


NEPAD and Castells -

An interpretation of the NEPAD development framework in terms of the Network Society Theory

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Abstract

This thesis is an interpretation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development paradigm as explained in the policy document released in October 2001, in terms of Manuel Castells' theory of the Network Society. This research is simply structured into three sections: an explanation and criticisms of NEPAD, an explanation of Castells' theory, and a synopsis of correlations between the two.

The NEPAD is a development paradigm aimed at the socio-economic development of the African continent. It is envisioned to be a partnership between the developed world and African leadership to lift the continent from the depths of poverty, corruption and exclusion, in which it now finds itself. The document was created through a merger of the Omega Plan, the Millennium Action Plan and the ECA Compact. The main proponents of the initiative are Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflika. Although NEPAD has been well received internationally, it has come under severe criticism from African civil society. Concern has been raised that NEPAD will serve to further consolidate the neo-patrimonial state and existing elite networks through providing the requested funding; in this context the argument for increased foreign direct investment is especially questioned. The authors of the document are especially criticised for excluding civil society from the drafting process. Due to this lack of consultation, it is argued that NEPAD does not reflect the true will of the African people. The neo-liberal undertones of the document, the recognition of the process of globalisation, and Africa's resulting marginalisation as well as the threat this poses for global security are further points of critique that are explored in this thesis.

Manuel Castells provides an explanation of the new global economy in his theory of the Network Society. He argues that the dominant system today, is a result of the advances in information and communications technology (ICT) as well as the capitalist pursuit of profit. The new global economy is therefore not only the new dominant international economic system, but also the new historical reality. Against this backdrop, he proposes a Technological Marshall Plan which essentially is a call for massive technological investment into Africa to assist the continent to leap-frog the industrial age and connect with the new global economy.

There are several points of correlation between NEPAD and Castells. Essentially NEPAD takes the worldview explained by Castells as its point of departure. NEPAD then builds a development strategy in full coherence with the logic of the theory of the Network Society. NEPAD concurs with Castells on the role played by ICT in the process of globalisation. The disarticulation of space and time has led to an instantaneous, global expression of social and economic life, specifically in financial markets and the production process. The result is the inclusion of valuable people and assets into the global network, while the devalued are excluded. Both NEPAD and Castells argue that the current state of affairs is both morally wrong and economically and politically unstable. It is therefore, as both agree, in the interests of the developed world to engage in this new partnership. This thesis exposes fundamental correlations between the theory of the Network Society and the New Partnership for Africa's Development.

Abstrak

Hierdie tesis is 'n interpretasie van die "New Partnership for Africa's Development" (NEPAD) paradigma, soos uiteengesit in die beleids dokument wat in Oktober 2001 uitgereik is, aan die hand van Manuel Castells se teorie van die Netwerk Samelewing. Die navorsing is gestruktureerd in drie seksies: 'n verduideliking van NEPAD en die kritiek daarop, 'n verduideliking van Castells se teorie en 'n samevatting van die ooreenkomste tussen die twee.

NEPAD is 'n ontwikkelings paradigma, gemik op die sosio-ekonomiese ontwikkeling van die Afrika kontinent. Dit word voorgedra as 'n vennootskap tussen die ontwikkelde wêreld en Afrika leierskap, waarin die kontinent uit die situasie van armoede, korrupsie en uitsluiting gehelp sal word. Die dokument is 'n kombinasie van die Omega Plan, die Millenium Aksie Plan (MAP) en die ECA Compact. Die hoof voorstanders van die inisiatief is Presidente Mbeki, Obassanjo en Bouteflika. Ten spyte van NEPAD se goeie ontvangs in die internasionale samelewing, het die burgerlike samelewing van Afrika dit nie sonder kritiek aanvaar nie. Kommer is uitgespreek dat NEPAD net die belange van die neo-patrimoniale staat en die bestaande elite netwerke sal konsolideer, deur die voorsiening van fondse. In die konteks word die vraag vir die vergrote buitelandse direkte investering veral bevestig. Die outeurs van die dokument word veral gekritiseer omdat hulle die burgerlike samelewing uitgesluit het uit die ontwerp van die konsep. Juis om die rede word daar geargumenteer dat NEPAD nie die ware wil van die mense van Afrika reflekteer nie. Die neo-liberale ondertone van die dokument, die erkenning van die proses van globalisasie en Afrika se marginalisasie wat gevolg het, as ook die bedreigings wat dit vir globale sekuriteit inhou, is verdere kritiek waarna gekyk sal word in die tesse.

Manuel Castells voorsien ons van 'n verduideliking van die nuwe globale ekonomie in sy teorie oor die Netwerk Samelewing. Hy argumenteer dat die dominante sisteem vandag voorspruit uit die ontwikkeling van informasie en kommunikasie tegnologie, as ook die kapitalistiese strewe na profyt. Die nuwe globale ekonomie is daarom nie net die nuwe dominante internasionale ekonomiese sisteem nie, maar ook die nuwe historiese realiteit. Teen die agtergrond stel hy 'n Tegnologiese Marshall plan voor, wat essensiël 'n vraag vir substansiële tegnologiese investering in Afrika is, om die kontinent te help om die industriële tydperk te oorbrug en aan te sluit by die nuwe globale ekonomie.

Daar is heelwat ooreenstemmings tussen NEPAD en Castells se teorie. Essensiël gebruik NEPAD Castells se wêreld beeld as vertrekpunt. Daarna bou NEPAD 'n ontwikkelings strategie in ooreenstemming met die logika van die teorie van die Netwerk Samelewing. NEPAD stem ooreen met Castells oor die rol wat IKTs speel in die proses van globalisasie. Die verplasing van spasie en tyd het gelei tot 'n skielike, globale uitdrukking van sosiale en ekonomiese lewe, spesifiek in finansiële markte en die produksieproses. Die gevolge is die insluiting van waardevolle mense en bates in die globale netwerk, terwyl dit die wat in waarde verminder uitstluit. Beide NEPAD en Castells argumenteer dat die huidige stand van sake beide moreel en ekonomies verkeerd is, as ook polities onstabiel. Dit is daarom, soos beide argumenteer, in die belang van die ontwikkelde lande om deel te neem aan hierdie vennootskap. Die tesis lig fundamentele ooreenkomste tussen die teorie van die Netwerk Samelewing en NEPAD uit.

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Chapter 1

Orientation to the Study

"The disassociation between economic growth and social development in the information age is not only morally wrong, but also impossible to sustain"

Castells, 1999:12

"The imperative of development, therefore, not only poses a challenge to moral conscience; it is, in fact, fundamental to the sustainability of the globalisation process"

NEPAD, par.38

1.1 Introduction

The process of globalisation is a strong emerging force advancing the merger of independent nation states and distinct national economies into a single transnational political economy. Power is increasingly shifting to global institutions and corporations. As a result, whatever sovereignty governments in the developing world managed to obtain with decolonisation is now rapidly eroding. The dominant logic of this new system is now determined by the neoliberal model premised on the dictates of the market and the preferences of supranational organisations. Against this backdrop, states in developing countries, especially in Africa, are faced with a formidable dilemma: "There are compelling pressures, largely emanating from the international environment, to carry out free market reforms. At the same time, these reforms often produce social resistance and political turmoil at home" (Adams, Gupta, Mengisteab: 1999:2). Therefore, devising effective strategies for maintaining reform in the face of societal opposition is the single greatest challenge confronting these governments today.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development is the latest policy document to emerge from current African policy makers. Although there are several different perspectives in African development thinking, the paradigm proposed by NEPAD incorporates current thought about development in the international arena, specifically in terms of information and communication technologies, globalisation and the global economy. NEPAD sees itself as a holistic, comprehensive integrated strategic framework for the socio-economic development of Africa. It aims to provide a development vision for Africa, a statement of the problems

facing the continent and a programme of action. NEPAD is specifically designed to be the continent's external engagement strategy and is aimed at initiating an African emergence into the new economy. Not only is it a reflection of the way African leaders see the world, and their vision for Africa in this world, it is also a response to the marginalisation and social exclusion experienced by the continent.

It is important to determine the paradigm in which NEPAD positions itself. Since NEPAD clearly envisions African development in terms of its relation to the international political economy, it would be beneficial to analyse the document in terms of a theory of the global economy. The relevant field of study would be the dynamics of the international political economy, which is essentially a study of the interplay between the politics and economics, and the subsequent world economic order. However, as De la Mothe and Paquet (1996:277) point out, in light of the evolution of the new global economy, "the traditional international political economy (IPE) frameworks and the conceptual and the conceptual apparatuses that are now in good currency are not yet adequate to realistically analyse the complex questions at hand". It is impossible to analyse all the issues at hand from a simple economic, political or cultural perspective. "What is required is a more complex multidisciplinary perspective to get at the tonus of these evolving systems and to be in a position to begin the work of developing the interlocking and overlapping maps" needed to chart a comprehensive understanding of our new world.

Against this backdrop and the acknowledgement of globalisation as a new historical reality, James Mittelman investigates globalisation as an ascendant paradigm through which an investigation of the world can be undertaken. He argues that there is a debate between "*para-keepers*, observers who are steadfast about maintaining the prevailing paradigms and deny that globalisation offers a fresh new way of thinking about the world, and *para-makers*, who bring into question what they regard as outmoded categories and claim to have shifted to an innovatory paradigm.... At this time, as a paradigm, globalisation is more of a potential than a worked out framework. It may best be understood as a proto-paradigm" (2002:1).

Globalisation is therefore more clearly understood as a "syndrome of political and material processes, including historical transformations in time and space and the social relations attendant to them. It is also about ways of thinking about the world. Globalisation, thus

constitutes as set of ideas centred on heightened market integration, which, in its dominant form, neoliberalism, is embodied in a policy framework of deregulation, liberalization, and privatisation" (Mittelman, 2002:2).

In *"The Information Age"* (1996-1998) Manuel Castells plots the way the information technology revolution, centred around information and communication technologies, is reshaping the material basis of society. "Economies throughout the world have become globally interdependent, introducing a new form of relationship between economy, state, and society in a system of variable geometry" (1996:1). In the three-volume work, Castells offers an explanation of the origin and evolution of the new economy and its network logic while pointing out the dramatic social changes that are occurring along side it. His theory provides a valuable multidimensional perspective through which the world in its current state of evolution can be understood. The significance of such a theory essentially lies in its value for interpreting the world and then acting on that interpretation. How people, countries and continents function in this new world depends very much on their worldview and understanding of the system.

The motivation for interpreting NEPAD in terms of Castells is twofold. Firstly, *"The Information Age"* has received international acclaim for both its pervasiveness and scope in charting the new global economy. Anthony Giddens (1996) considers it comparable to Weber's *"Economy and Society"*. Secondly, there has been a series of interactions between Manuel Castells and South African President Thabo Mbeki, one of the main authors of NEPAD.

Thabo Mbeki (cited in Fleming, 1996:1) has remarked that "the continuing growth of the Global Information Society, as it is being termed, will have profound implications for African countries. Some fear that it will only accelerate the marginalisation of Africa, as the pace of growth accelerates even more and the gap between those who are linked up and those who are not grows larger. Africa's disadvantage is a function of its underdevelopment in general, and of the low density of telephone connections in Sub-Saharan Africa".

The President first announced the establishment of the Presidential International Advisory Council on Information Society and Development in February 2001 at the opening of Parliament. The decision to establish this Advisory Council was based on the realisation that

information and communications technologies are key drivers for growth of the economy as well as for socio-economic upliftment. During two meetings between Castells and President Mbeki, and a subsequent meeting between Castells and a Cabinet group, the tasks and composition of the Advisory Council (of which Castells is a member) was solidified. It was also during these meetings that Castells' 1992 proposal for a Marshall Plan for Africa and the development of the *Millennium Plan for Africa*, later known as the *New Africa Initiative*, and presently the *New Partnership for Africa's Development*, was discussed. The first meeting of the International Advisory Council was held at Lake Pleasant in George from the 20th to the 21st of October 2001 (Cloete, 2001:1-2). This points to the hypothesis that there may indeed be correlations between Castells' *Information Age* and Mbeki's NEPAD.

The impact of the connection between Castells and Mbeki must be investigated in order to determine the extent to which NEPAD positions itself in the paradigm explained by Castells. I believe an understanding of the broader context of the NEPAD worldview will firstly add clarity to the debate about the policy and secondly, may further explain the rationale behind the document by showing that its assumptions are based on a sound and widely accepted theoretical framework.

1.2 Rationale for the study

The African Scholars' Forum on Envisioning Africa held its first meeting in September 2001 to discuss governance, globalisation and sustainable development in Africa. A follow up meeting was held in April 2002, when 30 African scholars attended a two-day Forum designed to foster a critical interrogation of the conceptual basis of NEPAD. The concept paper for the forum highlighted the key questions to be examined. The first being: "the paradigm(s) within which the conditions are pitched and their relevance to and/or suitability to Africa" (2002:3). In the working document prepared by P. Anyang' Ngong'o (2002:1) the following question is raised: "Assuming that the main aim of the framers of the document is to prepare a 'charter' or a 'manifesto' or a 'platform' on which to develop Africa into a modern, prosperous and free continent, are the proposals made in the NEPAD document viable?We could ask an even more fundamental question: on what basic assumptions have the framers of the NEPAD document developed their ideas and how valid are these assumptions?".

In light of this question, I propose a study of the assumptions of NEPAD within the framework provided by Castells. In the prologue of *The Network Society* (1996:4) Castells explains his motivation for his thesis: "I believe, in spite of a long tradition of sometimes tragic intellectual errors, that observing, analysing, and theorising is a way of helping to build a different better world. Not by providing the answers, that will be specific to each society and found by social actors themselves, but by raising some relevant questions". Understanding globalisation, its processes, manifestations, and consequences, helps us identify and rectify its failures and negative consequences. Castells has outlined our new world and in doing so has paved the way for governments and civil society to identify social ills and design policies to address them. Against this background, NEPAD is an attempt to provide a vision specifically for Africa, in the context of globalisation and, in essence, to build a 'different better world'.

My thesis is a response to the question raised by the African Scholars Forum in the framework provided by Castells. It is an investigation into the similarities in worldviews of NEPAD and the theory of the Network Society.

1.3 Problem Statement

NEPAD is an attempt by a certain group of African leadership to provide the answer to Africa's development dilemma. My thesis aims to interpret the NEPAD policy document in terms of Castells' theory on the new economy. Castells' theory is taken as a point of departure because his ideas are widely accepted and acclaimed, and he is seen as the leading authority on globalisation today. Castells argues that there is a connection between the new socio-economic system and the generation of inequality and social exclusion on an unprecedented planetary scale. In order to address this inequality and exclusion, the new system must be understood. My thesis is therefore a focussed investigation into the assumptions of NEPAD (which aims to address the marginalisation of Africa) within the framework offered by Castells, in order to evaluate its understanding of the new socio-economic system. The perspective taken by this thesis can be briefly illustrated by the following questions: To what extent does NEPAD employ the network logic as explained by Castells? Do the objectives set out in NEPAD address the main "criteria" which Castells sees as essential for entry into the global economy? How does NEPAD envision making Africa structurally relevant to the new

world? I expect to find fundamental similarities between the paradigm proposed by Castells and the paradigm that NEPAD positions itself in.

1.4 Research Process and Methodology

Firstly, a review of articles relevant to the New Partnership for African Development as well as an examination of the document itself will be done in order to identify the assumptions it is based on. The second part of the research process will involve an in depth study of Castells' *The Information Age* in which the main theory is documented, as well as a study of subsequent articles by Castells and other authors on social exclusion, marginalisation and globalisation. This part will focus specifically on aspects of the Castells theory which are relevant to the interpretation of the NEPAD document. Thirdly, NEPAD will be interpreted in terms of the Castellan theory outlined. Lastly concluding remarks will be offered.

1.5 Significance of the Study

It is important to show that NEPAD has not simply jumped on to the IMF / World Bank ideological bandwagon. My thesis will show that NEPAD is in fact based on a sound theoretical construct of our times. Without vision there can be no leadership, NEPAD offers Africa a vision of the global system and her present as well as proposed position in it. It has enormous unifying potential which can only promote the development of the continent. Criticism from civil society is essential to the health of the process of African development. My thesis does not argue against the objections raised in recent debate. However, NEPAD has been hailed as the most significant document to be produced by Africans, it would be unfair to write off this plan simply because it's rhetoric is 'neo-liberal' or 'neo-colonialist' without an investigation into its assumptions.

Also, it is significant that Castells has accepted President Thabo Mbeki's invitation to serve on the Presidential International Task Force on Information Society and Development, which will assist the South African government to harness information and communication technologies so as to further advance social and economic development.

1.6 Limitations to the Study

This study is not intended to be an exhaustive interpretation and discussion of either Castells or NEPAD. It is very simply testing the hypothesis that there are significant correlations between the Castells theory of globalisation and the assumptions on which NEPAD bases its plan. Neither is this research aimed at discussing the viability of NEPAD or evaluating the policy's chances of success based on a political or economic analysis.

1.7 Framework / Chapter Outline

Chapter 2 will encompass an explanation of the background to the NEPAD policy document as well as an examination of the policy itself. This chapter also outlines a brief review of current debate and criticism of the policy and its position in African and global politics. Also, a reading of African political and economic issues is made in order to elucidate the dynamics of the African political economy.

Chapter 3 is an explanation of the Castells theory with specific focus on the nature of informational capitalism, the network logic of the dominant economic system and the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in the new global economy¹. It will explain Castells' redefinition of social development and his argument for a "Technological Marshall Plan" that will not only connect Africa with the global economy, but also serve to consolidate the stability of the new global economy.

Chapter 4 will be a systematic interpretation of NEPAD in terms of the Castells theory. Focussing specifically on: the acknowledgement of globalisation as a new historical reality, the emphasis placed on the role of information and communication technology as a means of development, the marginalisation of the continent and the need to defuse the threat to global stability and the redefinition the continent's identity in terms of the notion of humanity.

¹ The term "new global economy" used in this thesis refers exclusively to the meaning accorded to it by Castells in *"The Information Age"*.

Chapter 5 will focus on the possible differences between Castells and NEPAD and the constraints faced by NEPAD on both a domestic and international level. Lastly, concluding remarks will be made.

1.8 Conclusion

This thesis is a focussed investigation into the assumptions on which NEPAD is based. This research is undertaken from the viewpoint of the new global system explained by Manuel Castells in *“The Information Age”*. The main hypothesis is that there are significant correlations between the paradigm provided by Castells and the paradigm NEPAD positions itself in. The significance of such an investigation is to show that NEPAD draws on a valid and widely accepted social theory and is not simply a homegrown version of IMF or World Bank structural adjustment policy.

This thesis does not advocate that the neo liberalist position is correct or even preferable. It is however the dominant system in the world today and is set to be streamlined into an even meaner, leaner version of global capitalism. With the major players in the world as its proponents it is highly unlikely that this system will make a quick and quiet exit. Africa is as yet structurally irrelevant to this new world. It is now the time for African leaders to choose whether or not they want to engage with this new world. NEPAD is effectively aimed at reserving a place for Africa at the global table. The costs of integration will be high, for both the developed and the underdeveloped. But the costs to Africa if it does not integrate are so much higher. The alternative is a continent of raw materials for the developed world to exploit and a wasteland of humanity to ignore.

Chapter 2 The New Partnership for Africa's Development

This New Partnership for Africa's Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world.

NEPAD, 2001:1

2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the NEPAD policy document and the debate surrounding the document. The first section explains the background to the document, the evolution of the creation and marketing of the initiative. The second section provides an analysis of the document itself, explaining the main tenets of the initiative as well as offering a tentative framework of the paradigm in which NEPAD positions itself. The last section focuses on the criticisms and debate surrounding the document, with particular emphasis on NEPAD's reading of the current system of African politics and the implications thereof for the success of the initiative.

2.2 Background to the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development

2.2.1 African Development Paradigm

The origin of African development thinking was essentially born out of resistance to colonialism and the liberation struggle. The aim was not only to win freedom and self governance, but also to assist the development of the African people. Adebayo Olukoshi explains: "the promise of independence nationalism lay not only in discarding colonial rule and the broad-ranging exclusion on the basis of which it thrived but also opening up access to economic, social and political opportunities. In other words, the anti-colonial coalition was held together by the promise of freedom, unity and development. In this sense, the promise

was at the core of the post-colonial social contract that linked state and society in the post-independence period" (2002:6).

In a consolidated democracy, the state is the ultimate incarnation of civil society. However, in the absence of the traditional development of democracy, it was this social contract that formed the basis of the state-society relations. Immediately after independence, all African states engaged in the development and expansion of the social and physical infrastructure of their countries. Along with reasonably high levels of economic growth, when compared to the structural adjustment years, the post-colonial period up to the early 1970's constitutes Africa's golden years. However, political space and participation was constricted by the state's top-down approach to the national unity project. This approach was based on "the assumption that the objective of uniting the multi-ethnic and, in many cases, multi-religious countries of Africa after decades of colonial strategies of divide and rule was one which could only be constituted from above by the state" (Olukoshi, 2002:6-7). Along with slowed economic growth and the differentiation of opportunities for different categories of people, the post-colonial social contract disintegrated.

Due to the lack of a well-developed African civil society, a viable Africa-centred development paradigm did not exist. According to Herbert Vilakazi (2001:32-33), "this is the fundamental cause of the failure of development in Africa, and therefore the crisis in Africa.... No civilization can rescue itself, and move itself forward, using a development paradigm conceived, formulated, and developed by another civilisation, or by intellectuals of another civilisation". The absence of a well-defined development paradigm in a world embarking on a process of full scale globalisation provided the context for IMF and World Bank loans and accompanying structural adjustment policies.

However, the 1980's finally saw the emergence of indigenous development paradigms. Adebayo Adedeji cites five landmark strategies that illustrate the continent's development paradigm:

- The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980 - 2000 and the Final Act of Lagos (1980).
- Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986 - 1990 (APPER) later converted into the United Nations Programme of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development (UN - PAAERD) (1986).

- The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF - SAP) (1989).
- The African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990).
- The United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990's (UN – NADAF) (1991).

At the heart of these initiatives lie four cardinal principles, which must not be compromised if Africa is to truly embark on a process of sustainable development. They are: self-reliance, self-sustainment, socio-economic transformation, holistic human development and the democratisation of the development process. In this context Adedeji (2002:8) warns that "NEPAD should aim to let Africa loose from the noose of both multilateral and bilateral financial institutions rather than tighten it. It should not be predicated on the assumption that its goals will be unattainable without further tightening of the colonial umbilical cord".

The search for African identity in a new historical and perhaps alien reality has been one of the defining characteristics of the African continent since the colonial era. The worldview of the international arena is a predominantly western one, defining the logic of political, cultural and economic interaction between countries and peoples. Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, those who could develop technology and transfer it on a large scale to the rest of the economy effectively determined the new structure of society first on a national level and then in the international arena. It is in this foreign world that Africans firstly had to win their freedom and secondly define themselves in relation to it. Now in a rapidly globalising and changing world, it is this search for identity, a need for redefinition that has been the underlying project of the African Renaissance.

It is important to understand the structure of the evolution of the African project in order to emphasize that the New Partnership for Africa's Development is not simply an exercise in African neo-liberalist discourse, but rather a product of the search for African identity in a changing world. Whether the product successfully addresses this need and whether it does so in an appropriate framework, is open to debate. The issues of African political unity and African development co-operation and integration go back a long way in history. The roots of the ideas of political unity are found in the Pan-African movement and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). The ideas of continental and sub-regional development co-operation

and economic integration originate in the more recent Lagos Plan for Action (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1991). It is on these concepts that NEPAD builds.

Thabo Mbeki initiated the concept of an African Renaissance with his speech to the South African Parliament on 8 May 1996 when he declared, "I am an African". It was an idea that was quickly and widely accepted. Willie Breytenbach (2002:5-6) explains: "It also gained academic credibility. It came to combine the Africanist views about the reinterpretation of history and culture, as articulated by Pan-Africanists and African and Afro-American intellectuals with the imperatives of new partnerships. For Eddy Maloka (2000:1014) argues that the African Renaissance should be viewed within the framework of the long history of the struggle for the reawakening of the continent, and must be based on the historical and cultural heritage of Africa. Pierre Botha (2000:15-42) and Peter Waller (2001:1-10) argue that the African Renaissance is a survival imperative initiated by development - minded African leadership. For others it is Africa's response to marginalisation and globalisation (Godwin, 2000:4). The African Renaissance therefore captured many different visions of the continent and synthesised them into a single project...". Against this background, thoughts on African development formed the context for NEPAD.

2.2.2 Historical Background to NEPAD

The NEPAD document is the result of a merger of three initiatives: the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP), the ECA Compact for Africa's Renewal, and the Omega Plan².

The impetus for the MAP had its genesis at the OAU Extraordinary Summit held in Sirte, Libya during September 1999. The Summit mandated President Mbeki of South Africa (then chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement) and President Bouteflika of Algeria (then head of the OAU) to engage Africa's creditors on the total cancellation of Africa's external debt. Following this, the South Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77, held in Havana, Cuba during April 2002, mandated Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo (then chairman of the G 77) to convey the concerns of the South to the G8 and the Bretton Woods institutions. Realising the correlation between the two mandates and the fact that debt relief

² The section on the historical background to NEPAD is based on the information made available on the NEPAD website www.nepad.org. The information is taken to be accurate.

forms but one critical aspect of the overall development agenda for Africa, the OAU Summit held in Togo in July 2000 mandated the three leaders to draft a common plan to address problems of marginalisation, underdevelopment, conflict, disease, poor capacity and bad governance. The result was the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme. Although Bouteflika and Obasanjo were involved in the drafting, Mbeki was seen as the principle architect and promoter, especially since it was a natural outlet for his ideas on African Renaissance.

The Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Mr KY Amoako developed the Compact for Africa's Renewal, which was presented and discussed at the Conference of African Ministers of Finance in Algiers in May 2001. The end product, The ECA New Global Compact with Africa was based on the idea that developed countries would encourage the rejuvenation of African economies through aid, debt relief, and market access. In return, African countries were required to put in place political reforms to ensure that their economies would take off. The key role the Compact envisioned for itself was the development of a partnership with the donor community.

During the same time, "President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, announced his OMEGA Plan for Africa. This plan identified the need to develop physical and human capital as the prerequisites for sustained and balanced growth and argues for investment needs in priority sectors to be brought under the purview of a single international authority. The OMEGA plan had the same vision and objectives as the MAP. Both were inspired by the need to launch Africa on a path of sustained growth and development at the dawn of a new century and both were based on the premise that Africa must assume the primary responsibility for that effort". (Nabudere, 2002: 6-10). President Wade presented the OMEGA Plan to the France-African Summit in January 2001; it was formerly launched in June 2001 at the International Conference of Economists on the OMEGA plan.

During the 5th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya (March 2001) the MAP, the ECA Compact and the OMEGA plan were presented and acknowledged. The work done by presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo, Bouteflika, and Wade was endorsed and it was decided to integrate all the initiatives being pursued for the recovery and development of Africa. In the following four months, the plans were merged and referred to as the New African Initiative (NAI).

In its preamble, the NAI was stated as Africa's Strategy for achieving "sustainable development in the 21st century". The NAI was submitted and adopted by the OAU - AU summit in Lusaka, Zambia on 11 July 2001 as the new continental framework for development. This document was then adjusted into an investment document acceptable to the donor community and renamed the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in October 2001, at the first meeting of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (which was mandated by the OAU-AU to drive the process forward) (Nabudere, 2002: 6-10).

NEPAD's relationship with the OAU-AU is important in order to assert its status as an African owned and led programme. NEPAD presents itself as a clearly OAU-AU mandated process and markets itself as the socio-economic blueprint for the African Union to implement its objectives.

The African project has received widespread exposure in the international arena. In 2000, the MAP was presented by Mbeki to select elites during meetings with Bill Clinton in May, the Okinawa G8 meeting in July, the UN Millennium Summit in September and a subsequent European Union Meeting in Portugal. By November, it was ratified by the World Bank President during a special visit to South Africa (Bond 2002:6).

The advocates of NEPAD have had several opportunities to market the initiative abroad and because NEPAD acknowledges that it does not exist in a vacuum, it seeks to employ a networking logic by creating linkages with existing initiatives and processes.

During the G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy on 20 July 2001, NEPAD was endorsed unanimously under the "Genoa Plan for Africa". The Summit then appointed a committee to develop a detailed Plan of Action which was adopted as the "G8 Africa Action Plan" at the last G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada in June 2002 (The G8 consist of Canada, USA, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the EU³). On 10 October 2001, the EU Presidency, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission expressed strong support for NEPAD when they met in Brussels, with the

³ Although three European countries are individual members of the G8, the EU is also represented as a unified body on the G8 Committee of Personal Representatives.

Chairman of the African Union, the Heads of State of South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria and the representative of the Head of State of Egypt on NEPAD.

At The UN ECOSOC High Level Segment Ministerial meeting in Geneva on 16 July 2001, the UN Secretary General committed the UNO, its organs and institutions to fully supporting NEPAD. The UN will ensure that Africa remains on the global agenda and will assist with studies, capacity and resources in support of NEPAD. The Bretton Woods Institutions: the promoting presidents met with the President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of the IMF in February 2001, who endorsed the initiative. The Nordic States, Belgium and the Netherlands have all committed to supporting NEPAD expressed in the Copenhagen Declaration and the Skagen Declaration.

During the Preparatory Meeting for the TICAD Ministerial-level Meeting in October in Dakar, Senegal and the Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo in December support for NEPAD was expressed by development partners and international organisations. China has also pledged its support for NEPAD and stated a willingness to examine the incorporation of NEPAD into the Sino-Africa process. The USA has also expressed support for the initiative and will align the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act with NEPAD.

2.3 Overview of the New Partnership for Africa's Development Document

2.3.1 The Introduction

In the introduction of the document the motivation for NEPAD is argued concisely and clearly in eight points. It begins by establishing the political determination of African leaders to take charge of the continents' destiny through poverty eradication, sustainable development and participation in the world economy and body politic. The African situation is then compared with the prosperity of the developed world, implying that the current system is morally wrong and stating that the marginalisation of Africa "constitutes a serious threat to global stability". The document then states that the limits of the credit option have been reached and that there has been a reduction of aid to the continent. As a result something new must be done. The dire condition of Africa is then highlighted to emphasize the depth of the problem. A reversal of this situation is called for by "changing the relationship that underpins it". Paragraph six argues that the "resources, including capital, technology and human skills,

that are required to launch a global war on poverty and underdevelopment exist in abundance and are within our reach". All that is needed is "bold and imaginative" African leadership with a new global partnership. Africans are determined to be the architects of their own destiny and signs of progress and hope must be seen as proof of their determination. This section concludes by calling for support and partnership from the international community to sustain this initiative.

2.3.2 Africa in Today's World: Between Poverty and Prosperity

Due to Africa's marginalisation and structural irrelevance in the world today, it is imperative that NEPAD puts Africa back on the map. Section two argues why Africa is not only relevant but also important. It does this in a unique way, appealing not only to neo-liberalist, profit driven capitalist logic, but also to the aspects of humanity, identity, culture, responsibility and post materialist values that are shaping the social landscape today.

"Africa's place in the global community is defined by the fact that the continent is an indispensable resource base that has served all humanity for so many centuries" (NEPAD, 2001: par.9). NEPAD defines resources as physical, natural, human or knowledge assets. These resources are divided into four different components.

The first component refers to natural resources, specifically: mineral, oil and gas deposits; flora and fauna and the "wide unspoilt habitat". These resources have already been exploited by the world through mining, and agriculture and tourism to a certain extent. It is the integration of cheap labour and raw materials from Africa into the world economy that helped to develop western countries. The next three components attempt to redefine Africa's significance for the planet.

The second component focuses on the "ecological lung provided by the continent's rainforests, and the minimal presence of emissions and effluents that are harmful to the environment - a global public good that benefits all humankind". Africa's environment is still seen as unspoilt when compared to the developed world, NEPAD appeals to the environmentalist ideals of preserving nature. In paragraph 13 it refers specifically to the destruction of the rainforests by indigenous peoples as a means of survival to argue that "it is imperative that Africa be placed on a development path that does not put them in danger".

This formulation could be interpreted as a warning aimed at engaging the support of environmentalist movements and so gaining a powerful ally in the international arena.

The third component focuses on "the palaeontological and archaeological sites containing evidence of the origins of the earth, life and the human race, and the natural habitats containing a wide variety of flora and fauna, unique animal species and the open uninhabited spaces that are a feature of the continent". Here there is an appeal made to both African identity and universal humanity. Emphasizing the importance of Africa's status as the birthplace of humanity is fundamental to the attempt to make Africa relevant to the world.

Lastly, in a world where diversity and culture are celebrated like never before in history, component four emphasises Africa's contribution, the real potential of which remains untapped due to its limited integration into the global economy.

2.3.2.1 The Historical Impoverishment of a Continent.

Paragraphs 18 to 27 explain the main forces that led to the marginalisation of the African continent. Here it is argued that the impoverishment of Africa is mainly due to four reasons: the legacy of colonialism; the Cold War; the workings of the international economic system; and inadequate post-independence policies.

This argument is presented historically. Initially Africa was integrated into the world economy as a supplier of cheap labour and raw materials, which were used to develop and consolidate the imperial capitalist state. Along with colonial rule, which subverted traditional structures, institutions and values; the outflow of African resources retarded the development of manufacturing industries and the development of an entrepreneurial class. As a result post-colonial Africa inherited weak states and dysfunctional economies, which were further aggravated by poor leadership, corruption and bad governance. Together with the divisions caused by the cold war, the development of accountable governments was hampered. Structural adjustment programmes provided only half the answer and proved insufficient. Today, economic decline, reduced capacity and poor governance reinforce each other, pushing the continent to the furthest edge of marginalisation.

Sustainable development today is dependent on reforming African states, installing a culture of good governance and striking a partnership with the rest of the world based on the realisation that Africa has fed the development of the world at its own expense, it is only right that there now be an infusion of wealth to lift Africans out of the depths of poverty and despair.

2.3.2.2 Africa and the Global Revolution

This section presents the main points of the paradigm in which NEPAD positions itself. It explains the new global economy created by the forces of globalisation. This section is important since it provides not only a collective world view for African leadership, but also shows the world that the continent has a meaningful contribution to make, especially in highlighting the structural weaknesses which may contribute to the instability of the system. NEPAD draws greatly on the network logic embedded in the dominant economic system by showing the linkages between globalisation and economic prosperity in the developed world and the threat posed by the process of marginalisation, the implications of underdevelopment in Africa and the sustainability of the system as well as the planet, as expressed in environmental concerns.

The first three paragraphs focus on the new world system that is a result of the economic revolution that has been made possible by advances in information and communication technology. The implications of these advances are explained; highlighting that one of the most important effects of globalisation is its logic of exclusion and inclusion. The highly industrialised nations drive the process of globalisation, while many developing countries, especially those in Africa only contribute in terms of their environmental and resource endowments. This logic is extended to the distribution of benefits through awarding opportunities to create wealth to the included while further marginalizing countries that are unable to compete effectively. "In the absence of fair and just global rules, globalisation has increased the ability of the strong to advance their interests to the detriment of the weak, especially in the areas of trade, finance and technology" (NEPAD, 2001: par.33).

Africa's specific marginalisation is the result of structural impediments to growth and development in the form of resource outflows and unfavourable terms of trade, as well as failed economic and political leadership in many countries. Marginalisation is a self-

perpetuating cycle as "the low level of economic activity means that the instruments necessary for the real injection of private funds and risk-taking are not available, and the result is further decline" (NEPAD, 2001: par. 35).

One of the most important effects of globalisation is the increasing polarisation of wealth and poverty on a national and international scale. It is this polarisation that constitutes a serious threat to the sustainability of the dominant economic system. "The closing years of the last century saw a major financial collapse in much of the developing world, which not only threatened the stability of the global financial system, but also the global economy as a whole" (NEPAD, 2001: par.36). The rapid rise of the number of socially excluded people also contributes directly to political instability, civil war, military conflict, and mass migration. Increasing industrial production and the deepening of poverty contribute to environmental degradation of our oceans, atmosphere and natural vegetation, preserving this heritage is a global responsibility, and therefore poverty in Africa must be alleviated.

NEPAD also argues that the process of globalisation must be guided through national authorities, private institutions, and civil society; especially at an international level to create fair and just conditions, which allow Africa to compete effectively in the global economy and body politic.

2.3.3 The New Political Will of African Leaders

This section expresses the will of African leadership to commit to and foster the development of democracy, state legitimacy, good governance, protection of human rights, rule of law, accountability and transparency. The logic is that if African leaders adhere to these principles, they have a right to development and the eradication of poverty (NEPAD, 2001: par.43) and the world has a responsibility to help.

2.3.4 Appeal to the Peoples of Africa

The appeal to the people of Africa is aimed at the construction of a collective African identity based on the ideas set out in the African Renaissance project: self confidence, pride, self determination and self development. This section calls for the mobilisation of Africans to end marginalisation by supporting the initiative taken by NEPAD.

2.3.5 Programme of Action: The strategy for achieving sustainable development in the 21st century.

NEPAD describes itself as ‘a holistic, comprehensive integrated strategic framework for the socio-economic development of Africa. The NEPAD document provides the vision for Africa, a statement of the problems facing the continent and a Programme of Action to resolve these problems in order to reach the vision.’ The primary objective of NEPAD is to eradicate poverty, to foster sustainable development and to counter the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process; and to promote the role of women in all activities. (NEPAD, 2001: par.59-66).

NEPAD has stated the following goals:

- To achieve and sustain an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of over 7 % per annum for the next 15 years.
- To ensure that the continent achieves the agreed International Development Goals (IDG's) which are:
 - To reduce the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by half between 1990 and 2015;
 - To enrol all children of school age in primary schools by 2015;
 - To make progress towards gender equality and empowering women by eliminating gender disparities in the enrolment in primary and secondary education by 2015;
 - To reduce infant and child mortality rates by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015;
 - To reduce maternal mortality ratios by three-quarters between 1990 and 2015;
 - To provide access to all who need reproductive health services by 2015;
 - To implement national strategies for sustainable development by 2005, so as to reverse the loss of environmental resources by 2015.

(NEPAD, 2001: par.68)

The fact that these goals are measurable and envisioned within a certain time frame gives the Programme of Action a more concrete character, instead of merely paying lip service to the principles of development.

The expected outcomes of the initiative are as follows:

- Economic growth and development and increased employment;
- Reduction in poverty and inequality;
- Diversification of productive activities, enhanced international competitiveness and increased exports;
- Increased African integration.

The Programme is divided into three sections: Conditions for Sustainable Development, Sectoral Priorities and Mobilising Resources.

2.3.5.1 Conditions of Sustainable Development

- *The Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance Initiative* states that "African leaders have learned from their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development" and pledge to promote these principles individually and collectively (NEPAD, 2001: par.71). This initiative is divided into two parts: the Peace and Security Initiative which focuses on peacekeeping, reconciliation, early warning and the political and social vulnerabilities on which conflict is premised; and the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative, which aims to strengthen the principles of democracy, transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights and promote the rule of law.
- *The Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative* focuses on ensuring the necessary policy and regulatory frameworks for private sector-led growth, as well as building the capacity to implement programmes. This initiative also expresses the need for countries to pool their resources and enhance regional development and economic integration in order to improve international competitiveness.

2.3.5.2 Sectoral Priorities

Bridging the Infrastructure Gap

- *All Infrastructure Sectors*: "The structural gap in infrastructure constitutes a very serious handicap to economic growth and poverty reduction" (NEPAD, 2001: par.98). The plan specifically aims to focus on sub-regional or continental infrastructures in order to enhance regional co-operation and trade. The objective is to improve access to, reliability and affordability of infrastructure through increased investment.
- *Bridging the Digital Divide*: Investing in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs): ICTs, "driven by the convergence of computers, telecommunication and traditional media, are crucial for the knowledge-based economy of the future" (NEPAD, 2001: par.104). The plan recognises that intensive ICT development will facilitate and compound the effects of all aspects of development, specifically by accelerating Africa's integration into the global economy.
- *Energy*: Energy is critical as a domestic necessity and as a factor of production whose cost directly affects prices of goods and services and as a result competitiveness. It is essential for the development of ICTs.
- *Transport*: The objectives are to reduce delays in cross border movement of people, goods and services; to reduce waiting time in ports, to promote economic activity and cross-border trade; and to increase air passenger and freight linkages across Africa's sub-regions.
- *Water and Sanitation*: The aim is to provide water and sanitation especially to the poor, to plan and manage water resources, so sustain ecosystems, to support agriculture and to effectively address the threat of climate change.

Human Resource Development Initiative

- *Poverty Reduction:* The plan aims to "provide focussed leadership by prioritising poverty reduction in all programmes and priorities of NEPAD, as well as national macroeconomic and sectoral policies" (NEPAD, 2001: par.115). It is specifically focused on supporting existing poverty reduction initiatives.
- *Bridging the Education Gap:* This section highlights the fact that poor facilities and inadequate systems are the key problems facing African education. Building a literate and educated society proficient in ICT is essential to compete in the world economy.
- *Reversing the Brain Drain:* The plan aims to create the necessary political, social and economic conditions in Africa that would serve as incentives for expertise to remain on the continent. The plan also envisions scientific and technical networks that will "channel the repatriation of scientific knowledge to the home country, and establish cooperation between those abroad and those at home" (NEPAD, 2001: par.122).
- *Health:* A healthy society is not only a fundamental contribution to economic growth through productivity, it is a human right. The plan aims to reduce the "burden of disease on the poorest people of Africa" and to "strengthen programmes for containing communicable diseases", especially HIV/AIDS (NEPAD, 2001: par.123).

Agriculture

The current agrarian systems employed in most of rural Africa are generally weak and unproductive due to climatic uncertainty, biases in economic policy and instability in world commodity prices. NEPAD argues that an improvement in agricultural performance is a prerequisite of economic development.

The Environment Initiative

The core objective of the Environment Initiative is to combat poverty and contribute to the socio-economic development of Africa. The initiative focuses on: combating desertification,

wetland conservation, invasive alien species, coastal management, global warming, cross-border conservation areas, environmental governance, and financing.

Culture

Special attention will be given to the protection and nurturing of indigenous knowledge since culture is seen as an integral part of development efforts on the continent.

Science and Technology Platforms

The main objective is to develop a network of knowledge as well as a critical mass of technological expertise in order to support and drive the process of economic renewal and social upliftment of the continent.

2.3.5.3 Mobilising Resources

The Capital Flows Initiative

In order to achieve 7 % growth, Africa needs to fill a resource gap of 12 % of its GDP or US \$ 64 billion. NEPAD aims to do this in four ways

- **Increasing Domestic Resource Mobilisation:** Increased national savings, more effective tax collection, and rationalising government expenditure as well as creating conditions conducive to private sector investments are envisioned.
- **Debt Relief:** NEPAD will secure further debt relief for participating countries.
- **ODA Reforms:** Increased overseas development assistance is sought as well as reform of the ODA delivery system, to ensure that flows are more effectively utilised by recipient African countries.
- **Private Capital Flows:** NEPAD seeks to increase private capital flows to Africa, as an essential component of a sustainable long-term approach to filling the resource gap.

The Market Access Initiative

This section focuses on the development of the following sectors of the African economy. In each case, the document outlines the objectives of the sector and what is to be done at both

the African level and the international level. Here the specific dynamics of the partnership is explained. The sectors are:

- Diversification of Production
- Agriculture
- Mining
- Manufacturing
- Tourism
- Services
- Promoting the Private Sector
- Promoting African Exports
- Removal of Non-tariff Barriers

2.3.6. A New Global Partnership

This section (par. 171 – 185) explains the premise on which the partnership is to be based: a centuries old injustice has been committed against the continent and efforts must be made to rectify the situation. The global technological revolution needs Africa for the following reasons:

- Africa provides an indispensable resource base.
- A developing Africa with a growing middle class constitutes an expanding market.
- NEPAD creates great opportunities for investment especially in infrastructure, ICT and transportation.
- Africa holds prospects for public-private partnerships in beneficiation, agro-industries, tourism, human resources, urban renewal and rural development.
- Africa's biodiversity and unspoilt nature provides both a global good and a resource in combating environmental degradation.
- Africa has a valuable contribution to make to world science, technology and culture. Africa as the birthplace of humanity is especially important for the collective identity of humankind.

- The deepening of democracy and human rights in Africa will free resources dedicated to resolving civil rights and interstate conflict, so that they may focus on more rewarding endeavours.

It is argued that the world is at critical point in history, where the threat posed by the consequences of social exclusion is very real. The collapse of Africa threatens global peace and security as well as the dominant economic system (informational capitalism). The convergence of the global technological revolution and the unprecedented level of underdevelopment in Africa provides us with a historical ultimatum.

Negotiating a new partnership with the development partners is critical to ensure more efficient delivery of development assistance and better performance of recipients. Present partnerships will be maintained. NEPAD however envisions responsibilities and obligations of developed countries and multilateral institutions in the following areas:

- Conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as peacekeeping initiatives.
- Debt reduction and debt relief.
- Increase ODA to 0.7 % of each developed country's GNP.
- Concrete developments in health and education, especially in providing drugs to fight infectious diseases.
- Improve developed market access for African goods.
- Encourage investment by the private sector in developed countries.
- Raise consumer protection standards for exports to levels in developed countries.
- Ensure that the World Bank and other multilateral development finance institutions participate as investors in key economic infrastructure projects.
- Provide technical support to accelerate the implementation of the programme of action.
- Support government reforms of multilateral financial institutions.
- Set up coordinated mechanisms for combating corruption effectively.

2.4 Criticisms of the New Partnership for Africa's Development.

The NEPAD policy document has come under severe criticism from civil society, especially because it claims to be an African owned and lead process but was written mainly in the international arena by select authors. The paradigm in which the initiative is premised has also been questioned. There is a general consensus among African academics that it is essential that any policy that aims to address the African situation must deal with the reality of African politics and economics. Only then can policy be formulated to address problems. Without a clear and honest understanding of the problems, there is the risk that the solutions suggested will in fact further exacerbate the problem, as well as further entrench the systems that are problematic.

According to current literature on NEPAD, the dynamics of African politics is either not understood by the authors of NEPAD or it is deliberately ignored. Another dimension of criticism focuses on the economic assumptions and the new global economy as the point of departure. An investigation into African politics, the assumptions of NEPAD and underlying neo-liberal currents points to the very real risk that the system of neo-patrimonialism will be perpetuated rather than reformed. Even though many of the criticisms of NEPAD form an integrated argument, it is perhaps beneficial to analyse them from separate angles. This section groups criticisms from civil society into three main dimensions: a political perspective, an economic perspective and a global perspective.

2.4.1 A Political Perspective

This section explores criticisms of NEPAD with specific focus on the dynamics of national politics and the role of civil society, as well as continental politics in terms of the African Renaissance, the AU, and the African Peer Review Mechanism.

2.4.1.1 The Good Governance Problem

A critical examination of the crisis of democracy and the state in Africa that defines the real problems and issues accurately and honestly is fundamental to the success of any policy, let alone a continent wide initiative such as NEPAD. Critics have voiced concern that the real

dynamics of African politics has been ignored by NEPAD, and as a result, is completely inappropriate as a strategy for African development.

Patrick Chabal offers a reading of contemporary African politics in terms of the very fabric of politics: power, and its relationship to production. "In the real world, however, power and production are inextricably linked. There can be no power exercised in a productive void, nor can there be production other than in the context of power relations. The object of political analysis must be to understand the link, causal or otherwise between the two.... Power and production are the two axes of politics in any society" (1992:5). Chabal argues that the nature of politics in Africa centres around neo-patrimonialism, which makes good government and political accountability difficult. (He limits his analysis to "black Africa " which refers to countries south of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt; and countries north of South Africa).

The link between accumulation, growth and development is well established. Chabal (1992:151) argues that the crisis of accumulation is critical to the crisis of production in the post-colonial state. Therefore, in order to understand African (under) development he focuses on the process and effects of accumulation in relation to power in Africa. The argument is simply stated: "the state is overdeveloped and consumes a disproportionate share of the country's revenues. This is partly a consequence of the colonial legacy and partly because the state [after independence] is the main locus for individual (social and economic) advancement" (1992:153). The colonial state was concerned with exploitation of the economy. The post-colonial state was concerned with individual advancement and class accumulation of those who had access to its revenues. Neither were concerned with productive investment or national development.

The current relationship between power and production during the years immediately before and after independence was shaped and subjugated by African elites "who constructed, financed and often led the nationalist parties. That they did so for honourable reasons did not detract from the fact that they believed that independence would make it possible for them to benefit even more from the productive inequalities, which the colonial economic revolution had brought about.... The masses who supported nationalism expected or were led to expect that independence would bring an end to colonial inequalities. But the new African elites, who largely ran the nationalist parties, expected for their part that independence would permit

the unfettered development of the pattern of productive inequalities which had served them so well" (Chabal, 1992:160).

Essentially, independent states continued to use the mechanisms of accumulation and appropriation introduced by the colonial state, and as a result the state became a channel for individual economic advancement. As political and economic power was held by the same actors, the state's mode of accumulation was simply to appropriate rather than to reinvest accumulation productively (Chabal, 1992:160).

Furthermore, although the colonial state had developed the foundations of a modern economy and the mechanisms for appropriation, an infrastructure aimed at national development was non-existent, since the purpose of the colonial economy was to supply the imperial economy. Therefore, development was further constrained by the lack of structures of productive investment. "The political momentum for the post-colonial state's economic hegemony was thus well-nigh unstoppable. In a situation where the development of state capitalism or state socialism was conditioned by political interests, there were no structural or institutional safeguards against unproductive appropriation" (Chabal, 1992:163).

The post-colonial state suffered a crisis of legitimacy, which along with the state culture of accumulation, led to the entrenchment of the neo-patrimonial state. Neo-patrimonialism refers to the exercise of power through the informal sector. "In a neo-patrimonial system, political accountability rests on the extent to which patrons are able both to influence and meet the expectations of their followers according to well-established norms of reciprocity" (2002:451). In the context of the neo-patrimonial system, political accountability was redefined. The legitimacy of leaders is dependent on their ability to provide for their own personal constituents. "Political bosses were seen as 'legitimate' because they could provide for their clients access to state resources" (1992:141). Neo-patrimonialism not only totally undermined economic growth, but once patrons ran out of resources as revenues declined and debt increased, political competition increased, resulting in intensified struggles for power. Production was deficient and therefore, power was diminished, which led to a deepening of the political crisis.

Therefore, in this system where resources were redistributed from patrons to clients, when resources ran out patrons became less effective and had to resort to more coercive policies. It

is in this context that democratisation and structural adjustment entered the African political sphere. In the new political economy of begging, international aid became a new source of resources utilized by elites to maintain the system of neo-patrimonialism. Political reform in the form of multiparty elections and occasional regime change occurred only because of externally imposed political conditionalities. Policies of structural adjustment were imposed randomly simply because this was the price to pay for continued assistance. For the international community the idea of allowing African states to collapse was unthinkable and as a result it found itself negotiating imperfect programmes of reform which did not threaten neo-patrimonialism (Chabal, 2002:454-458).

The nature of African political dynamics is however deeply rooted in its society, culture and the appropriation of modern processes into the system. Chabal has identified three trends characteristic of current African political systems. Firstly, these systems are becoming increasingly informal. This is explained in terms of identity: in Africa "the individual cannot be conceived outside the community from which (s)he hails, however geographically distant (s)he may be from it. The political system thus operates according to criteria which embody this core 'communal' dimension" (2002:452). The problem is that the state is not functionally differentiated from the society; in other words, there is no self-standing civil society because vertical ties remain more significant than horizontal (professional or functional) links. This communal logic is further extended along lines of patronage and clientelism. African elites use their official position to fulfil their unofficial obligations to their clients and to meet the demands on which their power and standing as rulers rest.

The second characteristic is the "retraditionalization" of the continent in terms of a merging of the realms of the modern and the traditional. African elites operate in a world that is both modern and traditional, "a world congruent with the beliefs of the rest of the population". In this world, what is actually illegal is often seen as legitimate by those within the community who benefit from it. The point is that neo-patrimonial political accountability allows for actions that are interpreted as corrupt by the West and in the long term constrain development (Chabal, 2002:453).

Thirdly, Africa's complete lack of development which when compared to their Asian counterparts who were in the same state of underdevelopment in the 1960's, cannot be solely blamed on external constraints. This leads Chabal to conclude that "the very organisation of

African political systems must itself be considered to be partly responsible for the present condition of the continent" (2002:453). Although rent seeking behaviour is characteristic of both the economies of South East Asia and Africa, leaders of the former understand that "growing rents require growing economies, so that when rent-seeking threatens sound economies, the rents are curbed" (Mbirimi, 2002:5). In other words development takes precedence. In Africa, this is most definitely not the case.

The success of the African state in consolidating neo-patrimonialism is due to the fact that this system of patronage is deeply embedded in the African socio-cultural matrix. It is what links political elites and ordinary people. It is still the way in which political accountability and representation are understood (Chabal, 2002:459). In this context, elections are seen merely to act as a facilitating device to obtain foreign aid.

Chabal summarises politics in contemporary Africa: "Briefly, the state in Africa is not much more than a relatively vacuous shell, useful insofar as it permits the control of the resources which it commands but politically feeble because it is neither institutionalised nor functionally differentiated from society. Similarly, there is no self-standing civil society because vertical ties remain infinitely more significant than horizontal (professional or functional) links. Finally, African political elites behave according to the norms of political legitimation and representation inherent in the neo-patrimonial system. They use their official position to fulfil their unofficial obligations to their clients and to meet the demands on which their power and standing as rulers rest" (Chabal, 2002:www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/humanities/pobrst/pcpapers.htm).

The exhaustion of the elites' resource base led to the demise of the neo-patrimonial system, leaving the functioning of the state even more unviable. The consequence of this demise has been the use of disorder as a political instrument, the logical outcome of which is the rule of force, not law. "This refers to the process by which political actors in Africa seek to maximise their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty and even injustice, which characterises most African politics" (Chabal, 2002:www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/humanities/pobrst/pcpapers.htm). Stated differently, "the structural dynamics of African political systems remain essentially patrimonial and prebendal, the diminishing resources available to the political elite induce them increasingly to use disorder instrumentally".

In a sense, the increasing importance of good governance and democracy in the international arena has had a fundamental impact on the dynamics of African politics. What ensued was the subversion of multi-party elections and the creation of a façade of western democracy. Essentially the new political framework was adopted without allowing it to undermine or replace the existing neo-patrimonial system. Therefore, the appropriation and perversion of notions of democracy into African political systems has "given a new lease of life to a political system that was seriously threatened by its inability to deliver economically in the long run" (Chabal, 2002:462).

Therefore, the crisis of the state and the African political elite must be understood in terms of the demise of the neo-patrimonial state in the context of globalisation, diminishing foreign aid, and increasing demands for true democratic reform from disenfranchised clients and citizens. "Devoid of the means of its ambitions, the state (or what is left of it) in Africa is more dependent than ever on the power and resources of its key political elites" (Chabal, 2002:www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/humanities/pobrst/pcpapers.htm).

In this context, Chabal raises the question of democracy and good governance, proclaimed preconditions for development by NEPAD. Specifically he questions paragraph 42, which refers to "a variety of reasons" for Africa's failure to develop, and the "new set of circumstances" which are conducive to development. He argues that the political elite are not willing to examine those reasons, nor is there anything new about the commitment to democratic reform. Changes in the exercise of power in Africa, renders true commitment to democratic principles very difficult.

The implications of an initiative such as NEPAD, which aims to capture foreign aid on a scale not seen before in Africa, are profound. Chabal concludes that NEPAD is to a large extent a strategy of the ruling elite to guarantee a transfer of resources to Africa which is a "continuation rather than a break from the type of relations that has guided the continent's engagement with the international community since independence" (2002:462).

Dani Nadubere makes a similar case against NEPAD. He interprets the initiative on two levels. Firstly, "it is a product of the continuing search by African people and its leaders to create pan-African structures that can lead to the social and economic transformation of the continent". Secondly, it "is an instrument of contestation between Africans seeking self-

determination in their development efforts and those forces that seek the continuation of the exploitation of the continent's resources upon which the accumulation of their wealth depends. The linkage that brings about this contestation is a historical one which manifests itself in the continuing structures of imperialist domination of the African people through the post colonial state, which continues to be a neo-colonial instrument of domination" (2002:1).

Archie Mafeje (2002:6) argues that the African state and economy are a continuation of the colonial state and economy and as such can deliver neither political democracy nor social democracy. The characteristics of the colonial state are evident in the African state since independence. Firstly, it was inherited ready-made from the departing colonial powers and remained extrinsic to the African society, despite change of personal. Secondly, its bureaucracy maintained the same arrogance as the colonial bureaucracy and continues to administer its subjects as if they are objects. Thirdly, it is accountable to itself and the president for life and not to those it administers (the colonial government was accountable to itself and the metropolitan power). Fourthly, it excels in arbitrary use of power and does not believe in transparency. Fifthly, it is highly extractive, but unlike the colonial state, it has no sense of accumulation or of changing ill-gotten state revenues into productive capital. Lastly, it is characterised by authoritarianism and callous disregard for civil liberties. Along with these characteristics, rampant corruption among state officials, bureaucratic inefficiency, and economic mismanagement, Mafeje concludes that "the neo-colonial state is a degenerate derivative or poor reproduction of the colonial state", the question is therefore, "whether or not the neo-colonial state in Africa can be democratised?" (2002:7).

So far, the attempts at democratisation of Africa have failed mainly because those at the helm have used the same methods as their opponents and oppressors to guarantee power for themselves as soon as they had won state power. "This is a sign that in Africa, civil society has not yet been able to assimilate into itself the political society whose ultimate incarnation is the state" (Mafeje, 2002:8). The state is not concerned with the national question, but rather with individual interests and its own survival. It is precisely this lack of a notion of public interest that makes the neo-colonial state is unserviceable and unviable. Mafeje then states that African intellectuals are advocating the establishment of a "democratic developmental African state", the main focus of which is the question of democracy and the active involvement of the state in national development. These demands represent a considered position against both the neo-colonial state and the new western neo-liberalism. "As far as the

latter is concerned, they signify a growing new pan-Africanist nationalism against "globalisation" or the new imperialism led by the Americans and implemented by the World Bank and the IMF. The idea of new democracy cannot be attained without a full commitment to the principle of self-reliance (2002:11).

Stephen Gelb argues that the weak state in Africa is a result of the process of state formation. States in Africa were created by imposing artificial boundaries through the process of colonisation, which were then consolidated by the OAU's resolution to respect those boundaries. As a result, the African state never faced an external threat to its sovereignty, which would have forced it to develop the capacity to raise human and financial resources (armies and taxes) for its own defence; as was the case with European state formation. The result was minimal territorial conflict between states but due to the lack of regard for self-determination of specific groups, most countries were riddled with internal conflict and instability. "The absence of an external threat meant that there were few, if any, incentives for the state to mobilise resources more effectively in order to defend itself, and also little of the accompanying improvement in governance as citizens demanded some return for their contributions.... Indeed, in contrast to any external threat increasing the pressure for effective domestic resource mobilisation, it must be recognised that the ongoing supply of aid (independent of outcomes) by both bilateral and multilateral donors further reduced incentives" (2001:6). The African state finally evolved to incorporate neo-patrimonial logic: personalised spheres of power and influence, with patronage used to develop networks, maintain power and seek personal gain.

The question Stephen Gelb then asks is whether good governance can be accomplished individually by weak African states. Gelb believes that, given the nature of African politics, the answer is no, and thus there is a need for collective action by states to improve governance in each state individually. In this context, the purpose of the African Peer Review Mechanism can therefore be seen as a means to create an external source of pressure on the weak state to democratise.

Adebayo Olukoshi argues that: "In reality... the main thrust of the NEPAD ideas and ideals, as well as the economic governance framework within which they are defined, are lacking in the kind of basic social anchor that can insure that the democracy and governance proposals that are made are moved from the realm of the *pro forma* and technocratic to the arena of the

political as a living experience marked by contestations and negotiations among the bearers of competing interests"... Therefore NEPAD "on a more critical examination, seems designed more to pander to a donor audience than responding to or representing the concerns of the domestic political forces in the vanguard of the struggle for the reform of the African political space and developmental agenda" (2002:5).

The fundamental problem is that "what the democracy initiative of the NEPAD offers is not so much the basis for a new social contract between the state and society, the rulers and whom they govern but a repackaging, under purported African 'ownership', of the governance programme which the international financial institutions developed within the framework of orthodox structural adjustment" (Olukoshi, 2002:9)... "It follows that ownership cannot be the exclusive monopoly of the elite; it must necessarily have popular anchorage. In addition, it should have a strong degree of local added value that is linked to local specificities and circumstances and not just be seen as a *pro forma* proclamation that is important in and of itself. The political democracy and governance initiative of the NEPAD does not offer any such local value or anchorage in domestic political process/structures. Indeed, even the entire process leading to the production of the NEPAD has been bereft of systematic public debate and consultation within Africa, a serious deficit which is not mitigated by the strategy of making the initiative an almost exclusively governmental affair" (2002:11).

Just as ownership will not be adopted simply because it is important, the same argument applies to accountability. It is a product of the completed democratisation process, not simply a voluntary exercise undertaken by benevolent leadership. The question is therefore; can a peer review mechanism address the fundamental questions of political accountability? Under the current political climate can one assume the integrity of the mechanism when all such mechanisms are subject to problems and accusations of bias, abuse, different interpretations, and in the case of political leaders, strategic choices that are tied to definitions of national interest (Olukoshi, 2002:12), the interest of the dominant elite?

Shadrack Gutto, (2002:3-14) argues that the weak development of the rule of law, especially with regards to compliance with norms and standards of basic international and regional human rights norms and standards, contributes significantly to the endemic social and political instability in many African countries which in turn impacts negatively on social and political stability and progress. The NEPAD creates a historic opportunity and challenge for

strengthening the development of political, economic and corporate governance based on the rule of law and human and peoples rights at national, sub-regional and regional levels on the African continent. Success is a question of true political will and not merely lip service to the concept.

Adebayo Olukoshi examines NEPAD's notion of democracy by firstly stating that democracy has different incarnations specific to historical context. "The authors of NEPAD seem to assume that there is a universal ideal model of democracy and governance against which African and other experiences can be measured. What is more, it is assumed that this universal model can be abstracted from the current practises of the West, as though those practices in themselves are not problematic and diverse" (2002:11).

Richard Cornwell critiques the assumption that the role of the state is to provide security to its' constituents in Africa. Globally it is assumed that the state apparatus exists largely to protect the security of its citizens, this is however not the case in Africa. The security apparatus is not only the means through which political power is won, but also consolidated. As a result, the state and its organs are not the incarnation of the will of the people but rather a continuation of the system of neo-patrimonialism in Africa. Therefore one cannot accept "at face value of the primary commitment of the leaders of Africa's political class to the development of their countries and citizens" (2002:1).

The lesson to be learnt is: "Democracy as we know it in the West is the outcome of, and not the precondition for, economic development - as has been amply demonstrated in the recent past in East Asia. In those settings it is an authoritarian, but (and this is crucial) effective state that has driven economic growth with single-minded determination, in the process forcing local businessmen to invest in their own country. It is only today, when the fruits of development have brought about spectacular improvements in the standards of living of the aspiring middle classes, that the pressure for greater democracy is increasing. To assume, therefore, that multiparty electoral competition will, in and of itself, make development more likely is to be guilty of wishful thinking" (Chabal, 2002:455). In terms of this view, one could argue that the real problem with the current African political system is not that it is authoritarian and patrimonial, but that it is ineffective and uninterested in real economic growth and development. In this context, the only aim of NEPAD should then be to foster

economic development, which would develop the African people into a society capable of democratising their political systems from the bottom up.

2.4.1.2 NEPAD and Civil Society

NEPAD was mainly written in the international arena and within the context of talks between Mbeki and other international leaders. Civil society (business, labour, the media, non-governmental organisations, opposition parties, academics) has not been consulted. As a result the question of ownership is a valid one.

Civil society's case is twofold. Firstly, it was not included in the NEPAD creation process. In fact it was called on for the first time in the document itself in section IV "Appeal to the Peoples of Africa" paragraph 55: "...the political leaders of the continent appeal to all the peoples of Africa, in all their diversity, to recognise the seriousness of the situation and the need to mobilise themselves in order to put an end to further marginalisation of the continent and to ensure its development by bridging the gap between Africa and the developed countries". Indeed after most of the concepts had been sold to the G8.

The second more fundamental problem refers to the basic assumptions of the initiative. The need for democracy and good governance is widely accepted. There is however a deep belief among academics, politicians and journalists that the main cause of Africa's problems lies in policies of structural adjustment, market liberalisation and privatisation, all of which NEPAD seems to embrace. As a result, NEPAD has been accused of being a "plan designed to tell donor nations what they want to hear to get aid and continue the present dysfunctional aid-dependency" (Herbert, 2002:12). It has been argued that it is a ploy by African elite to consolidate their positions and their systems of patrimonialism in the era of globalisation.

The true emergence of democracy in Africa is dependent on developing democratic values amongst the people themselves. Grass roots organisations linking up with other international social NGO movements provide the best way of creating external pressures to force the state to democratise. Patrick Bond argues that, effectively NEPAD has excluded alliances with international social, labour, and environmental movements who, "in their struggles for socio-environmental and economic justice, are the main agents of progressive social change" (2002:3), there by hampering the development of democracy.

There does however, remain room for contributions from civil society, albeit in the proposed paradigm: "the NEPAD process remains embryonic, with a vast amount of detail still to be elaborated - programmes, projects and institutional processes. It is essential that there be a growing amount of 'space' for input into, and influence in, the process, from all quarters of society - trade unions, community-based and human rights organisations, business and farmer associations, women and students" (Gelb, 2001:29).

2.4.1.3 The African Renaissance and Pan-Africanism

Efforts at African emancipation have their roots in the rise of Pan-Africanism. By linking with the birth of the African Union, NEPAD markets itself as the logical economic framework of the struggle. However, critics argue that African unity and the Renaissance project are under real threat from NEPAD.

Baffour Ankomah, (2002:20-21) argues that since its inception, "NEPAD has spun from being an 'African initiative' to a grotesque animal threatening to eat the African Union up". Although the initiative was born from noble intentions, the "animal" is the external funding of NEPAD. Through NEPAD, Western interests have been given a means to influence African politics i.e. the power to exercise selectivity and impose conditionalities.

The second threat of NEPAD for the African Union comes from the development of parallel institutions, which will serve as a source of contestation as to who is really leading the continent. NEPAD has its own structures, procedures, mechanisms and central organs. The Peace and Security Council, the conflict prevention mechanism, the 15 Member Implementation Committee, the Secretariat in Johannesburg, and the African Peer Review Mechanism all operate separate from the structures of the OAU-AU, even though the proponents of NEPAD insist on its role as the socio-economic blueprint of the AU.

Nadubere (2002:16) argues that NEPAD legitimatises the idea that some countries will be isolated and marginalised while others are rewarded, and in so doing will fragment and destroy the solidarity of the continent. From this perspective, "the partnership was not to unite Africa to tackle its own problems, but to disorganise them on the basis of a new western philanthropy - a new recolonisation". The real basis of African unity is being ignored. Africa's heritage and its status as the birth place of humanity is not coordinated to encourage

the will for true emancipation, rather it is "just a cheap basis for yet another begging from the same exploiters under the illusion that they will support a "Marshall Plan" for Africa's redevelopment".

How can the African Renaissance, understood as the rebirth and upliftment of the African, ever be realised if the continents' leaders vision does not match the spirit of the struggle for emancipation as embodied in the original ideas of Pan-Africanism, the only source of African identity and pride since independence? Furthermore the dismissal of civil society involvement in the creation of NEPAD which is supposed to be the climax of the struggle, NEPAD's disregard for the African Union, and the neo-liberalist undertones of the initiative; will only further confuse the search for identity and unity on the continent. Against this backdrop, prospects of a true African Renaissance are quite bleak.

Nadubere's emphasis on the fundamental role of African unity is not the kind of consideration that Chabal would consider legitimate. The tendency for African leaders to support one another when facing international criticism about undemocratic rule or inhumane activities suggests a consolidation of elite interests rather than concern for development.

2.4.1.4 The African Peer Review Mechanism

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was created and adopted by the NEPAD Implementation Committee in Abuja in March 2002. The mechanism is focussed on codes of good conduct with measurable criteria in the areas of political, economic and corporate governance (Gutto, 2002:13).

The concept of a Peer Review Mechanism is a highly problematic one. On the one hand, it is advocated as hard evidence of the "New political will" of African leaders to enforce good governance. On the other hand, it is a highly unusual and unique phenomenon not found in the international arena, specifically because of the political problems it poses for those involved. A recurrent concern is that NEPAD will become a source of conditionality through the APRM, in the relations between the donor community and the continent. It also provides a basis for the exercise of selectivity by the donors in the allocation of resources and aid.

NEPAD has effectively made aid dependent on political performance. "A basic principle of the Capital Flows initiative is that improved governance is a necessary requirement for increased capital flows, so that participation in the Economic and Political Governance Initiatives is a prerequisite for participation in the Capital Flows Initiative" (NEPAD, paragraph 144). The Capital Flows Initiative focuses specifically on increased debt relief, increased overseas development assistance (ODA) and increased private capital flows or foreign direct investment (FDI). Although not specifically mentioned in the NEPAD document itself, the African Peer Review Mechanism is the instrument through which it will be determined which countries will qualify for debt relief, ODA and FDI based on their political performance judged against the principles laid out in NEPAD. Through self-imposed conditionalities, it is a means of channelling capital flows to the continent.

In other words, the partnership concept proposed by NEPAD rests essentially on the logic whereby self-subscription or self-adherence to "best" international practices is traded for international financial support. However, the point is that sound governance aimed at the continents' development is necessary irrespective of foreign aid and must not be reduced simply to a prerequisite for aid.

An investigation of African leadership's reaction to the Zimbabwe controversy lends substance to the accusation that NEPAD is simply a strategy developed by the political elite to further consolidate their neo-patrimonial positions. Ian Taylor summarises the point clearly: "Zimbabwe was in many ways the test case for evaluating the credibility of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and a clear opportunity for African leaders to signal that they had changed their ways" (2002:1). Although African elites confirmed the legitimacy of Zimbabwe's latest elections in stark contrast to generally accepted reality, NEPAD has not yet been dismissed as irrelevant. The implications for the integrity of the initiative is however, quite severe.

The acclaim with which NEPAD was initially received has been tempered as the West have obviously not separated the Zimbabwe elections and the promise made by African elite to police themselves. "Tragically, that the NEPAD only lasted less than six months before its credibility was fatally undermined demonstrates the fickle nature of African elite politics. The much-vaunted desire to alter the "rules of the game" on how the continent interacts with the West, without any real reciprocal change in the behaviour of African elites - an absolute

precondition if such "partnerships" are ever to be taken seriously - now seems to be a one-way street of demands but no duties on the part of Africa's presidents. To put it bluntly, that will never wash in the global corridors of power and it is naïve of African leaders to think otherwise" (Taylor, 2002:4).

Certainly, the treatment of the Zimbabwe situation by the proponents of NEPAD raises questions about the credibility of the proposed African Peer Review Mechanism.

2.4.2 The Argument from an Economic Perspective

The basic trade off is that Africa will create good governance via a peer review mechanism. All African states will be induced to stop corruption, wars, inefficient economies and so forth by peer pressure from the others. In exchange, the rich nations' private sectors will invest in Africa, and governments will begin to allow more African trade into their countries.

There are several problems with this viewpoint: firstly, investors are interested in expanding markets and not theoretical partnerships, good governance and political stability are not the key factors in attracting FDI; otherwise oil-rich Angola and Nigeria would not be the main beneficiaries of FDI inflows on the continent (Bond, 2002: 9).

Secondly, NEPAD calls for reduction of trade barriers on African exports. Although laudable in theory, is this a realistic demand? It is widely believed by African academics that rich countries can open their markets to African trade regardless of NEPAD, however because of their own domestic issues, they fail to do so.

The basic theory developed in the above section on the current state of African politics, is that NEPAD is simply a means or a ploy to consolidate the position of the African elite and their neo-patrimonial networks in a new globalised world. Premised on this line of reasoning, Yash Tandon (2002) questions the motives of NEPAD in requesting increased FDI through an economic analysis of the rationale advanced in the document. He argues that the resource gap identified by NEPAD needed to bring the continent's GDP to 7 % per year, mainly through attracting foreign direct investment (FDI's) is based on the following simple mathematical logic:

$$Y - E = S \quad \text{or} \quad S = Y - E$$

Y = National income

E = National expenditure

S = National Saving

This equation is simply a logical construct, which says nothing about any particular reality; it simply says that national saving is what is left of income after expenditure. For a realistic picture, the sources and amounts of income and expenditure must be identified. For an even more informative picture the distinction between domestic saving (Sd) and domestic expenditure (Ed) and external expenditure (Ee) must be made.

$$S_d = Y - E_d - E_e$$

Tandon argues that in Africa, external expenditure is very large, owing mainly to "corruption; payment of past debts; transfer pricing by which large multinationals overprice their imports into the country and under price exports; worsening balance of payments on account of worsening terms of trade or flight of capital because of speculation - in other words, by a hundred different ways in which an "externalised expenditure drains away national income" resulting in little or negative national saving (2002:15). NEPAD fails to analyse the real reasons for such high external expenditure, and simply calls for FDI's to fill the "resource gap". Furthermore, the case for FDI's must be investigated along this line of reasoning. I is investment and Id and If are domestic investment and foreign investment.

$$Y - E = S - I$$

$$S_d = Y - E_d - E_e - I$$

$$S_d = Y - E_d - E_e - I_d - I_f$$

$$I_f = Y - E_d - E_e - S_d - I_d$$

If the case for FDI is made from the last formula then the following must apply:

- The national income (Y) may be very small; or
- The domestic expenditure (Ed) may be too high; or
- There may be a large externalisation of funds (Ee) - external seepage; or
- There may be no or little domestic savings (Sd); or

- There may be no or little domestic investment (Id).

These propositions must be explained: why is domestic expenditure so high? Is it due to war or wasteful imports such as luxury vehicles? Why is there a high externalisation of funds? (corruption, repayment of illegal debts?). Tandon concludes that NEPAD's case for wanting foreign direct investment is based on a logical construct and not on a real life analysis and as a result can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, "the ruling elite has no intention to cut down on their own profligacy". Secondly, "those who are externalising funds (legitimately and illegitimately) have no intention to put controls on their activities.... If, furthermore, the ruling elite is in alliance with foreign corporations, or foreign banks, wanting profitable investment in these countries, then it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the whole thing is a massive fraud" (2002:17).

Tandon explains the nature of FDI and its implications for Africa. The Economist defines FDI as follows: "The point about FDI is that it is far more than mere "capital": it is a uniquely potent bundle of capital, contracts, and managerial and technological knowledge. It is the cutting edge of globalisation" (The Economist, February 24,2001 cited in Tandon, 2002:21). One cannot assume that FDIs are nameless, neutral carriers of wealth and goodwill for Africa, they are really a means for corporations to accumulate their wealth, and although they may leave immovable assets in the countries they are operating in, their capital is highly fluid and mobile, which results in making the economy even more fragile. Africa does need capital, but the first source of capital must be domestic, and foreign investment must be tailored to needs of specific countries for their benefit, and not for the needs of corporations.

The danger of it all lies in opening the provision of basic social services to FDI. NEPAD says that African states must attract FDIs to finance the provision of water, electricity and other services to Africa, the practical effect of that would be "to surrender the human rights of the people of Africa to the whims of a volatile and untrustworthy global capital". Tandon concludes by saying that "NEPAD's noble intentions may be embraced, yes, but the strategy of self-reliance is just that. Self-reliance. Not FDI-reliance". The entry of foreign capital must be negotiated and its operation and exit must be monitored closely (2002:25). African development must start with human needs, not further integration into the global economy. Tandon is essentially arguing for true domestic economic reform, which would reduce external expenditure.

In the absence of a diversified industrial economy, and as long as the postcolonial state remains the main route to wealth formation, there will remain an impulse by African politicians to use high office as a means to wealth accumulation and Western corporations will collaborate in this process, cementing new ties of patron-client relations.

Richard Cornwell points out that the argument that globalisation will deliver sustained growth to Africa is based on the experience of larger and stronger countries. Also the economic development path implied by free-market strategists is not available to most underdeveloped countries for two reasons.

Firstly, underdeveloped countries react far more violently to changes in market sentiment and fluctuations, so much so that a single global financial hiccup could cause the collapse of such a country's financial system. Secondly, for Africa to gain equitable global market access, the dominant players are required to forgo some of the extremely unfair advantages they currently enjoy. Cornwell questions the political will of Western leaders to put in place policies that will make them unpopular at home. An example: the agricultural industry which is one of the largest opportunities for African growth if offered international market access, is also one of the most highly protected European industries. Margaret Legum (2002) states the point eloquently: "As for trade, rich countries can open their markets to African trade regardless of NEPAD. But they do not, because they have their own fish to fry politically at home. Mike Moore, World Trade Organisation's DG calls the present system "an obscenity.... there is no moral consistency to talk of free trade and then to block trade in some areas...". "

2.4.3 The Global Context

The process of globalisation, the current system of neo-liberal capitalism, the present international political order and the threat posed to global stability by the marginalisation of the continent form the components of the argument developed above.

2.4.3.1 The origin and course of the process of globalisation: an African view.

In order to justify NEPAD, it is important that there is a consensus that there is no alternative to globalisation. Patrick Bond cites the following arguments: Firstly, Mbeki, addressing the

ANC National General Council argues "there is nobody in the world who formed a secret committee to conspire to impose globalisation on an unsuspecting humanity. The process of globalisation is an objective outcome of the development of the productive forces that create wealth, including their continuous improvement and expansion through the impact on them of advances in science, technology and engineering" (Mbeki, cited in Bond, 2002: 4).

Secondly, NEPAD states "The current economic revolution has, in part, been made possible advances in information and communications technology (ICT)... We readily admit that globalisation is a product of scientific and technological advances, many of which have been market driven" (NEPAD, 2001: par.29,31,39). Bond states that the driving force of globalisation according to this argument "boils down to little more than technological determinism".

However the ANC's explanation of globalisation in 1998 when it sought to engage left wing alliances was as follows: "The present crisis is, in fact, a global capitalist crisis, rooted in a classical crisis of overaccumulation and declining profitability. Declining profitability has been a general feature of the most developed economies over the last 25 years. It is precisely declining profitability in the most advanced economies that has spurred the last quarter of a century of intensified globalisation. These trends have resulted in the greatly increased dominance (and exponential growth in the sheer quantity) of speculative finance capital, raging uncontrolled over the globe in pursuit of higher returns" (ANC, cited in Bond, 2002:4).

The fundamental question to be asked is what exactly is the driving force behind globalisation? Philip Cery (cited in Taylor & Nel, 2002:171) remarks, "globalisation is not driven by some inexorable economic process, but rather by politics: by ideology, by the actions, interactions and decisions of state actors, their private - sector interlocutors and wider publics". The point is that although globalisation is essentially an economic process, the motivation for this process is embedded in politics, ideology and the actions of the public and private sector which are in turn motivated by the dominant values of dominant international societies. Through this process of globalisation, Africa has become marginalised from the world economy. However, "Africa's marginalisation does not lie in its being excluded from the global economy, but in being the most exploited in the global economy" (Nadubere, 2002:19). Africa is therefore marginal in its importance.

Ian Taylor and Philip Nel (2002:164-6) argue that NEPAD is being well received by the West exactly because it appeals to the neo-liberal framework on which the present global system is based; is communicated without the traditional anti-imperialist rhetoric; and avoids blaming particular policies and global trade structures for Africa's marginalisation. The danger of such a good "fit" is that this message may serve to legitimise existing global power relations rather than restructure them. Indeed, they argue that this will serve to consolidate the position of African elites and allow them to benefit further from the process of globalisation while leaving the rest of the African people to further marginalisation and exclusion.

Taylor and Nel argue that global domination in the new political economy is exercised through three spheres namely: "a) transnational capital; b) the hegemony of neoliberalism; and c) the emergence of a global historic bloc" (2002:166). This historical bloc refers to a global elite, which has emerged from the process of globalisation forming a transnational capitalist class comprised of "transnational executives and their affiliates; globalising state bureaucrats; capitalist-inspired politicians and professionals; and a consumerist elite. Originating in the capitalist core, this transnational elite is increasingly developing linkages with like-minded parties in the South to form a truly *global elite*" intent on maintaining the system which enables them to remain dominant (2002:166). Elites in developing countries have been assimilated into this system, creating vested interests for these elites to help maintain the status quo.

However, growing concern about the negative effects of globalisation, especially its logic of exclusion and inclusion, driven by anti-globalisation protesters and certain African elite, has opened the political space to question globalisation. Indeed the launch of NEPAD is perfectly timed and politically appropriate. Its quick acceptance is indicative of both its palatable presentation and the current gap in international sentiment.

The fact that NEPAD takes the global competitive market place as a point of departure "reflects the actuality that elites from Africa, in the main are just as interested in maintaining the global system as their colleagues in the North...indeed the reforms being advocated ...are increasingly cast as sensible strategic choices in order to defend world wide neoliberalism from some sort of populist reaction" (Taylor & Nel, 2002:169). The new message is therefore, defending globalisation and the advancement of specific externally orientated interests and values, while at the same time improving the negative impacts of the process.

The problem facing African transnational elites is that they cannot openly reject the neo-liberal thrust of globalisation because that would entail a rejection of their own position and international credibility; and call into question their own individual compromises with externally orientated capital. The current situation is therefore rife with contradiction as diverging worldviews emerge from African elite, civil society and the general populace. The agenda for change pursued by Mbeki and the NEPAD is a restricted, reformist approach rather than one aimed at transforming global relations, "which is obviously a precondition for the drastic reduction of global poverty. Yet, this lack of a real agenda for fundamental change suits the transnational elite, those both in the North and the South" (2002:177).

Taylor and Nel do see merits in the initiative, especially with regards to developmental needs, the attempt to penetrate the shield of sovereignty protecting corrupt leaders, and the commitment to democratic accountability. The question is simply whether the initiative is able to transform the current African and international political situation to the extent where true sustainable development is possible; or whether it is going to be subverted to the current structures of neo-patrimonialism and the workings of the international political economy.

2.4.3.2 The Neo-liberal Development Paradigm

Anyang' Nyong'o, Fellow of the African Academy of Sciences in Nairobi argues that the paradigm in which NEPAD has positioned itself concurs with "Francis Fukuyama (*The End of History and the Last Man*) when he states that, as mankind approached the end of the millennium, the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist central planning left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity: *liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty*. For Africa to make it into the twenty first century, it must be part and parcel of this universalism, otherwise called neo-liberal globalisation...[However] the best we may hope for within the NEPAD crowd is some form of benevolent leadership arising out of the presidential authoritarian regimes that now claim to be democracies all over the continent" (2002:7-8).

Neo-liberal theory is premised on the assumption that economic modernisation and financial funding are the keys to accelerated development. Cecile Ambert (1997:44) notes that "until the 1980's, the predominant tendency was for the state to extend its hold on the economy. If political leaderships opted for different ideologies, the state was widely perceived as a

catalyst for development. Yet, as political and economic performance became an outlet for ideological competition, donor agencies sought to attach liberal economic conditions to the delivery of financial assistance". In this context good governance was defined as the ability of the state to promote development in accordance with neo-liberal principles. Economic stagnation and decline was seen as the result of poor policy making and bad governance. "Fighting poverty and underdevelopment in Africa has become synonymous with fighting the neo-patrimonial state under the banner of democracy, accountability and transparency" (Ambert, 1997:45).

The Chief Programme Officer of the Commonwealth Secretariat, Ivan Mbirimi notes that development thinking in current policy context is clearly that of neo-liberal economics: higher economic growth, fiscal and monetary discipline, trade openness and deeper integration into the world economy. Added to this are the dimensions of good governance, sustainable development and poverty alleviation. Therefore, he asks: "why given the poor record of Africa are so few people looking at alternatives to current economic development thinking and practices. One explanation ...is that development has become that which development agencies are doing.... An obvious assumption underlying IFIs [International Financial Institutions] and donor country approaches is that there is currently no alternative to 'market-friendly' development or 'neo-liberal economics'. This seems to have been accepted by African governments, although they are uncomfortable with some aspects of this position, in particular the variety of conditionalities that have to be satisfied" (2002:3).

The South African Communist Party defends NEPAD against the neo-liberal charge: "we should not be surprised to find that powerful forces internationally, much of the media (including within our country), and the local conservative liberal opposition political parties, are working full-time to hegemonise and interpret NEPAD for their own purposes. Essentially they seek to reduce NEPAD to the following features:

- Africa's crisis is acknowledged but largely attributed to "backwardness", and to the "inherent" propensity of African elites to be venal, corrupt and despotic.
- The partnership envisaged in NEPAD is reduced to a "trade-off" in which African governments promise to be good (and promise to "police" each other) in return for aid and foreign direct investment from the North. This particular reduction is already

beginning to be used to invoke "collective punishment" – if South Africa "fails to deal with Zimbabwe" then the whole of NEPAD must fail;

- And being "good", i.e. "good governance", is largely reduced to ensuring the protection of private property and the implementation of neo-liberal austerity, liberalisation and privatisation measures.

In the view of the SACP not all of the existing NEPAD document is sufficiently buttressed to deal decisively with this attempted neo-liberal hegemony of the initiative" (SACP, 2002: www.sacp.org.za/11thcongress/chapter3.html).

The neo-liberal issue relates to the question of which development paradigm is most appropriate for Africa. A policy based on self-reliance or isolation from the international economy is at this stage uncertain at best, given the current economic and political disarray of most of the continent. This is the main point from which NEPAD builds. The dominant international system is based on the principles of democracy and neo-liberal economics. Any development strategy that aims to engage with the global economy and developed countries must incorporate this dominant logic, if it is to have any chance at success. However, acknowledgement of and engagement with this logic does not efface the possibility of change, and the evolution towards a more representative global mindset.

2.4.3.3 Threat to Global Stability

The terrorism attacks on September 11, 2001 has changed the way the world is being governed, it has provided the legitimatisation for further consolidation of US policy and international political dictatorship. America and Britain are increasingly attempting to shape the world through the threat of military action and sanctions.

Prof. Nabudere (2002:19) explains Britain's take on poverty in Africa after September 11: "The concern about poverty in Africa was seen by him [Tony Blair] in the context of addressing the danger of 'terrorism'.... engaging African states could reduce the risk of them becoming 'breeding grounds for the kind of people who carried out the U.S. attacks". The

implications for aid to Africa is likened to Truman's policy in 1948, when aid for the "undeveloped world" meant the need to prevent them from becoming breeding grounds for "communism". Once the threat of communism disappeared with the fall of the Berlin Wall aid to Africa fell from \$ 17.2 billion in 1990 to \$ 12.3 billion today. Is the threat of terrorism "breeding" in Africa large enough to secure \$ 64 billion per annum in aid?

"NEPAD had after September 11 become a weapon of control of the African states. In the context of September 11, Mugabe was being targeted and singled out as a representative of 'evil' in Africa because he had dared interfere with the 'rights' of Rhodesians over 'their' land. He was judged to have rigged the elections even before they were held and Blair had insisted that Zimbabwe be expelled from the Commonwealth even before the elections were held". (Nadubere, 2002:20-21). The fear of terrorism "breeding" in Africa, may be founded, however the threat of NEPAD through the APRM becoming a source of conditionality and control over African sovereignty is even more real.

Richard Cornwell (2002:94) argues that Sub Saharan Africa is "not going to feature on the radar screens of the anti-terrorism units of the First World". Declining state systems may provide "breeding grounds" for drug dealers, gunrunners and money launderers, none of which constitute a threat to global security and for which there are other means of control.

The question of global stability in NEPAD pertains to the Castellan argument that the new system is inherently unstable simply because continued exclusion of the vast majority of the world's people will invariably lead to mass revolt and attempts to overthrow the dominant system. Patrick Bond takes a different approach and questions how serious the threat of Africa's marginalisation to global stability really is, since "weak governments have very few threats to make against the strong" (2002:3). In fact, "fake threats such as counterproductive radical-Islamic terrorism (which strengthened not weakened the forces of reaction in the US) are no substitute for the potential threat of a united Africa which acts in its self interest" (2002:15 footnote #7). Bond identifies the following as more profound threats to the Western status quo: US financial and trade-deficit crisis, Japanese depression, geopolitical tensions, dire environmental damage, or debilitating oil shortages. Real bargaining power can be mustered through collective repudiation of African and third world debt which would seriously threaten the stability of the global financial system and thereby gain leverage for genuine debt cancellation negotiations.

The current lack of true international political will is painfully manifest in Bush usurping international attention in the wake of the (relatively unproductive) Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development in June 2002, and focussing it on the Iraq weapons inspections. Illustrating once again that the domestic politics of the development partners take precedence over global development issues.

2.4.4 A Positive Perspective

Ross Herbert (2002:1) identifies positive aspects of NEPAD. Firstly, it has the potential to fundamentally improve the quality of African governance and the lives of the African people, if the envisioned process works as the architects say it will. Secondly, it has the potential to change the shape of African political discourse and forge a new, open, collaborative approach to governance and policy setting; even if it ultimately fails to achieve all of its objectives. Thirdly, NEPAD is a formal contribution to the international debate on issues of development, trade, security and equity with specific focus on Africa's deepening poverty, marginalisation and instability.

Due to the cross-border nature of many proposed projects, "NEPAD will also undoubtedly promote intra and inter regional project co-operation and eventual better market integration regionally" (Breytenbach, 2002:14).

NEPAD has been criticised as being too broad and vague, however, Ravi Kanbur (2001:6) argues that such a characterization is unfair, for two reasons: Firstly, an Africa-wide program such as NEPAD is bound to be general in nature, as the problems themselves are broad and interlinked. Secondly, the document does in fact suggest prioritisation implicitly by the order in which key issues are listed - conflict prevention, democracy, and governance are clearly seen as being of primary importance. Also four programmes are to be fast-tracked: communicable diseases - HIV / AIDS, malaria, TB; information and communications technology; debt reduction; and market access.

Furthermore, Kanbur emphasises that the comparative advantage of NEPAD and its "most precious resource [is] its position as a regional institution that draws its regional and global legitimacy from its democratic roots and aspirations" ...and the "special authority...that stems

from its claim to speak for the people of Africa through democratically elected heads of state" (2001:13-14).

Development in Africa has been hampered by a lack of vision by African leaders. In the context of globalisation, a strong sense of direction is needed to harness the benefits of the process. The disarticulation of space and time, the process of globalisation, and the nature of post-geopolitical international relations, has left the African political elite slightly bewildered. The direct impact of globalisation on African governments is the increased concern over the marginalisation of the continent. Therefore, "NEPAD is an attempt to pursue Africa-wide development strategies, that are situated in the context of globalisation....it articulates a clear vision of Africa's position in the world" (Mbirimi, 2002:4-6). What is fundamentally new in NEPAD is the explicit recognition of the *context* of globalisation and the attempt at continental leadership.

2.4.5 A Tentative Conclusion

Although the aims of poverty reduction, economic development and improved governance are embraced by civil society as essential to any development programme, NEPAD is seen as an entirely inappropriate plan because it does not use the African struggle as a point of departure. According to critics cited in this chapter, what NEPAD has done is it has sold itself to the developed world to consolidate the power of the present elites, because the current systems suits both the developed and the elite. NEPAD has effectively disqualified other African initiatives, which do not subscribe to the dominant international economic and political system. Critics argue that the current crisis of the neo-patrimonial African state and the concurrent economic dereliction of the continent, in the context of a globalising world is what the initiative should address.

However, in light of this, civil society has not been able to present a coherent unified critique of NEPAD. Literature reviewed in this chapter reveals several ambiguities and contradictions. One such a contradiction lies in Taylor's argument that through NEPAD, global and traditional African elite networks of patronage will be consolidated⁴, and in contrast, his concern with the credibility of the initiative and its status in the "global

⁴ Argued on p. 45 – 47

corridors of power”⁵ in light of the Zimbabwe situation (Taylor, 2002:4). The contradiction lies in the criticism of the concept underlying NEPAD versus the support for the initiative.

However, assuming the sincerity (genuine political commitment to change) of the initiative, NEPAD does provide a unified vision for continental development, an "Africa-wide perspective emanating from democratically elected leaders" (Kanbur, 2001:6). It is a clear articulation of the context and goals of sustainable development. In this respect it can serve as a new source of inspiration and cooperation for both African and developed leadership.

The importance of an initiative such as NEPAD for the continent essentially lies in the acknowledgement of responsibility and a firm commitment to genuine development and political accountability by African leadership, which is long overdue. The fundamental problem question is, given the history of non-compliance with regional and international agreements and development programmes, can the African people place their trust in this pledge and their leaders?

⁵ Argued on p. 40 - 41

international capitalism, have revolutionised the organisation of production on a global scale, with profound consequences for work, family, and the experience of space and time. The contradictory force, the search for identity "has shifted from the safe and relatively polite footing of civil society to the more treacherous slopes of communal experience" (Stern, 2000:100). These forces structure society in a "bipolar opposition between the Net and the Self" (Castells, 1996:3).

Firstly, this chapter begins with an overview of the larger context within which Castells writes as well as a brief examination of current criticisms of his work. The impact of the information technology revolution on space and time is essential to Castells' explanation of the network society. Space and time are the material expressions of society, the fabric through which dominant social processes manifest. The chapter will then embark on an examination of the impact the information technology revolution has had on space and time. The analysis will then turn to the ways in which this new logic has restructured the dominant functions and processes of society. The inclusive / exclusive nature of informational capitalism and the implications of the resulting process of globalisation for the developing world, especially Africa is discussed. Lastly, this chapter will focus on Castells' recommendations for social development.

3.2 Contextualising Castells

Peter Waterman notes that "it has been some sixteen years since liberal theorists or ideologues began telling us that our world was being transformed by networking and / or globalisation". He questions the lack of sociological discourse on the topic. "The answer is that until, say 1989 the left was still playing out its role as the counter-culture of national and industrial capitalism. Globalisation was still called 'internationalisation', 'imperialism', or 'the new international division of labour' and thought of in primarily political-economic terms. The 'information society' was bourgeois ideology" (1999:358). Castells has however "boldly gone where no critical sociologist has gone before, to tell us that it actually is a globalised network society".

⁶ Comment on "*The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*". Cited in Castells, Vol. III "*End of Millennium*", back cover.

Much debate about the theoretical framework that informs Castells' theory is based on his Marxist background and how his current interpretation of economy, society and culture in the Information Age relates to Marxist theory. Steve Fuller (www.netfront.to) points out that to argue as Castells does "that information technology has become the principle mode of production and perhaps even legitimation in today's world is to seriously challenge the Marxist proposition that emancipatory knowledge is integrally tied to class position". This does not surprise him, given the evolution of Castells' career. "Beginning as a Marxist specialising in urban grassroots politics, Castells is now a highly sought after advisor on the world's changing socio-economic order who is based in one of the US's premier universities". Waterman argues that Castells is part of a global and globalised elite and "has been hobnobbing with the elites responsible (or irresponsible) for many of the ills he criticizes. More: he has actually been advising the new masters of our universe.... I [Waterman] do not myself think this devalues his work, but it certainly qualifies it" (2002:378).

Waterman too comments on the distance Castells has moved from Marxism. "Castells is quite at home with political economy, as with a Marxist political-economic critique, and with a socialist moral condemnation, of capitalism. He knows that our brave new world is fundamentally capitalist, but he also knows it is of a profoundly different kind. What is different is the increasing shift of culture and communication to the centre, with all the implications this has for domination and emancipation" (2002:358). For this reason it can be argued that Castells has not completely abandoned his Marxist roots. Therefore, his reading of the new division of labour and the internal fragmentation of labour can be interpreted in a "binary opposition between capital and labour, in terms acceptable to a Marxist, and which surely implies the necessity of a movement to emancipate labour" (2002:377). Such a reading of the relationship between capital and labour lends itself to the consolidation of certain Marxist logic evident in *The Information Age*.

Perhaps one way of interpreting Castells' evolution is through understanding that "the 'New Left' of the 1960's was born from a belief that the *experience* of contemporary society did not fit with the intellectual models then in fashion. It grew out of a rejection of the established dominant ideology". Also, the "informational revolution at the core of the network society grew out of the individualistic, experimental culture of the 1960's" (Stern, 2000:115). Essentially social theory is the process through which we make sense of our world, and given the current experience of the information revolution, does it not make sense that a theory of

the new world must effectively incorporate and adhere to this new logic as discovered through lived experience?

Mark Stern concurs with Castells' view that the new civil society must comprise of those who have "freed themselves from uncritical adherence to theoretical or ideological schemes... [and who] construct their practice on the basis of their experience" (Castells, 1998:359). Therefore, Stern remarks that "Castells is trying to ride the crest of the wave of the network society. In doing so he has chosen a method that breaks with the traditional notions of scholarship. First, many chapters of the book start with an extended footnote about informants on whom he has relied for helping him master so many topics. Although there is plenty of theory worked out over the thousand pages of the work, Castells - like a surfer - seems to rely more on a 'feel' for what is going on than a neatly worked out theoretical position.... Instead of worrying about the 'cottage industry' of postmodernist critiques, Castells relies on pulling together as much information on as many topics as possible" (2000:114).

Although Castells cannot be classed as a globalisation theorist simply because many argue that he is a defective Marxist, there are several correlations between the nature of his work and the characteristics of globalisation theory. Mittelman (2002:7-8) identifies an emerging series of core, linked propositions which underlies current globalisation theories:

- Many contemporary problems, such as organised crime, environmental issues, AIDS, must be construed as global problems: "partly within and partly across borders, partially addressed by states and partially beyond their regulatory framework".
- "Globalisation constitutes a structural transformation in world order... it also warrants a long perspective of time and revives the study of space".
- The contemporary period "is punctuated by large-scale acceleration in globalising processes such as the integration of financial markets, technological development, and intercultural contact".
- "The advent of an ontology of globalisation is fluid, by no means fixed. It includes the global economy as an actor in its own right (as embodied, for example, in transnational corporations), states and interstate organisations, regionalist processes (at the macro, sub, and micro levels), world elites, and civil society, sometimes manifest as social movements".

- "Given shifting parameters, the state, in turn, seeks to adjust to evolving global structures". They are however, in different positions in terms of the global economy and structures, with different advantages and constraints, therefore reinventing themselves differently.
- "The horizontal connections forged in the world economy and the vertical dimensions of state politics are two dissimilar vectors of social organisation, with the later seeking to accommodate the changing global matrix".

Certainly, these themes are recurrent in his thesis. However, the fact that Castells attempts to base his argument in humanity's lived experience as expressed in statistical data and manifest in dominant social trends, is most probably a more accurate interpretation of the theoretical paradigm in which he positions himself.

Steve Fuller criticises Castells lack of reference to the theories which inform his work, specifically that of Daniel Bell and Jean-Francois Lyotard. "In the grand 19th century tradition of social theory, Castells' own output consists largely of summarising, rearranging and labelling large bodies of research". However, Castells bases much of his theory on research done by his students and colleagues at Berkley University (also with limited reference), which affords him a more comprehensive interpretation. Fuller (1999: www.netfront.to) also notes that although "Castells, may be in a position to ignore prior theorists and confront informationalism 'in itself,' his readers may not enjoy that luxury. Their views may be an alloy of ideology and fact, as far as Castells is concerned, but unless he takes that into account, his pristine vision of things is bound to be misinterpreted".

3.3 The Catalyst: The Information Technology Revolution

The information technology revolution refers to "the transformation of our 'material culture' by the works of a new technological paradigm organised around information technologies" (Castells, 1996:29). The fundamental significance of the information technology revolution (the same significance that the industrial revolution held) is said to lie in the pervasiveness of the transformation at hand, and in its depth of penetration into the material basis of economy, society and culture. The core of this revolution refers essentially to information and communication technologies, through which innovation builds on itself, in an upward spiral

of increasing creativity. Facilitated by new technologies, the human mind is now a direct productive force.

Castells has identified five characteristics of the information technology paradigm, which form the material foundation of the informational society. Firstly, information is the new raw material upon which technologies act. Secondly, because of the centrality of information in our lives, individual and collective experiences are directly shaped by ICTs. Thirdly, the network is the dominant logic structuring increasingly complex interactions, which are facilitated by information technology and driven by innovation and creativity. Fourthly, this paradigm is characterised by flexibility: constant change, organisational fluidity and the ability to reconfigure. Lastly, there is a growing "convergence of specific technologies into a highly integrated system... microelectronics, telecommunications, optoelectronics, and computers are all now integrated into information systems" (Castells, 1996:61-63).

The primary, fundamental consequence of this revolution is the new social meaning of space and time, and how this redefinition has reshaped the dominant processes and functions in our world. Today space organises time in the network society.

3.3.1 Space

Essentially, space is the expression of society not its reflection. Spatial forms and processes are formed by the dynamics of the overall social structure. Social processes and societal structure reproduce themselves on the surrounding physical environment which was itself shaped by the dynamics of the previous space - society relationship. Through this 'spatial evolution', one can say that "space is crystallised in time" (Castells, 1996:411).

Castells defines space as "the material support of time-sharing practices" and "time-sharing social practices refers to the space which brings together practices which are simultaneous in time" (1996:411). Space therefore derives its meaning from the material articulation of simultaneous social practices. In the new economy, our society is increasingly constructed around flows of capital, information, technology etc. These flows are the expression of the dominant processes shaping our world. In this context, Castells introduces the notion of the space of flows. This is defined as "the material organisation of time-sharing social practices that work through flows" (1996:412). The main idea is that space is the material

manifestation of the dominant structures and processes of society, and in the network society - due to the diversity of expressions offered by the information technology revolution, and the logic of flows - a new reflection of society is found in the space of flows.

Castells identifies three layers of material support that together constitute the space of flows. The first layer is comprised of a circuit of electronic impulses. Information technologies facilitate the process of dominant functions and interactions of our world in a network of connected technology. In this network of communication the logic and meaning of places become absorbed into the network. The spatial articulation of this aspect of societal interaction manifests itself in the networks of technological infrastructure, which have been built up to define this new virtual space in the network society. The network of flows is therefore expressed in terms of this technological infrastructure (Castells, 1996:412).

Secondly, the space of flows is defined in terms of its nodes and hubs. While the structural logic of the space of flows is placeless, the space of flows is not. Even though it is based on an electronic network, which is virtual, this network links up specific places, resulting in a tight complex web of strategically important connected cities, and vast expanses of excluded and unimportant areas. Nodes refer to the location of strategically important functions that build up activities and organisations around a key function in the network. Communication hubs coordinate the smooth interaction of all elements integrated into the network (Castells, 1996:413).

Thirdly, under informational capitalism, dominant interests and functions are expressed in terms of the spatial logic of the space of flows. These functions and interests are those of the elite social actors of our society. This spatial manifestation of the informational elite constitutes the dimension of the space of flows. The elite are distancing themselves from local, place bound masses, becoming increasingly cosmopolitan, and defining themselves not in terms of traditional culture, identity or nationality, but rather in terms of a highly exclusive informational international managerial class (Castells, 1996:415-7). In other words, the space of flows is reflected in the spatial organisation of the dominant managerial elites.

The majority of people, however, live in places. "A place is a locale whose form, function and meaning are self-contained within the boundaries of physical continuity...but because function and power in our societies are organised in the space of flows, the structural

domination of it's logic essentially alters the meaning and dynamic of places" (Castells, 1996:428). The significance of the disarticulating logic of flows and the resulting spatial reorganisation of society lies in the division of society into different and separate dimensions of social hyperspace, fuelling an increasing polarization between the included and the excluded segments and regions of society.

What is fundamentally new in the Network Society, is that power is increasingly concentrated in the space of flows. "The space of flows expresses the dominant social logic in the Network Society" (Stalder, 1998. Available online: www.ctheory.net/text_file?pick=263).

3.3.2 Time

The historical meaning of time is transformed under the information technology revolution, in a sense, advancements in technology has allowed time to escape the constraints of place specific contextualisation. In the space of the network society, the space of flows, traditional time as clock time, linear, measurable and predictable, is fundamentally altered. Time in this context, is self-maintaining, random and incursive. Time is disarticulated and desequenced, manifesting as either instantaneous or timeless, now or forever. Castells defines time as follows: "timeless time, as... the dominant temporality of our society occurs when the characteristics of a given context, namely the informational paradigm and the network society, induce systematic perturbation in the sequential order of phenomena performed in that context" (1996:464). This disruption may result in either instantaneity (as a result of compressing acts) or the expression of eternity through the elimination of sequencing in the flow of time.

The contradiction of experience evoked by the disarticulation of time poses serious consequences for social cohesion. For the first time in history, space is shaping time. The time of the space of flows and of the citizens of the network society is that of timeless time, while unconnected people who still live in traditional places, live according to traditional time. The tension induced by the temporal expression of the polarization of society is expressed in terms of opposed social interests (Castells, 1996:464-8).

The information technology paradigm invokes the evolution of the dominant processes and functions of our world towards a multi-edged network embodying the logic of

comprehensiveness, complexity, and networking in a historically new construct characterised by the new social meaning of space and time. It is this paradigm that allows for new expressions of economy, society and politics.

3.4 The New Global Economy

Today the dominant economic system is classified by Castells as "Informational Capitalism", it is this system that is redefining the way the world works. Nothing new caused informational capitalism, the age-old concept of "relentless competition in the pursuit of profit, and individual satisfaction (deferred or immediate) is its driving engine" (Castells, 2:1999). This system is, however, fundamentally new because "it is tooled by new information and communication technologies that are at the roots of new productivity sources, of new organisational forms, and of the formation of a global economy" (Castells, 2:1999).

It is important to identify the origins and evolution of the dominant economic system in order to show that it was formed by the same forces which motivated the evolution of capitalism and the modern political system. Castells states that "*firms will be motivated not by productivity but by profitability*, for which productivity and technology may be important means, but certainly not the only ones. *And political institutions*, being shaped by a broader set of values and interests, *will be orientated, in the economic realm, towards maximising the competitiveness of their constituent economies*. Profitability and competitiveness are the actual determinants of technological innovation and productivity growth" (Castells, 1999:81).

Castells argues that the evolution of capitalism into the informational capitalism of today was sparked by the 1970's economic crisis which was not the oil prices shock but the inability of the public sector to keep expanding markets. As a result, firms sought to expand trade relative to output and, turned to foreign direct investment. In order to open new markets, "capital required extreme mobility and firms needed dramatically enhanced communication capabilities" (Castells, 1996:85). International legislature was shaped to accommodate the increasing mobility of capital because political institutions have a vested interest "in fostering the competitiveness of those economies they are supposed to represent" (1996:86). The drive for increased profits therefore led to the deregulation of markets and the increased mobility of capital, facilitated by revolutionary information and communication technologies.

The new economy can be explained in terms of three interrelated features:

- The new basis of productivity and competitiveness.
- The global character of the dominant processes in the new economy.
- The technological, organisational and institutional nature of the economy.

3.4.1 Three features of the new economy

Firstly, the notion of competitiveness in terms of the relative position of national economies in relation to other countries has aided the evolution of informational capitalism. The strategic importance of competitiveness is based firstly, on the growing interdependence of markets, which threatens independent national economic policies, and secondly on the challenge for market share by emerging, protected Asian economies. Increased competitiveness was seen as dependent on the employment of new technologies, which was then embarked on, on a large scale by Asia, Europe and America (1996:87-88).

The role of the state in informational capitalism (the dominant global economic system) is different, because economic competition for firms within a country is linked to the specific political interests of the state. "It is precisely because of the interdependence and openness of international economy that states must become engaged in fostering development strategies on behalf of their economic constituencies" (1996:90). The point is, if states want to increase the wealth of their countries, they must ensure collective competitiveness of their firms in international markets and as a result pursue foreign policies, which would secure comparative advantages for domestic firms. Also, productivity potential is now released by the shift toward information technology. Productivity and competitiveness are now generated through knowledge and information because new information and communication technologies make knowledge and information a fundamental part of the production process.

On this point, Castells concludes that "firm's search for profitability and nation's mobilisation towards competitiveness induced variable arrangements in the new historical equation between technology and productivity. In the process, they created, and shaped a new global economy that may be the most characteristic and important feature of informational capitalism" (1996:88).

Secondly, the global economy is an economy with "the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale" (1996:92), facilitated, of course by information and communication technologies. This capacity refers to its core activities, not to everything and does not imply that the world is one single economic system. Rather through the network logic of the internet and other information and communication technologies, economic activity is no longer bound by space and time and is free to organise itself around flows of capital, people and markets.

Thirdly, the new economy is technological, organisational and institutional. It is technological because it has the ability to structure the entire planet through telecommunications and informational systems. "It has organisational capacity because the firms and networks working in this economy organise themselves to be active globally, both in terms of the supplies they receive and the markets they look for." The new economy is characterised by institutional capacity expressed in terms of deregulation and liberalisation, which creates the possibility to operate on a global scale. It is important to understand that the new economy is not the economy of Internet companies. "It is the economy of all kinds of businesses and all kinds of activities whose organisational form and source of value and competition are increasingly based on information technologies, of which the Internet is the epitome and organising form" (Castells, 2001:2-3).

"This new economy is informational because the productivity and competitiveness of units or agents in this economy (be it firms, regions, or nations) fundamentally depend on their capacity to generate, process, and apply efficiently knowledge based information. It is global because the core activities of production, consumption, and circulation, as well as their components (capital, labour, raw materials, management, information, technology, markets) are organised on a global scale, either directly or through a network of linkages between economic agents. It is informational and global because, under the new historical conditions, productivity is generated through and competition is played out in a global network of interaction. And it has emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century because the Information Technology Revolution provides the indispensable, material basis for such a new economy" (Castells, 1996:66).

3.4.2 Dimensions of Globalisation

Globalisation and the new meaning of space and time has fundamentally altered the key dimensions of the new economy: capital markets, the production process, international trade, science and technology, labour and the workings of the firm.

3.4.2.1 Financial Markets

Markets are becoming increasingly globalised, and since the dominant segments and firms, (the strategic cores) of all economies are deeply connected to world markets, the world economy is increasingly globalised. At the heart of the process of globalisation is the emergence of the global financial market, the integration of capital markets and money markets, in a system, which works as a unit in real time (Castells, 2001:4). These global markets have increased and expanded over the past two decades to the extent that it is seen as the most prominent manifestation of globalisation and capitalism, and as a result can be interpreted as the acceptance of the global economy. Capital flows through globally integrated financial markets in real time. Currencies, pension funds, stocks and shares all interact with markets around the world through networks created by information and communication technology, at an unprecedented pace. Instantaneous electronic communication, made possible by global computer networks and satellite transmission, allows for continuous economic decision making to be enacted globally.

In the global economy, time is a source of value; this value lies in the speed of transactions in international financial markets as well as in the rate of production of products. The world not only runs at a much faster pace, it is a unified global capital market that works in real time. The speed and timing of transactions is a fundamental aspect of profit making in the global financial network. Time now really is money. The abstraction of time and capital in financial markets induces and aggravates systemic volatility and entrenches structural economic instability the international and domestic economy, with dire consequences for people, firms, in the developing world, entire countries, and in Africa, the entire continent. "The annihilation and manipulation of time by electronically managed global capital markets are at the source of new forms of devastating economic crises, looming into the twenty-first century" (Castells, 1996:437).

This global interdependence of financial markets is the result of a number of developments. Firstly, the deregulation of financial markets and the liberalisation of cross-border transactions. Secondly, the development of a technological infrastructure, including advanced telecommunications, the Internet, interactive information systems and powerful computers capable of complex transactions virtually instantaneously. Third, this connectedness also results from the nature of financial products such as derivatives which include futures, options, swaps and other products. Derivatives are synthetic securities that combine everything that can be combined, from any market to any market. Therefore anything that happens in any market goes through the derivative system into other markets. Fourthly, the integration of financial markets is also linked to a speculative movement of financial flows, moving swiftly in and out of a given market security or currency to take advantage of the small differences in valuation which become amplified by the swift movements. Fifthly, market valuation firms integrate financial markets by establishing certain rules and criteria, and enforcing them. Markets have to fit into these criteria because the system is unified. Sixth, international financial institutions such as the IMF make sure that these criteria actually work, particularly for most developing countries, as rules of the game (Castells, 2001:4-7).

3.4.2.2 Production Process

The most important consequence of globalisation is for the production and distribution process itself, which now operates in a web-like structure. It is high volume, flexible and customised (Castells, 1996:93-97). The point is that "the core production of goods and services in every sector has been internationalised through transnational networks of production, distribution and management " (Castells, 2001:8). The new basis of production and therefore the new economy is in fact the Internet, it is the equivalent of electricity in the industrial age, and it induces the new network logic along which the core processes of the economy works.

The new economy is based on the network enterprise, which is not simply a network of enterprises but an organisational form. Most large corporations have decentralised into networks, with departments and production units that are largely autonomous and not hierarchically related to each other. Small and medium businesses have also organised into networks, increasing their competitiveness. These networks are subcontracted into

decentralised networks of multinationals. As a result, a web of internally decentralised networks connecting to external global networks gives structure to both the production process and the new economy. Also, these networks of production and management are increasingly configured around specific projects, products, markets or time periods; with specific consequences for mobility of resources and labour (Castells, 1996:153-5).

3.4.2.3 International trade

International trade between countries has greatly expanded as a result increasing interdependency in the global economy. International trade is concentrated between Western Europe, America and the Asian Pacific. One of the causes of this expansion is the internationalisation of production. Castells argues that the dominant composition of international trade has changed from commodities and raw materials, to manufactured goods, which in turn is being displaced by advanced services. Today advanced services and high value added, high tech manufactured goods constitute the bulk of profitable trade. In this market, Africa has no currency to compete (2001:7).

3.4.2.4 Architecture of the new economy

The informational economy is organised around command and control centres that are able to coordinate, innovate, and manage the intertwined activities of networks of firms. All advanced services in the new economy can be reduced to knowledge generation and information flows, the spatial scattering of which is facilitated by advanced communication technologies. Advanced services have boomed globally, but this is however concentrated in a few nodal centres. These nodes are megacities, which concentrate the directional, productive and managerial functions of the world, as well as the control of the media, the real politics of power and the symbolic capacity to create and diffuse messages. They have immense gravitational power since they articulate the global economy, link up informational networks and concentrate the world's power. All these megacities are nodes in the network of the global city, which is not a place but a process. A process by which the production and consumption of advanced services are connected in a global network. The global city is the architecture of the network society (Castells, 1996:404-6).

3.4.2.5 Labour

Labour, apart from a small professional elite, is not yet global and will probably not become global due to rising xenophobia. Labour is however a global resource because firms may choose to locate close to the cheapest, most skilful or most reliable available labour, firms may attract highly skilled labour and labour will enter any market on its own initiative.

Labour in the global economy, is redefined according to the logic of the dominant functions and processes of the economy. The international spatial division of labour is the result of split in the working space of the high skilled science and technology based labour force and the mass of unskilled workers. Castells has identified four positions in the new division of labour: "the producers of high value, based on informational labour; the producers of high volume, based on lower-cost labour, the producers of raw materials, based on natural endowments; and the redundant producers, reduced to devalued labour" (1996:147). The part of the production process that involves unskilled workers is concentrated in areas with an overflow of cheap labour while skilled labour moves to a milieu of innovation which is a "specific set of relationships of production and management, based on a social organisation that shares a work culture and instrumental goals aimed at generating new knowledge, processes and products" (Castells, 1996:388-90).

3.4.2.6 Science and Technology

Science, technology and information are also organised in global flows. In the new economy, science and technology are essential components of the production process and the capacity for social development. The integration of science and technology is highly asymmetrical in that it is concentrated in leading economies. However, science and technology has the capacity for diffusion because it is embedded in the human mind, and it is through the mobility of professionals, scientists and academics that the international network logic of diffusion is created.

3.4.3 The Logic of Inclusion and Exclusion

The new economy is not a planetary economy; markets for labour, technology, goods and services are not yet fully integrated and will not be because governments exist to foster the

individual interests of their constituencies in global competition. For the same reason, market penetration is not reciprocal. This has led to the regional differentiation of the global economy. The dominant economic system includes only those segments of economic structures, countries and regions which contribute to its functioning, as a result, it is "highly dynamic, highly exclusionary and highly unstable" (1996:102). Castells argues that the new economy is characterised by the double logic of inclusion and exclusion. The new economy operates through networks which connect valuable segments of society while excluding a large majority of the world. The problem is, because globalisation has changed the dominant logic of the world economy, and redefined what is valuable and important, it affects even those it does not include.

3.4.4 Competing in the global economy

In the network society, information technology and globalisation promote one another. Competitiveness in the global economy depends upon the capacity of units (such as firms, regions and nations) to generate and apply knowledge-based information. The ability to compete in the global economy, is dependent on four factors. Firstly, well developed countrywide technological capacity in terms of production, management and communication. Technological capacity as the defining attribute of an economy is probably the most important factor determining global competitiveness. Secondly, access to a large integrated, affluent market is essential for economic growth, which means that the dynamics of trade and FDI determine the capacity for a country or region to develop.

Thirdly, a higher differential between production costs at the production site and prices at the market destination will result in increased competitiveness. This factor only really has an effect if employed in addition to increased technological capacity and access to large affluent markets. Castells argues that "this observation is critical because it precludes in fact the possibility for developing countries to compete on the basis of low costs if they are not able, at the same time, to adapt their production systems to the requirements of the information age" (Castells, 1996:105), or are not granted access to developed markets. Lastly, competitiveness is dependent on "the political capacity of national and supranational institutions to steer the growth strategy of those countries or areas under their jurisdiction" (Castells, 1996:105). Government's actions in creating competitive advantages for the firms

under its rule include managing trade, supporting technological and human resource development, fostering national markets, and providing subsidies and loans.

3.5 Aspects of Society in the New Economy

The disarticulation of space and time as a result of the information technology revolution has not only restructured capitalism and redefined the dominant processes and functions of society, it also holds fundamental consequences for the constitution and expression of society. Essentially, this transformation is articulated through the redefinition of identity and meaning which in turn leads to new manifestations of family, politics, state and social movements. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss every dimension, however a discussion on the role of the state and the environmentalist movement is relevant to the interpretation of NEPAD.

3.5.1 Identity and meaning

Castells argues that the logic of the network society forces the traditional construction of identity into a crisis. The new social meaning of time and space has led to the systematic disjunction between the local and the global. In the network society, identity as people's source of meaning is constructed around a primary identity "that is self-sustaining across time and space". Traditional sources of identity building such as civil societies "shrink and disarticulate because there is no longer continuity between the logic of power making in the global network and the logic of association and representation in specific societies and cultures. The search for meaning takes place then in the reconstruction of defensive identities around communal principles" (Castells, 1997:11). The significance of this for society is that projects or subjects around which social actors mobilise are no longer constructed from the context of civil society, but is simply the continuance of communal resistance. Thus, it is the expression of communal resistance that is at the centre of identity politics in the network society, as well as the main source of potential for social change.

3.5.2 The role of the state in the new economy

In the global economy, there are increasing sources of authority and power organised through networks of capital, production, communication, crime, international institutions,

supranational military apparatus, non-governmental organisations, transnational religions, and public opinion movements. The state also faces increased pressure from below: communities, tribes, localities, cults, and gangs.

Essentially, globalisation has precipitated the decline of the nation state through making national economies dependent on the performance of their financial markets, which are globally integrated. The state has therefore lost control over monetary policies and interest rates - key levers of national policy. The state is also losing its legitimacy and power through the decline of its supporting institutions and processes. The demise of the social welfare system and changes in the nature and relationship of labour, continues to delegitimise the domestic role of the state. The state in the international arena is simply another social actor, less sovereign and more like a power broker in a world of shifting alliances.

"State control over time and space is increasingly bypassed by global flows of capital, goods, services, technology, communication, and information. The state's capture of historical time through its appropriation of tradition and the (re) construction of national identity is challenged by plural identities as defined by autonomous subjects. The state's attempt to reassert its power in the international arena by developing supranational institutions further undermines its sovereignty. And the states effort to restore legitimacy by decentralising administrative power to regional and local levels reinforces centrifugal tendencies by bringing citizens closer to government but increasing their aloofness toward the nation-state" (Castells, 1997:243).

The new role of states is that of agent of globalisation. Their main function today is to diffuse and create the conditions for globalisation in their economies.

Stephen Gelb argues that states will remain the main social actors and agents in integrating national economies into the international markets because of factor (e.g. labour) mobility is as yet imperfect. One of the main effects globalisation has had on the nation state is reflected in the increasing pressure on the state to respond to and interact with global capital. Dominant and economically strong states will obviously do better than weak ones and be able to manipulate global financial structures and rules to their benefit. The point is that "globalisation is thus not likely to render all national states 'powerless', but rather to promote

growing inequality amongst states, just as it promotes growing inequality amongst individuals within and across national borders" (2001:75).

3.5.3 Environmentalism

Castells defines environmentalism as "all forms of collective behaviour that, in their discourse and in their practice, aim at correcting destructive forms of relationship between human action and its natural environment, in opposition to the prevailing structural and institutional logic" and ecology as "a set of beliefs, theories, and projects that consider humankind as a component of a broader, ecosystem and wish to maintain the system's balance in a dynamic evolutionary perspective...environmentalism is ecology in practice, and ecology is environmentalism in theory" (Castells, 1997:112-30).

The fundamental significance of the environmentalist movement lies in the creation of a new socio-biological identity, our common humanity, our status as a species connected to nature is our primary and unifying identity. The implications of this new identity for social development are immense. It is widely acknowledged that poverty is a serious cause of environmental degradation: the burning of forests; polluting of lakes, rivers, oceans; rampant epidemics (Castells, 1998:127). The point is that through connecting with global environmentalist movements, which has become a major public opinion force, social development polices and actors gain enormous leverage in international aid politics. It is to this logic that NEPAD subscribes in emphasising the ecological assets of Africa and the impact of poverty on the degradation of the environment.

3.6 Social Exclusion in the Network Society

Castells defines social exclusion "as the process by which certain individuals and groups are systematically barred from access to positions that would enable them to an autonomous livelihood within the social standards framed by institutions and values in a given context.... Social exclusion is, in fact, the process that disenfranchises a person as labour in the context of capitalism" (1998:73).

Castells contends that there is a systematic relationship between the rise of informational global capitalism and the intensification of inequality, poverty and social exclusion in the

world. This trend is related to the "institutional conditions under which globalisation proceeds and the information technology revolution expands" (Castells, 2000:157).

The linkages between the new informational economy and social exclusion are as follows. Firstly, the flexibility and the networking logic of the new economy induces a logic of inclusion and exclusion. Valuable assets, people and areas are connected while the irrelevant are discarded.

Secondly, a major obstacle for development is the extremely uneven and polarised development of technological infrastructure around the globe. Most areas are extremely underdeveloped. The problem is that those areas and people who are connected are moving further and faster away from the rest of the world. Diffusion of the Internet, facilitates the inclusion of the included and amplifies the exclusion of the excluded (Castells, 2000:157). Castells argues that the implications of the Internet will further entrench inequality because the uses and structure of the Internet is determined by its initial and dominant users, also the Internet amplifies inequalities in educational capacity and cultural capital. In the same vein, different levels of access to and quality of education further exacerbates intellectual and technological polarization. This lack of informational infrastructure, along with the lack of education seriously inhibits large areas of the world to compete efficiently.

Thirdly, "as new technologies, new production systems and the organisation of international trade eliminate traditional agriculture (still employing two-thirds of the people in the world in this end of millennium), a rural exodus of gigantic dimensions is being propelled - particularly in Asia. Rural people are destined to be painfully absorbed into the informal economy of overcrowded megacities on the edge of ecological disaster" (Castells, 1999:9-10).

Lastly, states are increasingly bypassed by global flows, and subject to the enforcers of these flows such as the IMF, resulting in the deconstruction of the welfare state and the fundamental challenging of the social contract (Castells, 1999:10).

3.6.1 The unsustainability of the system

Castells argues that the notion that a system which excludes two thirds of humanity, can continue unhindered, is simply naïve. There is a perception that a trickle down effect will eventually improve the conditions of the excluded as they become connected to the system, in the mean time, the transition must be smoothed by charity. The problem lies in the time frame. However, in spite of the trickle down effect, Castells argues that such a system is not only morally wrong, but also economically and technologically unsustainable, due to three built in contradictions (2001:19).

Firstly, the volatility of financial markets is systemic. Fluctuations in the financial markets are separate from the traditional business cycle. The danger lies in a downturn in the business cycle coinciding with a conjunctural downturn in volatility, which could invoke a serious economic crisis. The trouble is that more and more people hold their assets in the stock market than in any other form (e.g. real estate), and that financial volatility is systemic and electronic, and therefore very difficult to regulate (2001:19). This economic dependency on a highly unstable, uncontrollable and interdependent system means that the repercussions of market activity is much more pervasive and far reaching. Therefore a profound market crash would cascade into a global financial crisis, on a scale and intensity not yet experienced, resulting in mass revolt and a fundamental restructuring of the capitalist system.

The second contradiction is the extraordinary increase in productivity and economic growth in core economies without corresponding market expansion to absorb this increased output. The increased ratio of productivity over market expansion will lead to a crisis of overcapacity and under demand. Thirdly, due to the extraordinary dynamism and creativity of the system, the new economy needs talent, innovation and creativity to thrive. At the moment, the rate of growth of high tech industries is far outstripping the rate of growth of the pool of talent needed to foster productivity. Therefore, without a process of development that produces talent on a global scale for the development of all countries, the system is inherently unstable (Castells, 2001:20).

Economic development based on a cost-lowering formula is simply not tenable. Competition between firms based on the worsening of work conditions and the concentration of productivity will kill incentives for workers to invest in their own mental capacity, which will

result in a slowing of the learning curve which in turn will restrict both purchasing power and the drive towards innovation. The danger lies in the technological polarization between the techno-elite and the population at large. Under conditions of exclusion from the global economy, the comparison of such a small elite with its wealth and power will simply fuel a fundamentalist rage and terrorist reactions. Therefore, "the disassociation between economic growth and social development in the information age is not only wrong, but impossible to sustain" (Castells, 1999:12).

3.6.2 Social Development in the Information Age

Social development in the information age is becoming increasingly complex and in a sense fragile. Economic growth is still the aim of social development. However, factors essential for sustainable social development are increasing and interdependent. Castells argues that sustainable economic growth is dependent on the entire social organisation becoming productive.

Today the source of productivity and competitiveness is the ability to generate and process knowledge and information. "Knowledge and information are the keys to productivity; connectivity is the key to global competitiveness. Knowledge and information can be applied to all activities, both in the production and in the delivery of goods and services. Development today is, above all, development of the capacity to process knowledge-based information effectively and apply it to production and to the enhancement of the quality of life" (Castells, 2000:160). Therefore, education is an essential component of social development, and a source of productivity.

However, this productivity potential is only released if labour enjoys "good health, decent housing, psychological stability, cultural fulfilment - in other words, a multidimensional improvement in the quality of life." (Castells, 1999:11) Social development therefore is a process which leads "to cultural development, which leads to innovation, which leads to economic development, which fosters institutional stability and trust; and this underlies a new, synergistic model that integrates economic growth and the enhancement of the quality of life."

3.6.3. A Technological Marshall Plan

"What is to be done?"

*Each time an intellectual has tried to answer this question,
and seriously implement the answer, catastrophe has ensued."*

Castells, 1998:378

In a keynote address at the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in New York (12 May 2000) Castells proposes a "Technological Marshall Plan". He argues that the important factors essential for development are global connectivity, information technology infrastructure, and especially human resource development in terms of education, a massive upgrading in the quality and scope of teaching and access to education. These will encourage economic interaction and trade between the developed and the developing world. Castells emphasises that because trade is an expression of the international production system, development is, in fact, "the ability to enhance the value produced in each node, increasing competitiveness on the basis of higher productivity" (Castells, 2000:156). Today, the Internet is the most dynamic productivity enhancing tool available, and its incorporation into the logic of development strategies is essential for success.

The premise underlying Castells' development paradigm is as follows: the provision of public services such as water, electricity, sewerage, transportation, health services are not prerequisites for development, they are the corresponding results of development. The key issue is how to generate enough economic growth to develop the infrastructure and technological knowledge to provide these services and maintain them. "The policy proposition is that only an Internet-based economy can generate enough value in the new, global economy to enable countries to develop fast enough to provide for themselves without having to resort to international charity on a permanent basis" (Castells, 2000:160).

The "Technological Marshall Plan" for global development is an idea aimed at "breaking the bonds of global apartheid" (Bond, 2002:1). A massive, sudden co-ordinated injection of resources and knowledge into the devalued areas of the planet is needed to reverse the dynamics that are fragmenting the world. Such a plan would aim to reconstruct the world through the stimulation of global demand by public works in creating a new infrastructure in high technology areas. Not only will such a plan allow the North / developed countries to

assume moral responsibility and to tame potential sources of geopolitical stability, it also holds economic and technological advantages.

Firstly, demand especially for high technology markets will be expanded in the following ways: "(a) the immediate impact of subsidised infrastructure building; (b) the future expansion of dynamic high-tech based economies; (c) the development of new uses of advanced technology to satisfy needs that are not marketable at this point, for instance in health care on-line expert systems or distance learning education" (Castells, 2000:166).

Secondly, the fundamental problem of a lack of a large enough pool of talent to sustain high technology development would be solved by opening up and expanding networks of educated elites. This is not brain drain because the reality today is one of highly skilled workers and entrepreneurs moving back and forth between different nodes of production and innovation" (Castells, 2000:166). All this is simply dependent on migration and company policy.

3.7 Africa

3.7.1 Castells' understanding of the dynamics of Africa's exclusion

Castells explains Africa's socio-economic demise as follows. "The exhaustion of the model of primary-commodity production, due to the deterioration in the terms of trade, led most African countries, and particularly the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa to virtual economic bankruptcy in the 1970's" (1996:133). The traditional trade model employed by most African countries became obsolete under worldwide economic restructuring. Primitive African economies could not compete in a new informational global economy simply because they could not generate the factors enhancing competitiveness.

The oil shocks of 1979 and subsequent rise in interest rates along with policies of structural adjustment consolidated Africa's economic disintegration. Furthermore, liberalization policies did not attract investment or improve competitiveness, but instead destroyed large sectors of agricultural production for local markets, which along with severe droughts and civil strife led to a dependency on food imports and foreign aid. In fact, the survival of African economies depends on international aid and foreign borrowing, resulting in Africa being the most heavily indebted region of the world. At the same time, Africa is increasingly being

bypassed by foreign direct investment (FDI). In 1992 Africa's share of FDI going to developing countries was only 6 % (Castells, 1998:90).

Castells accepts Paul Collier's explanation for Africa's marginalisation. He argues that there are three main reasons: "an unreliable institutional environment, a lack of production and communications infrastructure, as well as human capital; and erroneous economic policies which penalize exports and investment for the sake of local business favoured by their association with the state bureaucracy" (Castells, 1998:90).

The entire continent is not completely marginalized nor is it external to the global economy. In fact, Africa is disarticulated by its fragmented incorporation into the global economy through specific linkages. Firstly, there is a selective integration of a small affluent bureaucratic class consisting of the ruling elite and their networks of patronage, which through their control over earnings from exports and international aid, link up to the network economy. This is expressed clearly through the high level of consumption of expensive imported products and capital flows from African countries to personal accounts and profitable investments throughout the world. Secondly, traditional economic sectors are increasingly disorganised through the conversion from substance agriculture and local market production to export-orientated agriculture, which is in fact marginal in the world economy with very little scope for growth, which in turn means marginal growth for African economies. Volatility in international markets results in even greater disarticulation of domestic economic organisation (Castells, 1998:91).

The convergence of disinvestment in Africa by both the international business and African elites and the information technology revolution has led to the "de-linking of African firms and labour from the workings of the new economy characterising most of the world, while linking up African elites to the global networks of wealth, power, information and communication" (Castells, 1998:92).

The logic of Africa's technological apartheid is explained by Castells to illustrate how Africa's marginalisation is directly exacerbated by each leap forward in technological change in the developed world. The lack of physical infrastructure and human skills to operate information technology make it impossible for Africa to compete internationally either in manufacturing or in advanced services. The balance of trade becomes unsustainable as the

value of technology-intensive goods and services increase in relation to agricultural goods, which limits import capacity. The lack of technological development, means that this dimension is not incorporated into the only viable sector left in Africa, agriculture, which ensues in a downward spiral of competitiveness through the cutting of costs, rather than through increased productivity (Castells, 1998:95).

Africa has lost its significance for the world because raw materials (which Africa has and used to sell) used to form the material basis of the old economy, today in informational capitalism, advanced services and high value added, high tech manufactured goods constitute the bulk of profitable trade. Castells argues that structural irrelevance of the continent is a more threatening condition than dependency. However this is exactly the case, "most of Africa ceased to exist as an economically viable entity in the informational / global economy" (1996:136).

3.7.2 Castells' interpretation of the African State

Castells explores the role of the state in Africa, focussing on its predatory nature in comparison with the developmental (but not democratic) model followed by many Asian countries. He argues that the predatory state has become the largest threat to development and even survival in Africa today.

There are three major characteristics of the predatory rule in Africa. Firstly, domestic and international (aid) resources are processed according to the logic of personal accumulation, in the interest of the ruling elite regardless of the damage done to economic development and political stability of the country. Secondly, the main source of wealth is through control of the state and access to state power. This fuels competition between different political factions fighting for access to wealth through the state, resulting in a continuous pattern of violent confrontations, the loss of institutional credibility and stability, and the increasingly decisive role played by the military. Thirdly, a strategic network of patronage and clientelism is developed to foster political support in order to consolidate political power. "A mixture of criteria, encompassing ethnicity, territoriality, and economics, contribute to form networks of variable geometry that constitute the real life politics in most of Africa" (Castells, 1998:99).

Castells investigates the root of the predatory state and concludes that it is the result of a complex web of relations between ethnicity, society, the state and the economy.

Firstly, ethnic differences today are politically constructed rather than culturally rooted. The importance of ethnicity in the post-colonial state lies in its value as a source of political cohesion and legitimacy in rallying support for access to state resources, as well as wealth and power. In other words, the centrality of ethnic consciousness in African politics today is a result of its historical role as the main channel to state power and resources. This role was developed by and modelled on the structure of the colonial state. Because the colonial state extended their administration through traditional chiefs, the customary state was consolidated and as a result "became a fundamental source of control over land and labour, so that belonging to a certain tribe was the only acknowledged channel to access resources, and the only recognised avenue of intermediation *vis à vis* the legal, modern state, that was the connection with the vast resources of the outside world, the international system of wealth and power" (Castells, 1998:107). After independence, the fragmented, ethicised customary state was kept in place by the ruling elites as a means of access to resources. "Therefore, it is the state, and its elites, that shapes and reshaped ethnic identity and allegiance, not the other way around" (Castells, 1998:107).

The development of a plural democratic state was made unviable by firstly, "the sharpening of ethnic differences, and the crystallization of ethnicity in social status and political power, [which] came from the historical dynamics of the social basis of the state, colonial at first, independent nation-state later". Secondly, "the incapacity of ethnically constituted political elites to transcend the definition inherited from the past since they used their ethnicity to as the rallying flag to seize state power or to resist it" (Castells, 1998:110). Entrenched through bloody wars and mass genocide, "ethnicity overtook politics, after having been shaped, and hardened by the politics of the state".

The second feature of contemporary African politics is the weak nature of the nation state, due to the lack of a national basis encompassing a shared geography, culture and history. The lack of national identity and a shared culture debilitated the capacity of the state to mobilise resources for development.

Thirdly, the dynamics of the African political economy structured around networks of patronage and clientelism, and intensified by the massive shrinkage of resources resulting from economic crisis and structural adjustment policies, had serious consequences. States, especially after the Cold War engaged in the "political economy of begging", where the suffering of its people became currency to elicit more international aid and foreign lending. Refugee status, survival under NGO's was the other manifestation of this economy of begging. The shrinking of legitimate resources led to a large-scale involvement in illicit trade. Reduced resources also led to increased fractioning of patronage networks, as the ruling elite had to choose between different clienteles, resulting in intensified struggles for power and control of the state (Castells, 1998:114).

In concluding the part on Africa, Castells points out that an alternative model of development that focuses on self reliance and rejecting the dominant values embedded in global capitalism, one that is more "socially and environmentally sustainable, is not a utopia, and there is an abundance of realistic, technically sound proposals for self-reliant development models... [which] assume the necessary partial de-linking of African economies from global networks of capital accumulation..." (Castells, 1998:128). However, such a de-linking would require a revolution from a grass roots level. Which is highly unlikely given the fragmented nature of current African society. The fundamental obstacle to such a development strategy is on the one hand, the ruling elite and the structure and dynamics of African predatory politics, aimed only at the consolidation of their networks of patronage. On the other hand, this perverted political system is structurally maintained by vested international interests and the fragmented incorporation of Africa into the global economy. The only development alternative is then the one which Castells explains as a "Technological Marshall Plan".

3.7.3 Arguments against Africa's status as a lost continent.

Charles Soludo (2001:55) argues that Africa is not doomed to the "black holes of informational capitalism". Firstly, "the same endogenous growth theory that predicts path dependence also admits of the cumulative and virtuous effects of shocks", therefore economies "trapped in low-equilibrium levels could be liberated by some positive shocks". Along with current will for political and economic reform, Africa does still stand a real chance for economic recovery. Secondly, "the history of humanity has shown previously

destitute locations turn into harbingers of modern civilization", as proved by the totally unexpected rise of Asian economies.

The point is that globalisation, although inevitable, is subject to reform and change simply because its present form is the result of human actions, not an invisible hand. The lesson that growth is not sustainable without equity must be extended to the global level. Appropriate global governance structures to properly mediate conflicts, resolve market failures and devise and implement social insurance mechanisms, is what is needed.

"In essence, the disjuncture of the globalising market structure *vis-à-vis* the politics of resource allocation (restricted to national boundaries) creates tensions and unsustainable consequences that can only be mediated through reformed multilateral arrangements" (2001:56). The argument that the world lacks the political will to change current structures is refuted by Soludo based on two points. Firstly, "the unproven calculations of possible political resistance should not stop us from the normative thinking of what should be" (2001:57). Secondly, "the theory of the impossibility of change in the current form of globalisation is not valid"... because "it assumes myopia on the part of otherwise rational agents.... The current beneficiaries of globalisation know, as Castells argues, that the system is not sustainable, and they are rational enough not to wait for the 'revolt' predicted by Castells to materialise before they can act to maximise their long-term interests" (2001:57).

"The central point is that unlike the Castells description of what is, there is a need to coordinate the disparate but important ideas that are emerging and which proactively think about what can be done" (Soludo, 2001:57). "Africans on their part need a new consciousness and organisation to deal properly with the new phenomenon.... There is no prize for isolationism. The question is not whether Africa should integrate or not, but to integrate into what, when and how? Already, Africa is integrated deeply the global system, albeit at the wrong end of the stick (aid dependence, capital flight, brain drain). A challenge now is to reverse this form of integration" (Soludo, 2001:58). The question is to what extent can NEPAD redefine Africa's integration into the global economy. In order to begin a dialogue on this question, exactly what NEPAD sees Africa integrating into must be delineated.

Joel Netshitenzhe, the CEO of the Government Communication and Information System (GCIS), argues that there are three objective conditions which offer the excluded African

continent a point of entry to the new global economy. Firstly, building on Castells' point that productivity in the developed world is far overtaking consumption demand and that labour conditions are a serious impediment to profitability, Netshitenzhe asks "is Africa not virgin territory for expansion, both as a market and an investment destination?" (2001:83).

Secondly, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, there exists a historic opportunity for the consolidation of democracy and respect for human rights. A large part of the success of the Asian development model was the massive assistance received from the West due to their need to contain revolutionary uprisings in order to consolidate democracy in the East. Netshitenzhe argues that it is in the political self-interest of the developed world to engage in a partnership with Africa for democracy and development (Netshitenzhe, 2002:83).

"Thirdly, the shrinking of time and space in terms of visual media, disease, migration, global environmental degradation and so on, turns into a common interest the resolution of Africa's conflicts and epidemics, and the maintenance of its environmental endowments as one of the lungs of the whole planet" (2002:84). The rhetoric and logic used by Netshitenzhe in this quote is very similar to that used in the NEPAD policy document.

A new set of circumstances and a "historical opportunity" (to quote NEPAD) has arisen. On an international level, the emergence of the 'post-Washington consensus', a new level of discourse on global economics, the role of the state, the architecture of the Bretton Woods institutions and the move towards new world governance in politics point to the possibility of a "new paradigm for the common good of humanity". Added to this, in terms of Africa, the pressures for good governance in politics, economics and social issues created by the moves towards regional integration as well as the campaign for debt relief which has brought into focus the responsibility of the continent to address issues of prudent, sustainable and people-centred utilisation of resources.

According to Netshitenzhe, these factors "augur well for a new world agenda in partnership with Africa, for globalisation in the interests of the majority. The question is whether Africa is prepared to seize the moment". The biggest problem facing Africa is however the "brittleness" of the African state, ongoing conflicts, and the culture of violent accumulation of resources by the ruling elite. How does one institute a new and sustainable legality, and

create state integrity and sovereignty? This along with objective phenomena which have shaped the dynamics of the new system, constitute the challenge facing the excluded (2001:84). Netshitenzhe however, argues that even objective phenomena can be changed in the long run and therefore "there is no 'black hole' of despair; but green fields of opportunity. That is Africa: that is what the continent should convince the world about".

Chapter 4:

NEPAD & Castells

"And so, President Mbeki says to me, "what should we do in Africa?" While I search for the words, my eyes shift to the windows of his office through which I can see the gardens of the Union building, the symbol of apartheid for so many years and now the head office of the Government which represents Africa's last hope..."

Manuel Castells⁷

El Pais, 31 July 2000

4.1 Introduction

This thesis is an investigation into the correlations between the theory of the "Information Age" explained by Manuel Castells and the African development programme: the *New Partnership for Africa's Development*. Therefore this chapter aims to illustrate certain parallels between the two in the following areas:

- The evolution of globalisation and the dimensions of informational capitalism.
- The source of competitiveness in the global economy.
- The marginalisation of Africa as a threat to global stability.
- The networking logic of the new dominant economic system.
- The role of information and technology, as well as human resource development in a developmental paradigm.
- Identity and meaning as expressed in terms of culture and environmentalism.
- The new face of social development: A Technological Marshall Plan.
- The role of the state in Africa and in the Network Society.

Although there is a strong call for Africa to disconnect from the global economy and follow a more inward focussing approach to development; and Castells (1998:128) too noted the "abundance of realistic, technically sound proposals for self-reliant development models...[that] assume a partial de-linking of African economies from global networks of capital accumulation ", this idea is posed with a serious impediment. According to Castells, it

⁷ Interview with Manuel Castells by J.M. Mendiluce. Universitat Oberta de Catalunya: The Virtual University http://www.uoc.edu/web/eng/articles/mendiluce/jm_mendiluce_africa.htm

is a matter of will, neither the elite nor the youth are willing to return to the past, and in the wake of block geopolitics and the IMF's reign of devastation, history cannot be undone. Castells argues that Africa is left with only two real options: to live from international charity or to take the serious decision to compete in the techno-economical global game. NEPAD proposes to meet this challenge. The question posed by this thesis is to what degree does NEPAD incorporate Castells' reading of the "techno-economical global game" into the strategy for African recovery.

4.2 Globalisation and Informational Capitalism

4.2.1 The New Global Economy

In paragraphs 28 to 41, NEPAD discusses 'Africa and the Global Revolution', with specific focus on the source of the new economic system, the process of marginalisation, the threat the current situation poses to global stability and the case for restructuring the global financial architecture.

Castells' main argument is that advancements in information and communications technologies (especially the development of the Internet), has led to the disarticulation of the traditional meaning of space and time. The reinvention of space and time, as well as new opportunities of experience offered by information and communication technology, has facilitated new expressions of economy, society and politics.

"In sum, globalisation is a new historical reality - not simply the one invented by neo-liberal ideology to convince citizens to surrender to markets, but also the one inscribed in processes of capitalist restructuring, innovation and competition, and enacted through the powerful medium of new information and communication technologies" (Castells, 1999:5). In a sense, advancements in information and communication technologies has facilitated the evolution of capitalism through the process of globalisation, which has resulted in government policy and the firms pursuit of profit having global repercussions.

NEPAD concurs: "We readily admit that globalisation is a product of scientific and technological advances, many of which have been market driven. Yet, governments - particularly those in the developed world - have, in partnership with the private sector, played

an important role in shaping its form, content and course" (paragraph 39). This point is so important that Castells must be quoted again: the "firm's search for profitability and nation's mobilisation towards competitiveness induced variable arrangements in the new historical equation between technology and productivity. In the process, they created, and shaped a new global economy that may be the most characteristic and important feature of informational capitalism" (1996:88).

Informational capitalism is at the heart of Castells' theory. Essentially informational capitalism refers to the current dominant economic system facilitated by information and communication technologies. The defining characteristic of this new brand of capitalism is that the fact that productivity and competitiveness are now generated through knowledge and information because new information and communication technologies make knowledge and information a fundamental part of the production process. Also fundamental to the character of this new economy is its global nature, due to the disarticulation of space and time this economy "has the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale" (Castells, 1996:92). The point is that the dominant functions and processes of informational capitalism are *organised* on a global scale through flows either directly or through a network of linkages between agents.

Therefore there are three defining characteristics of informational capitalism:

- It is powered by information and communication technologies.
- It works instantaneously on a global scale.
- The new source of productivity and competitiveness is information and technology.

The question is to what extent does NEPAD acknowledge the features of informational capitalism as explained by Castells.

Castells' primary argument is quite clearly expressed in paragraphs 28 to 30. Paragraph 29 explains the source of this transformation; "the current economic revolution has, in part been made possible by advances in information and communications technology (ICT), which have reduced the cost of and increased the speed of communications across the globe, abolishing pre-existing barriers of **space and time**, and affecting all aspects of social and economic life" (own emphasis).

NEPAD goes on to mention how the production process and financial markets have been transformed. NEPAD states that this revolution has "made possible the integration of national systems of production and finance, and is reflected in an exponential growth in the scale of cross-border flows of goods services and capital" (paragraph 29). Also, "the integration of national systems of production has made it possible to 'slice up the value chain' in many manufacturing and service sector processes" (paragraph 30). Here NEPAD is referring to the internationalisation of the production process, which is explained by Castells as a system which is organised in international production networks that are managed daily in real time.

NEPAD also understands how the role of the state in the international arena has changed. The state is now simply a social actor in the global market: "the enhanced mobility of capital means that borrowers, whether governments or private entities, must compete with each other for capital in global rather than national markets" (paragraph 30).

4.2.2 The resulting logic of inclusion and exclusion

Castells notes that there is an increasing inequality within and between countries. Social exclusion is a process which results from structural barriers created by prevailing institutions and values, that encumber peoples access to social positions that would allow them a means of survival. In the network society, the logic of inclusion and exclusion is enacted, on a local as well as an international level, through one's value in terms of the dominant system of informational capitalism. In paragraphs 32 and 33 NEPAD illustrates this logic: "On the one hand, opportunities have increased to create or expand wealth, acquire knowledge and skills, and improve access to goods and services - in brief, to improve the quality of life. In some parts of the world, the pursuit of greater openness of the global economy has created opportunities for lifting millions of people out of poverty" (paragraph 32). "On the other hand, greater integration has also led to the further marginalisation of those countries that are unable to compete effectively.... **A fissure between inclusion and exclusion has emerged within and among nations**" (paragraph 33, own emphasis).

NEPAD argues that "in the absence of fair and just global rules, globalisation has increased the ability of the strong to advance their interests to the detriment of the weak, especially in the areas of trade, finance and technology" (paragraph 33). Under informational capitalism, the primary motivation is still the pursuit of profit, and because of imperfect factor mobility,

strong states, still have great power in shaping the international market to their benefit. (They do this because by increasing the relative competitiveness of their constituents, they retain power.) The point is the process of globalisation is limiting "the space for developing countries to control their own development, as the system makes no provision for compensating the weak" (paragraph 33).

Castells argues that "the disassociation between economic growth and social development in the information age is not only morally wrong, but also impossible to sustain" (Castells, 1999:12). NEPAD echoes this point : "the increasing polarisation of wealth and poverty is one of a number of processes that have accompanied globalisation, and which threaten its sustainability" (paragraph 35). "The imperative of development, therefore, not only poses a challenge to moral conscience; it is, in fact, fundamental to the sustainability of the globalisation process" (paragraph38).

4.3 The Threat to Global Stability and Security

Castells has identified several reasons as to why the current state of affairs is unsustainable, in terms of economic stability as well as political security. Firstly, the volatility of financial markets is systemic. Fluctuations in the financial markets are separate from the traditional business cycle. The danger lies in a downturn in the business cycle coinciding with a conjunctural downturn in volatility, which could invoke a serious economic crisis. NEPAD too refers to the volatility of the financial system: "the closing years of the last century saw a major financial collapse in much of the developing world, which not only threatened the stability of the global financial system, but also the global economy as a whole" (paragraph 36).

The second problem Castells notes lies in the extraordinary increase in productivity and economic growth in core economies without corresponding market expansion to absorb this increased output. The increased ratio of productivity over market expansion will lead to a crisis of overcapacity and under demand. In paragraph 38 NEPAD states that "Improvements in the living standards of the marginalised offer massive potential for growth in the entire international economy, through the creation of new markets and by harnessing increased economic capacity. This will bring with it greater stability on a global scale, accompanied by a sense of economic and social well-being".

Thirdly, due to the extraordinary dynamism and creativity of the system, the new economy needs talent, innovation and creativity to thrive. Therefore the development of an international pool of talent is essential to the sustainability of the system. NEPAD states that "Africa has already made a significant contribution to world culture through literature, music, visual arts and other cultural forms, but its real potential remains untapped because of its limited integration into the global economy. The *New Partnership for Africa's Development* will enable Africa to increase its contribution to science, culture and technology" (paragraph 16). In the long run, African development would significantly increase the world market and also integrate the continent's human and natural resources into the global economy in a dynamic and safe way.

Fourthly, in terms of a political perspective, the idea that those who are excluded from the network society will simply accept their marginalisation and economic suppression is naïve. Nowhere in history has there been repression that has not been met with resistance. Expressions of such resistance have already been found in social movements against the global order. "Some people's dream of a shrinking planet, made up of a highly productive, very affluent, avid consumer minority, floating on a cloud over low-skilled generic labour and ignoring the black holes into which devalued people and locales are doomed to sink, is simply untenable. It is a nightmare, shaken by the rage of fundamentalism and by the fear of desperate terrorist threats" (Castells, 1999:12).

NEPAD too notes the political unsustainability of the current state of affairs: "other factors exist that pose longer-term risks. These include the rapid increase in the numbers of the socially excluded in different parts of the world, which contributes to political instability, civil war and military conflict on the one hand, and a new pattern of mass migration on the other" (paragraph 37). Another risk that must be neutralized is environmental degradation due to poverty (as a result of marginalisation) and pollution (as a result of industrial production).

4.4 The source of competitiveness in the global economy.

One of the expected outcomes of NEPAD's Programme of Action is the "diversification of productive activities, **enhanced international competitiveness** and increased exports" (paragraph 69, own emphasis).

Castells argues that the ability to compete in the global economy is dependent on four factors. Firstly, well-developed countrywide technological capacity in terms of production, management and communication is needed to facilitate the development of an economy that will be able to link up to the global economy that works as a unit in real time. For this reason NEPAD emphasises the importance of bridging the infrastructure gap, especially in terms of information and communication technologies (this specific emphasis has been explained above in section 4.3).

Secondly, access to a large integrated, affluent market is essential for economic growth, which means that the dynamics of trade and FDI determine the capacity for a country or region to develop. The Market Access Initiative (section C2) paragraphs 153 - 170 specifically refer to the dynamics of trade that is essential to African development. This Initiative firstly expresses the need for the diversification of production so as to widen the export base.

There are several dimensions through which NEPAD discusses the objectives and actions to be taken on an African and international level: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, tourism, services and the promotion of the private sector. The promotion of African exports dimension, brings together and focuses on the role of the international community. Although there are various strategies NEPAD envisions Africa can take to enhance its international position, the real change must come from the international community if there is to be a fundamental improvement in the quality of life for Africa's people. NEPAD aims to negotiate measures and agreements to facilitate access to an international, "open, predictable and geographically diversified" (paragraph 167) market for African products.

African participation in the world trading system must also be transformed. NEPAD calls for "the provision of a forum in which developing countries can collectively call for structural adjustment by developed countries in those industries in which the natural competitive advantage now lies with the developing world" (paragraph 167).

Foreign direct investment must be encouraged; therefore, NEPAD must enhance "transparency and predictability as preconditions for increased investment, in return for boosting supply capacity and enhancing the gains from existing market access" (paragraph 167).

NEPAD also calls for the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade with Africa. "Improved access to the markets of industrialised countries for products in which Africa has a comparative advantage is crucial.... Progress on this issue would greatly enhance the economic growth and diversification of African production and exports. Dependence on ODA would decline and infrastructure projects would become more viable as a result of increased economic activity" (paragraph 170).

Therefore, thirdly, a higher differential between production costs at the production site and prices at the market destination will result in increased competitiveness. This factor only really has an effect if employed in addition to increased technological capacity and access to large affluent markets. Castells argues that "this observation is critical because it precludes in fact the possibility for developing countries to compete on the basis of low costs if they are not able, at the same time, to adapt their production systems to the requirements of the information age" (Castells, 1996:105), or are not granted access to developed markets.

Lastly, competitiveness is dependent on "the political capacity of national and supranational institutions to steer the growth strategy of those countries or areas under their jurisdiction" (Castells, 1996:105). Government's actions in creating competitive advantages for the firms under its rule include managing trade, supporting technological and human resource development, fostering national markets, and providing subsidies and loans. "Governments should remove constraints on business activity and encourage the creative talents of African entrepreneurs" (NEPAD paragraph 153).

Essentially, NEPAD is the continental strategy of the supranational African Union, aimed at coordinating a continental economic recovery. Whether African organisations and governments have the *political capacity* to steer this growth strategy, is not explicated by NEPAD, however, they certainly have expressed their *political will* to do it in Section III.

4.5 Networking logic

Castells argues that the dominant processes in the world are enacted through networks. The linking up of different markets, media or organisations with the same goal (e.g. NGO's) structures all aspects of human interaction. Essentially what NEPAD aims to do is to facilitate a point of entry for Africa into this global network of flows. Although the policy

document does not explicitly refer to networking, the underlying principles of the partnership concept is based on the fostering of linkages with the developed world. Furthermore, the focus on building regional networks to promote increased integration is one of the expected outcomes of the Programme of Action.

In a subsequent document issued by the authors of NEPAD, the networking role of the policy is elaborated on: "NEPAD has not been constructed and come into existence in a vacuum. Therefore it is important that it be linked to existing initiatives and programmes for Africa. In providing the focal point and overall strategic framework for engagement NEPAD does not seek to replace or compete with these initiatives and programmes, but rather to consciously establish linkages and synergies between NEPAD and existing initiatives.... A major effort is also going on to continuously factor NEPAD imperatives into the outcomes of international conferences ... to ensure the integration of NEPAD into the multilateral system (www.dfa.gov.za).

NEPAD aims to act as a facilitator for African connections with the developed world. The initiation of global linkages is essential to foster the inclusion of different African nodes into the network. Only through this linking up will Africa be incorporated into global financial and market flows, which will lead to economic and social development. The fundamental impetus for the initiative is to initiate, lobby for and facilitate a process of mutually beneficial interaction between the continent and the rest of the world. Since the dominant processes of the current world system operate in flows through networks, any development strategy must adhere to that fundamental logic. The essence of NEPAD is therefore embedded in its networking logic.

4.6 Information Technology, the Internet & Development

4.6.1 Information and Communication Technology

Castells argues any economy which integrates into the global economy without incorporating information technology into production and development, will quickly reach a limit, ideologically and educationally. How can an economy become part of a global system that operates on the basis of information and technology if the economy lacks communications infrastructure and human resources? It is tantamount to industrialisation without electricity.

Castells often draws the parallel between electricity and the Internet, as the driving forces behind the industrial and information revolutions. The question is to what extent does NEPAD acknowledge the significance of the assimilation of information and communication technology into its development paradigm.

In the introduction NEPAD illustrates the direness of the African situation with six statistics (paragraph 4). The first four refer to child mortality rate, life expectancy, access to safe water and the fact that half the population lives on less than US\$ 1 per day. The next two statistics are in connection with information technology and education, which shows the importance the authors of the document place on ICT development and education. Those statistics are: "The rate of illiteracy for people over 15 is 41 per cent" and secondly, "there are only 18 mainline telephones per 1000 people in Africa, compared to 146 for the world as a whole and 567 for high-income countries". Surely this indicates that the paradigm in which NEPAD has positioned itself is one in which information and technology play a defining role.

In section B: Sectoral priorities, precedence is given to developing what Castells sees as essential for any development strategy: "Under the informational paradigm, two key factors of production are necessary: information processing and communication infrastructure, and human resources able to use it" (Castells, 2000:160). Section B1 focuses on infrastructure development, especially investing in information and communication technologies. Section B2 is the human resource development initiative aimed at bridging the education gap and reversing the brain drain. Section B6 is the part on the Science and Technology Platform, which outlines the objectives and actions needed to foster the development and incorporation of ICTs as well as the support of African scientists and researchers and also, "centres of excellence" (NEPAD, paragraphs 142-3).

In the first sectoral priority: Bridging the Infrastructure Gap, developing physical infrastructures such as roads, airports, seaports, railways, waterways and telecommunication facilities is addressed. Specific focus is however given to bridging the digital divide. Paragraph 104: "Information and communication technologies (ICTs), driven by the convergence of computers, telecommunications and traditional media, **are crucial for the knowledge-based economy of the future.** Rapid advances in technology and the diminishing cost of acquiring the new ICT tools have opened up new windows of opportunity for African countries to accelerate their economic growth and development" (own emphasis).

NEPAD (paragraph 105) advocates that the employment of ICTs would bring "unprecedented comparative advantages" to the continent in almost all areas targeted for development, especially: the good governance and democratisation process; the integration of Africa into the **"new information society, using its cultural diversity as a leverage"** (own emphasis); producing a critical mass of ICT professionals; research and development as well as learning and health education programmes; expanding trade, investment and finance opportunities; conflict management; and the control of pandemic diseases.

Criticism has been launched against NEPAD for its emphasis on ICT development. Patrick Bond (2002:7) refers to NEPAD's "grand visions of information and communications technology - hopelessly unrealistic, considering the lack of simple reliable electricity across the continent". Castells too, noted the strategic problems posed by technological underdevelopment: "Indeed, before moving into electronics, Africa first needs a reliable electricity supply.... Furthermore, the critical aspect of computer use in the Information Age is its networking capability, which relies on telecommunications infrastructure and network connectivity. Africa's telecommunications are meagre, compared with current world standards" (Castells, 1998:92). However, in his Keynote address at the Economic and Social Council of the UN (May 2000), Castells qualifies his earlier 'common sense' statement about electricity preceding the Internet: "Yes, people need an electrical grid together with the Internet, but in a developmental sense rather than in this 'obvious' statement of starting with the basics first (such as electricity) that in fact belies our current technical capabilities" (Castells, 2000:9).

Castells envisions the building of an Internet infrastructure on two levels: the revamping and extension of the telecommunications system; and the development of the mobile internet based on new cellular telephony and satellite communication. Advancements in technology cannot be stopped, and that which is unimaginable today, may become reality overnight with unbelievable consequences for development, such as for example, solar powered, satellite connected Internet access.

The critical role of the Internet is emphasized by African scholar Lual A. Deng (2002:22-3) from the Institute of Development, Environment and Agricultural Studies in 'New Sudan'. In the context of agricultural development, expanded investment in ICT (on models of e-Agriculture or e-Farm Africa) will greatly enhance the productivity of rural and industrial

agricultural production. NEPAD's emphasis on developing the Internet, human resources and transportation networks facilitates agriculture's role as a renewed source of growth for the continent. The point is that through incorporating ICT, the enhanced productivity released will permeate all sectors of economy and society, resulting in at the very least social upliftment, if not increased international competitiveness.

4.6.2 Human Resource Development and Education

Castells also, however, points out that the real precondition for informational development is the expansion of the quantity and quality of education. The second sectoral priority namely: "The Human Resource Development Initiative, including reversing the Brain Drain" aims to address this issue. Although real progress will be a result of increased education and the reversal of the brain drain, in Africa, human resource development has the added dimension of poverty reduction and health care development.

In education development, NEPAD (paragraph 117-120) aims to consolidate universal primary school education, expand secondary education and promote networks of specialised research and higher education institutions. At all levels, enhanced quality of curriculum and incorporation of ICT is envisioned. Although NEPAD does not propose specific strategies that can be analysed in terms of Castells' ideas on education, the importance the document places on education correlates with Castells' view of its necessity in informational development. Castells proposes an educational system capable of teaching (and not only of 'storing' children) with continuous teacher training and recycling that uses tutorial systems centred on the Internet. Adult education and distance learning through the Internet are fundamental aspects of reducing functional illiteracy and a source of new possibilities (Castells, 2001:198). NEPAD needs to incorporate the logic of the Internet facilitating the education processes, which would result in the restructuring of traditional forms of teaching into a more effective and appropriate experience.

4.6.3 The Brain Drain and the New International Division of Labour

Castells argues that the traditional 'brain drain' debate is obsolete. "Today's reality is one of networks of highly skilled workers and entrepreneurs, moving back and forth between different nodes of production and innovation" (2000:14). Not only is the global mobility of

talent is essential to sustain informational capitalism, it is an agent of technological diffusion between the developed and the developing world. "The key here is to expand the networks and increase the size and quality of the nodes throughout the developing world, bringing in more talent from the whole planet to these networks so that ultimately innovation works back and forth regardless of country boundaries" (2000:14).

In paragraphs 121 and 122 NEPAD documents its aim to reverse the brain drain and turn it into a "brain gain" for Africa. NEPAD notes the need to provide incentives in terms of favourable political, social and economic conditions for educated workers to remain in the country. Although this is a more traditional approach to the problem, NEPAD also incorporates Castells' ideas on labour networks as follows: "...promote networking and collaboration between experts in the country of origin and those in the diaspora.... Develop scientific and technical networks to channel the repatriation of scientific knowledge to the home country, and establish cooperation between those abroad and at home.... Ensure that the expertise of Africans living in the developed countries is utilised in the execution of some of the projects envisioned under the New Partnership for Africa's Development".

Essentially, NEPAD is not trying to only lure back skilled labour, it is an attempt to facilitate the flow of information and skills between nodes of innovation in the developed world and areas in Africa which have potential to become nodes of innovation. The trickle down effect from these nodes and areas where information technology is incorporated in production or agriculture or manufacturing (etc) would be a great source of social development and upliftment. Through continuously connecting fragments of grassroots Africa to the global informational economy, eventually, the entire continent must be lifted from the depths of despair it has sunk into.

4.7 Identity, Environmentalism and NEPAD

4.7.1 Environmentalism

Castells argues that identity is rooted in experience, and through experiencing the destruction and reconstruction of the meaning of time and space, the traditional basis and source of identity is disarticulated. The environmentalist movement is an expression of the manifestation of shared resistance to this fragmentation of social experience. In the network

society, projects around which people mobilise are constructed from experiences of communal resistance, which is the main source of potential for social change.

The environmentalist movement has hugely impacted on cultural values and social institutions, transforming our perceptions about the relationships between economy, society and nature. Environmentalism creates a new resistance identity around our primary identity as human beings: "a biological identity, a culture of the human species as a component of nature" (Castells, 1997:127). Because 'being human' is the major characteristic of the planet's dominant species, and the movement experiences itself through a universal consciousness, it operates on a global scale. "Environmentalism shifts from the defence of one's environment, health and well-being, to the basis of the socio-biological identity of the species, assuming humankind's cosmological meaning" (Castells, 1998:358). This is not to say that the environmentalist identity is the only new identity to emerge from the reinvention of space and time, but it is certainly the most global, with the most legitimate international power and influence.

The significance of the environmentalist movement for NEPAD lies in the power of international organisations such as Greenpeace. "Greenpeace sees as its adversary a model of development characterised by a lack of concern with its consequences on life on the planet. Accordingly it mobilizes to enforce the principle of environmental sustainability as the overarching principle to which all other policies and activities must be subordinated" (1997:119). Greenpeace does not nationalise problems, environmental issues are interconnected and global, and as a result, destruction of the rainforests in Africa will have a direct impact on the rest of the world. Through aligning ideologically with such organisations, NEPAD can tap in to the political force and momentum they create for international reform.

In section II paragraphs 9 - 17 NEPAD appeals specifically to this logic through asserting Africa's status as firstly the birthplace of humanity, and secondly, the source of a global public good in terms of a relatively unspoilt environment. In advocating Africa's value and significance for the world the document mentions traditional natural resources, unique flora and fauna, environmental assets, palaeontological and archaeological assets, as well as Africa's cultural contribution. Africa's status as the birthplace of humanity is emphasised and "should be cherished by the whole world as the origin of all its peoples". It is because of this

common heritage that it is the collective duty of all people to end the underdevelopment and marginalisation of the continent. Castells too emphasises the perversity of the African condition, almost tantamount to sacrilege: "...famines, epidemics, violence, civil wars, massacres, mass exodus, and social and political chaos are, in this end of millennium, salient features of the land that nurtured the birth of Lucy, perhaps the shared grandmother of humankind" (1998:83).

NEPAD appeals to the primary biological human identity (explained by Castells) that is at the root of the environmentalist movement, in an attempt to focus international environmental attention on the plight of the continent. This appeal to a notion of humanity, which has come to the fore only now, through a shift towards post-materialist values in the developed world, carries mounting weight for international political reform. Castells too appeals to a sense of collective responsibility in *The Network Society*, a need to end "...the human holocaust that threatens Africa, and through Africa, the sense of humanity in all of us" (1996:136).

In paragraph 13 NEPAD goes on to formulate an environmental threat, almost an ultimatum in very simplistic terms: "unless the communities in the vicinity of the tropical rainforests are given alternative means of earning a living, they will cooperate in the destruction of the forests. As the preservation of these environmental assets is in the interests of humanity, it is imperative that Africa be placed on a developmental path that does not put them in danger".

The Environment Initiative is one of NEPAD's sectoral priorities. The focus is on a combination of preservation initiatives and labour intensive solutions to create a social and ecological base from which development can take place. This section illustrates the mutually beneficial effects for the environment (and therefore environmentalists) and local people in terms of public works and job creation.

The preservation of indigenous culture is becoming more and more important as globalisation homogenizes the world. NEPAD emphasises Africa's role in enriching humanity. Also in a world where cultural diversity is almost commodified to satisfy a growing demand for the exotic, Africa's unexploited cultural contribution is becoming increasingly valuable. Significantly, culture is one of the sectoral priorities of NEPAD, and is seen as an integral part of development efforts on the continent. African culture is a continental asset and

NEPAD will therefore "take urgent steps to ensure that indigenous knowledge in Africa is protected through appropriate legislation" (NEPAD, paragraph 140-1).

The point is that NEPAD is emphasising the relevance of the continent for the rest of the world, so as to show that it is in the self-interest of the developed world to engage in the proposed partnership. Aligning ideologically with environmentalist sentiment is a point of entry to gain international popular support, and also to tap into the momentum and political power created by this movement for reform. It is almost as if NEPAD aims to create international pressure from the global civil society embedded in the environmentalist movement.

4.7.2 Appeal to the African people

Another way in which NEPAD employs Castells' analysis of identity in the network society is reflected in section IV, the 'Appeal to the African people'. Castells argues that today, meaningful identity is structured around a primary identity. NEPAD aims to foster a unified identity, based simply on our common heritage as Africans, and on the solidarity created through the experience of marginalisation, exploitation and most importantly, the collective resistance generated.

Castells explains resistance identity as that which is "generated by those actors that are in positions / conditions devalued and or stigmatised by the logic of domination " (1997:8). Therefore, resistance identity is built on principles opposed to or different from the dominant ones and as a result becomes a source of survival and support for its subscribers. In the case of Africa, resistance against the marginalisation of the continent is a powerful source for social mobilisation, which is what NEPAD repeatedly calls for in this section.

Mbeki's Renaissance vision of the black man pulling himself up by his bootstraps is echoed in paragraph 50: "The African Renaissance project should allow our continent, which has been plundered for centuries, to take its rightful place in the world..." and paragraph 53: "This is why our peoples, in spite of the present difficulties, must regain confidence in their genius and their capacity to face obstacles and be involved in the building of the new Africa".

"Africa's rich cultural legacy is reflected in its artefacts of the past, its literature, philosophers, art and music. These should serve both as a means of consolidating the pride of Africans in their own humanity and of confirming the common humanity of the peoples of the world" (paragraph 179).

4.8 Partnership and the Technological Marshall Plan

Castells argues that "only a massive, sudden, co-ordinated injection of resources and know-how can reverse the current dynamics, which is fragmenting the planet. To give an image, I label this initiative a 'Technological Marshall Plan' in the framework of new, international Keynesianism...[which] means to stimulate global demand by public works, in creating a new infrastructure - this time in high technology industries" (Castells, 2000:13).

The role of the international community in the partnership proposed by NEPAD is based on two premises: firstly, there is a need to reform the global financial architecture to reward good socio-economic management, as well as global governance that recognises partnership among all people. And secondly, a massive injection of foreign funds is needed to kick-start the African economy. NEPAD acknowledges the need for political reform in Africa as necessary for social development in itself, and not simply as a means to attract more foreign aid. However, for aid and investment to be effective, good governance and sound economic management is essential.

The "New Global Partnership" (section VI) is based very simply on the premise that through improving the quality of life of Africa's people "there are shared responsibilities and mutual benefits for Africa and its partners" (paragraph 171).

Africa and the developed world are both faced with an existential crisis. On the one hand Africa needs desperately to develop in order to end human suffering on the continent. On the other hand, "the global technological revolution needs an expanding base of resources, a widening sphere of markets, new frontiers of scientific endeavour, the collective capacity of human wisdom, and a well managed ecological system" (paragraph 172).

Africa has the following to offer the developed world:

- An indispensable resource base in terms of mineral and other material resources.

- A vast and growing market for producers worldwide.
- Great opportunities for investment in developmental projects, especially in infrastructure (ICT and transportation).
- Prospects for "creative partnerships between public and private sectors in beneficence, agro-industries, tourism, human resource development, ...urban renewal and rural development " (paragraph 175).
- The biodiversity (flora, fauna, rainforests) of the continent is not only a global good, but important in combating environmental degradation and pollution.
- The continent's contribution in terms of science and technology.
- The collective source of the humanity's identity and the archaeological value of Africa.
- The consolidation of democracy in Africa would free resources currently dedicated to resolving conflicts.
- African development would stabilize global instability.

However in order to access these resources, intensive development of the continent is needed. NEPAD envisions the following responsibilities and obligations of developed countries and multilateral institutions:

- To fill the resource gap of US \$ 64 billion.
- To materially support conflict prevention, management and resolution.
- To accelerate debt reduction and improve debt relief strategies.
- To increase ODA flows to 0.7 % of each developed country's GNP.
- To "translate into concrete commitments the international strategies adopted in the fields of education and health" (paragraph 185).
- To secure drugs for Africans suffering from infectious diseases.
- To admit goods into markets of developed countries and negotiate more equitable terms of trade within the WTO framework.
- To encourage investment in Africa by the developed world's private sector.
- To "raise consumer protection standards for exports from developed countries to developing countries" (paragraph 185).
- To ensure multilateral development finance institutions invest in key economic infrastructure projects.

- To provide technical support to accelerate the implementation of the programme of action.
- To "support governance reforms of multilateral financial institutions to better cater for the needs and concerns of countries in Africa" (paragraph 185).
- To "set up coordinated mechanisms for combating corruption effectively, as well as committing themselves to the return of monies (proceeds) of such practices to Africa" (paragraph 185).

Essentially, NEPAD is asking for increased aid and ODA, increased investment, debt reduction, fairer terms of trade, technology transfer and assistance, and reformed global governance. Certainly, the developed world has a moral responsibility to do this due to the "centuries-old historical injustice" and the "infusion of [African] wealth" into now developed economies. However, it also makes economic sense, since as Castells explains capitalism currently faces a crisis as productivity is outstripping demand, there is therefore a dire need for market expansion. It is this "historic opportunity" NEPAD is referring to.

The *New Partnership for Africa's Development* is therefore aimed at securing "a massive, sudden, co-ordinated injection of resources and know-how" (Castells, 2000:13) into the African continent resulting in an improvement in the quality of life, on a global scale.

4.9 The Predatory State versus the Good Governance Initiative

Castells discusses the nature of the predatory state and refers to the fundamental obstacle to sustainable development on the continent as "the interest and values of the majority of Africa's political elites and their networks of patronage" (Castells, 1998:128).

An analysis of NEPAD's reading of the development of the African state and the proposed strategies for the advancement of good governance will show to what extent the authors of the document acknowledge the current dynamics of African politics as explained by Castells.

In the section on the historical impoverishment of the African continent (paragraphs 18 - 27) the document explains the historical reasons for the dire condition of the continent today. During pre-colonial and colonial times, Africa's natural resources and labour were exported

to enrich other countries at a critical point in the development of the continent. Colonialism subverted and exploited traditional structures, institutions and values, which impeded the development of "an entrepreneurial class, as well as a middle class with skills and managerial capacity" (paragraph 21). As a result "post-colonial Africa inherited weak states and dysfunctional economies, which were further aggravated by poor leadership, corruption and bad governance" (paragraph 22). Together with the geopolitics of the Cold War, the development of accountable governments was hampered. The poor rate of accumulation was not sufficient to rebuild African societies and structural adjustment policies provided only a partial solution. "This has had deleterious consequences on the political process and led to **sustained patronage and corruption**" (paragraph 25, own emphasis).

Furthermore, "many African governments did not empower their peoples to embark on development initiatives to realise their creative potential. Today, **the weak state remains a major constraint on sustainable development** in a number of countries" (paragraph 24, own emphasis).

The logic of Castells' interpretation of the development of the predatory state in Africa as explained in chapter three is clearly expressed in NEPAD's brief reading of the evolution of the African state. Specifically: the role of colonialism in perverting traditional and ethnic social structures and processes; the weak state; and the development of networks of patronage and clientelism.

In section III, NEPAD expresses the "New Political Will of African Leaders". NEPAD acknowledges the need for African leaders to take responsibility for their actions, which worsened the continents' condition: "The *New Partnership for Africa's Development* recognises that there have been a variety of attempts in the past to set out continent-wide development programmes. For a variety of reasons, both internal and external, including **questionable leadership and ownership by African's themselves**, these have been less than successful" (paragraph 42, own emphasis).

"It is generally acknowledged that development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance" (paragraph 79). Therefore, "the purpose of the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative is to contribute to strengthening the political and administrative framework of participating countries, in line

with the principles of democracy, transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights and promotion of the rule of law" (paragraph 80).

NEPAD places emphasis on the strengthening existing African mechanisms and organisations to enable the continent to take responsibility for its own stability. The emphasis is on conflict prevention, the development of early warning systems and limiting the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is aimed at creating an international or external source of pressure to complement the push from African civil society and local social organisations for democratic reform.

4.10 Conclusion

Although all the aspects on which NEPAD and Castells correlate are not solely the intellectual property of Castells, i.e. his ideas are shared by many development theorists. The point is NEPAD is modelled on the primary aspects of Castells' theory and does not fundamentally conflict with more general aspects of the theory. Quite simply Castells' reading of the dominant economic system today is what forms the basic economic assumptions on which the development strategy proposed by NEPAD is built on. Essentially, both NEPAD and Castells' Technological Marshall Plan argue for a paradigm shift in current ideas on development. The current process of globalisation must be tempered and employed to foster development in all areas of the world, so as to avert the looming economic and human crisis that will be its natural outcome. A last quote:

"We are convinced that an historic opportunity presents itself to end the scourge of underdevelopment that afflicts Africa. The resources, including capital, technology and human skills, that are required to launch a global war on poverty and underdevelopment exist in abundance and are within our reach. What is required to mobilise these resources and use them properly, is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely committed to a sustained human development effort and the eradication of poverty, as well as a new global partnership based on shared responsibility and mutual interest " (NEPAD, paragraph 6).

All this is feasible. We have the technical know how, the technology to do it, and the economic and institutional strategies to implement it. The obstacles, of course, are political. In part, they are related to very narrow business strategies....[We need to follow] basic,

elementary principles of economics and policy making 'as if people matter'. And they are in full coherence with the productive, creative logic embedded in our information-based society. If this sounds like wishful thinking, it is only a measure of how bewildered we have become at this critical moment of historical transition" (Castells, 1999:12-13).

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The ability, or inability of the state to cope with the conflicting logics of global capitalism, identity based social movements, and defensive movements from workers and consumers, will largely condition the future of society in the twenty-first century.

Manuel Castells

1998:109

Essentially, this thesis has been an investigation into the correlations between the *New Partnership for Africa's Development* and the theory of the *Information Age* as developed by Manuel Castells. NEPAD can be primarily defined as the continents' external engagement strategy, it is a vision for the socio-economic development of Africa in the context of a globalising world, with the full recognition of the constraints of the new global economy. On a fundamental level, it is a continental attempt by certain African states to “cope with the conflicting logics of global capitalism” and current African social dynamics. Chapter 2 gave the background to NEPAD, provided an overview of the document, and a discussion of the critiques launched against it.

Chapter 3 turned to an explanation of the framework in which the policy was to be interpreted. Castells has not only documented the contours and evolution of the process of globalisation and the resulting Network Society, but also proposed a developmental paradigm that is in coherence with the logic of the current dominant economic system.

In Chapter 4, Castells' theory served as an analytical framework through which the basic assumptions of the NEPAD policy document were explored. The initial question provided the structure of the chapter: What, if any, are the similarities between the paradigm proposed by Castells and the paradigm that NEPAD positions itself in? This thesis showed three main areas of correlation.

Firstly, the essence of Castells theory lies in his depiction of the rise of the new economy. Simply stated, he argues that the new global economy and the process of globalisation is a result of the advances in information and communications technology (and the ensuing disarticulation of space and time) as well as the ruthless pursuit of profit characteristic of

capitalism. The new global economy is therefore not only the new dominant international economic system, but also the new historical reality. It is this point from which NEPAD takes its departure. NEPAD essentially accepts this new historical reality and attempts to provide a developmental vision from within this reading of the world. Furthermore, within this dimension, NEPAD concurs with Castells on three essential issues:

- information and communication technology as the source of competitiveness in the global economy (and therefore the importance of human resource development);
- the networking logic of the new dominant economic system;
- and the threat posed by the marginalisation of Africa to global stability.

Secondly, the similarities between the partnership proposed by NEPAD and Castells' 'Technological Marshall Plan' are self evident. Castells argues that a model of sustained development requires "an injection of economical, technological and educational resources that would allow Africa to make a qualitative leap forward in accessing the Internet era without having to reproduce all the steps of the industrial era....and such resources would have to come from where they are had: rich countries and multinational companies" (Castells, El País 2000). The *New Partnership for Africa's Development* is designed to secure just such an injection (from the developed world) into the African continent.

Thirdly, Castells explains the emergence of a new biological sense of identity, essentially rooted in the concept of universal humanity. NEPAD draws on Castells' analysis of the increasing legitimacy of a primary biological human identity, and to some extent the power of the environmentalist movement. NEPAD uses both points to lobby for a restructuring of the international political order to a more development friendly environment.

The dominant logic of NEPAD corresponds with the paradigm proposed by Castells. NEPAD takes no position which stands in stark contrast to Castells' thesis. Neither does NEPAD completely emulate Castells' theory, simply because it is not a theory of the world, but a policy document based on such a theory. Stated differently, Castells provides a theory of the world, and an idea for development (which he calls a Technological Marshal Plan) in the world he describes. NEPAD takes this world theory as accurate and builds a plan for African development consistent with the logic of the world described by Castells.

In light of this point, NEPAD is not exempt from criticism and suspicion. NEPAD is an attempt by certain African leadership, to secure increased aid and financial assistance, for the development of the continent. Critics argue that the motivation for increased aid lies in the consolidation of networks of patronage, however, the motivation for the proposed partnership is still open to debate. (The predatory nature of African politics and the current systems of elite patronage are the fundamental obstacles to the success of the NEPAD). In this context, NEPAD would benefit from developing policy which captures the African reality.

Regardless of the reason, the initiative faces various tensions and constraints. The crux of the matter is simply: a choice has been made to engage with globalisation rather than to follow a more inward focussed development programme. This choice has been criticised by important sectors of African civil society. However, Samir Amin (1999:30) argues that due to the weak development of civil society, discourses on alternative models of development will remain "pious hopes, academic exercises and the wishes of intellectuals".

Therefore, since the new global economy and the process of globalisation forms the basis of the initiative, it would be absurd for the authors of NEPAD to ignore or refuse to deal with the dominant economic system, since this would severely constrain international relations. At the same time, the vision proposed by NEPAD does not reflect the more socialist logic of the Pan-African struggle for African emancipation. This lack of ideological continuity is one of the main causes of the current lack of 'ownership' of the initiative by the African people. On the other hand, in light of it's western audience, Francis Kornegay argues that "anything smacking of pan-Africanism and African or black unity tends to be viewed by those of European descent with a mixture of fear, contempt and disregard. The idea African might actually, one day, become more than a ward of the international community may, at a subliminal level, come across as slightly threatening" (2002:1). NEPAD cannot afford to growl at the hand that feeds it.

In this context, NEPAD must perform a balancing act between the demands of the African people and its position as a weak player in the international arena. It cannot distance itself from the world economy without sabotaging its chances of securing the desired financial assistance. Even though the initiative would drum up African popular support by employing traditional anti-capitalist, anti-neoliberal rhetoric, it would be much less effective as an external engagement strategy. Certainly, an investigation into the internal and external

pressures faced by Mbeki and the other authors would do much to further our understanding of the dynamics surrounding NEPAD and the African Union. The relationships between existing regional groupings, the AU and NEPAD need to be studied.

The aim of this thesis has not been to explore these tensions nor has it aimed to evaluate NEPAD's chance of success or to subject it to a comprehensive criticism. Furthermore, the criticisms launched against NEPAD cannot all be reflected on in terms of NEPAD's theoretical association with Castells' theory. Rather the relevance or significance of this study lies in showing that NEPAD's basic assumptions are based on a well developed, internationally acclaimed theory of the world today, and its frame of reference is much broader than what is laid out quite simplistically in the policy document.

Essentially NEPAD has a very specific purpose: it is a proposal for a developmental paradigm based on the idea of a partnership between the developed and the developing, the success of which depends on the input of the developed world, and its acceptance and ownership by the African people and the joint commitment to working towards its realisation.

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