

**DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN KHAYELITSHA : AN  
ANALYSIS OF RELATED ISSUES**

**BY**

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**Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree  
of**

**M.Admin. at the University of Stellenbosch**

**UNIVERSITY OF STELLENBOSCH**

**2000**

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Development is not the creation of wealthy people in isolated pockets of privilege. It is intended to meet the basic needs of the people and to satisfy their desire for peace of mind.

M.P. NQADINI

## **DECLARATION**

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

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**Date:**

## ABSTRACT

Apartheid statutes like the former Group Areas Act created what is referred to as “Apartheid Dormitory Cities”. Khayelitsha is a typical creation of apartheid. As a result Khayelitsha faces many socio-economic challenges such as poverty, low standard of living characterised by low income distribution or no income, high rate of unemployment, illiteracy, education problems, housing problems, health problems and poor economic conditions. Attempts were made to create civic associations and development structures to deal with socio-economic challenges in Khayelitsha, but all those attempts never brought about development solutions. The Khayelitsha community tends to have a poor participatory planning role in development related issues.

Khayelitsha as an apartheid legacy city will take a long time to dismantle in social, economic and purely practical terms. Rebuilding Khayelitsha equitably will be a tough exercise. The government strives to develop South Africa from a society of racially based compartmentalisation into a non-racial, developed country with equal opportunities, better education, health, housing and employment. These challenges are Khayelitsha’s major problems which cannot be solved overnight.

The problem faced is the re-integration of the separated zones of the former group areas. This makes it difficult to share the economic resources that are needed in Khayelitsha in order to solve its socio-economic problems. The integration of cities will only come about if the restructuring is in accordance with specific needs of the Khayelitsha community. People of Khayelitsha should be involved in the planning of their own city and be able to make informed decisions.

The objective of this thesis is to analyse related development issues and challenges in Khayelitsha and to provide possible solutions contributing to development.

Government and development agencies can draw lessons from the recommendations of this thesis and come up with sustainable and people-centred development-related strategies.



## OPSOMMING

Eertydse Apartheidswetgewing soos die herroepte Groepsgebiedewet as een van die wetgewende elemente van die Apartheidperiode, was verantwoordelik vir die skepping van sogenaamde “apartheidslaapdorpe”. Khayelitsha kan beskou word as ‘n tipiese voorbeeld en skepping van so ‘n “slaapdorp” as gevolg van Apartheid. As direkte resultaat hiervan ervaar Khayelitsha talle sosio-ekonomiese uitdagings soos armoede, lae lewenstandaarde gekenmerk deur huishoudings met lae inkomste verdelings en in sommige gevalle geen inkomstes, hoë werkloosheid, ongeletterdheid, onderwysprobleme, behuisingsprobleme, gesondheidsprobleme en algemene swak ekonomiese omstandighede. Pogings is wel in die verlede aangewend om burgerlike organisasies in Khayelitsha van stapel te stuur, maar hierdie pogings het daarin gefaail om werklike en meetbare ontwikkelingsoplossings te bewerkstellig. Die Khayelitsha gemeenskap vervul ’n beperkte deelnemende beplanningsrol in ontwikkelinggebaseerde aangeleenthede.

In praktyk sal Khayelitsha, as apartheidstad, lank neem om volwaardig te ontluik in terme van sosiale-, ekonomiese-, en verwante aanwysers en sal die regverdige en verteenwoordigende heropbouingsproses nie sonder struikelblokke ervaar word nie. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering strewende daarna om die land te ontwikkel vanaf ‘n samelewing gekenmerk deur rasgebaseerde kompartementalisering na ’n nie-rasgebonde gemeenskap met gelyke geleenthede in terme van onderwys, gesondheid, behuising en werksgeleenthede. Hierdie aangeleenthede vorm deel van die uitdagings wat Khayelitsha in die oog staar. Oplossings sal nie sommer oornag gevind word nie.

Die probleem wat oorkom moet word is die herintegrasië van aparte sones as gevolg van eertydse geskepte groepsgebiede. As gevolg hiervan is dit moeilik om ekonomiese hulpbronne, wat dringend in Khayelitsha benodig word, te herverdeel en te versprei ten einde die omvangryke sosio-ekonomiese probleem te verlig. Die integrasië van stede en spesifiek Khayelitsha, sal alleenlik suksesvol wees indien die herstruktueringsproses plaasvind met inagneming van die spesifieke benodighede en tekortkominge van die gemeenskap. Die gemeenskap van Khayelitsha moet betrek word in die beplanning van hul eie stad en deurgaans deel vorm van effektiewe konsultasie ten einde ingeligde besluite te kan maak, iets wat tans ontbreek.

Die doel van hierdie tesis is om ontwikkelingsaangeleenthede en uitdagings in Khayelitsha te analiseer en om moontlike oplossings vir volhoubare ontwikkeling van Khayelitsha te verskaf.

Die Regering- en ontwikkelingsorganisasies kan informasie bekom uit die gevolgtrekkings van hierdie tesis om volhoubare en mens-gesentreerde ontwikkelingsverwante strategieë daar te stel.



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without substantial support from various organisations, institutions and individuals.

- For financial support my thanks to the Education Opportunities Council (EOC), Tertiary Education Fund for South Africa (TEFSA), and a grant from the Centre for Science Development (CSD).
- Gratitude to all sources of information such as the University of Stellenbosch, University of Cape Town, Cape Town City Library, South African Library, Lingeletu West Town Council (LWTC), Khayelitsha Education Forum (KEF), Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF), Catholic Caring, Child Welfare, Community Kitchen, FAMSA, Life Line, NICRO, Nonzwakazi, Philani, SHAWCO, Wesgro and others not mentioned.
- I have benefited substantially from information received from the leaders of Khayelitsha such as Vuyani Ngcuka, Zolile Feni, Michael Kupiso and others.
- Thanks to the Department of Public and Development Management and the School of Public Management and Planning at the University of Stellenbosch, specially my supervisor, Francois Theron and examiner Prof Johan Burger.
- I am also indebted to the people of Khayelitsha who have shared their perceptions and experience of the development of their area. Some of them are cited as informants. Also the staff members and management of LWTC.
- Special thanks to Anelle Simonis and Belinda Petersen for typing the manuscript.
- To my family and my son Lihle Masalaza Nqadini, who have borne the major burden of the psychological side effects, which go with the long hours spent in the library. I hope this thesis will serve as a reward for their kindness and understanding.
- Last but not least, my special thanks go to my late parents, Lunga Nqadini and Nomantombazana Makhesa Anelia Nqadini, who contributed so much to my education. Their words of encouragement still shine in my mind with golden sheen.

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
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
**MAP 1: MAP OF KHAYELITSHA**



**KHAYELITSHA**

AREA : COASTAL

**MAP 2: MAP OF CITY OF TYGERBERG**





## **1. INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS**

The objective of this thesis is to develop an understanding of the complex and inter-related development issues in the

Western Cape region with special reference to Khayelitsha. It analyses the complex social realities in Khayelitsha, explores community participation in development and tries to find suitable solutions to development related problems. Khayelitsha is a large African township in the Western Cape. (See Maps 1 and 2). Its existence can be closely associated with the policy of separate development practised by the former National Party government as is shown by comprehensive documentation. The policy of separate development was meant to curtail urbanisation by Africans through physical coercion and social engineering. Through this policy approach Africans were compelled to relocate to former homelands, i.e. Transkei and Ciskei. These policy measures caused hardship to Africans. History has proven tragically how these policies failed to achieve the intended goals. Instead the opposite took place, namely, migration of Africans to more economically active areas like Cape Town (Gelderblom and Kok, 1994:67-93).

Because of the above-mentioned state of affairs, the former National Party government had no other option but to develop new strategies to manage urban development. Khayelitsha was identified as an urban area for Africans, a settlement far removed from the metropolitan centre of Cape Town. (See Map 1). This further resulted in the unbalanced co-existence of developed centres and underdeveloped peripheral areas within the larger Western Cape.

### **1.2 HYPOTHESIS**

Apartheid development malpractices were the causes of poor development in Khayelitsha.

### **1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM**

Since Khayelitsha emerged, multi-dimensional problems were encountered in fostering economic

#### **1. INTRODUCTION**

- Objective of the Thesis
- Hypothesis
- Research Problem
- Research Methodology
- Limitations of the Thesis

(See Figure 1, p7)



and social change. Problems were characterised by a lack of economic resources and a narrow economic base. Many developing economies have barely kept up with rapid population growth. In some instances large sums of money spent on development projects in Khayelitsha have yielded little improvement in basic needs and social welfare. A skewed concentration of income and wealth, and a partially skewed concentration of economic activity as well as vast social deficits are reflected *inter alia* in the vicious cycle of a lack of adequate and affordable housing, poor education and poor health; the latter resulting from unemployment, poverty and malnutrition. Financial constraints and shortfalls in development funds in the coffers of the Lingeletu West Town Council (LWTC) manifested themselves in a lack of viable economic infrastructure and industry, shortage of professional expertise, technical skills and community-based entrepreneurs. Some of the problems of development stem from the frustration of the community regarding top-down planning by the authorities. The top-heavy bureaucracies have failed to allow people to participate in planning processes and to take decisions regarding issues that directly affect their lives. The top-down approach in the decision-making process is criticised by Swanepoel (1992:89-93). As a result these bureaucrats failed to improve the quality of life of the vast majority of people in Khayelitsha.

Khayelitsha is now included in the Tygerberg substructure (*The Star*, 1995:6). (See section 1.5 Limitations of the thesis regarding information and time frame). The inclusion, it is hoped, will bring more relief with regard to some of the multiplicity of development problems, particularly on financial and economic levels. People's expectations about development delivery in Khayelitsha are high, but they are disillusioned about the slow pace of development. Due to the level of frustration Khayelitsha is a fertile ground for a culture of criminality and violence. As a result big and small businesses and investors outside Khayelitsha are scared to commit themselves to the area. The research problems raised are:

- How did apartheid development malpractices affect development in Khayelitsha?
- What needs to be done to rectify the negative effects?

To remedy the situation the leadership of various organisations, e.g. political organisations and non-political organisations such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), churches and cultural groupings, all came together to set up a development



forum known as the Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF). The main task of the KDF is to establish smaller local development forums in different areas of Khayelitsha in order to deal with the problems discussed above. KDF as a development framework for Khayelitsha has links with the central Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) office, Cape Metropolitan Council (CMC) and LWTC, but failed to bring about fundamental development.

Although apartheid has gone, its legacy is still a nightmare to the majority of South Africans. The new government came into power and is committed to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP is a policy framework and development programme for fundamental transformation to alleviate the problems created by the past. It is a programme that integrates the different organs of government, centrally, regionally and locally. In his inaugural address to a joint sitting of Parliament, the former President of South Africa expressed his government's commitment to the RDP (See RDP White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, 1994:5).

The RDP has been adopted and supported by all political parties in the new government and most sectors of the broader society (RDP White Paper, 1994:5). As a result many RDP forums were established over the country. Unfortunately, from a planning perspective, the implementation of the RDP nationally is not as effective as was expected by the people (RDP official interviewed on 7/10/96). This is due mainly to promises that were made prior to the 1994 national elections. The lack of the RDP and KDF to take off is a matter of concern in Khayelitsha.

The aim of this thesis considering the time frame of the research is to discuss selected problem areas relevant to the topic, i.e. to identify development-related issues in Khayelitsha, challenges, problems, causes, policy implications and other aspects that are fundamental to development. Stakeholders in the mainstream of development in Khayelitsha will be identified. Some development has taken place after the completion of the research. In this regard the thesis is dated. Most of the research was conducted between 1995 and 1997.

Khayelitsha has development potential, but socio-economic problems are major constraints to its development and sustainability.



## 1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

At the outset the problem areas that most impeded progress of large-scale development in Khayelitsha were identified. It is crucial to alleviate such problems and to formulate a concrete development framework. The researcher collected data by using a comparative literature survey, informal interviews and participatory observation. (See Brynard and Hanekom, 1997). The informal interviews were conducted in Xhosa and English. The use of a tape recorder was avoided. In addition, pad and pen were not used in some areas in order to make respondents feel free to speak openly (Swanepoel 1992:44).

The residents of Khayelitsha are relatively diverse socially. It was considered important to identify the key role-players and to include a representative sample of community stakeholders in the research. The information was collected firstly from community members, community leaders, NGOs, CBOs, business organisations, development forums, teachers, students, local government officials, councillors, developers and donors. Secondly, information was collected at meetings, particularly those of small local RDP forums and KDF. Thirdly, informal interviews were conducted with members of the project committees in Khayelitsha. Fourthly, statistical information regarding Khayelitsha was collected from annual reports.

A group method research technique has also been used.(Huysamen, 1994: 40-44). The group discussion participants were transported by taxi from different areas of Khayelitsha such as Macassar, Harare, Green Point, Town 2, Graceland, Ekuphumleni, Elitha Park and Site B. There were two representatives from each area and each one was given R3.00 for return taxi fare. The research participants were selected on the basis of stratified random sampling (Huysamen, 1994:40-41) and drawn from the rental list of the LWTC. Research participants gathered in the classroom at Nolungile Lower Primary School at Site C.

The group method is one of the more qualitative research methods or techniques used in research, especially in market research. This research method facilitates the study of the perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of groups through group interaction. It has also been adopted as a useful tool by social scientists, as it is viewed as a holistic, inductive and naturalistic framework within which to observe participants without manipulating the research outcome. The group



dynamic, which operates in discussions, encourages participants to become involved in the discussion and to conceptualise issues (Keller *et al.*, in discussion paper of O'Brien and Gillis, 1994:4).

## 1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS

Problems that were encountered which affected the quality of the research process were the following:

**Lack of data and information:** The lack of updated information records, specifically data regarding community profiles, economic profiles, employment profiles, income distribution, and per capita income placed limitations on the research. It is unfortunate that present data are outdated and reflect the 1983-1984 events (See Dewar and Watson, 1984:1-32). As far as possible data were controlled and updated through interviews, the group discussion method and participatory observation by the researcher (Bless and Higson-Smith 1995: 55-56).

It is not an easy task to generate accurate up-to-date data as Khayelitsha is growing rapidly and the nature of development challenges is complex and multi-dimensional.

**Legitimacy:** Khayelitsha is highly politicised. Most of the political parties are represented in the area. Because of the high level of politicisation people in the area are often suspicious of each other and find it difficult to distinguish between a researcher and a political party representative. In some areas respondents refused to provide information to the researcher. Respondents said they were told by their political leaders not to release information about the area.

**Organisational bureaucracy and “red tape”:** The information needed for research purposes was not received at the required time due to bureaucratic problems in the various organisations characterised by rigid rules and regulations. This restricted the researcher from interviewing the top management of the local authorities.

**Transport logistics:** When the research was conducted transport was a constraint. The researcher was relying on public transport, which was sometimes inconvenient and unreliable and caused

delays.


**Taxi violence:** Taxi violence erupted in Khayelitsha between two taxi rivals (CODETA & CATA) and placed limitations on the study. This made it difficult for the researcher to reach some areas in Khayelitsha.

**Information and data time frame:** The information and data contained in this thesis were collected between 1995 - 1997. Some development has taken place after the research was conducted. In evaluating this research the time frame must be considered. In this regard the thesis is dated and problematical. This is an unfortunate research reality which the researcher had to face.

The **Diagrammatic Structure of the Thesis** (Figure 1, p7) provides a summary of chapters that shape the debate on Khayelitsha's development issues and challenges.



**Figure 1: Diagrammatic Structure of the Thesis**



**Chapter One** is an introductory chapter. The chapter relates to the objective of the thesis, research hypothesis, multi-dimensional problems to be researched, research problem, research methodology and thesis limitations.

**Chapter Two** contains a literature review that provides a theoretical understanding of development issues, with special reference to Khayelitsha's socio-economic development realities. The chapter suggests possible answers to the research problem by considering development options relevant to Khayelitsha.

**Chapter Three** provides a historical perspective. The chapter covers the historical background of Khayelitsha and contributes to an investigation of the hypothesis. The aim is to share information on the past as a cause of the present conditions. This analysis is useful in addressing current problems and their causes and can act as a tool for development planning and policy considerations.

**Chapter Four** profiles the socio-economic characteristics of Khayelitsha. The chapter contributes to both the hypothesis and research problem by describing the current reality in the area. It is useful to policy-makers. It criticises policy-makers and planners of the previous government in accordance with the hypothesis. It deals with the shortcomings of the past and the end results of current realities in Khayelitsha.

**Chapter Five** provides an overview of the physical infrastructure development and services in Khayelitsha. It analyses poor planning strategies of the previous government and its results.

**Chapter Six** discusses economic/business development and projects in Khayelitsha. It brings to attention the business-economic conditions of the area and provides suggestions for solving related problems in Khayelitsha. Some of the material in this chapter is dated.

**Chapter Seven** provides a general conclusion. The chapter summarises the thesis and provides findings and recommendations of what ought to be done in order to solve the multi-dimensional problems of Khayelitsha.



## **2. DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF SELECTED THEORETICAL ISSUES**

### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

### **2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

- Meaning of Development
- Participation & Planning Management

Chapter One provided an introductory overview as a basic premise for the thesis. Issues that were discussed in Chapter One included the following: thesis objective, statement of the research problem, research methodology and limitations of the thesis. Chapter Two gives the theoretical analysis used to answer the research problem. The need for a theoretical foundation is a permanent concern of any research. This need is particularly acute for studies of the complex nature of development. This chapter establishes the context from which development in Khayelitsha can be analysed and has two components. Firstly, it provides the meaning of the concept of development both as independent and dependent variables. Secondly, it provides an analysis of the meaning of development as independent variable based on people's participation and planning management principles.


### **2.2 TOWARDS THE MEANING OF DEVELOPMENT**

Social scientists have been concerned with explanations of social change, the sources of different kinds of political structures, and the relationship between economic and social structures. For decades scholars have attempted to apply models of change specifically to new nations of the Third World. In this context the term "development" has become central (Thomas, 1981:8). The fact that development is a broad concept and complex in nature must be kept in mind. This suggests that we cannot claim to have a understanding of development through a single definition. Many definitions have been developed to define development. The debate on the definition of "development" is ongoing.

Development is defined as a multi-sectoral process. It implies that development is linked to historical, political, economic, social, cultural, financial, educational and environmental development (Jeppe in Meyer *et al.*, 1995:256). The meaning of development is illustrated in Figure 2 as follows:



**Figure 2: DEVELOPMENT AS A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH**



**Source: Jeppe, in Meyer *et al.*, (eds.) (1995:255)**

Like Jeppe, Burkey (1993:35-39) argues that development, as a holistic concept, embodies four interdependent dimensions, i.e. human (personal) development, economic development, political development and social development. Jeppe, Burkey, Bryant and White (1982:14-20) view development as a people-centred phenomenon. Their analysis is based on the fact that development involves both “being” and “doing”. In this thesis the hypothesis contains “being” as dependent variable and “doing” as independent variable. The hypothesis has the premise that the wrong “doing” led to bad “being”. Deprivation, degradation and poverty all indicate underdevelopment wherever they are found as “bad being”. It is argued that development as

“doing” means increasing the capacity of people to influence their future. It means that programmes and projects not only need to accomplish physical and concrete changes, but need to do so in such a way that people have a greater capacity to choose and respond to these changes. Development as an increase in the capacity to influence the future has certain implications. Firstly, it means paying attention to capacity, to what needs to be done to expand the ability and energy to make change occur. Secondly, it involves equity; uneven attention to different groups will divide people and undermine their capacity. Thirdly, it means empowerment, in the sense that only if people have access to powers will they receive the benefits of development. Finally, it means taking seriously the interdependence of the world and the need to ensure that the future is sustainable (Bryant and White, 1982:14-20). (Also see Kotze, 1983:1-21).

For the purpose of this thesis, development is defined as follows:

“Development is a multi-dimensional process which is not an end in itself but a means to an end. It embraces human emancipation as an effort to empower and build potential for impoverished disadvantaged societies in order for them to become the masters of their own destiny in reaching their ultimate goals and aspirations. It implies people’s participation and planning in decision-making for the purpose of the equitable distribution of goods, services and benefits. It promotes political and socio-economic development to reduce poverty, malnutrition and economic dependency in order to fulfil people’s basic needs”. (Also see Jeppe, in Meyer *et al.*, 1995:255).

The underlying assumptions of this definition are relevant for Khayelitsha. The research problem formulated in Chapter One outlined the multi-dimensional nature of development problems hampering Khayelitsha.

## **2.3 PARTICIPATION**

The definition of “participation” is, as is the case with most development-related concepts, a matter about which there is disagreement amongst scholars and practitioners. Some use the term to mean active participation in political decision-making. For certain activists and groups, participation has no meaning unless the people involved have significant control over decisions concerning the organisation to which they belong. Development economists tend to define



participation by the poor in terms of the equitable sharing of the benefits of projects. Others view participation as an instrument to enhance the efficiency of projects or as the co-production of services. Some perceive participation as an end in itself, whereas others see participation as a means to achieve goals. These diverse perspectives are the reflection of differences associated with the concept of participation (Paul, 1987:2). (Also see Oakley 1991 and Kotze ed. 1997).

For the purpose of this thesis, participation is defined as follows:

“Participation is involvement of the people in the development planning process voluntarily and willingly. People’s involvement has to be understood in decision-making, participating in the implementation of development programmes and projects, participation in monitoring and evaluation of development programmes and projects and participation in the sharing of benefits of development” (Gelderblom and Kok, 1994:44-45). (Also see Bekker ed. 1996 and Schwella *et al.*, 1996: 64-66).

Burkey (1993:56) goes further and argues that participation is an essential part of human growth, the development of self-confidence, pride, initiative, creativity, responsibility and co-operation. For Burkey, without development within the people themselves all efforts to alleviate poverty will be difficult, if not impossible. This process, where people take charge of their own lives through a process of social learning to solve their own problems, is the essence of development. (See Kotze ed. 1997 and principles of the RDP).

In order to achieve participation it is essential for the poor themselves to become more aware of their own context, particularly the socio-economic reality, their real problems, the causes of these problems, and measures which could be taken to change this situation (Burkey, 1993:57).

### **2.3.1 Interpreting Participation**

Participation has become an umbrella term for a new style of development intervention. It is inappropriate to propose a development strategy, which is not participatory. For instance, Oakley (1991:6-9) reviewed a range of interpretations of participation in development projects and presented them as a continuum to illustrate the relationship between interpretation and development analysis. The following **statements** summarise the range of interpretations:



Participation is considered a voluntary contribution by people in one or other of the public programmes supposed to contribute to national development, but the people are not expected to take part in shaping the programme or criticising its contents. Participation includes people's involvement in decision-making processes, in programme implementation, in the sharing of benefits of their development programme and their involvement in efforts to evaluate such programmes. Participation increases control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations on the part of groups and movements of those excluded from such control. Participation is regarded as an active process by which beneficiary or client groups influence the direction and execution of a development project with a view to enhancing well-being in terms of income, personal growth, self-reliance or other values they cherish.

Oakley (1991:6-9) argues that participation implies the achievement of some predetermined goal or objective. Participation is seen here as a learning process which unfolds over time and whose purpose is to develop and strengthen the capabilities of people to intervene more directly in development initiatives. Oakley (1991:14-18) further asserts that participation in development involves a series of arguments which see participation on five (5) broader issues as useful to the functioning of development projects, i.e. **efficiency, effectiveness, self-reliance, coverage and sustainability**. (See Kotze ed. 1997 and Bekker ed. 1996).

### **2.3.2 Popular Participation**

Lisk (1985:19) argues that decentralised planning should be emphasised in order to promote popular participation and engender broad-based interest in development. Gelderblom and Kok (1994:55-56) stated that participation referred to a variety of terms or concepts including "bottom-up planning", "grassroots planning", "public involvement"; "participatory planning", "democratic planning", and "collaborative planning".

Decentralisation of decision-making power and resources could in fact be a relatively efficient and economical way of promoting development at local level, according to the needs and aspirations of the intended beneficiaries. Decentralisation in the process of participation is a recognition of the need to define overall national policy and priorities in the interests of society, to reconcile diverse local interests and to ensure some degree of equity in the distribution of the benefits of development (Lisk, 1985:20 and Kotze ed. 1997).

## 2.4 PARTICIPATORY PLANNING


Planning, like other related development concepts, has a variety of meanings, i.e. national planning, development planning, physical or land-use planning, management planning, budgeting planning etc. (Fox *et al.*, 1991:47). Development planning is used by developing nations to set out the main measures that are needed to improve the national output and the standard of living of their citizens. Development planning will, to a greater extent, become the responsibility of the public sector of a particular developing country (Fox *et al.*, 1991:47).

Initially development planning was more concerned with economic development, and in particular the growth and structure of the national economy. The scope of development planning broadened to include more than just the economic aspects of planning. It now also considers political, social and environmental factors and has become an integrated and multi-dimensional concept (Conyers and Hills, 1990:46-48). (Also see Koontz *et al.*, 1980:56).

In the case of South Africa, development planning has been identified by the Forum for Effective Planning and Development (FEPD) as the tool to implement the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The FEPD debates development planning policies, laws and related matters. It also co-ordinates and integrates national and provincial development planning initiatives which will lead to reprioritisation of projects and budgets at all levels of government (Theron, *et al.*, eds. 1995:1). A planning process is illustrated in Figure 3 below.



**Figure 3: PLANNING PROCESS**



**Source: Theron, *et al.*, (eds.) (1995)**

The information contained in figure 3 above emphasises grassroots planning in community development. All development stakeholders, including the enabled structures, should move together until the end of the development process.

Development planning, as illustrated in the RDP, is underpinned by the principle of linking provincial and local community planning and development processes, plans and budgets with national processes, plans and budgets based on a bottom-up participatory approach. The issue of a bottom-up approach is not emphasised for reasons of global political correctness but to enable people to take charge of their own circumstances, mobilise their own resources, identify their strengths and opportunities on which they can build and then mobilise external resources (Theron, *et al.*, eds. 1995:3). (Also see Burkey 1993 and Rahman 1993).




For Theron *et al.*, (1995:3) local development areas should be demarcated according to functional criteria such as economic and social patterns, which do not necessarily conform to local authority boundaries. Local players may initiate this process. Provincial governments should oversee the process to ensure wall-to-wall coverage, involvement of all interest groups and to prevent wealthy areas from defining exclusive areas of privilege. Local forums should undertake a strategic SWOT exercise, drawing on local enthusiasm and understanding of needs, opportunities, resources and priorities. This process should involve developing a shared vision for the local community and its economy, undertaking a basic analysis of local strengths, weaknesses and threats and how to capitalise on the strengths and opportunities, identifying specific comparative advantages which can be exploited, identifying key priorities and projects within the local area, and identifying resources which can be mobilised, primarily within and also from outside the community. The process described above can be further developed by means of a "**Development Strategic Planning Model**" which the author has developed after the integration of relevant literature and field research.

## **2.5 DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLANNING MODEL**

This model develops a conceptual analysis and holistic understanding of a participatory planning process in the context of development. It also tries to bring the concept of participatory planning into the current reality of multi-dimensional development challenges. The model is illustrated in Figure 4.

**Figure 4: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLANNING MODEL**



This figure simplifies the development model and suggests the involvement of all relevant stakeholders in community development activities. For input, all communities consist of individuals interested in developmental issues. Such individuals come together to form the interest groups as political or non-political groupings. These groups sometimes become pressure groups against authorities. They exert pressure through demands, petitions, proposals and mass demonstrations. In this regard the input side is more powerful to the extent that authorities are left with no other option but to adapt to the new era and change the old policies into new inclusive policies. The development centre box input in figure 4 develops the participatory planning process, which in this thesis is referred to as the "Development Centre Box". The development centre box consists of group representatives, authorities, government officials, mediators etc. The purpose of this centre box is to discuss all issues of primary concern and to legitimate decisions through mutual consensus.

Decisions taken in the centre box may later become legitimate policies and development programmes. These policies and programmes are now taken to the enabling structures for implementation. Such policies and programmes ensure proper service delivery in order to satisfy the interests and aspirations of the pressure groups. The service delivery leads to mutual agreement between pressure groups and authorities.



## 2.6 THE “NEW” DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM

The “new” development paradigm addresses the current concerns in development. According to Chambers (1993:9-14) the new development paradigm has four interacting levels, i.e. the **normative level, conceptual level, empirical level** and **practical level**. Chambers describes the levels as follows:

### **Normative level**

Development on the normative level is perceived as a people-centred phenomenon. It is argued that deprived or poor people are the targeted recipients of development and they should be looked at first. They should be allowed to identify what they want and need. It has been made clear that in this process professionals are not the experts but the learners, and poor people their teachers. Priorities are not those perceived only by the poor. As the definition of development indicated in section 2.2, the goal of development is not only growth, but well-being as defined by the poor for themselves. This related to theoretical analysis perceived by Korten and Klauss in Chambers, (1993:10) and Coetzee, (ed). (1989:1-14).

### **Conceptual level**

Development on the conceptual level is viewed not as progress in a single direction, but as a process of continuous adaptation, which is meant to solve problems. It is also not aimed at achieving a fixed goal, but relates to continuous adaptation to maximise well-being in changing conditions as part of a participatory social learning and empowering process (Chambers, 1993:10). (Also see Kotze ed. 1997).

### **Empirical level**

The empirical level consists of four (4) verifiable elements:

Conditions are diverse and complex. Diversity and complexity are usually greater for the poor than for the less poor. Rates of change are accelerating. Poor people are knowledgeable. Indigenous technical knowledge (ITK) is now respected more and valued as part of the power of the poor. It is viewed as strong on knowledge of local diversity and complexity, precisely where an outsider’s knowledge is weak. Rural people are capable of self-reliant organisation (Chambers, 1993:10-11). (Also see also Treurnicht, 1997:93-103 and Chambers, 1983:168-189).

### **Practical level**

The practical level is the integration of the other three levels. Its premise is based on decentralisation and empowerment. Decentralisation means that resources and discretion are devolved, turning back the inward and upward flows of resources and people. Empowerment means that people, especially poorer people, are enabled to take control over their lives and secure a better livelihood with ownership of productive assets. Decentralisation and empowerment allow people to exploit the diverse complexities of their own conditions and to adapt to rapid change (Chambers, 1993:11). (Also see Kotze ed. 1997 ).

## **2.7 DEVELOPMENT AS A TRANSFORMATION PROCESS**

Development as a transformation process is another area of importance in understanding current development issues. The argument put forward by Korten (1990:3-7) is that the development issue for the 1990s is not growth, but transformation. For Korten the future depends on achieving transformation in our constitution, our technology, our values and our behaviour consistent with our ecological and social realities. Korten argues that transformation addresses three interrelated basic needs of a global society, i.e. **justice, sustainability** and **inclusiveness**. These are explained as follows:

### **Justice**

Justice implies the proper use of the earth's natural resources in order to ensure better life opportunities for all people.

### **Sustainability**

Sustainability requires that the earth's natural resources must be used in such a way that they will assure sustainable benefits for future generations.

### **Inclusiveness**

Inclusiveness implies that an individual has an opportunity to be recognised and respected as a contributor to the family, community and society. It does not mean that everyone must enjoy equal status and power. (See Bryant and White 1982:14-20 and section 2.2).



## 2.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter puts more emphasis on participatory planning as a tool that should have been and could be used in addressing development challenges in Khayelitsha. For instance, the challenge of all in Khayelitsha lies in community involvement in their development. This implies the community-active participatory planning as per the **Development Strategic Planning Model** suggested in this chapter. The model encourages the bottom-up participatory planning approach in the development decision-making process. This relates well to what Burkey (1993), Theron *et al.*, (1995) and Rahman (1993) argue.

As argued in the previous chapter (chapter one), it is clear that since the inception of Khayelitsha the community has seldom been involved in decision-making processes. Even at the present moment community involvement in the decision-making process is still lacking. The development challenges mentioned in chapter four are clear proof of the lack of community involvement in Khayelitsha. This is the opposite to what Korten (1990) and Swanepoel (1992) argue regarding community involvement. It can therefore be deduced that development as “doing” i.e. the independent variable in the hypothesis can indeed be described as “malpractice”, because the above requirements were absent and could not be present because of the policies of doing things “for people” not “with” them, in the past as well as the present.

As long as the role of the community is marginalised in development activities in Khayelitsha, the community will not abide by and respect decisions in which they were not part of during the planning stage.

Another critical factor for successful development in a community is knowledge. This was found lacking in Khayelitsha. Development knowledge, for instance, should not be the exclusive domain of only a few, but should be shared by all people as Swanepoel (1992) argues. In Khayelitsha it is evident that leaders do not share knowledge with those at grassroots level. Sometimes councillors and other leaders take decisions without involving ordinary citizens. It is against this background that development theory and the author’s **Development Strategic Planning Model** suggested in this chapter are advanced. These could be used as development tools in Khayelitsha.

It is incumbent upon the people of Khayelitsha to carry the banner of development. The cues they emit should elicit development thinking not political thinking, as mentioned in Section 4.16, Local Development Forums. In Khayelitsha, for instance, political behaviour is a common problem. This is the opposite of what the **Development Strategic Planning Model** proposes. The notion of working harder should be a distinctive characteristic of the Khayelitsha development agenda. The community should display attributes that encourage the notion of:

- how can we together make it easier and better?
- what must we understand about our own development and how?
- where and when do we embark on development campaigns in order to bring in all the role-players?
- do we have to get everyone on board?

Everyone has to understand the development process in Khayelitsha and the development realities the community faces.

This chapter dealt with selected theoretical issues of the concept of development. In the next chapter a historical perspective of Khayelitsha will be discussed.



### 3. KHAYELITSHA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter Two presents selected theoretical issues regarding development. The issues shaping the debate include the underlying meaning of concepts such as development, participation and planning. This chapter is devoted to a discussion of selected issues regarding historical development in the Western Cape and Khayelitsha. It is important to note that historical research is not always the best method to be used to find solutions to problems. (See Brynard and Hanekom, 1997). Historical research is used in this thesis as a response to the hypothesis to provide knowledge, insight and understanding as to where the problems facing Khayelitsha today originated.

<b>3. KHAYELITSHA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE</b>
- Migration to the Western Cape
- Western Cape: Early Development Evolution
- Khayelitsha: Development Evolution
- Local Administration
- Civic Organisations
- Local Development Forums

#### 3.2 MIGRATION TO THE WESTERN CAPE

Most of the migrants who moved to the Western Cape came from the former Transkei and constitute 71% of the total. Much smaller proportions came from the former Ciskei (12% of the total) and Eastern Cape as it was before the elections in 1994, i.e. Port Elizabeth, and surrounding areas (13%). The most common origins in the Transkei were the north-western and northern districts, in particular the districts of Cacadu, Cofimvaba, Engcobo and Mount Fletcher. Gatyana, in the south west of the Transkei, was also a common area of origin. Table 2 presents the percentages of each area of origin for Transkei, Ciskei and the Eastern Cape.

**Table 1: ORIGINS OF MIGRANTS TO THE WESTERN CAPE**

Area of origin	%
Transkei:	
North-West	30
North	16
South-West	16
Umtata area	5
Pondoland	4
<b>Total Transkei</b>	<b>71</b>

Ciskei	12
E. Cape	13
Other	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Seekings *et al.*, (1990:42)

**Table 2: MIGRATION TO WESTERN CAPE BY PERIOD (1960 and Before)**

<b>Khayelitsha Profile Tables: 1960 or before – 1988</b>	
	<b>%</b>
Born in the Western Cape	11
Not born in the Western Cape	89
Moved to the Western Cape:	
Before 1960	3
1960 – 1969	7
1970 – 1979	30
1980 – 1985	35
1986 -	7
1987 – 1988	8

Source: Seekings *et al.*, (1990:41)

**Table 3: MOVEMENT WITHIN THE WESTERN CAPE - FROM WHERE DID PEOPLE MOVE TO KHAYELITSHA?**

	<b>Total</b>	<b>Site C</b>	<b>T-Town</b>	<b>Vlg 3</b>	<b>Vlg 4</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
Langa, Guguletu & Nyanga (LAGUNYA)	36	25	36	39	42
Crossroads	44	41	52	39	42
Other squatter areas	3	5	2	5	1
Boland	4	5	3	5	4
Outside W. Cape	13	23	7	12	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Seekings *et al.*, (1990:35)

The tables show that people came from the homelands to mostly three townships, i.e. Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga. This led to overcrowding and unhealthy environments.



Overcrowding resulted in, among other things, a shortage of housing and eventually in Crossroads and KTC. Due to the complex nature of push-and-pull factors Khayelitsha began to emerge as an African squatter township, as migration decision-making procedures studied elsewhere indicate (see De Jong and Gardner ed. 1981). Migrants from outside the Western Cape had different reasons for moving to Khayelitsha than those who came from the Western Cape. Whereas people coming from other parts of the Western Cape gave housing-related reasons as the motivation for migration, migrants from outside the Western Cape had employment-related reasons. This is indicated in Table 4 below.

**Table 4: REASONS FOR MOVING TO KHAYELITSHA BY AREA OF ORIGIN**

Reason	Outside W. Cape		W. Cape	
	1 %	1+2 %	1 %	7+2 %
Housing	9	12	57	61
Employment	63	57	7	8
Family	16	15	7	7

**Source: Seekings *et al.*, (1990:38)**

Apart from the reasons for moving to Khayelitsha stated here, there are also other reasons that are important (see Table 4). About 57% of people gave housing as the most important reason for moving to Khayelitsha. About 61% gave housing-related reasons as either first or second choice. The equivalent figures for people from outside the Western Cape were only 9% and 12%. The latter gave employment-related reasons (63%) as their first choice and 57% as their first or second choice. About 13% of people stated the reason of living together as a family as first choice. (Also see Dewar and Watson, 1984).

Although migrants moved into Khayelitsha their status was not the same in terms of Western Cape citizenship (see Table 5).

**Table 5: PREVIOUS LEGAL STATUS BY AREA**

Status	Total %	Site C %	T-Town %	Vlg 3 %	Vlg 4 %
Born in W. Cape	8	1	17	2	70
Section 10 (1) b	16	21	9	17	16
Prospective section 10 (1) b	19	23	7	14	26
Section 10 (1) c	16	6	21	24	14



Contract Worker	11	14	8	3	15
Illegal	16	5	32	23	8
Other	16	30	6	17	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Seekings *et al.*, (1990:24-25)**

Table 5 indicates the differences in previous legal status by area in Khayelitsha. Residential status is that prior to the abolition of pass laws. About 8% were in "born" category (born in the Western Cape), 16% were illegal, 11% contract workers, 16% under section 10(1)c, (children born in the Western Cape and those of workers worked in the Western Cape for longer than 10 years), and 35% under section 10(1)b (Workers worked for one employer longer than 10 years and qualified to relocate in the Western Cape). (Also see Harrison and McQueen, 1992).

### 3.3 WESTERN CAPE: EARLY DEVELOPMENT EVOLUTION

History has shown that nearly all Africans in the Western Cape lost their South African citizenship and were regarded officially as "citizens" of the Transkei and Ciskei. Africans found it difficult to obtain permanent residence in the Western Cape, because the government had designated it a Coloured labour preference area. However, many Africans still qualified to be in the area in terms of influx control laws. KTC (named after the nearby Kakaza Trading Company Store), Crossroads, Disa River (Hout Bay), Nyanga and other "squatter" camps had partly resulted from the government's unwillingness to build more houses for Africans in the Cape Peninsula. The Chief Liaison Officer of the Western Cape Administration Board (WCAB), Mr Gert du Preez, said that there was a backlog of 6 000 houses. The "squatter" camps reportedly contained people who "qualified" to be in the area and people who did not, but who had fled from poverty and unemployment in the Transkei and Ciskei or who sought to join their husbands in the urban areas. Relocation was sometimes carried out by deporting officials (See SAIRR Surveys and Conradie, 1992).

In January 1983 more than 200 people were made homeless when WCAB officials and police demolished their shacks. A member of the Crossroads Committee, Mrs Alexandra Luke, claimed that almost all those raided were registered legal residents of Crossroads and that most of the men



were working in Cape Town. In 1984 Mr A A Louw, WCAB chief director, confirmed that most of the homeless people were legal residents. In February “illegal” shacks were demolished at the KTC camp, although the owners claimed that they were legal residents of Guguletu which was overcrowded. A few days later 31 more shacks were demolished. However, within hours residents erected new shacks. Mr Timo Bezuidenhout, chief commissioner, announced that 200 “legal” families would be allowed to stay. Within a week the camp saw an influx of more than 1 000 people from Guguletu, who said that they were “fed-up” with overcrowding. WCAB officials, accompanied by police and armoured personnel carriers, raided the camp and demolished the shacks (including the 200, which Mr Bezuidenhout had said could remain).

Dr George Morrison, former Deputy Minister of Co-operation, stated at a National Party (NP) congress that Crossroads was a symbol of provocation and blackmail. He said that the government wanted to destroy it at all costs and retain the Western Cape as a Coloured labour preference area (Cooper, 1984:100).

Mr Bezuidenhout announced that the R18 million development plan for New Crossroads, according to which 1 200 homes were to be built, had been scrapped. About 4 000 Crossroads residents were “endorsed out” of the Western Cape. The former foreign minister of the Transkei, Mr M Lujabe, said that his government had not been informed that they were to be repatriated to the Transkei. The Transkei had made it “very clear” that it considered the “squatters” to be South Africa’s problem. While 32 000 people from the Western Cape have been relocated over the past 20 years, 200 000 - 300 000 residents of Cape Town’s three established African townships, Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga, remained under threat of removal to Khayelitsha, 40 km from Cape Town. The township residents expressed opposition to the proposed removal in spite of assurances by Dr Morrison that it was a long-term project and would be carried out without compulsion. The Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC) said that people should have the right to decide where they wanted to live and should be consulted before decisions, which affected them, were taken. Many residents had spent between R500 and R20 000 renovating their houses and felt that it was unjust that they were to be removed. It was reported that in the meantime 112 “legal” families from KTC had been accommodated at Khayelitsha in ready-made aluminium huts (Cooper, 1984:311). The unilateral decision made to remove people to Khayelitsha provides proof that the independent variable in the hypothesis (See section 1.2) could be described as “apartheid development malpractices” if compared with the conceptualisation in chapter two.



### 3.4 KHAYELITSHA: DEVELOPMENT EVOLUTION

Khayelitsha came into being after a helicopter flight over the area on March 4, 1983. Mr P W Botha former State President, selected the Driftsands area as a new African city (Conradie, 1992:42). When Piet Koornhof former Minister of Co-operation and Development, first saw the site in 1983, he said:

“...we are going to build a city here. Well, we have. I really don't think the residents of Khayelitsha suffer from the “bright lights” syndrome; the urban environment does present a better lifestyle for them. We have no grandiose ideas here, we are well aware of the realities of poverty, but we will do our best to elevate the living standards of those who have made Khayelitsha their “new home” (*Barlows Cat*, 1990:9).

The above statement relates to a top-down decision-making approach and is exactly the opposite of popular participation discussed in section 2.3.2. (Also see Lisk, 1985). From a democratic development point of view this was a development malpractice (See section 1.2, Hypothesis). (Also see Kotze ed. 1997).

The development of Khayelitsha was first announced in parliament at the end of March 1983. The need for Khayelitsha arose from the severe housing shortage for Africans in the Western Cape. Despite the Coloured labour preference policy and brutal enforcement of influx control, the African population in the Western Cape had grown steadily, whilst there was very little provision of new housing (Seekings *et al.*, 1990:8). Khayelitsha could be historically understood within the political economy of apartheid South Africa. Essentially, the concept forms part of the insider/outsider strategy formulated by the Riekert Satellite City Development, of which Khayelitsha is a model example. It is the physical form of a strategy of reformed influx control and an emerging, ethnically based, political dispensation (Seekings *et al.*, 1990:6-7). The concept of creating a series of “new towns” or satellite cities on the outskirts of an existing metropolitan area is not new. Mitchell's Plain and Atlantis are examples of this (Seekings *et al.*, 1990:23). From the start, the conception, design and implementation of Khayelitsha was top-down and exactly the opposite of what was stated in



section 2.4, Participatory Planning. The officials liaised extensively with the Community Council, but to all intents and purposes it appears that they were merely informed by the officials of decisions already taken and were not consulted at all nor was there any liaison (Ellis, 1984:11). It makes a mockery of Oakley's interpretations of participation (See section 2.3.1).

The notion that the local population should have a considerable say in its own fate was not part of official practice, and in so far as the people were to be consulted, it was to be the officially designated Councils rather than authentic leaders with majority local support. These Councils were not recognised by large parts of the African community as representative of their opinion. Furthermore, the information channels had been ineffective in communicating with the people (Ellis, 1984:11).

Various organisations, such as civic organisations, opposed the establishment of Khayelitsha, but despite the opposition by those organisations people moved into Khayelitsha in large numbers. The first people to move into Khayelitsha were from KTC (located in Nyanga), where the Western Cape Administration Board had destroyed 3 445 structures between February and May 1983. By late September 112 families, or 439 people, were all living in temporary makeshift tin huts. Residents were expected to build their own homes (Seekings *et al.*, 1990:10).

The state set itself ambitious targets both for the construction of core housing and, more important, the resettlement of squatters from Crossroads to Khayelitsha. The first core houses were occupied in October 1984 by people who had been living in the makeshift huts in Khayelitsha. By mid-June almost 1 800 people were residing in core houses in Khayelitsha. In February 1985 former Minister Gerrit Viljoen announced that "extraordinary measures" would need to be taken to resettle squatters. "Site C" would be developed, with minimal infrastructure, for resettled squatters. In April 1985 State officials successfully negotiated with several groups of squatters to move to Khayelitsha. The most important were the "cathedral" squatters, led by Mali Hoza. The five groups which agreed to move comprised a total of almost 30 000 people. Hoza's supporters began moving into Site C in mid-April, and 18 000 people occupied 6 400 stands by mid-May. By the end of May Site C was "full", with



over 30 000 people having moved from Crossroads (Hoza, interviewed on 10/08/96) (Also see Seekings *et al.*, 1990:11).

The next stage of development of Khayelitsha was Site B. In February 1986, 9 000 serviced stands were ready. In late April it was opened, and by mid-May 35 000 people had moved in. Most of these people had come from Site C, but some came from Crossroads and KTC. In May 1986 people started to move to Site B when fighting erupted in the Crossroads area between the “witdoeke” from old Crossroads and the “comrades” from the satellite camps in Portland Cement, Nyanga Bush, Nyanga Extension and KTC. 70 000 people were left homeless. The government insisted that the refugees move to Khayelitsha, where facilities were allegedly provided; 3 200 were accommodated in tents in the emergency camp at Tent-town or Greenpoint (so-named because of the green colour of the tents). By August the population of the Greenpoint tent-town was estimated at 10 000 (Hoza, interviewed on 10/08/96). (Also see Seekings *et al.*, 1990:11-12).

By-mid 1988 Khayelitsha consisted of the following distinctive residential areas: Village 1 and 2 comprising 5 000 core houses, Site B with 9 000 serviced sites and a probable population of over 45 000 people, and Greenpoint with over 3 500 tents and shacks, with over 20 000 people. (Mbo, interviewed on 18/08/96 and Benya, interviewed on 19/08/96).

Since 1988 the population has grown considerably, with several extensive new shack areas (Seeking *et al.*, 1990:12-13). In 1990, 3 000 Greenpoint families settled in Macassar on serviced stands. In 1991 Harare was developed (Wesgro, 1995:9).

### **3.5 LOCAL ADMINISTRATION**

In October 1988 African people participated in local government elections in Khayelitsha for the first time. The Lingelethu West Town Council was established at this time as a Grade Nine Municipality to service the needs of greater Khayelitsha. It had an annual capital budget of R15 million and an operating budget of R35 million. Its aim was to serve the community in terms of water reticulation, roads, streetlights, refuse removal, sanitation, housing and health services (Hoza, interviewed on 19/08/96). (Also see *Barlows Cat*, 1990:9).



The Council lacked the institutional capacity for service delivery such as housing and this caused a backlog. Some of the Council departments were understaffed and some high-profile positions were vacant. Some of the high posts were filled by acting candidates from the Council itself. The Council faced administrative challenges such as undisciplined staff members and lack of productivity (Siyolo, interviewed on 15/08/96). Khayelitsha has become part of the City of Tygerberg and since then the administration of Khayelitsha has improved. Khayelitsha also benefits in terms of resources needed, such as skilled personnel.

### **City of Tygerberg**

As a result of the local government transition which took place in 1996, the City of Tygerberg was established. The new administration of the City of Tygerberg has been restructured and transformed in order to remove the old traditional boundaries of apartheid. The current planning is such that the city must be divided into four broad sub-areas, i.e. North area, South area, West area, and East area. The North area consists of Durbanville and part of Bellville. The South area consists of Khayelitsha and part of Delft. The West area consists of Goodwood, Parow, Elsies River, Bishop Lavis and Bonteheuwel. The East area consists of part of Bellville, Belhar and part of Delft. These areas are known as service areas. The idea behind these demarcated areas is to ensure that services are brought closer to the people. This new plan is not yet final. The chief executive officer is the top manager of all four service areas (Schutte interviewed 29/04/97) (See map 1 and 2).

Apart from the administration of the LWTC and City of Tygerberg, civil society organisations are involved in the running of local administration in the area. These include civic organisations, NGOs and local development forums, but the role of local development forums is still minimal. Currently such organisations are participating in and forming the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) of Khayelitsha. The aim is to address the development malpractices of the apartheid government. This is also an answer to the research question of this thesis (See section 1.3, Research Problem). This IDP is in line with what is contained in the IDP White Paper on Local Government, 1998. The White Paper states that the IDP is to address the socio-economic challenges and set up long-term development objectives (See IDP White Paper on Local Government, 1998). The organisations are also involved in Masakhane campaigns encouraging people to pay service charges.



### 3.6 CIVIC ORGANISATIONS

Civic organisations have emerged in Khayelitsha since the apartheid era. The South African Civic Association (SANCO) is one of those civic structures that were opposed to the rudimentary apartheid system. SANCO, as the largest civic organisation in Khayelitsha, is divided into two main groups, namely SANCO of INJONGO (named after the INJONGO primary school where the meetings of the group are held) and SANCO of EMTHINI (named after the Emthini primary school where the meetings of this group are normally held). These names (SANCO of INJONGO and SANCO of Emthini) were developed by the community in order to distinguish between the two SANCO's in the area (Benu, interviewed on 28/08/96). As a result, Khayelitsha has witnessed the existence of two civic organisations (SANCO and CIVIC), pitted against each other. These civics are involved in the development of Khayelitsha and in Council discussions regarding housing planning, clean-up campaigns and other community-based projects.

It has been alleged that SANCO of Emthini broke away from the original SANCO (also referred to as SANCO of INJONGO) following a series of events caused by differences and disagreements concerning the payment of service charges in the area. SANCO demanded the flat rate system of occupation service charges instead of different amounts charged in the various areas of Khayelitsha. SANCO of INJONGO, on the other hand, supported the current service charges. The difference between the two groups became more serious in April/May 1996 prior to the local elections. Attempts were made to resolve the problem, such as former President Mandela's visit to the Eyethu Public space in Khayelitsha, but none of these attempts could resolve the problem (Benu, interviewed on 28/08/96).

The other associations operating in the area are the Khayelitsha Residence Association (KHARA), Lingeletu for the Community (LC), United Residence Front (URF) and the Western Cape United Squatters Association (WECUSA). KHARA, LC and WECUSA function mainly in squatter areas. SANCO of Emthini joined forces with KHARA, LC, URF and WECUSA. These organisations together formed the new civic structure in Khayelitsha known as the Khayelitsha Civic Association. They argued that the reason for the establishment of a new civic structure known as "CIVIC" was to isolate and reduce the hegemony of SANCO of INJONGO (Benu, interviewed on 28/08/96).



### **3.7 LOCAL DEVELOPMENT FORUMS**

Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF) was formed in December 1994 by 26 Khayelitsha community constituent organisations as an umbrella development body to ensure broad participation in development. KDF's executive management team comprises 5 members who are elected at the plenary meeting. The plenary meeting is held once a month. The plenary meeting consists of representatives from the member organisations, with 2 representatives from each organisation. The plenary meeting is the highest decision-making body since it has full representation. KDF is the only legitimate development structure that has a mandate to liaise with government structures such as the local authority, Western Cape Provincial government and private developers. KDF co-ordinates the development activities in various local development forums, that were established in Khayelitsha. The local development forums are the ekuPhumleni-Graceland Development Forum, Harare Development Forum, Macassar Development Forum, Mandela Park Development Forum, Site C Development Forum, Site B Development Forum, Thembokwezi Development Forum (THEMBOKWEZI means combined sections such as Thembani, Bongweni and Kwezi) and ZABDEC development forum (ZABDEC means combined sections such as A, B, C, D, E and Z section, all in Khayelitsha) (Feni, interviewed on 28/08/96).

#### **KDF Goals and Objectives**


The following broad goals can be identified, i.e.

- To ensure that people's basic needs are met. These include food, housing, employment, water, sanitation, electricity, transport, health, education, safety and security, and recreation opportunities.
- To promote the creation of a strong economy and business development.
- To promote effective grassroots planning and management development process.
- To promote equitable, efficient and sustainable development.
- To enhance community participation in all development spheres.

The KDF has two wings, namely the Khayelitsha Development Trust (KDT), which consists of 11 executive members, and the Khayelitsha Project Committee (KPC), which consists of 10 members. The function of the Trust is to deal with financial matters of the KDF. The

KPC's function is to manage all the projects in Khayelitsha. The KDF is divided into 8 sectoral forums, namely education, health, housing, economy and business, police, sports and recreation, labour and tourism. Each sectoral forum has a head appointed by the KDF executive. The heads of the sectoral forums are linked to the head of the local sectoral forums. The heads of the sectoral forums attend the meetings of the KDF executive management team. The purpose of their attendance is to ensure that the KDF management receives all the information from the local development forums of the various sectoral forums. Figure 5 presents the KDF organogram from high-level structures down to grassroots level (Feni, interviewed on 28/08/96).

**Figure 5: KDF ORGANOGRAM**





Apart from the KDF development structure in Khayelitsha, there are two other development forums in the area, namely the False Bay Forum (FBF) and the Khayelitsha United Democratic Development Forum (KUDDF). These two organisations emerged as strong opponents to the KDF. They are closely associated with the initiative of the National Party in the area. FBF and KUDDF development forums do not enjoy the same support in the community as the KDF.

### **KDF Participation in other bodies**

KDF participates in several bodies. The objective is to create and strengthen diplomatic ties with the outside structures for the benefit of the people of Khayelitsha. KDF participates and has a representative in the Tygerberg Municipal Development Forum (TMDF). The TMDF was launched in September 1996 with the aim of carrying out development in the whole Tygerberg substructure. The TMDF consists of 12 local RDP Forums in the Tygerberg substructure. KDF also participates in the South East Metro Plan. In 1996 KDF attended and debated in a series of workshops initiated by the South East Metro Plan (Sogayise interviewed on 18/12/96). Although KDF participate in the above-mentioned bodies, the organisation is still lacking capacity and a broader knowledge of development. Participation is not for individuals or ordinary citizens, but for representatives from political organisations and political leaders. This is the opposite of the participation theory analysed in section 2.3. A need exists for Khayelitsha to use the development theory provided in chapter two of this thesis as their tool for development. At the present moment KDF is facing a challenge. After the annual general meeting in October 1999 KDF split into two opposing groups. This was perpetrated by political factions within the Khayelitsha community. As a result developers and councillors are now taking decisions regarding the development of Khayelitsha without involving KDF factions. This has now reversed the process back to a top-down approach, which is the opposite of participatory planning discussed in chapter two. In order to deal with its challenges Khayelitsha should use the Development Strategic Planning model proposed by the author in section 2.5. This should be regarded as an answer to the research problem of this thesis, i.e. what is to be done? (See section 1.3).

### 3.8 CONCLUSION

Given the historical context, it is evident that many events took place as a result of the lack of participatory planning between the community and the authorities. This is the opposite of the development theory on participatory planning perceived by Conyers and Hills (1990) Fox *et al.*, (1991) and Koontz *et al.*, (1980). (See section 2.4). History is one of the important aspects that shape the development debate as a multi-dimensional concept. This idea is also shared by Jeppe in Meyer *et al.*, eds. (1995). In order for Khayelitsha to prevent the actions of the past mentioned in this chapter from being repeated, it has to follow a development approach based on participatory planning. Participatory planning would promote the effective communication approach such as the bottom-up approach, which is now lacking in Khayelitsha. (See Kotze ed. 1997).

Historical analysis in the chapter provides evidence that only a top-down approach was used in the past. The invisible role of KDF is evidence of lack of participatory planning perceived by Conyers and Hills (1990). For Khayelitsha to ensure sustainable development it is important to take into consideration both bottom up and top down approaches in order to foster an inclusive and effective decision-making process. The principles of these two decision-making approaches in a development planning and management context correspond to those analysed by Swanepoel (1992), Burkey (1993), Chambers (1997) and Oakley (1991).

In this chapter a historical perspective of development in Khayelitsha was discussed. In the following chapter the socio-economic characteristics of Khayelitsha will be examined.



## 4. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN PERSPECTIVE

### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter Three provided a historical overview of events that are related to the evolution of development in Khayelitsha. The issues discussed were the early and late migration of Africans to the Western Cape and the early development of Khayelitsha. This chapter describes socio-economic aspects and development issues, which are critical in the development of Khayelitsha, and further explains the research problem of this thesis. The discussion

in this chapter covers thirteen (13) units of analysis, namely population composition, societal dynamics, family composition, income distribution, employment, education, health and social welfare, police and security, land ownership, housing, service charges, politics, sports and recreation.


### 4.2 POPULATION COMPOSITION

Population estimates of Khayelitsha vary as a result of disagreement over the accuracy of statistics. The Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) estimated the 1990 population to be 184 235, projected to 400 000 by 1998 (Harrison and McQueen, 1992:7). Wesgro estimated the total population of Khayelitsha to range from over 500 000 to as low as 320 000 (Wesgro, 1995:14). Population estimates of many areas within Khayelitsha remain current for a short time because of the rapid growth in the area and the movement of residents from one area to another. The influx of people from the former homelands and other areas of the Western Cape contributed to the rapid increase in population in Khayelitsha (See Chapter Three). The rapid population increase is one of Khayelitsha's major problems as stated in the research problem (See Chapter One). The statistical population estimates in Khayelitsha are derived from the number of shacks and formal houses. The following population distribution hierarchy illustrates the population distribution across age groups in Khayelitsha (See Figure 6):

#### 4. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN PERSPECTIVE

- Population Composition
- Societal Dynamics
- Family Composition
- Income Distribution
- Employment
- Education
- Health & Social Welfare
- Police & Security
- Land Ownership
- Housing
- Service Charges
- Politics
- Sports and Recreation

**Figure 6: DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION ACROSS AGE GROUPS IN KHAYELITSHA**



Source: May *et al.*, (1995:17)

The figure above contains information on the age distribution of household members in Khayelitsha. About 16% of the population in Khayelitsha are under the age of 7 (pre-school age) and 15% are between 7 and 14 years of age (primary school age), in other words 31% are aged 14 years or younger. About 13% are in the age group 14 to 19 years. 5% of the population are in the prime productive years and contribute to the labour force. The elderly, those of 60 years and above, constitute about 5%. In the total percentage females make up 57% and are more numerous than males in all age groups above the age of six or seven. The greatest difference occurs in the age groups 20 to 34 and 35 to 39 years, where females outnumber males by 49% and 62% respectively. (Also see Mpetsheni and Romanovsky, 1995).

**Table 6: DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS OF KHAYELITSHA - POPULATION AGE BY DWELLING TYPE**

AGE	FREE-STANDING SHACKS	FORMAL HOUSES	TOTAL	TOTAL (%)
0-6	65 928	869	66 797	21
7-12	34 534	924	35 458	11



13-20	40 812	869	41 681	13
21-29	78 486	978	79 464	24
30-39	56 509	815	57 324	18
40-49	25 115	489	25 604	8
50-59	9 418	326	9 744	3
60+	9 418	1110	9 528	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>320 220</b>	<b>5 380</b>	<b>325 600</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Mpetsheni and Romanovsky, (1995:8)**

The demographic statistics (such as increase in population) are influenced mostly by the related families who come from the rural areas to join their families in the Western Cape and settle in Khayelitsha. People come from the rural areas to the Western Cape for better living conditions, employment, education and medical care.

#### 4.3 SOCIETAL DYNAMICS

Anthropological research has shown that the Khayelitsha society typifies the heterogeneous composition of large South African townships. The society is dominated by Xhosa-speaking people and also includes Sotho speakers. In squatter areas people are organised into rural town groupings, i.e. Ama-Lady Frere, Ama-Gatyana, Ama-Ngcobo (See Harrison and McQueen 1992:19 and Wilson and Ramphela 1989). Although people organise themselves in such groupings, there are no tribal factions. The society is characterised by gender inequalities since it is still organised along gender lines. Women are still treated as minors and men as head of the family. In some families women are denied the right to participate in all spheres of the decision-making process. Their role is defined as looking after children and performing family duties, e.g. preparing meals, washing clothes etc., but in some families this kind of stereotype is no longer in practice.

#### 4.4 FAMILY COMPOSITION

As participant observer, the researcher noted that the Khayelitsha family composition broadly consists of the following types of households:

- **The family of mother, father and children (nuclear unit):** The spouses were married

in traditional or Christian marriage ceremonies, and some were married in a court of law.

- **The extended family:** This is the most common type of family composition, particularly in shacks, as is indicated in table 6 (See page 38). It normally consists of the nuclear unit as well as relatives and friends.
- **A women living on her own with her children (mother/child unit):** This type is common in both shacks and formal houses.
- **Relatives living together, mostly brothers and sisters:** This is also common in both shacks and formal houses.
- **Family members plus a lodger:** This type of household is more common in formal houses. In two out of five households lodgers may contribute financially, but families take in lodgers because they are destitute. Harrison and McQueen (1992:19) assert that households also commonly have absentee members, who are often children sent to grandmothers or close relatives in the rural areas for schooling. The following table provides household size and number of persons as percentages:

**Table 7: HOUSEHOLD SIZE: NUMBER OF PERSONS (%)**

Number of Persons	Shacks	Formal Houses
1	12	7
2	15	1
3	21	10
4	19	31
5	14	16
6+	19	35
All households	3,9	5,0
Number of households	43 250	34 284

**Source: Mazur and Qangule, (1995 (a):12-13)**

**Table 8: PERSONS PER ROOM (%)**

	Shacks	Formal Houses
1 or fewer	36	45
up to 2 persons	36	41
more than 2 persons	28	15

**Source: Mazur and Qangule, (1995 (a):31)**



Tables 7 and 8 show the percentages and number of persons in each household in Khayelitsha in both shacks and formal houses. It is evident that about 52% of households in Khayelitsha consist of extended families. This number will increase as more people flock to Khayelitsha daily for the reasons stated above and as a result of the natural birth rate. This process corresponds to migratory patterns in South African metropolises and in demographic and sociological research done (Mazur and Qangule, 1995 (a)).

#### 4.5 INCOME DISTRIBUTION

In South Africa more than 60% of the economically active population earn less than R25 000 per annum, while less than 1% earn more than R150 000. The average gross income earned in South Africa in 1995 was R32 000 per annum. This skewed income distribution reflects differences in skills or education - more educated people get higher wages or salaries (Falkena and Luus, 1995/6: 10-11).

Income-related analysis cannot be divorced from the challenge of poverty in South Africa. In their analysis of poverty, Wilson and Ramphela (1989:1) argued that poverty prevails among African families in rural areas to such an extent that the vast majority of rural households have incomes that are below subsistence levels. In the former homelands agricultural productive ability has become so eroded that rural household income is now chiefly derived from wages earned in towns, on commercial farms and from social pensions (May *et al.*, eds. 1995:1). As a result of rural push and urban pull factors, rural people left for towns or cities for a better life. It is estimated that 36.4% of South African people can be classified as poor. The headcount ratio for individuals living in poverty is larger than that for average households, indicating that larger households tend to be poor (May *et al.*, 1995:10).

According to May *et al.*, (1995:22) South Africa has a relatively uneven distribution of income, with a gini coefficient for the entire population ranging from 0.50 to 0.58, depending on the income measure that is selected. This uneven distribution, among the most uneven in the world, also holds within population groups, and in particular within the rural African population. This suggests that relative poverty in South Africa is not simply due to an urban-rural or racial differential, but that there are high levels of relative poverty within the rural areas themselves. The analysis of the Khayelitsha income distribution reflects the skewed income distribution in rural areas and the link between rural and urban poverty in general. This should be viewed as



one of the major problems to be looked at, as is also indicated in the research problem (See Chapter One).

The monthly household income in Khayelitsha ranges from R260.00 to R3 000.00 and above. Table 9 below indicates the monthly income distribution.

**Table 9: MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME (%)**

<b>Income</b>	<b>Shacks</b>	<b>Formal Houses</b>
R250.00 - R800.00	58	29
R801.00 - R1 500.00	29	28
R1 501.00 - R2 500.00	10	33
R2 501.00 - R3 500.00	3	10

**Source: Mazur and Qangule, (1995:14)**

### **Characteristics of income**

The researcher observed that income distribution is normally associated with the following income characteristics and vicious cycles:

- **Lack of education among household heads:** Male and female heads of households in Khayelitsha are particularly likely to lack education. Approximately 53% of people have no education and 47% have attended school (Mpetsheni and Romanovsky 1995:18 – 19). The likelihood of finding a household head with no education among poor households is greater than in the population in general. Education is related to the poverty status of the household.
- **Poor households have the highest dependence ratios:** The poorest households in Khayelitsha have the highest average household dependence ratio. Households above the 40 percentile have more potential providers than dependants and the dependence ratio for this group is lower than one (40 percentile is a relative cut-off point used in this thesis to measure poverty, and a household falling below the 40 percentile is considered to be poor). The dependence ratio is higher in households headed by women than in households headed by men. The households headed by women have more young dependants, and have per capita expenditure levels that are only three-quarters of those of households headed by men. The households headed by women also have fewer resources for generating income for their families. They need to increase their incomes



to support their dependent children, but they do not have the means to do so, making those households more vulnerable. The households headed by men constitute the majority of all households in Khayelitsha. The chance of those households being among the poorest 40% of households is one in five. By comparison the chance of a household headed by a woman being among the poorest 40% is two in five (Mpetsheni and Romanovsky, 1995:27).

- **Gender imbalance:** As indicated in section 4.2, Population Composition, women are over represented among the poor. This over representation is closely linked with gender imbalances and gender stereotyping in South Africa in general. Women were denied access to economic resources and also restricted from entering certain kinds of jobs. There are also certain traditional, rural values and beliefs that discriminate against women. Such restrictions put women below poverty lines with low income or no income at all. (See Wesgro, 1995:19.)
- **Some female heads of households are divorced, widowed or single:** Almost all male heads of households are married. Only 40% of all female heads of households are married, 15% are divorced, 20% are widowed and 25% are single. Households headed by divorced and widowed women are more likely to fall below the 40 percentile cut-off than households with a female head who is single. Single female household heads are the least likely to have families to provide for since these households have a lower dependency ratio than other households headed by women. Some of the households headed by older woman are poor (Mpetsheni and Romanovsky, 1995:28).
- **Households headed by women receive cash remittances from friends or relatives:** Some female heads of households are unemployed. They survive by getting cash remittances from friends or relatives. Certain norms and value systems are in place to absorb people in distress, as is shown by anthropological studies. (See Wilson and Ramphele, 1989). Only about 5% of male heads of households receive such remittances. The prevalence of poverty is higher for the households that receive cash remittances than for those that do not. The majority of widows are older than 50 years of age and it is likely that they receive cash remittances from their children or relatives. But these remittances are unreliable and irregular. (See O'Brien and Gillis, 1994:32).
- **Economic imbalances of South African provinces:** Economic imbalance is a major cause of low income and poverty in some provinces in South Africa. Provinces such as the Eastern Cape are characterised by poverty of a predominantly rural nature. Access to



basic services is not uniformly distributed across the country. Rural people left rural areas for the cities where there are opportunities for a better life, as is shown in studies on migration. Khayelitsha was established as a result of such provincial economic imbalances. (See Seekings, *et al.*, 1990).

- **Poor access to services and income:** Most of the households in Khayelitsha have low incomes and as a result such households have no access to services. They spend large portions of their already low income on basic needs such as food and clothing.

#### 4.6 EMPLOYMENT

Khayelitsha has a high rate of unemployment. The Khayelitsha Unemployment Committee (interviewed on 15-16/03/96) estimates unemployment at 50%. Twenty percent (20%) of people are estimated to be employed in the formal sector and 30% in the informal sector. The age group of the unemployed ranges from 15 to 45 years. The informal sector is an unreliable sector that cannot reduce the unemployment rate in the area. (See Wesgro, 1995:19 – 20). Unemployment is another area of serious concern creating poverty and should be resolved, as is mentioned in the research problem (See chapter one). The Khayelitsha Unemployment Committee (interviewed on 15-16/03/96) mentioned the following causes of unemployment:

- **Rapid urbanisation:** Rapid urbanisation of people from former homelands is a source of population growth in the Western Cape. This challenges the Khayelitsha local authority to deal with unemployment and its related manifestations.
- **Education, expertise and professionalism:** The lack of education, expertise and professionalism is regarded as major problem areas associated with the unemployment rate. Households of women and young men are seriously affected groups. Percentages for Khayelitsha households' education levels are indicated in Table 10.

**Table 10: EDUCATION OF HOUSEHOLDS (%)**

Education	Shacks	Formal Houses
Std 2 or less	18	9
Std 3, 4 or 5	35	19
Std 6 or 7	26	23



Std 8 or 9	18	27
Certificate or Diploma	3	22

**Source: Mazur and Qangule, (1995:18 – 19)**

- **Local industry:** The absence of local industries in the area contributes to unemployment. This is due to the fact that the area is a dormitory area. The lack of industries also contributes to further underdevelopment in the area.
- **Local investment and savings:** The absence of worthwhile local investment and savings is likely to be an additional cause of unemployment in the area.
- **The lack of financial assistance by the financial institutions:** The financial institutions are not funding the local small and medium-sized enterprises to reduce the level of unemployment.

#### 4.7 EDUCATION

Education in Khayelitsha is a problem as illustrated in the research problem of this thesis (See Chapter One). It is hampered by interrelated problems. The Khayelitsha Education Forum (KEF) (interviewed on 25-27/03/96) provided the following background information:

- **Lack of school facilities:** Schools in Khayelitsha do not have enough facilities such as technological instruments, computers, libraries and laboratories. This lack of infrastructure causes major problems.
- **Poor school buildings:** Some of the school buildings in Khayelitsha are in poor condition and cannot withstand the natural hazards.
- **Poor infrastructure:** Poor drainage systems are common at some of the schools. Schools are characterised by a lack of open areas for recreation and sport.
- **Overcrowding:** Most of the schools are overcrowded, especially primary schools in squatter areas. The enrolment rate in primary schools varies between 80% and 90% per school. As a result the average class size varies between 40 and 45 scholars per teacher. This uneven ratio puts teachers under stress and they have to work more than could be expected of them. As stated, the problem of overcrowding in Khayelitsha could be linked to rapid urbanisation and natural population growth in general. Overcrowding



will force the government to increase the education budget each year to address educational shortages or educational backlog/historical problems.

- **Expenditure inequality:** The historically unequal expenditure ratio between Africans and Whites was an area of concern in South African education and has caused backlogs. Expenditure ratios were five times higher per capita for White education than for African education (Frederickson, 1994:6). (See also RDP White Paper, 1995). School fees and other costs cause serious hardships for low-income households in Khayelitsha. Bursaries for tertiary education are very scarce. Enrolment rates by income group are such that scholars who were identified as being disadvantaged in the past are likely to remain disadvantaged due to lack of equitable distribution of services and wealth in the country.
- **Drop-outs rates:** High rates of primary and secondary level drop-outs amongst scholars are common and are the result of low income earned by parents or guardians, unemployment, teenage pregnancy and teenage marriages.
- **Food shortage:** Some schools and crèches experience food shortages. Backyard crèches are mushrooming. As a result some of these crèches find it difficult to obtain funding from the government and the private sector.
- **Poor health care services:** Some schools and crèches do not receive health care services, i.e. social work and the services of a nurse.
- **Low level of education:** Illiteracy and a low level of education are major problems associated with human development in Khayelitsha. Khayelitsha has one technical college known as the Mitchell's Plain Technical College. Khayelitsha students are compelled to travel long distances in order to attend tertiary institutions in the Western Cape, such as the Cape Town Technikon, Peninsula Technikon, University of Cape Town (UCT), University of the Western Cape (UWC) and the University of Stellenbosch (US).
- **Public libraries are poor and inadequate:** Public libraries in Khayelitsha are characterised by a shortage of reading material. Consequently about 75% of Khayelitsha students use Cape Town libraries (City library and South African library) and university libraries, e.g. UCT and UWC. There are not enough public libraries in Khayelitsha. Currently there are three libraries, i.e. Khayelitsha's new library, Khayelitsha resource centre and Site B library. (Also see Lawrence, 1994).



## **4.8 HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE**

Health and other related matters were mentioned in the research problem as problem areas facing Khayelitsha. According to the Khayelitsha Health Committee and SACLA (interviewed on 28-29/03/96), people in Khayelitsha face more difficult circumstances than those in developed societies. Khayelitsha has a lack of adequate health resources to ensure minimum standards of health and nutrition for its growing population. The lack of adequate health policies in Khayelitsha could be related to environmental problems discussed in section 5.5. The impact of population growth is likely to be the worst on the poorest households, since they tend to live far away from social services such as hospitals, e.g. Groote Schuur and Somerset Hospital. The shape of the population pyramid for Khayelitsha shows a large proportion of children (See Figure 5, 37). The government faces an overwhelming task in trying to provide nutrition, health care, health education and social welfare services.

### **4.8.1 Malnutrition**

Khayelitsha has a high malnutrition rate, which is caused *inter alia* by poor diets, inappropriate feeding practices and short birth intervals. Stunting is prevalent amongst children in Khayelitsha. Some children are short for their age and some are underweight (respondent nurse interviewed on 28/03/96).

### **4.8.2 Infant and Child Mortality**

Infant and child mortality is common in Khayelitsha. This is probably due to the continuing poor living conditions and the permanence of risk factors that cause mortality during pregnancy. According to Harrison and McQueen (1992:26-27) the infant mortality rate for Khayelitsha was 31,4 per 1 000 live births and child mortality was 10,4 per 1 000 live births, based on registered deaths and notified births. Infant and child mortality is caused by malnutrition, infectious diseases, i.e. diarrhoea, parental trauma, tuberculosis (TB) and cancer. Other interrelated causes associated with infant and child mortality are assaults, murders, accidents, abuse of liquor by parents, fire and cold winters. The level of the mother's education is associated with the mortality rate of children under the age of five years. Children born to mothers who had no education were twice as likely to die before their fourth or fifth birthday than children born to mothers who had been educated to the secondary level up to tertiary level. Risk factors associated with the mortality rate of children under the age of five years include having a mother



who is very young or very old, birth intervals shorter than 24 months or a year, birth order, with the firstborn child more likely to die than children fourth or later in the birth order, small size at birth, and little utilisation of health services by the mother during pregnancy and delivery (respondent nurse and doctor interviewed on 28/03/96). Problems of malnutrition, infant and child mortality in Khayelitsha relate very well with the analysis of poverty in South Africa in general (See Wilson and Ramphela 1989).

#### **4.8.3 Maternal Mortality**

The low utilisation of the already inadequate health services during child delivery and the poor conditions during pregnancy are the main causes of maternal mortality. The fertility and tendency of short intervals between births do not allow mothers to recover between births, which increases the risk of complicated pregnancies. A high prevalence of malnutrition among women of childbearing age is an additional factor affecting maternal mortality. The majority of female households live in shacks. Most informal shacks do not have electricity and there are no sanitation facilities in some areas. This increases the spread of disease, especially in overcrowded households. In some households, three to five people sleep in the same room and some households have five or more people per bedroom. (Community health worker interviewed on 30/03/96). Teenage pregnancy is common in Khayelitsha. In 1991 15,5% of births were to women under 20 years of age, compared to 15,1% in 1986 (Harrison and McQueen, 1992: 27-38).

The high percentage of teenage pregnancy is a general problem in South Africa, especially in Coloured and African communities. It is asserted by Mazur and Qangule (1995:12) that in South Africa much higher percentages of Coloured and African youth fall pregnant (17 and 25% respectively). In comparison, very few White or Indian teenagers reported having been pregnant (1 and 2% respectively). In Khayelitsha, 3% of teenagers at the age of 16 years were reported pregnant in 1996/97 (respondent nurse interviewed 28/03/97).

#### **4.8.4 Family Planning (FP)**

Family planning is the task of professional nurses at clinics in Khayelitsha. FP is aimed *inter alia* at preventing increasing pregnancy, especially teenage pregnancy. Nurses deal with about 200 females per week requesting prevention measures. The majority of them are school children. The ages of female teenagers requesting contraceptives range from 11-20 years



(respondent nurse interviewed on 28/03/97). Some teenagers ignore the use of contraceptives as they want to have babies so they would not be sneered by their friends. Consequently the birth rate in Khayelitsha is increasing. In 1996 the birth rate was estimated at 400 people per month (respondent nurse interviewed on 28/03/97). An increase in the birth rate cannot be separated from the social lifestyle in Khayelitsha, where most of the households are not educating their children about pregnancy and sex-related issues. Many households are still maintaining the tradition of not discussing sex-related issues with their children, resulting in teenage pregnancy and other sex-related problems.

#### 4.8.5 Life Expectancy

Life expectancy in Khayelitsha varies between 50 and 66 years of age. This low expectancy is due to inter alia illiteracy, precarious living conditions such as food insecurity, limited access to health care, poverty and poor social services (community health workers interviewed on 02/04/96). Low life expectancy in Khayelitsha could be linked to the problem of poverty in South Africa (See May, *et al.*, 1995)

### 4.9 POLICE AND SECURITY

Khayelitsha is one of the areas with the highest crime rate in the Western Cape. There are three police stations in Khayelitsha, i.e. Site B Police Station (central police station), Khayelitsha Police Station (next to Luhlaza High School) and the Harare Police Station. Various crimes are reported to these police stations. The following are common: theft, murder, robbery, burglary, rape and assault. The SAPS is committed to reducing crime in Khayelitsha. The shortage of police personnel is a problem area. Currently there is only 0.3% police personnel available per thousand people in the estimated total population of 500 000. Some of the serious crimes are committed by juveniles between the ages of 15-19 years (Mbolekwa interviewed on 18/04/96). Table 11 indicates the 1995 - 1996 Khayelitsha crime statistics.

**Table 11: THE 1995 - 1996 KHAYELITSHA CRIME STATISTICS**

Crime	Reported Number	Solved %
Theft	900	63
Murder	290	22

Attempted Murder	174	82
<b>Murder Total</b>	<b>464</b>	<b>33</b>
Robbery Common	134	52
Robbery Aggravated	514	35
<b>Robbery Total</b>	<b>648</b>	<b>38</b>
Rape	324	20
Burglary Residence	665	34
Burglary Business	93	25
<b>Burglary Total</b>	<b>758</b>	<b>32</b>
Assault Common	631	18
Assault GBH (Grievous Bodily Harm)	1418	18.4
<b>Assault Total</b>	<b>2049</b>	<b>18.2</b>
Other Crime	198	7.2

**Source: Khayelitsha Police Statistics, (1996)**

#### **4.10 LAND OWNERSHIP**

Land in Khayelitsha is owned by the Lingeletu West Town Council (LWTC), Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) and private organisations such as the South African Housing Trust (SAHT).

The LWTC owns about 1 230 ha of land and CPA about 1 607 ha. The land is owned in areas known as “status areas” and these include all areas north of Spine Road, Town 2 Village 4 (Griffiths Mxenge) and part of Town 2 Village 3 (Silverton). WCPA also owns land in “status areas” and these include all areas south of Spine Road, excluding Griffiths Mxenge and Silverton (Harrison and McQueen, 1992:5).

The number of developed plots available to the LWTC is currently 40 716 and the occupied plots 52 755. These plots range in size from 80m<sup>2</sup> to 200m<sup>2</sup>. The Council, with 2 763 units recently built on plots, also owns the buffer zone (Site C extension) next to the N2 road. It is clear that the Council will experience a land shortage in future due to population increases,



influx and double occupation such as at Site C where two households are currently occupying a 160 m<sup>2</sup> plot. Council tried to request a portion of land owned by ARMSCOR, but was unsuccessful.

#### **4.10.1 Private Ownership**

The SAHT and Fair Cape own the other portion of land in Khayelitsha. The SAHT owns land with serviced sites in Town 1, Village 1 and 2. Each site consists of a 150-200 m<sup>2</sup> plot. SAHT owns 3 382 vacant plots and 1 618 occupied plots a total of four thousand (4 000). Fair Cape owns 200 plots in Thembokwezi. Fair Cape currently has 200 serviced plots still available for further housing development (Lingeletu West Town Council, 1995:10 – 15).

#### **4.10.2 Land Invasion**

Land invasion is another problem area that hampers development in Khayelitsha and creates difficulties in service provision. In some instances the community has invaded land earmarked for township development, e.g. commercial land, school and church land. The invasion is allegedly caused by rural migrants and people from backyard shacks in townships such as Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga (Schwella interviewed on 15/04/96).

### **4.11 HOUSING**

Housing is a development challenge, as is mentioned in the research problem of this thesis (See Chapter One). Housing needs are a central challenge in the country as a whole, especially in semi-urban areas overcrowded by shacks. In August 1994 Gerald Morkel stated that the housing backlog in the Western Cape amounted to 181 000 units, calculated according to the housing waiting list (South African Institute of Race Relations Survey, 1994/96). The housing backlog in Khayelitsha could be linked to the historical analysis in section 3.3 and Cooper's (1984) analysis.

According to Ngcuka (interviewed 03/05/96) housing in Khayelitsha is hampered by inter alia, the following problems briefly discussed below:

- **Poor town planning:** Khayelitsha has been poorly planned. Some of its areas were planned and designed as transit camps. This relates to development malpractice by the



previous government (See section 1.2, Hypothesis). Site C is a typical transit area or camp. Site C currently has double occupation of shacks on one 90m<sup>2</sup> plot. The double occupation in Site C is really one of the development challenges that need to be addressed.

- **Population growth, influx and overcrowding:** Population in Khayelitsha, as mentioned, is increasing rapidly due to the increase in the birth rate and influx of destitute and poorly skilled people from rural areas. Most of these migrants prefer to settle in Khayelitsha, occupy any land available, and build informal houses. The local authority is experiencing difficulties in exercising its authority to remove those occupants. One of the reasons for the Council dragging its feet with regard to the illegal occupation of land earmarked for township development is the lack of effective government policies on birth and the failure to deal with the population growth.
- **Densification problem:** There is a proliferation of informal shacks, which results in high density. The high density puts a strain on infrastructure such as sewerage pipes. This results in the blockage of sewerage pipes and drainage systems and service delivery problems.
- **Land shortage:** Most of the land is owned privately. Land currently available is not sufficient for housing development in the area.
- **The land price:** The sum of R7 000 is deducted from the government subsidy to develop underground infrastructure.
- **Cost of services:** Khayelitsha is a sandy area and consequently housing development is characterised by a high cost of services such as stormwater drains, tarred roads, sewerage systems, etc.
- **The building of flats:** On the one hand the government does not have enough money to build flats as a measure to relieve the housing problem. On the other hand, the community of Khayelitsha is opposed to the flat system. They argue that the flat system would limit their opportunities for traditional farming, which normally takes place in yards. For them yards are also important for traditional occasions such as initiation ceremonies.
- **Transport problem:** Transport is another problem area linked to lack of integrated development in Khayelitsha. Areas such as Macassar experience transport difficulties. The integrated development is viewed as another aspect that should improve the



transport system in Khayelitsha (See Van Baalen and Meyer, 1998).

- **Insufficient state capital subsidy:** According to Sims (interviewed on 28/08/96) the state capital subsidy is insufficient to build a complete house. People are now compelled to obtain additional finance from banks in the form of loans. Banks provide loans only if the borrower earns a regular income. Unemployed people and those who make a living in the informal sector find it difficult to obtain bank loans. Bank interest rates limit the chances for low-income groups to obtain loans. Table 12 indicates the different categories of state capital subsidy, the bank's bond amounts, bank rates and repayment amounts, all based on different monthly household incomes.

**Table 12: GROSS MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME, SUBSIDY AMOUNT, BOND AMOUNTS, BANK RATES AND REPAYMENT AMOUNTS**

<b>Gross Monthly Household Income</b>		<b>Subsidy Amount</b>	<b>Bond Amounts</b>	<b>Rates</b>	<b>Repayment Amounts</b>
Up to R800	25%	R15 000	R 1 100,70	21,50%	R200,00
R801 to R1 500	25%	R12 500	R20 638,00	21,50%	R375,00
R1 501 to R2 500	25%	R 9 500	R 3 555,00	21,50%	R625,00
R2 501 to R3 500	25%	R 5 000	R49 772,00	21,50%	R875,00

(Sims interviewed on 28/08/96)

#### 4.12 SERVICE CHARGES

Khayelitsha, like many other communities, has a culture of non-payment of service charges. When the transitional councillors came into office in 1995, they encouraged the community to adopt a culture of payment for services to enable the local council to render a proper service. The well-known Masakhane campaign was launched with the following result: The monthly payment amounted to R60 000 in August 1995, R133 000 in September 1995 and R375 000 in October 1995. The October 1995 payment represented 54% of the monthly service charges in 1995/1996 and 62% payment in April 1997. In the period prior to 1995 the monthly payment of service charges was less than 30% (Ngcuka interviewed 03/05/96). The Council approved the following monthly rates for residential and business premises at its meeting on 17 August 1995:

**Table 13: OCCUPATION SERVICE CHARGES**

Site C (A and B occupants)	R12.50 each
Site B	R20.00 each
Harare, Macassar, Town 3 Village 5,	R20.00 each
Town 2 Village 4	R25.00 each
Formal Houses	R50.00 each
Core Houses	R40.00 each
Informal Shacks	R10.00 each

Source: Lingeletu West Town Council, (1995)

Despite the occupation service charges, businesses are also paying for services in Khayelitsha. These are shown in Table 14.

**Table 14: SERVICE CHARGES FOR BUSINESS PREMISES**

Type of Business	Service Charges				
	Site	Water 20KL	Refuse	VAT	Total
Shop	18,00	16,80	12,50	4,10	51,40
		16,00		3,99	50,49
		3,00		2,17	35,67
Supermarket & Bottlestore Café, Restaurant Service Station	72,00	16,80	12,50	4,10	105,40
		16,00		3,99	104,49
		3,00		2,17	89,67
Comm. Facility School Public Service Church	18,00	16,80	12,50	4,10	51,40
		16,00		3,99	50,49
		3,00		2,17	35,67
Industrial Premises 1 – 10 000 sq.m.	72,00	16,80	12,50	4,10	105,40
		16,00		3,99	104,49
		3,00		2,17	89,67
Industrial Premises above 10 000 sq.m.	144,00	16,80	12,50	4,10	177,40
		16,00		3,99	176,49
		3,00		2,17	161,67
Special Authority	36,00	16,80	12,50	4,10	69,40
		16,00		3,99	68,49
		3,00		2,17	53,67
Trading Stalls	9,00	16,00	12,50	3,99	41,49
		3,00		2,17	26,67

Source: Lingeletu West Town Council, (1995)



The Council's decision on the payment of service charges was strongly opposed by other sections of the community such as SANCO of EMTHINI. They demanded a flat rate for service charges in the whole of Khayelitsha. The Council, with the support of some cabinet ministers and members of Parliament, did not support the flat rate demand. In November 1999 the above-mentioned rates were still being used by the City of Tygerberg in Khayelitsha.

#### **4.13 POLITICS**

The African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) are the strongest political parties in Khayelitsha. The other political parties operating in the area are the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) and the National Party (NP). The NP operates mainly in Site C, but it does not have the mass support enjoyed by the ANC and PAC. At the time the research was conducted, there was no confirmation of the existence of other parties such as the Democratic Party (DP), Freedom Front (FF), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and South African Christian Democratic Party (SACDP). The 1997 period showed a shift of political support away from the ANC to the National Party in the Tygerberg substructure, but the ANC still enjoys overwhelming support in Khayelitsha. In 1998 the United Democratic Movement (UDM) emerged as the second largest party to the ANC in Khayelitsha.

#### **4.14 SPORTS AND RECREATION**

Sport in Khayelitsha is co-ordinated by the Khayelitsha Sports Council (KSC). The KSC was formed in 1992 by the majority of sporting bodies as an umbrella sports organization. The KSC constitutes the following types of sports: athletics, basketball, body-building, boxing, cricket, golf, karate, netball, rugby, soccer, tennis and volleyball. The task of the KSC is to establish links with organisations such as the Western Province National Sports Council (WPNSC), Western Province Netball (WPN), the Greater Cape Town Sports Commission (GCTSC), the KDF, and the Western Province Rugby Union (WPRU). Links have also been established by the KSC with UCT and UWC to assist in training of its management in sports administration and other training that is necessary in the sphere of sport (Mathabatha, interviewed on 24/08/96).

Despite the progress made by the KSC, sport in Khayelitsha still needs further development. The problems that currently hamper sport in Khayelitsha are the following:



- Unqualified sports management, particularly in relevant sports qualifications such as sports administration.
- Inadequate sports facilities and lack of funds in order to develop sports grounds.
- Poor links with the local council (LWTC) and other government sports structures or departments.

Khayelitsha has two stadiums, Village 1 Town 1 and Mandela Park Stadium. Village 1 Town 1 is a stadium with floodlights for both soccer and rugby. Mandela Park Stadium is a multi-purpose stadium (Mathabatha, interviewed on 24/08/96)

#### **4.15 CONCLUSION**

This chapter discussed social development-related issues that are Khayelitsha's biggest challenges at present.

In order for Khayelitsha to address its social development-related problems, there needs to be collective participation as per the Development Strategic Planning Model suggested in Figure 4 of chapter two. The model would help Khayelitsha in bringing together all development role-players to take the necessary decisions to address social development related-problems. The interpretation of this model can be related to the theoretical analysis in section 2.3.1 perceived by Oakley (1991).

It is important that social development should also focus on income, because it determines access to services and a better quality of life. As mentioned in section 4.5, Income Distribution, Khayelitsha has a high rate of low-income groups or people with no income. Unemployment mentioned in section 4.6, is another problem area. If these discrepancies are not addressed, the goal of a better quality of life will not be achieved in Khayelitsha.

In addition, broader understanding of social development-related issues and financial management can assist civil society organisations, the business sector and local authority to transform the community to realise their partnership dreams. Most councillors in Khayelitsha have a vision about how they would like their town to develop over the next 5-10 years. The community also know which services they expect from the local authority. The dream of an ideal community is a vision for the local authority. In this regard approving and monitoring the



council budget is one of Khayelitsha councillors' greatest responsibilities. But the budget should be drawn up on the basis of a bottom-up participatory planning approach as suggested by Theron *et al.*, eds. (1995:3) in chapter two. This will encourage public participation in budgetary affairs by the people of Khayelitsha.

Council policies are plans of action that describe how a council is going to achieve its vision. When councillors formulate policies, they set the broad framework within which they will take decisions and act. Such decisions must include all Khayelitsha stakeholders, as Korten (1990) argues. Without funds to implement policies, the Council will not be able to take action or serve the community of Khayelitsha well. The vision will then only be a dream. Clear financial management will help to ensure that funds are available to implement Council policies. The vision will help councillors make tough budgeting decisions and prioritise spending on the community's basic needs. This view is also shared by Swanepoel (1992). Accountability in financial management is also a very important responsibility of councillors. By voting on Election Day, residents of Khayelitsha indicated their trust in those elected to effectively manage their money contributed to local government. Councillors have a duty to ensure that Council monies are managed properly and that priority problems mentioned in this chapter, such as unemployment, lack of education, health, social welfare, security and housing are attended to. These are the fundamental needs related to poverty, which is mentioned in this chapter as Khayelitsha's major challenge.

This chapter discussed issues related to social development. The next chapter provides a discussion on issues related to physical infrastructure development.

## 5. PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICES

### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter Four presented an overview of selected socio – economic characteristics of Khayelitsha. Chapter Five gives an analysis of issues relating to physical infrastructure development such as water, stormwater, sewerage system, environment, roads,

transport, electricity and communication services. The objective is to describe the present state of physical development and services in Khayelitsha in order to determine the gap between what is and what has to be done.

5.	<b>PHYSICAL INFRA-STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICES</b>
-	Water
-	Stormwater System
-	Sewerage System
-	Environment Issues
-	Roads
-	Electricity
-	Street Lightning
-	Transport
-	Communication Service
-	NGO's Involvement in Health Related Development
-	Culture and Tourism

### 5.2 WATER

Khayelitsha has no dam or its own structured water supply. The LWTC bought water from the Cape Town City Council. In 1995/1996 Khayelitsha consumed approximately 700 000 litres of water monthly. But as the area is rapidly growing, Khayelitsha is consuming more than 700 000 litres of water monthly. It is difficult to quote the accurate number of litres of water consumed. The City of Tygerberg is now installing metre readers in some areas. Rent boycotts and non-payment of services by the community make it difficult for LWTC to pay the outstanding debt for water to the Cape Town City Council. Problems related to water supply in the area include the linkage of water pipes and low water pressure. In November 1998 the City of Tygerberg appointed a private contractor to investigate the low water pressure and other water problems. At present the company is still preparing the report to the Council and the results are expected in the first half of 2000 (Van Dyk, interviewed on 24/07/96). In November 1999 there was no improvement with regard to low water pressure.

Water is supplied in Khayelitsha for the following:

Formal houses	-	inside taps	-	flush toilets
Core houses	-	inside taps	-	flush toilets



Formal shacks	-	outside taps	-	flush toilets
Informal shacks	-	public taps. Some of the community members from informal shacks collect water from nearby service stations. The bucket system is used for toilets.		

### 5.3 STORMWATER SYSTEM

Khayelitsha was developed in an area which forms part of the Kuils River flood plain. Kuils River runs along the northern boundary through an area of natural wetlands. During periods of high flow, the river overflows and water fills the central area. This central area remains flooded for many weeks after the river has subsided, as there is no natural outlet to the sea (Wright *et al.*, 1993:10).

The stormwater system for Khayelitsha was designed for the purpose of removing urban run-off, controlling the high groundwater table and providing protection against flooding by the Kuils River. Most of the catchment area of Khayelitsha has no natural outlet either to the sea or to the Kuils River. The so-called Illudas stormwater drainage model was used during the design stage. The system allows for the disposal of stormwater originating from the whole western area and part of the eastern area into the sea. The balance, comprising about one third of the catchment, discharges into the Kuils River. The two main collector drains run in a south-south-easterly direction through the centre of the catchment area, before entering the main outfall conduit that drains into a retention basin upstream of the coastal outlet. The system is entirely below ground except for a short section of open channel between Site C and the retention basin north of

Town I. The main collector drains are box sections over most of the route, while minor systems feeding into them consist of open-jointed pipes allowing for groundwater to be carried away too (Wright *et al.*, 1993:10). The consequences of poor planning by policy-makers of the past are such that Khayelitsha experiences floods in the streets during the winter season. For future development Khayelitsha should consider the author's Development Strategic Planning Model. The Model is related to development analysis perceived by Burkey (1993), Oakley *et al.*, (1991) and Gelderblom and Kok (1994).



## 5.4 SEWERAGE SYSTEM

Khayelitsha has a waterborne sewerage system, except in the informal settlement, where the nightsoil bucket system is still in use. The sewerage system runs parallel to the stormwater system with two pump stations and one sewerage works (Zandvliet Wastewater Treatment Plant). One pump station is in the centre of Khayelitsha, the second is on the coast, south of the stormwater retention basin. Pit latrines, septic tanks and soak-aways are not used. The close proximity of the sewerage pipelines to the stormwater system has the potential for contamination of the stormwater in the final detention basin, as the sewer line runs across the basin (Wright *et al.*, 1993:10).

The blockage of the sewerage system remains a major problem in Khayelitsha. The system's manhole covers are stolen for scrap metal in some areas. The theft of manhole covers relates to problem of unemployment mentioned in section 4.6. This could also be related to unemployment mentioned in section 4.6. Sand blows into the sewerage system networks and blocks the sewer pipes. In some areas residents dump refuse into the open manholes, which results in blockage. Sometimes the sewer pipes are blocked for long periods, resulting in sewerage spilling into the stormwater drain, especially in areas such as Site C and Macassar. Cleaning the blocked sewer pipes costs LWTC about R3 000 a day (Van Dyk, interviewed on 24/07/96).

## 5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

As in the case of sewerage, the disposal of refuse remains a major pollution problem in the area. This problem started during the struggle against apartheid. Rent boycotts, strikes and violence were used as political strategies to dismantle apartheid. This resulted in the collapse of services in the former Black Local Authorities (BLAs) and the accumulation of refuse, blocking of drains and dumping of refuse by the residents into the open manholes and on open public spaces which are not authorised as legal dumping zones. Insufficient skips, irregular and erratic removal services, inaccessible informal settlements and burning of refuse in skips all contribute to an unhealthy environment in Khayelitsha (Van Dyk, interviewed on 24/07/96). The unpleasant environment could be related to health problems mentioned in section 4.8. In order for Khayelitsha to solve health problems there is a need for improvement of the environment. The illegal dumping of builder's rubble, industrial and toxic materials also contribute to a high level of environmental degradation. The Site C dumping zones,



along Lansdowne Road and Harare, are both typical of illegal dumping zones used by surrounding industries. At the time of the research LWTC pointed out that the two dumping zones would be closed immediately and traffic tickets would be issued to all those involved in illegal dumping. In Khayelitsha, where streets have been lined with mountainous piles of refuse for years, a clean-up operation is currently under way in a collective effort by the City of Tygerberg and private companies. Since its inception the City of Tygerberg has endeavoured to find a solution to the growing problem and a number of short- and long-term projects to clear up the area have been approved. These include regular clean-up operations, the use of four new compactor vehicles and the calling for tenders for a community-based entrepreneurial waste management system (Schutte interviewed on 29/04/97). To deal with refuse a Strategic Management Plan (SMP) has been drawn up by the CMC to assist the LWTC in reviving the services that have collapsed in Khayelitsha. (Bangani interviewed on 21/07/97). The intervention of the SMP has improved services in Khayelitsha.

Khayelitsha is also affected by natural hazards such as wind, flooding and very cold winters, which all have an effect on physical infrastructure development.

**Wind:** Khayelitsha is windy in summer. The wind causes sand erosion and sometimes blows sand into the roads, catch pits and stormwater systems, causing blockages and damage to infrastructure. In 1998 – 1999 sand was stabilised by the Council and the problem of sand blowing onto roads was improved.

**Flooding:** Khayelitsha experiences flooding problems during winter rains. The flooding is the result of high underground water table, and causes severe damage in the community, especially in shack areas. This is a typical example of poor urban planning by the policy-makers of the previous government. The City of Tygerberg created a Disaster Management Department to solve the flooding problem in Khayelitsha. No policy has as yet been tabled by the Council

**Winter:** Khayelitsha is very cold in winter. The temperature sometimes drops below 7°C, especially during July and August.

## 5.6 ROADS

Roads are damaged by floods during winter rains in Khayelitsha. Site C and Macassar are the most affected areas. Roads in Site B were not tarred. The Council subsequently appointed a private contractor to develop Site B roads, and a road development process got under way in Site B (Van Dyk, interviewed on 24/07/96). In 1998–1999 the Council improved roads at Site B, Site C and Macassar and roads are now tarred.

## 5.7 ELECTRICITY

The lack of electricity was a major development issue in Khayelitsha. Agreement was reached between ESCOM and SANCO for ESCOM to supply electricity. The process of electrification was termed "Phambili Nombane" (meaning "forward with electricity"). The term is still widely used in Khayelitsha and ESCOM offices in Khayelitsha are known as "Phambili Nombane". Since the initiation of the electrification process about 35 000 houses have been electrified, including shacks. The other 7 000 houses were electrified by LWTC before the "Phambili Nombane" electrification process started (Mcunu, interviewed on 14/08/96). In December 1999 Phambili Nombane electrified more than 150 000 houses (including shacks).

Apart from electricity, there are other sources of energy that are used by the various households in Khayelitsha, such as the following:

- Candles for light (candles are fire hazards)
- Coal for heating and cooking
- Flame stoves for cooking and heating. (Flame stoves are fire hazards. Many shacks are burnt down due to the explosion of flame stoves).
- Gas for cooking, heating and lighting
- Wood for cooking and heating. (Wood is collected by women mainly in the low-income group. Wood is the cheapest source of energy used).



## **5.8 STREET LIGHTING (Floodlights)**

Most of the areas in Khayelitsha, except informal settlements, have street lighting. Site C sometimes becomes dark at night due to technical problems with street lighting.

## **5.9 TRANSPORT**

Khayelitsha, on the periphery of Cape Town, is far from places of employment, e.g. Cape Town Centre, Bellville and Epping Industria. This justifies the historical analysis that Khayelitsha was created as a dormitory area or work reserve camp and could be linked to development malpractices (See section 1.2, Hypothesis) (See also historical analysis in chapter three). The Khayelitsha community mostly relies on public transport such as bus, rail and taxi.

### **5.9.1 Bus Transport**

A spokesperson (Jacobs, interviewed on 26/08/96) for Golden Arrow said that they were the largest bus company in the Western Cape. In 1996 the company provided bus transport service to about 10 355 passengers. About 119 buses were allocated to the area. The company also undertook about 600 weekly trips out of 52 000 weekly trips in the whole of the Western Cape. The 600 weekly trips are the highest compared to other areas in the region. Golden Arrow has a commitment to social responsibility. They provide bursaries, sponsor buses to pre-school facilities and the Red Cross. Khayelitsha benefits from such sponsorships. Golden Arrow developed a franchise system in Khayelitsha. The local spaza shops were invited to tender for selling Golden Arrow weekly tickets. Successful spaza shops are paid for the service they render. Golden Arrow, like Metro Rail, is subsidised by the state. Golden Arrow's fares are expensive compared to those of Metro Rail and taxis and are 45% higher on average.

### **5.9.2 Metro Rail**

According to information given by a Metro Rail spokesperson (Mkuchane, interviewed on 19/07/96), Metro Rail provides the cheapest transport service. Metro Rail is mostly used by disadvantaged communities in South Africa. Approximately 325 000 commuters per day are transported by train



from Khayelitsha to various workplaces in the Western Cape. Metro Rail experiences the following problems:

**Overcrowding of Khayelitsha trains:** Although trains in Khayelitsha have 14 coaches each, the problem of overcrowding has still not yet been resolved. Overcrowding is a problem mainly during peak hours, i.e. between 04:00 to 09:00 and from 16:00 to 19:00.

**Fare Evasion:** This is Metro Rail's major problem. About 80% of Khayelitsha commuters do not buy train tickets. Metro Rail has tried various methods to deal with the problem, such as train patrols by ticket examiners and hired security officers. Sometimes trains were stopped at Mandalay station for about 5 to 7 minutes to check train tickets. This resulted in several complaints by commuters who were inconvenienced by the procedure. The attempt by Metro Rail proved in vain and at the time of the research, Metro Rail was searching for the best strategy to deal with the problem.

**Vandalism:** As in the case of Mitchells Plain, trains in Khayelitsha are vandalised: train doors, seats, windows and aluminium are stolen and allegedly sold to scrap-yards.

**Crime:** Crime is increasing on Khayelitsha trains. Crimes include robbery of commuters' money and other valuables such as jewellery, as reported by the media. Metro Rail together with the community of Khayelitsha should find an amicable solution to deal with crime problem. The improvement of socio-economic conditions (such as those mentioned in chapters four, five and six) should be some of the solutions.

### 5.9.3 Taxi Service:

Taxis are used extensively as a fast and comfortable transport system in Khayelitsha. Taxis receive overwhelming support from domestic workers in areas that are far from the railway line. Kuit rank in Site C is the most central rank in Khayelitsha. Passengers are collected and taken to Kuit rank from various areas of greater Khayelitsha, such as Macassar, Harare etc., at a fare of R2.00. From Kuit rank taxis are available to transport passengers to various areas of the Western Cape. The Kuit rank is mainly run by the Convention for Democratic Taxi Associations (CODETA).

The taxi industry is the largest informal industry in Khayelitsha. About 20% of Khayelitsha



households receive some kind of income from the taxi industry. According to a taxi spokesperson (Jezile, interviewed on 21/07/96) the taxi industry is characterised by problems briefly described below and also reported in the media.

### **Taxi Violence:**

Taxi violence started in the 1980s between LAGUNYA (that is Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga taxis) and a group who referred to themselves as “taxi pirates”. Taxi pirates were operating without permits. Taxi pirates later formed an organisation known as the Western Cape Business Taxi Association (WEBTA). Since the appearance of these two rival taxi associations, violence has increased in the Western Cape. After a series of incidents between the two associations an organisation known as the Convention for Democratic Taxi Associations (CODETA) was formed as a measure to curb taxi violence. CODETA was an inclusive structure and led to integration between LAGUNYA and WEBTA. Since the formation of CODETA the taxi violence has subsided. Six months after CODETA was formed, some members broke away from CODETA. The breakaway members were former WEBTA members who disagreed with policies and management decisions of CODETA. This resulted in a WEBTA clique within CODETA. The members who broke away alleged that CODETA had undemocratic policies and that decisions were taken in favour of former LAGUNYA members. The differences resulted in the formation of a new taxi association, which is presently known as the Cape Amalgamated Taxi Association (CATA).

Since the formation of CATA taxi violence between CATA and CODETA has not been stemmed. This was evidenced by battles such as the one-hour battle in Khayelitsha stadium in 1995 followed by a series of other taxi wars where drivers of both organisations were brutally killed (Jezile, interviewed on 21/07/96). Jezile reported that taxi rivals fought the battle over the control of taxi ranks occupied by CODETA. Jezile claimed that CATA forced CODETA to leave those ranks and later team up with CATA. (Cape Times 1996:1).

The violence between CATA and CODETA resulted in another split within the ranks of CODETA. Some CODETA members left CODETA and a new taxi organisation known as Cape to Cairo (CC) was formed. CC was in alliance with CATA and the purpose of the alliance was to fight CODETA.



### **Taxi Administration:**

Committees elected at taxi organisations' general meetings perform the taxi administration. Such committees lack administrative skills and management expertise. The policies that govern the taxi businesses are verbal and decided upon at general meetings.

## **5.10 COMMUNICATION SERVICES**

The analysis of communication services is based on three types of services, i.e. radio, postal and telecommunication services.

### **5.10.1 Radio**

The name of the community radio in Khayelitsha is radio "Zibonele" (radio "See it yourself"). "Zibonele" broadcasts live from Philani Centre in Town 2. It started as a Town 2-radio station to broadcast mainly health programmes. The Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) granted the broadcasting license to radio Zibonele in 1995. Since then the radio has started to broadcast to the whole of Khayelitsha, except Site C, where there are reception problems. The radio management team is collecting funds in order to buy an antenna. Once the antenna has been erected, the radio station will reach areas such as Crossroads, Langa, Stellenbosch, Strand and Somerset West. The radio station is currently broadcasting for 19 hours, 5 days a week. Soon the radio station will broadcast for 24 hours. Zibonele has the following radio programmes: church, health, youth, women's, education, news, drama, children's, music and sports programmes. The radio management team is planning to erect a building, but the site has not yet been identified (Tshikila, interviewed on 20/08/96).

### **5.10.2 Postal Service:**

There are four post offices in Khayelitsha. The post offices provide a daily postal service. Post is delivered to formal and squatter houses. The congestion and lack of infrastructure in squatter areas make it difficult for post offices to deliver a good service. The post offices are in the process of installing containers with 200 post boxes all over the squatter areas, such as the one in Site C. Containerised post boxes have become a well-known new postal service network and part of a



people-friendly service orientation and vision.

### 5.10.3 Telecommunication Service:

Telkom is now installing telephones in Khayelitsha, including in squatter houses. This, according to Telkom, is to raise the standard of living of the disadvantaged community of Khayelitsha who had no access to telephones at homes in the past. (Jacobs, interviewed on 27/08/96). In November 1999 Telkom installed telephones at about 50 000 houses in Khayelitsha, including shacks.

## 5.11 NGO'S INVOLVEMENT IN HEALTH-RELATED DEVELOPMENT

NGOs are at the centre of development in Khayelitsha, especially regarding social welfare and health development. These specific NGOs are: Catholic Caring, Child Welfare, Community Kitchen, FAMSA, Life Line, Nicro, Mfesane-Nombulelo, Philani, SACLA, SHAWCO and private practitioners.

- **Catholic Caring:** This church organisation deals with daily family problems such as hunger. They assist the community of Khayelitsha during natural disasters such as winter floods and fires. They provide the community with blankets and food parcels and milk for children whose parents are unemployed. The organisation networks with other organisations doing the same work in Khayelitsha and also assists the aged in getting old-age pensions (Catholic Caring spokesperson, interviewed on 06/05/96).
- **Child Welfare:** Child Welfare deals with abandoned, abused and neglected children. These children are collected from the streets and referred to Child Welfare by hospitals and social workers. Elukhuselweni Children's Home was established by Child Welfare. The home accommodates children from 1-13 years of age (Ngidi interviewed on 06/05/96).
- **Community Kitchen:** Community Kitchen provides soup at ten cents a pint to the destitute of Khayelitsha, e.g. unemployed people, the aged, and underfed school children (Madikane interviewed on 06/05/96).
- **FAMSA (Family and Marriage Society of South Africa):** This organisation renders services such as family building and relationships, family counselling, individual counselling, marital counselling and post-divorce counselling (Sigonya interviewed on 06/05/96).
- **Life Line, Child Line and Rape Crisis:** These organisations deal with problems such as rape,



battered women, counselling, substance abuse and child abuse. The organisations work closely with the courts, SAPS, clinics and hospitals, Nicro and social workers. The organisations concentrate mainly on social problems and problem children and encourage sex education as a mechanism to prevent sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS (Veleko interviewed on 06/05/96).

- **Nicro:** Nicro deals with crime prevention in Khayelitsha. It also rehabilitates ex-prisoners and juvenile delinquents. Nicro works hand in hand with community organisations (political and non-political), SAPS and magistrate's courts. Nicro encourages job creation in the belief that unemployment is a source of crime in South Africa (Beja interviewed on 06/05/96).
- **Mfesane-Nombulelo:** This organisation is a social welfare NGO. Three meals a day are organised by the organisation. The people serviced by the organisation are collected each day and delivered by the organisation's mini-bus, except Saturdays and Sundays. Like Catholic Caring, the organisation helps handicapped and elderly people (Febana interviewed on 06/05/96).
- **Philani:** The organisation promotes primary health care in Khayelitsha, especially with regard to underweight children. The aim of Philani is to ensure that each child receives proper nutrition and health care, and the right to grow and develop to their full mental and physical potential. The Philani Nutrition Rehabilitation Project takes care of malnourished children. Hospitals, community health workers and Cape Metropolitan Council clinics and hospitals in Cape Town refer severely malnourished children to the Medical Nutrition Rehabilitation Programme. The Philani Health and Nutrition Education Programme takes the form of daily meetings during which a range of health-related subjects such as TB, AIDS, breast feeding and oral dehydration are discussed (Matolengwe interviewed on 06/05/96).
- **SACLA (South African Christian Leadership Association):** SACLA was established in the 1980s. The association consists of trained Community Health Workers (CHW). The function of the CHW is to promote health care and to visit the various homes that are in need of rehabilitation or health care services, especially for physically disabled and elderly people.
- **SHAWCO:** SHAWCO, like Philani, is involved in primary health care. SHAWCO has mobile clinics in Khayelitsha to promote primary health care. In order to meet its goal SHAWCO works closely with medical practitioners, nurses and social workers. SHAWCO assists elderly people with three meals a day. Youth outings are also organised and workshops are conducted on sexually transmitted diseases. SHAWCO is also involved in school feeding



programmes that are subsidised by the Peninsula School Feeding Association (Alexander interviewed on 06/05/96).

- **Private Practitioners:** Private practitioners play a vital role in providing health services in Khayelitsha.

The involvement of the above-mentioned NGOs in Khayelitsha relates to the analysis of participation discussed in section 2.3. This is also in line with the Development Strategic Planning model proposed in section 2.5.

## 5.12 CULTURE AND TOURISM

Culture and tourism play a vital role in Khayelitsha's development. The City of Tygerberg opened a tourism information office in Mew Way Hall in Khayelitsha in November 1999. The office will provide tourists with information about Khayelitsha. "Izwi labe Mbola" (The voice of the indigenous people) is the cultural organisation which promotes African culture in Khayelitsha along with other development spheres in the area. "Izwi labe Mbola" established the centre widely known as "Imbola Handcraft". The centre is involved in a variety of activities such as making sculptures of African origin, bead work, sewing of traditional dress, writing of African literature and poems, and training in traditional dance. The centre is also a school for training vocalists in mainly music of African origin. "Izwi labe Mbola" is looking forward to open a market for the products it produces in neighbouring states. Khayelitsha's enrichment in African culture could attract tourists. In December 1997 about 40% tourists visited Khayelitsha and showed their interest in cultural activities that take place in the area. In 1999 the number of tourists who visited Khayelitsha increased from 40% to 51,2%. This number is expected to increase in the year 2000 due to the opening of two guest houses in Khayelitsha in November 1999.

## 5.13 CONCLUSION

As this chapter tries to indicate, there is a need for Khayelitsha to improve its physical infrastructure and service rendering. The adequate provision of physical infrastructure development in Khayelitsha could create jobs, alleviate poverty and have an effect on the distribution of income. Unemployment, poverty and income distribution were discussed as social related problems in Chapter four of this thesis. Local markets and roads can be built or existing roads improved. This could create



employment.

The provision of physical infrastructure in Khayelitsha could also open up economic opportunities that did not previously exist in the area, which could result in economic growth and job creation.

The provision of physical infrastructure should involve a business development infrastructure that will have an impact on economic growth. Poverty alleviation could help to provide the stable social and political environment required for economic growth. The infrastructure development could raise the level of investment that is lacking at present. Appropriate allocation of investment could increase productivity and improve poor social conditions mentioned in chapter five. This is essential if, for example, small business opportunities are to increase.

In order for Khayelitsha to improve its infrastructure there is a need for partnership agreements between community organisations, local authorities, unions and the private sector. The terms of reference of such partnerships should aim to address poverty and include aspects such as inclusive decision-making among the partners, transparency, and accountability as mentioned in section 2.3. The participation of the community should prevent a top-down decision-making process, which is the opposite of participatory planning discussed in section 2.4, Participatory Planning.

The local authority has the responsibility for ensuring that all people living in its jurisdiction have access to adequate and affordable infrastructure service on a sustainable basis. This thesis argues that it does not mean that the local authority must itself control service delivery operations, rather, it must oversee and monitor service delivery operations whether managed by NGO's, the public sector or the private sector especially if partnership agreements are implemented. It must ensure that community objectives/needs are met. If for instance one looks at the involvement of NGO's in rendering health service in Khayelitsha, it is clear that the partnership with civic society organisation is a need.

The local authority should supply infrastructure services through service departments and work closely with NGO's that are already rendering services in Khayelitsha. Generally, individual infrastructure services should not be separated from autonomous units, with clear business objectives, or the financial autonomy to pursue those community needs. In some instances little is known about how the municipality uses its resources, and clear, comprehensible financial information



is sometimes not available to customers or ratepayers. This relates to the lack of participation by ordinary citizens in Khayelitsha. Viable infrastructure and service rendering in Khayelitsha should follow the Development Strategic Planning Model that the author proposed (See Figure 4 in chapter two).

In addition there is no real competitive pressure on service providers and sometimes ratepayers are dissatisfied with the level or quality of service and have to rely primarily on the political process as a means of resolving these concerns. The proposed partnerships could provide quality service delivery and satisfy the ratepayers who seen to be dissatisfied with the poor quality of service being provided at this point in time.

This chapter discussed physical infrastructure development-related issues. The next chapter provides a discussion on economic/business development and projects.

## **6. ECONOMIC / BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT AND PROJECTS**

### **6.1 INTRODUCTION**

The previous chapter discussed physical development issues.

Chapter Six gives an analysis of economic and business development and projects in Khayelitsha. The issues that shape the discussion of this chapter are business and economic development challenges, and the development of projects including pending, current and completed projects. This chapter contributes to the research problem in terms of describing the business and economic conditions in Khayelitsha.

### **6. ECONOMIC/BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT & PROJECTS**

- Economic Development Challenges
- Informal Sector
- Economic Growth
- Lack of Local Industries
- Business Planning
- Capital Outflow
- Public Sector
- Projects
- Community Participation in Planning and Management of Projects

### **6.2 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES**

Regarding economic and business related problems, special attention is given to the following challenges:

#### **6.2.1 Informal Sector**

Khayelitsha's economy is dominated by the informal business sector, as is the case in a large part of South Africa (See Falkena and Luus, 1995). Trade-related activities in the local economy include the taxi industry, meat market, fruit and vegetable market, shebeens and restaurants, spaza shops, hair salons and barber shops, shoes and clothing markets, repair services (e.g. motor, radio, watch and shoe repairs), furniture, food processing (e.g. traditional "umqomboti" brewing, bakery products, and dairy), metalwork, building material, arts and crafts and other. These informal micro-activities make a profit of about 53,2% (this percentage is based on the researcher's deduction). The profit associated with this sector indicates that the informal sector is the common denominator in Khayelitsha's local economy. The sector is also the largest employer (See section 4.6). Although the sector plays a vital role in Khayelitsha's economy, it is characterised by problems such as lack of professional business administration, marketing skills and financial support. The issue regarding the informal sector relates to poor planning of Khayelitsha, where the development of formal business was not considered. This could be linked



to the historical analysis provided in section 3.4.

Informal trading is also part of the informal sector. The scarcity of small industries results in informal trading in the area as a last resort against unemployment. Informal trading activities take place along the busy roads, at stations, road junctions, the Site C taxi rank informal market and other places of high pedestrian traffic. The systematic planning and development of such areas are necessary for the provision of shelter, storage facilities and low-cost trader accommodation. Such provisions were not made during the development of the Sanlam Centre in Site B next to Nonkqubela station. Hawkers who had been trading there for quite some time were denied small trading accommodation. Complaints were voiced by KHABA to Sanlam and KDF. With regard to the development of Khayelitsha station by the Central Business District (CBD), the development of informal trade should be given serious consideration (See Wesgro, 1995: 10-15).

The assumption underpinning the need for the formalisation of the informal sector is based on the argument set out below.

The informal sector is the most convenient and frequently used of the economic infrastructure of Khayelitsha. The sector describes either less or more formal structures that are used for predominantly retail functions usually at intersections (nodes), or along roadsides (strips). The smaller informal enterprises are frequently innovative, labour intensive, adaptable, competitive, fill economic niches left vacant by larger enterprises, and provide important on-the-job training and entrepreneurial skills. The sector plays a crucial role in the formal-informal and small-larger enterprise continuum (See Wesgro, 1995: 10-25).

Strategies to improve access to opportunities for medium and smaller traders are important. Integrating Khayelitsha's physical infrastructure, ensuring viable public transport, supporting other strategic outlets of various levels, such as access to the purchasing power of wealthier people, and internalising local residents' expenditure are strategic options. The informal sector improves opportunities for other operators at different levels of business.

The informal sector includes corner-shops, which provide a link in the continuum from informal street vendors to more formal enterprises. They can take on a range of forms, from permanent



formal premises to simple display stalls. This broadens access to potential operators, reducing initial investment in physical infrastructure. In addition the strategic location of corner-shops is important. The potential of business activity associated with public transport interchanges remains high. This is reduced where these facilities do not enjoy substantial or sustained use. Road-based transport (especially taxi transport), which is frequently used, do not have stopping patterns. This inhibits the locational choices available to operators; however, the importance of exposure to road routes is heightened (See section 5.9, transport).

Corner-shops can fulfil an incubator role, where operators are able to learn from the experience of others in close proximity. They also provide an identifiable business address that may help mobilise financial support from institutions more easily than home-based businesses. The availability of retail outlets within convenient proximity to home may have a beneficial consequence for small local suppliers, such as those growing vegetables for sale (See Wesgro, 1995: 20-27).

### **6.2.2 Economic Growth**

Development stakeholders in Khayelitsha face the challenge of creating jobs and stimulating the growth of the local economy. At this point economic growth of Khayelitsha can be analysed in different ways by looking at two schools of thought. One school argues that small informal enterprises should be upgraded or developed through strict control of intervention from outside investors. Outside investors are viewed by this school as opportunists who come to the area only to make a profit and leave the area underdeveloped. This school does not have much support in the area. In contrast the second school welcomes outside investors, as the local entrepreneurs operate in joint ventures with them and give special attention to local needs. This school has huge support in Khayelitsha and most of the business organisations, such as KHABA, fall into this category.

Besides the argument presented by the two schools, sustainable economic growth in the area can take place only if certain aspects are taken into consideration by development role-players. Appropriate suggestions include the formalisation of the informal sector, personnel services, catering, entertainment, NGOs' economic activities, and effective use of local resources for the benefit of the community, e.g. sand mining.



### **6.2.3 Lack of Local Industries**

Lack of formal industries or enterprises is another shortcoming in the area that retards economic growth. The absence of formal industries results in high unemployment, which eventually reduces the income and capital share in the area. Formal industries are established mainly in surrounding areas of Khayelitsha, such as Philippi Industry, Airport Industry and Belhar Industry. The establishment of such industries does not contribute to the economic upliftment of the community of Khayelitsha in terms of increasing its capital income share benefits and reducing unemployment. The real economic challenge faced by Khayelitsha is nothing more than the formalisation of the informal sector (See Wesgro, 1995: 15-30).

Economic success in Khayelitsha lies in the establishment of formal small, micro and medium enterprises (SMME's). Already over 50% of South Africa's working population is employed in the SMME sector. The informal sector activity in Khayelitsha accounts for about 11% of the manufacturing sector. There is no doubt that the formal sector will generate more income for the local authority and contribute to the country's GDP. (See also *SA Success Summer Magazine*, 1996/97:58 and *Entrepreneur Training Magazine for South Africa's Entrepreneurs*, 1997:3). It is also imperative for economic development in Khayelitsha to draw formal industries on a large scale and to improve commercial facilities and transport infrastructure. The problems of the informal sector, lack of economic growth and lack of local industries are typical of the economic problems raised in the research problem of this thesis (See Chapter One).

### **6.2.4 Business Planning**

Early planning for Khayelitsha did not cater for industrial development. It excluded facilities for larger industries and small enterprises, since the area was meant as a dormitory area. This again relates to development malpractices by the previous government (See Chapter Three). Business planning is also associated with business activity axes. Wesgro (1995 : 37) asserted that there is very little provision for commercial and mixed commercial or industrial developments along any of the major transport routes, such as Lansdowne Road, Spine Road and Mew Way.

Lack of proper planning also hampers the development of a town centre for Khayelitsha. At this point a segment of Town 2 near Khayelitsha station is earmarked for a town centre, but there is no clear perception as to the economic base for a CBD (Central Business District). Town 2 is not



the right place for the development of such a centre, since the area is off the major through-routes. It is important for business stakeholders in Khayelitsha to ensure that new plans are drawn and to promote industrial development in the area. The Development Strategic Planning Model could be used as a tool for business planning in Khayelitsha (See figure 4 in chapter two). It is essential that scopes for concentrated business activity axes should be explored in all areas. The business-planning problem best describes and contributes to an understanding of the hypothesis of this thesis.

### **6.2.5 Capital Outflow**

Khayelitsha has a high capital outflow. The outflow makes it difficult for the area to develop economically on its own, and puts Khayelitsha in a position of dependence in its economic relations with the larger metropolitan area. Khayelitsha's economic development is more dependent on external capital. The developers sometimes come to Khayelitsha with their own business agendas, which differ drastically from those of the community and KDF. Wesgro (1995: 22) estimated the capital outflow of Khayelitsha at about R22 million of the total locally created income. Profits of about R1 million go to outsiders. For Wesgro this amount is a large share, which illustrates the close interaction between the Khayelitsha economy and that of the metropolitan area. Khayelitsha should promote local investment and savings instead of relying on external investment and saving. The traditional savings and credit organisations play a vital role in business finance, hence the modern financial institutions generally fail to reach the neediest part of the community with the capital they need. Traditional savings and credit organisations are community savings, stokvels, credit clubs and funeral societies. The traditional clubs or savings organisations sometimes provide capital to small businesses or help to finance certain household expenses, such as buying goods, payment instalments, school fees, burial feasts and other basic household necessities.

In order for Khayelitsha to have sustainable business development, traditional financial organisations should be more formalised. Banks could administer the financial accounts for these clubs. The government, on the other hand, should promote competition in the financial sector by means of financial intermediation and development of "people's" banks.



### **6.2.6 Public Sector**

Mention has been made of income and share benefits. The local council is the only major employer in Khayelitsha, but the income generated from this sector is low compared to income generated by the informal sector. Khayelitsha should involve government branches or state departments e.g. magistrate's courts, education department and department of home affairs to create more formal employment in order to increase its income for further development (See Wesgro, 1995: 25-30)

### **6.3 PROJECTS**

As shown in the international development literature, Chambers (1997) and Conyers and Hills (1990), projects play an important role in generating income and stimulating economic growth in Khayelitsha. Projects can ensure maximum participation in decision-making processes and accountability. They address the needs of the community in the short, medium and long term. By the time the research was completed in **1997** some projects were in the planning stage, some were still running and some have been completed.

The projects include inter alia the following:

#### **6.3.1 The Market Project:**

The former Western Cape Minister of Transport, Mr Ramatlakane, launched the market project, at Site C on Friday, 24 May 1996. The project is one of 21 projects of the Community-Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) launched in the Western Cape in 1996. The project involves the construction of 60 lockable market stalls in Site C. The National Department of Public Works has made R6.3 million available to the Western Cape for CBPWP projects of which R610 000 will go to this project at Site C. According to former Minister Ramatlakane the total project cost is estimated at R810 000; the remaining R200 000 would be privately funded. The project is estimated to employ about 6 600 people. The time schedule for the project was June/August 1996 for the first phase (Ramatlakane, interviewed on 24/05/96). The project is scheduled for completion in November 1998 (Lingeletu West Town Council, 1996:12). This project was completed in 1999.

### **6.3.2 Upgrading of Site C Sports Facilities:**

This project is meant to upgrade the Site C sports stadium. The upgrading will include siteworks, water networks, roads and stormwater, and sporting facilities that are necessary for sports development. The development of the stadium will include rugby, soccer, netball and tennis facilities. The project will cost R300 000. Funding is still awaiting the approval of the CMC. Due to the limited amount of funding available and the long delays experienced, the intention is to complete the detail planning and design of the Site C sports facility with the funding at Council's disposal. The CMC has been approached regarding the reallocation of funds (Lingeletu West Town Council, 1996:13-14). The project is scheduled to be finished in the last quarter of 1998. This Project was completed in 1999.

### **6.3.3 Line Shops and Market Stalls:**

The project is planned for business development in Khayelitsha. It is an attempt to improve the operating conditions of informal traders. It is meant to formalise the informal sector and improve facilities for new emerging entrepreneurs who used to be in the informal sector. Project planning is under way. Funding of R500 000 has been proposed, but the approval of the CMC and RDP is still awaited (Lingeletu West Town Council, 1996:16). This project was still running in January 2000.

### **6.3.4 Upgrading of Minor Roads, Town 2 Village 4 C:**

The project will involve the upgrading of minor roads and the stormwater drainage system for 1 581 erven. Project planning has been completed. The estimated expenditure for the project is R300 000 allocated by the CMC and implementation of the project is under way (Lingeletu West Town Council, 1996:16-17). In January 2000 the project was not yet started due to lack of funds.

### **6.3.5 Flood Alleviation:**

The project is to be undertaken in Town 2 Village 3 and Lansdowne Road. It is planned to remove excessive vegetation, to build corrective earthworks, and to construct earth berms.



Application has been submitted to the CMC for the estimated amount of R350 000. When the research was conducted in 1996 no official confirmation had been received from the CMC and the project had not yet been started (Lingeletu West Town Council, 1996:17-18). This project was completed in 1999.

### **6.3.6 Flood Alleviation - Relocation of Squatters in Flood-Prone Areas:**

The project is aimed at relocating informal squatters who are currently living in areas not zoned for residential use and which are prone to flooding. The projects will ultimately result in the provision of serviced erven. The planning phase of the project is still under way. The amount of R 230 000 has been proposed for the completion of the project. The final date for the project is the last quarter of 1998 (Lingeletu West Town Council, 1996:20). This project had not yet been started in January 2000. Squatters were still occupying sites. Council was planning to relocate squatters in service plots in Harare by mid June 2000.

### **6.3.7 Flood Alleviation - High Water Table in Macassar Area:**

The project is to overcome the problems experienced in the area with regard to the high water table. The aim of the project is to install sub-surface drains. The funding source and amount have not yet been finalised (Lingeletu West Town Council, 1996:21-22). This project was completed in 1998.

### **6.3.8 Housing Project - Town 3 Village 5:**

The project is aimed at erecting 5 536 housing units in terms of the consolidation subsidies scheme. The source of finance is the Regional Housing Board (RHB) and the amount involved R18 197 500. (Ngcuka, interviewed on 3/05/96). In January 2000 this project had not yet been started due to political conflict.

### **6.3.9 Macassar Health Clinic:**

The project is aimed at the extension of the clinic of Macassar Town 3, Village 5. The funding of the project comes from IDT and the amount is R234 000. A trust fund has been set up and two

councillors serve on the Trust Management Committee, which also has an IDT representative. The project is still in the planning phase (respondent Nurse and Doctor: 28/03/96). This project was completed in 1998.

#### **6.3.10 Magisterial Complex:**

The project involves the construction of magisterial offices in the CBD area in Town 2, Khayelitsha station. The cost of the project is estimated to be R5 000 000 and will be financed by the National Department of Transport (NDT) and Public Works. Architects have been appointed and are in the process of drawing up preliminary plans (Schwella interviewed on 15/04/96). This project was still running in January 2000.

#### **6.3.11 Khayelitsha Station Transport Interchange:**

The area earmarked for the project is Khayelitsha, Town 2. The project involves developing interchange facilities aimed at meeting passenger needs. Metropolitan Transport Planning has informed the Lingeletu Town Council that the project can proceed as soon as possible in 1997-1998 (Sogayise interviewed on 18/12/96). In November 1999 the project had not yet started. The first phase of the project has been completed in 1999. In January 2000 the second phase of the projects was still running.

#### **6.3.12 Nolungile Station Transport Interchange:**

The project intends to develop interchange facilities to meet passenger needs. The estimated cost of the project is R1,5 million to be financed by the Department of Transport. Only preliminary designs and planning have been done (Sogayise interviewed on 18/12/96). In January 2000 the project had not yet started and the Council was still busy planning the project. More funding is required.

#### **6.3.13 Project Competition Venue - Mew Way Site:**

The corner of Lansdowne Road and Mew Way in Khayelitsha was earmarked for the project. The project aims to provide a competition venue for boxing. The venue will seat 10 000



spectators. The cost of the project is estimated at R56,45 million. (Sogayise interviewed on 18/12/96). The project was completed in 1998.

#### **6.3.14 Isikokele Primary School Project:**

The aim of the project is to build a primary school on plot D62 Site C (Erf No. 51272). The financing source is the Department of Education. The project will cost about R5,2 million. Due to problems experienced with the relocation of squatters occupying the school site, the tender validity period expired (Sogayise was interviewed on 18/12/96). Tenders were called again in 1997. This project was completed in March 1999.

#### **6.3.15 Khayelitsha Central Business District (CBD) Project:**

There has always been consensus among local and provincial authorities, officials, politicians, planning consultants, Wesgro and local community organisations, such as KDF that the proposed CBD area could play a significant role towards meeting the needs of the people of Khayelitsha. Initial proposals for the development of Khayelitsha's CBD were sought in 1994, and there was a lengthy participation process resulting in the eventual adoption of Macroplan and Baynham Theron's concept plan for the CBD (Downing interviewed on 28/04/97). In January 1999 the project had not yet been started. In January 2000 a private contractor was installing the underground infrastructure.

Khayelitsha CBD is a publicly owned, ±75ha, centrally located vacant site adjacent to Khayelitsha station. It is argued that a conventional, retail-focused CBD as planned is not appropriate. Instead there is a need to rethink the approach towards accelerating economic and business development in Khayelitsha. The reasons for such a shift are summarised as follows:

- Many of the traditional public facility growth impetuses planned for the CBD are not likely to occur at present.
- Existing spending and activity patterns are concentrated elsewhere. At present the business interest is particularly dampened in the vicinity of the CBD.
- Retail opportunities are usually a consequence of job creation at growth points and activities from other sectors, and similarly should respond in location to areas of high



activity.

- Local spending power is not great, hence an excessive number of large retail outlets in close proximity could result in a zero-sum game to capture local income.
- Experience has shown sensitivity of the local retail market to the entry of larger stores.
- The most significant employment opportunities are offered by thousands of home or street-based spazas, street market outlets, shebeens, hairdressers, tailors and repair shops in the informal sector, as indicated in section 6.2.1.
- The earmarked CBD area seems unsuitable and unfeasible for the informal sector, such as home-based shops and industries, the outlets and workplaces along streets and high-activity intersections (Downing interviewed on 28/04/97). The reality of the CBD is that there is consensus that a different approach to the tender process should be considered, accepting generally the points raised that it is not practical to put the entire ±70ha site to private development tender. The issues inhibiting the CBD development process from moving forward have been resolved. These include the following:
  - The rejection of CBD land claims by the Baymo Trust and Intersite.
  - Disagreements on the CBD Plan.
  - The project competition venue earmarked on the CBD land has been moved to Mew Way.

There was also agreement that, given the pressure for development delivery, some initial part of the site be opened for developmental proposals (Downing interviewed on 28/04/97). The cost of the CBD project is estimated at R36 million. It is scheduled to start in the middle of 1998. In January 2000 the project was up and running.

Chances are slim that a retail-anchor can drive the start of a CBD for Khayelitsha. Local economic stakeholders argued that CBD development in Khayelitsha should encompass various developments other than focusing only on retailing. This in essence will help in the gradual upliftment of the community and the broadening of its economic base. The driving forces behind the suggested CBD development could be linked to public sector projects such as a government department, academic institutions, post office, hospital, municipal offices, etc.



### **6.3.16 Offal Handling Facilities:**

This is a project for offal washing and waste disposal facilities. CMC is the financing source for the project to the amount of R38 876. The project was completed in 1998.

### **6.3.17 New Fire Station - Khayelitsha:**

The Engineer's Depot, Town 2, Khayelitsha is the area where the project will be implemented. The project is for the provision of a double-bay fire station to accommodate two early-response vehicles and to provide accommodation i.e. rest-rooms for a staff complement of 12 and provision for ablution facilities, a kitchen unit, office space, a storeroom and a gym (a total area of  $\pm 300\text{m}^2$ ). It was envisaged that four of these smaller fire stations would eventually be built to provide for the total needs of Khayelitsha. The estimated cost of the project is R731 177 and CMC is the financing source. This project was completed in May 1999.

### **6.3.18 Mandela Park Sports Complex - Phase 2:**

The project is aimed at the development of a sports complex in Mandela Park. The project is meant to provide, among other things, four change-rooms with shower facilities, ablution facilities, and cricket training nets, cricket pitch and a tennis-training wall. The Greater Cape Town Sports Commission is the major financing source of the project and the estimated cost is R400 000. The first phase was completed in 1997 and in January 2000 Council was still looking for funding to start the second phase of the project.

### **6.3.19 Development of N2 Buffer North - Site C - Completion of Phase I of the Original Project:**

The project provides roads and services. At this point 325 of a total of 798 erven have been completed. The project includes the provision of roads as well as stormwater sewerage and water systems. The Housing Board is the major financial source at a cost of R2 283 744 (95/96 financial year). In 1998 the project was completed

### **6.3.20 Development of N2 Buffer South - Green Point - Phase I:**

The project provides roads and services for 400 out of 1 774 erven, and also includes stormwater, sewerage and water systems. The Regional Housing Board is the financing source of the project at a cost of R4 768 700. This project was completed in 1998.

### **6.3.21 Survey of Sites:**

The project will survey the 2 995 erven in Site C for the transfer of these erven to their rightful owners. CMC is responsible for financing the project at a cost of R553 475. The project was completed in 1998.

### **6.3.22 Street Names:**

The project is intended to provide proper street names for all erven in the whole of Khayelitsha. The budget for the project is R300 000. This project was completed in 1999.

### **6.3.23 Upgrading of Streets and Stormwater Systems - Town 1 Village 3A:**

The project is for the upgrading of streets and the provision of stormwater drainage in Site B - Khayelitsha. The project costs R7 444 000. The City of Tygerberg is responsible for financing the project. This project was completed in 1999.

### **6.3.24 Upgrading of Streets and Stormwater Systems- Town I Village 4C:**

The project is intended to upgrade streets and provide stormwater drainage. The National Public Works Programme is the financing source and the estimated cost is R4 470 000. This project was completed in 1999.

### **6.3.25 Manyanani Multi-Purpose Community Centre - Phase I:**

The project was planned to build a multi-purpose community centre known as "Manyanani" in Macassar, Khayelitsha. CMC and RDP will provide financial backing amounting to R2 000 000.



This project was completed in 1998.

#### **6.3.26 Mew Way Taxi Embayments:**

The project aims to develop the Mew Way Taxi Embayments through the provision of a total of five mini-bus taxi terminals. CMC provides financial backing, but the project cost has not yet been stated. In January 2000 this project was still at the planning stage.

#### **6.3.27 Clean and Green Campaign "Work to Win" Park:**

The project is aimed at providing a park for recreational purposes in Khayelitsha. The Park will include an amphitheatre, play areas, splash pool and fountain, food garden and a general park. Ablution facilities will be erected and grassing and planting of trees will form part of the project by the Provincial Public Works Programme (PPWP). The project finance amounts to R653 650. The balance of funding to be procured is R326 325. The first phase of the project was completed in 1998. In November 1999 this project was still run. In January 2000 Council was still planning the second phase of the project.

#### **6.3.28 Clean and Green Campaign:**

The project is aimed at planting trees and grass at schools and their surroundings, and to provide workshops and training on the greening of Khayelitsha at schools. The financial source and amount had not yet been determined at the time the research was conducted. This project was completed in 1998.

#### **6.3.29 Transfer of State-funded Land:**

This is to transfer the ownership of 28 451 state-funded properties. The National Housing Board is the financing source and the estimated cost is R6 500 000. This project was completed in 1999.

### **6.3.30 Impendulo Primary School Project:**

The aim of the project is to build a primary school in Macassar. Funding for the building of this school has been allocated by the National RDP Fund and amounts to R5 200 000. The project commenced early in 1997. This project was completed in 1998.

### **6.3.31 Isiphiwo Primary School Project:**

The project was initiated to build a primary school in Harare. The National RDP Fund has funded the project, which will cost R5 200 000. The project was started in early 1997. This project was completed in 1998.

### **6.3.32 KwaMfundo Secondary School Project:**

The project was initiated to build a secondary school at Harare. It will cost R5 600 000 and is funded by the National RDP Fund. The project commenced in January 1997. This project was completed in 1998.

### **6.3.33 Intyatambo Secondary School Project:**

The aim of the project is to build a secondary school at Macassar. The project is funded by the Western Cape Education Department and will cost R5 600 000. This project was completed in 1998.

### **6.3.34 Library Town 2 - Khayelitsha:**

The new library in Town 2 - . The financial source was CMC at a cost of ±R1,8 million. In January 2000 the project has not yet been started due to lack of funds.

### **6.3.35 Cleaning of Sewerage Pipes in Site C:**

The cleaning of sewerage pipes and manholes has been completed in both Thembokwezi and Site C. CMC was the financing source of the amount of R1,3 million. This project was completed in



1999.

#### **6.3.36 Cleaning of Stormwater Pipes, Culverts and Manholes:**

The cleaning of stormwater pipes culverts and manholes have been completed in some areas in Khayelitsha. Stormwater dams and the outlet to Kuils River in Macassar have been opened. The main arteries in T3V5 and T3V3 have been cleaned. A catchpit team has cleaned all catchpits associated with the cleaned stormwater lines. This project was completed in 1999.

#### **6.3.37 Repair of Roads:**

The repair of potholes, kerbs and channels and the installation of subsurface drains were completed. The construction of a 600 m long road section in front of the shopping complex and police station in Site B has been completed. This includes the provision of subsoils and the repair of potholes around the complex. CMC funded the project at a cost of R450 000. This project was completed in 1999.

#### **6.3.38 Provision of Rain Shelters at the New Site C Mini-Bus Taxi Terminus:**

The project provides rain shelters for 12 taxis at loading areas at the new mini-bus taxi terminus in Site C. The project was funded by the CMC at a cost of R474 000. The project was completed in 1997.

#### **6.3.39 Provision of Bus Shelters:**

The project makes provision for concrete bus shelters. CMC is the financial source of the project. The estimated cost of the project is R88 000. The project was completed in 1996.

#### **6.3.40 Repair to Foul Sewers and Stormwater Manholes and Catchpits:**

Repairs to foul sewers, stormwater manholes and catchpits were completed in some areas in Khayelitsha. CMC funded the project at a cost of R1 426 993,81. The project was completed in 1999.

#### **6.3.41 Cleaning of Sewerage Pipes:**

Cleaning of sewerage pipes has been completed in areas such as Site B and Towns 2 and 3. The project was funded by the CMC. The cost of the project was R800 000 (Lingeletu West Town Council, 1996: 22-23). The project was completed in 1999.

### **6.4 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF PROJECTS**

Since the establishment of the KDF, its participation in development is still minimal. Decisions regarding projects in Khayelitsha are still taken by authorities in Council. Projects in Khayelitsha are still managed by Council officials exclusive of KDF. This is contrary to the theoretical analysis provided in section 2.3 regarding participation. Suggestions were made and discussed and resolutions taken by the plenary on how Khayelitsha projects should be managed to reflect participatory planning discussed in section 2.4. The Khayelitsha community proposed an inclusive participatory management body to manage projects. According to this proposal, Khayelitsha's participatory management body consists of Council officials, KDF and the private sector. The proposal corresponds with the IDP concept (See IDP White Paper on Local Government, 1998). The fundamental task of this body is to create and manage projects that can create employment, which is discussed as one of the challenges in Khayelitsha (See section 4.6).

In order for CBD development to be successful, it is necessary for the City of Tygerberg to initiate something like "Operation Spaza/Shebeen Upgrade". This will ensure the local survival of entrepreneurs so that development along the spines or a CBD will not ignore the needs and potential of those located outside the residential suburbs. Such a strategy also seems important in the light of the end of the tax moratorium. Local entrepreneurs now have to generate earnings in order to get into the process of tax repayment.

### **6.5 CONCLUSION**

As discussed in this chapter, enterprise development is critical in the war against poverty and unemployment raised as Khayelitsha's major challenges in section 4.6. Ultimately its



contribution can be the engine of economic growth, which is currently lacking in Khayelitsha. To alleviate Khayelitsha's social-related problems, poverty and unemployment, it is important to create an "entrepreneurial class" which is creative, energetic and self-reliant with "world-class" aspirations. This entrepreneurial class is needed in Khayelitsha in order to address poverty and unemployment. Khayelitsha at present relies virtually entirely on outside investors to create jobs. This is contrary to the concept of self-reliance mentioned in the theory. The self-reliance concept is viewed in the theory of development as an important development principal (See Oakley 1991: 14-18). Khayelitsha's youngsters in their teens and twenties are willing to work, but have no fixed employment. Only one in ten school-leavers are likely to find employment in the formal sector. This, in essence, causes the crime problem mentioned in section 4.9.

The sooner we move away from the notion that you are unemployed until someone else gives you a job, the better. This is the challenge of entrepreneurial development to save Khayelitsha's people. Whatever their circumstances, communities should create more meaningful economic opportunities for themselves. This means the ascent of the enterprise ladder to self-fulfilment begins right where they start developing their own resources and capabilities. People's capacity to empower themselves must be improved at all cost.

We cannot look to the formal sector to reduce the highest recorded poverty and unemployment rates in Khayelitsha, even if our economy does achieve the magic 6% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth target, which the government has set itself. (See SA Success Summer Magazine, 1996/97:59).

Self-employment is often forgotten, but Khayelitsha is facing a critical dimension to the job creation challenge. Much has been made of the power of small business; however, many of the opportunities waiting to be realised by the poor and economically marginalised people of Khayelitsha will never be sufficiently structured or dynamic enough to even warrant the title "business". Their importance, however, should not be overlooked, for they provide the first cracks in the wall of economic despair, empowering people to begin to shape a different kind of future for them. This means active participation of ordinary citizens in their development, unlike in Khayelitsha where citizen participation is not in practice, as a result the citizens are not taking the ownership of projects. The participatory management body proposed by KDF should use the Development Strategic Planning Model (See Figure 4 in chapter two) as their tool to manage

projects in Khayelitsha.

In order to address Khayelitsha's problems, it is important that lending organisations avoid the development equivalent of the free lunch – the “one day” loan. Lending organisations for instance grant hawkers or informal businesses a one day loan of about R100.00 but that literally means a payback period of 24 hours; R500.00 to be repaid within a fortnight. On the other hand hawkers have to work hard before they get their mini-loans from lending organisations. They must pay about R120.00 to R150.00 to attend basic business skills training course, which according to this thesis is a hefty investment for the poor people of Khayelitsha.

This chapter discussed issues related to economic and business development and projects. The next chapter embodies the general conclusion of this thesis.



## **7. GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **7.1 INTRODUCTION**

#### **7. GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Summary of research findings and suggested recommendation on selected socio-economic related issues

The previous chapter dealt with business and economic development and projects in Khayelitsha. Chapter Seven provides findings and recommendations.

### **7.2 SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS**

It has been established that Khayelitsha is a late-comer in the process of development and that it faces various daunting development challenges due to variety of development malpractices. (See section 1.2, Hypothesis). Khayelitsha is an underdeveloped African township. Poverty is widespread. The broad picture related to poverty is that of high rate of unemployment, illiteracy, low standards of living and low income distribution. This relates to the poverty model perceived by Chambers (1983) and Todaro (1989). It prohibits low income group access to the basics life-sustaining needs such as education, health and housing and those mentioned in chapter four as social problem areas. The highest prevalence of poverty and concentrations of poor households were found to be mostly among the households in squatter areas (See section 4.5).

The historical interpretation provided in chapter three made it clear that development malpractices created the above unfavourable conditions in Khayelitsha in one way or another. The complex interrelated problems mentioned in sections 4.7, 4.8 and 4.11 (health, education and housing) are the end results of apartheid development malpractices and policies (See chapter three).

NGO's, civic organisations and development forums in Khayelitsha have pursued their own survival strategies independent from government or local authority (See chapters three and five). It is argued that politicians in Khayelitsha focus more on political issues and less on development-related issues such as those mentioned in chapter four. They tend to develop a culture of blaming each other rather than to address development problems. Individuals in Khayelitsha tend to have a less participatory planning role in development-related issues. Only



political leaders are the custodians of participatory planning within KDF as mentioned in section 4.16. This is contrary to the participatory planning analysis provided in section 2.3. (Also see Burkey 1993, Lisk 1985 and Swanepoel 1992.).

Participatory planning in Khayelitsha should consider the Development Strategic Planning Model provided in Figure 4 of chapter two. This model could be used as a tool to ensure participation of more individuals in the development of Khayelitsha. The proposed Development Strategic Planning Model corresponds with the poverty model of Chambers (1983). (Also see IDP White Paper on Local Government, 1998).

Political differences between political parties in Khayelitsha retard development. These stems from each party's attempts to maximise power for its political hegemony and survival. The split in KDF mentioned in section 3.7 is best described as the political situation versus development in Khayelitsha (See chapter two). This is often to the detriment of the Khayelitsha community.

### **7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS**

Recommendations in this chapter are meant to provide a summary of strategies that can address problems mentioned in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 (refer to **Diagrammatic Structure** of the thesis on page 7). Such recommendations correspond with the research problem of this thesis, namely; what should be done? The strategies below are proposed as best options to consider. They serve the objective of this thesis, which is to analyse the social realities and explore community participation in Khayelitsha's development (See chapter one).

#### **7.3.1 Public Participation**

Community participation is regarded as an important recommendation since it is evident that development in Khayelitsha lacks public participation (as already mentioned in chapter two) and that Khayelitsha's development is championed by political leaders rather than by people at grassroots level.

As discussed in section 2.3.1, the argument is that a strategy towards creating inclusive development of all stakeholders is essential in addressing problems. It would be neither sensible



nor possible to exclude the other role players in the process. An inclusive participatory planning development approach is thus essential. The ills of Khayelitsha are the result of a variety of factors. Our strategic approach to development must include all participants in order to promote people-centred development as suggested by the Development Strategic Planning Model. Khayelitsha will not be able to create a practical development strategy by perpetuating the culture of blame, which has become characteristic of participants.

The City of Tygerberg has a responsibility to create an enabling environment in which civil society can play a meaningful role. The enabling environment should reflect the Development Strategic Planning Model. It is the local authority, rather than NGOs, who should create “enabling settings” for civil society organisations as suggested by the Development Strategic Planning Model in Figure 4 in chapter two. (Also see Kotze ed., 1997). The local government should not see civil society as a threat, but rather as a partner. In Khayelitsha NGOs are currently well positioned to act as an efficient and credible provider of services to the community. There are many opportunities for collaboration in the area of service delivery, without threatening the independence of the NGO sector. This is what is lacking in Khayelitsha at present.

In addition, Khayelitsha has to balance its own internal integrity with flexibility to respond to external requirements important for its development; thus to search for an elective affinity between its resources, skills and development techniques in line with those of the City of Tygerberg and those required by the business sector. The business sector has an important role to play in seeking and concretising these solutions as suggested by IDP (See IDP White Paper on Local Government, 1998). A partnership between the community of Khayelitsha and other role-players is a necessary strategy required to address poverty and other development challenges already mentioned above. This partnership could also create participation. Participation in Khayelitsha should take a development trend based on people centred approach in order to address its socio-economic problems (See section 2.6, the “new” development paradigm). The people-centred approach is a need for Khayelitsha to foster the following:

- A bottom-up planning strategy (See section 2.3.2, Popular Participation).
- Poverty alleviation (See section 2.2, Towards the meaning of development).
- Community empowerment and sustainability (See section 2.7, Development as a Transformation Process).



- Self-sufficiency (See section 2.3.1, Interpreting Participation).

This analysis corresponds with analysis perceived by Oakley (1991) and Van Baalen and Meyer (1998). In fostering participation in Khayelitsha, it is important for government to institutionalise citizen participation through the Integrated Development Plans (IDP). The IDP suggests that local authorities must move away from fragmented, uncoordinated, segregated planning to integrated, holistic and co-ordinated development planning. The IDP requires that local authority must take into consideration the following:

- compile budgets that reflect the needs of the citizens (See 2.4, Participatory Planning).
- compile a budget based on the philosophy of IDP and
- compile a development profile.

The IDP analysis corresponds with the author's Development Strategic Planning Model illustrated in Figure 4 in chapter two (See IDP White Paper on Local Government 1998 and Theron, *et al.*, eds. 1995).

### **7.3.2 Urban-Rural Development**

The functional link between urban-rural development should be regarded as a major and basic development focus for the development of Khayelitsha. In chapter three it was mentioned that the majority of people in urban settlements in Khayelitsha came from rural areas. They left the rural areas because of a variety of factors, i.e. poor living conditions, poverty and unemployment (See Wilson and Ramphela 1989). In order to ensure the development of urban areas in South Africa, particularly in Khayelitsha, the government has no choice but to commit itself to the development of rural areas. More funds should be pumped into rural development projects such as the establishment of small, medium and large businesses, agricultural scheme development, self-help projects, infrastructure development (roads, railway lines, transport, electricity and telephones) for viable economic development. The combined action of the SMME sector and large-scale businesses is currently lacking in Khayelitsha. The development of rural areas could solve the migration problem discussed in the historical analysis in chapter three. In addition, the housing problem, which is a result of urbanisation, could be addressed. (See Gelderblom and Kok 1994).



### **7.3.3 Educational Development**

Education in Khayelitsha has been identified as a major development challenge as mentioned in section 4.7. It is viewed as a common denominator in development success stories in most of the developing and developed countries, and Khayelitsha can learn from such experiences. This suggests that education in Khayelitsha should be a priority in order to meet long-term development goals. The imbalances in urban and rural education, which currently exist in the education system of South Africa, should be taken into account and rectified. More resources and grants should be allocated to rural education in order to close the gap between rural and urban education. The burden of the payment of school fees, buying of books and other school material should be reconsidered. The empirical evidence is that the school dropout rate in Khayelitsha and in South Africa in general is the result of the inability to pay school fees or books (See section 4.7). A low level of education or complete lack of education is common in Khayelitsha as is the case in South Africa in general (See section 4.7). Most of South Africa's human resources with low education or no education are employed in the informal sector and those employed in the formal sector are mainly employed in the construction industry and mines. This work force is not capable of increasing the country's productivity or stimulating growth. This analysis best describes the present situation in Khayelitsha. The argument suggests that non-formal education is a basic necessity for people who have no formal education. Khayelitsha should strengthen opportunities to improve vocational and technical skills. Investment in technical skills would benefit Khayelitsha in terms of economic growth. Once Khayelitsha grows economically, a better education for all will be provided.

### **7.3.4 Urban and Land Issues in Khayelitsha**

Access to land is a basic necessity. Food and shelter are basic needs, which depend entirely on land. As is the case in Khayelitsha, poverty cannot be alleviated without access to land. The argument suggests that land is basic to the life and death of all. In Khayelitsha, as in South Africa in general, the land issue is a difficult matter to resolve. It has led to two schools of thought, which view the distribution of land differently. One school of thought is of the opinion that land should be taken from those who have too much of it and distributed free to the landless. This school is in favour of drastic state intervention to distribute land. The other school argues



that land should be allocated only to those who can prove that they can use it productively and that land should be transferred only on the basis of willing buyers and willing sellers rather than state intervention (Also see Green Paper on South African Land Policy, 1996:25).

The researcher's argument is in line with the views of the state interventionist school in order to solve the land policy problem in Khayelitsha. Government should reconsider an approach where land policy favours the deprived communities such as those of Khayelitsha, which were denied right to land. In this regard the state has no other choice but to intervene and look at fair land redistribution strategy that will benefit the poor areas such as Khayelitsha. The policy should not cause harm to those who are in possession of land. Land redistribution is suggested in this thesis as an economic option to empower the disadvantaged community of Khayelitsha. For the government to facilitate land policy review and set up the basis for sustainable development, it is important for it to reassess its land claim policy. According to the current land claim policy (Restitution of Land Act, 1994) the cut-off date is 1913 and claims beyond 1913 are not allowed (Green Paper on South African Land Policy, 1996:3). The land claims should go beyond the 1913 cut-off date.

The state should stop customary and monopolistic ownership of land by individuals who claim land to be that of their forefathers owned at some point in time in 1600 or before, like in Khayelitsha where large hectares of land are owned by private developers. The major portion of such land should be confiscated for the benefit of the poor who are willing to use the land in a more productive way. The development of land should speed up the current process of compensating those who dispose of the land. Unlike the present land policy on compensation, Land Compensation should be paid on the basis of maintenance done on land and infrastructure on land, but not for the plots the person owns. Presently the government has no enforcement policy in respect of land.

The other alternative which government could follow is to facilitate a more active land market, which is not based on willing buyers and willing sellers perceived by the non-state interventionist school. The active market approach should impose a heavy tax burden on those who own many hectares of land but do not use it in a more productive way. Rents need to be raised and their collection should be enforced. Underutilised land should be redistributed among the people. All



such measures would benefit Khayelitsha, which currently has a shortage of land for housing and business development as mentioned in section 4.10 in the land ownership analysis. Khayelitsha is a land-constrained area in the Western Cape with high population growth, which cannot possibly be accommodated by the year 2005. In the light of these facts it is clear that sustainable development in Khayelitsha for the reduction of unemployment, poverty, etc. depends inter alia on the equitable distribution of unused land by the government in the Western Cape.

### **7.3.5 Housing Development**

Housing has been identified as a problem in section 4.11 of this thesis. People in Khayelitsha are currently residing in shacks as a housing option (See chapter four). Development of housing in Khayelitsha depends on other development such as land development and economic development. In order for the government to ensure that housing development takes place, rural development should be taken seriously to overcome the housing problem in urban areas resulting from rapid urbanisation, as is the case in Khayelitsha at present (See chapter three). Housing Federations should be supported and encouraged by the government. At present some people in Khayelitsha have joined housing federations as an option to get houses. Such federations have started to build four to five roomed houses in areas such as Site B and Harare. At Site C people are interested to join such federations but they still have the problem of double occupation. Two households are occupying a 160 <sup>m</sup><sup>2</sup> plot as mentioned in section 4.10. The City of Tygerberg Housing Department is investigating the possibility of land availability to relocate the other people from Site C. At this stage no decision has been taken as to what strategy the Housing Department will follow.

### **7.3.6 Economic Development**

The state of the local economy in Khayelitsha is the result of the apartheid economic legacy as mentioned in section 3.4, Development Evolution. As a result Khayelitsha is currently facing the poverty challenge characterised by crime. Community stability largely depends on the prosperity of the people, but public participation in Khayelitsha is still not flourishing as discussed in the KDF analysis (See section 3.7). This spells danger. For Khayelitsha to develop the bottom line is that the local authority should create employment, which is a challenge in



Khayelitsha at present (See section 4.6). To redress economic imbalances of the past, Khayelitsha should follow a holistic development approach, which encompasses grassroots development and encourages public participation in order to address development malpractices of the past. Khayelitsha, together with the government, should provide business skills to small and medium businesses. Training in marketing skills should be made available. The research evidence is that in Khayelitsha small manufacturers generally do not possess the necessary marketing skills. Consequently the local manufacturers do not market their products themselves, but rely on external marketers such as those at the Waterfront in Cape Town. A development forum in Khayelitsha should establish a central local market in Khayelitsha, which could attract consumers from all over the Peninsula. The market should have tourism facilities such as accommodation, restaurants, etc. The development of such a market would reduce unemployment, increase household income and improve the social environment.

It must be borne in mind that Khayelitsha cannot develop in isolation but needs to develop within the broad metropolitan development framework. The metropolitan development could include parts of the south-east, such as Mitchell's Plain, Philippi and other areas such as Cape Town CBD, Epping, Claremont and Bellville. With regard to future economic development of Khayelitsha, certain strategies should be followed:

**Resource mobilisation:** The Khayelitsha community should draw in external resources in the most effective way, given the lack of local capital, skills, entrepreneurship and most of the natural resources. However, the process of resource mobilisation should not lose sight of the needs of the people.

**Government support:** Since Khayelitsha is dependent on external resources for its development, it is imperative to enlist government support. This could include RDP programmes and major government projects.

**Metropolitan support:** Khayelitsha is one of the areas with the highest population in the Western Cape and it is viewed as one of the development nodes of the region. This is reflected in the greater allocation of funds by the CMC. Khayelitsha, therefore, should galvanise development support from the developed areas in the region and overseas.



**Self-help business programmes:** The self-help business programmes should enhance initiative, approaches and commitment of local private individuals or enterprises. This would serve the purpose of job creation and create a spirit of self-reliance.

**Support of development agencies:** Development agencies play a vital role in South African development. The agencies include NGOs such as Triple Trust and IDT and the parastatals such as Eskom and Transnet. Khayelitsha community should strike a deal with these agencies for its development.

**Investment:** The Khayelitsha community together with the local authority should encourage investments of different kinds for its own development. Such investment could come from the capital of shopping centres (e.g. the one in Site B, Nonqubela station and very soon the CBD development as mentioned in section 6.3.15, Khayelitsha CBD), office buildings, entertainment centres and hotels. Since Khayelitsha is in competition with other areas of the south-east, investment opportunities should not be missed. Tourism should be used as a tool to attract investment. The new tourism office and two guest houses recently opened in Khayelitsha could be supported and promoted. There is no doubt that they will bring investment to Khayelitsha.

**Seafront development:** In order for Khayelitsha to reach its development goal, the development of the seafront should not be underestimated. A development of this kind could take place near the Monwabisi resort where hotels, restaurants and other guest houses could be built. The seafront development could attract tourists and promote investment for further development.

**Transport and infrastructure development:** Transport and infrastructure development cannot be divorced from other economic development. The transport system in Khayelitsha needs to be improved. The taxi industry is characterised by violence as mentioned in the taxi service analysis in section 5.9.3. The industry needs to be formalised. The state should intervene by forming partnerships with the taxi owners to reduce the level of violence. The proposed partnership relates well to the partnership analysis in chapter six. Development without economic development is no development.

This chapter provided the general conclusion to the thesis. The chapter also made

recommendations, which serve as an answer to the research problem. It is evident that the policies of the past government have had an impact on what Khayelitsha is today. Lack of public participation in Khayelitsha impacts on its development. This proves that the hypothesis of this thesis is correct.



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