

SOUTH AFRICA AND PEACEKEEPING: THE CASE OF RWANDA

Hugo A. W. Basson

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Prof. W. Breytenbach

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

[Redacted Signature]

Date: 1998-02-23

OPSOMMING

Die studie beoog om die vraag te beantwoord aangaande Suid-Afrika se onbereidwilligheid om 'n aktiewe vredesmag beskikbaar te stel vir optrede in Rwanda, selfs nadat ander state Suid-Afrika om hulp genader het. Tweedens probeer die studie om moontlike alternatiewe rolle vir Suid-Afrika te identifiseer. Derdens, probeer die studie om gevolgtrekkings te maak aangaande die Suid Afrikaanse regering se beleid, rakende vredesmagte en die behoud van sekuriteit.

Die navorsing volg die konflik in Rwanda vanaf 1990 tot en met 1995/1996 om soodoende 'n basiese kennis by die leser te skep aangesien hierdie konflik die basis van dié studie vorm.

Rwanda en Suid-Afrika is albei ontwikkelende state en dus is dit belangrik om op sekere probleme te fokus, soos byvoorbeeld sekuriteitsvraagstukke. Vraagstukke betreffende militêre intervensie en publieke onmin, sal as belangrike gegag word. Daar sal dan ook gesien word dat meeste sekuriteitsvraagstukke in ontwikkelende state, sosiaal georiënteerd is.

Die rol en probleme van vredesmagte sal ook bespreek word aangesien dit een van die fokuspunte van die studie is. Gevolgtrekkings sal aandui dat groot vredesmagte nie noodwendig nodig is nie, maar dat koste die mees belemmerende faktor is.

Suid-Afrika het blykbaar nie die monetêre vermoë om sulke operasies alleen te finansier nie, en dus sal organisasies soos die Verenigde Nasies, die Organisasie vir Eenheid in Afrika en die Suider Afrikaanse Ontwikkelings

gemeenskap bespreek word, om dan ook te bepaal watter rolle hulle met betrekking tot byvoorbeeld finansiering kan speel.

Die vraag of ander organisasies ook 'n rol kan speel word ook bespreek. Op die oog af wil dit blyk of die antwoord sogenaamde Nie-Regerings Organisasies (NGOs) mag wees aangesien hulle oor sekere inherente voordele beskik.

Daar word egter geglo dat Suid Afrika nie in enige vredesmag operasies deel geneem het nie, as gevolg van interne druk soos byvoorbeeld die integrasie- en transformasieprosesse van die SANW asook begrotings beperkinge. Suid-Afrika beskik egter oor sekere positiewe kwaliteite soos byvoorbeeld 'n hoogs gespesialiseerde en professionele weermag asook oor unieke toerusting. Dus word daar geglo dat Suid-Afrika op hierdie voordele moet fokus en dat Suid-Afrika miskien in ander ondersteunende rolle betrokke moet raak, waardeur konflik gefasiliteer en opgelos kan word.

ABSTRACT

This study aims to develop an answer for South Africa's non-willingness to supply an active peacekeeping force to Rwanda, even after appeals from other states. Secondly, this research report aims to, at the same time, look at possible alternative roles which South Africa can play. Thirdly, it aims to make an assumption regarding the South African government's policy, regarding peacekeeping.

The research traces the Rwandan conflict since 1990 until 1995/1996 in order to convey necessary background information to the reader, since this is the case study providing the basis of the report's focus.

Since Rwanda and South Africa are part of the developing world, and this study concentrates on mainly security issues, it is important to focus on these issues. Security questions pertaining to the developing world such as military interventions and civil strife will be seen as major role-players. It will also become clear that most security issues, in the developing world, is civil/socially orientated.

The role, problems and usage of peacekeepers must also be discussed since this is one of the elements of the report's focus. Conclusions made will indicate that large contingencies of peacekeepers are usually not needed and that the main problem regarding peacekeeping over a prolonged period, is cost.

Since South Africa does not apparently have the budgetary freedom nor the wisdom to conduct such operation alone, certain organisations such as the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity, the SADC, etc. may play

leading roles in providing financial, technical and other support for such operations.

The question remains what other organisations may be utilised in support of peacekeeping operations? This is thought to come in the answer of the non-governmental organisation since they usually already possess a knowledge of the people involved, and are familiar with power distribution.

It is thought though that South Africa did not take part in any peacekeeping operation due to internal pressures, such as the transformation process within the SANDF and budgetary constraints. South Africa possesses some enabling criteria such as a professional and highly skilled defence force and some unique equipment. It is therefore believed that South Africa should rather focus on its enabling criteria, or even play a tertiary role such as using its charismatic political leaders in order to facilitate and mediate conflicts.

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CHAPTER 1

1.1 PROBLEM

Thousands and thousands of people were killed, maimed or left homeless in one of Africa's largest tragedies. Yet the South African government did nothing to prevent further conflict or to stop the ongoing conflict. This is notwithstanding that South Africa is one of the economic and military powerhouses of Africa south of the Sahara. It was only during July 1994 with "Operation Mercy" that the South African Air Force intervened. It used one of its Boeing 707's to ferry medical and food supplies for Rwandan refugees to Mwanza in Tanzania.

During the late 1980's and early 1990's one of Africa's bloodiest conflicts started in Rwanda, a central African republic. This was mainly an ethnic conflict between the "Hutu" and the "Tutsi" minority. With atrocities being committed by both groups, this conflict has taken the form of nothing else than genocide, yet several states, including South Africa, opted not to take any action. At present Tutsi rebels are also nearly in full control of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, thus threatening the whole regional peace and stability. South Africa was even invited by the Organisation for African Unity and the United Nation to take part in ending hostilities and monitoring peace in the region, but South Africa declined. It is believed that the reasons for this has to do with events that were taking place in South Africa, rather than policy constraints.

As mentioned, South Africa only went in to action during July 1994 when its air force ferried supplies to refugees in Tanzania. These took the form of food and medical supplies, but it can only be seen as a drop in the ocean if one looks at the total tonnage that one Boeing 707 can carry. Rumours also abound that the 707 also carried weapons destined for the region. During April 1996 South Africa

also donated R 12, 6 million to the United Nations to be used for peacekeeping operations in Africa.

This phenomenon is important, especially if one wants to predict further actions by the South African government in future conflicts that may arise in the region. Furthermore, it is possible to draw certain conclusions regarding government policy, although this is dangerous regarding that only one incident is analyzed. Furthermore, linking with the first point made, is that this phenomenon may give rise to a pattern with regards to the actions taken by the South African government with regards to possible future conflicts and peace operations in Africa.

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this study is not to analyze the Rwandan conflict itself, but to determine the South African Government's policy regarding peace-keeping. It is, however, still necessary to note the background regarding the Rwandan conflict. Thus the focus will be on the South African government and its reasons for non-involvement; especially with regards to the White Paper on Defence. Thus the main focus will be on South Africa's security system rather than the Rwandan conflict itself.

Certain questions may be asked at this stage, namely:

1. What role did the White Paper on Defence play with regard to the South African National Defence Force's towards committing troops and other personnel for peace-keeping?

2. What role did risk to people and equipment play in the decision? Was the South African government willing to lose equipment and the lives of its soldiers in order to restore peace and security in an "unknown" state?
3. What role did the transformation and integration process of the South African National Defence Force play? Did this hamper or advance the chances for involvement in peace-keeping?
4. What role did budgetary constraints play in the South African National Defence Force's decision not to get involved in peacekeeping?
5. What could this hold for future involvement by the South African National Defence Force in peace-keeping operations?

With regards to the above questions, the following assumptions will be used:

1. If security policy dictates an inward looking view of non-involvement, then involvement would be low.
2. If risk to people and equipment is high, then involvement will be low.
3. If transformation and integration have high priorities, then involvement will be low.
4. If available funds could be used more effectively and constructively elsewhere, then involvement would be low; or if financial resources are scarce, then involvement would be low.
5. If future involvement is dictated by the same considerations as in the

Rwanda case study, then future involvement will be low.

All in all, this study will aim to provide a scholarly study on the Rwanda conflict, but more importantly on the reason why South Africa did not want to be involved in the Rwandan conflict. Thus a hypothesis could be developed pertaining to the behaviour of South Africa. This hypothesis may then also be tested with regards to other similar future cases. This study does not, however, aim to develop the only answer to the phenomena. Thus further research will be welcomed with regards to this subject.

1.3 RESEARCH METHOD

The paradigm and type of design that will be used is the qualitative design. Five assumptions can be mentioned. This includes:

- The researcher is primarily interested in meaning. Thus how people make sense of their lives, experiences and structures.
- The research is descriptive, especially with regards to examples.
- The research is inductive.
- The researcher is concerned primarily with process rather than outcomes.
- The researcher is the primary instrument for data collection (Creswell, 1994: 145).

Furthermore, this problem is well suited to qualitative design because there is a need to explore and develop theory regarding this phenomenon of South Africa's reluctance towards involvement; available theory is still lacking and it is the view of the researcher that this problem is not suited to quantitative research methods. It is also important to mention that the type of design would be an analysis with a case study example.

All documents and data collected from these documents and other sources will be purposefully selected to cover only the Rwandan conflict, resolutions and other actions taken by organisations and states such as the OAU and UN, and

all information pertaining to South African security policy and its decision not to get involved. Gathering data will include analysing government and other official and public documents, keeping a journal during the study. (Creswell, 1994: 149).

The information will be sorted under different headings or categories during and after collection and when it is being analyzed. These categories may include general areas in the dissertation, i.e. Rwandan and the conflict, South African policy, new events, etc. It may also be sorted according to chapters in the dissertation, i.e. Rwanda: Past and Present, Security and Peacekeeping, etc. Thus the data will be reduced, interpreted and categorised.

A number of sources will be used to cross check data in order to ensure internal validity. Furthermore, the case study is also drawn into the study in order to enhance the internal validity. Lastly, generalizability of the findings will be limited as far as possible in order to enhance the external validity.

1.4 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

- **Peacekeeping** - This entails any military operation undertaken that does not resort to force through which hostilities are contained or terminated between or within states. Furthermore, the force has consent of all the parties in conflict in order to facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement (Cilliers, Shaw and Mills, 1995: 5) (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 29); (Williams, 1995: 87).
- **Peace enforcement** - This entails the use of or the threat of the use of force in order to force the parties in dispute into compliance with resolutions or sanctions that was designed in order to establish peace and order, in such a way that it complements the political process (Cilliers, Shaw and Mills, 1995: 52); (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 29); (Williams, 1995: 88).

Although the usage of Peace-keeping forms part of the conceptualisation, it will be discussed, in Chapter III, as part of security and peacekeeping in the developing world.

- **Humanitarian aid** - This includes all aid (monetary, food,

medical supplies and all other supplies) that does not contribute to the warring parties' efforts.

- **Involvement** - This refers to either peacekeeping, peace enforcement, providing humanitarian aid or involving one in the process of solving the conflict situation.

- **Non-Governmental Organisation** - This is a civilian organisation that is not owned or run by the government. For the purposes of this study, it will include only non-profit organisations.

- **Qualitative study** - This is a study where the writer uses the more literary point of view. This study involves more of a literary review than actual fieldwork involving questionnaires, interviews, etc. The writer also asks more questions in order to guide the reader. The research method is usually inductive in nature (Creswell, 1994: 42-44, 96).

- **Quantitative study** - This study method is usually more deductive. The dissertation is usually also written from the third person perspective and is more formal in composition style.

The writer will ask less questions. The researcher will usually make more use of questionnaires, interviews, etc. than literature (Creswell, 1994: 42-44, 96).

CHAPTER II

2.1 RWANDA: PAST AND PRESENT

Rwanda's were the Twa, or more commonly known as the Pygmies. During the 14th century the region (Rwanda-Burundi) developed into a highly centralised kingdom ruled by the pastoral Tutsi minority over the Hutu Majority. During 1896 the area became a German colony, and in 1916 it became a League of Nations mandate, and later a United Nations trust territory under Belgium administration. This was the Belgian administered Ruanda-Urundi or Rwanda and Burundi area (Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia, 1995); (Lemarchand, 1970: 48).

During the early 1960s the Hutu majority rebelled against the Tutsi minority demanding equal rights. During this period, tens of thousands of Tutsi's perished and the Hutu's seized power after abolishing the Tutsi monarchy with the support and help of Belgium. During this period more than half of the Tutsi population fled Rwanda, thus creating a large number of exiles. During 1973 Major General Juvenal Habyarimana took control in a bloodless coup. Under the new constitution 1978, Major General Habyarimana remained president. The new constitution provided for a sole legal political party, namely the *National Revolutionary Movement for Development* (MRND). The president and members of the legislation were elected for 5 year terms (Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia, 1995); (Lemarchand, 1970: 87, 88).

During 1990 an invasion began from Uganda into Rwanda by Rwandan exiles demanding political reform. This came in the form of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA). The Rwandese Patriotic Army mainly consisted of Tutsi exiles and/or their descendants which fled Rwanda during Belgium and Habyarimana

rule¹. This led to the ongoing civil war in Rwanda with the Tutsi RPA, backed by the USA, Britain and the United Nations, and the Hutu government, backed by France and Belgium.² The conflict has spilled over to Burundi and is now threatening the stability and peace of the region as a whole.

The 1990 invasion also brought about the adoption of a revised constitution in 1991. This provided for a multiparty system in which the military was prohibited from political activity and the president is limited to two 5 year terms of office.

Ever since 1992 the state was experiencing periods of peace/lull in fighting and periods of fierce fighting. During 1993 and 1994 fierce fighting broke out. During 1993 alone, an estimated 1 million people fled the capital of Kigali. During 1994, a second spate of fierce fighting started after the death of the two Hutu presidents Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryamira of Burundi. Both died when their aircraft was allegedly shot down on return to Kigali. By the middle of 1994 the United Nations authorised a peace-keeping force of over 2000 military personnel from 24 nations (Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia, 1995). A request was also sent to South Africa, but the government declined while the French government alone sent more than 2000 troops in order to protect civilians.

According to the World Fact Book (1996) the Republic of Rwanda is at current a land locked, Central African state with a total land area of 24950km². It shares boundaries with Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Democratic Republic of the

¹See also Overdulse, C.M. 1995. Die Rwanda Tragedie: Waarom dit gebeur het en wat ons daaruit kan leer. Instituut vir reformatoriese studie: Potchefstroomse Universiteit.

²Also see "Massacring the truth in Rwanda," in Living Marxism. Issue 85, December 1995.

Congo. Rwanda has an estimated population of approximately 7,6 million. The main ethnic groupings include the Hutu (90%), Tutsi (9%) and the Twa (1%).

The state is a republic with a presidential system. At current, key office is held by military leaders. This is a direct contravention of the 1991 constitution since this prohibits the military from political activity. For administrative purposes the state is divided into 10 prefectures including Butare, Byumba, Cyangugu, Gikongoro, Gisenyi, Gitarama, Kibungo, Kibuye, Rigali and Ruhengeri.

Approximately 40% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is derived from the agricultural sector with coffee and tea contributing 80-90% of all exports. The industrial sector is small, contributing only 20% to the GDP. The economy thus mainly focuses on agricultural and processed agricultural products. With the weakening of world prices, the Rwandese economy has contracted, resulting in heavy reliance on foreign aid. With this aid, its debt burden is still in excess of \$645 million.

Rwanda has a enormous military however, especially in the form of manpower. Approximately 1/6 of the population are involved. 1,6 Million males alone are combat ready. Defence expenditure are 2,1% of GDP (World Fact Book, 1996).

Therefore, it would seem that the rest of the international community believes that peacekeeping is the answer to the Rwandese problem, or at least, will create an environment in which peace may be achieved. This is evident by the fact that the United Nations authorised a peace-keeping force of over 2000 military personnel from 24 nations. It is therefore important to see what peacekeeping entails as well as how security is perceived in the developing world.



Figure 1. Map of Rwanda
(Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia, 1995)

CHAPTER III

SECURITY AND PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

3.1.1 SECURITY QUESTIONS

In the developing world, there are three "layers" of security, namely domestic, regional and global. The primary layer is domestic.

According to Mohammed Ayoob (1995: 16, 190) the main reason for domestic insecurities in the developing world, is the low level of social cohesion and regime legitimacy. According to these states, security can mainly be defined in political terms, i.e. state boundaries, state institutions and governing regimes. Therefore, if the concept of security is mainly state centred, it follows that political and other elites are responsible for defining and meeting the challenges to the state and regime. Therefore, the perceptions of these elites are also important in defining security. Therefore, it also follows that security issues will usually dominate domestic as well as foreign policies.

Therefore insecurity in the developing world can be seen as anything and anyone threatening the state, government and or elites and their regime. Therefore it is clear that security has a state centred connotation, thus emphasising political connotations. Thus in the developing world, insecurity can be defined as the threat of both internal and external vulnerabilities that threatens the state or political structures. Thus security in the developing world, does not merely involve military and strategic issues, but includes the whole political realm.

The Rwandese situation is clearly explained if one should use Ayoob's (1995: 190) definition on the existence of insecurities. Insecurity existed in Rwanda due to the fact that there was little social cohesion. There was a deepening ethnic polarization between the Hutu and Tutsi. Furthermore, there was a low level of state legitimacy and representation. This is evident in the fact that Habyarimana, a Hutu, declared his National Revolutionary Movement for Development as the sole legal political party. It was only after hostilities, that the political system changed to a multiparty system.³

Therefore, one can see that the broad cause for inter- and intrastate conflict in the Developing World is civil orientated. Since the intrastate conflict in Rwanda is used as case study, one can ask what is the main causes of intrastate conflict? This can be summarised as follows:

1. Military intervention

This usually takes the form of a coup d' état. The reason for this is that it is an appealing way for military leaders to get quickly and relatively effortless into power (Anglin, 1996: 8); (Mills, 1996: 24). These military interventions may sometimes also take on the form of large scale mutinies such as in Guinea during February 1995. It is however, sometimes difficult to distinguish between coup d' état's and mutinies.

2. Civil Strife

Civil strife usually take on the form of long drawn out, civil wars. Warlords are usually preoccupied with the pursuit of power. The tragedy is that it is usually innocent people caught in the middle that are killed or maimed. These civil wars may also result due to rebellions or secessionist movements which are in conflict

³ See Chapter V, Rwanda: Past and Present

with the government (Anglin, 1996: 10). Examples of states experiencing civil strife are Liberia and Somalia.

What role has peacekeeping to play?

3.1.2 ROLE AND PROBLEMS OF PFACEKEEPING

Firstly, there is no direct link between the international character of a dispute and the size of a peacekeeping operation (James, 1990: 362). Therefore, large peacekeeping forces may not be needed even in hostile, conflict ridden areas. In fact most peacekeeping corps consist of relatively small groups of observers.

It is further noteworthy that peacekeeping as an activity can be utilised in all types of conflict. The problem however is that peacekeeping operations demands long and constant periods of operations. The average peacekeeping operation lasts approximately 15 years. Less important situations may last less than 2 years, but as an average, operations exceed 15 years (James, 1990: 363). Thus, peacekeeping operations may also be prohibitively expensive in terms of supplies and equipment that have to be maintained and upgraded for long periods of time. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Syrian Golan Heights consists of 1 051 troops and 115 civilian staff members. Its average operational costs for 1994 to 1996 (3 years) were ± US\$ 33 million, for a total of US\$ 99 million over the three years (Neaman, 1996: 295). This is still one of the inexpensive peacekeeping operations around the world!

Another problem is that peacekeepers often find themselves in the middle of

conflict situations⁴, i.e. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia. Thus there is also a risk of bodily injury or even death.

One important aspect about peacekeeping operations, is that the disputing parties themselves are to a certain degree responsible for such operations. They have the right to request or decline peacekeeping operations. This requirement is basic both in political and legal terms. In legal terms, it is a fact that states, on account of their sovereignty are entitled to take their own decisions concerning their territory (James, 1990: 367). Thus one must have permission of sorts to deploy a peacekeeping force in a sovereign state. Furthermore, in order to achieve successes, the parties involved, must be willing to cooperate with the peacekeeping operation. In Rwanda, The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) had to be withdrawn after such a request by the Rwandan government during 1995 (Neaman, 1996: 294); (Williams, 1995: 91). However, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other peacekeeping operations are still active.

One can see that the main problem regarding, especially large, peacekeeping operations is sustainable funding. Other problems identified by Corum (1995: 120, 123) are the lack of relative intelligence and complexity of planning operations. With regards to the United Nations, this can be solved

In order to solve the above problems, Corum (1995: 127-130) suggests the following:

1. Enlargement of staff

It is necessary to enlarge the UN Directorate of Peacekeeping Operation. By

⁴Also see Betts, R.K. November/December 1994. "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," in Foreign Affairs Vol 73 No. 6

doing this, an Intelligence Section can be created which should lead to intelligence reports being analyzed and submitted with more accuracy.

2. Reorganising of UN doctrine

Corum (1995: 129, 130) argues that the United Nations should change its operational doctrine and develop it further so that procedures are created for the cooperation between humanitarian operations and non-governmental organisations.

3. Structuring Command

It is believed that the United Nations should during operations assign a single air commander as well as central headquarters. The commander and headquarters will have sole responsibility for maintenance, safety, scheduling, operational planning and airfields, instead of each contributing state controlling its own personnel (Corum, 1995: 130).

Therefore, it is felt that problems can be resolved to a certain extent, by restructuring the United Nations and to make operations more cost effective and coordinated.

How is peacekeeping used?

3.1.3 USAGE OF PEACEKEEPING

If a peacekeeping operation is scrupulous in being impartial and non-threatening in behaviour and all parties are willing to cooperate, such an operation can be extremely valuable in defusing and stabilising a situation. Since 1948, 75 such operations were identified (James, 1990: 368). Thus, there can be little question that peacekeeping is a valuable instrument in the maintenance of international peace. Peacekeeping may sometimes also have the effect of contributing to the development of demilitarised politics and political culture on both sides.

Thus peacekeeping is used in order to discourage armed conflict and to create an atmosphere in which differences can be settled. However, peacekeeping operations tend to be prohibitively expensive and may involve extreme risks to personnel, especially when caught between two still warring groups.

One important point to remember is that a United Nations Force could never be established under article 43 of the United Nations Charter. Thus peace operations involves contingents from different countries, which have an ad hoc agreement with the United Nations (Dugard, 1994: 309, 310). Reasons for this includes unresolved questions such as in which state will this force be based? What states would be willing to "donate" some of their professional trained military personnel for a independent reaction force? What will happen if members have to serve in their own states of origin? Will they not become partial to certain parties?

The question still remains wether or not South Africa opted not to send personnel or continuous assistance to Rwanda due to defence policy constraints. This will be answered in the course of the following three chapters.

CHAPTER IV UNITED NATIONS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Many regard the United Nations, although formed after the Second World War, as a continuation of the League of Nations. Pfeifenberger (1971: 19) argues however that the United Nations' roots can be traced back to three conferences. These conferences include:

1. The conference between Japan and the Third Reich during 1941. This negotiated the inclusion of Japan into the Third Reich after the Third Reich's anticipated victory, as well as the creation of a permanent world wide security system.
2. The conference between the China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during December 1941. In October 1943 another conference was organised, but with the participation of the United States of America (USA). These talks were also aimed at the negotiation and creation of an international security system. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics actually proposed a "organisation of peace loving states" (Pfeifenberger, 1997: 20).
3. During the same time period, negotiations and general talks were also continuing between the United States of America and Great Britain relating, yet again, to the creation of a world security system.

Although nothing concrete developed from these conferences, it led to the conference between China, Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America at Dumbarton Oaks during July 1944. This conference centred on negotiations in order to reach consensus on and design a new world organisation that would not be influenced by individual

states' politics and agenda's. This new organisation was also to be more effective and efficient than the League of Nations (Pfeifenberger, 1997: 20).

During the San Francisco-Charter conference it was decided that the organisation should include, as Pfeifenberger (1971: 23) describes it, an "Executariat". The functions of this organ was to include report on the peaceful adjustment of any situation which may threaten the general welfare of any state. This would include the settlement of disputes, restoration and maintenance of peace.

The conference decided that a organisation was needed that could maintain international peace and security and on the 24th of October 1945 the United Nations was "born".

Today, however, the United Nations does not only exist out of the so called "Executariat" or Secretariat, but out of a group of organs, each with its own objectives, goals and missions. These bodies include the General Assembly, the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat and the Economic and Social Council. Last mentioned does not have any specific roles regarding peacekeeping, and will thus not be discussed.

4.1.1 GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The General Assembly consists of representatives of all the member states of the United Nations. The basic goal of this organ is to provide a world forum.

Other objectives of this organ includes the coordination of other organs and functions of the United Nations. It also controls the United Nations, budget, elects the Secretary-General, new judges for the International Court of Justice as well as new members for the Economic and Social Council (Dugard, 1994, 298-301).

The General Assembly has, however, the very important secondary role of the maintenance of peace. By this is meant that all and any questions relating to international peace can be discussed in the General Assembly. These problems may be brought to the attention of the General Assembly member states and the Security Council. In due process, members present, may vote on these matters and if a two thirds majority⁵ is reached, a resolution concerning the matter may be declared (Dugard, 1994: 299). However, these resolutions are not legally binding on members states unless pertaining to admission, suspension or expulsion of a member, or the United Nations Budget.

4.1.2 SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council consists out of 5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent, rotating members. The 5 permanent members consist of China, France, Great Britain, The United States of America and Russia⁶.

⁵On general decisions taken only a majority vote is needed. Thus any decision not pertaining to the maintenance of international peace, the budget, admission, suspension or expulsion of members.

⁶Formerly the permanent members consisted of China, France, Great Britain, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). After the collapse of the USSR, Russia took up the position of the fifth permanent member of the

These members also have the power to veto any decision made by the Security Council. This especially comes to the fore with non-procedural matter where the votes of nine of the non-permanent members as well as the 5 permanent members are needed. On procedural matters, only the votes of nine of the non-permanent members are needed.

The 10 non-permanent members rotate with five members staying on and five new ones chosen by the General Assembly. The 10 members consist of 5 from Africa and Asia, 2 from Latin America, 1 from Europe and 2 from other states (Dugard, 1994: 302); (Ray, 1990: 444-445).

According to Article 24 of the UN Declaration, the primary goal of the Security Council is to maintain world peace and security. In order to do this, there are certain other important chapters and articles in the UN Declaration.

According to **Chapter VI** the Security Council are allowed to address matters not pertaining to world peace and security, according Chapter VII.

Chapter VII authorises the Security Council to take decisions according to article 25 in order to preserve and maintain international peace and security. These decisions are binding on states and can include the use of force. **Article 25** states that decisions taken under chapter VII are binding and must be implemented by states (Baily, 1993: 97-100); (Dugard, 1994: 304-306).

According to the above, the Security Council can make certain decisions pertaining to certain situations that threaten international peace and security. These situations are described in **Article 39** and include "...any threat to the

Security Council.

peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression..." (Baily, 1993: 101). These decisions usually involve 3 different types of reactions that can be used. These are:

1. Provisional matters - These include the pull out of forces involved, a cease fire or any other "provisional measures as deemed necessary" as described in article 40 (Baily 1993: 101); (Dugard, 1994: 306).
2. Non-military means - According to article 41, the Security Council can authorise member states to take non-military measures such as sanctions.
3. Military Measures - Article 42 empowers the Security Council to authorise air, maritime or ground actions in order to secure peace and security. According to Article 42, this may only be authorised after actions taken under article 41, had no effect in securing peace and security (Baily, 1993: 101, 102); (Dugard, 1994: 307)

According to **Article 36(3)**, states may also refer matters of legal dispute to the International Court of Justice.

4.1.3 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The International Court of Justice is based in Den Hague and all members of the United Nations, are members of the International Court of Justice. Non-members of the United Nation, such as Switzerland, can, however, also make use of the International Court of Justice. Only states can bring disputes before the International Court of Justice. Thus no international organisations,

multinational organisations, or individuals may present their disputes before this Court.

The international Court of Justice comprises of 15 judges, all from different nationalities. These judges are replaced every nine years by means of a system whereby a fifth are replaced every 3 years. Thereby 3 judges are replaced every 3 years (Dugard, 1994: 281).

All decisions are taken on a majority basis by means of a quorum. Nine judges constitute a quorum. The President has the deciding vote.

The main problem regarding the decision of the International Court of Justice, is that although they are accepted as binding, there is no means to enforce these decisions effectively unless the Security Council or General Assembly may act in terms of Chapter VI or VII.

4.1.4 THE SECRETARIAT

Of the Secretariat, the most visible member is the Secretary-General, currently, Mr Kofi Anan. The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly after a recommendation by the Security Council.

One of the aims of the Secretariat is to maintain international peace and security. Therefore, the Secretary General can, under **Article 99**, bring any matter threatening international peace and security, under the attention of the Security Council for further discussion and action.

The Secretary-General can also play the role as an arbitrator or mediator when disputes between members may arise (Dugard, 1994: 311).

Therefore, one can see that the majority of the United Nations' organs are geared towards the preservation of international peace and security. There are however, some stark criticisms against the United Nations. These include:

1. *The United Nations works on double standards* (Baily, 1993: 80). This may be illustrated by using South Africa as an example. Some of the strongest advocates against South Africa's policy of apartheid, had dismal human rights records themselves. Some of the developed states included in this is Australia and Sweden, as reported over some of the major international television networks. Australia removed Aboriginal children from their parents for placement with European people in order to assimilate and possibly destroy their culture. Sweden on the other hand, sterilised certain members of certain cultures in order to "create a better mankind". Secondly, some states with a worse human rights record than South Africa, was not subjected to the same severity of sanctions and other "punishments"⁷
2. *Unacceptable proposals*. In the past, it has happened that some of the organs of the United Nations, make proposals and resolutions that are not taken seriously, or accepted by all parties (Baily, 1993: 81). This is especially true in the case of Israel and the Middle East Peace Talks, where certain conditions were set that was clearly totally rejected by Israel.⁸

⁷ I am not contesting the actions taken by the United Nations and its organ, only arguing that it could lead to criticisms mentioned.

See also article Monnagotla, K. 1996. "The Naked Face of UN Peacekeeping: Noble Crusade or National Self-Interest?" in African Security Review Vol 5, No 5.

⁸ Ibid

- 3 *Polarisation of the United Nations* (Baily, 1993: 84). Although the United Nations Secretariat is comprised from a group of highly skilled people, it would seem, or the impression could be created that it is politicised. It could be exemplified by means of the fact that most of its current personnel was recruited after World War Two from mostly Western states. Secondly, Kofi Anan was appointed as Secretary-General, after the United States of America shifted its support from Boutros Boutros Ghali.⁹

Although these criticisms are mentioned, it still remains clear, if one should look at the United Nations record with regards to the preservation of peace and security, that it fulfils an important and invaluable role. It can, however, not fulfil this role and carry the burden alone. Therefore, it is important for regional organisations to fulfil or help to fulfil this role.

These organisations to be discussed in will include only organisations directly influencing South Africa. Thus only the OAU, SADC and other relevant institutions will be discussed.

⁹ Ibid

ROLE OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

4.2.1 INTRODUCTION

During May 1963, the Organisation of African Unity was created by 63 heads of state and other officials meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This organisation had the following purposes:

- the promotion of unity and solidarity among African states
- coordination and cooperation in order to achieve a better life for all in Africa
- the eradication of all forms of colonialism in Africa
- the promotion of international cooperation with due regard for the Charter of United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- to respect all African states' sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence (Červenka, 1968: 231, 232).

The issue explored here is what facilities were created in the Organisation of African Unity to facilitate conflict and peacekeeping?

4.2.2 FACILITATION OF CONFLICT

All member states have pledged to resolve conflict between themselves by peaceful means. Therefore, the Organisation of African Unity established a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (Červenka, 1968: 237)

The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration consists of 21

professionally qualified, elected members which serve a five year term before possible re-election. Any dispute may be referred to the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration jointly by the parties concerned. When mediation is the preferred option (usually with disputes), the President of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration will appoint one or more members to mediate the dispute. This must be done with the consent of the disputing parties (Červenka, 1968: 243).

There are strict rules as to what role the mediator shall play. These include:

- The mediator may only focus on the reconciling views and claims of the disputing parties.
- Written proposals must be made to the disputing parties by the mediator.
- If these proposals should be accepted by the disputing parties, it is stated that these proposals will form the basis for a protocol arrangement between the disputing parties (Červenka, 1968: 243).

If a conciliation is requested, the request must be submitted by means of a petition which is addressed to the President. This petition have to be undersigned by only one of the disputing parties. Prior written notice of this petition must be given to the other parties involved and the petition must include a summary explanation of the reasons for the dispute. When such a petition is received, a Board of Conciliators will be appointed. This Board of Conciliators will consists of members of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration as well as one representative from each of the disputing parties. The disputing parties may also nominate members for the Board of Conciliators.

The Board of Conciliators must bring the disputing parties into agreement by

means of clarifying the issues involved. The Board of Conciliators may undertake any inquiry and if it should happen that no agreement could be reached, then the Board of Conciliators will determine its own procedures, course of action and outcome (Červenka, 1968: 244). Finally the Board of Conciliators must draw up a report with regards to the outcome - whether an agreement was reached or not.

When arbitration is needed or requested, an Arbitral Tribunal will be established. This will be done in the following way:

- each of the disputing parties shall designate an arbitrator from among the legally qualified members of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration;
- the arbitrators will then designate the Chairman of the Tribunal. The chair is also a member of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration; if the arbitrators should fail to designate a Chairman, the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration will select a Chairman of the Tribunal (Červenka, 1968: 244).

The President may also appoint two additional members to the Arbitral Tribunal who do not necessarily have to be members of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. The President must have the consent and approval of the disputing parties.

It is stated that all parties shall find the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal final and legally binding. Usually hearings will be held *in camera* unless otherwise decided by the arbitrators. The arbitral award must be in writing and must also state the reasons on which it is based (Červenka, 1968: 244). When no compromise could be found, the Arbitral Tribunal will decide the matter according

to treaties between the disputing parties, international law, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity and the Charter of the United Nations.

4.2.3 CENTRAL MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION

During 1993 South Africa became a member of the OAU and therefore also a member of the newly established Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CMCPMR).

The Mechanism is composed of the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and the incoming and outgoing Chairmen. The Secretary-General and Secretariat forms the operational arm (Cilliers 1996: 15).

The Mechanism is in general committed to

- Close Cooperation with the United Nations in respect to peacekeeping and peacemaking
- Close cooperation with other regional organisations such as the SADC

Unfortunately, the Mechanism has not been extremely successful. Its most active area have been monitoring elections. Field trips have been undertaken to areas such as Burundi, Liberia and Rwanda in order to try and facilitate mediation between conflicting parties as well as to help develop early warning networks and to enhance the Mechanism's future capabilities.

Current problems associated with the Mechanism, identified at the 1995 OAU

Summit, includes:

- Delays in the exchange of information
- resource shortages
- absence of an African Rapid Reaction Force (Cilliers, 1996: 16).

One should remember that the OAU has decided not to include peacekeeping as a primary objective, yet it together with conflict prevention have been the most cost effective areas of the OAU.

Thus once again it is clear that this regional organisation, the Organisation of African Unity, has like most other regional organisations, a mechanism in order to facilitate conflict and friction between states. This is just the problem. What do you do if you have an intrastate and not a interstate problem such as in Rwanda? One answer may be that other, more regional organisations, such as for example the South African Development Community, or the Association of Southern African States, may be used?

Furthermore, how does one enforce one's decisions, especially in the case of the Organisation of African Unity which has no standing force. States will usually tend to abide by regional organisations' decisions, but how do you enforce decisions on warring groups or factions? The only practical way would seem to put monitors and other personnel such as troops in the area. Since the Organisation of African Unity does not have a peacekeeping or deployment force, it all comes back to the individual states who will have to donate some of their troops and other personnel for operations in restoring peace, stability and security.

Thus if all states should be reluctant to donate their personnel and equipment,

it could lead to grave consequences since the international and regional organisations will have no force for any operations.

CHAPTER V
PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION AND EXTERNAL
SECURITY STRATEGY

5.1.1 SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

SADC was formerly known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and was created largely in response to South Africa's plans for a Constellation of Southern African States (Department of Foreign Affairs Occasional Paper 1/96, 1996: 1). The SADCC consisted out of 10 member states which included: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Secretariat was and is located in Botswana and financed by subscriptions of member states.

During August of 1992, the SADC came into existence due to the change of emphasis from "development coordination" to "development integration". Thus the focus also shifted towards eventual economic integration and liberalisation of the member states.

Since August 1995, with new additions, the SADC consists out of 14 members: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Department of Foreign Affairs Occasional Paper 1/96, 1996: 2). It is also unique among other regional organisations in that it is the only body with a mechanism to manage regional security regimes, namely: SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (Venter, 1996: 174).

The SADC treaty is a legally binding and all encompassing framework by which the member states will harmonise and rationalise their policies. It also commits member states to the following fundamental principles:

- sovereign equality of member states
- peace and security
- democracy, rule of law and the respect for human rights
- mutual benefit (Department of Foreign Affairs Occasional Paper 1/96, 1996: 3); (Cilliers, 1996: 18).

According to the treaty, the main objectives of the SADC include:

- the achievement of development and economic growth; the alleviation of poverty and the enhancement of the standard of living in the region;
- development of common political values, institutions and systems such as
 - promotion of peace and security
 - self-sustaining development through self-reliance and interdependence between member states
 - complimentary national and regional strategies
 - maximise productive employment
 - sustainable utilisation of all resources (Department of Foreign Affairs Occasional Paper 1/96, 1996: 3); (Mboma, 1994: 110-112).

As noted earlier, the main difference between the SADCC and SADC was the switch from "development cooperation" to "development integration". The main areas targeted for integration and cooperation are:

- agriculture, food, land and security

- infrastructure and services
- finance, industry, investment and trade
- development of human resources
- environment and natural resources
- social welfare
- politics (Department of Foreign Affairs Occasional Paper 1/96, 1996: 4); (Mborna, 1994: 110-112).

5.1.2 ORGAN FOR DEFENCE, POLITICS AND SECURITY

On 18 January 1996 the SADC states' ministers of Security, Defense and Foreign Affairs met in Gaborone and decided to recommend the formation of the Organ for Defence, Politics and Security (ODPS).

It is proposed that the ODPS will replace the Front-Line States (FLS) and will abide to the same guiding principles of that of the SADC including:

- Sovereign equality to all members
- Peaceful settlement of all disputes
- Observance of Human Rights
- Democracy
- Rule of Law (Cilliers, 1996a: 1).

The main objectives of the ODPS is to include:

- Safeguarding the region against internal as well as external instability;
- Promotion of political cooperation between member states;
- Development of a common foreign policy as far as possible

between member states,

- Cooperation with regards to security and defence, including conflict management and resolution,
- The mediation of conflicts and disputes in the region;
- Instituting preventative diplomatic measures in order to deal with disputes;
- Collective peacemaking and peacekeeping in the region in order to promote sustained peace and security;
- Development of a common security policy;
- Collective participation between members with regards to peacekeeping operations;
- Addressing conflicts which impact on peace and security in the region (Cilliers, 1996a: 2, 3).

It is proposed that the Interstate Defence and Security Committee will be absorbed into the Organ. At this stage that does not seem to be likely in the immediate future. It is also proposed that the Organ establish either a small permanent secretariat, or be chaired on a rotary basis by member states.

According to Cilliers (1996a: 4) the SADC will have to move towards a system whereby various government bodies and departments can increasingly work together in order to successfully coordinate national policies on defence, security and other areas of importance.

According to Van Aardt (1997: 17-20) there are some problems regarding the organ. These include:

1. Lack of political institution

The organ plays heavily on the roles of diplomatic and political measures for securing the Southern African region, yet these are least developed. This is problematic since the organ currently "up and running" which creates the possibility that the organ may be negatively influence the organ as well as other security- and sub-committees (Van Aardt, 1997: 18).

2. Early warning

Although the organ is up and running, no mechanism for early warning, of possible threats to peace and security in the region, exists or are being finalised (Van Aardt, 1997: 18, 19). It follows that security issues cannot properly be attended to.

3. Lack of horizontal linkage

There is a lack of formal interaction between social and economic, and political and social wings, on lower levels within the organ as well as with the SADC (Van Aardt, 1997: 19). Thus there is hardly any interaction between lower levels which can and does hinder effective cooperation within the organ, and with the SADC.

Other possible organs include the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) as well as the Association of Southern African States (ASAS). Although lastly named is not operational anymore, it can still serve as an example of regional cooperation regarding security matters.

5.1.3 INTER-STATE DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

The ISDSC is a forum where ministers of Southern African states, responsible for public and state security, defence and home affairs discuss issues relating to individual as well as collective defence in the region. The ISDSC was established during 1983 as an aegis of the former Front Line States (FLS) and consisted of seven original members. During 1994 membership grew to 12 member-states with the inclusion of Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa and Swaziland (Cilliers, 1996: 21).

The main objectives of the ISDSC can be summarised as follows:

- Prevention of aggression from within as well as from outside the region;
- Prevention of coup d' états;
- Promotion of regional stability;
- Promotion of regional peace and security;
- Promotion of regional development (Cilliers, 1996: 22).

Based on its primary functions, the ISDSC's can be divided into 3 sub-committees including:

- Defence
- State security
- Public security (Cilliers, 1996: 22).

All three sub-committees' primary aims are to review and assess security and military activities and situations in the region as well as to recommend appropriate measures in order to deal with potential problems and threats.

Proposed possible future functions of the ISDSC may include:

- Promotion of common operating and planning procedures, as well as tactics where possible between member states
- Contingency planning
- Coordinate intelligence and related military activities in order to deal with possible threats
- Support strategic planning within the region
- Facilitate combined operations such as peacekeeping operations
- Participation in ASAS or any other early warning mechanism (Cilliers, 1996: 22).

During the ISDSC's meeting in Arusha during November 1994, it was decided that it will not immediately become part of the SADC or its Sector for Defence and Security, as envisaged by the July 1994 Windhoek conference.

Therefore, since the ISDSC might in future become part of the SADC, it is a separate and possible useful tool with regards to conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Again there is a focus on cooperative action rather than individual action.

5.1.4 ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES

During March of 1995 a meeting of foreign ministers, of SADC member states, was held in Harare. During this meeting the creation of the Association of Southern African States (ASAS) was proposed. ASAS will fulfil the role of a political arm of the SADC and will together with the Organ for Defence, Politics and Security, replace the now defunct Front-Line States (FLS). ASAS will, as the Organ and ISDSC be guided and abide to the SADC principles as noted

previously (Cilliers, 1996: 20).

It is proposed that the following objectives would apply to ASAS:

- Protection of people within the region against instability arising from either internal or external conflict
- Cooperation between members with regards to security and defence by means of conflict prevention, management and resolution
- Mediation of interstate and intrastate disputes and conflicts
- Promotion of democracy and respect for Human Rights
- Promotion of peace and stability
- Promotion of peacekeeping and peacemaking (Cilliers, Shaw and Mills, 1995: 55).

It was also proposed during the Harare meeting that ASAS will remain independent in its functions from the SADC, but will report to the SADC Summit.

It is said that South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe favour ASAS over the ODPS and ISDSC (Van Aardt, 1996: 16). The reason for this is that ASAS is rejecting the use of a more formalised structure of a Sector as proposed by the SADC, ISDSC and ODPS.

One can see that the idea of a peace and security as a cooperative regional venture is mentioned again. This is especially clear if one should look at the Organ, ISDSC and ASAS's objectives. All of these organs feature some form of cooperative security action.

One question that may be asked is how the SADC and its organs can get

involved in Rwanda when Rwanda is not a member state? The answer is simple. One of the SADC and ODPS's objectives is to protect the region (Southern Africa) from internal as well as external causes of instability. Tanzania is at this stage a member of the SADC and shares a border with Rwanda. Tanzania has to deal with refugees which puts a strain on its economy and thus stability. Furthermore, if the conflict should spill over towards Tanzania as it seems to have done in Zaire, it would lead to further regional instability as well as lead to instability within the SADC. Thus in short, since the conflict in Rwanda threatens the stability of the region (external cause), the SADC can act in order to eliminate this threat.

What does this mean for South Africa's external security strategy?

5.2 EXTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY

South Africa believes that for economic growth and development to thrive, peace and stability must be achieved in Southern Africa. In order to achieve this, South Africa is currently promoting some of its own foreign policy objectives, namely democracy, cooperation, freedom and a respect for human rights. It is also thought that South Africa should seek to strengthen security and defence forums within the region. Common security and defence arrangements, including the sharing of information, early warning of potential conflicts or crisis, joint problem solving and Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) should also be facilitated (Department of Foreign Affairs Occasional Paper 1/96, 1996: 6. 11).

However, it is believed that the focal areas of the external strategy should include:

1. Contributing toward peace, stability and security South Africa and Southern Africa's security are specially vulnerable to external economic conditions. This is due to the fact that the region's economy is largely depended on trade with other markets as well as foreign investment. In order to assure access to these markets and investments, it is believed that South Africa's diplomatic, intelligence and defence sectors can help to promote and protect national security as well as to promote, protect and establish new external ties (Department of Foreign Affairs Occasional Paper 1/96, 1996: 17).

2. Contributing towards international peace and security as well as stability. Priorities for South Africa, in this field, are:
 - Development and maintenance of the capability to participate or support multilateral peace support operations;
 - compliance with the international norms of trade of arms while still protecting South Africa's arms industry (Department of Foreign Affairs Occasional Paper 1/96, 1996: 17, 18).

It can be seen that South Africa wants to take part in peacekeeping and other support operations, but it would seem that this capability still has to be developed, according to the above. There is also a contradiction to a certain extent in the above. South Africa, like several other states, is willing to abide by international norms and laws with regards to the sale of arms, yet it wishes to promote its arms industry at all costs. Maybe this is one of the reasons why South Africa has sold tonnes of weaponry to the warring groups in Rwanda. This leads to a contradiction where states want to promote and peace and security,

but yet they sell tonnes of lethal weapon systems that undermine peace and security.

Mr Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs has said that South Africa needs to revise its decision to sell weapons to Rwanda since these weapons are now used to attack Zaire. Minister of Defence, Mr Joe Modise has admitted that South Africa has sold more than R80 million worth of weapons to Rwanda¹⁰ (Die Burger, 2 November 1996: 11).

In "Die Burger" (6 November 1996: 5) it was also reported that a commission has been appointed to investigate South Africa's arms trade with Rwanda. According to Mr Kadar Asmal, chairman of the National Committee on the Control of Conventional Weapons, South Africa has only exported troop carriers (armoured personnel carriers) to Rwanda. He denied that any other form of weaponry were exported to Rwanda.

If only troop carriers were exported, it could be argued that this was done in order to protect human life. However, if it is true that South Africa has exported other weaponry to Rwanda, it is difficult to see how this can be justified in the sense of promoting and ensuring regional peace and security. It can also do South Africa's image as a non-threatening "giant" serious damage.

3. Promoting regional security in especially Southern Africa South Africa's priority is to encourage cooperative problem solving as well as the prevention

¹⁰According to the United Nations, these weapons have usually entered Rwanda illegally by means of smuggling. It was smuggled to Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, from where it was smuggled across the border into Rwanda. Other states from Central and South America as well as South East Asia also took part in gun-running operations to Rwanda.

of intra- or interstate conflicts or crisis. South Africa will attempt to achieve this by means of preventative diplomacy, peace support operations and the establishment of operational compatibility within the region. Furthermore, in order to achieve this on a long term basis, economic development for the region will and must also be addressed in order to solve problems such as illegal immigration and cross-border crime involving crime syndicates (Department of Foreign Affairs Occasional Paper 1/96, 1996: 18).

4. Presenting a non-threatening and defensive military posture. At this stage South Africa faces no direct immediate military threat. Nonetheless, South Africa still needs to maintain an efficient and appropriate state of readiness should the situation change. Therefore, South Africa needs a core defence capability in order to protect its sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as its citizens against potential aggressors. Therefore, the National Defence Force must be transformed in order to be able to provide an effective and professional service, portraying a non-threatening, defensive posture, with less financial resources. This is hoped to enhance and encourage confidence and security building measures in the rest of the region as well and may include socio-economic roles such as elimination of illegal immigration as well as cross border crime by crime syndicates (Department of Foreign Affairs Occasional Papers 1/96, 1996: 18).

Thus once again it is stated, now by South Africa's Foreign Affairs Department, that South Africa is willing to participate in multilateral (not unilateral) military support operations. It is again further stated, that the National Defence Force will take a non-threatening defensive posture and will not only be primarily involved in military actions but also in socio-economic programmes. Two important points comes to the fore again, and this time from a foreign policy perspective, namely:

- South Africa is willing to militarily cooperate, support and take part in multilateral peacekeeping or other support missions if all other non-military means have been excluded.
- South Africa is still cautious since no effective operational strategy has been developed regarding the National Defence Force taking part in peacekeeping or other supporting operations.

However, according to Venter (1996: 165) for regional security regimes to be institutionalised in sub-Saharan Africa, several conditions will have to be met.

These include:

- a strengthening and sustaining of both national and intra-regional society;
- conceiving peace and security as a social and relational phenomena. This phenomena transcends all jurisdiction of individual states;
- development of necessary analytical and institutional capacities within a state and its bureaucracies;
- improving as well as expanding transport infrastructure and other communication networks;
- development of a regional identity at institutional as well as symbolic levels.

Some states have already taken certain administrative and institutional steps in

order to accomplish the above goals. These include:

- establishing schools of diplomacy emphasizing conflict resolution, mediation, conciliation arbitration and sustainable development;
- training police and military personnel by means of regional training facilities;
- building peacekeeping, peacemaking and monitoring facilities and capability;
- promoting regional conventions and treaties on the reduction and abolishment of arms and arms trade (Venter, 1996: 165).

As a member of the OAU's Central Mechanism for the Prevention and Management of Conflict, South Africa is committed to explore and develop ways of preventing conflict in Africa. During a workshop on African peacekeeping held in Harare during January 1995, consensus was reached that:

- South African policies on participation in peacekeeping operations will be guided the Department of Foreign Affairs, and not the Department of Defence;
- The South African National Defence Force is not an acceptable instrument for conducting foreign policy, including the settlement of disputes;
- Training cooperation whereby other African forces are assisted in equipped;
- Emphasis should be switched from peacekeeping operations to attainable conflict prevention policies (Cilliers, Shaw and Mills,

1995: 54, 57)

The above shows that South Africa has already started to move in the right direction. South Africa is currently building on its peacekeeping capacities and is promoting arms control and reductions in theory. Furthermore, regional training has been established. This is especially true of the South African Air Force which has become the training centre for most of the other Southern African states' pilots and supporting personnel.

It is clear that South Africa is available and willing to participate in any peacekeeping or support operations of its choice. The question however remains what role can South Africa play?

CHAPTER VI

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE POLICY

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In order to analyze the defence policy it is necessary to focus on all facets of Defence White Paper.

Security in the new South Africa is perceived not merely as a military or policing problem. It now incorporates political, economic, social and environmental problems. Security policy will also aim to achieve social justice, develop a safe environment and increase political stability (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 5). Therefore, security can now be perceived as an all-encompassing term with the security of people as the main concern. One can also see that the conceptualisation of security has moved away from a more Western perception (only military) to a more Developing World perception.

National security will also aim to promote regional security in Southern Africa (White Paper on Defence 1996: 5). The question now is what South Africa sees as Southern Africa. Where can one draw the border? What is interesting is that on the cover of the White Paper on Defence (1996), a map of Africa is drawn. This includes all African states south of Somalia, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Thus all African states except West Africa and Africa North of the Sahara. Thus if this is South Africa's perception of Southern Africa, Rwanda is included. Thus according to the above statement, South Africa must aim to promote security, which includes stability, in Rwanda too.

Furthermore, it is also stated that the South African National Defence Force

(SANDF) "...may be employed in a range of secondary roles as prescribed by law..." (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: 126). (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 5). Thus the National Defense Force is permitted to perform secondary functions such as aid relief, peacekeeping, even policing.

It is further stated that South Africa shall adhere to international law and that it shall seek national security also by means of promoting and maintaining regional security. South Africa is also committed to arms control and disarmament and will conduct arms trade in accordance with international law and norms (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 6, 21). The question can then be asked, why then did South Africa sell arms to the warring groups in Rwanda. Is this not adding fuel to the fire?

With regards to international law it is stated that the South African National Defense Force will comply with all treaties and other obligations under international law. This includes two broad headings, namely:

- the law against war, regulating the use of force;
- the laws of war, governing the conduct of hostilities.

There are furthermore, three exceptions when force or a threat of force may be used, namely:

- Under article 42 of the United Nations Charter states may use collective force in order to maintain and restore international peace and security, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council.
- Article 53 permits the United Nations Security Council to mandate regional organisations (such as SADC) to take action in certain circumstances.
- Under article 51, each state may defend itself individually or

collectively if attacked (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 8)

Therefore, the South African National Defense Force is permitted to take part in actions authorised by the United Nations, i.e. providing relief aid, controlling arms trafficking, clearing minefields, military training, etc. According to the White Paper on Defense (1996: 24) this is only permitted if all peaceful political efforts to resolve conflict, have failed.

South Africa believes that defense cooperation with other Southern African states are of paramount importance and are together with the other South African Development Community-states (SADC), committed to regional cooperation, especially with regards to peacekeeping and support operations. This includes strengthening and developing defense forums with the South African Development Community. It is also felt that these states should shape their political, security and defence policies in cooperation with each other and that it could be worthwhile to establish a small peace support operations centre. This centre can develop and coordinate planning, training, logistics, communication and field liaison teams for multi-national forces. (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 21, 22, 24). Thus creating a multi-lateral common security approach for Southern Africa. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter

It thus follows that although the South African National Defence Force are permitted to take part in international peacekeeping and support operations, the ideal is to form a multi-national peacekeeping and support force with the other Southern African Development Community states rather than to go at it alone.

What are the South African National Defence Force's constitutional provisions?

6.2 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The constitution provides the National Defence Force with the following functions:

- for protecting the Republic of South Africa's sovereignty and territorial integrity; thus defence
- "...for service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states..." (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 26);
- the preservation of life, health and property;
- maintenance and provision of essential services;
- cooperating with the South African Police Service in order to maintain and uphold law and order;
- supporting any state department for the purpose of socio-economic development and/or upliftment (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: 125, 126)¹¹; (White Paper on Defence, 1996).

It is clear that the National Defence Force does not have solely a military role any more, but also a socio-economic role as well.

6.3 SELF-DEFENCE ROLE

It is stated that South Africa will try to establish political, economic and military cooperation regimes with other states. This may include a common security regime, regional defense cooperation (most likely with other SADC states), as well as confidence-and security building measures. It is also stated that South

¹¹See articles 198, 200(2) and 201(2).

Africa will try to prevent, manage and resolve conflict firstly through non-military means such as diplomacy, mediation, arbitration or by means of an international (i.e. United Nations) or regional (i.e. Organisation for African Unity (OAU) or SADC) institution. The deployment of the National Defence Force is only seen as a last resort, when all other possible actions and solutions have been exhausted (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 27)

The preferred action is not to be involved in conflict and war, but rather to prevent it. South Africa therefore, will only turn to military means if all other "peaceful" actions and solutions have been exhausted. Thus one can start forming reasons why South Africa did not opt to send troops to Rwanda as part of a peacekeeping force, when first asked during 1994/1995.

6.4 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

According to the White Paper on Defence (1996: 29, 30), South Africa will fulfil its responsibilities towards peace support operations. It is further stated that the South African National Defence Force will be permitted to take part in either peacekeeping¹² or peace enforcement¹³. This involves not only the actual deployment of troops, but also the provision of equipment, logistical support, engineering services, communication systems and medical personnel and

¹²It entails operations where no military force is used. Furthermore, such operations carries the consent of the major disputing parties in order to monitor and implement any peace agreements (White paper on Defence, 1996: 29)

¹³It entails the use of, or the threat of the use of force in order to maintain or restore peace and order. This is preceded by international authorization; usually a United Nations Security Council Resolution (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 29).

facilities.

It is warned however that the dynamics of such operations are still new to South Africa and its National Defence Force. The National Defence Force was also busy with an integration process of all statutory and non-statutory forces.¹⁴ Therefore, participation will be regarded with a fair measure of caution. The National Defence Force is however investigating and developing appropriate doctrines, operational procedures and training programmes in order to overcome the problem of inexperience (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 30).

6.5 CONDITIONS FOR INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Five specific conditions are set for the National Defence Force, before it can get involved in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. This includes:

- There must be parliamentary approval. Although the president is the Commander-in-Chief of the South African National Defence Force, and can employ the National Defence Force in accordance with its function, he/she has to have the approval of the Parliament.
- Any operation must have a clear mandate and objectives.

¹⁴These forces include old liberation movements' military forces such as Umkhonto WeSizwe (African National Congress) and Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA) of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The integration process was finished by approximately July/August of 1996. Most of these members took early retirement from the SANDF by means of package deals. The SANDF is still busy with its transformation process however involving downsizing.

See also Harker, J. 1996. "Collaborative Security in South Africa," in Aurora Papers. Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data: Ottawa.

- The criteria for how and when to terminate such a mission, must also be clear.
- The United Nations Security Council must have authorised such a mission.
- Operations in Southern Africa should be sanctioned by the South African Development Community. Operations should also be undertaken with other SADC states, rather than conducting operations unilaterally. In Africa, operations should be sanctioned by the OAU (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 30).

The procedure whereby South Africa would become involved is a request from the United Nations will be directed through the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Government will then refer the matter to cabinet for a final decision, based on advice from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence (Cilliers, Shaw and Mills, 1995: 59).

With the case study, Rwanda, all the criteria were met, except that the Parliament did not approve any support operation. Furthermore, the support operations were sanctioned by the OAU since an appeal for help in the form of aid and troop deployment by this organisation, was sent to South Africa. It is also known that South Africa then declined to get involved. Little information could be found to indicate whether or not such actions were sanctioned by the SADC at the time of the first appeals.

It must also be remembered that the above is seen as one of the National Defence Force's secondary functions. Its primary function is still the defence of South Africa and the protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and its citizens.

6.6 BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS

This section is included, since this is a vital consideration with regards to the scope and size of the National Defence Force's operations.

Defence budgets are usually the product of a number of considerations, namely:

- wealth and size of the state;
- competing demands on resources, especially financial, between different sectors of government;
- prevailing and projected threats;
- actual and anticipated role of the National Defence Force (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 39).

Currently South Africa is busy with a number of socio-economic development and upliftment programmes under the auspices of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). These programmes requires a great amount of especially financial resources. It is also generally believed that if these programmes, such as housing, is not provided, domestic conflict and instability will be generated. Thus it follows that already the National Defence Force and other governmental departments are in fierce competition for financial resources. Furthermore, no prevailing or projected external threats are foreseen. These are perceived as reasons to limit the National Defence Force's financial resources.

On the other hand, there are certain reasons why the National Defence Force's financial resources cannot radically be limited. These include:

- The South African National Defence Force has to maintain a long-term capability in which it can fulfil its primary objective.
- The National Defence Force's is regarded as a modern technologically advanced military force and this should be

maintained.

- The domestic support operation of the South African Police Service, necessitates the ability, and the retention of it, to mobilise substantial numbers of troops when necessary.
- South Africa is expected to play a vital role in the region with regards to military co-operation and peace support operations. Thus financial resources are needed in order to fund this.
- The National Defence Force is still busy with a process of downsizing and rationalisation. In order for this to be a success, adequate funding is needed.
- The budget has already been cut by 50%. This is already putting a significant strain on current resources and capabilities (White Paper on Defence, 1996: 40).

Therefore it is clear that there are reasons for decreasing as well as increasing the National Defence Force's financial resources. It would actually be interesting to look at actual facts and figures of the South African National Defence Force.

6.7 SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE: FACTS AND FIGURES

According to Lunn (1995: 896) the National Defence Force's personnel totalled 78 500 during 1994. The budget for the same year totalled R14 200 million.

According to Neaman (1996: 264, 265) The total armed forces have a strength of $\pm 137\ 900$ active personnel. Over the next three years, the total strength will be reduced to $\pm 91\ 000$. A total of $\pm 550\ 700$ reserves exists, with 435 000 from the Army, 1 700 from the Navy, 20 000 from the Air Force and $\pm 76\ 000$ commandos.

The Army's equipment include:

- $\pm 118\ 000$ active soldiers
- $\pm 4\ 670$ Main Battle Tanks (MBT's), Armed Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFV's), Armed Reconnaissance Vehicles (ARV's) and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC's)
- ± 730 towed and self-propelled artillery pieces as well as Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRL's)
- over 4 000 mortars and air defence weaponry.

The Navy's equipment include:

- $\pm 5\ 500$ active personnel members
- 3 submarines
- 12 coastal patrol and combat craft
- 8 mine countermeasures craft
- 8 support and other miscellaneous craft

The Air Force's equipment include

- 8 400 pilots and supporting staff
- ±245 combat aircraft including Cheetah, Impala and Mirage
- ±90 transport and liaison aircraft
- ±126 helicopters (Neaman, 1996: 264, 265).

Therefore it is clear that the South African National Defence Force does not lack equipment or personnel with regards to a peacekeeping operation. In fact it is clear that South Africa has quite a large defence force with regards to total personnel (active and non-active) as well as equipment. Therefore, equipment shortages or problems do not seem as legitimate reasons for South Africa's non-involvement thus far in peacekeeping operations.

The defence budget for 1996 amounts to ±US\$ 2,9 billion, or US\$ 2 900 million. The average cost of a peacekeeping operation varies between US\$ 7 million and US\$ 269 million. The most expensive is the United Nations Implementation Force for Bosnia-Herzegovina which is estimated at ±US\$ 5 billion for 1996 (Neaman, 1996: 295-305). This is nearly twice the South African Defence Budget!

However, the cost of these operations are usually carried by the United Nations, unless a state voluntarily decides to contribute financially, as in Cyprus where Greece contributes US\$ 7 million and Cyprus a total of one third of the costs (Neaman, 1996: 296). The fact remains however, that any number of personnel that take part in a peacekeeping or support operation, must be equipped and transported to the area. This includes maintenance and fuel for vehicles and aircraft. During these operations, personnel's equipment must also be adapted to the conditions as well as replaced and, if necessary, modernised. The last

point is important, especially during long lasting operations¹⁵. With operations lasting ± 15 years one cannot expect personnel to be efficient and effective if they are using old, unreliable, outdated equipment. The costs of this is however not covered by the United Nations.

Therefore it can be seen that budgetary constraints can be a factor in South Africa's decision not to be involved. South Africa's National Defence Force is already under significant strain due to budgetary cutbacks. With a decreasing budget, the National Defence Force may not be able to transport and maintain a peacekeeping force as well as an effective and modern domestically based National Defense Force. Thus it is possible that in order to maintain a peacekeeping force, it could become necessary to cut back on the National Defence Force's effectiveness and domestic role due to financial shortages.

This however is not seen as major problem since the United Nations carries the majority of costs. If financial resources should become a problem, it is also possible to reallocate funds from other government departments as a stop gap measure.

Throughout its White Paper on Defence (1996), South Africa states that it would rather engage in peacekeeping and other military actions through cooperation with other Southern African states and bodies such as S/DC. This was discussed in chapters IV and V.

¹⁵Most peacekeeping operations have a duration between 2 and more than 15 years. On average the duration of such operations is ± 15 years. See Chapter III.

CHAPTER VII

SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE IN REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING: RESTRICTIVE AND ENABLING CRITERIA

7.1 INTRODUCTION

During April 1996, South Africa donated R 12, 6 million to the United Nations for use in aid of international peacekeeping operations. General Meiring, Chief of the South African National Defence Force also then stated that the National Defence Force will be willing to consider joining peacekeeping operations by the end of 1996 (Cilliers and Malan, 1996: 21). Up to now, South Africa has opted to utilise conflict prevention and management, rather than peacekeeping. Here the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Alfred Nzo, plays a important and practical role in his visits to Burundi, Angola and other conflict areas.

It is also known that Africa, especially from 1990 onwards, have witnessed renewed and mostly brutal civil wars. It is clear that African states and Organisations will have to accept greater responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution. This is in part due to an ever increasing reluctance of the major powers, such as the United States, to deploy troops in Africa.

The problem, however, is that the majority of African states lack the resources and experience to conduct peacekeeping and other supporting operations unilaterally (Cilliers and Malan, 1996: 27). The question now remains: if governments cannot conduct peacekeeping and other supporting operations, what other means are there for addressing international conflict?

One answer would seem to come in the form of Non-Government Organisations

(NGOs).

7.2 ROLE OF NGOs

NGOs advantage especially comes to the fore when one deals with violent intrastate conflicts, such as in Rwanda. The main reason for this advantage is that most NGOs possess an intimate knowledge of the culture, society and people (Marstein, 1995: 4). Thus they are also familiar with how power is distributed and conflict issues. Thus they possess knowledge that is useful, even important, when looking for solutions.

NGOs also help local authorities with knowledge- and capacity building by working close together and thus sharing information. However, NGOs have some major disadvantages. The first is that NGOs usually have preset and very specific values (Marstein, 1995: 5). This may impede their impartiality. Furthermore, due to this phenomena, their presence may not be accepted in the conflict area, thus limiting the chances of success.

Another major problem is that NGOs have often been present in an area long before the start of any hostilities. The problem is, that as soon as they get involved in peacekeeping, NGOs tend to lose track and sight of all other previous activities such as humanitarian projects.

Another problem that may arise, is one that was observed during the Angolan conflict. A South African Company, "Executive Outcomes", leased ex-South African Defence Force members, mostly ex-special operations personnel, to the Angolan Government. These people were leased as instructors and advisors.

The problem is that most of them became involved in the conflict itself as soldiers fighting for the government against UNITA. Although this company does not fall into the definition of NGOs as used, it still serves as an example of what should not occur.

Thus, although helpful, NGOs are not the ideal tool for peacekeeping itself. It seems that NGOs can be better utilised in supporting functions such as aid distribution. It is possible for NGOs to supply people with military knowledge to conflict areas. However, it is imperative that these people act as advisors or instructors in order to end or prevent conflict, and not as mercenaries involved in the conflict.

What role can South Africa play?

7.3 SOUTH AND SOUTHERN AFRICA'S ROLE

World-wide sympathy is declining for Africa due to donor fatigue, big business finding better investment opportunities elsewhere, and Developed states' governments becoming more reluctant to commit people and equipment to, especially, peacekeeping and other support operations (Cilliers, Shaw and Mills, 1995: 56, 57); (Venter, 1996: 30). A factor contributing to this is that after the end of the Cold War, African states cannot use their alliance to either the West or the old Communist Block, as political leverage. Thus it is clear that Africa will have to accept responsibility for security in Africa.

It is here that South and Southern Africa can play an important role with regards to regional peacekeeping. The reason for this is that regional organisations have

the potential to act as building blocks for a preventative "early warning system". These organisations include SADC as well as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). This, together with regional military cooperation could diminish the need for external assistance with regards to peacekeeping and other support operations.

It is clear that no state, including South Africa, can unilaterally provide stability and security which will lead to further development and thus stability.

According to Venter (1996: 31), if the United Nations should decide to delegate its role in peacekeeping to the SADC, the outcome can be predicted. An example of the outcome is Liberia, where peacekeeping, military intervention and banditry are synonymous. Thus it would seem that the author feels that peacekeeping in Africa by Africans can only be achieved with the assistance of the United Nations. His judgement can be interrogated by asking what about the relative successes the Botswana peacekeepers have had in, for example Somalia?

Thus it is felt that African armed forces should cooperate with each other as well as the international community. Venter (1996: 31) argues that a rapid reaction force should be created in order to deal with problems in Africa. The question remains which African states will be willing to "donate" troops for this and who is going to pay for this?

Thus the region must design and develop actions and strategies regarding peacekeeping in order to be able to multilaterally maintain stability and peace where needed.

7.3.1 Restrictive Criteria

1. *Transformation process* - During the time period after the 1994 elections, the South African National Defence Force has, and still is undergoing a transformation process. This includes the incorporation and training of members of armed wings of liberation movements such as Umkhonto weSizwe and the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army. Furthermore, positions not available to people of all races and sexes, are "opened" up. One example is the pilot and navigator training courses in the South African Air Force. Female and African South Africans are now allowed to apply and be trained. Earlier, before 1994, females were not allowed to navigate on nor fly military aircraft. All these programmes and changes coincide with the normal daily activity of the SANDF. Thus it could be assumed that attention and ultimately money will rather be committed and invested to these programmes and the transformation process rather than a peacekeeping operation out of the South African borders.
2. *Costs involved and the budget* - From previous chapters it is clear that peacekeeping needs a lot of financial input. The South African and SANDF budgets do not allow this. This is especially true if one should look at the SANDF's budget which is cut by Parliament every year. It is projected that the SANDF will lose R 700 million on its 1998 budget. Simultaneously, the Government has frozen expenditure levels to enable the payback of inherited national debt and is involving the SANDF in supportive operations of the South African Police Service in order to combat crime. Furthermore, the South African Government and NGOs are involved in the Reconstruction and Development Programme as well as other developmental and so-called upliftment programmes, within South Africa. It is thus highly unlikely that

South Africa will allocate funds for peacekeeping operations while relatively "expensive" projects such as the RDP is still a high priority (remember, a relatively inexpensive peacekeeping operation costs \pm US\$ 33 million/year which roughly translates to \pm R 150 million.)

3. *Experience/Training* - South Africa clearly lacks experience in peacekeeping. Probably the last United Nations operation South Africa officially took part in (excluding assisting UN members in Namibia during this country's election for independence during the late 1980's) was the Korean War during 1950-1953. One demonstration of this lack of experience could take the form of the infamous Peace-Corps which was established during the 1994 elections to maintain peace in the areas experiencing violence. Although millions were spent in training these people with the help of foreign instructors from Europe, they failed dismally. Firstly, problems flared up during training with trainees being disgruntled over conditions and treatment. Secondly, the unit could not achieve its primary goal and was fired upon and had to retreat many a time. Not long after it became operational, the unit was disbanded.
4. *Logistical problems* - It is a well known fact that South Africa possesses a relatively small air force and an even smaller navy. These two divisions of the SANDF will usually be responsible for moving equipment and personnel abroad (it is not viable transporting troops 3000-4000 km on roads). The problem is that with these divisions' relatively small size, their load-carrying capability is also relatively minute. If South Africa should deploy troops far outside of its borders, i.e. Rwanda, it may encounter logistical problems with regards to the movement of personnel and equipment.

7.3.2 Enabling Criteria

1. *Professional defence force* - South Africa's national defence force is regarded as one of the most professional and effective defence forces in the world. This is especially with regards to the army and its equipment and regiments for mobile land warfare such as mechanised infantry. Furthermore, most Southern African states send their personnel to South Africa for training and courses, such as pilots' training and other mechanical courses. South Africa's defence force also have invaluable combat experience which again could be used in the training role, not just for South African personnel, but others as well.
2. *Unique equipment* - South Africa possesses some unique equipment which was developed specifically for conditions in Southern Africa. These include anti-mine vehicles such as the Casspir and mine clearing vehicles and equipment such as the Mamba system.

If one should weigh the enabling and restrictive criteria, this thesis suggests that possibly South Africa should rather become more active in other areas of peacekeeping than the active role. South Africa could:

1. *Supply equipment* - South Africa possesses some unique equipment which could be used to protect peacekeepers and others. Especially useful vehicles could be the Casspir which is mine resistant and the Mamba which can clear a relatively large area of mines in a matter of seconds.
2. *Training* - Although South Africa may not be experienced in peacekeeping, it still has experienced and very qualified instructors in other areas. Furthermore, South Africa possesses a training area in the Northern Cape

which is large enough and isolated enough to carry out live fire exercises. In fact it is one of only three such areas in the world. Thus it could be used to provide necessary practical training even for other defence forces and even peacekeeping forces.

3. Role of political leaders - One should never underestimate the role of certain political leaders, in South Africa's case, especially President Nelson Mandela. These people can fulfil the role of mediator in order to get warring parties to negotiate or even to resolve conflict. The problem is that President Mandela retires as state president during April 1999.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS

During the course of this dissertation a number of factors have come to the fore.

This includes:

- South Africa is willing to commit to peacekeeping and other security operations, but is still cautious since no formal operational procedures or training procedures exists regarding peacekeeping and other operations in the South African National Defence Force.
- Most regional organisations have facilities to prevent, detect, analyze and solve conflict. The problem is that these facilities are set up and used to deal primarily with states, not with conflicts inside states. Another problem is that it is also difficult to enforce your decisions on different groups. States usually tend to abide by the organisation's rulings. Furthermore, none of these organisations have a force which can be deployed in times of crisis. They have to rely on their member states to provide the necessary equipment and personnel when needed.
- South Africa's attitude towards involvement in peacekeeping operations has changed. The reason for this will be later discussed.
- South Africa sees troop involvement as a last option after all other options have failed.

- Regional security cooperation can be beneficial to a region in terms of socio-economic as well as political terms. This may include greater stability which could lead to greater economic growth which could lead to human development.

The question still remains why South Africa did not want to get involved in any peacekeeping or support mission of sorts during the early 1990? The first question that was asked was whether or not defence policy played a role? According to the Defence Policy analyzed, there are no real constraints. The policy in fact promotes peacekeeping and other supporting operations. However, it does caution the National Defence Force not to be too hasty in committing themselves to peacekeeping operations since no effective operational plan or protocol exists at this stage with regards to peace supporting operations. Further, it also recommends that peacekeeping should rather be a multilateral process together with other states, especially SADC states, in the region. Therefore, policy constraints as one factor can be ruled out since it is believed that they did not have that a big influence.

The second question was whether or not budgetary constraints played a role? Although the average peacekeeping mission's duration is ± 15 years and costs total into the millions of dollars, it is believed that this was also not that big a consideration. The reason for this is that the United Nations pays for most of the costs involved in these operation. There are however hidden costs which will have to be paid by the individual states themselves, however these costs are not nearly as high as the costs for a average operation.

Did risk of life play any role? This is always a contentious issue. No one wishes to send people to especially another state to be killed or injured. This is one of

the issues that led to the USA's increasing reluctance towards supporting peace operations. The fact remains, however, that these people are professional soldiers. Soldiers are usually used to wage wars in which people are killed. Thus the risk of being killed or seriously injured is part of soldiering. Thus it could be said that the risk to human life and equipment did not play a role in South Africa's non-involvement.

What role did the transformation process in South Africa play? The evidence indicates that this is one of the reasons why South African soldiers were not committed to peacekeeping operations. During from 1990 onwards, South Africa has been going through a transformation process, from being a minority-ruled state, to a multiparty democracy. During the same time as the pleas for assistance, South Africa also underwent its first multiparty general elections. This was preceded by turmoil, including bomb blasts and killings. It is thus believed that the decision was taken to keep as much of the security forces in the state and ready as possible. The reason for this was to try and maintain order, peace and stability, for the elections, but also after it. After the elections, South Africa's Government as well as its departments, including Defence, started on a transformation and integration process. With regards to the National Defence Force, the defence forces of the old TBVC-states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei), as well as Umkhonto WeSizwe and Azanian Peoples Liberation Army members had to be incorporated.

It would seem that this was a time when the National Defence Force did not want to concentrate on other issues, such as peacekeeping, which were of relative lesser importance to other issues such as internal security and combatting crime.

It is believed that the transformation and integration process of the government departments was the reason why the National Defence Force was not used for peacekeeping in Rwanda. Thus the assumption can be made that if levels of integration and transformation processes are high, the involvement will be low.

If predictions could be made for future involvement, evidence points to South Africa playing an ever increasing role in peacekeeping and other support operation in the Southern African region and in Africa. It is doubted however whether or not South Africa will play a ever increasing role in international peace support operations, for now.

Costs and political factors suggest, that South Africa can provide better support services, such as supplying specialised equipment, providing training areas, etc. than actually committing personnel in an active peace-keeping role. Furthermore, South Africa can, and is believed, should use its leaders of stature, such as president Nelson Mandela, in order to act as a third party to conflict resolution, rather than to actively "keep the peace".

The following hypothesis could be made, at this stage, accordance with statements made in Chapter 1:

- If levels of transformation and integration are high in a state, then that state will not be likely to use its resources in peacekeeping and other support operations.
- South Africa will play an ever-increasing role in especially the Southern African region, but also in the rest of Africa with regards to peace support operation.

- South Africa will not at this stage opt to commit itself in large numbers to international peace support operations on other continents.

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