A philosophical understanding of the relation between the spiritual nature of persons and basic structures of intersubjectivity.

by M F N SHUTTE

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1. Introduction

Each chapter in this study will begin with an introduction setting out the purpose and the structure of the chapter. The present chapter is introductory to the whole work. Accordingly it begins with a consideration of the contemporary setting of the issue that is the central concern of our study. We then set out in detail the aim of the study and the method to be employed. The notions of spirituality and materiality, which are the keys both to the definition of the contemporary issue about the nature of persons and to the notion of a person that our analysis of intersubjectivity is held to manifest, are then presented by means of a brief historical sketch and also a preliminary conceptual analysis. That concludes our introduction which we judge sufficient to ensure an accurate grasp of our aim and method and the central concepts that we shall employ.

1.1 The contemporary scene

The ideas we have about the nature of persons are among the most important we have about anything. Not only will they have far-reaching implications for the human sciences; they will also influence our actual attitudes and actions. Ideas about the nature of persons will underlie our political and religious practice, our moral beliefs and our actual personal relationships themselves. This being the case, it is also important to be critically aware of them, as far as possible to remove contradictions between them and ensure that the resulting coherent system of ideas is true to what we are.

For I am assuming that we are indeed persons. In one sense such an assumption is a tautology. In English the word "person" is ambiguous. It can mean simply an individual human being. It has however a more technical use, connoting properties which certainly all human beings naturally possess but which it is possible that other sorts of being (angels, Martians, apes, dolphins?) do as well. What properties these are shall presently be enquired into. But taking the word in its most common sense it is the case that at present in English-speaking philosophy there are two competing systems of ideas about the nature of persons engaged in apparently irreconcilable opposition. I shall refer to them as "dualist" and "materialist".

As I shall be discussing dualism and materialism in detail in other places in this work I shall not say much about them by way of definition here. By "dualism" is meant any sort of ontological distinction between "mind" and
"matter" in human persons, in whatever terms this is expressed. By "materialism" I refer to the various forms of "physicalism", "mind-brain identity theory", "central-state materialism" that are current in contemporary philosophy. For the purposes of this work it is unnecessary to distinguish between particular variants of materialism or dualism. I shall make quite clear what view of persons I am arguing for and quite clear what this excludes,

This opposition of dualism and materialism is not merely a philosophical phenomenon. It has a wider cultural form as well. Materialism regarding the nature of persons is an aspect of a generally scientific and technological culture. Dualism is chiefly to be found in the sphere of religion. But however widely the opposition extends it raises philosophical problems. The problem of dualism is that of the unity of persons. We do experience ourselves as possessed of an enduring unity of life. How can this be the case if we are composed of two radically different elements? The problem of materialism is its apparent inadequacy to give a satisfactory account of the "mental" in human life.

The term that I shall use in this study to signify those properties that constitute their possessors persons in the technical sense is "spiritual". This is not a word that is common in contemporary English-speaking philosophy. It is partly for that reason that I use it. I shall be defining it exhaustively, and there will be less cause to confuse my own with other usages. It is also a term that is quite at home in one contemporary school of philosophy, namely the Thomist. And as we shall be making special use of Aquinas' metaphysics in this study, it is convenient to use a term that is closely related to them. The notion of the spiritual has however a long history in Western philosophical thought, having its roots in Biblical and, as some would argue, also in Greek thought. This might well be a sign that it denotes some enduring aspect of our nature, something moreover that might well be overlooked in a culture and a philosophy that has ceased to use it in any serious sense.

The term "spiritual" is at home in the dualist camp of the contemporary opposition. Indeed many will no doubt feel that "spirit" is more of a "ghost" in the machine than a mind could ever be. Be that as it may, we shall certainly use the term to mean at least "immaterial". We shall, that is to say, oppose a spiritual notion of persons to a materialist one. On the other hand we shall argue that although persons are spiritual beings, and although human beings are undeniable material, nevertheless human beings are persons and, moreover,
human persons are possessed of a unity as complete and as enduring as any materialist monist could wish.

1.2 Our aim and method

This is perhaps enough by way of necessary prologue. We must now state the purpose of this study. It is, put baldly, to reconcile the opposing views of persons that we have described. But now we must make this purpose more precise.

The two views of persons have had histories of their own. The dualist view was not always so dualist. And the materialist view gained an important new dimension after the Enlightenment, connected both with the philosophy of Hegel and the rise of the human sciences. This new dimension was the bringing to light of the essentially relational character of personal life.

We feel that the two views of persons can be reconciled by means of, on the one hand, a re-understanding of the spiritual, and, on the other, a thorough examination of the structure of personal relations to reveal their special character.

We propose accordingly, in this work, to analyse the fundamental forms of interpersonal relations, those in which persons are related to others as persons and which we call inter-subjective, with a view to showing that they do in fact manifest the spiritual nature of persons.

Our whole study is situated in the Thomist philosophical tradition. We thus approach the notion of the spiritual from this standpoint. To be more precise, we presuppose a basic foundation of Thomist metaphysics and expound the notion of spirituality against this background. We intend nevertheless to interpret and express this metaphysics in terms that will make sense both to those philosophers who are ignorant of it and to those who disagree with it. We specifically wish our interpretation to be understood by English-speaking philosophers of other philosophical schools.

To expound the notion of a person as a spiritual being we will make use of the work of contemporary Thomists rather than Aquinas himself. The reason for this is that they have consciously assimilated elements of the relational view of the person as it has come down to us through Hegelian, existential and phenomenological philosophy and so are able to define the spiritual in terms that are better suited to a comparison with the phenomena of intersubjectivity. In addition to this contemporary Thomists have to a large extent "personalised"
the somewhat cosmological categories of Aquinas' metaphysics (and this too under the influence of currents of thought produced by the rise of the human sciences), which makes it easier to relate metaphysical terms to terms descriptive of the phenomena of personal relations.

When we leave the metaphysical account of a person as a spiritual being and turn to the analysis of intersubjectivity, we shall not limit ourselves to Thomist authors. Other things being equal we would prefer to do so since it would be easier to relate our metaphysical account of persons to descriptions of interpersonal relations by those who in fact shared our metaphysics. Apart from anything else there would be more chance of the two tallying. Other things however never are equal, and our concern is primarily to develop descriptions that are true. And that has been our sole criterion in selecting authors to assist us in our task. In fact although Thomist authors predominate in the chapters of this work devoted to the analysis of intersubjectivity, a very wide variety of others are also made use of. This we feel has the additional merit of ensuring objectivity. We cannot fairly be accused of "tailoring" the descriptions to fit the metaphysics. In any case the ultimate test is the description itself. Each description must stand or fall on its own merits.

If our project is well-conceived and our descriptions of the inter-subjective relations of persons do in fact manifest the spiritual nature of persons, then in completing them we shall have developed a new personal and interpersonal way of conceiving of spirituality. For those suspicious of all metaphysical categories, as well as for those who merely find the categories of Thomist metaphysics rather alien, this will be a great help towards accepting a view of persons that is, in our view both true and profound. In any case we hope that the metaphysical part of this project, our essay towards a re-understanding of the spiritual (if it can claim so grand a title - which it can't really since we are only presenting in slightly different terminology what is after all the common view of contemporary Thomists), will also help to dispel the cloudy "mythical" notion of the spiritual that lurks in some philosophical as well as in most popular conceptions of it.

Finally - and here we must presume that our main project has been successful - having shown that the phenomena of intersubjectivity do manifest the spiritual nature of persons, we hope to present a view of human persons which, while doing justice both to their spirituality and their materiality, nevertheless also preserves their essential unity.
Having set out the aim of this study we must indicate how we are to go about pursuing it. After this introductory chapter (which we shall conclude with two brief sketches, one of the history of the two notions of persons with which we are dealing, the other of the concept of matter), there follows a chapter whose purpose is to present our new metaphysical formulation of the notion of the spiritual. This is followed by a sequence of three chapters containing descriptions of the intersubjective situation attendant on, in this order, the exercise, growth and fulfilment of our specifically personal powers. Why there should be three and only three such descriptions it is a little difficult to say. We have been influenced in this to a certain extent by the work of the Scottish philosopher John Macmurray (about whom more presently), but even this influence is not sufficient to justify the precise number of our descriptions. In fact though it is perhaps true to say that there could have been any number of descriptions of different interpersonal relations, it is probably also true that there could not have been less than three. Personal life, and so personal relations too, develops in time and the logic of beginning - middle-end has something ineluctable about it. For want of a better covering clause we shall take shelter in that. It must be adverted to in this connection that our descriptions are in no sense randomly chosen from the limitless wealth of personal relations between persons. They are descriptions of the necessary intersubjective conditions for the exercise (and development and fulfilment) of our specifically personal powers. It is only as such that their manifestation of spirituality can have all the significance that we require.

This study will conclude with a chapter of summary and application. The results of the three chapters on intersubjectivity will be related to those of the chapter on spirituality and a final judgement on their consonance delivered. Last, but not least, the problem of the unity of a human person will be tackled, and thus the work will end.

We are not yet in possession of all we need in order to grasp the problem of this study as we ought. We need both to know more of the nature of the opposed views of persons and also of the opposition of spirit and matter that we intend to introduce in place of more common descriptions of the duality. To this end we thus proceed first to a sketch of the historical background of the two notions of persons, and then, since we shall be defining the nature of the spiritual at great length, to a discussion of the concept of matter.
2. The historical background

The historical root of the notion of the person that underlies most forms of contemporary dualism is the Biblical notion of man being made "in the image of God" (Genesis I). The God of the Bible, unlike those of the Greeks, is conceived of as transcendent to the universe He has created. Indeed the notion of creation precisely expresses this transcendence. Insofar as he is "the image of God" man shares in this transcendence. In the case of man this transcendence is not expressed in the activity of creation but rather in that of ordering and controlling the natural order. He is in a derived sense also responsible for creation. The other side of this responsibility is freedom to carry out the divine commands. Man is thus, like God, independent, at least to a limited extent, from the natural order of the world.

On this Biblical basis and through the reflection of the Church Fathers a theological anthropology is progressively constructed. It is no longer expressed in narrative and mythical terms as in the Bible but in the terminology of Greek, and especially Platonic and neo-Platonic, philosophy. The pre-medieval development of this notion of the person can be summed up in Boethius' celebrated definition: "persona est natura rationalis individua substandia" (Du Duabus Naturis, 3). (Halder, 1969) This definition captures in philosophical terminology the special sort of individuality attendant on personal being. The note of rationality is peculiarly Greek, but the conception embodied in the definition is that of a being possessed of a peculiar and absolute unity and independence of being that reflects the simplicity and eternity of God. The scholastic development of the notion emphasizes this. Aquinas takes over Boethius' definition but adds by way of explication the notes of "incommunicabilis" (Summa Theologiae, 1.30.4 ad 2), (1963) and "subsistentia" (Summa Contra Gentiles 4.49). (1955) Finally, Richard of St Victor appears to put it all together in "intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia" (De Trinitate 4.22.24). (Halder, 1969) Here the emphasis is clear, of an absolute unity and independence of being. As A Halder (1969: 404) puts it in the article "Person" in Sacramentum Mundi: "Person does not mean "essence" or "nature" but the actual unique reality of a spiritual being, an undivided whole existing independently and not interchangeable with any other." The word "spiritual" is actually introduced to signify the difference of this sort of being from other kinds of being in the world. And the fact that human persons in addition to being persons are also beings in the world, formed from "the dust of the earth", is where the connection of this notion of persons with dualism is to be found. A certain duality was present from the very beginning,
a duality of transcendence of versus involvement in the world. In the terminology of Greek philosophy this became an internal duality of soul and body. Often this was understood in a Platonic sense. This involved a strict dualism, the human individual being identified with the soul at the expense of the body. Nevertheless, this position was always in conflict with the official doctrine of the Church, which strongly affirmed the unity of the human person in its faith in "the resurrection of the body" and the real presence of the person of Jesus in the "body" and "blood" of the eucharist. It was not however until the Christianisation of the philosophy of Aristotle by Aquinas in the thirteenth century that a satisfactory formula could be found to relate this notion of the person to human persons, namely that whereby the spiritual soul was defined as the Aristotelian form of the body.

The notion of the person whose development we have so briefly charted though strictly metaphysical, was big with consequences for ordinary personal and social life. Apart from implying the incorruptibility of the soul, and hence the possibility of a life beyone death for its possessor, it also entailed the notion of respect for the moral dignity of the subject of such a self-contained and independent form of life. As such persons were seen as being the possessors of rights and duties that went far beyond those granted or imposed on them by any particular state or positive law.

In spite however of the Thomist synthesis, the dualist potential of this conception of the person was revivified in the centuries that followed Aquinas. The development of the natural sciences fostered a conception of nature as a mechanical, or at any rate, a material system. The notion of material extension, partes extra partes, as also that of measurable regular forces producing changes in the position and behaviour of otherwise inert substances, were diametrically opposed to the notion of the person that had been developed during the middle ages. Even the atomism built into the scientific conception, though superficially similar to the radical individuality of persons, was in fact the very antithesis of it. Whereas each person was a unique centre of life and activity, each atom was merely an identical unit of a homogeneous flux. The radical dualism of Descartes was a perhaps inevitable result of this vision of the natural world. Man was after all a thinking subject and as such quite opposed to the object of his (scientific) thought. At the same time there could be no doubt that his body was part of the same objectified world that his science studied. A dualism of substance became an exigence of reflective thought.
Such a dualism of substance fitted ill with the theoretical superstructure of the natural sciences. As we shall see in greater detail in the following section the pre-dominance of the notion of matter in the natural sciences led eventually to a metaphysical materialism. The success and prestige of natural science led to the generalisation of its object and method to encompass the whole of reality. So even where a dualistic theory of man was maintained it was against the background of a naively realist theory of science that had an internal affinity with materialism. Man appeared as the one exception to an otherwise admirably monist theory of reality.

This opposition between dualism and a materialist monism is the form in which the problem about the nature of human person appears even in contemporary philosophy. It is not in its fundamental features any different from the opposition between, say, the phenomenalism of Hume and the dualism of Kant, in the 18th century. During the 19th century however a reaction to dualism began that has quite distinctive features of its own. We must devote some attention to this since it forms, so we believe, the historical root of that quite new approach to persons that offers promise of reconciliation between materialism and dualism.

In spite of the fact that the new approach explicitly intended to overcome the dualism of the older tradition by a renewed understanding of the notion of the spiritual, it is nevertheless situated within a "materialist" tradition of thought about persons. The sense in which this is true will very soon become apparent.

The clearest, the most influential and the most enduring example of the new approach to persons is the philosophy of Hegel. His philosophy begins indeed as an explicit attempt to overcome what he saw as the false dichotomies of Kant, those of understanding and reason, inclination and will, of moral freedom and natural necessity and, above all, of the noumenal and the phenomenal worlds. What is new in the attempt to overcome dualism that is typified by Hegel's philosophy is that it is also a reaction to mechanism of any sort, and the atomism that that inevitably implied. In place of a fundamentally mechanical model of reality Hegel puts a fundamentally organic one. Charles Taylor brings this out very well in his study on Hegel. Taylor (1975: 80) writes "Hegel is in fact one of the important links in a chain of thought in modern philosophical anthropology, one which is opposed to both dualism and mechanism, and which we see continued in different ways in Marxism and modern phenomenology."
Hegel's conception of persons is intrinsically related to his notion of Spirit. I do not need to go into the ramifications of this extremely complex notion in order to explain how Hegel's conception of persons differed from a dualist one. But I must say something in a summary way so as to relate Hegel to the general argument of this study.

The notion of Spirit is that of a subject who realises itself by virtue of an activity of self-expression, the result of which is then appropriated by a further act of affirmation or recognition. Put otherwise, Spirit's self-realisation occurs in two stages or moments, one of self-externalisation or self-objectification in what is other than the self, the other of identification with or possession of this external objectification of itself.

Taylor calls the view of man derived from Hegel's notion of Spirit an "expressivist" one. This is a useful term in the context of the present work because it introduces the notion of an intrinsic relation to "otherness" into the notion of subjectivity itself. It is perhaps a good thing to see a little more of what Taylor means by the term. With this in mind I give the following two quotations:

"If we return to our guiding analogy, the way in which an action or gesture can express what is characteristic about a person, we can see that there are two aspects which can be united in this idea. Something I do or say can express my feelings or aspirations in the sense we can speak of a person expressing himself when he finally gets out and thus makes determinate, perhaps for the first time what he feels or wants. In another sense we can speak of someone's actions as expressions of his feelings or desires when they carry out what he wants, or realize his aspirations. These two aspects can be separated; I can bring my desires to verbal expression without acting, I can act and remain an enigma to myself and others; but they often do go together, and frequently we are inclined to say of ourselves or others that we did not really know what we felt or wanted until we acted. Thus the fullest and most convincing expression of a subject is one where he both realizes and clarifies his aspirations...

Thus the notion of human life as expression sees this not only as the realization of purposes but also as the clarification of these purposes. It is not only the fulfilment of life but also the clarification of meaning. In the course of living adequately I not only fulfil my humanity but clarify what my humanity is about. As such a clarification my life-form is not just the fulfilment of purpose but the embodiment of meaning, the expression of an idea. The expression theory breaks with the Enlightenment dichotomy between meaning and being, at least as far as human life is concerned." (Taylor, 1975: 16)
To this one must add, as Taylor himself also makes clear, that the categories of the expressivist view are opposed to all internal dualisms as well. The self is seen as a radically unitary being, developing itself as a whole in its expressive outward directed activity. Spirituality as interiority is in no way opposed to the externality of matter.

Expressivist theories of man, by virtue of the intrinsic connection of self-realisation with otherness, overcome the opposition inherent in the dualist theories between the knowing subject and an objective nature. This dualism, also reflected in an interior dualism of mind and body, was replaced by the duality of self and other. This duality was however, in the notion of Spirit, merely the duality of two "poles" of a self-referential unity of conscious life.

The relevance of this highly abstract metaphysical conception of Spirit to this work can be seen once one takes note of the way in which Hegel "fleshed out" the notion in concrete terms. In the concrete, Spirit exists only as persons in relation to each other. As Hegel (1910:227) himself puts it, "A self-consciousness has before it a self-consciousness. Only so and only then is it self-consciousness; for here first of all it comes to have the unity of itself in its otherness. Ego which is the object of its notion, is in point of fact not "object" ... When a self-consciousness is the object, the object is just as much ego as object." And again, "Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or "recognized"." (Hegel, 1910: 229)

Our concern here is historical rather than critical. We shall see however in the chapters to follow the pervasive influence of such ideas as these. In particular the idea that persons can only realize themselves as persons in relation to other persons will provide the key to our analysis of intersubjectivity and the possibility of a bridge between a "dualist" or spiritual notion of persons and a materialistic one.

It is important in this connection to note that Hegel's conception of persons is a materialist one in the broad sense we have already defined. The fact that he derives it from his notion of Spirit should not mislead us into thinking otherwise. Hegel's notion of spirit is quite other that the traditional notion. Taylor (1975: 24) sees this very clearly: "The rejection of any disembodied spiritual reality is as we shall see one of the basic principles of Hegel's philosophy" And, distinguishing Hegel's idealism from Cartesianism, "This is paradoxically very different from all other forms of idealism, which tend to the denial of external reality, or material reality ... Hegel's idealism,
far from being a denial of external material reality, is the strongest affirmation of it; it not only exists but necessarily exists."

In contradistinction to the older view Hegel's Spirit is not characterised by the absolute transcendence of the natural world that we have noted. Nor are persons possessed of an enduring and unique identity; they are in no sense incorruptible or capable of a life beyond death. In fact it is probably true, though there is a good deal of difference of interpretation, here, that Spirit is a cultural rather than a natural category. It certainly seems to me to be true that in asserting that man is Spirit Hegel is not wishing to say that he is in any sense possessed of an immaterial nature. He is rather drawing attention to the way in which each person's identity depends on his relation to human culture in the broad sense. Thus his humanity is derived from this product rather than being the necessary natural condition for it.

This novel conception of persons embodied in Hegel's notion of Spirit did not die with Hegel, but has proved immensely fruitful ever since. The idea that persons can realize themselves only in relation to other persons, coupled with the notion that "person" is a cultural rather than a natural designation, has a strong affinity with the emphasis on environmental influence, both natural and social, that characterises the biological and behavioural sciences that have developed since his time. John Macmurray (1957: 62-83) has carefully charted this connection.

Hegel's formulations of the "relational" view of persons are both extremely brief and extremely enigmatic. They are constructed at such a high level of metaphysical generality that they are open to the most various interpretations. But because individual persons are only a manifestation of or a participation in Spirit there is an in-built tendency to collectivism and even "totalitarianism" in Hegel's theory. In other words the relational element is always understood primarily as the dependence of individual persons on their relations with others, or in terms of the influence of the social environment on the individual. What I have said above about Hegel's notion of Spirit being a cultural rather than a natural category is of a piece with this tendency.

The best example of this kind of interpretation of Hegel is of course that of Marx. From Feuerbach (1957: 66) ("Only through his fellow does man become clear to himself and self-conscious.") Marx took over the notion of man as a "species being" and used this to interpret Hegel's metaphysical categories in a definitely sociological sense:
"The individual is the social being ... In his species-consciousness man confirms his real social life, and reproduces his real existence in thought; while conversely, species-life confirms itself in species consciousness and exists for itself in its universality as a thinking being. Though man is a unique individual - and it is just his particularity which makes him an individual, a really individual communal being - he is equally the whole, the ideal whole, the subjective existence of society as thought and experienced. He exists in reality as the representation and the real mind of social existence, and as the sum of human manifestation of life." (Fromm, 1961: 130)

The species-being of an individual is not a natural property but his conscious participation in the cultural life of the social whole. Only insofar as he does so is the individual a strictly "human" individual, a member of the "human" species. Such dependence on others in order to develop one's humanity so far from being opposed to a materialist view of man is entirely consonant with it. We shall see this more clearly when we come to discuss materiality as relation to otherness in the work of contemporary Thomist writers.

Existentialist writers also derive their view of the relationality of human existence from Hegel. By and large they reject his "collectivism" finding it incompatible with the autonomy of the individual person. But asserting the freedom of the individual at the same time as his relationality proves a difficult task, putting a great strain on the metaphysical framework in which they attempt to do it.

Heidegger's account of human existence certainly includes the relational aspect as an essential part of it. As he puts it, "Dasein is essentially Being-With." (Heidegger, 1962: 137) And again, "The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is Being-with." (Heidegger, 1962: 135) The status of such expressions is that of a phenomenological description of a basic structure of consciousness. They are not factual statements about concrete relations between different persons. They thus refer to the consciousness of every individual person. In Being and Time, where the expressions occur, Heidegger is content to simply assert them. And nowhere else does he offer any deduction or derivation of them. Perhaps this intrinsic relatedness to others is associated with (and even to be derived from) the fundamentally artificial environment that constitutes the "world" of Dasein. All Heidegger's examples point to this connection. He speaks of the presence of Others in the equipment and the artefact of the craftsman, in the book we have bought or the boat we happen upon or even in the field along whose perimeter we are walking. The "world" of Dasein is haunted by the presence of Others. The "world" of Dasein
is not however the real world in which real people meet or avoid each other but the object-term of the individual's conscious self-presence. It is here, prior to all involvement in the real world, that Heidegger wishes to affirm an orientation to the Other. Just as much as persons are turned outwards towards objects of concern, so are they always related to possible others similarly placed - even if no actual others actually exist. "Being-with is an extential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world." (Heidegger, 1962: 137) Heidegger seems to be describing an essential plurality in our awareness of ourselves. What the source of such plurality is, he does not say. In view of its connection in his thought with spatiality and temporality, it does not seem to me far-fetched to connect it with what we shall presently come to understand as the intrinsic plurality of a material essence.

This speculation is of interest in view of the apparent tendency towards "collectivism" of Heidegger's notion of "being-with". This basic orientation of our consciousness expresses itself in social life most naturally in the inauthenticity of the "they". The individual's identity is submerged in that of the crowd. Sartre (1966: 222) picks up this tendency of Heidegger's thought, perceptively remarking that the best symbol of Heidegger's intuition is that of the "crew".

Whether or not one is justified in remarking totalitarian tendencies in Heidegger's thought, he does seem to find it difficult to show how the individual can affirm his freedom except in opposition to the Others. Sartre (1966: 223) certainly criticises him for his illogicality in doing this. And Heidegger does not say enough about authentic modes of existence to counter the conviction that Sartre is right. "Being-with" certainly should not be understood as implying any real intimacy and mutuality, or even "recognition" in an Hegelian sense. The nearest Heidegger gets to equating an authentic form of Dasein and a form of Being-with is when he speaks of solicitude. "Solicitude" is a general term, as wide as "Being-with". But within it Heidegger distinguishes "deficient" from others - presumably not deficient - forms of solicitude. One such "non-deficient" form of solicitude he calls "Being for". (Heidegger, 1962: 138) The change in preposition is significant. It throws light on the otherwise obscure statement that "Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with" (Heidegger, 1962: 137) by suggesting that there is a way of reconciling authentic existence and relations with others. But even if Heidegger does feel that this can, and indeed ought, to be done, his notion of Being-with does not seem to provide an adequate foundation for the possibility of doing it.
Sartre too stands in the tradition of thought about the human person which we are discussing and whose roots we have discerned in Hegel's idea of Spirit. Though an existentialist thinker he is, as we have already noted, intensely critical of Heidegger. He feels that in giving his whole attention to the structures of the individual Dasein's consciousness, Heidegger ignores the actual relations between persons that do in fact affect and transform that consciousness in its life in the real world. So Heidegger's category of Being-with obscures both the real aloneness of each individual person, and the real and inevitable state of conflict that characterises social relationships. (Sartre, 1966: 222, 226) Sartre bases his account of actual relations between persons on Hegel's, and in particular on his account of the dialectic of Master and Slave which he much admires. (1966: 214) Accordingly he describes the encounter of Self and Other in terms of conflict rather than as any kind of "togetherness". This is a direct result of the solitariness of the individual person that is bound up with his autonomy.

"Human-reality remains alone because the Other's existence has the nature of a contingent and irreducible fact. We encounter the Other; we do not constitute him. And if this fact still appears to us in the form of a necessity, yet it does not belong with those "conditions of the possibility of our experience" or - if you prefer - with ontological necessity. If the Other's existence is a necessity, it is a "contingent necessity"; that is, it is of the same type as the factual necessity which is imposed on the cogito." (Sartre, 1966: 226)

Neither the being nor the actual development of a person imply any relatedness in the sense of "togetherness" with Others. Yet other persons remain necessary in terms of the individual's project of self-realisation. They are necessary precisely so that by being dominated by the freedom of the self, the freedom of the self can be affirmed. Speaking of love between persons, Sartre (1966: 403) writes: "It does not demand the abolition of the other's freedom, but rather his enslavement as freedom; that is freedom's self-enslavement."

We cannot go further in this work into Sartre's (often brilliant) descriptions of relations between persons. Nor need we examine further the "phenomenological ontology" (Sartre, 1966) that underlies them. Among Thomist philosophers Sartre is criticised both for his phenomenology of interpersonal relations and for his metaphysics. (Lujipen, 1960; Marcel, 1951; Nedoncelle, 1966) We follow Marcel and others in judging Sartre to be a materialist. So there is little hope that his account of the relational aspect of persons would be compatible with a Thomist metaphysic. In this connection we feel it worthwhile to point out that in terms of the position taken up in the present work the "contradiction"
often pointed out by critics of Sartre between the individualism of his existentialism and the collectivism of his professed Marxism is in fact no contradiction at all but an association entirely to be expected. If it is true, as we shall argue, on a spiritual view of persons that the freedom of the self is augmented rather than diminished by a certain involvement with the other, then the converse might reasonable be expected to obtain on a materialist view. Individualism and collectivism are not such strange bedfellows after all; they have this in common, that both alike deny the possibility of a mutuality and reciprocity in which personal freedom can actually flourish. Freedom and relations with others are only contradictory on a materialist view of persons. Sartre is phenomenologist enough to recognise that it follows from the nature of human freedom that it should seek augmentation and self-realisation in relations with others, and indeed in the community of mutual recognition itself. His metaphysics however rules out the possibility of such a state of affairs and he consequently judges the project, though inevitable, illusory.

Sartre's work, though unhelpful in terms of our purpose of reconciling a relational view of persons with a spiritual one, does present more clearly than any other the consequences of a materialist metaphysic in the field of a philosophy of the person and relations between persons.

A historical outline of the development of the relational view of persons would not be complete without mention of Martin Buber. He has perhaps more than any other writer identified himself with this view and strengthened its influence, at least in certain circles. His descriptions of the phenomena of intersubjectivity have a profundity and poetic perceptiveness that is unique. The perspective that emerges from these descriptions, of the way in which the being of persons is bound up with their relations with other person, is in all major respects identical with our own. It is therefore necessary to say why it has been thought necessary in the present work to repeat much of what he has done and to restate many of his conclusions. Without doubt the writers we have used have been influenced by Buber. We have used them rather than him chiefly for two reasons. Buber is not a systematic writer, content to describe the phenomena of intersubjectivity from every angle and, as it were, piecemeal. We have sought system and hence an accurate picture of only the most fundamental structures of intersubjectivity in their relation to one another. Secondly, in spite of Buber's insistence that his descriptions have an ontological rather than a merely "psychological" significance, it is impossible either to discover an implicit metaphysic hidden in them or even to provide one that will "fit" his description with any degree of certainty. As Tallon (1973: 75) puts it
in his rigorous study of Buber's basic category, the "between", "One is left with the task of supplying a metaphysics, that is, of making explicit the metaphysics implicit in the statements about, for example, my becoming I as I say Thou ..." The poetic quality of Buber's writing however has so far resisted all attempts to do this. For this reason too, Buber could not be used in this study. We are intent on bringing out the metaphysical implications of the phenomena of intersubjectivity so as to relate them, if possible, to a particular metaphysical view of persons. And the language of Buber's descriptions does not permit one to do this with sufficient precision to make the attempt worthwhile.

In spite of this there are signs in Buber's writings that the metaphysical position implied by his descriptions is one that is closer to our own than to the other writers we have mentioned in this historical sketch. He even uses the word "spirit", though in a variety of ways and in none that is clearly the same as our own: "Spirit is the word ... Spirit is not in the I, but between I and Thou ... Man lives in the spirit, if he is able to respond to his Thou." (Buber, 1958: 39)

For this reason his criticisms of other writers in this tradition are instructive. Marx he criticises for subordinating the individual to society in his "sociological reduction" of Hegel: "Marx did not take up into his concept of society the element of the real relation between the really different I and Thou, and for that very reason opposed an unreal individualism with a collectivism which was just as unreal." (Buber, 1947: 182) As can be seen from this quotation, the basis for his criticism was the peculiar nature of the relation between persons.

Whereas Marx is criticised for his collectivism, Heidegger is taken to take for the opposite fault - individualism. "Heidegger's "existence" is monological." (Buber, 1947: 204) He notes the influence of Kierkegaard on Heidegger. In Kierkegaard however the very individuality of the "individual" he so exalted was derived from the finite person's relation to an infinite person. And in secularising Kierkegaard's basically theological anthropology Heidegger has done away with this relation, replacing it with an "internal" relation of the individual to himself. Buber relates Heidegger's anthropology to the phenomenon of "the death of God" in contemporary European thought and sees in it a philosophical expression of this loss of faith, not only in a divine Other but in other persons in general. "Heidegger isolates from the wholeness of life the realm in which man is related to himself, since he absolutizes the temporally conditioned situation of the radically solitary man, and wants to derive the essence of human existence from the experience of a nightmare." (Buber, 1947: 205)
These criticisms indicate the central positive thrust of Buber's philosophy of the person, that of breaking down the false alternative between individualism and collectivism.

"Its first step must be to smash the false alternative with which the thought of our epoch is shot through - that of "individualism or collectivism." Its first question must be about a genuine third alternative - by "genuine" being understood a point of view which cannot be reduced to one of the first two, and does not represent a mere compromise between them." (Buber, 1947: 243)

It is Buber's conviction that such a genuine alternative can only be supplied by his insight into the nature of distinctively personal relations.

"The fundamental fact of human existence is neither the individual as such nor the aggregate as such. Each, considered by itself, is a mighty abstraction. The individual is a fact of existence in so far as he steps into a living relation with other individuals. The aggregate is a fact of existence in so far as it is built up of living units of relation. The fundamental fact of human existence is man with man. What is peculiarly characteristic of the human world is above all that something takes place between one being and another the like of which can be found nowhere in nature. Language is only a sign and a means for it, all achievement of the spirit has been incited by it. Man is made man by it; but on its way it does not merely unfold, it also decays and withers away. It is rooted in one being turning to another as another as this particular other being, in order to communicate with it in a sphere which is common to them but which reaches out beyond the special sphere of each. I call this sphere, which is established with the existence of man as man but which is conceptually still uncomprehended, the sphere of "between". Though being realized in very different degrees, it is a primal category of human reality. This is where the genuine third alternative must begin." (Buber, 1947: 244)

The insight embodied in Buber's expression "the between", and sketched out in the above passage from his "Between Man and Man" is, in our view, what is most valuable in the tradition of thought about persons that we have been outlining. In general however the effect of the relational view of persons has been either to threaten true individuality or to subsume all relatedness into the individual's relation to himself thus making his solitariness absolute. In this regard the precise metaphysical status of the "relations" is crucial. In summary however, it would seem true to say that
effect of the development of this notion of the person has been to challenge not only the dualism of Enlightenment thought but, as I have already pointed out, the older notion of a person as the possessor of a spiritual nature that is prior to any social relations with others he might be involved in. It would seem therefore that to the extent that one shares the insight into the nature of persons represented by this view, though not necessarily subscribing to the slant given it by any particular thinker mentioned, one would lose faith in the theory of persons as spiritual beings in the traditional sense. After all the two views do seem to be diametrically opposed. The older view stresses the radical incommunicable individuality of persons as, moreover, a natural fact; the new view the intrinsic interdependence of persons for their personal identity as a cultural condition. In the one view a person appears as a separate autonomous origin of life that is well-nigh absolutely independent of other persons; in the other the very possibility of self-realisation depends on the existence and activity of others. Put like that the two views do seem simply contradictory. The sense of opposition between them is, if anything heightened, by the reflection that the one implies the immateriality, the other the materiality of persons.

We shall be discussing both the notion of immateriality and materiality and the personal relations of persons in this work. And in spite of all the indications mentioned above we hope to demonstrate the compatibility of the two notions of the person whose historical background we have sketched. Our confidence in this project is based ultimately on the common experience of personal life. This experience can be indicated as follows: We do indeed discover ourselves to be possessed of a peculiar and radical independence of life and thought, and this independence is both gained and augmented through a certain equally peculiar dependence on other persons. If this sounds enigmatic that does not so much matter. The assertion is to be thoroughly analysed and tested in the chapters to follow.

Our first task however will be to thoroughly clarify the notions of the spiritual and the material that we will be using in this work.

3. The notion of materiality

A difficulty that must be stated at the outset is the difference of usage regarding these two terms between modern common sense and science on the one hand and Thomist metaphysics on the other. In my account of what it is to be a person I shall be using the terms spiritual and material in a carefully defined metaphysical sense, since in that sense they are essential for my
purpose, and indeed for adequately describing the reality under consideration. But since I wish to oppose contemporary ideas which centre on the same terms I must relate the one set to the other. If the meaning of the terms in the solution bear no relation to their meaning in the problem, then the problem is not solved.

As I shall be defining and developing the notion of spirit at great length in the next chapter I will here concentrate rather on the notion of matter.

One should, I suppose, distinguish between a common-sense, a scientific and a philosophical view of matter. The common-sense view is, I should say, that matter is what everything is made of and is therefore a sort of featureless solid stuff we can't actually perceive. And of course this stuff can be divided up both logically and, within practical limits, actually, into ever smaller and smaller bits or particles.

The scientific view is very different. Atoms or sub-atomic particles are not little chips of homogeneous stuff. At least on a realist view each is an entity in its own right and therefore has an essence or nature of its own. "Meson", "neutrino", "quark" - each refers to a specific nature or type of entity. Whatever particles science of the future may discover, however low it goes as it were, it will never reach the fundamental matter of common-sense but only one or other kind of entity, a new kind of 'particle'. If, on the other hand, one were to ask a physicist in a general way what the different particles were particles of he would be very likely to reply that they were forms of energy, or something like that. The following quotation from Heisenberg (1958:13) is probably fairly typical.

"All elementary particles are made of the same matter, which we may call energy or universal matter. They are only the different forms in which matter can appear. If we compare this situation with the concepts of matter and form in Aristotle, we might say that the matter of Aristotle, which was essentially potentia i.e. possibility, should be compared to our notion of energy. Energy appears as material reality through the form, when an elementary particle is produced."

This quotation is interesting in that it shows how the fundamental concepts of physics are closely related to metaphysical ones. "Matter" in the sense of energy, even though a scientist is constrained to use the term or something like it, is not really a scientific term at all. Energy in this absolute sense is not something that could be the object of some experiment, it is not something that could - even in principle - be discovered. It is on the
contrary the necessary condition for anything at all being discovered or observed. No energy of any sort, no movement of the needles on the dials of our instruments. One knows before one starts that what one will find will be a form of energy. For if it isn't one will never be able to verify that it is there. In practice physicists tend to this more 'idealistic' notion of matter.

In philosophy, and probably even in contemporary philosophy, the word "matter" has so many meanings that it is probably best if I simply stipulate those that seem relevant to the concerns of this study.

Since Descartes (1931) "matter" and "material" have referred to a definite kind of thing. His dualism is a dualism of substance: there is extended substance (matter) and thinking substance (mind). And that is all there is; the universe contains only two sorts of things, material bodies and immaterial minds. This then is the dualism that is opposed by the forms of contemporary materialism that I wish to correct. These agree in supposing the universe to be made up of only one sort of thing and that material. A thing must be material to be real. Of course "material" doesn't mean "real". If that were so no problems would arise. Materialism, as I understand it, is a doctrine about what sort of things are real or, more precisely, what sort of thing a thing must be to be real. If, for instance, "material" is taken to mean "extended", then a materialist must hold that, at least, nothing that is not extended can exist. That is a very mild form of materialism for it leaves open the possibility that being extended is only one of a number of necessary qualities that all existing things must possess. The sort of materialist I am interested in correcting however is the sort who holds that matter is the fundamental attribute of all real things in the sense that whatever other attributes they may have they must all be understood as modifications of matter.

In this philosophical context "material" does in fact mean "extended" or "spatio-temporal" with the implication too of divisibility and measurability.

The metaphysical notion of matter, drawn from the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, which I will be using must be distinguished from all these usages.

In Aristotelianism, unlike Cartesianism, the term "matter" is not used primarily to designate a type or kind of thing but instead a metaphysical principle of a thing. (Shutte 1981) By this I mean that the term refers to a condition of possibility of the thing being as it is and being knowable as it is. In the
case of matter, it is the condition of various related possibilities among
which are those of there being more than one thing of the same kind and of such
things being known in their distinct individuality. Put thus materiality
looks very like extension or spatio-temporality. It is certainly that which
makes things able to be experienced by us, that is (as we shall see in greater
detail presently) the objects of a receptive rather than a creative condition.
But it is the cause rather than the effect of spatio-temporal extension. In
this it has much in common with the "energy" of Heisenberg. It is a priori in
both a scientific and a common-sense way in that it can neither be discovered
or observed but is instead the condition for scientific observation, and it is
also the necessary condition for ordinary sense-perception.

Matter as such, materia prima, in the Aristotelian sense, does not exist.
Since it is, as we have said, a condition of possibility of things being as
they are, it only exists as a constituent of things; not as a sort of stuff of
which they are made but as a quality or mode of their way of being, namely the
possibility they contain within them for not being what they are, for becoming
something else, for changing or ceasing to be. Materia prima is the pure
possibility of being other than they are. They lack as it were an enduring
identity.

Thomists do speak of "material beings" and contrast them with immaterial ones
but this is a different sort of contrast from the Cartesian contrast between
thinking and extended substance. There is question here, as we shall see in
greater detail presently, of differing degrees of being. An immaterial being
is itself, has an enduring identity and as it were a "hold" on its own being.
A material being is wholly dependent for its being on what is other than it;
its centre of being is not within itself, but it exists only as a function or
effect of another.

I have said enough to give an idea of how I shall use the term 'material'.
And enough has been said, I hope, to show that my use of the term designates
the same sort of things as the contemporary usages. Hence when I claim that
persons are immaterial I will be really opposing the view of contemporary
thinkers who hold that they are material, and not saying something that is in
fact quite compatible with what they say though in mere verbal contradiction
to it.

Perhaps the notion of the physical can throw added light on what is at issue
between me and materialism. By "physical" I mean something answering to the
terms and laws of physics. A physical thing is a reality that is postulated
by the terms of a physical theory and whose behaviour is defined by the laws of physics. To claim that a human person is a physical thing is to claim that their behaviour is either wholly or partly explicable in terms of the laws of physics, that they are either wholly or partly definable in terms of physical theory. The "wholly" I deny, the "partly" I accept. I wish to deny that human persons are purely physical things and that their behaviour is determined wholly by physical laws. Not that I wish to assert that human beings are partly physical and partly something else, say, spiritual. That would be a reversion to the ghost in the machine, a dualism of substance once again. Nor do I wish to imply that the laws of physics break down in human beings. It is only if physical laws are seen in grossly realistic terms, as the complete description of a machine-like universe, that the spirituality of persons would imply a sort of break in the system. If physical laws are seen rather as one sort of order discovered and verified in and between things, then room is left for other sorts of order as well. Persons can then be seen as things to which physical and other laws can both apply. In this connection it must be remembered that the laws of physics, as indeed the laws of all the sciences, are defined and verified according to the norms of our own cognitive processes. We are the subject of scientific activity as well as possible objects of it. This reflection should indicate that any account of human beings or explanation of human behaviour in terms of entities or causal processes that are extrinsic to the person or shared in any way with the rest of nature is bound to be incomplete if not actually false. It is not enough therefore to allow that though the science of physics is inadequate to give a proper account of persons and their behaviour nevertheless if one considers the whole system of the special sciences, both natural and social, then one would have as complete an account as one could ask for. However many sciences there be they are all alike based on the data of sense and in that sense have to deal with material realities. If human persons are spiritual then they must escape though not necessarily contradict the competence of the sciences.

We are now in possession of the necessary conceptual clarity so as to be able to grasp the problem of this work. Our aim is to give an account of the spirituality of persons as it is revealed in the phenomena of intersubjectivity. In the course of pursuing that objective it is our hope that the subsidiary issues that have been raised in this introductory chapter will be grasped more clearly and even shown to have their own solutions.

Our first task is thus to present a metaphysical analysis of the notion of spirituality with a view to gaining a renewed understanding of this much abused term. To that task we now turn.

1 For a philosophical theory of physical science that supports such a viewpoint while nevertheless doing justice to the requirements of scientific realism, see the work of P A Heelan (1964:334-342, 1965).
CHAPTER TWO. THE NOTION OF SPIRITUALITY

1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present a detailed treatment of spirituality. I propose to effect this by means of analysing and commenting on Karl Rahner's understanding of the notion. One of the foremost of contemporary Thomists, his account of the spiritual is eminently suited to the purposes of this work. It is firmly rooted in Aquinas' metaphysical psychology of the human person. At the same time it has learnt from the tradition of Heidegger and the phenomenologists as well as that of transcendental philosophy. In his philosophical writing Rahner has gone a long way towards bridging the conceptual gap between these schools of thought. His treatment moreover has the effect of "personalizing" Aquinas' somewhat cosmological categories and this is ideal from our point of view, increasing the usefulness of his work immeasurably. Rahner's work is profound but obscure. Any adequate interpretation of it is bound to be both detailed and difficult. In what follows I have tried to express the essence of what he has to say about the spiritual in terminology that could be understood by an English-speaking philosopher without expert knowledge of scholastic philosophy. I dare hope for only partial success.

The spirituality distinctive of persons is usually deduced from persons' capacity for intellectual knowledge by philosophers in the Thomist tradition and Rahner is no exception. We accordingly follow his analysis of the conditions of possibility for intellectual understanding. We are however interested chiefly in the spirituality of human persons and, in Thomist terminology, human beings are material as well. We thus turn to deal with the relationship between spirit and matter as understood by Rahner. And this relation throws added light on the notion of spirituality itself.

Finally we consider two further "proofs" of spirituality from the data of intellectual knowledge, in order to carry the notion of the spiritual beyond the terminology of Thomist metaphysics and to relate it to other common-sense and scientific notions. In particular we are concerned to relate it to common and scientific notions of matter since the notion of the spiritual that we are trying to defend is seen as an alternative to contemporary materialistic notions of the person.

The chapter ends with a transition to the chapters on intersubjectivity to follow.
2. The Notion of the Spiritual: K Rahner

Rahner (1978: 30) defines the spiritual by means of the notion of "self-possession". "Being a person, then, means the self-possession of a subject as such in a conscious and free relationship to the totality of itself."

Here, in Foundations of Christian Faith, one of his most recent books, Rahner prefers the term "person" to "spirit" but the meaning is identical. One could find similar expressions throughout his writings but I have chosen this precisely because it comes from that work in which he explicitly tries to sum up the main themes of his philosophical anthropology.

"Self-possession" is a comprehensive term to include both self-awareness and self-determination, the cognitive and volitional aspects of personal life. Hence the deliberate duality of "conscious" and "free". Rahner always distinguishes these two aspects as irreducible "moments" in the fundamental unity of personal existence. The use of the one, neutral term, "self-possession" to refer to both is intended to stress precisely this unity. There is however, in addition to the notion of unity, that of reference to self. The unity is one of self-reference. And as such is differentiated. Hence the language about the "relationship ... of a subject ... to ... itself". A person is both subject and object of his consciousness and action. And as such is identically the same. Hence the term "totality". A person is, at least in principle, completely present to himself in the sense that he has to do with himself as a whole, in all his conscious and free acts.

Fully to expound the meaning of the terms of this definition would be to give a complete account of Rahner's understanding of spirit. And that is not the way I judge it best to do it. The above explanation is intended to be only preliminary. There is however one further remark I would like to make at this stage about something else involved in the definition above. The term "self-possession" has for Rahner the connotation of a certain sort of infiniteness. In the passage from which the above definition is drawn one finds Rahner (1978: 25) concerned to point out that "a finite system of individual, distinguishable elements cannot have the kind of relationship to itself which man has to himself ... A finite system cannot confront itself in its totality. From its point of departure, which is ultimately imposed upon it, a finite system receives a relationship to a definite operation, although this might consist in maintaining the system itself, but it does not have a relationship to its own point of departure." We will of course have to examine in detail the meaning and import of this line of thought. Here I want simply to point out
the connection between the ideas of self-possession and infinity. It is
clearer perhaps in the realm of choice and will, where self-possession takes
the form of self-determination. Bringing oneself into act rather than being
brought into action by another can be seen to imply independence of, and hence
lack of limitation by, the causal efficacy of the other. To the extent then
that a person is really self-actuating he transcends the finiteness of limita-
tion by the causality of others.

Rahner, following Aquinas, and in common with virtually all writers in the
Thomist tradition, establishes the spirituality of persons by an examination
of our experience of cognition and knowledge. The expression reditio completa
subjecti in seipsum refers, for Aquinas, precisely to that self-reference that
he holds to be the characteristic of all strictly intellectual life, and hence
of what is spiritual in Rahner's use of the term. The locus classicus for
this idea is Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, 11. So Rahner (1969:54) comments,
"In this perfect return to itself St Thomas sees the distinctive attribute
of the spirit in contrast to all that is sub-spiritual." Our reason for
drawing attention to this way of talking of the spiritual is that it is this
expression that Rahner uses to define strictly intellectual operations in
his theory of knowledge. And as it is in the sphere of knowledge that Rahner
attempts to show how human spirituality manifests itself as such, it is to
this that we must now turn. As we shall see the notion of reditio, return,
has a peculiar appropriateness in the context of specifically human spirituality.

Human spirituality manifests itself in the sphere of knowledge in our ability
to form universal concepts, to make objective judgements and to achieve a
grasp of truth. These three "indications" of the "complete return to self"
are in fact intrinsic elements of the one human knowing. In human knowing
we always know "something" about "something" and this is expressed in the
typical act of human cognition, the judgement. (Rahner, 1968: 122). Just as
Rahner takes it for granted that our judgements are characterised by universality
objectivity and the intention of truth, so he also assumes, following Aquinas,
that their proper object is the objects of sense experience. No innate ideas,
no intellectual intuition; sense experience is the foundation for all human
knowledge, however abstract. For this reason one can take as one's example of
a typical judgement some such expression as, let us say, "This is a pig". We
must now follow Rahner in considering the conditions of possibility for the
making of such a judgement.
Any judgement is the affirmation of something as true. And as such it is objective, positing a real distinction between the knowing subject and what "really" is the case, what he judges to be true. So any judgement, because it involves this differentiation between subject and real object also involves a real presence-to-self of the knowing subject as one who is over-against-the-real-object. What is it that makes this positing of truth, this objectivity and hence this subjectivity, possible? The clue is to be found in the other necessary element of a judgement, the grasping or referring of a universal concept in or to a particular sensibly given thing. All judgements have this structure, even judgements about concepts themselves. (Rahner, 1968: 121).

The grasping of universality in the object of knowledge is what makes possible the objectivity of that knowledge and the differentiation of subject from object that we are concerned with. This is because apart from the universal concept in the judgement ("pig"), there is merely the reference to a particular "this". And with that reference the distinction between subject and particular object is achieved. Prior to grasping this distinction in the object, if one may speak in this way since there can in fact of course be no actual priority of that kind, there is no awareness of the object as an actually existing thing. If thus making the distinction within the object of knowledge between what is universal and what is particular is what makes possible the complete return of the subject to itself, then our task becomes that of finding out what it is that makes this possible. That it is for Rahner, and how, is made clear by the following quotation:

"Every objective knowledge is always and in every case the reference of a universal to a "this". Hence the "this" appears as the reference point standing over against the knowing to which the knower refers what is (universally) known by him. But then the subject with the content of this knowledge (the universal concept) already stands to some extent at a distance from the "this" to which he refers the content of the knowledge. This content of knowledge is universal precisely because it stands on the side of the knowing subject in its opposition to the "this" and therefore can be related to any number of "this"s". Or, to put it vice versa: precisely by the fact that the subject disengages the content of the universal concept from the indifferentiation of subject and object in sensibility (which does not at all have to mean a diminution of its content, because of course in this disengagement only a completely empty "this" has to remain behind), the subject attains to itself for the first time in its opposition over against the "this", it turns back into itself and thus for the first time has an object to which it can refer the known which is brought along in its return to itself and thus has become universal. The return of the knowing subject to himself and the liberation of a universal from its "subjects" is one and the same process. Thus the universal concept is actually the first indication of the opposition between subject and object which first makes possible an objective experience." (Rahner, 1968: 122)
In the judgement about the pig, to distinguish the universal from the particular is to distinguish its being a pig from its being this pig. In Rahner's Thomistic terminology it is to distinguish the form and matter of the pig. Its being a pig is clearly something that is in principle shareable, and thus universal. Even if it is a question of only one pig, to know it as such is to have grasped the possibility of their being more than one. It is, in Thomist terminology, of the essence of a pig to be material, and hence for its formal characteristics to be shareable by others. The question we must answer now is how can this universality be grasped in the individual pig that is the object of our knowledge. Or, as Rahner himself puts it, how can we discern the "confinement", the "limitation" of the form by matter. The possibility of comparison is of course ruled out since that would already presuppose the distinction of form from matter that has to be explained. (Rahner, 1968: 139)

Rahner's answer to our question is that objective knowledge entails a "pre-apprehension" that is infinite in scope such that it is against this limitless "horizon" that the form of a particular sensible thing can appear as limited in that thing and thus as in itself universal. The power capable of such a pre-apprehension is called by Aquinas "agent intellect". Thus:

"We must therefore ask how the agent intellect is to be understood so that it can know the form as limited, confined, and thus as of itself embracing further possibilities. Obviously this is possible only if, antecedent to and in addition to apprehending the individual form, it comprehends of itself the whole field of these possibilities and thus, in the sensibly concretized form, experiences the concreteness as limitation of these possibilities, whereby it knows the form itself as able to be multiplied in this field. This transcending apprehension of further possibilities, through which the form possessed in a concretion in sensibility is apprehended as limited and so is abstracted, we call "pre-apprehension..." (Rahner, 1968: 139)

At first sight one might identify such a pre-apprehension with an intuition of space and time. After all, the only essential difference between one pig and another (accidental differences, such as colour and shape, apart) might be said to be the fact that each occupies a unique position in space and time. The pre-apprehension would thus be of the infinite horizon of space and time or, in Thomist terminology (more or less), of prime matter. But this would be incorrect. Space and time is necessary for the numerical distinctness of individuals, and for grasping that distinctness. But the ability to do this would only help one to grasp the universality of an individual form if one were able to count all individuals of that form and find them to be more
than one. And one wouldn't be able to do that unless one had already "abstracted" the form itself. In any case "matter" in its Thomistic sense is in itself pure possibility for form, can only be grasped as already in some form, and hence is useless for revealing the limitation and universality of form.

Rahner calls that to which the pre-apprehension that makes objective knowledge possible attains esse. We have already seen that every act of forming a universal concept contains a reference to a possible "this", (or, better, universal concepts exist only as moments in judgements which refer them to a "this"). In our knowledge the "this" is always some sensibly intuited object. But it is not the sensibility of the object itself that grounds the possibility of forming the concept. If it were our question would not have arisen. The "this" to which all concepts are referred is some or other esse. Let us, to avoid difficulties, simply think of this in terms of some or other real thing, in a quite normal and loose sense of the expression. Its necessary qualities will become apparent soon.

To have knowledge of an individual thing it is necessary to grasp the principle that enables all the possible universals that can be predicated of it to be possible forms of one thing. It is a pig, it is pink, it is angry, it is in the field and making for the gate. It is also material, in both the scientific and the Thomistic senses. What makes it one thing however is its esse. This is of course its being a pig. This is the essential form that makes all the other forms possible for it. And one can distinguish within it the essence and the esse of the pig. As essence this form is considered as the locus of possible predicates of the one type of thing; it is what differentiates pigs from other sorts of animal or thing. As esse on the other hand the form is the principle of reality and unity of this particular pig. It is the principle of reality in the sense that this pig's being a pig is distinguished from its not being at all rather than being distinguished from its being something other than a pig. It is distinct from matter in that being material is part of the essence of a pig, whereas being at all is not. Esse is the principle of unity of the particular pig in the sense that it is the one foundation of the connection of all possible universal predicates in a particular subject. And as such it is as universal as the predicates themselves.

Esse is usually translated "being" in English. In Spirit in the World (1968: 157 et seq) Rahner sticks to the Latin (in the German editions too) in order to preserve the essential verbal character of Aquinas' term. Esse means to-be-real. Now the only realities are individually existing things as far as Rahner and
Aquinas are concerned. And such things are truly known in universal concepts and objective judgement. Hence the ground of the reality and the unity of a thing is also the ground of all possible universals that can be truly predicted of it. (For Rahner (1968: 168) it is only because individual things really exist that we can have universal concepts at all, by way of abstraction from what is given in sensibility). And that is what is called the esse of the thing.

Now according to Rahner it is the pre-apprehension of esse in the individual sensible thing that enables one to know the universality of the forms that are the objects of ones judgement about that thing. Why should this be so? Because esse in itself is not limited in any way, and in our pre-apprehension of it is grasped as such. This is how Rahner (1968: 171) puts it:

"This unity of esse appears most clearly in the fact that there belongs to one ens as a single real thing different determinations (as its parts, its essential or accidental properties) which make up a single reality in that they appear united in the one esse of this real thing. For if each of these determinations were real through its own reality, then there would be just as many real things as there are determinations, and not a single real thing; but it is to be a determination of this latter as a single thing which alone constitutes the essence of these determinations...... But from this it follows necessarily that the one esse which bestows reality upon the essence and its accidents must have the intrinsic freedom and infinity to bestow reality as much upon one quiddity as upon another. But this means that in every essential judgement (e.g. the tree is green) a universal esse is also simultaneously affirmed which, as one, is able to include in itself the quiddity of the subject and that of the predicate (being tree and being green), and to that extent is one and universal (that is, the being of many determinations)."

So esse is at once the ground of the unity and the universality that judgement grasps in a really existing thing:

"Insofar as an existent has esse, the plurality of its determinations is unified into a synthesis which is always already realized and given prior to the affirmative synthesis, that is, into a really existing essence. And insofar as esse is apprehended in the judgement as something of many quiddities, it is essentially apprehended as universal." (Rahner, 1968: 173)

The universality of esse is not simply the universality of any material form, that is the universality of repeatability in many subjects. This is clear since its universality is revealed within a single individual as comprising the several determinations of that individual. Hence Rahner (1968:175) writes that, "it is
universal as the unified fulness which releases out of itself the essential determinations of an existent as those of a single thing and holds them together in itself." He goes on however to say - and this is the crucial step - that

"... (I)t is also in itself the fulness of all possible determinations absolutely. For in every judgement it is the same to-be-in-itself that is pre-apprehended. Insofar as all possible quidditative determinations are real through esse as to-be-real in the usual sense, in every judgement the same esse is pre-apprehended, in every judgement a knowledge of the same esse is simultaneously known. But this esse manifested itself as the act of quidditative determinations not merely in the sense that they are real through it in some sense or other, but in the sense that esse is the unified ground of the determinations which produces them from itself as its own, holds them together in itself, and has already anticipated them in itself.

But it follows from this that esse in itself must be the absolute ground of all possible determinations......" (Rahner, 1968: 197)

This amounts to saying that esse is not simply the ground of the reality of a particular thing of a certain kind so as to be the one origin of all the possible qualities of that thing. It is also the one origin of the different essential characteristics of different sorts of things. One cannot, in other words, differentiate the esse of one thing of a certain kind from the esse of another thing of a quite different kind. For if one could the differentiating factor, the essence in question would be taken to be more fundamental and as qualifying the esse by its own reality and specificity from it. Hence esse in all individuals of whatever type is one and the same, the source of all similarities as well as all differences. The essences of different sorts of things owe their difference to esse; in Thomistic terms "essence is a potency for esse." (Rahner, 1968: 160 and 178)

The unlimitedness of esse is therefore absolute. Not only does it underlie the limitations of form by matter in a particular thing. It also underlies the limitation of particular kinds of thing to things of that kind. Each kind of thing is, if you like, a particular limited way of having esse. And this means that esse is not present in all its fullness in any kind of thing. Hence it never appears as the object of judgement but always only as its horizon or enabling ground. The pre-apprehension of esse is not objective knowledge but that which makes such knowledge possible.
We now have a complete account of what, according to Rahner, the necessary conditions are for the achievement of the "complete return" of the knowing subject to itself in objective knowledge. The ultimate enabling foundation of these is the pre-apprehension of esse in its infinite scope. It is precisely this capacity of human persons that makes their self-possession possible: it is this therefore that makes them spiritual. We have up to now spelt out the conditions for spirituality in the sphere of knowledge, but our results can be applied in the other spheres of personal life as well and so to persons as a whole. Rahner (1968: 186) himself sums up the results of his investigation as follows:

"Human knowledge as pre-apprehending is ordered to what is absolutely infinite, and for that reason man is spirit. He always has this infinite only in the pre-apprehension, and for that reason he is finite spirit. Man is spirit because he finds himself situated before being in its totality which is infinite. He is finite because he has this infinite only in the absolutely unlimited breadth of his pre-apprehension. Therefore he is not absolute esse himself, and in his concretizing thought he can never represent and objectify it because in such thought it cannot be represented and objectified in its totality, since esse in itself has no form distinct from itself which completely preserves the fullness of esse and which could be distinguished from it, and thus could be affirmed of it in a concretizing and affirmative synthesis without limiting it."

In Hearers of the Word Rahner deliberately applies what he has demonstrated in the case of human knowledge in Spirit in the World also to action and freedom. He typically speaks of the pair knowledge/action or judgement/freedom or some such, as in the following, "To the extent that judgement and free action are necessarily part of man's existence, the pre-concept of being pure and simple in its own intrinsically proper infinitude is part of the fundamental constitution of human existence." (Rahner, 1969: 63) He speaks not only of a cognitive capacity for esse in its infinite scope but also of a desire for it. In his last book, Foundations of Christian Faith, this ordination to esse is present as the foundation of every aspect of our distinctively personal life. Here, as has already been said, Rahner prefers not to speak of spirit or spirituality. We have seen how he uses the term "person" to refer to our capacity for self-possession. He uses another term, "transcendence" and "transcendent being", to refer to our capacity for esse:
"Insofar as man is a transcendent being, he is confronted by himself, is responsible for himself, and hence is person and subject. For it is only in the presence of the infinity of being, as both revealed and concealed, that an existent is in a position and has a standpoint from out of which he can assume responsibility for himself. A finite system as such can experience itself as finite only if in its origins it has its own existence by the fact that as this conscious subject, it comes from something else which is not itself and which is not just an individual system, but is the original unity which anticipates and is the fullness of every conceivable system and of every individual and distinct subject." (Rahner, 1978:34)

3. Interpretation of Rahner

In our treatment of Rahner's theory of knowledge we have been concerned merely to throw light on his idea of spirituality. We have therefore had to leave out a vital element on which the coherence of the whole account as a theory of knowledge depends, namely his treatment of sensibility. Some of the steps in his deduction of the necessity of a pre-apprehension of esse are not fully explicable except as against the background of this treatment. Our intention however has been merely to give an account of his idea of spirituality and not a critical account of his theory of knowledge. So far we have tried to explain this idea in such a way as to be true to Rahner. In the process we have had to speak quite a bit about knowledge, and often in our own words as well as Rahner's in order to clarify the sense or to summarise a relatively extended discussion. I now propose to offer some interpretative remarks of my own which will, I hope, throw light not only on Rahner's understanding of spirituality but also show the coherence of the notion as such.

The importance of Rahner's theory of knowledge for his idea of spirituality rests firstly on the theory that human knowing entails a grasp of esse, and secondly that the esse so grasped is in some sense infinite. From this it necessarily follows that human persons have a (cognitive) capacity for infinite esse, which capacity is no merely passive possibility but an active tendency or orientation. And this, correctly understood, is the foundation for the peculiar self-possession held to characterise personal life.

Hence it is of the first importance to have a thorough grasp of Rahner's notion of esse, and, if possible, of the sort of infinity it is held to have and why it is necessary that it should have it.
The necessity of a pre-apprehension of esse arises out of the need to account for the attributes of human knowledge that sensibility itself cannot account for, namely its universality, objectivity and truth. Both the notion of esse and that of a pre-apprehension are difficult and obscure. Apart from any intrinsic difficulty the notions may have they derive a certain obscurity from their dependence on the whole Thomist approach to knowledge which has such different assumptions from most contemporary approaches. Perhaps the chief of these is the assumption that what is known is in every case some individual existing thing. (We are considering our ordinary knowledge of the world rather than science, but the same principle applies there too.) This is true even in the case where the object of knowledge is a concept.

"Even if an attempt is made to conceive a universal concept by itself, it succeeds only in an affirmative synthesis, in a judgement. For if such a concept is thought "alone", then this thinking thinks something about it, as was said before. In this process it is itself conceived as something already objectified, as something existing in itself which thought holds before itself as something standing opposite, and to which as object (res) the knower relates a known intelligibility. Hence the universal concept is already and always conceived as independent from thought as knowing, as existing in itself and so as definite, and thus not merely a synthesizing, but an affirmative synthesis takes place." (Rahner, 1968: 125)

Hence it is always individuals, of whatever sort, that are known and not universals.
The fact that human knowledge is always universal is a sign of imperfection in us, of the fact that we have no intellectual intuition of existing individuals but that our knowledge is always based on what is sensibly given. (Rahner, 1968: 137)

This conviction that we know the existing individual rather than some general truth about it is one aspect of what is meant by saying that our knowledge is of the esse of the thing. Of course what we know of the thing in question is always general in the sense that it is grasped in a universal concept. But, this universality is secondary to the individual reality of the thing itself in the sense that it is derived from it. How what really exists only as individual can be the true origin of what is universal is part of the problem about the nature of esse. Of course if what is universal is only something "in the mind" then such a problem does not exist. Instead there is a problem of truth, of how what is "in the mind" is true of the thing itself.
If all the universal concepts that apply to a particular thing are in some way derived from its esse as an individually existing thing, then such esse can in no way be identified with the sheer materiality of the thing, its position in space and time or whatever, or its numerical distinctness from other things, since this sort of particularity is merely what is opposed to universality as such. There is a sort of infinity about matter to be sure but it is what Rahner calls "privative" infinity.

Another aspect of the doctrine that our knowledge attains to the esse of a thing is the Thomist confidence that we do know the real, in the sense that there is no "thing-in-itself" beyond what is knowable by us. If one asks, seeking a deeper understanding of esse, what it is to be real, then no strict definition can be given but only a list of all the sorts of things there are. "Real", or "esse", is predicated analogously of every different sort of thing. This being the case it is not difficult to see that the notion of esse has a certain sort of infinity. Just as the individual reality of a thing can't be expressed by a finite series of universal concepts, so too the sum of the different essences of different things do not exhaust the scope of the real.

If esse is to be understood as "being real", then the notion of a pre-apprehension of esse amounts to saying that in addition to and quite apart from sense intuition (though only ever occurring in the context of sense-experience) we have a sense or grasp of reality or what it is to be real. To say "what it is" suggests a conceptual grasp but that is not what is meant. Nor does the word "grasp" quite get the idea of a pre-apprehension. Initially and fundamentally there is only a question of a pure presence to or contact with or openness on reality. It is only in the course of cognition that this presence is raised to the level of a grasp, where what is apprehended is understood and what is understood is judged to be what it is taken to be. The point of the expression, nevertheless, is that the terminus of our cognitive openness on the world is whatever is real. If that is the case then one can see how such an openness could be described as infinite. For although being real entails being something of a certain kind it does not entail being of this kind or that. It is not limited to any possible kind of being at all. This is an infinity of non-exclusiveness, of the lack of that opposition that must exist between specific classes of finite things. Vice versa, one can from this perspective view each essentially different kind of thing as a particular form or way of being real, and because particular therefore limited. A pre-apprehension of esse in its unlimited scope would then explain the possibility of knowing the limitation of every universal form grasped by our cognitive powers.
This last point suggests a final reflection which, although it departs from Rahner's approach, is close enough to a generally Thomist approach and which, if justified, could bring the tricky notion of a pre-apprehension of infinite esse closer to intuition.

To speak, as Rahner does, of the essential limitation of material things is not, as we have said, making a point about their materiality. Nor is he only, so it seems to me, making the point that to be a pig is not to be a dog, and in this sense too to be limited. It is also the case that being a pig is to be essentially dependent on something else for existing at all. And this sort of dependence for being at all is another sort of finiteness. One can express this in various ways. One can say that its existence is caused. Or that it is not self-explanatory. Being a pig doesn't sufficiently account for its being real. In Thomist terminology there is a real distinction between its essence and its existence; its essence doesn't explain its existence. At all events if we can think of finiteness as dependence of this radical sort, dependence for existence, and if we are able to grasp the finiteness of every possible object of knowledge then this can only be in virtue of the prior possession of a standard of the finite, or in this case the dependent, namely something infinite. The infinity in question now is that of being absolutely independent. It is this sort of infinity that must define the scope of our pre-apprehension.¹ Such a notion is clearly akin to that of the sort of infinity associated with the notion of self-possession which we drew attention to at the outset. If to know something to be real is to know it to be dependent in the way suggested above, then this is, in Rahner's terminology, to have a pre-apprehension of independent being. Such an expression raises in an even sharper form a question about the subjective and objective poles of this pre-apprehension. What is this absolutely independent being? One could equally well have asked the question: What is this infinite esse? This is nevertheless not our question. We are interested rather in the subjective capacity for a being of that sort. This is what is asserted of us. Not merely a concept of the infinite, but an infinite openness. Or in this case a capacity for infinite independence. As long as one restricts the extension of such expressions to the cognitive sphere their full import can escape one, since one can always say of a cognitive capacity "Oh, but that's just an idea!" In this case however this won't do, since the capacity in question is one that

¹ For a metaphysical foundation for this line of thought see M Pontifax and I Trethowan, The Meaning of Existence, Longmans, 1952, (especially pp.1-40)
enables a contact with the real - individually existing reality - and a contact with the real is a real contact and so implies a real capacity on the part of the subject.

This way of understanding the infinity of being and its pre-apprehension is one that finds support from another line of thought in Rahner. The reason we were led to posit an unlimited openness on the part of the knower was because of the view that each object of knowledge was grasped as limited, both in its materiality and its formal property. As we have seen this limitation cannot be interpreted simply in terms of the object in question having a specific nature and therefore being limited to the properties possible to such a nature. Its specificity, its being something of a certain determinate sort, can only be contrasted with an absolute lack of form, the "privative" infinity of prime matter. Although such a horizon or background is implied by the specificity of a material essence, and although it does have a certain infinity, this is not the infinity of the pre-apprehension of being, which must rather be seen as a fullness than a lack.

If individual things are therefore grasped as having only limited being against a background of being that is absolutely unlimited, what can it mean to be limited or unlimited in being? The answer to this question is found in certain theses of Rahner's which we cannot go into in detail but must simply state in summary. These theses are of a piece with all his metaphysical thought and indeed are foundational to it; he claims moreover that they are thoroughly Thomistic. The first concerns the nature of being as such and is expressed as follows: "being signifies the being-present-to-self of that which is" (Rahner, 1969; 48), "being-able-to-be-present-to-itself (is) ... the fundamental conception of being" (1969: 43), "being-present-to-self is the being of the existent" (1968: 69). The second concerns modes or "degrees" of beings: "the degree of "having being" manifests itself in the degree in which the particular thing which is, is able to turn back on itself, that is, in the degree in which it is possible for it to be reflected in itself, to be illumined by itself and in this sense to be present to itself" (1969: 47), "the intensity of being of the being of an existent is determined for Thomas by the reditio super seipsum, the intensity of being is determined by the degree of possibility of being able to be present to itself." (1968: 69)

The first thesis is derived from the equation of being with the knowable and an understanding of knowledge as "the being-present-to-itself of being".
The second follows from the common fact that the presence-to-self of different sorts of thing is a matter of degree. This common fact is made definitive of the nature of the thing.

Thus we have an answer to our question about the meaning of limitation of being, and one moreover that is consonant with our previous reflection. Limitation of being is limitation of presence to self; unlimited being is complete self-presence. So we have a way of speaking of infinite being and also of a pre-apprehension that is of infinite scope. It is a capacity, an orientation, a dynamism that has as its term complete self-presence.

In following this line of thought it looks as though Rahner has attempted to define being, to give its essence as being-present-to-itself. This is in fact not his intention, since this "meaning" of being underlies the essence of every existent thing. It is because they differ in degree of being-present-to-self that things have different natures. For this reason "being" is not a univocal but an analogical notion; the degree of "having being" is the degree of presence-to-self and this is the foundation of an analogical attribution.

4. Spirit and Matter

We are attempting to clarify the notion of spirituality according to the doctrine of Karl Rahner. So far we have dealt simply with the notion itself. But there is further clarification to be gained by seeing it in relation to the complementary notion of "matter". And, as we shall see, to understand the spiritual in relation to the material will be helpful in gaining a clear picture of specifically human spirituality.

Most of what Rahner has to say about spirit in relation to matter is to be found in his book Hominisation. Here he is concerned with the evolutionary origin of man as a theological problem. Consequently his starting point is a theological one, the Church's teaching regarding both the fundamental unity of the human person and the real distinction of material and spiritual elements in him. Nevertheless Rahner attempts to justify in a purely philosophical way a view of spirit and matter that explains precisely this unity and duality.

As far as the unity of spirit and matter is concerned, Rahner bases his account on just that doctrine of degrees of being we have already met with. Regarding spirit and matter he remarks on "the intrinsic ontological kinship in nature between them as two different levels, "densities", greater or less limitations of "being"." (Rahner, 1965: 56) He goes on to point out that
"finite spirit is conceived as a limitation of exactly the same reality which confers on matter what is positive in it, namely, "being", and that what is material is nothing but a limited and as it were "solidified" spirit, being, act." (Rahner, 1965: 57) This limitation in material being is then described as "its lack of immanent self-possession given by transcendent dynamic orientation towards being as such" (Rahner, 1965: 57), which is, as we have seen, precisely what characterises spirit as spirit.

Explaining the unity of spirit and matter in this way however seems to prevent the possibility of real distinction. It is all simply a question of degree. Note on the other hand that Rahner has spoken of "what is positive" in matter, not simply of matter as such. He is contrasting "what is positive" in a material thing with "its negative aspect and limitation by materia prima." (Rahner, 1965: 56) Matter, properly speaking, is materia prima and this is not any sort of thing at all but a principle in things. It is not however a principle in all things, at least not in the Thomist universe, since wholly immaterial finite spirits are held to exist. It is not therefore that principle of limitation spoken of above, which distinguishes "material" things from spiritual. The limitation that differentiates one degree of being from another is a limitation of form and being, not of matter. We must make a distinction therefore between materia prima, which is, among other things the pure possibility for there being a plurality of things of a common essence, and material things which are things of a particular sort, having a determinate essence. What then is this essence? It is not enough to see it in terms simply of less of what makes spirit spirit. For this would not explain why it was really different or why, for that matter, human beings, as beings that are both material and spiritual, are really different from angels, who are purely spiritual. Materiality is not, in other words, an inevitable characteristic of the being of a finite spirit, in the Thomist understanding of the terms, and hence its concept can't simply be deduced from that of finite spirit or distinguished from that of spirit simply by negation.

In order properly to grasp the unity and distinction of spirit and matter according to Rahner, we have to derive it from the one and only experience where both are given in an equally primordial way, namely the experience of human cognition. As Rahner puts it, "what is really the first datum is the unity of a relation between the person inquiring, in the perspective of a
limitless horizon of inquiry, and an object that manifests itself as sensibly perceived \textit{a posteriori} and is received within the horizon but cannot be derived from it." (Rahner, 1965: 49) In knowledge, because of the pre-apprehension, we are present to ourselves and so are spiritual but only insofar as we are present to some or other finite being other than our own (spiritual) selves. To know in this way, receptively rather than creatively or intuitively, is to be material. To be material is in fact to have an essential relation to otherness. Human materiality shows itself in knowing as sensibility and in general as our bodiliness. Matter exists in other forms of course and not only in beings capable of knowing. A material but non-sentient being only exists in relation to and dependence upon the other members of its species or type. Plurality is thus an essential note of things with a material essence. The potentialities of the essence are not able to be realised in any one individual of that essence. This is of course true of human beings since they are material, and is perhaps especially evident in this case.

More of course could be said about the matter and material beings. Not only is matter (\textit{materia prima}) the principle of plurality in beings of the same type. It is also the cause of a certain lack of enduring identity, or changebleness, or beings of that type. These two notes of matter manifest themself in an "incompleteness" in material beings, that shows itself either by a tendency to become more complete by becoming part of something else or by in fact changing into something else. We are however not really concerned with matter as such but with its opposite, spirit, and with matter only as it shows itself alongside of spirit in human life.

From what has been said of human knowing it can be seen that human spirituality is closely bound up with matter, in human life. If in human life, self-presence is only able to be acheived by being present to another, and is therefore something acquired receptively in spite of being the most intimate act of the self, then being material makes a difference to our way of being spiritual. And such is certainly the doctrine of Rahner and of Thomas.

In fact from the perspective of Thomistic philosophy it is probably back to front to define spirituality as such and then relate it to human life. What in fact comes first, as has been said above, is the irreducible unity of human life, and then an equally irreducible duality is discovered within it. This duality, we now see, is the simultaneous reference to self and to other. The only excuse we can give for our separate treatment of spirituality in this chapter is that it is spirit and not matter that is the foundation of the
unity of the two principles. As Thomist psychology has it "the soul is the form of the body".

The "priority" of spirit over matter in the constitution of human beings is seen in the fact that the "self" of the self-presence is not simply the opposite of the "other". Self-presence, as has appeared from the previous pages, is made possible by a positive apprehension of being and not a negative distinction from what is other. In human cognitive life this pre-apprehension of being makes possible both awareness of self and of the other.

"Man is a finite cognitive being who is immanently present to himself precisely because, on the occasion of any particular finite being that manifests itself to him as he encounters it in experience, his cognition is intrinsically orientated and tends towards being in general. This "transcendence" as a mark of mind or spirit, that is to say this dynamic orientation of mind or spirit above and beyond itself towards being in general.... is the very condition of the possibility of reflective self-awareness and of the objective discriminating conceptual representation of particular objects experienced, and consequently of the unity of the two." (Rahner, 1965: 83)

Seeing spirituality in relation to materiality in this way is of great importance for an understanding of the spirituality of human persons. If human persons are both finite and also material then their spirituality, if indeed they have it at all, will show itself in a special way.

The essential mark of the spiritual is as we have seen a cognitive and volitional self-possession. But as we have also seen this implies a cognitive and volitional openness to being as such that is infinite in scope. It is only against such a background that a person is present to himself and deals with himself at all, and hence he is bound to experience himself as finite. At the same time, insofar as the term of his infinite openness is the real enabling ground and condition of his own self-possession it must be experienced as other than himself, at least as that from which his personal existence is always continually derived and to which it is always continually referred. Such finiteness and otherness is of course something different from the distinction and difference a person experiences between himself and the objects of his knowledge and action. We are talking about his relation to that which makes such objective knowledge and activity possible.
This may appear to be labouring a point, since in fact the only persons we have experience of are finite. We are however concerned to emphasize that our very personhood is derived in some sense, and ineluctably experienced as such. Hence our spirituality, the spirituality of finite persons, in addition to being self-possession is also orientation to (infinite) otherness.

In addition to this human persons are, as has already been pointed out, material. And this brings with it its own orientation to otherness, the otherness of plurality. So in defining the spirituality of finite, material persons, one will always be required to refer both to their relation to self and their relation to the finite other. For instance, that a person is both capable of self-determination and of entering into the personal life of another (finite) person. And this at one and the same time and to the same extent.

If the keynote of spirituality is self-possession, human spirituality will always at the same time show itself in a distinctive orientation to what is other. It will be the function of our descriptions of intersubjective relations between persons to show this simultaneous self- and other-orientation in its most explicit form.

I have more than once in the preceding pages pointed out that although Rahner prefers to elaborate the notion of human spirituality in the sphere of cognition, he does not intend it to apply only in that sphere. In fact all that is said regarding cognition is meant to apply ceteris paribus to the sphere of appetite as well, or, to be more precise, to volition. A term like "self-possession" therefore must not be understood in a merely cognitive sense and hence interpreted exclusively as "self-awareness" or "self-knowledge". It must also be understood in the sense of "self-determination" or "self-affirmation". Indeed the primary reference of a term like "self-possession" for Rahner is not to any sphere of activity of the person but but to his being. This is shown by the fact that self-possession is predicated of beings that are not capable of cognition or even of sense-knowledge, albeit in a lesser degree. (Rahner, 1969:49) Nevertheless, as the scholastic tag has it, as a thing is so does it act; a person's activity reveals his nature. It seems best therefore to understand the term "self-possession" as referring to the actual expressive activity of a person, that by virtue of which we are entitled to call him spiritual. Whether the activity is cognitive or volitional does not really matter. Human cognition cannot take place without the will, nor can the will operate without the cognitive
faculties. Indeed the most comprehensive notion to designate in a
general way the spiritual activity of a person is perhaps "action" itself,
prescinding for the moment from the fact that in the case of human persons
action inevitably involves physical movement. For these reasons I choose
to use the term "self-enactment" as the defining characteristic of the
spiritual rather than any other. In addition it avoids the notion of
completeness or perfection that is suggested by "self-possession". As is
perhaps already clear, and will be constantly stressed in what is to come,
human spirituality exists initially only as a potentiality or capacity.
Although from the start it is a capacity for self-enactment, this capacity
is fulfilled, if at all, only by degrees. There is a question of growth
from incompleteness to completion.

I shall therefore use the term "self-enactment"* to mean everything that
Rahner means by "self-possession". I must repeat that it will be used
in a quite general sense indifferent to the distinct powers of the person
and to the degree to which they have developed towards perfection.

5. Properties of the spiritual

We now need to show that spirituality, as we have defined it, will entail
immateriality in the contemporary sense. For if it didn't then there
would be no problem of reconciling the two views of persons, the materialistic
relational-cultural view and the spiritualistic dualist natural view.
Because, as we shall show, spirituality in the sense we have defined it does
entail immateriality in the contemporary sense, there is a problem as to
whether human beings can be persons in this sense. Our descriptions of
intersubjectivity are intended to show that they can. They thus in a sense
will "take the place" of the "proofs" of immateriality that are to follow in
this section. There is however a difference in the degree to which they can
be taken as "proofs". The Thomist proofs are all based on the nature of
intellectual understanding and even if they are judged to be sound it can
always be argued that human intellectual activity has been wrongly described.
Be that as it may, we feel that the experience of intersubjectivity is more
accessible to most people, more all-inclusive, more typically personal than
intellectual activity as such and for these reasons choose to expound
spirituality in these terms rather than the traditional ones. To speak

* For which term I am indebted to Andrew Tallon of Marquette University,
Milwaukee
of self-enactment and self-transcendence and dependence on the other and identification with the other seems more readily comprehensible and more immediately revealing of the nature of the processes and beings involved than the language of form and matter, being and spirit.

I propose to discuss two proofs, both based on what is regarded in Thomist tradition as the most typical of personal acts, (and as therefore the best candidate for spirituality in our sense) namely intellectual understanding. Each highlights one aspect of spirituality as we have defined it.

5.1. Transcendence of particularity

The first proof is that of St Thomas himself. He sets himself to prove that the mind is not a body nor the act of understanding the act of a bodily organ. His proof is succinct, though complex, and I give it here in full, as it appears in de Anima, (III iv, 680-681). The reference to "he" is of course to Aristotle, on whose text he is commenting:

"Anything that is in potency with respect to an object, and able to receive it into itself, is, as such, without that object; thus the pupil of the eye, being potential to colours and able to receive them, is itself colourless. But our intellect is so related to the objects it understands that it is in potency with respect to them, and capable of being affected by them (as sense is related to sensible objects). Therefore it must itself lack all those things of which of its nature it understands. Since then it naturally understands all sensible and bodily things, it must be lacking in every bodily nature; just as the sense of sight, being able to know colour, lacks all colour. If sight itself had any particular colour, this colour would prevent it from seeing other colours, just as the tongue of a feverish man, being coated with a bitter moisture cannot taste anything sweet. In the same way then, if the intellect were restricted to any particular nature, this connatural restriction would prevent it from knowing other natures...

...... From this he concludes, not that in fact the nature of the intellect is 'not one', i.e. that it has no definite nature at all; but that its nature is simply to be open to all things; and that it is so inasmuch as it is capable of knowing, not (like sight or hearing) merely one particular class of sensible objects, nor even all sensible accidents and qualities (whether these be common or proper sense-objects) but quite generally the whole of sensible nature.

Therefore, just as the faculty of sight is by nature free from one class of sensible objects, so must the intellect be entirely free from all sensible natures." (Thomas Aquinas, 1951)
To clarify my own interpretation of this argument I will permit myself a short commentary on the above text.

Aquinas is exploiting the parallel between the operations of the senses and of the understanding in order to clarify the latter. He then distinguishes between the two. His model of sensation is that of sight (since he considered sight the "most spiritual" of the senses and thus the closest analogue to the understanding) and is made rather obscure by his medieval optics. The logic of the example can however be perfectly preserved by substituting spectacles for "the pupil of the eye". If our spectacles are coloured then we will not be able to discriminate all colours in nature. To be able to see ("to be potential") to all colours, we must wear colourless spectacles.

Aquinas' real point regarding sense experience concerns the notion of sensation as such and not simply the sense of sight. The point that one should grasp is that a sense as such, a sense power as distinct from a sense organ, is not the sort of thing that could be coloured and that is why it is able to sense colour. The point is perhaps best made in connection with another sense, that of touch. If I touch a warm object then, with regard to the resulting effect of the contact, one must distinguish between the warming of my finger that occurs and the sensation of heat that I experience. Two things occur: the temperature of my finger is raised and I experience the sensation of heat. They are clearly different since the object of my experience is not my finger but the hot kettle. If it is too hot I will cease to experience its heat but only the pain of a scalded finger. It is only because it is the sort of thing, i.e. a physical one, that can have a temperature which can be changed that my finger is fitted to be an organ of touch. Hence touch itself, the actual power of sense, can't be the sort of thing that can be either hot or cold. In Aquinas' words it "is, as such, without the object", namely it is itself intangible, just as the sense of sight is invisible. And hence the whole sensual system is itself without those properties that make material things sensible and is thus, in a certain sense, immaterial.

It is this feature of our power of sensation that makes it a fit analogue for the intellect in Aquinas' eyes. Having established the analogy he must now demonstrate the difference. The premise for this argument is given in his assertion that the intellect "naturally understands all sensible and bodily things". Nor is this an extravagant claim. He is not claiming...
comprehensive or systematic scientific knowledge for the human mind, least of all as a natural endowment. He is simply claiming that the mind is capable of correctly applying concepts to the real world of material things, and that as long as anything is material it can have concepts correctly applied to it by our minds.

Since it has this capacity it is radically different from the sense powers. The proper object of a sense is a particular sensible property of a thing (a sight or a sound or a smell) not the sensible thing as such (the greenness of the leaf, not the green leaf). Hence the proper object of a person's whole sensual system never extends beyond "all sensible accidents and qualities". Of course pure sensation does not exist as such in personal life since the normal perceptual process is not a wholly sensual affair, being in fact the vehicle for understanding. But if the proper object of the senses as such is seen in this way then the contrast with the proper object of the understanding becomes clearer. As Aquinas says, its proper object is "quite generally the whole of sensible nature". And this means simply that in addition to the sensible properties known by the senses, the understanding is capable of knowing the things that the properties are properties of, namely of knowing them as real.

Taken together with the rule established in the case of sensation, that a cognitive power cannot have the nature of what it is capable of knowing, this yields the conclusion that the mind is not a material thing nor its act the act of a bodily organ.

In the case of the senses, though they are free of the properties of material things, their act is nevertheless the act of a bodily organ and hence they themselves are not an immaterial thing as the mind is. To characterise the nature of sensation in abstraction from understanding is a well-nigh impossible task since they are always and necessarily found together in human cognition. I cannot add anything to Rahner's excellent and exhaustive account of it in Spirit in the World (Rahner, 1968: section 2) and will therefore say no more about it here.

Aquinas' proof of the immateriality of the intellect does indeed presuppose the view of cognition (both sense and intellectual) that we have encountered already in our analysis of Rahner. Cognition of whatever sort is seen as
a participation in the being of the thing known so that some sort of real
identity of the knower and the known is set up. This is opposed to all
views of knowledge which see cognition as a merely subjective process that
is referred to the things of the world or arranges them in previously determined
categories of our own choosing, but never reaches the "thing-itself" or is
causally affected by the receptive appropriation of its real properties.
Hence those who have radical objections to Aquinas' realistic view of knowledge
will not find the above proof persuasive.

We however, in this work, are not concerned to criticise Aquinas' view of
knowledge. It is sufficient that it be made comprehensible. If this at
least is granted then it is clear that for Aquinas the mind or principle
of understanding is immaterial in the contemporary sense. It is simply
not a body, nor is understanding the act of a bodily organ. And this
carries with it the consequences that a modern view of immateriality would
expect. It is not a sensible thing; therefore in principle imperceptible.

Before we leave Aquinas' proof of the immateriality of the intellect I want
to draw out one consequence of it that will have relevance for the notion
of spirituality that will emerge from our descriptions of the intersubjective
relations of persons.

In proving that the mind is not a body nor the act of understanding the act
of a bodily organ, Aquinas proved that the mind has a sort of universality.
In the passage above he speaks of it as not having a "particular" nature.
And then, lest this expression be misinterpreted to mean that, like prime
matter, it is purely potential having "no definite nature at all", he
affirms that "its nature is simply to be open to all things". This then
is the universality that Aquinas asserts of the principle of the under­
standing. To fill out the notion of universality a little more, as it is
understood by the Thomist tradition I want to refer briefly to the work of a
contemporary English Thomist, Herbert McCabe, who is well-known for his
writing on this topic. (McCabe, 1968 and 1969) In a forthcoming book
on the psychology of Aquinas, McCabe develops a novel way of speaking of
the immateriality that Aquinas affirms of both the sense powers and the
mind. He considers the way Aquinas speaks of knowledge (both sense-knowledge
and intellectual knowledge) as the acquiring of the forms of things without
their matter. The crucial, and most misleading, word in this definition is
"acquiring". There is no suggestion that sensation changes the thing sensed.
A green leaf retains its greenness, even though its greenness is acquired by
an animal's power of sight. But the animal is changed. The greenness of
the leaf as well as continuing to be a real property of the leaf (informing
the matter of the leaf), is now also a property of the animal. Not that its
eye becomes green of course. But that the greenness of the leaf becomes part
of its visual life. And this is a real event. For the greenness of the leaf
is now able to play a part in the life of the whole animal. This "playing a
part" must not be understood in a strictly causal fashion (at least not in the
sense of efficient causality), but in terms of the relevance or significance the
part (what is seen) has for the whole (the animal). It could be that distinguis-
ing green from brown when standing near a tree has the significance of distinguishing the edible from the inedible for the giraffe. And grasping this distinction
might well have a causal effect on the giraffe's behaviour.

This idea, that a sensation can be best understood as the part played by a
particular sensible form in the life of an animal as a whole, is generalised by
McCabe by speaking of it as becoming part of "a transcendent community". The
sensible form, by being sensed, becomes part of the transcendent community of
an animal body, and ultimately, by virtue of its deep inherited inclinations,
of the whole species. It is this "becoming part of" that constitutes sensation,
and this is why the power and the organ of sense cannot be described in similar
language. The body, precisely as an animal body capable of sensation, is not
reducible to its constituent parts taken as entities in their own right. In this
sense it is transcendent. And in this sense it transcends materiality. It
cannot be properly described in simply physical or chemical or even physiological
language. Instead it must be described in terms of relevance, significance and
the like.

Similarly, in the case of understanding, the sensible form, the sensation is
taken up into yet another and more strictly transcendent community, namely the
community of language.

"Just as the sensible form is the form existing intentionally in the sensual system, so the
intelligible form is a form existing intentionally in the mental or linguistic system, having a role
in that system - the linguistic system being the special form of communication that makes up a
linguistic community, as the sensual system makes up the community of the body. Just as the impulses
in the nerves link to gather and bind up the parts of the animal body, just as DNA and the genetic
determinants link together and bind up the animal species, so meanings link together and
bind up the linguistic community." (McCabe, 1981)
(Unpublished MS, Chapter 5, p.8)
If our sense-experience is understood by becoming part of, taken up into, the transcendent community of a natural language, then it is not difficult to see why such an act of understanding transcends materiality in a far more radical way than does sensation itself. For, as we have seen, both an animal and an animal species are material things. But a language, although it is always embodied in material symbols is not. This is because the meanings that constitute a linguistic system are intrinsically shareable in a way that sensations are not. My sensations are irreducibly my own; my thoughts are not. The shareability of language is what constitutes its universality and hence, since everything material is particular, its immateriality. Now, McCabe argues, that insofar as human beings have a genuine linguistic ability they participate in the communication system of a natural language, the linguistic community, and to that extent they too transcend their own particularity. To the extent then that we are capable of intellectual understanding we share in a universality possessed by the whole community of language-speakers. There is even a sense in which the universality of the linguistic system precedes and makes possible any individual apprehension of meaning. As a human individual I only come actually to understand anything insofar as I make an already existing system of universal meanings my own.

As we shall see such an understanding of the universality enjoyed by persons will fit in well with that reached by our description of intersubjectivity. Universality as the shareability of meanings fits in well with certain forms of intersubjective relations between persons. And both are well suited to reveal the essential spirituality of persons.

5.2. Freedom from physical causality

The second proof of the spirituality of persons from our experience of intellectual understanding has many forms. It is an argument of an essentially retortive kind and in modern philosophy is employed by Thomists and non-Thomists alike. (Boyle, 1976; Donceel, 1967; Lewis, 1947; Lonergan, 1957 and 1967; Mescall, 1957; Moleski, 1977; Muck, 1968) It has a distinguished history, being traceable at least as far back as Aristotle's argument against the skeptic in Metaphysics T.4. The version that I shall base my remarks on is that of C S Lewis. It is both succinct and lucidly expressed and well-known to English-speaking philosophers. It is printed in his book Miracles (Lewis, 1947: 23–31) but appeared originally as a paper given to the Oxford Socratic Society in 1947.
Lewis' argument is essentially an argument against any universal determinism of a mechanistic, physicalistic or materialistic kind. Thus in arguing that the strictly intellectual activity or persons escapes the universal causality of material things he is arguing for the immateriality of persons in the modern sense.

Lewis argues that a thorough-going determinism (which he calls "naturalism") is self-refuting. If everything that happens, human thought and action included, is the result of the operation of physical or at least material causes, then no process of thought or argument could claim to be rational or valid since it, like everything else, would have been produced by non-rational causes. There would thus be no better grounds for believing naturalism itself to be true than a theory that contradicted it. The naturalist's attempt to argue for a radical determinism is therefore self-refuting.

Lewis' major premise in this argument is his view that "no thought is valid if it can be fully explained as the result of irrational causes". (Lewis, 1947: 27) To point the truth of this he contrasts two different ways in which a person could hold the same belief, one rational the other not. "(1) 'He thinks that dog dangerous because he has often seen it muzzled and he has noticed that messengers always try to avoid going to that house.' (2) 'He thinks that dog dangerous because it is black and ever since he was bitten by a black dog in childhood he has always been afraid of black dogs..."' (Lewis, 1947: 26) Both sentences explain why the person holds the belief but the first justifies the belief whereas the second invalidates it. Lewis thinks that whenever we discover a belief to have been produced by irrational causes we assume it to be false. Even determinists, he holds, such as Marxists or Freudians for instance, apply such a rule to the beliefs of others, dismissing them as bourgeois ideology or wish fulfilment, but make exceptions in the case of their own theories.

Precisely in what sense the naturalist is involved in a "self-contradiction" we shall have to see. But Lewis' case against him depends on the rule set out above. Apart from its general acceptance Lewis justifies the rule by means of a Humean theory of knowledge which I suspect he imagines would be shared by most determinists of the type he is concerned to refute.

"It is clear that everything we know, beyond our own immediate sensations, is inferred from those sensations. .... All possible knowledge, then, depends on the validity of reasoning. If the feeling of certainty which we express by words like must be and"
therefore and since is a real perception of how things outside our minds really 'must be', well and good. But if this certainty is merely a feeling in our minds and not an insight into realities beyond them - if it merely represents the way our minds happen to work - then we can have no knowledge. Unless human reasoning is valid no science can be true." (Lewis, 1947: 26)

This being the case, one really ought to accept (1) above and reject (2) since "in the first instance the man's belief is caused by something rational (by argument from observed facts) while in the other it is caused by something irrational (association of ideas)." (Lewis, 1947: 27)

We can now sum up this argument as follows: No thought is valid if it can be fully explained as the result of irrational causes; we do in fact think validly; hence irrational causes are not the only causes that there are and determinism is false.

It can be seen that there are really two arguments here, a negative rebuttal of determinism and a positive argument for the freedom of rational activity from universal materialist determinism. We must now try and formulate what it is that forms the foundation for Lewis’ confidence that determinism is positively wrong, rather than spend time examining the form of argument that appears to show that it cannot be formulated without self-contradiction.

The experience on which Lewis bases his argument is our experience of rationality in thought and action. In rational thought and action we believe or do something for a reason. We might not actually advert to the ground of our belief or the rationale of our action at the time, but if questioned we could supply it. What is always true however is that if our belief or action is to be a rational one, one of the causes of our coming to believe or deciding to act in this way must have been our actually seizing upon some or other belief that we already happen to have (whether a belief about a fact or a desire) as standing in a specific logical relation to the belief that we have now come to hold or the action that we have now chosen to perform. We must actually see that the one belief is a reason for believing the other or for performing the act. Thus one among the many causes of a rational belief or act must be the actual grasping of a logical connection between two different mental contents or states of affairs.

Consider Lewis' example of the black dog. To have a reason for his belief that the dog is dangerous the person concerned must have actually noticed, for instance, that it was muzzled and that messengers avoided the house. Nor is that enough. We must hold that the one belief (that the dog is dangerous) is true because the other (that it is muzzled) is. So we are talking about real events: him noticing that the dog is always muzzled and his believing (beginning to believe
and continuing to do so) that it is dangerous. And the first is the cause of the second in the sense that he would not have begun to believe that the dog was dangerous if he hadn't noticed that it was muzzled. The two actual occurrences are really linked but not in the sort of causal sequence that Lewis wishes to avoid, that is a mechanistic one. They are linked by a person who is capable of appreciating the logical relation of ground to consequent, that is to say, is capable of reasoning.

Notice that the above experience of rationality as a certain kind of causality does not depend on our being right about the logical links between different beliefs. One can with good reason come to believe something altogether false. One can simply be logically confused. Still the mere search for such a link is a testimony to our rationality, and thought or action that proceeds from the affirmation of such a link is to that extent caused by something other than material causality.

It would thus appear that there is another kind of causality than a deterministic one, that of rational agents. If Lewis is right about this then both determinism is mistaken and the determinist who attempts to give reasons for his beliefs is self-refuting. Rational agents are thus free from a complete determinism of materialistic kind, and thus to that extent immaterial.

Lewis does not specify the sort of determinism he holds rational agents to be free from very closely. I wish to say something as to how I think his argument can be interpreted. He is, in the chapter of the book that contains the above argument, trying to discredit a view of the universe as an ultimately homogeneous mechanical system. Whether the happenings in such a universe are random or lawlike does not in the end matter. As long as the nature of the basic entities that compose the universe and the relations between them are such as to exclude the sort of causality I have tried to depict above, the causality of rational agents, this view of the universe will be both untenable and false. Whether we call such entities and processes material, mechanist or physical does not really matter. What we are speaking about are the sort of entities and processes postulated by the natural sciences. And Lewis wants to assert the existence of entities and processes that no special science could contain within its scope. In his assertion of the special causality of rational agents he is opposing all reductionism of our distinctively intellectual activity to even the human sciences.
It might appear from such radical anti-reductionism that Lewis is committed to a very sharp form of dualism indeed. I do not myself feel that this is necessarily so. Only if physical laws are seen in grossly realistic terms, as providing a complete description or explanation of a machine-like universe, would the existence of another type of causality altogether imply a break in the system. If physical laws are seen rather as one sort of order discovered and verified in things and between things, then room is left for other sorts of order as well. Human persons can then be seen as things to which physical and other laws can both apply, the laws of logic included.

If Lewis' argument is well founded then it appears that rational agents are as such free from the laws that govern material things and hence transcend the possibility of scientific explanation. They are thus immaterial in the modern sense.

This freedom from determinism enjoyed by rational agents can be seen in a way that connects it closely with the way we have defined the spirituality of persons. To show how this is so we have to return to Lewis' account of our experience of rationality on which his whole theory is based. As we saw, in any case of rational belief or action - let us speak simply of rational judgement to cover both the realm of theory and of practice, judgement of fact or value - the cause of our making a judgement was a previous judgement coupled with the grasping of the logical link between it and the one we are considering. Now, whatever caused the first judgement the fact that our making it is the cause of our making the second rules out the possibility of any other causal factor in the process. The only link between the two judgements is a logical one (usually I suppose some or other variant of the law of non-contradiction) and not anything that could compete with the causal influence on me of my first judgement. In irrational judgements it is precisely something other than a judgement of mine that causes the new judgement to be made. Hence it appears that in the exercise of rational judgement I am genuinely self-enacting. One judgement of mine causes another by virtue of my habitual (?), natural (?), grasp of the principle of non-contradiction. As long, therefore, as my judgement continues to be rational there can be no interference from "outside" the causal chain of judgements (or, depending on the context, of beliefs and choices). The sequence of judgements and that of physical causes remain forever distinct. So the person who is free from all physical determinism because of his rationality, can by that very fact be seen to be self-enacting in the positive sense that one of his acts is the sole cause of another.

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There is a sense in which the notion of causality is applied metaphorically when speaking of the "causality" of rationality. When speaking of deterministic causality of a physical or mechanistic kind one is using the term "causality" to refer to the connections and regularities discoverable by one or other of the special sciences. And in the case of the rational acts of rational agents there are simply no such connections or regularities that science could in principle discover. When we use the term causality of the acts of rational agents we use it in a metaphysical sense taken from Aristotle. And in this sense the distinction between the causality of rationality and that studied by the sciences is quite clear. Science is interested in what would be named in an Aristotelian metaphysics as efficient causality, whereas the causality of rationality is formal causality. The difference can be grasped by reflecting that in the case of the causality of rationality the "cause" and the "effect" are both "interior" to the same thing, namely the person himself. And one can't properly speak of a person causing himself to act, in the sense of efficient causality. In what sense the "cause" and "effect" are "interior" to the person appears from the following consideration: it is in virtue of its content, that is its meaning, that a judgement can serve as the ground for a consequent judgement. There must be a logical connection between the contents of the judgements that form the premises and the judgement that forms the conclusion of a theoretical or practical syllogism for the resulting belief or choice to be a rational one. It is clear that the contents of judgements, or meanings, cannot act as efficient causes. To say that they are the formal cause of the rational act is really to say that they enter into the correct description of the nature of the act. And this is to say that an adequate description of the nature of rational action, and hence of a rational agent, must include reference to the meaning of his acts. In rational action therefore meaning is really present as part of the nature of the act; an agent is one who acts in terms of meanings. To say this is to do away with the absolute Humean divide between ideas and things, of logic and nature. It is instead to introduce a new distinction, that between persons and non-persons. Logic and meaning are simply an abstraction from specifically personal reality, just as scientific causality is an abstraction from non-personal reality. The laws of logic abstractly describe the rational behaviour of persons, the transcendental method implicit in their enquiry after truth and goodness; meanings are elements of the acts that constitute such enquiry, the acts of judgement by which truth and goodness is affirmed. And just as meanings, considered in their logical function, are relative to a whole language, so as elements in acts of a person they are parts of a whole system that is both autonomous and simple, in that it is constituted by a reference to itself. It is autonomous in that no amount of
discoverable scientific laws can completely account for its behaviour but instead circumscribe an area in which it generates its own laws, the laws of rational thought and action. It is simple in the sense that in this area it deals as a whole with its whole self, it is both subject and object of its acts.

Whether or not such a view of persons is a legitimate deduction from the conclusions established by Lewis' argument we cannot at present argue further. It is enough as far as demonstrating the immateriality of persons is concerned to show as Lewis has done that they are free of scientific determinism. That this implies that they are self-enacting in our sense is a further matter. I have indicated briefly why I think it does. I will conclude this section by making one observation that I hope will counteract the feeling that if I am right about the radical difference between persons and non-persons then I have established a dualism as radical as Descartes'

The observation is this: What we have had to say about the autonomy and simplicity of persons as self-enacting beings applies to persons as such and distinguishes them from non-persons. We are however concerned with human persons, namely with persons whose spirituality requires bodliness to realise itself and whose intellectual life depends on sensibility. Human persons comprise aspects that are strictly personal and others that are not but instead are of a piece with the rest of nature. Nevertheless there is not an absolute discontinuity between aspects. And the principle of continuity is the personal principle. This can quite easily be seen in the terms in which we have discussed causality above. The logical laws which explain the rational behaviour of persons are the basis for the methods of all the sciences that would give a causal account of the world of non-persons. Thus the world of non-persons and persons must not be seen as two separate realms. The world of non-persons in particular must always be seen in relation to persons, as that which makes the personal life of finite persons possible and provides a medium for meeting of a plurality of persons. There is a sense however in which the world of persons includes the non-personal world as an element within it. As Aristotle said: "man is in a way all things by sense and intellect". (de Anima 10, 728) The impersonal is included in the personal in the sense of being less real than it, of having, in Rahner's sense of the term, less density of being, less of a permanent identity, less enduring individuality.
6. Concluding Remarks

We have now reached the end of our discussion of spirituality. We have followed Rahner in defining it in terms of self-enactment, but seen too that in the case of human persons a certain self-transcendence is also involved. The basis for both these aspects of spirituality is the orientation of finite persons towards being in its infinite scope.

We have seen too that spirituality defined in this way also implies immateriality in the modern sense. Spiritual beings are not bodily in any way nor are their actions determined by the causality discovered by the special sciences. In the first case they are seen to be possessed of a certain universality which is opposed to the particularity of matter; in the second they appear to be self-enacting in a way that is opposed to the dependence on the causal efficacy of other things which is characteristic of material objects in the world.

As a result of these conclusions it appears that there is a problem about how we can reconcile the two notions of person we have isolated. If persons are self-enacting how can they depend essentially on others for the development of these powers of self-enactment? If persons are universal how can they be related to other persons as one particular to another? These problems are those of course that arise out of the idea of a human person, that human beings can be persons in the sense in which we have defined them.

We must accordingly now embark on the attempt to describe the fundamental forms of intersubjective relations between human persons. As has already been said, the description will proceed in three stages. The first stage concerns the basic minimum of reciprocity that must exist if persons are to exercise personal powers at all. The second concerns the sort of relationships between persons that must obtain if these powers are to develop towards fulfilment or perfection. Finally there is the interpersonal situation that is implied as the end of the process, the complete development of a person's specifically personal powers.

In adopting this threefold division of the subject I an indebted to the work of the little-known Scottish philosopher, John Macmurray. Because he is so little known I did not mention his name in my brief overview of the philosophers of intersubjectivity. He is not even a Thomist either. Yet of all recently-writing philosophers (he is no longer writing), no-one has tackled the topic more directly or systematically than he. (Macmurray, 1957, 1959)
His interest in the interdependence of persons grows out of a recognition of what he calls "the crisis of the personal" in contemporary Western society. It is a cultural crisis manifesting itself chiefly in the increase in political totalitarianism of all sort and a decline in the influence of religion. It has however a philosophical "shadow" in the absence of an adequate theory of the human person. Opposing but equally inadequate theories underlie both the individualism and the collectivism of contemporary culture. Macmurray saw the task of philosophy in our time, and indeed of his own philosophy, to discover and formulate "the form of the personal", a theory that would grasp what was distinctive of personal reality but see it in a unified theory of reality as a whole. (Macmurray, 1957: 11-38).

Whether Macmurray was as much as a pioneer as he imagined himself to be, whether, that is to say, much of the work had not already been done, is something one could dispute. One of the most interesting things about his work is the way it parallels (in a way most unusual in philosophers writing in English) the work of European existential philosophers and phenomenologists, though with hardly any detailed reference to them at all. Nevertheless it is precisely the originating, programmatic character of Macmurray's work that I have found most helpful. If, in the last resort, he doesn't provide an adequate theory himself, he does give a very comprehensive and penetrating picture of what such a theory should include. My indebtedness to him in this will appear in what follows.
CHAPTER THREE.  INTERSUBJECTIVITY I: THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL POWERS

1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the intersubjective conditions necessary for the exercise of our distinctively personal powers so as to reveal the spiritual nature of persons.

As has been said we intend to give three such descriptions, to cover all aspects of the intersubjective relations of persons. It was the work of Macmurray that led me to tackle our task in this way and hence it is with an account and critique of his theory of persons in relation that the chapter will begin. Our critique of Macmurray culminates in a critique of his method and this leads us to present our own method in broad outline, as it is to be employed in all three chapters on intersubjectivity.

We then turn to our description of the exercise of personal powers. At the outset we are obliged to identify them and do so in a preliminary way as those powers that enable us to be agents in the strict sense. Our analysis of agency stresses the self-referring nature of these powers, of which there are only two, self-consciousness and self-determination.

Our description of the first form of intersubjectivity, which then follows, is based on Macmurray's mother-child model. We take into account however the critical remarks we felt bound to direct at his version of the model. Our description is followed by a critical discussion of problems arising out of it in which we refer to the work of other authors on the topic of intersubjectivity. The chapter concludes with a section relating the description of the necessary intersubjective conditions for the exercise of our personal powers to our notion of spirituality as self-enactment.

2. J Macmurray: persons in relation

If it is true that persons depend on other persons to exercise, develop and perfect those powers that make them persons then it is in the relations between persons that one would expect those powers, and hence the nature of persons, to be most fully revealed. John Macmurray is one who is certainly committed to the first view. It is in fact the major theme of his Gifford lectures of 1953-4, "The Form of the Personal", a series that represents the culmination of his philosophical work. In it he attempts "to show how the personal relation of persons is constitutive of personal existence; that
there can be no man until there are at least two men in communication."
(Macmurray, 1959: 12) Put even more strongly, "Persons, therefore, are
constituted by their mutual relation to one another." (1959: 24) In
Macmurray's view this truth about persons is a consequence of his other theme
in the lectures that it is the capacity for agency in a special strong sense of
the term that makes one a person. For the purposes of this study it is
extremely instructive to see the manner in which he tries to show the connect-
ion between agency and intersubjectivity.

Since, according to Macmurray, the capacity for agency can only be realised in
a process of social interaction, his examination of it takes the form of a
genetic account of how it develops towards perfection. This account centres
naturally on the beginning and the end of this development, considering in the
first case the relationship between a mother and a baby, and in the second
a special mutual relation between two adults which he names "community".

Macmurray begins his genetic account by pointing out the significant differ-
ences between the human child and an animal offspring. The immediate
striking thing about the child is its helplessness. This is a result of its
almost total lack of instincts (defined by Macmurray as 'a specific adaptation
to environment which does not require to be learnt.' (1959: 48) Another
difference is the environment itself. The environment of the child is a
personal and artificial and not a natural one; it consists of the mother and
the home. And this means that for the child "its existence and development
depends from the beginning on rational activities, upon thought and action."
(1959: 50) This thought and action is not its own, of course, but that of
the mother. It is the intention of the Other (here the mother) that supports
the existence of Self (the child). The personal attributes must be present.
In this case they are simply distributed over two individuals.

Nevertheless if the child does not have intentions it does at least have
motives. It appears to feel comfort and discomfort. As Macmurray puts it,
the child has "an original feeling consciousness, with a discrimination between
positive and negative phases." (1959: 57) The way in which this consciousness
develops and the actual form it takes depends on course of the mother, whose
intentions determine the whole pattern and character of its comforts and
discomforts. Its mother feeds it regularly and at times withholds its food
although it desires it. It is in such an environment ordered by a pattern of
restrictions and rewards that the child is able to develop intentions of its
own and the germ of a sense of right and wrong, good and bad. Yet these last developments would not occur were it not for something else in its make-up that marks the crucial difference between it and an animal.

Signs of this crucially distinguishing characteristic are to be seen very early on in the child's behaviour. Both animals and children are not only capable of feeling discomfort but also of expressing it. Their cries have an obviously pragmatic value which reinforces the tendency to signal distress. With regard to the feeling of comfort, however, Macmurray discerns a difference. Children, in contradistinction to animals, are voluble in their expression of satisfaction. And such expressions of satisfaction at being nursed, cared for or caressed, even at the mere physical presence of the mother, seem to have no practical value. They seem to be expressions of satisfaction simply at the relation with the mother itself. Macmurray feels that this is evidence that the infant "has a need which is not simply biological but personal, a need to be in touch with the mother, and in constant perceptual relation with her," (1959: 49) and again, "His essential natural endowment is the impulse to communicate with another human being." (1959: 51)

This conclusion is reinforced by the character of the child's play. The play of both animal and child appears to have as its object the acquisition and the sheer enjoyment of skills. The skills acquired by the child, however, are not ones that have any immediate usefulness. It remains at the mercy of its environment. It is Macmurray's opinion that, whereas an animal's skills are learnt to enable it to do things for itself, a child's are learnt to enable it to communicate with others.

Thus the relationship between mother and child exhibits a two-fold structure. On the one hand there is the complete helplessness of the child, on the other the "impulse to communicate" that makes the resources of its personal environment open to it. Macmurray speaks of this as a case of a positive including its own negative; the negative being the child's consciousness of need and the positive being the satisfaction in the presence of the mother. Genetically the negative is prior, yet the positive is more fundamental in that it goes beyond the mere satisfaction of need to take delight in the mother herself. The relationship is enjoyed for its own sake and not simply as the means to the satisfaction of other needs. Some of the gestures and sounds of the child's seem to have what Macmurray calls a symbolic character. They are
symbolic in that they are not signals but simply expressions of affection through which the child communicates to the mother its "delight in the relationship, and they represent, for its own sake, a consciousness of communicating." (PR 63) It is this consciousness of communicating and the symbolic gestures that express it that Macmurray considers to be the true foundation of language.

There is no question as yet of the child being an agent in the proper sense. For that self-consciousness is necessary and it has not yet been acquired. The original form of objective consciousness is that of the Other. Initially, of course, the impulse to communicate is an unconscious one. The alternation between states of satisfaction and disgust, together with its helplessness, frustration and delight, soon give rise in the child to a consciousness of the Other as that which responds to its cry. This is the first case of something being present to it that is not simply a feeling of its own. Thus the consciousness of the Other is primary and positive; insofar as consciousness of self begins to emerge it does so as a negative contained in the positive knowledge of the Other.

"The first knowledge, then, is knowledge of the personal Other ... and since knowledge is primarily 'of the Other', the 'I do' now appears as the negative which falls within the knowledge of the Other as agent, and is necessary to it. In the actual situation in which we all begin our individual existence - in the mother-child relation - our own agency is negative. It is the Other who does everything for us, who is the Agent upon whose action we are totally dependent, and within whose activity, supporting and limiting us, our own action is progressively achieved." (1959: 77)

How then does self-consciousness arise? If the basic form of knowledge is the knowledge of persons and persons are primarily agents, it is in the active movements between mother and child that we should expect it to first show itself. As Macmurray depicts it, it does, and in the form of a conflict imposed on the relation by the educative intention of the mother.

"If the child is to grow up, he must learn, stage by stage, to do for himself what has up to that time been done for him by the mother. But at all the crucial points, at least, the decision rests with the mother, and therefore it must take the form of a deliberate refusal on her part to continue to show the child those expressions of her care for him that he expects." (1959: 89)
In such a situation the child is thrown back on itself and its own resources. Its activity becomes egocentric. Even when it has learnt to do what it must for itself, it feels excluded from the mother's love. Its primary impulse to communicate is thwarted and threatened and there is nothing it can do to restore the apparently ruptured relationship. What has been removed from it by the mother (apparently) - her care for the child - can only be restored by her own act. In spite of having acquired a new skill as a result the child is confronted by a task which no effort of its own can cope with.

Because self-consciousness arises in such a situation it is bound up with anxiety, and hence the existence of the emerging individual is a problematic one. The distinction between positive and negative states, (and hence too of a basic form of the distinction between right and wrong, good and bad) is now experienced in direct reference to the Other. The positive state would be a union of wills made possible by the will of the mother. Opposed to that are two negative states, both egocentric, one of desperate attempts to dominate, the other of fearful efforts to seduce, the mother. They have this in common, that they appear to deny dependence on the relation with the mother, while at the same time of course requiring it. The negative states are basically self-contradictory and, because they involve a clash of wills with an illusory idea of the (by definition) fully mature and loving mother, prevent the realisation of the child's intentions and a full freedom of action. So, though it has acquired self-consciousness, the child at this stage of its development is not yet an agent in the full sense of the term. To become such a further development of the relation between persons is required, a development that issues in the state of positive maturity called by Macmurray 'community'. The characteristics of 'community', though described in relation to the usual political and religious experience of persons, are in fact deduced by Macmurray from his notion of agency. There are three. One must be in a conscious intentional relation with another agent. One must share a unity of intention with him. Such an intention must be positive. Only when these conditions are met is the activity of a person really free and he an agent in the strict sense. We must now see briefly how Macmurray argues such a case.

With regard to the first condition he points out that any movement requires the resistance or support of the other as a necessary condition for its
actuality. For action proper this resistance or support must be that of another agent. His chief reason for holding this is the necessity of action's containing the element of choice. He imagines first of all the situation of a solitary agent in a purely material environment, called by him "the continuant".

"The resistance of the continuant is a negative resistance, and the support it provides is a negative support. It provides for the possibility of movement but not of action. For though the resistance limits the possibilities for the agent it still provides no grounds for discriminating between the possibilities which remain open." (1957: 144)

Even if the agent is placed in an organic environment the result is the same.

"If we then grant the agent an organic environment, something more than movement becomes possible, and this something more we call behaviour. Nature will provide stimuli to which he can respond. But action is still impossible. For at most the knowledge of Nature will reveal a plurality of possible activities, some easier, some more difficult, some pleasurable, some painful. But this still provides no ground of discrimination. At most the agent could "follow the line of least resistance", and this excludes the determination of an objective." (1957: 144)

In an organic as in a material environment the nature of the Other determines the character of the agent's act. Unless the Other is a person the resistance to the Agent is not that of a conscious intention. Hence there is nothing he can either be 'for' or 'against'. What is right is simply what he chooses.

But this is not all. There is also a sense in which action is only properly action when it realizes an intention. "To act is to realize intention with the help of the Other." (1959: 118) One can have an intention without acting, but an action is always expressive of an intention. If one doesn't share the intention of the Other, he will be no help to my action. It cannot therefore be performed as I intend. That is to say, I cannot realize my intention; what happens is probably the intention of neither. Thus the condition for the realization of intention is that the self and other must share intentions. Macmurray (1959: 118) argues as follows:

"Now if the world is a continuum of action, and there are in it a number of agents; and if action is the determination of the future, the condition for action is a unity of intentions, and actions of the different agents must be unified in one action. For the future of the
world cannot be determined in incompatible ways. If it could be, the world would become, as it were, a plurality of incompatible worlds."

This argument builds on the notion of the world as one action (in the sense of the resultant of a sort of parallelogram of forces made up of the sum of personal acts) and implies that in a struggle of wills action proper ceases because (as we saw in the earlier model) the intention is negative and based on an illusion. "In a struggle of wills action is negative, as we have seen. The intention of each party is dictated by the other, and neither determines the common future." (1959: 118) It can be seen that the inability to determine the future in accordance with my intention is an interference with my freedom as an agent. And as my determination of the future is also my self-determination it appears true to say that what happens is no act of mine. I do not exist as a freely acting person.

So, if free action depends on the ability to realise intention then a necessary condition for action is a unity of intention between self and other. Thus the necessary condition for any intention to be enacted by the agent is that he intends a unity of intention with the Other. Because all his action is with the other he must either act for or against the other, positively or negatively. If his attempts to realise his intentions are not to be self-contradictory he must intend, as a general condition of his particular intentions, to be united in intention with the other. Such an intention is, what Macmurray calls a positive intention and it is the foundation of community.

The notion of a positive intention is as such purely formal; it could be defined simply as the intention to bring about a form of community, of personal relation, in which a real unity of intention exists between members. But it goes without saying that the character of that unity of intention cannot be just anything at all. It is in fact already prefigured by the original motivation structure given in the relationship between mother and child, and in the exigencies of personal development that flow from it. There is an original "impulse" to communicate, the sole human "instinct" if you like. The object of this is a simple "being with" the other. Because of the problematic nature of personal development, this turns out to be either a "being for" or a "being against" the other. Of these two modes it is the "being for" that is the most fundamental, and it is the nature of this "for" that we will have to determine more exactly. It is the ground
of what Macmurray calls (1959:111) "certain interests which are universal and
necessary because they belong to the structure of personal experience."
Originally, in the case of the child, a distinction was made between need
for the help of the other and need for the other itself. This is a need for
a quality of relation with the other that can only be achieved or acquired if
it is given by the other. The child needs something which it is unable to
acquire for itself not, in this case, because of inadequate power but
because what is needed can only exist through the gift of the other.
Macmurray speaks of the child having to rely on the "grace" of the mother.
Now in the case of the relation between mature persons, insofar as they
have become free agents in the strict sense all such need is overcome.
The same structure nevertheless remains. Because there is no longer any
"child" in the relation there is no longer any need to "be given to".
There remains however a "need" to give. This is the final and mature form
taken by the original impulse to communicate "positively" with the other.
The notion of a need to give is so paradoxical that perhaps it would be
better to speak of a desire to give. Macmurray (1959:150) in fact prefers
to speak of a "need to care for one another". This must of course be seen
in a properly personal way, as a mature form of personal relation and not,
for instance, as the description of an immature psychological compulsion.
It must be remembered that this is a description of the final form taken by
an original impulse or instinct that is distinctive of human beings, and
the source of their properly personal character.

The community which is the necessary and sufficient condition for action in
the full sense of the term consists of two persons in fully reciprocal and
positive relationship to one another. That which makes each person an agent
in the full sense is the same factor that makes the relationship fully
positive - a totally heterocentric attitude on the part of each. Each lives
wholly for the other, making the other's will the ultimate condition of his
own. Because of this complete mutuality there is perfect freedom, both in
the sense that there is no constraint between the two, and in the sense that
there is no division in the will of either. Macmurray notes that this free-
dom is conditional on the inclusiveness and universality of the heterocentric
regard. In the model there are only two; potentially however all persons
in the universe are included in the self-forgetful will of each. Let me
conclude this all too sketchy account of Macmurray's analysis of the second
condition of action by quoting his own description of the community model.

65/...
"If, then, we isolate one pair, as the unit of personal community, we can discover the basic structure of community as such. The relation between them is positively motivated in each. Each, then, is heterocentric; the centre of interest and attention is in the other, not in himself. For each, therefore, it is the other who is important, not himself. The other is the centre of value. For himself he has no value in himself, but only for the other; consequently he cares for himself only for the sake of the other. But this is mutual; the other cares for him disinterestedly in return. Each, that is to say, acts, and therefore thinks and feels for the other and not for himself. But because the positive motive contains and subordinates its negative, their unity is no fusion of selves, neither is it a functional unity of differences - neither an organic nor a mechanical unity - it is a unity of persons. Each remains a distinct individual; the other remains really other. Each realises himself in and through the other." (1959: 158)

3. A critique of Macmurray

Macmurray's account of how personal agency is bound up with personal relation is persuasive and, it seems to me, at times profound. But it produces an unexpectedly large crop of problems and paradoxes when taken literally. Perhaps this is because "The Form of the Personal" is a largely programmatic work, content to present the broad lines of a theory to be filled in later in detail. It is also partly due to its epigrammatic, lecturing style. The difficulties I have with it concern both its message and its method.

As to the former, Macmurray's whole conception of agency and its necessary conditions is obscure, and the use of the terms 'person' and 'personal' that is bound up with it is ambiguous to say the least.

His general position that the agent's act requires the resistance and support of an Other, or environment, in order to take place is unexceptionable. But it is difficult to see why this Other should be a person. We have seen that Macmurray connects this condition to the possibility of choice, but I find this explanation unsatisfying. It is probably true that a person who had been brought up in complete isolation from others
could not be regarded as completely responsible for his actions and therefore as able to exercise deliberate choice. But that may be mere matter of fact. Macmurray does not do enough to connect choice conceptually with relation to a personal other. Or does he? Let us try to interpret what he says in the most sympathetic way to see whether a coherent argument emerges.

We can paraphrase Macmurray's argument in the following way. Action involves two elements: energy or effort and resistance or support, an element that is initiating and another that is receptive. In the case of animal behaviour the relationship between organism and environment is such that the environment is not a 'resistance' to the 'initiation' of behaviour: it makes it possible by 'supporting' it. The same applies to human action: there is a distinction of two elements in the unity of the act. These can be called in the broadest sense 'self', and 'other'. But it must not be thought that the action 'belongs' to the self in a special way. Both self and other are equally necessary for action, are essential elements in the actual occurrence and process of the act, and are only recognised as distinct by subsequent reflection.

"The resistance of the Other is not merely a negation of the act of the Self, it is necessary to the possibility of the act, and so constitutive of it." (1957:110)

Thus, to give a purely formal description of action (or behaviour or movement), it is a unity containing and constituted by two opposing elements—called by Macmurray, quite abstractly at first, positive and negative. In the case of action, the movement is consciously intended. Thus both elements that make up the act must have this character. (Whether one is considering simple movement, animal behaviour or human action, the distinguishing characteristic that defines each specific stage applies to both elements in it.) In other words both effort and resistance are constituted by a conscious intention. So Macmurray (1957: 145) concludes, "The possibility of action depends upon the Other being also agent, and so upon a plurality of agents in one field of action. The resistance to the Self through which the Self can exist as agent must be the resistance of another Self."

The principle consistently applied in this argument is that the Other is primary and positive. Its character determines that of the Self. This follows from Macmurray's whole conception of the self as Agent and not
Subject. As a knower the self is indeed a subject but simply as such it
does not actually exist. Even knowledge must be seen in terms of the act
of an agent if it is to be anything more than a mere idea. This is why
action is primary and positive and knowledge (especially self-knowledge) a
secondary and negative element within it that distinguishes action proper
from mere movement or behaviour. Hence if we distinguish, within the unity
of an action, Self and Other the role of knower must fall to self and that
of movement to Other. And just as knowledge considered in abstraction from
actual movement in the world does not exist, so too the Self apart from all
relation to the Other.

One appreciates that Macmurray is trying to get away from the notion of the
self as an absolute being distinct from and opposed to the material world.
And he is probably right in thinking that this usually happens when the self
is seen primarily as subject of knowledge or consciousness, since then it is
easier to attribute properties that are strictly only logical to an actually
existing person. But he is surely wrong to relativise the self to the
extent or in the way in which he does. Who after all performs the act,
the Self or the Other. It simply won't do to make the relation between
them the real agent. If Self and Other are both persons, then they are both
agents. Macmurray often speaks as though the relation between persons had
a higher ontological status than the persons themselves. Whatever the nature
of persons that could not be the case. Perhaps this last remark is not
quite true. If the term 'person' is taken to refer simply to a purely
'cultural' entity that comes into being through the active relations of
purely material beings, and if it were believed that human persons were in
fact simply such beings of culture, epiphenomena of material processes, then
such a position would be coherent. But Macmurray manifestly does not
believe this, since he criticises Aristotle (mistakenly in my opinion) for
holding that human offspring were only potential — and therefore not real —
persons. He, on the other hand, wishes to see personhood as a natural
endowment.

Although Macmurray believes that a human being is a person from the start
and not just an animal (the impulse to communicate is the strongest evidence
for this), the child is by no means an agent in the strong sense. Indeed
it could appear that this strong sense is so very strong that no-one is.
Macmurray (1957: 87) has this to say about the concept of action:
"As an ideal limit of personal being, it is the concept of an unlimited rational being, in which all the capacities of the Self are in full and unrestricted employment. As limited and finite persons, such a fullness of positive being lies beyond our range. This does not affect the concept, but only its application to the particular case. The limitation marks the fact that we are never fully active, without restriction or qualification, in our experience as agents."

If this is so, then what is the empirical basis for the concept? What is there to assure us that agency is a real possibility if it is never realised? Perhaps it would be better, some might say, to cut our conceptual coat according to our empirical cloth and use another notion of action, a humbler one closer to that of animal behaviour.

On the other hand Macmurray has his descriptions of personal development to offer and they are persuasive. I would go further. They are conclusive in demonstrating our reliance on the support and indeed the initiative of other persons in the development of our specifically personal characteristics. They do not, however, succeed as a justification of what Macmurray considers such characteristics to be. If freedom is an essential attribute of action, how is it derived from a dependence on the agency of another? And is it even coherent to see freedom, freedom of choice that is, not freedom from constraint, as something that can be present in degrees, that can develop and increase?

It could be said that Macmurray does not intend his descriptions as justifications of his notion of persons as agents. Exactly how we are to regard his account of the development of persons in relation to others we shall presently enquire. It is true, however, that he does not intend it precisely as proof of our existence as agents. For he regards such a proof as both unnecessary and impossible and explicitly says as much:

"Must we not raise a prior question, 'How do we know that the self is agent?' Clearly, if this question is logically prior, then the primacy of the practical cannot be maintained. But the question only seems to be a prior question from the standpoint of the Self as subject. The answer is simply that if, when acting, we did not know that we were acting we would not be acting. If any occurrence is an act of mine, I must know that I perform"
it. This, indeed, is the meaning of the statement that action, in distinction from thought, is an inclusive concept. To do, and to know that I do, are two aspects of one and the same experience. This knowledge is absolute and necessary. It is not, however, knowledge of an object but what we may call 'knowledge in action'.' (1957: 90)

Our agency has for Macmurray rather the status of a practical cogito. Its indubitability cannot be proved but only defended by some form of retortion.

These remarks on Macmurray's theory of intersubjectivity and its relation to human nature should not be taken to imply that I find little value in it. Indeed it is because I consider his programme well conceived that I am especially sensitive to the way he outlines for fulfilling it. Furthermore, I believe that persons are agents in the strong sense of the term and also that the capacity for such agency is one that is developed and perfected in intimate dependence on others. Macmurray's intuition that personal freedom increases in direct rather than inverse proportion to a certain sort of dependence on other persons is the crucial clue to a correct idea of what it is to be a person and to the role relations with others have in the life of human persons. Yet his account of intersubjectivity is definitely confused. The confusion stems, so it seems to me, from the lack of an adequate metaphysics for persons. To be precise, he lacks the necessary concept of the spirituality of persons.

This lack will be more clearly revealed in the descriptions to follow. We must preface these with a note on method, and will outline our own in relation to that employed by Macmurray.

4. An Excursus on Method

Macmurray's method in describing the personal development of a child in relation to its mother could, I suppose, be called scientific in a broad sense. It aims at the statement of general truths about human persons based on the observation and interpretation of their behaviour. The material for his observations is clearly provided by experimentation that is scientific in the narrow or strict sense. The work of Piaget (1929) on child development or of Koehler (1925) on the mentality of apes suggests itself. Certainly Macmurray does not appear to have experimented on his own account. Nor does he refer in detail, as for instance Merleau-Ponty (1964) or Charles Taylor (1964) do, to the experiments of others. As a consequence there is a certain ambiguity about the status of his descriptions
and the conclusions he draws from them. His description of the helplessness of a human child is based on an observation so general as to be irrefutable. Yet his account of the difference between human and animal play, though persuasive, is by no means unquestionable. Hence the conclusions he draws from this comparison, conclusions that strongly support his whole argument, that the function of play for the human child is to build up skills of communication with others, can't really be accepted on scientific grounds. Even less acceptable on such grounds is his "impulse to communicate", the innate capacity he regards as definitive of all personal beings and which he introduces as an explanatory principle of the whole process of human development. If however one considers an expression such as 'the rhythm of withdrawal and return' which is crucial to Macmurray's account of the acquisition by a person of self-consciousness one can I think discern a bivalence that will help us to form a judgment on his method. If the expression is taken in a scientific sense then the implication is both that the child acquires its sense of identity in a negative or hostile response to the mother and that this identity is reinforced by repetition. On the other hand if the expression is taken as the formulation of a necessary aspect of the relation between the mother and the child that must obtain if the latter, though originally not a person in the full sense is to become one through the agency of the mother, then no such theory of repetitive conditioning is involved nor is the conclusion of some essential negativity in the relation supported. Clearly Macmurray interprets this expression in the first way. He need not have done so however. Indeed with a few exceptions that are too specific, the whole of his description of the development of the child in relation to the mother could be taken as an analytic or conceptual account of features that are logically necessary if a potential agent is to become an actual one through the agency of another. In his other description, that of community, Macmurray appears to do just that. The notion of community is deduced as the set of conditions necessary for the possibility of agency, agency itself having been defined in a wholly a priori way as an indubitable feature of our experience. A reference to experience is included however, in the case of community, by his application of the notion to morality, society and religion. It remains true however that it is applied as an explanatory concept in these areas of human life; it is in no sense derived from them.

Our judgment then is that Macmurray oscillates between two types of description of personal relationships, one that is scientific in character and another that a priori and logically deduced. The first is not truly scientific; the second
is not sufficiently closely related to the fundamental features of human experience. Nevertheless his attempt is both perceptive in an intuitive and imaginative way and also instructive as regards a more appropriate method for the task. Both logical and empirical elements are required though related in a different way from that of Macmurray. In this chapter I shall attempt essentially the same description as he did but in what I regard as a more appropriate because more philosophical way. Before we leave Macmurray I must add that there are signs, and fairly frequent ones, that his intentions were more truly philosophical than his execution. He says, for instance, of the description of the mother and child, that

"The genetic account, which we have offered, therefore differs in no way from an analytic account of mature experience, so far as its formal conclusion is concerned. We have simply looked for the form of the personal in the earliest stage of personal existence because it is then at its simplest and least complicated, and therefore most easy to discern..." (1959: 107)

It is precisely this "analytic account of mature experience" that is our goal and Macmurray's attempt to provide it is extremely useful for the guidance that it gives.

Macmurray repeatedly points out that as the nature of agency or the personal only reveals itself in a process of development, it is not enough simply to analyse the notion of a complete or fully-formed person. One must also concern oneself with the necessary conditions for the realisation of capacities which, though strictly personal, are as yet undeveloped. Because we are interested both in the nature of persons and in the phenomenon of intersubjectivity we will have to use two sets of concepts, those that define persons in distinction from all other sorts of things and those that naturally describe the participants in the most fundamental forms of intersubjective relationships. Examples of the first are those such as 'agent' (to use Macmurray's own favourite), 'spiritual', 'person', 'infinite', 'self-enacting', 'self-conscious', 'self-determining'. Examples of the second are those such as 'communion', 'identification', 'reciprocity' and 'consent'. If there is a real connection between persons and the intersubjectivity then these two sets of terms ought to illuminate one another.

The notion of a personal power (or capacity, inclination or intendency) we shall be using is in our usage directly related to the Thomist notion of potentiality or potence. As such it is intrinsically linked to the notion of nature, the nature of a thing being simply the sum of its essential powers.
Such a usage is not however confined to the Thomist thought world. It is, for instance, the same in essential respects as the view of R. Harré (1975, 1976). Thus it in no way implies the existence of mysterious "forces" that are inaccessible to scientific investigation, but rather a conception of natural entities and their scientific understanding that is directly contrary to the Humean view of substance and causality and our knowledge of the world. Scientific laws are not merely the formulation of statistical regularities that have been observed and are associated with objects discriminated by our interests, but the recognition of a structure that is responsible for those regularities and which is independent of our interest.

A writer such as Shotter (1976) insists on a distinction between personal and natural powers that we cannot accept. For him "human beings have no personal powers at birth at all." (Shotter, 1976: 40) They must acquire them in a process of social interaction that he envisages in terms not unlike our own description of the mother-child relation. His reason for insisting on the distinction is precisely because he has grasped the essentially self-referential nature of personal activity, and recognises that "Clearly, at first, a child does not exist in the world as an autonomous, self-directing, self-actualizing and self-transforming agency, but he can become one." (Shotter, 1976: 29) We would add to this that he becomes one not by "acquiring" (Shotter's preferred word) but by developing his personal powers. It could be the case that the disagreement between myself and Shotter is merely verbal, that, whereas for him the notion of having a power implies an ability to use it, for me it need not but instead refer simply to a difference of (inherited) nature. I think that this is probably the case since in rejecting Harre's definition of human beings as beings possessing "the power to control their performance in accordance with rules" (Shotter, 1976: 26), he proposes instead that "we characterise human beings by the fact that they possess a natural power to construct or create in interaction with other human beings a personal power to control their performances in accordance with rules." (Shotter, 1976: 26) The difference between "a natural power to ... create ... a personal power" and a personal power that is part of our nature seems slight indeed. I can't help feeling however that Shotter thinks of personal powers more as cultural products than as natural characteristics of human beings, whereas I want to say that though competence in their exercise is a cultural product their possession is a natural fact. To claim this is however to claim something unusual, because of the self-referring character of personal powers. That the self can exist before it has an acquired "content", merely as the empty but real openness, for such a content, is something that many would deny. To grant the reality of such an indeterminate natural power is in fact to grant the spiritual nature of persons.
Because personal characteristics, though present as capacities, are not actually revealed in acts from the start, we shall begin our analysis with a consideration of the conditions of possibility for their development. We shall focus our description on the relation between two persons, one of whom we shall call "mother" and the other of whom we shall call "child". This relationship is intended as an abstract model of a purely "potential" person in relation to a fully "actual" one, yet our descriptions are intended to have reference to the actual experience of personal activity though only to those activities that are unavoidable if one is a person in any sense of the word. Thus there is a standard of "realism" implied, though it is not that of the scientific study of child behaviour, it is rather that of an imaginative reflection on his own experience by a mature adult. To isolate a pair of persons from the rest of human society is not realistic in the scientific sense of the term. But it is essential if one is to discern with any real insight what is required, from whomsoever or however many, for personal capacities to be realised in human life.

The "mother" thus stands for the personal milieu of persons, the "child" for the natural possibility of personal existence. And it would seem to be a fact in the most obvious meaning of the word that persons cannot realise their distinctively personal characteristics in a wholly impersonal environment. Suzanne Langer's account of "wild children" and the attempts to teach them the human use of language confirm the prima facie plausibility of this thesis. (Langer, 1942: 103-143) On the other hand, the Kelloggs' experiment of bringing an ape up from birth with their own baby shows that it is not simply communication with persons at a crucial ("lalling") stage of infancy that is sufficient to introduce the child to language proper. (Kellogg, 1933) The little chimp for all its precociousness and in spite of its far greater practical intelligence never learnt to speak. Thus a natural capacity is necessary as well as a personal environment. In looking for the fundamental features of a person we shall of course have to deal exclusively with human persons. But that does not entail that non-humans such as animals, Martians, angels or even computers are not persons. Once we have decided what qualities distinctively personal relations reveal (and we do presuppose that human beings at least possess them) we will be in a position to assess the personal status of other sorts of things.

5. The nature of agency

As has been suggested by Macmurray's analysis and confirmed by the cases of wild children, human children do require the presence of other persons if
they are to develop their distinctively personal powers towards maturity. What precisely these powers are it is part of our purpose to specify in this work. For the present let us take the notion of agency suggested by Macmurray (though not committing ourselves to his understanding of it) as the defining characteristic of a person, and see what is necessary for a child to become an agent in at least the common sense of the term.

By calling a person an agent one does not mean merely that he is capable of movement or of behaviour. To act implies at least that one is aware of oneself as the cause of certain happenings in the world. Thus it involves self-consciousness of a practical as well as a theoretical sort. By practical self-consciousness I mean that one is conscious of having power, or alternatively (since in the way in which I am using the term it amounts to the same thing), of being a cause. By theoretical self-consciousness I mean simply one's consciousness of existing as a real being distinct from others. Contemporary writers in the Thomist tradition usually recognise the self-referring character of personal agency. (Donceel, 1967; Coreth, 1973; Lonergan, 1972) Bernard Lonergan, for instance, who distinguishes four levels or degrees of consciousness in human subjects, makes it quite clear that at the fourth level, which is that of choice and action, we have to do with ourselves, whatever the actual object of our choice or act may be. "On all four levels, we are aware of ourselves but, as we mount from level to level, it is a fuller self of which we are aware and the awareness itself is different." Thus the final level (distinguished from the empirical, the intellectual and the rational level) is the responsible level "on which we are concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions." (Lonergan, 1972: 9)

To bring out this self-referring character of personal agency we can take as an example of an agent a person singing a song. The singer is a cause because the existence of the song depends on her own. Various elements are involved in this dependence. She knows she is singing the song. She wants to sing the song. Her wanting to sing the song is a necessary "cause" of its being sung. And in addition she wants her wanting to sing the song to be a "cause" of its being sung. Wanting to sing the song and knowing that she is singing it are unproblematic. The third condition is perhaps less so. All it means however is that if the existence of the song did not depend in any way on her wanting to sing it, then the singing could not be seen as an action of hers. Nor must this dependence be merely a fact; she must want it as well as the
mere existence of the song. Perhaps this distinction is difficult to grasp in the case of singing a song. Consider instead the case of a mountain climber who wishes to extricate his partner on the rope from a fissure where he has stuck. In the course of his attempts to dislodge his partner he loses his footing and falls, thus jerking the rope and successfully dislodging his partner. As the partner came out of the fissure his falling friend would not be unaware that he was the cause of setting him free. He would certainly want him to be free. But in this case his wanting to free his friend was not a cause of freeing him since his fall was a mistake. And in comparing his former attitude with his present the falling climber would be able to see that in addition to wanting to free his friend he also wanted his wanting this to play a "causal" part in setting him free.

The reason that I have put all reference to causality in inverted commas in the above paragraph, is because it seems to suggest that the wanting and the singing, or the saving, are two distinct events that are causally linked. This is of course untrue. They are instead two distinct elements in an all-embracing unity whose character will be further explored in this study. They are of course not merely logical elements; they could be called distinct acts to establish their reality, but this must not be taken to mean that they are "little" actions within the principal action we are concerned with. They have no existence except as parts of a whole.

The concept of action certainly does include that of being a cause, as appears from our example. In addition however are the two elements of knowledge and what I have called "wanting". The first wanting is simply wishing or desiring and is directed towards the object of the act. The second is what I have called "consent" and is directed not at the object but at the subject of the action. It has two degrees, the first being the consent to the wanting what the action achieves, the second the consent to the action and its achievement being partially caused by the very wanting itself. This self-directed affective act corresponds in the realm of the affections to the self-knowledge that is the inevitable concomitant of a judgement of fact and thus an inevitable ingredient in any action.

One could say in fact that the distinction between the two types of wanting is that between wishing and willing. However one wants to put it the crucial point is that the second type is referred to the self and not to the object of the act as its primary term. And so in addition to the realisation of events
in the world an action modifies the agent. And this not only in the obvious sense that it involves perceptions, judgements of fact and value, wishes and movements, all of which are of course new events in the history of the agent. The more important way in which an agent is affected by his action is that it involves a minimum of self-knowledge of oneself as a single distinct being having causal power, and a minimum of self-determination, both in that one's own mere wish has a causal role in the action and also because in one's consent to what one judges and wishes one actually concerns oneself with oneself in a direct and total way and so affirms, appropriates and enacts what one has become. The first meaning of "self-determination" is that it is the subject (and not some other) that is the cause of the event, the second is that in addition to causing something in the world to happen the subject deals with and so enacts himself.

The self-knowledge involved, though minimal, is also certainly real and objective. It must of necessity include an awareness of what one desires, what one intends to do to realise the desire, and one's consent. And all this is referred, however implicitly, to oneself and constitutes a concrete notion of oneself. If, after the act, one was questioned one could tell the truth about oneself under each of these heads.

Self-consciousness and self-determination thus represent two degrees of self-possession in the performance of any act. So all action is self-referential, and it is this that we shall take as its distinctively personal character.

6. The Mother-child model

Clearly a human child is not conscious in either a theoretical or practical sense from the start. We must now try to see what is necessary for it to become conscious in both. Clearly from the start it is both conscious and a cause. To say that it is conscious is to point to a certain effect that its environment has on it. There is experience. In addition to the world of things there is also experience. If one wants a word to characterise the simplest type of consciousness Macmurray's "feeling" seems a natural choice, particularly as "feeling" can refer both to the experience of being touched or affected by one's environment (I feel the warmth of the sun) and to one's response to one's environment (I feel desire). One's sensations as well as one's emotions can be called feelings. And the ambiguity of the term preserves the fact that at this stage there is no distinction felt between subject and object within experience. Consciousness also always has a subject in the sense that it is always somebody's consciousness but it need not have
this subject as a distinct object, whether vague or specific. Certainly at the start it should not be seen as containing a vague sense of self which then becomes stronger and clearer. This could never be verified by direct experience and it is difficult to see how it could even be inferred. In its simplest form consciousness should rather be seen as the capacity a person has for experience, a real "psychological" capacity for presence rather than mere occurrence. At the start, or in itself (if one wishes to forget the model), it is wholly non-specific and hence able to be specified by whatever can occur. At the same time it is a particular capacity of this particular person.

What must occur for this consciousness to become self-conscious in the sense entailed by agency? The answer to this question is that the child must be present to another person. The reason given by Karl Rahner for this necessity is that only another person is sufficiently "other" for the distinction between self and other to appear as an object for consciousness. Mere things can always be simply subsumed into the domain of the self as elements in its self-constituting activity. Their otherness is the mere passive otherness of space and time, their simple physical existence; the otherness of persons however is the otherness of autonomy and originality, a real opposition of intention and effort to our own. According to Rahner (1969: 138)

"..... it is only in that (man) always already enters into the concretely determined other of materia and experiences its determination (forma) as his own reality, that he is truly "with the other" in his own existingness (without this being again, simply, the pure negativity of his being-with-himself). This concrete otherness, precisely because it is always executed as one's own determination from the basis (forma) of one's own being (motus as actus moti), can only be experienced as the one not in our hands, as the "truly" other, when it (this otherness) is understood as coming from a free other basis (forma non mere materialis, sed subsistens). This in turn again implies, from another point of view, the transcendental deduction of a plurality of the co-world of free persons as regards man."

Without metaphor, the self of self-consciousness can only be found where consciousness discovers all its objects - in its environment. Now the only place where a trace of it could be found is, not in things since they are limited to being simply what they are, but in another consciousness. Before we clarify this it is as well to note that the "self" in question is no purely logical entity. We are not investigating the dawn of the realisation that consciousness as such implies the distinction between
subject and object. We are instead considering the origin of a person's knowledge that he is a separately existing real being. We are in other words talking about a real item of knowledge (although it need not be explicit) rather than a purely logical condition for all knowledge. The self-consciousness that is a necessary requirement for action in the common sense of the term is a real though very general item of knowledge. If it were not so the agent could not be held responsible for his acts; it would be as though they all proceeded from an "invincible ignorance" of a peculiarly radical sort.

Having given a preliminary account of the nature of the self that is to be found let us now attempt to clarify the process by which it is found. We have said that the essential condition is the presence of another person, in this case the person of the mother. This by itself however is not enough. The acquisition of self-consciousness is not a consequence of discovering in one's environment a different sort of being, i.e. a person, then discovering that they are self-conscious and finally coming to the realisation that one is the same sort of being that they are and therefore self-conscious too. That would be an entirely fanciful supposition. It would moreover presuppose sophisticated cognitive activity which is only possible once self-consciousness has been achieved. The sufficient condition for the real acquisition of self-consciousness is that one is oneself present to the person who is present to one. There are two aspects to this presence. First there is the personal presence of the mother as such and then there is the existence of the child in the consciousness of the mother. By becoming present to the mother who is present to it it becomes present to itself; it discovers itself as the object of the mother activity. As such it is not yet fully aware of itself as a person or agent. But the first step has been taken, a step that is of a piece with all that is to follow. Each element of full personal self-consciousness has to be acquired from the consciousness its mother has of it, since it is not actually present as such in any other place, least of all in its own as yet unactualised capacities.

It is for this reason that we cannot accept John Heron's suggestion, in his otherwise wholly admirable study "The Phenomenology of Social Encounter: the Gaze", that in an interpersonal encounter a person "retains his own sense of identity by virtue of his external perception of the body of the other and of his inaccessibly private kinesthetic sensations of his own body." (Heron, 1970:253) This suggestion is in fact out of line with the rest of the article which offers strong support for the view that strictly personal self-awareness is gained only from the mutuality of personal relation. We shall return to Heron's
discussion of this when we have completed our own description. For the moment it seems enough to point out the lack of continuity between the "kinesthetic sensations" referred to and one's sense of being precisely an agent. Kinesthetic sensations are certainly always an aspect of an action, yet by themselves they simply declare the existence of movement or behaviour, not action proper. Furthermore when Heron adds that they are sensations of one's own body, he in fact presupposes what has to be shown, viz. that one is conscious of having an own body, which implies of course that one is conscious of oneself. Against all this his study supplies ample foundation for the sense of identity in the intersubjective relation itself, in the experience of the "directed gaze". In experiencing the gaze of the other, one experiences oneself as the object at which it is directed.

We now have to enquire as to the necessary conditions for the child to become aware of himself as an agent in the common sense of the term. In order to do this we shall describe a transaction between the child and the mother. It must be remembered that this is not a pseudo-scientific account of child development, and that the elements that we shall distinguish as parts of a process are in fact simultaneous aspects of the common experience of being an agent, seen in relation to their necessary conditions.

In the mother-child model the child must be seen as a representation of the pure natural capacity for being an agent; it is a wholly helpless and needy being. The mother on the other hand is a representation of a fully developed person. As will become clear in the course of this study there can be a great deal more to such a notion than is commonly suspected. For the time being let us be content to envisage the mother as a mature person in a quite indeterminate sense of the word. The requirements of maturity in a stricter sense will very soon become apparent.

If the child has needs then either they can be met or not. The child is conscious. His consciousness is thus either of lack or fulfilment, pain (in a very general sense) or satisfaction. In the case of a simple physical need we can see that the child's lack is of three things: of something other than the child (say, food), of a state or condition of itself (being well-fed), and of power to get the first to satisfy the second. When the child's need is met by the mother consciousness of lack is replaced by consciousness of fulfilment. This changed state of the child is brought about by the activity of the mother so even if the child is conscious of the process of change there is nothing in that to counter his own sense of impotence. How far children
actually do have a sense of impotence with respect to meeting their physical needs, and therefore a source of dissatisfaction in addition to the physical needs themselves, is of course a question beyond the competence of a philosophical study.

At this stage one might perhaps say that the child is conscious of activity without an owner. Insofar as an agent is present at all in the fulfilling act it is certainly not the child, since his impotence, and whatever consciousness he has of it, remains. To the mother however the child is not simply a being of physical needs that requires her care but a person, in the sense at least of one who has personal capacities. Her recognition of it as a person is the foundation of another sort of activity in its regard: she values it, and this fact too finds expression in her acts. Thus one can make a primary distinction in the mother's attitude to the child: it is both the object of her care and of her value. This distinction is not founded on two radically distinct types of needs, physical and personal. To see it in that way would be to put the cart before the horse and would involve an unnecessary dualism.

The one child has many needs, but the child itself can be seen in two ways: as an object of care or an object of value. The same acts answering the same needs can and do express two different motives stemming from two different attitudes. The acts that express the mother's recognition and consent to the child's value can be the same acts that answer its physical needs. But the single act has now a double function, to meet the need and to express the value. If we consider a limiting case, and refuse to postulate in an a priori way a distinction between physical and personal needs, a machine (or a wolf) could care for the child and meet its needs. The mother does that of course but at the same time does what no machine could do. She has a belief in the existence of personal capacities in the child and for that reason is able to value it.

I have used the term "value" to distinguish the mother's attitude to the child as a person rather than simply a being of needs. It is a very general term and one needs to specify it a little more in order to account for the special role it plays in the development of the child. By "care" I mean to indicate simply an activity that is directed towards the meeting of needs; the term says nothing of the motive of the activity. The caring mother could be preparing her child for immolation on the altar. Or simply ministering to her own self-esteem. "Value" on the other hand refers primarily to the motive. The child itself is seen as valuable irrespective of any relation it might have to the mother and her own desires and intentions. Accordingly the caring acts

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performed in its regard are seen at the least as duties. The person who performs them and who at the same time recognises an obligation to do so is expressing in however minimal a degree consent to the value of the child and therefore to its existence and development as a person. To the extent to which they do this they are presenting themselves to the child as the person that they are rather than simply the fulfiller of his needs. Perhaps it is a trifle difficult to see this in the very minimal case that I have sketched. It is one that would be exemplified by an unenthusiastic nurse in an orphanage. The normal case is one in which this minimal sense of duty and responsibility is merely a structural element in more or less whole-hearted mother-love. Where the essential recognition and consent to the value of the child as a person is embodied in actual love then the active presentation by the mother of herself in her caring acts is much more clearly evident. In this the normal case, acts of care become inadequate to express the true motive of the mothers' activity with regard to the child. Another class of acts comes into being whose sole purpose is the expression of love. They have no pragmatic purpose at all. In such acts the mother is much more personally present, in the sense and to the degree that they are the expressions of a full consent to the active relation to the object of the act. She is thus available to be known as a person and not merely as a meeter of needs. This primary sense in which she is personally present to the child is the most important as far as its personal development is concerned and should be sharply distinguished from all others, even from such secondary quasi-personal presences as for instance that other and often deliberate self-presentation whose motive is the meeting of a normal mother's own need for love.

It is in the mother's presence to the child as one who recognises and consents to it as a person that the child is finally able to discover itself as the person to whom her activity is directed. And this is moreover the only place in the world where it can exist as an object for consciousness before it exists as such for itself.

The possibility of acquiring that self-consciousness that is a necessary element in being an agent in the common sense of the term depends on the presence of one who recognises and consents to one as a person. That in itself is however not enough to make the child an agent, since this also requires that it be conscious of itself as having power or as being a cause of an occurrence in the world. We have therefore to discover within the mother-child relation the origin of such causality and such a sense of power. And as before it is in the person of the mother that it must be found.
The motive of the mother's love goes beyond consent to the mere existence of the child. It is after all a person only in the sense of the possessor of personal capacities. Its mother's love thus necessarily wishes the development and perfection of these capacities for its own sake, so that it becomes an actual person in full possession of its powers. To the extent then that it becomes conscious of her presence and responds to it with consent of its own, consent that can take such various forms of fascination, adoration and delight, it realises her ambitions for it. She discerns the dawn of self-consciousness in it and the self-communication of consent. As it develops its distinctively personal characteristics it does the one thing needful to satisfy her love. No-one else has such power. The child is thus the possessor of a special sort of power which it possesses through a combination of personal capacities and the mother's love. It is the cause of an occurrence in the world and through its consciousness of the mother's joy it has the necessary condition for becoming conscious of itself as such.

It is important at this stage of our analysis of intersubjectivity to see why only a positive, loving attitude on the part of the mother is able to impart to the child the consciousness of agency. First of all it is only because she wills the development of its personal capacities that its exercise of them is able to cause her joy and give the child the power over her that it has. Secondly, the development of its personal capacities answers a natural inclination of the child, has its own satisfaction for it and inevitably makes for its consent. The inclinations of the child's personal nature and the mother's love coincide so that this real mutuality of satisfaction in its development of self-consciousness as an agent is able to be the necessary stepping stone to an eventual consent to her as a person. The child after all does not simply respond to the mother, it responds with grateful love. And this is a further degree of mutuality, and also a further degree of self-development. It consents both to its own development as a person and to her existence and value as a person who exists for it.

If on the other hand the mother's attitude to the child had been one of rejection and hostility then her consent to its existence and status as a person would have been lacking, she would not have been present to the child as a person herself, and the whole dialectic of development would have been subverted from the start.

W ver Eecke (1975) agrees with our emphasis on the necessity for a positive, loving attitude on the part of the other if a person is to become properly aware of himself as an agent. He bases his conviction moreover on a detailed analysis of the experimental work of Spitz and others in child development and pathology. Spitz's study concerned anaclytic depression and hospitalism in babies. Babies
who, for administrative reasons, were removed from their mothers in an institution showed all sorts of emotional and physical symptoms. They cried more than other babies and suffered from insomnia. They showed a greater susceptibility to colds and lost weight. In general they showed symptoms of withdrawal and a retardation of personality growth.

In the case of the hospitalism observations, where the babies were removed from their mothers after the third month, the results were ever more drastic. Ver Eecke (1975: 231) sums them up as follows:

"During the first three months of separation the symptoms were very similar to those of anaclitic depression. After the third month, the children showed excessive motor retardation. They became completely passive, lying on their backs without being able to turn themselves into the prone position. Their faces had an imbecilic expression, eye co-ordination was defective, fingers showed bizarre movements and the children were sometimes subjected to "spasmus nutans". At the end of their second year, these children had on the average a development which would classify them as idiots."

Ver Eecke's conclusion is the "child needs a mother or a mother substitute and not just a nurse". (Ver Eecke, 1975: 237) This is equivalent to our distinction between care and value or love. His purpose in his study is to counteract Sartre's notion that authentic subjectivity can exist only in opposition to other subjects by means of objectifying them, that, in short, genuine subject-subject relations are impossible. He concludes, in terminology very similar to our own that "real subjectivity is only possible within the context of inter-subjectivity ... The other is therefore not the enemy of my subjectivity, he is the condition for my becoming a subject." (Ver Eecke, 1975: 245) In the course of his study however, because he has to deal with the emphasis on negativity that is characteristic of Sartre's account of relations between persons, Ver Eecke is also able to find the proper place for opposition between self and other in the achievement of self-consciousness. He identifies opposition as a moment within a relation that is primarily one of mutual acceptance. In mutual acceptance self-consciousness as an agent is already achieved. The opposition that so often expresses this (the period of "No"-saying in young children) is, in the case of "healthy" development, not real opposition at all but symbolic opposition, an exercise of autonomy in a relationship of trust in an almost game-like manner. This insight is important for us since it provides a counter to those theorists who maintain, contrary to our own position, that a real struggle between subjects is necessary for the emergence of a genuine awareness of oneself as an autonomous agent.
Our account of why the mother's attitude to the child must be a positive one if it is to be an agent at all is necessarily incomplete at this stage. So far we have been trying to describe the conditions for the possibility of an absolute minimum of personal life. When we come to describe the further conditions necessary for personal "growth" much more will have to be said about a positive intention.

7. Critical review of the first stage

In this chapter we have tried to develop our own account of how and why it is that persons depend on other persons to be persons in at least a minimal sense of the term. We have done it on the lines suggested by Macmurray, though our method has differed in some respects from his. Is it necessary to say again that ours is in no sense a scientific account but a strictly philosophical one? Our conclusions must be seen as necessary, though related to experience in the way that we have explained. We hope to have shown accordingly that it is necessary for a person to be involved in a particular inter-subjective relation with another if their own capacity for being an agent is to be realised. And this, though inevitably taking place in an historical process, is not merely a contingent fact but a necessary consequence of what it is to be an agent.

We should note that the paradox of a free act that is dependent for its exercise on the act of another is a feature of our account as well as of Macmurray's. In this connection it is perhaps necessary to stress the point that terminated our account: that mutuality and agency go together, stand to one another in a relation of direct and not inverse proportion. The child's consent to its own agency is bound up directly with its consent to the powerful presence of the mother. There is a clear distinction between on the one hand the child's various needs, the mother as the meeter of those needs and the child's satisfaction in her as such, and on the other the child's capacity for agency, the mother as the one whose loving presence enables this to be realised and the child's delight in her loving presence. The capacity to be an agent and delight in the mere presence of a loving mother are conceptually connected as well as being but two sides of the specifically personal nature of a human child. The fact that it is necessary that the mother should be a loving one must not obscure the entire absence of self-interest or pragmatism in the child's delight. The presence of the mother answers a need, if you like, but it is a need that is quite sui generis, the need to be an agent. At all events it is a distinctively personal need for another person. Perhaps it is not so far from Macmurray's "impulse to communicate".
In view of our description of the mother-child relation it would indeed seem that human persons have a natural inclination or tendency towards other persons. Our description of the achievement of agency certainly suggests this. This tendency certainly has the character of a need for something that only the active initiative of another person can meet. This is ultimately the sheer presence of the person as a person for the sake of the other. There is also thus a personal capacity for the apprehension of and consent to such a presence, which consent and apprehension constitutes a minimal form of mutuality of knowledge and value. We can thus describe the essentially personal capacity indifferently as that for self-enactment in a general sense, or for communion in the sense sketched out above.

This question of a dependent freedom will receive a clearer answer when we discuss personal growth. But there as here it will be the case that mutuality and individuality hang together. Indeed it is precisely this feature of the intersubjective relations of persons that reveals their spiritual nature.

John Heron (1970), in the article previously referred to on the gaze as a form of social encounter, offers an account of the inter-subjective conditions necessary for personal self-awareness which is strikingly similar to our own, yet based on an analysis of the quite specific phenomenon of mutual gazing, that is of two persons gazing into each others eyes. The language in which he sums up the results of his investigation is so expressive that I feel justified in quoting him at length, especially in view of the parallel it affords with our own account.

"If there is a sense in which the inward streaming of the gaze of the other as received by me constitutes at that time the reality of my being: the gaze received openly and without fear can yield for me a profound awareness of my body-mind unity. In this situation the gaze of the other may illuminate me as a unitive being with no awareness of body-mind distinction. Similarly, I apprehend the other as a unitive presence revealed before me. But each of these states is secondary to the unitive reality constituted by the relation of mutual gazing itself. The transphysical streaming of the gaze of the other interfuses my whole being, the transphysical streaming of my gaze interfuses the whole being of the other; but in each case this only occurs by virtue of the thorough interpenetration of the mutual streaming - which constitutes the dramatic elan of true encounter between persons. It is the interaction of the two-fold gazing which is a necessary condition of the irradiation of each by each being."
This interpenetration, then, is a transphysical unitive reality of field - which is also a unitive field of consciousness - with two poles, the irradiated being of each. Within this unitive field, my awareness of myself is in part constituted by my awareness of his awareness of me, and my awareness of him is in part constituted by my awareness of his awareness of me; that is to say, my awareness of his awareness of me both reveals me to myself and reveals him to me, and his simultaneous awareness of my awareness of him both reveals him to himself and reveals me to him. But further, in my awareness of his awareness of my awareness, whether of myself or of him, I reveal myself to him; and in his awareness of my awareness of his awareness, whether of himself or me, he reveals himself to me. Thus in the unitive field of consciousness established through the interfused transphysical streaming of mutual gazing, each is revealed to himself, each is revealed to the other, and each reveals himself to the other. Because the gaze of each in part constitutes the being of the other only by virtue of the reciprocal interaction, there is a sense in which each is copresent at the opposite pole; that is to say, each has internal perception both of his own unitive being and of the unitive being of the other..." (Heron, 1970: 255)

There is a great deal in this passage that is relevant to points that will be brought up later on in our own investigation. Here however I will confine my comment to the term "transphysical". In his treatment of the gaze Heron is forced to recognise the existence of a phenomenal reality that cannot be equated with any physical properties of the eyes or face. Nor can it be explained, for a variety of reasons, in terms of a projection by the observer. So Heron coins the term "transphysical" to refer to a property both of the gaze itself and the person gazing. Such a notion obviously has points of contact with our own notion of the spiritual. But its importance in the present context is this: Heron's analysis of mutual gazing suggests a basis for a real but non-inferential knowledge of oneself and other persons. It is pre-objective. For that reason one might be tempted to relegate the sort of self-awareness and other-awareness involved to the realm of sense intuition, to something akin to the consciousness of animals. And of course it is certainly true in the case of a new-born child, as indeed in the case of an adult, that there are various levels of awareness or intuition below the fully
conscious or objective. The term "transphysical" however rules out the possibility of that kind of awareness, which could be accounted for in purely physical terms. This is of course important in the present context, since our description implies the existence of the capacity for an awareness which although it is not objective from the start is nevertheless properly personal and therefore, if we are right, unable to be reduced to something purely physical.

The fact, that a child's awareness of itself develops out of a prior state of awareness that could be called, in a general way, feeling, tends to prevent most writers on the subject from recognising that a genuinely personal self-consciousness could never develop at all unless the capacity for it were there from the start. Instead, in most accounts it is presented as the result of a sort of transmutation of a prior biological state of feeling. S Strasser (1969: 99), for instance, can say "Our knowledge of the other as an Ego" (on which, he holds, our knowledge of ourself depends) "is rooted in the most original, the non-objectifying mode of awareness. For that upon which a subject is first emotionally and biologically dependent is his fellow subject." As a purely psychological, that is scientific, account of the development of self-awareness, a statement like that is unexceptionable. As a statement of the necessary conditions for personal self-awareness it is however inadequate and indeed misleading.

With that we conclude our critical review of the first stage of the intersubjective transactions of persons. We must now relate our description to the notion of self-enactment.

8. Self-enactment in intersubjectivity I

Our description of the necessary conditions for someone being an agent in the common sense of the term presupposes for its accuracy just two facts: that persons require a personal environment to exercise their personal capacities at all, and that such a personal environment must contain unselfish love. Both these facts, when understood in the terms of our description, can be seen to imply that persons are self-enacting beings, in the sense we have defined, as well as in the loose sense required by the common notion of being an agent.

The fact that an impersonal environment will not do to enable the proper exercise of the distinctively personal capacities of the child points to the peculiar nature of such capacities. As we have seen, they are wholly non-specific. They are not adapted to the performance of any particular task or the acquisition of any particular skill, except, as we have seen, that of communicating with the mother. This however, as should already appear, is
precisely not one particular skill among others. Its inclusive, global character will appear more clearly as we proceed. Whatever the genetic endowment, the specific instincts or the particular natural and social situation of the child it has, over and above such an admittedly wholly material system, a capacity for the self-consciousness and self-determination implied by being an agent. We know of the initial existence of such a capacity because of its eventual emergence and exercise. Its radical difference from other natural capacities is revealed by the fact that it can only be realised in dependence on other persons, and not on any pragmatic or impersonal activity of theirs but on their distinctively personal acts alone.

The non-specific character of the capacity for agency is a result of the self-referring nature of its acts. It is in fact the bare capacity for self-reference. Whatever the particular "content" or character the self has, there is over and above that the reference of itself to itself in all its acts. This self-reference is neither conscious nor consented to in the case of a child. Yet no particular set of aspects of the child's life could lead to its emergence later on; it is a totally indeterminate relation of a whole to the whole of itself. Hence if it is not present at the start it will never be present at all. It can therefore only be present in the beginning as pure potentiality. For this reason it is wholly dependent for its exercise, parasitic one might even say, on the personal activity of another.

The lack of specificity that we have remarked in the case of the child is the obverse of an ability to transcend its own particularity and separatedness and enter the self-consciousness of the mother. Were all its natural powers oriented towards specific objects in its environment such orientations would interfere with and prevent its picking up the mother's own self-referring presence.

Thus what could appear to the uninstructed eye as merely a lack on the part of the child, the concomitant of that radical dependence on others of its species manifested by any material being, is in fact a sign of spirituality in the form of universality, an openness to sharing the being of another without destroying it, that is precisely sharing it rather than assimilating it.

Nédoncelle (1966) also remarks on this lack of specificity of our distinctively personal powers when he is discussing what he calls "the ideal self". The ideal self is the essential "instrument of personal singularization" (Nédoncelle, 1966: 104) and is contrasted with all the other powers and
inclinations of human persons as being that feeling for a certain sort of psychic "space" that permits our being genuine persons. "But the emptiness that always characterizes the ideal self in certain respects is full of meaning: it separates us from ourselves to make us sensitive to the appeal of a creativity that both assures the indetermined career of our freedom and already stamps our unique imprint on all the acts our freedom will originate." (Nedoncelle, 1966: 104)

We have said that the second necessary condition for the child's becoming an agent is that the mother should love it as the person that it is. To be accurate we should have said love and know. As we shall see in the descriptions to come, both love and knowledge are involved but in different degrees at different stages in personal life. Here at its inception, where there is (by definition) in the child so little to be known, love is predominant.

The mother is by definition fully self-enacting. We must here presume, though we shall later on argue, that such a condition will issue in the wholehearted love of others. What is important is that the mother is wholly present to the child as the fully-developed person that she is, and is present in this way for the child. Her knowledge of it (in this case merely knowledge of its potentialities) is complete, being derived from her own self-knowledge (as we shall see in the next chapter), and her consent to it (her love) is wholehearted. Hence the ideal self with which the child is presented contains nothing that could prevent its appropriation by the child. Insofar as the child makes the ideal self its own no alien multiplicity or division is introduced into its consciousness of and consent to itself. Its self-consciousness can be unified and simple about the intuition of its specifically personal potentialities that the mother presents through her expression of their full development in her. Its self-determination can be correspondingly complete, since in the system of the mother's own affective and volitional life there is neither lack nor conflict of will in her project for the child. Thus the self the child is offered as its own is strictly self-enacting. Its own self-enactment is present as the ultimate goal of its specifically personal life as a guiding light and a normative influence in the multiplicity of particular projects that make up a human life.

Finally, two characteristics of the relation between mother and child are deserving of mention as being of peculiar significance for our attempt to discover an interpersonal correlate of the spirituality of persons. There is first of all the reciprocity between mother and child brought about by the mother's distinctively personal influence. The more it suffers the influence
of the mother, the more the child enacts itself. This sort of influence is not the sort of thing that even the human sciences tell us of, at least when they are trying to be really "scientific". Is it in fact something that they could even possibly discover? And second, there is the "community" established between mother and child as a result of the transaction between them. The child contributes nothing to the "content" of the ideal self. This self, which is presented as the goal of the child's own development is simply the fully developed self of the mother. Insofar as the child makes it its own, child and mother appear to come to share a common character. There seems to be question here of two persons with but one personality. And again this would appear to contradict the logic of matter. Apart from this is there not something sinister about such spiritual osmosis? The precise nature of this identification between self and other in intersubjective relations will be further explored in the two chapters to come. Here it has barely begun so its character is hardly revealed. But there is already enough to point towards the immateriality of persons since it seems to involve a sharing of what is most interior to each, something that could not be envisaged in the case of physical objects.

We have come to the end of our first description of the intersubjective relations between persons, that intended to reveal the necessary conditions for the mere exercise of their personal powers. And the description has revealed that if persons are to be agents in the normal sense of the term then they are in a general way self-enacting. Further scrutiny of the necessary conditions for being an agent shows that they must be seen as self-enacting in a stricter sense, a sense in which many of the features of spirituality brought out by our previous analysis are already present.

In this the first description of intersubjectivity, since we are examining the conditions for the mere exercise of personal powers, the dependence of persons on other persons is emphasised. We were more concerned with the child than the mother. As we shall see, some features of the spirituality of persons do not show to much advantage in such a case. They will appear more clearly as we examine the conditions and the goal of personal growth.
CHAPTER FOUR. INTERSUBJECTIVITY II: THE GROWTH OF PERSONAL POWERS

1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the intersubjective conditions necessary for the growth of our distinctively personal powers so as to reveal the spiritual nature of persons.

The notion of growth has its own problems and so we begin with a discussion of them and the consideration of a particular attempt (that of R Johann) to deal with the normative force that the notion of personal growth implies.

We then take up the personal powers defined in the previous chapter in order to re-define them at this the second stage of their enactment. (They are re-defined as self-knowledge and self-affirmation.) As before, there are essentially only two, and so we discuss the question of duality and unity in personal life that this raises.

We begin our discussion of personal growth with a description of how self-knowledge is acquired. And so, before doing that, we present a detailed discussion of self-knowledge. This discussion is intended to explain the various elements of the intersubjective transaction that leads to a growth in self-knowledge and which are to be brought out in our description. In this discussion we refer to the work of many authors whose work we find especially helpful.

The description of the growth of personal powers that follows is of both self-knowledge and self-affirmation. To bring out the most important points of our description (which as far as we have been able to determine has elements of real novelty in it) we compare and contrast it with that of L Feldstein, which is the only at all comparable one we have been able to discover in the relevant literature.

Finally we attempt to see how far our description of personal growth does in fact throw new light on the spirituality of persons.

2. The Notion of growth

We now have to describe the necessary conditions for the development of our specifically personal powers beyond the bare minimum which entitles us to think of ourselves as agents in the common meaning of the term. In the previous
chapter we saw that the exercise of those powers implied by being an agent in this sense, namely self-consciousness and self-determination, depended on a peculiar relation to another person. We also saw how self-consciousness and self-determination could be seen as different forms of what I have named as the defining characteristic of a person as a spiritual being, namely the capacity for self-enactment. In this chapter, in considering the further development of these same powers, we shall once again discover as the necessary condition for this a certain specific kind of dependence on another person together with a sort of reciprocity that did not appear in that description. Our description of this form of intersubjectivity will throw further light on the self-enactment that is the metaphysical key to the interpersonal transaction.

It is perhaps necessary once again to remind the reader that the description of the interpersonal transaction is not in any sense a narrative. We are not describing a process as a process. We are giving an account of the necessary conditions for the actualisation of certain capacities. In spite of the concrete details and the psychological plausibility of the description it is neither a fictional nor a quasi-scientific one. The conditions described are held to be necessary. Nevertheless they can be verified by reflection on experience since human beings are persons and hence cannot fail to exercise these powers in everything they do. It is thus not at all the case that in this chapter we are describing a later period of a person's life than in the previous one, as though having dealt with the development of the child we now consider that of the adult. In fact the relation between the two chapters is this: whereas in the previous we dealt with the minimum exercise of the personal powers here we are concerned with their fullest possible exercise and hence with the conditions of their growth.

At once a problem appears. Since we are dealing with the capacity for being an agent, in what sense can there be a minimum and a full exercise of it. One is either an agent or one is not. How can one be more or less self-conscious or self-determining?

There is a valid point in this objection but it concerns the possession of the capacity and not its exercise. A baboon either is or is not an agent in the sense of having or not having the natural capacity at all. As far as the actual exercise of the capacity is concerned, it can still be a matter of degree. I hope to show in the course of this chapter that being more or less of a person or an agent, or even self-enacting is not as paradoxical as it sounds.
If in fact the actualisation of our distinctively personal capacities is a mere matter of degree, and hence the process of their development is therefore homogeneous, why do I bother with two (and even three) descriptions of it? Would not one suffice? Strictly speaking one would. All alike are simply descriptions of self-enactment. If however it is the case that self-enactment is the simple but all-pervasive enabling foundation for the whole of our lives as persons, then different descriptions in often quite sharply different sorts of language can only help in adding to our understanding of their common object. The different sorts of language in which the actualisation of personal capacities can be described can be very different indeed. The language of character or personality description, that of moral assessment and that of scientific psychology are very different from each other, yet all must find a place on the continuum of self-enactment if they are to be true descriptions of a person.

This change in language-sort will become immediately evident in the present chapter where we are dealing with the conditions for the growth of personal powers towards fulfilment. For "growth" in this context is a normative notion. We are not interested in increase in size, but in "personal growth" or "growth as a person". In our present climate of thought both scientific psychology and ethics can give sense to such a notion in terms say, on the one hand, of maturity or self-realisation or even "genital primacy", (Storr, 1960) and, on the other, of "rationality" or "responsibility", or some such evaluative term. Moral language and psychological language are certainly very different. Yet I would wish to locate both on a homogeneous continuum in much the same way as Aristotle does, for whom being a man and being a good man differ only in the degree to which the specifically human powers of the soul are properly developed. In the case of Aristotle it is a case of the proper development of reason as the foundation of the life of the soul, for us it will be the development of those powers of self-consciousness and self determination that we have taken as definitive of a person.

A writer in the Thomist tradition who equates moral growth with the development of our specifically personal powers, and, what is more, describes these in interpersonal terms, is R Johann. I want to look at his account of the intersubjective conditions for the moral life more closely since it contains much that is helpful in terms of our own interest.

Johann (1975: 169) takes as his starting-point our experience of moral deliberation. This sort of deliberation implies the existence of ends that transcend the contingent wishes and desires of the moral subject, namely ends or an end...
"to which the will is ordered prior to any of its commitments." Such an end must be one to which we are oriented by nature. Thus our capacity to engage in moral deliberation implies "that our very nature as subjects is normative for our conduct." (Johann, 1975: 169) So far, so good.

It is all very well to say that affirming my own subjectivity is an end that is somehow built in to my nature as a moral being. The trouble is that, like many another fundamental principle of morality, such an end lacks concreteness and can hardly serve to guide my action in the world. Johann acknowledges the emptiness of the form of this imperative but goes on to give it a content. Its content must come from something other than our own subjectivity; Johann (1975: 170) tries to deduce that this something other must be other persons. He presents his deduction as follows:

"To experience reality as making demands on us antecedent to choice, and therefore regardless of our intentions, is to experience it, not simply as the object of our own intending and relative to us, but as intending us and absolutely other. It is to experience our involvement with the other-than-self as more than one with something determinate and manipulable; it is to experience ourselves as involved with an initiative which transcends our own, a determining source which addresses us and expects an answer. It is to be conscious of the other as that to which our very actuality as subjects, our own intentional life, is essentially a response; as that to which we ourselves are relative. It is to be conscious of the other as You, and of ourselves as constituted by a relation to You. In other words, my very being as I am an intention of You, and interest in You as the ground of my life."

The logic of this is obscure, but seems to turn out something like this: Human nature has many tendencies and needs. They only become ends by being willed by a subject. My moral experience demands that I act in terms of an end that transcends my own contingent desires. Hence I must act in terms of an end willed by another. But to be an end for me it must be something he wills me to be or do.

Even if this is the gist of Johann's thought it is not clear how an end willed for me by another can be equivalent to something "to which the will is ordered prior to any of its commitments", since in the one case one is talking of an orientation of my nature as a moral subject while in the other one is talking about the will (albeit for me) of other persons. And I certainly can't be ordered by nature to just any end other persons happen to will for me. Perhaps what Johann really is trying to say is that I am by nature ordered to...
a certain sort of relation with other persons and that it is in virtue of this orientation that I am and can experience myself to be a moral subject.

That this is indeed what Johann (1976) wishes to say is I think borne out by a second article on this topic written a year later. And in the course of it some light is also thrown on what sort of relation with other persons it is that both grounds our moral subjectivity and is the ultimate norm for our moral growth.

Morality differs from technology in that the intentions of our actions are important for their own sake. From the point of view of getting things done, even intellectual projects, it matters not at all whether a particular act was intended or not. And it is only in the dialogal relationship that intentions as intentions have significance. "If you knock my hat on the ground, it may be an accident or it may be an act of aggression. The change in the external situation is identical either way; the hat which was on my head is now on the ground as the result of your movement. But whether or not you meant to knock my hat off can make a world of difference in our relationship." (Johann, 1976: 52)

The dialogal relation is thus one in which meanings can act as causes; without the intentional system of meaning called language there is simply no dialogue at all. Johann fastens on this feature of the dialogal relation to show that it is the necessary condition for morality since it is the necessary condition for our freedom as moral subjects. At the same time the dialogal relation turns out to be the ultimate norm for our moral activity.

That the dialogal relation with other persons is the necessary condition for our freedom as moral subjects follows from the causality of meaning we have already remarked on. Being a free subject is for one's intentions as intentions to have a causal effect, and this they do, and can only do, in the dialogal relation with others. In the experience of communication with others our intentional nature is both revealed to us and is effective in bringing about modifications in the relation in which we stand towards another. Thus we experience ourselves as causes of a unique sort, as freely originating changes in our relationships with other persons simply by means of communicating with them, revealing our minds to them. For Johann, unlike Aquinas and Aristotle, morality is strictly a feature of interpersonal relations. A solitary person could not have a moral life. This would seem a strange position for a Thomist writer to take up, were it not for the fact that Johann believes that the relation to other persons is somehow part of human nature. It is not simply the situation in which he must act.
It is because a certain kind of orientation to others is part of human nature that a certain kind of relation with others can act as the ultimate moral standard. Johann tries to deduce the dialogal relation as the ultimate moral norm from the fact of it being a necessary condition for our subjectivity, a condition which is therefore prior to any actual wish or choice.

"The ground of choice, in the last analysis, cannot be constituted such by any exercise of choice, but only by its own nature as ground and the nature of the subject as such, i.e. antecedent to choice. On the other hand, nothing can be the final ground for choice unless an exercise of choice is essential to its accomplishment. No observable state of affairs as such requires choice for its accomplishment. Only the transobjective relation of subjects ... requires choice for its accomplishment. The world of transobjective relationship, then, as that alone which can ground subjectivity (the capacity to choose), is the End to which being-as-subject is ordered by nature." (Johann, 1976: 57)

To make the relation with others normative for our acts as moral agents could seem a vacuous achievement, especially as such a relation is unavoidable for moral subjects. But Johann says enough to make it clear that he sees the relation as a good. It enables the development of our distinctively personal capacities. Further, there are two attitudes we can take up towards it. We can say "yes" to it or "no". We can "commit" ourselves to building it up, or we can in spite of needing it reject it. In ways such as these Johann tries to give the bare idea of the dialogal relation with others a concrete content.

In our opinion, in spite of the generality and tentativeness of his account of moral experience, Johann does enough to link the notion of morality with our nature as persons and with our relationship with other persons. I have more or less the same aim as he has, but it is our hope that by covering the same ground in greater detail and more concretely we can make his conclusions more secure. In our terms, we have to connect the notion of personal growth both with those powers we have identified as stemming from our nature as persons and also with an essential relatedness to other persons. Let us now begin by taking a closer look at the nature of those powers and their full development so as to have a clearer idea as to what can be meant by speaking of their growth.

3. Unity and duality of personal powers

As has been pointed out already, the self-consciousness that is an essential element of action is as a capacity or power quite devoid of content and without any determinate orientation to any sort of object whatsoever. This is the condition of it being a capacity for the objective presence of any object at all.
It is however determined in one way, and uniquely so, as to its structure. It is self-referring. Whatever content it gains through the consciousness of objects is referred to itself. And we have seen why it is necessary that it be conscious of another person if it is to have the degree of self-consciousness necessary to be a proper agent. This minimum self-awareness we described as the bare awareness of its existence as a distinct origin of effects in the world. Clearly once it has that grasp of its own existence there can be no question of a further growth in this awareness, since there cannot be any growth in existence. We exist in time however, and change; hence the content of the self will change, expressing to a greater or lesser degree its nature as a person. And we can grow in our awareness of this. We shall have to investigate the nature of this awareness more fully presently. But one can now see what sort of growth one envisages for self-consciousness. I shall refer to it and the term of its completion simply as self-knowledge.

Similarly in the case of self-determination there is the indeterminateness of a capacity characterised solely by its self-referential structure. In self-determined activity, in addition to the specific object of one's act, one is concerned with oneself as the origin of the act - and not at all in a purely cognitive way (though of course self-determination presupposes self-consciousness) but practically, in that one makes oneself to be the origin of the act. Many different words can be used to refer to this "making"; the one that we shall chiefly use is "consent". And clearly there can be different degrees of consent. Can there also be such a thing as a growth in consent? I think there can and hope that the fuller description to follow will substantiate my view. For the moment let it simply be noted that I shall use the term "self-affirmation" to designate the growth of the power of self-determination towards completion and for the term of the process as well.

We are thus going to be talking about the conditions for the development of self-knowledge and self-affirmation in the life of a person. Why we should concern ourselves with just two, and not one or three or ten, powers is a question important both to ask and answer. This duality, which also appeared in our previous chapter, is not an arbitrary one. Aquinas himself has an interesting "deduction" of a fundamental duality in our experience. His starting-point is the nature of action as such. He comments as follows:

"... (S)ince an agent must be joined in some fashion with the object it acts on, there are two aspects of the relation between the soul and that extraneous object of its activity. First, inasmuch as it is its very nature to be joined to the soul and to be in the soul through the medium of its own likeness... Next, under the second aspect, the soul is inclined and drawn to the external object." (I.78.1) (Thomas Aquinas, 1963)
In action there is a relation between two terms, and thus two possible "directions" to the relation. That of the object to the subject grounds a set of powers that could be called apprehensive in a broad sense. Chief among these are the senses and the intellect. The orientation of the subject to the object likewise grounds a set of powers that can be called appetitive in a broad sense. This class includes the will, the emotions or passions, and the power of locomotion.

Clearly our own duality of, on the one side, self-consciousness and self-knowledge, and, on the other, self-determination and self-affirmation can be seen to fit Aquinas' division. Nevertheless he lists more powers than two. A further principle of selection is clearly required. Aquinas provides this too. In the same passage he makes, within the apprehensive powers, a further distinction, resting on a difference in the objects of their acts:

"And in this respect there are two kinds of power, the senses bearing on the more restricted object, bodies subject to sensation, and the intellect bearing on the least restricted object, universal being." (I.78.1) (Thomas Aquinas, 1963)

Within the appetitive powers a corresponding distinction is made between the passions and the will. Thus two, and two only, powers survive the double filter: intellect and will. And these are for Aquinas the powers that flow from our nature as persons. Our duality too, also a duality of personal powers, would therefore seem to be well-founded. More however needs to be said about this duality lest a misunderstanding of its nature appear to threaten the unity of the human person, and also to clarify the coming description of the way both powers function in the growth of the one person.

The needs of clarity that require a distinction between intellect and will also demand that one treat of them one at a time. Scholastic philosophers speak indeed of an act of intellect and an act of will, and this is perhaps misleading. (Phillips, 1956) Whenever there is question of the act of a person both intellect and will are simultaneously involved. The judgement of the truth of a proposition is the carrying out of an intention just as the exercise of a deliberate choice entails the grasp of ground and consequent and the apprehension of a contingent truth. Nevertheless the imagination can become prone to depict the intellect and will as it were "in parallel", as two horses pulling the same cart. A corrective to this image is to see them as it were "in series". The truth in this image is that personal acts consist in two moments, one of which is logically prior to the other. The intellectual moment is logically primary since it is through it that a world is present to the agent at all. But the act only attains completion through
the will by means of which the world is modified. That at least is an approximate way of putting it, a way that does serve to indicate the lack of symmetry between the two relations in which the subject stands towards the world. But this is perhaps brought out more fully if, instead of speaking of intellect and will, one speaks of self-knowledge and self-affirmation. Here the difference in fundamental structure between the two moments of action is clearly seen. Self-knowledge and self-affirmation can be seen as successive moments in self-appropriation. Knowing oneself is a sort of self-possession. But the self known is an object of consciousness. So one possesses oneself as an object. The possessing act of knowledge itself, the very subjectivity of consciousness, is not possessed by knowledge since it cannot be objectified without ceasing to be itself. The self-possession of self-affirmation (which is that of will) is otherwise. It is able to affirm both all that the self knows of itself and also itself as affirming. It is the known self that is affirmed, and so it is affirmed as object; it is the known self that affirms, and so affirms itself as subject. An act of intellect, self-knowledge, is taken up into an act of will, self-affirmation, so that in the latter case it is a "richer" self that both affirms and is affirmed.

It is as a matter of fact common enough for Thomist philosophers, having once distinguished between intellect and will, to stress the total interdependence of the two powers. They do not usually however go on as we have done to see them as two aspects or moments of our distinctively personal, and hence self-referring, life. An exception is C Cirne-Ljima (1965: 117) who writes as follows:

"The personal is the single source from which the theoretical and the practical spring immediately. It is the place in which the theoretical attains its perfection and in which the practical exists in its original fulness. The personal is an act in which understanding and will mutually constitute one another without losing their own specific character, that is, without passing over into the other. It is not an act of the understanding into which the will is taken up. Neither is it an act of the will in which the understanding exists as an essentially volitional reality. It must be an act which is constituted by understanding and will, but in which understanding exists as understanding and will exists as will."

The question about the nature of persons is closely bound up with that about the sort of unity they possess. In this chapter more than in the last this question of unity will come to the fore. From the foregoing it can already be seen that a purely mathematical or logical notion of unity will not do
justice to the unity of a person. The unity in question is one that is reflexive, it "has to do with itself". And it seems that in such a case a distinction of relation must arise within the substantial self, a distinction that can be described in various metaphors, but which answers actually to the human experience of intellect and will.

Our description of personal growth will therefore treat of the conditions for the development of self-knowledge and self-affirmation. With the foregoing in mind we shall start with a consideration of self-knowledge. We start with self-knowledge rather than self-affirmation for two reasons. The first is simply, as we have said, that when considered "in series" the intellect and its act has a logical priority over the will. The second is that we are primarily interested in the growing person and not so much in the fully developed one, and as we shall see self-knowledge has a certain priority over self-affirmation here. As we shall also see, however, talking about self-knowledge will involve talking about self-affirmation, and hence though we begin with the one we shall be making an inevitable transition to the other.

4. Self-knowledge

As was the case in the last chapter, our actual description of the necessary conditions will require a rigour inimical to a helpful "realism" of treatment. Accordingly we will preface it by a detailed but informal account of, firstly, the ingredients of self-knowledge, secondly, the conditions usually favourable to its acquisition, and thirdly, the reason why it is often reckoned (justly) so hard to come by. A concrete account of these matters is not really just "an optional extra" to a proper description. It provides the necessary link with experience by means of which alone the description itself can be tested for adequacy and truth. Our intersubjective descriptions are intended to reveal the essential characteristics of persons as such, whereas our experience is always and only of human persons, namely persons involved in materiality. Hence it is impossible to present the descriptions without reference to details that are only really applicable to human persons. Regarding the essential unity of persons, for instance, our description must take into account that human persons can only realise and express this unity in a multiplicity of acts of different kinds. Hence the unity will always be a unity of structural rather than one of monadic simplicity. For these reasons our preliminary account of self-knowledge and its acquisition is the necessary key to the final one.
4. The ingredients of self-knowledge

Whether it is oneself or another, what is it that one gets to know as one gets to know a person? Consulting one's curiosity it would seem fairly certain, from the evidence provided by both biographies and gossip, that a major target of one's interest is the actions that a person has performed, what he has actually done. But even the most scholarly biography is not simply a catalogue of past events. There is inevitably an attempt to order them in some way. Even the division of a life into periods shows that in the study of a person's life it is a whole that one is concerned with, a more or less "organic" structure, and not just a completed series. If one asks what sort of whole it is, one is tempted to reply with terms like "significance" or "meaning". Not that it should be the case that it is possible to sum up a person's life as the expression of a particular purpose or project, or the exemplification of a certain moral truth or value. Not even that there should be in a person's life the sort of dramatic unity that one finds in a novel or a play. The notion of "character" however is surely important. In seeking knowledge of a person it would seem that one's goal could well be described as "character" or even "personality". One is interested in actions insofar as they are expressive of this.

In getting to know a person's character it is important to be able to see the world as he does, in the sense of having some access to his "mental" world. The very idiom of speaking of different "worlds" bears witness to the very different beliefs and theories about matters of fact that people have. We could not say we knew a person unless we were fairly intimately acquainted with the way they understood the world. It would also be necessary in this regard to be able to grade each belief according to the degree of conviction with which it was held. Not all classes of beliefs would be of equal importance however for getting to know the person. Of crucial importance would be his beliefs about what, precisely, was important or worthwhile, in other words, his values.

Perhaps even more important than knowing a person's beliefs, even his beliefs about what is truly valuable, is to know what he feels. How a person feels about things, his emotional life, is a very sensitive and pervasive indication of character. Feelings however are always related either positively or negatively towards their objects and thus contain an evaluative note. To understand the way a person feels about things is at the same time to know his likes and dislikes.

If these informal remarks are well-founded it would seem that it is in the sphere of value that the two aspects of a person which we drew attention to
above, the apprehensive and the appetitive, come together. If action in the broadest sense is the fullest expression of a person then it follows that the apprehensive sphere should be centred on or culminate in the judgement of value. Before one can choose what is good to do one must know the facts of the situation in which one must act. And the most important class of facts as far as action is concerned are facts about what it would be good to do. The appetites themselves have inevitably to do with value since at bottom they simply are a tending towards or away from certain sorts of object.

The notion that it is the sphere of value that is crucial for unifying the elements of the personality gains further support when one considers the role of the will. Clearly the will's role is definitive where action is concerned. It can give or withhold consent to both the judgement of the intellect and to the promptings of the feelings, and this in varying degrees. The notion of will cannot be separated from that of value.

If it is the case that the life of a person, intellectual, emotional and volitional, centres on the sphere of value, then it can be said that we know a person only when we know what he both judges and feels to be good and the degree to which he consents to these judgements and feelings. Whatever else it might be interesting or useful to know it would seem that this is the crucial area in which the various dimensions of a person's life are focussed and in relation to which other aspects can alone be properly understood.

Having said that, one must immediately qualify it with the distinction between what has become habitual in the life of a person and what has not. In fact it is the case that judgements are related to insights which eventually become habitually held beliefs. Indeed it could be argued that a belief simply is a habit of insight. In knowing a person it is even more important to know the underlying habits of understanding than to be aware of a particular judgement. Then there are systems of habits. Habits of insight into what is valuable are inevitably hierarchically graded. And this all in the purely cognitive sphere. There are of course systems of habits in the emotional and volitional spheres as well. And equally is it there the case that what is habitual is more important to one's knowledge of a person than particular acts as such.

So we have some sort of an answer to our question as to what it is one knows when one gets to know a person. It is these patterns of systems of habits,
cognitive, emotional and volitional, relating to what is valued, that form the foundation of knowledge of a person.

It might seem that in thus listing the elements in the knowledge of a person, in spite of the fact that we have judged the sphere of value to be in some sense a unifying factor, we have nevertheless not done justice to the unity of personality.

There is of course always the possibility of disunity among the elements of the person. Intellect and feelings can of course be in opposition. But so can intellect and will, as when I judge I ought to stay in bed to cure my cold but decide to go to a film because I want to. And so can the will and the emotions, as when I decide to stay in bed although I want to go and see a film. The possibility of unity would thus seem to depend on two forming principles, that underlying the hierarchy of values within each system and that bringing about the integration of the different systems. As an example of the first consider the system of value judgements within the purely cognitive sphere. There is a question as to which values are more fundamental or important, and what facts are relevant to deciding the issue. Clearly there is the possibility of conflict and incoherence in the system of one's value judgements, as well as the possibility of unity where fundamental values are recognised as fundamental and less fundamental ones are related to them in an orderly way. With regard to the second forming principle it is easy to see that the hierarchy of value in the sphere of feeling might not correspond to that in the sphere of the intellect, nor that of the will's consent to either. It would seem true to say that the possibility of unity within the systems depends on the intellect, whereas that of the systems in relation to one another depends on the will.

Intellect and will thus do represent two forming principles within the systems of the person, and as we have seen, this duality is not an absolute one. Indeed will could almost be defined as an appetitive principle that tends to consent to the intellect's judgement. So the foundation for a true unity of the person would seem to be present in the ingredients of the personality as we have listed them. We will have to return to examine the unity of a person later on in this chapter, but we cannot do this with proper rigour until we have dealt with the question of personal growth.

It is hoped that our preliminary account of what one comes to know when one comes to know a person, of the self of our self-knowledge, has a prima facie plausibility. We are encouraged to believe that such plausibility is in this case a reliable indicator of truth when we compare our account with the
extremely detailed and extended account of the self that forms the centre of
Austin Farrer's classic of natural theology, *Finite and Infinite*.

He too sees the self as a system of many elements. The system is moreover one
of acts; hence Farrer (1979: 229) defines it as follows: "the self is a continuous
intellective and creative activity which proceeds by concentration into successive
particular acts." As such the self has a unity and enduring identity which is
absolute (Farrer, 1979: 227) and the paradigm for the unity and identity of any
natural object it may come to know. (Farrer, 1979: 227,245) The principle of
this unity of elements in the system of the self is the will. The will reveals
its reality and power especially in the circumstances of moral struggle, where
in the war between the inclinations the weaker may sometimes prevail. Farrer
(1979: 119) calls will the "self-actualising potency of a project", and describes
its relation to the self as "will, taken in its extension, we call the self; in
its focussed expression the will." (Farrer, 1979: 220) He then shows its
centrality to the self by bringing out the connections between will and the other
elements in the system.

The relation between will and intellect is, as we have seen, so close that he can
describe it as internal. (Farrer, 1979: 144) Will, in fact, is simply the
active side of intellect (akin to Kant's practical reason). Thus it shares in
intellect's universality. The universality of the will and hence also of its
project Farrer connects with its self-referential character. (Farrer, 1979: 149)
It is because of this universality of scope that any particular project it may
entertain can be assimilated within and referred to the same self engaged in it.

At the same time as it enacts the intellect the will is subject to the continual
solicitation of emotion. This emotional ingredient of the will's life emanates
from its bodily base. Farrer doesn't limit the scope of will to what it is
explicitly conscious of; for that reason too the will is not absolutely free.
The body is both what particularises the will in time and space and gives it
a continuous particular content in the form of a changing pattern of inclination
and emotion that provides the material for choice.

The will is not reducible to the elements it synthesises. As the real potency
behind all the projects of the self, it has its own absolute and enduring unity.
This unity of the will shows up in the life of the self as a tendency towards
unification of the self-system. (Farrer, 1979: 157) The psyches of even bad
men can exhibit a terrifying consistency. Nevertheless the unity of good men is
both more comprehensive and more complete, since the consistency in the life of a
bad man is radically divorced from the real needs of human nature.
We have said enough, I think, in this short sketch of Farrer's theory of the self to show its essential similarity with our own. The similarity of emphasis on the unity of the self, both as an antecedent potentiality and as a consequent goal inherent in its psychic life, we find especially striking. That he speaks only of will, whereas we identify both intellect and will, as the principle of unity in the self, is I feel only an apparent difference. Surely I have said enough to have shown how the duality in our psychic life is contained within its unity and is merely the expression of its self-referring character. And the foundational character that Farrer accords to will is one that we also allow.

Farrer does not of course concern himself explicitly with personal growth (at least not in connection with his writings on the will) and therefore the question of how our relation to other persons affects the constitution of the will and determines the nature of its projects is not dealt with. There are however one or two places where we find him using expressions that suggest that were he to deal with these topics he would do so in a way not too dissimilar to our own. Awareness of the unity of the self seems to arise especially in interaction with other persons: "When I experience myself as coming into action against another self, substantial unity is something I am aware of." (Farrer, 1979: 221) And on the question of the nature of the project that could absorb the energies of a self possessed of a will with universal scope he comments, "Only on the hypothesis that the world already contained more fully determined selves for this self to assist and to explore, can we assign him any intelligible ends." (Farrer, 1979: 178)

Having considered the self that is known in self-knowledge we must now go on to consider the nature of the knowledge one can have of it and how it is to be acquired.

4.2 The acquisition of self-knowledge

As we have seen personal knowledge is primarily concerned with the realm of value. Self-knowledge will accordingly be insight into oneself in this respect. One will have insight into what one judges to be good and why, and know too the degree to which one consents to these value judgements. One will finally be aware of one's feelings and how far they correspond to one's value judgements. Put like that this last condition sounds simple enough. That is however not the case. Knowing one's likes and dislikes is only a simple matter if the field under consideration is a restricted one. When it is a case of the whole system of one's desires and aversions then it is a very different matter. It is often very difficult to determine what one really wants. The truth of the matter is that when one has to answer such a question it is not simply the intensity of a particular feeling that has to be measured against another, a question of a purely...
quantitative kind. Rather there is the complication of a difference in quality between wants of one kind and another. The point I am trying to make is well made by D H Lawrence. (1931: 52)

"All that matters is that men and women should do what they really want to do. Though here as elsewhere we must remember that man has a double set of desires, the shallow and the profound, the personal, superficial, temporary desires, and the inner, impersonal, great desires that are fulfilled in long periods of time. The desires of the moment are easy to recognise, but the others, the deeper ones, are difficult. It is the business of our Chief Thinkers to tell us of our deeper desires, not to keep shrilling our little desires into our ears."

It is not only that one may have desires that one does not know about, but these desires may be deeper in another sense, in the sense of more far-reaching or fundamental. It is difficult to say precisely what the qualitative difference is. H McCabe (1968: 61) makes a distinction between remorse and regret which does, I think, throw some light on it.

"Regret means realising that you now wish you had not behaved in a certain way; remorse is the realisation that you did not really wish to behave in that way at the time, that the behaviour was contrary to your deepest desires, your need to be truly yourself."

This distinction underlines the possibility of doing what one really does not want to do. It is not merely a question of what you want now and what you wanted then being different, but of two simultaneous desires being opposed, one of which though more powerful was in a sense more peripheral, while the other though perhaps scarcely adverted to was both more enduring and in a sense more central to the self-system. One could speak of desires that were rooted in human nature rather than those merely evoked by a particular culture or education. But even in the sphere of natural desires there would appear to be a hierarchy of importance. There would appear to be some desires upon the satisfaction of which the whole psychic balance and integrity of the person would depend. Aquinas (1963) lists such desires as the desire to know the truth and the desire for the society of other persons. (Summa Theologiae, I.II.94,2)

It is on knowledge of these desires above all that true self-knowledge ultimately depends.

Even that is an inadequate characterisation of self-knowledge in the sense in which I am using the term. One needs also to say something about the kind or mode of knowledge that is involved. Knowledge of the deepest springs of one's own behaviour, of one's emotional foundation, is not scientific or even
theoretical knowledge. Certainly it must be based on experience. But so is scientific knowledge. This experience is of an altogether peculiar kind. Not merely that it is accessible only to introspection or reflection (that is probably not in fact the case) but that it actually depends to some extent on the will. The connection between the emotions and the will in the appetitive sphere of the personality is so close that some feelings can hardly exist at all much less reveal themselves for what they are without the exercise of the will. I do not wish to imply that the consent be deliberate or considered, but rather that something like a censor will tend to operate. And if consent is involved in having the feeling it is certainly even more so when it is a question of bringing the feeling in question to consciousness and judging of its value. It is clearly the case that one will often resist revelations of one's true character, since various conflicts could result between the different elements of the person, feelings against will or feelings against intellect or will against intellect. It is also, and more importantly, the case that there is a resistance to knowing what my "deep" desires really are, what that is to say I really want. We shall have to deal with the reason for this presently. In any case it can be seen that the sort of self-knowledge that we are interested in depends for its acquisition on the will as well as the intellect. To sum up then the self-knowledge we are concerned with is a knowledge both of the particular character one actually has developed and of what one would really or "deep down" like to be and of the difference between them. Thus self-knowledge of this sort has a general as well as a particular character. I know both what I happen to value and why and the extent to which I consent to this. And that knowledge is particular. Then I know what the deep desires of my nature are. And this is general knowledge since my nature is not something I just happen to have and, furthermore, it is in principle shareable with others. It must be stressed however that although this knowledge is general it is gained from myself and referred to myself. It does not have the aspect of generality. It is not seen as the acquisition of a general truth about human nature. It is the discovery that this is what I (who happen to be human) really most want. The fact that it is something that is concomitant to human nature may never be adverted to. It is a value judgement but in the form of an insight into myself.

Cirne-Lima has analysed the knowledge of persons, whether oneself or another, in great detail from a Thomist point of view. For him personal knowledge is the cognitive aspect of an attitude and presence of the whole person to a person as a whole. It is therefore closely connected with the attitude of the will of both knower and known. Full knowledge of a person as a whole depends on the consent of the will both of a knower and the known.
As a consequence of these two determining factors, personal knowledge has some peculiar features of its own. Because it is the knowledge of a person as a whole it is not made up of a series of judgements nor is able to be adequately expressed in concepts. Nor, on the other hand, is it given in experience as a set or sequence of sense-images and feelings. The very simplicity of this knowledge, the fact that it is a grasp of a person as an undivided whole, is what differentiates it both from all sense-knowledge and also from the conceptual knowledge of the intellect. Cirne-Lima (1965: 44) presents its distinctive characteristics as follows:

"If we ask someone about a friend of his, or ask what kind of person this friend really is, he finds himself quite at a loss for words. He knows his friend very well indeed, and is deeply attached to him. Truly it is for this very reason that he cannot express what he knows in words, even if he is an experienced author. He knows his friend so well that to describe him at all appears at first sight quite impossible. If he tries to describe his friend, he realizes how jejune his description is, how colourless are his concepts, and how inexact is the information he is giving. The extent and depth of personal knowledge in a case like this becomes therefore the reason for a kind of inability to express its contents adequately in judgements and in concepts."

He decides in the end to call this sort of knowledge an intuition, which he characterises as follows:

"It is - in contrast to the judgement - a single unity, in which there is no distinction between subject and predicate. It is a purely intellectual "image" which presents to the mind a whole object in a single unity. It is a knowledge which - in contrast to the concept and to any type of sense-knowledge - is aware of its own truth." (Cirne-Lima, 1965: 45)

To call personal knowledge intuition in this way is an essentially negative way of defining it. As such it is a useful corrective and complementary to our own more analytical positive account. Nor do I think it is incompatible with what we have said. Perhaps it is best to see Cirne-Lima's account as concerning primarily the mode of personal knowledge, whereas my own concerns primarily its content. And in personal knowledge more than in any other mode and content are intimately related.

I hope I have said enough about self-knowledge to give an at least approximate characterisation of it and to suggest how it could possibly have the centrality
in the growth of a person that I wish to accord it. It is in fact the
foundation of strictly personal identity, and as we shall see, because a person
is a self-enacting being, a person's identity is not a datum distinct from the
knowledge of it and hence self-knowledge is not merely an expression of a prior
identity but a constitutive element of it.

4.3 The difficulty of self-knowledge

I must now say something more about the difficulty of acquiring self-knowledge
in the way we have defined it. This difficulty is an inevitable one and both
highlights the predicament of personal life and the need that persons have of
others if they are indeed to develop their specifically personal capacities to
the full.

There is a sense in which persons automatically grow as they grow older.
Personal life is a continuous exercise of the cognitive, volitional and emotional
dimensions of the personality. Hence there is an automatic growth of increase
of content or experience as far as the personal capacities are concerned.
There is however not a similarly automatic increase in self-knowledge. The
reason for this concerns the role played in the acquisition of self-knowledge
by the will. Because the crucially important self-knowledge is still to be
gained the consent of the will to the system of desires is badly guided. The
result is it will consent to a notion of the self that is antipathetic to true
self-knowledge. There will be both a lack of consent to the deeper desires
which self-knowledge would reveal and to the project of self-knowledge itself,
especially as it tends to set up conflict between a dimly intuited ideal self
and the actual self that has been consented to. This is especially true if it
is indeed the case that the desire for self-knowledge itself is precisely one of
those deeper desires we are talking about. And that is not all. If we are
right in identifying the specifically personal capacities, then the desire for
self-affirmation is also one of these deeper desires. This could be re-
formulated as the desire to give complete consent to the self in its whole
unified pattern of value-systems. Even when this desire is not adverted to
it can be expected to persist as a tendency to give an unjustifiably complete
consent to whatever values happen to be most approved of at the moment. The
position thus is as follows: because there is a lack of self-knowledge consent
is misplaced and thus also lacking to the project of self-knowledge; because
self-knowledge depends on rightly placed consent it cannot be acquired. Never-
theless because the capacity for self-knowledge is one of the basic powers of a
person it persists as a desire although it is not recognised or satisfied. The
self therefore remains in a state of disunity and conflict, both because a
central desire is unsatisfied and also because self-knowledge is the forming
principle on which the coherence of the value-systems of the self depends. However total the consent of the will appears to be to a particular state of the self, the disunity of desires and the lack of knowledge make it an unstable and unsatisfactory state. The inbuilt tendency of the will to follow the intellect is violated and there results what can only be called a division of the will. What precisely underlies such a metaphor, whether a real division of consent or an inability to give full consent to any alternative, we cannot go into here. It is enough for our purpose to grasp the reality of the predicament and its seriousness for the balance and integrity of a person's life.

In the face of the foregoing it must be pointed out that however vicious the circle might appear its occurrence is not strictly speaking inevitable. There is no logical reason why consent could not be given to the deep desires from the start and to the desire for self-knowledge. To be sure, it never seems to happen in that way. But even if it did, there would be a need for the presence of another person if the process of growth were even to begin. We shall see why this is so when our description of the conditions for personal growth has been completed.

Perhaps we can already begin to see this necessity from the description of self-knowledge that has been given. It is of course a well-tried rule of thumb that in coming to know others one lays oneself open to an increase in self-knowledge. This is probably because others usually know the basic structure of one's value systems better than one does oneself. It is true that one has access to more data on one's own actions than other people have, but a lot of it is not especially revealing. When it is the basic structure of one's insights, feelings and consent concerning what is valuable that is in question, others have as much "data" as one has oneself since this structure is revealed in every one of one's actions. What is more, because others are not subject to the feelings and will that create bias and self-stultification as regards self-knowledge, they are actually in a better position to see the structure clearly.

As we have seen however the crucial element in self-knowledge is something that is not in fact particular to oneself, the set of deep desires that everyone must have. Knowledge of others can help one to discover these in oneself simply because they are common, but also if their actions happen to reveal them more clearly because they have in fact been consented to. At all events it would seem that some sort of knowledge of "what is in man" does result from relations with other persons, and this rather general knowledge provides a way of structuring and evaluating one's detailed knowledge of one's own particular character.
Knowledge of this sort is by no means scientific, in the sense of sociological or psychological, nor would it seem to depend on having acquaintance of a great number or a wide variety of people. It would seem rather to be the fruit of intimate and enduring relationships with just a few.

5.1 The Growth of Personal Powers

We are now ready to describe as strictly as possible the necessary conditions for the growth of self-knowledge as we have defined it. Once again they will turn out to be the presence and activity of another person, and one in whom the strictly personal powers are fully and properly developed. And once again I am indebted for my general plan of attack to Macmurray. In the last chapter I adopted his mother-child model; here I shall use his "community" model, envisaging two "adults" in relation to each other, and describe the transaction in which self-knowledge on the part of one is achieved. (Macmurray, 1959: 106-166)

There is no attempt at realism, since the "community" must be limited to two if the essential role of the other is to be revealed. In real life of course we grow only in relation to a host of others.

In my two-person model one person (to be referred to as "I") must be envisaged as having the exercise of his personal powers (as was described in the previous chapter) but as yet having not begun to develop them at all towards their natural fulfilment. The other person (to be referred to as "he") must be envisaged as one in whom these powers have (as was the case with the mother in our previous model) been fully developed. Concretely, he has complete self-knowledge and is completely self-affirming.

The essential condition for me to gain self-knowledge is that I make his self-knowledge my own by coming to know him as he knows himself. It should be clear from what has already been said about self-knowledge that the essential core of it is something that is common to all persons, though for that core to constitute self-knowledge it must be experienced as one's own. So in coming to know him as he knows himself, although my knowledge will include those particular details of his history that distinguish him from me it will nevertheless be centred on those elements which he judges to be most crucial to his own identity, and these are precisely those fundamental values that answer to the deepest desires of our common nature. Knowing him as he knows himself involves discovering and understanding those value judgements that represent his grasp of what he really wants or what he desires most. Sharing in his understanding of the values that are most central to the personality is the essential basis for knowledge of myself. We must now consider how such cognitive contact at this deep level is achieved.
Without his consent it is impossible for me to come to share in the self-knowledge that he has of himself. Because of the role played by the will in gaining self-knowledge it would be clearly impossible for me to share in it if the will that had completely accepted the values that lay at its foundation had at the same time rejected me. Knowledge of the orientation of his will is an essential aspect of the shared self-knowledge that I aim at and this is denied me if his will is turned away from me. It must be stressed again in this connection that the knowledge aimed at is not simply notional or theoretical; it is empirical and it involves the will. I get to know him by experiencing or "sensing" his way of living. It is this sort of knowledge that is in question here, a knowledge of identity that is gained by a process of identification.

Cirne-Lima's account of personal knowledge is helpful at this point. As we have seen his definition of personal knowledge as an intuition, identifies it as the cognitive component of the presence of a whole person to a person as a whole. The other major component in this personal presence is of course the will. In describing how personal knowledge in its fulness is acquired Cirne-Lima presents us with concepts that are helpful in understanding how the identification between self and other we have spoken of is achieved.

Cirne-Lima notes first that every free decision of a person is a form of self-determination, that is to say it is reflexive and so deals with and modifies the person as a whole. A free decision regarding another person must moreover be either positive or negative; "we either accept the Thou in his concrete personal being or we reject him." (Cirne-Lima, 1965: 131) In the case of a positive free decision for another person, this other person is included in the personal life of the self in a quite distinctive way.

"Through this self-determination of the Ego, which takes place in every decision, the Other becomes a partial element of the personal life of the Ego. For as object of the decision it is a partial element of a personal attitude, and as such becomes a partial element of the truly personal life of the Ego." (Cirne-Lima, 1965: 129)

He specifies this presence of the other in the personal life of the self further by saying that, "In this form of knowledge the other is known not only "objectively" but also "subjectively." (Cirne-Lima, 1965: 130) What this "subjective" knowledge of another amounts to, and how precisely it becomes an element in the personal life of the self, is finally clarified by Cirne-Lima's (1965: 131) saying that personal knowledge of this sort is "a partial element of personal decision itself." This is the point at which the knowledge of the other "enters" the personal life of the self, as that which specifies the content of personal decision. And as personal decision is always self-determination, the intuition of the other thus determines the "content" or character of the self as well.
Thus if Cirne-Lima's theory of personal knowledge is well-founded we have a way of explaining how in knowing the other as a person the self becomes like him or, as we have said, makes his self-knowledge his own. In any case Cirne-Lima's account of personal knowledge confirms our own insistence that it is only achieved by virtue of the will's consent. Our own consent is required, and we shall consider that in a moment. But so is the consent of the other. And as that is the necessary (though not, alas, the sufficient) condition for our own, we must consider it first.

The necessary form that the other's consent must take in my regard is the consent to be known by me. This consent to be known by me is however a way of consenting to me. He, having full self-knowledge, does not need me in order to acquire it. Hence if he consents to me it is for my sake alone. And it is precisely this sort of consent that I need. For it is not simply self-knowledge that I lack. I also lack the will to achieve it. As was pointed out earlier on, without self-knowledge I am incapable of whole-hearted self-affirmation. I have a divided will. So in addition to an adequate object for my cognitive power I require something to move my will. So it is not enough that the other person be capable of complete self-affirmation. He must also affirm me. That is to say he must will me to share in his self-knowledge for my sake, in order that I may affirm myself as a fully developed person. This will to be known by me, which is also the will that I achieve full self-knowledge, is thus also a will to be affirmed by me — again for my own sake. It is in fact the formula for true interpersonal love, of the sort that was seen to be necessary in the mother-child model as well. My lack of consent to him is no barrier to his love since it is gratuitous. As he is by definition fully developed, he does not need me in any way so that he can develop. My lack of consent to him is even no real barrier to his knowledge of me. Of course he cannot know me fully without my consent. But in his own full self-knowledge he already is aware of my deepest desires, even if I am not aware of them myself. And this provides the essential cognitive component in his love for me. He is able to understand the particular aspects of my personality that are revealed on the basis of his insight into the fundamental determinants of my behaviour. So his love is able to be quite clear-sighted about my actual degree of development and hence to be genuinely directed at me and not at some figment of his imagination. Such an attitude is necessary on his part if I am to be capable of a willing response to his offer of self-knowledge. Let us see why this is so.

I have the capacity, and hence also the deep desire, for self-knowledge and self-affirmation. As yet, due chiefly to my lack of consent, these capacities lack an adequate object. His love of me however is informed precisely by
that self-knowledge and self-affirmation that answers to my deep desire. Other things being equal my will will tend to give its consent. There can of course be no question of coercion. I remain free to withhold consent. Nevertheless the chief barrier to consent, the absence of the adequate object, has been removed. Previously the lack of consent to the deep desire for self-knowledge meant that the reality of this desire was hidden and its power was not felt. Now both the desire for and the fulfilment of self-knowledge are given me in the consent of the other person. Of course since my will is divided there can be no question of my seeing him as he really is at first. To the extent that I give partial consent so will partial self-knowledge be achieved. Nevertheless the condition for full self-knowledge is present and I have the natural capacity to make it my own.

To sum up then. By consenting to his consent to me I participate in his self-knowledge and so grow in knowledge of myself. His consent to me is the expression of his own self-affirmation. In consenting to that I affirm myself as well. At the same time I consent to his affirmation of himself. Thus in the case of self-affirmation, as with self-knowledge, I do not affirm myself in opposition to him but in union with him. Personal growth and mutuality go hand in hand.

It should be clear from the foregoing that in the process of acquiring self-knowledge I also come to affirm myself. What I principally affirm are of course the same deep desires that are the foundation of self-knowledge. I consent to the judgement that these represent what I most fundamentally want. Thus far we have spoken of these deep desires only in the most general way. We must now discuss them explicitly since grasping their nature is essential to understanding the nature of personal development.

The shortest possible formula for these deep desires on which I have laid so much weight would be this: the desire for a personal relationship with another person. Remembering Aquinas's twofold division of our powers, one could then expand this into the desire to know and love another person. It is not too difficult to see the connection between this and the desire to be known and loved by another person. A natural mutuality would seem to be involved. Yet a further specification is possible. One's desires go beyond just any person. Implicit in the desire to be known and loved by a person whom one knows and loves oneself, is the desire that he be truly lovable. And implicit in that is the desire to be worthy of his love.
It is surely plausible to claim a peculiar status for such a desire for other persons. There is a sense in which it is not simply one desire among others. Certainly if it is true that persons need others to exercise, develop and fulfil their distinctively personal powers, then the fundamental character of such a desire is manifest. The desire for a personal relation with another person is as it were the setting for all one's other desires since one's own being a person depends on it, and this, as one's distinctive and all-encompassing essential mode of being, affects every dimension of one's life. The desire for relation with another person is in fact the obverse of the fundamental desire to develop as a person. The description of our deep desires given above, more plausible perhaps because more concrete, is only the obverse of the desire to realise one's own personal powers, namely the desire to know and love oneself, or, in the more technical language that I have been using, the desire for self-knowledge and self-affirmation. It is these, in sum, that are the deep desires of which we have been speaking. Speaking of our deep desires in self-referential terms is perhaps confusing since this is not the form in which we in fact feel them. As a matter of actual experience they are always referred to others, rather than to oneself. But speaking of them at this level of abstraction does serve to bring out a distinctive feature of personal reality, namely its reflexivity.

This conclusion should not surprise us in view of the stress that has been laid on the reflexivity of our personal powers. They are, inevitably, both subject and object of the process of personal development. If the central and foundational tendency of our nature as persons and hence our most far-reaching and ineradicable desire is that for self-knowledge and self-affirmation then one can only develop as a person by at once knowing this of oneself and consenting to it with an undivided heart.

5.2 Feldstein's Account of Personal Growth

We have come now to the end of our description of the intersubjective conditions for personal growth. Our task is now to make explicit what the description reveals concerning the nature of the personal powers involved so as to see to what extent and in what way they manifest the spiritual nature of persons. Before we do so however I wish to compare our account of personal growth with another, that of L C Feldstein (1976). There are striking similarities between his account and ours. Much of his terminology is similar. He stresses the need for relationships of a certain sort with other persons. He even brings out the self-referencing character of personal powers. For all that we find his account inadequate in certain respects which we shall mention. It is our hope that a critical survey of Feldstein's account of personal growth will highlight the distinctive characteristics of our own.
Feldstein (1976) treats of personal growth as a growth in freedom. He even uses the terms "self-possession" and "self-affirmation" to describe such freedom, and speaks of it as the search of the self for "an adequate Imago of itself," by which he means some sort of self-awareness or self-knowledge. Freedom itself is described as being "aware of oneself as actively orienting oneself toward oneself in relation to an object" and as "the mutual attunement of self and other." Further, growth in freedom is seen as the overcoming of the "contingencies" of character and situation, and the disorientation and flux attendant upon them, and the attainment of an "active state of peace." Peace is a harmony of the various elements of the self as well as harmony between self and other. Thus the whole process of growth could be described as a growth in integration of the self, both with regard to its internal powers (Feldstein uses the term) and its external environment.

Feldstein discerns three stages in the self's growth in freedom, and he explicates these by means of two triads of ideals, the Christian triad of faith, hope and love, and the Greek triad of truth, goodness and beauty. The Christian triad he sees as presenting ideals of activity for the subject, whereas the Greek triad picks out corresponding qualities of the object.

From the start the self is conceived as situated, and conscious of itself as being so situated, in an environment. The first stage of the self's growth consists in relating itself to the world in faith. In this relation the self is passive, being experienced as dependent on an objective world to which in order to live in faith the self must give itself up. The result of this surrender of self to world is truth. The self discovers the lawlike character of reality and discriminates between levels and classes of things. Instead of being in a state of flux the world appears as orderly and enduring. This grasp of its position in an orderly world, the grasp of truth, is the first stage of freedom. "Thus freely giving itself up to truth, the self comes to own itself more securely." (Feldstein, 1976: 83)

The second stage of the growth of freedom grows out of the first. Initially the world was seen as fragmentary, and in flux; now it is grasped as ordered and enduring. It is as a consequence controllable. Faith thus breeds confidence in the self, confidence in its own powers to affect the world. This active consciousness Feldstein calls hope. Its object is accordingly the good. The world is seen as a possible answer to the needs and desires of the self. And whereas in faith the self was especially aware of the powers of the world, now it is especially aware of its own, and aware of them as good. The self as
the subject of hope is moreover a fuller self.

"Initially, a passive self is counterposed to a dynamic object. In truth, the self relates to itself as essentially passive in its relation to an active world. Now, the self dynamically relates to itself as it dynamically relates to a passive world." (Feldstein, 1976: 77-78)

The third stage of the growth of freedom results from the inadequacies inherent in the first two.

"Absolute trust, hence truth, threatens self-pulverization, the subjectivity of the self being consumed by objective relationships; absolute hope, hence goodness, threatens a vacuously expanded self confronting an insubstantial reality." (Feldstein, 1976: 78)

Faith and hope clearly have a provisional quality about them. Yet when seen as but complementary aspects of the further attitude of love their value is preserved. In love subject and object stand in relation of "mutual co-adaptation". Because there is mutuality there is also parity between self and other. This relation tends therefore to be fully personal, both self and other being persons. Freedom is realised in a perfect harmony of invitation and response, and this harmony is beauty. Feldstein sums up his account of the dialectic of self-possession as follows:

"As soon as the self becomes aware of itself as a potential shaper of ideals and of the other as a manifold of lawful connections, it experiences itself as a manifold of lawful connections and the other as, in effect, the shaper (or, at least, the presenter) of ideals. In brief: it develops the power to apprehend both itself and the other as analogously constituted, hence capable of being brought into reciprocal dynamic relatedness. Thus, the self comes to possess itself in relation to another which (or who), immanently or explicitly, likewise comes to possess itself - each as reflexive activity, potential or actual. In consequence, self-possession in relation to another analogously conceived leads the self to an attitude of love. By this attitude, the beauty of a harmonious co-adaptation of powers, each to each, may be shaped." (Feldstein, 1976: 84)

Feldstein stresses again and again, that the growth of personal freedom can only take place properly in a strictly personal environment. Certainly it can only achieve fruition in a relation of persons. He does not however argue for this, or even explain how it is that "To lay the groundwork for the self's articulation of its powers, evidently the collaboration of other persons is required." (Feldstein, 1976: (")) It is indeed a very special sort of personal presence
that is required if the self is truly to grow in self-possession. He refers to it as a "witness" of the self's development, "an inclusive, enveloping presence", "an enveloping personal witness". It is moreover "a 'something' beyond the world".

"And so I am step by step led to root my searching activity in a "something" which lies beyond that activity. Yet this "something" cannot be, ultimately, my own self. It surely cannot be the world about me. For both are in flux and upheaval; both are in perpetual transit. My searchings are always enveloped by a beyond beyond those searchings. They are haunted, embraced, and tendered by that beyond. It can be no material beyond. Quite the contrary. It is a beyond which is personal. Yet, no person. It is a beyond which is experienced as in concernful relation to me." (Feldstein, 1976: 71)

Nowhere however does Feldstein explain why such a personal being is necessary for the self's growth. There is nothing in his many descriptions of the self that directly implies a need for it.

Feldstein's account of the growth of the self in personal freedom is both original and evocative. Yet because there is no attempt to justify the descriptions of the stages in that growth, no attempt to root the perceptive psychological language in a more systematic metaphysical framework, it has the appearance both of arbitrariness and, oddly enough, of vagueness. The use, and indeed the correlation, of the two triads seems merely the imposition of an alien framework on the data of personal development. This is a pity as there would seem, to my mind, to be a definite connection between the two triads, and between both and the fundamental powers of a person. Yet Feldstein has much to say about personal development that is of value. And in the course of that he also says much of value about the nature of the self that is developing.

He depicts the self as existing only in a reflexive activity that has always to do with itself. "I find my roots, my only roots, within the very I which is in quest of those roots. I secure myself in the very act by which I search for my security." (Feldstein, 1976: 71) The distinction between the subject of the activity and the activity itself is very fine: "the self takes hold of successive options, organizing its choices into patterns which, seen retrospectively, are foci in the searching activity - an activity unfolding within perspectives which become ever more inclusive." (Feldstein, 1976: 70) This distinction is elaborated in discussing the relation of the self to the body: "associated with every body of sufficiently complex organisation is the self. Indeed the self is that body insofar as it is implicated in the world. It is the totality of feelings, perceivings, sensings, willings, desirings, believings." (Feldstein, 1976: 79) This makes the self sound very like Hume's
bundle of perceptions. But that would be a mistake. For Feldstein (1976: 80) goes on to say, "in the last analysis, self expresses the animation of body; it is at once the principle governing bodily organization and the expression of that organization." Here self sounds more like an Aristotelian soul. And this is a better comparison to make, for Feldstein (1976: 80) concludes

"In consequence, neither body nor self may be conceived independently; sufficiently examined, each concept discloses itself as entailing the other. Indeed at bottom, body as a matrix of intentional activities and self as the form of those activities are one and the same. For form and matrix are indivisible. Self is that unity in its reflexive aspect; body is that unity in its aspect as the most intimate and proximate object of reflection."

Once again the final emphasis is on the self's reflexivity. It is both the subject of the reflexion and the reflexion's content, as content it is subject and vice versa.

There are three chief points on which we find Feldstein's account of personal growth instructive. Firstly there is the idea that personal growth is a growth in unity by means of an integration of the distinct dimensions of the self. Secondly there is his emphasis on the personal self's reflexive nature. Thirdly there is his way of depicting the influence of others on the development of the self. The "mutual co-adaptation" he speaks so frequently of, does, it seems to us, pick out a crucial characteristic of the way in which persons can influence other persons so as to augment rather than diminish their freedom. As such it is a clear sign for us of the spirituality of persons. Feldstein fails to follow up his insights. They stand unconnected to each other in his analysis. What attempts he does make to systematise them seem to us rather superficial. Having said that much it is now up to us to see whether we can show that our notion of self-enactment is capable of bringing order into the multifarious phenomena of personal growth.

6. Self-enactment in Intersubjectivity II

Our second description of the intersubjective relation of persons, in which we have been concerned with the intersubjective conditions for the growth rather than the mere exercise of our personal powers, does give us a picture of persons as, in a general way, self-enacting. We have seen that the goal of personal development can be described in terms of self-knowledge and self-affirmation. In addition to the self-referential character of both there is the interdependence of each on the other. To the extent that we have opened up by analysis the self of persons we have revealed its internal structure. And this makes it clearer than in our first description, and in greater detail,
how persons are in a general way self-enacting. We must now try to draw out of the description itself in a more careful way the elements of self-enactment in the strict sense that it manifests.

6.1 Personal causality

The first sign in our description that we are dealing with beings that are self-enacting in the strict sense is the phenomenon of what I shall call "personal causality". It will be remembered that we noted in the first description how the "personal influence" of the mother led to an augmentation of the child's power of self-enactment rather than inhibiting it. Well, this feature of interpersonal relations is much clearer in the second description. Here it is the case that the more the other person fosters my personal development with his disinterested love, and the more he manages to reveal himself to me, the more I come to possess myself in clear-sighted self-knowledge and the more I am able to consent to my desires with an undivided will.

Many writers in the Thomist tradition discern this feature of inter-personal relations and, moreover, recognise it as a sign of our spirituality. The name best known in this regard is that of Maurice Nedoncelle. He actually uses the terms "intersubjective causality" (Nedoncelle, 1966: viii) and "interpersonal causality" (1966: 107) and even "spiritual causality". (1966: 11) His descriptions of this phenomenon are expressed in such original and evocative language that I feel it worthwhile to quote some from among the many that appear in his writings.

An intersubjective relation between persons

"..... tends toward a dialogue in which each person returns to his partner the gift he receives from him after stamping his mark on it. Mutual causality ceaselessly alters and amplifies a process that is a creation of self by self, thanks to a creation of self by the other. It succeeds in uniting apparently divergent notions of initiative, influence, and community. It is, in a word, the only example at our disposal for understanding the coincidence of being and freedom, or of the same and the other." (Nedoncelle, 1966: 94)

As a result of this kind of causality freedom can actually be communicated from one person to another so that "The autonomy I give myself is ontologically proportionate to the presences I have received." (Nedoncelle, 1966: 93)

Thus personal causality must be contrasted with other ideas of causality:
"... though interpersonal influence is not total, it does constitute a fact so decisive and disturbing that we cannot liken it to a simple removal of obstacles. When we examine our past we know very well that our initiatives proceed from personal contacts that did not act on us from without but by a strange intussusception." (Nédoncelle, 1966: 119)

It results in a kind of community of identity between self and other:

"My encounter with a radiant, free being is already my liberation and my own freedom; to perceive it is to be what it wants me to be; I am at once by it and by myself, not in imitating it as an exterior model (which would be the mere contagion of example), but in awakening to myself within the perspective of our encounter; there the gift it offers me and the position I take are identical." (Nédoncelle, 1966: 119)

Nédoncelle even coins the phrase "heterogeneous identity" to define the relation between two persons in intersubjective contact.

In spite of his grasp of the phenomenon of personal causality we do not find in Nédoncelle a metaphysical account of its possibility. It is our opinion that it can be adequately explained by our notion of spirituality as self-enactment. It will be remembered that one of the features of this notion was the self-transcending capacity of a person. Because of this, two persons in relation are not opposed to each other or external to each other as two particulars would be. (Human persons are of course, but then not precisely as persons but as material beings.) Indeed the personal causality of the other person on me is in part made possible by my capacity of self-transcendence. His causal effect on me on the other hand is an instance of his own self-transcendence.

In our analysis of spirituality it appeared that a person's capacity for self-transcendence, as indeed his capacity for self-enactment, was derived from his openness to being in its infinite scope. It is thus this feature of the spiritual that is the ultimate foundation for the phenomenon of personal causality we have uncovered. Personal causality shows itself even more clearly for what it is in our third description, that of the relation between fully developed persons, in the phenomenon of personal community. And we shall then relate it directly to a spiritual being's orientation to infinite being. For that reason we will not go into this aspect of self-enactment any further here.

Before we leave this topic however it will be well to point out something that Nédoncelle stresses continually in his writings on inter-subjectivity. This
is that personal causality has an in-built tendency towards reciprocity. In
fact Nedoncelle always speaks of "interpersonal" or "intersubjective" and even
"reciprocal" and "mutual" causality. It is this feature of reciprocity that
leads to the culmination of the relation between persons in community. In our
description of personal growth it hasn't yet reached that stage. Nevertheless
it is much more in evidence than in the description of the mother and child.
It is clear, for instance, what the growing person needs to do to enable the
fully developed person to enable him to develop. He has to open himself,
cognitively and volitionally to the influence of the other. And in so doing
he is able to enter into the other's personal life far more completely than
the child. In contrast to the first description the element of dependence on
the other has diminished and its place has been taken by genuinely personal
self-transcendence into the intimate personal depths of the other. In fact the
fully-developed person is now more dependent on the growing person's response
for communicating his own influence than before.

From this discussion it does seem that in the phenomenon of personal causality
as it appears in our description of personal growth we do have a manifestation
of the spiritual nature of persons. Put from the other side, we have in this
phenomenon a distinctively personal, and interpersonal, correlate of this
aspect of our metaphysical notion of persons as spiritual beings.

There is, we feel, another way in which the spirituality of persons manifests
itself especially in our description of personal growth. This is in the
distinctive unity that our description showed attending the development of a
person, underlying it as its principle and haunting it as its goal. We must
now take a closer look at this unity to determine its nature more precisely.

6.2 The Unity of a Person

We spoke first of the unity of a person when discussing the duality of
apprehensive and appetitive powers in each individual. We saw there the way
in which the two spheres were ordered to each other as two logically successive
stages in the expression of the self. We referred also to the unity of a
person when we distinguished the different elements in personal knowledge and
raised the question of unifying principle. We now propose to see whether, and
if so in what sense, personal growth can be interpreted as a growth in unity.

The description of personal growth revealed more clearly than the previous
description that a person cannot adequately be conceived of as an individual
in a simple arithmetical way. An impersonal object can be conceived in this
way since it stands in relation only to what is other than itself. A person
however has an internal relation to himself. And this relatedness is part of
the individual being of the person, not something secondary, something that
merely happens to it.

To say simply that a personal self is a relationship to itself is obscure.
Translated into terms of self-knowledge and self-affirmation, as has been done
above, makes it seem less so. Yet between a description in terms of being
(being a person) and one in terms of activity (knowing and affirming oneself)
a great gulf seems to be fixed. Perhaps a bridge can be provided by the
notion of unity, a term that is expressive of both metaphysical and psychological
notions.

Personal growth is growth in self-knowledge and self-affirmation. As we have
seen self-knowledge consists in knowledge of what one really wants and con-
stitutes a system of value judgements unified by these basic wants. So clearly
growth in self-knowledge will mean a growth in the unity and coherence of one's
value system. It will also issue in a correspondence between the self one is
conscious of and the self as it really it. As far as self-affirmation is
concerned, that consists in consent to the self as known. And to the extent
the system of value judgements is unified about the fundamental desires of the
self so will the possibility exist of a complete consent, that is whole hearted
and single minded, not reduced to partiality by conflicting or contradictory
desires. The desires acted upon will correspond to the desires judged best to
follow.

The unity that follows on self-knowledge is thus a unity of principle (a person
with self-knowledge is consistent), the unity of self-affirmation is that of
wholeness or undividedness.

As has already been pointed out self-knowledge and self-affirmation appear in
two different roles. They are considered both as the distinctive powers of
a person and as fundamental desires, which are in fact what are known and
affirmed in the process of self-knowledge and self-affirmation, in other
words the proper objects of the powers concerned.

In the second sense, namely when one is talking of the deep desires for self-
knowledge and self-affirmation which are in fact what we come to know and
affirm in the growth of self-knowledge and self-affirmation, there is really
only one basic desire, a desire that could be called the desire to give full
consent to a full knowledge of oneself. Alternatively this could be called
the desire for self-knowledge and self-affirmation to grow to completeness together. Thus the desire that forms the foundation of the system of value judgements has an essentially unitary object. The value system thus does constitute a unity and can be known as such.

The personal powers that underlie the development of a person thus form a potential unity; to the degree that they are known and consented to, this unity is realised. The powers themselves form a whole and can be known as such, and in self-affirmation they are wholly consented to. The self that consents and the self that is consented to are identically the same, a whole that wholly acts upon itself. In the growth of the personal powers there is thus a growth in unity, both as regards integration and as regards completeness. What we have here but now more fully expressed in concrete psychological terms is the same structure of self-enactment that was revealed in the previous chapter.

Initially there is of course unity of an arithmetical sort: the human individual must be regarded as a single set of potentialities or tendencies, manifested in a single set of desires. Within this set of desires are the distinctively personal ones. Let us now group them together under the name of the desire for self-enactment. To the degree that this desire is fulfilled the total set of desires becomes a single unified system. And as it does so it is referred ever more completely to and operates ever more wholly on itself. In this sense the self grows in unity, realising its distinctively personal powers in a distinctively personal unity.

Let us now sum up what can be said of the unity a person has as a self-enacting being, as it appears from our description. It seems that in our account of personal growth we have revealed the unity of a person as reflexive or self-refering in the way required by Rahner's notion of self-possession and Aquinas' of reeditio in seipsum, (Chapter 2, Section 2) as indeed by the notion of self-enactment that emerged from our discussion of Lewis' argument against the determinist. (Chapter 2, Section 5.2) Here however, the unity appears in genuinely personal terms. We speak of self-knowledge and self-affirmation. And the unity they achieve exists at two levels. There is first the fact that the self that is known is the self that is affirmed and vice versa. And thus the powers are united. But the full reflexivity and self-reference is established at the second level, since the self that is known and affirmed is precisely a unity of self-knowledge and self-affirmation. This cannot be insisted on too strongly, since the absoluteness of the unity of a person depends on it. It is indeed this final reflexivity that gives the unity of a person its peculiar
absoluteness. The secret of this reflexivity is that the distinctively personal powers, self-knowledge and self-affirmation, constitute both the actuality and the content of the person's self-enactment. As the actualisation of the distinctively personal powers they are simply the subject, the person, in act. And as the central tendencies, the ultimate values, of his nature they are the object, the content, of this act. There is a formal distinction, to be sure, between act and content, or subject and object. But it is only that. The self-enactment is thus an occurrence in the sphere of being and not only in the sphere of ideas; the self-knowledge and self-affirmation constitute the person's self-enactment of his nature.

If we can indeed accept the growth of self-knowledge and self-affirmation in a person's life as self-enactment in the strict sense then this constitutes a real advance in our understanding of personal development. The metaphysical understanding of spirituality, which refers to all cognitive and volitional acts indiscriminately, though justified in absolute terms, is too abstract to guide our understanding of the actual dynamics of personal development. In particular it leaves the content or object of self-enactment open and undetermined, so that there is no way of assessing or assisting the actual development of a person. Our description gives self-enactment a concrete content but without limiting it in any way so as to disturb the freedom and creativity of persons. In many ways it comes close to Nédoncelle's notion of the "ideal self" that we have already referred to. He does not describe this ideal self in the concrete way that we have. In one place however he makes this distinction: "Strictly speaking it would be necessary to distinguish the ideal self, which is a process or a framework, from the value-self, which is a possible content of the ideal self, but not necessarily attached to it." (Nédoncelle, 1966: 106) This distinction, which is very similar to our own, makes me think that Nédoncelle had a very similar conception of the self-referring unity of a person to our own.

6.3 Conditions of Completeness

We have said enough now as to how our description of personal growth manifests the spiritual nature of persons. Perhaps however what has been said about the distinctive unity of persons will throw additional light on the necessity for a relation with another person, and on the role played by them in personal growth. Before we present our final description, that concerning the fulfilment of personal powers, we must say something about this, and in this precise context — namely that of the conditions for the complete development of a person.

As has been said it is a unity that can only be brought into being by the full exercise of the personal powers of self-knowledge and self-affirmation.
Yet these powers cannot be completely exercised unless the unity already exists. The whole-hearted consent that alone could establish the unity in question depends on its prior existence in order to be given. Thus quite apart from ignorance, bias and ill-will, quite apart from any divisions in the person that arise during the course of its history of seeking completeness, there is an absolute need of another person in whom this integration of self-knowledge and self-affirmation have already been achieved. This need springs simply from the nature of the capacity for self-enactment. Because a self-enacting system is as it were a closed circle. It can't simply develop from potentiality to completeness by acting on what is other than itself, but only by acting on itself. Yet it can only be enabled to do this by means of the peculiar personal causality of another self-enacting system with which it interacts. How such a causality might operate in actual personal relations, I hope our description of the intersubjective transaction has given some idea.

The peculiar nature of personal identity, the way it depends both on a correct insight followed by a freely given consent, and the peculiar nature of interpersonal causality, the way in which dependence enables rather than prevents a growth in freedom, seem bound to be connected. It is as though a relationship between two self-enacting beings has a certain sort of lack of mutual exclusiveness or opposition, of the kind that one would find in the relation between two material or physical beings. In each case the identity consists in a unification of many elements. It is not the different particular details of their different histories that give each his unique personal identity, but precisely what is common to both, namely the unifying structure of self-enactment. It is as though their common participation in this peculiar kind of act or mode of being is what gave each that unique self-possession that makes the different histories their own.

In our two-person model of intersubjective interactions one person has been envisaged as fully self-enacting. This was, as was said, for clarity's sake. One might indeed question whether one was ever in the presence of such a person. At all events such completely self-knowing and self-affirming persons are not typical. Yet this much one is bound to say: if one is to develop as a person at all one's environment must include personal capacities that have been developed to some degree. Even then a problem would seem to exist. If our description of the necessary conditions for the development of personal powers is correct then one's development would be limited by the level to which the most developed person in one's environment had developed. In that case, how does the general process of development get off the ground at all? And is the most developed
person unable to develop further himself simply because he is the most developed, and not because he is in fact fully developed? At any rate if anyone is to develop fully then an already fully developed person must already exist in order for them to do so.

Another query of a factual sort could be raised. We have seen that in addition to knowing and affirming himself a fully developed person must both will my own development and will to be known and loved by me, if I am to gain a share in his self-knowledge and self-affirmation. Is there any reason to suppose that a fully self-enacting person would tend to will the self-enactment of another and to want to be known and loved by him? It would appear that the contrary is the case, since by definition a fully self-enacting person would not need anything that another could give him. And if he was not completely self-enacting, and so loved me and desired to be known by me out of need, then in any case he could not help me towards self-enactment.

Our final study in the various fundamental modes of intersubjectivity will thus concern the activity and attitude towards others that a fully developed person could be expected to have. We are concerned, that is to say, with the kind of behaviour that would be most expressive of personal completeness. It is to be hoped that our description will give further content to our central notion of self-enactment, while the expressive behaviour concerned will be able to be seen to be a natural culmination of the activity of a self-enacting being.
CHAPTER FIVE. INTERSUBJECTIVITY III: THE FULFILMENT OF PERSONAL POWERS

1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the intersubjective conditions necessary for the fulfilment of our distinctively personal powers so as to reveal the spiritual nature of persons.

Because a description of fulfilment has certain logical differences from a description of conditions necessary for achieving it, this chapter begins with methodological remarks in order to situate it vis-à-vis the preceding two.

The description of interpersonal love with which this chapter deals is based on Aquinas' theory of love. So our methodological section also explains the reason for this and introduces his theory.

Aquinas' theory was chosen for its connection with the metaphysics that forms the whole basis for our notion of spirituality. But since in its original form it is somewhat lacking in detailed personalistic insights, being expressed in rather cosmological terminology, we present an analysis of it by two contemporary Thomist writers, Jules Toner and Robert Johann. A detailed consideration of their treatment of his theory forms the bulk of the chapter. These two writers were chosen for detailed consideration because of the way in which their work both dovetails nicely with each other and also covers thoroughly those aspects of Aquinas' theory of love that are most relevant to our interests. By means of a critical analysis of both writers we are able to combine their insights for the purposes of our own work.

Having considered the phenomenon of a person's love of other persons, we consider the intersubjective situation of mutual love, both in order to preserve the parallel with the previous chapters but also for the sake of special features that are evident in this case.

We conclude this chapter, as the two previous ones, with an attempt to see how far our description of personal fulfilment throws light on the spirituality of persons.

2. An Excursus on Method

There is at the outset a question whether the fulfilment of personal powers will indeed manifest itself intersubjectively. The question arises from the
very way in which the goal of personal growth has been described, as self-
knowledge and self-affirmation. Our descriptions have shown that intersub-
jective conditions are necessary to achieve such complete self-enactment.
But the very self-referential character of these constitutive elements of the
ideal end-state of personal growth seems to rule out any reference to other
persons whatever. In the state of fulfilment there is by definition no longer
any question of a further need of others. Why should the perfection of our
personal powers show itself in activity directed at others at all? And if
indeed it does so, what form will that activity take, and why?

To gain clarity here, it must be remembered that we are considering a situation
that is doubly ideal. It is first of all ideal in the same way as all our
descriptions of intersubjective relations are ideal: we simply exclude what we
judge to be irrelevant and assume perfect conditions for the interpersonal
transaction. But the description of personal fulfilment is ideal in another
sense. We all have experience of the exercise of our personal powers, and we
are entitled to believe that we have some experience of their growth, if not
in ourselves then at least in others. But who would claim to have had experience
of their fulfilment, in any one at all?

Perhaps the following consideration will be enough to forestall at least certain
kinds of confusion regarding the analysis contained in this chapter: We are not
in fact describing the temporal conclusion of a process of personal growth,
though it can be visualised as such. Instead we are attempting to describe the
activity that will be expressive of growth rather than that which leads to it.
In other words, we shall be describing a permanent feature of intersubjective
relations in which personal growth occurs.

When it is put like this it is much easier to see that it is at least highly
probable that activity expressive of personal fulfilment will be other-directed.
Personal growth occurs in a growing intersubjective intimacy. Is it conceivable
that at the same time a dynamism of a totally contrary kind, a sort of progressive
self-absorption, is being set up, in which the growing person, precisely because
he needs the other less, progressively withdraws from intimacy with him? Such
a situation is not conceivable, especially when it is remembered, as was pointed
out in the previous chapter, that although the goal of growth was described in
terms of self-knowledge and self-affirmation, this was primarily as seen from a
third-person view-point interested in the theoretical question about the nature
of personal powers, and not from the point of view of the growing person himself.
His dominant motive is certainly not the introverted one of achieving self-knowledge and self-affirmation, though he may well see that that is what is required, in a moment of critical self-reflection. As our descriptions have sufficiently shown he is conscious of and concerned primarily with the person of the other.

Thus our task in this chapter is to describe the relation with the other that is expressive of personal fulfilment. It is a task required of us in any case by our previous descriptions. In each of them the person of the other was envisaged as being fully developed. Whether or not this is a necessity if personal powers are to be exercised and to grow in this world is a matter we still have to decide. At all events the contribution of the other to the intersubjective transaction requires that he has developed, and therefore it is necessary to investigate the issue of what, to the extent that he has developed his personal powers, his attitude towards another person will be likely to be.

The descriptions that we have so far completed give us a concrete starting-point for the present one. In each case so far it has been the love and knowledge of the fully developed person of the other that has enabled first the exercise and then the growth in the self of his distinctively personal powers. And we have also seen that the couple, love-and-knowledge, is not an arbitrary one. Accordingly our task will be to see whether this twofold attitude to the other, can indeed be expressive of the fulfilment of personal powers. I propose however to limit my task still further. In the previous chapter, though we considered both of the distinctively personal powers, both sides of the growth of self-enactment, it was nevertheless self-knowledge that we concentrated on. And this was appropriate in the context of personal growth since, as we explained, self-knowledge has a certain logical priority to self-affirmation considered from the side of the subject. When considering the influence of the fully-developed person however it is his self-affirmation, his love, that bridges the gap, as it were between him and the other and makes his influence felt and efficacious. Accordingly in this chapter we shall concentrate on describing love rather than knowledge. It must be remembered however that knowledge, both self-knowledge and knowledge of the other, is at all times presupposed. And what has been already said about the reciprocal influence on each other of love and knowledge still applies.

The present chapter will thus centre on a description of interpersonal love in order to discover the necessary conditions for its realisation. Love of another person is being considered as a candidate for the activity expressive
of personal fulfilment, and so our description of its necessary conditions can be expected to throw light on the nature of the personal powers involved, and indeed on those personal powers when developed to the full.

We will first consider the love of another person as such and then the special case of mutual love. As we shall see the love between a fully developed person and one who is not, raises a problem of mutuality, a problem which in fact throws further light on the nature of persons and their distinctively personal powers.

As the basis for our consideration of personal love we shall once again consider the work of modern Thomist writers. There are two reasons for this. Aquinas' theory of love is a powerful expression of his metaphysics, and it is his metaphysics which we feel can best express the nature of persons. On the other hand his theory of love is somewhat lacking in the personalist insights of more modern writers. His Aristotelianism still retains its biological bias.

Aquinas' theory of love has two roots, one in Augustine, the other in Aristotle. Augustine (1944, 1958) compares the love of a person to the weight of a physical body; weight is the source or ground of movement, what makes falling possible. So love is the source of desire or appetite; it is not identical with either. (Confessions Bk.13, Chap 9; The City of God, Bk.11, Chap 28) Aristotle (1877) on the other hand saw love primarily as benevolence: "To love is to wish good to someone." (Rhet.ii.4) Aquinas, in the Question on the definition of love in the Summa combines both ideas in a masterly way. He distinguishes forms from parts of love. Both desire and joy are forms of love, desire love for what is absent, joy love for what is present. Love itself is neither; it is indeed something so elusive that Aquinas can't decide which of many terms is the best for it. In the Question concerned (I.II.26) he uses at least the following: proportio, coaptatio, aptitudo, connaturalitas, consonantia, immutatio, intentio, complacentia. Gilson (1957: 167) sees the notion of affinity as common to all of these. There is some ontological connection or orientation between lover and loved. This is the Augustinian element in Aquinas: this affinity is the foundation of the whole appetitive life.

Love as affinity has however two distinct parts which correspond to the two parts of Aristotle's definition. There is first of all the affinity for the person who is loved, whether oneself or another. This Aquinas calls amor amicitiae. Then there is the affinity for some particular desirable object (whether thing or state of affairs or activity) which constitutes the good you wish for the one you have amor amicitiae for. And this he calls amor concupiscientiae. This
twofold affinity is love as it is actually experienced.

Aquinas' theory of love is a masterly synthesis of diverse elements. I propose to consider the phenomenon of personal love largely on the foundation of these elements. In particular I shall deal with the work of two writers one of whom, Jules Toner, presents us with a more thoroughgoing analysis of the element of affinity that Aquinas sees as lying at the root of all love. Toner calls this "radical love". The other author, Robert Johann, bases his work on the Aristotelian definition of the parts of love. Between the two I hope to exploit all the riches of the Thomist theory while at the same time relating it to its pervasive metaphysical base.

3. The 'form' of love: J Toner

Toner approaches his own definition of love by means of what he calls a "descriptive analysis of experience." He accepts the insights of the classical writers on love as a guide to understanding the experience of love, and expects the various elements to find their place within the whole concrete experience of loving. What he is looking for, however, is what he calls "radical love", namely the central notion or prime analogate in terms of which all the various elements can be seen as aspects of love. To find this is only possible by critical attention to one's own concrete experience of love. And this attention is required as much of the reader as of the writer: "all that the writer can do is to stimulate the reader to recall his own concrete experience and to see if what is being said is justified by it and helps him to see clearly what was not attended to before." (Toner, 1968: 65) Toner is critical of a certain sort of phenomenological philosophy that seeks to capture the concrete in its actual, inevitably very general, descriptions of common features of experience. This is a mistake. A philosophical analysis is inevitably abstract; the concrete is only achieved by the actual activity of reflection on one's own experience by both writer and reader alike. "The only intelligible meaning of concrete philosophical writing is that in which the writer keeps his eye on experience instead of merely analysing concepts and keeps referring the reader to the latter's own concrete experience." (Toner, 1968: 65) The similarity between such a method and our own in this study should be obvious.

3.1 Radical love

Toner begins his descriptive analysis of the experience of love by locating love in the affective sphere of experience. He holds that the whole person is involved in love but looks for the essential root of the experience, what he calls "radical love". "Affection" is an intentionally broad term. It is
contrasted both with cognition and with purely bodily reactions. It appears to be almost synonymous with Aquinas' appetitive sphere, except that it excludes explicitly free responses such as choice and consent. Nevertheless it is meant to include the spiritual appetites as well as the purely sensuous such as emotion, feeling, or passion.

Toner's description of love concerns the personal love of another person. For the sake of clarity it is unilateral throughout except for the final section on communion, where mutual love between persons is considered. For the sake of such clarity I will refer to the object of love, although it is intended to be a person, simply as its object.

Radical love is essentially a response (and in this sense a passion) made possible by its object. As such it is "an indeliberate, unfree" (Toner, 1968: 96) response, in spite of the fact that it can later on "be brought to a free decision and in choice can be negated or ratified and transformed into a freely given, fully human love." (Toner, 1968: 96) Nevertheless it is not simply caused in the lover by the object. Hence it presupposes a capacity or power for precisely that sort of act in the lover from the start. This power reveals its presence in the experience of the 'release of energy' that love brings with it. Toner (1968: 163) calls this, in a phrase that will become clearer as the analysis proceeds, "the affirmatory energy of the act of being." So although it is essentially a response, love is also a true act of the lover's.

The object of the response of radical love is not the qualities of the loved object, or him under any specific description; it is his actuality as a person. Toner has a notion of the human person that can be grasped by contrast with that of Hume. A person is "not merely a collection of different perceptions, but a flow of acts, all of which are his acts, or rather himself in act." (Toner, 1968: 101) The unified flow of acts, all of them mine, is "the self in act." The principle of this unity is the self's "act of being." It is this to which the response of love is directed. One can get a clearer idea of this object by contrasting the response of love with a response to an object as the bearer of qualities that make him pleasing or useful to me. Although I only know another person by means of his personal (and pleasing or useful) qualities "I can respond to him as this unique person experienced in his uniqueness." (Toner, 1968: 103) Even when all I know of him is that he is a person and know none of his personal qualities (say the victim of a road accident) I can respond to his personal uniqueness, his actuality.

The affective response to the actuality of another person achieves a certain sort of union of presence that is beyond and more complete than either physical
or cognitive presence. Physical presence is the weakest form of presence for persons since it need imply no distinctively personal attention or interest. Cognitive presence is both personal and, in its various modes, necessary to affective presence. Yet affective presence goes beyond it in that it communicates the personal centre of the lover more fully and openly. The affection of love does this more than that of hate or indifference because of its consonance with the object, his life, his interests and his needs. A union of presence is accordingly set up whereby the lover is in the object and the object in him. The relation of interiority is not of course a physical one. It can best be understood as constituted by the giving of self and the acceptance of the other on the part of the lover. The lover is thus in the object as given (or as gift) and the object in the lover as accepted. Both giving and accepting refer not to completed but to continuous acts.

The effect of this mutual indwelling of lover and object (it must be remembered that this description continues to be entirely unilateral; the mutuality in question is one set up by the lover alone when the object of his love neither knows of his love nor loves him in return) set up by the lover's affective response to the object, is a certain identification of lover and object. It is opposed both to psychic subjection to or domination of the object by the lover, and must not be confused with what is referred to by the term in psychoanalytical usage. It should be called affective identification and can best be understood by considering the concrete sign of it in personal experience. The sign is the phenomenon of participation in another's life as my own. Affective participation in another's life must be distinguished from a cognitive one, which is seeing things from his point of view, as well as from the mere sharing of his feelings, though this can be the consequence of an affective participation. Both of these forms of participation can exist without my experiencing the other's life as lived and owned by me. They are participation in the life of the other but do not involve experiencing his life as mine.

Such an expression can suggest that the distinction between self and other has been obliterated, at least as far as a structural element in the experience of participation. But that is not the case, as can be seen in those experiences of affective participation in the life of another "in which a loved one's success is more satisfying than the same success for self. If I did not experience my loved one's success as mine it would not be a participation in his life; if I did not experience it as his it would be impossible for me to find more satisfaction in his success than my own." (Toner, 1968: 134)

In affective participation the lover experiences the life of the loved one both as his and as the other's at one and the same time.
As has been said this participation in the life of another is the concrete sign of an affective identification between lover and object. What precisely is the nature of this?

The act of being of a person, the "self in act", is an act of self-affirmation. "By my act of being I establish, found, myself firmly in the world for as long as I exercise being." (Toner, 1968: 147) It is not an act, precisely, of self-creation, but rather one of inescapable self-ratification. It is the inevitable contribution that consciousness of self must make to one's own existence. It is this, ontological, self-affirmation that underlies and makes possible and is expressed by affective self-affirmation. Affective self-affirmation is the formula of that natural love-of-self that is the basis for the whole appetitive life of a person. When I love another with radical love what I do is, essentially, to affirm him affectively as I affirm myself. Because of the mutual indwelling set up by love this can be expressed from the opposite point of view as well: "In the act of radical love I affirm him as he affirms himself, making him the term of the basic affirmation by which I affirm myself." (Toner, 1968: 142) Hence it can be seen that an affective identification has been made between his own act of being and mine. Once more it must be said that there is no obliteration of the otherness of the object of love. In affectively affirming his being as I do my own, there is no confusion of or fusing between the two acts of being, his and mine, but the transference of my act of self-affirmation in all its peculiar imperiousness, pervasiveness and absoluteness, to include him as well. He and I remain distinct but the act by which I affirm myself is the very act by which I affirm him.

It is thus the act of affective affirmation that is the essence of radical love. We have come to the end and reached the root of Toner's descriptive analysis of the experience of radical love. He sums up the various elements in the analysis in the following formula:

"... radical love is a response in which the lover affectively affirms the beloved for the beloved's self (as a radical end), in himself (on account of his intrinsic lovable actuality), directly and explicitly in his personal act of being, implicitly in his total reality, by which affirmation the lover's personal being is consonantly present to and in the beloved and the beloved present to and in him, by which the lover affectively identifies with the loved one's personal being, by which in some sense the lover is the beloved affectively." (Toner, 1968:183)

3.2 Mutual love

Having provided a definitive description of radical love Toner applies it to the reciprocal relation he calls communion. This is an intersubjective relation
in which each of two persons knows and loves the other. He considers the most intense form where the knowledge is not merely notional but experiential; each knows the other as the unique person that he is, with the fulness of knowledge made possible by love. (Toner, 1968: 187) The situation between the lovers (whom I shall now refer to as "I" and "You") can be made precise as follows:

1) We both love each other.
2) We each know we are loved by the other.
3) We each know that the other knows that he is loved.

Applying Toner's definition of love to this situation we get the following detailed analysis of communion. In this analysis we are only concerned with love and not knowledge.

1) I affirm you as I affirm myself.
2) You are affirming me as you affirm yourself.
3) I know this, and so I am affirming you (as I affirm myself) affirming me (as you affirm yourself).
4) But as you also know that I love you, you are in fact on your part affirming me (as you affirm yourself) affirming you (as I affirm myself).
5) If I then, in addition to knowing that you love me, also know that you know of my love for you, then my love for you amounts to me affirming you (as I affirm myself) affirming me (as you affirm yourself) affirming you (as I affirm myself).
6) You have the same knowledge of me as I have of you and therefore are engaged in a love of me of equivalent complexity to 5).

What emerges from this form of intersubjectivity are the following two conclusions relating to interpersonal love.

If 3) is considered it can be seen that by loving you I am actually loving myself. I am affirming your own act of self-affirmation, which is in fact an affirmation of me. This is not of course the motive of my love, but simply the resultant of the intersubjective situation. The object of my affective affirmation just happens to be identical with myself, while at the same time being you. Notice in this connection the difference between affirming you as I affirm myself, which is the definition of love, and this previously unrealised truth that by affirming you I affirm myself. There is a natural self-affirmation which is not at all mysterious and that is the root of all love. The self-affirmation that occurs as the result of my affirmation of you is something quite different and not at all an obvious phenomenon of personal life.

The complementary insight, that in this intersubjective communion when I love myself I am ipso facto loving you, emerges from a consideration of 4) and 5).
4) is simply the correlative of 3): by loving me you are actually loving yourself, for the reasons equivalent to those set out above. In 5) it appears that I both know and affirm your affirmation of me, the affirmation that makes your love of me love of your self. By thus making your affirmation of me my own I begin to love myself in a new way, from your point of view as it were. But affirming myself in this way, as you do, is identical with affirming you, since, as in 4), by loving me you are loving yourself. Hence by loving myself now, I am loving you.

From this it follows that in the intersubjective situation of communion whoever I love, the other is simultaneously loved; the love for self and other is identical. And of course this applies as much to you as it does to me. As has been said, this analysis takes for granted complete mutual knowledge of another by both participants. Where that is lacking, and to the degree that it is, the identity of the object and the act of each love will be correspondingly less complete.

I have presented the situation of intersubjective communion in as schematic a way as possible for the sake of clarity. But lest by doing this I obscure the singular nature of the union and identity between the two subjects I will now quote at length from Toner's description of it.

"To begin with, we can note that in communion all that was said above about the union established by unilateral love is doubled from the side of the loved one, who now is lover as well as loved. And all we said about being loved is doubled from the side of the lover who now is loved as well as loving. I know and love you in and for your unique self. You know and love me in the same way. My act is an act of union and for me an increase of conscious life. Your act is an act of union from your side and for you an increase of conscious life. My being loved by you is in some sense an expansion of my being into your conscious life. So also your being loved by me is in some sense an expansion of your being into my conscious life.

All this is so even if neither of us is aware of the other's love. But, in that case, the doubling and the union constituted by it does not enter the conscious life of either of us. Each actualizes in his own consciousness only one side of the reality of love, his own love. Neither of us actualizes in consciousness the other's love or his own being loved. What is missing is easily seen by noting what happens when we do come to know of each other's love. Because I love you, I already experience an increased fulness of life by union with you. Now when I discover that you love me, my consciousness is flooded with a new experience of fuller life in more complete union with you. I become aware of what already was; your love, your greater fulness of life in union with me, my expanded existence and doubled union with you in your love. What was reality before I became aware of it was conscious reality only in
your life. Now it enters my conscious life also. And because I affirm myself, all that I now experience from your side enters my consciousness as my life, not only the expansion of my being by being loved, but also your increased fulness of life in loving me. I was already you affectively. Now your conscious life, which is mine by reason of my love, begins to enter my consciousness. The whole experience is paralleled from your side." (Toner, 1968: 191)

Up to this point Toner's account is concerned with the relational structure of communion where, although each loves the other and knows that he is loved, neither knows that the other knows that he is loved. When this final condition is met, according to Toner, (1968: 192) "the reciprocal conscious acts of love so deeply interact and interpenetrate as in some sense to constitute one composite mutual act." And again, "The acts are mutually actualizing and form one total mutual act." (Toner, 1968: 193) This is his way of describing the final identity between the objects of the acts and the acts themselves brought out by our schematic outline of his theory. The degree of mutuality present in communion of this kind is to our mind most powerfully and most accurately expressed by saying that when, in this state of intersubjectivity, I love you it is myself that I am loving, and vice versa, my self-love is love of you.

3.3 Critique of Toner

We must now review Toner's account of love to see what conclusions we can draw from it that will be relevant to our own special interests. If this is indeed what personal love consists in, what then must persons be in order to be able to love like that? And if we can answer that question will we then have a better idea as to what part such love is capable of playing in a person's life, how central or important it will be?

Although Toner's account of personal love is avowedly descriptive and not metaphysical, it is shot through with metaphysical expressions of a Thomistic type which at least at one point seem to constitute a metaphysical formulation of what it is to be a person. He contrasts the affective self-affirmation that is the root of all radical love with a more fundamental self-affirmation of a person which is "his very act of being." (Toner, 1968: 147) This is "A declaration and affirmation of self which is actually and actively constitutive of self in reality." (Toner, 1968: 148) And again, a person's "act of being is, as it were, an exclamatory affirmation of self, an actively constitutive exclamatory affirmation." (Toner, 1968: 147) Thus it does seem as though Toner is working with an essentially self-referential notion of a person such as that
involved in our notion of self-enactment. As to whether his theory of love actually entails such a notion, I think that, in view of his repeated insistence that the affective self-affirmation that is identical with personal love is what most deeply and fully expresses, reveals and communicates what the lover is, we can give an affirmative answer.

There is another instance where light is thrown on the notion of the person implied in Toner's theory of love. He makes a distinction between two senses of "self", only one of which is adequate to the notion of self-affirmation implied by his theory of radical love.

"If by self is meant the egocentric self, the self who is only for self and not for others, the self who sees any giving to others as a loss to self, who sees all things ultimately as for self alone, this self gives rise to a selfish self-love. The denial of this self and this self-love is really a correlative of radical love for others. One cannot love self in this way and still love others with radical love. The lover has to make a choice between self or the other. There is, however, a second meaning of self, which is that of the personal or interpersonal self. Self in this meaning is only actualized in loving others with a genuinely radical love, an affirmation of the other for the other's own sake. The denial of this self makes genuine radical love of the other impossible." (Toner, 1968: 143)

This distinction between a "personal" self and an "egocentric" self is not very precisely expressed here, nor is it further elaborated elsewhere. It could indeed be taken as a description of two possible attitudes to oneself rather than two constitutive aspects or elements of a human self. Nevertheless it does suggest that there are two aspects to a person that can be the objects of two corresponding attitudes, only one of which can serve as the foundation of a self-affirmation which can be transferred in its wholeness and integrity to another. Indeed such a self-love is so little opposed to love of others that it would seem, according to Toner, to require it and to feed off it. If such a self-love is truthful, as Toner insists it is, then a very singular notion of a "personal" self is implied, a notion that appears very similar to the one that we have been developing in this work.

More light is thrown on Toner's notion of a person by another feature of his description of intersubjective relations that occurs frequently. This is, in his own words, "the very puzzling but clearly observable fact, that not only is participation in the beloved's life, as described, in direct ratio to the intensity and purity of radical love, but so also is the realization of the distance and unique personal reality of both the loved and the lover." (Toner, 1968: 134)
The development of individuality and mutuality would appear to go hand in hand: the more a person "enters into union, i.e., affective identity, with other persons, the more he is himself." (Toner, 1968: 136) This process of course reaches its culmination in communion. Regarding this Toner (1968: 194) says, "It is a striking fact that this union of persons in a mutual act composed of their reciprocal loves is such that the more they are one in their loves the more they are distinct as persons to each other, not separate nor even separable, but distinct ... Union and distinction turn out to be in direct instead of inverse proportion." The general idea of personal individuality is clear: it is non-exclusive in character, intrinsically shareable. As such it must be contrasted with another sort of individuality, the sort associated with material things. Material individuals can react with others of the same sort; there can even be reciprocal interaction. But there can be no identification between them; the more they merge the less they retain their own identity. With persons, at least insofar as they are related by mutual love, exactly the opposite is the case.

To sum up then, it would seem that Toner's account of love does involve a notion of the human person similar to that given in our theory of self-enactment. Radical love in fact implies a fundamental self-awareness and self-affirmation as its condition of possibility. Further, such love insofar as it achieves an affective identification with another in his most personal depths also implies the transcendence of the limitations of particularity on the part of the lover. Not only does he participate cognitively, volitionally and emotively in the life of another; he also lives his own life from the other's point of view. More accurately perhaps, he occupies a point of view and affirms a value that includes both himself and the one he loves and includes both in the uniqueness of their distinct personhoods.

That the union and individual self-affirmation should increase in direct and not in inverse proportion in radical love is another feature that is consonant with our analysis of persons in terms of self-enactment. And it is of a piece with the identity-in-difference of communion as described by Toner. If the description is true then it would appear that a causality is involved in this intersubjective relation that is radically different from that of any physical determinism. Here it appears to be the case that the greater the influence of the one on the other the more the self-determination of the other is enhanced. The individuality that grows in the relation of love is not an individuality of isolation and exclusion. It is an individuality of increased self-possession, and the relation of two self-possessed beings leaves each the freer the more complete the self-possession is. Such at any rate is the way we feel bound to interpret Toner's description of communion. These are preliminary remarks.
however, since Johann's account of love based as it is on the distinct parts of love, is as we would expect, in many ways a development of Toner's. The degree to which he confirms the broad outlines of Toner's theory we shall see.

4. The 'parts' of love: R Johann

In his study on love, The Meaning of Love, Johann (1966) notes the lack of and the consequent need for a treatment of love that integrates phenomenological accuracy with a systematic metaphysical base. Such a metaphysical base is, he believes, provided by Aquinas' metaphysics with its distinctive theory of being. Aquinas however, for all the profundity of his treatment of love, lacked the detailed grasp of human subjectivity provided by modern Thomists and others. So Johann (1966: 17) concludes that the key to understanding love lies, we think, in a synthesis of Thomist thought, as furnishing the metaphysical framework for a philosophy of intersubjectivity, with the insights of contemporaries into the mystery of intersubjectivity." He accordingly develops his own theory of love out of Aquinas', with nevertheless certain criticisms and additions.

His starting point is Aquinas' Aristotelian definition of love: to love is to wish good to someone. As we have pointed out, this definition establishes two irreducible parts of love: amor amicitiae and amor concupiscentiae. The first Johann renames direct love, the second he calls simply desire. The expression "direct love" for amor amicitiae seems amply justified since, as is clear from the definition, the act of love terminates in the person for whom whatever is desired is desired. It also of course avoids the confusion of the usual English translation, "love of friendship", with friendship (the relation) itself. "Desire" on the other hand need not cause confusion with desire as a form of love since Johann does not talk of the forms of love at all. And in English at any rate this is in fact the word we use to refer to what Aquinas means by amor concupiscentiae. Nothing of course especially to do with sex!

4.1 Direct love

Let us consider now the two parts of love. They are distinct but inseparable. We desire the goods we desire for the sake of the one whose good we have at heart, whether oneself or another. To forestall confusion, the distinction between desire and direct love is not that between love of things and love of persons. Persons can be desired for the sake of other persons. Nor is the distinction that between egoism and altruism, or selfish and unselfish love. Direct love can be either for oneself or another.
Desire is a subordinate type of love as it is always referred to someone's good. Its character as a deficient form of love is seen in the fact that it does not extend to the thing itself of which it is desire. This needs explanation. Something is desired because it is felt to contribute to the happiness or well-being of a person. It is seen in relation to a person's needs and desired because it is the sort or kind or class of thing that will meet them. It is not desired in its very particularity as a separately existing thing. This is not to say that it may not be desired for qualities which it and it only does possess. But one must distinguish between such qualities and its actuality as a separately existing being. Thus I am able to desire salami and especially perhaps the sort containing whole pepper-corns. What I am not able to desire is its existence quite apart from any relation to the needs of persons, myself or others. If I do will its being thus, simply, then it is by virtue of direct love and not desire. Whether Aquinas, even as a Neapolitan, would have admitted to the possibility of direct love for salami is doubtful. He would probably have put salamis in the class of irrationalia for whom direct love is only possible in a metaphorical sense! The point however is that the object of desire, even if it is the only one of its kind, is not desired for its own sake. It is not the sheer fact of its existence that is loved but the fact that it is a being of such and such a type or even, in addition, that it has such and such unique qualities of its own.

Direct love on the contrary does will the being and the well-being of the beloved. Thus direct love and desire differ both as regards their relation to the lover and as regards that aspect of the beloved that is loved. In desire the lover is concerned with his or someone else's needs and their satisfaction. In direct love he is affirming someone's worth, though not with regard to any virtue they might have or anything else that distinguishes them from other persons. Nor even in regard to their human nature. It is simply the fact of their existence that is celebrated. Direct love affirms that it is a good thing that they exist. It wills the good of the beloved, not in the sense of desiring something additional for them (though of course it does that too because it wills their good) but in the sense of willing their full development or perfection, the complete flowering of what they have it in them to be. It is difficult to catch in non-scholastic language what Aquinas means by that "being", which, beyond all essential character and accidental quality, is the term of direct love. Johann tends to conceptualise it as power, or activity: every existing being of whatever kind is the embodiment of a certain power and is actively being itself and no other being.

According to Aquinas the primary object of direct love is oneself. Johann accepts this axiom, which is integrated into Aquinas' whole theory of being.
Just as the formal object of love is the very being of an individual, so it is part of the integrity of an individual being to love its own act of being or, in Thomistic language, to know it and will it as good.

The axiom is of great importance in an account of interpersonal love that is based on a Thomist metaphysics, since an account will have to be given both of the principle and the motive of the transference or sharing of this fundamentally self-referred love with another. On the other hand rooting a theory of interpersonal love in the being of the individual in the way that Aquinas does has the virtue of establishing love as a natural power and not simply a cultural epi-phenomenon. There might be a tribe somewhere in Africa where self-love (and the love of others too by all accounts!) has so atrophied under the pressure of the natural and social environment that it has to all intents and purposes died out; nevertheless this is a real perversion or deviation of a natural impulse and will show itself in the psychic pain and disintegration of the individual members of that society.

Johann follows Aquinas in taking the principle of transference of self-referred love to others to be some sort of likeness, similitude or community between lover and beloved. "If I love another as directly as myself, it is only because the good which I love in myself is somehow shared by him." (Johann, 1966: 32)

Since the object of direct love is the beloved's act of being, any lesser form of likeness will be inadequate to found direct love of another; only a likeness or communion of acts of being will do.

As we shall see the notion of a likeness or communion of this sort is elusive and Johann criticises Aquinas for substituting another kind for it in many places in his writings. This is likeness of nature of various kinds, most commonly the likeness of both being human. This sort of affinity between members of the same species (or nation or family or race group or whatever) could certainly act as the foundation of various forms of altruism (an obvious modern variant would be Kantian "respect") but never as that of direct love itself. Here a likeness between what for each person is most distinctively his own, his incommunicable individuality, is required; "we have to find a community such that the other in his very uniqueness is still somehow one with myself." (Johann, 1966: 36) Working this problem out takes Johann to the very heart of his metaphysics of love. In so doing he presents us with a view of persons and the nature of their fulfilment that is extremely helpful for our own purposes.
4.2 The being of persons

If a being is to be capable of direct love of another it must first be capable of direct love of itself. Johann follows Aquinas in holding that it is only persons that are capable of this. "A being that is absorbed, as it were, in a material nature, never really conscious of its own proper subsistence ... is equally and strictly incapable of really loving itself." (Johann, 1966: 41)

Persons, on the other hand, are present to themselves as subjects of thought and action, and hence to their own unique act of being, which in terms of the theory is the only proper object of direct love. Johann's description of the way in which a person is present to himself is so rich and revealing, and also fits in so well with the concept of a person as self-enacting that is being developed in our descriptions of intersubjectivity that I will quote it at some length.

"The subject is present to himself as the secret and profound source of his activity. This is to say he knows himself precisely as subject. He experiences himself concretely from within as really existing, as exercising a true initiative. He has a living and experimental consciousness of himself as an "I". This self to which the subject is present is thus ineffable and incommunicable. It is not an abstract concept. The concept of the self remains exterior to that which it would signify and of which consciousness affirms the presence. Abstractly, the self is a characteristic common to all men. But the self of which there is here question poses itself in its unique exercise of existence, manifests in its singularity its responsible causality, renews itself incessantly in its identity in an act that is concrete and lived. It is a subsistent plenitude revealed to itself in its own immanent activity; a generous abundance of being open to itself, not indeed as a pure datum of introspection, capable of being isolated and determined by a collection of attributes, but as affirmed and attained in the act by which it poses itself. This profound source is therefore unequaled by the knowledge had of it ... And it is this original and subsistent value, seized in the existential act of giving itself to itself, that I love when I love myself. Willing good to myself, I give and devote myself explicitly to the full unfolding in being of this intimate value, this unique subjectivity to which I am present in myself, and which as in me is myself." (Johann, 1966: 41)

There are so many felicitous phrases in this description that detailed comment on it could well present us with the picture of the person that we ourselves are trying to provide. We prefer however to let the full picture emerge through the descriptions of intersubjective relations. There is always a danger, in such fulsome descriptions, of expression outrunning understanding, due to the obscurity and simplicity of what is being described and the difficulty of verification. One thing however that this description does bring out very well and which requires comment in our present context is the repeated insistence that the
self of personal self-consciousness is not simply a content of consciousness, a concept, idea or experience, but a reality. Nor, at the same time, is it some objective entity, in principle observable if only by some extraordinary form of introspection. Philosophies that only recognise these two classes of referents, ideas and observable entities, must therefore dismiss it as a mystification or at best a metaphor. Johann on the other hand, identifies it with Aquinas' "act of being", too interior to all our activity to be experienced or conceptualised as an object but instead the existential principle of such acts of self-reflection.

Since persons are present to themselves in the above sense they are present to their own act of being and hence are in a position both to love themselves directly and so, any further necessary condition being met, to extend such direct love to others. Both Aristotle and Aquinas use the expression "another self" to refer to the formality under which self-love is extended to another. A quotation will give an idea of the way in which this mysterious expression is used: "When a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him just as he wills good to himself; wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, insofar, namely, as he wills good to him as to himself." (I.II.28.1) (Thomas Aquinas, 1963) Such an expression begins to raise a question about the adequacy of Johann's account of the necessary conditions for the extension of a person's self-love to another. Both he and Aquinas hold that it is indeed only other persons that can be loved directly. And this seems reasonable since if the principle of extension of self-love is similitude and only persons can love themselves it would seem logical that they can extend this love only to others like them. But like them in what respect? As we have seen, likeness of nature is inadequate to found direct love of another. We are required to love that in the other that constitutes his very uniqueness, namely his act of being. We have just seen what this act of being is in the case of a personal being, namely the self of the presence-to-self peculiar to persons. Clearly such a presence to one's own act of being is necessary for direct love of self. But Johann has said nothing to show why it is sufficient for a similar love of others. Because as far as their act of being is concerned two persons are simply different; if that were not so they would not be two persons. So if I love my act of being simply because it is mine there is no way that I can extend my self-love to another, since his act of being is irreducibly his.

We would seem to have reached an impasse. Either the extension of self-love to another is impossible and the whole Thomist theory is flawed or else one will have to discover something else in the notion of the self-love of a person that has not yet been brought out.
In fact we are already in possession of the solution to this apparent impasse. In spite of its richness, Johann's account of our experience of being a self is lacking in one respect. As we saw in Rahner's systematic analysis of spirituality (Chapter 2, Section 2) it is only because I am, cognitively and volitionally, open to and oriented towards being as such, namely being in its limitless scope, that I am capable of the sort of cognitive and volitional self-possession that is characteristic of a personal being. Conversely, insofar as I am present to myself or with myself in those peculiar modes of life characteristic of persons as such, I am by that very fact present to and dealing with being in its limitless scope. In particular the exercise and affirmation of one's uniqueness that is experienced in direct love can only take place against the background of love of being as such.

It is precisely this that makes it possible for me to love another person in his very uniqueness, as distinct from me, and at the same time for my love of him to be an extension of self-love. If I loved myself just because I was myself in the sense of being different from him, then there would be no way in which this love could be extended to him. But the uniqueness loved in self-love is really a unique participation in being as such, and this is also what I love in him. If, to speak more metaphorically for a moment, one thinks of "being" as a sort of, very fundamental, activity, then one could say that what I love in loving myself or him is this activity of "being". The peculiarity of course about such "activity" is that when he does it he is himself whereas when I do it it makes me me. To speak less metaphorically, when I love myself with the direct love that is only possible to personal, spiritual beings, it is not just being myself that I love but being as such, to the degree to which I participate and realise it in my own being. Insofar as I am a spiritual being my own self-enactment, in knowledge and love, is the enactment of being as such, a participation in and affirmation of being in its limitless scope. And insofar as it is that, it is also an enactment of the other, since he too is a perspective on and a participation in being as such. Because of the limitlessness of the being that grounds each person's unique being as a person there can be no opposition between them when they are loved as such. Hence a person's love of self does not exclude and can be extended to another. From this it can be seen why non-persons, even if they could per impossibile, love themselves directly could never extend such self-love to others. Hence the ability to do so is a manifestation of the truly spiritual nature of persons.

Note that although it is because they have a certain nature that only persons can either love or be loved directly, it is not as possessors of a certain nature that they are loved. Even the similitude that makes the extension of
self-love possible, though it is present only in those who share a personal nature, is not this similitude of nature, but of a common participation in infinite being, which found both likeness and difference.

Johann himself understands this notion of being. He sees that "the idea of being does not express only that in beings in which all communicate, but also that by which each one is itself incommunicably." (Johann, 1966: 37) He even sees that this is what I really love in loving myself. To emphasize its lack of limit he refers to it as the Absolute:

"Since, therefore, what I love in being is the presence of the Absolute, I can love it in the other as well as in myself. And since as in myself it is myself, and in the other it is himself, so my own proper good, loved in myself, can be found by likeness in the other in the very trait that irreducibly distinguishes him from me, his proper subsistence." (Johann, 1966: 39)

He never however relates this capacity for the Absolute to the self-presence he so finely describes, and so never seems fully to grasp how it is by virtue of our spirituality that we are able to extend our self-love to other persons.

We come now to the final condition for the extension of self-love to another that Johann stipulates. This is simply that the other person must be present to me. Though obvious, this condition is not as simple as it looks. For if I am to love the other as a "second self", he must be present to me in some sense as I am present to myself. Direct love reaches to the beloved's being, in this case the very subjectivity of another person such as Johann has described. Hence a purely notional or general or even superficial knowledge of the other will not suffice for the transference of direct self-love. Indeed the sort of knowledge of the other that is required is beyond the reach of even my most devoted efforts without reciprocity on the part of the one whom I love. Here Johann takes over the work of Nédoncelle on the reciprocity implied by personal forms of consciousness. He does not elaborate on it but simply affirms that "direct love implies between two persons a state of reciprocal consciousness." (Johann, 1966: 45)

Such reciprocity is a matter of degree but, as Nédoncelle (1966: 19) has shown, genuine love implies an ideal completeness of reciprocity. Johann does not deal explicitly with the question of the necessary conditions for the achievement of reciprocity and its growth as Nédoncelle does but he is quite clear that its possibility is founded on the identity between true self-love and love of the Absolute, or being in its infinite scope. By loving the Absolute in myself I am open to its presence in the other and so too, presumably, to the self-love of the other which if genuine will have the same object as my own and hence tend to reveal itself to me.
4.3 Critical remarks

Aquinas (1963) himself is too good a metaphysician to overlook, as Johann does, the connection between spirituality and the love of others. He notes it explicitly and in so doing reveals the fundamental ambiguity of the notion of self-love.

"Love of self is common to all in one way; in another way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to the wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways: first in respect of his substance and nature, and in this way all think themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and body. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love themselves, in so far as they love their own preservation.

Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In this way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. For the reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive and corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of which the Apostle calls the inward man, and the latter, the outward man (2 Cor. iv, 16). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the inward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way they think themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward man, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what they think themselves to be. But the good know themselves truly, and therefore truly love themselves."

The distinction between types of self-love is established by reference to differing types of self-knowledge. In each case the knowledge in question must not be understood as abstract or theoretical, but rather as the sort of self-knowledge that is based on one's ordinary everyday experience of self and is present as an essential ingredient in one's choices and one's acts. Thus the first sort is not the self-knowledge of one who has a particular theory of human nature, i.e. that human beings are composed of two principles, a formal and a material, but the ordinary awareness of self of any normal person. With regard to the self-knowledge of the good it can be seen that it is nothing other than the sort of self-knowledge expounded in our own previous chapter. It is centered on a value judgement regarding the relative importance of the various capacities that make up human nature. And because the value judgement is right, the lover is able to love himself as a whole as he really is. This in contradistinction to the previous, natural love where what is loved, though a true, is nevertheless but a partial, aspect of the whole man. The wicked on the other hand have got the hierarchy of values wrong and hence their self-love, taken as a whole, does not love themselves as they by nature are.
In terms of the general thesis of this work it is instructive to see Aquinas linking self-love to self-knowledge and, furthermore, insisting that only the good person can truly love himself. It is even more instructive that he should describe the principle of such true self-love concretely as "rational nature" and "the inward man". He is indeed even more explicit in another place where he writes, "a man is said to love himself by reason of his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature." (Thomas Aquinas, 1963) Johann, in spite of his emphasis on subjectivity fails to bring out the genuinely spiritual character of that subjectivity, in the way that we have come to understand it in the present work, and so fails both to properly explain how self-love can be extended to another and why only the self-love of a good person can be extended in this way. Aquinas' theory of love, which in this respect is consonant with our own, provides an adequate explanation of this and so justifies the common usage whereby "selfishness" is a pejorative term.

In any case it is true that for Johann, as for Aquinas, my goodness or perfection is bound up with my ability to love others directly. Since direct love of others is only possible because it is included in love of the Absolute, and love of the Absolute implies a true self-love, direct love of others is the visible sign of the genuineness of one's love of self and therefore of one's development and completeness as a person. Johann’s (1966: 52) description of what happens to me when I love another with direct love reveals the role played by this seemingly abstract element in true self-love in extremely concrete terms:

"When I love another directly, I break the little circle I form with myself where I would lodge the other simply as an idea. I discover a new existence; I am present to a new and transcendent revelation of that value I love in myself. And by that very fact, I cure myself of the exclusiveness, the poverty, the solitude that are my lot and my curse when, through egoism, I constitute myself the center of the universe and the absolute. Here for the first time I am open to Value in all its infinity and mystery. So long as I love myself exclusively, I fail to realize the transcendent and absolute character of the value present in myself; it is loved precisely where its participation in plenitude is interrupted, precisely as detached and alone. The only way to fathom the depths of the value which I am in myself is to turn towards and be open to that same value where it exceeds the bounds of my proper subjectivity. I cannot really love myself without loving other selves. Only when drawn into communion with other selves is my own person confirmed in being and my own love equal to the perfection to which it secretly aspires."

The direct love of others is thus a condition of the true love of self and thus of one's growth as a person. Nevertheless, as Johann points out, my self-perfection is not precisely the motive of direct love of others. To be worthy
of the name, love of another must be love of him for his own sake, unselfish in the common meaning of the term. How can such a love be related to the natural dynamism towards self-perfection which, as we have seen, underlies even the true love of self? Surely at this point love of self and of another must be seen as simple contraries?

4.4. The Nature of Other-love

Thus far we have dealt with Johann's treatment of the principle of the direct love of others. The question we have just raised is a question not about its principle but its motive. And Johann deals with the question of the motive of direct love of others in the final part of his treatise on love where, having treated direct love and desire separately in order to clarify the peculiar nature of direct love, he now treats them together, in relation to one another as complementary ingredients in the complex but unified activity of human love.

The two parts of love, desire and direct love, correspond to two aspects of a person called by Johann "taleity" and "ipseity". By "taleity" he means a person's nature, in the case of human persons their humanity with all its natural capacities and needs, including those that make human beings also persons. By "ipseity" he refers to the act of being itself, the self of personal beings, that is the subject of the individual nature and its acts.

Now as taleity, as having a particular nature, a person necessarily desires what is perfective of that nature, what will develop his personal capacities to fulfilment. He desires his own perfection. On the other hand as ipseity, as a subsisting subject, he directly loves and values himself for his own sake. As a personal being however his very subjectivity is constituted by an openness to and an orientation to being in its infinite scope. And this term and foundation of subjectivity, though not, as we have seen, different from the subject himself, because it is the enabling and originating condition for the subject's very subjectivity, must be experienced as other than the self. Insofar as there is an experience, of whatever kind, of what is genuinely infinite, involved in a person's own self-awareness, there is also an experience of one's own finiteness and hence of the unique otherness of the infinite. In other words, there is an experience of a non-identity with being as such. The otherness is said to be unique because its presence is what constitutes the subjectivity of the self; it is no way opposed to the self as one human person is to another. As we have seen it is the active orientation and adhesion to being in its infinite scope that makes possible the extension of self-love to another. At all events
it is because of this characteristic of a person that his direct love of self, as well as being the deepest and most interior form of love has also an ecstatic character. It is directed more truly to the term and foundation of the self than to the self as such. Indeed, as the self's own love, it is from this foundation that it most truly emanates, and hence to it that it naturally returns.

Johann sums up the two aspects of a person as follows:

"For a subject that is really a self, there would seem to be a twofold dynamism, a double finality. As a nature it tends to its full realization and desires what will contribute to that fulfilment; as ipseity, an "I", its dynamic orientation is towards a "Thou", towards Absolute Subjectivity, the transcendent Source of all personality, the total existential Plenitude of whom its own finite self is but a participation." (ML, 70)

This twofold dynamism underlies the two parts of love. The one, desire, is thus both relative and exclusive, seeking what is perfective of a person's nature, the other, direct love, is absolute but ecstatic, unconcerned with the needs and fulfilment of the self and thus radically open and non-exclusive.

In human persons the two parts of love combine. Desire seeks the perfection of our personal capacities. And it finds in the society of other persons the necessary means to this end. Direct love seeks to express its infinite scope by giving itself to other persons, valuing them for their own sake without thought of reward, communicating the goodness of the self simply and not as a means to a further end. If the end of desire is self-fulfilment, the end of direct love is the gift of self for another's fulfilment or simply in adoration.

The two parts of love are moreover intrinsically related. In human persons it is only insofar as they achieve the perfection of their natures that they are able to know and love themselves as persons and hence become capable of an ecstatic love that expresses itself in the generous and unself-seeking gift of self. Similarly it is because they are persons that perfection of nature will show itself in the love of other persons for their own sake. Such love will seek to communicate the perfection of the self, either in order to bring about the perfection of the other if it is lacking, or in simple celebration of it if it is already present.

The question about the motive of the direct love of others has now been answered. Its peculiarity consists in its selfless character. We can now see it as the attempt to express a value that is infinite. This takes the form of a direct love of others because of the finiteness of human persons. The love of others
expresses the transcendence of the confines of that material individuality which can be the object of an inadequate love of self. Johann emphasizes very strongly the desire for union with another on the part of finite persons. Such a desire goes beyond the desire for self-perfection; it parallels, as it were, the direct love of others that in fact brings about such a union. It is because human beings are persons that they are capable of a disinterested love that transcends the distinction between self and other; it is because they are finite that they have a natural desire to love in this way. Such a desire goes beyond that for self-perfection, yet self-perfection is the necessary condition for its being met.

5. Comparison of Johann with Toner

Having critically analysed Johann's account of the parts of love, we are now in a position to compare the contribution of Johann with that of Toner, to our understanding of personal love. As we have seen he bases his theory of love on a view of the human person that is in essential respects the same as ours. There is the self-reference of subjectivity. And there is the orientation to being in its infinite scope. Johann does not appear to appreciate fully the intrinsic connection between these aspects of spirituality, but he is quite sure that they provide the necessary conditions for a genuine love of other persons for their own sake. In this he goes beyond Toner in providing an adequate metaphysical base for personal love. His theory also goes a long way towards showing why the love of others for their own sake is both perfective of human persons and the natural expression of a perfection already achieved.

A feature of Toner's account that is lacking in Johann's is the detailed treatment of reciprocity. Johann admits that direct love of others is impossible without a minimum of reciprocity and that it can only grow to the extent that reciprocity does as well. But he offers no explanation of what the necessary conditions are for such reciprocity to exist and to grow. In fact Toner also omits any consideration of this but he nevertheless supplies an extremely detailed account of the dynamics of reciprocal love.

The most useful result of Johann's analysis of love from our point of view is perhaps his connecting the generosity and unselfishness of direct love of others with what we can now recognise as the spiritual side of human persons. His emphasis on this is much stronger than Toner's and more in accord with the importance that we ourselves would attach to it.
From the work of Toner and Johann we can now see that a Thomistic theory of love shows that the love of others for their own sake is indeed made possible by the spirituality of human persons and thus a manifestation of their spiritual powers. Both Toner and Johann showed that the personal love of others implied a view of the human person that was in a general way self-referential. That this general reference-to-self was in fact self-enactment in our sense of the term was revealed by Toner's demonstration of the non-exclusiveness of personal communion and personal causality, a non-exclusiveness that meant that union and self-identity increased in direct and not inverse proportion. It was also revealed by Johann's emphasis on the gratuitousness and unselfishness, the ecstatic character, of direct love, that went beyond all desire for self-perfection while being at the same time founded on it and expressive of it. In each case the limitlessness of the personal self's basic orientation, which is the essential foundation of self-enactment in our sense of the term, was revealed.

6. Interpersonal Communion

Having completed a fairly thorough analysis of love we must now consider the special case of mutual love to see whether, as we should now expect, the nature of personal powers in their fulfilment will be revealed with an even greater clarity.

In Toner's work on love the spirituality of human persons was revealed by the way in which personal individuality and interpersonal union were developed and perfected together and how in the state of communion complete identification of self and other was achieved. In Johann it was the gratuitousness and generosity, the unselfishness, of love for the other that most clearly showed the person's spiritual nature. As will be seen, these various aspects of the love of persons come together in the phenomenon of mutual love. An accurate description of the dynamism and finality of mutual love will reveal the spiritual nature of persons more clearly than ever.

In the phenomenon of mutual love we are in fact considering the situation described by Toner in his section on communion. We wish, however, to incorporate into that the distinction examined by Johann between direct love and desire. In other words the love that is expressed between the partners in communion is twofold. There is the love of each for the other and for himself. And then there is the good that each desires for the other and for himself as a consequence of that love. The first love is the foundational love, called by Johann direct love, and is as we have seen in Toner's analysis, an affective affirmation of and identification with the loved one's act of being. The second
has as its most general object the perfection of the nature of the person loved and hence all that is necessary for that perfection. Insofar as that perfection is still to be achieved this subsidiary love will take the form of desire; insofar as it has already been acquired it will take the form of joy. And such desire for and joy in perfection will be referred both to the self and the other, to the degree, of course, to which the basic self-love has been extended to the other.

We are now in a position, having set out the ground-plan as it were, of mutual love, to see that the tendency and goal of personal love and its fullest expression is the communion constituted by full mutuality.

If I love another as myself I consequently wish for him what I wish for myself, namely the perfection of his nature. Now, as we have seen, the perfection of a person nature is most properly and completely expressed in the direct love of other persons. As Johann put it, even the desire for self-perfection of a personal being goes beyond a merely immanent fulfilment of its personal powers, but culminates in an ecstatic movement towards another, towards union. Hence my goal for the other whom I now love as myself is that he should love me, not for my sake but for his. Of course I wish him to love me for my sake too; but that is the goal of my own desire for self-perfection that follows from my love of self. And we are considering what follows from my love of him. There is a further consequence too, this time affecting my attitude towards my own desire for perfection. I now desire to be perfect not only for myself but for him, so as to constitute his fulfilment.

It can be seen from this description how both object and motive of my love for myself and my love for the other merge. And this is true of both aspects of personal love. Just as the object and motive of direct love of self and other come together in communion so do the object and motive of the subsidiary love Johann calls desire. Indeed the object of each is nothing other than the complete mutuality of personal communion. In loving this communion, I love both myself and you as the unique persons that we are. In wanting this communion for myself and for you I simultaneously express my own desire for fulfilment and your own. Thus communion of this kind expresses the complete goal of all aspects of personal love and is what ultimately grounds its finality. One should however add one thing more for completeness' sake. In talking of mutual love I have used such words as "wish" and "want" to express the subsidiary element in personal love, namely the love of the good that you wish the person you love to gain. This was simply to distinguish it from the love of the person himself. Words like "wish" and "want" sound more like "desire" than "joy", but of course what we are
talking about is the love that underlies both desire and joy. It takes the form of desire when what is loved is not yet achieved, or joy when it is. Now in the case of personal communion clearly it can take both forms. Completeness of communion goes hand in hand with the perfection of personal nature. Before this has been achieved both aspects of personal love will manifest the note of desire; when it is achieved desire will give way to joy. (In parenthesis it should be said that "faith" and "hope" are better terms than "desire" to express the note of futurity and incompleteness, as far as the foundational love of persons themselves is concerned. Perhaps "adoration" is the appropriate term for the state of completion.)

The communion that is expressive of mutual personal love can thus be seen to unite the special objects of both parts of love. Such a conclusion is expressly corroborated by G Gillemann (1959: 144) in his work The Prinacy of Charity in Moral Theology, "... love considered as personal communion lies beyond the distinction between love of concupiscence and love of friendship." (PCM, ) It also unites the natural desire for self-perfection and the selfless love of others, the age-old dichotomy of eros and agape made notorious by Nygren. (1944) This aspect of communion needs further comment since it brings out a distinctive feature of the love of persons very clearly. It is brought out especially clearly in the work of M Nédoncelle and is indeed a consequence of that feature of personal relations for the study of which he is best known, namely reciprocity.

Nédoncelle (1966: 32) defines the communion constituted by the reciprocal love of persons as the "heterogeneous identity of the I and thou." He explains this striking expression in a way entirely consonant with Toner's account of identification:

"It does not rest on the similarity between its participants but on their harmonious originality. Certainly it leads us to state, without fear of presumption, that the I is the thou, but only in the perspective in which it causes the thou to be, and is itself willed by the thou. By this will, the subjects identify with each other, and do so only in the measure in which they become different." (Nédoncelle, 1966: 33)

It can be seen from this that the communion of persons is the result and culmination of that distinctively "personal causality" that we noticed in the previous chapter. Nédoncelle's distinctive contribution is to show that from start to finish it is characterised by reciprocity. This is so because all personal love contains the intention of reciprocity even when it is not explicitly reciprocated. And this is as true of agape as it is of eros.
"What does it mean to give oneself to another? Is it to commit oneself to be concerned about him, to make him exist more fully? But the lover would deny the worth of his love did he not desire the beloved to share it and be loving in his turn. To will that the other be loving is to will that the love in me what makes me able and willing to love him; it is to will that he love me." (Nédoncelle, 1966: 22)

He concluded that "there is an eros of the agape, a need to possess the spirit of dispossession, a desire to find one's soul losing it," and that "the contrast proposed by Nygren is a psychological error." (Nédoncelle, 1966: 18) One could add that, similarly, there is an agape of the eros, also revealed in the love of communion. I both will the other to love me for his perfection and I will to be perfect in order to love him as I ought. In any case it is clear that in the communion of personal love both the desire of my own perfection and the self-forgetful love of others can find a common goal.

What does this feature of communion tell us about personal love, and hence about persons? That the love expressive of the fulfilment of personal powers is universal in its scope, and is not specified by the particular person or persons whom a particular person happens to love. For the sake of clarity we have taken the couple as our model for mutual love and communion. But this is misleading if it should be taken to imply that the love of a fully-developed person is adequately expressed as love only of some particular person or other. We have pointed out its lack of exclusiveness. This must not be taken to mean simply a lack of exclusion within the couple, namely that the loved one is not excluded from the self-love of the lover. It has to be understood as an absolute lack of exclusiveness. In principle no-one is excluded from the love with which I love myself. Conversely I only truly love myself, and any particular other person, if my love is in principle open to everyone. Speaking of the love of communion Nédoncelle (1966: 60) writes: "We commit ourself to make the other and ourself utterly lovable and loving. But for a consciousness to be so it must embrace the whole universe and strive for the promotion of all other centres of consciousness according to the same value system. The human love of one person leads to the love of all persons." The communion of mutual love which is the common goal of all personal love and the expression of the fulfilment of personal powers is thus a universal communion. And this at last explains the paradox of personal love, unselfishness, of how it can be a natural and valid expression of self-love that I love the other more than myself, that I sacrifice myself for him. What is being affirmed in true self-love as well as in the self-sacrificing love for another is the communion of mutual love that includes us both but in its essence
goes beyond us. In all genuine love it is this universal value that is affirmed in the desire for self-perfection as well as in the generous love of others.

The universality of the communion that is the object of personal love is in fact a clear sign of the spirituality of our personal powers. It is the symbol as it were, as well as the actual result, of our affirmation of a really infinite value in our particular loves. When we sacrifice our own interests for others who are as finite as we are, we are not simply being irrational but rather we are both expressing our desire for fulfilment in a communion that transcends our own particularity, and our adoration of something of absolute value for its own sake.

The orientation towards being in its infinite scope that characterises persons as spiritual beings is most clearly shown for what it is in the communion of mutual love of persons. On the other hand it is in our attempt to bring about the communion of mutual love that we enact ourselves as spiritual beings. As Tallon (1973: 74) puts it in his article on the dialogal philosophy of Martin Buber, "Person and Community", "to someone who asks "How am I to become a person?" the answer remains "Enact community." (Philosophy Today, Vol 17, 1973, pp 62-83)

Nédoncelle too, is in no doubt that this understanding of the aims and dynamism of personal love entails a very definite notion of a person. Speaking of human persons he defines being a person as "the condition of the self that obliges it to seek its progressive fulfilment by itself, according to a perspective at once unique and universal." (Nédoncelle, 1966: 60) It is the combination of uniqueness and universality that is so characteristic of persons. Commenting on the definition, he says that it implies "a self-creating continuity, that is the presence of a free causality in the self. And ... it establishes the self in a vocation to totality; it recognises in the self, by that very fact, the highest form of finality and value." (Nédoncelle, 1966: 60) He recognises the paradoxical character of a definition that juxtaposes two such contrary ideas as universality and uniqueness or totality and individuality, but holds that an understanding of the phenomenon of love such as we have presented can overcome this apparent contradiction. The two elements of personality are reconciled once one "analyzes the fact of love: in it, and in it alone, we understand that the self can keep and increase its singular self-awareness by becoming universal; for the self, by loving, wills to promote other selves and reach the entire universe of the spirit through them ..." (Nédoncelle, 1966: 62)
We have come to the end of our description of interpersonal love. The resources of a Thomist theory of love seem to have been adequate for our purpose, since it would appear from the analyses based on it that the love of others for their own sake is indeed expressive of the fulfilment of personal powers. Furthermore the notion of a person involved, rooted in the metaphysics of Aquinas, is consonant with and indeed augments our own notion of self-enactment. We must now set out how this is so.

7. Self-enactment in Interusbjectivity III

Our third description of the intersubjective relations of persons, namely that which is expressive of the fulfilment of personal powers, does indeed show us persons as being in a general way self-enacting. The unselfish love of others for their own sake is an activity that is not only entirely unmotivated by any need on the part of the subject, but is expressive of a state of personal fulfilment that has gone beyond distinctively personal needs. The person whose self-expression manifests itself in this way is quite unconcerned with satisfying its personal needs since it has no such desires that are not already satisfied by the interpersonal situation it is in. In this sense it is quite self-possessed and self-contained.

In the previous two chapters the need that persons had for other persons in order to develop their specifically personal powers was stressed. In the present chapter we have considered the enactment of personal powers precisely as going beyond the need of others. The intersubjective context of the self-enactment of persons is nevertheless, as we have seen, retained. But what was previously revealed in a limited and somewhat negative form is here revealed in a full and positive one.

In the unselfish love of others for their own sake there is a complete transcendence of one's own particularity. One identifies wholly with the person one loves and enacts him as one enacts oneself. The content and the act of love of self and love of the other are simply identical.

At the same time, in loving them as oneself one is loving what is the common interior ground of one's being as a person, the infinite term of one's orientation on being as such. This means that (in view of the fact that one is a finite person) one is loving oneself precisely as a spiritual being, in the very metaphysical ground of one's spirituality. One's activity is thus at the furthest possible remove from determination by what is material in any way.
Finally, the personal causality that was a feature of the two preceding descriptions reaches its culmination here in the full reciprocity of personal communion. It is this form of personal mutuality that is the fullest possible manifestation of the lack of limitation in the orientation and capacity of a person, that is the ground of their self-enacting powers. Unselfish love of another person for his own sake and the enactment of personal communion are two sides of the same coin. Unselfish love is an attitude and activity that is unconcerned with the fulfilment of need but is oriented to the affirmation of an infinite value. The unselfish love of another for his own sake to the point of self-sacrifice is expressive of the affirmation of a value that transcends the actual value of any particular person considered as such. They are loved (and so too is the self) as participants in a universal communion of mutuality which is the ultimate product and symbol of the self's orientation to infinite being.

To sum up then: the description of the unselfish love of another person for his own sake, especially when expressed in the mutuality of personal communion, reveals the fully developed person as self-enacting in the fullest possible way: in the self-transcendence of particularity, the freedom from external physical causality, the personal causality, and especially in personal communion we are presented with a personal analogue of self-enactment. In this, our third, description of the intersubjective conditions for the exercise, growth and fulfilment of our personal powers, it is especially the phenomenon of personal communion that manifests the spirituality of the powers involved. The mutuality of communion would be manifestation enough of the full development of the personal causality that is the interpersonal expression of self-enactment. In addition to that the universality of communion, a universality that in principle extends beyond the participants, however many they may be, makes this what I have called a symbol of the finite person's orientation to infinite being. It is important to see that the community is in principle open to all possible participants. Its universality is not simply a matter of being more than two, but of being completely open to all. This follows from the non-exclusiveness which is a quality we have seen to be involved in the unselfish love of any particular person. It is not therefore really a question of numbers, of how many an unselfish love can accommodate, but of the intrinsic character of that love whether it is in fact directed at one or many.

We have called this communion symbolic, but the conditions for its realisation have implications in the real world. And these we must now consider.
Our description of love has revealed a dynamism present in all love towards mutuality. And our description of mutual love revealed that the full mutuality of communion depends on the perfection of the natures of the persons involved. Each participant must have complete self-knowledge and be completely self-affirming so as to be able to know and affirm the other completely. In a word, each participant must be completely self-enacting.

From this it follows that the necessary condition for the exercise and growth of a person's distinctively personal powers is the personal presence of a person whose development is complete. The goal of community that is present in and gives its distinctive character to our personal powers imposes this requirement on us. So it appears that the personal perfection of the "other" in our different models for the personal life of the "self", was not an "unrealistic" feature of the description. It may of course be unrealistic in the sense that no such person actually has ever existed or ever will. But it is realistic in the sense that it is the necessary condition for the fulfilment of capacities which, (if we grant the substantial truth of our descriptions of personal interaction), persons undeniably have by nature and which, moreover, (if we grant that these capacities add up to a capacity for self-enactment in the sense that we have defined it) make them spiritual beings.

If we admit this conclusion then it would seem that we are bound to admit another, that would seem to follow from it. The two-person model is inadequate to express the reality of intersubjective relations. The reason for this inadequacy is simple. If I require the presence of a fully developed person in order to develop as a person, then he must have developed to personal completeness in relation to someone other than I. If he relied solely on his relationship with me, with my incomplete self-knowledge and imperfect love, for the mutuality that could express his perfection, it simply could not be expressed. As it is, if we admit the existence of a third, and fully developed, person, the other's own perfection can find proper expression in relation to him. And his relation to me can be seen as an extension of the relation of full mutuality he enjoys with this third. It is in a context such as this that the importance of the radical non-exclusiveness, the universality, of the love of communion can be seen. Thus a more accurate picture of the necessary conditions for my development as a person would show me in the presence not of a single other person but of a communion of persons. It is thus my integration into an already existing communion that provides the means to my development as a person. We should really begin at the beginning again and repeat our descriptions with this in mind. Or should we?
Is it not apparent that we are in fact confronted by a problem of infinite regress? How did the third member of our modified model of intersubjectivity reach his personal fulfilment? Certainly not in relation to the, by definition, undeveloped second. So we must postulate a fourth. But even that will not work since we shall always need another as the necessary condition for the new member's development. In fact what we need to complete the original model is not simply a third, fully developed, person but a person who, in addition to being fully-developed, did not depend on another person for such development.

We could have come to the same conclusion by a shorter route if we considered not the ideal conditions for personal development but the actual situation of human persons. What we are actually confronted with in our personal life is a situation in which persons at various stages of incomplete development are present to each other. And in such a situation if it is the case that I need you in order to develop as a person, and you need me in precisely the same way, and if my personal development is conditioned by yours, then there is no possibility of any development at all. This abstract sounding analysis can be expressed in concrete terms in order to show its pertinence. If we have a natural capacity and a need as personal beings to love unselfishly, and we can only exercise this capacity if and to the extent that we are unselfishly loved, and if all persons are in the same boat, then this need can never be met, and such a love although a possibility will never develop. Unless there is a person with just such a capacity, but who doesn't depend on others for its development.

If this is the situation of actual human persons in relation to one another then four possibilities obtain. We do not have the capacities and hence the needs that the account of persons in this work maintains we do. We have precisely those capacities but we do not depend on others for their development and fulfilment. We have those capacities and we do depend on others for their development and thus they remain for ever undeveloped. We have those capacities and we depend on others for their development, and moreover we have undeniable experience of such development, and hence the necessary conditions for such development must exist. There is consequently a question as to which of these possibilities is in fact realised. I incline to the last on the basis of a belief in the experience of the reality of personal growth. On what grounds such a belief could be justified is a real and an intriguing question, but one which I cannot, alas, attempt to answer here.

With the description of the fulfilment of personal powers our account of the basic forms of intersubjectivity is complete. We must now proceed to sum up this study and draw our conclusions.
CHAPTER 6. HUMAN SPIRITUALITY

1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to bring our study to a conclusion. Accordingly we review the results of our three descriptions of intersubjectivity to see how they manifest the spiritual nature of persons. We attempt to show that these results form a coherent picture of the spirituality of persons, a picture which thus presents us with a more easily recognisable personal and interpersonal definition of the spiritual.

Having thus completed our project in this respect we turn to consider the special case of human persons, since it is this that we are chiefly interested in, and this has special problems of its own. We state and attempt to solve the problems specific to human spirituality. Finally, we state formally our conclusions to the study as a whole.

2. The Intersubjective Manifestation of Spirituality

In each of our descriptions of the intersubjective relations between persons the spirituality of personal powers has been manifested in a certain way. We must now collect these results together in a synthetic view in order to see what conclusions we can form about human spirituality.

2.1 The Exercise of Personal Powers

If to be an agent is to be both self-conscious and self-determining in the sense that our first description implies, then persons are self-enacting in a loose and general sense of the term. It would indeed hardly seem necessary to argue for such a position. It is surely almost impossible to conceive of treating persons as though they were not aware of themselves as, in some sense, real originators of changes in the world. But this sort of self-reference cannot of course without more ado be equated with self-enactment as we have defined it.

The most obviously striking sign of the spirituality of persons in our first description is that the exercise of personal powers cannot take place except in relation to an environment where they are already in use. (Chapter 3, Section 6) The fact that personal capacities cannot be actualised by impersonal causes shows that there is a radical difference between persons and non-persons. This is the difference which we describe as that between spiritual and material beings. This difference is emphasised by the fact that, according to the description, it is not just any activity of persons that is required to enable the self-enactment of personal powers but precisely activity that proceeds from the specifically
personal powers, and what is more from those powers as fully developed. The mother must actually will the personal development of the child. Acts that satisfy the child's biological needs produced by a machine are not enough to enable the enactment of the child's personal powers. On the other hand a loving mother need perform no other acts in order to reveal her love and herself to the child and so enable his strictly personal response. In the transaction as we have envisaged it there is a clear distinction between two different kinds of causality.

The exercise of self-enactment on the part of the child in the transaction with the mother is revealed by two features of the description. (Chapter 3, Section 8) The first is the ability of the child to enter into the personal life of the mother and so appropriate her power to act as an agent. This ability to grasp the presence of a person as the origin of effects and to make her project its own represents a transcendence of its own separateness, and hence particularity, on the part of the child. The child's existence is revealed as (potentially) inclusive of the mother's. Its integrity as a personal individual does not depend on excluding the presence and influence of the mother as would that of an impersonal thing. The fact that it is able to really share the personal life of the mother in a way in which a non-personal thing could not, reveals a universality in the personal powers of the child. A concrete sign of this universality is the real lack of specificity in the capacities of a human infant. This empty openness we remarked on, this skill for no particular project, the very completeness of its orientation, albeit expressed initially as dependence, (one could even say parasitism) on the mother, provide a very expressive symbol of the universality of its powers that our description implies.

The second feature of the description that reveals self-enactment in the strict sense, is the way that the causal influence of the mother creates not dependence but independence on the child's part. The more the child enters into the mother's acts the more it enacts itself. This freedom from deterministic causality (as opposed to personal causality) is not, to be sure, especially highlighted by the first description since it concerns the absolute minimum of the exercise of personal powers. The mother, rather than the child, exemplifies the note of freedom in self-enactment, since in the exercise of her personal powers she is not motivated at all by need but only by her project for the child. Nevertheless the fact that the child gains the exercise of essentially self-referring powers while under the influence of the mother and because of that influence, is enough to show that it is, in that respect, free of all ordinary causality and hence is self-enacting.
To sum up then, the first description offers us an interpersonal model of self-enactment in a person's ability to enter into and appropriate the life of another by means of a causality that is directly opposite to that of impersonal processes. One has only to compare this distinctively personal causality with that involved in, say, the taking in of food, to grasp the crucial difference.

2.2 The Growth of Personal Powers

If personal growth consists in the development of self-knowledge and self-affirmation as we have described them in our second description of interpersonal relations, then persons do become progressively more self-enacting in a loose and general sense of the term. There are those, no doubt, who are opposed to any idea of growth since it is inevitably a normative notion, but we can see no way of removing all normative discourse from the understanding and practice of human life. It would not be too hard to show that to argue for such a position would be inherently self-refuting. (cf. Boyle, 1976; Donceel, 1967; Lewis, 1947; Lonergan, 1957 and 1967; Mascall, 1957; Moleski, 1977; Muck, 1968) But, apart from all theoretical considerations, imagine how one would bring up children!

As we saw in Chapter 4, Section 2, there are those who would admit growth in persons but confine it to areas susceptible of scientific control and measurement, i.e. to the biological or strictly scientific psychological domains. One thinks of intelligence testing, standards like genital primacy, and various other criteria for growth in these realms. These areas of growth and standards of measurement are adequate as far as they go but they cannot be identified with personal growth as we have described it.

Finally (as we also brought out in Chapter 4, Section 2) there are those who, while admitting the notion of personal growth and recognising its normative character would wish to see it described in more obviously ethical terms than those that we have used. I do not think there is a problem here. If one substituted the terms "wisdom" and "love" for "self-knowledge" and "self-affirmation" these critics would probably be satisfied. And it would make no difference to our idea of personal growth. But it would obscure our desire to overcome the dichotomy between psychology and morality, between what is merely part of nature and what is merely part of culture. The terms we use are intended to refer to the development of natural capacities, but to those uniquely personal ones that make culture in the strict sense possible. If we had described personal growth in terms of the growth of integration this could be interpreted in too narrowly a naturalistic way. If we had described it in terms of rationality, then this could have been understood in a purely cultural way.
Over and above these considerations there is of course our desire to bring out, if at all possible, the self-referential character of all personal life. If personal growth described in terms of self-knowledge and self-affirmation can be related to more obviously ethical notions as well as to a realistic grasp of the actual constants of human nature, then our description will have gone some way towards bridging a gap which to our mind needs bridging.

The way the spirituality of persons stands out especially in our second description is that the growth of a person is revealed as a growth of self control and autonomy. (Chapter 4, Section 5.1) This growth takes the form of a growth in unity or integration since, from the start, there is a question of a number of elements involved and an inevitable multiplicity of acts of each capacity. This is because of the spatio-temporal existence of human persons. Indeed the very notion of growth implies multiplicity. What we have in personal growth is thus a progressive unification of the elements of personal life. The existence of the distinctively personal capacities from the start provide an enduring principle of unification, but the actual life of an incompletely developed person can manifest all kinds of disunity. In spite of the pervading and permanent tendency towards unity, the actual unity of the self-system can fail of comprehensiveness as well as of interior coherence. But as we have seen, as the harmony between the systems of the self increases and the coherence within them, so the unity of the person becomes ever more total and ever more simple. It is always, from the beginning, a unity of self-reference, but as the integration of the self increases so the self as enacting and the self as enacted become more and more identical. In the end, when there is complete self-knowledge and complete consent to the self known, the acts of the self proceed from a single principle that is both simple and all-embracing. The self as a whole enacts the whole self. This is the term of personal growth at least as far as the distinctively personal powers are concerned. Since we are speaking of human persons there is still more to be said. Our description of personal growth nevertheless is not opposed to the growth of specifically human persons. Especially to be noted in this connection is our emphasis (Chapter 4, Section 4.1) on the multiplicity of acts, of systems of habits, (cf. Tallon, 1979) and of a hierarchy of values.

For us it is this peculiar consistency and simplicity revealed in a person's acts and judgements that testify to growth of his personal powers. To say as Kierkegaard (1938) did that purity of heart is "to will one thing" is to indicate the simplicity or wholeheartedness that is in question here. We have tried to show in our description that it is inseparable from an insight into the fundamenta
tendencies of our personal nature and a consequent unification of our emotional life on the basis of a unified hierarchy of value-judgements. The unity of a fully-developed person is strikingly different from that of an impersonal thing since it is both self-referential and wholly and simply such. The self-referential character of a person does not vitiate the simplicity and the totality of its unity but is the essential condition for it.

The increase in the scope and intensity of self-enactment is revealed in the growth of persons in two chief ways. (Chapter 4, Sections 6.1 and 6.2) There is first of all the progressive participation in the other person's self-knowledge and self-affirmation. Ultimately, as we pointed out, such participation involves gaining an identical character, based on identical degrees of consent to the same hierarchy of values. Until growth is completed full mutuality is not achieved. There is however a growing reciprocity so that all opposition of will is progressively overcome. In the second place, at the same time as this progressive identification with the other increases, so does the completeness of the growing person's possession of himself. The law of personal causality, that self-enactment and identification with the other increase in direct rather than inverse proportion, is more fully exemplified in this description than in that of the mother and child. The more the life of the other is entered into, the more self-control and autonomy increases. The more the difference in the character of the fundamental system of insights and choices is obliterated, the more the growing person possesses his own life. The more the growing person suffers the personal causality of the other, the more it becomes his own, the more he is freed from the determinism of his own impersonal nature and the inevitable conflicts it produces in him.

To sum up the description of personal growth: growth in self-enactment is seen as a growth in unity of the self. In a complex system the tendency to simplicity and wholeness gains the upper hand, integrating the various elements into a more simple whole. Simplicity and wholeness thus are the essential features of a self-enacting system.

2.3 The Fulfilment of Personal Powers

If the activity of fully developed persons consists in generous and disinterested love of others or in the attempts to realise a community that has an absolute value of its own, then such a person is self-enacting in the sense that his activities are not motivated by the desire to satisfy any need. He is, in Aristotle's sense of the term, self-contained or, better, in Rahner's and our own sense of the term, in possession of himself.
The unselfish love of others is, in fact, the most striking sign of the spirituality of persons in its fullest possible development. (Chapter 5, Section 6) Its gratuitousness, its ecstatic character and apparent preference of the good of others above the good of self might appear to qualify it as irrational and compulsive. Yet, as our description showed, it is in fact the appropriate expression of the perfection of our personal powers. In addition, as the two previous descriptions show, it is the one essential condition for the growth to fulfilment of other persons. In exercising such love fully developed persons tend to bring into being the communion of full personal mutuality.

That the communion of mutual love by each for each is in fact a true manifestation of self-enactment in the strict sense is clearly the case. (Chapter 5, Section 7) The transcendence of particularity through identification with the other, the possession of oneself in freedom from impersonal influence, are both complete. Personal causality is reciprocal and mutual.

In this situation of the fulfilment of personal powers, however, self-enactment reveals its ultimate root, namely the orientation to infinite being. It does this in its tendency towards communion. This is the fullest expression of the self-donation in unselfish love. By its potential unlimitedness and lack of exclusiveness such communion is a sign of the infinite openness that makes persons spiritual beings.

Finally, the lack of limitation that is the foundational feature of personal powers appears again in the fact that the actual existence of this communion of full personal mutuality depends, as we have seen, on the personal influence of a person who is strictly independent of any other person for the full expression of his personal powers. And in such a person the personal powers are simply unlimited in any way at all.

To sum up the description of personal fulfilment: full personal self-enactment reveals itself in the gratuitous love of other persons. This is its only adequate expression. Such love moreover is creative of a communion between persons that is characterised by mutuality and universality.

2.4 Spirituality in Personal Terms

Having considered the way in which the spirituality of persons manifests itself in each of the three descriptions of the intersubjective relations between persons we are now in a position to present a comprehensive picture of the spirituality of persons as it manifests itself in the most strictly personal way, namely in the acts of persons in relation to other persons. We shall then be in possession of a fully personal picture of spirituality which we can compare
If it is the case that persons are spiritual beings then clearly all aspects of their spirituality are implicated in any stage of personal life. Nevertheless each of our descriptions highlights a different aspect of the spirituality of persons and so gives a different fully personal model for the spiritual.

In the first description the self-transcendence of personal life stands out most clearly, the ability that persons have to make the life of another being, and that the most interior and autonomous of beings, their own. The ability to possess the other as other, without destroying his autonomy in any way, is what shows the spirituality of persons in a fully personal form at this stage.

In the second description it is self-enactment as such that stands out most clearly, as the peculiarly personal form of spirituality. Coherence of belief and consistency of choice manifest the comprehensiveness and simplicity of the unity attendant on personal growth.

In the third description the spirituality of persons shows itself especially in the unselfish love of others that is creative of a universal community of personal mutuality.

We are thus left with a fully personal picture of spirituality that is composed of three elements. We do not think it is far-fetched to relate them directly to the three elements of spirituality disclosed in our metaphysical analysis, namely universality, freedom, and the orientation to infinite being.

As we saw in chapter two, self-enactment as we had defined it with the help of Rahner, involved both the transcendence of particularity and freedom from physical causality. The first was brought out by Aquinas' argument from de Anima as interpreted by McCabe, (Chapter 2, Section 5.1) the second emphasised by C S Lewis' argument against determinism as developed by us. (Chapter 2, Section 5.2) Finally, this transcendence of particularity and this freedom were derived from the same basis in the operation of the intellect that was shown by Rahner to depend on an orientation to infinite being.

It seems clear to us that the three elements of spirituality of persons as revealed by our descriptions of intersubjectivity do in fact parallel the three elements revealed by our metaphysical analysis. The self-transcendence involved in the exercise of personal powers parallels the universality of the understanding (the transcendence of particularity). The simplicity and wholeness involved in personal growth parallels the freedom of intellectual acts from physical causality. The gratuitousness and universality of the love of others
in personal community parallels the infinity of the mind's orientation to being as such.

From the evidence of these parallels we conclude formally that the phenomena of intersubjectivity do manifest the spiritual nature of persons and present us with a fully personal picture of the spiritual as such.

There is a final element in the fully personal picture of the spirituality of persons that we have been trying to draw, that phenomenon of intersubjectivity that we have called personal or interpersonal causality. Whereas each of the three elements we have so far considered are features of persons as such, personal causality is a feature of relations between persons. As such it is manifested in each of our descriptions of the forms of intersubjectivity. In the first it appears as the influence of the mother that makes possible the self-transcendence of the child. In the second it takes the form of the other's knowledge and love that enables the self not only to reciprocate but to grow in freedom, the freedom both of inner integration and absence of constraint from without. Finally, in the third description, it is manifest in that complete reciprocity that is creative of personal communion. Thus it is the case that our descriptions give us not only a fully personal description of the spiritual; they give us an interpersonal one as well. Indeed the three descriptions can be seen as three stages in the development of personal causality, the ways in which persons exist in relation to other persons.

3. Human Persons

We must now consider the special case of human persons. For if it is the case that persons are spiritual beings and spirituality involved both transcendence of particularity and freedom from physical causality, as we have seen from our metaphysical account that it does, then it is difficult to see how human beings can be persons at all. We assume and do not intend to demonstrate that human beings are both possessed of spatio-temporal specificity and subject to physical causality. On the other hand if the descriptions of intersubjectivity do persuade us that we are persons, then there is a corresponding problem about the unity of human persons. Because the unity of human persons derives from their spirituality, we propose first to discuss the relation of spirit and matter in human persons and then, from that perspective, the special nature of human bodiliness.

3.1 Spirit and Matter

There is a metaphysical solution to the problem of the unity of a human person in Thomist thought; it is expressed in the formula that in the human person the
specifically personal powers are the form of the human individual (I.76.1). We do not, however, propose to discuss this solution. If it is the case that we are now in possession of an intersubjective analogue of the metaphysical account of spirituality, then it is a possible project to see whether a solution to the problem can be found in terms of persons and their relations to other persons. Clearly all the details of our descriptions of intersubjectivity were drawn from our experience of human persons and their relationships. If, from these descriptions the spirituality of persons emerges with something approaching certainty, is it not likely that we may find in them an intersubjective analogue of materiality as well? If we can, and the descriptions retain their plausibility, doing as well for our materiality what they did for our spirituality, then we are in fact in possession of a personal and interpersonal formula for human persons that does justice to both aspects of their spiritual-material nature. Let us at any rate see whether something like this can be done.

Our first move must be to see whether we can formulate an intersubjective analogue for materiality so as to be able to recognise its appearance in our intersubjective descriptions. I think we can. And it is the metaphysical notion of matter we formulated in Chapter one that shows us the way.

As we say in Chapters One and Two, the material is characterised by spatio-temporal specificity and causal dependence of a physical sort. The spatio-temporal specificity is the sign of a peculiar particularity which involves an essential relation to others of the same kind. A material thing is essentially one of many; it is intrinsically repeatable. Each class of material things is bound to have more than one possible member. For this reason, the particularity of materiality involves the separation from other individuals of the same kind. Now if this feature is taken together with the other, namely the causal dependence on a system of physical causality, we have a picture of materiality as consisting essentially in a relation to otherness. This is what underlies both separatedness and dependence. There is the general relation to what is other, and that takes the form of dependence. And there is the special relation to others of the same species, and that takes the form of separate particularity. The relation to otherness that characterises materiality can thus be summed up in the relation of one material thing to others of its own species, since these others are both other than it and specifically the same.

If we now consult our descriptions of the interpersonal relations of persons it certainly is the case that the personal life of persons is characterised by an intrinsic orientation towards other persons. In the case of the exercise and growth of personal powers there is dependence, while in their fulfilment, although
the dependence ceases, there is still an intrinsic relation to others involved in the expression of fulfilment. If spirituality is self-enactment, then this relatedness to others might well be the personal analogue of materiality that we seek. Let us now see whether it can in all respects be made to fit.

As spiritual beings human persons must reveal a radical independence of others to justify the application of the term "self-enacting". And this they do according to our descriptions. There is, however, an exception. In their orientation to infinite being, human persons experience the term and ground of this orientation as radically other. This would seem to be an ineradicable feature of our experience of ourselves as persons. In the very transcendence of all finite others that makes us persons, we experience a dependence in our cognitive and volitional life that shows us that we are finite too. Our very power of self-enactment is derived. This is simply the expression in consciousness of the metaphysical truth that although the existence of our personal powers cannot be explained as the result of impersonal causes (since these are not sufficient to explain their enactment), nor even of the causality of other finite persons (though they are necessary for their enactment), we are not ourselves their causes. Our existence as persons is caused. Thus as finite persons we are inherently oriented to what is other than ourselves but is also strictly infinite. As the descriptions disclose, the concrete form of this infinite other is the universal community of personal mutuality together with its enabling condition.

This orientation to otherness is also expressive of limitation though not the limitation of materiality. In scholastic terms it is expressive of the distinction in us of essence and existence. The limitation of materiality on the other hand is expressive of the distinction between act and potency. Human persons, because they are material, do not actualise all the potentialities of their essence. But the orientation to infinite being has another side to it. It does not only express our finiteness but the fact that we are persons. Impersonal beings are not thus open to the infinite. Thus, in this relationship at least, our very power of self-enactment is derived from a self-transcendence made possible by another. But this positive orientation to others remains a feature of the personal life of human persons resulting from their finiteness. It must be distinguished from that dependence on finite others that is the expression of their materiality.

Human persons are dependent on finite others as the descriptions show, and especially on other persons. In spite of a real independence of other human persons, both as finite and as material beings, we are also dependent on them,
both as finite persons and as material beings. We are dependent on them specifically as persons for the exercise and growth of our power of self-enactment. We are dependent on them as material beings (as necessary though not as sufficient causes) for our own existence as human beings.

Seeing materiality in terms of an intrinsic relation of dependence on other human persons turns out to fit our descriptions of interpersonal relations very well. Still, a critic might object that the simultaneous independence of and dependence on others which seeing materiality in this way does involve, is as contradictory as supposing that human persons are both spiritual and material in some more usual meanings of the terms. On the face of it that is so, but only on the face of it. The apparent contradiction here is precisely the same as that in the phenomenon of interpersonal causality as we described it, namely that freedom and influence increase in direct and not inverse proportion. It is also present to a degree in the idea that self-transcendence and self-enactment go hand in hand. If the descriptions justify the latter two, then they also justify the former.

If then, the notion of materiality can be fitted into our descriptions as an orientation to others, we can now try and see whether they can also yield an account of the fundamental unity of a human person.

If we attempt to find a formula that will characterise best in personal terms a human person, namely a finite spiritual and material being, we must proceed as follows: As spiritual we are self-enacting, but as finite we are dependent on others for the exercise and growth of this power. As finite spirits we are also self-transcending, both with respect to an infinite other, but also with respect to a positive relation to finite persons, since the activity most expressive of personal fulfilment was seen to be the love of others for their own sake. Thus a relation to otherness can be expressive both of finite spirituality and of materiality; in the first case it is a relation of self-donation and creativity, in the second it is one of need and dependence. Hence as a finite spiritual and material being this is the relation that is most expressive of our nature: the self-transcending relation with other human persons that is commonly called unselfish love.

If materiality can be seen as a relation of dependence on finite others of one's own species, and spirituality can be seen as self-transcendence towards others of the same sort, then it is the case that our descriptions provide us with support for a formula that will reconcile the spirituality and the materiality.
of human persons in this two-fold form of relatedness to other human persons. Thus to be both a spiritual and a material being might sound a contradiction in terms. The intersubjective descriptions of the relations between persons show, however, that in personal terms this is not the case. At least the formulae for spirituality and materiality fit the descriptions. Whether they fit the reality of personal life can only be determined by one's estimate of the plausibility of the descriptions themselves.

If self-enactment, which is the general formula for the spiritual, can, in the case of a finite person, express itself in a self-transcendence towards another finite person, then we have the necessary basis for the unity of a human person, in self-enactment itself. The orientation to others that characterises our materiality is founded on the orientation to others that characterises our spirituality. The fact that the one orientation is one of self-donation and creativity whereas the other is one of need and dependence, is precisely as it should be. The one is for the sake of the other; alternatively, they are related somewhat as means and end (I say somewhat, since I use this rather Aristotelian couplet impressionistically rather than exactly; of course in strict Aristotelian terms they are related precisely as matter and form!) And in this relation the end has priority in metaphysical terms. The positive orientation is the basis of the negative and not vice versa. The unity of a human person is a personal and not a material one, whatever that may be. For this reason it is probably best to define humankind in terms of spirituality rather than anything else. So "incarnate spirit" or "spirit-in-the-world" is better than "rational animal" all things considered, since it is possible to see animals merely in material terms.

3.2 Bodiliness

Before we leave the topic of the compatibility of the spiritual and the material in human persons, we should say something about our bodiliness. In this connection one must distinguish physicality from what one could call "corporeality". Clearly human persons are physical systems, in the sense defined in chapter two. The laws of physics do apply to us. At the same time, neither the laws of physics nor any conceivable complex of scientific laws can, in principle, account for the fact or the nature of our strictly personal activity. We have said as much as we intend to say on this topic.

Apart from our physicality however, there is another aspect to our materiality, what I have called its corporeality. I speak of human persons having the property of corporeality rather than of their having bodies. "Having bodies" is an expression redolent of dualism. At the same time the notion of a "body"
is big with materialistic confusion. If we are right about the spirituality of human persons then human bodies are not like any other animal bodies. We shall see presently why this is so. At the moment I want to stress that if our account of spirituality is correct we shall have to revise our way of speaking about human beings. Both physicality and corporeality are consequence of our materiality. And we have tried to interpret this in personal terms as a relation to otherness. As we have seen, human self-enactment is only possible in a relation of dependence on other persons. Yet the fact that it is self-enactment that is achieved shows that the relation is simultaneously one of self-transcendence into the personal life of the other, through personal knowledge and love. The fact that one's self-knowledge (and self-affirmation) is received is manifest in one's experience of the other from whom one receives it as their corporeality. Their self-knowledge (and self-affirmation) exists for us only in the form of corporeality. We are speaking of the well-known phenomenon whereby knowledge of another is gained only through the senses. We see what they are feeling; we listen to their thoughts. Corporeality is the way in which the strictly personal life of a human person is present for another, and indeed for himself in his own reflections.

It can thus be clearly seen that corporeality is different from physicality. We are not considering another person simply as subject to physical laws but as a person. So his corporeality is he, but as he exists for a human person, whether himself or another. Corporeality is thus different from physicality in that it implies an inherent meaningfulness. If a person's corporeality is the expression for finite persons of his personal life, then it contains meaning as an inherent component of its nature. Physical things as physical things do not. They are the referents of meaning systems that are applied by us to them. They do not contain their own meaning. To see this, one need only compare the notion of a physical thing with that of a word. Human corporeality contains meaning as a word does. A word is also a physical thing (either a sound or a mark with a certain colour), but it is not only a physical thing. Language however, derives its meaningfulness from human corporeality. Words do not contain meaning as inherently as persons do. So speech is the utterance of meaning in its fullness. The meaning of words is the meaning they have within the language. But the language is the product of persons as an extension of their corporeality. Meaning is always meaning for a person. And language as such is not a person. Nevertheless it is probably a fair approximation to compare human corporeality to a word. What we sense when we are in the presence of another person is the total context and foundation of meaningfulness in any possible cultural product, language, art or whatever. Culture as a whole is an
articulation in bits and pieces of this simple spiritual totality that is present in every person's corporeality. And it is never complete.

For this reason the corporeality of persons is different from that of other material objects that are present to us. I speak now of natural and not of cultural objects, which are, of course, containers of human meaning insofar as they are extensions of human corporeality. The whole natural world, in its continuity with human corporeality, that is to say, in its presence as a whole to us and not just abstractly considered as a physical system, can be regarded as a sort of unconscious or pre-conscious of the world of persons. It is of course present in our cultural products in a transformed state, as the medium of our personal expression, but by itself it provides a world of images to make the thoughts of persons possible.

This whole way of thinking is in fact a reversal of what is common to both ordinary thought and to scientific thought alike. It is based on the priority of ourselves as objects of awareness rather than taking for granted an extroverted consciousness of the world with ourselves as one particular class of things in it. We can come to know the world and ourselves like that but it is neither the primary nor the foundational perspective that we have on reality. That is the perspective that led to the definition of a man as a rational animal and also to the development of the scientific consciousness that sees him as ultimately only a physical system. The two definitions are linked. Even Cartesian dualism is at home within this perspective, that of extroverted consciousness. It simply introduces a mythical corrective (the "ghost" in the machine) but does not by that undo the extroversion nor get back to a proper awareness of our spirituality. Indeed this sort of extroversion is a perpetual possibility for beings that are material as well as spiritual. It is the foundation of all myth-making. We try to give a material form to our spirituality. We can do this because we are spiritual. But in doing this we put ourselves, in imagination, outside the world. The appetitive correlate of this cognitive move is to make ourselves owners of the world. In our mind's eye we look down on the whole of the world, with ourselves in it. In our ambition we control the whole of the world, and our own destinies in it. Our spirituality makes this myth-making a perpetual possibility. Our materiality is simply the inevitable form that the myth must take, that and its ghostly partner.

4. Summary of Conclusions

We have now come to the end of our attempt to give a philosophical analysis of intersubjectivity as manifestation of the spiritual nature of persons. We must briefly summarise our conclusions.
1. The three descriptions of intersubjectivity do manifest the spiritual nature of persons. Whether or not they constitute a proof of spirituality in their own right is a question we will not attempt to answer. The connections between the phenomena of intersubjective relations and the notion of spirituality would seem to lack the tightness that could support a rigorous proof. Too much and too detailed interpretation is required. Nevertheless, the starting-points of each description would seem to be solid enough. Not simply that persons are agents, do grow, and are capable of unselfish love. But that agency involves self-consciousness and self-determination; and that personal growth is essentially a growth in self-knowledge and self-affirmation or, if it is preferred, in understanding and love of other persons; and finally that the goal implicit in acts of unselfish love is the creation of a universal community of personal mutuality. These assertions seem to us able to be argued for in a way quite in accordance with normal canons of rationality. In other words, they are all probably true. Insofar as they are, and the spirituality of persons is what makes them possible, then the spirituality of persons is a fact.

2. If the descriptions of intersubjectivity do in some sense show that persons are spiritual, then the most important purpose of this study has been achieved. There is of course a sense in which Rahner's analysis of cognition is a proof of spirituality, and a more rigorous one than anything in our descriptions. As indeed is that of Aquinas, and that of Lewis too. Taken together the work of Rahner, Aquinas, and Lewis, constitute an extremely powerful argument against contemporary materialism. There is a sense in which our own conclusions have not added to that but rather have borrowed from its strength. On the other hand by means of our descriptions we have presented the spiritual in a slightly novel way. As Macmurray might say, we have presented a new "form" of the spiritual. Even defining the spiritual in terms of self-enactment is a move away from old categories of thought. It is certainly a move away from the "ghost". Of course writers such as Rahner have already done that. But to derive the notion of self-enactment as we have done from the phenomena of intersubjectivity rather than from a metaphysical analysis of cognition does serve to situate it in a new context and even to give it a somewhat new content. It is brought closer to the world of the human sciences and the materialist milieu.

So if it is said of us that in revealing the spirituality of persons we have changed the notion of what it is to be spiritual we shall not object. As long as the notion of self-enactment as we have defined it can stand we shall be
satisfied. It does we feel embody a more properly personal notion of spirituality, one that has been derived from that situation where persons are most fully in act, namely in personal relations with other persons.

3. If what has been said above is true, then another objective has also been achieved, namely the reconciliation of the two traditions of thought about persons. In discovering in the phenomena of intersubjectivity, the self enactment of persons, we have reconciled the traditional notion of the spiritual with the insight of modern anthropology that "person" is a relational and a cultural notion. Our descriptions show that the social relations of persons, which of course are a cultural reality and indeed the foundational cultural reality, emanate from a natural capacity that is adequate to explain them in all that seems furthest removed from anything we might share with the animals.

In achieving this reconciliation, our notion of self-enactment has broken with the dualism that has, since Descartes, characterised the "spiritual" tradition of thought about human persons. The dualism of different substances is replaced by the duality of relation to self and to other in personal life. At the same stroke materialism is avoided. The foundation of the unity that is the human person is self-enactment, not relation to the other. It is the finiteness of the human person that produces the relation to the other, and it is there that the materiality of human persons finds its proper place.

4. In conclusion, we feel that our notion of spirituality as self-enactment makes possible a coherent picture of the human person that does justice both to our peculiar unity as well as the distinctive nature of our relations with others. With a notion such as this it should be possible to avoid both theoretical individualism and collectivism and the practical distortions of private and public life that depend upon them.
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