Marginalisation in Southern Africa: Perceptions of and Reactions to State Regimes

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signature:

Date:
Abstract

During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the world economic order has passed through a transformation which can be characterised as a shift away from the idea of the “Keynesian compromise” to the idea or principle of greater openness and a revision of the role of the state in macroeconomic policy formulation. As a result, and to achieve the goal of global competitiveness, states have become more “outward” orientated. The last twenty years have also seen an increase in the levels of inequality within and between states, which means that the effect of economic growth on the reduction of poverty is much reduced. Critics of the “openness” principle point out that the policies of developing states should be more inwardly focused to ensure that economic openness contributes more directly to the alleviation of poverty and inequality.

Southern Africa is a region where the problem of inequality (particularly within states) is prevalent. The Critical Theory of Robert W Cox (CCT) suggests that one of the ways in which increasing levels in inequality can be observed and analysed is to determine how people are related to the dynamics (via their national economies) of the contemporary world economic order. Are they marginalised, in a precarious position, or integrated? Furthermore, Cox assumes that the marginalised are a social force which could bring about transformation “from below.” Following on from this assumption a number of claims about the marginalised can be deduced from CCT: they are inclined to political protest, they are dissatisfied with the political economic system of their country, they are politically apathetic, they are prone to low levels of political efficacy, they have turned “their back on the state” and belong to self-help associations, they are more inclined to participate in the activities of civil society and they are critical of neoliberal economic policies.

The study’s primary empirical question investigates whether the attitudes which Cox attributes to the marginalised are accurate. This is done through a detailed exposition of his core theoretical framework and a thorough conceptualisation/operationalisation of the marginalised, precarious and integrated. The area which is focused on is southern Africa. The vast majority of people in the region belong to the marginalised and the precarious components of Cox’s economic hierarchy. They derive little or no economic benefit from greater openness and outward orientated forms of state. The question is whether they can be mobilised into a “counter-hegemonic social movement” (as Cox foresees) and how they view the role of the state.

The second question is theoretical and is concerned with the usefulness and strong points of Cox’s explanatory framework compared to other approaches which either (1) ignore the state as a point of entry for analysis, (2) regard it as the primary actor in the international system, (3) or “bypass” it because they predict its demise in a future post-sovereign world. I argue that it is incorrect to associate Cox’s approach with the work of Richard Ashley, Mark Hoffman, Andrew Linklater and Mark Neufeld and to group them into a Critical Theory of International Relations school. Two important differences between Cox and these scholars are his incorporation of the state in a flexible, multiple points of entry framework and his resourceful combination of a diverse number of sources.
The theoretical question is addressed by a substantive literature review of Cox’s major publications in English and a representative review of the contributions made by Ashley, Hoffman, Linklater and Neufeld. In the reading of Cox’s work, I focused on the development of his thinking, his major influences and on the epistemology and ontology of his core theoretical framework. The empirical question was investigated through a nationally representative survey of seven southern African states (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe) which was undertaken by a research consortium of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa’s Public Opinion Service during 1999-2000.

In terms of Cox’s theoretical expectations of the marginalised the study found that, in southern Africa; their political protest potential is lower than the integrated, they participate less in politics and in civil society, they are not more inclined to belong to self-help associations, they are inclined to accord slightly more legitimacy to the state than the integrated, their economic values cannot be summarised as generally unsympathetic to “market” orientated policies, and that the majority (significantly more so than the integrated) think that the state should be the major provider of social services. The marginalised are more tolerant of authoritarian political alternatives, but are not significantly more dissatisfied (relatively) with the economy than the other groups.

We cannot, therefore, uncritically accept Cox’s assumption that the marginalised will act as a potential source of transformation “from below.” Furthermore, in the countries which were part of the survey, the marginalised still regard the state as the primary source for development assistance and social services. There was, however, strong support for the claim that the marginalised are inclined to be more politically apathetic and less politically efficacious.

A close reading of Cox’s work and comparison with Ashley, Linklater, Hoffman and Neufeld revealed that they share some tenets with CCT. However, they cannot be grouped with Cox in a school of critical thought because their intellectual debt is mainly located in the work of Habermas and the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, while CCT is influenced by a variety of sources (cf. Braudel, Carr, Gramsci, Khaldun, Marx, Sorel and Vico). This is an important and essential distinction to make because the empirical results of the survey data analysis validate Cox’s focus on the mutual influence between social forces, forms of state and world orders. It is, therefore, more accurate to regard CCT as a “critical realist” theory of International Relations (cf. Richard Falk, 1997).

It is recommended that, in a world order which is characterised by increasing inequality and the outward orientated form of state, public policy practitioners in developing states must reconsider the standard TINA (There is no Alternative) response to the critics of the openness principle. A more balanced approach to addressing inequality and poverty, which requires an outward/inward policy orientation is essential. What is needed, is a form of state which creates opportunities for the integrated but protects and assists those who are marginalised. This essential inward orientation remains one of the state’s primary responsibilities, even in a post-Westphalian world where there are other centres of authority.
Tydens die laatste twee dekades van die twintigste eeu het die wêreld ekonomiese orde deur ‘n verandering gegaan. Hierdie verandering is gekenmerk deur ‘n verskuiwing vanaf die “Keynesiaanse kompromis” idee, na die idee of beginsel van meer oopheid en ‘n hersiening van die rol van die staat in makroekonomiese beleidsformulerings. Gevolglik, en om die doelwit van globale mededingendheid te bereik, het die state meer “uitwaartsgeorienteerd” geword. Die laatste twintig jaar is ook gekenmerk deur ‘n toename in ongelykheid binne en tussen state. Hierdie ongelykheid het die impak van ekonomiese groei op armoede baie verminder. Die kritici van die “oopheid” beginsel wys daarop dat die beleid van ontwikkelende state meer na binne gerig moet word ten einde te verseker dat ekonomiese oopheid meer direk hydra tot die vermindering van armoede en ongelykheid.

In die Suider-Afrikaanse streek kom die ongelykheidsprobleem (spesifiek binne state) algemeen voor. Die Kritiese Teorie van Robert W Cox (CKT, Coxiaanse Kritiese Teorie) doen aan die hand dat een van die maniere waarvolgens toenemende vlakke van ongelykheid waargeneem en geanaliseer kan word, is om te bepaal wat die verhouding is tussen mense en die dynamika (via die nasionale ekonomie) van die hedendaagse wêreld ekonomiese orde. Is hulle gemarginaliseer, in ‘n onsekere posisie, of geïntegreer? Daarby, is dit ‘n aanname van Cox dat die gemarginaliseerdes en sosiale mag is wat “van onder af” verandering sou kon teweegbring. Voortvloeiend uit hierdie aanname, kan ‘n aantal beweringe oor die gemarginaliseerdes afgelei word uit CKT: hulle is geneig tot politieke protes, hulle is ontevrede met hul land se politiek-ekonomiese stelsel, hulle is polities apaties, hulle is geneig tot lae vlakke van politieke doeltreffendheid, hulle het hul “rug gedraai op die staat” en behoort aan selfhelp-organisasies, hulle is meer geneig om deel te neem aan burgerlike samelewing aktiwiteite en hulle staan krities teenoor neoliberale ekonomiese beleidsrigtings.

Die primêre empiriese vraag wat die studie ondersoek is om te bepaal of die houdings wat Cox toeskryf aan die gemarginaliseerdes akkuraat is. Dit word gedoen deur ‘n breedvoerige uiteensetting van sy verklarings, sy uiteenstelling van sy verklaarings en ‘n deeglike konseptualisering/operasionalisering van die drie ekonomiese kategorieë (gemarginaliseer, onsekere, geïntegreer). Die fokus-area is Suider-Afrika. Die oorgrote meerderheid mense in die streek behoort tot die gemarginaliseerde en onsekere komponente van Cox se ekonomiese hierargie. Hulle trek min of geen ekonomiese voordeel uit meer “oopheid” en uitwaartsgeorienteerde staatsvorme nie. Die vraag is of hulle gemobiliseer kan word in ‘n “teen-hegemoniese sosiale beweging” (soo Cox in die vooruitsig stel) en hoe hulle die rol van die staat beskou.

Die tweede vraag is teoreties van aard en is gerig op ‘n evaluerende van die bruikbaarheid en sterk punte van Cox se verklaarings, in vergelyking met ander benaderings wat of (1) die staat ignoreer as ‘n vlak van analyse, (2) die staat beskou as die belangrikste aktewi in die internasionale stelsel, (3) die staat “omseil” omdat hulle die ondergang daarvan voorspel in ‘n toekomsstige post-soewereine wêreld. Ek argumenteer dat dit verkeerd is om Cox se benadering te associeer met die bydraes van Richard Ashley, Mark Hoffman, Andrew Linklater en Mark Neufeld, en
om hulle saam te voeg binne ‘n Kritiese Teorie van Internasionale Betrekkinge
denksoor. Twee belangrike verskille tussen Cox en die ander bydraes is sy
inkorporering van die staat in ‘n buigsaam, veelvoudige vlak-van-analise raamwerk en
sy vindingryke samevoeging van ‘n diverse aantal bronne.

Die teoretiese vraag is ondersoek deur middel van ‘n uitgebreide literatuuroorsig van
Cox se belangrikste publikasies in Engels en ‘n verteenwoordigende oorsig van
Ashley, Hoffman, Linklater en Neufeld se bydraes. Die evaluering van Cox fokus op
die ontwikkeling van sy denke, die identifisering van diegene wat hom beïnvloed het,
de en die kennisleer en ontologie van sy kern-teoretiese raamwerk. Die empiriese vraag
is nagevors deur die analyse van ‘n verteenwoordigende nasionale opname in sewe
Suider-Afrikaanse state (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibië, Suid-Afrika, Zambie
en Zimbabwe). Die opname is onderneem deur ‘n navorsingkonsortium van die

Aangaande Cox se teoretiese verwagtinge van die gemarginaliseerderdes, het die
empiriese analyse van die Suider-Afrikaanse data-stel bevind dat hulle politieke protes
potensiaal laer is as die van die geïntegreerdes, dat hulle minder deelneem aan die
diwets en ‘n minder aktiewe rol speel in die burgerlike samelewings, dat hulle nie
geneig is om aan selfhelp-organisasies te behoort nie, dat hulle geneig is om die staat
als ietwat meer legitiem te beskou as die geïntegreerdes, dat hulle ekonomiese waardes
nie veralgemeen kan word as onsimplistiek tot mark-georiënteerde beleidsopsies nie,
en dat die meerderheid (betekenisvol meer as die geïntegreerdes) die staat beskou as
die belangrikste verskaffer van sosiale dienste. Die gemarginaliseerderdes is meer
verdraagsaam ten opsigte van outorriere politieke alternatiewe, maar is nie
betekenisvol meer ontevrede (relatief gesproke) met die ekonomie as die ander groepe
nie.

Ons kan dus nie Cox se aannames van die gemarginaliseerderdes as ‘n moontlike bron vir
verandering “van onder af” sal optree, onkrities aanvaar nie. Daarby beskou die
gemarginaliseerderdes, in die lande wat deel was van die opname, steeds die staat as die
primêre bron vir ontwikkelingshulp en sosiale dienste. Daar was egter beduidende
ondersteuning vir die bewering dat hulle meer geneig is tot politieke apatie en
politieke ondertreffendheid.

Die bestudering van Cox se benadering en die vergelyking daarvan met Ashley,
Linklater, Hoffman en Neufeld, toon aan dat dié vier skrywers sekere beginsels met
CKT deel. Nietemin, kan hulle nie saam met Cox in ‘n skool van kritise teorie
gevoeg word nie, omdat hulle intellektuele inspirasie uit Habermas en die Frankfurt
Skool van Kritiese Teorie geput word. Cox, daarenteen, is beïnvloed deur ‘n
Hierdie onderskeid is belangrik en noodsaaklik omdat die empiriese resultate van die
opname data-analise, Cox se focus op die wedersydse invloed tussen sosiale magte,
staatvrede en wêreldorde, ondersteun. Dit is dus meer korrek om CKT te beskou as
’n “krities-realistiese” teorie van Internasionale Betrekkinge (bv. Richard Falk, 1997).

Die studie beveel aan dat, in ‘n wêreld wat gekenmerk word deur toenemende
ongelykheid en die voorkoms van die uitwaarts-georiënteerde staat, openbare
beleidmakers die standaard DIGA (Daar is geen Alternatief) antwoord, in reaksie op
diegene wat die “oopheid” beginsel kritiseer, in heroorweging moet neem. ‘n Meer
Ewewigtige benadering tot die aanspreek van ongelykheid en armoede is noodsaaklik, en dit vereis 'n uitwaarts/binnewaartse beleidsherorientering. Wat benodig word is 'n staatsvorm wat geleenthede skep vir die geïntegreerdes maar wat ook die gemarginaliseerdes help en beskerm. Selfs in 'n post-Westphaliaanse wêreld waar daar ander magsentra voorkom, bly hierdie noodsaaklike binnewaartse orientasie een van die staat se primêre verantwoordelikhede.
This dissertation is dedicated to my son, Jean-Louis Leysens and to my parents, Mariette van der Goten and Jean Leysens.
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- The responsibility for the final product is, of course, entirely mine.
# Contents

Chapter 1  Aim, Scope and Method  1

1.1 Research Focus  1
1.2 Research Domain and Aim  6
1.3 Research Questions  14
  1.3.1 Main Claim  19
  1.3.2 Subsidiary Claims  19
  1.3.3 Theoretical Claim  19
1.4 Methodology  21
1.5 Contribution, Limitations and Values  23
1.6 Chapter Outline  24

Chapter 2  The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School  28

2.1 Introduction  28
2.2 Origins and History of the Frankfurt School  28
2.3 Epistemology  37
2.4 Materialist Social Theory  39
2.5 Critique of Positivism  40
2.6 A Critical Theory of Society  45
2.7 Summation  47

Chapter 3  Critical Theory in International Relations  52

3.1 Introduction  52
3.2 Andrew Linklater  56
3.3 Richard Ashley  64
3.4 Mark Hoffman  73
3.5 Mark Neufeld  80
3.6 Summation  91
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 4</th>
<th>The Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox: Tracing Influences and Early Developments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Early Context and Influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>The International Labour Organisation Phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Academia: Developing a Historical Mode of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Summation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 5</th>
<th>The Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox: Core Theoretical Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Problem-solving and Critical Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>The Method of Historicism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Historical Materialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Historical Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Applying Hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>World Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>Modes of Social Relations of Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Towards a Conceptualisation of the Marginalised, Precarious and Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>Summation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 6</th>
<th>The Southern African Barometer (1999-2000): The MPI Index, Regime and Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>The Marginalised, Precarious and Integrated: Restatement of Main Claim and Subsidiary Claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Construction of the MPI Index and Selection of Questionnaire Items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>The MPI Index, Regime and Legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Summation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>The MPI Index and Political Discussion/Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>The MPI Index, Political Participation and Civil Society Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>The MPI Index and Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>The MPI Index, Political Competence and Voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Summation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 8</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Main Empirical Findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.1</td>
<td>Summation of Main Empirical Findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Theoretical Findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Future Research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bibliography |

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables and Figures

Table 6.1 Correlation Matrix for Cox Employment Status, Occupation, Education and Income 193
Table 6.2 Factor Matrix for Cox Occupation, Employment Status Education and Income 194
Table 6.3 Total Variance Explained by Common Factor 194
Table 6.4 Reliability Analysis for Cox Occupation, Employment Status Education and Income 194
Table 6.5 Factor Matrix for Cox Occupation Employment Status and Education 195
Table 6.6 Total Variance Explained by Common Factor 196
Table 6.7 Reliability Analysis for Cox Occupation, Employment Status and Education 196
Table 6.8 The Marginalised, Precarious and Integrated in selected Southern African States 197
Table 6.9 The MPI Index and Rejection of Non-Democratic Alternatives 200
Table 6.10 The MPI Index and Attitudes to Anti-Democratic Actions 202
Table 6.11 The MPI Index and Behavioural Defence of Democracy 204
Table 6.12 The MPI Index and Commitment to Democracy 206
Table 6.13 The MPI Index and Governmental Legitimacy 210
Table 6.14 The MPI Index and Inclination to Disobey 211
Table 7.1 The MPI Index and Political Discussion 223
Table 7.2 The MPI Index and Political Interest 224
Table 7.3 The MPI Index and Political Participation 228
Table 7.4 The MPI Index and Political Protest 229
Table 7.5 The MPI Index and Civil Society Participation 230
Table 7.6 The MPI Index and Attendance of Self-help Associations 231
Table 7.7 The MPI Index and Economic Values 235
Table 7.8 The MPI Index and Provision of Social Services 238
Table 7.9 The MPI Index and Support for Economic Reform 241
Table 7.10 The MPI Index and Individual Relative Deprivation 243
Table 7.11 The MPI Index and Government Economic Performance 245
Table 7.12 The MPI Index and Political Competence 247
Table 7.13 The MPI Index and Voting Efficacy 248

Figure 1 Reciprocal Relationships of Dimensions in a Mode of Social Relations of Production 151

Appendixes

Appendix A Southern African Barometer: Sample Design Protocol
Appendix B Southern African Barometer (I): Questionnaire (Zambia)
Chapter 1
Aim, Scope and Method

1.1 Research Focus

During the last two decades of the 20th century a significant change to the underlying principle of the world economy has been brought about. At the Bretton Woods conference (held in New Hampshire, 1944) the soon to be victorious allies agreed that the re-occurrence of the protectionist trade policies and speculative capital flows which characterised the 1930s, had to be avoided in the post-war economic order. The principle on which the new order would be based was the Keynesian compromise or “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie, 1982). At the core of the Bretton Woods system was the goal to create an open international trade system coupled to stable and fully convertible currencies. However, this openness at the international level was linked to the acceptance of state autonomy over macroeconomic and industrial policy. It was agreed that the collective responsibility of the state and the individually driven needs of the market would have to be balanced.

In practice this meant that “free” trade at the international level would be “embedded” in the national priorities of individual states. These included full employment strategies and the establishment of appropriate social safety nets to accommodate the unemployed, as well as a degree of trade protectionism to enable infant industries to become competitive. It was also accepted that, during economic downturns states could use interest rates to make access to credit easier and that running moderate fiscal deficits was sometimes necessary as a measure to “kick-start” the economy. The regulation of capital flows was an accepted practice in order to maintain stable exchange rates and to prevent the situation where financial speculation becomes the “whirlpool” and enterprise the bubbles on top (Elliott, 2002).
The institutional pillars (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) that were created for the purposes of regulating the Bretton Woods order are still with us (GATT is now the World Trade Organisation) but the principle (idea) of embedded liberalism is not. Instead, and particularly since the demise of the gold/dollar fixed exchange rate system in 1971, the world economic order has gradually moved to embrace a new idea, the principle of which is deregulation and “openness”. This process has affected the balance between the state and market which underpinned the Bretton Woods system. States have become “outward orientated” in the sense that their policies are geared to meet the challenges of the global market. Cox (1987) talks about the “internationalisation of the state” and calls this the “hyperliberal” form. Although the idea and its practical consequences have drawn much criticism, it has also grown to be widely accepted. This is very much evident in the TINA (There Is No Alternative) reaction which state policy makers often proffer in defense of policies which are usually accompanied by substantial short-term social costs.

In addition to the maintenance of an open international trade system, the idea of openness also requires states to implement a number of policies which have come to be known as the “Washington consensus” and have become part and parcel of the prescriptions for developing states who apply for IMF loans. They have become a prerequisite for the twin goals of economic growth and competitiveness. The most important components of the neoliberal policy prescriptions are the deregulation of financial markets (this requires the eradication of capital and exchange controls), the privatisation of state assets (for example, by the establishment of public-private partnerships), the deregulation of the labour market and “sound” monetary and fiscal policies. The latter requires of states to cut spending in order to reduce the budget deficit and to restrict the supply of money (by raising interest rates) as a measure to reduce inflation (Cornia and Court, 2001:5; Galbraith, 2002:24 and World Development Report, 2001:49).

It is important to recognise that the advocates of the neoliberal approach to growth, while insisting that the state should abrogate some of its functions to the market, do acknowledge the importance of effective state institutional capacity to ensure a “strong
rule of law”, “absence of corruption”, implement domestic policies to cope with “adverse shocks” and “guarantee minority rights and provide opportunities to resolve conflicts” (World Development Report, 2001:50). In other words, the enhancement of state capacity to address these issues is essential to ensure that markets can function efficiently to ensure growth. But what have the results been of the shift to greater openness and the reduction of the role of the state in certain policy areas?

Recent studies on the link between economic growth, poverty and inequality have found that the effect of increased economic growth on the reduction of poverty is very much dependent on the level of inequality which prevails at the time. The World Development Report (2001:35) point out that “While economic growth is systematically associated with poverty reduction, the rate at which growth translates into lower poverty depends on the initial level of inequality in the distribution of income and how that distribution changes over time.” Cornia and Court (2001:1, 5), in a study for the United Nations University’s World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER), argue that the neoliberal approach’s emphasis on increasing economic growth rates negates the fact that there is a link between growth and inequality and one of their findings is that: “…the persistence of inequality at high levels or its further rise have made it much more difficult to reduce poverty. The higher the level of inequality, the less impact economic growth has in reducing poverty – for any rate of economic growth.”

Significantly, comparative research on inequality shows that levels of inequality within states have increased over the last twenty years. This coincides with the period during which states have gradually implemented policies centred around the principle of openness. The results of the UNU/WIDER paper are based on the development and analysis of a new data base on inequality which attenuates the Deininger and Squire World Bank data set. This data base, the World Income Inequality Database (WIID), indicates generally declining levels of income inequality for the period 1950 to early
1970s. However, out of seventy-three sample states for which “high-quality” data was available in the WIID database, forty-eight showed an increase in inequality during the last two decades. Only 9 states experienced a decline in inequality, while inequality levels remained constant in sixteen (Cornia and Court, 2001:5-9).

The World Bank’s *World Development Report* (2001:51) finds that the income difference between rich and poor states has increased significantly over the last forty years and attributes this to the lack of economic growth in the poor states. The phenomenon of increasing divergence in income between states is illustrated by the fact that the 1960 per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the twenty wealthiest states was eighteen times more than that of the twenty poorest states. In 1995, the equivalent number had increased to thirty-seven. On income inequality within states, the report is somewhat vague and finds that trends are “less pronounced” and that “in some countries inequality has increased, while in others it has fallen.” These findings were extrapolated from the Deininger and Squire database. However, using the Theil T statistic, it is acknowledged that “there have been some increases” in global inequality between individuals during the past decades.

Reporting on the work of the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) which applies the Theil T Statistic to the United Nations International Development Organisation’s (UNIDO) industrial data set, Galbraith (2002:22) finds that “…when the global trend is isolated, we find that in the last two decades, inequality has increased throughout the world in a pattern that cuts across the effect of national income changes” and significantly “During the decades that happen to coincide with the rise of neoliberal ideology, with the breakdown of national sovereignties, and with the end of Keynesian policies in the global debt crisis of the early 1980s, inequality rose worldwide” (own italics).
Galbraith (2002:23-24) and Cornia and Court (17-22) conclude that the causes of increasing inequality can only partially be explained by technological changes and trade liberalisation. In fact, the impact of the latter is regarded as being small. Instead they point to the (anti-inflationary) reduction of budget deficits which is accompanied by decreasing public redistributionist spending on the poor, the deregulation of labour markets, anti-progressive taxation systems and the deregulation of the domestic and global financial systems. This deregulation has led to an increase in capital’s share of income and a decrease of labour’s share (in the form of wages). Finally, although greater openness can be “helpful” it is the “…scope and speed of the liberalization approach, often in the absence of adequate regulatory capacity” which “have had a negative impact on distribution” (Cornia and Court, 2002:22).

From the background sketched above, indications are that the principle of openness has, in the short and medium term led to a worldwide increase in inequality and poverty. The World Bank’s (1990) prediction that the numbers of the poor would be reduced from 1.125 million to 825 million between 1985 and 2000 has not been realised. Current estimates are that the total amount of people living in poverty (existing on less than $1 per day) is slightly above 1200 million.

Disparities in income are particularly prevalent in southern Africa where the marginalised form a large proportion of the regional population: Botswana (59%), Lesotho (83%), Malawi (78%), Namibia (67%), South Africa (48%), Zambia (59%) and Zimbabwe (57%) (See Chapter 6). It is estimated that, on average, approximately half of the regional population subsists on less that 1$ per day. The Gini coefficients for these states are consistently high, reflecting serious disparities in the distribution of income: Botswana (.54), Lesotho (.56), Malawi (.62), Namibia (N/A), South Africa (.58), Zambia (.46) and Zimbabwe (.63). Put differently, the income/consumption of the richest 20% (1987-1998) in Botswana is 59% (compared to 4% for the poorest 20%). Comparative figures for other southern African states are, respectively; Lesotho (60% and 3%), South Africa (65% and 3%), Zambia (55% and 4%) and Zimbabwe (62% and 4%) (The IGD guide to the Southern African Development Community, 2001:36-37, 58-100).
Although the region has had an average annual growth rate of 1.7% (1994-1998) (6%-7% is required to halve poverty by 2015) the benefits of this growth have gone to workers in the formal sector. Mozamique, which saw high growth rates (an average of 6.3% per year) showed only small improvements in basic social indicators such as health and education. Government initiatives, started in 1999, have led to a 6% increase in health care units and 21% increase in secondary school facilities but 70% of the population still live below the national poverty line. Clearly, greater openness and de-regulation, which has weakened state capacity, has not resulted in poverty reduction (The IGD guide to the Southern African Development Community, 2001:39-40).

This requires a rethink about the balance between the state and the market and what the policy priorities of a development orientated state should be. The vast majority of people in the southern African region belong to the marginalised and precarious components of the economic hierarchy. They are not integrated in the current global economy and derive no significant material benefits from it. The world economic order and its outward-orientated states have resulted in increasing inequality, concentration of wealth and a de-prioritisation of national development goals. In the interests of greater inclusiveness and equity, this study hopes to contribute to a better understanding of the marginalised in southern Africa. Can they be mobilised, as part of a counter-hegemonic social movement to bring about transformation and how do they view the role of the state? This is an important question which must be investigated, if those who must strategise towards change are to work with a realistic view of the limits of the possible.

1.2 Research Domain and Aim

The contemporary hegemonic approach of neoliberalism and the accompanying principle of openness has been translated into policy practices which have been aimed at de-regulation and the transformation to a form of state which is market friendly, outward-orientated and willing to relinquish certain areas of the public sphere to the private sector. The assumption underlying this approach is that politics and power are irrational.
considerations which intervene with the efficiency requirement of the market. The growth imperative dominates thinking on poverty reduction and individual self-interest is deemed to, ultimately, contribute to the general well-being of the whole.

There is another approach to the analysis of the questions generated in political economy. Neorealism (cf. Waltz, 1979) regards states as unitary actors who interact with one another in an anarchic system (the absence of central authority). The dynamics of self-interest in the market are used to also explain the behaviour of rational power maximising states. But although neorealism (like neoliberalism), incorporates the state and state power as its unit of analysis, it does not concern itself with the social (sub-national) forces which help shape the form of state and influence its policies (cf. Baldwin, 1993). Finally, most Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches (cf. Wallerstein, 1979, Caporaso and Levine, 1995) view states as the captives of the interests of global capitalism (and its national variants) with little autonomy to re-direct policy to the needs of the poor and greater equity. The Critical Theory of Robert W Cox (CCT), however, provides us with a change orientated alternative explanatory framework (incorporating the subnational, state and world order levels) which is concerned with the issue of global equity.

The work of Cox has, over the years, achieved widespread recognition in the field of Global Political Economy (GPE). Admittedly, this recognition has initially been more prevalent among European, than among North American scholars (with the notable exceptions of Stephen Gill, Mark Hoffman, James Mittelman, and Mark Neufeld). Nevertheless, the importance of his work is illustrated by the fact that he is listed as one of 50 key thinkers in International Relations (IR) (Griffiths, 1999); the volume of essays in his honour (Gill and Mittelman, 1997); and the conversations between himself, Manuel Castells and Immanuel Wallerstein in the "The Millennium Symposium" of New Political Economy. In the latter publication the editors have this to say about their selection of Cox, Castells and Wallerstein: "Our choice was restricted, for there are not
many internationally reputed and theoretically inclined social scientists today who have
the boldness of vision, the appetite for transdisciplinary thought and the intellectual
fortitude necessary for sustained theoretical coherence of the kind that characterised the
foundational work of our 19th century forebears” (New Political Economy, 1999:379).

The study of International Political Economy (IPE) as a field in its own right can,
arguably, be dated to Susan Strange’s seminal article in 1970, “International Economics
and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect.” Strange argued the case for a
crossing of the divide between economics and politics. This division was the result of the
specialisation and compartmentalisation of disciplines in the social sciences. Subsequent
to the 1973 oil crisis and the ensuing world economic decline, others followed in her
footsteps (see for instance, Keohane and Nye, 1971, Keohane and Nye, 1977, Knorr,
1975, and Morse, 1976). The terminology (GPE) which is used in this dissertation is
taken from Cox (1999:11-12) who draws on an article by Madeuf and Michalet. In the
article they distinguish between flows of products, money and investment between states
(the international economy) and integrated production which takes place simultaneously
in a number of different states (the world or global economy).

In contemporary terms “global economy” refers to the two driving forces behind
economic globalisation, viz. the organisation of production and finance on a level which
transcends the traditional boundaries between states. Existing together with the global
economy, is the traditional international economy. For instance, inter-state trade and
those sections of the domestic economy which continue to function disconnected from
the global economy. Here one would find manufacturers who produce for local markets,
as well as subsistence producers in the rural areas of developing states. Nevertheless,
although disconnected, they are still affected and constrained by the global economy.
Together these two make up what Cox (1999:12) refers to as the “world economy.”
However, the dynamics of economic globalisation influence the relations between
social forces (defined in terms of modes of social relations of production), forms of state and international institutions. These dynamics and whether they result in resistance to the constraints imposed by globalisation, or adaptation and accommodation lie within the sphere of global political economy (GPE).

The strength of Cox’s explanatory framework lies in its holistic view, which incorporates the dynamic interaction and mutual influence between three levels of analysis: social forces, forms of state, and world orders. It is a theory which attempts to account for change/transformation and it identifies social forces as a catalyst for change in forms of state, and world order. In his later work, Cox also includes the regional level as an important focus for analysis, as well as international organisations. Throughout, he consistently emphasises the importance of change from the “bottom-up” which he hypothesises will emanate from those social forces who are “excluded” from the global economy.

The development of Cox’s thinking and his core theoretical framework is discussed in much detail below. As a run up to the research problem, a brief introduction of some of the salient elements are offered to provide some initial contextualisation and motivation. The reasons for proposing Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) as an explanatory framework lie in its distinguishing features; it is flexible, change-orientated or “transformative”, it has a dynamic methodology, and is reflective. The framework offers the analyst various points of entry which do not interact deterministically. These are: social forces related to production, the state, and the prevailing world order. To these we could add, as Cox (1999) himself suggests, a regional point of entry.

Cox (1981, 1983, 1987) aims to address the agent-structure problem which both neorealism and world systems theory fail to overcome. In the case of neorealism (Waltz, 1979) the structure of the system is defined in terms of the characteristics of its agents (states), in the case of world systems theory (Wallerstein, 1979) the action of the agents
(states and classes) are derived from the characteristics of the (capitalist) world economy. Cox’s framework improves on both, in that agents (social forces) are not viewed as “captives” of structures. Structures constrain the actions of agents, but they can also be changed or manipulated by agents.

By focusing on the nature of the relations of social forces (labour, capital and the state) to production, CCT emphasises the importance of production in society: “Production creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the ways in which human efforts are combined in productive processes affect all other aspects of social life” (Cox, 1987:1). Production, however, is not ontologically viewed in a deterministic manner, even though it can enhance state power. The relationship is one of reciprocity: “It has no historical precedence, indeed, the principal structures of production have been, if not actually created by the state, at least encouraged and sustained by the state” (Cox, 1987:5). In contemporary terms and also foreseen by Cox (1981, 1987), the state’s autonomy over “what is produced, by whom, where and by what means” (Strange, 1987) has been much reduced by the “internationalisation of production” (today, the globalisation of production). Contrary to Marxism, however, CCT does not predict the demise of the state. Instead, it focuses on the development of various state forms (for instance, bipartism, tripartism and state corporatism) in response to changes in the way social forces relate to production, and in response to changing world orders. Forms of state, in turn, influence production modes and social forces, as well as world orders.

In sum, and related to the focus of this study’s empirical research problem, social forces related to production are viewed as important agents of change. This is where the explanatory potential in Cox’s approach is located. Historical structures and hegemony (both at state and world order level) are created by agents and can be changed by them. The flexibility of this approach lies in the combination of the synchronic (problem-solving theory) and diachronic method for studying change in GPE. The synchronic approach can best be described as a “snapshot” of reality at a given moment in time. It attempts to give a contextual and in-depth description and explanation of a social phenomenon. Once this exercise has been undertaken, however, the diachronic approach
leads the analyst to focus on change and the potential for change within a particular historical structure: “This diachronic moment seeks out the contradictions and conflicts inherent in a social structure and contemplates the characteristics of emerging social forces (own italics) and the nature and extent of structural change that is feasible (own italics)” (Sinclair, 1996:8).

Finally, historical structures are described by Cox in terms of three “forces” which dynamically interact in a non-deterministic manner. Actors can either accommodate themselves to these forces or resist. They are: ideas, institutions and material capabilities. How these forces are configured is not a matter of abstraction but is determined by a study of the particular historical phase within which they are located. Secondly, it also requires a focus on tensions which can lead to the emergence of “rival structures.” Ideas are divided by Cox into intersubjective meanings (a shared understanding about, for instance, the nature of the state) and different perceptions by social groups about the “legitimacy of prevailing power relations” which he terms “collective images of social order.”

Institutions are used to maintain a specific order. They reflect power relations and promote “collective images” which are in tandem with these power relations. Material capabilities include technology, wealth, industries, armaments, and the capacity to build organisations (Cox, 1981:136-137). It is within historical structures that the three levels (social forces related to production, forms of state and world orders) can be viewed (explained) in terms of the configuration between ideas, institutions and material capabilities. The manner in which ideas, material capabilities and institutions relate to one another helps to explain whether a world order is hegemonic or whether it is in hegemonic decline and vulnerable to a counter-hegemonic challenge.

The above, brief introduction to CCT, forms the background for the empirical part of the study’s research problem. I now want to introduce a second, more theoretical dimension. This dimension is related to the intellectual “locating” of Cox’s approach within IR and GPE. A number of scholars associate Cox’s work with the Frankfurt School of Critical
Theory (CT) and/or with Jürgen Habermas. At the same time, they also often place Cox in the company of Richard Ashley, Mark Hoffman, Andrew Linklater, and Mark Neufeld as a group of scholars who are “inspired” by or who “draw on” the CT of the Frankfurt School.

A representative sample of authors who make this association in one way or another include Brown (1994), Devetak (1996), George (1989 and 1994), Hoffman (1987), Linklater (1992), Neufeld (1993) and Smith (1995). The following excerpts and observations illustrate the point:

“A number of critical theorists in international relations make at least a partial claim to be Critical Theorists...employing some of these notions in their work. Robert Cox uses Habermasian ideas in his contrast between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ theory, and Andrew Linklater’s approach to critical international theory explicitly employs the notion of knowledge-constituting interests” (Brown, 1994:213).

Devetak (1996) while discussing the role of CT in IR, sets out the assumptions of the Frankfurt School (particularly as related to the work of Max Horkheimer and Habermas) and then goes on to link these to Ashley and Linklater (justifiably) and also to Cox. He refers to “...Cox’s Horkheimer-like distinction between problem-solving and critical theories” and concludes that “The debt to Horkheimer in Cox’s assessment of problem-solving and critical theories is plain to see” (Devetak, 1996:149, 151). He does admit, though, that “Most of the inspiration behind Cox’s analysis...is drawn from Giambattista Vico and Karl Marx.”

In an article on the “third debate” in IR, George (1989:274) notes: “Cox’s emancipatory perspective, derived from Frankfurt School sources (own italics), has been one of the most significant theoretical influences within the third debate.” Later, in an excellent volume which reviews the state of theory in IR, George (1994) discusses the contributions of Ashley, Cox, Linklater, Hoffman and Rengger to CT in IR. In doing so
he obviously assumes that they have something in common. What are the similarities which have led him to group them together? According to him, it is the influence of Habermas, which is most discernible in the work of Ashley (George, 1994:171).

Hoffman (1987) makes the strongest case for linking CT with CCT. He identifies a number of authors who he regards representative of CT in IR; Cox, Ashley and Linklater. Cox is viewed as being the closest to the Frankfurt School. Hoffman (1987:237) qualifies this linkage by stating that Cox “draws implicitly (own italics) on the links between interests and knowledge that are central to the Frankfurt School”, and that Cox’s view on the nature of theory “has important similarities (own italics) with the work of the Frankfurt School.” He also observes that Cox’s work “may owe more” to Vico and Gramsci, than to Horkheimer and Habermas. However, in a footnote (Hoffman, 1987:247, footnote 30) he again “pushes” the connection between Cox and Habermas, when he criticises Kubalkova and Cruickshank (1986) for exaggerating Cox’s position on Habermas. Their comment in this regard (also in a footnote) is worth noting in full:

“Cox...refers to neither of the two generations of the Frankfurt School and in fact mentions Habermas as a theorist irrelevant (own italics) for an understanding of international behaviour” (Kubalkova and Cruickshank, 1986:181, footnote 9).

To this Hoffman (1987:247, footnote 30) replies that Cox does not regard Habermas as “irrelevant for an understanding of international behaviour” but that he criticises him for not taking into account “the implications of different forms of state/civil society relationships.”

Linklater (1992:91) while discussing the merits of the Frankfurt School for a “critical-theoretical point of view” in IR, cites Ashley and Cox as being representative of the critical challenge to neorealism: “When Cox and Ashley struck the first blow for critical theory in the early 1980s, they challenged the contention that knowledge should be constituted solely by a ‘technical interest’ in control. They argued that the quest for
knowledge should be grounded in an emancipatory interest in freeing human beings from unnecessary constraints.” He then continues, “The details of the argument were set out by Habermas...”, and thereby establishes the link between Cox and Habermas.

Lastly, we can take note of the following comments by Smith (1995) in an (otherwise) excellent overview of the development of theory in IR. Under the heading of “The Post-Positivist Debate”, Smith (1995:24) identifies a number of challengers to the “realist dominance of international theory.” One such challenge, he observes, comes from critical theory (as represented by Cox, Hoffman and Linklater):

“For critical theorists, knowledge of the world is always to be understood within a context of interests, following on from the pioneering work of the Frankfurt School, most notably Jurgen (sic) Habermas” (Smith, 1995:24).

“For critical theorists, problem-solving positivism needs to be replaced by a critical theory...” (Smith, 1995:24).

These quotations, as well as the heading “post-positivism” under which they appear, are revealing for a two reasons. First, because it is a perpetuation of an inaccurate placing of Cox, by eminent scholars which continues to this day (with the notable exceptions of Falk, 1997, Mittelman, 1998 and Wyn Jones, 2001). Secondly, they encapsulate the three issues which seem to be prone to a misinterpretation of Cox’s work and which are not accurate reflections of his thinking on realism, positivism, and the Frankfurt School.

1.3 Research Questions

The study consists of two main research questions, one empirical, the other theoretical. The empirical research question stems for Cox’s core theoretical framework which, although strong on holistic grounds and as a heuristic model for generating questions about future world orders and explaining them (the diachronic dimension), has never
been utilised to ask questions whose answers would provide us with a synchronic "snapshot" of contemporary social forces. Falk (1997:53) encapsulates the "bottom-up" aspect when he states:

"...critical realism in a period of historical transition has become for Cox not only a tool for understanding and interpretation, but also as a source of guidance for action, not in an immediate or concrete sense, but as an orientation that could achieve specificity in concrete settings of struggle between social forces aligned to the global market and those connected with more limited human communities of local, national and regional scope. Cox sees the potential for the transformation of forms of state and world orders as lying within these "more limited human communities."

The importance of social forces is consistently emphasised in Cox's work. In one of his more recent articles, he identifies three categories according to which people are related to the contemporary GPE:

- Those who are *integrated*. They are the dominant class who are in managerial positions (state and civil society) and decide "what is produced, where and by whom."
- Those who find themselves in a *precarious* position. These are workers who can easily be replaced because of skills levels, demand for a particular product, and the ability of capital to relocate production to where cheap and flexible labour regimes exist.
- Those who are *excluded or marginalised* from global production. They include people who are not formally employed in sectors of the economy integrated into global production. For instance, vendors, casual labour, peasants and those who have no means of permanent income whatsoever (Cox, 1999:9).
In terms of these three categories the focus is on the transformative potential of the “outsiders”:

- “...a very large part of the world’s population in the poorest areas remains marginal to the world economy, having no employment or income, or the purchasing power derived from it. A major problem for international capital in its aspiration for hegemony is how to neutralize the effect of this marginalization of perhaps one-third of the world’s population so as to prevent its poverty from fueling revolt” (Cox, 1981:113).

- “Possibly the potential for revolt arising out of the social relations in the production process is greater in the Third World than in the advanced capitalist countries” (Cox, 1987:387).

- “...whole regions of Africa belong to the bottom level...” (Cox, 1996c:26-27).

- The marginalised “...are a continuing source of anomic and potentially concerted violence” (Cox, 1997a:248).

- The results of globalisation friendly macroeconomic policies have brought about a state of affairs which can result in “open revolt” or a “passive withdrawal of obedience” (Cox, 1997b:248).

- “If we are to assume that power is grounded in human communities, and if we take a ‘bottom-up’ perspective on world order, then we need to ask about the condition of public affinity or comfort with the political authorities (own italics) of the entities that formally constitute world order – the states and multilateral institutions and processes. That affinity seems to range from the tenuous to the hostile throughout the world” (Cox, 2000:33).

It is clear that Cox foresees the developing world (and Africa) as being particularly conducive to transformation from below. Regarding Africa, he relies on the work of Fantu Cheru to generate predictions on the status of the marginalised. Citing Cheru’s
(1989) notion of a “silent revolution” in Africa, he concludes that the marginalised are “...dropping out of the world market, and the formal structures of national economies, to seek their survival in the informal sector” (Cox, 1992e:527-529). He also refers to and quotes Cheru’s “exit-option” in several other publications (cf. Cox, 1993c and 1999). For example, “One finds [in Africa] the striving of countless individuals and collectives towards new types of self-organization – perhaps one should say self-defense – aimed in one way or another at operating outside the bureaucratic centralism of the neocolonial state.” This phenomenon is seen as indicating a loss of state legitimacy. Furthermore, Cox (1993c:41) notes that there is a “...spreading attitude (own italics) that states and governments are anti-people, that they are merely transmission belts for dominant forces in the global political economy, and that the only salvation lies in local self-help and severance of links to formal authorities.”

Cox regards this potential challenge (from the marginalised) as a world of “mystery”: “The marginalized and excluded remain a world of mystery because they do not seem to participate in the ‘rationality’ of the centre” (Cox, 1997b:247). They remain a mystery, it is contended in this study, because for all its emphasis on the importance of social forces related to production as a source of contradictions in society, as well as possible transformation, Cox never investigated the individual (aggregated) motives of those who he sees as a (potential) threat to the established order. His theory, in the context of southern Africa, argues that the major problem facing states in the region is to be found in the exclusion of the marginalised. But this is a question which needs to be investigated. Does this vast underclass have the potential to act as a force for the transformation of state forms and how do they view the state? To what extent they have, remains an open question. It is this question which the study proposes to answer through the data base analysis of a recent survey which was undertaken in seven southern African states.

Such an exercise can be accommodated within the method and epistemology of CCT. This point will be illustrated and become clear in the discussion which follows in Chapters 4 and 5. But some motivation needs to be provided at this point. Although Cox’s focus has been on the diachronic rather than on the synchronic dimension, the
possibility of combining the two was never denied by him.\(^7\) This is stated in no uncertain terms in the *New Political Economy* conversation with Randall Germain. Cox emphasises the importance of focusing on something specific by isolating it temporarily. Thereafter one has to connect it with other aspects that are related to it. This requires a "pulling back" to critically ascertain how the specific relates to the whole and whether it helps one to understand the dynamics of transformation. The manner in which this may be attempted has been misunderstood by readers of his work:

"This problem brings us to the distinction I have made between problem-solving and critical theory. *Some people have read this to mean that I am against problem-solving theory, which was not all my point* (own italics). The important consideration for me is that problem-solving theory is useful within its limits, but that one needs to be aware that, in a period of rather important and significant structural change, these limits are a constraint that prevents you from seeing where you can go and what sorts of problems you are facing" (Cox, 1999b:392-393).

The empirical research question is therefore focused on the "something specific", the component of Cox’s conceptualisation of ideas which deals with the different perceptions by social groups about the “legitimacy of prevailing power relations” and which he calls their “collective images of social order.” The social group which is of particular interest, are the marginalised. But this empirical question is also linked to the theoretical question of whether it is correct to group Cox with Ashley, Hoffman, Linklater and Neufeld into a CT of IR school (see below).

Based on the above background, we are now in a position to list the main claim and subsidiary claims which are made by CCT.
1.3.1 Main claim

- Position in a social mode of production is a predictor of that group's propensity to challenge the political-economic status quo. Those who are marginalised/excluded are more inclined to pose such a challenge.

1.3.2 Subsidiary claims

- Being marginalised correlates with being inclined to political protest (Cox, 1997a:248).
- Being marginalised correlates with being dissatisfied with the political economic system (Cox, 1987:403).
- Being marginalised correlates with increased political apathy (Cox, 1991:207 and Cox, 1992c:527-529, 532-534).
- Being marginalised correlates with decreased political efficacy (Cox, 1991:207).
- Being marginalised correlates with increased civil society participation (“exit option”) (Cox, 1993c:41).

- Being marginalised correlates with negative perceptions of international organisations (Cox, 1999:24-25).

1.3.3 Theoretical Claim

The second, theoretical research question, is anchored in the apparent problem which scholars in IR/GPE encounter when they attempt to “locate” or “place” CCT. This problem arises from the linking of Cox to the CT of the Frankfurt School, and the association of his work with scholars who, on closer inspection, share some
commonalties with CCT but not enough shared intellectual roots to warrant grouping them together with Cox into a “CT school of IR/GPE”. I submit that this is an inaccurate assessment of Cox’s work and argue that his theory is an approach in its own right, with its own (eclectic) points of departure.

One of the major differences between Cox and the four authors with whom he is associated is his incorporation of the state as a unit of analysis and the manner in which this is done. This is also a crucial difference between Cox, the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and Habermas. The argument below will illustrate that Ashley, Linklater and Hoffman anchor their CT of IR in (particularly) Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cox’s critical approach (rooted in various sources) stresses the difference between his conceptualisation of the state and the one used by neoliberalism, neorealism and neo-Marxism. He accepts the continuing importance of the role of the state, even in a changing world order which is beginning to assume “post-Westphalian” characteristics.

The acceptance of the role of the state and the importance which is attached to state forms (shaped by social forces and world orders) is a major point of departure with the other CT of IR authors. Linklater (1990, 1992, 1998), recognises the importance of “inter-state” relations but is more concerned with theorising about the Habermasian notion of “universal moral principles” in order to investigate the potential of extending the international political community and providing a “post-sovereign” account of IR. Ashley’s (1981, 1986) critique of neorealism is inspired by Habermas and sees some “generative potential” in classical realism, but such an endeavour is regarded as futile by Hoffman (1987:240) because it would have to move so far from the central tenets of realism “that it would be a misnomer to speak of it as a critical realist theory of international relations.” For Neufeld (1995), IR should focus on how human emancipation can be attained in the global polis.

This distinction between CCT and the CT of IR authors is not only of academic importance. It is linked to the need to think critically and strategically about forms of state in southern Africa and also about how the marginalised in this region view the role
of the state. Coxian Critical Theory provides the framework which leads us to thinking about "feasible" options for transformation and the role of social forces, forms of state and the contemporary world order.

1.4 Methodology

The inquiry into the research problems relies on a literature review of Cox's work (theoretical) and the analysis of survey data (empirical). The study, therefore has a descriptive and quantitative focus. The survey data was obtained from the Southern African Barometer (SAB) project, which was initiated and coordinated (in 1999) by the Public Opinion Service of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA). Since its inception, I have been involved with this initiative (as an associate researcher), which has now expanded to include other regions in Africa (surveys have been conducted in Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Benin, Mali, Mozambique and Tanzania). This has led to the evolvement of the SAB into the Afrobarometer, jointly coordinated between IDASA, The Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, and Michigan State University (USA).

The primary mission statement of the first SAB includes investigating "under what extent and under what circumstances a supporting environment for representative, multi-party democracy has become established in these southern African states", to "investigate how strong the challenges are which are offered by alternative or parallel sets of ideas and their related institutions" and "to what extent these tentative democracies are hobbled by the hard economic choices expected of them by the international community to restructure their economies (IDASA, 1999:1).

Although essentially an instrument designed to poll the extent of democratic consolidation in southern Africa, the items in the questionnaire (see Appendix B for an example of the Zambian version) cover a wide range of issues that are related to the main and subsidiary claims listed above. For the purposes of this study they are the
questions and constructed indexes which attempt to measure attitudes on state legitimacy, political participation, political efficacy, political interest, political discussion, the state of the economy, personal economic values, economic reform, democracy, participation in civil society and self-help associations.

The seven national research partners which made up the SAB consortium are the University of Botswana, Sechaba Consultants of Lesotho, the Centre for Social Research at the University of Malawi, Research Facilitation Services in Namibia, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Zambia, and the University of Zimbabwe. Nationally representative samples (see Appendix A for an overview of the sample protocol) in the seven southern African states were surveyed over the following period (target sample sizes are given in brackets):

- Botswana: November 1999 (1200)
- Lesotho: March-April 2000 (1200)
- Malawi: December 1999 (1200)
- Namibia: September-October 1999 (1200)
- South Africa: July-August 2000 (2200)
- Zambia: November 1999 (1200)
- Zimbabwe: October-November 1999 (1200)

Based on Cox’s conceptualisation of what it means to be economically marginalised, precarious, or integrated an “economic position” measure was constructed, the MPI (Marginalised, Precarious, Integrated) Index (see Chapters 5 and 6). In his explanation of these three categories, he emphasises four aspects which determine where an individual will be located within them; regularity of income, skills, occupation, and employment status. These economic profile items all appear in the questionnaire (the item
corresponding to skills is education). Based on factor analysis, the index was constructed with the inclusion of occupation, employment status, and education. Correlations and cross tabulations were run between the MPI Index and selected items and indices (see Mattes et al, 2000 and Mattes and Bratton, 2001).

In order to address the theoretical question, a substantive literature review of Cox’s major publications in English was conducted. As a source list, the complete bibliography of Cox’s work until 1995 (provided in Cox with Sinclair, 1996) was used. Publications by Cox after 1995 were sourced from the Social Sciences Citation Index and the ABC of Political Science Abstracts. In the review, I focus on the development of his thinking, his major influences and on the epistemology and ontology of his core theoretical framework. I also refer to his later work on multilateralism and civilisations. The main assumptions of the Frankfurt School of CT are traced, followed by a discussion of a selection of representative work by those authors (Ashley, Linklater, Hoffman and Neufeld) with whom Cox is often associated. The summations at the end of the relevant chapters are drawn together in the conclusion.

1.5 Contribution, Limitations and Values

The major contribution which this study aims to make, lies in its focus on the empirical questions (the synchronic dimension) which are generated by CCT. Such an attempt has not previously been undertaken by adherents of the Coxian approach to GPE, or those who are sympathetic to its assumptions. The second contribution is to the literature on theory in IR/GPE which has been inclined to misinterpret and subsequently, to locate CCT in a school of thought where it does not belong.

While the study tries to provide answers to questions which lie within the synchronic dimension, its explanatory focus is not on the diachronic dimension of CCT. Nevertheless, the context of the world order within which the southern African region is located, emerges from the review and discussion of Cox’s work (particularly his core theoretical framework), as does the form of state in southern Africa (which corresponds
to his conceptualisation of “state corporatism”). There is a further limitation, and that is that the survey instrument was not specifically designed around the empirical research aim of the study. Furthermore, the results of the survey were subject to a one year embargo, in order to give the principal researchers the opportunity to publish their findings.

A diachronic analysis, using Cox’s method of historicism (see Chapters 4 and 5), is beyond the time and space limitations of this dissertation. A detailed account of the historical structure in southern Africa would require a focus, not just on the “collective images” aspect of Cox’s ideas component, but also on intersubjective meanings, institutions and material capabilities. Such an inquiry would begin with an analysis of the configuration of social forces in the southern African region and an investigation of the transborder linkages between them. Having determined and located historically this configuration, each state-society complex (and the region) would have to be placed within the context and dynamics of the contemporary world order. Subsequently, the analysis would have to focus on the nature of hegemony at the world order, regional and state levels. The aim of this study is more modest, it aims to provide a “snapshot” to analysts and practitioners who need to strategise about the potential for the mobilisation of social forces, as well as to policy makers who are in a position to re-orientate state priorities.

1.6 Chapter Outline

In order to address and evaluate the stated assumption of a link between CCT, the Frankfurt School of CT and Habermas as well as the role of the latter in the work of Ashley, Hoffman, Linklater and Neufeld, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the origins and history of the Frankfurt School and its major tenets. Chapter 3 reviews, in turn, the contributions of Linklater, Ashley, Hoffman and Neufeld to a CT of IR. It is aimed at
pointing out how they incorporate the CT of the Frankfurt School in their own work and why they regard Cox as being representative of the “critical turn” in IR. These chapters serve as points of comparative reference in order to determine whether the association of Cox with this school of thought is justifiable.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide a detailed analysis of CCT. Chapter 4 traces the development of Cox’s thinking and in particular identifies those scholars who influenced the development of his core theoretical framework. It also focuses on Cox’s initial use of the positivist method, the need to historically contextualise research and his understanding of change/transformation. Chapter 5 addresses Cox’s core theoretical framework in some detail, concentrating on the assumptions and premises of his epistemology, ontology and the method of historicism. It also covers Cox’s understanding and use of concepts such as hegemony, social forces related to production, historical structures, world order, forms of state, intersubjectivity and modes of social relations of production. The last section of the chapter provides an initial conceptualisation of the marginalised, precarious and integrated economic hierarchy positions and identifies the empirical claims emanating from Cox’s core theoretical framework.

Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the empirical claims through an analysis of the survey data generated by the Southern African Barometer (1999-2000). Chapter 6 begins by re-stating the main components of CCT, linking them to the empirical claims and providing an encapsulation of the reasons why CCT can be used in conjunction with the method of survey research. The next section deals with the construction of the Marginalised, Precarious, Integrated (MPI) Index and the selection of questionnaire items which are related to the empirical claims. The rest of the chapter presents the findings on those claims which are related to regime and legitimacy. Chapter 7 presents the results of the analysis related to political discussion/interest, political participation, economy and political competence.
Chapter 8 starts by restating the empirical and theoretical questions which underlie the core research aims of this study. Next, the results of the analysis of the SAB survey data are brought to bear on the empirical claims. The next section revisits the theoretical claim that a distinction must be made between CCT and those authors who are regarded as representative of CT in IR. It also links the empirical findings to the validity and usefulness of this distinction. The chapter ends with some recommendations for future research.
Endnotes


2 The most common measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient which focuses on income. The value ranges between 0 and 1. One indicates perfect inequality and zero perfect equality. A value of .40 and above is accepted as a high indicator of inequality. Inequality can also include a skewed distribution of assets (for instance, land), as well as unequal access to health and education (Cornia and Court, 2001:6). Galbraith (2002:16-17) uses the Theil T statistic as measure of inequality which focuses on pay inequality in the manufacturing sector. Inequality can be measured at three levels, viz. global inequality which focuses on the comparison of all individuals, international inequality which looks at the differences between states and national inequality (the differences in income within a particular state) (Cornia and Court, 2001:6).

3 The WIID database can be found at the UNU/WIDER website: www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm.

4 For example, the “Amsterdam School”, of which the work of Kees van der Pijl (cf. 1984) is the most representative.


6 I am grateful to Larry Swatuk for suggesting this term to me.

7 The point that positivism (problem-solving theory) and critical theory (of the Coxian variety) can be used in tandem, is made unambiguously by Cox. For instance, “Regularities in human activities may indeed by observed...and thus the positivist approach can be fruitful within defined historical limits” (Cox, 1986:244). In his differentiation between the actor-interactions approach of positivism and the historical structures approach, Cox (1989b:38) indicates that he does not view them in an either/or manner: “The structural approach is not so much an alternative to the actor-interactions approach as a logical priority to it.” Drawing a distinction between the positivist (“incremental change”) approach to the study of international organisations and the “structural-critical” approach, he observes that “...some combination may be appropriate” (Cox, 1997a:xvi-xvii). Finally, Sinclair (1996:6) in a review chapter of Cox’s contribution to IR theory, concludes: “Problem-solving and critical theory are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They may be understood to address different concerns or levels within one overall story.”

8 I am grateful to Pierre du Toit for pointing this out to me.

9 The questionnaires for the seven southern African were standardised in terms of items included and the order in which they appear. To accommodate the different political economic histories of the individual states some questions were contextualised. For instance, the item (question 80) which focuses on awareness of macroeconomic reform appears as follows in the Zambian questionnaire: “Have you heard anything about the government’s Structural Adjustment Programme, or haven’t you had a chance to hear or read about it yet?” The South African version reads: “Have you heard anything about the government’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR) or haven’t you had a chance to hear or read about it yet.”

10 With the notable exception of South Africa, which approximates Cox’s description of tripartism.
Chapter 2
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School

2.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to give the reader an overview of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory (CT).¹ This is essential in order to determine whether the association of Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) with the work of the Frankfurt School theorists is justifiable. A detailed discussion of the work of four scholars who (together with Cox) are usually cited as representative of Critical Theory in International Relations (IR) follows in Chapter 3.²

The Critical Theory (CT) of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research (hereafter, the “Institute”), as well as Habermas, has been linked (either directly or implicitly) to a number of IR scholars, particularly the work of Richard Ashley³, Mark Hoffman, Andrew Linklater, Mark Neufeld, and Robert Cox (cf. Devetak, 1996; George, 1989; Hoffman, 1987; Linklater, 1992; and Smith, 1995). We therefore need to look at the origins and history of the Frankfurt School, the epistemology of CT, as well as when and how it was introduced as the “third debate” in IR (see Chapter 3). Moreover, we also need to evaluate whether the linking of Ashley, Hoffman, Linklater and Neufeld (with Cox) to the thinking of members of the Frankfurt School (cf. Devetak, 1996:151; George, 1989:274; Smith, 1995:24 and Hoffman, 1987:237) is valid and warranted.

2.2 Origins and History of the Frankfurt School

The “Institut für Sozialforschung” (Institute of Social Research) was founded in 1923 with private money. This, notwithstanding its formal association with the University of Frankfurt, ensured its independence. The original members and those students who were attracted to it lived in a period of turmoil, change and uncertainty in Weimar Germany. They were deeply influenced by the carnage of the Great War, the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, and the attempts to bring about a socialist revolution in Germany during 1918-
1920. Many young, middle class intellectuals embraced Marxism as a reaction to the economic decline in post-war Germany. Prominent figures associated with the Institute had opposed the war from the outset, and some were involved in the failed attempt to establish a socialist republic in Germany during the 1918 revolution. By the time the Institute was founded the Social Democratic Party had purged its radical elements and embarked on a path of reformism. These radical intellectuals returned to university where they pursued studies in Marxism, and later gravitated towards the Institute (for example, Max Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock and Herbert Marcuse) (Held, 1980:16-19, 29 and Kellner, 1989:9-10).

One way in which the history and output of CT can be understood is by depicting it (as Kellner, 1989 does) in terms of a number of chronological phases and themes. Another way is to differentiate between the divergent thought associated with a wide variety of figures who were based at the Institute and the output associated with the Frankfurt School over time. According to Held (1980:15) one cannot attribute a unified approach to the Institute as such, but shared assumptions, premises and ontology can be discerned (as one would expect from a school of thought) in the work of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal and Friedrich Pollock. Jürgen Habermas, although also regarded as a critical theorist, is discussed separately, mainly because the latter’s “recent work in philosophy and sociology recasts the notion of critical theory.” (Held, 1980:15). Kellner’s (1989) overview and analysis of CT focuses mainly on the figures which Held also regards as important contributors (the School and Habermas), with the additional inclusion of Erich Fromm.

The first director of the Institute was Carl Grünberg (1923-1929). Under his directorship, and as the “first avowed Marxist to hold a chair at a German University” (quoted in Held, 1980:30) the research undertaken at the Institute was rooted in the basic Marxist assumption that society can ultimately be understood by focusing on the nature of the economy. Grünberg directed the work of the Institute towards the explanation of contemporary changes in German society. Also, during his tenure there was a distinctive focus on historical and empirical research which was published in the Archive for the
History of Socialism and the Workers' Movement. After Grünberg's retirement in 1929, Max Horkheimer was appointed as director in 1930. Horkheimer's first address, The Present situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute of Social Research, indicated a discernable change in the approach to the nature of research at the Institute. Like Grünberg, he emphasised the importance of both theoretical analysis and empirical research. There were, however three important points which Horkheimer introduced which pointed to a move away from the more orthodox Marxism of his predecessor, and towards the essence of what are today understood as some of the central tenets of CT (Held, 1980:29-31 and Kellner, 1989:13-16).

The first, and most important point raised by Horkheimer, was the need to introduce social philosophy as a framework for the understanding of society. From this point of departure follow two other observations which are derived from the way in which Horkheimer views the task of social philosophy. He stressed the importance of viewing society in its totality and the need to explain "the fate of human beings" as part of a community and inclusive of all the "material and spiritual" aspects which affect them (state, economy, religion, science, art, and public opinion). This endeavour could not be undertaken in terms of the traditional philosophy approach which looks at these issues in an abstract and ahistorical manner. What was required was a synthesis between philosophy, social theory and the "specialised sciences" (Held, 1980:32-33 and Kellner, 1989:16-19).

Kellner (paraphrasing and quoting from Horkheimer's address) does well in encapsulating the above point and it is worth quoting him in full (I have left out the original page references):

"Horkheimer claims that the positivistic view that philosophy 'is perhaps beautiful, but scientifically fruitless because it is not subject to controls', verification, experiments and the like, must be rejected, as must the philosopher's prejudice that he or she is dealing with the essential, while the scientist is dealing with bare, trivial facts. These conflicting claims to
primacy must be overcome in favor of a ‘dialectical penetration and development of philosophical theory and the praxis of the individual disciplines.’ For Horkheimer, the philosophical drive toward the universal and essential should be the animating spirit for social research; but at the same time philosophy must be ‘sufficiently open to the world to allow itself to be impressed with, and transformed by, progress in concrete studies” (Kellner, 1989:17).

Following on from this are two further observations which can be regarded as important themes in Horkheimer’s address. The first concerns a move away from the more orthodox Marxism espoused by Grünberg. Economic determinism is qualified when Horkheimer emphasised that the Institute would not adhere to one dimensional explanatory frameworks; “...the attempt to derive everything from an economy which is understood merely as material being is an abstract and therefore badly understood Marx” (Kellner, 1989:19). Instead emphasis would be put on placing the interaction between society, the state, the economy and people in historical context, with the aim of determining how society reproduced itself.

Secondly, the research program of the Institute was to be guided by a strategy of interdisciplinary materialism. This meant that Marxist political economy would have to be supplemented by other disciplines (for example, Cultural Theory and Social Psychology) to explain, for instance, why the German working class remained divided, and revolutionary consciousness absent under conditions of advanced capitalism. It also meant a tolerance for methodological diversity, and a willingness to use qualitative and quantitative techniques. The vehicle for the Institute’s publications was the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (Journal of Social Research), first published in Germany in 1932. In 1933, following Hitler’s appointment as chancellor, the Institute moved to Paris, and subsequently, just before the German invasion of France, to Columbia University in New York (Aronowitz, 1972:xiii, Kellner, 1989:19, 26, Held, 1980:34 and Morrow with Brown, 1994:98).
It was during the period of exile (at Columbia University) that Institute members first started denoting their approach as Critical Theory (CT). This was done partly because they found themselves in a radically different intellectual climate. For one, approaches which were deemed to be too close to Marxism were frowned upon and even treated with downright hostility. Secondly, they also found the uncritical acceptance of pure empiricism by the social sciences in the US problematical. Nevertheless, the period of exile and the accompanying social and intellectual challenges also coincided with a productive period of reflection and writing by the core members of the Institute. It was during this time that the "classics" of CT saw the light. Most were translated in English and published again during the 1970s, after a revival of interest in CT in Germany during the 1960s (Held, 1980:36, Kellner, 1989:44).

In 1936, a major research project on the family and authority was completed and published as a two part research report entitled Studies on Family and Authority. This was a collaborative theoretical and empirical undertaking between Fromm, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Lowenthal and focused on how the economy affected families, as well as how perceptions towards authority were formed by inner family dynamics. The interest in attitudes to authority was kindled by the rise of Fascism and Nazism and the submissive response to both by individuals. In 1937, Horkheimer published his essay on "Traditional and Critical Theory." In this seminal article, Horkheimer encapsulated his thinking on the assumptions and method of the Institute’s (critical) approach to research and knowledge and showed how it was different from mainstream or "traditional" theory. The ideas expressed in his inaugural address on the need to combine philosophy, science and praxis were also set out and elaborated on (Kellner, 1989:36-44).

Another member of the School, Friedrich Pollock, was doing further research on the crisis of capitalism in the aftermath of the 1929 Wall Street Crash. He argued that the market (liberal) form of capitalism had run its course and that its only means of survival lay in a centrally planned economy. This could take the form of capitalist state planning or the version followed in the Soviet Union. He predicted that a free market economy would eventually require state intervention to deal with recurrent economic crises. This
intervention would take the form of "state capitalism" (of a democratic or Fascist nature) and would involve total control by the state, leaving virtually nothing to the abstract laws of the market. State capitalism, as described by Pollock, would require more (political) planning, control and intervention than the New Deal or Keynesian models (Held, 1980:494 and Kellner, 1989:55-61).

In the meantime the circumstances experienced while in exile and developments in Europe and the Soviet Union had significant effects on the activities of the Institute. By 1941, financial difficulties were being experienced and some of the members of the Institute started working for the US government. Both Horkheimer and Adorno moved to California, effectively bringing to an end the Institute's ability to follow a collective multidisciplinary approach. Secondly, a significant shift in thinking (inspired by Adorno) took place, which culminated in the publication of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* by Horkheimer and Adorno in 1947, as well as *Eclipse of Reason* by Horkheimer in the same year.

Both publications reflect the "philosophical" turn in the development of CT and signaled the abandonment of the project to attempt a synthesis of philosophy, science and social theory. The lack of working class resistance to the authoritarian project of Fascism and Nazism, the excesses of Stalinism in the Soviet Union, and the use of the modern state to commit genocide led to a profound disillusionment with the instrumental reason of the Enlightenment and the science it had produced (Kellner, 1989:83-90).

Bourgeois science and the political economy of "progressive" Marxism were rejected as instruments of control and domination in the quest of humanity to conquer nature. The "totally administered" society, were humans dominate humans, was the end result of this quest. As Horkheimer (1947:59) put it: "Positivist philosophy, which regards the tool 'science' as the automatic champion of progress, is as fallacious as other glorifications of technology." Critical reason is offered as an alternative to the instrumental reason of positivist science, although as Kellner (1989:86) points out, what exactly critical reason is encompassed of is not really developed in *Dialectic*. In the end, *Dialectic* and *Eclipse of..."
Reason can be read as a radical critique of instrumental reason and positivist science, leaving the question open as to whether the foundationalist roots of the Enlightenment are rejected in toto, or whether the progressive benefits need to be retained. Habermas and his followers would later confront this critique, accepting the notion of control and domination inherent in positivism, but arguing that a reconstruction of foundationalist notions of knowledge is possible (Kellner, 1989:89).

During this time, other members of the Institute who remained in New York (among others, Lowenthal and Neumann) had embarked on a major empirical project to determine how authoritarian character traits in individuals were linked to prejudice and anti-Semitism. This study (named Studies in Prejudice) resulted in several publications one of which was The Authoritarian Personality, published in 1950 by Adorno and a number of collaborators. In conjunction with a number of psychologists at Berkeley, a detailed questionnaire was sent to 2099 respondents. The subsequent analysis produced a set of character traits or trends which the authors associated with prejudice and conservatism (Kellner, 1989:114-116).

Soon after the completion of Studies in Prejudice, an offer was received to take the Institute back to Frankfurt. As a result, Adorno, Horkheimer and Pollock returned to Germany and, by 1953, had re-established the Institute. Marcuse, Lowenthal, Kirchheimer and others remained in the US. Although the Journal was not re-established, a series of publications, Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology, was initiated. Horkheimer did not publish anything of note in the postwar years, and Adorno (while productive) did not re-visit the multi-disciplinary project of the 1930s (and to an extent 1940s). Adorno died in 1969, Pollock in 1970, and Horkheimer in 1973. Although Adorno and Horkheimer's work served as an inspiration for the radical student politics of the 1960s, they were not actively involved. It was Marcuse and Habermas (particularly Marcuse) who were more directly involved in the praxis of protest at this time and who are the names most commonly associated with the Frankfurt School (Marcuse) and CT (Habermas) in the aftermath of the deaths of Adorno and Horkheimer. Marcuse, in fact, is
often viewed as the intellectual father of the New Left during the 1960s, being a strong advocate of the need for critical theorists to also be involved (following on from CT’s premise on the need to overcome the division between object and subject – see below) in the politics of transformation and emancipation (Kellner, 1989:119-120 and Held, 1980:38-39).

Marcuse’s work (cf. Eros and Civilization, 1955 and One-Dimensional Man, 1964) carried forward earlier critiques of the “totally administered society”, mass culture, art, and communications (the mass media) by Adorno, Horkheimer and Lowenthal. Essentially, these were viewed as the products of instrumental reason, producing conformity to the consumerist society which is linked to the capitalist mode of production. Marcuse (in One-Dimensional Man, 1964) stresses the difference between “false needs” and “true needs”. The former are items which people think they need because of the socialisation dynamics prevalent in a consumerist society. The latter are “vital needs”, such as the acquiring of food, clothes, and shelter “at the attainable level of satisfaction” (quoted in Kellner, 1989:160, see also chapters 5 and 6 in Kellner, 1989).

Although Kellner (1989:197) refers to Habermas (and Claus Offe) as “two of the most influential members of the second generation of the Frankfurt School” this may lead one (according to Held, 1980:249) to view CT as an approach which cohesively developed from Adorno to Habermas (the latter carrying on the tradition of a unified school of thought, building on its theoretical premises and continuing its empirical research). But, although there are intellectual linkages (even similarities) between Habermas and the “inner circle” of the Frankfurt School, there are also substantial differences. These lead Held (1980) to differentiate between the two, an important point to note, particularly when we go on to consider CT in IR, as well as the “linkages” between Cox and CT.

Habermas’ debt to the Frankfurt School is most apparent in his early work (Structural Transformation in the Public Sphere, 1962 and Towards a Rational Society, written in the second half of the 1960s and published in English in 1970). In these volumes he analysed the growth of the state and its political role (its increasing autonomy showing
that it is more than just a reflection of the dynamics being played out at the economic level) in technically administering and neutralising the problems which arise in the crises which "late capitalist" societies typically experience. His conceptualisation of knowledge and how it relates to human activities (needs) in Knowledge and Human Interests (1971), however, differs from Adorno's more pessimistic view of the possibility to establish foundationalist truth claims. Secondly, both Adorno and Horkheimer, over the years, developed a deep-seated skepticism concerning the possibility for the transformation of capitalist society. Habermas, particularly in his identification of the crises which contemporary capitalism has to deal with, seems to be more optimistic (Held, 1980:251-253, Kellner, 1989:196).

Notably, in Legitimation Crisis, and contrary to Adorno, Horkheimer, Pollock and Marcuse who concluded that capitalism had managed to devise the means to ensure its own survival, Habermas (1976:61-68, 75-92) argued that, in addition to economic crises, the capitalist state also faced rationality and motivational crises. Essentially, economic crises (arising from class conflict are replaced by rationality crises which relate to the inability of the state to deliver the goods and manage the economy – both of which are essential to ensure legitimacy. The motivational crisis arises when individuals are no longer inspired to act in accordance with the values which underpin the system and start to question its structures. Furthermore, according to Habermas the system (at the time of his writing) was no longer able, through religion, ideologies of individualism, consumerism, and art and culture to provide the motivational legitimation required for its continued existence. He concluded that the possibility of a crisis which could affect the perpetuation of the capitalist system, was likely. Habermas' attempts to develop a normative base for his version of CT, began to take a linguistic turn from the early 1970s and reached their apogee with the publication of the two volume The Theory of Communicative Action (1984, 1987) (Held, 1980:284-295; Kellner, 1989:196-200 and Morrow with Brown, 1994:334).
2.3 Epistemology

This section provides a broad overview of some of the core values and underlying assumptions of CT. The epistemology and method of CT are difficult to encapsulate as a single coherent structure because the members of the Institute tended to adopt their own unique formulations. Nevertheless, some key elements can be noted, bearing in mind those who use CT in the analysis of international relations. The focus will thus be on lifting out those aspects of CT which have been used in IR, specifically by Ashley, Hofmann, Linklater and Neufeld (see Chapter 3).

The underlying value assumption of CT is to emancipate humans from all forms of domination. Effectively, this means emancipation from the domination which is encapsulated within the capitalist system of production and exchange. It also means emancipation from a form of science (specifically positivist science) which has been instrumental in perpetuating status quo power relations. These themes can be said to run as a connecting thread in CT, from Horkheimer to Habermas. Consequently, CT also attempts (not always successfully) to connect theory with practice, and envisages social-political transformation. Referring to Habermas' critical-emancipatory interest, as one of the three interests on which the generation of knowledge is based, Morrow with Brown (1994:147) make the following point:

"...it involves a different attitude toward meanings: Rather than merely describe and understand them, the objective is to criticize and transform them. This implies that values and norms have social functions linked to social and cultural re-production – that is, the maintenance of a particular set of social relations that disadvantages some groups relative to others. In short, a fundamental assumption of critical theory is that every form of social order entails some forms of domination and that the critical-emancipatory interest underlies the struggles to change those relations of dominant-subordination."
Horkheimer and Adorno (in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*) view domination as something which emerged from the post-Enlightenment ascendancy of instrumental reason. Domination is in evidence when “the thoughts, wants and purposes of those affected by it would have been radically different, if it had not been for the effects created by domination.” (Held, 1980:140). In this summation of Horkheimer and Adorno’s view of the concept (and later Marcuse) it becomes evident that domination is not only viewed as being the result of the inequalities generated by capitalism (which is viewed as one historical incidence of domination). It also arises from the need of humans to control nature, and following on from there, the need to control other humans, “The human being, in the process of his emancipation, shares the fate of the rest of the world. Domination of nature involves domination of man” (Horkheimer, 1947:93-94). This takes place in the form of internal domination (self-discipline), control over labour, and through science and technology. Domination, therefore, does not depend solely on coercion. It is based on legitimacy and also a process of alienation which restricts the options of humans involved in social struggles (Morrow with Brown, 1994:10, 149).

Although CT accepts the complexity associated with various forms of domination, it does posit, in accordance with its (historical) Marxist roots, that the analysis of contemporary society cannot proceed without taking into account the dynamics and contradictions which arise from the dominant mode of production and exchange (capitalism). Nevertheless, this does not entail economic reductionism, nor does it mean that CT wants to isolate itself from “bourgeois” science: “Both bourgeois science and scientistic Marxism utilized excessively objectivistic methods, and thus were not able to conceptualize current problems...Lacking a theory of the subject, orthodox Marxism could not really confront the failure of revolutionary consciousness to develop, and could not point to ways in which revolutionary consciousness and struggle could be produced”(Kellner, 1989:23). To overcome the restrictions (and associated stasis)
imposed by objectivism the project which early CT embarked upon was to work toward a "materialist social theory" (Kellner, 1989:46-47). I look next, broadly, at the components of this theory as reflected (mainly) in Horkheimer's early work, as well as how CT views positivist science and what this means for its own epistemology.\textsuperscript{12}

2.4 Materialist Social Theory

The CT project in the 1930s involved moving towards a unification between science and philosophy, while at the same time recognising the differences in method between the two. The traditional division between the disciplines and between the "positivistic" and "humanistic" approaches to knowledge generation in the social sciences was accordingly questioned and CT attempted to act as a bridge between both. This approach is described by Kellner (1989) as "supradisciplinary." Materialism, as viewed by Horkheimer (1972:226), is located in the material conditions within which humans have to satisfy their needs and the resultant conflict: "Thus the critical theory of society begins with the idea of the simple exchange of commodities..." which must "...lead to a heightening of those social tensions which in the present historical era lead in turn to wars and revolutions." It is not a metaphysical materialism which aspires to a universalist account of being, because concepts and theories are located in and are a part of historical events. As the one changes so does the other (Kellner, 1989:28 and Morrow with Brown, 1994:4-6).

Horkheimer also criticised approaches to knowledge which maintain a rigid distinction between subject and object. The two cannot be viewed separately from one another, because the one is influenced, in a dialectical manner, by the other. The subject (the human agent) is affected by material conditions (for instance, economic conditions), while in turn material conditions can be influenced (made or unmade) by the subject. Thought (our accounts of reality) and the objects which are our focus is contextually
dependent of who we are and where we are located in history. A materialist social theory also emphasises the need to understand the structure of society in terms of its material (economic) constraints on the attainment of human “happiness”, as well as the need to change “concrete conditions” (Kellner, 1989:30-32).

Horkheimer is skeptical about the use of pure transcendental metaphysics because it attempts to explain human existence through intuition and offers unmediated and unattainable idealist palliatives to the condition of human suffering. At the same time the “unconnected” facts and the supposed value free approach of positivism is also criticised. Critical theory, while rejecting the values espoused by idealist philosophy, derives its underlying values (alleviation of suffering) from contemporary and concrete material circumstances. Its ontology is “the reality of human needs, class interests, and the constitutive role of the system of production in shaping social reality and experience” (Kellner, 1989:31, 35). Horkheimer’s essay (1937) on the distinction between “traditional” and “critical theory” further concretises the main aspects of CT in opposition (but not in an exclusionary manner) to positivist science:

“Even the critical theory, which stands in opposition to other theories, derives its statements about real relationships from basic universal concepts, as we have indicated, and therefore presents the relationships as necessary. Thus both kinds of theoretical structure are alike when it comes to logical necessity” (Horkheimer, 1972:228).

2.5 Critique of Positivism

The major problem which Horkheimer has with traditional theory is that it does not reflect in upon itself. Traditional theory (the nomological deductive model from the natural sciences applied to the social sciences or positivism) does not locate ideas in society, it views itself as autonomous from the society in which it functions. Thus, “The scholar and his science are incorporated into the apparatus of society; his achievements are a factor in the conservation and continuous renewal of the existing state of affairs, no
matter what fine names he gives to what he does” (Horkheimer quoted in Kellner, 1989:45). Traditional theory, therefore, views the anomalies of society as a part of its dynamics and not necessarily as something which requires transformation.

Critical Theory, on the other hand, is not concerned with perpetuating the status quo, but to strive for a unity between theory and practice, to bring about transformation. It “...has for its object men as producers of their own historical way of life in its totality. The real situations which are the starting-point of science are not regarded simply as data to be verified and to be predicted according to the laws of probability. Every datum depends not on nature alone but also on the power man has over it” (Horkheimer, 1972:244). The problem with “reflectivity” would also later be addressed extensively by Habermas. In the preface of Knowledge and Human Interests he states: “That we disavow reflection is positivism” (Habermas, 1972:vii).

Held (1980:166-167) discussing the similarities between the Frankfurt School’s critique of positivism and Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, summarises their position on the reflectivity problem as follows:

“Thus, the modern scientific projects is seen to have, prior to the utilization of its findings, an inherently instrumental character. Its a priori condition is its tie to a specific societal project, namely, the adaptation of nature to human purposes. Furthermore, the Frankfurt theorists agree with Husserl that this character implies that modern science has, when viewed from a positivist self-understanding, an inner core which it cannot account for or master. It is intrinsically impossible for this science to assess its own objectives, or the purposes for which it is employed. Since it regards the world as a domain of neutral objects, as one such object itself it cannot even comprehend or assess itself; for it cannot reflect upon itself.” (own italics).
This point is also made by Marcuse (1941) when he discusses the positivism of Comte. To Comte, social institutions were a given and could not be changed. He was in favour of order and stability and suspicious of revolutionary forces. Events which were indicative of societal instability should be isolated and subjected to scientific scrutiny, so as to resolve them. The premise that there is nothing but observable facts in which all science must be grounded, and the fact/value distinction which follows from this, means that there can be no other basis from which to critique society. Consequently, we should (generally) accept that which we can observe as given, in the sense that, not much can be done to change it. Human activities become objectivied under the operation of natural laws.

Marcuses’ point is that this position is in itself a value judgment, and one which, in terms of its own premises, positivism cannot base on observation. The result is a legitimisation and maintenance of the status quo. Critical Theory does not view facts “in isolation” of the society in which they are embedded, nor in isolation of the individual who perceives them. It assumes that the facts “out there” are “our” facts, we cannot interact with them, without interpreting them (Held, 1980:162-164). Or, in E.H. Carr’s (1961:11) words; “It was, I think, one of Pirandello’s characters who said that a fact is like a sack – it won’t stand up till you’ve put something in it.”

It is important to note that the Frankfurt School and later Habermas, did not propose to negate the results of positivist research or that empiricism as such was to be rejected. The early project of the Institute was to bridge the gap between philosophy and science, and between materialism and idealism. As we have noted above, some of the early projects of the Institute involved survey research. The problem which CT identifies is with how one particular form of knowledge generation has become a force of domination, and how it is used to perpetuate the status quo, through its goals of prediction and, ultimately, control.
Held (1980:187-188), summarising Horkheimer's view of the "individual empirical sciences" and their relationship with CT stresses that, notwithstanding the assumption that theory must always be historically located, CT must also be prepared to engage with and subject its claims to the findings of (albeit flawed) "traditional theory":

"The limitations and one-sidedness of the individual, empirical sciences are to be superseded not by rejecting out of hand experiences won through methodological research, but by reconstructing and reinterpreting their works in the total context to which their concepts and judgements refer. Conventional criteria specifying standards of adequacy for scientific theory and research (for example, logical consistency, methodological clarity, reproducibility of results or intersubjective validity; capacity to explain problems and issues other theories and modes of procedures cannot account for) are to be respected" (Held, 1980:188).

However, and importantly:

"It must not exclude systematic reflection – employing philosophical, theoretical and interdisciplinary perspectives – on the nature of the phenomena under scrutiny" (Held, 1980:188).

Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, recognised and acknowledged the emancipatory effect of positivist science in the nineteenth century. It delivered people from dogma and superstition and held the promise of also delivering them "from natural necessity, domination by the forces of nature and drudgery in work." (Held, 1980:163). However, the carnage of the Great War at the beginning of the 20th century and the subsequent economic decline (accompanied by the rise of Nazism and World War II) cast a shadow over progress, science and technology. Notwithstanding this (which in later publications became more pronounced) skepticism toward "traditional theory", Horkheimer (quoted in
Morrow with Brown, 1994:97), referring to positivism, reflected the pragmatic approach of the Institute on this issue: “If such a method is applied to society, the result is statistics and descriptive sociology, and these can be important for many purposes, even for critical theory.”

This point is also made by Habermas (1972:308-311) when he discussed the three bases on which the generation of knowledge depends and how they relate to human interests. He referred to these as “knowledge-constitutive interests” and identified three: empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic, and critical. The empirical-analytic form of knowledge generation is associated with the deductive-nomological model of positivism. The cognitive interest of this form is technical control. The historical-hermeneutic form is not related to observation, but to “the understanding of meaning”. This understanding is derived from textual interpretation and acknowledges the role of the “interpreter” in arriving at conclusions about historical meaning and the connection with his/her own world. The cognitive interest related to this base of knowledge generation is practical; “The understanding of meaning is directed in its very structure toward the attainment of possible consensus among actors in the framework of a self-understanding derived from tradition” (Habermas, 1972:310).

The last knowledge base is the one which is related to “critical social science.” Critical social science goes beyond the goal of producing “nomological knowledge”, by focusing and aiming to discover when proposed “law-like regularities” hide ideologically determined relations of “dependence” (domination) which can possibly be changed. Through self-reflection, the subject to which the laws are supposed to apply can be emancipated: “The latter (self-reflection) releases the subject from dependence on hypostatized powers” (Habermas, 1972:310). The cognitive interest here is, emancipatory.
Again, this does not entail a rejection by Habermas of one form of knowledge-constitutive interests for another (superior) one. It is worth quoting Bernstein’s (1976:194) interpretation of Habermas’ view of the empirical-analytic sciences in this regard:

“It is essential to realize that Habermas is not criticizing or denigrating this type of knowledge. On the contrary, insofar as he claims that it is grounded in the dimension of human life that involves human survival, he is stressing its importance and its basic quality for any social life. Habermas’ primary object of attack is the ideological claim that this is the only type of legitimate knowledge, or the standard by which all knowledge is to be measured.”

2.6 A Critical Theory of Society

What then is a Critical Theory of society? In accordance with the notion of self-reflection, CT aims to locate ideas in historical context. It must point out the gap between ideas and reality. This, Horkheimer proposes, can be done through the method of *immanent critique*. In practise this would require pointing out the contradictions between the ideas/values which are propagated for a society and reality (practice). For example, the idea of market efficiency and equilibrium achieved through the pursuit of individual self-interest and the promise that this form of economic activity is fair, just, and will ultimately enhance equality and freedom. Then there is the reality of the continuing occurrence and perpetuation of poverty, inequality and economic crises. Ideology, so perceived, is something which needs to be historically determined by focusing on whether the universalist message contained therein conceals disharmony, is in the interests of a dominant group, and whether these contradictions are portrayed as the natural state of society.
Historical laws are different from natural laws. They are made and can be unmade by people. However, the more behaviour conforms with the idea of the reality proposed (via mass communications and culture) by the ideology, the more (in order to survive) will individuals “...become agents and bearers of commodity exchange.” To this effect, it will seem as if society functions according to invariate “natural” laws. The task of CT is to show that society can only be understood by acknowledging that “laws” are linked to “specific modes of human organization.” Abstracting them (as positivism does) leads to the perpetuation of the status quo. Critical Theory makes “…the individual and the conditions under which he or she lives the object of critical reflection...” (Held, 1980:168-169, 183-186).

Critical reflection reveals that concepts do not “mirror reality.” Thought and being are not identical as Hegel believed, instead the critical theorist discovers that concepts are part and parcel of a constantly changing reality and that they therefore have a justificatory purpose. Concepts are therefore intersubjective, they are formed, maintained and changed by structures and agency. Explanation, for CT, revolves around showing how theories and concepts mask relationships of domination (the purpose of ideology) and how they cannot encapsulate absolute truths, but are always historically contingent: “Materialism, unlike idealism, always understands thinking to be the thinking of particular men within a particular period of time. It challenges every claim to the autonomy of thought” (Horkheimer, quoted in Kellner, 1989:29).

In order to construct an accurate picture of society, CT (as proposed by Horkheimer) introduces the notion of “mediated totality”, and the need to reflect the “synchronic” and “diachronic” dimensions in the process of explanation and analysis. The term “mediated totality” refers to the importance of focusing on the interaction between the different spheres of society, and to avoid the economic reductionism of “vulgar” Marxism, while at the same time recognising the crucial role which the economic sphere plays in society at large. Any aspect of society; political, social, cultural and psychological cannot be
viewed in isolation but must be explained in terms of its relationship to the others, and in particular the economic. As such, the “superstructure” (the state) is viewed as having much more autonomy, relative to the rest of society, than classical Marxism is prepared to concede (Held, 1980:164-165 and Held, 1989:46-49).

In order to analyse capitalist society, by using the idea of “mediated totality”, it is also important to focus on it as a system, to recognise how and why this system has developed and changed historically both at the state and global levels, and to focus on the dialectics (contradictions) within and between the various spheres of society, leading to proposals for alternatives which may not necessarily be realised. Horkheimer was careful to stress that contradictions will not necessarily lead to change for the better. “Progression” is not an inevitable historical force, it depends on the capacity of human agency to bring about change. The synchronic aspect of analysis is related to the “research” component of enquiry. This may involve utilising the methodology of “traditional” theory to create an accurate “snapshot” of the structure of society in its “mediated totality.” This must be followed by a diachronic or historical “placing” of the findings, also referred to as the process of “presentation.” In the process of presentation and “immanent critique” concepts and findings are de-objectivied – they are placed and re-interpreted or “relocated within the context of historical totality” (Held, 1980:178, 188 and Kellner, 1989:48-49).

2.7 Summation

From the above overview of the work of Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School, and to a more limited extent, Habermas, a number of core assumptions underlying a CT of society can be discerned.

The early work of the Institute of Social Research emphasised the necessity of a supradisciplinary approach. This required the bridging of the gap between traditional and critical theory, philosophy and science. In order to understand society in its totality, the need for an interdisciplinary approach was also emphasised. Later, Horkheimer (1947)
and Adorno and Horkheimer (1944) became more critical of the merits of the positivist science project associated with the Enlightenment. As a result, the attempt to achieve synthesis between critical social theory and science was virtually abandoned. This issue would later be revisited in the work of Habermas (1972), who was more optimistic about the possibility to combine critical theory with the hermeneutic and empirical-analytical knowledge interests. Nevertheless, the empirical “Studies in Prejudice” resulted in the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) by Adorno and others.

Critical Theory also focuses on the emancipation of humans from relations of domination. Subordination is the result of capitalist production and exchange relations (materialism) and the perpetuation of the status quo by positivist science. The latter serves the interest of prevailing power relations by objectifying society and viewing it as nature, which needs to be controlled, but “Positivist philosophy, which regards the tool ‘science’ as the automatic champion of progress, is as fallacious as other glorifications of technology” (Horkheimer, 1947:59). Emancipation may be achieved by projecting feasible changes arising from the contradictions in society, which will result in freedom from the constraints of (materialist and scientific) relations of domination.

Emancipatory (critical) theory does not accept the division between subject and object, fact and value. This means that the subject (humans) is a part of society and consequently has the ability to be self-reflective about material circumstances and also to change them. In contrast, traditional theory objectively regards the “anomalies” (problems) of society as issues for enquiry which need to be resolved within the parameters of the status quo. Marcuse (1941) makes the point that this objectification of society is, in itself, a normative assumption which cannot be verified in terms of positivism’s own points of departure. Nevertheless, CT must “respect” the findings of traditional theory, while locating them and “reconstructing and reinterpreting their works in the total context to which their concepts and judgements refer” (Held, 1980:188). Habermas’ three knowledge-constitutive interests are linked and provide, through self-reflection (critical-emancipatory theory), a more historically contextualised understanding of social phenomena.
Critical Theory requires the analyst to locate ideas in historical context. This is done through the method of immanent critique which attempts to point to the contradictions between ideas/ideology and practice. What are the dominant universalist ideas and do they reflect the societal realities of the day? Or has behaviour (practice) come to resemble the idea of reality which is held out by the dominant ideology? Critical reflection on these questions leads us to the notion of intersubjectivity. Concepts are not universally applicable, but change in the sense that they are historically contingent. Thought, as well, is always “the thinking of particular men within a particular period of time” (Horkheimer, quoted in Kellner, 1989:29). Intersubjective understandings are related to mutual/shared conceptualisations of aspects of reality which can change. Changes in perception can, therefore, lead to changes in reality. This subjectified reality stands in contrast to positivism’s objectified reality.

The notion of a mediated totality in CT involves focusing on the interaction between the various spheres of society (for example, culture) while accepting the importance of the system of production and exchange, from which ultimately societal conflict emanates. Finally, the process of “presentation” requires, of the critical theorist, to locate the findings of synchronic research (traditional theory) in the mediated totality of historical context.
Endnotes

1 Capitals (CT) are used to indicate the association with the Frankfurt School and to distinguish CT from criticism in the study of literature, as well as to distinguish it from post-modernist approaches in IR (Morrow with Brown, 1994:14, 32). The need to make the distinction between CT and post-modernism as critical approaches in IR is correctly pointed out by Brown (1994: 214): “It is not possible to be a Critical Theorist and a post-modernist- although, using my initial definition, post-modernists are critical theorists.” As will be indicated below both approaches are “critical” (lower case) in the sense that they are disillusioned with the dominant (modernist) approach to knowledge creation. For CT, however, bearing in mind the need to be “reflexive” about theory, the modernist project can be reconstructed, for post-modernists the foundations of Enlightenment rationality have been flawed from the outset.

2 It should be noted at this stage that the term, “International Relations”, is a field of study which has been dealing with some serious challenges as to what should constitute its ontology. It is used here because not only past theoretical debates, but also recent critical contributions persist in using the term in their titles (cf. Booth and Smith, 1995; George, 1994; Macmillan and Linklater, 1995; and Neufeld, 1995). As the argument unfolds below and in accordance with CCT, I want to move towards a more encompassing term, which gets away from the “inter-state politics” approach, not only in method but also in the description of what it is that we focus on. The term (following on from Cox, 1999:11-12) which is favoured in this study is “Global Political Economy” (GPE).

3 Ashley (1981), in a seminal article, was among the first to argue for the incorporation of CT into IR, when he attempted to link Habermas’ notion of knowledge-constitutive interests to what he described as “technical” and “practical” realism. However, he subsequently rejected CT as foundationalist and his later work saw a move towards post-modernism (Haaacke, 1996:271 and Keyman, 1997:100). This point will be further elaborated on in Chapter 3.

4 Kellner (1989:1) notes that referring to those associated with the Institute as the “Frankfurt School” ignores the fact that much of the work done by what he sees as the major figures was done during their years of exile in the United States. He also emphasises that there were as many differences as there were similarities.

5 Other names which Held (1980:14) associates with the Institute as a whole are: Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Henryk Grossman, Arkadij Gurland, and on the “outer circle”, Walter Benjamin.

6 Technically, Karl Albert Gerlach preceded Grünberg, but he was unable to take up the directorship because of his premature death (Kellner, 1989:13).

7 One of the first projects initiated during Horkheimer’s time as director was a quantitative survey of white- and blue-collar German workers. Headed by Erich Fromm (who was assisted by Paul Lazarsfeld and Hilde Weiss) the publication of the results were delayed because of differences in opinion over their usefulness (there were methodological and theoretical problems) and the going into exile of the Institute members. A final (incomplete) publication, Arbeiter und Angestellte am Vorabend des Dritten Reiches, appeared in 1980. The translated version is: Erich Fromm. 1984. The Working Class in Weimar Germany. Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press (Kellner, 1989:20, 237, footnote 33 and Morrow with Brown, 1994:104).

8 Between 1939 and 1941 it was published in English as Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, after which it was discontinued due to the financial difficulties experienced by the Institute (Held, 1980:34, 37).

9 Erich Fromm, a psychoanalyst, published his key theoretical views on Marx, Freud and social psychology in 1932, the year before the Institute went into exile. They appeared in the Journal of Social Research and were later translated in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis: Essays on Marx, Marx and Social Psychology. Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett Publications (1971) (Held, 1980:488).
Both Kellner (1989) and Held (1980) point out that, although Habermas showed an initial interest in praxis by virtue of his early work on, and continuing interest in radical democracy (cf. *The Public Sphere*, 1962), he later became critical of the 1960s student movement. He argued that while they espoused democratic goals, essentially they were following an agenda which implied a move towards censure. As a result he began to focus more on theory during the 1970s, a trend which continued after he returned to the Institute in the early 1980s (Kellner, 1989:206, 211-212 and Held, 1980:250-251).

According to Adorno and Horkheimer in *Dialectics of Enlightenment* (1947), the notion of science (instrumental reason) as a form of domination and control over nature and humans is the legacy of the Enlightenment.

A good account of Critical Theory's critique of positivism can be found in Marcuse (1941), where he evaluates the rise of "positive philosophy" by looking at, among others, August Comte (Marcuse, 1941:340-360).

Held's (1980:163-164) reading of Adorno's and Horkheimer's texts suggests that their view of positivism is based on five premises: (1) all knowledge must be attributable to "sense" experience (2) observation is the base of meaning (3) concepts can be "operationalised", they represent/correspond to reality (4) knowledge creation must be based on one unified view of science, aiming at explanation and predictability according to the deductive-nomological model (5) facts and values must be separated.

This point (as related by Held, 1980:169-170) is also made by Adorno, and Adorno and Horkheimer in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Positivist science critiques other more "ideological" approaches which are value-laden, but negates the inherent values in its own view of science: rationality and parsimony in using the best "technical" means to achieve a stated end. In the words of Adorno (quoted in Held, 1980:169-171): "Value and value freedom are not separate; rather, they are contained in one another."
Chapter 3
Critical Theory in International Relations

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the reader with an overview of how CT has been introduced in the study of IR. I focus on the work of four scholars who are often linked in the literature to the work of the Frankfurt School and to Habermas. They are Andrew Linklater, Richard Ashley, Mark Hoffman and Mark Neufeld. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that some scholars, who focus on the development of theory in IR, associate Cox's work with the Frankfurt School of CT. Consequently, Cox is often mentioned, along with Linklater, Ashley, Hoffman and Neufeld, as representative of an approach (CT in IR) which is informed and influenced by the Frankfurt School.

The question, which forms part of the theoretical research aim of this study, is whether there are indeed any theoretical commonalities between these authors and the Frankfurt School, secondly whether these authors share theoretical premises in their respective approaches which warrants grouping them together, and thirdly, whether there are any commonalities between their work and Cox's approach to the study of GPE. In order to provide answers to these questions in the conclusion, the following sections address the substance of the contributions by Linklater, Ashley, Hoffman and Neufeld to a CT of IR.

In light of the fact that out of the four authors, three (Ashley, Linklater and Hoffman) set out their arguments for a CT of IR in opposition to Waltz's (1979) *Theory of International Politics*, this section will provide a summary overview of the main argument in Waltz’s book. Arguably, Waltzian neorealism was one of the major issues which dominated the “inter-paradigm” debate during the 1980s (Griffiths, 1999:47). The reactions were mixed, but the critics were vociferous in their condemnation of an argument which they believed was status quo orientated (supportive of bipolarity and superpower politics). The debate led to the publication of an edited volume by Robert Keohane in 1986, entitled *Neorealism and its Critics*.
Waltz starts his argument by setting out the criteria and assumptions which underpin the deductive-nomological model of explanation which is prevalent in the natural sciences, but more contested in the social sciences. He regards it as a superior approach to "the problem of explanation" and much more likely to lead to the ability to predict and control then the inductive approach to the development of theory. His understanding of theory "...does not accord with usage in much of traditional political theory, which is concerned more with philosophic interpretation than with theoretical explanation", but "It does correspond to the definition of the term in the natural sciences and in some of the social sciences, especially economics" (Waltz, 1979:6). In this sense, Waltz sets up his explanatory theory of international politics (based on the systemic principles of the balance of power and the absence of central authority) as "scientifically defensible" (Griffiths, 1999:47).

In contrast to the prevalent "interdependence" approach of the 1970s (cf. Keohane and Nye, 1971; Keohane and Nye, 1974; Keohane and Nye, 1977 and Morse, 1976) Waltz emphasised the importance of focusing on the utilitarian ("self-help") state functioning within the dynamics of an anarchic system in order to construct a good theory of international politics. Before setting out the principles of his "systemic" or "structuralist" explanation of state behaviour, however, Waltz (1979, 18, 38) turns his attention to two types of theory in the literature of "international-political studies", viz. "reductionist theories" and "systemic approaches and theories."

In the chapter on reductionist theories he examines and criticises Lenin and Hobson’s economic imperialism theories and Galtung’s structural theory of imperialism. These are found wanting because they attempt to link a systemic phenomenon, war, to the economic attributes (capitalism) of the stronger states (or similarly, but in Wallersteinian terms, the attributes of the "core" states). To this argument Waltz (1979:36) responds as follows: "All kinds of states have pursued imperialist policies. One who claims that
particular types of states cause imperialism would, to be cogent, have to add that at other
times and places quite different types of states were also imperialistic. Yet the theories
we have examined claim that an imperial relation exists precisely because the imperial
state has certain economic attributes.” Waltz’s point is that one cannot explain the
functioning of any system by focusing on the attributes of the units which are the
component parts of that system.

Next, Waltz examines some theories which, at the time of his writing, claimed to offer a
systemic explanation to the study of international politics. How does Waltz understand
systemic explanation? He accepts that the analytical approach is useful “but only when
system-level effects are absent or weak enough to be ignored” (Waltz, 1979:39). When,
however, system attributes are present “…one cannot predict outcomes or understand
them merely by knowing the characteristics, purposes, and interactions of the system’s
units” (Waltz, 1979:39). The behaviour of the component units (states) must be explained
by an organising principle which lies at the systems level. Waltz goes on to review two
systemic explanations by Richard Rosecrance and Stanley Hoffmann and finds them
inadequate because “For Hoffmann, and especially for Rosecrance, the important
explanations are found at the level of states and of statesmen; the systems level thus
becomes all product and is not at all productive” (Waltz, 1979:50).

Although the claims that are made by Morton Kaplan’s systems approach are “bold
enough to leave one breathless”, Waltz (1979:50, 56) concludes that his attempt at the
development of a systems theory “has failed” because “Kaplan like so many others fails
to distinguish the interaction of units from their arrangement.” Waltz (1979:53-54) offers
two specific reasons for this conclusion. First, systemic changes (or “disturbances”) in
Kaplan’s model are brought about by the actions of states (the component units) who do
not follow “the essential rules” of the system. There is, therefore, no outside
“environment” which feeds “inputs” into the international system. Kaplan describes
states as being a part of the environment. Second, states are conceptualised as
“subsystems” within the international system. The latter can even take on a “subsystem dominant” shape, according to Kaplan. To this Waltz (1979:54) responds (somewhat incredulously): “The mind boggles at the thought of subsystems being dominant, let alone sharing dominance. What could subsystems’ dominance be other than the negation of a systems approach?”

Waltz’s (1979:63) alternative to these “inside-out” explanations is to be found in his conceptualisation of the international political structure. The first systemic-level characteristic of this structure is “The enduring anarchic character of international politics [which] accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia…” (Waltz, 1979:66). This structural attribute (absence of central authority) affects the actions of states indirectly “through socialization…and through competition among them” very much in the same way that the structural principles of markets influence individual entrepreneurs (Waltz, 1979:74-76). The fact that all states have to assure their continued existence (their sovereignty) in a system with no central authority makes them “like units.” They are functionally undifferentiated (Waltz, 1979:93, 97).

States differ, however, in their capabilities to perform this primary function effectively. This is Waltz’s second structural attribute which, together with the first, determines how states are “arranged” or “positioned” relative to one another in the international system. Waltz (1979:97-98) realises that he may be accused of falling into the same “inside-out” explanation trap that he accuses others of falling into, so the key word he insists is “distribution of capabilities” which is not an attribute of a unit (state) but a “system-wide” concept. Together, the systemic attributes of anarchy and differential distribution of capabilities explain and predict the behaviour of states, viz. that states will form alliances (practice “balance of power politics” or “engage in balancing behaviour) (Waltz, 1979:128). In the last two chapters of Theory of International Politics, Waltz argues that a concentrated distribution of capabilities among fewer states is preferable to a more even distribution (multipolarity) and concludes that a bipolar order (such as the one between the former Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War) is better for system stability.
3.2 Andrew Linklater

Andrew Linklater’s approach is characterised by his emphasis on the need for CT to incorporate aspects of various perspectives, so as to provide an all encompassing framework which is able to give an empirical account of how to move toward the goal of human emancipation. According to Linklater (1990:4) the main approaches to IR, “have overlooked the possibility of a critical theory of international relations which analyses the prospects for universal emancipation.” His work connects a CT of IR with the Frankfurt School and more directly with Habermas. He also regards Cox as an example of someone who not only points out the shortcomings of “classical approaches” to IR, but actually uses a CT framework to analyse historical “paths of development” and to assess the possibility for emancipation (Linklater, 1990:27).

In a review article published in 1986, Linklater sets the scene for his 1990 volume, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*. He argues that neither Marxism nor realism can, on their own, provide an adequate account of IR. Marxism is criticised for not considering the effect of inter-state relations (“diplomatic and strategic interaction”) on state-building, and on the development of capitalism and the process of industrialisation. Realism, is taken to task because it abstracts the inter-state system and its operation from other spheres (society and economy) and concludes that its characteristics have endured historically. Prescriptions are therefore aimed at ensuring systemic maintenance and not transformation. He then introduces the notion of a critical theory of IR which has to be distinguished from the “dominant perspectives”, and identifies three things it should do:

- “...a critical perspective must present a vision of an alternative world order which appeals not to principles of eternal validity but to concepts of freedom and universality which have developed historically...”
• "...a critical international theory is also obliged to construct a sociology of the constraints upon the resolution of this tension between principle and practice..."

• "Finally, a critical theory must aspire to produce an outline of an emancipatory practice, or what writers in a different tradition have termed 'strategies of transition'" (Linklater, 1986:310).

In Beyond Realism and Marxism, Linklater (1990) goes on to develop a more comprehensive critique of realism and Marxism and elaborates in more detail on what he perceives as the purpose of a CT of IR. He starts out by linking his view of the difference between "traditional" and "critical" theory to Max Horkheimer's conceptualisation as set out in the latter's 1937 essay. The "critical turn" in IR, is, according to him to be found in his own work (1986), Ashley (1981), Cox (1981), and Hoffman (1987). The historical development of theory in IR, is divided into the three perspectives which Martin Wight identified; realist, rationalist and revolutionist. Linked to these perspectives are three core issues with which each one is concerned, and three modes of enquiry. Realism is concerned with power, and uses the positivist method, rationalism is concerned with order and uses the hermeneutic method, while revolutionism focuses on emancipation and uses critical social theory (Linklater, 1990:8-10). How does Linklater go about making these linkages, and what does an encompassing CT of IR, based on an "incorporation and supersession" of realism and Marxism's strong points, look like?

To start with, Linklater identifies and supports his view of epistemology (positivism, hermeneutics, and critical theory) with Habermas' three knowledge-constitutive interests (see above). Importantly, he thinks of these three modes of thought in a dialectical, progressive manner. Rationalism is an improvement on realism, while revolutionism (viewed by Linklater as CT in IR) advances our understanding of IR beyond the shortcomings of rationalism. It is only CT which can extend "the human capacity for self-determination" and provide the human subject with greater autonomy from societal relations characterised by domination.
The connection with IR is made through the work of Ashley (1981), who linked the neorealism of Waltz (1979) with Habermas' notion of positivism and its goal of technical control. It has an ahistorical approach to recurrent state conflict and is only concerned with the *problematique* of state survival in an anarchic world. Practical realism (approximating Linklater's rationalist approach) is more concerned with the meaning of "diplomatic practice" and how states adhere to certain norms and principles in international society. This focus on meaning can be associated with the hermeneutic method. Lastly, according to Ashley, there is the approach which focuses on the possibility of a transformation of the contemporary state system. This approach is linked to critical social theory (Linklater, 1990:9-10). Linklater goes on to consider the three perspectives and their associated core issues, and method of enquiry in turn.

As an example of the positivist, "technical" method associated with realism, Linklater points to *Theory of International Politics*, by Kenneth Waltz (1979). This particular strand of realism is also referred to as neorealism, because of its concern with positivist science and its emphasis on control. Without going into a detailed analysis of Waltz's framework, we can suffice by pointing out that it rejects "reductionist" explanations of international politics, i.e. those approaches which would focus on, for instance, the domestic dynamics within states to explain their foreign policies. According to Waltz, the foreign policies of states are alike because they are units which operate in an anarchic system. Differences in state action can only be attributed to differences in power capacities. The state system should therefore be "abstracted" from domestic politics, as well as from international economics and society. Linklater (1990:14-15) accepts that a focus on the "strategic interaction" between states is essential – an issue which has been traditionally ignored by Marxism and critical sociology – nevertheless:

"The issue is whether the decision to abstract the states-system from other domains ignores the existence of actual or potential logics of systems-modification which may strengthen the bonds of international community;"
and it is whether the preoccupation with systemic reproduction ends in a practice which suppresses the tendencies inherent in alternative logics” (Linklater, 1990:15).

In stressing that realism fails to account for its own part in “reproducing the power relations which it regards as the objective foundation” of the fact that no universal consensus is possible in a system consisting of different states with no central authority, Linklater (following Cox, 1981) points towards the need for theoretical self-reflection, which is lacking in neorealism (Linklater, 1990:13, 15).

Rationalism, according to Linklater, combines neorealism’s focus on power and anarchy, with a concern for the normative underpinnings which lead states to cooperate around shared principles and values, and which is an outcome of its practical concern with order, consensus and legitimacy. There are, in other words, moral considerations which must also be taken into account as a constraint upon the actions of sovereign states. This concern with order, says Linklater, is reflected in the work of Hedley Bull, which he cites as an example of how international order is linked to the existence of a set of principles (“international political culture”) which characterises and is essential for the existence of international society. The international system must, therefore, be explained not only in terms of power relations, but also in terms of its underlying principles. In this sense, both Bull and Wight stress the fact that views of the international state system are anchored in the societies which form a part of such a system. This approach allows for a more historical analysis of different state systems, based on founding principles and the consensus formed around them. Consensus on values (for instance, international economic justice) enhances order and stability, and provides legitimacy (Linklater, 1990:15-19).

For Linklater, rationalism (as exemplified in the work of Bull) is more concerned with the question of how an international community can be extended from a set of principles which are “universally binding” and this brings it closer to the revolutionist project which is concerned with change, and also to his own notion of a CT of IR:
"In this context, rationalism maintains that international order is unlikely to survive unless certain norms are regarded as universally binding and unless governments increase their commitment to developing a community of states" (Linklater, 1990:21).

Linklater (1990:21-25) goes on to describe what he understands to be revolutionism. He distinguishes between the ethical criticism of Kant, who foresaw the extension of the moral autonomous subject to the sphere of international relations; the revolutionism of Marx, who did not envisage revolution as a means to aligning society with "permanently true moral propositions"; and the immanent critique of the Frankfurt School (see Chapter 2). Linklater views revolutionism as a perspective which is "best explained by considering the political theory of the Frankfurt School." He accepts the latter's critique of positivism and Marxism (the belief that technological progress would lead to eventual emancipation, carried within it the seeds of a new form of domination), but concludes that its pessimism that emancipation could be achieved by the proletariat or by other social movements in modern society, led it to abandon the emancipatory project.

This project, Linklater says, would be continued by Habermas, who "sought not only to recover critical theory but to do so within the Marxist tradition." He goes on to highlight Habermas' distinction between "labour" and "interaction", and how the focus on language and culture within interaction brings in an interest in the moral development of humanity, in addition to Marx's concern with control over nature. Linklater, then lifts out Habermas' point that in an interconnected world, individuals have a dual moral identity:

"On the one hand, they have rights and duties as citizens of particular sovereign states; on the other hand, they are human beings with a morality which is better 'suited to the identity of world citizens' than to the 'citizens of a state that has to maintain itself against other states'" (Linklater, 1990:26).
For Habermas, this duality is illustrated, *inter alia*, by the challenge of the global economy which clashes with the interests of states. By focusing on the possibility of the attainment of universal moral principles, Habermas, according to Linklater (1990:27) succeeds in “recovering critical theory” and the emancipatory project, which is aimed at trying “to extend the realm of social interaction which is governed by universalisable moral principles.” What is more, this resonates with the (hermeneutic) method of Bull, who also identifies the need “to move beyond the principle of state sovereignty.” Bull, says Linklater, focuses on similar problems and issues, and this points towards a need to consider how the different perspectives must be evaluated in terms of the contribution they can make “to one another’s development.” What then, does Linklater end up with in his CT of IR?

As one can see from the above, Linklater links a CT of IR, with the Frankfurt School and more specifically with Habermas. In fact, he goes on to say that CT in IR “has been profoundly influenced by the Frankfurt School’s critique of mainstream sociology, and cites the distinction which Cox (1981) makes between “problem-solving” and “critical” theory as an example (no doubt referring to Horkheimer’s distinction between “traditional” and “critical” theory). Cox’s view on the need for theory to be self-reflective is viewed as resembling the Frankfurt’s School’s criticism of positivism. After sympathetically reviewing Cox’s seminal article (1981), he then introduces Giddens to support his own contention that a CT of IR should be “post-Marxist.” Giddens’ point is that Marxism failed to account for the persistence of the state and war, moreover the emphasis on the proletariat in effecting emancipation towards socialism “is incompatible with the notion that the modern world is governed by multiple logics.” Linklater then concludes that Cox does not adequately address the realist critique of an approach based on historical materialism and a focus on production (Linklater, 1990:27-31).

A CT of IR, must (in terms of the dialectical development of perspectives) take on board the “achievements” of the positivist and hermeneutic method, as well as “the main strengths of the realist and rationalist traditions.” This requires a focus on power and security to assess how state interaction impedes the movement towards international
community; it also requires a focus on order to show how the commitment of states to principles acts as a constraint on unilateral action; and lastly, it requires focusing on potential and real "developments which may strengthen the bonds of international community" (Linklater, 1990:32). Neither an exclusive focus on "war" or on "production" provides the whole picture. According to Linklater a CT of IR which is biased towards indicating how we can widen political and moral community,

"has to take account of two phenomena which realism and Marxism have ignored. The means by which independent political communities have established the principles of their co-existence is the first of these phenomena. The second is the means by which moral principles have been universalised in the course of human history" (Linklater, 171-172).

Linklater (1992) revisits these issues later in an article which, again makes the case for his view of a CT of IR, and ties this to the notion of "exclusion" and "inclusion". Linklater (1992:93-94) argues that the state should apply its "universalist moral discourse" to its own practices of excluding minorities (based on class, race and gender). Normatively, a CT of IR must "facilitate the extension of moral and political community in international affairs." This does not mean ignoring cultural differences, but it does mean moving towards a "post-sovereign" account of IR and assessing, empirically, what the impediments are which prevent the extension of (international) political community. This requires paying more attention to "sub-national and transnational loyalties" and envisages the continued existence of states, but with reduced sovereignty. To tackle the project of the extension of political community beyond states, he does not regard CT as "the next stage in the development of International Relations theory" (see Hoffman, 1987:244, and below). In accordance with the approach set out in Beyond Realism and Marxism, and notably, Linklater (1992:79) does not regard CT as being uniquely equipped to pursue this project by itself, but rather "...when articulated fully, (it) can give direction to the field as a whole...it can...shed light on what the ensuing phase should be."
Linklater (1992:86) is aware of the enormity of the task which the “synthesising project of critical theory faces.” He is particularly concerned to address the accusations of post-modernists, that he is promoting the establishment of a universalist international political community which is based on the norms and principles of the West.³ To this charge, Linklater (1992:80-81) replies that both Habermas and Foucault are concerned with questions of exclusion, and that strategies to resist exclusion must of necessity privilege “moral universals in the end.” In the end, post-modernists’ refusal to posit anything concrete, except being averse to “closure”, seems to satisfy Linklater that his attempt to construct a “more encompassing approach” has merit (Linklater, 1990:88-90).

Linklater’s attempt to construct a CT of IR, is wide-ranging and, according to him, cannot succeed without including a wide variety of issues, such as “state-building”, “geopolitics”, “war”, “the effects of commerce or production”, and “the cultural dimensions of international relations.” Bringing various perspectives together, by his own account, “...is another matter”, and it is unclear as to how Habermas’ notion of social learning (as suggested by Linklater) will be able to contribute to resolving this problem. In the end, his CT of IR, although it stresses the importance for an empirical account of how his notion of an extended international political community, is hindered or could be achieved, does not materialise. This leaves the whole endeavour hanging in the air as somewhat transcendental. His emphasis on an inclusive approach when it comes to issues, founders when we are urged to avoid the choice between perspectives, and to focus on “...how states can transcend the divisive pursuit of national security by creating international order, and transform a minimal order between states into a cosmopolitan community of humankind or Kantian universal kingdom of ends” (Linklater, 1992:96).

It founders not because Linklater sets us a normative goal, but because he does not deliver on his own challenge to scholars of global political economy:
"...the success or failure of the critical theory of international relations will be determined by the amount of light cast on present possibilities and not just by its performance in the spheres of philosophy and historical sociology alone" (Linklater, 1990:172).

3.3 Richard Ashley

According to George (1994:172), Richard Ashley's contributions to a CT of IR in the early 1980s, and more specifically his article titled "The Poverty of Neorealism" (1984), "...quickened the pulse of the critical challenge to the disciplinary orthodoxy perceptibly and became something of a catalyst for the extended critical agenda of the past few years." Similarly to Linklater (who follows Ashley's Habermasian footsteps) he criticises Waltz's neorealism, but wants to salvage the "practical" or "classical" realism of Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Herz and Kissinger and use its more interpretative approach in the development of an alternative model which he calls the "dialectical competence model" (Ashley, 1986). His critique of neorealism resonates with some of the points which Linklater makes, but overall Ashley's attack is directed more at the "uni-dimensional" positivism of neorealism and the accompanying implications for knowledge, as well as its notion of structuralism. He also does not concern himself with addressing the merits or shortcomings of any other approaches to IR.

Ashley's article, "Political Realism and Human Interests" (1981), in contrast to "The Poverty of Neorealism" (1984), is more directly linked to Habermas' (1972) notion of knowledge-constitutive interests (see Chapter 2). Here he argues that Habermas' empirical-analytic base of knowledge, which is linked to the interest of control, can be discerned in a form of realism which Ashley calls "technical" realism. This (Waltzian) variation took shape in tandem with the need of policy makers (in the US) to make sense of the Cold War international system and emphasised "scientific rationalism", "deductive empiricism" and research which was aimed at "problem solving" (George, 1994:171-172).
Ashley associates Habermas’ historical-hermeneutic form of knowledge creation, with “traditional” or “practical” realism. Referred to as “classical” realism in 1984, this form of realism is more concerned with meaning and an understanding of states, power, national interest, and diplomats which is historically and contextually anchored. A CT of IR, based on practical realism (as reflected in the work of John Herz), would be an approach “freed from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and [the] conditions of distorted communication that deny humans the capacity to make the future through free will and consciousness” (Ashley, 1981:227, quoted by George, 1994:172).

In “The Poverty of Neorealism”, Ashley (1986:256) starts his critique by referring to E.P. Thompson’s critique directed at the structural Marxism of Althusser, which (according to Thompson) was aimed at creating a positivist model of Marxism which ended up objectifying human agency, ignoring the historical Marx, watering down the dialectical component of Marx’s thought, and producing a “mechanistic theory of capitalist society.” In the spirit of Thompson’s critique of Althusser, Ashley goes on to identify the “structural turn” in North American scholarship, which he terms the neorealist “movement”, as reflecting the same drawbacks and subsequent results of Althusser’s positivist Marxism, albeit from a state-centric focus, rather than a class based one.

Although he associates a number of names with this movement (Keohane, Krasner, Gilpin, Tucker, Modelski and Kindleberger) he emphasises that he is concerned with the underlying assumptions of neorealist “lore”. In effect the major part of his criticism is directed at Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (1979). The “inspiration” for his argument is found in two post-modernists, Bourdieu and Foucault, and also in Habermas, as well as “...more distantly (own italics), the whole tradition of the Frankfurt School.” Although Ashley, acknowledges the substantial differences between particularly Habermas and the post-modernists in a footnote, this combination later left him open to attacks by his critics. Ashley’s problem was that one cannot draw on both, foundationalist and anti-foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without at least accounting for the difference between them and providing a defence as to why and how they could be reconciled (Ashley, 1986:255-259, 298 footnote 6 and George, 1994:175-176).
How does Ashley's treatment of neorealism proceed? He starts by identifying neorealism as the "scientific" reaction against classical realism, points out similarities between structuralism and structuralist realism (henceforth referred to as neorealism) and goes on to critique various aspects on which, according to him neorealism is based, viz. statism, utilitarianism, positivism, and structuralism. After this he reflects on the work of Morgenthau and Wight, as examples of classical realism, and concludes that the "generative potential" of classical realism can be built on by the development of a "dialectical competence model."

According to Ashley, neorealism (particularly Waltz’s version) attempts to give a scientific account of inter-state politics, based on the same concepts of classical realism (state, power, national interest), but aimed at addressing three shortcomings of the latter. Firstly, classical realism’s concepts are viewed as being too vague and not anchored enough in objective reality to be operationalisable. Secondly, classical realism does not emphasise the distinction between subject and object adequately. This leads to the notion that the constituent (subjects) units of the system have an effect on systemic maintenance. This reductionism (cf. Waltz, 1979), prevents theory building aimed at explaining the working of the system itself. Fourthly, classical realism has been too much separated from other disciplines and particularly from "social theory". Lastly, it has suffered from its insistence on the separation of politics and economics, in other words it adheres to the assumption of "the autonomy of political sphere." This resulted in an inability to explain the state’s role during the economic crises of the 1970s, and required a response which aims to "...disclose the power-political struggle for hegemony behind the economic dynamics that liberal and radical analysts had falsely treated in isolation from interstate politics" (Ashley, 1986:260-262).

The response to all of this was to be found “in a distinctly American fashion; that is, scientifically” (Ashley, 1986:262). For Waltz (1979) the road to theory needed to be based on (positivist) science and on the promise of structuralism. Having described neorealism as the scientific reaction to classical realism, Ashley identifies a number of
characteristics of structuralism and indicates how they resonate within the (structural) neorealism of Waltz. Ashley calls these the "isomorphisms" between structuralism and neorealism. Importantly, the parts cannot exist independently of the structure. Their identity and action, as well as differences between them are determined by structural characteristics. The system, however, in its totality, does exist independently of the parts and constitutes them. Subjective actions (behaviour and self-understanding) are merely the surface "...generated by a deeper, independently existing logic or structure." Change (diachrony) is dependent on the attributes of the system or structure. These attributes are static (synchronic). In other words, static (synchronous) features explain (diachronic) change. The subjective action (practice) of agents is not considered to explain structural change. As Ashley puts it: "structuralists adopt a posture that denies the role of practice in the making and possible transformation of social order" (Ashley, 1986:262-267).

Taking into consideration the limits which structuralism imposes on the ability of human agency to bring about structural transformation, there are, according to Ashley (1986:268) other reasons why neorealist structuralism does not deliver on "the promise of structuralism." He goes on to consider and critique the components or "commitments" of neorealism, beginning with its statism. The state for neorealism is an unquestioned assumption. It is, for all intents and purposes, regarded as a unitary acter. This is part and parcel of the neorealist discourse, notwithstanding some caveats made by neorealists that they can conceive of the state as the reflection of sub-national "coalitions" and interests.

This commitment takes on the shape of a "metaphysical" one, according to Ashley, and is not subjected to falsification tests by neorealists. As a result, all human interests (in whatever form or collectivity) have to be reduced to aggregations of domestic interests, and only those domestic interests which are congruent with state interests are taken into consideration. Everything is viewed through "the prism of the state." The second consequence, is that one of the tenets of structuralism is turned inside out. This comes about by neorealists’ adherence to the assumption that the state exists prior to the system.
The latter cannot exist independently of its constituent units (states), but is in fact brought into (unintended) existence by the interaction between states; similar to the manner in which the market is formed through the interaction of self-regarding individuals (cf. Waltz, 1979). Therefore, a systemic (structural) principle cannot determine the identity of the parts, because in neorealist terms that identity "is already taken for granted" (states are independent and sovereign, subject to no higher authority) (Ashley, 1986:268-273).

We turn, next, to what Ashley views as another "commitment" of neorealism, i.e. utilitarianism. According to him, the utilitarianism which is to be found in neorealism is not of the kind which is usually associated with the writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, but is related to a "paradigm" which can be said to have become the dominant one in social science. Its major tenets are individualism and rationalism. The ultimate source of action is the individual who, as an actor independent from societal institutions, makes choices under conditions of scarcity. Furthermore the actions of individuals are viewed in instrumental terms. This is the rationality aspect of utilitarianism. Ends are attained by using the most efficient means available. Change and order is the result of such instrumental interactions between individual actors and is attributed to changes in their demands, capabilities and interests. Again, as with the statist commitment in neorealism, the appropriate analogy is the market. Furthermore, observes Ashley (1986:275): "It is important to add that such modes of action, interaction, order, and change are deemed intrinsically objective, in need neither of normative defense nor of historical accounting. Their realization in practice, while not always to be observed historically, is taken to be an essential, objective, and progressive tendency of history."

In neorealism the objective, rationally acting individuals are taken to be states. Under "utilitarian statism", power is viewed as the capabilities (military, economic, technological) which states have at their disposal and which are unequally distributed in the system. There is therefore, no consideration of power "underneath" or "behind" the state, no consideration of social power or of the "intersubjective consensus" which exists apart from or prior to the state as individual actor. Order and change is dependent on the distribution of power capabilities between states in the international system. Ashley's
(1986:279) objection to all of this can be summarised in his contention that neorealism does not have a “theory of the state”: “That is to say, the neorealist counts on our being so awestruck by the Hobbesian and free-rider dilemmas we confront at the ‘international level’ that we shall join in neglecting the same dilemmas at the level of the state.”

From positivism, neorealism, begets its state-as-actor notion. An idea which, because it is to be found at the core of scientific enterprise, cannot be scientifically challenged. This is Ashley’s conclusion on what positivist commitment means for neorealism. His summation of what he regards as the most important tenets of positivism are in line with those of other critical theorists: reality exists independently from the observing subject; knowledge produced must be “technically useful”, it must lead to prediction and therefore to control; knowledge is value-neutral; and truth claims can only be evaluated by subjecting them to the test of whether they “correspond to the field of external experience.” Basically, human behaviour can be objectified, similar to how the natural sciences objectify nature. With this comes an acceptance, as well, of instrumental rationality and its “inherent objectivity” (Ashley, 1986:281-283).

Ashley (1986:282-284), in accordance with the critique of positivism by the Frankfurt School, contends that this view of science, is an ideological commitment in its own right. Additionally, it requires us to view society in terms of an “actor model.” For, in the end, the positivist approach automatically leads the analyst to look for the (individualist) actor to which all explanation must be reduced. “Meaning” is ultimately to be found in how individual actors view society as a set of constraints. Through their action to achieve their ends, “meaning enters society”, the only action worthy of consideration is “motivated action.” In the final analysis, explanation ultimately focuses on the interaction between actors and the instrumental reason they must of necessity use in their dealings with one another. Secondly, along with the acceptance of the positivist “actor-model”, also comes another tenet: the refusal of science to pronounce on values and ends, but only on the means with which they might be efficiently achieved. This means that some aspects of
reality can be examined and explained and others cannot: "...it excludes discussion of forms of social consensus that might themselves be value-laden, that might be historically contingent and susceptible to change, and that might nonetheless coordinate human practices and distributions of resources..." (Ashley, 1986:285).

Having criticised various aspects of what he deems to be the core components of neorealism, Ashley (1986:286) returns to "the promise" of its structuralism and concludes that it fails to penetrate "...beneath commonsense appearances of the given order." Why? Waltz's (1979) structural realism, according to Ashley, cannot stand the test of structuralism's main assumption: that structure can exist independently and before the elements which are a part of it. Ultimately, Waltz's explanation of structure is atomistic because it accords to the component parts (states) the function of creating the structure through their own interaction. This is a contradiction in terms. Secondly, neorealism is ahistorical in that it "denies history as process." The structure and its categories and parts interact according to a fixed set of rules which are applicable universally; from the medieval "international" order to the bipolar order during the Cold War. Thirdly, to neorealism political practice is reduced to rationally motivated states as actors. Political creativity, in the sense that individuals can reflect on their own existence and their institutions and, by so doing, change them and their material circumstances is ignored. The reason? "For to do so would mean that neorealist theory would itself be a mere part of history, and not the intellectual master it aspires to be." Politics, is thus viewed as a technique and not as a "creative critical enterprise" (Ashley, 1986:291-292).

Fourthly, neorealism deals with power as something which can be determined by looking at the capabilities of states, and not as a concept which ultimately is rooted in society. Ashley (1986:291) acknowledges that this is a conceptualisation of power which is in accordance with neorealism's atomistic and utilitarian model of international politics, but deems it be an inadequate one. He proposes instead a competence model of power, where
power does not depend on the capabilities of an actor, but on the fact that the power which an actor may nor may not have is dependent on the recognition accorded to it by the community. Power is “community-reflective”, and must be exercised within the “meaning” and “collective expectations” of the community.

Ashley’s (1986:294) “dialectical competence model”, according to him, is more suited to explain change and to penetrate below the apparently “commonsense” structuralist approach of neorealism. Encapsulated within this model is his aim to offer a more self-reflective approach to knowledge generation in IR, and to acknowledge its complexity. It is important to take note, that Ashley’s competence model draws on and tries to salvage the “usable” (more interpretative) aspects of classical realism (or practical realism, cf. Ashley, 1981). What are the assumptions of this model? Firstly, it needs to be able to account for the origins, maintenance, and “possible transformation” of the “world-dominant public political apparatus.” The latter is the balance-of-power regime which is made up by modern states. Importantly, Ashley contends that states are produced by this regime and that their actions are acts of “self-realization” because their identities are determined and are at one with it.

Secondly, global hegemony is construed as reflective of the power exercised by the dominant bloc in the regime. This is a political economic issue, one which is ignored by classical realism, according to Ashley. The working of the balance-of-power regime can only be fully understood by locating it within “the social, economic, and environmental conditions...upon which it depends” (Ashley, 1986:294). He argues that the “silence” on matters economic is possibly the result of a consensus within the dominant bloc of the regime, to relegate the economic within the realm of “private” actions, thereby removing it from public (political) responsibility. This reflects modern global hegemony. Thirdly, the competence model would have to explain the political practices of the regime, centered on resource allocation and legitimation to ensure “the possibility conditions of the regime” (Ashley, 1986:295).
Fourthly, the competence model should be able to investigate “the learning potential of the balance-of-power regime.” How do “competent” statesmen utilise reserves of acquired “symbolic capital” to improvise during crises. Fifth, the model should focus on crises and particularly on how they may act as catalysts for the transformation of the circumstances upon which the functioning of the balance-of-power regime rests: “...such a crisis might be expected to be marked by the economization of politics and the resulting loss of political autonomy vis-à-vis economic and technological change” (Ashley, 1986:296).

Lastly, this approach would view modern global hegemony within the context of “a multiplicity of mutually interpenetrating and opposed world orders, some of which might escape the logic of the modern global hegemony and assert alternative structuring possibilities under circumstances and by way of oppositional strategies that can in principle be specified.” (Ashley, 1986:296). This would involve focusing on challengers to the balance-of-power order and modern global hegemony, and their strategies to achieve transformation to achieve a situation where they “secure the widening recognition of their own ordering principles as the active principles of practice” (Ashley, 1986:297).

In conclusion, Ashley’s major contribution to CT in IR is to be found in his in depth and wide ranging critique of neorealism, using concepts and ideas drawn from Habermas (particularly, Ashley 1981), but otherwise more loosely connected with the Frankfurt School. The rudiments of his alternative model, which stresses the need to account for change, learning, and self-reflection on accepted practices within the status quo as proffered by neorealism was unfortunately not further developed or applied to practice. This is due to his shift to, and subsequent work from within the post-modernist perspective (cf. Ashley, 1987).
3.4 Mark Hoffman

Yet another name associated with the use of CT in IR is Mark Hoffman. Hoffman’s (1987:244) article ends by boldly stating that “Critical theory represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory.” This, rather optimistic, claim led to a critical response by Rengger (1988) and a short reaction by Hoffman (1988) which is worth taking note of because it points to the difference between post-modernism and CT within the genre of critical approaches in IR (as well as in social and political theory). Before turning to this “mini-debate”, I briefly look at the outline of Hoffman’s first article.

Hoffman (1987:231-232) starts by pointing out that IR theory can no longer be viewed or developed in isolation from social and political theory. Secondly, that the consensus on the realist paradigm in IR, and the certainty which went along with it, has been replaced with a divergence of approaches. This diversity was signaled by Banks’ (1985) identification of the “inter-paradigm” debate in IR. More particularly, Hoffman argues that the consequence of the demise of the realist consensus, are (in addition to IR theory’s re-integration) evident in a movement away from the positivist method (which cannot explain) to a more “interpretive understanding” of social phenomena (which can explain, but does not “critique the boundaries of understanding”). To address the shortcomings in both, Hoffman stresses the need for CT, which can transcend them by virtue of being “self-reflective”. Furthermore, CT opens up the possibility for “the realisation of human potential” through a critique of the present and, subsequently, the potential for its transformation.

In the next section, Hoffman (1987:232-238) sets out his understanding of CT. He starts by linking CT to the Frankfurt School and particularly to Max Horkheimer’s (1937) essay where he distinguishes between traditional and critical theory (see Chapter 2). The point is made that theory development is a part of social reality and shapes it. He also acknowledges CT’s debt to Marxism, but points out the differences between them.
Habermas is identified as the foremost contemporary intellectual associated with CT. Hoffman accepts Habermas’ critique of the modern variant of reason which, in the form of scientific rationalism, has created an order in which humans are the objects of control “and politics is about who gets what, when and how but not why (original italics).” (Hoffman, 1987:234). Hoffman (1987:235-236) goes on to an explication of Habermas’ “knowledge-constitutive” interests (see Chapter 2) and argues that scientific rationality (as reflected in the technical interest) should not be the only foundation of knowledge, but together with the practical interest, and the emancipatory interest, form a CT of which the purpose “is to isolate and critique those rationalisations of society which are advanced as self-evident truths, but which may be ideological mystifications” (Hoffman, 1987:236).

Hoffman (1987:236) then identifies a number of authors which, for him, are most representative of CT in IR. Among these he cites Robert Cox, Richard Ashley and Andrew Linklater, with Cox being regarded as being the closest to the Frankfurt School. Hoffman (1987:237) qualifies his linkage of Cox to the Frankfurt School by stating that Cox “draws implicitly (own italics) on the links between interests and knowledge that are central to the Frankfurt School”, and that Cox’s view on the nature of theory “has important similarities (own italics) with the work of the Frankfurt School.” Further on in the article he admits that Cox’s work “may owe more” to Giambattista Vico and Antonio Gramsci, than to Horkheimer and Habermas.

However, in a footnote (Hoffman, 1987:247, footnote 30) he again “pushes” the linkage between Cox and Habermas, when he criticises Kubalkova and Cruickshank for exaggerating Cox’s position on Habermas, and contends again that there are differences but also important similarities between Horkheimer, Habermas and Cox. He notes that Cox does not regard Habermas as “irrelevant for an understanding of international behaviour” but that he criticises the latter for not taking into account “the implications of different forms of state/civil society relationships.” This is an important point because it
is directly related to the question of how much intellectual debt Cox (or for that matter Ashley, Hoffman, and Neufeld) owe to the CT of the Frankfurt School. I will return to this issue in Chapters 4 and 5, where a detailed account of the development of Cox’s approach and his influences is given.

Next, Hoffman derives “a series of basic elements” which he views as belonging to CCT. They are based on Cox’s (1981, 1983, 1986) initial formulations of the framework he would later use in the 1987, *Production, Power, and World Order* volume, and accurately reflect his thinking at the time. I do not paraphrase them in full here, but revisit some of them below, when I discuss Rengger’s (1988) critique. Having conceptualised CT and CCT, as well as argued that the two are linked, Hoffman (1987:238-244) evaluates whether the three main paradigms (realism, pluralism and structuralism) in IR approximate the components of CCT.

Realism is tackled first, both “technical realism” as evidenced by the work of Waltz (1979) and “practical realism” as reflected in Bull’s (1977) contribution to the “English School” are found wanting, when measured up to CCT (see also the discussion of Ashley’s work above). Waltz (1979) engages in problem-solving theory and ends up concluding that state forms do not matter, but that the distribution of power in the international system does. The problem becomes one of how to survive in a system where there is no centralised authority. Whether the system is prone to change or transformation is left out of the equation.

Practical realism fares better because it focuses on the norms and culture of the international system and investigates how states arrive at a consensus in a system without “an overarching sovereign” (Hoffman, 1987:239). System maintenance depends on consensus, but Bull also entertains the notion of system transformation. In the end, however, practical realism also does not “step out of itself” to consider the ideological component hidden within the approach (how the norms, values, and rules shape the “reality” of the system of states). By not doing so, and by its relationship to technical realism, it “reifies a world order and as a consequence can only engage in problem-
solving” (Hoffman, 1987:240). Ashley’s attempt (see above) to salvage and use some of realism’s core insights cannot hope to succeed, because such an approach “...would have moved so drastically from the core assumptions of political realism that it would be a misnomer to speak of it as a critical realist theory of international relations.”

Pluralism, as reflected in the work done on international regimes, interdependence and transnationalism, is regarded by Hoffman (1987:241) as engaging in the problem-solving approach because it focuses on system maintenance (mainly) in the interests of states. He notes, however, that pluralism as an approach was a reaction to the “state as only actor worthy of consideration” premise of realism, and therefore finds Cox’s conclusion that they are problem-solving approaches “odd.” After making this observation he does not pursue the matter any further, notwithstanding the fact that Cox (1981) explains his reasons for arriving at this conclusion. I will return to this point in Chapter 5.

Hoffman (1987:241-242) finds more promise in the World Order Models Project (WOMP) and in the world society approach of John Burton. The former because it considers the possibility of an alternative set of norms which could form the basis of a new intersubjective understanding of world politics. It also focuses on the development of human potential in a world where states are no longer adequately equipped to deal with changes brought about by, for instance, technology. Burton’s approach to conflict resolution stresses the importance of self-understanding/reflection by the parties involved in a conflict. His focus on the realisation of human needs leads to the premise that states are not necessarily able to meet the identity and security needs of the individual. In both cases the focus on human potential and human needs are connected, according to Hoffman to the emancipatory cognitive interest of CT (and through association, CCT). He concludes, however, that both fail to address the emphasis which CCT places on historical contextualisation: “...human needs and their content cannot be ahistorically defined or determined” (Hoffman, 1987:243).
Hoffman (1987:243-244) finds the neo-Marxist approach located in structuralism to have the most affinity and overlap with CCT. Earlier in the article he points out that Frankfurt School CT deviates from Marxism in two important respects. Firstly, it does not view the proletariat as the catalyst for transformation. Secondly, it regards technology as not having the progressive role in society which classical Marxism accords to it. Hoffman's perception of the "Marxism tradition" is one which emphasises its reaction against positivism and modernisation, but negates the fact that essentially Marxism is not anti-scientific or anti-modern. He cites Wallerstein's world system theory as an example of an approach which takes account of historical context, focuses on system transformation, overcomes the division between domestic and international politics, and identifies the structural (universal) elements of world order (a capitalist system which determines the position of any state in the world system). Hoffman's (1987:244) only criticism about the approaches in structuralism is that they "...lack...any substantive development of practical cognitive interests, an explicit normative element other than that which it implicitly draws from Marxism...".

His conclusion regarding the similarities between structuralism and CCT is mainly based on the shared intellectual roots between neo-Marxist approaches and CCT. This affinity is readily acknowledged by Cox (see Chapters 4 and 5). It ignores, however, the similarities between Wallerstein's world system approach (cf. 1976, 1979) and the structural realism of Waltz. In structural realism the characteristics of the international system (no central authority, unequal distribution of power) determine the options open to states. In Wallerstein's world system, the capitalist world economy creates a hierarchy of structures (core, semi-periphery and periphery). Although, technically, systemic transformation is regarded as possible, in effect states end up playing out their roles in accordance with where they find themselves in the structure of the world system. Coxian Critical Theory, although it emphasises the importance of historical structures, allows for mutual interaction and influence between the system (world order), forms of state, and social forces (sub-state actors related to the mode of production).
Rengger’s (1988) reaction to and critique of Hoffman’s article points out the difference between CT/CCT and other critical approaches (post-modernism). Rengger’s points about rationalism, universalism, and foundationalism apply as much to CT as they do to CCT. I do not, however, agree with Hoffman’s argument which tries to link CCT to CT. My reasons for doing so will become clear in Chapters 4 and 5 and I encapsulate them in the concluding chapter. At this juncture it is sufficient to take note of Rengger’s reaction and Hoffman’s response.

Rengger (1988:81) begins by agreeing with Hoffman that IR can no longer be regarded as separate from developments in social and political theory. He then identifies and takes issue with three elements of CCT (as set out by Hoffman). They are that:

“CT questions the origins of the legitimacy of social and political institutions...[and] seeks to define what elements are universal to world order and what elements are historically contingent.”

“CT contains a normative, utopian element, in favour of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but also recognises the constraints placed on possible alternative world orders by historical processes.”

“CT is a guide for strategic action, for bringing about an alternative world order” (Rengger, 1988:81-82).

Rengger (1988:82) then singles out three aspects from the above premises: “universal to world order”, “normative utopian element”, and “a guide for strategic action.” Contained within these, argues Rengger, is a form of rationalism, albeit a weaker one, of the same variety that Hoffman (using Habermas) criticises as being a part of the scientific rationalism which is aimed at controlling and managing society, and objectifying the individual. Furthermore, thinking of “an alternative world order” – even while taking into account the historical constraints which often hinder the realisation of the normative goal
(freeing up human potential) – requires us to (rationally) think of a set of criteria which would lead to the realisation of a different world order, and to then use them as a “guide for strategic action.” As soon as we start doing this, Rengger says, we move into the territory of problem-solving approaches. Moreover, the use of criteria, and the setting out of theoretical elements are foundationalist. Citing the work of Foucault, Rorty and Williams, Rengger argues that CCT’s premise that the theorist “can stand apart from the prevailing world order” cannot be attained, because “our perceptions of that world order are themselves in part the production of such a culturally generated grid.” This means that criteria formed in a historically contingent context, can never be universalised, it means that there is “nothing unchangeable” (universal). The work of critical (postmodernist) scholars in IR, such as James Der Derian, can therefore not be grouped together with those who accept the premises of CCT (Rengger, 1988:83, 86).

Hoffman’s (1988) brief response is focused on the issues of rationality, foundationalism and universalism. Having expressed my reservations about aspects of Hoffman’s argument above, I am in full agreement with his reaction to Rengger’s critique. Hoffman (1988:92) starts by acknowledging that the roots of the rationalism used in CT lie in the Enlightenment. It is with the one-sided use of that rationalism that Hoffman has a problem, viz. an exclusive focus on instrumentalism and control (ignoring the other two knowledge-constitutive interests of Habermas). Rationalism too must be subjected to self-reflection, however CT “…seeks to critique the development of certain forms of rationality but does not accept the radical interpretivist renunciation of reason itself.” On the charge of foundationalism, Hoffman (1988:92) responds that CT does not need to assess itself from “within interpretivism.” It is in pursuit of “open-ended knowledge”, which means constant “critical assessment” and self-reflection.

On universalism, Hoffman (1988:93) counters that we need to “operate at the level of universality” in order to ensure progress in social and political theory. This need not be done rigidly. Critical Theory recognises that theoretical premises are open to criticism and that reason and rationality may appear in different forms, depending on time and place. Nevertheless, the anti-universalism of the radical interpretivist position leads us to
“become dispassionate observers rather than concerned critics.” Hoffman concludes by observing that Rengger is right that there is a fundamental difference between CT and the critical theory of scholars like Der Derian. However, by arguing that the latter approach offers a more comprehensive overhaul of “intellectual and evaluative categories”, Rengger also commits the error of predicting the outcome of the debate. The problem with the radical interpretivist approach’s relativism is that it contains “...an element of conservatism and stops short of the aims of critical theory to change the way we talk and act (original italics) in the world” (Hoffman, 1988:93-94). It for this reason that Hoffman (1988:92) views CT “…as the most self-reflective outpost of the radical traditions of the Enlightenment.”

It is interesting to note that Hoffman does not refer to CCT in his response to Rengger, but to CT. His acceptance of the possibility of a “conversation” between CT and postmodernism (reiterated later, see Hoffman, 1991:184, “…we need not deny the possibility of interconnections...”) led to a joint chapter with Rengger (Rengger and Hoffman, 1992) where they distinguish between critical interpretative theory (entailing minimum foundationalism; in other words, truth claims can be assessed) and radical interpretativism (there are no independent criteria for assessing truth claims, outside of any given theory) (Smith, 1995:28-29).

3.5 Mark Neufeld

I turn, lastly, to an overview of Neufeld’s contribution to CT in IR. His argument for a restructuring of IR theory to incorporate elements of CT is probably the most accessible and well argued example of this approach in the discipline. I will therefore deal with it in some detail, as he also draws on Cox to illustrate his own notion of reflexivity which he regards as an essential element of any theory which aspires to be critical. His earlier (1992, 1993a, 1993b) work is incorporated in The Restructuring of International Relations Theory (1995), and it is on this volume that I will be concentrating.
Neufeld's (1995:1-2) aim is to show why there is a scarcity in IR of theory which is “oriented toward human emancipation.” The answer, he argues, is to be found in the domination of the “logic of positivism.” The solution is to overcome this domination and to restructure IR theory along critical lines by undertaking “an exercise in international meta-theory.” In other words, by an evaluation of theory itself. What is it that makes a good theory? In order to determine what this means for a theory of world politics, Neufeld draws on social and political theory, particularly on Bernstein (1976). Bernstein’s approach involved moving away from positivism by focusing on an interpretative understanding of intersubjective meaning, a critique of the world constituted by the latter, and contemplation on how such a critique might lead to change and human emancipation. Similarly (but applied to IR theory), Neufeld focuses on the tenets and underlying assumptions of positivism and, through the method of immanent critique (see Chapter 2), points out what their implications are, as well as why they should be transformed. His critical intellectual roots lie in “Western Marxism (including Gramsci), and in particular the variant known as the ‘Frankfurt School’” (Neufeld, 1995:3-7).

Neufeld (1995:9-12) starts by drawing an analogy between human emancipation and the “Aristotelian project.” The Aristotelian view of the polis was that it was a created “space” within which humans could live in equality and freedom (not their natural state). The polis (as a way of life) guaranteed and amounted to “the minimum self-sufficient human reality.” He concludes that the world that we live in today faces threats to human autonomy and freedom on a global scale. International Relations theory should therefore concern itself with how minimum self-sufficient human reality can be attained in the global polis. How can a world which places constraints on human autonomy be transformed? How can IR theory contribute to human emancipation? The answer lies in the promises of CT. Neufeld (1995:13-19) then (briefly) traces the tradition of CT through the writings of Kant (the human mind orders reality), Hegel (society is not transcendental but historically contingent, and therefore so is the way in which the human mind orders reality), and Marx (human subjects are actors and capable of changing the world).
He ends this overview by identifying three elements which, according to him, are central to the "critical tradition" (Neufeld, 1995:19-20). The first is "theoretical reflexivity." Theory cannot only be concerned with the empirical, but it must also reflect "on the process of theorizing itself." Secondly, CT emphasises the importance of the (human) subject's role in transformation. Human consciousness through intersubjective meaning forms a part of the "web of meaning," and therefore is constitutive of reality (see below) and can, subsequently, also change that reality. Lastly, CT, being focused on human emancipation, "...is characterized by its engagement in social criticism in support of practical political activity oriented towards societal transformation. The absence of these elements in contemporary IR theory are the result of the "positivist logic" which is predominant. To make this connection clear, Neufeld (1995:22-38) first sets out the tenets and underlying assumptions of positivism.

He points out that quantification in itself, "is neither sufficient nor necessary for a study of the social world to qualify as positivist." Nor can we accept that positivism is not the preferred approach to knowledge generation, if it is not explicitly stated: "...because individual scholars do not consciously identify themselves with the positivist approach does not mean that such an approach has not been adopted unconsciously" (Neufeld, 1995:22-23). He also rejects the depiction of positivists as not being concerned with values and theory. What, then, are the core elements of the methodology of positivism, according to him?

Neufeld (1995:23-25) identifies two variants of positivism, Comtean positivism and logical positivism (associated with the Vienna Circle). According to Comte, positive knowledge (from there the name positivism) was the last type of knowledge to emerge in tandem with industrial scientific society (the others are theological and metaphysical). This approach would generate "true" knowledge by its correspondence to observable
facts. Such knowledge would be objective because it would have no bearing, nor would it concern itself, with the normative questions of theology and metaphysics. Lastly, the unity of the sciences would be attained by the assumption that positivism can be applied equally and productively in the social sciences, as well as in the natural sciences.

The positivism of Comte was modified at the beginning of the last century by, among others, the contributions of the “Vienna Circle.” Logical positivism emphasised “symbolic logic” which contained within it three elements: (1) the referential theory of meaning, (2) the deductive-nomological framework of explanation and (3) the axiomatic view of theory. The referential theory of meaning stresses the necessity to attach clear meaning to words and sentences in order to avoid vagueness (associated with the acceptance of ideas as being related to experience by Comtean positivism). Accordingly, the “verifiability principle” requires that all statements (either directly or indirectly) must be linked to empirical data (operationalised).

The deductive-nomological framework of explanation sets out the criteria which must be met by the researcher of social phenomena, in order for the results generated to qualify as knowledge. In terms of this framework a social event is deemed to be explained only once it can be shown that is part of an observable regularity. Explaining an event takes the form of deducing a statement (which describes the event observed) from a previously known set of statements (laws) which describe the initial conditions related to that event. Therefore, something is only explained once it has been incorporated under a “covering law” (event x occurs, when event y happens). Laws are generated through the deducing of hypotheses. How hypotheses are arrived at (discovery) is not important, but the manner in which they are justified must meet the requirements of the deductive-nomological method.

Lastly, positivism, differentiates between spurious generalisations and laws through its view of theories as being axiomatic. This means that laws are viewed as being deducible from theories, which in turn, are viewed as a set of connected statements, “...so laws
themselves are explained in terms of (i.e., derived from) theories. Axioms are derived from the core premises of a theory, and these axioms are the laws which "cover" observed regularities. There cannot, therefore, be any "accidental" generalisations. (Neufeld, 1995:28-31).

From the above, Neufeld (1995:33-37) identifies three core tenets (and their underlying assumptions) which are shared by all varieties of positivism (Comtean, Vienna Circle, Popperian and Lakatosian). First, the tenet of "truth as correspondence." For knowledge to be reliable it must correspond to empirical reality. The assumption underlying this tenet is that it possible to separate subject and object. The existence of a "real" world, which lies outside the subject (researcher) can be perceived and explained by the utilisation of positivism's "neutral observation language." Second, the notion that the practice of science is characterised by a unified method. This is based on the assumption of naturalism. There is nothing fundamentally different between the natural world and social world, therefore the method used to study natural phenomena can be applied to social phenomena.

Finally, the belief that the practice of science is value-free. This is based on the assumption that facts and values can be separated. While it is accepted that researchers have values which may even influence the choice of the social event which is studied, the positivist method insures that the eventual explanation is based on observable facts. Values can be studied when they are "emotional responses" to "real or presumed" facts. Scholars who investigate value-laden questions (ought questions) have a contribution to make, but their work is categorised as normative and not scientific theory.

It is these tenets and their assumptions, argues Neufeld, which have dominated IR theory and which have therefore hindered the development of CT in IR. To demonstrate this point, he goes on to look at the first core element of CT, reflexivity, within the context of positivism generally and the use of positivism in IR. But what does Neufeld regard as essential for a theory to be fully reflexive? First, such a theory must show an awareness and demonstrate a willingness to reflect on its own underlying assumptions. Second, it
accepts that all research paradigms, in addition to assumptions and tenets, also have a "politico-normative dimension." Third, it allows for a reasoned evaluation of what are essentially incommensurable paradigms. In terms of the first element, positivism also emphasises the importance of underlying assumptions in theory development. It is the other two elements of reflexivity, however, which challenge positivism. Why is this so? (Neufeld, 1995:40-41).

The acceptance that paradigms have a politico-normative dimension challenges the truth as correspondence tenet, which has as its underlying assumption the idea that it is possible to separate subject and object. This leads to the acceptance by positivists of a "subjectless" science which is dependent on ahistorical, timeless truth criteria. In contrast, a reflective approach stresses that the criteria which are used to determine what is to be regarded as knowledge and what not, have been developed by a research community and are therefore context bound, human standards. Moreover, these knowledge criteria are also linked to politics: "...the problems, needs and interests deemed important and legitimate by a given community for which 'reliable knowledge' is being sought." Secondly, the politico-normative content of different paradigms, makes them incommensurable (their values differ and they are often developed to address different political needs and problems). There is, therefore, no neutral observation language which can be used in the evaluation of paradigms with varying politico-normative dimensions – although this does not mean that "reasoned assessments" about the merits of contending paradigms cannot be made. According to a reflexive CT they can be made, precisely on the grounds of their different politico-normative dimensions (Neufeld, 1995:42-46).

Neufeld (1995:47-57) now moves on to an evaluation of the "Third Debate" (the first being between idealism and realism, and the second between traditionalism and behaviouralism) in IR, which, in 1989, attempted to offer a challenge to the dominance of positivism in the discipline and (tentatively) pointed the way towards the possibility of
increased reflexivity (post-positivism). He identifies three possible stances in this debate and relates them to positivism and reflexivity: (1) that paradigms are commensurable and therefore comparable, (2) that paradigms are incommensurable and therefore incomparable, and (3) that paradigms are incommensurable yet still comparable.

The first stance is associated with positivism as reflected in the work of Holsti (1985, 1989) who argues that it is possible to compare different paradigms in terms of how they do or do not correspond to reality (truth as correspondence). To illustrate the second stance, Neufeld (1995:54) cites the work of McKinlay and Little (1986). They acknowledge the politico-normative content of different paradigms: “Two global superpowers both able to destroy each other...are likely to have scholars especially interested in ‘global interdependence’ or ‘peaceful coexistence.’ Anti-colonial revolutionaries in relatively underdeveloped countries are driven by other practical imperatives” (quoted by Neufeld, 1995:55). Therefore, for example, the realist paradigm is concerned not (just) with a description of the facts, but acts as a means to deal with the problems, needs and interests of a specific group of actors (policy makers). However, in concluding that different paradigms cannot be compared because of their different politico-normative content adherents of this stance remain “...trapped within the positivist reinforced limitation of reason to episteme. Neither reasoned assessment nor even communication between paradigms is possible” (Neufeld, 1995:57). Thus, there are no means of deciding, through evaluation (using standardised criteria), which is the most useful model, accept to check whether they are internally consistent.

According to Neufeld (1995:57-68) it is only the third stance, incommensurable but comparable, which is truly representative of the reflexive approach required by a CT of IR. He then discusses three examples which he regards as representative of the critical genre in IR; “Gramscian-inspired neo-Marxist IR theory” (reflected in the work of Cox), post-modern IR theory, and feminist theory in IR. Although the commonality between all of these is that they are reflexive, Neufeld has a clear preference for Cox’s work, although he concludes that “it must be conceded that his intervention remains preliminary and in need of further development” (Neufeld, 1995:60).
Cox's approach is viewed as reflexive because of the distinction he makes between problem-solving and critical theory (see Chapter 5). Cox's point that "theory is always for someone and for some purpose", clearly illustrates that he believes knowledge and interests to be linked. Furthermore, although problem-solving theory has merits, it is status-quo orientated and serves the interests of those groups who stand to gain from system maintenance. Critical theory is superior because, although it can contain problem-solving approaches, it also considers how a particular order came about, looks at the contradictions therein, and reflects on what the possibilities for transformation to an alternative order are (Neufeld, 1995:58-60).

Therefore, although problem-solving and critical theory are incommensurable, they can be compared on the grounds of their politico-normative content. Neufeld (1995:60-64) goes on to discuss post-modern contributions to IR\(^8\) and although he finds them to be highly reflective, "It is with regard to the insight that all theory has politico-normative content...that postmodernism makes its main contribution to reflexivity." He expresses the same reservations as Hofmann (see above) regarding post-modernism's view of rationalism. The outcome of this position is that the post-modernist positions leads to "...a rejection not only of domination rooted in instrumental reason, but a rejection of reasoned criticism itself." The evaluation of contending paradigms using any criteria (for instance, on whether the politico-normative content is emancipatory or not) is deemed to be foundationalist and yet another universalist project. In the words of Ashley (quoted by Neufeld, 1995:63): "Poststructuralism [postmodernism] cannot claim to offer an alternative position or perspective, because there is no alternative ground upon which it might be established (original italics)." For Neufeld (1995:68-69) this leads to apathy, because an acceptance of reflexivity does not mean that rival theories cannot be compared. They can be compared in terms of the political project they serve, and whether that project enhances human potential and promotes the attainment of the global polis.
Having considered the first element of CT or “emancipatory theory”, Neufeld now turns to the second element, the role of human consciousness and how it is viewed by positivism. The major point which Neufeld stresses about human consciousness is that it cannot be viewed outside of time and context. Secondly, that human consciousness is constitutive of and constitutes social reality through intersubjective meaning. Therefore, it can transform that reality. To illustrate this Neufeld distinguishes between the way in which positivism views human consciousness and how an interpretative approach views it (Neufeld, 1995:70-82).

Underlying positivism's view of human consciousness is the assumption of naturalism (see above). This posits the unity of science. Social phenomena can be studied using the same method to study natural phenomena. Just as there regularities which can be observed in the natural world, so there are regularities in the social world which hold across time and space. How then, does positivism deal with human consciousness? According to “strict behaviouralism” only observable behaviour matters, an understanding of human consciousness (empathy) is only useful in the context of discovery and not justification. “Meaning-oriented behaviouralism” does allow for the consideration of subjective meaning in explanation. This is done through the determination of the subject’s attitude by using questionnaires, surveys and interviews. In this manner, it is believed, regularities can be found by linking the attitude (as an intervening variable) to the social context and the ensuing behavioural response. By doing this, subjective attitudes are brought out into the “open”, where they can be “observed” (Neufeld, 1995:71-75).

There is, however, another approach to human consciousness which does not deny that behavioural regularities can be observed, nor that attitudes can be linked to behaviour. The interpretive approach does deny, however, that the regularities so observed exist outside of time and place and they are, therefore, insufficient to fully explain human consciousness. The reasons for this is the so-called “double whammy” which social researchers have to deal with. The human subject interpreted, also interprets him-/herself
as well as the context of the social world of which he/she is a part. The meaning which humans attach to their environment is, contrary to the positivist approach, not merely the sum of their subjective attitudes. Rather, the "web of meaning", is a reflection of the shared intersubjective meaning ("collective self-interpretation") of a human collectivity.

Also, intersubjective meanings constitute social practices, and social practices are "nested" in them (Neufeld, 1995:75-77).

To illustrate, Neufeld (following Taylor) (1995:78-79) offers the example of the social phenomenon of negotiation. While there may be observable regularities in the process of negotiation in the form of the different attitudes of the participants which can be linked to their behaviour, these are reliant on the very existence of negotiation as a social practice. The social practice of negotiation is reliant for its existence on the shared intersubjective meanings with which a society views it. In another society (for instance, Japan), more emphasis is placed on the attainment of consensus without the confrontational thrust and parry which go along with negotiations. The practice of negotiation is therefore time and context bound, and is constituted by a "web of meaning" (intersubjective understanding). If we accept this, it means that the assumption of naturalism, on which "the unity of science" tenet of positivism rests, cannot be maintained.

Furthermore, if human consciousness (through the notion of intersubjectivity) partly constitutes social reality, it can also be transformative thereof. Considering the role of the interpretive approach in the study of IR, Neufeld (1995:91) cites Cox as one of the scholars who focuses on the question of how intersubjective meanings constitute the contemporary global system, and concludes that (on the whole) this approach is "being employed to underscore the possibility of a radical, emancipatory, transformation of the global order" (Neufeld, 1995:94).

The third, and last, element of CT which Neufeld (1995:95) looks at is its "...engagement in social criticism in support of practical political activity for the transformation of established 'forms of life.'" The corresponding tenet of positivism which he critiques is the notion of objectivity or value-freedom, with as its underlying assumption the
separation of fact and value. As an example of this positivist tenet in IR, he looks at and evaluates the position of Michael Nicholson who is one of a number of IR scholars to offer an extensive defence of the positivist method. Nicholson does not deny the existence of values, but firmly believes that they can be distinguished from scientific method. The following citation (Neufeld, 1995:100-101) encapsulates his point of view: "Why one wants to alter social behaviour is not a scientific question: how one alters behaviour is."

Neufeld (1995:101-106), however, argues that positivism has within itself a normative dimension which renders its claim to value-freedom null and void. The very fact that questions that deal with values are regarded as non-scientific and that they should be dealt with by normative theory is an affirmation of positivism's own normative content. Further, positivism's assumption of naturalism – the idea that regularities can be found in the social world – places limits on the possibilities for change and transformation and relegates explanation to "problem-solving" and the perpetuation of a particular order. Being status quo oriented instead of change oriented is also a normative choice, argues Neufeld.

Lastly, the manner in which explanation must be arrived at (the deductive-nomological model) is aimed at the prediction of recurrence. The goal is to account for social events by placing them under "covering laws", thereby enabling prediction, and ultimately "instrumental control." But because the elements to be controlled are humans and not atoms "...the application of a positivist approach to the study of science cannot be separated from the forms of politics implicit in the interest in the technical control of human beings integral to positivism's theory of explanation" and therefore "positivist-inspired social engineering is not neutral with regard to the implementation of a particular political programme" (Neufeld, 1995:103, 105). Consequently, positivism's claim to value-freedom and objectivity is questionable.
Having challenged and cast doubt on positivism’s three main tenets, “truth as correspondence”, “the unity of the sciences”, and “value-freedom in scientific research”, as well as how they have inhibited the development of a CT in IR, Neufeld (1995:123-125) concludes that the restructuring of IR theory along critical lines has begun. Its further development will depend on whether its claims can be successfully argued within the IR scholarly community, whether it succeeds in the actual emancipation of human beings, and whether it can “...be translated into significant gains in theoretical-empirical terms.”

3.6 Summation

This chapter has provided an overview of the work of four scholars who are associated with the development of CT in IR. The main theoretical premises of their work have been highlighted and contextualised for the purpose of providing an answer to the theoretical research aim of this study. The question which needs to be answered is whether the association of Cox with the Frankfurt School and with the authors whose work has been discussed in this chapter, is justified. Secondly, are there commonalities which can be discerned between the above IR scholars and can they be linked to the CT of the Frankfurt School? In this section, a summation is provided which attempts to encapsulate the main points of departure in the work of Linklater, Ashley, Hoffman, and Neufeld.

Andrew Linklater views CT as the catalyst and path which will enable scholars of IR/GPE to transcend the limitations of Marxism and realism, and which will act as a “vehicle” to achieve synthesis between these perspectives. He is concerned with the transformation of a system based on “minimal order between states” to one where moral principles are universalised in order to establish an international (“post-sovereign”) political community. This transformation will make possible human emancipation (or the attainment of human development).
In his argument to move "beyond" realism and Marxism (while keeping and incorporating their strong points in a new synthesised perspective), Linklater draws on the Frankfurt School and more specifically on Habermas to critique the realist and rationalist perspectives and to make a case for the revolutionist approach which is more emancipatory and which points the way towards the attainment of an international political community. Critical theory, for Linklater, is transformation orientated while other perspectives (particularly Waltz's neorealism) are inclined to ensure system maintenance. His distinction between CT and other perspectives is sourced from Horkheimer's distinction between "critical" and "traditional" theory (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, according to Linklater, the critical approach in IR is represented by his own work, and the work of Ashley, Cox, and Hoffman.

Linklater's critique of realism, rationalism and revolutionism (a distinction originally made by Martin Wight) uses Habermas' notion of three knowledge-constitutive interests (empirical-analytic, historical hermeneutic, and critical-emancipatory) to conceptualise his own view of epistemology as consisting of positivism, hermeneutics and critical theory. Positivism is associated with control and the system maintenance approach of Waltz's neorealism. He points out that, although a focus on inter-state relations is important, neorealism's lack of self-reflection (sourced from Cox, 1981) leads to the perpetuation of the inter-state power relations system which is accepted as an ontological given. Rationalism (as represented in the work of Hedley Bull) is closer to Linklater's idea of CT in IR. It is not just the power relations between states, but also the underlying norms and principles (and the consensus around them) which are important, and which underpin the concept of an international community.

Revolutionism encapsulates the essence of the CT of the Frankfurt School. Linklater points to, in particular, the latter's method of immanent critique and its critique of positivism and Marxism (see Chapter 2). However, it is Habermas and his focus on dual moral identity (humans as citizens of the state and as citizens of the world, who recovers the emancipatory project (abandoned by the Frankfurt School) for contemporary CT. In support of his argument that CT in IR "has been profoundly influenced" by the Frankfurt
School, Linklater cites the distinction which Cox (1981) makes between “problem-solving” and “critical” theory (thereby linking Cox and Horkheimer). Additionally, he links Cox’s point that theory must be self-reflective to the Frankfurt School’s critique of positivism. Nevertheless, Linklater also criticises Cox’s approach for being too focused on production and historical materialism.

Richard Ashley uses Habermas and (more distantly) some ideas from the Frankfurt School to criticise Waltz’s neorealism and its accompanying method of positivism. Like, Linklater, he does not want to discard the “classical” realism of Morgenthau and Herz in toto. Habermas’s empirical-analytical knowledge-constituting interest is linked to neorealism’s (or “technical” realism) interest in control and system maintenance (Linklater, subsequently used Ashley to motivate his own use of Habermas). “Traditional” (classical) or “practical” realism is associated with Habermas’ historical-hermeneutic form of knowledge generation. This is preferable to neorealism, because it is concerned with the meaning/understanding of concepts and their historical contextualisation.

Citing E.P. Thompson’s criticism of Althusser’s rigid structural Marxism, Ashley goes on to point out the similarities found in the limitations of Waltz’s structural realism, one of which is the neutralisation of the role of human agency. Ashley directs his critique of Waltzian neorealism at, what he views as, its major assumptions: statism, utilitarianism, positivism and structuralism. On the effects of rigid structuralism, Ashley argues that the assumption that the parts (states) cannot exist independently of (static) structural attributes, leads to an inability to explain structural change. Therefore, the actions of human agents are not considered when considering the possibility of structural change. Additionally, the fact that states are assumed to exist prior to the system, means that structural characteristics cannot shape the nature of the units. They are considered to be alike. This relates to the assumption of statism, which views states as unitary actors.
Utilitarianism, views individuals (states in neorealism) as rational actors who consider their actions in instrumental terms. (The end is achieved through the most efficient means available). When considering the actions of states, therefore, neorealists do not take into account “what lies beneath” (domestic or societal power).

Following the Frankfurt School, Ashley argues that “technical” realism’s commitment to a positivist view of science is also an ideological (normative) choice because explanation is reduced to the motivated rational actions (and interactions) of individuals (states). Postivism’s “actor model” and the focus on means, also comes along with a refusal to consider values a part of (explainable) reality. In this ahistorical view of structure, politics becomes the technical means of control, instead of the self-reflective, critical vehicle for material and institutional change that it should be. As an alternative, Ashley proposes his “dialectical competence model.” The dynamics of this model, he proposes, lie in its aim to offer a more self-reflective approach to knowledge creation in IR. The approach emphasises the notion of societal power, the need to investigate the possibility of transformation, the need to re-incorporate economics into the public (political) sphere, the importance of learning, the need to focus on crises which can lead to transformation, and the need to focus on the strategies of challengers to the contemporary political economic order.

The themes of transformation, emancipation, self-reflection and critique of positivism also appear in Mark Hoffman’s essay which holds up CT as representing the next stage in the development of IR theory. Also similarly to Linklater and Ashley, Hoffman links CT in IR to the Frankfurt School and explicitly to Horkheimer’s distinction between traditional and critical theory. Habermas’ knowledge-constitutive interests, too, are introduced and conceptualised, but Hoffman makes it clear that the technical (positivist) interest together with the practical and emancipatory interest should form the substance of CT. Hoffman identifies Ashley and Linklater as representative of CT in IR, while viewing the assumptions underlying Cox’s work as being closest to the Frankfurt School.
Although he acknowledges that the connection may be somewhat tenuous, he nevertheless insists on the link between Cox and Habermas, and subsequently lists the assumptions of CCT (see Chapters 1 and 5) as “basic elements” on the way to the development of a CT of IR.

Hoffman’s evaluation of three IR paradigms (realism, pluralism, and structuralism), in order to determine to what extent they meet the requirements of CCT, leads him to conclude that the structuralist paradigm comes the closest. Waltz’s “technical” realism is found to be “problem-solving” orientated and non-reflective. It also does not address the possibility of system transformation. Bull’s “practical realism” fares better (because it focuses on international norms, consensus and transformation), but cannot get away from the fact that it perpetuates the state-centred ontology of technical realism. Pluralism is also found to engage in problem-solving theory in the interests of (state) system maintenance, with the exception of the work related to the WOMP and Burton. The former because it envisages a world system based on different norms, and the latter because of the emphasis on human needs and self-understanding.

Structuralism, with the incorporation of the Frankfurt School’s criticism of Marxism, is regarded by Hofmann as being closest to CCT. Wallerstein’s world system theory is approvingly mentioned because it is historically located, it overcomes the state-society division of realism, and it deals with transformation. However, Hofmann does not refer to Cox’s criticism of world system theory (see Chapter 5). Cox’s point is that Wallerstein’s world capitalist system also pre-determines the role of states (core, semi-periphery, periphery) therein.

Mark Neufeld’s stated aim is to encourage the development of IR theory which breaks away from the “logic of positivism” and dedicates itself to the goal of human emancipation. His method is a metatheoretical enquiry into the assumptions of positivism and, consequently, to point out the basic elements of a theory which is anchored in the critical approach. These are sourced from Marxism and the Frankfurt School. For a theory to be critical it must: be “self-reflective” (focusing on the empirical but also on the
process of theorising and its own assumptions); be concerned with human consciousness and intersubjective meaning and the ability of human agency to change reality; and employ social criticism in support of “practical political activity” aimed at societal transformation. Furthermore, reflexive (critical) theory accepts that research paradigms also have political and normative aims and that they can therefore, in the final analysis, be evaluated in terms of these aims.

Three core assumptions of positivism (related to the referential theory of meaning, the deductive-nomological model of explanation, and the axiomatic view of theory) are identified. They are “truth as correspondence” (requiring the separation of subject and object), the unified scientific method (based on the assumption of naturalism), and the notion that science is value free (based on the fact/value distinction). Using the reflexive/critical approach, Neufeld questions and criticises these core assumptions.

The truth as correspondence tenet, requiring the acceptance of the division between subject and object, is problematised because “timeless” scientific criteria are time and context bound, and have been developed by a human research community. These criteria also determine what issues and problems are placed on the research agenda. Status quo oriented problem-solving approaches are linked to the political interest of control and are therefore not value free. This political-normative dimension of research paradigms means that they can be evaluated (even though they may be incommensurable) in terms of their contribution to human emancipation (for example, from want).

Neufeld regards Cox’s approach as reflexive because of the distinction he makes between problem-solving and critical theory, and his observation that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.” (see Chapter 5). He admits that problem-solving theory can be useful, but it must be subjected to the requirements of reflexive/critical theory in order to determine whether it perpetuates the status quo and serves the interests of those who stand to gain from system maintenance.
Intersubjective meaning is the term which Neufeld uses to emphasise that human agency is essential in the understanding of the possibility of change/transformation. Using the assumption of naturalism (unity of science) the positivist method attempts to access human consciousness by focusing on attitudes (using surveys and interviews). Neufeld admits that this can reveal behavioural regularities, but that, on its own, it is not enough to fully understand social reality. Humans also create reality through their shared understandings (intersubjective meanings) of a social practice. Social practices are time and context bound and are constituted (and therefore can be changed) by the "web of meaning" which humans share. Within these "webs of meaning", regularities of behaviour can be observed, but must be contextualised. How intersubjective meanings are connected to contemporary global political economy is a question, according to Neufeld, that CCT investigates.
Endnotes

1 Linklater uses Bernstein, Habermas and Ashley to posit an epistemological difference between positivism, phenomenology, and critical theory. These approaches to knowledge are linked in his 1990 volume to three perspectives in IR.

2 His treatment of Cox, here, is less critical and he holds the latter up as an example of CT against Waltz’s neorealism (Linklater, 1990:86-87).

3 Keyman (1997) in an attempt to develop a “critical social theory of international relations” from a post-colonial critical perspective, also deals with issues of exclusion and inclusion, and is particularly concerned with how “the critical turn helps us to break with the practice of inclusion/exclusion with which international relations theory operatess” (Keyman, 1997:99). Keyman finds that the various strands of CT in IR (Habermas, Cox, and Linklater) tend to ignore the voice of the excluded or the “other.” According to him, “…any critical theory of international relations cannot afford not to learn from the Other, not to reconstruct itself on the basis of the questions that the Other poses, and not to think of identity/difference from the lenses of the Other” (Keyman, 1997:146). Referring to Linklater’s CT of IR, he points to, “...the concealed patriarchal and Eurocentric tendency...” (Keyman, 1997:109).


5 The influence of structuralism in social theory dates from the late 1960s and early 1970s. It impacted on sociology from a number of different sources: structural anthropology (Claude Lévi-Strauss), philosophy (Michel Foucault), psychology (Jacques Lacan), linguistics (Ferdinand de Saussure), and the structural Marxism of Louis Althusser. Structuralism’s basic assumption is that social behaviour is determined by visible or underlying social structures. In its more extreme version agency is regarded as non-existent, all action is determined (consciously or unconsciously) by outside forces. This is the so-called “death of the subject” premise (Marshall, 1994:515-516).

6 By foundationalist, post-modernists mean the resorting to, or falling back on, the foundations of scientific enquiry. See for instance John Vasquez’s (1995:230) list of criteria for good theories in IR: “accurate, falsifiable, capable of evincing great explanatory power, progressive as opposed to degenerating in terms of their research programme(s), consistent with what is known in other areas, appropriately parsimonious and elegant.” This notion of foundationalism is taken back to the Enlightenment which is criticised by post-modernists for its belief in progress (an end goal attainable by making use of science and rationality) and for its assumption that there is an end-goal (modernity, human perfection or for that matter the ultimate realisation of human potential) (Vasquez, 1995:219).


9 See Nicholson (quoted in Neufeld, 1995:105): “the firmer is our knowledge of social behaviour, the greater our potential control over it.”
Chapter 4
The Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox: Tracing Influences and Early Developments

4.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews, in some detail, the development of, and influences on, Cox’s pre-1987 thinking and how this resulted in the explication of his core theoretical framework as reflected in two articles (1981, 1983), and the volume *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (henceforth referred to as PPWO) (1987). The purpose is to provide the reader with an insight into who Cox drew on during the process of the development of his own explanatory framework, and also the context within this process unfolded. The chapter (together with Chapters 2 and 3) attempts to shed some light on the theoretical research question of this study: Is the linking of Cox’s work with the Frankfurt School, and the placing thereof within a CT of IR approach (together with other scholars) warranted and, importantly, is this linking based on an accurate and close assessment of his work?

It is difficult to present Cox’s influences and the development of this thinking in neatly contained packages. Additionally, the major concepts and assumptions of Cox’s core theoretical framework and those he worked on after 1987, as well as his perspective on knowledge, ontology, theory and method inevitably form an essential component of the review. The approach which is followed in this chapter and in Chapter 5, is a chronological one. It traces the development of Cox’s thinking by reviewing some of his major publications and pointing to the contextual and scholarly influences on his thinking. Because 1987 marks the publication of PPWO, which is the culmination of the development of the core theoretical framework, the chronological review is divided into pre-1987 and post-1987 publications.
4.2 Early Context and Influences

The development of Robert Cox’s critical perspective was substantially shaped by his time spent at the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Geneva, Switzerland, while the content of what was to become his particular form of CT was influenced by his study of history (at McGill University, Canada) and the scholars he read over the years. Cox himself made the observation, in an interview with Randall Germain (1999b:380), that the restrictions which were placed on his intellectual autonomy by the bureaucratic ethos prevalent at the ILO (particularly during his later years there), contributed much to his thinking on change and the need for critical theory. As Hoogvelt, Kenny and Germain (1999b:380) conclude: “Surely a case of ‘I think where I am’?” His early experience with bureaucracy would also be reflected in his pessimism later on in life as to whether critical thinking and a focus on change could take place from within large organisations (he was referring particularly to the United Nations and to universities) (Cox, interviewed by Germain, 1999b:391, 398).

Towards the end of his time at McGill University, Cox was offered and accepted an invitation to join the ILO (the organisation had located itself on campus during the war years) in Geneva. His career at the ILO was to span some twenty-five years, from 1948 to 1972. From his early university years he took with him the thinking and ideas of E.H. Carr and George Sorel, two scholars who had very different ideas on the state. Carr would be credited with returning the study of international relations to where it belonged, viz. the state. Sorel, on the other hand, saw the state as an entity which needed to be eliminated in its modern form. Cox would consistently retain, in his own work, Carr’s emphasis on the relationship between industrialisation, the nature of the state, ideas, and change at the world order level. He was greatly impressed by Carr’s approach to not separate “levels of analysis” and to focus on structural change. From Sorel he learned
"...that you could take some things from Marxism without swallowing the whole package" as well as a "...a suspicion of positivism and pseudo-science applied to human affairs. Crucially for an understanding of Cox's thinking, as we will see, Sorel understood historical materialism to be "the relationship between mentalities and material conditions of existence" (own italics) (Cox, 1996b:27-28).

During his time at university, together with Carr and Sorel, there were others that shaped Cox's thinking on history as "a mode of understanding", and not "the study of any particular period and place." Oswald Spengler would later (during the post-1987 period) rekindle his interest in the notion of civilisations and what lies behind them: "The attempt to recover the sense of spirit behind the historical is what motivates me to explore the idea of civilisations." (Cox, interviewed by Germain, 1999b:392). The historian, R.G. Collingwood, together with Sorel shaped Cox's thinking on what he would later call "intersubjectivity."

Collingwood's notion that the study of history required "rethinking the thought of the past" combined with Sorel's ideas on the link between consciousness and existence led Cox to view "the relationship between the experienced material world and the subjectivity through which people interpreted and acted upon that material world" as a crucial component of any historicist attempt to explain (political and social) change. It is through the social practices and institutions which people collectively devise that they deal with the "challenges" posed by the "material conditions of their existence." From Collingwood, Cox would later (after leaving the ILO in 1972 and taking up a position at Columbia University) return to Giambattista Vico, and on to Antonio Gramsci. These early influences, taken together with the work of Fernand Braudel, Ibn Khaldun and Karl Polanyi form the backbone of his historical mode of understanding.
4.3 The International Labour Organisation Phase

In one of his earlier publications (a book review), while at the ILO, Cox (1953) emphasised that we cannot look at ideas in isolation from the historical context in which they originated and evolved. Writing on the “idea of international labour regulation” he points out that the notion of regulating labour can only be understood as the outcome of power relations between social forces, changes in production, changes in the form of state, and changes in ideas in 19th century England. This reflects his view of history as a “mode of understanding” and not just the study of events related to a specific time and space. Tracing the development and acceptance of international labour regulation, Cox (1953:44-46) shows how this was in the interest of industrial employers and the state at a time when “European states were entering a phase of increasing nationalism in economic and social policy.” Already, after the suppression of the working class challenge in mid-century industrial employers like Daniel Legrand (“a supporter of bourgeois monarchy”) were propagating for “An international law concluded by the governments of all industrial countries...” A concern, motivated not just by humanitarian reasons but also by the possibility of a “class war”.

Thinking of whose interests would be served by this “idea” Cox (1953:44) asks “...but is there not at least a suspicion that, by making national action conditional upon international agreement, the practical effect of the idea would be to delay improvement of conditions at home at a time when pressures were being brought to bear in that direction?” These pressures intensified during the last decades of the 19th century and the years leading up to World War I, when the increase in the industrial power of organised labour required incorporation, not suppression. This required state intervention to protect labour from foreign competition, as well the enactment of social security policies. Changes in the power of social forces related to production, led to a change in the form of state (nationalist-corporatist). At the international level, it was in the interest of the major industrialised states to agree to international regulation in order to prevent international working class solidarity. Furthermore, it was also compatible with further industrial expansion and nationalism.
This early article reflects the kind of thinking which Cox would refine over the years, and which leads some scholars (cf. Mittelman, 1998) to refer to his approach as “historicism.” To conclude, ideas are not isolated from events, we need to ask whose interests they serve, how and why? How are they related to the social events of the time, and why did they not evolve elsewhere? (Cox, 1953:41).

During the next fifteen years, Cox’s work initially reflected a more positivist epistemology and focused on leadership and decision making in international organisations, drawing particularly on his experiences at the ILO. Nevertheless, this was still combined with an eye for the constraints imposed by broader context and a willingness to be critical of the bureaucratic ethos prevalent in international organisations (again, particularly influenced by his position at the ILO). During the years that David Morse was director-general of the ILO (1948-1970), Cox felt himself able to exercise the kind of critical role within the ILO which enabled him to stay on for the length of time that he did. His major problem with the organisation was the espousal of a form of labour-management relations (tripartism) which was Euro-American centric, and which was accepted as universal in form and not historically contingent. As he puts it: “I found myself in the moral position of the anthropologist – a participant observer of my new tribe. I was in it but could not be entirely of it insofar as I reflected upon the sources of the norms it espoused (own italics)” (Cox, 1996b:22).

The time span of Cox’s career at the ILO virtually coincides with David Morse’s. He was Morse’s “principal staff officer”, then went on to become chief of the ILO’s Program and Planning Division, and was later (during the latter part of his career at the ILO) appointed by Morse as director of the International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS). The fact that he managed to stay on for so long as a “participant observer” clearly had much to do with the fact that he and Morse got along, and that the latter was prepared to allow criticism and autonomous thinking. As Cox (1996b:23-24) remarks: “David Morse had accepted the notion that it would be healthy for a large bureaucracy with an established ideology to harbor some faculty for independent criticism of its norms and practices, especially since
the critical faculty had only powers of expression, not of decision” and “He saw the value of allowing expression of criticism, while at the same time keeping a close control over its practical consequences. In contrast, Cox refers to the “frequently overbearing behaviour” of Clarence Wilfred Jenks (Morse’s successor) as opposed to Morse’s “understanding courtesy” (Cox, 1977:436, 444).

During his time with the ILO, Cox also managed to take time off to do work of a more academic nature (teaching and research). In 1964, he spent a year at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. Here he delivered an inaugural lecture on the ideologies of international organisations and also wrote a paper titled “The Executive Head.” The paper which dealt with the leadership challenges “in the peculiar world of international organization” ruffled many bureaucratic feathers among the “conformists” at the ILO. Presumably they were the ones who subscribed to the western idea of labour-management relations. At any rate, Cox recalls the incident as bringing him into disrepute with the organizational ideologists: “From then on, I was a controversial figure in an organizational milieu that put a premium on conformity” (Cox, 1996b:23).

Cox’s more positivist (or what he would later call “problem-solving theory”) approach was very much in evidence during this time (Sinclair, 1996:12). For instance, in an article on the potential leadership role of the executive head in transforming an international organisation, he attempts to answer the question whether international organisations are more than just a reflection of the power politics of member states, “...do they influence world politics in their own right?” (Cox, 1969:318). The “hypothesis within the hypothesis” is then whether the executive head, “among possible conversion variables” can be instrumental in converting/transforming an organisation of “multilateral diplomacy” to one which reflects “a more integrated international system.”¹ The end result (an integrated international system) would be one “in which conflicts between nations are resolved through the discovery of higher common interests and the creation of international agencies to promote and regulate them” (Cox, 1969:319).
Cox anchors this functionalist view of international organisations in the work of Ernst Haas’ *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (1964). He goes on to “complement the Haas model” by focusing on three key aspects of the executive head’s relationships; those related to the international bureaucracy, those related to dealings with member states, and those related to interactions with the international system. An important observation to take note of is that Cox stresses the crucial role played by subnational groups (domestic forces) who he argues are in a position to influence the foreign policy of their government towards international organisations. This leads him to propose that international organisations need to maintain links with domestic groups within member states which are well disposed to their goals and that, as such, the executive head needs to keep abreast of “...such favorable currents of domestic opinion as present themselves...” (Cox, 1969:339-340).

The importance of subnational (domestic) interests (later, social forces) in multilateralism is something which Cox would return to in his later (post-1987) work. It also indicates that, at this time, he already had a view of the state as an entity which is permeable, and not one which regards the state in international relations as a “billiard ball” (the neorealist perspective). Using Haas’ functionalist positivist framework, he stressed the importance of the need to always contextualise theory: “For any concrete application, theory has to be placed in a historical context.” Notably, bearing in mind the attempt to associate Cox’s work with the Frankfurt School of CT, is a brief reference to “Professor Herbert Marcuse.” This reference is made in the context of the need to view the United Nations (UN) as more than the sum of its parts, there is also a “fundamental essence...that ought to receive expression.” Marcuse is named (without a publication citation) as one who is supportive of this notion of a “real essence” which hides behind a name.

During his final years at the ILO, Morse appointed Cox as director of the IILS. He had been instrumental in the development of this institute which was founded (in 1960) with the aim of acting as an independent and critical think tank within the ILO. It was from within the IILS that Cox (together with Jeffrey Harrod, research coordinator at the IILS and a former doctoral student of Cox’s) undertook important ground work in the
identification of types of production relations. This took the form of a survey, sponsored by the ILO, to determine patterns in industrial relations. The report (Cox, Harrod, et al. 1972) became controversial, because it found that the prevalent tripartite labour-management perspective which was the basis of the ILO's *modus operandi*, applied to only 9% of the world's labour force (see also, Cox, 1977:444). Based on these findings, Cox would later develop his conceptualisation of different types of modes of social relations of production. His collaboration with Harrod, would culminate in the publication of *Production, Power and World Order* (1987), accompanied by Harrod's volume, *Power, Production and the Unprotected Worker* (1987).

By this time (1972), Cox's thinking had begun to shift towards the idea of hegemony. A concept which he related to his own position at the ILO, as well as to the activities of the ILO as a whole. By his own account, this was brought about by the events which played themselves out during 1968; the student riots in France, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and conversations "with a very few" critical scholars during a visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the same year. Thinking about these events led him to realise that there were contradictions in the Cold War world, as well as in his own working environment: "The movements of 1968...revealed that the convictions of Cold War ideology were transparent and fragile. The hiatus between ideology and reality was manifest" (own italics). Reflecting on his role at the ILO and IILS at that time, he remarks: "I began to see that my work through the institute had implicitly promoted a perspective on labor and social policy that reflected the dominant social forces in the rich countries and in the world. I now sensed the importance of a broader, more critical perspective" (Cox, 1996b:24-26).

Cox's use of the functionalist approach to study international organisations reached a turning point after the publication of *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (1972). The book, the result of a joint effort between himself and Harold Jacobson, with contributions from, among others, Susan Strange and Joseph Nye was completed at the University of Toronto during a year's leave of absence from the ILO. From now on, Cox would re-dedicate himself to the development of the
historical mode of understanding perspective. Coincidentally, 1972 was also the year during which he tendered his resignation from the ILO, and the year when a graduate student at the University of Toronto introduced him to Gramsci’s work. Cox’s resignation was sparked by a combination of changes in his thinking and the appointment of the new ILO director-general in 1970, Wilfred Jenks (Cox, 1996d:xiii, 24).

The IILS’s ability to fulfill a critical and independent role had always been constrained, even under the directorship of Morse. This can be attributed to the insistence of US representatives that its research role be restricted by close administrative links to the ILO. Nevertheless, during its formative years it “…made modest progress towards perspectives alternative to those of the ILO’s official ideology” (Cox, 1977:444). This modicum of autonomy came to an end with the change of directors. Cox (1996b:24) recalls: “This was not a person with whom I could maintain a civilized dialogue about our differences” and “(Jenks)...was the embodiment of the ILO’s conventional doctrine, which he took pride in having personally articulated” (Cox, 1977:445).

Apart from the difference in management style between Morse and Jenks, the latter also insisted that any publications which emanated from the ILO and IILS had to pass through him for approval. Any publication which, according to him, did not exercise the right of freedom of speech “responsibly” could be vetoed in terms of what he called his right of nihil obstat. When Jenks attempted to exercise this right with respect to Cox’s chapter in the Anatomy of Influence, Cox tendered his letter of resignation (12 June 1972). A full account of his reasons are footnoted (note 49) in the article “Labor and Hegemony” (1977). The article also contextualised Jenks’ management style (“absolutist” and based on the “doctrine of tripartism”) during his brief tenure as director-general (he died in 1973).
4.4 Academia: Developing a Historical Mode of Understanding

After leaving the ILO, Cox accepted a position at the University of Columbia (New York) as “Professor of International Organization.” However, at that time, his intellectual development had already led him away from positivist functionalism: “I had abandoned the concept of international organisation in favour of the notion of international political economy (IPE), which for me is simply the analysis of the structures that underlie the world in which international organisations operate, for it is these which effectively shape outcomes” (Cox, interviewed by Germain, 1999b:390). He began reading Gramsci, and returned to Giambattista Vico and Marx. This shift became apparent in his publications and was to culminate (during the next decade and a half) in the three publications (1981, 1983, 1987) which are representative of his core theoretical framework.

The article “On Thinking about Future World Order” (1976) published in *World Politics*, serves as a first example of the shift in the development of Cox’s thinking. In fact, it reflects many of the ideas which would be further developed in the first *Millennium* (1981) article. It is essential, therefore, to discuss it in some detail. Cox starts by identifying three approaches to “thinking about the future”: the natural-rational approach, the positivist-evolutionary approach, and the historicist-dialectical approach. In the rest of the article he shows (and criticises) how they are applied and motivates his preference for the historical-dialectical approach.

According to Cox (1976:177-178) the natural-rational approach assumes the universality of human nature, and proposes that the world can be understood in terms of the inner and the outer. The outward appearances of humans struggling to realise their potential are visible in their various forms (institutions and behaviour). Through reason (derived from the universality of human nature assumption) we may understand the “real essence of man and the polity.” Corresponding to “inner” and “outer” are subjective and objective principles, respectively. The subjective principle resides in the capacity of humans to deal with the challenges in constructing and upholding “the polity.” The objective principle is related to the external constraints (nature) which humans have to confront and overcome.
to attain their potential. Drawing on Machiavelli, Cox argues that objective circumstances may be “understood and manipulated” when “creative ability in politics” is strengthened by the will to overcome (necessità). In attempting to attain the ideal while having to deal with external constraints, polities will rise and decline (history is cyclical). During times when they possess “creative energy” (virtù) they will rise, but in the absence thereof, “civic spirit” is replaced by the “pursuit of particular interests.” Cox views this approach as having “critical potential” because, it compares the ideal with the status quo and because of the acceptance of link between the subjective and objective principles.

The positivist-evolutionary approach rejects the complementarity of the inward/outward approach to understanding. It is “Scientific method for the study of society...conceived as analogous to that evolved for the study of the world of nature”³ (Cox, 1976:178). Talcott Parsons’ structural-functionalist is described by Cox as fitting within this approach, and is seen by him as standing in the service of “problem-solving”, because it is used by Parsons to explain and facilitate the end goal of industrial societies: maximum productivity and societal stability. Essentially, Cox equates here (for the first time) the positivist approach with problem-solving. To account for change this approach (in terms of the “system” concept in structural-functionalism) uses the notion of “systemic feedback” in terms of outputs and modified inputs to explain systemic dynamics (change). Cox (1976:180-181) criticises this view of “change” because it projects current trends and outputs while assuming that the social relations and organisation upon which they rest will not change: “The existing distributions of power...are considered as given...”

What then, is the historical-dialectical approach? First, Cox (1976:181) states that this approach accepts the notion of dualism (subjective/objective) as posed by the natural-rational perspective. However, it does not distinguish between, nor does it separate the subjective ideal and the “objective conditions of existence.” It attempts to explain objective events by connecting them to the subjective “idea”: “The social world is intelligible as the creation of the human mind.” and “Historicism is a method for understanding historical process in terms of the workings of the human mind in its inward respect...”⁴ Second, this approach attempts to understand events (action and thought) by
locating them within the "larger totality." It emphasises, therefore, the view of the complex whole in order to arrive at understanding. Third, it tries to generalise by developing ideal types (e.g. feudalism and capitalism) related to specific historical phases. These types are found within "a coherent structural arrangement of ideas, behaviour patterns, and institutions" (Cox, 1976:182).⁵

Fourth, the dialectical aspect of the approach is crucial in the explanation of change. Quoting Ralph Dahrendorf, Cox introduces what he would later call "contradictions." The idea that societies change because of the appearance of "antagonisms" within them. These changes may come about because of an increasing gap between a prevalent idea of society (or a worldview) – "an intellectual schemata" – and the real material conditions which people (or groups of people) experience. When these contradictions develop, the potential for conflict and/or change becomes latent. Whether conflict/change actually occurs depends on "a change of consciousness on the part of the potential challengers and their adoption of a contrast image of society." Reflecting his reading of Gramsci, Cox ends the discussion of the historical-dialectical approach, by stressing the need for the "historical-dialectical analyst" to not only "diagnose the condition of the world", but also to "arouse consciousness and the will to act" (Gramsci's "organic intellectual") (Cox, 1976:182-183).

In the rest of the article, Cox evaluates the application of the natural-rational and positivist-evolutionary approaches to "thinking about future world order." He starts by looking at the ideal of liberal pluralism as the normative political goal: "...the political arrangement most conducive of the good life" – "...the normative condition for world order." In political practice, however, he argues that it was soon discovered that the assumption of the modernisation paradigm – economic development leads to democracy – did not hold up in the developing world. To account for this, the appearance of authoritarianism was explained as a being a necessary "function" of "underdeveloped political structures." The fact that it is extremely difficult to bring about the condition of
political pluralism (decentralisation of power) in societies where power is very unevenly distributed was, however, ignored. Cox (again) cites Machiavelli's concept of *necessità*: "...the material conditions that must be taken into account in shaping action toward the normative goal, has been deficient" (Cox, 1976:187).

Next, he looks at theories which have their origin in the positivist-evolutionary approach, particularly those which he encountered and used during his time at the ILO. Here world order is viewed as a problem which can be "solved" through institutions (international organisations) which advance global integration. He singles out David Mitrany's functionalism, and the neofunctionalism of Ernst Haas (citing Haas' *Beyond the Nation-State*, which he had earlier used as a model for his article on "The Executive Head"). Regarding the latter as a framework with which to analyse how international integration was to come about and referring to De Gaulle's obstructionist role in the European Economic Community, Cox (1976:189) concludes (thereby turning his back on his "positivist phase"): "It had become largely a checklist of concepts drawn up in relation to the question as to whether the international system was becoming more centralized."

Turning to a discussion of two other approaches to international integration in vogue at the time, transnationalism and transgovernmentalism, Cox (1976:192) notes that they both make the same mistake, they perceive "the future in terms of the magnification of one currently observable tendency." For transnationalism the tendency (trend) was the rise of the multinational corporation (MNC) which would lead to the development of political arrangements that surpassed the state. For transgovernmentalism the trend of increasing transnationalism and economic interdependence would lead to the need for greater direct coordination and interaction between the bureaucracies of states, thereby enhancing the role of international organisations and decreasing the role of foreign affairs departments. Both approaches took these trends and projected them into the future, ignoring the fact that when trends become observable, they are often approaching the point when the process is reversed. For instance, states intervening to reassert control
over MNC activities because of domestic pressures or moral concerns. Such projections take the parameters of the system as a constant, and do not envisage events which may lead to “a change of the system rather than merely changes within the system” (Cox, 1976:190, 196).

The historical-dialectical approach leads the analyst to focus on events such as a change in “balance of social forces within the state”, as well as change “in the nature of the state.” Citing the historian, Geoffrey Barraclough, Cox also points to the importance of “structural changes” such as population growth, industrialisation, and ideas and attitudes. Furthermore, the above accounts leave out the crucial issue of power, “Yet order refers, in the first instance, to the distribution and mechanism of power” (Cox, 1976:192-193, 195). To account for change, therefore, requires a focus on “crises” (contradictions) within states, and on the “differences in power relations among the social forces involved.” The outcome will also have an effect on the nature of the international system. Cox (1976:196) concludes by drawing on Fernand Braudel’s notion of the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of time. The former focuses on the here and now; how are societies linked to a specific world order? The latter focuses on the contradictions, “those points of critical change in the social and political landscape where power is moving from one configuration to another...”

The year of publication of the next article, 1977, coincides with Cox’s acceptance of a position at the University of York, Canada, which became “a congenial intellectual home.” Cox notes that his reasons for going back to Canada are related to his long absence from that country and the possibility that the opportunity might not arise again soon. But it also relates to his experience at Columbia University and the general atmosphere prevailing there at the time. The students, he remarked during the interview with Germain (1999b:391), who had been critical during the later 1960s “...were no longer revolutionary at all. They were much more concerned with getting on with their careers.” Reflecting on his broader environment and the difference he experienced at
By this time, Cox was reading Collingwood, Vico, Braudel and Gramsci. The latter's concept of "hegemony" is introduced in the "Decision making" (with Harold Jacobson) and "Labor and Hegemony" articles (both published in 1977). The collaborative article stems from the volume (also with Jacobson) *The Anatomy of Influence* (1972), and is an attempt to cast the results of their research (how influence is used in decision making within 8 international organisations) within a new framework which takes account of the importance of the context in which decisions are made. This context may be local, national or global, but during times of change the more specific focus on decision making within institutions requires the analyst to pull back in order to better understand the "whole into which the separate institutions fit." It requires a shift to the global context of power relations, and would need to sketch a "structural picture of power relations" a focus on the possibilities for conflict and change, and the role of international organisations in perpetuating or transforming power relations (Cox and Jacobson, 1977:350-351, 356).

Cox and Jacobson (1977:357) go on to identify three perspectives on power: state power, economic power and social power. Their conceptualisation of social power is the precursor to how power is used in the core theoretical framework. State power, they argue, while an essential ("first level) component of power relations in the world system, cannot be equated with a "state-centric" view of power. The latter view, in effect, would limit the study of power in the global system to inter-state relations, and essentially the study of the power relations of the strong states which originated in Europe. At the second level (economic power), there is a view of power which also takes into account non-state aspects of the world system: "economic relations, and the movements of people and ideas." However, it does so from a perspective ("economic-welfare politics") which
focuses on how the state influences economics in response to societal demands ("...we remain within the sphere of the state..."). The individual state's macroeconomic policy links it to other states (Cox and Jacobson, 1977:357-358).

Social power (Cox and Jacobson's preference) takes account of state power and non-state power. It is a model of power which originates in society, and is based on which social groups or classes (dominant and subordinate) have control over production. Because production is "internationalized", the notion of social power can be extended to the use of control over production between social groups in different states. Such a view of power, they argue, can be state or non-state (as in the relationship between states and MNC's). Social power (through control over production) can be exercised by state and non-state actors. Therefore, the power relations of the world system have to be thought of as existing within "the structure of international production relations." This includes the effects of the political policies of states on their "economic-welfare policies", and the effects of the latter on "international production relations." They conclude: "...production relations can be a common yardstick, to which the other levels of power can be reduced (own italics)" (Cox and Jacobson, 1977:358-359).

In the next section of the article, Cox and Jacobson (1977:359-361) outline a "model" of a world system configured around the structure of international production relations. It is interesting to note that, at this stage, the world system is described along Wallersteinian lines; a single system characterised by a hierarchy based on the division of labour (depending on what is produced and who controls it). Thus, there are core states (the industrialised North), semi-peripheral states (newly industrialised states), and peripheral states (poor states, with "limited development prospects.") (cf. Wallerstein, 1976 and 1979). Cox and Jacobson, then use the core-periphery model of Wallerstein, to identify a further five categories of states. It is important, for our purposes, to take note of three categories of states who, according to them, are potential sources of conflict in the system (contradictions).
The "postindustrial" core states are where innovations in production and research and development is situated. "Alienation" is identified as a potential source of conflict in these states, because of "...that large part of their population not engaged in the core economic activities" (Cox and Jacobson, 1977:361). The states of "dependent capitalism" are those states who have attained a degree of industrialisation and who import consumer goods from the core, and have managed to market themselves as "export platforms" for the MNC’s of core states. Sources of conflict here are the possibility of protectionist trade policies, and the growing inequality between sectors of the population who are "marginalised" from, and those who are integrated in the industrial sector of the economy. Then there are the poor states, with hardly any development to look forward to. They are not really required for the functioning of the world economy (except in cases where they possess essential raw materials for core production) but may be a source of regional and global instability. Their problems are viewed by "those more integrated into international production as problems of global poor relief and potentially of global riot control" (Cox and Jacobson, 1977:361).

Power cannot depend on material capacity alone. The exercise of power depends on a combination between material aspects and ideas/ideology. The legitimacy which is accorded to the status quo is rooted in a dominant ideology. This ideology and the "parameters of existing power relations" circumscribe "what problems are worthy of attention." The problems which are focused on by science are usually factors which could threaten the continued existence of the system and the existing power relations upon which it is based. Drawing on Gramsci, Cox and Jacobson (1977:363-364) introduce the concept of hegemony to refer to the way in which power is exercised by a dominant group in society. The latter cannot only rely on its control over the material components of power, it must also establish the consensus (and thereby the incorporation) of subordinate group(s). Consensus is achieved by ensuring that some benefits are distributed to the subordinate group, through "...a program that can be plausibly represented as of universal interest."
Returning to the context within which international organisations make decisions, Cox and Jacobson (1977:364) emphasise that (international) institutions reflect hegemony as well. They hereby make the “jump” from Gramsci’s application of hegemony to the relations between dominant and subordinate groups in state-society relations, to the application of this concept at the international level: “When a particular formal intergovernmental institution is established, it crystallizes the hegemonic consensus of a particular time in relation to a particular global task or set of global tasks.” Therefore, the crucial question becomes whether the contemporary world order reflects a condition of hegemony, or not. Referring to their previous explanatory “variables” related to the context (“general environment”) in which decision making in international organisations takes place (Cox and Jacobson, 1972), they state that hegemony as “a historical moving force”, replaces components of state power, political economic attributes of states, and “patterns of conflicts and alignments.”

The explanation of change, also, must be related to hegemony at the international level, one cannot focus on institutional change without first considering whether a change in hegemony is likely. Hegemonic change occurs when the material power capabilities of a subordinate group are increased, and when the subordinate group can muster a counter-hegemonic challenge to the prevalent ideology, i.e. “a coherent and persistent articulation of...demands that challenge the legitimacy of the prevailing consensus.” The first reaction by the dominant group will be to address a counter-hegemonic challenge by attempting to satisfy some demands without effecting any radical change of the system as a whole. This strategy amounts to further co-optation. In the absence of the possibility to achieve revolutionary change, the alternative is a “historical compromise” arrived at through negotiations. At the time of writing, Cox and Jacobson (1977:365) considered the demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) by developing states supported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), as an example of a counter-hegemonic challenge.
The article concludes by identifying and considering some "proximate factors" which could affect power relations and therefore also the condition of hegemony. First, there are those who influence foreign policy decisions in core states. Second, transnational interest groups such as MNC's and other non-governmental (NGO's) actors, as well as transgovernmental relations (the relations between specialised state bureaucracies in international organisation fora (sourced from Keohane and Nye, 1974). The interests of private transnational groups tend to be "economic-corporative" in nature (sourced from Gramsci), meaning that they are primarily concerned with the particular interest of the group they represent. They will be supportive of a particular hegemony, if their interests are accommodated. Those involved in transgovernmental relations are more directly concerned with the existing power relations which relate to hegemony.

Third, those who may be able to take the initiative as "empathetic neutrals." During a period which is potentially conducive to hegemonic change, their role would be to act as mediators between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces so as to arrive at a historical comprise or co-optation. This role could be played by heads of international organisations, "notable individuals", or the foreign policies of smaller states. Lastly, there is public opinion. The authors note that international organisations "...have in practice had little or no contact with mass constituencies." The interests of the latter, if they are represented at all, are channeled through national bureaucracies and special interest groups. Nevertheless, and an important point in the context of this study: "...it seems useful to enquire to what extent the mobilization of mass-based concern with certain world issues is capable of affecting the reformulation of hegemony and providing a political base for certain forms of international action." Cox and Jacobson argue that an awareness of how global issues affect the welfare of the poor in developing states, can only come about through "social mobilization" and "a fuller public consciousness." They conclude, however, that "popular participation" in international organisations, though far off, should not be discounted in the future (Cox and Jacobson, 1977:367-370).
In the last three articles which are reviewed in this chapter, Cox's returns to some of the above issues and introduces some new concepts. In “Labor and Hegemony”, Cox (1977) discusses the relationship between the ILO and the United States (US). He argues that the US withdrew from the organisation because it perceived that the ILO was moving away from legitimating a specific form of production relations (tripartism) which, in turn, is linked to a particular form of state. The detailed discussion on the dynamics between the ILO, the role of the executive head (director-general), the AFL-CIO (representing the interests of American labour), and the US government is cast in the “historical method.” In the process he shows how changes in the international production structure and the accompanying change in social relations related to production, are related to a corporative state form. This form of state takes on different manifestations in the core industrialised and the developing (peripheral) states (Cox, 1977:420-422).

Again, Cox (1977:421) views production as “...the ultimate resource on which political power rests.” He calls the hegemonic coalition in the US (at the time) which acted to legitimate a particular form of production relations, “tripartism”. This is one of the (twelve) modes of social relations of production which he lists and discusses in PPWO (Cox, 1987). These modes are dealt with in Chapter 5 and we need not go into any further particulars here, except to say that the equivalent form in states who are in a position of “dependent capitalism”, is termed “state corporatism” and that these modes of production are related to specific forms of state. In an extended footnote (no. 7, Cox, 1977:460) he cites Phillipe Schmitter’s (1974) work as being helpful in his own conceptualisation, but notes that Schmitter remains at the state level, while “corporatism, as I use the term, is in essence a form of production relations, one based on an ideology of non-antagonistic class relations and on bureaucratized structures of representation and control.”

In a reply to Douglas and Godson’s (1980) critique of “Labor and Hegemony”, Cox (1980) makes some interesting observations on his own method and it is worth taking note of these, as we approach the chapter on his core theoretical framework. He starts by categorising the approach of Douglas and Godson (1980) as one which is close to
"certain mainstream political science." What does this involve? It leads them to look at actors, the motives for their actions, and events which are the result of the interaction between them. Cox does acknowledge that this is part of the process of enquiry, but that it leaves the analyst with an incomplete picture. What is required is an approach which accepts that action is given meaning by the context in which it takes place.

The important first step is, therefore, to establish the context or "historical structure" (this concept is sourced from Braudel, see Cox, 1996b:29 and Cox, 1986:245-246) which forms the backdrop for action and which consists of (objective) power relations and (subjective) "shared meanings". Thereafter, and also important for this study, comes "the attempt to reconstruct the mental frameworks through which individuals and groups perceive their field of action." Finally, the analyst must ask whether properly contextualised actions are potentially transformative or supportive of a historical structure. According to Cox, this requires a focus on the consequences, and not the motivation which results in the action (Cox, 1980:474-475).

The last article (1979) we need to take note off (before turning to the core theoretical framework) is important for two reasons; firstly, because Cox (footnote 1, p.416) sets out his own values or "political position", and secondly, because here Cox explains in some detail his view of ideology and science. It relates, in other words, to how he perceives epistemology. His purpose is to show how ideology, politics and knowledge are linked and how this can be seen in various "clusters" of research networks surrounding a particular issue. The issue he investigates is the literature surrounding the demands for a NIEO by developing states at the UN during the 1970s, subsequent to the 1973 oil crisis. More specifically, he identifies (through a survey of the literature) various perspectives (viz. monopolistic liberalism, social democratic, Third World, neomercantilist, and historical materialism) and discusses the "research networks" connected to them in some detail.
He sets out his position on the "scientific" status of approaches in the social sciences from the outset, particularly those "establishment" perspectives which "...when stripped of their putative universality, become seen as special pleading for historically transient but presently entrenched interests." This position is the forerunner of the much quoted "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" premise in the 1981 article (see Chapter 5). Regarding his own purposes, he confirms Neufeld's (see Chapter 3) understanding (incommensurable but comparable) of his view on perspectives when he points out that perspectives can be (and are chosen) on the grounds of one's own value preferences. In Cox's (1979:376-377) case:

"It is...only fair to warn the reader that my purpose in undertaking this survey was to discover and encourage avenues of enquiry that might in the long run aid towards the transformation of power relations both within and among nations in the direction of greater social equity." and therefore, "...I found the work of some of the radical neomercantilists and historical materialists discussed below more potentially valuable...than the more prestigious products of the western academic establishments."

With respect to the establishment perspective, he concludes that attempts to deal with the demands for a NIEO reflect co-optation strategies. In other words, a research focus on what adjustments can be made to ensure wider acceptability (consensus/legitimacy) of the existing order, without making any major changes to the norms and regulations on which it is based. He concludes that the use of (social) science goes through two stages: it is initially accepted as "valid" as long as it serves as an aid to action during a particular time period, and it becomes ideology when its concepts and ideas are used to validate a particular order. However, any "new science...in due time will be perceived as ideology tied to historical foundations that have in turn become obsolete" (Cox, 1979:415-416).
Finally, some other points are worth taking note of. Cox (1979:410) introduces the concept “state class” (see Chapter 5) which he sources from Elsenhans. The notion of a state class refers to the privileged elite in developing states upon whom pressure must be maintained from below to ensure that they remain committed to “national development goals.” This pressure should come from the “disadvantaged strata” or from the latter in alliance with disaffected members of the state class. An important condition for the ability of the marginalised groups to exert any form of pressure is that they must be “effectively mobilized” (own italics), a condition which is usually present in developing states immediately after decolonisation. Currently, and within the context of southern Africa, this condition is most likely to have been present immediately after democratisation, or in the cases of severe legitimacy problems being experienced in one party dominant states.

Cox (1979:414) also hints at his imminent critique of Wallerstein which would be stated in more unequivocal terms later. He questions the notion that there is a single mode of production at the world system level and stresses the need to define “just what a mode of production is.” This is noted by him as being a “serious gap” in the historical materialist perspective: “Theorizing about the world system has achieved a certain academic status, but relatively little is being done towards a better understanding of the varieties of the real world of production...” This is, according to him, a serious oversight by an approach (world systems theory) which intends to base its explanation on the concept of production.

4.5 Summation

This chapter has traced Cox’s influences and reviewed the pre-1987 articles to trace the development of this thinking. The development of his Critical Theory originated during his time at the ILO, and was largely due to his realisation that the ideas on labour relations which this institution propagated did not have any bearing on practice. Additionally, his thoughts were shaped by several authors. The notion of the interactive, mutual influence between production processes, the nature (form) of the state, and
changes at the international level was taken from the work of E.H. Carr. From George Sorel, Cox absorbed the understanding of historical materialism as consisting of a link between ideas and material conditions, as well as Sorel's skepticism towards positivism.

People have shared understandings of the social practices and institutions which they create to deal with material challenges. Change must, therefore, be understood in terms of changes in (intersubjective) thought and its link to materialist conditions. The notion of "rethinking the thought of the past" is sourced from the historian, R.G. Collingwood combined with Sorel. Crucially, for Cox, ideas always evolve within a particular historical context and it is essential to ask where a particular idea (for example, international labour regulation) came from and in whose interest the institutionalisation of such an idea is/was. The possibility of change, can be discerned by looking at the relationship between ideas and material conditions.

Cox's early work (for instance, 1969), while at the ILO, was more inclined towards the positivist method, although he always reflected "upon the sources of the norms" which the organisation stood for. Nevertheless, even during this period he never regarded the state as a closed entity but showed a sensitivity for the influence of "subnational" forces on foreign policy, the need to historically contextualise theory, as well as the need to look for the "essence" of an international organisation. Regarding the latter point, there is a brief reference to Herbert Marcuse. During his last years at the ILO, Cox (together with Jeffrey Harrod) completed a major research project on different types of production relations and began to conceptualise and apply Gramsci's notion of hegemony to the explanation of the role of international organisations. This change in thinking was influenced by the contradictions evident in the world at that time (the 1968 student riots and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia) and by what Cox saw as the gap between "ideology and reality." This became more evident to him also in his own work at the ILO, particularly after the appointment of Wilfred Jenks as director. The latter's policy of censuring work critical of the ILO, led to Cox's resignation in 1972.
After his resignation from the ILO, Cox accepted a position at Columbia University and later at the University of York in Canada (1977). It was during this time that he began to conceptualise and set out the assumptions of his core theoretical framework, drawing on a variety of sources, but starting out with Gramsci and a re-reading of Marx and Giambattista Vico.

In “On Thinking about Future World Order”, Cox (1976) introduces some important concepts and premises related to the development of his core theoretical framework. He also criticises and leaves behind (although not entirely, as we shall see later) the “positivist-evolutionary” approach which was reflected in his academic work on international organisations while at the ILO. We can highlight and note a number of observations which are related to epistemology and method. Firstly, the “critical potential” of an approach, for Cox, lies in its willingness to ask whether practice reflects the normative goal/ideal of the polity (e.g. liberal pluralism). Secondly, there is a link between the subjective (creativity) and the objective (material circumstances). Thoughts and events are connected in explanation, one cannot separate the two as positivism does (here Cox draws on Machiavelli, Collingwood and Vico). Thirdly, the positivist approach to the creation of knowledge is a “problem-solving” one. It’s explanations are coupled to system maintenance and systemic efficiency. Moreover, they attempt to explain change by projecting current trends into the future, without considering the possibility of (systemic) change based on variations in power relations within society.

As an alternative to positivism, Cox proposes the historical-dialectical approach (Cox draws on Vico to support his argument, see endnote 3 of this chapter) which accepts the link between ideas and events (sourced from Collingwood). The main strengths of this approach, Cox argues, are that; it is holistic, it attempts to develop generalisations related to ideal types, it explains change in terms of contradictions arising in society (sourced from Dahrendorf) and that it adopts a “contrast image of society” by would be challengers (sourced from Gramsci). It also stresses the importance of analysing the
material conditions, and the effect of structural changes on forms of state and the "balance of social forces within the state" (sourced from Barraclough). Lastly, it uses two dimensions of time, synchronic and diachronic (sourced from Braudel). From this we can derive the following premises:

- Contradictions (a gap between the prevalent ideology and material conditions for a group) can lead to change/conflict.
- The potential for change/conflict depends on a "change of consciousness" and the adoption of a "contrast image of society" by would-be challengers.
- Changes in power relations between groups (social forces) within society, have an influence on the form of state.
- Changes in state form are related to changes in the international system.

The Cox and Jacobson article is (together with Cox's 1976, article) another important milestone in the development of the core theoretical framework. Firstly, power is conceptualised as, ultimately, being dependent on control over production. Power, therefore, needs to be understood as being exercised by state and non-state actors. Power relations in the world system (drawing on Wallerstein) must be related to the international production structure. Furthermore, the economic-welfare policies of states are in reaction to societal demands and the demands of the international order. Together they influence the form of state.

The "whole" within which events take place needs to be understood in terms of the condition of hegemony. Hegemony (or the absence thereof) is the context within which the potential for change needs to be understood. Furthermore, hegemony requires us to think of power in terms of material capacity and ideology. Hegemony is based on coercion and consensus. Contradictions (possibly leading to conflict) in the world system can be seen in terms of the alienation of social forces related to production in the core states, and marginalisation in the semi-periphery and periphery.
Hegemonic dynamics are characterised by co-optation, compromise or revolution. The legitimacy accorded to the prevailing order is dependent on the amount of consensus accorded to the dominant ideology by subordinate groups. This ideology also circumscribes the type of problems which are worthy of scientific investigation. Problem-solving theory focuses on issues which are potentially disruptive to status quo maintenance. Hegemony may be analysed in terms of state-society relations, but it may also be prevalent at the international level, for instance when international organisations reflect the "hegemonic consensus of a particular time."

Transformation or change can be explained by investigating whether hegemony is prevalent and whether the material power capacity of subordinate groups has increased to such an extent that the latter can mount a counter-hegemonic challenge to the dominant ideology. However, this is only possible within a context where marginalised groups can be effectively mobilised. The possibility of popular participation in international organisations is reflected in Cox's later (post-1987) work on multilateralism, while the role of the foreign policies of smaller states in hegemony is returned to in "middlepowermanship" (Cox, 1989a). For our purposes, we must take note of the question which arises from the discussion of the role of public opinion: "The poor of the world, as a whole, remain very largely inarticulate" (Cox and Jacobson, 1977:369). But to what extent has this changed? What do the (marginalised) in the (semi-)periphery know about how global issues affect their welfare?

Cox (1980) criticises "mainstream political science" for only focusing on the interactions between individual actors in terms of motives and subsequent actions. This is only a partial explanation and needs to be augmented by placing action within historical context. This requires us to establish the historical structure (sourced from Braudel) within which the consequences of actions take place. Thereafter the analyst must "reconstruct the mental frameworks through which individuals and groups perceive their field of action." This is the concept of intersubjective understanding of social practices, which Cox developed from his reading of Sorel and Collingwood.
He later “softens” his position on the “interaction” perspective (see Chapter 5). Actions and therefore motives do form a part of the total context. However, I maintain that the importance which Cox attaches to social forces as catalysts for transformation requires us to also focus on the (latent) motives of the individuals who form specific social forces. Consequences alone, cannot lead us to conclusions about the potential of a social force to bring about change, or to determine whether they could develop into challengers of hegemony. Thus, while he later acknowledges that actors, interactions, and motives form a part of the explanation, his own work does not address (latent) motivations at the level of social forces.

Finally, Cox affirms clearly that he perceives the creation of knowledge and interests as being linked. In a review of the literature (divided into “clusters” of research networks) on the NIEO, he argues that scientific approaches are connected to “historically transient but presently entrenched interests.” In other words, “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981). In this article (1979:376-377), he also states his own preference for “avenues of enquiry” which “…might in the long run aid towards the transformation of power relations both within and among nations in the direction of greater social equity.” Therefore, when science is used as an instrument to assist in the “validation” of the prevalent political economic order, it becomes ideology.
Endnotes

1 Cox’s positivism is also revealed in his use of the terms “dependent” and “independent” variable: “Throughout the history of the Organization the world pattern of conflict and alignment appears as the independent variable and the institutional development of the United Nations as the dependent variable.” (Cox, 1969:321).

2 To illustrate this point he refers to the domestic support which David Morse mustered in the United States (for example, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, AFL-CIO) to counter the possibility of the US pulling out of the ILO, after the Soviet Union re-entered the organisation in 1954. The support was forthcoming because Morse’s policies carried the approval of the AFL-CIO, in the sense that they were perceived as being anti-Communist. Later, when Morse came under pressure to appoint someone from the Soviet Union as assistant director-general, the support was withdrawn. Shortly thereafter, Morse resigned (Cox, 1969:339, editors note, Cox and Sinclair, 1996:340).

3 Cox (1976:178-179) distinguishes between data and facts to emphasise the difference between the positivist and “other approaches.” Data, as defined by positivism, are measurable objects (even mental attitudes can be measured, as in survey research, he notes). Facts (historical events), in contrast, can be understood by humans because they have been made by humans. Drawing on Giambattista Vico via Collingwood, Cox, notes that understanding is only possible if the event has been made by the knower (a human product) (footnote 8, p. 179). It is obvious that Cox is not referring to the need for participant-observation in order for us to be able to understand a social event. His own account of historical ideal types, for that matter, also depends on “second-hand” observation. Are individual opinion statements in a survey research project not a “human product”, are they not “facts”? If we accept the unity of subject and object when looking at statements of opinion in survey research, I think we can accept them as facts.

4 In later publications, Cox explains that this is not a form of idealism; that the external world is merely a creation of the human mind. Here he motivates the connection between consciousness and being by citing Collingwood (Cox, 1976:181-182, footnote, 12). In the quotation, Collingwood stresses the distinction between “the outside and inside of an event.” The outside, for him, are historical events observable as acts of behaviour. The inside, “can only be described in terms of thought.” What Collingwood means is that an event can only be understood by linking it to the thought of the agent who is involved in it: “action is the unity of the outside and inside of an event...”

5 In the 1981 article, Cox’s (1981:98) “coherent structural arrangement” becomes “historical structure.” Also, in that article, “behaviour patterns” changes to “capabilities”. The capabilities which Cox refers to are related to material conditions: productive capacity, destructive capacity (military), natural resources, technology, industry and wealth (economic growth/development). The change from “behaviour patterns” to “capabilities” is probably motivated by the need to anchor the schemata of “historical structure” to the assumption that collective actions of humans and their resultant organisations are the result of their response to the material challenges of their existence.

6 See also Cox (1982:39) “Ultimately, all forms of power...depend upon control over production...”

7 It is “interesting” because Cox (1981) would later (sympathetically) criticise Wallerstein’s world systems theory as inadequate, because it does not account for systemic change.
Chapter 5

The Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox: Core Theoretical Framework

5.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on Cox’s core theoretical framework as reflected in two articles (1981, 1983) and the volume *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (1987) (PPWO), focusing specifically on assumptions and method. It also takes note of Cox’s post-1987 thinking on aspects such as the changing world order (globalisation and the nature of the state), multilateralism, and civilisations and incorporates his reflections on issues, which have a bearing on the core theoretical framework. Cox’s modes of social relations of production are brought to bear on his identification of three contemporary social hierarchies, the marginalised, precarious and integrated. Lastly, the chapter draws from Cox’s work his perceptions on the “collective images” of the marginalised. These expectations, related to the assumption that the marginalised are a potential source for change/transformation will be used to focus on the data generated by the *Southern African Barometer* survey (See the main claim and subsidiary claims in Chapters 1 and 6). The analysis of this data forms the substance of Chapters 6 and 7.

5.2 Problem-solving and Critical Theory

The development of Cox’s thinking which has been traced thusfar is encapsulated in the *Millennium* articles (1981 and 1983). The two articles form the theoretical base for the PPWO (1987) volume. In addition to the assumptions, concepts and dynamics of his explanatory framework, Cox also provides us with a more nuanced motivation for his focus on production and his perspective on epistemology within the social sciences. Finally, he discusses and criticises neorealism, world systems theory and Marxism. Although I regard these three publications as the nucleus of Cox’s thinking on the method of historicism, where necessary, and to further clarify his concepts, ontology and epistemology, I also draw on his pre- and post-1987 publications.
The basic question which the core theoretical framework attempts to answer is, how are social forces (related to production) linked to forms of state, and to world orders? To answer this question, Cox (1981:86) argues, we need to move beyond the study of state and society as separate entities (as evidenced in the mainstream neorealism approach to the study of international relations): “Today... state and civil society are so interpenetrated that the concepts have become almost purely analytical.” What is required is a focus on state-society complexes and how these are related to different forms of states. This approach, furthermore, while being somewhat on the margins of mainstream International Relations (IR) can be found in the work of E.H. Carr, Eric Hobsbawm and Fernand Braudel. Although Wallersteins’s world systems theory draws on Braudel, Cox (1981:86-87) notes that it underplays the role of states as shapers. Wallerstein views states as being mainly shaped by their position within a single world (capitalist system). Secondly, world systems theory has the “unintended” consequence of focusing on aspects, which maintain the system, instead of looking for contradictions, which may be potential catalysts for systemic transformation.

I turn, next, to Cox’s view on epistemology, his method of historicism, and how this is related to his criticism of neorealism and (scientific) Marxism, as well as his own alternative, critical theory. Cox’s (1981:87) approach to theory in the social sciences (see Chapter 4) is one which accepts that knowledge is connected to interests: “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose” and “There is...no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space.” This leads him to make the distinction between “critical theory” and “problem-solving theory.” It is a distinction which is often used by readers of Cox to link him to the CT of the Frankfurt School (via Max Horkheimer’s 1937 distinction between “critical theory” and “traditional theory”, see Chapter 2).

What are the characteristics of problem-solving theory, according to Cox? The first important point to take note of, is that it is status quo oriented. It deals with issues that arise from within the parameters of “prevailing power relationships and the institutions
into which they are organized” and it does so to ensure that these relations and institutions operate efficiently (this reflects Cox’s own experience at the ILO). In this sense it is “ahistorical” because it views the contemporary parameters of the system (for instance, state power politics) as a being a mirror of the past and of the future. This assumption (of a universal fixed order) is not only related to method, but, according to Cox, contains within it a normative bias itself, because it serves the interests of those who want the present order to be maintained. The claim of value freedom by problem solving (positivist) theory is thus suspect (Cox, 1981:88-89).

Critical theory on the other hand, does not focus on problems by isolating them from the broader context, or by “further analytical subdivisions” (Cox, 1981:89-90). It also starts by looking at an aspect of “human activity” but then pulls away to place this activity within the context of the whole system. It does not deal with problems by attempting to resolve them so that the system functions more efficiently, but asks how the system gives rise to the problems in the first place; “...it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about.” Both, problem-solving and critical theory, are therefore connected to practice. The former as a guide to “tactical action” in order to maintain the status quo, the latter as a guide to “strategic action” aimed at changing it. The method of historicism forms a crucial part of CCT, and this will be returned to in more detail below. At this stage, we can note that Cox (1981:89) regards critical theory as a “...theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but with a continuing process of historical change.”

It is important to point out (see Rengger’s critique in Chapter 2) that Cox does not refer to standing “apart from the prevailing order” to indicate that it is possible to separate subject and object. His normative preference for an alternative order based on social equity is never denied, nor does he deny his own subjectivity: “...I accept that my own thought is grounded in a particular perspective; and I mean no offense in pointing to what appears to be a similar grounding in other people’s thought” (Cox, 1986:247). The idea encapsulated in “standing apart from” is related to the holistic component of Cox’s critical theory and to the need to think of the possibility of an alternative order.
Nevertheless, the contemplation of an alternative order must be anchored in an understanding of history. Strategies, which are considered for practical action, must be based on "...changing practice and empirical-historical study, which are a proving ground for concepts and hypotheses." Thus, we need to consider the possibility of an alternative order in a non-utopian manner; critical theory "...must reject improbable alternatives just as it rejects the permanency of the existing order" (Cox, 1981:87, 90).  

5.3 The Method of Historicism

What does the method of historicism in CCT involve? A good way of approaching this topic is by locating it in Cox's criticism of Waltz's neorealism (1979) (see Chapter 2), and his discussion of Marx.

Cox (1981:91) does not view classical realism as being incompatible with his view of critical theory. The realism of E.H. Carr and Ludwig Dehio are anchored in the "historical mode of thought" because, "they delineated the particular configurations of forces which fixed the framework of international behavior in different periods; and they tried to understand institutions, theories, and events within their historical contexts."

However, Morgenthau (1948, 1951) and Waltz (1979) are to blame for turning classical realism into problem solving theory. This development must be understood within the context of the Cold War and the resultant foreign policy focus in the US on power expansion and management. This (American) version of realism, is a "science at the service of big-power management of the international system" (Cox, 1986:248).

Neorealism assumes that there is a "common rationality" with which the international system may be understood. This rationality is informed by three premises: first, that the nature of "man" is unchanging and is informed by a selfish disposition to maximise power; second, that the foreign policies of states are alike - they are informed by the need to ensure political security in the national interest; and third, that the international system acts as a constraint on power maximising states through the balance of power mechanism (Cox, 1981:92). These premises, moreover, are unchanging and universal. History, as
viewed by neorealism, is continuity. The events, which play themselves out over time, are merely illustrations of variations, which are informed by the same three underlying premises. As a science it claims to "transcend history" and therefore the "future will always be like the past" (Kenneth Waltz, responding to a question at the American Political Science Association in 1980) (Cox, 1981:117, footnote 6).

Critical theory is informed by the method of historicism and neorealism is informed by the method of positivism. Thus, the positivist method in neorealism according to Waltz (see Chapter 2), enables the analyst to separate from that which is to be known - the "externally perceived events." These events consist of actors (states) who are responsible for causing a change in the behaviour of other actors (states) in a system, which operates according to the principle (law) of the balance of power. Cox (1981:93), however, argues that the claim of value freedom is transparent. While neorealism predicts that states will behave according to the premises of its theory, it also contributes to convert policy makers to its perspective of rationality. The advice to act in accordance with the dictates of neorealism is essential to ensure that the "actors" in effect perceive the inter-state system in this way.

The method of historicism, in contrast, asserts a unity of subject and object. Cox (1981:93-94) sources this assumption from Vico (originally 1774, translated version by Bergin and Fisch, 1970). He goes so far as to state: "The Vichian approach... is that of critical theory" (own italics). The assumption of unity between consciousness and being (Cox also uses E.P. Thompson as a source, Cox, 1996b:27) is crucial to the explanation of change in the historical mode of understanding. History is perceived as the arena of change through the changing (not the unchanging as in neorealism) nature of the human mind and the institutions which are collectively created by humans. For Vico, "...the nature of man and of human institutions (among which must be included the state and the inter-state system) should not be thought of in terms of unchanging substance but rather
as a continuing creation of new forms” (Cox, 1981:93). Historicism, as used by Cox (and defined by Vico) is an approach in which institutions (e.g. the state) are viewed as “collective responses to a collectively perceived problematic that produce certain practices” (Cox, 1986:242).³

But how are we to understand change? Change can be understood by accepting the unity between subject (the human mind) and object (institutions and practices). The latter are the result of collective responses to the challenges of the material (natural) environment (see also Cox, 1976), and we can therefore explain change through an understanding of the shared (intersubjective) ideas which people have of their institutions and practices. Institutions and practices (e.g. the state) do not exist in the same way as subjects do, but people respond and behave accordingly, because they (intersubjectively) share the same perception of these objective realities. In the sense that people respond to their material environment historicism is the same as historical materialism (own italics) (Cox, 1986:242). The task then, for the analyst using the method of historicism is:

“...To find the connections between the mental schema through which people conceive action and the material world which constrains both what people can do and how they can think about doing it” (Cox, 1986:243).

In the “Postscript 1985” added to the reprinted version in Keohane, 1986, Cox elaborates more on the research agenda of historicism (1986:244):

“The research program of historicism is to reveal the historical structures characteristic of particular eras within which such regularities (of human activities) prevail. Even more important, this research program is to explain transformations from one structure to another.”
The method of historicism is therefore not one which abstracts "essences" related to human nature from history, it "...does not envisage any general or universally valid laws..." "For historicism, *both human nature and the structures of human interactions change*, if only very slowly" (own italics) (Cox, 1986:243-244). History is not the "record" of universal truths; it reflects the dynamics of the different manifestations between the human mind and institutions. The "conceit of scholars", according to Vico is to assume that their knowledge is universal, to take "...a form of thought derived from a particular phase of history (and thus from a particular structure of social relations) and assuming it to be universally valid" (Cox, 1981:94). Nevertheless, and related to the two quotations above, the question remains as to how the analyst must access "the mental schema through which people conceive action...” in any particular historical structure. Are we to access them through "...an examination of the thought of the most perceptive minds of a period" as suggested by Cox (1976:182)? Or, alternatively, must we follow "Weber’s reconstruction of forms of religious consciousness” to arrive at the “world views” of groups?

Furthermore, if consequences are more important than individual motivations in explaining change what are we to make of seemingly contradictory footnotes in the 1981 article and the 1985 “Postscript.” In the former, when describing the concept “collective images”, Cox (1981:99 and footnote 19 on page 119) emphasises that “Collective images are not aggregations of fragmented opinions of individuals such as are compiled through surveys; they are coherent mental types...” Yet, in a footnote (Cox, 1986:254, nr. 33) added to a statement which says that there can be no universal laws which transcend history, he observes that explanation is the purpose of the historicism method and this requires "...an assembling of individual motivations (own italics) and social structures to be connected by explanatory hypotheses.” This apparent contradiction, can be explained by the fact that Cox does not reject positivism in toto: “Regularities in human activities may indeed be observed...and thus the positivist approach can be fruitful within defined historical limits” (Cox, 1986:244).
5.4 Historical Materialism

With Vico, Cox (1981:95) regards historical materialism as a "...foremost source of critical theory." He emphasises, however, that he draws on the historical Marx, and not the structural Marxism of Althusser and Poulantzas. The latter he regards as similar to the method (not the assumptions) of neorealism, in the sense that it is maintained that the development of capitalism can be explained in accordance with unchanging, ahistorical laws. The historical Marx, however, views the mode of production and the class struggle as social phenomena, which can be explained by using "historical reason." What then, does Cox use from the historical Marx?

First, the concept "dialectic." Cox (1981:95) explains his use of the term as being related to two levels: "logic" and "real history." At the first level, dialectical thought requires that we focus on contradictions as a guide to explanation. Concepts, therefore, have to be held up against reality and, furthermore, must be adjusted to correspond to changing reality. Additionally, statements about reality contain their opposites within them. Both are aspects of a constantly changing truth. At the historical level, dialectic leads us to consider the possibility of alternatives. These alternatives emanate from "opposed social forces in any concrete historical situation." While neorealism focuses on conflict, its premise is that conflict recurs within an unchanging structure. The dialectical view of conflict, however, is that it may contribute to structural change. Secondly, the historical materialist approach incorporates a vertical dimension of relations. This means that we need to focus on power relations, not only, between powerful states, but also on a hierarchy which is based on the division of labour (core - periphery) (Cox, 1981:95-96).

Thirdly, historical materialism "opens up" the state, by focusing on the relations between state and civil society in a Gramscian sense. This means that the state is not viewed as autonomous from civil society (as in neorealism). The relations between state and civil society are regarded as reciprocal, and subsequently, the state (as in the economist determinist Marxist perspective) is not merely an entity, which functions at the behest and in the general interest of capitalism. The interaction between the economic base and
the "ethico-political sphere" is one, which reflects interpenetration and mutual influence. Lastly, historical materialism leads us to focus on "...the production process as a critical element in the explanation of the particular historical form taken by a state/society complex." Production generates material capabilities upon which the power of the state is based. Control over production, and the resultant power relations between social forces related to production are therefore of direct interest to the state and influence the form it takes (Cox, 1981:96).

At this point, we need to expand more on the materialist component of Cox's method of historicism (see also Cox and Jacobson, 1977 and Cox, 1982). This materialist point of departure is (re)stated as follows in PPWO: "Production creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the ways in which human efforts are combined in productive processes affect all other aspects of social life, including the polity." The relationship between production and power, however, is not "unidirectional." Power, as exercised by the state, also shapes and influences the dynamics of production. Moreover, production does not necessarily historically precede the state (although it does have a "certain logical precedence" in that it provides the material underpinnings of the state). The state has often shaped and guided forms of production (e.g. the state's role in England to facilitate the transition to an unregulated economy during the 19th century). In any society, one type (form or mode) of production will be pre-dominant and this creates a hierarchy in terms of which wealth flows from the subordinate to the dominant classes (Cox, 1987:1-5).

Is this approach materially reductionist? In the sense that Cox views "the production of the material basis of life as a fundamental activity for all human groups," it is (Sinclair, 1996:9). However, it needs to be distinguished from the economism of vulgar Marxism, in the sense that Cox uses the Gramscian notion of the interpenetration between state and civil society. The state is not "merely" the instrument of the dominant class, it comes to "...embody certain general principles bearing on the regulations of production that act as a constraint on class interests narrowly conceived" (Cox, 1987:19). Additionally, while production involves work in order to directly satisfy human needs, it also creates the
"symbols and social institutions that make possible the cooperation among people required to do the first" (Cox, 1987:13). Production, therefore, does not just refer to the economic activities of any society, it also includes the creation of the ideas, institutions and social practices which form the framework within which material production takes place; "Looking at production is simply a way of thinking about collective life..." (Sinclair, 1996:9, see also Cox, 1989b:39).

Types of production relations form the basis for the formation of classes. Cox (1987:2-4) views the concept of class as providing us with the link between economics and politics (production and power). He emphasises, however, that we cannot apply this concept ahistorically. The concept cannot be transported from 19th century Europe and uncritically applied to contemporary production relations. Therefore, although production relations is the starting point for class formation "...other factors enter into the formation or nonformation of real historical classes", and the existence of class awareness must therefore be historically determined (Cox, 1987:2). A group, who have a common position in a mode of production must be aware of this position. They must have common perceptions of divisions in society, and express this in collective action. Classes, according to Cox (1987:356), only exist when their propensity for joint action in addressing a social, political, economic problem has been demonstrated. Such a propensity may be witnessed in terms of the consequences of a joint action, "...either these events provoke a response through common action or they reveal an incapacity for action" (Cox, 1987:407, footnote 8).

5.5 Historical Structures

Having set out the basic assumptions and premises (in terms of epistemology and method) of what he regards as critical theory, Cox goes on to explain the dynamics of his model. The framework within which "action" takes place is the historical structure. Any historical structure consists of "a particular configuration of forces." These forces circumscribe the dynamics within any given historical structure and act as the parameters within which social forces must act. They are, material capabilities, ideas and institutions.
and may be viewed as the three points of a triangle which are connected by lines denoting mutual influence: “No one-way determinism need be assumed among these three...” (Cox, 1981:98). It is important to note that Cox is not a “structuralist” in the sense that he views structure as the ultimate determinant of human action (as reflected in the work of Levi-Strauss and Althusser). Structures are the result of “collective human activities”, and while they influence and constrain human action, they can be transformed by human action (Cox, 1987:4). 5

Material capabilities may be “destructive” (military capacity) and “productive.” Both are determined by and are the result of technology, industry, organisational capacity, and wealth. Ideas are divided into two forms, “intersubjective meanings” and “collective images of social order.” Cox draws on Charles Taylor for his conceptualisation of intersubjective meaning. The concept refers to the shared perception which people have of institutions or practices. They behave as if the practice of negotiation or the institution of the state exists. Their behaviour, however, is determined by their shared understanding of an abstract idea. Intersubjective meanings can be “durable” over a prolonged period, but are “historically conditioned” and may change. The other form of idea refers to “collective images of social order held by different groups of people.” Unlike intersubjective ideas which tend to be constant over a prolonged period of time, collective images (on the legitimacy of power relations, for instance) may differ and stand in opposition to one another. They can form the basis for the emergence of “an alternative structure” (Cox, 1981:99).

Lastly, we find (in any historical structure) institutions, which function to maintain, and are usually a mirror of, the power relations prevalent at the time. Institutions may be hegemonic or non-hegemonic (see Cox and Jacobson, 1977). Hegemonic institutions accommodate diversity through consensus; which is grounded within a universal collective image and distributes rewards to subordinate groups without endangering the position of the dominant group. Thus, legitimacy is ensured. Non-hegemonic structures
are characterised by the predominance of power exercised as coercion and the absence (in varying degrees) of consensus (legitimacy). The existence of hegemony, however, depends not only on institutions but also on material capabilities and ideas/ideology (Cox, 1981:99-100).

Cox (1983:137-138) regards international organisations as the institutions which act as "mechanisms of hegemony." This, again, reflects his own experience at the ILO (see Cox and Jacobson, 1977 and Cox, 1977). Essentially, they encapsulate and give voice to the "universal norms" which are a part of the ideology (for instance, a liberal world economy) of a hegemonic world order. Their function is, therefore, to uphold the rules which underpin the idea of a liberal world economy (The WTO for international trade and the IMF for the international monetary system), to incorporate the elites of subordinate states, and to deal with ideas which challenge the hegemonic order. These institutions and the rules they administer are founded by the state, which, in conjunction with other states, is supportive of the hegemonic order. As such, they "reflect orientations favourable to the dominant social and economic forces." The post-World War II (WWII) Bretton Woods system with its attendant institutions, the IMF, WB and GATT, is an example of such an order.

Challenges by elites from peripheral states who work in these institutions are dealt with by allowing some room for manoeuvre, as long as this is in the interest of dominant social forces and their counterparts in developing states. Ideas, which challenge the ideology behind the hegemonic order, are absorbed to ensure that they do not threaten it. For instance, the notion of self-reliance or autonomous development (advocated by dependency theory), once it had passed through the policy analysis of the World Bank, was changed to mean "do-it-yourself welfare programs." The administration of such projects in rural areas were aimed at stemming the influx to the cities, thereby preventing those who cannot be integrated in the world economy from causing political and social instability. Cox (1983: 139) concludes pessimistically, that counter-hegemonic challenges via international organisations "can be ruled out as a total illusion."
Historical structures (consisting of material capabilities, ideas and institutions) represent “limited totalities” (part of reality) and must be located through “a study of the historical situation to which it relates; and second, by looking for the emergence of rival structures expressing alternative possibilities of development.” As such, although the three aspects describe “a complex reality” and “tendencies” they are “limited in their applicability in time and space.” The “method of historical structures” can be applied to three “spheres of activity”: the relations between social forces centred on modes of production, forms of state (anchored in a particular state-society complex), and world orders. Again, these three may be perceived of as the three points of a triangle, which are connected by arrows indicating mutual interaction and influence. Each one of these levels (and the three taken together) reflects a specific arrangement of material capabilities, ideas and institutions (Cox, 1981:100-101).7

5.6 Applying Hegemony

The use of the concept hegemony8 in Cox’s framework is not restricted to institutions. It also influences his perspective on power and change. In Chapter 4, it was pointed out that Cox uses the Gramscian conceptualisation of hegemony. According to Cox (1983:126-127) Gramsci’s insight was to extend the notion of (potential) working class hegemony (leadership exercised in consent with allied classes), to the actual dominance of the bourgeoisie. The hegemonic status of the latter (anchored in civil society) was reflected in the ability to rule (directly or indirectly) by extending concessions to subordinate classes. This requires a broader conceptualisation, one which recognises the symbiotic relationship between the state and civil society. The hegemonic position of a dominant class is not only reflected in the apparatus of government, but also in “the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society”, “...all the institutions which helped to create in people certain modes of behavior and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order.”
Notably, a society in which hegemony prevails, reflects the Machiavellian notion of power: "...the image of power as a centaur: half man, half beast, a necessary combination of consent and coercion." When hegemony prevails, coercion remains in the background, ready to be used in "marginal, deviant cases." Power, ultimately, has to be located in society, because it (social power) "determines the framework of political action." (Cox, 1982:39-40). Societies, in which a dominant class ("industrial bourgeoisie") has not succeeded in establishing hegemony, are in a condition of "stalemate" which Gramsci termed "passive revolution." These societies have had "aspects of a new order" "thrust upon them" from the outside, without the old order being displaced entirely.

This situation, according to Gramsci, may be characterised by one of two eventualities: caesarism or trasformismo. Under caesarism, a "strong man" takes charge to arbitrate between opposing forces of equal strength, as Mussolini did in Italy, after World War I. Under trasformismo, a leader attempts to construct as broad a coalition as possible, and to co-opt the leaders of those groups who would challenge the interests of such a coalition. "Passive revolution", which is the absence of hegemony, is regarded by Cox as the state of affairs in developing countries (Cox, 1983:129-131). The "historic bloc" (another Gramscian concept) refers to the interplay (mutual shaping) between ideas, politics, ethics and the social relations which result from the material conditions of production. This avoids economic determinism. The formation of a historic bloc requires a dominant class and a state which "maintains cohesion and identity within the bloc through the propagation of a common culture." This is essential to ensure that the interests of the subordinate classes are also accommodated, albeit without "undermining the leadership or vital interests of the hegemonic class" (Cox, 1983:132-133).

Making the jump to the world order level, it is the specific arrangement or "fit" between material capabilities, ideas and institutions that point towards the absence or presence of hegemony. Cox (1981:102-103, and footnote 24, pp. 119-120) criticises Keohane's (1981) and, by extension, Gilpin, Kindleberger and Krasner's use of the concept, because the condition of hegemony (and its association with stability) is explained by them in terms of the (material) power capabilities of a single dominant state. According to Cox
(1983:135), hegemony is not the same as coercive dominance by one state. He argues that stability (hegemony) cannot only be related to the material capabilities of one state. It also depends on whether there is a "coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of universality (that is, not just as the overt instruments of a particular state's dominance)" (Cox, 1981:103 and Cox, 1987:7).

Therefore, the dominance of one state may not be enough to explain hegemonic stability. Ergo, during the interwar years American power was dominant, yet there was an absence of stability/hegemony. Examples of hegemony at the world order level which are associated with stability and a "fit" between material capabilities, ideas, and institutions are the *pax britannica* and the *pax americana*. Important, also, is the notion of "transnational social forces" or a "global civil society" (see also, "trans-national managerial class" below) which is the equivalent (in Gramscian terms) of the inter-state system (Cox, 1981:105 and Cox, 1983:136). The world order is, therefore, made up out of and can be described in terms of social forces, as well as in terms of the interactions between states: "...states play an intermediate though autonomous role between the global structure of social forces and local configurations of social forces within particular countries."

Hegemony (the "fit" between the three aspects which characterise a historical structure) in a world order usually emanates from powerful states were a dominant class has succeeded in establishing it at the national (state-civil society) level, after the society has passed through and consolidated significant socio-economic changes. This hegemony is not only state-based but involves trans-national social forces (global civil society) that are linked via their relationship to the dominant mode of global production (Cox, 1983:136-137).
To encapsulate:

"World hegemony... is expressed in universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries, rules which support the dominant mode of production" (Cox, 1983:137).

However, hegemony wears thin in the periphery and is more "laden with contradictions." Developing states are inclined to reflect the dynamics associated with passive revolution, although they do attempt to follow the hegemonic "model" exported by dominant states. This involves attempts (with varying degrees of success) to incorporate the technological, economic and cultural components of "modernity", as well as the associated political form (liberal democracy) (Cox, 1983:136-137).

The question now becomes, "how and why the fit comes about and comes apart." The answer, Cox (1981:105) suggests, is "that the explanation may be sought in the realm of social forces shaped by production relations." It is, in other words, a "bottom-up" explanation. This is the crux of Cox's core theoretical framework, and it is the question, which this study specifically wishes to address within the context of the southern African region.

5.7 World Order

Focusing on the pax americana, Cox (1981:107) evaluates it as a world order by asking how hegemony has been perpetuated in this order, and by considering what forms of state and social forces within it could bring about its transformation. He does this by considering two phenomena, the "internationalisation of the state" and the "internationalisation of production." The structural characteristics and requirements of the pax americana world order are directly related to the internationalisation of the state. The ideological/normative aspect (ideas) emphasised the need for an open international trade system, with states retaining enough autonomy to enable them to protect their
populations from the negative effects of international trade. To facilitate trade, the system was underpinned by an international monetary order in which exchange rates were fully convertible. Stability was ensured through the fixed exchange rate system based on the linkage of the dollar to gold ($35 = 1 ounce of gold). These norms were applied and monitored by international institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Cox, 1981:108, Cox, 1987:255, cf. Eichengreen, 1996).

In addition to the need for surveillance at the international institutional level, the co-ordination of policies between the major industrialised states became essential. Being responsive to the international norms of the system also required "...a general recognition that measures of national economic policy affect other countries and that such consequences should be taken into account before national policies are adopted. Policy co-ordination as a characteristic of the system became entrenched through the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the United States), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The need to make national policies more sensitive to the dynamics of the international economy led to the increasing importance of state ministries which were more "outward" orientated, for instance finance, trade and the office of the head of state. Networks were formed between these government agencies and corporations, which were more, integrated in the world economy. In this way, the internationalisation of the state came about (Cox, 1981:108-109).

Cox (1981:109-110) argues that the internationalisation of production accompanied the process described above. This refers to the production of the various components of a commodity in different geographical (transnational) locations, following which they are (usually) assembled in the region from where they are marketed and sold. This is international production for international markets, or more accurately today, global production for global markets. International production takes place with control over the
process in the hands of the corporation or its affiliates, through foreign direct investment. In this process technology and the ability to sustain technological innovation is all important. Although the actual “arrangement” of production may differ (e.g. joint ventures) ultimate control resorts in the “source of technology” (Cox, 1987:244-245).

At this point, Cox (1981:110) notes the increasing role of finance capital in the directing and planning of global production. In PPWO, Cox (1987:267) acknowledges the importance of global finance when he observes that “…international finance is the pre-eminent agency of conformity to world hegemonic order and the principal regulator of the political and productive organization of a hegemonic world economy.” The question as to whether global finance has become more important than global production as the driving force of the world economy, is one of the contemporary debates in global political economy (GPE) and is also relevant to Cox’s own emphasis on production.9

The internationalisation of production results in the emergence of a “transnational managerial class.” The members of these social forces are a class “both in itself and for itself.” The existence of this class can be witnessed in the actions of individuals, the ideology which is propagated, and the institutions which represent its interests. The directors of multinational corporations (MNC’s) and the staff of international organisations such as the IMF and World Trade Organisation (WTO) are one component of the trans-national managerial class. They are linked to state managers of government agencies with an outward orientation, and those who manage companies that are linked (directly or indirectly) to the global production structure. In addition to the IMF and WTO, they are also organisationally linked to the OECD. Their interests are articulated through the Trilateral Commission, whereas probably the best illustration of their global network is the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland (Cox, 1981:111).

While the trans-national managerial class is integrated in the world economy, nationally orientated companies are not. They will be more likely to pressure the state for the enactment of protectionist policies. Similarly, the work force can be divided into those
who are integrated and those who are not. Established labour usually works for globally orientated companies, is organised, skilled and connected to the company through enterprise corporatism. Non-established labour has low skills, is normally unorganised, and if they are organised belong to unions which are controlled by the state so as to prevent their potential mobilisation. Non-established labour is often (on a non-permanent basis) used by MNC’s who locate themselves in developing states where wages are lower (Cox, 1987:263). However, and of particular interest to this study insofar as it is a question which remains unanswered in Cox’s own work, is the potential role of the marginalised sections of the populations of developing states:

“No matter how fast international production spreads, a very large part of the world’s population in the poorest areas remains marginal to the world economy, having no employment or income, or the purchasing power derived from it. A major problem for international capital in its aspiration for hegemony is how to neutralize the effect of this marginalization of perhaps one-third of the world’s population so as to prevent its poverty from fuelling revolt” (Cox, 1981:113).

When considering future directions into which a future world order might move, Cox (1981:113) directs us to the “social forces generated by changing production processes...” In the discussion of the possibility of a future new hegemony, he approximates the characteristics of the contemporary world order (circa, 2001). It is based on a dominant coalition (trans-national managerial class) which has managed to ensure the expansion/domination of global capital over national capital, and thereby maintained the process of the internationalisation (now globalisation) of the state. The policies, which this coalition advocates (through international institutions), are monetarism, the reduction of inflation, fiscal austerity, and deregulation.

The globalised state puts the interest of the world economy ahead of domestic concerns such as employment, social security and wage increases. In contemporary terms, this new hegemony is supported by the “quad” states (USA, European Union, Japan and Canada)
with the co-optation of some selected newly industrialised states (NIC’s). In opposition to this world order, Cox (1981:114) identifies capital, which is nationally located, and its associated labour force, non-established labour and “social marginals” in the developing states. He admits that these groups do not have “any natural cohesion” and could be “neutralised” by an “effective hegemony” at the national or world order levels.

The prospect of an effective counter-hegemonic challenge to the prevailing hegemonic order (deemed “remotely possible”), Cox (1981:115-116) argues, depends on the formation of a coalition of developing states which manages to de-link from the world economy of the quad states. This can only happen through increased capabilities, the development of an alternative worldview, and supportive institutions (for example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). This, in turn, requires a state class (“a combination of party, bureaucratic, military personnel and union leaders, mostly petty bourgeois in origin...”) in the countries of the developing world, who are prepared to focus on and attack the inequalities, which are the result of global integration. This counter-hegemony would have to be “supported from below.”

Furthermore, because hegemony at the world order level expands from states that have managed to establish hegemony at the national level, the problem of change and counter-hegemonic challenges (from developing states) must also be addressed within the “national context.” (Cox, 1983:140). In peripheral states this would mean the effective mobilisation of disaffected industrial labour in alliance with “peasants and urban marginals.” Bearing in mind Cox’s scepticism regarding the ability of international institutions to mount a counter-hegemonic challenge, he concludes (Cox, 1983:141):

“In short, the task of changing world order begins with the long, laborious effort to build new historic blocs within national boundaries”
(own italics).

The question is, whether such a challenge is latent in the marginalised social forces of the southern African region?
5.8 Modes of Social Relations of Production

The concepts of dominant and subordinated social forces (classes whose development originates in production relations) needs to be understood within the context of Cox's (1987) typology of "modes of social relations of production". These are identified from "observable historical patterns of conduct" and not, as in scientific Marxism, from the "logic" of capital or its "laws of motion" (Cox, 1987:396). Within these modes, which can be found in particular historical phases or are contemporary "remnants" of such phases, we see reflected the power relations (between dominant and subordinate classes) which emanate from production. It is important to take note of these in some detail, as they form the basis (with post-1987 modifications), from which contemporary social forces within the southern African context will be conceptualised (marginalised, precarious and integrated).

How do social relations of production come about and what criteria does Cox use to identify the different modes? In accordance with the notion of social power, what is prioritised in term of production is determined by the power relations prevalent within society. This also has an influence on how it is produced (who controls the process and who actually produces). The "structure of authority" (division of labour) reflects the role of dominant and subordinate social forces. Lastly, social relations of production are also centred on the distribution of the benefits of production, who gets what, when and how? A mode of social relations of production can also be identified according to its intersubjective content, "...the common understandings shared by the people embraced by the mode in respect to the relationships and purposes in which they are involved" (Cox, 1987:11-12, 17).

Cox (1987:17-29), building on research completed while he was at the IILS (with Harrod, see above), bases his identification of twelve modes of social relations of production on the reciprocal relationship between three dimensions and the factors associated with each one. Any mode of social relations of production can be thought of as having an objective,
subjective, and institutional dimension. Under the objective dimension, Cox notes the following factors: social power derived from the class structure of society, political power and the role of the state, the method of labour allocation, technology and method of distribution. Social power is based on past and present control over production and relates to the “class context of the society.” Political power is state power and “...may be derived directly from power over production combined with social power” (Cox, 1987:19). As in, for instance, the political ascendancy of the industrial classes during 1830-1848 in Europe.

Labour allocation refers to how the labour market functions. It may, for example, function according to custom (as in the feudal system) or according to market transactions between an employer and the worker. Technology applied to the production process enhances control over labour and is usually directed by dominant social forces. Fordist assembly line production brought about more effective control over production, through the concentration of the work force in factories, and through the segmentation of the production process. The distribution of the benefits from production reflects the division between dominant and subordinate social forces, and relates to what is consumed, what is saved, and what is invested. Again, this may take the form of a custom or market transactions (Cox, 1987:17-22).

The subjective dimension refers to forms of consciousness and includes the following aspects: the intersubjective image of the mode of production, the production ethic, the rationalities of social forces, and bias towards the dominant group. The intersubjective image of any mode refers to the manner in which those who participate in it share ideas on what is regarded as “normal behaviour” within the mode. For example, peasants have different “collective images” than urban wage earners. Ethics refer to the prevailing obligations within a mode and what their source is. Do they arise from kinship, family or traditional considerations, or are they based on contracts and therefore more conditional?
Are they motivated by natural obligation (as in subsistence farming), by coercion (as in slavery), by clientelism (based on instrumental protection and loyalty), by contractual obligation (based on an instrumental regulation of conflictual interests), or by inspiration (the deference of rewards in the interests of the common good)? (Cox, 1987:22-24).

The intersubjective meaning of a mode of production is usually biased towards the dominant class. Although there may be a veneer of reciprocity, the costs in the relationship are born by the subordinate class. The “partnership” which the social contract implies, for instance, between management and labour is skewed towards management, in the sense that the decision to withhold investment by the latter is not viewed in the same light as the decision by labour to strike. Finally, and related to intersubjective “images”, is the notion that different social groups in their own context operate and take action according to their own “coherently worked out patterns of thought”, their own rationalities. What may be “rational” and “coherent” as a form of action to an established industrial union, will be “irrational” and “incoherent” to unorganised temporary workers (Cox, 1987:24-26).

Objective and subjective dimensions and their related factors shape the “real structure of relations.” Formal institutions may lag behind this structure or may reflect it accurately. Their important function, however, is to enhance the legitimacy of the real structure. Important aspects of institutional forms include bureaucratisation, which may be external (state imposed), internal (originating in the “producing unit”), or a mixture of both. It also includes the degree of participation, which is allowed both by the state and the producing unit. Cox (1987:26-28) identifies four forms of institutionalisation. The first is an absence of institutionalisation, which occurs when the relationship is characterised by direct domination (coercion) and there are no rules, which govern it (e.g. slavery). Second, the corporatist form of institution, which emphasises consensus/harmony and the incorporation of contending forces in a “partnership” (in its tripartite form, this includes the state, capital and labour). Third, delegated bargaining. This form accepts conflict and opposition resulting from differences of interests and attempts to bureaucratisate it. For instance through collective bargaining mechanisms. Lastly, there is the self-management
form. This form is a reaction against bureaucratisation (external and internal) and is evident in self-employment and syndicalist trade unionism (a rejection of corporatism, and emphasis on direct worker control). The dynamic interaction between the three dimensions and their related factors is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Reciprocal Relationships of Dimensions in a Mode of Social Relations of Production

Objective Factors
(relationship of forces)
- Accrued social power (class power)
- Political power and role of state
- Method of labour allocation
- Technology and control over production
- Distribution method

Subjective Factors
(forms of consciousness)
- Intersubjective image of mode
- Production ethic
- Rationalities of social forces
- Bias towards dominant group

Institutional Forms
- Direct domination (no institutions)
- Corporatist
- Delegated bargaining
- Self-management

The above conceptualisation is used by Cox (1987:35-82) to identify twelve modes (ideal types) of social relations of production. Before outlining each one briefly, we need to take note of two points which Cox (1987:32-33) emphasises about these modes. First, different modes can co-exist. They do not exist in isolation, nor do they follow each other successively. Modes that are dominant during a certain historical phase become subordinate and adapt themselves to changes in (social) power relations. They may keep most of their characteristics, and simultaneously reflect new ones, which have been developed to integrate the mode with new forms. Second, analogue modes may exist. These are modes, which occur in societies, which are unlike the society in which the mode originally developed. The mode is, so to speak, “out of place.” For instance, the urban poor of cities in industrialised states have much in common with the marginalised component of cities in developing states. However, the different political economic context within which the mode finds itself, requires us to make a distinction.

The first four modes, which Cox identifies and discusses, are related to the “simple reproduction” characteristic of the “pre-capitalist era.” This phase involves no significant changes in the movement from one production cycle to another. There are no changes in the social relations of the producers, nor is there any significant change in production output (except when natural phenomena intervene, e.g. drought). All four modes have survived (albeit in adapted form) in societies, which have undergone capitalist development. The modes are: subsistence agriculture, peasant-lord agriculture, the primitive labour market and household production (Cox, 1987:35).

The subsistence mode of production survives (in adapted form) among a substantial proportion of the southern African population. Its distinguishing feature is that the producers, “...are substantially outside the monetized economy and the networks of commodity exchange.” Production is aimed at self-sufficiency and the term “subsistence”, Cox (1987:37) cautions, does not refer to the level of consumption. This mode of production is “embedded” in social relations who are based on kinship and lineage. It is not an expansive mode, in the sense that surplus is produced for a larger
market. The motivation for production and distribution is based on custom and communal solidarity. The mode has adapted itself in societies that have undergone capitalist development by supplying migrant labour to urban areas. The repatriation of wages serves as an additional source of income. In this sense, the subsistence mode is indirectly connected to the national and globally orientated sector of the economy (Cox, 1987:36-39).

The **peasant-lord mode** of production is based on social relations who revolve around a dominant and subordinate class. In its pre-capitalist form this mode involved the collective organisation of people through forms of governance, which approximate the modern state. The dominant class appropriates surplus agricultural production. Historically, this class has based its right to appropriate on military capacity, religious justification, or by ensuring that peasants remained in monetary debt to them. Because of this, the peasants are bound to the land and have no direct access to markets to sell their produce. The institutional form is one of direct domination. In its modern form, the dominant class has maintained its hold by keeping peasants indebted. The political power of large landowners (for example in Latin America), which supports their dominant status in the mode, is derived from a state, which (in the past) has declined to intervene on behalf of the peasants. However, the need for efficient commercial agricultural production for world markets has put this mode of production under increasing pressure (Cox, 1987:39-44).

In the **primitive labour market** mode of production, people become detached from the social relations that bind them to production (e.g. the subsistence mode). This mode developed during the pre-capitalist phase but survives today as “predominantly a phenomenon of poor and newly industrializing countries of the Third World” (Cox, 1987:45-47). Again, a major proportion of the population in southern Africa falls within this mode of production. As the number of people in the subsistence mode decline, the number of people in the primitive labour market increase. They are a constant indicator of the gap between the rich and poor and consist of landless labour, casual wage earners,
and hawkers. They engage infrequently with the dominant mode of production. Although they are prone to sporadic outbursts of violence, the contemporary state can control them because they lack cohesion. Usually there is no class-consciousness, no institutionalisation, and no organisation among them, or between them and the state.

Because they do not have any social cohesion or the security associated with the subsistence mode, people in this mode are highly insecure. They may attempt to remedy this insecurity by looking for protection in tribal links, ethnicity, gangs or criminal networks. The intersubjective consciousness of this group is characterised by a fluctuation between instrumentalism (aimed at survival) coupled to passive acceptance and a latent “commitment to the illusion of a new collective life” which may be exploited by outsiders to forment revolt. In return for votes, governments will tolerate their informal settlements: “...keep the bulldozers away from their lean-to’s or run a source of electric power into a squatter’s settlement” (Cox, 1987:48).

The last mode of production in the “simple reproduction” era, which also remains in contemporary capitalist development, is the household mode. This mode has no class structure, but depends for its division of labour and its authority relations on (religious) myth. It is a mode, which is supportive of all the other modes in the sense, that it reproduces and sustains the work force. In some rural areas of southern Africa, the household mode of production combines with the subsistence mode. In contemporary capitalist societies, the household mode of production is under pressure because of developments in the other modes. Women who, due to myth and convention, are the primary producer/manager of the household, often hold part-time jobs in other modes of production. The productive function of the household has been greatly reduced, but during times of unemployment it remain “the producer of last resort” (Cox, 1987:48-50).

The next eight modes of production are all associated with the phase of capitalist development. Whereas Wallerstein (1974) starts his analysis of the development of capitalism in the 16th century (based on the expansion of trade and the accompanying accumulation of capital), Cox (1987:51-52) prefers to focus on the development of a
particular form of capitalism at the beginning of the 19th century. His conceptualisation of this form regards the “essence of capitalism to be an organization of production designed to generate the expansion of capital...” The early phase of capitalist development, competitive capitalism, was characterised by particularly two modes of production; the self-employment mode and the enterprise labour market.

The self-employment mode of production typically reflects the independent, small-scale, owner who, with the use of his own and his family’s labour, produces goods and markets them. In the past this was the artisan who resided in the city, and the independent tenant and freeholder farmers who had managed to extract themselves (through the peasant revolts) from feudal obligations. The contemporary version of this mode includes independent farmers, artisans, writers, shopkeepers, professionals, writers, consultants, and craft market peddlers. They work within a market, which is dominated by other modes of production, and produce goods or provide services which large companies find too expensive to enter into. Their interaction with the state usually revolves around the issue of taxation (which is more difficult to enforce than with large-scale producers). Part of the contemporary globalisation mantra is to hold out self-employment as the entrepreneurial way out for the unemployed. Only some succeed, however, as “...most forms of self-employment are precarious in the long term” (Cox, 1987:52-55).

The formation of the enterprise labour market mode of production is associated with the migration, in Europe, of landless labourers to the cities where they worked for wages. Wage labour by itself is, however, not the only defining feature of capitalist development. Before the development of wage labour, artisans or merchants would hire or “put out” the production of goods and services to “cottagers” who eventually ended up as wage earners. Nevertheless, this development led to the location of new manufacturing centres, away from the old centres, which were dominated by guilds. Importantly, and accompanying the development of this mode, was a change in production which was
characterised by capital accumulation and re-investment for market production, production of basic goods (food and clothing) for trade, the commercialisation of land, and the creation of a "pure" (unregulated) labour market where wages follow supply and demand and workers are separated from production means (Cox, 1987:55-57).

This "unnatural" state of affairs (cf. Polanyi, 1957) was to result in a vast unskilled supply of labour for the early phase of industrialisation in England and, later, attempts by philanthropical industrialists and the unions to "re-humanise" the unregulated labour market through state imposed regulations which were aimed at re-embedding the market into society. Initially, though, "The state protected the employer’s freedom to contract and penalized attempts at collective self-defense by workers" (Cox, 1987:59). From 1850 onwards in England, two streams (based on the levels of skills) of workers could be discerned: "...a more established category of industrial workers and another category less established or more precariously connected to permanent industrial employment" (Cox, 1987:60).

Currently, many workers are not covered by union and state regulations. They form the contemporary version of the enterprise labour market, or the "non-established enterprise labor market." They form a proportion of the (non-integrated or indirectly integrated) industrial labour component in southern Africa. These workers are low or semi-skilled, they do not belong to unions, and their employment is insecure. They can be found in small to medium private enterprises which are associated with the "sweatshops" in the clothing, footwear and electronics trade in developing states (the majority are often women). When they are employed by larger industries, their situation is more precarious than that of established labour. Their employment is often of a temporary nature (for example, standing in for permanent staff), or otherwise they work for companies to which larger industries "outsource" work such as cleaning, maintenance and security. When they do belong do unions, or are covered by some state regulations related to their work status, they are usually less protected than established workers.
The last mode, which Cox (1987:63) identifies under the phase of competitive capitalism, is bipartism. This form appeared in England from 1867 onwards, and is associated with the stabilisation of capitalist development. It involved the institutionalisation of the relationship between established trade unions and management, and is supported by the state which feels that its political base is secure enough to grant concessions to labour without endangering the established political economic order. It was a sign that hegemony had been attained at the national level. In return, established industrial labour, through its industry based trade unions, agreed to accord legitimacy to the capitalist order. In the bipartist mode, the state does not intervene to influence the outcome of employer-labour disputes, and the latter are not interested in influencing government policy (Cox, 1987:63-69).

The last three modes of production developed after the advent of monopoly capitalism (beginning with the depression of 1873-1896). After the depression, capital was more concentrated in large corporations. This brought about a dualism in the economy, in the form of large and small enterprises. The latter are more a feature of capitalism in its competitive form. Monopoly capitalism is also characterised by an increase in the importance of finance capital which is essential to fund large companies. Also, the state became more concerned with providing the stability required for the expansion of production and investment. Lastly, capital moved abroad, to invest in (extractive) production ventures in the colonies (Cox, 1987:69).

The post-depression rise of large corporations was essential for the development of enterprise corporatism as a mode of production. In this mode, management enters into a "symbiotic" relationship with labour. The idea of an essentially conflictual relationship is passed off as being a "misperception" on the part of labour. Instead the enterprise corporatist mode of production emphasises harmony and the company becomes an extension of the community. The welfare and security of the established labour component and their families is the primary concern and focus, while company loyalty and worker participation are encouraged. Where trade unions exist, they are enterprise unions, and they do not concern themselves with unemployment and working conditions.
outside of the company, and certainly not with the tribulations of non-established workers. The important issues for enterprise unions are career advancement, health and welfare issues, and pension payouts. The companies are usually aligned with state economic policy, and there is, therefore, no significant intervention by the state. Contemporary examples are the Japanese *zeibatsu* and South Korean *chaebol*, as well as large public companies (Cox, 1987:70-74).

In *tripartism*, the state is more concerned to influence the outcome of settlements reached between managers and trade unions. The increasing complexity of macro-economic policy and management at the state level, brings about a change in outlook: "Governments were no longer prepared to leave wages and employment questions entirely to the interaction of employers and unions" (Cox, 1987:74). While this mode of production started to develop in the industrialised states from the late 16th and early 20th century, it became more prevalent after WWI. It was felt that the contribution of labour and capital during the war, entitled them (with government) to be consulted (and persuaded) on matters related to macroeconomic policy. The keyword here is "persuasion" in contrast to "control" or "domination" by the major economic interest groups and the state. This form of economic interest group interaction dilutes democracy, but in the final resort governments can always appeal to the people to pressure the other "partners" into making concessions. The tripartist mode requires an organised labour movement (trade unions and political parties) and, as in the previous mode, an acceptance by labour of capitalist hegemony (Cox, 1987:74-78).

The last mode of production which Cox (1987:79) associates with late industrialisation (in developing states) is *state corporatism*. This mode is found in societies were there is an absence of hegemony. The state uses coercion to force industrial development in the absence of hegemonic consensus. No co-operation between employers and labour has evolved and the institutionalisation of relations between economic interest groups is "imposed from above." State power is used to, in the national interest, prevent industrial instability and to promote industrialisation. There is no effective democratic counterweight, in the form of parliament or civil society, and trade unions and employer
organisations operate under state supervision. In their dealings with the state, they work through bureaucrats and the “party elite.” This mode usually includes large corporations and a national trade union, which is controlled by the state and excludes the enterprise labour market, primitive labour, peasants and self-employment. Its aim is social control by the state (Cox, 1987:80-81).

5.9 Towards a Conceptualisation of the Marginalised, Precarious and Integrated

In the final sections of PPWO (1987), Cox discusses the crisis, which the world economy experienced during the 1970s, and the effect thereof on states and the contemporary world order. He also identifies the dominant and subordinate classes (social forces) of the post-crisis order.

The 1970s started out with “Nixon’s surprise” (the announcement to delink the dollar from gold, thereby ending the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system) and the oil crisis of 1973. The subsequent inflation in the major industrialised economies, led to increased pressure on the state to do away with the automatic wage increases demanded by organised labour. Rising unemployment brought with it increased state expenditures on welfare transfers and “...social consensus was eroded as those who paid taxes were pitted against those who benefited from state revenues...” (Cox, 1987:279-281). Governments (in conjunction with corporations) acted to address the increasing gap between the need for capital accumulation and the legitimacy of the Keynesian welfare state. As the tax base to maintain the latter decreased (due to unemployment), the tax burden on corporations increased, thereby (together with increased foreign competition) putting a squeeze on profit margins. The crisis brought about a revision of the idea on which the Keynesian state was based, and “the social contract that had been the unwritten constitution of the neo-liberal state’s historic bloc was broken in all the advanced capitalist countries in the years following 1974-1975” (Cox, 1987:281).
The policies of, what Cox (1987:285) calls, the hyper-liberal form of state are; restricted monetarism (to reduce inflation), cut backs on government spending, wage stabilisation, a reduction of welfare transfer payments to subordinate economic groups, technology intensive production for a global market, flexible employment, a decline in tripartism and an increase in enterprise corporatism, and a decline in social subsidies. This form of state confronts those with whom the welfarist state sought consensus, viz. public service workers, welfare recipients and organised labour (Cox, 1987:283-288).

Along with changes in form of state, came changes in the social relations of production. The dominant class reflects the composition of the trans-national managerial class (see above); global corporations, national industries who are integrated in the global production structure, global finance (investment houses, speculators, and banks), the state class in developing countries (see above), and an established highly skilled work force. Those who are subordinate, and are therefore potential challengers to the ideology of the hyper-liberal form which underpins the notion of globalisation, are semi-skilled or downscaled skilled workers as well as contract workers in the industrialised states. In the developing states subordinate groups are industrial workers, state employees, peasants and urban marginals (subsistence mode, primitive labour market mode, and the enterprise labour market mode) (Cox, 1987:401).

Regarding subordinate social forces in developing states, Cox (1987:387) speculates that “Possibly the potential for revolt arising out of the social relations in the production process is greater in the Third World than in the advanced capitalist countries.” Referring specifically to the growth in the numbers of marginals, he regards them as “potentially destabilizing for the social and political order”, but acknowledges that this potential is reduced by the fact that they are mainly concerned with “survival and adaptation.” Because of this they are difficult to mobilise for collective action and are prone to succumb to clientelism. In the sense that they pose a threat to the more privileged social forces related to production, the state will act to repress or co-opt them (Cox, 1987:388-389).
Where do we need to look to determine whether there is a potential for change or a counter-hegemonic challenge? Cox (1987:393) concludes that we must focus on "...the possibilities (own italics) of launching a social movement" and that change may be possible because of a "dissatisfaction with the prevailing order" (own italics). Furthermore, mobilisation of subordinate forces requires the analyst to identify divisions in society which result from the production process, the material "conditions of their existence", and "their modes of perceiving the world, and of their potential directions of movement" (own italics) (Cox, 1987:403).

Two years after the publication of PPWO, Cox (1989a:250-251) introduces the idea of the possible emergence of a "post-Westphalian" order, which he compares to the medieval phase under the pope and emperor: "The state is no longer the only center, the exclusive point of impetus. It is also the product of non-state forces at work, and these non-state forces assert their own identities and claim recognition and tolerance within the world system." The (counter-hegemonic) future world order which Cox foresees is a multi-level one where the state co-exists with other "forms of authority" (e.g. sub-national) and which is not supported by a single "dominant hegemonic universalism." Instead power will be diffused and the order will be based on the acceptance of civilisational diversity. Globalisation, although dependent on the principle of territoriality to enforce market rules, also results in the "increase of sovereignties" at the micro- (regions within states, such as Flanders in Belgium) and the macro-levels (inter-state regionalism, for example the European Union). States, micro-regions, macro-regions and "global cities", therefore reflect a world order which is similar to the multi-level order of medieval Europe (Cox, 1992a:306-309 and Cox, 1993c:278).

Cox’s (1981 and 1987) concepts, the "internationalisation of the state" and the "internationalisation of production", pre-dated the term "globalisation" which dominated scholarly and popular publications during the 1990s. His conceptualisation of the hyper-liberal form of state and the ideology and policies which accompany it, accurately reflect the mantra and dynamics of contemporary globalisation. In his discussion of the effects of the "globalization thrust", Cox (1993a:204) notes that globalisation dislocates the
market from national societies, and depends on an extremely small base for its legitimacy. The mobilisation of the “marginals” would “pit democratic legitimacy against corporatist economic efficiency”, but notwithstanding the size of the “excluded”, the “fragmentation and powerlessness of these groups would make the task formidable.”

Nevertheless, he stresses that the potential of a counter-hegemonic challenge will have to be anchored and arise from within “popular strata” (from below). Cox (1993a:207) foresees that such a challenge will result from local reactions to the problems of globalisation (provision of welfare and (re)organising production). As such, he predicts that they will be aimed at local authorities and to “collective self-help”, rather than at the state, because of the alienation and de-politicisation experienced by these groups. Arising from within national societies, new forms of state will result from “the practice of non-state popular collective action rather than from extensions of existing types of administrative control.” To bring about change at the world order level, this process would have to progress within a number of societies at the same time, and it would have to draw support from trans-national social forces. The result would be a “globalization embedded in society” instead of the market.

The “bottom-up” focus is reflected, as well, in Cox’s later publications on international organisations or “multilateralism.” This is an area of study about which he had earlier expressed reservations and pessimism regarding the potential of international organisations to bring about change at the world order level. In an early article on the topic, Cox (1992d:161-166) is at pains to stress that the study of multi-lateralism should be about more than just the institutionalised interaction between states around specific issue areas such as trade or monetary policy. A contemporary conceptualisation must be one where multi-lateralism is “...considered from the standpoint of its ability to represent the forces at work in the world at the local level as well as at the global level.” In addition, it must also include a focus on the potential for change, and not just on how the existing order is regulated. The question (or value) is, therefore, whether multi-lateralism can include the “level of popular forces as well as the level of governments?” (Cox, 1992d:166 and Cox, 1996a:153).
Referring to the effects (*inter alia*, increasing inequality) of "new capitalism" (globalisation), which he sees as characterised by de-regulation, privatisation, reductions in state expenditures on social welfare, and a general subordination of the state’s functions to the global economy, Cox (1992e:527-529, 532-534) notes that the result is increased apathy, alienation and disillusionment among marginalised (excluded) sections of the population in developed and developing states. The resultant growth in civil society and self-help movements must accordingly be utilised by multi-lateral organisations that want to co-ordinate change, although, in the end, the process will have to be driven from below.

Cox’s return to the issue of multilateralism resulted in an edited volume (Cox, 1997a). This publication emanated from his participation in the United Nations University MUNS (Multilateralism in the UN system) project. The other volume was edited by Stephen Gill (1997). Cox’s book re-introduces the concept "new realism" (see Cox, 1996a). This concept affirms Cox’s intellectual debt to the classical realism of E.H. Carr and his rejection of the ahistorical approach inherent in neorealism. New realism expands on classical realism’s historical focus by “broadening the range of determining forces beyond state power” and goes beyond neorealism’s status quo orientation, in that it focuses on structural change and transformation (Cox, 1997a:xv-xvi). Its approach to multilateralism does not take current institutions as a given, nor does it analyse them with a view to make them function more efficiently. The approach followed is a “structural-critical” one. As with the critical theory outlined in the core theoretical framework it focuses on the “normative basis for an alternative world order” by standing back from the underlying structures of the contemporary order, asking how it came about, and what the potential catalysts for change are. The change envisaged is towards a more inclusive multilateralism as outlined above. Again, Cox stresses that this perspective uses a “bottom-up” approach, aimed at “...privileging the concerns and interests of the less powerful while not ignoring the constraints imposed by the more powerful” (Cox, 1997a:xvi-xviii).
Cheru (1997a and 1997b) and Stavenhagen (1997)\textsuperscript{13} expand on the concept of marginalised social forces (or movements in Stavenhagen’s case) and are, therefore, a useful addition to Cox’s thinking. In that sense, they also help to “operationalise” the concept, and serve as a further guide to the formulation of the questions which this study investigates through the survey of the seven southern African states. Cheru (1997a:155-156) views the resistance of peasants (the subsistence mode) as motivated by a rational calculation of gain, and a reaction to state repression. Their means of resistance are limited by the fact that they are not integrated into the national economy. They also do not (because of past experience) expect much from the state, and ignore state borders when they sell their products.\textsuperscript{14} His premise is that the survival of Western style democracy depends on whether it is accompanied by economic benefits: “People do not just want multi-party democracy, they want fundamental economic changes as well.” Furthermore, the democratisation transitions which have taken place during the 1990s, have also further contributed to the exit option being used (Cheru, 1997a:165 and Cheru, 1997b:205).\textsuperscript{15}

The inability of the state to deliver, drives the poor and peasants into the informal economy, where they are of necessity prone to unlawful activities. In this process they rely on local communities and traditional institutions, and engage in collective action in order to survive. The emphasis is on self-reliance and self-help. This process, Cheru (1997b:206, 217-218) argues, has increased political consciousness, and “Local grievances very quickly escalated into popular challenges to the established systems of government.” Stavenhagen’s (1997:20) argument also emphasises the legitimacy problem of the state in the eyes of those who experience the “disruptive impact upon them of the dominant forces.” Peasants in the rural areas “...discovered new forms of social and economic organisation at the grassroots level in order to satisfy their basic needs...or find alternative strategies of survival.” These strategies are geared to bypassing state institutions and are anchored in traditional “types of solidarity and governance” (Stavenhagen, 1997:26-27).
In the urban areas, the “underclass” (primitive labour market and enterprise modes) avoids state regulations. Their first concern is to meet basic needs (survival), and not accumulation. Because the state and market cannot or will not provide services, voluntary associations are formed to ensure self-reliance in areas such as food, waste disposal, and social security (Stavenhagen, 1997:28).

The conclusions and premises which Cox makes during the 1990s are based on a holistic view of the current world order (taking into account the multi-level and multi-actor dynamics thereof) and are similar to the observations made by Cheru and Stavenhagen. Reflecting on the effects of globalisation, Cox (1996c:26-27) observes that the process creates a hierarchy between those who are integrated, the precarious and the excluded, and that the last category is a “potentially destabilizing force” which is kept at bay by “global poverty relief (aid and projects aimed at ensuring self-sufficiency) and global riot control (intervention to stabilise states in regions which are strategically important because of their mineral resources). Furthermore, “whole regions of Africa belong to the bottom level”, and evidence shows that the populations of the poorest (also African) states “are turning their backs on the state and international organizations, which they see as their enemies rather than as possible supports” (see also Cox, 1997b:250 and Cox, 1999a:13, 24-25).

Cox (1999a:9) later expands, in more detail, on how he views current divisions and the concept of class. On the latter, he restates observations made earlier (cf. Cox, 1995a, Cox, 1996c and Cox, 1997a and 1997b). Class can no longer be regarded as a cohesive concept, which refers to a “universal proletariat.” Dominant and subordinate groups exist, but their position in relation to a mode of production stands in a dialectic relationship to other forms of “self-consciousness” such as gender, religion, ethnicity, and regional affiliation. The relationship between class and identity is, therefore, one, which needs to be ascertained. Concerning the components of the hierarchy which globalisation has reinforced and created, an important point to take note of is that Cox (1999a:9) views them as social and not geographic divisions. They occur globally and are not confined to the space of the core (developed states) or the periphery (developing states). The first tier
are the “integrated.” They consist of a global managerial class who are the “carriers of globalisation ideology” and decide on “what is produced, where, and by whom.” They are linked to the following (subordinate) groups: middle management, technicians, and skilled workers (Cox, 1997a:247 and Cox, 1999a:9).

At the next level, Cox (1997a:247-248 and 1999a:9) identifies those who are precariously integrated. They are blue-collar workers who belong to “old economy” industries, temporary workers and contract workers, all of whom are less skilled than workers who belong to the integrated category. They are easy to replace and are segmented further by their identity consciousness. Finally, there is the category of the “excluded.” They are not integrated (directly) into the global economy or, for that matter, into the (formal) national economy. Unskilled and unemployed they are mainly found in developing states and form the “marginalised” sector of the population. Of them, Cox (1997a:248) says, that they “...are a continuing source of anomic and potentially concerted violence.” Additionally, “The marginalized and excluded remain a world of mystery because they do not seem to participate in the ‘rationality’ of the centre” (Cox, 1997b:247).

The elites of developing states elites (the state class) have generally followed strategies of incorporation into the globalised world economy and in the process, national development strategies have been abandoned. The effects of macroeconomic policies in tune with what is required of the hyper-liberal form of state have brought about increased unemployment, increased crime and a reduction of state expenditures on social services and welfare. This state of affairs, Cox (1997b:248) argues, can result in “open revolt” or a “passive withdrawal of obedience.” Whether societal stability can be maintained during the process of integration into the world economy, based on the policies of the hyper-liberal form of state is, therefore, an open question.

The questions (see Chapters 1 and 6) which will guide the inquiry into and analysis of the survey data will provide us with a synchronic “snapshot” of aggregated individual motivations and attitudes. This is, of course, different from what Cox means when he refers to the shared ideas and collective images which he sees as being the components of
an intersubjective understanding by people of their material world. For Cox (1992b:138) the principal question is how the objective world is constituted and reconstructed through changes in intersubjectivity. This requires a focus on the (intersubjective) ideas people have about the world and the practical problems, which arise from material challenges to their existence. If the ideas so held are conducive to the resolution of these problems, change is unlikely. However, should a contradiction arise between the ideas and the problems, the likelihood of structural transformation increases. Cox (1987:403), therefore, emphasises the need to access “mental schema” of people, to determine “their modes of perceiving the world, and of their potential directions of movement.” This need is, in fact, stressed consistently in his work (see also, Cox, 1986:243).

Cox does not move beyond his emphasis of how important it is to access intersubjective ideas. How are we to access them? Following on from the discussion of Cox’s epistemology, it is clear that the process of accessing “mental frameworks” can be undertaken at the individual or group levels. He accepts the usefulness of positivist methodology (with notable qualifications), as one way of accessing perceptions on institutions and practices. This can be done by surveying the attitudes of individuals on issues which arise from his (holistic) historicism approach. The proviso is, however, that we must then “pull back” and critically locate the findings within the broader historical context.

5.10 Summation

This chapter has focused on the assumptions, dynamics and method of Cox’s core theoretical framework and some salient aspects of his post-1987 publications. One of the major goals was to sketch the context from within which the claim and subsidiary claims of this study have been generated (see Chapters 1 and 6). The other goal (related to the theoretical part of the research problem) was to, in addition to Chapter 4, provide a deeper insight into Cox’s intellectual roots.
The purpose of Cox’s explanatory framework is to provide a comprehensive explanation for change. Problem-solving theory cannot account for change because it attempts to, by making use of the positivist method, explain and resolve problems as they appear within the circumscribed rules and power relations of the existing system. The claim of value freedom, by problem-solving theories, is suspect because these theories are biased towards status quo maintenance and they serve the interests of those who gain most from the perpetuation of prevailing power relations. The neorealism of Waltz’s (1979) is criticised by Cox as an example of a problem-solving theory in the service of “big-power management of the international system” and status quo maintenance. The classical realism of E.H. Carr is, however, compatible with CCT because explanation is historically located, while Waltzian neorealism attempts to transcend history.

Critical theory (as conceptualised by Cox) stresses the need to historically contextualise any explanation or theory. Theory is always connected to interests and we therefore need to ask, in the first instance, why problems arise in a system and why the system developed the way it did. Knowledge is transient and must be related to the historical phase of history during which it developed (sourced from Vico). The underlying value assumptions of CCT emphasise transformation towards an order which reflects greater social equity. Cox locates his perspective on social equity in the “organic and solidaristic vision of society” espoused by Edmund Burke. The explanation of change and the strategic contemplation of transformation must, however, be based on “empirical-historical” study and feasible alternative orders.

The method of CCT is historicism. One of the fundamental assumptions of this method is the unity between subject (humans) and object (institutions and social practices). People have a shared (intersubjective) understanding of the institutions and social practices which they create to deal with the challenges of their material environment. The method of historicism requires us to access the “mental schema” (intersubjective understanding) of subjects and to “find the connections” between them and the “material world.” Cox derives the assumption of the dynamic interaction between shared understandings and institutions and practices from Vico and Taylor. In his later work on civilisations, Cox
(1992b, 1993b, 1995b and 1996a) developed the concept of “supra-intersubjectivity. The interest in civilisations stems from his pessimism regarding the possibility of the development of a new hegemonic order based on only the “universalist tenets of Western civilisation.” Instead, Cox envisages a post-hegemonic order which is characterised by the co-existence of “culturally distinct intersubjectivities” which are held together by a supra-intersubjectivity. The latter would consist of shared norms (on, for instance, the environment, human rights and inequality) which would be consistent with, and act as a bridge between, different traditions of civilisation.

The materialist assumption is another core component of CCT (sourced from the historical Marx and Gramsci). Cox (1992b) also derives his historicism and materialism (via Vico and Gramsci) from Ibn Khaldun (see footnote 3 of this chapter). For Cox, this does not mean economic determinism. It does require an acceptance of the dialectic approach to change. Conflict and change result from contradictions which arise from competing social forces related to modes of production. Furthermore, the state is not regarded as a “captive” of the economic substructure but is conceptualised in Gramscian terms. The relations between it and civil society are interactive and it is accepted that there is a mutual influence between the two. Production is viewed as the most important material base from which the state derives (social) power, but the relationship is not “unidirectional.” The state can shape the social power relations related to modes of production, but changes in modes of production and power relations can also influence the form of state and subsequently, the nature of world order.

The Coxian view of production is holistic. It emphasises the link between ideas and materialism. In this sense, production is viewed as including the formation of ideas, institutions and social practices which create the framework within which it takes place. In fact, in the conclusion of PPWO, Cox regards the role of the state as “crucial” in shaping the subordinate-dominant relations in modes of social relations of production. Although his later work stresses the diminishing power of the state in a “post-Westphalian order”, he concludes that there is no likelihood of the state disappearing in a future world order.
For CCT, the "totality" within which all of the above must be located is the historical structure (sourced from Braudel). Any historical structure and the potential of change/transformation requires the analyst to focus on the "fit" between ideas, material capabilities and institutions. In addition to the notion of intersubjectivity (mental schema), Cox also identifies another form of idea: the "collective images of social order held by different groups of people." These are more likely to change than intersubjective ideas and can "form the basis for the emergence of an alternative structure." The Gramscian concept of hegemony is instrumental in the explanation of whether there is a "fit" between ideas, material capabilities and institutions or whether the fit is about to come apart.

Hegemony (at the state and world order levels) cannot be analysed in terms of material capabilities alone. The establishment of a long term hegemonic order (for instance, the pax britannica and pax americana) also requires the consensus of the subordinated. Hegemonic legitimacy is established when subordinate social forces and states accept the underlying ideas (for instance, the norms of a liberal international trade system) of the "prevalent collective image of world order." Additionally, they must also accept the institutions (for instance, the WB) who are responsible for administering the rules "with a certain semblance of universality." A hegemonic order is not only established on the acquiescence of states, but also requires the cooperation of "transnational social forces", particularly those who belong to the transnational managerial class. The ideas and rules of hegemony are supportive of the dominant mode of production, but also co-opt and reward the managerial and state class in regions of the world which are peripheral to the global economy.

Challenges to a hegemonic order and the potential for change must, for Cox, be located in "the realm of social forces shaped by production relations." The contemporary world order, which is characterised by the internationalisation of the state and the internationalisation of production, has resulted in a form of state which is more outward orientated (the hyperliberal state). This has also brought about a new division of labour
where "a very large part of the world's population in the poorest areas remains marginal to the world economy." Because world hegemonic orders are established by states who have managed to establish national hegemony, any counter-hegemonic challenge will have to be "supported from below" (this requires the mobilisation of "disaffected industrial labour together with peasants and urban marginals"). It also requires a state class which is prepared to challenge the ideas and institutions of the prevailing order. State and managerial elites must be put under pressure to do so, by disaffected and dissatisfied marginalised social forces.

In contemporary terms, globalisation has created a division of social forces related to modes of production which can be grouped into three "economic position" categories. They are the integrated, precarious and marginalised. The integrated correspond to Cox's transnational managerial class, are the carriers of the ideology related to the dominant mode of production, and decide what is produced, by whom and where. They also include an established highly skilled work force. The precarious are workers who face redundancy in "sunset" industries or who are engaged in temporary work. The marginalised are the unskilled and unemployed who are excluded from the dominant mode of production at the global and national level. They are located in the informal economy of their societies. The twelve modes of social relations of production which Cox develops in terms of objective, subjective, and institutional dimensions can be used to further conceptualise the above hierarchy. For the purposes of this study, the subsistence, primitive labour market, self-employment, enterprise labour market, tripartism and state corporatist modes are important.

Cox consistently points out that the potential for change, based on "a dissatisfaction with the prevailing order" must be investigated by focusing on the marginalised "popular strata." (also see Chapter 1 and 6). Importantly, in order to evaluate the mobilisation potential of these social forces the analyst must identify the "divisions in society which result from the production process" (viz. the integrated, marginalised and precarious) and
“their modes of perceiving the world, and of their potential directions of movement.”
Finally, he deems this challenge to be latent among the marginalised because they are alienated, politically apathetic, inclined to belong to self-help movements, critical of the state and international organisations, a source of potential violent protest, have an economic view of democracy, and are inclined to “passively disobey.” Chapters 6 and 7 investigate, through a data analysis of the Southern African Barometer, whether there is any “potential direction of movement” among the marginalised and also whether there are differences, in this respect, between them and the precarious and integrated.
Endnotes

1 Cox (1981:116-117) motivates his use of the concept “world order” in a footnote (2). He prefers it to “inter-state system” because it can be applied to periods during which the modern state did not yet exist (e.g. medieval Europe). It also avoids the universal connotations and continuity associated with the concept “system.” The term “world” is used because it refers to a “designated totality, geographically limited by the range of probable interactions.” The term “order” does not discount instability, but is used to refer to patterns. The plural form, “orders”, refers to characteristics, which endure over time and (comparatively) allow us to distinguish between different world orders.

2 The need for critical theory to concern itself with practice and strategy, rather than an idealist type end-goal is, again, stressed in PPWO (1987): “Critical understanding focuses on...the possibilities of launching a social movement rather than on what the movement might achieve”, this “...must be distinguished from utopian thinking” (Cox, 1987:393). Cox’s own perspective on social equity is derived from the conservatism espoused by Edmund Burke, who had a “organic and solidaristic vision of society.” In other words a sense of community above individual interest. He is quick to point out, though, that he does not want to be associated with “those who have appropriated it (conservatism) to cloak an egoistic defense of acquired privilege.” (Cox, 1979:416, footnote 1). His conservatism is “more consistent with socialism than with the possessive individualism of economic liberalism” (Cox, 1996b:20). This alternative vision, which is to be arrived at through strategic practice and critical analysis, is one, which involves a shift away from consumerism and excessive individualism (Cox, 1987:402).

3 It is important to take note of the fact that Vico’s thought, as well as the thought of Gramsci and Machiavelli (both important to the development of Cox’s framework), can be traced back to the fourteenth century Islamic historian, Ibn Khaldun. Khaldun was concerned with understanding what lay behind the “events-history” of his own time - a period which was characterised by the decline of Islamic influence and North African civilisation. It was his purpose to understand what was responsible for the transformation he was experiencing. What was the “internal logic” which was driving it? (Pasha, 1997:57-58 and Cox, 1992b:152).

Cox’s method of historicism and the materialist base upon which it rests owes (via Vico and Gramsci) much to Khaldun’s “science of culture.” Writing on the relevancy of Khaldun, Cox (1992b:152) points to the importance of “umran” (culture) in his thinking: “...the ways in which human communities confronted their specific problems of material existence (own italics).” According to Khaldun, “rationally knowable principles” which explain historical change, revolve around the premise that humans organise collectively to confront the challenges of material existence. Through the creation of wealth beyond basic means of survival, greater needs are fulfilled such as social cohesion and reproduction. The state is the result of this co-operative endeavour and changes in accordance with the “human intentionality” upon which it is based. It is not a fixed, ahistorical entity (Pasha, 1997:60-62 and Cox, 1992b:148).

4 On the relationship between power, production and the state, Cox (1987:399-400) makes an important observation in the concluding section of PPWO: “Although production was the point of departure of this study...the crucial role, it turns out, is played by the state. States create the conditions in which particular modes of social relations achieve dominance over coexisting modes, and they structure either purposively or by inadvertence the dominant-subordinate linkages of the accumulation process.” The word to take note of is “crucial”. This signifies Cox’s view of the state as being an important autonomous actor, albeit one whose actions are constrained by internal (the social forces or historic bloc which underpin it) and external factors (the dynamics of the global political economy).

5 The historical structures approach is different from structuralism in the sense that “structures are made by collective human action and transformable by collective human action” (Cox, 1987:395). The transformation of structures is possible because of the shared intersubjective understanding, which exists between individuals, an understanding, which is extended to abstract concepts such as the state. The state
exists because "In being so shared, these ideas constitute the social world of these same individuals." Therefore, although, humans are often "born into" existing structures, the latter are not "givens", but have been "made." In this way historical structures are "...part of the material existence of people..." (Cox, 1987:395).

6 Cox would maintain this scepticism regarding the role of international organisations in bringing about transformation until the early 1990s. See for instance the following comment: "Therefore, the key to future world order is to be sought, not so much in the sphere of international institutions or 'regimes', as in the political leadership that may be able to consolidate a socio-political base from the mutations now going on in production" (Cox, 1989b:49).

7 The dynamic interaction between social forces, forms of state and world orders is described in rich historical detail in PPWO (1987), and is related to three historical structures; pax britannica, rival imperialisms, and pax americana. For instance, the rise and incorporation of the industrial working class in England (social forces) led to a new form of state; welfarist-nationalist. This change in the form of state led to a world order, which was characterised by increased rivalry (military and industrial), between the major European powers. World orders also influence forms of state. The bipolar order, a characteristic of the Cold War, contributed to the rise of the military industrial complex in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the USA. Forms of state (based on the interests of the dominant social forces) influence the power relations between contending social forces related to production (Cox, 1981:100-101).

To extend the example, the interaction between ideas, material capabilities and institutions, as well as the relations between social forces, forms of state, and world orders can be illustrated by the historical structure of the pax britannica. The liberal form of state in 19th century England was founded upon the attainment of middle class hegemony. The 1832 Reform Act, gave the middle class representation in parliament and excluded the working class, thereby thwarting attempts to create an alliance between the two. In 1846, the repeal of the Corn Laws signalled the triumph of industrial over agrarian interests. The functions of the liberal state were centred on the creation of an unregulated economy. A "pure" labour market was created (based on supply and demand), poverty became a personal responsibility (1834 Poor Law Reform), and employers-worker relations were based on bipartism. The ideas (ideology) underpinning the liberal state form were based on the separation between politics and economics (laissez-faire). Ironically, de-regulation of the market, was accompanied by growing centralisation and bureaucratisation of state power.

At the world order level, hegemony was maintained by England’s capacity (military and maritime domination) to manage the balance of power in Europe. The same capacity was also used to assure freedom of commercial access and an open trade order. Although there were no institutions comparable to the IMF and World Bank (created at the outset of the pax americana), the City of London was responsible for maintaining a gold exchangeable currency (the gold standard). The contradictions in the liberal state form arose from the social costs (unemployment, poverty, starvation, child labour, appalling work conditions) which accompanied the functioning of the unregulated market. Pressure by organised labour and sympathetic industrialists (e.g. Chamberlain) led to the promulgation of social safety net laws and the re-embedding of the market into society (Cox, 1987:123-147).

8 We have already seen that Cox (1977, see also 1982) uses Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and applies it to the international level. He is well aware of the fact that this was not Gramsci’s intention: “Not surprisingly, Gramsci did not have very much to say directly about international relations” (Cox, 1983:124). Notwithstanding Gramsci’s use of the concept at the state-society level, Cox feels that his ideas should not be frozen in time, but utilised to enhance understanding of contemporary developments. Also, Gramsci himself considered the link between state-society and international relations: “Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations? There can be no doubt that they follow” (quoted by Cox, 1983:133).
Cox addresses this issue in an article where he evaluates Susan Strange's contribution to the study of GPE (Cox, 1992c). Expanding on his (1987: 267) view of the role of finance he observes that its influence over production is to be found in its ability to politically enforce states to follow macroeconomic policies which have an effect on what is produced and for which market (domestic or export). Corporations are also dependent on it for the acquisition of new technology. In this sense, finance is the economic form of power over the (political) modes of social relations of production. Later (Cox, 1992c:180-181), he distinguishes capacity in the latter is reduced. This happens "...when credit at the top behaves in unpredictable and unstable ways, feeding on itself rather than nourishing the real economy..." and as a result "...the social structure and the financial structure become dangerously severed" (Cox, 1992c:181). The consequences of "paper profits" uncoupled from productive capacity can be seen in the Asian financial crisis (1997) and the dramatic decline of "new economy" corporate shares during 2000.

Later, Cox (1992a:298-299, 301) introduced the concept "nébuleuse" to explain the aftermath of the changes that took place in the Bretton Woods order during 1968-1975. It refers to the ascendancy of global finance and its increasing autonomy from global production. The removal of national capital control regulations, initiated by the US, resulted in states becoming "accountable to external bond markets and global financial interests", a form of "governance without government."

Cox's renewed interest in "civilisations" dates back to his time at McGill University while studying history. He explains that, "The attempt to recover the sense of the spirit behind the historical is what motivates me to explore the idea of civilisations" (Cox, 1999b:392). His deliberations on the possibility of a "post-hegemonic order" lead him to conclude that it is unlikely that a new hegemony will replace the contemporary declining hegemonic order. The reason for this lies in the difficulty of finding "an archimedian point around which the new order could be constructed" (Cox, 1992b:140-141). One can no longer assume that a future world order should or can only be based on the universalist tenets of Western civilisation, he argues. Instead, "mutual recognition" will involve moving "...towards a kind of supra-intersubjectivity that would provide a bridge..." between civilisations. This post-hegemonic order would be one in which "culturally distinct intersubjectivities" would co-exist (with their own values and development strategies), while supra-intersubjectivity would be the base which connect and reconciles them (Cox, 1993b:265). These points are reiterated when Cox (1995b:9) argues for a return to the study of civilisations, not in the manner of Huntington's "clash of civilisations" premise, nor by accepting Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis, but in order to find common ground.

One issue, for instance, which has been subject to "inter-civilisational" debate, is the notion of human rights. Can Western, Asian, African and Islamic conceptualisations of human rights be reconciled with each other? Or, more generally, "Is it possible to evolve out of the different realms of intersubjectivity expressive of different coexisting traditions of civilisation a supra-intersubjectivity that would consolidate norms consistent with all traditions of civilisation without any one tradition being superimposed on others?" (Cox, 1996a:147). Cox (1995b:26) suggests that the elements of a "supra-intersubjectivity" might be found in the fact that everyone shares the same eco-system and that we are all affected by environmental decline, that it is in everyone's interest to reduce global inequality, that we all recognise that violence is a sign of the breaking down of communication, and that we realise the importance of consensus on the issue of human rights. In as much as he doubts the possibility of a hegemonic order based on a single "archimedian point" and by offering the concept of "supra-intersubjectivity" instead, the eclectic Cox tilts his hat somewhat to postmodernism.

The notion of a post-Westphalian world order and the long term viability of the state as an autonomous actor in the global political economy is continuously emphasised by Cox during the early 1990s (cf. Cox, 1992b, 1993b. 1995a). He qualifies this, however, by saying "There is, of course, no question of the state disappearing" (Cox, 1993d:35).
13 Both contributed chapters to the “New Realism” edited volume (Cox, 1997a).

14 Cheru (1997a:154-163) details how peasants and people in the informal urban sector in Africa have developed “individual and collective defensive actions” because of a loss of confidence in the state. The delegitimation of the state, he argues, has come about because of the post-colonial African state’s agricultural policies. These included forcing peasants to produce cash crops for export markets, channelling production through marketing boards, and removing them from the land to make way for large scale commercial plantations, game reserves, and irrigation projects. The reaction has been to “innovate” and bypass the state. Cheru (1997a:156) cites the example of Kenyan milk farmers who, in reaction to low state imposed prices, diluted their milk with water and sold the rest privately. In the urban areas, the informal sector operates unregulated and often makes use of illegal means to acquire products, which are unavailable because of foreign exchange shortages and state corruption. For example, shortages of medicines result in smuggling by “middle-men”, who bring the goods in via trans-border trade networks (Cheru, 1997a:160). Additionally, peasants organise themselves in associations which organise the “selling” of produce through barter networks, thereby hindering attempts by the state and international development agencies (such as USAID) to encourage centralised, and large-scale production (161).

15 Cheru (1997a:165-166), as does Cox (1997a:250), question the assumption that all post-Cold War challenges to stability can necessarily be resolved by democracy (electoral) and the (unregulated) market. Cox rejects the view of social science, which goes along with this assumption, viz. that its function is to fix the “problems” associated with the transition to democracy and the market. In other words, “The purpose of enquiry is to bring the aberrant activity that focused attention as an object of study back into a compatible relationship with the relatively stable whole” (Cox, 1992b:135). Cheru (1997a:165) singles out the USAID Democracy Initiative, whose point of departure is that democracy facilitates the move towards a free market economy. He acknowledges that electoral democracy is essential, but maintains that it is not enough and that this view “is inconsistent with the views of popular movements in Africa. The latter have a perception of democracy, which stresses participation in decision making, not only at the local level, but at all levels (regional and national). It is also a view of democracy, which regards the social costs associated with free market reforms as “anti-democratic.” This has been reinforced by the negative experience with IMF directed structural adjustment programmes (SAP’s).

16 Or, as stated in the interview with Randall Germain, “Reality is a response by people to problems they confront and by the way they understand them and deal with them” (Cox, 1999b:393).

17 The following quotations and excerpts are indicative of the importance, which Cox attaches to this requirement. Referring to the need for the historian to “think himself into (an) action”, Cox (1976:182, footnote 12) stresses that the (historian’s) “main task” is to “discern the thought” of the agent who committed it. In “Labor and Hegemony” he emphasises the importance of reconstructing the mental frameworks through which individuals and groups perceive their action (Cox, 1980:475). Finally, “The mind is the privileged channel of access to understanding how social institutions are constructed to cope with material problems...” (Cox, 1996b:28).
Chapter 6
The Southern African Barometer (1999-2000): The MPI Index, Regime and Legitimacy

6.1 Introduction

This chapter and Chapter 7 investigate the claims emanating from Cox’s core theoretical framework, through an analysis of the survey data generated by the Southern African Barometer (SAB). These claims have been stated in Chapter 1, discussed at length and summarised, in particularly the latter part of Chapter 5. In order to contextualise and orientate the reader to this chapter a brief restatement of the salient points emanating from Cox’s core theoretical framework will be provided. This will serve as a precursor to the (re)listing of the main empirical and subsidiary claims which guide the data analysis. The next section of this chapter will deal with how the MPI Index was constructed. This is followed by the presentation of the data analysis (Chapters 6 and 7) which correlates and cross-tabulates the MPI Index with various items on the questionnaire. These items were grouped under five categories; regime, legitimacy, political interest/discussion, political participation, economy, and political competence.

The first important observation related to Cox’s framework which needs to be re-emphasised here is that he accepts the validity of using the problem-solving method in conjunction with the method of critical theory. This much has been made clear in the previous two chapters. His early work at the ILO reflected a more positivist epistemology, although he did point out then already that the results always had to be contextualised within the broader structures of which international organisations are a part. Later (Cox, 1976), he began to express his reservations about positivist “problem-solving” theory. His major qualification on the use of the “positivist-evolutionary” approach was that the knowledge it generated was connected to a particular interest, viz. the preservation of the political economic status quo. Secondly, that it identified current trends and projected them into the future, without considering the possibility of change.
Moreover, this concern with status quo maintenance, also influences the type of problems which are focused on. Mostly, these would be issues which may threaten the perpetuation of the system and its existing power relations. Science, thus becomes ideology when it no longer serves as a guide for action leading to change and instead, serves to validate a particular order: “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981:87). But, as we have seen, Cox’s interpretation of problem-solving theory is more nuanced than it would appear at first reading: “Regularities in human activities may indeed be observed...and thus the positivist approach can be fruitful within defined historical limits” (Cox, 1986:244). How then, within the parameters of CCT, could the positivist method be “fruitful”? Primarily, it can be useful depending on whether the findings are contextualised within the diachronic and holistic dimension of structural change, and if the analyst remains aware of the fact that the choice of problem/question may be related to the goal of maintaining the status quo.

It also follows that if the problems that are focused on in, for instance survey research, are of the kind which are of interest to those who want to consolidate and perpetuate the contemporary order (the characteristics of which are discussed in Chapter 5), they will also be of interest to those who want to change that order towards one which is more reflective of social equity. In other words, if problem-solving, like critical theory, is connected to practice, but in a manner which stresses “tactical action”, then the findings can also be used, tactically, to bring about status quo transformation instead of status quo maintenance. The method of historicism in CCT, however, also requires us to “pull back” and to also locate these findings within the dynamics of Cox’s historical structures. As stated in Chapter 1, this is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the findings will be used to shed some light on the claims generated by Cox’s framework as they relate to the marginalised in the southern African region. In doing so, it is hoped that a contribution will be made to a more considered evaluation of the possibilities of “strategic” change at the diachronic level.
The survey focuses on and aggregates the attitudes of a nationally representative sample in the seven states which were included in the first SAB project. How does this fit in with the method of CCT? Cox (1976:182-183) argues that change/transformation may occur when "contradictions" or "antagonisms" develop in society. They appear when a gap opens up between the dominant ideology or world view (for instance, free market liberalism) and the real material conditions of people. Whether this discrepancy between ideas and actual material circumstances is perceived and recognised depends on "a change of consciousness on the part of the potential challengers and their adoption of a contrast image of society." Furthermore, according to Cox (1980:474-475), this state of affairs can be accessed (through the method of historicism) by focusing on shared intersubjective meanings and by reconstructing the mental frameworks "through which individuals (own italics) and groups perceive their field of action."

Cox's notion of intersubjective meanings/ideas is sourced from Vico, and approximates Neufeld's conceptualisation (see Chapter 3). Thus, intersubjective ideas are a common understanding of a social practice (negotiations) or a social institution (the state). Attitudes and regularities in behaviour related to social practices and institutions can be observed, but for these to be able to develop or occur there must be a shared intersubjective understanding of them within society. For the historicist method of Cox, it is the change of intersubjective meanings which leads to the transformation of institutions and practices. Therefore, we need to access the "...connections between the mental schema through which people conceive action and the material world" (Cox, 1986:243). This chapter and the next one are not an analysis of the intersubjective ideas of people in southern Africa. While it is acknowledged that CCT requires us to focus on both intersubjective ideas and attitudes, the aim of these empirical chapters is limited to providing a "snapshot" of attitudes. Again, and in conjunction with Cox's views on positivism, this is acceptable in terms of his stated epistemology.

Explanation is the purpose of the historicist method and this requires "...an assembling of individual motivations (own italics) and social structures to be connected by explanatory hypotheses" (Cox, 1986:254). Furthermore, unlike intersubjective ideas which tend to be
constant over a prolonged period of time, collective images (on the legitimacy of power relations, for instance) may differ and stand in opposition to one another. They can form the basis for the emergence of “an alternative structure” (Cox, 1981:99). Cox, therefore makes the distinction between intersubjective ideas and collective images and recognises the importance of both. We now need to re-orientate ourselves to the claims which emanate from CCT, as well as to the “nuts and bolts” of the core theoretical framework and subsequent additions.

It will be recalled that the dynamics of CCT are located in historical structures. The interaction between social forces, states and world orders takes place in an environment which is characterised by material capabilities, ideas and institutions. This is the context within which a comprehensive Coxian analysis (incorporating both the synchronic and diachronic dimension) would have to locate the aggregated individual motivations of the SAB data set. Our focus is on the “collective images” component of the “ideas” concept. Furthermore, stable world orders and state-society complexes are founded and maintained through the establishment of hegemony. The Gramscian notion of hegemony, which Cox uses, predicates that hegemony cannot be maintained by coercive dominance alone, but that it also requires consensus (legitimacy). This consensus is attained through the distribution of material rewards to subordinate groups (and states) and their acceptance of the (universalist) norms of the prevailing ideology (for instance, those related to the perpetuation of a liberal world economy and pluralist democracy).

World order hegemony (for instance, the *pax britannica* and *pax americana*), in the past, has been established and maintained by states who have succeeded in establishing *national* hegemony, after their society has passed through and consolidated significant socio-economic changes. History shows that this requires a “fit” between ideas (ideology), material capabilities and institutions. Moreover, it is not only state-based but involves transnational social forces (in contemporary terms, global civil society). Although they attempt to emulate the exported hegemonic world order “model”, developing states usually do not manage to establish national hegemony. Here, hegemony “wears thin” and is more “laden with contradictions.” Cox later revised this observation
somewhat by pointing to the increasing numbers of the precarious and marginalised in
the industrialised states. This is a result of the dynamics of economic globalisation which
tends to favour high skills (technology) and contract (short term) employment. The
process is referred to as the “peripheralisation of the core.” (see Chapter 5). Nevertheless,
the social welfare benefits available in the core are still vastly superior to those in the
periphery, where they are sometimes non-existent.

In the interaction between social forces, forms of state, and world orders, Cox views
social forces (particularly the impoverished in developing states) as potential challengers
to the hegemony of the world economic order (although, as noted in Chapter 5, he does
recognise the enormous challenge involved in their mobilisation): “....a very large part of
the world’s population in the poorest areas remains marginal to the world economy...”
and “A major problem for international capital in its aspiration for hegemony is how to
neutralize the effect of this marginalization of perhaps one-third of the world’s population
so as to prevent its poverty from fuelling revolt” (Cox, 1981:113). Any counter-
hegemonic challenge by developing states (for instance, by “middle powers” using
multilateral fora to further the aims of the South1) would have to be “supported from
below” and “the task of changing world order begins with the long, laborious effort to
build new historic blocs within national boundaries” (Cox, 1981:116, 141).

In his later work, influenced by the diminishing autonomy of the state under
globalisation, Cox (1989a:250-251) foresees a counter-hegemonic future (“post-
Westphalian”) order which is characterised by a form of state which co-exists with other
“forms of authority” and is “...no longer the center, the exclusive point of impetus...”.
Nevertheless, he continues to emphasise that the potential counter-hegemonic challenge
will have to come from within “popular strata” and this challenge will result from local
reactions to the problems of globalisation (a reduced capacity of the state to provide
welfare support and the accompanying changes in the organisation of economic
production) (Cox, 1991:207). Finally, globalisation has created three strata; those who are
integrated, the precarious, and the excluded/marginalised (Cox, 1996c:26-27).
6.2 The Marginalised, Precarious and Integrated: Restatement of Main Claim and Subsidiary Claims

From the general overview and quotations in Chapter 1, and the more detailed discussion of his core theoretical framework and later publications in Chapter 5, it is clear that Cox views economic position in a social mode of production as a predictor of an inherent (but latent) force for transformation. Furthermore, those who are marginalised/excluded are more inclined to pose such a challenge. Additionally, the marginalised tend to exhibit certain characteristics and motivations (attitudes) and they are found primarily in the impoverished urban and rural areas of developing states, particularly so in Africa.

What are the characteristics of the marginalised, in other words, how does Cox conceptualise them? This has been discussed in detail in previous chapters, so what follows next is a concise “recap” of attributes and propensities. In urban areas the marginalised are unskilled workers (no formal job training and limited or no education). They are usually unemployed (in the formal economy) and earn an irregular cash income. This income is sourced through temporary, short-time jobs (casual labour) or side-walk vending. In the rural areas the marginalised are represented by peasants who attempt to subsist by producing their own food and have limited contact with the cash economy. Their income is usually supplemented through wage reparations from relatives in urban areas, the pension earnings of the elderly, and income earned from the sale of cash crops in times of surplus. The two Coxian modes of production of social relations of production which approximate the marginalised in southern Africa are the primitive labour market mode and the subsistence mode.

In terms of motivations and attitudes the marginalised tend to have a passive acceptance mentality together with an instrumentalist approach to daily survival issues. However, as we have seen, Cox attributes various attitudinal propensities to them: They are deemed to have within them a latent potential for political protest, they are dissatisfied with the political-economic status quo and challenge established systems of government, they are prone to political apathy, they suffer from a lack of political efficacy, they belong to self-
help associations and voluntary associations, they tend to be active participants in civil society, and they have a low regard of state legitimacy. To this list, we can add another, final attitudinal characteristic sourced from one of Cox’s later publications. Here he observes that evidence shows that the populations of the poorest states: “are turning their backs on the state and international organizations (own italics), which they see as their enemies rather than as possible supports” (Cox, 1999:24-25). To the list of subsidiary claims in Chapter 1, we can therefore add another one: “Being marginalised correlates with disapproval or negative perceptions of international organisations.”

The analysis of the SAB survey results will therefore focus on the marginalised and their attitudes as related to the above subsidiary claims. This, in comparison to the attitudes of the precarious and integrated on the same issues, will enable us to make some tentative observations on the accuracy of these hypothesised predilections, as well as on the accuracy of the main claim. Before turning to the construction of the MPI Index and the discussion of the items in the questionnaire which were chosen for correlation and cross-tabulation, we also need to briefly conceptualise the other two groups, viz. the precarious and integrated.

The precarious economic group are found in urban areas. They are semi-skilled (with some job training and basic education). They have low status full-time jobs (in cleaning, maintenance, security, the clothing, textile and footwear and mining industries) or are temporarily employed as contract workers. The latter two form the major component of the precarious and are looking for full-time work without being able to find it. Some workers in this category are not unionised. Cox (1987:52-55) also includes certain kinds of self-employment in this category (“...most forms of self-employment are precarious in the long term”). These are: commercial farmers, shopkeepers, craft market peddlers and any other form of non-professional self-employment with a regular income. The modes of social relations of production associated with this category are the enterprise labour market (non-established labour) and the self-employment mode.
The integrated category refers to those managers and workers who find themselves in a sector of the economy which is outward orientated. They are directors and upper level management staff of globally integrated (export focused), financial services and information technology companies. The integrated also include the “state class” (civil service managerial positions) in developing countries, particularly those who work for state agencies that are directing the process to becoming globally competitive (for instance; finance, trade and industry, foreign affairs, and the prime minister or president’s office). Established, full-time workers who are employed by these companies and state agencies are also included in this category. They are highly skilled or skilled (usually with post-secondary education and/or training) and are found in information technology related work, research and development, and technical supervision and support. Also included are self-employed professionals such as doctors, lawyers, consultants, accountants and engineers.

In South Africa, those who work for nationally orientated manufacturing companies (semi-integrated, because they do not produce for the global market), as well as export-orientated companies, and their unionised (established, full-time employed) work force can be associated with Cox’s tripartist mode of production. They participate in a corporatist forum (the National Economic, Development and Labour Council – NEDLAC) with the state. In other southern African states the arrangement is more representative of what Cox calls “state corporatism.” A situation where unions and employer organisations operate under government tutelage, and are in (a forced or guided) co-operative mode with state bureaucrats and the party elite.

6.3 Construction of the MPI Index and Selection of Questionnaire Items

The conceptualisation (derived from Cox, 1987 and 1999) of the three economic position groups (marginalised, precarious and integrated) indicates four attributes according to which we can differentiate between them. These are; occupation, skills, status of economic activity (employment), and income. The questionnaire (see Appendix B) includes items which cover these characteristics, although the closest corresponding item
to “skills” is one which attempts to determine the level and type of education completed (question 113). Occupation is covered by question 119, which allows the respondent to choose from a number of categories (including “never had a job”). Status of economic activity (related to employment) is addressed in question 114, while regularity of cash income (question 13d) was selected to represent the income aspect of Cox’s conceptualisation. A principal component factor analysis was conducted, using the four items. Cronbach’s alpha was used to produce a reliability coefficient which ranges between 0 and 1 (0 indicating no internal consistency between items in the measuring instrument, and 1 being an indication of perfect consistency). The options for each question were recoded to reflect Cox’s conceptualisation of the marginalised, precarious and integrated (MPI). These recodes will be discussed next.

First up, is the question on occupational categories (question 119), which was renamed as “Cox Occupation.” This item is preceded (question 118) by the following: “What is your present occupation or last occupation if unemployed?” Respondents were then read some of the options, after which the interviewer used the appropriate responses to probe and specify. These responses were then scored in the appropriate category:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q 119</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Employer, Manage Establishment with ten or more employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Employer, Manage Establishment with ten or less employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Professional Worker/Lawyer/Accountant/Doctor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Supervisor Office Worker/Supervise others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Non-Manual Office Worker (Not a supervisor).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Foreman/Supervisor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Skilled Manual Worker (Formal Sector).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Skilled Manual Worker (Informal Sector/Informal Producer).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Unskilled Manual Worker (Formal Sector).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Miner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Farmer (Has Own Commercial Farm).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Farmer (Has Own Subsistence Farm).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Farm Worker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Domestic Worker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Armed Services/Police/Security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Student.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Household Manager (Full-time).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Never had a job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Don't know.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In accordance with Cox’s conceptualisation of social modes of production and the concurring descriptions of the MPI, the above possible responses were grouped as follows:

### MARGINALISED

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Skilled Manual Worker (Informal Sector/Producer).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Unskilled Manual Worker (Trader/Hawker).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Farmer (Subsistence).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Farm Worker.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Domestic Worker.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Household Manager (Full-time).</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Disabled.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Never had a job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Don’t know.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: It must be stressed that the questionnaire was not primarily designed to reflect Cox’s conceptualisation. These categorisations have therefore been made to reflect, as accurately as possible, the essence of that conceptualisation. However, some choices are open to interpretation and this must be recognised as a limitation on the accuracy of the operationalisation. The “Skilled Manual Worker” category was included under marginalised because they are economically active in the
informal sector of the economy. It was felt that the marginalised status of economic activity should over-ride the "skills" attribute which is more associated with the precarious category in terms of Cox's conceptualisation. Household managers were included because in southern Africa, they represent women in rural areas who are usually actively involved in subsistence farming, but who would describe their role as being domestic in nature. In urban areas, this category represents women who cannot find jobs in the formal or informal sectors of the economy. Although this means that, technically, wealthy women/men could be included, the size of the nationally representative samples indicates that this risk would not significantly affect the composition of the marginalised category. The disabled category was included because it was assumed that the majority of respondents, would be unemployed and low skilled. On the other hand, some could be skilled and temporarily employed (precarious). Again, the number of respondents in this category is not large enough to influence the profile of the marginalised category, viz. no or low skills and mainly active in the informal sector of the economy.

PRECARIOUS

02 Employer/Manage less than 10.
05 Non-Manual Office Worker (Non-Supervisor).
09 Unskilled Manual Worker (Formal Sector).
11 Miner.
12 Farmer (Own Commercial Farm).
16 Armed Services/Police/Security
17 Student.

Notes: Employer/Managers of businesses with fewer than 10 employees were included because these fall under the self-employment mode of production which Cox regards as a precarious form of employment in the long run. The same goes for owners of commercial farms. Students are included here because they are not yet economically active. Furthermore, their entry into the job market is often
preceded by a period of unemployment or alternatively contract employment. The category "Armed Services/Police/Security Personnel" is a problematic one. Arguably, employment in the armed services and police can be considered as relatively secure. However, it is usually semi-skilled and members who are made redundant find it difficult to secure long-term employment in the formal economy. The security sector employs non-skilled or semi-skilled workers and is noted by Cox as a precarious form of employment. The other categories are found in areas of the formal economy which have been subjected to staff rationalisation and cut backs.

INTEGRATED

01 Employer/Manage more than 10.
03 Professional.
04 Supervisor Office Worker.
06 Foreman/Supervisor.
07 Skilled Manual Worker (Formal Sector).

Notes: The main criteria which were used to group these categories are skills levels and longer term employment in the formal sector. It is felt that this reflects Cox's conceptualisation of skilled and highly skilled managers/workers, as well as established employment in integrated companies. This category would also include "semi-integrated" companies and their workers, those that are more nationally orientated and their skilled (unionised work force). Managers and workers in the civil service are also able to classify themselves within this group.

The next item which was included for the purposes of constructing the MPI Index is not directly related to skills levels. This is question 113, which reads as follows in the questionnaire, "What was the highest grade, standard or form you completed?" Responses were coded using the categories listed below:
Q 113

01 No formal schooling.
02 Some primary schooling.
03 Primary school completed.
04 Some high school.
05 High school completed.
06 Some university, college.
07 University, college completed.
08 Post-graduate.
09 Other post-high school qualifications other than university/college.
10 Don’t know.

Notes: Although this item focuses on primary, secondary and tertiary level education, option 9 does allow the respondent who has received on the job training to categorise him/herself.

The responses were recoded to, as accurately as possible, reflect Cox’s notion of the MPI and renamed “Cox Education.”

MARGINALISED

01 No formal schooling.
02 Some primary schooling.
03 Primary school completed.
04 Some high school.
10 Don’t know.

PRECARIOUS

05 High school completed.
06 Some university, college.
09 Other post-high school qualifications.
INTEGRATED

07 University, college completed.
08 Post-graduate.

Notes: The categorisation was undertaken on the basis of Cox's assumption that the unskilled are more likely to be located within the marginalised group, the semi-skilled in the precarious, and the skilled and highly skilled in the integrated group. Again, the allocation of the "post-school qualifications, other than university/college" among the precarious is open to debate. The integrated group includes technicians and programmers in the information technology sector, most of whom underwent training and attained certification which would resort under "post-school qualifications." It could even be argued that their terms of employment are contract based and therefore precarious over the long term. However, within the southern African region the size of this group is small. Therefore, more people with post-school qualifications are likely to resort in the precarious group.

The third item for consideration in the MPI Index is related to whether people earn a regular income (are they on the margins of the cash economy or integrated into it?) and whether they have regular employment. The question (114) was recoded and renamed as "Cox Employment Status." It reads: "Do you have a job that pays a weekly or monthly cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you looking for a cash job (or looking for another one if you are presently working)? Possible responses were:

Q 114
01 No (not looking).
02 No (looking).
03 Yes, part-time (not looking).
04 Yes, part-time (looking).
05 Yes, full-time (not looking).
06 Yes, full-time (looking).
07 Don't know.
The possible responses were grouped as follows:

**MARGINALISED**

01 No (not looking).
02 No (looking).

**PRECARIOUS**

03 Yes, part-time (not looking).
04 Yes, part-time (looking).

**INTEGRATED**

05 Yes, full-time (not looking).
06 Yes, full-time (looking).

Note: The MPI categorisation is in accordance with Cox’s premise that the marginalised are not (formally) employed, the precarious are usually employed on a part-time basis, and the integrated are established managers/workers who are full-time employed in the formal economy.

The last item under consideration for the construction of the MPI Index relates solely to whether the respondent has been without a cash income over a prolonged period of time and was recoded and renamed as “Cox Income.” The corresponding item is question 13d: “In the last twelve months, how often have you or your family gone without a cash income?” Possible responses were:

Q 13d 01 Often.
02 Sometimes.
03 Rarely.
04 Never.
05 Don’t know.
Possible responses were grouped as follows:

MARGINALISED

01 Often.

PRECARIOUS

02 Sometimes.
03 Rarely.

INTEGRATED

04 Never.

Note: The response “rarely” was included in the precarious group because it augments the “sometimes” cash income problems of part-time workers, with the temporary cash flow problems of small businesses in the self-employment mode of production.

We are now in a position to assess and analyse the connection between these four items. Table 6.1 is a correlation matrix based on the whole data set (all seven states). It indicates that there is a meaningful positive correlation between the four variables. The highest correlations occur between occupation and employment (.484) and between occupation and education (.386). Next is education and employment (.287) and education and income (.269). Income has a relatively low correlation with both occupation (.221) and employment (.226). The correlations between all the items are meaningful enough to warrant a factor analysis in order to determine whether there is an underlying “hypothetical variable” without which their covariation would not occur. It is important to note, that the factor analysis is not aimed at data reduction (although one item was eventually dropped from the MPI Index).
Table 6.1: Correlation Matrix for Cox Employment Status, Occupation, Education and Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.484</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=9262</td>
<td>N=8639</td>
<td>N=9233</td>
<td>N=9197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>.484</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.386</td>
<td>.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=8639</td>
<td>N=8714</td>
<td>N=8687</td>
<td>N=8648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.386</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=9233</td>
<td>N=8687</td>
<td>N=9322</td>
<td>N=9254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.226</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=9197</td>
<td>N=8648</td>
<td>N=9254</td>
<td>N=9295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Pearson's Correlation Coefficient (two-tailed) at p < .01

The selection of the four items and their recoding was undertaken and based on Cox's theoretical conceptualisation and assumptions. It is therefore hypothesised that, on theoretical grounds, there should be an underlying commonality between them and that this underlying factor will be related to economic position or, in Cox's terminology, one's position in a mode of social relations of production.

The tables below illustrate the results of a factor analysis (using the principal component method) which incorporates our four (theoretically) selected items. A reliability analysis, to further assist us in determining the validity of the items (do they measure a similar phenomenon?), was done using Cronbach's Alpha (also known as Coefficient Alpha or $\alpha$).

Table 6.2 shows that the four items load on one factor and that only one factor was extracted. There is, therefore, one common underlying dimension, without which the selected variables would not show any covariation (in this case, as indicated in table 6.1, the overall tendency is for an increase in the value of one variable to result in the increase of another). We need to note, however, that this does not mean that there is any causality involved.
Table 6.2: Component (Factor) Matrix for Cox Occupation, Employment Status, Education and Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.787</td>
<td>.739</td>
<td>.694</td>
<td>.551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 Component (Factor) extracted (solution cannot be rotated).

Table 6.3: Total Variance Explained by Common Factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Variance</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.953</td>
<td>48.813</td>
<td>48.813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.845</td>
<td>21.127</td>
<td>69.940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.708</td>
<td>17.709</td>
<td>87.650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.494</td>
<td>12.350</td>
<td>100.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 6.4: Reliability Analysis (Alpha) for Cox Occupation, Employment Status, Education and Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Alpha if Item Deleted</th>
<th>Alpha on four Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>.4903</td>
<td>.6376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>.5307</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.5814</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.6471</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The statistics for the factor loadings reflect the correlation between the common factor and the variables. Occupation, Employment and Education show the strongest correlation, and Income the weakest. Table 6.3 illustrates to what degree the common factor is responsible for the covariation between our selected variables ("proportion of
Although only one factor was extracted, the programme (SPSS) will list as many factors as there are variables. The common factor accounts for 48.8% of the total variance between the four items (George and Mallery, 2000:283; Kim and Mueller, 1978:21-24).

Finally, in table 6.4, the results of the reliability test are summarised. The Alpha score on all four items (.6376) is rather low. According to George and Mallery (2000:279) “there is no set interpretation as to what is an acceptable alpha value.” However, they do provide a set of guidelines which places our result in the category of “questionable”, but still “acceptable.” Interestingly, Alpha would have been an unacceptable .4903, if the Occupation item were to be deleted. Also of interest, is that deleting the Income item would slightly increase Alpha to .6471.

At this stage, we can conclude that there is an underlying common dimension (factor) which is responsible for the covariation between the four items. Furthermore, the strongest loading occurs between the extracted factor and (in order of strength of correlation) Occupation, Employment and Education. Clearly, the Income item has proven to be the weakest link. To determine whether the MPI Index could be improved on (in terms of variance explained and reliability), a second factor analysis was undertaken which excluded the Income item. The results are provided below in tables 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7:

Table 6.5: Component (Factor) Matrix for Cox Occupation, Employment Status and Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>.831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>.774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.699</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 Component (Factor) extracted (solution cannot be rotated).
Table 6.6: Total Variance Explained by Common Factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Initial Eigenvalues</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of Variance</td>
<td>Cumulative %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.777</td>
<td>59.248</td>
<td>59.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.725</td>
<td>24.181</td>
<td>83.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.497</td>
<td>16.571</td>
<td>100.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 6.7: Reliability Analysis (Alpha) for Cox Occupation, Employment Status and Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Alpha if Item Deleted</th>
<th>Alpha on three Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>.4111</td>
<td>.6473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>.5295</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.6512</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All three items load stronger on the common factor. Occupation has increased from a loading of .787 to .831. Additionally, the total variance attributable to the common factor has now increased to nearly 60% (59.248). The Alpha coefficient has also increased (albeit slightly) to .6473. The factor analysis has confirmed the theoretical expectation that, based on Cox’s conceptualisation of economic position (related to modes of social relations of production), the selection of the items and their grouping into an Index instrument is theoretically and statistically justifiable. The MPI Index, therefore, has a high degree of construct validity. Is the MPI Index reliable? In other words does it measure and produce the same results after repeated use in a similar setting? Using the three items, the Alpha indicates that, although it is not an excellent or good instrument, it falls within the acceptable range. Based on the above results the final index was constructed using the items on Occupation, Employment and Education. In the question on Employment Status the respondent is also asked whether he/she earns a weekly/monthly cash income. This gives us an indication as to whether the respondent was (at the time of the survey) linked to the money economy or not.
6.4 The MPI Index, Regime and Legitimacy

This section focuses on the results of the data analysis. The method of analysis involves two stages. First, a correlational matrix was created between the MPI Index and all the items in the questionnaire which are related to attitudes towards regime type (democracy), legitimacy, political interest/participation, the economy, and competence/efficacy. Only those correlations of .160 or stronger were selected. Pearson's correlation coefficient ranges between \(-1\) and \(+1\). A positive correlation indicates that an increase in the value of one variable is associated with an increase in the other variable. A negative correlation means that an increase in one variable is associated with a decrease in the value of the second variable. The correlation matrix which was constructed is a bivariable one. It correlates the MPI Index (independent variable) with the items (dependent variables) under the categories stated above. Secondly, a cross-tabulation (between the MPI Index and the appropriate items) data analysis was run on all the selected correlations. 7

The first category, “regime type”, is related to attitudes towards the political system and facilitates an evaluation of the subsidiary claim which states that being marginalised correlates with being dissatisfied with the political system.

As an introduction to the data analysis, table 6.8 shows the results of a cross-tabulation of the MPI Index with the seven southern African states included in the SAB survey.

| Table 6.8: The Marginalised, Precarious, and Integrated in selected southern African states |
|--------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| MPI Index | LES  | BOTS | MAL  | NAM  | ZAM  | ZIM  | SA   | Total |
| Marginalised | 82.6% | 58.6% | 77.9% | 67.0% | 59.1% | 57.3% | 48.4% | 62.9% |
| Precarious | 16.0% | 32.3% | 15.5% | 22.4% | 28.6% | 32.5% | 40.4% | 28.1% |
| Integrated | 1.4%  | 9.1%  | 6.6%  | 10.6% | 12.3% | 10.2% | 11.2% | 9.0%  |
| Total      | 100%  | 100%  | 100%  | 100%  | 100%  | 100%  | 100%  | 100%  |

Note: Total N=9368, Valid N=8618 (92%), Missing N=750 (8%).
From the table it can be seen that the majority of the respondents in all seven nationally representative sample states are economically marginalised (63% of the total sample), followed by the precarious category (28% of the total sample). Only 9% of the total number of respondents surveyed are economically integrated. Nationally, Lesotho (83%), Malawi (78%), and Namibia (67%) have the highest proportion of marginalised respondents. South Africa, as the most industrialised economy in the region, has the lowest proportion of marginalised (48.4%), but the highest proportion of people who fall into the precarious category (40.4%). The high percentage of the economically precarious in South Africa indicates that a large number of those people in South Africa who earn a cash income are semi-skilled and find themselves in occupational categories which offer only part-time employment. Botswana (58.6%), Zimbabwe (57.3%) and Zambia (59.1%) follow South Africa with (compared to Lesotho, Malawi, and Namibia) lower proportions of respondents in the marginalised category. Lesotho has the lowest proportion in the integrated category (1.4%), while Zambia (12.3%), South Africa (11.2%), Namibia (10.6%) and Zimbabwe (10.2%) have the highest proportions.

We now turn to a review of the highest scoring correlations between the MPI Index and the items under the categories noted above, as well as the results of their cross-tabulations. The category, regime type, includes a number of items which attempted to measure attitudes towards and understandings of democracy. Meaningful correlations were discovered on four items. The first item (rejection of non-democratic alternatives) is a scale (1-5) aimed at determining how willing people would be to consider authoritarian options, in other words, how strongly are they committed in their expressed support of democracy as a form of governance. The question reads as follows:

“Our current system of governing with regular elections and more than one political party is not the only one [country] has ever had. Some people say that we would be better off if we had a different system of government. How much would you strongly
disapprove, disapprove, neither disapprove nor approve, approve or strongly approve of the following alternatives to our current system of government with at least two political parties and regular elections?

Alternatives (Items 53-58):

“If only one political party, or candidates from only one party, were allowed to stand for elections and hold office”?  
“If all decisions were made by a council of Elders, Traditional leaders or Chiefs”?  
“If the army came in to govern the country”?  
“If parliament and political parties were abolished, so that the President could decide everything”?  
“If all important decisions about the economy were made by economic experts rather than an elected government or parliament”?  
“If [the country returned to the previous regime]”?  

Table 6.9 shows the (meaningful) correlation results and subsequent cross-tabulations between the MPI Index and this item. Correlations were run for all seven states together (every respondent in the data set), for each state separately (all=rural and urban together), and for rural and urban respondents (all states and within each state). Where all states are included in correlations or cross-tabulations, they are referred to collectively as “southern Africa.” The tables below report only on those states and/or the region which showed meaningful correlations between the MPI Index and selected items. Unless otherwise indicated all significance levels for Pearson’s correlation coefficient are at p < .01 (two-tailed). The range of responses to the various alternatives have been collapsed into three categories: strongly disapprove and disapprove appears as “disapprove”, strongly approve and approve as “approve”, and neither approve nor disapprove as “unsure.” “Marginalised”, “Precarious” and “Integrated” have been abbreviated to M, P, and I, and “correlation” to C. While “all”, “urban” and “rural” appear as A, U and R respectively. All percentages have been rounded off.
Only four states showed meaningful correlations between the MPI Index and the “rejection of non-democratic alternatives” item. The majority of respondents indicated a “strong disapproval/disapproval” of the various items. However, it is interesting to note the significantly lower percentage disapproval of the item that posed that “economic experts” should dictate policy decisions on the economy. The lowest number of respondents who disapprove of this alternative are in South Africa (26%), followed by Zimbabwe (34%), Malawi (39%), and Namibia (41%). Furthermore, on all the items, the majority who reject non-democratic alternatives is lower in South Africa, than in the rest of southern Africa (Mattes et al, 2000:15).

The N for urban Malawians is small and, subsequently, includes no respondents for the integrated category. Overall, the marginalised in the four states show a lower disapproval and a higher approval rate of non-democratic alternatives than the precarious and the integrated. This is particularly noticeable in Namibia, where 10% of the marginalised approve, 29% are unsure, and 61% disapprove. Comparatively, only 3% of the integrated approve, 14% are unsure, and 84% disapprove. The tendency, among these four states, is therefore that economic position is somewhat linked to attitudes towards non-democratic
alternatives. The marginalised have a lower disapproval rate of these alternatives, while the disapproval rate increases among the precarious and shows a further increase among the integrated. This tendency is most visible in Namibia and Zimbabwe, but less so for Zambia. It is also interesting to note that the highest number (19%) of those in the integrated category who are “unsure” are found in Zambia.

The second item is a scale (1-5) which attempts to measure the opinion of respondents to anti-democratic actions by government. Are they strongly opposed to such actions, or not? The scale (defence of democracy 1) incorporates the responses to four anti-democratic actions: “If the government were to take the following actions, would you support it, neither support nor oppose, or oppose it?”

Anti-democratic actions (Questions 94, 96, 98 and 100):

“Shut down newspapers, or radio or television stations that were critical of it.”

“Dismissed judges who ruled against the government.”

“Banned political parties.”

“Suspended the parliament and cancelled the next elections.”

The questionnaire allows for five possible responses to the above scenarios; “strongly support”, “support”, “neither support nor oppose”, “oppose” and “strongly oppose.” These were collapsed into “support” (strongly support and support), “unsure” (neither support or oppose) and “oppose” (oppose and strongly oppose). Table 6.10 illustrates the meaningful correlations and resultant cross-tabulations for Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Again, there is an association between being marginalised, precarious or integrated and tolerance for anti-democratic behaviour by government. In Namibia there is no difference between the MPI categories and support for anti-democratic behaviour (levelling out at 7% each). There is, however, a large proportion of respondents who are uncertain. The largest proportion resides in the marginalised category (32%), declining to 20% for the precarious, and to 14% for the integrated.
Table 6.10 The MPI Index and Attitudes to Anti-democratic Actions by Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes to Anti-Demo Actions by Government</th>
<th>Namibia (A)</th>
<th>Zambia (A)</th>
<th>Zimbabwe (A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M  P  I</td>
<td>M  P  I</td>
<td>M  P  I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>7  7  7</td>
<td>2  1  0</td>
<td>5  6  1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>32 20 14</td>
<td>7  6  3</td>
<td>26 18 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>61 73 79</td>
<td>91 93 97</td>
<td>69 76 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>N=1072 (91%)</td>
<td>N=1033 (86%)</td>
<td>N=997 (83%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.171); ** Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.232); *** Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.254).

The majority of respondents in Namibia oppose anti-democratic actions by government, but they form a smaller majority than in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Additionally, there is a tendency for the proportion of those who oppose such policies to increase, depending on economic position. In the marginalised category, 61% oppose anti-democratic behaviour, while the proportion increases to 73% for the precarious and to 79% for the integrated. The vast majority of Zambians pronounced themselves against authoritarian policies (above 90% for all three categories), but again there is a tendency for the proportion to increase as one moves along the spectrum from the marginalised to the integrated. In Zimbabwe, as in Namibia, there is a substantial proportion of respondents who are unsure about their reaction to anti-democratic behaviour. Again, the larger proportion is found among the marginalised (26%), decreasing to 18% for the precarious, and 4% for the integrated. When it comes to rejection of anti-democratic behaviour, 95% of the integrated in Zimbabwe are on board, declining to 76% for the precarious, and 69% for the marginalised.
In the next item (which resulted in five meaningful correlations with the MPI Index) respondents were asked what they would actually do in response, if the government were to undertake the anti-democratic actions as set out in questions 94, 96, 98 and 100 above. The question (as reflected in questions 95, 97, 99 and 101) is: “What if anything would you do about it?” Respondents were given the opportunity to provide open-ended answers which were categorised as follows:

1. “Do nothing.”
2. “Speak to others about it.”
3. “Write to a newspaper.”
4. “Phone in to a radio or TV programme.”
5. “Contact a government official or representative.”
6. “Join a march or demonstration.”
7. “Don’t know.”
8. “Other (to be specified).”

Based on the responses a behavioural defence of democracy scale (1 to 5) was constructed, with 1 representing the lowest possible form of active defence of democracy (“do nothing”), and 5 the most highest (most intense) form (“join a march or demonstration). Table 6.11, below, presents the results. This is the first item where a meaningful correlation occurred for the whole (southern African) data set, more specifically among rural respondents. On the 1-5 scale, in order to simplify the analysis, the scale can be divided into three components; 1+2=low propensity to act, 3=average propensity to act, and 4+5=high propensity to act. When it comes to willingness to actually do something about anti-democratic government actions there is, again, a discernible pattern between the marginalised, precarious and integrated. Furthermore, across the board (M+P+I), the majority of respondents exhibit a low propensity to behaviourally defend democracy: southern Africa (66%), Botswana (58%), Malawi (63%), Zambia (52%) and Zimbabwe (69%).
Table 6.11 The MPI Index and Behavioural Defence of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavioural Defence of Democracy</th>
<th>MPI Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa (A) C=.173*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana (A) C=.243</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi (A) C=.141**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia (A) C=.194</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe (A) C=.227***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Focusing on the marginalised, precarious and integrated there are notable differences when it comes to the intensity of behaviour to defend democracy. Generally, the integrated are more inclined towards more intensive acts, while the marginalised and precarious are more inclined to do nothing. For southern Africa the proportions for those with a low propensity to engage in high profile acts among the three economic position categories are as follows: marginalised (70%), precarious (61%) and integrated (51%). Moving to higher intensity behaviour, the proportions are 14% for the marginalised, 19% for the precarious and 23% for the integrated. Lastly, out of those who would consider high intensity behaviour (e.g. “join a march or demonstration) only 16% of respondents are found among the marginalised, increasing to 20% among the precarious and to 26% among the integrated. The highest proportion of those among the integrated who indicated that they would consider high profile acts are found in Botswana (48%) and the lowest proportion in Zimbabwe (30%).
Among the marginalised, the lowest proportion who find themselves at the bottom end of the intensity scale is in Zambia (58%) and the highest in Zimbabwe (75%). Zimbabwe is also the only country which shows a reversal of the “more integrated, more intensive behaviour” trend in the average propensity to act category. The proportions are 11% for the marginalised, 19% for the precarious and 16% for the integrated. Except for Botswana (rural and urban) and Zambia (urban), rural respondents are responsible for the strength of the correlations in the other states.

The last item under the category of regime type relates to the respondent’s commitment to democracy. Out of the seven southern African countries, only Namibia and Zimbabwe showed a meaningful correlation with the MPI Index. The question (item 104 in the questionnaire) reads: “Sometimes democracy does not work. When this happens, some people say that we need a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections. Others say that even when things don’t work, democracy is always best. What do you think?” People were asked to respond to this by indicating their preferences relating to two statements. The results are summarised in table 6.11 and includes the “don’t know” response” as well as “do not agree with either.” The latter two were not read out to the respondents.

Statement A: Need a strong leader Options: “Agree somewhat” or “Strongly Agree”
Statement B: Democracy always best Options: “Agree somewhat” or “Strongly Agree”

In Namibia, 59% of the marginalised respondents either strongly agreed or agreed somewhat that when “democracy does not work” a strong leader who does away with elections is acceptable. Moving on to the precarious, the figure drops to 34%, and to 32% for the integrated. If we add the three categories (MPI) for those who either “strongly agree” or “agree somewhat”, 50% of Namibian respondents have no problem envisaging an authoritarian alternative. Those who regard democracy as always the best option, add up to 42% of all respondents. Similar to the previous items, there is a tendency for the preference for democracy to increase as we move from the marginalised to the integrated in Namibia (M=34%, P=55%, I=66%).
Table 6.12 The MPI Index and Commitment to Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment to Democracy</th>
<th>MPI Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C=.250</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree (A)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree somewhat (A)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree somewhat (B)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree (B)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1132 (96%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.181).

If we leave out the “agree somewhat” respondents to statement B (democracy is always best), the numbers drop to 27% for the marginalised, 45% for the precarious, and 56% for the integrated. The tendency for the democracy preference to increase as we move along the economic position index remains, but only for the integrated there is a slight simple majority who “strongly agree” that democracy is always best. In the marginalised category, only 27% of respondents chose this option.

In Zimbabwe, the preference for the democratic option, is much stronger. Additionally, the tendency for the democratic preference to increase as we move towards the integrated repeats itself. For the marginalised (“agree somewhat” plus “strongly agree”), 19% of respondents express a preference for the “strong leader, no elections”) option, while 72% opt for the “democracy always best” statement. Out of these, 56% “strongly agree” that democracy is always preferable to the authoritarian alternative. This is double the percentage of marginalised respondents that chose the democratic option in Namibia. Only 11% (“strongly agree” plus “agree somewhat”) of the integrated in Zimbabwe chose
the “strong leader, no elections” statement (compared to 32% in Namibia). Among the integrated, 86% (compared to 66% in Namibia) support the “democracy always best” statement (“strongly agree” plus “agree somewhat”) and 74% (compared to 56% in Namibia) chose the “strongly agree” option for this statement. The precarious are also supportive of the democratic option (80%), out of this group only 14% chose the “agree somewhat” response. As in Namibia, there is a tendency for democratic support to increase, as we move from the marginalised (72%), to the precarious (80%) and the integrated (86%).

This concludes the review of those items in the questionnaire which were aimed at determining attitudes towards regime type, and resulted in meaningful correlations with the MPI Index. It is interesting to note that the MPI Index did not correlate (meaningfully) with two scales which were constructed to determine respondents’ understanding of democracy. The scales attempt to measure whether southern Africans have a more political (multiparty elections, freedom to associate and free speech) or economic (equality, employment and delivery of basic needs) understanding of democracy. Mattes et al (2000:9-14) found that southern Africans (in unprompted answers) predominantly offered a political conceptualisation of democracy. Notably, 26% of South Africans offered an economic conceptualisation (equality and justice) of the term (by far the highest in the region). However, when confronted with a list of political (e.g. “regular elections”) and economic (“jobs for everyone”) components of democracy which had to be prioritised all seven states in the sample tilted towards a more economic understanding of democracy. For instance, the majority of respondents indicated that “basic necessities like shelter, food and water for everyone” is “absolutely essential” for democracy.

The next category for which correlations with the MPI Index were run is legitimacy. This category is associated with the subsidiary claim which states that being marginalised correlates with low state legitimacy. Mattes et al (2000:30) associate legitimacy with the consent or compliance of the governed to be governed: “...state and government legitimacy can be seen as the sense that there is no alternative set of structures or
institutions" which people view as having the right "to make authoritative, binding societal decisions." Furthermore, "It is the sense that rule-makers have the right to make laws, and that those laws ought to be obeyed." The term also relates to a firmly established trust in the institutions of government. This results in the acceptance of policy decisions, even though these may not always enjoy popular support. A number of items (8) were included which are all related in some form or other to the notion of legitimacy. A detailed description is given of only those items which correlated meaningfully with the MPI Index. Out of the eight items, only two correlated somewhat significantly and are reported on below. These items are discussed first.

The first item attempts to measure attitudes towards government and the constitution and consists of four questions (59-62) out of which a legitimacy scale (1-5) was constructed, with 1 being an indication of extremely low legitimacy and 5 an indication of high legitimacy. The question reads as follows in the questionnaire:

"Here are some things people often say about our current political system. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree, neither disagree nor agree, or agree?" (The interviewer was asked to probe for strength of opinion).

59 “Our government was elected to power by accepted procedures.”
60 “Our government exercises power in an acceptable way.”
61 “Our constitution expresses the values and aspirations of the [insert country] people.”
62 “Our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they agree with them.”
The second item which correlated meaningfully with the MPI index attempts to measure respondents' willingness/unwillingness to obey some selected fundamental laws related to, inter alia, the payment of taxes and payment for services. A scale (1-5) was constructed, based on the answers regarding four hypothetical actions (questions 92a, b, c and d in the questionnaire). The question reads as follows: “We would like to remind you that your responses to this interview are confidential. Here is a list of actions ordinary people are taking in a political system. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not.”

92a “Claim government benefits to which you are not entitled (like a pension, maintenance, or unemployment payment).”

92b “Avoid paying Development Levy or Property Taxes.”

93c “Avoid paying income taxes.”

92d “Get services like electricity or water without paying for them.”

The other six items did not correlate meaningfully with the MPI Index. These items attempted to measure various other dimensions of legitimacy: whether government institutions at various levels (e.g. President, parliament, and local government) are perceived as being interested/responsive in/to people's needs; whether people trust government institutions at various levels (President, parliament and local government); whether people trust state institutions (for instance, the army, the police, and courts); and whether they trust government at the various levels (President, parliament, and local government). Tables 6.13 and 6.14 illustrate the findings for the MPI Index and governmental legitimacy and the MPI Index and inclination to disobey fundamental governmental laws, respectively. For governmental legitimacy, the only somewhat meaningful correlation was for the Zimbabwean national sample (-.163). On the 1-5 scale, 1+2=“low legitimacy”, 3=unsure, and 4+5=“high legitimacy.” The large number of
missing cases is due to the "don't know" responses which were treated as missing cases. On the legitimacy scale, Zimbabwe ranked the lowest among the southern African states, while Namibia and Botswana ranked the highest (Mattes et al, 2000:31).

*Table 6.13 The MPI Index and Governmental Legitimacy*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governmental Legitimacy</th>
<th>MPI Index</th>
<th>Zimbabwe (A)</th>
<th>Southern Africa (A)</th>
<th>South Africa (A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C = -.158*</td>
<td>C = -.077</td>
<td>C = -.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>807 (67%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>7259 (78%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>2007 (91%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strongest correlation for urban respondents (-.163)*

The negative correlation reflects a pattern which occurred for all the correlations that were run between the MPI Index and the (8) legitimacy related items. As can be seen from the Zimbabwean sample, the marginalised tend to attribute more legitimacy to government than the precarious and integrated. Therefore, moving towards the more integrated, in terms of economic position, we can observe a decline on the legitimacy scale. By way of comparison, southern Africa and South Africa (with low correlations) indicate a repetition of the same pattern, albeit with smaller percentage differences between the marginalised, precarious, and integrated. Only 5% of the integrated in Zimbabwe lie on the upper end of the legitimacy scale, compared to 38% in southern Africa, and 40% in South Africa. As noted, the negative (weak) correlations occur uniformly among all the states and for all the items. The integrated tend to view government and state institutions (somewhat more than the marginalised and precarious) as not interested in them, and less trustworthy.
The table below illustrates the cross-tabulations of the second item (described above, questions 92a-d) which resulted in some meaningful correlations with the MPI Index. The full questionnaire versions of the abbreviated responses “No never” and “No, but would” are, respectively, “No, would never do this” and “No, but would do it if I had the chance.”

Table 6.14 The MPI Index and Inclination to Disobey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclination to Disobey</th>
<th>MPI Index</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C = -.035</td>
<td>C = -.166 (rural)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, never</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, but would</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, once or twice</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, a few times</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, often</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6583 (70%)</td>
<td>927 (78%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For both, Namibia and Zimbabwe correlations for the whole national sample were not meaningful. Meaningful correlations were found among rural Namibians and urban Zimbabweans. However, a selection of only these respondents would have (considering the large number of missing cases) made the N too small.

Taking into account the qualifying note at the bottom of table 6.14, the numbers do illustrate a tendency for the marginalised to be more inclined to consider disobeying government laws (tax avoidance, fraudulent benefit claims, and non-payment for basic services) than the precarious and integrated. The southern African data is included to illustrate that this tendency (the more integrated are less inclined to disobey) holds for the region, but with much smaller percentage differences between the three categories. In Namibia 83% of the integrated against 63% of the marginalised indicated that they have never undertaken such actions. Only 10% of the integrated state that they would take
these actions if given the chance, compared to 24% of the marginalised and 16% of the precarious. This pattern repeats itself in Zimbabwe. If we add the various “yes” responses (those respondents who admit to having broken the law) the differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated become even more pronounced. Among the Zimbabwean marginalised 12% admit to having transgressed, so too do 12% of the precarious, compared to only 3% of the integrated.

6.5 Summation

This chapter reported on the meaningful correlations and resultant cross-tabulations between the MPI Index and the various indicators under regime and legitimacy. The data set from the first Southern African Barometer (1999-2000) was used to construct the index and to run the correlations and cross-tabulations. The argument for combining CCT with quantitative (problem-solving) analysis was re-stated at the beginning of the chapter. Important in this regard, is Cox’s statement that “regularities in human activities may indeed be observed...and thus the positivist approach can be fruitful within defined historical limits.” (Cox, 1986:244). The reader is also referred back to the last section in Chapter 5 where Cox states that “This problem brings us to the distinction I have made between problem-solving and critical theory. Some people have read this to mean that I am against problem-solving theory, which was not at all my point.” (Cox, 1999b:392-393). In conjunction with these observations the point was made that the findings of problem-solving theory can be used to strategise for transformation to a more equitable order.

To access a “snapshot” of the southern African sample it was suggested that Cox’s (1980:474-475) notion of mental frameworks “through which individuals and groups perceive their field of action” is useful. The analysis of the data enables gives us a picture of the aggregated “individual motivations” (Cox, 1986:254) and the “collective images” (Cox, 1981:99) of the regional sample and the seven national samples. The quantitative method (I would argue) can also be used to partially determine the intersubjective meanings of people in southern Africa on social institutions and social practices. This is,
however, not part of the study's stated research goals. During the abbreviated discussion of the framework of CCT, the salient points which are important for the quantitative analysis were re-stated. Cox emphasises the difficulty which developing states experience to establish national hegemony and that any counter-hegemonic challenge to the current order will require the support of marginalised social forces. It is within the marginalised ("popular strata") that Cox perceives the potential for revolt, the result of dissatisfaction with the reduced capacity (or unwillingness) of the state to address national development goals within the context of the constraints brought about by globalisation. The three strata which are the result of globalisation processes are the marginalised, precarious and integrated.

In the next section of the chapter, the marginalised, precarious and integrated were (again) conceptualised from Cox writings (see Chapter 5), followed by a re-statement of the main claim and subsidiary claims. The marginalised approximate Cox's primitive labour market mode of production and the subsistence mode. The precarious can be related to Cox's enterprise labour market mode and the self-employment mode. Their long term employment is uncertain. The integrated are those (technology intensive) production modes of the national economy which are competitively integrated with the global economy. In developing states this also included the "state class."

The main claim which emanates from CCT is that position in a social mode of production is linked to a propensity to challenge the political-economic status quo (thereby leading to its transformation). The marginalised are more inclined to pose this challenge. From here follow the subsidiary claims: the marginalised have a latent potential for political protest; they are dissatisfied with the political-economic system; they are politically apathetic, they do not feel politically efficacious, they are inclined to belong to self-help associations; they are active participants in civil society; their perception of state legitimacy is low; and they disapprove (have negative perceptions) of international organisations (notably the IMF, which forces developing states to implement economic austerity policies). Finally, on all these issues the marginalised have different "collective images", compared to the precarious and integrated.
Based on Cox’s conceptualisation, four indicators were identified which allow us to place individuals within one of the three economic position strata (marginalised, precarious, integrated). They are: occupation, skills, status of economic activity (employment), and income. It was argued that these indicators can be associated with items in the questionnaire for the purposes of the construction of an MPI Index. Each item was, subsequently, identified and a case was made for the optional responses to be categorised (grouped) in Cox’s marginalised, precarious and integrated economic strata. The limitations and drawbacks inherent in this process were also pointed out. Next, a correlation matrix was created to determine the association between the four items. It was found that the four items correlated meaningfully and positively with one another, and that there is therefore an underlying commonality which connects them. On the basis of this a factor analysis was undertaken to determine the theoretical construct validity of the indicators. Are they related to economic position (modes of social relations of production)?

The factor analysis (using the four indicators) extracted one factor on which all the indicators loaded. However, the income item proved to be the weakest link (the correlation between the common factor and income is the lowest, compared to the other three items). An alpha (reliability test) score of .6376 was obtained, which is low but acceptable. A second factor analysis was run, leaving out the income item. The three remaining items loaded stronger on the common factor. Now, the common factor explains 59% of the variance between the items (compared to 49% in the first analysis). The Alpha score increased somewhat to .6473. The two factor analyses confirmed the theoretical expectation (derived from CCT) that the items belong together, and that they measure provide us with a measurement of economic position (mode of social relations of production). Subsequently, the MPI Index was constructed using the items on occupation, employment and education. In the last sections of the chapter the MPI Index was correlated and cross-tabulated with the questionnaire items related to regime (democracy) and legitimacy.
A cross-tabulation of the MPI Index with the seven southern African states which were included in the SAB (Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa) revealed that, on average, approximately 60% of the total sample belong to the marginalised category. The highest number of marginalised are found in Lesotho (83%) and Malawi (78%). On average, 25% of respondents are in a precarious economic position. The highest proportion is located in South Africa (40%), and the lowest in Malawi (16%). The integrated make out, by far, the smallest proportion of the sample. The average for the region is 9%. Of the seven states, Zambia (12%), South Africa (11%), and Namibia (11%) have the highest proportion of integrated.

Next, correlations were run between the MPI Index and a number of items related to attitudes and understandings of democracy (regime). All Pearson’s correlations of .160 (positive or negative) and higher were regarded as meaningful and cross-tabulations were run for between the MPI Index and these items. On “rejection of non-democratic alternatives” (a measure of commitment to democracy) and the MPI Index, meaningful correlations were found for Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In these states, the pattern which emerges is that the marginalised show a higher approval rate for non-democratic alternatives than the precarious and the integrated (the highest approval among the marginalised was found in Namibia, at 10%).

The second item attempts to measure attitudes towards anti-democratic policies/actions by government. Three states emerged with meaningful correlations, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The majority (among all three economic strata) in the three states indicate that they oppose anti-democratic actions by government. Again, there is a tendency for the proportion of respondents who oppose anti-democratic actions to increase as we move from the marginalised to the precarious, and the integrated. Namibia has the lowest proportion among the marginalised who oppose (61%), and the highest percentage who are unsure (32%).
The next item ("behavioural defence of democracy"), is aimed at determining whether respondents are actually prepared to do something about the anti-democratic behaviour of government. Five meaningful correlations were found. One for the regional sample as a whole, as well as for Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Overall, (for the marginalised, precarious and integrated) there is a low propensity to effectively defend democracy. Furthermore, the integrated are more inclined to actively defend democracy, while the marginalised and precarious are more inclined to do nothing. In southern Africa, 23% of the integrated are willing to undertake high intensity activities (march or demonstration) to defend democracy, as opposed to 20% of the precarious and only 16% of the marginalised.

The last item reported on in the regime/MPI Index data analysis is on commitment to democracy. Two states, Namibia and Zimbabwe showed meaningful correlations. Again, Namibia emerges with the most tolerance for authoritarianism. If we add the MPI categories, 50% of Namibian indicated that they could live with an authoritarian alternative to democracy. Also, there is a tendency for the preference for democracy to increase as we move from the marginalised to the integrated. In Zimbabwe the commitment to democracy is stronger, but the pattern found in Namibia repeats itself (56% of the marginalised strongly agree that democracy is always best, compared to 66% of the precarious, and 74% of the integrated). Finally, on regime type, there were no significant correlations between the MPI Index and two items in the questionnaire which attempted to determine whether respondents had a political or economic understanding of democracy.

The next category which was related to the MPI Index, deals with issues of legitimacy. Out of eight items in the questionnaire, only two correlated meaningfully with the economic position index. The first, a standard legitimacy scale, measures whether respondents view government and the constitution as legitimate. The strongest (negative) correlation found is for Zimbabwe. The marginalised accord more legitimacy to government and the constitution than the precarious and the integrated. Only 5% of the integrated rank high on the legitimacy scale in Zimbabwe, compared to 10% of the
precarious, and 17% of the marginalised. This negative correlation repeats itself (on issues of legitimacy) for all the items. The more integrated, the lower the score becomes on the legitimacy scale. For instance, in South Africa, 52% of the marginalised rank high on the legitimacy scale, compared to 40% of the integrated. Furthermore, the integrated tend (somewhat more so than the marginalised and precarious) to view government and state institutions as not interested in them, and not trustworthy. However, on the other items the correlations were extremely low, and there are, therefore, no significant differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated when it comes to trust in, and interest by state/government institutions.

The second legitimacy item which scored meaningful correlations with the MPI Index (in Zimbabwe and Namibia) deals with propensity to disobey state “extraction” laws (such as payment of taxes, levies, and electricity and water fees) and willingness to “cheat” (claiming of state benefits without being qualified for them). For both states, the national sample correlations were low, but were used because the Namibian rural and Zimbabwean urban sample would have made the N too small. Nevertheless, the data does show that the marginalised are more inclined to disobey and cheat than the precarious and integrated. In Namibia 63% of the marginalised indicate that they have never disobeyed or cheated, compared to 83% of the integrated, and 74% of the precarious. This pattern repeats itself for the region, albeit with much smaller percentage differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated.

The analysis of the relationship between regime type items and the MPI Index indicates that the marginalised are more inclined to reject democracy as a political regime type and are also more inclined to approve of authoritarian alternatives. There is, therefore, some support for the subsidiary claim which states that the being marginalised correlates with being dissatisfied with the political system. The correlations between the MPI Index and
items which attempted to measure attitudes on legitimacy were low. Overall, the marginalised, precarious and integrated showed little variance in their outlooks on legitimacy. If anything, the analysis indicates that the integrated are more inclined to be distrustful of state institutions. Consequently, there is no support for the subsidiary claim that being marginalised correlates with lower state legitimacy.
Endnotes

1 See for instance Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen (2001) on South Africa's role as a developing "middle power" state to further the cause of a more just and equitable world economic order in multilateral institutions.

2 It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that the construction of the MPI Index and the investigation of the empirical claims emanating from CCT use the data set from the Southern African Barometer survey (1999-2000). The survey incorporates seven southern African states, viz. Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Target sample sizes were 1200 for all the states, except for South Africa (2200). The first national survey took place during September-October 1999 in Namibia, followed by Zimbabwe (October-November 1999), Botswana and Zambia (November 1999), Malawi (December 1999), Lesotho (March-April 2000) and South Africa (July-August 2000). See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the sample design protocol.

3 There seems to be no general "rule of thumb" as to what should be reported as a meaningful correlation and what should be left out. Most publications on research methodology and social data analysis avoid making clear cut recommendations on this issue. One reputable and well-known South African social survey analyst, Hennie Kotzé, in discussion with the writer, commented that some researchers will even report a .150 correlation because it indicates that "something is going on." With Pearson's correlation coefficient ranging between −1 and +1 (where 1, either negative or positive, is the perfect correlation) .150 is a rather weak sign that there is indeed, "something going on." The correlations between the MPI Index and various selected items were, generally, rather low. None were as high as the .484 (occupation and employment) and the .386 (occupation and education) shown in table 6.1. As a rule of thumb in this study, all correlations with could be rounded off to .200 and those above were regarded as meaningful enough to warrant cross-tabulation.

4 Usually, factor analysis is undertaken to reduce the number of variables in order to arrive at a set which load on one or more underlying factors. This captures the essential dynamics of a concept, for instance political liberalism, which a range of items are trying to measure (George and Mallery, 2000:283 and Kim and Mueller, 1978:9).

5 The "N" values differ, because the "don't know" responses have been treated as missing cases. As indicated in the discussion of the recoding of the items in accordance with Cox's MPI categorisation, some of the allocations of responses could, arguably, have been done differently. I have motivated my selections based on my reading of Cox's conceptualisation of the attributes of the three "economic position" groups. However, "don't know" responses are notoriously problematical and there is no conceptual basis or criteria available for allocating them to either the marginalised, precarious or integrated. Fortunately, the number of "don't know" responses is low (under 15%). It was, therefore, not necessary to replace missing cases with the mean of distribution.

6 Kim and Mueller (1978:9) differentiate between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" factor analysis. The former (more common usage) is aimed at "...exploring the data for possible data reduction" while the latter usage sets out to confirm whether there is, in fact, a common underlying dimension (or dimensions) which explains the covariation of a number of selected items. The confirmation of the existence of a such a hypothesised factor (or factors) strengthens the case for the "belonging together" of the items, and subsequently also strengthens the case for the construction of a scale or index which incorporates them.

7 The level of measurement or scale which is used to measure the attitudes of respondents in this study technically lies at the ordinal level. This means that we cannot conclude that a respondent who scores high (3) on a political discussion scale of three (1 = "never discusses politics", 2 = "occasionally discusses politics" and 3 = "frequently discusses politics") discusses politics three times as much as someone who scores low (1). The difference in degrees of discussion can be explained in terms of "more, less and no" discussion, but not in terms of the "exact distance between each of the observations". The measurement of
income, however, allows us to specify exactly how much one respondent earns more than another. This level of variable measurement, which is rare in the social sciences, is called the interval level (Fielding and Gilbert, 2000:14-15 and Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996:158-163).

Generally, books on statistical analysis recommend that gamma (γ) should be used to determine the association between ordinal variables and Pearson's $r$ for determining the association between interval variables (Dometrius, 1992:308-309; Fielding and Gilbert, 2000:215 and Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996:421). However, Baker (1988:129) points out that ordinal scales are effectively "...often treated as continuous variables such that the average score of all respondents to [an] item might be given as 2.3...In this way a variable with an ordinal scale of measurement is actually treated like an interval scale." Furthermore, she notes that Borgatta and Bohmstedt (1980, cited by Baker, 1988) make out a strong case for treating ordinal variables as "imperfect" or "weak" interval variables because they "are generally described with statistical measures that assume continuous numerical scales."

Knoke and Bohmstedt (1994:21-22) confirm that this point of departure is, in fact, widely accepted and used in statistical social analysis. Therefore, although an attitude scale which offers several response items is technically an ordinal variable, one can assume that these items "effectively represent points along an intended continuum." The reason underlying this assumption is "that 'strength of attitude' is fundamentally a continuous property that our measuring devices only crudely tap." Consequently, the use of Pearson's $r$ to determine the association between the variables of the SAB survey, is acceptable. Furthermore, Pearson's $r$ has also been utilised as a measure of relationships in other analyses of the data set (cf. Mattes and Bratton, 2001).

8 For Botswana this was a return to colonialism under the British; for Zimbabwe, a return to the white minority government of Ian Smith; for Zambia, a return to the one-party regime of Kenneth Kaunda; for Malawi, a return to the one-party regime of the Malawi Congress Party under Hastings Banda; for Lesotho, a return to rule by the military; for Namibia, a return to South African administration; and for South Africa, a return to apartheid (Mattes et al, 2000:15).

9 The Pearson's correlations in this table and all subsequent tables are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). The correlations for the states not reported on in table 6.9 are: Southern Africa (.106), Botswana (.065), Lesotho (.068) and South Africa (.080).

10 The correlation of .182 for Namibia, based on the total national sample, can be attributed to rural respondents (.170) compared to .124 for urban respondents. Zimbabwe's correlation of .172 for the total sample is related to a meaningful correlation among urban respondents (.231). In order to increase the total N, so as to ensure a good distribution of respondents between the MPI categories, as much as possible, the total national sample (all) was used for the cross-tabulations.

11 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 6.10 are: Southern Africa (.966), Botswana (.999), Lesotho (.962), Malawi (.83) and South Africa (.957).

12 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 6.11 are: Lesotho (.104), Namibia (.140) and South Africa (.115).

13 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 6.12 are: Southern Africa (.087), Botswana (-.026), Lesotho (.080), Malawi (.117), South Africa (-.009) and Zambia (.061).

14 The Zimbabwean survey was completed towards the end of 1999, before the parliamentary elections of 2001, and before the occupation of white farms by Zimbabwean war veterans started gathering momentum. On the legitimacy scale (1-5), Zimbabwe's mean of 2.51 falls below the midpoint of three. This figure indicates that the Zimbabwean government is perceived as not being legitimate. The other scores are: Namibia (3.72), Botswana (3.61), Lesotho (3.53), South Africa (3.51), Zambia (3.35), and Malawi (3.25). Overall, the legitimacy scores for the seven southern African states tend to level out towards the mid-point, indicating an average accordance of legitimacy to southern African governments (Mattes et al, 2000:32).
The correlations for the states not reported on in table 6.13 are: Botswana (-.138), Lesotho (-.028), Malawi (-.053), Namibia (-.063) and Zambia (.014).

The correlations for the states not reported on in table 6.14 are: Botswana (-.026), Lesotho (-.036), Malawi (-.024), South Africa (.009) and Zambia (.028).
Chapter 7

7.1 The MPI Index and Political Discussion/Interest

The first section of this chapter focuses on the meaningful correlations between the MPI Index and how regularly people discuss politics, as well as their interest in political issues. These categories (and the associated items) are brought to bear on the subsidiary claim which states that being marginalised correlates with increased political apathy. Question 44 in the survey questionnaire attempts to measure the frequency of political discussion among the respondents. It reads: “When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never.” The recode of the political discussion item does not include the “don’t know” responses. The item on political interest (question 45) reads: “Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs always/most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, hardly at all.” As with the political discussion item, the “don’t know” responses are not included. Table 7.1, below, shows the results for the MPI Index and political discussion.

Throughout, the tendency is for those who are economically marginalised to discuss politics less than those who are more integrated. In southern Africa, 47% of the marginalised never discuss politics, compared to 37% of the precarious and 24% of the integrated. Among the integrated, the smallest proportion who never discuss politics are found in Malawi (12%). Zimbabwe is next, with 18% of the integrated who never talk about politics. Zimbabwe also has the highest percentage among the integrated who discuss politics frequently (49%), compared to 22% for southern Africa, and 13% for South Africa.
Table 7.1 The MPI Index and Political Discussion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Discussion</th>
<th>MPI Index</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Africa (A) C=-.150</td>
<td>Botswana* (A) C=.225</td>
<td>Malawi (A) C=.163</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>8475 (91%)</td>
<td>881 (73%)</td>
<td>1198 (99%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa** (A) C=.151</td>
<td>Zambia*** (A) C=.178</td>
<td>Zimbabwe**** (A) C=.159</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2160 (98%)</td>
<td>1037 (86%)</td>
<td>986 (82%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.268), **Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.215), ***Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.223), ****Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.215).

Among those who discuss politics frequently, the increase in the percentages, as we move along the spectrum from the marginalised to the integrated, are not very large (a 6% to 7% increase between the three categories). However, there is a significant increase in Zimbabwe between the marginalised (25%), precarious (26%) and the integrated (49%). Botswana has the highest percentage of marginalised who never discuss politics (56%), followed by Zambia (50%), and South Africa (44%). Nevertheless, a sizeable proportion
in all the states shown in the table, indicated that they discussed politics occasionally (ranging between a low 35% for the marginalised in Botswana and a high of 48% in South Africa). The highest proportion among the precarious who indicated that they discuss politics occasionally are found in South Africa (55%), as opposed to a low of 38% in Zambia. Majorities for the integrated who discuss politics occasionally are found in all the states (Zambia, 51%; Botswana, 54%; Malawi, 60%; South Africa, 61%) and for the region (55%). The exception is Zimbabwe, with 42%.

Table 7.2 The MPI Index and Political Interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Interest</th>
<th>MPI Index</th>
<th>Southern Africa* (A)</th>
<th>Botswana (A)</th>
<th>Malawi (A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M P I</td>
<td>C=-.182</td>
<td>C=.272</td>
<td>C=.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly</td>
<td>29 23 10</td>
<td>47 33 14</td>
<td>23 13 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrequently</td>
<td>55 57 57</td>
<td>57 43 48 64</td>
<td>61 67 56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>17 20 33</td>
<td>10 19 23</td>
<td>16 20 39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>8348 (89%)</td>
<td>876 (73%)</td>
<td>1191 (99%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M P I</th>
<th>South Africa (A)</th>
<th>Zambia (A)</th>
<th>Zimbabwe** (A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M P I</td>
<td>C=.172</td>
<td>C=.259</td>
<td>C=.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly</td>
<td>26 22 14</td>
<td>30 24 12</td>
<td>38 26 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrequently</td>
<td>64 66 65</td>
<td>53 50 37</td>
<td>45 50 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>10 13 20</td>
<td>18 26 51</td>
<td>17 24 46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2139 (97%)</td>
<td>1031 (86%)</td>
<td>959 (80%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.201). **Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.318)
Table 7.2 illustrates that, generally, when it comes to showing an ongoing interest in politics the pattern identified for the political discussion cross-tabulations repeats itself. In the table, the responses “some of the time” and “only now and then” were collapsed into an “infrequently” category. For southern Africa, the proportion of respondents who indicate that they are infrequently interested in politics (government and public affairs) does not vary significantly between the marginalised (55%), precarious (57%) and integrated (57%). The pattern is illustrated, however, when one looks at the “hardly” and “always” responses. Only 10% of the integrated indicate that they hardly ever follow what’s going on in politics, this increases to 23% for the precarious and 29% for the marginalised. Among those who always maintain an interest, 17% are marginalised, 20% precarious, and 33% integrated. The individual states where significant correlations between the MPI Index and the political interest item occurred, show some interesting variations on the pattern.

Botswana has the largest percentage of marginalised (47%) who hardly ever take an interest in politics (followed by Zimbabwe, 38%; Zambia, 30%; South Africa, 26% and Malawi, 23%). It also, together with South Africa, has the largest percentage of integrated (14%) who fall into this category. But, out of the five states, Botswana has substantially more integrated (compared to the marginalised and precarious) who are infrequently interested in politics (64%). The largest proportion of all respondents (marginalised, precarious and integrated) find themselves in the “infrequently” category. In Malawi, the percentage marginalised (61%) is higher than the percentage integrated (56%), with the precarious making out 67%. In South Africa there is no significant percentage variation among the marginalised (64%), precarious (66%) and integrated (65%). The variation in Zimbabwe is also small, 45% marginalised, 50% precarious and 45% integrated. In Botswana, as noted above, 64% of the integrated show an infrequent interest in politics, compared to 43% of the marginalised. Botswana and South Africa
have the lowest proportion among the integrated who are always interested in politics, 23% and 20% respectively. Among the integrated in Malawi, 39% are always interested, in Zambia the proportion is 51%, and in Zimbabwe, 46%. Throughout, the proportion of respondents who are always interested in politics increases as we move from the marginalised to the integrated.

The proportions of those who hardly ever follow politics are higher among the marginalised and lower among the integrated. In Botswana, compared to 47% of the marginalised who fall in the "hardly" category, only 14% of the integrated do. For Malawi the figure is 23% and 5% respectively, and for Zimbabwe 38% and 9%. When we look at those who follow public affairs "always/most of the time" the pattern is also clearly illustrated. In Malawi, only 16% of the marginalised are located here, 20% of the precarious and 39% of the integrated. For Zambia the comparative figures are 18%, 26% and 51%, and for Zimbabwe, 17%, 24% and 46%. Nevertheless, if we just look at the most apathetic category ("hardly") the proportion of marginalised (with the exception of Botswana at 47%, followed by Zimbabwe at 38%) is below one third of the total number of marginalised respondents for each state (Malawi, 23%; South Africa, 26%; and Zambia, 30%). The same applies to the precarious, again with the notable exception of Botswana, where 33% of the precarious resort in this category.

7.2 The MPI Index, Political Participation and Civil Society Participation

This section presents the results of the meaningful correlations (and subsequent cross-tabulations) between the MPI Index and political and civil society participation. These categories and their associated questionnaire items are related to the subsidiary claims which state that being marginalised correlates with increased political apathy (less participation); that being marginalised correlates with being more inclined to political protest; that being marginalised correlates with increased civil society participation and that being marginalised correlates with belonging to self-help associations.
In addition to the standard political participation item (question 91), the MPI Index was also correlated with an item on political protest (question 93). One of the questions, which is part of the civil society index (question 18) was correlated separately with the MPI Index. The question (18b) asks respondents about the frequency with which they attend the meetings of local self-help associations. The first table in this section (table 7.3) deals with political participation and the MPI Index.

The political participation index consists of the following question and sub-questions (91a-d):

“Here is a list of things that people sometimes do as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not?”

91a “Participate with others to address an important problem affecting the community or nation (other than an election).”
91b “Attend an election rally.”
91c “Work for a political candidate or party.”
91d “Write a letter to a newspaper.”

“Yes” responses were sub-categorised under “Once or twice”, “A few times”, or “Often.” “No responses” under “No, would never do this”, and “No, but would do it if I had the chance”. Only two states showed meaningful correlations between the MPI Index and the political participation item, South Africa and Zambia.

The strongest correlation for South Africa, was among rural respondents (the correlation for urban respondents was only .100). As can be seen from the results in table 7.3, the percentage proportions between the marginalised, precarious and integrated who would engage in the listed activities if they had the chance (but have not done so yet) do not differ significantly. Half of the marginalised and precarious would participate, if they had the chance. Among the integrated, only 43% would do so. The integrated in South Africa are, however, more politically active when it comes to having actually participated. Only
10% have never participated, compared to 35% of the marginalised and 34% of the precarious. Moreover, if we add “once or twice” and “a few times”, 47% (nearly half) of the integrated have participated, compared to only 15% of the marginalised and 17% of the precarious. This pattern is repeated among Zambians, albeit on a reduced scale (20% of the marginalised fall into the “yes” category, compared to 26% of the precarious and 32% of the integrated). Again, the proportions who would participate if given the chance do not vary much among the marginalised, precarious and integrated and they also make up a large proportion of the total responses. In fact, for both South Africa and Zambia, if we add the two variations on the “no” response, the majority have not participated in any of these activities. In South Africa, 53% of the integrated have not participated, compared to 85% of the marginalised and 83% of the precarious.

Political protest is the most active/extreme form of political participation. Question 93 (a-d) operationalises this concept in the following form, “Here are a number of different actions people might take if government were to do something they thought was wrong or harmful. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or
The "yes" and "no" responses were categorised in the same manner as for the item on political participation. Again, only two states showed meaningful correlations, Botswana and Zambia.

93a “Attend a demonstration or protest march.”
93b “Participate in a boycott of rates, services or taxes.”
93c “Take part in a sit-in, disruption of government meeting or offices.”
93d “Use force or violent methods (such as damaging public property).”

As with the political participation item, but even more so, the vast majority of respondents (marginalised, precarious and integrated) fall into the "no" category, but approximately one-third in both states would undertake some form of protest action if given the chance. The integrated are more inclined to do so. In Botswana, 54% fall into the "no, but would" category, as opposed to 31% of the marginalised and 36% of the precarious. Also in Botswana, 6% of the integrated fall into the "yes" category and in Zambia, 11%. The comparative numbers for the marginalised are 2% in both these states. Few people have engaged in protest activities, but the integrated (followed by the precarious) are more inclined to do so or to have done so.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Protest</th>
<th>Botswana (A)</th>
<th>Zambia (A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C=.156*</td>
<td>C=.154**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, never</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, but would</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, once or twice</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, a few times</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>865 (72%)</td>
<td>997 (83%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.203), **Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.173).
The next item (question 18a-f) deals with participation in civil society. If the integrated tend to participate more politically, does the same hold for their role in civil society? The question was put as follows to respondents: “Over the past year, how often have you attended meetings of a ______?” The responses to the sub-questions below were categorised under “Never”, “Just once or twice”, “A few times”, and “Often.”

18a  “Church group (other than religious services).”
18b  “Local self-help association.”
18c  “Group concerned with local matters such as schools, housing or rates.”
18d  “Local commercial organisation such as a business group or farmers association.”
18e  “Group that does things for the community.”
18f  “A trade union.”

### Table 7.5 The MPI Index and Civil Society Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Society Participation</th>
<th>Botswana (A)</th>
<th>Lesotho (R)</th>
<th>South Africa (R)</th>
<th>Zambia (A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just once or twice</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few times</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>855 (71%)</td>
<td>898 (95%)</td>
<td>761 (97%)</td>
<td>1001 (83%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.185), **Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.250, rural respondents, .223).

The overall trend for the four states (two of which have meaningful correlations among rural respondents, Lesotho and South Africa) is for the integrated to be more active in civil society than the marginalised and the precarious. Substantial proportions of the marginalised (rural marginalised in Lesotho and South Africa) have never participated in
community organisations, church activities, or a trade union. In Botswana, 76% have not done so, 74% of rural respondents in Lesotho, 66% of rural respondents in South Africa and 61% in Zambia. Not one of the three economic categories in the four states do so “often.” But, when we add the two variations of the “yes” response (“once or twice” and “a few times”), participation in civil society activities increases as we move from the marginalised to the integrated. In Botswana, 23% of the marginalised have participated, compared to 31% of the precarious, and 47% of the integrated. Among rural Sotho’s, 80% of the integrated have, 40% of the precarious, and 26% of the marginalised. This trend continues, with 84% of rural, integrated South Africans having participated, 36% of the precarious, and 34% of the marginalised (the highest after Zambia, at 38%).

A separate correlation was run between the MPI Index and the frequency of attending local self-help associations. The results appear in table 7.6, below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attendance of Self-Help Association</th>
<th>Malawi (A)</th>
<th>South Africa (A)</th>
<th>South Africa (R)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just once or twice</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few times</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1204 (100%)</td>
<td>2170 (99%)</td>
<td>783 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.205).

Meaningful correlations were found for Malawi and rural South Africans. Here, the number of marginalised who have participated in this particular civil society activity increases considerably. In Malawi, 26% of the marginalised indicated that they often attend a meeting of a local self-help association, compared to 11% of the precarious and
only 9% of the integrated. If we add the “once or twice” and “few times” categories to “often”, 48% of the marginalised are involved (at various degrees of regularity) in self-help associations. Comparatively, 81% of the integrated have never participated in the meetings of self-help associations. This trend, however, is reversed, when we look at the South African results. Among rural South Africans, only 22% of the integrated have never participated and 29% participate often (compared to 68% and 7% of the marginalised, respectively). Among the same group, 50% of the integrated (“once or twice” plus “a few times”) have participated infrequently, compared to 25% of the marginalised. This trend repeats itself if we look at the total South African sample, albeit with much smaller variations.

7.3 The MPI Index and Economy

This section reports on how the marginalised, precarious and integrated compare in terms of their attitude to, and understanding of some key variables related to the economy. They focus on the subsidiary claims which state that being marginalised correlates with being dissatisfied with the political economic system and that being marginalised correlates with negative perceptions of “international organisations” (IMF). These items consist of questions aimed at accessing the economic values of respondents, their perception of the role of the state and the market, their views on four key aspects of economic reform which form part of liberal adjustment policies, their sense of individual relative deprivation, personal level of satisfaction related to the economic conditions in their country, and their perception of overall government performance in the management of the economy.

Once again, the correlation between the MPI Index and the items related to the economy did not result in meaningful correlations for all the southern African states. The results below, therefore, are for a number of selected states where attitudinal differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated where apparent. The first two items deal with the economic values of southern Africans.
Essentially, the questions attempted to determine who the respondents thought was responsible for their economic well-being. The responses (encapsulated in two indices) could range from a more individualist (entrepreneurial) perspective, to a more (state) interventionist one. The first item on economic values (correlated and cross-tabulated with the MPI Index in table 7.7) includes three questions (19, 20 and 21 in the questionnaire) aimed at determining attitudes to self-reliance, income inequality and job creation. Before we turn to the table below, it is interesting to take note of some of the general findings as reported by Bratton and Mattes (2001). When it comes to self-reliance, a slight (cross-national) regional majority of 51% indicated that they preferred to take responsibility for their own well-being, as opposed to government taking responsibility for this. But there were also large proportions of respondents in each state who opted for state interventionism. For instance, Botswana (43%), Lesotho (53%), Namibia (40%), Zambia (43%), Zimbabwe (59%) and South Africa (47%). Malawi was the exception with 73% preferring individual responsibility (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:11-12).

The results on income inequality (should the state intervene to prevent this?) tilted more significantly towards a preference for non-interventionism. Significant majorities in five states (Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and South Africa) indicated that the state should not intervene to prevent income inequality and that people should be able to “earn as much as they can.” Botswana (41% for interventionist policies) and Zimbabwe (51% for interventionist policies) were the exceptions. On job creation significant majorities in Botswana (57%), Malawi (68%), and Namibia (63%) indicated that people themselves should take responsibility (by starting businesses). In Zambia there was an even split (47% for self-reliance, 48% for government help). Lesotho, Zimbabwe and South Africa leaned more towards state interventionism to create jobs (57%, 55%, and 57% respectively). When this item was correlated with the MPI Index, only South Africa and Zimbabwe emerged with meaningful correlations. The table below reports on the number of marginalised, precarious and integrated who agree with none, one, two or three of the (non-interventionist) statements in the questionnaire on self-reliance, income inequality and job creation.
Respondents were asked to consider and compare two statements and then to tell the interviewer whether they agreed most with statement A or statement B. The possible responses to the chosen statement; "agree somewhat" and "strongly agree" were grouped together as "agree" in the table. Other options were "do not know" and "do not agree with either."

Q19 Statement A: "People should be responsible for their own success and well-being."
Statement B: "Government should bear the main responsibility for ensuring the success and well-being of people."

Q20 Statement A: "People should be free to earn as much as they can, even if this leads to large differences in income."
Statement B: "Government should place limits on how much rich people can earn, even if this discourages some people from working hard."

Q21 Statement A: "The best way to create jobs is to encourage people to start their own large or small businesses."
Statement B: "The government should help to provide employment for everyone who wants to work."

The results above show the percentage respondents (among the marginalised, precarious and integrated) who agreed with the non-interventionist statement (A) in questions 19, 20 and 21. In both states, the tendency is for more of the integrated to agree with all three non-interventionist statements, while the percentage of the precarious and marginalised who opt for one, two or none is higher. Nevertheless, there is a substantial proportion among the marginalised and precarious (approximately one-third) in South Africa who agree with two. In South Africa, 21% of the marginalised agree with none of the three self-reliant statements, compared to only 8% of the integrated and 15% of the precarious.
Yet, a total of 49% of the marginalised agree with either two or three (27% + 22%), compared to 59% of the precarious, and 74% of the integrated. The pattern is repeated in Zimbabwe, although it is not as pronounced. Among the Zimbabwean marginalised, only 27% agree with two or three. The equivalent for the precarious and integrated is 48% and 67%, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Values Statements (Self-Reliance)</th>
<th>South Africa (A) C=.176*</th>
<th>Zimbabwe (A) C=.263**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree with none</td>
<td>M 21 P 15 I 8</td>
<td>M 30 P 24 I 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with one</td>
<td>M 30 P 27 I 18</td>
<td>M 33 P 28 I 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with two</td>
<td>M 27 P 33 I 38</td>
<td>M 25 P 24 I 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with three</td>
<td>M 22 P 26 I 36</td>
<td>M 12 P 24 I 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2053 (93%)</td>
<td>915 (76%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.168), ** Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.272).

The next economic scale item asked respondents whether the state, market or a mixture of both should take responsibility for the provision of a number of services. When correlated with the MPI Index, meaningful correlations emerged in five states and for the region as a whole. Again, we need to take note of the overall results because they are much more interventionist orientated than the previous item on economic values. Question 23 in the survey instrument addresses this issue: “Here is a list of things that are important for the development of our country. In your opinion, who should take the main responsibility for these things? Is it government, private business, individuals, or some combination of these?” Optional responses were; “government”, “private business”, “individuals”, “government and business”, “government and individuals”, “business and individuals”, and “all three.” For the purposes of table 7.8 below, the options
"individuals" and "business and individuals were categorised under "private sector." "All three" was categorised under "mixed", together with the options which include government in combination with business or individuals. The following services were listed:

23a  "Providing schools and clinics."
23b  "Creating jobs."
23c  "Building houses."
23d  "Reducing crime."
23e  "Buying and selling [the main national commodity] (e.g. copper in Zambia)."
23f  "Helping farmers borrow money to improve production of livestock and crops."

In terms of the general results, Bratton and Mattes (2001:14) note that "People overwhelmingly preferred government to take charge." The "helping farmers" service topped the list with 84% of respondents in Lesotho choosing "government", followed by 76% in Botswana and Zambia, 70% in Malawi, 62% in Zimbabwe, 53% in South Africa, and 51% in Namibia. The regional average of respondents who want government to provide this service is 67%. The provision of schools and clinics (regional average, 63%) was also regarded by significant majorities in most states as a government function (for instance, 76% of South Africans), with smaller majorities in Zambia (57%), Zimbabwe (53%), and Malawi (50%).

Job creation was more evenly divided (48% in Botswana, 52% in Malawi, 48% in Zimbabwe, and 47% in South Africa), with the exception of Lesotho were 74% of the respondents thought that this was the responsibility of government. Additionally, across the seven states the average for those who view job creation as a "mixed" responsibility
is 40%. Finally, an average of 53% of regional respondents prefer government to be responsible for selling the main national commodity. The highest national number of respondents for this item is 77% in Botswana and 75% in Zambia (Malawi has the lowest number at 38%) (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:14).

Table 7.8, below, shows that there are no significant differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated (regionally and in the individual states) regarding the role of the private sector in the provision of certain services. The choice is overwhelmingly in favour of either a mixed or state-led responsibility. Furthermore, the marginalised are more in favour of government taking responsibility, while the integrated prefer the “mixed” option. In Lesotho 60% of the marginalised chose “government” (compared to 20% of the integrated). Comparative numbers for the other states are; Namibia (55% and 24%, respectively), Zambia (63% and 45%, respectively), and Zimbabwe (53% and 24%, respectively). South Africa, (at 47%) has the highest proportion among the integrated who prefer government to take responsibility. Among the integrated in southern Africa, the equivalent proportion is 37%.

The lowest percentage, among the integrated who prefer the mixed approach, is also found in South Africa (52%), followed by Zambia (55%). In the other states the percentage integrated who chose a mixed variation is much higher (Lesotho, 80%; Namibia, 76%; Zimbabwe, 74%; and 63% for the region). In Zimbabwe (67%) and Namibia (60%) the precarious tend to prefer mixed responsibility, while in South Africa (59%) and Zambia (59%) this group is more inclined to opt for government responsibility. Regionally and in Lesotho, there is a more or less even division. Finally, among the marginalised, large minorities (in each state) fall into the “mixed” category.

In the following economic item index, respondents were asked to evaluate eight statements which are usually associated with liberal macroeconomic policies and the structural adjustment programmes of the IMF. They are; the scrapping of government price control measures (for example, on staple foods), the curtailment of free social
Table 7.8 The MPI Index and Responsibility for Provision of Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who is Responsible?</th>
<th>Southern Africa</th>
<th>Lesotho</th>
<th>Namibia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPI Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C=-.147*</td>
<td>C=.142**</td>
<td>C=.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>7676 (82%)</td>
<td>895 (76%)</td>
<td>956 (81%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.154), **Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.196), ***Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.150), ****Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.160).

services (health and education), the reduction of civil service employees (in an attempt to reduce government deficits), and the privatisation of state and semi-state corporations (cf. Cheru and Gill, 1997; Mengisteab and Logan, 1995; Onimode, 1988; and Skålnes, 1995). As with the first item on economic values, respondents were asked to evaluate two opposing statements (per policy item), and to indicate with which one they agreed. Optional responses, again, were “agree somewhat”, “strongly agree”, “do not
know”, and “do not agree with either.” Both responses were, as before, combined to produce a range of agreement with none, two, three or all four of the more liberal orientated reform/adjustment statements. The statements are:

Q24 Statement A: “It is better to have a wide variety of goods and many goods in the market, even if prices are high.”
Statement B: “It is better to have low prices, even if there are shortages of goods.”

Q25 Statement A: “It is better to be able to visit clinics and get medicine for free, even if it means we cannot raise health care standards.”
Statement B: It is better to raise health care standards, even if we have to pay medical fees.”

Q26 Statement A: “The number of people who work for government should not be reduced, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country.”
Statement B: The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay off/retrench some of them.”

Q27 Statement A: “The government should retain ownership of its factories, businesses and farms.”
Statement B: “It is better for the government to sell its businesses to private companies and individuals.”

The general results are interesting, in the sense that they indicate some support for two of the items on economic reform and opposition to the other two. On the cost of health services, there was a substantial measure of support for better standards, coupled to the payment of fees. This can be viewed as standing somewhat in contradiction to the item on who is responsible for the provision of schools and clinics. Here, it will be recalled, 63% of the cross-national average regarded government as being responsible. The highest level of support for the economic reform statement (payment for health care standards) was found in Lesotho (66%), followed by South Africa (59%), Zimbabwe (58%) and Botswana (56%). In Malawi (48%), Namibia (49%) and Zambia (51%) the support was lower.
The second market orientated reform item which found some measure of support is the one which sketches the scenario of higher prices, coupled to a wider variety of products. Here, however, there are no clear and outright majorities in the seven states, except for Zambia (59%). In Lesotho (45%), Malawi (52%), and Zimbabwe (43%) a substantial proportion of respondents profess their preference for lower prices and fewer goods. The results in South Africa are also mixed, 49% support uncontrolled pricing, while 43% indicate their support for the alternative. On the remaining two adjustment related economic policy items the results indicate substantive support for the non-liberal policy options. On the reduction of civil servants, except for Zimbabwe (51% support the reduction of government employees), the other states return strong majorities who oppose this measure (Botswana, 69%; Lesotho, 69%; Malawi, 73%; Namibia, 65%; and Zambia, 58%). In South Africa (49%), the opposition to civil service cutbacks is smaller, but still substantial (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:17-18).

Finally, there is the item on privatisation of government businesses, factories and farms. Regionally, there is only 37% support for privatisation policies. The strongest opposition is expressed in Zambia (66%), followed by Lesotho (61%), Namibia (57%) and Malawi (56%). The opposition to privatisation in South Africa and Zimbabwe is smaller, 49% and 48% respectively. The only state with a strong base of support for privatisation is Botswana (49% for, and 36% against).

The data in table 7.9 indicate that the integrated are more likely to agree with three or all four of the more liberal orientated economic policy statements. Conversely, the marginalised and precarious tend to agree with fewer of these statements, although there are significant proportions among them who agree with two or even three of the statements. The highest proportion, among the integrated, who agree with all four statements is found in Zimbabwe (44%), followed by Zambia with 28%, and South Africa with 20%. The lowest proportion is in Namibia (11%). At the other end of the spectrum, the proportion of marginalised who do not agree with any of the four statements averages out at around 11% for the region and the four states. The highest proportion is in Zimbabwe (13%) and the lowest in Namibia (7%).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for Liberal Economic Reform Policy Statements</th>
<th>Southern Africa (A)</th>
<th>Namibia (A)</th>
<th>South Africa (A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C=.231*</td>
<td>C=.320**</td>
<td>C=.182***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with none</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with one</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with two</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with three</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with four</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6535 (70%)</td>
<td>732 (62%)</td>
<td>1779 (81%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia (A)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe (A)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C=.207</td>
<td>C=.289****</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with none</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with one</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with two</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with three</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with four</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>856 (71%)</td>
<td>773 (64%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.151), **Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.323), ***Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.167), ****Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.321). There are large proportions of “don’t know” responses for this item, resulting in a lower N across the board.
Staying with the marginalised, at the top end of the agreement scale (agree with three or four), we find that 24% in southern Africa fall into this zone, 14% in Namibia (the lowest), 29% in South Africa, 31% in Zambia, and 32% in Zimbabwe. Among the integrated, approximately 50%, fall into this category (with the exception of Namibia and Zimbabwe where the figure is slightly lower at 43% and 44%, respectively). If we move to the middle-end of the scale (those who agree with two or three statements) and compare it to the bottom-end (agree with none or one statement), we find that the proportion who find themselves in the middle is larger than those at the bottom for the marginalised, precarious and integrated in the region and three states (with the exception of Namibia). For instance, in the region the marginalised in the middle range of agreement number 51%, compared to 44% in the bottom range. Comparative figures are 54% and 39% for South Africa, 51% and 41% for Zambia, and 52% and 37% for Zimbabwe. In Namibia the middle range proportion among the marginalised is 40%, and the bottom range make up 58%.

The final two items which resulted in some meaningful correlations deal with individual relative deprivation and perceptions of the manner in which the government manages the economy. The question on personal economic satisfaction (question 1 in the survey instrument) produced weak correlations with the MPI Index. The question reads as follows: “At the moment are you dissatisfied, neither dissatisfied nor satisfied, or satisfied with economic conditions in [insert country]?” Generally, substantial majorities in all the states (except Namibia, at 30%) indicated that they were “very dissatisfied/dissatisfied” with economic conditions (for instance, 94% in Zimbabwe and 68% in South Africa) (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:6). The question on individual relative deprivation attempts to measure how people views their economic position in relation to fellow citizens. Question 4 in the questionnaire reads: “Now let us speak about your personal economic conditions. Would you say that they are worse, the same, or better than other [citizens of the country]?” Possible responses to this question were, “much worse”, “worse”, “about the same”, “better” or “much better.” Meaningful correlations between this item and the MPI Index were obtained for three states.
Again, overall, people were inclined to see themselves as being economically “much worse/worse” off than others in their countries. This was the case for the majority in five states; Botswana (53%), Lesotho (66%), Malawi (53%), Zambia (57%) and Zimbabwe (65%). In South Africa, 49% felt this way. Namibia was the exception with only 37% feeling that they were worse off, compared to 21% who thought they were “about the same as others”, and 29% who thought they were in “better/much better” economic position than others (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:8).

In table 7.10, below, it is clear that in Botswana, Malawi and Namibia, the marginalised, followed by the precarious tend to see themselves as worse off (compared to other citizens) than the integrated. In Botswana, 59% of the marginalised regard themselves as much worse/worse off, 57% of the precarious, and only 28% of the integrated. The Malawian figures are comparable, except that the proportion of the precarious who think so drops to 45%. In Namibia, only 13% of the integrated think they are much worse/worse off (compared to 46% of the marginalised and 33% of the precarious). Between the three states, Namibia also has the highest number of integrated (61%) who feel that they are in “better/much better” position compared to other Namibians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Relative Deprivation</th>
<th>Botswana (A) C=.161*</th>
<th>Malawi (A) C=.160**</th>
<th>Namibia (A) C=.232</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much worse</td>
<td>22 23 5</td>
<td>20 17 6</td>
<td>13 9 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>37 34 23</td>
<td>37 28 22</td>
<td>33 24 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the same</td>
<td>23 25 33</td>
<td>17 19 25</td>
<td>22 21 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>15 14 34</td>
<td>23 29 42</td>
<td>28 39 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much better</td>
<td>4 3 6</td>
<td>4 6 5</td>
<td>4 7 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>887 (74%)</td>
<td>1201 (99%)</td>
<td>1047 (89%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Strongest correlation for rural respondents (.174). **Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.307).
The last item which was correlated with the MPI Index is concerned with how respondents view their government's management of the economy. Notwithstanding weak correlations, the results for both Namibia and Zimbabwe are presented in table 7.11 below. The relevant index incorporates four issues (out of nine in the questionnaire) about which respondents were asked to evaluate their government's performance. Optional responses were "not at all well", "not very well", "fairly well", and "very well."

The items included in the index are:

- 63a "Creating jobs."
- 63b "Building houses."
- 63c "Ensuring that prices remain stable."
- 63g "Managing the economy."

In both states, the integrated tend to be more critical of government's management of the economy related to the selected issues. The differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated are relatively small. In Namibia, when we add the "not at all well" and "not very well" responses, 46% of the marginalised, 49% of the precarious, and 55% of the integrated are not satisfied with their government's performance. On the approval side ("fairly well" plus "very well"), the respective proportions are 54%, 50%, and 45%. The disapproval rate in Zimbabwe is much higher. Here, 88% of the marginalised, 84% of the precarious, and 95% of the integrated are not satisfied. The proportions of those (across the spectrum) who are satisfied is, subsequently very small, but the marginalised (13%) and precarious (16%) still tend to be more satisfied than the integrated (5%).
Table 7.11 The MPI Index and Government Economic Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Management of the Economy</th>
<th>Namibia (A) C=.124</th>
<th>Zimbabwe (A) C=.112</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all well</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very well</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly well</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very well</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>857 (72%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.4 The MPI Index, Political Competence and Voting

The political competence index consists of three items (question 46b-d) and is aimed at determining whether people feel that it is worthwhile for them to participate in politics, based on whether they feel confident (competent) about doing so. This category is related to the subsidiary claim which states that being marginalised correlates with a feeling of decreased political efficacy. Respondents were asked whether they agreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, or disagreed with the following three statements:

46b “You think that you do not have enough information about political life and the actions of government.”

46c “Sometimes political and government affairs seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what’s going on.”

47d “In this country, you must be very careful of what you say and do with regard to politics.”

245
Optional responses to the above statements were "strongly agree", "agree", "neither agree nor disagree", "disagree", and "strongly disagree." For the purposes of table 7.13 below, the two variations on "agree" and "disagree" were combined into one response. The general results on these items indicate that southern African have a low sense of political competence (Malawians and Namibians feel more politically competent). Mattes et al (2000:63) table their findings for the three items separately. The majority of southern Africans strongly agreed/agreed that they thought they did not have sufficient information about politics and government. The highest percentage is found in Lesotho (80%), followed by Zambia (63%), Zimbabwe (63%), and South Africa (62%). Malawi and Namibia had the lowest figures, 55% and 51% respectively. Most southern Africans also indicated that they did not really understand politics. Lesotho (77%), again, had the highest figure, then South Africa (76%), Zambia (73%), and Botswana (66%). Namibia (55%) had the lowest number of respondents who felt confused about politics. Approximately half of southern Africans feel that they must be careful about what they "say and do with regard to politics". The highest number of these are in Lesotho (72%) and Zimbabwe (59%), and the lowest number in Malawi (33%).

Table 7.12 shows that, although generally most respondents tend to not feel very politically competent, there is a tendency among southern Africans (with a low correlation of .110) for the marginalised to feel more so than the integrated and the precarious. On the political competence scale (a combination of the three items) 58% of the marginalised, 54% of the precarious, and 43% of the integrated have a low sense of political competence. For the three states with meaningful correlations between the MPI Index and the political competence item, the difference between the marginalised and the integrated is approximately 20%. In Namibia, 46% of the marginalised score low on competence, 37% of the precarious and 28% of the integrated. South Africa, with the strongest correlation, has 62%, 56% and 42% respectively. Zambia’s figures on low competence among the marginalised, precarious and integrated is comparable to South Africa’s. It has to be noted that a substantial proportion of respondents chose the "neither agree/disagree" option.
In addition to political competence, correlations were also run for southern Africa and the seven states individually, on whether people thought that voting made a difference (question 47). Respondents were asked to choose between two statements and to indicate how strongly they agreed with them (“agree” or “strongly agree”). In table 7.13, both responses were added together and listed next to the statement of choice.

Q47 Statement A: “No matter how you vote, it won’t make things any better in the future.”

Statement B: “The way you vote could make things better in the future.”

Overall, southern Africans felt more confident about voting than their understanding of politics and their ability to participate in it. The majority thought that voting could improve things in the future. In Botswana, 71% of respondents thought so, followed by Malawi (68%) and South Africa (62%). The lowest majorities were found in Zambia (53%) and Zimbabwe (53%) (Mattes et al, 2000:64). The correlations for this item with the MPI Index, produced only one moderate coefficient among Zimbabwean respondents.
Table 7.13 The MPI Index and Voting Efficacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting Efficacy</th>
<th>Zimbabwe (A)</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting won’t improve things (Agree)</td>
<td>C = .125*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting will improve things (Agree)</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
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*Strongest correlation for urban respondents (.160).

In Zimbabwe the marginalised are evenly divided as to whether voting will improve things or not. Yet, there is a significant difference between them and the precarious and integrated. Only 28% of the integrated have a low sense of voting efficacy, compared to 46% of the marginalised, and 38% of the precarious. Among the integrated, nearly three quarters have a high voting efficacy, followed by the precarious at 59%, and the marginalised at 47%.

7.5 Summation

The chapter presented and discussed the data which resulted from the correlations and cross-tabulations between the MPI Index and political discussion/interest, political participation, economy and political competence. As in Chapter 6, the focus was on whether there are significant differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated in these areas.

The findings on political discussion show a tendency for those who are marginalised to discuss politics less, than the integrated and the precarious. This tendency holds for the data set as a whole (southern Africa) and for the five states (Botswana, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe) which correlated meaningfully with the MPI Index, albeit...
with significant national variations. Zimbabwe had the highest percentage of integrated who frequently discuss politics (49%). It also had the largest percentage difference between the integrated, the precarious (26%) and marginalised (25%) in this category ("frequently"). The vast majority of all respondents in the five states and in southern Africa discuss politics occasionally or never. The largest differences between the marginalised and the precarious and integrated occur in the "never discuss politics" category. For instance, in southern Africa, 47% of the marginalised never discuss politics compared to 24% of the integrated.

Turning to political interest, the pattern which was noted for political discussion tends to repeat itself, although there are also some interesting variations to take note of. For the southern African sample the pattern is illustrated by respondents who indicated that they are "hardly ever" and "always" interested in government and public affairs. Only 10% of the integrated hardly ever take an interest in politics, increasing to 23% of the precarious and 29% of the marginalised. Among those always interested we find that 17% are marginalised, increasing to 20% of the precarious and 33% of the marginalised.

Five states emerged with meaningful correlations for the political interest item. Interestingly, out of the five states, Botswana has substantially more of the integrated (64%) who are infrequently interested in politics than the other states (compared to the marginalised and precarious). Both Botswana and South Africa have the smallest proportion of integrated respondents who are always interested in politics (23% and 20% respectively). Nevertheless, the proportion of respondents who are always interested in politics increases consistently as we move from marginalised to integrated in the five states. Similarly, the proportion of those who hardly express an interest in politics decreases as we move from the marginalised to the integrated. Notably, the proportion of marginalised (with Botswana and Zimbabwe being the exceptions) who are hardly interested in politics is below one third of the total number of marginalised respondents in each state and for the region as a whole.
The next section presented the findings on the MPI Index and political participation, civil society participation, and political protest potential. Only two states showed meaningful correlations between the economic position index and political participation. The data showed that more of the integrated have engaged in actual political activities than the precarious and the marginalised. Only 10% of the integrated in South Africa indicated that they had never participated in any political activity, compared to 34% of the precarious and 35% of the marginalised. In Zambia, the figures are 22%, 28%, and 37% respectively.

In South Africa, 41% of the integrated (compared to 14% of the marginalised) indicated that they had engaged in some form of political activity “once or twice.” The majority of all the respondents have not participated in politics, but the proportions who have not participated increase as we move from the integrated to the marginalised. Looking at political protest potential and the MPI Index, two states (Botswana and Zambia) showed moderate correlations. Again, as with political participation, the vast majority of respondents among the three economic position categories had not engaged in political protest. Substantial proportions, however, indicated that they would do so, if given the chance, but the integrated showed a higher protest potential than the marginalised. In Botswana, 54% of the integrated would protest if given the chance, compared to 31% of the marginalised. In Zambia, the precarious who would protest outnumber the integrated (36% and 31% respectively). Here, 27% of the marginalised would protest if given the chance. Few people have actually engaged in political protest, but the integrated and the precarious are more inclined to, and more of them have actually engaged in such activity.

Four states (Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Zambia) correlated meaningfully on the civil society participation item. Generally, for all the states, the integrated were more active in civil society than the precarious and the marginalised. Large proportions of the marginalised indicated that they had never participated in any of the listed civil society activities. For instance, 76% in Botswana and 66% in South Africa. Comparatively, only 16% of the integrated in South Africa indicated that they had never engaged in these activities. The picture changes somewhat, when we look at the “attendance of self-help
associations" item and its correlation with the MPI Index. Only two states scored meaningful correlations, Malawi and South Africa. In Malawi, the number of marginalised who have engaged in this particular civil society activity outweighs those among the precarious and the integrated who have done so. Among integrated Malawians, 81% have never attended the meeting of a self-help association, compared to 52% of the marginalised who have never done so. In South Africa, this trend is reversed. Here, 22% of the integrated have never attended, compared to 68% of the marginalised. Among those who “often” attend self-help association meetings, 29% are integrated, 13% are precarious, and only 7% are marginalised.

Various items on the economy were correlated with the MPI Index. The first item attempted to determine the respondents' economic values (are they more inclined towards state interventionism or individual self-reliance?). While the overall response for the region was slightly in favour (51%) of self-reliance, only two states correlated with the MPI Index, viz. South Africa and Zimbabwe. The integrated in both states, are more inclined to opt for self-reliance. Nevertheless, there were substantial proportions among the precarious and marginalised who agreed with one, two or three of the non-interventionist statements. In South Africa, 27% of the marginalised agreed with two, and 22% agreed with three. The corresponding proportions for Zimbabwe are 25% and 12%. In South Africa, 49% of the marginalised fall into the group who agree with either two or three of the more self-reliant statements.

The next item asked respondents whether the state, market or a mixture of both should be responsible for the provision of services. For the survey as a whole, the response was strongly in favour of government taking the lead. When correlated with the MPI Index, the results for five states (Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) and the regional sample, show that there are no significant differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated on the role of the private sector (market). When it comes to the provision of selected social services, as well as job creation, all three groups are strongly in favour of either state-led or mixed (state and market) responsibility. However, the marginalised are more inclined to favour the state as sole provider, while
the integrated prefer the mixed approach. There are also some interesting national variations to take note of. For instance, South Africa (47%) has the highest proportion of integrated who prefer government to take responsibility. In Namibia (59%) and Zimbabwe (67%) the precarious indicate that they prefer mixed responsibility, while in South Africa (59%) and Zambia (59%), the same group prefers the state to take responsibility. Finally, significant proportions (for the region and the five states) of the marginalised opt for mixed responsibility.

Next, the MPI Index was correlated with an item which asked respondents how they felt about four issues (price controls, payment for social services, reduction of the civil service and privatisation) which are usually part of the macroeconomic policy prescriptions of an IMF structural adjustment programme. Southern Africa, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe had meaningful correlations for this item. Respondents were asked to choose between either the liberal orientated economic policy statement or a more interventionist alternative. The data indicated that the integrated are more inclined to choose (agree with) three or all four of the liberal policy statements. The precarious and marginalised agree with fewer of these statements, although there are significant proportions who agree with two or even three. For example, 24% of the marginalised in southern Africa, 29% in South Africa, 31% in Zambia, and 32% in Zimbabwe agree with three or four liberal policy statements. The marginalised who do not agree with any of the four statements comes to an average of 11% for the region and the four states.

Finally, the proportion of those (M+P+I) who agree with two or three statements (the middle range) is larger than those who agree with one or none (bottom range), across the board. Regionally, 55% of the marginalised fall in the middle range, compared to 44% in the bottom range. The exception is Namibia, with 40% in the middle range and 58% in the bottom range. Generally, the policies for which there was little support were the reduction of civil servants and privatisation options.
For the item on individual relative deprivation (do people perceive themselves as being worse off than their fellow citizens) and the MPI Index, results were tabled for Botswana, Malawi and Namibia. For the survey as a whole, respondents were inclined to see themselves as “much worse/worse off” than others. In the three states with meaningful correlations, the marginalised, and then the precarious see themselves as being much worse off compared to others. For instance, in Botswana 59% of the marginalised, followed by 57% of the precarious and 28% of the integrated, think that they are much worse/worse off compared to others. The lowest proportion of the marginalised (46%) and precarious (33%) who fall into this category are found in Namibia.

The section ends with the cross-tabulations between the MPI Index and an item which asks respondents what they think about their government’s management of the economy. Overall, the correlations with the MPI Index were weak, but the results for Namibia and Zimbabwe were tabled because they do reflect somewhat of a pattern. The integrated in both states tend to more critical of government economic performance, although the differences between them, the precarious, and the marginalised are small. The results for Zimbabwe, show a high level of disapproval in all three groups. Among the marginalised, 88% are not satisfied. Comparative figures for the precarious and integrated are 84% and 95% respectively. Consequently, only 5% of the integrated in Zimbabwe are satisfied with government’s management of the economy, compared to 13% of the marginalised and 16% of the precarious.

The last results which were reported on are for the MPI Index correlated with political competence and voting. The question on competence attempts to determine whether people feel that they know enough about and understand politics to enable them to participate. The general survey results indicated that the majority of respondents do not feel that they have enough information and that they do not understand politics. Cross-tabulations were tabled for southern Africa, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia. For southern Africa there was a modest correlation which, in the cross-tabulation, shows that there is a tendency for the marginalised (58%) and the precarious (54%) to have a lower sense of political competence than the integrated (43%). This pattern is repeated in the
three states where, on average, there is a 20% difference between the marginalised and the integrated. For instance, in South Africa, 62% of the marginalised score low on political competence compared to 42% of the integrated. On voting, generally, the majority of southern Africans felt more confident, in the sense that they indicated that voting can make a difference (can improve things in the future). However, there were no meaningful correlations with the MPI Index, except for a modest correlation in the Zimbabwean sample. In Zimbabwe, the integrated (71%), and then the precarious (59%) tend to have a stronger sense of voting efficacy than the marginalised (47%).

Finally, what do these findings say about the subsidiary claims which were focused on in this chapter? There is some support for the claim that the marginalised are inclined to be more politically apathetic. They are less inclined to discuss or show an interest in politics than the precarious and integrated. They are also somewhat more inclined to not participate actively in politics, but not significantly. The most significant differences are found among those who participate “infrequently.” Here the marginalised participate significantly less than the precarious and integrated, but meaningful correlations were found for only two states, viz. South Africa and Zambia. On the political protest item, most respondents indicated that they had never engaged in this activity. Among those who would do so, given the chance, the integrated showed a higher protest potential than the marginalised. There is, therefore, no support for the claim that being marginalised correlates with being inclined towards political protest.

Regarding the subsidiary claim that the marginalised are more actively involved in civil society, the data analysis revealed that the integrated are more inclined to do so. There is support for the claim which states that being marginalised correlates with belonging to self-help associations, but only in one state, Malawi.

What do the marginalised think about the economy? Are they more dissatisfied than the integrated and precarious? Generally, all respondents favoured economic self-reliance. In two states, South Africa and Zimbabwe, the integrated were somewhat more inclined to favour self-reliance as an economic value. But when it comes to the provision of social
services all respondents prefer either government to take charge or a mixed approach (state and market). The marginalised, however, are significantly more in favour of state interventionism than the integrated in the southern African region (the seven state data set), Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Although respondents, generally, dissapproved of how their governments managed the economy and also felt themselves relatively deprived, there were no significant differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated in this regard. There is, therefore, less support for the subsidiary claim that being marginalised correlates with being more dissatisfied with the economy.

Regarding the claim that the marginalised are more inclined to view the policies associated with IMF austerity packages as negative, the evidence is mixed. At best, the claim is partially supported by the data analysis. There were significant proportions of the marginalised who expressed their approval of some liberal reform policies (regionally, 50% of the marginalised agreed with two or three liberal economic policy options). The item on political competence and its relationship with the MPI Index illustrated that the marginalised have less political information than the integrated and precarious. Therefore, they feel less confident about understanding politics. There is, subsequently, support for the subsidiary claim which states that the marginalised have a lower political efficacy.
Endnotes

1 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.1 are: Lesotho (.069) and Namibia (.073).

2 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.2 are: Lesotho (.122) and Namibia (.097).

3 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.3 are: Southern Africa (.048), Botswana (.116), Lesotho (.053), Malawi (.052), Namibia (.037) and Zimbabwe (.024).

4 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.4 are: Southern Africa (.114), Lesotho (.062), Malawi (.084), Namibia (.029), South Africa (.053) and Zimbabwe (.107).

5 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.5 are: Southern Africa (.112), Malawi (-.107), Namibia (.104) and Zimbabwe (.032).

6 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.6 are: Southern Africa (.114), Lesotho (.078), Malawi (-.029), Namibia (.116) and Zimbabwe (-.029).

7 It should be noted that tables 7.7 and 7.9 do not include the “don’t know” and “do not agree with either” responses.

8 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.7 are: Southern Africa (.102), Lesotho (.115), Malawi (.089), Namibia (.027) and Zambia (.093). Botswana’s correlation for the MPI Index and economic values is .176, but was not included because the number of missing cases was too high (40%).

9 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.8 are Botswana (.149) and Malawi (.132).

10 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.9 are Lesotho (.088) and Malawi (.132). Botswana’s correlation for the MPI Index and support for economic reform is .205, but was not included because the number of missing cases was too high (40%).

11 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.10 are: Southern Africa (.123), Lesotho (.095), South Africa (.053), Zambia (.138) and Zimbabwe (.111).

12 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.11 are: Southern Africa (-.032), Botswana (.014), Lesotho (.073), Malawi (-.061), South Africa (-.087) and Zambia (.062).

13 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.12 are: Botswana (.115), Lesotho (.083), Malawi (.083) and Zimbabwe (-.020).

14 The correlations for the states not reported on in table 7.13 are: Southern Africa (.023), Botswana (.022), Lesotho (.014), Malawi (-.014), Namibia (.012), South Africa (.008) and Zambia (.099).
Chapter 8
Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

The primary research aims of this study were centred around two related problems, one theoretical and the other empirical. The theoretical problem relates to the association of CCT with the CT of the Frankfurt School and the categorisation of Cox’s work (together with a Ashley, Hoffman, Linklater and Neufeld) in a CT of IR/GPE school. It was submitted, in Chapter 1, that this is an inaccurate presentation of Cox’s work. Although there are commonalities between Cox and the others who are associated with the critical approach (particularly in term of underlying assumptions), they are not explicitly indebted to the same intellectual influences. For the same reason it is not correct to state that Cox’s approach is “derived from Frankfurt School sources” (George, 1989:274).

The first part of the study, therefore, focused on the history, assumptions, ontology and epistemology of the Frankfurt School of CT and also provided an in-depth review of the work of the authors in IR/GPE who are grouped together with Cox in a school of critical theory. In the second part, a detailed review of Cox’s publications was provided in order to trace the influences on, and the development of his thinking. This was followed by a discussion of the assumptions, epistemology and method of his core theoretical framework. The first contribution, therefore, which the study was directed towards, was to clarify the confusion surrounding the theoretical “locating” of Cox’s work.

The empirical problem is related to the explanatory focus of Cox’s core theoretical framework. In order to explain change, his major point of departure is that the analyst should focus on the power dynamics between social forces related to modes of production. This “bottom-up” approach should be the first “point of entry” to explain the non-deterministic interaction between social forces, state forms and world order.
In the publications which set out the main assumptions of his theory, as well as in later publications, Cox consistently emphasises that the potential for change (and transformation of the contemporary world order) must be investigated by focusing on that component of social forces related to production who are marginalised. To this effect, CCT has an explanatory dimension but also a strategic-tactical one. The latter aims to "...achieve specificity in concrete settings of struggle between social forces aligned to the global market and those connected with more limited communities of local, national and regional scope. Cox sees the potential for the transformation of forms of state and world orders as lying within these "more limited human communities" (Falk, 1997:53).

The marginalised are one of three ("economic position") categories which Cox identifies as part of a social hierarchy (or "division of labour") in the contemporary world order. The other two are the precarious and integrated. To evaluate the mobilisation potential of the marginalised so as to determine whether they can form the impetus for "bottom-up" driven change we need to access their modes of perceiving the world. Furthermore, Cox regards the marginalised as potentially capable of challenging current state forms (and subsequently world order) because they are inclined to be alienated, politically apathetic, to belong to self-help movements, critical of the state and international organisations, a source of latent political protest, and passive disobedience. Related to these expectations of the marginalised, the last section of the study analysed the survey data from the SAB (1999-2000) to shed some light on the attitudes of the marginalised and also to determine whether there are any differences between them and the precarious and integrated.

The purpose of the empirical section was to provide the reader with an empirical, synchronic "snapshot" of social forces related to production in seven southern African states (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe). It was argued and substantiated that such an undertaking is acceptable to the epistemological assumptions of CCT. Furthermore, the reformulation of Cox's theoretical expectations (related to the marginalised) into a number of hypotheses to facilitate an empirical enquiry has not been attempted before. Herein lies one of the
main contributions of the study, because although CCT emphasises the importance of social forces (particularly the marginalised) in the explanation of change, it never directly investigated their "collective images of social order." The SAB data was utilised to provide a profile of the "more limited human communities" at the national and regional levels in southern Africa.

To encapsulate, the **main claim** which CCT makes is that position in a social mode of production is a predictor of that group's propensity to challenge the political economic status quo. Those who are marginalised are more inclined to pose such a challenge.

Following on from the main claim, the **subsidiary claims** are:

- Being marginalised correlates with being inclined towards political protest.
- Being marginalised correlates with being dissatisfied with the political economic system.
- Being marginalised correlates with increased political apathy.
- Being marginalised correlates with decreased political efficacy.
- Being marginalised correlates with belonging to self-help associations.
- Being marginalised correlates with increased civil society participation.
- Being marginalised correlates with low state legitimacy.
- Being marginalised correlates with negative perceptions of international organisations.

### 8.2 Main Empirical Findings

The empirical findings are based on correlations and cross-tabulations between the MPI Index and various items (questions and indices) in the SAB questionnaire. These items were grouped in five categories (related to the subsidiary claims listed above): regime, legitimacy, political interest/discussion, political participation, economy, and political competence. The economic position groups (marginalised, precarious and
integrated) were conceptualised from Cox's twelve types of modes of social relations of production (see Cox, 1987) and other publications (cf. Cox, 1999). The operationalisation process involved a factor analysis using four items in the questionnaire which correspond to the conceptualisation attributes of each group.

The relevant questionnaire items are occupation, skills (corresponding to the education item), status of economic activity (nature of employment) and income. The possible responses within each item were, as accurately as possible, divided into MPI categories. Based on a meaningful correlation matrix between all four items, a factor analysis was run. The results showed that all the items load on one factor and that there is, therefore, an underlying dimension which links them. Between the four items, occupation, employment and education had the highest correlation. A second factor analysis was run without the income item. The remaining items loaded stronger and it was decided to leave out income from the MPI Index. The factor analysis results indicated that the selection of the items and construction of the index is statistically and theoretically warranted. Subsequently, a number of correlations were run between the MPI Index and questionnaire items related to the subsidiary claims. Pearson's correlations coefficients of .160 and stronger were selected for cross-tabulations.

The correlation between the MPI Index and all seven southern African states (total sample) indicated that an average of 63% of the respondents are marginalised, 28% resort in the precarious group, and only 9% are integrated. Lesotho (83%) has the highest proportion of marginalised respondents.

The first category was **regime type** and included items which measure attitudes to two types of regime, democratic and authoritarian. The results are related to satisfaction with the political system and provide insight in the subsidiary claim which states that:

*Being marginalised correlates with being dissatisfied with the political economic system.*
The first item focused on respondents' on how willing respondents would be to consider authoritarian alternatives. The pattern which emerged (in Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe) is that the marginalised are slightly more inclined to approve of authoritarian alternatives. The second item measures whether anti-democratic actions by government would be supported or opposed. In Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe the majority (in all three economic position groups) indicate that they would oppose such actions. Nevertheless, there is a tendency for those who oppose to increase as we move from the marginalised to the precarious and the integrated. This is particularly illustrated, in the “unsure” responses for Namibia (32% of the marginalised, 20% of the precarious and 14% of the integrated) and Zimbabwe (26%, 18% and 4% respectively).

The third item measured respondents’ willingness to defend democracy behaviourally. What actions would they consider taking? Meaningful results were found for the whole sample (all seven states), Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Except for Botswana, the high correlations in the other states are attributable to rural respondents. Generally, there is a low propensity to actively defend democracy. But the integrated are more inclined to do so, followed by the precarious and then the marginalised. For the seven states, 70% of the marginalised indicated a low inclination to actively defend democracy, followed by 61% of the precarious and 51% of the integrated.

The final item, under “regime”, accesses respondents’ commitment to democracy. Even when things are not going well, are they still prepared to regard democracy as “the only game in town?” Only two states emerged with meaningful correlations, viz. Namibia and Zimbabwe. In Namibia, 50% of all respondents indicated that they could live without democracy, but there is a tendency for the democratic preference to increase as we move from the marginalised to the integrated. This pattern is illustrated more strongly in Zimbabwe, 56% of the marginalised regard democracy as “always the best”, compared to 66% of the precarious and 74% of the integrated. There were no meaningful correlations between the MPI Index and items which attempted to measure whether people have a more political (liberty) or more economic (equity) understanding of democracy.
The second category, **legitimacy** focused on how people view government and state institutions. Do they accept policy decisions, even if they are not popular? Do they trust the institutions of government and their leaders? This category is related to the following subsidiary claim:

*Being marginalised correlates with low state legitimacy.*

Out of eight legitimacy related items in the questionnaire, only two correlated meaningfully with the MPI Index. The six which showed no significant results were items which attempted to measure whether people thought government institutions were interested in them and responsive to their needs, whether people trusted state institutions and government at various levels (national, regional and local). Although the integrated were slightly more inclined to not trust government and state institutions and to regard them as not interested in their needs, the correlations were so low that one cannot really differentiate between them and the marginalised and precarious. This tendency holds when one looks at the data for all seven states.

Two meaningful correlations (South Africa and Zimbabwe) were found for the MPI Index and a standard legitimacy item which measures attitudes towards government and the constitution. The strongest correlation was for Zimbabwe. Here the marginalised tend to accord a higher level of legitimacy to government and the constitution than the precarious and integrated. This pattern repeats itself in South Africa where 52% of the marginalised rank high on the legitimacy scale compared to 46% of the marginalised and 40% of the integrated. Out of all the states, Zimbabweans (all respondents) accord the lowest legitimacy to government and the constitution, but again the marginalised are inclined to feature higher on legitimacy. Among the integrated 5% score high, compared to 10% of the precarious and 17% of the marginalised.

The second item in the legitimacy scale measure respondents’ inclination to disobey state “extraction” rules (taxes, levies, water and electricity fees). The majority of respondents indicated that had never disobeyed and low correlations between the MPI Index and this item were the rule. However, for rural Namibians and urban
Zimbabweans the data showed that the marginalised are more inclined to disobey and "cheat" than the precarious and marginalised. For instance, in Namibia 63% of the marginalised indicated that they had never disobeyed, compared to 83% of the integrated and 74% of the precarious. This tendency repeats itself among those respondents who said that they would disobey if they were given the chance.

The next category was political discussion and political interest. This category and the associated items in the questionnaire provided some empirical insight into the following subsidiary claim:

*Being marginalised correlates with increased political apathy.*

The pattern which emerged from the correlation between the MPI Index and political discussion indicates that the marginalised tend to discuss politics less than those who are more integrated. This can be observed for the data set as a whole as well as for Botswana, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In southern Africa, 47% of the marginalised never discuss politics, compared to 37% of the precarious and 24% of the integrated. The majority (50%) of the integrated in southern Africa and the four states discuss politics occasionally. However, significant minorities of the marginalised (38% in southern Africa, 35% in Botswana, 44% in Malawi, 48% in South Africa, 39% in Zambia and 34% in Zimbabwe) and precarious (46% in southern Africa, 40% in Botswana, 49% in Malawi, 55% in South Africa, 38% in Zambia and 44% in Zimbabwe) also discuss politics occasionally.

Turning to political interest and the MPI Index a similar tendency is observable. In southern Africa (all seven states) only 10% of the integrated indicated that they are hardly ever interested in politics (compared to 29% of the marginalised and 23% of the precarious). But the majority of respondents (50%+) resort in the "infrequently" category. Here the difference between the marginalised (55%), precarious (57%) and integrated (57%) is negligible. Out of five states (the other being Malawi, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe), Botswana has the highest number of integrated (64%) who are infrequently interested in politics. With Zimbabwe (47%), it also has the highest proportion of marginalised (47%) who have a low interest in politics. With the exceptions of Botswana and Zimbabwe, the proportion of marginalised who score
low on political interest is below one third. However, among those who are always interested the proportions increase (for all five states and the region) as we move from the marginalised to the integrated (for example, 16% to 39% in Malawi and 18% to 51% in Zambia).

We now turn to the category on political participation and the MPI Index. Also included in this category were two items on civil society participation and membership of self-help associations. This category is related to the following subsidiary claims:

*Being marginalised correlates with being inclined towards political protest.*
*Being marginalised correlates with increased political apathy.*
*Being marginalised correlates with belonging to self-help associations.*
*Being marginalised correlates with increased civil society participation.*

On the political participation item, only South Africa (rural respondents) and Zambia emerged with meaningful correlations. For both states, the overwhelming majority of all respondents (marginalised, precarious and integrated) have not participated in politics at all. Among those who have done so infrequently, the proportion is higher among the integrated than the marginalised. In South Africa, 41% of the integrated have participated infrequently, compared to 13% of the precarious and 14% of the marginalised. The comparable figures for Zambia are 27%, 22% and 16% respectively. In both states, there is no significant difference between the marginalised, precarious and integrated in the “no, but would do if I had the chance” response. In South Africa this includes 50% of the marginalised, 49% of the precarious and 43% of the integrated.

The political protest item correlated modestly with the MPI Index in only two states, Botswana and Zambia. Similar to the political participation item but even more so, the vast majority of all respondents have never engaged in an act of political protest. Nevertheless, a substantial minority indicated that they would do so if given the chance. The data show that the integrated have a higher protest potential than the marginalised and precarious. In Botswana, 54% of the integrated gave the “no, but would do if I had the chance” response, compared to 31% of the marginalised and
36% of the precarious. Similarly, in Zambia, 27% of the marginalised, 36% of the precarious, and 31% of the integrated indicated a potential for protest. For the two states, very few respondents have engaged in actual protest, but more of the integrated and precarious have done so.

Botswana, Lesotho (rural respondents), South Africa (rural respondents) and Zambia correlated with the MPI Index and the item on civil society participation. In all four states the integrated tend to be far more active in civil society than the precarious and marginalised. In Botswana, 76% of marginalised respondents had never participated in civil society organisations (compared to 67% of the precarious and 53% of the integrated). The comparative figures in South Africa are, respectively, 66%, 55% and 16%. The data on the attendance of self-help associations showed a different pattern. Two states, Malawi and South Africa (rural respondents) correlated meaningfully with the MPI Index. There are substantial national differences between them. In Malawi, nearly half of the marginalised (48%) indicated that they had attended self-help associations meetings (most of them on an irregular basis, but 26% attend “often”). For the precarious and marginalised, the proportions are 35% and 19%, respectively. Among (predominantly rural) South Africans this pattern was reversed. Attendance of self-help association meetings is overwhelmingly monopolised by the integrated. This tendency holds, as well, if we look at the entire South African national sample.

The next category included items on the economy and is related to the following subsidiary claims:

Being marginalised correlates with being dissatisfied with the political economic system.

Being marginalised correlates with negative perceptions of international organisations (IMF).

On economic values (state interventionist or self-reliance) all respondents were narrowly in favour (51%) of self-reliance and only two states correlated with the MPI Index (South African and Zimbabwe). In both states the integrated tend to favour self-reliance. However, there were also substantial proportions of the marginalised and
precarious who agreed with some self-reliance statements. For instance, in South Africa, 49% of the marginalised agree with two or three (out of three) of the non-interventionist options. The corresponding figure for Zimbabwe is 37%.

Regarding the provision of a range of social services, all respondents showed a strong preference for government provision (as opposed to the market or a mixture of both). In five states (Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe) there was no significant difference between the marginalised, precarious and integrated on the question of who should provide. All three prefer a state-led or mixed approach. However, the marginalised are more inclined to see the state as being solely responsible, while the integrated prefer the mixed approach. There were some interesting national variations on this theme. In Namibia and Zimbabwe the precarious opt for mixed responsibility, while in South Africa and Zambia they prefer the state to take the lead. South Africa has the highest proportion of integrated (47%) who prefer the state-led approach. Lastly, for the region and the five states, an average of 40% of the marginalised were in favour of state and market (mixed) taking responsibility.

The next item listed a number of typical liberal economic reform measures (four in total) associated with an IMF structural adjustment programme as well as their (more interventionist) alternatives. In southern Africa (the seven SAB states), Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe the data showed that the integrated are more inclined to agree with three or four of the liberal policy statements (the highest proportion was in Zimbabwe, at 44%). The precarious and marginalised tended to agree with fewer statements, but there were large proportions who agreed with two, three or even four of the liberal policy statements. For example, 24% of the marginalised in southern Africa agreed with three or four, as do nearly one third of the marginalised in South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Regionally, the marginalised who agreed with two or three (51%) outnumber those who agree with one or none of the statements (44%). Only 11% do not agree with any of the statements. Generally, support was expressed for the payment of services and higher standards and the scrapping of price controls to ensure a wider variety of products. There was, however little support for privatisation and civil service cutbacks.
The item on relative deprivation was aimed at determining whether people perceive themselves as worse off than their fellow citizens. Generally, respondents viewed themselves as much worse/worse of than others. In Botswana, Malawi and Namibia the marginalised, followed by the precarious regarded themselves as being much worse off compared to others. Botswanian marginalised who fall into this category number 57%, compared to 28% of the integrated. Finally, respondents were asked what they thought about their government’s management of the economy. The correlations with the MPI Index were weak. Somewhat of a pattern can, however, be discerned for Namibia and Zimbabwe. The integrated tend to be more critical of government economic performance, but the percentage differences between them and the precarious and integrated are small. Overall, particularly in Zimbabwe, there is a high rate of disapproval among all three groups (88% of the marginalised, 84% of the precarious and 95% of the integrated).

The last category, political competence, also includes an item on voting efficacy and is related to the following subsidiary claim:

*Being marginalised correlates with decreased political efficacy.*

The item on political competence attempted to determine whether people understand enough about politics to give them the confidence to participate effectively. For the survey as a whole, respondents indicated that they do not have enough information and subsequently do not really understand politics. The marginalised (58%) in southern Africa, followed by the precarious (54%) and the integrated (43%) have the lowest sense of political competence. In Namibia, South Africa and Zambia this pattern repeats itself. On average, there is a 20% difference between the marginalised and integrated, i.e. among those with a low sense of competence. Most southern Africans thought that voting can make a difference in the future. However, there were no meaningful correlations with the MPI Index. In Zimbabwe, a modest correlation was found. Here, 71% of the integrated were optimistic about voting, compared to 47% of the marginalised and 59% of the precarious.
8.2.1 Summation of Main Empirical Findings

Are the marginalised more dissatisfied with the political economic system than the precarious and integrated? According to the results from the data analysis and related to regime type (attitudes to democratic political systems) the marginalised are more inclined to approve of authoritarian alternatives. They are also more inclined to not oppose anti-democratic policies by government and to not wanting to actively defend democracy. Lastly, the integrated (in only two states) are also more prone to view democracy as the “only game in town” than the precarious and marginalised. One can conclude, therefore, that the marginalised are would be (potentially) more willing to discard democracy. This can be interpreted as a degree of dissatisfaction with regime type.

Although, all southern African respondents (in prompted questions) tended to favour the economic conceptualisation of democracy (democracy should be about equity) there were no meaningful correlations between these items and the MPI Index. This means that there are no significant differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated in this regard. On economic dissatisfaction, the correlations with the MPI Index were weak. For the survey as a whole, respondents were inclined to not approve of their governments’ management of the economy and to also feel themselves to be relatively deprived compared to others. In three states, the marginalised felt themselves to be more deprived than the integrated, whereas in one state the integrated were slightly more critical of government economic performance than the marginalised.

The results indicate that there is some support for the subsidiary claim that the marginalised tend to be more dissatisfied with the regime type of their political system. They are less supportive, however, of the claim that being marginalised is correlated with greater economic dissatisfaction.

Do the marginalised accord less legitimacy to state and government institutions than the precarious and integrated? Overall, the correlation between the MPI Index and the items on legitimacy attitudes were low. This indicates that there is no or very little
difference in outlook between the three economic position groups. In fact, the data show that the integrated are more inclined to not trust state and government institutions. However, although the correlations were low, the marginalised (in two states) are more inclined to want to “cheat” than the precarious and integrated. The results do not support the subsidiary claim that being marginalised correlates with low state legitimacy.

Are the marginalised more inclined to be politically apathetic? The results of the data analysis provide some support for this subsidiary claim. More so, because meaningful correlations were found for the region as a whole and five states. The marginalised are less inclined to discuss or show an interest in politics than the precarious and integrated. However, among those who discuss politics “infrequently” (the majority of respondents are located here) the differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated are less pronounced. The majority of respondents tend to not participate very actively in politics. In two states, among those who participate infrequently, the marginalised participate significantly less than the precarious and integrated. There is therefore, also some support for the claim that the marginalised are more apathetic, but only in two states and in the “infrequent” participation category.

The political protest item correlated (moderately) with the MPI Index in only two states. Again, the vast majority of respondents indicated that they had never engaged in this particular form of political participation. Among those who indicated that they would do so, if given the chance, the integrated have a higher protest potential than the precarious and marginalised. Nevertheless, there are significant proportions of the marginalised who would also protest (given the chance) but less than the integrated. The fact that the MPI Index only correlated with political protest in two states means that there are no significant differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated in the region and the other states. There is, consequently, no support for the subsidiary claim that being marginalised inclines one to political protest (actual or potential).
Four states had meaningful correlations between the MPI Index and civil society participation. The integrated were overwhelmingly the more active participants in civil society than the marginalised and precarious. Although, the marginalised are also active on a more infrequent basis (for instance, 23% in Botswana), the data show no support for the claim that the marginalised are more active civil society participants.

Only two states showed meaningful correlations on the attendance of self-help associations item. In Malawi, more of the marginalised (approximately half) attend these associations, both irregularly and often, than the precarious and integrated. However, in South Africa the proportion of integrated who attend, is significantly more than the marginalised. Also in Malawi, the data supports the claim that the marginalised are more inclined to attend self-help associations. But, this does not hold for South Africa, nor for any of the other states in the survey.

Have the marginalised “turned their backs on international organisations?” Cox specifically refers to the economic austerity policies which the IMF expects states in Africa to implement in return for access to loans. The analysis of the data shows that there is partial support for this claim, albeit indirectly. In four states and the regional sample the integrated are more inclined to support liberal economic reform policies, while the precarious and marginalised are more inclined to disagree with these policies. But, there were substantial proportions of the marginalised who agreed with some of these policies (paying for services and doing away with price controls). Regionally, half of the marginalised agreed with two or three liberal economic reform policies. One cannot, therefore, generalise and accept that all of the marginalised reject all of the policies associated with IMF structural adjustment packages.

Similarly, half of all respondents in the survey opted for self-reliance as an economic value. In two states, the data indicated that the integrated prefer self-reliance, more so than the marginalised and precarious. Yet, there were significant proportions of marginalised and precarious respondents who also approve more of self-reliance than state intervention. In the other states there were no significant differences between the three groups on this issue.
When it comes to social services, however, in five states there was no meaningful difference between the marginalised, precarious and integrated as to who should be responsible for their provision. All prefer either a state-led or mixed approach, with the marginalised more inclined to prefer the state as the provider of social services. This finding is in accordance with the negative perception of privatisation and civil service cutbacks among the marginalised.

On political competence the marginalised, more so than the precarious and integrated, indicated that they do not have enough information on politics. This pattern is illustrated in three states and in the regional sample. There is some support, therefore, for the claim that being marginalised also means having a lower political efficacy. On voting efficacy and also related to political apathy, there were no meaningful differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated. The majority of respondents seem to be optimistic about voting, with the exception of Zimbabwe where the integrated are more inclined to believe that voting can make a difference than the marginalised.

Taking into account the above results and what they say about the subsidiary claims, the main claim cannot be accepted as a generalisation/predictor about the propensity of the marginalised in southern Africa to challenge the political economic status quo. Consequently, it can also not be accepted that they are more inclined to pose such a challenge compared to the precarious and integrated.

What we can, provisionally, note from the data analysis is that the marginalised are not as committed to democracy than the more economically integrated. There were no significant differences between the three groups on economic dissatisfaction, although the marginalised do see themselves as more economically deprived compared to others. On self-reliance as an economic value and liberal economic policies the results showed that the integrated tend to be more supportive of both, but that one cannot generalise. All respondents support a state-led (marginalised preference) or mixed approach (integrated preference), which somewhat contradicts the preference for self-reliance.
On legitimacy the correlations were weak, but pointed to the fact that the integrated are more inclined towards low legitimacy. Regarding political apathy, the marginalised do tend to participate less in politics, discuss it less, show less of an interest, and therefore feel less politically competent. However, all respondents feel that voting can make a difference. Finally, on participation in civil society and self-help associations the data show that the marginalised are less inclined to participate than the integrated and precarious (with the exception of Malawi).

The only subsidiary claim for which there is some unqualified support is that the marginalised are inclined to be more politically apathetic (discuss less, little interest, participate less).

The empirical analysis has provided us with a synchronic “snapshot” of the marginalised in seven southern African states but it also links up with the theoretical question of this study. Importantly, and in terms of Cox’s theoretical expectations, it has emerged that we cannot uncritically accept that they will act as a potential source of transformation “from below.” Their political protest potential is lower than the integrated, they participate less in politics and in civil society, they are inclined to accord more legitimacy to the state than the integrated and they are more tolerant of authoritarian alternatives. Interestingly, their economic values cannot be summarised as being generally unsympathetic to “market” orientated policies. Nearly half of all respondents in the data set indicated that they were in favour of self-reliance (taking responsibility for their own well-being). On this item, only two states correlated meaningfully with the MPI Index (South Africa and Zimbabwe). Here the marginalised were less sympathetic to the notion of self-reliance than the integrated and precarious. Nevertheless, 49% in South Africa and 37% in Zimbabwe, supported the idea.

Secondly, the empirical findings on how the marginalised view the role of the state tell us something about the usefulness of CCT, as well as the distinction between CCT and the CT of IR school (as represented by Ashley, Linklater, Hoffman and Neufeld). It will be recalled (see table 7.8, p. 223) that all respondents in southern Africa are overwhelmingly in favour of a either a state-led or a mixed approach when it comes to
the provision of social services. The marginalised are significantly more inclined to opt for state interventionism than the integrated (they prefer the mixed approach). Additionally, all respondents return strong majorities who oppose civil service cutbacks and privatisation policies. It is, therefore, clear from the data analysis that while a substantial proportion of the marginalised accept the principle of "self-help" (self-reliance), the majority look to the state for assistance (for instance, in the provision of credit to farmers). These conclusions are revisited and incorporated in the next section.

8.3 Theoretical Findings

The theoretical evaluation of Cox's work was aimed at generating a number of empirical questions for the analysis of the SAB data results, but also to properly locate Cox's work in the IR/GPE literature. It was submitted, in Chapter 1, that the linking of Cox with the Frankfurt School of CT and the association with others (Ashley, Hoffman, Linklater and Neufeld) into a CT of IR school, although understandable, is not justified. This conclusion is based on a close reading of his publications which revealed where his intellectual debt lies.

Why is it understandable? It is clear that there are some "commonalties" between CCT and some of the assumptions of the Frankfurt School and the work of the four scholars with whom Cox is often grouped in books and articles that review the development of theory in IR/GPE.

The Frankfurt School of CT also draws on the historical Marx and rejects economic determinism. The "supradisciplinary" approach of the early Frankfurt School, which would later be revised and left behind by Horkheimer and Adorno, emphasised the need for cooperation between traditional (positivist) and critical theory. Later, Habermas (1972) returned to the need for a holistic approach to the development of knowledge and accepted that there were various knowledge constitutive bases (inter alia the empirical-analytic dimension) which must augment one another. Horkheimer (1947) viewed subordination (and the need for emancipation) as being the result of the materialist challenges which humans are confronted with. To this effect he placed
more emphasis on the inequality arising from capitalist exchange relations, than on
the nature of production. He also stresses (similarly to Cox) that change arises from
contradictions in society and that the transformation towards an emancipated society
requires feasible (non-utopian) alternatives.

The Frankfurt School points to positivism's objectification of society and its focus on
problems which must be resolved within the boundaries of the status quo. It rejects
the division between subject and object, stresses that ideas need to be historically
located (they are “the thinking of particular men within a particular period of time”),
and that concepts are historically contingent and therefore prone to change. The
concept of intersubjectivity is used to refer to shared understandings of reality which
can change. The method of immanent critique requires us to focus on contemporary
dominant (universalist) ideas and whether they reflect social realities. Finally,
synchronic research must be located in the “mediated totality” of historical context.

The above core assumptions of the Frankfurt School are quite clearly similar to the
tenets of CCT. In fact, one could speculate and venture to conclude that Cox would
not disagree with any of them. Cox’s distinction between critical and problem-solving
theory is often linked to Horkheimer’s differentiation between critical and traditional
theory. This has led some to conclude that “The debt to Horkheimer in Cox’s
assessment of problem-solving and critical theories is plain to see” (Devetak,
1996:151) and others that CCT is “derived from Frankfurt School sources” (George,
between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ theory.” These observations are quite simply
not accurate. Both Devetak and Hoffman (1987) do acknowledge that Cox’s
“inspiration” and his intellectual debt are located more in Gramsci and Vico, but why
then, are the “links” between Cox and the Frankfurt School stressed?

Hoffman (1987:237) is more correct when he says that there are “important
“similarities” between CCT and the Frankfurt School and he may be correct when he
observes that Cox “draws implicitly on the links between the interests and knowledge
that are central to the Frankfurt School.” But surely if Cox did draw (even implicitly)
on the Frankfurt School, this would be apparent from a reading of his work, the
sources he cites and by his own admission (cf. Cox, 1996b) those who have provided
him with intellectual inspiration. From the literature review of Cox's work (Chapters 4 and 5), it emerged that there are only three references to authors who are associated with the Frankfurt School: the (1969) reference to Marcuse (the name only, no citation of any of Marcuse's publications), a brief in text reference to Habermas (again without source citation) (Cox, 1981) and the reference to Habermas' *Legitimation Crisis* (1976) in PPWO (Cox, 1987).

The reference to Marcuse is in support of the need to view international organisations as "more than the sum of its parts, to appreciate the "real essence" behind the organisation. The unsourced reference to Habermas is made in a critical context, in the sense that Habermas has "shifted attention away from the state and class conflict" (Cox, 1981:127). The citation in PPWO is in support of Cox's point that the hyperliberal state attempts to base its legitimacy on traditional, pre-capitalist values (e.g. family and patriotism). Habermas' (1972) conceptualisation of knowledge-constitutive interests could have been used by Cox to support his own approach to positivist methodology, viz. that it is useful, but that the results need to be historically contextualised because theory is always linked to interests. The development of Cox's thinking, however, is sourced from other intellectual roots.

The literature review of Cox's work reveals that his sensitivity for the mutual influence between industrialisation (production), forms of state and changes at the international (world order) is indebted to the work of E.H. Carr. The notion of the link between ideas and material conditions and the sensitivity to unfettered positivism comes from Georges Sorel. The premise that ideas always evolve within a specific historical context and that material change must be understood in terms of changes in intersubjective understandings is attributable to Sorel, R.G. Collingwood and Giambattista Vico. Cox develops his view of historical materialism from the Islamic historian, Ibn Khaldun. Later, Cox also cites Charles Taylor in his conceptualisation of intersubjectivity. The importance of production and the social forces which are related to modes of social relations of production, as well as the importance of the dialectic approach (contradictions) are related to Karl Marx and Ralf Dahrendorf.
The idea of synchronic and diachronic time frames and Cox's understanding of historical structures is taken from the work of Fernand Braudel. From Antonio Gramsci comes the idea of hegemony and counter-hegemony, a concept which Cox uses to understand change and transformation at the state and world order levels. Gramsci (with Carr) also influenced Cox's thought on the nature of the state, viz. that state and civil society are not autonomous entities and that they interact with one another. Hegemony is maintained, not only through coercion, but also by establishing consensus. Cox's own value preference for social equity is rooted in Edmund Burke's conservatism and particularly his "organic and solidaristic vision of society." But he makes it clear that he distances himself from "those who have appropriated it [Burke's conservatism] to cloak an egoistic defense of acquired privilege" (Cox, 1979:416).

Can we associate Cox's work with Ashley, Linklater, Hofman and Neufeld? Are there enough commonalities (shared assumptions and intellectual roots) to warrant grouping them into a school of thought?

The early work of Richard Ashley is anchored in Habermas's (1972) conceptualisation of knowledge-constituting interests. Ashley used Habermas to criticise Waltz's (1979) "structural" or neorealist approach and compares the latter to the empirical-analytical knowledge-constituting base. The "technical" interest of neorealism lies in control and system maintenance. He rejects the "neutralisation of human agency" (objectification) and the resultant inability of neorealism to explain structural change. The positivism of neorealism and the focus on rational, objective actors is a value choice in itself which results in an ahistorical view of international politics. States are not unitary actors and the analyst must also take account of domestic or societal power. Ashley argues for a more "self-reflective" approach which incorporates economics and a focus on crises which can lead to transformation. Finally, classical realism (Morgenthau and Herz), which is associated with Habermas's historical-hermeneutic knowledge-constituting base, should be retained and incorporated in Ashley's "dialectical competence" model.
Linklater’s work is firmly rooted in Habermas (see also, Linklater, 1998) and to some extent Horkheimer. His main concern is to move from a system based on order between states, to one where universal principles are established to create an international (post-sovereign) political community. He views critical theory (as opposed to other perspectives) as an approach which is orientated towards transformation and suited to achieve the goal of human emancipation. Waltz’s neorealism is also singled out as inadequate because of its association with positivism (control), system maintenance and lack of self-reflection. While acknowledging that inter-state relations are important, Linklater argues that an exclusive focus on state power negates the norms related to the concept of international community. The difference between a CT of IR and other (specifically neorealism) approaches is related to Horkheimer’s traditional/critical distinction. Crucially, Linklater draws in Cox’s (1981) critical/problem-solving distinction to indicate that CT in IR has been significantly influenced by the Frankfurt School. He criticises Cox, however, for being too focused on production and historical materialism.

Hoffman, too, links a CT of IR to the Frankfurt School and explicitly to the Horkheimer distinction between traditional and critical theory. Transformation, emancipation, the need for self-reflective theory and a critique of (Waltzian) positivism also appear as themes in an essay (1987) which regards critical theory as the “next stage in the development of International Relations theory.” Habermas’s knowledge-constitutive bases are conceptualised, but Hoffman emphasises that the technical interest (positivist), together with the practical and critical-emancipatory interest, must be retained in a CT of IR. This reflects Habermas’s own view. As noted above, Hoffman “pushes” the link between Habermas and Cox and regards the assumptions of the latter’s work as being closest to the Frankfurt School (more so than Linklater and Ashley). Interestingly, Hoffman (1987:240) criticises Ashley for wanting to “salvage” classical realism because such a revision “…would have moved so drastically from the core assumptions of political realism that it would be a misnomer to speak of it as a critical realist theory of international relations” (own italics).
The central theme of Neufeld's argument is to convince us of the need to break away from the “logic of positivism” and to move to a theory of IR which contributes to the goal of human emancipation. Critical theory must be self-reflective (looks inwards on its own assumptions, it must accept the notion of intersubjective meaning and the ability of human agency to change reality, and it must apply its social criticism in support of practice. Paradigms have political and normative aims and can (even if they are not commensurate) ultimately be evaluated in terms of these aims.

The bulk of Neufeld’s volume is dedicated to criticising the three core assumptions of positivism; the fact/value distinction, the separation of subject and object, and the unity of science principle. Ultimately, the timeless criteria of the positivist method determine what problems are placed on the research agenda. These are usually related to control and system maintenance. After evaluating various approaches to the study of IR, Neufeld concludes that Cox’s theory is truly reflexive because it acknowledges that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.” Lastly, Neufeld admits that problem-solving theory can be useful, but only if subjected to the requirements of critical theory. Change can only be understood from the vantage point of intersubjective meanings which constitute and change social practices. This, according to Neufeld, is the question which CCT focuses on.

The commonalities which can be identified in Ashley’s earlier work, Linklater, Hoffman and Neufeld (to a lesser extent) are centred around their explicit linking of a CT in IR approach to Habermas (1972) and the Frankfurt School (specifically Horkheimer’s critical and traditional theory distinction). They also all stress the need for theory to be self-reflective and criticise the positivist method which leads to system maintenance. The neorealism of Waltz (1979), in particular, bears the brunt of their criticism. Except for Ashley, the other three accept (in different degrees) that positivism has a place in a CT of IR, but with the qualification that its results must be incorporated within the self-reflective “spirit” of critical theory and that its results must be historically located. Linklater and Hoffman attempt to forge a link between Cox and Habermas (Hoffman) and Cox and Horkheimer (Linklater).
Their understanding of a CT of IR does share some tenets with CCT. These are the need for theory to be self-reflective, the requirement that ideas and concepts must be historically located in order to explain change (based on their critique of Waltzian neorealism) and their critique of positivism (or problem-solving theory) which focuses on the fact/value distinction and the separation of subject and object. They also share the concern with human emancipation and the need for transformation towards an order which will facilitate this. But they cannot be grouped with Cox in a school of critical thought because their intellectual debt is (mainly) to Habermas, while CCT is based on an eclectic bringing together of a number of diverse sources. Their attempt to link Cox to Habermas and the Frankfurt School does not rest on solid foundations but on similarities, which, unless the contrary is proven, must be regarded as coincidental.

Hoffman's critique of Ashley's project to incorporate or "salvage" classical realism illustrates the problem which is encountered by those who wish to classify Cox. In PPWO, Cox (1987:399-400) points out that, although the departure point of his framework is production relations, "...the crucial role, it turns out, is played by the state." Cox regards the state as having an important influence on the shaping of the nature of production relations. In his later work on the movement towards a "post-Westphalian" order, he acknowledges that the state has become one of many centres of power and that its autonomy has been much reduced. Nevertheless, he does not foresee that the state will disappear (Cox, 1993d:35). Cox does not discard classical realism (cf. E.H. Carr), yet Hoffman (who thought that it cannot be "salvaged") viewed CCT as the most representative framework of a Habermasian inspired CT of IR.

It turns out that the crucial difference between Cox and the four CT of IR authors lies in their different conceptualisations of the role of the state. Ashley, Linklater and Hoffman, in particular, draw on Habermas who (in one of three references to authors who are associated with the Frankfurt School) is criticised by Cox (1981:127) because he has "shifted attention away from the state and class conflict." Linklater foresees a post-sovereign international system, while Hoffman is critical of Ashley's endeavour to retain some aspects of classical realism within a more critical framework.
The empirical analysis of the SAB dataset has illustrated that the marginalised in southern Africa still regard the state as an important provider of assistance and social services. This finding supports the choice of Cox’s explanatory framework which incorporates state forms and looks at how they are influenced by social forces and world orders. It confirms the importance of including the state as a unit of analysis (among others), albeit in a post-Westphalian world order and it also makes it relevant to distinguish between CCT and the CT of IR authors. Finally, it provides an alternative to the structural realism of Waltz who views states as functionally alike in their timeless captive reactions to the systemic principles of anarchy and distribution of state capabilities. In the Coxian framework, social forces, forms of state and world orders interact in a relationship of mutual influence. It is this interaction which leads to a focus on change (transformation) and a consideration of strategies within the limits of the possible.

In his successful effort to bring together widely divergent strands of thought (including classical realism) in a comprehensive explanatory framework, Cox has shown that it is not entirely a “misnomer” to speak of a critical realist theory of IR. Richard Falk (1997) comes the closest to any possible categorisation of Cox’s work when he groups together and discusses Cox, Hedley Bull and E.H. Carr under the rubric of “critical realism.” Whether Cox would approve of being categorised at all is, of course, a moot point. In a review essay of Susan Strange’s work, he had this to say on the attributes of the “loner”: “Loners live on the margins. They may have an unconventional background...Loners tend to define their own issues and their own conceptual frameworks...One risk for a loner is inadvertently to become a guru...” (Cox, 1992c:178-179).

8.4 Future Research

It was pointed out in Chapter 1 that one of the limitations of the study is that the SAB (1999-2000) survey was not designed primarily around the empirical questions generated by CCT. The section dealing with the operationalisation of the marginalised, precarious and integrated has attempted to (within the restrictions of the questionnaire items) (see Chapter 6) reflect, as accurately as possible, the essence of
Cox’s conceptualisation of these terms. It is recommended, however, that future Afrobarometer surveys should incorporate mechanisms and questionnaire items which are more attuned to the identification of the socio-economic hierarchy.

Secondly, during the data analysis separate correlations were also run for the items which make up the MPI Index, viz. occupation, education, employment status, as well as income destitution. The employment status item generated relatively few meaningful correlations with the regime, legitimacy, participation, interest/discussion, economy and competence categories. However, the income destitution item resulted in medium to strong correlations in the economy category. Education provided similar results for regime, interest/discussion, economy and competence, while occupation correlated significantly with discussion/interest and to an extent, economy. This indicates that education is an important variable and that it could possibly be a crucial explanatory factor in the attitudinal differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated. This will be investigated further in the follow-up research related to this study, but also in future data sets of the Afrobarometer (see Chapter 1).

Thirdly, the major contribution which this study has hoped to make was to provide an empirical “snapshot” of the marginalised in order to put Cox’s predictions/expectations to the “test.” Taking into account the limitations and also the pitfalls which are associated with survey research, the data results have shown that (at the very least) those of us who are concerned about equity and greater inclusiveness must take cognizance of the need to access the profile of the excluded. A “bottom-up” explanation, also requires an empirical focus to determine whether a “push” for change is actually latent among the marginalised. This will enable practitioners who are interested in the mobilisation of broadly based social movements to work within the limits of the possible, but also to expand those limits.

Fourthly, the empirical analysis has confirmed the importance of including forms of state as a unit of analysis. The contemporary world order is characterised by increasing inequality and a stagnation in the reduction of poverty which has been associated with the principle of “openness” and the rise of the outward orientated (or in Coxian terms, hyperliberal) form of state. The time has come for public policy practitioners in developing states to rethink the TINA (There Is No Alternative)
option and to consider a more balanced approach to national/global inequality and poverty issues. This would require an outward/inward form of state which creates opportunities for those who are integrated, but protects those who are marginalised by globalisation. Again, the limits of the possible constrain action, but such a reorientation would have the support of the marginalised and those who have been vociferous in their condemnation of the social costs associated with greater openness.

Finally, there were many national differences and variations in the results of the data analysis. There were also many instances where only two states emerged with meaningful correlations. This requires follow-up research which is true to the diachronic dimension of CCT. The results have to be historically located within the divergent political economies of the seven states, as well as regionally, and ultimately within the nature of the contemporary world order. This necessitates a focus on ideas, material capabilities, institutions and the "fit" between them, but it also requires some critical thinking about whether and how it is possible to access the other component of Cox's notion of ideas: intersubjective meanings or shared understandings of social practices and institutions.
Bibliography


Books Consulted


Appendix A

Southern African Barometer

Sample Design Protocol

Introduction

This document describes the sample design and sampling procedure used for a study of citizens’ attitudes towards democracy in Southern Africa. The purpose of the design is to draw a representative sample of all citizens of voting age in each of seven countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe) included in the Southern African Barometer.

Sample Universe

The sample universe includes all citizens of voting age within each country, excluding areas determined to be either inaccessible and/or not relevant to the study. Excluded are the following: areas experiencing armed conflict or natural disasters, national parks and game reserves (e.g. the Central Kgalagadi Game Reserve and Okavanga Delta in Botswana), people living in institutionalized settings (students in dormitories, persons in prisons, nursing homes, etc.—though workers’ hostels are included).

Sample Design

The sample design is a multi-stage, stratified area cluster probability sample.

The objective of the design is to give every sample element (i.e. eligible adults) an equal chance of being chosen for inclusion in the sample. This objective is met by selecting elements with probabilities proportionate to the population size of successive area clusters, and by using methods of random selection at every stage of sampling.

In a series of hierarchical steps, geographically defined sampling units of decreasing size are selected with probability proportionate to their population size according to counts in the latest census. To ensure that the sample is representative, the probability of selection at various stages is adjusted as follows:

1. The sample is stratified by key social characteristics in the population such as ethnicity and residential locale (e.g., urban or rural).
2. Random sampling is conducted with probability proportionate to size (PPS). Larger (i.e. more populated) geographical units should have a proportionally greater probability of being chosen.
The sample design typically involves a three-stage design:

1. A first-stage stratification and random selection of primary sampling units (PSU’s) (e.g. census enumeration areas --EA’s) from a sampling frame;
2. A second-stage random selection of households (please note that households may also be referred to as housing units) from the selected PSU’s,
3. A final-stage involving the random selection of a respondent from the eligible members of selected households.

This document addresses the sample design in three separate parts:

I. The primary geographical-unit sampling design (selection of PSU’s)
II. The household sampling design
III. The selection of respondents.

Addressed within each part are selection unit definitions, stratification guidelines, and selection procedures. Appendix A gives characteristics and information available for each country in the study.

I. Selection of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs)

The primary sampling units (PSU’s) of a multi-stage area probability sample represent the first level of clustering of observable geographic units in the survey population. Clustering of elements at the primary and subsequent stages is an essential aspect of cost-effective, nationally representative sample design. Two steps are involved: PSU formation (i.e. forming heterogeneous, cost-efficient clusters) and stratification (grouping of PSU’s into homogenous strata).

For the SAB Democracy Survey I, PSU’s shall be set as the smallest cost-effective area for which population data is available. PSU’s must be well-defined geographic units. Census data and mapping materials must be available for PSU’s. PSU’s must also contain sufficient households / respondents to randomly select from. Finally, PSU’s should not be so large that enumerators must travel unreasonable distances to reach sample locations. Ideally, there should be unrestricted travel access to all residential areas within the PSU.

Where applicable, the PSU should be the area defined by the country’s census bureau as the standard enumeration area (EA) used in census taking.

Sampling Frame

The sampling frame is a list describing the universe of possible primary sampling units (e.g. enumeration areas -- EA’s). This list should be compiled using the most recent census data available. The sampling frame should thus be a comprehensive list of enumeration areas (EA’s). When drafting individual country sampling designs, country investigators should provide a detailed discussion (in this section) of data used to define the sampling frame.
Once PSU’s are selected from the sampling frame, the list of these units is referred to as the *master sample*. (In this document the terms PSU and EA are used interchangeably).

**Stratification of PSU’s**

Stratification of the master sampling frame should be based on:

a) **Region / Province** (used as a proxy for the country’s major cultural and linguistic groupings).

b) **(Within region / province) PSU Urban / Rural status**, or land-use status, or some other status referring to the nature of the residential area in which respondents are to be found.

c) **(Where possible) Within urban / rural distinctions** Further sub-division into specific land use (e.g. formal / informal housing in urban, and commercial / traditional farming in rural) may be used where possible.

**Selecting PSU’s**

EA’s should be randomly selected from the *sampling frame* for the *master sample*. In actuality, the sampling frame will consist of several different frames, or lists. For instance, where we had PSUs divided into nine regions (9), each with a set of urban and rural PSUs (2), we would have eighteen (9 X 2) lists. Census data will show us the actual proportion of population represented by each list, and thus guide the number of PSUs to be selected. For instance, if Region A / urban, constituted 12% of the national population, we would want to draw 12% of the total number of PSUs to be drawn, from that list.

If the EAs are created by the national census such that they are equal or roughly equal in population size or number of households, each EA should have an equal probability of being sampled. However, where they differ in populations size, we will use the draw EAs/PSUs with probability proportionate to size (PPS) for each sub-stratum. To use the PPS method, lists of EA’s should be prepared with their populations numbered cumulatively by population size. This involved the random selection of an EA in a specific list (or sub-strata) as a starting point and then selecting the next point (EA) using an interval determined by the sampling ratio.

The choice of how many EAs to select is essentially a trade-off between two logistical considerations: budgetary constraints versus number (and hence dispersion) of the PSU’s and concentration of the actual respondents. If a relatively small number of PSU’s are chosen, survey teams have smaller distances to travel in the field (more economical), but a relatively large number of respondents must be chosen from each of the small number of PSU’s. If a larger number of PSU’s are chosen, survey teams have greater distances to travel in the field (more costly), but a smaller number of respondents can be chosen from each of the greater number of widely dispersed PSU’s. This latter option increases the probability that the sample will be representative of the entire population from which it is being drawn.
Here is a list of different tradeoffs with a target of 1200 interviews.

- 10 EA’s, we need 120 respondents / interviews per EA
- 150 EA’s, we need 8 respondents / interviews per EA **
- 1200 EA’s, we need 1 respondent / interview per EA

Given budgetary constraints, the sampling design for the SAB should consist of 150 EA’s chosen for the master sample, and 8 interviews conducted per EA. Logistically, this means that 4 teams (4 enumerators each) should cover 2 EA’s per day, each team gathering 8 interviews per EA, and thus 16 interviews per day. At 4 interviews per enumerator per day, with 8 EA’s covered per day by all field teams, it should requires 19 interviewing days in the field. With an additional two days for travel and rest, fieldwork should take 21 days for 1200 interviews.

Country teams should additionally consider separating logistical plans for urban vs. rural teams; for instance, urban teams might be expected to cover 3-4 EA’s per day, and rural teams only 2 EA’s per day.

Once the list of EA’s has been chosen for the master sample, the sample designer shall confirm the accessibility of the selected EA’s, and randomly re-select EA’s to replace those that are inaccessible. Only if more than 15 EA’s are found to be inaccessible should the sample designer discard the sample and draw a new sample using the method described at the end of this document.

II. HOUSEHOLD SAMPLING DESIGN

Once the primary sampling unit is determined, eight households should be selected for interviews.

Households are defined as single housing units / groups of persons living together and eating from the same pot. When counting dwellings (as described below), enumerators should count separately compounds for multiple spouses or backyard dwellings for relatives, renters, or household workers as separate dwellings.

Selecting Households: The Ideal (Comprehensive enumeration of households within the PSU / EA)

If field logistics are such that it is possible for the field supervisor to enumerate (that is, compile a list) of all households in a selected EA, then this should be done. Once the list is compiled, the field supervisor should randomly (using a random numbers table) choose eight households, and send one enumerator to each during the day spent in that EA. A detailed map showing all households in the EA and matching them with the listed names is necessary for this method; alternatively, (especially in rural areas) someone knowledgeable about the area can be consulted to assist in finding the chosen households.
Selecting Households: The Alternative (Sampling point method)

If it is not possible to enumerate all households in the PSU, the following method should be used: For each PSU, the sample designer shall obtain the most accurate map possible, preferably one which shows the location of households or at least major population points. A sampling start point should be randomly selected according to the following “randomised grid method” and eight households around the start point should be chosen according to the method given thereafter.

The sample designer places a ruler with numbers along the top of the map of the selected SSU and a ruler with letters along the side of the map (increments between numbers and increments between letters should be no larger than 1cm). The designer then randomly chooses a number, and randomly chooses a letter, resulting in a random combination, e.g. “C6.” A line is then drawn on the map horizontal to the chosen letter, and another line is drawn vertical to the number. The point on the map where these two lines intersect is the “sampling start point.” This point is then marked on the map, which should be given to the field team for that area.

This point should then be used as a sampling start point. The fieldwork team should then locate the nearest housing settlements to this point, and travel there (or as near as they can get to the point). In rural areas, this may require the field team to consult with local residents to find the housing settlement nearest the start point.

Having arrived at the selected housing settlement, the method for selecting households is as follows:

1. In well-populated urban and rural areas, with single-dwelling units:

   The field supervisor should choose (as randomly as possible from his/her knowledge of the area) a point like a street corner, a school, or a water source. The four enumerators should be instructed to walk away from this point in the following directions: Enumerator one towards the sun, Enumerator 2 away from the sun, Enumerator 3 at right angle to Enumerator 1, Enumerator 4 in the opposite direction from Enumerator 3, etc. Each enumerator should choose the fifth dwelling on the right as the target household for the interview.

2. In well-populated urban and rural areas, with multiple-dwelling units:

   If the start point is a block of flats, or if the walk pattern includes a block of flats, the enumerator should stop at every fifth flat.

3. In sparsely-populated rural areas, with single-dwelling units / farms:

   In such areas, there may be only a few households around a given start point. In these cases, the following guidelines shall apply: If there are 15 or less households within walking distance of the start point, the field team shall drop only one enumerator there. If there are 16-30 households within walking distance of the start point, two enumerators can be dropped there. (If there are
more than 30, the whole team can be dropped off as usual). If only one or two enumerators can be dropped at the start point, the rest of the team should drive to the nearest housing settlement within the same EA, where the next one, two or three enumerators shall be dropped according to the same rule. And so on.

4. In sparsely-populated rural areas, with commercial farms:

In countries where commercial farms are large and contain populous settlements of farm workers, effort should be made to avoid collecting all eight interviews for that EA on one farm. To do this, the field supervisor should drop two enumerators at the first farm (either the first chosen from a comprehensive list of farms within the EA, or the first nearest the randomly selected start point), and then drop the remaining two enumerators at the next farm. Once the first two are finished, they are moved to another farm for two more interviews, and the same with the second pair, so that eight interviews are obtained from four separate farms in each EA. *It is important that all selected farms are within the selected EA.* At every other farm, one of the two enumerators dropped there should select the farm owner’s household. The remaining households should be chosen from lists of the farmworker’s households, or by using a random walk within the farmworkers’ housing settlement. Once the teams’ eight interviews are completed, the field supervisor should move the team on to the next selected EA and repeat the procedure.

**Enumerator’s second interview:**

Each enumerator is to obtain two interviews per EA. After completing the first interview, he or she should follow the same procedure as before. For instance, in case 1: he/she continues walking in the same direction and chooses the fifth dwelling on the right. And so on. If the settlement comes to an end and there are no more houses, the enumerator should turn at right angles to the right and keep walking, again looking for the fifth dwelling on the right. This procedure is repeated until the enumerator finds an eligible household.

**III. INDIVIDUAL SAMPLING DESIGN**

Eligible individuals are randomly chosen from the selected households according to a set method, with very strict substitution rules. Individual Respondents are the persons chosen for interview. Eligible Respondents are those members of the household who are citizens of voting age.

**Stratifying Individual Respondents**

A gender quota is used in addition to the selection procedure given below.

**Procedure for Selecting the Respondent**

Once the household is chosen through the method described above, the enumerator enumerates all eligible household members 18 years and older, even those not
presently at home but who will return to the house that evening. A numbered card* is given to each qualifying member of the household – as well as allocating one for all qualifying members not present. Odd-numbered cards are given to males, even-numbered cards to females.

The head of household (or someone else present) is then asked to select a numbered tile from a bag. A red bag with even numbers is used if the respondent should be a female, a black bag with odd numbers is used if the respondent should be a male (the enumerator should not make it obvious that there are two different bags to choose from). The person interviewed is the one whose card bears the number chosen.

*Note: Cards and tiles will be provided by Idasa. Essentially, the cards will be a small bit of paper with dots corresponding to numbers (e.g. the “one” card has one dot, the “two” card has two dots, etc.). The cards will be laminated so that the enumerator can write the names of the missing members of the household on a number card, and wipe the name off after leaving the household so that the card can be used again.

Substitution: Not at home

If there is no one at home in the selected household on the first try, or if the designated respondent is not at home, the enumerator should make at least one more trip to the household before substituting.

If the person is not at home after another call, the enumerator should substitute that household with the very next household found in the direction of the walk pattern.

Substitution: Refusals

If the person selected for interview refuses the interview either at the beginning or after the interview has started, the enumerator should walk away from the household and substitute that household with the fifth household found in the direction of the walk pattern.

Field-Supervisor Back-Checks

After the enumerators have completed their interviews in the PSU, the field supervisor shall randomly choose one of the eight completed interviews and return to that household to check the enumerator’s walk pattern and repeat several designated questions from the interview.

List of Terms Used:

Enumerator: A person who conducts interviews (also referred to as an “interviewer”).

Field Supervisor: A person who manages the fieldwork team in the field.
Fieldworker: A person who conducts interviews (also referred to as an “enumerator”).

Sample Designer: The person who both draws the master sample and (if ideal enumeration of households is not possible) randomly chooses and maps the sampling points, before the field teams leave for fieldwork.

Alternative Sampling Design

In those countries where enumeration areas (EA’s) are too numerous to provide a logistically feasible master sampling frame, an additional stage should be added previous to the selection of EA’s to limit the geographical areas from which EA’s should be chosen. In these cases, the following procedure should be used:

1. A suitable geographic area between region/province and the EA should be chosen, e.g. administrative districts (hereafter, these sub-province areas should be referred to as “districts”). The number of districts to be chosen should be determined by the country’s logistical constraints, but in any case should not be less than (half / 55%) of the total number of districts in the country.

2. A list of all districts (in cumulative order by population size) within each regional strata should be developed.

3. A population limit shall be set for districts that should be self-representing (i.e. districts which should represent themselves in the sample). This limit shall be determined by the country’s logistical constraints. Self-representing districts will thus have a probability equal to one of inclusion in the sample.

4. Nonself-representing districts will have a probability based on population size of inclusion in the sample. (Nonself-representing districts are those areas selected from strata containing more than one other area to represent itself and the other members (districts) of their respective strata.) Nonself-representing districts should be chosen randomly using a PPS method from the stratified list of districts (from which the self-representing districts have been removed).

5. Once districts are thus chosen, the selection of PSU’s (EA’s) from within each selected district should then proceed according to the general design.
Appendix B

SOUTHERN AFRICAN BAROMETER PROJECT
Democracy Survey I
(Zambia)

Case Number: [OFFICE USE ONLY]  
ENUMERATOR/AREA:  

BACK-CHECKED:  BACK-CHECKED BY:  CODING CHECKED BY
Yes 1  
No 2  

PREVIOUS INTERVIEW WAS WITH A  
1 Male 2 Female

THIS INTERVIEW MUST BE WITH A:  
1 Male 2 Female

IF THERE IS NO ONE AT HOME IN THE SELECTED HOUSEHOLD ON THE FIRST TRY, MAKE AT LEAST ONE MORE TRIP TO THE HOUSEHOLD BEFORE SUBSTITUTING. IF THERE IS NO ONE AT HOME AFTER A SECOND CALL, SUBSTITUTE THAT HOUSEHOLD WITH THE VERY NEXT HOUSEHOLD FOUND IN THE DIRECTION OF THE WALK PATTERN.

UNSUCCESSFUL VISITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REASON FOR SUBSTITUTION:</th>
<th>House 1</th>
<th>House 2</th>
<th>House 3</th>
<th>House 4</th>
<th>House 5</th>
<th>House 6</th>
<th>House 7</th>
<th>House 8</th>
<th>House 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refused to be interviewed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person selected through card procedure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was never at home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Premises empty for the survey period</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premises did not exist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaf/ Spoke only a foreign language</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not fit gender quota</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>7</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Good day. My name is __________. I am from the University of Zambia. I do not represent the government or any political party. The University of Zambia is part of the Southern African Barometer Project studying the views of citizens in six countries across Southern Africa about how their countries are governed. Your household has been randomly selected and we would like to discuss these issues with yourself, or a member of your household. Would somebody from this household be willing to answer few questions?

Every person in Zambia has an equal chance of being included in this study. Your household has been chosen by chance. We would now like to randomly choose an adult from within your household. Would you help us pick one?

APPLY RESPONDENT SELECTION PROCEDURE AND RE-READ INTRODUCTION TO THE PERSON SELECTED.

IF THE HOUSEHOLD REFUSES THE INTERVIEW, WALK AWAY FROM THE HOUSEHOLD AND SUBSTITUTE THAT HOUSEHOLD WITH THE FIFTH HOUSEHOLD FOUND IN THE DIRECTION OF THE WALK PATTERN.

Southern African Barometer / Democracy Survey I
RESPONDENT SELECTION PROCEDURE

Please tell me the first names of all the people over the age of eighteen who presently live in this household, including yourself. DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE MALE OR FEMALE.

LIST FIRST NAMES OF ALL ELIGIBLE HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS 18 YEARS AND OLDER, EVEN THOSE NOT PRESENTLY AT HOME BUT WHO WILL RETURN TO THE HOUSE THAT EVENING.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WOMEN'S NAMES:</th>
<th>MEN'S NAMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please choose a card. The person who corresponds to the number chosen will be the person interviewed.

ASK THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (OR SOMEONE ELSE PRESENT) TO SELECT A NUMBER FROM A BAG. IF YOU ARE REQUIRED TO INTERVIEW A MALE, INTERVIEW THE MALE WHOSE NAME APPEARS NEXT TO THE SELECTED NUMBER. INTERVIEW A FEMALE WHOSE NAME APPEARS NEXT TO THE SELECTED NUMBER IF YOU ARE REQUIRED TO INTERVIEW A FEMALE. CIRCLE THE NUMBER OF THE PERSON SELECTED.

The person I need to speak to is [READ IN NAME ] _______. Is this person presently at home?

IF YES: May I please interview this person now?
IF NO: Will this person return here at any time today?

IF NO: Thank you very much. I will select another household. SUBSTITUTE WITH A NEIGHBORING HOUSEHOLD
IF YES: Please tell this person that I will return for an interview at INSERT CONVENIENT TIME.
MAKE ONE RETURN VISIT. IF THE RANDOMLY SELECTED RESPONDENT IS NOT PRESENT ON YOUR SECOND VISIT, REPLACE THIS HOUSEHOLD WITH THE VERY NEXT HOUSEHOLD ON YOUR WALK PATTERN.

IF SELECTED RESPONDENT IS NOT THE SAME PERSON

Good day. My name is _______. I am from the University of Zambia. I do not represent the government or any political party. The University of Zambia is part of the Southern African Barometer Project studying the views of citizens in six countries across Southern Africa about how their countries are governed.

Your answers will be confidential. They will be put together with over 7200 other people we are talking to, to get an overall picture. It will be impossible to pick you out from what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you think. Are you willing to participate?

How many households were visited unsuccessfully before this one? ________________

How many calls were made to the household where the interview actually took place? ________________

DATE: ____________________________
BEGIN INTERVIEW

IF RESPONDENT REFUSES TO ANSWER A QUESTION, WRITE IN 98 NEXT TO THE LAST CODING BLOCK

LET’S BEGIN BY TALKING ABOUT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN ZAMBIA.

1. At the moment, are you dissatisfied, neither dissatisfied nor satisfied, or satisfied with economic conditions in Zambia? [PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION]

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Dissatisfied</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Dissatisfied nor Satisfied</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Satisfied</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know [DO NOT READ]</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. How do economic conditions in Zambia now compare to one year ago? Are they: [READ OUT RESPONSE OPTIONS]

<p>| | |</p>
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<tr>
<td>Much worse</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the same</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much better</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know [DNR]</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>

3. What about in twelve months time? Do you expect economic conditions in Zambia to be worse, the same, or better than they are now? [PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION].

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<tr>
<td>Much worse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
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<tr>
<td>About the same</td>
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<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much better</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know [DNR]</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>

4. Now let us speak about your personal economic conditions. Would you say they are worse, the same, or better than other Zambians? [PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION]

<p>| | |</p>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much worse</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the same</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much better</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know [DNR]</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

READ OUT ENTIRE PASSAGE CLEARLY

People get their basic necessities of life such as food, safety, health care, or income, in a variety of ways. For instance, some people have to:
- Steal or beg for it
- Pretend they’re eligible for government assistance
- Do a favour for, or bribe a government official

Other people get these things from:
- Local traditional leaders
- Government relief programmes
- Local cooperative groups
- Or, Friends or family

Still other people provide for it themselves, or pay for it in cash or in kind.
Finally, some people are not able to get these things at all.
5. What about you? Describe how you currently obtain the food you and your family eat each month? Is there anything else? RECORD UP TO FOUR ANSWERS

(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 

TO BE TRANSLATED WITH FIELD SUPERVISOR
(a) __________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(b) __________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(c) __________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(d) __________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION

OFFICE CODES: ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________

6. If you could no longer obtain food in this way, what other methods would you be most likely to use? Is there anything else? RECORD UP TO THREE ANSWERS

(a) 
(b) 
(c) 

TO BE TRANSLATED WITH FIELD SUPERVISOR
(a) __________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(b) __________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(c) __________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION

OFFICE CODES: ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________

7. Describe the things you currently rely on for the safety of your home? Is there anything else? RECORD UP TO FOUR ANSWERS

(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 

TO BE TRANSLATED WITH FIELD SUPERVISOR
(a) __________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(b) __________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(c) __________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(d) __________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION

OFFICE CODES: ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________

Southern African Barometer / Democracy Survey 1 (Zambia)
8. If you could no longer protect your home in this way, what other methods would you be most likely to use? Is there anything else? RECORD UP TO THREE ANSWERS

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

TO BE TRANSLATED WITH FIELD SUPERVISOR

(a) ENGLISH TRANSLATION

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION

(c) ENGLISH TRANSLATION

OFFICE CODES: 

9. Describe the things you currently do to obtain health care for yourself or your family? Is there anything else? RECORD UP TO FOUR ANSWERS

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

TO BE TRANSLATED WITH FIELD SUPERVISOR

(a) ENGLISH TRANSLATION

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION

(c) ENGLISH TRANSLATION

(d) ENGLISH TRANSLATION

OFFICE CODES: 

10. If you could no longer get health care in this way, what other methods would you be most likely to use? Is there anything else? RECORD UP TO THREE ANSWERS

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

TO BE TRANSLATED WITH FIELD SUPERVISOR

(a) ENGLISH TRANSLATION

(b) ENGLISH TRANSLATION

(c) ENGLISH TRANSLATION

OFFICE CODES: 

Southern African Barometer / Democracy Survey I
(Zambia)
11. Please describe how you normally obtain cash income? Is there anything else? ACCEPT UP TO FOUR ANSWERS

(a) ____________________________________________
(b) ____________________________________________
(c) ____________________________________________
(d) ____________________________________________

TO BE TRANSLATED WITH FIELD SUPERVISOR
(a) ____________________________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(b) ____________________________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(c) ____________________________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(d) ____________________________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION

12. If you could no longer get a cash income in this way, what other methods would you be most likely to use? Is there anything else? ACCEPT UP TO THREE ANSWERS

(a) ____________________________________________
(b) ____________________________________________
(c) ____________________________________________

TO BE TRANSLATED WITH FIELD SUPERVISOR
(a) ____________________________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(b) ____________________________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(c) ____________________________________________ ENGLISH TRANSLATION

OFFICE CODES: ________ ________ ________ ________

13. In the last twelve months, how often have you or your family: ? Was it: READ OUT OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Some Times</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13a. Gone without enough food to eat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13b. Felt unsafe from crime in your home</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13c. Gone without medicine or medical treatment that you needed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13d. Gone without a cash income</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13e. Gone without enough clean water to drink and cook with</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13f. Gone without shelter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13g. Gone without electricity in your home</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13h. Gone without enough fuel to heat your home or cook your food?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. In the last month, how much of the time has ________ ? Was it often, sometimes, rarely or never?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Some Times</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14a. Your physical health reduced the amount of work you would normally do inside or outside your home?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14b. Have you been so worried or anxious that you have felt tired, worn out, or exhausted?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Is there a school close by where you could afford to send your children?  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. Do you have an electricity hook-up into this household?  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Do you have water piped into your household?  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Over the past year, how often have you attended meetings of a group?  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Just Once or Twice</th>
<th>A few times</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>DNR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18a. church group (other than religious services)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18b. local self-help association  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18c. group concerned with local matters such as schools, housing or rates  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18d. local commercial organisation such as a business group or farmers' association  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18e. group that does things for the community  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18f. a trade union  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here are several pairs of statements. Please tell me whether you most agree with Statement A or Statement B? READ OUT, AND ONCE RESPONDENT HAS CHOOSEN A STATEMENT, PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF AGREEMENT

19. STATEMENT A: People should be responsible for their own success and well being. Or: STATEMENT B: Government should bear the main responsibility for ensuring the success and well being of people.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not know: DO NOT READ  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not agree with either: DO NOT READ  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. STATEMENT A: People should be free to earn as much as they can, even if this leads to large differences in income. Or: STATEMENT B: Government should place limits on how much rich people can earn, even if this discourages some people from working hard.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not know: DO NOT READ  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not agree with either: DO NOT READ  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. STATEMENT A: The best way to create jobs is to encourage people to start their own large or small businesses. Or: STATEMENT B: The government should help provide employment for everyone who wants to work.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not know: DO NOT READ  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not agree with either: DO NOT READ  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. STATEMENT A: There is no sense in trying to start a new business because it might lose money. Or: STATEMENT B: If a person has a good idea for business, they should invest their own savings or borrow money to try and make it succeed.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not know: DO NOT READ  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not agree with either: DO NOT READ  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
23. Here is a list of things that are important for the development of our country. In your opinion, who should take the main responsibility for these things? Is it government, private business, individuals, or some combination of these?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Govt.</th>
<th>Private Business</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Govt. and Business</th>
<th>Govt. and Individuals</th>
<th>Business and Individuals</th>
<th>All three</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23a. Providing schools and clinics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23b. Creating jobs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23c. Building houses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d. Reducing crime</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23e. Buying and selling copper</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23f. Helping farmers borrow money to improve production of livestock and crops</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here are several more pairs of statements. Please tell me whether you most agree with Statement A or Statement B?

[ONCE RESPONDENT HAS CHOSEN A STATEMENT, PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF AGREEMENT]

24. STATEMENT A: It is better to have a wide variety of goods and many goods in the market, even if prices are high. 
Or:
STATEMENT B: It is better to have low prices, even if there are shortages of goods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not know [DO NOT READ] 3 4
Do not agree with either [DO NOT READ] 5

25. STATEMENT A: It is better to be able to visit clinics and get medicine for free, even if it means we cannot raise health care standards. 
Or:
STATEMENT B: It is better to raise health care standards, even if we have to pay medical fees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not know [DO NOT READ] 3 4
Do not agree with either [DO NOT READ] 5

26. STATEMENT A: The number of people who work for government should not be reduced, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country. 
Or:
STATEMENT B: The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay off / retrench some of them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not know [DO NOT READ] 3 4
Do not agree with either [DO NOT READ] 5

27. STATEMENT A: The government should retain ownership of its factories, businesses and farms. 
Or:
STATEMENT B: It is better for the government to sell its businesses to private companies and individuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not know [DO NOT READ] 3 4
Do not agree with either [DO NOT READ] 5

Southern African Barometer / Democracy Survey I
(Zambia)
28. What, if anything, do you understand by the word "democracy"? What comes to mind when you hear the word?

(a)  
(b)  
(c)  

To be translated with field supervisor

(a)  
(b)  
(c)  

English translation

Office codes:  

NOW LET US SPEAK ABOUT THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THIS COUNTRY.  
First of all, can you tell me who presently holds the following offices?

29. Vice President

- Do not know 1
- Know answer but can't remember 2
- Right answer 3
- Wrong answer 4
- Could not determine 5

(Write in name given)

30. The Minister of Finance?

- Do not know 1
- Know answer but can't remember 2
- Right answer 3
- Wrong answer 4
- Could not determine 5

(Write in name given)

31. Member of parliament for this constituency

- Do not know 1
- Know answer but can't remember 2
- Right answer 3
- Wrong answer 4
- Could not determine 5

(Write in name given)

32. Your local councillor?

- Do not know 1
- Know answer but can't remember 2
- Right answer 3
- Wrong answer 4
- Could not determine 5
- Not applicable 98

(Write in name given)

33. In the past year, have you contacted a government or political party official about some important problem or to give them your views? IF YES: Was it Just Once or Twice, A few times or Frequently.

- No  
- Just once or twice 2
- A few times 3
- Frequently 4
- Do not know do not read 5

Southern African Barometer / Democracy Survey I  
(Zambia)
### 34. [IF RESPONDENT HAD MADE CONTACT] What type of official was it? [PROBE FOR MOST SPECIFIC ANSWER POSSIBLE] TICK ALL THAT APPLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Type</th>
<th>Elected local councilor</th>
<th>Elected regional or provincial representative</th>
<th>Elected member of parliament</th>
<th>Local council meeting or hearing</th>
<th>Regional, Provincial Legislative meeting or hearing</th>
<th>National parliament meeting or hearing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National government hearing or meeting</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local council official</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional, provincial official</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National government official, civil servant</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party official</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Contact</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 35. In the past year, have you or anyone in your family had to pay money to government officials (besides paying rates or taxes), give them a gift, or do them a favour, in order to get the following? IF YES: Was it Just Once or Twice, A few times or Frequently.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Once or Twice</th>
<th>A Few Times</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35a. A job</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35b. A government maintenance payment, pension payment or loan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35c. Electricity or water</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35d. Housing or land</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 36. In the past year, have you contacted any other influential person such as a church or community leader about some important problem or to give them your views? IF YES: Was it Just Once or Twice, A few times or Frequently.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Just Once or Twice</th>
<th>A few times</th>
<th>Frequently</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 37. [IF RESPONDENT HAD MADE CONTACT] What type of person was this? TICK ALL THAT APPLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person Type</th>
<th>Church leader, official /</th>
<th>Community leader /</th>
<th>Trade Union official /</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leader /</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Traditional council meeting /</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No contact /</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 38. I would like to speak about traditional leadership. Do you have a local traditional leader, chief or headman?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>CONTINUE WITH Q.39</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>SKIP TO Q.42</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 39. How interested do you think your local chief is in what happens to you or hearing what people like you think? Are they: READ OUT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Level</th>
<th>Not at all interested</th>
<th>Not very interested</th>
<th>Interested</th>
<th>Very interested</th>
<th>Or haven't you heard enough about them to know</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 40. How much of the time can you trust your local chief to do what is right? Is it: READ OUT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Level</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Only some of the time</th>
<th>Most of the time</th>
<th>Just about always</th>
<th>Or haven't you heard enough about them to know</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
41. What about corruption that is where leaders take money intended for the community and use it for themselves? How many chiefs or traditional leaders are involved in corruption? Is it: READ OUT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All, Almost all</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few, Some</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost None, None</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you heard enough about them to know</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable, DO NOT READ</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42. How often do you get news from the following sources? Is it: READ OUT OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Every day</th>
<th>A few times a week</th>
<th>A few times a month</th>
<th>Less than once a month</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Do Not Know DNR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42a. Radio</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42b. Television</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42c. Newspapers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most people can be trusted</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't be too careful</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know [DO NOT READ]</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

44. When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters ....... ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know [DO NOT READ]</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45. Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs: READ OUT OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always / Most of the time</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of the time</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only now and then</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly at all</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know [DO NOT READ]</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46. Do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree with the following statements? PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Do Not Know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Not Know [DNR]</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Please tell me whether you agree more with Statement A or Statement B? ONCE RESPONDENT HAS CHOSEN A STATEMENT, PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>Statement A: No matter how you vote, it won't make things any better in the future</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statement B: They way you vote could make things better in the future</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do not know [DNR]</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neither A nor B DO NOT READ</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>Statement A: It is important who is in power because it can make a difference to what happens</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statement B: It doesn't really matter who is in power, because in the end things go on much the same</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do not know [DNR]</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neither A nor B DO NOT READ</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49. On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in 1996? Was it:

- Completely free and fair: 1
- Free and fair, with some minor problems: 2
- On the whole, free and fair but with several major problems: 3
- Not free or fair: 4
- Don't know [DO NOT READ]: 5

50. What are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? ACCEPT UP TO THREE RESPONSES. Which of these is the most important? PLACE A ONE NEXT TO THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM.

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

51. We are now going to discuss how you rate different forms of government. I would like you to give marks out of 10. The best form of governing a country gets 10 out of 10 and the worst form of governing a country gets no marks at all. What grade would you give to: WRITE CODE IN BLANK PROVIDED

51a. The way the country was governed under the one party regime of Kaunda. 

51b. Our current system of government with regular elections where everyone can vote and there are at least two political parties. 

51c. The political system of this country as you expect it to be in 10 years time.
52. Some people say that today, under our current system of government, our political and overall life is better than it was under the one party regime of Kaunda. Others say things are no better, or even worse. For each of these following matters, would you say things today are worse, about the same, or better? PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF RESPONDENT’S OPINION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Much Worse</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Much Better</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52a. Anyone can freely say what he or she thinks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52b. People can join any political organisation they choose.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52c. People can live without fear of being arrested by the police if they have not done anything wrong.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d. Each person can freely choose who to vote for without feeling forced by others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52e. Everybody is treated equally and fairly by government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52f. People are safe from crime and violence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52g. People have an adequate standard of living</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52h. People have access to basic necessities (like food and water)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52i. Zambians are equal to one another</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our current system of governing with regular elections and more than one political party is not the only one Zambia has ever had. Some people say that we would be better off if we had a different system of government. How much would you disapprove, neither disapprove nor approve, or approve of the following alternatives to our current system of government with at least two political parties and regular elections? PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF RESPONDENT’S OPINION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Strongly Disapprove</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
<th>Neither Approve nor Disapprove</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Strongly Approve</th>
<th>Do Not Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53. If only one political party, or candidates from only one party, were allowed to stand for elections and hold office?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. If all decisions were made by a council of Elders, Traditional Leaders or Chiefs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. If the army came in to govern the country?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56. If parliament and political parties were abolished, so that the President could decide everything?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57. If all important decisions about the economy were made by economic experts rather than an elected government or parliament.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58. If the country returned to the old system we had under Kaunda?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here are some things people often say about our current political system. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree, neither disagree nor agree, or agree? [PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Do Not Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59. Our government was elected to power by accepted procedures.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60. Our government exercises power in an acceptable way</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61. Our constitution expresses the values and aspirations of the Zambian people.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62. Our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they agree with them.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOW LET'S SPEAK ABOUT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THIS COUNTRY.

63. How well would you say the government is handling the following matters? Would you say very well, fairly well, not very well or not at all well, or haven't you heard enough about this to have an opinion?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matter</th>
<th>Very well</th>
<th>Fairly well</th>
<th>Not very well</th>
<th>Not at all well</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63a. Creating jobs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63b. Building houses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63c. Ensuring that prices remain stable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63d. Reducing crime</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63e. Improving health services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63f. Addressing the educational needs of all Zambians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63g. Managing the economy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63h. Delivering basic services like water and electricity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63i. Making sure everyone has enough land</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOW LET'S SPEAK ABOUT THE PRESIDENT

64. How interested do you think the President is in what happens to you or hearing what people like you think? Is he:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest level</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all interested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very interested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very interested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you heard enough about him to know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65. How much of the time can you trust the President to do what is right? Is it:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust level</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only some of the time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just about always</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you heard enough about him to know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66. What about the way the President has performed his job over the past twelve months? Do you:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approval level</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disapprove</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly approve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you heard enough about him to know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67. What about corruption? (Corruption is where those in government and the civil service take money or gifts from the people and use it for themselves, or expect people to pay them extra money or a gift to do their job). How many officials in the Government do you think are involved in corruption? READ OUT OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of involvement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All, Almost all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few, Some</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost None, None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you had a chance to hear enough about them</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WHAT ABOUT THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT?

68. How interested do you think parliament is in what happens to you or hearing what people like you think? Are they:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest level</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all interested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very interested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very interested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you had a chance to hear enough about it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
69. How much of the time can you trust parliament to do what is right? Is it: READ OUT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only some of the time</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the time</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just about always</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you had a chance to hear enough about it</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70. What about the way parliament has performed its job over the past twelve months? Do you: READ OUT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disapprove</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly approve</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you had a chance to hear enough about it</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

71. What about corruption? How many people in parliament do you think are involved in corruption? Is it: READ OUT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All, Almost all</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few, Some</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost None, None</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you had a chance to hear enough about them</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

72. How many civil servants, or those who work in government offices and ministries do you think are involved in corruption. Is it: READ OUT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All, Almost all</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few, Some</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost None, None</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you had a chance to hear enough about them</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THINKING NOW ABOUT YOUR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

73. How interested do you think your local councillor is in what happens to you or hearing what people like you think? Is he/she: READ OUT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all interested</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very interested</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very interested</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you had a chance to hear enough about them</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable for my area DO NOT READ</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

74. How much of the time can you trust your local government to do what is right? Is it: READ OUT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only some of the time</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the time</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just about always</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you had a chance to hear enough about it</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable for my area DO NOT READ</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75. What about the way your local government has performed its job over the past twelve months. Do you: READ OUT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disapprove</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly approve</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you had a chance to hear enough about it</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable for my area DO NOT READ</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
76. What about corruption? How many officials in your local government do you think are involved in corruption?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All, Almost all</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few, Some</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost None, None</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or haven't you had a chance to hear enough about them</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable for my area DO NOT READ</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

77. You have told us how you feel about the effectiveness of the way government performs its job, its interest in what you think, corruption, and your trust in government. But how does this compare to the government that this country had before under the one party regime of Kaunda. Is government today more, about the same or less READ IN ITEMS BELOW as under the one party regime of Kaunda? [PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Only some of the time</th>
<th>Most of the time</th>
<th>Just about always</th>
<th>Don't know enough about them</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77a. Effective in the way it performs its job</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77b. Interested in hearing what people like you think</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77c. Corrupt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77d. Trustworthy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

78. What about the following institutions? How much of the time can you trust them to do what is right? READ OUT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Only some of the time</th>
<th>Most of the time</th>
<th>Just about always</th>
<th>Don't know enough about them</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>78a. The Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78b. The police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78c. Courts of law</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78d. Supervisory Electoral Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78e. Zambia Broadcasting Corporation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78f. Government Press / Newspapers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78g. Independent Press / Newspapers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

79. With which one of these statements are you most in agreement? A, B or C? READ OUT STATEMENTS. ONLY ONE OPTION TO BE CHOSEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements in agreement? A, B or C? READ OUT STATEMENTS</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STATEMENT A: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATEMENT B: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable to democratic government.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATEMENT C: For someone like me, a democratic or non-democratic regime makes no difference.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know DO NOT READ</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

80. Have you ever heard anything about the government's Structural Adjustment Programme, or haven't you had a chance to hear or read about this yet?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heard about it</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haven't had a chance to hear - Don't know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81. What effect do you think it has had on the way you live your life? Has it made it worse, had no effect, or made it better, or haven't you heard enough about this to say? [PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Made it a lot worse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Made it worse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had no effect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Made it better</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Made it a lot better</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haven't had a chance to hear - Don't know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable DO NOT READ</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
82. Here are two statements. Please tell me whether you agree more with statement A or B? [ONCE RESPONDENT HAS CHOSEN A STATEMENT, PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF AGREEMENT]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do not know: DO NOT READ
Do Not Agree With Either: DO NOT READ
Not applicable: DO NOT READ

83. We have spoken to many Zambians and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, religion, race, and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or a farmer. Besides being Zambian, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost.

TO BE TRANSLATED WITH FIELD SUPERVISOR

INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: READ ANSWER FROM QUESTION 83 OUT TO THE RESPONDENT INTO ALL THE BLANK SPACES AS FROM QUESTION 84 UP TO QUESTION 87. PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF RESPONDENT'S OPINION

84. Here are a series of things people might say about how they see their group in relation to other Zambians. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply interested in your opinions. Please tell me whether you disagree, neither disagree nor agree, or agree with these statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Do Not Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>84a. You feel proud to be</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84b. You would want your children to think of themselves as</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84c. Of all the groups in this country, ______ people are the best.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84d. You feel much stronger ties to ______ than to other Zambians.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84e. It makes you proud to be called a Zambian.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84f. You would want your children to think of themselves as Zambian.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84g. All people who were born in this country, regardless of what group they belong to, should be treated as equal citizens of Zambia.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84h. It is desirable to create one united Zambian nation out of all the different groups who live in this country.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

85. Are ______'s [R's IDENTITY GROUP] economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country? [PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Conditions</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>About the same</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Don't know [DNR]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Southern African Barometer / Democracy Survey 1
(Zambia)
86. To what extent are people treated unfairly by the government? Is it: READ OUT OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To a large extent</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly at all</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know [DNR]</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

87. In general, do you feel that people in government are less interested, or more interested in what people think compared to other groups, or is it about the same? PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much less interested</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less interested</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the same</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More interested</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much more interested</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know [DO NOT READ]</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

88. Do you think that the government represents the interests of all Zambians, or of one group only?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Zambians (SKIP TO Q.90)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One group only</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know [DO NOT READ]</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

89. [IF ONE GROUP] Which group is that?

TC BE TRANSLATED WITH FIELD SUPERVISOR

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

OFFICE CODE

90. With regard to the most recent, 1996 national elections, which statement is true for you? READ OUT OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I decided not to vote</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was not able to vote</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I voted in the elections</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election not held in my area [DO NOT READ]</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot remember DO NOT READ</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

91. Here is a list of things that people sometimes do as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not? IF YES—READ OUT OPTIONS 1-3. IF NO—READ OUT OPTIONS 4 AND 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>IF YES ([CODES 1-3])</th>
<th>IF NO ([CODES 4-5])</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>A few times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91a. Participate with others to address an important problem affecting the community or nation (other than an election).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91b. Attend an election rally</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91c. Work for a political candidate or party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91d. Write a letter to a newspaper</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
92. We would like to remind you that your responses to this interview are confidential. Here is a list of actions ordinary people are taking in a political system. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not. IF YES—READ OUT OPTIONS 1-3. IF NO—READ OUT OPTIONS 4 AND 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF YES (CODES 1-3)</th>
<th>IF NO (CODES 4-7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes A few times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

92a. Claim government benefits to which you are not entitled (like a pension, maintenance, or unemployment payment)

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

92b. Avoid paying Development Levy or Property Tax

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

92c. Avoid paying income taxes

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

92d. Get services like electricity or water without paying for them

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

93. Here are a number of different actions people might take if government were to do something they thought was wrong or harmful. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not. IF YES—READ OUT OPTIONS 1-3. IF NO—READ OUT OPTIONS 4 AND 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF YES (CODES 1-3)</th>
<th>IF NO (CODES 4-7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, Often</td>
<td>Yes, A few times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

93a. Attend a demonstration or protest march

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

93b. Participate in a boycott of rates, services or taxes

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

93c. Take part in a sit-in, disruption of government meeting or offices

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

93d. Use force or violent methods (such as damaging public property)

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

If the government were to take the following actions, would you support it, neither support nor oppose, or oppose it? PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly support</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Neither support nor Oppose</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Strongly Oppose</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly support</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Neither support nor Oppose</td>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>Strongly Oppose</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

94. Shut down newspapers, or radio or television stations that were critical of it. DO NOT READ OUT: ACCEPT ALL ANSWERS PROVIDED

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

95. What if anything would you do about it? DO NOT READ OUT: ACCEPT ALL ANSWERS PROVIDED

| Do nothing | 1 | Contact government official or representative | 5 |
| Speaks to others about it | 2 | Join march or demonstration | 6 |
| Write newspaper | 3 | Don’t know | 7 |
| Phone radio or TV programme | 4 | Other SPECIFY: | 8 |

96. Dismissed judges who ruled against the government. DO NOT READ OUT: ACCEPT ALL ANSWERS PROVIDED

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

97. What if anything would you do about it? DO NOT READ OUT: ACCEPT ALL ANSWERS PROVIDED

| Do nothing | 1 | Contact government official or representative | 5 |
| Speaks to others about it | 2 | Join march or demonstration | 6 |
| Write newspaper | 3 | Don’t know | 7 |
| Phone radio or TV programme | 4 | Other SPECIFY: | 8 |
98. Banned political parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly support</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Neither support nor Oppose</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Strongly Oppose</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>DO NOT READ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

99. What if anything would you do about it? DO NOT READ OUT: ACCEPT ALL ANSWERS PROVIDED

- Do nothing
- Speak to others about it
- Write newspaper
- Phone radio or TV programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly support</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Neither support nor Oppose</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Strongly Oppose</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>DO NOT READ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100. Suspended the parliament and cancelled the next elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly support</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Neither support nor Oppose</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Strongly Oppose</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>DO NOT READ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

101. What if anything would you do about it? DO NOT READ OUT: ACCEPT ALL ANSWERS PROVIDED

- Do nothing
- Speak to others about it
- Write newspaper
- Phone radio or TV programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly support</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Neither support nor Oppose</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Strongly Oppose</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>DO NOT READ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

102. Please tell me whether you agree more with Statement A or B? ONCE RESPONDENT HAS CHOSEN A STATEMENT, PROBE FOR STRENGTH OF OPINION

<p>| STATEMENT A: It will take years for our system of government to deal with the problems inherited from the one party regime of Kaunda. Or: |
| STATEMENT B: Our system of government ought to be able to deal with problems right now regardless of who caused them. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| STATEMENT A: Need Strong Leader |
| STATEMENT B: Democracy always best |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Southern African Barometer / Democracy Survey I (Zambia)
105. On the whole, is the way Zambia is governed: READ OUT OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completely democratic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic, but with some minor exceptions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic, with some major exceptions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a democracy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not understand question, DO NOT READ</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know, DO NOT READ</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

106. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Zambia? Are you: DO NOT READ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfied Level</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly satisfied</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very satisfied</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all satisfied</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia is not a democracy, DO NOT READ</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know, DO NOT READ</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

107. What are the most important things that need to be changed about the way we govern our country?

TO BE TRANSLATED WITH FIELD SUPERVISOR

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

OFFICE CODE

108. Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, SKIP TO Q111</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know, DO NOT READ</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CODING FOR THIS QUESTION IS CORRECT AS IS

109. Which party is that? DO NOT READ OUT OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
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<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other

Refused/Wont say

Don't know, DO NOT READ

No party
110. Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Close</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Close</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Close</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know [DO NOT READ]</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LET US CLOSE WITH A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOURSELF.**

111. How old were you at your last birthday? IF RESPONDENT CANNOT ANSWER: In which year were you born?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WRITE IN AGE</th>
<th>WRITE IN YEAR BORN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OFFICE CODE

Could Not Determine Age

999

112. Let's think for a moment about the languages that you use. What language do you speak most at home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chewa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinyungwe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chisena</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damara</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nama</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndebele</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oshiwambo</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjiherero</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukwangali</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepele, North Sotho</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesotho, Sotho, South Sotho</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setswana, Tswana</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other: SPECIFY: 25

113. What was the highest grade, standard or form you completed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No formal schooling</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some primary schooling</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school completed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some high school</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school completed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some university, college</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University, college completed</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post graduate</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other post matric qualifications other than university</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know [DO NOT READ]</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**114. Do you have a job that pays a weekly or monthly cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you looking for a cash job (or looking for another one if you are presently working)?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No (not looking)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (looking)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, part time (not looking)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, part time (looking)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, full time (not looking)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, full time (looking)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know DO NOT READ</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**115. In the past twelve months, have you been unemployed (that is, without a cash job) at any time for a period of at least one month or more?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes PROCEED WITH Q.116</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No SKIP TO Q.117</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't remember DO NOT READ</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**116. How many months did this amount to?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't know (DO NOT READ)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**117. Do you do any regular work without getting paid cash? IF YES What type of job? Is this a part time or full time job?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Watching, caring for, raising children</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watching, caring for, raising children</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning (part time)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning (full time)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking after animals (part time)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking after animals (full time)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing food (part time)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing food (full time)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer work (part time)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer work (full time)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: Specify</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: Specify</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**118. What is your present occupation or last occupation if unemployed?**

TO BE TRANSLATED WITH FIELD SUPERVISOR

OFFICE CODE

*Southern African Barometer / Democracy Survey 1 (Zambia)*
119. Would that be: DO NOT READ OUT ALL OPTIONS BUT USE THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSES TO PROBE AND SPECIFY

| Employer, Manage Establishment with ten or more employees | 1 |
| Employer, Manage Establishment with ten or less employees | 2 |
| Professional Worker / Lawyer / Accountant / Teacher et... | 3 |
| Supervisor Office Worker / Supervises others | 4 |
| Non-Manual Office Worker (Non Supervisor) | 5 |
| Foreman / Supervisor | 6 |
| Skilled Manual Worker (Formal Sector) | 7 |
| Skilled Manual Worker (Informal Sector / Informal Producer) | 8 |
| Unskilled Manual Worker (Informal Sector) | 9 |
| Employer, Manage Establishment with ten or less employees | 10 |
| Min | 11 |
| Farmer (Has Own Commercial Farm) | 12 |
| Farmer (Has Own Subsistence Farm) | 13 |
| Farm worker | 14 |
| Domestic / Maid / Char | 15 |
| Armed Services/ Police / Security Personnel | 16 |
| Student | 17 |
| Housewife / Works In the Household | 18 |
| Disabled | 19 |
| Never Had A Job | 20 |
| Don't know DO NOT READ | 21 |

120. Do you know a close friend or relative who has died of AIDS?

| Yes | 1 |
| No | 2 |
| Will not say | 3 |
| Don't know | 4 |

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION. WE REALLY VALUE THE TIME YOU HAVE GIVEN TO US FOR THIS VERY IMPORTANT PROJECT. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT YOUR RESPONSES WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL.

END OF INTERVIEW
ALL SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ANSWERED AFTER THE INTERVIEW IS CONCLUDED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIELDWORKER CODE</th>
<th>OFFICE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

121. SUBURB: ____________________________

122. TOWN/CITY: _________________________

123. DISTRICT/PROVINCE: ______________________

123. COUNTRY: ZAMBIA

124. Which languages was the interview conducted in? CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chewa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinyungwe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chisena</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damara</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nama</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndebele</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oshiwambo</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ojibherero</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukwanga</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepedi, North Sotho</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesotho, Sotho, South Sotho</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setswana, Tswana</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: SPECIFY</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

125. Respondent's gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

126. Respondent's race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black / African</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White / European</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese / Japanese / Asian</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could not tell</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Did the respondent have any physical disabilities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disability</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Could not tell / Could not see</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missing limbs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blind, or nearly blind</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the respondent cough repeatedly during the interview</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 130. In what type of shelter does the respondent live?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional (formal house)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional hut (rondavel)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary structure (shack) on separate plot</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary structure (shack) in backyard</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary structure (shed, Wendy House) on separate plot</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary structure (shed, Wendy House) in backyard</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat in bloc of flats</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Room in backyard</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Room in hotel, residential hotel, or hostel</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other SPECIFY:</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 131. Did the household have?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Could not tell / Could not see</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Windows</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass in windows</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 133. Was the roof made of? ONE CODE ONLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metal, tin, zinc</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiles</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shingles</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thatch</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic sheets</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple materials</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could not see / could not tell</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 134. Were there any other adults immediately present who might be listening during the interview?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No one</th>
<th>Spouse</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>A few others</th>
<th>Small crowd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 135. Did the respondent check with others for information to answer any question?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 136. Do you think anyone influenced the respondents' answers during the interview?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 137. What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All</th>
<th>Most</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Few</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 138. Was the interview conducted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inside</th>
<th>Outside</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What was the respondent's attitude toward you during the interview?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>Interested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>Patient</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>At ease</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>Honest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Did your presence in the area arouse interest from neighbours? No Yes: EXPLAIN

Did your presence in the area arouse suspicion from neighbours? No Yes: EXPLAIN

Did your presence in the area arouse fear from neighbours? No Yes: EXPLAIN

Did you feel threatened during the interview? No Yes: EXPLAIN

Were you approached by community and, or political party representatives? No Yes: EXPLAIN

Were you physically threatened during the interview? No Yes: EXPLAIN

Did anything else significant happen during the interview? No Yes: EXPLAIN

INTERVIEWER DETAILS

Name

Interviewer Number

Age

Do you come from a rural or urban area? Rural Urban

Interviewer's Home language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chewa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinyungwe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chisena</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damara</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nama</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndebele</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oshiwambo</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ojherero</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rungwogali</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepedi, North Sotho</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesotho, Sotho, South Sotho</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setswana, Tswana</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Southern African Barometer / Democracy Survey I
(Zambia)
## Interviewer's gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Interviewer's race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black/African</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White/European</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese/Japanese/Asian</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Interviewer's highest level of education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No formal schooling</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some primary schooling</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school completed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some high school</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school completed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some university, college</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University, college completed</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post graduate</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other post matrix qualifications other than university</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know [DO NOT READ]</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INTERVIEWER:** I hereby certify that this interview was conducted in accordance with instructions received from the Southern African Barometer Project. All responses recorded here are those of the respondent who was chosen by the appropriate selection method.

**SIGNATURE:**

---

### THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE TO BE FILLED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FIELD SUPERVISOR AND THE REST OF THE FIELDWORK TEAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Description</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Can't Determine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>159. Post-office</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160. School</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161. Police station</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162. Regular bus or taxi service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163. Electricity grid that most houses could access</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164. Piped water system that most houses could access</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165. Sewage system that most houses could access</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166. Railway Station</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167. Health Clinic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168. Recreational facilities for eg a sports field</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169. Any churches, mosques, temples or other places of worship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170. Any townhalls or community buildings that can be used for meetings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171. Petrol station</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172. Bottle store</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173. Supermarket (food and/or clothing)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174. Cafes/corner shops/Spaza shops</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175. Market stalls (selling food and/or clothing)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the PSU / EA did you (or any of your colleagues) see

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>176. Any policemen or police vehicles?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177. Any soldiers or army vehicles?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178. Any pavements along the roads or streets?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179. Any gardens or fields attached to households containing evidence of crops/vegetables being grown?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180. Any yards or fields attached to households containing livestock such as goats, sheep, cows or horses?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181. Any yards, gardens or fields attached to households within trees growing in them that were larger than one storey in height?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

182. How many houses within the primary sampling unit are formal houses?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All</th>
<th>Most</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Don't know, Can't Determine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

183. Type of area in which interview was conducted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban (formal)</th>
<th>Suburban (formal)</th>
<th>Township / town</th>
<th>Rural township / town</th>
<th>Rural village</th>
<th>Rural cluster / kraal</th>
<th>Urban non-permanent shack camp</th>
<th>Rural non-permanent shack camp</th>
<th>Don't know, Can't determine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thinking of the journey here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>184. Was the PSU clearly sign posted along the last 10km of your journey?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>185. Were there any stop/go aw ay signs along the last 10km of your journey?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186. Were there any traffic lights/robots along the last 10km of your journey?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187. If yes above, were all of them in working order?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188. Did you (or any of your colleagues) see a water-filled river during the last 1km of your journey?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189. Did you (or any of your colleagues) see a water-filled dam or lake during the last 1km of your journey?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Roughly how much of the last 10km of your journey were spent on these different sorts of roads? (tick all that apply)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of journey time spent on each road</th>
<th>0 kms</th>
<th>&lt;5kms</th>
<th>5 - 10 kms</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>190. Graded sand/dirt roads</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>191. Ungraded dirt roads</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192. Off road</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>193. Tarred or concrete roads</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>