


# **A Christian ethic in the modern and postmodern world**

by  
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## Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signature:

Date:

## Summary

In seeking to evaluate a Christian ethic in the modern and postmodern world, we should first search for the ethical principles of modernism and of postmodernism. Thereafter, we should attempt to find a common ethical principle in both modernism and postmodernism. In this way we can establish whether or not modern and postmodern ethics approximate to Christian ethics.

Modern ethics originated from and were established on the concept of 'the self' or self-centrism as defined in this thesis. More exactly, modern ethics were grounded on the basis of the 'reason' of the autonomous self. In this way modern ethics can be characterized by universal laws or universal norms. They served oppressive political norms. In modern times the rational ethics, therefore, correlated with the language of totalization and colonization. This modern ethical paradigm was criticized by postmodernists. Postmodernists deconstructed modernist universal norms which were constituted on the concept of 'the self'. They discovered 'the other'. Thus the postmodern ethics were developed on the concept of 'the other'. Postmodern ethics are expressed in uncertainty and can be characterized as 'minimalistic morality'. Even though modern ethics and postmodern ethics were established on different concepts, they have a common principle. We recognized that the this-worldly self-life centrism is a common principle of modern ethics and postmodern ethics. We established this in chapter 2.

In Chapter 3 we studied the Christian ethics in the Bible. Christians must follow Christ. Christians must become the image of Christ. The Holy Spirit transforms us into the image of Christ. Therefore, Christ is the origin and model of Christian ethics. But we also investigated the reason why so many believers fail to live Christ-like life. We discovered that the this-worldly life centrism always hinders believers from becoming Christ-like people. We suggested that life-giving love is the core ethical principle in the Bible.

In Chapter 4 we applied Biblical Christian ethics to the modern and postmodern world. We found that Christian ethics could not match up with modern and postmodern ethical principles in certain respects. Christian ethics are different from modern and postmodern ethics. From this application we proposed that Christian ethics are not expressed in either modern rationalism or postmodern deconstruction. We disclosed the reason why modern rational ethics and ethics of deconstruction cannot comprehend Christ-like ethics.

Modern and postmodern ethics were not established on the model of Christ. Modern and postmodern ethics did not emphasize the life-giving love which Jesus portrayed. In this thesis, therefore, the conclusion is that Christian ethics must be Christ-centric ethics. The Christ-centric ethic that can counter postmodern life comes true in life-giving love.

Countering modern rational ethics which are based on the concept of 'the self' or self-centrism we, Christians, must emphasize suffering and self-giving by loving 'the other', for example: women, the isolated, and so on. Countering postmodern ethics of deconstruction based on the concept of 'the other', 'the other' must strive to become a Christ-like person rather than pursue his/her own perfect self-realization and liberation.

## Opsomming

Ten einde Christelike etiek in die moderne en postmoderne wêreld te evalueer, moet ons eerstens soek vir 'n etiese beginsel ten opsigte van modernisme en postmodernisme, asook 'n gemeenskaplike etiese beginsel van sowel modernisme as postmodernisme. Slegs daarna kan ons klaarheid hê of moderne en postmoderne etiek inpas in die Christelike etiek.

Moderne etiek het ontstaan uit en is gebaseer op die konsep van 'die self' of selfgesentreerdheid, soos na verwys is in hierdie tesis. Om meer presies te wees, moderne etiek het ontwikkel op die grondslag van die 'rede' van die outonome self. Dus kan die moderne etiek op die wyse uitdrukking vind in universele wette of norme. Dit het onderdrukkende politieke stelsels bedien. In moderne tye het die rasonele etiek dus ooreengestem met die taal van kolonialisme en 'n totalitêre benadering. Hierdie moderne etiese paradigma is deur die postmoderniste gekritiseer. Postmoderniste het die universele norme gebaseer op die konsep van 'die self' deur moderniste, afgetakel. Hulle het 'die ander' ontdek. Die postmoderne etiek is dus ontwikkel op die konsep van 'die ander'. Postmoderne etiek word uitgedruk in onsekerheid en kan gekarakteriseer word as 'geminimaliseerde moraliteit'. Alhoewel moderne etiek en postmoderne etiek op verskillende konsepte gevestig is, het hulle tog 'n gemeenskaplike beginsel. Ons het die gerigtheid op hierdie-wêreldse selfgesentreerdheid herken as eie aan beide moderne etiek en postmoderne etiek. Ons het dit in hoofstuk 2 ondersoek.

In hoofstuk 3 het ons Christelike etiek in die Bybel bestudeer. Christene moet navolgers van Christus wees. Christene moet Christusgelykvormig word. Die Heilige Gees herskep ons tot die beeld van Christus. Daarom is Christus die oorsprong en die model van Christelike etiek. Ons het ook die rede ondersoek waarom die dissipels Christus nie kon navolg nie. Ons het ontdek dat die hierdie-wêreld lewensgesentreerdheid gelowiges altyd verhinder om Christusgelykvormige mense te word. Ons stel voor dat lewegewende liefde die kern etiese beginsel in die Bybel is.

In hoofstuk 4 het ons Christelike etiek soos ons dit in die Bybel bestudeer het, toegepas op die moderne en postmoderne wêreld. Ons het bevind dat die Christelike etiek op sekere punte nie in lyn gebring kan word met moderne en postmoderne etiek nie. Christelike etiek verskil van moderne en postmoderne etiek. Voortvloeiend uit hierdie toepassing het ons voorgestel dat die Christelike etiek nie kon ontstaan het vanuit die moderne rasionalisme en postmoderne dekonstruksie nie. Ons het die rede blootgelê waarom moderne rasionele etiek en dekonstruktiewe etiek nie Christusgelykvormige etiek kan omvat nie.

Moderne en postmoderne etiek is nie gevestig op die model van Christus nie. Moderne en postmoderne etiek is nie beklemtoon in die lewegewende liefde wat Jesus gedemonstreer het nie. Die gevolgtrekking in hierdie tesis is dus dat Christelike etiek Christus-sentriese etiek moet wees - Christus-sentriese etiek wat die postmoderne lewensuitkyk kan weerlê deur 'n openbaring van lewegewende liefde.

Om moderne rasionele etiek gebaseer op die konsep van 'die self' of selfgesentreerdheid te weerlê, moet ons as Christene die klem laat val op lyding en om onself te gee deur ander lief te hê, byvoorbeeld: vroue, die geïsoleerdes en ander. Ten einde postmoderne etiek se dekonstruksie gebaseer op 'die ander' te weerlê, moet dit 'die ander' se mikpunt wees om Christusgelykvormig te word eerder as om sy volkome selfrealisering en bevryding na te streef.

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## **Chapter 1, Introduction**

### **1.1. Motivation**

Kasper ( 1976 : 15) sees that the problem of the Church and Christian ethics at the end of the 20th century lies in the relationship of the Church to present-day society. Actually the Christian Church could not but encounter all world paradigms. The Church and the believers encountered the premodern paradigmatic world and is still encountering the modern and postmodern paradigmatic worlds.

It is within these world paradigms that the Church and Christians have to become the witness of Christ. At this time, when moving from modernism to face postmodernism, the Church and each individual Christian should strive to be the body of Christ and the Christ-like being. Therefore, the Christ-like ethical identity of its members must be questioned. 'Throughout history people have struggled with ethical questions. In fact, certain ethical issues are perennial' (Grenz 1997: 14-15). 'The great issues of ethics -- like human rights, social justice, balance between peaceful co-operation and personal self-assertion, synchronization of individual conduct and collective welfare -- have lost nothing of their topicality.' ( Bauman 1994: 4) In postmodern times all premodern and modern moral codes are being deconstructed. There remains only uncertainty, and proximity and responsibility.

We must question thus: Is there really nothing beyond uncertainty, proximity, responsibility? For, surely, in the present era of pluralism and deconstructuralism of theology and of complex ethical issues, a Christ-like ethic is urgently needed. And how do we reconstruct Christian ethics in this postmodern context?

In this situation Christ's personality and life must be embodied in the Church and the believers. Christ and the believers, faith in Christ and the ethics of Christians as the saved,

should be united. In other words, faith in Jesus Christ and Christian ethics should be united. This union we can call 'Christ-like' ethics.

Jesus said, in Matthew 10: 28, 'Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be afraid of the One who can destroy both soul and body in hell'. He also said, in Matthew 10: 38-9, 'And anyone who does not take up his cross and follow me is not worthy of me. Whoever finds his life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake will find it'. In Matthew 16: 24 we read, 'If anyone would come after me, he must deny himself and take up his cross and follow me' ( Mark 8: 34; Luke 9: 23). 'For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many' (Mark 10: 45 ). Jesus commands us to live a Christ-like life. How do we apply this commandment to modern and postmodern paradigmatic ecclesiological and ethical issues? Therefore my motivation for writing this thesis arose from the need to understand how we Christians encounter this modern and postmodern world.

## **1.2. Problem setting**

**Therefore, the main problem of this thesis is to establish the Christian counter to postmodern ethics, overcoming the ethics of modern rationalism and the ethics of postmodern deconstruction.**

In this thesis we would like to find the Christian counter to postmodern ethics. To do this, we should investigate the idiosyncrasy of modernism that gave birth to postmodernism. So, inevitably, Christian postmodern ethics includes the criticism of modernism. Obviously, the criticism of postmodernism is the essential part of this thesis. To find the Christian ethics we are going to set up the sub-problems as follows:

**The first sub-problem is to determine a prime ethical principle of modernism and of postmodernism respectively, and a common ethical principle in modern rationalism and in postmodern deconstruction.**

Modern Christian ethics were manifested in modern ideas, such as individualism and rationalism. The postmodern ethic, on the other hand, is the result of criticism of modern ethics.

Bauman (1994: 2) states the postmodern approach to morality thus: 'what has come to be associated with the notion of the postmodern approach to morality is all too often the celebration of the "demise of the ethical", of the substitution of aesthetics for ethics, and of the "ultimate emancipation" that follows. Ethics itself is denigrated or derided as one of the typically modern constraints now broken and destined for the dustbin of history; fetters once deemed necessary, now clearly superfluous: another illusion the postmodern men and women can well do without.'

He (:2) continues to criticize the postmodern idea: 'In our time the idea of self-sacrifice has been delegitimized; people are not goaded or willing to stretch themselves to attain moral ideals and guard moral values; politicians have put paid to utopias; and yesterday's idealists have become pragmatic.' Therefore we can define the postmodern ethics as 'minimalistic morality'. (:3)

In the process of postmodernisation, Christianity has imbued itself with limitless relativism and aimless narrative flow: there are only unnumbered human gods. Postmodernism has moved radically towards endless relativism and pluralism. In this postmodernist stage, ethics are expressed in uncertainty and chaos.

Given the superstitious theocracy of premodernism, the rationalism of modernism, and the revaluation in postmodernism of all that was devalued by modernism, we find it easy to understand how ethics has been variously perceived as a duty, as moral codes, and as moral relativism.

Recent philosophies and theologies have become the combatants on the battlefield of deconstruction against modernism. The ecumenical movement, multi-religious cultural

approaches, the concepts of a plural society, multi-dimensional approaches, etc, are all included in this trend of postmodernism in all areas, and especially in theology.

But the postmodernism of recent times still, ironically, reflects modernism in common ethical principles. We suspect here that the rationalism of modernism and the deconstructuralism of postmodernism have engendered certain ethical principles that bring about the demise of Christ-like ethics.

**The second sub-problem is to discover a Christian ethic which God initiated.**

**The third problem is to establish whether the Christian ethic runs counter to the modern and postmodern ethic or not.**

### **1.3. Hypothesis**

According to the above problems, we are going to formulate the hypothesis as follows:

**Our main hypothesis is that the Christian ethic, counter to postmodern ethics, is the Christ-centric ethic that was revealed in Jesus Christ. Its principle content is *life-giving love*.**

The sub-hypotheses are as follows:

**Firstly, the prime ethical principle of modernism is the concept of ‘the self’ or self-centrism, and that of postmodernism is the concept of ‘the other’, and the common ethical paradigm of both modernism and postmodernism is the this-worldly life paradigm.**

**Secondly, a Christian ethic, initiated by God, is the Christ-centric ethic which can be embodied in Christians by the Holy Spirit and the core Christ-centric ethic is life-giving love.**

**Thirdly, the Christ-centric ethic must be applied in the present modern and postmodern world, and it must be the counter ethic to the present modern and postmodern principles which could cause the believers to fall short of Christ-like ethics. Therefore life-giving love should be emphasized in the modern and postmodern world.**

Neither Christian ethics nor the Church can be fully established on an ethics based on the modern rationalism and the postmodern deconstruction. In order to deconstruct this modern and postmodern ethic to some extent, and to reconstruct the counter to postmodern ethics, we will examine the reliability of an alternative Christian ethics. When we achieve, to some degree, the paradigm shift from a modern and postmodern ethics to an alternative Christian ethics for the Christ-like image, the counter to postmodern ethics will shine through.

#### **1.4. The delimitations**

This study is grounded on the research of modern and postmodern thinking, but will not attempt to describe fully the theories of modernism and postmodernism; neither will it give a critical analysis of all aspects of modern and postmodern thinking. We will choose a few philosophers and theologians representative of modernism and postmodernism for this research.

#### **1.5. Assumptions**

In this thesis we honestly try to follow the Reformed tradition. We agree with the doctrine of grace, the total corruption of man, redemption by faith alone, and the uniqueness of

Jesus Christ. What we are trying to do here is faithfully keep and reinterpret our Reformed tradition in this postmodern context. What we hope to do, finally, is to distil Christian ethics from the struggling dilemma of the Christian Churches.

The first assumption is that faith and works should be related to each other. But my hypothesis is not based simply on the relationship between faith and works but on their unification. That is, how can we unify faith and works and what are the characteristics of this unification? With regard to unification of faith and works, my hypothesis is to reconsider a biblical paradigm.

The second assumption is that philosophy and religion are correlated.

The third assumption is that believers and non-believers share the same self-centrism.

The fourth assumption in this thesis is that even though the believers must be united with God, the distinction between God and man is never removed. There is no mysticism that can destroy the ontological distinction between God and man.

The fifth assumption in this thesis is that ethic is interpreted as a Christ-like image rather than any human moral code.

## **1.6. The importance of this study**

In the twentieth century the Church has been affected by the impact of the challenges of dualism, individualism, materialism and postmodernism.

All of these trends have brought about the spiritual apathy of the Church and have resulted in socio-political crises, ecological and nuclear crises, differentiation and exclusion. In this situation, how the Christian can live in faith is our chief concern.

## 1.7. Definitions of terms

1. *The life-giving dying* is a condition of Christian life, requiring that Christians should always remember Jesus' suffering and crucifixion. In sum, Jesus' sacrifice for 'the other' is the model of the *life-giving dying*. Here we can use this terminology interchangeably with *life-giving living*, because both dying and living involve our whole life. But in this thesis we will predominantly use *life-giving dying* because only dying can fully express Jesus's suffering, crucifixion and eternal communion with God. The term, 'life-giving,' is derived from 1 Cor. 15: 45f 'the last Adam became the life-giving Spirit.' In this thesis, *the life-giving* paradigm is a basic principle of creation and redemption.

2. In the *this-worldly-life* paradigm, humans pursue the worldly life, political liberation, prosperity, material well-being, and so on. Therefore the *this-worldly-life paradigm* is the antithesis of the *life-giving* paradigm. In this paradigm, self-centrism will be included.

3. *Self-centrism* embraces authoritarian theocracy, self-sufficient rationalism and organic holism. In this perspective, all knowledge starts from the knowledge of the self: therefore, the self stands at the centre of the world view. Of course, in *self-centrism* egoism is included.

4. In this thesis, *dualism* opposes the life-giving spirit that represents the alternative Christian paradigm and *God-man communion*. *Dualism* is used here not just as a philosophical term; it also has religious meaning. *Dualism* is seen as inherent in all thought: including premodern hierarchy and theocracy which were common characteristics of medieval thinking; the individualism of the Renaissance; the Cartesian frame of mind and matter which has influenced Western civilization, idealism and materialism; and the humanism of modernism. The separation of not only christology and soteriology, faith and work, but also life and death, mind and matter, self and other results from dualism.

5. *Holism* is the worldview in which all things are seen in unity. It rejects the dualism of mind and matter, subject and object. The acceptance of plural dimensions in individuals and society can be characterized as the holistic worldview.

7. On *paradigm*, Kuhn contends that each period of normal science in the development of a scientific discipline corresponds to one and only one methodological framework or paradigm. In a nut-shell, paradigms are ‘universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners’ (The Oxford English Dictionary).

In this thesis, we define paradigm more widely as a frame of thought that covers the spiritual and physical, the visible and invisible realm. It is a common human thought system at any given time. It, therefore, affects and formulates the nature of human society and even the contents of faith. Even though we use radical language such as the ‘self-centrism of divine self’, and so on, this is because we would dismantle the Christian illusive conceptual framework covering God, creation and redemption.

8. *Pneumatological context* is the dimension of the Holy Spirit as revealed in the Trinity. In this thesis it is primarily used in antithesis to the modern and postmodern social and political contexts which are based on *self-centrism*. *Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit* is a proposed concept adopted in order to establish the opinion of this thesis that the Holy Spirit actively dwells in humanity and that Christianity must move, therefore, from a *linguistic* paradigm to a *Christ-centric* paradigm. *Pneumatological realism* means that the Holy Spirit is the present modifier of the Christian’s life exactly as it was of the early apostolic Christians.

### **1.8. Method of research**

According to the above problems and hypotheses the method of this thesis is as follows:

In chapter 2, modernism and postmodernism will be discussed. What is the basis of modern and postmodern ethics? What is the common ethical principle of modernism and postmodernism? For proof of our hypothesis we use the opinions of modern and postmodern scholars and philosophers. They are Kant, Schleiermacher, Levinas, and Derrida.

In chapter 3 we will re-examine alternative Christian ethics. In this chapter we will examine the Bible. We will use some opinions of scholars who contributed towards finding the Christian ethics in the Bible. But we would not like to investigate the Bible to prove every ethical point. In this thesis we are going to find Christian ethics in the kingdom of God, Christ and the Holy Spirit. Concerning the Holy Spirit, we will constitute some logic concerning how the Christ-like ethic can be accomplished in the believers by the Holy Spirit. We will use the concepts of pneumatological context and hypostasis of the Holy Spirit. And then we will find an alternative biblical ethic to modern and postmodern ethics and we will reflect on the doctrines of the Trinity, creation and redemption.

All human beings experience the following dilemma. In the first place, human beings are made in the image of God and must be differentiated from other creatures due to their capability and humanity. Yet, at the same time they feel that they are incapable due to their intrinsic imperfection. So they feel that they need God to make them perfect as individuals and in society.

As a result, ethics and religion have co-existed on eternally parallel rails. There is religiosity of ethics and the ethicalness of religion. In order to overcome this dilemma we should consider how the Christian ethics can be embodied in concrete Christian practice.

In chapter 4 we will discuss how to apply an alternative ethical principle which goes beyond the modern and the postmodern paradigm. And we will apply this principle to modern and postmodern issues.

To do this we shall undertake literature study.

## **Chapter 2. The modern and postmodern ethics**

In this chapter our problem relates to the nature or principle of modern and postmodern ethics. To find the nature of modern and postmodern ethics we are going to study modern and postmodern thinking.

### **2.1. 'The self' in Modernism**

In modern times philosophy and theology were as closely connected to each other as in premodern times. This relationship between philosophy and theology, however, took a new form in modernism. Concerning this relationship between philosophy and theology Kenny states: 'as a result of the Reformation and the religious wars a new relationship has developed between philosophy and theology. It is not that the philosophers have ceased to believe in God; of the major figures of the period only Hume was an atheist, and the idea of God plays a fundamental role in the philosophies of Descartes, Spinoza, and Berkley. What changed was the attitude to ecclesiastical hierarchy' ( Kenny 1994: 109). Even though in modernism philosophy and theology had a close relationship, they resisted the ecclesiastical hierarchy of premodernism.

Modern philosophy and theology tried to overcome the authoritative theocracy of premodernism by means of the autonomous 'I' of Descartes. In order to overcome premodern ecclesiastical hierarchy modern philosophers constituted the human autonomy. The thinkable 'I' could by itself constitute truth. The thinking mind of 'I' was the foundation of truth.

The modern presumption was that 'everything, according to Descartes's system, is to be explained in terms of the dualism of mind and matter. Indeed, we owe it to Descartes that we think of mind and matter as the two great, mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive

divisions of the universe we inhabit' (: 113 ). Only the human mind has power to access the truth. Such dualism liberated science and reason from the ecclesiastical hierarchy. It provided 'a neat division of labor and let the new modern science escape the control of the church.' (Nelson 1992:126)

Thus the modern religious thought came from the dogma of rationalism against premodern authoritative hierarchy. 'Grotius, Descartes, Spinoza and Rousseau knew well the sting of ecclesiastical censure, as well as the experience of civil punitive measures. Hobbes, too, knew the requirements of political flight. But more than the exodus from the pressures of social institutions, the idea of self-preservation represented a departure from the outlook of Calvinist and Aristotelian humanism, which subscribed to the belief in pre-ordained goals for all individuals' ( Pacini 1988: 52-53). The idea they had in common was that self-preservation exemplified the emancipatory aspirations of the age. As a reflexive notion, it captured the inward turn away from 'external authorities, whether ecclesiastical or civil' (:52-53).

In this way now the non-bodily realm of the spirit could now be left to the church, and the physical, bodily world could be science's own domain (Nelson: 126.). In modern times only the material and bodily sphere was accepted as fitting object of science and reason. In this flow of thought, therefore, the modern theologians expressed themselves in rationalistic language.

This trend of modernism resulted in the loss of belief. According to Cupitt ( 1986 : 107 ), in this modernist thinking, 'the central theme of the crisis of faith is the sudden loss of belief in an objective. Since the seventeenth century, the secularization of the physical universe and of society has forced religious belief to become privatized *and* psychologized' (:107 ). The religious and spiritual dimensions of humanity were ignored in public life. Actually, this religious paradigm paralled human reason in the public area.

This liberation of human reason from Church control influenced all areas of human life. In other words, the earliest Christian belief became privatized in the modernist thinking. It is not only the academic realms which have been overrun by this modern theological outlook. Pacini (1988: 52-53) states, 'The religious outlook of modernity did not, as has often been supposed, belong to any particular people, but was expressive of a deeper transnational culture'.

Actually, the modern emancipatory teachings influenced all modern spheres, that is, physics, political social theory, ethics and metaphysics, economics and the philosophy of religion ( :52-53).

Indeed, this modernist religious paradigm has also overrun almost every country. According to Pacini ( 53) 'the initial proponents of this religious outlook were to be found in England, France, Switzerland, Italy, and Holland: all regions of religious intolerance and bitter ecclesiastical, political disputes. Others in Germany, Scandinavia, the United States, Austria, and Russia would soon contribute to the making of this outlook. The most prominent names associated with this view are Grotius, Hobbes, Descartes, Newton, Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau, Smith, Kant, Hegel, Coleridge, and Emerson. In their ways, Darwin, Marx, and Freud would develop the possibilities latent within this framework.'

### **2.1.1. Modernism as self-centrism**

Modernism was formed on the basis of Descartes' doctrine of the self, individualism, and humanism. The reason of the self, individualism, and humanism became the myth which replaced the medieval ecclesiastical myth and came to dominate modernist theology which held that without it there is no divine revelation.

In this modernism theology was overruled by 'a theoretical intentionality and the adequacy of thought to that which is thought in thought, which is assured on the basis of the unity of transcendental apperception of a self sovereign in its exclusive isolation as *Cogito*, with its

assembling and synthetic reign.’(Levinas 1998: 220) In modernism the One understood as an ‘I think’, the self, produced a new myth.

Cupitt ( 1990: 173) rightly described the modern new myths: ‘Roughly speaking, although the enlightenment believed itself to be demythologized, in fact it merely replaced old religious myths with new and very similar secular myths about reason, truth, progress, enlightenment and so forth.’ In short, modernism was dominated by the myth of self-sufficiency of reason as much as the philosophies of previous ages were. Therefore, recognizing it, during the late nineteenth century there began to take place the event that really mattered, the second demythologizing, as it became realized that all the beliefs of the enlightenment had been mythical too.

The purpose of these myths was to establish the human being as an independent and autonomous being. Louis Dumont (1986: 25) said: ‘One by one, modernity stripped man of all “particularistic” trappings and pared him to the (assumed) “all-human” core - that of the “independent, autonomous, and thus essentially non-social moral being”’.

According to Griffin, this modernism evidenced two main characteristics ( Griffin 1988: 8-14 ): *individualism* and *differentiation*, because the autonomous and independent self who identified with the divine self became a non-social being and differentiated itself from the other. The autonomous and independent self produced new spirituality that dominated modern people.

The characters of modernism that are based on a modern spirituality related to the doctrine of *homo oeconomicus* ( Griffin: 13 ) because the human spiritual dimension which related to God and the other was intentionally ignored. The modern spirituality based on individualism and differentiation developed from the serious illusion of a materialistic utopia for the autonomous self.

Therefore the Industrial Revolution, according to Polanyi ( 1957:40) ‘a revolution as extreme and radical as ever inflamed the minds of sectarians’, produced the materialistic creed ‘that all human problems could be resolved given an unlimited amount of material commodities’ and human rationality.

Griffin also described the modern materialistic character: ‘The [modern] creed, combined with the treatment in public discourse of the human being as *homo oeconomicus*, has allowed us to assume a virtual identity between material prosperity and general health and welfare of the society’ ( Griffin: 13; Dumont 1977: 75 ).

The characteristics of individualism and differentiation strongly relate to the hegemonic power of individuals who desire to get more material prosperity and wealth. This inevitably led people of modern times to a power game of domination. The homogenic world view ruled the modern world.

Further, according to Ross Poole ( 1991: 43 ), reason brought endless competition because the self needs power over the other in order to establish his moral code. In the modern society the goal was to have more power over than ‘the other’. Since the power sought is essentially comparative - it involves power over others - having must mean having more than others. What is achieved is not the efficient realization of goals, but endless and compulsive repetition.

In the absence of togetherness and solidarity, modernity created materialism and a preoccupation with this world and its wealth. Therefore modernism resulted in an oppressive political and religious paradigm.

If we develop this logic further, ironically, modern ideology has also developed into religious intellectualism. This has overruled the Church. Intellectualism, in turn, has developed into a more strict authoritarianism. Thus modern religious intellectualism has led Christianity to become an authoritarian and heteronomous religion which brings total

separation between the self and the other. This modern religious intellectualism has generated political and religious colonization.

Cupitt ( 1980 : 126-7 ) explains as follows:

This intellectualism is very spiritually immature. It is also very authoritarian because the more you see religious faith as assent to a set of propositions that are factual but not strictly empirically verifiable, the more you will be obliged to rely upon external authority to certify the truth of those propositions. So among Protestants and Catholics alike.... we have in modern times seen faith becoming more heteronomous, authoritarian and immature.

The modern method of higher criticism in theology could be cited as an example of modern intellectualistic methodology based on reason of the autonomous self.

Hauerwas ( 1992 : 37 ) criticized both the classical fundamentalism of premodern thinking and the higher criticism of modern thinking: 'Both higher criticism and fundamentalism are but attempts to maintain the influence of Constantinian Christianity - now clothed in the power of enlightenment rationality - in the interest of continuing Christianity's hegemony over the ethos of our culture - a culture that increasingly learns it can well do without Christian presuppositions'.

For Hauerwas (: 36), both higher criticism and fundamentalism are enlightenment ideologies in service to 'the fictive agent of the enlightenment - namely the rational individual - who believes that the truth in general and particularly the truth of Christian faith can be known without initiation into a community which requires transformation of self'.

Hauerwas' negative appraisal of the modern higher criticism shows us that modernist theology also belonged to the authoritative and the oppressive paradigm based on the autonomous self.

In this modern Christianity, there was no longer a real commitment to love beyond the self. Thus the enlightenment proceeded along a misleading path for true knowledge comes from the agony and suffering of the individual in community, from love for one another and from the suffering of the communal body.

To sum up, the modern invention of *autonomy of self* definitely has a connection with modern human self-centredness and with the differentiation of the self from the other. Indeed modern dualism was established on this ground of self-centrism, and self-centrism caused the real dualist paradigm that the self could not open towards the other and to tragedy and to the suffering body.

Thus modernism was the absolute expression of the self-centrism of humanity. It liberated the human self to reach out to the truth via the instrument of reason. This reason made universal rules. Therefore modernism can be characterized as a paradigm of totalization, because modernism is established on the moral codes which tolerate only one rationalistic dimension, to which all other dimensions are subordinated, and which demands the complete subservience of the individual to the reason. This totalization has dominated all areas of life, viz., politics, economy and religion. Churches, also, have become distorted and overrun by modern totalization.

Cupitt rightly indicates that modern Christianity has become a self-worshipping religion; ironically, human authoritative reason has been substituted for God. Furthermore, human reason is identified with God. In modernity there has been a close link between the ideas of God and of self; the more strongly centred the idea of God, the more strongly centred the self has become ( 1986: 123).

The very character of modernism actually ensured that there was no freedom from the human authority of the self. Modernism inherited the self-centric universal myths.

The modern religious, cultural and ethical achievements have been gained within the self-centric dimension. In fact, even the Christian doctrine of salvation is concerned chiefly with self-salvation.

Under the self-centric paradigm Christian dualism arose and modern Christian ethics became identified too closely with rationalized moral codes. The modern ethic was correlated with reasonableness, materialism or benevolence under the myth of the self.

### **2.1.2. The influence of self-centrism upon the modern ethics**

Wogaman (1993: 148) described the general relationship between reason and modern ethics thus: 'the development and increasing prestige of science and reason in the postmedieval world began to impact upon Christian ethics more seriously in the eighteenth century, especially in England and France. Religious claims based upon revelation were increasingly subjected to rational criticism. Writers like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke grounded their ethical thought on the analysis of human nature'

For Locke, all human beings are ultimately free and independent so that we find in him liberalism ( Long 1967:208). But we are vulnerable in our independence to the like independence of others. Hence, we form a political covenant for the purpose of protecting our natural rights, 'life, liberty, and property'. These humanistic values replaced the premodern theological ideas, sin, redemption, grace, so on. 'Among Christian thinkers, the Age of Reason stimulated efforts to portray Christian ethics as an expression of natural reason--or at least as being consistent with natural reason.' (Wogaman: 148-149)

On the basis of reason Bishop Joseph Butler ( 1692-1752), for instance, relates Christian ethics to the concept of *benevolence*. This he understands to have the same relationship to

society that self-love has to individuals ( Wogaman: 150). For Butler there is no serious conflict between self-love and benevolence.

Butler ( 1937: 374) writes that though benevolence and self-love are different, and though the former tends most directly to public good and the latter to private; yet they are so perfectly coincident that the greatest satisfaction to ourselves depends upon our having benevolence in a due degree; and that self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour towards society. Therefore, there is no such thing as love of injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude, but only eager desires after external goods. Thus, the principles and passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from self-love and benevolence, primarily and most directly lead to right behaviour with regard to others as well as himself (: 375).

Butler's version of Christian ethics was thus based on moral codes such as self-love and benevolence among human beings whose nature predisposes them to reasonableness and benevolence.

The modern ethics based on the natural reason of the human autonomous self was fully developed in Immanuel Kant. Therefore we must investigate the philosophical basis of his ethics and concrete ethics.

#### **2.1.2.1. Immanuel Kant**

Firstly we are going to survey his ethics in his own books

##### **A. Fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals**

For Kant (1724-1804) the morality of an act is not derived from its end and goal but from its motivation. The only thing that can be said to be morally good is the good will. Kant (1900: 10) said that nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it,

which can be called good without qualification, except a Good will. 'All talents of the mind, intelligence, wit, judgement, courage, resolution, perseverance are undoubtedly good, but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them is not good' (:10)

This moral principle also holds for the gifts of fortune. Kant (:10) states that 'power, riches, honour, even health, and general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting, and adapt it to its end.' For Kant none of the talents of the mind and the gifts of fortune have intrinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose the good will of the self. Moderation in the affections and passions, self-control and calm deliberation which were so unconditionally praised by the ancients seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person, but without the good will of the self they have nothing to do with the good.

Kant vividly praises this good will as good in itself, but states that it must relate to reason. Kant (:12) explained that there is 'something too strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will.'

Reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, *i.e.* as one which is to have influence on the will. Reason allows our human nature to direct its capacities towards an end and to produce a will (:14). From this reason comes moral duty. Therefore, the will stands between its *à priori* principle, which is formal, and its *à posteriori* spring, which is material, as between two roads, and as it must be determined by something, it follows that it must be determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, in which case every material principle has been withdrawn from it. (:19)

The action of the autonomous self, for Kant, must be controlled by duty, not inclination. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim that should follow this law even to the thwarting of all inclination. ( :20) The pre-eminent good which Kant calls moral consists in the conception of law which certainly is only possible in a rational being in so far as this conception determines the will ( :20).

For Kant this law must become a universal law because 'if I deprive the will of all inclination which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its action to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, *i.e.* I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law' ( :21). For Kant to will the good is to will in accordance with universal law. Kant's 'categorical imperative' calls for us always to act in such a way that the basis of our action is universal law (Wogaman:162).

But for Kant, man's common reason in its practical judgement perfectly coincides with a universal law. Our common reason and universal law never contradict one another. Kant ( :23-24) states that, without quitting the moral knowledge of common human reason, we have arrived at its principle. In other words, 'although common men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal form, yet they always have it really before their eyes, and use it as the standard of their decision.' ( :24)

What Kant attempted is to make *a priori* ethical judgements, that is, judgement based upon the reason acting apart from any traditional authority or experimental investigations (Long: 5). The human common reason has its own autonomy to distinguish what is good and what is bad, therefore, men do not need science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and good, even wise and virtuous. So all individuals can reach a universal law. Kant ( :24)said that indeed 'we might well have conjectured beforehand that

the knowledge of what every man is bound to do, and therefore also to know, would be within the reach of every man, even the commonest.’

For Kant the question of what *is* in accordance with universal moral law must be by reason and experience ( Wogaman: 162). In this way Kant’s moral self envisages the universal self. Against all the commands of duty which reason as the faculty of the universal self represents to man as so deserving of respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in his wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness ( Kant 1900:25). According to Kant, ‘Now reason issues its commands unyieldingly, without promising anything to the inclinations, and, as it were, with disregard and contempt for these claims, which are so impetuous, and at the same time so plausible, and which will not allow themselves to be suppressed by any command.’ ( :25-26)

Thus, Kant is convinced that one canon of universal law is that one ought never to tell a lie. Another is that we should always treat other persons as ends in themselves, and not exploit them merely as means to other purposes. For Kant the modern moral codes, or the ethics of duty are firmly established on the reason which belongs to the autonomous self ( Long: 5).

We found that Kant’s philosophical basis for his ethics is the reason which belongs to the autonomous self. We are now going to examine Kant’s opinion regarding some concrete ethics to clarify the philosophical basis of his ethics.

## **B. Concrete ethics**

For Kant( 1930:71) ethics is ‘philosophy of disposition; and as dispositions are the cardinal principles of action and correlate actions and their grounds of impulse,’ ethics is a practical philosophy. In order to explain disposition, Kant takes the example of a man who pays his debts. He may be swayed by the fear of being punished if he defaults, or he may pay because it is right and proper that he should. In the first case his conduct has *rectitudo*

*juridica* and marks him as a good citizen and in the latter case his conduct has *rectitudo ethica* which constitutes him a good man.

Therefore, the moral law must be pure ( :74). But its purity is not that of the fantastic theologian or moralist who puzzles his mind over things that do not matter and with sophistry and needless subtlety tries to extract some moral essence from them ( :74). 'Its purity lies in its principles.' And the ethics must be precise and holy. The moral law is holy not because it has been revealed to us. Its holiness is original and our own reason is capable of revealing it to us ( :75). Kant exalts our practical reason as the faculty for judging revelation. Men become capable of a pure judgement in questions of good conduct. Men have their own authority to be pure and holy in disposition. Kant's ethical opinion on the following subjects will serve to demonstrate this further.

( i ) Natural religions

Kant envisaged that morality based on the reason of the human self should be an essential part of natural religion. 'Natural religion is no rule of morality.' Instead 'religion is morality applied to God. It is ethics applied to theology.'( 1930:79) Theology must contain the condition of moral perfection. But the source of theology that contains moral perfection must be found in sound reason ( :80).

Let us examine the source of this theology according to Kant. For Kant a clear exposition of morality of itself leads to the belief in God. Kant set this belief on reason rather than revelation ( :80). This belief in a God is deeply ingrained in 'our human self's moral feeling,' for the pre-eminant consideration in morality is purity of disposition ( :80).

In this thesis we query some aspects of Kant's opinion on belief. Kant said that without belief in the existence of such a being man could not possibly attain to and be conscious of highest moral worth ( :80). After Kant questioned as follows: 'Only God can see that our dispositions are moral and pure, and if there were no God, why ought we to cherish these

dispositions?', he ( :80-81) answered that 'our conduct might be the same, we might still go on doing good, but not from any pure motive; we might be guided by considerations of honour or pleasure in benevolent actions; the action would be the same as if the disposition were moral because the analogues of morality are identical with it in the event.' Therefore, he ( :81) confirmed that 'it is impossible to cherish morally pure dispositions without at the same time conceiving that these dispositions are related to the Supreme Being to whom alone they can be an open book.' We cannot be moral without believing in God.

From his statements we can infer that he considers God's revelation to be prior to human moral understanding; however, he never plays down the human intrinsic autonomy which exists in our dispositions. God's own inherent goodness commits us to goodness, but he looks to the disposition and to inner goodness. 'It follows, therefore, that the proper ground of action should be morality, and not the divine will directly.' ( :83) Kant ( :83) continues: 'The divine will is the motive to action, not the ground of it. Religion is not concerned to secure the performance of actions, without respect to the ground and intention of their performance, but to secure that they are done from a certain disposition.' What Kant means is that God does not usurp human autonomy. Therefore, Kant identifies human practical reason with divine will.

According to Schneewind ( 1998: 512 ): 'Kant transposes onto human practical reason the relation he tried to work out between God and the goodness of the outcomes of his choices.' The invention of the autonomy of the self influenced Kant. So Kant thought that humanity must share moral capability with God.

## (ii) Trust in God and the concept of faith

For Kant our human ability and power of reason can never be given up, even in faith. As he( 1930: 95) said, we shall now take belief in the sense that we may hope that God, in His wisdom and goodness, will make up our shortcoming, but only when we do our best and

when we do what lies in our power ( :95). Faith means to trust in God that he will supply our deficiency in things beyond our power, provided we have done all within our power. Even humility and modesty are closely related to human moral duty.

We agree with Kant when he ( :96) said of faith: ‘Practical faith does not consist in saying: “If only I trust implicitly in God He will do what I want”; rather in saying: “I will myself do all I can, and if I then leave myself in God’s hands, He will strengthen my weakness and make up my shortcomings as He knows best.”’ Certainly, we must not use God for our selfish wants. We must obey him. What we question in Kant, however, is that he appears not to understand that even our best action can only be done by the grace of God.

### (iii) Duties to oneself

Kant emphasized the duty to one’s self. To him duty to oneself is prior to even duty to the other. First among our duties is the duty we owe to our own selves ( : 117).

We must be worthy of our personhood; whatever makes us unworthy of it makes us unfit for anything, we cease to be human ( :119). We must respect ourselves. Therefore, Kant strongly declares that ‘the most serious offence against the duty one owes to oneself is suicide.’( :119) He explained why suicide should be so abominable as follows ( see 119-120 ). It is no answer to say ‘because God forbids it’. Suicide is not reprehensible because God has commanded us not to do it. Instead, for Kant, ‘the ground for regarding suicide and other transgressions as abominable and punishable must not be found in the divine will, but in their inherent heinousness. Suicide is an abomination because it implies the abuse of men’s freedom of action: he uses his freedom to destroy himself’ ( :120).

For Kant the ground for regarding suicide is inherent in each person as an autonomous being. From this autonomous human nature the rule of morality inevitably comes true. We can say that morality is codified in our human nature. In other words, the rule of morality is categorized universally. Therefore the rule of morality commands apodeictically and

categorically that we must observe our duties to ourselves; and in committing suicide and reducing himself to a carcass, man uses his powers and his liberty against himself ( :120).

Kant agrees that a person can serve as a means for others, but only when he does not cease to be a person and an end. When he says 'a person and an end' he implies the autonomy of the human self.

For Kant freedom is that faculty which gives unlimited usefulness to all other faculties. It is the highest order of life, which serves as the foundation of all perfections and is their necessary condition. Therefore, to Kant this freedom is the inherent value of the world. Here again human nature has its own value without the other or even the Wholly Other.

Mankind differs from animals, because man alone can properly use freedom. Animals and nature use it according to sensuous impulse. But man does not use freedom according to sensuous impulse. Kant ( :122) states: 'mankind apart, nature is not free; through it all there runs a subjectively necessitating principle in accordance with which everything happens regularly. Man alone is free; his action is not regulated by any such subjectively necessitating principle; if they were, he would not be free.' But in the next sentence Kant (:122) states: 'If the freedom of man were not kept within bounds by objective rules, the result would be the completest savage disorder.' In other words, our freedom must be restricted by 'objective determination'. but the grounds of this objective determination must lie in understanding. Therefore, the proper use of freedom is the supreme rule ( :122).

From this supreme rule the universal law must be established. The universal law can be explained: 'Let thy procedure be such that in all thine actions regularity prevails.' (:122) Kant thereby inevitably establishes the universal law above the human autonomous self. The universal law rules the human self. Kant either replaces the universal law with God or identifies it with God. In other words, the individual autonomous self becomes the universal self which identifies with God.

( iv) Self-respect

Kant notes that humility and true, noble pride on the other hand are elements of proper self-respect. Shamelessness is its opposite ( :126). Why must we respect ourselves? The reason is that we must be humble as individuals, but we ought to hold ourselves in high esteem as representatives of mankind. Why must we be humble as individuals? Kant ( :126) answered thus: ‘In the light of the law of morality, which is holy and perfect, our defects stand out with glaring distinctness and on comparing ourselves with this standard of perfection we have sufficient cause to feel humble.’ From his view we can easily understand that our humbleness relates only to the law of morality, but not to other persons.

So Kant ( : 126) reasons that ‘if we compare ourselves with others, there is no reason to have a low opinion of ourselves; we have a right to consider ourselves as valuable as another.’ Kant ridicules the monk’s virtue of self-abasement because this implies a low opinion in comparison with others. Kant criticizes this ‘virtue’ as unnatural.

Kant considers that the true form of humility closely relates to a true form of pride. For Kant even humility is accepted as moral duty from the presupposition that the human self has his own autonomy. For Kant even humility is self-centric. He ( :127) states that ‘there is nothing unjust or unreasonable in self-esteem; we do no harm to another if we consider ourselves equal to him in our estimation.’

Kant does not see the place of humility in the relationship between the self and the other. This result is inevitable because human practical reason has its own authority. It is only when we recognize that we are not in authority over our own selves, that we can be humble in relationship with God and the other. As Kant does not give up the autonomy of the human self, he cannot understand the humility in a personal relationship with God and the other.

Kant relates humility only to the purity of the moral law. Therefore, he ( : 127) says that ‘if we are to pass judgement upon ourselves we must draw a comparison between ourselves and the purity of the moral law, and we then have cause to feel humble.’

Kant also considers that our self-esteem relates to self-love. Therefore he ( :127) stresses that moral self-esteem which is grounded in the worth of humanity should not be derived from comparison with others, but from comparison with the moral law. In Kant’s concept of self-esteem related to self-love we can recognize the self-centrism of his ethics.

Kant says that when men find that there are some whom they surpass it gives them a feeling of moral pride, but they can feel much more than moral pride when they believe themselves perfect as measured by the standard of the moral law. When a man recognizes by his own autonomy that he is the perfect moral self, for the first time he can take pride in himself.

According to Kant our self-conceit comes from our lenient view of the moral law. Therefore, for Kant ‘the remedy against such self-conceit is to be found in our being able to hope that our weakness and infirmity will be supplemented by the help of God who presented morality in its purity *if we but do the utmost that the consciousness of our capacity tells us we are able to do*’ ( :128). In this concept of self-conceit we discover Kant’s human centric autonomy.

#### ( v) Care for one’s life

To Kant life itself is not the greatest thing for man. Rather moral duty is far greater than life. Therefore, a worthless man values his life, but he who has a greater inner worth places a lesser value upon his life ( :154). The latter would sacrifice himself rather than be guilty of neglecting moral duty which exalts human nature and its dignity. He values his person above his life ( :154). He ( :155) says that ‘a man of inner worth does not shrink from death; he would die rather than live as an object of contempt, a member of a gang of

scoundrels in the galleys; but the worthless man prefers the galleys, almost as if they were his proper place.’

Therefore there exist moral duties that man should subordinate, and in order to accomplish them he must give no countenance to cowardice and fears for his life ( :155). Kant places the life of man below moral duty. In Kant man must sacrifice his life not for the other person but for moral duty.

For Kant our own personhood must be an object of the highest esteem. Therefore rather than dishonour it, or allow it to be dishonoured, man should sacrifice his life. If a man cannot preserve his life except by dishonouring his humanity, he ought rather to sacrifice it; it is true that he endangers his animal life, but he can feel that, so long as he lived, he lived honourably ( :156). Always Kant values the human self as above all. To him humanity is meritorious being.

For him ( :156) how long man lives is of no account; it is not his life that he loses, but only the prolongation of his years, for nature has already decreed that he must die at some time; what matters is that, so long as he lives, man should live honourably and should not disgrace the dignity of humanity; if he can no longer live honourably, he cannot live at all; his moral life is at an end.

But we should ask him why we should live honourably. And Kant would answer, ‘We should live honourably for the universal law,’ not for God and not for the other as person. In other words, according to him, we should live for the human self because the human self has its own meritorious value which is equal to God.

#### ( vi) Duties towards the body in respect of sexual impulse

When a person loves another purely from sexual desire, nobody can love another ( :163). Sexual love makes of the loved person an Object of appetite ( :163). Sexual love degrades

human nature, for as soon as a person becomes an Object of desire for another, all motives of moral relationship cease to function, because as an Object of desire for another a person becomes a thing and can be treated and used as such by every one ( :163).

Kant approaches sexual morality from the stand point of human nature. If man does not degrade human nature, sexual relationship is natural. So Kant criticizes the strict moralists who had pretensions to be regarded as saints. When man degrades another human's nature the sexuality is an immoral thing. The immoral desire which a man has for a woman is not directed towards her because she is a human being, but because she is a woman; that she is a human being is of no concern to the man; only her sex is the object of his desires ( :164) In this sexual desire human nature is always subordinated. Human nature is thereby sacrificed to sex.

As Kant approaches sexuality only from the perspective of autonomous human nature, he cannot see the point that sexual immorality disgraces the holiness of God.

Furthermore, we contend that man cannot dispose over himself because he is not his own property; to say that he is would be self-contradictory, for in so far as he is a person he is a subject in whom the ownership of things can be vested, and if he were his own property, he would be a thing over which he could have ownership ( :165). Man is a subject so nobody can degrade him. From human autonomy, thus, according to Kant the sexual moral rule comes forth, for example, matrimony and monogamous marriage.

These rules of sexual morality become universal law. Yet monogamy as universal law marginalizes the person who is born in polygamous culture. The Kantian universal law based on human autonomous self marginalizes the other person.

When we investigated Kant's ethics in his own works, we noted that Kant elevated the active human mind as the definitive agent both in the process of knowing and in the life of duty (Grenz 1996 : 79). Green ( 1978: 28) argues that for Kant the whole cognitive and

practical process is the realization of objects or states desired by the mind of the human self as rational agents. Kant's elevation of the mind of the human self influenced subsequent philosophers to concentrate their interest on the individual self ( Grenz: 79). This centrality of the autonomous self was the foundation of the modernist ethics ( :79).

Kant ( cited from Lewis 1960: 122; *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* 33[122] ) himself emphasized this autonomy of the human self. He said that 'The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them.....The moral law expresses nothing else than the autonomy of pure practical reason, i.e., freedom.' For Kant the human self has freedom from empirical determination because as a rational being the self follows a formal principle or a universal law but this formal principle or law is formulated completely by the autonomous self ( Lewis :122-123).

When the mind of the autonomous human self functions scientifically, it cannot approach absolute freedom and God. When it functions in a practical way, however, it necessarily presupposes freedom to act ethically as a formal principle or a universal law, and the human self can thus know God in this ethical life ( Griffin 1989: 60). The mind of the autonomous self is subject in scientific thinking as well as ethical practice. Kant liberated the autonomous human self from all authority of both religion and metaphysics ( Lakeland 1997: 14). Therefore the individual exercise of critical reason could not be limited to what may be subjected to critique ( :14). Lewis ( : 123) expresses Kant's human self-centrism thus: 'Only a law given by myself as a member of the intelligible world can interest me directly as a member of the empirical world; all other laws and actions under them can interest me only indirectly.' Therefore, only a self-given law can support the rule of morality.

For Kant, the freedom of human self from all authority means that the human self as the subject can become an object to himself, and can come to know himself ultimately as a transcendental subject over against the other and the world ( Lakeland : 14). For Kant the human self becomes his own master, but in his morality the human self must subordinate to

a self-given law ( Lewis : 123). The self produces the law and the self is subject to the law. This is the ‘paradox of Kantian ethics’ based on the autonomous self. Kant’s ‘central moral phenomenon is the restricting of the self by law; its explanation is the lawgiving of the self, the autonomy.’ ( :123).

Kant’s ethics, therefore, are the rational ethics or the ethics of the autonomous self ( Green :6). His ethics were generated from human self-centrism.

Friedrich Schleiermacher is a typical modern theologian. Therefore, to study Schleiermacher’s theology it is helpful to understand fully the character of modern ethics. But we cannot survey all his theological opinions. We investigate only his work on regeneration and sanctification because these two concepts are closely connected with Christian ethical life in his theology.

#### **2.1.2.2. Friedrich Schleiermacher**

##### **( i) Regeneration**

For Schleiermacher the essence of redemption is that the God-consciousness is present in human nature ( 1928: 476 ). Before redemption the ‘God-consciousness was evinced only casually in isolated flashes, never kindling to a steady flame’. At that time God-consciousness did not constantly control the various elements of life.

And regeneration means that human nature changes from the old to a new life. This new life means that our human passive element becomes part of the God-consciousness produced by the influence of the Redeemer; and every active element works by an impulse of the same God-consciousness ( :476). According to Schleiermacher our relation to God is really the business of human self-consciousness, looking at itself reflected in thought and finding a consciousness of God included there ( : 478-479).

Our relationship to God comprises relationship with his holiness and righteousness. Therefore, our corporate life of sin should change to divine holiness and righteousness. For Schleiermacher ( :479) the 'two elements cannot be held separate in such a manner that a conversion could even be imagined without justification, or a justification without conversion'. Conversion has two meanings, repentance and faith. But repentance and faith cannot be separated from each other. Human nature regrets the continual abjuration of the fellowship of the sinful life and at the same time desires to receive the power that comes from Christ ( :485). In other words, repentance as self-consciousness moved by the consciousness of sin comes to rest in forgiveness which is the outcome of faith.

For Schleiermacher justification is a change in our relation to God ( :500). For this reason justification and conversion cannot be separated from each other. Conclusively for Schleiermacher regeneration is total change from the consciousness of sin to God-consciousness.

#### ( ii ) Sanctification

Schleiermacher considers sanctification from two standpoints. The first is the etymological point that God's people must separate themselves from ordinary social life and devote themselves to God. This new relationship with God is the same as that which Christ brought, because this relationship to God that was seen in the absolutely powerful God-consciousness of Christ includes severance from participation in the common sinful nature ( :505). The second point is the connexion of the term with holiness as a Divine attribute.

Sanctification generates the action that is not quite identical with any previous sinful action. For Schleiermacher ( :512) grace is not lost by the action of the new man, but by his not acting. Therefore in everyone who believes in Christ the activity of the life of Christ defines itself by the demands that meet him in virtue of his position within the common life ( :516).

For Schleiermacher, on the one hand, good works cannot bring about the conversion and justification. If a man were to put his trust in good works, it would be injurious to salvation. On the contrary, anyone who does good works has blessedness already in his faith, and therefore cannot find himself wanting first to rely upon his works ( :518). Thus good works are the natural effect of faith. If a man has a living fellowship with Christ, he is laid hold of by the union of the divine with the human nature in His Person, and consent to this becomes a constant and active will to maintain and extend this union ( :518). Anything this will produce is a good work, were it only an incipient resistance to sin. For Schleiermacher good works are the object of divine good-pleasure. For man's actual deeds are at the same time good works and sin.

Schleiermacher ( :521) says that it is therefore quite right to say that it is really only the person, and the person only as God regards him in Christ, that is the object of divine good-pleasure; the works are so regarded merely for the person's sake. This consciousness, necessarily involved in the will for the kingdom of God, is the blessedness which accompanies that will. The will for the kingdom of God creates for every believer challenges of activity in the kingdom of God, answering to the powers at his command and his knowledge of the conditions by which he is surrounded ( : 521-522).

At this point Schleiermacher does not deny the law of reason. On the contrary, for him ( :522), 'something like legislation will always exist in Christian life in order in certain spheres to guide the actions of those who lack insight.'

We have briefly investigated Schleiermacher's theology in so far as it can be related to Christian ethics. Even though he strongly claims the priority of God's grace, he remains within the modernist paradigm.

He emphasized religion as feeling, because he saw that in the face of rationalism, there was a crucial need to state the unique and essential nature of religion as an indelible aspect of human existence ( Clements 1987: 36). He used modern ideas in order to defend the

Christian religion. But this brought the result that modern rationalism and scientific materialism perverted Christian belief.

Schleiermacher, in particular, presents the view that 'the Redeemer, then, is like all men in virtue of the identity of human nature, but distinguished from them all by the constant potency of His God-consciousness, which was a veritable existence of God in Him' ( 1928: 385). Therefore, in Schleiermacher, 'Jesus was a man with a uniquely developed consciousness of God and an exceptional spirituality, similar to the great prophets of old or the champions of civil rights of our own day, but supremely so' ( Hughes 1989: 325 ).

Jesus was the beginner of fulfilled human nature ( Schleiermacher 1928: 389). Schleiermacher's modern christology resembled the heterodoxical prototype of theology of the Ebionites and of the unitarians like Paul of Samosata, which led them to portray Jesus as a divinely inspired man, and thus, in effect, to affirm his *homoosia* with man but to deny his *homoosia* with God (Hughes1989: 324-325).

In Schleiermacher Christian faith was not understood as the revelation of God, but as the experience of man ( Barth *Protestant theology*: 463). On the other hand, Schleiermacher manifested the strongest tendency towards identity and homogeneity between God and man, in the opinion of Idealists Fichte, Schelling and Hegel ( Rosato 1981: 20).

Schleiermacher's theology started from the concept of the human self. When he refers to the 'feeling' or 'sense' of God as the Infinite in which all finite things exist, it does not live apart from ethical activity, or from scientific speculative knowledge based on rationalism ( Clements:36-37). His ethics as the perfect civil rights are based on the autonomous self. Schleiermacher's theological ethics are established on an attitude of a reasonable accommodation to the Enlightenment principle ( Lakeland 1997: 40).

As we discovered, the modern ethics are established on the self-sufficiency of human reason. Modern ethics are identified with rationalized moral codes in Kant's case and with reasonableness and benevolence. Modern ethics can be called the ethics of 'the self'.

## **2.2. 'The other' in postmodernism**

We have investigated modernism that took away the bridle of premodern hierarchical Church domination. Thereafter modernism firmly proclaimed its "man-made" provenance (Bauman 1994: 8). But there was another problem. In modernism rational individuals had to be recaptured by rational faculties or institutes. Therefore in this section we try to discover how postmodernism reacted against the rational human self of modernism and what goal postmodernism pursued.

### **2.2.1. Postmodern reaction against modernism**

The Kantian view of religion and the Enlightenment conception of history hold in common the assumption that there is one set of universal and unalterable principles that govern the affairs of the race. Therefore in modernism human nature is fundamentally the same in all times and places, 'consisting, as it does, of a constant central core, with which universal goals could be derived and verified through a logically connected structure of scientific laws' (Pacini 1988 : 48 ).

Contrary to these modern universal principles, the expressionist conception of religion and the counter-enlightenment conception of history rejected scientific universality, objectivity, rationality, and the belief in the human self to provide permanent solutions to all genuine problems of thought ( : 48 ). Postmodernism, therefore, seeks to deconstruct universalized modern rationalism.

Phillips and Okholm ( 1995 : 12-13 ) have described postmodernism as follows :

‘Postmodernism’ is a reaction against ‘modernity’ as it developed out of the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Rejecting the superstitious past as well as its ‘blind and bloody fanaticism,’ modernity attempted to establish culture and life on a universal and objective foundation. Over against the illusions, prejudices and fanaticism of the past, modernity offered Reason to scrutinize critically every claim and to ground the edifice of knowledge. Not only would all rational beings concur in Reason, but what is more important, Reason provided a set of rules and criteria for correct thinking about reality thus accessing Absolute Truth. In contrast to modernity, postmodernism repudiates any appeal to Reality or Truth. The very attempt to propose totalizing metanarratives that define and legitimate realities are denounced as oppressive.

In the postmodern world people are no longer convinced that knowledge is inherently good. Therefore, postmodernists no longer believe in any universal Reality or Truth. They also reject all totalizing metanarratives. The emphasis on holism among postmodernists is related to their rejection of the assumption of the Enlightenment - namely, that truth is certain, and hence purely rational, knowledge.

The postmodern mind refuses to limit the truth to its rational dimension and thus dethrones the human intellect as the arbiter of truth. There are ‘other valid paths to knowledge besides reason, says the postmodernist, including the emotions and the intuition’ ( Grenz 1996 : 7 ). Therefore, postmodernism confers meaning on the emotions and ‘the other’.

Actually, even modern knowledge could not be inherent in only the self without the other. The resources of modern knowledge, in truth, were produced in dialectics ( Lyotard 1984 : 29 ) which inherently must comprise the other.

For Lyotard, even modern knowledge could not escape from its dialectic relationship in its quest for legitimation. In fact, modern knowledge was narrative knowledge. But the modern scientific narrative knowledge itself has inherited the problem of its own legitimation.

Lyotard ( : 30 ) says that narrative knowledge makes a resurgence in the West as a way of solving the problem of legitimating the new authorities. It is natural in a narrative context to solicit the name of a hero in response to the questions, *Who* has the right to decide for society? Who is the subject whose prescriptions are norms for those they obligate? This means that, even though rational knowledge itself was a narrative knowledge, modernism totalized rational knowledge on the base of the self. In other words, this modern dialectics produced the self-centrism in knowledge by legitimating it.

But in the postindustrial society and postmodern culture the metanarrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation( : 37 ). This delegitimation is the counter narrative of postmodernity ( : 40). Postmodernism does not accept the universal narrative. Therefore, postmodern science and knowledge can be characterized as incomplete information, "*fracta*", catastrophes, pragmatic paradox; it is a 'paralogy' in Lyotard's term.

What Lyotard indicates here, however, is that, in postmodern times, neither science nor social pragmatics has a metaprinciple. Postmodernism, therefore, is contrasted in its uncertainty against the modern certainty of universalized rationalism. Postmodernism is established on this uncertainty and the unknown paradox.

Therefore Lyotard goes on to say that postmodern politics emphasized both the desire for justice among divers opinions and the desire for the unknown. These politics in turn mean that postmodern deconstruction of the legitimation of knowledge forces people to accept the postmodern style of life. People must live in uncertainty. There are strangers as the

other whom 'I', the self, cannot control. Postmodernism shifted the paradigm from the self to the other in recognition of the impossibility of one culture maintaining total power.

In this postmodern thinking, *the other* who was marginalized and isolated becomes a member of the world community. In this postmodernism, therefore, *the other*, women, homosexuals, and so on, claim their own rights and own life styles. Nobody can control the other.

In sum, postmodernism takes on the counter values of modernism. Palmer ( 1975: *Journal of religion* 55 : 319 ) indicates this as follows:

To take a postmodernist turn in one's thinking, one must be willing to call the whole development of modern culture during the past three centuries into question. It is not postmodern to demand a "holistic" or "gestalt" psychology that remains satisfied to encourage the individual to adjust to society as it is. It is postmodern to treat mental illness as a 'myth' and to find in schizophrenia a phenomenon that calls ordinary consciousness into question. It is not postmodern to say that the medium is the message, or to advise us to get ready for a 'future shock' of paper dresses and throwaway toothbrushes. It is postmodern to call into question the whole scarcity-oriented, manipulative, exploitative mind-set that dominates modern existence.

All the above-mentioned postmodern trends have rejected the modern universalized rationalism. Generally, postmodernism has deconstructed the universality of human reason and its foundation of truth. It has destroyed the human rational self.

This postmodern deconstructuralism inevitably innately inherit postmodern holism. Let us, therefore, examine postmodern holism.

### **2.2.2. Postmodernism and its character of holism**

Christians are striving to remove the dualistic view reflected in ‘the Newtonian-Cartesian laws about the dichotomies of subject-object, existence-essence, idea-phenomenon et cetera, that radically changed the description of the ontological status of God concerning his creation’ ( Van de Kamp 1987 : 312 ).

Indeed, the dualistic view is losing credibility even in scientific discoveries. The Quantum theory states that no object is real before it is perceived in the subject’s perspective (Talbot 1987: 29,40; Brink 1985:16 ).

Holism has emerged in the wake of this destruction of dualism. In certain respects postmodern holism even tries to unify ontological God with man. In fact, ‘recent organic holism as a postmodern philosophical view of God amounts to a quantum leap: the total-otherness of God is exchanged for the *deification of the physical*’ ( Van Aarde 1994 : 611).

The meaning of this is evidently that organic holism as a postmodern phenomenon is by nature monistic, but it is also open to the divine dimension from a pantheistic perspective (: 613 ). Thus organic holism, despite its monistic *metaphysical nature*, acknowledges two mutually exclusive forms of ‘being’: ‘the metaphysical is drawn into the physical, and thus time is blended with eternity, evil with good, and man with God’ ( : 614 ).

Ironically, from the perspective of organic holism, some Judeo-Christian denominations, while boasting of monism, were essentially dualistic because they separated God from his creation. For Capra, organic holism wipes out these boundaries and identities; immanence and transcendence become one and the same ( Van Aarde 1994: 606 ). Capra ( 1989: 75-89 ) did not split the universe dualistically into mind and matter, or into any other separate realities.

Banathy ( 1993 : 211 ) clearly describes human life from this perspective of organic holism. We must seek a balanced and coordinated development of the various existential

systems: 'of social, cultural, ethical/moral, economic and political, physical/mental/spiritual, intellectual/scientific/technological, and the aesthetic'. We aim to reconcile the opposition of body-mind-spirit, autonomy and responsibility, and cooperation and competition. Such reconciliation is manifested in a holistic perspective of life.

Postmodern holism is a world-view against modern dualism in all dimensions of human life. Let us then, in concrete terms, examine the characteristics of holism, in both the industrial and postindustrial worlds. According to Banathy (: 211 ), the difference between modernism and postmodern holism is as shown below :

A Comparison of general Characteristics

	<b>Industrial age</b>	<b>Postindustrial age</b>
Key mode of production	Processes organized around energy for material production in an assembly-line mode	Processes organized around intellectual technology for information/knowledge development and utilization
Key evolutionary markers	Extension of our physical powers by machines	Extension of our cognitive powers by cybernetic/systems technologies(hi-tech)
	Telecommunication	Global information networks of all kinds
Technologies	Inventing, manufacturing, fabricating, heating, transporting	Gathering, storing, organizing information and knowledge, communicating, planning, designing
Principal commodity	Material(raw and processed), machines, hard products	Information/knowledge organized to use for learning, innovating, designing, fomulating policy
Context of social consciousness	National and race	In addition: regional, transnational, global, universal.

More widely, Banathy (: 209) presented the cognitive mapping of societal systems in postmodern holism. The general characteristics apply to all three domains. Sociocultural characteristics influence both the scientific and the organizational domains. The scientific paradigm influences all the others.

**General characteristics**

Information/knowledge explosion, accelerating advancements in intellectual technology, new modes of communication, extension of our cognitive powers, a new world-view.

**Sociocultural characteristics**

Ethical/moral evolution, economic and social justice, increase of integrative power, participative governance

**Organizational characteristics**

Increasing complexity, uncertainty; accelerating rate of dynamic change; increasing interdependence

**New scientific paradigm**

New paradigm of disciplined inquiry, cybernetics and systems science, the science of complexity, synthesis, expansionism, emergence, recursive causation

( Banathy 1993: 210 ).

Poststructuralism ( for example Escobar ) extends holism to the realm of nature. The triple cultural reconversion of nature, people, and knowledge represents, for poststructuralism, a novel internationalization of production conditions ( Escobar 1996 ).

From this perspective, nature has the value of a positive actor, in other words, the co-dynamic operator with human beings. Combined with capital, invented technologies, and biodiversity discourse, biotechnology indicates to the bio-society that 'nature will be modeled on culture understood as practice. Nature will be known and remade through technique and will finally become artificial, just as culture becomes natural' ( Rabinow 1992 : 234-52 ).

In postmodern holism, as in the 'nexus of production relations' ( Yapa 1996: 71 ) production is determined within a web of mutually constitutive technological, social, ecological, cultural, and academic relations ( Watts and Peet 1996 : 262 ).

Postmodern holism is also an attempt to establish a new perspective beyond the 'logocentric' and 'anthropocentric' perspectives. After all, in Ross Thomson's words ( 1990: 133 ) : 'We are being taken away from the "logocentric" perspective which, while man is the only word-maker in the universe we know, is necessarily also an "anthropocentric" perspective'.

Ross Tomson explores how this move takes us from the "man-centred" monopoly of mind to a confusingly polycentric universe, in which meanings and interpretations proliferate beyond the human' (: 133 ). What this means to him is that 'there is no return to the old theocentricity here, but perhaps a new sense of "immanent transcendence", as everywhere the openness of being to meaning unfathomable to us confronts us"' (: 133 ).

In sum, postmodern holism saw the world as one unity, breaking the boundaries between God and man, man and woman, man and nature, and even between different religions. Actually, in modernism the premodern self-closed divine being became unified with the rational human being. In postmodernism and postmodern holism any objective entity or boundary was deconstructed. There were no outsiders, marginality, or isolation.

### **2.2.3. The postmodern ethics based on the concept of 'the other'**

While modern ethics were established on 'the self' or self-centrism of the autonomous self, postmodern ethics amended the modern ethics in terms of 'the other'. We are going to survey Immanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, as well as some feminist ethics and eco ethics.

#### **2.2.3.1. Immanuel Levinas**

Levinasian ethics bears representatively a critical relation to the modern philosophical and ethical tradition ( Critchley 1992:5). In this reason understanding Levinasian ethics is of crucial importance to our understanding of postmodern ethics.

( i ) Discourse and ethics in *Totality and Infinity*

Levinas criticizes the European thought that man is the measure of all things because he has reason. Actually in the European thought, however, the 'sentient I' could not find Reason. Instead the 'sentient I' was defined by reason. In European thought the pure I was ruled by a universal idea which produced separation between the self and the other. Therefore, for Levinas, Reason which speaks in the first person never addresses the other.

The external reason not only commands the first person but also it makes the first person rule the other. It conducts monologue. It would recover 'the sovereignty characteristic of the autonomous person only by becoming universal.' ( 1979 :72 ) The modern autonomous person thinks that his/her rationality must be unique and the measure of discourse. The modern autonomous thinker would himself enter into his own discourse. 'But to make of the thinker a moment of thought is to limit the revealing function of language to its coherence, conveying the coherence of concepts.' ( :72). Language innately suppresses 'the other,' who breaks the coherence and is hence essentially irrational. Therefore for Levinas language of the human self is involved in suppressing the other, in making the other agree with the self ( :73).

The ego, the knowing subject, self-consciousness that Levinas, following Plato, calls the Same, oppresses the other to accept its idea ( Critchley: 4). Language always prevents the other from becoming his own master. Language does not accept the other as autonomous self.

Therefore Levinas suggests 'the *revelation* of the other, the restoration of autonomy of the other'. In other words, Levinas gives autonomy to the other with the self. 'In this

revelation only can language as a system of signs be constituted.’ (Levinas:73). For Levinas the other called upon is not something represented, is not given, through one side already open to generalization. In this way, ‘language, far from presupposing universality and generality, first makes [the other] possible.’ In this restoration of autonomy of the other ‘language presupposes interlocutors, a plurality,’ because there are no more oppressors of the other. Rather the ethics is in ‘incalculable responsibility to and for the other/Other’ (Ward 1996: 156).

The other no longer participates in universality. From this the ethics begin. By Critchley ( : 5 ) ‘the Same is called into question by the other; or, to use Levinas’s word, the “alterity” of that which cannot be reduced to the Same, that which escapes the cognitive powers of the knowing subject.’ In this revelation of the other, the work of language is entirely different from modern language. It consists in entering into relationship with a nudity disengaged from every form (Levinas :74). For Levinas such a nudity is the face of the other. The nakedness of the face of the other is not what is presented to me because I disclose it, not what would therefore be presented to me, to my powers, to my perceptions in a light exterior to it ( :74-75).

Levinas’ opinion takes away the universal rules from each person and gives them freedom. From this nakedness of human persons he starts his ethics.

#### ( ii ) Ethics and the face

For Levinas ( :195) the ethical relationship which produces the discourse is not a kind of consciousness whose rays emanate from the I. Instead it puts the I in question. This putting in question emanates from the other. The ego never reduces to ‘the Same’ that is identified with unique and universal norm or rule. Therefore ‘the presence of a being not entering into the sphere of the same determines its “status” as infinite.’ ( :195). For Levinas every man has his own authority without any obligation, there is only the face of the other. Therefore, the facing position can be only as a moral summons. Levinas defines

ethics as ‘the putting into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other’ ( : 43). Critchley ( :5) says that ‘ethics, for Levinas, is critique; it is the critical question of the liberty, spontaneity, and cognitive emprise of the ego that seeks to reduce all otherness to itself.’

### ( iii ) Sensibility

Levinasian ethics start from the critique of the philosophical tradition ( Critchley: 5). Levinas, even though he deconstructs modern universality of ethics, never denies any ethical aspect. Instead new ethical life starts from the other. ‘The other’ includes the weak, the widows, the orphans. But this ethics is never reduced to any norm or rules. Therefore, human subjectivity signifies ‘the one-in-the-place-of-another,’ (Levinas:14) the relationship between the self and the other but in the priority of the other. Levinas calls it substitution. In Levinas’s major work, *Otherwise than being or Beyond Essence* ( 1981), substitution is the most important conception in order to constitute his ethics ( Ford 1996: 21). Let us consider Levinas’s ideas more closely in order to understand clearly the term of substitution. He ( 1981:119) states:

But communication would be impossible if it should have to begin in the ego, a free subject, to whom every other would be only a limitation that invites war, domination, precaution and information. To communicate is indeed to open oneself, but the openness is not in opening to spectacle of or the recognition of the other, but in becoming a responsibility for the other to the point of substitution, where the for-the-other proper to disclosure, to monstration to the other, turns into the for-the-other proper to responsibility.

Ford ( :21) sees Levinas’s substitution in terms of closely related ideas such as ‘being a hostage, expiation for the other, responsibility for the freedom of the other, responsibility for the persecutor, and the gratuity of sacrifice, as his culminating expression of radical responsibility.’ In Levinas’s substitution, the concept of ‘essence’ and ‘identity’ must be

ignored. Because when we use words such as 'essence' and 'identity' they always signify universality and it oppresses the other to agree with the self who has the universal law. When we use 'essence' and 'identity' we cannot substitute for the other. In substitution we can recognize *the otherness of the other*. Therefore the breakup of essence is ethics.

This break-up of identity, this changing of being into substitution, is the subject's subjectivity, or its subjection to everything. Through the break-up of identity the pure I who is curbed by any external authorities, either the self or the other, can subject itself to everything. For Levinas what the human self must be subjected to is not any external moral norms or any external authorities but the other person himself.

And for Levinas since the human self is subject to the other person, he is nothing but susceptible and vulnerable. The self must be subjected to the other. He has given up all power. Therefore he is susceptible and vulnerable. This is the subject's or the self's sensibility (Levinas 1979:14).

Furthermore, since the other is prior to the self, in Levinas' exceptional concept, the one is in the place of another, the subject comes to pass as a passivity more passive than all passivity. The other is the starting point of all ethical life. In modern times the self who produced the universal norms treated the other from his own perspectives. Therefore there was always separation and oppression. The modern self synthesized history and memory for his own sake. But 'to the diachronic past, which cannot be recuperated by representation effected by memory or history, that is, incommensurable with the present, corresponds or answers the unassumable passivity of the self.' (: 14) Therefore, for Levinas (:14), 'to come to pass' is for us a precious expression in which the *self* figures as in a past that bypasses itself, as in aging without 'active synthesis'. We cannot idealize any event. We cannot make any universal norms and rules. And we cannot suppress the other by these rules. We only meet the other. Our response to the other is, therefore, responsibility.

For Levinas when we must be responsible, it means that we must not treat the other by any moral rules. Levinas expresses it thus: 'Responsibility for the other is a passivity more passive than all passivity, an exposure to the other without this exposure being assumed, an exposure without holding back.' Responsibility for the other depends on the other and not on universal rules. This exposure is frank and sincere. For Levinas the other is the person who has never been curbed by external ideas, norms and rules. In this responsibility suffering is inevitably needed because the self cannot dominate the other by any external rules. Instead the self should be 'a subjectivity which is so radically passive that it is not possible to conceive of a time when it was not under an absolute obligation.' ( Ford: 25).

#### ( iv ) Proximity

Proximity relates to a new paradigm in which the other is his own master. As in the modern paradigm, if external authority offers universal norms, there is no difference between the self and the other. All things must be the same. Culture, life styles, etc. must be the same. Homogeneity does not allow any heterogeneity. This paradigm presupposes contiguity itself that can never accept a difference between the self and the other. If we remove all universal norms, we find that differences exists between the self and the other. In these differences of the other we can understand the alternative concept, 'the proximity, to contiguity' ( Levinas:82). Ward (: 157) says that the self cannot master the other because he has no rule to control the other, and he is proximate to the world and to the face of another person.

Since there is no external authority between the self and the other, 'proximity is not a state, a repose, but, a restlessness' ( Levinas:82). This means that nobody can rule the other by any authority and norm. My neighbour is totally different from me. My neighbour is his own subject. Therefore I must approach my neighbour not by my reason but by his own value. This is the moral proximity of Levinas.

#### ( v ) Eros

For Levinas ( : 256 ) 'love aims at the Other; it aims at him in his frailty.' But for him frailty does not mean the inferior degree of any attribute, the relative deficiency of a determination common to me and the other. This frailty had been ignored or accepted as humanity in modernism. Therefore in modernism all erotic dimensions which were identified with human frailty were disdained.

In postmodernism all the illusions of the idea of love must be taken away. Postmodernism reveals the nudity of the human person. As we are free from all artificial projections which were made by human reason, the commandment of love, being-for-the-other must not suggest any finality and not imply the antecedent positing or valorization of any value ( : 261). To be for the other is to be good. To love is not identified with artificial projections such as 'you must love your neighbor' but to be good. Love is my goodness.

In this point Levinas says, extraordinarily, that 'Love does not lead toward the Thou' ( :264). Love has been understood as 'you must love your neighbor, the Thou' But for Levinas ( :266) 'I love fully only if the other loves me, not because I need the recognition of the other, but because my voluptuosity delights in voluptuosity, because in this unparalleled conjuncture of identification, in this trans-substantiation, the same and the other are not united but precisely--beyond every possible project, beyond every meaningful--engender the child.' This is Eros. Eros means that I love the other in his frailty and the other loves me in my frailty.

If to love is to love the other and the other loves me, to love is also to love oneself, and thus to return to oneself ( :266). Love is not a transcendental idea but it is complacent, it is pleasure, it is dual egoism ( :266). Levinas's thinking is dynamic or paradoxical. For him dynamic principle is the always same--'the Spirit that inspires, the desire for the absolute which can never be satisfied, whose economy lies outside the economy of exchange, the market economy of need and satisfaction of need.' ( Ward: 158). According to Ward ( :158), on a physiological and psychological level 'Levinas locates this desire "within eroticism and the libido."' This 'nature of desire transforms the erotic relation into a love

which does not and cannot possess its object, a love that stretches out towards the Wholly Other.' (: 159). Levinas brought egoism into Love. For him our relationship with the other is eros rather than love.

Generally, Levinas' ethics can be called the ethics of deconstruction based on the concept of 'the other' ( Critchley1992 )

### **2.2.3.2. Jacques Derrida**

Like Levinas's ethics, Derrida's ethics, also, can be called ethics of deconstruction ( see Simon Critchley, *The ethics of deconstruction*). Firstly we are going to survey his ethics of deconstruction in his opinion on drugs ( see his book *Points.....:Interviews*) and on sacrifice and death ( see his book *The gift of death*) because in these two cases we encounter fully his ethics of deconstruction.

#### **( i ) Drugs**

In the case of drugs he suggests the ethical attitudes of the people of the postmodern world. Let us first consider his deconstruction of words relating to ethical attitudes.

For Derrida all words are not neutral, innocently philosophical, logical or speculative. Therefore, he ( 1995: 229 ) says, 'Nor is it for the same reasons, nor in the same manner that one might note, just as correctly, that such and such a plant, root, or substance is also for us a concept, a "thing" apprehended through the name of a concept and the device of an interpretation.' For Derrida there is no difference in the case of 'drugs'.

When we say 'drug addiction' in our society, it is conceptualized by an instituted and an institutional definition. 'A history, a culture, conventions, evaluations, norms, an entire network of intertwined discourses, a rhetoric' are required to understand the concept of drugs. Always the rhetorical dimension influences the concept of drugs. For Derrida,

therefore, we must not think that there exists any objective, scientific, physical, or naturalistic definition in the concept of drug. The moral or political evaluation institutes the concept of drug. So such a norm or prohibition as 'drug addiction is evil' or 'drugs must be prohibited' is established.

According to Derrida ( :229), 'As soon as one utters the word "drugs," even before any "addiction," a perspective or normative "diction" is already at work, performatively, whether one likes it or not.' The concept of drug-addiction is inevitably an ethico-political norm. Therefore, Derrida's main premise in treating the drug addiction is the opposition of institution. He actually would like to take away the institutional norm from our human self. If the same premises are taken, he would not mind what kinds of opinion are held to solve the drug addiction. He particularly introduces two kinds of opinions. The first is the naturalist opinion. For Derrida ( :230) the naturalist opinion is thus:

'Since drugs and drug addiction are nothing but normative concepts, institutional evaluations or prescriptions, this artifice must be reduced. Let us return to true natural freedom. Natural law dictates that each of us be left the freedom to do as we will with our desire, our soul, and our body, as well as with that stuff known as drugs. Let us finally do away with this law which the history of conventions and of ethical norms has so deeply inscribed in the concept of drugs; let's get rid of this suppression or repression; let's return to nature.'

In this naturalist opinion which Derrida also takes, the main premise is the contradiction to ethico-political conclusion as well as perfect freedom of the human self from all external obligation.

Derrida ( :230) introduces another opinion on drug addiction. This opinion can be called the laxist decree. This opinion, however, is based on the same premise as the naturalist. According to Derrida, such people will say,

We recognize that this concept of drugs is an instituted norm. Its origin and its history are obscure. Such a norm does not follow analytically from any scientific concept of natural toxicity, nor, despite all our best efforts to establish it in this sense, will it ever do so. Nonetheless, by entirely assuming the logic of this prescriptive and repressive convention, we believe that *our* society, *our* culture, *our* conventions require this interdiction. Let us deploy it consistently. At stake here are the health, security, productivity, and the orderly functioning of these very institutions. By means of this law, at once supplementary and fundamental, these institutions protect the very possibility of the law in general, for by prohibiting drugs we assure the integrity and responsibility of the regal subject, of the citizens, and so forth. There can be no law without the conscious, vigilant, and normal subject, master of his or her intentions or desires. This interdiction and this law are thus not just artifacts like any other: they are the very condition of possibility of a respect for the law in general in our society. An interdiction is not necessarily bad, nor must it necessarily assume brutal forms; the paths it follows may be twisted and symbolically overdetermined, but no one can deny that the survival of our culture originally comprises this interdiction. It belongs to the very concept of our culture, and so forth.

In this opinion while interdiction and law are needed, it is not because ethico-political norm commands them but because our society, our culture, our convention require them. Therefore no outer being and universal ethico-political norm repress our society, our culture, our convention.

In the above two cases, Derrida would like to take away all ethical norms from the individual. In the first case by deconstruction of the ethico-political norms or universal laws Derrida shows that postmodern ethics must embody perfect freedom. In the second case Derrida shows that postmodern ethics are identified with the requirements of the

society and conventions which affect each person. This means that the human self is his own master. Derrida envisages the mastership of each person.

( ii ) Sacrifice

Derrida explains at length how universal norms were produced and maintained historically in his book *The gift of death* ( 1995). We, therefore, can understand clearly the core point of his ethics of deconstruction by investigating his view of sacrifice in *The gift of death*.

According to Derrida 'the history to be acknowledged' was 'the relation between two conversations, [*incorporation* and *repression*] and three mysteries [Orgiastic, Platonic, and Christian]'. In this history orgiastic mystery is repeated. He ( 1995 : 11 ) explained the repetition of orgiastic demonic power through the example of the Greek paradigm: 'The incorporation by means of which Platonic responsibility triumphs over orgiastic mystery is the movement by which the immortality of the individual soul is affirmed--it is also the death given to Socrates, the death that he is given and that he accepts, in other words, the death that he in a way gives himself when in the *Phaedo* he develops a whole discourse to give sense to his death and as it were to take the responsibility for it upon himself'. What Derrida would like to explain is that any human effort for overcoming previous evil will result in another evil, an oppressive universal rule.

According to Derrida ( : 13-14), the orgiastic power was used in ancient society. Even in the platonic discipline that incorporated responsibility for society, the orgiastic secret lived again. Derrida recognized that Plato, ironically, incorporated the orgiastic secret in order to force people to be responsible for the other's life. This means that Plato conceived of the soul as immortal and this concept of the immortal soul brought again the recession to the orgiastic myth. Plato's idea that 'you must sacrifice your mortal self because you have immortal soul' forces people to lose their life. For Derrida it was just another orgiastic myth.

Derrida holds that the acceptance of death in Socrates and the lack of complaint about dying, that Plato takes as moral norms, further epitomizes orgiastic power when those things become uniform moral rule. He maintains that the orgiastic myth of Socrates and Plato forced people to be sacrificed and take life from the other. In sum, Derrida would like to show that the totalisation of the idea of sacrifices can produce a new orgiastic myth.

Actually, for Derrida, the perpetuation of the orgiastic myth in Plato came from when the responsibility for the life of the other became a universal norm.

Derrida (:15) explains repetition of orgiastic power throughout history which is, in fact, a history of orgiastic mythology, namely the power of death. In other words, history was a process of self-sufficient orgiastic power in which the power of the demon ceaselessly lives as the 'new mythology' (:19, cited from Patocka 1981). In other words, the demonic power was resurrected in every age. Even in periods when people attempted to remove the orgiastic and demonic mythology, the power of the demonic was resurrected.

Why is this orgiastic mystery repeated in history? According to Derrida, this repetition of all orgiastic power originates from 'the psyche as life, as breath of life, as [living] *pneuma*,' which 'only appears out of the anticipation of dying'. Patocka rightly speaks of the reason why the living *pneuma* became the orgiastic myth; because the living *pneuma* returns to itself, reduces to itself, that is, to the individual immortality of soul or eternity of the self's life. The self-sacrifice of Socrates returns to the extreme eternity of life of the self. This living *pneuma* was generated by totalization and brought about the demonic power.

Patocka ( cited in Derrida: 19 ) states that, 'there is born a new and shining mythology of the soul, founded on the duality of the *authentic(pravé)* and responsible, on the one hand, and of the extraordinary and orgiastic on the other. The orgiastic *is not eliminated but disciplined, enslaved (není odstraneo, ale zkázneo a ucineno služebným )*'.

Actually, modernism sought to destroy the demonic or orgiastic structure of premodernism. The modern mind destroyed premodern orgiastic ( Derrida ) structures, such as, authoritarianism. Modern people were liberated from all premodern authoritarian obligation. Therefore, they could participate in a new life. Pippen ( 1991 : 4 ) states, 'modernity is characterized by the view that *human life* after the political and intellectual revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is fundamentally better than before, and most likely will, thanks to such revolutions, be better still'. Modernism destroyed premodern orgiastic power and it brought freedom, wealth and improvement of life to the human self. Dumont ( 1977 : 76 ) described also the modern perspective which 'focuses on gain, wealth, material prosperity, as the core of social life.' Modern people could enjoy their lives because they were freed from all religious restriction.

Ironically, this modern paradigm, even though it destroyed the premodern orgiastic paradigm, such as, authoritarianism, again produces the orgiastic mythology, namely rationalism, that singularized all people's characters.

Modernism can be characterized as the orgiastic paradigm that reflects the metanarrative of the self. Lyotard states that the modern metanarrative was undertaken in a speculative spirit. This 'speculation' is the name given to the scientific discourse ( Lyotard 1984: 33 ). In this speculation of scientific discourse some conceive that 'philosophy must restore unity to learning, which has been scattered into separate sciences in laboratories and in university education; it can only achieve this in a language game that links the sciences together as moments in the becoming of spirit, in other words, which links them in a rational narration, or rather metanarration'. This totalization of knowledge in philosophy means constructing the world paradigm by discourse, a world paradigm that will dominate the lives of all human beings. The new orgiastic power, rationalism, dominated the modern world. And modern man colonized the other.

The idealization and totalization as work of the living soul or the self was a typical modern trend. And this kind of orgiastic power was correlated with the hope of modern man who desired to become his own master, forcing the other.

Postmodernism is a historical idea that seeks to destroy this modern orgiastic power. In the postmodern age nobody can have 'recourse to the grand narrative', to rationalism; 'we can resort neither to the dialectic of Spirit nor even to the emancipation of humanity as a validation for postmodern scientific discourse' ( Lyotard: 60). Therefore, Derrida's focal point is in deconstruction of universal norms, 'orgiastic mythology' in his terms.

Derrida deconstructed all modern universal norms. When he took away the external norm, he emphasized the differance of the self and the other. In this opinion on sacrifice he said that 'no one can either give me death or take it from me' ( Derrida: 44).

There is no absolute responsibility to universal norms that you must sacrifice for the other without sacrificing duty to another. For example, Abraham had to discharge his duty towards his son, even though he loved him, by following the duty to God who commanded him to sacrifice his son. In Derrida's words, 'There is no language, no reason, no generality or mediation to justify this ultimate responsibility which leads me to absolute sacrifice; the sacrifice of the most imperative duty in favor of another absolutely imperative duty binding me to every other.' ( :71 ). When Abraham received the commandment of God to sacrifice his son, why was he silent? In other words, why did Abraham keep the secret from his family, even from his son? The reason is that 'If he were to speak a common or translatable language, if he were to become intelligible by giving his reasons in a convincing manner, he would be giving in to the temptation of ethical generality.' ( :74 ). As there is no ethical generality, Abraham's silence and secrecy must be an analogy for us. Therefore, when Derrida speaks about ethical issues, he would like to embrace a perfect freedom of the human person from all external norms. For Derrida, justice is an important political element, because all norms that have oppressed the other must be taken away and the self must not force the other by any universal ethico-political

norms. Each one has his own freedom whether he sacrifices for the other or not, recognising the difference between the self and the other.

Assembling some ethical points of Derrida, we observe that he concentrated on deconstruction of the realism of the dominant Western intellectual tradition, in his words, 'Metaphysics of presence' (Grenz 1996: 141; Middleton & Walsh 1995: 136). The concept of a 'presence' that Derrida would like to deconstruct implies a 'given' truth which exists prior to language and prior to thought but which we have adequately grasped by our language and thought (: 136). Modern Western intellectual tradition claims that human language and reason can reflect and represent the 'given' truth or the prelinguistic 'reality' (Grenz : 141-142). Modern philosophers offer a variety of labels of the prelinguistic 'reality'--the Idea, the World Spirit, the Self (:142). Such prelinguistic 'reality' can be accessed through an infinitely creative subjectivity or reason of the human self (Megill 1985: 157-162).

Therefore, the human self of modernism has an impulse to master the world once and for all (Flax 1990: 34). 'By granting an aura of universal truth to our local conventions, the Western intellectual commitment to realism serves ideologically to legitimate Western conquest and political superiority.' (Middleton & Walsh: 137) Derrida (1978: 91) expresses it thus: 'the entire philosophical tradition, in its meaning and at bottom, would like to make common cause with oppression.'

For Derrida the metaphysics of presence in the Western intellectual tradition was a metaphysics of violence (Middleton & Walsh: 137). James Olthuis (1990: 351) also explains that the 'unity of truth' of modernism is 'purchased only at the cost of violence, by erasing the memory of those who have questioned it'. This modern realism expressed in metaphysics of violence, therefore, was a 'self-centered totalistic thinking that organizes men and things into power systems, and gives us control over nature and other people.' (Wild 1979 : 17).

Derrida denies this modern homogeneous totality, since it seeks to reduce the heterogeneous diversity to a system which the self can grasp ( Middleton & Walsh: 137). Derrida deconstructed the homogeneous totality or homogeneous unity of modernism and reconstructed the heterogeneous difference ( : 137). He liberated the other from the self. The postmodern ethics that was established on the heterogeneous difference of the other holds out the promise of 'boundless liberty' ( Lundin 1995: 37).

### **2.2.3.3. The applied postmodern ethics**

The postmodern ethics were applied in many issues of the 20th and 21st centuries. But we are going to cite only two examples, the case of gender and nature.

Firstly, the applied postmodern ethics in issues of gender can be called the ethics of feminism. The feminist movement of the 20th and 21st centuries is a representative movement of postmodernism. Therefore we are going to investigate the feminist ethics.

The feminist movement found expression in the 1970s and 1980s as a theology of liberation. Inheriting much of the enduring agenda of the nineteenth-century feminist movement, theologians Rosemary Radford Ruether, Dorothee Solle, and Mary Daly sought to understand Christian theology as expressing and requiring the liberation of women ( Wogaman 1993: 254).

Some feminist theologians--Ruether and Solle--give considerable weight to economic oppression, but the feminist's main concern is the distinctiveness of oppression in gender relationship. One of the points of distinctiveness is the degree to which the oppression of women enters into everyday speech ( : 254). Language conveying male dominance is deeply embedded in every culture, blatantly so in most. Such linguistic male dominance is especially interesting to feminist theologians because so much of the symbolism of the divine in Christianity is male. Therefore, feminist theologians deconstruct the linguistic

male dominance. In this respect the feminist is one of the typical postmodern deconstructionists.

Deconstructing and challenging this linguistic male dominance, Mary Daly entitles a book *Beyond God the Father*, and Rosemary Ruether seeks a new term, 'God/ess,' to convey equally male and female attributes to the deity ( Ruether 1983: 46, 68-71).

According to Wogaman (: 255) Mary Daly ultimately concluded that Christianity is irretrievably committed to male dominance through its theological language and church structures and, hence, that religion is not consistent with feminist liberation. Ruether is also critical of the enormous weight of male dominance in the history of Christian thought.

Ruether regards this male dominant language as an expression of idolatry, not as the essential witness of the church: 'If all language for God/ess is analogy, if taking a particular human image literally is idolatry, then male language for the divine must lose its privileged place.' (Ruether: 68-69).

Ruether deconstructed the patriarchy. Then language about God/ess drawn from kingship and hierarchical power must lose its privileged place (: 69). And she envisaged 'a new community of equals', that is, a fully self-realized community. For this new society, images of God/ess must be drawn from the activities of peasants and working people, people at the bottom of society. Most of all, images of God/ess must be transformative, pointing us back to our authentic potential and forward to new redeemed possibilities (: 69).

Most postmodern feminist theologians have sought the new model of society in which equality and heterogeneity replace the modern, western, male-dominant society.

This feminist paradigm has sought to make common cause with the victims of all forms of human oppression. The point has been underscored in a special way by 'womanist' theology and ethics, contributed by black women theologians and ethicists who are able to

write out of the experience of the double oppression of being black and being women ( Wogaman: 255).

In this respect the feminist ethics and the black theologian's ethics are totally different from modern male-dominant ethics. Both envisage a world without moral codes and duties, and above all, without rulers ( Bauman 1995: 27). They are also grounded in heterogeneity, ambivalence and uncertainty rather than in homogeneity, certainty and universality, a foundation which is associated with the predominantly male stance.

In postmodernism the feminist theory of theology is quite right in its eschewal of male domination. Male self-centrism oppressed not only the other, the female, but also the whole world. Feminists are involved in dispelling 'the mind/spirit/body pollution that has been produced from artificial myths, language, rituals, atrocities, and meta-rituals such as scholarship that erases the very selves of the female' (Meyer-Wilmes 1995:98)

Rosemary Radford Ruether, a feminist theologian, separated Jesus from Christ in order to explain the liberation from male dominated paradigm. For her Jesus was 'a first-century rabbi...who became a prophet and critic of established religious authority' (Ruether 1987: 146). Therefore, 'not only in the context of interreligious discussion, but also in the context of Christianity, Jesus [who wore the male form] is not the last of revelation'. (Young 1995: 38). For Ruether, 'Christianity should not concentrate on Jesus but on "Christ"' (: 38). Christ is the liberated humanity (Ruether 1983: 138) 'As vine and branches Christic personhood continues in our sisters and brothers'(Ruether: 138). 'In the language of early Christian prophetism, we can encounter Christ *in the form of our sister.*' (: 138) Therefore, 'redemptive humanity goes ahead of us, calling us to yet uncompleted dimensions of human liberation' (:138). The Christ as 'the goal of Christianity is liberating activity, and in particular, liberating activity on behalf of women' ( Young: 38). In other words, Christ is the redemptive human being, especially for women.

In feminist ethics the focal point is liberation of women from male dominated social structure. Liberty and freedom are the main subjects of feminist ethics.

Secondly, as we saw in section 2.2.2, "Postmodernism and its character of holism", postmodernism is a movement from dualism to holism based on discovery of 'the other'. Nature was recognized as a 'the other'. On this ideological basis Marietta describes the relationship between ethics and the holism as follows.

Holism sees humanity as an inseparable part of nature and not as a spiritual entity apart from nature or even as a privileged part of nature. Marietta (1995:31) takes 'the person-planetary perspective' on the relationship between human being and nature.

This perspective does not play down the worth of individual people or the worth of human culture (31). In other words, it recognizes the value of persons as well as the value of the natural environment in which they live. Therefore when we use anthropocentrism, firstly, we can avoid disregarding humanity. Secondly, we may be able to make environmental philosophy much more accessible to people who are not professional philosophers.

From this perspective we can consider new environmental ethics and a new approach towards the biosphere. From this holistic approach to the relationship between humanity and nature we can support environmental ethics: as Aldo Leopold states, 'A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise' (1949: 224).

This holism rejects any universal morality. This holism rejects a strict dichotomy between fact and value. Therefore this holism supports contextualism that can be defined thus 'The rightness and wrongness of the action is affected by the context, all the aspects of the situation that can have moral relevance.' (Marietta: 141). The benefit of contextualism is that it makes morals less abstract (144).

With this contextualism, holism takes the concept of multiple sources of moral insight. Marietta cites the inadequacy of utilitarian and deontological theory for environmental ethics and advocates 'ethical polymorphism,' with a variety of moral principles that fit different situations ( :155).

But Marietta rejects any hard contextualism and pluralism. Therefore, for him, the use of pluralistic ethics requires a responsible approach that provides justification for using the principle or principles employed at any time (:157). In this way the pluralistic contextualist does not require a wholesale abandonment of the basic moral principles that guided humanistic ethics for generations ( :186). He does not abandon rational decision. For him the human is a free moral agent. A man cannot escape the responsibility that goes with his freedom. He has vision; people can use moral principles, nevertheless, each moral principle must be appropriate in each context. There is no one moral principle that can serve in all contexts and for all our ethical activities (:191). The reason must decide. What are these principles? Marietta names non-maleficence, utility, justice and so on.

Pluralistic contextualists stand on moral uncertainty and moral disagreement. However, Marietta suggests that we must make reasonable decisions. His ethical approach does not provide moral absolutes that can be applied to all situations ( :208). He does not pursue moral certainty. His humanistic holism is not ready to sacrifice freedom or intellectual integrity for a sense of certainty ( :209) And he also does not accept an ethical approach that is not morally adequate. But his main idea stands on postmodern moral uncertainty and pluralism ( :209).

In addition, 'deep ecologists' have four ethical points. Firstly, they reject 'man-in-environment' images for a 'relational, total-field image,' which stresses the interdependence of individual members of the biosphere ( Marietta:34). Secondly, for them all forms of life should have the right to live. Thirdly, they support the principles of diversity and symbiosis. Fourthly, they have a principle that is an anticlass posture, in

human social relations and ecologically. They oppose exploitation and suppression of any kind, whether between social groups, nations, or species.

### **2.3. The this-worldly self-life centrism as a myth of modernism and postmodernism**

Modernism and postmodernism and their ethics were described in the previous section. Modern ethics established on the concept of 'the self' or self-centrism. Postmodernism deconstructed the modern totalization and rationalism based on 'the self' or self-centrism. Postmodernism and its ethics, therefore, established the concept of 'the other'. Postmodern ethics can be called as the ethics of deconstruction.

In order to focus on the goal of this research, however, we should ask :Has postmodernism and postmodern holism overcome the modern dualistic world-view, and self-centrism?; Have postmodernism overcome the modern problem?; Have modernism and postmodernism a common element? If there is a common element, what is it? We shall attempt to answer this question in this section.

From postmodernism and holism some theologians have gained some important insights. Grenz recognizes the religious and spiritual dimension of postmodern holism. Grenz ( 1996 : 14 ) explains postmodern holism in all realms, nature as well as human community and religion, as follows:

The quest for a cooperative model and appreciation of non-rational dimensions of truth lend a holistic dimension to the postmodern consciousness. Postmodern holism entails a rejection of the Enlightenment ideal of the dispassionate, autonomous, rational individual. Postmodernists do not seek to be wholly self-directed individuals but rather 'whole' persons.

Postmodern holism entails an integration of all the dimensions of personal life - affective and intuitive as well as cognitive. Wholeness also entails a consciousness of the indelible and delicate connection to what lies beyond ourselves, in which our personal existence is embodied and from which it is nurtured. This wider realm includes 'nature' (the ecosystem), of course.

But in addition it involves the community of humans in which we participate. Postmodernism is keenly conscious of the importance of community and of the social dimension of existence. And the postmodern conception of wholeness also extends to the religious or spiritual aspect of life. Indeed, postmodernism affirms that personal existence may transpire within the context of a divine reality.

It was seen in the previous section that postmodernists deemed the relationship with the other to be an important role for the spiritual person. To some extent it can be said that postmodernism replaced the self-centric paradigm of modernism with the other-centric paradigm. Postmodern holism also introduced the philosophical concept of the interrelationship between God and man and nature. We can, thus, gain some insight from postmodern holism.

At this point, the meaning or the identity of 'the other' needs to be investigated.

'The other' of postmodernism represents the opposite concept of 'the self' in modernism. In short, 'the other' of postmodernism includes the neighbour, other people, the marginalized in a community as well as the emotions as part of the whole person. It comprehends cosmic nature as well.

The question needs to be asked: what is the common ground of 'the self' of modernism and 'the other' of postmodernism? To answer this, an examination of the relationship between the enlightenment and counter-enlightenment, which is similar to the relationship

between modernism and postmodernism, can help us. Pacini ( 1988: 48-49) describes the common ground between the enlightenment and counter-enlightenment as follows :

The products of human creation -- music, law, poetry, mathematics -- although imbued with the effects of the finite encounter with the infinite, are nonetheless thoroughly intelligible, because they are the products of human mind. When viewed together in just this way, the enlightenment conception of history and the Kantian view of religion exhibit common beliefs about social development, just as do the counter-enlightenment conception of history and the expressionist view of religion. Social development, they thought, was a matter of human progression that depends upon unquestioning faith in the main features of a framework that weaves the threads of political, social, economic, and religious institutions into the fabric of the languages, ideals, modes of feeling, and habits that function to promote the welfare of people. *The wellbeingness* was the main point of enlightenment and counter-enlightenment. Where the enlightenment-Kantian view differed from the counter-enlightenment-expressionist view, of course, was in its assessment of what characteristics made such a framework adequate.

From the above, we understand that the well-beingness was the main subject of both the enlightenment and the counter-enlightenment. This subject dominated modernism and postmodern holism.

The wholeness that was described by Cobb was strongly identified with human well-being. Postmodern wholeness and well-beingness dominates whole areas of the world of thought even in the spiritual and religious areas. In this sense, postmodernism shares a common view with modernism.

It would seem, then, that the aim of postmodern holism is human wellbeing. When Cobb spoke of 'wholeness', he recognized it as the way of achieving human well-being. He

(1988 : 239-40 ) said, 'Insofar as wholeness means the cultivation of all our potentialities, there is no limit to how far spirit-centered wholeness can go'.

The entire holistic approach pursues the improvement or developmental process of the whole personality and cosmological community. Introducing six dimensions of wholeness Clinebell(1988:9-10) includes the wholeness of our physical organism, the wholeness of minds, the wholeness of our network of significant relationships, the wholeness of our interaction with those wider social systems - organizations, institutions, the wholeness of our relationship with the ecosystem, and the wholeness of our spiritual lives, our 'higher Selves'. He insists that all this wholeness is for the well-being of humanity ( : 9-21 ).

In his words ( : 9-10 ), 'The fundamental dimension of wholeness is the wholeness of our physical organism. The degree of wholeness in this dimension, as in the other five, is on a continuum from debilitating pathology to high-level wellness'.

Although modernism also served human wellbeing and has long been recommended for human wellbeing, ironically, it has destroyed the life of *the other*. Therefore, postmodernism revolts against modern metanarratives. It aims to destroy the modern metanarrative, the visible substitute for the invisible God of human well-being.

Modernity has been under attack at least since Friedrich Nietzsche ( 1844-1900 ) raised the first criticism against it late in the nineteenth century, but the major attack did not begin until the 1970s. 'The immediate intellectual impulse for the dismantling of the enlightenment project came from the rise of deconstruction as a literary theory, which influenced a new movement in philosophy' ( Grenz: 5 ).

The revolt of postmodernism actually shares common ground with the modern paradigm in that both paradigms liberated the visible species, man and nature from the invisible metaphysical beings. The well-being of the cosmological community ( including all species,

ances, and all dimensions ), liberating themselves from all restrictions, is the character of postmodernism.

For example, let us examine the postmodern deconstructionist's (or poststructuralist's) philosophy. It rejects the tenet of structuralism. According to postmodern poststructuralists, meaning is not inherent in a text itself but emerges only as the interpreter enters into dialogue with it. Because the meaning of a text is dependent on the perspective of the one who enters into dialogue with it, it has as many meanings as it has readers ( or readings ) ( Grenz: 6 ).

Thus postmodern philosophers applied the theories of the literary deconstructionists to the world as a whole: just as a text will be read differently by each reader, so reality will be 'read' differently by each knowing self that encounters it. This means that there is no one meaning of the world, no transcendent centre to reality as a whole (: 6 ). All readers become the subject of their lives. In this process, they never become the object for the other. They each become the subject for themselves. This is the fate of postmodernism.

Furthermore, Cornel du Toit ( 1988 : 84) said: 'God is text. This text is, like most texts, crisscrossed with other texts, full of traces of other traditions, never complete, but always open to reinterpretation of existing interpretations'. For Van Aarde (1994:611), 'wandering in the maze of the text, the reader is, as a result of the deconstructive reading act - according to De Beer (1986:462) - free to break away from the rigid restrictions of methods and question, to rethink and redefine accepted philosophical-metaphysical concepts of God, truth, authority, subject, sin, meaning, etcetera'.

In this postmodern philosophical paradigm, individuals encourage themselves to be perfect selves for their well-being: Therefore the postmodern 'the other' is the fully liberated self that has been ignored in modernism. Postmodern society aims at a cosmological community of fully self-contained individuals for well-being. But postmodern well-being is also related to personal control.

Modernism's meta-self was privatized in postmodernism to fully accomplish the well-being. The authority of reason was handed over to the individual's authority. The universalization of reason became localized in individual authority. In other words, postmodernism pursued the same human well-being in the fully liberated self. Bauman ( 1992: 35 ) states :

It is this new cultural experience, ....., which has been distilled in the postmodern view of the world as a self-constituting and self propelling process, determined by nothing but its own momentum, subject to no overall plan of the 'movement toward the Second Coming', 'universalization of human condition', 'rationalization of human action' or 'civilization of human interaction' type. Postmodernity is marked by a view of the human world as irreducibly and irrevocably pluralistic, split into a multitude of sovereign units and sites of authority, with no horizontal or vertical order, either in actuality or in potency.

Therefore, surprisingly, postmodernism never reconstructs a real 'the other' even in its denial of universalized rationalism. On the contrary, it produces a multiplicity of 'self' for well-being.

According to Snyder ( 1995 : 221-2 ), postmodernism has a strong self-character for human wellbeing. Postmodernism's *focus on the individual and the particular* is a further expression of the same tendency of modernism. Postmodernism explores 'the individual person, motif, artefact, or subculture as the proper focus of attention'.

From the proof given above so far concerning the postmodern self and wellbeing, postmodernism can be characterized by its self-reference and present life-centrism. The *aspect of self-reference and life-centrism* are key elements of postmodernism. Actually, with the awareness of the impossibility of objectivity, the postmodernist celebrates

subjectivity, frankly and perhaps playfully acknowledging his or her presence in the activity or the work produced.

It is quite clear, as expressed by the postmodern theories themselves, that present life centrism is their subject. The present life was the essence that postmodernism could not give up.

As a postmodern textualist, Cupitt ( 1986 : 87 ) explicitly says that *the self* and *present life* are the subject of the postmodern paradigm, introducing Nietzsche's idea thus: 'Nietzsche rejects idealism of every kind and urges us to be frankly egoistic, because when it is a matter of our moral assessment of our lives, no other standpoint than our own is morally relevant to us'. Postmodernism bluntly says that the ego and present life are best.

Bauman (1992 : xxi ) also stresses postmodernism's life-centrism and describes how it maintains it. Postmodernism simply accepts the other. In premodern and modern times the other was the slave or the oppressed. But in postmodern times the other is the other who becomes his own master. The other claims his own interests. He claims his own rights. He claims his own life. Therefore, the postmodern other is just *another ego*. Postmodernism, therefore, is the expression of another self-life centrism. According to Bauman ( : xxi-xxii ), in his correct interpretation of postmodernism, the self-life dimensional mind has given rise to communities and dialogue :

The fact remains that the postmodern privatization of fears has prompted and will prompt a furious search for communal shelters. Tolerance reaches its full potential only when it offers more than the acceptance of diversity and coexistence; when it calls for the emphatic admission of the equivalence of knowledge-producing discourses; when it calls for a dialogue, vigilantly protected against monologicistic temptations, when it acknowledges not just the otherness of the other, but the legitimacy of the other's interests and the other's right to have such interests respected and, if possible, gratified.

Postmodernism has indeed given extreme expression to the dimension of the human self-life dimension.

But, due to this self-life dimension of humanity, in order to reduce the fear of uncertainty and risk-taking (: xxiii ) postmodern people, including Christians, tend to focus on mutual responsibility in communities. This responsibility was considered security for self-interest or self-life: for this reason, according to Bauman (: 36 ), 'the postmodern view shifts the focus on to the agency of community; more precisely, the focus shifts to communities.....If the concept of society was a device to "erase" the "outside" and reduce it at best to the status of environment ( i.e. the "goal-achievement" territory, and object, but not a subject of action), the concept of community as it appears in the postmodern discourse derives its essential meaning from the co-presence of other communities, all seen as agencies.'

The attempt of postmodernism to protest against modern totalization is simply another form of self-life centrism. Originally this concept of community in postmodernism came from the fact that people really wanted to remove the fears of uncertainty in society. In other words, it was for human self-confidence or human well-being.

Postmodern ecologist, Devall, who postulated ecological togetherness, envisaged communities experiencing well-being. Devall (1985: 67) said, 'No one is saved until we are all saved,' where the phrase 'one' includes not only me, an individual human, but all humans, whales, grizzly bears, whole rain forest ecosystems, mountains and rivers, the tiniest microbes in the soil, and so on.' Actually, postmodernism pursues the fulfilment of self-life centrism by including all the other species. It purposes the realization of the organic world which has merit in itself.

This is the self-life centrism of postmodernism. In terms of holism, all identities of the self are alive as names of the other. This is the deception of holism. The spirit of the Western world deceives humanity concerning '*the giving up of self through self-externalization*' (

Welker 1994: 281 ). '[The spirit of the Western world] includes this moment of [*the giving up of the self*] only as a point of transition on the way to heightened self-development' ( : 281 )

In heterogeneity, *the others* and *the otherness of the other*(Levinas1998:149), the postmodern spirit pursues the paradigm shift from the self to the other in order to produce the perfect 'itself' of the self. ( Welker: 282 ) Postmodernism encouraged the individual, the local, to be the perfect self for well-being. Whether we define postmodernism in terms of holism or heterogeneity, it is still limited to human self-life centrism.

#### **2.4. Summary**

As we investigated, the modern ethics are established on the concept of 'the self' or self-centrism. Modern ethics are identified with universal law which is based on the autonomous self in Kant's case. Human autonomous self has intrinsic ability to find the rule of morality. Therefore, this modern autonomous self totalized and colonized the other. And modern ethics was human self-centric ethics so that it purposed liberty, reasonableness and the benevolence of the human himself.

Postmodern ethics are based on the concept of 'the other'. Postmodernism discovered the otherness of the other so that its ethics start from the difference between the self and the other. From this postmodern emphasis on the other all moral norms were deconstructed. Therefore its ethics can be characterized as ethics of deconstruction. Postmodern ethical characters can be expressed in a boundless liberation and moral uncertainty, proximity, and responsibility.

Even though modern ethics and postmodern ethics are established on different concepts, they have a common ethical paradigm. This common paradigm is the this-worldly life centricism.

### **Chapter 3 The Christ-centric ethic**

In the previous chapter we investigated the modern and postmodern ethics. In this chapter our research problem is to contemplate the nature of Christian ethics. To begin with, we are going to investigate the ethics of the New Testament.

#### **3.1. The origin and model of Christian ethics: the kingdom of God**

Actually Jesus was not just a teacher of ethics. Instead Jesus used significantly the eschatological language of God's kingdom ( Jones 1994:27). The centrality of Jesus' proclamation was the Kingdom, and his proclamation called his hearers to repent their sins in the face of God's imminent action ( Matt. 4:17; Chilton & McDonald 1988:5).

Jesus told many parables--which largely concern the Kingdom--to warn his hearers about a situation of eschatological crisis ( Chilton & McDonald: 5) in Matt. 13:3-9/Mark 4:2-9/Luke 8:5-8; Mark 4:26-9; Matt.13:24-30, 47-50; Matt 13:31-2/Mark 4:30-2/Luke 13:18-19; Matt. 13:33/Luke 13:20-1; Matt. 13:44-5; Matt.21:33-46/ Mark 12:1-12/Luke 20:9-19; Matt. 22:1-14/Luke14:16-24.

And in Matt. 5:3,6,10. Jesus said that the kingdom of heaven would be bestowed upon the poor in spirit; those who hunger and thirst for righteousness will be filled; those who are persecuted in the pursuit of righteousness will possess the kingdom of heaven ( Jones :26). Jesus who proclaimed the eschatological God's Kingdom asserted to his disciples that they would receive the highest good. Jesus said, 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you' ( Matt. 6:33). Jesus connected the kingdom of God with the highest good and with a different way of life from the secular world. Martin Franzmann (1961: 58) comments:

[Jesus] thereby makes the blessing bestowed in the first Beatitude the imperative force in their lives. The Kingdom is given to the poor in spirit, to men [and women ] who stand before God unhindered and undeceived by the security of things, in the need of their bare humanity. The gift of the Beatitude has become the dynamic of their existence: they seek the first gift. Likewise the blessing of the fourth Beatitude has become the imperative that shapes their lives. God gives His righteousness to men who hunger and thirst for it, who see in their need for righteousness the supreme need, the need which must be met if they are to live, a need before which the need for things recedes.....so that it becomes a footnote on the page whereon is written: 'The Lord is our righteousness.'

God's kingdom comes as he exercises his sovereignty in a world of apostasy and restores the sins of humankind in Christ ( Jones: 27). The righteousness of God will be recovered in the coming of the kingdom. Therefore, those who listen to Jesus' proclamation encountered a moral or ethical challenge ( Matera 1996:15 ). Actually in repentance the coming event and the ethical reform are united immediately ( Wilder 1978 :74). Schrage ( 1988:28) also connected the eschatological message of Jesus and human ethical conduct.

Bultmann ( 1977: 20) also attempted to reconcile the eschatological and ethical aspects of Jesus; he, however, gives a priority to dominical ethics, rather than to dominical eschatology ( Chilton & McDonald: 6). This was Bultmann's weakness, the reason that Albert Schweitzer reacted against his attempt. Schweitzer, in his turn, did not concentrate on Jesus' ethical statements due to his exclusive focus on Jesus' vision of the future ( :7). Neither of the two opinions fully understood both aspects of 'not yet' and 'already' of God's kingdom. When we see the kingdom of God that has already been established in this world, even though it will only be fully realized in the future, we can understand this reconciliation between the eschatological and ethical aspects of Jesus' preaching ( :9).

Therefore, 'to enter the kingdom of God is to live under God's rule, be it in the present or in the future' (Matera : 19-20). Let us consider the characteristics of the kingdom of God.

#### ( I ) Discipleship, freedom, obedience and community

Jesus never separated his extraordinary claims of the kingdom of God from the calling of disciples to him ( Wilder:165). God's rule will recover the vice of this world. But this kingdom of God has come upon men in Jesus and he identified with the kingdom of God ( :164). Jesus is not only the Lord who brought the rule of God over the vice of this world but also the model of the people of God's kingdom. Therefore Jesus called his disciples to follow him ( Mark 1:16; Verhey 1984:75).

The relationship between Jesus and his disciples in the claims of discipleship is totally different from the relationship of student and teacher because in the rabbi tradition of Judaism the student succeeds the teacher through the formal educational process of the group and the appropriate examinations ( Schrage : 47). But nobody can become Jesus' disciples by his own free will and choice or the formal educational process of law but by virtue of the word that evokes discipleship ( :47). Nobody can become Jesus' disciple by virtue of Greek philosophy ( Crook 1994: 71). Only when one responds to the calling of Jesus who identified himself with the kingdom of God, can one become Jesus' disciple.

To follow Jesus is to live in the kingdom of God. At Mark 8:34 Jesus said what is to follow him: 'If any man would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me'. Therefore, to become Jesus' disciple is to suffer with Jesus ( Verhey :75). From this perspective of ethics of discipleship based on the kingdom of God we should consider the meaning of liberation. According to Chilton and McDonald ( :92 ) liberation is not only liberation *from* law and destructive social structure but also liberation *for* discipleship.

Luther also identifies two aspects of Christian freedom. To Christians two theses are essential for their identity. They are the freedom and the bondage of the Spirit. A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. But a Christian is also a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all ( 1979: 343). Luther defends the harmony of two aspects, the doctrine of justification by faith alone and its applications for Christian life ( Jones :39)

Calvin also said that Christian freedom is not only freedom from the law but also freedom to obey God's will ( Calvin 1989: III.19.4; Jones: 39-40). In chapter 20 of the Westminster Confession of Faith Christian liberty was well defined:

The liberty which Christ hath purchased for believers under the Gospel consists in their freedom from the guilt of sin, the condemning wrath of God, the curse of the moral law; and, in their being delivered from this present evil world, bondage to Satan, and dominion of sin; from the evil of afflictions, the sting of death, the victory of the grave, and everlasting damnation; as also, in their free access to God, and their yielding obedience unto him, not out of slavish fear, but a child-like love and willing mind.

To be free from the law and from sin is to be free to follow Jesus who identified himself with the kingdom for God. Freedom to experience child-like servanthship is an important teaching of Jesus, concerning the kingdom of God ( Matt. 18:1-5; Mark 9:33-37; Luke 9:46-48; Chilton and McDonald :81)

Above all freedom for discipleship necessarily comprehends the new obedience which the kingdom of God requires ( Chilton and McDonald:92). The Christian must love God and his neighbour 'with all his heart', 'with all his soul' and 'with all his mind' in the kingdom of God. Just so, Jesus loves God and his people with all his heart. Jesus has shown how the believers should love God and their neighbours. Therefore, he says, 'I have set you an example, that you should do as I have done to you.' ( John 13:15). To follow Christ is to share in the model he has provided ( Manson 1960: 59).

To love one's neighbour entails involvement with the community. The believers are one in Christ Jesus. Those who live in the kingdom of God form one community because they are included in Christ (Tannehill 1967: 20). This is the inclusive unity as the body of Christ which the Christians enter ( : 20). Furthermore, this inclusive unity which the Christians enter is Christ himself. Christian community is the community of those who follow Christ. Chilton and McDonald ( :90) describe this community thus: 'the fellowship of disciples rested on the fact that all its members had received a call or commission which entailed leaving their former way of life and mode of subsistence.' As Jesus did not distinguish between tax collectors, sinners and women, this community is open to all people. Therefore, Christian community is the fellowship of disciples and the context wherein Christians learn the Christ-like life and live as his disciples ( Crook :44).

To sum up, we can say that to become people of the kingdom of God is to be like Christ, the image of God ( Jones :40).

### **3.2. The goal of Christian ethics: The image of Christ**

God created the heaven and earth to glorify himself. God is God of glory. He is the Father of glory ( Eph 1:17). He is the Son, the Lord of glory ( I Cor. 2:8). He is the Spirit of glory ( I Pet 2:8 ) ( Jones 1994:21 ). Jonathan Edward ( 1989: 433) says that God created the world to declare his 'glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fullness of good *ad extra* [outside himself].'

This glory of God in creation is expressed in damnation of the wicked and in the salvation of the chosen. Jones (:22 ) said, 'The glory of God's justice in the damnation of the wicked is radically subordinate to God's supreme and ultimate end in creating the world, the glory of God's goodness in the salvation of the elect.' God ultimately called us to 'his eternal glory in Christ' ( I Pet 5:10). Therefore, the believers should do everything, eating,

drinking, or whatsoever, for the glory of God ( I Cor. 10: 31). Actually Jesus is not only the glory of God but also the model of how the believers should glorify God. John asserts that the glory of God is manifested in Jesus ( John 1:14). Jesus enjoyed a position of glory before Incarnation and subsequently returned to it ( Barret 1978: 166 ). And the glory of Jesus is dependent upon both his essential relation with God and his obedience ( : 166 ).

The believers were called in Christ to glorify God so that the imitation of Christ, the image of Christ, is the supreme expression of the glory of God ( Jones: 24). Apostle Paul says in Romans 8: 28-30 ( KJV ), ‘And we know that all things work together for good to those who love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren. Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.’ In I Cor. 15: 49 ( NRSV ). The goal of God’s purpose was expressed thus: ‘just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we will also bear the image of the man of heaven.’ When the believers become the image of Christ, they can glorify God, because God’s open secret is Christ in them, ‘the hope of glory’( Col. 1:27; Jones:24).

The believers ‘are being transformed into likeness with ever-increasing glory’ ( 2 Cor. 3:18). Christ who dwells in us must be the final goal of the personality of the believers ( Gal. 4:19). Baptism is the ceremony of union with Christ. Baptism means union with the death and resurrection of Jesus.

In Rom 6:1-11 the Apostle Paul says that what takes place in baptism is founded upon what has taken place in Christ’s death ( Tannehill 1967: 30). This foundation is expressed in Rom 6:6. There Paul explains that ‘Christ’s cross puts an end to dominion of sin, and so to the “old man”’. But Christ’s cross is ‘an inclusive event, for the existence of men was bound up with the old aeon, and what puts an end to it also puts an end to them as men of the old aeon’ ( :30).

When Paul speaks of dying and rising with Christ as the essence of baptism, and associates it with the end of the old dominion and the foundation of the new, it is clear that he is thinking of the death and resurrection of Christ as eschatological events (: 30). Baptism means dying to the old dominion and rising with the new dominion. Jesus Christ's cross and resurrection were the inclusive event which brought a total change of paradigm.

As the glory of Jesus is in the death of Jesus ( John 7: 39; 12:16, 23; 13:31f ); Jesus dies as Son of God and as an obedient Servant; he is thereby lifted up on the Cross and elevated to heaven ( Barret : 166 ), we should glorify God through following the Cross of Jesus. Jesus resurrection revealed that his obedience to God up to the Cross was the right way to glorify God.

To sum up, the image of Christ is the goal of Christian ethics.

### **3.3. The deliverer of Christian ethics : the Holy Spirit**

In the previous section we studied the origin and goal of Christian ethics. Now we are going to investigate how the Christ-life is embodied in the human self.

As we have seen, Christians must live a Christ-like life. Though Christians live in this world they must be dominated by heaven ( Welker 1994:134). Christians tend to think of the doctrine of the Christ-centric life as far away from what the secular environment can, in general, imagine as circumstances within the realm of truth and reality ( : 134 ). When Welker speaks of the 'heaven', he does not mean a conceptual or empty thing which is not related to our human life. Welker ( :139) defines it thus: 'Heaven is the domain of reality that is relatively inaccessible to us, which we cannot manipulate, but which exercises a determinative and even definitive influence on life here and now.'

How, then, does this heaven dominate our human life? In the early Church the presence of the Holy Spirit was the living context of the believers and the Church: in other words, he was the ambience in which they lived (McIntyre 1997:71). In the early Church the Holy Spirit was active in the early Christian's life.

The Holy Spirit brings us the domain of heaven. This means, in other words, that the Holy Spirit can dominate our human life. The Holy Spirit dominates nature, social spheres, history and the future ( Welker:139). Certainly this heaven extends beyond peoples, cultures, climates and times through the Holy Spirit ( : 141 ). We can call the domain of heaven which the Holy Spirit brings into this world, the *pneumatological context*.

Actually our salvation that is accomplished in Christ is embodied in the human self through the Holy Spirit. To understand our salvation in Christ we must contemplate the Holy Spirit, because he brings the salvation and sanctifies us in Christ.

### **3.3.1. The early Christian life and the *Pneumatological context***

Early Christians lived in a pneumatological context and we too should live in this pneumatological context. In this section we are going to survey what constituted the lives of early christians who lived in the Holy Spirit.

We can see what must be early Christian life in the Holy Spirit in Acts 1: 8, 'But you will receive power when the Holy Spirit comes on you; and you will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, and in Judea and Samaria, and to the ends of the earth.' The phrase 'the Holy Spirit comes on you' has two meanings. Firstly, it means that Jesus' disciples will receive the Pentecost miracle, but not human power, in advance. This phrase teaches them that they will live by the Holy Spirit, and not by their reason. Secondly, it means that this baptism of the Holy Spirit makes them remember Jesus' own baptism by the Holy Spirit. The phrase 'the Holy Spirit comes on you', in other words, teaches the disciples what their life must be in the Holy Spirit ( Lenski 1961: 31 ).

This phrase indicates that the real power of disciples is the Holy Spirit. Just as Jesus received the Holy Spirit for his work, disciples must receive the Holy Spirit. That means just as Jesus did his work in the Holy Spirit, his disciples also must do their work for Gospel.

While the Holy Spirit came to Jesus' individual body when he was baptized in water by John the Baptist, Pentecost was the global coming of the Holy Spirit. From the two events the same movement followed. Jesus started his public life to bring the rule of the kingdom of God. He enacted God's work that he had experienced in the Trinity. From the day of Pentecost the disciples of Jesus repeated God's work as Jesus did. The Holy Spirit empowered the disciples to repeat God's work.

The Holy Spirit who descended like a dove and alighted on Jesus came from heaven like the sound of the blowing of a violent wind and tongues of fire. This power like the blowing of a violent wind and tongues of fire is symbolic of the extension of Christ's life which began with the coming of the Spirit upon Jesus like a dove. The symbol of the dove means that 'a new covenantal people started from Jesus' (Hawthorne 1991: 126). The symbols of the violent wind and tongues of fire imply that the new life rapidly and strongly spread throughout the world via the Holy Spirit.

This indicated that the reality of life to be given to anybody who believes in him is globalized because the wind can be generated from any situation and anywhere and the fire can limitlessly divide itself to make new fire. 'The promise--or "gift" or "baptism"--of the Spirit was for the disciples, and for their spiritual descendants in the next and subsequent generations, indeed for all whom the Lord our God will call' (Stott 1990: 78). The Holy Spirit makes the messianic community which is fully visualized in the Christ-like life (: 79).

The coming of the Holy Spirit to Jesus' disciples can be identified with Jesus' receiving of the Holy Spirit. From these two anointings of the Holy Spirit God's thing was proclaimed to the whole world by Jesus Christ as well as to his followers. Now God's work in the

disciples is for them to become the witness of Christ. Stott (:61) says that ‘Pentecost is the inauguration of the new era of the Spirit and he equips the Apostles to be the primary witness of Christ.’

But this coming of the Holy Spirit is not just a coming of ‘the other’. The Holy Spirit comes to disciples, just as the second person become flesh. The third person physically inspirits the believers. The Holy Spirit is the power of God within the human self (Dunn 1996:11). The human self cannot accomplish the work for the Gospel. Therefore, ‘The impact of the Spirit is, therefore, characteristically, one of transformation, of enabling what would be impossible in human strength alone.’ (:11). Without him, they could not live and speak in such a way as bears witness to the risen Christ.

The disciples will be witnesses of Christ ‘everywhere’ (Johnson 1992: 27). But without the Holy Spirit they cannot be witnesses of Christ. By the coming of the Holy Spirit the disciples receive the power of God and then they go forth into the world. When the disciples receive the Holy Spirit they can live in the invisible pneumatological context in the world. And then they become the witness of Christ.

From Pentecost Jesus’ disciples became witnesses of Christ as proved in Acts. Now we must understand that to become the witness of Christ is not only to testify to the name of Christ but also to live the Christ-like life. From Pentecost, Jesus’ crucificial death was fully embodied in the Christian body. After Pentecost, Jesus’ crucificial death became the model for Christian life in the world.

The Holy Spirit enabled the Incarnation to extend beyond Jesus. Stott (: 81) puts it thus: ‘What happened at Pentecost was that the remnant of God’s people became the Spirit-filled body of Christ.’ The Holy Spirit made of Jesus’ disciples Christ-like persons. Through the Holy Spirit, God creates *Jesus-like disciples* who reflect the true image of God.

This way was shown even in the Old Testament in the vision of the valley of dry bones. Here God asked Ezekiel, ‘Son of man, can these bones live?’ (Ezekiel 37:3). And Ezekiel said, ‘O Sovereign Lord, you alone know.’ And God commanded to him to prophesy, ‘Thus says the Lord God to these bones, “Behold, I will cause breath to enter you that you may come to life.....”’ (Ezek. 37:4-5). God also commanded him, ‘Prophesy to the breath [wind/spirit/Spirit], prophesy, son of man, and say to the breath’, thus says the Lord God, ‘Come from the four winds, O breath, and breathe ( *emphysēson* ) on these slain that they may live’ (Ezek. 37:9) (Hawthorne: 235).

The reason why the author of John’s gospel ( 20: 22) chose to quote Ezekiel is that ‘the Gospel of John intended to make it obvious to everybody that just as a lump of clay fashioned from the earth or a pile of bones bleaching in a valley were caused to spring to life by the breath of God then, so now the followers of Jesus are being given the opportunity to spring to life with a new spiritual vitality by that same breath of God’ ( : 236). Furthermore, the prophet prophesied to the breath [wind/spirit/Spirit] according to God’s commandment. When the prophet came alive by the breath of God, he was commanded by God to prophesy on behalf of God. The prophet led by God does not just hear God’s word. He does not just become an outside witness to the resurrection. Rather the prophet is commissioned to speak God’s promise of life into the death that leads back into chaos(Welker 1994: 179). The prophet proclaims the spirit in the midst of chaos.

Just as Ezekiel prophesied, Jesus said, ‘Receive the Holy Spirit’ ( John 20:22). Ridderbos states (1991:643): ‘This breathing on the disciples recalls texts like Genesis 2:7 and Ezekiel 37:5f, that mention God’s life-giving breath’. And then Jesus gave to his disciples the authority of the messianic ministry. Receiving the Holy Spirit and prophesying to the Holy Spirit are two aspects of one reality. Without the Holy Spirit nobody can become the image of God.

In the redemption Jesus breathed into the disciples and they became Christ-like persons, so that Jesus said to them, ‘If you forgive anyone his sins, they are forgiven; if you do not

forgive them, they are not forgiven.' ( John 20: 23 ). Jesus gives them his own authority and power. In early days disciples become the Christ-like person in the Holy Spirit. Therefore, disciples proclaim and declare, and, empowered by the Spirit, live by the message of their own proclamation. When they proclaim the Gospel on behalf of Christ God effectively forgives or retains the sin ( Carson 1991: 656 ). Thus a disciple's ministry is a continuation of Jesus' ministry: 'through the gift of the Spirit the authority that Jesus exercises in, say, John 9, is repeated in their lives' (:656).

Actually Jesus' sending his disciples to the world is a repetition of God's sending him to the world ( John 20: 21 ). This is the repetition of Jesus's work through his Spirit, the Holy Spirit. Therefore, God's work in Jesus continues in the body of the disciples. The disciples are full of the life of Christ in order to be able to do what Jesus said, namely, to have the authority of Christ to forgive any other. The disciples know the mind of God and they can accomplish the will of God and they have the authority to forgive any other through the Holy Spirit.

Let us contemplate the nature of a disciple's life in the Holy Spirit as shown in other biblical texts. In Matthew 26: 26-29, Jesus said 'Take and eat; this is my body' 'Drink from it, all of you. This is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins'. The Lord's Supper was an entirely new form of Passover ( Lenski 1943: 1023 ). The eating and drinking of the Old Testament meant thanksgiving. Old types of ritual eating and drinking were participated in by Jews who were chosen by God. But although the Lord's Supper has the same ritual of eating and drinking, only disciples who have received the Holy Spirit can participate in it. While the Lord's Supper has its thanksgiving, this thanksgiving refers directly to Christ's sacrificial body and his blood and to their saving effect ( : 1023 ). In the new type of thanksgiving the disciples face Jesus' sacrificial death and they embody Jesus' life in their life through the Holy Spirit. Ford states that: 'The moment of the Last Supper, therefore, is one in which Jesus, facing death, draws his disciples into identification with his movement towards death' in the new spiritual life.

This Lord's Supper was the expression of the climax of his sacrificial life for disciples and all believers. The giving of his body and his blood is the climax of his love. Therefore, Barret says that 'the Lord's Supper must be understood as having taken place in the immediate context of the crucifixion' ( Barret 1968: 266 ). Thus this sacrament is linked to the crucifixion of Jesus ( Lenski 1943: 1025). This sacrament is also the response of his disciples in identifying with Jesus' body, so that they should follow Jesus' suffering and crucifixion. The miracle of the sacrament is not that Christ makes us partakers of his *glorified* body and blood but of the body *given* and of the blood *shed* for us on the cross. The sacrament draws on Calvary, not on heaven ( : 1031 )

Jesus said, 'This is my body, which is for you; do this as my memorial.' Jesus's words are present in the body ( at the Last Supper ) ( Barret : 266 ). Jesus gave us his body and we live in his body. And we live as his body that suffered. As the passover to the Jews was the sacrifice of the Lamb and festival of God's deliverance, Christ, the crucified, by his death, has effected our deliverance by God from our sin, and this is represented in the Supper ( : 267 ). Christ, resurrected from the dead, finally called his disciples to live in his body that continues to suffer for his people who still remain in the evil world. The shedding of his blood is the founding of the new covenant in which men's sins are forgiven and knowledge of God is conveyed. Therefore the drinking of the cup is to enter into 'covenant established in Christ's blood' ( :269). The drinking of the cup connects with what is said in I Cor. 10:17 about the eating of the loaf which constitutes the one body in which believers joined. This means that those who enter into covenant with the Lord naturally enter at the same time into covenant with one another, and a covenant community which still must endure suffering with Christ is thereby established.

In the words of the Apostle Paul says, 'For whenever you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord's death until he comes' (1 Corinthians 11: 26). How can we proclaim his death, his sacrifice? The Corinthian Christians made a serious mistake. Thinking, perhaps, that the separation of the heavenly figure of Christ from Jesus might be necessary, they allowed their lives to become very religious and distanced from Jesus' life

of sacrificial service. Thus they did not know the meaning of sacrament. So they became exclusive, considering themselves as those who have no shame. This was terrible sin. They did not have Christ. They actually attacked the body of Christ. But 'the self-manifestation of Christ calls men to obedience to his words' ( Barret: 272 ).

Therefore, 'if we eat and drink unworthily, if we do not recognize the purpose of Christ's self-offering and the Spirit who is a reality in our body, if we do not understand that our body is the house of the Holy Spirit, we are exposing ourselves to the power of demons, who were taken to be the cause of physical disease' ( : 272 ). So Paul said 'That is why many among you are weak and sick, and a number of you have fallen asleep' (1 Corinthians 11:30). This sacrament must be celebration of union with Jesus' life, suffering, and crucifixion. Then it will be true that the sacrament is the remembrance of Jesus (1 Corinthians 11: 24-25).

This sacrament must be extended to Jesus' crucifixion. The disciples, when they broke bread, would think especially of the Eucharist-Agape, the representation of the Last Supper of Jesus with his disciples, when he had broken bread to give them his broken body ( Williams 1964: 72 ). Some of them, like Stephen, were killed as Jesus had been crucified.

When Stephen proclaimed the Gospel, the crowd gnashed their teeth at him. Then Stephen saw the glory of God and Jesus who was standing at the right hand of God. 'While they were stoning him Stephen prayed, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit". Then he fell on his knees and cried out, "Lord, do not hold this sin against them"' (Acts 7: 59-60). He prayed like Jesus. This prayer for the other, for forgiveness for the other's sin can be the prayer of believers through the Christ-like suffering. In this Christ-like dying Stephen was an image of Christ.

From the Lord's holy communion to his crucifixion to his resurrection to Stephen, Peter, Paul, Christ-like sacrificial life is one of the subjects of the Gospel. Stephen's prayer, 'Lord, do not hold this sin against them', shows that our sacrificial life is permeated by

forgiveness and compassion as recursive action of Jesus. Most striking to the disciples is the way that 'the martyrdom of Stephen is deliberately modelled on the death of Jesus.' ( Williams:99 ). When we contemplate the life of Stephen, we can see the pattern of Christ. Firstly the rejection of the prophets which climaxed in the rejection of Jesus Christ is continued in the frenzied rejection of Stephen himself ( Acts 7:57-58 ). Secondly Stephen in his final utterance before the council, 'full of the Holy Spirit', identifies himself with Jesus as the 'Son of Man' at God's right hand, vindicated after his suffering ( Acts 7:55-56 ). Thirdly, his final utterances are prayers which echo those attributed to Jesus in Luke 23: 24 and 46 ( Dunn: 99).

Luke identified Stephen with Jesus in his Christ-like actions. In particular, Luke designated that Jesus is 'the Son of Man' ( Acts 7:56 ) which had been customary in early tradition but which failed to become established in later traditions ( Dunn: 99). Jesus was the essential figure of humanity. In Stephen's case Luke shows us a martyr's own dying as another microcosm of Christ's life that was shown in Jesus Christ and even in resurrection in which the resurrected Jesus still suffers with his followers (: 99)

### **3.3.2. The *Hypostasis of the Holy Spirit***

In the above section we saw that in the early days of Christianity disciples had lived in the Holy Spirit. They had lived in the pneumatological context. Their life was a totally Christ-centric life. In this section we are going to find out how Christians can embody the life of Christ in themselves. We must live in the pneumatological context just as the first disciples did. This does not mean that we must leave this world. What we mean is that we must pursue the Christ-centric life which the Holy Spirit brought to us. This life is not easy but we must live therein through the Holy Spirit. We can embody the life of Christ through the Holy Spirit in us.

#### **3.3.2.1. Setting the concept of the *hypostasis of the Holy Spirit***

The reality of the human being's life is God's Spirit. According to Welker, God gives fleshly, perishable, concrete creatures a share in God's "breath" and thus in God's Spirit. This God's 'breathing' grants to human beings the 'breath of life' (Gen. 2:7). God's breathing is God's Spirit. God's Spirit takes effect in human beings and in other creatures as the breath of life ( Welker 1994: 159). *Rûah-breath* of the Old Testament is incarnate. The Holy Spirit is what animates the body (Congar 1983: 3). God's breath was the 'living-being' of the flesh in creation. God's breath make the dead a living being. This living being means not just to live alone but also to live with other living beings. To be alive thus means: through God's *rûah*, to bind in a substantial pattern of interconnection, to have a part in 'a medium that is both individually enlivening and common to all that is creaturely' (Welker:160). God's breath is the essence of individual human life and community. The Spirit of God was in 'reality God, the vital God, infusing vitality into his creation, God present and operative in his world, and especially in the world of human beings' ( Hawthorne 1991: 21-22).

Actually in creation the Holy Spirit was the life and power of the world. Therefore, the taking back of the *rûah* leads to death and decay of the human being and creature (Welker 1994: 160). The Spirit, on the other hand, animates and enlivens the believers' lives (Thüsing 1980: 100). Therefore, we must not imagine that we had in mind some secondary cause, something wholly separate and distinct from the Spirit of God ( Hawthorne: 14). Therefore, Fee (1994: 136) could claim that: 'God does not dwell *among* his people, but is himself present, by his Spirit, *within* his people, sanctifying their present earthly existence and stamping it with his own eternity'

The Holy Spirit is the life itself of people so that 'whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never receives forgiveness' ( Mark 3:28-30; cf. Matt. 12: 31-32; Luke 11:14-15, 17-23; 12:10). This is because he denies his life itself. Without the Holy Spirit there is not just spiritual death but also death of the body. Somebody who blasphemes against the Holy Spirit is like a Pharisee who insults the origin of life, the Spirit, that Jesus brought through his work. Therefore, if somebody blasphemes against the Holy Spirit, it is simply that

somebody hostile to Jesus has deliberately attributed the life he lived *through the power of the Holy Spirit* to the power of the Evil One ( Welker: 172). Such people who are on the verge of becoming incapable of repentance and even attribute God's attestation of Jesus to the devil, can be counted in the unforgivable category (Keener 1997: 107). Evil power always brings human life back to death. Therefore to blaspheme against the Holy Spirit is to come back to evil, to death.

The *renewal* of creation by the Spirit does not remove fleshness but removes the Evil Power who had usurped the essence of creation. Indeed, the renewal of creation goes hand in hand with 'a *renewal of and change in fleshness*' (Welker: 164). We can see this Spirit within fleshness or substantiality in the Old Testament.

I will gather you from the peoples, and assemble you out of the countries where you have been scattered, and I will give you the land of Israel..... I will give them one heart, and put a new Spirit within them; I will remove the heart of stone from their flesh and give them a *heart of flesh*, so that they may follow my statutes and keep my ordinances and obey them. Then they shall be my people and I will be their God. ( Ezek. 11:17b, 19-20)

A new heart I will give you, and a new Spirit I will put within you; and I will remove from your body the heart of stone and give you a *heart of flesh*. I will put my Spirit within you, and make you follow my statutes and be careful to observe my ordinances. Then you shall live in the land that I gave to your ancestors; and you shall be my people, and I will be your God. ( Ezek. 36: 26-28)

From the above two similar verses we can illuminate what concretely happens with the people touched by the Spirit's action ( Welker: 164-165). The Holy Spirit always works in our concrete life. Therefore he removes the evil at work in our concrete lives. In this passage we can understand that 'God would creatively endow Israel with new wills and

new minds that were to be sensitive rather than stony and hard in their reactions to God's commandments' (Allen 1990: 179). To borrow the words of Welker (:165), 'The granting of the Spirit, of the "new Spirit," of the Spirit of God, is attended by an *exchange of hearts*. In particular, the heart of stone is replaced by a heart of flesh'. God would re-make our human nature which had hard hearts of stone (Allen: 179). That the heart of stone is replaced by the heart of flesh means the Holy Spirit's substantial or structural dwelling in our body.

Therefore the Holy Spirit is not an external appendix to our body but the substance of our body in that if the Holy Spirit withdraws from the body, our body is just like stone or soil. Actually the Holy Spirit becomes *hypostasized*.

God in us through the Holy Spirit is a continuing pattern of the incarnation ( Marriage 1989 : 89 ). For this reason Welker dares to see the believers as the 'messianic bearer of the Holy Spirit'. We refer to it here as *hypostasis of the Holy Spirit in human self*. Let us develop this concept.

This *hypostasis of the Holy Spirit* is not merely the extension of the incarnation of the second person because the Holy Spirit operates in the world today by his own autonomy just as the Son is incarnate by his own autonomy ( McIntyre 1997: 205 ). The historicity of the Spirit has a christological basis ( Lull 1980:154). But a difference between Christ and his Spirit exists within their identity (: 155)

Hendrikus Berkhof described the Holy Spirit in the sense of the extensional incarnation (Berkhof 1964: 115 ). Hendrikus Berkhof understands that the exalted Christ becomes the life-giving Spirit. Therefore, for Berkhof the Holy Spirit is the exalted Christ. Accordingly the coming of the Holy Spirit is an extensional incarnation ( McIntyre: 205). Berkhof clearly emphasizes that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ, but he ignores the autonomy of the Holy Spirit as one of the Trinitarian personalities. Berkhof's opinion is that the Holy Spirit as one of the Trinitarian personalities does not inspire the believers by his own

autonomy. In other words, the Holy Spirit is not ‘another Helper’. He is, rather, the power of Christ. Therefore, Berkhof’s understanding of the Holy Spirit as the extension of the incarnation could incur the charge of docetism (: 205 ).

Therefore, McIntyre suggests an alternative concept of ‘*definitional substantive model*’ on the indwelling of Holy Spirit. McIntyre’s ‘*definitional substantive model*’ which images the Spirit as acting in the world as “an autonomous substance” can give us a clear definition of the *fleshly dwelling of the Holy Spirit in human self*.

In order to overcome docetic pneumatology we can borrow the concept of the *opus ad extra* of the Word. We make use of the advantage which christology has over pneumatology finding there a word to designate the *opus ad extra* of the Word of God, namely, incarnation of *ensarkosis* (:207). If pneumatology follows docetic christology, the Holy Spirit can never give the reality of salvation and make people Christ-like believers. McIntyre (: 208 ), therefore, avoids the docetism of pneumatology by means of ‘such neologisms as *empneumatosis*, or “inspiring”, the Holy Spirit informing the spirit, heart, mind and will of human beings, with whom he is thus in touch as never before.’ The Holy Spirit dwells in the concrete human self who believes in Jesus Christ. John of Damascus said: ‘We do not conceive the Spirit as an unhypostatic breath..., but as substantial power, self-related in his own individuating hypostasis...’ ( *The orthodox faith* 7. 14-21)

McIntyre claimed *hypostasis* and *physis* as the terminology of the doctrinal statements concerning the Holy Spirit (McIntyre: 237). Using the same meaning as McIntyre and not implying the extension of the incarnation of the Son of God, we use here the *hypostasis of the Holy Spirit*.

In this *hypostasis of the Holy Spirit*, the Holy Spirit does not nullify the human spirit but rather imbues the human spirit with autonomy in order to continue the work of Christ. The Holy Spirit makes us the image of Christ. The Holy Spirit makes us the sons of God. The

Holy Spirit brings, through the witness that he bears ( Rom 8:16), the experience of *huiiothesia* or 'adoption of sons' to our *pneuma*. (Thüsing 1980: 100). The Holy Spirit is God himself identifying himself with his creatures and his creation ( McIntyre: 182 ). Therefore, God willingly accepts the believers as his sons, because these sons have the same Spirit. In other words, the expression of the *pneuma* of God, the bearer of this experience from God, and 'our spirit are indissolubly united' ( Thüsing: 100). Just as God's unique Son Jesus Christ has the Holy Spirit, the adopted sons also have the Holy Spirit. The *pneuma* of God unite with our spirit. Now we can understand the Holy Spirit fully embodies Christ's character and power in our body. The Holy Spirit also unifies Christ-life with the believer's life. The Holy Spirit changes our sinful nature to Christ-centric life. The Holy Spirit makes the believers as new born beings. The Holy Spirit is the new context of human life.

The Spirit is a historically 'new mode of God-in-the-world' (Lull:159) and God-in-our-spirit. In Galatians 4:4-6 the Apostle Paul described how, in the Spirit, 'the new mode of divine immanence, the believers continue Christ's presence and activity as imitators' (Lull:159).

Therefore, McIntyre (: 243 ) commented that 'no account of the doctrine of the atonement is complete unless it lays a proper emphasis upon the part which the Holy Spirit plays in the effective completion of the salvation process and that this role which the Spirit plays in the fulfilment of the work of Christ is in no sense an afterthought requiring to be implemented after the event of the death of Christ, to obviate God's purpose being nullified through the sinfulness of human kind.' On the contrary, it was an integral part of that divine design which centred around Christ. The *hypostasis of the Holy Spirit* is the fulfilment of *opera ad extra Trinitatis* begun from the beginning of the world and completed in Christ.

### **3.3.2.2. *The hypostasis of the Holy Spirit in the believers***

God's immanent dwelling among his people and transforming them to holiness was the purpose of the Old Testament. The consummation of this immanence was found in Christ, the One who is anointed with the Spirit's presence and power. And the consequence of his work is 'the giving of the Spirit to indwell believers' (Ferguson 1996: 176). Ferguson explains that the relationship between the Holy Spirit and his people is more than that of a mere divine influence. As Christ gave the Holy Spirit to dwell in believers, it is not just a divine influence on the human being.

The divine-human engagement in the Holy Spirit is an analogy of the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ ( : 176 ). And this divine-human indwelling in each other is also an analogy of Trinitarian relationship. The analogy is that the mutual indwelling of Christ and the believer is shaped according to the pattern of inner-Trinitarian relationships. Just as there is a mutual indwelling of Father and Son revealed by the Holy Spirit, so, by the indwelling of the same Spirit, Christ and the believer are united ( : 176; John 14: 20)

In the Holy Spirit's hypostatic dwelling in the believers, the action of Christ must be continued in the human self and community who believe in Jesus Christ. In the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit the personality of Christ is resurrected in the believers. Jesus' life continues through the believers.

How is the life of the Christ perceived by human beings after we "no longer know Christ according to the flesh" ( 2 Cor. 5:16) ? Concerning this question we should consider Jesus' injunction of silence. Jesus commanded a man with a shrivelled hand 'not to tell who he was' ( Matthew 12: 16) as Isaiah had prophesied in Isaiah 42:1-4. And this injunction of silence was initially directed at the demons. Demons recognized that Jesus was 'the Holy One of God' ( Mark 1:24; Luke 4:34 ), the 'Son of God' ( Mark 3:11; Matthew 8: 29; Luke 4:41), the 'Son of the Most High God' ( Mark 5:7; Luke 8: 28), the 'Messiah' ( Luke 4: 41 ). But Jesus commanded 'Be silent' ( Mark 1: 25) so as 'not to make him known' ( Mark 3:12 ).

Why did Jesus not publicize his name ? We can answer this when we think about Jesus' words to the healed Gerasene. Jesus ( Mark 5:19; Luke 8:39) said to him : 'Go home to your family and tell how much the Lord has done for you, and how he has had mercy on you'. Jesus wanted only someone who had personal experience of suffering and of liberation to publicly testify to who he was and not those whose hearts had not experienced Jesus' suffering ( Welker 1994: 208).

Furthermore, Jesus did not want to make his messiahship public knowledge until his crucifixion. Only on the basis of the experience and knowledge of the cross and the resurrection of Christ is it possible to publicize the identity of Jesus ( : 209). In other words, when we experience Jesus's cross and when we share in Jesus' sacrifice the messiahship of Jesus can be understood publicly. And only at that time is our function as microcosms of the messianic bearer of the Holy Spirit realized.

The Holy Spirit definitely unifies us with the historical Jesus and transforms us into Christ-like persons. The Holy Spirit empowers us to become microcosms of the Servant Son. For this reason we can say that *the Holy Spirit is a hypostasis of Christ in the believers*.

### **3.3.3. Christ, the Holy Spirit and the human self**

The Holy Spirit who worked in Jesus is the same as that given to the followers of Jesus.

Jesus was led by the Holy Spirit even when the devil tempted him ( Mat. 4:1; Mark 1.12; Luke 4:1). Jesus must be tested because only 'when tested and proven and the covenant confirmed by his unwavering obedience to the Father can Jesus go forth in his work as Son and Servant for others' ( cf. Heb. 5:8-9) ( Hawthorne 1991: 139). Israel was tested likewise, in order to be the sons and servants for others. Actually this temptation of Jesus recalls Deut.6-8. Just as the Lord God led Israel, his 'son', ( cf. Exod. 4:22-23; Jer. 31:9; Hos. 11:1) in the wilderness for forty years to test and to discipline him ( Deut. 8:2-5 ), so

Jesus as the supreme Son of God is led by the Spirit for forty days to be tested at this very point, at the point of his sonship ( Matt. 4:3,6 ) ( Hawthorne : 138).

The reason why God had made a covenant with Israel and constantly tested Israel was in order to make them faithful sons of God but they had failed the test by rebelling against God (cf. Acts 7:36,39; Heb. 3:8-9) ( Hawthorne : 138-139). Therefore, now in the testing of Jesus the new covenant has been introduced and the New Israel is tested ( : 139).

The Son of God, the beginner of the new Israel, Jesus, returned to Galilee in the power of the Spirit ( Luke 4:14), proclaimed the Gospel by the Holy Spirit, ( Luke 4: 18) and brought the salvation. The Spirit was always with Jesus. ‘The Spirit is upon Jesus by reason of his baptismal anointing. His [messianic] anointing signs appointment and empowering to be the Isaianic messiah who heralds and brings salvation’ (Nolland 1989 :202 ). Similarly, the believers have been made sons of God in the Holy Spirit. Hawthorne ( :237) explains it thus: ‘In a similar way the followers of Jesus, who have received the gift of the Spirit, are thus anointed by God with that same Holy Spirit and so become God’s contemporary “christs,” so that they might know the mind of God and be authorized to carry out his will in this day and age ( cf. 1 John 2:20,27).’

Through the Holy Spirit we are joined to the Anointed One so that God has anointed us as well (Fee 1994: 292). The Apostle Paul taught the Corinthians two aspects of the *hypostasis of the Holy Spirit*, one of which applies to Jesus and the other to his followers. (Hawthorne: 237) ‘Now He who establishes us with you in Christ ( *Christon* ) and anointed ( *chrisas* ) us is God’ (2 Cor. 1:21 NASB ), i.e., ‘the one who establishes us in the *Anointed One* and *anointed* ( *christon kai chrisas* ) us is God.’ (: 237). In other words, ‘in putting us into Christ, God *christed* us’ (Fee: 291). God anointed us as he anointed Christ.

Therefore, just as Jesus said of himself, ‘The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me...’ ( Luke 4:18), and as Peter said to Cornelius, ‘God anointed Jesus of

Nazareth with the Holy Spirit and with power...' (Acts 10:38), just so in this same way Christians are now spoken of as anointed ones because they, too, have received the Holy Spirit and are thus set apart to serve God, authorized to act in his behalf ( Hawthorne: 237).

Jesus' words in John 20: 23 are tremendously difficult for the teachers of law, as well as for us, to accept. Even when Jesus said to the paralytic, 'Son, your sins are forgiven' ( Mark 2:5), the teachers of law thought, 'Why does this fellow say that? He's blaspheming! Who can forgive sins but God alone?' Thus the fact that the believers also have the authority to forgive any other will definitely present a problem to the teachers of law, as will all of us who believe in Jesus.

But when we are called we too have this authority. Where does it come from? It comes from the Holy Spirit. Because Jesus' authority comes from the Holy Spirit, Hawthorne (:157-158) can say that 'Jesus' authority to forgive sins was not his intrinsic authority but a delegated authority, not one inherent in him by virtue of his own divine nature, but one given him by God.' 'This authority was his by virtue of a prophetic gift bestowed on him ( cf. John 5:19,27,30; see also 2 Sam.12:13; John 20: 22, 23).' The believers received the same Spirit. In 1 Pet 1:23 the apostle Peter described this authority in terms of anointing faith. According to Congar ( 1983: 102), Peter implies that the anointing faith is the work of the Spirit and that it is an extension and a communication to believers of the prophetic and messianic anointing that Jesus received from the Holy Spirit at his baptism.

This 'pneumatic-prophetic authority' ( *exousia* ) of Hawthorne and Congar can be seen prominently in the event of the cleansing of the Temple ( Mark11:15-17, 27-33/Matt. 21:12-13, 23-27/Luke 19: 45-46; 20:1-8) ( Hawthorne: 158). In the *hypostasis of the Holy Spirit* this authority also belongs to the believers (: 238), since they are the witness of Christ ( Luke 24: 48) in the Holy Spirit. Jesus' Sonhood and human sonhood are identified with each other in the Holy spirit.

### **3.4. 'Never, Lord,' the this-worldly life paradigm as the demonic myth**

The Bible teaches us that there is a totally different paradigm of the human self from that which Christ and the Holy Spirit has shown us. Even Jesus' disciples lived in this paradigm. They actually could not follow Jesus. We can say that they could not become Christ-like people before Pentecost. We can overcome this paradigm by the Holy Spirit. But we must recognize it.

We are going to investigate the main human prejudice that made the believers fail to be Christ-like person. The human prejudice was shown in Mark's Gospel ( 8:27-38):

Jesus and his disciples went on to the villages around Caesarea Philippi. On the way he asked them, 'Who do people say I am?' They replied, 'Some say John the Baptist; Others say Elijah; and still others, one of the prophets.' 'But what about you?' he asked. 'Who do you say I am?' Peter answered, 'You are the Christ.' Jesus warned them not to tell anyone about him. He then began to teach them that the son of man must suffer many things and be rejected by the elders, chief priests and teachers of the law, and that he must be killed and after three days rise again. He spoke plainly about this, and Peter took him aside and began to rebuke him. But when Jesus turned and looked at his disciples, he rebuked Peter. 'Get behind me, Satan!' He said. 'You do not have in mind the things of God, but the things of men.' Then he called the crowd to him along with his disciples and said: 'If anyone would come after me, he must deny himself and take up his cross and follow me. For whoever wants to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for me and for the gospel will save it. What good is it for a man to gain the whole world, yet forfeit his soul? If anyone is ashamed of me and my words in this adulterous

and sinful generation, the Son of Man will be ashamed of him when he comes in his father's glory with the holy angels.'

This section is paralleled in Matthew 16: 13-28 and Luke 9:18-27.

When Jesus asked them 'Who do people say I am?', the disciples gave various answers, viz., John the Baptist, Elijah, one of the prophets. All recognized him as a holy man, as their religious leader. But Peter identified Jesus as the messiah, the Christ and the Son of the living God. At that time Jesus said to Peter, 'Blessed are you, Simon son of Jonah, for this was not revealed to you by man, but by my Father in heaven.' ( Matthew 16: 17)

Jesus is not just one of many religious heroes, but the apocalyptic liberator. Peter recognized this. Even more, he recognized Jesus as the son of the living God. Peter answered somewhat more than correctly: you are the living God. This was the real secret that nobody could know. This sonship of the living God closely relates to his death on the cross.

Even though Peter could not know at this point--so that he was rebuked by Jesus--he confessed the secret of God. So Jesus said to him, 'And I tell you that you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not overcome it.' ( Matthew 16: 18 ).

Jesus would build his church on this rock of Peter's faith. According to Garland ( 1993 : 171 ), 'the rock upon which Christ's church is built is the confession, revealed by the Father, that Jesus is Christ, the son of the living God. The answers of the others to the question of who Jesus is offer him nothing on which to build'. Actually, Jesus identified Peter's confession with his church.

Amazingly Jesus blessed him thus: 'I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will

be loosed in heaven.' ( Matthew 16: 19 ). This means that Jesus gave Peter the same authority as himself to hold the keys of the kingdom of heaven. This implies, surely, that Jesus identified his own authority, even the kingdom of God beyond the church, with his disciples' authority because Peter knew the secret of Jesus.

Gundry ( 1994 : 335 ) said that 'God will not ratify at the last judgement what Peter does in the present age, but Peter does in the present age what God has already determined.' In other words, Peter has received authority from God for his scribal activity. Put differently, this means that to become the believer is to perform Christ-like action in individual and communal life.

But when Peter thought that this worldly life and prosperity could be all for him, he could not fully understand Christ. When Peter did not overcome the *this-worldly life paradigm*, he became Satan. When Jesus said that He must go to Jerusalem and suffer at the hands of the elders, priests, and teachers, and must be killed and be raised to life, Peter said, 'Never, Lord!' 'This shall never happen to you!'

Even though he appeared to know the secret of Jesus as the real Son of God, actually Peter did not know what to be Christ really is. He knew Christ only in the this-worldly life paradigm. He understood Jesus as the Messiah Christ, the apocalyptic liberator, who could never be killed.

This negative reaction of Peter is historically comprehensible ( Hare 1993 : 194 ) because the Jewish Messiah was expected to inflict suffering and death on Israel's enemies and on the wicked within Israel, not to experience it himself ( Hare: 194 ). This concept of the Messiah comes from the life-centrism. The Messiah Christ can never be killed and death must be destroyed. This was the original fear of religion, even of Christianity.

This fear comprises the 'soteriotype' of the this-worldly life paradigm. When Peter remains in this paradigm, he is frightened that Jesus must be killed.

The paradigm that Peter was obsessed by was the extreme fear of death, fear of giving up the self perfectness, immortal soul, that created life-centrism. This life-centrism has dominated men and women since 'the first man, Adam, became a living being [ soul ]'(1 Cor. 15: 45f) after his sin. We call it the this-worldly-life paradigm.

This-worldly life-centrism was the dominant paradigm of the whole world. Even God was seen as the *self-life paradigmatic* Divine Being. The divinity was endowed with self-centrism and self-glorification. It was enclosed in the *self-life paradigm* of humanity.

In this way, the this-worldly life-centrism created a total separation of Christology and soteriology, a schism between Jesus' vicarious death and a Jesus-like life, because it brought the impossibility of union between the heavenly and the earthly.

In the this-world life paradigm Christ and Jesus were separated from each other, because while Christ is an eternal divine supreme being, Jesus is a mortal being. The Christ of christology, must be defined as a heavenly thing. By making a heavenly figure of Christ people hope to expiate the fear of death. In other words, people want to establish the immortality of life of self and eternity according to *self-life*.

This reflects the actual demonic power paradigm. Peter's separation of Christ from Jesus' death and from his own death is demonic and Satanic; in other words, this separation in the this-worldly life paradigm's fear of death is demonic and satanic. The real satanic power is the desperate fear of death. This desperate fear of death characterizes physical death as belonging to Hell.

Peter's exclamation, 'Never, Lord!' is the human representation of the demonic myth. The reaction, 'Never, Lord!', reveals a demonic fear of death reflecting the this-worldly life paradigm. In this fearful utterance of 'Never, Lord!' there is the distortion of salvation.

Certainly, then, if we remain in the this-worldly life paradigm then physical death is a demonic power, and we cannot actually understand the Christ. Peter remained in this self-life paradigm. So Jesus said to Peter, 'Get behind me, Satan!' ( Mathew 16: 23; Mark, 8: 33). Peter became identified with Satan.

Jesus's words show that the this-worldly view of death as demonic is not God's 'thing'. Rather, the this-worldly life paradigm is of the 'things' of men, even more, of Satan. Jesus said, 'You are a stumbling block to me; you do not have in mind the things of God, but the things of men' ( Mathew 16: 23; Mark 10: 33 ).

Peter's defence, 'Never, Lord!' is representative of men's 'things'. God's 'thing' is that Jesus must suffer and be killed and be raised.

Jesus must be killed. Jesus must die. This was one of contents of Gospel. Even while Jesus as a human being had a horror of death, yet he did not desperately fear death. In Matthew, Mark and Luke, Jesus reveals that he must be killed. In other words, Jesus is not in the this-worldly life paradigm of humans. He accepts suffering and physical death.

When Jesus said to Peter that he would give him the keys of the kingdom of God, Jesus authorized Peter to perform the same work as himself. Christ's work and Peter's work cannot be separated in accomplishing the 'things' of God. Jesus will build his church on the rock of Peter.

Jesus said, 'If anyone would come after me, he must deny himself and take up his cross and follow me. For whoever wants to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for me will find it.' ( Matthew 16:24-25; Mark 8: 34-35 ) Jesus' suffering, his death, are not only limited to Jesus' own self but also include his followers.

Hagner ( 1995 : 487 ), in his Matthew commentary, writes, 'The path of discipleship is the path of the cross for everyone who would follow Jesus. Paradoxically, it is the one who

gives up his or her life in discipleship to Jesus who will truly find life, both in the present and in the future, while the one who seeks to have life on his or her own terms will in effect lose it. This self-denial means a new set of priorities that will look foolish to the world'. He also said, 'This dying-to-self makes possible the radical love and service that are the essence of discipleship' ( : 487 ).

Jesus said to his followers, 'Take up [your] cross'. Such action would reflect Jesus' life in each follower. This is the Christ-like life. Peter's plea discloses not only his own misconception but also that of all people concerning the self-life paradigm of humanity. But Jesus strongly commands his disciples and his future disciples to take up their crosses. In order to do so we should overcome the this-worldly life paradigm, and the desperate fear of death.

According to Hare ( : 193 ), this passage ( Mark 16: 13-28 ) is Jesus' preparation of the disciples for his death. Hare ( : 193 ) said, 'in terms of the *theological message*, however, the announcement serves as the occasion for important instruction concerning what Jesus' death means for the life-style of his followers'.

The death on the cross of Jesus as Christ and the denying of, the losing of self, for Jesus and for the Gospel are the action which unifies Jesus and the believers. In Jesus' commandment physical death for his sake is a testimony of discipleship. When the believers overcome the this-worldly life paradigm, they can become the image of Christ, the Christ-like person.

### **3.5. The *life-giving love* as the essence of Christian humanity**

Peter's response can be seen as representative of all people, the whole human race, male as well as female. From this self-life paradigm there arises the need for a transformation of

history, almost like being born again; a perspective totally different from this world paradigm.

Therefore, Christians must have a different view of life from this-worldly life paradigm. To contemplate our new Christian life we need to reflect on the doctrines of trinity, creation and redemption.

### 3.5.1. James D.J. Dunn's opinion

James D. G. Dunn explained 1 Cor. 15: 45 in terms of the believer's new life as 'life-giving spirit'. He ( 1975: 322 ) interpreted that verse thus: 'By "life-giving spirit" Paul is just as obviously speaking in terms of the religious experience of believers; the "life-giving spirit" is that power which believers experience as a new life, liberating life, life from the dead' ( Rom. 8.2; II Cor. 3.6ff. ). The point for us to note in 1 Cor. 15 : 45 is that '*Paul equates the risen Jesus with the spirit who makes alive.*' Jesus becomes the *life-giving spirit* as the representative of all people, that is, just as under Adam, all people became the self-centrism, in Jesus all people become the *life-giving spirit*.

The Apostle Paul deliberately says that Jesus, by his resurrection, becomes the life-giving Spirit which believers experience as the source and power of the new life and new relationship with God. From his resurrection Jesus may be known by men only as the life-giving Spirit ( : 322 ). This Spirit is also essentially the Spirit of the Father so that the Spirit of God can be more precisely recognized as the Spirit of Jesus's own relationship with the Father and as the Spirit, which brings about the same relationship for believers and makes it existentially real ( : 320 ). Dunn continues, in this 'life-giving Spirit' '*suffering and death are the necessary complement to life.* For Paul, the christian life is a continuing experience of death as well as of [new] life' ( Rom 7: 24 ; 8: 10,13 )

For Dunn ( : 327 ), Paul was living as 'a member of the last Adam' as belonging to Christ through the Spirit, but at the same time, Paul was dying because he is still 'a member of

the first Adam', belonging to the world as flesh. So this dying is a necessary process for the believers.

This dying as a member of the first Adam belongs to all believers. Dunn continues: Suffering and dying was something *all* believers experienced--an unavoidable part of the believers' lot--an aspect of experience as Christians, which his converts shared with Paul (Rom 5: 3 'we'; 8: 17f 'we' ). Furthermore, '[suffering] is the inevitable consequence of the life of the Spirit having to express itself through the body of death'. This thinking of Paul is clearly expressed in II Cor. 4:11. 'While still alive, we are continually being handed over to death for Jesus' sake, so that ( *iva* ) the life of Jesus also may be revealed in our mortal flesh'. Explaining this verse and following Paul's line of reasoning, Dunn (: 327-328) unified two thoughts as follows:

First, that the experience of suffering is the experience of the power of death, continually asserting itself over its continuing domain, the flesh, the mortal body. Second, that if the life of Jesus is to achieve visible expression in the believer's life that can only be through the body--but that means through this body, the body of flesh, the body of death.

Thus Dunn ( 327-328 ) continues

Now notice how Paul links these two thoughts--by *iva*; death must have its say in the believer's experience *in order that* the life of Jesus may come to visible expression. Also, *the life of Jesus manifests itself precisely in and through the dying of the body*; life and death are two sides of the one process. So in II Cor 4: 16--'Though our outward humanity is wasting away, yet day by day we are being inwardly renewed' There is no dualism here.

The Christian always lives a life of tension, that is, 'the tension of belonging to two opposed worlds simultaneously, of knowing the life of the Spirit but having to express it

through the body of death' ( : 338 ). How can we escape from this tension? Dunn said that there is no abstract experience which exempts the believer from the reality of his divided state; as man of Spirit and man of flesh ( :339 ). There are only two ways of escape, and both are ways of *life-giving dying*: 'One is the way *forward*--to engage in the Spirit/flesh conflict till its end in physical death; the other is the way *backward*--to abandon the conflict, to retreat into a life lived on the level of the flesh, the level where death alone reigns, the way of death' ( :339)

These two ways represent the life-giving spirit and the this worldly life-centrism respectively. But the only way of escape from the tension is death--either the death of the body, or the death of the whole man, in sum, life-giving dying ( : 339 ). The only way of escape from the tension is to become the life-giving being by the Spirit following Jesus. This death is the Christian life-giving paradigm. 'Death is part of the present experience of life' ( II Cor. 4:10ff; Dunn : 339 ).

Only in the life-giving spirit can we overcome both the dualism implicit in the knowing of Christ and in the following of Christ, and life and death.

Let us examine the meaning of the life-giving spirit regarding the trinity, creation and redemption.

### **3.5.2. Suffering and the sacrificing God**

Through Jesus' death the divinity of God has fully been revealed. In fact, Jesus' death is already intimated in the Trinity.

#### **3.5.2.1. Trinity and the sacrificing God**

Howard A. Snyder ( 1995 : 244-5 ) explained the Trinity in this way:

In the christian tradition, philosophers and theologians have dealt with the issue of meaning and relationship in part through the doctrine of the Trinity. Whatever or whoever God is, God is not only one. God is three-in-one. The Trinity is one way of describing the complexity and multidimensionality of God's self-awareness. The unity - perhaps the meaning - of God is found in the indivisible, ever-intercommunicating relationship of one-in-two, two-in-three, three-in-one. In the christian view, meaning is therefore trinitarian and relational. God is Trinity - a personal unity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, bound together in loving intercommunion. So profound is this relatedness in the being of God that it constitutes Trinitive personhood: three persons in one (not two persons united by some impersonal energy or spirit). The doctrine of Trinity is itself, therefore, an intriguing intimation of the essential twoness and threeness of oneness of meaning. Increasingly, it is actually an ecological conception, not a mechanical and certainly not a hierarchical one.

How well Snyder explained the character of the Trinity! The intercommunal, divine being. In the Trinity, the relatedness of three persons is an intercommunicating relationship. Furthermore, when we look at the doctrine of the Trinity from the point of view of the life-giving-spirit paradigm, the real meaning of intercommunion in the Trinity is the life-giving communion, the invisible new communion rather than the benefits of one or the other.

The personal character of each member of the Trinity, ie. the *paternitas* of the Father, the *filiatio* of the Son, the *processio* of the Holy Spirit, is revealed in the Trinity via life-giving communion with each other; the Son is in the Father in a self-giving body of love, the Father is in the Son in the self-giving of the Word, the Holy Spirit is in the Father and the Son in a total self-giving of power and knowledge.

The triune God is the relational God who knows suffering, self-giving and transformation within God's own life ( Inbody 1997: 168). God and suffering are not contradictions

within a christological perspective, for God's being is in suffering and life-giving, and the suffering is in God's being itself, because God is love ( : 171 ).

*In the Trinity, the life-giving divinity is the principle of the divine being.* Therein, one God, but three personalities are established. Geddes McGregor (1973) thinks that God's being should be understood in the light of God's work of sacrificial love. According to kenotic theology God is *always* and in *all aspects* self-humbling, self-giving, and self-limiting, not simply in the second person ( Inbody : 175 ). Therefore, revelation derives *from the other's sacrifice* and is in *the sacrifice for the other*.

God's essence is in the perfect self-sacrifice in the Trinity, not just in himself alone. In this interpretation God must necessarily be a triune being. In other words, the life-giving character of God inevitably generates the Trinity 'of three persons in one Divine essence'. The life-giving is the lifestyle of the Trinity.

### **3.5.2.2. Creation and the sacrificing God**

The immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity and the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity (Inbody 1997 : 168-9). In other words, the pattern of divine life in the Trinity is revealed in creation and redemption. The Trinity who abides in creation is the Trinity who works in creation and redemption according to the Trinitarian pattern of life. Thus the immanent and economic doctrines of the Trinity together show that interrelationship exists not only within the divine life but between God and man ( :169). Let us look at the pattern of life expressed in creation.

The Nicaeo-Constantinopolitan Creed ( 381 ) shows us that the Father and the Son has one essence, *homoousios*. The Creed ( cited in Torrance 1981: 58-59 ) states as follows:

We believe in one God..... and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father as unique ( *monogenes* ), that is from the *ousia* of the

Father, God from God, light from light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, *homoosios* with the Father, through whom all things were made.....

The Father and the Son are one essence. Therefore, the creation of God was the Father's creation through His Son. In other words, creation was God's self-giving through His Son.

Jesus' uniqueness is Christianity's uniqueness. What is different from other religions is the self-giving love that comes from God's sacrificial action. In all other religions there is the concept that the Divine Supreme Being cannot suffer, without a divine personality who has performed the self-giving himself. The uniqueness of Christianity which is different from other religions is in God's self-giving action.

Actually we can say that God gave himself for us from the time of his Creation. The saying of His Word can be identified with a giving of himself, because the Word was God. God said himself: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning' ( John 1: 1). The Word was God who came to earth in the person of Jesus of Nazareth who was crucified.

When God created the world, God did not actually create from nothing. His creation was his giving and sending of his Word as his essence. The creation was a creation from himself. The *creatio ex nihilo* is only a wonderful expression of God's sending of himself. In other words, God created the world by his self-giving, without any external materials. The creation was God's perfect self-giving.

From the point of creation, God began his self-giving towards the other. Thus God's personality and the life-giving spirit paradigm, were never separate even from the beginning. In this self-giving, paradoxically, God glorified himself. In this, the Father's self-giving to creation, was the foundation of creation.

Actually, from the creation Jesus Christ was slain as the slain Lamb in Rev. 13: 8. NIV has this verse, 'All inhabitants of the earth will worship the beast--all whose names have not been written in the book of life belonging to the Lamb that was slain from the creation of the world.' AV/ KJV render it, 'And all that dwell upon the earth shall worship him [ the beast], whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.' AV/NIV/KJV connect the phrase 'the lamb' and the phrase 'from the creation of the world'.

But RSV associated the phrase 'before the foundation of the world' with the clause 'everyone whose name has not been written', thus separating the phrase 'the Lamb slain' from the phrase 'before the foundation of the world' ( McIntyre 1992: 113-114 ). But, following McIntyre ( :114 ), in fact, in the Greek original, the text separated the phrase *apo kataboles kosmou* from the phrase *gegraptai* ( written ). Therefore, the RSV is an erroneous translation from the Greek original.

According to NIV/AV/KJV the Lamb, Jesus Christ was slain 'from the creation of the world', 'from the foundation of the world' in order to forgive men and women. In other words, 'the suffering and the anguish of the cross were foundational elements in those attributes of God' ( : 114).

Clearly we can understand that before the falling into sin of human beings, the life-giving life-style was the fundamental attribute of God and man as shown in Revelation 13.8. Consequently, when God is presented in the Old Testament as forgiving, he does so because of a life-giving love which is already endemic to his nature [ in the Trinity as well as the Creation ], even though it still has to be overtly fulfilled in the life of Jesus Christ ( : 114 ). In creation as well as in the Old Testament the life-giving sacrifice was the principle of the creation and the sacrifice of the Old Testament altar.

Extentionally, this sacrificial love, life-giving love was the life style of the first human beings of creation. The life-giving love and its concomitant sacrificial love were included

in God's creation. According to McIntyre ( : 114 ) God's essential natures ( the mercy and the forgiveness) that are rooted in sacrificial love are 'the foundation of his whole relationship to the created order of mankind and nature.' Men and women should follow God's essential nature that comes from life-giving love ( : 117 ). God's essential nature rooted in life-giving is the foundation and the possibility of the believer's christ-like action within union with Jesus Christ ( : 117 ). Sin was humanity's resistance to the life-giving and sacrificial love.

From this consideration of creation 'the theology of [vicarious] atonement [of Christ] and the components of soteriology and the actual ways in which atonement and redemption are implemented in the lives of men and women' ( McIntyre : 120 ) are interrelated with each other.

The first Adam could not understand the meaning of the life and the reality of life. In creation, God created man and woman, and gave them life. By this life man and woman had to conform to the image of God and likeness of God that was already the divine life style. The reality of the life-giving life was, even in creation, the life of the spiritual body ( 1 Corinthian 15: 44 ) in holy communion with God that overcomes the second death ( Rev. 20: 6 ).

As we see in Genesis 2: 7, 'The Lord God formed the man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living life'. In the beginning God created a good creation, but the man became a bodily nature who concentrated upon the self in isolation from God, the Wholly Other. This became a serious sin. Man became sinner as he became the self-centric bodily nature instead of the life-giving spirit planned by the creator. So man really died.

From that time, death became the punishment. From this time death gives birth to fear for life. It is the awareness of death which first generates fear for life, the fear of not getting one's fair share, of not having enough from life, the fear that life will be cut short

(Moltmann 1996: 93). But Jesus overcame the this-worldly life-centrism which is the basis of self-centrism. The Apostle Paul expressed the reality of Jesus' life as follows; 'the first man Adam became a living being; the last Adam, a life-giving spirit'( 1 Corinthians 15: 45).

The essence of creation was for man to become the life-giving spirit. In the beginning, human beings had to pursue the real life, the 'fruit of life' through this life-giving spirit. The purpose of creation was not the 'knowledge of good and evil' for one's own life's sake. God created man and woman as living beings who, without a partner, had no real life; God considered that being alone was not good ( Genesis 2: 18 ). Unfortunately the first man and woman chose the knowledge of good and evil and love of self rather than love for others.

In Genesis 1:27-28, God created man in his image. One of the meanings of the image of God is the sonship of Adam, when we refer to Genesis 5:1-3 ( Adam fathered a 'son' in his own 'likeness' and 'image' ) and Luke's Gospel 3: 38 ( Adam is 'the son of God' ) ( Mathews 1995: 168 ). This sonship imitated the Son of God who gave himself according to God's will, when he created the world. This means that the human being was God's image which was revealed already when God created these creatures. The sacrifice for the other was part of God's image. 'Man will not live until he loves, giving himself away to another on his own level' ( Matthews: 213; Kidner 1967: 65 )

In obedience to God's image, they had to fill the earth with God's image. Verse 28 of Genesis states, 'God blessed them and said to them: "be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground"'. This command of God to people is that they should take God's image and make this world the society of God's image through the human life-giving spirit.

The authority of man and woman to rule over the other creatures is conferred on them by God when they fulfil the image of God. As they become the life-giving spirit and express God's attributes, their domination over the other creatures would be rightly completed. If they fail to take rightly the image of God, even in the family, a distortion in this ruling relationship would begin. Although the first man become the bodily nature, the second man, Jesus Christ, become the life-giving spirit.

### **5.2.2.3. Redemption and the sacrificing God**

#### **A. Incarnation of God**

If we recap, all things were made through the Word. All things have their existential ground in the Word's creative power: 'Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made' ( John 1: 3 ). We must link this to John 1:14 ( Morris 1995: 67). When we link this verse to verse 14, the creation was God's self-giving action. Morris ( : 70 ) said that 'the self-communication of God occurs first of all in creation, and that is why creation and salvation are very closely connected in the New Testament. Both of them have to do with God's self communication' This self-communication of God is accomplished perfectly in the Incarnation.

Therefore, Barrett ( 1978: 61 ) said that 'the term Logos is seen to describe God in the process of self-communication--not the communication of knowledge only, but in a self-communication which inevitably includes the imparting of true knowledge.' In other words, the knowledge that the Word brings is not merely information. It is life ( Morris : 67 ). So all things have their life in the life of the Word. Without the life of the Word there is no life for anything. What is the meaning of: 'In him was life'? A person's life comes from the self-giving of the Word.

Indeed, without his spoken word and gift of himself nothing was made. This gift of himself was the light of men. In other words, the self-giving of the Word is the light of men.

Without receiving the Word, no one can become a child of God. Without identification with the self-giving Word nobody can become a child of God. Children of God are not born of natural descent, of human decision or a physical father's will. But they are born of God, and God's will. But the will of God is in the Word-giving love of God.

How can men receive the Word of God? This receiving does not mean a physical receiving. That would be a satanic sacrifice. To receive the Word is to become the Holy Spirit centered person.

Therefore, Philippians 2:1-5 states: 'Your life in Christ makes you strong, and his love comforts you. You have fellowship with the Spirit, and you have kindness and compassion for one another. I urge you, then, to make me completely happy by having the same thoughts, sharing the same love, and being one in soul and mind. Don't do anything from selfish ambition or from a cheap desire to boast, but be humble towards one another, always considering others better than yourselves. And look out for one another's interests, not just for your own. The attitude you should have is the one that Christ Jesus had.'

In Jesus, God's action was not just sending any more, but becoming, identifying with human beings. God became a human being. The Word became flesh. So Jesus' personality and the life-giving love of humanity are never separated.

The incarnated Word produced the total identification of the self-giving of God with the self-giving of men. The Incarnation is the perfect accomplishment of God's will in the body; it is the embodiment of God's will. The Incarnation brought the reality of salvation, that was in the trinity, to the world of human beings.

In brief, the Incarnation of God was the climax of God's self-giving divinity. The real leadership and priority of God are found not in his almightiness as classical theology confessed, but in his whole action of incarnation and suffering and crucifixion. This divine paradigmatic incarnation in the flesh of man is the core of God's redemptive history. .

## **B. Suffering and crucifixion of the Son of God**

God's own life is 'shorthand for the significance of the death of Jesus Christ for the being of God' (Inbody 1997: 168). The divine life has absorbed the death of Jesus into itself (:169).

The real suffering and death of Jesus must be to bring about the divine paradigm that is revealed in the Trinity and through that which God created. This divinity of God is not a metaphysical concept of the character of God.

In order to embody the paradigm that God created man, Jesus must perfectly express two natures. This is Jesus' uniqueness. The true God can show true divinity, but true man can receive the divinity.

The death of Jesus epitomizes the essential suffering of God for his creatures. In Trinitarian terms, not only can the individual Father, Son, and Holy Spirit not exist without communion with one another, but also in relationship with the world God revealed himself through the death of Jesus.

All relationships, in Trinitarian terms, are validated by Jesus' suffering and death. In Jesus' suffering and death God revealed the secret of his divinity. The concept of deity in a pagan religion could not include this trinitarian secret. Therefore we must differentiate between the concept of deity of the Pagan God and the concept of divinity of the God of Christianity. *The deity of God becomes the divinity of God through God's life-giving action in Jesus.*

Jesus' action was a total paradigm shift from the old to the new, from the this worldly-life centrism to a life-giving spirit. He became not a self-centric being but a 'life-giving' 'Spirit'. With Jesus, even dying became a blessing for man. The dying became a blessing

enabling the believers to be witnesses of Christ. The dying became God's blessing that makes the believers' Christ-like function possible.

Jesus is the bearer of God's self-giving paradigm. Jesus is the bringer of the self-giving paradigm. Jesus is the giver of the Trinitarian life-style. This unique paradigm of humanity and divinity was initiated by Jesus Christ. His crucifixion is the core of the life-giving paradigm, the means by which his personality and this paradigm are united. The life-giving paradigm expresses the uniqueness of Christianity. Christianity's uniqueness is that salvation and Christian life have the same meaning. In this life-giving spirit, faith and a Jesus-like life have the same meaning.

In Jesus' suffering and crucifixion God showed his divinity to his people in order that they might know how they should live in this world. Thus the death of God is not just for the liberation or emancipation of humanity, but for the divinity itself that was revealed in the Trinity and creation. In other words, the divinity that God brought to this world is suffering for the other and dying for the other. God's redemptive action incarnated this paradigm into this world.

According to Hauerwas (1986: 48 ), Jesus' death is not just an accidental death but the necessary outcome of his life and of his mission. Certainly, the death of Jesus is of decisive significance, not because it alone wrought salvation for us, but because it was the end, and fulfilment of his life (: 48).

The life-giving love was the means to real human life through creation and redemption. In this sense, creation and redemption do not have different principles. In the life-giving Spirit, the principles of creation and redemption will be unified with each other; in other words, no different principle exists.

The suffering of God and the sacrifice of God in the triune being constitute the essential divine character, the character of creation, the character of redemption and even of the

resurrection. This self-giving paradigm of God runs through creation and redemption and the resurrection as the reality of salvation. The first Adam was the living being, the self, but the last Adam was the life-giving spirit, the subject, who gave his life for the other. This led directly to the resurrection.

This life-giving spirit was the power that was able to bring about the resurrection. Actually the resurrected Jesus or exalted Jesus was distinguished from the glory of God in some early Christian traditions (Dunn 1996 : 99 ). Luke shows us this fact in Acts 7 :55. According to these traditions ‘we are not yet developed into the christological reflection’ ( : 99) of the later traditions. ‘As in the echo of Isaiah 52: 13 in Acts 3: 13, the thought is still the basic one of the suffering Jesus having been vindicated by God’ ( : 99).

Furthermore, life-giving love will continue to be the believer’s eternal life style. In John 19:13 Jesus is called the “Word of God” ( John 19: 13 ); and the *skene* of God is said to be with men ( Revelation 21: 3 ), according to John 1:14 (Barrett 1978: 62). In both books, Christ is the Lamb of God. In both, Christ has come to glory through suffering; he summons the thirsty ( Rev. 22: 17; John 7:37), and bids men keep his words or commands ( Rev. 3: 8,10; 12:17; 14:12;22:7,9; John 8: 51f; 14:15,21,23f; 15:10,20 ).

In his letter John writes, ‘Dear friends, I am not writing you a new command but an old one, which you have had since the beginning. The old command is the message you have had’ (1 John 2: 7). Actually this command has continued from the foundation of the world. We can understand the paradigmatic life-style of the new heaven and earth not in terms of the perfection of the immortal soul nor of the individual self-sufficiency but in terms of the life-giving spirit.

Therefore, Christ’s action is not a creative act of liberation for humanity. It is a representative act of the original paradigm of creation that God has given. Christ’s action was rather a total revelation of the original paradigm of creation. Christ’s action revealed, or more correctly, embodied, the divinity that God intended for his creation being

incarnated into it so that the divinity comes true through dying for *The Other* and *the other*, or through giving up the this-worldly life paradigm.

The real enemy of humanity is not natural death itself but the desperate fear of death, the fear of losing the self, the power of death ( Hebrews 2: 14-15). This fear of death is another expression of the self-life centrism of humanity.

Thus, God revealed to his people that they must suffer and die for the other in order to unify the *pathos* of God with the *sympatheia* of man. Jesus' death revealed the original essence of death in creation, the original meaning of the human being's life. Dietrich Bonhoeffer ( 1971: 360f ) expresses it thus:

God lets himself be pushed out of the world on the cross. He is weak and powerless in the world, and that is precisely the way, the only way, in which he is with us and helps us. Matt. 8.17 makes it quite clear that Christ helps us, not because of his omnipotence, but because of his weakness and suffering ..... Only the suffering of God can help.... That is a reversal of what the religious man expects from God. Man is summoned to share in God's sufferings at the hands of a godless world.

To Bonhoeffer, suffering is clearly an essential part of the believer. This Christ-centric life of human beings has been ignored in some Christian traditions. The reason for this is that from ancient times men have had a prejudiced world-view steeped in *self-life centrism*.

When *the self-life centrism* became the essence of humanity, the desperate spiritual death united with the death of the body. The physical dying becomes the death that is identified with spiritual death. In this way, Jesus became a superstitious idol for the benefit of humanity.

Frequently we embrace the fallacious hypothesis that our salvation gives human beings freedom from suffering and death. This mistake came from the this-worldly life centrism, the desperate fear of death. In this spiritual fear of death, men could not recognize dying, the weakness of humanity, and fragility as an essential part of themselves. Yet even though the this-worldly life paradigm created a completely false understanding of God's love and of Jesus' action, God ceaselessly shows us the real life that humans should live.

Indeed, Jesus' action destroyed the this-worldly life paradigm, the demonic power. He brought the new way, strictly speaking, the original way of life. In this new way there are no principles of law, no mortal fear of God's judgement. Jesus brought the 'love' described in 1 John 4:18, 'There is no fear in love, but perfect love drives out fear'. 'In the death of Christ on the cross one sees at once the destructive freedom of the human race in the face of the divine, and a representation of exactly the message of the divine for the human, namely, that human selflessness, self-abnegation, and the embrace of failure and death are the way in which the world can be saved from and for itself' ( Lakeland 1997: 109 ).

God's sufferings destroyed all hierarchical dualism between heaven and earth, life and death. God's suffering made people humble. The salvation of humanity and of the whole of creation is by the mercy and compassion of God. In Jesus the power of hell and the demon was destroyed. God never wanted to exclude anyone from salvation and his grace. We should overcome the power of hell by dwelling in God's suffering and mercy. Who has created dualism, exclusion, separation, and division? Only human beings, themselves.

God is not just a metaphysical object since human beings can know him through language. God is actor as well as knower. This action of God in the Trinity is seen in his creation and his redemption as the Son of God. He did not only act as God who is unique and distinct from human beings. He also revealed his character and attitudes to human beings so that they would be able to know the image of God. God created the world as a revelation of '*free self-withdrawal and self-giving for the benefit of other creatures*' as

‘the condition of the psyche and the community’. ( Welker 1994 : 248 ). Therefore, Jesus is not only the unique Messiah, Christ, but also the expression of the soteriological aim.

### **3.6. Summary**

We investigated the foundation of Christian ethics. The kingdom of God that Jesus proclaimed closely relates to the repentance and new life of the believers. Those who were called to the kingdom of God must be disciples. Jesus has called them to follow him, because Jesus himself identified with the kingdom of God. Therefore, to live in the kingdom of God is to become the image of Christ, the Christ-like person. All Christian ethical dimensions are connected to Christ. Christ is the origin of Christian ethics. He is the model of Christian ethics. He is the aim of Christian ethics.

As we contemplated in this chapter, the Holy Spirit accomplishes the Christ-like life in the human self. The Holy Spirit uses our wisdom and reason but he himself renders our human self into the Christ-like person.

We found that the Christ-like ethics that the Holy Spirit brings is the life-giving love or life-giving dying and living with Christ. We based this on the doctrines of the Trinity, creation and redemption.

## **Chapter 4. Christian ethics in the modern and postmodern world**

Thus far, we have seen that the modern and postmodern thoughts and ethics were founded on self-life centrism. We also found that the life-giving love was an important point in the doctrines of the Trinity, creation and redemption. Now we are going to apply this life-giving love in the modern and postmodern context.

### **4.1. Rediscovering the pneumatological context in the modern and postmodern world**

In order to apply the life-giving love in the modern and postmodern world, it is necessary to disclose the real context that Christians should live in, because when Christians know the context that they should live in, they can apply ethics to the concrete context with moral conviction, without, however, returning to moral totalization.

Modernism always uses the reason as a universal tool to make rules of morality. In modernism the self was the subject of ethics. Postmodernism took away this universality of morality and set the self and the other free from it. It brought an ethic of uncertainty. Bauman ( 1994: 17) described the postmodern uncertainty in his book, *Postmodern ethics*.

In postmodern life all codes of conduct and guidelines are removed from our real selves ( :19). Here we are indeed 'ourselves', and thus we alone are responsible for our deeds. The postmodern moral self takes away a unique form of authority. Therefore, the postmodern self feels helpless. Postmodern times not only offer to us perfect freedom of moral choices but also cast us into a state of moral uncertainty ( :21). Postmodern ethics still remain foxed in this-worldly human self-centrism. In this self-centrism there exists moral uncertainty. But in the previous chapter we disclosed that the Holy Spirit is the real

subject of the human self. In the Holy Spirit there is no moral uncertainty but moral conviction and confidence. We should have moral conviction in the Holy Spirit.

On the context that Christians should live in, Welker ( see 1994:134-141) takes a different perspective from modern and postmodern methodologies.

According to him, 'Heaven' cannot be recognized by modern and postmodern methodologies without the Holy Spirit. Heaven does not belong to this world. But modern and postmodern methodologies come from human reason or the human self which do belong to this world. Therefore modern and postmodern methodologies cannot understand the concept of heaven. And the salvation and ethics that the Holy Spirit brings cannot be understood by modern and postmodern methodologies, because these modern and postmodern methodologies were constituted on human self-centrism. Such methodologies were established on the reason which was based in turn on the human self.

Yet, with the increase of the secular spirit in our times, we endanger ourselves by vacating the realm of the Holy Spirit ( McIntyre1997: 72-73). The reason why in modern and postmodern times we have vacated the realm of the Holy Spirit is to be found in the illusion of modern and postmodern world views. The illusion of modern and postmodern Christianity is that the salvation of Jesus can be found in critical, sociological, political, ideological, and literary methodologies which belong to this-worldly self-centrism.

To understand our salvation and moral conviction we must withdraw from the modern and postmodern methodologies which were based on human reason. This does not mean that we must reject all rational thinking. What we must think is that the nature or the content of our salvation cannot be identified with human rights and human freedoms which human methodologies have developed.

To sum up, we can speak of the *pneumatological context* that the Christian should live in. As mentioned above, early Christians were totally dominated by the domain of heaven.

Early Christians were dominated by the Holy Spirit. They lived in a *pneumatological context* that was very different from the modern social and political context, and the postmodern deconstructed plural context (: 71 ). In other words, early Christians lived in a *pneumatological context* that was very different from the social context which resulted from *self-centrism*.

We should try, therefore, to rediscover the *pneumatological context* experienced before the emergence of the modern and postmodern *self paradigm* which brought about the false representation of the secular world in which we live and the danger of trivialising the dimensions of life in the Spirit (: 73).

In this modern and postmodern self-paradigm the Holy Spirit is the context that the believers should live in. When we live in the pneumatological context, we can have moral conviction and apply the Christian ethic to the modern and postmodern world.

#### **4.2. From the self-centrism of modernism to Christ-centrism**

We found that modern ethics were established on self-centrism. Self-centrism connotes *the self-centrism of the self* which dominated the thinking of modernism.

*The self-centrism of the human self* never lets the other become the self, because the self always returns to the self. The self-centric self, therefore, generates the modern totalization and rationalism. Self-centrism leads the Church and Christians to be oppressors, conquerors and colonizers.

As we observed in chapter 2, self-sufficiency, self-reference and self-producing are the language of self-centrism. In the *self-centric spirit*, 'the community and the world lose all foreignness for the "I," which recognizes its own structures of life and knowledge' in

'real, material processes of producing self and of becoming thematic to self' ( Welker 1994: 292 ).

The *self-centrism* of humanity can also be characterized as a matter of the quantitative and visible realm rather than the qualitative and spiritual realm. This self-centrism cannot understand the qualitative and spiritual realm of reality beyond quantitative and visible methodology ( Johnson 1996: 140). It cannot recognize spiritual forces and realities beyond the ken of strict historical, social or linguistic method ( : 140).

Therefore it follows that *self-centrism* brings about separation between *knowing about the truth of faith* which belongs to the self and society, and *the doing of the truth* which is realized only in 'something other than self-generation, self-attestation, perception of itself' ( Welker: 295 ).

Therefore *self-centrism* has brought tension between Jesus' vicarious atonement and human participation in salvation. In other words, in self-centrism we cannot establish the individual's Christ-like ethics without sacrificing the uniqueness of Christ, because self-centrism innately brings separation between the giver and the receiver of life which represent both sides of humanity.

When the believers live with the other in Christ, we can overcome this self-centrism. In 1 Corinthians 3: 21-23 we read, 'So then, no more boasting about men! All things are yours. Whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas or the world or life and death or the present or the future--all are yours. And you are of Christ, and Christ is of God'. In Christianity there should be no more dualism and distinction. All things are the believer's and believers are of Christ, and Christ is of God.

In Ephesians 1:7-10 we read, 'In him we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, in accordance with the riches of God's grace that he lavished on us with all wisdom and understanding. And he made known to us the mystery of his will

according to his good pleasure, which he purposed in Christ, to be put into effect when times will have reached their fulfilment--to bring all things in heaven and on earth together under one head, even Christ'. Jesus' life and his sacrifice destroyed all barriers, all distinctions and brought all things under one head, Christ. Therefore, believers willingly desire to be Christ-like in relation to the other. In connection with the other, the soteriological commitment becomes real. God reveals himself not through human self-knowledge, but in the suffering of/for the other. In this human suffering, the giving up of the this-worldly paradigm is the necessary element in salvation.

This is the analogy of the life of Jesus. Jesus said this about his life: 'Just as the living Father sent me and I live *because of* the Father, so the one who feeds on me will live *because of* me' ( John 6 : 57 ). Jesus lives *because of* the Father. Also we, believers, live *because of* Jesus who has eternal life *because of* the Father. Furthermore, that the self's life will live *because of* the other is an analogy of the truth that the one who feeds on Jesus will live *because of* Jesus. We, as self, do not merit the righteousness and the life, because we can live only *because of* Jesus. Thus our life is our imitation of the Christ-life. Eating the flesh of Jesus and drinking the blood of Jesus means two things. First, our life is dependent on Jesus; second, we should live for Jesus as he lived for God ( Morris 1995: 336 ). To eat the flesh of Jesus and to drink the blood of Jesus is to receive life from Jesus, and at the same time to give our life for the other. This dependence on Jesus shows us that our ontological life of the self is inseparable from the life for the other.

In the beginning, man first needed the fruit of the life, the Divine Other. Therefore, in the beginning the grace of God was absolutely needed for Adam's life. 'I' is not the subject as the observer of the world, but the object as observed by God. 'I' cannot observe the world from my perspective but 'I' can be observed from the other's perspective. 'The gaze of the other, indeed, is that which confirms me in my personhood' ( Lakeland 1997: 110). More clearly, 'I' was created by the Wholly Other', God's self-giving in creation rather than that 'I' created myself. In other words, we are created by God. According to Lewis B. Smedes ( 1970 : 161 ) we can share in the life of Christ; however, this shared divine life is the life

that we can live *because of* Jesus as the representative of the other. 'I am dependent on the other, as the other is dependent on me'( Lakeland: 110).

To sum up, we must change the paradigm from the ethics of the self to the Christ-like ethics. The believers must become Christ-like and move away from self-centrism.

#### **4.2.1 From reason to Incarnation**

In order to overcome hierarchical theocracy, modernism promoted rationalism. In modernity, 'the abstract rationalism dominated, when reified, violates the axioms of determinancy, concreteness, change, and relativity' ( Williams 1995: 82 ). According to Zygmunt Bauman ( 1994: 8 ), 'modern ethical thought, in co-operation with modern legislative practice, fought its way through to such a radical solution under the twin banners of *universality* and *foundation*'. This modern rationalism generated the universal norms. This road of rationalism comes from division of the body and the spirit.

In modern Christianity, by rationalism the body was divorced from the spirit. In this modernism, God had to remain in the spiritual private area. In public, humans were autonomous and absolute with a monolithic power of reason. In public life Christians embraced capitalism and individualism which could not connect with Jesus' way, with God's way.

##### **4.2.1.1. Rationalism and Incarnation**

John Hick( 1995: 100) criticised the old paradigm of incarnation based on premodern theocracy and modern universal rationalism as follows:

Their causes lie in human greed, selfishness, acquisitiveness, cruelty and prejudice. But the incarnation doctrine has been readily available to justify those evils. In theory it would have been possible for christians to believe that

Jesus was God incarnate and yet not to have felt justified in persecuting and murdering Jesus; not to have used the lordship of Christ to justify colonial annexations in India, Africa, North and South America, the Pacific Islands and elsewhere; and not to have used christianity to reinforce and validate male domination. If centuries of christian influence had sufficiently modified our human greed, acquisitiveness and propensity to cruelty, the absoluteness of Christ could not have operated to justify ruthless aggression and persecution. But in fact human savagery has too often found christian dogma tailored for its own self-justification. And this entire situation, consisting in the combination of an absolute claim together with a moral powerlessness which belies that claim, adds to the problematic character of the traditional dogma.

Although modernism took away the premodern hierarchical theocracy, it still remains locked in self-centrism. Rationalism based on self-centrism becomes an instrument for the oppressor. Even the dogma of incarnation was influenced by modern rationalism. At that time the incarnated God was thought of as a perfect man as we saw in Schleiermacher. But the Incarnation is not just a movement from a hierarchical God to perfect man; rather it is the self-expression of the life-giving God.

The life-giving love will be accomplished not by modern rational life but by the incarnational life of the human self. Only by life-giving love can we overcome global oppression. The global community will be built beyond colonization through God's Incarnation and sacrifice in Jesus, and man's sacrifice. Indeed, by the life-giving love expressed in God's Incarnation we can overcome the premodern hierarchical theocracy and modern colonization. As John Hick said, they come from the greed and selfishness of the human self. The global community based on the life-giving love ushers in a totally changed era in terms of overcoming the old dualism of the classical and the modern world which was based on greed and selfishness of the human self.

Furthermore, the aim of Incarnation is not only the salvation of the individual but also the glorification of God through production of his image in the human self. This means that the aim of God's Incarnation is the recovering of humanity for God's glorification due to the very connection between human life and his glorification. So God's purpose in his action is the translation of his essential love for the whole of humanity. The true humanity that God intended is the humanity that will be accomplished in the practice of the life-giving love. This life-giving love cannot be involved in the greed of the self. This life-giving love is not involved in colonization. Rather it is involved in the service of the other. But since this life giving love does not involve the self's own dignity as Kant pursued, there is no impediment to serving the other.

Modernity ascribes high authority to scientific study and considers any deviation from rational inquiry unthinkable. Such scientific and rational thinking always identified God's image of humanity with the dignity of the self. This type of modern thinking influenced the interpretation of the Bible. When biblical interpreters insist on rational, scientific explanations of biblical events, or when they defy traditional interpretations in the name of free scholarly inquiry, they show a debt to modernity ( Adam 1995: 3 ). Adam ( : 29 ) describes how modernity has used the above paradigms: 'The simplest way to construct identity involves drawing an absolute and simple distinction (what structuralists call a "binary opposition"): male/female, animate/inanimate, white/black, truth/falsehood, original/copy, center/margin, objectivity/subjectivity.' Modern rationalism, therefore, is not able to understand the life-giving love that humanity can accomplish in the Holy Spirit. Without the Incarnation of God, no person can escape from the dualistic world-view that distinguishes between this world and the other world, and differentiates between man and woman, and white and black.

Since modernism has such an evil character, people start to doubt the modern idea. Therefore, according to Adam ( :3 ), 'Deconstructive thinkers note that these pairs always tend to favor one of the members; the first members tend to be defined as normal or normative, and the second members as not-the-first, or less-than-the-first.' This modern

idea underlies the framework of ruling. The illusion of a self who would like to unify with the other is really a projection of the self's overwhelming desire for his own life. This trend of modernism can be called an anti-Incarnational life of humanity. This modern character comes from fear of self-giving dying as in Peter's case. The 'Never Lord' myth totally controlled the modern self. The Incarnation, on the other hand, was the historical field where the material and spiritual, human and God, body and soul, master and slave, were able to meet. How can we continue the incarnation in our body? Through life-giving dying and living in the Holy Spirit we can overcome this dualism.

When we overcome the dualistic world, we can obtain salvation. The coming of the Holy Spirit has accomplished salvation, because the Holy Spirit dwells in everybody and overcomes dualism, "distinction" and "binary opposition". When we overcome self-centrism, there is Incarnation. When we overcome life-centrism there is Incarnation.

This Incarnation of God totally changes the paradigm from reason to sacrificial love. It is difficult for our human reason to understand why the self must serve the other. This incarnation brings the love of God to fulfilment everywhere and anywhere the believer practices. So this revelation of God in the concrete human self who willingly offers himself as living sacrifice is not limited to a particular region, race, language, or culture. Without the creaturely hypostasis of the Holy Spirit there is no visible revelation of God in everyday life.

Faith cannot be experienced by word of mouth alone. Rather, faith is in the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit in our human self in life-giving dying. In the embodiment of the Word in body and in obedience our verbal confession of faith is actualized.

As Graham Ward ( 1996 : 162) has said, the necessary thing in ethics is the *kenosis* before God through life-giving love.

#### **4.2.1.2. Beyond capitalism**

Modern capitalism and the scientific world-view are connected to each other. With modernity, a distinctive understanding of the nature of reality begins to emerge that is rooted, in part, in the conjunction of scientific method and capitalism.

The successes of science and capitalism are possible on the basis of the interpretation of reality as quantifiable. 'The twin engines that fuel an advanced industrial society, science and capitalism, though for different reasons, share a belief that *being* is reducible to quantity, that is, to thinghood' ( Farley 1995: 25). Therefore, in modern society, then, 'the dominant conceptions of market activity, capitalist production and bureaucratic administration exclude the feelings, relationships and commitments which are characteristic of familial, sexual and emotional life' (Poole 1991: 47). Actually modern materialism controls all aspects of the human being.

In the modern industrial society, what is real for the scientist is what is quantifiable and repeatable. By whatever strange coincidences that guide history, this methodological abstraction parallels almost exactly the moral requirements of capitalist industrialization. Reality is denuded of 'aesthetic and ethical dimensions as these are banished to the private, subjective, and "feminine" spheres. Cleansed of those features that would resist commodification, reality ( persons, creatures, cultural artifacts, ecosystems ) becomes both materially and morally passive' ( Farley: 25 ).

Also, the artificially created plasticity of modern capitalistic industrialism allows all beings to be transformed into whatever the industrial machine needs them to be. The flattening out of reality into members creates ideal conditions for its domination. 'The complexity of beings is rendered invisible so that they can be mastered by thought; the integrity and intrinsic spiritual value of beings is dismissed as mere sentiment, freeing us from the ethical resistance beings exert against their own domination' (: 25 ).

Even in Western religious circles, it is not sufficiently remarked on that 'the historical enlightenment and the rise of bourgeois individualism and immorality, and anti-religious

ethics, are profoundly linked to the rise of capitalism; and that it is in the nature of capitalism to reduce everything without exception to a single monetary framework' (Lowe 1993: 6).

This modern paradigm has aroused a reaction. In order to be most effective, ethical resistance must be mindful of its historical location at the end of modernity, in a post-industrial, capitalist and moral wasteland. The deadly modern paradigm must be overcome. This reaction to modernism was an effort to recover the moral and ethical paradigm. Therefore Farley (:24) says, 'Reflection on this historical context .....should include also a more overtly ethical one that examines the ways in which the very categories of ethical and religious existence are debased by our society.'

Christians must recover the ethics proclaimed by the Bible. Capitalism has created the idea of noble and base cultures. Noble cultures supposedly had noble ethics. This noble ethic of capitalism is very different from Jesus' message and action. Jesus does not require a high ethical standard. If he had sought this, he could have maintained a friendship with the noble class which kept the law and socio-economic power. But instead of moral exclusivism, he expressed compassion, mercy, and sympathy towards everybody.

Furthermore, Jesus Christ never sought power for himself. In his compassionate mission, God never responded to him by sending strong powers to support him. Instead of this, Jesus had to feel isolation and loneliness. To be compassionate towards another is to lose yourself, to be compassionate is to embrace nothingness. This nothingness is not nihilism but a feeling of total dependence on God, without any desire for power of one's own. So compassion and love and self-sacrifice are directly connected with the feeling of total dependence on God.

The ideal nature of society is compassionate. Indeed there are no noble cultures and base cultures in civilization itself, for every culture and society has its characteristic value and

purpose. Civilization is not the real purpose of society. In civilized society there exists a differentiation between material and spiritual.

Christianity moves ceaselessly towards a compassionate society. We should shift the paradigm from civilization and economic improvement to a compassionate and sympathetic society. Jesus Christ is not the saviour who is concerned with this human position of civilization; he is ceaselessly compassionate. Accordingly, salvation is the ceaseless forming of a compassionate community.

When seeking to overcome the modern paradigm, we should not restore the modern idea of ethics based on capitalism. We need Christ-centric ethics. Even in capitalism we should accomplish the life-giving love of humanity. Sometimes civilization in capitalism destroys the pneumatological context that the Christian should live in. Sometimes its unlimited growth and expansion and conquest alienates life-giving love from society and even from the Church ( Rasmusson 1995: 123-4 ). As we found, this trend of modern capitalism comes from self's life-centrism.

The human self's desire for his own well-being creates the real death, and distances humans from God who is the divine source of love and compassion. On the contrary, in our original state, life-giving love ensures a good relationship with God. Thus the life-giving love as well as infinite compassion might be able to save modern society from the false ethics of civilization and false illusions of divinity.

Through limitless compassion, human beings are capable of unification with God who is incomprehensible love and compassion. From this love and compassion, human beings may acknowledge God as their real friend and meet Him. Jesus Christ has walked the way of human nature and then proceeded to meet God through the doorway of life-giving love.

Yet, in fact, while he lived in endless compassion, he was meeting with God already. Indeed, his action of healing the diseased, the blind, and the lame, was the action of

healing a society accustomed to death, a society that marginalized some people with diseases and physical and spiritual flaws.

In this world, materialism has always been correlated with the ungodly and the non-Holy Spirit. Materialism has never been neutral but has always been strongly connected to the self-life centric spirit.

In the thinking of modern times, the Spirit could not bring holiness to human society;. human society was ruled by process and utopian ideals. Human beings, having reason, were the owners of nature. In modern times the human materialistic spirit replaced the Holy Spirit.

Griffin ( 1988 : 4 ) defines modern spirituality as follows:

Modern spirituality is also distinguished from previous modes of human existence through its relation to divinity or holiness. The divine reality for the Middle Ages was both transcendent and immanent. Protestantism moved away from divine immanence and toward pure transcendence--for example, by reducing the number of sacraments, by rejecting icons, saints, and post-Biblical miracles, and by rejecting infused grace in favor of imputed justification. Early modern theological scientists (including Catholics such as Mersenne and Descartes as well as Protestants such as Boyle and Newton) carried this tendency to an extreme, so that God was wholly outside the world. The mechanistic picture of nature, basic to the mind-and-nature dualism mentioned above, was a denial of divine immanence in nature. But any natural immanence of God in the human mind was also denied, mainly through the 'sensationist' doctrine of experience, according to which nothing can be present in the mind except what enters through the physical senses.

Modern spirituality was identified with materiality without the immanence of God rather than with the Holy Spirit who dwelt in the human person. Actually in modern times the Spirit could not be the subject of the creation and redemption. The modern God was the giver of prosperity to humans, so that in modern times, the spiritual dimension of salvation was ignored by materialistic minds.

For Griffin, modern spirituality 'can also be discussed in terms of a new attitude toward self-interest in relation to morality. ....One of the unique features of modern spirituality is that it has come to regard self-interest as an acceptable basis for at least one dimension of life, that is, the economic dimension' (: 6 ). Therefore, '[modern] society that is dominated by individual, national, economic, and cultural forms of egoism' could not develop spirituality ( Welker 1994: 2 ).

Total dualism existed because reason could not accept the Spirit who could make people in God's image. 'The modern world has lost God and is seeking him.' This is the judgement passed by the mathematician, natural scientist, and philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead (: 4). They have lost the Holy Spirit, however, they still continue the useless efforts to find God as 'an enterprise' (:5 ). This is their judgement. 'Today in many cultures common sense simply has difficulty reciprocating the friendship of the Holy Spirit (: 6). And their 'suspicion of so-called common sense that the Holy Spirit is a phantom is strengthened by theologies and religious attitudes that emphasize the abstract transcendence and otherworldliness, the naked supernaturalness, or the mysterious and numinous character of the Holy Spirit' (: 6 ). This was the spirituality of modern normal society. Modernism, at the last, pursued the anti-spiritual life that does not relate to the Holy Spirit.

But Jesus had a very different lifestyle from 'normal' society, because he had a very different idea of life from the normal religious economic and political point of view. Jesus lived in the Holy Spirit. In other words, Jesus' lifestyle reflected the Spirit-centered paradigm which contrasted with his society.

In the Holy Spirit Jesus overcame temptation as the Servant Son and proclaims the Gospel in the isolated region of Galilee. In this way Jesus accomplished his work only in the Holy Spirit.

Therefore, the Christian life should be directed not towards materialism but towards spirituality in the *pneumatological context*. This spirituality becomes embodied and socialized in the neighbour who reflects the total image of God. If we do not live the Spirit-centered life, normal society, that is, the family, the economic system and the political system shrink into the ego and materialism.

We human beings are immeasurable beings connected with the incomprehensible God who reflects himself in an uncountable dimension that is incapable of the objectifying knowledge that modernism has attained. So if we draw human nature in one dimension of egocentric materialism or capitalism, it is a totally distorted image of human nature, and out of keeping with the image of God.

This egocentrism of modernism is the extreme evil and it distorts the nature of everything. Salvation is freedom from this egocentrism. It is clear that in all historical situations the structures and power hegemonies have expressed the multiple faces of egocentrism. When we see that which is strange as non-human because of our egocentrism, the concept of non-humanity as externally strange dominates all human interrelationships. When we see other people as the outsiders, egocentrism appears in inter-human relationships. This means that, if we see the other as alien, we will stumble over egocentrism and sin.

Today's economic and political system is correlated with this egocentrism. Jesus Christ definitely counters this political and economic system, not in terms of sociological and political revolution, but in terms of the life-giving love. Jesus brought the Holy Spirit to dominate society.

Thus Jesus reflects a completely negative response to the worldly power that made humans serve this world. In Jesus' action we see that Jesus would like to oppose this worldly system and yet, at the same time, he would not like to abandon this world.

The Christians are already freed from this economic and political system and materialism. This does not mean that they have denied this world. This means, rather, that they live in this world according to the Holy Spirit. This is perfect freedom from materialism.

Sometimes the people of God should resist the power of politics that is strongly connected with human wellbeing, and egocentricity. Yet sometimes, politics does bring about justice for other human beings because human beings belong to the power of this world. Our life-giving love has a political dimension because it must resist any evil power that works in people.

As we mentioned in 4.2.1 'From reason to incarnation', Western worshippers have reached a spiritless vacuum. Humankind is caught in a profound spiritual crisis which makes it very difficult to satisfy human spiritual needs for growth. The awareness of transcendence as an energizing force has largely disappeared from the consciousness of millions of thing-worshipping people in western cultures. This has left human beings in a flat, boring, two-dimensional world of materialism with little transcendence or awareness of meaning ( Clinebell 1988: 28 ). This transcendence comes true through life-giving pneuma rather than through prosperity.

#### **4.2.1.3. Beyond individualism**

Modernity established its system on the concept of the self. According to Georg Simmel ( 1971 : 223 ), 'all relations with others are thus ultimately mere stations along the road by which the ego arrives at its self.' This is true whether the ego feels itself to be basically identical to these others because it still needs this supporting conviction as it stands alone upon itself and its own powers, or whether it is strong enough to bear the loneliness of its

own quality, the multitude being there only so that each individual can use the others as a measure of his incomparability and the individuality of his world ( :223).

The egoism (not ego itself) of 'I', individualism, reproduces the dichotomy or dualism of 'you' and 'me' to be personalized globally and even to a cosmic extent. Also, 'the decay of Christian society in the West--in continuation of the process of individualization that began with the Reformation--has allowed the individual to become an ultimately indissoluble mystery to others' ( Gadamer 1976: 98).

In contrast to modern individualism, Jesus never separated the individual from the social. The life-giving spirit of humanity definitely put the individual self in emperichoresis with the other. Therefore when Jesus healed the individual body, he was healing the social and political body also by making society accept the isolated. Through his healing action, he produced a holy community that harmonized the individual body and the social body, and included nature. In other words, the crucified Jesus never accomplished redemption for Christians in the sense of any spiritualization or individualization of salvation ( Moltmann 1974: 101).

Jesus destroyed the this-worldly power which had brought death into this world through the human desire to be individualistic, and then he replaced divided society with holy community that harmonized all races, genders, classes. Thus reconciliation and compassion towards the other is the salvific ethics of Jesus. Hauerwas ( 1986 : 50 ) describes our salvific ethics in Jesus Christ thus;

The power that comes from trusting in truth is but a correlative of our learning through Jesus to accept our life as a gift. In Jesus we have met the one who has the authority and power to forgive our fevered search to gain security through deception, coercion, and violence. To learn to follow Jesus means we must learn to accept such forgiveness, and it is no easy thing to accept, as acceptance requires recognition of our sin as well as vulnerability. But by

learning to be forgiven we are enabled to view other lives not as threats but as gifts. Thus in contrast to all societies built on shared resentments and fears, Christian community is formed by a story that enables its members to trust the otherness of the other as the very sign of the forgiving character of God's kingdom.

Hauerwas ( : 49 ) also said that to be a disciple is to be part of a new community, a new polity, which is formed on Jesus' obedience to the cross. The gospels are not just the depiction of a man, they are manuals for the training necessary to be part of the new community.

In this new community the believers take the new paradigm of self-giving for the other. Therefore, Jesus commands us to give up everything that we have. Jesus said 'Any of you who does not give up everything he has cannot be my disciple' ( Luke 14:33 ). By giving up everything he becomes closely connected to the spiritually changed mind of life-giving love. They can make use of the material sometimes for the other and at other times they can give up everything they have for God's sake. This really means becoming the righteous people of God by faith and not by law. Because faith means that Christians trust in God rather than in anything they have. The law belongs to the self-centric, for the rich young man did not give up everything he had, even though he had kept the law from his youth.

The law cannot give a human being the total self-denial that Jesus demonstrated. In other words, the law produces only religious hierarchy like that operative in Jesus' time. In such a society there is no grace, and no compassion and no mercy, no obedience, but only judgement. The Spirit alone can give us the power to live in a pneumatological context and with life-giving love.

No human being can be a spiritual being without the other. In the salvific action and Jesus-like love for the other, man becomes the Christ-like personality by the Holy Spirit.

Jesus is the mediator for the person who gives up his/her everything. Jesus brings the power of the Holy Spirit to him/her who gives up everything for a neighbour. So when we give up everything we have, we can feel the power of the Holy Spirit.

The people of God are therefore correlated with one another. Thus the openness to the other signifies the life of the individual human being. We can say that the openness to the other is life. This means that my possibility of life and my existence depend on the other. We need our neighbour in whom the Holy Spirit dwells. In the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and the *giving of life* for the other is the only way of overcoming the modern myth, individualism.

We can see God visually in our neighbour. We can approach the core of God's personality in our neighbors. We can experience the eternal love of God in life-giving love for the other. We can embrace the origin of humanity. My neighbour becomes part of me in the Holy Spirit. At such a time we can feel that we are the centre of the cosmos; and simultaneously, we are a necessary part of our neighbour.

This is the reality of the holy God-man community. In this community, my life relationship with God is deeply connected with my relationship with the other person and with my giving up of everything I have. In this way, my life relationship with God is connected with Jesus' mediation, his guiding of me to God and his giving of the Holy Spirit. This is the meaning of Christian freedom.

Christian freedom is a spiritual thing. God gave us his gifts to nourish us to live, not to luxuriate. Calvin ( Book ii.xix.9) also warns against abuse of Christian freedom to have a disregard for work. We should regard our neighbor's weakness. At this point our freedom has its limitations. We must use freedom for the love and edification of our neighbors. We have freedom but we must limit ourselves. Paul (I Cor. 10:23-24) says, 'All things are lawful to me, but not all things are helpful. All things are lawful, but not all things build up. Let no one seek his own good but another's.' We must use freedom according to love.

Likewise, my life depends on the other, my salvation and my life depend on Jesus as mediator. The believers are the receivers of life, peace and forgiveness and givers of life, peace and forgiveness so that they live for the other and they die to the self.

#### **4.2.2. Summary**

No premodern or modern concept--neither the metaphysical tradition of the concepts of God, nor Plato's brilliant defence of a World of Being beyond our own world of changing and becoming, nor Descartes's systematic doubts about our knowledge of the external world, nor the scepticism of Hume, nor Kant's transcendental ego as the timeless and universal self--could give us a definition of the Christ-like life expressed as a soteriological aim.

In modern times, philosophers tried to avoid the metaphysical, hierarchical theocracy, but they still belonged to these metaphysical traditions. Theology went along with this limitation of modern thought. Modernist theology emphasized the rational faith. In terms of this faith, theology understood Jesus to be the perfect modern ideological man as seen in Schleiermacher. ( Moltmann 1974 : 97).

Modern theology could not tolerate taking into account Jesus' abandonment by God to his death on the cross ( : 97 ) and could not accept that this abandonment is a believer's essential way to life, because modern theology cannot accept Jesus' weakness, owing to its rationalism and speculative idealism.

Moltmann questioned this modern Jesus and rightly brought the death of Jesus on the cross to the centre of theology. From the point of view of Jesus' death on the cross, Moltman himself answered Jesus' question 'Who do you say that I am?' In short, the answer implied a transition 'from life to death' ( : 105 ). Jesus recognized his personal identity in his death for the other.

We should follow Jesus. Jesus brought life-giving love. The life-giving love will cause a change into a new world that has never been experienced in the self-life centrism which dominated modern rationalism. This was the work of Jesus and is now the work of the Holy Spirit.

To sum up, the self-life centrism generated modern rationalism, capitalism and individualism. Even though modernity brought civilization, wealth and health, these gifts of modernity are not the essence of life for humanity. In the modern era what we should emphasize is the life-giving love.

#### **4.3. From 'the other' of postmodernism to Christ**

Levinas used the otherness of the other as the core concept of postmodern ethics. Therefore, we can reach the goal of this research to expose the lack of Christian ethics in postmodernism by critical evaluation of his opinion.

##### **( i ) The otherness of the other and the Incarnation**

Even though Levinas discovered the concept of the *otherness* of the other, his understanding raises some problems.

Levinas's philosophy starts from the heterogeneity between the individual self and the other. Levinas basically holds that the face-to-face dissymmetrical relationship, the heterogeneity, is prior to any homogeneous unity. For Levinas, *the other* is just a stranger. *The other* is an untouchable stranger, a stranger parallel with *me*. Therefore, Levinas's God in Incarnation encounters the other as a stranger who keeps his distance and does not identify with the other. In this case, God cannot be identified with man, not even by his death. If we follow Levinas, God's death is just inefficaciously his self-sacrifice for the

other. In the heterogeneity between the self and the other the self's suffering and sacrifice becomes a meaningless action for *the other*. Even Jesus' action becomes a meaningless action for the world ( Ford 1996: 37-38 ).

Therefore, Levinas ( Levinas 1981: 126) said that 'No one can substitute himself for me who substitutes myself for all.' Levinas's words rule out Jesus's vicarious death ( Ford: 33 ). But in biblical opinion God identified with his creature, men and women, by his Incarnation and death in Jesus. God's Incarnation and death, therefore, are the basis of the salvation for human beings, for creation.

Of course Levinas refers to the dying for the other. But Levinas understands Heidegger's concepts, *being-to-death*, without reducing it to a transcendental norm ( 1998: 209 ). According to Levinas, Heidegger approached 'being to death' as a human duty, as a transcendental norm. Levinas refuses Heidegger's term and uses a concept of 'dying for....', or 'dying for another' ( :214). Without encountering the faces of the other, without the death of the other signifying to the survivor more than funerary behaviour and emotions, and memories, the concept of 'being-to-death' is nothing but a transcendental norm. He also, therefore, uses 'dying together.' When he uses 'dying for,' 'dying together', Levinas is not concerned with 'dying for' for any other life or after-life. He is concerned with the human life in this world.

For Levinas, 'dying', whether it is the death of the other or my dying for the other, must give meaning to the self in this world as survivor. 'The priority of the other over the *I*, by which the human *being-there* is chosen and unique, is precisely the latter's response to the nakedness of the face and its mortality.' ( :217). Even though he says 'Dying for another' he is concerned with the self's response in claiming that I substitute myself for the other. Therefore, Levinas's dying cannot come to God's Incarnation that substitutes the other for the self. Only God's Incarnation that substitutes the other for the self can bring the eternal life that the human self cannot attain to by himself. God was incarnated and identified with humans in order to give eternal life.

( ii ) The responsibility for the other and the dying of Jesus for the other

Levinas' concept of responsibility definitely contains an ethical attitude. According to Levinas ( 1981 : 148 ), the ethical is the field outlined by 'the paradox of the Infinite in relationship with the finite'. Ethics is 'the breakup of the original unity of transcendental apperception'. For him, ethics violates the unity and divine salvation breaks all the unity as an eschatological event.

Ward ( : 161-62 ) explains Levinas's salvation in terms of eschatology, 'Hence, in time made continually possible only beyond time, there is an eschatology rather than a teleology. Eschatology because of the responsibility for an exteriority is more exterior than the neighbour or the world of nourishments'. For Levinas 'the unappeasable responsibility for the other' as an eschatological action of the self ( :163) is the essence of salvation. Levinas identified salvation with the relationship of responsibility for the other.

Levinas ( : 148 ) continues, 'Witnessed, and not thematized, in the sign given to the other, the Infinite signifies out of responsibility for the other, out of the-one-for-the-other, a subject supporting everything, subject to everything, that is, suffering for everyone, but charged with everything, without having had to decide for this taking charge, which is gloriously amplified in the measure that it is imposed. Obedience precedes any hearing of the command'. Thus in Levinas there is just a relationship of responsibility between the self and the other. His world is a formless and aimless relationship of the self with the other.

This is the postmodern paradigm ( Blanchot; Maurice; Løsstrup; M.M.Bakhtin; Cyörgy Lukas had a similiar world view). This is also a general weakness in postmodern deconstruction. Postmodern deconstruction claims that there are only two realities, the modern self and the postmodern 'the other'. In postmodernism the main theme is the endless encounter between the self and the other.

We agree that we should have responsibility for the other. Of course, salvation comprehends that the relationship between the self and *the other* has two kinds of destinations: the individual in individualism and community in communitarianism. In individualism, the freedom of *the other* as individual is the most important subject. In communitarianism, the individual must be responsible to *the other*. Furthermore, we agree that freedom and responsibility are important ethics. Levinas included the communitarian perspective in the relationship between the self and the other. Concerning the community and the relationship between the self and *the other* in this salvation, Tina Chanter ( 1995: 184 ), a feminist, holds, like Levinas, that the only access of the self to God, the salvation, the holistic, is through the face-to-face encounter with *the other*.

But neither fully express the meaning of salvation and its resultant ethics because they originate entirely from relationship between the self and the other. In Levinas such responsibility does not relate to God's goal beyond the relationship and responsibility for the other.

In order to prove our argument, we need to study the reason why responsibility for the other is emphasized in postmodern ethics.

It is clear that the uncritical celebration of the plurality of postmodernism, ironically harbours a dangerous anti-humanism. We can end up with 'a form of tribalism ( Derrida) in which differences are deified and where there is a failure to seek out commonalities and similarities' ( Reader 1994: 95).

Therefore, Bauman ( 1994 : 185 ) suggests that the responsibility of postmodernism may derive from commonalities or similarities.

Though ethically speaking, *being for* precedes *being with*, and the moment the self enters into interaction with the other it is already responsible for the other's weal and woe, the only space where the moral act can be performed is

the social space of 'being with', continually buffeted by the criss-crossing pressures of cognitive, aesthetic and moral spacings. In this space, the possibility to act on the promptings of moral responsibility must be *salvaged*, or *recovered*, or *made anew*; against odds--sometimes overwhelming odds--the responsibility must exchange its now invalidated or forgotten priority for the superiority over technical-instrumental calculations; a superiority grounded, as Vesttlen suggests, in the ongoing 'we-experience' without recognising the revelation of God as universal norms.

Postmodernism teaches us that we should consider responsibility towards others. This responsibility is a result of the postmodern search for the commonalities. The postmodern world has been emancipated from the modern universalism with its focus on uniformity. Therefore there exists only the autonomous individual. In this postmodern situation, there are no guarantees for safety. Therefore postmodernism claims responsibility to each other as security.

Postmodernists claim the responsibility for security of life of the self and the other as their commonality. The responsibility of postmodernism is for the life of the self as well as for the life of the other.

As we saw in the section, "'Never Lord' myth", the this-worldly life paradigm of the self is the centre of postmodernism. Even for Levinas, salvation is responsibility for the other based on the this-worldly life paradigm. The unlimited openness to *the other* and responsibility for *the other* based on the this-worldly life paradigm, ironically, suggest that God cannot thereby fully accomplish the salvation for the believers. Such salvation has no place in the this-worldly life paradigm. In other words, the this-worldly life paradigm always reduces the meaning of salvation to the relationship of responsibility between the self and the other.

Let us consider the words of Jesus who demands of his disciples to lose their lives *for my sake* ( Mat. 10: 39; Mark 8: 35; Luke 9: 24 ); the meaning of *for my sake* is not just for his personal self. Jesus demands that his disciples' bear the cross as the cost of fearless loyalty to his mission rather than to his physical person ( Filson 1960: 134). If Jesus' command had meant that the disciples must lose their lives for himself as a self, he never would have rebuked Peter. Therefore 'for the other' does not simply reflect a relationship of responsibility between the self and the other of Levinas.

Ward (: 162) argues that the salvation of Levinas is not personal integration, inner healing that has been accomplished through the reconciliation between the I and God. This salvation is not therefore the Protestant salvation. The salvation of Levinas is not union with Christ. And for Levinas 'there is no messianic figure of the grand deliverer' (: 166). For Levinas each person is the messiah for every other, only as an ethical agent (:166). Finally in Levinas there is no reference to the self who can live only by God who dwells in him. Levinas's salvation just enacts a pilgrimage from the non-ethical to the ethical (:163).

We should distinguish between the postmodern ethics that come from the responsibility for the other and the ethics that come from the uniqueness of Jesus' death for the other. The ethics that come from Christ go beyond responsibility for the other based on the concept that I substitute myself for the other.

The meaning of salvation and its ethics can be fully realised in both the relationship between *the self in Christ* and *Christ in the self*. Therefore, the substitution of the other for me cannot be separated from my substitution for the other ( Ford: 39) in the Incarnation of God. This relationship of 'in' Christ involves the changing of the personality.

Therefore Jüngel says that 'it is decisive for the self-understanding of Christian theology whether the story of Jesus Christ is conceived only ethically, as an example of *right human behaviour, only as exemplum*, or beyond and behind that, as a *history which effectively*

*changes the being of humanity, as a sacrament.*' ( Jüngel 1995: 169) The Christian must be transformed himself ( Gibb 1992: chapter 8, 10). This ontological change of the human self is the aim of the Incarnation of God.

Jesus demanded that his disciples bear the cross in order to accomplish not just the responsibility for the other but God's salvation. The salvation of the believers means that God dwells in the believers. God's goal is that he should dwell in us. In other words, divine life lives in me permanently. But this formation of the Christian self does not reduce the self of modernism. The Christian must transform to a Christ-like being. In this transformation of self in whom the other dwells we can understand why the believers are required to render the praise, thanks, confession and intercession that are complexly represented by the Psalms ( Ford: 39).

Therefore, the Christian ethic means expression of the life of Christ who dwells in the believers. Christian ethics are established on the salvation of God. Christian ethics must begin with Christ. Our messianic action, the Christ-like action, comes from only the unique Messiah Jesus Christ who dwells in us. It comes from God's Incarnation. Any ethics and salvation must originate from there.

In other words, Christ is the ground of Christian ethics ( Jüngel:154). Jüngel considered, for example, that the prayer that Christ commanded comprises a Christian ethic ( Ford: 40). Postmodern ethics, however, including Levinas, could not comprehend this ethical point. Even though Levinas's concept of prayer is that of "Prayer without Demand" (Levinas 1994:127ff), 'Levinas's giving exclusively ethical content to theological language is most extreme.' ( Ford: 40). For Levinas God is not 'You who can be identified with "me"' but "'He" who cannot substitute for me'. Therefore, For Levinas the imperative of prayer is based on the human ethical action that 'I' must petition in prayer rather than on what has already been done in Christ (: 40).

Without God's self-giving, all face-to-face relationships are 'formless' and 'empty darkness' (Genesis 1:2). Without Christ's life-giving love there are just formless ethical illusions. The postmodern ethic is a formless illusion because there is no purpose in an ethic without a goal.

Each person totally needs The Wholly Other's revelation in his self-giving. By this self-giving or life-giving paradigm we can understand fully the meaning of salvation and Christian ethics. By this self-giving or life-giving paradigm we can understand why salvation necessitates that God dwells in the believers and why Christian ethics must be established on Christ.

God's will is that we must accomplish the self-sacrificial love that comes from him. Then, only, can we share the mode of Trinitarian life that has already been revealed in creation, with God.

Thus life-giving love that Jesus brought in his crucifixion for the other is still needed beyond responsibility as the ethics of postmodernism. This life-giving love enables the believers to do everything for God's will, because life-giving love is not based on the self-life centrism but on Christ. Jesus strongly commanded them to lose their lives for his sake. This teaches us that Christian life is not for our security. Christian life should direct to Christ. This means that Christian life must look beyond this-worldly life centrism. 'If I value my life [ and the other's life ] in this world more than Jesus and the life of the next world, I cannot be his disciple' ( Keener 1997: 210 ). We should recognize the uniqueness of Jesus' death, as it can reveal to us the core point of Christian ethics, and as it embodies God's own will.

God's perfect identification with man, his Incarnation, suffering, and crucifixion, in other words the self-giving paradigm of divinity is the original ordering of creation. This original ordering exists in the sacrificial love of the crucifixion, and generally in human dying and

living with Christ who died for us and who dwells in us. Christian ethics involves becoming the Christ-like person. The believers must follow Christ.

#### **4.3.1. From postmodern linguistic trend to Christ-centrism**

Put another way, at this time there remains just the self's power of language. Once modernity's claims to universality and reality are dissolved, what remains is the autonomous self and its power of language ( Phillippes & Okholm 1995: 13 ).

Phillipes & Okholm (: 13) express it thus:

The understanding of our (self-) reflective activity as a subject's relation to a world of objects has been one of the main philosophical concerns of our century. From Freud's undermining of the notion of an absolutely rational and non-fragmented subjective world, to the later Wittgenstein's critique of a non-situated philosophizing and Heidegger's rejection of Western metaphysics, down to the poststructuralist liquidation of a conditioning and autonomous subject, the focal point of criticism is one of the most deep-seated assumptions of Western philosophy: the idea that an external reality is represented by means of reflective thought in human consciousness....The linguistic turn in its various forms promotes a critique of the philosophy of consciousness and instals language in its place. It offers the framework for a reformation of that set of problems that was previously dealt with by means of a subject-centered reason.

In this way, analytical philosophy on the one hand, and Saussurean linguistics on the other, have inaugurated a new approach to problems concerning the constellation: thought, signification and interpretation. Lyotard's theory of the incommensurability of the language game, Derrida's *différance*, and Lacan's linguistic reformulation of Freudian

psychoanalysis are considered to be the *coup de grace* to the sovereignty of the subject-object model of thought ( :14).

However, endorsing the linguistic paradigm means, for some philosophers, a necessary repudiation of revelation, truth, the autonomy of the Holy Spirit and, consequently, authentic christ-like ethics. Such linguistic accounts--often idealist or ultra-nominalist--can have some very negative implications.

Papastephanou contends that these kinds of linguistic theories have, ironically, turned anti-humanist in that they lead to an unwarranted attack on knowledge and science, or to moral scepticism, or to an intellectual abdication from all political struggles ( Papastephanou 1997: 42 )

But modern knowledge and science as well as postmodern linguistic trends could not preach the revelation of God. Papastephanou has indicated the weakness of linguistic theory, and even though this theory is in other ways satisfactory, the linguistic turn of postmodernism can never give any confirmation to religious truth or religious ethics.

Let us consider the non-realistic textualist's failure. Cupitt ( 1980: 153-4 ) undertakes a negative view against the God of Christian doctrine in terms of the 'only human' and linguistic turn of postmodernism.

Cupitt thought that there was no God out there, but only humans. Cupitt (1990 : 123-8 ) says that only language and the human exist in the world, but nothing, 'out there'. If humanity retains intersubjective communication ( 1986: 198 ), there will be endless chaos. This chaos means that, as Cupitt (: 199 ) says 'Loss and again, life, death, life out of death, death in the midst of life, a living death, a dying life, eternal life' of endless loss without the eternal life.

He also sees sacrifice and dying as the third element of life. (: 155), but in his view, these actions also are performed by humans alone. This creates the human idol, human absolutization. Even though Cupitt advocates, 'sacrificing, self-giving', his problem is that he thinks that this 'sacrificing, self-giving' belongs to humanity. But it comes from outside of the human being as we disclosed in chapter 3. If there are only signs and language, people cannot escape from self-centrism because the human himself can become a god.

In postmodernism, therefore, the truth of God's revelation is limited by human perception and 'socially produced' concepts. Thus truth and method and language are correlated within the social situation. In the deconstructive postmodernism 'all knowledge is situated within a culture.' ( Spretnak1993: 14)

The deconstructive postmodernists insist that the meaning of every aspect of human existence is culturally created and determined in particular, localized circumstances about which no authentication can be made.( :13-14) 'Even particularized meaning, however, is regarded as relative and temporary, a permutation within our invented language systems, which many deconstructionists regard as merely indeterminant chains of words (signifiers) referring endlessly to other signifiers.' ( : 14) If there is plurality and uncertainty of language, there is no real truth and no one God. Only relative truth obtains; in other words, only the human himself is there, according to Cupitt.

Michael Yeo (1992: 46) criticizes the linguistic turn of postmodernism thus: 'I should never be able to learn anything. The text would be but an empty sign reminding me of what in some sense I must already have known. I could get out of the text only what I put into it. There would be nothing new, but rather, always more of the same. Communication would be an illusion, and solipsism the order of the day'. This seems to us a valid criticism.

Indeed, the postmodernist would have us believe that the Scripture then is not God's word and there is no longer any absolute truth. The written word is not God's revelation but just the language of a particular Christian community. No God, no truth, no revelation. This is

the pluralistic age of the 20th century. There is no ultimate truth, but just a story and the narrative process of world, without Christ-metanarrative. There is only human.

Yet, living in the Holy Spirit does not mean that 'God frowns on intelligence or education, or on people continuously pushing themselves to go beyond the supposed limits of their abilities' ( Hawthorne 1991: 239). What God is concerned about is that the work of the Holy Spirit never be done solely in a natural way, only with natural endowments ( : 239). 'Hence God wishes by the power of his Holy Spirit present and available, as in the life of Jesus, to make it possible for the followers of Jesus to exceed the *real* limits of their humanness and thus speak to the hearts of people with a life-creating, life-transforming power' ( :239). Recall, 'the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life' ( 2 Cor. 3:6 NASB ).

In addition to all this, from the feminist theory and the liberalist theology we are aware that women and the oppressed must be respected as the other. But what we want to say here is that we must pursue God's aim which Jesus brought. Jesus was concerned about the poor and the marginalised but was more deeply concerned about God's will. We must move from human-centrism to Christ-centrism. The Holy Spirit offers Christ-like life-giving love. Without life-giving love there exists only human centrism. Without Christ-centrism the human centrism always recurs. Ironically, humans need Christ in order to destroy the absolutism of the human self.

#### **4.3.2. The *homogenic* life of the believers**

Here we must distinguish between Derrida's concept of death and the life-giving love. The point of difference between Derrida's concept of death and the life-giving-love paradigm ensures a totally different content of salvation.

For Derrida, no ethico-political norms can force 'me' to sacrifice for the other. The heterogeneity of the self and the other ensure that nobody can force sacrifice for and take sacrifice from the other. The heterogeneity of the self, 'the uniqueness and irreplaceable

singularity of the self' (Derrida 1995: 41) connotes the impossibility of the substitution of the death of individuals. Interpreting the case of Abraham, Derrida finds an example of the impossibility of the substitution of the death of individuals, in the heterogeneity of the death of individuals. Derrida states (: 58), the heterogeneity, therefore, 'refers to the impossibility of substitution, the unsubstitutable; and then also to the substitution of an animal for man; and finally, especially this, by means of this impossible substitution itself, it refers to what links the sacred to sacrifice and sacrifice to secrecy'.

Derrida's statement is debatable because he does not consider the *homogeneity* of Christian salvation between the self and the other. Christ who lives in the self and the other is the basis of the homogeneity of the self and the other. The Holy Spirit who dwells in us is the foundation of the homogeneity of all Christians. This means that in the Holy Spirit the believers can share in the death and life of Christ. And in the Holy Spirit they can share their dying and living with each other. In Christ the life of self is for the other. In Christ the Christian can give his life to the other. We cannot share our life, dying and living, when the self and the other claim their own mastership on life and death, but when we hand over our lives to Christ, we can share life and death with each other in the Holy Spirit.

How is this possible? As Jesus shares his life with us in his suffering and crucifixion we can share our dying and living with one another through self-giving love or life-giving love. If there is a difference between the self and the other, it exists in the qualitative difference of the individual experience of Jesus' life. In other words, no two people have an identical experience in becoming Christ-like.

Thus salvation means becoming new people in the likeness and image of God which is the common aim of all Christians. Because actually 'the love, the self-giving, which is at the centre of Christian discipleship and obedience to God, and which is present in sinful humanity through the quickening power of the Spirit, has its ultimate foundation in the being and nature of God' (McIntyre 1997: 155 ). This homogeneity of the life-giving paradigm and the heterogeneity of Derrida's 'gift of death' are totally different concepts.

Moore ( 1994: 40 ) criticizes Derrida as follows: 'I take all of this to mean that Derrida has always aspired to a writing that would be "beyond" negative theology, while recognizing that this might not be possible. After all, by his own admission, "différance" remains a metaphysical name when all is unsaid and undone'. Derrida's mistake is generated from his poststructural heterogeneity. This 'différance' always leads to chaos. This 'différance' cannot allow humans the homogenic life with Christ.

This plurality encourages people who live in the postmodern world to enjoy 'boundless liberty'. Postmodern 'différance' has taken away all restrictions from men and women.

The 'boundless liberty' based on postmodern heterogeneous difference must be restricted by the homogeneous truth. The self's liberty must be restricted by the other and the other must be restricted by the self. In this restriction and obedience we find the homogeneous truth. In this restriction we find that the self-giving or life-giving love is the Christian life.

Bonhoeffer provides us with guidance concerning how we should live in the postmodern world ( Lundin 1995: 38). Bonhoeffer ( 1971: 369-370) states: 'During the last year or so I've come to know and understand more and more the profound this-worldliness of Christianity.' But he continues, 'I do not mean the shallow and banal this-worldliness of the enlightened, the busy, the comfortable, or the lascivious, but the profound this-worldliness characterized by discipline and the constant knowledge of death and resurrection' This means that, in this postmodern world, Christians must share in the suffering of God, and the watching with Christ in Gethsemane ( Lundin :38).

Christian freedom or liberty is accomplished in suffering and sacrifice with Christ in the Holy Spirit. Therefore, Christian spirituality which the Holy Spirit brings should be very different from postmodern spirituality based on 'the other' and 'difference'.

#### **4.3.3. From postmodern spirituality to Christ-centric spirituality**

In order to know the Christian spirituality we must investigate postmodern spirituality in more detail. Postmodern spirituality differs from modern spirituality. David Ray Griffin ( 1988 : 2 ) defines postmodern spirituality by comparing modern and premodern spirituality:

Modern spirituality began as dualistic, supernaturalistic spirituality, and ended as a pseudo- or antirituality; postmodernity involves a return to a genuine spirituality that incorporates elements from modern spiritualities. Because postmodern spirituality is not simply a return to a premodern spirituality, however, the type of society it legitimates must be different from premodern as well as from modern societies. Although this postmodern society will retain and expand many features of the modern world, it will reverse modernity's individualism and nationalism, its subordination of humanity to the machine, its subordination of social, moral, aesthetic, religious, and ecological concerns to economic interests, and it will transcend both of the modern economic systems.

In postmodern times, people no longer considered reason, that produced individualism and materialism, to be everything, and holding universal truths became impossible. Postmodernism offered the space for 'the other' dimension that modernism discarded.

But a continuing problem is that postmodernism has no unique place for the Holy Spirit, because of its pluralistic character that focuses on human needs. Postmodern pluralism reduces everything to an unrealistic, abstract equality, reducing everything to 'the ego', 'the subject', the decision-maker, the consumer, or the payee. ( Welker 1994: 21-22 )

Even the spiritual dimension that is recognized is not that of the Holy Spirit, because this spiritual dimension is adopted only for the merit and the well-being of people and nature. In fact, postmodern spirituality emphasizes sensibility, eros and emotion.

So in this respect postmodern ethics are based on sensibility and eros. What is the postmodern eros? Eros is 'a disposition towards others that no longer requires that other beings function as parts of an alien system' ( Farley 1995: 30). This erotic responsibility includes suffering according to postmodernists.

The eros of postmodernism is a passion for reality that allows the other to emerge from the shadows and dreams of the modern self's domination and socially constructed illusions. The other is not a thing, an object of use, or an anonymous, threatening power. The other is 'beautiful, mysterious, and vulnerable'. But 'eros is always directed toward concrete others and is therefore also knowledge of and towards these particular creatures, threatened in particular ways, with unique capacities for suffering, resistance, and joy' ( Farley : 33).

Concerning this eros, however, we must look carefully at this postmodern spirituality. Postmodern spirituality is based on sensibility and eros is also a result of the postmodernist's efforts to find the source and meaning of salvation and ethics in human nature, as modernist's efforts in reason. Therefore, postmodern spirituality is humanistic and naturalistic, concentrating upon human 'individualism of the spirit' ( Welker: 22 ).

This postmodern humanistic and naturalistic spirituality have worked against the Holy Spirit because the Holy Spirit revealed to us Jesus who suffered and died for the things of God ( John 15:26 ), not for the things of humanity.

In this postmodern spirituality based on the humanistic and the naturalistic world view, martyrdom cannot be accepted and thus the Holy Spirit cannot be accepted. Furthermore postmodernism is irrelevant to the non-social being, because postmodern thinking intentionally does not recognize anything other than the social context. Therefore, there is no space for the Holy Spirit. Indeed, even in these super-elements of postmodernism spirituality basically cannot be harmonized with the Holy Spirit.

In other words, even though in postmodern society the religious aspect was accepted in the public area, this is nothing other than humanism. Clearly, then, the life of Christ cannot be identified with the humanistic spirituality of postmodernism.

The only way in which humanity can identify with the Christ-life beyond the limitations of postmodernism is through the Holy Spirit who worked within the Trinitarian union and communion, at the creation. In the beginning, God planned that humans would share God's character. 'The Spirit of God was hovering over the waters.' ( Genesis 1: 2 ) To take the image of God is to share his divine life in his Spirit. In this sense we can say that the image of God arises from the Holy Spirit.

The image of God and the likeness of God were not intrinsic to humanity; rather these could become human attributes through the Holy Spirit. 'God created man in his own image' ( Genesis 1: 27); people in obedience to God, are the reflection of God's image towards the world (Genesis 1: 28). The image of God correlates with the Holy Spirit within us.

This spiritual dimension of humanity means that the Holy Spirit is not only 'out there' beyond humanity as God but also that the Holy Spirit is with the human person as divine being. Nobody can possess the Holy Spirit unless at the same time, the Holy Spirit acts in and on the believers. Therefore no believer can live his own life but the life of God lives in his personality through the Holy Spirit.

What can Christian spirituality be beyond postmodern spirituality? Jesus became flesh to reveal to us the things of God. When the Jews tried to kill Jesus, reasoning that Jesus made himself equal with God, Jesus said to them: 'I tell you truly, the Son can do nothing by himself; he can do only what he sees his Father doing, because whatever the Father does the Son also does.' ( John 5: 20 ) The Son of God takes the essence of humanity in order to do what he sees his Father doing. Jesus does not take the form of humanity to do

human things. Jesus comes to the earth to accomplish heavenly things. In doing the Father's things Jesus equalizes himself with God.

'The condescension of the grace of God is clearly *indispensable* to the realization of his purpose with man' ( Hendry 1965:112. my emphasis ). But this *indispensability* of Incarnation is for God's sake rather than our sake. Hendry (: 112 ) criticized Augustine who 'made the mistake of equating indispensable with irresistible and also did not take account of the other element which is present in the grace of the incarnation, viz., the element of accommodation.' The grace of God is irresistible but our human body and spirit are indispensable for our salvation. Augustine ignored this element of humanity's indispensability. Therefore we need the indispensable elements *in the believers*.

Yet Hendry makes the mistake of confusing the Incarnation of God himself for God's purpose, with humanity's own plan. God's accommodation of himself to our condition of humanity, however, is not for human merit or human life itself. For God accommodated himself to humanity for his glory. The grace of Incarnation is for God's glory and not for the sake of humanity. Furthermore, God accommodated himself to create human beings in his image in the Holy Spirit. Even though the Spirit works for the Father's gracious love beyond the Christ to create a new salvific encounter between himself and man ( Rosato 1981: 165; Balthasar *Spiritus Creator*: 100), he never works for merely human wellbeingness as envisaged in postmodern thinking.

Jesus comes to us to do God's business, not for the sake of the believer's business. Nevertheless Jesus' action paradoxically accomplishes salvation for the believers. Thus Jesus' action must be our soteriological life model. Jesus is the soteriological 'fulfilment-model' of the believers, but first, Jesus had to do the will of God without taking any merit for his own being.

In doing God's things the sonship with the Father is opened to all humanity. In other words, in doing God's work two hypostases in one personality are opened to all

subsequent sons of God following the first born Son, Jesus. Therefore, the Christian spirituality that the Holy spirit realizes comes from doing God's business rather than from seeking the this-worldly life.

#### **4.3.4. From deconstruction to life-giving love**

Postmodern theologians have tried to liberate human beings regarding religious aspects of humanity, not only in the public, but also in the private and emotional realms. Postmodernism emphasized the sensibility, eros and moral uncertainty. In postmodernism, holism and pluralism were also emphasized. But the Christ-centric life is not embodied in the postmodern paradigm.

Postmodernism was also established on human self-centrism. Actually, in postmodernism, the superiority of humanity and the self sufficiency of the human self is stressed more than Christ and the Holy Spirit. There is an ideology of meaninglessness ( Spretnak 1993: 13-17).

In order to counter modernism, with its totalitarianism, and colonization, philosophers and theologians have introduced the notion of deconstruction. However, this deconstruction also relates to the extreme human self-centric world we saw in chapter 2.

##### **4.3.4.1. The cause of suffering**

The idea of postmodernism contains no pre-coded logic of which it is the seed. 'Its "logos" is non-teleological, non-grounding, and non-totalizing' ( Schroeder 1996: 75). When the postmodernist rejects universality, postmodernism recognizes the difference between the self and the other.

The work of Derrida, Foucault, and Rorty reflect what seems to have become the central dictum of postmodern philosophy: 'all is difference'. This view sweeps away the 'uni' of

the 'universe' which was sought by the Enlightenment project. It abandons the quest for a unified grasp of objective reality. It asserts that the world has 'no centre, only differing viewpoints and perspectives' ( Grenz 1996: 7).

Therefore, the deconstruction of postmodernism is based on the idea of a non-substitute self. Postmodernism is grounded in difference. Therefore, postmodern ethics relate to the concept of proximity. In certain aspects, the concept of moral proximity provide the insight that the world is a suffering world. This difference made people acknowledge the fact that suffering is an essential part of humanity. From this postmodern world we are experiencing the suffering of humanity beyond modern totalization.

Avoiding the modern totalization, we should therefore look upon the nature of human beings as naturally beautiful and mysterious and fragile, for modern self-centrism did not like to accept any fragility or weakness of humanity. Modern self-centrism also did not see the otherness of the other. In postmodernism there is 'infinity' rather than modern totality.

At this point we as Christians must raise certain questions. What is next? There is relativity itself. The idea of 'infinity' of postmodernism is not posited within the subject from without, from the other; it arises within consciousness and signifies the radical absolute difference that exists between the same and the other. This idea of 'infinity' is 'the trace of an absolutely heteronomous past, unrecoverable in its totality by consciousness' ( Schroeder: 88). Postmodernism developed the heteronomous self in this way, then produced *relativism*.

Grenz (: 15 ) also said that 'the relativistic pluralism of late modernity was highly individualistic; it elevated personal taste and personal choice as the be-all and end-all'. Its maxims were: 'To each his/her own' and 'Everyone has a right to his /her own opinion'.

Postmodernism is definitely based on the concept of perfect self-realization. Some postmodern consciousnesses, however, focuses on the group. In this kind of

postmodernism human self-centrism still dominates. Some postmodernists live in self-contained social groups, each of which has its own language, beliefs, and values. Postmodernism's group egoism has replaced individual egoism.

In this self-centrism, postmodernism falls into the trap of hazardous 'cultural *relativism*' (Cook 1999: 3; my emphasis). On the one hand, postmodernism has liberated people from oppression based upon selfish desire, but on the other hand, it still remains rooted in the dimension of *self-centrism* so that postmodernism also falls into the terrible relativism that is interwoven with the dimension of *self-centrism*.

Postmodernism's localization and relativism leads to power games. Postmodernism proposes to liberate the powerless from hegemonic power but, ironically, it is accepted by the hegemonic powers themselves, because there is no absolute power or absolute truth. All individuals and groups have their own power. Even though postmodernism has destroyed the universalism of human reason based on human self-centrism, it encourages the human being in self-centrism. This self-centrism is correlated with this-worldly life centrism. This worldly life-centrism always concentrates on immanence and immediacy of life.

In this world, the paradigm of the immanence and the immediacy of life, the preservation of life without harmonizing with the transcendent God, has dominated the whole of humanity. This paradigm has been called *the self-life paradigm* in this thesis. Therefore, ironically, postmodernism's self and other does not put their life, personality and glory in God. They are their own master. In postmodernism both the self and the other are their own master. Since each person has his own mastership there exist differences between the self and the other.

In postmodernism the biblical concept that 'I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but *Christ lives in me*' (Gal. 2:20) and that 'what is more, I consider everything a loss compared to the surpassing greatness of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord,

for whose sake I have lost all things. I consider them rubbish, that *I may gain Christ*' ( Phil. 3:8) cannot come true. We, as Christians, do not live by ourselves but in Jesus, for Jesus and of Jesus. Postmodernists do not understand this *life-giving life*.

Therefore we should overcome postmodern deconstruction itself, through suffering for the glory of God in Christ. By offering their bodies to God the believers give up the self-centric life and live Christ-centric lives. From this total shift from self-centrism to Christ-centrism is derived the basis of the exhortation that 'they be not conformed to the fashion of this world, but be transformed by renewal of their minds, so that they may prove what is the will of God.' ( Rom. 12:2). The suffering is caused from the faith that my life is not my own. Calvin insists that we are not our own ( Book III.vii.1). We belong to God. We must not seek for our own glory but the glory of God. We are God's. We must live in this world for God and die for Him through the power of the Holy Spirit. In other words, suffering comes from the Holy Spirit who brings us life-giving love. Each Christian must bear his own cross ( Matt. 16:24). The Christian life is often one of suffering.

#### **4.3.4.2. Suffering as the way of life against the postmodern chaotic life**

Jesus' suffering reveals that the believers should identify with this suffering. Salvation begins with Jesus' suffering. The saved people of God also start their salvation from this identification with suffering. This identification with suffering is like that of Jesus and is the fruit of salvation and eternal life.

In Jesus Christ, the believers are freed from law and sin. But in this freedom of the believers, our suffering originated ( McGrath 1995: 50). God makes space for us to make mistakes in our freedom. God never blames our mistakes on Jesus Christ. But God disciplines us to recognize that we must suffer in this world. Therefore, in this freedom, we may see the origins of much of the tragic suffering of the world ( : 50).

In Christianity, the life-giving love must be practised throughout the world wherever *the self paradigm and life paradigm* still predominate. This life-giving love is not one which denies human life. The life-giving love means that we see the Christ-life in us. Indeed it is a paradigm that, ironically, shows the highest respect for human life.

When we see only our own life in our selves, the satanic power dominates human beings by the fear of death. Thus this fear of death must be overcome by life-giving dying or living for the other, by power of the Holy Spirit. Jesus destroyed this dimension of death. Essentially, Jesus sacrificed himself as the essence of God's life. Without the salvation of the other there is no more salvation. But this salvation is not safety. Rather it is freedom from all fear of evil as well as fear of the other.

In the relationship with the other the suffering is necessary because we must not control the other and indeed cannot control anything, including our fate (: 50). 'Suffering is threatening because it is a reminder of our powerlessness to control our world' (: 52). The essentiality of the kingdom of God can be tasted *through life-giving dying or living*.

Ross Thomson (1990: 205) gives a coherent description of life-giving dying as the essence of the suffering of the human self. The universe is dying in an unimaginably prolific and creative act of generosity, a 'sacrificial' act in that through dying it generates a newer and richer form, structure, in-form-action ( dare one say Spirit?), just like the wine that is poured and the body that is shattered to become life and communion in us. There will always be those for whom the whole pattern carries a single piece of overwhelming information: for whom the world brings the Word of the cosmic Christ. The life-giving spirit, the life-giving dying identified with love of God. In this love we can overcome the fear of death, the 'heat death' (: 205 )

Ross Thomson ( : 264-265 ) says:

It is perhaps our deepest fear that a darkness enfold the creation, that all beauty and meaning will be swallowed up in chaos and nothingness, in the end of individual life that is death and in the end of cosmic life that is heat death. But if beyond that shadow there is this triune dance of eternal love, this well of ever-communicating uncreated goodness upholding both the cosmic darkness and cosmic light, we have nothing to fear from the abyss, for in the immortal words of Deuteronomy(33:27) 'Underneath are the everlasting arms'. And in the Paschal mystery we see Christ pioneering a way for us through the darkness of the tomb, falling through the abyss of nothingness to touch, on the third day in the void of the tomb, the divine mainspring of life.

The very important distinction between christianity and paganism is in the life-giving dying or living. Harvey ( 1991: 268 ) said that for the pagan the world is still glorious; for the Christian, however, it is only a stage to the next life. The life-giving love hopes for the next life beyond the this-worldly prosperity. This does not mean that Christians must be ignorant in this world. This means that Christians must live in this world as God's people who are called to follow Christ. In this world, the Christian must live in the Holy Spirit.

As Christians we pursue the next life, accomplishing the calling of God. For the next life, Calvin ( Book III.ix.1) uses radical language that postmodernism cannot understand. The Christian must accustom himself to feel 'contempt for this present life' and to be aroused thereby to meditate upon 'the future life'. The final goal of the Christian life is not this present life. Rather Calvin encourages us Christians to be 'contemptuous of it'. Our goal is the future life. This Christian belief disdains postmodernism. Postmodern thinking is not concerned with anything outside the human self. It emphasizes the present.

'God pushes us into suffering, lest we cleave too tenaciously to love of this world' (III.ix.1). If God does not exercise us by tribulation to recognize 'the vanity of this world, we become no better than brute beasts'. We live in this world with 'a brutish desire'. Our

plans, efforts and deeds concentrate upon 'self-satisfaction'. 'Our whole soul, enmeshed in the allurements of the flesh, seeks its happiness on earth'.

Christians must meditate upon that eternal life to come. Paul, indeed, laments his lot and sighs with fervent desire for redemption ( Rom. 7:24). For Calvin, 'Christians eagerly hasten to death not because they want to be unclothed but because they long to be more fully clothed' ( II Cor. 5:2-3). Postmodernism emphasizes the human self and its well-being. Therefore they cannot think of an eternal life which is 'better than this one'. To them death is a disaster and dissolution. In postmodernism some philosophers dare to accept death, but they become captivated with 'the empty solace of this world', because they do not believe that eternal life is better than this life.

Only through Jesus' Resurrection beyond the second death, and through self-giving dying and identifying with God, will we overcome this world's power. The life-giving dying and sacrificing for the other with Christ are the crossroad where we decide whether to go the way of the incomprehensible grace of God or towards the abyss that remains, the terrible dimension of non-grace, of selfish conflict and of selfish chaotic postmodern life.

We can overcome the plural *relativism* in Postmodernism only through the life-giving dying. The most important holy meaning of human life is not the survival of the self and the self community or the survival of the human being but the sacrifice of the self for the other and for the community or the unlimited openness for the other and the incomprehensible mercy for the other in the Holy Spirit. So 'the man who gives his life for his friends does not even enjoy the satisfaction of his future company' ( McGrath: 55).

The real purpose of human life is the imitation of this divinity by the human being in the Holy Spirit. This comes about through the life-giving love of God, the suffering of God in Jesus Christ rather than through the infinite differences of postmodernism. We can see God's giving up of himself for his people in the image of the dying Christ ( : 55).

A way of sanctification comes true through life-giving love for *the other*. Karl Rahner (1974: 201) puts it this way: 'Our death becomes the death of the imitate God himself'.

#### **4.4. From holistic community to God-man-creature holy communion**

It is very necessary to apply the Christian ethic to the postmodern holistic community.

In John 15: 4 we read, 'I am the vine; you are the branches. If a man remains in me and I in him, he will bear much fruit; apart from me you can do nothing.' As we are in Jesus and as we live in *life-giving love*, we, the believers can bear fruit, for example, life, love, hope, and so on. The believers can eat the fruit of 'the tree of life' of Eden ( Genesis 2: 9 ), when they enter into *mutual indwelling* with Christ. Not only was Jesus the first man who partook of the fruit of 'the tree of life', but he was also the first fruit itself of 'the tree of life' for his people, the other. Jesus was saviour and actor in his life-giving action. And we also will bear fruit in union with Christ.

Furthermore, in John 17: 21-23 we read that the Father and Christ dwell in each other, and at the same time, all believers dwell in Christ and Christ in us. The true communion that is accomplished in the Trinity is revealed in the world. We call it here the *God-man-creature holy community*. This community is not only the community in which the Father and Christ dwell in believers and the believers dwell in Christ but also the community in which the believers together live in each other. Therefore, in Ephesians 2:22 Paul said that 'In union with him [Christ] you too are being built together with all the others into a place where God lives through his Spirit.' The Holy Spirit builds community in Christ.

Therefore, each believer--individual as well as community--must represent the body of Christ in this world. This body of Christ relates to the self-giving of ourselves to one another in the Holy Spirit. The believers are the bearers of the life-giving spirit. Therefore,

the God-man-creature holy community will be characterized as Spirit-centered society. This community is not just a community, either human or ecological, of well-being.

We should seek the eternal life beyond the this-worldly life. The Church also seeks the holy world which the Holy Spirit fulfilled. Even though the Church is in this world and is struggling to do God's will in this world, she must belong to the holy world, because 'the Church is the spiritual house' ( 1 Peter 2:5). Therefore, the '*In Holy Spirit, en pneumatikē* of Eph.2:22,' expresses the uniqueness of the new dwelling of God in relation to the old temple' ( Hanson 1963:134). 'The Church is apostolic, holy, and pneumatic (:134).

In Jesus' life-giving action, he went through the past, present and future to the God-man community and built it. The apostle Paul said of Jesus that he is, '....far above all rule and authority, power and domination, and every title that can be given, not only in the present age but also in the one to come. And God placed all things under his feet and appointed him to be head over everything for the church [ *God-man-holy communion* ], which is his body, the fullness of him who fills everything in every way' ( Ephesians 2: 21-23). The God-man-creature holy community is the community that Christ rules and indwells. Therefore, for this community the believers must proclaim Christ and become Christ-like people. This community is a mission community, proclaiming the Gospel as well as making a world in which life-giving love overflows. Just as Jesus becomes the head of his body, the Church, and every member of the Church, should accomplish the task of fulfilling the life-giving love by 'the superior principle of *agape*' ( Hanson: 131 ). Then the Church will eschatologically taste the kingdom of God.

Jesus' death on the cross has already revealed to the believers that the original purpose of life is sacrificial love. Our eschatological hope, too, is this love. The Apostle Paul expressed this eschatological hope as follows; 'Now we see but a poor reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known. And now these three remain: faith, hope, and love. But the greatest of these is love' ( 1 Corinthians 13: 12-13 ). Both faith and hope will be accomplished in love.

Paul simply makes the assertion that love is the greatest of the trio, that is, faith, hope and love, but love is not the greatest because it outlasts faith and hope but because it outranks these two ( Lenski 1963: 573 ). How does it outrank them? For Lenski (: 573) Bengel's answer is best: *Ac Deus non dicitur fides aut spes absolute, amor dicitur* ( cited in Lenski : 573). Love alone makes us like God ( Lenski: 573 ), 'for love comes from God ( or for love is of God): and everyone who loves has been born of God and knows God' ( 1 John 4:7).

Also 1 John 4:12 states: 'if we love one another, God lives in us and his love is made complete in us'. Especially, 'God is love: and he that dwells in love dwells in God, and God in him' ( 1 John 4: 16 ). Therefore, we can say clearly, 'it is faith's nature to receive, but love gives; and giving is greater than receiving' ( Lenski: 574). 'Hope also looks forward to receiving, but love is full possession and completed' (: 574). Here the hope is not just political liberation but looking forward to love. 'And for every new joy which hope receives in heaven love will be the response on our part. When we come to rest on the bosom of God, it will be by love' (: 574).

Christian community must be fulfilled with this love. Life-giving love means that the believers do not pursue only benevolence and utility as ecologists do. Rather it means that the believers can give up benevolence and utility and can become the poor and the marginalized. Life-giving love means that, sometimes, the community of Christ can become the poor community in the Holy Spirit. This union with Christ through the Holy Spirit is very different from postmodern community, because this community is Christ-characterized community, whereas postmodern community is simply community based on difference between the self and the other.

*The God-man holy community is established on the holy ground of self-denial of each individual and community in Christ through the Holy Spirit rather than on the social ground of the self's own respect for individuals and community.*

In Galatians 6:7-10, especially 6:8, the Apostle Paul teaches that the Spirit produces his fruits, namely, love, joy, peace, etc. (Galatians 5:22,23) in the present life of the *pneumatikos* just as he is the source of 'eternal life in the future' (Lull 1980: 173). The Spirit creates community that is abundant with spiritual fruits which will be fulfilled in eternal life in the future.

Therefore, the Christian life in the kingdom of God is very different from the this worldly kingdom. Matthew 13:1-23 shows us the kingdom of God. The message about the kingdom ironically contains two paradigms. On the one hand, the evils of the living soul, the trouble and persecution, the worries of this life and the deceitfulness of wealth; on the other hand, the fruits of the word and the life-giving love. The first remains, of course, 'a dominant factor in modernism and [postmodernism] with its rampant materialism' (Hagner 1993: 381). The second reminds us that the discipleship should undermine the evils in the world ( : 381). The message of the kingdom encourages the believers to overcome the this-worldly life paradigm ( Matthew13: 1-23).

The kingdom of God is like a mustard seed. Even the smallest giving of our self-life will generate a kingdom cosmologically wide and deep. The kingdom of God is like yeast. Self-denial for the other will produce a holy community beyond the this-world community. Rather, the mustard seed, the yeast, the life-giving love, is the kingdom ( 13:31-33). Therefore, the parables of Jesus are 'the mysteries of the kingdom' ( 13: 11), things hidden from the foundation of the world now being made known.

The kingdom of God is like the treasure and a fine pearl. A man sold all he had and bought a field to get the treasure and the fine pearl. The kingdom of God means giving up this world's things, all things, property, everything one has, even one's life, to get the reward ( 13: 44, 45 ). 'Those who find the kingdom joyfully make it their one priority in life and they seek first the kingdom, sacrificing all to it, but at the same time paradoxically finding with the kingdom all they need' ( Hagner: 397 ).

Matthew strongly warns his readers of the reality of judgement on the people who value this worldly life and hence stresses the importance of genuine discipleship ( : 400). The kingdom is like a net, so the wicked cannot enter, because the structure of the kingdom distinguishes between the wicked and the righteous. The kingdom of God is the community of the life-giving love, so the this-worldly life centric people cannot enter it. The kingdom of God is the community of life-giving spirit who follow Jesus (Matthew 13: 24-30, 36-43, 47-50).

The kingdom of God is totally different from this world's principles, from the this-worldly life paradigm. The life-giving spiritual person does not depend on time and wealth because the Holy Spirit who generates the Christ-like life is a non-temporal, and non-material Spirit. People can enter the kingdom of God not by the duration of their belief nor by how many things they have done but by whether they have become the life-giving spiritual beings or not ( Matthew 20: 1-16 ). Matthew said that the disciples could be first but they would be last 'if they did not rejoice in their hearts over the "little one" whom God calls, in other words, if they cannot live as a community according to the principles inculcated in chapter 18' ( Schweizer 1975:395). We must be child-like and humble, we must forgive and be merciful, we must live the life-giving love. Jesus said, 'So the last will be first, and the first will be last' ( Matthew 20: 16 ).

Like the eye of the needle, the kingdom of God is not a place that one can easily enter. The kingdom of God is like God's wedding banquet for his Son. This banquet is totally different from the lifestyle of this world where people must work and do business. The Son's banquet is very different from this world's banquet. It is strange to the people of this world who have a worldly lifestyle.

In the parable, therefore, people seized the King's servants, mistreated them and killed them. The reason is that the Son's banquet celebrated his life-giving work and people who practise this worldly lifestyle are not accepted at this banquet. If people do not live in the life-giving Spirit, they cannot attend. Jesus said, 'But when the king came in to see the

guests, he noticed a man there who was not wearing wedding clothes. Here 'the boor without the clean wedding garment is the Christian who did not prepare for the kingdom of God by total repentance and a life filled with the fruits of repentance' ( Meir 1979: 153-154 ) "Friend," he asked, "how did you get in here without wedding clothes?" The man was speechless. Then the king told the attendants, "Tie him hand and foot, and throw him outside into the darkness, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth" (Matthew 22: 11-13). God invites all, but those who repent, that is, those who live in the life-giving love through the Holy Spirit, are few (22:1-14).

Therefore, *the God-man holy community is not the world of the human beings' highest benevolence and utility, but the community of the life-giving love in Christ.* The offering and reconciliation and giving up of everything was the life of Jesus. More clearly, then, *the God-man holy community is not a community of immortal souls who pursue the this-worldly life but the community of life-giving spirit.*

#### **4.5. Summary**

In this thesis the fourth problem was how to apply the specific Christian ethics to the modern and postmodern world. While considering how to apply the specific Christian ethic we, at the same time, disclosed that the modern and postmodern paradigm caused the believers to fall short of Christ-like ethics. We did not totally deny any world view but critically constituted the Christian ethics beyond modern rationalism and postmodern deconstructuralism. We proposed that Christians should pursue the reincarnational life and suffering of Jesus beyond reason, and the self-giving or life giving love beyond the deconstruction for human self-wellbeingness.

## Chapter 5. Summary and conclusion

### 5.1. General summary

Major problems that have arisen in Christian ethics at the end of the 20th century might be resolved from the way in which we critically overcome the modern rationalism and postmodern uncertainty, and deconstructuralism.

In the introduction we cited the commandments of Christ from the Bible on the Christ-like life of the believer. From Jesus' commandments we can understand that we, the believers, still must accomplish the Christ-like life. We started this thesis from this essential theological point. We had to examine world views to establish the Christ-like ethics.

Therefore, in this thesis, the main problem was how to establish the Christian postmodern ethics, overcoming the ethics of modern rationalism and the ethics of postmodern deconstruction.

The first step was to determine those ethical principles in modernism and postmodernism which have caused the believers to fall short of the Christ-like life. From the influence of world paradigms Christian ethics approximated either to moral duty or moral codes under modern rationalism, and to responsibility under the ethics of deconstruction.

We investigated modern rationalism and postmodern deconstruction in chapter 2. From this investigation we affirmed the first sub-hypothesis that the common ethical principle of modernism is *the self* or *self-centrism*, and the postmodern ethical principle is *the other*. We found that the common principle of modern and postmodern ethics is *the this-worldly life centrism*.

As our final purpose is to find the counter to postmodern ethics, our next business was to find the Christian ethics which God initiated and to find how to embody these Christian ethics in individuals. We investigated the Christian ethics in the Bible. In the Bible we discovered that Christian ethics must originate from Christ and must be implemented for Christ's sake. Christians must be Christ-like persons. They must follow Christ. We found, too, that the Holy Spirit delivers the Christian ethics to us. In order to propose the way in which the Holy Spirit delivers the Christian ethics to Christians we conceptualized the *pneumatological context* and *the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit*.

But the Bible shows us that Jesus' disciples have a certain mind-set that prevents them from following Christ. They have this-worldly life centrism. By interpreting the doctrine of Trinity, creation and redemption in Jesus Christ we found that the life-giving love is the Christ-like ethic beyond the this-worldly life centrism.

In chapter 4, we addressed the problem of how to establish whether the Christian ethic is the counter ethic to the modern and postmodern world ethical paradigm or not. And then we argued that the specific Christian ethic needed in the modern and postmodern world is life-giving love. Conversely, we found that modern and postmodern ethics cause the believers to fall short of the Christ-like ethic.

From these three sub-hypotheses we affirmed the main hypothesis that the Christian ethic in the modern and postmodern world is the Christ-centric ethic characterised by life-giving love which includes incarnation and suffering.

## **5.2. Conclusion**

We can now define the Christ-centric ethic in the modern and postmodern world.

### **5.2.1. From humanistic liberation to Christ-centric liberation.**

Modern philosophers and some theologians revolt against all external authority, whether religious or socio-political. We agree that we should be free from all oppressive authority. What we would like to question concerning modern rational ethics or ethics of the autonomous self is whether they took the right direction or not.

This question can be applied to postmodern ethics at the same time. Postmodern ethics attempted to deconstruct all products of the autonomous human self, that is, metaphysics of presence, androcentrism, anthropocentrism, totalization. Postmodern ethics were established on the concept of 'the other'. Therefore they were based on human sensibility, eros, feminism, homosexuality, and so on.

We agree that liberation is an important subject in the Bible. What we are proposing in this thesis is that our liberation must be directed by Christ, not by the autonomous human self and 'the other'.

### **5.2.2. From the this-worldly life centrism to life-giving centrism**

As we discovered, modern and postmodern ethics are directed towards the perfect self-life realization as their common aim. This perfect self-life realization was applied to the human autonomous self in modern times. Therefore, postmodern philosophers and theologians criticized this attitude of modernism. They applied this perfect self-realization to all areas of humanity. In brief, the reason why modern and postmodern ethics are directed towards human self-centric liberation and the other-centric liberation is that the human being concentrates on the this-worldly life.

By contrast, Jesus taught us that we must pursue life-giving love. Therefore in the modern and postmodern world the point that we should emphasize is life-giving love. Christian ethics in the modern and postmodern world are very paradoxical. Christians obtain

freedom by self-giving or life-giving for each other. Christian ethics is not for the self and the other. When we are turned towards Christ and his eternal life, we can practise self-giving or life-giving love for one another, without oppressing the other as if only 'I', as the self, have validity and without focusing on external authority and oppressive structures.

### **5.2.3. Christ-centric ethics**

Christ-centric ethics means that; firstly, Christ is the origin of Christian ethics; secondly, Christ is still the model of Christian ethics. His life of incarnation, suffering and crucifixion should remain as the model of our Christian ethics; thirdly, Christ's mission is the goal of Christian ethics; fourthly, the specific Christ-centric ethic in the modern and postmodern world is the life-giving love or self-giving love in both dying and living; fifthly, the Holy Spirit regenerates this Christ-centric ethic in Christian life.

As Christ is the origin and model of Christian ethics, Christians should not only include all 'the other', women, the poor, the weak, the marginalized, the sinner, but also should exclude the this-worldly sinful trends.

In Galatians 3:28 Paul said that 'So there is no difference between Jews and Gentiles, between slaves and free men; between men and women; you are all one in union with Christ.' Christians must identify with the other as God incarnated, identified with us. This identification is not just to help the other to find a better life in this world. If we pursue the good life in this world we cannot really identify with the other. This identification means life-giving dying as Jesus demonstrated. This identification means becoming the poor, the beggar. This identification, therefore, can mean social or physical death.

But Christians must be ruled by God's sovereignty. Christians must change their purpose and direction. In Colossians 3:1-4 Paul said, 'You have been raised to life with Christ, so set your hearts on the things that are in heaven, where Christ sits on his throne at the right-hand side of God. Keep your minds fixed on things there, not on things here on earth. For

you have died, and your life is hidden with Christ in God. Your real life is Christ and when he appears, then you too will appear with him and share his glory.' Therefore we must live a totally different life from the worldly life. Christians must reject the sinful power, the evil power. Christians must fight against sin.

Paul continues in Colossians 3: 5-9, 'You must put to death, then, the earthly desires at work in you, such as sexual immorality, indecency, lust, evil passions, and greed.....Do not lie to one another, for you have taken off the old self with its habits and put on the new self. This is the new being which God, its Creator, is constantly renewing in his own image, in order to bring you to a full knowledge of himself.' At this point Christians can be identified with Christ in this world. They must become Christ-like persons. On becoming the Christ-like person Paul recaps the meaning of Galatians 3:28 clearly in Colossians 3:11: 'As a result, there is no longer any distinction between Gentiles and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarians, savages, slaves and free men, but Christ is all, Christ is in all.' In becoming the Christ-like person, the Christian might lose his life.

We contended that modern and postmodern ethics based on the self or the other and the this-worldly life paradigm cannot reach the Christ-centric ethics. Therefore, the life a Christian must live, consists of life-giving dying or living with Christ. Christ who lives in us continuously rules the world through his disciples' enactment of Christ-centric ethics.

Self-giving or life-giving love means that our human self has no own mastership so that we must depend on the Holy Spirit who is the Spirit of Christ. Life-giving has two meanings. The first is that the self must depend on God and receive Christ's life because he has no autonomy. Our salvation as well as ethics come true only by faith in Christ. More exactly, our salvation means that Christians transform to Christ himself. Therefore, the second meaning is that the self can give his life for the other. By the Holy Spirit we can practice Christ-like ethics. By the Holy Spirit alone we can fulfil the Christ-like ethic which we cannot accomplish by our human reason and power. Those who have the Spirit of Christ

can become Christ-like persons. Therefore Christ-centric ethic includes, as its essential part, worship and prayer.

Christian ethics must concentrate on Christ rather than on the self and the other. This uniqueness and distinction of Christian ethics cause Christians to be opposed by the other, even though they themselves are open to all people. Christians break the wall between the self and the other. But still Christians are opposed by the other. They are persecuted. They will be marginalized. When Christians concentrate on Christ rather than on the self and the other, they live a paradoxical life. Our life is not our own. Our life is Christ's. In *this otherness of life*, dying and living with Christ come true. We should live in this world with Christ and in Christ. In this modern and postmodern world to live with Christ and in Christ is to live in the life-giving dying or living in and for Christ.

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