following are worthy of consideration:

- By including only the four so-called major epistles in the study, one may avoid much of the controversy about the *authenticity* of the letters. Even when F C Baur and the Tübingen school questioned the authenticity of most of the letters traditionally ascribed to Paul, these four letters were not disputed (cf Kümmel 1975:250). In other words, one is rather safe in taking them to be authentic Pauline writings. Of course, it does not exclude the problems posed by various partition theories, but these can be dealt with more competently when they present themselves in the course of the study (and then only if they are really relevant to the study).
- A second obvious advantage is to be found in the fact that the *time span* of the various writings under discussion, is narrowed down considerably by this limitation. Most scholars deem these four letters to have been written within a relatively brief period of time - probably between AD 52 and AD 56 (cf Du Toit 1985:33-4). It is reasonable to accept, I presume, that Paul's thoughts on the topic of "salvation" would not have changed so significantly during such a brief period of time.

All in all, the advantages of concentrating this study on Paul's letter to the Galatians, his first and second letters to the Corin-

thians, and his letter to the Romans, seem to outweigh the disadvantages. In the final analysis, nonetheless, this restriction must be seen, not so much as a matter of principle, but rather as a practical arrangement so as to ensure a manageable field of research. And in this light, I feel, the procedure seems to be perfectly justified. The study can always be extended by someone else.

#### 4.4 Outline of the semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles:

In the following outline, three principal strategies (of division, and of description) have been employed. These are:

-- The field is divided in terms of the various *cultural spheres* to which the different metaphors for "salvation" owe their origin. Four major sections will emerge from a division in these terms, namely the soteriological metaphors from the sphere of *social interaction*, then from the sphere of *biological and physiological transformation*, also from the *cultic and ritual* realm, and finally from the *technical* sphere of life. The incentive for this principle of division comes from Theissen (1974), who, however, only discerns two such 'cultural spheres' as constituting the nursery, so to speak, of the different soteriological symbols used by Paul. His field is namely divided in terms of 'soziomorphe Interaktionssymbolik', on the one hand, and 'physiomorphe Verwandlungssymbolik' on the other hand (cf §1.2 above). He himself copied this idea from Topitsch. He says:

Der Begriff 'soziomorph' stammt von E. Topitsch: Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik, 1958, 1-32. Topitsch unterscheidet bio-, sozio- und technomorphe Modelle. Um die unbelebte Natur ggf. mit einzubeziehen, wird im folgenden von physio- anstatt von biomorphen Symbolen gesprochen.

(Theissen 1974:285, footnote 5)

As for the present study, however, it seems useful to apply the same idea, but then in the slightly modified form as explained above. To us there appear to be at least the four different spheres already mentioned, and by distinguishing them, one can obviously



καταργεῖσθαι, δικαιοῦν.

- c) *A change of ownership*: the transfer from one sphere of power to another.

Rm 6:1-23.

ἐλευθερωθέντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας δουλωθέντες  
δὲ τῷ θεῷ.

- d) *Adoption*: slaves become children.

Rm 8:12-17, 23; Gl 4:1-6.

υἰοθεσία.

- e) *Acceptance*: receiving someone into an association.

Rm 11:15; 14:3; 15:7.

πρόσληψις, προσλαμβάνειν.

- f) *Justification*: the acquittal of the guilty (the restoration of the covenant relationship).

Rm 3:21-31; 5:15-19; 2 Cor 3:9.

δικαιοῦν, δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, δικαίωμα, δικαίωσις,  
κατάκριμα, κατάκρισις.

- g) *Remission of sins*: wiping away the guilt.

Rm 4:1-8; 11:26-27; 2 Cor 5:19;

(Eph 1:7; Col 1:14).

ἀφεῖναι, ἐπικαλύπτειν, οὐ λογίζεин, ἀποστρέφειν,  
ἀφαιροῦσθαι (mid. as act.).

- h) *Reconciliation*: enemies become friends.

Rm 5:1-11; 2 Cor 5:11-21.

καταλλαγή, καταλλάσσειν.

- i) *Glorification*: given to share the splendour.

Rm 3:23; 8:18-30; 2 Cor 3 (vs 18 in particular).

δοξάζειν, 'μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν'.

- j) *To make rich*: poverty turned into wealth.

2 Cor 6:10; 8:9; 9:11; (1 Cor 1:5).

πλουτεῖν, πλουτίζειν.

- k) *Giving victory*: the loser becomes a winner.

Rm 8:37; 1 Cor 15:54-57; 2 Cor 2:14.

υπερνικᾶν, δοῦναι νῖκον, θριαμβεύειν.

- l) *Winning over*: a profit is gained.

1 Cor 9:19-22.

κερδῆσαι.

m) *Calling*: the creative word establishing a new identity/status.

Rm 9:25-26.

'καλέσω τὸν οὐ λαόν μου λαόν μου'.

#### 4.4.2 Soteriological metaphors from the sphere of biological and physiological transformation:

a) *Dying and rising*: entering into a new realm of life.

Rm 6:1-11.

'εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγονάμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα'.

b) *Raising the dead*: from death to life.

Rm 8:11; 1 Cor 15:42-45; 2 Cor 3:6; Gl 3:21;

(Eph 2:1-10; Col 2:13).

ζωοποιεῖν, ἐγείρειν.

c) *New creation*: man and world remade.

Rm 12:2; 2 Cor 5:17; Gl 6:14.

καινὴ κτίσις, ἀνακαίνωσις τοῦ νοός

d) *Transformation of image*: the creation of a new conformity.

1 Cor 15:49; 2 Cor 3:18; Gl 4:19;

(Phlp 3:21).

μεταμορφοῦσθαι, μορφοῦσθαι, ἀλλάσσειν, (μετασχηματίζειν).

e) *Illumination*: the blind are brought to sight.

2 Cor 4:1-6.

'ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ὁ εἰπὼν, Ἐκ σκότους φῶς λάμψει, ὃς ἔλαμψεν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν πρὸς φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν προσώπῳ Χριστοῦ'.

f) *Incorporation*: joined to one body.

Rm 6:3; 1 Cor 12:13.

'ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν.'

g) *Grafting*: joined to a cultivated tree.

Rm 11:17-24.

ἐγκεντρίζειν.

#### 4.4.3 Soteriological metaphors from the cultic and ritual realm:

- a) *Making atonement*: the expiation of sin by way of sacrifice (the propitiation of God):  
 Rm 3:25a.  
 'ὄν προέθετο ὁ θεὸς ἱλαστήριον ... ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι....'
- b) *Sanctification*: set aside in order to belong to God.  
 Rm 15:16; 1 Cor 1:2, 30; 6:11.  
 ἀγιάζειν, ἁγιασμός, (ἱεουργεῖν).
- c) *Washing*: the dirt is removed.  
 1 Cor 6:11; (Eph 5:26).  
 ἀπολοῦσθαι.
- d) *Anointing*: qualified for a new status.  
 2 Cor 1:21.  
 χρίειν.

#### 4.4.4 Soteriological metaphors from the technical sphere of life:

- a) *Sealing*: impressing the mark of ownership.  
 2 Cor 1:22; (Eph 1:13-14; 4:30).  
 σφραγίζειν, (διδόναι τὸν ἄρραβῶνα).
- b) *Building*: bricks (stones) laid in the erecting of a new edifice.  
 1 Cor 3:9; (Eph 2:19-22; {1 Pt 2:4-5}).  
 'θεοῦ οἰκοδομὴ ἐστε'; 'ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑμεῖς συνοικοδομεῖσθε εἰς κατοικητήριον τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν πνεύματι.'
- c) *Moulding*: clay shaped in the hands of the potter.  
 Rm 9:20-21.  
 'ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐξουσίαν ὁ κεραμεὺς τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φυράματος ποιῆσαι ὃ μὲν εἰς τιμὴν σκεῦος, ὃ δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν.'
- d) *Clothing*: the old garment replaced by a new one.  
 Rm 13:12-14; 1 Cor 15:53; 2 Cor 5:1-5; Gl 3:27;  
 (Eph 4:22-24; Col 3:9-10).  
 ἐνδύεσθαι, ἐπενδύεσθαι.

ENDNOTES.

- 1) For a very penetrating survey of the attention awarded to eschatology in the field of New Testament research during the past century, consult the article written by Kümmel (1982:81-96).
- 2) For a similar conclusion, but on a different level, cf König (1970:155-60).
- 3) This distinction corresponds with the distinction between the 'immanent' (or 'substantial') Trinity and the 'economic' (or 'revelatory') Trinity (cf Moltmann 1981:151-61; also Durand 1976:63-77). It is nevertheless important to emphasise that this distinction should *not* be taken to mean that there is any distinction between God as He is in himself, and as He reveals himself to the world. In the words of Durand (1976:72): 'Teenoor elke vorm van modalisme waarin die "eintlike" God skuilgaan agter die historiese maskers van sy openbaring, is die belydenis van die wesenstriniteit van God die erkenning dat God *Homself* openbaar: ons ontmoet Hom in die openbaring as die Drieënige omdat Hy dit na sy wese is.'

CHAPTER 5."SALVATION" FROM VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES.

This shows what an effort is required to reintroduce Paul's doctrine and rekindle the fire with which it once burned. Our task today, then, is what it was in the past: to open our minds to his teaching, spell it out again, and do all we can to understand it afresh.

'Again to spell out' Paul's doctrine of justification can never mean an academic resolution of it into its various conceptual component parts and then a further addition of these into an orderly system. The primary thing is what is done in Christ and made effective in the gospel, and it immediately manifests itself in the close frame of reference into which the various terms used in Paul's message are put. *Each one of them points to the rest, and none is sufficient in itself.* Each needs to be examined for the contribution it makes toward the understanding of what is proclaimed in the gospel. (italics mine).

(Bornkamm 1971:136)

In the introduction to this study, the present chapter was described as the very heart of the whole thesis, the crux of the matter. This chapter will namely be devoted to a thorough analysis of all the different soteriological metaphors listed in the previous chapter. This analysis, to be sure, will take up the lion's share of this dissertation seen in its completeness. Of course, the mere fact that there are such a large number of metaphors involved in the programme of research, will force us to keep these analyses as brief as possible. This requirement, one may expect, will be a hard nut to crack, seeing that there is such an extensive body of literature available on some of the topics to be discussed (think, for example, of the overwhelming amount of literature dealing with the issue of the  $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ ). There are, nevertheless, some factors in our favour. So, for instance, it has already been stated that the study is going to be deliberately one-sided (cf §4.1 above). The focus will namely be on the saving event as God's business. The human factor in the process of salvation will be played down, in the sense that the spotlight will be concentrated on the other side of this coin. In this way some of the most difficult questions in this field (such as the one concerning the relation between God's activity and our

own), may be side-stepped. Thus the discussion will obviously become much more straightforward in character.

In the light of our theoretical and methodological orientation in chapters two and three, however, there are certain indispensable requirements we need to honour in our treatment of the field in question. For one thing, one will always have to be on the alert for the metaphorical twist in the meanings to be dealt with. If they are worthy of the name 'metaphor', one ought to become aware of some kind of tension between the so-called 'donor field' and the 'recipient field' (cf §3.2 above). It means that somehow that 'donor field' must still be experienced as living a life of its own. As such it may serve as the starting point of our analysis. In other words, each of those metaphors should first of all be looked at in the context of their respective 'donor fields'. It is in this context that the components of the particular meaning can best be determined. Only after this has been done, can the examination of the interaction between the 'donor field' and the 'recipient field' get under way. This, in turn, will enable us to see the connections between the particular meaning and all the other meanings within the overarching semantic field "salvation".

Obviously this procedure may be expected to serve as an aid in the uncovering of the numerous relations existing between the variety of semantic units belonging to the field under discussion. In fact, it is to be hoped that it will show forth the semantic field "salvation" in the wonderful richness and depth to which it was developed by the apostle Paul in his major epistles. One would certainly not be too far off the target in calling it a real diamond. Surely one can never come to a full appreciation of this diamond by looking at it from only one perspective. No doubt Paul wanted us to turn it around so that we can see that the same diamond shines with a new splendour when we look at it from a different angle. Or, changing the metaphor slightly, we can say that Paul is providing us with a handful of 'lenses' through which we can study that diamond. Each of those lenses will give us a wonderful new perspective on that same diamond. But, since it remains only one and the same diamond, one must not forget that each one of those perspectives '...points to the

rest, and none is sufficient in itself.' (Bornkamm 1971:136).

With this in mind, we may now proceed with the exercise of looking at "salvation" from various perspectives:

### 5.1 Soteriological metaphors from the sphere of social interaction:

Probably the most fruitful source in the generation of soteriological metaphors is the sphere of social interaction. Actually it shouldn't really surprise us that this particular 'cultural sphere' plays such a dominant role in Paul's attempt to give expression to the saving event wrought in Christ. After all, it is quite clear that this saving event basically concerns the *relationship* between God and the sinner. Thinking of a relationship, we as human beings will almost automatically do so in terms of our daily experiences of the way in which different people in the society interact with one another. These interactions on the social level may therefore very naturally become one of the windows through which we look at the divine activities (cf Fawcett 1970:31).

The social interaction between people may of course be qualified in an innumerable variety of ways. In the present case, however, the scope is narrowed down considerably by the fact that it is actually the *restoration of a broken relationship* which is being considered. For the description of this particular aspect of social interaction, Paul could evidently have selected a whole range of experiences rather common to the people living in that specific cultural climate. (Some of those may, however, be less obvious in the social environment in which we find ourselves!)

Of course, one should remain careful not to force all the soteriological metaphors from the sphere of social interaction into the mould of the restoration of a broken relationship. Some other aspects of social interaction may just as well be foregrounded. The detailed analysis of all the different metaphors will therefore have to be

given due allowance, so that each of them can display its own colours. To these analyses we now proceed.

### 5.1.1 Deliverance - from danger to safety:

The first semantic field to be considered in its metaphorical interaction with the semantic field "salvation", is that of *deliverance*. At the outset, though, it is important to emphasise the fact that this field should be seen in close conjunction with some of the other fields to be discussed shortly. The fields of *liberation*, *a change of ownership* and *adoption* are definitely functioning in association with the field of *deliverance*, as is demonstrated by the fact that Theissen (1974:285-7) is treating them all under the one heading of 'Befreiungssymbolik'. In this thesis, nevertheless, they are distinguished from each other, for reasons that will crystallise as we go along.

The semantic field of *deliverance*, then, is characterised by three salient features of meaning. They are the following:

- a) Someone finds himself in *danger*;
- b) He is *rescued* from that endangered position by the *intervention* of someone else;
- c) He is brought to *safety*.

The last of these three features is obviously an inferential component of meaning (cf §2.2.4.3 above). In other words, although it may be regarded as one of the diagnostic components (cf §2.2.4.1) of the meaning in question, it is not as obligatory as the other two. Deliverance may thus be described without any specific reference to the safety resulting from the event.

No doubt, this particular field of meaning is derived from a very common area of experience in all human societies. At all times and in all cultures everywhere in the world, people encounter situations where life is endangered, and where the help of some superior power (or person) has to be called in with a view to the defusing of that

threat to life. Selfevidently the threat may be posed by a great variety of causes, and similarly the rescue action may be undertaken by anyone capable of counteracting and neutralising the particular threat.

It is obvious too, that this semantic field finds its most natural application in situations posing a threat to *physical* life. This kind of application is, for instance, very frequent in the Old Testament Psalms. One quotation will be sufficient as illustration. Psalm 59: 1-3, which is characterised by the heading attached to it as, 'A Miktam of David, when Saul sent men to watch his house in order to kill him' (RSV), provides an illuminating example in its Septuagint rendering (cf LXX Ps 58:2-4):

Ἐξελοῦ με ἐκ τῶν ἐχθρῶν μου, ὁ θεός,  
καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐπανιστανομένων ἐπ' ἐμὲ λύτρωσαί με·  
ρύσαι με ἐκ τῶν ἐργαζομένων τὴν ἀνομίαν  
καὶ ἐξ ἀνδρῶν αἱμάτων σῶσόν με.  
ὅτι ἰδοὺ ἐθήρευσαν τὴν ψυχὴν μου,  
ἐπέθεντο ἐπ' ἐμὲ κραταιοί.

This example is noteworthy, not only as an illustration of the fact that *deliverance* is naturally understood in terms of rescuing someone from danger which is threatening his physical life, but also as a demonstration of the fact that a whole range of lexical units may be employed in order to give expression to this particular meaning. In this case four different verbs are involved in the poet's urgent plea to God for deliverance. These four verbs obviously run parallel, with very little distinction in meaning. In other words, ἐξαιρεῖν (mid), λυτροῦν, ρύεσθαι and σῶζειν, as they are used in these verses, all belong to one and the same semantic domain. This fact is certainly underlined by the strikingly parallel structures of verses 2 and 3, with the corresponding verbs in the sentence-initial and sentence-concluding positions. (For a discussion of these four verbs as a group of synonyms, see the reference to Hatch's *Essays in Biblical Greek* in Silva 1983:57-9.)

In the Acts of the Apostles too, the lexical item ἐξαιρεῖν in parti-

cular, serves at several points to depict a deliverance from hardships and dangers on an earthly and physical level. In Stephen's speech, for example, it is said that God rescued Joseph '...out of all his afflictions.' (Ac 7:10 - RSV; ...ἐξείλατο αὐτὸν ἐκ πασῶν τῶν θλίψεων αὐτοῦ, ....). Peter, again, was rescued from Herod's clutches (Ac 12:11 - NEB; ...ἐξείλατό με ἐκ χειρὸς Ἡρώδου....). Paul too, was rescued from the Jews when he was about to be murdered by them (Ac 23:27).

However, in his letters Paul himself mostly employs this semantic field in the service of descriptions dealing with God's intervention in situations pregnant with danger to life in its *religious* (or spiritual) dimension. In other words, he is using this rather common experience of daily life as a lens through which a new perspective may be acquired on an essentially unseen event. This so-called 'metaphorical twist' results in a slight reinterpretation of the semantic components involved. Thus the danger implied by the use of lexical units from this semantic field is viewed from a rather different dimension. So too the resulting safety is of a rather different kind. Even the event of deliverance itself is of a special character, seen in contrast to the ordinary rescue actions on a purely physical level.

It should be stressed, though, that the donor field (cf §3.2 above) is by no means consigned to oblivion. It remains in the background, as the foil against which the recipient field attains more relief. That is why Paul is occasionally still using the relevant terms in the setting of the donor field, thereby showing that he is well aware of that background. The donor field is not usurped by the recipient field. In 2 Corinthians 1:8-10, for example, Paul says the following:

For we do not want you to be ignorant, brethren, of the affliction we experienced in Asia; for we were so utterly, unbearably crushed that we despaired of life itself. Why, we felt that we had received the sentence of death; but that was to make us rely not on ourselves but on God who raises the dead; he delivered us from so deadly a peril, and he will deliver us; on him we have set our hope that he will deliver us again. (RSV).

Obviously Paul's physical life was at stake in this case, and therefore ῥύεσθαι, as it is used in verse 10, comes pretty close to con-

veying the same meaning as in the Septuagint passage quoted above (cf LXX Ps 58:3). The same thing also applies to the use of σωτηρία in Philippians 1:19. From the context it is clear that this σωτηρία can hardly be anything but his deliverance from prison.

The latter instance is perhaps of special interest, seeing that so many people tend to think of σωτηρία as '...the most comprehensive term for what the Apostle found in Christ.' (cf Scott 1966:17; also Hunter 1966:14). As such it may be taken to '...express the richness and range of Christianity according to St Paul.' (Hunter 1966:14). Thus it becomes an umbrella, providing accommodation to Paul's soteriological thinking in its widest scope - a vague term with little or no specific semantic content.

Of course, it cannot be denied that σωτηρία was sometimes used in such a sweeping manner. Widespread application may often bring about this kind of effect. Therefore we could also make use of the term "salvation" in order to cover the whole field we are studying in this thesis. That is not to say, however, that σωτηρία is no longer apt to be used in the conveying of some very specific meaning.

In *Romans 1:16*, for instance, one may still argue for an interpretation of σωτηρία in terms of 'being rescued from an endangered position by the intervention of someone else'. This I maintain in opposition to those exegetes who hold the view that σωτηρία, in this verse, should be understood as going beyond the rather negative sense of a deliverance from a dangerous situation. Althaus (1966:12), for one, remarks: 'Über den negativen Sinn der Errettung hinaus umfasst das Wort auch den positiven des Heils, als Teilhabe an dem Leben, an der Herrlichkeit Christi.' It is obvious, of course, that the event of deliverance will naturally result in a positive outcome; it will lead to a state of having been saved (which can also be described as σωτηρία, and which will include aspects such as life, peace and safety). However, in my opinion this verse focusses on the event itself, rather than on the resulting state (cf Newman & Nida 1973:19).

This opinion is confirmed by the fact that in several of the modern translations of the Bible the noun σωτηρία is transformed into a verb.

So, for example, the *Good News Bible* renders verse 16b as, '...it is God's power to save....', and *The Jerusalem Bible* has, '...it is the power of God saving all who have faith....' This kind of transformation is usually accomplished by way of a 'decomposition' of the text into its semantically simplest form, followed by a 'recomposition' of this simple form into an appropriate equivalent in the receptor language (cf Nida 1975a:156-8).<sup>1)</sup> Applying this procedure to Romans 1:16b, Vorster (1979:232) discovers the following 'kernel sentences' in the 'deep structure' (my translation from Afrikaans):

- God exercises (his) power. (God has power).
- He saves X (X = people who believe).
- Every person believes (The Jew believes; the Greek believes).
- The Jew is first.

This analysis evidently leaves no doubt about the *event* character of σωτηρία, and in such a case '...a verb expression is accurate and more natural as an English equivalent', according to Newman and Nida (1973:19).

The fact that the power of God is specifically mentioned in conjunction with this 'salvation' (δύναμις γὰρ θεοῦ ἐστὶν εἰς σωτηρίαν), may be taken as a further indication to the effect that it is indeed God's act of deliverance which is being contemplated. No need to strain the imagination in order to see that power is required when someone else has to be rescued from an impending danger. In terms of the semantic components of *deliverance* outlined above, one could even say that the Gospel (το εὐαγγέλιον) is God's intervention in order to rescue us from the danger of destruction.

Of course, no mention is made of any specific danger in Romans 1:16. At least not explicitly. Yet, I tend to agree with Michel (1966:52) when he says in connection with this verse: 'Der Mensch erfährt durch die Botschaft in welcher Gefahr er steht, und wodurch er Errettung und Leben empfangen kann.' This point of view is supported by Michel mainly on account of the fact that there is such a close relationship between σωτηρία, δικαιοσύνη and ζωή in this context. Taken in a forensic sense, δικαιοσύνη immediately suggests the idea of God as a Judge, in front of whom we all are bound to appear. Obviously,

where a sinner has to face God's judgement, it must necessarily be experienced as a threat.

That σωτηρία may indeed sometimes function against the background of this threat of God's judgement, is also indicated by the fact that it is used with reference to that final day of judgement (cf Rm 13:11), and in contrast with ἀπώλεια (cf Phlp 1:28). The latter, and its cognate ἀπολλύναι, point to the situation where the threat of God's condemning judgement has been allowed to run its full course, ending up in destruction (cf Oepke 1964:396). Therefore the *The New English Bible* may also render τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις in 1 Corinthians 1:18 and 2 Corinthians 2:15 respectively as '...those on their way to ruin...', and '...those who are on the way to perdition....', and ἔνδειξις ἀπωλείας in Philippians 1:28 as '...a sure sign ... that their doom is sealed....' (NIV: '...a sign that ... they will be destroyed....'). In all these instances this idea of eternal doom stands opposed to salvation (τοῖς σωζομένοις and ἔνδειξις σωτηρίας). In other words, it may be taken to imply that σωτηρία is actually to be rescued from the danger of that destruction.

In that destruction, it seems, God is not just passively involved. It may namely be seen as the execution of his judicial function (cf Oepke 1964:396). It is in this context, no doubt, that references to the wrath of God should also be considered (cf Rm 2:1-11; vs 8-9 in particular). With reference to Paul and John's usage of ἀπόλλυσθαι, Oepke (1964:396) remarks:

In contrast to σώζεσθαι or to ζωὴ αἰώνιος, ἀπόλλυσθαι is definitive destruction, not merely in the sense of the extinction of physical existence, but rather of an eternal plunge into Hades and a hopeless destiny of death in the depiction of which such terms as ὀργή, θυμός, θλίψις and στενοχωρία are used (R.2:8f.).

It is interesting, then, to note that, in *Romans 5:9* the wrath of God is specifically mentioned as that from which we shall be saved by Christ (...σωθησόμεθα δι' αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς). This wrath, says Käsemann (1974:130), cannot just be interpreted as an objective principle or an impersonal process, as some have tried to do. 'Ge-meint ist die verzehrende Macht des Weltenrichters, ....' (Käsemann

1974:130). And, even though it is generally accepted that the reference of σώζειν in this verse is to '...the final deliverance at the last judgement...' (cf Barrett 1971:107), most scholars do acknowledge the fact that this σωτηρία extends into the present as well. Foerster (1971:992-4), for example, who contends that σωτηρία is primarily a future, eschatological term for Paul, concedes that it is also used in connection with a present and even a past experience. Käsemann (1974:20), in his commentary on Romans 1:16, provides us with a balanced view in this regard when he says:

Für Paulus und seine Traditionsquellen meint σωτηρία nach 13,11; 5,9; 1.K 3,15; 5,5; Phil 1,19 konstitutiv Rettung im Endgericht. Gleichwohl wird die Übersetzung 'Rettung' nicht völlig dem Sachverhalt gerecht, dass die damit verbundene Erlösung für den neuen Äon nach 8,24; 2.K 6,2 und unserer Stelle durch Christus bereits gegenwärtige Wirklichkeit mitten in der Welt, und zwar nicht bloss (Lietzmann) als Antizipation 'im Prinzip', geworden ist.

From this information one may draw the conclusion that, with reference to the particular field of meaning under discussion, σώζειν and σωτηρία do include the implicational semantic component of the danger posed by the wrath of God and the consequent threat of eternal destruction. (It must of course be remembered that the meaning under discussion is not necessarily the meaning of σώζειν and σωτηρία in all instances these words are used by Paul. That is to say, Paul may employ the same lexical items, σώζειν and σωτηρία, in order to convey another meaning in a different context. The components of the meaning we are now discussing may therefore not be transferred automatically to all the other occurrences of these two lexical items. In Barr's terms that would amount to an 'illegitimate totality transfer'.)

From this position of danger we are 'saved' by the intervention of God himself (cf Rm 1:16 - δὸναμις θεοῦ εἰς σωτηρίαν) through Jesus Christ, the Saviour (Rm 5:9). (It is not the purpose of this dissertation to explain exactly *how* this saving event was accomplished in and through Christ. In other words, my concern is not with the *means* of salvation, but with the *event* as such - cf §4.1 above).

But, of course, σώζειν and σωτηρία are not the only lexical units

functioning in the semantic field of *deliverance*. Two more of the verbs we have already encountered in the reference to Psalm 59:1-3 (cf LXX Ps 58:2-4), make their appearance in the main letters of Paul in connection with God's intervention in sinful man's position of religious hazard. These are ῥύεσθαι and ἐξαίρειν. (λυτροῦν no longer functions in this domain with Paul, although one may say that it is represented by ἀπολύτρωσις. The latter will, however, be considered in conjunction with the semantic field of *liberation*.)

In *Romans 7:24-25a* Paul exclaims:

What a wretched man I am. Who will rescue me from this body of death? Thanks be to God - through Jesus Christ our Lord! (NIV)

In this context ῥύεσθαι stands in the service of a meaning very similar to the one expressed by σώζειν and σωτηρία as outlined above. According to Louw (1979:87) these verses (Rm 7:24-5a) should be treated as an interjection or an intermezzo, reflecting on verses 14-23, though not directly part of the argument. Essentially this is true, and yet it is also clear that they were triggered by the whole preceding discussion. Paul's consideration of the utterly hopeless situation of sinful man (even in his noblest manifestation) under the law's regime (cf Ridderbos 1959:147), caused him to cry out in distress, 'What wretched man I am.' Verse 24 then goes on to describe the dismal situation of even the man who is ever so keen to obey the law, in terms of 'this body of death' (...τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου;) from which he needs to be rescued. This expression, it seems, should be understood as a reference to man in his concrete, bodily existence, qualified by his being reigned by the power of evil, '...which in relation to the imminent final struggle seeks to drag man down to eternal perdition, and which man himself has no power to resist.' (Kasch 1968:1003). As such it stands under the threat of eternal death (cf NEB: '...this body doomed to death').

This, to be sure, is not only to be regarded as a hopeless situation, but also as a very dangerous one. In fact, it comes very close to the situation characterised by the wrath of God. Therefore it should not really come as a surprise when we find that 1 Thessalonians 1:10 describes Jesus as the one who rescues us from the coming wrath (NIV;

NEB: '...our deliverer from the terrors of judgement to come.';  
 ... Ἰησοῦν τὸν ρύόμενον ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης.)

Obviously, then, in these contexts ρύεσθαι involves the very same semantic components we have already discerned in connection with the use of σώζειν and σωτηρία. Sinful man finds himself in a hazardous situation, spiritually speaking, in which he can do nothing for himself, but God intervenes in and through his Son, in order to rescue man from that position of nerve-wrecking danger. If there is any difference between σώζειν and ρύεσθαι in this particular field of meaning, then it must be sought in the fact that an *acute* danger is implied in the use of ρύεσθαι. This, in any case, is the suggestion of the new *Greek-English lexicon of the New Testament based on semantic domains*, which will soon be published.<sup>2)</sup> In this lexicon the meaning of ρύομαι is defined as, 'to rescue from danger, with the implication that the danger in question is severe and acute.' (Louw & Nida 1986:§21.23). This suggestion appears to be confirmed by 2 Corinthians 1:10, where it is used with reference to a deliverance from '...such terrible dangers of death....' (GNB) (ἐκ τηλικούτου θανάτου ἐρρύσατο), but it can hardly be proved in those instances where Paul applies it in a metaphorical sense to God's activity on the level of the spiritual life. There the main threat seems to remain the impending perdition brought about by the wrath of God.

Another lexical unit belonging to this particular semantic field is ἐξαίρεσις (mid). It occurs only once in the letters of Paul, and that is in *Galatians 1:4*. It has already been stated, of course, that this lexical item is a favourite in the Acts of the Apostles for the depicting of a deliverance from hardships and dangers on an earthly and physical level (cf p 109-10). The verse in Galatians, however, '...is the only place where it is used metaphorically of salvation.' (Stott 1968:18). As a qualification of Christ, it claims that He is the one '...who sacrificed himself for our sins, to rescue us out of this present age of wickedness.' (NEB).

'This present age' (ὁ αἰὼν ὁ ἐνεστώς) should doubtlessly be understood along the line indicated by our explanation of Paul's eschatological frame of reference in paragraph 4.2.1. It stands in contrast

to 'the age to come' (ὁ αἰὼν ὁ ἐρχόμενος), and, as here, it is often characterised as 'evil' (πονηρός). It is evil, not only in an ethical sense (cf Bruce 1982:76), but also in the sense that it is subject to the 'Evil One'. In the 'Freer logion', for example, the disciples are reported to have said, 'This age (ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος) of lawlessness and unbelief is subject to Satan' (Mk 16:14 W) (cf Bruce 1982:76). Parallel to this, Satan is called 'the god of this age' (ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου) in 2 Corinthians 4:4.

According to the traditional Jewish schema, then, God's people would be delivered from 'this present age of wickedness' at the inauguration of 'the age to come'. According to Galatians 1:4, however, this deliverance has already come to pass through the self-surrendering sacrifice of Christ. Schlier (1971:34) manages to explain the essence of this verse when he says:

Indem Jesus Christus sich gab, um unsere Sünden zu tilgen, schuf er auch die Voraussetzung dafür, dass wir - in der Voraussetzung des künftigen Äons! - dem gegenwärtigen Äon entnommen werden. Die Tat Jesu Christi liess in ihrer unsere Sünden tragenden Hingabe den zukünftigen Äon für uns angebrochen sein.

It is in this regard that Bruce (1982:76) observes, 'Here, then, is Paul's "realized eschatology".' While still living in this world, the Christian already enjoys that life of the age to come (cf Cole 1965: 35). In other words, it is not a case of being taken out of the material world, but rather of being rescued from the '...control of the powers which dominate the present age.' (Bruce 1982:76).

In this context, evidently, ἐξαίρειν does not only signify God's intervention in a situation of danger (that too), but also his interference in a situation which may be qualified as bondage. This fact is ably described by Schlier (1971:34) when he says:

Der Machtcharakter der das Dasein böse umstellenden Weltzeit wird hier, in Gal 1:4, dadurch deutlich, dass Paulus von dem 'Herausreissen' aus dem gegenwärtigen Äon spricht. Das setzt voraus, dass die Welt uns schon immer verhaftet hat und in ihrer Gewalt festhält, dass wir immer schon von der uns angehenden bösen Weltzeit in sie selbst hinein gebunden sind.

The fact must therefore be acknowledged that ἐξαίρειν (mid) does not only function in the semantic domain of *deliverance*, as outlined

above, but also in the semantic field of *liberation*, to which we shall turn shortly. (Incidentally, one may also point to the fact that the same thing applies even to ῥύεσθαι. In Col 1:13 it is used in a sentence very similar to Gl 1:4, the only difference being that it is much more explicit, in the sense that even the positive side of this liberation is fully stated. It says: 'He rescued us from the domain of darkness and brought us away into the kingdom of his dear Son....' - NEB.)

Looking back on our discussion of the semantic field of *deliverance*, it seems as though the aspect of *danger* may somehow be regarded as a focal component of this meaning. Although it has to be qualified as an implicational component, the core diagnostic component being the aspect of the *deliverance* wrought by the *intervention* of someone else, it nevertheless remains essential in the distinguishing of this particular meaning. If, for example, a particular lexical item is employed in order to describe how someone is rescued by the intervention of someone else, but from a position of bondage rather than of danger, that would imply that it does not really belong to the semantic field of *deliverance* as distinguished above.

This observation, again, appears to be important in view of our desire to bring out the metaphorical quality of Paul's language concerning "salvation". It may namely be hard to find translational substitutes more appropriate than *save*, *rescue* and *deliver* for verbs such as σώζειν, ῥύεσθαι and ἐξαιρεῖν (mid). And, as it is, these substitutes do not always remind us of the donor field in question. However, when the danger from which one is saved, or rescued, or delivered, is stated more explicitly, it may immediately bring the donor field into play, and thus the process of interaction between donor field and recipient field may be ignited anew. That is to say, by specifying the danger from which the person is to be rescued, the 'ground of comparison' (cf De Waard 1974:109) between donor field and recipient field is highlighted.

The point may be briefly illustrated with reference to σώζειν and σωτηρία. To begin with, one must consider the possibility that we are dealing with a dead metaphor in this case. That is in any case

the implication of the fact that a separate domain is set up in Louw and Nida's forthcoming lexicon for the meaning 'to save in a religious sense'. In the defining of the meanings included in this domain, no mention is made of any danger. The meaning of σωζω, for example, is described as 'to cause someone to experience divine salvation.' (Louw & Nida 1986:§21.27). Evidently this is no longer a metaphor, but a new fixed meaning (cf also Louw 1985b:102).

If it could be demonstrated, however, (as we have tried to do in the case of Rm 1:16), that the idea of a threatening danger was still present, even though only in the background, it may be an indication that the metaphor was not quite so dead for Paul after all. In such a case one could try to revive that metaphor by way of an explicit mentioning of the danger involved. It will of course mean taking a risk. Where the text itself does not specify the danger, the choice of any particular specification might easily be regarded as rather arbitrary. Yet, it may indeed be worth the effort, seeing that it will immediately catch the eye, without changing the meaning involved. Say, for instance, one would render Romans 1:16b as, '...it is God's power saving all those who believe *from eternal destruction....*', wouldn't it be a much more striking 'translation'? At least it would ring a bell somewhere, whereas we, so easily, read right across the words 'to save' without even noticing them! And, in fact, it is but making explicit what is really implicit in the lexical item σωτηρία.

### 5.1.2 Liberation - a slave is set free:

Closely related to the field of *deliverance* (as treated above), is the semantic field of *liberation*. Whereas, in the former "salvation" is described in terms of 'being rescued from a position of danger by the intervention of someone else', in the latter that same intervention is seen as having the effect of setting someone free from a position of bondage or slavery. In other words, basically we have the same components of meaning, but for the fact that they are now seen from a different perspective. For the domain of *liberation*, the basic features may namely be stated in the following way:

- a) Someone finds himself in the position of being in *bondage*, that is, of being a *slave to someone*;
- b) He is *released* from that position of slavery by the *intervention* of someone else;
- c) The result is *freedom*.

It appears to be rather difficult to pinpoint the exact socio-cultural setting for this particular field of meaning as far as Paul is concerned. Obviously the idea of being set free from slavery would immediately remind any devout Jew of the *exodus from Egypt*. This experience was so deeply carved into the memory of the Israelites that it really became one of the basic tenets of their faith. Says Floor (1969:257),

De exodus uit Egypte, wel het grondpatroon van Israëls geloof genoemd, was bijzonder diep ingeprent in het volksleven van Israël. De verlossing uit Egypte heeft zo 'n geweldige stempel op het volk Israël gezet dat zij kan gelden als het 'kristallisatiepunt' van het hele volksleven.

Therefore it would be quite natural for them to interpret God's subsequent saving and liberating actions in terms of the exodus (cf Caird 1980:156). This tendency is, for example, very clearly illustrated in the so-called Deutero-Isaiah (Is 40-55) (cf Odendaal 1970:190; also Odendaal s a:176). According to Floor (1969) the idea of a *new exodus* was current in most of the New Testament writings.

However, many scholars have argued that Paul had a much closer analogy at his disposal in the form of the legal practices of his own day pertaining to the way in which slaves were released. Deissmann (1910:322-34), in particular, introduced the idea of *sacral manumission*, whereby a slave was purchased from the earthly master by a god, and thus became the fictitious property of the god, as a possible background to this semantic field. Käsemann (1970:163), who admits that there are some indications showing that Paul knew such a practice, is nevertheless trying to bring it into discredit by his remark to the effect that it is but an attempt to restore some colour and brightness to a term (namely 'redemption') which had already become somewhat washed out in pre-Christian times.

Yet another proposal is offered by Elert (1947:265-70), who reckons

that it should be understood against the background of the practice known as *redemptio ab hostibus*. According to this practice, prisoners of war, whose normal fate it was to become slaves, could be released and returned to their native land on payment of a ransom by fellow-citizens. The 'freedman' would then stand under certain obligations to the person who had redeemed him by paying the ransom.<sup>3)</sup>

Partly accepting the latter, but totally rejecting the other proposal, Fryer (1979:309) opts for the view of Ridderbos, according to which it is probable that '...behind the imagery employed there lies the old practice ... of the Mosaic Law whereby ransom money could be paid for the liberation of a forfeited life.' In this way, he feels, justice can be done to the principle that '...the "redemption" metaphor, too, must be interpreted primarily out of the OT background.' (Fryer 1979:309). This view is held particularly in relation to Galatians 3:13, occurring in a context '...saturated with motifs, imagery and terminology which are derived from the OT and can be properly understood only against their OT milieu.' (Fryer 1979:309).

Although Fryer's point of view cannot be ruled out altogether, it does seem to have the consequence that the aspect of the *slavery* from which the liberation is effected, is played down considerably. As a matter of fact, however, it must be maintained that one of Paul's important perspectives on "salvation" is that of liberation from the enslavement by a number of different forces. Therefore it seems much more profitable to side with Marshall (1974:158-9) when he concludes:

Thus it may be wrong to look for one specialized background to the NT concept of redemption; rather, the general concept of manumission forms the background, and different aspects of it contribute to the detailed understanding of the various NT passages. What is important is that along with the OT background this secular background is certainly present, so that redemption in these passages is to be thought of in terms of change of ownership as a result of payment of a price.

One may still add that, although the payment of a price (or a ransom) should be regarded as an element of this meaning in various passages (especially with the use of ἀγοράζω and ἐξαγοράζω), one can hardly take it to be an essential feature in all instances. In other words,

it may be classified as a supplementary or accidental component of this meaning (cf. §2.2.4.1 above), which may sometimes retreat into the background. Where this is the case, liberation may simply become a matter of the overpowering of the enslaving force by another, whereby the slaves are delivered from their bondage. Obviously this perspective would lie much closer to the exodus motif.

Although Theissen (1974:285-7) takes the latter possibility to be the only essential component in this field of meaning, one may beg to disagree. He says (1974:287):

Aus welchem Bereichen die Bilder der Befreiungssymbolik auch stammen, sie alle thematisieren das Problem von Dominanz und Macht, von Abhängigkeit und Selbständigkeit. Es sind Bilder von sozialer Macht.

The presence of this aspect may of course be granted in several passages, but not to the exclusion of any reference to the idea of a ransom. On the other hand, it would also be wise to take heed of Pelser's warning (1985:250) that one might say more than what Paul himself found necessary, in an attempt to define this ransom more exactly. He concludes that,

...it is wrong to seek to carry the question further than Paul deemed it necessary. That means it is sufficient to accept his statement that through Christ's coming and death the enslaved sinner has been set free from his former bondage.

That is to say, the basic features of this field of meaning, as stated at the beginning of this paragraph, seem to be justified.

In the conveying of this particular meaning, a whole range of lexical items may of course be employed. In Louw and Nida's forthcoming lexicon the semantic domain *release, set free* (1986:§37.127-37.138) includes, among others, the following lexical units (relevant to Paul's major epistles): ἀπολύτρωσις; ἀγοράζω, ἐξαγοράζω; καταργέομαι and δικαιόω. In accordance with the approach followed in the present dissertation, it is important to treat all these lexical units in their mutual relation to each other.

Comparing Paul's use of these different items, it immediately strikes one that the mentioning of some power, from whose bondage the release

is effected, is a rather common feature in most of the passages concerned. Just consider the following sample:

- G1 4:5 ἕνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον ἐξαγοράση, ....  
 Rm 8:21 ..ὅτι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις ἐλευθερωθήσεται ἀπὸ τῆς δουλείας τῆς φθορᾶς....  
 Rm 6:22 νυνὶ δὲ, ἐλευθερωθέντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμαρτίας....  
 Rm 6:7 ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανῶν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμαρτίας.  
 Rm 7:6 νυνὶ δὲ κατηργήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου....

Though we do not have any specific example in Pa 1's letters of ἀπολύτρωσις being used in a syntagmatic relation of this kind, it does occur in the context of Romans 8:18-25 in a sense very closely related to that expressed by ἐλευθερώω in Romans 8:21. This, certainly, is the rationale behind the New Afrikaans Bible's translation of τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν in verse 23 as: 'Hy sal ons van die verganklikheid bevry'.

On the other hand, ἀγοράζω seems to be more appropriately treated in the following paragraph, where the emphasis will fall on the idea of 'a change of ownership'. As it is found in 1 Corinthians 6:20; 7:23, the emphasis is definitely, as stated by Marshall (1974:157), '... not on deliverance leading to freedom, but on purchase leading to slavery'. Although one has to be careful not to overstate the differences between ἀγοράζω and ἐξαγοράζω Marshall's statement (1974:157, footnote 8) that ἀγοράζω is used of simple purchase, ἐξαγοράζω of a purchase that leads to freedom, seems to be borne out by their actual occurrence in Paul's letters (and that is of course not so frequently).

*Galatians 3:13* then is actually a kind of a *locus classicus* as far as the meaning of ἐξαγοράζω is concerned.<sup>3)</sup> In this verse, however, that from which 'Christ redeemed us...' (NIV) is qualified as the curse of the law (ἐκ τῆς κατάρης τοῦ νόμου). According to the preceding verses, 'All who rely on observing the law, are under a curse' (cf G1 3:10, NIV). This curse stands in contrast to the blessing mentioned in verses 8 and 9 (cf Arichea & Nida 1975:62). It therefore involves being exposed to the awful penalties of God's judgement. As Stott (1968:79) remarks, '... if the blessing of God brings justification and life, the curse of God brings

condemnation and death.' To be 'under a curse' may thus also be interpreted as 'to continue under threat of being condemned' (Arichea & Nida 1975:62).

In this context, it seems, the semantic component of *slavery* doesn't stand out so clearly. Therefore, Ridderbos (1974:127) may be right in seeing the redemption mentioned in verse 13 against the background of the Mosaic law whereby ransom money could be paid for the liberation of a forfeited life. This interpretation would bring the use of ἐξαγοράζω in Galatians 3:13 in the proximity of the semantic field of *deliverance*, as outlined in the previous paragraph (§5.1.1). To be sure, one would probably be justified in finding a close connection between ὀργή (wrath) and κατάρρα (curse) (cf Cole 1965:95-6).

One should add, however, that the idea of a *bondage* under the law and its consequences, is by no means absent from this passage (cf Hill 1982:198). Especially when it is screened against the wider context (continuing into the fifth chapter), where the contrast between the slavery under the law and the freedom in Christ plays such a significant role, it soon becomes evident that even the first section of chapter three (3:1-14) falls in with the general flow of this argument. Therefore, Fryer (1979:298), in his comment on the structure of this section, also remarks: 'Christ's death to deliver us from the curse of the Law is envisaged as the Divine way of ending *the tyranny of the Law* and introducing the blessing of Abraham for those who believe in Christ' (italics mine) (cf also Venter 1959:181). Lyall (1984:168) also feels that, 'It is but a short step from the idea of redemption from debt to the idea of redemption from any form of control by a hostile power.'

This impression is confirmed when we turn to the use of ἐξαγοράζω in the context of *Galatians 4:1-7*. Here the state of bondage or slavery is explicitly referred to as being ὑπὸ νόμου, (vs 5), and alternatively as ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ἡμεθα δεδουλωμένοι (vs 3). The effect of God's redeeming action is also described in terms of the fact that 'You are no longer a slave...' (vs 7, NEB). Using ἐξαγοράζω in this setting, obviously points to an awareness on Paul's side of the contemporary practices of manumission.

In general Louw and Nida's definition of the meaning of ἐξαγοράζω therefore seems to be on target. According to them it means 'to cause the release or freedom of someone by a means which proves costly to the individual causing the release.' (Louw & Nida 1986:§37.131). Evidently this definition includes the idea of a *ransom* being paid for the release (without specifying it more closely), but it avoids any allusion to its connection with the procedures relating to the redeeming of slaves. Probably their way of dealing with the meaning in question is prompted by the fear that it might be misunderstood '... in the sense that Christ actually engaged in some kind of monetary transaction' (cf Louw & Nida 1986:§37.131). On the other hand, however, it may be argued that they actually demetaphorise it by stating it in such general terms. It is namely possible that Paul is in fact challenging the reader to think in terms of such a transaction, without necessarily implying that all the details of the transaction are relevant. Of course it is absurd to ask a question like: To whom is the ransom paid? To pose such a question, is to introduce an aspect of the donor field which is ignored by Paul himself (cf Barclay 1964:196).

In using a metaphor one is always at risk of being misunderstood! Surely this possibility is built into the characterisation of metaphor in terms of a 'category mistake' (Degenaar 1970:297) or a 'semantic impertinence' (Ricoeur 1975:78). Coming across such an element which is apparently out of place, one is forced to start looking for some kind of resemblance, and in the present case it is obviously to be found in the fact that we, who used to be slaves under the rule of the law, were set free from that bondage at the cost of Christ Himself carrying our curse on the cross.

It is interesting to note, then, that Louw and Nida (1986:§37.128) come up with a much more direct reference to this socio-cultural background in their treatment of ἀπολύτρωσις. It is combined with λυτρόματι and λύτρωσις, and the meaning is then defined as 'to release or set free, with the implied analogy to the process of freeing a slave.' (Louw & Nida 1986:§37.128). This definition is the more interesting in the light of the fact that there is apparently such a definite parallelism between Galatians 3:13 (where ἐξαγοράζω is used) and Romans 3:24 (where ἀπολύτρωσις is found) (cf Marshall 1974:162). This fact suggests that, if the 'implied analogy' is relevant

in the case of ἀπολύτρωσις, it is also relevant in the case of ἐξαγοράζω.

Be it as it may. The fact remains that ἀπολύτρωσις, in any case, may be used in order to depict a release from a position of slavery (cf Ziesler 1982:357). On this aspect scholars seem to be agreed, even though they disagree considerably on the question as to whether the idea of a ransom is implied or not in a context such as Romans 3:24 (cf Cranfield 1975:206). This question, no doubt, is very difficult to decide. Therefore Barrett (1971:76), for example, remarks that,

'The word can mean simply "deliverance", "liberation"; the act, that is, by which God finally sets men free from bondage to evil powers and to corruption; but the connexion with blood and death suggest that it has not completely lost its original sense of "ransoming", emancipation by the payment of a price; compare Mark 10:45; 1 Pet 1:18f.'

Cranfield (1975:206-7) is essentially in agreement with this point of view, but admits that, in the final analysis, the question must remain open.

Käsemann (1974:90), on the other hand, is quite pertinent in his rejection of the notion of ransoming. According to him the 'principal meaning' of ἀπολύτρωσις is simply 'liberation', as exemplified in Romans 8:23 (cf Käsemann 1970:163). In his opinion most of the other Pauline texts in which ἀπολύτρωσις makes its appearance (such as 1 Cor 1:30; Col 1:14; Eph 1:7), show clear signs of liturgical influence, and are therefore appropriately interpreted in terms of that 'principal meaning' (cf 1974:90).

Without question one has to admit that, especially where ἀπολύτρωσις is employed in marked eschatological contexts (cf Rm 8:23; Eph 4:30), the semantic component of the payment of a ransom has definitely retreated into the background (cf Hill 1967:72). In other words, this particular component must be regarded as a supplementary component. Stating it thus, the possibility is of course still open for this aspect of the meaning to become critical in a given context (cf Nida 1975b:35-7).

In any case, Paul can also speak of *liberation* without any regard whatsoever to the idea of a ransom. This is obviously true of his argument

in *Romans 6* and *Romans 7:1-6*. Without any shadow of doubt, these two contexts deal with the disposition of man apart from Christ in terms of being enslaved to other powers. Sin (ἡ ἀμαρτία) and the law (ὁ νόμος) appear in a personified form as two slave masters ruling over those who turn out to be their subjects (cf Pesch 1983:56). Various motifs in these two passages give expression to this idea of 'subjection to a master' (cf Tannehill 1967:14-20; also §5.1.3 below). Not only is Paul here directly referring to the possibility of being δοῦλοι τῆς ἀμαρτίας (Rm 6:16, 17, 20), but he also mentions the other side of the picture by pointing to the reign of sin (βασιλεύω and κυριεύω - Rm 5:21; 6:12-14) and its colleague, death (Rm 6:9), and to the possibility of surrendering oneself to this dominion (παρίστημι/παριστάνω - Rm 6:13,19). Living under this reign involves obedience to the master in question (Rm 6:16) and the consequent rendering of slave service (Rm 6:6), and even military service (Rm 6:13 - ὄπλα ἀδικίας τῆ ἀμαρτίας). Similarly, according to *Romans 7:1-6*, one may be said to be bound by the law (ἐν ᾧ κατευχόμεθα) while the law itself is shown as having authority (ὅτι ὁ νόμος κυριεύει) over man as long as he lives (vs 1). This fact is illustrated with an analogy from marriage where the married woman is by law bound to her husband as long as he is alive.

From this bondage or slavery, Paul argues, one may be freed by death (Rm 6:7; 7:2,6). And surely it is not necessary to complicate this principle. Paul is simply stating the very obvious fact that the slave owner's authority over his slave is terminated by the death of that slave (cf Lyall 1984:39). No need to say, as Cranfield (1975:311) does, that *Romans 6:7* should be understood, not as a general statement about dead men, but as a specific theological statement concerning the man who has died with Christ in baptism (so too Harrisville 1980:94). It simply points to the fact that a dead slave is no longer under any legal obligation to his former master (cf Jonker 1969:94; also Newman & Nida 1973:116).

Seen from this perspective, Arndt and Gingrich's interpretation of δεδικαίωται in *Romans 6:7* proves to be the correct one. They propose that the sentence should be rendered as 'the one who died is freed from sin'. Louw and Nida's definition (cf §37.138) tends in the same direction, but is nevertheless open to some criticism. According to them, the meaning of δικαίω in this particular domain may be described as 'to cause to be released from the

control of some state or situation involving moral issues'. The very last phrase in particular (i.e. '... involving moral issues') seems to advocate a rather moralistic view of sin, not quite suitable to the context. The aspect of being set free from the control of someone (sin is personified!), is the point that really matters. This point is well-expressed in Newman and Nida's rendering of this sentence as, 'for whenever people die they are set free and sin cannot control them.' (1973:116).

More or less the same idea is conveyed in *Romans 6:18, 22* with the help of the lexical item ἐλευθερώω. The parallelism between the phrase δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας (vs 7) and the phrase ἐλευθερωθέντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας (vss 18,22) is so striking that it can hardly be overlooked. The repetition of ἀπό with the genitive of separation (cf BDF §180), as well as the use of the passive voice in both instances, strengthen the impression that these two phrases are semiotactically very closely related. The same construction is of course also found in the case of *Romans 7:2,6*, where καταργέομαι functions in a meaning very similar to that of δικαίωω and ἐλευθερώω in *Romans 6*. In fact, it is hard to determine any exact distinctions in the meanings of these three terms as they are used in the specific context under consideration. All three of them give expression to an event in which someone causes another person to be released from the control of something or somebody else. Therefore the translation substitutes proposed for all three of them are exactly the same, namely *to set free or to release* (cf Louw & Nida 1986:§37.135; .136; .138). Moreover, in all three of them the semantic component of the *freedom* won by the liberating activity of Christ seems to be the focal element (cf the emphatic statement in Gl 5:1 - τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἠλευθέρωσεν· στήκετε οὖν μὴ πάλιν ζυγῷ δουλείας ἐνέχεσθε ; also Rm 8:21; compare this with the translation proposed by Newman & Nida for Rm 6:7, as quoted above).

On the other hand, of course, one cannot deny that different nuances do exist. Whereas ἐλευθερώω may be regarded as the most common and straightforward vehicle of this meaning, δικαίωω and καταργέομαι seem to have other associations as well. δικαίωω may perhaps have a moral overtone after all, while καταργέομαι finds its most suitable application in the termination of an association with a person or institution imposing certain

obligations upon the one to be released (cf Louw & Nida 1986: 37.136; .138; also Arndt & Gingrich ad loc). Therefore *The New English Bible* also renders these lexical units in three different ways (Rm 6:7 - ... since a dead man is *no longer answerable* for his sins; Rm 6:18 - ... and, *emancipated* from sin, have become slaves ...; Rm 7:2 - ... she is *discharged* from the obligations of the marriage-law). However, these renderings are rather unfortunate (except perhaps the last one) in that they obscure some of the essential components of the meaning involved (cf Newman & Nida 1973:116). For one thing, God's active involvement in causing the release to come into effect, (implied by the passive form of the verbs) is practically obliterated. And, to my mind, this aspect is certainly not dismissable. It is namely by our incorporation into the death of Christ that our freedom from the bondage of 'Herrin Sünde' (cf Schmidt 1972:108) and from the slavery under the domination of the law is secured (cf Rm 6:6; 7:4). This incorporation, no doubt, is the work of God wrought through his Spirit in our baptism (cf 1 Cor 12:13; Rm 6:3,4).

Taking this whole semantic field of *liberation* into account, it is quite remarkable to notice just how many of the elements from this donor field are employed in the structuring of the recipient field of "salvation". It must of course be remembered that slavery was a widespread phenomenon at the time when Paul was writing his letters. In this regard the following statement is worthy of being taken into consideration:

The facts are that the institution of slavery existed; that its legal incidents had been thoroughly worked out, particularly in Roman law, and were well known to all; and that it is evident from the Epistles that it was a fruitful source of metaphors for the New Testament writers. Even today the word 'slave' is not without meaning when we read it in the Epistles, but the usual meaning we give to the word is significantly weaker than the reality known to the writers.

(Lyll 1984:28).

The liberation of slaves would therefore doubtlessly also be a rather common area of experience to both Paul and the recipients of his letters. And naturally, this experience would afford a telling interpretation of the "salvation" wrought in Christ. Its applicability is in fact highlighted by the observation that Paul had a very definite preference for the interpretation of *sin* in terms of a power controlling our lives. 'To

him sin is not basically separate moral missteps; but *sin is a power under whose bondage man lives.*' (Nygren 1949:242; italics his). Of course, as we have already noticed, sin is not the only power dominating man and keeping him in a position of slavery. It has several companions in the Satan, death and even the law. As Theissen (1974:285) suggests,

Versklavende Mächte sind Satan, Tod, Sünde und Gesetz; der Satan als 'Gott dieses Äons' (2 Kor 4,4), der Tod als 'letzter Feind', der mit seinem Stachel die Menschen tyrannisiert (1. Kor 15.26); die Sünde als persönliche Macht (Röm 5.21), die ihrem Sklaven den Tod zum Lohn gibt (Röm 6,25), ihn betrügt und vernichtet (Röm 7, 7-12). Ebenso gilt das Gesetz als numinose Macht, als eins jener Weltelemente, denen die Galater als Götzen dienen (Gal 4,3).

But, Christ intervened, and by his death the fetters of this slavery are broken; man is set free, released from the bondage in which he was caught up. And, as we have seen, Paul could make use of the whole range of lexical items akin to the experience of an ordinary slave being released, in order to describe this work of Christ. In so doing, he is not just saying that "salvation" *is like* the liberation of a slave; he is actually saying that "salvation" *is* the liberation of a slave. The richness of this metaphor, however, can only be appreciated if the donor field is allowed to maintain its presence in the background.

### 5.1.3 A change of ownership - the transfer from one sphere of power to another:

The counterpart of the liberation metaphor is what we may call the metaphor of a change of ownership (or a change of masters). Evidently both of them sprang from the same socio-cultural milieu, that is, from the practice of slavery. But, whereas the former focuses on a 'transaction' (or just an activity) leading to the freedom of a slave, the latter concentrates on an event whereby that slave is transferred from one owner (or master) to another.

Naturally one may feel to object to the idea of understanding "salvation" in terms of a change of ownership. Theissen (1974:285), for one, calls the attention to the fact that the concept of a 'Machtswechsel' might be confusing and misleading. He says: 'Dieser Begriff könnte missverständlich sein. Er suggeriert, es handle sich um einen blossen Austausch feind-

licher und heilbringender Macht bei gleichbleibender Abhängigkeitsstruktur.' He then contends that this is not the case in the letters of Paul. In these letters, he says, there is no unequivocal evidence of Paul treating "salvation" as a mere shift from one dominion to another, from one bondage to another. Instead, Paul is rather contrasting the slavery under sin and the law with the freedom and the sonship acquired in Christ.

'Pointe ist nicht der Wechsel des Herrn bei gleichbleibender Dominanzstruktur, sondern die Umstrukturierung der Dominanzverhältnisse durch das Heilsgeschehen (vgl. auch Gal 3,28).' (Theissen 1974:286).

One must admit, however, that *Romans 6* constitutes a bit of a problem to this contention. To a certain extent this is also conceded by Theissen (cf 1974:286). The problem is namely that, in this chapter Paul is saying in so many words that Christians, '... having been set free from sin, have become slaves of righteousness' (vs 18, RSV), and alternatively that '... you have been set free from sin and have become slaves of God ...' (vs 22, RSV). Moreover, these cannot be regarded as accidental slips of the tongue. A discourse analysis of the entire chapter reveals that this idea of a transfer from the dominion of sin to the dominion of God (or of righteousness) may in fact be the structuring principle behind Paul's argument. (For my own discourse analysis of *Romans 6*, see Appendix 1. There are also a number of other discourse analyses of this chapter available: cf Louw 1978:13-4; Du Toit 1979:264-6; Pelser 1981:102-3; Malan 1981:119-21).

According to the analysis displayed in Appendix 1, this pericope (Rm 6: 1-23) comprises nine different clusters of thought, which can again be combined into four paragraphs. The contents of each of these four paragraphs (constituting the major semantic units of the pericope) may be summarised in the following way:

- \* Paragraph A: the transfer from the dominion of sin to the dominion of God by dying and rising with Christ.
- \* Paragraph B: a call to take the transfer from the dominion of sin to the dominion of God seriously.
- \* Paragraph C: an explanation of what this transfer from the dominion of sin to the dominion of God really involves.
- \* Paragraph D: a comparison of the final outcome of being under the dominion of sin and of being under the dominion of God.

In the present context there is no urgent need (and in any case no space) for a full description of the structure of this pericope. Therefore only the essential elements are briefly discussed.

Starting with *paragraph A*, the claim can be laid that the idea of a transfer from the dominion of sin to the dominion of God is introduced even at this point (cf Tannehill 1967:8,9). It should therefore not be regarded as a kind of a 'Fremdkörper', causing a break in the flow of the argument between the end of chapter 5 and verse 12 of chapter 6 (cf Du Toit 1979:289, footnote 106). Although the idea of dying and rising with Christ (usually taken to be the theme of Rm 6:1-11) is certainly standing in the foreground, there are clear indications that this very idea is here actually being employed in the service of the underlying motif of a change of masters. The focus is therefore actually on dying and rising with Christ as the *way* in which the transfer to God's dominion is accomplished. According to these verses one is transferred from the one dominion to the other in that, when you are baptised, you get a share in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ himself (cf vss 3,4 = colons 5,6: from here onwards 'colon' will be abbreviated as 'c', and 'colons' as 'cs'). Thus the suggestion in verse 2 that those who have been baptised, died to sin as a master (cf Schmidt 1972:108) and can no longer live under its rule (ἐν αὐτῇ - '... weist auf den Bereich der Sünde' - Käsemann 1974:157).

This claim is substantiated and qualified by clusters (c) (vss 5-7 = cs 7-9) and (d) (vss 8-10 = cs 10-14), running closely parallel to one another (cf Bornkamm 1969:74; also Tannehill 1967:9 and Frankemölle 1970:23). There is such an exact parallel between these two clusters that one can only agree with Tannehill (1967:9) when he states that,

'The major difference between vss 5-7 and 8-10 is that vss 6-7 focus on the *believers'* release from the old dominion while vss 9-10 speak of *Christ's* death to sin and new life to God. Yet these are not two separate things, for it is the assertion of vss 5 and 8 that the *believers'* death is involved in that of Christ.'

The core of the argument may then be stated as follows: Jesus' death was of the kind that, through his death, the reign of death was broken (c 12 - θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει), and therefore sin, which is

the power behind death (cf Rm 5:21; 1 Cor 15:56) was stripped of its influence (c 13 - τῆ ἀμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς). Thus it came about that, since his resurrection, Christ is fully at the disposal of God. In other words, the life He now lives, stands completely under the dominion of God (c 14 - ὁ δὲ ζῆ, ζῆ τῷ θεῷ). And by being incorporated into Christ through baptism, the believer undergoes this very same transfer from the dominion ('Machtsbereich') of sin to the dominion of God. Colons 8 and 9 (= vss 6 & 7) leave no doubt about the reality of this transfer:

'And we know that our old being has been put to death with Christ on his cross, in order that the power of the sinful self might be destroyed, so that we should no longer be slaves of sin. For when a person dies, he is set free from the power of sin.' (GNB).

Cluster (e) (vs 11 = c 15) is just the summary and application of this whole argument (cf Merk 1968:25). At the same time, however, it also serves as a transition to the rest of the pericope. Paragraphs B-D are but drawing out the consequences (or implications) of the ground stated in colon 15, namely that the believer is dead to master sin so as to live under the new reign of God, in Christ Jesus.

In *paragraph B* (vss 12-14 = cs 16-20) those who have experienced this transfer, are called to take it seriously in their daily lives by not allowing sin to reign in their mortal bodies. This would involve a refusal to let sin gain control over any of their 'natural capacities' (Cranfield 1975: 317); every expression of their existence as human beings should rather be put to the service of God (cf Du Toit 1979:276).

Even though these implications are stated in the imperative, Paul is obviously very eager to let them understand that these imperatives are grounded in the indicative of the transfer that has already taken place (cf ὡσεὶ ἐκ νεκρῶν ζῆντας in vs 13/c 18, as well as vs 14/cs 19,20. οὐ κυριεύσει. In Colon 20 should *not* be regarded as a prohibitive as proposed by Malan 1981:122, and as translated by the NAB and GNB; it is rather to be taken as a future indicative, offering the believer an assurance of salvation - cf Ridderbos 1959:137; Nygren 1949:248; Wilckens 1980:22). In other words, Paul's imperatives do not express doubt as to the new status of the believers; they are already under the dominion of God;

now they must just live accordingly. In the words of Wilckens (1980:21),

Der Mahnung in VV 12f liegt keineswegs die ängstliche Sorge zugrunde, die Christen könnten alsbald der Herrschaft der Sünde wieder anheimfallen. Sie hat nicht eigentlich warnenden Charakter. Vielmehr mutet Paulus den Adressaten vollauf zu, ihren Standort zwischen den beiden entgegengesetzten Herrschaften Gottes und der Sünde in eigener Verantwortung zu beziehen ...'

That is: they must take that transfer from the dominion of sin to the dominion of God seriously in their everyday lives.

Bearing this interpretation in mind, it is clear that the imperatives do not contradict the indicatives (as Bultmann - 1924:123 - appears to have suggested by characterising their relationship as a real antinomy). The imperatives rather form an integral part of the indicatives - the inescapable implication (or consequence) of the indicative (cf Käsemann 1974:166-7: 'Der sogenannte Imperativ ist in den Indikativ integriert und steht keineswegs neben ihn ...').

This interpretation is further supported by *paragraph C* (vss 15-20 = cs 21-30). The main thrust of this paragraph can namely be subsumed under the assertion that one is either a slave of sin, or a slave of God, and that one is obliged to obey the master to whom you belong (cf Malan 1981:134). The structure of all the different statements in this paragraph is determined by this 'either-or' (Eichholz 1972:269), but then not in the sense that the believer is still called upon to make this decision. As Bornkamm (1969:83) has observed, 'The decision is no longer open - an "either-or". Rather, what holds is "Once-Now", "Then-Now" (Rom. 6.19-22; 7:5f; ...)' . Indeed, in colons 25 and 26 (vss 17,18) Paul is thanking God for having freed the believers in Rome from their slavery to sin, in order that they could be transferred to the dominion of righteousness (he literally says that they became slaves to righteousness - ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ). But, once again, this fact of having been transferred from the one slave-owner to the other, carries with it the implication that one has to be obedient to that new master. And that is exactly where the emphasis lies in paragraph C. This obedience, in turn, finds practical expression in surrendering oneself to the service of God (vs 19 = cs 28.29).

Finally, *paragraph D* (vss 21-3 = cs 31-6) highlights the ultimate consequences of one's allegiance to either of these two opposing powers

that may be in control of our lives. The slave of 'master sin' will eventually receive their due remuneration, that is death! 'Sie ist eine gerechte Entloohnerin. Sie gibt nach Verdienst, nicht mehr und nicht weniger.' (Gaugler - as quoted by Eichholz 1972:271). On the other hand, those who stand under the dominion of God will ultimately enjoy eternal life, evidently not as a reward for their services to God, but rather as a free gift in Christ Jesus, the merciful Lord to whom they belong.

Considering the argument of the whole chapter, it is clear that Paul is counteracting the false conclusion drawn from his thesis regarding the justification by grace through faith (cf Tannehill 1967:7). This false conclusion is namely the one stated in colon 2 in the form of a rhetorical question: 'Should we continue to live in sin so that God's grace will increase?' (GNB). Paul's answer to this question is a categorical NO, and actually the entire pericope is but a backing for that  $\mu\eta\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\lambda\omicron\tau\omicron$  in colon 3. His argument, then, boils down to this: we who are justified by the grace of God through faith, may definitely not continue in sin, because we have been transferred from the dominion of sin to the dominion of God.

Obviously, therefore, the actual purpose behind this chapter is a 'paranetical' or an 'ethical' one. Paul is indeed concerned about the practical effect of 'his gospel' in the daily lives of the people who have experienced the justification by the grace of God through faith. But, and that is the main dictum of the present section, in stating his case concerning the practical, ethical consequences of 'his gospel', Paul does not simply base his argument on the previously presented understanding of that gospel as justification. He is introducing, so I propose, a new perspective on that same gospel. What has previously been described as justification, or reconciliation, or redemption, or salvation, is here viewed from a different angle, and is then described in terms of a transfer from one dominion to another.

In taking this stance, we seem to come close to the interpretation put forward by Windisch (1924:268ff). He is of the opinion that Romans 6 is moving in a direction totally independent from that found in Paul's doctrine of justification. In his own words: 'Vielmehr haben wir es

hier mit einem neuen und gegenüber der Rechtfertigungslehr selbständigen Lehrkomplex zu tun.' (1924:268). And a little further on he adds: 'Die Schwierigkeit liegt also hierin, dass Paulus in einem anderen Bilderkreis überspringt, der ihm aus der Überlieferung geläufiger ist. Die Antinomie hängt also zum Teil an der Verbindung sehr verschiedenartiger und gegeneinander nicht ausgeglichener Terminologien ...' (1924:271).

This, however, is not exactly what has been proposed above. When saying that this chapter is looking at the same issue from a different perspective, it may not be deduced that this chapter is therefore presenting a totally different and independent body of teachings ('Lehrkomplex'). It is true, though, that Paul is employing another metaphor in this context, but this fact does not imply that this new metaphor is contradicting the previous ones. On the contrary, it is our contention that the figure used in the context of Romans 6 is perfectly compatible with those employed in the first five chapters of the epistle. In linguistic terms one could say that they belong to the same semantic field!

To prove this, let us enquire about the components of the semantic unit involved. The analysis of this meaning, it seems, will yield the following semantic components:

- a) Someone finds himself in a position of being in *bondage*, that is, of *being a slave to someone*;
- b) He is *released* from the position of slavery by the *intervention* of someone else, who then becomes his *new master*;
- c) As a result, he is standing in the *service* of that new master.

These are the components of meaning, no doubt, we witness in the expressions included in *Romans 3:18 and 21*, saying:

ἐλευθερωθέντες καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ (vs 18);  
 οὐκ ἔχετε τὸν καρπὸν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν εἰς ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῶν αἰώνων (vs 22).

To say that we have become slaves (ἐδουλώθητε) of righteousness (as a ruling power!) as a result of God's saving actions, may at first seem to be totally inappropriate and even repulsive (cf Merk 1968:31 -

'... das harte und anstössige ἐδουλώθητε ...'). But, looking at Romans 6, one soon realises that this new master is of a completely different character than the old one! This is particularly evident from paragraph D (Rm 6:21-23 = cs 31-36), where the different ways in which these two masters treat their slaves are compared. The gain to be expected from sin as a master is that of which one can only be ashamed, finally issuing in death (vs 21 = cs 31-2), whereas '... God gives freely, and his gift is eternal life.' (NEB). Being transferred from the ownership of sin to that of God is therefore indeed a matter of entering into a blessed new life (cf also Rm 6:1-11).

And yet, throughout this pericope, but especially in paragraph C (vss 15-20 = cs 21-30), the fact that we are slaves, even under the dominion of God, is accentuated (cf Malan 1981:134). Even though Paul is drawing the attention to the fact that he is actually using a metaphor (ἀνθρώπινον λέγω διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν - vs 19a = c 27), he does not shrink away from its consequences. That is the point he wants to bring home in this specific context, and even if we find it a bit shocking, he is standing by that point. After all, a good metaphor must produce some kind of a shock (cf §3.1.2 above). And, apparently Paul is, in this context, intending to 'shock' his readers to the realisation that, having been freed by God from the bondage of sin, there is no other option for them but to serve God as their new master in absolute obedience (cf Du Toit 1984:75; also Lyall 1970:75).

In fact, the same kind of argument is also found in *1 Corinthians 6:19-20*. The circumstances are much the same as in Romans 6. Paul is namely fighting the libertinistic principle that we are free to do anything (cf 1 Cor 6:12 - NEB). His ultimate answer is then that we are not free to do what we like. 'You do not belong to yourselves; you were bought at a price', he concludes (1 Cor 6:19b-20 - NEB). Obviously the phrase ἡγοράσθητε τιμῆς should be understood in terms of the purchasing of a slave. Says Marshall (1974:157): 'The emphasis, however, is not on deliverance leading to freedom, but on purchase leading to slavery.' In other words, by a very costly transaction God has secured us as his own, and as his slaves we have no option but to honour him, even with our bodies (cf 1 Cor 6:20).

Of course this is not the full picture. Paul can just as well say that

we are no longer slaves, but sons of God (cf Rm 8:15; Gl 4:7). And if we want the full picture, both of these perspectives should be taken into account. None is sufficient in itself (cf Bornkamm 1971:136).

However, that does not imply that the one perspective can simply be subsumed under the other (as Theissen-1974:286 - would like to do). Each of them is entitled to a place in Paul's soteriology, seeing that each of them is emphasising a particular view on the same gospel. In his comments on Romans 8:15, Käsemann (1974:219) grips this apparent paradox with exceptional clarity, saying,

Der Apostel scheut nicht den formalen Widerspruch zu 6, 12ff. Seine Aussagen richten sich jeweils auf die Situation und die Leser. Radikaler Gehorsam wird pointiert als Sklavendienste bestimmt. Sofern dieser jedoch dem gnädigen Herrn nach 1.K 9,17 als freudiges Opfer dargebracht wird, markiert er zugleich echte Freiheit und Kindschaft. Paulinische Dialektik kämpft stets auf zwei Fronten und kommt deshalb ohne Paradoxien nicht aus.

Therefore it is also not good to reduce the force of the metaphor in our translations. For example, rendering Romans 6:22 as '... freed from the commands of sin, and bound to the service of God...' (NEB) is much less striking than the RSV-rendering, 'But now that you have been set free from sin and have become slaves of God ...' (cf also the difference between the NAB and the 1954 Afrikaans version of the same verse). In this case the metaphor may be kept alive by calling a spade a spade! (that is: call a slave a slave, not a servant!).

#### 5.1.4 Adoption - slaves become children

The other metaphor (just mentioned above) by which Paul is describing the termination of man's bondage and slavery under the rule of the law, sin and death, is that of becoming a child of God. To be a child of God, one may dare to say, is the epitome of the freedom won by Christ. Forming a radical contrast with anything that smacks of servitude, it sets man in '... an entirely different relation with God, one of mutual confidence, and reciprocal love, one in which God gives and man receives, making spontaneous returns in loyalty and obedience and service, in a word, the relation of sonship.' (Scott 1966:171).

It goes without saying that Paul is here drawing upon the common social datum of family relationships. The kinship system of his time may therefore be said to form the 'symbolic universe' within which Paul's language in this regard should be read (Petersen 1985:208). Within this system it is quite natural to find him referring, not only to God as 'our Father' (cf Rm 1:7, etc), and to us as his 'children' or 'sons' (but not 'daughters') (cf υἱοὶ θεοῦ and τέκνα θεοῦ in Rm 8:14,16), but also to Jesus as '... the eldest among a large family of brothers' (NEB Rm 8:29) and to us as 'brothers and sisters' of one another (cf Rm 16).

However, the fact should still be kept in mind that, '... while Paul conceives of the relationship between God and his people in kinship terms, he does so with extreme symbolic freedom.' (Petersen 1985:208). So, for instance, it is obvious that Paul's symbolic kinship system '... consists of only two generations, those of the father and of his children, for after the firstborn male Jesus Christ, the son of God, all of the rest of the children of God are generated through Christ without a spouse.' (Petersen 1985:208).

For the purpose of the present dissertation there is of course no need to discuss this whole system in all its details. (Even though it might have been very interesting to see how Kittay & Lehrer's suggestion concerning the metaphorical interaction between entire semantic fields is at work in this case (cf §3.2.1). Anyhow, our peculiar concern is rather with that part of the metaphor dealing with the way in which someone who is not a child of God can *become* a child of God (cf §4.1).

In this regard, then, it is important to take note of Paul's use of the term υἰοθεσία. This term, occurring only five times in the letters of Paul (including Ephesians) and nowhere else in the New Testament, is attested in the Greek world only from the second century B.C. (cf Von Martitz 1972:397), and does not occur at all in the Septuagint (cf Schweizer 1972:399). It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that it should be regarded as a technical term from the juridical sphere, more or less equivalent to the Latin *adoptio* (cf Schlier 1971:197). By no means does that imply, however, that all the intricacies of the legal procedure in question are relevant for the interpretation of the term in its Pauline contexts, as Lyall (1984:88) appears to be suggesting. To use Petersen's phrase - Paul is applying this term '... with

extreme symbolic freedom'. For that reason it is also not so crucial to decide the question as to whether the metaphor should be interpreted against the background of either the Greek or the Roman law (cf Lyall 1984:95-9; also Lyall 1969:458-66).

On the other hand, Käsemann (1974:219) seems to be approaching the opposite extreme with his remark in connection with Romans 8:15, saying: 'Der ursprüngliche Sinn von "Adoption" schwingt hier bei υἰοθεσία kaum noch mit.' Although one has to admit that it is rather difficult to determine whether the act of conferring sonship unto someone, or the sonship itself, as the result of that act, is in focus in Paul's use of υἰοθεσία (cf Schweizer 1972:399), one feels inclined to agree with Wilckens (1980:136) when he, in his comment on Romans 8:15, declares the following:

Während jedoch nach jüdischer Anschauung alle Israeliten als Erwählte 'Söhne Gottes' sind (vgl. so auch 9,4!), sind es hier die Christen seit ihrer Taufe; das dürfte der Grund für die Wahl des hellenistischen Terminus υἰοθεσία sein: Gott hat sie zu seinen Söhnen *gemacht*, sie also als die Seinen 'adoptiert' (vgl. noch Gal 4,5; Eph 1,5).

To my mind, there appears to be room, both in Romans 8 and in Galatians 4, for an interpretation stressing the fact that God actually took steps in order to *cause* somebody who used to be outside his 'family' to *become* a member of that family (cf also Van Rensburg 1981:161-4 and Coetzer 1981:184).

Taking this stand, it may be helpful to keep hold of the distinction between sonship as such, and the act whereby someone is instituted into that status of sonship. As far as sonship in itself is concerned, scholars are nearly unanimous in their opinion that it should be seen against the Old Testament background of Israel as the 'son of God' and the Israelites as his children (cf De Villiers 1950:10-47; Wilckens 1980:136; Bruce 1982:197 and Ridderbos 1975:198). This connection is particularly clear in the context of Galatians 3:1-4:7, where the whole argument is firmly rooted in the Old Testament history of salvation, and where those who believe in Christ are even typified as the true children of Abraham (cf Gl 3:7,29). Being part of the true 'Israel of God' (Gl 6:16), they form such an integral part of the family, that they will also share in the inheritance (Gl 3:18,29; 4:7).

Coming to the way in which sonship was bestowed on someone standing outside the family, it seems very likely that Paul must have availed himself of the idea of 'adoption', which was fairly common at that time (cf Bruce 1982:197). Adoption can, in the words of Lyall (1984:69), simply be defined as '... a device found in many legal systems by which a person leaves his natural family and enters another family.' According to Lyall (1984:69) the fundamental reason for this procedure in ancient legal systems was to ensure the perpetuation of the family making the adoption.

It is important, however, to realise that in those ancient legal systems, the sonship conferred by the process of adoption was equal in status to natural sonship. Bruce's statement in this regard (1963:166) is worth quoting:

The term 'adoption' may smack somewhat of artificiality in our ears; but in the first century AD an adopted son was a son deliberately chosen by his adoptive father to perpetuate his name and inherit his estate; he was no whit inferior in status to a son born in the ordinary course of nature, and might well enjoy the father's affection more fully and reproduce the father's character more worthily.

Surely adoption, understood along these lines, would fit in admirably with Paul's general treatment of sonship. At the same time, it would also be in accordance with his teaching about "salvation"; it is in fact providing yet another perspective on the very same action of God (cf the obvious parallelism between ἐξαγοράζω and υἱοθεσία in Gl 4:5). Just as the metaphors of liberation and a change of ownership, it stands in sharp contrast to the slavery imposed by 'master sin' and its allies. Even though the notion of changing the status of a slave into that of a son is not inherent in the meaning of the term υἱοθεσία the context within which it is used, may certainly be taken to suggest such an interpretation (cf Rm 8:15 - πνεῦμα δουλείας versus πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας; and Gl 4:7 - ὥστε οὐκέτι εἶ δοῦλος ἀλλὰ υἱός). In other words, by God's intervention someone who used to be a *slave*, is now legally and formally bestowed with the status of being *God's own son* (or daughter).

There is, of course, but one other way in which one can lawfully become an integral part of a certain family, and that is by birth. And, it is

interesting that this is the metaphor used by John in order to convey the same message, namely that God wants to draw us into his own family (cf Jn 3:3,5). According to him one may be 'born again' (NIV), or 'born anew' (RSV), or 'born over again' (NEB) (... ἡμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ ἁγίου γεννηθήσονται ἄνωθεν ...). In other words, the child of God is in this case seen as '... the offspring of God himself' (NEB - Jn 1:12,13 - ... ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν). The children of God are 'begotten' by Him (cf Dukes 1983:12); they are 'generated' by what one may call a 'symbolic reproductive process' (cf Petersen 1985:210).

Paul, however, does not make use of this metaphor, but replaces it with another, calculated to have the same effect. In both of them God is instituting man, from outside the 'family circle', into a new status on sonship - in the one case with reference to 'natural means'; in the other with reference to 'legal operations' (cf Dukes 1983:66).

If this be the case (and we believe it to be), one may certainly conclude that *υἱοθεσία* is very rich in meaning. And yet, one has to be extremely careful not to overload it. It cannot be expected to carry the whole burden of Paul's theological thinking concerning the sonship of the believers. It is basically shedding some light on one specific aspect of that sonship, and that is namely the way in which God is drawing somebody into his own family. This particular meaning is beautifully summarised by Louw and Nida (1986:§35.53) in their definition pertaining to *υἱοθεσία*. They describe the meaning as 'to formally and legally declare that someone who is not one's own child is henceforth to be treated and cared for as one's own child, including complete rights of inheritance.'

The components of meaning included in this definition, may be stated in the following way:

- a) Someone finds himself in the position of *not belonging to a certain family*; (he may even be a slave, but that would be a purely supplementary component of this meaning);
- b) By a legal and formal declaration of the head of that family; *a new status of sonship is conferred* on that person;
- c) As a result, he is to be regarded as *a full member of that family*, even with complete rights of inheritance.

Obviously one element of the definition was ignored in the stating of the various components, and that is the reference to the fact that this adopted child is '... to be treated and cared for as one's own child.' According to Lyall (1984:69) this feature may be part of our modern conception of adoption, but it was not inherent in the ancient understanding of this practice. In his own words: 'Although in the twentieth century ideas have changed, in the legal systems of New Testament times there was usually no suggestion that an adoption was made for the protection, maintenance, or benefit of the adoptee.' Therefore, taking this element as one of the semantic features of  $\nu\lambda\omicron\theta\epsilon\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\alpha$  might just leave room for the accusation that we are using the word to ventriloquise our own ideas on the subject. On the other hand, a reference to the rights of inheritance appears to be in order, seeing that it is closely associated with the use of  $\nu\lambda\omicron\theta\epsilon\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\alpha$ , both in Romans 8 and in Galatians 4 (cf Coetzer 1981:184). It may, nevertheless, only be a supplementary component, in the sense that the meaning can also be defined without necessarily referring to the rights of inheritance.

'Adoption' still remains the rendering with the best chance of keeping the metaphorical quality of  $\nu\lambda\omicron\theta\epsilon\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\alpha$  alive - even at the risk of incurring the negative connotations which might be associated with the idea of adoption in most modern societies.

#### 5.1.5 Acceptance - receiving someone into an association:

Closely related to the metaphor of 'adoption', but of a more general application, is the metaphor of 'acceptance'. Whereas 'adoption' is used with reference to the accepting of someone, who did not originally belong to one's family, as one's own child, 'acceptance' may be taken to have reference to the incorporation of someone into any kind of association or fellowship.

This metaphor is introduced by Paul, as a soteriological metaphor, in the paranetical context of *Romans 14:1-15:13*. Actually this whole passage, forming a unity in three sections (Louw 1979a:126, speaks of a trilogy), is basically dealing with the obligation, resting on all who belong to the church, towards mutual acceptance (cf Wilckens 1982:79-80). Paul is namely addressing the problem of the difference

of opinion that apparently existed between two groups within the congregation in Rome. Though it is difficult to tell exactly what their respective views were (cf Barrett 1971:256), it is clear that they were in disagreement on issues such as the abstinence from meat and wine (cf vss 2,21), and the observing of certain special days (vs 5). Some were in favour of the keeping of such regulations (they are 'the weak in faith' - even in Paul's eyes - cf Jonker 1969:179), others did not feel themselves bound by these restrictions (they go through as 'the strong' - cf Rm 15:1). Evidently there was a real danger that these two groups would despise and even condemn each other (vs 3). Driven by his pastoral concern (cf Ridderbos 1959:302), Paul therefore had to convince them not to deny each other a place in the church. His plea was extended to both groups, calling them both to mutual acceptance (προσλαμβάνεσθε - Rm 14:1; 15:7 - is in the medium, indicating the mutuality of the acceptance to which they were summoned - cf Venter 1985:132).

This commission, then, was motivated with reference to the fact that God (and alternatively, Christ - cf Rm 15:7), had finally and conclusively accepted both groups to be associated with Himself. Commenting on the use of the aorist tense in connection with God and Christ's deed of acceptance (cf Rm 14:3; 15:7 - προσελάβετο), Venter (1985:133) remarks:

Die gebruik van die aoristus om die daad van God se aanvaarding na vore te bring, verleen 'n sekere karakter aan die oproep. Dit kan so onder woorde gebring word: moenie voortgaan om hom wat eet te oordeel nie, want God het hom vir eens en vir altyd, finaal aanvaar. As afsluiting van die paranese in 1a-3c word die heils-indikatief van God se aanvaarding as grond vir die wedersydse aanvaarding baie sterk beklemtoon.

Delling (1967:15) summarises the argument in the following words: 'As God (or Christ) has taken every member of the Church into fellowship with Himself, so incorporate each other into your Christian circle with no inner reservations (such as might spring from differences in religious custom).'

That this application of προσλαμβάνω may indeed be regarded as a soteriological metaphor, is confirmed by the use of πρόσληψις in the context of *Romans 11*. There can be little doubt that salvation is at the centre of Paul's interest at this point in the discussion (cf

De Villiers 1981:209-18). Therefore, when he refers to Israel's πρόσληψις in Romans 11:15, contrasting it with their ἀποβολή, one cannot but see it as an act of God whereby they would be reinstated into their fellowship with Himself. Says Wilckens (1980:244-5): ἀποβολή kann nicht "Verlust", sondern nur die Verwerfung Israels durch Gott meinen, weil πρόσληψις das entsprechende oppositum ist.' Louw and Nida (1986: §34.34;34.38) therefore also treat these two lexical items as belonging to the same semantic domain, and define them in parallel terms as 'the acceptance of someone into an association', and 'the removal of someone from a particular association'.

In this light we may conclude that it is perhaps still preferable to use 'accept' as translational substitute for προσλαμβάνω in Romans 14 and 15, although it is rendered 'welcome' by most translations (cf Newman & Nida 1973:255). One may of course argue that 'welcome' is more likely to alert the reader to the fact that we are dealing with a metaphor. Seeing "salvation" in terms of an act whereby someone is made to feel at home (or welcome) in the company of God, may in fact turn out to be quite a striking perspective on the saving event.

Thus, it seems, any of these two translational equivalents could be used. Both of them seem to convey the basic components of the meaning in question, namely that someone, who used to be outside a particular society, is *received into that association*, with the result that he then *belongs to that particular company*.

One can hardly overlook the obvious correspondence between this metaphor and the few others already discussed thus far. Once again there is the negative condition under which someone happens to find himself; once again there is the element of an intervention by God (or Christ) by which the situation is radically transformed; and once again there is the positive result of a new position in relation to God. No doubt, then, this meaning should also be included in the semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles. It yields yet another perspective on the same saving event.

### 5.1.6 Justification - the acquittal of the guilty; the restoration of the covenant relationship:

Coming to the notion of justification, one is almost overwhelmed by the mass of literature available, defending an alarming diversity of opinions regarding the interpretation of the pericopae involved, and more especially of the meaning of δικαιοσύνη in the different contexts (cf Roberts 1981:12). In the words of Pelser (1985:251): 'Surely the most debated and therefore the most disputed, but at least for Protestant theology most central, of the thought-complexes in Pauline soteriology is the concept traditionally termed "*the righteousness of God*".'

However, as far as the present thesis is concerned, it should immediately be stated as a matter of principle that it is not so much the meaning of δικαιοσύνη or even of the phrase δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ that will occupy our attention, but rather more specifically the saving *event*, as it is finding expression through this 'thought-complex' (cf §4.1 above). And, even though δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ can also be interpreted as denoting an event (cf Newman & Nida 1973:20, Roberts 1981:18), the more direct approach to this semantic unit is of course to be found in concentrating on the use of lexical items unmistakably referring to an action of God, such as the verb δικαίω and the nouns δικαίωσις and δικαίωμα. Using *justification* as a heading to this section, is also an attempt at bringing out this particular emphasis on the event-side of the meaning under discussion, although this English term as such may perhaps be liable to be misunderstood (cf Sanders 1977:470).

In trying to determine the exact sense in which these lexical units are functioning in Paul's major epistles, it would be possible to focus the attention on a single pericope, such as Romans 3:19-31, where the issue is treated most exhaustively (cf Pelser 1985:252). Pelser (1985:252-3) even goes to the point of claiming that, 'All that Paul has to say elsewhere in his correspondence about God's righteousness as an act on behalf of and with man, and about man's participation in the results of this act, are expressed in these few verses.' It is, nevertheless, of the utmost importance not to treat this passage in isolation (a fact, no doubt, of which Pelser himself is also well-aware; cf 1985:253).

To start with, we contend, it is absolutely essential that this pericope be comprehended in the light of the preceding part of this letter (cf Ziesler 1982:356). Now, of course nobody will deny the fact that Romans 1:18-3:20 forms the negative counterpart of the positive exposition of God's saving action found in 3:21-26. In fact, commentators are unanimous in their interpretation of the former as a prelude or preamble to the latter; the former describing the utterly hopeless condition of man (including both Jew and non-Jew), necessitating the intervention of God as explained in the latter.

The fact that this hopeless condition in which man has landed himself is specifically described in terms of man's position in the eschatological judgement before God, the supreme Judge, should, however, be emphasised. Certainly this motif is so conspicuously attested in Romans 2:1-16, that there is absolutely no chance of denying its presence. Nevertheless, it may still be rather illuminating to list a number of the forensic catchwords found in this context pointing to the final judgement. Consider the following :

- ἀναπολόγητος (vs 1); κατακρίνεις (vs 1);
- τὸ κρίμα τοῦ θεοῦ (vss 2,3);
- ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως δικαιοκρατίας τοῦ θεοῦ (vs 5);
- ὃς ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ (vs 6);
- καὶ ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον, διὰ νόμον κριθήσονται·  
οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλ' οἱ ποιηταὶ  
νόμου δικαιοθήσονται (vss 12b-13);
- ἐν ἣ ἡμέρᾳ κρίνει ὁ θεὸς τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων (vs 16).

This motif, then, one may venture to say, is by no means confined to Romans 2:1-16; it may even be regarded as the leading motif throughout this section of the epistle (namely Rm 1:18-3:20), as is indicated by the appearance of the same, or closely related 'thematic markers' at structurally significant points in this unit of discourse. Right at the beginning of this section, for example, in Romans 1:18, the mentioning of the ὀργὴ θεοῦ is already setting the stage for the development of this notion, and at the end of the same pericope (cf Rm 1:32) we encounter a reference to being ἄξιον θανάτου in relation to the δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ. The juridical quality of the latter is accentuated by the following translation of the verse in question: 'They know what

God's verdict is: that those who behave like this deserve to die ...' (cf JB - Rm 1:32).

Equally significant, structurally speaking, is the statement of Romans 3:19-20, drawing the conclusion from the entire preceding argument. Here, once again, Paul is speaking of man's predicament in terms of being tried before the judgement seat of God. The lexical item ὑπόδικος (vs 19), in particular, is strikingly expressive in this regard. It may namely be taken to mean 'liable to judgement or punishment' (cf Arndt & Gingrich 1957:852). As such it is pointing to man's *guilt* in the tribunal of God (cf Ridderbos 1959:79-80; his comment in this regard is worth quoting: 'ὑπόδικος, schuldig, strafwaardig. Die gedachte aan het veroordelend vonnis van God laat de apostel in 1:18-3:20 a.h.w. geen ogenblik los.'). In this light, then, the sentence διότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιοσύνησεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ, can hardly mean anything but that no one will be *justified*, or be *declared righteous* in God's final judgement '... by doing what the Law requires.' (GNB).

It seems quite obvious that the use of δικαιοῶ in the context of Romans 3:21-31 should be seen in the very same light. It would certainly be rather awkward for Paul to have switched to a different meaning at this point in the argument. In other words, even in Romans 3:24,26, 28, 30 this verb '... is employed as the divine verdict that means the opposite of the divine condemnation in the judgement.' (cf Ridderbos 1975:163).

Accepting this point of view, the translation of this verb still remains somewhat of a problem. Despite the problems created by its modern connotations, 'justify' may still be considered a possibility. (cf Sanders 1977:470-1). Others, however, prefer 'make righteous' as a translation substitute (cf Käsemann 1980:96; Barrett 1971:75). This preference, to be sure, is immediately qualified by Barrett (1971:75), saying:

It is far better, and more in harmony with Paul's teaching as a whole, to suppose that 'to justify' (δικαιοῶν) does mean 'to make righteous', but at the same time to recognize that 'righteous' does not mean 'virtuous', but 'right', 'clear', 'acquitted' in God's court. Justification then means no legal fiction but an act of forgiveness on God's part, described in terms of the proceedings of a law court.

Even Käsemann (1980:96) is not denying its incontestable forensic character, '... which is not to be taken out of the context of eschatological judgement.' According to him, 'The argument that legal terminology is unsuitable for the ethical relation between God and man, and that it can be used only paradoxically (Dodd), is a relic of what is now illegitimate liberalism.' (cf 1980:96). So too, Sanders (1977:471), while arguing that 'make righteous' may be a more adequate translation, especially in the context of Galatians 2:15-21, is quick to add that 'it is to be hoped that one can learn to read "make righteous" in a neutral sense ...' But, surely this wish cannot be expected to come true so easily; the history of opposition between the analytical and synthetical interpretation of justification is just too long - as is the history of the association between the analytical interpretation and that phrase 'to make righteous' (cf Venter 1959).

Three other possibilities for the rendering of δικαιόω that have been proposed, are 'to acquit', 'to put in a right relationship' and 'to pardon'. Neill (1976:59) strongly favours the latter. It should be noted, though, that in choosing this particular translational substitute, he has no intention of imposing any infringement on the forensic character of 'justification'. Neill (1976:59) fully acknowledges the strict legal sense of this metaphor, saying:

Even in a court of law, acquittal and condemnation are not the only two possibilities; in almost every country in the world there is also the possibility of a pardon.

In other words, this pardon is to be understood as a judicial activity, but then not of an ordinary judge, but of the sovereign. After having established and having proved the guilt of the person concerned, the sovereign '... may intervene and declare that the offender has been pardoned, that is, restored to his rights within the community, his guilt being as though it had never been and as something that can never again be quoted against him' (Neill 1976:59; cf also Theissen 1974:288).

With this remark we obviously come very close to the view held by a good number of scholars, who believe that Paul's forensic language should actually be understood in the covenant setting.<sup>5)</sup> In other words, due to God's faithfulness to his covenant (cf Pluta 1968:56-77), He, as the Sovereign, actually pardons man, thus removing all his guilt, and restoring the covenant relationship in a legal and formal way (cf

Käsemann's interpretation of *καρπός* in Rm 3:25 - 1980:98; cf also Bornkamm 1971:139; Goppelt 1982:138). Referring to the act of God, involving the substitutionary death of Christ as the demonstration of 'the righteousness of God', Goppelt (1968:155) remarks:

Diese 'rechtfertigt', d.h. sie *macht uns gerecht*; sie verleiht nicht eine Qualität, sondern stellt in eine personhafte Relation. Sie setzt den Glaubenden als Bundespartner Gottes. Sie versieht den Menschen nicht mit dem Etikett: 'gerecht', das er für wahr halten soll; sie weist ihm eine Platz am Tische Gottes zu, den einzunehmen, um zu leben, glauben bedeutet.

This, of course, must be the rationale behind the translational substitute so frequently employed by *The Good News Bible* in rendering both *δικαίω* and *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, namely that 'God puts people right with himself' (cf Rm 1:17; 3:20.21,22, etc). Though it is not stripped of its forensic connotations (cf Newman & Nida 1973:67), the focus is decidedly shifted to the establishing or restoration of a relationship (which is evidently falling in the category of the covenant) (cf also Roberts 1981:18; Pelser 1985:253). Therefore Louw and Nida (1986:§34.46) also treat these lexical items in the same semantic subdomain as *δικαίω* (§34.44), defining their meaning as 'to cause someone to be in a proper or right relation with someone else.' In explanation they add the following comment:

Some scholars, however, interpret *δικαίω*, *δικαίωσις* and *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* in the following contexts as meaning 'forensic righteousness', that is to say, the act of being declared righteous on the basis of Christ's atoning ministry, but it would seem more probable that Paul uses these expressions in the context of the covenant relation rather than in the context of legal procedures.

Unfortunately, however, one cannot escape the impression that this way of translating these lexical items inevitably involves a demetaphorisation. (And, actually one may feel the same about 'to pardon' as translational equivalent.) It is not that we find it necessary to deny the fact that this act of God is aimed at the restoration of the covenant relationship; it is just that we find the playing down of the forensic element rather objectionable. To my mind, these two aspects do not stand in contrast to each other; they may very well be combined (cf Bornkamm 1971:138-9). The restoration of the covenant relationship may namely be seen as the result of God's act of justification (which

is incontestably forensic - on this point even Käsemann is in agreement with Bultmann's thesis that *δικαιοσύνη* and *δικαίω* are essentially forensic-eschatological terms - cf Bultmann 1952:273).

There can be little doubt, however, that few people will think in forensic terms when they read about God putting someone in the right relationship with Himself, or about God pardoning the guilty. For that reason, then, the translational equivalent 'to acquit' seems preferable.

The objection that the idea of 'acquittal' may still conjure the notion of treating sinners as though they were not sinners (cf Martin 1981:35) - a notion which Sanday and Headlam (1902:36) criticise as 'legal fiction' - may seem to paralyse this proposal. This would especially be the case if 'acquittal' were to be taken in the meaning ascribed to it by Neill (1976:58). According to him, 'To acquit an accused person is to declare that that person has not committed the offense with which he has been charged and is therefore innocent.' Surely, applying this meaning to the justification of a *sinner* would appear to be something like 'legal fiction'.

However, it would also be possible to see 'acquittal' as expressing the meaning, 'the act of clearing someone of transgression'. This, in fact, is how Louw and Nida (1986:§ 56.34) define the meaning to which *δικαίω*, *δικαίωσις* and *δικαίωμα* may render a service in the semantic field of legal activities, and for which they supply the translational substitutes 'to acquit, to set free, to remove guilt, acquittal'. If 'to acquit' can also be rendered by 'to remove guilt', it would turn out to be a perfectly suitable way of describing God's forensic act of clearing us of the guilt incurred by our transgression on account of the substitutionary death of Christ (cf Ridderbos 1975:175).

The main advantage, we feel, in using 'to acquit' as translational equivalent for *δικαιοῦν*, is to be found in the fact that it provides such an immediate clue towards the metaphorical interpretation of the meaning in question. And exactly the apparent 'anomaly' of the acquittal of the sinner and the ungodly (cf Rm 4:5, 5:6,8), would make the metaphor all the more lively and striking. Having proven the universal guilt of mankind in Romans 1:18-3:20, Paul certainly intends

to strike home by way of a sudden turn-about in stating that those same convicted sinners go out free from the tribunal of God, not on account of the merit of their own deeds, but solely in consequence of the fact that Christ has already suffered the due punishment in their place.

Taking this stance, we don't mean to deny the fact that *δικαίωσις*, and more especially *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, may also be used in the service of other meanings (cf Sanders 1977:495; Roberts 1981:18-22). In particular, it seems likely that there is at least some truth in Käsemann's contention that the gift of righteousness which is being bestowed in God's act of acquittal, is never at any time separable from its Giver, and that the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* therefore '... partakes of the character of power, in so far as God himself enters the arena and remains in the arena with it.' (cf Käsemann 1969:174). Surely this meaning appears to be applicable at least in the context of Romans 6 (cf § 5.1.3 above), but then, of course, it is functioning in quite a different semantic field. That meaning may, however, not be used in order to deprive the meaning we are now dealing with, of its place in Paul's language. In other words, when Soards (1985:108) concludes that '... for Paul "the righteousness of God" is a code-term for the consistent vision of the salvific triumph of God', (his emphasis), this conclusion must be regarded as objectionable, for the simple fact that it does not keep track with the flexible way in which even Paul is making use of language in order to communicate a certain message. Using terminology such as 'code-term' and 'consistent' is therefore just a bit too bold.

The meaning, defined by Louw and Nida (1986:§ 56.34) as, 'the act of clearing someone of transgression', may then definitely be said to function in Paul's major epistles as a soteriological metaphor. It is attested, not only in the use of *δικαίωσις*, but also in the employment of other related lexical items such as *δικαίωσις* and even *δικαίωμα*. A particularly clear example of the last two being used under the auspices of this semantic field, is to be seen in Romans 5:16,18. The GNB-rendering of verse 16b is quite illuminating: 'After the one sin, came the judgement of "Guilty"; but after so many sins, comes the undeserved gift of "Not guilty!" In this case *δικαίωμα* stands over against *κατάκριμα*, denoting the opposition between condemnation and acquittal. In verse 18, however, the opposition is between *κατάκριμα* and *δικαίωσις*, without any significant change in the meaning (cf Ziesler

1972:209). Therefore the NEB-translation: 'It follows, then, that as the issue of one misdeed was condemnation for all men, so the issue of one just act is acquittal and life for all men.'

In this light, it is very interesting also to take note of 2 Corinthians 3:9, where the *δουλοκονία τῆς κατακρίσεως* and the *δουλοκονία τῆς δικαιοσύνης* are juxtaposed. For this verse the NEB offers the following translation: 'If splendour accompanied the dispensation under which we are condemned, how much richer in splendour must that one be under which we are acquitted.' After the mentioning of condemnation on the negative side, it follows rather naturally that its opposite on the positive side must be acquittal (cf Grosheide 1959:100). One may certainly conclude that this is a rather sure case of *δικαιοσύνη* being used in the sense of 'acquittal' (cf Fung 1980:252).

No doubt, one could go on to quote many more examples, but perhaps enough has been said to show how this semantic field comes to expression in Paul's writings. The discussion may therefore be concluded with an explicit statement of the various components involved in this meaning:

- a) Someone is found *guilty* in the context of a law-court;
- b) By way of a *pardon*, granted by the *sovereign*, who is acting as *judge*, the person is *acquitted*, that is, his guilt is removed;
- c) As a result, that person is *restored* to his rightful place in the *community*.

As it must have become evident in the foregoing discussion, it is extremely difficult to find any one translational substitute comprising all of these semantic components. There is no need to despair, though. The fact that the present semantic unit more or less duplicates the pattern of the other metaphors encountered thus far, just from a different perspective, reaffirms the impression that Paul's soteriological thinking should not be too narrowly tied up with any one metaphor - not even the metaphor of *justification*. Without denying the fact that it must have been one of Paul's favourite metaphors, it must still be said that one cannot escape the conclusion that it is but one among a whole host of metaphors, and that the full picture only emerges from the totality (cf Theissen 1974:284).

### 5.1.7 Remission of sins - wiping away the guilt

As it must be evident from the immediately preceding discussion, there is a very tight bond between the metaphors of *justification* and the *forgiveness of sins*, to be treated in the present section. In fact, this bond is syntagmatically (cf §2.1.3.1) established in the context of *Romans 4:1-8*. To support his claim that justification is by faith, and not by works, Paul turns to the example of Abraham in this pericope. With reference to Genesis 15:6, Paul argues that Abraham was 'credited' (NIV-rendering of ἐλογύσθη in vs 3) with righteousness on the basis of his trust in God, as opposed to an attempt to earn that righteousness by way of meritorious works. Noting the formal link between Genesis 15:6 and Psalm 32:2 in the use of λογίζομαι, the latter is quoted in support of the former in accordance with the principle of rabbinical exegesis called *gezerah shawah* ('equal category' - cf Bruce 1963:115; Käsemann 1980:113). But, of course, it is important to recognise that Paul's argument is not merely verbal but substantial. Says Cranfield (1975:233):

The validity of his appeal to Ps 32.1f as helping to interpret Gen 15.6 is not just a matter of the presence of a common term (λογίζεσθαι / *hāšāb*) in both places: his appeal to the psalm-passage has an inward and substantial validity, for God's reckoning righteousness to a man χωρὶς ἔργων is, in fact, equivalent to His forgiving of sins.

Following the same line of interpretation, Nygren (1949:171) comes to the conclusion that,

For Paul the essence of justification is the *forgiveness of sins*. When God lays sin to one's account, that means that he stands under the wrath of God and the dominion of death. But when sin is forgiven and not laid to one's account, that means that he is delivered from the wrath of God and placed under His righteousness. That righteousness is reckoned to one, or that sin is not reckoned to one, is one and the same thing, stated positively in the former and negatively in the latter.

That does not mean, however, that the forgiveness of sins may therefore be completely absorbed by the idea of justification. Even though it is true that the notion of sins being forgiven does not figure prominently and is nowhere independently developed in the letters of Paul (cf Bultmann

1964:512), one should nevertheless take note of the fact that it is quoted, not only in support of justification, but also in support of several other soteriological metaphors. In *Romans 11:26-27*, for instance, the future *deliverance* of Israel is also undergirded with a reference to God's promises of forgiveness in the Old Testament. And, again, *2 Corinthians 5:19* shows that forgiveness may also be connected with the metaphor of *reconciliation* (which is, of course, yet another prominent Pauline way of looking at "salvation"). And finally, *Ephesians 1:7* and *Colossians 1:14* demonstrate that it can equally well be associated with the metaphor of *liberation*; that is, as a qualification of ἀπολύτρωσις.

This observation certainly bears out the conclusion that there is no need to interpret the remission of sins exclusively against the background of the law-court. Though the sovereign's pardon in a juridical situation may afford a very suitable *Sitz im Leben* for the interpretation of the metaphor of forgiveness, it may just as well be understood in terms of other situations. In other words, the semantic unit *remission of sins* may include the forensic background as a supplementary component of meaning, but not as a diagnostic component.

The semantic field in question, then, is characterised rather by the following salient features of meaning:

- a) Someone becomes *guilty* by an offense committed against someone else;
- b) By an act of grace on the side of the offended, that guilt is *removed*; it is completely done away with;
- c) Thus the *restoration of a broken relationship* is effected.

Considering the few references concerned in Paul's major epistles, one soon comes to the realisation that this meaning is communicated in a number of parallel expressions. In a characteristic Old Testament fashion, the quotation of Psalm 32:1-2 in *Romans 4:7-8* contains three parallel statements with exactly the same reference. They say the same thing, and yet they say it in different ways. The guilt, variously depicted as αὐτονομία and ἀνομία (cf. also ἡμετέρας ἀνομίας in *2 Cor 5:19*) may be said to have been *forgotten* (ἐπιλήσθησαν) or *covered* (ἐπεκαλύφθησαν) or *not counted against* them (οὐκ ἠλοοῦνται αὐτοῖς). Though

they all share the semantic features outlined above, the first seems to focus on the idea of a cancellation as the way of removing the guilt and restoring the relationship (cf Arndt & Gingrich 1957:125), whereas the second is describing the same thing in terms of the idea of putting a covering over something (cf Louw & Nida 1986:§40.11), and the third in terms of not booking a debt to our account (cf Pop 1971:176).

The special contribution of ἐπικαλύπτω within this semantic field is perhaps well-accentuated by the NEB version of Romans 4:7, where ἐπεκαλύφθησαν is rendered as 'whose sins are buried away'. In my opinion this is a beautiful example of a successful metaphorical translation. In the same way, the translation of οὐ λογίζεται τὸ κακόν in 1 Corinthians 13:5 as, 'it does not keep a record of wrongs' (cf GNB), may also provide a significant clue towards the interpretation of ...οὐ μὴ λογίσσεται κύριος ἁμαρτίαν in Romans 4:8. Not counting sins is not to keep record of them - which certainly is a vivid way of saying that those sins are forgiven.

In the combination of Old Testament promises quoted in *Romans 11:26b-27*, forgiveness is once more brought into focus (cf Ridderbos 1959:265; Wilckens 1980:257; Käsemann 1980:314). However, this time the message is conveyed by means of other lexical units. These are: ἀποστρέφω (vs 26b) and ἀπαρρέω (mid as act). Although they are not included in Louw and Nida's semantic domain concerning forgiveness (cf §40.8-40.13), they certainly function within this field of meaning (cf Newman & Nida 1973:227). One could possibly feel that Paul is in this case talking about the removal of sin and ungodliness not as guilt, but as a state of being (cf the RSV and JB rendering of ἀποστρέψει ἀσεβείας as, 'he will banish ungodliness'; in Louw & Nida's lexicon they are also treated in the semantic domain concerned with 'a change of state' - cf §§ 13.38; 13.63).<sup>7)</sup> Yet the argument that even these verses should be read in terms of the removal of *guilt*, appears to be convincing enough. Ridderbos (1959:265) expresses this view in the following remark:

De verlossing bestaat daarin, dat *Hij de goddeloosheden van Jakob zal afwenden*, d.w.z. de schuld en de daarmee gepaard gaande straf zal vergeven en opheffen. In dit alles, dat in vs. 27 nog met andere woorden Gods *vergeving van hun zonden* heet, zal Gods *Verbond te hunnen gunste aan de dag treden*, d.i. Gods eenmaal aan Israël gedane toezegging hun God te zijn en hun zijn heil te zullen schenken.

Here, then, the emphasis is on the act of God by which sins are taken away, in the sense of being forgiven (cf Newman & Nida 1973:227). Moreover, it is very interesting to take note of the fact that the result of this act of God is also explicitly stated in Romans 11:27, namely that the covenant will be re-established. In this we may find confirmation for that third semantic feature included in the analysis of the *remission of sins* as a semantic unit (cf p 155 above).

Needless to say that this whole semantic field - being a field that may also find application on the level of ordinary interpersonal relationships between human beings - is extremely suitable for the description of God's saving action in Jesus Christ. In fact, we tend to think of forgiveness as the exclusive prerogative of God, and therefore we may perhaps find it difficult to use the cancellation of guilt on the human level as lens through which we may gain yet another perspective on "salvation". In other words, the donor field is no longer actively involved when we talk about the remission of sins. It may therefore be characterised as a 'dead metaphor' (cf §3.3 above). And, probably it might have been a 'dead metaphor' or 'stock metaphor' even in Paul's time.

In this light one might even consider the possibility that Paul was avoiding this metaphor precisely because of its highly conventional character; the metaphor of justification might have afforded him with a much more 'fresh' view on the same issue from a very closely related angle. Be it immediately granted, though, that such considerations might very easily land us in the dangerous waters of pure speculation!

#### 5.1.8 Reconciliation - enemies become friends:

Apart from *justification*, the metaphor of *reconciliation* is certainly a very prominent topic in theological discussions concerning Pauline soteriology. In fact, attempts have even been made to prove that reconciliation is really the centre of Pauline theology (for a recent attempt, cf Martin 1981; even Ridderbos - 1978:72-90 - appears to be thinking in that direction; note, however, the extremely critical review of Martin's book by Donfried 1983:83-4). On the opposite side of the spectrum, though, Käsemann (1971:49-64) is convinced that this

motif has no significant meaning for Pauline theology as a whole, seeing that its function in the passage concerned is basically to underscore and sharpen the doctrine of justification.

Part of the problem posed by the existence of such greatly divergent interpretations of the very same material, may perhaps be solved by recognising the fact that it is possible to use the term 'reconciliation' in more than one way (cf Goppelt 1968:147-8). For the champions of the view that reconciliation is playing a prominent role in the writings of Paul, the term usually includes the whole range of ideas associated with the sacrificial and substitutionary nature of Christ's death on the cross. In other words, according to this view one should not only consider Paul's use of items such as *καταλλάσσω* and *καταλλαγή*, but also *ἰλάσκομαι* and *ἰλαστήριον*, etc., as well as phrases having to do with Christ's death for our sins, and even the ransom terminology (cf Ridderbos 1972; also Budiman 1971).

Other people, however, treat *καταλλάσσω* and *καταλλαγή* in a category of their own, without reference to the rest of the field mentioned above (cf Büchsel 1964:254-8). And, indeed, there seems to be adequate motivation to follow this line of thought. For the simple reason that we are actually dealing with metaphors from two completely different spheres of life. On the one hand we have a metaphor originating from the cultic and ritual realm of the Old Testament sacrificial system; on the other hand there is a metaphor, obviously coming from the 'secular' source of ordinary social interaction. The term 'reconciliation', then, is more appropriately applied to the latter, whereas 'atonement', or 'expiation' (or 'propitiation') may be chosen as a suitable designation of the former.

Of course, it cannot be denied that there is an unmistakable link between these two metaphors in Paul's major epistles (cf Jonker 1977:195-6). Particularly in the two most significant passages, as far as the use of *καταλλάσσω* and *καταλλαγή* is concerned, namely 2 Corinthians 5:11-6:2 and Romans 5:1-11, one has no difficulty in finding clear traces of the 'cultic' metaphor. So, for instance, we read in Romans 5:10 that '... we were reconciled to him through the death of his Son...', and evidently this reference to Christ's death should be read as parallel to the phrase '... by his blood...' in verse 9. Surely there can be

little doubt that the latter is emphasising the sacrificial quality of that death (cf Fryer 1981:49). Similarly, 2 Corinthians 5:14-15, 21 too contain conspicuous allusions to the effects of the death of Christ as a vicarious sacrifice (cf Ridderbos 1972:24-6).

However, these connections do not necessarily imply that καταλλάσσω and καταλλάγη should therefore be understood in terms of the atonement wrought by a sacrifice. Just as a statement about God's justifying action may stand in a syntagmatic relation with sacrificial terminology (cf Rm 5:9; 2 Cor 5:21), without losing its character as an independent metaphor, so too with God's act of reconciliation. The link between reconciliation and atonement (in the sense explained above) is none the tighter than the link between justification and atonement (cf also Rm 3:25). Atonement may therefore be analysed in a different context (cf § 5.3.1 below). In the present section, however, attention will be focused on reconciliation in the sense of reconciliation brought to an end. According to Käsemann, in an earlier work (c. 1956), '... reconciliation means nothing other than enmity brought to an end' - even throughout the whole New Testament. This meaning, to be sure, is also applicable in Paul's major epistles, where it is mainly communicated by the use of the lexical units καταλλάσσω and καταλλάγη.

As mentioned above, these two lexical items are basically functioning in only two important pericopae in Paul's major letters, namely 2 Corinthians 5:11-6:2 and Romans 5:1-11 (the only other occurrences being Rm 11:15 and 1 Cor 7:11 - to the latter we shall return shortly). As for the two main passages, we may just refer to the dissertations of Fryer (1979) and Hedquist (1979), in which they are treated at length (cf also Maartens 1985:118-81; and for Rm 5:1-11, cf Fryer 1981:34-69). Without duplicating the material, we may gratefully use the insights won by the thorough exegetical investigations executed by these researchers (Fryer, especially, is also implementing the methods of discourse analysis and componential analysis to useful effect).

From the results of these studies, the following diagnostic components of the meaning to which καταλλάσσω and καταλλάγη are rendering a service, may be identified: (cf Fryer 1981:56; Louw & Nida 1986:§40.1):

- a) Two 'parties', who used to be in an intimate relationship, find themselves *at odds with one another*, due to an offense of the one against the other; thus their relationship is disrupted and they may be described as *enemies*;
- b) By the initiative of the offended party, *the hostility is removed*;
- c) As a result, *peace and harmony is restored*, and the intimate relationship is re-established.

These semantic components, no doubt, are neatly expressed by the use of *καταλλάσσω* in *1 Corinthians 7:11*. This fact is borne out by the observation made by Fryer (1981:54), saying:

1 Corinthians 7:11 envisages a situation where a husband and wife are at odds. The wife presumably feels offended by her husband. In her indignation she leaves him. The apostle now urges her to lay aside her feeling of offence, to seek the restoration of friendly relations with her husband, and to resume the marriage relationship.

It goes without saying that, in this instance *καταλλάσσω* is used in a purely 'secular sense' (cf Käsemann 1971:51). But, contrary to the view of Käsemann, it may not, for that reason, be discounted as irrelevant for the interpretation of the passages where the same term is used with a 'theological emphasis'. Particularly since it is generally acknowledged that these terms were only very rarely used in a religious context before the time of Paul (cf Büchsel 1964:254; Goppelt 1982:139), one ought to give serious consideration to the possibility that this secular use is in fact our most reliable clue to the correct understanding of the theological application of *καταλλάσσω* and *καταλλαγή*. Goppelt's view in this regard may therefore be wholeheartedly endorsed. He says: 'Paul used the infinitive "to reconcile" (*katallassein*) for the relationship between God and man with the same philological meaning it had in 1 Cor. 7:11 for the restoration of the separated marriage partner (cf. *diallassein*, Mt. 5:24) ' (Goppelt 1982:138-9).

The great advantage in approaching the issue from this angle, lies in the fact that it provides us with the canvas upon which the picture of God's act of reconciliation is painted. It brings us into contact with the donor field behind the metaphor of reconciliation. And, although

the transfer from the donor field to the recipient field cannot be thought of as taking place holus-bolus, there always remains a degree of interaction between the two (cf § 3.1.2 - that is, of course, as long as the metaphor remains a live metaphor). For Paul, in any case, it must have been a live metaphor. If he himself was not the one to have created it, it must have been created in the early Hellenistic Jewish Christian community (cf Hedquist 1979:232; also Thrall 1982:229). In applying the term to God's saving activity in Christ, Paul certainly must have been aware of its applicability in the social sphere (if anything, 1 Cor 7:11 can at least be taken as a proof of this awareness!).

However, in looking at "salvation" through the lens of this social phenomenon, called reconciliation, certain accents must of necessity be laid. Thus, it must immediately be emphasised that, in all the relevant passages, God is in an absolute sense the only Subject of the event of reconciliation (cf Ladd 1974:451; Goppelt 1982:139). He does not only take the initiative, but is also the One to cause the whole process to come into effect (cf 2 Cor 5:18). In the event of a broken marriage relationship, one may still think of reconciliation as an event involving an input from both parties; but where the relationship between God and man is concerned, there can be no thought of the two partners being equal in the process of restoring the peace and re-establishing the broken relationship (cf Hedquist 1979:114). On account of his misdeeds (cf 2 Cor 5:19 - NEB), man is solely responsible for the break in that relationship, but it is only God who can heal it again by an act of forgiveness (cf 2 Cor 5:19), based upon the substitutionary death of Christ (cf 2 Cor 5:14,21; Rm 5:6-10). This He did in independence from any effort on man's side; in fact, He did it while man was still 'powerless', 'wicked', 'a sinner', yes, even 'his enemy' (cf Rm 5:6-10 - NEB).

A much debated question, is the one as to whether the reference to 'Gods's enemies' in Romans 5:10 (NEB) should be understood in an active or a passive sense. In other words, is the idea here that man is actively hostile against God, or is he just passively standing in the position of experiencing God's hostility? Many arguments have been listed in favour of both positions. Those who favour the active interpretation usually stress the active nature of the other expressions describing man's disposition in Romans 5 ('powerless', 'wicked', 'a sinner'), as well as the fact that God cannot very well be the Author

of reconciliation if He is at the same time in a state of hostility towards man. It would also be going against the general tenor of the pericope, with its marked emphasis on the love of God (cf Hedquist 1979:225).

Proponents of the other view usually focus the attention on the fact that the pericope also contains not only a direct reference to the wrath of God (vs 9), but also some allusion to man's position under the threat of God's judgement (cf Fryer 1979:185). Even in 2 Corinthians 5 this motif is not absent (cf the mentioning of the 'judgement seat of Christ', vs 10; 'the fear of the Lord', vs 11; and 'not counting sins', vs 19). Coupled to this motif, the ideas of enmity and reconciliation acquire something of an objective overtone (cf Fryer 1979:185). And if reconciliation is really an objective reality accomplished through Christ's death *antecedent* to our Christian experience (cf Fryer 1979:194; also Ladd 1974:452), then, at least, one cannot rule out the passive interpretation so easily.

It seems possible, though, to side with Cranfield (1975:267) in treating this enmity as a matter of mutual hostility between God and man (cf Ridderbos 1975:185). It is simply a case of a broken relationship, caused by man's hostility against God, by which he becomes subject to the wrath of God. And, as Ridderbos (1975:185) contends,

Even if one choose to assume that 'enemies' here describe a reciprocal relationship, the context clearly indicates that the abrogation of this enmity through reconciliation is the same as being delivered from God's wrath, being acquitted of sin and guilt, and thus describes not only the relation in which man stand toward God, but also that in which God stands toward man.

Of course, this may seem to be a paradox: that God, in his love (cf Rm 5:5,8; 2 Cor 5:14) reconciled to himself those who were due for his wrath. But, after all this paradox is not quite so strange. We have already noticed similar features in our treatment of the metaphors of justification and deliverance. The threat or danger we are to be delivered from, is none but wrath of God (cf Rm 5:9), and yet, it is only by the intervention of God Himself in Christ that we can be delivered (cf §5.1.1 above). So too, we ought to be condemned by

God as we appear before his judgement seat, but still, it is the same God who pronounces our freedom and acquittal. All these apparent paradoxes, to be sure, are only intelligible in the light of Christ's death as a substitutionary sacrifice (cf Fryer 1979:195).

With this observation we automatically come to the question about the relation between justification and reconciliation. If they show forth such similar features, and if they are stated in such parallel structures as we find in Romans 5:9-10, (cf Fryer 1981:49), should we not equate them as signifying substantially the same message? (cf Barrett 1971:108; Käsemann 1974:130). In line with our study thus far, the answer can only be: justification and reconciliation are two independent metaphors dealing with the very same saving event. This answer, however, does not mean that they can hardly be distinguished as far as their meaning is concerned. Only a misconception about the real nature of metaphor will lead one to such a fallacious conclusion. It is namely perfectly possible that two metaphors may have *reference* to the very same issue, without being identical in *meaning*. Their common reference may cause them to share certain semantic components (in the present case, they consequently belong to the same semantic field "salvation"), and yet, due to the divergence in the donor fields of these different metaphors, each of them also has certain distinctive semantic features. In other words, they look at the same issue, but from different perspectives, and through different lenses. And therefore each of them is opening up a new horizon of meaning. Every metaphor, as Ricoeur (1975:79) has indicated, is a veritable creation of meaning; in essence it is to be regarded as a semantic innovation; it may not be degraded to the status of a mere ornament in discourse which may be replaced by any other expression without any significant loss in meaning (cf §3.1.2 above).

The special contribution of the metaphor of *reconciliation*, then, can only be fully appreciated if the fact is kept in mind that it is drawn from the field of *intimate interpersonal relationships*, first disrupted, but then restored again, to the full enjoyment of a *mutual friendship, harmony and peace*. This special quality is cogently formulated by Cranfield (1975:258), when he says:

Whereas between a human judge and the person who appears before him there may be no really personal meeting at all, no personal hostility if the accused be found guilty, no establishment of friendship if the accused is acquitted, between God and the sinner there is a personal relationship, and God's justification involves a real self-engagement to the sinner on His part. He does not confer the status of righteousness upon us without at the same time giving Himself to us in friendship and establishing peace between Himself and us...

There can be no mistaking of the intimate and personal character of the relationship envisaged in the passages concerned. One may, for example, just think of the particular emphasis on the love of God, both in Romans 5 and in 2 Corinthians 5 (cf also Theissen's remarks in this connection - 1974:291-3). To this one may add the idea of peace (*εἰρήνη*) as the state resulting from God's reconciling action, also prevailing in Romans 5. Newman and Nida (1973:92), in their comment on Romans 5:1, is probably correct in saying that, 'Here the term (peace - v.D.) appears to be used as a description of the harmonious relation established between man and God on the basis of God's having put man right with himself.' Therefore *εἰρηνοποιέω* may also function as a closely related alternative for *ἀποκαταλλάσσω* in Colossians 1:20.

On the whole, then, it appears as if the theological application of *καταλλάσσω* and *καταλλαγή* fits in remarkably well with the semantic components formulated on page 160 above. As always, however, it remains a problem to grasp all these components of meaning in a single translational substitute. For instance, the rendering of 2 Corinthians 5:18 as, 'All this is done by God, who through Christ changed us from enemies into his friends...' (GNB), may indeed be regarded as a brave attempt. But when it is subsequently reduced to the expression that 'God made us his friends' (without mentioning the prior state of enmity - cf Rm 5:10,11; 2 Cor 5:19 - GNB), it might perhaps become less effective.

The ideal thing would of course be to use the kind of term employed in the Venda translation of the Bible (cf Nida 1975a:179-80). According to Nida the Venda lexical item *ʒhelekedzi* is normally used in the restricted context of reconciling a wife so that she will return to her husband whom she has left (quite similar to the use of *καταλλάσσω* in 1 Cor 7:11). The diagnostic semantic components of this Venda term, according to Nida (1975a:180), are the following:

- 1) A husband and wife are at odds;
- 2) The wife leaves her husband;
- 3) The husband (in such circumstances always regarded by the Bavenda as the innocent party) intercedes with his wife (usually through a intermediary) for her return; and
- 4) Fellowship is restored.

Obviously these components are closely parallel to the components of the Pauline idea of reconciliation, and therefore it certainly has the potentiality for a theological usage (cf Nida 1975a:180). The interaction between the donor field and the recipient field will evidently be activated by the application of such a 'technical term' in the theological context.

Unfortunately, of course, there is no such 'technical term' available in English, including all the relevant components of meaning. 'Reconcile' probably remains the closest parallel.

#### 5.1.9 Glorification - given to share the splendour

Most people will probably be rather surprised about the proposal that *glorification* should also be seen as a *coloriological* metaphor. Selfevidently nobody will really object to the idea of treating it as the ultimate consummation of the salvation wrought by Christ, but putting it on a par with justification, reconciliation and the like, may at first seem to be rather awkward. Glorification, we tend to think, is an act of God to be expected at the final coming of Christ; there can be no thought of it being a present reality for the believer (cf Newman & Nida 1973:169).

Yet, there is no way to escape the force of the aorist ἐδόξαται in *Romans 8:30*. Referring to this aorist, Käsemann (1980:245) aptly remarks that it '... has constantly confused exegetes in view of the fact that elsewhere Paul expects heavenly δόξα only at the parousia.' For that reason, Newman & Nida (1973:169) bluntly admit that they find it difficult to see why Paul uses the past tense in this case.

In trying to determine the trend of Paul's thought in using the verb in this particular way, one should of course start by taking cognisance

of the immediate context in which it appears. In this regard the discourse analyses of the pericope concerned, presented by Louw (1978: 18; 1979a:91-3) and Coetzer (1981:193-4) may serve our purpose. And, according to both of them (and virtually all other commentators) the expectation of the future redemption is actually the leading theme of the pericope as a whole (stretching from vs 18 to vs 30). In this expectation the hope of glory must certainly be regarded as a significant structural component (cf Coetzer 1981:188). The pericope is not only introduced, but also concluded by the  $\delta\delta\zeta\alpha$ -theme, with several other references to the same theme inbetween. And throughout the gaze is fixed on the *future* revelation and participation in that glory (cf vss 18 and 21 in particular). The aorist  $\epsilon\delta\delta\zeta\alpha\sigma\theta\upsilon$  in verse 30, however, is a different story; even an apparent contradiction.

The past tense becomes more understandable, nevertheless, as soon as one notices the fact that it forms part of a cluster of thoughts within this pericope (cluster E, according to Coetzer's analysis, cf 1981:194) comprising verses 28 to 30, and serving to show that the basis of the future glory is grounded in the eternal purpose and truth of God (cf Coetzer 1981:186; Newman & Nida 1973:157). Therefore Cranfield (1975: 433) may rightfully claim that this glorification should be interpreted in relation to the foreordination, also mentioned in the immediate context. Thus he arrives at the following explanation (worthy of being quoted rather extensively):

The use of the aorist here is significant and suggestive. In a real sense, of course, their glory is still in the future, still the object of hope (cf. 5.2), and this 'not yet' with regard to their glory is certainly not to be explained away or glossed over. But their glorification has already been foreordained by God (cf. v. 29); the divine decision has been taken, though its working out has not been consummated. Moreover, Christ, in whose destiny their destiny is included, has already been glorified, so that in Him their glorification has already been accomplished.

(Cranfield 1975:433).

In other words, in using the aorist  $\epsilon\delta\delta\zeta\alpha\sigma\theta\upsilon$  in Romans 8:30, Paul is actually coming very close to the type of 'realised eschatology' presented in Ephesians 2:5-6 (cf Käsemann 1980:245), where it is said in so many words that God '... made us alive together with Christ..., and raised us up with him, and made us sit with him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus.' (RSV).

It underlines, once more, that double-entendre of Paul's eschatological frame of reference, according to which the 'already' and the 'not yet' may be viewed through the very same lens (cf §4.2.1 above). This possibility of a 'double-vision' renders the juxtaposition of justification and glorification in Romans 8:30 quite acceptable. As justification may be seen as both a present reality (cf Rm 5:1) and a future prospect (cf Gl 5:5), so too with glorification. Within Paul's eschatological frame of reference, the 'already' and the 'not yet' are co-existent, without invalidating or contradicting one another.

This fact is confirmed by the reference to the Holy Spirit as the ἀρραβὴ in Romans 8:23. This term, belonging to the same semantic field as ἀποδόση (cf Coetzer 1981:167), is characterising the Spirit, so to speak, as God's first instalment' or 'down-payment', serving as a guarantee to the believer of that eternal heritage of glory they are expecting to receive at the parousia (cf Bruce 1963:173). In other words, through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, something of that eschatological life is experienced even now, in the present life of the believer (cf Kittel 1964:251). And, according to Romans 8, that eager longing for the consummation of God's redemptive action is actually born out of the present experience of sharing in God's glorious life through his Spirit.

It may further be claimed that Romans 8:30 does not stand isolated in presenting the idea of glorification as it does. In fact, according to 2 Corinthians 3 the new covenant as such is fundamentally characterised by the superseding glory inherent to it (cf vs 7-11 in particular). And, once again the believers' participation in the glory of Christ is directly related to a present activity of the Holy Spirit (cf vs 18). Through the transforming power of the Spirit, presently at work in our lives, we are transfigured into the likeness of Christ (cf also Rm 8:29 - καὶ κτισθέντες ἀποδοσῶν τῆς εὐδοκίας τοῦ υἱοῦ αἰῶνος) from splendour to splendour (cf vs 18 - NEB).

Though the last phrase (καὶ κτισθέντες ἀποδοσῶν τῆς εὐδοκίας τοῦ υἱοῦ αἰῶνος) is often understood as indicating the process, commonly known as sanctification, in which a development is taking place from one stage of glory to another (cf Grosheide 1959:113; also Barrett 1973:125), one may also think of it

in terms of present glory giving way to future glory (cf Barrett 1973:125). Says Kittel (1964:251),

The bridge between the present and eschatology is to be found in the phrase ἀπο δόξης εἰς δόξαν. The present is ἐν δόξῃ, but the εἰς points to a coming consummation. In both affirmation and limitation this is in full accord with the ἀπαρχὴ τοῦ πνεύματος. In this prepositional construction, which is to be found elsewhere in Pl. (cf. ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, R. 1:17), we have the whole simultaneity of possession and expectation which is the basis of NT piety.

The conclusion seems to be near at hand, then, that the semantic unit of *glorification* may indeed be classified as yet another Pauline metaphor for "salvation". In other words, the event whereby God restores the fellowship between Himself and sinful man, may also be thought of in terms of glorification (cf also 2 Cor 4:4,6). Therefore the condition of man prior to God's saving intervention may also be described in the words of Romans 3:23, stating that '... all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God...' (RSV). And surely one can hardly fail to observe the striking fact that this portrayal of man in his utter need of salvation, happens to be found at the very heart of that passage, usually regarded as containing the essence of Pauline soteriology - that is, Romans 3:19-26. How could we be surprised, then, about Paul's use of glorification as soteriological metaphor - being, as it is, the rectification of that most important 'shortcoming' in our lives?

In the light of the preceding, *glorification* as a semantic unit may now be analysed into the following components of meaning:

- a) Someone finds himself at a *lack of the divine splendour* he was destined to possess;
- b) By an *act of God* himself that person is drawn into the sphere of *divine glory*;
- c) As a result he finds himself *sharing in the splendour of God Himself*, having been transfigured into the likeness of Christ.

Obviously we are faced with a bit of a problem in this case. This metaphor is namely being treated as one of the metaphors drawn from the sphere of social interaction. But, although δόξα could, in some rare cases, attested by the Septuagint and the Hellenistic Apocrypha, also

be ascribed to human dignitaries in the sense of 'human glory', or 'power', or a 'reputation' (being honoured by other people), it was (within the NT, in any case) almost exclusively applied with reference to the 'divine mode of being' (cf Kittel 1964:242-53). That is to say, we can hardly claim that, in using  $\delta\omicron\xi\acute{\alpha}\zeta\omega$ , Paul is looking at "salvation" from the perspective of some human analogy. In this case, it is rather working the other way round. Paul is here actually viewing an event involving man through a lens that is, properly speaking, only fit for being used with reference to God. The effect, of course, is an element of surprise. And, needless to say, but metaphors, in turn, are thriving upon elements of surprise.

Glorification, therefore, appears to be quite an eye-opening metaphor for "salvation"!

#### 5.1.10 To make rich - poverty turned into wealth:

A metaphor that does look at the event of being given a share in God's splendour in terms of a social phenomenon, is that of spiritual poverty being turned into tremendous wealth. This metaphor Paul is employing - as a soteriological metaphor - in the context of *2 Corinthians 8*. The pericope as a whole (i.e. 2 Cor 8:1-15) is obviously to be regarded as Pauline paranesis, encouraging generosity in contributing towards the alleviation of the needs of those brothers and sisters who were in great trouble. In verse 9, however, (rather in the form of a parenthesis - cf Tasker 1958:115) Paul is motivating his plea by referring to the well-known (cf  $\gamma\lambda\omega\acute{\nu}\omicron\sigma\kappa\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ ) soteriological dictum that our Lord Jesus Christ, '... rich as he was, ... made himself poor for your sake, in order to make you rich by means of his poverty.' (GNB).

The interpretation of this metaphor, one may feel, is quite a straightforward matter. The donor field in question evidently yields the following significant components of meaning:

- a) Someone finds himself hopelessly bound in *poverty*;
- b) By the *intervention* of some benefactor, the position of that poverty-stricken person is *radically reversed*;
- c) Consequently, he *becomes rich*; he enters upon a glorious position of wealth.

One can imagine that this particular field of meaning might have been a matter of common experience within the society to which this letter was addressed. Even though it is no longer assumed that Paul's congregations mainly consisted of people from the lowest classes in society (cf Meeks 1983:51-73; also Hengel 1974:35-9), it can neither be denied that they also had the poor among them! (cf Theissen 1982:105). This, to be sure, is emphatically stated in 2 Corinthians 8:2 with reference to the churches in Macedonia (cf ἡ κατὰ βάθος πτωχεία αὐτῶν), and regarding the Corinthian church it is at least implied by the statement in 1 Corinthians 1:26, recalling that, 'Not many of you were wise by human standards; not many were influential; not many were of noble birth.' (NIV). In other words, many of those early Christians must have known the hard reality of poverty from their own experience.

On the other hand, they could not have been unaware of the idea of a benefactor offering help to such unfortunate people out of compassion (cf Danker 1982 for a full treatment of the New Testament semantic field of the 'benefactor' - unfortunately not available to me, but cf the review of this book by Mott 1984:672-5). The conspicuous presence of the χάρις-motif in the context of 2 Corinthians 8:1-15 (and particularly in 2 Cor 8:9) might even be regarded as an indication that the idea of a benefactor is at work in what Paul is saying here (according to Danker χάρις is one of the important elements functioning within this semantic field of the benefactor - cf Mott 1984:673-4).

It is unlikely, though, that the help offered by a benefactor would really go to the extent of turning poverty into wealth! Even in this sense, therefore, Paul is radicalising the ordinary social experience so as to render it applicable to the spiritual reality he would like to express.

The spiritual reality we express in saying that the 'bankrupt sinner' is changed into someone in possession of heavenly riches, should most likely be understood in the light of the 'great exchange' pictured in 2 Corinthians 8:9. This feature of an 'exchange' taking place between Christ and the sinner is, no doubt, strongly reminiscent of 2 Corinthians 5:21, where the same thing is expressed in terms of God making Christ, who had no sin, to be sin for us, so that in Him we

might become the righteousness of God (cf NIV). So too, it may be said that Christ took our poverty upon Himself, so that we might enter into the enjoyment of the riches that are his - in exchange.

Most commentators explain the issue of Christ's poverty and wealth with reference to the christological hymn in Philippians 2:6-11, where we read of Christ, 'Who, being in very nature God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped, but made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a servant, being made in human likeness.' (vss 6-7 NIV). Christ's 'being rich' (πλούσιος ὢν in 2 Cor 8:9) is then taken to be an equivalent to Christ's 'being in the form of God' (ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων in Philp 2:7), which, by any means, can only be interpreted as a reference to Christ's pre-existence with the Father. (cf Groenewald 1967:118). As Barrett (1973:223) is putting it,

'Before the incarnation, the eternal son of God lived the life of heaven, which, to Paul, must have been desirable in every way, and could be anthropomorphically depicted in terms of wealth.'

It is in this heavenly life, then, in all its richness and glory, that the believer is given a share by his allegiance to Christ (2 Cor 8:9 does not specify, of course, in exactly what way this participation is accomplished - cf Pop 1971:248-9).

The verb πλουτέω, being used in 2 Corinthians 8:9, does not necessarily include the semantic component of someone being the *cause* behind the event of 'becoming rich' (though the context is evidently pointing to God in Christ as the direct cause, even the Author of this event - cf the GNB translation). This causative element would usually be indicated by the use of the verb πλουτίζω, the meaning of which is defined by Louw and Nida (1986:§ 57.29) as 'to cause someone to become rich'. And indeed, πλουτίζω does occur in the letters of Paul (cf 1 Cor 1:5; 2 Cor 6:10; 9:11), but not always in the strictly soteriological sense - as with πλουτέω in 2 Corinthians 8:9. While Paul does seem to have "salvation" in mind in 2 Corinthians 6:10, the other two instances appear to have a more general reference (cf 2 Cor 9:11, 'You will be made rich in every way so that you can be generous on every occasion, ...' - obviously this may involve prosperity in a broad sense.) In 2 Corinthians 6:10, again, we have the 'problem' that Paul is referring

to himself as the author of this 'saving event'. It is not a real problem, though, since he can also say that he is trying to 'save' people (cf 1 Cor 9:22), meaning that he is really God's agent or instrument in bringing people to salvation (cf §4.1 above).

One may conclude, then, by reaffirming that Paul does indeed look at "salvation" from the perspective of someone *being made rich* by God. A metaphor, to be sure, that may perhaps not be so striking in an affluent society, but that will certainly meet with keen interest in the context of a community bent under the yoke of poverty!

#### 5.1.11 Victory granted - the loser becomes a winner:

That the achievements of Christ may also be described in terms of a victory over the powers of sin, death and the devil, needs no proof.<sup>8)</sup> Therefore it is naturally to be expected that the "salvation" of man, as a consequence of Christ's achievements, will also be depicted in terms of victory, as indeed it is.

Speaking of victory, one may of course have different categories in mind. There is, for instance, victory in the sense of winning an athletic contest. And, in fact, in 1 Corinthians 9:24-27 Paul does make use of this idea of victory, but then as a metaphorical expression of the way in which the Christian should be striving to win the prize. Obviously it won't qualify for being a soteriological metaphor.

Nevertheless, victory can also be understood in terms of the battle field. In this case it is evidently a matter of two forces opposing one another, leading to the point where the one power proves to be superior by defeating and overcoming the other. This perspective, one may sense, is much closer to the kind of soteriological thinking we have thus far encountered in our programme of research - but, once again, only with some modification. In accordance with the characteristic Pauline view on "salvation" (as we have come to know it from the previously investigated metaphors), it can never be the sinner himself who wins this battle against his spiritual foes. In an absolute sense, the victory belongs to Christ alone; yet man can share in that victory by being associated with Christ.

This, in any case, is the picture we find in *1 Corinthians 15:54-57*. Man, being threatened by the forces of sin, death and the law, stands no chance of holding his own by engaging in battle. In the words of Morris (1958:234-5) the passage is exposing death as 'a malignant adversary' and 'a virulent antagonist'. Fighting against such a dangerous enemy, it seems, man is bound to lose the battle. When Paul considers the onslaught of the same alliance of spiritual foes (i.e. the alliance of sin, death and the law) in *Romans 7*, he is brought to the point of crying out in distress, 'What a wretched man I am! Who will rescue me from this body of death?' (NIV - *Rm 7:24*).

Yet, in *1 Corinthians 15:54-5* Paul is, so to speak, hurling defiance at death as a defeated enemy! The courage to do so, one may assume, originates from Paul's faith in the resurrection of Christ (which is, of course, the motif underlying this whole chapter). By the resurrection of Christ, death has lost its sting, it has been swallowed up in victory, so that those who belong to Christ may also be assured of their glorious resurrection (cf *1 Cor 15:20-3*). Through the Lord Jesus Christ God is *giving* them *victory* (cf *1 Cor 15:57* - τῷ δὲ θεῷ χάρις τῷ δοδόντι ἡμῖν τὸ νῆκος). It is not their own victory, but with Christ they stand on the conquering side; they share his victory!

Moreover, this victory is not just a dream of the future. Apart from the fact that the present participle is being used in verse 57 (δοδόντι τὸ νῆκος; cf Grosheide 1959:432), it must also be noted that Paul is not confining himself to the overcoming of death (a victory that must of necessity still lie in the future, as far as the believer is concerned), but that he is also turning to the defeat of sin and the law in verses 56-57. Commenting on verse 56, Barrett (1971b:384) therefore rightly states that,

The earlier verses look into the apocalyptic future, and rejoice in the ultimate defeat of death. Verse 56 soberly considers its present sting and power, and verse 57 exults, not in unfounded optimism but in the victory already won, not only over death but over sin.

The very same state of affairs also comes to expression in *Romans 8:37*. This time an array of inimical forces are enlisted (cf Schlier 1979: 280). In the face of all these threatening powers, however, the believer

emerges as more than a conqueror (cf Rom 8:37, NEB: '... overwhelming victory is ours...'). The verb ὑπερνικάω, employed in this verse, is doubtlessly emphasising the fact that this victory is complete and overwhelming (cf Louw & Nida 1986:§39.58). As Bauerfeind (1967:945) remarks, 'For the warrior whom no earthly affliction or defeat perturbs νικάω is almost to weak a term.' (cf also Schlier 1979:279 - 'Νικάω ist zuwenig. Es ist ein ὑπερνικῶμεν.'). And, according to Käsemann (1980:250), this is actually the keyword of the passage (i.e. of Rm 8:31-9). But, of course, this overwhelming victory is only to be attained in and through the One who loved us - that is Christ, no doubt (cf Eichholz 1972:169-70).

To this we may still add the very interesting application of the verb θριαμβεύω in *2 Corinthians 2:14*. Certainly its meaning in this context has been much disputed (cf Tasker 1958:57). There are, it seems, three principal ways in which it could be understood, being used with a direct object (as here in 2 Cor 2:14). It could simply mean 'to triumph over someone', or 'to lead someone (as a prisoner of war) in one's triumphal procession'. According to the third opinion it should be taken to convey the meaning 'to cause to triumph' (cf the AV; also Louw & Nida 1986:§39.60 - though with hesitance). Barrett (1973:98) finds none of these proposals entirely appropriate, mainly because they do not give due consideration to the fact that Paul is describing himself and his colleagues in this verse as collaborating with God, and not as exposed by him to disgrace. Barrett's own proposal (1973:98) is quite attractive, saying,

Notwithstanding the lack of supporting lexical evidence it is right to follow L.S., Allo, and Kümmel in taking Paul to represent himself as one of the victorious general's soldiers sharing in the glory of his triumph.

In other words, the background to this metaphor would then still be the triumphal processions of emperors and generals, in which they were usually leading in their train some hapless captives they had taken in battle, exposing them to shame and disgrace (cf Tasker 1958:57). Paul, however, is not seeing himself as a captive in this procession, but as one of the soldiers, being cheered, together with his 'General', for their overwhelming victory (cf also Grosheide 1959:81 for a similar, though not identical interpretation). Seen in this light, Paul is

actually claiming to have been given the privilege of participating in Christ's show of victory.

From these different references, a particular pattern of thought may be recognised. This pattern can perhaps be summarised in the following analysis of the components of meaning involved:

- a) Someone is involved in a very serious and dangerous *battle*, having no hope to obtain victory by himself;
- b) Nevertheless, the opposing forces are *thoroughly defeated*, an *overwhelming victory is won* by the intervention of a superior power;
- c) Those who are in association with the conqueror *receive the privilege of participating in the victory*;
- d) As a result, they too are regarded as *being victorious*, even taking part in the victor's triumphal procession.

Considering the few passages we have discussed in this section, it may be concluded that all the semantic components outlined above are relevant in each case. In 1 Corinthians 15:57, though, the focus is on the third component (marked 'c' above: cf  $\delta\epsilon\delta\acute{o}\nu\tau\epsilon\ \tau\acute{o}\ \nu\acute{\iota}\kappa\omicron\varsigma$  ), whereas the emphasis is shifted to the fourth component (marked 'd') in Romans 8:37 and 2 Corinthians 2:14 (cf  $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\epsilon\rho\nu\acute{\iota}\kappa\omicron\nu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$  and  $\theta\epsilon\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\beta\epsilon\tau\acute{\iota}\kappa\omicron\nu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$  respectively). However, in every case even the components that are not drawing the focus, remain important - as implicational and/or inferential components (cf § 2.2.4.3 above).

Especially when we concentrate on the third component, it is quite clear why this semantic unit may qualify as a soteriological metaphor. We gain yet another perspective on "salvation" by looking at it in terms of a victory being shared with us. In other words, God's saving action is equal to God's act of *giving us victory* through Jesus Christ.

#### 5.1.12 Winning over - a profit is gained:

In 1 Corinthians 9:19-22 Paul introduces a metaphor from the business world in order to describe "salvation" (cf Groenewald 1971:118; also Pop 1971a:188). Writing about his own strategy as a missionary, Paul

reveals as his ultimate goal, the activity of 'winning over' (to Christianity) as many people as possible. The verb he employs in reference to this activity, is *κερδαίνω* - a lexical item that came to be used as a 'missionary term' even before the time of Paul (cf Barrett 1971b:211). Therefore Schlier (1965:673) also remarks that,

In the main, however, *κερδαίνω* is a missionary term. Thus in 1 C.9,19ff. it means 'to make a Christian', and is interchangeable with *σώζω*, 9,22.

This, indeed, is the motivation behind all the missionary endeavours of the apostle Paul, namely to help as many people as possible, both Jew and Greek, to become Christians. And he would certainly bend over backwards, in order to avoid being a stumbling block in the way of anybody desiring to do so. As he is also indicating in 1 Corinthians 10:32-3, saying:

Give no offence to Jews or to Greeks or to the church of God, just as I try to please all men in everything I do, not seeking my own advantage, but that of many, that they may be saved. (RSV).

In fact, the resemblance between this verse and the structure of 1 Corinthians 9:19-22 is quite remarkable (for a valuable analysis of 9:19-22, cf Eichholz: 1972:50). The three groups whom Paul is taking into consideration according to 10:32 (i.e. the Jews, the Greeks, and the church of God), seem to be identical with those mentioned in 9:20-22 (i.e. the Jews = οἱ ὑπὸ νόμον, the ἀνόμοι and the ἁθέτους). This correspondence, for one thing, may lead us to the inference that, although Paul is in chapter 9 speaking of himself as winning and saving people, he is actually but the agent of God, who is the real Author of this activity (cf Van Deventer 1977:29-30). The passive *σώθωμαι* (aor subj) in 1 Corinthians 10:33 is obviously implying that God is really the One who saves. Therefore even the metaphor of 'gaining someone' (for Christianity) - expressed by *κερδαίνω*, the equivalent of *σώζω* in 1 Corinthians 9:19-22 - may be taken as a metaphor depicting "salvation" (understood in the strict sense of being an activity of God - cf §4.1 above).

However, if this is the case, one is still confronted by the problem that *κερδαίνω* could also be used with reference to a group of people

already belonging to the church, namely the weak (cf 1 Cor 9:22). As a solution to this problem many commentators propose that a slight shift in the meaning of κερδαίνω should be assumed with regard to its use in verse 22, as opposed to verses 19-21 (cf Grosheide 1957:253). Barrett (1971b:215), for example, thinks that in verse 22 κερδαίνω is employed in the new sense of 'to win them from an inadequate to an adequate understanding of Christianity', or else in the sense of 'to *keep* them for the church, instead of driving them out by wounding their consciences'.

It must be noted, though, that in 1 Corinthians 10:32-3 the 'church of God' is also included among the parties not to be offended, with a view to not being a hindrance in the way of their salvation (ὅνα σωθῶσιν). In this verse, then, salvation is the ultimate purpose Paul has in mind for each and everyone (including the church). Similarly it seems more appropriate not to assume too much of a change in meaning as far as the use of κερδαίνω in 1 Cor 9 is concerned.

Confirmation for this opinion may perhaps also be adduced from the observation that this application of κερδαίνω should in fact be treated as a metaphor. Recognizing it as a metaphor, one may not so easily jump to the conclusion that its *meaning* is, 'to make someone a Christian' (cf Schlier 1965:673). Even though, as a metaphor, it may *refer* to the event involved in becoming a Christian, its *meaning* should rather be looked for in the interaction between the donor field of business terminology and the recipient field of "salvation". In other words, the saving event is here screened through the filter of a profit being booked to God's account. Due to God's skill in *doing his 'business'* (working through the agency of the apostle Paul), someone who used to be a *dead loss* (cf ζημία versus vs κέρδη in Phlp 3:7-11), is turned into a *real profit* for the Kingdom of God! (cf Louw & Nida 1986: §57.189?). Such, we dare to say, are the components of the meaning involved in the use of κερδαίνω in the context of 1 Corinthians 9. And, of course, from this assumption it is but a small step towards the claim that *this* meaning might even be applicable to the weak members of the church. Even though they are no longer a dead loss, they are neither the kind of profit God would have liked them to be! Therefore they still need to be worked at; they are a cause for concern, as much as those who are still standing outside; thus they ought

to be treated with sensitive care and consideration. That, in fact, is the essence of Paul's plea in chapters 8 to 10 of his first letter to the Corinthians.

The translational substitute 'to win' (for κερδαίνω) - used by most of the English translations - will hardly succeed in conveying this metaphorical meaning. Perhaps 'to gain as a profit' may have a much better chance of success.

#### 5.1.13 Calling - the creative word establishing a new identity/status:

Facing the charge that God cannot really blame man for anything, since man is not in the position to resist the will of God (cf Rm 9:19 - NEB), Paul turns to a statement about the sovereign freedom of God in *Romans 9:19-29*. Actually, of course, this topic has been the backbone of the discussion even from verse 6 of *Romans 9*. But in response to the provocative question posed in verse 19, we see a more direct concentration on the topic in the following verses. Interestingly, however, Paul does not try to justify or to defend God against the accusation; he simply disallows the question (cf Nygren 1949:367-8). Man has no right to answer back to God (cf vs 20). That is Paul's basic and straightforward reply to the charge laid in verse 19 (cf Louw 1979a: 101). The rest of the pericope (up to vs 29) only supplies some illustrative material supporting this basic assertion; firstly from secular life (the freedom of the potter in handling his clay - to this we shall return in § 5.4.2 below), and secondly with reference to some Old Testament quotations, underlining the sovereignty of God in the bestowal of his grace. It is within these quotations, especially, that the notion of the creative power of God's calling is brought into focus. In sovereign freedom, so Paul is suggesting in verse 24, God's call is going out, not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles. In chiasmic contrast to the order in verse 24 (cf Käsemann 1980:274; also Du Toit 1984:99), it is then first proved, with reference to some verses from the prophet Hosea, that even the Gentiles are to be included in the eschatological people of God by virtue of the divine pronouncement regarding them.

In their original context, undoubtedly, the words of the prophet Hosea, quoted by Paul, '... have reference in the first place to the receiving again of the people of Israel that had fallen away from God and was therefore first cast off by him...' (Ridderbos 1975:340). Paul, however, understands them in universal terms as a prophetic announcement of the future inclusion of the Gentiles in the people of God, by virtue of the call God himself is extending to them. (contra De Villiers 1981:204). Says Wilckens (1980:206):

'Ich werde rufen' ist ein futurum propheticum; Gott kündigt durch den Propheten die Berufung der Heiden an, die sich jetzt verwirklicht hat. Denn im 'Nicht-Volk' findet Paulus die Heiden benannt, die nach jüdischem Verständnis das Privileg der Erwählung zum Volk Gottes nicht besitzen. Gott hat es ihnen jetzt durch seinen schöpferischen Ruf zugesprochen. Die Nicht-Geliebten als die Nicht-Erwählten (vgl. V13) sind dadurch zu Geliebten Gottes, zu seinen Erwählten geworden.

Particularly, it is that 'creative call' (schöpferische Ruf) that we would like to single out as a soteriological metaphor in this context. God's call - thus we learn from *Romans 9:25-26* - is capable of transforming those who were not-his-people into the-people-of-God, and he who was not-his-beloved into his-beloved. One could almost say that this calling is simply a matter of giving them a new name! Just as Hosea first had to name his children with the symbolical names *Lo'-'Anni* (not-my-people) and *Lo'-Ruhamâ* (not-beloved) - cf Hosea 1:6,9 - so that God could later on reverse this naming process by removing the negation, so as to assure the unworthy Israelites of their being re-established by God, in his infinite grace, as his own people. This, to be sure, is the miracle of grace which transforms the ungodly, as Käsemann (1980:274) is also summarising the particular emphasis of the context in *Romans 9* in which these quotations occur.

Calling in general should of course be understood against the background of Abraham's calling out of Ur (cf Ridderbos 1975:333), but the semantic unit finding expression in *Romans 9:25-26* may perhaps be more specifically related to the awareness, so characteristic in the time of both the Old and the New Testament, of the significance attached to a name; and even more so if that name was given by God (cf Bietenhard 1967:253, 281). According to Bietenhard (1967:253-4) it can even be

said that, in Old Testament terms, one is actually establishing a relation of dominion and possession towards someone by giving him a name; by that name his identity is determined (to a certain extent), so that it can often be said: 'As a man is named, so is he'. Similarly, in the New Testament, one may be transported to an entirely new situation by the receiving of a new name (cf Rv 2:17). If God is therefore calling those who are not-his-people by the name 'my people', their position is completely transformed by that 'creative call'!

This action of God must obviously be recognised as another way of looking at the saving event. This time, however, it is seen through the lens of the donor field in which the following semantic components play a significant role:

- a) Someone used to be known by a certain name (with a negative connotation);
- b) A new name is given to him by someone invested with the authority to do so;
- c) As a result of receiving this new name, the person is regarded as having been *completely transformed*, and as set in an entirely new position.

In the recipient field, then, these components of meaning acquire a more pertinent character, so that they may be defined in the following way:

- a) A certain group happens to be categorised as not-belonging-to-the-people-of-God;
- b) By the gracious decision of the sovereign God they receive the new name of being *my-people* (i.e. God's people);
- c) Consequently they acquire the new status of *belonging-to-the-people-of-God*.

The metaphorical quality of this meaning is obvious enough in the phrase *καλέσω τὸν οὐ λαόν μου λαόν μου*; it is in this phrase, and its equivalents in Romans 9:25-6, that the particular meaning is vested; it should therefore not be ascribed to the verb *καλέω* as such.

## 5.2 Soteriological metaphors from the sphere of biological and physiological transformation:

All the metaphors hitherto considered, owe their power of expression to the common background of cultural events on the level of social interaction. As we have seen, some ordinary social experiences, such as a slave being set free, a guilty person being pardoned by the judge, enemies being reconciled, the poor being made rich, the loser being granted a share in the victory of his general, etc. - all these common social phenomena are made to serve as different windows or lenses through which the reality of God's saving action may be viewed. It is obvious, nevertheless, that the sphere of social interaction is not the only source from which Paul is drawing his soteriological metaphors (although it may be regarded as the dominant source). But, undoubtedly there are some other cultural spheres too from which material, perfectly suitable for application in the semantic field of "salvation", may be obtained. Such is the sphere of biological and physiological transformation.

Speaking of "salvation" in terms of biological transformation, of course, one is bound to create the impression that the change to be effected, is of a more profound nature. In contrast to the soteriological metaphors from the sphere of social interaction, where the change in the *relationship* between God and the sinner is pertinently emphasised, the metaphors from the realm of biological transformation seem to suggest that it is a change in the person's *mode of existence* that is being contemplated (cf Ridderbos 1975:205). Hence also the idea that the Pauline soteriology may be treated in terms of 'salvation as an objective reality', on the one hand, and 'salvation as a subjective reality' on the other hand (cf Pelser 1985:246-62).

This distinction, however, may perhaps be misleading. It must namely be stressed that this category of soteriological metaphors (from the sphere of biological transformation) is no less 'objective' than those discussed in the previous section (originating from the sphere of social interaction). This fact is poignantly expressed by Ridderbos (1975:206), from whom we may take the following (rather lengthy) quotation:

To put it succinctly, Paul's doctrine of the new life does not find its determinative point of departure in the new 'creature' but in the new 'creation', as it is expressed in 2 Corinthians 5:17... As we have already been able to ascertain (Section 10), all this does not speak in the first place of personal, individual regeneration, the individual past and the personal renewal. It is a matter here of redemptive-historical categories of old and new. Undoubtedly this does not mean a de-personalizing of salvation. The new man, as we shall see still further, is not merely a collective or supra-individual quantity. But as in the doctrine of sin, where the individual's inclusion in the great corporate relationship of solidarity in sin was the dominating point of view, so also in the doctrine of renewal, what predominates is the inclusion and participation in the new creation that has taken effect with Christ and is represented by him.

Basic to the metaphors in this category is therefore the presupposition of participation 'in Christ'. It is quite generally agreed that the 'in Christ'-formula is expressive of one of the most fundamental motifs in Pauline theology. For a long time, though, this expression stood in scholarly opinion as *the* formula of Pauline mysticism (cf Conzelmann 1970:141). Yet, more recently this interpretation has receded into the background (cf Ladd 1974:482). A certain degree of consensus has been reached among scholars that it should rather be seen in the light of Paul's redemptive-historical and eschatological way of thinking (cf Beker 1980:272). According to Paul, it is said, Christ, as the last Adam, is the Inaugurator of a totally new dispensation in the history of salvation. Just as in the case of the first Adam, therefore, whatever is happening through him and to him, is of determinative significance for the dispensation he is launching (cf Du Plessis 1985:216). Referring to the way in which Paul is contrasting and comparing Adam and Christ in Romans 5:12-21, Tannehill (1967:25) therefore remarks that, 'These two are not simply men among other men. In each case the act of the one determines the existence of the many.' In the same connection Ridderbos (1975:60-1) comments that,

Adam and Christ here stand over against each other as the two great figures at the entrance of two worlds, two aeons, two 'creations', the old and the new; and in their actions and fate lies the decision for all who belong to them, because these are comprehended in them and thus are reckoned either to death or to life.

This 'inclusive pattern of thought' (cf Tannehill 1967:24) is often

explained with reference to the alleged Old Testament notion of a 'corporate personality' (cf Ridderbos 1975:61-2; also Beker 1980:273). According to this idea a whole nation or a society could be identified with their leader or king or progenitor or spokesman, in virtue of the relationship in which they stand to him; as their representative, his deeds are therefore affecting them directly. (cf Quek 1980:73; also Du Plessis 1985:213).

However, Tannehill (1967:28-9) may well be right in claiming that this idea '... is not a sufficient explanation of Paul's corporate or inclusive patterns of thought.' According to him, one should rather emphasise the eschatological nature of the death and resurrection of Christ as constituting the end of the old dominion and the foundation of the new. 'And because they are eschatological events, affecting the old dominion as a whole, they are also inclusive events.' (Tannehill 1967:30).

Be it as it may. Wherever it may come from, the fact of the matter is that the general conception of the Christian's participation in Christ permeates Paul's thought (cf Sanders 1977:456). What has befallen Christ, has also happened to those who belong to Him. He did not only die for them, but they have also died 'with Him'; they 'participate' in his death and resurrection (and even his ascension and glorification - cf Rm 8:29-30; Eph 2:5-6; Col 3:1-4). The 'in Christ'-formula is therefore also filled out by the concomitant 'with Christ'-formula.

Thus, we claim, it is also possible to see "salvation" in terms of the 'biological and physiological transformations' to which Christ himself was subjected. He died (even in the physical sense), but then rose again on the third day; He was really dead, but was raised by the Father; in his human form He is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation.. (cf Col 1:15 - RSV). And by 'being-in-Christ', the believer is also granted participation in all these things. He enters into 'the body of Christ', is transformed into 'the likeness of Christ', participates in the new creation wrought by Christ, and is included in the death and resurrection of Christ.

This participation, to be sure, is more than the transformation by virtue of 'mythischer Analogie', hailed by Theissen (1974:294) as the rationale behind the 'physiomorphe Verwandlungssymbolik'. It is not just a case of a similar thing happening to the believer, but rather of the believer being incorporated into Christ and therefore being involved in the very thing that took place on Golgotha.

That does not mean, however, that one may ignore or disregard the metaphorical quality of these soteriological expressions, on account of the fact that they appear to be connected to the actual death and resurrection of Christ. Although they do have that connection, they must still be recognised as metaphors. They provide yet another perspective on that 'Wende vom Unheil zum Heil' (cf Theissen 1974:282), accomplished by the intervention of God. Admittedly, in this case we don't always have the kind of event words, frequently encountered in the previous section, indicating the direct intervention of God in bringing about a new situation. But then, of course, the mere fact that we are talking about participation in *Christ*, is in itself sufficient indication of the fact that we are undoubtedly dealing with none other than the saving actions of God himself. This, one may expect, will in any case come out more clearly as we consider each of the metaphors in this category in its own right.

### 5.2.1 Dying and rising - entering into a new realm of life:

When we speak of dying, we normally have an event in mind involving the cessation of the biological functions of the body, whereby the termination of life is effected. This event, of course, is perhaps one of the most common experiences in human life one can possibly think of; it is the inescapable destiny of each and every human being (cf Heb 9:27).

When we speak of rising, on the other hand, (in this combination with dying), an event is envisaged which we don't have any direct experience. In fact, the very idea of rising is most probably to be understood in relation to the more common daily experience of rising from sleep. As Pannenberg (1970:104) has pointed out,

It is rather a metaphor, a way of speaking in an image. Just as we arise from sleep in the morning, in a similar way those who are dead shall also rise. This is not a literal expression for a reality which can already be experienced, but something which normally cannot be experienced directly and, therefore, must be described by a metaphor, in analogy to our rising from sleep daily.

At the same time it must also be stressed that, as it is used in the Christian tradition, rising does not merely involve the revival of a corpse, as one might have been tempted to think in following the analogy of rising from sleep (cf Pannenberg 1970:104). It is rather to be interpreted as the entering into a completely new realm of life. Of this, one may confidently claim, the clearest proof is the reality of the resurrection of Christ himself from the dead (which is something quite different from the raising of the widow's son - Lk 7:11-7 - and of Lazarus - Jn 11:38-44 - also cf Pannenberg 1970:105-6). In the words of Ladd (1974:323-4): 'Jesus' resurrection is not the restoration to physical life of a dead body; it is the emergence of a new order of life. It is the embodiment in time and space of eternal life. It is the beginning of the eschatological resurrection' (cf also Barth 1949:123). But, of course, Christ only came to this point by first dying on the cross.

In *Romans 6:1-11*, then, Paul is referring to the death and resurrection of Jesus as the way in which He was being transferred from the old dominion of sin and death to the new realm of life under the reign of God (cf vss 9-10 in particular; for an analysis of the whole chapter, cf Appendix 1, and the explication given in §5.1.3 above, where it was indicated that the idea of dying and rising, which is foregrounded in Rm 6:1-11, is actually being employed in the service of the underlying motif of a change of masters, which is the main theme of the entire pericope). In a certain sense, even Christ, in his position of being man's representative, had to be subjected to the dominion of sin and death and the law (cf 2 Cor 5:21; Rm 8:3; Gl 4:4), but by his death on the cross He was removed from that sphere of power; its hold was broken, its influence destroyed (cf Rm 6:6,9,10; mark the following translation of vss 9 & 10, supplied by the GNB: '... death will no longer rule over him. And so, because he died, sin has no power over him...'). By his resurrection Christ entered into a

totally different sphere of life; a life, that is, in which God is absolutely in control of everything.

The dying and rising of Christ, of course, may be regarded as an event that literally took place. He was dead in the sense that the biological functioning of his body had ceased, and just as literally He came to life again; and, for that matter, still in bodily form, even though it was quite a different kind of body (cf Pannenberg 1970: 105). Attaching the transition from the dominion of sin and death to that of God to this particular historical event, must therefore, of necessity, create a very vivid impression. Seen in this light, there can be little doubt about the radical nature and the finality of this transition.

However, the real sharp edge of the argument in Romans 6:1-11 is certainly to be recognised in the fact that, according to Paul, not only Christ, but the baptised as well, have undergone this transition. By baptism, the believer is united to Christ, incorporated into Him who is the inclusive figure of the new aeon. And by virtue of that relationship, they may be regarded as having participated in his death on the cross and his resurrection. Thus they may also be urged to consider themselves '... dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus' (cf Rm 6:11, which is the summary and conclusion of Paul's argument in this paragraph; i.e. paragraph A of our discourse analysis).

This passage has often been treated on the assumption that baptism should be taken as the real issue under discussion. On this assumption, it is quite natural to interpret the dying and rising of the believers as a baptismal or a sacramental event; even the baptismal rite may then be regarded as a symbolisation of that dying and rising. This is, for example, the interpretation presented by Louw (1979a:75). Following the same colon division than the one provided in Appendix 1, he argues that,

Colon 5 states the essential fact on which the answer in colons 3-4 is based: baptism resembles dying with Christ. This is explained in colons 6 and 7, of which 7 is an epitome of 6: baptism suggests burial, symbolized by going down under the water, and coming out of the water represents emergence from the tomb, i.e. coming into life again. The believer has died to sin, and a new life in Christ has begun.

However, Tannehill (1967:7-14) has shown decisively that this interpretation cannot be accepted. Paul's argument, he says, is not really based on baptism; he only refers to baptism because he is assuming that the kind of tradition, current in most of the early congregations would already contain an association between the idea of dying and rising with Christ and baptism. In other words, a reference to baptism would strengthen his argument about dying and rising with Christ, but the focus is on the latter, not on the former.

Therefore verse 5 (= colon 7) should also not be understood as a direct reference to baptism. Particularly so, since it is not to be directly connected to verses 3 and 4 (= colons 4-6); its primary connection is rather with verses 6 and 7 (= cs 8-9). The remarkable parallelism in the structures of clusters (c) and (d) - that is, verses 5-7 and 8-10 - (as shown in the analysis presented in Appendix 1) leaves little doubt about this connection. Bornkamm (1969:74) drew the attention to the '... exact parallel character of the sentences in vv. 5-7 and 8-10.' This parallelism is well-defined by Tannehill (1967:9) saying:

Both vss. 5 and 8 move from a conditional protasis with εἰ and indicative, asserting participation in the death of Christ as a condition which is fulfilled, to the conclusion of future participation in the resurrection of Christ. This is supported in vss. 6 and 9 by a closer explanation of what this means, in each case connected to the preceding by a causal participle which is to be translated 'since we know ...' (vs. 6 - γινώσκοντες, vs. 9 - εἰδότες). The explanation given is in terms of release from the power of sin (vs. 6) or of death (vs. 9). Vss. 7 and 10 then add support for these assertions in short sentences connected to the preceding by γάρ, in both cases referring to release from sin and its claims.

In this light it becomes possible to see colon 7 (= vs 5) simply as a statement of the fact that we have died the same death as Christ did, and that we may therefore conclude that we shall also participate in his resurrection. This, obviously, presupposes a specific interpretation of ὁμοῦμα. Without going into details, it can just be stated that we are following the suggestion made by Eichholz (1972:205f), saying:

Der fragliche Begriff ὁμοῦμα dürfte aber, mit Günther Bornkamm, im Sinn der 'gleichen Gestalt' zu fassen sein und deshalb die 'gleiche Gestalt' des Todes Jesu Christi meinen. So sind wir 'mit

der gleichen Gestalt seines Todes zusammengewachsen', und das heisst in besserer Übersetzung: 'Wir sind den gleichen Tod gestorben wie er'!

The primary concern, in any case, remains the fact that the believer too, having been united with Christ through baptism, may be thought of as having died with Christ, thus escaping from the power of sin (cf Käsemann 1980:168-9; also Pelser 1981:107-8). The believer's death, of course, is not completely identical with that of Christ, but still it may be regarded as the same thing. According to Ridderbos (1959: 129) it is exactly this idea of being the same, though not identical, that is expressed by the lexical item *ὁμοίωμα* (cf also Rm 8:3; Phlp 2:7).

It must further be noted that Paul is extremely careful in his formulation when it comes to the counterpart of dying with Christ, namely rising with Christ (cf Käsemann 1980:166). Even though he is suggesting that there is correspondence between the believer's new way of life and the resurrection of Christ (cf *ὡπερ - οὕτως* in vs 4), nevertheless he avoids the present indicative in the verb, and only speaks of *καλυότης ζωῆς* instead of resurrection as far as the believer is concerned. To this observation one may add the fact that he deliberately chooses the future tense when referring to the resurrection of the believer (cf vss 5b & 8b). Undoubtedly these should not be treated as 'logical' futures, but as real futures (cf Pelser 1981:109; also Tannehill 1967:10).

Yet, it is quite obvious that Paul is essentially in agreement with the conviction that the resurrection power is already at work in the believers (cf Käsemann 1980:166). As Pelser (1981:108) suggests, '... Paul does not reject the idea that the baptized somehow participates in the new life in the present, but he is careful to make clear that it does not become the believer's possession.' This caution, it seems, must have been prompted by the kind of enthusiasm current in the Corinthian congregation, for instance (cf Schweizer 1970:180). According to this kind of enthusiasm, 'The experience of the Spirit seemed to prove that the new aeon had in the church already broken into this world; resurrection was an already accomplished fact, since it had taken place in the rising with Christ in baptism' (Schweizer 1970:181). In other words, for them the expectation of a future

resurrection became obsolete. And this, of course, would not be acceptable for Paul. According to him, both the 'already' and the 'not yet' have to be maintained (cf § 4.2.1 above). Therefore, with the danger of being misinterpreted looming in the background, it is quite natural to find him avoiding any direct reference to rising with Christ as an already accomplished fact. On the other hand, if this danger would subside at a later stage, it would be just as natural for him to speak of rising with Christ as a present reality, as it is indeed happening in the so-called deutero-Paulines, Ephesians and Colossians (cf Eph 2:5-6; Col 3:1; cf Roberts 1985a:115). As we have already seen on several occasions, Paul can, without hesitation, employ the very same soteriological metaphor for past, present and future - due to his peculiar eschatological frame of reference.

This, one may dare to assert, is also the case with the metaphor of dying and rising with Christ. Even though one may never lose sight of the fact that the final resurrection is still something to be eagerly awaited, it is just as true that the believer (or the baptised) has in a very real sense died with Christ, and that he has consequently entered into a completely new realm of life. In fact, this transition to a new sphere of life is as sure and as real as the death and resurrection of Christ himself. What Paul is doing in Romans 6:11, is no less than inviting the believer to look at his own life through the lens of the transition that took place in the dying and rising of Christ himself.

This lens, then, brings the following features into focus:

- a) Someone finds himself living under a dreadful condition of *slavery*;
- b) By his (physical) *death* he is released from that situation - a dead man can no longer obey orders;
- c) Following his death, however, he again *rises up* to a new life;
- d) The rising brings him into a completely *different sphere of life*.

Certainly there is no need to argue about the suitability of these features in conveying the message of "salvation"; especially if it is kept in mind that the dying and rising, as spoken of in Romans 6:1-11, should actually be regarded as an event in which God himself is fully

involved. Evidently nobody would ever think of it as a natural biological process, running its course without any interference. No, of course it is God's work; but then God's work described in biological categories. Or what else does it mean to be *dead*, the one moment, and then again, *alive!!!*?

### 5.2.2 Raising the dead - from death to life:

At first sight the raising of the dead, as a soteriological metaphor, might seem to be exactly the same thing as the metaphor of dying and rising with Christ. On second thoughts, however, one discovers that there is a slight change of perspective from the one to the other. Whereas the event of *dying* as such is an important element in the metaphor of dying and rising with Christ, raising the dead rather presupposes a dead person, who is then brought to life by the intervention of someone else (who can hardly be anyone but God himself, of course!). In other words, the semantic components of the latter may be stated as:

- a) Someone happens to be *dead*;
- b) By the intervention of someone else (who can only be God), he is *brought to life* again;
- c) The new life he enters upon, however, is of a *radically different quality*.

In Paul's letters this meaning is mainly conveyed by two lexical items, namely ζωοποιέω and ἐγείρω (also ἐξεγείρω). And mostly they are used with reference to the final resurrection. So, for example, in *1 Corinthians 15:42-45*, where both of them occur. In this context they obviously denote the *transformation* that will take place at the 'resurrection of the dead' (ἡ ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν - vs 42). In a series of couplets in antithetical parallelism (cf Barrett 1971b:372; also BDF § 490), Paul characterises this event as a transformation from being perishable to being imperishable, from humiliation (or dishonour) to glory, from weakness to power, from an animal body (NEB translation of σῶμα ψυχικόν in vs 44; RSV & NIV: natural body) to a spiritual body. Just as a seed that is sown, however, (cf the repeated use of σπείρεται in all these couplets), this transformation has to be preceded, of necessity, by death (cf vs 36 - ἄφρων, συ ὁ σπείρεις οὐ ζωοποιεῖται ἐὰν μὴ ἀποθάνῃ.) Only after having died, one can be raised, or be brought to life.

Of course it is true that Paul also reckons with the possibility that some of them might still see the dawn of that new day without having died (cf vs 51). In such a case, evidently, they would not be made alive or raised; they would simply be changed (cf ἀλλαγῆσόμεθα in vss 51-2). This change, however, is then depicted by yet another metaphor (to which we shall return in due course), namely that of being clothed (cf vss 53-4).

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Christ is here spoken of as having become a life-giving spirit (πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν - vs 45), in contrast to the first man, Adam, who became a living being (ψυχὴν ζῶσαν; NEB: an animate being). It is noteworthy, particularly in the light of the fact that the Spirit is often associated with the notion of a life-giving event in Paul's major epistles. Not only was the Spirit very directly involved in the resurrection of Christ (cf Rm 1:4), but He is also thought of as the Agent, *par excellence*, through whom our mortal bodies will be brought to life by God (cf Rm 8:11). While God remains the real Subject of this event in which the dead will be raised to life (cf also Rm 4:17), He will do so, according to *Romans 8:11*, through his Spirit, dwelling in the believer (διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος ἐν ὑμῖν).

And, as far as Romans 8:11 is concerned, it is obviously the present reality of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit that affords the assurance of that intervention of God in the future when the dead will be raised to life. In his discourse analysis of Romans 8:1-17, Coetzer (1981: 191-2) clearly indicates the significant role played by the Holy Spirit; a role that is specified in verses 5-13 in terms of the life-giving function of the πνεῦμα. In relation to verses 5-13 Coetzer (1981:183) therefore also remarks that, 'Time and again the emphasis is on death as the result of the *sárx*, but, on the other hand, on life as a result of the *pneûma*' (cf also Louw 1979a:90). In other words, the Spirit is even now imparting life to the believer; therefore verse 11 may also conclude that He will finally endow even our mortal bodies with a new, imperishable kind of life.

With this in mind, it is perhaps not quite so surprising to find that ζωοποιέω, being an eschatological term in essence, may indeed also be employed with reference to a present activity of the Holy Spirit. Says Bultmann (1964a:875),

As eschatological ζωή is in some sense present..., so the divine ζωοποιεῖν can also refer to the present. We see this in Jn. 5:21, in Col. 2:13, in Eph. 2:5, and with reference to the ζωοποιεῖν of the πνεῦμα in 1 C. 15:45; 2 C. 3:6; Jn. 6:63.

*2 Corinthians 3:6*, to be sure, is of special significance as far as the present study is concerned. It is namely characterising the new covenant as a whole in terms of the life-giving activity of the Spirit, as standing in contrast to the written law of the old covenant, which can only condemn to death and kill. The same contrast, one may presume, is also underlying Paul's claim in *Galatians 3:21*, to the effect that the law does not have the power to bestow life (cf NEB). That life can only be obtained in relation to Christ (cf Gl 2:20), working through his Spirit dwelling in the believer (cf Rm 8:2).

Certainly Paul is very careful in applying the metaphor of the dead being raised to a soteriological event prior to the final resurrection. And yet, as we have already seen in our discussion on the metaphor of dying and rising with Christ, it would not be impossible for him to do so. The way he is using ζωοποιεῖν (and ἐγείρω) in the major epistles, also shows that *Ephesians 2:5* and *Colossians 2:13* are not really out of touch with the Pauline way of handling this metaphor - as is often suggested (cf Roberts 1985a:115). There can be little doubt, of course, that in these two texts, Paul is again looking at "salvation" through a certain lens. He is namely describing God's saving activity in terms of bringing someone from death to life. The metaphor is worked out quite elaborately in the context of *Ephesians 2:1-10*. Here, it should be noted, it is not a case of being dead *to* sin - with Christ - (as in Rm 6:1-11), but rather of being dead *in* transgressions and sins (cf Tannehill 1967:48). From this *state of death*, then, says Paul, God, who is rich in mercy, brought us to life together with Christ (συνεζωοποίησεν τῷ Χριστῷ - vs 5).

No doubt, there can hardly be a more radical way of describing the predicament of sinful man, on the one hand, and the complete transformation wrought by God himself, in Christ and through the Holy Spirit, on the other hand. And obviously it follows the same pattern as all the metaphors from the sphere of social interaction, namely of the triumphant intervention of God in the utterly hopeless situation that man has brought upon himself by his rebellion against God, incurring the dreadful judgement of God (cf Eph 2:2,3).

### 5.2.3 New creation - man and world remade:

Thinking of creation, one is immediately reminded of God's activity right at the beginning of the world, when, according to Genesis 1 and 2, the heavens and the earth were made. By the sheer word of God, the chaos was brought to order, the world came into being, man, and other living creatures, were formed. So impressive was this act of God that it is not surprising to find a broad circle of ideas being associated with it or based on it in the subsequent history of Israel (cf Foerster 1965:1012; also König 1982:133-9).

Considering the disastrous results of sin and the disorder caused by it, it seems quite natural that even salvation would get linked up with the idea of creation. As a consequence of man's rebellion against God, the whole world is in such a mess, that it is no use trying to improve it; it has to be completely refashioned (cf De Boor 1972:138). In other words, a new creation is required; God would have to *recreate* everything.

This idea, undoubtedly, was already present in the mind of the so-called Deutero-Isaiah (cf Is 48:3-8; 65:17; 66:22). According to many scholars the idea of Yahweh's *new creative activity* may be regarded as the central theme of Isaiah 40-55, while a few are even prepared to treat it as the theme of the entire prophecy of Isaiah - especially also of Isaiah 56-66 (cf Kruger 1984:32). It certainly came to fruition in the apocalyptic tradition of the intertestamental period, and is carried on in the eschatological expectations of the New Testament. Nothing less than the creation of new heavens and a new earth was awaited (cf Rv 21:1; 2 Pt 3:13). But, of course, it was expected as the glorious end of the revelation of God's salvation; with the introduction of that new creation, the supreme goal of the entire biblical *Heilsgeschichte* would reach its fulfilment (cf Ladd 1974:480).

When Paul then speaks of  $\kappa\alpha\lambda\upsilon\eta\ \chi\tau\iota\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$  in *2 Corinthians 5:17* and *Galatians 6:15*, it should most likely be understood in terms of that eschatological background (cf König 1982:137). It is by this background, to be sure, that Ridderbos (1975:206) is motivated to suggest that *2 Corinthians 5:17* be rendered as, 'If any man is in Christ, he is

(he belongs to the) new creation. The old things have passed away, behold! new things have come.' This translation assumes, namely, that the determinative point of departure in Paul's doctrine of the new life is not to be found in the new 'creature', but in the new 'creation' (cf Ridderbos 1975:206). This new creation, one is to understand, has broken into the old world in the resurrection of Christ (cf De Boer 1972:137). Therefore, if any man is 'in Christ' (that is, if anyone is incorporated into Christ so that he belongs to Him), he also participates in the new creation; he belongs to the new creation. Says Bruce (1982:273):

The 'new creation' in its fulness belongs to the future, but to those in Christ it is already realized through the Spirit. Christ is the head of the new creation; in him they have been transferred from their former existence 'in Adam', the head of the old creation, and await the final manifestation of the new creation on the day of resurrection when 'in Christ all shall be made alive' (1 Cor 15:22).

Of course, participation in this new creation implies that man too must have become a new creature. After all, even though the last part of 2 Corinthians 5:17 is cast in almost universal terms (τὰ ἀρχαῖα παρῆλθεν, ἴσθ' ὅδ' ἔγενεν καινὰ) , the first part is evidently focussing on the individual (εὖ τις ἐν Χριστῷ). As an individual every person who, by faith and baptism, finds himself included in Christ, is so to speak, newly created or re-created. And, what is more, this transformation is thought to be a reality even now!

Normally 'creation' (κτίσις - and κτίω) depicts the event of making or creating something which has not existed before (cf Louw & Niča 1986:542.35). In the combination καινὴ κτίσις, nevertheless, an extra component is introduced. Here it is rather a case of remaking something which has already existed. And yet, the new thing which is produced, is so radically new, that its production may well be described in terms of creation.

Turning sinful man into someone who is reconciled with God (cf 2 Cor 5:13-21), is so radical a transformation that it is indeed well-defined in terms of creation (cf König 1982:136-8). In fact, seeing God's saving actions in terms of a new creation is any time as radical a metaphor as that of raising the dead. And yet, it is essentially the very same saving event we have met in so many other soteriological metaphors. Still, that diamond of "salvation" glitters in a new way when it is viewed from this

particular perspective and through this particular lens. Therefore the interaction between the donor field of 'creation' and the recipient field of "salvation" ought to be preserved.

This may perhaps be done by calling the attention to some other expressions from the same donor field, also functioning metaphorically in the semantic field of "salvation". Such are, for instance, notions like the *renewal of the mind* (ἀνακαίνωσις τοῦ νοός) and the *transformation of image* (which will be discussed in §5.2.4 below). New creation, it seems, is paralleled and explained by the ideas of being transformed in the image of Christ and God, and of the mind being completely renewed. This fact, in any case, is suggested by the co-occurrence of all these metaphors in the context of both *Ephesians 4:22-24* and *Colossians 3:9-10*.

However, *Romans 12:2* is actually the only place in the major epistles where reference is made to the renewal of the mind. In this verse, though, it forms quite a noteworthy contrast with the conformity to the '... pattern of this world'. (NIV; μὴ συσχηματίζεσθε τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ). The implication is that the renewed mind will follow the pattern of the new aeon rather than that of the present aeon (cf Venter 1985:41). This again, will enable them to discern the will of God; they will know what is good, acceptable and perfect (vs 2b - NEB). They will be able to resist the god of this age (cf 2 Cor 4:4 - ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου).

Surely the conclusion may be drawn that, as God is shaping that new creature to be in harmony with the new creation in Christ, He is also remoulding the mind, as the centre of thought and discernment. The event word ἀνακαίνωσις is conscribed, according to Louw and Nida (1986:§58.72), in the service of the meaning defined as, 'to cause something to become new and different, with the implication of becoming superior.' It may be rendered as 'to make new, renewal'.

It may almost sound as if we are here talking in material terms. Verbs such as shaping, and moulding, making, and creating - all have the taste of something concrete. Perhaps it would not be too daring to say that Paul himself is actually challenging us to think in such concrete terms. "Salvation" may also be seen as the handiwork of God, the Creator, who, by his immense power, can reshape the by sin deformed caricature of man into something really new; something quite superior - into a new creature, with a new mind - in the likeness of his Creator!! (cf Theron 1978: 64-8).

#### 5.2.4 Transformation of image - the creation of a new conformity:

It has already been suggested in the previous paragraph that the semantic unit expressed as a *transformation of image*, should really be treated as a concomitant of the *new creation*. In the light of Genesis 1:26-27 this association is rather obvious, one may presume. If the original creation was a matter of being formed in the image of God, then certainly the new creation may be interpreted as a matter of being transformed in the image of God and of Christ.

Nevertheless, the latter is not just considered as a sub-section of the metaphor of a new creation, seeing that it may also contract a relation with some of the other soteriological metaphors from the sphere of biological and physiological transformation. So, for instance, it may be associated with the *raising of the dead* (cf 1 Cor 15:49 in the context of an argument concerning the resurrection; also Phlp 3:21), and even with the metaphor of *dying and rising with Christ* (cf Tannehill 1967: 104-12). It is, in other words, a metaphor in its own right.

Its most significant application is probably to be found in *2 Corinthians 3:18* (cf Theissen 1974:294). According to this verse, all believers (cf ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ...) are being transformed (or transfigured - NEB) into the likeness of Christ. It happens as they are beholding or reflecting<sup>9)</sup> the glory of the Lord. By coming into contact with the glory of the Lord (which is the same as the glory of God in the face of Christ - cf 2 Cor 4:6), they are transformed into the same image (τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα). They, so to speak, take the shape of the glory-image of Christ, who, himself is the visible manifestation of God; that is, the image of God (cf 2 Cor 4:4). Says Tannehill (1967:106), 'it is the glory-image which characterises the Lord's heavenly existence and in which the believer can now participate.'

According to Theissen (1974:294), this transformation takes place by virtue of the 'mythical analogy' ('... kraft "mythischer Analogie"...') between the Redeemer and the redeemed. By way of sacramental actions and a conformable fate, the Redeemer and the redeemed are joined together, so that, whatever overcomes the former, is also happening to the latter. From this line of argument, the following conclusion re-

garding the metaphor of a transformation of image emerges:

Innerhalb der Gestaltwandelsymbolik wird also das Heil als Prägung durch das Wesen des Erlösers vorgestellt. Erlösung geschieht nicht durch einen bestimmten Akt des Erlösers, sondern dadurch, dass sein Wesen erscheint, wirksam wird und das ihm entgegengesetzte Wesen des Menschen verdrängt: Die Gestalt Christi ersetzt die Gestalt Adams, seine Doxa die Herrlichkeit Moses. Zur Gestaltwandelsymbolik gehört daher die Adam-Christus- bzw. Moses-Christus-Typologie. Entscheidend ist dabei nicht der Antitypos, sondern dass Christus die wahre Eikon Gottes ist, welche die Kraft hat, die Menschen in seine Eikon zu verwandeln.

(Theissen 1974:296).

Against this view, however, it may be objected that Paul is rather conspicuously referring to this transformation in terms of an active deed of God. This, to be sure, must be the function of the reference to the Spirit in 2 Corinthians 3:18. 'The phrase καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος indicates the source of the transformation, as ἀπό shows, and thereby indicates that this transformation is the result of the active power of the Lord as Spirit or through the Spirit' (cf Tannehill 1967:107). In any case, it must also be remembered that this verse is occurring in the context of the thematic statement of 2 Corinthians 3:6, where the life-giving function of the Spirit is highlighted as the outstanding characteristic of the new dispensation. Thus, it may be insinuated, it is by his life-giving and life-creating power that the Holy Spirit is changing the lowly figure of sin-trodden man into the illustrious image of the glorious Christ. Continuing the argument of chapter 3, 2 Corinthians 4:1-6 too contains language that is obviously meant to call the creative activity of God to mind (cf particularly 2 Cor 4:6, where the allusion to Gn 1:3 cannot be mistaken).

Dealing with the same subject matter (contra Grosheide 1959:113), *Philippians* 3:20,21 removes all doubt about the fact that this transformation should really be seen as a creative act of God. In this case, though, it is an act of God, the Son, in his capacity as the Lord, who will bring about this transformation at his *parousia*, '... by the power that enables him to bring everything under his control' (NIV; cf Friedrich 1976:166). Of course, one can hardly fail to recognise the fact that, being concerned with the final coming of Christ on the day of the resurrection, Paul is here speaking in a very concrete way, even getting down to the point of describing the actual content of the trans-

formation in terms of a change from one kind of body to another. A body, if anything, is undoubtedly the most concrete side of man; the tangible and visible manifestation of his existence. Therefore, the change foreseen in Philippians 3:21 must inevitably be thought of as a visible and perceptible reality. It is a transformation just as concrete as the original formation of man. The only difference being that, whereas in the formation of man it is a case of forming something which has not existed before, in the transformation of man it is rather a case of reshaping something which has already been in existence. Evidently this is exactly the same distinction as the one we have already noticed with regard to the relation between creation and new creation (cf § 5.2.3 above).

Although 2 Corinthians 3:18 is often taken to be in a different category on account of the fact that it is referring to '... a transformation invisible to the physical eye' (Arndt & Gingrich 1957:513), the correspondence with Philippians 3:21 is worthy of being noted. The use of lexical items such as *μορφος* and *δόξα* in the latter, is clearly reminiscent of the former. And, if one also considers the fact that the future transformation of Philippians 3:21 may as well be stated in terms of exchanging the *εἰκὼν τοῦ χοῦκοῦ* for the *εἰκὼν τοῦ ἐπουρανίου* (cf 1 Cor 15:49), it becomes evident that we may agree with Schenk's remark in connection with Philippians 3:21 (1984:325), saying that, 'Was hier μετασχηματίζειν bezeichnet, drückt 2Kor 3,18 mit μεταμορφοῦσθαι oder 1Kor 15,31f. mit ἀλλάσσειν aus.'

By using μεταμορφόμααι (in the passive) together with the accusative τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα (cf BDF §159,4), Paul is indeed calling forth quite a lively and concrete field of meaning in 2 Corinthians 3:18. According to Louw & Nida (1986:§13.53), this verb should namely be classified as belonging to the domain of event words describing a change of state. Within this semantic field, shared by some other lexical items we have already encountered - such as ἀποστρέφω (§13.63 - cf §5.1.7 above) ἐγείρω (§13.65 - cf §5.2.2 above) and ἀνακαίνω (§13.67 - cf §5.2.3 above) - the specific semantic contribution of μεταμορφόμααι may be defined as, 'to change the essential form or nature of something.' This definition clearly shows that it is in fact a complete *transfiguration* or *metamorphosis* that is envisaged. By being caused to take the shape of Christ (cf also Gi 4:19 - NEB), the believer is, so to speak, undergoing a

radical metamorphosis; he is acquiring a brand-new 'appearance'! (of course not in a physical sense, but in a comprehensive sense) (cf Wilckens 1982:7).<sup>10)</sup>

The present tense of the verb in 2 Corinthians 3:18 (as well as in Rm 12:2) naturally favours the interpretation that this transformation should be understood as an ongoing process, dogmatically categorised as sanctification. As such it would not qualify as a *soteriological* metaphor. But, although one has to agree that a certain process may be involved in Paul's understanding of this transformation (even in Gl 4:19 too), the very fact that the same notion may also be used in an eschatological context (cf Phlp 3:21; 1 Cor 15:49), where sanctification in the dogmatic sense is no longer applicable, clearly indicates that we are dealing with an intervention of God that may rightly be classified as a soteriological metaphor. As with all the other soteriological metaphors, this one too may be employed to indicate either a past event, or a present experience, or a future prospect. This point of view, it seems, is confirmed by the following quotation from Wilckens' commentary on Romans 12:2,

Paulus beschreibt hier also den Existenzwandel, der das zentrale Thema vor Röm 6 war: In der Taufe wirkt die endzeitliche Heilswirksamkeit des Christusgeschehens als Rechtfertigung und Heiligung (1 Kor 6,11) so in das konkrete irdische Leben herein, dass das Alte vergangen und Neues entstanden ist (2 Kor 5,17). Diese Verwandlung und Erneuerung bestimmt von der Taufe her das ganze christliche Leben. Dies drücken die präsentischen Imperative aus, die - im Unterschied zum Infinitiv Aorist in V 1 - iterative Bedeutung haben.

(Wilckens 1982:7).

The semantic components involved in this meaning, then, are the following:

- a) Someone finds himself in a shape which is undesirable;
- b) By the *creative act* of someone else (who can hardly be anyone but God) the person *is transfigured* so as to conform to another shape which is desirable (represented by Christ);
- c) A *glorious new appearance* (in the comprehensive sense of the word) is the result.

Using this meaning metaphorically in the semantic field "salvation", one

may perhaps elicit the maximum effect by employing an unusual translational substitute, such as 'to undergo a metamorphosis' (which is, of course, derived from μεταμορφώω). However, since this equivalent may have the connotation of a natural process, and since it cannot really be turned into the active voice, 'to transfigure' (or 'to be transfigured') may serve as a useful alternative (cf NEB - 2 Cor 3:18). Evidently 'to transform' would be equally suitable, though 'to transfigure' seems to be a bit more expressive. Whereas the former is more generally used for any kind of a change of state, the latter is better-disposed in describing an event in which someone is made to conform to a different shape.

#### 5.2.5 Illumination - the blind are brought to sight:

In close conjunction with the previous semantic unit, we find yet another soteriological metaphor in the context of *2 Corinthians 4:1-6*. In this paragraph, just as at the end of chapter 3, Paul is still concerned with the glory of God shining in the face of Christ (cf 2 Cor 4:6 - GNB). However, while this glory may be perceived with an unveiled face by all who turn to the Lord (according to 3:16-18), it is obscured from those who are on their way to perdition (according to 4:3). For the latter Paul's gospel is veiled (κεκαλυμμένον; cf ἀνακαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ in 3:18), so that they fail to see the glory of Christ. This is so because, 'In their case the god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them from seeing the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the likeness of God.' (2 Cor 4:4 - RSV).

To be blinded, of course, is a biological and physiological event, causing a disability of the eyes in the reception of the light impulses coming their way. Then the light may be shining as brightly as ever, but in the mind of the blind only darkness will be registered. And, in a spiritual sense, this is exactly what is happening in the minds of the unbelievers. While the gospel is radiating the brightest of lights<sup>11)</sup>, consisting of the splendour of Christ, the unbeliever, having been blinded by the Satan (ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου - 4:4), has lost the ability to receive and to register these light impulses. Therefore, in his heart and mind the darkness prevails.

In the final analysis, then, it is only God, who, by the power with which the darkness was overcome at the creation in the beginning, can break through the darkness prevailing in the heart of man. As Tasker (1958:72) has noted,

Conversion was to Paul a miraculous new birth, a constantly recurring display of God's creative and redemptive power. The only adequate parallel to the penetration of the darkness of the sinful human heart by the kindly light of God's grace was the dispersal of the darkness that originally covered the face of the deep by the divine fiat 'Let there be light' (Gn. i.3).

Probably Paul is here also thinking of his own experience on the way to Damascus when the glory of God shone upon him in the appearance of Jesus, the risen Lord (cf Groenewald 1967:64). As he was on his way to Damascus, he saw, according to Acts 26:13, (in the middle of the day) a light from the sky, more brilliant than the sun, shining all around him and his travelling-companions. It was by this experience of meeting with the glorious Christ that his own eyes were opened for the light of the gospel (cf also Ac 9:17-18 for the literal opening of his eyes). But more than that. At the same occasion he was also commissioned and appointed by Jesus to go to the Gentiles, so as '... to open their eyes, that they may turn from darkness to light and from the power of Satan to God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins and a place among those who are sanctified in me' (Acts 26:18 - RSV). It is not surprising, then, to find Paul writing to the Corinthians about his task as an apostle in terms of the blind being brought to sight and the darkness being turned to light.

It must be noted, of course, that Paul is actually working with two very closely parallel metaphors in 2 Corinthians 4:1-6. Blindness is equalled by darkness, while the illuminating intervention of God is the restoring of sight. That both of these are indeed to be taken as soteriological metaphors, surely needs no proof. It is in any case highlighted by the 'semantic impertinence' of the statement that it was 'the minds of the unbelievers' (τὰ νοήματα τῶν ἀπίστων - vs 4), rather than their eyes, that were blinded by the Satan. Similarly the fact that God is said to have shone 'in our hearts', rather than just upon us, comes over as rather unusual. So too the fact that this illumination brings knowledge (πρὸς φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως - vs 6). Obviously these 'discrepancies' are due to the interaction between donor field and recipient field. The "salvation" in which God is transforming the hearts and minds of people by a

new creation, is here telescoped through the lens of biological and physiological categories such as blindness and sight, darkness and light.

The important features of meaning in the donor field, exercising a formative influence on the recipient field, are the following:

- a) Someone happens to be *blind* (as a supplementary component of meaning one may add that this blindness is due to the malicious intervention of someone else);
- b) The mind of the blind person, of course, can only register *darkness*;
- c) By the miraculous and creative power of someone else, however, this darkness is *overcome by light*, that is, *illumination* takes place;
- d) As a result, *sight* is restored.

The third of these components (marked 'c') is undoubtedly the core of this meaning, as far as its interaction with "salvation" is concerned. This element mainly finds expression in the phrase ὅς ἔλαμψεν ... πρὸς φωτισμὸν... (vs 6). Actually the metaphor would have been more complete if Paul had introduced a lexical unit for 'causing to see'; this feature, nevertheless, may be inferred from the idea of illumination. It is the obvious counterpart of the implied component of blindness.

Seeing "salvation" as a turn-about (caused by the creative intervention of God) from darkness to light, and from blindness to sight, once more brings it in connection with the realities of the biological and physiological realm. And, as we have previously seen, this connection is surrounded by an air of concreteness; a concreteness, to be sure, that may be sensed in the present metaphor as well!

#### 5.2.6 Incorporation - joined to one body:

Although "salvation" is mostly treated as a personal affair between God and the sinner, that is, on a rather individualistic basis, one would certainly be violating the Pauline interpretation of God's saving actions by not acknowledging their communal dimensions as well. The time is long past when the Pauline view of the religious life was confined to the personal piety of the individual, who acknowledges God as his Father

and is set free by his Spirit from his sinful nature to emulate Jesus - as the liberal theology of the nineteenth century, with its typically individualistic tenor, would have it (cf Roberts 1985:265-6). Therefore the church too is no longer regarded as '*... a purely natural, human association that came into being when the early Christians found it useful to join forces and take their place as an organization in the world of the first century.*' (cf Roberts 1985:266). The recognition of the eschatological character of the New Testament message, in particular, brought the realisation that the church is in fact God's own making, to be regarded as '*... the New Israel or the true Israel of the end-time, the covenant people of God in continuity with the old Israel*' (cf Roberts 1985:267). And, from this point of view it follows quite naturally that even "salvation" may be considered in terms of someone being joined by God himself to this community. In fact, even though it has not been stated so explicitly, the metaphors of *adoption* and *acceptance* too (as discussed in §§5.1.4 and 5.1.5 above) show something of this community-constituting character of God's saving work. And if *justification* is interpreted in terms of the restoration of the covenant relationship, that would also introduce the communal dimension (cf Neill 1976:59).

It is a well-known fact, one may presume, that the New Testament contains an amazing variety of images and titles designating the church (cf Minear 1960:14,28; Roberts 1985:269; Clowney 1984:64). For Paul, nevertheless, the metaphor of the church as 'the body of Christ' is certainly one of the most important of these characterisations (cf Ridderbos 1975:362). It is, in any case, a typically Pauline way of referring to the church, only indirectly alluded to in the other writings of the New Testament (cf Minear 1960:173; Ridderbos 1975:362).

Our primary concern, naturally, is not with this ecclesiological metaphor as such, but rather with its soteriological connections. No need, therefore, to involve ourselves in the controversies pertaining to this expression. Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, it must definitely be understood as a metaphorical expression, and not, as a number of modern scholars do, in a real, personal sense (cf Ridderbos 1975:363-8). Of course, taking it as a metaphor does not necessarily engage us '*... in the role of repudiating the ontological realism of the image*' (cf Minear 1960:20). As Richardson remarks (cf Minear 1960:21), it is rather

a case of the phrase being '... used realistically, ontologically, and *therefore* metaphorically or symbolically or analogically.' Far from being opposed to reality, metaphor is in fact looking at reality, but then through a certain lens. Rather than distorting the reality, the lens is used for nothing but to bring that reality into sharper focus.

In this case, then, the human body, as a biological and physiological entity, and as an organic unity, serves to interpret the realities of the church's existence. It does so, particularly, in two important respects. On the one hand, it points to the essential unity, that is, the corporate unity, between Christ and the believers (or the baptised) (cf Roberts 1985:284-6). Otherwise it also makes for an excellent and vivid portrayal of the mutual relationship between all the members of that body - their essential (and visible) unity within the body, as well as the diversity within that unity (cf Roberts 1985:287-90).

According to Ridderbos (1975:369-76) the former of these ought to be given priority as the basis from which the latter eventually developed. In his opinion the church was first qualified as 'one body in Christ' (Rm 12:5) because of their incorporation into Christ as the inclusive Figure of the new covenant. In other words, it is to be taken as a redemptive-historical category. Only subsequently it '... works itself out sacramentally and pneumatically, so the believer's incorporation into and belonging to the body of Christ is represented by baptism and the Lord's Supper; and so the church can only reveal itself as the one body of Christ in virtue of the gift of the Holy Spirit given by him to his body.' (Ridderbos 1975:276).

Roberts (1985:284), then, suggests that the corporate unity between Christ and the believers be comprehended in terms of the body as an organically working unit. Says he:

We might put it this way: whereas the organic has to do with how the body fits together and with how it works, the *corporate view* expresses the idea of a group of people who are linked in a very special way to one person. That *one person is their representative or representation. They are the represented, who stand in so close a relationship to the one person that they are regarded as part of him: they have been incorporated into him, so that they form part of him* (emphasis his).

In other words, just as a person is insolubly united with his own body, so the church as the body of Christ is inseparably bonded to him. In fact, this bond is so inseparable that the believer may even be said to have died (and to have risen) with Christ. As it is expressed in *Romans 7:4*, stating, 'So you, my friends, have died to the law by becoming identified with the body of Christ...' (NEB).

In the nature of the case, evidently, our interest in the present dissertation lies mainly with the aspect of *incorporation* into this body of Christ. Speaking of incorporation, we are of course thinking of that event by which someone becomes identified with the body of Christ. In the light of the preceding discussion of this metaphor, to be sure, this event of being incorporated in Christ's body may be qualified as a soteriological event. The question is, however, how does it take place? Or, to put it differently: can this metaphor be extended so as to cover even this aspect in terms of the same metaphor?

The answer to the last question, it seems, must be in the negative. One can hardly disagree with Clowney's observation (1984:80) that the metaphor of the body is an awkward model to use for the missionary expansion of the church. As he rightly mentions, '... the hellenistic world knew nothing of bodily transplants, and the notion of the body growing by feeding on the nations would scarcely be an appropriate metaphor for world missions!' (Clowney 1984:80). Paul does employ another metaphor from the organic realm of plant life, though, in order to describe this event of being included into an already existing, living organism, and that is namely the idea of grafting, but that metaphor, we feel, is more appropriately and more profitably treated in its own right (cf §5.2.7 below).

In relation to the idea of incorporation into the body of Christ, rather, Paul is using the metaphor of *baptism* (cf Dukes 1983:87-91). This fact is most clearly evidenced by Paul's statement in *1 Corinthians 12:13*, claiming that '... we were all brought into one body by baptism, in the one Spirit...' (NEB). Although some versions take the phrase ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι to be a dative of agent (BDF §191) by translating it as 'by one Spirit' (cf RSV, NIV, GNB), it is more likely pointing to the Spirit as the element 'in' which they were baptised (cf Morris 1958:174;

Dunn 1978:174; also the NEB and JB). By being baptised, one is brought within the sphere of the Spirit (cf Morris 1958:174), under the rule of the Spirit (cf Ridderbos 1975:373). According to Dunn (1978:174), Paul is here taking up the metaphor coined by John the Baptist, pointing forward to the coming Messiah who would baptise with the Holy Spirit and fire (cf Mt 3:11; Lk 3:16 - αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς βαπτίσει ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρὶ). This *metaphor*, says Dunn (1978:136), was '... drawn from the symbolical significance of the rite which characterised John the Baptist's ministry - *viz.* as immersion in a river.' As such it basically signified initiation and judgement. As an *initiatory* metaphor, '... it denoted the means by which the new age would come to birth ('the travail of the Messiah'), and the means by which the penitent would enter into the new age and be fitted for the new age, refined and cleansed' (Dunn 1978:136). The same fire that would purge the penitent, however, would destroy the impenitent in *judgement*.

This characterisation of the Messiah's ministry, then, was accepted by Jesus himself, but slightly reinterpreted (cf Dunn 1978:138). Rather than seeing himself as the One who baptises in Spirit and fire, He chose to interpret his own death in terms of this baptism. This is quite obviously the trend of his thought as it is expressed in Luke 12:49-50. The fire Jesus came to cast on the earth, would be kindled *on himself* (vs 49 - cf Dunn 1978:138), which is really the same thing as the baptism He would have to undergo (vs 50). In this way He himself would endure the birth pangs of the new age, thereby opening up the way for others to enter into this new realm. In other words, He took the judgement (the baptism in fire) upon himself, so as to ensure the initiation of others into the sphere of the Spirit.

In this light it is significant that Paul does not only say in 1 Corinthians 12:13 that they were baptised 'in one Spirit', but also that they were baptised *into one body* (εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν), that is, *into Christ* (cf vs 12). Therefore, says Dunn (1978:174), 'The initiating "baptism" is not only an experience of the Spirit, it is also that action of God whereby the would-be convert comes to share in the risen life of Christ, becomes a member of Christ, "in Christ"' (cf also Gl 3:27). And, of course, where this argument holds true, it is but a small step forward in order to reach the conclusion drawn in *Romans 6:3*, namely that being baptised into Christ selfevidently involves being

baptised into his death. By being incorporated into the body of Christ in baptism, one may also be regarded as having participated in that event of judgement that was suffered by Christ himself on the cross.

Baptism, then, is to be understood as that *action of God* (cf Dunn 1978: 174) whereby a person is *incorporated* into the body of Christ. Baptism does not constitute the unity of the body, but rather joins to an already existing unity. As Ridderbos (1975:372) says with reference to the phrase 'baptised into one body' in 1 Corinthians 12:13,

The expression does not say that the unity of the body comes into being by baptism, in the sense of: 'so that we are of one body', or: 'in order together to form one body'. Rather, the term employed here - 'to baptize into' (*baptizein eis*) - denotes that the one baptized is brought into relation with an already existing person or unity (cf. 1 Cor. 10:2; Gal. 3:27); this means therefore incorporation into an already existing body, namely, the communion of those who have been comprehended in and baptized into Christ.

Now, in order to make the link with the metaphor of the body more explicit, the term *incorporation* is preferred as designation for the soteriological metaphor in question, rather than baptism. Although the term incorporation is evidently not found in Paul's vocabulary, the meaning it conveys is undoubtedly present in his major epistles. In fact, it gives clear expression to the saving event involved in baptism as an act of God, signifying, as it is, the joining of a 'foreign' member to an already existing, living body. In its connection with the donor field of language pertaining to the human body, it may namely be analysed into the following semantic components:

- a) A certain 'object' is found in the position of not being part of a particular body;
- b) By the intervention of someone, that 'object' is *caused to become an integral part* of the body in question;
- c) As a result it starts *functioning as one of that body's own members*.

For us who live in the age of organ transplantations, it might not be a problem to imagine such an event taking place. As it has already been granted above, Paul could of course not be thinking in such terms. And yet, one may assume that it would not have been impossible for him to

think of God, who is after all the Creator of the body, as being able to incorporate something - or rather: someone! - into an already existing body. On the other hand, one must surely be careful not to push the metaphor too far! *1 Corinthians 6:15-17*, for one thing, should certainly caution us against such an over-enthusiasm. These verses are namely showing that Paul can just as well describe the event of being united with another body in terms of the sexual union with a prostitute! This is established with reference to *Genesis 2:24*, where it is said of husband and wife that the two will become one flesh. It is obviously the aspect of two separate persons being united into one, that Paul is drawing the attention to. As Theissen (1974:298) remarks in connection with these verses,

Paulus benutzt hier das Wort *κολλᾶσθαι* sowohl für den Geschlechtsverkehr mit einer Prostituierten als auch für die Vereinigung mit dem Erlöser. Tertium comparationis ist die Vereinigung zwischen zwei getrennten Personen zu einer Person.

This, in any case, is the point to be stressed as far as the metaphor of *incorporation* is concerned. Someone who used to have no connection with Christ, is caused (by God's act of initiation in baptism) to become an integral part of Christ's own body; he becomes a member of that body, that is, a hand or a foot, an eye or an ear (cf *1 Cor 12:14-27*). That is to say, he becomes inseparably bonded to the person of Christ, so that he must, of necessity, also start functioning as a member of that body, in unity with all the other members, being equipped by the Holy Spirit, who himself is the gift in which all members participate by virtue of their belonging to the one body of Christ (cf Ridderbos 1975:373).

#### 5.2.7 Grafting - joined to a cultivated tree:

The idea of incorporation into an already existing organism, as we have already mentioned (cf p 205), may also be described in terms of the arboricultural procedure of *grafting*. Paul avails himself of this idea only once, namely in *Romans 11:17-24*. Within the wider context of a discussion on questions pertaining to the rejection and reintegration of Israel as the people of God (cf Louw 1979a:119), Paul is warning the Gentile Christians in this particular pericope not to take pride in their position, as if the Jews were permanently excluded from the people

of God in favour of their inclusion. Deliberately exploiting the long-standing identification of the olive tree as a figure of Israel (cf Baxter & Ziesler 1985:26), Paul reminds those Gentile Christians of the fact that they, as branches taken from what is by nature a wild olive tree, were grafted, contrary to nature, into a cultivated olive tree (vs 24). If they don't stand fast through faith, therefore, they might easily fall prey to the pruning process again - just as those Jews, who were removed as fruitless branches, while they were persisting in their unbelief (vs 20).

For the purposes of our study, there is of course no need to determine the exact reference of the different aspects included in this metaphor. Apart from the fact that it is in any case difficult to decide what exactly the root is standing for, and to which part of the tree Israel, as the people of God, is actually related (cf Minear 1960:46), one must also be careful not to overtax the metaphor. As Baxter and Ziesler (1985:29) remark,

Paul's figures in general have a limited area of applicability. One thinks of the marriage law in Romans 7 as a prime example. If the details are pressed, the figure dissolves in confusion, but the main point is clear enough and the figure works.

According to them, then, the main point Paul would like to convey in Romans 11 by way of the figure of the olive tree and its grafting, is precisely what it is sometimes alleged not to be, namely the rejuvenation of the tree. Columella (who was an almost exact contemporary of Paul's) is quoted in support of the contention that '... such grafting with scions from a wild olive tree would be done only to a tree that was exhausted, unproductive, or diseased, in order to re-invigorate it' (Baxter & Ziesler 1985:27). This, no doubt, would fit in quite well with the general trend of the chapter in question, where the ingathering of the Gentiles obviously serves to restore life to Israel. In Paul's time, it may be assumed, Israel, as the cultivated olive tree, is found in a rather bad condition (having responded inadequately or wrongly to Jesus Christ). In this condition, nevertheless, God is not just setting out to destroy the tree, or even to get new branches as a permanent replacement for the old, unfruitful ones. Seeing that there is nothing wrong with the root (which is probably to be understood as the patriarchs - Abraham in particular, seen as the recipient of and respondent to the

promises of God - cf vs 16), Paul remains hopeful that, some time the whole tree will again come alive with a forceful and fruitful new vitality. In the words of Baxter and Ziesler (1985:28), one may say that,

The long-term strategy of God allows Paul to hope for the final inclusion of all Israel. Surely the figure of the olive tree and in particular the meaning of the grafting process (to rejuvenate the tree) tends on the whole to give strength to this hope. There is no new tree, but the same old tree rejuvenated, though part of it has had to be removed and new scions grafted in. Thus the process not only enables the Gentiles to become fruitful, but also restores strong life to the tree as a whole. Certainly the root is not affected, and certainly the ingrafted branches depend on the root for their life (as branches not ingrafted they are moribund). Yet they do, once ingrafted and deriving sap from the root, contribute to the renovation of the tree.

Against this background, nevertheless, it is also possible to concentrate on the event of grafting itself. Although the procedure is mainly aimed at bringing about the rejuvenation of the tree, it is, at the same time, causing a radical change of state as far as the ingrafted branches are concerned. They are namely taken from the one kind of tree, in order to be implanted into a different kind of tree, so that they may become organically one with the latter; they come to share (συγκοινωνός) in the nourishing sap from the olive root (cf vs 17 - NIV).

Keeping the fact in mind that this pericope is specifically addressed to 'the Gentiles' within the church (cf Rm 11:13), one may certainly conclude that we have here encountered yet another soteriological metaphor. Focussing on the *effect* of the grafting process (that is, on the rejuvenation of the tree), the *ecclesiological* consequences may seem to occupy the limelight; the church is then seen as a continuation of the people of God in the Old Testament - no new tree, just some new branches helping to re-invigorate the exhausted and unproductive old tree. Concentrating on the *event* of grafting itself, however, the inclination is rather towards the *soteriological* interpretation of the metaphor - the Gentiles, who used to be excluded from the citizenship in Israel and outside God's covenants and the promise that goes with them (cf Eph 2:12), are now, by an act of God, being incorporated into the true Israel; the branches from the wild olive are joined to the cultivated one. ἔνεκεν-τρούθης in verses 17 and 24, says Wilckens (1980:247), is a 'passivum divinum' - it is indicating the initiating action of God, by which that

'Wende vom Unheil zum Heil' (cf Theissen 1974:282) is effectuated.

It is hardly necessary to spell out the semantic components expressed in the lexical item ἐγκατερύζω, but for the sake of comparison with the other semantic units within our field of investigation, the following analysis may be suggested:

- a) A branch or a small twig, belonging to a certain kind of tree, is *separated* from its natural setting;
- b) This shoot, then, is *inserted in under the bark of another tree*, thus being caused to become organically united with that other tree;
- c) As a result, this branch not only starts *bearing fruit* through taking a share in the nourishing sap from a cultivated root, but in turn also causes the whole tree to be *rejuvenated*.

Oviously this agricultural (or, more precisely speaking, arboricultural) procedure is perfectly appropriate as a metaphor depicting an event very similar to that event of incorporation into the body of Christ discussed in paragraph 5.2.6 above (naturally with the exclusion of the inferential component of rejuvenation, which is evidently not applicable to the image of the body of Christ). And, whereas the idea of incorporation might have been difficult to imagine, the people to whom Paul was addressing this letter would probably be well-acquainted with the grafting process. Even though some commentators think that what Paul is talking about is really botanical nonsense, being an impossible procedure (e.g. Michel 1966:348), Baxter and Ziesler (1985) have shown quite convincingly that this is not the case. This kind of grafting was not only a widespread, but also a well-known practice in the time of Paul, so that even the townsmen would be able to grasp the striking message conveyed by the metaphorical use of this figure in the soteriological context of Romans 11.

### 5.3 Soteriological metaphors from the cultic and ritual realm:

Taking the essential nature and function of the Old Testament cultic actions into consideration, and assuming that the young church of the New Testament stood in good rapport with these traditions, it is certainly to be expected that some of the soteriological metaphors in operation would have originated from this source. The likelihood of the cultic and ritual realm being a productive source in the generation of metaphors interpreting God's saving actions, is underlined by the revealing characterisation supplied by Vriezen (1970:255) in connection with the function of the Old Testament cult. He contends that,

*In Israel the cult exists in order to maintain and purify the communion between man and God: the cult exists as a means to integrate the communion between God and man which God has instituted in His Covenant, in other words, the cult exists for the sake of the atonement (emphasis his own).*

The cult, in other words, is an essential part of the covenant relationship between God and man, as is shown by the fact that it was instituted at the sealing of the covenant itself (cf Ex 24; cf also Vriezen 1970:256). Therefore, as Budiman (1971:58) remarks, the cultic institution of Israel is continually driving at the preservation and restoration of the fellowship between God and man. And this, after all, is essentially what "salvation" is all about.

It is particularly with the view to the interpretation of the death of Christ that the sacrificial cultus of the Old Testament was engaged to a significant extent by the authors of the New Testament. At first, one may presume, the death of the Messiah must have caught them by surprise (notwithstanding the fact that, according to the Synoptic tradition, they were pre-informed about it by Jesus himself). This death, it seems, only became intelligible to them when they realised that '... Christ died for our sins in accordance with the scriptures' (1 Cor 15:3 - RSV). Searching the Scriptures, they soon made the discovery that the death on the cross was actually to be regarded as a very meaningful event; even as something that happened '... according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God...' (Ac 2:23 - RSV). As such it came to occupy a very prominent place in the New Testament.

teaching concerning the accomplishments of Christ.

That the death of Christ is occupying a very prominent, yes even a central position in the Pauline epistles, can hardly be denied (cf Morris 1976:216-24). The prominence of this event, even in the apostle's preaching at large, is quite obvious from his statement in *1 Cor 2:2*, claiming that, while Paul was with the Corinthians, he had made up his mind '... to forget everything except Jesus Christ and especially his death on the cross' (cf GNB). Even though it might be true, as Pelser (1985:248) contends, that explicit references to Christ as a sacrifice (such as we find in Hebrews) are absent from the writings of Paul (cf also Käsemann 1971a:43), it can scarcely be doubted that Paul does indeed view the death of Christ as a sacrificial death (cf Ladd 1974:425). In any case there are quite a number of statements in Paul's letters which may, at the very least, be regarded as strong allusions to the sacrificial cult of the Old Testament (cf *Rm 3:25; 8:3; 1 Cor 5:7; 11:25; 2 Cor 5:14, 21; Gl 3:13; Eph 5:2*). All the references to the 'blood of Christ' may also be taken to fall within this category.

The main concern in drawing the death of Christ into the sphere of the cultic practices must certainly be the desire to highlight the *saving significance* of that death (cf Käsemann 1971a:43). Surely it is a commonplace to say that the sacrificial death was thought to possess *atoning* value (cf Vriezen 1970:261). For that reason it is rather obvious that, for those Jewish Christians, it would be the most natural thing to qualify the (rather unexpected?) death of Christ metaphorically in terms of an atoning sacrifice. It would not only make his death more acceptable - it would in fact underline its soteriological value as an *atonement for sins*. Seen in this light, even all those references in the writings of Paul containing the 'for us' (ὐπὲρ) motif will qualify for consideration within the present section (cf Goppelt 1982:92-98).

Moreover, one may even go further and argue that not only the cult proper, but also some of the ritual practices associated with the cult would lend themselves to a metaphorical application in the semantic field of "salvation". In other words, not only the sacrifice as such, but even some of the attending rites could afford the material

for the interpretation of the effects of the Christ event. Practices such as the consecration of the priests (by which they were sanctified for their particular task), as well as the rites of purification and anointing, could also become 'lenses' through which yet another perspective may be attained on the saving intervention of God through Christ and the Holy Spirit.

Of course it is to be understood that these soteriological metaphors from the cultic and ritual realm do not constitute the only possibility of looking at the death of Christ and its consequences. Although the idea of an atonement wrought by the death of Christ as a sacrifice has always enjoyed a rather prominent place in soteriology, it seems quite appropriate to say that it is but *one of the many ways* in which the apostle Paul is interpreting the benefits of the cross and resurrection of Christ (cf Fryer 1984:18).

### 5.3.1 Making atonement - the expiation of sin by way of sacrifice:

In paragraph 5.1.8 above the distinction between *reconciliation* and *atonement* was outlined in terms of their belonging to two different conceptual spheres. The former, we suggested, is a metaphor drawn from the sphere of social interaction, whereas the latter may be related to the cultic and ritual realm. The fact must evidently be recognised, however, that these terms have rarely been used so unambiguously; it is rather the case that they have often been used indistinctively (cf Fryer 1984:24-26; as a matter of fact, in Afrikaans, as in Dutch, there is only one translational substitute available for both of these, namely 'versoening'; it is therefore a little more difficult to give pointed expression to this distinction in these languages.) That this distinction is valid, though, can be maintained with a measure of confidence (cf also Roloff 1977:192).

In Paul's major epistles, then, the motif of *atonement* occurs prominently in the context of Romans 3:21-26, which is, by general consent, probably the most important passage in the entire letter to the Romans. It is namely containing the basic thesis (cf Käsemann 1974:85) of Paul's views regarding the justifying grace of God manifested in Christ and to be received through faith. The quintessence of God's justifying act

finds expression in the words of *Romans 3:24-25a*, stating that '... they are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, whom God put forward as an expiation by his blood, to be received by faith' (RSV). There seems to be a wide consensus that, in this statement of the ground of justification (cf Ladd 1974:448), Paul is using language that must certainly be interpreted against the background of the Old Testament sacrificial cult. Even Käsemann, who is convinced that no essential significance can be attributed to the theme of sacrifice as far as the Pauline writings are concerned (cf 1971a:43), has to admit that in this case the language is undeniably cultic (1974:91). According to him, of course, Paul is here appropriating traditional material of a Jewish-Christian origin, which he then supplements with his own commentary in verse 26 (1974:93). Whether this is indeed the case or not, the fact remains that a cultic perspective is utilised in the explanation of Paul's most characteristic soteriological metaphor, namely the justification by faith. Thus Paul is undoubtedly showing that this cultic motif is perfectly compatible with his own understanding of the heart of the gospel of "salvation".

However, the crucial question in this regard is of course the question as to the interpretation of *Romans 3:25a*, and more especially the interpretation of the key-word ἱλαστήριον (cf Cranfield 1975:208). By simply comparing the different translations of this lexical item in the different versions of the Bible (cf Fryer 1984:20-22), one may already get an idea of the wide range of possible interpretations. The following synopsis of the various translations (cf Fryer 1984:22) illustrates the point:

- \* Luther: Gnadenstuhl
- \* WB: Sühnopfer
- \* Afr (1953); St V: versoening; verzoening
- \* NBG: als zoenmiddel
- \* Afr (1983): as offer wat... versoening bewerk
- \* Rotherham: a propitiatory covering
- \* Conybeare: a propitiatory sacrifice
- \* AV, RV, NASB: a propitiation
- \* Philips(1947); Moffat (1964): the means of propitiation
- \* NIV: a sacrifice of atonement
- \* Montgomery: an offering of atonement
- \* LB: to take the punishment for our sins  
and to end all God's anger against us
- \* RSV: an expiation

- \* NEB: a means of expiation
- \* GNB: the means by which people's sins are forgiven
- \* Barclay: through whose sacrificial death sin can be forgiven
- \* JB: so as to win reconciliation
- \* TCNT: a means of reconciliation

In the main, it seems, all these alternatives may be reduced to three or four basic lines of interpretation. In the first place there are people who think, like Luther, that ἱλαστήριον should be understood in terms of the *kapporeṭ* or mercy-seat, which is so prominent in the proceedings of the Great Day of Atonement described in Leviticus 16 (cf Nygren 1949:156-8; Manson 1945:1-10; Goppelt 1982:95). In twenty-one of its twenty-seven occurrences in the LXX this word stands for the cover-seat of the Ark of the Covenant in the Holy of Holies in the temple (cf Cranfield 1975:214). As such it was the place where God manifested his glorious and gracious presence in Israel (Nygren, 1949: 157; Goppelt 1982:95); also the place where atonement was made for the sins of the people on the Day of Atonement. The possibility that Paul is here in Romans 3:25 thinking of Christ as the anti-type of the OT mercy-seat must obviously be taken seriously (cf Cranfield 1975:214). Nevertheless, on account of the fact that ἱλαστήριον is used without the article in this verse - in contrast to the way it is used in the LXX with reference to the mercy-seat - most commentators nowadays prefer to give a more general meaning to the term.

One such interpretation, which is perhaps all too vague, is to be recognised in those translations presenting ἱλαστήριον as either a means or a sacrifice of atonement or reconciliation. The term 'atonement', one may observe, is of such general application that it actually becomes patient of many different interpretations (cf Fryer 1984:24-5). And the same holds true even in the case of 'reconciliation'. In fact, the latter must be regarded as the more inappropriate, seeing that it does not necessarily include any semantic component related to the cultic and ritual realm. The former, on the other hand, does indeed convey such a component of meaning, but it is still in need of some further specification.

Specifying the meaning of atonement, one may proceed in two apparently

opposite directions, marked by the well-worn terms *propitiation* and *expiation*. Brown (1978:151) supplies the following definition of the distinction between these two diverging views of the atonement:

In propitiation the action is directed towards God or some other offended person. The underlying purpose is to change God's attitude from one of wrath to one of good will and favour. In the case of expiation, on the other hand, the action is directed towards that which has caused the breakdown in the relationship. ... In short, propitiation is directed towards the offended person, whereas expiation is concerned with nullifying the offensive act.

The case for understanding the Old Testament sacrifices in terms of expiation rather than propitiation has been strongly supported by people like Dodd (1931:352-60) and Von Rad (1962:270-1). The fact is emphasised that the sacrifice is not offered to God in order to allay his wrath; it is rather a case of making an appeal to Yahweh himself actively to effect the expiation by removing the guilt or defilement (cf Von Rad 1962:270; also Wiersinga 1972:41; cf also Grayston 1981:645 for a slightly different, but related view). Since God is also the Subject of the sentence in Romans 3:25a (He is the One who puts Christ forward as a ἱλαστήριον), many exegetes argue that Paul must have been thinking of expiation rather than propitiation (cf Newman & Nida 1973:68). The thought of God being appeased or placated, is found to be absent; in putting Christ forward as a ἱλαστήριον, God is not receiving anything, but is much rather actively involved in a saving event by which the human sin is conclusively removed (cf also Büchsel 1985:365).

On the other hand, there are quite a number of the more conservative scholars who still maintain the view that ἱλαστήριον is more appropriately understood in terms of propitiation. Morris, in particular, has shown rather decisively, '... that in many, if not all, of the passages in which ἱλάσκεισθαι or related words occur in the LXX the idea of God's wrath is present' (Cranfield 1975:215). This wrath, then, might be put away by the offering of the appropriate sacrifice; not because of the efficacy of the sacrifice in itself, but because God himself has ordained the sacrifice for that purpose by saying: 'For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it for you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that makes atonement, by reason of the life' (Lv 17:11 - RSV; cf Morris

1962:1046).

It has been demonstrated that even in the letter to the Romans Paul's statement about Christ as ἑλασθήριον comes in the context of '... the wrath of God, the guilt of sin, and the doom of death' (Ladd 1974: 430). From Romans 1:18 up to Romans 3:20 Paul is at pains to establish the fact that the whole world (Jews and Gentiles alike) is exposed to the judgement of God (cf Rm 3:19 - NEB). It would therefore be natural to suppose that, when Paul proceeds to the salvation wrought in Christ Jesus, he would also include an element showing how this wrath was averted (cf Morris 1962:1047).

It must evidently be stressed that Paul, as well as the authors of the Hebrew Old Testament and the LXX translators, are far removed from the crude pagan idea of propitiating a capricious and malevolent deity (cf Brown 1978:157). In fact, God himself is the One who initiates the atonement and who provides the means by which his anger against us may be ended (cf LB, Rm 3:25). The effects of sin could not be nullified in a quasi-mechanistic way by just resorting to the appropriate rite as a kind of an antidote. As Brown (1978:157) has rightly indicated,

There is a personal dimension which effects both the offending and the offended parties which means that, even where an offence has to be expiated, the action has to be taken because the personal relationship between the parties requires it.

It would be obstinate to deny the obvious fact of God's wrath upon evil in every shape and form. It therefore follows logically that the removal or expiation of sin will inevitably also involve the appeasement of propitiation of God. Barrett (1973:77-8) may thus be hitting the target with his comment on Romans 3:25, stating that,

We can hardly doubt (since Paul says that God set forth Christ in this capacity) that expiation rather than propitiation is in his mind; though it would be wrong to neglect the fact that expiation has, as it were, the effect of propitiation: the sin that might justly have excited God's wrath is expiated (at God's will), and therefore no longer does so.

Obviously there is a need, then, to say that expiation and propitiation do not necessarily stand in opposition. In speaking of expiation, one may include the thought of propitiation as one of the components of

meaning (even though it has to be admitted that those adhering to the view that Christ must be understood as an expiation, or rather as God's means of expiating sin, usually want to exclude the semantic component of propitiation). As far as the present dissertation is concerned, though, the term *expiation* is employed (also as the heading of the present section) without the 'liberal' connotation (cf Fryer 1984: 28) of an aversion for the idea of the wrath of God. Expiation is used rather than propitiation mainly because the former is more suitable in conveying the thought of *God's saving intervention* in putting Christ forward as ἰλαστήριον - which is undoubtedly the focus of Paul's argument in the context of Romans 3:21-26.

Furthermore, it seems necessary to make the implicit semantic component of Christ being presented as a *sacrifice* by which sins are expiated, explicit in the translation of ἰλαστήριον (cf Cranfield 1975:216-7; contra Fryer 1984:23). By the conspicuous mentioning of the blood of Christ (ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι) Paul himself is revealing that he is specifically thinking in terms of sacrifice (cf Ridderbos 1959:85; also Lekkerkerker 1971:151). Making this feature explicit, can therefore hardly cause a shift in the focus of the argument, as Fryer (1984: 23) is suggesting. It is rather bringing Paul's intention into sharper focus. Moreover, it is particularly important for the sake of underlining the metaphorical quality of the expression. The reader ought to be struck by the fact that God is here pictured as offering his own Son as a sacrifice by whose blood the expiation of sins was effected (also resulting in the propitiation of God himself) for those who believe (cf the translation of the NAB).

The translation of the *Good News Bible* ('God offered him, so that by his death he should become the means by which people's sins are forgiven through their faith in him') may be reproducing the essential semantic content of Romans 3:25a, but must nevertheless be regarded as insufficient, due to the fact that it is actually demetaphorising the original by avoiding the cultic terminology.

It is quite obvious that this metaphor too contains all the essential semantic features we have witnessed in the other soteriological metaphors hitherto considered. It is, once again, looking at the very same

divine activity from yet another perspective. The following componential analysis of this semantic unit establishes our contention:

- a) Someone commits an *offense*, thus becoming *guilty* and arousing the *anger* of the offended party;
- b) By the provision of the offended party a *sacrifice is offered* in order to restore the broken relationship;
- c) Consequently the guilt is taken to be obliterated (*expiated*), and the anger of the offended party is averted (*propitiated*).

Comparing these semantic components with the ones ascribed to the semantic unit *reconciliation* in paragraph 5.1.8 (p 160 above), their similarity is immediately apparent. In the present case, however, the whole situation is coloured by the inclusion of the idea of a sacrifice by which the restoration of the broken relationship is secured. Thus it is shown to have been drawn from a completely different semantic sphere (cf also Trench 1953:294-5).

Within this donor field it is associated with elements such as 'blood' and the ideas of representation and substitution (cf Morris 1962:109). When referring to the blood of Christ (Rm 3:25; 5:9; 1 Cor 10:16; also Eph 1:7; 2:13; Col 1:20), Paul is certainly thinking of life violently taken away, life offered in sacrifice (cf Ladd 1974:426; Morris 1976: 218-9).<sup>12)</sup> Referring to the death of Christ, the thought of it being a substitutionary sacrifice can often be clearly discerned (cf Pelser 1985:249). This is especially true of those Pauline texts in which Christ is said to have died *for us* (cf 2 Cor 5:14 in particular). Ladd (1974:426) remarks:

In such passages as II Corinthians 5:15, 'He died for all,' and Galatians 3:13 where it is said that Christ became a curse on our behalf, the idea of substitution is demanded and 'only violence to the context can get rid of it'.

Although all these aspects may serve to undergird the conclusions we have drawn from Romans 3:25a, the latter may obviously be taken as stating the essential soteriological significance of the death of Christ seen as a sacrifice. Of course, as such *ἑλαστίσιον* can hardly be classified as an event word, but in the sentence as a whole an event is signified in which God himself is offering Christ as a sacrifice

by whose blood (i.e. sacrificial death - cf NEB) atonement was made: sins were expiated, and God's own wrath was allayed. This, by all means, may be valued as a strikingly fresh metaphorical perspective on the "salvation" wrought in Christ.

### 5.3.2 Sanctification - set aside in order to belong to God:

It can scarcely be imagined that any dogmatist would seriously consider the possibility of treating *sanctification* as a soteriological metaphor. As it were, this term has acquired such a fixed position in the history of dogma as signifying the process of moral purification following the initial act of *justification* by God, that it might be difficult to see how one could ever regard it as being on a par with all these metaphors pertaining to "salvation". Yet there can be little doubt that this state of affairs may be counted as a telling example of the kind of theological fixation criticised in paragraph 1.1.1 above. One thing is for sure: no justice is done to the mind of *Saint* Paul if the soteriological significance of this thought-complex is disregarded.

Testing structural approaches to understanding the theology of the apostle Paul, Poythress (1981:167-74) has demonstrated (also with the help of the componential approach to meaning) the statistical preponderance of the combination of relational-cultic holiness with a past time factor. In other words, he shows that Paul is predominantly using the lexical item ἄγιος and its cognates with reference to a sanctifying experience (of a pre-ethical kind) that took place, so to speak, at the conversion (or justification!) of the sinner. The expression οἱ ἅγιοι, in particular, used as a designation of Christians, is one of Paul's favourites and must certainly be regarded as indicating a status acquired through believing in Christ, rather than an ethical qualification. All Christians are *saints* in Paul's opinion, not because of the high moral standard they have achieved, but simply because of their relation to Christ through the Holy Spirit.

It is therefore not strange to find that, in *1 Corinthians* 1:30 and 6:11, sanctification is used as a parallel to justification and even

redemption (ἀπολύτρωσις). From a prejudiced dogmatic point of view one may of course find it curious that justification is even preceded by sanctification in 1 Corinthians 6:11 (cf Morris 1958:98), but realising that Paul is much more free in the application of these currents of thought, it is obvious that Calvin (1960:126) is right in saying that the three verbal expressions in this verse are conveying only one idea, though from different angles. As with ἐδικαιώθητε, the passive ἡγιασθήτε also denotes an act of God himself whereby the sinner is set in a radically new relationship with the Holy One.

Says Barrett (1971b:142):

*You were sanctified* does not refer to the process of ethical development, or it could scarcely have preceded *you were justified*; it means rather, You were claimed by God as his own and made a member of his holy people - in Paul's language, a saint (ἅγιος).

At this point it is important to observe that there was a very close relation between holiness and the cult in the Old Testament. Even though it is evident that the sphere of the holy was wider than just the cult (cf Seebass 1976:224), it remains true that '...by far the most extensive occurrences of the (ἅγιος-) word group are to be found in the cultic, ritual texts...' (Seebass 1976:226). Everything belonging to the realm of the cultus was therefore also regarded as being holy (cf Seebass 1976:226), including the priests and their garments, all the objects involved in serving the cultus, as well as the numerous cultic and ritual practices.

It has often been suggested, as Trench (1953:331) is also doing, that the fundamental idea of this word group is that of separation, and, so to speak, consecration and devotion to the service of the Deity. Seebass, however, would rather see it as signifying the positive thought of encounter with God which inevitably demands certain modes of response (1976:224). The difference, one may feel, is not very significant. Essentially, it seems, it is a matter of being drawn in to the sphere of God's presence; it is to become associated with God himself. That, in turn, must of necessity give way to a separation from the world and its defilement. God himself, of course, is the Holy One par excellence; his holiness being the out-shining of all that He is, defining the contrast between the Divine and the human (cf Finlay-

son 1962:530, also Louw & Nida 1986:§88.24). To be associated with Him, then, is to enter into a sphere where the impurity of the world is out of place.

That the cult with all its accompaniments would also fall within this sphere needn't be proved. Being, as it is, the point of encounter between God and his people, it is self-evident that it would have to be in accordance with the character of God himself. It would have to be set apart from the world, and be dedicated and consecrated to God.

At the same time it is not difficult to see that this encounter and association with the holy God would inevitably also have some moral and ethical consequences (cf Trench 1953:331-2). Consecration in the cult could never be confined to purely ritualistic matters, but had to be concerned just as much with one's way of life (cf Seebass 1976: 225).

Returning to the letters of Paul, then, we find that even there this twofold application may be discerned (cf Walters 1962:1140). There are contexts in which the references to holiness and sanctification bear a decidedly cultic flavour; there are other contexts in which the ethical 'meaning' is obviously prevailing (cf Poythress 1981:115-20).<sup>13)</sup> It is in these cultic contexts, to be sure, that the semantic unit of *sanctification* is used as a soteriological metaphor. And in these contexts it is mainly the description of what may be qualified as a saving *event* that concerns us. In other words, we are not concerned with holiness as such, but very particularly with the event of sanctification.

*Romans 15:16* offers a striking example of the use of ἀγιάζω in the latter sense. The whole verse is saturated with cultic motifs (cf Jonker 1969:192-3). Paul is in fact depicting his entire ministry to the Gentiles in terms of the priestly service of the Old Testament, with himself acting as the priest who is presenting the heathen as an acceptable offering to God. The piling up of lexical units with an undeniable cultic reference, such as λειτουργός, ἱεραουργέω, ἡ προσφορά, εὐπρόσδεκτος, and ἀγιάζω, reveals the apostle's intention in an unmistakable way. He is deliberately creating a cultic atmosphere. No one would of course be misled to think that Paul's claim has to be

taken literally. It is quite obviously to be read as a metaphorical statement. It is one of the 'lenses' through which the apostolic ministry may be viewed.

In this context, then, of Paul's missionary enterprise among the Gentiles, the 'sacrifice' he is offering to God is qualified as '...sanctified by the Holy Spirit' (RSV). One is immediately struck by two things in connection with this qualification. On the one hand, one is reminded of the way in which the Old Testament sacrifices were dedicated to God; they were set aside to become God's - in that sense they became holy. Translations rendering ἡγιασμένην by either 'consecrated...' or 'dedicated...' point to this aspect (cf NEB, GNB). On the other hand, the pertinent mentioning of the Holy Spirit as the agent behind this act of consecration is also bound to catch the eye. It is thus marked as an event going beyond the external and the ritual. It is qualified as a divine act by which these Gentiles would be brought into the presence of the Holy One.

That this phrase may be interpreted as having reference to "salvation", should be accepted without argument. Though Poythress (1981:169) may be correct in classifying this verse as one of those instances where it is difficult to determine whether Paul has a past or a future experience in mind, since he seems to be treating the whole of Christian life and experience as a single unit, the very fact that it occurs in a 'missionary context' suggests that it is that 'Wende vom Unheil zum Heil' (Theissen 1974:282) that is contemplated.

This possibility is confirmed by the other texts we have already mentioned (1 Cor 1:30; 6:11). It is also expressed by *1 Corinthians 1:2, 14*) An overview of these references will also quickly show up some common elements. So, for instance, it is worth noting that the event of sanctification is more than once associated with the work of the Holy Spirit (Rm 15:16; 1 Cor 6:11; cf Seebass 1976:229-30). This work of the Spirit, nevertheless, cannot be isolated in the least from the achievements of Christ (cf 1 Cor 1:2, 30; 6:11). To be even more correct, one may claim that this saving event is actually the business of the triune God (cf also 1 Thess 5:23; §4.2.2 above). Most important is the fact that it is not a human achievement, but a divine provision

'in Christ' and through the Spirit (cf Berkouwer 1952:17-27).

Analysing this divine act, then, in terms of the components of meaning constituting the semantic unit *sanctification* in the cultic sphere, one may come to the following outline:

- a) Someone finds himself in the sphere of the *profane*;
- b) By an act of *consecration*, effected by God himself, the person is *separated* from the profane to be *transferred to the sphere of the Holy One*;
- c) As a result he may be regarded as *belonging to God*, and may therefore be *associated with God himself*;
- d) This must eventually also lead to *a life in accordance with the character of God*.

Using this meaning as a soteriological metaphor, the emphasis will evidently be placed on components b) and c) of the analysis above. These components of meaning may be conveyed by both the noun ἁγιασμός and the verb ἁγιάζω, functioning as event words. As has often been the case with these metaphors, it is not so easy to find a suitable translational equivalent. Although *consecration* and *dedication* may, to a certain extent, serve the purpose, in that they bring out one of the most essential semantic features in question, the traditional term *sanctification* may still be the most effective, seeing that it implies the cultic connection. On the other hand, if it is true that sanctification as a term is burdened by a certain dogmatic connotation, it may be preferable to choose *consecration*. The latter, anyhow, may also be said to maintain a special association with the cultic and ritual realm,<sup>15)</sup> and may therefore be able to keep the metaphor alive.

It is still to be emphasised that, in a given situation, component d) of the analysis above may be foregrounded. In such a case we approach the traditional understanding of sanctification as a matter of moral purification. That this is possible, is not quite so surprising. Poythress (1981:171) reminds us of the fact that even righteousness, which is so central in Pauline thought concerning "salvation", may be employed in a similar twofold way. He says:

... it is possible to classify occurrences of ἁγίος and its

derivatives in terms of the relational/ethical distinction, provided that we are willing to allow for some boundaryline or doubtful cases. The distinction is roughly analogous to the common distinction between the Christian's 'righteousness' as a forensic or God-ward relational matter on the one hand (Bultmann 1952:270-87), and as an ethical, behavioral matter on the other hand. ... An analogous distinction can be set up in the sphere of holiness, by distinguishing holiness as cultic status from holiness as a matter of behavior.

It may thus be concluded that, without denying the need for a continuous process of cleansing by the Holy Spirit, as sanctification is usually understood, a real profit is booked by realising that it could just as well be used in order to shed new light on that diamond of the divine "salvation". Being set aside in order to belong to God, is after all a very appropriate description of that wonderful turn-about God is accomplishing in our lives through Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit.

### 5.3.3 Washing - the dirt is removed:

Together with the reference to sanctification and justification, 1 *Corinthians* 6:11 also mentions *washing*. The attention has already been drawn to the fact that Calvin (1960:126) took the three verbal expressions in this verse as referring to one and the same idea, though from different angles. It must be noted, though, that, of the three verbs, the second and the third are in the passive voice (ἠγιάσθητε and ἐδικαιώθητε), while the first is in the middle voice (ἀπελούσασθε). Usually the middle voice is taken to denote an action performed with reference to the agent (cf Barrett 1971b:141) or else in the sense of 'to let oneself be...' (cf BDF §317). If such be the case, ἀπελούσασθε would have to be rendered as 'you got yourselves washed' (Morris 1958:97) or as 'you let yourselves be washed' (cf NAB: '...julle het julle sondes laat afwas').

However, Nunn (1969:64) points out that there is often little difference between the active and middle voices of a verb, and that one should therefore refrain from drawing too forceful conclusions from these differences. The middle can sometimes be used instead of the

active (cf BDF §316). Thus it seems possible to go along with Barrett (1971b:141) when he remarks that '...the passive form of the verb (λούειν and its compounds) is rare, and it is perhaps better to suppose that the middle is used for the passive...' This is in any case the way in which most of the modern translations are rendering this verb, namely as an equivalent to the other two verbs in the Aorist passive (cf NIV, NASB, RSV, GNB, NEB). Whatever the case, it is clear that in 1 Corinthians 6:11 Paul is not thinking of the Christians as washing themselves, but rather as having been washed by someone else - presumably God.

This event of washing, which the Corinthian Christians had experienced at a particular occasion (cf Beasley-Murray 1975:152 for the interpretation of the aorist), is mostly identified with baptism (cf Ac 22:16; Grosheide 1953:141; Oepke 1985:539). It is important, nevertheless, to qualify this identification, as is done by Barrett (1971b:141), saying:

In the present verse the reference to *the name of the Lord Jesus Christ* makes it probable that baptism is in mind, though the use of the non-technical word (when 'you were baptized', ἐβαπτίσθητε, would have been as easy to use) shows that it is the inward meaning rather than the outward circumstances of the rite that is important to Paul.

In this regard one must keep the fact in mind that λούω and its compounds were commonly used for taking a bath, generally indicating the washing of the whole body, in contrast to νύπτω which is used for washing parts of the body, and πλύω which is used of inanimate objects, especially clothes (Beasley-Murray 1975:150). And according to Beasley-Murray (1975:150-1) ἀπολούω (which is used here in 1 Cor 6:11), '... is a strengthened form of λουῶ, having the same meaning but stressing the removal of dirt.'

In the Old Testament (and even in the pagan cults), however, λούω is also employed with reference to ritual purification (Oepke 1985:538). In this connection ἀπολούω is rarely used, but later on it becomes Josephus' favourite term for ritual washing (cf Beasley-Murray 1975:151). In these instances the rite is obviously thought to purge and to purify the ritually unclean; through the ritual washing the 'dirt' is removed.

Of course they also realised well enough that this purification was achieved, not just by the ritual water, but actually by the spiritual cleansing coming from God himself (cf Ezk 36:25; Zch 13:1). After all, the dirt involved was not just a physical stain. It could therefore not be removed by mere external means, as Jesus had to remind the people of his time by his sharp protest against confusing ritual and moral purity and against trust in external observances (Mk 7; cf Oepke 1985:539).

This fact does not invalidate the symbolical significance of these ritual practices, however, as one may also infer from the instituting of baptism by Jesus himself as the 'rite' marking the forgiveness (purging) of sins by virtue of which one may become a member of the new Messianic community. Thus Paul would also be fully justified in using the idea of a ritual washing as a metaphor expressing the spiritual reality of Christ and the Spirit purifying us from the 'dirt' of sin. As Beasley-Murray (1975:152) has stated, 'The traditional association of these terms with cleansing through ablution emphasises the symbolism of washing away sins in baptism.'

In this case the following semantic components may be discerned (with reference, of course, to the donor field in question):

- a) Someone happens to be *ritually unclean*;
- b) By the act of *washing*, symbolic of *God's cleansing power*, the person is *purified*;
- c) Thus he is qualified, once again, for the *communion with God* in the cult.

In order to facilitate the metaphorical interaction between these features of meaning functioning in the donor field and the meaning to be conveyed in the recipient field of "salvation", the translation presented by the *New English Bible* may prove to be quite useful. It renders ἀπελούσασθε as, 'you have been through the purifying waters.' With this rendering the essential link with the ritual washing is maintained, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, the purifying and cleansing work of Christ and the Holy Spirit in relation to the defilement of sin as experienced in baptism simultaneously comes into view.

#### 5.3.4 Anointing - qualification for a new status:

As the saving event involved in baptism may be described in terms of *washing*, so it may also be depicted with reference to *anointing* and *sealing* (the latter will soon be discussed in the section dealing with soteriological metaphors from the technical sphere of life). As with the metaphor of washing, sealing and anointing also occur but once in Paul's major epistles. The relevant text, namely *2 Corinthians 1:21-22*, is generally acknowledged as a baptismal reference (cf Grosheide 1959:62; Tasker 1958:49; Müller 1975:123; Grundmann 1985:1332), but then with special emphasis on baptism as an event in which the believer is bestowed with the Holy Spirit (cf Jager 1974b:32; Groenewald 1967:29). Thus Barrett (1973:81) can even go to the point of concluding that the passage '... refers more probably to the whole complex of their entry into the Christian life - conversion, faith, baptism, the reception of the Spirit.'

*Anointing* as such would naturally be closely associated with the reception of the Spirit (cf Müller 1975:122; Barrett 1973:79). Even in the Old Testament it had come to be used as a metaphor pointing to the Holy Spirit as equipping kings and priests for their special task (cf Is 61:1; Grosheide 1959:61). In this regard Kruger (1984:110) characterises the anointing in the following way:

Deur die unieke verbinding van salwing met die Gees van die Here (La Sor, Hubbard & Bush 1982:387, 388), word die teenwoordigheid van Jahwe beklemtoon, asook die dinamiese werksaamheid van God met daarby die aksent op die afsondering, toerusting en verantwoordelikheid van dié Gesant (Odendaal 1982:9).

This remark shows that the significance of anointing needn't be limited to the aspect of a commission (cf 2 Cor 1:21 - RSV) with the attending equipment, but may even be taken to include the semantic feature of being set aside as belonging to God (cf 2 Cor 1:21 - NAB; Tasker 1958:48). The last element, to be sure, can be traced in the context of 2 Corinthians 1:21-22, where anointing is used in association with sealing (indicating the application of the *mark of ownership*) and the receiving of the Spirit as *guarantee* (ἀρραβών - i.e. the first instalment of the full salvation to be received, serving as an assurance of the fact that the remainder is definitely forthcoming).

Therefore it is also more likely that Paul is here referring to the anointing of all Christians, and not just to that by which he himself was commissioned and equipped as an apostle (cf Tasker 1958:48).

Although some exegetes have found evidence in this verse for the existence of a sacramental act of anointing before baptism, as part of the baptismal ceremony (cf Müller 1975:123), it is rather obvious that it should be read as a metaphorical statement. As Grundmann (1985:1332) has suggested,

Its sense is transferred; it denotes the appropriating to Christ that baptism signifies and seals, that the Spirit renders efficacious, and that God himself confirms.

As such, one may venture to say, it has a definite affinity with the anointing of the priests in the Old Testament. Qualifying the ritual procedure of anointing as a process of desecularisation and sanctification, Müller (1975:122), in a very illuminating remark, provides the following description of the rite and its meaning:

This anointing took place during the 7-day-long consecration of the priests, after the preparation of the sacrifice (Exod. 29:1-3), the ritual cleansing (Exod. 29:4) and the enrobing (Exod. 29:5f.) at the entrance of the sanctuary (Exod. 29:7; cf. 28:41; 29:29; 40:13; Lev. 4:3). The anointing made the priests sacrosanct. It separated them from the sphere of the unclean.

Seen in this light, and keeping the other soteriological metaphors from the cultic and ritual realm in mind, one need not be very imaginative in order to see that even anointing is employed by Paul as a metaphor depicting an act of God whereby one is introduced to a new status. This conclusion may be underlined by the following analysis of the components of meaning involved in the semantic unit *anointing*, as it is functioning in the donor field of ritual procedures:

- a) Someone finds himself in the sphere of the *ordinary* (or the secular);
- b) By the act of *anointing*, symbolic of the *bestowal of God's Spirit*, the person is introduced to a *new status*;
- c) The primary result of this event, then, is that of *being set apart for God* (i.e. a new relation to God);
- d) At the same time it also involves the idea of *being qualified and equipped for a special task*.

By stressing component c) of the above analysis, some translations (like GNB, NAB) succeed in bringing out the soteriological significance of Paul's reference to anointing (cf GNB: 'it is God himself who has set us apart'), but in the process the metaphor itself is abandoned. It is obviously required, however, that the first should be included without omitting the second. This may perhaps be accomplished by rendering the phrase (in line with the GNB) as, 'God himself has anointed us to be his own'. Such a translation would neatly comply with the following phrase, which may then be added in the form of the participle (i.e. '... placing his mark of ownership upon us...'). Thus one could provide a clue to the reader that he should be thinking of God's saving action, but he should do so in terms of the ritual practice of anointing!

#### 5.4 Soteriological metaphors from the technical sphere of life:

On first thoughts, one may tend to think that the technical sphere of life is inappropriate as a source of soteriological metaphors. After all, in his saving activities God is concerned with human beings; that is to say, beings whom God himself has created to be responsible. Therefore, even God himself cannot just treat them as mere objects; they are bound to *respond*, and this response ought to be incalculated in the consideration of God's activities.

In the technical sphere of life, however, this aspect seems to be excluded. Here we find ourselves in the sphere of *things* rather than *persons*, of *technique* rather than *relationships*. Here no real response is expected from the object which is being handled. It all depends on the skills of the one who is performing the action.

Notwithstanding this observation, it cannot be denied that Paul (and other New Testament authors) does sometimes turn to this source for metaphors capable of illuminating the "salvation" wrought by God. Even if it is true that these metaphors are relatively scarce (probably for the reason given above), and that the strictly technical aspects are adjusted to fit the human subjects to which they are

applied (cf 1 Pt 2:5), it must nevertheless be maintained that they do occur, and that they serve to present that "salvation" from yet another perspective. Of course, it needs to be emphasised, once again, that one would certainly misinterpret Paul if his whole soteriology were to depend on only this perspective. Ever since the beginning of this study it has been our aim to demonstrate that Paul's soteriological thinking should not be too narrowly tied up with any one metaphor, but should rather be sought in the picture emerging from the totality of all his metaphors in their mutual relationship (cf Theissen 1974:284). In other words, Paul could use certain metaphors that would be unacceptable in isolation, but could nevertheless become acceptable when seen in its relation to all the other metaphors interpreting the very same reality. In fact, these seemingly 'one-sided' metaphors may actually serve to emphasise a particular aspect of the same old issue in a rather forceful way by just looking at it from a different perspective (cf Smit 1983:15).

The soteriological metaphors from the technical sphere of life, it seems, are mainly putting the spotlight on the absolute priority of divine grace in the whole event of "salvation" - to the extent that it appears to exclude any human involvement or response. In certain circumstances such an accent may evidently be required, on condition that it should never be absolutised. With Paul, in any case, the proper balance is restored by the numerous other metaphors he employs.

#### 5.4.1 Sealing - the mark of ownership:

Closely related with the metaphor of *anointing* mentioned in 2 Corinthians 1:21, we find a reference to *sealing* in 2 Corinthians 1:22. Without hesitation we may claim that these two should be regarded as equivalent ways of describing the same event, rather than as subsequent events in a particular process (cf De Boer 1972:47-8). Not only do they both have God as the direct Subject of the event involved, but in both cases the Holy Spirit is also intimately linked up with the whole affair (cf §5.3.4 above; also Eph 1:13; 4:30). It is namely by receiving the Holy Spirit as ἁγιασμός that they are sealed, just as the anointing also takes place in the reception of the Spirit (cf

Groenewald 1967:29). The difference between them is therefore basically to be found in the fact that they are metaphors drawn from different spheres of life. Whereas the first comes from the ritual realm, the second has its origin in a more technical sphere.

No doubt the seal had various functions at the time (cf Lyall 1984: 148). Paul himself was in fact also using it in more than one way (cf Schippers 1978:499-500). In 2 Corinthians 1:22, however, it is obviously a case of '...God's making believers his inviolable possession' (Fitzer 1985:1128; cf also Schippers 1978:499). Here Paul is stating that God has placed (aor part) his seal, that is, his mark of ownership, upon them, thereby claiming and identifying them as his own possession. By receiving the Holy Spirit, the believer is marked as belonging to God (cf Rm 8:9)!

Although this meaning has been qualified as a 'mercantile image' (Lyall 1984:148-52) and as a 'commercial metaphor' (Barrett 1973:79), in which the legal aspect is prominent (Schippers 1978:497), it seems preferable, in the present context, to put the stress on the technical side of the issue. This I maintain notwithstanding the fact that Horowitz has tried to prove that sealing really meant attestation of a deed by a witness and not the actual use of a seal (cf Lyall 1984: 148). That sealing could be used in the meaning proposed by Horowitz, cannot be denied, but it can neither be denied that, in a time when reading and writing were not general accomplishments (cf Lyall 1984: 148), there would be a need for the actual use of a seal. Surely this need is all the more obvious in the case where the idea of sealing was used to establish and to indicate ownership. As such it was applied to non-living things, but also to animals and even slaves (cf Schippers 1978:497).

When Paul is saying, then, that God has put his seal upon the believer, it actually conjures the vivid picture of a visible mark being placed on the owner's possession. Such a possession, of course, would not have much of a choice in the matter; it was on the receiving end of an act in which the owner was establishing his ownership by the application of 'technical' means. The following componential analysis emerges from this picture:

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- a) Someone *acquires possession* of something or someone else (like a slave);
- b) By the *impression of the owner's seal*, that property is marked as belonging to the particular person;
- c) This mark may also serve to indicate that *the transaction* (by which possession was acquired) *has been legally established*, and thus it may act as an *authentication*.

In 2 Corinthians 1:22, for sure, the emphasis lies with components a) and b) of the above analysis. (In other contexts, such as 1 Cor 9:2, the accent is shifted to the third component, which is only an inferential feature of the meaning used in 2 Cor 1:22). By stressing the first two components, this meaning certainly offers an excellent perspective on "salvation". As suggested in connection with the soteriological metaphors from the technical sphere of life in general, the spotlight is here also fixed on God's act of appropriating someone for himself, sealing and marking that person as his own property by granting him the Spirit to stay in his heart. Man's assurance is therefore not dependent on human achievements, but on God's deeds - an element which is of the utmost importance in the pericope as a whole.

#### 5.4.2 Building - bricks (stones) laid in the erecting of a new edifice:

In Paul's major epistles the metaphor of *building* is not really developed as a soteriological metaphor. It does occur, though, in the form of the statement in *1 Corinthians 3:9*, characterising the congregation in Corinth as 'God's building' (θεοῦ οἰκοδομῆ ἐστε). This expression, admittedly, is patient of at least two diverging interpretations (cf Jager 1974a:69; Morris 1958:66). In semantic terms we may say that οἰκοδομῆ could either function as an object word or as an event word; it may signify either the edifice itself or the process of erection. Even though several exegetes feel that the first possibility should be regarded as the more probable one (cf Barrett 1971b:86; Jager 1974a:69), there is no strong objection against the second possibility. And in the light of Paul's argument in *Ephesians 2:20-22* it is certainly not unlikely that he could have been using

οἰκοδομή as a *nomen actionis*, even in 1 Corinthians 3:9. As such it would in any case fit in quite well with the general trend of the pericope in question. After all, in 1 Corinthians 3:5-9 Paul is basically arguing that the existence of the congregation does not depend on the activity of the human ministers among them, but rather on the active involvement of God himself. God's fellow-workers (cf vs 9) have their part to play: they are planting the seed and watering the plants, but ultimately it is God who makes the plants grow (cf vs 6-7). Similarly, Paul may present himself - and his co-workers - as master-builders, while God is in reality the One who is erecting the building through their agency.

Seen against this background, θεοῦ οἰκοδομή may indeed be taken to signify the event of a building being erected by God. Thus, as Grosheide (1953:83) suggests, the word 'building' (οἰκοδομή) actually '...implies the thought of a slowly rising edifice in which stone is joined to stone....' Integrated in this view is the notion of *bricklaying*, being the process through which the master-builder is erecting the building. This notion, one may establish, is quite a useful metaphor, not only in the sphere of ecclesiology, but also in the field of soteriology. Not only does it point to the essential unity and fellowship of those who are built on the one and only foundation, Jesus Christ (cf 1 Cor 3:11), but also to the way in which God himself is adding the believers one by one to this 'slowly rising edifice'.

True enough, in 1 Corinthians 3 the metaphor is not developed in this direction. There is of course a suggestion of some kind of bricklaying, but the focus is not on God's work, but rather on that of his 'fellow-workers', and the purpose is parnetic rather than interpretative. The warning not to build with wood, hay or straw, for instance, evidently has no bearing whatsoever on the work of God as master-builder.

That Paul may nevertheless think in such terms of God's work too, is confirmed by *Ephesians* 2:20-22. The use of the passive in verses 20 and 22 (ἐποικοδομηθέντες, συνοικοδομηθήσεθε) obviously points to God as the builder (cf Barth 1974:271). With reference to individuals the work of construction may be treated as a past event (cf the aor part pass in vs 20 - as bricks they *were* built on the foundation of the

apostles and prophets); as far as the church as a whole is concerned, the construction work is still being continued (vs 22 - they *are being* built together to become a dwelling in which God lives by his Spirit - cf NIV). In this connection Barth (1974:320) remarks that, 'Unlike 1 Peter 2:5 the saints are not called "living stones" in Eph 2:22, but the same metaphor is presupposed.' And, as far as 1 Peter 2:5 is concerned, there can be little doubt that the event envisaged in this metaphor is akin to that decisive intervention of God, described as a transfer from darkness to light in 1 Peter 2:9. Expounding this verse (vs 5), Stibbs (1959:99) therefore presents the following postulation:

Talking metaphorically those who acknowledge Christ as the exalted stone themselves become, by reason of their relation to Him, *as lively* (RV 'living') *stones* to be built into God's house. Here Peter is expounding truth to which his Christian name 'Peter' (i.e. 'a stone') testified, and truth which he had learnt from the Lord Himself. It was when Simon similarly acknowledged Jesus as God's Christ, that Jesus in effect had said to him: 'Now you are a stone; and I want many similar stones, because I intend with them to build a Church; and to build it upon, or in relation to, Myself, thus confessed as Christ, as the basic Rock or unifying chief cornerstone (see Mt. xvi. 15-18).

The fact that Peter is speaking of *living* stones (λίθοι ζῶντες) is surely eye catching. The unexpected turn in the expression (ordinary stones are not alive!) draws the attention to its metaphorical character, but at the same time also reveals that, as a reference to human beings, this metaphor from the technical sphere of life must be adjusted to incorporate human traits. Therefore these 'stones' may also be called to come and let themselves be built into a spiritual temple (cf the NEB rendering of vs 5). In other words, they are not mere bricks in the hands of the Builder; they are *living stones*, with the capacity of approaching the Builder! But then, eventually, it is the Great Bricklayer who picks them up, and lays them in their proper place!

This act of *building*, expressed by the verb οἰκοδομέω and its compounds, as well as by the noun οἰκοδομή, obviously contracts the following semantic components:

- a) The builder makes use of some *basic bricks or stones*;

- b) In the act of *construction*, these are *added together one by one*, using some binding material;
- c) The construction work is aimed at *the erection of a new edifice*, which someone may eventually use as a *dwelling place*.

Looking at God's saving work through this lens, one is struck, once again, by the fact that it may also be seen as a community-constituting affair (cf §§5.2.6 and 5.2.7 above). In the present case that decisive intervention of God in Christ is envisaged as having the effect of constituting the individual believer (the living stones) as part of that new temple in which God himself is residing in the Person of the Holy Spirit (cf 1 Cor 3:16; Eph 2:22). That this act of God, as the 'Bricklayer', has soteriological significance, can hardly be denied (cf Louw, D J 1985:30; Theron 1978:43-7).

#### 5.4.3 Moulding - clay shaped in the hands of the potter:

Although Braun (1985:863) is of the opinion that the reference to the potter's moulding in *Romans 9:20-21* does not really concern God's saving action in history or his new and spiritual creation, that possibility cannot be ruled out so easily (cf §5.1.13 above for a brief analysis of the context in which these verses appear, proving that the idea of "salvation" does in fact occur in the vicinity). As for these verses in particular, it is of course true that the emphasis is on the sovereignty of God in dealing with his creation (cf also Lane 1978:912), but this sovereignty, then, is also revealed in his saving actions. Confirmation for such a claim may be derived from the observation that there are echoes of Isaiah 29:16 and 45:9-10 in these verses (cf Barrett 1971a:188). In these Isaianic portions (specifically the latter) the divine sovereignty undoubtedly has a direct bearing on salvation (cf Braun 1985:863). The point is namely that, because God is acting as the Sovereign in saving his people by using Cyrus as an instrument, He may not be criticised - not by his own people (cf Young 1972:203) nor by humanity at large (cf Beuken 1979:241). The righteousness and salvation *created* by God (cf Is 45:8 - LXX: ἐγὼ εἶμι κύριος ὁ κτίσας σέ), and therefore not to be compared with human achievements (cf Beuken 1979:240), stand above re-

proach. It would be as absurd for human beings to complain about the way God is saving them, as it would be for a lump of clay to protest against the shape it acquires in the hands of the potter.

As the other soteriological metaphors from the technical sphere, this image is also not wholly suitable for the expression of all the different aspects involved in the saving event. Nevertheless, if "salvation" may be described in terms of a new creation (cf §5.2.3 above), the potter's handiwork, being a creative production, could just as well serve to interpret the same. The likelihood of this view is enhanced if we (with Jonker 1969:137) equate the clay with sinful man. In his comments on Romans 9:20-21 Jonker resolves:

Ook hier moet ons weer eens onthou dat die *klei* waarvan hier sprake is, die *sondige mens* is. Die sonde is nooit weg te dink uit die verhouding tussen God en mens en uit die optrede van die pottebakker met die weerbarstige klei nie, soos die Ou-Testamentiese gebruik van dié beeld oorfloediglik bewys. Juis daarom is die verwyte, dat God onregverdig sou handel of skuld sou hê aan die mens se sonde, heeltemal misplaas. God het mag om Sy guns te bewys aan wie Hy wil en te onthou van wie Hy wil, sonder dat iemand Hom daarvoor mag verwyte.

Seen in this light, the metaphor of the potter is highlighting the activity of God by which a sinner may be shaped into 'a vessel for honorable use' (cf NASB). In this sovereign power (cf ἐξουσία in vs 21) God is moulding that lump of clay into the form He desires; He transforms the shapeless mass into a 'vessel for beauty' (RSV), a thing to be treasured (NEB). Thus the categories of creation come to be applied even in the field of soteriology (cf Theron 1978:64). The change accomplished in the life of the sinner is so profound that the creative work of art performed by the potter can easily become its counterfoil. Moreover, this change is so deeply determined by the mercy of God that it may fairly be matched with the freedom the potter is exercising in the creation of his pottery.

The semantic unit of *moulding*, then, ostensibly incurs the following components of meaning:

- a) The potter avails himself of a *lump of clay*;
- b) By an *act of creation* this clay is *shaped* according to the potter's desire;

- c) The completed product may eventually *be put to the use* for which it was designed.

Of course God does not treat man as a mere object to be shaped under his transforming power. Yet, in order to show just how much we depend upon God's mercy, the potter's act of creation may well serve as a metaphor revealing a particular perspective on God's multi-faceted work of "salvation".

#### 5.4.4 Clothing - the old garment is replaced by a new one:

It may be taken for granted that the event of *clothing* is also utilised by Paul in the function of a soteriological metaphor (cf Bruce 1982:186; Schlier 1971:173; Hanhart 1969:451). This assumption is even relatively unproblematic in the case of *Galatians 3:27*, where the idea of *putting on* Christ is directly connected to baptism as the event of incorporation into Christ (cf §5.2.6 above).<sup>16)</sup> Quoting Dunn, Bruce (1982:186) affirms that '..."to put on Christ" is simply a figurative usage to describe more expressively the spiritual transformation which makes one a Christian.'

As Schlier (1971:173) has indicated, it must of course be remembered that Paul often employs the lexical unit ἐνδύεσθαι in paranetical contexts in the form of an imperative. Thus the believers are urged in *Romans 13:12-14* to put on the armour of light (τὰ ὅπλα τοῦ φωτός), as well as the Lord Jesus Christ; in *Ephesians 4:24* to put on the new man (τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον); and in *Ephesians 6:11ff* to clothe themselves in the whole armour of God (τὴν πανοπλίαν τοῦ θεοῦ). But, says Schlier (1971:174),

... es ist bezeichnend, das der καινὸς ἄνθρωπος, den man anziehen soll, eben der ist, der schon nach Gott geschaffen ist, so wie auch der παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος, den man ablegen soll, in der Taufe schon mitgekreuzigt ist (Röm 6:6).

In other words, it is again a case of an 'indicative/imperative oscillation' (Bruce 1982:186) - a phenomenon which may actually be regarded as a characteristic Pauline feature (cf Pelser 1985:259). 'In Christ' the believer is already participating in the new age of

salvation, on the one hand, while on the other hand, he is still engaged in a battle with the forces of the old evil age, so that he must continuously re-endorse that victory which has already been accomplished 'in Christ'. Thus, as Käsemann (1974:167) suggests, the imperative is actually integrated with the indicative, seeing that the latter in reality involves being brought into the sphere of power where Christ is ruling as Lord, while the former may be understood as a call to sustain this stand under reign of Christ, the Lord. In the words of Käsemann himself:

Was man 'Ethik' zu nennen pflegt, übergreift das Feld des Moralischen, so gewiss es sich auch darin äussert, weil Sünde für Pls zwar moralische Folgen hat, jedoch kein moralisches Phänomen ist. Widerstand gegen ihre Macht und deren Überwindung hängt davon ab, dass Christus der Kyrios über uns bleibt, als der er sich in der Taufe uns mitgeteilt hat. Der sogenannte Imperativ ist in den Indikativ integriert und steht keineswegs paradox neben ihm, weil der Kyrios nur für den ihm Dienenden Kyrios bleibt. Gabe und Aufgabe fallen darin zusammen, dass sie den Stand unter der Herrschaft Christi bezeichnen, ....

In this light it is evident that one need not be perplexed by the apparent paradox between *Ephesians 4:22-24* (where the putting off of the old man and the putting on of the new man is taken to be the abiding obligation of the Christian) and *Colossians 3:9-10* (where the same 'change of clothes' is viewed as a past experience by virtue of which one is counted as a Christian). Obviously the imperative of the former is grounded in and integrated with the indicative of the latter. The former is drawing out the ethical consequences of the soteriological event described in the latter. Moreover, it may also be maintained, with Ridderbos (1975:63-4; 1960:211-12), that the *παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος* and the *νέος ἄνθρωπος* should be interpreted, not as individual categories, but rather as supra-individual, redemptive-historical, eschatological frames of mind. That would imply that *Colossians 3:9-10* should not just be read in terms of the putting off of the old *nature* (or *self*) and of having been clothed in a new *nature* (or *self*), as most of the English versions of the Bible have it, but rather in terms of the *old man* and the *new man* as collective entities, of whom it may be said that they share in Christ's own death and resurrection (cf *Col 2:20; 3:1; Rm 6:5-6*). In other words, being 'in Christ', the old man is put off together 'with Christ' (in his death on the cross), as the new man is then also put on 'with Christ' (in his resurrection).

Baptism then serves as the sacramental representation of this redemptive-historical event.

Thus we again come in the close vicinity of *Galatians 3:27*. Against the background provided above, one may feel justified in claiming that it is indeed the new status, the new order of existence 'in Christ Jesus', that is emphasised in this verse (Bruce 1982:186). Here 'To put on Christ' is not just a matter of displaying a new mode of conduct (as if covering ourselves in a new overcoat); it is rather a case of one's whole mode of existence being changed. We may therefore agree with Schlier (1971:173) when he states:

Als summarischen Ausdruck für das mittels der Taufe geschene intensive Eingehen in das neue Sein gebraucht Paulus hier den Begriff ἐνδύεσθαι.

The vividness of this figure may perhaps stand out even more clearly when one comes to realise that it is also used in *1 Corinthians 15:53* with reference to the change that will take place in the final resurrection. Stating that, 'This perishable being must be clothed with the imperishable, and what is mortal must be clothed with immortality' (NEB), Paul could certainly not have thought of the change as a matter of covering the perishable with the imperishable, and the mortal with immortality (cf Grosheide 1953:393). It is obviously impossible for these two states to co-exist; it is a radical and profound change from the one to the other. And yet the metaphor of clothing might have been chosen by Paul with the particular purpose of expressing the identity between the earthly body and the resurrection body (cf Calvin 1960: 344; Grosheide 1953:393). That is to say, even here ἐνδύεσθαι serves to express the thought of a radical transformation from our old mode of existence to a completely new and different one - without, of course, becoming a different person altogether.

It is very interesting, then, to notice that Hanhart (1969:451) is suggesting a remarkably similar interpretation for the use of the compound ἐπενδύεσθαι in *2 Corinthians 5:1-5*. His conclusion is the following:

The arresting use of the preposition ἐπί in ἐπενδύεσθαι does not therefore refer to the putting on of a new heavenly *body* over the old one like a pull-over or a topcoat, as if Paul indeed was trying to solve an anthropological puzzle of the afterlife. Rather,

it refers to receiving a *new mode of existence*, the nature of which is glorious and beyond imagination (4:17). (Italics mine).

It must be stressed, of course, that according to Hanhart (1969:447), this passage is not concerned with the final resurrection, but rather with the individual believer's departure from this life (cf also Grosheide 1959:140). Therefore he shuns the popular view that Paul is here expressing the desire that the resurrection may occur in his own lifetime, so that he may have his heavenly body put on over the present one. Such a view is founded on the assumption that Paul is either combatting a Gnostic group in Corinth, according to whom the state of nakedness, where the soul is rid of the body (cf γυμνός in vs 3), is desirable, or he is, as a full-blooded Jew, just dreading the so-called intermediate state of a bodiless existence (cf Weigelt 1975: 315; Barrett 1973:153-4). However, it seems more plausible to accept that verse 3 has nothing to do with the intermediate, bodiless state, or with the state of the naked soul. With Ellis (cf Hanhart 1969:447) it should rather be accepted that γυμνός and ἐκδύω in verses 3 and 4 have the judgment scene in view (cf also De Boor 1972:120). In that context 'to be found naked' would imply being put to shame because of a barren, fruitless ministry (cf Hanhart 1969:456). Verse 3 may then be taken as an expression of Paul's confidence of not being in danger to be found naked. The phrase εἰ γε καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι serves here as the basis for this confidence, so that Hanhart (1969:455) may propose the following translation of verse 3: '... if indeed we shall not be found naked, since we have (already) been clothed.' The aorist participle ἐνδυσάμενοι is thus taken to refer to the Christian's life *before death*, that is, the life of the Spirit, which is received at the baptism 'into Christ' (cf Gl 3:27; Grosheide 1959:144-5). This interpretation leads Hanhart (1969:455) to the conclusion that,

... vs 3 does not deal with an eschatological detail but reflects the major theme of Paul's message: that of justification and sanctification.

In distinction from ἐνδυσάμενοι, the use of ἐπενδύσασθαι in verses 2 and 4 may then be regarded as an expression of Paul's confidence that he will receive the *full measure* of the life he already possesses 'in Christ' after his death.

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It is in any case clear that in all these instances Paul is using the metaphor of *clothing* in order to describe the decisive transformation we undergo from our old mode of existence to a completely new one. Though the act of being clothed may seem to be something purely external when conceived in a 'technical' sense (as we propose to do by treating it in the present context), the particular 'garment' in which we are clothed is so encompassing that it actually colours one's whole existence! This is the more obvious when one realises that it is in fact God himself who is clothing us with Jesus Christ, with the new man, with the life of the Spirit in its fullness, and eventually with the imperishable and with immortality. Without this 'new garment', one will be found naked before the judgment seat of Christ (cf 2 Cor 5:10). And, for that matter, those who are still wearing the old garment (the *παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος*), will also be as good as naked before the searching eye of God!

Obviously the semantic unit of *clothing* (as a 'technical' event) may be analysed into the following components of meaning:

- a) Someone is found to be either *naked* or as *wearing an old garment*;
- b) Taking off the old garment, the person is *clothed in a new outfit*;
- c) As a result his whole *appearance is transformed*.

Viewing God's saving action through this lens, one is once more brought to the realisation that it is indeed a diamond reflecting a new splendour from every angle you look at it! That we '*... are clothed, so to speak, with the life of Christ himself*' (cf Gl 3:27 - GNB), is of course something to marvel at. It is none but thrilling to think of "salvation" in terms of being enfolded by Christ himself - to such an extent that one's entire mode of existence is radically changed! Even in this life, but still more fully in the next.

ENDNOTES.

1. Nida (1975a:156-9) outlines the following five steps of procedure in transferring the meaning of a particular sentence from a source language to a receptor language (in other words, in making a dynamic equivalent translation):
  - a) Analyze the formal grammatical structure in terms of the sets of immediate constituents comprising the constructions;
  - b) Determine the semantic class or classes in each word or lexical unit;
  - c) Add to the text all the objects, events, abstracts or relationals which are clearly implied by, but not explicitly indicated in the text;
  - d) 'Decompose' the text into its semantically simplest form;
  - e) 'Recompose' this simplest form of the text into an appropriate equivalent in the receptor language.
  
2. By the kind favour of one of the editors of this new lexicon, Prof J P Louw, some of the proof texts have been made available to me. According to Prof Louw the lexicon will appear during 1986 under the following title: *A Greek-English lexicon of the New Testament based on semantic domains*. It is edited by J P Louw and E A Nida, with the assistance of K Munson and R Smith, and will be published by the Bible Society in Cape Town. References to this lexicon in the present dissertation will be handled as in the following example: (Louw & Nida 1986:§21.27). In other words, the number of the paragraph will be given in stead of the page number.
  
3. This proposal is supported by such reknown scholars as Bornkamm (1966:133) and Eichholz (1972:196)
  
4. For a lengthy discussion of Gl 3:13, and especially of the semantic content of ἑξαγοράζω within this context, cf Fryer 1979:281-320. He also provides a discourse analysis of the entire third chapter of Galatians (cf p286a-d), as well as an 'immediate constituent analysis' of verses 13 and 14 (cf p305a), of which we could avail ourselves.
  
5. Writing about 'Righteousness in Romans', Roberts (1981:12-33) also substantiates the results of his 'componential analysis of *dikaiosúnē* in Paul' by submitting a discourse analysis of Rm 3:19-31. This discourse analysis, which is different from the one presented by Louw (1978:8) in only two respects (cf Roberts 1981:22-4), may serve as a basis for our arguments in this section.
  
6. Stuhlmacher (1966:90-1) goes a step further in qualifying the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, not just as the deed springing from God's faithfulness to his covenant (that is the case in Rm 3:25a), but more than that as the judicial act of God, issuing from this faithfulness as Creator to his creation. In his own words: 'Wenn aber Paulus Gott und Welt und nicht nur Gott und Bund einander zuordnet, so kann δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ für ihn nicht mehr nur Bundestreue heissen, wie V. 25, sondern muss die Treue des Schöpfers zu seiner Schöpfung, wohlgermerkt: als Rechtsereignis!, meinen' (cf 1966:90).

7. Arndt & Gingrich's treatment of the meaning of ἀποστρέφω in this context (cf 1957:99-100) is a remarkable example of the confusion that may sometimes arise in the conventional lexicography. Handling the meanings of ἀποστρέφω in terms of the grammatical categories of being transitive, intransitive or middle, the transitive meanings are taken to fall under two sections, characterised by the translational equivalents 'turn away' (= a) and 'return, put back' (= b). The first of these two transitive 'meanings' (a) can, according to them, again be used in a literal (= α) or a figurative (= β) way. Paul's use of ἀποστρέφω in Rm 11:26b is then classified under the subsection β. The remarkable thing about this classification, however, is the fact that this particular occurrence of ἀποστρέφω, which they want to render as 'he will *remove* ungodliness fr. Jacob', is combined with other occurrences where it may be rendered as, 'to mislead', or 'to cause to revolt', or 'to alienate'. Obviously these other occurrences belong to completely different fields of meaning, with the result that this classification of Arndt & Gingrich creates the impression of total confusion.
8. Beker (1980:355ff) even takes the triumph of God to be the centre of Paul's theology and thought.
9. The exact meaning of κατοπτριζόμενος, as it is used in this context, is very difficult to determine. Though most of the modern translations (as NEB, NIV, GNB) render it as 'reflecting' or 'reflect', the possibility that it may be referring to the act of beholding (RSV) or perceiving, cannot be finally dismissed (cf Tasker 1958: 68; also Grosheide 1959:112). Anyway, for the purposes of this thesis, it is not quite so crucial to take a final decision on this matter. As Tannehill (1967:106) suggests, '... whether it refers to perception or reflection, it clearly involves participation in the revealed glory, as the transformation "from glory to glory" shows'.
10. In his commentary on Rm 12:2, Wilckens (1982:7) offers the following interpretation (which we find quite acceptable): 'σχήμα und μορφή bezeichnen bei Paulus gleicherweise nicht die äussere Erscheinungs-gestalt gegenüber dem inneren Wesen, sondern die Gestalt, in der sich das Wesen selbst manifestiert; beide Begriffe sind darin nahezu synonym, wie Phil 3,21 zeigt. Paulus beschreibt hier also den Existenzwandel....'
11. According to Grosheide (1959:119-20), it is significant that Paul is using φωτισμός rather than φως in 2 Cor 4:4,6. In his own words, this significance may be explained in the following way: 'Het nomen actionis, φωτισμός niet φως, zegt, dat er werking van het evangelie uitgaat. Wij gaat niet naar het evangelie, maar het evangelie trekt ons. τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, genet. subject., het evangelie schijnt, brengt licht, doet de δόξα van Christus uitstralen, 1 Tim. 1:11.'
12. Attempts have been made to show that 'blood' points essentially to life presented as an offering to God, rather than death (cf Taylor 1965:54-5). Morris (1976:219) points out that exponents of this view rely heavily on a particular interpretation of Lv 17:11, a verse which is patient of more than one interpretation. 'It could mean that the ritual presentation of blood signifies the ritual

presentation to God of life, the life of the victim. Or, it could mean that what is ritually presented to God is the evidence that a death has taken place in accordance with His judgment on sin' (Morris 1976:219). It is certainly more in keeping with the latter interpretation that Paul's references to the blood of Christ should be understood (cf also Ladd 1974:425-6).

13. According to Poythress (1981:115-20), we are not really dealing with two *distinct meanings* of ἅγιος, namely a cultic meaning and an ethical meaning. They may seem to belong to two separate semantic domains, but in fact they are just to be treated as different applications of the same meaning. Says Poythress (1981:120): 'There is only one "meaning". But it has a noticeable variation across a continuum from the cultic to the ethical. The context determines which part of this continuum will be most prominent.'
14. Grosheide (1953:23) suggests that this verse contains Paul's description of the objective condition of the Christians. This condition is explained thus: 'God has sanctified them. He has liberated them from the unclean world and has put them in a relationship to Himself whereby they might have intercourse with Him (Jn. 17:19; I Thess. 5:23). This sanctification by God is possible only through the work of *Christ Jesus* in whom we are sanctified. The Corinthians are not born saints, but they are sanctified by virtue of an act of God in Jesus, the consequences of which last till the present.'
15. In the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary 'to consecrate' is defined as: 'to set apart for a holy use; to render holy or venerable; to devote'. Similarly the definition for 'consecration' is: 'the act of devoting to a sacred use'.
16. Using baptism as a metaphor for the incorporation into Christ (cf §5.2.6 above) is of course not quite so unproblematical (cf Bruce 1982:185-6; Ridderbos 1953:148). According to Bruce (1982:185) it gives rise to the question: 'if Paul makes baptism the gateway to "being-in-Christ", is he not attaching soteriological efficacy to a rite which in itself is as external or "material" as circumcision?' An affirmation of this question would imply that the external rite of baptism works *ex opere operato*, which is obviously an unacceptable interpretation for Reformed exegetes in particular. Says Ridderbos (1953:148): 'We are not to take this in a magical or automatic sense. Baptism, too, is not in that sense an independent moment in the economy of salvation, as though oneness with Christ should take place for the believers only at baptism. ... What happens at baptism is a confirmation and sealing, a visible manifestation of what is given to the church by faith.' It nevertheless remains a vivid reminder of the radical turn-about accomplished 'in Christ' for the believer (cf Rm 6:3ff; Col 2:12ff).

CHAPTER 6.

THE SEMANTIC FIELD "SALVATION" - A SYNTHESIS OF THE RESULTS.

So ist es fast zum Konsens geworden, den Streit zwischen juridisch-ethischer und physisch-mystischer Interpretation paulinischer Soteriologie in dem Sinne zu schlichten, dass die letztere vorwiegend der Tradition, erstere dagegen Paulus selbst zugerechnet wird. Ein strukturalistischer Ansatz könnte hier eine Alternative zur traditionsgeschichtlichen Lösung des Problems anbieten: Denkbar ist, dass die Intention paulinischer Soteriologie in keiner einzelnen Symbolik und Thematik liegt, sondern im Beziehungsgefüge aller Symbole, in der Struktur eines umfassenden Feldes soteriologischer Sinneinheiten.

(Theissen 1974:284).

We now face the task of having to come to grips with the semantic field "salvation" in its full circumference. In the previous chapter the scalpel was in operation, so to speak, in dissecting the various elements constituting this field. Analytical procedures took the order of the day. Now these have to make way for a synthesis. From the dissection of the different parts of the body, we must now come to the point of establishing how all those parts fit together and function together.

In view of the wealth of material available from our analysis, the task of a synthesis may reach formidable proportions. An eagle's view may even seem to be impossible. Being overwhelmed by the separate trees, we may fail to oversee the bush as a whole.

The need for a synthesis, nevertheless, does not even require a motivation. It is beyond discussion. After all, one of the basic premises of the semantic field approach - on which this study is grounded - is the assumption that meaning can only be properly determined in relational terms. In other words, it is only when a particular meaning is seen against the backdrop of the semantic field within which it is functioning, and when its intertwinement with all the other elements in the same field is clearly outlined, that one can, by way of contrast, come to a valid definition of its peculiar semantic contribution. That is to say that there is continuous interaction

between the structure of the semantic field as a whole and the elements constituting that field. Analysis and synthesis must therefore necessarily go together. This need is well-articulated by Theissen (1974:284) in the following statement:

Das durch diese methodischen Akte konstituierte Feld soteriologischer Bilder lässt sich demnach auch definieren als Gefüge synchronisch-paradigmatischer Beziehungen aller metaphorischen Sinneinheiten paulinischer Soteriologie. Zunächst sind diese Sinneinheiten jeweils für sich herauszuarbeiten, abschliessend sind ihre Beziehungen zu untersuchen. Methodisch gehört beides zusammen: Erst die Aufdeckung eines Beziehungsgefüges zwischen den Einheiten erlaubt es, die verschiedenen bildhaften Elemente klar voneinander abzugrenzen. Element und Struktur bestimmen sich gegenseitig.

It is undoubtedly true that the field under discussion in the present thesis is much more complicated than any other ordinary semantic field. This is mainly due to the fact that the field in question is constituted by metaphors. In the nature of the case, these metaphors are drawn from a whole variety of other semantic fields, with which they still retain a relation of interaction. In other words, they do not naturally belong together; it is rather a case of bringing them together in an act of semantic innovation. By what may actually be regarded as a *tour de force*, Paul was, so to speak, *erecting* an entirely new semantic field.

The complicatedness of this field, then, stands in direct proportion to the numerous relations it is contracting with other semantic fields. In fact, as it has already been indicated (cf the introduction to chapter 5), the components of the various meanings included in the semantic field "salvation" can best be determined in the contexts of the respective 'donor fields' where the respective metaphors have their origin. To say this, of course, is not to deny the existence of the structurally coherent semantic domain of "salvation"; it is, nevertheless, a concession that the chartering of this structure is an extremely difficult task. A graphic representation, in particular, seems to be nearly impossible. There are just too many connections to be indicated. Any attempt in this direction will therefore be nothing more than a bleak illustration. Thus our efforts will rather be directed towards the *description* of some of the more obvious relations discovered in the course of the many componential analyses undertaken

in the previous chapter. Even so, it may as well be foreseen that the structure to be uncovered will probably be less impressive and less symmetrical than the one presented by Theissen, for instance, in relation to the same field (cf §1.2 above). It can hardly be imagined that a field, containing such a wide variety of metaphorical meanings, could be so neatly compartmentalised, even with formal markers. It seems to be more likely that we are in fact dealing with a loose conglomerate or cluster of contiguously related meanings (cf Nida 1975b: 18-20). Yet, one may still expect to find some kind of a structure, which will enable us, not only to relate the various metaphors with each other, but also to differentiate them from one another.

#### 6.1 Common components - the cohesion of the field:

In the delimitation of the semantic field "salvation", it was of course assumed that all the different meanings to be included in the field had some semantic features in common. In fact, it was evident that these common components of meaning afforded the only relatively objective criterion for the demarcation of a particular field. At the same time, we had to admit that one would have to wait for the completion of the componential analyses in order to establish whether the different semantic units really had so much in common.

Now that we are in the position to review all those analyses, it may be stated that there are indeed some semantic components which are being shared by all the semantic units under consideration. And the first of these, to be sure, being the most generic of them all, is the fact that all these meanings commonly denote *an event of change*.

That every single one of the metaphors analysed in the previous chapter may be categorised as belonging to the semantic class of *events*, is so obvious that there is no need for argumentation. That there is a *change* involved in all of these events, may also be readily established. Although the particular character of the change may differ from the one unit to the next, the fact that the change is always *turning a negative situation into a positive one*, may also be marked as a common component, to be encountered throughout this entire field

of meaning. Confirmation for this assumption may certainly be found in the very conspicuously recurring pattern according to which the components are arranged in the analyses presented in the previous chapter. In almost every case there is an implicational component, qualifying the negative situation, which is then followed by a feature depicting a decisive intervention in this negative situation, resulting in a radical change for the better (which may then often be taken as an inferential component of the meaning).

Undoubtedly this pattern also serves as an immediate pointer towards the common focus in all these related meanings. Time and again the focal component in these semantic units is the notion of an *intervention* by which the change is brought about. Seeing that this feature stands in the centre, it becomes possible to include in this semantic field even those meanings in which the component of a *negative situation* seems to be absent, or to be of minor significance. (This is the case, particularly with metaphors from the technical sphere of life. The metaphors of *sealing* and *moulding*, for instance, do not necessarily imply a prior negative state, but they do involve a change caused by the intervention of someone.)

Evidently this idea of an intervention takes as many forms as there are metaphors in this field. Most likely, the execution of this variety of intervening actions may seem to involve a host of *actants*. This would indeed be the natural conclusion if only the donor fields were taken into consideration. However, in the context of the recipient field of "salvation", one is soon struck by the all too obvious fact that there is actually but one *Actant* involved in all these apparently divergent actions, namely God himself. Of course, this reference to God must then be understood in terms of the Trinity. It is by the intervention of God, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, acting 'separately' or in concord, that "salvation" is accomplished. Whether this intervention is of a direct nature, or in a more indirect form (as in those cases where it is achieved 'in Christ'), it remains an *action of God himself*, and as such it may be identified as one of the common components of this field. (This applies even in those instances where God is working through a human agent - cf §5.1.12).

Another feature which is ostensibly running through the whole field, is the fact that this intervening action of God is basically concerned with the *religious (or spiritual) life of the individual*. (Not in an individualistic sense, though. In a good number of these meanings, the direct result - and aim - of this intervention is obviously the inclusion of the individual in a particular company - cf §§5.1.4; 5.1.5; 5.2.6; 5.2.7; 5.4.2 above). This religious life, in any case, must here be understood in its broadest possible scope, covering the whole range of man's encounter with God, from its very initial stage up to its completion at the return of Christ. In other words, it does not relate to only one particular stage of the so-called *ordo salutis*; in fact, it embraces all the stages in the sense that the very same metaphor may be employed with reference to several of these stages. That is to say, these metaphors describe the saving action of God, irrelevant of whether it refers to the past, present or future of the individual's spiritual life.

This, again, is possible because of Paul's peculiar eschatological point of view. All these saving actions of God, it may be said, are *eschatological actions*. Sometimes, however, these actions may be described in terms of a 'realised eschatology'; while at another occasion the same metaphor may serve in the context of a 'future eschatology'. The point is, Christ himself should be regarded as the *Eschatos* in Person (cf König 1980:7-24), and therefore all his deeds, whether at his first or second coming, or even during the interim through the Holy Spirit, are to be recognised for what they really are, namely as bearing an eschatological character. In Christ the *eschaton* has already been inaugurated, while at the same time its final realisation will remain outstanding in expectation of God's final move, when the same Christ will come to judge. (Cf §4.3.1 above). Thus both the 'already' and the 'not yet' of God's saving actions through Christ and the Spirit may be depicted in similar terms. The eschatological character of God's saving action may indeed then be taken as another common component, shared by all the different semantic units in this field of meaning.

Lastly, it may also be accepted as selfevident, in the light of the preceding analytical chapter, that the whole field does in fact consist

of *metaphors*. Although this fact may certainly be experienced as a complicating factor (cf the introduction to the present chapter), it may equally well be treated as a binding feature. Even though there is such a diversity of perspectives on the saving event, as one is looking through the variety of 'lenses' provided by the different metaphors, yet there is at least one feature they have in common on the formal level, namely that of being metaphors. This formal qualification, to be sure, is quite significant in the determination of the semantic content of all those diverging units included in this particular domain of meaning. It may therefore also be regarded as one of those common semantic components lending cohesion to this field.

From all these common features, one may now compile the following comprehensive outline of this field: it is constituted by a variety of *metaphorical* semantic units, describing an *eschatological* event, consisting of the *triune God's saving intervention*, whereby a *change* is effected in the *spiritual life of an individual*, amounting to a turn-about *from a negative religious position to a positive one*.

This outline, undoubtedly, is apt to be applied as a criterion for the delimitation of the field in question. That is, with this criterion we can also re-examine our own choice of elements to be included in the semantic field under discussion in this dissertation. And, for that matter, it seems to confirm our initial selection!

## 6.2 Diagnostic components - defining the distinctions within this field:

Having established the common ground for this particular semantic field, we may now turn to the even more important charge of having to put all the significant contrasts within this field in array. With this assignment, one may certainly assume, we have come to the proof of the pudding. After all, our ultimate purpose in drawing up this field has not just been to show that all those soteriological metaphors belong together in some sense, but more especially to highlight the distinctiveness of each metaphor in relation and in contrast to all the others. As it has already been said, it is only by way of contrast

with all the other related units within the same semantic domain, that one can come to a valid definition of the peculiar semantic contribution of any particular unit in that field.

Reviewing the previous chapter, it is of course immediately apparent that the different *cultural spheres* in which the various metaphors have their origin, should be treated as a distinguishing factor. Thereby the whole field is at once divided into four distinct categories. And it is definitely a matter of consequence to establish whether a particular unit is belonging to one category or the other. So, for instance, we could differentiate between *reconciliation* and *atonement* on account of their belonging to different of these categories (cf §5.1.8).

There is evidently no need to repeat the whole division in terms of the various cultural spheres of origin at this point. It is simple enough to consult the table of contents at the beginning of the thesis, or the outline of the field offered in paragraph 4.4. The mere mentioning of those four categories may nevertheless serve a purpose in the present context. They are the following:

- \* Soteriological metaphors from the sphere of social interaction;
- \* Soteriological metaphors from the sphere of biological and physiological transformation;
- \* Soteriological metaphors from the cultic and ritual realm;
- \* Soteriological metaphors from the technical sphere of life.

It goes without saying that, in using these four categories as a distinguishing principle, only limited distinctions can be made. Within each category there are of course quite a number of semantic units sharing this component of meaning. Yet it may be identified as a diagnostic component, seeing that it does serve to separate and to differentiate the various meanings within the field. In fact, it may even be claimed that this distinction is so illuminating, that its application sends a fresh breeze through the whole field of soteriology! The moment one realises that some of these metaphors should be interpreted against the background of cultic and ritual procedures, while others are to be understood in terms of events in the sphere of social

interaction or biological and physiological transformation, or even in the light of technical activities, it opens up a new perspective, not only on the field as a whole, but also on the individual items constituting the field. Somehow, it seems, there is a distinctive air surrounding each of these categories of metaphors. One can, for instance, immediately sense an important difference between those metaphors originating from the sphere of social interaction, and those coming from the sphere of biological and physiological transformation. Therefore one may often find that the latter are either not being treated as soteriological metaphors, or they are regarded as the subjective side of salvation, as opposed to the objective side expressed in the former (cf Pelser 1985:246-59). Whereas the former seem to be dealing with an event of change in terms of various *relationships* (i.e. social interaction), the latter create the impression of a transformation *in the person as such*. This difference may perhaps also be described in terms of the difference between a *change of status*, on the one hand, and a *change of state* on the other.

It should nevertheless be emphasised that, even though the latter distinction is applicable in general, it does not entirely coincide with the two spheres of origin mentioned above. In fact, it seems to be cutting across all four those cultural categories identified as a distinguishing principle above, even causing a division within those categories. Therefore this distinction between a *change of status* and a *change of state* may certainly be regarded as yet another diagnostic component as far as this particular semantic field is concerned. It might perhaps not be a factor in *all* the semantic units included in this field, but it does apply to *most* of them. (Cf the schematic presentation below.)

Coming to some diagnostic components shared by only a number of the units, thus setting them apart from the rest of the field, we may first of all mention the feature of a *power struggle* (cf Theissen 1974: 285-7). Obviously the notion that God's saving action involves the *overpowering of the forces of evil* may be discerned in the following semantic units included in this field:

\* Deliverance - from danger to safety;

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- \* Liberation - a slave is set free;
- \* A change of ownership - the transfer from one sphere of power to another;
- \* Giving victory - the loser becomes a winner;
- \* Raising the dead - from death to life.

Due to its close association with the metaphor of a change of ownership (particularly in Rm 6), even the metaphor of dying and rising may be entered at this point. In all these instances man's predicament is characterised by enslavement and the domination of destructing powers, such as the devil, sin, wrath and death. By God's powerful intervention, then, man is rescued from this domination. Each of these metaphors, nevertheless, gives expression to God's liberating action in its own peculiar way. This fact is most conspicuously illustrated by the varying results issuing from God's saving intervention - it ranges from safety, through freedom, victory and life, to the notion of entering into a new realm of life under the dominion of God.

However, man's predicament can also be characterised in terms of *guilt before God*. Surely Paul did not think of sin only as a power dominating our lives, but also in terms of rebellious and disobedient deeds incurring guilt. There are, therefore, some other soteriological metaphors too, in which one may detect the diagnostic component of *guilt being nullified*. This component evidently comes to expression in the following semantic units that were considered in the previous chapter:

- \* Justification - the acquittal of the guilty;
- \* Remission of sins - wiping away the guilt;
- \* Making atonement - the expiation of sin by way of sacrifice;
- \* Washing - the dirt is removed.

One hardly needs to reiterate the fact that even this feature finds a further intensification in each of the relevant metaphors. Whereas the forensic aspect is foregrounded in the case of justification, it is only a supplementary component in the case of the remission of sins. Atonement, on the other hand, brings the sacrificial system of the Old Testament into play, while the symbolism of the ritual procedure is exploited in using the semantic unit of washing as a soteriological metaphor.

Another feature which may be qualified as diagnostic in this field, is to be recognised in *the establishing of a new relationship between God and man*. On the negative side it usually involves the implicational component of being at odds with God, and of thus being excluded from the fellowship with God. This state of affairs, then, is rectified by God himself, who reinstates man into the most intimate fellowship with himself. The following list of metaphors, drawn from the semantic field "salvation" discussed in the previous chapter, will immediately show the variety of ways in which the establishing of this new relationship may be described:

- \* Adoption - slaves become children;
- \* Acceptance - receiving someone into an association;
- \* Justification - the restoration of the covenant relationship;
- \* Remission of sins - wiping away the guilt;
- \* Reconciliation - enemies become friends;
- \* Calling - the creative word establishing a new identity/status;
- \* Making atonement - the expiation of sin by way of sacrifice/the propitiation of God;
- \* Sanctification - set aside in order to belong to God;
- \* Anointing - qualified for a new status;
- \* Sealing - the mark of ownership.

It is noteworthy, one may think, that some of these semantic units (viz justification, remission of sins and making atonement) share in both the present and the previous diagnostic components. Thus they are already distinguished from the other items in the present context. Among these other items one may still focus on outstanding characteristics such as the special quality of the new relationship as seen in terms of the social phenomena of adoption and reconciliation. Both of them imply a very intimate relationship - the former, of course, the father-child relationship, as established through the legal procedure of adoption; the latter that of close friends, who became estranged at a certain stage, but whose intimate friendship was eventually restored. The metaphors of acceptance and calling, on the other hand, describe in more general terms how God is drawing people, who used to be 'outside the circle', into fellowship with himself, that is, into his own company. Virtually the same idea is also conveyed by the semantic unit of sanctification, but this time in terms of the cultic

background of something secular and profane being drawn into the presence of the Holy One, so as to belong to Him. So too, even anointing may suggest being set apart for God (cf §5.3.4). And this special relationship, one may include, is also sealed by God with his own special mark of ownership, thus authenticating its reality with the vividness of a 'technical' procedure, to be witnessed by everybody.

But, one should still go a step further. God's saving intervention does not only put one in the right relation with God himself, but also establishes a new relationship with fellow-believers. And, for that matter, it ought to be well-understood that this new relationship with fellow-believers is not just an optional side-effect of "salvation"; it is part and parcel of the saving event itself, it is even an integral part of God's salvific outreach. Therefore the notion of an *inclusion in the fellowship of the redeemed* very naturally appears as one of the diagnostic components of the semantic field "salvation", as is demonstrated by the following semantic units:

- \* Adoption - slaves become children;
- \* Acceptance - receiving someone into an association;
- \* Incorporation - joined to one body;
- \* Grafting - joined to a different tree;
- \* Building - bricks (stones) laid in the erecting of a new edifice.

Although the first two of these items have already been marshalled in connection with the new relationship God is establishing between himself and man, they may obviously serve in the present context as well. After all, by adoption one is joined to a new family (cf Rm 8:17, 29), and being received (accepted) into an association with God brings one in a company where mutual acceptance ought to be the order of the day (cf Rm 15:7). As for the two metaphors from the sphere of biological and physiological transformation (incorporation and grafting), and the one from the technical sphere of life (building), it is quite clear that they depict that crucial intervention of God whereby a person's spiritual association is determined. Essentially they say the same, but from different perspectives.

Yet another diagnostic component to be recognised in this field, is

the idea of a *radical transformation of one's religious disposition*. Although it might perhaps be argued that all the metaphors in the field actually qualify for this particular component of meaning, it is nevertheless true that it is more directly attested in those instances where the turn-about from a negative situation to a positive one is specifically indicated. This component may then be taken to specify the following semantic units:

- \* Deliverance - from danger to safety;
- \* Liberation - a slave is set free;
- \* Adoption - slaves become children;
- \* Justification - the acquittal of the guilty;
- \* Reconciliation - enemies become friends;
- \* Glorification - given to share the splendour;
- \* To make rich - poverty turned into wealth;
- \* Giving victory - the loser becomes a winner;
- \* Calling - the creative word establishing a new identity;
- \* Raising the dead - from death to life;
- \* New creation - man and world remade;
- \* Transformation of image - the creation of a new conformity;
- \* Illumination - the blind are brought to sight;
- \* Clothing - the old garment is replaced by a new one.

In all these cases there is a well-articulated contrast between the negative situation prior to God's saving intervention and the positive situation resulting from that intervention. Obviously each of these metaphors sheds a new light on this radical transformation. It may be noted too that this transformation may be depicted in terms of either a change of status or a change of state, just as it includes metaphors from the sphere of social interaction as well as from the sphere of biological and physiological transformation, and even from the technical sphere.

Finally, one may also discern the component of *re-creation* as being diagnostic. This component, to be sure, is actually an intensification of the previous one (i.e. the idea of a radical transformation of one's religious disposition). However, in the present case that transformation is so profound, so complete, that it may be aptly denoted in creational terminology. In other words, God's redeeming action is here seen as a complete remaking of something (or rather someone) who has already been in existence, but nevertheless proved to be an utter failure. Evidently it is not hard to recognise the

semantic units in which this diagnostic component is featured:

- \* New creation - man and world remade;
- \* Transformation of image - the creation of a new conformity;
- \* Moulding - clay shaped in the hands of the potter;
- (\*Dying and rising - entering into a new realm of life;
- \* Raising the dead - from death to life.)

Though this feature is not so explicit in the last two units (in brackets), the categories of death and life are so radical, that they may well qualify for being slotted in at this juncture. As for the other three metaphors, one can hardly miss the obvious reminiscence of God's mighty deeds at the creation of the world. Here, of course, these ideas are being utilised in a metaphorical sense, in order to express the most profound spiritual transformation.

In conclusion it has still to be said that the diagnostic components identified above do not tell half of the story of this semantic field. To be quite frank, there are many, many more diagnostic features involved in this field. In fact, seeing that we are dealing with metaphors, there must necessarily be something special to each of them; something striking, distinguishing that particular metaphor from all the rest. Without such a peculiarity these semantic units would not really qualify as metaphors. And all these peculiarities, in turn, will most likely have to be treated as diagnostic components. But, it is virtually impossible to discuss them all in the present context. It would actually imply that much of the previous chapter would have to be repeated. That would of course be a waste of time and energy! At this point, we'll therefore have to be content with only the most essential features - that is, those salient components of meaning which are necessary in order to outline the contours of this semantic field. With this broad structure in hand, one can always return to our analyses in the previous chapter so as to fill in the finer distinctions. And, probably it is to be expected that this overall structure will facilitate new insights into the various elements constituting the field, just as the analysing of these elements was evidently a necessary prerequisite for the assembling of this structure. Indeed, then, there is a notable interaction between element and structure, as Theissen (1974:284) has rightly suggested. In his own words: 'Element und Struktur bestimmen sich gegenseitig.'

### 6.3 Diagrammatic presentation of the field:

The possibility that it would be extremely difficult to supply a graphic representation of the semantic field under discussion, has already been foreseen earlier on (cf p 248). The complexity of the multiple relations contracted by each of the units in this field, not only within the field itself, but also with the donor fields in question, has been suggested as the main reason for our inability to chart the field.

Nevertheless, we may at least endeavour to offer a diagrammatic presentation of those few diagnostic components we have isolated above as outlining the broad structure of this field. Even though it might not be fully satisfactory as a comprehensive picture of this field, yet it may well enable us to acquire a better perspective on the field as a whole, and more especially to see the internal relations more clearly.

In order to get this diagram onto one page, it will be necessary to make use of various abbreviations. The following indications should therefore serve as a key to the reading of Diagram 1 on the next page:

a) Abbreviations for the different diagnostic components:

- CS - cultural spheres from which the metaphors originated;
- CH - the distinction between a change of status and a change of state;
- PS - power struggle resulting in liberation from evil powers;
- NG - nullifying of guilt;
- NR - the establishing of a new relationship;
- FR - inclusion in the fellowship of the redeemed;
- RT - radical transformation of one's religious disposition;
- RC - re-creation.

b) Abbreviations for distinctions within the diagnostic components:

- si - sphere of social interaction;
- bp - sphere of biological and physiological transformation;
- cr - the cultic and ritual realm;
- ts - the technical sphere of life;
- ss - change of status;
- st - change of state.

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Diagram 1.

	CS	CH	PS	NG	NR	FR	RT	RC
Deliverance	si	ss	x				x	
Liberation	si	ss	x				x	
Change ownership	si	ss	x		x			
Adoption	si	ss			x	x	x	
Acceptance	si	ss			x	x		
Justification	si	ss		x	x		x	
Remission	si	ss		x	x			
Reconciliation	si	ss			x		x	
Glorification	?si	st					x	
To make rich	si	ss					x	
Giving victory	si	ss	x					
Winning over	si	ss					x	
Calling	si	ss			x		x	
Dying - rising	bp	st	x					x
Raising the dead	bp	st	x				x	x
New creation	bp	st					x	x
Transformation of image	bp	st					x	x
Illumination	bp	st					x	
Incorporation	bp	ss			x	x		
Grafting	bp	ss			x	x		
Atonement	cr	ss		x	x			
Sanctification	cr	ss			x			
Washing	cr	st		x				
Anointing	cr	ss			x			
Sealing	ts	ss			x			
Building	ts	ss			x	x		
Moulding	ts	st						x
Clothing	ts	ss					x	

#### 6.4 Conclusions:

The foregoing attempt at gaining a synthetical view of the semantic field "salvation" in Paul's major epistles, may be seen as yielding the following conclusions:

##### 6.4.1 The importance of the entire picture:

Usually when people think of Paul's soteriology, only a few of the major concepts come into consideration. Mostly these include elements such as justification, reconciliation, atonement and deliverance. These are then in any case being treated as independent units. Obviously one of the greatest advantages of the present study is the way in which one is enabled to acquire a much broader perspective on the whole issue. Not only does it show, rather decisively, that there are many more elements to be included in this field of meaning (because of the fact that they all share certain semantic components), but at the same time it also facilitates a much better understanding of the mutual relations between all these elements.

If one would be interested, for instance, to investigate the semantic contribution of a particular unit within this field, it is of the utmost importance to see it against the background of the entire picture. Only against this background is it possible to recognise those features it has in common with all the other units in the field, as well as those diagnostic components which it shares with some other units in the field, but not with all; and finally also those truly diagnostic components which are peculiar to the specific unit. Thus one can immediately determine its affinities as well as its contrasts with related meanings.

The implication is that, in a study of *justification*, for example, one may no longer be concerned with only this one element in isolation. It should, first of all, be seen as part of this structural entity which we call the semantic field "salvation". As part of this field, it must selfevidently also share in all those common components of meaning outlined in paragraph 6.1 above. In these features its coherence with the rest of the field is defined.

However, if one looks at Diagram 1, the picture that emerges, is one of both relatedness and distinctiveness. The diagnostic components listed in this diagram, do distinguish the units from one another, but, simultaneously, they also indicate some of the mutual relations contracted between certain units in the field, to the exclusion of others. So too, the components of being a metaphor from the sphere of social interaction, describing an event which involves a change of status, indicate the relatedness of the semantic unit of *justification* to many other units in this field, but, at the same time, distinguish it from others. According to the diagram, the component of a nullification of guilt (which is suggested to be one of the diagnostic components of *justification*), is shared by only a few other units in this field (of which two are metaphors from the cultic and ritual realm). On the other hand, a feature such as the establishing of a new relationship between God and man (which is also to be recognised as one of the diagnostic features of *justification*), is qualifying a considerable number of other units too.

For our understanding of Pauline soteriology, one may dare to claim, this comprehensive approach could be of great value. For one thing, it shows very clearly that, as far as this question is concerned, there is no need to put all our eggs in one basket. Justification is not everything - not even in these major epistles of Paul. It forms part of a whole field of meaning, within which it may be seen in its proper perspective, as, on the one hand, sharing certain semantic components with a host of other meanings, while, on the other hand, it is also distinguished from all those other meanings by certain diagnostic components.

#### 6.4.2 The insufficiency of the comprehensive structure:

It must, nevertheless, be admitted that the comprehensive structure, especially as it has been presented above, will not be entirely sufficient as an indicator of all the necessary distinctions that are required in order to show up the special contribution of each individual unit. Looking at Diagram 1, one cannot help noticing the fact that, although there is some kind of a distinction between units such as

*justification, remission of sins and reconciliation*, one will hardly succeed in distinguishing them properly only on the basis of these diagnostic components. As it has already been suggested (cf the concluding remarks in §6.2 above), one will have to return to the analyses in the previous chapter in order to fish out those peculiarities characterising each individual metaphor.

It is conceivable, of course, that some of those peculiarities could be included among the diagnostic components featured in the diagrammatic presentation of the field. However, that would imply a considerable extension of the diagram, and it is questionable whether it would really be more effective. A metaphor being what it is, namely a semantic innovation, accomplished through the interaction between two semantic fields (cf §§3.1.2 and 3.2.1 above), some of its components of meaning are certainly very hard to capture in a formal structure. Particularly since each one of these metaphors retains a relation of interaction with the donor field from which it was drawn, one may take it for granted that the value of a more individual treatment should not be underestimated. That is to say, analysis and synthesis, element and structure, should be allowed to play an equally important role in our search to understand a specific unit.

Evidently this fact is underlined by the observation that each of those semantic units which are included in the field we are studying, may be expressed by a variety of lexical units. These lexical units, then, represent different nuances of the particular semantic unit. In other words, they show just how extremely complicated the semantic field "salvation" really is. Therefore their inclusion in the comprehensive structure has not even been considered. They simply have to be taken into consideration on the basis of the individual semantic units, where their mutual relations may be determined in terms of the donor field in question.

#### 6.4.3 The prevalence of the social metaphors:

Despite the reservations mentioned in the previous paragraph, one may still take notice of the fact that Diagram 1 is indeed revealing

some interesting points of emphasis in this field. For one thing, it is immediately apparent that the metaphors with a social dimension do not only form the majority in this field, but they are also the most prominent, and, in any case, the best known soteriological metaphors of Paul. Nearly half of the field consists of metaphors from the sphere of social interaction. In addition, however, there are also metaphors from the other cultural spheres in which one may detect a social dimension. So, for instance, one may classify the idea of the establishing of a new relationship, which is one of the diagnostic components included in the diagram, as a feature with a social orientation. After all, a relationship is a social phenomenon. Incidentally, this particular component of meaning cuts across all four those cultural spheres in which the metaphors have their origin. (That is, of course, if we take this new relationship to refer, not only to the one between God and man, but also between man and his fellow-believer. Then incorporation and grafting, and even building may also be regarded as sharing in this diagnostic component).

Virtually the same notion is introduced with our distinction between a change of status and a change of state. The only proper way to distinguish between these two possibilities, is to ask whether the change is involving a transformation in the person as such, or else just a change in his relation to another party. The latter would then be a change of status, and status, qualified in this manner, must obviously be seen as a social factor. A factor, once again, which is running through this whole field, affecting almost three quarters of the metaphors in the field.

The conclusion to be drawn from this observation will undoubtedly have to run in the direction of a realisation that the restoration of a broken relationship may be identified as one of the basic issues in this field of meaning. For the conveying of this notion, certainly, the sphere of social interaction affords some excellently suitable material. Even the cultic and ritual realm, however, lends itself to the possibility of being a productive source in the generation of this kind of metaphor (cf the introduction to §5.3 above). Of course, in both of these two spheres, there is a whole variety of ways to express this thought.

#### 6.4.4 The significant contribution of the other metaphors:

The diagnostic component of a change of state, it should also be noted, mainly finds expression in the metaphors from the sphere of biological and physiological transformation. The idea of a change of state, as we have already indicated in the previous paragraph, should basically be understood as a matter of change taking place by the transformation of the person as such. It is not just a question, in other words, of acquiring a new status or a new relation to some other party, but rather of one's own life and person being transformed.

That there is also this side to God's saving intervention, can hardly be denied. That events of social interaction will most likely not be suitable to convey this thought, seems evident. Just as evident is the assumption that the sphere of biological and physiological transformation ought to be perfectly appropriate as a source for the generation of metaphors to express this kind of saving event. Not surprisingly, then, we find Paul utilising and exploiting the richness of this sphere in order to typify God's actions in the field of "salvation".

Without question, this semantic feature of a change of state finds its most sublime expression in the event of creation. Here, of course, it has to be qualified in terms of re-creation, seeing that God is dealing with existing people, who have to undergo a radical transformation. Coming to this aspect of a radical transformation, however, one suddenly discovers that, after all, there is not quite so big a difference between the present category of metaphors and the previous one, since most of the metaphors on both sides have something to do with a radical transformation of one's religious disposition, as it may also be deduced from the diagram.

#### 6.4.5 The semantic field "salvation" as a contiguous cluster of meanings:

Finally, and by way of summarising, it may be concluded that the semantic field "salvation" should indeed be characterised as a *con-*

*tiguous cluster of meanings.* There is, on the one hand, no question about the relatedness of all the different semantic units we have identified as belonging to this field. All of them do indeed belong together, by virtue of the common components they share. In other words, '... they cluster together in the sense that they are so closely related that they occupy a well-defined, restricted semantic field' (cf §2.2.4.8 above).

On the other hand, though, they cannot really be qualified as synonyms in the traditional sense of the word. The separate units may, to a large extent, have a common reference, but they do not have exactly the same meaning. That is to say, they are also rather clearly distinguished from one another, on account of certain diagnostic components they possess.

It is a field, therefore, of related meanings (and, in fact, there is a criss-cross of mutual relations between the various semantic units), and yet, each unit is offering its own, very special perspective on the saving event. Each metaphor provides a different lens through which that diamond of "salvation" may be appreciated anew!

SECTION C.

FROM THE BIBLE TO THE PRESENT.

CHAPTER 7.

THE VALUE OF THE STUDY IN A NUTSHELL.

The interpreter of Scripture has to live in two worlds. He has to be immersed in the world of the Scriptures with such intensity that at the heart of his being his most intimate companions are prophets, psalmists, apostles, and evangelists with Jesus Christ at their center. ...But he has also to be immersed in his own world, a man of his own time, open and sensitive to situations and dilemmas different from any that have ever existed before. Living in these two worlds at one and the same time, he becomes aware that they are not two worlds but one and the same world. The two worlds come together so that the Scriptures are like a magic glass through which we look to see ourselves, our fellowmen, and our world as they really are.

(Smart 1970:163).

We have now arrived at the point in this study where its practical value ought to be demonstrated. Having analysed all the different soteriological metaphors in Paul's major epistles, and having attempted to define their mutual relations and idiosyncrasies in terms of the common and diagnostic components identified within the context of the semantic field in question, it now remains to be seen how the results can be of use to the various theological and semi-theological disciplines. The consequences of our findings with respect to the study of the New Testament, Systematic Theology and Practical Theology, as well as Lexicology, need to be drawn out. The research conducted in the present thesis evidently has a bearing on various aspects of theology, and can therefore make a contribution in all these different fields.

At first, however, some general observations may be in order. Some of the discoveries made in the course of the study might be of value to theology in general, rather than just to one specific theological sub-division. Obviously this is true in the case of hermeneutical questions, which are basic to all the theological subjects.

### 7.1 The pragmatic dimension of Paul's metaphorical way of speaking:

Pausing to think about the reason behind Paul's metaphorical approach to "salvation", one is struck by the realisation that there must have been a practical intention right from the start. Paul was using this impressive variety of metaphors with a practical purpose in mind. He wanted to evoke a certain response from his readers. That his language was determined, to a certain extent, by the 'implied reader' (cf Lategan 1984:11), can hardly be denied. In fact, in Romans 6:19 Paul himself is stating rather explicitly that he was '...speaking in human terms', because of the 'natural limitations' of the recipients of this letter (cf RSV).

At a time in which the saving significance of Christ's death and resurrection, and of the energetic activities of the Holy Spirit, was still in need of an interpretative expression, there was certainly nothing more appropriate for the task than the use of metaphors. As it was suggested in paragraph 3.1.2 above, metaphorical language is, *par excellence*, the tool to be used in the description of new experiences for which there is no ready-made linguistic resource available. It opens up a new field of meaning by seeing it in terms of other familiar experiences.

From the beginning, then, Paul's soteriological metaphors were meant to facilitate the understanding of God's saving actions in relation to specific circumstances. This is confirmed by the fact that Paul was employing different metaphors in different situations. It may even be claimed that, in many cases, the metaphors were suggested by the particular situations in which it was to render a service (cf Theissen 1974:304). So, for example, Paul would refer to Christ's becoming poor in order to *make us rich* in support of his appeal to the congregation in Corinth for a contribution in aid of the poor Christians in Judea (2 Cor 8:9; cf §5.1.10 above). Similarly, in calling the Christians in Rome to mutual acceptance, he made use of the soteriological metaphor of being *accepted into God's company* (Rom 15:7; cf §5.1.5 above). In his effort to counteract some libertarianistic tendencies among the early believers, he didn't hesitate even

to describe the saving event in terms of a *change of masters*, implying that it actually involves being transferred from one slave-owner to another (cf Rm 6; §5.1.3 above). In another situation, however, but in the same letter, he can just as well deny that we remain slaves by using the metaphor of *adoption* in order to highlight the intimate character of the new relationship established between God and man through the saving event - we who used to be slaves become children in the family of God (cf Rm 8:15; §5.1.4 above). Metaphors from the sphere of biological and physiological transformation, again, are particularly suitable for situations where there is a need to emphasise the radicality of the change accomplished in God's redeeming actions. There are a couple of these soteriological metaphors too which are very closely associated with ecclesiastical concerns (cf §§5.2.6; 5.2.7; 5.4.2 above). Still others are determined by the need for an assurance of salvation (cf 2 Cor 1:21-2; §§5.3.4; 5.4.1 above), and by the problems arising from a consciousness of guilt (cf §§5.1.6; 5.1.7; 5.3.1; 5.3.3 above).

Unfortunately it has to be admitted that, although this aspect has been touched upon here and there, it has probably not received adequate attention in the analytical section of this thesis. Neither can it be fully discussed at this stage. It is evident, nevertheless, that this pragmatic dimension in Paul's use of soteriological metaphors may constitute a factor of momentous influence. Even though it can by no means be regarded as the only factor determining Paul's choice of metaphors - the character of the saving action itself, for one thing, must also have played a major role in directing his preferences - there can be little doubt that Paul was writing with the view to the practical circumstances of the various congregations. Consequently one should, on the one hand, start looking for that hermeneutical bridge, connecting the past to the present, in the situation addressed in the epistles themselves. The text (or even the particular metaphor) might have been calculated to effectuate a very pertinent response in a specific situation in the lives of the original recipients (cf Combrink 1985:165), and may thus become extremely relevant to us in a similar situation. On the other hand, though, this same observation may also imply that one ought to be careful not to canonise and over-emphasise one particular metaphor at the expense of the others.

In Paul's view there was apparently a considerable freedom to employ different metaphors in different situations. He did not hesitate even to coin new metaphors where the practical situation demanded such change of perspective in order to convey the same good news more effectively. Surely this fact must have important consequences both on dogmatical and homiletical level (as I shall shortly try to indicate). In general it may even now be stated that one would be out of step with the pragmatic character of Paul's metaphorical approach to "salvation", if one would be too rigid in the handling of those metaphors in our own situation. Although the original formulation will always enjoy a normative significance (cf Thiselton 1977a:309), it must certainly be acknowledged that there is room for new metaphors to suit the different situation we live in (cf Goldingay 1977:358-9). One may of course be hesitant to accept the way in which Goldingay (1977:358-9), for instance, is trying to re-express the Biblical metaphor of atonement (by removing its cultic aspect, and by casting it in terms of the idea that God was, so to speak, absorbing man's hostility by allowing it to strike at Himself on the cross!), but he may nevertheless be correct in suggesting that, 'It is not enough to *explain* what atonement, sacrifice, substitution are; a metaphor that needs explaining is thereby shown to have lost its force.' There may thus be some truth in the slogan of the so-called 'New Hermeneutic' according to which (in the words of Ebeling), 'The *same word* can be said to another time only by being said differently' (cf Thiselton 1977a:309). However, it has not been the purpose of the present dissertation to suggest such *new metaphors* that would serve to re-express the Biblical ones; such an undertaking could possibly become the challenge of another study in this field.

In passing one may perhaps note that the argument above could as well be harnessed to justify the existence of a '*theology of liberation*'. It is conceivable that someone could argue that this theology is a legitimate re-expression of some of the soteriological metaphors in the Bible in terms of certain social problems of our own time (cf Kirk 1979:74-5; 86-8). The metaphor of *liberation*, in particular (cf §5.1.2 above), might seem to tolerate such a re-interpretation. At this point, however, it is essential to remember that we have identified certain components of meaning within the semantic field

of "salvation" which must necessarily be reproduced in order to convey the same message. In that light, no doubt, the liberation of 'liberation theology' seems to be quite far removed from the liberation we had in mind (cf also Moltmann 1979:109-14 for a typical description of what liberation really involves in these circles). At least, it would not qualify to be treated as part of the semantic field delineated above.

## 7.2 The awkwardness of metaphors in the making of a dictionary:

In this study we have basically been trying to determine the *meaning* of various units of communication in the major epistles of Paul. In so doing, some insight from Semantics and Semiotics were implemented. It was our aim, in particular, to establish what the various soteriological metaphors of Paul (as semantic units) have in common, and how they are distinguished from each other in terms of components of meaning. They were, in other words, treated as constituting a semantic field. One may therefore expect the present study to make a useful contribution towards the recent trend in lexicography according to which dictionaries ought to be arranged in terms of semantic domains (cf Louw 1985c).

One may, however, be perplexed to find that in the new *Greek-English lexicon of the New Testament based on semantic domains*, which is due to appear during 1986, there is no reference to the semantic field "salvation" (cf Louw 1985c:187-194)! In the light of our research, though, there is no need to be embarrassed. It has namely been shown rather decisively that we are actually dealing with a field of *metaphors* in the present case. As such all the units included in this field simultaneously belong to some other semantic field (the 'donor field' - cf Kittay & Lehrer 1981:32). Moreover, in order to remain a live metaphor, it is essential that the unit be understood in terms of that donor field. As soon as the interaction between recipient field and donor field dies down, the particular semantic unit can no longer be qualified as a metaphor, or it should at least be regarded as a dead metaphor (cf also Wendland & Nida 1985:9).

Therefore, by entering a metaphor into a lexicon, one may actually cause it to lose its impetus. Once the metaphorical meaning is independently defined in the dictionary, it tends to fall prey to fixation, with the result that the element of interaction with the donor field gradually fades away. No wonder, then, that Ricoeur (1976:52) can go to the extreme of saying that, 'There are no live metaphors in a dictionary.'

Recognising the fact that we find ourselves in a rather awkward position with metaphors as far as the making of a dictionary is concerned, it remains a question, nevertheless, if it would not be feasible to make room for the semantic field "salvation" in the semantic domain dictionary after all. Taking the results of the present study into consideration, there can be little doubt about the existence of a conceptual sphere concerning "salvation" in the thinking of Paul. That there are a good number of related semantic units covering this conceptual sphere, thereby forming a semantic field, also seems to be quite evident. These semantic units, of course, again find expression in a network of related lexical units, constituting a lexical field.

Notwithstanding the problems in connection with the metaphorical character of the particular semantic field under discussion, it would certainly be most valuable to have it included in a lexicon dealing with the New Testament vocabulary. Such a presentation in which one may gain a comprehensive view of Paul's soteriological metaphors, at once showing both their relatedness and their distinctiveness, will most likely be a tremendous asset, not only for the purposes of translation, but also for New Testament exegesis and theology.

### 7.3 Assets for the study of the New Testament:

This dissertation is of course presented as a venture in the field of New Testament studies. Its primary concern is therefore not with the field of lexicology, or any other field for that matter, but to make a worthwhile contribution towards a better understanding of Paul's major epistles. If only this aim has been achieved, the effort will already have been rewarded.

In retrospect, one feels, it wouldn't be too presumptuous to claim that at least some new perspectives have been gained in this field. For one thing, the comprehensive treatment of this field of meaning is obviously to be acknowledged as an approach with significant consequences for the study of the New Testament in all its sub-divisions. Its usefulness, it may be suggested, starts from the level of *translation*. According to Louw (1985c:167), '... a translator needs far more to see the range of related meanings expressed by different words than the range of meanings expressed by a single word.' For a translator it is of the utmost importance to be able to discern minute nuances of meaning, and such differentiation, for certain, is most effectively done by contrasting closely related meanings in terms of their common and diagnostic semantic components in the context of a particular semantic field. Even though the units included in the semantic field "salvation", as delineated above, are quite distinctly separable from each other, due to their metaphorical character, the mere fact that the semantic field approach is enabling one to see what components of meaning they share, and by what components they are distinguished from one another, may definitely contribute towards the selecting of the most appropriate translational equivalent.

Obviously this gain in clarity of distinction will also be to the benefit of *exegesis*. In trying to understand the mind of Paul, it can only be helpful to discover such a clear pattern of thought running through various elements in his letters. However, as far as the exegesis is concerned, it is not only the structure of mutual relations which is important; it is just as important to appreciate the individual quality of each metaphor. In this regard, then, the analysing of the metaphors in terms of the different cultural spheres of origin should be valued as an illuminating contribution. I would like to believe that it has succeeded in revealing to us the peculiar perspective of each of those twenty-eight soteriological metaphors on the saving event. By trying to divert the attention for a moment to the donor fields in question, the element of metaphorical interaction ought to have been re-stimulated.

In this whole process (as was already mentioned in 57.1 above), we are certainly moving towards a recognition of the role played by

sociological factors in the production of the text (cf Theissen 1974: 304). Thereby the possibilities of the new sociological and socio-linguistic approach to the New Testament (cf Lategan 1984:8) are also acknowledged, even though they have not been fully exploited. That does not mean, however, that this study is paving the way for something like the *materialist exegesis* (as practised, for instance, by Van Tilborg 1978:109-30). The latter method is of course also accentuating the social function of a text, by trying to determine the 'material conditions' which gave rise to the production of that text (cf Lategan 1984:6), but, in general, it suffers from the defect of failing to do justice to the text itself (cf Van Iersel 1978:422).

Seeing that the benefits accruing from this study for both New Testament Theology and Systematic Theology are equivalent in many respects, we may proceed to the latter.

#### 7.4 New light for Systematic Theology:

Although there are indications that the need for the kind of approach to soteriology, advocated in the present thesis, has started to dawn on some scholars in the field of Systematic Theology (cf especially König 1980a:1-4; 1983:55-62), it can by no means be heralded as a general trend. The traditional treatment of God's saving actions in Jesus Christ and through the Holy Spirit is mostly confined to a discussion of elements such as justification, forgiveness, atonement, reconciliation, redemption and regeneration. Moreover, the metaphorical character of these few 'concepts' does not always receive due recognition. As a result, they are sometimes being handled as constituting a particular 'order of salvation', consequently necessitating an arrangement according to a certain sequence.

In the light of our findings in this dissertation, however, there can be no doubt about the necessity of a metaphorical approach to the dogmatic locus in question. In fact, this supposition is directly confirmed by Heyns (1978:282), when he asserts the following:

Die versoening - as die herstel van die gebroke gemeenskap  
tussen God en mens, en tussen mens en mens - is inderdaad

h diepe misterie wat in die Bybel dan ook met 'n veelheid van beelde en in verskillende gelykenisse weergegee word. ...Nie een van hierdie en ander beelde of gelykenisse mag ontbreek in 'n besinning oor die versoening nie, want aanvullend gee hulle saam uitdrukking aan die rykdom van die verlossingswerklikheid wat na sy ware diepte buite die bereik lê van enige begripsmatige sisteme en teoretiese teorieë.

It is noteworthy, though, that even Heyns himself, notwithstanding the quoted remark, does not pay adequate attention to the metaphors he has personally identified. Probably the reason is simply to be found in the tendency, rather characteristic of Systematic Theology, and the church at large (cf Smit 1985:35), to perpetuate a particular tradition.

Usually more justice is done to this aspect in the field of *New Testament Theology* (cf eg Ladd 1974:423-56; 479-94; Pelser 1985:246-62). Seeing that a more restricted area - like the Pauline corpus - is covered in this connection, it is more likely to give due credit to exegetical results. Even so, it is clear that the exegetical endeavour put into chapter 5 above has revealed quite a few soteriological metaphors which have never before been treated as substantial contributions to Pauline theology. Even König, who is well-aware of the fact that God's saving action is viewed from different perspectives, can make the blunder of reducing Paul's contribution to justification, mainly (cf 1983:56). Of course, he does not actually say that Paul is exclusively speaking in terms of justification, but, by putting the emphasis so decidedly on Paul's preference for justification, he does create the impression that the other metaphors might perhaps not be all that relevant as far as Paul is concerned. In any case, this is certainly how many people think of Paul's soteriology - they think it can be characterised, almost entirely, in terms of justification. Although it cannot be denied that the metaphor of justification does occupy a very prominent place in Paul's soteriology, it may be presumed that the present study has established, quite decisively, that it is by no means the only soteriological metaphor of importance in his major epistles. On the contrary, it is one of a host of metaphors interpreting the saving event, and it is only properly understood in relation to all these other metaphors.

Commenting on the metaphorical (or symbolical) way in which we characterise God as Father and Lord, Berkhof (1973:72) has made a remark

which is readily applicable even in the present context. He says:

Welke eigenschappen van een aardse vader wij analoog aan God mogen toeschrijven, lezen wij af uit de andere symbolische uitdrukkingen waardoor dit symbool is omringd. Daarom is het niet geoorloofd, de openbaring of de God van de openbaring met een enkel woord te karakteriseren. Los van de andere woorden en van datgene waaraan het uitdrukking moet geven, verliest elk symboolwoord zijn relevantie en transparantie.

Similarly one could argue that even Paul's soteriology should certainly not be understood in terms of only one metaphor; the variety of metaphors he is employing, are not only interrelated, but also interdependent and mutually modifying. According to Theissen (1974:284) this very fact also underlines the need for a structuralistic approach to this particular field of meaning. He contends that,

Ein strukturalistischer Ansatz könnte hier eine Alternative zur traditionsgeschichtlichen Lösung des Problems anbieten: Denkbar ist, dass die Intention paulinischer Soteriologie in keiner einzelnen Symbolik und Thematik liegt, sondern im Beziehungsgefüge aller Symbole, in der Struktur eines umfassenden Feldes soteriologischer Sinneinheiten.

This, of course, is what we have tried to accomplish in the present thesis by way of the semantic field approach, and with the aid of the method known as 'componential analysis of meaning'. In such a way even the less important soteriological metaphors may serve to complete the pattern of Paul's thought concerning "salvation", and thus the more well-known metaphors too come to be seen in a new perspective.

Obviously much more is needed in the context of Systematic Theology. In this dissertation we have only been looking at the major epistles of Paul, not even the whole Pauline corpus. For dogmatic purposes, on the contrary, it is evidently required that the scope of the entire Bible be comprehended. That does not mean, however, that the present contribution can be ignored. In fact, if the main letters of Paul yield so rich a harvest in this connection, one can just imagine how much more abundant the yield of the whole Bible ought to be. In comparison, then, the dogmatic treatment of this field of meaning might not seem to reflect its tremendous wealth.

### 7.5 Preaching and pastoral work - a new challenge:

In the final analysis, of course, a theological investigation which is failing to render a service to the preaching, teaching and pastoral work of the Church, would be rather meaningless. Our ultimate aim in studying the New Testament must certainly involve being better equipped for our responsibility in tending the flock of God. As Smart (1970:166) has suggested,

Theology as merely a specialized field of intellectual investigation is likely soon to drop away in the life of the pastor. Theology, however, is more likely to survive if it is a thorough facing of the critical question of how the church in its preaching and teaching, in its social and political action, in its total life, can be the faithful expression in the present-day world of that movement in history from beyond history which began with the prophets, Jesus, and the apostles.

Original metaphors, undoubtedly, offer an excellent way of opening up new avenues of thought, and are therefore time-honoured companions of preaching and pastoral work (cf Bohnen 1981:95-104). They serve, not just as illustrations, but actually as authentic interpretations and explications of the saving events (among other things). Their most important function in relation to preaching, says Bohnen (1981:103), is their ability of achieving a 'Seinsgewinn' (cf Jüngel 1974:121). By seeing the one thing in terms of another, they usually provide a striking new perspective on the issue in question.

The only problem is, however, that the same metaphor which may have produced a striking effect in Biblical times, might fail completely to elicit understanding in our situation. Either because we have become so familiar with it, or because there are some cultural overtones which are beyond our grasp, it might just not be able to stir our imagination, as a metaphor is supposed to do. It is then that one feels to agree with Zauner (1985:289), when he utters the following complaint:

Wir stehen mit unserer Botschaft da wie mit einem Bündel Ostgeld vor einer westlichen Bank: Man wechselt es nur ungern und zu einem beschämend niedrigen Kurs; es gilt nicht viel in der westlichen Wirtschaft.

It is just as true, nevertheless, that those Biblical metaphors cannot

simply be discarded (cf Zauner 1985:291; also §7.1 above). Although one might perhaps allow for new metaphors to supplement the original ones, those original ones can never be replaced. In fact, they will always enjoy a normative significance (cf Thiselton 1977a:309). Therefore it is essential, even for the sake of more effective preaching and teaching, and for the sake of pastoral applicability, that those Biblical metaphors be revitalised. This, anyway, is what we hope to have achieved - to a certain extent, at least - in the present study. It has become apparent, for sure, that Paul chose his soteriological metaphors from at least four different cultural spheres. By becoming aware of these spheres of origin, and of the different eventful situations in which the various metaphors were born, something of that metaphorical tension and interaction between donor field and recipient field may hopefully be rekindled.

The Church, then, is challenged to keep this awareness of a metaphorical tension alive in its preaching and pastoral work. This task, one may assume, is alleviated by the fact that many of these soteriological metaphors were shaped in response to practical situations which may even appeal to the modern mind. To a certain measure, they answer to the needs that are experienced in the Church, even today. For that matter, pastoral needs are not excluded. Yet, at the same time these metaphors are also determined by the character of the saving event itself. As such, of course, they are basically aimed at the establishing of understanding, and therefore fit for educational purposes in preaching and teaching.

However, it has been indicated before (cf §3.3 above), that it is not quite enough just to explain a metaphor. As Goldingay (1977:358) has stated, '... a metaphor that needs explaining is thereby shown to have lost its force.' In the preaching and teaching these metaphors must therefore be presented in such a way that something of the original 'punch' be repeated. As an attempt to achieve this end, I have tried to supply a striking translational equivalent for most of the semantic units considered in chapter five. This attempt may perhaps be seen as a matter of 'challenging and reclaiming symbols' (cf Coll 1985:373-82). Just as symbols, metaphors '... require more than intellectual assent; they speak to a deep part of our being and if they do not hit that chord

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within, they cease to be symbols (or metaphors - v-D.) in the real sense of that word' (Coll 1985:375). It is hoped that a fresh and powerful metaphorical translation will hit that chord within, and thus stimulate new insight through preaching and pastoral work.

CHAPTER 8.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

O depth of wealth, wisdom, and knowledge in God! How unsearchable his judgements, how untraceable his ways! Who knows the mind of the Lord? Who has been his counsellor? Who has ever made a gift to him, to receive a gift in return? Source, Guide, and Goal of all that is - to him be glory for ever! Amen.

(Rm 11:33-36 - NEB).

8.1 Summary:

Although salvation has been the topic of numerous theological investigations before, the present study has been undertaken in the belief that new perspectives could be opened by the application of different methods, currently developed in the fields of Semantics and Semiotics. Two aspects, mainly, which had not previously received due attention in the study of Pauline soteriology, had to be included in our approach to this topic. In the first place, it was felt that the implementation of structural methods - in the Saussurean tradition - would yield interesting new results. In the second place, there was the realisation that Paul had actually been casting his thoughts about salvation in the form of metaphors. These two aspects, then, had to be investigated first, in an attempt to gain a fresh *entrance to the Bible*.

The structural methods which were to be employed in this dissertation, involved two significant semantic principles - that of paradigmatic relations between semantic units, and that of a synchronic approach to the study of meaning. The consideration of these principles led us to the insight that salvation ought to be treated in terms of the *semantic field* constituted by a number of related meanings. These meanings could be analysed, relative to each other, by means of the method known as a *componential analysis of meaning*. By the application of this method, one ought to discover certain components of meaning that are being shared by all the units included in the particular semantic field. These are known as *common components*, establishing the cohesion of the field, and therefore function as the most important criterion for the *delineation* of the field. However, the related

meanings belonging to the same semantic field may also be clearly distinguished from one another in terms of certain *diagnostic components* of meaning. In other words, according to this approach, meaning should not be determined in isolation, but rather in relational terms. It is only by contrast with related meanings that the peculiar contribution of a specific semantic unit can be established.

Apart from the linguistic and semantic side of the research to be undertaken in this thesis, one also had to take the literary side into consideration (in ch 3), seeing that the semantic field we were going to discuss, had been identified as one consisting of *metaphors*. Among the various theories regarding the true character of metaphorical language, a choice was made in favour of the *interaction theory*. According to this theory, a metaphor should be understood as a *semantic innovation*, which is brought about by means of a 'calculated error' (or a 'category mistake'). One is, so to speak, challenged to interpret a new experience in terms of a more familiar one. Metaphor, says Ricoeur (1975:79) '... discloses a relationship of meaning hitherto unnoticed between terms which were prevented from communicating by former classifications.' The tension and interaction between the so-called tenor and vehicle of the metaphor, are necessary prerequisites of its success as a metaphor. Moreover, according to Kittay and Lehrer (1981:31-63) this interaction does not only take place between single lexical units, but even between semantic fields. The idea of a *donor field* and a *recipient field*, which are being drawn into a process of metaphorical interaction, obviously suited the purposes of the present study perfectly well. Certainly a point of conjunction with the semantic field approach was established.

In the second section of this dissertation, then, the focus was turned to *the Bible* itself - more especially to the four major epistles of Paul. The principles and methods discussed in the first section, now had to be implemented.

First of all, the semantic field in question had to be delineated. It involved the tentative selection of meanings which appeared to be closely related, in the sense that they all seemed to describe an

*intervening action of God (the Father, Son and Holy Spirit) whereby the spiritual status or state of man is radically changed. Assuming that the saving event should be understood in terms of Paul's eschatological frame of reference (with its characteristic overlapping of the two aeons), soteriological metaphors were chosen without any regard for the tense aspect. The human answer to this saving intervention of the triune God was also deliberately excluded from consideration. So too, the study was restricted to Paul's major epistles, in order to prevent it from becoming unmanageable. Eventually a list of nearly thirty different metaphors was suggested as an outline of the semantic field "salvation".*

In chapter five all these metaphors were analysed. On the one hand, they were treated as semantic units, so that an attempt was made to determine the various components of meaning. On the other hand, one had to bear the fact in mind that it was a metaphorical meaning one was looking for. In other words, it was not a matter of simple analysis. Actually one had to try and dig up the original setting of each metaphor. Within the context of the donor field, then, the semantic components could be defined. Against that background the re-interpretation of those components in the recipient field could be assessed, and a translational equivalent could be proposed that would serve to maintain the relation of interaction between donor field and recipient field.

In this way twenty-eight different soteriological metaphors were subjected to scrutiny. They were categorised according to the different cultural spheres from which they had originated. Most of them (13 to be exact) proved to have connections with the sphere of social interaction. Another seven had their origin in the sphere of biological and physiological transformation, while the cultic and ritual realm and the technical sphere of life were identified as the source of four each.

Of course, although only these four categories were used as an ordering principle, there were as many different donor fields involved as there were metaphors. From within the sphere of social interaction, for instance, Paul could select a wide variety of situations to serve as a

nursery for soteriological metaphors. What is more, most of these donor fields could offer a number of lexical units to describe the event in question - with very slight nuances of meaning. These were therefore treated as conveying different shades of the same meaning. (Cf §5.1.2 above, where it was found that the semantic unit of *liberation* could be expressed by the following lexical units: ἐξαγοράζω ἀπολύτρωσις, ἐλευθερώω, δικαιοῶ, καταργέομαι.)

Furthermore, it also proved possible that some semantic units could be represented by an entire pericope, rather than by particular lexical items. For example, it became evident that Romans 6, as a whole, was basically determined by the metaphor of a change of ownership (cf §5.1.3 above. Of course, one may be able to find certain expressions in the chapter - eg vss 18 & 22 - in which the semantic unit in question is contracted. The application of the method of discourse analyses, therefore, seemed to have been justified by its results in terms of showing that the entire chapter was orientated towards that specific meaning.)

Without repeating the detail of the whole list of metaphors at this point, some indication of the special contributions made by individual metaphors must obviously be included in this summary. One can hardly summarise this dissertation without giving a glimpse of the kaleidoscope of "salvation" Paul was displaying. Perhaps it is enough to say (first of all, in terms of the sphere of social interaction):

- Paul saw us in mortal danger, from which we were *delivered (saved)* by God;
- he recognised our slavery to different powers, and understood that we were *liberated*, so that God alone could be our Master;
- he also sensed, however, that God did not just buy us as his slaves, but also *adopted* us as his children, *accepting (welcoming)* us into his own company;
- we who used to be guilty before God as the Judge, were *acquitted* on account of Christ's death, our sins were *forgiven*;
- thus the enmity between God and us was removed and friendship was restored, we were *reconciled* with God;
- that amounts to: a poor man becoming *rich*, a loser becoming a *winner*, a loss being turned into a *profit*, the *glorification* of some-

one who fell short of God's glory, an outsider receiving a new name by God's creative *call*.

This same event, however, may also be seen in terms of biological and physiological processes:

- Paul thought of us as *dying and rising* - with Christ - so that we could enter a new realm of life;
- he certified us as dead, so that we had to be *raised* by God;
- in fact, our state was so hopeless, that we had to be *created* all over again, we had to be *re-formed* so as to conform to God's image;
- we were blind and in the dark, but God restored our *sight*;
- we found ourselves not being part of Christ's body, but were *incorporated* into this body through baptism, just as one would *graft* a wild branch into a cultivated olive tree.

Through the lens of cultic and ritual practices the same saving intervention of God acquired yet a different colour and shape:

- By giving his own Son as a sacrifice, God himself *expiated* our sins, thus making *atonement* for us;
- we who used to be in the sphere of the profane, were drawn into the presence of the holy God, we were *sanctified*;
- the dirt and defilement of sin was removed as in the ritual *washing*;
- and through *anointing* (with the Spirit) we were introduced to the new status of a special fellowship with God.

Even technical procedures could serve to explain and interpret God's redemptive action:

- By putting his mark of ownership on us, we were *sealed* as God's own property;
- we who used to be loose bricks, were *built into* the new temple in which God himself is dwelling through his Spirit;
- as a skillful *Potter*, God shaped us into the form He had desired;
- and, in order not to be found naked, we were enfolded in Jesus Christ, our whole life was *clad* in a brand new garment.

From the synthesis of these results, the comprehensive structure of the semantic field "salvation" could be outlined in chapter six. **The**

componential analyses of the previous chapter, in particular, enabled us to identify certain common components, as well as diagnostic components of this field of meaning. Compiling all the common features, the field was shown to consist of a variety of *metaphorical* units, describing an *eschatological* event, involving the *triune* God's *saving* intervention, whereby a *change* is effected in the *spiritual* life of an *individual*, amounting to a *turn-about* from a *negative* religious position to a *positive* one. The following components of meaning, however, were suggested as diagnostic features, distinguishing the various meanings belonging to this field (although they may be shared by several units):

- The different *cultural spheres* from which the metaphors had originated;
- The distinction between a *change of status* and a *change of state*;
- The aspect of a power struggle resulting in the *liberation* from *evil forces*;
- The *nullifying* of *guilt*;
- The establishing of a *new relationship*;
- The *incorporation* into a *new fellowship*;
- The *radical transformation* of one's religious disposition;
- The idea of a *re-creation*.

Assessing this comprehensive picture, the conclusion was reached that it was indeed essential for the understanding of the Pauline soteriology in its *unity and variety*. Both the relatedness and the distinctiveness of those metaphors could thus be determined. Yet, for the special contribution of every unit in this field, one would still have to rely on the analytical part; all the details could impossibly be comprehended in the synthesis. The synthesis has, nevertheless, indicated that the semantic field "salvation" should be recognised as a *contiguous cluster of meanings*.

In the final section of the thesis some of the practical consequences of the study were more explicitly shown. Benefits accrue, not only for the investigation of the New Testament, but also for Systematic Theology and Practical Theology. Even Lexicography may gain from the results of our research. The fact that one is enabled to define more accurately, not only the cohesion between various related semantic units, but also their distinctions, may certainly be valued as a positive contribution

to all efforts which are aimed at the understanding of Paul's letters. Obviously it will make more accurate translation possible, just as it will enrich our ability to draw dogmatic conclusions. Eventually it will also bear fruit for preaching, teaching and pastoral work - especially where the metaphorical character of this semantic field, with its pragmatic orientation, is given due recognition.

## 8.2 Conclusion:

At the end of this study, one cannot help to feel that it was a worthwhile enterprise. Of course, the last word has definitely not been spoken in this dissertation. Many aspects of what has been said, might probably be criticised. Someone might feel that refinement is required in respect of both the theoretical consideration and the eventual implementation of the methods that have been employed. At least, though, it may be hoped that a new direction has been indicated for future studies. Even though other scholars have used a similar approach to the investigation of the New Testament, the particular combination of methods employed in the present study must be relatively unique. Since it has obviously yielded worthwhile results, it may be expected that someone else might follow the same line of investigation.

The final impression left by this survey, no doubt, is that of amazement at the marvellous richness of the divine salvation which was wrought in Christ and through the Spirit. Even if someone has played this tune before me (cf Alves 1984:240), this effort has once more revealed that this salvation is so multi-faceted that a new approach to the same old truth may still leave one at a complete loss of words. Then one can only say amen to Paul's doxology in Romans 11:33-36. Indeed, to this Saviour God be glory for ever, since He is the Source, Guide and Goal of all that is - certainly of salvation, and also of the present study!

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
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
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
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APPENDIX 1.

1. Discourse analysis of Rm 6: 1-23:







2. Summary of the analysis presented above:

