


**The Political Risk of Terrorism:
The value of “new terrorism” as a concept for analysis**

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*Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters
of International Studies at the University of Stellenbosch*



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Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

December 2010

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Abstract

This research paper offers an analysis of *new terrorism* as a concept for analysis in Political Risk. In order to assess the novelty and value of *new terrorism* it is juxtaposed with *old* terrorism. This analysis uses a historical comparative method in which three terrorist groups, within two distinct historical periods, are discussed and compared. The first historical period is 1945-2000 and assesses *old* terrorism through a descriptive assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah. The second historical period, 2001-2009, provides a descriptive assessment of al-Qaeda. The primary variables for analysis with regards to the terrorist groups selected herein are *goals*, *targets* and *tactics*. Also discussed is the secondary variable *structure*.

A number of key findings indicate that there are more similarities than there are differences between *old* and *new terrorism*. The novelty and value of *new terrorism* is thus limited as a concept for analysis within Political Risk Analysis. The conclusion of this research paper establishes that for a normative conceptualisation of terrorism to exist, and have value, it must consider both *old* and *new terrorism*. This normative understanding of terrorism better serves the purpose of mitigation within the sphere of Political Risk Analysis.

Opsomming

Hierdie studie bied 'n ontleding van *nuwe terrorisme* as 'n begrip vir ontleding in Politieke Risiko. Ten einde die nuutheid en waarde van *nuwe terrorisme* te evalueer, word dit naas *ou* terrorisme gestel. Hierdie ontleding gebruik 'n histories-vergelykende metode waarin drie terroristegroepe, in twee afsonderlike historiese tydperke, bespreek en vergelyk word. Die eerste historiese tydperk strek van 1945–2000 en evalueer *ou* terrorisme met behulp van 'n beskrywende evaluering van die Moslem Broederskap en Hezbollah. Die tweede historiese tydperk, 2001–2009, bied 'n beskrywende evaluering van al-Qaeda. Die primêre veranderlikes vir ontleding met betrekking tot die terroristegroepe wat hierin aangewys is, is *doelstellings*, *teikens* en *taktiek*. Verder word die sekondêre veranderlike *struktuur* bespreek.

'n Aantal belangrike bevindinge dui daarop dat daar meer ooreenkomste as verskille tussen *ou* en *nuwe terrorisme* bestaan. Die nuutheid en waarde van *nuwe terrorisme* het dus beperkinge vir ontleding as 'n begrip in Politieke Risiko-ontleding. Die gevolgtrekking van hierdie studie dui dus daarop dat, vir 'n normatiewe konseptualisering van terrorisme om te bestaan, en ook waarde te hê, dit beide *ou* en *nuwe terrorisme* in berekening moet bring. Hierdie normatiewe begrip van terrorisme dien die doel van tempering binne die sfeer van Politieke Risiko-ontleding beter.

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List of Abbreviations

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
MNC: Multinational Corporation
PRA: Political Risk Analysis
RCF: Rational Choice Framework
USA: United States of America

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction:

Throughout history the concept of terrorism has gone through a number of changes. Its origin as a word can be traced back to the French Revolution in 1789. During this time the revolutionary leader Maximilien Robespierre referred to it as “nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue” (Innes and Fuller, 2002:9). It was however during the Reign of Terror¹ (1793-1794) that *terrorism* began to resemble something other than the revolutionary verve of the common French people. During this time the revolutionary opponents (antigovernment activists) acting against the prevailing French regime were swiftly beheaded by the infamous guillotine. This pursuit of traitors culminated in some eleven thousand deaths at the hands of the state (Betts, 2000). It was thus that *terror* as an idea and concept came to represent the abuse of power by a government, or regime, against its people.

In 1848, within the climate of popular uprisings throughout most of Europe, the revolutionary Italian, Carlo Pisacane, put forward the doctrine of “propaganda by deed,” arguing that violence is a necessary means to encourage public revolt as well as to educate the masses and gain their support (Innes and Fuller, 2002:10). This doctrine represents another conception of terrorism and it is argued by Innes and Fuller (2002:10) that this represents the justification behind more modern conceptions of terrorism – that is social actors acting against the state.

During the 1930’s and 1940’s terrorism once again came to resemble the use of violence by governments against their citizens. Fascists in Germany, Italy and Spain all ruthlessly suppressed ‘enemies of the state.’ In Russia, Stalin’s “Great Terror” set about eliminating all those who challenged his power. However, just like in 1848, terrorism began to resemble something else after the end of World War II in 1945 (Innes and Fuller, 2002:18).

In the post-war period Shughart (2006) argues that three identities or ‘stylized waves’ of terrorism have emerged. These identities are captured by the *left-wing* terrorist groups like the

¹ The “Reign of Terror” was a period in the French Revolution characterised by numerous executions of supposed enemies of the state (Encyclopedia.com, 2010).

Red Brigade² in Italy, the *national liberation movements* like Irgun Zavi Le' umi³ in Palestine as well as *Islamic fundamentalist* groups with the Muslim Brotherhood⁴ representing one of the first.

Whatever definition of terrorism one might adopt; many scholars, government analysts and politicians claim that since the mid 1990's *terrorism* has again changed into an inherently new concept. This *new* concept involves different actors, motivations, tactics, targets and actions, compared to the *old* concept of terrorism used in the mid twentieth century. Since 9/11⁵ this, so-called, *new* type of terrorism has greatly gained in prominence as it is characterised by the *war on terrorism*⁶. This is prevalent in a range of academic disciplines including Political Science, sociology and economics and without doubt has become a central issue throughout the world (Spencer, 2006: 4).

This research study represents a critical reflection on the application of the concept of *new terrorism* as a concept in Political Risk Analysis (hereafter PRA). The concept of *new terrorism* will be analysed by researching the identity of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism within two historical frames of analysis. This will allow for the comparative analysis of *old* terrorism versus *new terrorism*. The relevance of such an undertaking is to aid PRA in correctly framing the concept of terrorism for analysis so that PRA can accurately forecast and mitigate against terrorism.

1.2 Rationale for the Research Study:

Underpinning the Islamic fundamentalist identity of terrorism is the conceptualisation of terrorism: terrorists are actors acting against the state or prevailing world order. In the post-1945

² The Red Brigades or *Brigate Rosse* was a Marxist-Leninist left wing terrorist group that operated in Italy during the 1970s and 1980s (Historyofwar.org).

³ Irgun Zavi Le' umi is a Jewish right wing nationalist underground movement founded in Palestine in 1931, and committed acts of terrorism against the British in whom it regarded as illegal occupiers of Palestine (Britannica.com).

⁴ The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 as an Islamist revivalist movement over the decades since its start various break away groups have adopted its principles and adapted its methods – most notable is Hamas (Fas.org).

⁵ 9/11 refers to September 11 2001 in which al-Qaeda; a well known Islamic fundamentalist group, al-Qaeda, executed a large scale terrorist attack on American soil which had an immediate cost of \$100 billion in property damage and human life and up to a further \$2 trillion damage in lower future corporate profit (Shughart, 2002:6).

⁶The “war on terrorism” refers to the mitigation tactics of the USA against terrorism, including policy decisions related to terrorism and the much publicised wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

era terrorism has broadly come to mean the use of violence against non-combatant targets⁷ to achieve politically motivated goals (Office of the Coordination for Counterterrorism, 1997: vi). After 9/11 this definition has become even more entrenched allowing the post-war identity of Islamic fundamentalism to be analysed over time. The purpose of such an analysis is to challenge the so-called primacy that the *war on terrorism* places on *new terrorism*. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2005) the adjective ‘new’ means ‘not existing before’ or ‘discovered recently or now for the first time.’ Therefore the concept of *new terrorism* implies that there is an *old* terrorism and that the differences between the two are significant. This research study will question the apparent ‘newness’ of the concept *new terrorism*, by using a historical comparative framework of analysis to compare *old* and *new* terrorism.

New terrorism as a concept argues that terrorists now operate transnationally, in loosely organised networks; that they are largely motivated by religious extremism; that they aim at mass casualties and attempt to obtain weapons of mass destruction for the targeting of indiscriminate victims (Hough, 2005: 2; Spencer, 2006: 9-11). This concept of *new terrorism* as discussed in Hough (2005:2) implies that Islamic fundamentalism (as a single terrorist identity), has in a significant way changed over time. By studying Islamic fundamentalism over time, and the specific concept of terrorism that defines it, significant changes can be exposed to either give weight to, or detract from, *new terrorism* as a concept for analysis as part of a political risk analysis.

Regardless of more contemporary arguments about *old* terrorism versus *new terrorism* it can be argued that the fundamental decision-making processes that govern the organisational operations of each identity of terrorism have remained unchanged. That is, a terrorist identity contains rational actors (that make up the organisational structure), who make rational decisions with a goal to achieve desired outcomes. By understanding the Islamic fundamentalist identity of terrorism and the terrorist actors that operate within them as rational (following a rational decision-making process) a better understanding of how terrorists operate and behave can be established. This is done by linking actions with desired consequences through the study of the primary variables *goals*, *targets* and *tactics* of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups.

⁷ Non-combatant targets can include military personal that are not active in the field of duty.

In this research study the process of historical analysis and time based comparison within a rational framework will illustrate whether or not there is real value in the concept *new terrorism*, by locating significant and identifiable changes in terrorist behaviour and action, if any. The relevance of this study is located in the field of PRA in which rational actors behave in such a way as to utilise the PRA process to reduce loss and maximise profit through the assessment and mitigation of risk. In this field of study terrorism can be regarded as an important risk variable⁸ for analysis for interested states and organisations; however, the introduction of the *new terrorism* concept poses a significant problem to the analysis of terrorism by casting what is perceived to be conceptually significant. This potentially undermines the analysis and mitigation process within PRA. This will now be elaborated on in the following section.

1.3 Research Problem:

PRA investigates certain variables and their respective indicators to deduce probabilities of risks occurring. The effectiveness of a political risk analysis lies in its ability to correctly and effectively frame the problem. As noted by Vertzberger (1998:33) “the framing of problems is...of great importance to their apprehension and to the search for solutions by decision-makers, but it is especially critical in dealing with political-military problems that are ill defined, complex, indeterminate, and wicked.” As a way to construct the frame of analysis of the concept terrorism PRA analyses the terrorist organisations membership, goals, tactics and environment to create a risk probability (Bremmer and Keat, 2009:105-114).

For the purpose of this thesis these analytical categories have been reduced to three primary variables. The first two are *goals* and *tactics* as those objectives that terrorists groups want to achieve and the means they use to achieve them respectively. The third variable that is added is *targets*, and refers to those structures, physical or human, that terrorists seek to destroy or influence on the path to attaining their goals. The reason these categories of analysis have been selected is because, as per the rational choice framework, rational decisions are consequential and preference-based (March, 1994:2). This means that given perceived consequences (goals), rational actors (terrorists) will favour certain tactics and targets (preferences) over others given constraints (mitigation strategies) and incentives. In spite of the selection of three primary

⁸Within the field of political risk some authors choose to use ‘variable’ (Simon, 1982), while others use the word ‘factor’ (Brink, 2004). These concepts are interchangeable however; ‘variable’ will be used predominately herein.

variables this research remains open to the discovery of possible secondary variables for analysis.

An alternative conception of terrorism (new terrorism) should reveal different *goals, tactics* and *targets* which can make the mitigation process confusing and haphazard. Spencer (2006:5) argues that a focus on *new terrorism* may justify a whole new set of rushed restrictive governmental counter-measures without these being democratically debated, publicly discussed, independently monitored or even necessary. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on *new terrorism* could lead to a neglect of other forms of terrorisms as represented by the identities not covered in this research study, but referred to by Shughart (2006:7): *terrorism as national liberation movements and ethnic separatism* as well as *left-wing terrorism*.

Present literature by Shughart (2006:7) indicates that terrorism as a concept can be subdivided into three main identities: 1) *terrorism as national liberation movements and ethnic separatism*, 2) *left-wing terrorism*, and 3) *Islamic fundamentalism*. These identities can be individually assessed in terms of their so-called ‘newness’; however, for the purposes of this research study, the *Islamic fundamentalist* identity will be analysed due to its direct relation to the *war on terror* and the concept of *new terrorism*. Islamic fundamentalism was selected because of the primacy that *new terrorism* places on religion and because the proper analysis of the remaining identities falls beyond the page limit in this research study. The remaining identities however can also be discussed within the framework of PRA, using similar methodological tools to make critical reflections on the concept *new terrorism* and without doubt present avenues for further study.

Understanding the terrorism variable, and its subsequent identity, from within a single frame (new or not) can provide a richer picture of terrorism as a risk variable. PRA can thus provide details as to how terrorism changes over time and the decisions terrorists are likely to make which can in turn offer a degree of cost effectiveness to the mitigation process especially when such an analysis is conducted within a rational choice framework.

Accordingly, this thesis will analyse the changing identity of Islamic fundamentalism in terms of their *goals, tactics* and *targets* over two distinct historical periods, the first being the post-war

period 1945 to 2000, and the second period being post-9/11 (2001) to 2009. This will provide evidence either for or against the concept *new terrorism* as well as provide a rich picture of Islamic terrorism throughout recent history.

Before continuing however, terrorism has to be justified as a concept for analysis within PRA. Terrorism is justifiably a concept for analysis within PRA because terrorism generally has devastating effects on business enterprises and states alike. The estimated cost of terrorism according to Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2004) in their analysis of the tourist industry in a sample of European countries noted that Austria, Italy and Greece lost \$4.583 Billion, \$1.159 Billion and \$0.77 Billion respectively between 1974 and 1988. Similarly, terrorism in Spain for the period 1975-1991 is estimated to have reduced annual foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow by 13.5% on average, which translates into some \$500 million (Frey et al, 2004:11).

Apart from costs to industry and FDI there are a number of costs involved with the mitigation of terrorism thereof. According to Shubik and Zelinsky (2009:8) the 2006 estimated costs of the *war on terrorism* for the United States of America (USA) was \$188 Billion with their defence budget exceeding the \$527 Billion mark, 17% of this was allocated to terrorism. Coupled with financial costs to terrorism it is also relevant to note that there is a human cost to terrorism too. It is reported that incidences of terrorism in recent years are 17 percentage points more likely to result in casualties than in the 1970's (Enders and Sandler, 2002).

In sum, to paraphrase Howell and Chaddick's (1994:71) definition of political risk terrorism represents a political/social decision, event or condition that affects the business environment such that investors lose money or have a reduced profit.

When weighted against the cost of 9/11, the cost of the *war on terrorism* as a mitigation response appears overly excessive and ineffective. The lives lost in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the costs of maintaining a military theatre of action seems hardly a rational response to an event that cost the USA just over \$2.1 Trillion, and approximately 3000 lives. In fact six times as many Americans were killed by drunk drivers in 2001 than by the 9/11 attacks (Richardson, 2006:183). One can also argue that the *war on terror* encourages extremist aggression against the USA

rather than mitigates it. When considering the words of Osama Bin Laden's second in command al-Zawahiri this becomes quite clear:

“the masters in Washington and Tel Aviv are using the regimes [such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan] to protect their interests and to fight the battle against the Muslims on their behalf...therefore we must move to the enemy's battle grounds to burn the hands of those who ignite fires in our countries” (Cited in Richardson, 2006: 129)

This thesis therefore represents a rational response to terrorism as concept for analysis in Political Risk. In examining Islamic fundamentalist terrorism through rational analysis this research study will attempt to illustrate that: 1) *new terrorism* is not justifiably *new* and, 2) terrorism can be more holistically understood and therefore more effectively mitigated through a political risk analysis that adopts rational choice as a framework for analysis.

Subsequently, terrorism as a risk variable is more valuable as an all encompassing variable that includes other identities of terrorism. This is favoured over a *new* variable that places value on a specific period or apparent trend.

Accordingly the research herein will address a number of important questions. The main research question guiding this study is: *Are the changes in Islamic fundamentalism (from 1945- 2000 and 2001 - 2009) significant enough for the variable of “new terrorism” to have real value within Political Risk Analysis?* Three sub-questions have also been identified to support the main research question. The first sub-question is: *What is the old versus the new conceptualisation of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism?* This will serve to illustrate that *new terrorism* is not a meaningful concept for analysis since it provides too narrow a focus which can potentially hinder risk mitigation strategies within PRA. The second sub-question is: *How does rational choice theory contribute to understanding terrorism as a PRA variable?* This will establish the importance of the conceptualisation of terrorism as a rational act and reconcile it with the main goals of PRA. The third and final sub-question is: *How does rational choice theory reconcile the differences between old and new terrorism?*

1.4 Research Design and Research Methods:

In order to answer the questions posed above this study will analyse terrorism through the overarching theoretical framework of rational choice theory (e.g. Shughart, 2006; Pape, 2003; Frey et al, 2004; Richardson, 2006) as it exists in decision-making, political science and economics. The basis of this approach is grounded in the idea that terrorists and the organisations that they represent are deliberate actors whose behaviour can be modelled. Within this framework terrorists are assumed to be motivated primarily, yet not exclusively, by self-interest.

Rational choice theory assumes decision processes are consequential and preference-based. “They are *consequential* in the sense that action depends on anticipations of future effects of current actions. Alternatives are interpreted in terms of their expected consequences. They are *preference-based* in the sense that consequences are evaluated in terms of personal preferences” (March, 1994:2). To add to these processes utility must be taken into account. Utility is broadly defined as a way to describe preferences (Varian, 2006:54), and in the case of rational actors, who are self-interested, a primary goal is to maximise utility – that is to achieve the highest possible preference outcome given a number of anticipated outcomes.

In the case of terrorism, according to rational choice, terrorists want to maximise utility. This means that actions depend on expected payoffs to members as weighted against expected losses. Shughart (2006:11) notes that such payoffs might include wealth, power, fame, or patronage, as against losses like death, injury or imprisonment for example.

The value of this model as it relates to the field of PRA is also important as political risk analysis at its most objective level relies on scientific method and rational choice to analytically forecast probable eventualities (Kobrin, 1979). The process of forecasting in PRA is more than simple prediction because it attempts to remove itself from the bias of personal value judgements. In keeping with the scientific method and rational choice PRA projects the certainty of past events into the outcomes of future events. This is done in such a way that the results, given fixed information, would remain unchanged when repeatedly tested and maximise utility for the enterprise that the model serves. Also, actors (organisational or state based) seek to maximise

utility in ways congruent to those described above and PRA represents a method to reduce loss and maximise profit. The very basis of PRA is grounded in rational choice.

Within this overarching theoretical framework of rational choice this thesis will analyse the most fundamental changes to the Islamic fundamentalist identity of terrorism from the vantage point of two distinct historical periods.

The first historical period is 1945 to 2000. This historical period begins at 1945 with the end of World War II and includes the period of decolonisation, the Iranian Revolution as well as the Cold War, up until 2000. Herein the following terrorist groups will be discussed: The Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah.

The second historical frame is characterised by the post 9/11 “war against terrorism” (2001-2009) and what the American 9/11 commission calls *new terrorism* which places primacy on the changing nature of Islamic fundamentalism⁹. The terrorist group for discussion herein is al-Qaeda.

Within each time series, Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisations that make up the overarching identity will be evaluated on the basis of three primary¹⁰ variables, namely: *goals*, *targets* and *tactics*. Furthermore this will be done within a rational choice framework.

Rationally terrorist’s goals are shaped by their motives, preferences and perceived utility of success. Terrorists seek to exploit targets with high payoffs and low levels of expected losses; that is high levels of utility (given a range of goals) as achievable using available tactics (as shaped by constraints). The tactics they use are such that they inflict the most damage with the lowest possible level of reciprocal damage and do so with the overarching design to achieve their stated goals. Finally, terrorist tactics are shaped by constraints on their power to achieve their desired goals and implement appropriate tactics. To extrapolate such information about terrorist goals, targets and tactics the terrorist group or organisation must be examined. To this end the

⁹ The concept *new terrorism* emerged in the mid-1990’s however, it did not gain wide acceptance until after 9/11 (Spencer, 2006: 9)

¹⁰ It must be noted that the research herein remains open to the discovery of possible secondary variables.

unit of analysis¹¹ is thus the terrorist organisations that characterise the Islamic fundamentalist identity. Primary focus is given, though not limited to, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda.

This thesis represents a qualitative historical comparative analysis of the possible changes to a single identity of terrorism and the rational decision-making framework that underpins it within two historical time frames. In accordance with this type of analysis this thesis will use the method of difference. The method of difference (Neuman, 2006:473) requires a comparison between cases and analyses significant commonalities between cases as well as significant differences. In this case significant commonalities and differences will be observed and discussed between each organisation from a given historical period. This method will allow further discussion to illustrate that Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, as it exists post-9/11 is not new, and has remained largely the same. This method of observation and comparison is both exploratory and evaluative (Babbie and Mouton, 1998:76).

This research is grounded in theory and in secondary sources. The use of primary sources in this context would present this author with a number of unnecessary dangers. Interviewing a terrorist or interacting with a terrorist organisation is not on the agenda. Thus all observations on the variable terrorism are constructed from the theoretical safety of academia. This means the research herein is obtained from journal articles, academic libraries and the internet. The secondary data herein is collected from a range of educational books, academic journals and sources in fields as diverse as economics, political science, and decision-making. Internet news sources will also be made use of, as journalists have more recently conducted a number of interviews with known terrorists and their organisations.

1.5 Literature Review:

The literature covered within this thesis will involve four key areas. The four areas are as follows: PRA and the rational choice framework; terrorism and new terrorism; Islamic fundamentalist terrorism 1945-2000; and Islamic fundamentalist terrorism 2001-2009.

¹¹ The unit of analysis is the unit, case or part of social life that is under consideration (Neuman, 2006:58).

1.5.1 Political Risk Analysis and the Rational Choice Framework:

The rational choice framework will be discussed from within the field of decision-making using the work of March (2004), and Bray (2009) both of which will be used extensively. Supplementary information is provided by Caplan (2006) and Dixit and Skeath (2004).

When conceptualising PRA key texts in the field will be used. Texts of notoriety include Brink's (2004) *Measuring Political Risk: Risks to Foreign Investment* as well as Kobrin (1979), Simon (1982, 1984) and Robock (1971). These texts will be consulted to conceptualise "political risk" as a field of analysis in which terrorism as a concept can be located. Notable examples of terrorism as a concept for analysis occur in Simon (1982, 1984, and 1987), as well as Alon and Martin (1998). Bremmer and Keat's (2009) *The Fat Tail* also serves as a foundational text in this regard.

With regard to the definition of rational choice and its application to terrorism texts by March (1994), Caplan (2006), Pape (2003) and Intriligator (2010) will be consulted. Enders and Sandler (2006, 2006a, 2005) represent some of the most intensive application of rational choice to terrorism, these authors also provide in depth statistical analysis of the changing nature of terrorism and the effects thereof within society.

1.5.2 Terrorism and New Terrorism:

The identity of terrorism contained herein is obtained from Shughart (2006) who refers to *Islamic fundamentalism* as a "stylised wave of terrorism" in his historical account from which the basis of this thesis is established. Authors used to define the concept of terrorism herein are Richardson (2006) and Enders and Sandler (2005; 2006; 2006a). Further definitional substance is added by Bremmer and Keat (2009).

The concept of *new terrorism* is defined in Spencer's (2006) *Questioning the Concept of New Terrorism*. Tucker (2001) as well as Laquer (1996) also contributes to a foundation of what constitutes *new terrorism*. For a summary of the key attributes of *new terrorism* Hough (2005) provides an adequate synthesis.

1.5.3 Islamic Fundamentalism 1945-2000:

After terrorism is located within the field of political risk and rational choice, the first conceptual identity of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism will be historically established using the work of

Shughart (2006) who traces the history of this type of terrorism from 1945 until 2000. This analysis will be further bolstered by the work of Milton-Edwards (2005) entitled *Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945*. This text provides a more thorough account of Islamic fundamentalism post-1945 with valuable coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda.

The use of internet sources herein will be extensive, especially media publications as they often contain direct quotes from known terrorist groups referring directly to *goals, targets* and *tactics*.

Notable publications that also make direct references to the primary variables discussed herein are located in the work of Richardson (2006) and Philips (2009) whose accounts of terrorism includes many direct quotations from terrorist groups as well as extensive research on groups known *goals, targets* and *tactics*. Supplementary texts included herein are by Abed-Kotob (1995) who illustrates the divergent goals of the Muslim Brotherhood as it grew and Rapoport (2004) who helps establish the importance of the Iranian Revolution for the “fourth wave” of terrorism – forming the basis from which Hezbollah is discussed.

This section will establish a firm historical basis from which the *new terrorism* can be compared. It is in the comparison of the time periods that meaningful results about the changing concept of terrorism can be discussed.

1.5.4 Islamic Fundamentalism 2001-2009:

In this section the period 2001 to 2009 will be discussed within the same framework as the previous section by looking at an organisation within the identified category of *Islamic fundamentalism*. For this purpose al-Qaeda has been selected as a case study focusing on the text *Al-Qaeda* by Jason Burke (2007) which establishes how al-Qaeda formed, its nuanced group structure and overarching goals. These goals will be supplemented by Blanchard (2007) who provides an interesting collection of al-Qaeda statements in the period 1994-2007. Manning (2006) will also be discussed in this regard as his analysis helps explain the transnational character of al-Qaeda as a rational reaction to counter-terrorism practices. Further supplementary texts include Kalic (2010), Hellmich (2005), and Castells (2004).

1.6 Limitations and Delimitations of the Research Study:

Foreseeable limitations in the production of this thesis are few; however, time, as in all research, is a factor of limitation a great deal of work has to be covered in a short period. The research is thus reflective of this, attempting to make generalised assumptions without getting distracted by the vast amount of available data since the timeframe to be covered herein is from 1945 to 2009. This data is found in the numerous texts, publications and perspectives on terrorism. Andrew Silke (cited in Lentini, 2008:133) has indicated that since 9/11 there has been a new book on terrorism appearing nearly every 6 hours, and peer-reviewed papers have increased by approximately 300%. Also a hindrance in this regard is trying to compact all relevant information into 70 to 90 pages of work. Finally, only texts written in English will be used.

Perhaps the most important limitation herein is the terrorist group itself. One has to try and objectively assess the quality of information recognising that certain information on terrorist groups is merely speculation or in fact untrue. There is a question mark over how much real and factual information exists. Also, the sensitivity of the topic (given the violence and destruction that terrorism and terrorists are associated with) must be kept in mind so as to avoid overly sensationalised claims - objectivity must be maintained.

The delimitations in conducting this research are the wealth of information available and the time frame in which the research is being conducted. Over a period of 65 years there are numerous historical accounts to utilise in order to provide a rich picture of past events. However, to provide focus to the research herein only one of a possible three identities of terrorism – *Islamic fundamentalism* is focused on, while *terrorism in the service of national liberation and ethnic separatism* as well as *left-wing terrorism* are not discussed. These identities are however recognised as further avenues for study.

1.7 Chapter Outline for the Research Study:

Chapter 2 serves to conceptualise the main concepts of the study and provide a theoretical grounding for the research. Accordingly the chapter will begin by outlining the rational choice framework as it exists in PRA and as it is applied to terrorism. Secondly the chapter will define the parameters of PRA and then move onto a discussion of what is conceptually understood as terrorism versus new terrorism. Also discussed herein is that rationality of terrorism. In the final

instance the terrorist identity used herein will be discussed providing the core characteristics of *Islamic fundamentalism* and known terrorist groups that are considered as such.

Chapter 3 will develop the first historical time period for the analysis. Two relevant Islamic fundamentalist groups will be analysed in terms of their goals, targets and tactics for the period 1945 to 2000. These groups are the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah. In a summary table the structural overview, primary goals, targets and tactics of each group will be given illustrating the similarities and difference between each group as well as laying the ground work for comparison with the next time period 2001-2009. A discussion on the time period will also reveal what is conceptualised to be *old terrorism*.

Chapter 3 will also develop second historical time period for analysis. Al-Qaeda as an Islamic fundamentalist group will be discussed in this regard. Similarly to the previous time period discussed in this chapter a summary table will illustrate the structural overview, primary goals, targets and tactics of each group to allow for easy comparison. A discussion will also conceptualise what is observed to be *new terrorism*.

Chapter 4 will set about analysing and discussing the core characterises of the primary variables of both *old* and *new terrorism*. From this analysis the novelty and value of *new terrorism* will be clearly established. Also, chapter 4 will serve as a means to discuss any secondary variables for analysis – should any occur.

Chapter 5 will provide a summary of the main findings and conclusions that this research paper achieves.

1.8 Conclusion:

In summary, this research study assess the value of *new terrorism* versus *old terrorism* through the examination of the primary variables *goals*, *targets* and *tactics* of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups to help provide a richer understanding of the terrorist/terrorism concept in PRA. The reason for such an undertaking is to avoid too narrow a focus which can hinder risk mitigation strategies. To locate change the analysis is done in two distinct time periods and qualitatively attempts to make broad generalisations as to how the terrorism variable has

changed. This exploratory and evaluative analysis is underpinned by a rational choice framework as it occurs in PRA and understands terrorists and terrorist groups as rational actors who seek to maximise their own utility. From this understanding an attempt will be made to show that the concept of *new terrorism* holds little weight as a concept for analysis in PRA.

In the following chapter, the conceptualisation of what constitutes PRA and the rational choice framework will be discussed so as to lay the basis for the introduction of the concept of terrorism and *new terrorism*. All other key concepts located within this research study will also be conceptualised.

Chapter 2: Conceptualisation and Contextualisation of Key Terms

2.1 Introduction:

“Often it is not easy to deconstruct political risk in terms of its causes, probability, and impact. That does not mean that the process of analyzing difficult issues is not valuable” (Bremmer and Keat, 2009:5). On the contrary, it is vitally important. Political risk addresses the so-called “black swan logic”, a term coined by Nassim Taleb, by attempting to make what we do not know far more relevant than what we do know (Taleb, 2008: xix). In this process of knowing what we cannot know there are a number of given conditions. First and foremost it is vital to assume a degree of uncertainty about future events. Secondly, it is important to analyse the environment in which uncertainty operates. Thirdly, it is necessary to assume that by knowing of uncertainty, there is a certainty of risk. Finally, through the forecasting of risk the positive and negative value of risk may be fully utilised.

The process of trying to know what we cannot know leads us to the conceptualisation of political risk and the related concepts for this research study. To this end, this chapter will construct a conceptualisation of political risk that recognises the uncertainty of future events, the construction of risk through uncertainty, and the environment in which risk is analysed as well as the actors involved – in this case the actors that are risk averse (actors who use the process of PRA to reduce uncertainty) and the terrorists (the actors that create uncertainty in the risk environment).

This chapter will begin by outlining the rational choice framework that guides the theoretical grounding of political risk analysis. Secondly, the chapter will set the conceptual parameters of the key terms associated with the field of PRA. This includes *risk, micro political risk vs. macro political risk, PRA and country risk*. Also, both terrorism and *new terrorism* will be conceptualised and discussed within the rational choice framework. In the final instance the terrorist identity used herein will be discussed providing the overarching characteristics of *Islamic fundamentalism* which forms that basis of the remaining chapters herein.

2.2 The Rational Choice Framework:

Rational choice theory makes a number of assumptions about human behaviour and decision making. Firstly, rational choice assumes that individuals have preferences over various states of

the world (Bray, 2009:3). Thus rational choice depends on two key processes, 1) what alternatives exist in the world, and 2) two guesses about future consequences. The first guess is how the choice will influence future states of the world, and the second guess is how the decision maker will feel about that future when it is experienced (March, 1994:3). Within economics this means that consumers know whether they prefer chips to chocolate and can therefore rank their preferences based on their perceived outcomes. This rank is referred to as utility in economics. This also implies that rational decision makers respond to incentives, since incentives will alter the utility attached to a perceived outcome.

Secondly, rational choice assumes that individuals will act in such a way that is systematic, consistent and predictable in order to achieve those preferences. Importantly, in rational choice preferences do not have to be 'rational' however, rational actors must act on those preferences in a consistent way (Bray, 2009:3). This assumption is expressed by the concept of transitivity. Transitivity requires that if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C. This means that when individuals are offered the same choices repeatedly that they do not reverse their choices repeatedly. This concept represents the ranking of preferences and the ordering of utility (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986:253).

To achieve the assumptions outlined above decision makers that are rational are assumed to possess two essential sets of knowledge: complete knowledge of one's own interests and, flawless calculation of what actions will best serve those interests (Dixit and Skeath, 2004:30). Furthermore it is important to realise that the above assumptions of rational choice do *not* mean that decision makers are selfish. Similarly it does not mean that decision-makers only consider short-run objectives and it does not mean that all decision makers share the same value system – it merely means decision makers follow one's own value system consistently (Dixit and Skeath, 2004:30).

Finally, within a rational choice framework preference outcomes and therefore utility is limited by constraints. Examples of constraints are numerous and case dependant; however when considering terrorist activities incomplete information, money, and logistical resources can be considered constraints for risk averse actors to achieving preferred outcomes.

As it relates to risk the rational choice framework reduces risk to human choice. That is, given a selected number of preferred outcomes, risk exists in attaining the preferred outcome given actions by other actors in the world. This means that PRA is thus a means to learn preferences and reduce subjective knowledge about human action so as to forecast future decision outcomes and reduce uncertainty. As quoted in March (1994:13) decision makers “use results of memory as a proxy for the projection of future probability”. This process in decision making of using history to forecast future outcomes is known as heuristics. As will be conceptualized, a rational approach to PRA has congruent outcomes to heuristics and thus rational choice.

It is from within this theoretical approach that PRA is grounded. This is highlighted extensively in Brink (2004:30) who notes when there is an interest to invest (a preference), and a client is uncertain of the best option, various possible preference outcomes can be analysed and compared by means of PRA as a way of managing such uncertainty. “The application of management science can be viewed as a rational attempt at problem-solving” (Brink, 2004:30).

Apart from being grounded in rational choice theory, PRA can apply a rational choice framework to understanding variables and concepts for analysis – in this case terrorism and/or new terrorism. From this point of departure Schön (1982 cited in Brink, 2004:32) argues that successful decision makers and risk analysts strive to do two things. They try to relate new experiences to their existing past experiences, and also often try to maintain the uniqueness of the current situation. A good professional does not simply apply a standard response but tries to keep in mind what is different and special about current circumstances. As it is argued herein the primacy given to *new terrorism* as a sort of ‘special current circumstance’ is overstated which can potentially unbalance that analytical process that PRA strives to maintain, i.e. a holistic heuristic balance between past knowledge and current experience.

2.3 Conceptualisation of Key Concepts:

2.3.1 Risk:

Political risk analysis became a popular field of study in the wake of the 1973-74 oil crises. This severe economic event illustrated the importance of political risk analysis to investors (Brink, 2004:3). This period was however short lived and in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, particularly given the Cold War, political risk analysis lost its pre-eminence. This was as a result

of poor analytical techniques and inaccurate forecasting. Also the conceptualisation of what constituted political risk was challenged with growing trends in globalisation (Hawkins, 1996:6). “Increased uncertainty and the salience of non-traditional business and societal risks such as terrorism...have not only increased the awareness of risk in a complex environment, but have also increased the demand for risk analysis” (Hough et al, 2008:6). It is within this new global context that the question can be asked – what is risk?

Friedman and Kim (1988:64) refer to a number of definitions of risk, making special mention of the fact that risk is hard to clarify. Some commonalities among the authors on the matter cited in Friedman and Kim (1988:64) refer to such things as “probability”, “chance”, and “loss.” Simply put risk could refer to *the probability or chance of future loss*. While this is adequate it does not satisfy on a deeper meta-analytical level. According to Kobrin (1979:70) risk “has perfect knowledge of both all possible outcomes associated with an event and the probability of their occurrence, either through calculation a priori or from statistics of past experience.” This leaves one asking about the *black swan*. How do we know what we cannot know?

The definition derived from Friedman and Kim (1988) when viewed after revising Kobrin (1979) presents a number of questions and challenges to the reader. Are risks only those entities that can be perfectly forecast and accounted for? What about that which we are uncertain?

To answer these questions, one must conceive that risk is more than just “perfect knowledge of both probable outcomes...and the probability of their occurrence.” To concede that risk is founded in perfect knowledge accepts a basic premise of pure rationality – “all decision-makers share a common set of (basic) preferences, that alternatives and their consequences are defined by the environment, and that decision makers have perfect knowledge of those alternatives and their consequences” (March, 1994:3-4). This premise makes no account for that which we cannot know and the nature of imperfect information in the environment in which decision-makers’ operate. One cannot possibly conceive of all possible outcomes from an act in the political environment.

Rather, actors must accept that there are things that cannot be known, which acknowledges limited rationality in the sense that there always exists uncertainty about consequences. “Uncertainty may be imagined to exist either because some processes are uncertain at their most

fundamental levels or because decision makers' ignorance about the mechanisms driving various processes make outcomes look uncertain to them" (March, 1994:5-6). Kobrin (1979:70) makes note of the nature of uncertainty by classifying uncertainty in terms of "objective uncertainty" and "subjective uncertainty."

Subjective uncertainty refers to a situation where actors perceptions about the probability of an event occurring are based on "available information, previous experience, and individual cognitive processes which synthesize both into an imagined future" (Kobrin, 1979:70). This is congruent to heuristics within rational choice and illustrates a degree of limited rationality.

Objective uncertainty refers to a state where actors perceptions about the probability of an event occurring are founded in the situation where no single outcome dominates another and "all feasible outcomes are known, information is readily available, and all (or almost all) observers agree upon the probabilities" (Kobrin, 1979:70). This state is such that pure rationality exists and perfect decisions can be made.

From the above we can note that risk and risk analysis is in flux between both pure rationality and limited rationality. It extends beyond perfect knowledge by recognising that its knowledge is imperfect. The knowledge of uncertainty is the risk. This is essentially subjective uncertainty, but through the process of rational choice, actors will always seek to reduce the level of uncertainty such that it becomes objectively known. Risk analysis recognises the limited rationality of subjective uncertainty, and seeks the perfect rationality of objective uncertainty. Risk analysis is thus the dialectical process between that which we know and that which we cannot know but want to.

Risk, at a meta-analytical level, can thus be defined as the *situation "where the precise consequences are uncertain but their probabilities are known"* (March, 1994: 6).

Taking into account the positive and negative nature of risk, in the sense that it can be both exploited and exploitative, for the purpose of this research study a definition of risk will read:

*Risk is forecasting unknown consequences through known probabilities so as to reduce future loss or make future profit.*¹²

2.3.2 Political Risk Analysis:

From the above it is obvious that the risks defined herein occur in the context of the political environment. What is less obvious is the composition of this political environment in terms of the field of political risk analysis. Who are the actors and what sort of risks do they pose, to whom?

Authors like Kobrin (1979:67) note that political risk is most “commonly conceived of in terms of government (usually host government) interference with business operations.” Simon (1984:125) argues however, that “theories that focus exclusively on the host government as the initiator of political risk are misperceptions of the role of the state in the political risk process.” Simon (1984:125) goes on to note that the government-business interaction, while relevant, is too narrow and other relationships at a political level need to be considered. Simon (1982:66) addresses this more clearly in his earlier work by referring to the risks posed by “societal and governmental related actions and policies, as well as internally and externally based events.” Internal events occur within a specific state, and external events are events that occur outside of the state but act in. Within this research study the key actor that produces the political risk is the terrorist organisation. This organisation usually originates from within the societal level, and seeks to influence the societal and/or governmental and/or economic environment in the pursuit of its own goals or agenda.

Given the above definition of what constitutes the rational choice framework and risk, as well as the newly conceived political environment, the over-arching concept of political risk can now take its full form. Frei and Ruloff (1988:2) offered a very simple construct when they referred to political risk as “the entire scope of uncertainty posed by the political environment.” This political environment as defined above is composed of societal and governmental variables and their interaction with the enterprise/business. When reading Alon and Martin (1998:13) however,

¹²Friedman and Kim (1988:64) note that risk (in the context of PRA) can only exist in the context of an organisational entity or business activity. This assumption is implicit as the definition refers to “future loss” and “future profit” which necessarily assumes the existence of a profit driven actor as a decision-maker.

as opposed to referring directly to macro and micro threats in the enterprise/business they use the word “economy” to signify business actors or variables, and the environment it directly operates in, as well as the potential for economic gains and losses. This notion of economy signifies such things as GDP¹³ growth, income distribution and the likelihood that economic goals will be met (Alon and Martin, 1998:14). This also forms part of the political environment as the interactions between societal-governmental-economic variables and actors continually define and redefine each other. PRA uses a rational system as a means to reduce uncertainty in this environment and create probable forecasts of future events. This rational system is a “deliberative, analytical system that functions by way of established rules of logic and evidence” (Slovic et al, 2004:6).

Given the nature of political risk as it is grounded in a rational choice framework this author’s definition of PRA will read:

Political Risk Analysis is the forecasting¹⁴ of unknown consequences (risk), which originates in the environment of societal-governmental-economic interactions (at their various levels), through known probabilities so as to reduce future loss or make future profit for business.

2.3.3 Country Risk:

Within the context of this thesis an important distinction exists between political risk and country risk. From Brink (2004:22-23) it is clear that country risk is almost exclusively tied to economics, and generally tends to avoid variables of a political nature. Friedman and Kim (1988:64-65) highlight that country risk is said to be caused by...situations in a country which are economical, financial, or socio-political, while political risk is seen as being brought about by political sources.”

To paraphrase the example used by Brink (2004:23) country risk implies the financial/economic inability of a country to repay a loan, whilst political risk refers to economic, governmental, and societal reasons to be unwilling to do so.

¹³ GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product and is defined as the “total value of all final goods and services produced within the geographic boundaries of a country in an annual period (Mohr, 2005: 19).

¹⁴ “Forecasting” is favoured for use over “prediction” since forecasting is a scientific and objective rational process of projecting the certainty of past events into the uncertainty of future outcomes. Prediction is highly dependent on intuition and gut-feelings and is therefore subjectively biased and not considered scientific or reproducible as a method of analysis (Transtutors, 2010).

Country risk implies that if a country owes X and has X it will pay – given past experience of history of payments. Political risk implies that if a country owes X and has X it may still not pay due to other strategic interests in the political environment.

For example, assume Angola has a positive balance of payments in excess of \$5 billion from resource revenues and they are seeking a loan of a further \$4 billion for infrastructure development. In terms of country risk on a scale of 1 (guaranteed repayment) to 10 (no chance of repayment) the chance that Angola has the ability to repay the loan is close to 1. They would thus score very low on a country risk profile. This means that Angola's ability to repay the loan is very good owing to the fact that they have \$5 billion in resource revenues. However, when taking into account the years of bloodshed, political turmoil and harsh government politics directed at foreign mining firms an assumption can be made that the political risk of opening a mine in Angola would be closer to 10 than 1 (where 1=low risk and 10=high risk).

From this example, which is a hyperbole, one can see that political risk may take into account country risk but that country risk does not take into account political risk. In this sense political risk is perhaps less nuanced and more interpretive.

Also, from the definition of country risk it is important to note how it does not take into account variables at a societal level, like terrorism. It therefore is not relevant herein. What is relevant herein however is the following distinction between micro and macro political risk as this can have a potential impact on the type of terrorism being studied, what its goals are, and whether or not they are selective or broad-based?

2.3.4 Micro Political Risk vs. Macro Political Risk:

Further terminology can be added to this complex political environment by referring to the two terms introduced by Robock (1971:9). These terms characterise the nature of the political risk environment and are referred to as the micro and macro environment. Micro threats are risks directed at selective businesses or enterprises, while macro threats are directed at all businesses or enterprises (usually foreign enterprises are targeted by local governments). When analysing terrorism it is important to realise that terrorism occurs at both the micro and macro level – i.e. terrorism can be directed at specific industry or unilaterally applied. The activities of the Belgian CCC (Communist Combatant Cells) represents a micro level terrorist campaign in which Banks

were targeted almost exclusively since, according to the group, they represented “major havens for the financial oligarchy in the country” (Enders and Sandler, 2006:56). An example of a macro terrorist threat is the transnational nature of al-Qaeda operations in particular the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.

Simon (1982:67) represents the difference between micro and macro risk graphically in Table 1:

Table 1: Macro and Micro Threats of Political Risk

	Macro		Micro	
	Societal	Governmental	Societal	Governmental
Internal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revolution • Coup d'état 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expropriation • High inflation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selective terrorism • Selective strikes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discriminatory taxes • Subsidization
External	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International terrorism • Disinvestment pressure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nuclear war • Border conflicts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International activists • International firm boycott 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bilateral Trade • Multilateral Trade

From *Table 1* it can be deduced that the political environment refers to societal-government-business interactions. These interactions occur at a macro or micro level and may come from both internal and external sources. The relevance of this conceptual clarification is the primacy that *new terrorism* places on macro terrorism versus micro terrorism as well as the transnational versus the domestic as highlighted further on herein.

2.3.5 Political Risk vs. Political Instability:

Political instability, according to Robock (1971:8), as represented, for example, by an unexpected change in government leadership, “may or may not involve political risk for international business. Political instability... is a separate although related phenomenon from that of political risk.”

What Robock (1971) is trying to highlight is that the processes of government change need not necessarily create risk. Leadership may change constantly but decisions towards business may not. In this sense, political instability is a property of the political environment. It can occur in

spite of the presence of business, whilst political risk by its very definition assumes an effect on business in either the form of profit loss or profit gain. As noted in Friedman and Kim (1988:64) “without the existence of an organisational entity, or a business project, risk may not exist, but stability/instability can.” Political risk assumes interactions through the environment between actors; however instability assumes changes in the environment regardless of business actors.

An example of this is the stability of the USA’s electoral system. While the presidents are voted in and out of office democratically and predictably the stability of the environment hides the risks of policy change. The first term of George Bush’s presidency, regardless of the political stability, created an internal macro risk for private businesses in 2003 when he directed the Department of Homeland Security to compile a list of structural vulnerabilities to the nation’s critical infrastructure. Private companies accounted for 85% of the designated infrastructure and were warned to comply or to be strong armed by the government – facing financial penalties and loss of investment (Laudicina, 2005:143-144). In this example the political stability of the environment belies the political risk inside it.

Similarly the instability of an environment may belie the lack of political risk inside it. An example is that of large oil companies operating in notoriously unstable countries around Africa. “Companies [like] Gulf in Angola have “sat out” extended civil wars and operated profitably in unstable environments” (Robock, 1971:115) often being largely unaffected by major regime change.

The two examples above show that while there may be political stability/instability there may or may not be political risk. For this reason political risk and political stability are not synonymous.

As this relates to the threat of terrorism it has been illustrated by Enders and Sandler (2006) in their book entitled *The Political Economy of Terrorism* that politically stable liberal democratic regimes are the most susceptible to the threat of terrorism. This is because rationally liberal democratic regimes have to make a trade-off between civil liberties and the threat of terrorism - many civil freedoms granted to society (freedom of association, freedom of speech etc.) also allow terrorists the same freedom within which to make plans and attack. Conversely, regimes that are generally unstable and authoritarian do not have to guarantee civil freedoms therefore these states have more power to suppress not only their own citizens but terrorists operating

within their borders too. It seems that in the case of terrorism, one can tentatively extrapolate that political instability has a greater ability to reduce terrorism as a political risk due to the fact that civil liberties can be excluded more easily and with greater force. Whether this extrapolation can be factually established or not is out of the scope of this research study.

2.3.6 Terrorism and New Terrorism:

Richardson (2006: 20-22) highlights seven key characteristics of terrorism. Firstly, a terrorist act is political. This factor separates terrorism from crime. Secondly, the act of terrorism must involve the threat of violence or the use of violence. To this end such labels as “info terror” and “cyber terror” are not considered as terrorism herein. Thirdly, a primary goal of terrorism is to communicate a message; terrorism is not violence (or the threat thereof) for the sake of it. Fourth, the act, as well as the victim (target), represents some significance in the representation of the political message. Fifth, terrorism is the act of sub-state actors, not states. This highlights the asymmetry of power between terrorists and the societies or states that they seek to influence. Sixth, the victim of terrorism is very often removed from the primary audience that terrorists seek to change or express a message to. The point of terror is to use the victim as a means to convey the larger political message to a more powerful audience. Finally, because of the asymmetry of power that exists between terrorist organisations and states, terrorists target non-combatants or civilians. Violence directed towards non-combatants is not accidental, unlike state military confrontations, it is deliberate. This is how the locus of terror is created through the targeting of ordinary people or civilians.

A useful definition that encapsulates the above characteristics of terrorism is the definition used by the US Department of State (2003, xiii cited in Enders and Sandler 2006:3): “Terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”

To add further conceptual weight to the understanding of terrorism it is important to further distinguish between domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism according to Enders and Sandler (2006:6) “is home-grown and has consequences just for the host country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies. In a domestic incident, the perpetrators, victims, and audience are all from the host country.” An example, in this regard is the terrorist

campaign conducted by the Red Brigades in Italy which sought to significantly undermine the Italian state during the 1970's (Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 108).

Conversely, transnational terrorism is when a terrorist incident in one country involves victims, perpetrators, or audiences in two or more countries. A terrorist act may be transnational owing to its impact, planning and execution, its perpetrators, or its targets and resulting damage (Enders and Sandler, 2005: 468). An example is the simultaneous bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 by al-Qaeda.

Finally, a thorough discussion on *new terrorism*¹⁵ is constructed in Laquer (1996) and Spencer (2006). Spencer (2006: 9) notes that the concept emerged in the mid-1990's particularly after the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre, and the 1995 sarin gas attacks in Tokyo Japan by the cult Aum Shinrikyo. It is within this climate that Laquer (1996) begins to talk of 'postmodern' terrorism due to the failure of conventional definitions of terrorism to capture the global phenomenon. This 'postmodern' terrorism is characterised by transnational terror networks that use indiscriminate killing rather than attacking specific targets (Laquer, 1996:25). Hoffman (cited in Spencer, 2006:9) makes special mention of the trend that *new terrorism* is driven by religious extremism that has an uncompromising world view and largely seeks the destruction of established society which contributes to the use of indiscriminate killing as a tactic. Also, *new terrorism* is characterised by increasingly riskier and complex terrorist operations of which suicide terrorism is an example. This increased riskiness coupled with growing technological awareness means the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist groups is increasingly more likely (Spencer, 2006:10). Finally, *new terrorism* is also characterised by amateur terrorists with little experience or concrete group ties. Groups are no longer hierarchical rather they are loose networks (Spencer, 2006: 11). The afore mentioned characteristics are summed up in Hough (2005: 2) who notes that *new terrorism* places primacy on the transnational and argues that terrorists operate transnationally, in loosely organised networks; that they are largely motivated by religious extremism, and that they aim at mass casualties and attempt to obtain weapons of mass destruction for the targeting of indiscriminate victims.

¹⁵ The concept of new terrorism arguably first appears in Laquer's (1996) *Postmodern Terrorism*.

These two distinct concepts frame the concept of terrorism in two different lights. It is argued herein that this new understanding of terrorism is counterproductive and that the concept of *new terrorism* is in fact not new and is not a valid replacement to terrorism as a concept for analysis in PRA.

2.3.7 Islamic Fundamentalism:

The Islamic religion was founded by the Prophet Mohammed in the seventh century CE, and like Christianity and Judaism it is monotheistic¹⁶. The early origin of Islamic fundamentalism dates back to the formation of the Shi'a and Sunni Muslim sects and their disagreement on how the leader of the *Umma* (the community of Muslim faithful) should be selected after the death of the Prophet. The Shi'a argued that the Caliphate (successor to the Prophet Mohammed and leader of the *Umma*) should remain in the hands of Mohammad's lineal descendants. The Sunni on the other hand contended that the Caliph could be any man meeting certain criteria of faith and learning. A bitter struggle ensued between the Shi'a and the more moderate Sunni - in which the Sunni eventually gained ascendancy as well as the majority of Muslim followers (Shughart, 2006: 17-28).

Coupled with this inherent disagreement about the Islamic faith is the strand of fundamentalism woven into Islamic theology during the 18th century. This followed the doctrine of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his support for the Shi'a. His purpose was expressed as a campaign of purification and renewal where he sought to return the Muslim world to the pure and authentic Islam of the Prophet, removing and if necessary destroying all those opposed. This fundamentalist idea is carried on in the notion of Wahhabism and leads its followers to disdain, above all, "false Muslims" who do not follow Shari'a (Islamic Law) or correctly practice the ways of Islam – making them infidels. If a Muslim group could show proof that the laws of Islam had been incorrectly practiced, the strictures against Muslims using violence on Muslims no longer applied (Botha, 2008:17). This heralded in a movement of Islamist terrorist groups that fought against the "more liberal, tolerant, and pluralist" Muslim rulers in the Middle East (Shughart, 2006: 28). This also helped radicalise opposition to colonialism in the national uprisings which characterised decolonisation in the post-war period.

¹⁶ Monotheism is the belief in one god. In Islam this is *Allah* (Rowe, 2001:5)

Contributing to the fundamentalism inherent in Wahhabism, the colonial experience of predominately Muslim nations gave rise to a number of nationalist movements. These movements, however, were largely secular aligning themselves purely to political ideals. Fundamentalism thus became a representation of the need to have a nationalist project that had Islamic principles in mind. Islam has always been considered a universal religion in the sense that Islam dominates all dimensions of human existence. The key factor in this regard is the primacy followers of Islam (in particular Shi'a Muslims) place on Islamic Law to achieve this universality. It is this factor that links the Islamic religion to politics (Milton-Edwards, 2005:11). Fundamentalism in the post-war period thus became a representation of political and religious Islamic beliefs in opposition to the colonial experience.

Other characteristics of fundamentalism (be it Islamic or other monotheistic religions) are religious idealism, cosmic struggle, demonising the opponent, reactionary thinking, and envy of the modernist hegemony and the revolutionary overthrow of power (Milton-Edwards, 2005: 2). The Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups that are to be discussed within this context are: the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda.

Within the overarching context of this research study this understanding of Islamic fundamentalism is important as it illustrates that fundamentalism is not a 21st century novelty. Islam has long been in competition with established secular societies and institutions. Islam has also long been a part of politics and with the more recent growth rate of Islamic followers at roughly 2.9 percent the global population of Muslim followers can be approximated to be in the region of 1 billion (Dixon, 2004:237). This implies that there will likely be a growing tendency to challenge institutions, governments and societies that do not adhere to Islamic laws, particularly in states that are predominately Muslim. This is already being expressed in certain countries in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia where Muslims are in conflict with non-Muslims for control of the government, as well as, Sunni Muslims are in conflict with Shi'a Muslims with regard to the stringency with which Islamic law is interpreted.

2.4 Contextualisation: Terrorism within a Rational Choice Framework

As mentioned in the previous chapter this research study will use a rational choice framework as it guides the political risk assessment process and also the terrorist organisation. However, there

are a number of objections to applying rational choice to terrorism. The first objection comes from Bandura (1990:79) who notes that rational choice is a theory for individual behaviour and terrorist behaviour “can best be explained by the psychology of the group.” A second objection is the assumption in rational choice that individuals rationally seek to maximise their well-being. In this instance Caplan (2006) points to suicide terrorism, where the personal cost far exceeds personal benefit.

The first criticism goes to the debate on structure and agency where there is dialectic between the group and the individual in which they consistently shape one another’s values and roles. When applying rational choice it is logical to assume that as rational choice shapes the individual it in turn shapes the values of the group and vice-versa. This criticism can also be discarded by relaxing the assumption of rational choice that it purely applies to individuals – this is covered extensively in March (1994).

Pape (2003) provides a promising rebuttal to the second criticism in his text *The Strategic Logic of Terrorism* in which he highlights the rationality of suicide terrorism as a tactic given constraints on the terrorist group and given relevant motives and outcomes. Caplan (2006) also concedes that, apart from suicide terrorism, terrorism at the very least is “probably close” to rational. Caplan (2006) also concedes that the principle of self-interest in rational choice need not be strictly applied to rational choice. These rebuttals go a long way in supporting the following argument.

Despite these criticisms Bray (2009:2) notes a number of benefits of considering violent political behaviour and terrorism in terms of rational choice. First, rational choice can explore the motives of terrorists within a single conceptual framework from tacit approval to explicit monetary support. Second, rational choice theory does not pass value judgements on the reasonableness of individual’s preferences. Therefore, it is applicable no matter what the individual’s religious, moral or political beliefs. Third, rational choice explicitly considers constraints on individual behaviour. Finally, the forecasts made by rational choice can be tested empirically using observational data. This final point however, is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The question then has to be asked and answered – What makes terrorism/terrorist rational?

Caplan (2006:93) notes that there are three classes of terrorist: sympathisers, who favour terrorism without doing much about it; active terrorists, who belong to a terrorist organisation, and suicidal terrorists, who kill themselves for the political agenda (or cause). These classes will now be systematically discussed given the three most important assumptions of rational choice: rational actors respond to constraints/incentives, rational actors are self interested, and, rational actors have rational expectations about preferences.

2.4.1 Responsiveness to Incentives:

Responsiveness to incentives implies that rational actors weight the utility of incentives versus the utility of constraints when identifying preferences. As far as terrorist sympathisers go, if the constraints to being a terrorist (persecution, imprisonment, death) drastically decreased, and there was no risk to being a terrorist, it seems likely that terrorist sympathisers would in fact become terrorists (Caplan, 2006: 94).

Terrorists measure their involvement in a different fashion to terrorist sympathisers based on the fact that their preferences are different and the weights that they assign to incentives and constraints differ. To this end the incentive (monetary support, personal happiness, religious acceptance) outweigh the constraints.

Response to incentives is similarly applied by the individual or group when selecting tactics. Richardson (2006:33) notes that historically the most common terrorist tactic is bombing because it is cheap, dramatic, indiscriminate and relatively easy to leave the scene of the crime. Therefore while terrorists might have preferences that seem irrational to those that do not share similar preferences, they still respond to incentives and constraints when acting.

Suicide terrorism follows a similar logic. As applied to the group, suicide terrorism is a tactic that considers constraints and incentives – the death of a low number of group member versus a high impact, high death ratio against the target. Pape (2003) notes that suicide attacks are more likely to extract large concessions from targets making the reward greater than the loss. In this sense the rational individual would make his preferences based on the cost to the group versus the cost to the so-called enemy.

From the above terrorist sympathisers, terrorists and suicide terrorists can all be considered rational as they all respond to incentives and constraints.

2.4.2 Narrow Self-Interest:

Sympathisers are most obviously selfish. They agree with terrorist goals, motives and tactics and yet do not take part in any of the activity. This is paramount to free-riding in economic terms, where a certain benefit or preference can be enjoyed without having to consider the constraints and incentives to achieve it (Black et al, 2006: 34). Free-riding is not to say however, that they do not consider constraints and incentives to join a terrorist group directly it is merely stressing that they can selfishly enjoy the achievements of a terrorist group, without having to suffer any of the constraints associated with terrorist activity.

However, what about active terrorists and suicide terrorists? A response taken by a number of authors who value the rational choice approach make mention of the idea that terrorists value the group, the political agenda and the hatred of the enemy above the value that they place on themselves (Gambetta, 2005; Hoffman and McCormick, 2004 cited in Caplan, 2006: 95). Richardson (2006:34) makes a similar claim that those who become suicide terrorists do so out of the value that they place on anger, humiliation, a desire for revenge, commitment to the cause and a desire for glory. In other words suicide terrorists give their lives “for reasons no more irrational than those of anyone prepared to give their lives for a cause.” Similarly Pape (2003:2) says “even if many suicide attackers are irrational or fanatical, the leadership groups that recruit and direct them are not.” From this perspective suicide terrorists are designed to achieve specific political goals, to mobilise financial support and coerce a target government which are in the group’s self-interest. Finally, as noted by Caplan (2006: 94) and Dixit and Skeath (2004:30) narrow selfishness is very rarely an explicit condition in rational choice and can be relaxed.

Terrorist sympathisers, terrorists and suicide terrorists can all be considered rational as they either are narrowly self-interested or probably close depending on how stringent the application of narrow self-interest is. They are, however, interested in the success of the group as a whole since the group ideals sustain most of their preferences.

2.4.3 Rational Expectations:

One of the main reasons many see terrorists as irrational is probably that their beliefs are so improbable and dogmatic (Wiktorowicz, 2004 cited in Caplan, 2006; 97). The promise of rational choice presents a notable insight in this regard. Dixit and Skeath (2004:30) note that rational expectations need not mean that rational actors share the same value or belief system it simply means that rational actors consistently follow the value or belief system that they subscribe to.

Caplan (2006:97) argues to the contrary stating that rational actors have unbiased beliefs and that making a mistake (with regard to expectations is one thing) but making the same mistake over and over is another. Random mistakes can be explained by constraints to the rational process, but recurring mistakes suggest a disregard for the rational process.

Terrorist sympathisers by not engaging in terrorist activity have rational expectations that are very close to the rational model, but terrorists and in particular suicide terrorists require some investigation.

Logically, biblical literalism as in Islamic fundamentalism seems an irrational expectation. Osama Bin Laden is quoted as saying that “we are certain the we shall – with the grace of Allah – prevail over the Americans and over the Jews, as the Messenger of Allah promised us...Instead of remaining United States, it shall end up separated states” (Caplan, 2006: 97).

This expectation that the USA will fall at the hands of Allah cannot be claimed with absolute certainty and is extremely radical, it therefore violates rational expectation – or does it? Within a rational framework people can subscribe to radical doctrines and biblical literalism even though they get little material satisfaction from doing so; however, it must be noted that there is no material cost to being wrong. Transitively, however, if a radical doctrine is not believed and it comes true then the material cost of being wrong is very high. *Pascal's wager* illustrates this logical dilemma perfectly. *Pascal's wager* is based on the logic of utility and states that: the cost of believing in God and being wrong is less than not believing in God and finding out that He does exist. Therefore the rational choice would be to believe (Bernstein, 2006).

Within the staunch ideological, radical and religious doctrines that terrorist groups follow members are surrounded by other so-called true believers. It is such that the cost of not following the prevailing doctrine is higher than simply adhering to the doctrine. The expectations of terrorists are mutually reinforced by the organisation and the members within it who all place a higher cost on not following organisational values than following them. In this way they consistently follow the value or belief system that they subscribe to.

Intriligator (2010:3) notes that the idea of substitution in economic theory applies to terrorist groups who, given the cost of terrorist tactics, substitute one tactic for another. In cases where the chances of success of a simple bombing are low and the success of a suicide bombing is high, the suicide tactic will substitute the more traditional bombing method. Suicide terrorists when considered as a tactic and not as a human choice are therefore close to perfectly rational. Furthermore Richardson (2006:136) notes that suicide terrorism is a group choice since the group plays a significant role in planning the attack, as well as training, sustaining and supervising the volunteer. It is likely that the individuals selected are particularly radical in their religious, ideological and moral expectations. Also given the likely number of terrorists being relatively high and the number of suicide bombers comparatively low suicide bombers can be seen as the exception and not necessarily the rule.

Suicide terrorists, whilst not wholly satisfying the rational expectations assumption, are closely aligned to the group. It is the dynamics and the values of the group, which guide suicide terrorists, which are rational. This in turn makes suicide terrorists at the very least close to rational.

From the above arguments terrorists, suicide terrorists and the terrorist organisation can be considered rational as they respond to incentives, are largely self-interested, and have rational expectations about future events.

2.5 Conclusion:

The primary aims of this chapter was to provide a conceptual understanding of the key terms within this study as well as introduce the theory on which this study is based. Accordingly, rational choice, PRA and terrorism were discussed.

The core of the rational choice framework stresses 3 key points: 1) rational actors have preferences about varying states of the world, 2) even when relaxing the narrow self-interest principle, rational actors still seek the preference with the highest utility given incentives and constraints, 3) rational actors can have varying expectations about future events, however, so long as they consistently act to achieve their highest expected outcome they are considered rational.

When rational choice is applied to PRA it is visible that the process that PRA follows is congruent to the heuristic process within the rational framework. PRA also serves as a means to illuminate the rational processes of the actors that it seeks to analyse by reducing uncertainty and providing the link between subjective and objective uncertainty within a risk environment.

The conceptualisation of political risk herein is based on principles of risk and uncertainty and shaped around a conceptual understanding of the political environment as being societal-governmental-economic in its dynamic interaction. To further add range to the conceptualisation of political risk the micro, macro, internal and external nature of the political environment is also considered. What is important to recognise however is that risk can only occur in the context of the interaction between business/enterprises/organisations and the political environment such that there is the probability of future profit loss or profit gain. To this end PRA is grounded in rational choice theory as business/organisational actors, who are risk averse, actively seek to use the processes of PRA to maximise expected utility by reducing loss.

The strength of this definition lies in its meta-analytical depth by addressing the decision-making structures of uncertainty and risk and the actors that operate within this environment. This gives PRA scope to address varying forms of risk, as well as various forms of political environmental actors.

Ultimately, political risk analysis is a useful forecasting tool and according to Howell and Chaddick (1994:71) provides the “critical interface between the world of politics and that of economics.”

The conceptualisation of terrorism illustrates that terrorist groups and terrorists are politically motivated, thus locating them within the political environment that PRA similarly operate in.

Also, due to the targeting of non-combatants terrorism can also be simultaneously located in the social and business environment since actors in these spheres often form part of the target agenda of terrorist groups.

Terrorists and suicide terrorists were also shown to adhere to a rational framework because they respond to incentives, act on their own behalf or that of the group in which they have a stake and have rational expectations even if those expectations are not congruent to the rest of society. This rational framework is chiefly applied to the study of the terrorist group henceforth; it also recognises the rationality of individual actors.

A discussion on what is considered *new terrorism* also presented the key characteristics of terrorism since the mid-1990's and in particular since 2001. Notable characteristics in this regard are the transnational and macro nature of *new terrorism*. Also important is the primacy given to Islamic fundamentalism.

This chapter also indicated what is understood by *Islamic fundamentalism*. Defining characteristics of fundamentalism include: religious idealism, cosmic struggle, demonising the opponent, reactionary thinking, and envy of the modernist hegemony and the revolutionary overthrow of power (Milton-Edwards, 2005: 2). Following from this discussion the concept of *new terrorism* argues for the novelty of religious fundamentalism. This, however, is not considered a variable due to the blurring of the lines between political and religious goals of so-called religious fundamentalist terrorist groups. Also from the outset of the study it is apparent that Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups have existed in both time periods and therefore religious extremism cannot be a novelty.

A prominent feature of the terrorist landscape in the late 20th and early 21st century is Islamic fundamentalism which adds to the level of risk associated with terrorism. It is often characterised as militant and radical, with such accounts focusing on the 'here and now' threat that Islamic fundamentalism poses to established political and economic institutions.

Chapter 3 will discuss Islamic fundamentalist terrorism as it existed from 1945-2009. This historical comparative analysis forms the basis of what is considered *old terrorism* versus *new terrorism*, accordingly, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda will be discussed.

Chapter 3: Islamic fundamentalism (1945-2009)

3.1 Introduction:

This chapter will begin by discussing two important Islamic fundamentalist organisations within the time period 1945-2000. For this purpose the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah have been selected. To add further depth to the historical analysis an account of the Iranian Revolution will also be given since Ayatollah Khomeini's regime in Iran, as a result of the revolution, "inspired and assisted" Shi'a terrorist groups in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Lebanon (Rapoport, 2004:62). Accordingly, terrorism had an "able and active state sponsor", a role Iran played throughout the 1990's (Pillar, 2001:46). Also for discussion is the influence of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the role of international actors, and the subsequent responses from Islamic fundamentalist groups.

In the second instance this chapter will provide clear descriptions of the *goals*, *targets* and *tactics* of each group within the period 1945 to 2000 and illustrate notable trends within this time frame. This analysis will help determine the fundamental characteristics of so-called *old terrorism*.

Moving on from the period 1945-2000, al-Qaeda will be discussed within the context of the second historical time period 2001-2009. The development of "al-Qaeda" from an ideal to what can be called a network of groups will be discussed in the section entitled *al-Qaeda*. This section will establish the group al-Qaeda as a meaningful construct in the dialogue of *new terrorism*. Once the group that is considered al-Qaeda is more firmly established, the *goals*, *targets* and *tactics* of al-Qaeda will be discussed to assess whether there are any significantly new observations to be made about al-Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism in the period 2001-2009 that justify the concept *new terrorism*.

In concluding the most significant differences between *old terrorism* and *new terrorism* will be highlighted so that a discussion can take place on the value of *new terrorism* as a concept for analysis in PRA.

3.2 The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism in the Period 1945-2000:

As discussed in the previous chapter³³, Islam is predominately divided between the Sunni and the Shi'a³⁴ both of which are denominations of the Muslim faith. What is important herein is

³³ Chapter 2 sub heading 2.3.7 – Islamic fundamentalism

³⁴ Shiite is also an accepted term; however, Shi'a will be used henceforth.

the growth of Islamic fundamentalism between both Sunni and Shi'a sects and the increasing links between Islam, politics and terrorism.

The most expressive link that Islam has to politics is through Shari'a (Islamic Law) which Muslim rulers are obliged to implement over the territories of their authority. This in turn guarantees the universality of the Islamic faith as Islamic Law coupled with Islam as a religion accounts for all aspects of life, birth and death within a Muslims world view (Milton-Edwards, 2005:14). Anneli Botha in *Terrorism in the Maghreb* (2005:17) notes that "in practical terms Muslims are under an obligation to implement and follow God's Law [(Islamic Law)]...Those who do not implement it and follow it to the letter are regarded as illegitimate...[failure] to follow Islamic Law...provides sufficient grounds for a legitimate *jihad*." *Jihad* is literally translated to mean 'struggle' (Burke, 2007:30).

The term *jihad* was a key concept in the first terrorist group for discussions vocabulary. Within the Muslim Brotherhood's vocabulary *jihad* refers not only to armed struggle to liberate Muslim lands from colonial occupation, but also to the inner effort that Muslims needed to make in order to free themselves from an ingrained inferiority complex and from fatalism³⁵ as well as passivity towards their condition (Ikwanweb, 2010).³⁶

At a broader level this so-called struggle is undertaken by all Muslims to reunite (or destroy) infidels and non-believers within the universal religious principles of Islam. However, the *jihad* declared by Islamist leaders of fundamentalist organisations has been interpreted as a declaration of [holy] war against the West (Milton-Edwards, 2005:108). *Jihad* is seen as the final link in the chain between religion, politics and terrorism - Islam is linked to politics via Islamic Law, and this in turn is linked to terrorism by the principle of *jihad* which links back to Islam as a religious practice.

The colonial legacy challenged the ability of Muslim communities, especially in North Africa and the Middle East, not only to rule themselves (self-determination) but also challenged a key aspect of the Muslim faith – Islamic Law. This represents a break in the chain. Accordingly, the first fundamentalist groups adopted elements of *jihad* as a means to right the wrongs levelled against them and their religion.

³⁵ "Fatalism is the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do" (Stanford, 2010).

³⁶ Ikwanweb (or <http://www.ikwanweb.com>) is the official English language Muslim Brotherhood website.

As discussed in Milton-Edwards (2005:25) fundamentalism in the inter-war period of the early twentieth century was evident in the rise of new Muslim figures such as Hassan al-Banna in Egypt. Hassan established the first major Islamic movement known as the Muslim Brotherhood. This group remains active to the present day and accounts for a variety of activities associated with Islamic fundamentalism as a political force. Hassan was also pivotal in articulating fundamentalist political agendas that motivated millions to participate in processes that became the struggle in colonial Muslim domains for self-determination and independence.

The risk of fundamentalism, and terrorism, in the period immediately after the World War II (1945) was located in areas where the colonial legacy was still entrenched – in particular in countries that had a majority Muslim population and that had growing nationalisation movements. Due to the nature of colonial domination terrorism in this period manifested itself domestically. One such group, already alluded to, is the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

3.3 The Muslim Brotherhood – A Structural Overview:

Hassan al-Banna is arguably the founding father of modern Islamic fundamentalism. Born in 1906 his emergence as the founder of *al-Ikhwān al-Muslīmīn* (Muslim Brotherhood – henceforth referred to as Brotherhood) in 1928 in the Suez Canal city of Ismailia, Egypt, represents, according to Milton-Edwards (2005:27), “the transition from pre-fundamentalist to full-fundamentalist articulation of ideas within many Muslim realms.”

The Brotherhood is a hierarchal organisation lead by the Supreme Guide. This individual is aided by a thirteen member Guidance Bureau that formulates policies, manages activities and selects leadership. Also attached to the leadership is a consultative group of clerics – leaders sharing the goal of promoting Islamic Law in Egypt. In spite of its hierarchical nature the Brotherhood also had some 1,700-2000 decentralised branches working at a municipal level to aid local Egyptians neglected by the government’s incompetence. In 1948 the Brotherhood had about 1 million followers and sympathisers in Egypt (Zollner, 2009:10).

3.3.1 Goals:

The most explicit statement of the Brotherhood’s goals, appeared, as they still do, in their publication entitled *The Initiative*:

“[The Brotherhood is] working to establish God’s law as we believe it to be the real effective way out of all suffering and problems. The mission could be achieved through

building the Muslim individual, Muslim family, Muslim government, and the Muslim state that leads Islamic countries, gathers all Muslims, regains Islamic glory, gives lost Muslim land back to its owners and carries the flag of the call of God, thus making the world happy via the teachings and rights of Islam” (cited in Phillips, 2009:8).

This statement is borne out of the period between 1920 and 1945. During this time al-Banna formed the Brotherhood due to grievances that stemmed from the exploitation of Egyptian workers at the hands of foreigners at the Suez Canal Company as well as the incompetence of the Egyptian government to protect its citizens from such exploitation. Also heavily criticised was the corruption and division that the Egyptian political elite caused in the country. Al-Banna declared that Egyptian poverty, powerlessness, and lack of dignity resulted from failing to adhere to Islam and adopting Western values and culture. “Islam hooah al-hal” (Islam is the solution to all Egyptian and mankind’s ills), a catch-phrase still used today within the group, represents the frustration that the Brotherhood had with socialism, capitalism, and a democracy manipulated to favour the ruling party and the global elite (Aboul-Enien, 2003:27).

To add insult to injury the persistent interference of the British government in Egyptian politics to secure allies against Nazi Germany prior to World War II resulted in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. This treaty added to anti-British sentiments which were already on the rise due to the confrontation between Jewish settlers and Muslim natives in Palestine, a land under British mandate. The Palestinian uprising of 1936 gained wide spread support amongst Egyptian nationals and members of the Brotherhood – in which the Brotherhood contributed a number of fighters from its armed wing. Also, the beginning of the World War II further galvanised support for the Brotherhood as anti-British sentiments grew even more, not only because Egypt did not want to become a theatre of war but also because Britain now demanded power over Egyptian national politics. These events exposed the powerlessness of the Egyptian government under King Farouk, which led to wide spread disillusionment with the democratic movement and the value of a parliament (Zollner, 2009:11).

Al-Banna also heavily criticised the secular path of Egypt’s elite, and lamented the extent to which Egyptians were subservient to foreign ideas. Al-Banna went as far as to criticise the community of clerics (Ulama) for being influenced by the British. Accordingly al-Banna declared that the Brotherhood would use all necessary means, including violence, to establish Islamic rule in Egypt in the post-war period (Phillips, 2009:7).

From 1926 to 1945 no significant changes occurred within the Egyptian ruling elite, despite political pressure from the Brotherhood. From 1945 onwards a breakdown in the relationship between King Farouk and then Prime Minister Nahas Pasha and the Brotherhood began to surface. A once tolerant relationship quickly eroded with the formation of militant guerrilla training camps outside of Cairo and in southern Egypt. At its outset the Brotherhood had developed a political, educational and social wing and by the end of World War II (1945) it also had a fully functional military wing known as the “Special Apparatus” (Phillips, 2009:7). In conjunction with the militant wing the Brotherhood established a quasi-judiciary that issued fatwa’s³⁷ against those who were judged to have betrayed faith and country. Once the judiciary arm condemned a person, the Brotherhood’s militant arm carried out the sentence.

A critical point in the Brotherhoods early history was the assassination of Al-Banna in 1949 by the Egyptian government as retaliation for a brief programme of violence attributed to the Brotherhood. This is in spite of al-Banna’s efforts to steer the group towards mainstream political Islam and the political centre within Egypt (Ikhwanweb, 2010).

The assassination of al-Banna left the ideology of the Brotherhood open to a number of Islamic thinkers and ideologues whose philosophical justification for fundamentalist Islam would spread beyond a small group of extremists. For the Brotherhood such an ideologue was the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (Richardson, 2006: 87).

Under the influence of Qutb, and in reaction to the harsh treatment by the political elite the Brotherhood aligned themselves to the Free Officers³⁸ in a 1952 coup to overthrow King Farouk in which Gamal Abdul Nasser came to power. Nasser consolidated his power by abolishing the monarchy, constitution and all political parties. Nasser also set about rejecting foreign control and promoting a sense of Arab nationalism, however his secularism did not reflect the identity of many Egyptians. Qutb’s philosophy of fundamentalism coupled with the failure of Nasser and the Egyptian government to promote Islamic Law eventually triggered the emergence of even more hostile, violent and radical groups committed to imposing Islamic Law within Egypt, for example Al-Jihad³⁹ (Phillips, 2009:8).

³⁷ A *fatwa* is a legal statement or ruling issued by an Islamic scholar.

³⁸ The Free Officers refers to a clandestine group of young officers from within the Egyptian military formed under Gamal Abdul Nasser (Onwar, 2010).

³⁹ Al-Jihad or Egyptian Islamic Jihad has been active in Egypt since the 1970’s and currently has strong links to al-Qaeda (Castells, 2004).

By 1954 the Brotherhood had rejected Nasser and rallied a number of protests. A member of the Brotherhood also attempted to assassinate Nasser. When Nasser uncovered the plot a nationwide sweep arrested some 20,000 Brotherhood members (placing them in internment camps) and banned the Brotherhood⁴⁰. Among the arrested was Qutb.

While in prison Qutb wrote *Signposts on the Road (Ma'alim fi al-tariq)*. This work is the seminal literary work articulating Islamic fundamentalist and is considered the founding manifesto of jihadism (Phillips, 2009:11). Qutb was as radical as to deny all forms of human rule on earth, including democracy.

Qutb is cited in Phillips (2009:12) as follows:

“To declare divinity for God alone...means a full revolt against human rulership in all its shapes and forms, systems, and arrangements. It means destroying the kingdom of man to establish the Kingdom of God on earth...the wresting of power from the hands of its human usurpers to return it to God alone; the supremacy of divine law alone and the cancellation of human laws.”

The execution of Qutb in 1966 at the hands of Nasser as well as the humiliating defeat of Egypt and its allies to Israel in the Six Day War on June 1967 further accelerated Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt. The government was again blamed, and the loss was seen as punishment by God for its secularism (Phillips, 2009:9). At this time, an already growing split in the ideological path of the Brotherhood became even more apparent. The more radical members favoured an immediate revolution, while the moderates favoured a more long term political solution.

Nasser's successor, Anwar al-Sadat, introduced a policy of economic liberalisation and, to a much lesser extent, political liberalisation. In 1971 the internment camps were closed, and the regime began to gradually release the imprisoned Brothers, though the organisation itself remained illegal; the last of those still behind bars regained their freedom in the general amnesty of 1975 (Ikhwanweb, 2010). Under Sadat the Brotherhood achieved a minor success with regard to their goals when Sadat officially reviewed Egyptian legislation. In accordance with this the constitution was amended in 1980 to state that Islamic Law “is the main source of law” (Ikhwanweb, 2010). These concessions by the government meant that the Brotherhood could favour a moderate stance and still achieve results. Sadat was assassinated

⁴⁰ The Brotherhood was also outlawed in 1948

by the Islamic fundamentalist group Al-Jihad in 1981 because of a peace agreement that he brokered between Israel and Egypt, which was seen as a failure to the Muslim world.

For the 1980's and 1990's under the Egyptian leadership of Hosni Mubarak the Brotherhood continued to, as it still does, favour a moderate approach to achieving their goals. This is characterised by their attempts to infiltrate legal political parties, trade unions and various industries across Egypt to gain a stronger political foothold in Egypt.

3.3.2 Targets:

During a period of militancy after World War II the Brotherhood singled out a number of targets to achieve their goals (both violently and non-violently) through the use of their military wing the "Special Apparatus." Internally, the unit was structured around cells which operated almost independently, with fighters not knowing about the activities of other clandestine cells (Zollner, 2009:13). This makes the activities of the group hard to account for, however the following list of offences were attributed to the Brotherhood and their military wing in 1948: an explosion outside the house of Mustapha El Nahas, president of the Wafd party ("Delegation Party"); the attempted bombing of the Sudan Agency, and; bombing of department stores of Ades, Ben Zion, Gettegno, the Delta Land Company⁴¹ and the Société Orientale de Publicité⁴² (New York Times, 1948).

Also, on the 29 December 1948 the Egyptian Premier, Mahmoud Fahmy Nokrashy Pasha, was assassinated by a student member of the Brotherhood, which the Premier had banned on 8 December 1948. Also at this stage mass protests were held against the government ruling to ban the Brotherhood (New York Times, 1948).

Zollner (2009:13) notes that during 1948 the struggle between the Brotherhood and the then ruling government accelerated into a state of near-persistent violence. This culminated in the dissolution order of 1948, Al-Banna's assassination in 1949, the public shaming of the Brotherhood in a number of military trials, and the persecution and torture of members, which left the organisation in a deep crisis. In this situation, the survival of the idea of this political-religious movement was at stake (Zollner, 2009:16). This ushered into notoriety a number of ideologues that would advance the group in a number of directions, one such ideologue was Qutb.

⁴¹ A London-based business consortium.

⁴² A French industry, also called the Eastern Advertising Company

Whilst the influence of Qutb on the Brotherhood, circa 1960, can be debated, the Brotherhood nevertheless aligned themselves with the Free Officers in 1952 in a coup d'état to overthrow the Egyptian government. This participation is similar to their contribution of fighters to the Palestinian uprising in 1936 and illustrated their desire for an Egypt (and her allies) free from the hold of foreign power as well as the rise of an Egyptian government that promotes Islamic Law.

Whether the actions of the Brotherhood inspired Qutb's writings or visa-versa, is debatable but a corner stone of Qutb's ideology is the key concepts of *jahiliyya* (ignorance or the ignorant) and *jihad* (struggle). Upon these he builds a concise and uncomplicated interpretation. It emphasises that the true Muslim is obliged to counteract all non-Islamic influences, thus striving to implement *hakimiyyat Allah* (God's 'absolute' authority). "Jahiliyya and *hakimiyyat Allah* are thus binary opposites and it is the duty of Muslims to engage in *jihad* to fight the first and to implement the latter" (Zollner, 2009:56).

The execution of Qutb in 1966 made him a martyr for the cause giving the Brothers a clear sense of community and resistance. The Qutb legacy is also revered amongst both radicals and moderates (Zollner, 2009:45). Whilst this did not usher in a new phase of extreme violence within the Brotherhood (which had its own leadership struggles to contend with), Qutb's work serves as a basis for more radical members and groups that have emanated from Egypt and the Muslim world in the years after his death.

Given the targets above, it is clear, as aligned with the group's goals, the Brotherhood targeted foreign interests as well as key government officials. It must be noted that this violence was only propagated with the failure of a political solution. Rationally it was perceived within the Brotherhood that extreme action against said targets will put pressure on them to leave the country (with regard to foreign business) or change policy (with regard to government officials).

3.3.3 Tactics:

The Brotherhood's tactics can be split into two clear paths as it emerged from World War II and as it entered the 21st century – these are confrontationist and accommodationist respectively (Abed-Kotob, 1995:321).

The confrontationist agenda has attributed to it an antidemocratic hostile philosophy that encourages violence and terrorism and poses a risk to both regional stability and Western

interests (Abed-Kotob, 1995:321). These factors make confrontationist terrorist groups a high political risk.

The immediate post-war period was when the Brotherhood was at its most violent peak. This was exacerbated by the situation in Egypt whereby the political elite had failed in its accommodation of Brotherhood ideology and proceeded to ban it. This exacerbated the asymmetry of power that already existed between the political elite and the Brotherhood. A growth in the asymmetry of power between forces makes it rational to use more unconventional methods to achieve preference outcomes or goals. This forced elements within the Brotherhood to adjust their tactics away from the political process towards protests and eventually violence – this is especially the case with the Brotherhood’s “Special Apparatus.”

After the assassination of al-Banna, and the rise of Qutb, as an ideological leader, this process of adjusting tactics to achieve preference outcomes was even more extreme such that it could not be contained within a single organised structure like the Brotherhood. Also members of the Brotherhood faced low rates of return and high rates of loss – given the steadfast nature of the Egyptian elite and the harsh measures that were enacted to curtail the Brotherhood.

These factors prompted the emergence of organisations more ready to use and maintain a confrontationist approach outside of the limitations already set against the Brotherhood. Prior to this, however, the terror campaign conducted by the Brotherhood included, protests, bombings, assassinations and the contribution of fighters to war-like efforts and coups.

With the formation of alternative groups to the Brotherhood, like Al-Jihad, the onus was no longer on the Brotherhood to act in a confrontationist way. More moderate members, the original core of the Brotherhood, could now stay within the group, and more fundamentalist members could start their own groups or join groups that promoted more confrontationist ideologies.

In the latter half of the 20th century the Brotherhood increasingly leaned towards an accommodationist approach decreasing their political risk. Accommodationists argue that hostility and violence are not inherent in Islamic movements and political and religious objectives can be achieved peacefully (Abed-Kotob, 1995:321). This approach taken by the

Brotherhood draws its concepts of non-violent opposition from al-Hudaybi's⁴³ writing *Du'at la Qudat* (Preachers not Judges). Although al-Hudaybi played a decisive role in the development of a conciliatory concept, which aims to gradually change the existing state system(s) toward an Islamic order, he is seldom given much Western scholarly attention when compared to al-Banna and Qutb (Zollner, 2009:146). Al-Banna and Qutb lived as activists, and their propagandist writings are used today to portray the Brotherhood's violent political engagements and creed, but less recognised is al-Hudaybi's theological and juridical approach. This has created a gap in descriptions of the Brotherhood, with the focus on Qutb and al-Banna providing little by way of explanation for the Brotherhood's accommodationist approach today (Zollner, 2009:146).

The evolution of the Brotherhood throughout the 20th century illustrates some of the core grievances, main goals, preferred targets and likely tactics for terror groups to come. In the context of the Brotherhood, their evolution as a political risk was within a politically unstable environment, which they both reacted to and fostered. It appears that harsh government reaction in fact aids terrorism rather than removes it, as is the case with the formation of Al-Jihad as a reaction to the clamp down on the Brotherhood. Based on the goals, tactics and targets of the Brotherhood, they present a macro, transnational risk. This is in light of the fact that local and foreign were regarded as targets. *Table 2* highlights the key findings with regard to the primary variables as they relate to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Table 2: Summary of Findings for the Muslim Brotherhood

Group	Goals	Targets	Tactics
Muslim Brotherhood (1945-2000)	1) Islamic Law for the state 2) Removal of foreign influence	The Egyptian State. Domestically located foreign influences.	Protest, assassination, kidnapping, bombing.

3.4 The Iranian Revolution: A Catalyst for Violence:

The Iranian Revolution in 1979 was a watershed moment for Islamic fundamentalism and ushered in a wave of terrorism that was mostly Muslim in origin and exceedingly more transnational; spreading into Central Asia through the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, in the Middle East by animosity to American support of Israel, and inspired everywhere from Algeria to Chechnya, Kashmir, Indonesia, the Philippines and beyond by pan-Islamic

⁴³ al-Hudaybi was the leader of the Brotherhood after the assassination of al-Banna (Zollner, 2009).

dreams of uniting fundamentalist Muslim states, freed from Western cultural contamination, under Caliphate hegemony and Shari'a law (Shughart, 2006:8).

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was wholly unexpected (Rapoport, 2004:62). Ayatollah Khomeini's successful toppling of the Shah swept a Shi'a theocracy into power in Iran, subjecting the Iranian populace to a "dour, puritanical faith, policed by petty theocrats and religious commissars" (Zakaria, 2003:145).

As it has been claimed by Rapoport (2004:62) Khomeini's reign "inspired and assisted" Shi'a terrorist groups in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Lebanon. Khomeini's reign was also heavily autocratic, anti-modernisation as well as anti-American. This stance is epitomised by Khomeini's reference to America as the "Great Satan" and the holding of fifty-two American hostages for more than 400 days in the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979 (Milton-Edwards, 2005:98). The revolution therefore had two notable effects: 1) it ushered in a government in Iran that was pro-fundamentalism, and 2) illustrated the fallibility of foreign interests in Muslim states.

Apart from the Iranian Revolution and, what many fundamentalists (including the Brotherhood) saw as a capitulation to Israel – Egypt's treaty with Israel⁴⁴ – there is another event that is also pivotal in galvanising Islamic fundamentalist ideals across the globe. This event is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 25 December 1979. The Soviet invasion coupled with the Iranian Revolution, turned what was largely sporadic Islamic fundamentalist militancy into a future trend of full blown terrorism. In the context of Afghanistan, Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion was aided by Western governments who sought to use Afghanistan as an extension of conflict against their Soviet enemy within the auspice of the Cold War (Milton-Edwards, 2005:97). Within this context what was a *jihad* against a foreign invader lead to further *jihads* as the pre-1990 Cold War world order collapsed. Terrorism in the 1980's and 1990's was thus facilitated by: the exposed vulnerability of certain states within the Arab world as failed or weak to competing rival forces and warlords, the number of ex-combatants and easy access to a wealth of arms and armoury, chronic economic underdevelopment, and intervention by external actors and backers - of which the West is a

⁴⁴ The Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty was signed by Egyptian President Sadat and Israel's Prime Minister Begin on 26 March 1979, ending a three-decade state of war between the two countries. Since its formation in 1948 Israel had previously been diplomatically unrecognised by the Arab world. President Sadat was assassinated by members of the Islamic Egyptian Jihad, who opposed the peace treaty on 6 October 1981 (Findingdulcinea, 2010).

primary example. It is estimated that Western intelligence agencies trained and supported thousands of local Afghan and foreign Arab forces in the art of terrorism. Osama Bin Laden is widely acknowledged to have been aided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Afghanistan (Milton-Edwards, 2005:98-99).

Rapoport (2004) refers to the growing religious-based terrorism described above as part of the “fourth wave” of terrorism and found Islam to be at the centre of this terrorist trend. Enders and Sandler (2006:47) also make note of the gathering force that this “fourth wave” has attained in recent history, since 1979. The increase in accepted Islamic terrorist organisations since 1980 is demonstrated as follows: two of sixty-four groups in 1980, eleven of forty-eight groups in 1992, sixteen of forty-nine groups in 1994, and twenty-five of fifty-eight groups in 1995.

This trend demonstrates the increasing interconnectivity of fundamentalist ideas and ideology between Islamic fundamentalist groups across the globe, as well as the growing technological means to disseminate such ideas. It also indicates the inability of Western actors to effectively deter or prevent Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and illustrates that in some cases Western actors have in fact helped exacerbate the problem. An example of a group that took hold in the wake of the Iranian revolution is Hezbollah.

3.5 Hezbollah – A Structural Overview:

Hezbollah⁴⁵ was inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Phillips, 2009:42) and formed in the wake of Lebanon’s civil war. The civil war reflected the sectarian and civil dispute between the country’s Muslim and Christian populations. As the state weakened this conflict was increasingly extended to non-state actors (Milton-Edwards, 2005:86). Within the power vacuum that formed external state actors were drawn into the conflict including Syria, Israel, France and the USA. Hezbollah, amid an increasingly more powerful Shi’a community, formed as a direct response to the 1982 Israel invasion of Lebanon⁴⁶(Globalsecurity, 2010; Milton-Edwards, 2005:86).

The movement was inspired by the teachings and actions of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran which is reflected in the leadership of the group as espoused by their spiritual figurehead Ayatollah Fadlallah. For Fadlallah, war, conflict and Israeli occupation demanded a dualist approach from the Shi’a community and its leaders: resistance and social action (Milton-

⁴⁵ Also referred to as Hizballah or *Hizb’ Allah* (“Party of God”).

⁴⁶ Lebanon is the primary location of Hezbollah.

Edwards, 2005:87). To this end the group shared similar ideals to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt as reflected in a quotation by Fadlallah (cited in Milton-Edwards, 2005:87) “the occupation has to end and it can only do so by resistance...yet we have to support the community through health, educational and a social point of view, to prisoners and orphans etc.”

Much like in Egypt with the Brotherhood, it was Hezbollah’s attention to social upliftment as well as militant action against oppression and foreign influence that won the support of Muslim’s within a politically unstable Lebanon. In spite of this, its links to Al-Jihad, the revolution in Iran and their attacks on Israel and other foreign actors define them as a terrorist group (Milton-Edwards, 2005:87). Though Hezbollah acts at a community level and from mostly within the confines of the Lebanese state it has a transnational organisational structure – “Hezbollah maintains a network of terrorist cells and training camps in Asia, Europe, and in South America where it uses the triple frontier of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay as a base of operations” (Phillips, 2009:41). Also its attacks levelled against Israel as well as the USA, France and other foreign entities that are deemed inappropriate make them a transnational terrorist group.

In spite of its transnational character Hezbollah maintains a hierarchical organisational structure based on discipline and secrecy. According to Phillips (2009:41) Hezbollah is a coalition of Shi’a clerics which fall under the Shura Council. This council is responsible for overall administration as well as executive, legislative, judicial, political and military affairs. Up until 1993 Iranian officials served on the Shura. Also under the command of the Shura Council is the General Secretariat comprising of various district heads, and the Politburo which is in charge of coordinating the activities of the Party Committees (e.g. Security, Propaganda, and the Combat Committee).

3.5.1 Goals:

The most direct evidence of the goals and objectives of Hezbollah appear in their founding letter, dated 16 February 1985, and entitled *The Hizballah Program: an Open Letter to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World* (Standwithus, 2010):

“Let us put it truthfully: the sons of Hizhallah know who are their major enemies in the Middle East - the Phalanges⁴⁷, Israel, France and the US. The sons of our *umma*

⁴⁷ The Phalanges refers to the Lebanese Social Democratic Party

[community] are now in a state of growing confrontation with them, and will remain so until the realization of the following three objectives: (a) to expel the Americans, the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land; (b) to submit the Phalanges to a just power and bring them all to justice for the crimes they have perpetrated against Muslims and Christians; (c) to permit all the sons of our people to determine their future and to choose in all the liberty the form of government they desire. We call upon all of them to pick the option of Islamic government which, alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative attempts of imperialistic infiltration into our country.”

Hezbollah’s goals can thus be broken down to reflect a number of fundamentalist ideals: self-determination, formation of an Islamic state, Muslim state unification, a rejection of the state of Israel, and a desire to escape foreign influence. These goals can be broadly referred to as the creation of an Islamic state under Islamic Law and the removal of foreign influence.

3.5.2 Targets:

Hezbollah became infamous for three specific attacks during the 1980’s. First was the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in which an American serviceman was killed. Also, the USA is widely perceived to have conceded to Hezbollah’s demands due to the pressure that the USA put on Israel to release hundreds of prisoners in exchange for the hostages on the flight. Second, is the kidnapping of high profile Western targets. This had severe repercussions on USA foreign policy when it was exposed that the USA brokered arms-for-hostages. Thirdly, suicide bombings, with arguably the most successful example occurring on 23 October 1983. A suicide car bomb exploded outside an American Marine barracks near Beirut and killed 241 off-duty American soldiers serving as peacekeepers in Lebanon. On the same night, a similar explosive tactic was used to target and kill 58 French soldiers. This prompted the American and French withdrawal from the country (Richardson, 2006: 87-88).

These targets show clear links to the organisations stated goals. With attacks being widely levelled against what Hezbollah perceives as ‘foreign invaders’ in particular Israel and the USA.

3.5.3 Tactics:

Hezbollah uses an array of tactics, from kidnapping to suicide bombing. What can be noted is the progression and variation of attacks and the concessions made by political actors in

response to the attacks, especially suicide terrorism. Enders and Sandler (2006:48-49) report that there were 32 reported, domestic and transnational, terrorist attacks during the 1980's, 109 in the 1990's, and 83 in the period 2000-2001. With the 1980's data being attributed mostly to Hezbollah and their campaign to remove foreign troops from Lebanon.

According to Pape (2003:1) studies show that suicide terrorism follows a rational process, one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions. Since the 1980's suicide terrorism has been rising largely because terrorists have learned that it works. Suicide terrorists, like those linked to Hezbollah, achieved in compelling American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in 1985, and Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995. Suicide terrorism is used because it works.

Hezbollah has embraced this tactic through its ideological support for the idea of martyrdom which dates back to 680AD. As cited in Phillips (2009:42) "Hezbollah's strength resides in its ability to harness a hundred grievances to one sublime purpose, and to persuade its downtrodden adherents of their own strength – the strength of sacrifice." According to Deputy General Sheik Naim Qasim, (cited in Phillips, 2009:42) "we do not call them suicide operations because suicide comes out of a loss of hope in life, while martyrdom is a love of life."

Another tactic utilised by Hezbollah is rocket attacks. This tactic utilises rockets/missiles largely supplied by Syria and Iran with an effective range of up to 120 miles. These rockets/missiles contain varying warheads (with varying damage potential) and can be fired from a shoulder held rocket launcher or in some case from more stable missile platforms. It is estimated that Hezbollah has fired some 4000 to 5000 rockets at Israel across the border, with varying results. This number of rockets only represents a third of Hezbollah's rocket potential (Sharp, 2006:10).

Israel's retaliation is in some cases instant, but the mobility of the Hezbollah rockets makes them hard to pin-point, with Israeli attacks often inflicting more damage on civilians than actual Hezbollah targets. This prevents more damaging counter attacks from Israel as a negative global image encourages fundamentalist groups and can potentially lose Israel its allies. Accordingly rocket attacks remain an effective urban terror weapon for Hezbollah (Sharp, 2006:10). Also, the role of the Lebanese government in protecting its own sovereign

territory of which Hezbollah is a part of prevents more extreme foreign intervention and retaliation.

From the above it is clear that Hezbollah presents a transnational, macro political risk. Having been aided and abetted by unstable states and encouraged by concessions made by their targets due to the extreme violence used in their attacks. *Table 3* summarises the analysis of the primary variables as they relate to Hezbollah.

Table 3: Summary of Findings for Hezbollah

Group	Goals	Targets	Tactics
Hezbollah (1983-2000)	1) Removal of foreign influence 2) Islamic Law for the state	The Lebanese state. Domestic and regionally located foreign influences.	Assassination, Hijacking, Bombing (and rocket attacks), Suicide terrorism.

3.6 Old Terrorism:

Islamic fundamentalism in the post-War period is characterised by a number of goals, targets and tactics of which a number of trends can be extrapolated and discussed within a PRA context.

The Muslim Brotherhood, like Hezbollah, has a number of common grievances. These grievances whilst initially directed at their own state were increasingly directed outwards at foreigners. Richardson (2006:95) refers to the common goals expressed amongst terrorist groups as the 3 R's – Revenge (for humiliation at the hand of foreign imperialism, and government exploitation), Renown (to illustrate the power of terrorism and the groups power to achieve its aims), and Reaction (to gain political ascendancy towards achieving their goals).

The movement of action from the domestic to the transnational is represented by the increased likelihood of attack on foreign states and entities as well as the need to safe guard group interest (when under pressure from host governments), train new recruits, gather funding, and/or locate less protected targets. This trend began with the Brotherhood and became more expressive in the work of Hezbollah. The leadership structures of both groups are inherently hierarchical, however, due to persecution by legal and military forces, both the Brotherhood and Hezbollah tended to expand operations transnationally in search of safe operational areas, funding, training and/or targeting. This was especially the case for Hezbollah. This illustrates a growth in the macro risk of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.

In terms of tactics, there are a number of methods that have been employed throughout the period that have gathered notoriety. The Brotherhood, whilst oscillating between more fundamentalist and more moderate leadership tried both peacefully and violently to achieve its goal of an Islamic state free from foreign contamination. Where the political process failed, protests and then violence were used. Assassinations and bombings were their modus operandi of choice. However, with the moderate leadership having grown in stature within the group, and the rise of more militant organisations with similar aims, the Brotherhood no longer has to, or is willing to ply its violent trade which gave it notoriety during the late 1940's. One however, cannot consider the Brotherhood in isolation. With the leadership expressing a more moderate approach to achieving political Islamic ideals there was a vacuum for more hard-line fundamentalists to fill. Consequently, with the growth of Islamic fundamentalist thought in Egypt, and the notoriety of ideologues like Qutb, other fundamentalist members of the Islamic faith took action to achieve what appears universal amongst fundamentalist groups – an Islamic state based on Islamic Law without foreign interference.

Competing with this goal however, were the post-War efforts of liberal democracies to encourage constitutionalism and principles of democracy – along with all relevant institutions. This drew the Islamic fundamentalist groups into direct competition, in some cases with their own governments as well as with Western democracies – in particular the USA. Coupled with the communist rhetoric of the Cold War period the international scene was plagued by competing ideologies.

This competition came to the fore during the Iranian Revolution which served as a defining moment in the eventual path of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic fundamentalist terrorism for the remainder of the century. Most directly with the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the terror campaign that Hezbollah still wages today in Lebanon against Israel, the Lebanese government and any foreign 'invader' preventing it from uniting all Shi'a Muslims under a new Islamic state.

Coupled with this increase in terror came an increase in the means to achieve terrorist objectives. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as well as the eventual collapse of the Soviet regime has guaranteed a continued supply of weapons to terrorist groups. Hezbollah's tactics include kidnapping, hijacking, assassination, bombings, rocket attacks, and most notable suicide bombing.

Most studies, when assessing the cost of terrorism make mention of incidents and casualties. If this were the case, the cumulative total of incidents for the period 1968 to 2003 would stand at 12,559, this according to the ITERATE⁴⁸ data featured in Enders and Sandler's book *The Political Economy of Terrorism* (2006:59). Prior to 1968, there were obviously terrorist events, as mentioned briefly, however they were ill documented and data is unreliable.

Trends for the period 1968 to 2000, illustrate a spike in terrorist incidents in 1971, 1986, 1991 and 1994 (Enders and Sandler, 2006:61). These spikes can be directly attributed to, the Iranian Revolution, Hezbollah's campaign against the USA, France and Israel, and the collapse of the Soviet Union post-1990.

Old terrorism is thus, domestic and transnational, increasingly violent, varied and effective. Terrorist organisations operate in a hierarchal structure as well as increasingly loose transnational networks. This is demonstrated by the hierarchical decision-making structure in both the Brotherhood and Hezbollah, with dissemination of the groups practices and organs of operation all over the world; particularly Latin America for Hezbollah. They continually seek out more effective and devastating weapons and strike where the likelihood of retaliation is minimal. This concept of *old* terrorism will be contrasted with so-called *new terrorism* in the period 2001 – 2009 as discussed further on in this chapter.

3.7 Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism Post-9/11:

Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisations like the Brotherhood and Hezbollah have survived a number of strategies to combat them and remain active in the 21st century. This brings them into the post-9/11 analysis. They will however only be referred to in brief as the main focus of this time period is al-Qaeda.

More recently the Brotherhood has expanded outside the Middle East into the USA. Activists affiliated with the Brotherhood have founded the Muslim Students' Association, the North American Islamic Trust, the Islamic Society of North America, the American Muslim Council, and the International Institute of Islamic Thought. The Brotherhood also reportedly exercises a strong influence in Muslim communities throughout Europe (Discoverthenetworks, 2010).

Originally conceived to follow the teachings of the Prophet the Brotherhood's ideals have ebbed and flowed throughout the last several decades reflecting the views of both extremist

⁴⁸ International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events.

and more moderate leaders (Phillips, 2009:7). A number of figures in contemporary terrorist groups are from the ranks of the Brotherhood, notably: the late Mohammed Atef, Osama bin-Laden's military commander, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's political ideologue and former leader of Al-Jihad. Also worthy of mention are the many members of the more militant Gammaa al-Islamiya (The Islamic Group) and Al-Jihad as well as Al-Takfir wal-Hijra (Excommunication and Migration) (Aboul-Enein, 2003:26). Hamas to this day also maintains that the organisation is a branch of the Brotherhood (Phillips, 2009:75). The Brotherhood presently has some two million active followers and three million supporters among Egypt's population of 74 million (Phillips, 2009:7) which illustrates a growth in popularity.

More recently the Brotherhood is characterised as a moderate fundamentalist group and have denounced the use of violence. Chairman of Muslim Brotherhood Political Department, Dr. Mohamed Morsi is quoted in a 2008 article as follows (Ztruth, 2008):

“Immediately after the 9/11 attacks that happened six years ago, the Muslim Brotherhood group condemned them, seeing them as totally divorced from any religion or creed, actions which are totally rejected by Islam.”

Morsi goes on to say that:

“The Muslim Brotherhood has a moderate attitude. We reject and don't commit violence. We also condemn what the US did before 9/11, after 9/11 and its current terrorism against mankind.”

This quotation illustrates a tactical division from the Brotherhood of the *old* terrorism era. The Brotherhood having once used violence to achieve its aims has now sought out a more moderate and political way to achieve their goals. However, this is largely due to perceived successes versus severe failures – the recognition of Islamic Law within the Egyptian constitution and the inclusion of certain Brotherhood members into the Egyptian business community versus the history of violence perpetrated against the organisation by the Egyptian government especially during the 1940's and 1950's which lead to the near collapse of the organisation. Also, the growth in the number of more militant organisations both in Egypt and throughout the Muslim world have allowed members of the Brotherhood who do not want to remain moderate the ability to join more radical groups.

Hezbollah as of 2001 has maintained much of its 1980's and 1990's character. Even after 9/11 the USA remains concerned about threats from Hezbollah. In 2002 USA Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley warned of Hezbollah "dormant cells" in the USA. Other top officials have also warned that Hezbollah may in fact be the "A team of terrorists" while al-Qaeda is the so-called "B team" (cited in Phillips, 2009:47).

Perhaps the greatest illustration of Hezbollah's power came with the thirty-four day war between Lebanon and Israel in 2006. Hezbollah gained a great deal of public support as the war escalated, particularly as Israeli Defence Force mechanised units and infantry crossed the border into southern Lebanon – a chief location of Hezbollah. These Israeli forces coupled with the Israeli air bombardment killed numerous civilians and devastated southern Lebanon. According to Phillips (2009:51) "the war forged a sense of social cohesion and common purpose among Lebanon's factions united by the view of Israel as the common enemy."

The war also did little to hamper persistent attacks by Hezbollah forces. These forces fired numerous rockets at Haifa and the towns of Galilee. Hezbollah leadership also promised to attack Tel Aviv with long range Iranian Zelzal missiles. Hezbollah's forces effectively halted the Israeli Defence Force advance and they got bogged down in Southern Lebanon. This led to increasingly violent attacks from Israel on Lebanon which lost Israel a great deal of diplomatic support – especially after Israel's use of cluster bombs in the final days of the war (Phillips, 2009:51).

In 2008 Hezbollah were given enough cabinet seats in Lebanon's parliament to veto any decision and to avert civil war, however, Hezbollah have not disarmed. Rather Hezbollah has pledged not to use its arsenal against the Lebanese. Operations in Israel however, still persist either directly or through the aiding and abetting of pro-Palestine groups (Phillips, 2009:49-53). In spite of Hezbollah's activities, arguably, the most notorious terrorist group of the 21st century is al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda will now be discussed as the primary case study of the period 2001-2009.

3.8 Al-Qaeda – A Structural Overview

The present understanding of al-Qaeda as a terrorist organisation, with Osama Bin Laden as its leader, is a gross simplification of what al-Qaeda actually is, and how it operates. Rather, al-Qaeda (as a group), and Osama bin Laden, form only one component of the movement. Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden represent the symbol, the figurehead, and the main nodes of a

vast network of terrorist groups each with similar, as well as, contrasting ideals (Castells, 2004:110; Burke, 2007:2; Katzman, 2005:1). To gain a further understanding it is important to briefly look at the historical development of what is currently understood to be al-Qaeda.

The word “al-qaeda” comes from the root word in Arabic *qaf-ayn-dal*. It has various meanings, and most commonly refers to a base, as in a camp or a home. It can also refer to a foundation, as in a foundation of a building. Crucially however, it can also mean a precept, rule, principle, maxim, formula, method and/or model pattern (Burke, 2007:1).

There is little doubt that the word was used by Muslim fighters in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion –to describe the base from which they operate. However, the word “al-qaeda” was also used by the more extreme elements of the fighters against the Soviets. In this case, Abdallah Azzam, a chief ideologue of non-Afghan Muslims fighting alongside the Afghans. Azzam used the word to describe the role he envisaged for the most committed fighters after the war (Burke, 2007:2).

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 Abdallah Azzam, a chief ideologue of the non-Afghan militants, and mentor to bin Laden, used the following words to describe the role he envisaged for the most committed Muslim fighters (Burke, 2007:2):

“Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and [to] put up with heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require...a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory...It carries the flag all along the sheer, endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination in the reality of life, since Allah has destined that it should make and manifest itself. This vanguard constitutes the strong foundation (*al-qaeda al-sulbah*) for the expected society.”

To Azzam ‘al-qaeda’ represented a base from which individuals committed to the cause of Islam would, through the cumulative weight of all their actions, bring about great change to the world. Al-Qaeda (the group) thus represents the revolutionary ‘vanguard of the strong’ that would unite and mobilise Islamic fundamentalist principles throughout the Islamic world (Burke, 2007:2).

Following the teachings of Azzam, bin Laden carried his ideology with him throughout the 1980’s and beyond. Bin Laden was initially associated with the Muslim Brotherhood however, upon the formation of al-Qaeda in the mid-1980’s, the Muslim Brotherhood broke

off its links with bin Laden. In spite of this bin Laden remained a devoted adherent to the teachings and influence of Muhammad Qutb, brother of Sayyid Qutb who authored *Sign Posts on the Road* and was an integral part of the Brotherhood ideology.

Reflecting influences from both the Qutb brothers as well as the ideological teachings of Azzam, the original conception of al-Qaeda was that of a “base” that would bring together different Islamic fundamentalist groups and co-ordinate their activities towards expelling foreign influence of all types (Hellmich, 2005:43).

Initially, al-Qaeda had very little support due to key disagreements about the scope of action for the collective. This is epitomised by the failure of the meeting between al-Qaeda leadership and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Jama'a al-Islamiyya in Afghanistan in 1988. The primary view or most Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisation during the 1980's, according to Hellmich (2005: 43) was that action should be confined to each groups' nation-state. However, this began to change when Ayyman al-Zawahiri joined the ranks of the al-Qaeda movement.

Along with bin Laden, al-Zawahiri believed that domestic efforts of Islamic fundamentalist groups were being hampered by a larger external enemy. This enemy was the USA because of its support for Israel and for the corrupt dictatorships of the Middle East especially in Saudi Arabia. In order to project this message and gather support al-Qaeda leaders conducted sophisticated public relations and media campaigns through the use of a series of faxed statements, audio recordings, video appearances, and Internet postings throughout the 1990's (Blanchard, 2007:1). The main achievement of these postings and a signal of unity established between fundamentalist groups was achieved in 1998 through a signed agreement between various Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups; The World Islamic Front for the Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders (*al-Jabbah al-Islamiyyah al-'Alamiyyah Li-Qital al-Yahud Wal-Salibiyyin*). This agreement was established by bin Laden as the figurehead of the al-Qaeda movement; al-Zawahiri, on behalf of the Egyptian group Al-Jihad; Shayyakh Mir Hamazah, representing *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan*; Fazlul Rahman, of the Jihad Movement of Bangladesh, as well as a number of undisclosed signatories (Castells, 2004:110-111). It is this agreement that has largely characterised al-Qaeda as popularly conceived in the 21st century.

According to Katzman (2005:7-8) there are a number of other groups that were part of the al-Qaeda coalition before 9/11, and to varying degrees are still associated with al-Qaeda today. These groups are: the Islamic Group and Al-Jihad (Egypt) - al-Zawahiri was the operational and political leader of Al-Jihad before he merged it with al-Qaeda in 1998; the Armed Islamic Group and the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Algeria); the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); the Jemaah Islamiyah (Indonesia) – allegedly responsible for the Bali nightclub attacks in 2002 that killed 180 people; the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; Harakat ul-Mujahedin, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Kamshmiri militant groups based in Pakistan; and Asbat al-Ansar (Lebanon)⁴⁹

Al-Qaeda, the organisation, regardless of the loose networks of affiliates, has a core structure with several subordinate committees and cells. Bin Laden resides at the top of the structure as the figurehead and transnational representative. Assisting bin Laden is a consultative council which gather information on planned and ongoing operations. A loose configuration of further sub-committees and cells provides further information in this regard (Kalic, 2010:3).

Al-Qaeda thus refers to both an overarching ideological construct that is the “revolutionary vanguard of the strong” as well as a group both in a singular and networked capacity. In spite of this multitude of conceptual understandings al-Qaeda can still be considered a group for analysis in this research study since as an ideological entity it encourages specific goals, tactics and targets which either it or its affiliates carry out. Al-Qaeda’s ideology has been expressed through sophisticated public and media relations since the mid-1990’s. These have been document by Blanchard (2007) and represent the core goals of what is commonly referred to as the group (or network of groups) al-Qaeda.

3.8.1 Goals:

Bin Laden and other leading al-Qaeda figures have continually referred to their statements as important primary sources in seeking to understand the group’s ideology and political goals. In this regard the primary goals of al-Qaeda can be traced to the period 1994-2001 in which al-Qaeda first began to assert itself through its numerous declarations in response to non-Muslim interference in Saudi Arabia after the 1991 Gulf War (Blanchard, 2007:2).

In 1996 bin Laden issued a “declaration of jihad” against the USA, this was emotively referred to as the “Islamic resistance to the alliance of Jews, Christians and their agents.” This

⁴⁹ For a composite list of these groups see Table 7 in Appendix 1.

declaration largely stemmed from grievances associated with the international climate at the time. Al-Qaeda thus came to represent opposition to the US military presence in Saudi Arabia, the international sanctions regime on Iraq, and the US support of Israel. Bin Laden's declaration also cited "massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Fatani, Ogaden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina" as examples of the war already being waged against Islam (Blanchard, 2007:2-3).

The above declaration was further ratified by al-Qaeda's fatwa issued in 1998 in which bin Laden is quoted as follows: "For seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbours, and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighbouring Muslim peoples" (Richardson, 2006:127).

These goals, to redress Muslim humiliation and expel foreign influence were officially adopted by al-Qaeda, its members and affiliates in "The World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders" that same year. Also, in 1998, al-Qaeda was involved in the simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. While bin Laden denied direct responsibility he approved of the attacks and argued that the bombings should be seen by Americans and the world as retribution for US policy (Blanchard, 2007:4).

The most infamous attack associated with al-Qaeda however, remains 9/11. Without dwelling on 9/11, bin Laden, among other members, issued a number of statements confirming al-Qaeda's responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. Bin Laden also repeated his claim to strike further American targets (Blanchard, 2007:4). Then later in 2001 al-Zawahiri issued a further statement which listed the "tools" adopted by "the Western forces" to fight Islam: (1) The United Nations, (2) The friendly rulers of Muslim peoples. (3) The multinational corporations. (4) The international communications and data exchange systems. (5) The international news agencies and satellite media channels. (6) The international relief agencies (Burke, 2007:23-24).

Further al-Qaeda material discovered in the form of tapes of al-Zawahiri in 2005 list what he refers to as "three foundations" of the al-Qaeda goals and ideology. These tapes represent the

clearest articulation of al-Qaeda's goals in the 21st century. These are cited in Blanchard (2007:10-11) and are as follows:

- 1) "The Quran Based Authority to Govern". According to al-Zawahiri al-Qaeda advocates the creation of a Muslim state governed by Islamic Law. Secular government or "man-made" government is not an option and is represented as contradicting the Islamic faith.
- 2) "The Liberation of the Homelands". This principle argues that reforms and free elections will not be possible until "the freedom of the Muslim lands and their liberation from every aggressor" is achieved. Al-Zawahiri also emphasised concern over the Middle East's energy resources and described the Middle East as "exposed and impotent to the Israeli nuclear arsenal."
- 3) "The Liberation of the Human Being". This emphasises a contractual social relationship between Muslims and their rulers. It also demanded that Muslims fight to overthrow rulers who violate Islamic Laws. He criticised hereditary government and noted that Muslim government needs "to specify the power of [an Islamic Law] based judiciary, and insure that no one can dispose of the people's rights except in accordance with this judiciary."

These goals and statements broadly outline the main targets of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The overarching message or goal that is conveyed is based on a real (or perceived) grievance with Western interference in the Middle East. Furthermore, the goals are issued in such a way as to convey the grievances in vocabulary that emphasizes the unity of the Muslim world versus their apparent Western aggressors. The goals create an 'other' – this helps attract group members and justify group actions. This is evident in the use of words like "homeland", "the Western Forces", and continued reference to "Muslims" as a collective rather than exclusively al-Qaeda.

3.8.2 Targets:

From the stated goals there are, broadly speaking, two primary targets: 1) the Western world – more specifically the USA, and 2) non-believers of, or within, the Islamic faith.

The targeting of the Western world stems from a real fear of liberal theory which is interpreted by lay preachers and teachers in mosques as the foundation of a Western conspiracy to dominate and make subservient the Muslim people. This struggle has deepened since 9/11 when bin Laden and al-Qaeda claimed to speak in the name of Islam. The "war on terrorism"

has done little to alter this perception and it is generally perceived by al-Qaeda and a growing number of Muslims as a war on Islam, especially since the original motive for war - Weapons of Mass Destruction - have yet to be discovered (Milton-Edwards, 2005:126).

The most notorious impact of this targeting is 9/11 in which the World Trade Centre and Pentagon were hit by passenger airlines. This imposed immediate costs exceeding \$100 billion, in the form of property damage and lives lost, and up to \$2 trillion in lower future corporate profits (Navarro and Spencer, 2001 cited in Shughart, 2002:6).

Since 9/11 a vast number of attacks have been linked to al-Qaeda either directly or indirectly (through its affiliates). However, unless a terrorist group takes responsibility for an attack, attributing attacks to groups is speculative. Some notable attacks are listed below:

22 November 2002: al-Qaeda reportedly bombed an Israeli owned/patronized hotel in Mombasa Kenya, killing 15 and injuring 40. Simultaneously, al-Qaeda also reportedly tried to shoot down an Israeli chartered plane using a surface-to-air missile at the Mombasa airport in Kenya (Cronin, 2004:4).

16 May 2003: Fourteen suicide bombers, members of a local group (Salafia Jihadia) allegedly connected to al-Qaeda, carried out nearly simultaneous attacks on five Western and Jewish targets in Casablanca, killing 45 people and injuring more than 100 (Cronin, 2004:4).

11 March 2004: Simultaneous bombings of four packed commuter trains in Madrid killed 190 people and injured more than 1400. Evidence is still being gathered; however, Spanish police have in custody a number of Moroccan and other Islamist radicals who are reportedly members of the group Salafia Jihadia. A self described spokesperson for al-Qaeda claimed the organisations responsibility for the attacks although that has not been confirmed (Cronin, 2004:4).

7 July 2005: Three simultaneous explosions on the London Underground as well as an explosion on a double-decker bus kill more than 30 people and leave more than 700 injured (BBC, 2005:1). Al-Qaeda claim responsibility for the suicide attacks in September 2005 and denounce Britain for the “historical crime of setting up Israel and the continuing crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq” (BBC, 2005a:1).

The incidents above deliberately exclude ongoing al-Qaeda attacks and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq since terrorist activity is defined herein by the use of violence against

non-combatants and to make such distinctions in a theatre of war is problematic. However, it must be stressed that the attacks highlighted above still represent a small percentage of attacks by al-Qaeda and groups linked with it. The website *The Religion of Peace* (2010) reports that some 15782 deadly Islamic fundamentalist terrorist attacks have been carried out since 9/11. This figure does not only refer to al-Qaeda but it also gives an indication of the severity of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in the period 2001-2009.

A clear trend illustrated above is the targeting of Western interests and citizens both locally and transnationally. Worth mentioning is the fixation on the USA and Britain. This is even more likely given the involvement of British and American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.

3.8.3 Tactics:

From the examples above the primary methods and tactics employed by al-Qaeda in the period 2001-2009 can be extrapolated. To this end, two noticeable trends stand out: 1) bombing, and 2) suicide terrorism. These tactics are accounted for by Enders and Sandler (2006:190) who note that as a consequence of the high costs (leadership and resources) associated with hostage taking, assassinations and hijacking, the al-Qaeda network has turned to logistically simple, but deadly, bombing. This is especially in light of the high number of losses that the group has suffered in Afghanistan and Iraq as a result of the war on terror. Further factors inhibiting tactic selection are the counter-terrorism measures taken in the wake of 9/11. These measures have reduced the effectiveness of tactics like hijacking, hostage taking and assassinations. Measures in the USA, described by Manning (2006:458) include:

- 1) New procedures for issuing visas and granting students permission to study in the USA
- 2) Placing armed air marshals on both domestic US flights and international flights between the USA and Canada.
- 3) Revising procedures for screening passengers prior to boarding aircraft.
- 4) Designing and integrating extensive and growing databases for tracking visitors and US citizens.
- 5) Consolidating a number of US agencies into a Department of Homeland Security
- 6) Legislating the “PATRIOT Act” giving the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) wide and unprecedented access to previously private places, spaces and documents.

A rational response to increased USA security measures by al-Qaeda is illustrated by the tactic of bombing Western targets outside of the USA where security measures are not as well enforced. This maintains a high casualty ratio and requires very minimal costs to the terrorist organisation – even when suicide terrorism is used (Pape, 2003). This is reiterated by Enders and Sandler (2006:193) who note that increased security in wealthy nations have had unintended negative consequences by inducing terrorists to stage their attacks in countries less able to afford widespread defensive measures – this is because terrorists weigh the costs, risks and benefits when choosing the venue for attack.

Also interesting to note is an upward trend in the lethality of incidents. A terrorist incident in the post-2000 era is now 17 percentage points more likely to result in death or injury (Enders and Sandler, 2006a:307). However, the problem with such claims is that rather than representing an average growth, the statistics are heavily influenced by high casualty events. High casualty events skew terrorism casualty trends upwards. Also, the statistics employed by Enders and Sandler is based on media reports who often only report on the most sensational of events since they are the most likely to guarantee readership (Frey et al, 2004:4). In spite of this however, the point remains that there have been a number of high casualty events in the post-9/11 era, which apart from 9/11 itself have been as a result of bombing and suicide terrorism.

The overarching tactical strategy of al-Qaeda post-9/11 is thus, bombings and suicide terror, aimed at Western interests and proxies in countries with insufficient security measures. This is illustrated by attacks in countries with relatively low-income as a percentage of GDP (gross domestic product) like in Kenya and Morocco, as previously discussed.

Table 4 summarises the analysis of the primary variables as they relate to al-Qaeda.

Table 4: Summary of findings for al-Qaeda

Group	Goals	Targets	Tactics
Al-Qaeda (2001-2009)	1) Removal of foreign influence 2) Islamic Law for the all Muslim lands	Domestic and transnationally located foreign influences – especially the USA. False Islamic states.	Bombing and suicide terrorism.

3.9 New Terrorism:

Most notable in the so-called *new terrorism* period of 2001-2009 is indeed the network of networks that is represented by al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda as discussed is essentially a collective of

congruent transnational groups which share the same core ideals and interact with one another in terms of planning, financing and/or joint attacks. Also, given the increase of more costly and efficient security measures in more advanced Western societies (the USA is a case in point) the transnationalisation of terrorism has become a necessary feature of the terrorist landscape as terrorist groups adjust their targets and tactics in terms of access to resources, leadership and the likelihood of success.

Two primary goals can be highlighted from the analysis herein these are the creation of the Islamic state under Islamic Law and the removal of foreign influence from Muslim lands. However, due to the increased security apparatus in preventing terrorism in certain areas and not others, coupled with the transnational nature of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism these goals are now being enacted through indirect targets – for example Western interests and citizens are now being targeted internationally rather than domestically.

Much like the proxy wars between the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is occurring outside of the country from which the groups grievances originate. Targets are now being located outside of the traditional Western ‘empire’ – the USA and Europe. Accordingly, areas of increasing concern for Islamic fundamentalist terrorism are less-developed countries especially in the Middle East, South East Asia and Africa.

With regard to tactics the tendency has leaned towards bombings and suicide terrorism. This usually entails high degrees of destruction and increased casualties.

3.10 Conclusion:

Scorn for false-Muslims began with fundamentalists attacking their own governments who were largely considered “autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed.” They were also considered “more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic” than the true believers would prefer (Zakaria, 2003: 120and125). These factors lead to a number of key instances in the development of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism throughout the period 1945-2000. The first instance and group discussed herein is a case in point – the Muslim Brotherhood. The second instance is the overthrow of the Shah, by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in 1979.

These instances represent the nationalist as well as the fundamentalist trend within the given time period. They represent the need for Islamic fundamentalists to unite nationalism with theology, the state with religion, and politics with Islam.

With the growing desire amongst so-called *true believers* to achieve a unification of the state and Islam, a need to rid Muslim states of foreign influence also developed. This was gradual at first and then accelerated with the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Hezbollah eventually emerged within Lebanon to carry on the goals for a united Shari's Islamic world free from foreign intervention. Subsequently, there began a bloody campaign of terrorist events perpetrated famously against the USA, France and Israel.

The defining characteristics for old terrorism are however not static. Beginning in 1945 goals and groups were domestically orientated, however, with a successful revolution in Iran, the transnational nature of terrorism emerged, first in Iran, then in Afghanistan.

The groups discussed within this period both have political and militant wings - each of which were used to gain local support and achieve moderate political concessions without violence. However, with the failure of the political process in most instances and the demonstrated success of terrorist tactics, the rational choice was for the use of violence to achieve group goals. This rationality is driven by an ideology and fundamentalism which at its core tends towards violence to achieve political-religious outcomes.

The period 2001-2009 is characterised, simultaneously by a group structure that at its core operates transnationally and by a growing security environment that encourages the need for increasingly transnational operations.

Al-Qaeda by design is a transnational network of networks. The immediate structure of al-Qaeda is hierarchical, however it has a number of independent organisational nodes and affiliates that share similar ideals however; they maintain their own organisational identity and structure. Therefore as much as an organisation is affiliated to al-Qaeda, and regardless of its operations, it is still independent from most of the hierarchical processes that govern al-Qaeda.

With regard to the goals of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in the period there is a primacy given to combating the West as a means to establish the secondary objective – the Muslim state under Islamic Law. A by-product of these initial goals is the liberation of Muslim lands from foreign intervention and exploitation.

The primary target of al-Qaeda in the struggle to achieve its stated goals, is the USA. The USA represents an embodiment of the West, of Western liberal policy and institutions. This

does however extend to other Western nations, in particular Britain. A further target is Israel as a product of the West and as a primary culprit in the oppression of the Muslim people, especially Palestine.

The tactics used against said targets have become increasingly cost-effective and damaging. In this case bombing and suicide terrorism are used extensively. This is representative of the historical success of violent terrorism, in particular the use of suicide terrorism and bombing by Hezbollah, and the rational progression of tactics to account for changing dynamics in the operational environment. These changes are encouraged by the “war on terror” and other counterterrorist measures that have adjusted Islamic fundamentalist terrorist preferences accordingly.

Chapter 4 will now juxtapose *old* terrorism with *new terrorism* in an effort to answer the research questions set out in within this research paper.

Chapter 4: Findings and Discussions of the Research Study

4.1 Introduction:

This chapter will set about analysing the data from chapter 3. This analysis will highlight the key characterises of *old* and *new terrorism*. For this purpose the primary variables *goals*, *tactics* and *targets* will be discussed. From this analysis an argument will be constructed against the novelty and value of *new terrorism* as a concept for analysis in PRA.

This argument will be bolster by *Table 5* which highlights the primary variables for analysis from the previous chapter. *Table 5* presents a summary of the most important findings associated with each variable, and presents them in such a way that *old* and *new terrorism* can be more readily compared.

After the initial variable analysis, a second section will discuss a proposed secondary variable: *structure*, as it relates to both *old* and *new terrorism*. This variable was discovered to be important through the research conducted herein. This discovery was made through the process of describing the structural overview of the Islamic fundamentalist groups that are used as examples herein. What started out as a means to introduce the reader to the terrorist group as a whole was instead revealed to be a secondary means through which the Islamic fundamentalist groups could be compared.

Through the variable analysis, and the subsequent analysis of *old* and *new terrorism* critical comments can be made on the value of *new terrorism* within the field of PRA. In closing a normative concept of terrorism will be constructed out of the most valuable findings from within this research study. This concept is such that it best serves PRA's objective of risk analysis and risk mitigation.

4.2 Old and New Terrorism within a Rational Choice Framework:

Table 5: Variable Comparisons for Selected Islamic Fundamentalists Groups

Group	Goals	Targets	Tactics
Muslim Brotherhood (1945-2000)	1) Islamic Law for the state 2) Removal of foreign influence	The Egyptian State. Domestically located foreign influences.	Protest, assassination, kidnapping, bombing.
Hezbollah (1983-2000)	1) Removal of foreign influence 2) Islamic Law for the state	The Lebanese state. Domestic and regionally located foreign influences.	Assassination, Hijacking, Bombing (and rocket attacks), Suicide terrorism.
Al-Qaeda (2001-2009)	1) Removal of foreign influence 2) Islamic Law for the all Muslim lands	Domestic and transnationally located foreign influences – especially the USA. False Islamic states.	Bombing and suicide terrorism.

Table 5 illustrates the key findings from chapter 3 with regards to each terrorist group, as well as from each time period. From this table a number of characteristics and discussion points are present with regard to each individual terrorist group, the time period they are from and the conceptualisation of terrorism (old or new) that they represent.

4.2.1 Goals:

The first variable for discussion in *Table 5* is the goals of the organisations. There are two main goals shared between Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisations: 1) the creation of the Islamic state under Islamic law, and 2) the removal of foreign influence.

The Brotherhood placed a great deal of primacy on the adoption of Islamic Law in Egypt, with a secondary goal being the removal of foreign influence from the domestic sphere. However, advancing past the Iranian Revolution to the establishment of Hezbollah, more emphasis was placed on the removal of foreign influence in domestic affairs, with the creation of the Islamic state in Lebanon being a secondary goal.

Old terrorism is thus defined by the creation of the Islamic state, as well as the removal of foreign influence.

Al-Qaeda's goal orientation is primarily aimed at the removal of foreign influence since foreign actors are perceived by al-Qaeda as the greatest obstacles to the realisation of the

Islamic state. The goal of the Islamic state under Islamic law is also transnationally applied across all Muslim dominant nations. A possible explanation for this transnational application of goals within the auspice of *new terrorism* lies within the network structure of al-Qaeda and its broad base of affiliates. These affiliated groups operate in numerous countries throughout the world pursuing similar goals – this gives rise to the transnational nature of what are generally very traditional and old Islamic fundamentalist goals.

New terrorism is thus also defined by the creation of the Islamic state, as well as the removal of foreign influence.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the goal orientation of these fundamentalist groups is that there is nothing significantly novel about *new terrorism's* goals. The period of *old terrorism* sought to simultaneously remove foreign influence and achieve the Islamic state, whilst *new terrorism* sees the removal of foreign influence as a necessary means to achieve the realisation of the Islamic state under Islamic Law. The application of *new terrorism's* goals transnationally is more reflective of the interlinked and transnational number of groups, rather than novelty on the part of goal selection. The fact remains however, that *new terrorism* and *old terrorism* share congruent goals.

4.2.2 Targets

Based on the analysis of the goals in *Table 5* as well as extensive group analysis there are two main targets that the Islamic fundamentalist groups within this research study pursue: 1) local government officials, and 2) foreign actors.

Hough (2005) notes that *new terrorism* is characterised by the increased number of casualties that terrorist organisations try to inflict. This speaks, not only to their targeting of foreigners, but also to their tactics.

The increase in the number of casualties in the *new terrorism* period is largely due to the number of affiliated groups in the *new terrorism* time period. The more groups pursuing the same goals and targets the more incidents there are likely to be and therefore the greater the chance of casualties. These groups are largely defined by al-Qaeda. This has contributed to the classification of *new terrorism* as increasingly violent.

This classification is, however, also influenced by a number of other factors. Firstly, foreign actors as targets represent a much larger pool of targets for potential attack than do local

government actors, therefore it seems logical that terrorist groups attack and kill more foreign actors. Secondly, as discussed in the previous section the goal orientation of *new terrorism* means that foreign targets are perceived as a barrier to the Islamic state - when considering that a growing number of groups share similar views this compounds the violence as more foreign actors are targeted by an increasing number of Islamic fundamentalist groups.

In spite of this upward trend, it would be remiss not to consider similar upward trends in the *old terrorism* time period too. Notable periods of increasing violence against foreign targets also occurred during the early 1980's and 1990's. When analysed as a trend, increases in violence occur periodically in both time periods. The increase in violence in the *new terrorism* time period is therefore not a novelty.

In conclusion, the targets of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups have remained the same in both time periods – government officials and foreign actors. The degree of violence is not a novelty because similar increases in casualties occurred throughout the 1980's and 1990's when foreign targets were priority targets.

4.2.3 Tactics:

Table 5 highlights al-Qaeda's use of bombing and suicide terrorism as primary tactics. Enders and Sandler (2006:61-62) note that a typical bombing incident is not complex and requires far less terrorist resources in contrast to more costly, and generally less destructive tactics like kidnappings, assassinations and hijackings. Also tactics like kidnapping, assassination and hijacking are presently more effectively mitigated against as discussed in Manning (2006) and Spencer (2001) who note that more proactive measures in airport security, better security of key personal and state counter-terrorism information sharing have led terrorists to more cost effective measures.

The cost effectiveness of bombing, as a "hit and run tactic" means that trends in bombings can increase drastically in any given period. This is true for the period in which *new terrorism* is defined - 2001 onwards. Enders and Sandler (2006:62), through the analysis of the ITERATE data, note that the proportion of bombings relative to the total number of terrorist incidents has increased sharply since 2001 – a trend that they have largely attributed to al-Qaeda. Occurring simultaneously with the increased use of bombing as a tactic, is the rise in deaths and casualties. Thus, given that the pool of targets has increased (foreign actors), the number of like minded and connected groups has increased, the destruction of

bombing and suicide terrorism has increased (while the cost of bombing and suicide terrorism has decreased) it seems logical that *new terrorism* is characterised by an increase in violence. As previously discussed in the section on targets this is a matter of course and not something new.

Also, as alluded to already, the increase in deaths and casualties in any time series however, is skewed by high impact, outlier events like 9/11 – an event which has skewed casualty and death statistics within the *new terrorism* time period. Also detracting from any correlation that this violence has with *new terrorism* is that fact that associated rises in bombings as well as casualties and deaths have also occurred throughout the period defined by *old terrorism* especially the 1980's and 1990's (when targeting of foreign targets was at its peak). Also, more efficient technologies, have contributed to more efficient bombs, therefore the rise in casualties is not a result of the type of terrorism (*old* or *new*) but rather the modernisation of weapons systems (Spencer, 2001:16).

In conclusion, bombing as a tactic is used extensively throughout both time periods. Suicide terrorism was also a feature of *old terrorism* and was in fact pioneered by Hezbollah. Kidnapping, assassinations and hijackings while featuring prominently in the old terrorism period as tactics are still used in the *new terrorism* time period but less so. Bombing has been and will always be the tactic of choice due to its cost effectiveness and destructive capability.

4.3 A Secondary Variable for Consideration:

In analysing that data from the previous chapter a secondary variable has been discovered that can also be effectively used as a variable for comparison between *old* and *new terrorism*. This variable, *structure*, is regarded as important due to the attention it receives from a range of authors herein as well as the attention it receive as part of what is considered to constitute *new terrorism*. It is argued that *new terrorism*'s group structure is novel because of its loosely defined network. This variable will now be discussed to assess whether or not it exposes any significant novelties within the concept of *new terrorism* when located within both *old* and *new terrorism*.

4.3.1 Structure:

Organisational structure has a number of implications with regards to how terrorist organisations are able to operate. Structure can affect the ability to achieve goals through the mechanisms of command and control. Similarly, organisational structure can also dictate the

constraints faced by the terrorist organisation and the degree to which it can operate transnationally.

The organisational structure of the Brotherhood was hierarchical and domestically located. This structure is given to localised incidents of terror, especially within Egypt. Also, financing largely came from local sources and members. The reason for said structure is largely defined by organisational theory at the time which relied on top-down bureaucratic structures much like *Weber's bureaucracy* (Morgan, 1998:23). This bureaucratic structure dictates that goals are achieved through a fixed division of tasks, hierarchical supervision, and rules and regulations. The Brotherhood also achieved limited flexibility by decentralising some of its key functions to other bureaucratic branches within the Egyptian state – that is the “Special Apparatus” as well as local level municipal branches.

This organisational structure and subsequently the effectiveness of the Brotherhood was undermined by the swift and decisive actions of government which, under Nasser, arrested some 20,000 members – not to mention the assassination of key Brotherhood figures like al-Banna. These arrests and killings exposed the weakness of the organisational structure since the inherent form of the organisation as a bureaucratic apparatus has difficulty in adapting to change and can become paralysed by the loss of key personal (Morgan, 1998:32-33).

The Iranian Revolution (1979) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served as a watershed moment and catalyst for violence in the growth of terrorist groups in the period 1945-2000 by contributing to the structural change of terrorist organisations within the historical period.

Groups that were hierarchical, bureaucratic and localised were now “inspired and assisted” in operating in an increasingly dispersed fashion. The organisation that is a case in point is Hezbollah.

The organisational structure of Hezbollah, while similar to that of the Brotherhood, exhibits a new trend. This trend is the use of regionally and transnationally decentralised units of operation which make up its transnational organisational structure. This trend coincides with a number of key variables. Apart from the Iranian Revolution, a number of parallels can be drawn to the rise of the Multinational Corporation (MNC). This parallel can be made due to the similar time period in which MNC's have emerged as well as the structural similarities that MNC's have with organisations defined by the concept *new terrorism* – that is loose transnational networks.

In the late 19th and 20th century the world witnessed the growth and proliferation of MNCs along with developments in the capitalist world economy (Morgan, 1998:282). Coinciding with this globalisation was a change in the structure of the organisation to account for global influence, diversified resource bases and the reaction to government policy either enabling the MNC or not (Saul, 2009:1). This led to a change in the structure of business organisations from local bureaucracies to more adaptive and decentralised business organisations, examples include General Motors and Royal Dutch Shell.

Coinciding with the rise of MNC's and globalisation is the second key factor – the Iranian Revolution (1979) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Iranian Revolution further enabled and encouraged Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups to adopt a pattern of organisational decentralisation (transnationally) by becoming a global provider of weapons, funding and ideological support.

It is thus that Hezbollah, under the influence of globalisation and other factors like the Iranian Revolution, adopted a structure similar to that of a globalising MNC. This structure is characterised, in the late 1980's and 1990's, by a pattern of centralised control with an increasingly broad-based pattern of ownership (Morgan, 1998:282). To this end Hezbollah draws resources from a broad-base of 'investors'(actors who have an interest in the groups success) and acts in its own centralised manner – that is from within the state of Lebanon.

From the above, it is clear that *old* terrorism is both characterised by the centralised bureaucracy of the Brotherhood and the increasingly decentralised structure of Hezbollah.

The structure of al-Qaeda defines *new terrorism* in a similar fashion. Al-Qaeda is described in chapter 3 as an organisation that has a both singular (bureaucratic) and networked (decentralised) capacity. Similarly to the Brotherhood and Hezbollah before it, the al-Qaeda network is symptomatic of a number of global influences. The first is globalisation and the creation of the MNC. Globalisation provides a number of technological accessories that aid a network configuration which is modelled on MNC development, both consciously and subconsciously by al-Qaeda leadership. In this respect al-Qaeda operates much like a large MNC – a central authority intervenes where necessary, but largely autonomous units are allowed, and encouraged, to operate on a global level. This allows for a greater degree of organisational flexibility, and encourages a strong simultaneous presence in a number of key areas around the world (Morgan, 1998:284).

The second factor contributing to this network structure is the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in which Muslims from various states around the world came to Afghanistan to help dispel the foreign invaders. These fighters were largely state sponsored, and when the war was over they were given leave to return home. However, many of them retained the ideological teachings that they had attained from influential fighters like bin Laden and Azzam. Upon returning to their home states these fighters now possessed a will to fight and an ideology to fight for; in some cases either starting their own Islamic fundamentalist groups or joining existing ones, subsequently growing the network.

This organisational configuration is better suited to the asymmetrical power configuration that exists between states and terrorist organisations. The advantages of such a configuration are that al-Qaeda's attacks can be selectively carried out in any country around the world – especially where a country lacks the resources to effectively implement counter-terrorist policies and initiatives. Such a configuration also allows network affiliates the opportunity to draw from a larger, more diverse resource base. Thus capital, weapons and prospective group members are more easily located and attained – this insures organisational survival. Whether it is Iraq, Afghanistan, Malaysia or even Morocco al-Qaeda will always have a network affiliate from which to regroup and re-organise.⁵⁰

The network structure for al-Qaeda, like modern MNCs, is shaped directly by a number of variables from within the rational choice framework. First, the network represents a response to various incentives; increased flexibility, increased chances of organisational survival, diverse access to resources, and, an increased chance of success. Secondly, if terrorists are considered self-interested, then group survival is a key variable, since the interests of the group are closely linked to terrorist group members. Networking increases survival. Also, rational expectations dictate that group members are more inclined to support a network structure since heavy handed bureaucracy is shown to undermine goal acquisition and place pressure on the organisational hierarchy (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood).

Through a networked structure, al-Qaeda can now operate in areas with less security where the rational expectation of success is high and the associated costs are low. *New terrorism's* structure in this regard is not new but rather necessary, reactionary and rational. The rational choice framework effectively reduces the unexpected nature, and novelty, of the network structure by exposing the heuristic process that helped create and change terrorist

⁵⁰ For a list of known al-Qaeda affiliates in the post-2001 period see Appendix 1 *Table 8*.

organisations over time. In this regard the history of the terrorism helps to frame the present reality of terrorism, reducing the novelty therein. Thus *new terrorism* gains a great deal of its value from the processes and trends that help define *old* terrorism.

Also, what must be noticed is the striking similarity between al-Qaeda's organisational structure and the structure of Hezbollah which also favoured higher degrees of decentralisation. Tucker (2001:3) also notes that the Marxist or left-wing revolutionary groups also became network-like as ideological diversity lead to greater structural complexity. An example is the Red Army Faction⁵¹ (RAF), which, despite the hierarchical connotation of the word 'army', was not very hierarchical at all. The RAF spawned second and third generations haphazardly and remained more a collection of terrorists sharing a common purpose than a hierarchical organization. Hoffman (2001:426) also notes that over a century ago the anarchist movement referred to as Anarchist or Black International, active mainly in Russia and France, pursued a similar strategy to al-Qaeda. This strategy was characterised by violence carried out by loosely networked, largely unconnected cells of like-minded radicals.

Given the existence of loose network structures in *old* terrorist organisations like Hezbollah, the RAF and the Anarchist or Black International, the novelty of structure within *new terrorism* is debatable.

4.4 The Value of New Terrorism as a Variable in Political Risk Analysis:

As can be noted from the above analysis *new terrorism* as a single conceptual entity has little novelty or value as a concept in PRA. This is largely because *new terrorism* takes a snap shot of contemporary trends in terrorism. Secondly, the concept of *new terrorism* fails to address the historical periods in which similar trends have occurred. The lack of novelty in the concept *new terrorism* combined with its narrow focus undermines its value within PRA by creating too narrow a focus for analysis and subsequent mitigation. Therefore *new terrorism* as a concept for analysis does not contribute to mitigating the political risk of terrorism; instead it constrains the forecasting and heuristic process through which PRA rationally operates.

⁵¹ RAF, also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, is a group of German origin that came into existence during the late 1960s in opposition to German capitalism, and was responsible for a number of high profile bombings, assassinations and kidnappings (Baader-Meinhof, 2010).

Analysed by itself the strict focus of *new terrorism* guides PRA towards the forecasting of unknown consequences (risk) from a pool of information that is constrained by its very definition. In this regard, primacy is given to loose networks, over structured ones; transnational groups, over national ones; macro risks, over micro risks; high casualty incidents, over low casualty incidents; and religious motivations, over political ones. To this end as a concept *new terrorism* constricts the field of analysis of political risk. This stands in contrast to what PRA strives to achieve, that is the “entire scope of uncertainty posed by the political environment” (Frei and Ruloff, 1988:2) – or in this case the entire scope of uncertainty posed by the political risk of terrorism.

The rational choice framework while guiding terrorism trends internally also guides the analytical process in PRA. In the rational choice framework this process is heuristics, while in PRA this is called forecasting. Forecasting, like heuristics, is the process through which new experiences are related to past experiences, whilst maintaining the uniqueness of the new experience. *New terrorism* might not be a novelty however it does capture unique trends in the 21st century. Accordingly, as per the rational framework that is used within PRA, for a variable or concept to offer significant insight into the risk environment it needs to be able to “use the results of memory as a proxy for the projection of future probability” (March, 1994: 13).

Unfortunately, the limited capacity of what the *new terrorism* concept considers to be new, as well as the way in which the *new terrorism* concept places primacy over certain trends and not others, prevents it from having any deep analytical character or memory from which PRA can draw from. This further undermines the value of *new terrorism*. In the following section a normative concept of terrorism will be constructed using the insights gained from both *old* and *new terrorism*. The purpose of this normative concept of terrorism is to create an analytical concept within PRA that serves the rational choice process of forecasting and heuristics and therefore better serves the mitigation of terrorism as a political risk. *New terrorism* has its most value when considered in conjunction with *old terrorism* rather than in a single capacity. To this end a normative concept of terrorism must consider both past events and the uniqueness of the present.

4.5 Derived Indicators of a Normative Concept of Terrorism:

Given that the novelty of *new terrorism* can be called into question this section addresses the manner in which *old* and *new terrorism* should make up a normative concept of terrorism for application within PRA.

The most valued insight that the previous discussion has offered is that terrorism as a concept must analyse a number of key variables rationally, that is using the memory of past events to project future outcomes. That said terrorist groups do not operate in a vacuum – they both shape, and are shaped by, the environment in which they operate. Accordingly, when constructing a terrorism concept, its primary focus must express the macro and micro risk environment. Secondly, the ever increasing transnational character of terrorism, must not discount the domestic character of terrorism – both spheres must be considered.

From the method of analysis herein three primary variables for analysis are already apparent: *goals, targets and tactics*. A secondary variable for analysis is *structure*.

As already demonstrated through the analysis in chapter 3, these variables are easily applicable to the concept of terrorism in both an *old* and *new terrorism* context. This is important as the most value is gained by considering terrorism historically as well as in a more contemporary setting. A normative concept of terrorism must therefore express both its historical and contemporary character; in doing so terrorism has a past memory, as well as a contemporary understanding, with a possibility to project future outcomes.

The construction of the matrix represented in *Table 6* is based on the conclusions from the variable analysis herein and serves as a representation of a normative concept of terrorism. The power of terrorism as a concept for analysis in PRA is found through the heuristic and forecasting processes. These processes combine the *old* and the *new* conceptions of terrorism so as to provide a more holistic picture from which PRA may develop better suited mitigation strategies. *Old* or *new terrorism* cannot serve to meet these ends in their respective singular capacities.

Table 6 provides an outline as to how a normative understanding of the terrorism concept can be applied through a simple matrix. It must be stressed that this matrix is not a table in which information is an input, rather it serves as a check list. This check list serves to provide the user with a representation of that which must be considered in constructing a normative conceptualisation of terrorism for analysis within PRA.

Table 6: Normative Terrorism Matrix:

	Domestic (Terrorist Group)				Transnational (Terrorist Group)			
	Micro Risk		Macro Risk		Micro Risk		Macro Risk	
	<i>Historical Trend</i>	<i>Contemporary Trend</i>	<i>Historical Trend</i>	<i>Contemporary Trend</i>	<i>Historical Trend</i>	<i>Contemporary Trend</i>	<i>Historical Trend</i>	<i>Contemporary Trend</i>
Goals								
Targets								
Tactics								
Structure								

From the analysis conducted through the course of this research study it has been discovered that *new terrorism* is not a novelty, however, it is recognised that *new terrorism* as a static concept provides a snap shot of contemporary trends in terrorism. These trends however, only have value when compared to past terrorist trends which is captured by the concept of *old terrorism*. This finding combined with the rational choice framework and PRA is further illustrated through the heuristic process and forecasting respectively. These processes combine the concepts of *old* and *new terrorism* to form a normative concept of terrorism.

On a normative level to illustrate these rational processes *new terrorism* and *old terrorism* have to be captured simultaneously. For this purpose the categories *Historical Trend* and *Contemporary Trend* capture the dynamism of a normative terrorism concept. To add further conceptual weight it is also vital to assess whether or not the nature of terrorism is domestic or transnational, or whether the threat that terrorism poses is at a micro or macro level. This is a holistic approach to terrorism not represented by either of the previous concepts when considered in a singular capacity.

From the analysis herein a normative variable of terrorism must include a descriptive analysis of the key variables discussed at the starting point of this study – *goals, targets and tactics*. It has been illustrated throughout that they provide adequate description of terrorism in both time periods. Contributing to these variables *structure* is also added since this variable measures the degree to which terrorism has an influence on a domestic or transnational level.

It also illustrates the degree to which the terrorist group is interlinked with other groups or not. This has implications for the risk that terrorism poses as well as the strategies of mitigation that need to be adopted.

To utilise this table first, the question is asked, what group/s have an effect at a *domestic* or *transnational* level (or both). After the group is identified the terrorist group is assessed to determine whether it determines its targets selectively or whether it targets indiscriminately; at a *micro* level or *macro* level respectively. Then the terrorist group is assessed to determine its *goals*, *targets*, *tactics* and *structure* both as a *historical trend* as well as how they are perceived as a *contemporary trend*.

This matrix can be applied to all terrorist groups active in the environment in which a PRA seeks to mitigate risk. This type of analysis does not rely on a singular conception of terrorism to guide it, or on a variable that is static in its analysis. Instead the value of this type of analysis, and this normative understanding of terrorism, is its ability to locate a trend and make subsequent forecasts based on both a historical and contemporary account of the key variables that constitute a terrorist group – the *goals*, *targets*, *tactics* and *structure*. This fulfils a key objective of PRA through the use of the rational choice framework.

4.6 Conclusion:

The data herein illustrates a number of key findings about *old* and *new terrorism*. Through an individual analysis of the *goals*, *targets*, and *tactics* as the primary variables assessing terrorism it was illustrated that both time periods exhibit similar traits, and that no novelties occur.

Adding to the existing variables of analysis was the secondary variable of *structure*. Similarly to the above it was illustrated that in spite of subtle differences similar traits have occurred in both time periods – this again shows that the novelty of *new terrorism* is unfounded.

What is illustrated by *new terrorism* however, is a contemporary trend in terrorism in a certain time period. It is herein that the real value of *new terrorism* is located. The real value of *new terrorism* as applied to PRA is gained when it has a memory from which to be compared. In this regard the value of *new terrorism* is dependent on an analysis of *old* terrorism. This type of analysis is based on the heuristic process from the rational choice framework as well as the forecasting process from within PRA. To this end, Table 6 offers a basis for the construction of a normative concept of terrorism. This table encourages its user

to capture both historical and contemporary trends in terrorism based on the discussed variables herein.

In conclusion, the value of *new terrorism* does not come from its novelty, but rather from its comparison and inclusion of *old* terrorism. In this regard, a normative *historical-contemporary terrorism* concept is better suited to the rational choice framework and PRA in general.

Chapter 5: Summary of Main Findings and Concluding Remarks

5.1 Introduction:

This research study began by focusing on the novelty and value of *new terrorism* as a concept for analysis within PRA. This focus led to the construction of the implied concept of *old terrorism*, as well as the establishment of two clear time periods for analysis. These time periods were 1945-2000 for *old terrorism*, and 2001-2009 for *new terrorism*. These time periods were compared on the bases of three primary variables *goals*, *targets* and *tactics*, as well as a discovered secondary variable *structure*.

The central research question of this research study was concerned with the value of the concept of *new terrorism* within PRA. Accordingly this research study set about establishing this value through a historical comparison of the two time periods and concepts mentioned above. Also considered was the role of the rational choice framework as well as this frameworks contribution to the understanding of terrorism as a concept for analysis within PRA.

This chapter highlights the key findings as they relate to what this research paper initially set out to do. What follows is a discussion on the *Course of the Research Study*, an *Evaluation of the Research Study*, a *Summary of Contributions*, as well as, *Suggestions for Further Research*.

5.2 Course of the Research Study:

The main findings within this research study are guided by a number of variables as they relate to both *old* and *new terrorism*. The initial variables for discussion were *goals*, *targets and tactics*. Through systematic analysis of three Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups in two distinct time periods a number of conclusions were drawn about each variable. The Islamic fundamentalist groups discussed in the period 1945-2000 were the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah.

Through the analysis of the given variables for each group it was illustrated that they shared two primary *goals*. These goals were 1) the establishment of Islamic law within the state, and 2) the removal of foreign influence.

Based on the *goals* of these two groups, as well as further analysis, the Brotherhood and Hezbollah also shared two broadly characterised *targets*. These targets were 1) government

officials and, 2) foreign actors. However, Hezbollah sought to act against targets in a regional/transnational capacity. It therefore pursued both local targets as well as targets across the state boundary from which the group originates.

The *tactics* that each group used differ slightly based on one primary factor – the Iranian Revolution. As discussed herein it was as a result of the Iranian Revolution that Hezbollah, (among other terrorist groups) garnered better weapons as well as inspiration. Essentially, the Iranian Revolution “inspired and assisted” Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in the latter part of the time period 1945-2000, especially during the 1980s.

The *tactics* employed by the Brotherhood were protest, assassination, kidnapping and bombing - with primacy given to more resource heavy and selective methods of attack. Alternatively, Hezbollah – whilst engaging in similar tactics to the Brotherhood were more prone to violence and methods of violence that were achievable through little use of resources – these include bombing and suicide terrorism. Data given by Enders and Sandler (2006:59) note that for the period 1968-2003 bombing incidents (4,003) made up a quarter of the total incidents (12,559), with kidnapping (1,186) and assassination (1,078) also featuring prominently.

For the period 2001-2009 the Islamic fundamentalist group al-Qaeda was discussed in terms of its *goals, targets and tactics*. Herein it was discovered that similarly to Hezbollah and the Brotherhood before it al-Qaeda also pursues two primary goals, albeit with a different focus. These two goals are first and foremost, the removal of foreign influence, and secondly, the establishment of Islamic law within the state. The altered focus of the group towards foreign influence first and the establishment of the Islamic state as a secondary goal emanates from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which shaped the ideologies of al-Qaeda’s two main ideologues – Azzam and bin Laden.

Accordingly the *targets* that al-Qaeda pursues are equally similar to the preceding groups. These targets are: 1) foreign actors and 2) local government. Similarly to Hezbollah al-Qaeda also pursues its targets transnationally – it is therefore not contained by any one state.

Finally, the *tactics* of al-Qaeda were discussed where it was discovered that al-Qaeda favours bombing and suicide terrorism. This is not to say however that kidnapping and assassination are not employed, these tactics are rather not favoured or employed as rigorously. The tactics of bombing and suicide terrorism are reflective of the subtle goal change towards foreign

influence. These tactics can be used to inflict maximum damage and a broad range of foreign targets.

Contributing to the variable analysis herein is the addition of a secondary variable for comparison. This variable was *structure*. Structurally, it was illustrated that the Brotherhood had a centralised bureaucratic structure; however, as the first time period progressed the structure of Islamic fundamentalist groups became increasingly decentralised and flexible; this is reflective of Hezbollah's group structure. Explanations for this are attributed to the Iranian revolution, as well as the rise of the MNC and globalisation. This is similar to the group structure of al-Qaeda which is also decentralised. However, al-Qaeda has taken it a further degree than Hezbollah by becoming a decentralised networked of affiliated groups that share similar goals, targets and tactics. The group structure of al-Qaeda and its affiliates therefore appears to be both simultaneously bureaucratic and decentralised. It is debatable however that this is novel. When considering al-Qaeda and its affiliates in isolation of one another their group structures would merely reflect the structures of the Brotherhood and Hezbollah, from the previous time period – that is al-Qaeda is largely decentralised and transnational, with its affiliates mostly being bureaucratic and domestically located.

As this relates back to PRA it can be concluded that *new terrorism* has little value as a singular concept for analysis and may in fact constrain the analytical processes within PRA and subsequently the mitigation of terrorism as a risk in PRA.

5.3 Evaluation of Research Study:

To establish a definitive conclusion to the main research question herein the sub-questions will be considered first. These sub-questions served to broadly outline the main differences and similarities between *old* and *new terrorism*. The sub-questions also served to illuminate the role of the rational choice framework within PRA. The first sub-question for consideration asked:

What is the old versus the new conceptualisation of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism?

Based on the above findings, *old* terrorism is focused towards the establishment of the Islamic state, under Islamic law, as well as the removal of foreign influence. To this end old terrorism seeks to target local government officials and foreign actors through the use of violent means. Violent tactics employed during the period defined by *old* terrorism include, kidnapping, assassination, bombing and suicide terrorism all of which inflict varying degrees

of casualties. Also the main perpetrators of these violent acts are terrorist groups that are both structurally bureaucratic as well as structurally decentralised, that operated both domestically and increasingly transnationally.

New terrorism, as is conceptualised through an analysis of al-Qaeda in the period 2001-2009 is characterised as follows. *New terrorism* is focused towards the removal of foreign influence so as to establish the Islamic state under Islamic law. To this end *new terrorism* seeks to target both local government officials and foreign actors through two primary tactics, notably suicide terrorism and bombing. These tactics are extremely violent and generally inflict high number casualties. This contributes to a trend of increased violence. Also the main perpetrators of these acts are increasingly decentralised and transnational. However, when considering al-Qaeda and its affiliates as separate entities, the group structures are bureaucratic and decentralised, as well as domestic and transnational.

The two conceptualisations of *old* and *new terrorism* respectively illustrate that *new terrorism* is not as novel as first thought. It is certainly not novel enough to justify its label. There are a number of striking generalisations that can be made in both time periods. These generalisations come in the shared characteristics of the variables, *goals*, *targets*, *tactics*, and *structure*.

The remaining sub-questions can be addressed in a similar fashion. These sub-questions asked:

- *How does rational choice theory reconcile the differences between old and new terrorism?*
- *How does rational choice theory contribute to understanding terrorism as a PRA variable?*

In discussing the first sub-question posed above, it is important to note that *old* and *new terrorism* share more similarities than differences. To this end rational choice theory, and the rational choice framework is not very applicable when it comes to reconciling differences. Where the rational choice framework is applicable is in the comprehension of terrorism as something that responds to various historical incentives that alter its general characterises over time regardless of whether these characteristics are new or being repeated – herein lies the value of the rational choice framework and terrorism as a variable in PRA.

Rational choice theory contributes to the understanding of terrorism by illustrating the importance of both *old* and *new terrorism* as necessary considerations when assessing risk. Through the use of rational choice, the importance of understanding past events is highlighted through the heuristic process. This process combines *old* and *new terrorism* creating a more holistic understanding of terrorism within PRA. From this point of view terrorism is not considered as a single snapshot in time but rather a continual process. The value of terrorism as a variable in PRA is in understanding terrorism as a dynamic variable that subtly shifts over time without necessarily being novel. It locates trends where certain goals, targets, tactics and structure are being repeated and assesses to what degree these trends are being repeated.

For example, the Muslim Brotherhood did not use suicide terrorism as a tactic but Hezbollah did. Regardless of this difference that fact the Hezbollah used this tactic within the *old* terrorism negates the novelty of suicide terrorism in the *new terrorism* period. By just focusing on *new terrorism* this would not be seen as important. However, using rational choice, the environmental incentives (Iranian Revolution, Soviet Invasion, and war on terror) for this shift can be discussed both historically and in a contemporary setting to make inferences as to why suicide terrorism is presently so prevalent as well as forecast future probabilities as to how suicide terrorism may be used in the future. This method, using the rational choice framework, may be similarly applied to other *goals, targets, tactics* and *structure* of terrorism. What is important to note herein is that the significance of *new terrorism* can only be located through a rational process that considers the memory of *old* terrorism. Should either concept stand alone the rational framework for analysis within PRA is undermined, and subsequently the ability for PRA to effectively mitigate terrorism is also undermined.

These sub-questions can now be analysed together in order to answer the over arching research question which asks:

Are the changes in Islamic fundamentalism (from 1945-2000 and 2001-2009) significant enough for the variable “new terrorism” to have real value within PRA?

The simple answer is no, the changes in Islamic fundamentalism are not significant enough for the concept *new terrorism* to have real value within PRA. Instead the value of a terrorism concept in PRA must come from a combined rational understanding of both *old* and *new*

terrorism. This rational understanding seeks to unpack the various incentives motivating terrorist *goals, targets, tactics* and *structure*. Furthermore by adding conceptual weight to both time periods, the memory of past events, combined with the uniqueness of the present can be used to make a rational forecast as to how terrorism will be in the future. Rational choice advocates a more holistic approach to terrorism and the trends that guide it in both a historical and a contemporary setting. This finding is illustrated in *Table 6* which provides a checklist for consideration when establishing a concept of terrorism for analysis within PRA. This normative concept allows for a greater depth of analysis and subsequently the possibility for more effective mitigation.

5.4 Summary of Contributions:

Hough (2005), as well as Spencer (2006), highlight the importance of *new terrorism* since the concept argues that terrorists operate transnationally in loosely organised networks, they are motivated by religious extremism, they aim at mass casualties and target indiscriminate victims.

What has been illustrated through the above research is that this is indeed the case for contemporary terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. However, the novelty of this is questionable. It is illustrated herein that terrorist groups, both *old* and *new* share a number of similarities, and that these groups are more alike than they are different. Terrorist groups from both periods share similarities in *goals, targets, tactics* and *structure*. These findings undermine the novelty of the claims made by authors who support the concept of *new terrorism*.

The practical implications of this are realised through the use of the rational choice framework as it relates to PRA. The rational choice framework advocates that PRA must consider terrorism in both a historical as well as a contemporary setting to get full value for its analysis. In this regard, PRA cannot find value in the exclusive use of *new terrorism* as a variable in PRA. When PRA uses both the historical and the contemporary understanding of terrorism it is better able to forecast possible future trends by having a more holistic conceptual understanding of terrorism - regardless of whether these trends are novel or being repeated. This understanding provides a holistic approach to terrorism and forms the basis of a normative terrorism variable in PRA. This variable, rather than placing primacy on certain conceptual characteristics, seeks to unpack why these characteristics are prevalent and forecast what these characteristic are likely to be in the future.

This research therefore has not reinvented the terrorism concept or variable, it merely states the fact that PRA cannot be too hasty in its adoption of a static conceptualisation of terrorism to the detriment of a more holistic and historical analysis. Too narrow a focus has the real potential to undermine the total mitigation of terrorism as a political risk.

5.5 Suggestions for Further Research:

For further contributions to be made to the debate on the novelty of *new terrorism* future research could be conducted using a range of other terrorist organisations. The more organisations that are used, using the methods outlined herein, the more valid the findings. Similarly, the applicability of the findings herein to other identities of terrorism would make for an interesting comparison. In this regard *terrorism in the service of national liberation and ethnic separatism*, as well as *left-wing terrorism* could be explored as further avenues of comparison.

With regards to PRA, future research would do well to help establish a more concrete and consensual variable of terrorism. At present there are over 100 alternative definitions of terrorism which, rather than adding clarity to the concept or variable, draw away from the effectiveness of PRA to produce reliable and consistent results. The concept of *new terrorism* is a case in point since, from the research herein; it merely serves to overstate the novelty of contemporary terrorist activity to the detriment of a more holistic understanding of the trends associated with the development of terrorism as a tactic governed by rational actors who respond to various environmental incentives.

Another avenue of research within PRA is the role that political stability plays in terms of the risks that terrorism poses. Does high political stability mean less risk of terrorism? Subsequently, what is the relationship between democracy and terrorism? This was tentatively alluded to in chapter 2, but would make for very informative future research.

A final suggestion for further research could be on the effects that the concept of *new terrorism* has on the nature of counterterrorism policy. As the “war on terror” rages on through the 21st century with little intention to halt, how has *new terrorism* shaped discourse on the war and on the policies that drive the war both domestically and in the theatre of combat? Has the significance of *new terrorism* been overstated since 9/11 and is the “war on terror” really that – a war on terror? Or is the “war on terror” really a war against Islam, or war for resource control?

5.6 Conclusion:

This sub-section ends this research study which has been a historical comparison of *old* and *new terrorism*. Through the analysis of the primary and secondary variables herein it has been established that there are more similarities than differences between *old* and *new terrorism*. The value of *new terrorism* as a concept for analysis within PRA is thus extremely limited. For PRA to be successful in its objectives of risk assessment and mitigation it requires a concept of terrorism that is not limited in its conceptual capacity. Too narrow a focus has real potential to undermine the total mitigation of terrorism as a political risk. To this end PRA requires a holistic terrorism concept for analysis. This normative terrorism concept must reflect both *old* and *new terrorism* simultaneously. It is through this holistic and rational understanding of terrorism as a concept for analysis that the greatest value can be attained from analysis and strides can be made towards the mitigation of the risk that terrorism poses.

Regardless of the findings herein however, terrorism will always have elements that will be wholly unknown and unpredictable. So long as the dominant world order (the West) characterises the actions of terrorists as problems to be solved, or confined, or taken over there will always be groups of reactionaries ready to make a stand for their culture, their religion, or their politics. Terrorism at its heart is a grievance. For terrorism to be effectively combated it must be understood as a human condition with a human face. Similarly terrorists must be considered people, albeit more desperate than your average person, they nevertheless seek similar ideals – to have a place in this world free from a relationship of domination and subordination. As a closing comment on the “war on terror” as a form of mitigation, future mitigation tactics should not involve such extreme uses of force or counter-violence; instead mitigation should consider the real grievances at the heart of the terrorist organisation. As Edmund Burke is quoted in a *Speech on Conciliation with America* (1775) “the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again.”

Appendix 1

Table 7: al-Qaeda Affiliates 1990-2000

Groups affiliated to al-Qaeda between 1990 and 2000	
Group	Country of Activity
Jihad Movement of Bangladesh	Bangladesh
Al-Jihad	Egypt
<i>Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan</i>	Pakistan
Armed Islamic Group	Algeria
Salafist Group for Call and Combat	Algeria
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	Uzbekistan
Jemaah Islamiyah	Indonesia
Harakat ul-Mujahedin	Pakistan (Kashmir)
Jaish-e-Mohammad	Pakistan (Kashmir)
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba	Pakistan (Kashmir)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	Pakistan (Kashmir)
Asbat al-Ansar	Lebanon
Al Qaeda Jihad Organisation	Jordan
Islamic Army of Aden	Yemen
Hizb-e-Islam/Gulbuddin	Yemen
Moroccan Islamic Combat Group	Morocco
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	Saudi Arabia
The Secret Organisation of Al Qaeda in Europe	England/Egypt

(Castells, 2004; Katzman, 2005)

Table 8: al-Qaeda Affiliates post-2001

Groups affiliated to al-Qaeda post-2001	
Group	Country of Activity
Egyptain Islamic Jihad	Egypt
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group	Lybia
Islamic Army of Aden	Yemen
Jama'at al-Tawhid wal Jihad	Iraq
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba	Kashmir
Jaish-e-Muhammed	Kashmir
Islmaic Movement of Uzbekistan	Uzbekistan
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (aka Salafist Group for Call and Combat)	Algeria
Armed Islamic Group	Algeria
Abu Sayyaf Group	Malaysia, Philippines
Jemaah Islamiya	Southeast Asia

(CFR, 2009)

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