THE SELF IN THE THOUGHT OF KIERKEGAARD, SARTRE AND JUNG

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DECLARATION:

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signature:

Date:

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SUMMARY:
The problem explored in this study concerns authenticity, and can be formulated as the question: 'How does one become oneself'? In order to answer this query, related issues must be addressed, for example: the nature of consciousness/ self-awareness; the individual's relationship to society; the meaning of existence, and so forth. The reply's of three thinkers, Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung, will be discussed in this investigation. They have been selected for several reasons: Each of their respective theories addresses issues that are generally pertinent in contemporary society, such as: the alienation and dissociation of individuals from each other and themselves through mass-mindedness and the impersonal nature of state and religious institutions; the anxiety that many experience due to, firstly, a lack of confidence in the above-mentioned institutions and, secondly, a loss of trust in existing (political, religious, moral, social) life-strategies, because these often fail to give a convincing sense of meaning and purpose to life. Each of the three thinkers places the 'self' at the center of their philosophy, and addresses many similar themes which share between them a family resemblance that admits of comparison. The theories are presented in an order that allows for a dialectical approach to the problem of self: Kierkegaard's fundamentally Christian theory is presented as thesis, and Sartre's atheistic position as anti-thesis. Jung's theory of the psyche is presented as synthesis, because it is anti-metaphysical, but nevertheless claims to prove empirically that a convincing religious/spiritual experience is the key ingredient for authenticity. The outcome of the enquiry will show that the three thinkers point from different directions towards the same basic conceptualization of the 'self': The self is both a project and a goal or, to put it differently, a journey and a destination, the goal/destination being the synthesis of the various disparate and conflicting elements that influence or make up the personality. The study as a whole echoes the three individual approaches in describing the condition of modern man as a malady or sickness, which is the lack of authenticity, of which the symptoms are falsehood, anxiety, alienation, crippled relationships, lack of responsibility and adaptability, and perhaps, on a larger scale, issues such as social/political injustice and conflict. The cure for this malady is an enhancement of consciousness/ awareness that is known as 'the self'. The self is seen as a 'becoming' and a choice, a dynamic synthesis, something which is not given and cannot be taken for granted, but must be actively striven for. The study outlines and explores the nature and value of such a project towards the self.
OPSOMMING:
Hierdie studie beskou die probleem van outentisiteit, wat as die vraag, 'Hoe word ek myself?', gestel kan word. Om hierdie vraag te beantwoord, moet verdere kwessies, soos byvoorbeeld die aard van (self)bewussyn, die verhouding waarin die individu tot die samelewing staan, en die betekenis van 'bestaan' (eksistentie), ook aangespreek word. Die voorstelle van drie denkers, Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung, word bespreek in hierdie tesis. Die drie is vir verskeie redes uitgesoek: Elkeen van hulle spreek pertinente kwessies rondom die moderne samelewing aan, byvoorbeeld: individue se vervreemding en verwydering van hulself en ander weens die massa-mentaliteit en onpersoonlike aard van staats- en godsdienstige instellings; die angs en spanning wat baie ervaar as gevolg van 'n gebrek aan vertroue in bogenoemde instellings, asook 'n gebrekkige geloof in bestaande (politiie, godsdienstige, morele, sosiale) lewensstrategieë wat nie meer daarin slaag om sin of rede aan die lewe te gee nie. Elkeen van die drie denkers plaas die 'self' sentraal tot hulle filosofie, en spreek temas aan wat onderling familie-ooreenkomste vertoon, en daarom onderlinge vergelyking toelaat. Die teorieë word aangebied in 'n volgorde wat 'n dialektiese aanslag tot die probleem moontlik maak: Kierkegaard se Christelike teorie word as tese aangebied, en Sartre se ateistiese posisie as anti-tese. Jung se teorie van die psige word as sintese voorgehou, want, alhoewel dit geen metafisiese aansprake maak nie, beskou dit 'n oortuigende religieuze/ geestelike ervaring as die hoofbestandeel vir outentisiteit. Die gevolgtrekking van die ondersoek sal wys dat die drie denkers vanuit verskillende rigtings na dieselfde konsepse van die 'self' wys: Die self is sowel 'n projek as 'n doel, of, anders gestel, 'n reis en 'n bestemming. Die doel/ bestemming is 'n sintese van die verskillende, onderling botsende elemente waaruit die self bestaan en waardeur dit beinvloed word. Die studie in geheel volg die voorbeeld van die drie denkers deur die moderne mens se 'toestand' as 'n soort siekte te beskryf. Die symptome van hierdie siekte, of gebrek aan outentisiteit, is valsheid, angs, vervreemding, gebrekkige verhoudings, die afwesigheid van persoonlike verantwoordelijkheid en aanpasbaarheid, en ook miskien kwessies soos sosiale en politieke onreg en konflik. Die remedie vir so 'n siekte is die 'self': 'n verheldering en intensifisering van bewussyn, wat gesien kan word as 'n 'wording' en 'n keuse, 'n dinamiese sintese, iets wat nie as voor-die-hand-liggend beskou kan word nie, maar wat aktief nagestreef moet word. Hierdie studie ondersoek die aard en waarde van so 'n projek gerig op die self.
Per Marco, senza il quale non potrei mai scoprire me stessa.
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“This above all- to thine own self be true, and it must follow, as the night the day, thou canst not then be false to any man.”

Shakespeare: Hamlet.

“Be yourself... no matter what they say.”

Sting: Englishman in New York.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

"Yet it seems to me that all my books Steppenwolf is the one that was most often and most violently misunderstood than any other... These readers, it seems to me, have recognized themselves in the Steppenwolf, identified themselves with him, suffered his griefs, and dreamed his dreams; but they have overlooked the fact that this book knows of and speaks about other things, besides Harry Haller and his difficulties, about a second, higher, indestructible world beyond the Steppenwolf and his problematic life. The 'Treatise' and all those spots in the book dealing with matters of the spirit, of the arts and the 'immortal' men oppose the Steppenwolf's world of suffering with a positive, serene, superpersonal, and timeless world of faith. This book, no doubt, tells of griefs and needs; still it is not a book of a man despairing, but of a man believing. Of course, I neither can nor intend to tell my readers how they ought to understand my tale. May everyone find in it what strikes a chord in him and is of some use to him! But I would be happy if many of them were to realize that the story of the Steppenwolf pictures a disease and crisis - but not one leading to death and destruction, on the contrary: to healing."

- Hermann Hesse

1. THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF

The problem of personal identity and the meaning of the word "I" stands central not only to philosophy, but to life itself. Each of us is conscious not only of the world around us and the mysteries it holds, but also of our own consciousness. However, should we be asked to explain what exactly is meant by the word "I" or to describe the nature of our own awareness of being conscious, most would probably feel like Augustine confronted by the question 'What is time?'. Augustine said that as long as no-one asked him, he knew exactly what time was, but as soon as he had to think about it, the answer escaped him completely. Similarly, one's self is so elusive and perplexing that the act of turning your attention to it seems to make any understanding of it disappear like mist before the sun.

The main reason for this problem is that when the self tries to apprehend itself as object, a paradox immediately arises, because the self is that which apprehends, the subject, and that which must be apprehended, the object. If the self is primarily equated with consciousness, then it is a way of knowing, which cannot at the same time be an object of knowing. Trying to understand what one's self is, is like trying to open a locked crate with the crowbar that is inside it.¹ The self is like a rainbow,
always moving away from our grasp, or as Sartre would say, the ego "is too much present for one to succeed in taking a truly existential viewpoint on it. If we step back for vantage the me accompanies us in this withdrawal." (Sartre,1957:86) Heidegger (1962:195) similarly pointed out that the Being for whom Being is a question, the Dasein, must have a circular structure, because it reflects back on itself. How then can one escape this circle and these paradoxes and say something sensible about the self? Is it at all worthwhile to try and study it then? This problem is exactly what has led to skepticism about the self: Hume (1896:252) said that no matter how hard he looks inside, he can find no impression which corresponds to the idea of self. The most he finds are various perceptions, all in continuous flux, defying any attempts to unify them. The language analysts and logical positivists similarly pointed out that the 'self' (or mind) is merely a trick of language, a category mistake, and that anything said about it cannot be verified; consequently there is no answer to the problem of self because it is a pseudo-problem.

Nevertheless, there are certain typical human experiences in which it is not only useful to be able to refer to a concept of self, but positively necessary; these experiences are those that suggest the self is something of value to us - of the most intimate value moreover. This feeling can arise not only in the possibility of facing death, where the extinction of the self becomes a 'personal problem', but in rather more familiar circumstances where the self is intuited to be something of worth that is cherished. Envy can point to a sense of self-deficiency, as if the self one has/is at present is not quite adequate; shame and embarrassment speak of acute self-awareness, of one's self being suddenly exposed and unprotected; mis-recognition and betrayal are injuries against the self, and so the list can go on. In instances like these the self, whatever it may be, is felt as something 'real' even if indescribable; perhaps that which is most real, because closest to us. That is why the traditions of phenomenology and existentialism, to be represented in this thesis, have taken the self as their point of departure. Phenomenological existentialism analyzes very specific self-experiences, the most important of these being anxiety in its different forms, like dread, nausea, despair, anguish. Anxiety is the mode of apprehension by the self of itself, because the self has no essence, but is an absurd, paradoxical freedom that is unbearable to consciousness. This thesis will explore these anxious states and their meaning.
The reader who expects to find at the conclusion of this work a definitive or essentialist answer to the question ‘What is the self’, will therefore be disappointed. It will soon become apparent that the three thinkers discussed here, Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung, each deal with a rather unique human experience, namely the desire, search and need for authenticity. This desire normally arises precisely in the existential realization that the self has no essence, which is accompanied by anxiety. There are many situations where a state of affairs is felt to be restrictive, but the ‘way out’ is intuited to be not so much a ‘change of outer circumstances’ as an ‘inner journey’. It is in cases such as this that people tend to say: ‘I need to find myself’ or ‘I need to get in touch with myself’. The word ‘self’ can therefore be used in many different ways, which shows that the concept does not have an essential meaning, but rather that the different uses exhibit a family resemblance to each other. This thesis explores the meaning of ‘self’ that corresponds to authenticity, as described above, although that naturally becomes the opening for many other themes related to selfhood and personal identity, such as consciousness, psychological conflict, the structure of the psyche, the nature of self-awareness. The themes do not necessarily end there, because other related issues quickly become relevant and in need of clarification, such as the nature of society, the role of the state, religion and the church, the existence of God, the meaning of justice, morality, ethics and personal responsibility. In the end it can be seen that the problem of self opens up and becomes the problem of Being, especially if the discussion takes place in phenomenological and existential terms, as it does here.

But without pre-empting the conclusion, we can say that in general authenticity refers to the state where one is truly an ‘individual’, not just caught up unthinkingly in the patterns of social life that already exist. It is the kind of ideal implicit in the lines:

\[
Two\,\,\text{roads}\,\,\text{diverged}\,\,\text{in}\,\,\text{a}\,\,\text{wood,}\,\,\text{and}\,\,\text{I}\,\,-
I\,\,\text{took}\,\,\text{the}\,\,\text{one}\,\,\text{less}\,\,\text{traveled}\,\,\text{by},
And\,\,\text{that}\,\,\text{has}\,\,\text{made}\,\,\text{all}\,\,\text{the}\,\,\text{difference}
\]

Robert Frost

This poem by Frost implies that making one’s own way in the world, even if it is more difficult than just ‘following the herd’, will lead to a fuller, richer and more worthwhile life. Authenticity must not, however, simply be equated with self-centered individualism: it will become apparent during the course of this thesis that this narrow
ideal is in fact a form of in-authenticity, because it over-emphasizes ego-consciousness. What is meant by selfhood as authenticity in this thesis, is rather the exploration and integration of all the personality’s unrealized potentialities, a theme that is taken up in different ways by the three figures to be discussed here.

1.1 THE KEY FIGURES
Many thinkers within the existential/phenomenological traditions have created theories of the self; they are normally linked to other, more over-arching, conceptual schemes, for example of society, metaphysics, ethics or culture. This study focuses on the work of three thinkers, one a Swiss psychiatrist, Carl Gustav Jung (1875 - 1961) (although he is a psychiatrist and not strictly speaking a philosopher at all, this thesis will argue that he fits into the phenomenological tradition); the other two can be described as existentialists, one Danish and one French: Søren Kierkegaard (1813 - 1855) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 - 1980). While there are many divergences in their personalities and philosophies, there is a common thread woven through their different approaches to the self – what can be called also a ‘family resemblance’ between their different descriptions of authenticity: each thinker argues that a sickness pervades society, a sickness which is nothing but the absence/loss of self. The symptoms are alienation and dissociation of individuals from each other and themselves in the face of the mass-mindedness, which is exacerbated by the impersonal nature of state and religious institutions. The anxiety that many experience are due to, firstly, a lack of confidence in the above-mentioned institutions and, secondly, a loss of trust in existing life-strategies, since they often fail to give a sense of meaning and purpose to life. At a deep level this can be translated as fundamental misgivings about 'Being' itself.

1.1.1 THE PROBLEM OF AUTHENTICITY
Because people want to escape from anxiety, according to these thinkers, it often happens that a person lives his/her whole life in a state of self-alienation. The cure for this malady is a conscious, deliberate and life-long effort at self-cultivation, which can in principle never be finally completed. In other words, the self is not a ‘given’ to be found hiding somewhere in our heads or inside consciousness, but is rather an attempt to willfully and consciously interact with the world and other people with the integrity of sustained self-examination. Not every person is/has a self just because they are
human. Since the self is something that must be achieved, it is also possible to possess 'more' or 'less' self, which can be described as living more or less consciously.

1.1.2 THE PROBLEM WITH ABSTRACTION

The next interesting connection between the three thinkers is that each in his own way struggled with the topic of their writings not only on an abstract, objective and purely academic level, but personally and emotionally as well. Each lived through his own (often anxious) philosophy in a very concrete manner. Jung came to a deeper insight of the collective unconscious only after a period of mental collapse, where his personality was in danger of being flooded by images and hallucinations from the unconscious. The therapy that he developed was born in part from his own attempts at self-healing.

As far as Kierkegaard and Sartre are concerned, it is almost a defining characteristic of existentialism that its proponents' theories cannot be separated from their personal lives, and Kierkegaard and Sartre are both known to have portrayed themselves and their own problems in their work. Each thinker discussed therefore argues for a concrete, lived existence, rather than the construction of flawless abstract theoretical systems. It is to be expected therefore that their own biographies should speak of the struggles described in their academic works. Kierkegaard’s and Sartre’s enterprises can be seen as a venture into anxiety in search of the cure to spiritlessness and bad faith (broadly speaking, inauthenticity). According to them learning to live with anxiety is the sine qua non of selfhood. Jung aims on the other hand at a real cure for anxiety and neurosis, since his theory is mainly therapeutic. The merits of Jung’s point of view will be discussed by placing his thought in juxtaposition to that of Sartre and Kierkegaard.

1.1.3 PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUNDS

Each thinker must be placed against a specific background: Kierkegaard against Hegelianism and systematic philosophy, Sartre against Husserl and phenomenology, and Jung against Freud and psycho-analysis. Kierkegaard is often regarded as the grandfather of both existentialism and modern psychology, although it might be more accurate to describe his philosophy as a Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment. The extreme states explored by Kierkegaard, such as dread, despair, fear and trembling, are in keeping with the existentialist
emphasis on the extreme conditions of human existence, and of the irrationality and absurdity of life. His main objection to Hegel was that systematic philosophy tries to construct a system while losing sight of the fact that the one who constructs it, is him-/herself a part of the system. The individual can have no objective knowledge, but must apprehend truth subjectively. This truth is of an order to help that person live a concrete and unique life, and not to gain perfect but abstract understanding.

There will be no problem with labeling Sartre as a key proponent of existentialism, since his name is more or less synonymous with the movement. In addition he is a phenomenologist, an investigator of appearances/apparitions, and therefore also of interest to psychologists, since phenomenology is the link that most closely ties psychology and philosophy. For Husserl phenomenology was the attempt to place the world and the question of its reality in brackets, and to suspend the ‘natural attitude’ through the phenomenological reduction, in order to reach for our most original, uncontaminated and naive experience. This would supposedly lead us to apodictic certainty about the nature and structure of the mind and its noetic objects. Sartre used the phenomenological method in order to later overthrow and transform it into existentialism, whose object is Being, and whose aim is the uncontaminated experience of existence. Through this experience it can be realized that the self is a construct of consciousness, not its source, and that consciousness is fundamentally impersonal and without essence. The self is therefore a fiction, destined to a useless striving after essence and substance.

That brings us lastly to Jung, who, although a psychiatrist, was knowledgeable on many philosophical issues. The main influence in his life was the type of idealism handed down from Kant and Hegel. His philosophical idealistic background was probably one of the major causes of his break with Freud, whose approach spoke of rigid empiricism and the attempt to view the psyche with detached, objective scientific scrutiny. Jung argued against this purely causal approach that the psyche lives intentionally, and that the goal it strives for, the Self, is the purposeful activity of balancing all the conflicting elements in the personality. Although Jung's use of philosophical terminology is not always accurate, it is nevertheless possible to locate him in the history of philosophical thought concerning authenticity, which is one of the aims of this thesis.
2. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS ENQUIRY

2.1 AN INTERDISCIPLINARY COMPARISON

There is always a risk attached to attempting a cross-pollination between different disciplines such as psychology and philosophy. The temptation exists to minimize the differences between the methods and aims of each discipline, and create an amalgam that is of little use to anyone. The same danger exists in comparing the work of different thinkers. One might too easily see connections where none exist, and try reduce or absorb the thought of one person into the theories of another. It is not my intention here to do away with the uniqueness of the thought of either Jung, Kierkegaard or Sartre. Nor is it my intention to let the lines of demarcation between philosophy and psychology become blurred. The purpose of the comparison made between these three thinkers is to juxtapose their views on the self in such a manner that both the similarities and differences stand out in relief. What is to be gained by this is a better understanding of each separate approach to the self. The fact that each author had a lot to say about the anxiety inherent to the human condition, ties them together in a meaningful way, especially to someone living in the last quarter of the second millennium, and now to us who face the first few steps of the third. As explained before, the status of the term ‘the self’ is different for each thinker, but their different usages still exhibit family resemblances. It is my contention that what these authors have to say about the human condition is particularly true and valid for anyone facing the rapid changes of the twenty-first century. What emerges from their work is a call to authenticity that is as thrilling as it is urgent. Their ‘message’ is that it should be the task of every person to go in search of the self. The goal of this enquiry is to present a map comprising of three different, sometimes overlapping, sometimes divergent viewpoints that will be of use in the philosophical investigation as to what such an undertaking amounts to.

The aim of this study is therefore by no means to give an exhaustive account of selfhood, a definitive answer to the question posed, or a final solution to the problem of the nature of self-awareness. On the contrary, like any philosophical enquiry, it proposes to make a contribution to an on-going debate that would open up new possibilities rather than close off existing paths. The comparison between the depth-psychology of Jung and the existential and phenomenological approaches of
Kierkegaard and Sartre will constitute precisely such a new line of enquiry, since, to my knowledge, no such extensive comparison between the three has yet been made. The study hopes to show not only why each thinker's work is of philosophical importance, but also that they demonstrate some note-worthy similarities to each other. Sartre and Kierkegaard are of course easy to compare, because their descriptions of freedom and anxiety are virtually identical. In the less obvious comparison between Jung and Kierkegaard, we can see that both use Christ as symbol of individuality and the reconciliation of opposites. Lastly, Jung and Sartre stress the impersonal and autonomous nature of consciousness, and show how the identification with only one aspect of your personality, such as the intellect for example, is bad faith. There are of course many differences between them, but the salient disagreement lies in their different approaches to religion. Jung and Kierkegaard both stress the need for religion, while Sartre's atheistic stance serves as counterfoil to them. This last point will become an important one during the course of the discussion.

2.2 THE RELEVANCE TO CONTEMPORARY STUDIES

As concerns the contemporary significance of the study, each thinker in his own right is becoming the focus of greater attention from philosophical circles, and has an irreplaceable contribution to make to the study of society and the place of humans in it. These contributions reach far more widely than a simple study of the self, but are nevertheless based on their respective anthropologies:

- Kierkegaard is only now coming into his right as one of the first influences in the stream that later became post-structuralism: Jegstrup (1995:425) states: "Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) not only anticipates the postmodern critique, he begins it... Kierkegaard begins to rethink singularity and responsibility to otherness, a concept lost in modernity's preoccupation with objectivity and possessive individualism."

- In turn, Sartre's contribution to the philosophical understanding of human responsibility is incontestable. As a political thinker and analyst he provided insights that continue to be of use in the present age in which issues such as collective guilt and responsibility are in need of clarification. (See Flynn, 1986: *Sartre and Marxist Existentialism: The test case for collective responsibility.*)
Jung's voice can make a lucid contribution to the popular surge of interest in dreams, eastern culture and esoteric religion. A rigorous philosophical scrutiny of his work is necessary in order to prevent it from degenerating into a shallow and trendy self-help dogma.

Taken together, the insights of the three thinkers give an enlightening account of the nature of consciousness and self-awareness, human existence and humanity's being-in-the-world, the relationship between mind and body, anxiety, human freedom, guilt and redemption. The study as a whole echoes their individual approaches in describing the condition of modern man as a malady/sickness/lack of authenticity, of which the symptoms are (suppressed) anxiety, alienation, a general sense of unease and dissatisfaction with life. The cure is seemingly an enhancement of consciousness or awareness that is known as 'the Self'. The Self is seen as a 'becoming' and a choice, a dynamic synthesis, something which is not given and cannot be taken for granted, but must be actively striven for. The aim of the study is thus to outline and explore the nature and value of such a project towards the Self.

3. WORKING METHOD

Chapters II to IV treat each author's work in the following way:
- Firstly there is an introduction that serves to familiarize the reader with the author's theory in a general sense, so as to ensure that the more focused inquiries of the next sections may be seen against a meaningful background. In each case the author's work is contrasted with another thinker that had influenced them, worked in the same field as they, or served as a counter-foil against which to elucidate their own theory. Kierkegaard is contrasted to Hegel, Sartre to Husserl, and Jung to Freud.
- Next the authors' diagnoses of the malady afflicting humanity is sketched. In each case the disease is a lack of self, which very often means a deficiency in consciousness, although 'consciousness' might be understood slightly differently in the case of every author. The three thinkers all argue that this particular disease not only very often, but consistently, goes unnoticed. The onset of extreme states like anxiety, dread and nausea are not so much the symptoms of the disease emerging, but rather the first intimations of the possibility for a cure. Since the cure might still go awry even after these warning signals make themselves known, they are discussed together with the 'disease'.
The next section outlines the recipe for care of self, which in each case is prescribed as the cure for the malady. In none of the cases is an instant cure posited; instead the task, as outlined by each thinker, is difficult, laborious and must be daily taken up anew. The self is placed ahead of the one who struggles as his or her goal and treasure, but the individual must know that he or she will never quite get there; this does not mean that the self is a chimera, but rather that, because of its paradoxical nature, it resembles a process/road rather than a product/destination.

Lastly there is a final section dedicated to a critical appraisal of the thinker in question. The critical evaluations given here will be of a general nature, that is, commenting upon each thinker's methodology and style, as well as on the aims, contents, and implications of their work. Since the self stands centrally to each of their philosophies, the critiques here are already indirectly aimed at it. However, in Chapter V, the concluding chapter, a more direct critique of Kierkegaard and Sartre's descriptions of authenticity will be given, together with the reasons for why Jung's description is to be preferred.

The outline is deliberately structured so as to present Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung in that order, which effects a kind of dialectical progression. The reader should not anticipate a dialectic such as Hegel's which takes the conflict of the first two positions to a higher level where the oppositions are seen to be illusory. None of the thinkers opted for such a solution to the paradox and conflict of existence, and I would not presume to do it in this thesis either. By 'dialectic' here one should rather understand 'dialogue', one in which the reader is invited to freely participate.

In this dialectical conversation Kierkegaard's position is presented as thesis, Sartre's as antithesis, and Jung's as synthesis: Kierkegaard's solution to the problem of spiritlessness is so deeply entwined in a call to the (what he would call 'authentic') Christian faith, that it can hardly be distinguished from it at all.

Sartre on the other hand sees the difficult and lonely road of atheism as the only one worth taking in the end, although few, he would say, are really cut out for it.

Jung, the last thinker in the series, holds a position that cannot be described as either theistic or atheistic, since he refrains from metaphysical speculation and presents instead (so he claims) an empirical position. From this standpoint, he claims, it can be shown that religious faith is as vital to the psyche as water and food are to the body. The reader would not be wrong in guessing that his position, because it is placed last,
means most to the author\(^5\), but it is not a synthesis that dissolves the other two positions into incoherence; each thinker had a special disdain for such totalizing closures. Instead, it is suggested as a possible position that takes the shortcomings of both the atheistic and religious standpoints into account, and that offers a more attainable and realistic description of authenticity than they do.

4. THE OUTCOME

In conclusion this enquiry hopes to show that the three thinkers point from different directions towards the same basic conceptualization of the 'self' as authenticity: the self as such is both a project and a goal or, to put it differently, a journey and a destination, the goal/destination being the synthesis of the various disparate elements that influence or make up the personality. That means that authenticity is described in each case as the conscious management of inner conflict.

4.1 THE SELF IS CHARACTERIZED BY CONFLICT

Firstly, the 'self' is the attempt to synthesize, harmonize or balance the conflicting and incommensurable aspects of the personality. These conflicting aspects are given in the first place through the disparity between the 'inner' and 'outer' environments, in that inherent pre-dispositions/needs are often at odds with the influence of society. But the conflicting forces in the psyche are not only or even chiefly generated by a discord between 'inner' and 'outer' influences, but rather by the very nature of consciousness that attempts to understand itself.

Kierkegaard examines the conflict between the heart and the mind by showing that reason and faith are inimical and irreconcilable, and vividly illustrates the dread that consciousness feels because it is fundamentally free.

Also Sartre understands consciousness as essentially free, in this case free to construct its own meaning of the world. However, for Sartre, it wishes to escape its freedom in lieu of existential certainty. The dread consciousness experiences at its own freedom is therefore the fountainhead of all psychic conflict.

In Jung's theory the conflict arises from the different demands that consciousness, on one hand, and the unconscious, on the other, make on the individual.
4.2 THE SELF IS A TRANSCENDENT SYNTHESIS

In the second place, the self is not only the attempt at synthesis, but is itself that synthesis, that is, the harmony and balance between conflicting elements. Because the tendencies that make up the personality pull in opposite directions, and are of such a nature that they cannot be reduced to each other, the 'self' is projected into a transcendent realm that traditionally is shrouded in religious language. The 'self' is thus transcendent, that is, inaccessible to reason, because it is self-contradictory, and is consequently constituted in the face of an absurd, incomprehensible, strictly speaking non-existent God, for whom the impossible is nevertheless possible. The nature and value of this transcendent, infinitely deferred self, is the main order of business in the proposed discussion, which will now be turned to without further delay.
CHAPTER II: KIERKEGAARD.

"But to ... be in despair, although usually obvious, does not mean that a person may not continue living a fairly good life, to all appearances be someone, employed with temporal matters, get married, beget children, be honored and esteemed – and one may fail to notice that in a deeper sense he lacks a self. Such things cause little stir in the world; for in the world a self is what one least asks after, and the thing it is most dangerous of all to show signs of having. The biggest danger, that of losing oneself, can pass off in the world as quietly as if it were nothing; every other loss, an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife etc. is bound to be noticed."

- Anti-Climacus: The Sickness Unto Death.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE INDIVIDUAL

In order to understand Kierkegaard’s position it is necessary to take into account his historical background, since his philosophy is a reaction against his time and its pervading intellectual atmosphere. Kierkegaard reacted against Danish bourgeois Christendom on the one hand, and Hegelian speculative philosophy on the other. Hegel’s philosophy was seen as the crowning achievement of rationality and can be taken as a prime example of the Enlightenment’s attempt to explain the ‘universe-and-all-of-existence’. Christianity on the other hand is - or at least should be according to Kierkegaard - in spirit the very opposite of Hegel’s philosophy, since its central tenet is an absurdity, namely that God (who is infinitely other than human) once walked the earth as a human being. There are many things that riled Kierkegaard about the society he lived in, and of the most irritating to him was the fact that no-one else seemed to notice this disparity between faith (as represented by Christianity) and reason (as represented by Hegelianism), but married them happily into a bourgeois coziness that for Kierkegaard represented the ultimate betrayal of authentic selfhood.

As a student and admirer of Hegel’s work, and the son of a deeply and piously Protestant father, he was affiliated to both these ‘doctrines’, but his philosophy in the end is an indictment of both. In his solution to the disparity between reason and faith existentialism was born, which is a philosophy that is neither simply understood (reason) or affirmed (faith), but rather lived. 'Inwardness' or inner conviction is the
salient feature of this new philosophy, and it is arrived at only through a leap of faith, made in fear and trembling. The self shapes its life through choices for which it knows there are no criteria/guarantees. This causes the unbearable inner tension that is the true mark of the individual. According to Kierkegaard most people escape from this near-unendurable state of mind by blending in with others and so avoiding their freedom. This is what Kierkegaard wanted to avoid at all costs, because the ‘individual’ stands higher than any group, an idea that he develops in such works as *Fear and Trembling*, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* and the posthumously published *The Single Individual*.

Let us now look at why his philosophy might, in the first place, be seen as a reaction against Hegel’s. Since its inception, philosophy can be said to have been the attempt at understanding and describing the truth about reality. After centuries of difficulties, Kant came up with a ‘simple’ explanation for why philosophy had never succeeded in this task. The reason is simply that whatever is true about reality will always be beyond us, since we can only be sure of how things appear to us but not about how they really are. In this Kant introduced the concept of the phenomenal world, the world as it appears to consciousness, and the nouminous world, that exists independently from the mind. For example, things appear to us as situated in time and space because that is how our minds are structured; Kant explained that it is possible to know quite a lot about the way the human mind works, but that is where knowledge ends. Kant thereby dealt with the age-old problem of appearance versus reality by saying that all we can know is appearance. (Kant, 1929:265-268).

With apologies for this brief version of an extremely complex and nuanced philosophy, we can say, somewhat simplifyingly, that Hegel returned to the problem that Kant believed had been solved once and for all, and said that it is possible to know the truth about reality, since appearance (thought) is reality. Mind (in the widest sense possible, that is, not only individual mind but consciousness as such, also called ‘spirit’ by Hegel, and more specifically ‘reason’) apprehends what is ‘real/actual’ to such an extent that what is ‘real’ is precisely that which is ‘rational’. (Hegel, 1952:10). The purpose of the history is the growth of consciousness, or of ‘spirit’ unfolding its grand destiny. In the end, when the summit has been reached, reason will have fully apprehended everything about the universe that gave birth to it, and history will have, so to speak, ended. In short, Hegel’s philosophy comes down to the argument that Being and Thought are one. Thought which knows it is Being and Being that knows it
is Thought is then what is known as the Absolute Spirit. "Each phase of history is the expression of a conceptual scheme, in which the gradual articulation of the concepts leads to a realization of their inadequacies and contradictions, so that the scheme is replaced by a higher and more adequate one, until finally Absolute Knowledge emerges and the whole historical process is comprehended as a single logical unfolding. It is this comprehension itself that is the culmination of the process..." (MacIntyre, 1967:337).

What makes Hegel's system so impressive is the way in which he demonstrates that the unfolding of the Absolute in history is perfectly rational in the sense that it is 'logically necessary'. Even the suffering of individual people can be understood as having been logically necessary and therefore meaningful.

It is against this last implication of Hegel's philosophy that Kierkegaard protests. Thinking as Hegel does it is thinking for thinking's sake, not for the sake of a single human being. "For Kierkegaard to think for the sake of thinking is not to think in the most human manner; rather it is to think disinterestedly." (Jegstrup, 1995:430).

Kierkegaard asks who it is that is supposed to "finish the system", and answers that "it is a human being" (1941a,:120). By this he means that only in a human being can this or any system find its true realization. A human being is an individual, and it is the fact that the individual and his/her inner life and even suffering is minimized - by stating that it is all a logical necessity and a contribution to the unfolding of the world-spirit - that moved Kierkegaard to attack Hegel. According to Kierkegaard it is impossible to complete the system, because the human system-builder stands inside the system.

Kierkegaard understood Hegel's system as dissolving all conflict in the dialectical process of thesis and antithesis being taken up into the higher synthesis; Kierkegaard seeks instead to maintain the tension of the conflict (between the contradictions of life), stating that this (tension and conflict, incarnated in a single person) is all that is of value in the world, because the management of this conflict is what makes the individual a 'concrete existent'. What is concrete is more real than what is abstract, and what is particular is more valuable than what is universal, and nothing is more concrete and particular than a single person and his/her struggle with life. Against Hegel, he maintained that what is truly important is precisely that which cannot be comprehended reasonably, because the very fact of incarnate existence gives rise to irreducible paradoxes.
It is intriguing that Hegel and Kierkegaard had such contrary solutions to the problems of their time, which they both labeled 'spiritlessness'. For Hegel the spiritless person was that individual who still rebelled against being taken up into the community and into history, the one who struggled against the inevitability of logical necessity. A true individual is one who expresses the spirit of the age s/he lives in without trying to transcend it. A person who is anything except a representative of the age is, according to Hegel, alienated and can only have an unhappy consciousness. Kierkegaard on the other hand, said that the only way the individual could escape from spiritlessness (the complete absence of the true self) is to struggle against assimilation by the grand system and maintain him-/herself as a separate being even though it implies inner conflict. For Kierkegaard, the true enemy of the individual is mass society. He cut himself off from Danish bourgeoisie, broke his engagement to Regine Olsen⁸, secluding himself to write his books, inflammatory pamphlets, journals, and philosophical fragments, most under a number of pseudonyms. Kierkegaard was entirely concerned with man's 'inner life', that aspect that had been overlooked by Hegelian theory. What is of value to him is not the awe-inspiring way in which conflicting ideas and trends in history eventually fitted into slots that were part of a bigger whole, but rather the never-ending conflicting feelings, thoughts and ideas that are inside a person (for this reason he can also be hailed as one of the fathers of modern psychology).

By becoming a part of the bourgeoisie it is possible to leave behind most of these conflicts, since it entails accepting mainstream ideas, repressing the unpleasant aspects of the self, and ostracizing those who deviate from the norm. Kierkegaard was a self-appointed Socratic gadfly, who adopted the technique of Socratic irony in order to shake his fellow Danes out of their complacency. He wrote under a number of assumed identities, and not one of these pseudonyms can be taken as the real Kierkegaard - not even the Kierkegaard of the personal journals or later religious works. What is (perhaps unintentionally⁹) demonstrated by this way of writing is the fragmentary nature of the individual, who hides behind a series of masks, and is him-/herself a mask. These different characters were often engaged in dialogue and argument with one another, just as the self is in constant conflict with itself.
1.2 FREEDOM OF CHOICE.

By taking up different and opposing positions on a number of issues, Kierkegaard challenges the reader to examine unquestioned assumptions, because the only life worth living for him is that which is constantly examined - not with the aim of finding a reasonable solution, but rather to be as painfully aware as possible of the irreducible absurdity of existence. He offers no real solutions, but urges his reader to choose. The reason why the process of self-examination discovers no core personality that can serve as the true self, is because there is no essential, self-contained truth either inside or outside a person; that is, a truth which would hold for all people at all times. (Descartes thought for example that such universal truths could be discovered ‘inside’ the mind, in the form of innate ideas placed there by God, such as the idea of ‘perfection’.) For Kierkegaard, although truth is subjectivity or inwardness, this is an orientation, not a fixed quintessence to be discovered inside. This approach to the notion of truth deviates completely from the other two accepted notions, namely correspondence theory and coherence theory. Correspondence theory, possibly the oldest and most widely accepted notion of truth, holds that a statement is true if it corresponds to what is in reality. Coherence theory holds that a statement can be true if and only if it is internally coherent, that is, if it makes sense logically. Kierkegaard's theory of truth is like neither of the above. Instead, truth for him is 'passion', which is the inner experience of a deeply held belief, even, and especially, when it flies in the face of reason and evidence. Logically speaking an individual cannot be in two different places at the same time, but when one is in 'passion', this is the closest one can get to being in two different places simultaneously. (Kierkegaard,1941a:178).

The necessary implication of such an attitude is that choice is of paramount importance to human existence. Since there is no way of knowing objective truth, there are also no criteria to guide one's choices and to make one option more attractive or sensible than another. If it were possible to take all the factors involved in a choice into account and deduce from that which would be the right decision, it would not be a choice but a calculation. Then human life would have been a guided determinism. In Kierkegaard's view each person must make choices for which there can be no true reasons. A case in point would be his own rejection of Regine, his one-time fiancée.

The decisions spoken of here are not trivial, because to agonize over what to wear is not necessarily the mark of a true individual. The truly existential decisions are those made in fear and trembling; they are characterized by feelings of anxiety in the face of
the self and its freedom. For once a choice has been made, there is no going back, since it is a choice of the type either/or, not both/and.

In Hegel's philosophy 'both/and' choices are possible because opposites are reconciled in a synthesis. Kierkegaard's rejects this approach, but nevertheless his theory of self is also characterized by a dialectic, although it differs in fundamental ways from Hegel's.

1.3 STAGES OF LIFE.

Hegel's dialectic implies that abstract ideas contain within themselves contradictions and tensions that inevitably lead to the idea turning into its opposite or antithesis, and this new tension is resolved when a higher understanding or synthesis is reached. Kierkegaard's dialectic, on the other hand, does not primarily concern abstract ideas, but rather stages of concrete, incarnate life. There is no sequential, systematic or necessary progression involved, since the states of being can overlap; it is also possible to move backwards and fall onto a more 'primitive' state, from which the journey 'upwards' must again be laboriously made. (See Kierkegaard, 1945:430).

Despite the fact that each state is concrete, not abstract, there are of course certain ideas inherent to each style of life, since each is the expression of an underlying view of the world. But the difference here between Kierkegaard and Hegel is firstly that the latter never admitted that the steady progression of ideas can only take place through and in the life of a single human being, and secondly that the next stage is not effected through logical necessity, but through the individual's free choice and act of will.

The three phases of Kierkegaard's dialectic are the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious.

1.3.1 THE AESTHETIC.

This phase is marked by the pursuit of immediate aesthetic satisfaction. It would be too crude to say that the aesthetic person searches merely for pleasure, but accurate to say it is fundamentally self-centered. Aesthetic pleasures are not merely of the flesh, but of the refined spirit; examples of such pleasures might be music and art, fine food, lodgings in a beautiful and tasteful setting, the pleasure of intelligent company. (See for example the section entitled In Vino Veritas in 'Stages on Life's Way', 1945, where the aesthetic stage is represented by the story of a banquet, where different Kierkegaardian pseudonyms converse in a pleasant fashion). The aesthete measures
life by the criteria 'boring/interesting', avoiding the former and pursuing the latter. The enemy of aestheticism is not pain, but ennui, that soul-destroying experience of satiation and lack of desire. When faced, inevitably, with the less pleasant aspects of life, the aesthetic individual falls rapidly into despair and melancholy. This is a type of melancholy that is reveled in, a romantic Weltschmerz that is merely another indication of the essentially passive nature of the aesthete, who makes no important choices but lets life 'happen'.

A clear example of the attitude of the aesthete are the following words of the seducer, who wrote the diary in the first part of Either/Or:

"The banefulness of an engagement is always the ethical in it... Under the esthetic sky everything is buoyant, beautiful, transient; when ethics arrives on the scene everything becomes harsh, angular, infinitely langweilig [boring]." (Kierkegaard, 1944b:367)

The shirking of responsibility, the naïve desire for life always to be pleasant, and unwillingness to take oneself and existence in hand to change it for the better, are clearly evident here.

1.3.2 THE ETHICAL.
When driven to its extreme, the aesthetic lifestyle will introduce the possibility of its opposite, the awareness and call of duty that initiates the ethical stage of life. A person entering the ethical stage no longer lives self-centeredly, but is bound to a sense of obligation and the need for community and shared values. When it becomes clear that transient pleasant moments fail to satisfy the needs of the soul, the individual is faced with the choice to remain lazy and passive, or to become a responsible citizen.

In Either/Or, where Kierkegaard sets forth the two opposing styles of life, one finds imaginary letters, papers and correspondences written between A, the libertine and seducer of women, and B, a married man and a judge.11 Judge Wilhelm, or 'B', is the proponent of the ethical style of life, and although the 'editor' purports not to try and convince his readers to choose one above the other, but merely to lay the choices impartially before them, through the fact that B has the last word and seems to be able to 'see through' the libertine's aesthetic façade into his misery, the ethical viewpoint is in fact presented as the favored one. (See also Kierkegaard, 1938: section VI)

Whereas the aesthetic stage of life is characterized by resignation (or at the most...
intrigue, as is illustrated by the diary of the seducer), the ethical stage is marked by involvement in society and acceptance of general moral standards and rules. The individual is driven by a sense of responsibility; life is now actively lived instead of just passively experienced. The judge advises his young friend specifically on the topic of marriage, something the seducer sees as the death-knell of spontaneity and of love. The Judge insists that marriage is not the enemy of true love, but its friend. (Kierkegaard, 1994b:31). He shows that living aesthetically means living without making any choices, and a meaningful choice, such as deciding whom to marry, is that which shapes life, because implies committing oneself to what one wants to become in the future.

The ethical phase can however be described as the negative phase of the dialectic, since it is characterized by adherence to the universal, whereas the actual goal of selfhood is particularity. In doing what is ethical the individual submerges him/herself and identifies with the rules of the majority. The ethical fails on its own terms, since it is based on an inappropriate principle, namely abstract universality, and also because the ethical life is characterized by conflicting moral claims that are impossible to satisfy. In order for the ethical, of which the real goal is true selfhood, to be placed on its proper basis, a venture into the religious stage is required.

1.3.3 THE RELIGIOUS.

The religious life begins where the ethical leaves off. There is a double movement involved in faith: The first movement is a resignation of the finite, temporal and ethical, and the second a return to it, but this time through the Power that constitutes the individual. Only in these circumstances will the individual possess the finite, but also the self, on the correct basis: “Kierkegaard calls this transition beyond either the aesthetic or the ethical to the neither-nor of infinite resignation a leap, but it is only the first movement of what can become the double movement of the leap of faith.” (Goicoechea, 1999:212). The leap of faith is illustrated by the story of Abraham and Isaac in Fear and Trembling. God called upon Abraham to sacrifice his son, and the father prepared to do so. The son was bound down and the knife was lifted, but before the act was carried out God stayed Abraham's hand and pointed him to a ram trapped in a nearby bush, which served as replacement.

The meaning of the Biblical story is that God was testing Abraham's faith, demanding a sacrifice that was a three-fold horror: first of all it flew in the face of the ethical rule
that the murder of an innocent is fundamentally wrong and evil; second it nullified
the very promise that God had made to Abraham, namely that his descendents would
be as numerous as the stars of the heaven or the sand of the desert; thirdly Abraham
was required to take the life of his son whom he loved. Abraham's obedience to God's
voice was the most extreme of leaps of faith, because it believed the absurd: that Isaac
would be restored.

Abraham could not know beforehand that God would save him out of this dilemma at
the last minute, but he believed He would, and his faith was ultimately rewarded.
Abraham, the knight of faith, illustrates the profundness of the spiritual torment that
real faith requires. That is why Kierkegaard was so disdainful towards his fellow
Danes who practiced such an undemanding and self-assured form of Christianity.

1.4 PARADOX.
The question arises as to the relationship between the three phases: do they replace
each other or co-exist? Kierkegaard answers this question by saying that the three
stages are like three levels of a house: the ground floor is the aesthetic, the first floor
the ethical, and the second the religious. One can live one's whole life only on the
ground floor, either unaware of the others that are higher up, or, having seen them,
unwilling to live there. The same goes for each of the floors: the first one represents
the life of a moral person strictly adhering to the rules of society, and the second that
of a mystic. One can live on each of these floors alone, or only on two for example.
Of course one cannot come to the first floor, the ethical, without first having been
acquainted with the aesthetic; neither can one come to the religious without passing
through the ethical. Having arrived at the religious it is possible to stay there, and this
type of religiousness is called religiousness A, which corresponds to infinite
resignation, the leaving behind of all earthly interests.

Arriving there is only the first movement of the double movement of faith however; in
order to be an authentic self, it is necessary to dwell on all the levels of the house and
inhabit it entirely - this approach is also known as religiousness B: "Kierkegaard's
person paradoxically gets up to the realm of absolutely loving the absolute, but then
should come back to relatively loving the relative... Kierkegaard's person of faith does
everything within the context of living on all floors of the house at once. His decisions
are not those of a mere aesthete, ethical person, or mystic. The decisions of the person
of faith are made at each moment with a responsibility, that takes all realms into account". (Goicoechea, 1999:212-213).

This view of the self's three stages indicates that they exist in potentia in everyone: each person does indeed live in a house that already has all three levels, although they do not initially know of all. This image lends clarity to Kierkegaard's insistence that the self is a blueprint requiring an act of will to be actualized. The making of the Self, that is, the movement between the levels, requires will power however, because existence is paradoxical, not logical. One does not of necessity move to a higher (or lower) level. The steps between levels are taken through free choice.

Kierkegaard paid a lot of attention to the notion of paradox, and said that it is only through the inward affirmation of something that is offensive to reason, such as paradox, that true inwardness or individuality is established. This is exactly what happens whenever a choice is made between the three approaches to life, because there are no good, reasonable reasons to make one choice rather than another. When a person passionately holds on to something which reason, and by extension, popular belief or common sense, finds to be absurd, then the true meaning of inwardness is revealed. As has been explained before, inwardness stands opposed to that passivity which is in-authenticity. Authenticity is necessarily characterized by a sense of being split apart, and is thus a difficult position to maintain: the temptation is always there to think that the paradox is an illusory contradiction that exceeds our current powers of reason, but that it does make sense at a 'higher level'. On the other hand, it is also possible to give way to fuzzy logic and be unaware of the glaring nature of the contradiction and the extent of its offense to reason. Any such a bringing together of the two opposites, faith and reason, as had been attempted in Hegel's philosophy, dilutes inwardness.

1.5 ANXIETY/DREAD.

In The Sickness Unto Death Kierkegaard (1989:22) states that there is not a living being that does not "secretly harbor an unrest, an inner strife, a disharmony, ... an anxiety about some possibility in existence or an anxiety about himself." This way of describing the existence of a conscious being is what marks Kierkegaard as the first existentialist, and, in fact, it is from Kierkegaard that Sartre (and Heidegger before him) would later derive much of the existentialist terminology and descriptions of states like anxiety, dread and fear. Existential anxiety differs from normal fear in the
sense that it is an 'objectless' state. Normal fear is fear of something; for example fear that you might lose your job, that you might have an accident and be crippled for life, that natural disaster will rob you of your possessions and your family. On the other hand existential anxiety, as the name simply says, is fear of existence, or more specifically, fear of oneself. Fear of oneself or one's consciousness goes hand in hand with the realization of the self's essential freedom. The self is free because there are no external restraints that act upon it, although that mostly appears to be the case. Sartre's famous example is that of a man who walks along a path next to a ravine where there are no guardrails, and experiences vertigo, not because he is afraid of falling, but because he is afraid he might throw himself over the edge. (Sartre, 1958:30-31). Kierkegaard characterizes the experience of freedom as engendering the same sensation that staring into an abyss gives you (reminding quite naturally of Nietzsche who says that the abyss will begin to look into you! which can be interpreted to mean that one's own self is this abyss). The self is continually becoming what it is not yet and what it becomes is a matter of choice. The consciousness of the absence of any ground to these choices is what creates the acute sense of dread.

But anxiety is an important spur in the development of the individual. Anxiety reveals the Self's freedom, and it is this freedom that must be used to choose God. Since faith in God is absurd, 'inwardness' or 'passion' is strengthened by actually making this choice. Objective truths pale in comparison to the importance of this inwardness. To Kierkegaard the historical Jesus and the details of his life are of little importance. The only thing that matters is believing the paradox that God could become man. This means that the infinite/eternal/universal does not find its dwelling in the perfect working of the universe, or in the unfolding of the Absolute Spirit, which is what Kierkegaard understood Hegel to mean, but in a single individual of flesh and blood. Hegel had tried to show that the truths of Christianity could be appropriated by reason, and that Christ was the symbol of man's awareness of being a part of God (Absolute Spirit.) But Hegel here refers to mankind in a generic way, whereas Kierkegaard refers to The Individual, of whom Christ is the most perfect example. More than anything else, it is in the inward experience of the of paradox of the God-man, the offense that Christianity engenders because it is paradoxical, and the passionate commitment to believe it nonetheless, that is of value to the Self's development. Kierkegaard says that a man who worships an idol with passion and fervor is closer to the truth than a man who worships the Christian God with
complacency. What is meant by this is simply that religion does not consist in the following of rituals and adherence to dogma, but that it must be felt. We shall see later when the discussion turns round to Jung, that on this point the two thinkers share the same intuition. Both men favor 'spirituality' rather than organized religion, where 'spirituality' refers to an inner, personal experience of God, rather than the mere mimicking of religious gestures. Jung adds something that Kierkegaard does not touch upon however, and that is that Christ as symbol is naturally rooted in the unconscious itself. This means that Christ is only one of many possible symbols of individuation: an inherent tendency of the psyche to overcome the oppositions that characterize it. Christ is merely the modern Western cultural expression of this tendency, and therefore by no means the only way to 'redemption' Nevertheless, the idea that Christ is a subjective experience rather than an article of dogma, or something to be 'proven' historically, is to be found in both Kierkegaard and Jung's thought. The 'truth' of Christ will stand even if no such historical person existed, because it is a psychological truth, depicting an ideal but difficult state of harmony between what could broadly be described as 'spirit' and 'matter'.

1.6 TRUTH AS SUBJECTIVITY

Seen in this light, it is easier to accept Kierkegaard's statement that truth is subjectivity; the statement does not carry an implied solipsism and does not reduce reality to a figment of the individual's imagination. It should rather be seen as a statement of value, which holds that whatever may be the case in the world, those factual details do not matter nearly as much as the way in which the world is felt, experienced and remembered. The emphasis on affectivity does not mean though that thought and reason are placed entirely in the background. As has been shown before, it is only the person with good powers of analytical reasoning who can honestly be said to know the meaning of faith, since one who imagines that the truths of Christianity are logical does not really believe in them at all, but accepts them on what are supposed rational grounds.

Kierkegaard's understanding of truth as subjectivity explains his strange method of authorship. Since he never wanted to convince anyone by the force of logical argument (as had been done by Hegel) to accept a system that was, objectively speaking, true, and since he wanted even less to bring his readers round to his own particular way of thinking, he used the pseudonyms, and carefully argued as
vehemently for one side of an issue as for another. One should also be careful to pay attention to Kierkegaard's sense of irony, by which method, so admired in Socrates, he was able to subtly make a joke of himself, and so at the same time make light of all he had to say. This technique meant that he should never have to force the readers hand. Kierkegaard, by laying out the facts of spiritlessness before the reader, clarifying the choices facing him or her, and sketching their implications, then taking a step back at an ironic distance, ensures that the subjectivity of the reader would not be violated. He does not say "be a Christian/ ethical person/ aesthete" and perhaps not even "this is what it means to be a Christian/ ethical person/ aesthete". His work is rather like a trick mirror to let the reader see both what s/he wants and doesn't want to know about him-/herself.

It was only in a later period that he wrote inflammatory pamphlets against the church, whose indifference towards his indictment of them he could not stomach, and, so to speak, lost his cool. By the time he collapsed in the street at the age of forty-two he had exhausted his physical, emotional and financial resources in his fight against the passionless complacency of his countrymen. The passing away of the laughable, fanatic figure of Kierkegaard, at first did not cause too many ripples in the fabric of Danish society, but the later translation of his entire voluminous collected work into German let his influence be spread beyond the borders of Denmark, where it moved a generation of writers, like Sartre, whose work would later be called existentialism.

Having laid the groundwork, it is now possible to move on to a more complex explication of and grounding for Kierkegaard's central ideas, namely dread (of freedom), despair (of lack of spirit/ self) and fear (with reference to the leap of faith); which, broadly speaking, is the malady of spiritlessness.
2. THE MALADY: SPIRITLESSNESS

Dread, despair, and fear are three aspects of the malady that Kierkegaard labels 'sin'. There is a progression involved in the disease, and if carried out to the end, it leads to that cure and salvation which is the true self. The malady is not a mental illness, because it is all-pervading and therefore the norm, not an aberration. The disease is also not undesirable, and should not be prevented. In fact disease and cure are so intimately entwined that there can be no talk of 'health' where there are no symptoms: an absence of dread, despair or fear in an individual should be taken as a ominous sign of the gravity of the illness. Despair is a necessary ingredient of spiritual development, and Kierkegaard claims that it offers the only avenue to 'truth and deliverance'. (Hannay, 1989 in SUD:5).

Discriminating between dread, despair and fear makes it possible to mark how far the illness/cure has progressed. The concepts are put forward in three books: *The Concept of Dread*, *The Sickness Unto Death*, and *Fear and Trembling*. The order is not chronological and is largely adopted for the sake of explication. The first work deals with dread/anxiety (German: *Angst*) in its relation to original sin, as it 'came into the world' through Adam, the second, *The Sickness Unto Death*, with different forms of despair and their relation to consciousness, and the third with that unique *Fear and Trembling* which propels the 'knight of faith' to his healing. The progression starts with innocence/ ignorance, runs through knowledge/ guilt, and arrives at faith/ salvation. The first and last works deal respectively with Adam, the father of the human race, and Abraham, the father of faith. Both Adam and Abraham suffer anxiety, and both make an important leap: Adam into sin and Abraham into faith (Goicoechea, 1999:216). They represent the individual and the human race as a whole, so that the stories are in fact psychological analyses of the human condition.

2.1 THE CONCEPT OF DREAD.

2.1.1 DREAD AS THE PRESUPPOSITION OF SIN.

Walter Lowrie (1944a:xi) says in the introduction to *The Concept of Dread* that Kierkegaard was probably the only 'modern man who has so profound a sense of the solidarity of the race that original sin makes any sense to him.' Kierkegaard starts his exposition of dread with an analysis of the Genesis tale, which must not be taken
as a myth (a fictional and inconsequential story) but rather as a psychologically accurate explanation of the origin of sin and of suffering. If taken at face value, the nub of that parable is the relationship in which Adam’s original sin of disobedience stands to the rest of humankind. Does original sin get passed on like an inheritance (which would mean later generations are essentially innocent), or does each individual commit the first sin anew? Kierkegaard’s solution is dialectical: Adam (and every person) is at the same time them-self and all humankind, and that which explains Adam’s predicament accounts for the human condition. Adam’s or anyone else’s sin is always the ‘original sin’: a qualitative leap from innocence.

Dread is the presupposition for sin in the story of the Fall, because it exists prior to God’s prohibition, although unconsciously. Adam lives in a state of innocent bliss, without knowledge of good and evil, or, more importantly, of his own freedom. Consequently in Adam, the first man (and by the same token also every man and woman before their own personal ‘fall’) spirit lies sleeping.

The moment Adam in dread becomes conscious of the yawning abyss of freedom, he takes the first step towards guilt. When God tells Adam that everything is allowed, except eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, whose fruit leads to death, Adam does not know good and evil or death, but yet he trembles before the admonition. Why? What does he fear? Not punishment, death or God. No, he is afraid of what he himself will do. For the very first time his own freedom stares him in the face, and he becomes alarmed at the thought that he will want to taste the forbidden fruit, and moreover that he will taste it, and that he will not be able to stop himself from tasting it. For the first time he realizes there is something foreign in the garden of Eden: not a snake in the grass, but his own self which he does not understand and cannot control.

Can one conclude from this that dread (of one’s freedom) is sin, or alternatively that knowledge (of one’s freedom) is sin? The answer is no, because when the discussion later turns to Abraham we shall see that he also knew of and feared his freedom, trembling before God’s absurd and paradoxical command that he should sacrifice Isaac. The difference between him and Adam is that he obeyed God, whereas Adam did not. “Abraham made the leap of faith by being faithfully obedient and trusting throughout his anxiety. Adam made the leap of sin by falling into his anxiety and becoming unfaithfully disobedient.” (Goicoechea, 1999:216). It seems therefore rather that the disobedience is the sin; there is thus a qualitative leap from innocence into
sin, but importantly this leap presupposes anxiety. Sin is not to offend God but rather to be offended by God and His absurdity. Dread is that which makes disobedience possible, while faith is that which makes obedience possible; but importantly, faith can only come into being after acquaintance with anxiety. For this reason anxiety is actually the prerequisite for the leap of faith, which only comes later.

Firstly, however, we need to answer the question: why can dread lead to disobedience? The answer lies in its psychological ambiguity.

2.1.2 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AMBIGUITY OF DREAD.

Dread has a psychological ambiguity in that it both repels and attracts. Kierkegaard calls this an 'antipathetic sympathy and a sympathetic antipathy': dread is exactly dreadful because one longs for that which one fears. When looking down a precipice into an abyss it is as much the fault of the eye as of the abyss that the onlooker becomes dizzy, since the eye was drawn and looked upon the abyss in the first place. This exactly is the experience of 'vertigo' so often described in existentialist writings. The meaning of Adam's temptation is not that prohibition serves as stimulus to desire, which would place the responsibility for Adam's sin in God's court, but rather that innocence is merely guilt/ dread that had been sleeping. Guilt begins to be born exactly in the awareness of dread. The individual is then overcome by something stronger than him-/herself (dizziness and vertigo as s/he looks down into the pit of freedom) and is in this sense innocent. At the same time because s/he loved the dread (the eye was drawn to the abyss), there is also (possible) guilt and culpability. This is one of the fundamental paradoxes of the human condition: namely that a human being is a being that is both innocent and guilty.

Dread is only conquered through faith, which brings forgiveness, redemption and salvation. The further complication however, is that a human being dreads salvation as well; the reason why is shown in The Sickness Unto Death, which will be discussed next. Here we can see that before coming to faith, dread compounded and turning into sin, leads to despair, the malady described in The Sickness Unto Death, where it is explained that "dread awakens man to his nature as a synthesis, one that remains unrealized." (Pappin,1982:229).
2.2 THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH.

The sickness that is unto death is despair, and the cause of despair is lack of self/spirit/responsible freedom. The notion of spirit is elucidated in the book of this name, although in terms that are rather baffling. Whatever spirit is (Anti-Climacus seems unable really to say), it is best described by an analysis of the types of despair and the aspects under which they might be viewed, since despair is directly caused by lack of spirit. In order to escape the dread of freedom, the individual finds ways to hide knowledge of it from him-/herself. According to how efficacious this deception is, one can distinguish between the different types of despair.

There are three types of despair and two polarized aspects under which they can be viewed. The two aspects are reluctance/refusal and consciousness/unconsciousness. The despair of reluctance/refusal is also often referred to as the despair of weakness/defiance. The three types of despair are a) ignorance of having a self, b) not wanting to be one-Self, and c) wanting to be oneself. Schematically, we can outline despair thus:

b) Not wanting to be one-Self. Conscious. Reluctance.
c) Wanting to be oneself. Conscious. Refusal.

2.2.1 THE TYPES OF DESPAIR.

For the purpose of these analyses we can assume the Self to be (knowledge of and taking responsibility for) freedom, although that does not exhaust the meaning of Kierkegaard's concept: the self's freedom is also its eternal element, and the true Self is that freedom that acknowledges the Author of its freedom, using it to make the leap in faith back to God.

2.2.1.1 The ignorance of having an eternal self.

This type of despair is 'over the earthly or over something earthly'. This person, who does not know s/he has an infinite and eternal part in him/her, goes about life in a carefree manner and seems to be content. The despair is unconscious because unmindful of the eternal within. The subject has never encountered the problem of the eternal vs. the finite, since s/he has never experienced the loss of something held passionately dear: s/he lives as if everything will last forever, for although s/he knows intellectually (objectively) that everything on earth dies and decays, it has never been
experienced or suffered personally (subjectively). Loss and death have not yet become existential tasks; on the contrary, the individual avoids all that is possibly unpleasant or boring. If s/he feels despair of any kind, it always comes from outside, and concerns trivial matters. The subject is passive, an aesthete, and at the mercy of the fluctuations of fortune. This despair is that of weakness or reluctance because there is a cowardliness and an unwillingness to really engage in life, to take risks, to examine things deeply. “[H]e is too sensate to have the courage to risk being spirit.” (Kierkegaard, 1989:73). There is a denial of freedom and responsibility underlying this cowardliness, since for the individual all disappointments are attributed to fate rather than to his/her choice. The despairer lives in the realm of immediacy, and is bound to all things through desire and the project of aesthetic fulfillment. If this project is hindered despair follows, which the subject thinks is due to the loss of these pleasures, whereas in fact all despair is over the lack or loss of self. The very concept of despair is here therefore misplaced. If, however, despair intensifies, reflection might set in, and with reflection comes a shearing loose from the external. Awareness of the self as something that differs from the external is born, and the subject realizes its nakedness and freedom before existence. This is the so-called break with immediacy, but the person as yet is not practiced enough in abstraction from the external to sustain it. Despair over something earthly (over noget Jordisk) is the more primitive form of this type of despair; when it is heightened enough it turns into despair of the earthly as a whole (over det Jordiske) which is the breakthrough to the next stage.

2.2.1.2 The despair of not wanting to be one-self.
Kierkegaard describes this despair as ‘despair about the eternal or over oneself.’ This type of despair is not over something earthly and does not come from outside, but from inside. It concerns the eternal: it is despair over the self, of which the person has now become aware as something free and separate from the world of time. This despair is therefore conscious. The despair of not wanting to be oneself sets in once the person realizes that not only particular things on earth, such as a wife or five dollars, have the tendency to disappear, but that all things under heaven are subject to moth and rust. The despair therefore “comes from reflection, from inside, not from an external jolt.” (Kierkegaard, 1989:85). It is not despair over the earthly as in the previous instance, but despair of the earthly as a whole. Consequently, the person comes to realize that there is a longing in him/her for something that is eternal, and

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that nothing ‘on earth’ can satisfy that longing. By realizing this, the person comes for the first time to understand that there is a self that is different from the pseudo-self, the immediate ‘self’. This ‘new’ self is painful. The pain lies in admitting to oneself that one has a longing for the eternal, while at the same time understanding that ‘earthly things’, the only things one has access to, are not eternal, but pass away. The despairer “understands with the help of reflection that there is much he can lose without losing the self.” (Kierkegaard, 1989:85). This causes unbearable tension in the subject, who must admit of two truths: that there is inside a longing for the infinite, and that the infinite is an impossibility. This tension, and specifically the management of this tension, is the ‘self’ that the subject does not want to ‘be’. It is conscious, aware that the striving after immediate gratification is a chasing after wind. But it is still a despair of weakness or reluctance, because the subject is not strong enough to bear up under the paradox.

Again a subtle distinction must be made with reference to the prepositions Kierkegaard uses: This type of despair is either over oneself, or about the eternal. Despair over oneself is the more primitive form of despair within this stage. That ‘over which’ one despairs can take many forms, while that ‘about which’ one despairs remains unchanging. In the last stage one further step is taken, and a further intensification of consciousness breaks through. (Verstrynge, 1997:446). This form of despair, because it becomes introspective and searches for the source of its despair not on the outside but on the inside, is a less passive form than the last. The subject is no longer passively experiencing the fluctuations of fortune, but actively examining itself and growing in consciousness. That which remains unchanging however, the eternal, is precisely that which will in the end set this person free from despair. (Verstrynge, 1997:446). This also takes us over to the next and most intense stage of despair/consciousness.

2.2.1.3 The despair of wanting to be oneself.

The break with the previous stages is here effected through pride. (Verstrynge, 1997:448). Two types of this despair is again distinguished, namely between the ‘acting self’ and the ‘suffering self’. The acting self does not want to admit of any ground for its being that is greater than itself. It is proud and wants to shape itself and create itself (which is the despair of defiance). The subject wants to be master in its own house, but is a king without a country, since this attitude comes
down to a denial (again) of the eternal. The suffering self on the other hand acknowledges the eternal, resists from it, making a castle of its sorrow to live in, and does not want to accept any (divine) help. S/he has fallen in love with pain and does not want to desert it. S/he wants the pain to be the 'self'\textsuperscript{31}. (Verstrynge,1997:449). Both types want to be autonomous, one by forgetting the eternal and one by remembering and remaining in it too much. Both thus abuse the consciousness of the eternal. The ‘self’ that both want to be, is a pseudo-self because it is presumed to be autonomous; it does not admit to being grounded in something greater and does not desire redemption. What must happen now is for the process of trying to create the self autonomously to be abandoned; the subject must ‘die’ to itself in order to find true life.

If the last two types of (conscious) despair create the impression that there is no way out of despair, it must be understood that the second type of 'oneself' has a different meaning than the first 'oneself'. The 'self' in the despair of not wanting to be oneSelf (despair b), is the strenuous ideal of being oneself in front of the absurd God, and its difficulty explains why people do not wish to take up the burden. The last type, wanting to be oneself, refers to wanting to be oneself as you and society see it. The last type of (false) self relies on the age's ideals of self-centered autonomy, whereas Kierkegaard's ideal of self is "a self that conforms to the image of humanity revealed by God in the person of Christ." (Hannay in SUD,1989:11).

The image of Christ as a lowly servant and the humility that was his aura, as well as his death, speaks of utter 'selflessness', an ideal most would argue is impossible for humans to achieve. The fact that the true self lacks all referents to society and the aspects of identity that it is possible to find therein, such as status, social acceptance, a good reputation, and so forth, is one reason why people refuse to take the cross of selfhood on their shoulders. The second reason is that this understanding of selfhood offends reason, since to be redeemed it must accept the idea that the eternal entered time in the person of Christ, which is described as inaccessible to thought, that is, offensive, in \textit{Concluding Unscientific Postscript}, wherein Kierkegaard attacks the Hegelian system.

How then is the individual meant to reach the state of unselfishness that actually is the true Self? The answer is that s/he has to become \textit{aware} of the conflict in the self, which exists because of the different polarities pulling in opposite directions (the
ambiguity of consciousness). Once there is awareness of the conflict, it can begin to be managed. This achieved, spirit (which is the dynamic synthesis of the opposing elements) will have been realized in the self.

2.2.2 THE CAUSES OF DESPAIR.

2.2.2.1 The polarities of the self.
The causes of despair can be clarified with reference to the different syntheses that (should) constitute the self, as well as their various imbalances. Consequently a discussion of Kierkegaard's polarities of the self is also required. These types of despair are considered without regard to their being conscious or not: They are:

a) Despair under the aspect of finitude and infinitude, where infinitude's despair is to lack finitude, and vice versa;
b) Despair viewed under the aspect of possibility and necessity, where possibility's despair is to lack necessity, and necessity's despair is to lack possibility;
c) Despair viewed under the aspect of time and eternity.

The first two are discussed below, and the third in 3. The Cure, because it is more relevant to the remedy than to the sickness.

Kierkegaard (1989:43) begins the discussion with the following passage:

"The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation which is relating to itself. A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity. In short a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two terms. Looked at in this way the human being is not yet a self."

From the above two things are clear: first, for Kierkegaard the self is neither a substance nor an entity. Second, it is possible to be alive and not (really) have a self. Although the polarities are present in everyone, consciousness of them and the endeavor to seek greater balance are not. The root-cause of despair is imbalance within the self. It is consequently impossible to understand any particular type of despair without reference to its opposite, which means despair is always defined dialectically. (Kierkgaard,1989: 60).
2.2.2.1.1 Finitude/ infinitude. It is the task of the self to become concrete and particular, where 'concreteness' is a synthesis of the finite and the infinite. To put it in a different way: ".. the task before the individual is not to resolve the inner opposition within the self by dissolving the uneasy synthesis; instead it is to become more of a self in the direction of the existential infinite and to posit that movement under the conditions of one's finite existence." (Pappin, 1982:227). The reason for this is that the concrete self is 'becoming' rather than a 'being'; infinity opens the individual to becoming, through the imagination, within the bounds of the finite. The individual initially tries to escape this task by "seeking out one pole of the synthesis at the expense of the other." (ibid). Infinitude's despair is to lack finitude, a state experienced by a person who is given over to fantasy and who lacks practical sense. When imagination, feeling, understanding and will become fantastic, the self becomes volatile, abstract, leaping into a false infinity of fantastical proportions." (ibid:228). On the other hand finitude's despair, which is to lack infinitude, is that despairing confinement which causes someone to mire him-/herself "in the wretchedness of finitude, wrapping about him the cloak of the 'everyday' and the distractions of the material realm." (ibid:227). A person existing in this state of despair lacks imagination and is caught up in worldliness; s/he is "one more repetition of this perpetual Einerlei [one-and-the-same]" (Kierkegaard, 1989:63), finding it easier and safer to copy others in all matters. This approach makes life convenient and comfortable for the individual, and is naturally enough in no ways regarded as despair. (ibid:64). This is cowardice or weakness that leaves no outward marks of damage, but imperils the emergence of 'spirit'. In order to balance the infinite and finite, the subject must become inwardly infinite, which means it must become acquainted with the eternal. The true existential infinity is this inward infinity. (Pappin, 1982:228). It is only the religious individual who finds infinity within him-/herself. A poet or a mystic for example finds the infinity outside, and consequently they abhor the world, all earthly things, trying to be rid of them. When infinity is focused 'inside' it is not necessary to abhor the world or try to escape from it. This inwardness means possessing oneself in clarity as a being before God, and becoming that synthesis of infinite and finite that is a human being. (Pappin, 1982:228).
2.2.2.1.2 Possibility/ necessity.
A different way of articulating the opposition finitude/infinity, is through referring to possibility and necessity. Necessity is the constraining factor in relation to possibility, and without it the self keeps 'running away from itself' in flights of fancy through the imagination. This is a static state since the self doesn't 'go anywhere'. It is, so to speak, running to stand still, because necessity, that which one is at this moment, provides the solid footing from which the self launches itself into the future. Possibility engulfs and overwhelms the individual, who places emphasis on that pole, in that "more and more becomes possible because nothing becomes actual... Just when one thing seems possible, some new possibility arises, and finally these phantasms succeed one another with such speed that it seems as though everything were possible, and that is the very moment the individual himself has become nothing more than an atmospheric illusion."35 (Kierkegaard,1989:66). The two specific forms of this type of dread are wishfulness and melancholia; in both cases one is led away from oneself either in optimism or pessimism.

The pendulum can also swing all the way to the other side where necessity’s despair is to lack possibility. In the utmost extremity of human existence one finds unmerciful necessity, typically in a situation such as imprisonment or illness where the realm of possibility is cruelly fore-shortened. In a case such as this it is rather obvious from whence despair comes. Then only faith can lessen the despair because that is the key to the realm of possibility, since, says Anti-Climacus, for God everything is possible, even the absurd. In fact, "Anti-Climacus does not characterize God as a person-like something with supernatural attributes. He writes that God is 'that all things are possible'." (Mooney,1992:349). An unbeliever merely hopes that the type of event that will prove their undoing, something s/he could not bear, like torture for example, shall never happen, and when it does, it is their undoing. The despair that lacks possibility is exhibited for example in determinism or fatalism.36 A person of faith on the other hand cannot be undone in any dire straits, argues Anti-Climacus, since s/he leaves the eventual outcome of all things to God.

That brings us to the discussion of faith that is found in Fear and Trembling.

2.3 FEAR AND TREMBLING
The intensification of despair is linked to an intensification of consciousness, argues Verstrynge (1997:435). The analysis of consciousness is structurally bound to the
development of the different forms of despair analyzed above, since the structure of the self and its aberrations is to all appearances equal to the different manifestations of despair. It seems that the agitation of despair is incrementally parallel to the intensity and clarity of consciousness.\(^{37}\) The greater the awareness, the more despair, the more spirit, the more self. Fear, as the final stage before faith, represents the point of most heightened attentiveness and distress. It is unsurprising that at this juncture the individual should feel the burden of freedom at its heaviest, since s/he is faced with the ultimate choice, for or against Christ, whose way according to Kierkegaard is the complete contrary of the directly human. (Rumble, 1994:24). The call to follow Christ entails suffering, as had been suggested by many before Kierkegaard. Faith and the absurd go hand in hand, and so the attitude of faith requires such an extreme departure from common sense that it cannot occur except in an atmosphere of fear and trembling. There are no gradations possible, no piecemeal step-by-step coming to Christ, for the abyss between man and God is too wide. The leap is a radical conversion.

2.3.1 RESIGNATION AND FAITH.  
The father of faith is Abraham, because his faith was tested in a most drastic way when God commanded him to sacrifice his son Isaac. Why does Kierkegaard choose this story to explain what he means by the concept faith? An analysis of Abraham's sacrifice in terms of resignation and of faith must be made to answer this question. Faith is not synonymous with an unexamined presupposition, but is rather something arrived at with difficulty.\(^{38}\) Kierkegaard (1941b:36) holds that faith is something hard enough to get to, let alone go further than. Hegelians saw in religious faith only one type of expression of Absolute Mind (others being for example aesthetics and philosophy) – it was for them a mere stepping stone on the way to perfect understanding. What Kierkegaard wishes to illustrate is that faith begins where thinking and understanding leave off. To make it a stepping stone on the way to reason is to misunderstand what faith is and to put the cart before the horse. It is not a childish attitude to be overcome because it does not imply credulity or gullibility, which are facile and unexamined.

Before faith, there must be resignation, which is more common. Johannes de Silentio (John the Silent, the pseudonymous author of *Fear and Trembling*) introduces the knight of infinite resignation in the story of a swain-herd who falls in love with a
princess. Clearly a life with her is impossible, but although the young man accepts this, he does not relinquish his love, which becomes an eternal principle. He is the knight of infinite resignation because he is willing to make a spiritual movement that renounces all that makes life beautiful and meaningful without thereby also renouncing his desire for it, and so his love acquires a religious character. (Kierkegaard, 1941b:72). The movement of resignation is directed inward, towards the spiritual and the infinite, because radically different from the 'world' and its form of 'common sense'. 'Spirituality' here means giving up the temporal (but this is not yet Kierkegaard's spirituality).

This impossible love is something that "the knight nevertheless makes possible by his expressing it spiritually, but he expresses it spiritually by renouncing it. The desire which would convey him out into reality, but came to grief on an impossibility, now bends inwards, but is not thereby lost nor forgotten." (ibid:73). If the movement of resignation is made properly there is peace and consolation despite the pain of desiring the impossible. The movement of resignation corresponds to that relinquishing of the world that many people associate with faith. They assume that faith is required in order to leave behind the world. But resignation is prior to faith, if not in time, then in degree, and is a philosophical rather than a spiritual movement. "Infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, so that anyone who does not make the movement does not have faith; for only in infinite resignation does my eternal validity become transparent to me, and only then can there be talk of grasping existence on the strength of faith." (ibid:75) The reason why resignation is prior is that the individual must first understand that what is desired is absurd/impossible, incommensurable with reality, and absolutely unobtainable.

Faith understands the above, but nevertheless is certain that what it desires will come to it. What would have been relinquished is returned on the strength of the absurd, because what is humanly impossible is divinely possible. The knight of faith, Abraham, was convinced that even though he should sacrifice his son, Isaac would be restored. This is the double movement of faith39 and the type of religiousness described as religiousness B in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. If anyone proclaims to have faith, but does not recognize that their faith is absurd, it would not be faith, because they had not even come so far as infinite resignation. Resignation does not require faith; it is a purely philosophical movement. Faith, because it is preposterous and believes in something patently impossible, is ridden with fear and
trembling, something that Kierkegaard is at great pains to illustrate in the story of Abraham: "Should one perhaps not dare to speak about Abraham? I think one should. If I myself were to talk about him I would first depict the pain of the trail. For that I would suck all the fear, distress and torment out of the father's suffering, like a leech, in order to be able to describe all that Abraham suffered while still believing." (Kierkegaard, 1941b:81). Whereas resignation can bring consolation even in the midst of dreamy melancholy, faith is wide-awake because of the terrifying absurdity of its ground. This is the first reason for the 'fear' of faith.

2.3.2 THE TELEOLOGICAL SUSPENSION OF THE ETHICAL.

The second source of Abraham's suffering is that his act of faith is a breach of the ethical. Religiously speaking Abraham's intended act is sacrifice, ethically speaking it is murder. His fear stems from doubt as to whether the voice telling him to kill his son is that of God or of a demon or his own dementia. What De Silentio implies here, and what Kierkegaard later works out more fully, is an alternative principle of morality, which does not rely on the rule that what is ethical must be universal, as for example Kant's categorical imperative does. Abraham believes himself to be acting in accordance with a superior moral principle that overrides the ethical defined as the universal. "Abraham wants to show that the goals can be re-established on the principle that the particular individual is 'higher' than the universal." (Kierkegaard, 1941b:27-28).

In Abraham's case there was no-one who could understand or sympathize with him, because no-one would benefit from the deed. He acts on the strength of the absurd, and it is indeed absurd to think that a single individual is higher than the universal. This is a paradox that cannot be mediated, that is, apprehended by reason. As soon as Abraham would start to reason, he will have to admit that he is in a state of temptation, and in that case he would never obey God and sacrifice Isaac. But on the strength of the absurd he gets Isaac back. "Abraham is therefore at no instant the tragic hero, but something quite different, either a murderer or a man of faith." (ibid:85).

The universal is in this new account of De Silentio's no longer the category in which humanity is established, but the expression of a humanity pre-established. (Hannay, 1941b in FT:30-31). The universal must be established in the individual prior to (ethical) relations with society; this is a view diametrically opposed to Hegel's
conception of individuality. The universal is formed in the individual through faith, and as such it is no easy matter. On the contrary the path goes through a hell of dread and despair before coming to the point of faith, in which the individual finally stands in the correct relationship to God, transparently rooted in the power that constitutes him. And so there is an absolute duty to obey God that overrides all social convention. But, and this is an important point, after being raised up to the religious stage, there is a return to the ethical, which will now be founded on a proper principle, which can be broadly understood as personal responsibility. The goals praised by the universalist can be “re-established as praiseworthy on a principle that is the diametrical opposite of that on which the universalist praises them.” (Kierkegaard, 1941b:27). This principle is that of concrete particularity as opposed to abstract universality.

The entire description of resignation together with faith, the belief that that which you surrender will be handed back to you on the proper basis, is nothing but an extended analogy for what must occur within the individual on his/ her way to authenticity. It is the socially bound, passive self which must be sacrificed in order that the Self (Spirit, of which the source is God) might be given back on the proper basis.

Reaching the point of faith, and making the leap, is the first step to healing, but is a step that is not made once and for all. It must be renewed all the time, for the absurdity underlying the individual’s incarnate, concrete existence, does not diminish. This practice in faith leads to the growth and increase of spirit, and the practical implication is that the individual begins to live more consciously, more actively, intensifying inwardness, maintaining and managing the tension that is its inner dynamic. In this way ‘self’ becomes a verb, a conscious relating of the polarities that are its matrix. This is what the long-term cure implies, and what is described more fully in the section that follows.
3. THE CURE: THE SELF BEFORE GOD

In Kierkegaard’s thought, the cure to the malady of humankind, described above, is enmeshed in the very meaning of existence. It has to do with a task that lies before each individual as both a duty and a privilege: it is the task of making existence an art, and of the individual an artisan skilled enough in his craft to live a life that is worthwhile. The task of existing is nothing less than the task of becoming a self. Sagi (1991:473) describes the art and task of existence as outlined in The Sickness Unto Death as the “goal of attaining a synthesis between the dichotomic ontological elements which constitute it”.

Throughout Kierkegaard’s most important works the ontology/ontologies (see footnote 9) he describes, exhibit(s) the following three features:
- The self is not being but becoming.
- In view of the previous point, the self is perceived as a synthesis/relation between different or even contradictory elements and man’s existential task is to balance and harmonize these elements.
- The structure of the self is trichotomous rather than dual: that means that the self is shaped not merely by the balance between, say, two conflicting forces, but by actively relating to all its various components.

In the previous section some of these dichotomous elements have already been introduced, but there is yet a way to go to grasping the nature and significance of the synthesis that is the self, especially in the aspect/expression of the synthesis that refers to time and eternity, as realized in the instant or moment. This whole discussion of synthesis must be seen together with Kierkegaard’s understanding of the nature of ‘spirit’, and accordingly that is where we shall start.

3.1 THE NATURE OF SPIRIT.
The concept spirit is such an important one in Kierkegaard’s thought that it can without doubt be said to be the axial point around which his work turns. According to Kierkegaard’s own description, it passes understanding. It must be experienced and cannot be explained, as its paradoxical nature is inaccessible to reason. The only way to experience it is by faith, and the only way to get to faith is to first go through despair. Concerning the relation between spirit, faith and the self a comparison to
Hegel must again be made, because in the context in which Kierkegaard wrote, Spirit was a familiar and fairly well-defined term. In Hegelian philosophy Absolute Spirit represents an ideal of reconciliation between two at first apparently incongruent concepts, which can be conceived of as 'subjectivity' and 'substantiality', which for Hegel occurs in the inward and outward manifestations of human reason. Kierkegaard of course rejects this view but keeps its ideal of reconciliation, although this must be indefinitely deferred. The congruence of subjectivity and substantiality consists, however, for Kierkegaard, in 'reposing freely in God.' The subject becomes substantial, that is 'concrete' by accepting, through faith, a master-plan or template of itself, grounded in the Power that posited it. "The spiritual self, for Kierkegaard, is the self that acknowledges for itself an ideal of reconciliation between incongruent terms that in immediacy are not yet grasped as incongruent." (Hannay, 1985:265).

Four important features of spirit can be discerned: 1) it has to with a relation that cannot be grasped by reason, 2) spirit is the relation between incongruent and opposite terms that relates to itself; 3) this relation is established through faith, and lastly 4) spirit is only to be found in a concrete individual or 'self'.

3.1.1 SPIRIT CANNOT BE GRASPED BY REASON.

Kierkegaard's work is an exhortation to faith, a description of the nature of faith, and an indirect method of acquainting people with their own hidden despair which is the only path to faith. The subject must first be stripped of all attachments to finitude in order to be placed in such a position as to be ready to receive the truth of Christ's offer of salvation. Kierkegaard works towards preparing the subject to stand in this nakedness, which is in stark contrast to that 'immediacy' where the self fits easily into its milieu by virtue of its passivity and lack of will. This 'self', which is really no self, does not shape itself but merely reacts to the agreeable and the disagreeable. The Self only emerges in an act of discrimination and differentiation, through a breach with immediacy, which is the only source of greater consciousness. (Hannay, 1985:265-266).

In Kierkegaard's work there are only pointers in spirit's direction, or sights along the way to the 'leap of faith'. One cannot 'say' what faith is, because of the distinction between reality and ideality. Ideality or 'mediacy', is associated with language and speech. Reality or 'immediacy' on the other hand, is made up of the particular facts of
the self's existence, and is concrete and temporal. There is a basic contradiction between ideality and reality: existence cannot be known, much less described by language (said), because "knowledge, as such, ignores precisely the concrete particular dimensions and is by nature universal, and the contradiction [that arises when a statement is made about reality] is therefore unavoidable." (Sagi, 1991:475). We shall see later that Jung makes exactly this point: no theoretical knowledge can give insight into the life and problems of an individual, because the individual is always an exception, while theory averages things out to create an abstract idea of humanity, that bears no resemblance to any particular individual on earth.

The more consciousness/despair, the more spirit/self. Kierkegaard describes consciousness as the third term of a trichotomy of the self which relates reality and ideality (the other two terms) to one another and so makes knowledge possible. (Kierkegaard, 1985:169-170). Here the self does not consist in the simple relation(ship) between the two terms: reality and ideality, but in its own relation to the two terms, because the self is not indifferent to the contradiction between the two poles. It expresses self-concern and the will to master the contradiction and establish balance between them. Through 'repetition' a continuous return to the self, a moving between the future and the past, that is - between possibility and facticity - a relation to itself and balance between the poles is established; through repetition the self continually establishes a new relation with itself. (Sagi, 1991:476).

Whatever unity there can thus be between knowledge and existence is only momentary, and must be acquired through effort, and thus it is more a transcendent goal of life than a description of a realizable or sustainable state. The unity cannot be achieved through or equated with reason, as was the case with Hegel, for whom subject and substance were both taken up into the Absolute. Reason is on the side of mediacy, of language, and cannot be the principle that unites the opposites, since it is itself one of the poles. That spirit is unsayable means that neither reality, nor the difficult attempt to reconcile reality and ideality can be articulated without contradiction.
3.1.2 SPIRIT IS A RELATION THAT RELATES TO ITSELF.

The opening passage of *The Sickness Unto Death* details the self as a reflexive relation.

"The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation which is relating to itself...In a relationship between two things the relation is the third term in the form of a negative unity, and the two relate to the relation, and in the relation to that relation; this is what it is from the point of view of soul for soul and body to be in relation. If on the other hand, the relation relates to itself, then this relation is the positive third, and this is the self." (Kierkegaard, 1989:43).

Although the synthesis that is the self is expressed in many different ways (also including ideality/ reality discussed for example above), all the elements can be grouped into two opposing poles: one limiting the self and the other expanding the self. Finitity, temporality, and necessity limit the self and show that rather than being an abstract entity, the self is already determined by given facts, such as for example gender, physical abilities, language, family and cultural history. On the other hand infinity, eternity and possibility represent the expansion of the self, which (especially in the case of infinity) is made possible through the imagination. (Sagi, 1991:481).

Spirit must not be equated *prima facie* with merely one of the terms of the synthesis, for example with the expanding factor, also, it is not merely the synthesis between the two poles that constitutes the self, but rather the relation between them that relates to itself. Seeing the self merely as a synthesis would mean it has a dichotomous structure, but because it is a self-relating synthesis it has a trichotomous structure.

3.1.2.1 Positive and negative unity.

Between the terms of any synthesis there will always be unity, but what type of unity it is depends on whether the connection/relation between them is active or passive. A 'negative unity' actually refers to two poles being connected without being really being related, in which case there is no self.

Opposed to this is a 'positive unity' where the two poles are related - where 'related' is a verb, and the self is that which does the work of relating. Sartre incidentally also sees the self as the attempt to integrate two opposing realms, the for-itself and the in-itself, rather than identifying it with one or another type of being. For both existentialists then, the self is a like a verb, rather than a noun.
Hannay argues that one can distinguish a negative from a positive unity thus: a negative unity is latent, forming merely the path along which the two terms interact with each other, while a positive one exists where the unity is actively supervised by the relation. From this it must already be clear that a human being unconscious of self and spirit (without self) is nothing but a negative unity between its opposing elements, while a true self is a positive unity, a being that consciously balances the different extremes of its personality. The negative unity stands for the diseased state and the positive unity for the healthy.\textsuperscript{44}

3.1.3 SPIRIT IS GROUNDED IN GOD THROUGH FAITH.

The relation that relates itself to itself does not constitute itself but is constituted by another, that is, by God. Does this not contradict the self's active nature and its freedom? No, for the self must rest with God, and God must be the one that supervises the relation, because the relation or the synthesis between the incongruent terms is impossible, or at least does not belong to the repertoire of human possibilities.\textsuperscript{45} The fact that there is Another that constitutes the relation, explains the self's desire to rather constitute itself in a less demanding and more comfortable (though despairing) fashion: that is the despair of defiance, and this despair then, so to speak, 'proves' God. It shows that the self cannot of itself attain and remain in equilibrium.

To be a self, a spirit, requires the individual to have a concept of God and Christ, and the more 'concept' of God/Christ, the more self.

"A self directly before Christ is a self intensified through the stupendous concession God has made, intensified by the stupendous accent that falls on this self because, also for its sake, God let himself be born, became man, suffered and died. As it was stated above, the more conception of God, the more self, so here it is: the more conception of Christ, the more self. Qualitatively, a self is what it has as its standard of measurement. That Christ is the standard, is the expression, attested by God, of what stupendous reality a self has. For only in Christ is it true that God is man's goal and standard, or standard and goal." (my emphasis, Kierkegaard,1989:147).

Greater despair brings greater consciousness; greater consciousness brings greater conception of the idea of God. As the degree of clarity of the concept God intensifies with consciousness, it becomes the standard against which the self is measured (Verstrynge,1997:451). This compares in an interesting way with Jung's insistence
that a concept and relation to a/the deity, is necessary for successful individuation. Jung counseled his patients to form a conception of God for themselves and find a way to relate to that conception personally. Of course the difference between Jung and Kierkegaard, as will later be pointed out again, is that Kierkegaard seems to imply that one comes into relationship with a metaphysical reality that is God, whereas Jung shies away from metaphysics, and says that the deity is a psychological reality.

3.1.4 SPIRIT IS ONLY FOUND IN A CONCRETE INDIVIDUAL.

The concept 'spirit', for Kierkegaard, only makes sense if used with reference to a particular, concrete individual. Existential possibilities shape and mould the self in its factual, empirical existence, and this process takes place in two stages: Firstly, through the imagination, the self moves away from itself, transcending its facticity and opening existential possibilities; secondly, the self selects from a number of possibilities the one most suitable to its factual existence, and so moves back to itself. Only when the entire process is complete the self becomes concrete. (Sagi, 1991:481). Because there are always various existential possibilities open, the self cannot be transparent to itself, a point which is emphasized by Sartre as well. The self is always unfinished. Spirituality is therefore not, as one might expect, some insubstantial otherworldly concern, nor is it the all-encompassing Absolute Spirit of Hegel's thought. The issue of concreteness versus abstraction is, as we have repeatedly seen, an important theme in existentialism which will be carried forward to the likes of Sartre.46

In conclusion it can be said that the self or spirit is nothing but a fact about the relation or synthesis that constitutes a person; it follows that it is not a disembodied intelligence directing history. Nevertheless spirit can be said to derive from, and be constituted by, a 'higher Power, because the reconciliation between the opposing factions of the self can only be effected by faith, and by the relation to an extra-mundane source of meaning. There is something about reasoning that merely continues and aggravates the conflict, or else, as in Hegel, resolves the conflict by reference to abstract, universal categories.

Consequently belief in God is not a pre-constituted assumption of a 'highest good', but rather the remedy to this assumption: with consciousness' increasing transparency, the absurdity of the assumption and its difficulties become increasingly evident. Only a human individual who can, despite the difficulties, still refer to that Power is in a
position to establish and maintain the unity/harmony/equilibrium/rest, the absence of which is despair, and the presence of which is spirit. (Hannay, 1982:192-193).

The aspects of spirit introduced above find their clearest expression in the synthesis between time and eternity, which will be discussed next.

3.2 THE SELF AS SYNTHESIS
3.2.1 INCARNATION IN THE INSTANT.

Time is the 'opposite' of eternity because time consists of past, present and future, whereas eternity knows no such stages. Kierkegaard describes the instant or moment as a 'synthesis' of time and eternity. The paradoxical nature of the instant makes it eminently usable to illustrate the incarnation of God as a human being in the person of Christ, the Absolute Paradox, whose arrival on earth occurred in, and marked, the 'fullness of time'. Kierkegaard is convinced that this is the pivotal concept in Christianity, and that the 'fullness of time' actually refers to the eternal which exists 'in the moment'. (Dupre, 1985:124).

A spiritless person such as the aesthete for example, lives immediately, lives 'for the moment', or more precisely, for pleasurable moments. That he lives for the moment does not mean however that he lives in the moment. It is precisely in the instant or in the moment that the spiritless person fails to live. To understand why this is so we must bring the discussion about time, and the discussion about anxiety, together. Temporal awareness is an important aspect of anxiety: if anxiety is the fear of the future and the pointless rehashing of the past, then the spiritless person's whole being is therefore obsessed with temporality.

A person who is on the other hand fully a self, a spirit, is not obsessed by time, because s/he has become, in a real sense, eternal. Such a person, according to Kierkegaard, lives absorbed in today, in the moment, completely unaware of the next day and its possible problems. Paradoxically, this means that faith 'turns its back to the eternal' in order precisely to live in it today. If someone turns with earthly passion towards the future, s/he is farthest from the eternal. (Dupre, 1985:126). Greater dread and despair brings/implies greater consciousness both of time and of eternity. There are in point of fact two ways that an individual becomes aware of time and the 'eternal' in himself: The first is through anxiety, the second through a disillusionment
about the kind of goals belonging to a life of immediacy, which goes hand in hand with the experience of loss.

Anxiety brings greater consciousness of *time* because it intensifies the fearful anticipation of an uncertain future. Greater self-reflection in the individual increasingly leads on the other hand to greater awareness of *eternity*. How this happens, can be explained by how self-reflection shows that it impossible it is to grasp one's own end/finitude. Trying to imagine one's own end is like the Kantian thought-experiment of trying to imagine no space or no time: it cannot be done. One is incapable of imagining finitude at either end of the spectrum of life, birth nor death. In other words every individual is pre-reflectively convinced of personal permanence, despite all reasonable indications to the contrary. This permanence is not sensed as an intuition of the present, but exists because of recollection of the past and anticipation of the future. The self lacks real awareness of its *existence* in the present: "... [A]ll time-consciousness implies a notion of permanence. But unless it is interpreted as an intersection of time by eternity, this permanent element tends to be repelled to the past or propelled into the future." (Dupre, 1085:124). In dread, the spiritless person is continually living in this temporal recollection/anticipation.

The knight of faith, on the other hand, lives as if the future and the past, tomorrow and yesterday, do not exist. And in fact s/he is not wrong to do so because the future and the past *do not* exist, ontologically speaking: they are only figments and aspects of the mind. The present is the only ontologically 'real' category of time. The present is nothing else but the instant or the moment. Understanding of the nature of the instant abolishes the illusion of time. What is left when time is abolished, is time's opposite: eternity. But eternity can only manifest in time.

Reasoning over this paradox however, will only spiral downward into senselessness, because it is not meant to be an intellectual exercise: one is meant to *live* the moment, mindless of future or past, not try to *understand* the moment. Without faith, implies Kierkegaard, this is an impossible task.
3.2.2 GAINING THE ETERNAL THROUGH FAITH.

The first movement of faith is resignation. This entails abandoning a project or goal whose realization had previously justified the individual's existence. This has the effect of stripping the individual naked before existence. It stands in contrast to the 'clothed' self of immediacy that attaches to fleeting pleasures and aesthetic gratification. This is the first step to self-realization because it makes the individual recognize that the self is different from the environment. Selfhood begins with the discernment of a deficiency in the type of goals belonging to the life of immediacy, since they are temporal and not eternal. Hannay (1985:266) adds that "[a]ccording to certain passages in Kierkegaard, one 'gains' the eternal in the experience of temporal loss. Losing what you have set your heart on, but being able to say the loss is 'merely' temporal, means you have 'gained the eternal', and placed yourself outside the range of temporal defeats, good and bad fortune, fate. It is interesting to compare this to Jung's idea that a person who has established a line of communication and connection to the unconscious, is placed outside the reach of the type of defeats and disillusionments that afflict everyone and cripple some. Establishing this connection to the unconscious, which in Jung's thought is also the home of the 'eternal' because it houses the timeless archetypes, is the very goal of Jungian therapy.

The step Kierkegaard calls 'resignation' involves a transference of the wish one had for oneself in the world of time, to a wish one has for the Eternal Being. One is thereby compensated for the loss, though really 'more than compensated', as Kierkegaard says, just because you have now 'gained the eternal'. "The eternal is thus to a great extent negatively conceived in Kierkegaard, and is the impulse behind the move to finally accept the actual Self with all its difficulties and advantages. (Hannay,1985:269). The eternal is appropriated through concrete existence in the present, which is actually the synthesis of time and eternity.

The synthesis of time and the eternal is the expression for the synthesis of soul (psyche) and body, and of all the other syntheses, also between finitude and infinity, and possibility and necessity. There is in fact only this one synthesis of which all the others are mere aspects, or "subordinate stages that do not receive their definitive meaning until the synthesis of the eternal and the temporal has been posited." (Dupre,1985:116). The synthesis is not absolute however. Kierkegaard's dialectic is somewhat lopsided and open-ended, and shows yet again where he diverges from Hegel. Whereas Hegel is an idealist that dissolves the real (material) into the ideal.
(spirit), Kierkegaard insists on a permanent dialectical opposition between the polarities. The final apprehension of self/spirit is indefinitely deferred. The movement of faith that resigns the temporal in favor of the infinite (eternal) must be balanced by a concern for the finite, or else the self is lost in mystification. This is shown by the fact that Abraham believed, but believed for this life. Kierkegaard's dialectic returns the individual to the particular, back from the religious to the ethical, which will then be based on the correct principle: particularity, not universality. The particular stands higher than the universal for it is (in a sense) the universal, just as eternity stands higher than time for it is (in a sense) time. Eternity is the ground against which time must emerge: there is no time without eternity. Similarly God is the ground against which the self must emerge, since God becomes the symbol for possibility, eternity, infinity, and the universal, against which the self - the concrete, finite particular, bound by time - can be realized. But talk about God does not make sense divorced from talk about the individual, since God cannot be apprehended by a mass of people or a 'church' and its dogma. The truth about God is subjectively apprehended in passion, and is not an objective truth to be proven or reasoned out. Without God there is no self, because God is that all things (even the self) are possible. God is the Author of the individual's freedom, which the individual is called upon to recognize and use to choose the truth of Christianity, reversing the qualitative leap that had plunged Adam into anxiety and despair.
4. CRITICAL EVALUATION.

An evaluation of Kierkegaard's specific recipe for authenticity, in comparison to those the other two thinkers put forward, will be left aside until chapter five. For now we can have a look at what has been made of Kierkegaard's work as a whole. Since the self stands centrally to his thought, these well-known critiques are actually already directed against his notion of self, even if only indirectly.

Kierkegaard's contribution to debates within contemporary philosophy is beyond dispute. Not only Sartre and the existentialists, but also figures such as Heidegger and Derrida drew inspiration from his thought. Derrida's aporia's bear a reasonable resemblance to Kierkegaard's paradoxes, and his thinking about the leap over the abyss of undecidability can credibly be compared to Kierkegaard's own 'leap'. (Goicoechea,1999:211). Nevertheless, Kierkegaard's philosophy has also fallen under heavy critique, which must be answered to. Instances of criticism can be divided into two main categories: against his defense of irrationalism (faith, or the absurd), and secondly against his uncompromising defense of Christianity.

3.1 IRRATIONALISM?

Kierkegaard is regarded by many as a writer of uncommon skill and as master stylist. Few have objections against counting him as a literary artist or religious thinker. But many feel he is not a philosopher at all, at least as the term is commonly used. His work, taken as a whole, is indirect and not systematic; there is no central thesis defended through reasoned argumentation, and often one finds beautiful and moving passages that appeal to emotion and not to sense. Furthermore, his work is fragmented into many voices that speak against one another. For these reasons Hannay says that "compared with a Hume, a Kant, or even a Hegel, Kierkegaard may seem too volatile and prolix, even too passionate and ironic, a writer to be counted in the same company." (Hannay,1982:8-9). If one leaves aside questions as to the style and method of his writing, and analyzes the contents, one might feel inclined to agree with those who find him a vague and perplexing thinker who resorts to paradox and the absurd to camouflage the deficiencies in his theory. These critics argue that his work
is too obscure to follow, too given to abstraction (despite his own insistence on the category of the concrete individual as primary).

In his own defense, Kierkegaard on more than one occasion, in anticipation of these types of criticism, described his pseudonymous style as indirect and ironic. Not everyone is convinced that this objection is valid, and give other reasons for his pseudonymous authorship: "Kierkegaard wrote much. His style was humorous, vivacious and often highly poetical, although marred by the acute self-consciousness which led him also constantly to hide behind pseudonyms, and to write long and tedious polemics (often against himself)." (Scruton, 1981:186-187). Implicit in this criticism is the idea that Kierkegaard's entire body of work was the effort of a deeply neurotic though gifted man to understand and come to terms with himself, mistakenly understood by later generations to be a form of philosophy. But by making this criticism Scruton in effect commits precisely that potentially disastrous interpretative error that Kierkegaard himself warns against, namely to "ascribe the polemical stance of the pseudonym unqualifiedly to Kierkegaard himself". Kierkegaard places himself equally far from all his pseudonymous characters (Aiken,1993:21) and wrote an entire work, *The Point of View for my Work as an Author* to serve as guide to the interpretation of his authorship.

Regarding the critique against his pseudonymous authorship the following must be noted: if seen as a whole it becomes apparent that the pseudonymous writings present an elaborate and credible typology of human character: Kierkegaard developed, perhaps initially as a species of thought-experiment "several mutually incompatible but internally consistent world- and life-views from their initial assumptions to their logical conclusions. By demonstrating that these characteristic forms of thought and existence are insufficient to sustain the effort of attaining inward integrity, Kierkegaard was not merely performing a pragmatic reductio ad absurdum; rather he was devising a protocol for the diagnosis of human corruption." (Aiken,1993:34). In light of the fact that this entire study is based on an exploration of the self and its forms of self-deceit and in-authenticity, this is a particularly important comment, and ties in with the conclusion that will be reached finally, namely that any form of excess or exclusivity in the development of the personality, a development in one direction at the cost of others, a one-dimensional self, is no Self, but precisely the very disease of the self.
But this still leaves open the question of whether Kierkegaard was in fact busy with philosophy, and not merely instructive literature or lay-psychology. In this vein Scruton (1981:186) claims for example that Kierkegaard's philosophy is an 'irrationalism' which by its very nature is philosophically indefensible, since it undermines the essential tools of philosophy, which are rational and systematic arguments that may in turn be evaluated by other philosophers.

Kierkegaard's whole point seems to be that something which is indefensible (reasonably) must be accepted on faith. Is the unquestioning acceptance of ideas the proper province of philosophy? The concept of spirit, which is in the end the most important one of Kierkegaard's thought, is to him an irreducibly religious concept, and because of that "Kierkegaard's may seem an even more primitive, outmoded and 'mystifying' approach than Hegel's." (Hannay,1982:314). For Kierkegaard the truth about Christ and the eternal, and the reality of spirit, cannot be proven, and cannot be 'transferred'/communicated to another, for example by using the method of reasoning whereby the correct manipulation of a series of premises compels one to accept a specific conclusion. Each must choose the truth about his own eternal spirit. The problem is in other words that whereas philosophy deals with the laws of thought, Kierkegaard's 'subject' or 'Self before God' is on his own account inaccessible to the laws of thought. From this flows the further criticism that Kierkegaard's work is self-defeating. For although Kierkegaard claims that truth cannot be talked about, that does not appear to deter him: "Like almost every philosopher who has located his subject in the unsayable, Kierkegaard goes on to say a great deal about it." (Scruton,1981:188).

In light of the above two comments must be made: in the first instance it must be kept in mind that Kierkegaard's entire output served in the first instance as corrective to speculative Hegelianism. He convincingly illustrated the radical incompatibility of that system and Christian practice. It also constitutes a corrective in the sense of providing an alternative to, and critique of, the central tenets of idealism52, and thus contributed to ushering in a new age. Kierkegaard was one of the first voices of postmodernism53, in that the "undermining of the would-be autonomous subject is the overriding concern of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship." (Rumble,1994:22). This corrective would not have been needed had Hegel not appointed himself and philosophy as the final arbitrator between Athens and Jerusalem; the Danish Hegelians under whom Kierkegaard studied theology regarded Hegel's System as the
only bulwark against the religious skepticism of the early Enlightenment. (Aiken, 1993:33). Kierkegaard showed how they failed miserably: religious doctrine is not meant to be understood and then obeyed, but through obedience, through living the Christian life, to be appropriated subjectively, and in this manner understood. Even the most simple-minded can understand a command like 'turn the other cheek'. What Kierkegaard is in effect saying is that the attempt to grasp Christian doctrine intellectually, arises from an unwillingness to commit to religious truths, an unwillingness to sacrifice self-interest in the manner prescribed in the gospels, and comes down to nothing but yet another form of self-deceit, all the more odious for being shrouded in intellectual pride: "Thus the cardinal sin of the intellect does not primarily consist in the adoption of the theoretical attitude as such - though this attitude is indeed problematic for Kierkegaard - but rather in the self-deceiving attempt to employ the methods of scholarly enquiry to postpone religious commitment, dethrone legitimate cognitive authority, and, above all, to preserve the autonomy of judgement." (Aiken, 1993:32).

Kierkegaard's work must therefore in the first instance be seen against the background from which it arose, and understood with reference to the soil that gave birth to it. It was an attempt to save Christianity from the fate that its well meaning Hegelian 'saviors' had meant to subject it to, which would have resulted (and indeed did result in many quarters) in ever-increasing skepticism regarding its claims. For the attempt to interpret biblical texts instead of obeying them, or to prove religious truths by means of historical evidence, simply gives rise to a "bewildering host of ambiguities and qualifications" (Aiken, 1993:31). Kierkegaard restored Christianity to its proper province, namely faith, and precisely a risky and difficult type of faith.

On this point a slightly more ominous criticism might be the following: if truth is subjectivity, a deeply held and passionately felt conviction, what criterion remains by which to judge the nature and influence of these beliefs? Is any belief as good as another? What about harmful beliefs? What if someone passionately held the conviction that the Aryan race is superior and all other races must be eradicated from the face of the earth? There seems to be no check left if the ethical as universality is teleologically suspended, and every individual left to go their own way and follow their own idea of right and wrong. Ussher mentions that a lot of what is dubious within existentialism found its root in Kierkegaard's teleological suspension of the ethical:
"It is obvious that it [existentialism] is a dangerous philosophy: taken 'neat', it can end in something like the 'gratuitous crime' of Gide - the state of mind of a man who throws a bomb, or of the child who commits an indecency, just to see what will happen, to show that he is not afraid... This raises the question, which cannot be passed over, whether Existentialism is radically evil in its nature; for the deification of the Will, like that of the Void, has always something Satanic. This will scarcely be urged in the case of Kierkegaard, who has inspired in some quarters almost a revival of primitive Christianity; nevertheless, Kierkegaard's doctrine of a 'suspension of the Ethical' held the germ of all that is dubious in Existentialism today." (Ussher,1955:11-12).

The above comment focuses on the sensationalistic uses to which existentialism has in the past been put, no doubt by those who have failed to scrutinize existential theory. At first glance it might seem true that on suspension of the ethical there will be no criterion against which to measure what is right and wrong. It is all very well to praise Abraham as the knight of faith who set out to murder his son on God's command; he believed God would give him his son back, and according to the story it happened so. But in contemporary times there are also people who claim to hear the voice of God, and it tells them to do all types of strange things that include war, murder and mass suicide. These individuals also believed that since they were suspending the ethical in favor of a greater Demand, all would turn out well. But not all intended sacrifices are apparently stopped by God at the last moment.

I think this question may be dealt with by again clarifying Kierkegaard's use of the word faith. What many would claim as faith he would not allow to go by that name. Firstly no-one has faith who is not wracked by doubt, which I think takes care of the examples of Aryan or religious zealots. Faith by no means equals conviction. Faith is a rather a type of crucifixion between the demands of the heart and the intellect; it is a passionately held inward belief in something that the intellect knows without doubt is impossible. A person must choose 'him-/herself' in relation to something absolute and eternal.

"[T]he object of supreme choice is in the nature of things ideal, uncertainly real; and the more uncertain its reality is the more passionately must the man hold on to it in subjective inwardness, not in blind affirmation but, on the contrary, with unrelieved recognition of its objective uncertainty - in the case of the Incarnation, of its intellectual absurdity. Kierkegaard's incisiveness and despair exhibit to full view the scandalous peril of his position. Millions occupy the same position [of
Christianity] in comfort by leaving the recognition of objective uncertainty on taking a resolution of belief. Such common subjectivism Kierkegaard regarded as the extinction of belief. To depend for one's life upon the object of a supreme choice and to lay hold of it with one hand and with the other to hold onto its objective uncertainty and to hang suspended between the two, that is the meaning of faith; hanging upon them seems to pull them closer together, but that is an illusion that comes of 'beginning to lose one's hold; grasping them with a firmer grip jerks them violently apart and starts the fierce pain of being torn asunder and the sharp temptation to relinquish one and swing free: that is the subjective inwardness of faith." (Blackham, 1952:18-19).

From the above it is clear that the person who claims to be suspending the ethical in favor of some 'higher goal' must be sure to be willing to suffer the torments of the damned and certainly there are few that willingly set out on this road.

There remains one aspect of the critique that Kierkegaard's work is 'irrational, vague and obscure' that must yet be pursued. It concerns the fact that the very notion of truth seems to be so completely bent out of shape in Kierkegaard's body of work as to not be recognizable anymore: "As a literary idea, and as an invitation to exalt the individual to a position of eminence that he had never achieved before, this [truth as subjectivity] is fairly comprehensible. But as a philosophical doctrine it has the obvious weakness that the distinction between appearance and reality disappears. For truth, the concept in terms of which that distinction has ultimately to be made, has been absorbed into the realm of appearance, resulting in the following obscure definition: truth is 'an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness', hence 'the mode of apprehension of the truth is precisely the truth." (Scruton, 1981:190).

Gill (1981) shows in his article Faith Is as Faith Does that the above type of criticism rests on a misinterpretation of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, and that Kierkegaard's interpretation of faith (and therefore his entire body of work, to which faith stands centrally) is as far from being a defense of irrationalism as it is a defense of Hegelian rationalism. Kierkegaard's theory can be classified in neither of these categories, and is by no means simply a support of Tertullian's credo quia absurdum. Instead it is a defense of the concept of truth as 'lived' and of faith not as mental assent (with or without reasons) but rather as something un-analyzable but nevertheless real. This is a point that will be taken up again in the discussion on Jung, namely that faith can be 'real' in that it has an effect on the psyche.
Belief is thus never a matter of mere mental assent, and if irrationalism is taken to be the assent to propositions although there are no reasons for it, Kierkegaard is not guilty of irrationalism at all. He uses the voice of De Silentio in order to provide a dialectical corrective, an extreme taken to the other end, to the prevailing atmosphere that took faith to be the mental assent to a proposition because constrained to do so by logic. Thus he also is not guilty of speaking about what cannot be spoken of, since he only obliquely implies it through his entire body of work, which must be read holistically in order to understand what Kierkegaard was pointing at: something that does show itself when one's head is turned in the right direction (the implicit reference to Wittgenstein is intended), something that cannot be articulated but that does not, for that reason, not exist. And what he does point to is a holistic understanding of faith that integrates reason and the will. (Gill, 1981:205). This conception does not arise directly in the text of Fear and Trembling or any other. Gill contends that Kierkegaard's "holistic, neither-rationalistic-nor-irrationalistic view of faith is only dialectically suggested by the text by means of 'indirect communication'." (Gill, 1981:205).

Kierkegaard's entire body of work is intended to arrange an existential meeting between an individual and him-/herself. It confirms and supports existing presuppositions in one moment and tears them down in the next in order to leave the reader confused, and so it confronts individuals with the undeniable, unmediated, irreducible paradox of their own existence. To accuse Kierkegaard of hiding self-consciously behind his pseudonyms (implying that he really did hold the views expressed in them but had not the courage to say so directly) is to rob "these profoundly creative works of their existential power. They must not be interpreted in such a way as to compromise their force. Rather they must be seen, in light of Kierkegaard's remarks about indirect communication, as authentic presentations of various extreme points of view - and not as balanced or knowingly overstated positions. Kierkegaard's own view must be discerned in and through those of his various pseudonyms, indirectly and dialectically." (Gill, 1981:210).

Where does that leave us on the question of whether what Kierkegaard did could be described as philosophy or not? It has been suggested that Kierkegaard should be called a 'para-philosopher': that is someone whose activities stand beside or beyond philosophy. This category was created to accommodate those writers that say something of importance to philosophy although they themselves fall short of the
standards of academic or professional proficiency required of philosophers. (Hannay, 1982:9). Hannay disagrees with this, and suggests that Kierkegaard should be called a meta-philosopher, but also, because of this position, a philosopher. That is because his work, though primarily directed towards a religious goal, is a criticism and delineation of philosophy, an activity recognized as philosophy in itself: "[W]e are, of course, nowadays well prepared to accept that the view that philosophy is limited is a philosophical view. Unlike paraphilosophy which carries the connotation of a project 'beside' or 'beyond' philosophy, metaphilosophy takes philosophy itself as its province and has just as good a reason to be called philosophy as has, say, philosophy of religion, politics, or whatever." (Hannay, 1982:11-12). That is why, although Kierkegaard's work sets the limits of philosophy, it can also be said to contain philosophy inside those limits.

As such Kierkegaard's work is indeed a coherent and incisive exposure of the pretensions of systematic philosophy, and a prelude to the styles or techniques of phenomenology, existentialism and deconstruction.

4.2 KIERKEGAARD'S DEFENSE OF CHRISTIANITY.

Having said the above, it is now also necessary to move on to Kierkegaard's defense of Christianity, and discover whether this might not be a point on which to find fault. Kierkegaard did in fact work on the assumption that it is correct to be interested in a particular religious doctrine, namely Christianity, and specifically in its doctrine of the incarnation. (Hannay, 1982:10). It is also not certain that his conception of the self makes much sense in a secular context. Hannay, (1985:270) states that Kierkegaard's "concept of the self is rather special and belongs to a tradition that is unlikely to afford insights to students of selfhood used to a new and more secular climate of thought." His philosophy would appear at any rate to many individuals who are neither Christian nor in any sense religious, to have a particularly closed-minded point of departure. Should Kierkegaard not perhaps have been mindful of cultures entirely alien to his own, cultures that know of no doctrine of incarnation and had not heard of the God-man, before applying such universal importance to it?

What will emerge towards the end of this study, is that Jung discovered in many other cultures a conception of the self and its relation to (a) divinity that also expresses the problem in terms of irreconcilable opposites, just as Kierkegaard does. Thus Christianity is only one expression and example (also extensively discussed by Jung), of an underlying
psychical reality which Kierkegaard in fact very accurately and insightfully portrayed. The real problem is that Kierkegaard was not as careful as Jung to distance himself from metaphysical speculation.

So, we can ask, is it really true that someone familiar with these doctrines of Christianity and redemption, who rejects them, is doomed to 'in-authenticity' as Anti-Climacus suggests? It seems to be a very narrow view, and even if Anti-Climacus holds it, and not Kierkegaard, there appears to be not enough of a corrective in other pseudonymous works to claim real indifference on Kierkegaard's part.

This problem is closely related to another line of criticism which concerns his so-called insensitivity to issues of social rather than personal liberation. Adorno argued that Kierkegaard had "actually provided a pseudo-reconciliation of real social contradictions by giving ontological significance only to the spiritualized subject." (Rumble, 1994:20). His entire philosophy advocates inwardness and individuality and is thus to some extent already directed against society and involvement in it. His emphasis on transcending the universal could conceivably be used to justify an indifference towards social issues. Kierkegaard seems not really to take account of the individual's dependence upon society and community. Although the knight of faith is in the end, after completing the double movement of resignation and faith, indistinguishable from a normal upstanding citizen going about his/her business, an alienation from and renunciation (even if only temporary) of society is the sine qua non of Kierkegaard's project of self. Rendering one's duty towards society is not prior but incidental to the project outlined by Kierkegaard. 54

This touches on an important issue: Kierkegaard spoke about human liberation, salvation and authenticity without ever referring to the realities of social life, such as oppression, poverty, exploitation, and the like. This forms the basis of for example Marcuse's critique of Kierkegaard: according to Marcuse human freedom is something that can only be reached when the instruments of social oppression have been removed from human life, because individual freedom presupposes a free society and not the other way around. (Hannay, 1982:316). Adorno 55, who like Marcuse viewed the alienation of the individual as historically conditioned, agrees that Kierkegaard's theory of freedom is still abstraction that has no influence on the realities of social oppression. It extricates the individual from the century and country in which he finds himself, and supposes that freedom has nothing to do with political, social and economic conditions.
Religion is seen by many as just such an instrument of social oppression. Kierkegaard stands in the Hegelian/anti-Hegelian tradition in which Marx also has a say, and as is well known the latter, like Hegel, saw religiosity, which Kierkegaard could be said to advocate, as an infantile form of consciousness. Marx specifically saw in religion a form of oppression justifying suffering here and now by turning the gaze of the oppressed to the next world. He would vehemently disagree with Kierkegaard's point that only in religious faith can a human being reach authenticity. The criticism from the side of Marxism and the Critical School is that the idea of an "infinite Being" such as God "deflects attention away from social life as the necessary locus of human fulfillment, and thus also from an adequate conception of the nature and also the conditions of that fulfillment." (Hannay,1982:315).

On this point I believe Kierkegaard can be defended, because it is uncertain that people will naturally be able to reach authenticity even after the oppressing conditions have changed. Kierkegaard's view of human freedom might be a necessary precondition for all types of social change. This theme will again be taken up in the discussion on Jung, who believes that the sickness of society is nothing else than the sickness of the individual. Because society is an abstraction, and society is in fact a collection of individuals, discord in society can only be alleviated if the nature of the discord in the self is understood. "[T]he unity which the notion of genuine community implies must first be a characteristic of the will. If wills are not individually unified, individuals cannot be unified collectively..." (Hannay,1982:315). The objection against Kierkegaard that he places the source of human happiness outside social and empirical reality, can be answered by arguing that Kierkegaard's whole point is that wholeness as a human being is impossible without the re-orientation of the individual's interests towards some absolute goal.56

Let a distinction therefore be made between the ideas of liberation and fulfillment. The former is what social theorists like Adorno and Marcuse strive for, and the latter what Kierkegaard advocates. From the post-Hegelian point of view liberation is seen as man's appropriation of his essence. (Hannay,1982:317). But precisely this appropriation is not possible unless the goal of fulfillment is reached, or at least striven for. While the two issues of liberation and fulfillment cannot be discussed as if they have nothing to do with each other, Kierkegaard cannot be faulted for working at only one aspect of the problem, and in any case I agree with Rumble (1994:32) that Kierkegaard's passionate campaign against the hypocrisy in the Danish Lutheran
Church and the need for reform, seem to suggest that he was not entirely indifferent to issues of social praxis.

But the question at the end of all this still remains if Christianity, or less specifically perhaps - (blind) 'faith' in the absurd - is really the only way to reach the self's fulfillment. In the next Chapter we will examine the approach of Sartre, which poses a very similar analysis of anxiety, but prescribes a very different cure. From Kierkegaard's point of view Sartre would be suffering from the despair of defiance, and from Sartre's point of view Kierkegaard still suffers from the bad faith of the self that does not know itself as useless passion. The two recipe's for authenticity seem to be mutually exclusive. Must one make an either/ or type of choice between them, or is there yet another option that might be more satisfactory? A decision as to which point of view should gain precedence, or an investigation into the way in which both the Christian and the atheistic points of view can make sense, will have to wait until chapters IV and V.
Summary of themes:

- Kierkegaard’s philosophy is unique and not easily classifiable, but thinkers from many different traditions, including psychology, existentialism, theology and postmodernism have drawn inspiration from him. Although existentialism was really a 20th century movement, Kierkegaard can be seen as its grandfather, in that he described Christianity as a way of existing, rather than as a set of metaphysical beliefs that must be affirmed. He argued that the misunderstanding about what it means to be a Christian, is really rooted in a misunderstanding about existence; in order to rehabilitate Christianity, he must rehabilitate the meaning of human existence, and it is this that makes him of interest to secular thinkers.

- The salient feature of human existence is that it is absurd/paradoxical. No objective, final and complete knowledge, such as envisaged by Hegel’s speculative philosophy, is therefore possible or useful. It is not possible because the individual necessarily stands inside any system that can possibly be devised, and therefore can never reach a vantage point from which to survey Absolute Truth. Neither the system nor the process of gaining individuality can be finalized or completed. Objective knowledge, even if it were possible, would be useless knowledge, because it would not help the concrete individual to deal with the paradox of his/her existence. ‘Truth’ is only of value when it is ‘subjective’, in as far as it helps a person live a concrete, particular and authentic life.

- The individual is constituted and characterized by the free choices s/he makes about how to deal with the conflict between the different needs of life. The authentic individual is one who manages this conflict consciously, and who in this way achieves identity as a self. Inner conflict arises from the basic paradox of human existence: on the one hand there is a need for something eternal and perfect, beyond the reach of earthly disappointments, and such a realm can only be taken on faith since it is infinitely other than that of human existence; on the other hand there is the knowledge, arrived at through reason, that the eternal can never be reached by a ‘temporal being’ such as the human being. Hegel tries to overcome all such paradoxes, and so also all conflict and tension, with his dialectical synthesizing logic, which reduces the entire problematic of existence to an
abstraction, by emphasizing rationality and minimizing the role of faith. In so
doing Hegel overlooks the individual, for whom this conflict is irreducible.

- In order to achieve authenticity, it is necessary to counter the homogenizing
tendencies of systematic philosophy and of bourgeois conformity. To this end
'inwardness' needs to be cultivated. This is achieved through introspection, which
discovers the conflict that constitutes the self. Awareness of the conflict that is
implied in being a living paradox, is then exacerbated by the realization of the
self's fundamental freedom. The awareness of freedom is born in an analysis of
dread which comes to light through the process of introspection; dread/ anxiety is
nothing but the conflict inside the self, which can be both repelled and attracted by
the same thing. Kierkegaard describes this as a sympathetic antipathy and an
antipathetic sympathy.

- The reason for this ambiguity of dread is that the self is fundamentally free
(autonomous), which is a burden, because it means that nothing is fixed. It also
means that the process whereby the individual becomes a self (which should pass
through the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious stages) is effected through free
choice, and is therefore the person's own responsibility. Because the movement
does not happen of necessity, it is possible for the individual to get 'stuck' in any
of the stages.

- Despair, in both its conscious and unconscious forms, is the equivalent of in-
authenticity, and is the result of the self trying to escape from itself, and from its
freedom and responsibility. Escape is preferable to authenticity, because managing
the conflict between the different polarities that constitute the self is a strenuous
task, requiring the continuous affirmation of the absurd. The fundamental paradox
of being a 'temporal being' that longs for the eternal, manifests itself specifically
as the struggle between the polarities of finitude/ necessity versus infinity/
possibility. Despair is the emphasis of either of these poles at the expense of the
other.

- The first two stages of life (the aesthetic and the ethical) are manifestations of
despair, usually unconscious, because the aesthete tends to emphasize infinity/
possibility at the expense of finitude/ necessity, while the ethical person tends to
emphasize finitude/ necessity at the expense of infinity/ possibility. The aesthetic
stage is characterized by the inclination to satisfy immediate desires, and is
therefore the most infantile, while the ethical is characterized by the project to achieve a unified self by a commitment to ideals with enduring validity.

- However, it is impossible to manage and balance the conflicting polarities, and impossible to realize enduring ideals, without the divine help that comes only in the religious stage, reached through the leap of faith. Only one person has ever through faith been able to integrate all the opposing tendencies in himself, and that is Christ, because he is the incarnation of the eternal and the infinite (God) in the temporal realm of human and natural necessity. The true Christian (who is the equivalent of the true Individual) does not merely admire Christ, but strives to become like him.

- Believing against reason that it is possible for time/necessity/finitude and eternity/possibility/infinity to be resolved in synthesis in a single Individual, (first in Christ and then ideally in oneself) allows one to live a life that is authentic, characterized by Spirit.

- The authentic life is actually the ideal both of the aesthetic and the ethical stages, and that which makes both possible: In faith, on the strength of the absurd, one can live like the aesthete in and for the moment, but without fear for the future, and without dwelling on the past. For the authentic individual the shocks and disappointments of life will lead no longer to boredom, melancholy or despair. In faith, one can also live the ethical ideal of expressing the universal in one's life, but now the ethical life becomes possible on the right basis, namely that the particular individual stands higher than the universal, because it is only in a particular individual that Spirit can be incarnated.

- The only way to live authentically, that is, to manifest Spirit in one's own life, is to cultivate passions such as faith and love, which allows one to end the process of disengaged reflection, so as to make a free choice of existential import. There are many important choices, but none so important as to use your freedom to make the leap of faith over the abyss that separates humanity from God, God being the only being that can help the individual to manage the conflict inside it. Because this leap can only be made in fear and trembling, and because people have a tendency to avoid unpleasant extremes, few ever come to the point where they are in a position to make it. That few make the inner journey, means that conflict/despair is for the most part unconscious. That means that most people tend to continue living inauthentically and never discover the self.
CHAPTER III: SARTRE.

"Now when I say 'I', it seems hollow to me. I can't manage to feel myself very well... And just what is Antoine Roquentin? An abstraction. A pale reflection of myself wavers in my consciousness. Antoine Roquentin... and suddenly the 'I' pales, pales and fades out. Lucid, static, forlorn, consciousness is walled up; it perpetuates itself. Nobody lives there anymore. A little while ago someone said 'me', said my consciousness. Who? Outside there were streets, alive with known smells and colors. Now nothing is left but anonymous walls, anonymous consciousness. This is what there is: walls, and between the walls a small transparency, alive and impersonal... Consciousness... is conscious of being superfluous. It dilutes, scatters itself, tries to lose itself on the brown wall, along the lamp-post or down there in the evening mist. But it never forgets itself. That is its lot."

- Sartre: Nausea.

1. INTRODUCTION

Our second thinker on the issue of the self has been chosen for his point of view which is so similar to Kierkegaard’s in the analysis of anxiety/dread, and which yet leads to a conclusion which stands diametrically opposed to that of Kierkegaard. Any attempt, according to Sartre, to ground your own existence in the face of another more complete and perfect form of being, is precisely an act of bad faith/inauthenticity. His notion of what inauthenticity entails could thus not be further removed from Kierkegaard’s, who holds that a person can only be his/her true self before God, and in awareness of the infinite chasm that divides the sinner from Him. Whereas Kierkegaard implies that anxiety/despair can be cured by the individual’s relating to the Absolute, Sartre’s prescription for authenticity is to accept the absence of absolutes, and help someone accept their mortality and insignificance in the face of existence which is purely contingent, superfluous and meaningless.

What makes Sartre’s analysis of the self so interesting is the skill he displays as phenomenologist in turning the magnifying glass upon himself and his own states of consciousness. Admittedly, what he finds most often nauseates him, but he returns the attention of the philosopher back to the body, to the flesh that is so repulsive in its 'thing-ness', and more importantly, to existence and its fundamental, irreducible absurdity.
And here exactly is the starting point for our study of Sartre, namely the distinction he makes between two types of 'being' or existence: that which is characterized as mere 'things' (belonging to the world of matter, whether organic or inorganic) and that being which is, in point of fact, 'nothing'. The being that is no-'thing' is, in one sense, brought into being by human consciousness, and in another sense is human consciousness (Sartre, 1958:24).

This dualistic ontology was first explored in The transcendence of the Ego and later extended in Being and Nothingness. The first type of being, characterized by its 'thing-ness', is called 'being-in-itself or en soi, and the second, human consciousness, is 'being-for-itself or pour soi. The two terms are not resolved in a synthesis but remain radically and irreconcilably opposed. In this sense Sartre not only reminds of Kierkegaard (for whom the maintaining and management of conflict was of higher value than its resolution on a higher plane of abstraction), but also of Descartes, who upheld a dualistic ontology of res extensa and res cogitans. Like Descartes, Sartre uses thought and reason to define the self, but differs from Descartes by also emphasizing emotional and visceral reactions.

Sartre's thought also bears a great resemblance to Heidegger's, but there is a crucial difference that sets him apart from this great thinker too, which is that he is not concerned, as Heidegger is, with 'being' as such, but with human 'being.' From there the subtitle for Being and Nothingness: 'an essay in phenomenological ontology'. The terms 'phenomenology' and 'ontology' do not normally go together, being opposites: phenomenology refers to appearances and ontology to being/reality. But Sartre is interested in 'being for that being to which being appears', or, to put it less clumsily, the way humans experience being, which in point of fact is the only type of Being there is. This is the quintessence of Sartre's phenomenology.

But Sartre is also an existentialist: in Existentialism is a humanism, an essay which attempts to capture the main points of Being and Nothingness and to set Sartre's atheistic existentialism apart from the religious existentialism of Marcel, Jaspers, and others, Sartre spoke the words that have since defined existentialism for scores of scholars: 'man is a being whose existence precedes his essence' (Sartre, 1948a:27-28).

To explain what is meant by this, Sartre refers to such an everyday object as a paperknife: a paperknife, he says, was designed and fashioned for a specific purpose. That means that it was first conceived of in the mind of its creator. The essence, that which it is, that which it was meant to do, thus preceded its physical existence. Man,
however, was not first a concept in another, greater mind, fashioned to a purpose and then made from clay with life breathed into it. Man simply exists: without reason or final goal. Yet that does not mean that existence is meaningless - merely that human beings must infuse their own existence with meaning, after discovering their own contingent being, and thus only then can they create for themselves a human nature, or essence. Therefore a human being's existence precedes its essence.

1.1 THE FOUNDATION OF ATHEISM: A DUALISTIC ONTOLOGY
But why atheism for Sartre? What is his reason for claiming that there is no Designer, Creator, God? For Sartre God's existence is disproved through a logical argument that is really the reverse of Anselm's ontological proof, since he shows that God, by definition, cannot exist.\(^\text{57}\) The steps in this argument will become increasingly clear as we continue to study Sartre's thought. For now we can just say that God is supposed to be that conscious Being that is necessary, self-sufficient, \textit{causa sui}; this definition comes from the scholastic scholars such as St. Thomas, who defined God as that Being that is its own cause. (Jones,1969:439). In Sartre's vocabulary that means the word God refers to a \textit{being-in-itself-for-itself}, which is to him a logical contradiction. Since God is presumably, like His universe, bound by the laws of logic, He simply cannot exist. In order to understand why a thing-in-itself-for-itself is a logical and ontological contradiction it is now necessary to go over to a clarification of these concepts.

1.1.1 BEING-IN-ITSELF
Being-in-itself or \textit{pour soi} is completely unaware/unconscious, dense and opaque. It coincides with itself exactly and does not know that it exists. These entities, which include material things of both a mineral, animal and vegetable nature, are the objects of consciousness, and so have an objective nature. They are tangible/ visible/ audible, in short, things that can be perceived. The human body falls under entities that are things-in-themselves, and so the body is also an object of my consciousness. Another interesting fact about being-in-itself is that it is as it \textit{appears}. (see Sartre,1958:172-180; 617-625). There is no 'inside' to its 'outside'. (This is, incidentally, one of the things that bring on 'The Nausea', namely that the world is a world of impenetrable surfaces.\(^\text{58}\)) The reason why there is no inside to the outside of these objects is that they are really also dependent on consciousness, or being-for-
itself. They are what they appear to be to consciousness, or, put differently, their 'being' is their appearing. Sartre, as phenomenologist, does away with the distinction between appearance and reality. He "denies that there is any screen of sensations or mental events behind which reality lurks." (Olafson, 1957:290). "The world as it appears to reflection is a combination of the objective characteristics of the in-itself—factual existence, solidity, quality and movement; and the subjective contribution of the perceiving for-itself—particularity, order, change, value and instrumentality." (N.H. Greene, in Cranston, 1962:44).

As concerns the self, if I am not body, which is an object, a thing-in-itself, but am instead (in a sense) my consciousness of my body (amongst other things), what is it that separates 'me' (my consciousness) from 'my' body? Sartre's answer is simple and complex at the same time, to such an extent that some have accused him of mere word-play: what separates someone from their body, what separates being-for-itself from being-in-itself, is 'Nothing', Le Neant. The self is neither a 'something' (an in-itself), nor a 'nothing' (the for-itself), but rather the hopeless attempt of the for-itself trying to become an in-itself; an impossible task, yet one that is inevitably incarnated in - and definitive of - every concrete individual.

1.1.2 PURE AND IMPURE REFLECTION

Consciousness can be characterized either by pure or by impure reflection, and the difference between them is the attitude each type of reflection takes towards Nothingness. (Wider, 1993:743). Impure reflection is consciousness being present to itself in such a way that it takes a definite point of view on itself, which means that it attempts to grasp, in bad faith, this 'nothing' as a 'something.' "In pure reflection, consciousness does not attempt to be present to itself as an ego, a transcendent object, which partakes of psychic temporality and has a past, present and future congealed into states, qualities and actions. No; in pure reflection, consciousness attempts to be present to itself as a present moment of consciousness, a moment which partakes of the original temporality of the for-itself." (Wider, 1993:743). How and why is it possible that consciousness, the self's reflection upon itself, can be either pure or impure? As was the case with Kierkegaard the reason is that consciousness is freedom, but freedom causes anxiety, and for this reason consciousness tries to disguise its own nature from itself because it tends to seek conviction rather than distressing uncertainty.
1.1.3 FREEDOM

Sartre's understanding of Nothingness cannot therefore be separated from his concept of 'freedom'. The self's freedom lies in its ability to say 'no' and being-for-itself exists in the ability of consciousness to negate. Sartre gives the example that during the Second World War, when France had been invaded by Germany, the choice was given to each man and woman to become either a collaborator or a member of the resistance, Sartre chose resistance. As a result of this he was captured and placed in a war camp. At the beginning of The Republic of Silence (1944) he says that Parisians were never more free than during the occupation of the city by German troops. This statement is not ironic, but literal. Sartre inverts the traditional idea that says that you are most free when you can do whatever you want to: his kind of freedom consists not in being able to do whatever you like, but rather in the ability to 'say no' in any situation, to resist, regardless of the consequences of your resistance; if your 'no' will lead to your own capture, torture, or death, then that single word has become the most definitive act of freedom there can be. In conditions such as were prevalent in France during the occupation, every dissenting opinion, every criticism directed against the conquerors, things that under normal circumstances would have cost the individual nothing, now becomes an enormously significant act of authenticity, independence, self-assertion. Sartre's understanding locates freedom inside a person, in the imagination, and not within external circumstances, and here there is really nothing that limits it.

1.1.4 ANXIETY

The extreme conditions described in the above example merely illustrate a truth that is operative in daily life as well. Faced with the future, we are confronted with a void. It is not certain at all what will happen next, but more importantly even, what we will do next. Because a person has no essence there is nothing that determines him/her. S/he is radically and absolutely free. One's freedom does not depend on anything else, and the only thing that can in any sense compromise such freedom is bad faith, which is the denial of freedom or the unconsciousness thereof. Naturally the experience of this radical freedom is, as in Kierkegaard, accompanied by anguish, for anguish is precisely freedom's own apprehension of itself, as well as being the realization by consciousness that it is Nothingness. (Sartre,1958:34).
Freedom is actually a burden, (we can say it is of the kind described by Milan Kundera as the 'unbearable lightness of being'), since it is impossible not to be free, as shall presently become clear.

1.1.5 NOTHINGNESS

Not only is Nothingness and freedom defined by the ability to say no, but the ability to receive a 'no' in answer to a question, which points to the fact that for consciousness to be able to negate reality, there must be an ontological counterpart to negation. Because "...negation is not, of course, just a logical function of judgement. Negative judgements themselves are said to require, as a condition of their being possible at all, an extra-logical or ontic counterpart which is non-being..." (Olafson,1957:291). Sartre does not, like Hegel, hold Nothingness and Being to be ontologically equivalent or logically mutually dependent, but rather describes Nothingness as the backdrop to Being, that within which Being is suspended.

In another example (Sartre,1958:9-10) used to illustrate the experience of Nothingness Sartre describes his entering a café in order to meet with Pierre as agreed by way of a previous arrangement, whom he then finds has missed the appointment. Pierre's absence is not 'located' within any one part of the café. Nor is it the same kind of absence as the absence of all the other people in the world who happen not to be there that night. It is in fact a very specific kind of absence or nothingness ('not-there-ness'): Pierre's absence fills the entire café and so also Sartre's own mind, and the absence stands against the background of the physical environment and the expectations of Pierre's presence that Sartre had harbored. What had been a possibility did not actualize.

Now it can be seen that consciousness specifically is the origin of this absence, or 'not-there-ness', or nothingness, because it is exactly consciousness that is the instrument which apprehends actuality (the café without Pierre) in the context of possibility (the café with Pierre). The salient feature of consciousness is therefore its meaning-conferring activity which is not acted upon from without. The Nothing that confronts consciousness in the absence of Pierre is not a feature of being-in-itself, that is, of the café and its objects, but purely a feature of the consciousness that had expected Pierre to be there. That is why Nothing comes into the world through consciousness, and why the ontic counterpart to negation is the for-itself.
1.1.6 BEING-FOR-ITSELF

The being of consciousness is being-for-itself. The term 'for-itself' indicates the reflexivity of consciousness. Consciousness is conscious of being conscious. It has already been mentioned above that this reflexivity can be either pure or impure, but a further discussion of this aspect of reflexivity, as manifested in good and bad faith, will follow only later. For now let us forget about the different types of reflection and concentrate only on the problems involved with conceptualizing consciousness as reflection of any kind.

To say that 'consciousness is conscious of being conscious' could start a spiraling train of repetitions, as one has to ask whether there might not be a consciousness that is conscious of being conscious of being conscious... Sartre says that indeed this implicit infinite regression has always been the main problem with previous theories of consciousness that had described self-reflexivity in terms of knowledge, and that made of the "I" something that resides inside consciousness or inside the body like a ghost haunting an old house. When he has to describe what consciousness of consciousness is, he first explains (characteristically) what it is not. "It is not a knowledge. If self-consciousness at the pre-reflective level were self-knowledge, that would involve consciousness taking itself as an object - which would result either in an infinite regress or in a regress stopped only by accepting a non-self-conscious consciousness." (Wider, 1993:748).

Neither infinite regression nor a limit of non-self-conscious consciousness are acceptable, because in the first case we are confronted with an unthinkable absurdity and in the last case with a logical impossibility, since (Sartre says) all consciousness is self-conscious. For Sartre for consciousness to be, and to be aware of itself, are one and the same thing. Sartre rejects the subject/object duality and so concludes that whatever reflection is, it is not knowledge. It is something more immediate: an "immediate non-cognitive relation of the self to itself." (Sartre, 1958:lii-liii). Consciousness does not take itself as object, but is aware of its own awareness of an object, like one's hand for example, and this awareness is immediate and present to itself.

To understand what Sartre is getting at, try a simple experiment: look at your own hand. You are not merely aware of your hand, but you are aware of the fact that you are looking at your hand. So it is with all our awareness, even with states (as opposed to objects) of consciousness, including emotion, such as sadness.
This ever-present awareness is really the source of the self's sense of alienation, of not being at one with itself. The reflective aspect of awareness often spoils things, because it is removed, it stands back from the 'innocent' impression one wishes that the moment should hold. This 'simple', pre-reflective consciousness that is mere intentionality, does not depend on reflexive consciousness.

Although (human) consciousness is for Sartre per definition reflexive, consciousness of an object and consciousness of being conscious of an object have to go together, but analytically it is possible to distinguish pre-reflective/ non-positional and reflective/ positional consciousness: pre-reflective (animal-like) consciousness is in a sense something that is also 'in the world', out there with the other objects of consciousness. It is trans-phenomenal because it is not exhausted by the immediate intuition thereof. It has a dimension beyond its appearance in profile to consciousness. (Jones, 1969:429-430) That is why being human means never coinciding with oneself, and always being what one is not, or not being what one is.

Reflective self-consciousness presupposes the antecedent existence of pre-reflective consciousness. Being-for-itself is thus consciousness to the 'second power'. It is not in the world, it is not thing-like. Yet the for-itself has a desire to be thing-like, because of the disconcerting split in the self; this means that it wants not to be free. But there can unfortunately be no reconciliation between the for-itself and the in-itself, no synthesis that does away with the dualistic ontology, no affirmation that negates negation. We desire to be a thing, a body, an essence, that is conscious that it is a thing, but this is impossible. Yet this does not stop the project of trying to substantify the self. All of human life, history and relationships are derived from this project.

Sartre is a Hegelian who doesn't believe in happy endings. Man/woman is a useless passion. The idea of God, matter that is conscious of being matter, a being that is its own cause, is a contradiction. There is no Being such a being-in-itself-for-itself. There is only the Sartrean Self, condemned to its own horrible freedom.
1.2 THE TRANSCENDENT-EGO.

1.2.1 THE DISAGREEMENT WITH HUSSERL

The above analysis of the two types of being derive from Sartre's early disagreements with Husserl, which will now be examined.

Husserl's contribution to the history of philosophy is a significant one, because through his phenomenology he opened a field that had been temporarily closed off by Kant; while Kant studies only the human mind and its structure as presupposed by science and mathematics, and refrained from saying anything about reality independent of and outside the mind, Husserl returns the focus back onto the objects of consciousness, without thereby committing the error of speaking about what cannot be known. (See Jones, 1969:403-404). Of course, he has Hegel to thank for shifting aside the no-entry barriers to this area (the world as it stands independent of our minds), because Hegel was the first to again lend credibility to the study of appearances. But Hegel insisted on tying appearance up with reality and pursuing the ultimate truth about the universe in order to create a grand over-arching scheme, that in the end left much room for criticism.

Husserl took a step back and continued to study consciousness, and not objects as they stand independently of it. Nevertheless he did study objects, although now not noumena (things independent of the mind, the existence of which were to be doubted) but phenomena (things as they arise in the mind), and so turned the focus of philosophy onto the truth of immediate experience. (See Husserl, 1913:30-33). What had been overlooked by Kant, and what this new strategy now stresses, is emphasis on the 'intentionality' of consciousness. "Consciousness, Husserl stressed, is consciousness of an object, and composes no part of the object. Consequently, even if necessary laws of the activity of consciousness can be established, as in the philosophy of Kant, such laws would never add up to an account of any object of consciousness" (Kirkpatrick, Williams in Sartre, 1957:13). Husserl wanted to counter the prevailing tendency to reduce questions about the nature of objects to questions concerning the nature and activity of thought. Consequently, he makes a distinction between a mental act/event, such as the activity of doing arithmetic, (for example as asking yourself the question, what is two plus two?) and the intended object of the mental event itself (the sum 2+2=4). As a result of this new phenomenological approach, intentional objects, whether they really exist objectively or not, can be studied in their own right.
The question as to whether these objects of consciousness are real in any other sense than the manner in which they appear to consciousness, is placed in brackets and not commented upon. This is the *epoche* so vital to phenomenology. The thesis of intentionality goes on to state that consciousness is never pure and empty, but always has an object.

The question now arises, and it is here that Sartre's disagreement with Husserl lies, whether there is also an 'I', an 'intentional agent', or in the words of Husserl, a transcendental ego, that is just as necessary for any act of consciousness to be carried out, as are the existence of objects of consciousness for consciousness to be. Sartre (1957:34) formulates it thus: "[I]s the I that we encounter in our consciousness made possible by the synthetic unity of our representations, or is it the I which in fact unites the representations to each other?" In the answer to this question he breaks with Husserl, saying that "the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: it is outside, in the world. It is a being in the world, like the being of another." (1957:31). Husserl's ego is in consciousness because it makes consciousness possible; it is called 'transcendental' because it is that by means of which we experience transcendent entities. By 'transcendent' Husserl means that objects of consciousness have more to them than is given in a finite amount of immediate experience (a profile). For Husserl the contents of consciousness was shaped into intended objects for consciousness by the transcendental ego. Thus the transcendental ego stands behind consciousness and directs its activities. (See Jones, 1969:404-405).

Consciousness for Husserl has a specific contents: the term he used for this is *hylê*, which is an intermediary reality between the ego and the outside 'reality' which is different from it. Without this intermediary 'stuff' which contain characteristics of both consciousness and 'reality', the ego would be caught up in idealistic solipsism: reality would be simply the product of consciousness much as dreams are. Secondly, without this intermediary, an infinite regress would result should one try to explain how consciousness can be conscious of its objects. This hybrid 'stuff', Husserl's third term, can represent or resemble the objects intended by the ego.

The intentional activity of the ego shapes the sense data of consciousness in much the same way that a potter shapes a pot from clay. This 'clay' is the analogy for the content of consciousness which Husserl posits. In other words, for Husserl the 'I' is an active entity, and it stands behind consciousness, directing its synthesizing activity which consists in blending the objects for consciousness into sensible data. Husserl
argued that there must be such an 'I' which organizes and directs the activities of the mind, since there must be some manner in which the contents of consciousness is so shaped as to be intelligible.

According to Sartre the very ambitions of phenomenology to investigate the objects of the mind in their own right are thwarted and reversed by this attitude, and moreover, "the phenomenological conception of consciousness renders the unifying and individualizing role of the I totally useless. It is consciousness, on the contrary, which makes possible the unity and the personality of my I. The transcendental I, therefore, has no raison d'être (Sartre, 1957:40). "If a transcendent I like Husserl's is posited, the objects of consciousness are still 'interfered with' by consciousness in the form of the ego. A theory of ego is unnecessary because consciousness already is intentionality." (ibid:38). It apprehends objects directly because it is a nothingness, a transparency, that allows objects to be.

Nevertheless, Sartre does also speak of a 'transcendent ego', but it is not a transcendence from 'above' - for this reason he chooses to speak of a transcendent rather than a transcendental ego. In this case the determinant 'transcendent' does not refer to the fact that the T stand above and behind the intentional activity of consciousness: rather it means that it is not inside consciousness at all, but 'out in the world' together with all the other objects of consciousness. For Sartre (1957:40), although consciousness is always conscious of being conscious, it does not always refer to a 'self'. Pre-reflective consciousness is impersonal, not cognitive, not characterized by knowledge of any kind, and does not contain a 'I' at all. It is non-positional in the sense that it does not take a stance on itself, and is not for itself its own object (ibid:41).

It is only upon reflection that a proper 'I' becomes part of our experience. An example of pre-reflective consciousness, also called non-positional consciousness, is any activity that completely absorbs us, such as for example running after a streetcar: "When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no I. There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken, etc., and non-positional consciousness of consciousness." (Sartre, 1957:48-49). And when the 'I' is encountered, it is encountered in the same way that a chair or a streetcar is met with, namely that it is alienated and different from consciousness, and it does not reveal itself exhaustively to our intuition. As shall
be seen later, it is precisely for this reason that the phenomenon of bad faith is possible.

1.2.2 TRANSITION TO EXISTENTIALISM

Sartre therefore continues the tradition of phenomenology, but uses its terminology differently than does Husserl. He takes the *epoche* much further, and asserts that reality is nothing but apparitions. But his position is not to be confused with that of Hegel, because he still argues for the transphenomenality of objects, and therefore being is not exhausted and completely taken up in the appearance thereof, which means that things do exist independently of the consciousness that apprehends them - there is no synthetic moment for Sartre where the mind covers and apprehends all of being so that the distinction between mind and matter disappears. The word ‘apparitions’ is here used instead of appearance to describe that which constitutes ‘reality’, since ‘appearance’ still implies the existence of something else hidden away underneath the surface. But there is nothing but surface for Sartre. Being and truth do not hide away beneath a skin of appearance. The world is the totality of what can and does appear to consciousness, and consciousness is both the apprehension of this apparition and that which appears to itself in the act of apprehension. (Lafarge,1970:8).

Sartre accuses Husserl of betraying the original project of phenomenology, and sliding into idealism; the original project of phenomenology was of course to study the *objects* of consciousness, isolated from the *activity* of consciousness. (JOnes,1969:418). Sartre also accused Husserl of not carrying the *epoche*, the bracketing off of the world from the sphere of pure consciousness, far enough. Not only are the objects of consciousness *not* the result of the activity of the ego, the ego itself (as has been mentioned before) is not *inside* consciousness (as many philosophers and psychologists seem to think) but *outside* it, in the world. "According to Sartre, the self, unlike pure consciousness, does not disclose itself exhaustively to immediate intuition and for precisely this reason belongs among the objects that transcend consciousness - that is, in the world." (Olafson,1957:289). Inside consciousness there is nothing, because consciousness *is* Nothing, it has no content and is impersonal/autonomous. (Wider,1993:748). The world as it appears to the mind is constituted by the intentional acts of consciousness, and consciousness is itself pure intentionality. It does not require a personalized ego for this function. The
‘I’, which is ‘in the world’, is also the result of a synthetic act of organization, and not the agency which performs these syntheses.

The result of Sartre’s disagreement with Husserl was nothing less than the transition from phenomenology to existentialism: after having carried the phenomenological reduction to its extreme, Sartre showed that this epoche of phenomenology is after all not possible, since it is impossible to contemplate the being of consciousness separately from the being of what is not consciousness, since consciousness is never secluded or detached from the world that exists, and also cannot be surgically removed from it. Consciousness depends on the objects of consciousness for its existence, just as nothingness depends upon being. (Sartre, 1958:22). If the Husserlian reduction of consciousness were possible it would imply the total annihilation of consciousness. 61 “Thus, with no transcendental ego or contents to clutter up consciousness, phenomenology, or the reflexive study of consciousness, becomes directly occupied with human existence in its concrete relations to the world, with the nature of man as consciousness of things, of himself, and of other selves.” (Williams & Kirkpatrick in Sartre, 1957:25).

Sartre’s philosophy is therefore a phenomenological ontology, a study of humankind’s existence taking as starting point a position that might be rather reductively articulated as follows: there is no consciousness without the world (being), and there is no world without consciousness of it. Later we shall see that Jung makes this same point when he says that nature and the psyche require each other. In this, it is argued that Sartre stands at the top step of a flight of stairs of which the first step was mounted by Hume:

“Hume was right to eliminate metaphysical entities and to lay the foundation of an experimental philosophy. Kant was right when he restricted the sphere of possible knowledge to phenomena. Comte was right in proclaiming the advent of the positivistic era. Renouvoir was right to adopt the ‘point of view of Knowledge’. Lachelier, Brunschvicg, Hamelin were all right to reject Kant’s ‘Thing-in-itself.’ And Husserl, above all, was right to accept only the pure phenomenon as apodictic and unquestionable, and so was Heidegger when he refused to make a distinction between phenomenon and Being.” This process managed to reduce “the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it.” (Lafarge, 1970:27).

Manifestation is what is of importance in Sartre’s philosophy, not potency or substance or essence. A person is judged by what s/he does, not what s/he is capable
of. Essence and substance do not refer to something behind appearances. All these metaphysical concepts are now thoroughly and irrevocably outdated. At the same time, Sartre doesn't fall back into idealism, which states that thought and the idea is the only reality. In fact, Sartre makes the distinction between idealism and realism obsolete.

What there is, is simply what exists, and strangely enough 'existence' in its brute facticity has never yet been fully revealed. Existence wears a mask, and with good reason, for when it slips it induces a horrible fascination, flavored with dread, that Sartre calls nausea. Existence just is, it is completely unnecessary, superfluous, contingent and, by itself, without meaning.

Idealism and also solipsism are refuted through existentialism because 'I' do not contain existence, but 'existence' contains me. I depend on the object, such as my desk, my computer; these objects bind and resist me and surpass the appearances which reveal it, and this is the 'transphenomenality' of phenomena. (Lafarge, 1970:30). Ontology cannot go beyond the phenomena, and thus it becomes a phenomenology whose purpose is merely to describe and not to explain. Being and Nothingness consists of descriptions of man's experiences in existence and ways of dealing with them, and a few of these are touched upon in the next section, such as anxiety, nausea, and bad faith, all symptoms of the split nature of being, revealing the useless passion that is the self.
2. THE MALADY: THE USELESS PASSION

2.1 NAUSEA

Sartre, like Kierkegaard, explores the problems of human freedom and of absurdity. Also for Sartre the self’s anxiety is the direct result of its freedom, just as nausea is the reaction to the absurdity, the sheer senselessness of being. Sartre does not find nature grandly beautiful, but rather monstrous, terrifying, and hostile. Nature here is not flora and fauna, but rather 'being-in-itself', matter, that which is dense, which has 'essence' as the nature of its being. And what 'nature' inspires when understood in its superfluity is nausea.

The experience of nausea is described in its utmost form in the novel of the same name, when the protagonist, Roquentin, sits under a tree in a French municipal park, and the tension that had began building inside him during the past few weeks (on account of his growing awareness of his own freedom and the strange and terrifying nature of 'existence') reaches a climax. The arbitrary and superfluous nature of existence overwhelms him with it's sheer meaninglessness, and although the experience of Roquentin to some might seem so removed from daily life that many would find it, rather than nature or existence, truly absurd, it is nevertheless on this that Sartre's seven-hundred page essay on phenomenological ontology, Being and Nothingness, is based. The possibility of nausea lies at the root of the malady that Sartre describes. Nausea in itself, although clearly not a state of well-being, is less severe yet than another type of illness, 'bad faith', which is the denial of, and flight from, nausea and anxiety. Bad faith can be said to correspond to Kierkegaard's unconscious despair, because those who live in it are unmindful of the fact that they have a disease. Nevertheless both bad faith and despair are actually nothing less than inauthentic existence.

Together anxiety, nausea and bad faith are symptoms of that particular malady endemic to the human condition, namely that of striving to be (a) God, to attain 'thing-like' status without losing consciousness, which Sartre calls the 'useless passion.'

2.1.1 THE CAUSE AND NATURE OF NAUSEA

"[I]f the key-word in Kierkegaard is despair, and in Heidegger dread, that of Sartre is not really one or the other, but disgust – though a disgust which displays a certain metaphysical humility." (Ussher,1955:103). Existential nausea is related to physical
nausea as its very ground. Therefore one does not speak of existential nausea by way of analogy to physical nausea, for even physical nausea is existential. According to Sartre there is a nearly unnoticeable but potentially overwhelming nausea involved in the self's awareness of its own body, that is, of its own existence. Sartre's term 'nausea' should therefore not be understood simply as a metaphor which draws a comparison between our physiological aversions and the fear and loathing of existence itself; on the contrary it is against the background of existential queasiness that all the concrete and empirical nausea's such as at the sight of existential queasiness that all the concrete and empirical nausea's such as at the sight of existential queasiness that all the concrete and empirical nausea's such as at the sight of rotten meant, fresh blood, excrements, etc. are produced. (Ussher,1955:103). Nausea is always related to the human body, but it does not stop there; consciousness and the body react to the nakedness and 'fleshiness' of nature as a whole.64

2.1.2 EXISTENTIAL HUMILITY
The experience of nausea has a potentially positive side-effect: that of existential humility, which results because of the realization that being in itself is both indifferent and uncontrollable. Any illusion humans have as to being in control of nature, or more specifically 'existence', are sadly mistaken. 'Control' is here not meant to refer merely to such technological control that transforms raw material into tools, nor the scientific manipulation of natural forces. Instead 'control' refers rather to the attempt to 'grasp' nature and existence consciously, to give it names, assigning function and essence. This cognitive interaction with being-in-itself appears to render it harmless. Only when the illusion of such control is stripped away does existence reveal itself, as happened in the case of Roquentin as he contemplated the root of the tree he was sitting under: "The world of explanations and reasons is not the world of existence. A circle is not absurd, it is clearly explained by the rotation of a straight segment around one of its extremities. But neither does a circle exist. This root, on the other hand, existed in such a way that I could not explain it." (Sartre,1964:129). Existence normally is hidden, and is paradoxically the least real and most empty of all categories that we use in daily speech and thought. Existence cannot be encountered, Sartre seems to be saying, except in this overwhelming experience of nausea.65
Being-in-itself in its immanence, with "metaphors of the slimy and holes" has the tendency to engulf 'being-for-itself', or put differently, is "always ready to swallow up the for-itself". (De Lacoste,1998:285). In the end being-in-itself will succeed in its project to swallow and extinguish the 'being' of human consciousness, the for-itself
as, upon death, the human becomes a thing. But strangely enough, despite this, human beings strive to be 'thing-like', to have an essence just as Being-in-itself does, but strive to do all this without losing consciousness, which is impossible. Being-for-itself-in-itself thus becomes the object of humanity's useless striving. Consciousness, being a fundamentally different type of being than being-in-itself, cannot attain the status of thing-ness without being extinguished. Nevertheless, to be human is strive in this way for this impossible goal. That is why man is a useless passion.

The question naturally arises why, if being-in-itself inspires such disgust and nausea, should human freedom tend towards it and desire to be like it? To answer this question we must refer to another aspect of the absurdity of existence; for it is not only the being of the en soi that is absurd, but also the being of the pour soi.

2.2 ANXIETY.

The reason for being-for-itself's striving to become like being-in-itself is that consciousness, being-for-itself, is freedom, and freedom inspires anguish. Anguish is the reflective apprehension of the self, or freedom's apprehension of itself, as opposed to fear, which is simply unreflective apprehension of the transcendent, and which in terms of intensity of affect is far less potent than is anguish; this is so much so that fear and anguish are really mutually exclusive of each other: anguish is born in the death of fear. (Jambor, 1990:111). Sartre's analysis of anguish/ anxiety, is that it arises before one'self. He uses the now well-known example of vertigo, which is not so much fear that I will fall over a precipice, or that someone might push me, as that I might throw myself over. One speaks of fear when there is a possibility that life will be changed by external forces, but anguish is provoked by being itself, one's own being, to the extent that one distrusts one's own reactions in a particular situation. In this context we shall see upon getting to Jung, that he emphasizes the autonomy of the psyche in a way that reminds of Sartre' analysis of anguish.

This human freedom has no absolutes to which to cling, but must rely on itself for all values, projects, and choices. Even pre-reflective, non positional consciousness is already free, but this is overlooked by those caught up in daily routine and habitual respect for authority, which creates the impression of being 'bound' by an existence that is more or less predictable. But just as existence can break through, inspiring disgust and nausea, so too freedom can break through and reveal itself, inspiring anguish. The combined effect of recognizing the volatility both of your own
consciousness and of the world, and realizing that nothing is certain either in the inner or the outer reality, can lead to the sheer paranoid frenzy that Roquentin sporadically experiences in Nausea:

"An absolute panic took hold of me. I no longer knew where I was going. I ran along the docks, I turned into the deserted streets of the Beauvoisis district: the houses watched my flight with their mournful eyes. I kept saying to myself in anguish 'Where shall I go? Where shall I go? Anything can happen.' Every now and then, with my heart pounding wildly, I would suddenly swing around: what was happening behind my back? Perhaps it would start behind me, and when I suddenly turned round it would be too late. As long as I could fix objects nothing would happen: I looked at as many as I could, pavements, houses, gas lamps; my eyes went rapidly from one to the other to catch them out and stop them in the middle of their metamorphosis." (Sartre, 1965:115):

Sartre sums it all up by saying that anguish is the mode of being of freedom, where freedom is consciousness of being. Anxiety is the very state in which being becomes a question for itself (Solomon, 1972:285), and, as seen in the above quote, the query is made not in the spirit of disinterested, academic calmness, but rather in panic.

The Sartrean description of anguish in fact combines those of Kierkegaard and Heidegger: the former described anguish as the apprehension of freedom while Heidegger described anguish as the trepidation over death/ nothingness. (Sartre, 1958:79). Sartre merely makes the short logical step that says freedom is nothingness is the human being that is conscious of its own consciousness.

Although anguish is not continually present, (if it were, it would be near impossible to live) those few times when it does surface are sufficient to show that it is the fundamental structure and ground for human existence and consciousness, and that it is normally covered up through the mechanism of bad faith. It is impossible to escape anguish, says Sartre (in contrast with Kierkegaard, who posits faith as a way out, although it is difficult to attain) but that does not prevent humankind from trying to do so. "The discomfort of anguish drives man to attempt to 'flee from anguish', and it is in this flight that man searches for excuses for himself, interpretations of his situation (which are presented not as interpretations but as facts) which limit his freedom and responsibility. It is in this search for excuses that bad faith is born." (Solomon, 1972:287). If the fundamental 'metaphysical' yearning of the human soul in Kierkegaard is for the eternal, then in Sartre it is for fixity and purpose (trying to appropriate oneself as a necessary being), or for completeness (to "cease to transcend our acts and conditions, but to be identical with them." (Allen, 1974:185).)
2.3 BAD FAITH.

2.3.1 BAD FAITH AS A-PRIORI STRUCTURE OF THE SELF.

Bad Faith is an a priori structure of the human self, which means that deception constitutes the self from the moment that a 'self' or an 'I' of any kind is posited. The notion of bad faith can be compared to Heidegger's analysis of 'fallen-ness' and 'everydayness'; a preoccupation with trivial matters, giving to these all the importance and anxiety that should attach to existence. It can also be compared to Kierkegaard's form of unconscious despair, or the despair of weakness, because similarly it is preoccupied with trivial matters and unaware/afraid of the real problems of existence. To exist in bad faith is to live automatically and passively, without reflection, like a machine. Sartre, like Kierkegaard, had a special disdain for the comfortable and self-righteous lives of the bourgeoisie, who typified for him this type of wasted, inauthentic life. This can be clearly seen in the following comments by Roquentin in Nausea:

"They have dragged out their lives in stupor and somnolence, they have married in a hurry, out of impatience, and they have made children at random. They have met other men in café's, at weddings, at funerals. Now and then, caught in a current, they have struggled without understanding what was happening to them. Everything that has happened around them has begun and ended out of their sight; long obscure shapes, events from afar, have brushed rapidly past them, and when they have tried to look at them, everything was already over. And then, about forty, they baptize their stubborn little ideas and a few proverbs with the name of Experience, they begin to imitate slot machines; put a coin in the slot on the left and out come anecdotes wrapped in silver paper; put a coin in the slot on the right and you get precious pieces of advice which stick to your teeth like soft caramels." (Sartre, 1965:101)

This strategy of life or degraded state of being is described by Heidegger as inauthentic, and Sartre adopts this notion. Bad faith is inauthenticity, and Sartre concretizes the notion with the use of many credible examples. (Solomon, 1972:288).
2.3.1.1 Types of bad faith

Broadly speaking, on Sartre's understanding, bad faith can be divided into three different categories:

- The first and most discussed by Sartre, is that of denying transcendence and over-emphasizing facticity; this becomes psychological determinism.

- The second is the excessive focus on transcendence that takes little or no account of facticity.\(^68\)

- The third kind of bad faith seeks to escape its anguish by treating itself as an *other* instead of as itself.\(^69\)

A self is made up of *both* facticity and transcendence: facticity refers to the past which stands in need of interpretation. A person is (at any given moment) the sum total of all his/her actions (up to that point). Sartre's emphasis on action rather than intention in assessing culpability implies that it doesn't matter what your intentions and motives are, but merely what you do, and how, in the end, things turn out.\(^70\)

Transcendence refers to the future and the possibilities it holds, but also to the ability to make of your situation (facticity) what you want; to interpret it in any way. Interpretation forms the basis for action and decision. Over-emphasizing facticity or transcendence, or treating oneself as an 'other' (an object), are all typical attitudes of consciousness, and the ideal of authenticity (the balance between facticity and transcendence while avoiding the trap of taking the self as an object) is virtually impossible.

2.3.1.2 Examples

Sartre uses three main examples of bad faith, (two of them unfortunately reflecting unfavorably upon women's approach to their own sexuality:\(^71\))

The first example, (Sartre,1958:55-56) like the second, comes from Sartre's café experiences: A couple sit at a table, discussing some intellectual matter. The man takes hold of the woman's hand while they are talking; she does not remove her hand but also does not respond. She merely lets her hand lie where it is without noticing it, as if it were a 'thing'. She is in bad faith because she insists to herself that the man is in that moment interested in her cerebrally, not sexually, as she takes the discussion up to higher abstract planes. The expression of bad faith here is that she treats her hand as an inert object, divorced from her will, for which she is not responsible.
The second example (Sartre, 1958: 59) refers to a café waiter serving a table. He is 'playing at being a waiter', bending forwards a little too solicitously, walking stiffly like an automaton. He tries to be a waiter in the same way that a table is a table, that is, to coincide perfectly with his role.

The third example is that of a frigid woman, who believes she finds no pleasure in sex, whereas in fact she is merely afraid of the pleasure she might experience and so distracts herself from it by thinking of her household accounts. She also tries to make of herself a 'something' with a fixed essence (a 'naturally' frigid woman) in order to escape the anxiety of her freedom. (In all fairness one shouldn't think Sartre a misogynist or someone who looks down on waiters, since he does not spare himself an equally thorough and damning analysis.)

The 'bad faith' of all three people in the above examples, lies therein that they are trying to escape from the contingency and indetermination of the human condition by way of 'imposture', play-acting, and self-avoidance, in order to endow themselves with substance and to make their own being necessary in some way.

2.3.1.3 The cause and nature of bad faith

Bad faith is endemic to the human condition because the self is a function/result of the reality-negating attitude of consciousness, directed inward. Bad faith can be seen as a 'self-negation' because it conceals certain aspects of the self from itself, or misrepresents a state of affairs to itself, or purposefully misinterprets a situation so as to avoid discomfort and/or anguish. But the main reason why bad faith is a form of the 'self-negation', is that it habitually takes it'self (consciousness) as an object instead of as subject. Consciousness, by being conscious of itself, and taking itself as object in apprehending itself, affects itself with bad faith: "We do not 'undergo' bad faith; we are not afflicted with it; we do not have it inflicted upon us. We 'put ourselves' in bad faith as we put ourselves to sleep..., so to say. As Sartre states it, there must be an original intention and project' of bad faith..." (Santoni, 1990: 8). The original intention and project begins at the very instant that self-awareness emerges. Everything that adds a predicate to the 'I' is a 'basic project' and is in bad faith because it assumes essence where there is none.

Bad faith is not an ethical problem to be overcome, but an ontological fact. Sartre appears to be saying that for the most part the ideal of sincerity contradicts the
ontological structure of one's consciousness and is therefore impossible, although he
is obscure enough on this point to leave room for interpretation.\textsuperscript{75}

2.3.2 THE DISAGREEMENT WITH FREUD.
To reach a broader understanding of the phenomenon of bad faith and what lies
behind it, we must investigate Sartre's condemnation of Freud's theory of the
unconscious.

2.3.2.1 Psychological determinism
According to Sartre, any resort to psychological determinism (of which, Sartre thinks,
Freud's theory is the prime example) is bad faith. Anything which attaches to an
individual an essence that controls behavior, thoughts and decisions, denies human
freedom, and is nothing but an attempt to escape anguish and responsibility. "Bad
Faith is the attempt to take one's situation and one's reactions to it as pure facticity and
deny one's own interpretative evaluative role in that situation" (Solomon, 1972:287).
Whereas Freud found explanations for human behavior in such 'universally present'
psychological elements as the Oedipus complex, \textit{eros} and \textit{thanatos}, etc., Sartre insists
that every choice and every project is pure spontaneity. Motives, reasons and
dispositions do play a role in our choices and projects, but never to such an extent that
they \textit{compel} a certain course of action.
This does not mean however that Sartrean freedom necessarily guarantees success in
any given project. Freedom refers to the ability to \textit{interpret} any given situation as one
sees fit. "[I]t is only through a project of a particular self (a 'fundamental project') that
situations and things acquire their 'coefficient of adversity'." (Jambor, 1990:113). A
large rock lying in my way might be unclimbable, but only if it is my project to
\textit{succeed} in climbing it. "If we were not intending to climb the rock, it would not be
unclimbable for us, nor would its size and obliqueness present obstacles to us. It is
only so far as we have expectations of success in climbing the rock that we find the
rock to be an obstacle. The choice of the project of climbing or strolling by is entirely
ours, but our success in climbing depends as much on the rock as it does on us. We
are absolutely free to form the project and try to climb; we are not absolutely free to
reach the top of the rock." (Solomon, 1972:281).
An inferiority complex for instance might simply be the result of a fundamental
project to be superior, and no attempts are made at accomplishing anything, precisely
because the subject does not want to fail, and so relinquish his/her project towards superiority. Not even undeniable physiological forces and needs, seemingly beyond our control - as for example hunger - can force one into a certain line of action - for example to eat. To clarify - although hunger is a physical reality, the meaning given to hunger is a choice: for one on a hunger strike it is test of strength, for one on a diet it is dreaded temptation, for a connoisseur it is a savored anticipation. Similarly all aspects of one's physical life, normally taken us unchangeable and 'natural', such as masculinity or femininity, are in need of interpretation. In fact any description at all of what masculinity or femininity entails, even the most scientific and biological, already implies such an interpretation. 76

Absolute freedom implies absolute responsibility, and the anticipation of guilt naturally intensifies anguish. Might not this anguish at absolute freedom equal the 'universal' guilt of Kierkegaard, connected with original sin? A theory like Freud's denies this responsibility, and holds the unconscious and events of childhood responsible for interpretations people place over their lives. In this way it also shifts responsibility for happiness, fulfillment and doing 'what is right' off the individual's shoulders, which is an anathema to Sartre.

2.3.2.2 The existence of an unconscious

Sartre disagrees with Freud on a second count, and that is over the very existence of an unconscious, understood as a realm where the self is hidden from itself, and from whence self-deception originates. Sartre's understanding of consciousness holds it to be entirely transparent, it has no contents because the self is not something inside consciousness, but rather the manufactured and basically fictional unity of acts and states of mind. This raises an important problem/ question about the mechanism of bad faith. "Specifically, consciousness has been described as nothingness and as 'entirely translucent to itself': as such, how could it be possible for the phenomenon of bad faith to occur? If bad faith is a hiding of a truth from oneself (that is, 'self-deception'), then the whole of Sartre's ontology must collapse, for consciousness can no longer be 'consciousness (of) consciousness' and man, in his ignorance even of what goes on 'in' his own mind, cannot possibly be said to have absolute freedom of choice and intention." (Solomon,1972:288). Sartre must find some way to explain how it is possible for a person to lie to him-/herself, since when one lies to oneself the traditional duality of liar/ one being lied to disappears.
Sartre (1958:49-50) does point out that if I deliberately and cynically try to lie to myself the lie self-destructs because of the awareness and intention behind the lie, and for this reason he also views the very possibility of lying to oneself as very problematic. (Santoni, 1990:6). Consequently, bad faith must be something other than lying to oneself.

Is it perhaps better described as simply 'hiding things from oneself'? This understanding is also problematic, because 'where' might things be hidden if consciousness is translucent? Sartre argues, against Freud, that the bifurcation of mind into consciousness and unconscious is unnecessary, and moreover, that the notion 'unconscious mind' is a contradiction in terms. Freud claimed that the mind tends to conceal unpleasant things from itself, and created the notion of a censor that does the dirty work of deceiving the ego about whatever rises up from the id that is unacceptable.

The law governing this activity of the censor is of course the well-known 'pleasure principle' that says one tends to repress or suppress what is unpleasant and distasteful. Sartre says basically the same thing when he holds that bad faith is to 'hide a displeasing truth or to present as truth a pleasing untruth'. (Solomon, 1972:293). Where the two thinkers differ is that Sartre does not acknowledge the idea that there could be any kind of consciousness, even that of the censor, that is not self-aware and that is not mindful of what it is doing when suppressing unpleasant impulses.

2.3.2.3 Self deception

So how then does self-deception occur within translucent consciousness? One answer to this problem is to say that precisely because the self is not something that is inside consciousness, but rather an object for consciousness, a transcendent object outside in the world like the self of another, I do not have a privileged knowledge of myself and my states of consciousness. In fact, it can be said that I can know just as little about my 'self' as I can know of another person's 'self.' Because I do not have a privileged comprehension of myself, but only a "more intimate awareness", it is possible to "fudge evidence about myself." (Catalano, 1990:683).

This approach makes it clear that for Sartre there is a big difference between awareness and knowledge. One may be pre-reflectively aware of something that only upon reflection will become knowledge. Thus it is possible to be aware of something but yet not know it; that is, conceptualize it or verbalize it. This is for instance what
the woman who does not remove her hand from her companion's clasp does: she is undoubtedly aware of his hand holding hers, but she refuses to acknowledge it to herself or to think about it. This is actually something that should be familiar to anyone: the process whereby an unpleasant thought is avoided by starting to think about other matters. According to Sartre this is the mechanism by which the mind hides things from itself, or in other words stops itself from 'knowing' things: it is simply distraction, because through distraction reflection is thwarted. In the case of the woman who allows her companion to hold her hand without reacting to it, "it is not the mere absence of reflective thought that causes bad faith, but her reflective denial and thus refusal to 'notice' her hand, or as Sartre says, to give a name to her feelings... This refusal reflectively to name our pre-reflective feelings might be called an act of bad faith by distraction." (Haynes-Curtis, 1988:272-273).

In answer to the above Solomon argues that in his theory of 'distraction' Sartre is implicitly acknowledging Freudian suppression, which is conscious, while he mistakenly thinks that this argument also deals with Freudian repression, given in examples like hysteria or neurosis, that are a function of the unconscious at work. (Solomon, 1972:293). The existence of an unconscious will be further debated in chapter V, in relation to Jung and not Freud. For now it is enough to say that, according to Solomon, Sartre and Freud are not really at odds with one another, but just start from different directions: Freud from an empirical-scientific standpoint that posits the theory of the unconscious as hypothesis to explain the symptoms of his patients, and Sartre from a phenomenological-theoretical standpoint that attempts to capture the nature of being and consciousness in its scope. Sartre overlooks that Freud also admits of freedom, since liberation consists in making repressed contents available to consciousness which frees it (Solomon, 1972:293), and we shall see in the discussion on Jung that the existence of the unconscious by no means precludes personal responsibility.

The disagreement with Freud stems at bottom from a gross caricature of him that Sartre sets up in order to shoot it down. It does not detract too much however from a genuinely insightful analysis of instances of self-deception and the escape from responsibility. From his discussion of bad faith the importance of responsibility is clearly emphasized. Taking responsibility means fighting to overcome bad faith; even if bad faith is so endemic to the human condition that it seems impossible to escape it.

Thus there is a measure of cure posited by Sartre. If 'bad faith' is described as a
selective and biased attitude towards evidence for certain beliefs, then no project has a substantive basis. All projects are then based on belief, but certain beliefs are more justified in the face of particular evidence than others. Bad faith is belief that believes too soon and too easily that which is comfortable or advantageous for it to believe: "By contrived criteria and the choice of selective evidence, the bad faith consciousness decides that it is 'persuaded' even when it is not... I can accept 'believing' the reassurance which I do not (finally) believe because the mercurial make-up of consciousness allows me to tell myself that all believing is 'not believing enough'. So - as we have seen - I count myself satisfied even though I am not 'fulfilled' by the evidence." (Santoni, 1990: 11-12).

Sincerity then is the correct attitude to evidence and the only possible basis for personal responsibility, which takes us over to a discussion about how the individual should sustain his/her fundamental project in such a manner that it approaches authenticity, which is then the cure for the hopelessness of useless passion.
3. THE CURE: THE RESPONSIBLE SELF.

3.1 THE FUNDAMENTAL PROJECT TO 'BECOME GOD'

A human being is that creature defined by Sartre as a being that wants and strives for the impossible: to be God. Sartre goes so far as to say that at its core a human being is the desire to be God, or, more precisely, substance that is conscious. (King, 1974:46)

That this desire is impossible, in a sense disallows the search for a remedy. A search for a cure that will remove the disease is in itself a form of intensifying the disease. Bad faith pervades all possible projects. Yet while explicitly this new existentialism is rather depressing, there is woven through much of Sartre's writing the implicit hope that the burden of existence can be born, and that it is yet worthwhile to do so. Rather reductively, one could say that Sartre's answer to the problem of existence is atheism.

Sartre's cure is neither an antidote, nor an infection-fighting drug, nor even a placebo (that would be the worst kind of medicine), but an admonition to the 'patient' to bear up under his/her existential burden, and to find the courage not to falsely lighten it. Shelburne (1983:62) calls this the choice for 'honest despair'. Sartre does not attempt to sweeten the truth of atheism, or present it in an optimistic fashion of nineteenth-century liberals. "Atheism is a cruel and long-range affair: I think I've carried it through." (Sartre, 1981:253).

Together with this denial of God/ a perfect being, there is also a form of 'self-emptying' involved in the remedy; a self-denial. This 'self-denial' must not be confused with Kierkegaard's Christian understanding of self-denial, which is a charitable placing of the other higher than oneself. In Sartre's case, if any religious comparison can be made, it would be to Buddhism, because in Sartre's view there is no real self to deny, only the illusion of one, and the subject should ideally be aware of this illusion. This is the realization that the self does not, strictly speaking, exist - there is only impersonal consciousness. In order to be authentic, one must face up to one's freedom, and that freedom is pure 'negativity'. Sartre has elevated Nothingness and negativity to ruling principle, and finds precisely in this the cure to inauthenticity.

The imperfection of consciousness, it's doubt and anguish, is precisely consciousness. This must be acquiesced to.

Sartre's atheism rests on the principle of the insubstantiality of consciousness. For ontological reasons, the search for and striving towards a consciousness that has
substance is futile, but despite this consciousness does strive towards substantiality, because it seeks to be self-identical. The self's transcendence, and the requirement that its facticity must be interpreted, precludes this.

States of consciousness, like for instance sadness, are recreated anew in every moment: when one suffers, a part of the suffering lies therein that you are not suffering enough. We try to convince ourselves and others of the magnitude of the sadness, but the suffering of which we speak is never precisely that which we feel. Suffering presented in literature and art seems noble, because it is suffering that has 'being'. But because one cannot observe one's own sadness in the same way that one can observe the face of a statue frozen in pain, it seems too fleeting and unreal to qualify as 'adequate'. (Solomon:1972:299). If one could be sad (or anything else) absolutely, it would constitute one's essence or substance, but due to the reflexivity and self-overcoming of consciousness this is impossible.

Can one ever give up trying to be substantial? The answer according to Sartre is no, because consciousness cannot help in reflection taking itself as a kind of object and try to affix essence to itself.77

The self is a useless passion, striving for the impossible and moreover unable not to strive for it. Yet is seems that it is possible to strive for the impossible in good faith, which will now be discussed.

3.1.1 GOOD FAITH.

3.1.1.1 What good faith is not

It has been argued that good faith might merely consist in being absorbed in a role, and therefore being sincere rather than 'acting it out'. Manser (1983:102) argues for instance that that waiters who are fluid and at ease in their service of tables during a rush of activity, are not playing a role because they are absorbed in their task. This implies that bad faith is an effort, a strain, and good faith means being at ease and natural. I do not think however that this simple explanation suffices to distinguish good from bad faith. It is possible to support a bad faith project, such as racism for example, without strain. 'Being absorbed' would rather be that state which Sartre refers to as pre-reflective or non-positional consciousness, and thus the issue of consciousness taking a stand on itself does not enter into discussion in these cases. Only where consciousness tries to apprehend itself does the question of good/ bad faith arise.
Because all projects are taken up on 'faith', it is precisely in the analysis of the 'faith' of bad faith that a way out of the dilemma appears.\textsuperscript{78} How one arrives at faith is what determines whether it is 'good' or 'bad' faith. This requires lucid reflection on the machinations of consciousness. Knowing and admitting that you are in that state that is known as 'faith', facilitates a more authentic existence, even if perfect authenticity might be out of the question.\textsuperscript{79}

3.1.1.2 Taking responsibility for one's basic project

Sartre's references to the phenomenon of good faith and sincerity in \textit{Being and Nothingness} are usually in passing. He also seems to alternate between the admonition to live in good faith and the indication that good faith is an impossibility.\textsuperscript{80} (Solomon,1972:301).

Whatever good faith is, it must be (in some sense at least) the opposite of bad faith. It follows that if bad faith is the denial of one's facticity and transcendence, good faith must be the recognition of it. Again we can refer back to Kierkegaard on this point, and note how similar the two thinkers are in their analysis of inauthenticity: both show that the ignorance or denial of either necessity/facticity, or possibility/transcendence, is a denial of the totality of the true self. Authenticity then for Sartre means nothing else than that one should recognize that the meaning and foundation of one's life are the result of choices and interpretations. Whatever affects itself with bad faith must be conscious of it, since the 'being' of consciousness, is precisely the consciousness of its own being. It follows then that to be in good faith should mean at least admitting to self-deception. As has been suggested above this actually means that one must recognize that one lives naturally by 'faith'.

'Faith' must of course be understood differently from the religious context in which Kierkegaard uses it. It refers not to belief in a supernatural being, but rather to the fact that no project or choice is grounded in certainty. In bad faith one chooses for inauthenticity, because the self then does not acknowledge its own shaping role in its foundation. "What we call inauthenticity here, Sartre writes.... 'is the first sketch or the original choice the human being makes of himself when he chooses his God. That sketch is inauthentic if it is based on a choice to attain an \textit{En-soi-pour-soi}, and if he identifies himself with it, i.e. if he wants to be God and his own foundation...' [T]he fundamental choice of bad faith is the choice for inauthenticity. It is collusive, impure, because it does not realize, or does not want to acknowledge, that nothing precedes..."
my choice and freedom: neither God nor Commandment, neither values nor norms, since these are creations of the human being's existential freedom." (Boudier, 1985:420).

Good faith lies therein that although a person might be a useless passion, s/he is nevertheless a passion: that means that the self is the sum-total of all the strategies consciousness uses in this project of trying to substantify itself. The problem of choosing a 'God' (substantial consciousness) is actually a human problem which concerns the rapport between people. A person's life is the solution that s/he brings to the problem, which reflects the attitudes one chooses towards others and oneself. Each such project is unique: there are as many projects as there are individuals, although they can fall into broad categories. The 'project' forms the basis for a person's 'fundamental choice' in life, from which other attitudes such as that towards people, property, and knowledge are derived.

That one's fundamental project is also nothing less than one's own identity, sheds light in a different way on the nature of existential anguish: "[I]t is highly likely, in the light of Sartre's existentialism, that the object of anguish is not freedom per se, but the prospect of our fundamental project (and our believed personal essence) being undermined." (Jambor, 1990:113). It also follows from this that the cure for anguish and bad faith lies not only in the recognition of the nature of one's fundamental project, but also in developing the capacity to adapt or change it should circumstances so require. A great part of Sartre's work, namely existential psycho-analysis (Sartre, 1958:557-574) aims at setting a method for revealing a basic choice, and confronting the individual with it, so that s/he realizes a specific state of affairs represents a subjective interpretation, and not something objectively given.

That the world always reflects one's own, unique psychological outlook, is a point that will be taken up again in the chapter on Jung, in the outline of psychological types.

3.1.2 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SARTRE AND KIERKEGAARD.

3.1.2.1 The problem with religion

For Sartre, religion is just one among the many available strategies for the objectification and substantification of the self, and one that he specifically does not approve of. Sartre refers to Kierkegaard's discussion of Abraham on this point, and concludes that for all Abraham's struggles, he was yet not authentic, because he succumbed to the 'gaze of God' that made of himself an object. This, according to
Sartre, is typical of the religious attitude. "[U]nder the reign of the monarch the human being is transformed into an object, his consciousness into an epi­
phenomenon, his freedom into a static characteristic of his nature. And religion is
nothing else but the projection of human subjectivity to the outside, fixed in an
objective Existence by which it becomes a 'subjectivity of the Other' or
'other/somebody else's subjectivity.'" (Boudier,1985:422).

Here lies the major difference between Kierkegaard and Sartre, for despite their
similar analyses of dread, freedom and the importance of choice, they differ
fundamentally on the acceptability of giving up your own subjectivity in order to
become an object for an absolute subject. Kierkegaard does not differ from Sartre as
concerns the logical contradiction entailed in the idea of God, but holds nevertheless
that selfhood can only be found by rendering the self an object to an infinite and
constituting gaze. God's existence is not as radically impossible for Kierkegaard as for
Sartre, since Kierkegaard holds that God is simply above human comprehension.
Sartre's opinion is that finally Kierkegaard also gave in to anxiety, and invented
opacities in order to escape the dread of transparency. For all that Abraham suffered
for instance, he felt himself looked at by God, and therefore he had not to bear the full
weight of his own subjectivity. Because God's gaze constitutes him from without,
Abraham becomes an object, so fulfilling the need of the self/consciousness to
substantify itself and become its own object. (King,1974:83).

Despite the above, there are some that feel that Sartre and Kierkegaard do not differ
fundamentally from each other. Haynes-Curtis (1988:274-275) argues that what Sartre
calls a 'radical conversion' is really compatible with the Kierkegaardian 'leap of faith';
in both cases there is a choice of a way of life by an act of will not guided by reason,
based on principles to which one is existentially committed. This commitment comes
down to a single-mindedness of purpose and will, such that the will or faith behind the
'leap' or 'conversion' becomes a guiding principle for action of the same caliber that
knowledge and certainty would be.
3.1.2.2 Taking evidence into account

Catalano has a different view of the matter however, which says that it is exactly the blind disregard of evidence, and its implicit value relativism, that causes one to be in bad faith. In many cases there is evidence for making one choice rather than another. But bad faith commits itself to maintaining only one attitude despite any evidence that contradicts it. A racist attitude for instance is based on false stereotypes and irrational and hasty generalizations, but for the anti-Semite in bad faith not even overwhelming evidence against their basic assertions will rock their contempt and hatred.

A 'blind will to believe' is thus precisely not what is required for authenticity, but rather a discerning spirit that takes the evidence into account, even while realizing that no evidence can ever be entirely compelling. (Sartre,1958:67-68). Catalano thinks that good faith "tries to avoid extremes in its attitude towards its freedom and its ability to change its fundamental project. It views freedom as more than a blind force following the direction of an intellect and less than a will acting in accordance with its own arbitrary goals...It is only when freedom chooses to be uncritical and in bad faith that it deceives itself that it must follow one of two extremes: It should act only when there are clear reasons or it should make an irrational leap. But good faith is aware that these alternatives do not reflect its true condition. Between the clarity of apodictic evidence and the darkness of the leap there is the persuading voice of critical reason..." (Catalano,1980:215).

In good faith, one is willing to change one's beliefs in the face of new evidence, but in bad faith, any piece of evidence is as good as another. (Catalano,1990:684-685.)

"Bad faith apprehends evidence but it is resigned in advance to not being fulfilled by this evidence, to not being persuaded and transformed into good faith." (Sartre,1958:68).

A further step towards authenticity is to choose a project oneself, and not accept the project others might foist on one. The individual is the source of all value and all meaning, and his/her choice for a foundational objectivity must be made in transparency. For although existence may precede essence, essence must somehow follow or else no meaningful life is possible. That this essence is not prior to existence but posterior to it, appropriated by man himself, is the basis for existentialist ethics, which will be discussed in the next section.
3.2 EXISTENTIALIST ETHICS.

3.2.1 ACCOUNTABILITY

The foundation of existentialist ethics and an authentic morality is accountability/responsibility, which is only realizable on the basis of a conversion, which is "the recognition of myself as an ec-static Pour-Soi, as existence or continuous movement of transcendence, as creation or source of being and meaning." (Boudier, 1985:420).

Existentialist ethics is not a normative ethics, but (like Kant's) a meta-ethics. It does not set out norms and values to be used in the making of ethical decisions, as for example utilitarianism or emotivism would do, but rather provides an exposition of the framework, conditions, and circumstances that must be in place for ethics to be possible at all. It focuses not on the deed but on the doer. Human freedom is incompatible with the existence of absolute values, but relies instead on choice. What is important regarding the choice is not its content or nature, but the manner in which it is made, which must be conscious. The choice must be taken while honestly admitting that there is no ontological foundation to it. (See Sartre, 1958:625-629).

Sartre disagrees with those nineteenth century atheist liberals who said that universally valid moral values can be deduced without God or an absolute 'good' to support them. For Sartre, like Dostoevski's character Ivan Karamazov, if God is dead, then everything is permitted. But existentialist ethics implies that it is possible for humans to also be humane even though no external force compels them to. One can deconstruct fundamentalist moral doctrines to show that the fact that 'everything is permitted' is even supported implicitly by those bodies of thought that posit an ultimate standard against which to evaluate which choices are 'good' and 'right' as opposed to 'evil' and 'wrong'. "If reason is argued to be the ultimate justification of reality, one is free to be 'irrational'. If God is posited as the ultimate source of all true values, one is free to be irreverent; if patriotism is taken as the ultimate duty, one is free to be treasonably undutiful; and if human nature is cited as support for a principle, one is free to act 'unnaturally." (Solomon, 1972:315).

Sartre is a forerunner of postmodern ethics which stresses the in-decidability of moral dilemma's; shortly, the ethics of deconstruction states that if there were a simple right and wrong answer to any moral problem, then one's responsibility would not be so great (as it would be if we had to decide for ourselves what is right and wrong) because then the consequences of the decision are not as important as the imperative of making the 'right' decision. Postmodern ethics stresses that there can never be a
simple 'right' or 'wrong' choice, but rather that correct moral action lies in taking the responsibility for the consequences of the choice, and minimizing the damage that (inevitably) results because of it.85

Deeds are vastly more significant to Sartre than are intentions; a ‘self’ is quite simply the sum of all his/her deeds up to the present moment. A failure to act is on many levels an iniquity: on the personal level for example, a person with an inferiority complex suffers from an unwillingness to act and so risk failure. This is because of the inherent (bad faith) project of being superior, which will be dashed if ever the individual commits to freedom. We have seen already that for Sartre most people remain trapped in an inappropriate project their lives long and only with great difficulty succeed in approximating authenticity.

Sartre was influenced later in life by the thought of Merleau-Ponty to leave behind the pessimism of *Being and Nothingness* and adopt a philosophy of salvation. In a rather Hegelian/ Marxist move he locates man's salvation not in being nor in nothingness, but in 'becoming'. This means that consciousness must refrain from trying to keep itself abstract and pure, and also refrain from trapping itself in the series of meaningless 'gestures' that make up bourgeois life, and must instead involve itself in a *praxis*. This is still congruent however with his basic idea that taking responsibility is the closest one can get to salvation.

3.2.2 CREATIVE FREEDOM.

3.2.2.1 Contemplation and action

Sartre’s ideal recipe for human life is a sustained balance between action and contemplation. The purely contemplative life corresponds to a consciousness that has given itself over too much to being-in-itself, while the active life on the other hand can become too far removed from being-in-itself and be unable to recognize that its own projects are human, and not 'natural' or divine. The contemplative life has to do with 'being', under which category Sartre includes magic, substance, the object, soul, death and fatality. The category of action comprises of 'nothingness': freedom, will, the subject, consciousness, life and the will to live. (King,1974:61). The difference between praxis on the one hand, and either the active and contemplative life on the other, has to do with the extent to which one recognizes how being-in-itself is transformed by human consciousness. Both the active and contemplative life, as
traditionally perceived, tend to deny the imprint of human consciousness upon existence.

As concerns the contemplative life, take as an example a city dweller going on holiday in the country: looking at a typical farm scene, the city dweller will be inclined to see it as pure 'nature', vastly removed from urban existence. The farmer sees the same landscape as the product of work and cultivation. The city dweller on holiday did not bring any subjectivity to bear on the scene, and consequently feels detached from the surroundings, blending in like one object among many. This contemplative attitude appears to succeed in leaving the spontaneity of consciousness behind, because it is taken up into the environment in fascination. If the city dweller's position is taken to the extreme we find the mystic's stance, which is detached from everything and from all human projects. In this mode of existence, being-in-itself has a magical and sacred quality about it, because no distinction is made between the subject and the object. Consciousness is fascinated, but also passive. The mystic's position is a form of bad faith for it denies the freedom of consciousness and its influence and imprint upon being-in-itself. It denies that all meaning comes from human consciousness, and endows 'nature' with a meaning of its own.

The active life on the other hand can also be taken to extremes and is also a form of bad faith, because ceaseless activity is another means of escaping from the spontaneity of consciousness and the anguish of existence.

3.2.2.2 Praxis

Sincerity lies somewhere between these two extremes: one cannot withdraw from the human life-world altogether in passive contemplation, nor can one escape through activity. A fundamental project must be chosen that takes into account any evidence that supports or negates it - a project that incorporates both facticity and transcendence, and that is chosen for oneself, but without any intention of retaining it at all costs. Sartre dubs this saving form of consciousness 'creative freedom.'

Sartre in his later years replaced the endorsement of existential psycho-analysis with a Marxist insistence on the need to establish a history through labor and solidarity with others. This new line of thought does not however constitute a departure from his earlier thinking. As with Kierkegaard, it is a question of different stages succeeding one another. "The negative freedom must totally intervene before the final freedom can make its appearance." (King,1974:170). Like Kierkegaard, Sartre explains that
before one can grasp the temporal and the finite, one must first give it up. "The final stage (which both Kierkegaard and Sartre would consider salvation) strongly resembles the life of the bourgeoisie, but actually it is radically different because a total disengagement has intervened." (King, 1974:171).

The difference between Kierkegaard and Sartre is that for the former freedom and essence lies beyond the self, in God, whereas the latter holds that an individual must appropriate its own essence, because essence for Sartre's is what one has done.

Thus we can see that also for Sartre there is a synthesis that constitutes the self; the synthesis between facticity and transcendence. As with Kierkegaard it is not a synthesis that dissolves conflict but maintains it. The correct balance between these opposites is what makes for authenticity of the self.
4. CRITICAL EVALUATION.

4.1 MORALITY AND INFLUENCE.

As was the case with Kierkegaard, a general critique of Sartre's style and method will be given here, while a more specific evaluation of his recipe for authenticity will be left until the final chapter.

Sartre's literary work seems to dwell on weak characters, dazed by boredom and unfulfilled lives, who have questionable morality and a penchant for the unpleasant and perverted aspects of life. His characters are hardly inspiring and the world he depicts is grim. The irony is that Sartre's philosophy endorses a morality of an extremely high standard, if properly understood. Once the philosophical underpinnings of his literary work are fathomed, it can be seen that the penchant for the perverse is not gratuitous, but necessary.

Sartre employs the same technique as Freud, namely analyzing the human condition by studying its most extreme forms. He found in the abnormal that which also explains and clarifies what is 'normal'. Sartre's fictional characters are extreme examples of ordinary vices: "Roquentin's sensations are not in themselves so rare and peculiar. All of us experience, for instance, that sense of emptiness and meaninglessness that we call ennui. In so far as Sartre exaggerates in Roquentin our ordinary feelings of boredom and loss of meaning this is in order to bring home to us a point which 'carelessness' and 'inattention' usually obscure." (Murdoch, 1953:6).

Consequently Sartre's special form of ethical nihilism should not be interpreted as the death-knell of decency. Sartre lays bare the incontestable foundation of all morality, which is personal responsibility.

One can distinguish between the ontological and the ethical analyses of authenticity, because on the ontological level good and bad faith are not moral categories. The ethical dimension comes into play in the attitude we take and the way we relate to our responsibility. (Catalano, 1980:225). As far as admitting to responsibility goes, it is clear that under Sartre's scrutiny no-one can in good faith say things like "I had no choice" or 'I didn't mean it'. Those defenses of 'kill or be killed', 'I was just following orders', as well as the ever popular 'the devil made me do it', lose their power in light of Sartre's ontological analysis of freedom, which demonstrates that one is never constrained to do anything, one always has a choice, even when there is a gun to one's head. Similarly, because a person is the sum total of all his/her actions, it
is not possible to refer to the hidden intention behind a deed, for example ‘I meant well’ or ‘I didn't mean to hurt anyone’ to exonerate oneself. Relating positively to one's responsibility on an ethical level is taken up in Sartre's later call to action, to a life of getting one’s ‘hands dirty’, the direct opposite of an attitude that washes its hands of evil.

On this ethical level two attitudes are unacceptable: Firstly denying involvement and responsibility for the state the world is in: to say that one has no share in the sins of one's ancestors/ fellow countrymen is in bad faith. Jung makes the same point when he says that all are capable of evil, simply by virtue of being human, and painting a picture of oneself that contains only the good and the pure, is not only inauthentic, but also dangerous. In the second place, Sartre implies, it is unacceptable to say that one's own small contribution cannot make a difference to anything. This is an attitude that always waits for someone else to take responsibility, and is therefore also unethical.

The ages when atheism and immorality were associated with each other, are long gone. Already it is clear that in many instances atheism has been infinitely more humane than the world’s religions. In the latter case suffering, poverty, war, and cruelty can always be justified to some extent, because wrongs are made right in the afterlife. Similarly speculative systems like Hegel’s tries to show that past injustices were in some way necessary, in order for our knowledge and understanding of the world to increase. Sartre, like Kierkegaard and Jung, disapproves of any such attitude that absolves people from the need to act, and places all the responsibility for history squarely in front of humanity.

In Sartre’s vision the fact that the world is a cruel and violent place reflects our choice that it should be so. It reflects the meaning that we as a human species have conferred upon our existence, and nothing can serve to condone it. The vision of the responsible self thus offered by Sartre is a singularly powerful one. His ethical contribution to the current discussion is a view of a self that creates its own existence through the spontaneous meaning-conferring activity of consciousness. This self must take responsibility for its attitude, before being able to reach a stage that, on an ethical level at least, might be called authenticity. This is a self that does not isolate itself from society in order to nurse its despair, but even in the midst of it can work, act, and take its place in the world.
4.2 METHOD: THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE

Now we turn to the philosophical underpinnings of the above ethical scheme, taking time to evaluate Sartre as a philosopher.

Sartre's work has been called obscure, and it has been asked (again as with Kierkegaard) whether he himself has the right to be called a 'philosopher'. Olafson (1967:293) says that Sartre's "argumentation is often skimpy and lacking in rigor; he seems to be unaware of, or unconcerned by, the grossly metaphorical character of many of his leading ideas...". Instances of this metaphorical tendency abound in Being and Nothingness, since all his descriptions of Being and Nothing can be said to be to some extent poetic. To call being-in-itself opaque, the for-itself a wind that blows towards objects, and nothingness a worm curled up in the heart of being, seems to render the notions vague and obscure, necessitating an imaginary rather than a rational effort for them to be understood. But if Sartre can be blamed for this tendency, so can many others. It is typical of the type of enterprise that Sartre undertakes that the rules of language must be bent, and that he should expect language to do things it was not designed for.

Consequently many instances of criticism directed against Sartre accuse him of slips in the logic of language. Santoni (1985:142-143) argues that Sartre's entire ontological analysis of bad faith is based on the fallacy of equivocation:

"The critical intent of my earlier article on sincerity is to question Sartre's controversial contentions that the essential structure of sincerity is the same as that of bad faith, and that the ideal of sincerity - 'to be what one is' - contradicts the ontological structure of (one's) consciousness (as 'being what one is not and not being what one is') and is thus impossible (BN:112). I acknowledge that if the aim of sincerity is 'to be what one is' and if 'to be what one is' means what Sartre defines it to mean in his characterization of being in itself (l'être en-soi), then sincerity's goal of 'co-incidence' or 'absolute equivalence' with oneself constitutes a project to flee from oneself as being for-itself (l'être pour-soi) and, hence, is in 'bad faith'. But I go on to argue that Sartre's analysis of bad faith is defective because it is based on an equivocation. Sartre locates the meaning of sincerity - 'being what one is' - in ordinary language usage, but then proceeds to place that ordinary language expression in his idiosyncratic system of ontological terms, and to invest it with the full meaning that 'to be what one is' has in that system. This step is philosophically illegitimate."

This line of criticism is what one expects from an analytic approach, which says that when language doesn't make sense anymore, it does not mean something profound is
being expressed, but merely that the mind is being caught up in all sorts of muddles and category mistakes.

In answer it might be pointed out first of all that the distinction between metaphorical and literal language has long since been discredited by Nietzsche; language is metaphorical through and through and all so-called 'literal' expressions of it merely seem literal through frequent use. Moreover, it must be pointed out that the metaphorical character of a work does not disqualify it from being rigorous nonetheless. Sartre does much more than play word games: he breaks open patterns of thought and language in order to bring the reader to an existential experience (as did Kierkegaard.) Indeed, in Nausea it can be seen that the meeting with naked existence is precisely one that is defenseless against the classifying power of 'literal' language.

Language and words are precisely among the tools used in service of 'bad faith'. As long as one has command of language, it appears that one has command of the world, of existence and of oneself. When something has a name it can be mastered.

But the naming activity of consciousness must be recognized as arbitrary and contingent. Sartre differs from the analytical school in not analyzing language's actual use, but rather suggesting how it should be used. How it should be used is not to classify and ossify the totality of the senseless, chaotic, overflowing realm of 'being in itself', but to stabilize and create one's own life in the first place, and in the second place to equate "literature, meaning, truth and democracy". (Murdoch, 1953:44).

Sartre does not use the indirect technique of Kierkegaard, but nevertheless through his literary talent he creates and magnifies the ennui that hides in everyone below the surface. The slow pace of his novels, and the dreariness of his characters, have the effect of creating that same sense of nausea in the reader. The phenomenological analysis found in Being and Nothingness lays bare facts about human existence that are familiar to all, like shame, anxiety, crippled interpersonal relationships, alienation, and so on. In this way the reader is first brought face to face with his/her own inauthenticity, and then (especially in Sartre's later works) with the need to act and change the world for the better.
4.3 DOGMA?

A criticism more difficult to set aside is the one that accuses Sartre's work of being too dogmatic. Olafson says that although Sartre tries to break himself loose from the giant system builders like Hegel and Husserl, he shares one of their main defects, namely an inability to distance himself critically from his own ideas: "His ideas may quite literally be said to define reality for him in a way and to a degree that makes it impossible for him to submit them to any kind of empirical or pragmatic test by which their merits might be compared with those of other philosophical points of view." (Olafson, 1967:293). This form of criticism is based on a circular argument, which posits as conclusion that Sartre's ideas are flawed because they cannot be submitted to empirical and pragmatic tests, but also takes as premise the assumption that ideas are worthwhile only if they can be proven to be empirical, pragmatic and comparable to other philosophical points of view. The criticism takes for granted a standard of judgment, namely pragmatism and empiricism, but does not provide a reason for why these standards are to be accepted in themselves.

Again, we can see that this criticism comes from a different tradition than that to which Sartre belongs. It relies on those principles of language analysis, positivism and pragmatism that underlie modern Anglo-American philosophy, and looks with scorn on the continental traditions that followed from the great 'system builders', that still have smatterings of what appears to be metaphysics embedded in them. In other words, the criteria of pragmatism and empiricism are actually incommensurable with the project Sartre undertakes, which is phenomenological, ontological and existential. It is not fair to use these criteria against Sartre, for his work must be judged on its own terms. The idea that a philosopher must be able to distance himself from his own work is not only outdated in the light of the double hermeneutic of the human sciences, it also goes against the grain of existential phenomenology, which is an exploration of inner subjective states.

But having taken this into consideration, there still remains a kernel of truth in the accusation that Sartre has a built-in defense in his work against any criticism stating that the central tenets are completely misguided: If anyone should deny that existence is gratuitous and that man is the only source of meaning in the universe, that person would simply be said to be in 'bad faith'. This is the same type of criticism directed against Kierkegaard and against thinkers like Freud and Jung (Sartre himself directed this critique against Freud). But again it can be parried that in the game of
psychology, phenomenology and existentialism, the rules do not say that utterances should be tested against reality, or in terms of their coherence. That is because they are concerned with paradoxical matters that cannot be expressed so easily in coherent language. The matters of which these bodies of thought speak must be experienced and lived through, not merely thought about and solved pragmatically. They deal with factors undeniable to those who have experienced them, such as the reality of anxiety, dread and nausea, and as such are descriptive systems that posit hypotheses to aid understanding of these phenomena. While the hypotheses might be contested, and I believe that Sartre does allow his to be, a denial of the phenomena of nausea and bad faith is also a refusal to play the game Sartre is engaged in. The phenomenological reality of these data must first be accepted before any further discussion around the issue can take place, and this does not necessarily constitute an inability on Sartre's part to critically distance himself from his work.

4.4 ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

Sartre repeatedly criticized the notion of the unconscious. He did this for two basic reasons: firstly, to him the concept of an 'unconscious mind' was a contradiction in terms. That which is not conscious is the in itself, and what is left is consciousness. There cannot be, according to him, hidden regions of the mind that are opaque to consciousness, for consciousness is transparency. Secondly Sartre was opposed to all theories of psychological determinism, such as Freud's, which made the conscious mind subject to forces that it itself does not know and cannot control. Consciousness is radically free and any theory that tries to determine and predict the forces that act upon it from a so-called 'outside', is in bad faith.

Yet there are many things Sartre says about consciousness and the world that are not entirely irreconcilable with a theory of the unconscious, and while Sartre tends to use terminology that comes at the problem from an entirely different direction than that of traditional psychology, some parallels might be noted. First of all, Sartre holds that the self does not disclose itself exhaustively to immediate intuition. According to him that meant that the self belongs among the objects of 'the world' that are also never entirely disclosed in all their aspects by the impression one has of them at any given moment. A chair for example is more than just the basically two-dimensional image (profile) of it that appears to vision; even if one is not at a given moment touching it, there is for instance a memory of the feel of hard, smooth wood that accompanies the
understanding of the characteristics of that ‘chair’. Since that is a memory and not a sensation directly experienced at that specific moment in time, it is one of many aspects of the chair that transcends the immediate intuition thereof. For the same reason the self is ‘transphenomenal.’ (Olafson, 1967:289).

What this means is that there are many things about the self, memories, characteristics, etc. that one not only has no knowledge of, but that one is not aware of all the time. The aspects of the self take turns in presenting themselves to consciousness. But here is exactly where a theory of the unconscious can possibly come in. Just as one cannot see around a corner until you turn it, there are many things that are undeniably in the mind, or if you prefer, of a ‘mind-nature’, that are only discovered when one goes in search of them. Memories are a case in point.

In other words, a part of the self is always unconscious, or alternatively, not yet conscious. Sartre did not call this aspect of the self the ‘unconscious’ but rather ‘pre-reflective consciousness’ or sometimes also ‘non-positional’ consciousness. “Just as Sartre presents the transphenomenality of objects as the background against which they appear, he also argues that the being of consciousness is similarly transphenomenal in the sense of not being dependent on its appearing to itself in explicit, reflective self-awareness. Instead, this reflective self-consciousness of objects is held by Sartre to presuppose their transphenomenal status.” (Olafson, 1967:292). In short, Sartre’s theory holds that consciousness is not necessarily awareness, and so it can be said, somewhat clumsily, that there is a type of ‘consciousness’ that is one is actually for the most part unconscious of.

Sartre commits what Jung would call the common error of the overvaluation of consciousness. This is an attitude that takes the tip to be the iceberg. Sartre does not acknowledge the historicity of the mind in terms of the development of the entire human race, but insists that consciousness has absolute freedom. But just as the body has a history, so has the mind, Jung would argue, and therefore it is not only our physical bodies, but also some parts of our minds that help to constitute facticity. As we shall presently see, this does not mean that consciousness is entirely determined, and thus need not go against Sartre’s argument that the self is fundamentally free.
Summary of themes:

- Sartre is a phenomenologist in that he reconsiders Husserl's phenomenological reduction, which supposedly shows that it is possible to describe the essential structures of consciousness by isolating consciousness and its objects. But he is also an existentialist in that he shows, like Heidegger, that one cannot study consciousness without at the same time affirming the reality of actual objects in the world. The transition from phenomenology to existentialism lies therein that the reduction is, properly speaking, impossible, since the brute facticity/existence of the world is absolutely irreducible.

- Sartre can also be described as a modern Cartesian, because he distinguishes between two distinct realms of Being, namely the in-itself (objects for consciousness), which is opaque, thing-like, and lacking consciousness, and the for-itself (consciousness itself), which is transparent, empty, and 'no-thing', or in other words, not a substance.

- In this respect (stating that consciousness is not a substance, not even a 'thinking' substance) he differs from Descartes, but also breaks with rationalism/idealism because he does not equate selfhood with consciousness, as so many other philosophers before him had done. The self/ or the "I" is an object for consciousness, not its source, and is consequently 'out in the world', together with other 'things'.

- Nevertheless, the self is not a thing like an in-itself, since it has no substance. The self is instead the hopeless attempt to reconcile and synthesize the two different realms of being, which is a useless passion, since ontologically and logically speaking, they are mutually exclusive. The non-existence of God is affirmed as indubitable fact, since God is defined as that Being that is both for-itself and in-itself.

- In light of the above, human consciousness is characterized by radical and absolute freedom, since it is distinct and totally removed from the physical universe it inhabits. It is always possible for consciousness to negate and change any given situation through the imagination and free choice.

- This freedom, and the non-existence of God, necessarily implies that meaning and purpose are not given or inherent in the universe, but are entirely
anthropomorphic, that is, originating in human consciousness and then assigned arbitrarily to the world. Awareness of this unconditioned freedom and concomitant lack of meaning in the universe, causes anxiety, which is fear of oneself rather than of fear of extraneous circumstances. Anxiety and nothingness are those facts about the self that the human being attempts to flee by resorting to bad faith.

- Bad faith, or, what we also call 'inauthenticity', takes different forms: First, it means denying transcendence, or in other words not admitting the fact that consciousness is an empty nothingness for which everything, through the imagination, is possible. Secondly, bad faith is the denial of facticity, which means not admitting to the factual restraints and restrictive circumstances in which choices must be made.

- Bad faith is an a-priori structure of the self, not only because a human being flees from anguish, but also because every attempt to establish an 'I' or 'self' implies consciousness taking itself as object, denying nothingness, and assigning essence and substance where there is none. One is in bad faith whenever one tries to establish oneself as something particular, fixed, and settled. Because establishing a self of any description is precisely an assigning of essence, and because establishing a self in this manner is the basic prerequisite for existence, bad faith is basically unavoidable. Human existence is the frustrated desire to be God, which is an expression of despair, or form of ontological original sin.

- Nevertheless, it is possible to approximate authenticity, by taking personal responsibility for any and every situation in which one might find oneself, admitting that one can always choose to interpret it differently and so assign a different meaning to it. Authenticity means acquiescing to the fact that one is a useless passion, or, in other words, it means living in 'honest despair' rather than succumbing to the self-serving delusions of bad faith.

- The self arises precisely in the dialectical tension between freedom and facticity. This is the same point that Kierkegaard makes: what Sartre describes as 'facticity' Kierkegaard calls necessity/ finitude, while 'transcendence' is Kierkegaard's possibility/ infinity.

- The similarities between Kierkegaard and Sartre lie therein that both see inauthenticity as the avoidance of inner conflict; conflict is avoided by suppressing one aspect of existence in favor of another. Authenticity, on the other
hand, means dealing with this tension consciously, even if it creates anxiety, rather than trying to suppress one of its poles.

- The two thinkers differ in that Kierkegaard argues that the management of this inner tension is only possible through the orientation to an extra-mundane source or authority, namely God. Sartre says on the other hand that authenticity is only possible by denying any 'outside' source of meaning. The individual must manage the inner conflict by him-/herself and assign meaning to a world that is essentially devoid of it.

- Authenticity, according to Sartre, is to be achieved through 'creative freedom', which means establishing for oneself an own basic project, and so becoming involved in a praxis which allows for solidarity with others. In the light of his later departure from the pessimistic character of Being and Nothingness towards a more positive encouragement of creativity and praxis, Sartre had modified his hypothesis that bad faith is endemic to the human condition. Towards the end of his life he said that one is always responsible for what is made of one. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the phenomenological discovery that consciousness is nothingness, and that the for-itself and the in-itself are irreconcilable can be careless overlooked or overthrown. Authenticity, such as it is, then effects a real, practical engagement with life, which translates into a meaningful existence, and it means that the self is an on-going project in the world with other people.
CHAPTER IV: JUNG

"There was once a man, Harry, called the Steppenwolf. He went on two legs, wore clothes, and was a human being. Nevertheless, he was really a wolf of the steppes. He had learned a great deal of everything that people, with a fair mind, can, and he was a rather clever fellow. What he had not learned however, was this: to find contentment in himself and his own life ... In him the man and the wolf did not go the same way together, they did not help each other, but were in continual and deadly enmity.

[But] ... to explain so complex a man as Harry by the artless division into wolf and man is a hopelessly childish attempt. Harry consists of a hundred or a thousand selves, not of two. His life oscillates, as everyone's does, not merely between two poles, such as the body and the spirit, the saint and the sinner, but between thousands, between innumerable poles."

- Herman Hesse: Steppenwolf.

1. INTRODUCTION.

1.1 THE ARCHETYPES OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS.

1.1.1 THE DISAGREEMENT WITH FREUD

Freud wasn't the first theorist to use that term which today has become a popular expression, namely the 'unconscious', but he certainly can be credited with taking a relatively obscure notion and building a Copernican revolution around it. Freud is often referred to as one of the three 'masters of suspicion', those intellectuals who played the biggest part in the shift from the world of the Enlightenment and modernism to post-modernism, even though he himself was in many ways a product of the Enlightenment with his rationalistic and positivistic approach to the human mind. The other two influential thinkers so referred to are Nietzsche and Marx. Each of these three men in their own way threw into doubt the notion that human beings are or can be guided by their critical reason. They undermined the unexamined assumption that a person is the 'captain of their own ship', and revealed in their theories that people are subject to forces vastly greater than themselves, and to a great extent beyond their control.

Freud, the theorist that here most interests us, since Jung worked closely with him, cast in doubt the assumption that motives determining behavior are obvious and
transparent. Beneath a modern person's semblance of control and civility, argued Freud, there are hidden memories, impulses and trauma's that strive to rise to the surface and that, because they are repressed due to their unpleasant content, or even barbaric nature, work in ways never guessed at by the conscious mind.

Jung's understanding of the unconscious must be contrasted with Freud's in the following ways: firstly, Freud tended to think of the unconscious as a type of wastebasket for socially unacceptable feelings, traumatic memories, and unfulfilled wishes; an example might be the wish of a young boy to possess his mother. (Freud, 1949:73). The unconscious of a newborn is a blank slate that will be filled up slowly as life progresses and experiences accumulate - experiences like a young boy's fear of castration, which stands at the center of the mutually contending emotional impulses of love for the mother and fear of the father. This entire conflict, and other typical ones like it, are "subjected to a highly energetic repression." (ibid.). Jung on the other hand saw the unconscious as the rich and fertile soil from which consciousness flowers, because, he said, the unconscious "is life", which turns against us if it is suppressed. (Jung, 1939: pars. 520-524).

The intellectual origins of Jung's attitude can be traced back to the German Romantic philosophers such as Schelling, Schopenhauer, von Hartmann and Goethe, all thinkers whom Jung read and admired. (Clarke, 1992:12). According to Jung, every child is born with innate meaning-creating tendencies and pre-dispositions which give shape to the particular experiences of his/her life. These tendencies are not determined by the place or time in which a person is born, since they are 'universal' in the sense of being distinctly human. However, two important points must be stressed right away: First, that Jung saw these innate tendencies as universal in no ways means he minimized the differences between peoples from different parts of the world and different cultures. Quite the contrary: the same basic and inherent psychic forces give rise to very different cultural or symbolic shapes, and since they grow in different climates, symbols - and even their significance - differ, even while the archetypes they point to are the same. Secondly, these tendencies are not fixed, but develop in an evolutionary way, just as the human body does. In fact, according to Jung, contemporary human development/ evolution must be seen as exclusively psychic, since there have been no significant evolutionary changes in the body for some millennia, while the human mind has changed a great deal during that time, and still is changing.
The essence of the distinction between Jung and Freud is between seeing the mind/consciousness as a *tabula rasa* (as Locke did for example), or as possessing an a priori structure that serves to organize sensory and other experience, as did Kant. Freud would fit into the first category, being a scientific empiricist in the tradition of naturalism (Darwin) and positivism (Brucke). Jung belongs to the second category, which would, according to some, make him an idealist. This is hardly surprising, since Jung was an avid reader of Kant during his student days, and was steeped in the tradition of German Idealism and Romanticism. His debts to these philosophies were explicitly acknowledged on more than one occasion. Like Kant, he wished to overcome the age-old problem of rationalism versus empiricism, a debate incarnated in his own time as the dispute between science and spiritualism, by uniting the two tendencies through an elucidation of the structure/nature of the psyche. It can be argued that Jung's notion of symbol and archetype are logically isomorphic with that of Kant's 'idea' (Bär, 1976:114) - both being structuring tendencies given in human (but also animal) life. In fact, Jung on occasion argued that Kant's categories represent a rationalized, deteriorated intuition of the archetypes. (Brooke, 1991:75). Without delving into this polemic, it is enough to say that an analysis of the structure of the mind (understood in the broadest possible terms) showed Jung that all experience, even sensory experience, and all meaning-creating practices of mankind, such as religion, art, culture, philosophy, and science, are influenced by and conform to mental patterns (archetypes) that are collective and therefore supra-personal.

One of the problems in understanding Jung's work however, is his claim, oft repeated, that he was an empiricist and a scientist, despite his idealist/romantic roots. By this we are to understand that he regarded experience as the primary source of knowledge about the human psyche, and tried to avoid a-priori reasoning, or the imposing of theory on facts (as he believed Freud had done with his theory of human sexuality). Clarke (1992:37-38) says that two kinds of empirical evidence are presented as such by Jung: the first is phenomenological evidence in the sense of information provided by patients recounting dreams, fantasies and hallucinations, and the second cultural, namely the publicly observable and historically recorded activities of groups of people, expressed in myth, religion, art and architecture. Clearly this places Jung in the hermeneutic rather than natural scientific tradition, a distinction to which he was unfortunately insensitive. In keeping with this claim however, he attempted to back up the hypothesis of the collective unconscious with evidence that could be observed and
documented. That these types of claims are hard to swallow for the scientifically-minded who require 'evidence' to be quantifiable, is due to the above-mentioned error of terminology on Jung's part. The scientific climate of his time, which demanded of true science to be empirical and positivistic, would however go a long way to explaining why Jung felt the need to defend his theories as being scientific. Today one would be more likely to refer to Jung as an investigator of phenomena, than as a scientist investigating and measuring reality.

1.1.2 JUNG AS PHENOMENOLOGIST.
Brooke (1991:2,6,30) feels that Jung finds his true intellectual home in that particular form of hermeneutics called existential phenomenology, although Jung himself was not familiar enough with its central tenets to give precise phenomenological expression to his thought. In fact, Brooke claims that Jung anticipated much of (for instance Sartre's) existential-phenomenological critique of Freud (ibid,28). Jung's method can broadly speaking be classified as phenomenological by looking at how it conforms to its four central, overlapping characteristics, as described by Merleau-Ponty in the preface to The Phenomenology of Perception (1945): description, reduction, the search for essences and intentionality. It is also possible to find in Jung features of the existential-phenomenological correction of some of Husserl's original formulations.

1.1.2.1 Description
Phenomenology favors description of lived experience above the formulation of theoretical and scientific hypotheses. Description should be contrasted with explanation, but not with interpretation, since description is "to return repeatedly to the phenomenon itself so that it may show itself in ever deeper, richer, and more subtle ways", which is an interpretative activity, known as the hermeneutic circle. (Brooke,1991:31). Jung's work is phenomenological in that it avoids metaphysical considerations, and treats images, beliefs, myths, dreams, hallucinations, and religious ideas on their own psychological terms, describing them in detail without attempting to explain them too hastily.
1.1.2.2 Reduction

Closely tied in with description, is the phenomenological reduction, which is a kind of 'mental leap' whereby theoretical and philosophical prejudices are set aside. This is achieved through the epoche, the bracketing of being, or disconnection from unexamined presuppositions that obstruct access to an experience of the phenomena as they would present themselves to a naïve consciousness. (Brooke, 1991:33).

Supposedly in this manner it is possible to return to our most original and pure experience of the world. The reduction is intended to overcome distinctions and categories of thinking, for example between Kant's phenomenon and noumenon. Specifically in existential phenomenology it is also meant to return one to the Lebenswelt - that is, the lived world or 'life-world', which stands in contrast to the abstract world that science presents. Although a complete reduction is impossible, Jung emphasized that psychology must abandon its pre-conceived, historically contingent and Euro-centric opinions. He turns to pre-Enlightenment sources such as alchemy (see: Psychology and Alchemy, 1968; and also Mysterium Coniunctionis: an inquiry into the separation and synthesis of psychic opposites in alchemy, 1963) and Gnosticism (see Jung, 1959:184-222) in order to find sources of experience 'uncontaminated' by the ontological premises of materialism and rationalism, (Brooke, 1991:34) as well as to systems alien to Western thinking such as for instance those of the Pueblo Indians (see Jung, 1961:242-250 and 257-277), African religion (see Jung, 1961:242-250) and Chinese divination (see his foreword to Richard Wilhelm's translation of the I Ching.; or Book of Changes, 1951).

The phenomenological reduction also helped him to begin making sense of the delirious fantasies of the insane, which psychiatrists had assumed to be pure nonsense. By focusing on the images as they appear, and insisting on the meaningful integrity of the 'thing itself', he was able to discover that these delusions have a peculiar logic of their own that are open to interpretation. Thus he assumes a naïve attitude which takes the tales of the insane at face value. "Through my work with the patients I realized that paranoid ideas and hallucinations contains a germ of meaning. A personality, a life history, a pattern of hopes and desires lie behind the psychosis. The fault is ours if we do not understand them... At bottom we discover nothing new and unknown in the mentally ill; rather, we encounter the substratum of our own natures." (in Berger & Segaller, 1989:27).
1.1.2.3 The search for essences

Having made the first reduction, which situates the phenomenologist in the most original life-world, (supposedly) uncontaminated by theoretical science or presuppositions, Husserl said that a second (eidetic) reduction is required, by which to intuit the essences of the objects of consciousness. This is to be achieved by using the imagination, which is able to discriminate the essence of any phenomenon from its empirical contingencies by imaginatively investigating "what changes can be made to a sample without making it cease to be the thing that it is." (Brooke, 1991:37). Husserl noted the following points about the eidetic reduction: the essences of phenomena are given in the things themselves; they can be intuited by a naïve consciousness through the mode of the imagination; and in the life-world these essences are meaningful relations. (Brooke, 1991:37).

Existential phenomenology departs from Husserl's 'pure/ eidetic' phenomenology in saying that there are no ontologically immutable essences, and furthermore that every act of understanding is already an interpretation (Sartre's point), which means that the reduction is in principle forever incomplete. This means that phenomenology becomes hermeneutic phenomenology as the significance of language in constituting our experience is understood. In this context we can say that it makes a difference whether the organ at the center of our bodily life is called a heart or a pump (Romanyshyn's example), whether the moon is defined as the satellite orbiting the earth or as a source of romance and madness, or, to use one of Jung's examples, whether we speak of serving a god or serving a mania. What makes this important is that metaphors have significance not only in a linguistic, but also in an ontological sense, because they are the means by which the Being of beings is made manifest - through a concealing revelation. (Heidegger's point.)

Jung's archetypes have this kind of metaphorical status, (hiding the 'truth' even while revealing it), as will soon become clearer. Jung is therefore a phenomenologist not only in the sense of performing the reduction - taking dreams, hallucinations, myths, etc. seriously - but in treating them as texts requiring interpretation, he aligned himself with hermeneutics in a way that was ahead of his time, says Brooke (1991:38).

His hermeneutic method of dream-analysis was called 'amplification', which consists in adding further personal as well as collective analogies to the ones already supplied by the symbol. In this way an individual's personal life is linked to cultural/collective
meanings. (Brooke, 1991:39). This method of amplification shows many similarities with Husserl's free imaginative variation, whereby the essence of phenomena are intuited. The difference for Jung, and what aligns him with existential rather than 'pure' phenomenology, is that the hermeneutic procedure spirals ever further downward into the mysteries of being without the hope or intention of striking rock-bottom apodictic evidence. He says instead that "interpretations make use of certain linguistic matrices that are themselves derived from primordial images. From whatever side we approach this question [of meaning], everywhere we find ourselves confronted with the history of language, with images and motifs that lead straight back to the primitive wonder-world." (in Brooke, 1991:40).

1.1.2.4 Intentionality

Intentionality, unlike the previous three aspects of phenomenology, is not a method or technique, but is held to be the defining characteristic of consciousness. With this thesis phenomenology succeeds in overcoming the traditional mind-body/ subject-object dualism of Descartes and Kant, by saying that consciousness is the ontological 'there' or 'world-opening' which makes it possible for a thing to 'be'. Intentionality means objects are apprehended directly; it is not a connecting bridge or link between consciousness and something else. Intentionality defines human existence as ex-istere, to stand outwards, to be intimately involved in a life-world.

The interesting thing is that an analysis of consciousness as intentionality leads very quickly, as in Sartre, to the realization that consciousness is impersonal and for the most part not self-reflectively aware. Consciousness is more of "an operative yet pre-personal latency" or something that "precedes and surrounds the boundaries of personal identity" (Brooke, 1991:43). From here it is possible to find a way of speaking about Jung's 'unconscious' in a way that does not reify it. The thesis of intentionality not only undermines the traditional subject-object duality, but also the primacy of the subject itself: not the ego, but the unconscious is logically prior (which is the opposite of Freud's insistence that the unconscious is a sort of deteriorated, derived form of consciousness.)

Although Jung did not address the phenomenon of intentionality 'in those words', says Brooke (ibid), it speaks clearly from his first major work that appeared in 1921, ten years after the break with Freud, namely Psychological Types. The basic idea behind this book was that the perceived world is always a world-for-someone (a
particular type), and that every person's world, although seemingly 'natural' to themselves, is actually colored by their own basic orientation. Jung here also redefined the term 'libido' in order to distinguish it from Freud's mechanistic, 'hydraulic' model, giving it direction "as a measure of the shifting values and intensities in one's relation with the world" (ibid:44). The libido is described not as energies in Freud's natural scientific sense, but as general motivating powers or will-forces, where introversion is an inward turning of the libido/interest in a negative relation of subject/object. The 'inner' and 'outer' world are thus not spatially defined, but have to do with 'world-engagement', the lived experience of an incarnate existence: for instance an introvert's relation to the object is largely repressed, says Jung, and takes place via the unconscious.

This engaged relation to the world is established by fantasy and the imagination, which Jung connects with the psychological richness and subtlety of intentionality. That implies that human beings have a "primary understanding of the meanings of things and relationships within their world, and that this understanding is lived whether or not it is dealt with appropriately." (Brooke,1991:47). These 'primary understandings' can be described as archetypal propensities to react in certain ways in certain meaningful situations. The goal of individuation would then be the imaginative bringing-into-harmony of reflective self-knowledge with this already lived understanding. In Jung's terminology this translates as 'integrating the archetypes into consciousness'.

The 'already-lived-understanding' therefore provides a phenomenological and philosophically viable way of speaking about the archetypes. What makes Jung's theory of the archetypes unique, is that he says this lived understanding has its base in a kind of species-specific memory, and that it takes the form of typical patterns of meaning, always ready to be repeated. Evidence for this comes from many sources, just a few of which can now be touched upon.

1.1.3 EVIDENCE FOR THE ARCHETYPES

What does the so-called evidence for his theories consist in then? Jung happened on the first proof for the theory of the archetypes through his work with psychotic patients at Burgholzli mental hospital at the start of his career during the first decade of the 1900's. One of these patients related the following 'vision' or schizoid fantasy to Jung: According to the patient, he was watching the sun and happened to notice
that it had a phallus hanging from its disc. The phallus would move to and fro as one moves one's head while looking at it, and the patient reported that this movement was in fact the origin of the wind. In a study of the Mithraic cult which Jung came upon four years later, a similar vision was recorded, which reported the existence of a so-called tube, which is the origin of the 'ministering wind', which is said to hang down from the disc of the sun. (Clarke, 1992:121). The fact that the patient reported his vision in 1906 and the obscure text appeared first in translation in 1910 ruled out for Jung the possibility of cryptomnesia on the part of the patient - he could not have read of the myth and then forgotten he had read it - and similarly it was impossible that Jung could have transferred his own thoughts to the patient.

The astounding similarity between the two accounts of the source of the wind left Jung with the impression that there must be certain symbols and myths that are always potentially present in the human psyche, regardless of culture or generation. By meticulously collecting the data from the fantasies and dreams of his patients (both healthy and ill), and comparing them to myths and symbols from diverse cultures, (a work that spanned a lifetime), Jung added weight to the hypothesis that there is indeed something like a 'collective unconscious' that can spontaneously manifest the archaic and ancient attitudes of our distant ancestors.97

These ancient and archaic attitudes are most often typical reactions to typical situations that face our species, these situations being for example birth, death, partnership with the opposite sex, parenthood, and so on. Brooke (1991: 155) gives the following list of examples of archetypal themes:

"[T]he development of consciousness as a movement from darkness to light; the establishment and appropriation of a sense of oneself in relation to one's world; transition and initiation from one phase of life to another, especially, perhaps, from youth to adulthood and adulthood to old age; separation and loss; the separation (splitting) of one's self and world into good and bad, right and wrong, loving and persecuting, and so on, and the necessity to reintegrate these divisions in some way (i.e. the struggle with ambivalence); the experience of sickness and renewal, death and rebirth, dismemberment and wholeness, and so on; the ambivalent fear of and longing for the Void, Mother, Death; negotiating the Oedipus complex; the need for courage - a neglected theme that makes dealing with many other existential themes possible; dealing with masculine and feminine possibilities of identity and relationship; parenting; facing a taboo; transformation as a journey through the underworld; appropriating a sense of justice and fairness; presence to the sacred; the spiritual journey. The list could continue almost endlessly, and within each theme listed here there are typical - i.e. 'archetypal' - variations."
The typical sense-making reactions to these situations are expressed by the psyche; the psyche condenses them into symbols, which are in turn incorporated into myths. Although these myths and symbols are visually and verbally passed down from generation to generation, and so undergo a process of modification, they can and do also arise spontaneously in stories, dreams, fantasies, hallucinations, art, architecture and literature, to name but a few examples. These typical symbolically expressed human reactions Jung first called 'primordial images'. Later, after 1919, he also started referring to them as 'archetypes'. These terms continued to exist side by side until the first was abandoned, the terminological change indicating a shift in emphasis from image (content) to structure (form). (Brooke, 1991:137).

Jung throughout his life tried to explain exactly what he meant by the term 'archetype', and his difficulty in succeeding must be ascribed to the fact that he was trying to determine its nature for himself. He was unwilling to formulate a perfect, consistent theory to impose arbitrarily on the 'facts'. The question was still not entirely settled by the time of his death, since many conflicting and difficult descriptions of the archetypes exist, which Jung never came round to solving satisfactorily; thus the clarifying of his theory of archetypes is a work that continues to this day.

1.1.4 THE NATURE OF THE ARCHETYPES

The confusion surrounding the hypothesis of a collective unconscious, populated by archetypes, can be expressed by two important questions: firstly, how are these archetypes transmitted from generation to generation (if they are 'transmitted' at all) and secondly, what is their essential nature: psychic or somatic? These two questions are in fact tied together, and their tentative answer reveals a lot about Jung's basic assumptions concerning human nature and existence, which translates in his philosophy as an attempt to overcome the traditional mind-body duality inherited from Descartes.

It is important to note that Jung vehemently denied that ideas themselves could be passed on from generation to generation - merely the disposition to have certain ideas are 'inherited'. These ideas are then expressed in a way best suited to the period in which the individual finds itself. Therefore Jung must not be understood to be reviving those theories of Lamarck that have already been discredited. (Brooke, 1991:137).
Jung had several ways of answering the question as to where archetypes come from, and all of them must be understood metaphorically. An example of such an answer, is that archetypes are formed by a process like sedimentation: typical experiences are deposited in the unconscious and so gradually gain a definite shape and texture, as reflected in the following quote: "[i]t seems to me that their origin can only be explained by assuming them to be deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity" (Storr, 1983:70). Another example to describe the process of archetype-formation, is the image of a river slowly cutting its way through riverbanks, in the process shaping them and cutting a deeper and deeper groove into the earth. Our experiences are not found or made anew but follow the shape and lay-out of the ancient ‘deposits’ or ‘riverbanks’ in the psyche.

Describing the archetypes in these ways is congruent with Jung's implication that they are basically metaphorical. The image, cluster of images, ultimate unconscious 'core/nucleus of meaning' that is an archetype, can never be fully and permanently articulated, because every interpretation of it necessarily remains an 'as-if'. (Broooke, 1991: 144). One may circumscribe the archetypes but never describe them exhaustively, because, like Heidegger's Being, they conceal even while they reveal, and thus remain an irreducible mystery and a fundamental hiddenness.

1.1.5 MIND AND BODY

The importance of the points made above concerning the transmission of archetypes, are that they give some clues as to the way Jung understood the interaction between mind and body. Jung held that the psyche was a product of nature and thus has its roots in matter. He also held that the mind has a considerable effect on the body and that the center of consciousness is not in the head, as is thought by most lay-persons in Western countries but that the psyche encompasses the entire body.

Given Jung's predisposition to this monist/holistic attitude to body and mind, it is understandable that he should imagine it possible for psychic experiences to be 'inherited': if the mind is not separate and independent from the body, it would be just as preposterous to suggest that it is a tabula rasa, as to suggest that every human baby can develop in biologically original ways. That Jung never succeeded in satisfactorily explaining the origin and nature of the archetypes makes sense in light of his own insistence that he was merely documenting empirical data about natural phenomena, and that he created the notion of archetypes as an imperfect but nevertheless useful
explanatory hypothesis or model to explain observable realities. This attitude is adequately illustrated by the following quote:

"The archetype is a kind of readiness to produce over and over again the same mythical ideas. Hence it seems as though what is impressed upon the unconscious were exclusively the subjective fantasy-ideas aroused by the physical process. Therefore we may take it that archetypes are recurrent impressions made by subjective reactions. Naturally this assumption only pushes the problem further back without solving it. There is nothing to prevent us from assuming that certain archetypes exist even in animals, that they are grounded in the peculiarities of the living organism itself and are therefore direct expressions of life whose nature cannot be further explained." (my emphasis, in Storr, 1983: 71).

1.1.6 THE ARCHETYPES AND THE SELF

The archetypes play an absolutely central role to our discussion of the self, the disease of the self and it's cure. Without proper understanding of the nature and working of the archetypes the process of individuation (becoming a/the self) will never get properly underway, because the archetypes are "those processes by which the individual's responsibility for their own potential is sustained over their lifetime" (Bockus,1990:48). They represent reservoirs of psychic energy that enable the individual to make sense of those border-situations (emotionally charged events) in life, that reason cannot penetrate.

While there are as many archetypes as there are typical situations in life, a few stand out due to their importance and influence in the psyche: these are the shadow, the persona, anima, animus, old wise man, earth mother and Self. Others include the divine child, the eternal youth, the oedipal child, the mother, the hero, the shadow, death, birth and rebirth, and even the 'wounded healer'. (Brooke,1991:16-17). The archetypes are not isolated but can relate to each other in polar pairs: child/mother, mother/wise old woman; mother/death; mother/father; hero/father; hero/maiden; victim/victor; trickster (fool)/ wise old man. (ibid.)

- The shadow is the unpleasant, repressed part of the personality – the Mr. Hyde that hides below the civilized facade of Dr. Jekyll. The shadow is normally projected onto people whom one dislikes.
- The persona is the mask worn by the individual in his/her daily life, or in other words, the face s/he presents to the world.
- The anima is men's typical experience of women as well, as their latent femininity, and the animus is a women's typical experience of men as well as latent masculinity.
- The wise old man and the earth mother represent the fulfillment of masculinity or femininity.
- The Self\textsuperscript{101}, finally, represents the psyche's striving towards unity and harmony between the different and opposing factions that populate it.

The self is both like the center of a circle and like its circumference; it is the source but also the goal of the psyche, and in many other ways paradoxical. Just as the ego is the center of consciousness, so the self is the totality, but also the center of consciousness \textit{and} the personal \textit{and} collective unconscious, all taken together. The move towards the self, taken up through the process of individuation, entails a move of the center of gravity of the psyche "away from the I in the direction of the unconscious, thereby depotentiating the I's control and shifting the balance of power toward the autonomous complexes and the archetypal figures of the collective unconscious." (Parkes,1989:467).

The self is represented by many different symbols, the most common of which is the mandala of Eastern tradition, a circular pattern that normally serves as an aid to meditation and which has special religious significance in, for example, Buddhist thought. In Western thought Christ is the symbol of selfhood and of individuation, although Jung added that the anti-Christ or Lucifer is needed to complete the archetype of the self, which should be an image not of perfection, but of completion. The archetype of the self cannot be distinguished from a God-image, as will later be illustrated more fully, but which can already be inferred from the definition given above of self as alpha (source) and omega (goal) of the psyche (life).

Recognizing an archetypal symbol is not as difficult as one would imagine: typically "an emotional heightening accompanies its occurrence in patient or audience and the wider its appeal or fascination, the more collective the symbol." (Gras,1981:473). Also, the more the affect/emotion that surrounds a symbol or situation, the deeper in the unconscious lies the archetype to which it refers.

Before moving on to a more focused discussion of the problems and questions arising from the introduction to the self given above, it is necessary to investigate Jung's use of the terms ego, personal unconscious, and collective unconscious.
1.2 THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

1.2.1 THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF THE PSYCHE

Due to his work with psychotic patients, Jung came to the conclusion that unlike neuroses, which can be adequately explained by a patient's personal biography, the origin of true psychosis lies much deeper, is independent of the patient's personal history, and shows marked resemblance to mythological themes. Thus he came to distinguish between three levels in the psyche, namely consciousness, the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious. In the personal unconscious one would expect to find all those thoughts and impressions that once were conscious but gradually lost intensity and therefore fell below the threshold of consciousness, as well as those repressed contents that are unacceptable to consciousness (Freud). There are also certain impressions, some of them sensory, that never reach sufficient intensity to penetrate consciousness but that nevertheless enter the psyche. Jung went further than Freud when he posited a 'deeper psychic activity' that he described as "the ancestral heritage of possibilities of representation, [that] is not individual but common to all men, and perhaps even to all animals, and is the true basis of the individual psyche." (Storr, 1983:67). This deeper psychic activity goes by the name of the collective unconscious.

Many people when thinking about what is referred to by the word 'I', will be thinking about the ego only. This is typical of that Western attitude which Jung calls the overvaluation of consciousness. The ego stands at the center of the conscious mind as its regulator and spokesperson. Jung insists however that the general assumption that consciousness forms the whole of the psychological individual, is deeply mistaken. Consciousness, according to Jung, is merely the relationship between the ego and the psychic contents, but there is also an abundance of psychic contents that do not stand in any relationship to the ego. What doesn't enter into this relationship is what is therefore 'unconscious.' Everything of which the ego takes notice at any given point makes up the conscious mind. The ego is the organizing principle of consciousness; it gives a sense of unity and connection between impressions that come from inside and outside, and supplies the individual with that sense of continuity that most equate with selfhood.

The ego, being merely a construct of the impersonal, autonomous psyche (like in Sartre) is however in constant danger, either of inflation, or of being drowned by unconscious forces. In the first case, inflation, a person identifies the ego as the entire
self and so cuts him-/herself off from the useful influence of unconscious insights and energy. The inflated consciousness identifies with (i.e. is taken over by) the complex/archetype of the hero, and is characterized by a quality of manic self-defense. "Symbolic depth is perceived as mysticism and fuzz, and the lived body solidifies into anatomical and mechanical self-understanding." (Brooke, 1991:123). Jung writes that an inflated consciousness is always egocentric and conscious of nothing but its own existence. It is incapable of learning from the past, incapable of understanding contemporary events, and incapable of drawing right conclusions about the future. It is hypnotized by itself and therefore cannot be argued with. It inevitably dooms itself to calamities that must strike it dead. Paradoxically enough, inflation is a regression of consciousness into the unconscious." (in Brooke, 1991:123).

In the second case the danger is of the ego being submerged by unconscious contents such as dreams, fantasies and hallucinations, symptoms that are typical of paranoia, schizophrenia, and various other types of psychological pathologies. What happens here is that those fragments and splinter personalities that populate the unconscious gain control to such an extent that the ego is drowned, and the unconscious takes over the position of the ego. An example, according to Parkes, is the case of Nietzsche himself, who through his de-centering deconstruction of the soul, lapsed into insanity (Parkes, 1989:466). In a case such as this, the person in question will no longer be able to tell reality from fantasy. Jung insisted that a healthy, strong ego is a necessary tool in the effort to live, and in the process of individuation, but if it is cut away from the soil which feeds it, namely the unconscious, it becomes a useless tool. Consciousness is the crowning product of the psyche as it has developed over millions of years, and it is in constant danger of being drowned by unconsciousness, either by sleep, neurosis, insanity or death. An individual life, according to Jung, is nothing but a short period of intense effort at sustaining consciousness and the ego.

1.2.2 COMPLEXES

The ego, that which people normally equate with ‘I’, can be described as just one complex among many, which means, amongst other things, that it is an a-posteriori construct, a product of the psyche, formed in order to cope with the demands of the world. In this Jung agrees with both Freud and Nietzsche (Parkes, 1989:460), and
reminds strongly of course of Sartre, who showed that consciousness is basically impersonal, and does not necessarily contain an ‘I’. The ‘I’ is not the source of consciousness, but merely a product of consciousness.

The personal unconscious is made up of various complexes, just as the collective unconscious is populated by various archetypes, and there is a structural connection between them, so that at the heart of a complex, or on a deeper level, so to speak, there lies an archetypal situation/problem. Complexes, also called ‘part-souls’, ‘splinter-psyche’s’ and ‘fragmentary personalities’, are crystallized collections of feelings (affects), thoughts and ideas which surround a specific ideas/entities that had proved problematic in the individual’s life, such as for example father, mother, sexuality, inferiority/superiority, heroism, competition, children, etc. These complexes are normally easy to spot in others, although not so easy to detect in oneself, precisely because they are unconscious. They are those areas about which people are abnormally sensitive, and ‘pressing someone’s button’, so to speak, can lead to upsetting results.

Jung came upon them through his word association tests, where he discovered that “the stimulus-words to which the subject’s reaction times were abnormally long, typically clustered around groups of interconnected images, bound together by strong emotion or affect.” (Parkes, 1989:461). These tests proved beyond reasonable doubt the interconnectedness between the mind and body, or in other words the intrinsic connection between language, cognition, affects/emotions and the body’s physical reactions. Along with the reaction times to certain words, the body’s responses such as heart-beat, perspiration, breathing, temperature and skin color were measured. (These tests eventually came to be used as the lie-detector tests we know of today). Quite obviously a long reaction time was accompanied by signs of physical stress in the body.

A complex is in a sense a small narrative, a unit of meaning characterized by feeling, which structures and limits existence. It often accrues due to bewildering and/or unpleasant circumstances that force the psyche to make sense of something it experiences at first as incomprehensible. Jung believed the reason for the long reaction time is that a momentary block in psychic flow occurs, and that the psyche has to first find its way around the incomprehensible knot surrounding the specific concept suggested by the prompting. In Sartre’s terms: the mind has to first find a way to distract itself, so as to avoid some unpleasant thought or feeling connected to the
prompting word. A complex is autonomous, as can be seen by its effect on the body. What this means is that the complex acts as if it has consciousness/ personality of its own. This interpretation of Jung’s shows that he is not so far removed from Sartre, who said that any form consciousness is, by its very nature, also conscious of itself. The complex, although it is unconscious, acts like a small personality or ‘splitter psyche’, often frustrating the ego’s intentions and perceptions of itself. Jung writes: “What happens in word association tests also happens in every discussion between two people... The discussion loses its objective character and its real purpose, since the constellated complexes frustrate the intentions of the speaker and may even put answers in their mouths which they can no longer remember afterwards.” (in Brooke,1991:125).

The ego is the ‘ruling complex’ of consciousness, and can be said to have arisen in consciousness in the same manner that a pearl forms in an oyster, where the constant irritation of the sensitive membrane caused by a piece of dust that lets layer after layer of pearl form around it. Similarly, the ego is shaped by the constant irritation of the demands of life upon the individual, and as such it can be seen as an end product of the psyche. Thus the ego is the result of the meeting/ interaction of the unconscious psyche with the 'outer world', and is slowly differentiated from the instinctive life of the unconscious through-out childhood and puberty, and even later in life.

The fact that the ego is in some sense an end product of a long history of human evolution doesn't mean however that it is the goal of psychic development. This position of honor must be reserved for the Self. (Jung,1961:200). The Self is the whole of the psyche; it is the combination of consciousness, personal unconsciousness and collective unconsciousness. The unconscious by itself has no ruling principle that corresponds to the ego (the ruling principle of consciousness), because the material that comes from there in dreams, fantasies and hallucination lacks the organization that is typical of consciousness. (Jung,1939: par 492). The self is rather a symbolic expression of the psyche’s attempt to balance and harmonize all the conflicting forces in it.

Due to the nature of the human life-world, the human mind is full of centrifugal forces. The psyche is far from naturally individuated, but is in fact populated by many different fragmentary personalities. Jung was not unique in arguing this point: besides Kierkegaard and Sartre, who made it their work to analyze conflict in the self, there are thinkers like Nietzsche who insisted that multiple ‘drives’ are the engine of the
personality, and the ego presents itself to the world wearing different ‘masks’; Freud discerned a natural tendency of the psyche to form disassociated sub-personalities, and even a pragmatist like William James entertained the notion of ‘multiple personalities’ and of a human being made up from multiple ‘social selves’. (Parkes, 1989:454,465). In order to experience psychic health it is necessary for all these split-up forces to work, not in conflict, but in roles supporting each other.

The psyche tends to regulate itself and naturally inclines towards the Self in a manner Jung equates with Aristotelian entelechy, (the tendency of an entity to develop purposefully into all it can possibly be), but the process can be either helped along or sabotaged by the will. This implies that individuation must involve the will in some way.

That means a decision and an effort must be made to integrate as much as possible of the unconscious into the personality, which is the same point that both Kierkegaard and Sartre make. The process of integrating the personality is called the process of individuation, and its goal is the attainment of the self. The Self is transcendent, which does not mean it is a metaphysical entity, but simply that it is always deferred. To reach it would mean complete harmony and the end of all striving, a state of bliss, which explains why the archetype of the Self is shrouded in religious symbolism. All that can be realistically hoped for is a greater degree of harmony in the personality.

The Self is the archetype that represents that ideal state of balance between the ego, the personal unconscious, and the collective unconscious, as well as between all the functions (thinking, feeling, intuition, sensation) and the two tendencies (introversion and extraversion), to be briefly introduced presently.

The relationship between the ego, the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious, is better understood through reference to Jung’s concept of the libido, contrasting it with that of Freud.

1.2.3 THE LIBIDO.

The dispute over the nature of the libido is what caused the final bitter break between Freud and Jung. Freud originally used the concept to refer to sexual desire, and explained neuroses as the sublimation of the libido, or in other word the suppressing of the sexual instinct and incest wishes of childhood. (see Freud, 1936:53-56). Libido is, broadly interpreted, another word for energy; Freud, in his attempt to construct a
mechanistic model for the psyche similar to that of the natural sciences, explained that energy never disappears, but only gets transformed into different manifestations. That is why displacement occurs in the psyche and why hysterical patients might manifest illnesses of which there is no physical cause. Memories of traumatic events tend to hide behind other memories and their emotional content gets transferred to situations that have nothing to do with the original cause of the emotions.

Jung agreed with the model of libido as energy, but was careful to state his reservations regarding its exclusively sexual nature. Despite these reservations, he did initially defend it, and stated that Freud's use of the term 'sexual' covered a wide field not normally encompassed in the word. Finally he had to insist however that the energy of the psyche is not merely driven by the sexual instinct, but in the main by the urge to create meaning. Jung thus has a hermeneutic approach to psyche which contrasts with Freud's mechanistic/biological approach. Freud unfortunately believed that Jung was watering down psycho-analytic theory in order to make it palatable to a prudish public. The misunderstanding about sexuality led, in general, to the end of their personal and professional relationship. (See Jung,1961:151-174).

Jung's understanding of the libido is that it is all the psychic energy available to an individual. It is this energy which, in short, is both the desire and the capability to life, and Jung himself on more than one occasion acknowledges that this concept was influenced by, and is parallel to, Bergson's notion of *elan vital*. (Gunter,1982:638-639). This influence already indicates that Jung's understanding of libido is philosophical rather than mechanistic, as Freud's was. A lack of libido or stunted flow of psychic energy, which often translates as meaninglessness in life, leads to depression/ listlessness, anxiety, stress, paranoia, and a host of other ills. The libido is activated by symbols that stimulate the functioning of the archetypes. The terminology introduced by the theory of libido allows us to speak of archetypes as being 'crystallizations of libido', which corresponds to specific 'developmental potentials' in Bergson's *elan vital*. (Gunter,1982:646).

An important step in the healing process is the spontaneous symbol-making activity of the psyche, which regulates the flow of the libido between consciousness and unconsciousness. The symbol-creating faculty of the psyche is stimulated by creative activities such as writing or painting, or the use of active imagination. These actions naturally take place in the psyche, and the products of the unconscious are available all around to see, in architecture, advertising, art, literature, social/ political policy,
and so on. The degree to which unconscious contents arise to consciousness or take
over the functions of the ego, is expressed by the continuum/ spectrum on which lie
the 'normal' ego-centered person, the artist, the case of multiple personalities, and the

Our entire cultural life-world is in a sense the product of unconscious 'meaning-
creating' forces. Its best, most controlled manifestations are art, architecture, literature
and music, and it's worst, most uncontrolled, is war, genocide and insanity. The 'I'
must relate to unconscious contents, but not be identified with it (taken over by it):
this is what makes for the difference between artistry and psychosis, literature or war.

The process by which consciousness gradually integrates the information from the
unconscious, is called the process of individuation.

1.3 INDIVIDUATION

1.3.1 THE NEED FOR INDIVIDUATION

Individuation is the process of becoming undivided against oneself. "Paradoxically,
one becomes a unique individual as one realizes and responds personally to those
archetypal, and hence universal, potentials that are one's inheritance." (Brooke, 1991:21).
Becoming oneself in this manner is the opposite of being obsessed with one's own self, because discovering the deep sense of one's own unique identity,
opens up the world in new ways and "establishes a humble, perhaps reverent,
relationship to some greater reality." (Brooke, 1991:21) The development of this
identity is in one sense a compromise and in another sense a battle with society, which
can threaten to swallow individuality, but within which individuality must also take
root. The individual relates to society through its persona (mask), and the typical
danger is that the individual identifies too closely with it, which amounts to a
"submersion in the anonymity of collective life, where 'they' become a new kind of
Mother, and true individuality and consciousness, which is founded on dialogue with
the self, is lost." (Brooke, 1991:22).

In the course of his book, Modern Man in Search of a Soul (1933), Jung describes this
predicament which is peculiarly strong in his (and our) age, where many people feel
alienated and ill at ease in the world, and are in danger of being swallowed up by the
mass, as society tends to relegate persons to the status of number/ statistic. In the
attempt to standardize life, human beings get classified along with everything else,
and that places an unbearable burden on the psyche as it struggles to conform and to convince itself that its social persona is its true face.

It is not only individuals that are ill, but society as a whole. Jung ascribes this problem to the scientific and mechanistic world-view which had taken root since the Enlightenment. There is nothing inherently wrong or harmful in this world-view as such, except in that it seeks to, and succeeds in, de-mythologizing the world, censuring superstition, religion, fairy-tales, and the irrational. This, in Jung's view, is nothing less than a tragedy as far as the human mind is concerned, for the psyche's symbolic functioning is as dependent upon myths and religion as plants are on water and sunlight. Old symbols and myths have lost their living meaning and become empty rituals, and the new symbols that are being formed are discarded under the rubric of craziness or silliness. (Jung thought for example that the belief in extraterrestrial life, and UFO's, are simply autonomous attempts by the psyche to create modern myths!).

In these circumstances, individuation is particularly necessary, but unfortunately beset with problems all around.

1.3.2 THE PROBLEMS SURROUNDING INDIVIDUATION

Jung, like Nietzsche, mourned the current state of Christianity, potentially a rich source of meaning and symbolism, but now an example of a myth dried out and stripped of its meaning. Modern Christianity, in addition, represents a social neurosis, in that it entails a collective suppressing of the shadow-side of the psyche (symbolized by the anti-Christ/Lucifer). Christ, the God-man, is the symbol of the paradox of human existence, of a being both infinite and finite, both mind and matter, and the crucifixion is symbolic of the tension between the spiritual and the material. Christ represents the complete balance between all the forces at work in the psyche; His life-story is that of the archetypal hero, and is a unique illustration of the sometimes torturous path to individuation. Christ's life is flecked through with images of rebirth and rejuvenation, which is the process by which the psyche continually heals and renews itself.

However, Christ alone as symbol of the Self is incomplete, since it needs the image of the anti-Christ to complete it. This is one of the biggest obstacles in the way of the individuation of the modern person. In Aion, Researches into the Phenomenology of Self Jung describes modern Christianity's denial of the flesh and of evil, both
categories that are then subsumed under the notion of the Anti-Christ, as pathological (see Jung 1959:36-72 and 173-184), and ascribes to it many of the horrors of the age. The reason for this is that repressed contents are normally projected onto another person, or, in the case of a collective suppression, onto an entire group. The projection causes the split psyche to see evil outside of itself, which must of course be destroyed by means of inquisitions or holy wars, or else by institutionally controlled mechanisms, for instance apartheid. The unconscious is never rigid, but always reflects the face that is turned towards it: "Hostility lends it a threatening aspect, friendliness softens its features." (Brooke, 1991:132). This means for example that "a savage and heathen world reflects the face of Christian moralism". (ibid.) Yet the psyche always anticipates the fact that one-sidedness will give way to its opposite; in the end the institutional Christianity's psychic illness will lead to the 'rise of the shadow-side', as is expressed for example in the book of Revelation. That is not to say the apocalyptic events described in this book will actually happen in a historical sense. Like all outpourings from the unconscious it describes a state of affairs in - and possible danger to - the psyche, not the objective world.

As Christ is the symbol of the Self in the West, so the mandala is the symbol of the self in the East. That does not mean that the mandala is absent from the Western psyche; many of Jung's patients started drawing mandala-like figures during their 'healing' and it normally pre-figures a significant step forward in the individuation process. (Jung also noted the natural appearance of mandala shapes in nature, and used this to draw parallels between psychic and natural activity.) The shape referred to is circular, usually quartered by a horizontal and a vertical line, sometimes bearing intricate repeating symmetrical patterns that Buddhists believe guides the mind into a state of tranquility. For Jung the mandala stands as a symbol of totality and completeness. (See Jung, Mandala Symbolism, 1972). In the same way that a drop of liquid would attain a perfectly spherical shape in zero-gravity, so the psyche tends towards perfect equilibrium, and this prefect equilibrium is symbolized by the mandala.
1.3.3. THE ROLE OF RELIGION

Both the mandala and the Christ-figure as symbols of the Self (there are many more) have religious significance. This is no accidental fact. The 'experience' of the Self cannot be distinguished from a religious experience; in fact as far as Jung is concerned, they are the same thing. Jung's attitude to religion and the existence of God is sometimes unclear. In his work he repeatedly states that there can be no proof for or against the existence of God, and he refuses to speculate about it since the issue is a metaphysical one of which he, an 'empirical investigator' wants no part. Thus he was - academically speaking - an agnostic and wary to the extreme of taking the claims made by religions, mysticism, occultism, etc. literally. Yet in a televised interview when asked by a reporter: "Do you believe there is a God?" he replied, "I don't need to believe, I know." (Clarke, 1992:75). The riddle of these conflicting statements can perhaps begin to be cleared up by the following reply Jung gave to a review of Aion that had labeled him a Gnostic:

"Now I state expressly and repeatedly in my writings that psychology can do no more than concern itself with assertions and anthropomorphic images. The possible metaphysical significance of these assertions is completely outside the bounds of empirical psychology as a science... The difficulty which gives rise to misunderstandings is that archetypes are 'real'. That is to say, effects can be empirically established whose cause is described hypothetically as archetype, just as in physics effects can be established whose cause is assumed to be the atom (which is merely a model). Nobody has ever seen an archetype, and no-one has ever seen an atom either. But the former is known to produce numinous effects and the latter explosions. When I say 'atom' I am talking of the model made of it, but never of the thing-in-itself, which in both cases is a transcendental mystery." (in Nagy, 1991:148).

First of all, Jung made it clear that no possible intellectual or emotional depiction of God could possibly begin to give an idea of what God might, metaphysically speaking, 'be', and he is also not guilty of psychologism's mistake which entirely reduces God to the psyche (although that sometimes appears to be the case and is often held against him). Whatever God's nature might be, it belongs to the realm of noumena, which Kant has shown is futile attempting to explore, and Nietzsche argued does not even exist. Yet there is indubitably such a thing as the phenomenon of God, since there have been throughout history, and still are, individual and collective experiences of God(s). These experiences are invariably numinous. Numinosity means that the experience of a 'pure' archetype, especially if projected, is characterized by
an immense fascination that hypnotizes the individual and moves him/her very deeply, to such an extent that for that person it would be impossible to deny the absolute reality of what he or she experienced.

The most profound of archetypal experiences, and the most rare, is an experience of God. Jung says that it is of no importance what the world thinks about the religious experience, because whoever has had it, owns a great treasure of something which becomes a source of life, meaning, and beauty. What therefore interested Jung in the final analysis was not the factual question about the existence of God, but the fact of universal belief in some kind(s) of supreme being. Nagy (1991:149-151) describes this as a form of the "common Consent" argument for the existence of God, but Jung would not insist that the mere fact that peoples throughout history have believed in and worshipped some type of supreme being(s) guarantees its objective existence. What he did believe was that the experience of a beneficent being that is the origin and creator of all things, that directs events towards their final and true goal, that is sometimes bloodthirsty and sometimes forgiving, and that even speaks sometimes to subjects, demanding their obedience or love, is nothing else than the experience of the beginning, end and totality of the psyche, rooted in nature, which is, as has been explained above, the 'Self'. This can be seen as psychologism only if the 'I/ego' is taken to be the whole self, whereas Jung's Self is closer to Heidegger's 'Being', a transpersonal but nevertheless own-most realm of existence.

If Jung's view of God sounds a bit like Hegel's Absolute Spirit becoming self-aware, that is no coincidence. There are many correlates to be drawn between Jung's thought and that of Hegel, especially as concerns their attitude towards the dialectical development of consciousness. But there are important differences in their outlooks that I think can be illustrated by Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel. Firstly, Jung does not presume to pronounce on metaphysics and thus also denies the possibility of objective knowledge for an observer who stands inside the system. Secondly Jung, like Kierkegaard, would not sacrifice the individual on the altar of history, and places the particular higher than the universal in terms of importance. "[F]or Jung the great events of history were unimportant except in so far as they reveal and are explained by the inner life of the individual..." (Clarke,1992:51). Third, he rejected the Enlightenment's idea that history presents some form of progression of which human reason is the summit of achievement. (ibid:54). In fact, this Enlightenment ideology
presents for him precisely the source of the modern malady, loss of soul, which will now be discussed in the next chapter.
2. THE MALADY: LOSS OF SOUL.

Each of the three thinkers discussed here describes the sickness of the individual and society as a lack of consciousness of self, but no one states this so explicitly as Jung. "In the judgment of . . . Jung, the lack of authentic self-awareness has been responsible for no small part of the century's mindless destruction." (Lowe, 2986:41). Gary Clark voices the concern of many Jungian scholars when he says: "What if our thunderous lack of understanding on matters personal and global stems from nothing other than a negligible knowledge of the psychic roots of mankind?" (Clark, 1973:207). Jung’s point is that when a sickness is caused by things of which we are not conscious, it follows that there exists the possibility of a cure through making the causes conscious. Practically, in terms of Jung’s philosophy, this would mean freeing oneself from the possibly harmful effects of the collective unconscious by analyzing it: the unconscious always manifests itself, but in potentially destructive ways if its contents are not integrated with consciousness. (Sato et al, 1992:134-135). Before the suggested cure can be explained, the symptoms and nature of the disease must be spelled out. To this end a map of the psyche is required.

2.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE PSYCHE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES.

Jung (1936:981-987) distinguishes between two attitudes and four functions of the psyche, universally present. The functions are thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition, and the two attitudes introversion and extraversion. The four functions do not represent so much an unchangeable and fixed structure of the mind, as a useful matrix to compare and classify psychic activities. That Jung called these perspectives introversion/ extraversion, and thinking/ feeling, sensation/ intuition is not as important as the epistemological point that all access to the world is psychological, and that any perspective on the psyche itself is paradoxical, because there is no Archimedean point from which to view it. Originally Jung created the terms introversion and extraversion to explain the differences between his (introvert) and Freud’s (extravert) psychologies. What this effectively means is that, although the structure of the human mind can be said to be universal, it is also individually determined according to which tendencies have the upper hand, which shapes the life-world of every person in a very unique way. All tendencies are equally present in
everyone, but in one individual some will tend to predominate. That means that some
tendencies are conscious and others (their opposites) unconscious.

2.1.1 INTROVERSION AND EXTROVERSION.
The extroverted attitude means that the individual relates positively to the
environment, while the introverted attitude turns in upon itself. In analytic terms that
means that the libido of the extraverted type fixes habitually on objects while in
introversion the libido regresses to the subject. An ‘extravert’ relates easily to the
world, is adaptable, and feels at home in company and in new situations. The
introvert on the other hand relates primarily to inner events, feels most comfortable
when in contemplation and becomes ill at ease in strange company or crowded places.
Both tendencies are present in all people, but in a single individual one attitude will
always be the more typical, which makes that person a 'type'. Each 'type' tends to
undervalue the other. This animosity is created because the attitude that is repressed,
is undervalued, and then projected onto some other person.

2.1.2 THE FOUR FUNCTIONS OF THE PSYCHE
Sensation is phylo-genetically prior to all the other functions: before consciousness
developed properly, and as it was just emerging from animal state, this was the
function relied upon and consequently most developed. Sensation has to do with
sensory experiences, and a person in whom this function is dominant, relies primarily
on observation and perception. Thinking is used in the ordinary sense of the word,
while 'feeling' is used slightly differently: it does not refer to emotions, but to
valuations. Intuition has to do with perceiving data from the unconscious. Thinking
and feeling are inimical to each other, as are sensation and intuition.
The opposite function and the opposite tendency to that which characterizes
consciousness is nevertheless present, but of course repressed, in the unconscious. In
certain situations however, the repressed contents can rise to the surface, and this
explains for instance violent outbursts of emotion in a person who is normally
reserved and phlegmatic, or vice versa. This unfamiliar personality is however just as
much a part of the Self as are the more obvious traits. The goal of individuation is to
bring all the contrasting factors of the personality into balance. This goal is not always
congruent however with the demands of society, since individuation requires a fluid,
adaptable personality. In order to fit in with society however, people tend to create
and then fix an identity, denying whatever tendencies are contrary to the social persona. I will return again to the problem of repressed contents in the psyche, but first it is useful to focus once more on the plight of the individual in modern society, comparing it to Kierkegaard and Sartre's analyses of the same problem.

2.2 THE SICKNESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY.

Jung, like Kierkegaard and Sartre, writes against the background of a greater political and economic world picture. In Kierkegaard's case the background was the predominance of Hegelianism and the power of the Protestant church, in Sartre it was the Second World War and the steady growth of communist and socialist trends in Paris. Jung also writes against the background and the aftermath of the World War II and Nazism, and has one or two things to say both about that and about the rise of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe. These remarks have direct significance upon the plight of modern man, which can be described as 'loss of soul'. The profound emotional energy that the symbolic connection with nature had supplied has dried up as scientific understanding has grown. We speak of 'matter' and the 'intellect', rather than of the 'Great Mother' or the 'Father of All'. The limited ego-rationality of modern man and the denial of the unconscious puts him at the mercy of the psychic 'underworld', says Jung. (Gras, 1981:480). Moreover, the threat comes not merely from inside, but because of lack of inner strength, also from outside. The individual, the 'self', is in danger of being exterminated in the face of mass movements, whether of a political, social or religious nature.

Jung writes of the same general loss of meaning and sense of alienation that is the subject matter of the existentialists. These symptoms indicate to him, just as it did to Sartre and Kierkegaard, an absence of self, and like them he also says that the self and individuality can only be attained at the cost of hardship, through conscious choice and an effort of will. The lack of self manifests itself in psychologically definable and measurable symptoms like neuroses, and in extreme cases, mental illness that cripples all ability to function. Jung claims that 'normality' or 'sanity' is an illusion, because the forces that cause so-called mental aberrations are equally present in everyone, manifesting themselves to varying degrees that still fall within the spectrum of 'normal' behavior.

Jung does not however undervalue reason and logic when he accuses the modern world of suffering under an 'over-valuation of consciousness'. On the contrary, reason
is the bulwark against the overwhelming danger of 'psychic infection' that spreads whenever a mass movement takes hold of a one-sided idea and tries to implement it:

"What will become of our civilization, and of man himself... if the spiritual and moral darkness of State absolutism should spread over Europe? We have no reason to take this threat lightly. Everywhere in the West there are subversive minorities who, sheltered by our humanitarianism and our sense of justice, hold the incendiary torches ready, with nothing to stop the spread of their ideas except the critical reason of a single, fairly intelligent, mentally stable stratum of the population. One should not overestimate the thickness of this stratum." (Italics mine, Jung,1957:3).

From these remarks it can already be seen how the sickness of the individual is for Jung inseparably connected to the sickness of society, where in both cases the sickness might be described as a split in the psyche. On a deep level the sickness is nothing but existential mistrust: a general lack of confidence in 'being'. (Friedman,1985:90).

Our discussion here takes a turn back to Kierkegaard and Sartre, and it will be seen that there are remarkable similarities between their and Jung's view of the self, although perhaps more so in the case of Kierkegaard. Like Kierkegaard, Jung criticizes the church, and especially the Protestant church, which "by eliminating most sacraments and other rituals, has eliminated outlets for the release of archetypal energy...[and] by excluding from the trinity both Mary and Satan, has denied outlets to what he calls the anima archetype in males and the shadow archetype in all.” (Segal,1985:85).

Jung would also agree with Sartre that the self is transcendence, and that it is consequently impossible to apprehend the self completely, because the soul in archetypal psychology, just as in existential phenomenology, is not an object of knowing as much as a way of knowing; therefore it is just as much of an outer reality as an inner event. (Avens,1982:195,197).

In the case of all three thinkers the disease arises from a misrecognition and repression of the opposing forces that make up the self, or else a bogus attempt to overcome the opposition.
2.2.1 COMPARISON TO KIERKEGAARD

Jung's words in saying that in modern culture "[n]o one has time for self-knowledge or believes that it could serve any sensible purpose" (Clarke, 1992:82) sound a lot like Kierkegaard's, who by way of Anti-Climacus said that the self is that which is of most value, yet least sought after in the world. There are many points of agreement between the two thinkers arising from these basic sentiments. Like both existentialists, but especially like Kierkegaard, Jung warns of the danger of mass-existence encroaching on the individual, emphasizing the sinister aspects of the state and of creed-driven religions that deny the value of an individual and the reality of inner life. He laments the power of theoretical systems, whether empirical - based on statistics - or theoretical and hypothetical, to reduce a person to an 'average' or universal figure. "The mass crushes out the insight and reflection that are still possible with the individual, and this necessarily leads to doctrinaire and authoritarian tyranny..." (Jung, 1957:4).

Theories that apparently have universal application are highly sought-after in the natural sciences and even in the humanities, of which psychiatry is a type of crossbreed. These theories are easily manageable, can be used to make predictions, and may be compared with other theories and so criticized and amended. But the neater and more generally applicable a theory is, says Jung, the less applicable it is to an individual's needs. The individual, and moreover, the entire world in its complexity as it reveals itself to the individual, is made up of exceptions to the rules, and in the attempt to paint a picture of the 'average' man, the extremes cancel each other out and are ignored. "These considerations must be borne in mind whenever there is talk of a theory serving as a guide to self-knowledge. There is and can be no self-knowledge based on theoretical assumptions, for the object of this knowledge is an individual - a relative exception and an irregular phenomenon. Hence it is not the universal and the regular that characterize the individual, but rather the unique." (Jung, 1957:6).

Like Kierkegaard, Jung also sees the only solution to the problem of mass-mindedness as lying in an inner journey of self-discovery, by which process consciousness must detach itself from the objects of the external world, so that the individual no longer places the guarantee of happiness in factors outside him-/herself. (Clarke, 1992:86). This can only be accomplished however, according to both thinkers, by the individual's relation to some 'extra-mundane authority' that can give protection against the external demands of work and citizenship, and protect 'inwardness.' This
necessitates a conception of and relationship to a 'transcendental force, in other words a religion, but one that is alive and rich with living symbols that have a real effect on the psyche. "Echoing the criticisms of Kierkegaard a hundred or so years earlier, he [Jung] lamented that the church and its doctrines had become a fortress whose purpose is to protect us from God and his Spirit." (Clarke, 1992:77). But Jung also corrects one of the possible deficiencies in Kierkegaard, when he condemns "that megalomania of ours which leads us to suppose ... that Christianity is the only truth, and the white Christ the only Redeemer." (ibid:53).

However, when I discuss Jung's understanding of the Christ-symbol in the next chapter, the subtleties and nuances of both Kierkegaard and Jung's concept of Christ will be brought to light in such a way as to show that Kierkegaard was not necessarily guilty of the above hubris, but gave to Christ more or less the same meaning that Jung does.

2.2.2 COMPARISON TO SARTRE

Generally Jung, like the other two authors, diagnoses the sickness of the self as a lack of self-knowledge, but he goes further than the other two by introducing the notion of an 'unconscious mind' and saying that self-knowledge must include knowledge of unconscious forces as well. Jung (1957:5) writes:

"Most people confuse 'self-knowledge' with knowledge of their conscious ego-personalities. Anyone who has any ego-consciousness at all takes it for granted that he knows himself. But the ego knows only its own contents, not the unconscious and its contents. People measure their self-knowledge by what the average person in their social environment knows of himself, but not by the real psychic facts which are for the most part hidden from them."

From this one would assume that Jung has little in common with Sartre, since Sartre did not want to hear anything about an unconscious mind and would object severely against the implication that consciousness 'has contents'. Jung works with a notion of human nature that is more than a "blank tablet upon which consciousness intentionally may write whatever it wishes." (Shelburne, 1983:66). Nevertheless, on closer inspection, one can see that both thinkers hold in common the idea that people deceive themselves about their own identity, and it is precisely here, in the emphasis on the need to work towards authenticity, that a comparison between them becomes possible. In fact Shelburne (1983:58) argues that "the Jungian concept of
individuation is similar to Sartre's ideal of authenticity, in that both focus on the goal of achieving meaningful existence through the development of inner resources, creative exercise of freedom, and overcoming self-deception".

Like Sartre (1957:58), Jung also believed that for the most part consciousness is not personal, and that un-reflected consciousness is autonomous. What Sartre would call the impersonal, autonomous consciousness that is Nothingness, Jung would call the autonomous, collective psyche, or the unconscious.

We can see this clearly when we compare the way in which Jung describes the activity of the complexes, and the way Sartre's describes how an Erlebnis, for example of love, hate, repugnance, desire, comes at someone, instead of originating inside him/her: "This can be seen when someone, after having said in anger, 'I detest you,' catches himself and says, 'It is not true, I do not detest you, I said that in anger'" (Sartre,1957:64). Jung says that the complexes can put words in our mouths, and that emotions originate in a source that is not (normally) under the control of the will of the ego. Therefore both thinkers take the autonomy of the self (by which one must understand take the greater part of the self is beyond one's control) as a starting point for their philosophy. According to Jung, the persona is the mask that this collective psyche wears, which feigns individuality and makes one forget that you are merely acting a role. This view is remarkably close to Sartre's notion of mauvaise foi, or bad faith, says Clarke. (1992: 157). In both cases the individual escapes the burden of individuality by adopting rigid and socially contrived patterns of behavior.

As opposed to Sartre however, Jung maintains that there are very real forces that influence a life of which the conscious mind is completely unaware, and over which it has little control, and that these forces conform to certain patterns that are typically human. The will is not sovereign and freedom is not absolute, and there is a very great part of the mind that is 'opaque.' This does not become determinism however: Jung's conception of freedom is, as has been explained before, the harnessing of unconscious powers through the greater knowledge and understanding of them. The (free) will does play a central role, because the path of self-realization requires the active collaboration of the conscious ego, which means that individuation is a matter of moral choice. The will does not lie in taming the instincts (Plato/Christianity), nor is it Nietzsche's inflated, all-conquering will to power. The will is something that facilitates the emergence of the instincts into consciousness with the aim of harmonizing the psyche. (Clarke,1992:159).
Certainly therefore, Jung's thought does not imply that there is no such thing as responsibility. Quite the contrary, he severely condemns that tendency which places blame on institutions rather than individuals, and in this of course he echoes Sartre. The freedom and the duty of the individual lies in the responsibility to work at withdrawing the projections of the unconscious. Without this attempt, mutual projections alienate people from one another and this gives the state and its institutions more power, leading in a downward spiral to even more moral complacency and lack of responsibility. Like Sartre, Jung says that we all share in the guilt of the sins of mankind, by virtue of our human nature and the capacity for evil that lies in everyone.

"Since it is universally believed that man is merely what his consciousness knows of itself, he regards himself as harmless and so adds stupidity to iniquity. He does not deny that terrible things have happened and still go on happening, but it is always 'the other' who do them. And when such deeds belong to the recent or remote past, they quickly and conveniently sink into the sea of forgetfulness, and that state of chronic wooly-mindedness returns which we describe as 'normality'. In shocking contrast to this is the fact that nothing has finally disappeared and nothing has been made good. The evil, the guilt, the profound unease of conscience, the dark foreboding, are there before our eyes, if only we would see. Man has done these things; I am a man, who has his share of human nature; therefore I am guilty with the rest and bear unaltered and indelibly within me the capacity and the inclination to do them again at any time." (Jung, 1957: 52).

As long as the greater part of the personality is repressed, the danger keeps existing that the evil will really manifest, although of course the doer(s) of evil will then not see it like that, since they cannot think of themselves as evil. Surely one of the clearest examples of this is the institutionally structured and church sanctioned repression/projection of the shadow that was apartheid. In order to escape from the tyranny of the unconscious, and so also from the psychic epidemics of mass movements, unconscious forces must be recognized, understood and harnessed.

The forces in the unconscious are psychic instincts that take the shape of archetypes, and the entire reservoir of these powers is the libido. This libido concerns generally the will, desire and ability to negotiate through life. The instincts and their world of imagery "are potentialities of the greatest dynamism, and it depends entirely on the preparedness and attitude of the conscious mind whether the irruption of these forces, and the images and ideas associated with them, will tend towards construction or catastrophe." (Jung, 1957:58).
Jung would agree with Sartre that insight into the psyche is a slow and pain-staking process, and most are not naturally inclined to undertake the project. Therefore they can get on quite happily with knowledge only of their ego-consciousness, blindly living the metaphors of social life, and so foregoing a fuller and richer selfhood in favor of comfort and predictability. This is understandable, as what one might discover when going in search of the Self might not be at all congenial. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to introduce the notions of persona, shadow and animus/anima.

2.3 THE PERSONA, THE SHADOW AND THE ANIMUS/ANIMA.

2.3.1 HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS.

One of the first places where the disease of self manifests is in human relationships. The main reason for this is that people tend to project their own bad/unpleasant side onto others, while identifying themselves only with their persona. This is the source of all conflicts that do not yield to reason, the conflict being irreducibly emotional with its roots in the unconscious. Few people want to acknowledge imperfection, and the recognition of the shadow would entail just such an admission:

"Recognition of the shadow... leads to the modesty we need in order to acknowledge imperfection. A human relationship is not based on differentiation and perfection, for these only emphasize the differences or call forth the exact opposite; it is based, rather, on imperfection, on what is weak, helpless and in need of support - the very ground and motive for dependence. The perfect have no need of others, but weakness has, for it seeks support and does not confront its partner with anything that might force him into an inferior position or humiliate him." (Jung, 1957:57).

Unfortunately, the individual normally strives exactly for perfection (away from the shadow), instead of for completeness (towards acknowledging the shadow).

In social situations people tend to react to others based on three elements: their persona, their shadow and the anim(us/a).

One's persona is the mask one wears, the way we present ourselves to others, composed of social, familial and work-related duties, and most take this to be their 'self'. Jung describes it as that complicated system of relations between an individual and society, which is on the one hand a kind of mask designed to make a definite impression, and on the other a disguise to conceal the individual's true nature (Storr, 1983:94). The identification of the ego with the persona is the most common
and widespread form of infirmity in modern man. It causes the individual to be one-dimensional, but moreover, (to express it in Sartrean terms), to deny the psyche's autonomous and creative role in the shaping of his/her character and world. Persons who identify with the persona tend to be intractable, to see the world in terms of absolutes, and to look down on life-strategy's that differ from theirs. This state is fabricated and inauthentic, but despite it the person in question might be socially admired and respected.

The shadow, on the other hand, is to be found in the personal unconscious, and consists of all those qualities preferably hidden from oneself and others. The shadow has three basic aspects: first it is the negative side of the personality, all that must be concealed in order to make a good impression on people; secondly it contains the insufficiently developed functions, for example feeling where thinking is conscious, or sensation where intuition is conscious; lastly it is connects to the material of the personal unconscious. (Storr,1983:87). The shadow represents the opposite tendencies of those features of the persona, so that when, for instance, a woman sees herself as kind and understanding, she might be sometimes harsh and intolerant in terms of her shadow, a fact about herself to which she is blind, although others are likely to observe it. (If they were to tell her it would bring out the most vehement and injured denials). These unpleasant aspects are projected, for the most part arbitrarily, onto others who then particularly irritate and displease the person. One is able to congratulate oneself for being 'different' from others that one dislikes, because through the working of projection one can convince oneself of not being in possession of unsavory qualities. The hidden parts of the self always seek expression/recognition however, and the more they are denied, the more they cause discomfort, anxiety and tension. The inability to acknowledge the shadow can often lead to the breakdown of longstanding relationships.

It must be noted that the shadow is not wholly evil; instead it can resemble the weak and undeveloped aspects of the personality. It is better described as childlike, inferior, un-adapted and awkward. According to Jung it often contains those human qualities that would vitalize and embellish human life, were it not for the prohibitions of convention. (Storr,1983:90). In general the shadow should be seen as a kind of complement and opposite to the ego, the shadow constituting all the remaining potentialities with which the ego does not identify. These remaining potentialities can of course be either positive or negative, the negative being the possibilities the
individual would rather never realize at all. But many of the qualities existing in the shadow might actually be needed in order for the individual to become a well-rounded person: for example a capacity for play and enjoyment in someone who is industrious and work-orientated. (Shelburne, 1983:64).

This first dualism, expressed by the tension between the ego and the shadow, is the psyche's chief enigma, and ignorance or denial of its existence is its affliction. The manner in which this tension manifests in the individual because of his/her personal life is expressed by the ego/ shadow dichotomy, but a more profound and potentially destructive antonymy, which has its origin in the history of the species and not only of the individual, is that between the persona and the animus/ anima. This dichotomy is made up of elements that have never been conscious before.

2.3.2 THE SOUL IMAGE.

The shadow is the part of the unconscious that is most accessible and easiest to acknowledge and integrate, because it is personal and therefore still reasonably intelligible to consciousness. Once this first hurdle to healing is crossed however, a much larger obstacle looms. This is the anima/ animus or latent femininity in a man/ masculinity in a woman. (Jung, 1956: 19). This inhabitant of the psyche, a full blown archetype to whit, also represents the underdeveloped parts of the self, but it owes its existence not merely to the circumstances of the individual's life, but to the life of the species. Where, if the shadow is projected, it is usually projected onto someone of the same sex as oneself, the anima/ animus, if projected, is projected on someone of the opposite sex. Jung distinguishes between psyche and soul in the following way: the psyche is the sum of all the processes that constitute consciousness and unconsciousness. The soul on the other hand, consists of two features: the attitude of a person towards the outer world, and the attitude towards the own inner world. The former aspect of 'soul' is called the persona (already discussed) and the latter is called the anima/-us.

Because it is an image that expresses unconscious forces, all encounters with the animus/-a are loaded with deep emotion. It appears in stories, myths, and legends, and in daily life, but is also usually projected upon a specific member of the opposite sex, i.e. one's partner, although it can also be a friend, mother/father, daughter/son. The anima contains all aspects (positive as well as negative) of femininity like nurturing/ smothering, enchantment /seduction, emotion/ madness, and manifests in such shapes
as mother, maiden, crone, femme fatale, muse, etc. In its mythical aspects the anima refers to all goddesses or personifications of nature like ‘Mother Earth’.

The animus contains similarly the positive/ negative aspects of masculinity such as warrior-hero/ violent conqueror, critical judgment/ harsh intolerance, etc. In its mature aspect it is the 'Wise Old Man', but more broadly it is the spiritual (non-material) principle belonging to the air and sky, or, more recently, reason. The soul-image of a man is usually feminine because the inner attitude is the exact opposite to the outer in all respects, and thus also with respect to gender. Wherever there is excessive identification with the persona, says Jung, the soul accordingly is unconscious, and the soul-image transferred to a real person. This person becomes the object of either intense love or equally intense hate/fear. The presence and influence of the person onto whom the animus/-a is projected is immediate and compelling, possibly even overwhelming. This excessive emotion means that normal conscious adaptation to the (often unfortunate) person is impossible. (Storr, 1983:103).

The more rigid and unbending the persona is, the more soft and malleable will be the inner nature, and vice versa. It can happen that the animus/-a becomes autonomous, as all complexes or archetypes may, when they are sufficiently ignored. If it happens only momentarily, we have those rare and a-typical outbursts of people that lead us to say “something got into him” or “he became completely another man.” If it takes over the position from the ego in a more permanent way, full-blown psychosis may result. Attempting to integrate the anima or animus into consciousness is an extremely difficult task, firstly because the projection is absolutely convincing: there seems to be no doubt that the source of emotion comes from another person and not from inside oneself. Secondly if the animus/-a has genuinely unpleasant qualities it will be extremely difficult for an individual to admit to them. Thirdly drawing the animus/-a back into consciousness can have the initial effect of crucifying the individual between conflicting desires and attitudes, since all possible conflict is now contained within and not without.

2.4 NEUROSIS.

Jung's view of neurosis is not merely negative, since according to him it has the advantage of being an opportunity for the personality to develop and grow. “In Jung’s view every neurosis has an aim; it is an attempt to compensate for a one-sided attitude to life, and a voice, as it were, drawing attention to a side of the personality that has
been neglected or repressed... The symptoms of a neurosis are not simply the effect of long past causes, whether infantile sexuality or the infantile urge to power, they are also attempts at a new synthesis of life - unsuccessful attempts let it be added - yet attempts nevertheless, with a core of value and meaning." (Fordham, 1953:88).

A neurosis is any damming up of the libido that inhibits functioning. It is a failure of libido to carry the psyche over an obstacle or new phase of development. This blockage of libido is nothing but the *failure to achieve meaning*, due to consciousness being cut off from its natural soil, the unconscious. Jung in his approach to the treatment of neurosis, makes the same point as Levi-Strauss, who also wants to bridge the gap back from culture to nature by relating conscious to unconscious contents. (Gras, 1981:481). Jung's therapy, however, which is neither fixed nor prescriptive, is designed to develop the personality and ultimately to engage it in the process of individuation. Jung says that he has no ready-made philosophy to hand out, and hardly knows any better than the patient what the right course of action for him/her would be. What he had learned however, is that when to the conscious mind there is no possible way forward, the unconscious will come into play to point the way, as it were. (Fordham, 1953:94). The role of therapy is to teach the patient several hermeneutic methods (for example active imagination, amplification, the drawing and painting of dream-imagery, etc.) so that information from the unconscious can be interpreted, for where neurosis is too powerful "all rational explanations or conscious attempts at adjustment fail, and where hope lies only in tapping the energy of the unconscious, and releasing new sources of life." (Fordham, 1953:88).

2.4.1 THE ORIGIN OF NEUROSIS.

At its root a neurosis is a conflict between two different inclinations of the psyche: one conscious and the other unconscious. The conflict that characterizes the psyche arises from many different sources, not only from archetypal dyads like child/ mother, fool/ wise old man, but from existence as a whole and even from conflict within each archetype itself, as has already been intimated. Examples of conflict arising in each archetype are for instance "the great mother whose nurturing embrace also suffocates,
[and] the wise old man whose sense of history inhibits youthful initiative..." (Brooke, 1991:17).

The unconscious aspect of any conflict might be an autonomous complex, but if the aspect that has become autonomous is an archetype the problem is more serious and can veer towards mental illness. The neurotic is unaware of this autonomous element, which obtrudes into consciousness and attracts libidinous energy (for example emotional energy) to itself. As a result less energy is available for conscious and directed activity, making the person listless and depressed, or anxious and overly stressed, with little or no enthusiasm for the demands of life.

"A neurosis might show itself in the mildest way, in fact we are all sufferers to some extent; most of our lapses of speech or of memory, misunderstandings of what we have heard or read, or of other people's motives, or so-called hallucinations of memory when we mistakenly believe we have done or have not done something, are neurotic in origin. At the other extreme lie the dramatic cases of lost memory, hysterical paralysis, blindness, or deafness etc. - i.e. physical conditions for which there is no traceable physical cause - and in between the host of anxieties, fears and obsessions from which the wretched sufferer is quite unable to free himself." (Fordham, 1953:89).

2.4.2 THE NEUROTIC LIVES UNCONSCIOUSLY

The predominance of neurosis actually means that the unconscious is in control for a greater part of the day than we can imagine. Jung emphasizes the spiritual dilemma of modern man to be the fact that he lives unconsciously for the most part, but at the same time denies the existence of, or undervalues, the unconscious. Despite the fact that modern civilization has come about by the gradual raising of consciousness, in the process the individual has been tangled up in the psyche's depths. This is so because, although this freeing from the unconscious has had a tremendous positive influence on the progress of science and technology, it is only the intellectual faculty that has been 'emancipated'. In all other respects we are still 'primitive' and carry the same superstitions our ancestors did, although they now attach to different shapes.

In the west, with respect to matters of religion, there has indeed been a giant step backwards: modern man suffers from shock due to the disappointment of two thousand years of Christianity that had predicted the return of Christ and world peace, finding instead two millennia after Christ's birth two violent and senseless world wars and countless other, equally senseless, ethnic conflicts.
suffering from having been stripped of its myths and fantasies, and having to make do with a scientific and rational world-view. Couple with this the hubris that in all the above mankind has reached its pinnacle and is the crown of nature and the peak of eons of evolution, and one has an inkling of the profound disillusionment that characterizes the modern psyche. "It is true that modern man is a culmination, but tomorrow he will be surpassed; he is indeed the end-product of an age-old development, but he is at the same time the worst conceivable disappointment of the hopes of humankind." (Jung,1933:230).

As long as there is an outwardly established and widely accepted spiritual form which adequately expresses all the hopes and yearnings of mankind, there is no spiritual problem, for then the psyche is, as it were, on the 'outside', as primitive man's was, and it does not then conflict with conscious purpose. (Jung,1933:232.) Without this saving grace however, or when mankind outgrows its symbols and myths, the psyche acquires a life of its own that seeks expression, and this expression often takes the form of sheer madness, mindless violence, mass adherence to bizarre cults, and all manner of occult interests such as we see flourishing in popular society today. Mankind is left in a state of perpetual uncertainty that the daily hubbub of life does not always succeed in drowning out. The cure to this condition is clearly a greater awareness of the nature and aims of the psyche, conscious and unconscious, and the reaching towards that goal that is the embodiment of wholeness, namely the self.
3. THE CURE: THE ARCHETYPAL SELF.

The cure to the sickness described above (a split in the psyche leading to 'loss of soul') is to be achieved by re-mythologizing consciousness, which is a claim Jung is not alone in making. The main task of archetypal psychology is to restore mankind's connection to mythic and metaphorical thought patterns, because "man's dwelling (existence) is founded on divine standards, that is to say, on mythos." (Avens, 1982:189). Through the process of individuation, which is teleological, aiming at completeness, this link to living myth can be established and maintained.

3.1 THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF INDIVIDUATION.

3.1.1 CAUSALITY VERSUS TELEOLOGY.

According to Jung, any moment in the self's development can be viewed from either a causal or a purposive standpoint, since both are valid lines of enquiry. However, very few of Jung's contemporaries would agree that there is anything purposive about the psyche, and in this Jung parted company with the prevailing positivistic atmosphere of his time. He agrees that any moment in an individual's history can be traced to its origins and initial conditions through a sequential series of connections and antecedent causes. But this causal view of a psychic occasion is a closed system, and does not allow for the spontaneous development that undoubtedly is one of its most important aspects (Sartre's point again). The purposive or final perspective, on the other hand, regards any psychic moment as a "novel and unique configuration of the self, reflecting something other than the sum of a series of causal sequences" which will always elude sequential analysis. (Bockus, 1990:47).

Jung's 'teleology' offers an alternative to the causal and materialistic view of the psyche that had been advanced by Freud. In searching for the origins of neuroses, dreams and the like, Freud (especially the early Freud) took an empirical approach to the psyche that followed the model of cause and effect popular in science at the time. When asking what had made the patient have this dream, or display these hysterical symptoms, he initially tended to find the answer to be the repressed sexual wishes of childhood. Jung on the other hand, while not denying or minimizing the value of such an approach, emphasizes that the psyche tends to a goal. Where Freud thus looks for a
first foundation, Jung looks to a final purpose. When analyzing a dream for example, Jung will not merely ask what caused it, but rather 'what is its intent?'

Jung disagreed with Freud's theory that dreams conceal things; quite the opposite, he held that their purpose is to reveal. His is a hermeneutic approach which says that dreams are perplexing simply because we do not understand their language. He widened the field of hermeneutics by treating dreams like a text requiring interpretation, and his methods are also those of hermeneutics: the dream must be placed in the context of the patient's life and other dreams, but also against the background of cultural history. The purpose of a dream is always to inform the dreamer of a conscious attitude that does not fit in with the present state of the unconscious. A dream works towards addressing an imbalance in the psyche, in accordance with the theory that the psyche is self-regulating and autonomous.

The natural striving of the psyche towards a specific purpose is called the process of individuation, and the goal it strives for is the Self. This is a lifelong process of "coming into union with one's own being." (Nagy, 1991:209). It must be realized in the first instance that, according to Jung, whether the goal striven for is actually practically reachable is of no consequence, which is just as well because in fact it cannot be reached. The conflict of opposing forces creates the dynamic tension that raises up libido and is the very source of life (Kierkegaard's point); therefore the reaching of perfect harmony will have to mean death, and the extinguishing of consciousness. (Sartre's point.)

It is vital that, despite this fact, the futuristic and hopeful attitude of the psyche not be repressed by the scientific attitude which relies on a purely causal approach and on empiricism, for while these are valid and applicable to a specific area, namely that of nature (which as Sartre has shown, has no final purpose and is thus de trop), it is of little use for the study of the psyche. For life to have meaning for an individual, a goal-orientated approach is indispensable. However, in Jung's opinion, not just any goal can arbitrarily be chosen, for nature and the psyche already have their own goals. The purpose of the psyche, the reason for its existence, can in one way be seen as creating the space where 'Being' manifests itself. This reminds of the Heideggerean notion of Dasein: the Da- of Dasein, is the human being's letting 'Being be', is the place where Being can be brought out of concealment into disclosure. (Avens, 1982:184). For this reason we can say that the human psyche had been nature's goal. But the psyche also has its own goal: that of wholeness, completion,
harmony. This goal must inevitably be transcendent, because perfect harmony can never be attained, and for that reason 'wholeness' is usually described by religious systems as Nirvana, heaven, or some other form of blissful afterlife. It is possible to establish, even empirically, that under certain conditions, religion is of vital importance to the psyche's health\textsuperscript{110}: Jung claimed that no patient of his past the age of forty ever found healing without finding religion of some kind. It places the individual in a correct relationship with a driving force which tends towards a supra-personal goal, this driving force being nothing other than the unconscious.

3.1.2 DIVERSIFICATION AND UNITY.

Lest the above train of thought starts sounding Hegelian, it must be noted that this supra-personal goal that the psyche strives towards is in one sense wholeness and unification, \textit{but in another diversification}; the latter refers to the tendency to separate the individual from its surroundings and to gain absolute uniqueness. The former refers to the attempt to unite the conflicting influences that come from inside and outside, in a workable and coherent unit. It is a paradox of human existence (of the type also expressed by Kierkegaard), that what is universal is only to be found within a concrete, particular, unique individual. The individual must know that his/her own situation is \textit{not} unique, in order to cope with whatever problems lie ahead: "To interpret dreams and fantasies through amplification is to find certain mythological parallels with the patient's situation so that his difficulties become generalized and 'spiritualized.' He comes to understand his present plight as participating in a collective meaning which has always been true and \textit{is now true for him in particular.}" (my italics Gras,1981:473). This can also be understood to correspond with Heidegger's 'appropriation' by which the \textit{Dasein} establishes personal identity and boundary by accepting responsibility for a world that is uniquely 'mine'. (Brooke,1991:107).

The vital principle which diversifies and separates the individual from nature and from other people is spontaneous and inherent to human nature. Being a natural principle, this tendency to individuality continues to flow in and of itself, and all neurotic disturbances are obstacles in its path. The libido flows from sublimation in the 'darkness of primitive consciousness' (present also in modern people), where no distinction is made between outer and inner world, towards analytical consciousness which distinguishes and diversifies. According to Jung the "true end of analysis is
attained when the patient has arrived at an adequate knowledge of the methods by which he can maintain contact with his unconscious" which will enable him/her to consciously sustain the individuality s/he has achieved. (Nagy, 1991:212.) An indispensable part of the cure which keeps this lifeline to the unconscious open, is to restore faith in being and in existence. As such it is necessary that the patient begins to trust the process by believing that "all shall be well", a motif which is a verbal expression of a primordial hope. (Caspar, 1981:150). This hope that is promised is "cosmic and eschatological. To be able to invoke an eternal order in which 'everything is all right' and 'all shall be well' is to have the capacity to transcend the space and time of the empirical world - a world of disorder - and to participate in an order that is ultimately trustworthy: a supernatural order, the context of, and ground for, religious faith." (Caspar, 1981:144). The religious tendency is consequently discussed in the next section.

Jung prefers to say that we must take a 'final view' onto the development of the psyche, rather than a teleological view, since the latter implies the inevitable attainment of a goal, while the former means that the 'process' of striving has precedence over the 'end'. As concerns the final goal of wholeness and unification, it can be described as a condition where all the different elements of the psyche, both conscious and unconscious, are supportive of each other. The person who achieves this goal possesses an attitude that is beyond the reach of emotional entanglements and violent shocks, and is able to outlive the longest night.

3.2 THE JUNGIAN SELF

3.2.1 THE SELF AS IMAGO DEI

Bockus distinguishes between different meanings of the Self in Jung's thought: it is the total system of the psyche, but also the centralizing tendency of the psyche as a whole. It is furthermore the whole within which progressive differentiation and complexity develops, and the goal of human development (already discussed above). Lastly the Self is the archetypal tendency which predisposes us towards typically human development. (Bockus, 1990:45). The most important aspect of all, however, that does not emerge so clearly from the above, but which is actually implied by all five viewpoints, is that it is a God-image (imago Dei.) The Self as God-image is a paradox of the kind that the 'self is not only the center, but also the whole circumference which embraces both conscious and unconscious', a paradox, says
Brooke, which becomes manageable when one realizes the this is not a spatial arrangement but that "God [the self] is a circle whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere." (1991:97).

Jung was adamant not only that the process of individuation was a spiritual and religious quest, but also that the Self, the ultimate symbol of completeness, cannot be distinguished from a God-image. 'God', broadly seen in the above terms, is not only the end of human endeavor, but also the agency that sustains and breathes life into the individual. As such it is a power that both supercedes and grounds the human subject and which cannot be brought under the final control of the will. Nevertheless, it is only through self-exploration that the deity can be recognized and can be a 'real' influence in the affairs of humans: "When we know our own depths, our inherent grounding in the divine reality, God becomes effectually and concretely present in human affairs and human experience. Modern individuals must take their potential for self-realization with the utmost seriousness. Alienated from their own depths, they are alienated from God. And alienated from God, they are estranged from themselves.” (Bockus,1990:56).

The Latin religio means paying attention to and recognizing certain potent factors that mythically are conceived as 'powers': spirits, daemons, gods, laws, ideas, ideals, or, as Jung puts it, "whatever name man has given to such factors in his world as he has found powerful, dangerous, or helpful enough to be taken into careful consideration, or grand, beautiful and meaningful enough to be devoutly worshipped and loved." (Storr,1983:240). It is precisely this aspect of religion that Jung regards as irreplaceable. The term religion intends a scrupulous and careful observation of the numinosum, which is a life-shaping energy or effect that finds it's origin outside of the conscious will. It can often seize and control of consciousness, and so the human subject is more accurately described as its victim than its creator. (Storr,1983:239).

A religious experience is essential to the individuation process, and a religious experience as Jung describes it is always accompanied by a deeply felt confrontation with a force that is not the same as one's own ego or consciousness, that does not spring from it, and that cannot be touched by the intelligence in the ordinary manner. Consciousness is irrevocably altered by such an experience, which is typically described as a 'conversion'. It can be overwhelming or slight, fleeting or permanent, but without it there is no use merely confirming or confessing to a creed or belief. Religion in the true sense of the word must at some point have been internalized and
felt. (A comparison with Kierkegaard's exhortation to 'inwardness' springs immediately to mind.)

3.2.2 SYMBOLS OF THE SELF

A symbol, according to Jung, is the best possible depiction of an unknown thing. It is not like a sign which stands in a one to one relationship with that which it denotes, but rather has a wealth of meanings that are potentially inexhaustible - from there its mystery. Any conversion ideally draws its energy from a symbol of self: these are always of a nature that integrates mutually exclusive opposites into a unity. These symbols are inexhaustible by reason, and are consequently difficult to express conceptually, finding their best representation through visual metaphors. Despite being contrary to common sense, they are nevertheless true in a dialectical sense, because “conflict, instead of destroying unity, is constitutive of unity. Opposites in nature as well as in the psychic realm are not contradictory (as in logic) but polar: they live by virtue of each other and at each other’s expense.” (Avens, 1982: 198).

That the self is best expressed symbolically, is due to that problem with any theory that tries to explain and define consciousness and the psyche, already articulated by Sartre: the mind tries to know itself and so be one with itself, but this is impossible, for it cannot be both subject and object. It will always escape its own view of itself. Jung also articulates this problem when he says that the psyche is ineffable: it is something unknown that defies every attempt to describe it exhaustively, but yet it does undeniably exist. It lies beyond the limits of the comprehensible but also beyond the limits of ontology (as Sartre has shown.) That something is rationally incomprehensible has long since ceased to be a disqualification from paying it attention nevertheless: the Kantian refusal to study the Ding-an-sich was overthrown by phenomenology, and someone like Heidegger relies heavily on the notion that underlying human existence, there is the ‘unreasonable’: “Indeed the outstanding feature of Heidegger’s thought is that it has succeeded in dismantling nearly all the entrenched philosophical positions by showing that our thinking is inevitably a kind of eternal return to something unthought or even unthinkable by means of rigid universal categories... it is precisely this insight into the complicity of all thinking with a residual non-rational substrate that makes possible a ‘genuine dialogue’ between Heidegger and archetypal psychology.” (Avens, 1982: 184). In the thought of Jung, this is implied in the definition of self as the ineffable totality and indefinable
whole of rational thinking and non-rational psychic activity, which can only be designated symbolically. The chief symbol of the Self is 'God', since symbols of God actually represent an intuition of the self and its grounding in the processes of life, or 'reality'. "Imago Dei represents the self-world correspondence, binding us to a common ground and thrusting us toward individuation." (Bockus, 1990:52).

Through active imagination, a process of amplification of psychological contents by means of association that actually raises unconscious contents to consciousness, the process of individuation is animated. This process is also called centroversion or psychic transformation, and can be found expressed in practices as widely diverse as yoga and alchemy: "Individuation is a process of mental transformation toward psychic wholeness and equilibrium, which Jung conceived as a yogic dialectical pattern of reconciling all conscious and unconscious elements of the psyche into what alchemical tradition termed coincidenta oppositorum or 'union of opposites'. The inner dynamic for this individuation process is provided by the creative imagination’s power to evoke ‘symbols of transformation’ and ‘images of wholeness’ from the collective unconscious so that they may be integrated into ordinary ego-consciousness...” (Odin, 1982:257).

3.2.2.1 The Mandala.

Jung was a great admirer of Eastern culture and religion, since he believed that in the East many ways of tapping into and assimilating material from the deeper levels of the psyche had been refined over the many centuries that the West had spent blocking it off through excessive development of rational consciousness. (Clarke, 1992:82). He did warn however against the attempt to immerse oneself completely in another culture; the assumption that gaining Eastern wisdom is as easy as buying a primer from the New Age section in the local bookstore, severely underestimates the real and deep differences between the two strategies of life. Nevertheless at a deeper level even the Western psyche produces spontaneously the same kind of images and ideas used in Eastern religions.

In many Eastern religions the self is symbolically expressed by the mandala, a circular motif with a quaternity structure that normally includes deities or symbols of androgyny at the center. In Sanskrit 'mandala' simply means circle, but in religious practices it denotes circular images that may be painted, drawn, modeled, or even danced, often richly embroidered and complex, although the basic pattern is quite
simple. The circle is usually divided in quarters, with a horizontal and vertical line meeting in its center. This is the pattern that depicts harmony and the equality of opposing forces. It is a drawing of supreme order that, through meditation on it, is meant to impose pattern onto the chaos and confusion of consciousness. In many Eastern religions, the conception of a deity is replaced by human wholeness, and for this reason Indian philosophy makes no distinction between the self that is without and the self that is within. Therefore the “Mandala Circle, from the Jungian standpoint, represents the basic God-image (*imago Dei*), Self-archetype, or vision of wholeness evoked from the collective unconscious through the noetic constitutive functioning of active imagination which acts to establish equilibrium between conscious and unconscious dimensions in the psyche through its power of dialectical ‘synthesis’, i.e. its power to mediate all opposites and reconcile all psychic contradictions... the radical transformation of one’s *ahamkara* or ‘self-image’ into the divine personality of the deity enshrined by the Mandala Circle designates what Jung terms the ‘centroversion’ or ‘centralization’ process whereupon one’s psychological center is shifted from the ego, which only regulates conscious activity, to the ‘Self’ representing the totality of all conscious and unconscious patterns of psychic energy.” (Odin, 1982:264).

3.2.2.2 Christ.

In the case of the West, the foremost symbol for the self is that of the person of Christ. According to Jung (1959), the psychological aspects of individuation is described quite effectively by Christian tradition, despite the fact that Christ is severed from his 'shadow', as will be explained shortly. Like Kierkegaard, Jung emphasizes that the historical details of Christ's life are irrelevant, and even if no such person existed, or if his words and life had been hideously distorted by history, it makes no difference to the efficaciousness of the living symbol that people unknowingly acknowledge when they affirm belief in Christ. The important point is that Christ's life such as it is known to us had a distinctly archetypal character; it is the personal and historical realization of the God-human archetype. (Bockus, 1990:53). This can be recognized by a simple comparison to numerous other myth-motifs from all over the world, for example of a God-man, of a hero come to save humankind who is subsequently killed/sacrificed, of birth, death and re-birth. In this respect the life of Christ is certainly not unique, in that, according to Jung, "not a few of the great
figures of history have realized, more or less clearly, the archetype of the hero's life with its characteristic changes of fortune." (Storr, 1983:248). The archetypal themes in the life of Christ include very obviously sacrifice, death and rebirth, the wounded healer, and the hero/ savior persecuted. Its mythical character means that the story is repeated in the life of the contemporary psyche, making the historical present.

The problem with modern Christianity as religion however, is that it is entirely unaware of the psychological nature of its central doctrine and takes it to be a metaphysical reality. Like all religions, it is a projection of psychic truths, and in this case there is clearly something wrong in the psyche. Projection can lead to the more sinister aspects of that religion, as psychological truth becomes sterile dogma, defended by the judgmental and intolerant. The archetype of the God-man is an inner truth, a fact inherent in the nature of the modern person, which must be withdrawn from projection onto the historical Christ for it to be truly efficacious. "Projection is the transferring of a subjective content onto an external object. It represents a form of disassociation, since people fail to recognize the content as a part of themselves and to assimilate it into their selfhood. To the extent that the content remains unassimilated, the self is unrealized." (Bockus, 1990:54).

The Christ symbol, when realized in the self, leads to that same inner conflict and psychological suffering described by Kierkegaard and Sartre. Generally speaking, the integration of unconscious contents into consciousness by the withdrawal of projections, implies an increase of the 'area' of consciousness. As consciousness grows, develops, and differentiates, so does the awareness of conflict. The awareness of conflict is very aptly expressed by the crucifixion, which symbolizes also the crucifixion of the ego between irreconcilable opposites. Here Jung's analysis of the nature of the conflict and the syntheses between the opposing poles of the psyche remind us strikingly of Kierkegaard's work, where Christ represents the Self and is the apotheosis of individuality, described in antonimical terms, and in Jung even more explicitly, as a quaternion. On the one hand, illustrated graphically on a vertical axis of the cross, Christ is the synthesis of the eternal and the uni-temporal: Christ was born, grew up and died in a specific period in time, but yet is also immortal and eternal, existing outside time. On the horizontal crossbar, we have on the one side Christ's uniqueness and on the other his universality: Christ was one man, and yet lives in everyone. In his aspect of Man, the biblical Christ is uni-temporal and unique, and in his aspect as God eternal and universal. "We can speak of the self-
transcending side of the archetype in Jesus Christ as the 'Son of God'. We can speak of the personal aspects of his selfhood as the 'Son of Man.'... On the basis of the archetype of the God-human, we can say that Christ's divine nature refers to his actuality, definiteness, uniqueness, individuality, and unitemporal nature." (Bockus, 1990:53). This paradox indicates that while the Self must be realized by each person individually, and represents the apex of uniqueness, it is at the same time a universal archetype. The process of individuation is a 'mysterium coniunctionis' that makes sense of these paradoxes. (Jung 1959:par 115 - 117).

As symbol of the self, the current concept of Christ declared by the various Protestant denominations as well as the Catholic Church, is not, however, as satisfactory as is the mandala. That is because Christ today stands for 'perfection' (purity, holiness, and inviolable sanctity) rather than completeness (integrative wholeness). Perfection in this case refers to absolute goodness and the absence of evil/sin. This one-sided conception naturally gives rise also to the notion of the antichrist, who must be taken together with Christ in order to deal with the symbol in its entirety. Just as the Christ is a projection of the unconscious, so is the devil, it's shadow side. By making of Lucifer Christ's adversary, the modern Christ symbol represents a degeneration from the original imago Dei, which stood once for an all-embracing totality. In the old testament there are still remnants of a different view of God, namely one that is familiar with evil and that allows it for his own purposes: in Job the devil does not appear as the antagonist, but rather as the familiar of Yahweh. (Jung, 1959: par 77).

Historical development of Christianity is merely a reflection and indication of mankind's greater separation from its shadow side. Describing Christ as without sin ties in with a long philosophical and theological tradition that describes evil merely as a privatio boni, or absence of good (Aquinas), and as lacking in substance (Augustine) or 'uncreated'. This frees God from the responsibility for the existence of evil. Of this tradition Jung says that the "perfectly natural fact that when you say 'high' you immediately postulate 'low' is here twisted into a causal relationship and reduced to an absurdity." (Jung, 1959: par 84).

According to Jung good and evil must necessarily go together, even though they don't derive from each other, since they are the sine qua non of all moral judgments. It is in the nature of consciousness to oppose concepts to each other, also good and evil, for consciousness works by differentiating. Only the unconscious does not know the difference between good and evil. The slow and painstaking development of
consciousness leads to greater awareness of the oppositions that (must) constitute it. This leads to greater psychic tension and the rising up of libido for all those tasks human life requires. From this it can be seen why it is such a mistake to relegate 'knowledge of evil' to the unconscious and burying it in the shadow, as has been done in the Christian tradition. The mis-representation of an archetype leads to the stunting of the libido and malevolent expression of its energy, as can clearly be seen in the bloody and intolerant history of the Christian church, and many instances of religiously toned mental illness in individuals.

Jung describes the argument of the *privatio boni* as a euphemistic *petitio principii* which draws a false conclusion from the premise that good is the *Summum Bonum*. (Jung, 1959:par 94). The argument of the *privatio boni* is a metaphysical one that is not borne out by current empirical psychological findings, for here it is seen that evil is real and does not lack substance, and that the tendency towards evil is alive in the breast of every man and woman. For this reason an individual that strives for 'perfection' is misguided and doomed to failure; the goal instead must be 'completeness' and the admitting of imperfection.

3.2.3 THE NEED FOR ORIGINAL RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

It must be noted that the above is not metaphysical speculation, but an analysis of the human psyche which during the course of its development gave birth to the symbol of Christ. Whereas Freud thought that myth has the same nuclear complex as a neurosis, and that religion is a universal obsessive neurosis, Jung believed that myth and religion are both healthy and positive functions of the psyche. (Clarke, 1992:11). Since both God and Christ in the Christian tradition are anthropomorphic (as are all conceptions of God/s) they are capable of psychological elucidation. According to Jung, in the above analysis, he is concerned with 'scientific fact', and not statements of faith. (Jung, 1959:par 123). The unconscious mind, like the 'transcendental', is unknowable in itself, and can be studied only through its manifestations. (Clarke, 1992:34). Thus, if Jung speaks about man's having a 'natural religious function' in the same way that he has certain instincts, for example sexuality or aggression, he is making not a statement of faith, but of what is according to him, 'scientific' fact, by which he must be taken to mean that it is the fact of religions existing, rather than their content, that constitutes something which can be empirically validated. But not only can the fact of religions existing be empirically validated, Jung
also held that there are strong empirical reasons for holding on to beliefs even though we know they cannot be proved, and that is that they are known to be useful. (Clarke, 1992:75). (Refer again to footnote 26). Religion is a manifestation of the unconscious, common to all humankind, although in different forms, and according to Jung, they are all psycho-therapeutic systems that give people the security and inner strength "not to be crushed by the monstrousness of the universe." (Clarke, 1992:75).

What is vital however is that the proper expression be given to the religious function, lest it deteriorate into tyranny. Dogma is the product of the conscious mind working on and refining the raw date from the unconscious. (Fordham, 1953:71). A dogmatic attempt to rid unconscious truths of paradox must fail, and a religion that tries to be perfectly rational is weakened, for it debilitates the power and dynamism that the grasp of an archetype through its symbolism can release into the psyche. (Kierkegaard's point). "Dogma, creed and ritual are crystallized forms of original religious experience, worked over and refined, sometimes for centuries, until they reach the forms in which we know them. In this way channels are made that control the unruly and arbitrary 'supernatural' influences. A living church protects men from the full force of an experience that can be devastating; instead of being gripped by the collective unconscious, they can participate in a ritual which expresses it sufficiently to 'purge' by its reflection." (Fordham, 1953:72). A weak consciousness might be so overwhelmed by the experience that it can lead to illness. For this reason dogma is a necessary bulwark and useful channel against the overwhelming forces of the unconscious, of which people are quite rightly afraid. There must however be a balance between the rigidity of dogma and its suppleness, for a too rigid channel can block of the flow completely, and then ritual will become meaningless.

In conclusion to this section I quote the following passage (par 12) from Psychology and Alchemy at length:

"The great events of our world as planned and executed by man do not breathe the spirit of Christianity, but rather of unadorned paganism. These things originate in a psychic condition that has remained archaic and has not even been remotely touched by Christianity. The Church assumes, not altogether without reason, that the fact of semel credisse (having once believed) leaves certain traces behind it; but of these traces nothing is to be seen in the march of events. Christian civilization has proved hollow to a terrifying degree: it is all veneer, but the inner man has remained untouched and therefore unchanged. His soul is out of key with his external beliefs; in his soul the Christian has not kept pace with external developments. Yes, everything is to be found outside - in image and in word, in Church and Bible - but not inside. Inside reign the archaic gods,
supreme as ever; that is to say the inner correspondence with the outer God-
image is undeveloped for lack of spiritual civilization and has therefore got stuck
in heathenism. Christian education has done all that is humanly possible, but it
has not been enough. Too few people have experienced the divine image as the
innermost possession of their own souls. Christ only meets them from without,
ever from within the soul."
4. CRITICAL EVALUATION.

Of the thinkers discussed here, not one of whom has escaped the accusation they are not strictly speaking 'philosophers', Jung is the one that has evoked the severest criticism. On the one hand he has been dismissed, until recently, by academic philosophers. This is despite the insistence of some critics that he "contributes an irreplaceable philosophic and existential element to contemporary approaches to the re-appropriation of myths" (Bar, 1976:119), and that his work contains a "blatant wealth waiting to be put through the multitudinous philosophical sieves that presently exist" (Clark, 1973:205). On the other hand he has gained a faithful popular following that yearly grows world-wide, and seem almost religious in their devotion to him and his work. He would surely not have been too pleased with this latter development and himself is said to have stated once: 'Thank God I am Jung and not a Jungian!' In fact he was hesitant to make his ideas accessible to a wider audience, since he saw much danger for misinterpretation, sloppy thinking, and pseudo-mysticism to arise from it, the near inevitable result of it being "isolated between the faculties". (Clarke, 1992:xiii). It was only towards the end of his life that he was finally convinced to publish a summary of his life's work, *Man and his Symbols*, that would be accessible to a lay audience. His popularity among the 'uneducated', and his unfortunate appropriation by many 'New Age' thinkers, did not contribute to his academic standing, and explains the fact that he is largely shunned by psychologists and philosophers alike. Recently however, it has been realized that his work, although not easily classifiable and falling 'between disciplines', has an undeniable place in the history of thought, and delivers valuable contributions that it would be careless to overlook.

A typical example of the kind of criticism directed against Jung, is that his "mind was profoundly confused, and his writings are a trail to anyone who attempts to discover in them a logical sequence of ideas" (S.S. Hughes, in Clarke, 1992:4), which basically echoes Freud's dismissal of his erstwhile colleague's views as "obscure, unintelligible and confused". (ibid, 17). Even Jung himself admitted that there is an "apparent carelessness and vagueness" about his own concepts that resist systematic formulation. (ibid). This might also be the reason why, strangely, academic criticism of Jung is not always in agreement with itself: one finds for example that some
criticize him for postulating an unchanging reality behind the world of appearances, hypostatizing and reifying the archetypes into absolutes, and restoring the notion of innate ideas in a Platonistic fashion. At the same time, paradoxically, others charge him with relativism. It seems that everyone has a bone to pick with Jung: from positivists to post-structuralists, from believers to atheists, even feminists who object against his supposed patriarchal depiction of women, despite the fact that the number of Jungian analysts who are female is basically exactly the same as the number of men, making it one of the most equal (with respect to gender) scholarly fields today. Also, many of the academics, like Jolande Jacobi, Aniella Jaffe, Marie-Louise von Franz (who is widely recognized as his successor), that carried on his work after his death, were women.

All of the above criticisms hold water to a greater or lesser extent, but most lose sight of the fact that Jung was first and foremost a psychiatrist, and that his object was to cure the various manifestations of mental disturbances in his patients. Furthermore, his patients did not include only relatively functional but neurotic individuals, but real cases of insanity. Jung's method was and is still unique in that it does not deal with these cases through mere institutionalization and medication, as is most often the practice, but by trying to understand what is the nature of the psyche itself, that it allows in certain circumstances for such deterioration. It is hermeneutic in assuming that these lunacies do make a modicum of sense, if only we could find the key to interpreting them. The cause and nature real insanity is nearly unfathomable, there being almost no point from where to start making sense of it. From a neurological point of view one can look at brain-chemistry and how it alters as insanity progresses, but even from this point of view most forms of mental illness is incurable and the methods also experimental, including such horrors as electro-shock therapy and lobotomy. His method was always experimental, and certainly not as damaging as some of the archaic methods used to treat the mentally ill, and he would literally try anything to see if it could work. That is why Brooke (1991:29) says that "[w]hen it comes to considering Jung, it seems at first that he makes use of several approaches in a kind of muddled eclecticism, which gives rise to several different and incompatible languages within analytical psychology." In answer to this we can cite Clarke's interesting comment that Jung's work was really also dialectical, like Kierkegaard's, that is, it grew in the shape of a dialogue between several different, often conflicting voices: "Like Kierkegaard, the great nineteenth century Danish philosopher who
addressed his public through a variety of carefully contrived pseudonyms, he speaks to us not just with two but with many voices, with the voice of the philosopher, the psychologist, the scientist, the theologian, the mythologist, the seer." (Clarke, 1992: 14).

So the reason why scholars often find it difficult to make sense of his academic output is that he didn’t formulate an explicit, systematic theory, since his work was aimed at therapy, and not at the development of a coherent system. On this point he said that "[t]here is and can be no self-knowledge based on theoretical assumptions, for the object of self-knowledge is an individual - a relative exception and an irregular phenomenon. Hence, it is not the universal and the regular which characterize the individual, but rather the unique. He is not to be understood as a recurrent unit but as something unique and singular which in the last analysis can neither be known nor compared with anything else." (Jung, 1957, 9).

Does the confusing style betray a confused thinker? asks Clarke, and is there more to his work than a muddle of brilliant insights that simply failed to cohere? He answers this question by using the distinction between problem thinkers and system thinkers made by Hartmann, where Jung, as problem thinker, might be described one of those who "put into play a variety of subordinate and sometimes mutually contradicting notions, and who seek to encourage open-ended exploration rather than to close off possibilities." (Clarke, 1992: 18-19).

The question might then be asked however, why Jung should be discussed in a philosophical context at all? In answer we can point out first of all that he read widely in philosophy, and explicitly admitted that his thought had been influenced by the likes of Kant, Schopenhauer and Bergson, and many more. Secondly, the careful study of his method reveals that he can fit without too great a stretch of the imagination into the discipline of existential phenomenology; moreover, as Shelburne (1983: 63) argues, Jung in fact corrects many of the deficiencies of an existential phenomenological philosophy (like Sartre’s), because, while he deals with the same broad themes, he provides more substantive guidelines as to what ‘authenticity’ might mean, and also spells out more clearly how to attain it.
4.1 ON THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS.

Jung's entire body of work must stand or fall with the central notion of the collective unconscious. The course of his life led him to concentrate all efforts around the unconscious, and how it manifests in dreams, myths, and culture. If the scientific world had found it difficult to accept Freud's idea of an 'unconscious', it balked even more at the idea that humanity has the unconscious in common, and that it finds its roots in nature. The theory smacks of mysticism and seems to belong more to theology or the occult than to science. It apparently calls for credulity on the part of any reader, because it demands a denial of common sense. Jung's theory places consciousness and the ego, that which is most familiar to every person, in the position of a suspect, and then exhorts the individual to give an ear to something that is by definition largely unknowable.

4.1.1 THE STATUS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS AND ITS ARCHETYPES.

Not only in terms of common sense, but also philosophically speaking, Jung goes against a tradition stemming from Locke, who said that the mind is a tabula rasa, and that the only ideas that can come 'into' it, are those that the individual experiences through the senses in its own lifetime. Locke's understanding of the human mind again goes back to the Aristotelian dictum: nihil in intellectu quod nisi prius in sensu: nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses. Jung apparently takes the Platonic side in the Plato/Aristotle debate, and the side of the idealists in the debate between idealism and realism. Idealism and Platonism being long out of date, it is clear that the burden of proof lies on Jung's side. A further point in this same line of critique is that Jung's theory of archetypes fails Ockham's razor, which says to never make an explanation more complicated than it need be. Levin says: "One could argue that these themes and characters appear and reappear in myths, dreams, art, and symptoms because they are universal human experiences that appear in and are lived by each and every generation. Each and all have a mother, is or was or knows a child, and so forth, so of course we write, sculpt, paint and dream about them, and there is no need to posit an innate mother pattern antecedent to experience of mother. Universality does not necessarily entail innateness. The archetypes, like Plato's forms, double the world - there is the world as experienced and the world as eternal pattern - in the collective unconscious, or in the Platonic Heaven, or in the mind of God. Is this doubling necessary? Does it really explain anything? I have my doubts...."
(Levin, 1991:119). MacIntyre (1967:296) adds that the notion of a collective unconscious and the archetypes are suspect on the grounds that they cannot be proven to exist, and that no experiments or predictions can be based on it, but that despite this Jung treats them almost like scientific facts. MacIntyre says that at "the root of the problem lies an ambiguous set of ontological claims. Jung insisted that the contents of the psyche are as real as what exists in the external world. He clearly meant by this more than the obvious, which nobody would be disposed to deny, for example that there \textit{are} recurrent patterns of symbolism. But what he meant beyond this remains unclear. Sometimes he seems to have treated the archetypal images as autonomous agents and the collective unconscious as the realm in which they dwell. However, his insistence on the inapplicability of the ordinary canons of logic in these matters makes it difficult to press the questions which this seems to raise." (MacIntyre, 1967:296).

4.1.1.1 The archetypes regulate experience

In the reply to these types of criticism it can be clarified that the archetypes of the unconscious are examples of those types of regulative principles, put forward by Kant, that have pseudo-rational status, and which cannot be explained or experienced simply because they make experience possible in the first place. These ideas are needed because the conceptualization of human experience inevitably runs into antinomies such as the finitude vs. the infinitude of the universe, or determinism vs. freedom. In order to unify human experience according to semiotic rules, these pseudo rational themes are required, or else our concepts will remain piecemeal and contradictory. Although they cannot be experimentally demonstrated and conflict with strictly scientific concepts, they unify our experience and are valuable sense-making tools. The archetypes are beyond the limits of experience and rational elucidation, because they make experience possible, and are not objects of experience. (Bar, 1976:115). This is precisely why our attempts to understand the human psyche "inevitable lead us into making use of conceptual models which often seem bizarre and paradoxical and which run counter to common sense". (Clarke, 1992:25). It also explains why Jung said that he needed to speak in a language that is enigmatic and has more than one meaning; this is what is needed to do justice to the ambiguity of our psychic nature. (ibid).
4.1.1.2 The archetypes are real facts

That the question of whether or not the collective unconscious exists cannot be determined by any possible observation or experiment, only shows therefore that it is not a question of fact, but of meaning. But did Jung not continually refer to his psychology as a science and treat the collective unconscious not just as an hypothesis, but as a fact in itself? (MacIntyre, 1967:296). One must also take into account the structuralist critique of Levi-Strauss, who said that Jung reified the archetypes, positing a one-to-one relationship between mythological pattern and meaning (which is a similar mistake to that which holds that sound has an inherent affinity with meaning). (Gras, 1981:484). These criticisms have in common the claim that Jung, despite all his protestations to the contrary, does treat the unconscious as a reified, absolute system behind consciousness.

Two replies to this are possible: first of all, Jung did make himself clear on more than one occasion about what status should be accorded to the unconscious, believing himself again closely affiliated to Kant in this matter: "Jung accepted Kant's view that as well as the faculty of perception there is also a faculty of apperception whose function is to give shape and meaning to the raw data of the senses. Like Kant he believed that archetypes must be understood in phenomenal rather than metaphysical terms, in other words as telling us about the necessary structure of experience rather than the essence of things. Just as for Kant we cannot know what things are like in themselves beyond our experience of them in space and time, so Jung believed that strictly speaking in itself the collective unconscious cannot be said to exist at all, but as a concept represents only the possibility of certain kinds of experience." (Italics mine. Clarke, 1992:119). Yet, even while using Kant to illustrate his own point, he revealed Kant's noumena-phenomena distinction as being wholly unnecessary (in typically phenomenological fashion), thereby demolishing also that last vestige of the metaphysical. "On a closer inspection, archetypes for Jung are not ultimate psychic 'things in themselves' or metaphysically real; their unknowability is only a portent of their ambiguity and the wealth of reference." (Avens, 1982:190). Archetypes have a character of fundamental hidden-ness, and should be allowed their central ontological mystery. Their metaphorical 'as-if' nature means that the unconscious conceals even as they reveals. That means that the term 'collective unconscious' must not be understood substantively, as if it were a 'thing', a supra-individual psyche, or world soul. On the contrary, it must rather be understood as a set of dispositions, as a
"potential for certain kinds of typical human psychic activity." (Clarke, 1992: 117). It can be studied through its manifestations, which are 'facts', at least in the phenomenological sense. Thus the motif of the virgin birth is a "fact" in the sense that there is such a "story/belief", and psychology is not concerned with whether it is true or false in any other sense. (ibid:35). It is in this sense that the unconscious and archetypes are to be regarded as facts.

Concerning whether they are 'real facts', one must again realize that the archetypes are regulative principles, which means they situate human boundary situations in their overall context, and thus serve a fundamentally practical purpose. (Bar, 1976:118). When Jung says that the unconscious and archetypes are 'real', it must be understood within the context of his therapeutic pragmatism: they are real in that, through their symbolic expression, they have an undeniable effect on the psyche, and symbols like the Mandala, although a mentally constructed interior image visualized through the active imagination, is 'real' because efficacious in transforming the psyche. (Odin, 1982:267). This ties in with Jung's insistence that the psyche itself is real, because whatever a person experiences, is real to him or her. If a schizophrenic, because of her illness, experienced vividly an alternate life among vampires on the moon, then Jung would say that it really did happen. This was part of his therapeutic method, allowing him to communicate with his patient, for whom the moon-visits were undeniably real. (Berger, Segal, 1989:20-21). This obviously ties in with Kierkegaard's idea that truth is subjectivity, and shows that despite Jung's own insistence on it, the 'truth' of which he speaks is not 'scientific' truth.

4.1.1.3 The collective unconscious is a hypothetical model.

The second reply says that even if the theory of the unconscious were presented as scientific, it is no more far-fetched than any other scientific theory, which similarly rest on certain presuppositions that cannot in themselves be proven, such as that nature is uniform. It presupposes that just as the body has a history in terms of evolution, the mind, which is integrally bound up with the body, must also have a history. Jung rejected a simple theory that sees the psyche as an epi-phenomenon of physical processes: it is difficult to understand how the reactions of chemicals and the flow of energy in the brain gives rise to thought and consciousness. But nevertheless he held that the Cartesian mind-body dualism which places an abyss between mind and body - never to be breached - is also misguided. The manner in which the psyche
has come into existence is extremely complex, but Jung supposes, and in this he is surely not reaching too far, that the psyche has a history, and is not created anew in every individual. To say that the collective unconscious is a mystical concept that links all minds of the present, past and future together, is as misguided as to say that the theory that humans have a common physical structure developing out of relatively fixed genetic programming means that humans all belong to one body. Jung perhaps would have been wiser to drop all terminology indicative of 'innateness', in favor of a Heideggerean 'pre-conceptual togetherness' between humankind and Being, because of the "unfortunate circumstance that the Jungian unconscious has often been described as a separate psychic system containing hypostatized forms - the unknown and mysterious archetypes which are conceived as the primary carriers of meaning analogous to Plato's ideas or to the a priori logical categories of Kant. As a consequence, the Jungian model of the unconscious is perceived, even by those who are sympathetic to his general approach, as dualistic in that it reifies aspects of experience into unconscious contents and thereby perpetuates the Cartesian view of mind as a place 'inside' the organism, inherently distinct and separate from the total world process." (Avens,1982:190).

It is clear that Jung meant the collective unconscious always to be treated as hypothesis, and one no more daring than postulating that instincts, the atom, electrical charges, or matter 'exists'. All of the above are merely models that attempt to explain occurrences that do exist, such as that certain birds tend to fly south in the winter (instinct), or that electricity is conducted through metal (electrical charge). It is true however that Jung does sometimes speak and write incautiously, not taking care to clearly state that all his ideas are hypothetical, are still open to scrutiny, etc. His use of terminology is also not always consistent, which he admitted to himself, as he often seems to be groping for words. The reason for this must be found in his personal life, since he had encounters with fantasy images, hallucinations, lucid dreams, and the like that literally made him think he was going insane, and only by the most severe effort was able to pull himself back to 'normality'. What he writes about is thus not mere hypothesis to himself, but brute (albeit subjective) reality. He experienced first-hand the other side of sanity, and cannot therefore dismiss the overpowering forces of the unconscious as easily as do more 'objective' observers.
4.1.1.4 The archetypes can be proven to exist

This brings us also to the last part of the argument he used to defend his position on the unconscious against charges that it is unscientific: the defense here is that there is an abundance of empirical (that is, observable) evidence to support it, where 'empirical' is here understood in its phenomenological, hermeneutic sense. Levin argues that the postulation of a collective unconscious is unnecessary and brings about a 'doubling' of experience, but in fact it is necessary, because there is no way to explain how uneducated people can experience in their dreams, fantasies, in hallucinations, etc. symbols and images and whole stories that bear uncanny resemblance to age old myths and religions - of which they have never even heard or read. Jung was in a unique position to assemble this data and draw conclusions from it since his interests ranged so widely; his studies into gnosticism, alchemy, Indian yoga, and the like are meticulously documented, and informed criticism undoubtedly necessitates a first-hand study of the material.

4.2 HOLISM.

A different but related criticism is directed against Jung's supposed teleology. The characteristic feature of human life, Jung believed, is that it must be explained in terms of meanings, purposes and reasons, not merely of events and causes. Individuation means that the psyche is essentially goal or aim-directed, and must therefore be understood in teleological terms, in the language of ends and purposes. According to Jung this is the case for living things in general. 'Life', he wrote, is teleology par excellence; it is the intrinsic striving towards a goal, and the living organism is a system of directed aims which seek to fulfill themselves. (Clarke, 1992:170). The idea that the psyche, and more than that, nature in itself in creating the psyche, has a purpose 'in mind' is what has given weight to the charge of mysticism against Jung. The theory of evolution specifically and the sciences in general do not allow for an approach that presupposes a disembodied intelligence at work behind everything. An example of this approach was found in Plato, who believed that goodness is equivalent to reason, "and if it is only in human beings that we discover the capacity for reason then we may assume that the ordering purposes of the human mind correspond to the ordering purposes of a transcendent Being," a view
which has long since been discredited. (Nagy, 1991:222). Science on the other hand will have us believe that whatever there is, is the result of chance, not of purpose. Another way to state this criticism is to say that Jung commits the moralistic fallacy and confuses an 'ought' with 'is'. Undeniably he contributed much to the current fashion of 'self-realization', and any theory that exhorts the individual to become all that s/he can is to be lauded, but the point that is confusing here is whether Jung merely exhorts or on the other hand states what he believes to be a fact (an 'is') about the activity of the psyche. Should the individual strive towards the goal of a harmonious self, or does the psyche do it by itself? Levin (1991:123) states the problem thus: "Do we strive for wholeness, integration, an the realization of all out potential? It would be nice to think so, but I don't see much evidence for it. Jung thought otherwise, and believed that he saw such evidence in myths, religions, and Mandala's, as well as in his own life and the life of his patients. Is there anything to be gained by calling this process and its product the Self and giving it archetypal status? I don't think so, although the Jungian Self makes more sense as an explanatory hypothesis than as a substantive entity. If the Jungian Self lacks evidential support and is more of an ought than an is, more of an injunction than a scientific description, is it then of value?" In light of the above it is necessary to review what exactly Jung implies by his teleology, and to see whether or not he oversteps the mark when saying that the goal of nature is, and always has been, consciousness.

Underlying this claim to a final view is a wider attempt to reconcile philosophy and science, both fields which interested him personally. His was an anachronistic quest for the unus mundus, a project that is not without precedent in the history of philosophy. This project takes as starting point the suggestion that the nature of the division between natural and human sciences might be artificial in the first place, and that it was made for the sake of simplicity, so that science could move forward without being dragged down by the need to answer questions about the meaning of the world, which questions were then left to philosophical and metaphysical speculation. The Cartesian division between mind and matter was "an effective division of labor from the point of view of the natural sciences, and served well as a methodological device enabling scientists to get on with the job of understanding the mechanical workings of nature without being diverted by intractable metaphysical issues." (Clarke, 1992:171). The important point to note is that this distinction between the mental and the material is pragmatic, not ontological (as Sartre would have it for
example). For the simple fact of the matter is that our bodies do interact with our minds, hence they must have some properties in common, hence they must belong to one world.

The division between mind and matter is not necessarily only a function of pragmatic need, but of consciousness itself: consciousness must distinguish, but those distinctions (high/low, hot/cold, dark/light) make sense only in terms of consciousness, whereas the unconscious knows no such divisions. And so Jung argues that we cannot rid ourselves of the suspicion that perhaps this whole separation of mind and body may finally prove to be merely an intellectually necessary separation of one and the same fact into two aspects, to which independent existence is then attributed. (Clarke, 1992: 172).

The idea that mind and body are really only two aspects of a single 'substance' goes back to Leibniz, Spinoza and Schopenhauer. In the mechanistic world of nature events apparently stand in a causal relationship to each other, while in the subjective world of mind, things are connected in terms of meaning and have relevance only to the individual that experiences them. What Jung does in making statements like 'life is teleology par excellence' is to move the two dimensions, mind and matter, over one another, so that what is true of the subjective world of mind becomes also true of the objective world of matter. That is because the human psyche has inhuman reaches that are anchored in the realm of matter and nature, a claim echoed by Hillman and also the later Heidegger. (Avens, 1982: 185).

Jung explains the mind body paradox by drawing an analogy to the nature of light, which has either a wave- or a particle character, depending how you look at it. Another metaphor employing the nature of light is to say that light is unified, but contains both infrared and ultraviolet aspects, and similarly mind-body is a unity that represents a spectrum which includes both mind’s involvement in, and freedom from, matter. "The collective unconscious, although ultimately a single reality, bears both an infrared or ecto psychic aspect in its relation to the body, and ultraviolet or endo psychic aspect, in which mental processes are separate from psychic control. The physiological and biochemical aspect of this reality passes over in its most basic level into the body. At this level, mind is virtually analogous to the autonomous systems of the body... For the purposes of analysis however, a 'cut-off' line is required between mind and body, so that one can properly speak of the mind as a distinct system... [W]e need to note here that, for Jung, the mind is free from causal control of the
autonomous systems of the body\textsuperscript{118} to which it bears an 'ultraviolet' relation." (My emphasis. Bockus, 1990:41).

Jung is thus in certain circumstances simply suspending a division that can be said to have been artificial to start with. This is precisely what has led to many difficulties with his thought, to the critique that he confuses an 'is' with an 'ought': Again, as with the criticism raised against Kierkegaard and Sartre, the charge of irrationalism and illogicality is thrown in here, and again, the criticism displays insensitivity to the metaphorical character of language in general, and the difficulties met with by consciousness that tries to describe itself.

I conclude this section with a quote from Clarke (1992:26-27):

"The variety of seemingly contradictory approaches he [Jung] adopted, his teasingly elusive method of 'circumambulation', and his dialectical sinuosity, these can be seen not just as quirks of a confused mind and an overheated imagination, but as appropriate modes of discourse for someone who sees the world, not as a monochromatic whole, but as a kaleidoscope of colors arising from our very manner of seeing and being-in-the-world."
Summary of themes:

- Jung is first and foremost a psychiatrist, but, philosophically speaking, he is a phenomenologist; his focus on the individual and the need for authenticity also implies an existential perspective in his work. Like Kierkegaard, Jung searches for subjective truths (which he describes in phenomenological terms as 'psychological facts'), rather than for objective, systematic truths, because the former is all that can help the individual overcome the problems and paradoxes of his/her existence.

- In his work he shows that the human psyche is an extremely complex, essentially indescribable, but nevertheless real 'fact'; it is best described as a 'world-openness', or the 'between' which founds and constitutes both personhood and the world. The psyche consists of consciousness (of which the center is the ego), the personal unconscious, and the collective unconscious. The personality consists in the totality of these three different realms.

- The psyche can be described with reference to its four functions: sensation, intuition, thinking, feeling, and it's two orientations: extraversion and introversion. All functions and orientations are present in every person, but some are conscious and others unconscious, causing tension and conflict in the psyche. There is a precursor to this type of analysis in the work of Kierkegaard and Sartre, both of whom show that the self is made up not only of the facts that constitute it in the present (for Kierkegaard necessity/ finitude and for Sartre 'facticity') but also of the possibilities that are still open for its future (respectively: possibility/ infinity and transcendence). All three thinkers show that this conflict is the source of the dynamic tension that constitutes the human personality.

- Jung's analysis of conflict shows that the dynamic tension lies between the ego/persona (what consciousness takes itself to be) and the shadow/animus-anima (unrealized possibilities that are for the most part unconscious). This ties in with Kierkegaard's and Sartre's work, and confirms in psychological terms their intuition that in-authenticity means suppressing conflict by denying certain aspects of existence. In the in-authentic person despair/anxiety is unconscious (Kierkegaard) or, put differently, bad faith is like being asleep or unmindful of conflict (Sartre).
Jung however presents an even more complex analysis of psychological conflict than do the existentialists, because he shows that the tension exists not only between two main poles, but rather between innumerable forces that all pull in different directions, namely, the different complexes, archetypes, the ego, etc. These centrifugal forces in the psyche are controlled and balanced by a uniquely human tendency which strives for wholeness and harmony between the spheres. This tendency is called individuation, which integrates the personality, and its goal is the Self, which is a God-image, or image of completion and harmony.

The universal presence both of the centrifugal forces and the centralizing tendency, seems to indicate that the human mind has an evolutionary history and structure, which gives rise to typical human reactions to typical situations. At its most basic level, the psyche therefore functions unconsciously and in collective ways; in other words consciousness and the ego has its roots in a collective unconscious. This hypothesis was induced and is supported by the analysis of dreams, myths and psycho-pathological symptoms, which all point to an inherited archive of symbols, latched together in recurrent mythic themes, that appear in the most diverse cultures and historical epochs.

At the level of the collective unconscious these symbols and mythic themes are called archetypes, primordial patterns in the matrix of the psyche, into which a human being is born. Although the archetypes shape and influence behavior, they generally represent material that never becomes conscious, and which has nothing to do with the individual's personal life and history. Usually only in cases of mental disturbances do they arise spontaneously, in an uncontrolled manner, to take over the ruling position of the ego. At the level of the personal unconscious, the archetypes take on the personal texture of complexes, which are characterized by the unique circumstances of the individual's life.

The psyche is therefore not naturally individuated, but is rather populated by many different, opposing factions. Unreflectively or blindly living these patterns means living in-authentically. Through individuation, the process of personal differentiation, the slow assimilation of these unconscious collective patterns into daily life occurs, which enriches and expands the experience of the world and the sense of selfhood. Individuation is the appropriating as one's own of the archetypal potentialities. This movement of existential opening is what makes a
rich, full, meaningful and authentic life possible, since it facilitates a more flexible, open and textured relation to the world.
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

'Look,' he said. 'This landscape of clouds and sky. At first glance you might think that the depths are there where it is darkest; but then you realize that the darkness and softness are only the clouds and that the depths of the universe begin only at the fringes and fjords of this mountain range of clouds... The depths and the mysteries of the universe lie not where the clouds and blackness are; the depths are to be found in the spaces of clarity and serenity... I would like to say something more to you about cheerful serenity, the serenity of the stars and of the mind... You are adverse to serenity, presumably because you have had to walk the ways of sadness, and now all brightness and good cheer... strikes you as shallow and childish, and cowardly to boot, a flight from the terrors and abysses of reality into a clear, well-ordered world of mere forms and formulas, mere abstractions and refinements. But, my dear devotee of sadness, even though for some this may well be a flight... this would not lessen the value and splendor of genuine serenity, the serenity of the sky and the mind... Such cheerfulness is neither frivolity nor complacency; it is supreme insight and love, affirmation of all reality, alertness on the brink of all depths and abysses... it is indestructible and only increases with age and nearness to death... Even though whole peoples and languages have attempted to fathom the depths of the universe in myths, cosmogonies, and religions, their supreme, their ultimate attainment has been this cheerfulness...'

'Each of us should be... striving to reach the center, not the periphery... The kind of person we want to develop, the kind of person we aim to become, would at any time be able to exchange his discipline or art for any other.'

- Hermann Hesse: The Glass Bead Game

1. PRELIMINARY CONCLUDING REMARKS

Our discussion up to now has seemingly veered into three different directions as each thinker was treated individually. Here and there common motifs were pointed out and comparisons were made, but there is still a need to sensibly integrate the themes.

Let's therefore go back to the beginning by recalling the basic problem which Kierkegaard and Sartre intuited, tracing the extent to which they were on the 'right track', and indicating where they came to a halt, unable to go further. It will become clear in the course of this concluding chapter, that Jung sketches a more believable and useful picture of authenticity than they were able to. In order to understand what exactly it is these three thinkers have to say to us, it will be helpful to start again with the point which all three have in common: that is that the sickness of modern society and of the individual is one of 'self-forgetting' / 'self-forgetfulness' (with apologies to Heidegger's idea of Seinsvergessenheit).
1.1 THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF: A RECONSIDERATION.

Returning once more to the problem of self, as presented in the introduction, we find we are now in a position to approach it with new insight. The hermeneutic circle comes back to its starting point, although hopefully we are not back exactly where we started. By now the reader should be acquainted with the horizons of all three authors, Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung, and it remains to try and let these horizons meet so that a new framework of understanding can be established.

At the beginning I said that the self is in the first place a problem because it can hardly be said to exist at all. Accordingly, this thesis has focused on the idea of self within the context of authenticity, and has avoided trying to posit an essentialist answer to the question 'what is the self?' The focus has rather been on the question: 'how can I be (true to) myself?' This implies that the self is a becoming, a process, a dynamic synthesis. But just because I have yet to 'become myself', does not mean that the self is now already nothing more than an illusion or trick of language, as analytical philosophers and logical positivists would have us believe. Three points can be used to illustrate that the self is in many ways our most intimate reality:

- Firstly, to someone who is convinced that the self is nothing more than a collective name for all our experiences, which therefore does not merit independent study, one has only to point out that for a single person, his or her self is the one thing that it is impossible to escape from, to ever leave behind, or to ever find a point outside of from which to take up a perspective. In its very intimacy, it is somehow more than the sum-total of all your experiences. The self, loosely defined, accompanies you everywhere, even (and perhaps especially) when you deny it.

- Secondly, to someone who is not convinced that their own being/existence is a problem, we have only to suggest that they sit quietly for a half-hour, without doing anything and without distractions, and try not to become uncomfortable or agitated. Without distractions, the discomfort of simple existence quickly becomes evident.

- Thirdly, the problem of self is inherent in our daily lives and routine: After the thesis has been written by the student, and read by the examiner, each one takes him or herself back to problems more pressing than philosophy: dealing with family, work, children, relationships, worrying about money, the future, health, eating, drinking, washing, clothing and undressing oneself, going to sleep, attending meetings, dreaming, fearing death, thinking, crying, laughing, being irritated, being bored, getting tired, speaking, listening, daydreaming, concentrating, meeting deadlines,
hating, resenting, lying, making mistakes, feeling sorry, and so on ad infinitum. But what is this list, if not the ways in which the problems addressed in philosophy books begin to find their real application? Precisely this shows that the problem of self is not found only in a philosophy thesis, but is vividly incarnate in every being that is self-aware. The problem is not left behind once the book is closed... in fact that is when it really sets in. The above lists experiences everyone shares, but although the inventory is a uniquely human one, whatever can be listed there belongs uniquely to the individual. No one sees through my eyes, no one breathes my air, and above all, no one can die my death. The problem of self in this way becomes the problem of being, of the way in which the world opens up and reveals itself to us, sometimes kindly, sometimes with resistance. Is it not possible then that a better understanding of the self will lead to a better rapport with being? Moreover, what might 'authenticity' refer to, if not to a better quality of life, as one learns which resistances and conflicts - normally attributed to the objective world - actually originate in the self?

These are points that Kierkegaard and Sartre made clearly: any philosophy that does not address the problems of the individual, and that does not find concrete manifestation in the individual's life, is futile speculation. Their philosophy is of the everyday, of the distinct problems faced because of life in a body, which broadly speaking is the problem of the brute facticity of existence. For this reason critics often accuse them of being unsystematic. For the same reason Jung had to forego the systematization of his thoughts and theories, at the cost of his academic standing, in order to find ways to deal with individuals and their daily troubles. The entire body of work of each thinker is therefore aimed at drawing intellectual attention away from grand, abstract, universal problems, and to focus it on smaller, concrete ones in the life of the particular individual.

1.2 NAVEL GAZING?

But is this self-focusing and self-enclosing not the problem - leading to the dilemma of solipsism maybe? To many, certainly, the entire exercise might be one of pointless navel-gazing. Is the fact that every person is for the most part alone with his/her own consciousness not merely the most straightforward of truths? The logical positivists and analytical philosophers would say that making a problem of the self is precisely an example of formulating questions in such a way that there can be no answers. It's a
game for children who ponder the question: 'Why am I me and not you?' What can be gained by this enquiry except a few hours of intriguing mental exercise?

David Hume said that, as he leaves his study to join his friends for a game of relaxed backgammon, he finds himself moving between two worlds that are strangely incompatible. In the study the problems of the world become the problems of philosophy, and everything gets taken up and becomes significant in its all-encompassing embrace. Yet once he leaves the study and spends a few hours in good and relaxed company, the problems of philosophy seem distant, and even slightly comical and pointless. Compare the following:

“There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse... If these opinions become contrary, 'tis not difficult to foresee which of them will have the advantage. As long as our attention is bent upon the subject, the philosophical and study'd principle may prevail; but the moment we relax our thoughts, nature will display herself.” (Hume, 1896:216).

“...[N]ature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three quarter of an hour's amusement I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find it in my heart to enter into them any further. (ibid:269.)”

So it is with the problem of self: to the philosopher who spends time thinking about it, it grows into an enormous enigma, difficult but fascinating. But to the 'ordinary person' that the philosopher becomes when s/he steps outside his/ her study, the whole question seems to recede. Given that a 'philosopher' is unable to indefinitely sustain that curious but driving sense of dissatisfaction arising from an un-answered question about being, how much more then should the problem of self seem a non-problem, a waste of time, to those who have no philosophical inclinations? Taking into consideration as well that even for 'philosophers' the self can be a pseudo-problem, a trick of language that traps the incautious in its tangles, only piles up evidence against the validity of this investigation. Wittgenstein would say: stop trying to find an answer, stop breaking your head about it, just be silent and wait for it to go away! But there again the problem has popped out anew: how does one make oneself stop asking questions once you've started? How does one become silent? How does one 'make oneself do' anything? It's not always as simple as it sounds. Here precisely is the
problem of the self: it resists me, deceives me, works against me, and yet it is me!
How is it possible?

1.3 INAUTHENTICITY RESULTS FROM AVOIDING INNER CONFLICT

In light of the above possibility of self-alienation (experienced especially where there is inner conflict and you cannot 'make yourself do something') I believe that there is indeed a problem of self, and I find in Kierkegaard and in Sartre precisely the awareness and delineation of it. The reason for this inner conflict is that the 'self' is for the greatest part impersonal and autonomous, and where this is not recognized, the ego/will is engaged in a constant battle for control of the psyche.

Sartre emphasized the impersonal character of consciousness through his analysis of the for-itself: he showed that the self, the transcendent ego, is an object for consciousness and not the subject of consciousness. Kierkegaard in turn, was one of the first modern thinkers to find evidence for the self's autonomy in the study of dread: Adam experiences anxiety precisely because he cannot be sure whether or not he will disobey God. Jung came to the same conclusion as the existentialists, but from a radically different angle: through his word-association tests he was able to prove that whatever someone says or believes consciously, can be contradicted by the psyche, which is populated by a myriad of autonomous complexes and archetypes. That the self is merely the tip of an iceberg, the collective unconscious, illustrates from a psychological viewpoint why the self is for the greatest part impersonal.

The autonomy and impersonality of the psyche is the reason why often one part of the self pulls in one direction, and the rest of it in (an)other direction(s). That is why frequently one cannot control oneself, why words come from nowhere into your mouth that later you regret, why the future - in as far as it depends on yourself - is uncertain, and therefore the source of anxiety. For the most part, it is possible to hide the autonomy and impersonal character of consciousness from yourself through various forms of bad faith: by identifying excessively with your persona, and then by projecting the conflict to the outside. Jung and the existentialists are in agreement that ignorance of inner conflict, and avoiding the management of inner conflict, is the root cause of inauthenticity.

The problem of self is therefore not a question of trying to divine the essence of a person, but rather an examination of the dilemma of being a 'being divided'. An important theme of this thesis has been that greater consciousness brings greater inner
conflict. And if self-examination, a sustained study of this inner conflict, is regarded by many as navel-gazing, then that only emphasizes one of the most important actual manifestations of the problem/sickness as presented by the existentialists: that people tend to not to regard the self and existence as a problem at all.

Let's therefore take a quick general look at how the existentialists describe and explain 'self-forgetfulness': According to Kierkegaard people ignore the problem of the self not only because it is too difficult to try and solve it, but also because it leads to despair. Authenticity involves being offended by, but believing, against all odds, in an absurd God. It also involves making uncertain choices, practicing introspection, and setting out on a painful inner journey. Kierkegaard implies that the solution to the problem of self requires a completely new (Christian) approach, and that this approach is characterized by conflict and tension, or what Kierkegaard would call 'passion'. But since people (prefer to) live unconsciously, the entire dilemma of authenticity is minimized and left aside.

Sartre also said that people are unaware of the problem of self because they are unaware of the problem of existence, which hides in its nauseating contingency behind the façade of bourgeois life. That this experience can be shattering is the reason why most people in some way, instinctively one could say, manage to avoid it. The shattering nature of the existential experience is marvelously illustrated by the following (much shortened) excerpt from Nausea: In it Roquentin realizes his own existence dramatically as he is busy writing his history of the Marquis de Rollebon, and it not only incapacitates him for an hour, but causes him to abandon the project altogether, since the entire exercise immediately became senseless. All the effort that had gone into it now stands revealed as a technique he had used to make himself forget his own being:

"But as my eyes fell on the pad of white sheets, I was struck by its appearance... There was nothing in it that wasn't present. The letters which I had just written on it were not dry yet and already they no longer belonged to me... I had thought out this sentence, to begin with it had been a little of myself. Now it had been engraved in the paper, it had taken sides against me... I, I wasn't sure that I had written it... I looked anxiously around me: the present, nothing but the present. Light and solid pieces of furniture, encrusted in their present, a table, a bed, a wardrobe with a mirror - and me. The true nature of the present revealed itself: it was that which exists, and all that was not present did not exist...Now I knew. Things are entirely what they appear to be and behind them... there is nothing... Then I gave a violent shrug of my shoulders to free myself and I pulled the pad of paper towards me... A feeling of immense disgust suddenly flooded over me..."
and the pen fell from my fingers, spitting ink... It was my fault: I had uttered the only words that had to be avoided: I said that the past did not exist. And straight away, noiselessly, Monsieur de Rollebon had returned to his nothingness...

Four o'clock strikes. I've been sitting here in my chair for an hour, with my arms dangling. It's beginning to get dark... I shall never write anymore on this page I have started... I want to jump up and go out, to do anything - anything at all - to dull my wits... The great Rollebon affair has come to an end, like a great passion. I shall have to find something else... Monsieur de Rollebon was my partner: he needed me in order to be and I needed him in order not to feel my being. I furnished the raw material, that material of which I had far too much, which I didn't know what to do with: existence: my existence. I jump to my feet: if only I could stop thinking, that would be something of an improvement... 'I must fini... I ex... Dead... Monsieur de Roll is dead... I am not... I ex...' It goes on and on... and there's no end to it... Oh how long and serpentine this feeling of existence is - and I unwind it, slowly... If only I could prevent myself from thinking! ... 'I think that I don't want to think. I mustn't think that I don't want to think. Because it is still a thought.' Will there never be an end to it? My thought is me: that is why I can't stop." (Sartre, 1964:139-145)

Roquentin's salvation at the end of the novel lies in his resolve to create something new: to write a novel rather than a historical biography. The memory of his meeting with existence can never leave him again, but at least he can labor to create meaning where previously there was none. Similarly, Sartre's solution to the problem lies in 'creative freedom', which admits that meaning can be found nowhere else than in one-self.

In the case of the first thinker, Kierkegaard, the experience of self-alienation and dread exists because there is an infinite gap between man and God, who is the individual's ground, which the individual is free to try and close by choosing to make the leap of faith. Without God, implies Kierkegaard, there is no meaning to life. Sartre agrees, but goes one step further: Instead of just affirming that God is infinitely distant, infinitely other than human, absurd to the understanding, and silent on all matters of import, he makes the logical step and says: There is no God, ergo, there is no meaning to life. Meaning must be made/ created anew by each individual.

Although the solution here, as in Kierkegaard, is concrete rather than abstract (typically existentialist), it is nevertheless the opposite of Kierkegaard's, who said that God is the foundation and ground of the self. Which view is to be preferred? The Christian or the atheist?

In reply I suggest that neither Kierkegaard nor Sartre's solutions, which can be broadly described as existential, are satisfactory. Shelburne (1983:62) describes the problem with the existentialist description of authenticity as follows: "It is
unfortunately characteristic of the existentialists in general and Sartre in particular that their description of the ideal goal state supposedly achievable as a result of living in accord with the existentialist tenets is not generally described in a positive way... Although the complete elimination of bad faith is probably not an achievable goal, life characterized by a predominance of good faith would have to be one in which one's levels of self-awareness was sufficiently increased so that one could 'wake up' from the 'sleep' of bad faith. This increased self-awareness would expose contradictions within one's concern that would have to be worked through in order for good faith to be possible, one would have to achieve a present-centeredness that would keep both the past of facticity and the future of transcendence in perspective, acknowledging both without being identified with either." Shelburne goes on to describe how Pablo Ibbieta, the protagonist of The Wall, is held up as a paragon of authenticity, but how his responsible freedom makes no difference in the end to anyone but himself:\textsuperscript{21}:

"Although in acting out his freedom with integrity, he is, so to speak, doing the best he can, yet this best is still cancelled out in the end and makes no difference except to the consciousness of the one acting. Thus for Sartre, even in the realization of the ideal of good faith, the choice is only one of honest despair as opposed to the self-serving delusions of bad faith." (Shelburne,1983:62). It turns out therefore that the existentialists place so much emphasis on the conflict and basic meaninglessness of life, that they undermine their own descriptions of authenticity, which is the management of the conflict and paradoxes of human life. The reason why their solutions fall short of the mark, is that they did not find the right way to deal with the paradox of the self and of existence, which is meant to lead to genuine individuality. Both approaches think about the problem in the terms of rational consciousness, and for this reason it seems so glaring and difficult to overcome. Jung's philosophy provides answers to the problem of authenticity that existentialism fail to come up with.\textsuperscript{122} Jung succeeds where they fail, because he shows how the irrational unconscious deals with paradoxes as a matter of course.

Before returning again to Jung's solution, it is necessary to take a closer look at the paradox which animated Kierkegaard and Sartre's writings, since his solution only makes sense in light of the way that theirs failed.
2. THE PARADOX OF THE SELF

The greatest paradox concerning the self is the following: for every person it is that which is known best, and that which is known least. This is what lies at the root of all the other paradoxes discussed in this thesis. Sartre intuited this basic paradox and his philosophy is an attempt to explain its existence. He formulates the problem as follows:

"Let us also note that the I Think does not appear to reflection as the reflected consciousness: it is given through reflected consciousness. To be sure, it is apprehended by intuition and is an object grasped with evidence. But we know what a service Husserl has rendered to philosophy by distinguishing between diverse kinds of evidence. Well, it is only too certain that the I of the I Think is an object grasped with neither apodictic nor adequate evidence. The evidence is not apodictic, since by saying I we affirm far more than we know. It is not adequate, for the I is presented as an opaque reality whose content would have to be unfolded. To be sure, the I manifests itself as the source of consciousness. But that alone should make us pause. Indeed, for this very reason the I appears veiled, indistinct through consciousness, like a pebble at the bottom of the water. For this very reason the I is deceptive from the start, since we know nothing but consciousness can be the source of consciousness." (Sartre, 1957:51-52).

To bring this from a philosophical to a more personal level, we can express the paradox by way of a few simple examples from daily life: People often say for instance: 'I know this like the palm of my hand!' which is meant to intimate that the person knows whatever it is really well. This is a peculiar saying, because who does know the palm of his/ her own hand? Might this not be a good illustration of a deeper problem, namely that the very act of self-reflection distorts the self and gives a false picture? Furthermore, in keeping with the literal problem of looking at your own visage, it is strange that many people don't like most photographs of themselves; more than simple vanity, might this not be because they feel strangely alienated from the face they see there? It might as well be a stranger in the mirror or in the photo... someone else altogether. Is it not uncanny that the most familiar can potentially be the source of greatest unease?

This root paradox gives rise to the others that have been discussed in this thesis. It naturally follows from this first paradox that what one does not know - the self - one cannot master. This finds expression in the different and conflicting desires that constitute the self: examples can range from the banal to the sublime - one may wish to have a fashionably slim and healthy body, but also to enjoy the pleasures of eating, drinking, smoking and sleeping; one might want to be an attentive parent and spouse, but also a successful professional. Mastering the self would mean being able to satisfy
all these (often mutually exclusive) desires; that one is unable to do so speaks not only of the centrifugal forces in the psyche, but also of those physical, material restrictions which Sartre referred to as our facticity, and Kierkegaard as the poles of finitude and necessity. In fact, in Kierkegaard's work we find, not only in terms of content, but also through his pseudonymous characters, an unsurpassed expression of the variety of conflicts that make up the self. One can group them into the broad conflict between the sober Appollonian ordering tendency, and the ecstatic, chaotic Dionysian tendency, such as Nietzsche does, but Kierkegaard weaves from this broad dichotomy a rich and finely nuanced tapestry, which is why he was selected for this thesis.

Melchert (1995:448-449) sums up these themes in his description of the different stages of life:

"If the key characteristic of the esthetic style of life is enduring or enjoying (and perhaps arranging) what happens to one, and that of the ethical stage is taking oneself in hand and creating oneself, it seems apparent that human existence involves a tension between two poles. Kierkegaard characterizes them differently in various works: immediacy and reflection; nature and freedom; necessity and possibility; the temporal and the eternal; the finite and the infinite. On the one hand we simple are something: a collection of accidental facts... On the other hand, we are an awareness of this, together with some attitude towards these facts and the need to do something about them. This aspect of ourselves seems to elude all limitation, since it is not definitely this nor that. It seems to be a capacity for distancing ourselves from anything finite, temporal or given. From the ethical point of view, this duality defines the task facing an individual: to become oneself. The task is to bring these two poles together so that they interpenetrate and inform each other: the immediate and the finite takes a definite shape, and the reflective and infinite loses its abstract indefiniteness. One becomes a definite and unique thing: oneself. If you listened only to the Judge [in Either/Or] you might think that becoming yourself by melding your immediate and reflective aspects is an achievable, if difficult, task. Further reflection however, casts doubt on that optimistic assumption. These two sides of a person... have a disconcerting tendency to drift apart... As soon as we discover this tendency, we are beyond the ethical. What use is more determination to succeed in the task of being yourself if you continually undermine this determination by your unwillingness to be yourself?... You might as well try to raise yourself off the ground by wrapping your arms around your chest and lifting!"

Both the fact that you cannot know yourself, and the fact that you cannot master yourself, combine to make that seemingly incurable malady of human nature, described in this thesis as self-alienation or inauthenticity. The question naturally arises: 'How does one go about dealing with it?', which will now be discussed.
2.1 THE DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PARADOX OF SELF

There are different ways of dealing with the above-mentioned sense of uneasy distance from oneself: the first can be called the 'natural attitude' and the second the 'philosophical attitude'. The natural attitude quickly gets over the sense of discomfort and dismisses it, while the philosophical attitude attempts to sustain and explore it. In fact this is what phenomenology originally sets out to do: to hold onto and examine our most original experience. According to both Hume and Husserl, the natural attitude is hard to set aside – preparation is required to sustain the suspension of it. (Jones, 1969:420; see also Hume, 1896:216 and Husserl, 1913:91).

I suggest however that there is a third attitude, one not at the beck and call of the will. This third possibility is the experience of Roquentin. Trying to 'will' it away only exacerbates this particular state of alienation, because it becomes abundantly and nauseatingly apparent that this state is autonomous. It is the result of the ego coming face to face with the rest of the self - that part which is impersonal. It can overtake one, maybe unexpectedly and suddenly, quickly passing again, or else remaining an underlying disconcertment for long periods at a time. This attitude/state has been variously described in this thesis as anxiety, anguish, nausea, or dread. It is within these states, Kierkegaard and Sartre say, that the problem of the self, or more broadly speaking, self-consciousness, comes into its own.

Bringing Jung into the discussion enhances this picture: for him, even more than for the other two thinkers, the problem of self is real and urgent. Dealing with it is not an optional exercise. Jung, through his work as a psychiatrist, was in a unique position to see that there is a deterioration of the 'natural attitude' taking place, and that more people today are being overtaken by anxiety, despair and fear than ever before. A different way of putting it is that the roles of consciousness and unconsciousness can be switched around, in which case the will is no longer used to suspend the natural attitude, but precisely to try and sustain it.

The reason for this is that the 'natural attitude' is not a firm and steady force of nature like the tides and sunshine, but an extremely fragile and delicate thing that has taken some millennia of evolution to create, but which, like all products of 'nature', is vulnerable to extinction at any moment.

We can for instance define insanity as the permanent suspension of the 'natural attitude' - a complete break with the human cultural life-world. If we see the natural attitude in Hume's terms, insanity becomes a plunge into chronic skepticism. If we see
the natural attitude in Husserl's terms, the irreversible break implies a complete loss of human meaning, or what could be called schizophrenia. In this last case the life-world becomes the victim of whatever fantasy arises spontaneously from the unconscious; everyday objects become threatening and frightening, and any hallucination can pose as reality.

The danger of insanity lies dormant in everyone, although fortunately it breaks out in full force quite rarely. The bigger danger lies in the risk of the 'psychic infections' of mass movements, which go not by the name of insanity but of ideology. What this shows is that reason, common sense, a clear head, and most of all a sense of safety and the intuition that existence is meaningful, are not by any means the natural basis of our psychic life. This is what Sartre emphasized by way of exaggeration in his novel *Nausea*, and what Kierkegaard delved into through his own break with the Danish bourgeoisie and subsequent solitary life. Let's look a bit more closely at the nature of this spontaneous suspension of the natural attitude, emphasizing how it concerns the problem of the self.

2.2 SELF-ALIENATION AND THE NATURAL ATTITUDE

If the mild sense of self-alienation that 'ordinary people' sometimes experience, is taken to its extreme, we find the pathological detachment of Roquentin in *Nausea*, of which the following scene is another good example:

"On the wall there is a white hole, the mirror. It is a trap. I know that I am going to let myself be caught in it. I have. The gray thing has just appeared in the mirror. I go over and look at it, I can no longer move away. It is the reflection of my face. Often, during these wasted days, I stay here contemplating it. I can understand nothing about this face. Other people's faces have some significance. Not mine. I cannot even decide whether it is handsome or ugly... My gaze travels slowly and wearily down over this forehead, these cheeks: it meets nothing firm, and sinks into the sand... it may be that I am too accustomed to my face. When I was small my aunt Bigoïs used to tell me: 'If you look at yourself too long in the mirror, you'll see a monkey there.' I must have looked at myself even longer than that: what I can see is far below the monkey, on the edge of the vegetable world, at the polyp level. It's alive, I can't deny that; but this isn't the life that Anny was thinking of: I can see some slight tremors, I can see an insipid flesh blossoming and palpitating with abandon. The eyes in particular, seen at such close quarters, are horrible. They are glassy, soft, blind, and red-rimmed. Anyone would think they were fish-scales." (Sartre, 1964:31).
This is a good example of the spontaneous phenomenological reductions described in Nausea. Jones says of another scene where Roquentin becomes afraid of a simple glass of beer, (Sartre,1964:19) that it "is evident that Roquentin is performing - quite unwittingly of course - what Husserl called phenomenological reduction. But note that whereas Husserl held that it requires long and arduous preparation, Sartre believes that people may happen on it quite by accident, in the midst of other activities, and with literally shocking results to their sense of reality." (Jones,1969:420). The natural attitude has dropped away, and a more original experience (or at least very different experience) of existence suddenly became available to Roquentin.

As has been explained before, this is rather strange, because according to Husserl the phenomenological reduction required quite an effort. Husserl's view - which says that the 'natural attitude' is pretty much entrenched in human life - can be seen in a far stronger form in Hume. Hume was an extreme, almost Phyrronian skeptic, questioning even the most common sense assumptions: his skeptical treatment of causality implies that we can never be 100% sure that the sun will rise tomorrow, or that when I walk out of my office to my home it will still be there, or that the things I see every day are the same they were yesterday, or that things go on existing even when I'm not looking at them, or that my memory of my life is reliable. But Hume's skepticism was entirely philosophical, and as said before, when he went out of his study these skeptical thoughts seemed to him bizarre and strange, which is exactly the attitude we take towards the paranoid fantasies of the insane. Hume arbitrarily concluded from his own experience that the 'natural attitude', which finds the world to be a safe, secure, familiar place, full of certainties and meaning, is pretty much built into us. Only through some effort, suggest both Hume and Husserl, can this natural attitude be 'gotten rid of'. In our century we know this is not necessarily the case, and furthermore, in contrast with Husserl's guess that the reduction would lead us to a reassuring, pure, familiar apodictic evidence, it is clear that to lose our stable world of useful and familiar things, is nauseating and terrifying. (Jones,1969:420). That is because in point of fact, as the existential critique of pure phenomenology shows, there are no fixed essences to intuit, only the spiraling chaos of the senselessness of the natural world.

So nowadays we are forced to take a slightly different view on the matter of the phenomenological reduction. Nowadays, in many cases, the entire situation as Husserl had imagined it has been reversed: there are many people who should have to make an
immense effort to convince themselves that the world is a well-ordered, safe, and secure place. These are people who are unable, to different degrees, to feel that 'being' is to be trusted. The anxiety caused by this is 'real' in psychological (as opposed to philosophical) terms, and can therefore be paralyzing.

Here is where Jung makes an indispensable contribution to the discussion, showing where the fields of philosophy and psychology touch: in the psyche of the single individual. He spent a lifetime treating individuals who did not have to perform the phenomenological reduction, but who had it happen to them. Our designation for them is that they are mentally ill. We assume that something has gone wrong with their minds, something structural perhaps. This attitude assumes that a meaningful relation to the world is primary and natural, and mental disease unnatural, derivative and secondary. But in a move that can only be described as deconstructive, Jung asks through his entire body of work: what if the irrational, the delusional and the fantastic are somehow the very ground of consciousness? What if the insane manifest the mind as it exists on a more basic level? What if we can only understand our own 'normal' consciousness and way of being in the world by studying this 'abnormality'? And this is precisely what Jung does.

The loss of meaning experienced by Roquentin as he gazes in the mirror is by no means these days reflected only in isolated individuals. The rise of psycho-therapy, psychiatry and psychology in the past 100 years speaks not only of academic growth in these fields, but are a response to a growing demand. Although the insane have always been with us, there is a whole new 'middle class' of mental disturbances, of which depression is the most common manifestation. Depression is the psychological expression of Kierkegaard's 'philosophical' despair, especially as a common solution to 'not wanting to be oneself', associated with depression, is suicide. What has happened in our century? Have people always been depressed but we just never knew about it? This is possible, but it is also probable that things are going backwards. What could be the explanation for this?

Jung's work shows that the natural attitude does not owe its existence to reason, but to the unconscious, and since reason is the faculty that has been developed since the Enlightenment in the West (almost to the exclusion of all the other faculties), and since the unconscious has been neglected, there has been a deterioration of the natural attitude, which translates as a loss of meaning, or what Jung calls a 'loss of soul'. Reason tells us that nothing is certain, that God cannot exist, that life in most cases is
short, terrifying and brutish. This is what Kierkegaard illustrated in his work: the hope that Christianity had held for mankind began to be eroded rapidly once the critical light of reason was turned on it. What remains of it today is a poor imitation of the rich symbolism from a dozen cultures that created it. Moreover, it is defended by dogma because no-one really believes in it anymore – that is because very few people have had a spiritual encounter (an actual experience of God) strong enough to instill real conviction. There is common consent today that even if Gods once spoke to people in the past, they do not do so anymore. According to Jung the reason for this is that while technological progress and instrumental reason is advancing at a rapid pace, psychic development lags far behind. The symbolic activity of the unconscious is not keeping up with the rapid change of the past century, because the unconscious thinks in millennia, not years.

This means that different aspects of the human psyche are being pulled into opposite directions. This stretch to which the psyche is being submitted explains those serious cases of self-alienation that can be called insanity, and, more generally speaking, to the loss of meaning and cynicism. This might have been just a sad but inevitable fact about humanity's development, were it not for the dangers of submitting the psyche to this the unbearable strain. Jung puts it as follows:

"Nowadays particularly, you see, the world hangs on a thin thread, and that is the psyche of man. We are the great danger. The psyche is the great danger. What if something goes wrong with the psyche?" (in Berger, Segaller, 1989:6).

This danger, if nothing else, is the problem of the self, and the most sideways of glances at any newspaper today will confirm the validity of Jung's fear. The paradox/irony lies therein that knowledge of the psyche/ self is what is most needed, but what is least available, and what least interests people. This is the point that Kierkegaard and Sartre strikingly bring to the modern attention. In fact, in many ways the discussions on Kierkegaard and Sartre in this thesis are meant to serve as background and introduction to Jung's work. They give a philosophical depiction, as it were, of mental/psychic disease. Both deal with the theme of authenticity and the difficulty of attaining it. Both describe the way in which a person might come to consciousness of his/her own state of falsehood (spiritlessness and bad faith), and then suggest a way in which authenticity might be striven for (faith in God vs. the creative shaping of
one's own meaning and values). With reference to the projects of these two thinkers, it is possible to show how thinking about authenticity is a philosophical project on many levels, and since Jung's entire body of work is aimed at precisely this goal, it is possible to rehabilitate Jung as a philosopher in his own right.

With that in mind, I have presented this thesis in such a way so as to make the following three broad points:

1. Kierkegaard and Sartre started from a single problem, that of how to reach authenticity, and came up with different, mutually exclusive solutions to it.
2. Both of their solutions fail to solve the problem of authenticity.
3. Jung's solution succeeds in solving the problem that Kierkegaard and Sartre were unable to.

3. THE PROBLEM OF AUTHENTICITY

First, I showed that Kierkegaard and Sartre were really dealing with the same problem of authenticity, and that they came up with different solutions to it, these solutions being opposed and inimical to each other. The problem concerns how to attain authenticity, and it arises in the awareness of anxiety, which manifests because the human being is a divided being. Authenticity as goal is one of being undivided against oneself - of being what one is, pure and simple. The very etymology of the word 'individual' (in-dividere) speaks volumes about this fact. Kierkegaard says that one can become an Individual only by making a leap of faith, and acknowledging, believing, and obeying God. Sartre says that authenticity can only be attained by denying God, or to put it more precisely, affirming God's non-existence, and responsibly creating your own values and meaning. Clearly these two solutions are mutually exclusive.

The real importance of their contributions however lie therein that they show that inauthenticity is the very basis of our existence: 'Self-realization' is not merely a trendy modern fashion, but touches at the very heart of our human life. Although neither emphasizes the dangers of ignoring the self in such ominous tones as Jung does, both do illustrate that a lot of what is wrong in the world today (injustice, bigotry, lack of social responsibility, the power or totalitarian movements) is due to this spreading wave of 'self-forgetfulness'. It is for this reason that they can be introduced into a discussion involving Jung, since he makes exactly this point, but expresses it in terms that are not of interest to the philosopher. Nevertheless, as was
shown, he presents a solution to the problem of authenticity that philosophy would do well to take note of, especially since the existentialists actually fail to answer it.

3.1 THE FAILURE OF KIERKEGAARD AND SARTRE’S SOLUTIONS

Why exactly is it in Kierkegaard and Sartre’s descriptions of authenticity that fails to satisfy? Quite simply, both make of authentic selfhood something that is impossible to attain, although it must be striven for. This striving is to be accomplished through extraordinary and unrelenting effort, and no rewards are in store except the knowledge of your own honesty. Much of their writing implies that the self’s anxiety can never really be relieved. Both thinkers picture the individual as laboring along on its own, with very little or no help from God or society. Authenticity becomes a thankless and forbidding task, and in many ways entails the sacrifice of a happy life.

The above might be an exaggeration, and doubtless there is much humor and ironic wit in the writings of both existentialists. Nevertheless I do think that both authors praise a lonely and strenuous existence as the only authentic one. While they are very good at laying out the difficulties surrounding the search for authenticity, and in exhaustively describing the various states of dread that accompany it, they do not really satisfactorily describe the state of authenticity itself. Now of course this is due in part to their saying that it was unobtainable, but their unobtainable goal seems too lofty and unattractive.

3.1.1 Kierkegaard

Kierkegaard says that the individual must make the leap of faith, but it seems that God does not meet him/her halfway. After once having sent his son to earth, he retreated back to the other side of the abyss. He does not stretch out a helping hand or even give a friendly push. The responsibility remains with the individual who must use his/her freedom to make the ultimate choice. God for Kierkegaard seems to remain impossibly distant, infinitely other than man, and Christ, his son, who is meant to be the synthesis of man and God, seems to remain crucified unto eternity in suffering upon the cross. The inescapable conclusion seems to be that the authentic individual, living in faith, will be similarly crucified between the demands of reason and the heart.
3.1.2 Sartre

Sartre does no better: the only hope for him seems to lie with 'honest despair', being strong and austere enough to resist all temptations to lightheartedness, comfort, safety and happiness. Man, insists Sartre over and over again, is a useless passion. This is a position best illustrated by Camus's tale of Sysiphus, who is condemned unto eternity to roll a giant boulder up a mountain, and have it roll down again as soon as he reaches the top. His labor is in vain, but he is happy, says Camus, because the meaning of the ordeal lies in the struggle, not in the accomplishment. This most definitely makes of Sysiphus an extraordinary individual, but after all, isn't he half-God? Is this species of 'happiness' in the face of senseless adversity also within the province of human possibilities? Who wouldn't rather settle for bourgeois comfort when authenticity means the bleak realization that all your projects are a pointless expenditure of energy?

In general I therefore suggest that the mistake in both Kierkegaard and Sartre, is that they identified a problem which undoubtedly exists, but although they must be lauded for bringing it to the attention of a humanity that would rather remain ignorant, their solutions leave much to be desired. I think this is where we can bring Jung into the picture.

3.2 JUNG'S SOLUTION AND WHY IT WORKS

The thesis of this study is that Jung solves the problem of authenticity that Kierkegaard and Sartre were unable to. That is because both Kierkegaard and Sartre were approaching the problem from too intellectual an angle. All three thinkers in their own way showed that the authentic self is one who is cognizant of all its potentialities, and who is consciously working towards the realization of them. What Shelburne (1983:65) says of Jung, can apply to all: "Jung emphasizes that his individuation is not equivalent to a shallow individualism in which idiosyncratic qualities are emphasized and the person tries to develop himself in isolation of concern with others." But for the two existentialists the middle way between all the extremes of the personality could not realistically be realized; that the problem of the middle way was insurmountable to them is due to their overly rational approach to it. In Kierkegaard's case, although he does take a definite stand on the existence of a realm that is inaccessible to reason, namely faith, and spends a lot of time speaking about inwardness and the necessity to cultivate it, his descriptions of the nature and
meaning of faith are unsatisfactory; he admits to not being able to account for it, and says little beyond the fact that it is a tremendous leap, made in fear and trembling, which might or might not occur as one is forced finally to make a radical choice, having come to the end of the road of dread and despair. The reader is left to try and understand for him-/herself what this leap is, how to launch oneself, when you'll know if you've executed it successfully, etc. All you can know is that you must first reach the deepest pit of despair before being able to make this leap. For the most part the individual seems to be left on its own, with no real outside help.

Sartre in his turn completely disavows both God and the unconscious; wants nothing to do with them, doesn't want to admit to anything that determines the individual in any way. Insisting on absolute freedom, in his own way he exacerbates the cult of proud individualism that characterized the Enlightenment. Admitting to no greater authority or force, and persistently stating that all meaning must be created anew by each individual, he places what might become an unbearable burden of responsibility on the individual. (Jung, 1956:38).

Turning on the other hand to Jung, we find that although he invokes with the voice of a doomsday prophet all the horrors of our society, he also has a much brighter, more positive picture to paint – it is a picture of the real possibility of healing and survival. His approach shows that there are potentialities in the unconscious that always have and always will help mankind outlive the 'longest night'. For him authenticity is not a sustained exercise in anxiety, but rather the real relief from it. His authenticity is a window on a world rich with humanity, and the possibility of personal fulfillment, although technically always deferred, is much closer and more concrete than in Kierkegaard and Sartre. Authenticity for him is not on the other side of a deep abyss, but teasingly within arms reach - from time to time one might even manage to get a hold of it, and experience for a while the relief of being undivided against oneself, one's family, friends, colleagues, enemies, and all of being. The reason for this is that, according to Jung, the unconscious (although a formidable adversary if ignored) is always ready to help the individual, to meet him/her halfway, to bridge all those gaps that consciousness find insurmountable, to mediate the paradoxes and make them sources of energy rather than paralyzing obstacles. Jung therefore outlines a much clearer route towards authenticity, not only describing what characterizes it, but also giving firm direction, and several techniques to follow in trying to attain it.
Two important points can be made about Jung's philosophy that shows how he corrects the excesses of the existentialists. They concern 1) the concept of God, and 2) the relationship between mind and body.

3.2.1 THE CONCEPT OF GOD
While both Kierkegaard and Jung say that the individual must 'find God', Kierkegaard's God still retains too much of the stern, distant face of his own devout father. Here the contrast between the individual and God is too great: the individual is too mired in sin, God is too perfect. Jung's God by contrast is not only as imperfect as man/woman, but is understandably then also more loving, more ready to forgive, less serious, richer and brighter in texture and meaning. Whereas Kierkegaard concentrates most of his efforts on describing how to become a Christian like Christ was, Jung points out that Christ is only one of thousands of different possible mediations of the paradoxes of human existence, and quite an unsatisfactory one at that, because it denies too much the world, the flesh and evil. Although Kierkegaard did say that anyone who worships an idol with fervor, is better off than one who worships the Christian God with complacency, his work nevertheless displays the inherent cultural bias towards Christianity as the only 'real' religion. For Jung it was not only a question of all the religions of the world being roads to God - he insisted that each person can create anew his/her very own conception of the deity or deities of his/her choice. As long as there is a real and convincing experience of a beneficent power greater than oneself, one can basically convince oneself that everything will turn out all right in the end, and that is the main ingredient required to live a full and fulfilled life. Whether or not this is true, he said, this is what the human psyche needs. In contrast with Sartre who says that man is a useless passion, and that authenticity lies in admitting to this, Jung says that a person who feels that his/her existence is meaningful, has greater psychic health than one who doesn't. A unique way to illustrate this point of Jung's is by referring to his encounter with the Pueblo-Indians of South-America. He became friends with the chief, and learned a great deal from them about their way of life and beliefs. One of their rituals consisted in a kind of sun worship which took place in the mornings and the evenings. The chief explained to Jung that it was the task of the Pueblo Indians to help the sun make its way across the sky, and if they as a people should become extinct, or their ways taken over by those of the white men, in a few hundred years the sun would start deviating
from its course and disintegrate. (Segaller, Berger, 1989:135). Of course this is an absolutely ludicrous belief within the context of science, but within the context of the psyche and its world, Jung says that it is the most sensible belief there can be. It deeply grounds the psyche of the Pueblo Indian on a firm footing that is incomparable to the shaky foundation of modern Western people. Having such an important role to play in the scheme of things as to help the sun stay on its course, will ensure that generations of Pueblo Indians will find their lives rich and immensely meaningful. Especially considering that they have fulfilled their role so successfully thus far! The authentic individual does not only need to believe s/he is useful, but, (paradoxically) also that independently of him/her, everything will turn out well, as guaranteed by (the) God(s). For this reason all fairytales end with 'happily ever after'; Jung is not worried if the idea of God(s) might only be a fairytale, an imaginary fantasy, or an illusion, because he says that an experience of God is most definitely real if it has a real effect on the psyche.

3.2.2 MIND AND BODY

The entire problematic given above need not only be expressed in religious terms. With reference to Sartre, for whom the fundamental split was between being-in-itself and being-for-itself, and who refers only peripherally to God and to religion, we can say that the real issue here concerns a split between the body and the mind. For Sartre this is really the fundamental and unbridgeable gap/break in being. Again, we can see this as a pathology, and a personal one at that. Sartre admitted many times to feeling ill at ease in his own body, and to being disgusted with it. His lifestyle was sedentary to the extreme - the mere thought of walking in a meadow or swimming in the sea exhausted him.

Jung insists on the contrary that the body is the very expression of the psyche: it is the 'lived body', and its illnesses reflect and influence the illnesses of the mind. For him the division between body and mind was artificial to begin with and a symptom moreover of the disease of Western society. He therefore, again, shows a way in which a contradiction which is irresoluble to logic, namely the ontological break between body and mind, can become a concrete, lived unity, if the unconscious is brought into play.
4. CONCLUSION

Despite their differences, the three thinkers discussed in this thesis have one thing in common: a passionate interest and empathy for the human condition and a disdain for all easy theoretical solutions that try to minimize the suffering that results from it. The search for the self is in fact nothing less than the attempt to understand humanity, and through it, being itself, which is revealed through an attitude of open-ness and 'letting be'. The different solutions to the problem of authenticity presented here, contribute in different ways to our understanding of what it means to be a self, but if there is anything to be learned from the work of these three thinkers, it is that the problem can never be resolved by just theorizing about it. For this reason I end with the following words from Jung (in Brooke, 1991:34) which expresses most clearly the only real way to find answers concerning humanity and authenticity:

"[A]nyone who wants to know the human psyche... would be better advised to abandon exact science, put away his scholar's gown, bid farewell to his study, and wander with human heart through the world. There, in the horrors of prisons, lunatic asylums and hospitals, in drab suburban pubs, in brothels and gambling hells, in the salons of the elegant, the Stock Exchanges, Socialist meetings, churches, revivalist gatherings and ecstatic sects, through love and hate, through the experience of passion in every form in his own body, he would reap richer stores of knowledge than textbooks a foot thick would give him, and he would know how to doctor the sick with real knowledge of the human soul."
NOTES FROM CHAPTER I

1. This metaphor comes from Small Gods by Terry Pratchet.
2. It has been said that Jung was a schizophrenic who healed himself, which led to the further description accorded to him during his life: that he was the only man in the world who could heal schizophrenia. (Segaller, Berger, 1989:59). Both claims are undoubtedly exaggerations, but nevertheless contain a germ of truth, since Jung seemed to have a remarkable understanding of and success with the disease that had previously been known as dementia praecox, but which today is called schizophrenia. Schizophrenia, broadly speaking, is the spontaneous and incapacitating eruption of unconscious contents into consciousness, in the form of chronic hallucinations. For more on this subject, see Jung (1909) and Jung (1921).
3. Sartre very thinly disguises himself as Roquentin in the novel Nausea, and Kierkegaard’s work Fear and Trembling was on one level his way of dealing with the breakdown of his engagement.
4. It would of course be possible to contextualize Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung in many different ways, but since each author expressly referred to these other thinkers (Hegel, Husserl and Freud), I make use of these specific backgrounds. Furthermore it must also be noted that in this thesis the theories of Hegel, Husserl and Freud are respectively described as Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung understood them; this, of course, does not do justice to the philosophies of Hegel, Husserl or Freud. Inevitably it can be argued that Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung had misinterpreted or misrepresented these other thinkers. What effectively happens in each case is that the ‘older’ thinker is set up as a straw puppet to be shot down, and therefore I apologize in advance for the abbreviated and incomplete sketches of these ‘background’ philosophies.
5. No author is objective, and I prefer to lay my cards on the table, only so as to emphasize that I would leave the reader free to do the same, or to rearrange the dialectic (as is possible), to best suit him/her. Since in a broader sense this is also the aim of each thinker separately, I am not hesitant to follow suit.

NOTES FROM CHAPTER II

6. Denmark had a state church, which meant that every Danish citizen was regarded as a Christian and automatically baptized.
7. Hegel’s rationality was of a different order to the standard logic of the law of non-contradiction: Hegel wanted to show how contradictions can also make sense by stating the logic inherent to thesis, antithesis, synthesis. So what is meant here by the use of the word ‘rationality’ is rather, more broadly speaking, ‘thinking’ in general. The Enlightenment was characterized by the attempt to ‘think things out’ and the belief that this was no futile exercise. In short, Hegel’s philosophy was one of the last ‘grand narratives’ that attempted to explain everything by use of reason and thinking.
8. His engagement to, and break with Regine, left a lasting impression in Kierkegaard’s work and inspired much of his voluminous output both by the sublimation of his love and desire for her, and content-wise in his own attempt to understand why he felt himself so compelled to break with her, and in such a cruel manner eventually, although he loved her sincerely all through his life. This is without doubt a tragic part of Kierkegaard’s story, and one that cannot be ignored when trying to understand his work. Arnold Heumakers writes about this facet of Kierkegaard’s life in his article: De Liefde van Een Zelfkweiler, NRC Handelsblad 21/4/2000, p.35: He writes that the most important event in Kierkegaard’s life was this engagement, entered into in 1840 and broken a year later: "Maar hij heeft er zo vaak over geschreven, zowel direct als indirect, dat dit evenement gaandeweg steeds vreemder en ongewoner is geworden. Zozeer zelfs dat dat ook de biografie amper nog in staat is de zaak tot normale proporties terug te brengen. Wie zich voor Kierkegaard interesseert, zal zich dus ook moeten verdiepen in diens verlowing en de raadselachtige verbreking ervan." The main purpose behind Kierkegaard’s adoption of pseudonyms is to ‘indirectly’ communicate that which cannot be expressed or comprehended by reason. The motivation behind it is therefore pedagogical, and designed to lead the reader of his work to an existential confrontation with themselves.
9. Kierkegaard, having inherited a substantial sum from his father, was able to explore this life in both its more vulgar and more refined aspects.
10. The book Either/Or concerns a discussion between a bachelor and a married man, and as such the difference between love as eros (such as that which the seducer holds as ideal) and love as obligation (which Judge Wilhelm supports) serves as good example for the difference between these two stages: erotic love is changeable, unreliable, it is spontaneous, is concerned with immediate (sensual)
gratification, and is by nature selfish. (Refer to footnote 39). It is passive because acted upon from
without, always searching for a new pleasure once the thrill of the chase is over. Love as obligation
and choice has much more value according to the judge, because it truly comes from inside, being a
personal choice and commitment, and not a fancy. "Spontaneous love can change, can become its
opposite, can turn into jealousy or hate, or it can become sluggish and become 'exhausted in the
lukewarmness and indifference of habit'; indeed erotic love can turn into something by which it
becomes unrecognizable as love." (Jegsups, 1995:439). The 'ethical' love of the judge for his wife is of
a higher quality, but still highest, as we shall see later, is the paradoxical religious love Abraham had
for Isaac, which implied a willingness to sacrifice his son, but a belief nevertheless that his son will be
returned. Kierkegaard was willing to sacrifice his Regine, but only made the first movement of faith,
namely resignation, and did not get her back as he would have if he had truly had faith, if he had been
able to make the 'movements of faith' (De Silentiio's words as he admires Abraham in Fear and
Trembling: see Kierkegaard, 1941b:49-57), instead of just understanding them.

Some of the problems that arises in Kierkegaard's understanding of the religious phase are the
following: first of all he makes it clear that the choice to believe must be made deliberately. It is an act
of will and therefore one cannot assume a person is a Christian merely because of having been born in
a Christian country. Yet at the same time Kierkegaard states that it would be impossible to take this
step into faith were it not for an act of divine grace. Faith is a miracle, and the believer every day
marvels at the change that has been effected in him that enabled him to reach that receptive state that
made faith possible. Kierkegaard does not do much to clarify his position on this point and would say
that it is yet again a paradox that a believer must believe through an act of will, and yet needs God's
grace to believe. Perhaps this attitude ties in with his insistence that whatever is believed with sufficient
passion is also objectively true. (Gardiner, 1988:99). Along with this perplexing statement goes
Kierkegaard's insistence that truth is subjectivity, a maxim that follows from what has been said above.
Gardiner (1988:100) is of the opinion that Kierkegaard's intentions here are expository, namely to
sketch the conceptual and phenomenological implications of faith, and relegating it to its proper sphere,
which is personal involvement rather than detached reflection. I would be inclined to agree with this
take on Kierkegaard, which will be further explored in comparison to the thought of Jung.

13 Much has been said of the leap of faith up to now without explaining in greater detail what it entails.
In order to understand what Kierkegaard had in mind it is necessary to compare it to the thought of the
philosopher he most admired, and to whom his magisterial thesis constantly referred. Socrates
embodied for Kierkegaard the ideal philosopher: one who 'practiced what he preached' and whose life
was a vivid example of his philosophy. Socrates, by mouth of Plato, held that the only knowledge that
is important is that which comes from within; for Plato no 'new' knowledge was possible - one merely
remembers what has been known before through the working of anamnesis. For Kierkegaard
knowledge was also a matter of inwardness, but it is however not a process of remembering what the
soul had known in previous incarnations; against Socrates he presumes that the soul knows nothing of
its relation to God and the infinite. Religious truth cannot be arrived at through introspection; that is
why a teacher is needed. The teacher is God and the problem that the divine teacher must face is how to
communicate His knowledge. This can only be done by assuming the shape of those who must be
taught. That is the reason why once, in a certain historical period, the infinite became finite, was born,
grew up and died. What requires faith in this regard does not concern the historical fact of Christ's life,
because it would have been just as difficult for His contemporaries to believe it. The reason why faith is needed for the
story of Christ, is because of the fact that it is a logical impossibility that the infinite could become
finite: infinity and finitude mutually exclude one another. That Christ could have been God is untrue in
terms of the theory of coherence rather than that of correspondence. Moreover, faith in Christ does not
merely require that a logical contradiction must be swallowed, but that the style of life propagated by
Christ must be led. It is not enough to confirm the existence of the God-man as an article of faith -
Christian faith requires actions that consistently offend common sense (such as turning the other cheek,
giving away one's possessions to the poor, not concerning oneself with the day of tomorrow but
believing that God would provide daily bread, etc.) Imitation of Christ in the strictest sense necessarily
means that the road to salvation is narrow, to be traveled by an individual alone, who, because of his
beliefs, will be held up to ridicule, and who must suffer along the way the tortures of the Garden of
Gethsemane. Near the end of Kierkegaard's life he came into open confrontation with the church over
this very issue. He believed the church had eschewed the ways of its divine leader in order to make
itself comfortable and at home in the world. However, he did not desire to overthrow the entire
structure and existing forms of the church - merely to breathe life into them again. (Hollander,
1960:28). His argument with the Danish protestant church can also be expressed in another way: sin to

Kierkegaard was not lack of virtue as it was to the church, but lack of faith. In fact, despair equals sin equals lack of faith. That is why faith, and not virtue, is the opposite of sin.

14 For an extensive discussion of paradox that is Christ, and the offense it causes - which is the sine qua non of faith, see Kierkegaard, 1967.

15 Compare the following piece of prose from In Vino Veritas: (In Hollander, 1960:39)
"Date and year I have forgotten; indeed, this would be interesting only to one's memory of details, and not to one's recollection of the content of that experience. The 'spirit' of the occasion, and whatever impressions are recorded in one's mind under that heading, concerns only one's recollections; and just as generous wine gains in flavor by passing over the Equator, because of the evaporation of its watery particles, likewise does recollection gain by getting rid of the watery particles of memory; and yet recollection becomes as little a mere fragment of the imagination by this process as does generous wine."

16 Kierkegaard probably did not want to influence anyone with force of any kind, in any situation, ever, at least not if he was living up to his own standards of (Christian, unconditional, non-preferential) love, which means 'letting the Other be', leaving them alone while (and because of) caring for and loving them. This is a kind of attitude that can go a long way to countering any possible criticism that Kierkegaard was dogmatic or intolerant to those who do not accept the 'truth' of Christianity. Because although some of his more severe alter-ego's, such as anti-Climacus, labeled the denying of the truth of Christianity as the pinnacle of sin and despair, Kierkegaard himself took great pains not to change anyone with any of the usual propagandist methods used by those out to 'convert' others. In Works of Love (1964) he shows that rather "than succumbing to difference, love transformed or love as obligation decisively and undauntedly deals with difference by letting the other be." See Jegstrup (1995), for a very insightful and original comparison between the deconstruction of justice as law with Kierkegaard's concept of love as 'letting difference be'. It is a convincing political application of a theme that is normally considered as purely religious.

17 In a work published after his death Kierkegaard gives some guidelines as to how to interpret his aesthetic and dialectical works. He says the former are to lead the reader to Christian concepts, back from the aesthetic way of interpreting them, back from the point of view of life as immediacy, and the latter, dialectical works, lead them 'back from the System and speculative philosophy'. In the case of the aesthetic works his method, he says, is to deceive. In answer to his own question as to what the deception amounts to in this case, he says: "It means that one doesn't begin directly with what one wants to communicate, but... going along with the other's delusion. Thus (to keep to the present work's topic) one begins by saying, not 'I'm a Christian, you are not', but 'You are a Christian, I am not.' Not by saying 'It is Christianity I preach, and the life you lead is purely aesthetic [the life of immediacy]', but by saying 'Let's talk about the aesthetic.' The deception is that one does this precisely in order to come to the religious. But according to the assumption, the other is also under the delusion that the aesthetic is the Christian, since he thinks he is a Christian and yet leads the life [of immediacy]." (Hannay, FT: 31-32).

18 Interestingly enough, as we shall see later in Chapter Four, Kierkegaard's notion of psychological disease is in this sense congruent with Jung's, who sees psychic illness as the norm and health as the exception.

19 Kierkegaard was assuredly an individual obsessed by sin. This is no doubt to a large extent the result of the pious and fear-inducing household he grew up in, and something about his inherently morbid personality must also have attracted him to the subject. I venture therefore that it is not sin as such that fascinated him (he looks with contempt on those persons who interest themselves in the matter purely out of curiosity) but the sense of his own indescribable, inexplicable guilt. In his self-analysis the question as to the origin of his guilt had naturally to lead to the origin of sin, and to original sin. A 'scientific' curiosity on the matter of sin (such as a psychology that wishes to merely classify instead of to cure) is just one of the improper 'moods' in which the question of sin might be approached. Other 'moods' that are inappropriate to the study of sin is the comic and the tragic, which makes of sin either something trivial or insurmountable. The proper approach to the study of sin is in a mood of seriousness that views it as something to be overcome. Whereas dogma studies the fact (the what) of sin, psychology studies the origin (the how) of sin, and so Kierkegaard describes the work in question as a 'simple psychological deliberation oriented in the direction of the dogmatic problem of original sin'. It must be clarified that what Kierkegaard understands as 'sin' has an ontological rather than a moral quality, sin being a state where the human being is removed from God and exists in a particular way, that is, without spirit. The opposite of sin is not virtue, but faith.

20 The term 'offence' is an important and distinctively Christian one: in Training in Christianity (1967) Kierkegaard explains that there are two reasons for being offended by the idea of the God-man: first
because it is a paradox that the Infinite and Eternal could become finite, born in time of a human mother, living as a human being. The second reason for offense is that the Almighty became the most lowly and humble of humans, suffering the death of a despised criminal. Before Christ one comes to a cross-roads where it is possible either to be offended or to have faith; no-one comes to faith without the possibility of offense.  

21 Rumble (1994:25) thinks that Kierkegaard’s description of the subject’s anxious apprehension of possibility owes much to Kant’s phenomenology of the sublime: “Kierkegaard’s equation of freedom with ambivalence echoes Kant’s account of the sublime. In contrast to the restful contemplation of beauty, the sublime sets the mind in motion. ‘This agitation [of the mind in its attempt to comprehend magnitudes which overwhelm the imagination] can be compared with a vibration, i.e. with a rapid alteration of repulsion from, and attraction to, one and the same Object.’

22 The term vertigo, strictly speaking of course, merely refers to a fear of heights, and it might be stretching it too far to say that all instances of vertigo are in fact disguised instances of existential anxiety. However, it is not entirely inconceivable that ‘vertigo’ is often and widely used as just such a symbol of dread of oneself and of existence; see for example Stack, 1986: Vertigo as Existential Film.

Here Stack analyses Alfred Hitchcock’s well-known and haunting thriller Vertigo (1958), showing that behind the story-line there are undeniable and uniquely existential themes such as guilt, boredom (ennui), attraction to death, dizziness before endless possibilities, and the like.

23 In a way, this exactly the point that Jung makes, as we shall see later. He emphasizes that evil is a real possibility for anyone, simply by virtue of their being human. People who are horrified by the brutality and cruelty of the world are in part horrified because they cannot understand how human beings are capable of such acts. But the point is precisely that it is human beings who commit atrocities, not monsters, and it is a mistake to assume automatically that there are no circumstances that could drive oneself to the point where it becomes possible, for instance, to murder. Might it not be that some of the dread we feel when hearing about horrifying crimes, comes from a part of oneself that is not certain that you will never do anything similar? Denying this possibility is in bad faith, Sartre would say, because it assigns an essence to oneself prior to the unfolding of future events. Only the future can reveal whether or not you will become a murderer. Accepting this and recognizing the dread for what it is, is the only way to deal responsibly with freedom. The more common reaction however is to repress the dread and guilt all the more strongly, by making of the criminal an incomprehensible monster, so placing greater distance between oneself and one’s shadow.

24 This ambiguity also gives another possibility for the interpretation of the Christ symbol: Christ is innocent, but takes all the sins of the world on him. Later on we shall see that Christ for Jung is a symbol that mediates the paradoxes of the human condition, and that is why it is useful to take this into account now.

25 This book is an uncompromising defense of the Christian faith, and it may be one of its weak points. It does not allow at all for a rejection of the Christian doctrine of sin and redemption through Christ; in fact, rejection of this doctrine is labeled as the worst and most profound type of despair, namely that of defiance. Almost certainly it is for this reason that the work in question is proffered under yet another of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms: Anti-Climacus. Anti-Climacus is almost demonic in his arduous support of the Christian faith, and Kierkegaard apparently does not quite share his conviction. By ascribing the entire text to a fictional character of his own invention, Kierkegaard thus seemingly escapes the charge of bigotry.


27 In the original: ‘Fortvivlelse om det Evige eller over sig selv.’ (Verstrynge,1997:444).

28 Fortvivlelse over sig selv

29 Fortvivlelse om det Evige

30 “Toch wordt in dit laatste stadium (‘vertwijfelend ten aanzien van het eeuwige of over zichzelf’) een stap verder gezet, brekt er zoals boven reeds aangekondigd een verdere intensivering van bewustzijn door. Er is namelijk sprake van een nuancering binnend het vertwijfelen der zwakheid. Men vertwijfelt niet langer in zwakheid, maar over de eigen zwakheid. Het gezichtspunt keert hier als het ware om: men verkrijgt een groter bewustzijn zowel van wat vertwijfelend inhoudt als van de eigen staat van vertwijfelting. De vertwijfelde wordt er zich van bewust zowel gegeven te hebben om het aardse dat hij het eeuwige en het zelf heeft verloren. Er brekt dus een bewustzijn van het eigen zelf door, omdat ‘vertwijfelen ten aanzien van het eeuwige’ niet mogelijk is zonder een begrip van het zelf in soeveren het iets eeuwigs ‘bezit.’” (Verstrynge,1997:446-447).

31 This compares quite interestingly with Sartre, who as we shall see later, said that one of the ways one tries in ‘bad faith’ to assign substance/ essence to oneself, is by trying to be ‘absolutely’ sad, in the same way, for instance, that a statue can exhibit ‘frozen pain’.
A comparison is again possible on this point between Kierkegaard and Sartre’s views on inauthenticity: Kierkegaard’s finitude/necessity corresponds to Sartre’s facticity, because it refers to that which constrains the self in the here and now. Examples of such factors are: one’s nationality, language, gender, state of health, talents, current financial status, and any other material/physical factors which limit what one might become. A man, for example, cannot give birth, and this describes the factual, unchangeable, necessary conditions of his existence. What Kierkegaard calls infinity/possibility, and Sartre calls transcendence, describes on the other hand everything that expands the self, giving it an infinite range of possibilities to choose from. It is this which makes the future uncertain.

Inauthenticity, for both Kierkegaard and Sartre, can result either from taking one’s facticity too seriously - thinking for example that because one is a man one cannot be a mother in any other sense of the word - or from becoming lost in the possibilities that the future offers. Typical examples of the latter type of inauthenticity might be a student who cannot settle on a final course of study, but keeps changing in the hope of finding the perfect one, or a person who cannot commit to one partner, but always remains on the lookout for someone more interesting or suitable.

We can compare this to Heidegger’s concept of ‘fallenness’, which is the degraded and anonymous state of being of ‘Das Man.’

One is here reminded by not too far a stretch of the imagination of Sartre’s character, Roquentin in Nausea, who suddenly finds himself overwhelmed by the sheer contingency of existence, and imagine that if nothing is really certain, it is even possible that his tongue could become a caterpillar.

A lesser, but equally odious despair, is that of the petty bourgeois mentality of spiritlessness, which translates as an attachment to probability. This is a lukewarm and trivial state of mind that attaches no more importance to the outcome of any chain of events than to the roll of dice.

In the original Dutch: “Deze analyse wordt structureel verbonden met een ontwikkeling van de verschillende vormen van vertwijfeling. De structuur van het zelf en zijn aberraties is, zo moet blijken, gelijk oorspronkelijk met de verschillende gestalten van vertwijfeling. Een centraal thema in ons betoog zal zijn dat Kierkegaards, of beter, Anti-Climacus' beschrijving van de vertwijfeling onlosmakelijk samenhangt met de opeenvolgende intensivering van het bewustzijn. Ofschoon hij dit zelf niet steeds thematisere, lijk de intensiteit van de vertwijfeling recht evenredig te zijn met die van het bewustzijn.” Verstrynge’s analysis deals only with despair in The Sickness Unto Death, but I believe the same thesis, namely that the intensification of dread, anxiety and fear is equivalent to the growth of consciousness, holds throughout Kierkegaard's work as a whole. The relationship is reciprocal: increased consciousness necessarily increases (consciousness of) anxiety, in so far as anxiety, despair or fear is the feeling of being pulled into opposite directions, and consciousness is structurally determined as being a relation between different personality elements that pull in opposite directions. In this manner greater consciousness increases anxiety. Anxiety increases consciousness because it directs the attention inward as the individual tries to cope with his/her anxiety, thus increasing introspection and subjectivity.

This contradicts the spirit the 19th century, where Hegelians continued the tradition of absolute doubt begun by Descartes, starting with faith as one of the first things to be done away with, as if it were a child’s disease to be outgrown. But they went "further" than previous skeptics, because both Descartes and Kant in the last instance kept faith safe from skepticism. The expression ‘going further’ was used by H.L. Martensen, Kierkegaard’s former tutor at Copenhagen University and later Bishop Primate, in a review where he claimed that one should move forward from the methodological doubt of Descartes to Hegel and even beyond.

An interesting application of faith as a double movement, illustrated by the story of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, and one that I do not wish to touch on except in parentheses, is Kierkegaard’s take on love, that other core component of Christian life besides faith. There are many examples in which it seems that faith and love are made out to be the same thing. (See Jegstrup 1995:425-451). Kierkegaard draws the important distinction between erotic, preferential and spontaneous love on the one hand, and non-preferential, unconditional love, based on duty/obligation rather than selection, on the other. The first is of course normally called romantic love, which is unchangeable since it is subject to change, and the second the Christian love of neighbor, which is deemed preferable by many Christian thinkers. Certainly Abraham’s love for Isaac is preferential, although not romantic, in that Isaac is his child. One interpretation of the story of the sacrifice of Isaac, is that it is the laying down of preferential love, and so also a laying down of sacrifice/resignation of the ‘self’. ‘In Works of Love he [Kierkegaard] shows how any natural affection, friendship or eros is a preferential and therefore a self-centered love. If I
love *my* child, *my* friend, and *my* beloved with natural love the emphasis is on the 'my'. Thus, if I love my child for example, with any kind of preference over other children or persons then I am loving *my* self in *my* child. My child, *my* friend, and *my* beloved are reflections upon *myself*. However, Kierkegaard, with his double movement leap, is able through faith to valorize our preferential loves as well as our self-sacrificial pure love of the other.... As aesthetes, we love our friend or our beloved in our preferential self-loving friendship or eros... As ethical persons, we love our child or others with a preferential self-loving affection.... If I move from loving my child, friend or beloved with my whole heart, mind and soul then I move from absolutely loving the relative to absolutely loving the absolute. Derrida shows how Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac is at bottom a sacrifice of his own self-love." (Goicoechea, 1999:214-215).

40 Sagi (1991), describes in fact three different approaches delineated in, respectively, Philosophical Fragments: Johannes Climacus; Concluding Unscientific Postscript and The Sickness Unto Death, that according to him are usually lumped together by Kierkegaard scholars. In his article he proceeds to separate the three approaches by nuancing the existential or ontological status of their components: The first approach, in Fragments, sees the art of existence as the striving to shape a unity between knowledge and factual existence; the second approach in the Postscript sees existence as the goal of a critical and reflective life. In this thesis I will concentrate for the most part on the third approach as found in Sickness, namely that existence is the task of achieving synthesis between the dichotomic elements which constitute the self. Since the grouping together of the three approaches usually occur under the rubric of the third, it does not represent a too disturbing departure from the manner in which Kierkegaard is generally understood. Sagi (1991:482), in the conclusion of his article summarizes the difference between the three approaches as follows: "All three consider that the goal of existence is to shape a relation between two elements; however, while in the first two the suggested relation is a sort of correspondence between the elements, the third approach speaks of self-realization. It is in the third approach that existence as the art of self-moulding reaches its culmination, since concreteness as such is the result of an active shaping of the synthesis." The first two approaches took cognizance of the third element of self-concern, but did not assign to it ontological status.

41 From this it can be seen that the only point of correspondence between Kierkegaard and Hegel on the notion of Spirit, is that it is born dialectically through the synthesis of opposites, but other than that it is directly opposed to Hegel's Absolute Spirit that transcends individuality and particularity and is to be arrived at through reason alone.

42 As Porn (1984) does for example. He tries to describe the Kierkegaardian self in action-theoretical terms, describing the self as a kind of 'self-correcting device' that continually makes up the difference between an ideal and an actual state of a system. Hannay (1985) shows that Porn identifies the spiritual self with what he calls the 'expanding factor' in contrast to the 'limiting factor'. The mistake that Porn makes is to identify the ideals to which the self strives in its expansion to be particular abilities, skills and the like, such as the acquiring of a new language, instead of understanding that the goal of the self is 'wholeness' and 'totality'; in a sense, the goal of the self is the self itself! On Porn's account, explains Hannay (1985:264-265), the self's spirituality will depend upon the number of evening classes he attends and the diploma's he can pocket.

43 Hannay comments on the use of the terminology 'negative unity' in order to explain what is meant by 'relation': it is rather strange to speak of any unity as a negative unity. It seems to be a misnomer, since one would normally think of a unity as two/more elements related, *plus* the relation. Take as an example a family: one normally thinks of a family unit as the members of the family plus the blood-relation between them. But this example would for Kierkegaard be a negative unity since the relationship, or better, the connection, between them is passive and not active. It just is there. To understand why Kierkegaard speaks of the relation between two terms as a third term in the form of a negative unity (or in other words, as a third term intruding upon and intervening in a negative unity), one would then have to distinguish between "unity" in the more conventional static sense, which means "unit", and the active sense, which refers to that which makes the two terms a unity, or unites the two terms. In the static sense the term 'unit' has then nothing but the status of a third term, *on par with the other two*. In a negative unity 'relation' is an abstract noun, in a positive unity it is used as a verb, and would be better translated as 'relating'.

44 In the negative unity the two terms relate merely themselves to the relation, which is the third term. In a simple relation between soul and body there is no self, since "the self would then be merely a dependent factor, mirroring the interplay of the other two with each other and with the environment. " (Hannay,1982:191). In this case the self would be capable of being controlled from outside, which means it would be passive, and besides that, there would be no such type of despair as that wanting to be itself (defiance). The despair of defiance indicates that the self is 'active' because it wants to
constitute itself as it wants to be. But since there is this type of despair it means that "the self is a controlling rather than a controlled or controllable factor, this being the respect in which it is properly said to belong to the category of spirit." (Italics mine, Hannay, 1982:191). This emphasizes the dynamic nature of true selfhood: the so-called 'immediate person' (for example the aesthete) wishes, desires, enjoys, etc. passively, and reacts merely to what is agreeable or disagreeable, to good fortune and misfortune, and so coheres immediately with others, that is to say, unreflectingly and automatically. The self emerges only in an act of discrimination between it and its environment (from there the need for 'nakedness' and giving up all that is 'finite'), that can be described as infinite abstraction from everything outward (the first movement in the double movement of faith, as described previously, namely resignation.) (Hannay, 1985:265-266).

45 Reason is required to understand this, but reason can go no further than realizing the impossibility of uniting things that are, logically speaking, irreconcilable. "[I]t is precisely because of the centrality of freedom that the relation to God appears in the process of self-relation. Through his conscious reflective relation to himself, man discovers his absolute dependence on God; it is God that enables freedom and self-transcendence, as well as the relation between the elements of the synthesis, namely, self-relation." (Sagi, 1991:482).

46 To illustrate this, reference can be made to a very important existential topic, namely the need of each person to face his or her own death. For most people death is an abstract idea, because although they know they will die, intellectually, they have as yet made no personal interpretation of it, they have attached no existential meaning to their own death, or, to speak, realized it. To know death abstractly is of little existential use. Death becomes concrete only when it is one's own death. Through a person's own, that is, concrete death, s/he is forced to "face questions that touch upon the totality of ... existence." (Sagi, 1991:479). Death becomes an existential task, but it is only one such task among many, all of which share the characteristic that for the individual they must be made 'concrete'. What this means is that the thought of death must not only remain a thought, but must become a deed, a conscious preparation for it. And it is in this sense as well that one must also follow Christ, says Kierkegaard: not in thought but in deed.

47 I use the word synthesis in inverted comma's to indicate that it is not a synthesis properly speaking; it is rather an open-ended synthesis, or a dialectic without synthesis, since the concepts do not dissolve into another that completely contains and supercedes both. Rather the 'eternal' retains a precedence of sorts.

48 This coming together of time and eternity is another paradox that cannot be grasped by reason, but that must be apprehended by faith. It must be recalled of course that a paradox is not the same as a contradiction. An example of contradiction would be the statement: "Sally is a cat and Sally is not a cat", where the word 'cat' contains no ambiguities, and the two parts of the sentence logically exclude each other. A paradox has rather the nature of seeing one thing from two different viewpoints or directions, viewpoints that seem at first glance to be mutually exclusive and contradictory, an idea that is difficult to grasp because it requires insight of the kind not furnished by reason. Christ stands as symbol for the paradox of time being the same thing as eternity, because he is the God-man: both divine and human, a fact that cannot be explained or understood, but must be accepted by faith. To explain why time and eternity are two sides of the same paradoxical coin the following preliminary explanation is given: contrary to popular conception, the eternal is not one long succession of instants without beginning or end, but rather the abolition of the 'succession of instants' (that is normally understood as time) altogether. But what is the instant? The instant itself is precisely the absence of past, future, or -for that matter- present. Thus it can represent eternity. But at the 'same time' instants (or moments) are the very building blocks of time, for there can be no other 'thing' of which time is made up of. The paradox here is thus that the instant or moment is both time and also eternity; it is the intersection of these two (seemingly) mutually exclusive domains.

49 Anxiety is a fear of the nothingness that is the future, or in other words the possibilities contained in it, wherein the individual is not sure of what he will do, whether or not he will throw himself over a cliff, fail to do his duty, or become an alcoholic, to name but a few examples.

50 Interestingly, Sartre (1965:139-140) also emphasizes that greater awareness of existence automatically implies greater awareness of the present, or in other words, the awareness that nothing but the present exists.

51 Even Kierkegaard himself did not wish to refer to himself as a 'philosopher', because according to him the philosophy of his day was no longer saying anything to anyone, because the addressee had been neutralized by the System. (Jegstrup, 1995:426), and Kierkegaard's project was specifically to direct remarks, experiences and choices to the single individual.
Vanessa Rumble states that Kierkegaard's philosophy presents an alternative to and critique of two specific tenets of idealism, namely (1) the autonomy of reason and spirit, and (2) the subject's immanent transcendence of temporality; she interprets and adjudicates Theodore Adorno's ambitious and controversial project to show that Kierkegaard did not succeed in overthrowing the central tenets of idealism, but in fact maintained the patterns of sacrifice of and domination over nature, that was implied in the work of such idealist philosophers as Hegel and Kant. Adorno argued that Kierkegaard had, through his all-encompassing subjectivity, unwittingly repeated Hegel's construction of an entire, undifferentiated totality and monism. Rumble explains that Adorno also made the mistake of not distinguishing between the fictive voices that populate Kierkegaard's authorship and disregarding the anthropology that frames the material; the intimations of hubris and instrumental reason Adorno discovers must be ascribed to specific pseudonyms and not to the authorship in toto. For the discussion, see Rumble (1994).

Jegstrup (1995:425) states that Kierkegaard not only anticipates the postmodern critique, but actually begins it.

His attitude perhaps acquires significance in light of his own personal wealth, inherited from his father, that enabled him to live comfortably without ever needing to work. Cynics could argue that his entire anti-establishment philosophy sprang from the neurotic sense of guilt he experienced at this state of affairs, and though an attack like this would of course be ad hominem, there are many critics who do commit this fallacy, whether explicitly or implicitly.

Incidentally, Rumble (1994:32) argues however that although Kierkegaard viewed "the subject's enslavement to renunciation and self-domination from a theological and a-historical perspective, this [same] element is not lacking in Adorno's thought."

Also the theme of the necessity of an absolute goal for personal psychic health is echoed in Jung's work.

NOTES FROM CHAPTER III:

Anselm's proof of God's existence, and variations thereof, have been used by many thinkers, for example Descartes. The same argument has been shot down by as many others. Basically Anselm's proof says that God must exist by definition, because he is the most Perfect Being, and a being that is perfect but that does not exist, is less perfect than an existing perfect Being. So the most Perfect Being must exist, and since God is the most Perfect Being He does exist.

It is interesting to take note of the fact that Sartre from a young age had vision in only one eye, which means that for most of his life his vision could have no 'depth'. Many of his visual references contain this implicit two-dimensional quality.

A.J. Ayer compares Sartre's use of the word 'nothing' here with the puns and paradoxes in 'Alice in Wonderland': Alice says that she sees Nobody on the road, and the King replies that she must have good eyes to see Nobody, and at such a distance too! (Cranston, 1962:47) Ayer, a logical positivist, holds that for a sentence to be meaningful it must adhere to the verification principle: that is, a sentence is meaningful if a process is described by which it can be proven true or false, and this is clearly not so in the case of Sartre's description of consciousness as Nothingness.

"If we accept the law of the knower-known dyad, then a third term will be necessary in order for the knower to become known in turn, and we will be faced with this dilemma: Either we stop at any one term of the series - the known, the knower known, the knower known by the knower, etc. In this case the totality of the phenomenon falls into the unknown; that is, we always bump up against a non-selfconscious reflection and a final term. Or else we affirm the necessity of an infinite regress... which is absurd." (in Lafarge, 1970:48).

Interesting to note here that many Eastern conceptions of the Self imply exactly such a Brahmanic annihilation of consciousness.

For an analysis of why Sartre's character Roquentin experiences 'nature' as monstrous rather than glorious, see Allen (1974).

"...Roquentin - himself a very deracinated intellectual - sits under a chestnut tree in a park, contemplating one of the tree's dark thick roots; one thinks of the sage Gautama under the bo-tree, or Omar and his book of verses beneath the bough. Suddenly he has an 'illumination', which 'takes his breath away'. The innocent reader expects (and is doubtless intended to expect) some mystical rapture; but the emotion that has flooded over Roquentin is in fact nauseated disgust. The tree exists -
"naked" which gives him the overall impression breathless. Never, until these last few days, had I understood the meaning of 'existence'. I was like the of this black, knotty mass, entirely beastly, which frightened me. Then I had this vision. 'facticity', the 'contingency' of the tree is unbearable." (Ushher,1955:104).

Roquentin's nausea when he sees the trees and shrubs become "soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder, naked" which gives him the overall impression of "frightful, obscene nakedness." (Sartre,1964:172).

The experience is described in Nausea as follows:

"I couldn't remember it was a root anymore. The words had vanished and with them the significance of things, their methods of use, and the feeble points of reference which men have traced on alone in front of this black, knotty mass, entirely beastly, which frightened me. Then I had this vision. It left me breathless. Never, until these last few days, had I understood the meaning of 'existence'. I was like the others, like the ones walking along the seashore, all dressed in their spring finery. I said, like them 'the ocean is green; that the white speck up there is a seagull,' but I didn't feel that it existed or that the seagull was an 'existing seagull,' usually existence hides itself. It is there, around us, in us, it is us, you can't say two words without mentioning it, but you can never touch it. When I believed I was thinking about it, I must believe that I was thinking nothing, my head was empty, or there was just one word in my head, the word 'to be.' Or else I was thinking... how can I explain it? I was thinking of belonging, I was thinking that the sea belonged to the class of green objects, or that the green was a part of the duality of the sea. Even when I looked at things, I was miles from dreaming that they existed: they looked like scenery to me. I picked them up in my hands, they served me as tools, I foresaw their use to fit into his ideal of 'what one should be', which greatly favored action when dealing with the objective world." (De Lacoste, 1998:284). This same feeling shines through in the description of Roquentin's nausea when he sees the trees and shrubs become "soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder, naked" which gives him the overall impression of "frightful, obscene nakedness." (Sartre,1964:172).

The correlation between Kierkegaard's description of the despair that is the despair of infinity/possibility without finitude/necessity should be quite obvious here.

In Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and Sartre the despair or anguish of trying to be another rather than oneself is described as the most primitive form of bad faith/despair/anguish, and the furthest removed from authenticity.

In 'No Exit' (Huis Clos) Sartre introduces condemned souls, one for example who was a coward because he had deserted the army, although he had intended to be brave and liked to think of himself as
brave. Now however, in hell, he is a coward for eternity, because life, the only thing that lets man's identity remain open to change, is no more. In this Sartre's view is akin to Heidegger's, which says that man's ultimate identity lies in his death.

71 It is interesting to take note of this in light of the fact that Simone de Beauvoir, his life-long companion, found it necessary to write The Second Sex in order to show that for women 'authenticity' as a woman was a thing slightly more difficult to accomplish, because certain institutional systems and habitual attitudes of society paint a picture of women that is, if not determining, at the least very constricting. Feminine authenticity merits a unique approach, and this idea later gave birth to feminism.

72 See also Manser (1983).

73 Sartre explores his own strategies of inauthenticity in his autobiography The Words, and exposes several instances of play-acting in front of his family, that finally culminated in his project to become a 'writer', which he did: In his own words, during childhood he already succumbed to bad faith and "sought to imagine himself as a fixed and necessary being, like the hero of a novel who has a particular destiny to fulfill, and who is 'justified' as soon as he makes his first appearance." (White, 1991:294). This shows that bad faith is not something found especially amongst certain types of people, such as waiters or women, but that everyone is afflicted with it by virtue of their humanity.

74 Bad faith is therefore by no means only an adult affair. Young children are as adept at play-acting and presenting themselves in the best possible light to the audience of their parents and family/society at large. Sartre particularly refers to his own childhood in The Words and shows clearly how even children are not innocent, but know that they are being fake. One must conclude that possibly only babies and animals, whose consciousness is not yet reflective (Jung would say whose consciousness is still at the instinctive, that is, unconscious state) have no anxiety or guilt.

75 See for example Santoni (1985).

76 This is a very good example to use when speaking about bad faith in general. As has been shown before, Sartre uses two women's approach to their own sexuality, or to sexuality in general, as examples of bad faith. Simone de Beauvoir took up the theme when she said that femininity is not something given, a fact about oneself, but something to be appropriated, and something, moreover, of which the meaning is not clear at all. I think that to add to this and to complete the picture one should also emphasize that if a woman's denial of her own sexuality can be an example of bad faith, then a man's emphasis on his own sexuality can also be an example of the same. Unfortunately, this is a very prevalent form of bad faith in our world, as men unthinkingly and blindly live the metaphors of masculine society. Whatever a man's biological and physical make-up, what it means 'to be a man' is still up to him and reflects nothing but a personal choice. Unfortunately again, not taking responsibility for this basic choice comes very easily. A married man could for example tell himself, 'there's nothing wrong in my having a roving eye, after all, i am a man, and men simply can't help being aroused when a pretty girl walks by, that is how they are made.' Again, the 'fact' of arousal, (or of its absence incidentally), like hunger, is not a 'given' fact, because it is always already and necessarily an interpretation. Attributing male sexuality and/or aggression to the working of testosterone is just as much a recourse to self deception, and a shirking of responsibility, as is a woman's bad temper attributed to PMS. This entire problem of the biological basis to our emotions and behavior can take on sinister dimensions, when for example a book is written to show how rape is actually a tool of evolution to ensure the survival of the species. (A Natural History of Rape, by R. Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer, MIT Press, 2000). Or, on a slightly different level, one can take a case of one person's 'road rage' (which has been said to be nothing but a primitive 'fight or flight' reaction that can occur under stress) leading to another's being bludgeoned to death. Now this is not to say that there aren't forces that can potentially overwhelm one at any moment, and the physical instincts that go back to our primitive forbears are surely prime candidates for this position. Hunger in extreme circumstances could conceivably turn anyone into a thief, a beggar, or even maybe a killer. But just like a gun to one's head cannot ultimately compel one into any course of action, since the choice is always there to die rather than do whatever the assailant wants you to do, on far lesser levels one's physical drives are never strong enough to 'cause' behavior/action/attitudes, which are always necessarily due to choice. A responsible self accepts this.

77 On the other hand it can be argued that the reason why a person does not want to give up being an en-soi is because s/he finds the contingency of things threatening, sickening and meaningless, and the reason why the person finds things to be so is because s/he wants to be 'in control'. Allen (1974) has compared the descriptions of the radical experience of contingency of both Iris Murdoch and Sartre with each other, and concludes that Roquentin experiences nausea because he is egotistical and wants things to revolve around him. The central character of Murdoch's book The Unicorn has a similar
experience of 'existence' when near death, but for him it is beautiful and meaningful precisely because he has given up the notion that things should revolve around himself: "Effingham Cooper, when he recognizes that he is nothing, that with death he will cease to be, gives up his desire to control things. He gives up his desire to have them orbit around himself. So when he perceives their independence, they are seen as precious and glorious realities." (Allen,1974:185). Allen is implying therefore that the real reason why the self cannot give up trying to be en-soi is pure egotism and selfishness, but although I think he makes a valid point, it seems he moves the discussion away from its ontological foundations into an ethical discussion; the problem of trying to be en-soi is not done away with so easily.

78 Sartre's references to 'good faith' are obscure and contradictory, but can be interpreted positively, as has for example been done by Haynes-Curtis (1988:269):

"Sartre's account of bad faith has been widely discussed... If good faith is to be taken as the antithesis of bad faith, by the inclusion of the evaluative term 'good', it would appear to be the more desirable of the two states, and thus radically different from bad faith. Sartre, however, appears to rule out this interpretation of good and bad faith, when in his footnote to the section The "Faith" of Bad Faith' (Sartre,1958:70) he states that 'it is indifferent whether one is in good or bad faith' since neither would seem to provide the ground for what Sartre sees as the truly desirable and achievable state - that of authenticity... The inconsistencies raised by the footnote can be resolved, however, if we realize that for Sartre 'good' and 'bad' are both secondary terms, whilst it is the common denominator of Faith upon which he places his emphasis... "The true problem of bad faith stems evidently from the fact that bad faith is faith."" 79

79 Perfect (ontological) authenticity would then presumably be a state where not faith, but certainty, grounds one's existence.

80 Sartre draws a parallel between his own view of sincerity/ good faith and Kant's maxim that 'ought implies can.' One's duty and effort to sincerity implies that it is possible to become sincere (in Solomon,1972:302). (Kierkegaard is thus not the only one who must have recourse to paradox.)

81 Catalano (1980) points out that because one's fundamental project is made up in part of facticity (that is the events of one's past, and also the material, unchangeable circumstances of one's life, such as that one is a woman, born in a certain country, endowed with certain physical or mental advantages and disadvantages, etc.) it is not possible to erase oneself altogether and start over again from scratch. He describes what Sartre means by drawing an analogy with portrait painting, to illustrate the options open to the individual who intends to adapt his basic project: "In describing the relation of our acts to each other, Sartre compares them to the lines of a portrait (BN pp. 469-70). To elaborate on this analogy, we can say that the lines of a portrait are related to the whole portrait as each human act is related to its fundamental project, or self... We should not imagine our artist free to throw his canvas away or free to erase the lines he has drawn, but we can imagine that he is able to change the entire character of his portrait by one properly spaced line. For example, our artist might suddenly become winsome and change an almost completed, serious looking portrait of George Washington by giving him a Mona-Lisa like smile. In a similar way, for Sartre, although we have only one life to live and cannot change our past, our real freedom is that we are free to perform acts that give new meanings to our past and open new possibilities for our future. To continue one step further with the analogy, I understand the terms 'good faith' and 'bad faith' to refer to the twofold relation the artist can have to his project and to the twofold relation we can have to our fundamental projects. I consider the artist in good faith to be aware that, although he must complete the portrait he has begun (for we must imagine him to have only one canvas) he is still free to give his portrait a new meaning. I consider the artist in bad faith to see his task merely to represent as accurately as possible the features of George Washington once again." (Catalano,1980:208-209).

82 Catalano gives the example of Sartre's own support for Russian Communism between 1952 and 1953, that was later modified in the face of Stalinist excesses and the invasion of Poland, without however giving up the project of supporting basic socialist and communist ideals altogether. Sartre's belief changed when the evidence changed, and he was not too proud to admit that he had been wrong and should have foreseen the dangers of communism earlier. (Catalano,1990:686-687).

83 The moment in which one accepts a project is 'sacred', because it is in that moment that one assumes the illusion of being an object, and it creates the impression that life becomes overflowing with meaning. What Abraham had experienced was indeed the sacred in the face of God's gaze, but Sartre characterizes every event that serves to objectify a person as sacred. Sartre's own experience of his grandfather predicting that the young Jean Paul will one day be a writer, was such a sacred moment. In these moments an identity is handed over and a release from subjectivity is allowed, for in each case the person (usually in childhood) has a chance to give himself an essence, whether it be of a writer, a thief, or an anti-Semite.
holds people infinitely more accountable than these conventional systems: when one realizes they have a life independent of oneself and outside of one's control. But this, Sartre men are responsible for the colonialist crimes committed in Algeria and all men are responsible for the would be that any policy-makers that are guided by a specific moral outlook should take responsibility for the consequences that arise from their policy: for example anyone who argues that life is sacred and begins at conception should make provision for generous care to all the orphans that will be born from unwanted pregnancies. It is not enough to outlaw abortion. Similarly policies that do allow for abortion should, for example, make provision for measures like counseling to mothers, family planning clinics available to all (so as to combat unwanted pregnancies from an angle that will not diminish respect for life), etc. A good example of the typical attitude that does not take responsibility for choices, is that of a character in one of Sartre's plays who shoots and kills a man and then says: "Did I even do it? It wasn't I who killed - it was chance... Chance fired three shots, just as in cheap detective stories... Where does that put me in the thing? It was an assassination without an assassin." (in King,1973:163). This is the effect of consciousness that wants to keep itself pure, unstained by reality, that is estranged from itself and does not want to get its 'hands dirty'. It is ironic but true that many systems of contemporary morality are able to find excuses and justifications for man's inhumanity to man, ranging from defenses of insanity to blaming a child's deprived upbringing for later crimes. Sartre's ethics on the other hand holds people infinitely more accountable than these conventional systems: "... Sartre will argue that all men are responsible for the colonialist crimes committed in Algeria and all men are responsible for the 'hooligans' that populate our cities, for it is by our deeds that the unjust world continues to be possible; our mental reservations or our different intentions count for little." (King,1974:167).

Allen (1974) indicates that it is possible to experience existence not in nausea, as Roquentin does, but in wonder and awe, as Effingham Cooper does in Iris Murdoch's novel The Unicorn, which is a typically mystical description. He prefers the mystical experience to Roquentin's, because, he says, it is possible to appreciate the beauty and wonder of existence, its "precious and glorious realities" only when one realizes they have a life independent of oneself and outside of one's control. But this, Sartre would say, is bad faith, because it denies the involvement of consciousness in 'things' and negates the responsibility of the pour-soi in its apprehension of the en-soi. It makes of the world one that exists without human intervention, and attractive picture that this might be, it is always inaccurate, for as long as consciousness perceives the world it is a human world.

When a character does triumph, as does Matthieu at the end of the trilogy Roads to Freedom, his conduct is hardly what one would normally expect from a 'hero'. After a lifetime of inaction and non-commitment Matthieu finally begins firing in suicidal triumph upon advancing German troops, and with each shot also metaphorically shoots down some virtue, saying: that's for the girl I should have seduced, that's for all the people I wanted to hate but tried to understand.

Sartre is typical of his age, an age that recognized the limits of language and that marked the ending of a period of 'essentialist' thinking. (Murdoch,1953:28). The problem of reference (the question of whether or not language refers to something outside itself) was dealt with by dividing language into descriptive and emotive uses, the latter which were said to have no reference. Poets like Rimbaud, authors like James Joyce, took language to one extreme where it disintegrated into senselessness, just as the surrealists used words and images merely as nets to drag the murky waters of the unconscious. (Murdoch,1953:35). Sartre objected against this use of language and deplored the loss of communication that it implied, for language to him is principally communication. "Sartre too wishes to conceive language neither as a vehicle for realistic reporting nor as an expression of the unsorted totality of the unconscious. Literature is not to be a reconciliation through appropriation, it is to be an activity going forward in a world where certain reconciliation's are impossible and certain conflicts inevitable. The world in which Sartre sees language as active is the world of ideological battles, where morality is a function of self-conscious political and religious allegiances..." (Murdoch,1953:43).

This criticism that Sartre has an inability to distance himself critically from his work, was admittedly made at a time when Sartre's final work, A Critique of Dialectical Reason, was still underway. In this book, which is a rethinking of Marxism and an attempt to reconcile the central tenets of existentialism with this doctrine, Sartre does indeed distance himself from many of his previous attitudes, although not repudiating his own ontology entirely. What emerges from this last work is the emphasis on the necessity for action and involvement in the world as opposed to the detached spectator's passivity as is often found in existentialism and phenomenology.
NOTES FROM CHAPTER IV:

90 Because Jung is an unfamiliar figure in academic philosophy, and since most of his terminology is unfamiliar, this introduction is somewhat extended, in order to clarify his basic approach, and also to comment on features that have made his thought problematic to philosophers.

91 A phrase coined by Ricœur.

92 Marx argued that the force which ruled the thought of people was history: the ebb and flow of economic tides. He claimed that a person’s ideas are shaped by the kind of life s/he leads, which in turn depends upon which economic class s/he belongs to. Nietzsche in his turn undermined the notions of reason and morality, by showing they are merely the epi-phenomena of an all-pervading will to power.

93 Later we shall see that it would have been better if Jung had avoided the terminology of ‘innateness’ -tentative as it was - because it has connotations that immediately problematize his entire philosophy: it lends weight to charges against him of idealism, mysticism, and the reification of the archetypes. His sometimes inconsistent, sometimes ignorant use of philosophical terminology, must not however deter one from interpreting his work favorably for a modern-day context. According to Roger Brooke it is often necessary to adhere to the spirit rather than the letter of Jung’s work, a task that is not difficult for those who know his work well.

94 Clarke (1992:57) writes that, given Jung’s eclecticism and non-linear thinking style "it is not surprising that he showed a great affinity with Romanticism, that great sprawling cultural and intellectual phenomenon that gripped the heart and mind of Europe in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries..." The exploration and realization of the self and its unconscious depths, the emphasis on imagination, the painful conflicts that make up the personality, the conception of nature as a living organic whole of which consciousness is a crucial part, the placing of the subject back onto center stage, the attempt to overcome the mind-body dualism through a unified philosophy of nature, are all themes shared by Jung and the Romanticists. The notion of the shadow, and the need to integrate it into the personality, can for example be found thematized in Goethe’s Faust, who came to mean a lot to Jung; even more, he said, than Jesus of the Gospels. (ibid:58). Jung was influenced also by Schiller, who claimed that the tension between opposing principles are vital to life, and who warned against any one-sided development. Both Schiller and Jung believed that the imagination, art, and fantasy are important features of the healthy personality, and Jung explicitly attributed to Schiller his own idea that 'man is completely human only when playing'. (ibid:59) Fichte’s and Schelling’s idea that ‘the human spirit is fundamentally an active principle, working out its destiny through the reconciliation of opposing forces which arise from within the self” sounds very similar to Jung’s process of individualization, although Jung is here closer to Schelling, because he does not subsume matter into spirit as does Fichte, but maintains instead that the unity that is the Self is a unity of opposites. (ibid:62,63)

95 Spiritualism here refers to the emergence of the Theosophical society, which reduced all knowledge to Indian metaphysics, as well as the popular rise of interest in matters Eastern and esoteric. This represents the same side of the rationalist/ empiricist debate as did Descartes’ rationalism, because it attempts to reduce the essence of mankind to an immaterial, immortal, unchanging reality beyond the world of matter. This essence supposedly pre-dates the birth of the body and outlives its death.

96 This book was born from Jung’s efforts to understand the reasons behind the bitter break between himself, Freud and Adler. He felt that there was more to the break than a divergence of theory, and that an incompatibility of characters better explained it. His, he said, was an introverted psychology, as opposed to Freud and Adler’s extraverted ones. This same clash of basic psychological orientations goes a long way to explaining personality clashes in general. In fact, it is not too far-fetched to say that the very notion of a ‘personality clash’ was born with Jung’s Psychological Types, which also contributed much to the analyses of temperament, and gave birth to the Meyer’s-Briggs personality analysis tests.

97 It is difficult to give an indication here of the scope of ‘hermeneutic evidence’ Jung collected in his lifetime, or to present many more examples, especially in light of the esoteric nature of some of the evidence. Few people today are acquainted with the symbolism of medieval alchemy, or the obscure myths from dozens of extinct religions, but for the reader interested in exploring further parallels between psychic activity and ancient symbolic systems, much of Jung’s work is nevertheless accessible. There is for instance a very interesting and clear comparison between alchemy and a modern woman’s (a patient of Jung’s) series of therapeutic paintings, described in Jung (1956:30-51).
As concerns the 'transmission' of the archetypes it is useful to refer to evolutionary theory: The two schools of evolutionary thought prevalent in Jung's day were Darwinism and Lamarckianism, and some argue that Jung falls into the latter school. (Clarke, 1992: 122). This is not true except in a very limited sense, as we shall soon see. Darwinism, or Neo-Darwinism to be more precise (since Darwin was actually what we would now call a Lamarckian), argues that genetic changes are passed down from generation to generation strictly due to the working of chance. Mutations in genetic structure occur randomly and those mutations that are fittest to survive do so. Lamarck argued however that whatever abilities an 'individual' acquires during its lifetime, will be passed on to its progeny. Lamarckianism has been widely discredited, but it is still interesting to compare it to the way Jung believed the archetypes to be inherited, since he argued that the psyche purposefully changes and develops over time, in order to better deal with the challenges of a new historical period. What Jung affirms is not necessarily the broader notion that evolution is not at the mercy of mere chance. The evolutionary development in question in Lamarckianism speaks of a tendency of life to adapt itself, almost intentionally, to changing circumstances, and in this limited sense Jung has affinity with this theory.

For an engaging series of examples see Stevens (1983).

Jung explained that, for instance, Pueblo Indians believe the seat of consciousness and thinking to be the heart, and certain African tribes locate their psychic functioning in the belly. (Brooke, 1991:69).

Where reference is being made to the archetype of the Self in its capacity as being a God-image, the "S" will be capitalized.

That Nietzsche's insanity is normally attributed to a case of syphilis is an expression of the biological, positivistic, mechanistic and causal bias in the approach to mental illness. This problem can obviously be debated, but Jung's approach supposes that simple chemical/biological explanations fail to explain either the function or the disfunction of the human mind. This is also relevant for instance to the modern approach that explains depression in terms of chemical imbalance, not taking into account the very real personal and psychological problems and attitudes of the sufferer that more than adequately indicate what went wrong in the individual's life.

It is interesting to note that it is usually people who most vehemently deny the existence of the unconscious who are most likely to fall prey to this danger. An example relevant to this work in an oblique sense is that of Jean-Paul Sartre, who in his experiments with mescaline experienced vivid hallucinations and visions which haunted him for some time.

Undoubtedly a long an interesting discussion about these concepts can be entered into, but I forego it, since the details of Jung's point are not so important as the broad argument that in the psyche there are different faculties that stand into opposition to each other, a point which is argued through-out the chapter. Incidentally, the terms 'introversion' and 'extraversion', coined by Jung, have passed over into popular use.

Jung does state however that introversion always necessarily fails, because the object is too powerful to be blotted out by consciousness: the outer world presses into the mind no matter how hard the introvert tries to avoid it. This can be understood in phenomenological terms as the intentionality of consciousness.

A good example of the powerful emotion that the projection of the anima can evoke, can be seen in Shakespeare's Othello. At first Othello is overwhelmed by love for Desdemona. The mere sight of her moves him to speechless happiness: "It gives me wonder great as my content to see you here before me. O, my soul's joy." (Act 2, scene I: lines 175-176); and: "I cannot speak enough of this content; It stops me here, it is too much of joy" (Act 2, scene I: lines 188-189). After Iago stokes Othello's jealousy, insinuating that his wife is being unfaithful, playing on Othello's hidden insecurities about being an despised outsider/foreigner, everything is changed. The sight of Desdemona still fills Othello with uncontrollable passion - but now the passion/emotion is hatred: "Heaven knows that thou are false as hell." (Act 4, scene 2:40); "Oh thou black weed, who art so lovely fair and smell'st so sweet that the sense aches at thee, would thou hadst never been born!" (ibid: 68-70); "Was this fair paper, this most goodly book, made to write 'whore' on?... O, thou public commoner!" (ibid:73-75); "I took you for that cunning whore of Venice that married with Othello." (ibid:90-91). Upon the most flimsy evidence, Othello's emotion towards his wife (who is innocent of adultery, whose personality had not changed during the course of events, and who had given him no just cause for anger) swings from tender love to murderous rage. This is clearly a case of an eruption of unconscious energy into the mind, since two different aspects of the anima-figure: the virginal, pure, devoted maiden, and the...
treacherous, 'fallen' seductress, take turns in being projected onto Desdemona, who probably in 'reality' resembles neither of these two extremes.

107 "The man whom we can with justice call 'modern' is solitary. He is so of necessity and at all times, for every step towards a fuller consciousness of the present removes him further from his original 'participation mystique' with the mass of men - from submersion in a common unconscious. Every step forward means an act of tearing himself loose from that all-embracing, pristine unconsciousness which claims the bulk of mankind almost entirely." (Jung, 1933:226.)

108 In my opinion examples of modern myths gone awry comes from the realm of advertising and popular entertainment, the bread and circuses of modern life. The outrageous metaphysical claims made by big brands in advertising smacks of undiluted superstition, and the adoration of celebrities and obsessive interest in their private lives remind of nothing so much as fascination with the gods of Olympus and their frolics.

109 I place this word in inverted commas because it is not the ideal term to use. Teleology usually implies the reaching of a goal that really exists and is reachable, whereas Jung’s ‘teleology’ is an open-ended process with an ever receding goal.

110 It is a little known fact that Jung was instrumental to the founding of Alcoholics Anonymous, having indirectly, and later personally, influenced one of its two founders into understanding that the only thing that could cure chronic alcoholism, was an authentic religious experience. One of the two founders of AA is William G. Wilson (1896-1971), who was a friend of Roland H., to whom Jung made the remark that only a spiritual experience can cure chronic alcoholism in 1931. Roland H. was a patient of Jung’s who several times was pronounced ‘cured’, only to have a relapse again. In 1931 Jung told him that in fact there was no cure for his condition, which several other doctors and psychiatrists had pronounced hopeless, unless he found a way to connect with a ‘Power’ greater than himself. An authentic religious conversion and subsequent reliance on a greater Power therefore became the keystone of AA philosophy, and all members are required to try and realize it as part of their treatment. I quote a section from the AA’s ‘Big Book’, the manual prescribed by that organization to all its prospective and current members:

“Some of our alcoholic readers may think they can do without this spiritual help. Let us tell you ... of the conversation our friend [Roland H.] had with his doctor [Jung]. The doctor said: ‘You have the mind of a chronic alcoholic. I have never seen one single case recover, where that state of mind existed to the extent that it does in you.’ Our friend felt as though the gates of hell had closed on him with a clang. He said to the doctor, ‘Is there no exception?’ ‘Yes’ replied the doctor, ‘there is. Exceptions to cases such as yours have been occurring since early times. Here and there, once in a while, alcoholics have had what are called vital spiritual experiences. To me these occurrences are phenomena. They appear to be in the nature of huge emotional displacements and rearrangements. Ideas, emotions and attitudes which were once the guiding forces of the lives of these men are suddenly cast to one side, and a completely new set of conceptions and motives begin to dominate them. In fact, I have been trying to produce some such emotional rearrangement with you. With many individuals the methods which I employed are successful, but I have never been successful with an alcoholic of your description.’ Upon hearing this, our friend was somewhat relieved, for he reflected that, after all, he was a good church member. This hope, however, was destroyed by the doctor’s telling him that while his religious convictions were very good, in his case they did not spell the necessary vital spiritual experience.... The distinguished American psychologist, William James, in his book ‘Varieties of Religious Experience’ indicates a multitude of ways in which men have discovered God. We have no desire to convince anyone that there is only one way by which faith can be acquired.... Those having religious affiliations will find here nothing disturbing to their beliefs or ceremonies. There is no friction among us over such matter.” (pp 21-23 in Chapter 2 of Alcoholics Anonymous Big Book: source found on the internet at http://my.netian.com/~bellelee/bigbook1.htm). Alcoholics Anonymous was founded by two men in 1934; by 1955 membership had risen to 150 000 recovered alcoholics in 6000 groups worldwide. According to the foreword of the third edition of the Big Book in 1976, membership had by that time risen to over 1,000 000 in 28 000 groups in 90 countries, with membership growing at 20% a year. At the risk of over-stating my case, I think this constitutes overwhelming empirical evidence of the efficaciousness of an authentic religious experience in transforming the psyche.

111 Besides the symbolism of the mandala and Christ, there are many other symbols for the self, for example the Golden Flower, the lapis or philosopher's stone, and the 'diamond body.' It is interesting to note that Sartre also used the diamond as an expression for that ideal synthesis, the Being-in-itself-for-itself, because it is substance (undeniably, since it is also the hardest substance), but it is not opaque like the in-itself, but rather transparent, like consciousness.
The most impressive and moving example of mandala must surely be the Kalachakra sand-mandalas of Tibetan Buddhists. Four monks painstakingly over a period of months create an immensely complex mandala using dust-fine sand of different colors. The result is breathtaking, and once completed the mandala is surrounded by a glass enclosure so that thousands of pilgrims may walk past and admire it. At the end of the religious festival the sand is swept up and poured into a river to remind of the temporary and fleeting character of all existence. For more information about the Tibetan Kalachakra Mandala, its meaning, and the religious festival, see: Bryant, 1992: *Wheel of Time Sand Mandala*, and The Dalai Lama, 1985: *The Kalachakra Tantra*. For more on mandalas, see Jung, 1972: *Mandala Symbolism*.

Also the cross is of course a symbol of the self, but like the sinless Christ, an imperfect symbol, for the crossbar moved up from the center represents a move away from the physical, material empirical reality, to disproportionate emphasis on the spiritual, and other-worldly.

This makes for an interesting take on the Genesis myth, that also certainly ties in a bit with Kierkegaard: animals have no consciousness of good and evil since they entirely on the level of the instincts, that is to say, of the unconscious.

For example: "The self, the bridal unification of good and evil, is elevated by Jung into the new 'Incarnation', and the idea of God is replaced by that of the deified or divine man. Jung's psychology or religion is to be understood as the announcement of the Gnostic god who embraces Christ and Satan, God and man, as the Coming one." (Buber in Friedman, 1985:91). These types of statements, that call Jung a Gnostic, or interprets his statements about the self literally rather than metaphorically, contributed much to his being appropriated in esoteric circles like for example the new Age movement, the Theosophists, and devotees of Eastern cultures and religions. In fact Jung insisted that it can be harmful to the modern psyche to try and adopt postures that are alien to it, since disciplines like Gnosticism or yoga for example, were grown in a different soil, whether it be of place, time or culture.

This critique follows on his insistence that no theory of humankind can be used to explain the nature of an individual, since an individual is always an exception: "Taken by itself, this viewpoint left Jung open to a one-sided criticism. Jung took the ideas and images of people too seriously. Hence, some critics found him too relativistic. The fact that an idea or image exists in the mind, they argued, is no ground for its validity. Mental images must be subjected to criteria of verification, especially in the realm of religion." (Bockus, 1990:57).

"Though Jung's ideas in general have found great appeal for women, perhaps due to his emphasis on meaning rather than mechanism, and on imagination, feeling and intuition... his own stance and style have often been labeled sexist, and his views concerning the anima seen as limiting and even damaging for women. Now there is no doubt that as a man Jung displayed many of the cultural prejudices of his age, and despite his affinity for women, both personally and professionally, he showed some decidedly old-fashioned prejudices, about intellectual women in particular, describing them deprecatingly as prone to being 'animus-driven'." (Clarke, 1992:160). I agree with Clarke however that Jung contributed immensely to a realignment of our views on gender and also in this way to the liberation of women, and would emphasize with Brooke again that when it comes to understanding Jung, a little bit of intuition is always needed, in order to make sense of the contradictions and to get to the spirit rather than the letter of things. Is this not already a 'feminine' enterprise, making Jung's entire body of work 'feminine' to a great extent? As with allegations that he did not object strongly enough to the rise of Nazism, and so implicitly supported it, these criticisms can only come from people with the most shallow acquaintance of his work.

This is a point that is of cardinal importance to keep in mind when comparing Sartre's thought with Jung, since it shows that Jung has the same concerns in mind as does Sartre.
119 That the disparity between the aims/ motivations of the different parts of the self is the very cause of anxiety, is vividly illustrated by the modern polygraph (lie detector) test which developed from Jung’s word-association tests: In effect this is a device to measure anxiety, as expressed physically by a faster heartbeat, more perspiration from the skin, greater volumes of blood in the finger, breathing becoming shallower and speeding up, etc. These miniscule reactions show that while the person, under command of the ego/ will untruthfully answers ‘no’ to a question, there is someone else ‘standing behind him/her’, saying ‘yes!’ When the two parts are in agreement, no intensification of anxiety occurs, but when they are in disagreement, the body and the psyche immediately experience stress.

120 In this regard I refer especially to Kierkegaard, for whom a false self, that is, one with no ‘self’, is a person in whom the polarities stand in the relationship of a negative unity to each other. In other words, the disparate aspects of the self are there, but the relation between them is passive/ unconscious. On the other hand a positive unity between the polarities makes for a real self or spirit, because the relation between them is managed consciously. This latter case is the authentic self.

121 Ibietta, a condemned prisoner, accepted responsibility for his freedom and acted with integrity, when he refused to divulge the true hiding place of a comrade sought by his captors, even though he was promised his life for the information. He gave his captors the wrong information, telling them that the man could be found hiding in the graveyard. Unknown to him, the man had however changed his hiding place to the graveyard, and was consequently captured. Ibietta’s ‘good faith’ thus made no difference in the end.

122 This point is made by Shelburne (1983).

123 What would characterize an authentic self, is simply balance. The authentic individual is a well-rounded person who has many different interests and proficiencies. One-sided development, such as for instance an excessive focus on intellectual development at the cost of family life, is a sign of an unhealthy psyche and is furthest from authenticity.

124 The techniques Jung devised were experimental, and many of them require the assistance of a trained professional, but in most cases they are quite simple, and nothing prohibits the individual from trying them ‘at home’ as it were. The main thrust seems to be in finding a creative outlet for psychic activity: Jung suggested painting and drawing as one of the best forms to capture unconscious images in a form that allows consciousness to come to terms with it. Very little artistic proficiency is needed, and in fact human figures are better depicted in glyphs, like for example a circle with a seed in its middle. The unconscious, he wrote, likes to see its ideas depicted in bright and vivid colors. The process whereby the fantasy images arise from the unconscious is of course also helped along by getting them down on paper, as the fantasies then become more complex and meaningful. Another way of accessing unconscious material is by the writing of poetry and fiction, and it is indeed in this way that countless numbers of melancholy and troubled individuals have healed themselves throughout history. If the aim of writing is ‘healing’ however, care should be taken to not let conscious purposes interfere too much with the process – that means that the story-writer should pay less attention to style and sense-making, than to let the story develop autonomously. Similarly music can play a tremendous role in harmonizing the entire psyche. Other forms of art include sculpting, dancing, weaving, all of which have a beneficial effect on the psyche. It is interesting to note that for ‘primitive cultures’ these activities were a matter of course, but these days only professionals sing, dance, paint or tell stories. Even where it is practiced, the approach tends to be too serious, and goal orientated, as people take part in competitions or aim to be the best. A great part of our psychic life was lost when these forms of expression were dissolved in our society by the emphasis on instrumental rationality, which aims to develop only those skills that are considered ‘useful’, in the sense of contributing to the maintenance of the systems that ensure our physical survival, and scientific and technological progress.
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