

**PEACE SUPPORT IN AFRICA:
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION AND ROLES OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY**

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DECLARATION

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OPSOMMING

Die Suid Afrikaanse Vloot (SAV) het na die Eerste Wêreld Oorlog tot stand gekom omdat so 'n inheemse vloot as broodnodig vir Suid Afrika beskou was. Die SAV se rol en verantwoordelikhede was deur die geskiedenis gerig deur die behoeftes van die regering van die dag en van die politieke oorwegings van die oomblik. Toekomstige verantwoordelikhede vir vredesteun sal insgelyks afhang van politieke oorwegings, sowel as die aard van, en bates beskikbaar vir, die SAV. Tot dusver was die SAV bydrae aan vredesteun beperk tot patrollies deur die SAV Operasionele Booteskader op die Tanganjika meer in Burundi, en bystand deur die Maritieme Reaksie Eskader met BBP werk in Burundi. Hierdie geringe bydraes is onstellend omdat vredesteun pogings belangrik geag word deur die Suid Afrikaanse regering. Die SAV sal dus 'n groter rol in vredesteun in Afrika moet speel, en veral in die instandhouding van goeie orde op see, ten einde beter sigbaarheid te bewerkstellig.

Die potensiële SAV bydraes aan vredesteun aktiwiteite moet dus nie slegs gesien word in die direkte SAV steun aan landmagte betrokke by vredesteun in een of ander land nie, maar ook in die bydrae tot die instandhouding van goeie orde in die ooreenkomsstige maritieme omgewings in Afrika. Potensiële SAV bydraes moet daarom in diepte ontleed word ten einde 'n beter insig te vekry in die maritieme streke (veral in Afrika) waar tot dusver maar min navorsing gedoen is.

Om hierdie potensiële bydraes te bepaal, is die tradisionele rol en doktrines van vlete (veral die wat betrokke is by vredesteun) ondersoek. Daar is bevind dat die huidige doktrines, rol en take van vlete voortgevloeи het uit die tradisionele rol van vlete. Moontlike rolle en bydraes van die SAV is reeds beskikbaar in die SAV Maritieme Doktrine (2006). Verdere moontlike bydraes spruit voort uit die verwagtinge van die verskillende streke in Afrika soos die deelname in Suid Afrikaanse opleiding, kundigheid en informasie, en die behoefte aan instandhouding van maritieme veiligheid en goeie orde op see.

Die huidige en toekomstige bates van die SAV (insluitende skepe, eenhede en personeel) blyk voldoende te wees om by te dra tot moontlike vredesteun aktiwitiete. Die moontlike bydraes sal egter beperk word deur ontoereikende toekomstige begrotings en tekortkominge met betrekking tot kundigheid, toerusting en kapasiteit. Trouens, die huidige en toekomstige begrotings is ontoereikend vir verdere vredesteun bydraes buiten dit wat tot dusver gelewer word. Sonder 'n toename in die begroting sal die vredesteun pogings van die SAV beperk bly tot patrollies deur die SAV Operasionele Booteskader op die Tanganjika Meer, en bystand deur die Maritieme Reaksie Eskader in BBP werk.

SUMMARY

The South African Navy (SAN) was created after the First World War as an indigenous naval capability for South Africa was deemed necessary. Its roles and responsibilities through the years have depended on both the requirements of the state, and the political realities of the time. Possible future roles in peace support would therefore depend on political requirements as well as the capabilities and composition of the SAN. To date, the SAN has only contributed to peace support by way of the patrols carried out by the SAN Operations Boat Squadron on Lake Tanganyika, and assistance from the Maritime Reaction Squadron in VIP protection duties in Burundi. The seemingly minor nature of this contribution is disconcerting, because the contributions of the SANDF in present (ongoing) peace support are very highly rated by the South African Government. To enhance its visibility, the SAN should preferably play a more visible role in peace support in Africa, and generally in assisting in the maintenance of good order at sea around the African coastline.

The potential contributions to or during peace support activities should therefore not only be seen as the direct support which the SAN can give to land forces carrying out peace support in a specific country, but also the support the SAN can give to maintaining good order in the corresponding, and other African, maritime zones. Potential contributions and roles of the SAN in particular therefore need to be interrogated more comprehensively to foster a deeper understanding of this unexplored field of study within the peace support environment, and that of Africa in particular.

To determine the possible contributions and roles of the SAN, the traditional roles and the doctrines of navies (specifically those involved in peace support operations) were investigated. It was found that the roles emanating from the traditional roles for navies were assimilated into navies' doctrines, roles and tasks. Possible roles and missions for the SAN are reflected in the SAN Maritime Doctrine. Regional expectations have added more roles and missions like the sharing of training, assets, expertise, information, the

requirement of maintaining maritime security and the maintenance of good order at sea.

The assets available in the SAN (and the future assets) seem to be adequate to carry out possible peace support activities. However, the potential roles and contributions of the SAN to peace support will be limited by the scope of future budgets and the shortages of skills, equipment and capacity. The foreseen budgets available will not allow participation in activities beyond those being undertaken at present. Unless more funding is received, the potential roles and contributions of the SAN towards peace support activities in Africa will probably not extend beyond some lake patrols and VIP protection.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. BACKGROUND

Histories from the ancient Mediterranean world (from 2 500 BC) mention navies consisting of rowed warships, called galleys, whose purpose was to control communications on the sea by defending friendly trade, disrupting enemy trade, and thereby gaining command (or control) of the sea.¹ In modern times Mahan (1890) wrote that “if navies exist for the protection of commerce, they must aim at depriving their enemy of that great resource”.² He suggested that wars were won by driving the enemy’s flag from the sea, and lost by failure to prevent the enemy from economically strangling one’s own country. Hence control of maritime commerce through command of the sea is the primary function of navies.³ Similarly Corbett theorised about operations at sea between fleets of traditional nation-states, whose concern was winning control of the sea and the subsequent exploitation of this control by either defending or attacking shipping.⁴ These theories held, and will hold, in times of war; but in peace-time, and under the stimuli of a range of twentieth century developments in technology, social attitudes and politics, redefinitions and amendments to the traditional roles of navies have had to be developed.⁵

With navies being the armed elements of sea power,⁶ Tangredi defined modern sea power as “the combination of a nation-state’s capacity for international maritime commerce and the utilisation of oceanic resources, with

¹ Potter, E. (ed). 1981. *Sea Power – A Naval History*. 2nd ed. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, p 9.

² Mahan, A. 1897. “Interest of America in Sea Power” in P. Paret (ed), *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p 455.

³ Mahan, A. 1890. “The Influence of Sea Power on History 1660-1783” in P. Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p 455

⁴ Till, G. 2004. *Seapower – A Guide for the Twenty-first Century*. 1st ed. London: Frank Cass Publishers, p 74.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Tangredi, S. 2002. “Sea Power: Theory and Practice” in J. Bayliss, J. Wirtz, E. Cohen, S. Gray, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. New York: Oxford University Press, p 114.

its ability to project military power into the sea, for the purposes of sea and area control, and from the sea, in order to influence events on land by means of naval forces".⁷ In addition, Gray stated that "a powerful navy at the beginning of the twenty-first century functions as an enabling instrument of national and coalition strategy".⁸ Tangredi added to the above that sea power entails "the control of international trade and commerce, the operations of navies in war, and the use of navies as instruments of diplomacy, deterrence, and political influence in peacetime".⁹

A major twentieth century stimulus for the redefinition of peacetime roles of navies was the collapse of the Soviet Navy, which impacted significantly on the peacetime roles and functions of global and medium-range navies.¹⁰ There was no other ocean-going navy to challenge Western control of the sea, which left navies with the opportunity to focus on influencing events ashore.¹¹ In Africa in the post-Cold War era, opportunities to influence events ashore have existed because of conflicts in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Eritrea and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (among others). The conflict in Somalia, for example, led to a complete lack of maritime security along the Somali coast, which, in turn, has allowed piracy to flourish along the Horn of Africa. The causes of these conflicts are varied and complex. However, authors have listed as crucial factors access to and control of valuable natural resources (e.g. minerals, oil, timber, productive pastures, farming land and marine resources).¹² Following on access and control of natural resources is the transportation of these resources, and bulk transportation invariably takes place along sea routes. Risks (such as the increase in piracy) to transportation will threaten good order at sea,¹³ and possibly enhance the existing conflicts. Ultimately these conflicts continue to threaten peace and security in the surrounding regions and the corresponding

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Gray, C. 1999. *Modern Strategy*. New York: Oxford University Press, p 227.

⁹ Tangredi, *op cit*, p 114.

¹⁰ Tangredi, *op cit*, p129.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Lind, J. and Struman, K. 2002. *Scarcity and Surfeit – The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts*. Pretoria: The Institute of Security Studies, p 2.

¹³ Till, *op cit*, p 311.

maritime zones, as is becoming apparent in the Gulf of Guinea. Hence there is a need to support the measures for keeping good order at sea, as well as maintaining peace and security on land.

In the United Nations (UN) Charter Article 1(1),¹⁴ the maintenance of international peace and security was defined as “to take effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”. Peace support can thus be defined as supporting the measures taken to prevent and remove threats to peace, including suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, as well as supporting the peaceful settlement of international disputes while conforming to the principles of international law and justice. The scope of peace support activities (i.e. peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-building operations, preventative diplomacy, and humanitarian operations), is then widened to include confidence-building and conflict prevention measures, as well as ensuring good order by adherence to international law.

The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, accepted in 1998 that the UN was responsible for matters of international peace and security, but lacked the capacity to address all the problems in Africa.¹⁵ He further stated that the provision of support for regional and sub-regional initiatives in Africa was both necessary and desirable,¹⁶ and that Africa had to demonstrate the political will to solve its problems, for which political commitment (and funding) was required from the international community.¹⁷ Further support for the notion of sharing the burden of peacekeeping between the UN and regional organisations was given by the Brahimi report in 2000 on the reform of UN

¹⁴ Charter of the United Nations at <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm>

¹⁵ Annan, K. 1998. *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development* at <http://www.un.org>, p 9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Annan, *op cit*, p 23.

peace support operations,¹⁸ stating that where enforcement action was required, the Security Council would authorise other role-players to execute such action.¹⁹ These other role-players would be regional and sub-regional organisations willing to take on difficult enforcement tasks. International authority for the formation of regional organisations was provided in the UN Charter in Chapter VIII (as pointed out in the “Agenda for Peace” by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali) in so far as nothing precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies to deal with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security that are appropriate for regional action.²⁰

As a regional organisation taking on peace supporting tasks, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was unable to deal effectively with the many conflict situations in Africa during the 1990s, and perhaps even since its inception in the 1960s. It was threatened with irrelevance if it did not change alongside shifting global and regional political, social and economic settings.²¹ The OAU Secretariat responded by drafting the constitutive legal text of the African Union (AU) which entered into force on 26 May 2001,²² which showed growing political will to move from non-interference to non-indifference. For African peace support, growing international support and a growing regional willingness presented an opportunity for sub-regional organisations to contribute towards stabilising conflict-torn areas. The OAU (and AU) recognised five main sub-regions²³ with their corresponding organisations of which most were established as economic unions. Although established initially with clear economic roles, most acquired over time a security and defence responsibility as well. In fact, conflict and security have become their primary role, as opposed to what was declared and documented.

¹⁸ Brahimi, L. 2000. *Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations at www.un.org/ga/55/fifth/work5.htm*

¹⁹ *Ibid*, par 53.

²⁰ Boutros Ghali, B. 1992. *An Agenda for Peace*, at <http://www.un.org>, , par 60.

²¹ Neethling, T. 2004. “Pursuing a Policy Framework for Peace and Security in Africa”. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, vol 26, no 2, November, p 4.

²² *Ibid*.

²³ *Ibid*, p 12.

In the Southern African sub-region, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) treaty aims to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa, and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.²⁴ Its structure includes the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), and under the ISDSC's supervision, SADC committed to creating a standby brigade,²⁵ the SADCBRIG. SADCBRIG is one of five envisaged regional brigades for the AU to act as part of an African standby force. The SADCBRIG (which will have a maritime component to which the SAN will contribute) will be used to maintain peace and security in selected trouble areas and operate under the auspices of SADC, the African Union, or the UN.²⁶

Through the UN and the AU, legal authority thus exists for established African sub-regional organisations to carry out peace support in Africa. Due to its SADC (and SADCBRIG) membership, South Africa is committed to assist with peace support in Africa in the future. This commitment is also reflected in the South African Constitution, the subsequent White Paper on National Defence,²⁷ and the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions.²⁸ There can be no doubt that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and by implication, the SAN, will be involved in peace support in Africa for some time to come. In line with Tangredi's statements, the SAN should be able to influence events (such as peace support) on land, as well as assist in maintaining good order at sea.

²⁴SADC profile in www.iss.co.za.

²⁵Berman, E.G. and Sams, K.E. 2000. *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. Pretoria: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; Geneva and Institute for Security Studies, p 167.

²⁶Yekelo, G. at the SADC SMC Conference, June 2007.

²⁷Department of Defence, *White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa*, ch 5, par 19 & 20.

²⁸Department of Foreign Affairs, *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions*.

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Since the publishing of the South African Constitution and the two white papers mentioned above, SANDF involvement in peace support in Africa has grown, with soldiers deployed in conflict areas like Burundi, the DRC and Sudan.²⁹ This was after official requests for contributions from the UN and AU, but not as part of a SADC force. According to Vice Admiral Mudimu (present Chief of the SAN), the SAN contributed through the patrols carried out by the SAN Operations Boat Squadron on Lake Tanganyika in Burundi, and by assistance from the Maritime Reaction Squadron in VIP protection duties in Burundi.³⁰ The seemingly minor nature of this contribution is disconcerting, because the contributions of the SANDF in the present (ongoing) peace support are very highly valued by the South African Government, as can be gleaned from the 2007/08 Defence Department Budget Vote.³¹ During the vote, the Minister of Defence stated that the SANDF is the mainstay in most of the operations in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burundi, the DRC, Comoros, Lesotho, Sudan and the Central African Republic, and is contributing to the rising profile of South Africa.³² To enhance its visibility, the SAN should preferably play a bigger role in peace support in Africa, and generally in assisting in the maintenance of good order at sea around the African coastline.

Aside from the aim of being visible to the politicians, the SAN will also participate in peace support because it is part of the missions allocated under the “Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in the Region and on the Continent” in the 2001 Military Strategy for the SANDF,³³ as applicable to the SAN.³⁴ The question that arises then is “How can the SAN contribute to peace support in Africa?” (other than border and VIP protection in Burundi).

²⁹ Le Roux, L. 2007. *The Revision of the South African Defence Review and International Trends in Force Design*, p 276 in www.issafrica.org.

³⁰ Mudimu, J. 2007. *Message by the Chief of the SA Navy on the State of Progress of the SA Navy during 2007*, at www.navy.mil.za.

³¹ Lekota, M. 2007. *Defence Dept Budget Vote 2007/08*, at www.polity.org.za

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Jansen, B. 2004. “Comply with the Demands of an Uncertain Environment”, *SA Soldier*, Johannesburg, July 2004, p. 38

³⁴ SANGP 100 – *Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy*, ch 4, in www.navy.mil.za.

The potential contributions to or during peace support activities should not only be seen as the direct support which the SAN can give to land forces carrying out peace support in a specific country, but also the support by the SAN to maintaining good order in the corresponding, and other African, maritime zones. These potential contributions of the SAN to peace support are quite underdeveloped. Potential contributions and roles of the SAN in particular therefore needed to be interrogated more comprehensively to determine a deeper understanding of this unexplored field of study within the peace support environment, and that of Africa in particular. The aim of this study was thus to explore the potential contributions and roles of the SAN in peace support in Africa.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study is a qualitative analysis and falls within the ambit of policy research with the aim of exploring existing policy and practices in order to make certain recommendations regarding the possible contributions and roles of the SAN during peace support on the African continent. Included is an analysis of historical factors as well as of the present potential of the SAN. The information is set against the political environment and expectations of getting involved in peace support operations. Certain deductions are then made in order to answer the research question.

The theory behind the research design of this study is that of a qualitative approach to social research.³⁵ In the design of the study, it was decided to obtain data from credible sources like official literature, scholarly and semi-scholarly publications, books on maritime strategy, seminar papers, magazine articles and unstructured interviews. The data was then collected, analysed and interpreted, and is intended to inform SAN members in order to stimulate further discussion on the topic.

³⁵ Neuman, W. 2006. Social Research Methods. 6th Ed. Whitewater, Wisconsin: Pearson, p 14.

To answer the research question, an analysis was necessary of the types of peace support activities and the theoretical roles of navies over time, as well as the doctrines of some of the navies more visible in peace support (like the United States Navy, the Royal Navy, the Royal Australian Navy, the French Navy and the Canadian Maritime Forces). Their past, and more particularly their present, naval contributions to peace support are important departures for this study. Naval roles during peace support offer an indication of the contributions of different navies of different sizes in different locations of the world.

In order to understand the present structure and vessel acquisitions of the SAN, the political mandate of the SAN according to SA Government, SADC indicators and AU objectives, together with the history of the SAN, is analysed. Without this background information, future potential contributions cannot be identified with any confidence. Having established the above, the potential contributions of the SAN can be formulated, and evaluated against realities like the budget, the national security environment, and the available assets of the SAN. Recognising these realities is crucial. In the absence of establishing what is possible, the potential contributions of the SAN remain mere theory.

Geographical and temporal demarcations for the research are the following. The research is set to cover as many geographical areas as possible where peace support with naval involvement is carried out. It is expected this will uncover a range of roles on which the contributions by the SAN can be modelled. However, the investigation of these latter contributions is aimed at uncovering information and indicators useful to argue and propose possible naval deployments towards peace support in Africa. The investigation of naval participation in peace support will take into account all peace-keeping operations since the Second World War. Even though South Africa has fundamentally changed its approach to security matters since 1994³⁶, the research on the SAN will focus on its history and its present policies, with the

³⁶ Edmonds, M. and Mills, G. 1996. *Uncharted Waters*. Johannesburg: SAIIA, p 2.

aim of making recommendations for its future. This time frame is used to identify the contributions that would match the potential of the present assets of the SAN, and hence serve the purpose of the study, i.e. to make some future projection of what needs to be considered.

4. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the potential contributions and roles of the SAN in peace support in Africa. In pursuit of the purpose, relevant sources will be scrutinised and evaluated in order to trace the debate on the contributions of the SAN in peace support, and even to suggest certain roles and contributions. This is significant because little research has been done on the actual and potential SAN involvement in peace support. Given the rapid deterioration of maritime security along the African west and east coasts, considering extended roles for the SAN beyond war-fighting only serves to underline the significance of the study. Therefore, besides stimulating further debate, it will add to the limited available research material on, and be of significance in understanding, the potential contributions and roles of the SAN in peace support in Africa.

A particular significance of the study is that the roles during formal peace support may have a broader application that stretch beyond the formal SAN-peace support nexus. It will therefore also be illuminating to investigate what kind of naval support the SAN can expect from other navies, when contributing to the maintenance of good order at sea. For example, any seaward aid to peace support in Somalia will have to take in consideration the danger of the increase in piracy off the Somalian coast, and therefore will have to include support and protective elements, the size of which may be beyond of the capability of the SAN.

5. OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE

The dearth of literature on the topic of peace support activities by the SAN offers scope for the study and a rationale to pursue the research for the SAN

and Africa in particular. The literature and data sources consulted for the research can be described as:

- official (but available on public media such as the internet);
- scholarly and semi-scholarly professional publications (such as studies done by research institutions);
- military (such as general SAN publications); and
- accessible material (like newspaper and internet articles).

Official literature included white papers tabled in the South African Parliament (like the White Papers on National Defence, and on South African Participation in International Peace Missions), SADC documents approved by the Standing Maritime Committee (SMC) of the ISDSC (like the SADC SMC1,³⁷ and the SADC MPSO 1A³⁸), the Modality Report on the Establishment of the SADCBRIG, and relevant documents from the AU and UN. Military sources included SANGP 100, which is the Maritime Doctrine for the SAN, the SANDF Review 1998, and the American, British, Australian and Canadian maritime doctrines. The South African official and military literature supplied the mandates in terms of which the SAN will carry out operations, and the foreign doctrines supplied the background for foreign navies' contributions to peace support.

Scholarly and semi-scholarly professional publications used in researching this topic were books published by institutions like the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), and the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, which had the services of authors like Greg Mills and Martin Edmonds. Included in this category were journal articles published by academics from the Faculty of Military Science, University of Stellenbosch, and a publication from the Human Sciences Research Council by authors from the Centre for Military Studies and the Institute for Strategic Studies. The authors of these publications and journals analysed the military and naval challenges facing South Africa from the 1990s onwards, and made

³⁷ SADC SMC1 – South African Development Community - Standing Maritime Committee publication on “Organisation and Co-operation” of the committee.

³⁸ SADC MPSO 1A – “Instructions for officers commanding on the conduct of maritime peace support operations” as approved by the Standing Maritime Committee.

suggestions how to face these challenges. For research on piracy, information was drawn (amongst other sources) from a treatise written by H. Fouche for the degree Doctor Technologiae at the Tswane University of Technology. Reference was also made to articles published in the United States Naval War College Reviews.

Books on maritime strategy by A. Mahan, J. Corbett, J. Cable, G. Till and E. Grove were used to extract the traditional roles and contributions by navies, while the predictions by these authors on the possible future contributions were used in the compilation of the SAN's possible contributions. A book on maritime security and peacekeeping by M. Pugh supplied information on naval contributions during UN peace support activities. Pugh's focus was on the UN and its operations, but valuable information about historic naval contributions to peace support was included.

Seminar papers from "A Navy for Africa" and "The South African Navy and the African Renaissance Conference" were used where relevant, as well as material from the annual "Seapower for Africa" symposia, the 2008 International Quality and Productivity Center (IQPC) and Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS) conferences on maritime security, Africa and its maritime environment. Material from these seminars and the "Emerging Maritime Concepts Conference" in June 2007 was used to support the selection of possible contributions and roles for the SAN. Similar use was made of the presentations delivered during the conference on SAS DRAKENSBERG on maritime security issues on the east coast of Africa held in November 2007.

Magazine articles from magazines like "Jane's Defence Weekly" and "Navy News" were used to update and support the statements from the scholarly publications in the different chapters. Unstructured interviews were conducted with the Flag Officer Fleet and a journalist from the "Jane's Defence Weekly" magazine. The interviews were unstructured because the intended research questions on the potential roles of the SAN, generated in-depth discussions on the generic roles of navies, possible future roles for the SAN and the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia.

6. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

The thesis will be structured in five chapters. Chapter One will cover the background to the research theme, the formulation of the research theme, and the problem statement. The first chapter further contains the purpose and significance of the research, the methodology adopted in the research, the demarcation which narrows the research area down to a manageable scope, an overview of the sources consulted in the form of a literature review, and concluding remarks.

Chapter Two comprises an analysis of the traditional roles of navies over time. Doctrines of selected navies more active in peace support, and their naval involvement in various areas of the world, and the origin of, and different options (from preventative diplomacy to peace building) for peace support activities are then presented. A range of missions that have been carried out by various navies is thus isolated and used to point out possible roles, taking into account the sizes of the different navies and the specific areas where these missions took place. This will be the background against which the possible roles for the SAN can be considered, bearing in mind the specific nature and structure of the SAN.

Chapter Three is designed to provide a brief insight into the history of the SAN as a pathway to argue the nature of, and the reasoning behind, the current structure and composition of the SAN. The size of the SAN will also be compared to other navies, in order to evaluate what can reasonably be expected from a navy the size of the SAN. The expectations of SADC and the AU (as described in doctrine documents of the African Standby Force (ASF) and Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)), as well as the commitment already made by the SAN in terms of force contributions to the SADCBRIG, will also be taken into account to outline a background for the discussion in the Chapter Four.

Chapter Four will evaluate the possible contributions by the SAN against a range of identified limitations, like the national security environment, the

impact of future budgets, and the available assets of the SAN. The possible impact of these limitations is not intended to restrict the discussion on possible contributions for the SAN, but merely to acknowledge conditions that temper what is possible.

Chapter Five will comprise of a summary, findings and recommendations for future studies.

7. CONCLUSION

The UN has acknowledged that it does not have the wherewithal to deal with all the problems in Africa, and it has been made clear that Africa will have to assist to a larger extent. Legal support for this assistance has been shown in the UN Charter, and it appears as if African leaders have acknowledged their role with the establishment of the AU. The listed underlying causes for conflict still exist, and hence the possibility for conflicts will be present for some time to come. With the South African government's commitment to assistance in Africa, there can be little doubt that the SANDF will be used more and more to participate in peace support. The SAN is an integral part of the SANDF, and cannot afford not to be part of the major peace-time utilisation of the SANDF. It thus makes sense to discuss possible contributions and roles of the SAN in peace support in Africa as events on land create increasing insecurity at sea as well. The expectation is that this thesis should offer some fresh insights into contributions by the SAN and even stimulate further discussion on the topic.

CHAPTER 2

TRADITIONAL ROLES OF NAVIES

1. INTRODUCTION

The traditional roles of navies can be traced from the earliest writings on sea power, through history to the present-day thoughts of strategists and authors on sea and maritime power. More roles were added to the traditional roles with changing political environments (the first naval contribution to peacekeeping was in 1948) and ever-changing technology (the threat of surface-to-surface missiles was first noted in the 1970s). To confirm the validity of the traditional roles, the doctrines of navies will be analysed with emphasis on the roles in peace support (with peace support defined as supporting the measures taken to prevent and remove threats to peace, including suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, as well as supporting the peaceful settlement of international disputes while conforming to the principles of international law and justice). The actual naval involvement of the Western navies in peace support will be investigated with reference to their planned and actual contributions to peace support operations/missions. This investigation will show which roles are possible for navies of different sizes, and form the background against which possible contributions of the SAN in peace support can be considered.

2. TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF NAVIES

Early sources on shipping suggest that the first role that fighting vessels in the Mediterranean performed was to protect maritime commerce.¹ Navies therefore came into being because of difficulties in making the most of the four historic attributes of the sea, which are, according to Till, the use of the sea as a means of transportation and exchange, as a resource, a medium for

¹ Potter, E. (ed). 1981. *Sea Power – A Naval History*. 2nd ed. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, p 1.

information and the spread of ideas, and a medium for dominion.² From the use of the sea as a resource, navies were charged with the role of protecting resources like oil, fish and other marine food-crops.³ The use of the sea as a medium for information spread Christianity as well as commercial interests that fostered co-operation, but also conflict, and hence the role of protecting the advance of religious and commercial interests was entrusted to navies. The sea was also used as a medium for dominion, as European nations created empires with the assistance of navies (undertaking sea control, projecting power ashore in peace and war, attacking and defending trade, and maintaining good order at sea⁴).

However, the use of the sea as a medium for transportation and exchange (i.e. commerce) created the need for navies to protect trade and became an important reason for having a navy at all. The formative years of the United States Navy can be used as an example. By 1785, the US government had sold off all the warships used in the American Revolution because the US Congress concluded that the US Navy was an expendable luxury.⁵ It was the capture of American merchant ships by Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean Sea (and the subsequent loss of income) which fostered a desire for naval protection, which, in turn, led to the creation of the US Navy.

Merchantmen could only ply their trade if the sea was not controlled by the enemy, and Mahan believed that control of maritime commerce through command of the sea was the primary role of a navy.⁶ In this role, Mahan favoured blue-water battle-fleet actions to dispose of the enemy, while Corbett emphasized the broader context of naval operations.⁷ Corbett understood that war demanded very accurate co-ordination between land and sea power, and this offered different ways of obtaining command at sea, like a blockade,

² Till, G. 2004. *Seapower – A Guide for the Twenty-first Century*. 1st ed. London: Frank Cass Publishers, p 6.

³ *Ibid*, p 15.

⁴ *Ibid*, p 16.

⁵ Potter, *op cit*, p 85.

⁶ Mahan, A. 1890. “The Influence of Sea Power on History 1660-1783” in P. Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p 455

⁷ Till, *op cit*, p 47.

a “fleet in being”, defence against invasion, and support of military expeditions,⁸ as opposed to Mahan’s emphasis on battle between opposing navies’ ships.

However, in peace-time, there is no clearly defined enemy, and navies have different, but very relevant roles to carry out. They have to deal with piracy, patrol against illegal immigrants, protect fishery and so on, because the huge capital outlays by states in acquiring navies cause the taxpayer to demand returns on the investment. These typical peace-time roles navies are expected to perform are part of the traditional roles of navies.

Booth explained that the sea is used for three purposes: passage of goods and people; passage of military force for diplomatic purposes or for use against targets on land or at sea; and the exploitation of resources in or under the sea.⁹ These purposes can be summarised as the military, diplomatic and policing functions of navies.¹⁰ Grove reconstructed Booth’s use-of-the-sea triad by placing the military roles at the base of a triangle, with the constabulary and the diplomatic roles on the two sides of the triangle.¹¹ The military roles (which are power projection, sea control and sea denial) are placed at the base of the triangle because most navies are primarily designed to perform these roles. The diplomatic roles can be divided into showing the flag, and gunboat diplomacy; while the constabulary (or policing) roles are the maintenance of sovereignty and good order, safeguarding of national resources, and international peacekeeping.¹² Hattendorf stated that all three roles are based upon the ability to put armed forces to sea, and the potential that they have to use force, even in peacetime.¹³ It is necessary to investigate these military, constabulary and diplomatic roles in more detail, because they represent most of the traditional roles of navies, based on ability and potential;

⁸ Corbett, J.S. 1911. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, p 165.

⁹ Booth, K. 1977. *Navies and Foreign Policy*. London: Croom Helm, p 16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Grove, E. 1990. *The Future of Sea Power*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, p 233.

¹² *Ibid.*, p 234.

¹³ Hattendorf, J. 1994. *The Conceptual Foundations for Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century*. African Defence Review, no 18, p 2.

and because the peace support activities will be visible in these roles. Also, the effects of changes in the political and security environment, and in technology, must be taken into account.

Figure 1 – Grove's triangle of roles (as adapted in the Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy)¹⁴



2.1. MILITARY ROLES

The military roles are sea control, sea denial and power projection. According to Mahan, sea control can only be obtained by destroying an opposing fleet and thereby denying use of the sea to the enemy. Sea control can also be referred to as command of the sea.¹⁵ However, such complete control would require a highly capable, long-ranging fleet, and Tangredi argued that local or regional sea control (where control was only established over a particular area

¹⁴ Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy – SANGP 100. October 2006. Simon's Town: Naval Publications Depot, p 8. Available at <http://www.navy.mil.za/>

¹⁵ Tangredi, S. 2002. "Sea Power: Theory and Practice" in J. Bayliss, J. Wirtz, E. Cohen, S. Gray, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. New York: Oxford University Press, p 123.

of the sea) was a concept more suited to today's navies which are not as long-ranging and capable.¹⁶ Most of the theorists on sea power now agree that command of the sea would not be absolute, but relative, and in this vein, Winston Churchill stated that command of the sea was ultimately about control in that part of the sea which was selected for operations.¹⁷

Tangredi listed sea denial as the reverse of sea control, being the ability to prevent an opponent from using the sea without attempting to establish local sea control.¹⁸ Grove listed coast defence and "guerre de course" as sea denial missions,¹⁹ while Till argued that sea denial could be an alternative to sea control, or complement sea control. For example, to Israel, the ability to prevent the enemy from using the sea would be a sufficient alternative, while to the former Soviet Union, sea denial complemented sea control in the "open ocean zone" because they did not have aircraft carriers to support their submarines.²⁰

Both sea control and sea denial involve the struggle for the use of sea lines of communication (SLOCs),²¹ while power projection ashore is one of the two strategic uses of the sea emanating from control of the sea (the other being the use of the sea as a means of transportation).²² Power projection ashore (also known as maritime power projection, and including amphibious warfare, combined operations, land-sea operations, overseas raids and invasions, and attacks on territory from the sea) involves the use of sea-borne military forces to influence events on land directly.²³ The aims of power projection could be to determine a conflict, open new operational fronts, directly support land forces, force displacement, practice economic warfare, attack naval bases, force an inferior adversary to fight, or use political coercion.²⁴

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Grove, *op cit*, p 233.

²⁰ Till, *op cit*, p 158.

²¹ Tangredi, *op cit*, p 123.

²² Till, *op cit*, p 193.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid*, pp 195-199.

2.2. DIPLOMATIC ROLES

In carrying out the diplomatic roles of showing the flag and gunboat diplomacy, navies are generally more effective than armies or air forces in terms of their international acceptability and their capacity to symbolically send a message to a specific government.²⁵ Tangredi defines naval diplomacy as the use or display of force without fighting.²⁶ However, Cable points out that, while “showing the flag” is a general reminder to foreigners of the existence of the navy (with seldom any threat of force),²⁷ gunboat diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force, other than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage in the furtherance of an international dispute.²⁸ Till offers a more modern interpretation: naval diplomacy is a continuum, a naval presence varying from coalition building to picture building to naval coercion.²⁹

Coalition building is defined as activities expressly intended to secure foreign policy objectives by influencing the behaviour of allies; while picture building concerns collecting, processing and disseminating data about the actions and policies of allies and potential adversaries. Naval coercion is the use of coercive force to influence the behaviour of others by means short of a war.³⁰

2.3. CONSTABULARY ROLES

The constabulary (or policing) roles are the maintenance of sovereignty and good order, and international peacekeeping. The inherent advantages offered by sea power are adaptability, flexibility and mobility,³¹ which enable navies to carry out constabulary roles although inherently designed for military roles. Among these constabulary roles, the management of good order at sea is

²⁵ Vego, M. 2008. On Naval Power. Joint Forces Quarterly issue 50, 3rd quarter 2008, p 12. Also available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/ifq_pages/i50.htm

²⁶ Tangredi, *op cit*, p 124.

²⁷ Grove, *op cit*, p 194.

²⁸ Cable, J. 1971. *Gunboat Diplomacy*. London: Chatto and Windus, p 21.

²⁹ Till, *op cit*, p 276.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p 285.

³¹ Gray, C.S. 1999. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 221.

very important during peace-time. Navies can help to manage the risks and threats faced when using the sea's resources, using the sea as a means of transportation and trade, as a means of gaining and exchanging information, maintaining maritime sovereignty, and protecting the maritime environment.³²

Among the resources from the sea, oil and gas, and fish and other living marine resources,³³ will probably face bigger risks in the future than any other, which will translate into severe challenges to law and order at sea. With one-third of the world's petroleum reserves being under the sea, and reserves on land being steadily depleted, the threats to the safety of rigs and platforms will demand protection by navies. This is already being experienced in the Gulf of Guinea off West Africa. The lost income to states due to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing off the coasts of Somalia, Mozambique, South Africa and Angola is estimated to be about one billion dollars every year.³⁴ The threats to shipping transporting goods along busy sea-lanes are well illustrated by the acts of piracy currently being carried out off the coast of Somalia,³⁵ and to a lesser extent, around Malaysia and in the Gulf of Guinea. Absence of control along the sea-lanes also allows drug smuggling and the movement of illegal immigrants to continue unabated.³⁶ Information about the future is currently being gained in the developing field of marine biotechnology and in oceanographic research, and knowledge about the mineral riches on the ocean floor will help future generations survive.³⁷

The maintenance of maritime sovereignty has been a contentious issue for centuries as illustrated by the Pope dividing the whole world between Portugal and Spain with the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494.³⁸ The protection of sovereignty is the duty of the state, and the adoption of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) supplied a framework for such protection.

³² Till, *op cit*, p 311.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Standing, A. 2007. *The Crisis of Maritime Plunder in Africa*, at www.issafrica.org

³⁵ Ports & Shipping News. 2008. *No protection available to commercial shipping in Gulf of Aden*, at http://ports.co.za/news/article_2008_08_10_2602.html

³⁶ Till, *op cit*, pp 321-324.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p 325.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p 327.

However, there are still many areas of maritime dispute such as in the South China Sea between China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. In protecting the environment, navies can contribute by not polluting the oceans, and by providing skills and technical assets for research and protection.³⁹ Peace support is inevitably needed in Africa when the management of good order at sea is compromised by the exploitation of resources, the disruption of transport, a lack of information, threats to maritime sovereignty, and endangering of the environment, and the subsequent escalation in conflict.

The constabulary role of peacekeeping has evolved considerably since it was listed by Grove and therefore the “international constabulary roles developed from enforceable and mutually agreed international law and order” need more investigation.⁴⁰ The UN Charter states that the primary purpose of the UN is “to maintain international peace and security”,⁴¹ and to “safeguard succeeding generations from the scourge of war”.⁴² Although there is no explicit reference in the UN Charter to either peacekeeping or peace support operations, the concepts and principles associated with contemporary peace operations have emerged over the last 50 years from the conduct of such operations.⁴³ In practice, the 15 member states of the Security Council of the UN created and defined peacekeeping operations,⁴⁴ and Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter provide the basic frame of reference for such Security Council action.

Chapter VIII deals with “regional arrangements” and states in Article 52 paragraph 1 that “nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security”.⁴⁵ However, no precise

³⁹ *Ibid*, pp 329-333.

⁴⁰ Grove, *op cit*, p 234.

⁴¹ Malan, M. 1997. A Concise Conceptual History of UN Peace Operations, in *African Security Review* Vol 6, no 1, at <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/6No1/Malan.html>, p 1.

⁴² Neethling, T. 2002. Peacekeeping in Africa: Who are the Role-players and What are the Challenges?, in *Journal for Contemporary History*, Vol 27, no 3, p 106.

⁴³ Malan, *op cit*.

⁴⁴ Neethling, *op cit*.

⁴⁵ UN Charter Chapter VIII. Available at <http://www.un-documents.net/charter.htm>

definition of regional arrangements and agencies is provided. Article 53 refers to enforcement action by regional bodies, but requires that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangement or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council”.⁴⁶

Chapter VII deals with actions with “respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”.⁴⁷ Chapter VII is essentially concerned with coercion and empowers the UN Security Council to investigate alleged violations, and then determine measures to be taken against the states concerned.⁴⁸ These measures can include political and economic pressure, as well as the use of force. These broad powers under Article 42 allow the Security Council to take such “action by air, sea and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”.⁴⁹

Chapter VI deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes and it emphasizes the primacy of negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement as major mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.⁵⁰ No provision is made for unsolicited intervention, but it provides a weak and vague basis for the concept and conduct of peace support operations.

Traditional, or classical, peacemaking operations were commonly referred to as “Chapter VI and a Half” operations, typically somewhere between Chapter VI and VII,⁵¹ even though mandated under Chapter VI. These operations were military observer missions, generally assigned to monitor, or to supervise cease-fires, truces, or armistice agreements in conflict areas. Accordingly naval forces (inclusive of amphibious and naval air forces) have been enforcing sanctions and conducting conventional high-intensity operations in terms of Chapter VII, for example in Kuwait (1990/91); and

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ UN Charter Chapter VII. Available at <http://www.un-documents.net/charter.htm>

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ UN Charter Chapter VI. Available at <http://www.un-documents.net/charter.htm>

⁵¹ Farrell, Theo. 2002. Human Intervention and Peace Operations, in Baylis, J. et al. *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. p 288.

collecting weapons, monitoring, observing, providing coastguard services, mine clearing, and providing safe havens in terms of Chapter VI.

From the above listing of traditional (and more modern) roles, it can be argued that there are definite military and non-military roles for navies, and that the adaptability, flexibility, mobility and military design of naval forces will ensure the execution of various non-military (i.e. diplomatic and constabulary) roles during peace-time and in peace support applications. To confirm this statement, and how navies further adapt to what governments require from them, the doctrines of navies involved in peace support need to be investigated.

3. NAVAL DOCTRINE COMPARED

In the Royal Navy, the existence of formal doctrine can be traced back to the original edition of Fighting Instructions, issued to the Fleet in 1672, and to a code of tactical signals promulgated during the Commonwealth in 1653.⁵² Till points out that the British break the fighting power of a military force down into three components – the physical component (platforms, weapons), the moral component (motivation, leadership, management) and the conceptual component.⁵³ The third component is the thought process behind the conduct of maritime operations, and doctrine is an important element of this thought process.⁵⁴ The Oxford dictionary defines doctrine as a “body of instruction”, and a “set of principles”.⁵⁵ For the military, doctrine is a set of instructions derived from the country’s military strategy, out of which roles and operations can be deduced. From these definitions, it can be assumed that the foreseen roles of navies (and specifically, indicators of roles in peace support) will be found in the following investigation of the doctrines of navies. Apart from the doctrines of the United States Navy, the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy, the doctrines of the other Western navies involved in peace support

⁵² BR 1806 – *British Maritime Doctrine*. 2nd Ed, p 1.

⁵³ Till, *op cit*, p 111.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Branford, W. (ed). 1994. *The South African Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current English*. 8th ed. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

could not be accessed, but the roles of the Canadian Navy, the operations of the French Navy, and the roles of the Royal New Zealand Navy are thought to supply enough information related to the relevant navies' doctrines.

3.1. UNITED STATES NAVAL DOCTRINE

According to the United States Navy (USN) doctrine, the basic roles of the naval forces are promoting and defending national interests by maintaining maritime superiority, contributing to regional stability, conducting operations on and from the sea, seizing or defending advanced naval bases, and conducting such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of naval campaigns.⁵⁶ These roles are accomplished through deterrence operations and specific peace-time operations, while maintaining fighting readiness through continued forward deployed presence, exercising a robust sealift capability, and developing interoperability with all Services.⁵⁷

Under peace-time operations, or operations other than war (OOTW), the USN listed participation in peace support operations, conduct of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance and civil support operations, conducting of contingency operations, combating of terrorism, aiding host nations through security assistance, assisting other nations in defending themselves, and enforcing UN economic sanctions. Also included is the evacuation of non-combatant personnel from conflict areas, co-ordination of public health operations, and the intercepting of vessels to prevent uncontrolled immigration and drug smuggling (in support of other government agencies).⁵⁸ While the US naval forces are trained, organised and equipped to defend the nation and its interests, the application of this naval expertise in OOTW missions involves many of the wartime capabilities, and is therefore beneficial to enhancing the readiness of the naval forces.

⁵⁶ Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (1994), *op cit*, p 15.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p 15.

Subsequent incremental developments in the USN strategy (and roles and missions) consisted of documents such as “Forward.....from the sea” (1994), “The Navy Operational Concept” (January 1997), “Anytime, Anywhere: A Navy for the 21st Century” (November 1997), and “Navy Strategic Planning Guidance” (2000).⁵⁹ The latest incremental development is “A Co-operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (October 2007).⁶⁰ According to Till, navies need to revise their naval strategies in the light of security issues in the post-9/11 world, and of the impact of globalisation.⁶¹ Till found it significant that in the October 2007 revision, firstly, the USN may be signalling a willingness to engage in constabulary operations, and secondly, importance is attached to humanitarian aid and disaster relief.⁶² However, these tasks were previously listed in the USN doctrine, and therefore the 2007 revision merely showed a new emphasis on these tasks (as opposed to new tasks).

3.2. BRITISH MARITIME DOCTRINE

In the British Maritime Doctrine textbook (known as BR 1806), the range of operations for the British maritime forces is divided into military, constabulary and benign operations,⁶³ similar to (but evolved from) the triangle of functions of navies as listed by Booth. However, it is pointed out in BR 1806 that the three categories of operations may also fall into the contexts of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA).

Power projection (from the sea) and sea control (at sea) are listed under the military application of maritime power in BR 1806, but the operations included under the two headings are different from those listed by Booth or the USN. Evacuation operations, naval force in support of diplomacy, and peace support operations are included under power projection, while sanctions

⁵⁹ Hattendorf, J. (ed). 2006. *US Naval Strategy in the 1990s*. Newport: Naval War College Press.

⁶⁰ International Seapower Symposium. 2007. A Co-operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Available at <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf>

⁶¹ Till, G. 2008. A Co-operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower – A View from Outside. In *Naval War College Review* Vol 61 No 2. Newport: Naval War College Press, p 25.

⁶² *Ibid*, p 28.

⁶³ Naval Staff Directorate. 1999. *BR 1806 – British Maritime Doctrine*. 2nd Ed. London: The Stationery Office, p 51.

enforcement, peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations are included under the constabulary application of maritime power. Disaster relief, assistance to refugees and peace building operations are included under the benign application of maritime power.⁶⁴ However, these different missions are not seen as rigidly classified under the different applications, and benign disaster relief may require constabulary or military protection, depending on the scale and nature of the threat.⁶⁵ Similarly, what started off as a constabulary task may deteriorate into peace enforcement or evacuation, which are military application tasks. However, it should not be construed that the distinctions in the use of military force are arbitrary, because of the different legal basis for each of the three uses. Specific doctrines for each use and distinct attitudes of mind from military personnel are required to ensure appropriate action.⁶⁶

3.3. ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY DOCTRINE

The RAN doctrine is derived from the Australian Joint Doctrine, and a distinction is drawn between combat operations, military support operations and shaping activities.⁶⁷ The span of these maritime operations is explained in terms of a triangle of sea usage (similar to that of Booth) with the military operations along the base of the triangle and the diplomatic and constabulary operations along the two legs of the triangle. The placing of the military, or combat, operations at the base of the triangle is deliberate because the ability to carry out combat operations enables the maritime forces to also undertake the constabulary and diplomatic operations.⁶⁸

Military operations are classed as combat operations at sea (such as maritime strike and advance force operations), or combat operations from the sea (such as amphibious operations and support to operations on land). Shaping operations can be described as naval diplomacy, or the use of maritime forces

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p 75.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p 74.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*.

⁶⁷ RAN Sea Power Centre. 2000. *RAN Doctrine 1*. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, chapter 7, p 1 available at http://www.navy.gov.au/Publication:Australian_Maritime_Doctrine

⁶⁸ *Ibid*.

in support of foreign policy.⁶⁹ Some of the activities under this heading can be constabulary or benign operations, but are diplomatic in intent. Military support operations are made up of constabulary operations and benign operations. Peace operations are included under constabulary operations and the major categories are peacekeeping, peace enforcement, embargo and sanctions enforcement, and peace building.⁷⁰ Other lesser categories of constabulary operations include defence force aid to civil power (supporting domestic law enforcement), environmental and resource management and protection, anti-piracy operations, quarantine operations, drug interdiction and prevention of illegal immigration. Benign operations include evacuation, defence assistance to the civil community, search and rescue, disaster relief and defence force assistance to allied and friendly nations.⁷¹

3.4. CANADIAN NAVY ROLES

The Leadmark model offered the roles of the Canadian Navy in terms of a refinement of the Booth and Grove models.⁷² The roles are divided into military, diplomatic and constabulary roles, and the functions of the military role are command of the sea, sea control, sea denial, battlespace dominance, fleet in being, maritime power projection, and maritime manoeuvre.⁷³ The functions of the constabulary role are in support of the Canadian Coast Guard, and are sovereign patrols, aid of the civil power, assistance to other government departments, search and rescue, disaster relief, and oceans management.

The functions of the diplomatic role are listed under the broad categories of Naval Diplomacy and Crisis Management, and are preventative deployments, coercion, maritime interdiction operations, peace support operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, civil military co-operation, symbolic use (to signal a message), presence, humanitarian assistance, confidence building

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p 6.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, pp 7-8.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, pp 8-11.

⁷² Directorate of Maritime Strategy. 2001. *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*, ch 3, at www.navy.dnd.ca/leadmark/doc/index_e.asp

⁷³ *Ibid*, p 5.

measures, and Track Two Diplomacy (which is interaction with people from adversarial groups or nations, like academic conferences).⁷⁴ The peace support operations are defined as assistance to diplomatic and humanitarian activities in order to achieve a long-term political settlement, and include preventative diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, and post-conflict peace-building.⁷⁵

In an update to the Leadmark model, it is noted that, while the 9/11 attacks led to a renewed emphasis on Canada's domestic maritime security, the number of flashpoints where the Canadian Navy can contribute to the Canadian government's international engagement policy is increasing.⁷⁶ Hence, the notion that Canada is made more secure by enabling the resolution of global problems at their source (called forward security), will encompass options from dispatching naval forces to demonstrate concern over a developing situation, to participating in naval peace-keeping in disputed waters, to the suppression of piracy along international sea-lanes, and to the enforcement of sanctions against rogue states.⁷⁷ These are not new missions to the Canadian Navy, but these missions are gaining new prominence.

3.5. FRENCH NAVY OPERATIONS

The changed strategic environment due to the 9/11 attacks demanded the defence of the French nation's vital interests and action as fast as possible, mostly in joint and European frameworks.⁷⁸ The contributions of the French Navy (Marine Nationale) revolve around operational functions derived from four strategic functions, namely the deterrence, protection, prevention and projection functions. While deterrence is the cornerstone of French defence strategy (thereby guaranteeing the protection of vital French interests),

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, pp 7-8.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*.

⁷⁶ Directorate of Maritime Strategy. 2005. *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers – Charting the Course from Leadmark*, p 22, at www.navy.forces.gc.ca/mpsa_video-media/Securing_Canada_E.pdf

⁷⁷ *Ibid*.

⁷⁸ Global Security. 2008. *Marine Nationale*, available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/fr-marine-national.htm

operational action consists of prevention missions (to stop the development of conflict or crisis situations) and force projection missions.⁷⁹ Prevention consists of exerting a watchful presence to collect intelligence on potential crises, and when prevention cannot stop crises from escalating, direct intervention with a carrier battle group (for assault or force demonstration), or an amphibious group (for deploying forces or aiding populations in disaster-affected areas) can be carried out. Maritime safeguard guarantees the protection of the French territory from the sea, and is the overarching framework for operations carried out by the French Navy to face any potential threats from the sea (like terrorism, narco-trafficking, piracy, illegal transport of migrants), and to defend sovereign rights at sea.⁸⁰

The reforms of the 2003-2008 Military Programming Law transformed the Marine Nationale into a more task-based organisation.⁸¹ Focus on safeguarding France's naval approaches was increased by assuming a maritime protection role further out to sea in order to fight terrorists, drug-traffickers and illegal immigrants. A bigger emphasis was placed on joint and combined operations with friends and allies, particularly in crises management and peace support operations.⁸²

3.6. ROYAL NEW ZEALAND NAVY ROLES

The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) is one of the smaller navies in the world, and its roles are defined as the maritime element of the Royal New Zealand Defence Force's (RNZDF) missions. The RNZDF strives to secure New Zealand, including its people, land, territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, natural resources and critical infrastructure⁸³. The RNZDF is also tasked with reducing the risks from global and regional insecurity, and with advancing New Zealand's values and interests through participation in regional and international security systems.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Jane's Sentinel Western Europe, issue no 11. 2007. *France – Navy*, p 208.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ Royal New Zealand Navy, available on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_New_Zealand_Navy

For the RNZN, this translated to having a presence in overseas waters, assisting in redevelopment in troubled countries, participating in peacekeeping and peacemaking, and supporting land-based operations. The RNZN is also tasked by other government agencies, resulting in patrolling the EEZ, transport to offshore islands, supporting the New Zealand Customs Service, and producing hydrographic information.⁸⁴

Therefore the doctrines of the various navies indicate the roles and operations that are envisaged to be undertaken, and all these navies envisage the inclusion of peace support activities. Some actual past involvement of these navies in peace support activities will now be listed to confirm that the anticipated roles and operations were carried out in accordance with the visions.

4. PARTICIPATION IN PEACE SUPPORT

Naval units have not been prominent in traditional peacekeeping roles, primarily because the origins of internationally significant disputes are predominantly land-based.⁸⁵ It was previously not obvious that ocean boundary issues can lead to disputes which, in turn, can deteriorate into conflicts. Differences at sea did not attract the political symbolism and popular levels of emotion which interfere with peaceful resolution processes⁸⁶ (even though the present piracy activities off Somalia may have changed this line of thinking). Therefore maritime forces have mostly been used to assist with peace support activities on land, and navies have supported and supplied land-based peacekeepers in order to help defuse or stabilise situations, and monitor the implementations.

The first UN naval peacekeeping operation rendered assistance to the mediation process in Palestine in 1948. The ships involved were from the

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ Pugh, M. 1994. *Maritime Security and Peacekeeping – A Framework for United Nations Operations*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p 5.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p 33.

USA and France, and they patrolled the coast, transported personnel and supplies, but were not allowed to use force to stop and board vessels.⁸⁷ More recently, 36-ton Argentinian patrol boats patrolled the Gulf of Fonseca near Nicaragua in 1990 to gather information on the movements of ships and craft in the area for the UN headquarters (who were trying to find the gun-smuggling routes). These boats' crews did not have the right to stop and inspect shipping, but when the operation ended in January 1992, it was claimed that the naval patrols discouraged gunrunners by their permanent presence.⁸⁸ This was thus one of the first examples of a peace support operation, because the role of the patrol boats was to take measures in the prevention of threats to peace.

The tasks of the UN riverine and coastal patrols in Cambodia from early 1992 to the end of 1993 were to transport personnel and equipment, to supervise the ceasefire and investigate allegations of foreign military presence, to monitor the demobilisation of naval forces, and to deter and intercept arms smuggling.⁸⁹ Again this can be seen as an example of a peace support operation because the aim was the prevention of threats to peace. However, riverine patrols are different from patrols at sea because of the legal implications of action to be taken in territorial waters (or on the high seas), compared to action on inland waters where the borders are more clearly defined.

Indications that naval monitoring and verification moved from peacekeeping to enforcement, were visible in the hostile behaviour of Serbian military units towards NATO and WEU task groups monitoring sanctions in the Adriatic Sea in 1992/3. At the same time, aircraft carriers from the UK, USA and France (under national operational control) sustained and supported UN Protection Forces in Croatia and Bosnia, serving as sovereign base areas, and standing by for evacuation. However, they also provided air cover to enforce no-fly zones, and thereby engaged in peace enforcement as opposed to

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p 36.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p 38.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

peacekeeping⁹⁰ (due to an ongoing peace enforcement mission on land in the Balkans).

Apart from peacekeeping and peace enforcement, navies have also contributed to the enforcement of sanctions, as in the deployment of the RAN's HMAS MELBOURNE to the Persian Gulf in 1999 in support of the UN-mandated sanctions against Iraq.⁹¹ In another application, the RNZN, apart from also sending a frigate to the Persian Gulf, supplied the HMZS ENDEAVOUR as a site for peace talks between Papua New Guinea and Bougainville.⁹² Many examples exist of disaster relief and humanitarian aid operations, such as Operation TELLAR where the RN sent ships, helicopters and personnel to Honduras and Nicaragua to supply humanitarian relief after Hurricane Mitch caused disruption and loss of life in 1998.⁹³ These peace support activities are in line with the envisaged roles for navies, even though only a few examples have been listed.

Focussing on Africa, there have not been many peace support activities where naval units were involved. In August 1990, an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) task group assisted a landing of forces in Monrovia,⁹⁴ Liberia, to oppose the forces of Charles Taylor after he ousted the elected government. The task group consisted of two corvettes, a fast attack craft, a tug and an oil tanker from Nigeria, and two fast attack craft and a merchant ship from Ghana.⁹⁵ The tasks executed by the group included sealift, coastal patrolling to prevent arms importation, a blockade of Buchanan Port, civilian and military evacuation, port control, and communications between ECOMOG and the

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p 41.

⁹¹ RAN Sea Power Centre. 2000. *RAN Doctrine 1*. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, chapter 7, p 1 available at http://www.navy.gov.au/Publication:Australian_MaritimeDoctrine

⁹² Town, R. 1999. *Ships are not just jeeps with fancy shower facilities*, available at wps.cfc.dnd.ca/papers/amsc2/town2.doc

⁹³ Naval Staff Directorate. 1999. *BR 1806 – British Maritime Doctrine*. 2nd Ed. London: The Stationery Office, p 66.

⁹⁴ Adebajo, A. 2002. *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press (A Project of the International Peace Academy), p 75.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*.

outside world.⁹⁶ While the landing was successful, the ECOMOG operations suffered from excessive control by home governments, different training standards, doctrine and staff procedures, and poor sea lift capabilities.⁹⁷ Despite these limitations, the peace support tasks executed by the ECOMOG naval task group compare well with the doctrines and tasks executed by those Western navies already listed (to suppress of acts of aggression or breaches of peace).

Another interesting peace support deployment by a naval unit off the African coast was the assistance given by the Canadian naval replenishment ship HMCS PRESERVER towards UNITAF, the UN-sanctioned Unified Task Force in Somalia in December 1992.⁹⁸ The ship functioned as a joint command and control platform to assist the joint forces ashore in setting up operations.⁹⁹ At the same time, the Canadian ship also performed duties as a floating logistics, medical and support base, an operating base for helicopters, and a floating centre for technical repair and support. Apart from the joint headquarters role, HMCS PRESERVER also supplied humanitarian aid ashore, provided medical and dental care, repaired equipment and assisted with the building of an orphanage in Mogadishu.¹⁰⁰

The USN participation in peace support activities off the African coast has been similar to the aid operations of the Canadian Navy, but more extensive and varied. The West African Training Cruise (WATC) and the African Partnership Station (APS) are two of the peace support activities organised by the USN which can be described as confidence-building measures. The WATC is a co-operative maritime exercise that includes port visits by the USN, aiming to further the USN's working relationships with African navies and allowing for unique training and exercising to the benefit of the

⁹⁶ Pugh, *op cit*, p 156.

⁹⁷ Khobe, M. 2000. The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa, in Monograph no 44, available at <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/ECOMOG.html>

⁹⁸ Unified Task Force, available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UNITAF>

⁹⁹ Town, *op cit*.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

participating maritime forces.¹⁰¹ The APS activities consist of joint exercises, port visits, professional training and community outreach with the nations of West and Central Africa. The activities focus on building the maritime capacity of these African nations and increasing the level of co-operation between them to improve maritime safety and security. It is hoped that these activities will improve the abilities of the nations involved, to extend the rule of law out to sea, and better combat illegal fishing, drug smuggling, human trafficking, oil theft and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.¹⁰²

However, it is off the coast of Somalia where piracy is currently threatening the continuation of good order at sea. According to Article 101 of UNCLOS,¹⁰³ piracy is a criminal act, which is carried out on the high seas.¹⁰⁴ The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported that there had been an unprecedented rise in pirate attacks during the first nine months of 2008, with Somalia and Nigeria being the first and second ranked piracy hotspots.¹⁰⁵ These attacks in the Gulf of Aden (an international seaway) against different kinds of commercial ships have been violent, with hostages taken, and ransoms demanded.¹⁰⁶ The attacks represent a threat to commercial shipping, and therefore a threat to the peaceful use of the sea as a medium of transportation; hence the suppression of these acts of piracy is a naval peace support function,¹⁰⁷ since action is being taken against acts of aggression which are a threat to peace.

Naval forces deployed to counter pirate attacks off the Somalian coast include ships from the EU, NATO and Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150). CTF-

¹⁰¹ West African Training Cruise, available at
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/watc.htm>

¹⁰² African Partnership Station, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Africa_Partnership_Station

¹⁰³ Preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 101, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm

¹⁰⁴ Fouche, H. 2006. Policing Piracy and Armed Robbery of Ships in South Africa's Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone, available at
http://libserv5.tut.ac.za:7780/pls/eres/wpg_docload.download_file?p_filename=F626643704/fouche.pdf

¹⁰⁵ Unprecedented rise in piratical attacks, 24 October 2008, available at <http://www.icc-ccs.org/>

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Till, *op cit*, pp 7-8.

150 was initially set up under the US-led war in Afghanistan to patrol (and monitor, inspect, board and stop suspect shipping in) the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean.¹⁰⁸ It was diverted earlier in 2008 to concentrate almost solely on fighting piracy.¹⁰⁹ Naval units from NATO have been escorting UN World Food Programme (UNWFP) ships, loaded with food for those starving in Somalia, safely to Mogadishu.¹¹⁰ On 10 November 2008, the EU launched Operation Atalanta, its first-ever naval mission, to assist Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838 of the UN Security Council (UNSC), with the aim of protecting vessels of the UNWFP and other vulnerable vessels, as well as of deterring, preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.¹¹¹ The UNSC resolutions (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) called for states interested in the security of maritime activities to deploy naval vessels and military aircraft to suppress acts of piracy on the high seas and airspace off the coast of Somalia in a manner consistent with UNCLOS.¹¹²

The piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea have not reached the same intensity and scale of those off the Somali coast, but on one occasion, an offshore oil platform was attacked 75 miles into the Gulf.¹¹³ On another occasion, a French oil supply vessel was seized off Cameroon and the crew members were held hostage¹¹⁴.

¹⁰⁸ Combined Task Force 150, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_Task_Force_150

¹⁰⁹ Guarded shipping corridor limiting Somali piracy, available at
<http://www.3news.co.nz/News/InternationalNews/Guarded-shipping-corridor-limiting-Somali-piracy/tabid/417/articleID/79398/cat/61/Default.aspx>

¹¹⁰ NATO navy escorts protect UN-shipped food aid to Somalia against pirates, 11 November 2008, available at
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=28895&Cr=somalia&Cr1=pirates>

¹¹¹ Council adopts joint action on a European Union military operation against acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, 10 November 2008, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/103937.pdf

¹¹² Security council asks nations with military capacity to actively fight piracy on high seas off Somalia, 7 October 2008, available at <http://un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9467.doc.htm>

¹¹³ Terrorism and piracy – the dual threat to maritime shipping, 11 August 2008, available at
<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374367>

¹¹⁴ Bakassi militia free French oil hostages in Cameroon, 11 November 2008, available at
<http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/11/11/europe/OKWD-UK-CAMEROON-KIDNAP.php>

Although not exhaustive, the above listing reflects the participation and the possibilities for participation by naval units in peace support activities, and more specifically, off the African coast. The SAN has been involved in at least one peace support task off the African coast, but that will be discussed in the next chapter. Lastly, only one example of naval peace support activities in the interior of Africa by foreign forces could be found. Uruguay accepted command of the eastern sector of MONUC (French abbreviation for the “UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo”) and deployed a first-ever riverine unit to patrol the vast waterways in that part of the country.¹¹⁵ The roles of navies in peace support activities, and specifically those applicable to Africa, can now be summarised and concluded.

5. CONCLUSION

There are definite military and non-military roles for navies, and the adaptability, flexibility, mobility and military design of naval forces will ensure the execution of various non-military (i.e. diplomatic and constabulary) roles during peace-time and in peace support applications.

To confirm the interface between the military and non-military roles listed by the UN and the naval actions, the doctrines of navies, and specifically those involved in peace support operations, were investigated. It was shown that the roles emanating and evolving from the traditional roles for navies have thus been assimilated into naval doctrines, roles and tasks. From examples of actual naval peace support tasks by selected navies, it was shown that such tasks were effective in preventing threats to peace.

From these traditional naval roles and doctrines, and actual examples of peace support activities by navies, and particularly in Africa, the potential contributions of the SAN can include patrols to stop smuggling, riverine patrols to monitor security, disaster relief and humanitarian aid, sealift, acting as a

¹¹⁵ Military Assistance, 2003, available at <http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/fy2003part5.pdf>

floating base, training and community outreach. However, the history and future expectations of the SAN must first be investigated.

CHAPTER 3

THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY: HISTORY AND POTENTIAL

1. INTRODUCTION

The South African Navy (SAN) was created after the First World War as an indigenous naval capability for South Africa was deemed necessary. Its roles and responsibilities changed through the years and depended on both the requirements of the state, and the political realities of the time. Possible future roles in peace support would depend on political requirements as well as the capabilities and composition of the SAN in the short to medium term. In order to understand how the current SAN came about and how it acquired its current structure and organisation, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of its history and experience. Furthermore, as its current philosophy will determine the possible contributions by the SAN with regard to peace support activities, the guidelines provided by the SAN doctrine must be taken into account.

Bigger navies (like the US Navy) can execute a variety of roles during peacetime because of their size. The size of the SAN is limiting its capacity, and therefore its comparison to other navies will enhance an appreciation for the possible contributions from the SAN. The aim is then to analyse the history, the comparative size and the maritime doctrine of the SAN, the expectations of organisations like SADC and the AU, and the initiatives discussed at maritime security forums, in order to understand the future contributions the SAN can make in peace support activities.

2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY

The acquisition of three ships to form the nucleus of its own navy for South Africa stemmed from decisions at an Imperial Conference held in London in early 1921. Instead of the annual financial contribution by South Africa to the Royal Navy (RN), it was agreed that South Africa would

- undertake responsibility for the hydrographic survey of the Union of South Africa's waters;
- commence with the formation of the nucleus of a sea-going naval Permanent Force;
- bear the cost of certain development works in the East Dockyard in Simon's Town; and
- expand the South African Division of the Royal Naval Voluntary Reserve (RNVR) to provide the men necessary for the local defence flotillas and similar reserves.¹

The three ships were commissioned on 1 April 1922, and the South African Naval Service (SANS) was established as a unit of the South African Permanent Force (then known as the Union Defence Force (UDF)) from 1 February 1923.² The **role** of the UDF (according to the South African Defence Act No 13 of 1922) was the **defence of the Union** in any part of southern Africa, inside or outside the Union.³ However, due to the economic depression and the resultant budget cuts, the Union government paid off the ships by 1934. The SANS was reduced to an organisation consisting of four officers, 12 ratings and 10 civilian staff, with the tasks to administer and train the RNVR(SA), and to continue the hydrographic survey of South African waters.⁴

After the start of the Second World War (WW II), the South African Government decided in September 1939 that it was necessary that the Union Forces should accept full responsibility for certain services in connection with the Union ports and coastline.⁵ The new force was to be called the South African Seaward Defence Force (SDF) and consist of both Permanent and Active Citizen Force units. The SDF was renamed in the Government

¹ Goosen, J.C. 1973. *South Africa's Navy – The First Fifty Years*. Cape Town: W.J.Flesch & Partners, p 12.

² *Ibid.*

³ Van der Waag, I. The Union Defence Force between the two World Wars, 1919-1939. Available at http://academic.sun.ac.za/mil/mil_history/244_udf.htm

⁴ Du Toit, A.K. 1992. *South Africa's Fighting Ships Past and Present*. Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty)Ltd, p 4.

⁵ Du Toit, *op cit*, p 27.

Gazette of 1 August 1942 as the South African Naval Forces (SANF). During the war the SANF expanded from an organisation with five personnel and no ships, to a force with 89 ships and 10 332 personnel at the end of the war. The South African naval vessels served in South African waters and in the Mediterranean, while South African naval personnel served in most theatres of the war.⁶ As no custom-built warships were available, initial South African naval vessels consisted of ships taken up from trade and adopted for wartime service. These included nine trawlers and 49 whalers (converted and utilised as anti-submarine warfare vessels and minesweepers), three boom defence vessels, one salvage vessel, one controlled minelayer, three examination vessels and eleven harbour defence motor launches.⁷ It was only at the end of the war that the South African naval establishment received its first custom-built frigates - the three Loch-class frigates.⁸

After the end of the war, the SANF was initially reduced to six ships (the three frigates, two boom defence vessels and the minelayer) and eleven motor launches.⁹ The Loch-class frigates were put to good use with the annexing of Marion and Prince Edward islands for South Africa in 1947, and flag-showing visits to East and West African ports in 1948.¹⁰ However, Simon's Town was strategically important against the background of the developing Cold War and was situated on the alternative sea route to the Suez Canal (especially in the light of the developing Middle East conflicts).¹¹ Therefore the naval situation in South Africa was bound to change, and the catalyst was the changing political environment in the country from 1948. By 1954, the RN and the South African Navy (SAN - the name changed in 1951) saw the **role** of the SAN as that of being in assistance to the RN in the **protection of the Cape Sea Route**, being the sea lines of communication (**SLOCs**) between the resources of the east and Europe.¹² This view, the success of the German U-

⁶ Goosen, *op cit*, p 50.

⁷ Du Toit, *op cit*, p 325.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Goosen, *op cit*, p 111.

¹⁰ Potgieter, T.D. 2002. The Geopolitical Role of the South African Navy in the South African Region of Influence after the Second World War. *ISSUP Strategic Review* XXIV(1), June 2002, pp 98-101.

¹¹ Bennett, C. 2006. *Three Frigates*. Durban: Just Done Productions, p 3.

¹² Bennet, *op cit*, p 7.

boats off the South African coast during WWII and the Simon's Town Agreement supplied the reasoning behind the SAN's acquisition of ships¹³ after the transfer of the Simon's Town Naval Base from the RN to the SAN in 1957. In short, the Simon's Town Agreement dealt with South Africa assuming control over Simon's Town naval base, while the Royal Navy retained the use of the naval base's facilities in peace and in war.¹⁴ The *Agreement on Defence of the Sea Routes round Southern Africa* (as part of the Simon's Town Agreement) stipulated that the SAN would purchase six anti-submarine frigates (only three delivered due to cost escalation), ten coastal minesweepers and four seaward defence boats (five delivered).¹⁵ However, Bennett saw the acquisitions as the result of the Government yielding to diplomatic pressure from the British Government (who needed to employ ship-construction workers after the war), and not from an understanding of a maritime strategy.¹⁶

The stance of the world towards the politics of the Republic of South Africa in the early 1960s led to foreign ports being closed to the SAN, which made it difficult to obtain fuel for long cruises. It also became clear that the so-called Great Powers (like the USA and the UK) would not assist in case of a seaward attack on South Africa, and these two realities guided the SAN to the acquisition of a replenishment vessel and three submarines in 1967.¹⁷ Since the frigates were getting older, the requirement to upgrade the fleet was becoming urgent, and when the acquisition project from Portugal was cancelled for various reasons in 1974, the Minister of Defence opened negotiations with Israel in the same year to acquire strike craft.¹⁸ After the cancellation of the Simon's Town Agreement in 1975, there would be no further British naval presence in South Africa, or any British assistance in the acquisition of future naval ships.¹⁹ This, and the institution of the UN Arms

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Goosen, *op cit*, p 133.

¹⁵ Goosen, *op cit*, p 142.

¹⁶ Bennet, *op cit*, p 177.

¹⁷ Potgieter, 2002, *op cit*, p 104.

¹⁸ Potgieter, T. 2004. *The Secret South African Project Team: Building Strike Craft in Israel 1975-1979*. In Scientia Militaria Vol 32 (2), p 124.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p 122.

Embargo against South Africa in 1977, meant that the ageing frigates could not be replaced by acquisitions from France.²⁰ The strike craft now fitted into the view of the South African Defence Force (SADF) Headquarters staff that the **role** of the SAN had **changed** from the protection of the Cape Sea Route, to **monitoring, controlling and protecting the interests of South Africa's territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), deterrence of any maritime aggression against South Africa, and supporting the objectives of land operations.**²¹ Bennett argued that, while the strike craft proved to be extremely effective and useful additions to the SAN, the Naval Staff (as opposed to the SADF headquarters staff) still believed in 1977 that the SAN was the custodian of the Cape Sea Route.²² Mills and Edmonds noticed the same sentiment in the SA Defence White Papers of 1977 and 1979, and attributed it to the Cold War geo-strategic thinking.²³

The period of military isolation from the 1960s began with the UN adopting restrictive resolutions regarding the sale of arms to South Africa in 1963, the ceasing of sales of weapons by the UK Government in 1964, the closure of the Royal Navy's Southern Atlantic Headquarters in Cape Town, and the subsequent withdrawal of the last British frigate from South Africa in 1967.²⁴ Foreign contact by SAN ships became limited with a last visit to Australia in 1968, the last official visit to a Portuguese possession in Africa (Lourenco Marques – now Maputo) in 1973 by two frigates and a submarine, and the last exercise with the Royal Navy in 1974.²⁵ There was also the only visit to North America with the participation in the bicentennial celebrations of the US in New York in 1976, and the first visit to Argentina in 1967 by two frigates and a supply ship.²⁶

SAN ships also acted in support of the South African landward forces involved in the combating of insurgents in the northern Namibian border region and in

²⁰ Bennet, *op cit*, p 183.

²¹ *Ibid*, p 181.

²² *Ibid*, p 178.

²³ Edmonds, M. and Mills, G. 1996. *Uncharted Waters*. Johannesburg: SALIA, p 20.

²⁴ Potgieter, 2002, *op cit*, p 102.

²⁵ *Ibid*.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p 103.

Angola.²⁷ At least one of two frigates and a supply ship were at all times on patrol along the Angolan coast from October 1975 to January 1976 during Operation Savannah, while a submarine was also deployed in the same area.²⁸ This marginal role (in military strategic terms) by SAN ships in the Angolan war included assistance in clandestine military operations (by being on standby to extract SADF forces and to supply naval gunfire support to SADF forces if required) and the landing of reconnaissance teams.²⁹

Flag-showing opportunities included the visit by the SAN survey ship to Uruguay as guardship for the transatlantic yacht race in 1979, a visit to Mauritius by a strike craft and a supply ship while searching for the missing South African Airways aircraft (*Helderberg*) in 1987-88, and a visit to Chile by two SAN ships to transport South African defence equipment to the FIDE '88 international air show in 1988.³⁰ During the isolation period, South Africa had good relations with Taiwan, which resulted in the Taiwanese Navy visiting South Africa in 1981, 1985, 1989 and 1992, and two strike craft and a supply ship visiting Taiwan in 1990.³¹

An interesting development in the SAN force structure during 1979 was the creation of the Marines. The SA Corps of Marines was formed in 1951 to man the coastal and anti-aircraft artillery, but was disbanded in 1955 when the coastal artillery became obsolete.³² The role of the Marine branch created in the SAN in 1979 was to protect South African harbours against attacks from land and from the sea. However, the Marines also patrolled the Zambezi, served in an infantry role on the Border until 1988, were employed in counter-insurgency operations in the South African townships in support of the SA Army, and demonstrated their ability to carry out amphibious landings near Walvis Bay in 1988. Due to budget cutbacks and the need for a new ship acquisition program, the SAN disbanded the Marines in 1989.³³

²⁷ Bennet, *op cit*, pp 155-166.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Potgieter, 2002, *op cit*, p 111.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p 112.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *History of the SA Navy*, available at <http://www.navy.mil.za/aboutus/history/index.htm>

³³ *Ibid.*

The specification for new ships, formulated in the Naval Staff Requirement 6 (NSR 6) of 1980, mentioned corvette-sized vessels,³⁴ and this was in line with Defence White Papers of 1977 and 1979, and the thinking of the Naval Staff at the time (as mentioned earlier). Earlier projects to acquire such vessels for the SAN failed mainly because of the international embargo against South Africa, and the high cost of such vessels.³⁵ These reasons continued to bolster the argument against the acquisition of new corvette-sized ships for the SAN through the 1980s and the early 1990s, but NSR 6 was reworked to specify a bigger vessel because of the operational experience gained from using the strike craft.³⁶ The requirement for corvettes was repeated in the recommendations of the Defence Review in 1998,³⁷ after the White Paper on Defence in 1996 called for a “core force”.³⁸ The Defence Review also recommended the acquisition of submarines to replace the old submarines. When the Strategic Defence Package (SDP - which included the purchase of four corvettes and three submarines)³⁹ was signed in December 1999, it was in line with naval thought over a number of years (i.e. to obtain ships for the control of South African SLOCs), and also in line with what was recommended and accepted in Government circles at the time.

Moving from origin and acquisition history to the recent history of the SAN, operations in a **diplomatic role** will be listed in order to highlight the capabilities and role of the SAN in peacetime. The visit by the replenishment ship, SAS *Drakensberg*, and two strike craft in 1990 to Taiwan strengthened diplomatic ties with this Far East country.⁴⁰ The visit by the same replenishment ship and two mine hunters to the Republic of Zaire (as the Democratic Republic of the Congo was then known) strengthened the

³⁴ Edmonds, M. and Mills, G, *op cit*, p 31.

³⁵ *Ibid*, pp 21-22.

³⁶ *Ibid*, p 31.

³⁷ South African Defence Review 1998, chapter 8, par 34. Available at

<http://www.dod.mil.za/documents/defencereview/defence%20review1998.pdf>

³⁸ White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, chapter 5, par 8-10. Available at <http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1996/defencewp.htm>

³⁹ Botha, D. 2003. *Offsetting the Costs of SA's Strategic Package*, available at

<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/75/Paper75.html>

⁴⁰ Potgieter, 2002, *op cit*, p 112.

diplomatic ties with an African country.⁴¹ A good example of the SAN's early involvement in a peace support activity was the visit of the replenishment ship, SAS *Outeniqua*, to Zaire in order to supply the services required by President Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki in their initiative to bring peace and stability to the former Zaire. After Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila arrived on board, the ship moved into international waters to facilitate neutrality – a requirement from both Sese Seko and Kabila⁴².

In terms of **inter-departmental co-operation**, assistance to the Department of Environmental Affairs' (DEA) Antarctic mission was given regularly, with the SAS *Drakensberg* supplying victuals and fuel to the SA *Agulhas* for an extended stay in January 1991,⁴³ and the same ship towing the SA *Agulhas* from the Antarctic (and supplying the German ship *Polarstern*) in February 1992.⁴⁴ The hydrographic ship, SAS *Protea*, assisted the DEA in Antarctica by transporting a group of scientists to the SA *Agulhas* in January 1993,⁴⁵ and exchanging the SA Air Force crew at the South African research base in Antarctica in January 1994.⁴⁶ The SAS *Protea* also assisted the Australian Navy and civil fisheries by intercepting the *South Tommy* for illegal fishing.⁴⁷

Humanitarian assistance during emergencies was given by the SAN after the floods in Natal in 1987,⁴⁸ during the foundering of the Greek pleasure cruiser, *Oceanos*, in August 1991,⁴⁹ and when SAN divers retrieved bodies from a capsized Tanzanian ferry on Lake Victoria in 1996.⁵⁰ Relief-aid was supplied by SAS *Drakensberg* in July 1991 to Bangladesh, Turkey and

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p 114.

⁴² Werkman, H. 1997. *Breaking Ice at the Equator*. Navy News, Vol XVI, No 4, 1997.

⁴³ Wessels, A. 2002. Unlikely Ambassadors – Flag-showing Cruises by South African Warships 1922 – 2002. Available at http://www.navy.mil.za/about_us/history/ambassadors.htm

⁴⁴ Marais, F. 1992. *The Long Haul – Towing SA AGULHAS back from the Antarctic*. Navy News, Vol XI, May 1992.

⁴⁵ Law, B. 1993. *PROTEA in Antarctica*. Navy News, Vol XII, March 1993.

⁴⁶ De Wet, J. 1994. *Operation Breme*. Navy News, Vol XIII, May 1994.

⁴⁷ Le May, J. 2001. SA Navy pirate-nabbing drama on the high seas. Available at http://www.id.co.za/index.php?sf=115&set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=ct2001041320402025C6003

⁴⁸ Jacobson, D. 1992. *Extending Hands of Rescue*. Navy News, Vol XI, September 1992.

⁴⁹ Reed, G. 1991. *OCEANOS Rescue Mission*. Navy News, Vol X, October 1991.

⁵⁰ Potgieter, 2002, *op cit*, p 119.

Mozambique,⁵¹ and by the other replenishment ship, SAS *Tafelberg*, in September 1992 to Somali refugees in Kenya in Operation Flush/Big Tree.⁵²

However, since SAS *Outeniqua*'s involvement in Zaire in 1997, the SAN has only contributed to peace support by way of the patrols carried out by the SAN Operations Boat Squadron on Lake Tanganyika in Burundi, and assistance from the Maritime Reaction Squadron in VIP protection duties in Burundi.⁵³

This abbreviated history of the SAN focused on the reasons for its existence and growth, the earlier acquisitions of ships which would execute some operations under the roles required, and examples of other operations carried out under peacetime and wartime roles. The primary reasoning behind the existence of the acquisitions for the SAN seemed to have been (for most of the time) the protection of the SLOCs around the South African coast in wartime. This reasoning allowed the SAN to execute other peacetime duties (when the capabilities acquired were not required for wartime duties). The rank of the SAN in relation to navies around the world must now be investigated in order to establish if the roles (and the operations) expected of the SAN are commensurate to its size.

3. COMPARATIVE SIZE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY

Ranking navies in terms of power and capability was difficult because different factors like types of forces deployed, the sophistication of their equipment, level of afloat support, and the numbers of vessels had to be taken into account.⁵⁴ To make this ranking easier, navies which could exert force at sea would be ranked, and force projection would imply the capacity to engage in sea control, sea denial and power projection.⁵⁵ After the somewhat dated ranking from Grove, the more modern ranking from Till will be discussed.

⁵¹ Marais, F. 1991. *Noodleniging in die Buiteland*. Navy News, Vol X, December 1991.

⁵² Wessels, *op cit.*

⁵³ Mudimu, J. 2007. *Message by the Chief of the SA Navy on the State of Progress of the SA Navy during 2007*, at www.navy.mil.za.

⁵⁴ Grove, E. 1990. *The Future of Sea Power*, pp 236-237.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Grove divided navies into nine different categories of navies,⁵⁶ with the **Major Global Force Projection Navy (Complete)** being the **first rank**. A navy in this rank would be capable of carrying out all the military roles of naval forces on a global scale. By implication, this capability would also enable this navy to carry out diplomatic and constabulary roles (as discussed earlier). At present, only the US Navy could be ranked this high. **Fifthly** ranked was the **Adjacent Force Projection Navy**, which possessed some ability to project force well offshore, but was not capable of carrying out high-level naval operations over oceanic distances.⁵⁷ Grove included Portugal, Greece, Israel and South Africa in this ranking,⁵⁸ and while he did not refer specifically to the ability of these navies to carry out peace support activities, “projecting force well offshore” could be interpreted as such. Ranked **ninth** was the **Token Navy**, which had a formal organisational structure, a few coastal craft and could carry out the most limited constabulary functions.⁵⁹ The navies of Angola and Western Samoa fitted this rank.

Till ranked navies in three notional models of naval development, namely **modern, post-modern and pre-modern navies**⁶⁰ and attributed the development to the effect of globalisation on countries and the subsequent effect on their navies. He cautioned that none of the terms were value judgements, implying that one was better or worse than the other, and that they were not mutually exclusive absolutes. **Modern navies** adapted to the traditional or conventional concepts of naval employment to contemporary circumstances, while **post-modern navies** transformed into something else in some or in all respects. Adverse circumstances forced **pre-modern navies** into a struggle to exist or to do anything other than to symbolise their country and its problems, and could perhaps at best supply a sporadic defence of some of its key interests.⁶¹ The missions of a post-modern navy would be the

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Directorate of Maritime Strategy. 2001. *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*, p 12, at www.navy.dnd.ca/leadmark/doc/index_e.asp

⁵⁸ Grove, *op cit*, pp 236-237.

⁵⁹ Button, R.W, et al. 2008. *Small Ships in Theater Security Co-operation*, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG698.pdf

⁶⁰ Till, G. 2007. *Seapower – A Guide for the Twenty-first Century*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, p 2.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

sea control, expeditionary operations, the maintenance of good order at sea and the maintenance of a maritime consensus (i.e. maritime co-operation). Modern navies would have the same missions, but would tend towards the narrower interpretation of the different concepts, and would prefer a balanced fleet for the execution of the missions with national defence/interest perhaps more salient. The post-modern fleet would be a specialised, contributory fleet (i.e. a collective maritime effort), a characteristic which would be more evident in the case of smaller navies influenced by resource constraints.⁶²

The ranking of some of the navies mentioned in Grove's typology could be debated, but it is the range of peace support activities carried out by the navies ranked above and alongside the SAN which could give an indication of what the SAN may be able to contribute. The navies ranked alongside the SAN have also changed somewhat since Grove's typology was written (as has the SAN). In 2008, the Greek Navy possessed nine submarines, fourteen frigates and eighteen fast attack craft,⁶³ the Israeli Navy three submarines, three frigates and ten fast attack craft,⁶⁴ and the Portuguese Navy one submarine, four frigates and seven corvettes.⁶⁵

While the Israeli Navy had been defending the Israeli coast and its sea lanes,⁶⁶ Greece had sent a frigate to participate in Operation Atalanta, (the European naval campaign to stop piracy off the Somali coast),⁶⁷ and the Portuguese Navy supplied a frigate in support of Combined Task Force 150.⁶⁸ It has been shown that the Greek Navy had many more ships than the SAN, and the Portuguese Navy was somewhat superior to the SAN in numbers of ships. It was acknowledged that the Greek and Portuguese navies were part of a EU/NATO group which supplied them with operational and logistic

⁶² *Ibid*, pp 7-17.

⁶³ Saunders, S. (ed) 2008. *Jane's Fighting Ships 2008-2009*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 293.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p 376.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p 615.

⁶⁶ Perkins, C. 2000. *The Israeli Navy Sails into a New Era*, available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/navy1.html

⁶⁷ Daly, J. 2009. Somalia: Pirates of the Gulf, available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current_Affairs/Security_Watch/Detail/?id=975858&lng=en

⁶⁸ Less is more: French Naval Task Force aim, available at <http://www.arabnews.com/?page=9§ion=0&article=96693&d=27&m=5&y=2007>

support when operating far from home. Still, two navies, similar in rank to the SAN, were actively involved in peace support activities, and therefore the SAN could theoretically supply a ship for similar peace support activities if the operational and logistical support requirements could be satisfied. This could be part of a collective maritime effort, as described by Till in the missions of post-modern navies. The planned roles (and peace support activities) of the SAN must now be investigated as they were captured in the Maritime Doctrine of the SAN.

4. MARITIME DOCTRINE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY

The Maritime Doctrine of the SAN took its direct lead from the SANDF Military Strategy, which in turn was based on the White Paper on Defence, and the Constitution of South Africa.⁶⁹ The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa determined that “the primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity, and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force”.⁷⁰

The White Paper on Defence states that the primary role of the SANDF is to defend South Africa against external military aggression, and that the SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently.⁷¹ It also states that South Africa will fulfil its responsibility to participate in international peace support operations.⁷² This statement was further reinforced by the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions 1998, which stated that the South African involvement in peace missions could range from involvement in the broader diplomatic and political initiatives to

⁶⁹ Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy – SANGP 100. October 2006. Simon’s Town: Naval Publications Depot, p 8. Available at <http://www.navy.mil.za/>

⁷⁰ Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, no 108 of 1996, chapter 11, par 200, subparagraph (2). Available at <http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf>

⁷¹ White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, chapter 2, par 11. Available at <http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1996/defencewp.htm>

⁷² *Ibid*, chapter 5, par 19.

those missions with a more reactive focus.⁷³ The South African Defence Review 1998 confirmed the country's commitment to the development of common security which can facilitate sharing of information and resources, early warning of potential crises, implementing confidence-building measures, and resolving inter-state conflict through peaceful means.⁷⁴

With this primary guidance from the Constitution and the White Papers, the mission-based SANDF Military Strategy was compiled in 2001. The military strategic objectives to be achieved were identified in the Military Strategy as follows: **enhancing and maintaining comprehensive defence capabilities, promoting peace, security and stability in the Region and the Continent, and supporting the people of South Africa.**⁷⁵

The SAN will be able to defend South Africa against external aggression if it achieves the **objective of enhancing and maintaining comprehensive defence capabilities**. The **missions** envisaged in terms of this objective (as derived from the SANDF missions) were identified as:

- operations against enemy forces;
- protection of maritime trade (including naval co-ordination and guidance of shipping);
- combat operations against land forces;
- combat operations in support of and the defence of land forces; combat and non-combat evacuation operations; and
- combat search and rescue.⁷⁶

To achieve the **objective of promoting peace, security and stability in the region and continent**, the SAN will engage in co-operative ventures with counterparts throughout the region such as combined exercises, exchange visits, and training and education.⁷⁷ The **missions** (as derived from the

⁷³ White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, October 1998, chapter 5, par 1. Available at <http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1999/peacemissions.pdf>

⁷⁴ South African Defence Review 1998, chapter 4, par 9. Available at <http://www.dod.mil.za/documents/defencereview/defence%20review1998.pdf>

⁷⁵ Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy – SANGP 100, chapter 4, pp 43-44.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, pp 49-50.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p 50.

SANDF missions) to be undertaken in the achievement of this objective, will be conducted outside the territorial waters of South Africa. These missions are: embargoes, sanctions, blockade and quarantine enforcement, peace support operations, anti-piracy operations, drug interdiction, anti-contraband operations, maritime counter terrorism, and support to counter insurgency operations.⁷⁸ More missions for the same objective are: fishery protection, enforcement of maritime agreements, and riverine and lake patrols.⁷⁹

The **objective of providing support to the people of South Africa** will be achieved by the SAN playing an active role within the internal South African maritime sector.⁸⁰ Most of the **missions** required to achieve this objective will be in support of other government departments where they will be the leading department. The missions (as derived from the SANDF missions) were identified as: humanitarian aid and disaster relief, border safeguarding, search and rescue, hydrographic surveying and support to other government departments.⁸¹

The **peace support activities** which the SAN could then theoretically be tasked to execute, would be covered by those missions identified under the objectives of promoting peace, security and stability in the region and the continent, and providing support to the people of South Africa. The hierarchical structure of the development of the Maritime Doctrine of the SAN ensured that the expectations of the government of the day were incorporated in the missions of the doctrine. From the brief history and the comparative size of the SAN, it could be stated that the objective of providing support to the people of South Africa had been proven. The ability to achieve the objective of promoting peace, security and stability in the region and continent had not been proven (except for executing lake patrols), but size-wise, the SAN could be expected to carry out peace support activities providing proper planning was done and support is available. International expectations for South African participation have been made clear in the request from the

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

World Food Programme to South Africa to escort emergency aid shipments to Somalia.⁸² However, for the achievement of the objective, the expectations of the South African sub-region and the continent must be investigated to determine if the expectations of both parties are aligned.

5. REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL EXPECTATIONS

Some regional and sub-regional expectations were articulated by the Standing Maritime Committee (SMC) and at maritime conferences held around the continent (regional referring to “the African continental area” and sub-regional referring to “geographical groupings on the African continent like SADC and ECOWAS”). South Africa is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) was established in 2001 to promote peace and security in the region.⁸³ One of the sub-committees under the OPDSC is the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) with, as members, the Ministers of Defence, Public Security and State Security of the SADC countries, and one of the sub-committees under the ISDSC is the Defence Sub-Committee.⁸⁴ Under the Defence Sub-Committee are various workgroups and standing committees, such as the SMC, which produced a common doctrine for the Multi-National Marine forces of SADC (when engaged in peace support operations in the future).⁸⁵

In SADC MPSO 1A, it is stated that the common doctrine for Officers Commanding **SADC maritime forces in peace support operations (PSOs)** is authoritative, but not prescriptive, and aims to serve as an aide memoire.⁸⁶

⁸² Jordan, B. and Ferreira, A. 2008. SA Navy asked to help fight pirates. Available at <http://www.thetimes.co.za/News/Article.aspx?id=824197>

⁸³ SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) – Presentation by the Department of Defence to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) on 14 November 2003. Available at

<http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2003/appendices/031114sadcopol.ppt#256,1,SADC ORGAN ON POLITICS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY CO-OPERATION>

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ SADC MPSO 1A – Instructions for Officers Commanding on the Conduct of Maritime Peace Support Operations, 2002, p vii. Available at

http://www.navy.mil.za/SMC/functions_publications.htm

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

Similarly to the Maritime Doctrine of the SAN, this publication discusses possible missions for SADC to achieve a required end state. SADC MPSO 1A states that maritime involvement in PSOs may involve supporting sealift, surfaces forces (often with organic aircraft for coastal surveillance operations), submarine forces, amphibious forces, or provision of individual observers. In order to be effective, maritime forces should have access to the territorial waters adjacent to the parties to the conflict (i.e. localised sea control), and should offer a staging platform for personnel and equipment destined for shore duty, and for sustaining the force ashore.⁸⁷ Furthermore, the accompanying of neutral shipping in and out of a danger area, the providing of neutral territory onboard ships for peace negotiations, close and continuous observation of selected areas by sea and air surveillance, coastal control to ensure unimpeded use of an offshore area, harbour defence and port security, mine countermeasures, and search and rescue are missions that SADC maritime forces may be required to execute.⁸⁸ In the publication it is also realised that interoperability at many levels, shared doctrine, common tactical picture, and training towards safe seamanship and helicopter operations, are essential to the success of a multi-national operation.⁸⁹

The missions listed in the SADC maritime doctrine focused on operations, but many other options for peace support activities have been put forward at various conferences and symposia in Africa. **At the South African Navy and African Renaissance Conference** in Simon's Town in 1997, Simpson-Anderson (then the Chief of the SAN) suggested that the SAN could contribute SAN expertise, hydrographic survey services, assistance to maritime resource protection, search and rescue services, naval training, and maritime research services to the African Renaissance.⁹⁰ At the same conference, the exchange of maritime surveillance information among

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p 1-11.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, pp 1-12 – 1-13.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, pp 1-13 – 1-14.

⁹⁰ Simpson-Anderson, R. 1997. *The South African Navy as part of the African Renaissance – Setting the Pace for the Future*, at **The SAN and African Renaissance Conference**, Simon's Town, 23 October 1997.

regions,⁹¹ a modern SAN maritime air-patrol capability, including flexible multi-purpose ship-transportable helicopters in order to link up with other Southern African armed services, and maritime and naval co-operation could act as a confidence-building measures.⁹²

These suggestions can be interpreted as peace support activities, because it would assist African nations in helping themselves, and remove threats to peace when other nations may want to access precious resources, for instance. The suggestions from Simpson-Anderson reflected what he deemed as possible peace support activities which the SAN could execute at the time, while the suggestion about the sharing of maritime surveillance information would require liaison through other government departments, and therefore something the SAN could not directly control. Not being able to control events directly would require extensive inter-departmental negotiations with an even chance of success or failure.

At the “A Navy for Africa” conference in 2001, Mudimo (then South African Chief of Naval Staff) concluded that the SAN must fulfil the requirement for security and confidence-building initiatives within the framework of the National Strategy and Foreign Policy of South Africa in order to promote regional co-operation in the SADC region.⁹³ At the same conference, it was stated that the SAN intended to develop initiatives like sharing repair and training facilities with the region, developing interoperability with regional forces, assisting in creating a command doctrine and developing regional standing forces, acquiring multi-purpose hulls and a sealift capability, and developing an amphibious capability, a surveillance capability, and a riverine/inland water operational capability to assist where required in the

⁹¹ Porter, I. 1997. *Integrating the African East Coast into the Wider Community – Indian Ocean Rim Realities*, at **The SAN and African Renaissance Conference**, Simon’s Town, 23 October 1997.

⁹² Mills, G. 1997. *A Bridgehead into Africa? A Maritime-Naval Strategy for Security building in Southern Africa*, at **The SAN and African Renaissance Conference**, Simon’s Town, 23 October 1997.

⁹³ Mudimu, J. 2001. *Active Engagement: The Vital Importance of South Africa in the Southern African Regional Navy Scenario*, at the **A Navy for Africa Conference**, Simon’s Town, 29-30 November 2001.

region.⁹⁴ A regional maritime strategic forum,⁹⁵ the sharing of facilities, the usage of ships, the establishment of standing naval forces⁹⁶ and the carrying out constabulary functions in the region⁹⁷ were suggestions of further possible contributions.

The suggestions about co-operation on various levels were in tune with modern naval strategic thinking, but would require high-level governmental intervention, while the possible roles suggested included some which would be possible at the time, but also others which still had to be developed. Transforming navies into Coast Guards would require a change of philosophy which should tie in with government policy, while the acquisition of a Landing platform Helicopter Dock ship (LHD) was a good idea, but probably not readily possible in the light of budget restrictions and the commitment to the Strategic Defence Package.

At the first “Sea Power for Africa” symposium in 2005, the importance of sea power for African navies (even if not specifically referring to the SAN) in order to protect a country’s resources (like oil) was emphasized.⁹⁸ The importance of co-operation among African Hydrographic Missions for the maritime charting of African harbours and maritime zones,⁹⁹ and the need for a co-ordinating mechanism to ensure continued, effective and efficient training efforts were stressed.¹⁰⁰ It was mentioned that the SAN’s overall utility value in peace support operations would be severely restricted without strategic lift

⁹⁴ Stead, S. 2001. *New Paradigms in Warfare in the African Context – A Naval Perspective*, at the **A Navy for Africa** Conference, Simon’s Town, 29-30 November 2001.

⁹⁵ Bennett, C. 2001. *The Need for Joint National and Co-ordinated Regional Maritime Policies*, at the **A Navy for Africa** Conference, Simon’s Town, 29-30 November 2001.

⁹⁶ Heitman, H. 2001. *MIDAS*, at the **A Navy for Africa** Conference, Simon’s Town, 29-30 November 2001.

⁹⁷ Gagiano, C. 2001. *The South African Navy at the Start of the 21st Century: Facing the Challenges of Peace Keeping Responsibilities*, at the **A Navy for Africa** Conference, Simon’s Town, 29-30 November 2001.

⁹⁸ Christie, R. 2005. *Sea Power for African Navies*, at the **Sea Power for Africa 2005** Symposium, Cape Town, 29-31 August 2005.

⁹⁹ Nhnyete, I. 2005. *The Challenges of Charting Africa’s Maritime Zones*, at the **Sea Power for Africa 2005** Symposium, Cape Town, 29-31 August 2005.

¹⁰⁰ Teuteberg, B. 2005. *Challenges in the Field of Maritime Training*, at the **Sea Power for Africa 2005** Symposium, Cape Town, 29-31 August 2005.

and a limited amphibious capability,¹⁰¹ as well as that African navies should transform into functional and multi-faceted Coast Guards to protect African maritime resources.¹⁰² The strong argument for the SAN to acquire a Landing Platform Helicopter Dock ship (LHD) to enhance the SAN's contribution in peace support operations¹⁰³ tied in with the formation of a contributory fleet for a post modern navy.¹⁰⁴

The suggestions about co-operation on various levels are good and in tune with modern naval strategic thinking, but would require high-level governmental intervention, while the possible roles suggested included some roles which would be possible at the time, but also others which still had to be developed. Transforming navies into coast-guards would require a change of philosophy which should tie in with government policy, while the acquisition of a LHD was a good idea, but probably not readily possible in the light of budget restrictions and the commitment to the Strategic Defence Package.

It was stated at **the second “Sea Power for Africa” symposium** in Abuja, Nigeria, in 2006, it was stated that African navies could overcome the challenge of excessive dependence on foreign technology by entering into a Joint Venture to acquire technology.¹⁰⁵ It was pointed out that an imperative need existed to develop a framework for co-operation at both regional and sub-regional levels in order to optimise the comparative advantages and specialisation already acquired by a number of states in Africa (as the only way to build the naval capacity required).¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ Shoultz, P. 2005. *Naval Participation in Peace Keeping Operations in Africa*, at the **Sea Power for Africa 2005** Symposium, Cape Town, 29-31 August 2005.

¹⁰² Wambua, P. 2005. *Challenge of Controlling African Maritime Zones*, at the **Sea Power for Africa 2005** Symposium, Cape Town, 29-31 August 2005.

¹⁰³ Heitman, H. 2005. *The Potential of a Landing Platform, Helicopter, Dock (LHD) in Support of AU Initiatives*, at the **Sea Power for Africa 2005** Symposium, Cape Town, 29-31 August 2005.

¹⁰⁴ Till, *op cit.*

¹⁰⁵ Jonah, G. 2006. African Navies and Technological Collaboration: Challenges and Opportunities, at the **Sea Power for Africa 2006** Symposium, Abuja, 27 May – 3 June 2006.

¹⁰⁶ Okpo, E. 2006. Capacity Building for African Navies, at the **Sea Power for Africa 2006** Symposium, Abuja, 27 May – 3 June 2006.

The resolutions agreed on at the symposium included undertakings such as all countries integrating into the Automated Identification System (AIS), embarking on regular sub-regional co-ordinated operational training, compiling expertise and core competence as a guide for other navies, instituting meetings of professionals like engineers, hydrographers and cartographers, and ensuring that a SADC naval component (as one of four Naval Task Groups led by Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa) become part of the African Union Standby Force within the next four years.¹⁰⁷

The suggestions on integrated AIS, co-ordinated training, compilation of competence guides, and meetings by professionals would require budget prioritisation by all navies, while the sharing of facilities would require governmental and civilian contractor co-operation. A SADC naval component in the given time-scale was a practical and possible idea in which the SAN could participate.

In his opening address of the SADC Standing Maritime Committee conference on “**Emerging Maritime Concepts in Southern Africa**” in 2007, the Chief of the SAN stated that the conference would focus on naval training, Naval Control and Guidance of Shipping (NCAGS), sea lift capabilities required for peace support operations in Africa, and the formation of a Maritime Component of the SADC Brigade.¹⁰⁸ It was concluded that the Landing Platform (Helicopter/Dock) (LHD) could supply the most effective form of sealift, even if sealift was much slower than airlift. Airlift and sealift were complimentary capabilities, but the LHD can conduct flexible helicopter operations, act as task force flagship, hospital ship, depot ship and lend itself to many more roles.¹⁰⁹ It was conceded that the SAN’s possible acquisition of a LHD would only be the beginning in the process of maximising its contribution as a regional and Sub-Saharan capability.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Secretariat. 2006. Resolutions for **Sea Power for Africa 2006** Symposium, . Available at http://www.navy.mil.za/Web%20Seapower_files/Page385.htm

¹⁰⁸ Mudimu, J. 2007. Official Opening of SMC Conference **Emerging Maritime Concepts in Southern Africa**, Simon’s Town, 12-14 June 2007.

¹⁰⁹ Heitman, H. 2007. *Sealift for Peacekeeping*, at the SMC Conference **Emerging Maritime Concepts in Southern Africa**, Simon’s Town, 12-14 June 2007.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

With regard to NCAGS, the conference recommended that naval co-operation and guidance of shipping practice be used to increase commonality of systems and to improve interoperability between navies.¹¹¹ It was explained that the SADC Standby Force (SADC SF) would have a military component, the SADC Brigade (SADC BRIG), consisting of land, air, sea and medical forces pledged by the SADC member-states.¹¹² The SAN contribution would include one Operational Diving team, five Harbour Patrol Boats, one large ship, and one platoon of the Maritime Reaction Squadron.¹¹³

The suggestion about a LHD was again a good idea (as determined at a previous symposium), but restricted to the availability of funding, while the suggestion on NCAGS was practical and possible. The SAN contribution to the SADC BRIG was in line with the suggestion at a previous symposium about a SADC naval component led by South Africa, even though the detail about such a deployment would need more investigation.

During a visit by the SAS DRAKENSBERG to Mombasa, Kenya in 2007, the Institute for Security Studies organised a conference to discuss **maritime security issues on the east coast of Africa**, and more specifically to look at the role of maritime organisations and naval forces in supporting Africa's security and development.¹¹⁴ It was stated that navies of the region had an important peacetime function in support of the maintenance of good order at sea, and would require good regional and sub-regional co-operation and integration.¹¹⁵ In order to address the lack of maritime security, African navies should focus on their good capabilities, combine these capabilities to save

¹¹¹ Resolutions: SADC **Emerging Maritime Concepts in Southern Africa** conference, Simon's Town, 12-14 June 2007. Available at http://www.navy.mil.za/archive/0706/070621_SADC/resolutions.htm

¹¹² Yekelo, G. 2007. The Status and Way forward for the SADC SF, at the SMC Conference **Emerging Maritime Concepts in Southern Africa**, Simon's Town, 12-14 June 2007.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Conference Report on **Maritime Security Issues on the East Coast of Africa**, on SAS *Drakensberg*, Mombasa harbour, 26 November 2007.

¹¹⁵ Potgieter, T. 2007. *The Maritime Security Quandary in the Horn of Africa Region – Causes, Consequences and Responses*, at the **Maritime Security Issues on the East Coast of Africa** Conference, on SAS *Drakensberg*, Mombasa harbour, 26 November 2007.

cost in the long run, and improve interoperability and communication.¹¹⁶ African countries should co-ordinate their maritime surveillance and reconnaissance activities, and ensure that appropriate elements from their naval capabilities be placed at the disposal of the AU Standby Force.¹¹⁷ In concluding the conference, it was stated that collective actions by regional and sub-regional authorities were required, as well as joint law enforcement at sea, and the defining of the priority peacetime tasks of navies.¹¹⁸

Collective and joint activities by regional and sub-regional authorities were good, practical suggestions, providing that the political leaders could be influenced to think similarly. Interoperability and communication would probably require much practice, given the different naval assets and the different languages along the east coast of Africa.

At the **International Conference on “Maritime Security in Southern African Waters”** in Stellenbosch in 2008, Mudimu (Chief of the SAN) told delegates that the biggest threat to maritime security in the region was complacency.¹¹⁹ At the same venue, it was pointed out that the disintegration of central government authority in Somalia led to a lack of maritime security in the Horn of Africa, allowing piracy to flourish, and also threatening peace and regional stability.¹²⁰ While African navies mostly did not possess the tools to singly address maritime security off their coasts, these navies should combine their good capabilities (like the blue water capability of the SAN), and then develop the necessary enhanced integrated approach to maritime security (despite financial and material limitations).¹²¹ The SAN must be seen as a responsible regional partner, and as such, complement other African navies by providing capabilities they did not have, conduct operations on behalf of

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, available at <http://www.hss.or.ke/documents/Maritime%20Security.pdf>

¹¹⁷ Fouche, H. 2007. *The Manifestation and Challenges to Combating Piracy on the East Coast of Africa*, at the **Maritime Security Issues on the East Coast of Africa** Conference, on SAS Drakensberg, Mombasa harbour, 26 November 2007.

¹¹⁸ Le Roux, L. 2007. Conference Report on **Maritime Security Issues on the East Coast of Africa**, on SAS Drakensberg, Mombasa harbour, 26 November 2007.

¹¹⁹ Davies, R. 2008. Lack of Cohesive Maritime Policy “is Wasting Resources”. In *Business Day*, p 4, 23 July 2008.

¹²⁰ Potgieter, T. 2008. *When Maritime Security is Absent*, at the **International Conference on Maritime Security in Southern African Waters**, Stellenbosch, 22-23 July 2008.

¹²¹ *Ibid*.

African governments not possessing naval capabilities, and provide the core for multi-national maritime forces.¹²² African navies should be pragmatic about the SAN's role, and assist the SAN to reach an optimal co-operative arrangement for maritime security of the region.¹²³

Again the suggestion about combining capabilities to address maritime security was good and practically possible, provided that political leadership were aboard in the thought process and supplied the required funding. Not duplicating the roles of other navies would be difficult, because inherently all navies carried out the same roles, and each navy's roles were determined by the country's military strategy.

At the **third Sea Power for Africa symposium** (with the theme “**Towards Effective Maritime Governance for Africa**”), it was pointed out that the illegal operations in African waters (like poaching, drug smuggling, piracy and human trafficking) compromise maritime and human security, and impact on the economic growth of the continent.¹²⁴ These illegal operations were the result of a lack of sea control due to a lack of naval capacity and poor maritime governance.¹²⁵ It was also due to the lack of collective political and required military responses, with the military roles being that of deterrence, to combat the threat and alleviate the effects.¹²⁶ In order to carry out these military roles in the most cost-effective way, the option of regional collaborative acquisitions of tried and tested platforms was suggested.¹²⁷ The transcendental nature of maritime issues highlighted the need for regional maritime co-operation between maritime states.¹²⁸ The effective regional co-operation in the governance of African maritime interests would require the

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ Nqakula, C. 2009. *Keynote Address, Third Sea Power for Africa Symposium*, Cape Town, 9 March.

¹²⁵ Mudimu, J. 2009. *Welcoming Address, Third Sea Power for Africa Symposium*, Cape Town, 9 March.

¹²⁶ Ngoma, N. 2009. *Emerging Threats to Maritime Security on the African Continent, Third Sea Power for Africa Symposium*, Cape Town, 9 March.

¹²⁷ Singh, B. 2009. *Cost Effective Collaboration: Regional Acquisition of Vessels Designed to Undertake the Whole Spectrum of EEZ Protection Duties, Third Sea Power for Africa Symposium*, Cape Town, 9 March.

¹²⁸ Wambua, P. 2009. *Enhancing Regional Maritime Co-operation in Africa: The Planned End State, Third Sea Power for Africa Symposium*, Cape Town, 9 March.

decision makers in the various national governments within the region to collaborate on how to achieve effective governance of the ocean spaces of Africa.¹²⁹ However, the lack of political will by African governments and decision makers to adequately invest in measures and structures for maritime security was a serious shortcoming.¹³⁰

To overcome the constraints, it was suggested that states with core competence in various areas of education and training should establish institutions in these states that other states could access, and that sub-regional coast guards should be formed.¹³¹ Inter-agency and international co-operation would be critical in the fields of information sharing, interoperability in sensor and processor systems, joint patrols, reciprocal rights of hot pursuit and extradition arrangements.¹³² It was confirmed that the SAN would work with the navies of the region to foster closer co-operation, strengthen existing relations, promote greater awareness in inland Navies and landlocked nations, and encourage Navies of the continent to play their constitutional mandates.¹³³

The suggestions on co-operation were essentially the same as at previous symposia, but a more positive step was the attendance by an AU representative. However, the signing of a code of conduct indicated that it could still be a long time before African navies carry out combined operations under the auspices of the AU. To work on closer co-operation and stronger relations were practical suggestions for the SAN, while creating awareness and encouraging navies probably needed more investigation.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Ibrahim, O. 2009. *To Patrol is to Control: Systems to Ensure Situational Awareness in Africa's Exclusive Economic Zones*, **Third Sea Power for Africa Symposium**, Cape Town, 9 March.

¹³¹ Asante, B. 2009. *Africa's Regional Maritime Training Services: Collaboration and Co-operation towards Success*, **Third Sea Power for Africa Symposium**, Cape Town, 9 March.

¹³² Kame-Domguia, S. 2009. *Well-managed Exclusive Economic Zones: A Complex Yet Rewarding Task for Africa's Littoral and Island States*, **Third Sea Power for Africa Symposium**, Cape Town, 9 March.

¹³³ Mudimu, J. 2009. *Closing Address*, **Third Sea Power for Africa Symposium**, Cape Town, 9 March.

In the observed symposia and conferences, the views expressed by serving and retired SAN officers at the different conferences were based on the general thinking, and the available assets, in the SAN at the time. Some of the other speakers offered good, practical suggestions as to which missions and roles navies could execute towards promoting peace and prosperity in Africa. Some suggestions by other speakers amounted to a wish-list which could not materialise in the near future (like acquiring strategic sealift and changing to coast guard navies), and would depend on how governments were affected by globalisation. However, for all the practical advice offered and good ideas listed, there seemed to be little political will to supply the resources required to convert good ideas into working solutions.

6. SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE AND EXPECTED ROLES

Not taking into account the roles the SAN performed historically, a summary from the possible roles suggested by the Maritime Doctrine of the SAN and the expected roles suggested by speakers at symposia and conferences are as follows:

Table 1: Roles suggested by Maritime Doctrine vs Roles suggested by Symposia and Conferences¹³⁴

Maritime Doctrine	Symposia and Conferences
Embargoes, sanctions, blockade and quarantine enforcement	Embargo enforcement
Peace support operations	Providing logistic support, sealift, containment and disarming by maritime forces
Anti-piracy operations	Addressing maritime security, focus on and combine good capabilities
Drug interdiction	Joint law enforcement
Anti-contraband operations	Joint law enforcement
Maritime counter terrorism	
Support to counter insurgency	

¹³⁴ Table compiled by Capt Thiart.

operations	
Fishery protection	Assistance to maritime resources protection
Enforcement of maritime agreements	
Riverine and lake patrols	Protection on rivers and lakes
Humanitarian aid and disaster relief	Regional and sub-regional co-operation
Border safeguarding	Joint law enforcement
Search and rescue	Search and rescue services
Hydrographic surveys	Hydrographic survey services
Support to other government depts	
	Contributing SA expertise, compile expertise
	Maritime research services
	Co-ordinating and exchange of maritime surveillance and reconnaissance activities
	Mine clearance
	Naval control and guidance of shipping
	Maritime and naval co-operation, co-ordinated naval training
	Improving interoperability and communication
	Sharing facilities and usage of ships

Hence the roles and missions suggested by various speakers at different forums were in line with those envisaged in the Maritime Doctrine. Not included in the Maritime Doctrine were the missions aligned with assistance from and co-operation from the SAN in terms of expertise, surveillance information, training and the sharing of assets. The required roles and

missions stated by the SADC MPSO 1A fell under Peace Support Operations, which were accounted for in the Maritime Doctrine.

7. CONCLUSION

From the analysis of the history of the SAN, it is clear that political intentions rightly guided the possible roles of the SAN from its inception to the present. The assets with which to execute these roles were then procured as and when the budget was available. The thinking on the possible roles persisted from the early (pre-1960) roles, centred around the protection of the SLOCs around the South African coast and the protection of South Africa's borders, to the present, even though the changing political environment during the 1960s allowed for forced changes and subsequent new assets. This was visible in the requirements put forward in the SDP and the assets acquired.

The changed world political environment since 1990, and the different political situation in South Africa since April 1994, added possible roles and missions for the SAN, some of which the SAN should be able to execute due to its size. The possible roles and contributions to peace support in Africa could then be the roles and missions reflected in the SAN Maritime Doctrine as derived from the White Paper on Defence and the SANDF Strategy. More possible contributions could be added from the regional expectations, like the sharing of training, assets, expertise, information and the requirement for maintaining maritime security and the maintenance of good order at sea. The maintenance of maritime security and good order at sea would depend on the influence of globalisation on African governments. Taking all the suggested possible roles into account, the potential roles now need to be determined in terms of the resources available to the SAN.

CHAPTER 4

PEACE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES: IMPERATIVES AND THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY

1. INTRODUCTION

The possible roles and contributions of the SAN towards peace support in Africa have been identified in previous chapters and shown to be relevant in terms of the perceived needs in Africa and those envisaged by the SAN. All these contributions focus on peace support, which was identified as **supporting the measures taken to prevent and remove threats to peace, including suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, as well as supporting the peaceful settlement of international disputes while conforming to the principles of international law and justice.** The possible contributions towards peace support must now be evaluated, taking into consideration the national security environment and imperatives, the impact of future budgets, and the assets currently available in the SAN (and those envisaged in the near future).

2. NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND IMPERATIVES

The national security environment of South Africa will be analysed in terms of the national security objectives, the South African security culture, the shifting security environment and South African political preferences.

2.1. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

The White Paper on Defence stated that national security was not viewed as a predominantly military and police problem, but was broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters.¹³⁵ The security of people was of paramount concern, and at national level, the objectives of security policy encompassed the consolidation of democracy, the

¹³⁵ White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, Ch 2, par 1. Available at <http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1996/defencewp.htm>

achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment, and a substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability.¹³⁶ At the international level, the **objectives of security policy** included the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the South African state, and the **promotion of regional security in Southern Africa.**¹³⁷ It is expected that the defence of sovereignty and the promotion of regional security will be allocated equal priority in the Defence Update (to be released in November 2009 but yet again postponed by the minister).

The 1996 White Paper also confirmed that South Africa would pursue peaceful relations with other states and that South Africa's force levels, armaments and military expenditure would be determined by defence policy which was derived from an analysis of the external and internal security environment.¹³⁸ It was acknowledged in the 1996 Defence White Paper that, after being welcomed into the UN, (then) OAU and SADC, South Africa was expected to play an active role in these forums, and get involved in multi-national peace support operations on the African continent.¹³⁹ With the policy-determined force-levels, South Africa would fulfil its responsibility to participate in international peace operations as long as there were parliamentary approval and public support for such an involvement, a clear mandate, mission and objectives, authorisation by the UN Security Council, and sanction by SADC¹⁴⁰ (if in the sub-region). The national security objective of the promotion of regional security could therefore be interpreted as the participation in international peace operations by forces determined by the defence policy and the AU.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, par 3.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, par 4.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, par 11.

¹³⁹ *Ibid*, ch 4, par 1-2.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, ch 5, par 24.

Neethling stated that the concept of national interest has traditionally been attached to the theory and practice of foreign policy.¹⁴¹ The national security objective of the promotion of regional security was further discussed in the South African Foreign Policy, where Africa was made the prime focus of future engagements (as stated in *The White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions 1999*).¹⁴² South Africa had an obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and development, and to avoid the spill-over effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood.¹⁴³

The negative effect of conflict spill-over was anticipated by observers in the mid-1990s when they pointed out that it would be in South Africa's economic interest to stabilise the region, and that South Africa could not prosper among African insecurity and instability. Peacekeeping in Africa (and specifically Southern Africa) might therefore be considered by South Africa as action in direct support of its own security and economic interests.¹⁴⁴ Neethling regarded the above-mentioned 1999 White Paper as the crucial framework and guideline for South Africa's participation in peace missions.¹⁴⁵ Cilliers saw the same White Paper as the most important foreign policy document to pass through Cabinet (at the time), because it forced the South African government to outline its national interest, its philosophy on conflict resolution and its general approach towards Africa.¹⁴⁶ Hence the SANDF roles would be directed by the foreign policy and the SANDF would be used as a foreign policy instrument.

¹⁴¹ Neethling, T. 2003. South Africa's Evolving Role in Peacekeeping: National Interest and International Responsibilities. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall 2003, Vol 6, Issue 2.

¹⁴² Department of Foreign Affairs. 1999. *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions*, Government Gazette, Notice 2216 of 1999, par 4.2. Available at <http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1999/peacemissions.pdf>

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Cilliers, J. and Malan, M. 1996. From Destabilisation to Peacekeeping: The Potential Role of South Africa, *Africa Insight* 26/1 (1996), p 343.

¹⁴⁵ Neethling, *op cit.*

¹⁴⁶ Cilliers, J. 1999. An Emerging South African Foreign Policy Identity, *ISS Papers* 39 (April 1999). Available at <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/39/Paper39.html>

The White Paper on National Defence made provision for a Defence Review which would entail comprehensive long-range planning on matters such as doctrine, posture, force design and levels, logistical support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding.¹⁴⁷ One of the concepts underpinning the 1998 Defence Review was the government's declaration of defence against external aggression as the primary function of the SANDF.¹⁴⁸ Any other function was a secondary function. However, it was stated in the Defence Review that where self-defence capabilities were insufficient for certain secondary functions (such as peace support), additional capabilities might be required.¹⁴⁹ These capabilities might include the provision of equipment, logistical support, humanitarian aid, engineering services, communication systems, and medical personnel and facilities.¹⁵⁰ This would be aided by the spectrum of military diplomacy which is more of a naval expertise than an army or air force expertise. It is this latter nuance that is expected to come over more clearly in the envisaged Defence Update with the attempt to bring the primary and secondary roles closer together.

The emphasis on participation in regional peace support was reflected in the SANDF Military Strategy, where it was (as one of the three military strategic objectives) interpreted as the promotion of peace, security and stability in the region and on the continent, and further defined as the provision of external deployment or support to enhance security in support of the decisions of the executive.¹⁵¹ This was how the SANDF (as a state department) would act to support the national security objectives.

This strategic military objective was interpreted in the SAN Doctrine as engaging in co-operative ventures with African countries in the fields of maritime defence planning, combined exercises, procurement of arms and

¹⁴⁷ White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, Ch 1, par 17.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, ch 2, par 11.9.

¹⁴⁹ Department of Defence. 1998. South African Defence Review, ch 1, par 29. Available at <http://www.dod.mil.za/documents/defencereview/defence%20review1998.pdf>. Accessed 3 March 2009.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, ch 5, par 6.

¹⁵¹ Jansen, B. 2004. "Comply with the Demands of an Uncertain Environment", *SA Soldier*, Johannesburg, July 2004, p. 38

equipment, training and education, and the conduct of exchange visits.¹⁵² The naval missions associated with this objective (and as derived from the SANDF missions) were defined as embargoes, peace support operations, anti-piracy operations, drug interdiction, fishery protection, riverine and inland lake patrols, support to counter-insurgency operations and enforcement of maritime agreements.¹⁵³

In summary, it can be stated that the national security objectives will definitely not limit, but rather will formally support or facilitate the execution of peace support activities in Africa as reflected and expanded upon in the White Paper on National Defence, the White Paper on Participation in Peace Missions (from the Foreign Policy department), the SANDF Strategy and the naval missions stated in the SAN Doctrine.

2.2. SECURITY CULTURE

Williams stated that security cultures shape the way in which regional arrangements construct and respond to threats. He defined security cultures as the beliefs and norms of a particular group about what constituted a security threat and which responses were considered appropriate and legitimate.¹⁵⁴ This is similar to the Oxford Dictionary definition of culture as the customs, achievements, philosophy, etc of a particular group.¹⁵⁵ Hence the customs and philosophy of the SANDF could be interpreted as an expression of security culture. The national security objectives were further defined in the Defence Review as the SANDF self-defence functions of:

- the promotion of regional security through defence co-operation within the SADC framework;¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy – SANGP 100, ch 4, p 50.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Williams, P. 2007. *The African Union's Emerging Security Culture: Options for US policymakers*. Available at <http://csis.org/blog/african-union%20%99s-emerging-security-culture-options-us-policymakers>

¹⁵⁵ Branford, W. (ed). 1994. *The South African Pocket Oxford Dictionary*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

¹⁵⁶ Department of Defence. 1998. South African Defence Review, ch 3, par 5.

- the promotion of international security through participation in peace operations and military co-operation in support of foreign policy; and
- the provision of a core defence capability against internal and external threats.¹⁵⁷

The promotion of regional security as part of South Africa's emergent security culture is further supported in the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Strategic Plan 2009-2012 where it is stated that the principal focus of the South African foreign policy is the consolidation of the African Agenda. One of the four pillars of the Agenda is the strengthening of South Africa's participation in the implementation of Africa's peace and security agenda and management of peace missions.¹⁵⁸ The name of the department has since changed to the Department of International Relations and Co-operation.

In the interpretation of the SANDF strategic objectives, the SAN doctrine listed the SAN missions required to reach the SANDF objectives of the promotion of peace, security and stability in the region, and the provision of support to the people of South Africa.¹⁵⁹ Peace support activities, as defined for this study, would typically be found under these two objectives.

The promotion of regional security as an element of South Africa's security culture was therefore visible in the Constitution, the various White Papers and eventually in the SAN doctrine. Therefore the security culture would not limit the SAN's participation in peace support activities, but rather support it.

2.3. CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

For most people, the Cold War era ended in 1989, and the ideological and military confrontation dominating the foreign and defence policies of the major

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ Department of International Relations and Co-operation Strategic Plan 2009-2012, Part Two: Key Performance Areas: Consolidation of the African Agenda. Available at http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/stratpla2009-2012/strategic_plan2009%20-%202012.pdf

¹⁵⁹ Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy – SANGP 100, chapter 4, p 49-50.

antagonists and their allies made way for new policies of internationalism, co-operation, openness and disarmament.¹⁶⁰ South Africa, unlike the rest of the world, did not experience these changes at the time because of the political situation in the country, and only after the end of apartheid in 1994 was a period of transition initiated.¹⁶¹ Vrey explained this transition by means of the paradigm shift theory, where the thinking on South African defence moved from the pre-1994 Total Onslaught approach, to the post-1994 Democracy approach.¹⁶²

The pre-1994 SADF paradigm had a pre-emptive, operationally offensive strategic posture based upon a notion of security as a military and police problem.¹⁶³ However, the government's foreign relations changed from an adversarial mode to bilateral and multi-lateral co-operation, and it was deemed that the defence policy should be in harmony with the foreign policy.¹⁶⁴ Accordingly, Nathan stated that the post-1994 defence paradigm was dramatically different from its predecessor, but in line with broader defence thinking at the time, where interdepartmental and sub-regional defence co-operation (and its extension to regional and international levels) became focal points.¹⁶⁵ The sub-regional co-operation had both defence and socio-economic goals, while regional and international conflict would be addressed in a preventative and co-operative way¹⁶⁶ - indeed fundamentally different from the previous interventionist and coercive way.

The post-1994 paradigm was entrenched in human security, democratic principles and non-isolation.¹⁶⁷ Hence it was deduced that the primary function of the SANDF was self-defence, and by implication, the SAN's first responsibility was towards South Africa, and then towards SADC or the wider

¹⁶⁰ Edmonds, M. and Mills, G. 1996. *Uncharted Waters*. Johannesburg: SALIA, p 1.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*, p 2.

¹⁶² Vrey, F. 2004. Paradigm Shifts, South African Defence Policy and the South African Defence Force: From here to where?, in *Scientia Militaria* Vol 32(2)/04, p 90.

¹⁶³ White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, Ch 2, par 1.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, ch 1, par 10.

¹⁶⁵ Vrey, *op cit*, p 101.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p 103.

African region.¹⁶⁸ However, as the biggest economic and strongest military power in the region, South Africa was expected to have a balanced and flexible force which could play an important role in SADC security.¹⁶⁹ The expectation was acknowledged in the planned contributions of the SANDF, and the SAN, to the SADC Brigade as part of the SADC Standby Force.¹⁷⁰ Hence the shifting security environment was apparently guiding future SANDF (and by implication, SAN) operations towards an emphasis on the execution of peace support activities.

An example of the shifting security environment in Africa was the sharp increase in reported incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Karamalikis (Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Navy) concurred that it was one of the challenges due to the rapidly changing security environment that was confronting the EU, NATO and the UN.¹⁷¹ Proof of the changing security environment was evident in the increase in annual reported piracy and armed robbery incidents at sea off the East African coast from 22 in 2003 to 111 in 2008.¹⁷² A further increase was shown in the first quarter in 2009 (61 incidents) compared to the first quarter in 2008 (6 incidents).¹⁷³

The lack of enforcement capacity and resources to address the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia was of major concern to Somalia, as well as to some of the other affected littoral states of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.¹⁷⁴ This highlighted the need to identify an integrated approach

¹⁶⁸ Potgieter, T. 2002. The Geopolitical Role of the South African Navy in the South African Sphere of Influence after the Second World War, *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol XXIV no 1, p 117.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Yekelo, G. 2007. The Status and Way forward for the SADCSF, at the SMC Conference **Emerging Maritime Concepts in Southern Africa**, Simon's Town, 12-14 June 2007.

¹⁷¹ Karamalikis, G. 2009. Piracy. The international monetary crisis. Terrorism. Global Warming. *US Naval Proceedings*, March 2009, Vol 135/3/1,273. Available at http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1808

¹⁷² ICC International Maritime Bureau. 2009. *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Annual Report – 1 January to 31 December 2008*. Available at www.icc-ccs.org

¹⁷³ ICC International Maritime Bureau. 2009. *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Quarterly Report – 1 January to 31 March 2009*. Available at www.icc-ccs.org

¹⁷⁴ UN Security Council. 2009. *Report to the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1846 (2008)*, par 48. Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49c2164b2.html>

between the operational responses at sea and those on land.¹⁷⁵ Hence the Security Council, in accordance with resolution 1816 (2008), called upon states and interested organisations, including the IMO, to provide technical assistance to Somalia and nearby states upon their request to enhance the capacity of these states to ensure coastal and maritime security.¹⁷⁶ This way of dealing with the problem of piracy was previously observed by Till, when he stated that the maintenance of good order required an improved level of awareness, effective policy and integrated governance.¹⁷⁷ He also confirmed that only a holistic all-round maritime approach could address the complexity and importance of the linkages between the different values of the sea and its many connections with events ashore.¹⁷⁸

In the same vein, Mudimu (Chief of the SAN) comments that maritime insecurity manifests itself when coastal states are vulnerable in the three areas of inadequate maritime domain awareness, the inability or lack of political will to institutionalise international protocols and local marine issues at national level, and a weak maritime infrastructure.¹⁷⁹ This could lead to maritime threats such as piracy and other crimes like oil theft and human trafficking.¹⁸⁰ Common denominators for this state of affairs appeared to be complacency and high levels of ignorance about maritime issues in Africa, and Mudimu suggested that the SAN would facilitate the enhancement of maritime security with the hosting of the Third Sea Power Symposium in order to make a case for urgent comprehensive and collaborative reform.¹⁸¹ On a more practical level, Heitman is of the opinion that, in order to support the suppression of piracy off Somalia, the SAN has the capacity to deploy a frigate with a boarding party, the SAS *Drakensberg* as a command and support ship, and a submarine (to gather intelligence).¹⁸² Hence the shifting security environment off the East African coast seems to guide the thinking at

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, par 49.

¹⁷⁷ Till, G. *Seapower – A Guide for the Twenty-first Century*, *op cit*, p 333.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Mudimu, J. 2009. Piracy. The international monetary crisis. Terrorism. Global Warming. *US Naval Proceedings*, March 2009, Vol 135/3/1,273.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² Heitman, H. 2008. Twiddling thumbs on Somali piracy. *The Star*, 30 October 2008.

different levels towards South African assistance in peace support activities in Africa.

The shifting security environment in the world, around Africa, and in South Africa, would thus seem to support the participation of the SAN in peace support activities in Africa. It must now be investigated whether political preferences reflect similar support.

Figure 2: Map of Africa¹⁸³



¹⁸³ Map: Africa. Available at www.infoplease.com/atlas/africa.html

2.4. POLITICAL PREFERENCES

The political preferences of the South African government in terms of the existence and the usage of the SANDF were recorded in the White Paper on Defence, stating that South Africa would have a primarily defensive orientation and posture, pursue peaceful relations with other states, and seek a high level of political, economic and military co-operation with Southern African states in particular.¹⁸⁴

The similar political preferences of Williams (a member of the former Military Research Group)¹⁸⁵ were visible in the Defence Review where one of the SANDF tasks related to the self-defence function, was the promotion of international security through participation in peace operations and military co-operation in support of foreign policy.¹⁸⁶ Peace support operations would take place under the auspices of the UN Security Council, the AU, and SADC. Any request for South African participation would be routed through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). After consultation with the Department of Defence (DoD) on potential involvement, the DFA and the DoD would then advise Cabinet before the final decision on participation would be taken.¹⁸⁷ This would confirm political approval before any operation could be started.

The DFA's White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions stated similarly that contemporary peace missions were fundamentally political initiatives, and that a careful appraisal of the political and strategic environment where peace missions were due should be made before participation could commence.¹⁸⁸ The participation could be of a global nature, but the priority afforded Africa in the South African foreign policy would make Africa the prime focus of future engagements, particularly given South

¹⁸⁴ White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, Ch 2, par 11.

¹⁸⁵ Kenkel, K.M. 2006. Civil Society Participation in Defence Policy Formation: Academic Experts and South Africa's Post-Apartheid Defence White Paper. *Journal of Security Sector Management*, Vol 4 No1, January.

¹⁸⁶ Department of Defence. 1998. South African Defence Review, ch 3, par 5.4.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, Ch 5, par 22.

¹⁸⁸ Department of Foreign Affairs. 1999. *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions*, Government Gazette, Notice 2216 of 1999, par 1.1.

Africa's obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability to promote trade and development, and avoid the spill-over effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood.¹⁸⁹ The DFA would be the lead department in co-ordinating any South African participation in peace operations because such participation would be an extension of South African foreign policy, and would also take the lead in securing finances for South African participation in specific peace missions.¹⁹⁰ The DOD would have the lead responsibility to oversee and manage the operational deployment and maintenance of SANDF contingents involved in peace support activities.¹⁹¹

The political preferences of a peaceful stance and preferred assistance to Africa mentioned in the two White Papers and the Defence Review would clearly support the participation of the SANDF (and the SAN) in peace support activities in Africa. However, Mandrup observed that, during the first post-apartheid decade, South Africa showed great reluctance to undertake peace support activities for both political and practical reasons.¹⁹² He also noticed that the DoD informed policy-makers in March 2004 that the current level of operations could not be sustained without additional funding, or a political prioritisation of the tasks of the SANDF.¹⁹³ In addition, the DFA had often not been able to secure the bridging funding required, and with a very small defence budget, the SANDF was relegated to an almost peripheral status in the South African political agenda.¹⁹⁴ Mandrup was of the opinion that a lack of departmental co-ordination in government, and the tendency of politicians not to follow the guidelines in the 1999 White Paper on Peace Missions, were responsible for the lack of funding and availability of personnel in the SANDF.¹⁹⁵

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, par 4.2.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid*, par 6.4.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, par 7.3.

¹⁹² Mandrup, T. 2008. *The South African Defence Force: Midwife of Peace in Africa?* Copenhagen: Danish Defence, p 5. Available at

<http://www.forsvaret.dk/FAK/Publikationer/Research%20Papers/Documents/Roleofsandfnet.pdf>

¹⁹³ *Ibid*, p 8.

¹⁹⁴ Kent, V. and Malan, M. 2003. *Decisions, Decisions: South Africa's foray into regional peace operations*. Occasional paper no 72, p 9. Available at

<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Papers/72/Paper72.html>

¹⁹⁵ Mandrup, *op cit*, p 11.

However, the increased deployment to international peace support activities (as requested by government) constituted firstly a reason for existence, and secondly, a justification for the state funding of the SANDF.¹⁹⁶ Hence, the current political preferences were supportive of SANDF participation in peace support activities, with the only possible uncertainty being the DFA's willingness to accept disproportionate requests for participation.

3. FUTURE BUDGETS

Adequate funding to prepare, train, support and sustain, is arguably one of the most important resources a navy requires in order to fulfil the expectations of its government. In South Africa, the annual Estimates of National Expenditure (ENE), supplied by the National Treasury, offers an insight into past and present budgets of the SANDF and the SAN, or "Maritime Defence". The ENE of 2009 states that the main objective of the SANDF is to defend and protect South Africa, its territorial integrity and its people (as stated in the DoD Strategic Business Plan 2009), as well as provide support to UN and AU initiatives aimed at promoting peace, stability and security in Africa and SADC.¹⁹⁷ With regard to peace support activities, the ENE of 2009 states that security, peace and stability in the region and the continent are promoted not only through peace support operations, but also through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, support for government initiatives, and post-conflict reconstruction and training, and the SANDF prepares annually to assist in support these operations through peace support.¹⁹⁸

According to the ENE of 2009, the SAN must defend and protect South Africa and its maritime zones by providing:

- A surface combat capability of four frigates, one combat support vessel, three off-shore patrol vessels, three inshore patrol vessels, and a maritime reaction squadron;

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p 12.

¹⁹⁷ Estimates of National Expenditure 2009. Available at <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2009/ene/19%20defence.pdf>

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid*.

- A sub-surface combat capability of three submarines;
- Two mine countermeasures systems to ensure safe access to South African harbours, and where mine clearance may be required; and
- An ongoing hydrographic survey capability to ensure safe navigation in charting areas and to meet an international obligation.¹⁹⁹

From the above (and the statement about the promotion of security, peace and stability in the region and continent), it seems that the compilers of the ENE of 2009 were aware of the SAN's obligations to contribute towards peace support activities, as well as the assets required for this contribution. It must be taken into account that traditionally navies have always offered the inherent advantages of adaptability, flexibility and mobility on, under and over the sea,²⁰⁰ and hence the contribution towards peace support would be carried out with core defence capabilities without major changes to the platforms. A table with some of the detail of the funding supplied towards supporting the SAN activities must now be scrutinised to find out if the awareness translates into financial enhancement, or limitation of the ability of the SAN to contribute.

In the ENE of 2009, it is stated that the SAN expenditure (or budget) decreased at an average annual rate of 5,5% from financial year (FY) 2005/06 to FY 2011/12 due to the commissioning of the new frigates and submarines, which were supplied by the Special Defence Package (SDP).²⁰¹ The Available SAN Budget in Table 1 was then obtained by subtracting the SDP payments from the SAN Budget, from which the percentage increase (year-on-year) was calculated. When taking into consideration that inflation in South Africa increased from 4,5% in FY 2005/06 to 6,5% in FY 2008/09,²⁰² and comparing it to the percentage increase (year-on-year), there seems to

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁰ Gray, C.S. 1999. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 221.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² South Africa Inflation rate (consumer prices). Available at [http://indexmundi.com/south_africa/inflation_rate_\(consumer_prices\).html](http://indexmundi.com/south_africa/inflation_rate_(consumer_prices).html)

be a small average increase in the available budget every year from FY 2006/07 to FY 2008/09.

However, it must be kept in mind that in 2005 only one of the new frigates was handed over to the SAN and none of the new submarines were in South Africa yet. This meant that the SAN budget was not yet required to support the frigates and submarines in terms of supplying the required spares when defects occur, and also in terms of supporting patrols and other exercises. The statement by Mudimu (the Chief of the SAN) that the SAN was underfunded²⁰³ could be seen against the background of the increase in assets and forces to be prepared and supported (new frigates and submarines), and the small increase in the budget from 2005 until 2008. Other new demands on the budget were the support and deployment of the MRS, and transfer payments²⁰⁴ to the Naval Dockyard (now under Armscor management).

Table 2 – Funding Detail from ENE of 2009 (all Rand figures in millions)²⁰⁵

Financial Year	Available SAN Budget	Percentage Increase (Year-on-Year)	Force Employment Budget	Percentage Increase (Year-on-Year)	Inflation Percentage
2005/06	R 1,365.7		R 1,605.4		4.5
2006/07	R 1,445.0	5.8	R 1,508.0	6	4.0
2007/08	R 1,643.9	13.7	R 1,581.2	4.6	5.0
2008/09	R 1,782.2	8.4	R 1,798.0	6.4	6.5
2009/10	R 1,968.3	10.4	R 1,801.8	0.2	
2010/11	R 2,050.6	4.1	R 1,862.0	3.2	
2011/12	R 2,121.4	3.5	R 1,978.5	6.2	

²⁰³ Engelbrecht, L. 2009. *Navy underfunded*. Available at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13698&Itemid=370

²⁰⁴ *Estimates of National Expenditure 2009*. Available at <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2009/ene/19%20defence.pdf>

²⁰⁵ As adapted by Capt Thiart from the *Estimates of National Expenditure 2009*.

It is known that South Africa will be reimbursed for its participation in UN peace missions, but that this will only take place after the start of the deployment, and that specific (bridging) finance will be required for such participation.²⁰⁶ With reference to such participation in peace operations, ex-Defence Minister Lekota started lobbying in 2008 for an increase in the Defence Budget, stating that additional funds were required in order to honour South Africa's peacekeeping obligations.²⁰⁷ He also added that if the present level of involvement of the SANDF in peacekeeping operations were to be sustained, or additional missions undertaken, the budget approach should reflect that those operations and missions would be part of the SANDF's regular tasks instead of incidental deployments.²⁰⁸ While the ENE of 2009 seemed to have taken note of Minister Lekota's lobbying in terms of acknowledging the SANDF's role in peace support activities, the budget was not increased accordingly.

The Force Employment (Regional Security) budget must provide for the deployment of forces in support of South Africa's commitment to regional, continental and global security, but, assuming that inflation will more or less stay at the same level until 2012, then the detail in Table 1 confirms no increases for the SAN in the immediate future.

Taking into account the budget figures for the future as explained in the ENE of 2009, and the demands on the SAN in terms of force preparation and sustenance, it can be stated that future participation by the SAN in peace support activities (beyond its present involvement) will be limited. Increased participation can only become reality if some of the roles of the SAN are scaled down (or disregarded) in favour of increased peace support participation, or if the SANDF budget is increased with subsequent increases in the SAN and Force Employment budgets.

²⁰⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs. 1999. *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions*, p 24. Available on <http://www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1999/peacemissions.pdf>

²⁰⁷ Musgrave, A. 2008. Lekota in plea for more cash. *The Business Day*, 14 February.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

4. ASSETS AVAILABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY

The SAN's hard assets available to contribute towards peace support activities are vessels, the landward bases and units, and perhaps most important, the personnel. Present vessels of the fleet and future vessel acquisitions will be analysed for their potential contributions, while the bases and units will be listed. The shortage of skilled personnel and capacity will be discussed in detail. Among the soft assets which can contribute are the experience gained in various training fields and the experience and professionalism of the SAN hydrographic branch.

4.1. PRESENT ASSETS OF THE FLEET

The four SAN MEKO A-200 **frigates** provide the surface combat capability of the SAN. They are intermediate size vessels with good sea-keeping characteristics, capable of sustainable operational presence.²⁰⁹ These frigates are multi-purpose vessels capable of operating individually, or jointly as members of a task force. Their primary role is to execute combat missions, but because of their multi-dimensional nature, their secondary roles include the following:

- participation in peace support operations in Africa;
- evacuation of civilian nationals from littoral states in times of crisis;
- patrolling of South Africa's and other SADC states' territorial waters and EEZs for:
 - the protection of marine resources against poaching and pollution, and
 - law enforcement (ie the prevention of piracy, the smuggling of illegal weapons, substances and contraband); and

²⁰⁹Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy – SANGP 100. October 2006. Simon's Town: Naval Publications Depot. Also available at <http://www.navy.mil.za/>, chapter 4, p 53.

- search and rescue (SAR) missions within the South African international SAR area of responsibility.²¹⁰

These frigates are therefore well suited to contribute to peace support activities (operating in secondary roles), especially with the ships' flight decks being large enough to accommodate the SA Air Force Oryx helicopters and designed-for *Super Lynx* helicopters²¹¹. Theoretically it will then be possible for the SAN to commit one frigate to assist in the anti-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa (HOA).

Such a deployment will require a support organisation for the frigate, which will probably consist of a civilian support agency in the closest harbour, and the deployment of a support ship to enable the frigate to stay on station and be maximally effective. For effective continuous assistance to the patrols over an extended period, a second frigate will have to be prepared and ready in South Africa to relieve the frigate on patrol after a specified period. This will require a change to the current planning for SAN ships' deployment because the cost of spares to support the frigate on patrol, as well as keeping the only SAN support ship in assistance, will challenge the SAN budget, as already pointed out.

There are other European naval support ships currently assisting EU and NATO naval ships in the HOA area, but since no relationship between South Africa and the EU or NATO exists, such support is not considered to be an option. A possible option might be a Ship Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) for support, but the budgetary and regulatory implications will probably be significant, given that South Africa is not in a state of war, and therefore will probably have to "hire" STUFT at commercial rates. A further challenge to this option is that South Africa has no such vessels and no agreement is in place.

²¹⁰ *Ibid*, p 54.

²¹¹ Bennett, C.H. and Soderlund, A.G. 2008. *South Africa's Navy*. Simon's Town; Naval Publications Unit, p 93.

Conventional **submarines** can play a major role in littoral maritime warfare because of their mobility, versatility and resilience.²¹² The three SAN Type 209 submarines are very well suited to the protection of maritime territorial integrity, SLOCs, and merchant vessels, as well as carrying out expeditionary and sea denial operations. However, submarines can operate “unseen”, and can therefore carry out a wide range of peace support activities like surveillance, reconnaissance, situation analysis and verification.²¹³

Deploying small submarines (such as the SAN 209s) away from home will require a sizeable support organisation at the nearest base, as well as assistance from a support ship. Submarines are heavily dependent on expert maintenance, and splitting the submarine support resources between South Africa and another country will require rigorous planning and sound budgeting. It is also not known whether any of the European or the US Navy is deploying submarines in the HOA area, for example.

The **strike craft** were intended to increase the surface-to-surface strike capability of the SAN when originally acquired (launched between 1977 and 1986) and would serve as an effective deterrent from aggression at sea.²¹⁴ The two strike craft currently in commission are thought to be well suited for a range of coastal operations, from patrols through the interception of suspect craft to insertion operations.²¹⁵ While not possessing the endurance of the frigates, their high speed and ability to go close inshore is a useful capability, particularly for deploying small, fast boats to go right inshore.²¹⁶

Small ships like strike craft are heavily dependent on regular maintenance and support from a shore base and a support ship (more so as the ships get older). A SAN technical contingent will have to be deployed to the nearest shore base for assistance. For maximum effect, SAN and Kenyan ships (for operations off the HOA, for example) will probably have to be deployed

²¹² *Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy – SANGP 100, op cit, p 55.*

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ Du Toit, A.K. 1992. *South Africa’s Fighting Ships Past and Present*. Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty)Ltd, p 297.

²¹⁵ Heitman, H. 2007. Somalia: Send the Navy? *The Star*, 28 February.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

together which will require good command and control, and training in preparation.

At present, the roles of the SAN River class **minehunters** are coastal patrol, diving support and training after a decision in 2004 not to upgrade the vessels' minehunting systems (due to difficulty in maintaining the systems).²¹⁷ Proving very useful in assisting the clearance of smaller wrecks in the Congo River in 1990, the two commissioned vessels²¹⁸ can still contribute where diving support and coastal patrols are required in support of peace. In terms of deploying these ships away from home, it must be noted that they are also very dependent on regular maintenance and support from a shore base.

The **combat support vessel** (*SAS Drakensberg*) can provide underway replenishment of fuel, water, stores and ammunition to enable the SAN to conduct blue water operations as well as foreign deployments and limited sustained operations.²¹⁹ The *SAS Drakensberg* can also be invaluable in contributing to peace support activities like

- the limited transport of land forces and their equipment;
- the provision of limited hospital/medical facilities and temporary accommodation for refugees;
- the transport of material and equipment to areas where social disturbances or natural disasters have caused humanitarian distress;
- general tasks in support of other state departments; and,
- the provision of a platform for helicopter operations.²²⁰

The *SAS Drakensberg* will have to be deployed in assistance if other SAN ships and submarines are deployed away from home for an extended period, and because it is the only SAN support ship, crew rotation will probably have to take place if it is to be kept on station for an extended period.

²¹⁷ Bennett and Soderlund, *op cit*, p 99.

²¹⁸ *Ibid*, p 98.

²¹⁹ *Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy*, *op cit*, p 56.

²²⁰ *Ibid*.

The three SAN **inshore patrol vessels (IPVs or T-craft)** are lightly armed with a limited deployment capability and provide a patrol capability for assistance in policing roles.²²¹ These IPVs can form an inner layer of defence against small vessels, and ensure sufficient inshore presence in support of peace activities like the enforcement of state authority, the upholding and restoration of law and order, and the patrolling of inshore waters in other African countries.²²² These craft are even more dependent on regular support from shore workshops than the small ships.

The **harbour protection boats** were acquired for patrolling South African harbours to prevent sabotage and insurgency, as well as carry out range clearance and ferry crews to naval ships in harbour approaches.²²³ These boats are transportable by sea, road, rail or air, and can therefore carry out patrols, board and inspect ships and land shore patrols at key points in African harbours.²²⁴ The patrol boats are fairly easy to support and will require a less intensive support organisation.

The **Maritime Reaction Squadron (MRS)** of the SAN was commissioned in December 2008 and was formed by the merging of the Operational Boats Squadron, the Rapid Deployment Force and two Operational Diving Teams (ODTs).²²⁵ The tasks of the MRS are the following:

- conducting interdiction, patrol and escort operations in coastal, lake and riverine areas;
- boarding of suspicious ships to counter criminal and illegal activities at sea;
- combating piracy and smuggling;
- carrying out operational diving and salvage operations;

²²¹ *Ibid*, p 57.

²²² *Ibid*.

²²³ Du Toit, *op cit*, p 294.

²²⁴ Heitman, *op cit*.

²²⁵ Engelbrecht, L. 2008. *Navy gains teeth*. Available at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=869

- augmentation of land forces; carrying out beachhead operations and spotting duties for naval gunfire support;
- supplying specialised boats crews for combat and combat support ships on deployment, as well as force protection of vessels when in harbour or approaches during deployment.²²⁶

The MRS can make a big contribution when deployed on board the frigates, strike craft and/or the support ship when being used to board and interrogate suspicious ships and boats off the HOA. This will probably require more intensive training which can be obtained from navies experienced in such operations. A challenge exists in how to deploy the MRS ashore (with a base camp consisting of 33 6m containers, boats and vehicles)²²⁷ with very limited sea- and airlift capability available in the SANDF.

The SAN fulfils its regional and international obligations to provide a **hydrographic service** to the maritime community through its survey vessel (SAS *Protea*) and the hydrographic infrastructure ashore.²²⁸ The Hydrographic Office ashore at the Silvermine complex is authorised through the International Hydrographic Organisation to distribute paper charts and Electronic Navigational Chart (ENC) products, and is the only hydrographic organisation in Africa producing ENCs.²²⁹ The SAN Hydrographic office was recently acknowledged as being a “mature centre of expertise in the region” by the UK National Hydrographer²³⁰ and hence this soft asset can make a contribution to peace support in the region, because no ships supporting peace support activities will enter harbours without reliable and up-to-date charts.

Landward bases are important assets in terms of assisting peace support activities. *Naval Base Simon’s Town* supplies general support, while training

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

²²⁷ Engelbrecht, L. 2009. *Project Xena on track*. Available at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1162&Itemid=419

²²⁸ Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy – SANGP 100, chapter 4, p 58.

²²⁹ Bennett and Soderlund, *op cit*, p 137.

²³⁰ Helfrich, K. 2009. Hydrographer honoured. *The Citizen*, 3 July, p 4.

is supplied by SAS *Saldanha* (basic training), SAS *Simonsberg* (specialised training) and SAS *Wingfield* (technical training).²³¹ Training for officers take place at SA Naval College (formative training) and SA Naval Staff College (Junior Staff and Warfare Course).²³²

Logistical support can be given by *Fleet Maintenance Unit* (maintenance and repair beyond ships' own abilities) and the *Naval Dockyard* (maintenance and repair beyond ships and *Fleet Maintenance Unit* capabilities).²³³ *Naval Station Durban* is not only important as a SAN presence in South Africa's busiest harbour, but can play an important support role as the only SAN base on the east coast of Africa. Support distances to the HOA area, the Prince Edward Island group and nearby East African harbours are shortened from Durban. However, for proper support to SAN ships, the facilities at the base will probably have to be upgraded, which will be counter to the original decision to scale the base down in the late 1990s. SAN ships can also be supplied with support when deployed away from South Africa by contracted shipping agents, and a *Transportable Logistics Support* organisation.²³⁴

The SAN Diving centre at SAS *Simonsberg* has already provided diving training for members from Malawi, Tanzania and Nigeria, while officers from SADC have attended courses at the SA Naval Staff College²³⁵ – more soft assets from the SAN that can contribute to peace support.

4.2. FUTURE ASSETS

In four to six years' time, the SAN will acquire six **inshore and offshore patrol vessels** (OPVs and IPVs) under *Project Biro*.²³⁶ These vessels will be armed and used to stop crimes along the country's shoreline such as drug

²³¹ South African Navy (SAN), available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rsa/navy.htm>

²³² Bennett and Soderlund, *op cit*, pp 155-158.

²³³ Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy – SANGP 100, chapter 7, p 92.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ Bennett and Soderlund, *op cit*, pp 157-158.

²³⁶ Hosken, G. 2009. SA vessel venture to boost African navies. *The Pretoria News*, 3 March, p 4.

smuggling, human trafficking and poaching.²³⁷ The OPVs and IPVs will replace the three remaining strike craft (about 29 years old) and the three IPVs (T-craft - about 16 years old) currently in service,²³⁸ and take over their patrolling roles.

Under *Project Hotel*, the SAN is planning to replace its **hydrographic survey vessel** (*SAS Protea* – 36 years old) in the future, as well as establishing a mobile hydrographic survey team.²³⁹ According to Teuteberg (SAN Chief Director Maritime Strategy), the SAN has also received permission to investigate a strategic sealift capability which would be operated by the SAN on behalf of the entire SANDF.²⁴⁰ Such a strategic sealift ship can contribute in peace support activities like the following:

- Deploying and support of forces carrying out peace support.
- Supplying offshore command and support facilities for joint forces conducting operations in the littoral.
- Command and underway support of a naval task group conducting offshore operations.
- Assist non-combatant evacuations, and disaster and emergency relief operations.²⁴¹

The SAN is acquiring a core capability for **Mine Warfare Operations**, which will not depend on dedicated mine counter-measure vessels.²⁴² This capability will consist of unmanned or remote controlled vehicles for mine detection and neutralisation, and will be operated from vessels of

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁸ Engelbrecht, L. 2008. SA Navy sketches future design. Available at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=828?Itemid=419

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰ Campbell, K. 2009. SA Navy needs new ship to chart exclusive economic zone. Available at <http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/navy-needs-new-ship-for-future-charting-of-countrys-exclusive-economic-zone-2009-03-20>

²⁴¹ Heitman, H. 2008. *African Navies and Peacekeeping: A Role for the SA Navy?*, at the **International Conference on Maritime Security in Southern African Waters**, Stellenbosch, 22-23 July 2008.

²⁴² Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy – SANGP 100, chapter 4, p 56.

opportunity.²⁴³ *Project Mapantsula* will replace the SAN minehunters and already phased-out minesweepers with a modular minehunting system.²⁴⁴

The present and future SAN vessels, and the bases and units, seem to be adequate and useful assets to carry out possible peace support activities, but with the limitations of a restricted sealift capability, no minehunting capability and old ships to perform hydrographic survey, offshore and inshore patrolling. Up to now, the SAN has only conducted patrols on Lake Tanganyika, and carried out VIP protection in Burundi, which represents a small percentage of the possible SAN contributions to peace support activities in Africa. Further limitations which can prevent a more significant contribution must now be investigated.

4.3. LACK OF SKILLS AND CAPACITY

One of the lessons from the Battle of the Nile that was repeated in the SAN Maritime Doctrine was that “men matter most”.²⁴⁵ Ultimately it was the people that constituted the fighting power of an armed force. The White Paper on Defence stated that one of the features required from military professionalism was the maintenance of technical, managerial and organisational skills and resources, which would enable the components of the SANDF to perform their primary and secondary functions effectively and efficiently.²⁴⁶ For political, strategic and economic reasons, the SANDF would be an all-volunteer force, and the DoD would have to design appropriate strategies to attract high quality recruits, secure the required rate of turnover, and develop functional and technical skills.²⁴⁷ It is therefore very important to note that in December 2008, Pillay (SAN Director of Maritime Plans) stated that the SAN was moving “aggressively” to address an on-going **loss of skills** caused by sailors

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ Engelbrecht, L. 2009. *Sea otter for Mapantsula?* Available at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1434&Itemid=178

²⁴⁵ Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy – SANGP 100, chapter 1, p 7.

²⁴⁶ White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, Ch 3, par 30.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid*, Ch 6, par 9-12.

resigning to follow more lucrative careers in the local and international maritime industry.²⁴⁸ He further stated that the SAN had lost an average of 200 sailors a year in the combat, engineering and technical musterings since 2004.²⁴⁹ If one takes into consideration that the new frigates and submarines bought as part of the Strategic Defence Package were being delivered from 2004 onwards, such a loss of skills could quite possibly have negatively influenced the successful integration of the new vessels into the Fleet.

A shortage of skilled staff in the SAN was nothing new, and it was already noticed (due to various reasons) in 1966 (and probably before), and again in 1977 when it was reported to be due to problematic SADF personnel policies, poor contractual requirements and a lack of incentives.²⁵⁰ In 1996, it was highlighted that the key to maintaining a modern navy with high-technology and personnel-substitutive equipment, was the existence of highly-trained officers and operatives.²⁵¹ It was also emphasized that if SAN personnel were lost, it would take years to train others and for them to acquire the necessary experience.²⁵²

In 2001, Teuteberg (then SAN Acting Director Naval Personnel) confirmed that the SAN faced challenges around the supply of human resources in order to provide the output required from the SAN.²⁵³ He acknowledged that the introduction of the new corvettes and submarines would place much stress on the organisation, and the unacceptably high loss of expertise at the time would severely constrain the staffing and maintenance of the newly acquired ships and submarines.²⁵⁴ Strategies to stem the outflow of expertise, mainly in the technical and combat environments, were introduced, such as a

²⁴⁸ DefenceWeb. 2008. Navy moves “aggressively” to curb skills loss. *DefenceWeb* (online), 8 December. Available at

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=857&Itemid=363

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ Bennett, C. 2006. *Three Frigates*. Durban: Just Done Productions, p 173.

²⁵¹ Edmonds, M and Mills, G. 1996. *Uncharted Waters*. Johannesburg: SAIIA, p 68.

²⁵² *Ibid*, p 69.

²⁵³ Teuteberg, B.H.. 2001. *The Human Resource Challenge facing the SA Navy into the new Millennium and Possible Strategies aimed at meeting the Future with Confidence*, at the **A Navy for Africa** Conference, Simon’s Town, 29-30 November 2001.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

graduated, competence-linked, remuneration/incentive contract scheme, among others.²⁵⁵

The struggle to retain specialised or scarce skilled personnel was emphasized in the briefing to the Portfolio Committee on Defence on its oversight visit in 2007.²⁵⁶ The limited availability of the scarce skills in the country made the lost personnel difficult to replace at a time when the SAN was working towards increasing its relevance in the African battle space, and alignment with the broader government initiatives.²⁵⁷ The committee expressed concern over the possible impact on the SAN's ability to secure the South African coastlines and accepted that the retention of the institutional memory of the SAN was critical.²⁵⁸

The SAN Director of Maritime Plans stated that special allowances and incentives were being negotiated for submariners, training for divers was being upgraded and allowances for technical personnel were being reviewed.²⁵⁹ The Flag Officer Fleet was of the opinion that better pay for SAN personnel would help with the retention of skilled members.²⁶⁰ The Military Skills and Development System (MSDS) would also act as an important feeder for the SAN into the future.²⁶¹

However, with historical problematic retention of skilled personnel, forewarning in the White Paper, and subsequent continuing acknowledgement of problematic retention of skilled personnel, allowances and incentives might only have limited success. Therefore the loss of skilled personnel might well continue. It is quite possible that the shortage of skilled personnel might negatively affect the ability of the SAN to participate in peace support activities where more skilled personnel are required for instance when more ships are

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁶ Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2007. *Report of the Portfolio Committee on its Oversight Visit to Simon's Town Naval Base and the South African Military Academy at Saldanha, 07-08 May.*

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁹ DefenceWeb, *op cit.*

²⁶⁰ Interview with R Adm R.W. Higgs (Flag Officer Fleet), 31 August 2009.

²⁶¹ DefenceWeb, *op cit.*

deployed, or when more skilled instructors at training institutions are required due to higher trainee numbers. This would particularly be the case when SADC military personnel are accepted to be trained.

In a briefing on the Department Budget 2009/10, Sisulu (South African Minister of Defence and Military Veterans) stated that the recession was eroding the **capacity** of the SANDF.²⁶² She also mentioned that Cabinet had not yet discussed the sending of naval assets to support the international fight against piracy off the Horn and east coast of Africa. At the same briefing, Ngwenya (Chief of the SANDF) remarked that the only reason why no naval assets had yet been sent was the uncertainty about how to support the ships off the east coast of Africa.²⁶³ If capacity is defined as “the maximum amount of effort that can be produced”,²⁶⁴ then the negative effect of a recession on the SAN budget and loss of expertise will prevent the maximising of effort. It is possible that this will introduce uncertainty about long and expensive deployments of ships away from their home base (and their support) – deployments typical of peace support operations. The lack of skilled personnel and the availability of older ships will also prevent the maximising of effort required to participate in peace support activities. It can therefore be stated that a shortage of capacity exists in the SAN which does, and in the future will, limit its participation in peace support.

The shortage of skills and capacity will limit the participation by the SAN in future peace support activities of enhanced support when compared to the present. This will be visible in the following areas:

- where more skilled personnel are required (whether on board ships deployed or in training institutions where more trainees require training); and
- where more capacity than presently available is required.

²⁶² Sisulu, L. 2009. *Briefing by Minister of Defence and Military Veterans on Department Budget 2009/10*. Available on <http://www.pmg.org.za/print/17136>

²⁶³ Wingrin, D. 2009. *No decision yet for SA's anti-piracy mission*. Available on http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2784&Itemid=363

²⁶⁴ Sykes, B.J. (ed). 1982. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Ed. Clarendon Press; Oxford.

5. CONCLUSION

The aim of the chapter was to evaluate the possible contributions by the SAN towards peace support in Africa against the national security environment, identified limitations like the impact of future budgets and current and future SAN assets. The limitations were analysed in terms of their ability to support future SAN contributions. Current assets like ships, bases and personnel were analysed in terms of their possible contributions in the near future, while the possible contributions of the future assets were noted.

The national security objectives, the security culture, the political preferences of the South African government and the shifting security environment in Africa support the participation of the SAN in peace support activities as described in the SAN Maritime Doctrine and expected by other countries in the region. However, the potential roles and contributions of the SAN to peace support will be limited by the capabilities of the present assets, future budgets and the shortages of skills and capacity.

The analysis of the possible contributions of the current and future assets revealed that the SAN could definitely contribute towards peace support activities (even with the present restrictions of limited sealift, no minehunting capability and elderly ships) like the following:

- Peace support operations in Africa.
- Patrols of South African and other SADC states' territorial waters and EEZs to protect marine resources and enforce the law (in combating smuggling and piracy).
- Carrying out Search and Rescue missions.
- Carrying out surveillance, reconnaissance, situation analysis and verification.
- Coastal operations like interception of suspect craft, and insertion operations.

- Limited transport of land forces and their equipment, and material and equipment to assist where natural disasters occurred.
- Provision of limited hospital and medical facilities.
- Support of other state departments.
- Providing a platform for helicopter operations.
- Conducting interdiction, patrol and escort operations in coastal, lake and riverine areas.
- Boarding suspicious ships.
- Carrying out operational diving and salvage operations.
- Supplying hydrographic services.
- Supplying basic, formative and technical training.
- Supplying logistical support for ships.

It also showed that the present limitations would be negated significantly by the acquisition of future assets.

While limited peace support activities can be executed with present assets, future budgets will prevent any extension of the present involvement in peace support, unless the roles and missions in the present doctrine are scaled down. The minimising of effort towards peace support activities due to shortages means that some activities can be executed, but the budget available will not allow participation in activities beyond those being undertaken at present.

Unless more funding is received, the potential roles and contributions of the SAN towards peace support activities in Africa cannot extend beyond some lake patrols and VIP protection. Hence, even with fine new frigates and submarines available, participation in peace support activities will remain sub-optimal.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. SUMMARY

In summary, the research question for the study initially arose from “How can the SAN contribute to peace support in Africa?” According to Vice Admiral Mudimu (present Chief of the SA Navy), the SAN contributed primarily through the patrols carried out by the SAN Operations Boat Squadron on Lake Tanganyika in Burundi, and by assistance from the Maritime Reaction Squadron in VIP protection duties in Burundi. To enhance its visibility, it was stated that the SAN should preferably play a bigger role in peace support in Africa.

To discuss the possible further contributions of the SAN to peace support in Africa (with events on land creating increased insecurity), the traditional roles for navies and the doctrines of navies (specifically those involved in peace support operations) were investigated. Thoughts on the possible roles of the SAN historically centred around the protection of the SLOCs around the South African coast and the protection of South Africa’s borders, even though the changing political environment during the 1960s allowed for forced changes and subsequent new assets. In a similar vein, the changed world political environment since 1990, and the changed South African political situation since April 1994, added possible roles and missions for the SAN. These roles and missions were reflected in the SAN Maritime Doctrine (2006) and the SA Navy Review (2001). Growing regional expectations added room for more roles and missions. However, the identification of these roles and missions would have been of academic value only, unless matched with assets available to the SAN. The assets available in the SAN (and the future assets) were evaluated against identified limitations like the national security environment, budgetary limitations that might be experienced in the future, and the shortage of skills and capacity.

2. FINDINGS

From the discussion on traditional roles and doctrines of navies, it was found that generally the roles emanating and evolving from the traditional roles were assimilated into navies' doctrines, roles and tasks, and these were found to be effective in preventing threats to peace. From the history of the SAN, it appears that political intentions have strongly influenced the possible roles of the SAN from its inception to the present. The present possible contributions to peace support activities were found to range from peace support operations (including riverine and lake patrols) to joint law enforcement (like drug interdiction, anti-contraband operations, embargoes, anti-piracy operations, fishery protection) to humanitarian aid, disaster relief, search and rescue services and hydrographic surveys. Regional expectations (as expressed over the last ten years) added roles and missions like the sharing of training, assets, expertise, information and the requirement of maintaining maritime security and the maintenance of good order at sea.

The nature of the changing national security environment and imperatives supported the greater participation of the SAN in peace support activities as described in the SAN Maritime Doctrine (2006) and expected by other countries in the Southern African region. From the analysis of the present and future SAN vessels, and the bases and units, it was found that, even with the limitations of a restricted sealift capability, no minehunting capability and old ships to perform hydrographic survey, offshore and inshore patrolling, these assets seem adequate for utilisation in peace support activities like

- peace support operations in Africa;
- patrols of South African and other SADC states' territorial waters and EEZs to protect marine resources and enforce the law (in combating smuggling and piracy);
- Search and Rescue missions;
- carrying out surveillance, reconnaissance, situation analysis and verification;
- coastal operations like interception of suspect craft, and insertion operations;

- provision of limited hospital and medical facilities;
- support of other state departments;
- provision of a platform for helicopter operations;
- conducting interdiction, patrol and escort operations in coastal, lake and riverine areas;
- boarding suspicious ships;
- operational diving and salvage operations;
- supplying hydrographic services;
- supplying basic, formative and technical training; and
- supplying logistical support for ships.

However, in spite of the newly acquired naval platforms, the potential roles and contributions of the SAN to peace support will be limited by future budgets and the shortages of skills and capacity. Unless more funding is received, the potential roles and contributions of the SAN towards peace support activities in Africa will probably not extend beyond the recent lake patrols and VIP protection.

The acceptance of the limitations must mean understanding and managing them in order to execute the peace support missions discussed in the study. The asset limitations and shortages of funding, skills and capacity suggest that emphasis must be placed on ways to minimise the effect of the shortages in order to enable greater participation in peace support activities.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations indicate matters requiring further study, such as what can be contributed with the resources available, as well as how to minimise the effect of the shortages of skills and capacity.

An aspect requiring more inquiry is the **landward deployment of the MRS**. The policing capabilities of the MRS beyond the recent lake patrols and VIP protection must be investigated, as well as the functioning of the MRS complement as part of a bigger force involved in peace support activities.

The **wider use of a combat support ship** (like SAS *Drakensberg*) will also warrant further study. Deployed in anti-piracy operations with MRS forces to assist in boarding operations and a mix of helicopters on board, the ship could possibly carry out limited sealift in assistance of peace support operations, and conduct anti-piracy patrols off the HOA.

Another area worthy of further inquiry is the **shortage of funding**. This includes topics like continued lobbying for a bigger budget,¹ and more focused budget allocations and in-depth expenditure control in the areas where participation in peace support activities can be improved.

An important aspect which can be explored is how the **shortage of skills and capacity** can be eliminated by concentrating on training in as many areas as possible. With skill being defined as “expertness, practised ability”,² it must be accepted that the training to achieve the various skills will take time, with the necessary repeated practice. With no immediate threats to national security and various established training facilities available, the SAN can concentrate on training members to the required standards.

At the same time, members from African navies can also be trained at SAN facilities (without compromising the numbers of SAN members under training). The real value of such a study into training must identify how it should be carried out, and how to utilise opportunities like multinational exercises, SAN ships’ patrols, goodwill visits to African navies, and assistance in sharing maritime surveillance information to enhance members’ knowledge and experience. This will be a major contribution to peace support activities, and more specifically to interoperability and understanding.

It may also be worthwhile to investigate the possibility of linking up with the US Navy’s *African Partnership Station* programs. Undergoing the same training can improve interoperability and understanding of the African navies’

¹ Supported by Mr Heitman in the interview with him.

² Sykes, B.J. (ed). 1982. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Ed. Clarendon Press; Oxford.

ways of thinking and handling situations. However, a SAN/US Navy partnership may not be politically acceptable to the SA government, or to other African governments because of the connection to AFRICOM (the new US Africa Command).

As the SAN is part of the National Defence Force of South Africa, it has the responsibility to always be prepared to fulfil its primary role. However, despite its primary function and the fact that it is geared for it, most of the operational hours spent by the SAN (and other navies for that matter) from 1991 onwards, have to do with its secondary roles. Therefore it appears that the SAN can make a better contribution towards peace support activities in Africa than has been the case up to now. To do it will require careful management of the present assets and a sensible application of available funding. Training must form the hub of all evolutions in the SAN whereby the minimising of the effects of scarce skills, and a larger contribution towards peace support, can be effected.

Navies are historically prominent because they perform tasks over a wider spectrum than is common for other services. One way in which the SAN can fulfil a prominent and very necessary role within the context of the present international security paradigm, is in the field of peace support operations. Besides the real political gains and support to national and regional strategic objectives, it would enhance the image of the SAN as a national asset.

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