In/exclusion and (dis)ability: (de)constructions of Education White Paper 6: Special Needs Education

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that this study project is my own original work, and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university in order to obtain a degree.
Abstract

White Paper 6: Special Needs Education, released in July 2001, is the response of the South African government's Department of Education to the inclusion movement. In this (re)search, I (de)construct this text to explore constitutions of (dis)ability and in/exclusion. I do so because I frame (de)construction as 'an aggressive, political mode of critical analysis that strips conventional and assumed truths down to their logically insubstantial bare bones' (Danforth & Rhodes, 1997: 358). I argue that it is necessary to (de)constructively read government policy that proposes a course or policy of action, particularly if, as poststructuralists state, language constitutes reality.

In reading White Paper 6, I (de)construct the functionalist grand narrative as hegemonic: discourses constituted by and constituting this metanarrative, including the medical or special needs discourse, the charity discourse, the systems discourse, the business discourse and the pioneering discourse. The radical humanist grand narrative is also read as dominant, formed by and forming the rights discourse and social justice discourse. The social constructionist discourse, constituting and constituted by the interpretivist grand narrative, is (de)constructed in White Paper 6 as not reflecting upon the social construction of disability itself, but on social constructions related to (dis)ability and in/exclusion. The objects, agents, action and binaries constituted by each of these discourses are also (de)constructed, as are the voices on the margins.

The purpose of my (re)search is not to construct conclusions, but rather to (de)construct the polyphony of voices, truths and realities speaking into and out of White Paper 6. In so doing, the 'indecidability' (Silverman, 1989: 4) of the text is (de)constructed. With the indecidable (de)constructed, '... discourses can no longer dominate, judge, decide: between the positive and negative, the good and the bad, the true and the false' (Derrida, 1992: 86). (Dis)ability and in/exclusion truths are troubled and the text is opened to different readings.
Opsomming

Witskrif 6: Spesialebehoefteonderwys, wat in Julie 2001 beskikbaar gestel is, is die reaksie van die Suid-Afrikaanse regering se Departement van Onderwys op die insluitingsbeweging. In hierdie onderzoek ek genoemte teks om bepalinge van (on)vermoë en in/uitsluiting te ondersoek. Ek doen dit omdat ek konstruksie sien as "... an aggressive, political mode of critical analysis that strips conventional and assumed truths down to their logically insubstantial bare bones ..." (Danforth & Rhodes, 1997: 358). Myns insiens is dit nodig om regeringsbeleid wat 'n handelswyse ten opsigte van, of beleid vir optrede voorstel, konstruktief te lees, veral indien dit is soos die poststruktuurale voorstel, naamlik dat taal werklikheid is.

Met die lees van Witskrif 6, het ek die funksionalistiese groot narratief as hegemonies gekonstrueer: diskoeerset deur hierdie metanarratief gevorm word en dit tegelyk ook vorm, met inbegrip van mediiese of spesialebehoefte diskoeerset, die relaas van naasteliefde, die stelseldiskoeerset, die sakediskoeerset en die baanbrekersdiskoeerset. Die radikaal humanistiese groot narratief, wat die regtediskoeerset en die diskoeerset van maatskaplike geregtigheid vorm en daardeur gevorm word, word ook as dominant vertolk. Die diskoeerset van maatskaplike konstruktivisme, wat die interpretatiewe groot narratief vorm en daardeur gevorm word, word in Witskrif 6 gekonstrueer, as sou dit nie op die sosiale konstruksie van (on)vermoë self sinspeel nie, maar op sosiale konstruksies wat met (on)vermoë en in/uitsluiting verband hou. Die voorwerpe, agnte, optrede en binêres wat deur elk van hierdie diskoeerset gevorm is, sowel as die stemme op die kantlyn, word ook deur hierdie diskoeerset gekonstrueer.

Die doel van my onderzoek is nie om uitsluitings te konstrueer nie, maar eerder om die polifonie van stemme, waarhede en realiteite wat vanuit Witskrif 6 tot ons spreek, maar ook inspraak daarin het, te konstrueer. Deur dit te doen, word die "indecidability" (Silverman, 1989: 4) van die teks gekonstrueer. Met die nie-besluitnemende "... discourses can no longer dominate, judge, decide: between the positive and negative, the good and the bad, the true and the false" (Derrida, 1992: 86). (On)vermoë en die in/uitsluiting van waarhede is problematies en die teks word oopgemaak vir verskillende interpretasies.
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Chapter 1: Setting the Scene

By deconstructivist, I mean stories that foreground the unsaid in our saying, 'the elisions, blind-spots, loci of the unsayable within texts'.
Grosz (Lather, 1991: 87)

1.1. Constructing Relevance

In July 2001, the Department of Education published ‘Education White Paper 6: Special Needs Education’ (hereafter referred to as White Paper 6): a policy document constituted as outlining the framework for an inclusive education and training system in South Africa. This text, I argue, both constructs and is constructed by narratives about in/exclusion and (dis)ability. My aim is to (de)construct grand narratives, discourses and objects, agents, actions, binaries and voices in the margins constituting in/exclusion and (dis)ability in White Paper 6.

The value of this I narrate as political - a challenge to the reification of constructions of (dis)ability and in/exclusion, a demystification of policy and legislation stories by exploring them as constructed. To this end, I find Danforth and Rhodes' (1997: 358) construction of deconstruction useful: ‘Deconstruction is an aggressive, political mode of critical analysis that strips conventional and assumed truths down to their logically insubstantial bare bones’.

That a critical approach to policy is of value in the field of educational psychology is supported by the ethical code, which, under the principle of social responsibility, states that psychologists should ‘encourage the development of law and social policy that serves the interests of their patients and clients and the public’ (Thompson & Rudolph, 1996: 591). Sharratt (1995) also describes the need for students of educational psychology to reflect on and exercise critical ability in the area of policy.

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1 A term used by Keary (1998: 225) to represent the exclusion within inclusion: ‘questions of who speaks for and represents whom’
2 Reification is described by Warner (1993: 319) as occurring when ‘an object which is, at least in part, socially and historically produced (e.g. learning disabilities) is assumed to be a “natural thing” and the fact that it has been created by humans becomes hidden’.
1.2. Constructing Self

... by reflexive, I mean those stories which bring the teller of the tale back into the narrative, embodied, desiring, invested in a variety of often contradictory privileges and struggles.
(Lather, 1991: 87)

As (re)searcher, narrator, reader and (de)constructor, I story myself within my narrative to (de)construct positioning, motives and influences.

I am a trainee psychologist in the field of education with a particular interest in inclusive employment and therefore an education and training system facilitating school to work transition. I narrate inherent value in continuous (de)construction of narratives legitimised and given 'truth' status by the words 'legislation' or 'government policy' or 'scientific finding' or 'academic knowledge' or 'religious revelation'.

My commitment to (de)constructing dominant and marginalised voices comes from my own and familial experiences of marginalisation. I have a sister disabled by a speech impairment and subsequent 'mental illness'. I have witnessed her exclusion at home, school and in the labour market - thus my focus on inclusion. I have witnessed others silencing and even actively denigrating her voice. I have witnessed her slipping into 'psychosis', which I story as a space in which she can speak and in which her voice is grandiose.

I am a woman raised by a single mother and a grandmother. I have both experienced and witnessed marginalisation, silencing and devaluing of woman as 'the Other'. I have been objectified and minimised by catcalls and words such as 'cherry', 'pussy' and 'chick'. I have been spoken over by men in business and social contexts. I have seen my mother, a secretary, working ten-hour days for a minimal wage. I have heard my grandmother speak of her dreams to be a teacher, foiled because, as a woman, her further education was sacrificed for that of her brothers.

3 Within this text I use the verbs 'story' and 'narrate' and the nouns 'story' and 'narrative' interchangeably. I construct them both as representing 'events linked in sequence across time according to a plot' (Morgan, 2000: 5)
4 I place these signifiers in quotes because they are constructions constituted by the medical discourse. The mind/body duality characterizes this discourse, as does the label 'illness', which pathologises what could be constructed as an adaptive response in a particular context.
5 As in the above, this is a construction constituted by the medical discourse, which privileges some experiences as healthy and others as pathological or psychotic.
I was raised in a religious orientation, Christian Science, which is marginalised and even demonised by mainstream Christian religions. I was silenced in religious instruction classes in a Christian National Education system. The same religious system taught us that ‘God made man in his image and likeness’ (sic) and that all human beings reflect God: a construction silenced and actively opposed in the classroom and in leadership camps by teachers promoting the previous apartheid system.

I could not but become aware of different realities, an awareness heightened by the Christian Science tenet that the spiritual, and not the material, is real. Thus realities, for me, were conflicting constructions from an early age, with mine often devalued. I thus became aware of how some constructions are more powerful than others and, as someone who constructed herself as experiencing oppression, rebelled against the dominant constructions.

As an adult woman I have become increasingly aware of how languaged constructions of ‘the other’, those of different races, religions, genders and abilities, are used to narrate value in segregation and exclusion. Binaries - elevating what is male, white, Christian, heterosexual and constructed as able - become ‘truth’ stories. Such narratives are given ‘knowledge’ status by, among others, religious and positivist medical and psychological discourses: Gregory (1996:279), for example, cites Jensen’s 1969 ‘scientific’ finding that ‘genetic factors are strongly implicated in the average Negro-white intelligence difference’. ‘Science’ justifies racism, which in South Africa led to the devaluing, marginalisation and even silencing of many voices.

(De)constructing dominant or truth narratives to reveal silenced voices is therefore, perhaps, an effort to give voice to my sister, my mother, my grandmother, myself and all those I construct as marginalised. In constructing alternative, silenced, conflicting, contradictory and challenging voices, I story emancipation.

Yet even for these voices, I make no ‘knowledge’ claims, because in the storying of ‘truth’ I see the languaging of power-knowledge. I therefore attempt to constantly foreground the constructed nature of my narrative and I invite the reader to read (de)constructively.

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6 A term used by Foucault to indicate the relationship between power and knowledge (1977: 27)
1.3. Constructing Context

Post-apartheid South Africa has been storied in legislation as a democracy protecting and promoting the rights of all. Implicit in this story is the construction of the new government as the antithesis of the old, with various bipolarities, emerging including old-new, autocratic-democratic, oppressive-free, unjust-just, segregated-united. Nowhere are these more evident than in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The preamble to this text constructs it as a means to ‘heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights’, and further to ‘improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person’ (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: 3).

Among those constructed as discriminated against by the old order are people with disabilities, states the Integrated National Disability Strategy White Paper (INDS), released by the Office of the Deputy President in November 1997. INDS refers to people with disabilities as having been ‘excluded from the mainstream of society and … thus been prevented from accessing fundamental social, political and economic rights’. The previous National Party government’s contribution to this exclusion is cited as ‘the political and economic inequalities of the apartheid system’ and ‘a discriminatory and weak legislative framework which has sanctioned and reinforced exclusionary barriers’ (INDS, 1997). However, even post-1994 legislation in South Africa is described by INDS as both failing to protect the rights of people with disabilities and creating barriers that prevent them accessing equal opportunities: ‘… some new laws and amendments contain sections with directly or indirectly lead to discrimination against people with disabilities’ (INDS, 1997).

Taking INDS evaluation into account, I find it significant that the Constitution (1996: 5), describing the values upon which it is founded, cites ‘non-racialism and non-sexism’ but does not mention non-ableism and non-ageism. Point 9.3 of the Bill of Rights does, however, forbid the state or any person to ‘unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth’. Point 9.5 states that ‘discrimination is unfair until established as fair’ (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: 8).

7 No page numbers are cited for INDS as the text was downloaded from www.gladnet.org/infobase/legislation/text/disabilitysa.htm (2 March 2001).
Since 1994, policy documents, Green Papers, White Papers and Acts have been produced constructing their purpose as promoting and protecting the rights of people with disabilities. In education, children with disabilities are constructed as being part of a larger group given the name ‘learners with special needs’ or ‘learners experiencing barriers to learning and development’. Texts promoting their in/exclusion include:

- The Education White Paper 1 on Education and Training (Department of Education, 1995), which discussed the importance of addressing the needs of learners with special needs both in special and mainstream schools;
- The SA Schools Act (1996), which stated that principals and heads of departments should take into account the rights and wishes of the parents in deciding where learners with special needs should be placed. It was also recommended that schools accommodating such learners should have persons with expertise in the field on the governing body;
- The Report of the National Commission on Special Education Needs and Training and the National Committee for Education Support Services (NCSNET/NCESS): Quality Education for All (Department of Education, 1997), which described special needs as ‘barriers to learning and development’, with one category of barriers being (dis)ability;
- The Consultative Paper No. 1 on Special Education: Building an Inclusive Education and Training System (Department of Education, 1999), based largely on the recommendations of the above document;
- The Higher Education White Paper, which calls for identification of existing inequalities ‘which are the product of policies, structures and practices based on racial, gender, disability and other forms of discrimination or disadvantage’ and ‘a programme of transformation with a view to redress’;
- The Education White Paper 6: Special Needs Education (Department of Education, 2001), which I will (de)construct in my narrative.

1.4. Constructing Focus

1.4.1. The Question

What grand narratives, discourses, agents, actions, objects, binaries and voices on the margins constituting in/exclusion and (dis)ability will I (de)construct in reading White Paper 6? Grand

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8 No page numbers are cited as the text was downloaded from www.gov.za (31 July 2001)
narratives I read as the paradigms or worldviews constructed by and constructing discourses that constitute agents, actions, objects and binaries and that also marginalise certain voices. I will elaborate on these terms further in Chapter 2.

1.4.2. The Choice

Criteria I used in selecting White Paper 6 for (de)construction were:

- immediacy: the text was published in July 2001;
- relevance: I narrate it as central to the construction of (dis)ability and in/exclusion in education in South Africa today.

To language my choice in positivist terminology, this could be described as ‘purposeful sampling’. Patton, quoted in Merriam (1998: 61), argues that:

...the logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the narrative, thus the term purposeful sampling.

I have a problem with Patton’s language, in that ‘learning’ suggests there is a truth to be discovered. I would also like to substitute the word ‘information-rich’ with meaning-rich and to stress that ‘issues of central importance’ and the ‘purpose of the narrative’ are storied by me and emerge from my desires as ‘emancipatory enquirer’ (Lather, 1991: 15).

1.5. Constructing Intent

The intent of my narrative is (de)constructive, with emancipation seen as emerging from such a process. I call such a process (de)constructive in that I aim to disrupt or trouble ‘truth’ or ‘unquestioned’ stories in the legislation: exploring binaries, hierarchies and inconsistencies constituted by discourses and the silences and ‘rebel voices’ (Boje & Dennehy: 1999) in their margins.

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9 Lye (1996) uses the strikethrough option to graphically signify the instability of ideas such as ‘truth’
I see this as emancipatory in that, in (de)constructing such stories, it creates space for alternative narratives or knowledges. As Clough and Barton (1998: 5) cogently state: ‘One move which has been characteristic of emancipatory research and its variants is to exploit the potential for multiple constructions in order to subvert and critique those constructions which are currently dominant.’

1.6. Constructing Approach

1.6.1. Antifoundationalism and Poststructuralism

My narrative is antifoundational and poststructural which, as Skrtic (1995: 36) points out, ‘falls outside the four-paradigm matrix of modern social knowledge’, questioning constructions of both objective (quantitative) and subjective (qualitative) ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’.

![Figure 1: Skrtic's Four Paradigms of Modern Social Scientific Thought (1995: 31)](image)

Skrtic argues that because these paradigms are based on mutually exclusive views of the social world and science, they cannot be measured by the same standards. He notes that each paradigm thus produces ‘a particular type of modern knowledge because it is a unique, historically situated way of seeing that defines the metathetical frame of reference of the scientists who work within it’ (Skrtic, 1995: 30).

Falzon (1998:3) describes antifoundationalism as ‘the rejection of any absolute overarching, unifying standpoint’. With this comes the recognition that there are no universal standards or criteria to judge claims of truth or knowledge. The only ‘truth’ is recognition of multiple paradigms...
and perspectives and on-going conversations among these voices, or what Falzon calls ‘social

... antifoundationalists call for a relativistic form of social analysis, a dialogical discourse in
which no modern methodological, theoretical, disciplinary, or paradigmatic perspectives can
claim cognitive superiority.

Poststructuralism I construct as both similar and different to antifoundationalism. Poststructuralism,
as does antifoundationalism, rejects the storying of universal deep structures (or foundations)
underlying surface appearances and regulated by laws that can be discovered through science.
Poststructuralists also reject the past, dominant assumption that we can understand and fully
represent social reality within a single theoretical scheme or metanarrative. Instead,
poststructuralists see social realities as narratives situated in particular social, cultural or historical
contexts (Miller, 1997: 63).

Poststructuralism seems to differ from antifoundationalism in its focus on the languaging of social
realities. Poststructuralist writers (among them, O’Connell: 1998; Goolishian & Anderson: 1987,
1988; Miller: 1997; Sluzki: 1992) describe social realities as constructed and sustained through the
use of language. As Miller (1997: 63) writes:

In using language we construct complex signs that are linked in ways that are similar to
spiders’ webs. That is, as spiders weave their webs, it becomes increasingly difficult to
answer such seemingly simple and straightforward questions as, where do the webs begin?
Where are the web building projects going? And to what extent are the projects shaped by
the spiders’ choices and by the constraints provided by the emergent webs?
Poststructuralists argue that these questions are not answerable in any absolute sense ... the
best way to avoid the endless pursuit of such questions is to focus on the ways in which we
use language in our everyday lives to construct meanings ... these meanings are unstable
and shifting ... meaning(s) ... (are) always contingent on the contexts and language games
within which they are described and/or categorized.

Poststructuralism offers a way to move beyond the four foundational paradigms, which all seek the
‘right’ or ‘best’ way to seek and find ‘valid knowledge’. Instead, I argue, it examines the multiple,
ever-changing realities constructed through languaging and highlights their constructed nature
through multi-voiced social dialogue and deconstruction.
I story my approach as falling within what Skrtic (1995: 36) calls radical or continental postmodernism, embodied in the works of writers such as Derrida (1988, 1992) and Foucault (1977, 1988, 1994), both of whom see claims of knowledge as but historically-situated constructions which oppress or subjugate other knowledges. Paradigms, I story as oppressive grand narratives.

1.6.2. Deconstruction

I construct deconstruction as an approach emerging from poststructuralism. It involves a reading of texts to expose inconsistencies, contradictions and silences constituted by grand narratives and discourses. As Grosz (Lather, 1991: 5) posits:

The goal of deconstruction is to keep things in process, to disrupt, to keep the system in play, to set up procedures to demystify continuously the realities we create ....

Why deconstruct? I see the value of poststructuralist thought and deconstruction as questioning and troubling what may otherwise become truths, or what White and Epston call (1990: 27) ‘dominant narratives’ that subjugate the stories of others. I see myself as placed in a time in which postmodernist thought challenges all knowledges or truth stories, a time of ‘... critical discourses which disrupt the smooth passage of what Foucault (1980) calls "regimes of truth"' (Lather, 1991: 6-7).

1.7. Constructing Languaging

I speak as ‘I’ in my narrative because I challenge the construction of authoritative, knowing absence constructed by the use of self-objectifying phrases such as ‘the researcher’. Removing ‘I’ removes the person from the story and thus imbues the personal, constructed in a particular context, with qualities of universality and objectivity. The goal of the removal of ‘I’ thus seems to be to create ‘truth’ stories that subjugate and marginalise alternative narratives not storied as constructed by an objectified absence. Removal of ‘I’ silences the voice that says:

This is what fools people: a man (sic) is always a teller of tales, he lives surrounded by his stories and the stories of others, he sees everything that happens to him through them ...

(Jean-Paul Sartre in McAdams, 1993: 17)
Beavis and Gough (2000: 76), who cite Jones (1992), present other arguments for the presence of ‘I’ in (re) search:

- ‘I’ maintains relations of power between ‘academic’ researcher and subject. I would suggest it also maintains relations of power between authoritative absent writer and reader;
- ‘I’ is central in that ‘our accounts of the world are constructions made from the language, meanings and ideas historically available to us, the “I”’ (Beavis & Gough, 2000: 76).

I also argue that, by speaking as the ‘I’, I constitute a voice on the margins of positivist texts. In so doing, I ‘explicitly take the stand of those who have been subjugated by dominant discourse - a stand many poststructuralist writers see as a “preferred position” from which to begin (re)search’ (Beavis & Gough, 2000: 76).

I will also refer to my text as (re)search or narrative because I do not constitute ‘research’ in the way that dominant narratives describe it. The Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 1217) constructs research as follows:

**Research**: (Noun): the systematic investigation into and study of materials and sources in order to establish facts and reach new conclusions; (Verb): carry out research into, use research to discover or verify information presented in (a book, programme, etc)

- **ORIGIN**: French *re* (expressing intensive force) + *cerchier* ‘to search’

I construct this dictionary definition as illustrating how the word ‘research’ has shifted in emphasis from its origins, ‘searching’, to a focus on finding. What finding encompasses is establishing fact (a truth story) and reaching new conclusions: conclusions being end points, summations, ‘judgements or decisions reached by reasoning’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition, 1999: 296). To me, this is indicative of the dominance of the positivist grand narrative in our languaging of research.

If I were to construct my narrative as research, I would label it (re)search to signify the idea of continued ‘searching’ rather than positivist finding - the continuous construction and disruption of ‘truth’ stories through de(construction) and dialogue rather than the effort to establish unitary, absolute power-knowledge.
1.8. Constructing Structure

In Chapter One I have introduced both myself as emancipatory (de)constructor and the policy and legislative context within which I will be narrating my story. I have further briefly constructed the relevance, focus, intent and approach of this (re)search. My languaging of self and (re)search was also discussed.

In Chapter Two, ‘Ways of Being and Seeing’, I will further story my approach: exploring constructions, contradictions, binary-unities and silences within postmodernism, antifoundationalism and poststructuralism. I will explore ways of reading, including (de)constructing binary-unities, hierarchies and discourses. Critiques of this approach will be raised.

(De)constructions of in/exclusion in literature will be storied in Chapter Three, while Chapter Four will story her/history of in/exclusion in education in South Africa. The goal of these chapters is to constitute the intertextual matrix constituting my (de)constructions of White Paper 6.

Chapter Five narrates my (de)constructions of White Paper 6: the grand narratives and discourses constituting agents, actions, objects and binaries and silencing voices on the margins. I will also story implications of each discourse for in/exclusion.

In Chapter Six I will reflexively reflect on the process of reading and (de)constructing, on how the process of writing, supervision and rewriting has perturbed my narrative and how the self has been (re)constructed. I will also narrate suggestions for further (de)constructive readings.
Chapter 2: Ways of Being and Seeing

There is something political in the very project of attempting to fix the content of utterances. Derrida (Allen, 1993: 25)

2.1. An introduction

This is a story not of one truth but of multiple truths, not of one reality but of multiple realities, not of one knowledge but of multiple knowledges. It is a story of power: power described by Francis (1999: 383) as ‘constituted through multiple, and constantly shifting discourses’. This power, I argue, languages one truth, reality and knowledge as foundational or absolute: in the process subjugating and marginalising others. This is also the story of a process - (de)construction - a process which constructs the dominant as a response to and thus dependent on the subjugated and which gives voice to marginalised truths/realities/knowledges, opening up the text to different readings (Francis, 1999: 384).

2.2. An explanation

Method is constructed in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 896) as ‘a particular procedure for accomplishing or approaching something; orderliness of thought or behaviour’. The origins lie in the Greek *methodos*, meaning ‘pursuit of knowledge’; this, in turn, derived from *meta* (expressing development) + *hodos* ‘way’.

In titling this chapter, I balk against the use of the term ‘method’ or ‘methodology’, as the approach constructing and constructed by my narrative is more a way of being and seeing than a ‘particular procedure for accomplishing or approaching something’. Further, as can be seen, if one explores the origins of the term ‘method’, it languages and is languaged by positivism: the storytelling of method as an orderly way to achieve (objective) ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’ stories.
What antifoundationalism offers to my narrative is the possibility to create space for multiple stories or ‘truths’ about (dis)ability and in/exclusion: stories which both construct themselves and in the process de(construct) one another.

2.3.4. Poststructuralism

Poststructuralism is another narrative that is so multiply storied that many works (Culler: 1983, Norris: 1994, Flynn: 1994) spend many words debating which theorists are poststructural and which are structural, while others avoid the label. Among theorists whose structuralist-poststructuralist status is most debated is Foucault (1976, 1977, 1991, 1994), whose storying of power-knowledge is woven into my narrative.

I story poststructuralism as a response to structuralism: structuralism constructed as the search for deep, stable, universal structures, regulated by laws, underlying any phenomenon (Miller, 1997). Constructed thus, poststructuralism seems synonymous with antifoundationalism. However, what distinguishes it from the latter is its focus on the socially, culturally, historically located construction through language of ‘realities’. As O’Connell (1998: 10) argues:

... we have no direct access to objective truth, independent of our linguistically constructed versions of reality ... What was considered previously as being a definitive version of ‘the truth’ was actually the dominant discourse of the powerful.

Lather (1991: 13) speaks of the power of language to organise thought and experience, describing it as ‘both carrier and creator of a culture’s epistemological codes’. She argues that language influences our conceptual boundaries, as it organises meaning according to pre-established categories and creates ‘areas of silence’.

Poststructuralism has made me aware that I should not narrate such ‘pre-established categories’ as unitary, stable and having essential meaning: I should not state that signifier equals signified within a particular social, cultural or historical context. If I do so, my story becomes structuralist. Instead I should recognise that a signifier has no definite signified.

Benn and Thompson (2001)\textsuperscript{11} illustrate the poststructural construction of language using the word ‘water’ as an example. They point out that the word ‘water’ does not evoke a ‘quintessential picture

\textsuperscript{11} No page numbers: \url{www.educ.queensu.ca/~qbell/update/tint/postmodernism/postst.html} (accessed 1 August 2001)
2.3. Narrating Foundations

2.3.1. Why?

My story is constructed on foundations, excavated here. These are not seen as absolute truth or what Lyotard would call metanarratives (McLennan, 1994: 332). Instead, I construct them as Lyotard’s mini-narratives or language games (Gasché, 1994: 116), possible truths or knowledges among many others. As McLennan (1994: 333) writes:

... by adopting the postmodern view of knowledge as a kaleidoscope array of limited and transient language games, we can see how deep at the heart of postmodern society, knowledges (in the plural, not the singular) actually lie.

2.3.2. Postmodernism

Postmodernism I construct as both emerging from and as a response to modernism. In many ways it has been (re)presented as the antithesis of modernism, particularly by those writers who seem to equate modernism and realism or positivism in opposition to postmodernism and constructionism (Burman & Parker, 1993). How multiply storied postmodernism is, became evident to me as I tried to narrate it. Lather (1991) and Skrtic (1995) see postmodernism as moving beyond or differing from positivism, interpretivism, social constructionism and structuralism. As Skrtic (1995: 147) argues:

Even the subjectivist paradigms are, according to postmodernists, built on the idea that behind appearances there is still the true and the real.

For this reason, Lather (1991) describes interpretivism and social constructionism as ‘postpositivist’ and postmodernism as one of the postpositivist approaches.

Table 1 depicts my construction of the storied relationships between modernism, postmodernism, positivism, postpositivism, poststructuralism and deconstruction.
Even the name - postmodern - deconstructs itself. As Appignanesi and Garratt (1994) point out, the modern is always historically at war with that which comes before it. ‘Modern is always post-something’, they argue, the modern ending up being at war with itself and therefore inevitably becoming post-modern (Appignanesi & Garratt, 1994: 19). They cite Lyotard, who introduced further complexity into the languaging of this story, arguing that:

A work can become modern only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant.

(Appignanesi & Garratt, 1994: 19)

Kelly (1994) describes Foucault as another who embraced this languaging of the modern. Even though most writers describe him as postmodern or antimodern, he describes himself as modernist, ‘where modernism is understood as more of an attitude than a historical period, as a permanent critique of our historical era’ (Kelly, 1994: 3).

For the purposes of my (re)search, the importance of the term ‘postmodernism’ is to signal a move away from absolutism, positivism, foundationalism and structuralism. To use Grassie’s metaphor of a house with foundations upon which a superstructure is built, modernism would assert that there is a universal base, while postmodernism would state that there are many foundations (Grassie, 1997).\(^\text{10}\)

\(^\text{10}\) No page numbers: [www.users.voicenet.com/~grassie/Fldr_Articles/Postmodernism.html](http://www.users.voicenet.com/~grassie/Fldr_Articles/Postmodernism.html) (accessed 1 August 2001)
Lyotard describes postmodernism as the end of master narratives (Gutting, 1994: 43), while Lather speaks of it as the ‘end of the quest for a ‘God’s Eye’ perspective’ (1991: 6). Giroux (Swadener & Lubeck, 1995: 102) writes:

... postmodernists have mounted a still more pointed critique by questioning the very existence of frameworks or ‘structures’ that are timeless and universal .... The various explanatory frameworks that have arisen have come to be viewed instead as discourses that represent alternative constructions of reality, constructions that privilege the interests of some and marginalise those of others. For an increasing number of social theorists, a universalist, acontextual, and value-free science is no longer tenable.

2.3.3. Antifoundationalism

Skrtic (1995) narrates antifoundationalism as a stance that rejects the notion of value-free ‘independent foundational criteria for judging knowledge claims’. It therefore concludes that there is no certain way to ‘establish a particular paradigm or theory as the ultimate frame of reference for interpreting the social world’ (Skrtic, 1995: 36).

For example, positivist criteria for establishing validity, reliability and therefore the probable ‘truth’ of findings and the theories upon which they are based are but one narrative or construction of knowledge and the path to knowledge. When they narrate themselves as THE way, they become what Foucault (McCarthy, 1994: 250) would call a ‘regime of truth’.

Skrtic (1995: 36) argues that, for the antifoundationalist, truth about the social world is more usefully constructed as ‘an ongoing conversation, an open dialogue among many paradigmatic voices and theoretical perspectives’. What antifoundationalism does is remove the sense of groundedness and certainty constructed by paradigms or narratives asserting foundational criteria. Instead it offers multiple constructions of foundations or what Clough and Barton (1998: 6) call ‘not ... alternative pathways to “the truth”, but ... pathways to alternative truths’. They contrast the paths of positivist and emancipatory research to ‘truths’: both follow rules and procedures, which are different, to access the ‘real world’ and the ‘constructions of oppressed people’ respectively. ‘The "truthfulness" of one does not necessarily negate the "truthfulness" of the other’ (Clough & Barton, 1998: 7).
of water’ common to everyone reacting to the signifier. Some may think of puddles, others of rain, and others of a glass of water. Furthermore, when any of these concepts are considered, for example ‘rain’, again there is no definite, common signified. Signifiers lead to other signifiers, not to definite signifieds. This is known as ‘deferral of the signifier’ or ‘the endless play of the signifier’, which I (re)present visually in Figure 2-1:

![Figure 2: Deferral of the signifier](image)

In my narrative, the storying of (dis)ability and in/exclusion will be (de)constructed to explore signifiers emerging from these signifiers in literature and in policy.

Furthermore, poststructuralism creates in me an intense awareness of the signifiers I select in my (de)constructions. As Lather writes (1991: 13):

> Poststructuralism demands radical reflection on our interpretive frames as we enter the Foucauldian shift from paradigm to discourse. Here, we shift from a focus on researcher ontology and epistemology in the shaping of paradigmatic choice to a focus on the productivity of language in the construction of the objects of investigation.

### 2.4. Implications of these Foundations

#### 2.4.1. Postmodernism and qualitative research

I am not placing the labels of qualitative/quantitative on my narrative because, as Skrtic points out, ‘...postmodernism calls all forms of modern social knowledge - objectivist and subjectivist - into question’ (1995: xvi). I recognise in so doing that there are many researchers, including Burman and Parker (Banister et al., 1994) and Lather (1991), who do apply this label to postmodern,
poststructuralist research. Yet I concur with Skrtic (1995: 36), who sees postmodernism as moving beyond the dualistic qualitative-quantitative/subjective-objective knowledge debate.

Dominant narratives about qualitative as opposed to quantitative research seem to constitute the following binaries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualitative</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flexible</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words/images</td>
<td>Numerical data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation</td>
<td>Measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Value-free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis-generating</td>
<td>Hypothesis-testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holistic</td>
<td>Reductionistic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Qualitative-Quantitative binaries (Banister et al., 1994; Kincheloe, 1991; Merriam, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2000)

According to Parker (1994a), qualitative methods have only recently emerged in psychology, offering a variety of alternative responses to those of the mainstream. Therefore, he argues, it is ‘difficult to define, explain, or illustrate qualitative research without counterposing it to those methods in psychology which rest upon quantification’ (Parker, 1994a: 1).

Yet, I (de)construct quantitative research as defining itself in opposition to the qualitative and in so doing I reverse the hierarchy: one of the techniques of (de)constructive reading that I will explore further on in this chapter. Quantitative research, I argue, focuses on overcoming and thus centres the qualitative. For example, quantitative researchers strive to counter ‘experimenter effects’ (subjectivity) with multiple raters or double blind experiments (Huysamen, 1994: 69-71), ‘nuisance variables’ (context) with strategies such as matching (Huysamen, 1994: 69-71), and flexibility with systematic observation that is replicable (Huysamen, 1994: 139).

Thus, I argue, strategies to overcome the qualitative lie at the heart of quantitative research and qualitative methodology can no longer be seen as the alternative newcomer, as Parker (1994a) writes. Instead, it becomes the pre-existing centre provoking the birth of the quantitative methodologies.
A dominant claim in qualitative research is that it seeks to understand or explain the world or events from the perspective of the participants, thus focusing on the subject's constructions of meanings of reality or subjective knowing. As Merriam writes: 'The key concern is understanding the phenomenon of interest from the participants' perspectives, not the researcher's' (1998: 6). To this end, criteria have been developed for trustworthiness, including triangulation, the researcher's personal reflection, peer examination and member checks (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

Postmodernism seems to move beyond this, taking an inclusive, critical perspective. Rather than becoming embroiled in the battle of quantitative versus qualitative, validity versus trustworthiness, objective versus subjective knowledge, both are deconstructed and given voice with the relative power of those voices noted. There is a both-and, dialogical permissiveness in postmodernism: a critical questioning of the knowledge claims of both while, at the same time, an interest in how both claims are constructed. Skrtic (1995: 30) takes a postmodernist perspective when he writes:

> Each paradigm of modern social scientific thought represents a mutually exclusive view of the social world and how it might be investigated because each one rests on an incommensurable set of metatheoretical presuppositions about the nature of social science itself. As such, each paradigm produces a particular type of modern knowledge because it is a unique, historically situated way of seeing that defines the metatheoretical frame of reference of the scientists who work within it.

As noted in Chapter 1, Skrtic (1995: 36) sees postmodernism as 'a frame of reference for social analysis that falls outside the four-paradigm matrix of modern social knowledge': the four paradigms being the functionalist (micro-objective), interpretivist (micro-subjective), radical structuralist (macro-objective) and radical humanist (macro-subjective). All four of these paradigms, Skrtic (1995: 147) argues, cling to the Enlightenment idea of knowledge, truth and reality. Even if interpretivists explore perceived reality, the implication is that there is an external reality knowable only through interpretation.

For postmodernists, power produces or constitutes knowledge or 'discourses of truth' and knowledge generates and maintains power (Foucault, 1976: 97). There is no necessary link to an external truth or reality: As Skrtic (1995: 147) points out:

> ... power and knowledge are always linked. Behind the appearances in society are more appearances, not the real.
2.4.2. Postmodernism and power-knowledge

Foucault (1977: 27) asserts:

... power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful) ... power and knowledge directly imply one another; ... there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.

The implications of abandoning a modernist concept of truth-knowledge for a postmodernist Foucauldian story of power-knowledge are multiple, but should not be delineated simplistically. Foucault (1988: 43), who recognises that the thesis ‘knowledge is power’ or vice versa has been attributed to him, says that he laughs on hearing this, ‘... since studying their relation is precisely my problem. If they were identical, I would not have to study them’.

What his study has encompassed, he stated in 1976, is exploring - or what I would term (de)constructing - the ‘rules of right that provide a formal delimitation of power’ and ‘the effects of truth that this power produces and transmits, and which in their turn reproduce this power’ (Foucault, 1994: 31). I value Foucault’s observation that ‘we are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth’.

A central implication of the recognition of a power-knowledge relationship is that research does not represent, but rather enacts, power relations (Lather, 1991: 14). Within my narrative, for example, I find myself enacting power relations within research: by storying my writing as challenging or resisting, I story the modernist approaches as dominant and powerful. To a large extent, I find I have internalised the norms of the dominant story. Rather than challenging an external power, I resist my internal oppressor or the ‘docile body’ that has been forged and that observes itself from the perspective of academic readers/examiners steeped in positivist value systems. As White and Epston (1991:24) point out:

When conditions are established for persons to experience ongoing evaluation according to particular institutionalized ‘norms’, when these conditions cannot be escaped, and when persons can be isolated in their experience of such conditions, then they will become the guardians of themselves. In these circumstances, persons will perpetually evaluate their own behavior and engage in operations on themselves to forge themselves as ‘docile bodies’.
As does Parker (1994b: 104), I recognise that the power of this dominant story is not exercised deliberately, but is rather something within which others, I and those who exercise the power are enmeshed. It is such a linguaged reality that to move beyond it seems ‘wrong’, and in this ‘wrongness’, this sense that other perspectives just cannot be true, lies its power.

The implications of power-knowledge for my narrative include my recognition that, within research, power relations are enacted and thus, as Lather (1991: 14) suggests, the focus of the poststructuralist researcher should be on developing ‘a mutual, dialogic production of a multivoiced, multi-centred discourse’.

2.4.2.1. Subjugated knowledges

Connected to the construction of a relationship between power and knowledge is the construction of subjugated knowledges, Foucault describes these knowledges as present but ‘disguised within the body of functionalist and systematizing theory’ (Foucault, 1994: 21) or, alternatively, disqualified: ‘naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity’ (Foucault, 1994: 21).

My narrative, I recognise, may become a subjugated knowledge if judged by foundationalist, modernist, positivist criteria. I also construct the possibility of knowledges being subjugated by the grand narratives, discourses and hierarchies storying (dis)ability and in/exclusion in policy documents - a motivation for my (re)search.

2.4.3. Poststructuralism and qualitative research

Another significant move is from attempting to represent, interpret or understand reality (positivist quantitative research) or perceived reality (qualitative interpretative research) to rather focusing on how language produces or constructs what is researched (Lather, 1991: 14). This focus on language and languaging is what distinguishes poststructural from traditional qualitative research and is another reason why I have chosen not to use the label ‘qualitative’ to (re)present my (re)search.

However, once again I acknowledge that respected researchers, including Parker (1994a) and Lather (1991), focus on language, discourse and power and yet do use the label ‘qualitative’ - seeing such research as yet another dimension of qualitative research. Parker (1994a: 102), for instance, notes:
The presentation of discourse analysis marks it as a variety of qualitative research ...

2.5. Narrating ways of reading

2.5.1. Why?

Postmodernist and poststructural narratives generate ways of reading that are exercised in my text.

2.5.2. (De)construction

Derrida (1988: 4) states:

Deconstruction is not a method. Neither is it an act nor an operation. Deconstruction takes place, it is an event that does not await the deliberation, consciousness or organization of a subject ... 

As with postmodernism and poststructuralism, there seem to be as many different constructions of (de)construction as there are narrators. However, running through all these constructions is the postmodernist story that texts do not refer beyond themselves to an independent reality, and the poststructuralist construction that there are no limits on how a text can be read (Skrtic, 1995: 50). I story this as the absence of unitary, stable signifier-signified links and the presence of difference and deferral.

Derrida (1988), in a letter to a Japanese friend, discusses his choice of the word 'deconstruction', which he favoured over the word 'destruction' because of the latter's associations with 'annihilation or a negative reduction'. Throughout my narrative, the term (de)construction is used to highlight my awareness that in (de)constructing there is construction of alternative stories. I therefore, as does Derrida (1988), challenge those who equate (de)construction and destruction, a judgement implicit in the words of Grassie: ‘To build a house takes a long time. To deconstruct a house takes only a few reckless hours’ (1997)12. From my perspective, (de)construction is the construction of many possible alternative houses and not a reckless breaking down.

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12 No page numbers: www.users.voicenet.com/~grassie/Flldr_Articles/Postmodernism.html (accessed 1 August 2001)
In constructing deconstruction, Derrida (1988: 1-2) looked at various signifiers and found the following:

- ‘action of deconstructing’;
- ‘disarranging the construction of words in a sentence’;
- ‘Of deconstruction, common way of saying construction’;
- ‘to disassemble the parts of a whole. To deconstruct a machine to transport it elsewhere’;
- ‘to deconstruct verse, rendering it, by the suppression of meter, similar to prose’;
- ‘Se déconstruire (to deconstruct it-self) … to lose it’s construction’.

Derrida (1992: 83) moves on to raise binaries within deconstruction: primarily that of deconstruction being simultaneously a structuralist and anti-structuralist gesture. Deconstruction he describes as a term that signifies a certain attention to structures, but it is also ‘an antistructuralist gesture … structures were to be undone, decomposed, desedimented’ (Derrida, 1988: 2). It is a word suggesting destruction, but in the process of deconstructing there is also a process of reconstructing. Deconstruction itself is deconstructible (and presumably reconstructible). Derrida (1988: 5) ironically comments: ‘What deconstruction is not? Everything of course! What is deconstruction? Nothing of course!’

Countering absolutes and truths, Derrida (1992) focuses on the ‘undecidability’ or unreadability of any text and argues that the ‘traditional project of interpretation’ should be abandoned for ‘dissemination, the project of illustrating through alternative interpretations or optional descriptions the fundamental illegibility of texts’ (Skrnic, 1995: 49-50).

I find the most accessible description of deconstruction offered by Derrida (1992: 83) to be the following:

... an edification, an artifact is taken apart in order to make the structures, the nerves, or as you say the skeleton, appear, but also, simultaneously, the ruinous precariousness of a formal structure that explained nothing, since it is neither a center, a principle, a force, nor even the law of event.

Other constructions of deconstruction have been offered since Derrida. Appignanesi and Garratt (1994: 79-80) offer the following:
This is deconstruction - to peel away like an onion the layers of constructed meanings ... Deconstruction is a strategy for revealing the underlayers of meanings ‘in’ a text that were suppressed or assumed in order for it to take its actual form - in particular the assumptions of ‘presence’ (the hidden representations of guaranteed certainty). Texts are never simply unitary but include resources that run counter to their assertions and/or their authors’ intentions.

Silverman (1989: 4) goes into greater detail, describing deconstruction as reading texts in terms of their ‘marks, traces, or indecidable features ... their margins, limits or frameworks ... their self-circumscriptions or self-delimitations as texts’. Again there is recognition of deconstruction occurring within a text as a result of difference and deferral, rather than it being an act or method applied by the deconstructor. Silverman (1989: 4) elaborates:

... deconstruction is concerned with offering an account of what is going on in a text - not by seeking out its meaning, or its component parts, or its systematic implications - but rather by marking off its relations to other texts, its contexts, its sub-texts ... deconstruction accounts for how a text’s explicit formulations undermine its implicit or non-explicit aspects. It brings out what the text excludes by showing what it includes. It highlights what remains indecidable and what operates as an indecidable in the text itself.

I have selected this way of reading because my personal story features a personal preference for the continuous (de)construction of stories regarding (dis)ability and in/exclusion that are constructing and constructed by policy and legislation so that those stories do not become ‘truths’ - so that inconsistencies, contradictions, silences and alternative ‘truths’ are given voice or constructed.

As does Attridge (Lye: 1996)13, I story (de)construction as political:

... deconstruction ... is not a hymn to indeterminacy, or a life-imprisonment within language, or a denial of history: reference, mimesis, context, historicity, are among the most repeatedly emphasized and carefully scrutinized topics ... And we know - though this myth perhaps dies hardest of all - that the ethical and the political are not avoided by deconstruction, but are implicated at every step.

2.5.2.1. **(De)construction and binaries**

A central theme in Derrida’s narrative was that of binary opposition. He constructed systems as creating binary pairs (for example, abled-disabled; inclusion-exclusion), with one term prioritised over the other. Benn and Thompson\(^ {14} \) call this a ‘mini-hierarchy’. Deconstruction illustrates how the term given priority or centred is in fact dependent upon the marginalised other, which therefore is, in some sense, centred (Mann)\(^ {15} \). It also stories these binaries and hierarchies as narratives or constructions - not representations of reality.

Davies and Hunt, quoted by Haywood and Mac An Ghaill (1997: 264), constitute (de)construction as ‘... a strategy for displacing the hierarchy, for revealing the dependence of the privileged or ascendant term on its other for its own meaning: deconstruction moves to disrupt binary logic and its hierarchical oppositional constitutive force’. I provided an example of this when I displaced the quantitative-qualitative hierarchy; constructing quantitative methodology as dependent on and a response to the qualitative.

Binaries I construct as a move from the either-or dualism of modernist stories to a both-and holism - a yin-yang unity. In the recognition that opposites emerge from and are dependent upon one another, they seep into one another. I value Foucault’s (1977) construction of power as constituting hierarchies within these binary-unities. He describes power as a relationship, not a force: a relationship that creates superiority-truth-knowledge-rightness within binary-unities. My goal is to (de)construct binary-unities and hierarchies within the selected texts.

2.5.2.2. **(De)construction and discourses**

Within this narrative, I story (de)construction of discourses as another way of reading texts within the poststructural tradition. What is essential in such (de)construction is not storying the discourses as within texts, waiting to be discovered, but rather recognising that in (de)constructing one constructs discourses. If this is not recognised, the assumption is that there is a ‘structure’ or ‘truth’ to be uncovered through (de)construction of discourses - a move back to modernism and structuralism. As Parker (1994b: 104) writes:

> The discourses are not really there hidden away waiting discovery; they are indeed produced through analysis ...

\(^ {14} \) No page numbers: [www.educ.queensu.ca/~qbell/update/tint/postmodernism/more.html](http://www.educ.queensu.ca/~qbell/update/tint/postmodernism/more.html) (accessed 1 August 2001)

\(^ {15} \) No page numbers: [www.bitinternet.com/~fountain/philosophy/decon.html](http://www.bitinternet.com/~fountain/philosophy/decon.html) (accessed 1 August 2001)

The term discourse analysis will be used when these authors are quoted, but I prefer to speak of it as discourse (de)construction, as the term ‘analysis’ emerges from the positivist vocabulary and implies discovery of an underlying structure. The Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 47) constructs analysis as ‘a detailed examination of the elements or structure of something, the process of separating something into its constituent elements’.

As Derrida (1988: 3) writes:

... deconstruction is neither an analysis nor a critique ... It is not an analysis in particular because the dismantling of a structure is not a regression toward a simple element, toward an indissoluble origin ....

(De)construction of discourses facilitates a process whereby the text implodes: discourses (de)constructing one another as multiple contradictory voices are (de)constructed and ‘truths’ are unsettled. Instead of monologue, there is polyphony\(^1\). Instead of a universe, a multiverse (Becvar & Becvar, 1996: 82) is revealed. Apparent coherence is challenged. As Benn and Thompson\(^2\) argue:

... in the activity of deconstruction, one is not dismantling the text, but rather is showing the means by which the text has already dismantled itself ... one skeptically reexamines the apparent structure of the text, and, abandoning the search for the centre, considers the various threads of discourse which comprise the text.

But what are discourses? Within my narrative, Foucault’s construction is accepted, namely discourses being seen as ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which we speak’ (Parker, 1994b: 94).

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\(^1\) Polyphonic: having many sounds or voices (Pearsall, 1999: 1109)

\(^2\) No page numbers: www.educ.queensu.ca/~qbell/update/tint/postmodernism/decon.html (accessed 1 August 2001)
As does Derrida (1992), Foucault (Parker, 1994b) focuses on meaning making through difference - 'meaning includes identity (what is) and difference (what it isn’t) and it is therefore continuously being deferred' (Appignanesi & Garratt, 1995: 80). Foucault (Parker, 1994b: 94) therefore argues that 'we are all difference, that our reason is the difference of discourses, our history the difference of times, our selves the difference of masks'.

An additional consideration in discourse (de)construction is how objects are constructed (such as 'medical experts’ writing about ‘people with disabilities’) and how voices are silenced by these constructions (people with, for example, intellectual disability are not capable of speaking for themselves). The constructed nature of objects is highlighted during (de)construction, as are alternative constructions and possible voices for the silences. As Giroux (Swadener & Lubeck, 1995: 102-103) argues:

> There is a politics of resistance in which difference is explored through the category of voice. Central here is the need to engage the voice as an act of resistance and self-transformation, to recognize that as one comes to voice one establishes the precondition for becoming a subject in history rather than an object.

However, in (de)constructing discourse, the focus is not only on the construction of the object, but also of the subject (Burman and Parker, 1993: 7).

### 2.5.2.3. (De)construction and my narrative

The focus areas and questions constructing my narrative are designed to (de)construct elements of marginality, supplementarity and indecidability in the selected text (Silverman, 1989:4). I will therefore, as do Boje and Dennehy (1999b)\(^\text{18}\):

- (de)construct binaries: Which one is central? Which one is marginalised? What relations, practices, discourses produce power differentials? How are the binaries dependent upon one another?
- reconstruct hierarchies within the binaries;
- construct ‘rebel voices’;
- tell the other side of the story;

\(^{18}\) No page numbers: [http://cbae.nmsu.edu/~dboje/deconstruct.html](http://cbae.nmsu.edu/~dboje/deconstruct.html)
• deny or unsettle the plot;
• construct the exception;
• narrate what is between the lines, what is not said or what Van Maanen (1988: 26) calls ‘the fullness of the empty sign’;
• restory by bringing in new voices and exceptions and storying the silence.

Among specific questions I will be asking as I read the White Paper 6 are:

1. What grand narratives constitute and are constituted by discourses constituting (dis)ability and in/exclusion?
2. What discourses constitute (dis)ability and in/exclusion?
3. What objects, agents, actions and binaries constitute and are being constituted by these discourses?
4. What power relations are constituted by these discourses?
5. What voices are marginalised or silenced by these discourses?
6. What implications does this have for in/exclusion?

2.6. Narrating text selection

As I noted in Chapter One, the policy document selected for (de)construction, the Education White Paper 6: Special Needs Education (July 2001), is one that I story as of value because of its immediacy and relevance and thus this could be languaged as a purposeful sample.

This text is based upon the following prior legislative documents, which I construct as the intertextual matrix of White Paper 6:

i. The Constitution of South Africa (1996);
ii. The South African Schools Act (1996);
iii. Quality Education for All: The Report of the National Commission on Special Education Needs and Training and the National Committee for Education Support Services (1997);

As the text to be (de)constructed is storied as embedded in this textual matrix, there will also be some (de)construction of these documents within my (re)search.
2.7. Narrating Transgressive Validity

Validity, as traditionally storied, is seen by postmodern and poststructural writers as a ‘regime of truth’ (Stronach, Allan & Morris, 1996: 494), or what Foucault (1994: 31) might call one of the ‘rules of right’ formally delimiting power to produce truth. Transgressive validity I construct as a challenge to this power-knowledge: one which, rather than accepting that validity equals knowledge equals truth, points out that validity itself is multiple, every-changing, endlessly deferred (Stronach et al. 1996: 31).

Thus there is no effort to meet modernist, positivist criteria for traditionally constructed validity. There also is no effort to story the researcher’s objective or subjective integrity. Instead, the researcher is constructed as narrator or storyteller. As Stronach et al. (1996: 494) argue:

... the integrity of the researcher ‘self’ - whether reflectively polluted or methodologically cleansed - would be equally suspect, ignoring the ‘researcher’ as an effect of a representational economy (Butler, 1992), a false unity or, as Strathern (1995: 98) has put it, a ‘representational fix’.

Validity within this (re)search is constructed as creating the space for transgressive knowledges, rather than ‘proving’ the truth of a dominant knowledge. As Lye (1996) writes:

It is possible that texts which ‘confess’ the highly mediated nature of our experience, texts which themselves throw the reader into the realm of complex, contested, symbolized, intertextual, interactive, mediated experience, texts which therefore move closer than usual to deconstructing themselves, are in a sense closer to reality (that is, the truth of our real experience) than any other texts.

In the complexity, in the contradictions, in the silences, in the rebel voices, in the alternative stories, in the polyphonic choir lies transgressive validity - replacing the monologues and power-knowledges of positivist, modernist, foundational approaches.

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19 No page numbers: www.brocku.ca/english/courses/4F70/deconstruction.html (accessed 24 April 2001)
2.8. Narrating Critiques

2.8.1. Narrating value

Lather (1991: 15), discussing deconstruction, writes:

What is sought is a reflexive process that focuses on our too easy use of taken-for-granted forms and that might lead us towards a science capable of continually demystifying the realities it serves to create.

This is the value I narrate in (de)construction: that it provokes reflection on meaning-making and in the process highlights the ways that texts (de)construct themselves. It thus challenges truth claims or power-knowledges that otherwise remain unchallenged.

2.8.2. Narrating criticisms of (de)construction

Criticism 1:
A strong, possible criticism of deconstruction and Foucauldian discourse analysis offered by Burman and Parker (1993) is that discourses themselves are reified. They become the structures that poststructuralists explore, in the same way positivists seek structures and laws to facilitate prediction and control.

This criticism can be fuelled by the language used by many of the writers. Burman and Parker, who recognise that discourses are not pre-existing but are a product of analysis (Parker, 1994b: 104), nevertheless often write as if these are underlying concrete structures to be discovered. An example of this is the quote below:

Drawing attention to the discursive structures of texts highlights the assumptions underlying them and challenges their facticity, that is, their status as truth.

(Burman & Parker, 1993: 8)

Burman and Parker (1993: 162), in fact, confess to such reification, writing: ‘We are also ineluctably caught in the trap of reifying the discourse ...’. What this perhaps signifies is how steeped in positivist language we are and how much we have forged ourselves into ‘docile bodies’ as narrators. We fear to move away from words signalling power-knowledge, such as ‘researcher’,
‘discover/explore’ and ‘underlying structures’. If we do not create stories of depth and narrate our contributions as those of experts who can reveal these findings, we fear our narrative will be seen as without value.

Response 1:
I recognise that in my (re)search, as I (de)construct I simultaneously construct binaries, hierarchies, unities and discourses. These constructions are not pre-existing - waiting to be discovered - but are alternative possibilities that reveal what Derrida would call the ‘undecidability’ or fundamental illegibility of texts (Skrtic, 1995: 49-50) that could otherwise remain unchallenged truth claims.

Criticism 2:
Related to the above is the criticism that discourse analysts or those who (de)construct do not only read but also produce discourse, their reading in some way reproducing or transforming the text (Burman & Parker, 1993: 159).

Response 2:
I recognise that as I (de)construct, I construct possibly multiple discourses that may be inconsistent and (de)construct one another. I would further argue that an assumption upon which postmodernism, poststructuralism and the process of (de)construction rest is that there is no simple, single, signifier-signified relationship and thus no ‘authentic’ or ‘true’ or ‘stable’ text that can be ‘transformed’. As Appignanesi and Garratt (1995: 79) state: ‘Any meaning or identity … is provisional and relative, because it is never exhaustive, it can always be traced further back to a prior network of differences.’

Criticism 3:
Through (de)construction or discourse analysis, writers close texts to alternative readings. Such closure, write Burman and Parker (1993: 157) does ‘violence to the variety of possible interpretations that could be given of any text …’

Response 3:
My goal is to open rather than close alternative readings. The readings I produce, I argue, are constituted in the intertextual space created as I (the reading intertext) encounter the text (the read intertext). These readings are not framed as the only possible readings, but rather as those constructed in my (re)search. I recognise the importance of opening the space and throughout my narrative will bear in mind the questions raised by Lather (1991: 14-15):
• ‘How do we frame meaning possibilities rather than close them …?’
• ‘How do we create multi-voiced, multi-centred texts …?’

Criticism 4:
This criticism raises the question of the power the writer/narrator/analyst has to impose meanings on another’s text. Stenner (1993), writing from this perspective, is quoted by Burman and Parker (1993: 157) as stating: ‘There are ethical problems in having power and control over other people’s words’.

Response 4:
This criticism lies within a worldview that presupposes that an author has the power to impose a particular meaning on a text and that another, who has the power of the label of expert or researcher or academic, can change that meaning and impose another. Postmodernism and poststructuralism deny that the author of any text can embed meaning within or impose meaning on a text. Roland Barthes (Appignanesi & Garratt, 1995) took this stance, proclaiming the death of the author. Appignanesi & Garratt (1995: 74) explain:

He meant that readers create their own meanings, regardless of the author’s intentions: the texts they use to do so are thus ever shifting, unstable and open to question.

I recognise that there may be efforts within my text to story my meaning as ‘right’ or ‘true’ by virtue of storied expertise. For this reason I have resisted using language such as ‘the researcher’, ‘research’, ‘findings’, ‘methodology’ and other words emerging from approaches that construct expertise and objective or subjective knowledges and ways of knowing as characteristics of the researcher, who is thus placed in a position of power-knowledge. It is also the reason I have elected to speak of myself as ‘I’ and not hide behind references to an all-knowing third person.

I also bear in mind the following questions raised by Lather (1991: 14-15)

(a) ‘How do we examine questions of narrative authority raised by poststructuralism …?’ I argue that poststructuralism removes narrative authority. I may construct my text with a particular set of meanings or signifiers in mind, but these meanings are unstable and ever shifting and I have no authority or control over readings. I may attempt to gain such authority or control by casting myself as an expert within a body of knowledge, in the process moving into the realm of power-
knowledge, or what Foucault (1991: 2) calls 'games of truth'. I will, however, attempt not to do so. I will consciously avoid making truth claims for any (de)constructions, because I construct truth claims as oppressive forms of power-knowledge: what is true (generally something storied as proven by science or religious experience) is known and should be accepted, not challenged. I invite the reader to (de)construct my writing to reveal any such games.

(b) 'How do we deconstruct the ways our own desires as emancipatory enquirers shape the texts we create?' I recognise that I have a rebellious desire to unsettle truth claims and this does shape my text. I construct this as not destructive but creative, in that it produces polyphony - multiple voices that may be inconsistent and (de)construct one another.

(c) Why do we do our research: to use our privileges as academics to give voice to what Foucault (White & Epston, 1991: 25) terms 'subjugated knowledges'; as another version of writing the self? I would like to story this as a narrative giving voice to knowledges subjugated by dominant truth claims, but I simultaneously recognise that what I write is self-referential. As Varela and Johnson (Becvar & Becvar, 1996: 76) write: 'Whatever you see reflects your properties.

That which I write, therefore, reflects me, and for this reason I write myself into my story: 'bringing the teller of the tale back into the narrative, embodied, desiring, invested in a variety of often contradictory privileges and struggles' (Lather, 1991: 87).

Criticism 5:
Self-referentiality and reflexivity are criticised by Burman and Parker (1993: 68), who feel that it can be problematic to focus on the researcher's construction of the account rather than on what is being accounted for. They argue:

...how can we interpret anything if all meanings relate only to each other and not to something outside. Self-referentiality breeds solipsism.
(Burman & Parker, 1993: 168).

Burman and Parker (1993) seem to feel it is important to hold onto some notion of representation, even though they recognise that representation and interpretation presume the independent existence of that which is represented or interpreted. This indicates (re)presentation of the modernist, positivist belief in an external truth or reality that can be discovered. What motivates
Burman and Parker’s criticism is their belief that if everything becomes but a story, then no politically-motivated interventions - presumably aimed at improving the human condition - can be implemented. A state of ‘interpretive regress and political immobilization’ is reached:

If all research is rendered only fictive, then it can be said that we cannot make material interventions with our work, because our work is just another fiction. (Burman & Parker, 1993: 168).

Response 5:
I do not see challenging master narratives as political immobilisation - as I previously noted, I see it as intensely political in that it troubles or disrupts truth claims and power-knowledges. Neither do I see the construction of truth stories to justify social interventions as particularly valuable: I narrate both apartheid and Nazism as encapsulating truth claims, supported by the science of that time and place, leading to actions or interventions storied as beneficial.

Those who can accept and live a master narrative and want to make political changes within such a narrative, believing their construction is true and their actions therefore right and justified, can do so. Those who cannot, among whom I place myself, would rather (de)construct such actors, thus playing a different type of political role: one that I story as of value.

Criticism 6:
Related to the postmodern, antifoundational rejection of truth claims or absolutes and the acceptance of multiple possible truths is the criticism that such approaches are relativistic. Burman and Parker (1993:166-167) see the value in the recognition of polyphony - ‘acknowledging readings as multiple and mutually coexistent can work to usefully problematize and disrupt dominant accounts’. However, they are also critical of it in that it proscribes a ‘motivated, partisan, political orientation ... Theory floats disconnected from any political position, and this is a return to a disturbingly familiar liberal pluralist position’ (Burman & Parker, 1993: 167). With relativism, they imply, may come moral and political paralysis, as one cannot take a stance.

Response 6:
Once again I state that the process of disrupting dominant accounts is itself political. The absence of stance-taking and the construction of polyphonic collages from symbols otherwise claiming truth status continually unsettles and disrupts all political truth claims. That this is cast as ‘disturbing’
and 'liberal pluralist' by Burman and Parker (1993: 167), reveals that they possibly story themselves as activists who wish to make what they story as socially meaningful interventions.

In my stance I concur with Foucault (1988: 197), when he says:

... it is not up to us to propose. As soon as one ‘proposes’ - one proposes a vocabulary, an ideology, which can only have effects of domination ... if the intellectual starts playing once again the role that he has played for a hundred and fifty years - that of prophet, in relation to what ‘must be’, to what ‘must take place’ - these effects of domination will return and we shall have other ideologies, functioning in the same way.

Burman and Parker (1993), possibly, are attempting to reconcile a radical structuralist need to change material structures with a postmodern, poststructural narrative. This again becomes evident in the next criticism.

Criticism 7:
Burman and Parker (1993: 158) also criticise what they call the ‘attention to language at the expense of an attention to the materiality of power’. They point out that power is not only (re)produced in discourse but also in structural or material relations or positions.

Power relations endure when the text stops.
(Burman & Parker, 1993: 158)

Response 7:
This criticism emerges from a radical structuralist story in which material structures in society are seen as generating and maintaining domination and exploitation (Skrtic, 1995: 33): Marxism could be seen as a central example of such a narrative. Such a story, once again, embraces the concept of a true, knowable external reality that can be changed through intervention and resistance or, alternatively, will change as a result of cyclic processes.

Those who wish to voice both radical structuralist and postmodernist narratives have embraced what Grace (1997: 55) calls ‘eclectic critical postmodernism’, which values what he calls a ‘dialogical encounter involving modern, postmodern, feminist and postcolonial discourses as a means to invigorate life, learning, work and their prospects in contemporary times’. Grace (1997: 57) stresses that this is not about the ‘fixed fusion or hybridisation’ of these discourses, but rather
about teaching and learning that is strengthened by interactions among distinct and even competing theoretical perspectives and energised by tensions generated during such interactions. In so doing, he creates the space for polyphonic dialogue rather than the monologue prescribed by purists, who take an either-or stance: an either-or stance presumes that one is right and the other wrong.

My story is one of (de)constructing a languaging of subjects, objects and power-knowledge. Within this, a radical structuralist story may also be told as one narrative among many. I do not story it as true or false, but as a languaged construction that (de)constructs itself.

Criticism 8:
Also related to the above debate is Burman and Parker’s criticism that attention to variability and difference in (de)construction and discourse analysis makes collective action or resistance difficult. Such readings emphasise ‘multiple positionings within discourse, yet where difference reigns supreme, so resistance threatens to be envisaged primarily only as residing within the individual’ (Burman & Parker, 1993: 167)

Response 8:
Again this criticism can be constructed as possibly emerging from a radical structuralist narrative in which collective resistance to oppressive material structures is valued. Thus ‘threat’ is storied in individual resistance which, the implication is made, is less effective. The power of the masses seems to be valued above individual power.

Criticism 9:
Discussing the languaging of postmodern, poststructural narratives, Burman and Parker (1993: 158) criticise the use of terms such as discourse, text, narrative and story as if they were interchangeable. They suggest that the meanings and uses of such words should be carefully specified.

Response 9:
Apart from the obvious response that the writer’s meaning cannot be imposed on a text and that any signifier has possibly multiple deferred signifiers, I find that I construct the meanings of these words as largely interchangeable. Narratives, stories, discourses and texts construct objects that are done to and agents that do. They all constitute binaries and marginalise voices outside their conceptual boundaries.
I would construct my own meanings and use of the terms - meanings that cannot be fixed because of deferral or the endless play of the signifier (see page 17) - as follows:

**Text/Intertext:**


A text I construct as the fabric woven of multiple narratives/stories/discourses. I therefore seem to story it as the most inclusive term. I use the word ‘text’ to construct the policy document that will be (de)constructed. I also construct readers and authors as texts. I see all texts as situated in an intertextual space:

... readers, critics, writers, tutors and ... the student constitute a web of intertextuality ... In a sense, every text is an intertext ... it takes its place between texts, with other texts in mind, picking up the traces of texts that have gone before.

(Batley, 1995: 4-5)

**Narrative/story:**

I use these words interchangeably as the next most inclusive term. I construct the words narrative and story as signifying an account or relating of objects or events constructed as connected. A single narrative/story may (de)construct more than one discourse.

**Narrative:**

The Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition constructs a narrative as a spoken or written account of connected events, originating from the Latin word *narrare* ‘to relate’ (Pearsall, 1999: 948).

**Story:**

A story is constituted as ‘an account of imaginary or real people and events told for entertainment, a storyline, an account of past events, experiences, an item of news, (informal) a lie’; its origins lying in the Latin word *historia* (Pearsall, 1999: 1415).

**History:**

*Historia* is also the word upon which this modern-day signifier is based and it, in turn, has its origins in the word *histör*, ‘learned wise man’. History is constructed as ‘the study of past events, the past considered as a whole, the whole series of past events connected with someone or something, an eventful past, a continuous, typically chronological, record of past events or trends’ (Pearsall, 1999: 674).
I use the following terms interchangeably:

- grand narrative, master narrative, dominant narrative, metanarrative, game of truth: these words I use to (re)present what could otherwise be called paradigms or worldviews, such as the previously discussed four paradigms of modern social scientific thought (de)constructed by Skrtic (1995) (see page 6);

- mini narrative, narrative, story, language game: these are narratives or stories that are less extensive or broad, but which construct and are constructed by the grand narratives. For example, within the radical structuralist grand narrative, Skrtic (1995: 123) speaks of many different approaches to the study of social institutions. Each of these approaches, I would argue, presents an alternative story or narrative.

**Discourse:**

I construct a discourse as practices, which may be verbal (written or spoken) or non-verbal, that ‘systematically form the objects of which we speak’ (Parker, 1994b: 94). Several such objects may be constructed in a narrative within a text.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 403) constructs these practices as:

*(noun)* written or spoken communication or debate, a formal discussion of a topic in speech or writing, *Linguistics*, a text or conversation *(verb)* **speak or write authoritatively about a topic**, engage in conversation.

The origins of this term lie in the Latin *discursus*, ‘running to and fro’, from *discurrere*, ‘run away’. I emphasised the words ‘speak or write authoritatively because this (re)presents to me the process of power relations giving rise to knowledge and knowledge extending and reinforcing the effects of this power (Foucault, 1977: 29).

**Criticism 10:**

This grand narrative or framework is not easy to understand, argue Burman and Parker (1993: 161), and is therefore open to charges of elitism because ‘it defies simple exposition and ... explicitly resists generalized description or easy how-to-do-it rules’.
Response 10:
I accept this criticism, as I have struggled to construct my understanding of the framework and in the process storied it as exclusive and elitist. I also am tempted to construct this as a possible power-knowledge practice: constructing oneself as powerful knower because that which is known cannot easily be understood by others. Nevertheless, I story political value in both the theoretical framework, the ways of being and seeing, and the languaging. That the language is complex does, as Lather (1996: 526-527) writes, trouble ‘... the uses of transparent language, language that assumes a mirroring relationship between the word and the world’. Lather (1996: 529) asks a question I value: ‘What is the violence of clarity, its non-innocence?’ I relate this to the words of Derrida (Allen, 1993: 25) beginning and now ending this chapter:

There is something political in the very project of attempting to fix the content of utterances.

In suggested clarity, I argue, may lie an effort to conceal the multiplicity of possible readings within any text. In this lies its non-innocence, for when voices are concealed or hidden by one transparent meaning, they are marginalised.
Chapter 3

In/exclusion: (De)constructions

Social exclusion affects and implicates us all. Our ‘inclusion’ as teachers and academics is but one side of the exclusion equation. In managing the exclusion of others, professionals become dependent upon the very same systems of competition and selection for their own identity as ‘insiders’.

(Armstrong, Dolinksi & Wrapson, 1999: 35)

3.1. Introduction

Inclusion has become a ‘global agenda’: a rapidly emerging, dominant issue within and even beyond special education across national contexts (Clark, Dyson, Millward & Robson, 1999: 37). South Africa, state Sayed and Carrim (1998), has entered into discourses of inclusiveness on all levels of society. I argue that this is, however, a fragmented agenda with constructions of inclusion that vary depending upon the grand narratives and discourses of the proponents. For as I read about inclusion, I found myself flung into a field of contested meaning. I am not alone in this experience. Armstrong (Bélanger, 2000: 233) notes that:

...discourses of inclusion have multiple meanings, used by different people in different contexts, and are commonly used in ways which mask the attitudes, social structures and processes which produce and sustain exclusion.

Lloyd (2000: 135) describes as ‘dangerous’ the assumption that ‘there is some kind of agreement about what is meant by equality of opportunity and inclusion’. He strongly challenges notions of inclusion as a simple matter of ‘relocation’ rather than ‘a problematic and controversial concept which is open to a wide range of definitions and about which there is little agreement or shared understanding’ (Lloyd, 2000: 136).

Dyson (2001: 1) furthers the debate, noting that there is not one agreed upon conception of inclusion, but rather a range or variety of inclusions. These include inclusion-as-placement, inclusion-as-education-for-all, inclusion-as-participation and social inclusion. What all these
varieties have in common, Dyson (2001: 11) suggests, are commitments to building a more just society and a more equitable education system, and a belief that if schools are able to respond to diversity, the previously noted commitments will become reality.

The signifier ‘in/exclusion’ became even more significant to me as I constructed writers’ including and excluding as they attempted to fix meaning and the ‘truth’ of their narrative. As Clough (1999: 36) argues, exclusion is as central to consciousness and social structure as inclusion: we form identity by a process of inclusion AND exclusion.

This chapter is a reading of the multiple grand narratives, associated discourses and constructions of (dis)ability and in/exclusion I (de)construct in the literature.

3.2. Signifiers

In an attempt to get some point of reference in the kaleidoscope - to construct some meaning for myself - I consulted the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th Edition (Pearsall, 1999: 717), which offered the following signifiers:

**Include**: verb. 1. Comprise or contain as part of a whole, 2. make part of a whole or set, *allow (someone) to share in an activity or privilege*  *(include someone out) informal* specifically exclude someone. Origin ME from L. includere, from *in- ‘into’ + claudere ‘to shut’.*

My immediate thought, on reading this, was who ‘allows’ or shuts in? Is it the same agency that shuts out? What relationship of power is languaged by using the word include? How often, in the act of allowing someone to be included, does the includer ‘include someone out’?

**Inclusion**: noun. 1. The action or state of including or of being included  a person or thing that is included 2. *Chiefly Geology*: a body or particle of distinct composition embedded in a rock or other material (Pearsall, 1999:717)

The geological descriptor most captures, for me, my (de)construction of in/exclusion in the literature: the process of in/excluding those differentiated by language, such as ‘learners with

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20 As the origins of ‘include’ suggest ‘to shut in’, the origins of exclude suggest ‘to shut out’ (ex- ‘out’ + claudere) (Pearsall, 1999: 496)
special needs’, ‘learners with disabilities’ and even those who experience barriers to learning. Through such languaging they are constructed as bodies of distinct composition that will be allowed access.

3.3. Constructions of Inclusion

Three words recurrently appear in the literature - mainstreaming, integration and inclusion. Sometimes they are used interchangeably; sometimes distinctions between them are made clear; sometimes they are storied with different meanings.

Engelbrecht (1999: 8) relates the concepts mainstreaming and integration that, she argues, stem from the development of a liberal-progressive society, which stressed equality of opportunity, in the 1960s to 1980s. In agreement with Dyson, Bailey, O’Brien, Rice and Zigmond (1998), Engelbrecht constructs integration as including those with special needs in mainstream systems as long as they can fit in. The focus is on ‘supporting children in an (unreconstructed) mainstream’ (Dyson et al., 1998: 54) with, as Engelbrecht (1999: 8) points out, difference still being accentuated by separate instruction time in separate settings. The underlying message seems to be adapt or leave. Those who cannot fit in are again segregated, either in special classes or in special schools, in which, it is suggested, their needs can better be met. Dyson et al. (1998: 53) indicate that professionals or experts make decisions regarding whether or not the child (or adult) should be integrated.

Inclusion, to the contrary, argue Dyson et al. (1998: 54), stresses that being part of the mainstream or included is a fundamental human right. The mainstream should adapt to fit the needs of all, with the focus being on ‘reconstructing the mainstream so that it responds to the full range of student diversity’ (Dyson et al., 1998: 54). Sebba and Sachdev (1997) describe inclusion as a process, not a state, of a school adapting to fit the needs of learners. During such a process, decisions regarding inclusion are made by those with special needs and their families, not by professionals, who may be seen as ‘an oppressive interest group’ (Dyson et al., 1998: 54).

According to Sebba and Sachdev (1997: 11), inclusion is an all or nothing process: ‘... inclusive education is about how we deal with diversity ... people can be included or not included but cannot be described as partially included’. Thus there is either inclusion or exclusion. There can be no exclusion or partial inclusion (thus partial exclusion) within inclusion.
In contrast to the above distinction, Donald, Lazarus and Lolwana (1997: 20) describe mainstreaming as 'a specific option within a policy of inclusion. Mainstreaming refers to the inclusion of a child with special needs, wherever possible and practicable, in the normal, mainstream school, classroom and curriculum. It assumes that the resources exist to meet the child’s special needs in that context'. The suggestion here is that, where it is not ‘possible and practicable’ and where the resources do not exist to meet special needs, learners can be excluded from mainstream schools but still educated within an inclusive education system.

Thus Donald et al. (1997) do not prescribe mainstreaming for all learners as a realisation of inclusive policy. Instead they describe an inclusive system that attempts to meet the needs of all children ‘as ‘normally’ and inclusively as possible, rather than the child having to be separated or excluded to suit the needs of the system’ (1997: 20). Within this system, however, there may be ‘different ways of meeting special needs’ - ways which involve learners being excluded from the mainstream and relegated to ‘special’ classes, schools or other sub-systems. Thus there is exclusion within inclusion:

Only where it is absolutely necessary in terms of a child’s particular needs, should the child be educated in a context which is separate from the mainstream.

(Donald et al., 1997: 235)

3.4. Grand narratives and discourses

(De)constructions of in/exclusion discourses are multiple. Naicker (1999) and Slee (1997) suggest that responses to in/exclusion are constructed by discourses on disability. Naicker cites four of the discourses constructed by Fulcher (Naicker, 1999: 13-14), namely medical, lay, charity and rights, but omits to mention the management discourses, which are noted by Slee (1997). Slee notes all five of Fulcher’s discourses, but suggests five others constructed by Riddell (Slee, 1997): the essentialist, social constructionist, materialist, postmodern and disability movement ‘theoretical perspectives’. Skrtic (1997) uses his framework of functionalist, interpretivist, radical structuralist and radical humanist to describe discourses around inclusion and disability. Dyson et al. (1998) use three primary strands: critical, pragmatic and rights. Table 3 illustrates the discourses deconstructed by these writers.
---|---|---|---
Medical  |  Essentialist  |  Pragmatic  |  Functionalist  
Charity  |  Social constructionist  |  Critical  |  Interpretivist  
Lay  |  Critical  |  Rights  |  Radical Structuralist  
Rights  |  Disability Movement  |  Postmodern  |  Radical Humanist  
Postmodern  

Table 3: In/exclusion discourses (de)constructed.

From these I have constructed the following framework within which I discuss my readings. I realise, as I construct it, that I am (re)constructing what I have read. For example, Skrtic (1995) does not suggest that postmodernism is a grand narrative, but rather that it goes beyond all grand narratives by creating space for multiple ‘truths’ and dialogue. However, as does Francis (1999: 390), I suggest that it could be labelled a grand narrative, as it is based upon a position about the world (that there may be no absolute truth) and it suggests ways of reading (deconstruction). However, I also recognise that it does not make the truth and knowledge claims of other grand narratives, that it creates the space for all narratives and discourses to be heard and that it (de)constructs itself. Thus the position in which it is placed in Table 4.

In constructing my framework, I also recognise that I include and exclude as I write, marginalising and silencing possible discourses that could have been voiced. Again I invite the reader to (de)construct these silences. I further suggest that my constructions may imply boundaries between grand narratives and discourses that are not there as they construct and position one another: thus the broken lines of Table 4. The medical discourse, for example, by emphasising and giving greater importance to objective observation and individual deficit, decentres and silences the voices of subjective experience and individual strength. However, these voices are constructed in the margins: binaries signified through opposition, which gives that which is centred it’s meaning.

Table 4 (re)presents the framework of grand narratives and discourses (de)constructed in my reading:
Table 4: Grand narratives and discourses (de)constructed in this (re)search, incorporating the work of Dyson et al (1998), Naicker (1999), Skrtic (1995) and Slee (1997).

3.5. Polyphonic dialogue

3.5.1. The functionalist grand narrative

I begin with the functionalist grand narrative because I, as does Skrtic (1995: 66), construct it as the ‘dominant mode of social theorising in the modern era’. Why this is so becomes evident if one considers the following signifiers associated with functionalism in the literature (Slee, 1997; Skrtic, 1995).

Figure 3: Some signifiers associated with the functionalist grand narrative.
Skrtic (1995: 68) describes functionalism as presupposing an ‘objective, inherently orderly and rational’ social reality. Social or human problems, disorder or irrationality are therefore storied as pathological. Social scientists operating within the functional paradigm use positivist methodologies to study microscopic social phenomena (Skrtic, 1995: 32). It is this interpretation of social reality, Skrtic (1995: 66) argues, that grounds the knowledge, practices and discourses of the social professions. Slee (1997: 411) speaks of the ‘essentialist’ position as representing ‘an essentially functionalist position’ and defines the essentialist perspective on disability as one that situates pathology or defect or disability within the individual. Here the medical discourse is constructed within the functionalist grand narrative.

3.5.1.1. The medical discourse

The medical discourse, or what is often referred to as the ‘medical model’, constructs disability as within the individual and constructs a process of assessment, diagnosis, prognosis and intervention as necessary to identify and manage the disability (Burden, 1996; Kriegler & Skuy, 1996; Archer & Green, 1996). It is this model that I referred to in Chapter One (page 2) as constructing my sibling as ‘mentally ill’. Within this discourse, as Slee (1997: 411) writes, ‘The “defective” individual … is subjected to diagnostic classification, regulation and treatment’.

Expanding on the construct of the defective individual, Naicker (1999: 13) states that the medical discourse constructs disability as ‘an objective attribute, not a social construct’ and as a ‘natural and irremediable characteristic of the person’. This construction - of people with impairments as ‘disabled’ or ‘unable’ and of this ‘disability’ as an objective characteristic of the person - leads to exclusion because they are seen as ‘inadequate human beings who are unfit to be included in mainstream economic and social life’ (Naicker, 1999: 13).

As Naicker (1999: 13) points out, the medical discourse links impairment with disability. This can be contrasted to the construction of organisations of people with disabilities, such as Disabled People International (Sebba & Sachdev, 1997: 12), who ‘distinguish between "impairment" as lacking part of a limb, organ or mechanism of the body and "disability" as the disadvantage imposed by society’s reactions’.

Dyson and Forlin (1999) link the medical model’s construction of people with impairments to what they describe as the politicisation of disability. They argue that different cultures historically have constructed disability in different ways but that, as modern states have developed, governments have found it necessary to develop social policies to guide national responses to issues believed to
be associated with disability. These policies, Dyson and Forlin (1999: 26) write, have constructed disability as ‘personal trouble ... disability has been seen as an affliction from which a minority of individuals suffer and which is attributable to "natural" (i.e. physical and mental) causes’.

The medical discourse is traditionally associated with institutionalisation, differentiation, exclusion, regulation, dehumanisation (Bélanger, 2000) and special education practice (Kugelmass, 2001). Lloyd (2000: 137) describes ‘traditional medical, deficit models of disability’ as resulting in ‘segregated educational provision based on notions of treatment and remediation’. However, within so-called ‘inclusive’ education systems, the medical discourse is associated with what I would call in/exclusion or exclusion within inclusion related to the assessment of and provision for ‘special needs’: a discourse that I will discuss later.

I find it significant in South African policy that the report of the National Commission on Special Needs in Education (NCSNET) and the National Committee for Education Support Services (NCESS) still constructs the medical discourse. Appointed by the Department of Education to investigate and make recommendations on all aspects of special needs and support services in education and training, NCSNET/NCESS proposed a move in education from ‘changing the person’ to a ‘systems-change approach’ (Department of Education, 1997: 54): thus a move from focusing on individual deficit to systems deficit. However, one of the barriers to learning and development discussed is ‘disability’; the NCSNET/NCESS report (Department of Education, 1997: 18) stating that there are some learners whose impairments may ‘prevent the learner from engaging continuously in structured learning and development’. Among such impairments are schizophrenia, severe autism, severe intellectual disabilities or multi-disabilities. The implication is that the system cannot adapt to meet some needs and that exclusion and learning breakdown will occur because of internal, individual ‘barriers’, presumably diagnosed.

The NCSNET/NCESS report (Department of Education, 1997: 82-86) also makes recommendations founded on a medical discourse, including early identification, assessment and intervention for ‘at risk’ learners and assessment of learners with high needs for support. The medical discourse, with its focus on the individual and exclusion of those pathologised, seems alive and well in South Africa’s inclusive texts.

On reading in/exclusion texts, I construct three discourses as founded on and woven into the medical discourse: what Naicker (1999: 14), citing Fulcher, calls the charity and lay discourses and the special needs discourse.
3.5.1.2. **The charity discourse**

Naicker (1999: 13) describes the charity discourse as constructing people with disabilities as 'in need of assistance, as objects of pity and eternally dependent on others ... as underachievers and people who are in need of institutional care'. This discourse, I construct as founded on the medical discourse that situates pathology within individuals and thus constitutes them as in need of care.

With the politicisation of disability, the state has become one dispenser of care, using resources to reduce the effects of disability and enable those with impairments to live life as fully as possible (Dyson & Forlin, 1999: 27). Recently, however, this has been constructed as paternalistic and indicative of a charity discourse. The latter, Dyson and Forlin (1999: 27) argue, is both 'essentially demeaning, casting people with disabilities in the role of deficit-laden dependants on the rest of society' and 'can also be used to legitimate the maintenance of social arrangements which routinely and systematically marginalise and disadvantage such people'.

Engelbrecht, Naicker and Engelbrecht (1998: 101) describe the past approach in South Africa as one of 'benevolent humanitarianism', with disability viewed as a health and welfare issue. This 'dependency welfare model', they state, has disempowered people with disability.

The Integrated National Disability Strategy (INDS) (1997) links the medical and charity discourses in South Africa, describing a 'caring for' people assessed and labelled disabled by organisations controlled by 'non-disabled people'. INDS (1997)\(^{21}\) constructs the aims of these organisations as providing treatment and their philosophy as being 'that disabled people were not to be hated or feared, but rather to be pitied or helped as part of the "deserving poor"'. INDS (1997) points out that this charity stance, emerging from the medical model, has created:

- exclusion through provision of alternative services for people with disabilities;
- dependence on state assistance, and
- disempowerment.

\(^{21}\) No page numbers are cited for INDS as the text was downloaded from [www.gladnet.org/infobase/legislation/text/disabilitysa.htm](http://www.gladnet.org/infobase/legislation/text/disabilitysa.htm) (2 March 2001).
3.5.1.3. The lay discourse

Naicker (1999: 14) describes lay discourses as those related to ‘prejudice, hate, ignorance, fear, and even paternalistic tendencies’. I read these discourses as founded on and woven into the medical discourse, with its constructions of individual deficit and practices of exclusion generated by the process of assessment, diagnosis, labelling and treatment. As the INDS (1997) states, ‘…disabled people and their families have been isolated from their communities’. This isolation and exclusion I construct as marginalising and silencing the voices of people with disabilities and creating space for unchallenged constructions fed by the medical and charity discourses.

Extreme examples of the demonisation of people with disabilities abound in literature: ‘The Hunchback of Notredame’, ‘The Phantom of the Opera’ and ‘Elephant Man’, to name but a few. But prejudice may be subtler. Liefield and Murray (1995: 239) cite Turnbull and Turnbull, who identify the following ‘beliefs … wrongly taught’:

1) Children with disabilities are burdens and can make no overall positive contributions;
2) Families and children should have few expectations and be realistic about their lives and grateful for only a few privileges and limited rights and opportunities;
3) Families and children should have few choices because they have few abilities, including the ability to choose;
4) Families and children ‘are disabled’ and inherently without strength, their disabilities being their chief attributes; and
5) Families and children with disabilities should accept second-class citizenship, because that is all they can deserve or can earn.

That these are founded on the medical discourse is evident in their construction of people with impairments as, to quote Naicker (1999: 13), ‘inadequate’ and ‘unfit’ human beings.

3.5.1.4. The special needs discourse

What I construct as the special needs discourse is the languaging of people with disabilities as ‘other’, with ‘special needs’, defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition as ‘particular educational requirements resulting from learning difficulties, physical disability, or emotional and behavioural difficulties’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1377). Thus the ‘particular educational requirements’ are treatments or interventions related to labels of ‘difficulty’ and ‘disability’ applied through a process of assessment and diagnosis.
Traditionally, the educational psychologist has provided an assessment of such needs (Armstrong et al., 1999: 34). I therefore construct the special needs discourse as the medical discourse dressed in words other than pathology, disorder or disability.

Clough (Bélanger, 2000: 234) differentiates ‘disability’ and ‘special needs’, describing the latter ‘not as the expression of an individual’s ability, but as a result of his or her interaction with a particular curriculum’. I argue that it nevertheless is a discourse that constructs exclusion within inclusion and proposes the medical model practices of assessment, labelling and intervention. Donald et al. (1997: 236), for example, speak of an inclusive system in which appropriate facilities, resources and specialised help, where needed, will be available in the mainstream and the curriculum will be flexible enough to accommodate special needs. But how, I wonder, are these special needs assessed and how excluding are curricular adaptations? This issue is raised by Ainscow, Farrell and Tweddle (2000: 218) who, in their study of inclusive policy development, found that assessment of children who are perceived to have special needs created ‘significant barriers to the development of more inclusive arrangements’.

I argue that writers like Smith, Polloway, Patton and Dowdy (1998), who describe individualised education programs and, if necessary, pullout time for learners with special needs, illustrate how excluding inclusion can be. These learners are identified, assessed and treated differently. Here the geological meaning of inclusion as ‘a body or particle of distinct composition embedded in a rock or other material’ (Pearsall, 1999: 717) comes to mind. Bélanger (2000: 249) describes this in/exclusion:

> Despite the fact that students who experience difficulties are taught with regular students ‘together under one roof’, it seems that differential treatment of students occurs, thereby creating different tracks for different children and drawing boundaries between them (Mehan 1996). Schooling might be described as ‘an institution which keeps within its walls people who were previously excluded from the (mainstream) schools, while excluding them from the inside’ (Bourdieu & Champagne 1993: 921).

As do Donald et al. (1997), Smith et al. (1998: 236) describe their goal as education in the least restrictive environment, but how restrictive the environment will be, depends upon an assessment gauging the degree or severity of special need. As Donald et al. (1997: 236) state:
There will always be some special needs of such severity, or requiring such specialized resources, that a child’s needs have to be met, wholly or partly, in a specialized setting separate from the mainstream.

This is indicative of what Bélanger (2000: 231) calls the ‘cascade metaphor’ comprising different levels of integration. She compares this to the ‘kaleidoscope’ approach, which sees all students integrated at one level. I would argue that Donald et al. (1997) and Smith et al. (1998) advocate the cascade metaphor and that, within this approach, the word ‘special need’ is a euphemism, behind which the intended meaning - ‘disability’, ‘pathology’, ‘inadequacy’ - lurks, even if it is constituted in interaction with a curriculum.

A discussion document on inclusion policy released by the Gauteng Department of Education and Culture (Burden, Singh, Topham & Naidoo, 1996: 5) notes:

The notion of special needs derives from the traditional focus ... it is actually about categorising students as ‘special’ or ‘ordinary’, about identifying the relatively stable characteristics of the ‘special’ students (their ‘needs’), and about allocating those students to the appropriate structural solution of the problems they present.

Here the binary of ordinary-different as opposed to ordinary-special could be constructed, leading to terms such as ‘differently-abled’, clearly identified by the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 400) as ‘euphemistic’ for ‘disabled’.

Muthukrishna and Schoeman (2000), who were among those compiling the NCSNET/NCESS report ‘Quality Education for All: Overcoming Barriers to Learning and Development’ (1997), trouble the notion of special education needs. They stress the need to challenge ‘exclusionary concepts from pathology, medicine, and concepts related to normative assessment’ (Muthukrishna & Schoeman, 2000: 323). Clough (1999: 66) links ‘special needs’ and normative assessment, noting that ‘special educational needs are not noticed in a vacuum ... they appear against a background of "normal" ability and performance which gives them relief’.

Further challenging the notion of special education needs, Muthukrishna and Schoeman (2000: 323) describe this as a ‘catch phrase for all categories of learners who do not fit into the system’. It reflects an "individual change" model, which has resulted in highlighting personal inadequacies in individuals rather than on challenging social inadequacies in the system" (Muthukrishna &

I found it illuminating that when inputting the phrase ‘special needs’ into the ‘find’ function on my computer, these words were found in quotes promoting inclusion (Donald et al., 1997; Dyson et al., 1998; Engelbrecht et al., 1998). The term is also embedded in the name of the body on which Muthukrishna and Schoeman sat (National Commission on Special Needs in Education and Training). Ainscow et al. (2000: 227-228) also note continuing preoccupation with pupils with disabilities and those perceived as having special needs, thus continuing the problems of ‘separation within the mainstream’.

Muthukrishna and Schoeman (2000: 331) suggest one possible reason. They hypothesise that resistance to a move from the concept of ‘special needs’ to one of ‘barriers of learning’ is based on fear: the fear that, if special needs are not identified and the necessary support is not provided, ‘the prevailing process of “mainstream dumping” will continue’.

Slee (2001: 168) describes how the process of ‘inclusive education’ has led to the introduction of units of study in special education for all teachers, who must become familiar with the ‘range of syndromes, disorders and “defects” that constitute the population of special educational needs students’. He acerbically comments: ‘Inclusive education is reduced to a default vocabulary for a Gray’s Anatomy conception of educational inclusion’. He further points out that educating teachers in these codes formalises ‘exclusionary special educational discourses as the official knowledge of difference’ (Slee, 2001: 168).

Slee (2001) here indicates power-knowledge relations, also suggested by Armstrong et al. (1999: 34), who describe the process of assessment and decision-making about learners with particular or special needs as ‘taking place within a context of claims by professional groups to an “expertise” based upon their rational application of knowledge’. They further state: ‘The representation of children’s “needs” in terms of particular forms of knowledge is essential to the legitimation of particular professional interests’ (Armstrong et al., 1998: 34).
3.5.1.5. The functional pragmatic or systems discourse

In opposition to the medical discourse that situates pathology within the individual, I construct in my readings an alternative discourse within the functionalist grand narrative: one that situates dysfunction in the school and broader education systems. Lloyd (2000: 140) uses the term ‘school effectiveness research’ to describe this view, which holds ‘schools and teachers responsible for compensating for socio-economic factors and disadvantage’. Dyson et al. (1998) use the term ‘pragmatic discourse’ to construct this languaging of inclusion. They describe it as focusing on what an inclusive school and education system may ‘look like’ (1998: 12), with the approach varying from theoretical definition to practical studies. The end goal is ‘generalizable guidelines’ (Dyson et al., 1998: 12).

Through their language, Dyson et al. (1998) situate pragmatism in a functionalist grand narrative: one that ‘looks’ (objectively observes) to develop ‘generalizable guidelines’ (generalisation being the goal of positivist social researchers). The literature of pragmatic discourse they describe as ‘concerned with issues of school organisation, classroom practice and, particularly, with the ways in which schools can empower their staff to become more inclusive in their approach’ (Dyson et al., 1998: 12).

Many writers in the field of inclusion, I argue, write within the functional pragmatic framework: developing principles for successful or effective inclusion without deconstructing what inclusion is, questioning power-knowledge relations, critically evaluating their positioning or in any way troubling this ‘global agenda’ (Clark et al., 1999: 37). Among such writers are Beninghof (1997: 3), who identifies 12 underlying principles of inclusion: vision, leadership, high standards, sense of community, array of services, flexible learning environments, research-based strategies, collaboration and co-operation, changing roles and responsibilities, new forms of accountability, access and partnership with parents. Then there is Kugelmass (2001: 47-48), who describes the ‘essential ingredients for successful reform’ as ‘commitment to a central philosophy and belief system; teacher initiatives supported by the building principle; structures that support on-going change and continuous improvement’.

I construct the move within the functionalist grand narrative as follows:
Discourse: Medical  Pragmatic
Focus: Individual  Teachers/Curriculum/School/Education system
Actions: Observe  Observe
    Diagnose disability  Assess barriers to learning
    Predict consequences  Predict consequences
    Prescribe interventions  Prescribe interventions
    Treat individual  Treat teachers/curriculum/school/education system
Goals: Individual fits system  System fits individual

Table 5: Change of focus.

Both these approaches are embedded in a functionalist metanarrative that constructs the observer as independent and able to objectively observe and act on individuals or systems. Both approaches exclude social constructionist, critical and postmodern considerations: the construction of disability is not questioned and neither are the disabling-enabling power-knowledge relations.

This pragmatic discourse is constructed in many texts advocating inclusion, leading to the observation by Slee (1997: 411) that inclusion is being ‘reduced to a technical problem of resourcing, management, social groupings and instructional design…. Disablement is not recognized as a field of cultural politics, it is a set of technical challenges to the smooth running of the organisation’. He further asserts that pragmatic interventions, such as supplying resources, environmental adaptations and flexible teaching strategies, are ‘cosmetic surgery’ that ‘fails to excise the deep culture of exclusion’ (Slee, 1997: 412).

I construct the pragmatic discourse as woven into the NCSNET/NCESS report (1997). Muthukrishna and Schoeman (2000) describe this text as a shift in thinking from the focus on individual deficit in ‘special needs education’ to a focus on ‘barriers to learning and development’ in systems that lead to learning breakdown and exclusion. They assert that the education system, structurally and functionally, should be able to ‘accommodate and be responsive to a diversity of learner and system needs’. If it is unable (disabled?), ‘learning breakdown and the exclusion of certain learners will occur’ (Muthukrishna and Schoeman, 2000: 324).

The NCSNET/NCESS report (Department of Education, 1997: 12-19) identifies 12 barriers to learning and development in various systems: the individual (the medical discourse), the education system (the pragmatic discourse) and the broader social, economic and political context (discourses
within the radical structuralist and radical humanist grand narratives). Barriers that I construct as
signifying the pragmatic discourse are:

- problems in the provision and organisation of education;
- an inflexible curriculum;
- language and communication;
- inaccessible and unsafe built environment;
- inadequate and inappropriate provision of support services;
- lack of human resource development.

I narrate the pragmatic approach as developing assessment and diagnosis tools for systems and
'How to Promote Inclusion in Your Organisation' manuals. This replaces medical discourse
diagnostic tools (such as the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders*, 1994) and
intervention manuals, such as *Teaching Special Students in the Mainstream* (Lewis & Doorlag,
1995).

The foundations of such 'how tos' are supplied by the NCSNET/NCESS report (Department of
Education, 1997: 69-86), whose recommendations include:

- holistic development of centres of learning;
- an outcomes based education;
- barrier-free access to the built environment;
- teaching practices, materials and mediums to cater for diversity;
- assessment of barriers to learning and development, including systems assessment.

Echoing Slee (1997), I wonder if this is not a Band-Aid placed over power-knowledge relations in
which we all are involved and which in/exclude. As Foucault (1988: 39) states: 'If I tell the truth
about myself ... it is in part that I am constituted as a subject across a number of power relations
which are exerted over me and which I exert over others'. Changing the physical, social and
educational environment does not address issues such as who writes policy documents, who knows,
who recommends, who assesses, who implements interventions, who accepts such knowledge and
constructs self and systems by it, who accepts such recommendations and implementations. Dyson
*et al.* (1998: 16) voice similar concerns in their pragmatic critique, raising the issue of 'how easily
the rhetoric of inclusion as it appears in national or school policy is subverted by practices which
remain exclusive ... the pressures and processes which lead to exclusion appear to be ever present'.
As Clark et al. (1999: 39) point out, those who advocate inclusive systems and schools assume that changes in the characteristics of education systems or the ‘configuration’ of schools as organisations will transform them from ‘reproducers of inequality and disadvantage’ into institutions that ‘realize values of equity and inclusion’. Inclusive education is not seen primarily as a political struggle, but rather as a process of ‘designing or managing the right sorts of characteristics into schools’ (Clark et al., 1999: 39).

3.5.2. The interpretivist grand narrative

Skrtic (1995: 32) defines the interpretivist grand narrative as being concerned ‘primarily with understanding the social construction of reality’. The interpretivist perspective resists the construction of disability as fact, ‘an entity - whose nature is just waiting to be discovered’, but rather describes it as ‘an experience waiting to be described or, more precisely, a multitude of experiences waiting to be described’ (Skrtic, 1995: 113).

Within interpretivism I construct two strands:

- The Piagetian approach (Thomas, 1996: 231-269), which focuses on how the individual constructs reality and knowledge. I call this constructivism;
- The Vygotskian approach (Thomas, 1996: 270-293), which explores the social construction of knowledge. I call this social constructionism.

What distinguishes interpretivist from postmodern discourses is the assumption that there is a single, underlying reality which, however, can only be known subjectively. As Skrtic (1995: 147) writes:

> Even the subjectivist paradigms are, according to the postmodernists, built on the idea that behind appearances there is still the true and the real.

Thus interpretivist approaches do not deny that there may be a reality, disability, but they focus on either the individual or individual-social construction of that experience. Several writers - among them Armstrong et al. (1999), Biklen (2000) and Carrington (1999) - construct interpretivist grand narratives in their storying of inclusion.
3.5.2.1. The constructivist discourse

The constructivist discourse I construct in research presenting individual narratives or responses to disability and inclusion. *What about Chantel? From inside out: an insider’s experience of exclusion* is one such study, co-written by and charting the experiences of Chantel Wrapson, who experienced exclusion within inclusion: sent into a mainstream that could not meet her needs (Armstrong *et al.*, 1999). Another such study is that of Green, Forrester, Mvambi, Janse van Vuuren & Du Toit (1999: 127-156), which describes the responses of individual teachers to inclusion.

The value of such research is, I argue, constructed by Clough (1999: 67), who states:

> ... the present system (of broadly exclusive provision) is supported not merely in the structures of society (such as institutions) but necessarily in *the structures of experience of the individuals who participate in that culture.*

If individual experiences and constructions supporting exclusion and inclusion are not voiced, they cannot become part of an inclusive postmodern dialogue.

Another argument is supported by Slee’s (2001: 171) observation that ‘quasi-medical generalizations’, carrying expert authority, say little about the experience of disability, but rather essentialise ‘people, their lives, hopes and possibilities’. Individual narratives, I suggest, counter such constructions.

Skrtic (1995: 118) suggests that the value of individual stories lies in their ‘reformative’ possibilities. He describes parents’ accounts of their experiences of and views about raising children with severe disabilities in the community, in schools and with other children as one of the ‘primary forces toward integrated, inclusionary education’. Skrtic further posits that simply telling stories is empowering.

Coming from a postmodern perspective in which I value polyphony, I found the following words particularly meaningful:

> So, let us tell our stories: recognize them as legitimate. Listen to the stories of others; appreciate them as additions not contradictions. And most important, proclaim the value of those whose stories so often go untold.

(Skrtic, 1995: 119).
3.5.2.2. The social constructionist discourse

Social constructionist perspectives or discourses, writes Slee (1997: 409), present disability as an 'oppressive and normative construct deployed against minorities enforcing social marginalisation'. Erevelles (2000:41) calls these 'liberal constructivist theories' appealed to by 'disability scholars'. These theories acknowledge that dimensions of the experience of disability may hamper functioning in 'a world whose organization is based on particular conceptions of "normality"', but nevertheless argue that it is not the differences of disability that are the issue. It is how these differences are 'read' or constructed by the social world (Erevelles, 2000: 41).

Carrington (1999: 257-259) brings the notion of culture into the social constructionist discourse, describing success and failure, ability and disability and the notion of schooling as 'cultural constructions'. These constructions are represented in teachers' personal beliefs, attitudes and values and shape the way they interact with students. Inclusive education, she writes, requires a school culture emphasising diversity and 'based on a desire to explore similarity and difference'. The focus should not just be on the needs of students with disabilities, but also on 'recognizing and understanding social responses to difference and establishing "cultures of difference" in schools'. She links such a culture to a child-centred pedagogy in which there can be no construct of failure because the learner is seen as directing his/her own learning (Carrington, 1999: 259-260).

Describing the inclusion of multiple cultural positionings in discussions about inclusion and education in general, Welch (Kisanji, 1998: 68), speaks of the need for cultures to enter into 'open-ended dialogue, where neither party is in control' and where 'there are no privileged cultural positions'.

Biklen (2000: 337) asks how inclusion can be practised in the light of critical disability narratives: narratives that recognise 'disability as a social construct and which see disability as occurring within shifting political, economic and social contexts, often highly marginalizing and discriminatory in nature'. Such an interpretation directly challenges the concept of disability as an individual characteristic, a construction dominating the medical model of disability.

Discussing four themes in critical disability narratives, Biklen (2000: 337-352) develops principles for inclusion from these themes. I represent them in tabular form below:
### Themes

| Resisting static understandings of disability | Creating and finding contexts for experiencing competence | Learning to recognise and resist normative narratives of disability | Honouring the experience of disability |

### Principles

| Recognise students or employees with disabilities will change (develop new skills) | People with disabilities, like other people, may demonstrate abilities in some contexts and not in others | Teach resistance and disability consciousness as part of inclusive schooling and employment | People with disabilities may already have understandings of the social meanings of disabilities and there would be benefit in making the social construction of disability an element in school content and in employment |
| Approach the student/employee from a stance of presuming competence | Consider not only the student/employee’s skills, but also those of supportive people in the setting and the impact of the setting itself | Recognise that people with disabilities care about participation and self-determination, as does anyone else, and recognise barriers to their participation as discriminatory | Recognise people with disabilities’ experience of the world and strategies they have developed for effectively engaging with the world |
| Educators/employers have a responsibility to try and find ways to assist the person in bridging the gap between separation and inclusion, ineffective and understandable communication, inaction or disordered action and participation | |

Table 6: Biklen’s (2000) social constructionist themes and inclusion principles derived from them.

#### 3.5.3. The radical structuralist grand narrative

The radical structuralist grand narrative focuses on the ‘sociology of radical change’ (Skrtic, 1995: 32). Like the functionalist grand narrative, this story constructs the possibility of objective observation and knowledge of an independent reality. Yet, although it approaches social science
objectively, this perspective is used to ‘mount a critique of the status quo and to advocate change’ (Sktic, 1995: 32). This ‘macro-objective’ narrative characterises society in terms of ‘domination and exploitation’ and focuses critique on ‘material structures of society … things such as language, economy, technology, bureaucracy, and law’ (Sktic, 1995: 33).

Various signifiers have labelled discourses (de)constructed by the radical structuralist grand narrative: two of the most common being ‘materialist’ (Slee, 1997) and ‘critical’ (Erevelles, 2000). I therefore use both words to signify discourses constructing domination and exploitation in material structures.

3.5.3.1. The materialist critical discourse
Slee (1997) describes the materialist perspective as resisting ‘reductionist’ urges to position disability either as individual pathology or dominant social construction. Instead, impairment is identified as both ‘historically and culturally specific, mediated through the organization of labour and the processes of material reproduction’ (Slee, 1997: 409-410). Thus, materialist writers equally challenge functionalist and interpretivist narratives. They also challenge the antifoundationalism and multiple positionings of postmodern narratives. In common with feminists, critical narrators challenge the way in which poststructuralism ‘deconstructs all "principled positions" thus causing political and ethical paralysis’ (Francis, 1999: 387).

As Erevelles (2000: 27) argues, discourses that frame disability as a social or languaged construction ignore the subjugating reality of political and socio-economic conditions. She states that approaches that locate emancipation ‘solely in the transformation of discursive systems’ ignore the ‘harsh reality of disabled people’s lives, which are bounded by oppressive social and economic conditions that are much more difficult to transcend’. Erevelles (2000: 27) therefore proposes a return to historical materialist analysis that makes visible ‘the historical, political, economic and social interests that have supported debilitating constructions of disability…’.

Dyson and Forlin (1999) offer such an analysis, positing that disability is not an individual affliction but rather that it is created by dominant groups in society refusing to create enabling social conditions. People with disabilities are unable to participate fully in society and exercise their rights as citizens. They are ‘effectively "oppressed"'(Abberley, 1987) by current social conditions and the interest groups which maintain those conditions’ (Dyson & Forlin, 1999: 27).
Education is among the systems storied as maintaining oppression (Clark et al., 1999). Rather than providing equal opportunities for all children, education systems reproduce existing patterns of inequality. Clark et al. (1999: 38) describe critiques of special education, which demonstrate how ‘its apparently benevolent and altruistic face concealed mechanisms which worked to the advantage not of its supposed beneficiaries, but of those relatively powerful groups - notably the medical and psychological professionals - who had a vested interest in its maintenance and expansion’. These critiques (de)constructed special education as a purported way to ensure ‘equity, cohesion and inclusion’, revealing it to be a ‘mechanism for perpetuating discrimination, disadvantage and even oppression’ (Clark et al., 1999: 38).

I read materialist critical discourses in South African policy and legislation in, for example, the identification of ‘socio-economic barriers’, including a lack of basic services, poverty, underdevelopment and thus high risk as one of the barriers to learning and development suggested by the NCSNET/NCESS report (Department of Education, 1997: 12-15). In fact, all the barriers identified by the NCSNET/NCESS report, I argue, could be seen as material structures, constituted by a capitalist and racist apartheid regime. They are maintained by ‘a lack of enabling policy and legislation’ and ‘attitudes’ that reproduce the disablement and oppression of some groups and the enabling and dominance of others.

3.5.3.2. Inclusion and materialist critical discourse

Materialist and critical discourses conceptualise schools as sites in which ‘complex social processes intersect and contests take place between individuals and groups’ about the direction and meaning of policy. ‘Inclusive education, if it happens at all, emerges out of the “struggle” (Vlachou, 1997) between these groups’ (Clark et al., 1999: 39). The potential for real social change is limited: these discourses constructing vested interests as powerful and existing patterns of inequality consistently reproducing themselves. As Clark et al. (1999: 39) argue:

there is a real sense ... that behind every ‘appearance’ of change is a ‘reality’ in which everything that matters stays the same (Jeffs 1988); indeed, inclusive education and other ‘liberal’ policy initiatives may be particularly susceptible to this phenomenon given their tendency to threaten vested educational interests.
3.5.4. The radical humanist grand narrative

Radical humanists, as do radical structuralists, focus on the ‘sociology of radical change’. However, their view of social science is more subjectivist and, rather than looking at material structures, they look at ‘ideational structures such as culture, norms and ideology’ (Skrtic, 1995: 33). Central to humanist analysis are the following assumptions, as framed by Skrtic (1995: 136-139):

- a valuing of human consciousness and self-consciousness, facilitating ethical reflection and action;
- a need to increase human freedom and thus an emphasis on democracy;
- a belief that ideologies, defined by Skrtic (1995: 137) as ‘value schemata that emphasise the differences among people and allow injustices to be perpetuated self-righteously’, may restrict human development by causing a schism between appearance and reality;
- the Enlightenment (science), which promised more human freedom and social transparency, but produced ideologies such as utilitarianism and capitalism and social structures such as the modern nation-state, which do not meet these promises.

In/exclusion literature within a radical humanist grand narrative I read as constituted by and constructing five discourses: democracy, human rights, social justice, normalisation and independence/interdependence.

3.5.4.1. The democracy discourse

My reading of the literature on in/exclusion for this assignment constructs the following signifier associations:

![Figure 4: Some signifiers associated with the democratic discourse.](http://scholar.sun.ac.za)
Sayed and Carrim (1998: 29) are among writers constructing such associations, arguing that inclusiveness is ‘inextricably tied to discourses about democracy, which privilege the notion of participation, through which it is assumed inclusiveness will be achieved in ways that are considered to be appropriate’. Engelbrecht (1999: 7) also discusses ‘the wider notion of inclusion in a participatory democracy’, describing the development of and commitment to democratic values of liberty, equality and civil rights as generating ‘a radically inclusive, participatory form of social discourse’. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996: 7) describes the Bill of Rights as the ‘cornerstone of democracy’ affirming the ‘democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom’. It thus stories rights as foundational elements within democracy.

Within my (re)search I construct the democracy discourse as constituting and constituted by the human rights and social justice discourses.

3.5.4.2. The human rights discourse

Human rights discourses, according to Dyson et al. (1998: 55-56), constitute inclusion as a human right, linked to other minority rights issues, and as the only ‘ethical’ path in society. Naicker (1999: 14) also links inclusion to the rights discourse, which he describes as ‘committed’ to all people having ‘full citizenship ... equal opportunity, self-reliance, independence and wants rather than needs’. He cites the following statements that define inclusion as a right (Naicker, 1999: 15):

- The South African Federal Council on Disability’s statement that learners with special education needs have a right to equal access to education at all levels in a single inclusive education system;
- The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa’s assertion that all people have the right to basic education and equal access to educational institutions.

Examples of the rights discourse construction of inclusion can also be read in Donald et al. (1997: 235). They argue that inclusion is important, because it is about the children’s rights ‘to be seen and treated as normally as possible (not labelled and separated)’ and to have their needs met within the mainstream as far as possible. These rights are described as ‘tremendously important’, affecting not only the lives of people with disabilities but also normalising inclusion at all levels. Donald et al. (1997: 236-237) describe individual difficulties and differences as part of life, and state:
These rights accept and entrench this view. In the process of putting these rights into effect, all teachers, students, and the curriculum itself have to become flexible enough to accommodate individual differences at many other levels as well. As human beings we can only benefit from such flexibility.

Muthukrishna and Schoeman (2000: 326-327) read rights-inclusion links in the Constitution and White Papers on Education and Training, which call for human rights for all learners, participation and social integration and equal access to a single, inclusive education system. I emphasise the words ‘all learners’ to indicate that inclusion is not only about learners with disabilities. As Dyson and Forlin (1999: 32) indicate, it is a ‘means of extending educational opportunities to a wide range of marginalised groups’. They describe the role of the state in ‘pluralist democracies’ as building an inclusive society: a single system with built-in levels of flexibility enabling it to respond to diversity. Inclusion in some countries, they argue, is ‘enmeshed with much wider issues to do with the creation and maintenance of pluralist societies and pluralist political systems’ (Dyson & Forlin, 1999: 38).

However, as Dyson and Forlin (1999: 31) point out, there has been some troubling of the rights-inclusion link. They quote Buchanon and Brock, who state:

A sound ethical framework for decision-making for incompetent (sic) individuals must reflect the fact that others have rights and interests as well and that resources are scarce.

This speaks of clashes between rights and interests, but Dyson et al. (1998) also raise the issue of clashes between values. They describe inclusion as an example of the ‘dilemma of democracy’ in that inclusion is not the only educational value and that it may not be mutually compatible with other educational values (Dyson et al., 1998: 55-56).

Farrell (2000:154-155) describes the following possible conflicts within the construction of inclusion as a right:

- There may be times when a learner’s right to a good education and to have individual needs met may be better met in a special school;
- The question of whose rights are referred to - the learner’s, the parents’, the school’s, other learners’, the teachers’ - and whether these rights are compatible;
• The issue of the right to choose: some parents choose special education over inclusion perceiving the former as offering security and specialised attention;

• The type of development valued: research suggests learners with disabilities may benefit socially from inclusion at the cost of academic skill development (Farrell, 2000: 157)

De Beaugrande (1999: 107), who constructs a gap between inclusive theory and inclusive practice in modern democracies, presents an alternative argument. Social change, he writes, occurs when ‘new groups gain the right to determine the theory of the society and its relation to practice’. However, social progress, he writes, only occurs when theory and practice meet and a broader, more inclusive range of the population is granted freedom and equality. De Beaugrande (1999: 107) notes:

So far, the evolution of ‘modern societies’ shows the official inclusive theory of ‘democracy’ providing for ‘freedom’ or ‘equality’ but being contradicted by exclusive practices.

Thus, De Beaugrande (1999) seems to say, the rights to be included are there, but they are not exercised in practice.

3.5.4.2. The social justice discourse

I construct social justice discourses in readings of post-apartheid South African policy and legislation at all levels of society, and particularly in regard to inclusive education and employment. Social justice is described by Gale (2000: 253) as a ‘positive regard for group differences and for democratic processes based on group representations’. He stresses that such justice is not a state but a process, ‘not something that can be, but something that can be done’ (Gale, 2000: 253). He goes on to categorise social justice in terms of distribution, retribution and recognition.

In South African policy and legislation, I read distributive justice, justice that focuses on equal distribution of material and social goods, except where unequal distribution would benefit those who had unfavourable starting positions (Gale, 2000: 254). Distributive justice has two forms: the liberal democratic approach, which focuses on simple equality, and the social-democratic approach, which proposes equity. Equity, unlike equality, recognises that ‘people do not have the same needs or the same resources at their disposal to meet those needs’, thus ‘different distributions to different people’ or ‘positive discrimination’, also called ‘affirmative action’ (Gale, 2000: 254-255).
In South African policy and legislation, the word ‘redress’ has been used to construct the notion of ‘positive discrimination’. The Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 1201) defines redress as: ‘(verb) remedy or set right; (archaic) set upright again; noun: remedy or compensation for a wrong or grievance; (phrase) redress the balance, restore equality in a situation’. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996: 7) seems to constitute redressing the balance when it writes: ‘To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken’. Alternatively phrased, positive discrimination or equity principles will be applied to undo the effects of past negative discrimination.

Equity and/or redress are principles cited in numerous policy and legislation documents advocating inclusion, among them:

- The National Education Policy Investigation report (1993);
- The Education White Paper No 1 on Education and Training (1995);
- The South African Schools Act (1996);
- The Higher Education Act (1997);
- The Skills Development Act (1998);
- The Employment Equity Act (1998) and its draft Codes of Good Practice relating to disability (February 2000; April 2001);
- The Consultative Paper No. 1 on Special Education (1999);

Keary (1998) questions power relations within the equity discourse. She quotes Yeatman (Keary, 1998: 232): ‘The issue is still there: who is speaking on behalf of whom? The conditions of participation can be as wide as possible; the issue is still there’. This is a question I value in the (de)construction of social justice discourse in South Africa. Who is constructing notions of social justice? Whose voices are not being heard?

An alternative argument presented by Lloyd (2000) is that the liberal democratic approach of simple equality with recognition of plurality is preferable. He cites Young (Lloyd, 2000: 138), who states:
The goal is not to give special compensation to the deviant until they achieve equality, but rather to denormalize the way institutions formulate their rules by revealing the plural circumstances and needs that exist, or ought to exist, within them.

The implication seems to be that notions of equity are comparable to paternalistic charity discourses, with Lloyd (2000) constructing liberal democratic social justice as more like Gale’s (2000) definition of recognitive justice, which I will discuss later.

I narrate discourses of retributive social justice as those that dominate in schools, resulting in (re)production of existing power-knowledge relations. Retributive justice states that differential rewards are bestowed for differential contributions to production or competition (Gale, 2000: 256). The questions here become who constructs the value of contributions and whom such constructions include and exclude. If, for example, value is constructed in memorising religious scripts, only those with the required abilities and values will be rewarded. As Gale (2000: 258) points out:

...there are problems with trying to identify and justify talent. Schools, it seems, are characterized by a particular organizing logic compatible with the dispositions of some students (typically those from dominant groups in society) and not others.

Recognitive social justice, as I read Gale (2000: 259), seems to (de)construct both the above, acknowledging the place of social groups within conceptions of social justice and rethinking its meanings to ‘redress its restrictive conceptions’. It is narrated by Gewirtz (1998: 475) as a version of relational justice: focusing on the nature and ordering of relationships that structure society and not on distribution. Where distributive justice is individual and atomistic, relational justice is holistic, non-atomistic and concerned with the nature of inter-connections between individuals in society (Gewirtz, 1998: 471).

According to Gale (2000: 260), recognitive justice describes three necessary conditions for social justice:

- fostering respect for different social groups through their self-identification;
- opportunities for groups’ self-development and self-expression;
- participation of groups in making decisions that directly affect them.
Gewirtz (1998: 475) cites three terms constituting recognitive justice: ‘a politics of recognition (Fraser 1997), an openness to unassimilated otherness (Young 1990) or … an ethics of otherness (Leonard 1997)’. Thus I read it as asking ‘Who is speaking for whom?’ as regards social justice, the recommendation being that groups should speak for themselves. It is, perhaps, comparable to what Lloyd (2000: 138) calls liberal democratic social justice: recognition of plurality and diversity with facilitation of participation, choice and empowerment.

Recognitive justice in South African policy and legislation relating to inclusion is constructed in the Integrated National Disability Strategy (INDS) (1997), which refers to ‘consultation with all the relevant organisations of and for disabled people’ in the drawing up of the document. INDS (1997) also calls for ‘partnership with disabled people’ and ‘involvement of people with disabilities’ in government decision making about the protection and promotion of their rights.

3.5.4.4. The normalisation discourse

A strong discourse in inclusion is that of the right to a ‘normal life’ or ‘normalisation’ - a term defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th Edition (Pearsall, 1999: 971) as meaning ‘bring to a normal or standard state’. Normal is defined as ‘conforming to standard; usual, typical or expected’. Both words are derived from ‘norm’, defined as ‘the usual, typical or standard think, a required or acceptable standard’ and derived from norma (Latin) ‘precept, rule, carpenter’s square’. Thus I construct normalisation as being about standards, rules and typicalities. The discourse of normalisation within inclusion does not construct people with disabilities as having to meet such standards - they are not expected to become ‘normal’ - but rather suggests that they are entitled to live lives that are typical.

Wilson and Bartak (1997) discuss two central normalisation discourses, those of Nirje and Wolfensberger. Nirje (Wilson & Bartak, 1997) presents normalisation as improving the conditions of life of people with disabilities by making available those conditions others take for granted. Carr and Collins (1992: 22) expand on Nirje’s concept, presenting normalisation as people with disabilities having:

... the same opportunities, using the same means, for the same kinds of lifestyle and experience as are open to anyone else ... where people cannot, because of their ... disability,

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22 No page numbers are cited for INDS as the text was downloaded from www.gladnet.org/infobase/legislation/text/disabilitysa.htm (2 March 2001).
achieve these socially-valued goals, they should have specialist support and help to attain them; but this support and help should not demean or devalue them as people and the goals aimed for should not be diminished or modified.

Wolfensberger (Wilson & Bartak, 1997: 214) describes normalisation as redressing or undoing social devaluation by establishing socially valued roles for people with disabilities who will then, because their roles are socially valued, be provided with benefits associated with those roles. He calls this ‘social role valorisation’.

Such normalisation discourses, I argue, lack reflexive critique. There is no critical examination of socially valued opportunities, means, lifestyles, goals and roles. Why are they constructed as socially valued? Who constructs them as such? Who benefits from such constructions? Who is oppressed or exploited by such constructions? Why should someone strive for these opportunities, means, lifestyles, goals and roles?

Oliver (Lloyd, 2000: 138) challenges the concept of normality in society and education. He argues that normality does not exist, but rather that it is ‘a construct imposed on a reality where there is only difference’. This I read as a social constructionist discourse.

Other critiques of efforts to ‘normalise’ are constructed by materialist and postmodern discourses. I value Lloyd and Norris’s (1998: 363) description of schools as fulfilling an essentially ‘normalising’ function that ‘acts to produce and reproduce pupils according to the value systems that constitute dominant social relations’. This normalising function is seen as at the ‘heart of power’ of such institutions, with this power constructed in two interrelated ways: the power of one individual over another, such as the power of teacher over learner; and power as productive. Foucault (Lloyd & Norris, 1998: 363) constructs productive power thus: ‘... it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledges, produces discourses’. Within institutions fulfilling normalising functions, productive powers are enacted in the reproduction of values that ‘constitute, reproduce and sustain the dominant view of the "good society"‘ (Lloyd & Norris, 1998: 364).

3.5.4.5. The independence/interdependence discourses

In reading I constructed independence and interdependence discourses as woven into inclusion literature. An example is Naicker’s (1999: 15) description of the rights discourse as committed to all people having independence. Independence, I argue, is storied as of value in individualistic Western
narratives, while interdependence is a valued characteristic in the collectivist narratives of African and Eastern narratives. Bankart (1997: 378), for example, speaks of his experience in Japan, where ‘individualism was isolation, and isolation was the central pathology of selfishness’, while Kisanji (1998: 67) describes self-determination as ‘played down or sacrificed in favour of group identity’ in non-western cultures.

Research on inclusive employment voices the employer expectation that employees with disabilities should be independent (Reid & Bray, 1997; Rimmerman, 1998). A study of Israeli executives conducted by Rimmerman (1998: 252) found that they preferred to employ people with intellectual disabilities who have vocational and social skills and that they avoid ‘hiring persons whose intellectual disability raises concerns about their ability to integrate in the workplace’. Employees are expected to function relatively independently and not be of too much concern. Reid and Bray (1997: 91) found that employers were willing to give a person with disability an opportunity to perform the job, but their expectation was that they should ‘learn and eventually do it independently like any other worker’.

Carnaby (1998: 219) argues that normalisation has become synonymous with independence in the process of integration. Thus people with disabilities are expected to fit the norm rather than the environment accommodating their differences. What is ironical, Carnaby (1998) points out, is that independence is not even expected of those without disability - we all have dependencies and needs. Oliver (Carnaby, 1998: 221) points out the contradictions in the call for people with disabilities to function independently:

... independence suggests that the individual needs no assistance whatever from anyone else and this fits nicely with the current political rhetoric which stresses competitive individualism. In reality, of course, no one in a modern industrial society is completely independent: we live in a state of mutual interdependence. The dependence of disabled people therefore, is not a feature which marks them out as different in kind from the rest of the population but different in degree.

3.5.5. Disability Movement Narratives

Slee (1997: 410) borrows the term ‘disability movement perspectives’ from Riddell (1996) to describe an approach that focuses less on producing a coherent theoretical account of disability and more on an ‘eclectic quest for social change and the incorporation of disability rights in the
mainstream political agenda’. This I construct as the type of approach that will use the medical discourse to construct a disability and pragmatic discourse to emphasise the necessity for systemic accommodations for the diagnosed disability. However, it will simultaneously challenge social constructions of disability, focus on the human rights of those with disabilities and situate abuse of these rights within a materialist discourse of reproduction of oppression.

This movement I would construct as ‘eclectic postmodernism’: described as an ‘anything goes’ approach by Appignanesi and Garratt (1995: 47) with the only criteria, in this case, being utility to the disability movement. Grand narratives and discourses are produced to fit historical social contexts to further the goal of the movement.

I construct this narrative in the stance of the British Council of Disabled People and Disabled People International, who distinguish between impairment - ‘lacking part of a limb, organ or mechanism of the body’ (medical discourse) - and ‘disability as the disadvantage imposed by society’s reactions’ (social constructionist and/or materialist critical discourses). These organisations prefer the use of the term ‘disabled people’, including all people with impairments, ‘to challenge society’s reaction and stress the emancipatory (as opposed to derogatory) meaning of difference’ (Sebba & Sachdev, 1997: 12). The message of this chosen label I construct as being: ‘We are disabled-by-society people with impairments’. It focuses on a disabling context, rather than on a disabled person.

Sebba and Sachdev (1997: 12) contrast the term ‘disabled people’ with the ‘people first principle’, which stresses the importance of noting the person before the disability and therefore prefers the term ‘person with disability’. What I find significant is their choice to note and then marginalise this disability movement voice. Sebba and Sachdev (1997: 12) write:

While wishing to acknowledge the preferences of ‘disabled people’ themselves, the need in this report is to challenge the perceptions of service providers which might be better achieved through the ‘people first’ stance. Furthermore, the debate about the development of inclusive education must also address pupils who are identified as having emotional and behavioral difficulties and might not be appropriately encompassed by the term ‘disabled people’.
‘Why not?’ I found myself asking. These too are people disabled by the system, if the voice of the disability organisations is heard. Or is the word ‘disabled’ constructed as so devaluing that only people with ‘real’ impairments can be given the label?

A possible disability movement criticism of discourses framing disability as languaged or a social construct of others is offered by Erevelles (2000: 32), who writes:

disabled scholars and activists ... have sought to define a disability culture that is based on recognition of their different bodies - not in spite of their disabilities but because of them.

The implication here is that difference is real - it is not storied - and there should be recognition of ‘disability as central to the experiences of disabled people’ (Erevelles, 2000: 33). There is a functionalist assertion of a proven objective reality here, which made me wonder if the disability movement does not perceive a devaluing of their ‘reality’ in postmodernist approaches.

Clark et al. (1999) join the disability movement in promoting an eclectic, or what they call a holistic approach, or dilemmatic perspective. Citing Ball (Clark et al., 1999: 48-49), they describe the need for a ‘toolbox of diverse concepts and theories’, as no single theory is able to account adequately for the complexity of schools as organisations. They further argue for the linking of the project of inclusion to wider educational dilemmas. Findings presented by Clark et al. (1999: 47-48), emerging from their holistic approach and dilemmatic perspective, are that:

- we should be wary of labelling schools (or systems) as unequivocally inclusive: we should rather explore when, where and how they are more inclusive for some learners or more exclusive for others;
- we should be wary of seeing inclusion as the only good or true path: it is one in a history of resolutions and, as Clark et al. (1999: 48) write:

  It is inevitable that this resolution, like its predecessors, will fall apart under the weight of its internal tensions, particularly as those tensions become exacerbated by changing socio-economic conditions, social values and national education policies.

- inclusion is seen only as a disability or special education issue, which has led to what Clark et al. (1999: 48) call its ‘ghettoization’, when it should have been extended to address fundamental issues of values and purposes arising from issues generated by diversity.
3.5.6. Postmodernist (de)constructions

Slee (1997: 410) presents post-modernist perspectives as casting ‘doubt over the limitations of the class struggle and capitalist production narratives as an explanation of the complex and fragmented experiences of disability across a wide range of identities’. I would suggest that it also problematises all the discourses in my narrative by providing space for multiple voices in describing and analysing disability and deconstructing disabling language to reveal ‘the politics of identity and difference’ (Slee, 1997: 410).

I read what I have already written as a postmodernist (de)construction, in that it has already given space to multiple languagings of disability and in/exclusion that (de)construct themselves and one another. None of these ‘knowledges’ are constructed as ‘truth’, but they are valued as voices in conversation, (de)constructing one another to reveal the fundamental undecidability of the constructs ‘disability’ and ‘inclusion’. As Slee (1997: 416) writes:

Inclusion ... demands that educators problematise their theories of disability and schooling. Imported structural and post-structural theories from a range of disciplines are prerequisite tools in this enterprise.

3.5.6.1. (De)construction and (dis)ability

Danforth and Rhodes (1997: 360) propose deconstruction as a way to oppose, subvert and critique the accepted ‘political and moral hierarchy of ability and disability’, describing the ability-disability dichotomy as a ‘useful conceptual and practical hinge’. A hinge is defined by Brooke (Danforth & Rhodes, 1997: 360) as:

... where the text ‘breaks open’ ... where the words hinge, where they fold, admit multiple meanings, work against themselves - a deconstruction of a text begins with the search for hinges in the seemingly coherent organization, purpose, meaning and argument of the text

The ‘indecidable features’ (Silverman, 1989: 4) of the disability construct are illustrated by Danforth and Rhodes (1997). They present a case study in which special education experts, using standardised diagnostic procedures construct disability in a child: the measure of ability being mastering of the basal and phonics reading activities. The parents of the child, on the other hand, construct ability: their measure being a whole-language approach within which their son was proficient. In this example it becomes clear how arbitrary the differentiation of ability from
disability is: how conflicting constructions develop when those applying the labels emerge from different paradigms. As Danforth and Rhodes (1997: 362) point out, the goal of deconstruction is not to assess whose paradigm is ‘better’; it is that by giving voice to two opposing definitions a ‘paradigmatic monkey wrench’ is thrown into the process of diagnosing a disability. The illusion of a single truth is destroyed.

I found it significant that in the case cited by Danforth and Rhodes (1977: 27), the school’s construction is legitimised - given the power, accuracy, authority and superiority accorded by standardised tests and expert opinion. The parents’ construction of ability is challenged until they are forced to move their son from the public education system to home schooling. To me this becomes an illustration of ‘power-knowledge relations’ (Foucault, 1977: 27) and ‘regimes of truth’ that privilege certain discourses and approve certain ways of distinguishing true from false statements (McCarthy, 1994: 53). As Danforth and Rhodes (1997: 362) state:

If the ‘objective’ diagnosis arises from the instance of social coercion, then the sorting ... into groups based on ‘ability’ and ‘disability’ is not an act of ideologically neutral evaluation but a political act, an application of power.

Erevelles (2000: 35), although she calls for historical materialist analyses of disability and inclusion, (de)constructs the disabled subject’s experience of invisibility as situated in the marginalisation of the ‘Other’ by people without disability. She writes:

...the nondisabled subject upon encountering its Other (the disabled subject), finds it necessary to suppress the memory of this ‘deviant’ image in order to support the illusion of ‘normalcy’ or ‘wholeness’. That these assumptions of ‘normalcy’ or ‘wholeness’ are themselves illusions becomes vividly apparent when one examines how constructions of the normative self are in fact predicated on the existence of the disabled Other.

(Erevelles, 2000: 35)

In Erevelles’ (de)construction, I construct ability as becoming meaningful only with reference to disability, with disability thus centred and given voice.

3.5.6.2. (De)construction and in/exclusion

Slee (1997), Keary (1998), Maguire (1999) and Clough (1999) trouble the constructs ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’, replacing the binary with a construction of inclusion within exclusion and
exclusion within inclusion. As Maguire (1999: 15) argues, there has been a tendency to see forms of inclusion/exclusion as ‘totalizing … immutable’ and ‘opposing binaries’. But, she points out, there is greater complexity in social life, with people inhabiting and experiencing both inclusion and exclusionary positions. When there are clear patterns of exclusion and ‘othering’, she stresses the importance of exploring alternative perspectives that ‘work to interrupt these regulatory discourses’.

Clough (1999) also argues against the binary opposition and constructions of inclusion as the natural/good/right and exclusion as the unnatural/bad/wrong. To bring about a more inclusive society, Clough (1999: 71) states:

... we need to start from a recognition that exclusive principles are no less at the co-structured heart of ‘organism and organization’ (Williams 1965) than are inclusive intentions. ... we have to find a way of understanding teachers’ resistance to inclusive practice without pathologizing, or even demonizing it.

Clough (1999: 70-71) illustrates his point by discussing three narratives:

- the traditional theory of abstraction in which we form concepts by identifying resemblances and differences between people or things and then placing them inside or outside classes;
- the pluralist contextualist view, which indicates that in order to decide on resemblances and differences we have some idea, perspective or principle enabling ordering or grouping;
- the Hegelian approach which involves:
  i) understanding: forming categories;
  ii) dialectic proper: recognising that such categories are absurd because they are given character within settings;
  iii) reason/speculation: recognising that contextualisation and categorisation require each other as part of the same process.

Keary (1998: 225) offers another criticism of the inclusion movement, arguing that it ‘does not acknowledge the meanings, understandings and experiences that a range of social and cultural groups bring to the construction of disability’. This lack of acknowledgement excludes. She queries whether the inclusion debate is relevant to all communities ‘because other identifications are more important than - or even incompatible with - those associated with being disabled’ (Keary, 1998: 233).
This Australian researcher writes within a framework in which students are ascertained to determine their educational needs which, she points out, once again locates the 'problem deficit student external to classroom pedagogy and school management' (Keary, 1998: 227). Even though the system promises inclusion, the focus is on experts/the school/others defining the individual with disability's needs, which once again become labels or dominant normative narratives, perhaps subjugating their personal story (Becvar & Becvar, 1996: 282). As Keary (1998: 226) succinctly states: '... inclusive rhetoric only renames and remoulds the deficit disabling discourse of special education'.

Danforth and Rhodes (1997: 357) offer a (de)construction of the inclusion movement as characterised by inherent contradictions, in that it simultaneously accepts the disability construct as objective reality (through practices such as assessment) while lobbying for learners with disabilities to be included in school settings designed for learners without disabilities. By not challenging the truth and reality status of the disability construct, Danforth and Rhodes (1997: 357) argue that the inclusion movement has unintentionally worked against its 'own integrationist and civil rights purposes, supporting the devaluation and stigmatization of students "with disabilities" while decrying the same'. Danforth & Rhodes (1997: 357) describe deconstruction as the 'one coherent philosophical orientation for inclusion, an approach that critiques the political and moral hierarchy of ability and disability'.

Also noting the contradictions within the inclusion movement, Slee (1997: 407) argues that special education has reinvented itself to 'stake its claim in this so-called era of inclusion'. Rather than special education being retheorised, it has blended 'dominant disabling discourses into a language of inclusion' (Slee, 1997: 407). He describes special educators as using the vocabulary of inclusion to offer superficial 'cosmetic' adaptations to practices and procedures that reflect continuing assumptions about pathology and normality (Slee, 2001: 167). The beneficiaries of such cosmetic amendments and 'theoretical and political deflection' are those with an interest in special education practice (Slee, 1997: 407).

3.6. Reflections

As a child I recall reading a story about a round house on a hilltop with many different coloured windows. The view from each window was different. This was my experience as I became immersed in the in/exclusion literature and it is this feeling I hoped to recreate in writing this chapter.
I emerge from this experience with a sense that my use of Keary’s (1998) term ‘in/exclusion’ has been validated because I have read nothing that makes me feel that there is not exclusion within inclusion. I construct one imperative to maintain in/exclusion as the storied need to acknowledge the ‘reality’ of disability. As the Tomlinson committee (Sebba & Sachdev, 1997: 12) stated, the terminology should ‘not seek to minimise still less ignore the real difficulties or differences that a disability or learning difficulty can bring into a person’s life’.

Am I, in my postmodern musings, minimising the experience of people with disabilities? I cannot answer this. I can only present the following reflections. Differences are differences from, ‘not the same as another or each other; unlike in nature, form or quality’ states the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 399). What is different can only be defined with reference to what it is different from, which in turn is defined with reference to it. Difference is and is not because everything is different from and thus the same. Difference becomes disability only through discursive practices that constitute ability. As Slee (2001: 169) writes, discursive practices ‘do not identify objects, they constitute them and in doing so conceal their own invention’. Are the difficulties, I ask, not constituted in power-knowledge relations formed by these discursive practices?

‘Inclusive education,’ states Slee (2001: 168), ‘is about all students’. Inclusion, I argue, is about all people, all of whom are unique and have different abilities, needs and wants. To label the needs of one group ‘special’ and to spend time studying them to accommodate them I construct as exclusionary and discriminatory. As does Slee (2001: 168), I construct ‘diagnostic frameworks, and the knowledge that informs them … as representing a form of cultural exclusion’: a cultural exclusion that is so entrenched that we seem afraid to move beyond it. We justify our fear by saying that we need to train teachers to identify and accommodate learners’ special needs in order to meet these needs in an inclusive system. I suggest that this immediately becomes an excluding system, using the same justification as was used for the previous, segregated special education system.

I also read in the literature what could be called explicit and justified exclusion of some learners: those constituted as severely disabled by the medical discourse and those constituted as conduct disordered by the psychology discourse. Donald et al. (1997: 236) speak of special needs of such severity that they cannot be met in the mainstream. The NCSNET/NCESS report (Department of Education, 1997: 18) speaks of disabilities within the learner that become a barrier to learning,
leading to learning breakdown. The message I construct is that the system cannot be expected to accommodate such learners, again for their own good.

Apart from those people constructed as having severe disability, I also read justification of the exclusion of children who do not meet social behavioural norms. Armstrong *et al.* (1999: 33) describe the exclusion of learners labelled with behavioural problems such as aggression, substance abuse, theft and disobedience. These labels are decontextualised and used to legitimate exclusion. As Armstrong *et al.* (1999: 33-34) argue:

> The criteria used in making decisions about school exclusion are depolitized (sic) and the emphasis placed upon the child’s problems and deficits. The child is represented either as a wrongdoer or as the victim of his or her own failure to adjust to the conditions of competition and selection through which the organization of rewards and opportunities is managed.

The message I read as: ‘You don’t have special needs. You are just bad. You are choosing to misbehave (not meet our norms) and therefore you will be punished with exclusion’.

This justified rejection, pathologisation and/or criminalisation of some children is further explored by Lloyd and Norris (1998). They research the exclusion of gypsy children in Scotland, whose behaviour is labelled ‘difficult’ because of its difference: this difference is seen as deviance. The school, fulfilling its normalising function, produces norms to which learners are expected to adhere. ‘When children come into class and do not operate in this way it is often perceived as disruptive to the class’ (Lloyd & Norris, 1998: 366). They suggest that if such different behaviour emerges from diverse experiences and it is not acknowledged as such, there is devaluation of diversity.

Lowe (Armstrong *et al.*, 1999: 33) sums up the continuing experience of those judged to have severe disabilities or behaviour problems. This author describes inflexible assessment and recording procedures contributing to the formation of judgements that impact on the lives of learners, both in school and beyond.

Words I found particularly moving were those of Bauman (Slee, 2001: 171):
All societies produce strangers but each kind of society produces its own kind of strangers, and produces them in its own inimitable way. The strangers are the people who do not fit the cognitive, moral or aesthetic map of the world - one of these maps, two or all three.

What, I wonder, is our map if it excludes learners languaged as having ‘severe’ disabilities and behavioural problems?

I also read continuing exclusion of the voices of parents and children in the literature. In a rare article that includes the voice of a woman excluded within an inclusive system, Armstrong et al. (1999: 31) describe educational decisions as shaped by institutional assumptions that do not fit the child’s needs. Discriminatory practice marginalises the voice of the child, with Armstrong et al. (1999: 31) referring to accumulating evidence pointing to ‘the invisibility of the child’s view within special educational assessment procedures’.

Parents too may feel excluded from educational decision-making by language and power-knowledge relations. As Oliver (Armstrong et al., 1999: 31) argues:

It is often assumed that the function of language is communication. While it is undoubtedly true that communication is a function of language, it is not the only one. Language is also about politics, domination and control.

But do we have another language? Another voice I hear in the literature is the postmodern acknowledgement that we do not have the language to move beyond the functionalist medical model and other power-knowledge relations. Slee (2001: 169) stresses the need for reflective examination of ‘the way in which the uses and abuses of language frame meanings that disable and exclude’. And Cherryholmes (Lloyd, 2000: 149) speaks of the need to ‘create alternative discursive practices, rhetorical structures that constitute a challenge to existing thought patterns. We need to find a way of thinking/speaking that gives power no place to hide’.

Presenting a polyphonic dialogue of sometimes discordant, sometimes harmonious voices is my way of attempting to open a space for multiple meaning-making to be expressed. But even as I write this, I acknowledge, like Foucault (1988), that I am constituted by and constituting power relations, so I too become a voice to (de)construct if power is to have no place to hide.
Chapter 4
Her/history: (De)constructions

I use the term her/history in my narrative to signify a storying of events over time related to in/exclusion in South Africa. I resist the word ‘history’ as I construct it as excluding and marginalising the female voice. The story I construct is told by South African women and men and is therefore incongruent with the origins of the word history, as cited in the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 674): Latin via Greek *historia* ‘narrative, history’ from *histōr* ‘learned wise man’. Her/history I construct as a more inclusive word, a word including wise men and women.

In this chapter I (de)construct the context or textual matrix within which the document that I am to (de)construct in Chapter Five will be read. I argue that this is important because every text is an intertext, taking its place ‘between texts, with other texts in mind, picking up the traces of texts that have gone before’ (Batley, 1995: 5).

4.1. The past

South African society has a long her/history of racial segregation and inequality at all levels of society. As were other systems, education was fragmented by apartheid laws enforcing racial segregation and by legislation separating ‘ordinary’ learners from learners categorized as having ‘special needs’. Learners with disabilities and learning difficulties were in a second education system, ‘separated and marginalized from mainstream educational provision’ (Muthukrishna & Schoeman, 2000: 317).

Provision and support services ‘operated along racial lines with gross inequities between white and black learners’ (Muthukrishna & Schoeman, 2000: 316). These inequities were apparent in vast disparities in expenditure on and, as a result, the quality and quantity of both mainstream and specialized education offered to different race groups. As Engelbrecht, Naicker and Engelbrecht (1998: 97) write:
While remarkable strides were being made in the field of specialized education for whites, educational provision by the Government for disabled children from other population groups developed more slowly, resulting in severe discrepancies in both the quality and quantity of provision.

Within the specialised education system, provision for children with disabilities was based on the medical model of diagnosis and treatment of ‘learner deficits’. As Muthukrishna and Schoeman, (2000: 317) point out, South Africa’s her/history is one of ‘negative stereotyping and marginalization of these learners, and their exclusion from mainstream education provision’.

In 1997, three years after South Africa’s first democratic election, Donald et al. (1997: 237) describe the heritage of the apartheid past as ‘a totally inadequate and divided system of meeting the needs of children with individual disabilities and difficulties in learning’. They note the following:

- Special education services have only been developed for about 20% of the school-going population (whites, coloureds and indians);
- The purpose of these special education services is to separate children with special needs from the mainstream and educate them in special schools or classes;
- Special needs education for the remaining 80% of the population has ‘hardly been developed’ (Donald et al., 1997: 237). Therefore, some children are not able to attend school (an estimated 50% of children with disabilities), while others have been mainstreamed ‘by default’, with no provision of facilities, resources, specialized help or choice.

After reading Kisanji (1998), I found myself questioning Donald et al.’s (1997) decision to call this ‘mainstreaming by default’, which carries negative connotations and implies that integration without official sanctioning or planning (by which expert or authority and involving which power relations?) is somehow lesser. I will further (de)construct the term ‘mainstreaming by default’ in Chapter Five (see pages 115-116).

Engelbrecht et al. (1998:98) further colour the picture of post-apartheid education in South Africa, describing the specialised education system as construing special education needs as only present in children with intrinsic deficits or disabilities and ignoring extrinsically generated needs. Inadequately trained teachers and a lack of resources are other problem areas identified.
The impact of inequities in the education system on the future employment opportunities of people with disabilities is pointed out by Engelbrecht, Howell and Bassett (2001: 6), who point out that only a few of the ‘special schools’ offered provision up to Grade 12. They state:

The impact of this historical inequity has had profound effects on the number of learners with disabilities eligible for entry into higher education.

(Engelbrecht et al., 2001: 6).

4.2. Transformation

In 1994, South Africa held its first democratic elections, officially ending the apartheid era. But transformation in education was signalled ‘in influential reports published even before the new democratic government came to power’ (Engelbrecht et al., 2001: 7). One such report was the National Education Policy Investigation report (Lazarus & Donald, 1997: 98), which proposed the following five goals for education: non-discrimination, democratic process and governance, development of a unitary system, establishment of equity and effecting redress. Five years later the impact of this report is still evident, with Donald et al. (1997: 238) describing the idea of ‘progressive mainstreaming’ suggested by NEPI as ‘probably the most realistic proposal’.

The next document noted in the literature is the Education White Paper No 1 on Education and Training (1995), described by Lazarus and Donald (1997: 98) as an important step towards meeting the five goals suggested by NEPI, ‘but the challenge … is to see them take root in practice’. In the same year, the South African Federal Council on Disability (Naicker, 1999: 15) called for the development of a single education system in South Africa, to which learners with special needs would have access and which would be responsive to the diverse needs of all learners.

In 1996, a text I construct as foundational to all successive legislation and policy was released: the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which constituted a Bill of Rights affirming ‘democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom’ (1996: 7). Equality as constructed by the Constitution includes the concepts of equity and redress; these were discussed in Chapter Three, as constituting and constituted by the social-democratic distributive justice discourse (see pages 65-66).
In discussing education, the Bill of Rights uses the words 'equity' and 'redress' of the 'results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices'. It also asserts the right of everyone to basic education and to further education, which the state 'must make progressively available and accessible' (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: 13).

The preamble to the South African Schools Act (SASA) (1996: 2) repeats the need to redress past injustices and stresses the need to provide quality education for all learners and to uphold the rights of learners, parents and educators. Sayed and Carrim (1998: 30) argue that SASA (1996), described by some as indicating a move to inclusion, may exclude the historically marginalised in South Africa and 'rather than redressing past inequities, may perpetuate and further exacerbate them'. Sayed and Carrim (1998: 32-40) construct the following ways in which SASA may exclude:

- requirements that elected community representatives must have certain levels of expertise;
- the notion of 'stakeholders' defining some as having more stake than others;
- privileging parental choice above that of teachers and children: why should the rights of parents be privileged when this approach does not consider 'prioritizing the rights of other citizens, for example, students and teachers, let alone the disabled', ask Sayed & Carrim (1998:36);
- an absence of redress and redistribution as regards funding.

Sayed and Carrim (1998: 40) sum up their argument as follows:

...notions of participation constrain the degree and nature of inclusiveness by excluding members who are not considered to be part of communities, are not considered to be stakeholders, are not granted equal representation and those who are economically unable ... inclusiveness is being framed in ways that actually do not enhance greater democratic participation and reduce inequities of past and present.

The next significant text released by the Department of Education was the NCSNET/NCESS report (1997), discussed in Chapter Three. Muthukrishna and Schoeman (2000: 315) frame this document as a shift in thinking from the internal deficit model or 'special needs education' to looking at systemic 'barriers to learning and development'. Barriers to learning are constituted as factors contributing to learning breakdown and exclusion, with the NCSNET/NCESS report (Department of Education, 1997: 12-19, 53-68) identifying twelve such barriers and a framework for the future. These are summarized in Table 7.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers</th>
<th>Framework for the future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Problems in the provision and organization of education</td>
<td>Transforming the system from a person-changing to system-changing focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developing an integrated system of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A holistic approach to institutional development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Disability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lack of enabling policy and legislation</td>
<td>See 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Attitudes</td>
<td>Promotion of rights and responsibilities of educators and learners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See 1 and 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Inaccessible and unsafe built environment</td>
<td>Developing barrier-free access to the built environ in all centres of learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. An inflexible curriculum</td>
<td>Developing a flexible curriculum to ensure access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Language and communication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Lack of parental recognition and involvement</td>
<td>Promotion of rights and responsibilities of parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Lack of human resource development</td>
<td>Development programs for educators and other human resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Inadequate and inappropriate provision of support services</td>
<td>Infusing special needs and support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of integrated and holistic support services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Socioeconomic barriers</td>
<td>Community-based support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Factors that place learners at risk, such as violence, HIV/AIDS, substance abuse</td>
<td>A preventative and developmental approach to support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Barriers and a framework for the future recommended by the NCSNET/NCESS report (Department of Education, 1997).

The NCSNET/NCESS report (Department of Education, 1997, 69-116) also offers specific recommendations for curriculum, institutional development and assessment, utilization and development of human resources, funding and governance. A strategic implementation plan stating priorities, objectives, actions and the responsible agents is laid out.
In 1998 - after the NCSNET/NCESS report and much talk about inclusion - Engelbrecht et al. (1998: 97) write:

In spite of the fact that education is being emphasized as one of the most important factors in facilitating the change process, inclusion as an option in the education of children with special educational needs appears not to have materialized.

Their feelings are echoed by Muthukrishna and Schoeman (2000) who, writing their paper in October 1999 (although it was published in the year 2000), describe a situation in which the move from special needs to barriers to learning and development is ‘still not accepted as viable’. They construct three conceptual reasons (Muthukrishna & Schoeman, 2000: 331):

- it encompasses too large a population, whose needs should be accommodated by general education policy;
- in making the focus so wide it generates fears of not meeting the needs of learners with disabilities;
- the learner deficit view is deeply entrenched.

They also present four contextual reasons (Muthukrishna & Schoeman, 2000: 331):

- ‘policy overload’ in the new South Africa;
- not enough local expertise to work out the funding implications of a system with infused support;
- the implementation of Curriculum 2005;
- some decision-makers’ inability to accept that outcomes based education provides the framework for inclusive education.

Based on the NCSNET/NCESS report, the government released ‘Consultative Paper No 1 on Special Education: Building an Inclusive Education and Training System: First Steps’ in August 1999. Muthukrishna and Schoeman (2000) criticise this document on the basis that it has not made the paradigm shift from ‘learners with special needs’ to ‘barriers to learning and development’. They discuss three markers of this lack of movement.
The first they describe as ‘contradictions and a lack of clarity’, as the Consultative Paper swings between the individual deficit and systems deficit model. There is a ‘rather narrow, conservative focus’ on learners identified in terms of their deficits and establishing alternate provision to meet their needs, but there is also a focus on a wider group of vulnerable learners and the need for systems change (Muthukrishna & Schoeman, 2000: 333).

Secondly, Muthukrishna and Schoeman (2000: 333-334) argue, the ‘first steps’ proposed in the Consultative Paper - which focus on strengthening existing education for learners with special needs - are ‘an inappropriate solution to the issue of equity, and to addressing the imbalances and neglect of the past’. They argue that such steps may make transformation more difficult by supporting the status quo. Related to this issue is ‘a lack of careful analysis and clarification on the role of special schools, remedial classes and special classes in a transformed system’.

Finally, they criticize the Consultative Paper’s retention of the language of the traditional, medical, deficit model. This language, the Department of Education (1999: 7) states in Consultative Paper no.1, has been retained because ‘a new terminology … may complicate and obfuscate, rather than assist the participation of education managers, educators and the public in the discourses and processes of change’. Muthukrishna and Schoeman (2000: 334) argue that continued use of the medical discourse reflects ‘confusion and serious contradictions in terms of the paradigm shift’.

Coming from a postmodern perspective, I would suggest that by maintaining particular discursive practices, educational policy continues constituting itself, schools, teachers, learners and practices in ways that are excluding and ‘othering’ (Slee, 2001: 172). I agree with Slee (2001: 169) that there is need for reflective examination of ‘the way in which the uses and abuses of language frame meanings that disable and exclude’ and I feel that the Consultative Paper’s framing of medical discourse as less complicating should be challenged. ‘Less complicating and obfuscating for whom?’ I ask. Who made this decision and in whose best interests is it? What power-knowledge relations does this discursive practice support?

Consultative Paper No. 1. was released for public comments and information. Submissions received from the public were analyzed and the next policy document released was ‘Education White Paper no. 6: Special Needs Education: Building an Inclusive Education and Training System’ (2001), which I (de)construct in Chapter Five.
4.3. Reflections

In this chapter I construct a textual matrix for the document I will (de)construct in Chapter Five. I story this matrix as one of in/exclusion: of division into categories (racial/gender/ability groups) and of inclusion and exclusion within this classification. With the advent of the new democratic South Africa, a narrative I read is one of wiping out the categorisations of the past and including all into a larger category known as South Africans.

However, I read the language of the past in phrases such as ‘learner with special education needs’ in Consultative Paper no. 1 (Department of Education: 1999: 4). This language may be used because, as the Consultative Paper (Department of Education, 1999: 7) states, it is ‘in common use and has currency’, but from a postmodern perspective, it (re)constructs the past. As Sluzki (1992: 218-219) points out:

... language is not representational; what we call ‘reality’ resides and is expressed in one’s descriptions of events, people, ideas, feelings, and experiences.
Chapter 5

White Paper 6: (De)constructions

Deconstruction foregrounds the lack of innocence in any discourse by looking at the textual staging of knowledge, the constitutive effects of our uses of language.

Grosz (Lather, 1991: 5)

5.1. Constructing Context


5.2. Constructing reading

I read White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) in the following ways:

- (de)constructing objects in the text;
- (de)constructing agents and actions in the text;
- (de)constructing binaries in the text;
- (de)constructing discourses/power-knowledges constituting those objects, binaries, agents and actions;
- (de)constructing grand narratives constituting and constituted by those discourses;
- (de)constructing voices/alternative knowledges on the margins of those discourses.

I visually (de)construct my reading as follows:
I read the functionalist grand narrative and its positivist approach as dominant in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001). Discourses in the document constitute objective observations of people and systems, identification and assessment of problems, the design of interventions and monitoring and evaluation of these interventions. There is ‘an attempt to predict and control various aspects of social life’ (Skrtic, 1995: 32). The process of objective research is constructed through signifiers such as ‘investigate’, ‘make recommendations’, ‘findings’ and ‘models for later system-wide application’ (Department of Education, 2001: 5-6). The Minister of Education speaks of understanding parents’ concerns after ‘I have observed what a difference special schools can make …’ (Department of Education, 2001: 5-6). What is observed is constructed as meaningful and real: a ‘true’ cause for concern.

‘Functionalism presupposes that social reality is objective, inherently orderly, and rational, and thus that social and human problems are pathological,’ argues Skrtic (1995: 67). White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) constitutes a reality in which ‘disabilities’ and ‘barriers to learning and development’ are problems or deviations that need to be identified and fixed in order to
(re)create order and reason. As Skrtic (1995: 67) points out, there is the construction of inefficient/non-rational organisations, which I (de)construct as the systems discourse, and defective/pathological students or workers, which I read as the medical/special needs discourse.

Other discourses I (de)construct in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) as constituting and constituted by the functional grand narrative are the charity discourse, the business discourse and the pioneering discourse.

5.3.1. Medical/Special Needs Discourse

Following my reading of White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) and (de)constructions in Chapter 3, I construct the medical and special needs discourses as constituting the same objects, agents, actions and binaries, and I therefore unite them. I take note of Clough’s (Bélanger, 2000: 234) differentiation of ‘disability’ and ‘special needs’, in which the latter is described ‘not as the expression of an individual’s ability, but as a result of his or her interaction with a particular curriculum’. My reading, however, constitutes the special needs resulting from interaction with a particular curriculum as arising from both constructed differences in ability (the medical discourse) and constructed inability of the environment to accommodate those differences (the systems discourse). There remains a process of identification through the assessment and labelling of those learners.

5.3.1.1. Objects constituted

As I read, I (de)constructed the following ‘objects’ constituted by a medical discourse:

- disabled learners; learners with mild, moderate or severe disabilities; learners with special education needs; disabled learners; people with disabilities; disabled children (Department of Education, 2001). The White Paper constructed the relationship between these phrases as follows: ‘...the learners who are most vulnerable to barriers to learning and exclusion in South Africa are those who have historically been termed "learners with special education needs" i.e. learners with disabilities and impairments’ (Department of Education, 2001: 7).

The equation I construct is:

learners most vulnerable to barriers to learning = learners with special education needs
learners with special education needs = learners with disabilities and impairments
learners most vulnerable to barriers to learning = learners with disabilities and impairments
Are these terms synonymous? Is the term ‘barriers to learning’ a cosmetic adjustment to disguise the medical discourse? Is this an example of what Slee (1997: 407) termed ‘professional resilience in blending dominant disabling discourses into a language of inclusion’?

I (de)construct further indecidability when the White Paper (Department of Education, 2001) specifically addresses terminology. It states that it no longer uses the terms ‘learners with special education needs’ and ‘learners with mild to severe learning difficulties’, because this is ‘part of the language of the approach that sees disabilities as arising within the learner’. It then goes on to use the terms ‘special needs education’ in it’s title, ‘learners with special needs’ (Department of Education, 2001: 42) and ‘individuals with special needs’ (Department of Education, 2001: 43), thus contradicting its stance.

What the White Paper attempts to do is use the term ‘barriers to learning and development’ but, it notes, it retains ‘internationally acceptable terms of "disability" and "impairments" when referring to learners whose barriers to learning and development are rooted in organic/medical causes’ (Department of Education, 2001: 12). Thus medical diagnosis = disability = barrier to learning. Does this mean that some learners have internal barriers to learning or ‘personal trouble’, while others have external barriers to learning? That through some process of ‘diagnosis’ or ‘assessment’ it is determined whether the barriers are internal or external: whether the individual or the environment is labelled disabled. But does the removal of external barriers not transform internal barriers into difference and not difficulty or barrier? Are there internal barriers if external barriers are removed?

- Other objects formed are ‘special, full-service and ordinary schools’ (Department of Education, 2001: 10, 15). Learners who require low-intensive support will be accommodated in the ‘ordinary’ schools, those who require moderate support will be in ‘full-service’ schools and those who require high-intensive support will be in special schools.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 1003) defines ‘ordinary’ as ‘with no distinctive features; normal or usual’. Special is ‘better, greater, or otherwise different from what is usual; designed for or belonging to a particular person, place or event; used to denote education for children with particular needs’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1377). I read the constitution of ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ as signifying the ‘normal/abnormal’ binary, which I will discuss shortly.
Defining the schools to which learners with low support needs go as ‘ordinary, normal or usual’ suggests that low need for support is the norm, or alternatively, that such learners are ‘normal’ as opposed to ‘abnormal’. The document also situates learners with mild to moderate disabilities in ‘mainstream education’: mainstream education presumably comprising ordinary and full-service schools. I read the following:

![Diagram]

Figure 6: Ordinary and special school signifiers.

5.3.1.2. Agents constituted

Agents I construct as those who do, as opposed to those that are done to. The doers constituted in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) include: the White Paper, the Ministry (of Education), I (Minister of Education), We and the policy. At other times, doers lurk behind the passive voice, as in the following statement: ‘... indicate how learners with disability will be identified, assessed and incorporated into special, full-service and ordinary schools ...’ (Department of Education, 2001: 10). Thus, are there agents who could be called ‘identifiers’, ‘assessors’ and ‘incorporators? Are these the educators? Or are they those with vested interests in the medical discourse, which constitutes them as experts, as those with ‘knowledge’ who know the problems and the solutions: the doctors, the psychologists, the special needs teachers?

5.3.1.3. Actions constituted

I read contradictory actions - which render one another indecidable - in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001). The policy (agent), the White Paper states, will ‘move away from segregation according to categories of disability as an organising principle for institutions’ (2001: 8). I read this as constructing a move from the process of assessing, labelling and placing learners according to disability in settings specifically catering for those disabilities. One sentence later, the document describes the policy as ‘placing emphasis on supporting learners through full-service schools that will have a bias towards particular disabilities’ (2001: 8). Thus, certain learners will be assessed, identified as having particular disabilities and will therefore be placed in certain full-service
schools, which have a bias towards that disability. Is this not segregation according to categories of disability?

Other actions constructed within the medical discourse are identification, assessment, interventions and placement or ‘incorporation’ into ordinary, full-service or special schools, based on the identification, assessment and prescribed interventions. Thus the label determines the placement - the degree of inclusion or exclusion. Learners with ‘mild to moderate disabilities’ will be accommodated in the mainstream. Learners with ‘severe and multiple disabilities’ will be provided for in special schools (Department of Education, 2001: 24). Learners with ‘disabilities that stem from impaired intellectual development’ will be more easily accommodated in the mainstream (Department of Education, 2001: 25). There is assessment of the mildness, moderateness or severity of the disability; whether it is seen as intellectual and more easily accommodated or more physical/medical and less easily accommodated. There is medical categorisation, classification and placement. The disability is within the learner and the learner must therefore be placed in an environment that can accommodate him or her. There are some systems - ‘ordinary schools’ - into which some learners cannot fit. Therefore, they will be moved into a system into which they can fit.

Another action constituted is that of overcoming the ‘debilitating impact of disabilities’ (2001: 10). Is it the disability that is debilitating? Or is it the formation of disability by the medical discourse? Does the disability need to be overcome, or the way it is constituted?

5.3.1.4. Binaries constituted

The central binary constituted by the medical discourse is that of ability-disability. Ability is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 974) as a noun: ‘a word used to identify any of class of people, places or things (common noun) or to name a particular one of these (proper noun)’. This word identifies ‘the capacity to do something; skill or talent’ (Pearsall, 1999: 3). The capacity to do what? Skills are defined as ‘the ability to do something well; expertise or dexterity’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1344). The ability to do what well? Looking at the binary opens up possibilities.

Disability, also a noun, is constructed as ‘a physical or mental condition that limits a person’s movement, senses or activities; a disadvantage or handicap, specially one imposed or recognised by the law’ (Pearsall, 1999: 406). Is ability therefore the capacity to move, sense and be active? Or is it an advantage imposed or recognised by the law? Is it an advantage created by constituting certain
ways of moving, sensing and being active as abilities, while other ways of moving, sensing and being active are (dis)abilities?

Dis- is a prefix ‘expressing negation; denoting reversal or absence of an action or state; denoting removal, separation or expulsion; expressing completeness or intensification of an action’ (Pearsall, 1999: 406). Is (dis)ability the negation of the abilities of those who are different? If so, who negates? Is it the reversal or absence of an action or a state that is labelled ability? If so, who constitutes presence of the action or state? Is it removal, separation or expulsion of ability? If so, who removes, separates or expels. Or is (dis)ability expressing completeness or intensification of an action labelled ability? Does ability, intensified, lie within disability?

I argue that ability can only be understood with reference to disability: in itself it does not form meaning, referring only to the capacity to do ‘something’. That thing is constituted in (dis)ability as an absence. But absence lies within ability, which can only become when (dis)ability is present to define it.

I also argue that the ‘something’ that can be done in ‘ability’ and ‘skill’ is formed by the medical discourse, which further constructs a process of identifying and treating those who cannot do the prescribed ‘something’. Thus this power-knowledge constructs knowers and doers, the known and done to, the subjects and objects. But these knowers only exist in relation to what is known and the doers only exist in relation to those done to.

Another binary I (de)construct is that of normal-abnormal in the classification of schools as ordinary-special. As previously noted, ‘ordinary’ constitutes objects it describes as ‘with no distinctive features; normal or usual’. As is ‘ordinary,’ ‘normal’ is an adjective, or a word that names an attribute of a noun. The attribute it defines is that of ‘conforming to standard, usual, typical or expected’ (Pearsall, 1999: 971). Abnormal is constructed as ‘deviating from what is normal’ (Pearsall, 1999: 3). Who constructs what is standard? Which discourse constitutes what is standard?

Here I find Mercer’s delineation of two models of normality, cited by Skrtic (1995: 81-82), useful:

i) the pathological model from medicine (biology), which defines normal/abnormal according to the presence/absence of observable biological processes: those that interfere with life are ‘bad’ (pathology), while those that enhance it are ‘good’ (health);
ii) The statistical model from psychology, which defines normal/abnormal in terms of variance above or below population mean and is evaluatively neutral - good or bad is a social definition.

In White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001: 12), I read (dis)ability defined as pathology, linked to the medical model by words such as 'organic/medical'. Thus, normality is presence of ability/health/good and abnormality is absence of ability/pathology/bad: with ability defined as the 'capability to do something'. But, as I noted previously, the statistical model may also be (de)constructed. Low support needs may be constructed as the 'norm' or population mean, and thus schools meeting such needs are ordinary (usual or normal).

5.3.1.5. Implications for in/exclusion

Inclusion, as constituted by the medical discourse, necessitates exclusion for those identified/assessed as having needs that cannot be met in 'ordinary' schools. These needs, the discourse forms as rooted in organic/medical causes. White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001: 10) states it best, discussing how policy will 'indicate how learners with disability will be identified, assessed and incorporated into special, full-service and ordinary schools in an incremental manner'. It further provides 'clear signals about how current special schools will serve identified disabled learners' (Department of Education, 2001: 10).

The Ministry of Education states its 'support' of the condemnation of 'segregation of persons with disabilities from the mainstream' voiced by the National Disability Strategy (Department of Education, 2001: 10). Yet it goes on to constitute an 'inclusive education and training system' in which learners with disabilities are segregated depending upon the construction of the level of their disability or support needs by those who identify and assess. Those assessed as having severe disabilities and requiring high levels of support will be excluded from ordinary and full-service schools. Those identified as having moderate disabilities and requiring moderate levels of support will be excluded from ordinary and special schools. Those diagnosed with mild disabilities and requiring low levels of support will be excluded from full-service and special schools.

Through a process of assessing the level of disability and the required level of support, the child will be in/excluded. As Lloyd (2000: 140) writes: 'The whole issue of inclusion as entitlement is fudged. The familiar "let out" clauses are inserted and the implications of genuine inclusion as full participation are avoided.' Another advocate of full inclusion, Slee (2001: 168), argues that 'inclusive education is about all learners'. The medical discourse constituting and constituted by
White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) seems unable to constitute ‘all learners’. Instead, there is reference to ‘all learners, with and without disability’ or ‘all learners, whether disabled or not’ (Department of Education, 2001: 11). Why make the differentiation? The term ‘all learners’ embraces everyone.

Slee (2001: 171) furthermore asks the pertinent question: ‘...in whose interests do particular forms of knowledge operate?’ The forms of knowledge constituted by the White Paper can identify, assess and test people with disabilities to determine their needs or requirements. They can recommend accommodations to meet these needs and support people with disabilities and educators. They can place people with disabilities in an environment meeting their needs. They are experts constituted by the medical discourse - doctors, psychologist and special educators - who, to use the words of Slee (2001: 167):

... demonstrate a remarkable resilience through linguistic dexterity. While they use a contemporary lexicon of inclusion, the cosmetic amendments to practices and procedures reflect assumptions about pathological defect and normality based upon a disposition of calibration and exclusion.

5.3.1.6. Voices on the margins

I (de)construct multiple voices on the margins of the medical discourse as constituted by and constituting White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001):

- The voice of the undisguised medical/special needs discourse is a voice on the margins acknowledged by the Minister of Education, Professor Kader Asmal (Department of Education, 2001: 3). This is the voice of those who see an inability to cope in educational institutions as situated within the learner and requiring specialised intervention. It is the voice of ‘educators, lecturers, parents and learners’ who fear the challenges that may come with inclusion ‘of teaching, communication, costs, stereotyping and the safety of learners’. The White Paper addresses these concerns, writes Asmal (Department of Education, 2001: 3), in what seems like an attempt to soothe them. It is these voices who want segregation or exclusion, not only for learners with severe disabilities rooted in organic/medical causes, but also for learners whose barriers to learning may emerge from extrinsic factors, including the medium of instruction or socio-economic circumstances. These are the voices saying that the inclusion of such learners may not meet their needs.
Kauffinan (1999) is one such voice, arguing that more children are being reared in poverty and conditions that produce elevated risk of disability. Yet, he points out, special needs education is expected to downsize as sentiment rises against the increasing number of students served by special education and the increasing cost of such services. He sees this as a sign of ignoring social welfare problems and abandoning government commitments to all but the 'spectacularly needy' (Kauffman, 1999: 247). Another argument against inclusion put forward by Kauffinan (1999: 246) is that inclusion 'provides physical access but not instructional access for most students' and that common space may, in some cases, 'present insurmountable obstacles to needed instruction'.

Concerns are also expressed by those involved in education for deaf and hard of hearing students. Kluwin (1999: 339) speaks of these learners experiencing 'inclusion' as 'isolated individuals in a mainstream class'. Bat-Chava (2000: 426) describes the increased attendance of deaf children at hearing schools as limiting 'self-esteem ... opportunities for an active social life and participation in leadership roles'.

- Another voice I (de)construct as silenced is that of advocates of full inclusion. Farrell (2000: 158) speaks of parents falling into two groups: the above-mentioned group, which wants to maintain a special school sector, and those who want full inclusion. White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) constitutes a system in which the assessment of severity and support needs is linked to attendance at special schools. It therefore excludes some, even if parents, educators and learners feel their needs will be better met in a fully inclusive school. In White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), the criterion for inclusion seems to be the ease with which learners can be accommodated. For example, the document discusses including learners with impaired intellectual development, because they require curriculum adaptation, while those who require intensive support through medical interventions, structural adjustments to the built environment and/or assistive devices are less easily accommodated (Department of Education, 2001: 25) and therefore will be excluded.

- Other voices I (de)construct in the margins are those of people with organic/medical impairments who define themselves as able, but society's responses as disabling. These are the voices expressed by organisations such as the British Council of Disabled People and Disabled People International. They 'distinguish between "impairment" as lacking part of a limb, organ or mechanism of the body and "disability" as the disadvantage imposed by society's reactions' (Sebba & Sachdev, 1997: 12).
They are the voices silenced by White Paper 6's (Department of Education, 2001: 10) construction of the ‘debilitating impact of those disabilities’. They are voices marginalised by its reference to ‘disability’ and ‘impairments’ when referring specifically to those learners whose barriers to learning and development are rooted in organic/medical causes’ (Department of Education, 2001: 12).

- Linked to this are the voices of social constructionist writers such as Biklen (2000). These voices constitute disability as a construction in a particular social, historical, cultural and economic context in which certain appearances and ways of looking, acting and being are valued as abilities, while others are devalued or constructed as disabilities. These voices are alluded to in references to discrimination, fear, anxieties, stereotyping and attitudes (Department of Education, 2001). An example of a (re)construction of ability in terms of different values is the book Expecting Adam (Beck, 1999), in which the author credits her child, Adam, born with Down’s syndrome, for transforming her on a metaphysical level. She writes: ‘He has taught me to look at things in themselves, not at the value a brutal and often senseless world assigns to them ... he is no less beautiful for being called ugly, no less wise for appearing dull, no less precious for being seen as worthless’ (Beck, 1999: 317).

- I also (de)construct materialist critical voices on the fringes: questioning the reproduction of power relations constituted in policies constituted by discourses in which certain people are identified, assessed and placed in certain contexts by other people who hold values representative of the dominant culture. Placement in those segregated contexts because of the label ensures continuing segregation, devaluation and oppression. This voice is present in the text in Kader Asmal’s (Department of Education, 2001: 4) words: ‘Race and exclusion were the decadent and immoral factors that determined the place of our innocent and vulnerable children’. It is a voice that I read as responding critically to apartheid policy in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), but one which does not reflexively address the reproductions of dominance and inequality in its own policy.

5.3.2. Charity discourse

The Integrated National Disability Strategy (1997) narrates the medical model as constructing disability as a health and welfare issue, leading to state intervention channelled through welfare institutions. INDS (1997) describes a philosophy of pitying, helping and caring for people with disabilities. This Naicker (1999: 13) labels the charity discourse, in which recipients of special
education are seen as 'in need of assistance, as objects of pity and eternally dependent on others ... as underachievers and people who are in need of institutional care'.

Even though disability is no longer a health and welfare issue, I (de)construct the charity discourse - with its constitution of people with disabilities as those who must be done for - in this text.

5.3.2.1. Objects constituted
‘...our people with disabilities’ is a phrase used by the Minister of Education, Professor Kader Asmal, in his introduction to White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001: 4). ‘Our’ is framed by the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 1117) as a ‘possessive determiner indicating possession’. It constructs that which it defines as ‘belonging to or associated with the speaker and one or more others previously mentioned or easily identified; belonging to or associated with people in general; used in formal contexts by a royal person or a writer to refer to something belonging to himself or herself’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1010-1011). The ‘our’ he refers to is the Government, social partners, members of the public and interested organisations.

I construct word-use constituting people with disabilities as ‘belonging to’ a group of people invited together by the government/Minister of Education as patronising. Have people with disabilities given these people ownership of them? If not, are they entitled to take it? What power relations are constituted?

In the same paragraph, Professor Asmal (Department of Education, 2001: 4) refers to people with disabilities as ‘them’.

5.3.2.2. Agents constituted
The agent constituted is ‘us’: the government/Ministry of Education and the social partners, members of the public and interested organisations invited to join them. Excluded from this invitation are people with (dis)abilities for they are the ‘them’: the objects, not the agents; the done to, not the doers.

5.3.2.3. Actions constituted
Actions constituted are working together ‘to nurture our people with disabilities’ and ‘providing them, and our nation, with a solid foundation for lifelong learning and development’ (Department of Education, 2001: 4).
Nurturing, as a verb, re(presents) the following in the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 978): ‘rear and encourage the development of (a child); cherish (a hope, belief, or ambition)’. Cherish is defined as signifying ‘protect and care for lovingly; nurture (a hope or ambition) (Pearsall, 1999: 242).

People with disabilities are constituted as child-like, in need of nurturing, care and protection. They are not constituted as independent and able, but as dependent: an image constituted by the charity discourse. They are also provided for, rather than being constituted as partners in a process of constructing an alternative

5.3.2.4. Binaries constituted
Constituted in this discourse is an us-them binary that is ‘othering’ and devaluing. I (de)construct it as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Us</th>
<th>Them</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carers</td>
<td>In need of care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurturers</td>
<td>In need of nurturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectors</td>
<td>In need of protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providers</td>
<td>Provided for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doers</td>
<td>Done to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builders</td>
<td>Being built for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Binaries constituted by the charity discourse.

5.3.2.5. Implications for in/exclusion
The charity discourse constitutes inclusion as a process of caring and providing for dependent and helpless others, rather than constituting them as active partners in a process of self-determination. ‘Dependency’, writes INDS (1997)23, ‘... disempowers disabled people and isolates them from the mainstream of society, preventing them from accessing fundamental social, political and economic rights.

23 No page numbers are cited for INDS as the text was downloaded from www.gladnet.org/infobase/legislation/text/disabilitysa.htm (2 March 2001).
The let-out clauses in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) can be seen as constituting justification of continuing exclusion and ‘caring for’. Those constituted as ‘unable’ are placed in segregated special schools and removed from the place of work. Rather than participating in the mainstream, they are ‘cared for’ (their needs are met) and supported by public social security and occupational benefit schemes.

5.3.2.6. Voices on the margins

I construct the voice on the margins of this discourse as one voiced by the Integrated National Disability Strategy (1997):

We must stop seeing disabled people are objects of pity but as capable individuals who are contributing immensely to the development of society. We must play an active role in working with them to find jobs and happiness and the fulfilment of their aspirations.

It is a voice acknowledged by Professor Asmal (White Paper 6, Department of Education, 2001: 4), who describes policy as recognising the ‘vital contribution that our people with disabilities are making’. As he empowers, so he disempowers with the possessive pronoun.

5.3.3. Systems discourse

The systems discourse is constituted by White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) as the discourse shaping policy. Throughout the document there are references to systems: as the adverb ‘systematically’; as nouns such as system, the education and training system, education structures and systems; as the adjectives ‘systemic’ and ‘system-wide’. The word ‘system’ appears on 47 of the 56 pages of the document (it is not on pages 14, 29 ,31, 35, 41, 44, 47-49). The White Paper constitutes its language as consistent with the systems discourse, stating that to maintain consistency with the inclusive approach, which sees barriers to learning existing primarily within the learning system, the White Paper uses the term ‘barriers to learning and development’ (2001: 12).

5.3.3.1. Objects constituted

On reading White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), I (de)construct a central object constituted by the systems discourse as the ‘inclusive education and training system’, comprising:
the home, the community and other formal and informal settings and structures within which learning occurs;

centres of learning/inclusive and supportive centres of learning;

ordinary schools, full-service schools, special schools and special settings.

These systems have components:

the home comprises parents, fathers and mothers, children. Mothers and fathers are constituted as those who need to be convinced not to keep disabled children in ‘dark backrooms and sheds’ (Department of Education, 2001: 4). Their non-involvement and the non-recognition of them are formed as reasons why different learning needs may arise (Department of Education, 2001: 7). They are therefore constructed as those with whom educational institutions will form partnerships (Department of Education, 2001: 50). Parents also seem to be constituted as conscripts, in that they will be ‘armed’ with information, counselling and skills: I (de)construct the arms supplier as the information dissemination and advocacy campaign that will be launched by the Ministry;

centres of learning comprise: educators, learners, management, governing bodies, professional staff, curricula, the environment, resources (human and material; physical and professional) and education support services. ‘Inadequately and inappropriately trained’ (Department of Education, 2001: 7) education managers and educators are constituted as one reason why different learning needs arise. They are constructed as ‘human resources’ in need of development (Department of Education, 2001: 18) and support (Department of Education, 2001: 49).

Once again the Ministry attaches the possessive term ‘our’ to educators, who are described as ‘our primary resource for achieving our goal of an inclusive education and training system’ (Department of Education, 2001: 18). Resources are defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition as ‘a stock or supply of material or assets; an action or strategy adopted in adverse circumstances; personal attributes and capabilities that sustain one in adverse circumstances; a teaching aid’. The origins of this word lie in the Old French dialect: resourdre ‘rise again, recover’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1219). In White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), I argue, the educators’ personal attributes and capabilities are not constituted as of value as they are. They are the Ministry’s raw materials in need of refinement in order for the Ministry to reach its goal. It is not a mutual goal.
White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) forms the curriculum as ‘inflexible’ (Department of Education, 2001: 7) and ‘one of the most significant barriers to learning’ (Department of Education, 2001: 19). Again, it is educators who need to be assisted to create greater flexibility in the curriculum. ‘Inappropriate and inadequate’ education support services are described as another reason why different learning needs arise (Department of Education, 2001:7) and are in need of strengthening. In its strengthened form, it will comprise district support teams, institutional support teams, trained education managers and an educator cadre and special schools and settings as resource centres (Department of Education, 2001: 29).

The inclusive education and training system could be visually (de)constructed as follows:

![Inclusive education and training system](image-url)
Questions I found myself asking about the constitution of an inclusive education system as an object include:

- Apart from the removal of segregation according to race, how does this inclusive system differ from the past system? There are still exclusive sub-systems formed within the inclusive system: systems that exclude on the basis of not being able to meet the requirements of learners with severe or multiple disabilities - disabilities defined by White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) as rooted in organic/medical causes;

- Why, if the home and community are formed as systems within which learning can take place, does the Minister of Education write: ‘I hold out great hope that through the measures that we put forward in this White Paper we will also be able to convince the thousands of mothers and fathers of some 280 000 disabled children - who are younger than 18 years and are not in schools or colleges - that the place of these children is not one of isolation in dark backrooms and sheds’ (Department of Education, 2001: 4). The home, here, is constituted as a place of isolation and imprisonment, not of possible learning. Parents are constructed as imprisoners unwilling to see their wrong: they need to be convinced. They are constructed as stubborn: the Minister of Education questions the capability of ‘we’ to convince them, hoping that the ‘we’ will be able enough to do so. Are ‘we’ disabled when confronted with the parents of children with disabilities?

Within the inclusive education and training system, there are objects cast as necessary to identify, primarily barriers to learning and development. There are also key strategies and levers, mechanisms and approaches attached to identifying and overcoming these barriers, and interventions including resource development, curriculum adaptation and graded levels of support.

### 5.3.3.2. Agents constituted

A central agent constituted by the systems discourse in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) is ‘we’: a ‘we’ not defined, but which I (de)construct as referring to the ‘Ministry of Education’ or the ‘Ministry’. A ministry is an amorphous body - a government department headed by a minister (Pearsall, 1999: 907). The individuals comprising the ‘we’ or the ‘ministry’ are anonymous, with the exception of the minister, Professor Kader Asmal (Department of Education, 2001: 3-4), who identifies himself in the introduction, but disappears into the ‘we’ thereafter. The origins of the word minister and ministry lie in the Latin words *minister*, ‘servant’, from *minus*,
'less'. I (de)construct the practice of using the upper case to refer to the 'Ministry' as an effort to elevate the 'we' from servants to controllers of the process of systemic transformation.

On page 46 the Ministry becomes the 'Department of Education' which, together with 'the nine provincial departments of education, will play a critical role ... in laying the foundations of the inclusive education and training system' (Department of Education, 2001). Again the upper case is used: indicating hierarchy? Superiority? Power relations? Is the Department of Education the most important agent in this process? Can systemic change happen without the Department of Education directing it?

Abstract constructs - institutional development, transformation and change - are also agents formed by White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001: 26, 32), which self-referentially constitutes itself as another primary agent. The White Paper (Department of Education 2001: 10, 11) is referred to as outlining policy and as being the policy framework.

By constructing the central or primary agents as an anonymous 'we', a body such as a Ministry, texts and policy, I (de)construct a move away from accountability, which is also evidenced in the use of the passive voice. The change agents become anonymous, amorphous groups, or texts, or absent words at the end of passive constructions: ‘...a wider spread of educational support services will be created ...’, ‘...there will be a qualitative upgrading of their services’ and so on.

5.3.3.3. Actions constituted

Despite their anonymity and absence, these agents are formed as prime movers in the process of a 'system-wide' (Department of Education, 2001: 6) 'transformation programme' (Department of Education, 2001: 11).

In White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), some advocated changes to the system are presented in the passive voice and active agents are never constituted for these actions. An example of this is: ‘The overhauling of the process of identifying, assessing and enrolling learners ...’ (Department of Education, 2001: 8). Other changes are initially presented in the passive voice, with active agents linked to them later. ‘The qualitative improvement of special schools ...’ (Department of Education, 2001: 8), the reader later discovers will be implemented by 'we' who will 'review, improve and expand 'participation' in special schools/resource centres and full-service institutions' (Department of Education, 2001: 32).
The Ministry, ‘we’ and the White Paper are linked to most actions:

- Among actions carried out by the Ministry are: collaborating, giving urgent attention to, putting forward a framework, reviewing existing policy and legislation, believing, investigating how in the future, recognising, accepting, acknowledging, requiring, making recommendations, expecting, monitoring;
- ‘We’ focuses efforts, requires, outlines, defines, acknowledges, strengthens, evaluates and decides;
- White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), among other actions, outlines ‘key strategies and levers’, provides the framework for establishing an inclusive education and training system, details a funding strategy, and lists key steps to be taken. It outlines a policy which will: systematically move away from using segregation to categorise institutions; introduce strategies and interventions; give direction for education support services; indicate how learners will be identified, assessed and incorporated and provide clear signals about how special schools serve learners with disabilities and act as resources (Department of Education, 2001: 10).

By being the doers of these actions, White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), the Ministry and ‘we’ are constituted as the planners, decision-makers, evaluators and monitors of the process of system-wide change. On the receiving end of action are management and governance teams, education support personnel, professional staff, educators, parents, learners. They are rather constituted as objects that must be trained, made aware or identified, assessed and allocated.

5.3.3.4. Binaries constituted

A binary constituted is one of an inclusive education and training system as opposed to an exclusive education and training system. An inclusive system, as constituted by White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001: 12), is one in which the learner or worker is not seen as inherently disabled but is rather primarily disabled by barriers within the system. An exclusive system I thus read as one in which the learner is seen as inherently disabled and thus unable to participate in the system.

After defining an inclusive approach this way, the White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) goes on to describe some learners’ barriers to learning and development as rooted in organic/medical causes, stating that these will be called learners with disabilities or impairments. After advocating inclusion as defined by itself, the White Paper languages exclusion as defined by itself. It also constitutes a system in which learners with severe or multiple disabilities are
physically excluded or segregated from both ordinary and full-service schools (Department of Education, 2001: 23). Rather than languaging inclusion, it languages in/exclusion.

Other binaries associated with the inclusion-exclusion opposition are constituted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exclusion</th>
<th>Inclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immoral</td>
<td>Moral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decadent (decaying)</td>
<td>Generating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past</td>
<td>Present and future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apartheid</td>
<td>Post-apartheid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Binaries constituted by the systems discourse.

Considering the degree of exclusion within inclusion already noted - particularly as regards learners with moderate and severe disabilities - the Department of Education therefore constructs itself as (im)moral, both decadent and generating, set in the past, present and future and retaining elements of apartheid or segregation relating to people with disabilities.

Another binary constituted by the systems discourse is one of system/chaos. A system is defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition as a noun that forms: ‘a complex whole; a set of things working together as a mechanism or interconnecting network; the human or animal body as a whole; an organised scheme of method; orderliness; method; the prevailing political or social order, especially when regarded as oppressive and intransigent’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1453). I (de)construct inconsistencies in the use of this signifier in the document which, rather than describing things working together, describes ‘we’, the Ministry, as working on things. Thus, the use of the word system perhaps is more in line with the third definition, re(presenting) oppression and intransigence: power relations in which those at the top (indicated by upper case letters) dictate what those below will do. This, in turn, I (de)construct as inconsistent with phrases constituting the policy and process as democratic and participatory: phrases such as ‘These values summon all of us’ and ‘In building our education and training system, our Constitution provides a special challenge to us’ (Department of Education, 2001: 11).

Perhaps systems, with their orderliness, inspire the need to direct? Perhaps the fear is of the binary - chaos: ‘complete disorder and confusion; physics behaviour so unpredictable as to appear random, owing to small changes in conditions; the formless matter supposed to have existed before the
creation of the universe' (Pearsall, 1999: 236). Yet can change from the top-down be predicted? Is the policy not advocating small changes - 'our vision of an inclusive education and training system can only be developed over the long term ... action we will take in the short to medium term must provide us with models for later system-wide application' (Department of Education, 2001: 6). There are no existing models. The implication is that there is a step into the unknown, the void. The origin of chaos is the Greek *khaos* 'vast chasm, void' (Pearsall, 1999: 236). Is the need for a system and top-down control not a reaction to the void and the unknown?

5.3.3.5. Implications for in/exclusion

The systems discourse constituting and constituted by particularly White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) is one in which objective outsiders can observe and assess a system, determine barriers and supports, recommend guidelines or a framework for change, implement it, monitor and evaluate it. This is referred to by Becvar and Becvar (1996: 75-76) as simple cybernetics and is visually depicted as follows:

![Cybernetics](image)

Figure 8: Cybernetics (Becvar & Becvar, 1996: 76).

This document constitutes **observations** made by NCSNET/NCESS (Department of Education, 1997) and accepted by the ministry of education. These bodies were appointed by the ministry to **investigate and make recommendations** on all aspects of special needs and support services in education and training in South Africa (Department of Education, 2001: 5). These bodies observed barriers to learning and development in the education system. The White Paper constitutes factors from which learning needs arise, weakness and deficiencies of the current system, a framework for establishing an inclusive education and training system and strategic changes to be implemented over a 20-year period. Thus it identifies needs and advocates system-wide solutions, which are summarised in Table 10.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflexible curriculum:</td>
<td>Create curricula accessible to all learners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate languages Communication</td>
<td>Information, advocacy and mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative attitudes and stereotyping of difference</td>
<td>Develop sites of learning that provide physical access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inaccessible and unsafe built environments</td>
<td>Strengthen education support services: institutional and district support teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate and inadequate support services</td>
<td>Review all existing policies and legislation so that these will be consistent with the White Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate policies and legislation</td>
<td>Information, advocacy and mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-recognition and non-involvement of parents</td>
<td>Human resource development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequately and inappropriately trained education managers and educators</td>
<td>Expand provision and access:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic deprivation</td>
<td>• Mobilise out-of-school youth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Differences in intellectual ability</td>
<td>• create ordinary, full-service and special schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical, mental, sensory, neurological and developmental impairments</td>
<td>• early assessment and intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychosocial disturbances</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Learning needs and system-wide solutions.

The process becomes about funding; introducing, developing and reallocating resources (human and material); adapting environments; developing new teaching strategies and materials; changing policy and attitudes: designing an input that will create a different output (an inclusive system). The input is graded according to short, medium and long-term goals, outcomes are defined, a time frame is established (20 years) and strategic plans for the next eight years are outlined (Department of Education, 2001: 45-51).

New knowledges are constituted - those delineating and solving systemic deficits - and with them power relations, as the knowers constitute the known in terms of strengths and weaknesses, problems and solutions, barriers and supports. Instead of special needs educators, there are systems analysts.
5.3.3.6. Voices on the margins

A strong voice on the margins - present in the need to constitute a framework, monitoring, evaluation and control - is that of cybernetics of cybernetics (Becvar & Becvar, 1996: 76). This is the voice that says that the observers are part of the system and cannot objectively view the system: what they construct is self-referential.

Figure 9. Cybernetics of Cybernetics (Becvar & Becvar, 1996: 76).

This voice also sees systems as generating a unity, not because of the nature of the parts (the resources/the funds/the environment), but because of the way in which parts relate (learners are still assessed to identify their barriers to learning and allocated to sites depending upon their needs for support).

Cybernetics of cybernetics further states that systems will determine the range of structural variation without a loss of identity: ‘The environment, therefore, does not determine what a system does’ (Becvar & Becvar, 1996: 79). The voice of ‘we’, the Ministry and the White Paper cannot change a system that it sees out there in predictable ways. They cannot outline ‘how the education and training system must transform itself … how it must change’ (Department of Education, 2001: 11). They can only couple or join with the system (Becvar & Becvar, 1996: 80) - change their own ways of relating and being and then observe to see if this leads to some reaction in the system within which they are.

Dictating a policy, maintaining a top-down policy of outlining, monitoring and evaluating change, is not behaving in an alternative way to possibly generate or perturb alternative responses. Instead of, for example, constituting think tanks with teachers and learners to generate alternative teaching strategies and materials, the document constitutes the training of teachers. Educators are constituted as unable to participate in the process. The public and parents too are not constituted as partners to
work with, but rather as objects that must be exposed to information and advocacy campaigns. Rather than working with, White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) prescribes to and attempts to dictate and control systemic transformation.

Yet despite policy outlining and prescribing, the voice of systemic determinism is heard within White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001: 11): ‘The White Paper outlines how the education and training system must transform itself ... how it must change ...’. The White Paper, the Ministry, and ‘we’ cannot transform the system: it must transform itself. Control is lost at this point.

A verse from Gottfried Benn’s poem, Foreign Minister (1999: 215), captures for me the chaos within systems and systems within chaos: the efforts to constitute system, hierarchy and control.

In parliament - not at all humbug by any means,
but methodic like Sanskrit or nuclear physics,
vast laboratory: official advisors, press releases, empiricism,
character too must be felt to be at work
seriously: character they do have, those come to the top,
not because of possible law suits
but it’s their moral sex appeal -
true, what is the State?
‘One existing thing among many others,’
Plato said long ago.

Another voice I (de)construct in the margins in its absence is that of the materialist critical writers. Ideology and reproductions of power relations are not explicitly languaged in this policy (except for references to democracy and socio-economic deprivation from which different learning needs arise), but are present in:

- the hierarchies established by who does and who is done, who is agent and who is object;
- upper and lower case usage, representing power relations; and
- the constitution of curriculum as not ideological.

Curriculum is constituted by White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001: 19) as:
• content;
• language or medium of instruction;
• how the classroom or lecture is organised and managed;
• the methods and processes used in teaching;
• the pace of teaching and the time available to complete the curriculum;
• the learning materials and equipment that is used;
• how learning is assessed.

That all the above could reflect and be reflected in ideology that reproduces power relations is not constituted by the document. As Bernstein (1975: 85) writes:

‘How a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public, reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control … Curriculum defines what counts as valid knowledge, pedagogy defines what counts as valid transmission of knowledge, and evaluation defines what counts as valid realization of this knowledge on the part of the taught.

The White Paper (Department of Education, 2001: 25), in fact, constitutes curricular adaptation as the easiest:

We are persuaded (by whom?) that the inclusion of learners with disabilities that stem from impaired intellectual development will require curriculum adaptation rather than major structural adjustments or sophisticated equipment. Accordingly their accommodation within an inclusive education and training framework would be more easily facilitated than the inclusion of learners who require intensive support through medical interventions, structural adjustments to the built environment and/or assistive devices with minimal curriculum adaptation.

Is White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) saying it is easier to change the reproduction of power relations through curriculum than to make physical structural changes, buy assistive devices or offer medical interventions?
Other voices on the fringes are those of the objects that ‘we’, the Ministry and the White Paper aim to transform. These are voices acknowledged by the Minister of Education (Department of Education, 2001: 3), who writes:

I am deeply aware of the concerns shared by many parents, educators, lecturers, specialists … I understand these concerns … I am also deeply aware of the anxieties that many educators, lecturers, parents and learners hold about our inclusion proposals …

Among these are the voices of:

- Parents of children constituted as with mild or moderate support needs, who feel their children will not receive the resources, facilities and protection or security they need in ordinary or full-service schools in an inclusive system;
- Children constituted as with mild or moderate support needs, placed in ordinary or full-service schools, who fear unequal competition, teasing and not being able to cope in an environment in which there is less time for them. Padeliadu & Zigmond (Kavale & Forness, 2000: 285) found that ‘most students with disabilities … felt the special education setting to be a supportive and quiet environment where they could receive extra academic assistance’;
- Parents of children constituted as having low support needs, who feel the rights of their children will be infringed on: teachers will have less time for their children, standards will drop, classes will be disrupted;
- Educators in mainstream schools, who constitute themselves as overworked, underpaid, under-trained and unable or unwilling to play the role expected of them in an inclusive system;
- Special needs educators, who are expected to change roles within the inclusive system: rather than primarily working with children they constitute as having special needs (in both special schools and other settings), they will be expected to also train and support teachers.

The Ministry’s response to these voices is to mobilise public support (Department of Education, 2001: 50): to launch an information dissemination and advocacy campaign. Rather than listening to these voices, the goal is to change them by informing those who disagree of the policy and their ‘rights, responsibilities and obligations’ (Department of Education, 2001: 34). Only when discussing mobilisation are parents constituted as partners who will be armed (by the Ministry?) with ‘information, counselling and skills’ to participate in inclusion activities (Department of Education, 2001: 50). Before this, parents are constituted as those who keep their children isolated

5.3.4. Pioneering discourse

A discourse I (de)construct as constituted by and constituting the systems discourse is what I call the pioneering discourse: a discourse that constitutes ‘we’, the Ministry and the White Paper as pioneers, laying the first bricks of inclusive systems.

5.3.4.1. Objects constituted

The object constituted is the inclusive education and training system: thus my (de)construction of the pioneering discourse as forming and formed by the systems discourse.

5.3.4.2. Agents constituted

Agents constituted are ‘we’, the Ministry, the Ministry of Education, the Minister of Education and the Departments of Education and Labour. The Minister of Education invites ‘social partners, members of the public and interested organisations’ to join ‘us’ and together they become ‘we all’ (Department of Education, 2001: 4). The qualities described as needed by these agents are ‘persistence, commitment, co-ordination, support, monitoring, evaluation, follow-up and leadership’ (Department of Education, 2001: 4).

5.3.4.3. Actions constituted

Actions constituted by the pioneering discourse are building, providing a framework, establishing, developing, implementing and transforming.

5.3.4.4. Binaries constituted

Building is a verb describing actions of constructing by putting parts of materials together, or alternatively increasing in size or intensity over time (Pearsall, 1999: 183). Its binary could be constituted as destroying by breaking up parts or materials, or alternatively decreasing in size or intensity over time. The origins of the word destroy form this binary: based on Latin destruct-, destruere, from de- (expressing reversal) + struere ‘build’ (Pearsall, 1999: 389). As the agents of the state build the new inclusive education and training system, they destroy ‘the decadent and immoral factors’ of race and exclusion. But do they?
Special schools - exclusionary and segregated institutions established in the apartheid era - are to be ‘strengthened rather than abolished’ (Department of Education, 2001: 3), so that they can better serve learners who require intense levels of support and become a resource to educators and learners in other schools (2001: 21). Thus there is an increase or intensification: a building on the foundations of exclusionary structures founded in the past, rather than a decrease facilitating (re)building. If what is built encompasses an increase in the strength of institutions that segregate certain learners, rather than a decrease or destruction of such institutions, is there a building of inclusion or exclusion? Should there not be a process of (de)construction to reveal the foundations before rebuilding?

If there is not such a process, can this be constituted as a process of ‘constructing’ or establishing: initiating or bringing about (Pearsall, 1999: 488)? Can this be seen as transformation: ‘a marked change in nature, form or appearance’ (Pearsall, 1999: 488)?

Are these pioneers? Are they not rather those who build up - increase the strength of exclusionary structures - rather than those who pioneer?

5.3.4.5. Implications for in/exclusion

The implication of the pioneering discourse is that inclusion is constituted as new, an alternative to an exclusionary past, which was ‘decadent and immoral’ (Department of Education, 2001: 4). It constitutes those creating the framework or outlining the process as leaders of a process of transformation. These agents design and implement inclusion: it was not there before.

5.3.4.6. Voices on the margins

The voice of inclusion in the past lies on the margins of this discourse. It is a voice that says there has been inclusion in Africa before; it is not new. It is a voice of previous knowledge, expressed by Kisanji (1998), who narrates his experiences of growing up partially sighted in an African community in which the principles of inclusion characterised indigenous customary education. ‘...hearing, visually, physically and intellectually impaired young people in the community I grew up with underwent this kind of education’, he writes (Kisanji, 1998: 59). This writer describes customary education, which has a curriculum emphasising functional and social skills, as enabling all learners to live in and contribute to society according to ability. He sees Western education as evolving from this inclusive customary education: ‘... inclusive education is a return to the basics’, Kisanji (1998: 64) states.
In South Africa, one voice of inclusion in the past is called mainstreaming ‘by default’ (Department of Education, 2001: 5). This is not defined by the White Paper, but is constituted by Donald (1996: 83) as occurring because of the severe lack of special educational facilities for ‘African’ (sic) learners. Thus all learners attended mainstream schools without having the benefit of special support services to meet the ‘special needs of pupils’. Instead of using the experiences of learners, parents and teachers in this context as a rich source of information - ‘How did they cope?’ ‘What worked?’ ‘What did they learn?’ ‘What could they teach us?’ - this resourceful inclusion within exclusion is framed as ‘default’.

Why? Because it was not implemented, controlled or built by those who know? Because people who need to be trained (educators) did it without training? Because the objects became agents? Because power-knowledges did not constitute these systems as inclusive and therefore they cannot be?

The implication I read is that mainstreaming, before officially endorsed by the inclusion movement, occurred ‘because of lack of opposition or positive action’ (Pearsall, 1999: 375). Kisanji (1998: 65) reframes this, speaking of ‘casual integration’ - also referred to as ‘unplanned or unofficial integration’ - taking place in non-western countries long before ‘official endorsement’. ‘It should be noted that some of those children casually integrated have managed to go through university,’ Kisanji (1998: 64) writes. As framed by Kisanji, mainstreaming in the apartheid context was a positive action, an act of opposition to segregation and not an act by default.

5.3.5. Business discourse

Another discourse constituting and constituted by the systems discourse is what I (de)construct as the business discourse: a discourse (re)presented in the presence of ‘cost-effectiveness’ in the seven principles guiding the vision (Department of Education, 2001: 5). This discourse frames funding as necessary for the successful implementation of an inclusive education and training system (Department of Education, 2001: 35).

5.3.5.1. Objects constituted

People are constituted as human resources and productive citizens by this discourse, which constructs ways in which to make such objects more valuable to the state rather than dependent on the state. By increasing the value of these objects, another abstract object - the fiscal burden - is decreased.
5.3.5.2. Agents constituted
The only active agents in the first six pages of Chapter Three of the White Paper - a chapter focusing on the funding strategy - are White Paper 6 (once), policies outlined in White Paper 6 (once) and provincial governments who will have responsibility (once). On the seventh page, two other active agents are introduced - the Ministry (four times in two paragraphs) and the National Plan for Higher Education (once). The passive voice predominates, which I (de)construct as removing agents, thus decreasing accountability. A lot must be done, but by whom remains unstated.

Another agent constituted by the business discourse in other chapters is the Government: again the upper case denotes the power hierarchy of Government in relation to provincial governments.

5.3.5.3. Actions constituted
Actions constituted and carried out primarily by absent agents include adopting, proposing and investigating; reviewing, revising and reformulating; auditing and allocating. ‘Much more cost-effective use/usage’ is also made of specialist educators and other resources.

Government focuses on developing the objects to their fullest potential, increasing the number of these objects and thus reducing the Government’s fiscal burden, as fewer objects will be dependent on the state.

5.3.5.4. Binaries constituted
A binary constituted by the business discourse is one of cost-effectiveness versus cost-ineffectiveness. Cost-effectiveness is the future goal. However, ‘the current system of provision is both cost-ineffective and excludes individuals with barriers to learning from the mainstream of educational provision’ (Department of Education, 2001, 1999: 38).

What is cost-effectiveness? The term is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition (Pearsall, 1999: 322) as ‘effective or productive in relation to its cost’. Effective is ‘producing a desired or intended result’ (Pearsall, 1999: 456). Productive is ‘producing or able to produce large amounts of goods, crops etc; relating to or engaged in the production of goods, crops etc; achieving or producing a significant amount or result’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1140).
The desired or intended result constituted by White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) is an inclusive education and training system. But who will determine when this system is effective or productive in relation to its cost? Who sets the standards of effectivity and productivity? And in relation to what? To the past cost-ineffective system? And what is being produced by this system to measure its effectivity? Is effectivity going to be measured by the number of citizens dependent on the state for social security grants as related to productive citizens produced by the inclusive education and training system? Are productive citizens the measure of effectivity? Who determines the productivity of these citizens? Is it just that they no longer drain state resources?

Another implied binary is that of costs versus benefits. Within the document, costs are framed as short term - ‘additional funding will be required for "special needs" (sic) education’ - but long-term benefits are promised:

The policies outlined in this White Paper will lead to more cost-effective usage of resources in the long term when the proposed model is fully operational.

(Department of Education, 2001: 112)

Thus, cost in this document is formed as the ‘effort or loss necessary to achieve something’, the origins of this term based on the Latin constare ‘stand firm, stand at a price’ (Pearsall, 1999: 322). But is there firmness or a sense of resolve in the efforts proposed by White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001)? I read tentativeness in words such as ‘it will be important to pursue our policy goal of inclusion through the development of models of inclusion that can later be considered for system-wide application’ (Department of Education, 2001: 22). The highlighted phrase, to me, indicates possibility rather than definite action. These models will not be applied system wide; they will be considered:

Consider: (verb) 1. Think carefully about believe to be take into account when making a judgement 2. Look attentively at.

(Pearsall, 1999: 303)

If careful thought renders them to be cost-ineffective, will they be abandoned?

5.3.5.5. Implications for in/exclusion

If transformation to an inclusive education and training system is being run according to business principles, cost becomes more important than the value of inclusion. That this is the stance of
government and policy makers is constituted in the following sentence, twice repeated: ‘It will not be possible to provide relatively expensive equipment and other resources, particularly for blind and deaf students, at all higher education institutions’ (Department of Education, 2001: 31, 42).

But what if inclusion itself is constructed as ‘too expensive’ after ‘consideration’ of the models of inclusion? Will the transformation program then be abandoned? These are questions provoked by inclusion as constituted by the business discourse.

5.3.5.6. Voices on the margins

One voice on the margin of this discourse is that of parents, educators and learners who see inclusion and the accommodation of education systems to their needs as their right and not something that depends upon expense. It is a voice that might say that human rights cannot be costed before government makes decisions about whether or not they can be granted.

Another voice is that saying that meeting the needs of all costs money. Kauffman (1999: 247) speaks, for example, of downsizing of special needs education in America, the argument being that it is ‘wasteful and ineffective’. (I think here of White Paper 6’s assertion that the current system is cost-ineffective). Kauffman (1999: 247) passionately argues:

... if we are to serve even the remaining students (in special education) adequately, then surely we will need an increase, not a decrease, in the fiscal resources devoted to the task ...

Today, Americans want to ignore social welfare problems as much as possible, to abandon government commitments to all but the spectacularly needy ...

A materialist critical voice could also be deciphered on the margins, one which asks who defines ‘productive citizens’ and whose interests are met by such productivity. This voice suggests that rather than attempting to meet the needs of citizens, educational institutions design administrative, curricular and pedagogical practices that reproduce subject positions that sustain exploitative class hierarchies (Erevelles, 2000: 28).

5.4. Interpretivist Grand Narrative

Although disability itself is not narrated as socially constructed within White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), but is constituted as medical/organic with no reflection on how these medical/organic differences are read, I do (de)construct the interpretivist grand narrative within this
text. This narrative is concerned with understanding the social construction of reality’ (Skrtic, 1995: 32).

5.4.1. Social constructionist discourse

The social constructionist discourse argues that:

... all social realities are constructed and shared through well-understood processes. It is this socialized sharing that gives these constructions their apparent reality, for if everyone agrees on something, how can one argue that it does not exist?

Guba (Skrla, 2000: 296)

As I noted previously, White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) does not reflect upon the social construction of disability itself, but it does constitute social constructions related to disability and inclusion.

5.4.1.1. Objects constituted
The social constructionist discourse forms the following objects: public awareness and acceptance of inclusion; support for the policy; community support (Department of Education, 2001: 33); negative attitudes to and stereotyping of difference (Department of Education, 2001: 7); fears, concerns, worries and anxieties about inclusion (Department of Education, 2001: 3).

5.4.1.2. Agents constituted
Agents constituted by the social constructionist discourse are the Ministry and the passive voice.

5.4.1.3. Actions constituted
Actions are constituted primarily by what I narrate as a military discourse. The Ministry uncovers negative stereotypes, launches an information and advocacy campaign, targets parents and mobilises community support. The passive voice arms parents with information. War is declared against social constructions averse to the vision of the Ministry.

Another group of actions is formed by what I story as the missionary discourse, which disseminates information, advocates unconditional acceptance and wins support for the cause.
5.4.1.4. Binaries constituted

Binaries are constituted in adjectives describing social constructions: unconditional versus conditional acceptance of inclusion; negative versus positive stereotypes. What I construe as ironic is that White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) itself constitutes conditional rather than unconditional acceptance of inclusion. There is not full inclusion within the system: all schools including all learners. There is rather conditional mainstreaming or allocation to ordinary schools, depending upon an assessment of the severity of the barriers to learning and the degree of support needed. There is also conditional entry to full-service schools ‘that will have a bias towards certain disabilities’ (Department of Education, 2001: 10). Thus inclusion in any sub-system of the inclusive system is conditional: ‘subject to one or more conditions being met’ (Pearsall, 1999: 297).

I also find myself questioning a system that requests unconditional acceptance in the following way: ‘... advocating unconditional acceptance and winning support for the policies put forward ...’ (Department of Education, 2001: 33). To what is this unconditional acceptance attached? Is this advocating unconditional acceptance of the policy? Unconditional acceptance or positive regard within psychology constitutes acceptance of a person regardless of what that person does. The behaviours may be condemned, but the person must remain accepted (Meyer, Moore & Viljoen, 1989: 385). Is the public being asked to accept a policy regardless of what actions materialise from that policy? Is this freedom and democracy? Or are people the object of the unconditional acceptance? If so, as noted above, the document is inconsistent, in that certain schools within the vision of the inclusive system do not accept certain people.

As regards negative and its binary, positive, these are value judgements. A stereotype is constructed as ‘an image or idea of a particular type of person or thing that has become fixed through being widely held’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1408). Constituting people with differences rooted in organic/medical causes as people with disabilities or with the reversal of abilities is a fixed idea associated with particular knowledges constructing ability in particular ways. Is this a negative or a positive stereotype? Within the medical discourse, White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001: 12) frames it as ‘internationally acceptable’; thus positive? Is international acceptance the value we use to determine what is negative and what is positive? If the world stereotypes a group of people in a particular way, is that positive?

And what of the way in which the document represents the mothers and fathers who must be convinced that the place of their children is not one of isolation in ‘dark backrooms and sheds’ (Department of Education, 2001: 4). The words ‘dark’ and ‘isolation’ bring to mind imprisonment,
thus constituting parents as the imprisoners. I (de)construct this as the representation of a negative stereotype. Does the Ministry frame it as positive?

5.4.1.5. Implications for inclusion

I read the social constructionist discourse in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) as constituting the Ministry’s awareness of these attitudes, stereotypes, fears, anxieties, worries and concerns but, simultaneously, outlining a lack of acceptance of these constructions. They must be changed, thus the constitution of military and missionary discourses focused on uncovering and overcoming resistance.

What I ask is why these voices cannot become part of the process, why they cannot dialogue with and be heard? Rather than disseminating information, can knowledge not be produced collectively? Rather than imposing a dominant story, can space not be created for alternative stories? The answer may lie in Young’s (Gerwitz, 1998: 477) languaging of what she calls ‘cultural imperialism’: a form of oppression that stereotypes oppressed groups’ experience and interpretation of life and imposes the dominant group’s experience and interpretation of life.

5.4.1.6. Voices on the margins

That a need is narrated for a military or missionary discourse indicates that there are many voices on the margins - heard by the narrators - which need to be converted. They need to be made aware of their ‘rights, responsibilities and obligations’ as outlined by the policy, they need to be armed with ‘information, counselling and skills’, and they need to change. These are the voices of the many parents, educators, lecturers and learners who are anxious and afraid, or who do not unconditionally accept inclusion. It is the voice of the lay discourse (see Chapter Three), storied by Naicker (1999: 14) as one of ‘prejudice, hate, ignorance, fear, and even paternalistic tendencies’.

But what of voices within the text that are not unconditionally accepting, that create negative stereotypes? What of the medical and charity discourses I read in the text? What of the exclusion? What of the narrating of parents as prisoners and educators as inadequate? Are these voices also going to be converted?
5.5. Radical Humanist Grand Narrative

White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) constructs itself within the context of a democratic state founded on values outlined by the Constitution: values of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.

These values summon all of us to take up the responsibility and challenge of building a humane and caring society, not for the few, but for all South Africans. In establishing an education and training system for the 21st century, we carry a special responsibility to implement these values and to ensure that all learners, with and without disabilities, pursue their learning potential to the fullest.

(Department of Education, 2001: 11)

Here I read the radical humanist grand narrative of social change: a narrative that, rather than looking at material structures, looks as ‘ideational structures’ (Skrtic, 1995: 33). Stressing the need to increase human freedom, it emphasises democracy (Skrtic, 1995: 136-139) and rails against the oppressive apartheid ideology of the past.

Enslin and Pendlebury (2000: 431) argue that a primary purpose of policy in a democracy is ‘to improve practice in the interests of public good’. The radical humanist grand narrative, in line with this argument, constitutes the White Paper as outlining how the education and training system must transform itself to contribute to establishing a caring and humane society (Department of Education, 2001: 11). It is also a paper narrated as benefiting from ‘early experience and knowledge of the complex interface of policy and practice’ (Department of Education, 2001: 4): constituting it as, in some ways, better than earlier policy.

5.5.1. Rights discourse

‘Rights feature prominently in post-apartheid policy, and so they should,’ write Enslin and Pendlebury (2000: 432), describing the apartheid era as characterised by a ‘systematic abuse’ of human rights. The educational discourse during apartheid was ‘one of obedience to authority; apartheid education set out to teach citizens to be obedient, to know their place and accept authority, rather than see themselves as learners, as exercisers of rights’ (Enslin & Pendlebury, 2000: 432). They describe the present rights discourse, entrenched in the Constitution and in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), as a crucial element of democracy.
5.5.1.1. Objects constituted

I read the rights discourse in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) as forming the following objects: the advancement of human rights and freedoms; the fundamental right to basic education for all South Africans; the right to equality and non-discrimination; rights, responsibilities and obligations. The advancement of human rights is defined as one of the values on which the Constitution founded the democratic state. What are rights?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Moral</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘that which is morally right; a moral or legal entitlement to have or do something’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1232)</td>
<td>‘a regard that something is held to deserve; importance or worth ♦ material or monetary worth ♦ the worth of something compared to its price; (values) principles or standards of behaviour’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1584)</td>
<td>‘a fundamental truth or proposition serving as the foundation for belief or action ♦ a rule or belief governing one’s personal behaviour ♦ morally correct behaviour and attitudes’ (Pearsall, 1999: 925)</td>
<td>‘(adj): concerned with principles of right and wrong behaviour and the goodness or badness of human character; adhering to the code of behaviour that is considered right or acceptable ; (morals) standards of behaviour or principles of right and wrong’ (Pearsall, 1999: 925)</td>
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Table 11: Some signifiers associated with rights.

Rights, as constituted in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), seem to embrace both a legal and a moral dimension. That specific rights are entrenched by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution delineates them as legal entitlements in South African legislation. Are they therefore primarily laws? That the advancement of such rights is equated to a value, I read as forming moral and/or fundamental truth and/or judgement of worth dimensions. These, I argue, contradict one another, as fundamental truths are absolutes, while principles of right and wrong or judgements of worth are relatives. Are these rights seen as absolute, incontestable universals? Or are they relative to the historical, social, cultural, economic context of the judge of worth, right or wrong? Marshall (2000:127) highlights the variability and relativity of values, describing them as ‘continuously shifting. At times education policy may value equity, efficiency or choice/democracy’.

Enslin and Pendlebury (2000: 434) offer an alternative, languaging rights as enabling us to stand up, look others in the eye and in some fundamental way feel the equal of anyone. Rights, they argue,
involve respect for people, seeing people as potential asserters of claims and recognising their agency.

5.5.1.2. Agents constituted

The Constitution is constructed as the primary agent responsible for founding the democratic state and common citizenship on values, including human rights. The agency constituting these values - which become abstract agents - is absent. Other agents of the Constitution (1996) are the state, the Government, the Ministry of Education and White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), whom I read as (to use a positivist term) operationalising these rights.

5.5.1.3. Actions constituted

I (de)construct actions within the rights discourse as once again constituted by the missionary discourse: values ‘summon us all to take up the responsibility and challenge’, the Constitution (1996) ‘provides a challenge to us’, requires that we give effect and ‘commits’ us and the state.

5.5.1.4. Binaries constituted

Binaries constituted by the rights discourse within White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) include discrimination versus non-discrimination and equality versus inequality. The latter I will (de)construct in the reading of social justice discourses.

Discrimination is constituted by the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition as ‘the action of discriminating against people; recognition and understanding of the difference between one thing and another; good judgement or taste’. To discriminate against is ‘to make an unjust distinction in the treatment of different categories of people, especially on the grounds of race, sex or age’ (Pearsall, 1999: 409). The Constitution extends these categories, prohibiting unfair discrimination, directly or indirectly, against anyone on one or more grounds. These grounds include the three categories mentioned above, disability, gender, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: 8). Binaries of fair-unfair, direct-indirect (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: 8) and just-unjust (Pearsall, 1999: 409) are also formed.

White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) constitutes an inclusive system that claims to recognise and understand the difference between learners with barriers to learning and development rooted in organic/medical causes, and learners whose barriers are storied as not attributable to these causes (Department of Education, 2001: 12). It further distinguishes between learners requiring
low-intensive, moderate and high-intensive educational support (Department of Education, 2001: 15); those with mild to moderate, severe and multiple disabilities (Department of Education, 2001: 24) and those with impaired intellectual ability versus those who require intensive support (Department of Education, 2001: 25). Based on these distinctions/discriminations, actions are taken which include or exclude them from schools and services. The document constructs this discrimination and the subsequent actions emerging from this discrimination as the system meeting the diverse range of learning needs. The implication therefore is that this is fair and just discrimination. But do the objects of this discrimination - the learners identified, classified and allocated and their parents - perceive it this way?

Discrimination, as formed by the Constitution, also encompasses not discriminating against someone on the basis of belief. Here the complexity of competing rights becomes apparent. If parents believe they can better meet the learning needs of their child, who has been constructed as disabled, in the home (which has been recognised as a site of learning within White Paper 6), should they be framed as isolating their children in dark venues? Should they become the targets of an advocacy campaign? If educators believe that the needs of learners with mild to severe barriers to learning (internal or external) are better met in special schools and settings than in classes comprising 60 learners, should they be framed as having negative attitudes and inappropriate or inadequate training? Is this not discrimination?

5.5.1.5. Implications for in/exclusion

Everyone's right to basic education, entrenched in the Bill of Rights, is narrated as creating the government's obligation to provide such education. White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001: 11) is storied as:

outlining the Ministry's commitment to the provision of educational opportunities, in particular for those learners who experience or have experienced barriers to learning and development or who have dropped out of learning because of the inability of the education and training system to accommodate the diversity of learning needs, and those learners who continue to be excluded from it.

Thus the White Paper is the Ministry's response to this obligation: a policy framework delineating a system that includes all. But does it simultaneously meet the right to non-discrimination? Perhaps not, in that it distinguishes and excludes people on the basis of identified needs for support, severity of disability and barriers to learning, and stereotypes and targets people on the basis of their beliefs.
Returning to the alternative storying of rights as respect for people and acknowledgement of their agency (Enslin & Pendlebury, 2000: 434), I find myself asking: Is this respect for people? Is this recognition of their agency? Do rights as constituted in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) enable people with disabilities and their parents to stand up, look others in the eye and feel their equal? I cannot say ‘yes’. I (de)construct the inclusive education and training system in South Africa as constituting those who write the policy documents as agents and everyone and everything else - communities, schools, homes, parents, educators, and learners - as objects that must be transformed by the agents. Some are more objectified than others are, particularly learners experiencing barriers to learning who will be assessed and allocated according to their identified needs for support.

I also value Young’s (Gewirtz, 1998: 447) narration of ‘powerlessness’, or a lack of authority, status and sense of self, as a form of oppression. White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) I (de)construct as rendering all but the agents as powerless: learners with organic/medical differences are labelled (dis)abled, parents are stereotyped and presented as in need of conversion and educators are narrated as inadequately and inappropriately trained. These stories decrease the authority, status and sense of self of these groups, effectively oppressing them.

As Enslin and Pendlebury (2000: 439) write:

> The achievement of a sense of self-worth, which each citizen needs to be an agent, a claimant of rights, is also an access issue. Without it, the institutional conditions for equal access will be inadequate to their purpose, as those with a diminished sense of their own worth are less likely to take full advantage of formal access to schooling. This in turn threatens to corrupt the vision of the public good declared in post-apartheid South Africa’s Constitution …

### 5.5.1.6. Voices on the margins

Among the voices on the margins of the rights discourse are those of educators, parents and learners, who may have different beliefs and values. It may be the voices of those who do not want a basic education for all, but rather aspire to a quality education that does not only meet needs, but also aspirations and wants. It may be the voices of learners constituted as having severe disabilities and their parents who value social participation in ‘ordinary’ schools above the basic education in a special setting. It may be the voices of learners with mild support needs who value the extra
support offered in a special school above inclusion in an ordinary school. Dyson et al. (1998: 55-56) describe this as the 'dilemma of democracy', in that inclusion is not the only educational value and that it may not be mutually compatible with other educational values.

Also on the margins is the right to choose. As Farrell (2000: 154-155) points out, some parents and/or learners choose special education for the security and specialised attention they perceive that it offers. Their right to do so is not acknowledged in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001). Instead they are constituted as targets of the information dissemination and advocacy campaign. As do Sayed and Carrim (1998), Farrell (2000) discusses the complexity of the competing rights of different groups. Whose rights are referred to: those of the parents, the educators, the learners storied as with disabilities, those constituted as without disabilities?

Questions I find myself asking, questions I (de)construct as also lying in the margins, are:

- Which knowledges constitute rights?
- Which knowledges decide which rights take precedence over other rights?
- Which knowledges decide whose rights take precedence over other rights?
- What power relations are constituted by the rights narrated?

5.5.2. Social justice discourse

Forming and formed by the rights discourse is what I read as the social justice discourse: the discourse constituting what is just or ‘morally right and fair, appropriate or deserved’ (Pearsall, 1999: 768) within society.

5.5.2.1. Objects constituted

I read the social justice discourse in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) as delineating equality, equity and redressing past imbalances. What are these objects? The Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition constitutes them as follows:

- Equity: quality of being fair and impartial. Origin: Latin aequus ‘equal’ (Pearsall, 1999: 482)
- Equality: the state of being equal. Origin: Latin aequus ‘level, even, equal’ (Pearsall, 1999: 481)
- Equal: being the same in quantity, size, degree, value or status ‘evenly or fairly balanced’ (Pearsall, 1999: 481)
Equity and equality are formed as having the same root, yet I read them differently within White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001). As does Gale (2000: 254-255), I read equality as associated with the liberal democratic form of distributive justice proposing simple equality, while equity I read as associated with the social democratic approach of ‘different distributions to different people’.

Equity is linked to the phrase ‘redressing past imbalances’ (Department of Education, 2001: 11) and thus constructs different provisions for those who were disadvantaged by the apartheid system in order to (re)create balance.


5.5.2.2. Agents constituted
As does the rights discourse, the social justice discourse forms the Constitution as the primary agent: an agent that founds the democratic state and common citizenship on values including achievement of equality. The agency constituting these values, which become abstract agents, is absent. Other agents of the Constitution are the state, the Government, the Ministry of Education and White Paper 6, which I read as (to reuse that positivist term) operationalising equality, equity and redress.

5.5.2.3. Actions constituted
The Constitution commits the state to achieving equality. The government recognises the need to base the ‘new unified education and training system’ on equity and on redressing past imbalances.

5.5.2.4. Binaries constituted
The fundamental binaries constructed within the social justice discourse are equality/inequality and equity/inequity. As I previously noted, both equality and equity are rooted in the Latin word *aequus* ‘level, even, equal’ (Pearsall, 1999: 481), with equal ‘being the same in quantity, size, degree, value or status; evenly or fairly balanced’. Both equality and equity, therefore, are constituted with reference to some characteristic - be it quantity, size, degree, value or status - that must be the same.
Inequality and inequity therefore can be defined only with reference to the same characteristic, which is identified as in need of being the same. Where I find myself confused is with the associations between equality, sameness, evenness and balance. Balance, depending upon where the fulcrum lies, may require inequality and difference. Is one therefore striving for balance with inequality/inequity (as in Figures 10 and 11), or equality/equity with possible imbalance, or for balance and equality/equity or centring of the fulcrum?

![Figure 10: Balance with inequality/inequity.](image)

And then the question becomes: Equality of balance of what? Equality of access? If so, I (de)construct White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) as constituting inequality, because all learners do not have equal access to all schools. Is this balance? Where does the fulcrum lie? On definitions of level of disability? Perhaps. The more disabled you are, the less access you have to the ‘ordinary’; the less disabled you are, the more access you have to the ‘ordinary’. On definitions of level of need for support? Perhaps. The more support you need, the less access you have to the ‘ordinary’; the less support you need, the more access you have to the ordinary.

![Figure 11: Balance: Unequal needs, unequal support, unequal access.](image)

Considering the above, I read the social justice discourse in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001) as constituting balance rather than equality/equity. The question then becomes, are the rights to equal access of learners with disability or high needs of support being recognised?
Who constitutes balance as more important than access? What power relations does this form? If justice is based on constructions of what is right and wrong, fair and unfair, appropriate and inappropriate, deserved or undeserved, who constitutes the above ‘equality’ as right, fair, appropriate and deserved? Who is the fulcrum? Why is it placed off centre? Who does this benefit?

5.5.2.5. Implications for in/exclusion

The social justice discourse constitutes the inclusive education and training system as striving towards equality, equity and redress. Considering the above, the question I ask is equality of what, equity of what and redress of which imbalances?

Equal access to ‘ordinary’ schools is not granted to all, but only to those with mild disabilities and low-intensive needs for support. All learners are granted access to the inclusive education and training system, but there is not equal access within this system. Equal participation is not granted to all. Educators, parents and learners - constituted as either with or without disability - do not participate in establishing the inclusive education and training system: they do not participate or ‘share in’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1039). Consultation, collaboration and co-operation with these educators, parents and learners are not constructed in the document. Instead, their needs are assessed and they are trained with structured programmes, allocated to schools and/or targeted by information dissemination and advocacy campaigns.

So which imbalances are redressed? Perhaps what are constituted as organic/medical and thus individual imbalances - moderate to severe and multiple disabilities - which are balanced by services supplied in full-service or special schools. But what of imbalances constructed by the way these disabilities are read by society? Does this system not reinforce those imbalances? Another imbalance might be a need for support, which could arise from intrinsic or extrinsic factors. But what of other needs, such as the need for social integration? Who prioritises needs?

I (de)construct the use of the words ‘equality’, ‘equity’ and ‘redress’ as forming a distributive justice discourse that focuses on the distribution of resources rather than on the nature of the relationships that structure society (Gewirtz, 1998: 470). What Lynch (Gewirtz, 1998: 472) calls the ‘fundamental problems of hierarchies of power, wealth and other privileges’ are not addressed.
5.5.2.6. Voices on the margins

I read three of Young’s (Gewirtz, 1998: 477) five faces of oppression on the margins of this text:

- Marginalisation, in that people with severe or multiple disabilities or high-intensive support needs remain segregated from ‘ordinary’ and ‘full-service’ schools;

- Powerlessness, in that there is reduction of the authority, status and sense of self of:
  i) educators, by defining them as in need of training and support and not as valuable contributors to the process. They are a primary resource, but one that needs to be worked on;
  ii) parents, by constituting them as imprisoners of their children and the targets of information dissemination and advocacy campaigns. They are, for example, not sketched as valuable sources of information;
  iii) learners, who have their needs assessed and identified and who are allocated to schools accordingly. They are not formed as active agents who can express their own needs and contribute to decision-making regarding their placement;

- Cultural imperialism, in that there is a stereotyping of those who do not have the vision of the Ministry - they isolate children in dark backrooms and sheds, they have negative attitudes and stereotypes and different learning needs may arise from these. Simultaneously, there is an effort to impose on this group the Ministry’s experience and interpretation through the information dissemination and advocacy campaign that will outline roles, responsibilities and obligations.

These five faces of oppression are associated with injustice (Gewirtz, 1998: 469).

I also hear the voice of Leonard (Gewirtz, 1998): a voice calling for relational justice based on recognition of difference. This is a voice that calls for the participation of people with disabilities rather than agencies of power assessing their needs and ‘justly’ distributing goods, resources and services accordingly. Leonard (Gewirtz, 1998: 476) writes:

A politics of recognition or an ethics of otherness involves not only a commitment to respond to others and otherness but also a commitment to avoid practising the power of surveillance, control and discipline upon others. We may act if the Other wishes us to, and on their terms, but only after reflection, trying to relax the imperative to organize and classify with our plans and projects.
Brine (1998: 149) is another strong voice, noting that ‘despite the shift within the equality discourse from individuals to groups, the power to define ‘disadvantaged’ groups and their ‘needs’ has not shifted …’

5.6. Reflections

Despite frequent references to clarity and making things clear in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), I am confused. Inclusion and disability I (de)construct as constituted by multiple discourses within this document, rendering them fundamentally indecidable. The text speaks of full inclusion:

When schools are fully inclusive, a situation should ensue that on the average, a school’s population will comprise no more than a small percentage of individuals with special education needs.

(Department of Education, 2001: 39)

Yet it defines its long-term goals as forming 380 special schools/resource centres and 500 full-service schools (Department of Education, 2001: 43). Learners with moderate to severe and multiple disabilities, or with moderate to high support needs, will be educated in these institutions. Are schools then fully inclusive?

It explicitly mentions a move away from the terms ‘special education needs’ - ‘which is part of the language approach that sees learning disabilities within the learner’ - favouring the term ‘barriers to learning and development’ (Department of Education, 2001: 12). Yet in the sentence cited above it once again refers to ‘individuals with special education needs’, as it does in the following statement:

.... policy proposals described in this White Paper are aimed at developing an inclusive education and training system that will ensure that educational provision for learners with special needs is largely integrated over time into what are currently considered to be ‘ordinary’ schools.

(Department of Education, 2001: 36)

The word ‘ordinary’ is sometimes place in quotation marks (as above), yet in other parts of the document the term is used without any indication of questioning its usage and connotations (Department of Education, 2001: 10, 15).
As reader, I was left with a feeling of ‘so what’s changed’ as regards the construction and inclusion of learners with disability. Using the adjective ‘inclusive’ for this system is equivalent to calling the apartheid education and training system inclusive. In the past there was an inclusive system comprising schools that excluded on the base of identified racial and disability characteristics. Now we have an ‘inclusive’ system comprising schools that exclude on the basis of identified levels of disability or needs for support. Race may no longer be an exclusionary criterion, but disability and required levels of support still are. Both disability and higher required levels of support - creating different learning needs - are constituted as possibly arising from socio-economic deprivation (Department of Education, 2001: 7). Thus lower socio-economic status may become another exclusionary criterion.

I also read a (re)construction of disability that further marginalises those with organic or medical differences. Only those with medically diagnosed organic impairments are called disabled or people with disabilities: their environment is not constituted as that which makes difference disabling. The ‘personal trouble’ or medical discourse survives for some, who are those formed as most vulnerable to barriers to learning (Department of Education, 2001: 7). Then there are others who have no organic cause (there has to be a process of diagnosis to ascertain this). If they are not doing well at school, it is barriers to learning in the education and training system that are to blame: educators must be trained, the curriculum must be changed, support services must be strengthened. So another power-knowledge is constituted: one that assesses and designs interventions for dysfunctional systems.

Questions are not asked about the reproduction of power relations, about whose knowledges are privileged, dominant and valued in this system and whose knowledges are marginalised and devalued. What I constitute as a significant indicator of power relations is that the agents, formed by every discourse (de)constructed in White Paper 6 (Department of Education, 2001), are the Ministry/Department of Education/‘we’. These are the uppercased controllers who seem to dictate to, rather than collaborate with, educators, parents and learners. A voice highlighting the reproduction of power relations through such policy is that of Marshall (2000: 129), who describes education policy as directing schools, ‘as major socialization instruments in curriculum, testing, governance - to reinforce the hegemonic view’. Furthermore, she describes the grounding for research, policy and action as ‘the political choices and power-driven ideologies and embedded forces that categorize, oppress and exclude’.
In reading this proliferation of discourses regarding disability and in/exclusion, both in the White Paper and in the multiplicity of texts on its margins, I hear the words of Foucault (1976: 18) describing the history of sexuality, but of value here:

There was a steady proliferation of discourses ... specific discourses, different from one another both by their form and by their object .... But more important was the multiplication of discourses ... in the field of the exercise of power itself; an institutional incitement to talk about it, and to do so more and more; a determination on the part of the agencies of power to hear it spoken about, to cause it to speak through explicit articulation and endlessly accumulated detail.
Chapter 6: (De)constructing Reflections

I do not really wish to conclude and sum up, rounding off the argument so as to dump it in a nutshell on the reader. A lot more could be said about any of the topics I have touched upon ... I have meant to ask the questions, to break out of the frame... the point is not a set of answers, but making possible a different practice ...

(Kappeler in Lather, 1991: 30)

6.1. Introduction

I write this chapter to bring myself as narrator/(de)constructor back into the story: to foreground this as my narrative and not as The Narrative. I do not offer conclusions, because there are none. What I have offered is a troubling of a policy document to (de)construct multiple discourses constituting (dis)ability and in/exclusion, discourses that (de)construct one another. What I also offer is my text for (de)construction, for exploration of the voices on its margins.

6.2. (Re)constructing self

‘Why did I read these texts this way? What produces this reading?’, writes John van Maanen (Lather, 1991: 5). I would argue that the intertextual self produces this reading: thus my construction of self in Chapter One. But as I have (de)constructed texts for this assignment, my reading of self has been (re)constructed and thus I (re)present the voices of self silenced in my first reading. I also (re)present the voices of my supervisors, who have spoken into my narrative, (de)constructing it as I was writing and thus provoking a process of (re)construction.

6.2.1. Self as used by language

Even though I was intensely aware of not writing as the invisible expert, even though I continually tried to foreground myself as narrator and the constructed nature of my narrative, I found myself slipping back into the absent authority of ‘the narrator’ writing ‘this narrative’ in the passive voice. The quotes below, from my supervisor, Lesley le Grange, illustrate ‘...how I use language and how language uses me ...’ (Lather, 1991: 14).
What this illustrates, I argue, is how dominant the discourse of detached and invisible expertise is within academia and how subjugated alternative discourses are. It is scary to move out from behind the mask of the absent authority.

6.2.2. Self as the docile body

In this text, I have explicitly constructed myself as a ‘rebel’ voice: as a voice troubling and challenging power-knowledges; as a political agent. I have embraced the words of Skrtic (1995: 37) as my (dis)position:

> The radical postmoderns reject modern knowledge as oppressive and attempt to free us from its hold by delegitimizing or ‘deconstructing’ it ... by exposing its inherent inconsistencies, contradictions and silences.

Yet in writing, I found that I have also forged myself as a ‘docile body’ (White & Epston, 1990: 24). One example of this is the way in which I permitted language to use me. Another was pointed out by my other supervisor, Rona Newmark, who challenged my passive acceptance of the medical discourse’s constitution of my sister as ‘mentally ill’ and ‘psychotic’. Here I am writing about constructions and these constructions, which have significantly affected the lives of my sister and the rest of the family, I introject (to use a Gestaltian term): ‘...material from outside is swallowed whole’ (Nelson-Jones, 1995: 55).

A third way in which I have both been forged and have forged myself as docile body, is that I am constituted as a student with supervisors. To supervise is constructed as ‘to observe and direct the execution of (a task or activity) or the work (of a person)’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1439). I read observation as a ‘gaze’ that is internalised, leading to self-observation and self-censorship or the self-subjugation of Foucault (White & Epston, 1990: 24). That the gaze is by one storied as controlling or in authority, promotes internalisation.
What I internalised were the rules of academia relating to writing form and coherence. My impulse in telling this story was to create discordance: not to link, to put voices that (de)construct one another side by side visually, to create polyphonic dis/harmony. Instead I linked and created an appearance of order and coherence, conflicting with the indecidability and confusion I read in in/exclusion and (disability). I constructed tables and figures to make it all 'clearer'. As I look at these forms I read them as constituting boundaries, containment and, once again, authority. There is an attempt to fix meaning: first with words and then with visual images.

6.2.3. Self as marginalising voice

I have constructed myself as ‘giving voice to voices on the margins’, yet I have felt I am devaluing and marginalising by speaking for. I story the constitution of (dis)ability through dominant discourses as disabling: my story. I am not someone constituted by dominant discourses as disabled. I am, therefore, speaking about or for, and yet again objectifying.

Is my act not reinforcing power relations? The words of Foucault (1976: 18) included in the quote at the end of Chapter Five come to mind:

> But more important was the multiplication of discourses ... in the field of the exercise of power itself; an institutional incitement to talk about it, and to do so more and more; a determination on the part of the agencies of power to hear it spoken about, to cause it to speak through explicit articulation and endlessly accumulated detail.

Am I not meeting the needs of the agencies of power?

Yet on the margins of this text lie the words of Rich (Lather, 1991: 57): ‘Where language and naming are power, silence is oppression, is violence.’ Respecting the silence, not (de)constructing voices silenced, I argue will be an act of permitting power to go unchallenged. Yet, as I challenge the languaging and naming in White Paper 6, I would desire readers to trouble my languaging and naming and the power relations constituted thereby.
6.2.4. Self as oppressor of alternative readings

I constituted my goal in this narrative as opening rather than closing alternative readings. Yet even as I write this, I acknowledge that my (de)constructions of objects, agents, actions, binaries, implications and voices of the margins - even though they are multiple - may close readings. They do, for example, close a reading of the text as signifying one meaning. They also close a reading of the text as constituting inclusion.

6.2.5. Self as (dis)abled.

As I wrote, I began to construct myself as (dis)abled by my (de)constructive stance. Constant (de)construction removes taken-for-grantedness or absolute power-knowledges, which I experience as ‘abling’. Yet in so doing it removes justification of action, which can be (dis)abling. Those who act tend to act on beliefs that are not troubled or problematised: think of the men who flew aircraft into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, and of the American response in Afghanistan. Both sides believed in what they were doing and did not deconstruct, problematise or trouble these beliefs. They did not hear the voices silenced, the voices of those who were to die.

I cite a negative example here, but strong and untroubled belief can also lead to emancipatory action. Francis (1999: 387) writes:

... it can be asked whether a theory which deconstructs other theories, but appears to provide nothing with which to replace them, can be relevant to emancipatory positions.

Perhaps one needs the believers and doers who act on faith as much as one needs the deconstructors and troublers: together they form a (de)constructing whole.

6.2.6. Self as dictionary dependent

In a space in which there is no signifier-signified link - no signifier (re)presents an external, absolute signified - I found myself seeking signifier chains in the oft-quoted Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition. As I read signifiers associated with signifiers by this text, I experienced my reading of White Paper 6 as enriched. Possible alternative narratives in a single word were (de)constructed.
6.3. Suggestions

My goal is not to story generalisations or broad conclusions or recommendations. However, coming from my postmodern, (de)constructive stance, I suggest that what is said and written about (dis)ability and in/exclusion should be (de)constructed, particularly in texts constituted as state policy.

Policy is defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edition as ‘a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by an organisation or individual’ (Pearsall, 1999: 1106). When that organisation is the government - the governing body of a state - the languaging of objects, agents and actions in policy is given explicit power. The government is an instrument of ‘control or influence; it steers: the origins of the word ‘govern’ being the Greek kubernan ‘to steer’ (Pearsall, 1999: 614). Documents released by government thus become texts constituted as ‘steering’. If, as poststructuralists state, language constitutes reality - ‘... language is not representational; what we call ‘reality’ resides and is expressed in one’s descriptions of events, people, ideas, feelings, and experiences’ (Sluzki, 1992: 219) - the languaging of reality in these texts, I argue, should be (de)constructed as a matter of course.

As does Slee (2001: 169), I suggest that in all texts - but particularly in texts constituted as ‘steering’ - we need to reflectively examine ‘the way in which the uses and abuses of language frame meanings that disable and exclude’. I would also like to see what Cherryholmes (Lloyd, 2000: 149) describes as the creation of ‘alternative discursive practices ... We need to find a way of thinking/speaking that gives power no place to hide’.

We need to look at our own words and how they constitute power, as the following poem by Erich Fried (1999: 219) (de)constructs:

**Weaker**

They are getting stronger again

*Who is?*

They are
Why should they be?
They should not be
they just are

Stronger than who?
Than you
soon perhaps than many

What do they want?
First of all
to get stronger again

Why do you say all this?
Because I can still
say it

Can't this get you into trouble?
Yes
for they are getting stronger

What makes you so sure?
Your own words
that I can get into trouble

I would add another two lines

And my own words
that they are getting stronger


Higher Education Act: (No. 101 of 1997).


Skills Development Act: (No. 97 of 1998).


South African Schools Act: (No. 84 of 1996).


