


# **The Influence of Gender on Foreign Policy Beliefs and Behavior: A Literature Review**

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**Assignment presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
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## **Declaration**

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this research assignment is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

## **Abstract**

Since feminist approaches to international relations (IR) first made their appearance in the late 1980s, efforts to explain the 'gender gap' have proliferated. Gender studies within IR in particular have been focused on foreign policy opinion, seeking to discover whether men and women have different views on foreign policy simply due to the fact that they are of different genders. The correlate of this is that if women believe differently than men, in which way do they believe differently and if this were then taken to its logical end, what would happen if they were more equally responsible for foreign policy decision-making?

As an illustration of the varying approaches to feminist IR, this research project undertakes a brief overview of the history of feminist IR, showing how the tools and language of traditional IR do not encompass the needs of feminist IR study.

The research article then reviews the literature of gender, feminism and foreign policy beliefs and behavior, examining its research core and evolution to date. Three research questions are covered. Firstly, is gender a relevant variable in foreign policy analysis? Secondly, if yes, does it make a difference to the foreign policy beliefs of women? Thirdly, where women play a significant role in foreign policy decision-making, are countries more pacific on the international level? Dealt with separately, foreign policy beliefs are found to have a clear gender-based breakdown. Foreign policy behavior is less simple to approach since the dataset of countries led by women during international disputes is limited.

The research project and literature review also looks forward, pointing toward the future, not only of gender and foreign policy studies but also to the implications that future developments in feminist IR may have for the study of IR.

## Opsomming

Pogings om die geslagsgaping te verduidelik het vermenigvuldig sedert die feministiese benadering tot Internasionale Verhoudinge die eerste keer in die laat 1980's sy verskyning gemaak het. Geslagstudies binne Internasionale Verhoudinge het veral gefokus op opinies oor buitelandse beleid om sodoende vas te stel of mans en vroue verskillende sienings oor buitelandse beleid huldig bloot as gevolg van die feit dat hulle verskillende geslagte is. Die keersy hiervan is dat indien vroue anders glo as mans, op watter manier hulle anders glo, en – indien dit dan tot 'n logiese uiteinde gevoer word – wat sou gebeur indien daar meer gelyke verantwoordelikheid vir buitelandse beleidsbesluite sou wees.

As 'n illustrasie van die verskillende benaderings tot feministiese Internasionale Verhoudinge, onderneem hierdie navorsingsprojek 'n oorsig van die geskiedenis van feministiese Internasionale Verhoudinge om sodoende te toon dat die gereedskap en taal van tradisionele Internasionale Verhoudinge nie aan die behoeftes van feministiese Internasionale Verhoudingstudies voldoen nie.

Hierdie navorsingsartikel gee dan 'n oorsig oor geslagsliteratuur, feminisme en buitelandse beleidsopinies en -gedrag deur sy navorsingskern en evolusie tot datum te ondersoek. Drie navorsingsvrae word behandel. Eerstens, is geslag 'n relevante veranderlike in buitelandse beleidsanalise?. Tweedens, indien ja, veranderdit die buitelandse beleidsopinies van vroue? Derdens, is lande meer passief op internasionale vlak waar vroue 'n wesentlike rol in buitelandse beleidsbesluitneming speel? Afsonderlik beskou, is daar gevind dat daar 'n duidelike geslagsonderskeid in buitelandse beleidsopinies is. Dis egter minder eenvoudig om buitelandse beleidsgedrag te bestudeer, aangesien slegs beperkte inligting oor lande wat gedurende internasionale dispute deur vroue beheer is beskikbaar is.

Die navorsingsprojek en literatuuroorsig kyk ook vorentoe met spesifieke verwysing na die toekoms van nie net geslag en buitelandse beleidstudies nie, maar ook na die implikasies wat toekomstige verwickelinge in feministiese Internasionale Verhoudinge 'n vir die studie van tradisionele Internasionale Verhoudinge kan hê.

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank Professor Nel for his limitless patience and kind manner, and for giving me the opportunity to work as his research assistant. I am exceedingly proud to share credit with him on an article, to which my contribution was very small and his very great. I wish him all the best for his new venture in New Zealand.

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **Introduction and Explanation of Necessity**

## 1.1 Setting the Scene: Anecdotal Evidence as Case Study

Since September 11, the media has denied that men and women have significant differences of opinion on terrorism and war, despite contradictory evidence in polls conducted before and after the first bombs were dropped on Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> A closer look at the polling associated with the news articles shows that the media have put a questionable analysis to fairly straightforward polling data.

Poll stories proliferated post-September 11, with headlines like the Washington Post's September 29th 'Public Unyielding in War Against Terror; 9 in 10 Back Robust Military Response'.<sup>2</sup> The numbers seemed overwhelming: '9 in 10' referred to Bush's approval rating, while more than four-fifths of the public generally supported some sort of military action. According to the newspaper, Americans questioned were 'unswerving' in their support for war and were unified in their 'demand for a full-scale response.'

But it is not actually clear that they were as unswerving in their support of the 'war on terror' as the paper purported them to be. At the end of the story was the important information that women 'were significantly less likely to support a long and costly war' than were men, and their hesitant support might develop into 'hardened opposition' over time. In fact, though 44 % of women said they would favor a broad military effort, '48 percent said they want a limited strike or no military action at all.'

The gender gap appeared again in an October 5 CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll,<sup>3</sup> which found that 64% of men thought the United States 'should mount a long-term war' and just 24% favored limiting retaliation to punishing the specific groups responsible for the attacks – but that women were 'evenly divided – with 42% favoring each option'. Though 88% of women and 90% of men support some military action, women reconsider in greater numbers as soon as conditional questions are asked, Gallup's analysis showed.

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<sup>1</sup> Torres-Reyna, O. and Shapiro, R. 2002, 'Trends: Defense and the Military', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 66, no. 2, pp. 279-304.

<sup>2</sup> *The Washington Post*, 29 September 2001, cited in Lambert, F. 2002, 'What Men and Women Are Thinking', *The Washington Post*, 19 August 2002.

<sup>3</sup> *USA Today*, 5 October 2001, cited in Lambert, 2002 (fn. 124).

For example, only 55% of women said they would support military action if a thousand American troops would be killed, whereas 76% of men would still support a lengthy war under these circumstances; women were also much less likely than men to support war if it would continue for several years, bring about an economic recession, or provoke further terrorist attacks at home.

When presented with only two possible post-September 11 alternatives – ‘bomb’ or ‘do nothing’ – it is not surprising that majorities of the public would choose to do something. It is alarming that politicians and the press first completely ignored the Post and Gallup data about women's more conditional approach to the ‘war on terrorism’, and then claimed the traditional gender gap familiar from the Persian Gulf and Kosovo crises had ceased to exist as a result of the shock of September 11.

While polls were covered selectively, news content about women and war was often opportunistic. Television news focused on the restrictive burqa forced on Afghan women as a symbol of the Taliban's cruelty and a reason why they should be defeated. In contrast, the Bush administration portrayed itself as a feminist bastion as Republican women like Condoleezza Rice, Karen Hughes and Mary Matalin took center stage. As a result, a Republican official told the Washington Post in early January, George W. Bush "has not only erased any question about legitimacy, he has also erased the gender gap."

Perhaps the gradations in women's support for or opposition to the war did not make the news because focusing on simple, surface-level ‘yes or no’ questions required less research and investigation, and made a more intriguing and attention-getting headline. It seems certain that women's differing degrees of dissent are seen as inconsequential to the American news media.

## **1.2 Introduction**

What are the larger ramifications of this small case study? If newspapers are indifferent to women's foreign policy opinions, can we extrapolate that foreign policy decision-makers are equally indifferent? What are the ramifications of ignoring the ‘gender gap’?

In fact they are quite severe. J. Ann Tickner argues that gendered discourses, an example of which is the indifference to the gender gap in attitudes after September 11, are used in conflict situations to reinforce mutual hostilities.<sup>4</sup> She suggests that men's association with fighting and national security serves to reinforce their legitimacy in international relations, while it acts to create barriers for women. Tickner also points out that often in times of conflict, women are seen only as victims. These examples of gender oppression are manifestations of ignoring the gender gap.

### 1.3 Necessity

Gender studies, which separate the socially constructed roles and orientations of women and men from biological definitions of sex, are increasingly being combined with international studies at the theoretical level. There has been significant disagreement over the presence of a 'gender gap' in foreign policy beliefs. Research focusing on identification and analysis of broad structural dimensions of mass foreign policy attitudes has consistently reported gender to be relatively unimportant in explaining foreign policy attitudes.<sup>5</sup> Research that focuses primarily on attitudes toward the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy, however, has generally found a significant gender gap.<sup>6</sup>

There is also significant work that shows that women are more 'peaceful' than men, and less likely to support the use of force internationally. Other studies suggest that women are more likely to use a collective or consensual approach to problem-solving and conflict resolution than an approach that focuses on the unilateral imposition of solutions.

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<sup>4</sup> Tickner, J. 2002, 'Feminist Perspectives on 9/11', *International Studies Perspectives*, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 333-350.

<sup>5</sup> See Bardes, B. and Oldendick, R. 1978, 'Beyond Internationalism: The Case for Multiple Dimensions in the Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes', *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 59, pp. 496-508; Wittkopf, E. 1981, 'The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes: An Alternative View', *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 62, pp. 102-123; Maggiotto, M. and Wittkopf, E. 1981, 'American Public Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy' *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 601-631; Wittkopf, E. and Maggiotto, M. 1983, 'Elites and Masses: A Comparative Analysis of Attitudes Toward America's World Role', *Journal of Politics*, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 303-334.

<sup>6</sup> See Baxter, S. and Lansing, M. 1983, *Women and Politics*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor; Hosli, O. and Rosenau, J. 1981, 'The Foreign Policy Beliefs of Women in Leadership Positions', *Journal of Politics*, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 326-365; Frankovic, K. 1982, 'Sex and Politics: New Alignments, Old Issues', *Political Science*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 439-448; Jensen, M. 1987, 'Gender, Sex Roles and Attitudes Toward War and Nuclear Weapons', *Sex Roles*, vol. 17, no. 5/6, pp. 253-267.

A debate as to whether states with more gender equity are more peaceful internationally is also very much alive, as are debates as to what it would look like if ‘women ran the world’, unfortunately, included in this debate are sub-debates considering if they are even *capable* of running the world.<sup>7</sup>

In an effort to contribute to the dialogue between feminist and IR theorists, this report seeks to collect and catalogue the literature pertaining to two fields of research: gender and foreign policy beliefs and gender and foreign policy behavior. In broad terms, the goal of this literature review is a contribution to rigor and cumulativeness, and not an attempt to put forth a unifying theory. However, it seems that it would be a useful exercise to compile a catalogue of the literature that is relevant to the current debates mentioned above.

### 1.3.1 The Literature in General

There is a great diversity in what is aggregated under the heading of feminist theory. Accordingly it must be acknowledged that only a small subset of feminist theory is addressed in this discourse, particularly the subset of feminist IR theory. In spite of the diversity within feminist theory, it is possible to identify a variety of themes that suggest differences in how women and men conceptualize peace and security. A significant amount of scholarship has shown, for instance, that women are more peaceful than men and less likely to support the use of international violence.<sup>8</sup> Ample work exists within

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<sup>7</sup> See Fukuyama, F. 1998, ‘Women and the Evolution of International Politics’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 77, no. 5, pp. 24-40; Tickner, J.A. 1999, ‘Why Women Can’t Run the World: International Politics According to Francis Fukuyama’, *International Studies Review*, vol. 41, pp. 3-11; Ehrenreich, B. and Pollitt, K., et al. 1998, ‘Fukuyama’s Follies: So What If Women Ran the World?’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 1, pp. 118-129.

<sup>8</sup> de Boer, C. 1985, ‘The Polls: European Peace Movement and the Deployment of Nuclear Missiles’, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 119-132; Fite, D., Genest, M. and Wilcox, C. 1991, ‘Feminism and the Gender Gap: A Second Look’, *Journal of Politics*, vol. 53, pp. 1111-1122; Conover, P. and Sapiro, V. 1993, ‘Gender, Gender Consciousness and War’, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 1079-1099; Frankovic (fn. 2);<sup>8</sup> Shapiro, R and Mahajan, H. 1986, ‘Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s’, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 5, pp.42-61; Smith, T. 1984, ‘The Polls: Gender and Attitudes Toward Violence’, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 48, pp. 384-396; Togeby, L 1994, ‘The Gender Gap in Foreign Policy Attitudes’, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 375-392; Tessler, M. and Warriner, I. 1997, ‘Gender, Feminism and Attitudes Toward International Conflict’, *World Politics*, vol. 49, pp. 25-281.

the feminist literature to provide expectations that women will behave differently than men regarding the sanctioning of a state's use of violence as a means of conflict resolution.<sup>9</sup>

These gender-based value differences in international relations and foreign policy find their genesis in contrasting values and conceptions of politics, security and power. From this starting point of contrasting values, the predominant theme in the literature arises: the gender gap.

For centuries, the image of gender roles toward war has been that men go to war and women try to stop them.<sup>10</sup> In recent history, however, American women in particular can hardly be considered pacifists when examining their overall support for World War II, Korea and Vietnam.<sup>11</sup> While the differences in attitudes among men and women certainly do not warrant the above stereotype, consistent variances do merit the inclusion of gender as a potential cause of the willingness to use military force.

Several studies over the last two decades indicate that a gender gap exists over foreign policy issues, particularly those concerning war.<sup>12</sup> That is, women have been less supportive of the use of force during crises than men. While some studies have found gender differences largely disappear when combined with other variables,<sup>13</sup> recent polls continue to show a discrepancy in level of support for military force between the sexes. For example, a 1993 Gallup Poll questioning support for possible U.S. air strikes against Bosnian-Serb forces in order to protect Muslim enclaves revealed that 44% of the male and only 28% of the female respondents favored such strikes.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, leading up to

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<sup>9</sup> Fite, Genest and Wilcox 1990 (fn. 4); Mueller, J. 1973, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*, Wiley, New York; Welch, S. and Thomas, S. 1988, 'Explaining the Gender Gap in British Public Opinion', *Women and Politics*, vol. 8, no. 3/4, pp. 25-44; Wilcox, C., Hewitt, L. and Allsop, D. 1996, 'The Gender Gap in Attitudes Toward the Gulf War: A Cross National Perspective', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 67-82.

<sup>10</sup> Elshtain, J. 1987, *Women and War*, New York, Basic Books.

<sup>11</sup> Conover and Sapiro, 1993, 'Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 37, no. 4.

<sup>12</sup> Fite, Genest and Wilcox, 1990 (fn. 4); and Frankovic, 1982 (fn. 2).

<sup>13</sup> Wittkopf, E. 1990, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, Duke University Press, London.

<sup>14</sup> Cited in Tessler and Warriner, 1997 (fn. 4).

the Gulf War, women were nearly equally divided on possible U.S. military action, while men displayed much stronger support.<sup>15</sup>

Many theories have attempted to explain the gender gap but few have been tested. In 1950, Almond suggested 'more women than men seem to be ignorant of or apathetic to foreign policy issues'.<sup>16</sup> More precisely, it may be that among the older American cohorts, women have lower levels of education than men and are therefore less attentive to international matters.<sup>17</sup> This suggests that dissimilarities in attitude are not a result of inherent differences between men and women. Rather, gender differences are a function of society. Another such example supported by several researchers suggests that mothering impacts the views of women toward the use of force.<sup>18</sup> Women do more parenting and are therefore 'more empathetic and less concerned with their own autonomy and individuation'.<sup>19</sup> While others have attributed the gender gap to men being more biologically disposed toward violence than women, most theorists do not accept biological determinism as a strong rationale.<sup>20</sup>

Certainly, a correlation between gender and warlike or pacifist attitudes is often assumed. Several studies have found this to be valid but the evidence suggests that the relationship is not strong enough to allow gender to be a reliable predictor of attitudes toward the use of force. Moreover, the correlation may be a function of other demographic factors that have been tied to gender, such as political identification and education. Nonetheless, there is a significant enough gender gap to warrant consideration in determining variances in opinion regarding military force.

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<sup>15</sup> Holsti, O. 1992, 'Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippman Consensus', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 36, pp. 439-466.

<sup>16</sup> Almond, G. 1950, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, Praeger, New York, p. 121.

<sup>17</sup> Wittkopf, 1981 (fn.1).

<sup>18</sup> Ruddick, S. 1980, 'Maternal Thinking', *Feminist Studies*, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 342-367.

<sup>19</sup> Conover and Sapiro, 1993 (fn. 4) p. 1080.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1091.

### 1.3.2 Africa in Particular

South Africa, as part of the developing world, has a different set of gender issues than the West, from where a preponderance of the literature on the subject comes. In Africa, the relation of women to foreign policy is a physical one, not a theoretical one as it is for the more privileged women of the developed and industrialized countries where there is time and leisure to debate theoretically women's distance from foreign policy decision-making. In Africa, women are on the frontline of the battle to de-masculinize states' foreign policy decision-making and foreign policy behavior. Taking a gendered perspective in the African context, according to Jacklyn Cock, means

'recognising how women suffer the most from the structural causes of violent conflict, such as poverty, unemployment and environmental degradation. This is because it is still women who manage the household economy and who deal directly with the natural resource base. In many post-conflict situations, women become the main keepers of threatened cultures and traditions as well as continuing to be responsible for their own daily survival and that of their children.'<sup>21</sup>

Transition, war, globalization, and poverty: all these issues impact on African women to a much greater degree than on their Northern or Western counterparts.

African feminism reflects this in its wide front. In the African context, feminism has emerged out of women's engagement with and commitment to national liberation, so it is not surprising that African women's movements today feature in the disparate struggles and social movements characterizing post-colonial life. African women mobilize at local, regional and international levels, and deploy various strategies and forms of engagement. Gender politics in post-colonial Africa are deeply contested, within and beyond the minority who call themselves feminists. African women activists are as likely to be engaging the World Bank over the detrimental impact of structural adjustment on African women as they are to be lobbying the national governments over the

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<sup>21</sup> Cock, J. 2001, 'Closing the Circle: Towards a Gendered Understanding of War and Peace', *African Gender Institute Newsletter*, vol. 8, p.4.

marginalization of women in the corridors of political power, or challenging traditional and community-based organizations.

Since independence, the persistence of patriarchal hegemony across Africa has stimulated a visible proliferation of feminist scholarship and strategy, yet this has not extended to the sub-genre of gender and foreign policy. In the post-colonial context, African feminism is more often concerned with opposing the interests of multinational corporations, international financial and development agencies and the hegemonic interests of nation-states, as well as the persisting male domination of disparate traditional structures, civil society formations and social movements.

### **1.3.3 Women and Participation**

Despite the improvement in women's status in general, barriers to women's political participation still exist. This in turn has an influence on the development of political opinions where 'distance' from the political system is greatest, and in particular on the development of foreign policy opinion.

Of the factors limiting women's ability to participate in politics, poverty is perhaps the most pervasive. Women carry primary responsibility for household and family maintenance. In both rural and urban communities, women of poorer families augment the income and food supplies with agricultural labor or informal employment. These dual obligations of household and paid labor leave many women with little time for politics.

Illiteracy further limits women's participation. In few countries are women's literacy rates equal to those of men. But even beyond basic literacy, information about political processes is often difficult for women to obtain. Trade associations, unions, political parties and other organizations, the most common sources of this information, are less accessible to women, and in the developing world, effectively inaccessible to most women.

Violence against women also restricts women's political activity. Where women raise their voices, challenge the authority of men, or devote time and resources to political activism, they often risk provoking violent anger of male relations, neighbors and community leaders.

Women who have access to information and have some protection against domestic or community violence are more likely to take advantage of opportunities for political action than those who do not. But even where poverty, illiteracy and the threat of violence are endemic, women and women's groups have emerged in recent years as powerful agents for social and political transformation.

#### **1.3.4 The South African Experience**

In South Africa in particular, the feminist movement was overshadowed by the struggle for national liberation: issues of race superseded issues of gender under the apartheid system. Despite the difficulties of the transition, however, for women in the foreign policy arena post-colonial and post-apartheid society have opened doors to women that are not open in even the long-standing democracies.

A cursory inspection of the list of states that had female leaders between 1900 and 1994 shows that developing and transitional countries were more likely than developed ones to put a woman in the top leadership position.<sup>22</sup> (See Table 1) Canada and the UK are the two members of the G8 to have had female leaders and Norway is also one of the few industrialized countries that have had a female leader. The rest of the list is dominated by developing and transitional societies that have had a much better record of putting women in the highest leadership position. Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan and Corazon Aquino of the Philippines are perhaps the best well known, while Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua is among Argentina, Bolivia, Dominica and Haiti in Latin America and the Caribbean. The former Soviet-bloc countries of Lithuania, Poland, and Yugoslavia

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<sup>22</sup> Caprioli, M. and Boyer, M. A. 2001, 'Gender, Violence and International Crisis', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 45, no. 4, p. 506, Table 1.

represent transitional society. Africa is represented by Burundi, Central African Republic and Rwanda. Now, as a transitional society, one in which a radical and complete power shift has cleared all government positions, South African leadership has a certain freedom that governments in more long-standing democracies do not.

TABLE 1<sup>23</sup>

States With Female Leaders from 1900-1994

<b>State</b>	<b>Leader</b>	<b>Years in Office</b>
Argentina	Isabel Peron	1974-1976
Bangladesh	Khalida Zia	1991-1996
Bolivia	Lidia Gueller Tejada	1979-1980
Burundi	Sylvie Kingi	1993-1994
Canada	Kim Campbell	1993
Central African Republic	Elisabeth Domitien	1975-1976
Dominica	Mary Eugenia Charles	1980-1995
Haiti	Ertha Pascal-Trouillot	1990-1991
India	Indira Gandhi	1966-1977, 1980-1984
Israel	Golda Meir	1969-1974
Lithuania	Kazimiera Prunskiene	1990-1991
Malta	Agatha Barbara	1982-1987
Netherlands Antilles	Maria Liberia Peters	1984-1985, 1988-1994
Nicaragua	Violeta Chamorro	1990-1997
Norway	Gro Harlem Brundtland	1981, 1986-1989, 1990-1996
Pakistan	Benazir Bhutto	1998-1990, 1993-1996
Philippines	Corazon C. Aquino	1986-1992
Poland	Hanna Suchocka	1993
Portugal	Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo	1979
Rwanda	Agathe Uwilingiyimana	1993-1994
Sri Lanka	Sirimavo Bandaranaike	1960-1965, 1970-1977
Turkey	Tansu Ciller	1993-1996
United Kingdom	Margaret Thatcher	1979- 1990
Yugoslavia	Milka Planinc	1982-1986

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 506.

While South Africa has not yet had a female leader, 30% of parliamentarians are women, which puts South Africa at number eight in the world in terms of gender equality in government.<sup>24</sup> The country moved from a position of 141 in the world before the 1994 elections to number eight, when the African National Congress adopted a 30% quota on its party list.<sup>25</sup>

The country can also boast that nine of its twenty-seven Cabinet ministers and eight of its fourteen deputy ministers are women. Both the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces are women, Frene Ginwala and Naledi Pandor respectively. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the international association of parliaments of sovereign states, as of June 2002, 'Ginwala and Pandor were two of only twenty-five women around the world to preside over a house in one of the 1,809 participating parliaments'. South Africa is one of only three African countries to have female presiding officers in Parliament or a house of parliament.<sup>26</sup>

The Commission on Gender Equality, a statutory organisation set up to advance women's rights in South Africa, set 30% as the target for women's representation in Parliament: the level needed to make a difference in the struggle to promote women's rights through policy and legislation. Internationally, the target for women's representation in parliaments is 50%, but by 2000, women comprised only 13% of national parliaments around the world, with a yearly increase of 0.5%.<sup>27</sup> 'It is only when there is a critical mass of women in all their diversity in every country of the world, in both appointed and elected decision-making positions and in all international bodies, that gender issues will be addressed in the policy agenda and the goals of equality, development, peace and human rights for all can be realised in the 21st century', says WomensNet, an online venture to advance women's rights internationally. The campaign was launched in South Africa in March 2002 by the Gender Advocacy Project and has the full support of the Commission on Gender Equality and many politicians.

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<sup>24</sup> [www2.womensnet.org.za/gender/parl.stats.htm](http://www2.womensnet.org.za/gender/parl.stats.htm), 11 August 2002.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> [www.ipu.org/womens/res12.36jameson.htm](http://www.ipu.org/womens/res12.36jameson.htm), 12 August 2002.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

Not all women in the South African Parliament are able to actively take up women's issues as well as engage in the day-to-day Parliamentary politics. While those who are not active feminists are still trying to advance women in society, they are over-extended and are playing many roles, as women are supposed to be represented on every parliamentary committee.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Quality of Life and Status of Women has supported several important pieces of legislation on customary law, domestic violence and child maintenance, all of which have a direct bearing on the quality of women's lives.<sup>28</sup> Unfortunately, policy and practice are two different things and even the best-intentioned policy must have structures in place to enforce it. For example, the legislation protecting women against domestic violence puts much of the onus on an already troubled police force, which does not have the resources to make the law into reality.

While women have taken up key positions in Cabinet and Parliament, in government generally, women still hold marginal positions. The primary goal, as stated by the Gender Equality Commission, is to increase women's representation in local and provincial government to 30% as well.<sup>29</sup>

While gender equity in the political arena is much improved, socially and economically women are still discriminated against. Levels of violence against women are alarmingly high; women are extremely vulnerable to rape, sexual abuse, domestic and other violence, teenage parenthood, a lack of education opportunities, unemployment and sexual harassment. To change a patriarchal, chauvinistic society into one in which women are seen as equal will be a long and difficult process; the Commission on Gender Equality will monitor all sectors of society to ensure that they are promoting gender equity. The Commission must also investigate complaints on gender-related issues, as

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<sup>28</sup> [www.parliament.gov.za/comms/GEC.bd/htm](http://www.parliament.gov.za/comms/GEC.bd/htm), 11 August 2002.

<sup>29</sup> [www.womensnet.org.za](http://www.womensnet.org.za) (fn. 20)

well as conduct research on all existing and impending legislation from a gender perspective.

### 1.3.5 A South African Gendered Perspective

Taking a gendered perspective involves a cataloguing of the situations in which women find themselves under-represented, or where they find themselves discriminated against, as well as a cataloguing of the advances that have been made by women in male-dominated arenas. Much South African literature on the subject of gender and foreign policy falls into one of these categories. Schoeman and Sadie<sup>30</sup> find that women in South Africa are making gradual progress as far as their representation in the foreign policy decision-making process. Essentially excluded from the process before 1994, women are now somewhat better represented in the higher echelons of the foreign policy decision-making apparatus. Schoeman and Sadie's contribution catalogues advances that have been made by promoting women's role in political decision-making, specifically within the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).

'South Africa's transition to democracy created an opportunity for more inclusive approaches to women and a more gender aware policy environment. The heavy emphasis placed in the country's constitution on gender equality finds expression in legislation and the institutionalisation of processes aimed at addressing gender issues whilst at the same time, the 'issue of gender' has become, for all intents and purposes, 'acceptable' and part of what post-apartheid claims to be about.'<sup>31</sup>

Schoeman and Sadie's study of the DFA is an effort to explore the effect of change on real women, and the degree to which South Africa's foreign policy decision-making structures have democratised from a gendered perspective as they have from a racial perspective. In exploring the DFA's strategies for *including* women in decision-making and *considering* women in DFA decision-making, Schoeman and Sadie focus on the DFA's internal policy for hiring and external policy that the Department projects. They

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<sup>30</sup> Schoeman, M. and Sadie, Y. (forthcoming) 'Women as Subjects and Objects in the Making of South Africa's Foreign Policy', *Democracy, Public Participation, and the Making of Foreign Policy in South Africa*, eds. P. Nel and J. van der Westhuizen, Lexington Books.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

are specifically looking for, firstly, 'a sustainable increase in opportunities for participation in decision-making and policy-implementation' and secondly, 'systematic attempts to use foreign policy to improve the situation of the marginalized and most vulnerable segments of society.'<sup>32</sup>

They find that there has been an increase in availability and type of options for women's involvement in foreign policy decision-making and practice, but that the DFA does not have the capacity to educate and train the women that do try to take advantage of the new opportunity and so they are relegated to low-level positions. It appears that ways and means are preventing the 'mainstreaming' of gender rather than a lack of desire to do so.

The South African government is party to many national and international agreements that commit the country to the promotion of gender equality wherever the government is present, and commit the government to promoting gender equality in the broader South African society.<sup>33</sup> The constitution is a global example for its dedication to gender equality. The DFA has specifically allocated money to the promotion of women's rights through participation in international compacts, conferences and conventions; the country contributes humanitarian aid specifically earmarked to address women's issues; as SADC Chair, South Africa highlighted gender issues as one of the top three issues to be addressed by the Community; and as Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Chair, South Africa stated its intention to push for women's empowerment under the charter of the Movement.<sup>34</sup> And yet women are not present in the departments and committees that make the policy decisions and implement the policies once put in place.

As Schoeman and Sadie found in their later work, Sadie discovered that women are not represented in the DFA to the extent that they should be, given the country's commitment to gender equity. She also found that this was due to capacity constraints on recruiting and training, but did find interestingly enough, that women actually employed in the DFA

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<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>33</sup> Sadie, Y. 1999, 'Women in foreign relations in South Africa: and exploratory analysis', *Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 210-234.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 210-211.

did not find that their sex negatively influenced their ability to impact on foreign-policy decision-making.<sup>35</sup> A significant difference was discovered between men and women's management styles in the DFA, with women being much more 'people-oriented', communicating better and emphasizing feeling much more than their male colleagues. It is concluded that this 'ethic of care' evident in women's management style could potentially impact on international relations where more women are in positions to display this management style. The fact that this does not happen is evidenced by the fact that where women are in the minority, they are more likely to conform to conventional masculine values.<sup>36</sup>

The second half of Sadie's article explores the differences between men and women in their foreign policy beliefs, and, more specifically, differences in these beliefs between elites and masses. She finds that women are truly more concerned with human rights and with achieving peace where there is none than are men. This attitude was also found in women of the DFA.<sup>37</sup> (These differences between men and women's value preferences in foreign policy issues will be addressed in Chapter 3.) But overall, women are not represented in sufficient numbers within the foreign policy decision-making structures to indicate any impact on policy.

These two articles represent a movement within the South African literature to address gender differences in foreign policy. As poll taking improves, research will broaden and develop. For now, gender and South African IR literature are best represented by studies of the impact of transition, globalization, poverty and war on women's lives.

#### **1.4 Previous Reviews**

A review of the literature has not been done previously, although as expected most articles on the subject are prefaced with a brief overview of the foregoing research. This is primarily due to the fact that this sub-genre of Feminist IR is relatively new. Reviews

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<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p.221.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p.231.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 221.

on Feminist IR have been written, a very recent example of which is Tickner's recent chapter in *Handbook of International Relations*.<sup>38</sup> In the review, Tickner begins by trying to dispel the notion that gender is an intra-state problem and that international relations are therefore 'gender-neutral'. She covers ground from the beginnings of feminist IR in 1988 to ten years on when the young field is revisited in the publication, *Millennium*, which heralded its arrival on the academic scene.

The lack of a review of literature on gender and foreign policy beliefs and behavior prompts this discourse. It will not fill the gap, but may perhaps shed light on a small yet diverse collection of work. The collection is small enough that a short paper like this one can attempt to combine a review of two potentially vast areas of study

### **1.5 Overview of Approach and Methodology**

This cataloguing will take the form of a literature review. It will summarize and systematically evaluate published research on the topic. It will also seek to situate the collection of literature against the broader backdrop of the literature from which it arises, specifically feminist, IR and feminist IR theory.

The research questions that I will seek to answer are the following:

1. Is gender a relevant variable in the formation of foreign policy public opinion?
2. If yes, how do women and men differ in their foreign policy beliefs?
3. Where women play a significant role in foreign policy decision-making and in states with high levels of gender equality, are countries more pacific on the international level?

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<sup>38</sup> Tickner, J. 2002, 'Feminist Perspective on International Relations' in *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons, Sage Publications, London.

### **1.5.1 Criteria for the Selection of Literature**

Literature reviewed was chosen with an eye to its placement within IR and its use of a conceptualization of gender. Much research was *not* included simply because its focus was outside the boundaries of IR. For example, while many studies from political behavior and voting behavior could have been included for their research on voting differences between men and women; they were excluded as their connection to IR is limited.

Articles and books included in the literature review also contain a clear conceptualization of gender. A 'feminist' viewpoint was not a requirement, only that gender be conceptualized clearly, appreciating that differences between male and female are more than physical.

The reasons for these criteria are simple; space and focus. The limitations imposed by length required limiting the literature selection to articles placed mostly within the field of IR. The focus was required to effectively manage each research question. As the ground to be covered by the research questions was quite broad, focused articles (each broadly representative of a certain viewpoint) were chosen. Duplication of research was avoided by including one author from a school of thought on a subject, to achieve representation.

The literature review seeks to present a broad overview of thought on a certain subject. The criteria used in the identification of the literature to be included were chosen to counter the review's space limitation and the author's desire for focus.

### **1.5.2 Limitations**

This literature review is not an attempt to create a unifying theory of gender and international relations. It is also not in a position to make a statement about gender and foreign policy beliefs and behavior internationally. This is due to the fact that the

majority of the literature reviewed is based on research done in the United States. It is not possible to apply conclusions made in American work to the rest of the world. Some of the literature reviewed is based on research conducted outside of the US, but it is not the majority of the work covered. As such, this literature review must be considered incomplete due to the US focus of much of the contents.

Material selected for review was chosen with an eye to its basis in IR and a focus on foreign policy beliefs and behavior. As such, it is possible that relevant literature has been neglected due to its basis in, say, public opinion research or gender studies. There is much work from feminism, sociology, public opinion, pure political science and voting behavior that could not be included as they are beyond the scope of the present literature review. It must also be noted that, as a literature review, the piece contains no primary research and only secondary research.

It is hoped that the following review will shed some light on the importance of gender equity in international relations and the study of International Relations. A gendered perspective does not encompass everything that we need to know about IR, but it can help us to uncover new ideas and see old ones in a new way. But putting a gendered perspective into practice means that more women need to be brought into the domain of international politics as leaders, officials, soldiers and voters. Only by participating fully in global politics can women overcome the male domination of foreign policy decision-making, as well as the male domination of the field of International Relations.

## **1.6 Overview of Forthcoming Chapters**

The chapters ahead will explore the relationship between gender and foreign policy preferences. Chapter two provides the necessary background to feminism and IR. The two subjects have a relatively short relationship as Feminist IR Theory only emerged in the early 1990s. Chapter Two also provides a conceptualization of 'gender'; situating the term as a concept within the field of International Relations. The final sections of

Chapter Two explore the specific manifestations of feminism in IR, describing specifically the different approaches within the field.

Chapter Three provides the theoretical context for the study of gender and foreign policy preferences. A wide scope is applied at first to include studies based in Sociology, and the influence of political feminism on the beliefs of those exposed to it is explored.

Chapter Four presents a typological framework for the literature review, and some evidence of the existence of the 'gender gap' is presented. This chapter includes the review of the literature on foreign policy beliefs and behavior. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions as well as the recommendations for further research.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **Feminism and International Relations: Theoretical Background**

## 2.1 Feminism and International Relations

There are many reasons why feminist issues rarely, and then only relatively recently, are raised within the study of international relations. The most obvious is the very different concerns of international relations and feminism. IR is a sub field of political science, and the former is much younger than the latter discipline. A product of the twentieth century, mainstream IR originated between the World Wars and was located primarily in the United States.<sup>39</sup> It was created largely to serve the needs of government, specifically the American government, in training diplomatic and foreign service personnel and providing direction and answers to important diplomatic and strategic issues. More than most other social science disciplines, mainstream international relations has had an intimate relationship with government, both through the funding of international relations research institutes and in the regular exchange of academic and government personnel.<sup>40</sup>

Initially informed by the goal of serving government, scholars of mainstream international relations took the causes of war and the conditions of peace, order and security as their central concerns.<sup>41</sup> Such enquiry appears to be antithetical to the study of women. The 'high politics' of international security policy is, as Tickner writes, 'a man's world, a world of power and conflict in which warfare is a privileged activity,' and from which women have traditionally been excluded.<sup>42</sup>

Much of IR theorizing, moreover, posits a separation between inside and outside, community and anarchy. It is argued that while one may appropriately raise questions of ethics and politics when examining relations within civil society, such questions are irrelevant outside, in the anarchical international system, where it is only appropriate and

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<sup>39</sup> Hoffman, S. 1977, 'An American Social Science: International Relations', *Daedalus*, vol. 106, no. 3, pp. 41-60.

<sup>40</sup> Whitworth, S. 1994, 'Theory as Exclusion: Gender and the International Political Economy', in R. Stubbs and G. Underhill, eds. *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, Macmillan, London, p. 117.

<sup>41</sup> Waltz, K. 1979, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley, London, p. 6.

<sup>42</sup> Tickner, J. A. 1995, 'Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism', in *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, ed. J. Der Derian, Macmillan, London, p. 53-75.

reasonable to ask how rational states may increase their power in an anarchic system.<sup>43</sup> Apparently absent from the particular substantive concerns of international relations, in fact or by definition, the suggestion that women or gender relations should be examined in IR is often met with disbelief at best and hostility at worst.<sup>44</sup>

In contrast to the field of international relations, contemporary feminism has its roots in a social movement: the women's liberation movement. It represents a protest against prevailing gender-based power structures and against accepted societal norms and values concerning women and men. Feminists have expressed this protest in a number of ways, with some demanding that women be allowed to join the spheres in which only men, historically, have been permitted, while others have demanded more dramatic and fundamental social change. Whatever its different prescriptions, however, feminism is a politics of protest directed at transforming the historically unequal power relationships between women and men.<sup>45</sup> As a politics of protest, feminism clearly follows a path significantly different than the path followed by international relations. It is concerned with the seemingly domestic questions often deemed irrelevant to the study of international relations. That international relations and feminism may be antithetical, then, it is not because of their apparently different substantive concerns but more importantly, because of their normative and political predispositions: mainstream IR has been aimed primarily at maintaining the international status quo, while feminism aims at precisely the opposite.<sup>46</sup> It is little wonder that a focus on women in particular, and the issues that concern them, have not proliferated in IR.

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<sup>43</sup> True, J. 1996, 'Feminism', in *Theories of International Relations*, eds. S. Burchill and A. Linklater, Macmillan, London, pp. 210-251.

<sup>44</sup> Tickner, J. 1997, 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 41 pp. 611-632.

<sup>45</sup> Ketchum, S. 1980, 'Female Culture, Womenculture and Conceptual Change: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Studies', *Social Theory and Practice*, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 151-162.

<sup>46</sup> Tickner, J. 1997, (fn. 38), p. 614.

## 2.2 Background to Feminist IR Theory

There are many ways in which feminist issues have been raised in international relations, primarily seeking to include women as a new issue or actor in international relations and gender as a relevant variable. This work seeks to document the under-representation of women in traditional areas of international relations activities, or conversely, to show the ways in which women do participate.<sup>47</sup> While not in positions of decision-making authority, women have been active in many international relations activities, from 'wiring up the bombs during wartime through servicing, sexually and otherwise, foreign military bases in times of peace and war, to comprising the vast majority of employees in export processing zones.'<sup>48</sup>

This was the perspective taken by much of the early work on women and development, and aimed at demonstrating the ways in which women were involved in the development process and the manner in which this involvement had been ignored previously by development researchers and practitioners. Ester Boserup's groundbreaking book, *Woman's Role in Economic Development*,<sup>49</sup> documented women's economic contributions in the developing world, and from Boserup's own and later work we now know that women constitute 60 to 80% of the agricultural work force in Asia and Africa and more than 40% in Latin America.<sup>50</sup> Development planners ignored these facts because they assumed that women in the developing world were involved primarily in household chores and tasks. As such, the policies they produced tended to bypass women workers, fundamentally misunderstanding the economic processes that were supposedly analyzing and worsening women's inequality rather than alleviating it. By showing women's true role in developing societies, Boserup and her colleagues created the basis for Women in Development (WID) programs and departments in almost all major

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<sup>47</sup> Thom, B. 1981, 'Women in International Organizations: Room at the Top: The Situation in Some UN Organizations', in *Access to Power: Cross-National Studies of Women and Elites*, eds. C.F. Epstein and R.L. Coser, George Allen and Unwin, London.

<sup>48</sup> Enloe, C. 1989, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Relations*, Pandora, London, p. 21.

<sup>49</sup> Boserup, E. 1970, *Woman's Role in Economic Development*, George Allen and Unwin, London.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

international development agencies. The WID agenda has been to take women into account in the formulation and implementation of development policies worldwide.

While the documentation and cataloguing of women's roles in development and other issues of relevance to international relations is useful and important, a number of criticisms have emerged. These parallel the criticisms made of early feminism in general and suggest that the collection of empirical information about women is made at the expense of any assessment of the structural features of relations of inequality between women and men.<sup>51</sup> Implicit in a standpoint feminist analysis, the critics argue, is the assumption that the inclusion of women in areas previously denied them will eliminate gender inequalities. By contrast, feminists who attempt to introduce analyses of class or patriarchy argue that inequalities are a defining characteristic of the very structures in which women might participate, and as such their participation alone will not change this fundamental fact.<sup>52</sup>

Writing with a greater sensitivity to structural issues, some of these feminists have suggested that the relations of inequality observed within both the study and practice of international relations reflect the simple fact that both of these represent the viewpoint of men, not women.<sup>53</sup> They argue that women have a unique perspective, different from that of men, and that this perspective should be given a voice within many of the decisions associated with international relations. By this view, women tend to be more nurturing and pacifistic than men and thus should be brought into international relations not on equity grounds but to allow women's more peaceful views some influence. Accordingly, a feminist reformulation of notions such as power, security and national interest, in which power is defined as empowerment and security as including development and ecological concerns, is an important first step toward a better understanding of women and international relations.

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<sup>51</sup> Tickner, J. 1999, 'Why Women Can't Run the World: International Politics According to Fukuyama', *International Studies Review*, vol. 41, p. 11.

<sup>52</sup> True, 1996, (fn. 37), p.226.

<sup>53</sup> See Tickner, J., 'Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism'; Tickner, J. 'Feminist Perspectives on International Relations' in *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons, Sage, London, pp. 275-291; Whitworth, S. 1994, *Feminism and International Relations*, Macmillan, London.

The criticism of the notion that women are more 'peaceful' than men is that it essentializes women's nature. Many feminists are skeptical of any theory that seeks to explain *all* women, and are suspicious of the association of women with peace. This association has the propensity to categorize women as naïve or overly idealistic, and further diminish their voice and stature.

Other authors have focused instead on the dynamic of class and gender oppression. They argue that analyses that presume there is a single "feminine" perspective essentializes and universalizes that category of 'woman' (and of 'man') at the expense of other forms of domination.<sup>54</sup> Thus, analyses have assessed the impact of the changing international division of labor on women and the ways in which women's subordination is sustained under different historical modes of production with forms of domination associated with class relations taking advantage of, and building on, pre-existing relations of domination between women and men.<sup>55</sup> For example, with the introduction of private property during the colonial period, women tended to suffer more than men because they lost their traditional land-use rights completely.<sup>56</sup> Likewise, as production shifts to the export sector under the terms of structural adjustment programs imposed in recent times, it is women who are moving into these poorly paid positions with little or no opportunity to improve wages or benefits, and the prospect of only short-term, limited employment.<sup>57</sup> The point here is that class and gender oppression work together rather than separately.

These demonstrations of the way sex and class oppression are linked improve yet again on the previous analyses outlined above, but they too have been subject to criticism. Primarily the concern is that still other forms of oppression exist that must be examined, and still other issue areas must be included in the study of international relations. One

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<sup>54</sup> Martin, J.R. 1994, 'Methodological Essentialism, False Difference, and Other Dangerous Traps', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 630-657; Sylvester, C. 1994, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

<sup>55</sup> Sen, G. and Grown, C. 1986, *Development, Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives*, Monthly Review Press, New York, pp. 30-31.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

way in which these criticisms have been taken into account is to examine gender and gender relations.

### 2.3 Conceptualizing Gender Within IR

Gender refers to the assumptions about the appropriate relationships between women and men, the roles they fill, and even what it is to be 'feminine' or 'masculine'. Analyzing gender relations entails exploring the ways in which these understandings are constructed and maintained. As Sandra Whitworth writes,

'To create an account of international relations that is sensitive to gender, then, is to explore how knowledge about gender difference is sustained, reproduced and manipulated in the international system, as well as domestically. It means uncovering the ideas about gender difference that inform different international activities and discovering the impact these ideas have on their practices. It also means looking to the material conditions in which those activities take place with attention to the ways in which those conditions facilitate or prohibit the adoption of some understandings instead of others. As such it also means assessing the extent to which international practices themselves contribute to the particular understandings we have of gender in any given time or place.'<sup>58</sup>

Understood in this way, meanings about gender are maintained and contested through the practices and struggles of actors engaged in relationships with each other and the institutions in which they are involved. The content of what the relations of gender look like is arrived at not in any static way but through the activities of real, living human beings operating within real historical circumstances. These people may be engaged in what for them are the normal routines of their daily lives or, on the other hand, in dramatic and demanding political struggles: from the daily rituals of the traditional family to the personal struggles of the single parent, to women and men engaged in anti-sexist demonstrations demanding the adoption of more egalitarian policies by the state. Gender is also shaped by the policies produced by the state and its numerous additional

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<sup>58</sup> Whitworth, S. 1994, 'Theory as Exclusion: Gender and the International Political Economy', in R. Stubbs and G. Underhill, eds. *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, Macmillan, London, p. 21.

appendages, and as well by the policies rendered by international institutions. All of these activities, moreover, take place within particular material conditions and so the specific meanings surrounding gender depend very much upon these circumstances. Race, class and sexual orientation will fundamentally affect how gender is understood and the practices associated with reproducing or challenging those understandings.

The complete approach, then, attempts to draw from the various feminist approaches discussed above through maintaining a concern with the structural inequalities within which women operate, while at the same time documenting the actual experiences of particular women within the international system. It is also aware of 'the way in which agents, as gendered agents, both create and are created by structures they encounter'.<sup>59</sup> Women and men do not only contribute to the construction of gender relations through their actions: gender relations inform their actions. Assumptions about the appropriate roles of women and men in society and what it is to be masculine and feminine inform the practices of individual men and women. But these practices, whether of individuals, in social movements, or through institutions, also serve to reproduce, and sometimes challenge, particular assumptions about gender. All of these activities, moreover, do not take place in a vacuum but exist always within particular historical and material conditions. Gender relations make sense only if we remember that all of these elements must be considered together.

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<sup>59</sup> Wendt, A. 1987, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', *International Organization*, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 335-370.

## 2.4 Feminist IR Theory

When feminists began their gender-based analyses of the field of international relations in the 1980s, they asserted that the field was highly gendered rather than gender-neutral. Its theories were based on foundational stories by male-focused authors, such as Machiavelli and Hobbes.<sup>60</sup> From the origins, political science and IR have been inhospitable to gender studies.

The first reason, though obvious, is also the most intractable. Diplomatic practices and the art of war are the business of men; and women belong in private spaces, guardians of a morality that is unsuitable and even dangerous in the world of *realpolitik*. In spite of the visibility of former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright and current National Security Adviser to President Bush Condoleezza Rice, there are still relatively few women in the top ranks of the foreign service. In academic international relations, there are few women in the sub field of national security.<sup>61</sup>

In neo-realism – ‘a more parsimonious and scientific devolution from classical realism’<sup>62</sup> – human beings have disappeared altogether. This point leads to the second reason why the discipline is inhospitable terrain for feminist perspectives. In their search for mechanistic laws that stand up to scientific reproducibility requirements, international relations theorists have typically preferred explanatory theories that favor a structurally determined level of analysis; the international system is a world in which, as Jean Elshtain observed, ‘no children are ever born, and nobody ever dies...there are states and they are what is.’<sup>63</sup> Rational choice theory, modeled on the behavior of firms in the marketplace, has further reinforced this depersonalization of state behavior. Explanations that focus on social relations, a space where gender relations could be analyzed, are considered reductionist

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<sup>60</sup> Tickner, J. 1997, (fn. 38).

<sup>61</sup> Halliday, F. 1998, ‘Gender and IR: Progress, Backlash and Prospect’, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 833-846.

<sup>62</sup> Keohane, R. and Nye, J. 1993, ‘Realism and Complex Interdependence’, in *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism and Globalism*, eds. P. Viotti and M. Kauppi, Macmillan, New York, p. 411.

<sup>63</sup> Elshtain, J.B. 1990, ‘The Problem with Peace’, in *Women, Militarism and War*, eds. J.B. Elshtain and S. Tobias, Rowan and Littlefield, Maryland, pp. 255-266.

and, therefore, unable to shed much light on the behavior of states in the international system.

The third reason for the inhospitality of international relations to feminist perspectives has to do with what Martin Wight called the 'intellectual and moral poverty' of its theories.<sup>64</sup> Given that all individuals must be citizens of sovereign states, the state remains the consummation of political experience according to Wight: outside the state lies only the realm of necessity where progress is impossible. Given that women's historical relationship to the state has been marginal in most societies, feminist perspectives do not fit comfortably within these state boundaries in which political life has been situated. Largely excluded from the realm of policy-making, women's 'foreign relations' have generally taken place across the boundaries of civil society.

It is important to note that feminists involved in revisioning international relations are not simply looking for more women in the field's positions of power. Efforts to integrate women and to consider them equal to men tend to reinforce gender stereotypes. In the tough world of international politics, successful women leaders must often assume masculine roles and personalities. Conversely, if we look for women working in traditional women's fields such as peace groups, it only reinforces the socially constructed boundaries between activities deemed appropriate for women and men. Feminists seek to find ways in which gender hierarchies serve to reinforce these socially constructed boundaries that perpetuate inequalities between men and women. Feminist investigation of IR seeks to build a comprehensive understanding of the behavior of states in the international system that includes gender as a category of analysis.

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<sup>64</sup> Wight, M. 1995, 'Why Is There No International Theory?', in *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, ed. J. Der Derian, New York University Press, New York, pp. 15-35.

### 2.4.1 Varying Feminist Approaches to IR

Feminist scholars in IR use gender-sensitive analysis to challenge the foundations of the discipline in three significant ways, feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint and feminist postmodernism.<sup>65</sup> Obviously there are nuanced versions of all the feminist approaches to IR,<sup>66</sup> but the following epistemologies are significant schools of thought and represent three types of contributions that feminist thought makes to IR knowledge.

What is common to the three approaches is their belief that the structures of the international system and therefore, the structures of the approaches to the study of the international system (IR), are not gender neutral, as is largely assumed in political science. The dominant theories of the discipline represent men's experiences of the world; they are based on a series of assumptions that give primacy to characteristics and values historically considered to be masculine, devaluing those associated with femininity. These gendered theories risk replicating and reinforcing gender inequalities in international relations and security. As J. Ann Tickner states eloquently: 'The policy consequence of this male bias is the inability to achieve a multidimensional and multilevel security for the entire population, including men, women and children, because the underlying theories offer only a partial view of reality.'<sup>67</sup>

Characteristics stereotyped by society as male, such as toughness, courage, power, independence and the readiness to use force, are images frequently found in international politics. In this arena, 'the characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity are projected onto the behavior of states whose success as international actors is measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self-help and autonomy.'<sup>68</sup> State characteristics that are defined by IR scholars as necessary match those considered by society to be masculine, and thus highly valued. In turn, this characterization of

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<sup>65</sup> Jacqui True's typology, in 'Feminism', 1996 (fn. 37).

<sup>66</sup> Feminists themselves were the first to acknowledge that there are 'multiple feminisms', as women have challenged the notion that there is a single, representational feminism.

<sup>67</sup> Tickner, J.A. 1992, *Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 35-37.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

appropriate state behavior results in a hierarchy of values in international relations that falls along gender lines.

Feminists take issue with the privileging of masculine characteristics in both society and international relations, arguing that the dichotomy used to divide the world into male or female characteristics – ‘public vs. private, objective vs. subjective, self vs. other, reason vs. emotion, autonomy vs. relatedness and culture vs. nature,’<sup>69</sup> is culturally determined, not natural or fixed. Feminists raise the question of whether the male characteristics that form the basis for prescriptions of statecraft in most IR theory are the only appropriate ones for the achievement of global peace and prosperity.

TABLE 2

Feminist Approaches to IR

	EMPIRICISM	STANDPOINT	POST-MODERNISM
GENDER EQUALITY?	Identifies a lack of gender equality	‘Gendered’ international structures a result of the lack of gender equality	Not applicable
PRIME TARGET	Achieve gender equality through legal remedies	Restructure the Domestic-International dichotomy that diminishes women and women’s issues	Recognize that all knowledge is socially constructed
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE	Documentation of the absence of women in IR subjects	De-masculinize the field of IR	Question universal acceptance (within IR) of positivism and ability to predict states’ behavior

#### 2.4.1.1 *Feminist Empiricism*

Feminist empiricism in IR arises from the liberal feminism school that believes legal remedies can and will place women as equals to men in society. Feminist empiricists seek to make women’s lives visible in IR. They argue that ‘only when women are recognized as fundamental to economic and political processes will they share and equal part of societal decision-making. Feminist empiricist epistemology acknowledges that

<sup>69</sup> True, 1996 (fn. 37) p. 213.

the absence of women scholars in IR has led to IR knowledge that is largely concerned with men's lives, but aim to correct that balance.<sup>70</sup> This approach seeks to document the absence of women in the subjects of IR, using that identification as a starting point to remedy the situation. Gender-sensitive research has been undertaken in many subfields of IR, including Development, Globalization, International Organization, International Political Economy, Ecology and Sustainable Development, Foreign Policy Behavior, Nationalism, and Social Movements.

#### 2.4.1.2 *Feminist Standpoint*

Theorists and practitioners of feminist standpoint research differ from feminist empiricists in that they believe that the entire field of IR is 'gendered': its conceptual framework is biased toward the masculine in visible and invisible ways. 'Key IR concepts such as power, sovereignty, autonomy, anarchy, security, and core units of analysis such as man, the state and the international system are inseparable from the patriarchal division of public and private.'<sup>71</sup> Feminist standpoint theorists seek to deconstruct the discipline and its masculinist concepts in order to relocate women and women's issues in the field.

The prime target of feminist standpoint theorists is the domestic-international dichotomy. This 'definitive disciplinary boundary' appears increasingly arbitrary when one takes notice of 'how anarchy outside supports gender hierarchy at home, as well as how the international has been very much about the management of change in domestic political orders.'<sup>72</sup> Using gender as a unit of analysis or even women as an identity group renders the divisions between the individual, state and international system not only less potent, as women are so obviously missing, but as obviously only one approach to represent the world.

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<sup>70</sup> True 1996 (fn. 37) p. 224.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 225.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 226.

### 2.4.1.3 *Feminist Postmodernism*

Also known as post-positivist, this school of thought rejects positivism and its belief in the scientific method, its distinction between facts and values, its belief that the social world has the same regularities as the natural world, and that empiricist epistemology can determine the 'truth'.

This approach to feminist IR study begins at the ontological level, which, these theorists hold, is subordinated in traditional IR to epistemologies. 'Positivist methods in IR subordinate questions of ontology- the specificity of the knowing-subject and subjects of knowledge- to questions of epistemology- universalizing levels of abstraction and the quest for universal knowledge.'<sup>73</sup> In other words, feminist postmodernists question the validity of realist IR scholars' claims that certain universal laws predict the behavior of nation-states. They argue that all knowledge is socially constructed and is grounded in the time, place and social context of the investigator.

## 2.5 **Feminism, Gender and Public Opinion**

Establishing the existence of an unequivocal pacific orientation among women is made difficult because of the impact of other factors that affect the relationship between gender and public opinion. To begin with, women, compared to men, respond to survey questions with more 'don't know', 'no opinion', or 'not sure' answers.<sup>74</sup> One study which investigated the impact of gender on public opinion toward foreign policy and military issues finds that women, on average, are 5.4% more likely than men to say 'don't know' when asked about the use of force overseas by the US over the course of the last quarter century.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> True, 1996 (fn. 37) p. 236.

<sup>74</sup> Rapoport, R. 1982, 'Sex Differences in Attitude Expression: A Generational Explanation', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 86-96.

<sup>75</sup> Shapiro, R. and Mahajan, H. 1986, 'Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 42-61.

This cognition gap may reflect 'ignorance, a preoccupation with issues closer to home or simply a hesitancy to express a view'.<sup>76</sup> It may also be the lingering effect of gender-based socialization that has stressed, especially in the past, 'that politics is a man's exclusive club'.<sup>77</sup> Age might also influence gender responses to public opinion items. People born after World War II in highly industrialized countries appear to have a post-materialistic set of values that includes a strong commitment to personal autonomy, to improving the quality of the environment, and to the containment of the spread of nuclear weapons. Their older counterparts, raised during times of economic depression and intense military conflict, emphasize the importance of stability and preparedness to ensure economic order and world peace.<sup>78</sup>

As a distinct cohort, younger women have also had a substantial exposure to the feminist movement of recent years. Hence they have been imbued with a woman-centered perspective, a set of interrelated values that encompasses a general humanitarian concern, a spirit of cooperation, and a pacific outlook toward international affairs. Conover has shown that adopting a feminist identity reinforces and legitimates the public expression of a caring attitude and serves as a psychological bridge connecting this concern to specific policy issues.<sup>79</sup>

Not unexpectedly, given the likely mixture of gender and age, younger women, especially in Western democracies, have decidedly more pacific views of military, defense and nuclear matters than other age/gender groups.<sup>80</sup> They also have been found to be less inclined than older women to express 'no opinion' responses to questionnaire items.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Boulding, E. 1984, 'Focus On: The Gender Gap', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 1-30.

<sup>77</sup> Iglitzin, L. 1974, 'The Making of the Apolitical Woman: Femininity and Sex-Stereotyping in Girls', in *Women in Politics*, ed. J. Jacquette, Wiley, New York, p. 34.

<sup>78</sup> Erikson, R., Luttbeg, N., and Tedin, K. 1980, *Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content and Impact*, Wiley, New York.

<sup>79</sup> Conover, P. 1988, 'Feminists and the Gender Gap', *Journal of Politics*, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 985-1010.

<sup>80</sup> De Boer, C. 1985, 'The Polls: The European peace Movement and the Deployment of Nuclear Missiles', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 119-132.

<sup>81</sup> Rapoport, 1982 (fn. 68); but see Shapiro and Mahajan 1986 (fn. 69) for contrary evidence.

Substantive gender-based differences in public opinion, however, rarely lead to a distinctive style of political behavior in women. The greater propensity of women, especially younger ones, to be pacific in military, defense, and nuclear outlook does not usually shape their partisan or electoral choice, for instance. One reason for this failed connection may lie in the political environment. The opportunity for some women to fashion their political activity upon their unique attitudes may simply not be readily available since candidates and decision makers usually do not speak publicly, frankly, or contentiously about issues that tap the political dispositions of these women.<sup>82</sup>

Much of the discussion about, and the research on, gender and politics has occurred within the American political context. The lack of congruence between opinion and behavior may be a characteristic of this particular setting, one in which conventional, everyday politics rarely engages issues salient to many women. This United States-based focus also means that generalization of the findings concerning gender differences in public opinion must be made with caution.

## **2.6 Feminism and Foreign Policy**

At least, feminism has made us aware that men and women experience the world differently. At the optimistic most, feminism will help the world achieve gender equality. Significantly, feminism teaches us that women and men are not affected by world politics in the same way, nor do they participate in the same way. This leads us to wonder if the world would be a different place if the world achieved gender equity. Perhaps the following will illuminate the answer.

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<sup>82</sup> Jacquette, J. 1974, *Women in Politics*, Wiley, New York, p. 102.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **Gender Differences in Foreign Policy Preferences: Theoretical Background**

### 3.1 Theoretical Context

Two interrelated bodies of theoretical literature shape much of the current interest in gender and international studies. The first, which includes attempts to link feminism and globalism, hypothesizes that women are more pacific than men in their approach to international relations, being more accepting of compromise to resolve interstate disputes and less likely than men to believe that war is necessary or appropriate in particular conflict situations. Competition, violence, intransigence, and territoriality are thus associated with a 'male' approach to human relations, including relations among sovereign states, whereas moderation, compromise, tolerance, and pacifism are seen as a 'female' perspective on world affairs.

Public opinion research provides some evidence in support of these propositions. Evidence from research is limited to the United States, however, and findings are not entirely consistent. For example, while several systematic studies have found American men to be more supportive of militarism and war involvement than American women by an average of seven to nine percentage points,<sup>83</sup> a more recent data-based analysis by Conover and Shapiro reports no sex-linked differences in general militarism.<sup>84</sup>

The Conover and Sapiro study, which analyzed data from the 1991 American national Election Study Pilot Study, did note that women were less supportive than men of US involvement in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, and it speculated accordingly that sex-linked differences are 'by no means large enough to divide men and women into different camps, and they are certainly not large enough to warrant making the kinds of statements differentiating women and men that have long been part of the popular stereotype.' Overall the authors conclude that 'stereotypes (about male-female differences) turn out to

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<sup>83</sup> Brandes, L. 1992 'The Gender Gap and Attitudes Toward War' (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago), cited in Tessler and Warriner 1997 (fn. 4) p. 269; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986 (fn. 4); and Smith 1984 (fn. 4).

<sup>84</sup> Conover and Sapiro, 1993 (fn. 4).

be only partial truths, and the hypotheses (about the explanatory power of gender) are only partially confirmed.’<sup>85</sup>

Findings from research on the differences between men and women in several related fields are also sometimes offered in support of efforts to establish a connection between gender and international relations. For example, Gilligan reported a distinctly feminine sensibility based on studies undertaken with small children, college students and adults.<sup>86</sup> In these studies, women repeatedly demonstrated a predilection to care for others and to prefer harmonious human relations to individual achievement and conquest. Men, by contrast, were more likely to value and pursue behavior involving rivalry and competition, even when this resulted in interpersonal conflict.

Also sometimes cited in support of hypotheses about differences between men and women are findings from earlier anthropological studies of tribal societies and even from studies of animals, particularly of our closest genetic relatives, monkeys and apes. McGuigan has shown, for example, that communal violence and aggressive behavior vary in proportion to male control of the public sphere, and also as a function of the degree to which paramount gods are male.<sup>87</sup> To the extent that these attributes are present, aggression and violence predominate in the resolution of conflicts. Alternatively, the level of violence is significantly lower in tribal societies that draw less of a distinction between the roles of men and women and worship female gods.<sup>88</sup>

More common than studies presenting empirical evidence in support of ‘feminist-pacifist’ propositions are analyses based on deductive reasoning, most of which emphasize the uniquely female experience of motherhood.<sup>89</sup> Two overlapping visions of the

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<sup>85</sup> Conover and Sapiro, 1993 (fn. 4), p. 1095.

<sup>86</sup> Gilligan, C. 1982, *In A Different Voice*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

<sup>87</sup> McGuigan, D.G. 1977, *The Role of Women in Conflict and Peace*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>89</sup> For example, see Ruddick, 1989 (fn. 14); Elshtain, J. 1985, ‘Reflections on War and Political Discourse’, *Political Theory*, vol. 13, no. 1; Dietz, M. 1985, ‘Citizenship With a Feminist Face: The Problem With Maternal Thinking’, *Political Theory*, no. 13, no. 1; and Scaltsas, P.W. 1992, ‘Do Feminist Ethics Counter Feminist Aims?’ in E.B. Cole and S. Coultrap-McQuin, eds., *Explorations in Feminist Ethics*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, cited in Tickner, 2002 (fn. 32) p. 338.

motherhood experience and its salience are found in those feminist and other discourses that seek to establish the link between gender and international affairs. The first celebrates a cultural feminism, or feminism of identity, in which the 'female' values caring and nurturance are given prominence. The second introduces the concept of 'moral motherhood', which is said to incline women toward 'preservative love' and the elimination of violence in human relations.<sup>90</sup>

The caregiver approach to international relations stresses empathy and compromise, observing that these values are associated with social roles that in most societies are played primarily by women. Women are the principal caregivers in most cultures, attending to the needs of children, ailing friends, elderly parents, and others. Cultural feminism argues that this has relevance for the international arena. Emphasizing the universal applicability of a predisposition toward nurturance, it links women's roles as domestic caregivers to a more tolerant approach to relations among communities and states. Men, by contrast, being less involved in caregiving, are said to be less moderate and pacific and more likely to be concerned with hierarchy, hegemony, and justice in intercommunal and international relations.

While advanced by some feminist scholars, others express reservations about these hypotheses associated with caregiving, not only challenging the evidence on which they are based but also dissenting from their philosophical and political assumptions. In particular, critics charge that attributions of empathy, nurturance and caring reinforce traditional stereotypes about women and retard the feminist goal of emancipation. On the one hand, some postmodern feminist theorists insist that there are no 'essential components' that characterize all women.<sup>91</sup> On the other hand, some assert that the emphasis on caring is itself misplaced, either seeing this as patronizing or disputing the hypothesized link to public and international affairs.<sup>92</sup> A second and closely related feminist discourse emphasizes the concept of 'moral motherhood', which asserts that

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<sup>90</sup> Ruddick, 1989 (fn. 14) p. 76.

<sup>91</sup> Zalewski, M. 1994, 'The Women/'Women' Question in International Relations', *Millennium*, vol. 23, no. 2.

<sup>92</sup> Elshtain, 1985 (fn. 6).

women as mothers have a responsibility to eliminate violence in the resolution of conflicts. 'Advancing the concepts of "maternal thinking" and "preservative love", which are said to be consequences of the social practice of mothering, this discourse distinguishes between "bureaucratic-administrative abstractionism" and an empathetic and loving approach to human relations'.<sup>93</sup> Maternal thinking about world affairs thus rejects a distinction between individual and collective forms of violent conflict, viewing both as equally abhorrent. Elshtain describes the political implications of maternal thinking as 'social feminism'. An approach to international relations shaped by maternal thinking, she argues, is significantly more pacific and tolerant than one founded on abstract and hierarchical conceptions of justice.<sup>94</sup>

This discourse, too, has critics among some feminist and other scholars. Some argue that men as well as women are capable of maternal thinking, even though the male voice is largely absent in discussions of this concept. Some also raise questions about women who do not have children, noting that they are not considered in the conversation about maternal thinking. Still another reservation, echoing a complaint about the caregiver paradigm, is that an emphasis on motherhood and maternal thinking reduces women to one-dimensional actors and obscures the diversity of the factors that influence their attitudes and behavior.

Whether there is indeed a distinctly female approach to international relations, and if so, whether it is characterized by an inclination toward compromise, tolerance and pacifism, thus remain open questions. Hypotheses to this effect are advanced by some scholars but challenged by others, with debates for the most part uninformed by the results of systematic empirical research. Moreover, consistent and unambiguous conclusions do not emerge from the empirical research that has been conducted, and in addition, this research has been limited almost entirely to the United States. Finally, even should it eventually become clear that significant sex-linked differences do exist, these might be the result of factors other than caregiving and maternal thinking. For example,

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<sup>93</sup> Ruddick, 1989 (fn. 14) p. 110.

<sup>94</sup> Elshtain, 1985 (fn 6).

as one analyst points out, women might be more predisposed than men toward the peaceful resolution of international conflicts because they are the principle users of social programs that compete with the military for governmental funds.<sup>95</sup>

### 3.2 Early Studies on Gender and Belief - Sociology Finds Little Evidence

The observation that men are often more supportive of war has led to the speculation that masculinity plays a role in war making. For example, Easlea writes that 'male-female factors must be included in any satisfactory explanation of the origins of the nuclear arms race, and of the forces that so powerfully continue to sustain it...the nuclear arms race is in large part underwritten by masculine behavior in the pursuit and application of scientific inquiry.'<sup>96</sup> Similarly, White suggests that 'macho pride,' which he defines as 'undue satisfaction from, or undue craving for, an image of oneself or one's own group as powerful, prestigious, tough and courageous, usually with a strong underlying assumption that those are masculine attributes...'<sup>97</sup>, is second only to fear as a motive leading to war.

Understanding what motivates people to make war represents one of the most important endeavors of IR. However, despite the common suggestion that masculinity acts as a mediator in the gender/war attitude relationship, its mediating role has rarely been tested.

In a study by Cottle, Edwards and Pleck, the dimension of masculinity-femininity (M-F) was assessed in two ways.<sup>98</sup> First, 'unconscious' M-F was measured using an adaptation of a drawing completion task. Second, social role preference was assessed using a shortened version of the Gough Femininity Scale. These two measures of M-F were then correlated with a seven-item questionnaire measuring 'liberalism', five items of which dealt with attitudes toward the Vietnam War and war protestors. No significant

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<sup>95</sup> Enloe, 1989 (fn. 42).

<sup>96</sup> Easlea, B. 1983, *Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms Race*, Pluto Press, London, p. 5, cited in Jensen, 1987 (fn. 2).

<sup>97</sup> White, R. 1984, *Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of US-Soviet Relations*, The Free Press, New York, p. 120, cited in Jensen 1987 (fn. 2).

<sup>98</sup> Cottle, T., Edwards, C. and Pleck, J. 1970, 'The Relationship of Sex Role Identity and Social and Political Attitudes', *Journal of Personality*, vol. 38, pp. 435-452, cited in Jensen 1987 (fn. 2).

relationship between sex role preference and the liberalism measure was found for either M-F measure. However, subjects who were consistent in their sex role preference, as defined by demonstrating the same sex role preference on both M-F measures, were more likely to support the Vietnam War and to oppose protestors of the war than subjects who were inconsistent in their sex role preferences.

A more recent study has directly examined the relationship between sex typing and various political attitudes. Hershey and Sullivan measured masculinity and femininity using the Bem Sex Role Inventory.<sup>99</sup> This procedure involved calculating a standardized estimate of the difference between the masculinity and femininity scale scores. If this number is low, then the subject has about as many masculine as feminine characteristics, and so is labelled 'androgynous.' If the number is high, then the subject has relatively more characteristics associated with one or the other gender, and so is labelled 'nonandrogynous.'<sup>100</sup>

Regarding the responses of the subjects to questions about war, Hershey and Sullivan found that increased androgyny was associated with a decreased willingness to send troops to the Middle East and Cambodia for both men and women. The relationship between androgyny and two additional measures of willingness to use military force was inconsistent. Among women, a higher level of androgyny was associated with an increased willingness to support the use of military force, while among men a higher level of androgyny was associated with a decreased willingness to support the use of military force. Unfortunately, because androgyny was measured as the degree of similarity between the femininity and masculinity subscales, the magnitude of the relationship between masculinity or femininity and support for the use of military force cannot be determined from the results reported.

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<sup>99</sup> Hershey, M. and Sullivan, J. 1977, 'Sex Role Attitudes, Identities and Political Ideology', *Sex Roles*, vol. 3, pp. 37-57, cited in Jensen 1987 (fn. 2).

<sup>100</sup> Bem, S. 1974, *Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI)*, Consulting Psychologists Press, Palo Alto, CA, cited in Jensen, 1987 (fn. 2).

Feshbach, et al report on two studies that looked at gender role identification and attitudes toward nuclear arms. In the first, they assessed opinions about nuclear armament using a scale that tapped several different attitudes such as support for nuclear armaments, judgments about people who support a nuclear moratorium, and opinions about the survivability of a nuclear war. They also asked their college student sample to indicate their support for a nuclear moratorium. While the male students demonstrated more positive attitudes toward nuclear armament than women on both measures, this difference was not significant, indicating a great deal of overlap between males and females on these attitudes. However, two significant relationships between specific items on the nuclear armament attitude scale and support for a moratorium suggest that sex role characteristics may be implicated in opinions about the moratorium. Opponents of the moratorium were more likely to state that it is important for the US to be the most powerful nation in the world, and that animal death or injury is largely a sentimental and irrelevant matter. The former attitude is very similar to White's concept of macho pride reported above, and the latter appears to relate to tenderness, a trait seen as stereotypically feminine.

In the second study reported by Feshbach, et al, nuclear armament scales scores were correlated with knowledge about nuclear armaments and scales that assessed both affection for children and willingness to expand resources to benefit children. The latter two measures may be considered to be related to 'femininity', and both demonstrated a significant relationship to armament attitudes in the expected direction- the more value placed on children, the more the subjects were opposed to nuclear armaments. Thus evidence suggests that gender and sex role orientation may play a role in some (but not all) attitudes toward war. However, further research was required to clarify the possible relationships between gender-related variables and war attitudes.

Jensen took up the challenge and sought to prove four hypotheses regarding relationships between gender, sex role orientation and attitudes toward war. The 'masculinity' hypothesis is the one espoused by most theoreticians, and argues that masculinity predicts war attitudes and mediates the observed relationships between war attitudes and gender.

The 'femininity' hypothesis could explain observed relationships between gender and war attitudes, including the idea that men may be more supportive of belligerent foreign policies not because they are socialized to be more aggressive but because they were not trained to be tender.

A third hypothesis argues that the observed gender differences in war attitudes exist because specific sex role subgroups express more or less positive attitudes toward war. The four sex role subgroups are the ones identified by Bem, and addressed in the abovementioned studies, particularly 'androgynous,' 'masculine sex-typed,' 'feminine sex typed' and 'undifferentiated.' If it was found that more masculine sex-typed people expressed attitudes of support for war, it would be assumed that gender *did* play a role in foreign policy attitudes since more men are masculine sex-typed. Alternatively, if only androgynous individuals express negative attitudes toward war, while the other groups are neutral or positive, then one would expect a gender difference because women are more androgynous than men.

The fourth hypothesis brings in political beliefs to account for an outcome in which both masculine and feminine sex types express positive attitudes toward war. This might happen if an individual's attitudes were largely influenced by their political beliefs, particularly liberalism or conservatism. It is assumed that conservative men and women are more sex typed than liberal men and women and would therefore exhibit more masculine or feminine traits.

The study found support only for the femininity hypothesis, giving support to the belief that attitudes toward war are associated with feminine traits. Gender was not always found to be related to war attitudes, and was found to be related only to attitudes about the use of military restraint.

Against this background, with slight but statistically relevant support for a gender gap in political attitudes, the door was opened to more focused studies on gender and beliefs regarding the use of force internationally.

### 3.3 Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: the Influence of ‘Feminism’

What happens to politics when more and more women become interested and active? What happens to women’s politics when they are influenced by the women’s movement and feminism? General questions like these address the ‘gender gap’ in politics.<sup>101</sup> They are of concern to political scientists who examine the ‘gender gap’ and politics. Examples of such analyses include Shapiro and Mahajan’s ‘Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s’, and Conover’s ‘Feminists and the Gender Gap’.<sup>102</sup> These articles argue that there *are* gender differences in policy preferences at the mass level, most notably in relation to compassion issues, regulation and protection, and force and violence. While a number of authors explain these differences in terms of a distinct ‘woman’s perspective’, they are more accurately explained by a subgroup of women who identify with a distinct feminist perspective that is political in nature. These gender differences in policy preferences, as well as distinctions between their explanations, matter in terms of both their importance to feminists and their potential electoral importance.

One gender difference in policy preferences at the mass level relates to compassion issues. Shapiro and Mahajan define compassion issues as those that ‘are largely about jobs, income redistribution, and other economic policies to help the poor and targeted group. These include spending on social welfare, education, health, and programs to assist blacks and poor states and central cities, and inflation and unemployment policies.’<sup>103</sup> The authors found that the average gender difference related to such policies is just over 3%, but that women are more supportive of a range of policies that aim to help the poor, including ‘guaranteed annual income, wage-price controls, equalizing wealth, guaranteeing jobs, government-provided healthcare, student loans, and rationing to deal with scarce goods’.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Shapiro and Mahajan 1986 (fn. 4).

<sup>102</sup> Conover, P.J. 1988, ‘Feminists and the Gender Gap’, *Journal of Politics*, vol. 50, no. 5, pp. 985-1010.

<sup>103</sup> Shapiro and Mahajan 1986 (fn. 4) p. 51.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

Another, larger gender difference in policy preferences at the mass level concerns issues of regulation and protection. Such policies, as defined by Shapiro and Mahajan, 'regulate and protect consumers, citizens, and the environment'. They found that, while there are no major gender differences in responses to whether or not 'the government has too much power', there are differences for specific policies, with women being more likely to support regulatory and protective policies. For example, women are more in favor of 'the 55 mile per hour speed limit, fines for people who do not wear seat belts, jail terms for drunk drivers, and banning cigarette advertising and sales', and they are as much as 20% more likely to be against nuclear power plants.

The largest gender difference in policy preferences at the mass level relates to issues of force and violence. Shapiro and Mahajan classify such issues into three categories, based on how clearly or ambiguously they deal with force or violence. Examples of the issues which most clearly deal with violence or force include 'defense, troop levels abroad, capital punishment, and gun control', and examples of those which ambiguously deal with violence or force include 'the space program, the country's activeness in international affairs, the courts' treatment of criminals, and abortion'. Shapiro and Mahajan found that men are more likely than women to support such issues of force and violence. These gender differences are about the same whether the violence is foreign or domestic, and they are as high as 15 to 20% with 'issues such as gun control, capital punishment, defense spending, the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, mining the harbors of North Vietnam, and providing arms to Israelis and the Arabs'.

While Shapiro and Mahajan clearly document these gender differences in policy preferences at the mass level, they do not account for the differences. According to Conover, a common explanation for the differences is that 'men and women have different political values and priorities which stem from fundamental value differences'.<sup>105</sup> Underlying this explanation is the belief that there is a distinct 'woman's perspective', with some 'woman's perspective' proponents attributing this perspective to the ways in which women and men are socialized differently and others pointing to

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<sup>105</sup> Conover, 1988 (fn. 96) p. 987.

biological differences between women and men. Regardless of how they attribute such differences, 'woman's perspective' advocates argue – much like Carol Gilligan's work discussed earlier – that women's policy preferences are influenced by an ethic of caring, while men's are influenced by an ethic of justice.

It is easy to see why the 'woman's perspective' argument is convincing to some, especially within a society where the paradigm for considering gender focuses on differences, assuming that the two genders are polarized opposites. Of course, women and men are not always complete opposites, men are not all alike, and women are not all alike. Such is also the case in terms of gender 'differences' in policy preferences at the mass level. Men and non-feminist women are actually very similar in their policy preferences, whereas nonfeminist women and feminist women vary significantly in their policy preferences. The differences in policy preferences are more accurately explained, then, not by a distinct 'woman's perspective', but by a distinct feminist perspective that is political in nature.

Using 'a sense of membership in the category or group and a sense of psychological attachment to the group' as measures of women's feminism, Conover re-examined gender differences in policy preferences, this time breaking the larger group of women into two subgroups: nonfeminists and feminists. She found that with respect to foreign policy issues, non-feminist women differed significantly from men in only one instance, whereas feminist women differed significantly from men in every instance. Likewise in the area of domestic policy issues, nonfeminist women again resembled men in spending preferences – with the exception of issues affecting the elderly – while feminist women differed significantly from men on almost every domestic policy issue. Feminist women resembled men only in their preferences 'on social policies such as abortion and school prayer'. Thus Conover's research confirms that gender differences in policy preferences can be explained not by a distinct 'woman's perspective', but by a distinct feminist perspective.

Although women are perhaps more likely than men to be socialized to accept feminism, such a feminist perspective is less an outgrowth of gender differences in socialization or biology, and more an outgrowth of political differences. In other words, any existing 'woman's perspective' 'may be an outgrowth of . . . political values (e.g., egalitarianism) and not . . . femaleness per se'. If feminists want to effect change, and especially if they want to influence public policy, then any set of 'woman's values must be coupled with, if not subordinated to, democratic political values'. Such democratic values look like this: 'they are more liberal, less racist, more egalitarian, less traditional morally and with regard to sex roles, and more sympathetic to the disadvantaged'. Thus not only are the gender differences in policy preferences due to a feminist perspective that is political in nature, but this distinction of the perspective as a political one should matter to feminists who want to effect change.

Gender differences in policy preferences and distinctions between their explanations also matter in terms of potential electoral importance. Such gender differences in policy preferences can impact differences in voting. Yet the differences in policy preferences are explained less by differences between groups of women and groups of men and more by differences between groups of feminists and groups of non-feminists. An awareness of this distinction may be equally important to candidates.

Gender differences in policy preferences, as well as distinctions between their explanations, *do* matter in terms of both their potential electoral importance and their importance to feminists. These gender differences in policy preferences at the mass level are most evident in relation to compassion issues, regulation and protection, and force and violence. Distinctions between their explanations recognize that while these differences are often attributed to a distinct 'woman's perspective', they are more accurately attributed to a subgroup of women who identify with a distinct feminist perspective that is political in nature. Building on the research of Shapiro, Mahajan, and Conover, further analyses of gender differences in policy preferences at the mass level may want to consider an additional issue: how policy preferences differ among feminist and non-feminist men.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **Foreign Policy Beliefs and Behavior: the Literature Reviewed**

#### **4.1 A Typology of Two: IR Finds Evidence**

Schoeman and Sadie identify two very prevalent, yet still divergent arguments put forth by authors arguing for the inclusion of women in the foreign policy decision-making process;<sup>106</sup> I will use their typology to examine the remainder of the collected literature to be reviewed.

The first argument maintains that women should be included in the foreign policy decision-making process for the simple reason that they make up half of the world's population. What women believe, or if what they believe differs from men for any reason, is not taken into consideration under this argument. It simply puts forth that there is no reason women should not be included and there is not likely to be any difference in outcome once women *are* included.

The second argument holds that women and men have different perceptions of the international political landscape and believe and behave differently from men by nature of their gender. The correlate of this is that, if involved equitably in foreign policy decision-making structures, women would have an influence on the outcome by virtue of their differing perception of the international system. More specifically, and simplistically, since women are more "peaceful" than men, this would impact on international relations causing the world to be a more "peaceful" place.

#### **4.2 Foreign Policy Beliefs and Behavior**

How does gender influence foreign policy beliefs and foreign policy behavior? The theory that domestic norms can influence a state's international behavior (foreign policy behavior) was first expounded by democratic peace scholars.

The empirical finding that democracies do not fight each other has long suggested that regime type influences international behavior. Statistical tests of the relationship between

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<sup>106</sup> Schoeman and Sadie, forthcoming (fn. 24) p. 3.

regime type and war suggest that institutional attributes of states influence state behavior in the international system and affect international outcomes. Yet traditionally, in the academic pursuit of understanding the causes of war and peace, little attention has been paid to state attributes,<sup>107</sup> due primarily to the dominance of the realist paradigm. Realism, and especially the neorealism of Waltz,<sup>108</sup> attributes the greatest causal importance in explaining war and peace to the distribution of power in the international system. According to Waltz's systemic theory, different states similarly positioned in the international system behave in a similar manner. From the nature of the system and the distribution of capabilities within it, we can understand state behavior in the absence of knowledge of the internal dynamics of states.

There have been many challenges to Waltz's assertions. Many scholars have argued the importance of sub-systemic factors in explaining and predicting international actions. Most, however, have focused on the level of the individual decision-maker or on decision-making processes.<sup>109</sup> Only recently has more attention been paid to the influence of state attributes on international conflict, driven mainly by the empirical discovery of the democratic peace.<sup>110</sup> While initially the statistical revelation that democracies do not fight each other was met with a great deal of skepticism, a number of statistical tests including a variety of control variables have shown the empirical finding to be robust.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Levy, J. 1989, 'The Causes of War: a Review of Theories and Evidence', in *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, eds. P. Tetlock, J. Husbands, R. Jervis, P. Stern and C. Tilly, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 209-333.

<sup>108</sup> Waltz, K. 1979, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.

<sup>109</sup> See Allison, G. 1971, *Essence of Decision*, Little, Brown, Boston; Bueno de Mesquita, B. 1981, *The War Trap*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT; Janis, I. 1982, *Victims of Groupthink*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston; and Jervis, R. 1976, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.)

<sup>110</sup> Doyle, M. 1983, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 205-235; Rummel, R. 1979, *Understanding Conflict and War: Volume 4, War, Power, Peace*, Sage Publishers, Beverley Hills; and Rummel, R. 1983, 'Libertarianism and International Violence', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 27-71.

<sup>111</sup> See Bremer, S. 1993, 'Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965', *International Interactions*, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 231-249; Maoz, Z. and Russett, B. 1992, 'Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth and Political Stability: Is the lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?', *International Interactions*, vol. 17, no. 3, 245-267; Oneal, J. and Russett, B. 1997, 'The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence and Conflict, 1950-1985', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 267-293; and Oneal, J., Oneal, F., Maoz, Z., and Russett, B. 1996, 'The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict, 1950-1985', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 11-28.

In recent years, scholarly focus has concentrated on developing and evaluating explanations for the democratic peace. A number of competing explanations have been advanced which purport to explain the same empirical evidence. As a result, we have no single well-accepted theory of the democratic peace, or of the potentially broader relationship between structural attributes of states and international behavior. In general, the explanations tend to cluster in three areas: explanations based on the externalization of internally developed norms of behavior, explanations based on the constrained behavior of executives who must accommodate large numbers of politically relevant domestic actors, and explanations based on the relationship between regime type and international interests.

The norms-based explanation of the democratic peace was recently championed most notably by Russett. According to Russett,<sup>112</sup> leaders choose to employ the standards and rules of conduct that have been successful and acceptable at home in their international interaction. Leaders who come to power in democratic states learn to view politics as a non-zero-sum game, to negotiate and compromise with opponents, and to bargain rather than fight. In democratic systems, political adversaries disagree and have conflicting views and interests, but they resolve these conflicts peacefully. Democratic leaders prefer to follow these same standards and rules in international interaction as well, and do so when they have reason to expect that such behavior will be reciprocated, namely when they are facing other democratic states. When facing non-democracies, however, leaders of democratic states cannot expect their opponents to adhere to the same norms, and they must abandon these standards in favor of traditional power politics approaches.<sup>113</sup>

If, as Russett suggests, regime type can be useful in predicting a state's behavior particularly because of that country's norms, a country's gender relations might be useful in predicting foreign policy behavior as well. Caprioli has done the most extensive work

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<sup>112</sup> Russett, B. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, p30-38.

<sup>113</sup> Dixon, W. 1993, 'Democracy and the Management of International Conflict', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 42-69; Dixon, W. 1994, 'Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 88, no. 1, pp. 14-32; Maoz, Z. and Russett, B. 1993, 'Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 87, no. 3, pp. 624-638.; Rummel, 1979; and Russett, 1993.

on this subject to date, first examining quantitatively the relationship between state militarism and domestic gender equality.<sup>114</sup> Her research is based on theory, supported by IR and studies by Warriner (1997) and Conover and Sapiro (1993), which suggest that women are more peace oriented than men. Relevant literature employed by Caprioli implies that the impact and potential impact of women on foreign policy would be tangible due to the fact that women are more peaceful: they are less likely than men to support the use of international violence.

Women, compared with men, are more opposed to: the spread of nuclear weapons;<sup>115</sup> to the positioning of nuclear weapons in Europe<sup>116</sup>; to the use of force and violence in general;<sup>117</sup> and to the specific military involvement of the United States in Korea<sup>118</sup>, Vietnam<sup>119</sup>, Iran, Central America and Grenada.<sup>120</sup> Shapiro and Mahajan's inventory of 84 questionnaire items measuring public opinion toward the use of force overseas between the early 1960s and 1983 reveals that on average, American women are 6.2% more pacific in attitude than are American men.<sup>121</sup> As concluded by Abzug, 'American men and women have registered the deepest division of opinion on the issues of war and peace, with women always taking the more pacific position.'<sup>122</sup>

Work by Tessler and Warriner is notable in that it finds no evidence that women are more pacific than men, in a study of four Middle Eastern societies.<sup>123</sup> The study uses survey data from Kuwait, Israel, Egypt and Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) to explore the connections between gender, feminism and attitudes toward war and peace. Using

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<sup>114</sup> Caprioli, M. 2000, 'Gendered Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 51-68.

<sup>115</sup> Abzug, B. 1984, *Gender Gap*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, p. 123; Conover, P. 1988, 'Feminists and the Gender Gap', *Journal of Politics*, vol. 50, no. 4, pp.985-1010; Goertzel, T. 1983, 'The Gender Gap: Sex, Family Income and Political Opinions in the Early 1980s' *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 11, no. 2, p. 213.

<sup>116</sup> de Boer, C. 1985, 'The Polls: European Peace Movement and the Deployment of Nuclear Missiles', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 49, no. 1. pp. 119-132.

<sup>117</sup> Smith, 1984 (fn. 4).

<sup>118</sup> Baxter, S. and Lansing, M. 1980, *Women and Politics: The Invisible Majority*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 58-59.

<sup>119</sup> Pomper, G. 1975, *Voter's Choice*, Dodd, Mead, New York, pp. 78-79.

<sup>120</sup> Abzug, 1984 (fn. 109) pp. 122-124; Conover, 1988 (fn. 73); Goertzel, 1983 (fn. 109) p. 214.

<sup>121</sup> Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986 (fn 4).

<sup>122</sup> Abzug, 1984 (fn. 109) p. 120.

<sup>123</sup> Tessler and Warriner, 1997 (fn. 4).

evidence from all four societies, Tessler and Warriner conclude that women are not less belligerent than men in their foreign policy beliefs. They did find, however, that attitudes toward gender equity were positively related to attitudes toward the use of violence internationally. Men and women that expressed greater concern for the status and role of women were more likely than others to believe that their country should endeavor to solve international disputes through 'diplomacy and compromise.' These findings stand against the majority of literature on the subject, which, while not conclusive across the board, do tend to find that sex-linked differences can be identified on attitudes toward foreign policy issues.

Other research indicates that a domestic environment of equality between men and women would lead toward greater state pacifism, and Caprioli develops hypotheses to test the relationship. Where women are more socially equal, economically equal and politically powerful, are countries more peaceful? This hypothesis, in conjunction with the hypothesis that increasing gender equity has a causal relationship with increased pacifism at the international level, is tested by Caprioli. The Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset is used to measure the level of militarism employed by any given state to resolve international conflicts and hostility level is used as the dependent variable. Independent variables used to indicate gender equality include the percentage of women in parliament, the duration of female suffrage, the percentage of women in the labor force, and the fertility rate. Several control variables including alliances, contiguity, wealth, and whether or not the state is a democracy are added to the multivariate logistic regressions, and all the hypotheses are confirmed. The study substantiates the theory that domestic gender equality has a pacifying effect on state behavior at the international level. It also finds that a more pacific view of conflict resolution can be linked to gender-neutral value systems during interstate disputes. In Russett's terms of the democratic peace, if a country's norms include gender equity, it can be expected that that country will not be likely to have a foreign policy dispute with a similar country.

In later work, Caprioli and Boyer<sup>124</sup> use the record of female leaders as primary decision makers during international crises and then test the relationship between domestic gender equality and a state's use of violence internationally. The most significant finding relevant to this hypothesis was made by Caprioli in her earlier work, where she found 'those who are more supportive of equality between women and men are also more favorably disposed toward diplomacy and compromise. A norm of equality among individuals, therefore, translates into equality and more restrained treatment for other political communities and countries.'<sup>125</sup> The level of violence exhibited during international crises is compared in states with varying levels of domestic gender equality: the results show that the severity of violence in crisis decreases as domestic gender equality increases.

The difficulty in studying the actions of states led by women in international disputes lies in the fact that the dataset is so small. A mere 24 states have had a female leader since 1900 and there are only 10 crises in which a country led by a woman was involved. Out of the 10, there are only 4 different leaders: Golda Meir in 7 cases, Indira Gandhi in 1 case, Margaret Thatcher in 1 case and Benazir Bhutto in 1 case. In percentage terms, only 16.6% of states with women as leaders were involved in an international dispute, and, most notably, the female leaders never initiated the dispute.<sup>126</sup> As anecdotal evidence this is very interesting but not statistically significant due to the limited amount of data on which it is based.

Despite not having initiated any of the conflicts, the female leaders included in the study did respond with violence when provoked. This, Caprioli suggests, is most likely due to that fact that the women in question were

'...leaders who have risen to power through a male-defined and male-dominated political environment may well need to be more aggressive in crises than their male counterparts. Thus the violent responses and overall violence seen in these 10 cases may be the result of female leaders trying to prove themselves as heads of state

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<sup>124</sup> Caprioli, M. and Boyer, M. 2001, 'Gender, Violence and International Crisis', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 503-518.

<sup>125</sup> Caprioli, 2000 (fn. 108) p. 59.

<sup>126</sup> Caprioli and Boyer, 2001 (fn. 118) p. 505.

in a hostile, male-defined and male-dominant international political environment. Moreover, women may also work harder to “win” in crises for the same reasons, because to appear and act feminine (and therefore weak) would be political suicide both domestically and internationally.’<sup>127</sup>

So, although research seems to indicate that the chances for international peace may be influenced by states’ gender norms and levels of gender equity, the literature as yet is not conclusive.

Gender-based differences in foreign policy beliefs and behavior seem as if they should exist; from a common sense perspective one would expect it, as Boulding notes, ‘as far back as we have historical records, we have evidence that women are less enthusiastic about war than men’.<sup>128</sup> Yet research has shown that the differences between men and women are not as distinct as common sense might lead us to believe. Gender does have an impact upon opinion toward the use of force internationally. What is less clear is if states with more gender equity are more pacific, and if women leaders are more pacific in general.

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<sup>127</sup> Caprioli and Boyer, 2001 (fn, 118) p. 507.

<sup>128</sup> Boulding, 1984 (fn. 70) p. 1.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research**

## 5.1 The Gender Gap: Does It Exist?

Do gender differences in foreign policy attitudes exist? Although early studies reported that there were few gender differences in foreign policy attitudes, more recent scholarship has challenged this view. A significant body of research has consistently shown that women are less supportive of the use of military force than men.

While these studies offer significant empirical evidence of a gender gap in foreign policy attitudes in the United States, it is not clear if these results are applicable to other countries. Nor is it clear whether the gender gap extends from foreign policy beliefs to the realm of foreign policy behavior. Limited data regarding women leaders means that any conclusions must be considered anecdotal and not statistically relevant.

The gender basis of attitudes toward war and foreign policy are more complex than expected. What stereotypes and common sense about peace-loving women tell us are only partial truths when examined academically and rigorously. Of the articles reviewed, the gender-related hypothesis that women are less supportive of the use of force to resolve international disputes found the most support. Women are more worried about the prospects of war, and more wary of foreign involvements in general, though when given justifications are just as willing to support the use of force.<sup>129</sup> When questioned about real-life issues, rather than abstractions, women were much more likely than men to react negatively to the use of force. These gender differences are some of the largest and most significant examples of a gender gap.

## 5.2 Suggestions for Further Research

There is no doubt that there will be more and more extensive research on the subject at hand. The question is, what would be most relevant to the field? Is a prolonged search for hard evidence of the gender gap in foreign policy attitudes necessary? It seems clear

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<sup>129</sup> Conover and Sapiro, 1993 (fn. 4).

from the articles surveyed that the gap exists, despite being small and unpredictable. Perhaps better polling techniques will tease out greater differences over time, and in reaction to new events.

It is unlikely that new and improved research regarding women in national leadership positions will emerge any time soon. As Caprioli found, the dataset needed to examine female leader's response in international crisis situations is just not forthcoming due to the dearth of female leaders over the last century. That data will not emerge quickly.

Likely the most promising area for new research will be in the influence of gender equity on states' behavior. Data on states' gender equity may not be readily available, but variables already polled for can be used in new and different ways to identify states' and citizens' views on gender norms. In this potential research, a male leader is not an issue as the country's gender norms will be applicable to a male leader as well as a female leader.

The area in which research into the gender gap could be of practical interest is in peace research. For instance: Why do foreign policy experts need to recognize untapped resources to avert or resolve violent conflict? What have been women's roles in confronting violent conflict? How does grassroots organizing compare with their role in the political structure of the same conflicts? How do gender stereotypes impact public policies about how we deal with violent conflict: are those characteristics more linked to institutional or social power rather than gender? What are the typical—and the optimal—dynamics between women-led community-oriented initiatives and the political processes in situations of conflict? What steps can policy makers take to benefit from these initiatives? Policy-makers and foreign policy decision-makers can take heed of women's differing views on foreign policy to see alternative ways to deal with conflict.