OUTCOMES-BASED EDUCATION AS A SOCIAL PRACTICE: TRANSFORMATIVE OR NOT?

IVAN P NOVEMBER

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Promoter: Professor Y Waghid

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

SIGNATURE:

IVAN P. NOVEMBER

DATE:
ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores whether Outcomes-based education (OBE) as currently being practised in South Africa is transformative or not. Put differently, the dissertation explores whether the critical outcomes of OBE can engender citizens who can function in a deep democratic ‘space’. My contention is that the outcomes seem to be framed according to the tenets of instrumentality which erode peoples’ self-independence and dialogical aspirations necessary to further democratise and transform the country’s education system. Consequently, although the current critical outcomes have the possibility of engendering critical citizens, this dissertation argues that this kind of criticality is not enabling enough in order to cultivate persons who can function adequately in a deep democracy – one whereby people can deliberatively and imaginatively engage in a dialogical relationship. Therefore, it is argued that outcomes need to be framed commensurate with a democratic citizenship agenda which holds the promise of cultivating a critical mass which can function in a deep democratic dispensation on the basis of deliberation and imagination – a matter of reconceptualising the critical outcomes in a transformative manner.

KEYWORDS:

Outcomes-based education, critical outcomes, transformation, deep democracy, deliberation and imagination.
Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek of Uitkomsgebaseerde onderwys (U.G.O.) soos huidiglik gepraktiseer transformatief is of nie. Anders gestel, die proefskrif ondersoek of die kritiese uitkomste van U.G.O. burgers kan genereer wat kan funksioneer in ’n “diep” demokrasie. Ek hou voor dat die uitkomste huidiglik volgens die denke van instrumentaliteit geskakeer is wat mense se onafhanklikheid en dialogiese aspirasies, nodig om demokrasie en transformasie van die onderwyssisteem te bevorder, teenwerk.

Vervolglik, alhoewel die kritiese uitkomste oor die moontlikheid beskik om kritiese burgers te genereer, redeneer hierdie proefskrif dat die kritiese vermoëns nie krities genoeg is nie om burgers te genereer wat kan funksioneer in ’n “diep” demokrasie nie – een waar mense beraadslagend en met verbeelding kan verkeer in ’n dialogiese verbintenis. Daarom word geredeneer dat die uitkomste geskakeer moet word in ooreenstemming met ’n demokratiese burgerskap agenda. So ’n agenda beskik oor die moontlikheid om ’n kritiese massa voort te bring wat kan funksioneer in ’n “diep” demokratiese bestel op grond van deliberasie en verbeelding – dus behoort die kritiese uitkomste van UGO op ’n transformatiewe wyse geherkonseptualiseer te word.

**SLEUTELWOORDE:** Uitkomsgebaseerde onderwys, kritieke uitkomste, transformasie, “diep” demokrasie, deliberasie en verbeelding.
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PREFACE

As a teacher at a high school I engaged with Outcomes-based education. I found that some learners were quick to finish assigned tasks, whilst others were at times disinterested. Added to this were huge class sizes and a lack of resources. Colleagues seemed demotivated by their increased teaching loads and seemed to just make it through the day everyday. The question that came to mind was what type of citizens are these learners and teachers to become? Teachers who are demotivated and who cannot see that their situation can change, seemingly will find it difficult to convince learners that things can be otherwise. Yet, policy documents proclaim that Curriculum 2005 and Outcomes-based education can engender critical citizens for participation in a democracy. The paradox between teaching practice and policy documents prompted a sense of discomfort in me about the potential success of Outcomes-based education and, in particular, whether the prescribed critical outcomes can foster critical citizens for a deep democracy. This is the reason why this dissertation undermines the way the critical outcomes are framed.

The central question that this dissertation seeks to answer is whether Outcomes-based education as currently practised in South Africa is transformative or not. Put differently, this dissertation seeks to answer whether the critical outcomes of Outcomes-based education are able to engender critical citizens for a democracy as envisaged by the South African Government and the national Department of Education.

This dissertation holds that the outcomes are currently framed in terms of the demands of market related forces such as globalisation and industry. The demands of the market require workers and citizens who are critical and creative. These demands seemingly become the task of schools – to engender a specific citizen for the job market. This type of technical rationality displays features of instrumentality, for the current critical outcomes are structured in a way to produce the labour that globalisation requires. The critical outcomes are preset by experts and politicians who are not necessarily interested in what education can mean for learners but in what a learner as citizen can mean for the market and the economy. Outcomes that are conceived in an instrumental way seemingly stunt critical and creative activity.

This dissertation contends that if the critical outcomes are framed in such a way that they are ‘open-ended’, learners may think beyond the given and may see that what is given does not have to be accepted unquestioningly and uncritically. Inconclusive outcomes foster the ability to imagine beyond the given. Such outcomes do not restrict learners’ freedom to reach beyond. In some poverty stricken areas in our country learners need to know that things can be different, that there is hope in a seemingly hopeless world. Education needs to give learners the hope that they can be included and can open windows that were formerly shut.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND DESIGN

1.1 INTRODUCTION

I shall briefly outline instances of the history of education in South Africa pertinent to this investigation. The aim is to delineate the manipulation of education in South Africa by Whites and racist governments. Also, how the political framework has served to maintain an ideology of separatism to serve the needs of Whites (a privileged minority) and industry. In so doing, I shall trace the technicist nature of education and, how as a result, Outcomes-based education emerged as a response.

Education, as a social practice, has always been a highly contested and problematic terrain. Instances of this can be seen with reference to the history of education in South Africa that I shall briefly outline - specifically those instances pertinent to this investigation. During the 1930s the Welsh Report (Rose & Tunmer, 1975: 229-239) maintained that education made the native “a) lazy and unfit for manual work; b) it made him cheeky and less docile as a servant; c) it estranged him from his own people and often led him to despise his own culture.” It did not object to education as such, but to the wrong type of education. There was an established political framework and any social practice, of which education is an example, had to fit into that particular framework. The political framework, in essence, underpinned every aspect of civil society, including education. During the 1950s industry in South Africa needed unskilled cheap labour, essentially for the gold mines, and native education had to produce for this need. The economy did not at this time demand a critical, thinking native citizen that could reflect about the type of education she was forced to undergo.

The rise of the Nationalist government in South Africa in 1948 heralded the advent of Christian National Education (CNE). This system signified an educational system for White Afrikaans-speaking children. Although purportedly for White Afrikaans speaking children, the government's pronouncements on the education of those children other than White had a major
impact. As such, it advocated that all education should take place in the mother tongue, that education for Blacks should not be at the expense of White education and that education should preserve the cultural identity of the Native, and be administered by Whites. Christian National Education was an attempt not only to Christianise the Black people, but in line with Bantu Education, to subvert the Black nations to an inferior position in civil society. Ostensibly, cultural identity was paramount in Christian National Education policy, yet Blacks would be forced to accept Christian and national principles and Whites would administer Bantu education. “The notion of racial superiority is essential to the function of an ideology like CNE”, states Enslin (Kallaway 1984: 140).

In 1949 the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Native Education (Eiselen Commission), whose terms of reference were “the formulation of principles and aims of education for Natives as an independent race” (Fleisch in Kallaway, 2002: 42), recommended that Bantu Education, whose underlying principles had already been put in place with the advent of Christian National Education in 1948, needs to be reformed. In 1953 the Bantu Education Act advocated the registration of all schools for Blacks to be registered with the government. “Bantu education sought to replace purportedly outmoded and inefficient forms of provincial, local and missionary control of African education with a new kind of expert-led bureaucratic management of education” (Kallaway, 2002: 16). With the introduction of Bantu education, the education of Africans was taken away from the church and the missionaries and placed in the hands of experts. The new government (1948) had usurped control over African education. The discourse of the commission was filled with terminology such as “facts”, “solutions”, “efficiency” and “problems”, which seemed to locate the discourse in positivism with its concomitant possibility of social engineering and control. The fact that control of African education was taken away from local level and vested in central government, could be interpreted as a sign that policies made at central level would be used to ensure the production of Black labour (Fleisch in Kallaway, 2002: 45):

The needs of industry thus come to exercise a major influence on public policy, and have a direct effect on policies put forward in the face of educational crisis. Public policy comes to be structurally weighted towards capitalist solutions, and whatever else
educational policy has to deliver it must certainly aid (or appear to aid) economic growth (Kallaway, 1984: 13).

Furthermore,

The South African government had the resources and the ideological commitment to ensure that the education system would continue to produce the requisite type of workers (Fleisch in Kallaway, 2002: 45).

With the end result (a specific worker and citizen) in mind, teaching methods and the curriculum were strictly content and knowledge based. The teachers controlled the knowledge as laid down by central government and the pupils were to be filled with facts. The teaching method was unidirectional and the pupils were passive, non-reflective and uncritical about their learning experience. The learning experience was exam driven, rote learning was encouraged, and syllabi were rigid and non-negotiable.

There was another side to Bantu education that is of interest to this investigation. The Nationalists, the ruling party, in establishing Bantu education, had a “Bantu citizen” in mind. The effect of this was a greater drive to tribalise the Bantu. Thus, Bantustans (Homelands) based purely along tribal lines were established. The Bantu would then be citizens of these Bantustans where Bantu education was the order of the day. “Central to their strategic objectives was the defusion of African nationalism through a systematic attempt to retribalise in such a way that the resultant fragmentation would obstruct the further development of Black Nationalism. It was primarily for these purposes, and in order to retrench the status of the bulk of the oppressed literally as non-citizens by placing them politically in a sphere completely removed from South African citizenship, that the Bantustans were devised” (Kallaway, 1984: 92).

1959 saw the introduction of separate universities, so-called bush colleges. In 1963 the Department of Coloured Affairs took control of Coloured education. In 1965 Indian education resorted under the Department of Indian Affairs. Coloured and Indian Education followed upon the Group Areas Act and as with the Bantustans, served to separate people on racial lines under
the guise of culture preservation. Bantu education resorted under the Department of Education and Training. The situation in Coloured and Indian schools was not much different from that in Black schools. Schools were based on race within residential areas set aside for particular races and teachers were, as a rule, from the same race group. Rote learning, corporal punishment and exams were common.

Thus far, the chapter has briefly outlined the development of education from the 1930s until 1970. Especially significant was how education was utilised at various times to the advantage of the government of the day, the way in which Christian National Education was developed by the new government in 1948 and served as the foundation for Bantu Education based on race and not culture as claimed by the Nationalist government. The chapter also refers to the role education played in meeting the needs of capital as in providing unskilled labour for the goldmines. Thereafter, to indicate that racism in education was not only confined to Black education, mention was made how Coloured and Indian education, although each resorting under its own racially based education department, were also concentrated in the hands of the government. Of importance to this investigation is the concept of citizenship in these times and the way in which education was manipulated to transform society in a pre-planned social engineering. I shall now refer to instances of resistance in education pertinent to this investigation, as the forms and nature of the resistance in many instances informed, shaped and redefined the way in which people thought about themselves, the way they lived and the education and educational institutions available to them, in short, their practices or as is the case with education, practices which were forced upon them.

This investigation needs to ask whether the self-understandings of the black community about the practice of education in South Africa, that is, the common meaning attached to a practice by a community within which individuals in that community discover their self-definition, was in congruence with the practice of education as they experienced it or whether it was detached from their self-understanding. “Experience” as used here does not necessarily mean that the individual self-defines him/herself in terms thereof.
From the 1930s onwards there was a fair amount of resistance, especially by Black people, to segregated education. I specifically refer to the type of education received by those other than Whites during this period because segregated education as the official policy of Apartheid had not yet been established at this time. Resistance gathered momentum during the 1950s when people started to mobilise. I should caution against a notion that resistance in education during this period arose in isolation. Parallel to resistance in education was resistance in civil life, such as the burning of passbooks and Ghandi’s passive resistance in various forms. Black people were also unhappy with low wages and that they had to reside in reserves and were confined to certain areas at certain times. As a result of the general conflict in civil life, and as a means of giving vent to frustration, The Congress of the People was held on 26 June 1956 by those who resisted the policies of the Nationalists. The Freedom Charter, which was to ground guidelines for a future non-racial South Africa, was adopted. The slogan “The doors of learning shall be opened”, a significant section of the Charter, which was to reverberate throughout the struggle for freedom in South Africa into the 1980s, came into being. The period from 1960, after the infamous Sharpeville massacre through to 1973, was relatively quiet in terms of resistance though the important ideas of Black consciousness were seeded at this time.

Black consciousness called upon all people suffering under Apartheid to unite in the struggle for democracy in South Africa. Because of the insistence that Blacks (including Coloureds and Indians) had to be the vanguard rather than Whites, the movement became known as the Black Consciousness Movement. The movement spurred a significant shift in thinking as it urged the eradication of racist thinking amongst the oppressed communities. The significance of this idea will be indicated later. During the 1970s schools were turned into terrains of struggle. Most noteworthy during this period was the uprising in Soweto in 1976. Black students mobilised against the introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. Moreover, Afrikaans was seen as the language of the oppressor. Protests erupted all over the country and though Afrikaans as medium of instruction seemingly was the reason for educational breakdown, students and the Black society (parents and workers) were influenced by many ideas and events. It is at this juncture that the ideas of the Black Consciousness Movement played a pivotal role in uniting the community, and especially students. From this point onward, education in South Africa would never be thought of or envisaged in the same way again by both the Nationalist government and
resistance movements. Common/constitutive meanings about the practices in terms of which the community could find their self-definition were being established at this time. It is at this time that the constitutive meanings about what education means to the community were given meaning to. More about this later.

It was clear to most people in South Africa, to hegemonic forces and radicals alike, that the policy of apartheid education had failed. The opposition forces were looking for an alternative to Bantu education, an educational alternative that would grow spontaneously from the struggle for liberation in South Africa, couched in the language of that struggle as the community wrestled to define what they understood to be education to liberate themselves, physically and mentally; an educational practice in which they could find self-definition. Within the language of protest concepts were heard that had been found within the work of Paulo Freire and his work on dialectical humanism, more specifically. There was a complete rejection of what Freire calls banking education, which “refers to situations in which narrating teachers deposit into the minds of passive receiving students. Banking education is invaluable for maintaining an oppressive social order, for the more that students put their efforts into receiving and storing information deposited in them, the less they can attain the critical consciousness that comes from intervening in reality as makers and transformers of the world” (McLaren & Leonard, 1993: 99). Slogans such as “education for liberation” and “people’s education for people’s power” prevailed not only at schools as sites of struggle, but also in the workplace. There was a decided push from the community as a whole, for the democratisation of schools, for a change in syllabi to reflect the history of not only White South Africans and for representation on shop floors by workers.

The seminal influence of the Black Consciousness Movement, a force that unified society with its insistence that the vanguard should be led by all those not White (Coloureds, Indians and Blacks), was predominant at this time. The struggle for democracy was noticeable throughout society. These were couched in the language of critical pedagogy (Nekhwevha in Kallaway, 2002: 137). Motala and Vally (in Kallaway, 2002: 174) posit that “The concept of “People’s Education” captured the imagination of many South Africans, regardless of whether they perceived it to be a notional term providing impetus to a political strategy or an important contribution to education praxis in its own right … For the majority of South Africans People’s
Education promised liberation from the effects of an unequal and disabling education system and was seen as providing the basis for a future education system in a democratic South Africa”. The oppressed masses in South Africa yearned to change the structures which oppressed them, longed to put in place a social and education system that could transform society – a system which would recognise them as citizens in a democratic South Africa – free them from the second class citizenship of the Bantustans. I shall now examine some of the constitutive meanings of People’s Education, considering whether these meanings could liberate the oppressed masses in South Africa from the prevailing oppressive structures and, therefore, legitimately serve as a basis for a future South African political and educational dispensation.

At a conference held in December 1985, where the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) was established, it was agreed that People’s Education was education that would educate the masses about the oppressive system of apartheid and educate and prepare them for a non-racial democratic South Africa. It would educate the masses about capitalist power structures with its inclination toward individualism and competition rather than community input and participation. People’s Education would give everybody an equal chance in terms of training and equipping him/herself for the people’s struggle for power, would eliminate illiteracy and ignorance and stimulate critical thinking and analysis. In line with Paulo Freire’s rejection of banking education, which finds an analogy with Apartheid education in terms of the passivity of the learner and the teacher as the source of knowledge, People’s Education advocated a rejection of some forms of domination and the attainment of a People’s Power. Significantly, pupils were challenged to return to school and to continue the struggle from within. The salient features of People’s Education were identified as non-racialism, democracy, and participation of students and parents in education structures (Motala & Vally in Kallaway, 2002: 181).

From the above it seems evident that a People’s Education based on the pedagogy of Paulo Freire, permeating the struggles of the oppressed masses in South Africa, does contain the necessary notions of a liberating political and educational theory that was so desperately needed, but more importantly, which could form the basis for a future political and educational system in an effort to transform society. People’s Education signalled a break from past thinking in education about education, but also empowered the Black (oppressed) community to think about
their own education in terms of social practices established by themselves through which they could find self-definition. Consequently for the first time in the history of South Africa, the oppressed masses were a seminal part of the emergence of an educational practice with which they could identify themselves. Motala and Vally (Kallaway, 2002: 184) are of the opinion that “the key significance of the events that took place between 1985 and 1990 was that the NECC set the agenda of People’s Education by 'capturing spaces' through which alternative practices compatible with education transformation were attempted”.

As a result of the uprising in Black education and society in general in the aftermath of 1976, the South African government, led by PW Botha, reacted with its policy of Total Onslaught. This translated into a measure to hold onto power by using repressive methods. The upshot was a community that was more united than ever against the Apartheid government. The government also experienced pressure from abroad, and within the country industry had made ever-increasing demands for a semi-skilled labour force. Thus industry with its former demand of an unskilled and, therefore, cheap labour force in line with the national policy of Apartheid and Bantu Education had ceased to be an ally and had become another dissenting voice. Satisfying industry and the ever increasing vociferous assaults from abroad to undo the policy of Apartheid, was understood by the Nationalists not as requiring a shift away from Apartheid, but at the very least a modification of the ideals of Bantu Education in order for the educational system to produce semi-skilled workers. Any dilution of Apartheid would require a major paradigm shift for the Nationalist government, almost unthinkable if one reflects on the extreme repressive measures, such as the proclamation of a state of emergency, shooting of protesters, and the banning of political organisations and individuals, taken to enforce an illegitimate (for the disenfranchised masses) policy.

During the late 1980s it became apparent to the Nationalist government that the policy of Apartheid had failed and “the cultural/racist conceptions of apartheid gradually shifted to a more inclusive notion of 'White nationhood' and the need to develop a vigorous economy. This led to an emphasis on the development of human resource capacity and a shift to a skills-based economy that would provide the preconditions for South Africa’s effective participation in the global economy” (Kallaway, 2002: 18). Thus, having been commissioned by the Nationalist
government, the De Lange Report in 1981 advocated that education should be “equal but separate”. The De Lange Report (Report of the Main Committee of the Human Science Research Council, 1981: 208) advocated that:

Education should equip the education client with knowledge and understanding of the requirements of continuous cultural change, for example to adapt to new situations, to cultivate productivity-oriented ethics of work, and to master technological knowledge and skills.

Thus with De Lange the emphasis seems to have shifted from “unequal and separate” to “equal and separate”. Moreover, there was a concerted thrust in the direction of the economic and technicist and the discourse of the report was also firmly lodged therein. Pupils who did not show a certain aptitude would be streamed into courses leading to the acquisition of technological skills. A greater emphasis was placed on mathematics and science. Academic education was viewed as a waste of money by industry because when pupils entered the labour market, they could not employ their school knowledge profitably. The task was then left to industry to train these labour seekers with the necessary and sufficient skills needed in a technological age, thus reducing education but as a means of providing human capital for capitalist economic growth concentrated in the main in White hands in South Africa and multi-national conglomerates such as Anglo-American. A “better life for all” in De Lange’s discourse was only seen in economic and technicist terms. The transformation of education with the intention of producing critical citizens in a non-racial and democratic political and educational dispensation could not be part of De Lange’s agenda, as his conceptual framework, “equal but separate” would not allow that conceptual space, since it was undeniably racist with its emphasis on “separateness”. Though regarded as conservative by radical groupings, the De Lange Report was rejected by the South African government in 1983 as being too progressive, but “in practical terms that meant a shift in emphasis from formal education based on the traditional liberal arts and science curriculum to training and skills development purportedly appropriate to the workplace for the majority of Black students” (Kallaway, 2002: 18).
The line of thought that education should be skills-based seems to be haunting South African education to this day, perhaps not with the intention to maintain a status quo of racism, but more in line with the trend of globalisation which is so prevalent today throughout the world. The emergence of a “systemic discourse” in South African education and industry during the period of political negotiation between the South African government and the African National Congress and the profound effect the discourse had on subsequent policy will be discussed in Chapter Two, along with the genesis of Outcomes-based education.

The years 1983 to 1990 are the struggle years, marked by the slogan “First liberation, then education” and an intensification of the struggle. The slogan emphasised that society had to be transformed before education could take place. The period 1990 to 1994 was characterised by structural reform and jockeying for position as the Nationalist government unbanned political organisations. Formal talks began with the government proposing the Education Renewal Strategy in 1992. The Education Renewal Strategy represented a shift away from education based purely on race. “The capitalist work ethic was now at the heart of the curriculum restructuring process. Most of the proposals emerging from the reports were little more than work socialisation strategies aimed at remoulding the value base of Black students and workers so that they internalised the work ethics and values of South African capitalism” (Kraak in Kallaway, 2002: 79). There was a strong push for knowledge, technological skills and values in the report. The emphasis on skills announced a significant shift away from the cheap unskilled labour demands by capital in the past and a return to the skills agenda of the De Lange Report. The Education Renewal Strategy placed South Africa firmly within the new globalisation trends in the world, which demanded a highly skilled labour force to utilise the new technologies in line with the changes in the manufacturing sector.

From the side of the Black opposition emerged The National Policy Investigation (NEPI). The NEPI report prepared the groundwork for a values-based democratic education policy, including non-sexism, democracy, equity, redress and non-racism (Jansen, 1999: 4). However, since political organisations had been unbanned, the African National Congress (ANC) officially engaged in negotiations with the Nationalist government, with the result that the erstwhile radical groupings such as student bodies and labour representation had to step aside. A downside to the
countrywide euphoria that liberation was a reality, was that during the negotiations many of the key principles, which were for the radical forces of paramount importance during the era of People’s Education, were either diluted or fell by the wayside. These included key principles, such as free and compulsory schooling and childhood education. The radical forces that throughout the internal struggle were at the forefront were noticeably almost absent as the ANC took the pivotal role in negotiation. The radical demands located in the discourse of People’s Education that focussed on social and democratic power relations, and in terms of which people had voiced their understanding of certain practices such as education, were substituted with a discourse stressing outcomes, performance, cost effectiveness and economic competitiveness.

The character of transition, the continued pressure from abroad for change and the concomitant globalisation, which I view as a trap for all capitalist economies manipulated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, especially Third World economies, served to moderate the radical demands made by the democratic movement in the run-up to negotiations. The consensual atmosphere of the negotiations was necessary to avoid possible civil war it was claimed, but at what cost as notions of quality, redress and equity were compromised (Motala & Vally in Kallaway, 2002: 187).

The ANC discovered that rhetoric and sloganism were very different when confronted with the reality of a real economy. “Politico-economic demands had to be backed up with politically and technically sound economic policy alternatives” (Chisholm in Kallaway, 2002: 102). Research in education was left to experts, also called consultants. Policy research and educational research became intertwined and because the earlier demands of the democratic movement had been watered down, policy and educational research were headed in the direction of a liberal democratic state based on market principles. Significantly, the discourse that impacted the most on education was that which had taken place within labour forums, especially that of the National Training Board. In collaboration with COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) the Board spawned the National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI) which proposed “an integrated approach to education and training which bound the education sector, including schools, into this framework of thinking” (Jansen, 1999: 6). The National Qualifications Framework was founded under the auspices of the National Education Training Forum (NETF) with its most important contribution being its support for a “technocratic framework for education related to issues of
economic growth and human resource development at the expense of addressing issues related to social justice and redress” (Motala & Vally in Kallaway, 2002: 186).

It was significant that the discussions about education were taking place in forums other than that of education, such as labour and economy and were influenced by global trends about competences in the workplace and the emphasis on skills. Within these forums competences first surfaced in linking educational qualifications to training qualifications and within COSATU, more specifically, the discussion emerged about competency-based education as a method to accredit training. Nekwhevha (2000: 29) contends that globalisation is but a form of cultural imperialism driven by educational prescriptions from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). The main features of the educational systems advocated by these institutions are capitalist and technological and based on Western educational models.

I have briefly illustrated instances of South African educational history pertinent to this investigation, without denying the importance of other “histories” in that development. The aim was to delineate how education was manipulated in this country by successive governments for their selfish racist agendas, but more so, to show how the conceptual political framework (read ideology) within which education finds itself embedded or immersed in the history of a specific people at a particular time, dictates, manipulates and maintains the course and content of an educational system and in so doing undergirds and supports the dominant ideology. This has been proven throughout the history of education (Soviet Union, U.S.A., U.K.), and South Africa was no exception. Moreover, political and educational systems are not insular and are open to the pressures and influence of the modern day phenomenon of globalisation and its invariably concomitant debt, mostly by Third World countries, owed to institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, who then “subtly persuade” debt-ridden governments to implement their vision, be it economic, social or educational. I attempted to outline how globalisation’s “request” for skilled labour worldwide has influenced the emerging educational system after the ANC came to power in South Africa in 1994, how the educational demands of the democratic movement (NEPI) embedded in People’s Education and some of the key principle’s of the Freedom Charter, all in the name of consensual politics, had been eroded or distilled in favour of competences discussed in Labour forums under the leadership of COSATU
who seemed to have hegemony in this sphere at the expense of the marginalisation of stakeholders and role-players in education.

Having considered the debate around competences and how it emerged in the South African context, I shall, in the following section, briefly examine the genesis of Outcomes-based education in South Africa.

1.2 RATIONALE

I aim to explore whether Outcomes-based education can be transformative or not. Transform means to change, from one state to another or in character. But for this study it means the change from an education system that served the needs of the government and industry to provide unskilled workers to one that could possibly serve the needs of society as a whole and that would have democratic citizenship as an aim.

William Spady, generally accepted as the author of Outcomes-based education, identifies three types of outcomes-based models. The first model is the Traditional Outcomes-based model. This model uses the current curriculum as foundation or point of departure. The outcomes are the objectives and emphasise the learning of content that need to be remembered and understood. The content of the curriculum remains unchanged and outcomes are predictable and measurable (Pretorius, 1998: x). Secondly, Transitional OBE concentrates on higher order competences of outcomes “which emphasise broad attitudinal, affective, motivational, and relational competences, as well as the acquisition of critical thinking, effective communication, technological applications and complex problem solving skills” (Waghid, 2002: 10).

Thirdly, Transformational OBE moves away completely from the existing curriculum. The outcomes are future driven in order to provide the learners with knowledge, competence and orientation needed for the future. Outcomes-based education had previously served as an educational basis in the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. However, the Outcomes-based education system in use in South Africa differs from the three models in the afore-mentioned countries as explained previously. It seems that OBE in South
Africa is adjusted to suit local needs and emerges from transitional and transformational OBE. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two.

Outcomes-based education, officially referred to as Curriculum 2005, the current education system upon which education in South Africa is based, was introduced by Professor S. Bhengu, then Minister of Education, as follows:

Essentially, the new curriculum will effect a shift from one which has been content-based to one which is based on outcomes. This aims at equipping all learners with the knowledge, competencies and orientations needed for success after they leave school or have completed their training. Its guiding vision is that of a thinking, competent future citizen (Department of Education (DOE) in Morrow & King, 1998: 49).

My central claim in this investigation is that Outcomes-based education, as practised in high schools in South Africa, has the potential to be transformative, for South Africa needs to have an education system that will produce democratic citizens before it can lay claim to democracy in a deeper sense. That is in line with the vision above the goal of education as presented in Curriculum 2005, to foster “thinking, competent, future citizens”. In apartheid South Africa, education was about the transmission of factual knowledge; about a passive learner and a teacher “filled” with factual knowledge – a teacher who believed that he/she could not be challenged, both in the sphere of delivery of knowledge and the knowledge per se. This model of education corresponded with Paulo Freire’s explanation of banking education. In this model the teacher “teaches, knows, thinks, disciplines, chooses and acts as the subject of the learning process. On the other hand, the students listen meekly, memorise, comply and adapt to this ‘domesticating process’ as mere objects” (Nekhwevha in Kallaway, 2002: 135). In providing this type of education, the apartheid government effectively manipulated its own conception of Black “citizens” (inclusive of Coloureds, Africans and Indians) and the demand from industry for a semi-skilled workforce. Thus in line with the above, Apartheid was the conceptual framework and Bantu education was the method.
The advent of a democratic South Africa in 1994 brought with it the expectation of an alternative education system located within a different conceptual scheme. Gone would be the days of Verwoerdian social engineering with its concomitant educational system based upon race and White privilege. The years prior to 1994 had seen the emergence of an educational discourse within the democratic movement lodged firmly within People’s Education and its idea of “Education for Liberation” – the expectation being that the educational curriculum to be introduced by the new government would be negotiated by the community, the content of education being legitimated by same, democratic participation at all levels the norm, and creativity and critical thinking would underscore the curriculum.

The struggle for liberation gradually introduced a shift from a positivist social and educational theory (Apartheid and “banking education”) to a social and educational theory that displayed features (constitutive) of critical theory (“Education for Liberation”) as outlined before. The democratic movement and the oppressed society at large at least expected features of critical theory, as these had realised in People’s Education, to emerge in the new social and educational theory as, unlike the apartheid educational system which was foreign to these communities as they had been devised by the Nationalist government, the oppressed masses would then be able to identify with such an educational system based on their democratic participation and which they could legitimately claim as their own.

Thus, Outcomes-based education, as briefly profiled earlier, was to signal the advent of the long awaited democratic education system for which the disenfranchised masses had fought. Whether the disenfranchised masses viewed Outcomes-based education as the panacea is questionable. In line with the expectation of the democratic movement, which now had “disbanded” in favour of the new government, OBE, would be embedded within the principles of People’s Education and would announce a radical break from the past where the educational system was driven by the ideas of the Apartheid government. Aims and objectives of the apartheid system were replaced with outcomes. The “essence” of Outcomes-based education is the outcomes, and ends which have been specified in advance of learning. “The critical outcomes are broadly inclusive of the skills, knowledge and values necessary for development of a democratic citizenship and the specific outcomes refer to what learners should be able to do at the end of the lesson” (Sedibe, 15 Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za)
1998: 7). As Sedibe states, the possibility is embedded in the critical outcomes of OBE, of cultivating democratic citizenship. That possibility interests this investigation. Educators are “free” to determine the best means to realise the outcomes. Because outcomes are specified in advance, Outcomes-based education has been accused of being instrumental, stifling imagination and creativity.

My contention is that Outcomes-based education, as currently practised in some South African high schools, may not necessarily be transformative. In this dissertation I shall attempt to investigate claims of instrumentality which are at the heart of scientific investigation; claims that place Outcomes-based education squarely within the behaviourist approaches to education (Kraak in Jansen & Christie, 1999: 46). This would make Outcomes-based education indigestible, to say the least, when taking South Africa’s educational history into consideration. Waghid (2002: 11) argues that “rational reflection and imagination are constitutive meanings intrinsic to or in terms of which education should be justified. And, for the reason that outcomes alone do not necessarily accommodate rational reflection and imagination, such a notion of education would be impoverished and trapped in an instrumental (extrinsic) justification of education.” But is there no space for reflection? I wish to argue that within the critical outcomes of Outcomes-based education there should be space for reflection and imagination and, therefore, I am not quite convinced as yet whether these claims are necessarily justified. I shall return to this discussion in Chapter Five.

Notwithstanding the claim that Outcomes-based education is located within a positivist framework, which relies on instrumentality and prediction, the South African government holds that Outcomes-based education is located within a critical conceptual scheme (as outlined in C2005) and thus holds the possibility for transformation. And so it should be if the radical break from the past is to become reality. The question is about the nature of transformation – whether it is a deep transformation begs the question. The notion of deep transformation concerns actual (intrinsic) change within society, the way in which education allows people to see and think differently about themselves and their community. It should not only be about legislative change that normally ensures only change of a structural nature. The Minister states: “The Ministry’s vision is of a transformed, democratic, non-racial and non sexist system of higher education that
will support a democratic ethos and a culture of human rights by educational programmes and practices conducive to critical discourse and creative thinking, cultural tolerance, and a common commitment to a humane, non-racist and non-sexist order” (DOE, Education White Paper 3, 1997: 10-11).

My contention, as stated, is that Outcomes-based education, as currently practised in South Africa, may not necessarily be transformative. I contend that Outcomes-based education has the potential to engender transformative space and that to point to outcomes which are specified in advance (and not without merit) as most of the critics of OBE are doing as the single-most if not the only objection against OBE, is not justifiable enough to claim that OBE cannot be transformative (in an absolutist manner), because it has notions of instrumentality embedded within it. I shall attempt to show that the potential to transform exists within Outcomes-based education, because of features within it that can be traced back to critical theory. These are features which, as claimed by educational authorities, would possibly enable OBE as the current educational policy to be located within a critical pedagogical discourse and in so doing link it conceptually with critical theory. If so, Curriculum 2005 should encourage learners to become citizens with skills to be critical, to investigate, solve problems and be creative. This enfranchised citizen would be the “product” of the emancipatory powers of Outcomes-based education – an empowered citizen for the new democracy. Whether Outcomes-based education is able to accomplish this as practised at present, is what I shall pursue in the following section.

Critical Pedagogy differs from a positive pedagogy in a fundamental way. It is never absolute, instrumental or predictive in nature. Adriana Hernandez makes the following observation: “A critical pedagogical practice is an ongoing process that redefines itself constantly, taking into account both personal and social investments” (Hernandez, 1997: 85). Thus, if Outcomes-based education is located within critical theory it needs to redefine itself constantly, that is, there must be space for reflection.

This is also emphasised by the Report of the Review Committee on C2005 (DOE, 2000: 12) when it states that:
No curriculum, if it is to be a living curriculum, can be cast in stone. Curriculum 2005 is not cast in stone and can change to address the problems that have emerged in implementation. What must be resisted is the notion that there is only one way of doing curriculum change. There are as many ways of doing outcomes-based education as there are routes to a curriculum that will enhance teaching and learning in South Africa.

Hernandez (1997: 86) continues by stating: "Knowledge is the core of pedagogical relation since pedagogy is about the production of knowledge and the constitution of subjects in the context of particular social relations. Therefore, conceptions of knowledge turn into particular practices that constitute subjects to accept their place in society, conceiving it as 'natural' or enable them to perceive oppression in its articulation through complex questions such as class, gender, race/ethnicity, and work to transform social relations; practices that, in the end, contribute to either transform or maintain the current social order." For the purpose of this investigation it is of essence to explore whether OBE can contribute to transform not only a social order, but whether learners in engagement with the educational system are able to become thinking, competent and critical citizens as envisioned in C2005 and whether in this process they are able to discover whether they are being oppressed or not. Thus, at ground level the poser is whether OBE is able to engender democratic citizenship as an instance of deep transformation, that is, transformation of an intrinsic nature.

Transformation can occur at different levels in society. One may say that schools have been transformed because learners are now represented in decision-making or that parents are empowered because of participation in governing bodies. These are instances of structural transformation finding emergence at a more extrinsic level. The transformation significant for this dissertation is of an intrinsic nature, that which changes communities and subjects therein at a more fundamental level, where the constitutive meanings of transformation define who they are, "extend, or criticise or even challenge their self-understandings" (Taylor, 1988: 94) hence, deep transformation "for it is", continues Taylor (1988: 94), "in this sense that theory makes a claim to tell us what is really going on, to show us the real, hitherto unidentified course of events." In so doing, OBE will heed the requirement of a critical theory that has at its roots the constitutive meaning of emancipation, necessary for deep transformation. I shall now discuss
constitutive meanings of transformation – of which democratic citizenship seems to be an instance.

If Outcomes-based education is located within critical theory or at the very least embraces constitutive meanings thereof, as I shall attempt to show, then it should have the potential to engender democratic citizenship as an instance of deep transformation. I contend that if the goal of education is to achieve democratic citizenship, there is a conceptual and not a contingent relationship between democratic citizenship and educational transformation. Thus, constitutive meanings for democratic citizenship hold true for educational transformation – that the one needs to be understood in terms of the other. Constitutive meanings of educational transformation may include, equity, redress, communicative praxis, critical rationality and compassion, instances of democratic citizenship - ways in which democratic citizenship manifest at a deep level and which find space within critical theory (Van Wyk, 2004: 42). There is the possibility for the space of constitutive meanings of transformation to manifest in Outcomes-based education. Constitutive meanings are those features that make a thing what it is. I want to explore whether the predetermined outcomes of Outcomes-based education, although seemingly cast in a positivist frame, has the potential to engender a critical spirit. Waghid (2002: 48) discusses how critical theory transcends the quantitative-qualitative dichotomy when driven by transformative research. “This type of transformative (or empowering) research shaped by critical theory uses both quantitative and qualitative methodologies to effect change and to support the kind of reflection that leads to emancipation during and after the research process”. Waghid (2002: 49) uses Velasquez (1998) to explain that “transformative research stimulates critical awareness of power relationships and empowers researcher and participants with the knowledge to change power relationships.”

I shall now proceed to a discussion of instances of critical pedagogy which may possibly manifest within OBE and in this way show that there possibly exists space for reflection and imagination, constitutive features of a critical theory of education, within Outcomes-based education. Hernandez (1997: 87) posits:
School knowledge in the context of the critical approach does not constitute – as the hegemonic concept holds it – a standardised and rigid body, detached from everyday life. School knowledge, as a particular selection and reconstruction of the wider scientific knowledge, should be demystified and its connection to cultural networks worked out. Students need to be recognised as knowers who come to the process of learning/knowledge appropriation, carrying their own experience, their own knowledges. The work of the teacher, as a transformative intellectual that struggles to control the conditions of it, consists of mediating the interplay of the multiplicity of knowledges, facilitating a critical reconstruction, "transpositions", distribution and appropriation.

Hernandez gives a clear exposition of her understanding of educator and learner in relation to critical pedagogy. It is within the understanding of a critical theory as posited by Hernandez that I wish to locate the discussion about ways in which features of critical pedagogy could manifest in OBE. In the methodology section the nature of critical pedagogy is discussed and it is pointed out why it is important for this study to be located in critical theory.

The objection against OBE is that the outcomes are predetermined and, therefore, treated as absolute, leaving both educator and learner with little room for imagination and creation. Could the pre-determined outcomes possibly be interpreted as minimum outcomes? As mentioned earlier the intention of the educational authorities is not that the educational theory is cast in stone. If thus, it would make nonsense of the educational authority’s claim that the educational policy is located within critical theory – seen as a natural continuation of the conceptual scheme within which the democratic movement had waged the political and educational struggle. Consider instances in which features of critical theory can manifest in OBE and thus provide the spaces for OBE to possibly become transformative. That is what the investigation is about.

It is possible for a learner to work at his/her own pace. A learner who is slower in assimilating certain skills does not have to compete and if in control of his/her own pace, the possibility exists for the learner to take greater responsibility for his/her own learning. Each learner is accordingly afforded an equal chance. Because outcomes are unambiguous (as claimed), learners seem to know what is expected, and instead of rendering learners powerless could give them control and
autonomy in the learning situation. Knowing what to do can also empower a learner because it may offer a sense of direction. Learners can discuss the outcomes. These are not objectives that only teachers know, but when outcomes become transparent, that is, learners come to know about these, the possibility for deliberation exists because of minimum outcomes. Therefore, outcomes are rendered as demystified and methods for attaining outcomes can be discussed or negotiated, creating space for creativity and imagination and reflection on their outcomes, but within the space created by the external experts who determined the outcomes.

Outcomes-based education advocates lifelong learning. The benefits are twofold: those outside the formal school system can be included, especially workers who were only valued in terms of their contribution to the economy at a specific time (unskilled or semi-skilled) and education is seen as dynamic, not fixed, absolute and exclusive. Learning is by doing, that is experiential learning is more flexible so that skills can be accumulated over a period of time and be more inclusive in order to give recognition to prior learning, empowering workers with the necessary skills to become more “meaningful” citizens.

I have briefly indicated there is a possibility for theoretical space for instances of critical pedagogy to manifest within OBE. If this is the case, then space for rational reflection and imagination may be possible. But this is a poser I wish to explore in this dissertation.

1.3 MOTIVATION AND SCOPE

Curriculum 2005 is regarded as a key project in the transformation of South African society. The critical outcomes of OBE are directed towards achieving citizens who are able to display “critical and creative thinking”, who can work with others in teams, and who can “manage themselves responsibly and effectively” (WECD, 1997: 5).

The vision of C2005 underscores a social role for education in the quest for deep transformation (intrinsic) in South Africa – transformation of society that will encourage learners to become “creative and critical” en route to democratic citizenship – seemingly the aim of education in South Africa. But there are different notions of citizenship that abound. In this new democracy of
ours it is vital to make explicit which notion of democracy will inform the education system, as I am of the contention that there is a conceptual connection between education and citizenship. Thus, whether the notion of democracy is based on a liberal Western notion, a participatory or any other notion has implications for education and society at large. Education has to have an idea of the notion of citizenship envisaged by society.

One of the purposes of education in South Africa is “To address the development needs of society and provide the labour market, in a knowledge-driven and knowledge-dependent society, with ever-changing high-level competencies and expertise necessary for the growth and prosperity of a modern economy” (DOE, 1997a: 8). It seems that the notion of education is linked to skills, and the notion of citizenship is linked to leading a critical, productive and self-fulfilled life. Education should prepare thinking and reflective citizens who are able to prosper in a technically orientated workplace, which demands particular skills. Immediately one senses a tension between education and the demands of the labour market. As noted before, it is an age-old tension that haunts education. However, reality demands that the skills that Outcomes-based education offers in South Africa and a world where joblessness and poverty is rife, need to be considered seriously. South Africa is a developing country whose economy is not insular. The tentacles of globalisation are enveloping the world and South Africa with all its lofty aspirations of democracy and African Renaissance are (knowingly so) manipulated by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank who could be seen as either the saviours or the villains of the present world. Without the necessary funding from institutions such as these, South Africa and the African continent will not be able “to play catch-up” after years of exploitation. Skinner (1999: 124) in discussing whether democracy can reassert itself over the economy (that social factors can be readmitted) comes to the conclusion that “the power of multinational corporations and international trade agreements to which nations surrender their sovereignty make this less and less of an option.”

Given the above scenario, we need somehow to bridge the conceptual gap between the preset outcomes of Outcomes-based education and critical theory. It is because of the tensions between those involved in education that this investigation is of importance. Outcomes-based education is the prevailing education system and it is not going anywhere. “The spaces that possibly exist
within Outcomes-based education have to be occupied and utilised by progressive forces if any meaningful re-organisation of society is to occur. Colonisation of intellectual space has to be effected by radical pedagogues so that the process assumes an identity of theoretical occupation, which can prove to be the forerunner of various other forms of taking back what are rightfully the entitlements of all society: the rights to be meaningfully educated and to live as dignified human beings” (Author unknown, 2001: 23).

Thus, if there is no pursuit of research in this area, we may end with a sham transformation. Outcomes-based education, specifically the critical outcomes, should engender democracy and citizenship. We cannot have another education system that encourages the “banking” system of education that will enslave learners’ thinking abilities. We need citizens that can take responsible decisions, who care about others and that can make a difference. To emphasise the concern of this investigation that the “goal” of critical educational theory is emancipation viz. democratic citizenship, I refer to Nussbaum (1997: 300):

It would be catastrophic to become a nation of technically competent people who have lost the ability to think critically, to examine themselves, and to respect the humanity and diversity of others. And yet, unless we support these endeavors it is in such a nation that we may well live. It is therefore very urgent right now to support curricular efforts aimed at producing citizens who can take charge of their own reasoning who can see the different and foreign not as a threat to be resisted, but as an invitation to explore and understand, expanding their own minds and their capacity for citizenship.

We need to seek and aggressively occupy the transformative spaces within Outcomes-based education. We cannot plunge our children into a system that is seemingly only vocationally directed. They need to become democratic citizens.

1.4 PRELIMINARY STUDY/ LITERATURE REVIEW

A great deal of research has been done in the area of democracy and citizenship and on Outcomes-based education, in South Africa and elsewhere. In South Africa many academics
and others with an interest in education have voiced their opinions against Outcomes-based education. Most of these authors are opposed mainly to the set outcomes of Outcomes-based education as being instrumental in nature. This is duly noted. Jansen (1999: 145a) argues convincingly why OBE will fail. He renders a convincing argument whilst highlighting several reasons for the almost inevitable demise of OBE. Deacon and Parker (1999: 72) come to the conclusion that “successful transformation does not lie in the learning outcomes that are registered on the NQF (or contained in Curriculum 2005)”. They contend (1999: 72) that a Deweyan pragmatism offers an alternative approach to set outcomes that are instrumental in nature, but caution that for this approach to succeed numerous challenges such as teachers “with the knowledge, skills and values to be competent outcomes-based educators is all too rare.” I agree with Jansen (1999: 145) that OBE has instrumental tendencies. My contention is based on practical experience at a high school where I engaged with Outcomes-based education and the integrated use of practice and theory. Deacon and Parker’s position holds hope for a pragmatic view on outcomes would not be conclusive. Rather, pragmatism gives hope for moving beyond preset outcomes. I contend that if the critical outcomes of OBE are reconceptualised in terms of democratic citizenship the outcomes may have the potential to be transformative.

There is a dearth of research that links the potential of OBE to transform learners to an idea that learners can become democratic citizens. This is the reason for this dissertation’s interest in reconceptualising the critical outcomes in terms of democratic citizenship.

1.5 METHODOLOGY

This dissertation will be located within interpretive and critical social theory with pragmatism as an instance of critical theory. Pragmatism offers hope and later I will argue for a pragmatist solution. The “aim” of critical theory is the emancipation of the individual and/or the group. Given the social, political and economic history of South Africa and that democracy in South Africa is but ten years old, it would possibly be presumptuous to assume that deep transformation has taken place. Although C2005 and OBE have to be implemented, there is still much confusion and disputation.
Academics focus on the instrumentalist notions of OBE and claim that OBE will fail (Jansen & Christie, 1999: 151), teachers bemoan that they have had insufficient guidance and that structures, such as libraries and modern technology, are lacking, that class sizes are not conducive or that finances are lacking at school. How are educators to respond to the situation that prevails? Yes, educators do feel disempowered (and perhaps not without reason) by a new education system that they feel has apparently been foisted upon them without much deliberation. Meanwhile learners are at school and educators do have a responsibility to educate. This scenario attracts me to a critical theory that teachers need to be empowered and emancipated – which are some of the goals of a critical theory. Knowledge is not absolute, finished and packaged as Hernandez (1997: 92) posits:

Knowledge is not a set of compartments and knowing is not one fully accomplishable and expectable act. Both knowledge and knowing are a complex and never-ending process that develops in particular social and historical contexts.

When one studies governance (from a critical theory perspective) one should look at the actions of governors, interpret what they do and simultaneously improve one’s own understanding of the practice and what it means for people. More importantly, one would also want to empower and emancipate the practice of governance (for the agents) within a hermeneutic discourse. This is what this investigation shall attempt when looking at education and the practice thereof – investigate whether transformative spaces exist within the critical outcomes of OBE which can engender citizenship and to inform education but also, to come to a better self-understanding of such possibilities. To do this, I shall briefly relate how and why critical theory has grown out of interpretive social theory, and argue that pragmatism as an instance of critical theory can engender the transformative space that exists within the critical outcomes of Outcomes-based education. This space may engender deep transformation which has democratic citizenship as constitutive feature.

Interpretive social theory which forms part of the analytic tradition, developed as an alternative to the stranglehold that positivism had to some extent on how people should think about the
world. This was a type of thinking where absolutism, determinism and scientism held sway, where everything could be analysed, observed and rationally be accounted for, be objectified, observed and predicted. This state of affairs was applicable to natural objects as well as human beings. Interpretive theory focuses its attention on actions. It claims that the reactions of objects and the actions of humans are conceptually of a different kind. That people do not necessarily react to a given stimulus, but have the capacity to make sense of (give meaning to) situations and are then able to act in terms of what seems reasonable and morally justified. Thus the actions (intentions) of human beings are capable of interpretation. This is a major shift from positivism, which tends to objectify all action.

Interpretive theory aims to give meaning to actions, practices or constitutive meanings. An interpretive theory requires an action done with an intention by an agent and an observer who in turn, interprets the action. According to Fay (1984: 79) interpretive theory does this by means of discovering the intentions and desires of actors or agents, by searching for the rules which give point to these sets of rules or practices. The social scientist (interpreter) explains the experiences she observes and attempts to see how these fit into the nature and purpose of human life.

Although it represents a major shift from positivism, interpretive theory also has its critics. One such critic is Fay (1984: 83), who outlined four specific areas (amongst others) in which interpretive theory is flawed. I shall now relate this in order to show why a critical theory was necessitated. Given that through its notion of agency, people are able to communicate and understand each other differently than posited by positivism, interpretive theory does not adequately explain the relationships between structural elements in society and the behaviour and beliefs which such elements engender (Fay, 1984: 84). To make sense of the actions of an agent the interpreter needs to know the circumstances, conditions and rules in that specific community which serve to continue and give rise to these actions and which seem to have a causal nature. The explanations, Fay claims (1984: 84), are not causal in a positivist sense but quasi-causal because:

Men act in terms of their interpretations of, and intentions towards, their external conditions, rather than being governed directly by them, and therefore these conditions
must be understood not as causes but as warranting conditions which make a particular action or belief more “reasonable”, “justified”, or “appropriate”, given the desires, beliefs, and expectations of the actors.

I concur with Fay that the intentions of agents are not adequate in trying to interpret actions. The conditions in which agents find themselves have an effect on the kinds of decisions they make. A decision (action) may depend on whether it is cold or hot, whether the agent is sad or happy, whether she is employed or unemployed. These conditions would have to be taken into consideration when interpreting the intention of an agent for hermeneutics. Of significance is that the agent’s actions and intentions are not determined by these conditions or circumstances in a sense that it would be possible to make predictions, but at the same time the interpreter has to create space for intentions to be informed by conditions in which agents find themselves.

Another supposed weakness of interpretive theory is “the pattern of unintended consequences”. According to this theory there are features in social life that cannot be explained in terms of the intentions of actors. In this way Fay (1984: 85) states that societies consist of ordered sets of relationships among their members and, because of this, when an action is performed we find at times that its results rebound in society in ways which are relatively predictable, though the actors may not have been aware of them nor exercise any control over them. This type of unintended consequence serves to maintain the structure of a group and needs to be explained for the consequences of an act or practice modify a host of other social factors. These consequences change and strengthen the factors, which comprise the social whole and help to maintain the act or practice. The method of explanation applicable in this case is functional explanations that attempt to explain why such actions or practices continue to exist (Fay, 1984: 86).

A third objection to interpretive theory is that it offers no method of analysis for the contradictions that may exist between certain types of rules, common meanings, or between these and their causes and results. The interpreter has no way of investigating whether the meanings, beliefs, practices and actions “are congruent with one another” such that whole areas of social experience could be omitted from analysis.
A final objection relates to the explanation of historical change. Interpretive theory is not able to explain why a social order will develop and develop in definite ways, how it has come to be what it is. This is so because it assumes coherence between the self-understandings of agents, their common meanings, social practices and actions (Fay, 1984: 88).

It is for the above reasons that critical social theory came as a response to and finds itself seeded by interpretive social theory. I shall now analyse in which ways critical theory attempts to overcome some of the above-mentioned “flaws” of interpretive social theory and also in this way show why this dissertation is embedded in the notions of a critical social theory by pointing to those features of critical theory which could possibly lead to deep transformation.

Critical theory had its inception in Germany in the Frankfurt School (1920-1950) and had its roots in Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis, but has since then included contributions from structuralism, feminism, post-modernism and post-colonialism. I should point out that there is no one conception of critical theory, but different strands exist. However, I do not think it necessary for this investigation to discuss the various strands within critical theory, other than to emphasise that all strands agree that the intention of an agent only is not adequate for interpretation. Strands of critical theory “all share a common commitment to the idea of empowerment and emancipation… that are tied to particular historical circumstances and practical contexts” (Morrow & Brown, 1994: 193). Fendler (in Popkewitz & Fendler, 1999: 173) posits that the importance of the Frankfurt School resides in that it:

Argued against instrumental reasoning by explaining instrumental reasoning as a product of the Enlightenment taken to unreasonable extremes. In response they sought to interrupt instrumental reasoning through an emphasis on aesthetics. It was posited that aesthetics was not reducible or explicable in terms of rationality, and therefore the aesthetic realm offered the possibility of escape from the domination of instrumental reasoning. Herein lay the emancipatory potential of critical theory for the Frankfurt School.

Critical theory bases itself on three main features (Fay, 1984: 93) that underscore interpretation and emancipation. The first is that, as is the case with interpretive theory, it accepts that human
action needs to be explained; that the agent is capable of explaining why he/she acted in a certain manner as a preliminary explanation. It rejects the notion that human action can be explained in a causally deterministic way. Because critical theory accepts that the felt needs and suffering of an agent or community must come into recognition, the agent’s own point of view is imperative, but not sufficient. It only serves as a preliminary explanation.

Critical theory would possibly accept the objection that Fay makes against interpretive theory that at times people perform actions over which they have no control. What they do is not necessarily the result of considered knowledge or choice. There are systems of social relationships that influence the actions and intentions of individuals which need to be exposed to such individuals. These systems are in the form of quasi-causal and functional laws (as explained earlier) that seek to explain social behaviour in a hermeneutical manner.

For this study the way in which theory relates to practice for a critical theory is of significance. For positivism, theory and practice are seen as being distinct from each other. In this way then facts and values, and means and ends are separated. In this way also “Education becomes the means to achieve these ends, and is judged by its effectiveness. If it is not effective, then it should adopt other “means”, based on the kind of research which relates means to ends … “Means” are logically separated from the “ends”, and the quality of the “input” is measured simply by reference to the success or otherwise of the “output”” (Pring, 2000: 26). For the interpretive humanistic sciences of which critical theory is an instance, theory forms an integral part of practice. Facts are accepted as being value-laden, and means and ends, when they have to be justified, are steeped in values for human decisions are always taken from a particular vantage point. One cannot help being influenced by one’s surroundings and by what is considered good or bad. Theory and practice cannot be separated; the one informs, strengthens and maintains the other in a dialectical manner for a critical theory.

But in this way critical theory performs an educative role, a role that seeks to empower and emancipate. It is also the interpretive notion of how theory relates to practice that a critical theory challenges. The relation of theory to practice of a critical theory is a constitutive feature within which critical theory finds its genesis. In this way critical theory extends beyond the mere
interpretation of the intention of an agent. In this regard Hernandez (1997: 85) states that “A critical pedagogical practice is an ongoing process that redefines itself constantly”. Unlike a scientific practice, there can be no finality for a critical social or educational practice. Knowledge in the form of ideology needs to be challenged on a continual basis as the way in which subjects for a critical theory are defined, and that reality and the way subjects fit into that reality, is constantly changing. Critical theory seeks to empower and emancipate; this is its educative role which cannot have an end in mind which concurs with that of positivism because reality is constantly being constructed and reconstructed by agents and practices.

Critical theory charges that the agent will resist the interpretation of the interpreter (social scientist), thus possibly negating the opportunity to empower and emancipate. The educative role of critical theory has the possibility to transform education in South Africa. The educative role opens social actors to look at what they are doing in new ways; they see themselves and their practices in different ways and because social actors are not only emancipated, but also empowered, they are able to alter the conditions that they now recognise as oppressive through ideology critique and critical reflection.

Ideology critique is an integral component of the educative process “which serves to open up social actors so that they can look at what they are doing in new ways”. I shall briefly explore this concept by first exploring the concept of ideology. Morrow (1994: 51-52) identifies two important uses of the term ideology that is of significance to this study. The first is the notion of ideology associated with a well-organised, action-oriented belief system, is characteristic of modern politics such as conservatism, liberalism, socialism, communism, and fascism. However, it is the second notion of ideology, which is of interest here where the focus is on the cultural mechanisms involved in the creation and the potential distortions of consciousness and communication in everyday life situations.

Morrow (1994: 52) posits:

The main theme is that when individuals and groups have material or ideal interests at stake, they tend to justify them in ways that distort their perceptions of reality. In particular the concern here is with how ideological processes are a pervasive feature
of the practices that make up a social life and institutions even where there this is not overtly associated with ideologies as organised belief systems.

It is that interest of a critical theory that aims to show the social actors the ways in which there is "a pervasive tendency for slaves to identify with the legitimacy of their masters' oppression even though that clearly entails denial of their own humanity" (Morrow, 1994: 149), which is ideology critique. Hernandez (1997: 86) comments as follows in relation to the production of knowledge:

Knowledge is the core of the pedagogical relation since pedagogy is about the production of knowledge and the constitution of subjects in the context of particular social relations. Therefore, conceptions of knowledge turn into particular practices that constitute subjects to accept their place in society, conceiving it as natural or enable them to perceive oppression in its articulation through complex questions such as class, gender, race/ethnicity, and work to transform social relations; practices that in the end, contribute to either transform or maintain the current social order.

Education is an instance of the practices mentioned by Hernandez. She clearly points at the pervasiveness of and inherent danger of an ideology seeded within a practice, such as education. Burbules and Berk (in Popkewitz & Fendler, 1999: 60-61) conclude that:

Over time, the selfsame ideologies become "hegemonic", not because they change, but because circumstances change while advocates for the ideology become more and more concerned with its preservation.

In sum then, this investigation is located within critical theory because it has the potential to unmask the social relations that encapsulate and disempower social actors. The result is that through ideology critique and the way its theory is related to practice, it becomes possible for critical theory to emancipate social actors when they come to appreciate what they are really doing and are able to change what they are doing and come to see themselves differently. Herein also lies the "truth" of its theory – that alternate ways are sought by the social actors to a former oppressive condition.
For this study the educative process, the way in which theory relates to practice and the emancipatory nature that a critical theory promises, are the constitutive meanings of critical theory. I contend that pragmatism as an instance of critical theory has the possibility to engender democratic citizenship that is a constitutive feature of transformation.

Having outlined those constitutive features of a critical theory that is of significance for this study, I shall now outline why I shall utilise pragmatism and the pragmatic method which I contend holds the possibility of transformation (in a deeper sense) that can engender democratic citizenship, and which simultaneously is an instance of a critical social theory. I shall confine the discussion to outlining pragmatism as methodology; the pragmatic method will be discussed in the method section and will tie in with other methods of educational research.

I started off by looking at positivism and logical analysis; thereafter I moved on to the period of the analytic philosophers and the method of conceptual analysis. It seems, posits Stone (Popkewitz & Fendler, 1999: 211), “that most postanalytic philosophy is pragmatist at least in spirit. My understanding of pragmatism and the pragmatic method relies heavily on the theory of John Dewey and that of the neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty. Pragmatism has roots in America and in Europe, especially well known is the group associated with the Frankfurt School. Generally, neo-pragmatists are “anti-essentialist, antifoundationalist, and antirepresentationalist” (Stone in Popkewitz & Fendler, 1999: 212). Features that appealed to the scientific method for the certainty these concepts promise. Furthermore, Stone (1999: 212) states, pragmatists all agree that history, culture and the environment influence theorising as people interact, change and change the world. They have no urgency in representing reality as the empiricists did, they do not believe in a certainty in foundation and a truth.

Stone (1999: 213) continues by positing that within the affinity to pragmatisms, what ties them together is their social orientation – locations within history and culture – and their social mission – theorising to change the world that is hierarchically ordered, power-driven, and unequal for many people. This is where I find the link between critical theory and pragmatism – pragmatism is an instance of a critical social theory for their basic premises are similar. In fact,
I shall argue in the next section, pragmatism is the method which a critical theory can employ to engender emancipation which is its goal – not in a finite sense, for emancipation itself is a process.

For Dewey philosophy was criticism, posits Stone (Popkewitz & Fendler, 1999: 209). Dewey practised a thoroughgoing pragmatism, the instrumentalism of ideas put into action and judged by their present contributions and direction of future possibility; this is Dewey’s critical philosophy (Stone, 1999: 215). What distinguishes philosophy for Dewey, it seems, is the scope of ideas from the past that portend the future, a future that is not final or absolute or predetermined in any way in an empiricist sense. Waks (1998: 3) sums up Dewey’s view on philosophy thus:

Philosophy’s task is to adjust inherited traditions in times of social and cultural crisis, to new aspirations, to “dawning rebellions, struggles to escape and to express some new life”. Philosophical ideas in this way affect a “junction” of the old and the new, a refocusing of “deep sunk customs and unconscious dispositions, that are brought to the light of attention by some conflict with newly emerging directions of activity. Philosophy is thus fed by “streams of tradition”.

Following the ideas of Waks (1998: 3) it immediately dawns upon one that pragmatism relies heavily on history. That which has gone before (“streams of tradition”), whether it is in the form of knowledge within practices, the oral histories of people or in some other sense, has some value for pragmatism. Knowledge for pragmatism has utility value – this is the conceptual link between knowledge and pragmatism. It is how this knowledge of the past is utilised by pragmatism that is of importance. Dewey has often been accused of being an instrumentalist. He had a strong leaning toward science and the scientific method and his method, that of experimentalism, is based on science. Morrow (1994: 120) asserts that “pragmatism did not culminate in a fully sceptical attack on scientific knowledge; instead it stressed the importance of assessing knowledge in terms of its practical uses and justifying science in terms of its actual procedures, rather than some idealised “logic”. Dewey emphasised that which works. He emphasised that doing, thus experience, is all-important in life. What is considered as knowledge for pragmatism
is based on experience. But this knowledge is not of the instrumental kind that is certain, final, absolute or determinate in a causal manner so that action can be predicted in terms of deductive-nomological explanation! Instead, pragmatism presents explanations of a quasi-causal and functional nature. In this way knowledge of the past is useful for the future when ideas from the past are brought together and studied to unlock and expose the pervasiveness and cunning of ideology in order to chart a chosen (upon experience) but not predicted path for the future. “Every problem is a “forked-road situation” – alternative possibilities are identified and tested out. If the hypothesis proves to be correct, then a particular way of thinking is confirmed and strengthened. But that results in further questions, further problems to be solved”, comments Pring (2000: 12). The failures and successes of the past come into cognition. Subjects are given the opportunity as actors and not as objects, to decide on a strategy that in no way guarantees success, yet is not solely a hit and miss affair but is concerned with growth that is constitutive to pragmatism with its open-ended agenda. Stone (1999: 218) adds that:

In such a philosophy there is no notion of perfection but rather “a genuine field of novelty”, in which error is inevitable and “good fortune and bad fortune are facts”. It is finally one that because of a contingent world must “avoid conceit and intellectual arrogance”. Philosophy must be self-correcting and humble, and thus itself “democratic”.

Thus far, I have shown that pragmatism does not wish to cling to a representational picture of reality as positivists do. Knowledge for pragmatism is located within history and culture and has some utility value geared towards future decision making based upon the wisdom gained from the past. Wisdom in this sense includes both decisions that met with success and/or failure. I shall now discuss the pragmatist notion of democracy that is central to the question of whether an Outcomes-based education system of education can engender democratic citizenship.

Stone (1999: 216-217) stresses that philosophy for Dewey had education (growth) as aim and that education had two purposes, to be moral and democratic. Concerning the first purpose, Rosenthal (2002: 218) explains that for Dewey growth itself is the only moral end, that the moral meaning of democracy lies in its contribution to the growth of every member of society, and that growth involves the rational resolution of conflict. The ultimate goal of a community is growth or
development – a goal that can never reach a point of finality. Dewey’s democracy demands a certain discursiveness that can accommodate the need for plurality, negotiation and compromise.

Secondly, Dewey’s understanding of democracy (Rosenthal, 2002: 219) and the nature of the democratic self is inextricably intertwined with his ongoing stress on the pressing need for both universal education, which means education not just of all individuals but also of collective social intelligence – holistic education or education of the whole person. Democracy for Dewey is engagement in a process in which “criticism is centrally practical and in which persons engage in a process of extracting the desirable traits of forms of community life that actually exist, (employing) them to criticise undesirable features and suggest improvement” (Stone, 1999: 217), (Dewey, 1925: 96). “Truth” for Dewey lies in experimentation, that which works, rather than in consensus. Truth is dependant upon the experimentalist solution that pragmatism provides “by which individuals and communities alike can grow by learning from and taking the perspective of others” (Rosenthal, 2002: 220).

Individuals and communities, by following the pragmatic method offered by Dewey, enable themselves to reconstruct their reality on a continual basis as their conditions change and in so doing are not held captive by undistorted communication but live their lives premised by the open-ended emancipatory and learning-by-doing agendas of critical theory and pragmatism.

1.6 METHOD

As posited in the previous section, this study is located in the interpretive and critical paradigms, utilising pragmatism as an instance of critical social theory with conceptual analysis. This has been the subject of much discussion and dispute over its nature by logical empiricists and analytical philosophers alike, and the nature of analysis in general since the Enlightenment, utilised as analytical tool. In addition, I also use deconstruction as a method. I shall explain my rationale for utilising deconstruction briefly and thereafter I shall discuss conceptual analysis.

The reason for utilising deconstruction as a method in this dissertation is that the outcomes of Outcomes-based education are accused of being instrumentalist. Put differently, for the reason
that the outcomes are formulated in advance by experts (not teachers or learners), outcomes seem to limit the learners’ scope for creativity, critical thinking and imagination. First a brief word about deconstruction. Deconstruction offers ways to think about human practices differently. Education as a social practice is offered a chance to be “dis-covered” again. In this regard Biesta notes that “deconstruction rather provides a way to think again and afresh, more strictly and more radically about the concern that has been central to the ‘project’ of education at least since the Enlightenment” (Biesta, 2001: 34). It is my intention to “read between the lines”, to be attentive to what is in the margins, to that which is not said. Deconstruction posits that what is unsaid many a time is seemingly as important or even more than what is said. When I construct meanings by way of interpreting the critical outcomes, deconstruction as method aids in opening up the unsaid. Thus, as method deconstruction offers this dissertation the opportunity to engage and encounter others (teachers and learners) and teaching and learning “afresh”, that is, to look beyond the text and to explore alternative possibilities. In this regard, Derrida (in Caputo, 1997: 57) refers to deconstruction as that “(which allows) … for listening and opening up … (of being attentive to) other voices …”.

Under the influence of globalisation society is caught in thinking that global initiatives are always in their interest. Society is not always aware of the pernicious nature of market related notions, especially how these impact on education. Outcomes framed by the rationale of globalisation are directed toward preset outcomes that are ends in themselves, but the means to the ends are also prescribed in most instances. These ends are to the advantage of globalisation and do not necessarily to the advantage of the community and education. To break from the instrumental notion of the outcomes, outcomes framed in a deconstructive manner hold the possibility of being open-ended, inconclusive, reasonable and imaginative – ways of attending and responding to the other in their otherness which is unknowable. Outcomes framed in a deconstructive manner that are open-ended are able to help teachers and learners think of the world as if it could be different – breaking the instrumentalist stranglehold on teaching and learning.

At this time it is necessary to explain why I employ conceptual analysis as tool of investigation. I shall do so by reviewing whether educational research as method should be linked to the philosophy of education. Thereafter the role of conceptual analysis as a method of philosophy of
education will be discussed and finally I shall argue why for this investigation it is important for conceptual analysis to be linked to pragmatism and critical theory.

In drawing the link between educational research and philosophy of education I start by posing the questions: What is philosophy? What do philosophers do? Barrow and Woods (1990: 2) posit “philosophy is not to be thought of as a fixed body of information waiting to be digested but as an activity through the exercise of which men and women can think things through, in concert with others, for themselves”. For them it seems that the emphasis of philosophy is the thinking about things with others, that it is an activity that although private, at times needs public scrutiny. Hirst and Peters (1970: 2) describe philosophy as:

An activity which is distinguished by its concern with certain types of second-order questions, with questions of a reflective sort which arise when activities like science, painting pictures, worshipping, and making moral judgments are going concerns. They continue ... Philosophy, in brief, is concerned with questions about analysis of concepts and with questions about the grounds of knowledge, belief, actions and activities (1970: 3).

For Hirst and Peters, it seems, the emphasis of what philosophy is about falls on concepts, about finding meaning by defining concepts carefully. Hirst (Carr, 2004: 58) states that philosophy was “an analytical pursuit...concerned with the clarification of the concepts and propositions through which our experiences and activities are intelligible”.

Dewey’s view of philosophy (as a representative voice of pragmatism in this investigation) is as follows:

When it is acknowledged that under guise of dealing with ultimate reality philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded in social traditions, that it has sprung from a clash of social ends and from a conflict of inherited institutions with incompatible contemporary tendencies, it will be seen that the task of future philosophy is to clarify men’s ideas as to the social and moral strife of their own day (Rorty, 1999: 109).
It seems that for Dewey it is important to recognise that the notions about which philosophers think are constantly changing; that the ideas and problems of people are located within a particular time and space and because of such recognition the way philosophers think about things will also differ. And it is this point of view that will be taken up in this investigation – that philosophy and philosophers need to occupy themselves with the ideas and problems of the day, having taken into consideration what has gone before, and from this basis one can make intelligent decisions. In this way the past gives direction, but does not provide the answer. According to Dewey there are no answers:

He wanted to get rid of what he called “the notion”, which has ruled philosophy ever since the time of the Greeks, that the office of knowledge is to uncover the antecedently real, rather than, as is the case with our practical judgements, to gain the kind of understanding which is necessary to deal with problems as they arise (Rorty, 1999: 29).

Thus there seems to be no easy answer to the question of what philosophy is, but perhaps philosophy being what it is, this is to be expected.

What then is philosophy of education? What in educations’ nature can find space within the framework of philosophy? Hirst and Peters (1970: 13) posit that the philosophy of education as a branch of philosophy has a narrower focus, only that of education. This seems to be the case also for those philosophers who philosophise about education. Thus, “Philosophers of education are specifically interested in educational matters and philosophise in order to get clearer about what should be done in this particular realm” (Hirst & Peters, 1970: 13). A caveat here is that though philosophers of education focus in the main on education, one should not view education or the thinking about education as being insular. Aptly, Hirst and Peters state that the philosophy of education draws from all branches of philosophy. This is also the notion that Pring (2000: 9) puts forth, and with which I concur, when he argues:

I want to draw a distinction between research which is firmly embedded within the social sciences and which may well be relevant to education, and research which arises from distinctively educational concerns and which draws upon, but is not to be reduced to, the
knowledge which has accumulated within those sciences...It can only be relevant if it relates to the “practice of education” – to the activities, engaged in on the whole by teachers, which have those characteristics which pick them out as educational.

I think that because philosophy of education is the branch of philosophy from which this study draws, it needs more explanation and as such I shall at this time portray the form that it takes in this study. Soltis (Hirst & White, 1998) on whose ideas I shall rely in making clear how I think the philosophy of education should be viewed, identifies three distinct though in my view still interconnecting dimensions of the philosophy of education viz. the personal, public and the professional.

In life people hold certain things dear, they value certain things more than others, and view activities from a particular vantage point, such as may include religion and education. All of these, when added together, give a person a sense according to which he/she directs his/her life, in terms of which decisions are made or not made. This is for Soltis the personal sphere, a personal philosophy of life in terms of which the life of a particular person is charted. In educational terms much of this holds true except that a narrowing down is necessary. The personal philosophy of life now focuses only on matters educational in terms of which a teacher will direct his/her practice of teaching which is underpinned by “a set of personal beliefs about what is good, right, and worthwhile to do in education” (Hirst & White, 1998: 196).

A personal philosophy of education is just that, the philosophy for that person only. But if one is an educator, one cannot escape the public scrutiny of one's personal philosophy of education. Surely it has to emerge through one's everyday teaching, that is, one's practice and in this sense guides and directs the way in which many (learners) view education. “Any educational proposal meant for others to follow or any normative prescription or critique that is intended to alter present educational practice exists in the public dimension” (Soltis in Hirst & White, 1998: 197). Philosophy of education in the public dimension has as principle, that is, the guiding of the practice of the many. It seems to me that the notion Soltis has about the public sphere is one that operates outside of the school. For me, however, one enters the public sphere as soon as the personal philosophy of education impacts on anyone other than for the person for whom it has
meaning, that is, the very learners in the class are already in the dimension of the public and in whichever way they are guided and directed, will have an influence on others, be it at home or any other civil institution. The public sphere will include educators/teachers, policy makers, institutions of learning such as schools and universities amongst others.

When philosophers of education think about matters educational, a significantly different activity takes place compared to when educators involved in personal reflection about their practice and others in the public domain think about education.

For Soltis (Hirst & White, 1998: 198), when:

philosophers perform as professionals, there is less proposing and more analysing, reflecting, evaluating, and seeking of a clearer understanding of educational matters. There is more emphasis on ascertaining the logical soundness of arguments, explicating the meaning of ideas, justifying value claims, constructing reasonable arguments and providing ways to think about educational tasks and problems rather than ways to solve them. When engaged in this sort of philosophising, a philosopher is more intent on providing illumination, understanding, and perspective for educators to think with, than on providing programmes and policies for educators to act on.

Soltis emphasises that the activity of philosophising in the professional sense is a rigorous and disciplined vocation, which calls for rational self-reflection. Professional philosophers in this sense have to master philosophical skills and endure rigorous training; they do “technical philosophical work demanding rigour, precision, and adherence to their own professional canons of scholarship” (Hirst & White, 1998: 199). In effect then, the act of reflecting on their respective practices differs greatly when that of the educator is compared to that of the professional philosopher. Although, as mentioned, the three dimensions of educational philosophy are distinct, a measure of overlap does indeed occur, and Soltis concurs. It is the measure or size of the overlap that is of concern to Soltis and to many other philosophers of education. Often the cry is heard from especially educators (read teachers) and those other than
professional philosophers that ideas and thinking around education as espoused by professional philosophers are not relevant, that it has nothing to do with the day-to-day practice of education.

In this regard Soltis (Hirst & White, 1998: 200), in referring to professional philosophers, is of the opinion that:

We need substantive contact with educational researchers, professional educators and practitioners to keep our minds open to potentially relevant philosophical problems issues or ideas. In fact, relevance of what we do to education must be the *sine qua non* of our professional commitment. It cannot be otherwise if we are honestly to call ourselves philosophers of education.

My contention is that educational research needs to remain research about matters educational by philosophers thinking, in the main, about education as a profession. Theory and practice (for this is what this is about) should not be separated or seen as being distinct or separate from each other. Theory informs practice, just as practice informs theory and educational research serves as vehicle to accomplish that. If not, the relevance of research as method for the philosophy of education becomes meaningless to especially educators; and philosophers will be accused of sitting in ivory towers occupying themselves with thinking completely detached from educational reality. This is in reality the current claim. To clarify this statement I turn to Carr (2004: 56) who comments that:

the philosophy of education is now regarded by most members of the wider educational community as an inward-looking scholastic activity that, when judged by the most minimal criteria of practical relevance, makes little contribution to the formation of educational policy or the improvement of educational practice.

But where and how did this divide between educational research and philosophy of education originate and can this divide be bridged? I shall now turn my attention to these questions and the thought uppermost in my mind is that educational research should serve as a method to the philosophy of education so that both educational practice and the philosophy of education are
informed. I shall now discuss the nature of educational research and the relationship between theory and practice. However, these two questions should not be viewed as being unrelated; the nature of educational research and the relation between theory and practice should be “mutually constitutive elements within a single dialectical process” (Carr, 2004: 61).

Educational research has come under a great deal of criticism in especially recent times aimed at its supposed loss of focus. It is not my intention to enter this debate but think it more helpful to consider what should possibly be done to change the perception that educational research as the method of philosophy of education has lost focus. The area of focus of research in philosophy of education should be education. Whilst philosophers in education can think or philosophise about many things, it must be deemed in service of or must bring light to bear on education and educational research.

Educational research and philosophers of education, then, should draw from both the social and natural sciences. I wish to emphasise this as contention, for it is upon such notion that this investigation is premised. However, in doing so, those sciences should also in some way be at the service of educational research. In other words, educational research can draw from the social and natural sciences that which it needs to improve or clarify matters educational, but those sciences should not demand from educational research a type of research to serve their needs. Of course what immediately springs to mind is the debate that industry and the political forces at times, in the name of advancement of society, make their own demands upon education and educational research, especially with the worldwide drive of globalisation. I do not necessarily support this notion of educational research, but shall elaborate on my contention later when discussing Aristotelian practical philosophy.

For now I shall just add a caveat (in support of my contention) as stated by Taylor (1985: 55) when he refers to political decisions made by technically trained experts:

It would be a form of autocracy in which decisions were imposed on the members. In this regard it is worthwhile to remember Aristotle’s remark that one of the ways that the polis
can be destroyed is through the excessive unity that stems from having “correct” solutions imposed on it by either philosophers or kings.

A major influence on education and educational research was what the Greeks called *techne* or technical reasoning (poesis). This was a type of reasoning that was “value-free” where the ends could be specified in advance. Means and ends were separated. Technical reasoning, to my mind, seems in a way to be the forerunner of the logical positivists of the Vienna circle (I shall refer to this period again when discussing conceptual analysis). For the logical positivists the emphasis was on logical analysis and all phenomena whether natural or social were judged in these terms. Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein were known logical positivists of the time. By the 1940s logical positivism had less of an influence, but had changed the course taken by research into the social sciences in a meaningful way.

All that I wish to point out at this stage is the stranglehold that empiricism (read positivism) has had on human practices (and on education). The scientific worldview was not problematic to people in education when it tried to explain natural phenomena. Problems with such a view surfaced for non-positivists when an attempt was made by the scientific view to explain human activity in the same way as that of natural objects. And this is what educational research has to guard against. The practice of education is a human phenomenon; it is a social activity and “the mode of enquiry is determined by the nature of the ‘object’ being enquired into” (Pring, 2000: 157).

The scientific view, however, was interested in absolutes; the best or most efficient methods to attain specified ends, truths that were universally valid; these “scientific explanations give man power to act in situations by giving him the knowledge by which he can control phenomena through the manipulation of a particular set of variables” (Fay, 1984: 39). Science, in this way, gives humans the power to act in an instrumental manner because scientific explanation (causal explanations) gives humans the power to predict outcomes. There is not necessarily any inherent danger in utilising the scientific method. In fact, in the natural sciences this method has been responsible for major discoveries such as those in the world of medicine – discoveries to the
benefit of humankind. But as cautioned previously, “the mode of enquiry is determined by the nature of the object being enquired into” (Pring, 2004: 157).

Thus far, I have given an outline of how philosophy of education in this investigation is viewed, that is, the dimensions of the personal, the public and the professional. Thereafter it appears, through my discussion, there seems to be a divide between the philosophy of education and educational research as method. I have argued that the apparent divide should exist and I shall now trace the origin of the divide as I think that the answer to bridge the gap that has arisen (between theory and practice) is locked in the history of philosophy of education. I now trace this history in order to unlock a way out of this apparent divide.

To support my contention that educational research as the method of philosophy of education should inform both philosophy of education and the practice of education (which is the object of educational research), I shall utilise Aristotelian practical philosophy as premise for my contention to investigate the nature of educational practice. Since the earliest times the Greeks distinguished between theoretical and practical philosophy. Theoretical philosophy “referred to those detached forms of inquiry that employed purely contemplative forms of reasoning (theoria) and that led to a priori knowledge of necessary, eternal and unchanging truth (episteme)”. For the Greeks,

Theoretical philosophy was pursued entirely for its own sake and had no relevance whatsoever to everyday practical matters. For this reason it was distinguished from practical philosophy which aimed to develop and improve the kind of “context-based” practical reasoning that was employed in the conduct of a wide range of morally informed human activities (Carr, 2004: 61).

Hughes (2001: 49) in a commentary on Aristotle’s *Nichomachean Ethics* concerning the relationship of theory to practice states:

Human practical living cannot be divorced from thoughtful action: and the very nature of thinking eventually leads us to considerations which are theoretical, not practical, and yet which provide the basis for even our most practical decisions … the principles which we
use in our moral decision making are theoretical, even though the use to which those principles are put is practical.

Thus, if one studies both Carr and Hughes it seems evident that there is some emphasis on the practical; that for Aristotle theory is about doing - we think in order to do and do not think for the sake of thinking. This is where I wish to link the educational research as method to philosophy of education. That research should not be for the sake of research; theorising about matters educational cannot be for the sake of theorising only. Educational research should be engaged upon to make clearer or to inform practice. Thinking about and researching educational matters should be making a difference to the practice of teaching - where teachers/educators “do-the-doing” of practice and in order to make research count; research cannot be detached from what teachers’ are doing. Even thinking about the practice is in a sense a “doing”; theory, therefore, is a practical action concerned with a doing action; a doing (thinking) action about the practice of teaching. Only that thinking (theorising) which could possibly enhance thinking which has a practical bearing on educational practice, is to my mind worthwhile when thinking about education. In this regard and significant to the view espoused in this work is the view of Rorty (1999: xxv):

All areas of culture are parts of the same endeavour to make life better. There is no deep split between theory and practice, because on a pragmatist view all so-called “theory” which is not wordplay is always already practice.

Significant to the discussion about theory as a doing action is that Greek philosophers distinguished between two modes of non-theoretical reasoning, that is, technē (technical reasoning) and phronēsis (practical reasoning). Technē refers to those activities that the Greeks referred to as poēsis. These activities were value-free, reasoning about means and ends – ends that were specified in advance (Carr, 2004: 61). Phronēsis on the other hand was a form of practical reasoning about how to act in a morally appropriate way and this type of morally informed practice was called praxis.

For Aristotle the “end” of a practice is some ethically worthwhile “good” that is internal to, and inseparable from, the practice and only exists in the practice itself … in practical
reasoning, “ends” and “means” stand in a reciprocal relationship such that reasoning about the good which constitutes the end of a practice is inseparable from reasoning about the action that constitutes the means for its achievement. Reasoning about “means” and reasoning about “ends” does not therefore involve reasoning “technically” about the former and “theoretically” about the latter. They are two mutually constitutive elements within the single dialectical process of practical reasoning (Carr, 2004: 61).

Means and ends when viewed in this way cannot be separated as it is in a positivist manner – in deciding the best means to an end which is inherently instrumental (which here includes notions of prediction and control) in a positivist sense. I stress “instrumental in a positivist sense,” because for pragmatism the concept of instrumentality has a quite different meaning that is not linked to prediction and control. This view has major implications for education as a practice.

The practice of education is, when located within interpretive and critical theory, essentially a social practice that involves human beings. As such, and this cannot be overstated, the actions of humans cannot always be predicted and, therefore, controlled but should rather be interpreted. But in a quest for finding “the best means” to educate, the practice of education has at times been compared to practices with a bent toward the natural sciences, in particular medicine (Pring, 2004: 2). I shall now look at this trend, which could possibly have a major impact on educational research and serves as a second caveat after the impact of the method of the natural sciences on educational research as previously denoted.

The method of explanation predominant in the natural sciences was the deductive-nomological explanation (d-n explanation), a model of causal explanation. For the model to come into operation three conditions had to be satisfied. The relationship between the variables must be invariable; one variable must precede, or occur simultaneous with the other; the occurrence of one (the independent) variable should encourage the occurrence of the other (dependent) while the reverse is not true. Causal laws, therefore, state an invariable sequential order of dependence between kinds of states of affairs (Fay, 1984: 33). According to this method of explanation, once the pattern of invariable sequential order was established, the possibility of prediction and control was present. But the deductive-nomological explanation of the positivist social science is not
only a method of explanation, but the very premise upon which is based the positivist notion of how theory relates to practice. When used to explain the behaviour of objects for the natural sciences, the model of explanation seems in order. As soon as one knows what the ends (pre-determined outcomes) are, it is possible to manipulate the variables (establish a method) in such a way as to gain the desired end. However, when the deductive-nomological model of explanation is applied to the human sciences the temptation arises to explain human behaviour (action) in a similar causal and observational manner so that a desired end, once determined, can be attained. This model of explanation is possible because of the way in which theory relates to practice; theory informs practice such that the two are separated and the announcement of one predetermines the manifestation of the other. In this regard Taylor (1985: 92) posits:

There is a constant temptation to take natural science theory as model for social theory: that is, to see theory as offering an account of underlying processes and mechanisms of society, and as providing the basis of a more effective planning of social life. But for all the superficial analogies, social theory can never really occupy this role. It is part of a significantly different activity.

Fay (1984: 14) indicates that this is the way in which a “policy science” is established viz. “that set of procedures which enables one to determine the technically best course of action to adopt in order to implement a decision or achieve a goal.” And herein lies the danger: The policy scientist “chooses the most efficient course of action in terms of the available scientific information” (Fay, 1984: 14). In this way then, it becomes possible for education to simply choose the most efficient ways to educate in order to (as example) save money or to equip learners with skills to meet the demands of industry and government.

This notion of education is located within a particular social theory based on a method of explanation that works for the natural sciences. The claims made are deemed to be of a general nature and universally valid. The theory is based on what is economical and effective. It shows “what works”. What works is then what we are to strive for in society and in education in particular. One of the claims that positivism makes is that it is value-free. Values are subjective and not in the world and as a result do not exist for positivism. Positivism lays claim to neutrality
as well. But the very nature of "what works", that is, the most efficient (best) means to an end or the most desirable end, is a moral question where one has to decide one way or the other based upon a value-judgement, thus negating the very claim positivism makes.

Recently, because of dissatisfaction with educational research, evidence-based education has emerged. I wish to claim that the emergence of evidence-based educational research is premised upon such a notion of "what works" and a particular view of what an educational practice is, and is a reaction from those who claim that educational research:

- did not provide answers to the questions the government asks in order to develop educational policy, that it did not provide educational professionals with clear guidance for their work, that it was fragmented, non-cumulative and methodologically flawed, and that it often was tendentious and politically motivated (Pring, 2000: 10).

I shall briefly discuss the nature of what an educational practice is and then see what the relation is between an educational practice and evidence-based research. Educational practices are practices by humans for humans. As such, educational practices are social practices. "A society is amongst other things a set of institutions and practices and cannot exist and be carried on without certain self-understandings" (Taylor, 1985: 93).

Evidence-based research finds its genesis in medical research because of the certainty and efficiency research based upon the natural sciences can render. A professional doctor who already has all the "true" answers in his repertoire runs a medical practice, waiting for patients coming for healing in a prescribed manner, offering prescriptions whereupon is written his solutions. Causality seems to play a major role in the medical practice. It should not be possible for an educational practice such as run by a professional teacher to offer prescribed solutions to learners as if they are ill. Education and medicine are inherently different practices. No amount of education or the use of particular methods can produce the certainty (truth) that a medical practice demands. There is far less scope for trial and error in a medical practice than in an educational practice. Patients would surely object to such a practice of trial and error for which they have to pay. Education should not consistently desire that kind of certainty, for "what works" in the educational arena should not be
able to be generalised, be universally valid, causal in nature and capable of producing sound evidence.

But having said this, I am in no way suggesting that the research method of positivism, that is, quantitative research, has no place in educational research within a critical and pragmatist paradigm. I am not convinced that the break between positivism and critical theory in terms of their methods of research, quantitative and qualitative research respectively, should be a definitive break in a foundationalist sense. This will be discussed later in this section.

Thus, I have tried to show that the practice of education is in its very nature different to that of the practice of medicine; learners and patients have very different reasons for coming to school in the morning and seeking medical advice in the afternoon from a doctor, that what can be passed on as being the truth and valid for medicine and the natural sciences should not necessarily be compared to what is acceptable as the notions of truth and validity for education and educational practice. That education should perhaps not be viewed as a technological process driven by governments and others in a “policy scientific” manner where the concerns are about “what works” – the most efficient manner of education where ends and means are separated in a positivistic manner. This is not the kind of notion of education that this investigation favours.

Education, based on the above notion of education and educational research, must seek the best and most efficient methods that work when the “ends” (desirable) have already been decided upon in advance. Such ends could possibly be in agreement with the ends for a positivistic educational practice, based on a supposedly value-free, neutral and objective notion of education that is congruent with a technological approach to education, possibly open to the manipulation of policy scientists. This type of education would be “what works” for some people. The unanswered question is, “what works” for whom?

Thus, reasoning is doing and doing is reasoning; theory and practice should not be separated and educational research as method and the philosophy of education “are two mutually constitutive
elements within the single dialectical" practice of education. This is how in this investigation educational research will be linked to the philosophy of education as method.

However, this notion of how theory relates to practice was a very different one at the time of the philosophers of the Vienna Circle. To illustrate this specific point I shall now begin with the second part of this section, that is, I shall show why for the purposes of this investigation, conceptual analysis is important for the philosophy of education. Earlier, when I discussed technical rationality, I briefly showed the genesis of positivism, how logical positivism gained popularity with the analytical philosophers of the Vienna Circle and mentioned that logical positivism had a major influence on philosophy with philosophers such as Moore, Russell, Quine and Wittgenstein being amongst the most influential analytical philosophers of the period. I need to link up with that discussion again to discuss the historical development and show the significance of conceptual analysis as method of research for the philosophy of education, that is, show why logical analysis was a focal point in analytical philosophy and how it developed into conceptual analysis.

The early Wittgenstein viewed philosophy as a critique of language whose business is primarily to uncover the true logical form of statements hidden under superficial structure of ordinary language (Romanos, 1983: 32). For positivists, the logical analysis of language was the main aim of philosophy. Philosophy was about giving clarity to meaning which was in a sense locked up in language; philosophy had to uncover the “truth” (reality). In order to do this philosophy had to analyse language. Language was all that there was. To philosophise then, is to analyse language. My contention is that there is a conceptual connection between philosophy or the philosophy of education and analysis (conceptual analysis); that in our thinking about research in the philosophy of education we are trying to unlock what concepts mean to people in a specific context. I shall now argue for this by showing the development of conceptual analysis.

For the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle a priority seems to have been the elimination of metaphysics, “particularly the post-Kantian variety. Kant, in his quest to undermine metaphysics once and for all, in his Critique, instead breathed new life into metaphysics by severing its increasingly tenuous union with science and setting it up as a distinct and autonomous mode of
inquiry, with its separate domain of concern” (Romanos, 1983: 5). This had to be undone by the logical positivists and the means of doing this was through the logical analysis of language – a linguistic conception of truth grounded in the very nature of language (its structure or meaning, rules or conventions) as revealed through logical analysis.

For the analytic philosophers there existed a dichotomy between meaning and truth; a dichotomy which even today is still under dispute and manifests in the continuing duel between quantitative and qualitative methods in terms of meaning and truth and which will be addressed in this work at a later stage. In considering the genesis of conceptual analysis (which played a major role in the search for meaning and truth), it is especially the work of Wittgenstein and Quine that for me seems to have been the most influential.

The thinking of Wittgenstein may be divided into his earlier and later works in terms of his search for meaning. The early Wittgenstein, in his quest for meaning, developed what is known as the Picture Theory of Language. This theory aims to explain what language really says or means by appealing to the way the world really is. Here linguistic absolutism is totally dependent upon metaphysical absolutism (Romanos, 1983: 35). Somehow, according to the Picture Theory, there is a picturing relation between language and reality. “Language pictures the world through projecting the logical form of the facts. The picture is a model of reality” (Romanos, 1983: 34-35). Furthermore, according to Romanos (1983: 35), all that remains for the analytical philosopher is to clarify the confused and distorted picture presented by ordinary language with its superficial grammatical structure and to reveal its true sense and structure by means of reformulations in the ideal language, which represents an accurate or true picture (true in the sense of having the right logical form). This was known as Wittgenstein’s notion of ideal language that pictured the world as it really is (Romanos, 1983: 34).

It seems clear that at this time Wittgenstein is looking for the “real” or “correct” answer with his pictorial theory, a type of thinking that was consistent with the age of the analytic philosophers to whom he belonged, yet who did not necessarily always agree with him. The latter part of Wittgenstein’s career started off with his Philosophical Investigations, wherein a break from his earlier essentialist or foundationalist notion of the relation between meaning and reality (a
correspondence theory) is discerned. The picture theory aimed at a “true” representation of reality. However, the *Philosophical Investigations* started off with a complete about turn against the Augustinian (classical) picture of language, the very explanation of the relation between meaning and reality, which he had supported in the earlier *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*. Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* signalled a conceptually different way in looking at language and reality. With the introduction of language games, the later Wittgenstein provides us with a new model, a new paradigm, for thinking about language and reality by reconceptualising the nature of language and the place of language in the world (Harris in Shanker & Kilfoyle, 2002: 129).

For Wittgenstein the use of language has now become context based. Asking for the name of a thing and understanding an answer presupposes understanding the language-game and to understand any relationship between a name and the thing named one must “look at the language game” (Harris in Shanker & Kilfoyle: 132). “For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus” the meaning of a word is its use in language” (Wittgenstein, 1958: 20, Anscombe, trans). In the later Wittgenstein the meaning of a word is in its very use. This is an important departure from the Picture Theory where representation of the world in the form of a picture was the representation of reality. Meaning and reality was distinct. The actions of those using the language are part of the language game. Language is not set off from the world; it is part of it. The definitive boundary between language and reality has been deleted and the two have become inseparably interwoven (Harris in Shanker & Kilfoyle: 132). Hardwick (1971: 21) sums up the works of Wittgenstein as follows:

But rather than seeing words and expressions merely as elements of a logical calculus, he came to see words and expressions as tools that gained their significance through their use in various life situations. And rather than seeing words as “objects” with fixed meanings, he came to see them as instruments, each given to numerous uses. In short, we see Wittgenstein’s later views shift away from the pictorial role of language to its functional character.
Thus the meaning of a word is its use. If this is so, then one shows that one understands the meaning of the word when one employs the word correctly. To be able to do this one has to play Wittgenstein’s language-game. I shall now illustrate how this game is played. Suppose one is teaching a child to use the word “sweet”. In the shop there are different sweets of all sorts of sizes and colours, but in the shop there are also all sorts of other objects. The problem is to get the child to associate the word “sweet” with a particular kind of object. If one shows a sweet to a child, points the object out to him/her and make him/her repeat the word, if the child is able to do this exercise on his/her own, the child has learned to use the word and is able to associate the word “sweet” with a particular object.

But this, according to Wittgenstein’s language-game still does not show that the child knows the meaning of the word “sweet”. If, however, the original sweet is placed among other objects such as balls and toys and the child is then able to point out the “sweet” when called upon to do so, it shows that the child is able to associate the word “sweet” with the object “sweet”. This still does not show whether the child understands the general term “sweet”. If the child is able to identify several sweets, disregarding their size and colour, then the child has understood how the word “sweet” was used. Understanding the meaning of a word, then, lies in its use. Hardwick (1971: 98) sums it up neatly as follows:

The child’s understanding of the meaning of a word is indicated by the child’s ability to use the word, and here “use” involves the child’s tacit understanding of rules for the use of a word … we assume that the child has learned the semantical rule for “sweet”, but there may be a pragmatic rule also. The child may learn the word “sweet” by understanding the various things she can do with it.

Wittgenstein himself states that to obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique (Hardwick, 1971: 99). This is what analysis for the later Wittgenstein meant.
In summary then, there seems to be two clear periods in the works of Wittgenstein; the earlier period where there was a similarity with Augustinian classical thought in terms of the Picture Theory, and the later Wittgenstein where in his *Philosophical Investigations* language and meaning were explained in terms of language games and its reciprocal rules and with the acknowledgement that language is part of customs, that in terms of which people come to define themselves. But it is not only the history of Wittgenstein that is important, but along with it there is also the growth of analytical philosophy and its method of inquiry, logical analysis, that is also experiencing conceptual change itself. It is all about how language represents reality and conflatedly the challenge to logical analysis.

I shall now relate the next period in the development of analysis as method of research for philosophy and more importantly for this study, that is, a study in philosophy of education. The philosophers, who in my mind were among the pioneers of analysis after the Wittgenstein period, are Hirst and Peters. Just as I traced the earlier history of logical analysis and the subsequent development of analytic analysis and its importance for philosophy and the philosophy of education by looking at the work of Wittgenstein up to the 1940s, I shall now explore the next period in the development of analytic analysis by portraying the work on analysis by Hirst and Peters.

During the 1960s (after a 20 year lull) Hirst and Peters take up the cudgels of philosophical analysis. They posit: “philosophy is concerned with questions about the analysis of concepts and with questions about the grounds of knowledge, belief, actions and activities” (Hirst & Peters, 1970: 3). The essential question relates to what we understand a concept to be. Only once this question is answered can we begin to analyse a concept. One way of finding out what a concept is perhaps to relate it to other words. If the concept of “love” is used as example we may conclude that to love is to have some kind of loyalty toward the person so loved. However, often we find that a person claiming to love another is unfaithful toward that person. Does infidelity diminish love in any way? Did the unfaithful not have (understand) the concept of “love”? This ability to relate words to each other would also go along with the ability to recognise cases to which the word applied (Hirst & Peters, 1970: 4).
One could also posit that it would be a sufficient condition to say that the possession of a concept is the ability to make discriminations and to classify things together if they are similar. However, it would not be a necessary condition. It may simply be that a person (for reasons of lack of education or some other reason perhaps) has not been introduced to the words that have been developed for marking such distinctions. But the absence of the ability to use the word in the sense of being able to make discriminations or to classify things cannot lead us to the conclusion that the person does not understand the concept.

Hirst and Peters (1970: 4) state that it is not satisfactory to equate having a concept with the possession of an ability, such as the ability to use words appropriately or classifying and making discriminations for it implies an assumption that we are able to grasp a principle which enables us to do these things. Amongst philosophers, it seems, there is a tendency to rely on a publicly observable criterion of having a concept, as our understanding of what it is to have a concept covers both the experience of grasping a principle and the ability to discriminate and use words correctly, which is observable in the case of others as well as ourselves (Hirst & Peters, 1970: 4).

Having looked at the notion of Hirst and Peters (1970: 4) of what a concept is, I shall now investigate their notion of what it means to analyse a concept. “What we do is to examine the use of words in order to see what principle or principles govern their use” (Hirst & Peters, 1970: 4). What we see here is a difference in terminology. Hirst and Peters are seeking the “principles” that govern the use of concepts and Wittgenstein was looking for the rules that governed his language-games. Uncovering the rules or principles would lead to an uncovering of the concept. One way of uncovering the principles in order to uncover the concept is to seek for definitions. Hirst and Peters posit that there are two types of definitions, strong and weak. The strong definition of words searches for characteristics or conditions that are both logically necessary and sufficient. This would lead one to say that if and only if these characteristics or conditions are present would a person be “happy” or “sad” (as examples of concepts). This leads us to the type of “truths” and certainty that the logical positivists demanded – a certainty that Wittgenstein at first accepted but had abandoned in his later works and which is unacceptable to Hirst and Peters because words were used in the mathematical subjects in a stricter sense than in the social sciences, for there was no space for the metaphysical. Hirst and Peters (1970: 2) accept the
metaphysical as integral to their philosophical studies for in asking after the nature of philosophy they state that philosophy concerns itself with “activities like science, painting pictures, worshipping, and making moral judgment”.

For Hirst and Peters (1970: 5) then, theoretical activity that makes explicit characteristics in the weaker sense, which uses words in a looser sense in ordinary language, is conceptual analysis; that is, in conceptual analysis the philosopher searches only for the logically necessary conditions or characteristics. Thus, the weak sense is when another word can be found which picks out a characteristic that is a logically necessary condition for the applicability of the original word. The principles that govern the use of concepts that were earlier alluded to by Hirst and Peters are thus the logically necessary conditions or characteristics that “makes a thing what it is”. But this activity of searching for the logically necessary conditions of a concept may seem all too simple. Even Wittgenstein realised this and issued a caveat. Logically necessary conditions (characteristics) should not be defined in any simple way and concepts can only be understood in relation to other concepts. We should not define words by attempting to find synonyms, a type of encyclopaedic explanation with an empiricist nature. We need to analyse concepts by examining meanings of words. Pursuing the relationships of concepts to each other does this; the understanding of the use of concepts does not solely depend on grammar but also needs reflection on the different purposes that human beings share in their social life (Hirst & Peters, 1970: 8).

After exploring Wittgenstein’s language-games, I inquired into Hirst and Peters’s notion of what a concept is and discovered that it covers both the experience and the ability to discriminate and use words correctly. For them, concept analysis concerns the looking for logically necessary conditions of a concept. This creates the conceptual space for the metaphysical, which the positivists decried – but which allows reflection about the justification of the meaning of concepts that attain meaning in everyday life situations of human beings (Hirst & Peters, 1970: 8).

Thus far I have argued why educational research should be linked to philosophy and philosophy of education as a method by tracing the development of logical analysis through the works of the earlier and later Wittgenstein and, in doing so, demonstrated the influence of empiricism on language and meaning and the representation of reality – how the picture theory gave way to
rules and language-games and then in the 1960s logical analysis had developed into the search for logically necessary conditions of Hirst and Peters.

I shall now investigate the significance of conceptual analysis for philosophy and by implication also for philosophy of education, as advocated by Hirst and Peters. In the beginning of this section I briefly looked at what philosophy is by, amongst others, looking at the explanation of Hirst (Carr, 2004: 58) in this regard:

an analytical pursuit ... concerned with the clarification of the concepts and propositions through which our experiences and activities are intelligible.

Hirst (Carr, 2004: 58) asserts that in Great Britain the history of philosophy of education had been based on an erroneous view of what philosophy is. He is of the opinion that it is because philosophy is drawing life and energy from developments in academic philosophy that philosophy had acquired a proper understanding of its task. Though definitions of the task of philosophy were varied, most philosophers agreed that the task included the clarification of concepts – this I contend is one of its main tasks for philosophy of education which amongst others include clarification of concepts, such as education, teaching, learning, authority, discipline, critical thinking, and the like, so that those involved in education can come to a clearer understanding of the practice of education.

Conceptual analysis is important to philosophy and philosophy of education because it seeks to clarify what people are doing when engaging in the practice of language. Conceptual analysis tries to give meaning to concepts, ideas that human beings have about their practices – whether practices are desirable or undesirable, efficient or otherwise. This view of conceptual analysis is important for this study to understand how humans give meaning to their practices.

In this regard Pring comments that if one wants to undertake any kind of research one has to know what is being researched. This would necessitate a definition of key terms (such as those mentioned previously for education). The definition of terms is important to understand meanings of words used. Though meanings of concepts, as argued earlier, can only be understood in
relation to other concepts, what is generally called a field of relations, this does not signify that concepts or their meanings can be understood that simply. It would be an error to try and understand a concept in isolation from a particular context. Also, there are many concepts over which there is no universal agreement on meaning. Pring (2000: 9) calls the pursuit of the meaning of concepts a controversial one – words can rarely be defined in a way that attracts universal agreement.

It is important to note that as the nature of philosophy and philosophy of education changed, so also did its tool of research – conceptual analysis. When the influence of the positivists was at its greatest logical analysis was the preferred method of analysis – a method that was embedded in the rules of science. Just as means and ends, and theory and practice were separated for positivism because of its belief in synthetics, when analytic philosophy gained momentum logical analysis declined and began to make way for conceptual analysis – a method that acknowledged that concepts gained meaning within social contexts and that as these contexts differed from community to community, the interpretation of these concepts could differ. Pring (2000: 11) confirms this when using the concept of education as example in stating that, “But it soon becomes clear that there are important differences between people in how a word is applied – albeit within a broad area of agreement about its definition. That is because the concept of education implies a set of values, and there is disagreement over what those values are”. The recognition of values was a major paradigm shift. It allowed for the presence of the metaphysical and thus philosophy and the philosophy of education could develop a conceptually different analytic tool – conceptual analysis.

In sum then, conceptual analysis is important for philosophy and philosophy of education because in language usage and philosophical endeavour one needs to have clarity about meanings of concepts – to be clear about one's own and the practices of others. This means that one is aware that concepts are linked to practices that are embedded in particular values that have particular meaning for particular people in a particular context and time. Because of its importance for philosophical endeavour it has developed parallel with the development of philosophy and philosophy of education.
I shall now argue why conceptual analysis should be linked to critical theory and pragmatism as method for this investigation. If we look at the two periods into which the works of Wittgenstein can possibly be divided, we find that the earlier Wittgenstein leaned toward the logical positivists with his pictorial representation of reality. This notion of reality was one that was detached, a notion that separated means and ends, facts and values and practice and theory. The method of research was logical analysis – a method that decried the metaphysical as non-sense and relied upon the observable and natural, that which could be tested scientifically as valid.

The later Wittgenstein, with the linguistic turn, underwent a major paradigm shift in his philosophy. Wittgenstein at this time favoured analytic philosophy and developed the theory of language games that was discussed earlier. According to this theory one had to know the rules of a language in order to understand the meaning of concepts. However, his admission was significant that language games are practised in communities. Within this admission was conceived the genesis of conceptual analysis as realised by Hirst and Peters that had moved into the realm of hermeneutics. Thus, from the turn of the century there had been two major competing paradigms, positivism with its scientific method and hermeneutics with its hermeneutic-dialectical method.

There was an almost complete rejection of the scientific method in favour of hermeneutics. Research in hermeneutics highly favoured qualitative methods that envisaged humans as interpreting beings whereas science viewed humans as objects in the natural world and utilised quantitative methods. Pring (2000:55) argues that the opposition between quantitative and qualitative research is mistaken. The world is seen differently by different people, their practices differ and at times what they consider to be valuable differ. As such, “social constructions are constantly reconstructed as new experiences force us to reshape how we understand things”. Hermeneutics aids us in understanding the world from the perspective of social actors, including their practices and traditions. Reality is constantly being constructed and reconstructed. “We acquire those constructions which (although socially developed) are possible because certain features of reality which make them possible. It is not that there are multiple realities.” Pring (2000: 55) asserts, in favour of the quantitative method, that “there are features of what it is to be a person that enables generalisations to be made and “quantities” to be added or subtracted. Most
persons have predictable emotions and capacities which make it possible for certain purposes to consider them the same from person to person – and thus open to quantification”. I do not necessarily agree with Pring that at times human emotions are predictable, for it can place one on a slippery slope. I do, however, concur that the so-called dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative methods should be overcome. For Rorty (Parkinson, 1987: 103) “there is no right or wrong” method. Theorists should conceptualise what they are doing and with whom.

But how does critical theory see a break between quantitative and qualitative methods? “Critical theory is, at its center, an effort to join empirical investigation (quantitative research), the task of interpretation (qualitative research), and a critique of this reality... (in order) to improve human existence by viewing knowledge for its emancipatory or repressive potential” (McLaren & Giarelli, 1995: 2). Rorty (1999: xxv) asserts that:

> for pragmatists there is no sharp break between natural science and social science, nor between social science and politics, nor between politics, philosophy and nature. All areas of culture are parts of the same endeavour to make life better. There is no deep split between theory and practice, because on a pragmatist view all so-called “theory” which is not wordplay is always already practice.

Critical theory has an educative agenda that wishes to emancipate human beings. It wishes to show humans how they are at times constrained by using functional explanations. My contention is that critical theory needs pragmatism as an instance to empower a community that has been so constrained. Critical theory has an open-ended agenda and so does pragmatism. “Pragmatists hope to break with the picture which, in Wittgenstein’s words, “holds us captive” – the Cartesian-Lockean picture of a mind seeking to get in touch with an outside reality itself” (Rorty, 1999: xxii).

One of the methods utilised by critical theory and pragmatism is the narrative method. MacIntyre asserts that “man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal” (McIntyre, 1981: 201). People tell stories based on what has gone before. Through stories they find for themselves a place in history whilst making sense of that history. “Are
stories lived or merely told?” asks Fay (1996: 197). He continues by stating that “stories are lived because human activity is inherently narratival in character and form: in acting we “knit the past and the future together.” But this is what pragmatism also says. We should use past “failures” and successes and use these as guides to make intelligent decisions in future. To be able to do this we need to understand the past. We need to understand and interpret the meanings of concepts and for this we need conceptual analysis. Concepts are not of a static nature so that their meanings do not change. Meanings change all of the time for concepts within hermeneutics. Our present and futures are constructed and reconstructed all of the time in line with critical theory’s educative process of emancipation and the pragmatist notion of continual growth.

I have argued that conceptual analysis is necessary for critical theory and pragmatism for their premise is that practices of communities always change. If this is the case, then the way in which we interpret practices need to change on an ongoing basis as the meanings change for particular communities in particular social conditions at particular times.

1.7 SUMMARY

In summary then, I wish to explore whether the critical outcomes of Outcomes-based education are transformative or not. Although the outcomes are seemingly cast in a technicist frame, they may still have the potential to be transformative, that is, deepen democracy and citizenship, driven by pragmatist-critical theory through educational research and philosophical, more specifically, conceptual analysis.

1.8 PROGRAMME OF STUDY

In Chapter 2 I investigate Outcomes-based education. I explore meanings of concepts such as performance and outcomes. Thereafter I discuss three approaches to Outcomes-based education; the Traditional, Transitional and the Transformational approaches. I show how Outcomes-based education has evolved by giving an overview of OBE in other countries (U.S.A. and Australia) and then link this with the genesis of OBE in South Africa. Also, I argue that global forces such
as the IMF, the World Bank and Multi-National Corporations influence the approach to education in South Africa a labour force with skills required by the market.

In Chapter 3 I argue that outcomes framed in line with market requirements are instrumental in nature. Outcomes so framed, I contend, can only lead to “thin” democracy. I thus argue for critical outcomes to be reconceptualised in terms of democratic citizenship which has the potential to engender a critical mass for a deep democracy.

In Chapter 4 I show first, what the implications are of the outcomes as currently framed in terms of globalisation. That is, I discuss how globalisation seems to reinforce the instrumentalism and individualism leading to an aggregative notion of citizenship. Thereafter I argue for a notion of citizenship that is more maximal (communitarian/associative) than the minimalist notion that instrumentalism and individualism offers. I then reconceptualise outcomes of OBE in terms of democratic citizenship, for I contend that in this way the outcomes may be more transformative.

In Chapter 5 I investigate ways that teachers and learners may think about teaching and learning. I contend that if teachers and learners think about teaching and learning through deliberation, imagination, inconclusive outcomes and reasonableness, the outcomes are able to avoid the instrumentality of which it is often accused and are enabled to be transformative. Outcomes that are open-ended and open to reasonableness, deliberation and imagination are not finite. Outcomes framed thus open the way to think differently about teaching and learning. Teaching becomes not a space where an all-knowing teacher meets a not-knowing learner. Rather, spaces are opened where teachers and learners can attend and respond to the other in their unique otherness – where there is a constant search, questioning, challenge and attendance to the other in a pedagogy of unknowability. In this way the outcomes can be transformative for a deep democracy.
CHAPTER 2

THE GENESIS OF OUTCOMES - BASED EDUCATION (OBE)

2.1. INTRODUCTION

In this section I start out by briefly sketching the ideological scenario prevailing in South African society (specifically education) - from formal apartheid education (1948) to the period just before the advent of democracy and shortly thereafter (1992 onward). In Chapter One I gave a synopsis of the development of education in South Africa by focusing on those instances of the history of education that are significant for this study. In the synopsis mention was made of apartheid education with its emphasis on the “banking method” - condemned by Paulo Freire - that reduced learners to mere passive receptors of facts and elevated teachers to glorified “know-alls” whose knowledge it was sacrilege to challenge by learners, who were curious to know more about life (human practices) - for this is what I believe education should be about. Apart from the charge of racism against apartheid education, Jansen (1999: 4) notes that there were other charges such as Eurocentrism, a prescriptive and unchanging nature and the concomitant authoritarianism of a dinosaur bureaucracy levelled against apartheid education.

For liberation movements such as the African National Congress, still banned and in exile, and the democratic movement internally under the banner of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the task of liberating a nation from apartheid and its concomitant unequal education system, was not easy. Groundswell was gained by means of trade unions, such as the Congress of Trade Unions of South Africa (COSATU), amongst others. In an attempt to escape apartheid education the seeds sown by the Black Consciousness Movement, which found resonance in the thinking of Paulo Freire, led to a concerted push toward People’s Education which to many involved in the liberation struggle at the time was to be the seedbed of a future education system for a democratic South Africa. However, when the apartheid South African government unbanned political parties and released political prisoners and exclaimed a willingness to negotiate with the ANC, instead of before non-negotiable values
for the people's movement being held with the same esteem, these were diluted in the name of consensual politics in order to avoid civil war.

From the side of education and the democratic movement had emerged the National Policy Investigation Report (NEPI) under the auspices of the National Co-ordinating Crisis Committee, an umbrella group of education and labour stakeholders and it was widely agreed that NEPI would provide the "broad values framework for thinking about democratic education policy after apartheid; this framework emphasized non-racism, non-sexism, democracy, equality and redress as the platform for post-apartheid education policy" (Jansen, 1999: 4). Jansen further notes that nowhere in this report was any mention made of Outcomes-based education as a possible education system for a future democratic South Africa. I shall return to this polemic later in this chapter when I discuss the sudden rise of OBE in South Africa.

Having given the above brief outline of the ideological contestation (between the apartheid government and liberation forces) prevailing just before Outcomes-based education emerged in South African education, I shall thereafter discuss the genesis of Outcomes-based education by first looking at the nature of competences and outcomes, which I contend are the constitutive meanings of OBE and against which claims of instrumentality against OBE are aimed. Thereafter I shall briefly trace the history of OBE in Australia and the United States of America (U.S.A.) in order to see the nature of the OBE that emerged in those countries. The OBE system of South Africa is claimed to be transformational OBE, unlike the traditional and transitional forms that also exist. It is necessary to give a brief overview of each so that the reason for South Africa practising transformational (as claimed by the educational authorities) rather than another form of OBE may possibly become clearer. At the same time I shall discuss why and how Outcomes-based education emerged in South Africa in the way that it did after the democratically elected government came to power in 1994.
Finally, I contend that the worldwide implementation and interest in OBE is linked to the rise in globalisation which seemingly has a certain type of global citizen in mind, but in the case of South Africa also has links with transformation of society, given South Africa’s apartheid history. I argue that there is a conceptual relationship between the aims of globalisation and the critical outcomes of Curriculum 2005 and South African OBE that encourages an instrumental justification (extrinsic) of education. Hence, the critical outcomes of Curriculum 2005 and OBE may be critical but not be critical enough to engender deep democracy in the form of democratic citizenship education.

2.2 COMPETENCES AND OUTCOMES

The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1991: 89) describes the word base as a part that supports from beneath or serves as a foundation for an object or structure; it is a notional structure or entity on which something draws or depends (powerbase); a principle or starting point amongst others. Put differently, if the base is that which helps to make something what it is, linguistically speaking a root, then the base must form part of the constitutive meaning of a concept. Thus an education system based on competences or outcomes could find itself constituted by the meaning of such concepts on which they are based. Competency-based education as a concept has as a base or is constituted by competences and Outcomes-based education is constituted by outcomes and therefore anyone who wishes to know what competency-or Outcomes-based education is, should possibly attempt to understand the notions of competences and outcomes.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1991: 232) describes competence as an ability, the state of being competent. To describe someone as competent is to say that a person is capable, efficient or able to do something. Someone described as competent has the necessary skill or knowledge to perform a particular task or fulfill a particular role. Van der Horst and McDonald (2003: 9) state that the term competence could include any of the following: survival or skills, basic skills, psychomotor skills, professional and vocational skills, intellectual skills, interpersonal skills and personal skills. If I read Van der Horst and
McDonald correctly, the concept *competence* has to do with a skill or skills. The type of skill is not the important factor; it is the emphasis on *skill* when referring to competence that matters. Describing one as *capable* conveys a sense of confidence that any task entrusted will be done reliably and well. An *efficient* person does whatever he/she has to do well, and is sufficiently well organized to achieve this with the minimum of effort. Describing a person as *able* emphasises the intellectual capacity or the talent that makes him/her good at what he/she does. *Competent*, on the other hand, means skilful, skilled, talented, gifted, expert, knowledgeable, qualified and trained.

Competency-based education came into prominence in America during the 1960s (Van der Horst & McDonald, 2003: 8). The role of education in preparing learners for life after school and more specifically the workplace was being questioned. Education did not make learners competent for life and its challenges. There seems to have been an assumption that the role of education was to prepare learners with skills that could be utilised in the workplace, seemingly with an emphasis on vocational training; a debate that touches the nature of education and educational research as alluded to in Chapter One. This has given rise to a tension between education and globalisation and is an outflow of the contention that education should serve the needs of industry, a matter that will receive more attention when the rise of OBE in South Africa is discussed in this chapter.

According to Baxen and Soudien (in Jansen & Christie, 1999: 133) OBE has its basis in two educational reforms, one of which is competency-based education. They contend that the fundamental premise of competency-based education is that it should be fabricated around the integration of outcome goals, instructional experiences and assessment mechanisms. King and Evans (1991: 74) claim that competency-based education was a response to the change in the job-market in the 1960s. "In its ideal form, CBE contained all the elements of OBE; however, the lack of agreement as to what ‘competency’ represented ultimately doomed it".

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1 CBE: Competency-based Education
The other reform on which OBE is based is mastery learning – which assumes that “all learners are able to master the desired outcomes if educators reconstruct the time and instructional parameters in which learning is set” (Baxen & Soudien, 1999: 133). Although there are claims that Outcomes-based education is based on mastery learning, Spady, the recognised author of Outcomes-based education himself states:

the agenda of what were called mastery-learning schools was more success-based than outcome-based. The focus was on creating more success for all the learners on whatever the individual teachers were teaching (Spady, 1993: 66).

After reading Soudien, Baxen and Spady it seems that there is at least some agreement that although Outcomes-based education is seemingly based upon competency-based education and mastery learning, it has come into its own. It is this development that I shall attempt to delineate at this time. Spady, defines an outcome as:

a culminating demonstration of learning. It is a demonstration: what it is the kids will actually do. Most people have thought over the years that the outcomes were the curriculum content: What will the kids know? What can they recall on a test? But outcomes are not content, they’re performances. One of my major points is that outcomes occur at the end (Spady, 1993: 66).

On another occasion Spady and Marshall comment as follows in relation to outcomes:

An outcome is a successful demonstration of learning that occurs at the culminating point of a set of learning experiences. The term culminating refers to the completion point of a segment of curriculum – what students are ultimately able to do at the end, once all formal instruction is over and can be synthesised and applied successfully (Spady & Marshall, 1991: 70).
For Spady it is important to understand that outcomes are “performances at the end”. Outcomes should not be equated with content (knowledge). Performances are the demonstration of outcomes. To understand the meaning of outcomes, one would thus have to understand the meaning of performance, being a constitutive part of the meaning of the concept of outcome. The South African Concise Oxford Dictionary describes performance as an act of performing a play, concert or other form of entertainment, the action of performing a task or function. It is often contrasted with competence.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1991: 885) declares amongst others that performance is the act or process of performing or carrying out. Thus an outcome is what a learner can do at the end demonstrated through the successful\(^2\) performance thereof. According to the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) an outcome is the demonstration in context of a learning experience; and capabilities that derive from and underpin that learning experience. Musker (1997: 10) states that the definition emphasises three things: That the learner has an underlying capability, a capability that the learner has to demonstrate, and the capability has to be demonstrated in a particular context.

In readings on Outcomes-based education it is often asserted that this education is skills-based – a skill being an ability, aptitude or proficiency. Having studied the definitions concerning outcomes given by Spady, it seems surprising that he does not use the concept skills when referring to outcomes. I am not quite certain whether this is intentional in the sense that he wishes to make a clear distinction. I do not wish to enter into debate around the use of the concepts, but merely find Spady’s stance interesting. At one time he almost disparagingly remarks, “Years ago, we had outcomes that were just little skills. Now, we’ve got complex role performances as culminating outcomes” (Spady, 1993: 66). From the above discussion of performance it seems that when one refers to performance, one is seemingly also referring to a particular skill.

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\(^2\) No time limit is attached to success.
In sum then, to be considered as an outcome it seems that a performance has to satisfy four criteria according to Spady (1994: 18). Firstly, the demonstration of the outcome must be of high quality, meaning thorough and complete. Secondly, the demonstration must be at the culminating point or after the end but definitely not before the end. Thirdly, the performance must have evidence of significant learning. Significance here has a bearing on real life situations, life after schooling. Finally, performances take place in some context that demands the performance of outcomes. If one studies the four criteria that a performance has to satisfy to possibly be considered as an outcome, one notices concepts such as “thorough”, “complete”, “ultimate culminating point” and “not before the end”. The articulation of performances/outcomes through a particular language seemingly locates the performances/outcomes of Spady in a positivist mould – a suggestion of absolutism seems to be present.

In the following section I shall investigate three approaches to Outcomes-based education, namely, Traditional, Transitional and Transformational Outcomes-based education.

2.3 APPROACHES TO OUTCOMES-BASED EDUCATION

2.3.1 TRADITIONAL OUTCOMES-BASED EDUCATION

The essential feature of this type of OBE is that it takes the existing curriculum as its point of departure. This is also Spady’s greatest objection to this approach and upon which his claim that traditional OBE is not truly outcomes-based, is founded. “Traditional OBE encourages local staff to take their existing curriculum content and structure – lessons, units, courses, and programs – and determine what is truly important for students to learn ...” (Spady & Marshall, 1991: 68). If on the one hand an educational approach claims to be truly outcomes-based it has to start from the performances, what the students should be able to demonstrate at the point of culmination. If this method is followed, the outcome becomes the point of focus. On the other hand if the existing curriculum is the point of departure, the emphasis falls on content and the design of the outcomes is from the bottom up i.e. the content of the
curriculum takes precedence over the design of the outcomes. The effect is that the culmination of performance is concentrated on smaller units of success. The content and structure remains mostly the same and the outcomes are similar to the teaching objectives of the traditional approach to teaching that have seemingly little or no bearing on the actual living experiences and demands that life makes upon students. The definition of the graduate is simply “an academically competent student” (Spady & Marshall, 1991: 69).

Somehow I gather that in the South African context, there is the intention to equip South African students to be more than just “academically competent” and that education somehow should have a bearing on the type of citizens South Africa needs. Traditional Outcomes-based education reminds one to a large extent that the Apartheid government’s approach to education had a heavy emphasis on curriculum content, “banking education” and teacher-centred learning. Moreover, Traditional OBE tends to be conservative in the sense that it still retains some of the essential tenets of traditional approaches to education, such as its time constraints (time table, weekly and quarterly structure) and all students grouped according to subjects rather than seeking to eliminate these. An education system in South Africa, emerging in the aftermath of Apartheid, had to signal to the masses that the democratic government was serious about social and educational transformation. It could not be a system that was akin to Bantu education in structure and method and for this reason the conservatism of a traditional outcomes-based approach to education would seemingly not be acceptable to South African society who had conceptualised education along the lines of Peoples’ Education and the Black Consciousness Movement.

2.3.2 TRANSITIONAL OUTCOMES-BASED EDUCATION

“Transitional OBE lies in the Twilight Zone between traditional subject-matter curriculum structures and planning processes and the future-role priorities inherent in Transformational OBE” (Spady & Marshall, 1991: 69). The difference between the Traditional outcomes-based approach and the Transitional approach seems to be located in the emphasis on the future. The question to be addressed, Spady posits, is “what is the most essential for our students to
know, be able to do, and be like in order to be successful once they’ve graduated?” (Spady & Marshall, 1991: 69). Outcomes in Transitional OBE should, therefore, be concerned with what students can do after they have left school. The outcomes should convey which performances are important to demonstrate in order to live a meaningful life. These outcomes are called outcomes of significance – outcomes that are significant in all life and learning environments. In this regard Spady and Marshall (1991: 67) proclaim that outcomes of significance require substance of significance applied through processes of significance in settings of significance.

Transitional OBE thus has a special concern for the outcomes that students are able to perform at the end of their school life or the culminating stage of the outcomes. The aim is to have a certain type of citizen and for transitional outcomes-based education that citizen should be broadly competent. Instances of outcomes that a broadly competent citizen should be able to demonstrate, would be those that encourage critical thinking, effective communication, technological applications, and complex problem solving, rather than particular kinds of knowledge or information. Malcolm (1999: 86) posits, “For Spady successful students are ready to take their place in society as citizens, producers/workers, lifelong learners, community and family members. Achievements in science, art, mathematics or history that don’t relate to such roles need to be questioned – it may be that they are simply in the curriculum for their own sake”. The focus is thus on higher-order competencies rather than on subject knowledge. However, the essential difference between Traditional OBE and Transitional OBE lies in that for Traditional OBE the curriculum is strongly content-based and the starting point of the design process remains the curriculum whereafter the significant outcomes are identified. Transitional OBE, on the other hand, does not focus on subject-specific skills or subject matter content. The purpose of programs and courses is to adapt content to the explicit development of the higher-order competencies and orientations in the exit-outcomes, rather than to foster subject knowledge in isolation (Spady & Marshall, 1991: 69).
It seems to me that Spady and Marshall’s main objection to Transitional OBE is its insistence on “adapting” the current curriculum although focusing on higher-order competencies. The starting point of design still seems to be the curriculum. Hence Spady’s accusation that Transitional OBE “lies in the twilight zone between Traditional OBE and Transformational OBE”. In sum, Traditional OBE concerns itself with content, and the focus and starting point is mainly the curriculum. Transitional OBE seems to move beyond the conservative outcomes of traditional OBE when it insists on a future-oriented focus for outcomes, that the outcomes should engender critical thinking and problem solving. It should become manifest, when discussing the nature of Transformational OBE in the next section, why Spady demands an entirely different approach from Transformational OBE in relation to that of Traditional and Transitional OBE.

2.3.3 TRANSFORMATIONAL OUTCOMES-BASED EDUCATION

Spady and Marshall (1991: 70) posits that Transformational Outcomes-based education is founded on four operational principles. The entirely different approach to education that Spady advocates is located within these operational principles. The first principle is that of ensuring clarity of focus on the outcomes of significance. The culmination of outcomes i.e. the end of all teaching when the performance has to be demonstrated by the students/learners, becomes the focal point and the goal of the curriculum and instruction. The curriculum, the instruction, assessment, and credentialing with the criteria are all brought into alignment at the culminating point. Secondly, Transformational outcomes are designed down from the ultimate outcomes. The starting point of curriculum design is thus the design of outcomes³ and having established these, the curriculum and instructional design should “proceed backward from the culminating demonstrations (outcomes)... thereby ensuring that all components of a successful culminating demonstration are in place (Spady, 1991: 70). Thirdly, Transformational outcomes stress high levels of expectation that all students can succeed and the challenge to students (in the form of the culminating outcomes) is also set at high levels. When students perform the significant outcomes at the culminating point at the

³ In the Traditional and Transitional OBE approaches the design of the curriculum normally starts with the content. This is a defining difference.
expected high levels, due acknowledgement should be given for performances whenever these occur. Fourthly, Transformational OBE provides expanded opportunity and support for learning success. The emphasis on allocation of time is totally different from traditional approaches to education (including OBE approaches) because Transformational OBE insists that “time should be utilized as a flexible resource rather than a predefined absolute in both instructional design and delivery” (Spady, 1991: 70). Spady is indicating in which way there is a difference between Traditional, Transitional and Transformational OBE. When Spady claims that Transformational OBE is not “a predefined absolute in both instructional design and delivery”, he seems to confirm that that is what Traditional and Transitional approaches espouse, hence the attempt at a decisive break. But at the same time Spady also seems to lock Traditional and Transitional Outcomes-based education within a positivist educational theory and seemingly decries such a notion for a Transformational approach.

Expanded opportunity means that the school setting should grant the student/learner the opportunity to complete an outcome in his/her own time. In this way some students may possibly attain the required level of performance sooner than others and be afforded the opportunity of new challenges. Delivery and performance of outcomes are thus matched to the individual performance levels (learning rates and aptitudes) so that all students can attain (are enabled) the high level of performance expected at the point of culmination. Students who are not able to demonstrate a required culminating outcome at a specific time should not be penalised, but the point is (for Transformational OBE) that such learners should be afforded more than one preset routine opportunity by educators to receive instruction and to demonstrate performance (expanded opportunity). In this way the three basic premises of Outcomes-based education will come into their own, namely that all students can learn and succeed (but not on the same day in the same way), that success breeds success and schools control the conditions of success (Spady & Marshall, 1991: 67). Thus nobody fails or is regarded as a failure.

My aim in outlining the three approaches to Outcomes-based education is firstly, to briefly point out the respective nature and the features of each approach and secondly, to utilise the
exposition to attempt to identify the South African approach to OBE which will be given attention after a discussion of the genesis of South African OBE later in this chapter. The main areas of difference are that traditional OBE is conservative in nature, using the curriculum as point of departure and overtly favouring content, whereas transitional OBE favours a more critical approach with an emphasis on the future. In sum then, Traditional Outcomes-based education is content-based; this meaning, according to Olivier (1998: 27), that learning is purposed to acquire as much content as possible. On the contrary, Transformational Outcomes-based learning implies that contents should be mastered and drawn upon within a specific context - the context within which the outcome must be achieved. Knowledge and skills now become supportive in order to achieve the outcome that points to the future (Olivier, 1998: 27).

Having given a brief outline of three approaches to Outcomes-based education in order to understand the nature of each, I shall now examine Outcomes-based approaches to education in the United States of America and Australia. The Outcomes-based approaches in these two countries seem to have the greatest relation to the approach employed in South Africa, although it is not the intention or focus of this investigation to draw comparisons between the differing approaches that countries have toward Outcomes-based education. Approaches to Outcomes-based education are studied to sketch a background against which South African OBE can be postured.

2.4 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF OBE IN OTHER COUNTRIES

The above outline of three approaches to Outcomes-based education by no means claims to be detailed in its explication or to be complete, but should be seen as a cursory glance emphasising the salient features of each approach solely to give a general understanding of each. The reason is there has thus far been no any one understanding of these approaches, but having captured the general features of each, a specific country wishing to implement Outcomes-based education seems to decide upon a specific approach and thereafter adapt that approach to suit its particular situation and needs. In this way then, seemingly following
a trend, each of the following countries, the United States of America (U.S.A.) and Australia, have adjusted a particular version of the outcomes-approach. It is in line with this trend that an overview of Outcomes-based education will be given in the said countries with the emphasis on how Outcomes-based education in these countries has assisted in engendering a particular notion of citizenship. Although Outcomes-based education is also practised in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Scotland, Canada and Singapore, I shall only examine Outcomes-based education in the U.S.A. and Australia as I contend that the outcomes-based approaches practised in these countries seemingly bear closest relation to the outcomes-based approach practised in South Africa.

2.4.1 OUTCOMES-BASED EDUCATION IN THE U.S.A.

Competency-based education was introduced in the U.S.A. during the 1960s. One of the most compelling reasons for the introduction of a competency-based approach to education was that people in the business sector were questioning whether education was adequately preparing students for life after school (Van der Horst & McDonald, 2003: 8). After World War II American society felt vulnerable and the past war had exposed a need for scientists and engineers to emerge within American society in order to compete with other societies and to be regarded as a world force economically and otherwise. Important competitors in the trade market were amongst others Japan and Germany. Business needs had been modified. The question asked by industry was whether education had kept abreast with the needs of industry. This question seeks answers touching the very nature and purpose of education. Should education be subservient to the needs of capital? It is a compelling question that not only affected education in America, but also affected the manner in which nations around the world began to think about education. This will become more evident in subsequent discussions about education in other countries and South Africa. Schools had to link knowledge with social functions, and education had to be directed toward future life, a life for students that would be very different from that of the past.

4 In most cases this seems to be an adjusted version of Transformational Outcomes-based education seemingly because of the three approaches Transformational OBE favours critical thinking and analysis, and emphasises the future more than the others.

5 Competency-based education was also introduced in the workplace.
Industry is now calling for skills it was not demanding fifty years ago ... In the present days of automation, global economy, and value-added production, they are highly skilled. Industry needs a different kind of worker; school-leavers need different kinds of skills and higher levels of knowledge if they are to get jobs. Industry is calling not only for better teaching, but for students to learn more important things (Malcolm, 1999: 82).

Thus thinking in education and industry about education had undergone major change and had taken on different connotations, not only in America, but also in the rest of the world. As mentioned earlier (Baxen & Soudien, 1999: 133), Outcomes-based education was an outflow of competency-based education and mastery-learning, but Outcomes-based education had come into its own especially because consensus on the concept of competences could not be found. It should be pointed out at this juncture that Outcomes-based education in America, especially the notion of Transformational Outcomes-based education (as explained earlier), is the outcomes-based version of which Spady is generally (in America) considered to be the author. He defines three approaches to OBE, the other two being Traditional OBE and Transitional OBE – all of which have been discussed earlier.

Malcolm (1999: 87) asserts that setting out what a nation thinks all students should learn is a major political exercise. It is a direct statement of what the society believes schooling is all about. Is it to “make a certain kind of person or is it more simply to relieve ignorance?” Therefore questions such as these, fundamental to teachers, academics and others involved in education, are not usually left to the auspices of such role-players only. It is inevitably generally found that others beyond the ambit of education, such as government, politicians and industry, all vie to have a say about matters educational. If someone introduces a novel approach to education, it is to be expected that such an approach will come under close scrutiny of all role-players and stakeholders claiming to have a say (whether legitimate or otherwise) in education. Consequently, when Spady introduced his Transformational OBE, Malcolm notes, “Many of them especially in the public domain (criticism) were grossly
unfair in their misrepresentation and exaggeration. The loudest voices protested about defining schooling and outcomes in terms of what students should be and be like. Further, because Spady derived his role performances and outcomes from a view of the future and students’ future roles, they criticised his approach as social engineering (or at least putting too many eggs in one basket) and deterministic, instead of seeing it as an attempt at student-centred planning” (Malcolm, 1999: 88).

The accusation that Spady’s Transformational OBE is deterministic is a cry from the public domain that this type of approach to education is not what some people in the U.S.A. wanted the nature of education to consist of. Stated differently, such an approach to education would not generate the type of citizens (workers) society and industry demanded at the time. Because OBE is accused of being deterministic, it is a major concern for this study, as this study explores whether the critical outcomes of OBE can engender democratic citizenship.

2.4.2 OUTCOMES-BASED EDUCATION IN AUSTRALIA

Unlike in the U.S.A. where there was a certain vulnerability after World War II and a felt need for more scientists and engineers to emerge in society, in Australia a change in the approach to education was seemingly prompted by a looming decline in the economy. Raggatt (1995: 307) states that during the 1980s Australia’s economy was largely developed around “a low value-added commodity/resource export strategy.” The economy was vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices in the commodity and resource markets and the decline in those very markets in the 1980s affected the economy negatively. Australia had a huge national debt that had to be serviced and one way of turning the situation around was to invest in a “highly educated and well trained workforce (that) would use advanced technologies to produce high quality, high tech goods and services yielding high value added returns” (Raggatt, 1995: 308). In their quest to find a solution, Australia looked at the ways in which their seemingly more successful competitors were training skilled workers. The

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6 I conflate the notions of citizen and worker for this dissertation because I contend that if industry demands a certain type of worker, whether skilled or semi-skilled, that worker is a citizen and therefore the demands of industry dictate the level and type of thinking (education) in a society. Citizenship will be discussed in chapter three.
German economy seems to have had a considerable influence on the development of education and training in Australia and that “provided the conceptual model for the definition of standards and the process of skills formation through partnership in delivery and quality assurance” (Raggatt, 1995: 308).

Most noteworthy was that the decided impetus for a highly educated and well-trained workforce able to use advanced technologies, came from none other than employers, unions and the Labour administration. Those representatives who had gleaned from the educational innovation of other countries (such as Germany and England) were impressed with the emphasis those countries placed on skills formation, skill enhancement, skill flexibility and overall training. Concomitantly, vocational education and training was viewed as lifelong learning within a system based on skills (or competencies), open to time, place and methods as proposed in the Carmichael Report (Raggatt, 1995: 309). As employers, unions and the Labour Department served as the driving force for Australia’s change in education, it comes as no surprise that national standards were established that served as the bedrock of the new system. It was endorsed by a National Training Board that included the competencies required in employment. An Australian Standards Framework works correlative and provides a link between the competencies required for work and the outcomes of the vocational education and training system (Raggatt, 1995: 309).

As was the case in the U.S.A., it seems that the change in approach to education in Australia was prompted by an industry that needed people with different skills, though in this instance to prevent a slump in the economy. Once an idea/approach is accepted by industry as a possible solution for an existing economic problem, it seems very difficult for education not to pander to its demands. In this instance industry demanded an outcomes model that provided multi-skilled, creative and adaptable people that are, in the words of Raggatt (1995: 311),

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Ultimately more productive because they know and understand their work, their product or their service. They are encouraged to work in teams, to become involved in problem solving, planning and decision-making … They are also better equipped to participate actively in the range of roles outside employment which are required as members of a complex society.

To find and implement an outcomes model as a possible solution meant a change in the way workers had to be trained and concomitantly, this affected education and necessitated a change in the way education was conceptualised. Moreover, the type of education and training provided would give rise to a different type of citizen, one who could adapt to a different way of community life in Australia. Malcolm (1999: 91) postulates that Outcomes-based education in Australia is conceptualised within a constructivist approach to education. At this time I shall briefly delineate a few tenets upon which the constructivist approach, as espoused by Malcolm and his concerns in Australia, are based. I need to point out that behaviourism and determinism are lodged within a positivist educational paradigm. I do not wish to take issue with Malcolm with his particular notion of constructivism. I do concede the existence of other notions of constructivism, such as that of Piaget (individual constructivism), Vygotsky (social constructivism) and radical constructivism and that not all of these notions of constructivism necessarily has consensus as a basic tenet. Within the notion of constructivism that Pring (2000: 50) advocates, he notes that each person lives within a world of ideas but there is no way in which the person can step aside to verify whether or not they accurately represent a world that exists independently of the ideas themselves. One of the basic tenets of the constructivism that he advocates is consensus in terms of which there can be no right or wrong, but only negotiation when people come to share the same ideas. At times new situations and new people should be accommodated with different ideas. Consequently a “marketplace of ideas” comes into existence within which negotiation takes root and new consensuses can constantly be reached. Moreover notions of “truth” need to be negotiated and distinctions between “objective” and “subjective” need to be redefined because nothing can exist independently of the world of ideas. Lastly,

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8 This will be discussed when looking at current debates around OBE in this chapter.
development of thinking lies in negotiation of meanings between people who only partly share each other’s ideas, create new agreements – new ways of conceiving reality. It is to the above notion of constructivism and the consequences of such a notion for a conception of citizenship in Australia that I shall briefly turn my attention, for I contend that there is a conceptual link between a paradigm, its concomitant educational theory and the notion of citizenship.

Australia does not insist on “culminating” outcomes as does the transformational outcomes of Spady, which seemingly points to a conclusion at some point. Australian transformational outcomes are apparently open-ended in the sense that there is no definitive point of culmination. Skills are viewed as always developing and, therefore, there are no culminating outcomes that all students must reach, either all at the same time or at the same point. Important to this study is the assertion by Malcolm (1999: 90) that outcomes are open-ended, meaning that a skill can never be complete and the learner has the potential to always develop a particular skill. An instance is reading. Outcomes are not necessarily tied to grades. At the end of schooling different students are at different levels, some behind the average, others ahead. Importantly, Malcolm also infers that the levels are designed up: they indicate distance from the beginning, not the end and the focus is on children as they are now rather than on outcomes of significance⁹ that concentrate on what children may become. These, what I term constitutive meanings of transformational outcomes (point of design and point of culmination), indicate two major points of departure from Spady’s transformational outcomes that are designed from the top down and significance of outcomes that places great emphasis on the future. Thus, following Malcolm, Australian transformational outcomes differ from the transformational top-down outcomes of Spady in two ways. Firstly, it designs learning levels from the bottom up, and secondly, the focus falls on what learners can do now, rather than on what they can do in the future. Learning takes place in the mind and expresses itself in many ways, of which performance is but one. This is an essential point of difference to Spady’s transformational outcomes where the performance is the demonstration of the outcome. There can be no negotiation, creativity or imagination coming into play. Malcolm

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⁹ Outcomes of significance refer to the Transformational Outcomes of Spady that is geared toward the future.
(1999: 91) notes that what occurs in the mind are a nexus of world-view, perception, imagination, values, purposes, social interactions and cultural expectations, features of human existence that a positivistic educational theory that advocates behaviourism, prediction and determinism would contest. If the Australian outcomes-based approach to education and training is cast on a constructivist notion of learning as championed by Malcolm, the curriculum is subjective and performances are but clues about what and how students think i.e. performance is an indicator of learning and not the measure of learning (Malcolm, 1999: 91) and thus the outcomes are seemingly open-ended.

In sum, Australia, goaded by industry and having taken its precarious economy into cognisance, took the bold step to “salvage” the economy by putting in place a different education and training system cast on an outcomes-based approach. The conceptual move to outcomes, they had hoped, would equip workers and students/learners with different skills, which would enable them to do things and think about things differently. In this way, a new generation of workers and students/learners would emerge, also representing a new generation of citizens who would have been engendered by an outcomes model and who would think differently about life and work, thus lending credence to my contention that there is a conceptual link between a paradigm, its educational theory and the notion of citizenship. I shall pursue this contention in the following section.

2.5 THE GENESIS OF OBE IN SOUTH AFRICA

In this section I shall initially discuss the genesis of Outcomes-based education in South Africa to indicate why Outcomes-based education was chosen to drive Curriculum 2005. Thereafter, I shall investigate the South African approach to OBE that I claim is uniquely South African, and finally I shall argue that the critical outcomes of South African OBE can be linked to the notion of globalisation. This I do to indicate that the genesis of OBE in South Africa did not occur insularly but that globalisation seemingly is a tool of neo-liberalism that South Africa will dismiss at its peril. Also, I argue that globalisation as vehicle of neo-
liberalism drives OBE as its educational theory to engender a citizen/worker as befits the
demands of capitalism.

The challenge that the newly democratically elected government in South Africa faced after
its inception in 1994 was that of “immediacy”. Enslin and Pendlebury (1998: 261), in
examining the scenario after democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, conclude that
South Africa’s most urgent and difficult project is to reconstruct and develop all spheres of
public life so as to establish enabling conditions for a flourishing democracy. How would it
be possible to deliver on all the promises made in the run-up to the elections? After forty-six
years of Apartheid the masses in South Africa were tired of waiting. The expectancy was
high for delivery on the promised housing, increased employment opportunities and
restructuring of education. Democracy meant that “The people shall govern” and to many
unskilled workers and a largely illiterate mass this meant that these promises could be
delivered overnight. Coupled to this, the newly elected government had to contend with a
huge foreign debt that had to be serviced. This scenario was fertile ground for
conglomerations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to offer
aid and assistance on their terms. This seemed like the ideal solution to South Africa’s
economic problems. I shall return to this polemic later.

In the meantime, the needs of industry were rapidly changing. During the 1950s South
Africa’s economy needed a largely unskilled workforce specifically in the area of gold
mining. Therefore, the educational system was adjusted (Bantu Education) to suit this need.
Moreover, this meant a certain type of citizen was being prepared for the labour market – a
citizen who was not taught to question, use critical thinking or to graduate to higher
education. It is thus not surprising that the Minister of Native Affairs at the time stated that
the Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects and that there was no
place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. During
the 1970s South Africa’s economy needed workers who were semi-skilled. The then
Nationalist Government duly indicated a willingness to adjust the educational system to
prepare workers for the economic needs of the time. As a result the De Lange Report\textsuperscript{10} was released in 1981, but was rejected by the government as being too liberal. If the language of this document is studied, it seems that it was cast in a technicist mould with concepts such as "educational clients" and phrases such as "mastering new technological skills".\textsuperscript{11} In 1991 the NEPI Report\textsuperscript{12} was set up by the National Education Co-ordinating Committee. One of the principal aims of NEPI was to set up a continuum of options, Kraak (1999: 30) asserts, "with on the one hand models which emphasized longer-term conditions such as economic growth and, on the other, models which privileged the immediate amelioration of conditions of inequality. The NEPI report continuously stressed the inherent tensions in trying to satisfy both political demands. Systematic change inevitably entailed some form of trade-off between equity and development".

The newly elected South African government (1994) somehow had to circumvent legitimate internal demands "to ameliorate conditions of inequality" immediately and yet somehow had to spur economic growth as well. "Many South Africans see educational transformation as the key to transforming society at large. If we cannot transform education, what chance do we have of transforming anything? People's hopes for improved employability, democratic citizenship and a better life are pinned on education" (Enslin & Pendlebury, 1998: 261). For Enslin and Pendlebury, the way out for the South African government lay in education, but of more importance for this study is the conceptual link that they establish between education and democratic citizenship.

The National Training Board emerged as an important role-player in thinking differently about education, proposed a shift toward competency-based education and training and investigated artisan training in the 1980s (Kraak, 1999: 38). In place of the declining trend in the time-based apprenticeship system it proposed a shift to competences. The adoption of an education and training system based on competences in the 1980s formed part of a larger apartheid state strategy of freeing market forces and diminishing the role of the state in


\textsuperscript{11} De Lange Report, 1981: 208.

\textsuperscript{12} National Education Policy Initiative (NEPI)
regulating the economy and labour market inserted into an unchanging apartheid work and training environment based on narrow interpretations of skill and cost-minimising approaches to human resources development, posits Kraak (1999: 38). At this time competency-based approaches to education and training emerged for reasons seemingly only advantageous to the apartheid government as stated and the shift to competences was a rather conservative one that seemingly aimed at maintaining and reinforcing the status quo of apartheid.

However, the shift to competences was to undergo another shift in thinking, this time by the forces bent on democratising South African education and training, therefore, being a shift hopefully more progressive than the previous one by the apartheid government. Two key documents emerged at this time that would form the seedbed of future discussions on education and training in South Africa and in which the more progressive shift came to the fore, were the discourses in ANC and COSATU policy literature in 1993 in *A Framework for Lifelong Learning* and in January 1994 the ANC policy document *A Policy for Education and Training* (Kraak, 1999: 39). Prominent in these papers was the conceptualisation of an outcomes-based approach to education and training that paved the way for the *National Training Strategy Initiative* (1994) and the ANC's *White Paper on Education and Training* (1995). Significant is that the concept of outcomes first emerged in forums other than that of education. It was first mooted by the then Nationalist Apartheid government for its own reasons, thereafter and quite unexpectedly so for education, it came to prominence within the forum of the Trade Unions as represented by COSATU.

Almost simultaneously, there was a concerted thrust for the integration of education and training. Chisholm (1997: 59) asserts that the integration of formal schooling and non-formal education by bringing schooling into one system was a hallmark of UNESCO’s approach in the 1970s, and was counterposed to the narrower World Bank policy of isolating particular aspects of the system for change. Also prominent within the ANC discourse was the notion of lifelong learning.

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13 Outcomes approaches in education and training became the discourse of the ANC and COSATU.
This vision ... was pioneered from within COSATU, and draws on both new international trends attempting to harness educational reform to changing global economic conditions, to new forms of flexible specialisation, and on radical traditions which have historically challenged the division between mental and manual labour, academic and vocational education and training, and between conception and execution as underlining wider social, political and economic divisions (Chisholm, 1997: 59).

As a result of the policy of Apartheid and the need of industry for under-skilled and later semi-skilled workers, a great majority of the workforce “inherited” by the democratically elected government in 1994 were not prepared for participation in the social, economic and civil life in a new South Africa. Somehow these people had to see the benefits of the new democracy, but society also had to view education and training differently. The legacy of Apartheid education would have it that vocational training\textsuperscript{14} was to prepare people for manual labour which did not have the same esteem in public life as academic training did. Thus a South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) was established that would ensure integration of national standards and qualifications by means of a credit-based system. In this way, workers who were unskilled or semi-skilled could advance in the labour market without having proof of formal education\textsuperscript{15} in terms of their skills. Added to this was the “advantage” of “life long learning”. Kraak (1999: 39) notes that reports by the National Department of Education, such as \textit{A Curriculum Framework for General and Further Education and Training} (National Department of Education, December 1995b), \textit{Lifelong Learning through a National Qualifications Framework} (National Department of Education, February, 1996), and a \textit{National Qualifications Framework} (National Curriculum Development Committee (NCDC), 1996), were authoritative documents in terms of locating Outcomes-based education and training in South African education. At this point a brief discussion on The National Qualifications Framework is imperative, as its link with the South African

\textsuperscript{14} Vocational training consisted of skills-based training that was frowned upon or regarded of lesser importance by those who acquired an academic education.

\textsuperscript{15} That is, formal certification but advancement would be based amongst others on level of skills and years of experience.
Qualifications Authority charts the map for all educational activity in South Africa henceforth. It is also important to explain how globalisation affected the need for education and training to forge ever closer links and how this, I contend, gave rise to the National Qualifications Framework (NQF).

The conceptualisation of the NQF (2002: i) emerged in various documents prior to 1994 and came into prominence in the National Training Strategy Initiative. It aimed to bring all learning under a single framework of Outcomes-based standards and qualifications. The intention was to broaden the space for learning and to enable prior learning. Moreover, Unterhalter (1998: 351) asserts that the NQF intended to overcome the divisions between education and training (portability).\(^{16}\) The NQF would serve as a single overarching qualifications authority, concerning itself with the facilitation of the horizontal and vertical mobility of learners over a lifetime. This would empower workers to advance in education and in their career paths. As a result the South African Qualifications Authority Act was passed in 1995 (Department of Education 1995b). Interestingly, the Ministers of Education and Labour held joint sponsorship. The NQF was established in 1998.

The NQF consists of various levels of education and training. Level one consists of ten years of compulsory general education and training (GET), coupled with four levels of adult basic education and training and on completion learners receive a general education and training certificate (GETC). Learners who continue will on completion of level four, receive a further education and training certificate (FETC). Levels five to eight denotes education beyond FET level, such as degrees, certificates and diplomas.

The NQF emphasises the concept of portability. It was a significant move from government to borrow from the experiences of other countries that had also employed an NQF system, but in South Africa’s case portability meant a levelling of the education and training fields for workers who were suddenly faced with the possibility of advancement in their careers with

\(^{16}\) Portability empowers workers to move from education to training and vice versa, lifting the restrictions from workers who are not formerly trained but possess the knowledge and skills for advancement through experience and simultaneously encourages lifelong learning.
the added bonus of an increase in salary. Workers\textsuperscript{17} who had participated in the struggle for democracy and had endured many hardships such as boycotts, strikes and job losses, now regarded this as their just reward. At the same time, for the democratic government, the workings of the NQF held the promise of satisfying the sense of “immediacy”.

But the move toward a National Qualifications Framework should not be seen in South African terms only. It is important to note that the national qualifications movement was an international one carrying support in varying degrees from UNESCO\textsuperscript{18}, The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labour Organisation and European Union amongst others. Countries that have national qualifications frameworks in place are amongst others New Zealand, Namibia, Australia, Ireland, Mexico and United Kingdom. The national qualifications movement is thus a worldwide phenomenon that, for the present South African government, snugly combined efforts toward transformation\textsuperscript{19} that their electorate could immediately recognise and be appeased with.

As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the incoming democratic South African government was saddled with a huge debt that had to be serviced. In order to settle such debt, South Africa could not afford to be a mere spectator in the economic arena. However, to become and more importantly to remain a participant, South Africa seemingly did not have much choice but to accept the advances and prescriptions made by institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary fund. But at what cost?

To answer this question, I shall briefly investigate the concept of globalisation to see whether it does indeed affect not only our economy, but also education. Loots (2002: 265) describes globalisation as a borderless world typically referred to as the global village where distance and space disappear, and in which a single community and a common pool of resources exist. Loots (2002: 265) asserts that globalisation will necessarily encourage closer economic, political and social interaction and refers to a definition given by the World Bank on

\textsuperscript{17} Read citizens. For reasons given before, I conflate these two concepts.
\textsuperscript{18} The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).
\textsuperscript{19} Efforts toward transformation such as equity, redress and access.
globalisation, which notes that “in recent years a quickly rising share of economic activity in the world seems to be taking place between people who live in different countries”. Christie (in Kallaway, 1997: 114) refers to Archer’s remarks on globalisation that characterises globalisation as “a multi-faceted process entailing a growing worldwide interconnectedness of structure, culture and agency, and a parallel de-differentiation of traditional boundaries”. Kraak (in Unterhalter, 2000: 11) notes that in the early formulations, globalisation was the partner of the newly democratising state and it was believed it would deliver high income for high skills, if appropriate education policy could be developed. However, Unterhalter (2000: 3) notes that the critics of globalisation, especially those in the South African education policy community “asserted the need for the South African state to engage critically, and if necessary antagonistically, with the forces of globalisation, taking careful account of political, economic and education conditions and the potential for strategic partnerships in South Africa, Africa and internationally”. Thus, although globalisation seemed to be a way out for ending years of isolation on the economic front for South Africa, certain dangers were inherent in the structural formulation of globalisation. One such danger was the alleviation of poverty and unemployment in the country. South Africans needed jobs, but lacked the skills. South Africa, as an emerging economy or as a moderate globaliser (Loots, 2002: 278) was also saddled with a huge inherited Apartheid debt. Under the pretence of aiding struggling or emerging economies, Nekwhevha (2000: 28) insists, globalisation is but an attempt of neoliberalism to consolidate its influence in South Africa. I would add that it was with none other but capitalist intentions and that globalisation is but another form of imperialism where large corporations (transnational companies) are now gaining control of the emerging economies of especially Third World countries – the spoils of colonialism. Nekwhevha (2000: 24) in a study of Namibian education policy notes that Namibia’s policy is similar to that of donor agencies such as UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, and the World Bank. He continues that at the World Conference on “Education for All” organised by the donor agencies some of the pronouncements presupposed the acceptance of the free market, that all should receive a basic education to engage and understand the capitalist system, that the state funds basic education and that higher education should be paid for – seemingly the preconditions under which aid by the IMF and the World Bank will be given. But what holds
true for Namibia holds true for South Africa as well, as the same pronouncements have emerged in South African society seemingly under the auspices of the same donor agencies. Furthermore, Nekwhevha (2000: 29) contends that under the pretence to globalise education “educational prescriptions from the IMF and World Bank have been uncritically incorporated into the new 'reconstructed' education programmes”.

The agenda of the IMF and the World Bank needs to be investigated as to “globalise education”. In whose interest is it to “globalise education”? What type of education is “preferred” by debt-relief agencies? Why was there a worldwide interest in Outcomes-based education and a narrowing (in some cases) and integration in others (as in South Africa) of interest between education and training? To answer these questions I shall investigate the links (and I contend that there are) between the outcomes of Outcomes-based education and the goals of globalisation. I contend that the link between the outcomes of Outcomes-based education and the goals of globalisation is of a conceptual rather than contingent nature; that the critical outcomes of South African outcomes-based education are conceptually linked to a globalised education agenda such as is advocated by donor agencies and transnational corporates. Put differently, one needs to unpack the underlying reasons why the World Bank and the IMF are so eager to promulgate and advocate a general education at the lower levels of education (basic education) which is free (state funded) and a higher education system that has to be paid for (by the students), when knowing that the countries that these policies are intended for are impoverished by decades of imperialism and that a minority will be able to afford expensive higher education. An offshoot is that the very people who had engaged in the struggles for liberation and independence, those who had paid with their lives to obtain a better life for all, are again the people who are being marginalised in terms of education. Globalisation, as part of the neo-liberal agenda as Nekwhevha (2000: 28) posits, serves to promote Western values and norms normally associated with capitalist and technological interests (an economic agenda) seemingly at the expense of African experiences in terms of curriculum content and intent on engendering a different notion of democratic citizenship to that envisaged by the Mass Democratic Movement that claimed to have roots in People’s Education and Critical theory.
At this juncture I need to briefly outline developments in the world economic arena since the 1930s, the time of The Great Depression, in order to show how economic globalisation developed and in turn gave rise to social and political globalisation that influenced other spheres of society such as culture and education. What should also emerge are the goals of globalisation and the rationale for the worldwide current emphasis on outcomes in industry and education, and also the link between education and the labour market. It should be borne in mind throughout that whatever happens in the education and labour scenarios affect the kind of citizens that are engendered. The economic system after the depression (1930s), a period known for strong capitalist growth, was modelled on what was known as the Fordist system of production. Before the Fordist system came into being, a system known as craft production was used where each individual part of production was produced separately and fitted (Mahomed, 1996: 11). Mahomed (1996: 11) explains that Fordism involved standardisation, from the various components of the product, down to the final stage. “Some tasks were mechanised, with mass production plants developing special purpose machinery for each model and the development of the flow line meant that instead of workers moving to and from the product (which was regarded as too time consuming), the product flowed past the workers”. Based on Frederick Taylor’s Scientific Management “complex labour tasks were divided into component parts, thus forcing workers into repetitive tasks requiring little, if any, skill” (Mahomed, 1996: 11). The labour process and the speed against which production took place were strictly controlled. Furthermore, the system depended upon huge firms that employed machinery for single purposes. The mental and manual aspects of labour were separated which, in turn, opened the way for mass production and in this way markets could easily be flooded with standardised products (Mahomed, 1996: 11).

The period of Post-Fordism is marked by a different way of production to that of Fordism. Gone are the levels of standardisation, mass production and workers engaged in repetitive tasks that led to boredom and resistance – these were the very characteristics on which success for Fordism depended. Instead, Post-Fordism announced the need for multi-skilled workers, whose job-descriptions included product improvement and not only manufacture and maintenance. As a result, workers are subjected to continuous training and seem more motivated. Christie (1997: 115) remarks that
In recent years, there have been global shifts towards more skill-intensive production, bringing the need for a more qualified labour force. As well as people with a sound knowledge base in general education, and transferable rather than job-specific skills, a number of other qualities are stressed: versatility, flexibility, problem-solving abilities, technological competencies and ability to work in teams.

More importantly for this investigation is the connection (conceptual link?) between education and work when Christie (1997: 115) points out that “There is an assumption that education plays a role (though not the only one) in the anomaly between shortages of certain types of skilled labour occurring alongside an increase in unemployment. As this literature reveals, one way of addressing the perceived mismatch between education and work has been the move towards bringing competencies and generic skills into the curriculum”. It seems to emerge from Christie’s remarks and observations that labour markets the world over now have different requirements. Post-Fordism has generated different needs in terms of types of workers required. Industry does not want labour that is inflexible and semi-skilled. Thus, at the time, there was a move afoot in New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, the USA, Canada and France to introduce a unified system that merges general and vocational education (Christie, 1997: 115). It emerges that countries such as Canada, Australia, the U.S.A., the UK including South Africa, have subsequently opted for an Outcomes-based education system. Mahomed posits that Australia and the UK provided the most systematic and enduring influence in shaping South Africa’s education and training policy (Mahomed, 1996: 42). In South Africa, especially, the new government and other policy makers perceived (prompted by international developments) the need for “better educated workers, who are conversant with mathematics and science as required by technological developments, as well as possessing the qualities of flexibility, problem solving and so on. In short, there is a need for education to be more responsive to changing patterns of work. Up to this point, there are strong similarities between local and international debates” (Christie, 1997: 116). The upshot is that emerging economies are not able to extricate themselves from the legacies left by colonialism. These countries are in most cases saddled with the prospect of huge debt repayments, massive unemployment, poverty and an education system that cannot provide the prospective workers with adequate skills necessary for the labour market. In this regard
Chisholm (1997: 58) remarks that “flexible specialisation, modernisation and the language and disciplines of austerity have been central to the educational vision developed for the new South Africa. The image of multi-skilled, flexible workers to ensure South Africa’s international competitiveness has been created as part of a vision for modernisation of the society and education system through human capital and resource development”.

Accordingly, the new democratic government in South Africa had to face hard decisions. The electorate was expectant for a scenario in which jobs would be created, where poverty would be relieved, houses would be built and education would benefit all citizens and would be free and compulsory. To work this miracle the government soon realised that it would have to rely on outside financial aid, which always comes at a cost. In this case the cost that had to be paid for investment by transnational companies and funding from the World Bank and IMF that foresaw amongst others the provision of a worker with a specific profile, as mentioned earlier – a worker who could adapt, be flexible, work in teams who possessed problem solving skills, workers who could fit into the factories to be erected in terms of investment agreements with overseas companies who had adapted to a Post-Fordist mode of production.

Ostensibly, the outcomes of Outcomes-based education seemed to be the panacea in a considerable part of the world at the time. In line with what was happening in other parts of the world, in countries such as Canada, Australia, UK and the U.S.A. where there seemed to be a drive toward Outcomes-based education, I contend that the decision to accommodate an Outcomes-based approach to education in South Africa was not easy, voluntary or insular. The decision seems to be more in accordance with a scenario of duress, where greater (global) forces (economic) impinge upon local interests. There seemed only one way out for the government and I do not wish to sound like an apologist. In this regard Christie (1997: 117) comments that “to whatever extent integration ideas are the result of global influences, in practice they are being woven into a texture of local concerns, and specifically concerns with equity. Global trends are certainly evident, but in interaction with local needs and interests in the production of specific policy positions”.

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In sum then, two points emerge from the above. Firstly, that the South African Government’s National Qualifications Framework was driven as much by the desire to satisfy workers’ needs as the need to remain in the global economic arena to prevent it sliding into a Third World country. Secondly, that the change in education system would possibly be driven from needs that arise outside of the educational arena, bringing with it an own agenda for education. And herein lies the rub.

2.6 SOUTH AFRICAN OUTCOMES-BASED EDUCATION

Having given an outline to three modes of Outcomes-based education (Traditional, Transitional and Transformational OBE) and the genesis of OBE in South Africa, I shall now investigate the nature of Outcomes-based education in South Africa. I do this because there are claims (Malcolm: 1999) that the South African notion of OBE is uniquely South African and I shall attempt to uncover the premise for this claim. In doing so, I shall briefly look at the constitutive features of each of the three modes of OBE to ascertain whether any of these had an influence in the conceptualisation of the South African approach to Outcomes-based education.

In line with what was happening in the rest of the world in terms of a drive toward Outcomes-based education (as prefaced earlier) that could produce a certain type of worker and citizen, South Africa opted for an Outcomes-based approach to education to drive Curriculum 2005. Malcolm (1999: 105) posits that the manner in which countries decide to accept or reject the ideas of OBE, or which OBE approach to opine, demonstrates to which degree education depends on forces such as politics, cultural norms, interest groups, history, the committees and individuals who provide educational leadership. Also, the “borrowing” of educational ideas and practices from other nations, I claim, is not contingent, but seems to be an indication of the spread and influence of globalisation (multi-national corporations and donor agencies) who have their own agenda in terms of the education system which is required to produce a certain type of worker/citizen. The push for political change in South Africa had seen strong support at school level. The result was that schools were seen as the terrain of struggle. Especially the young people had vehemently resisted and rejected the
apartheid educational system and any conceptual change in terms of educational transformation was visualised as the forerunner of a democratic society based on non-racial principles. Hence, education was to be conceptualised in terms of a different framework, from one that was authoritarian in nature and focussed on transfer of knowledge to one that would be embedded in a critical theory. The Department of Education seemingly lays claim in its documents that Curriculum 2005 driven by Outcomes-based education is conceptualised within a framework of critical theory. Thus, the vision of the Department of Education (DOE, 1997: 11) includes amongst others that it should “meet, through well-planned and co-ordinated teaching, learning and research programmes, national development needs, including the high-skilled employment needs presented by a growing economy operating in a global environment and support a democratic ethos and a culture of human rights by educational programmes and practices conducive to critical discourse and creative thinking, cultural tolerance, and a common commitment to a humane, non-racist and non-sexual order”.

The above seems to indicate that though the current educational system in the form of Curriculum 2005 and Outcomes-based education is apparently located (as claimed by the Education Department) within a paradigm of critical theory, the agenda of globalisation seems to drive education. The latter, therefore seems to add an instrumental nature to the provision of education since there is an insistence that education should serve the needs of the economy that operates within a global framework that demands a highly skilled workforce. Hence, Traditional Outcomes-based education with its emphasis on curriculum content (subject knowledge), could not be the answer to South Africa’s supposed educational paradigm leap as it was too similar in nature to the educational baggage from South Africa was trying to rid itself (did not make a conceptual break from the past) and was not congruent with the educational aims of a globalised agenda in terms of its educational product (citizen/worker) and the hope to locate education within critical theory.

Transitional Outcomes-based education focuses on outcomes of significance. This approach emphasises what learners are able to do at the end of schooling (point of exit) and higher order outcomes are the focal points of the curriculum content and assessment (Spady &
Marshall, 1991: 69)., asserts Spady and Marshall (1991: 69) assert that the importance of this approach is that “ultimately, the purpose of programs and courses is to adapt content to the explicit development of the higher order competencies and orientations in the exit outcomes”. The encouragement of subject knowledge on its own should be avoided. Competencies such as critical thinking, effective communication, technological applications, and complex problem solving, rather than particular kinds of knowledge or information are the desired outcomes. The question that Transitional OBE seeks to answer is “What is most essential for our students to know, be able to do, and be like in order to be successful once they’ve graduated?” (Spady & Marshall, 1991: 69). This question and the competencies that Transitional OBE makes its centre of interest seem to be commensurate with the notion of OBE that South Africa has adopted. Firstly, for the South African approach, as outlined in the vision of the Department of Education (1997: 11) the same competencies seem to be of importance and secondly, Traditional OBE makes a conceptual move away from textbook knowledge assimilation and subject knowledge. Rather, as with Transitional OBE, the South African version hopes that content should be used as a base to support and develop South African critical outcomes, but the content should not be an end in itself – this is the break that Transitional OBE seemingly makes with Traditional OBE.

Transformational OBE, the third approach in Spady’s notion of Outcomes-based education, focuses on learning that is patterned by outcomes, integrated knowledge and assessment. The aim of transformational OBE is to question what competences students need in life after school. “Hence, its guiding vision of the graduate is that of competent future citizen (Spady & Marshall, 1991: 70). Van der Horst and McDonald (2003: 21) assert that transformational OBE is not confined by classroom or time structures. It emphasises the development of the individual at his/her own pace; contact is on a personal basis, aided by instructional coaching and supported by a cross-curricular approach to outcomes. But transformational OBE is not only designed down (the desired outcomes first established), it is about examining, critiquing and synthesising conditions of life students may encounter in the future (Spady & Marshall, 1991: 71). When the constitutive features of transformational OBE are distinguished and compared to those of transformational OBE, there seems to be a relation between the vision and purposes of the National Department of Education and the features of Transformational
OBE. Both focus on the type of citizens that is required. The critical outcomes of Curriculum 2005 refer to skills, knowledge and values necessary for the unfolding of a democratic citizenship (Sedibe, 1998: 277) and transformational OBE has a vision of learners as future competent citizens (Spady & Marshall, 1991: 70). For Spady this means that unless outcomes focus on being future-oriented and has a life-role-perspective the benefit of success in school has a limited benefit, unless learners are able to transfer that success to life in a complex, challenging, high-tech future (Spady & Marshall: 1991). In contrast to the proposals of transformational, South African OBE is seemingly still structurally cast in the old system of traditional schooling. For all its claims, schooling still takes place in the confines of a classroom at set times according to a time-table that manipulates teaching and learning (thus also facilitators and learners). Learners are mostly working at the same levels within a set stream. Moreover, assessment (formative and summative) seemingly still takes place at specific times for all learners and assess the same outcomes despite the possibility that individual learners may be at different levels and need to be assessed at the specific level that they have obtained at that stage.

Malcolm claims (1999: 86) that Spady and South Africa conceptualise “transformational” differently. For South Africa “transformation” means a society that has moved from its past of exploitation, apartheid and white privilege to a society premised on principles of equity and redress, development, quality and public accountability (DOE, 1997: 11-12). The upshot is that transformational OBE may not lead to the transformation of society that South Africa had in mind.

In sum then, it seems as if South Africa has adopted an approach to OBE that resembles a cross-section between transitional OBE and the lofty ideals of transformational OBE. For me, however, there seems to be a paradox between the claims of the National Department of Education on the one hand, claiming that Curriculum 2005 and OBE is driven by a critical theory and a persistence, on the other, throughout its documents that education should be conceptualised within the framework of a global economy. Put differently, I contend that there is a conceptual link between the critical outcomes of South African OBE and the goals of a globalised education system. I shall argue that such a conceptual link can possibly only
conceptualise the critical outcomes in a manner that justifies education in an instrumental manner and thus may seemingly not be able to engender democratic citizenship education which, I contend, requires a non-instrumental justification of education.

In the following section I shall discuss the nature of the critical outcomes. Although the outcomes may be critical, the question arises whether the outcomes are critical enough to engender democratic citizenship. It is this question that I shall now pursue.

2.7 AN INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE CRITICAL OUTCOMES OF SOUTH AFRICAN OBE

I shall first give an outline of the critical outcomes before going over to discuss the nature of the critical outcomes. The following critical outcomes are identified (Department of Education, 1997c: 24-25) as adopted by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA):

1) Identify and solve problems in which responses display that responsible decisions using critical and creative thinking have been made;

2) Work effectively with others as a member of a team, group, organisation, community;

3) Organise and manage oneself and one’s activities responsibly and effectively;

4) Collect, analyse, organise and critically evaluate information;

5) Communicate effectively using visual, mathematical and/or language skills in the modes of oral and/or written presentation;

6) Use science and technology effectively and critically, showing responsibility towards the environment and health of others; and

7) Demonstrate an understanding of the world as a set of related systems by recognising that problem-solving contexts do not exist in isolation.
Additional guidelines were:

In order to contribute to the full personal development of each learner and the social and economic development of the society at large, it must be the intention underlying any programme of learning to make an individual aware of the importance of:

1) Reflecting on and exploring a variety of strategies to learn effectively;

2) Participating as responsible citizens in the life of local, national and global communities;

3) Being culturally and aesthetically sensitive across a range of social contexts;

4) Exploring education and career opportunities;

5) Developing entrepreneurial abilities.

Can the critical outcomes be conceptually linked to a globalised agenda? Did the global demands for a certain type of worker impact upon and in many instances direct the education agenda of countries of which South Africa may be an instance? The upshot is that education may be “producing” workers and citizens who are taught to think in a certain way in line with the demands and goals of the global arena – a neo-liberalist agenda that satisfies capitalist and technocratic greed.

If considered on their own as goals of the new educational system for a democratic South Africa, the above critical outcomes seem almost innocuous and mundane and fitting for a country bent on social, economic, cultural and educational transformation. I contend that the perniciousness of the globalised agenda is hidden in the almost “everyday acceptable values” that the critical outcomes exhibit. Hence, when measured against the goals that the global education agenda proposes for the type of workers/citizens that the world economy needs, the critical outcomes of Outcomes-based education in South Africa display remarkable similarities to the global education agenda and come to acquire new meaning when conceptualised in this context. What does an instrumental attitude towards education entail?
Instrumentality is normally associated with technical knowledge and a narrow specialisation of skills (Peters, 1998: 208). This mode of rationality emphasises ends for their own sake. Thus, instead of asking what is the point of it all (what makes it valuable and worthwhile) the question that emerges is one that asks “where is it going to get me?” This type of question does not speak to the nature of the activity or the activity is not enacted for the sake of or for the love and respect for the activity. Instead, the value attached to the activity is one that is extrinsic to the activity. The activity (in this case education) serves but as an instrument (vehicle) to achieve a specific pre-determined end (producing a certain type of worker/citizen). In this way it is quite possible for people to engage in the activity without having any regard for the activity (education). What drives people in this pursuit seems to be an intention to profit. Peters (1998: 210) argues that in today’s society the justification of anything seems to be driven by either its use for the individual or the community – that society is geared toward consumption. However, “as soon as industry or the professions come to be looked at not simply as providing profit, goods for consumption, or services to the public, but being themselves constitutive of a desirable way of life, then the values associated with consumption begin to recede” (Peters, 1998: 212). But the justification is external to the activity. Waghid (2002: 11) cites as example the labours of a university academic who does research for the sake of the activity (intrinsic worth). Yet, the labour of the same educator could be instantiated by external motivation (extrinsic) such as profit (it may improve opportunities for promotion) and extra funding for projects – activities that seem external to the activity of research. MacIntyre (1981: 178) in discussing external goods asserts that “when achieved they are always some individual’s property and possession. Moreover, characteristically external goods are such that the more someone has of them, the less there is for other people”. The result is that someone has more and is seen as the winner and someone else has less and therefore is seen as a loser, which introduces the notion of competition to education.

One can cogently argue that although much of what is taught and learnt in a non-instrumental manner is valuable to the individual and community, and could be constitutive of a community (such as the education of its young into its practices – socialisation) people also
need to make a living and need to provide in different ways for their families. This is a motivation that is seemingly external to the activity (work). It is this notion that I shall now pursue.

My claim is that globalisation utilises education (critical outcomes) in an instrumental way. For advocates of globalisation, the critical outcomes have to produce and provide a skilled workforce needed by the state and industry (multi-national corporations) to be competitive in the global marketplace. Carr (2004: 14) posits, “State educational policymaking in past and present economies has more often been dominated by a utilitarian or instrumentalist mindset”. Put differently, for the state education is a means to an end; thus, education is valued for its extrinsic worth. This instrumentalist attitude towards education seemingly prevails in education (by various stakeholders and role-players). Education is geared more and more towards the market, with the emphasis on efficiency and accountability. “Underlying the market orientation is the ascendance, almost worldwide, of market capitalism and the principles of neo-liberal economics” (Johnstone, 1998: 3). The upshot is that as education focuses more on “good” practices, cash flows, market positioning and accountability, the conceptualisation about education itself is being transformed. Education is seen as a commodity (Tooley, 1998) being marketed to clients who pay for services rendered. Consumerism and consumption, commensurate with competition and a capitalist focus on self-gain (what is in it for me), have overtaken and transformed thinking about education. Further, educational policy is now often conceptualised as a central plank of economic planning – the skills of a nation’s people being an important factor in attracting capital to a specific place. Whereas the focus has traditionally, I contend, been on the intrinsic value of education, this focus has now shifted toward an emphasis on goods external to the activity of education – as means to an end. As a result education seems to increasingly be taking on the character of a private rather than a public good in line with the agenda of neo-liberalism.

Throughout the documents of the Department of Education the focus seems to be on economic growth, job creation, the global economy in which South Africa has to compete, the need for a highly-skilled labour force, the need to provide skills and innovations
necessary for a global economy and a focus on life-long learning. South Africa and its economy are not insular. This I concede. What I do object against is that the children of the masses are now being used to further the aims of a global agenda. What seem to be emerging in the aftermath of the democratic celebrations in South Africa are a bent toward human capital theory, and the “inevitability thesis” toward globalisation where the emphasis is on the extrinsic (instrumental) nature of education rather than on the intrinsic (non-instrumental), I wish to argue.

The goals of global education agenda demands a certain type of worker that is highly skilled in his/her specific work context, who can critically reflect upon questions within that space, but who cannot necessarily conceptualise how his/her labour fits into the greater scheme of globalisation. This type of worker is thus multi-skilled, flexible, a life-long learner, and a critical thinker, equipped with on-the-job problem-solving skills and able to work in teams. Thus an education system (and its critical outcomes) that seemingly seeks to engender this type of pre-determined worker/citizen is to conceptualise of education in an instrumental way that seeks to capitalise on extrinsic motives, instances of which are benefits to the economy, global market positioning, provision of labour and profit. The South African government hoped that Outcomes-based education would produce the worker/citizen as required by transformation in South Africa and the agenda of globalisation. I argue that it is not feasible to please both aims, as it constitutes a paradox; that at best one could argue for a complementary relationship between the goals of globalisation and a transformation agenda in South Africa. The question is whether the critical outcomes of OBE and Curriculum 2005 are critical enough to engender “deep” transformation.

Contentions that the outcomes of Outcomes-based education are manipulative for the reason that they are pre-determined (they exclude the inputs of the learners) are not new (Jansen, 1999; Waghid, 2002). Jansen posits that pre-determined outcomes may be anti-democratic and the emphasis on what students can do at the end of the lesson also skirts the issue of

As mentioned earlier, change in the education system in South Africa were possibly driven by needs outside the educational arena such as the World Economy, promoting its own globalised education agenda that could produce workers/citizens for its own profit-driven purposes.
values (Jansen, 1999: 150). Solway (1999: 57) is quite scathing in his attack on predetermined outcomes when he states that the “Outcomes program is merely the classroom analogue of information processing, storage, and transfer, and offers a computational model of learning whose systematicity leaves no room for ambiguity, sensitivity to context, or the unforeseeable contingencies associated with human knowing and discovery”. Fritz (1994: 81) argues that to prepare students for work in the 21st century to work co-operatively is heavily biased in favour of multinational firms and that OBE proponents believe that it is their right to encourage students to conform to that vision. Solway (1999: 58) lists reasons that militate against the critical outcomes being critical enough to engender democratic citizenship education. Firstly, “it militates against serendipity and the emergence of unforeseen ideas”. The result is boredom, an unadventurous learning as everything is planned and predictable. Secondly, because the nature of outcomes is such that everything can be broken up into small sections/units, education becomes a “step-by step procedure in which everything is explicitly stated so that a “problem” can be mechanically solved”. Third, the aims of education should be subject to elements of surprise, not to forms of predictable behaviour. Pre-determined outcomes also militate against free play, considered to be fertile ground for the development of the imagination and creative. Solway concludes what for me is the difference between the predictable and pre-determined on the one hand, and the imaginative and creative (critical) on the other.

In good teaching one should always give chance an opportunity. Or alternatively, one should not be hobbled and fettered by the program, the algorithm, the “table of behaviour” which may successfully define the operation of a Turing machine, but whose principal effect in the world of human experience is one of escalating cogniplegia. Possibility, surprise, emergence, intuition, interpretation, imagination, and epistemic flexibility – these are everything or almost everything … Chance depends for its irruption upon a prior discipline that in turn is nerved and revitalised by chance (Solway, 1999: 59).

In sum, it seems that the critical outcomes of Curriculum 2005 and OBE fall short of being critical enough; that the critical outcomes, because they are pre-determined, lack the conceptual space to engender a critical attitude that can foster “deep” democracy and
transformation. Because of a seemingly conceptual link between the aims of globalisation and the critical outcomes of Curriculum 2005 and OBE, the critical outcomes assume an instrumental nature that emphasises the extrinsic at the expense of the intrinsic. The result is that though the South African national Department of Education may claim that the new education system is located within a critical theory driven by a transformational OBE approach, the critical outcomes may not be critical enough. I claim that if the critical outcomes of Curriculum 2005 and OBE are fostered by the agenda of democratic citizenship, instead of globalisation, the critical outcomes may assume a more critical nature.

Democratic citizenship, framed within critical theory, has the potential to engender “deep” democracy (transformation) that will enable us to reconceptualise teaching and learning. In Chapter Three I shall argue that democratic citizenship can frame the critical outcomes of OBE differently to that of globalisation.
CHAPTER 3

EXPLORING MEANINGS OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter Two I argued that the critical outcomes of Outcomes-based education in South Africa, coerced by globalisation, seem to be framed by an instrumental justification of education rationale that leads to “thin” democracy. Put differently, the critical outcomes, if framed in terms of the demands of neo-liberalism and driven by globalisation, seemingly has the potential to engender a spirit of individualism that is embedded in instrumentality. Consequently, I shall argue for a non-instrumental justification of the critical outcomes of OBE which I contend can be engendered by democratic citizenship. Much has been written in education that takes root in democratic citizenship (Enslin & White, 2003; Torres, 1998; Gutman, 1987; Giroux, 1988; Morrow, 1989; Putnam & Putman, 1993). I think it prudent at this stage to heed the words of Torres (1998: 421) with regard to democratic citizenship:

The questions of citizenship, democracy, and multiculturalism are at the heart of the discussion worldwide on educational reform, deeply affecting the academic discourse and the practice of comparative and international education. Cloaked in different robes, questions about citizenship, the connections between education and democracy, or the problem of multiculturalism affect most of the decisions that we face in dealing with the challenges of contemporary education.

However, what seems to be so implausible if the critical outcomes are framed in notions of individualism and instrumentality? In looking at instrumentality, it seems that the critical outcomes that individualism and instrumentality engender have little room to create democratic citizenship education that seems to demand outcomes of a conceptually different kind. I shall consequently petition for a non-instrumental justification of outcomes which I contend democratic citizenship can foster. The relationship between individualism and instrumentality is pernicious and seemingly impoverishes education. This relationship and its
consequences for education shall be the focus now. Thereafter I shall explore constitutive meanings of democratic citizenship.

3.2 INDIVIDUALISM AND INSTRUMENTAL REASON: A CONCEPTUAL LINK?

I contend that if the critical outcomes are framed in instrumentality that is conceptually linked to individualism, it would not be plausible to argue that the critical outcomes can engender democratic citizenship, for the reason that the idea of the critical outcomes was to produce a critical mass or intellectual community. If democratic citizenship shapes the outcomes, it would perhaps be more plausible to argue that a critical community can be shaped. This seems to be the intention of the South African government in terms of its educational aims encapsulated in the critical outcomes of Outcomes-based education. I shall now explore the notion of individualism and its possible consequences for modernity and at the same time investigate the link between individualism and instrumental reason which I claim is conceptual rather than contingent.

In recent times there has been a tendency in political thought to move away from political doctrines that emphasise the notion of the individual as a free, autonomous and rational being that a liberal notion of democracy seemingly generates. It is claimed that such a view of the self actually infringes upon the way we understand ourselves, does not take cognisance of the way in which cultural practice impinges upon us or how people need their actions to be appraised by the other, and strives for an objectivity that is unattainable. It is argued that humans can understand themselves and understand the other only in terms of the other – as they are rooted in the practices of communities that they inhabit (Winch & Gingell, 1999: 34). Understanding ourselves in terms of others leads to a particular conception of the relationship between the individual and the community. I shall argue for this notion, being communitarianism. A philosopher that challenges such thoughts about individualism is Taylor (1991).

Modernity, Taylor posits (1991: 2), has undergone certain changes of which individualism is one. Individualism is closely related to political atomism, which envisions society as in some
sense constituted by individuals for fulfilment of ends which are primarily individual. This type of rationality (individualism) is related to the doctrine of utilitarianism. “The term is also applied to contemporary doctrines which hark back to social contract theory, or which try to defend in some sense the priority of the individual and his rights over society, or which represent a purely instrumental view of society” (Taylor, 1985: 187).

According to Taylor (1991: 2) the focus of modernity is, first, on the right of individuals to take control of their lives, to make their own decisions and shape their lives in ways that did not exist before. The rights of the individual are generally protected in constitutions. Credence is given to the rights that individuals have in society, albeit in their own interest and at times at the expense of the community. Taylor (1991) further states that the freedom that individuals are experiencing today is as a result of freeing themselves from former moral traditions, that “People were often locked into a given place, a role and station that were properly theirs and from which it was almost unthinkable to deviate. Modern freedom came about through discrediting of such orders”. Individuals do not operate in a larger order that seems to confine them. But, claiming a freedom from a larger order that seems to influence life, hold consequences for the way humans live and attach meaning. It seems as if people “have lost a broader vision in claiming individuality”, resulting in what Taylor (1991) refers to as a “narrowing” – a focus on the individual that has the effect that the individual centres on the self “which both flattens and narrows our lives, makes them poorer in meaning, less concerned with others or society” (Taylor, 1991: 4).

A second consequence of modernity that flows from individualism is that the centering of the self changed the goal to happiness and well-being of the individual. For, “once the creatures that surround us lose the significance that accrued to their place in the chain of being, they are open to being treated as raw materials or instruments for our projects”. Once individuals rationalise in a narcissistic way, it seems to open the way to instrumental reason – “the kind of rationality we draw on when we calculate the most economical application of means to a given end. Maximum efficiency, the best cost-output ratio, is its measure of success (Taylor, 1991: 5). As a result of this type of rationality social activity (practices) is measured in terms of efficiency – cost-output ratio – and the ascendance of technology and technological
solutions to social problems (seemingly a feature of modernity) lend credence to the primacy of instrumental reason. Problems in the social sphere are technical problems that can be solved through technical solutions bereft of value considerations.

Thirdly, individualism and instrumental reason have a loss of freedom as consequence for political life that should be guarded against. Industry and technology has the effect of restricting choice and coerce society and individuals “to give weight to instrumental reason that in serious moral deliberation we would never do, and which may even be highly destructive” (Taylor, 1991: 8). In another sense, losses of freedom is also experienced in a society where individuals tend to be “enclosed in their own hearts” for such individuals would rather stay at home and indulge in private activities than partake in self-government. With regard to the individual as citizen, Barber (1998: 20) observes that

The citizen is defined as a consumer of government services, not as a participant but only as a watchdog to the political representatives accountable to him. From the point of view of the citizen who sees himself as an economic animal, civil associations feel, at best, rather like consumer operatives or rights allegiances. They permit people to protect themselves more efficiently and serve themselves more securely, but have little to do with participation, cooperation, or sociability per se, much less solidarity, community, or the pursuit of a commonwealth such a community makes possible.

As long as government provides the means to and distributes what they desire, such individuals are content. But there is a danger here. Taylor admonishes that such political activity (inactivity may be a better term) could spawn an immense tutelary of power – engendering a disinterested citizen as Barber (1998: 20) points out. Atomism in this sense would lead to an abandonment of control over processes of the polity, affecting the conceptual notion of (democratic) citizenship. “What we are in danger of losing is political control over our destiny, something we could exercise in common as citizens. This is what Tocqueville called “political liberty” (Taylor, 1991: 10). In discussing the libertarian perspective of civil society, Barber (1998: 21) asserts that
Consumers enjoy newly acquired economic power and a novel sense of rights, but they do not wear the textured mantle of engaged citizens and are ambivalent democrats at best. Thanks to democratic laws and democratised formal governmental institutions, these consumers become voters, but such voters do not become citizens in a deeper sense and democracy remains thin and unpersuasive.

Thus, the conceptual link that I argued for between individualism and instrumental reason engenders thin democracy and a thin notion of citizenship that cannot foster a critical mass. One can argue that if the policy (education policy is an instance) of a government is to create critical citizens, that such an aim of education itself is instrumental in nature. The difference in this instance is that such reasoning seems to be in the interest of society as a whole (a common interest in a shared good) and not utilitarian in the sense that an individual will benefit at the expense of the other. But we should guard against conceptions that a state always has the interest of its citizens at heart. In this regard Carr (2003: 14) reminds us that “it should occasion little surprise that state educational policy making in most competitive past and present economies has more often been dominated by a utilitarian or instrumentalist mindset”. Herein lies the perniciousness of individualism and instrumental reason that is so implausible for a spirit of democratic citizenship and the fostering of a critical mass (intellectual community). This is the reason why I argued against critical outcomes framed by an instrumental justification of education, because I regard education (and democratic citizenship) as about something conceptually different – about “something worthwhile”. I shall touch upon this when investigating the nature of social practices.

In sum then, Taylor’s caveat is that in modernity there is a loss of meaning, and a decline in morals that seemingly opens the way for instrumental reason (that denies values) and a concomitant loss of freedom. But it is the last question, the loss of political control and how, as individualism seems to gain ascendancy, concomitantly there seems a loss in the sense of citizenship that interests me. How then should citizenship be conceptualised for it to foster a relationship where citizens exercise control over the polity in common (as opposed to individuals) and are simultaneously enabled to “restore” to citizenship what has seemingly
been lost? I think that this question touches the nature of social practices. If democratic citizenship is a social practice (and I contend that it is), I put forward that it is an activity that is inclusive rather than exclusive. Put differently, as a practice it would encourage the active participation of individuals, not for their own sake only, but also for the sake of the others and for the value the practice of democratic citizenship holds for the community.

I shall briefly focus on social practices. I concur with MacIntyre (1981: 175) that social practices are constituted by goods internal to the practice. Thus the internal goods of a practice such as democratic citizenship (this is an assumption) should, if following the reasoning of MacIntyre (1981: 175), be able to frame the critical outcomes of OBE in a non-instrumental manner. Individualism and instrumental reason has had the effect of creating citizens as individuals for whom the primacy of democracy and citizenship is about self-gain – about goods external to the practice. I contend that a practice of communitarianism that has as focus an inclusive community, is capable of engendering a spirit of democratic citizenship that fosters “deep” democracy. Miller (2000: 100) posits that communitarianism must be contrasted with individualism, not liberalism. This is also the spirit in which this investigation argues. Democratic citizenship is about people, about the relationships that people have. Such a practice has as focus goods internal to the practice rather than goods external to the practice. Communitarianism conceptualises the individual differently to individualism. Following Miller (2000: 99), communitarianism understands the self as being part of the social relations in which it is embedded. That means that human beings can only be understood in terms of their social institutions, practices, forms of life in which they find identity. In sum, “... we have two broad philosophical anthropologies: the individualist picture which sees people as independent, freely choosing agents, and the communitarian picture which sees them as essentially embedded in communal relations” (Miller, 2000: 100). It is the latter position that I hold offers hope for the engendering of a critical community. Practices are of communities in which individuals find self-definition. As such I need to enquire after the nature of practices. Democratic citizenship in a communitarian sense is a practice that I contend can encourage a democratic community that can foster critical citizens.
3.3 THE NATURE OF SOCIAL PRACTICES

Whilst I am enquiring after the nature of social practices, I shall at the same time argue that the constitutive goods of practices (goods that make a practice what it is) engender a non-instrumental justification of practices. In arguing for the latter, I shall employ a particular notion of practice as a “doing action”. Carr (1998: 175) following the Aristotelian notion of *praxis* explains the difference between practice (praxis) and poesis in the following way:

Although ‘practice’ (*praxis*) is also action directed towards the achievement of some end, it differs from *poesis* in several crucial respects. In the first place the end of a practice is not to produce an object or artefact but to realise some morally worthwhile ‘good’. But, secondly, practice is not a neutral instrument by means of which this ‘good’ can be produced. The ‘good’ for the sake of which the practice is pursued cannot be ‘made’, it can only be done. ‘Practice’ (*praxis*) is a form of ‘doing action’ precisely because its end can only be realised ‘through’ action and can only exist in the action (discourse) itself.

When one attaches meaning to a concept, such as claiming that practice is a “doing action” and that there are “goods for the sake of which a practice is pursued” one is at the same time attaching value, for concepts are embedded in values, I contend, if it is to have meaning for a subject and the meaning is within a field (Taylor, 1985: 22) The concepts “efficient” and “effective” carry value (what makes it desirable) for people in a particular discourse. Taylor (1995: 93) posits, “Social theory arises when we try to formulate explicitly what we are doing, describe the activity central to the practice, and articulate the norms which are essential to it”. If self-descriptions and self-understandings of agents involved in practices (social action) of which education and democratic citizenship are instances, are constitutive of the practice (makes it what it is) as Taylor claims or is their narrative for MacIntyre, then it follows that there should be norms of education (as a practice) that are constitutive of the practice of education – norms that are valued for the reason that they constitute the practice.
The way in which norms constitute the practice (form part of a general principle) brings me to consider the question of virtues. For it seemingly follows that we must closely guard the norms (justify) if we value the practice for what it is. Justification implies giving good reasons. For MacIntyre (1981:175) practices are

any coherent form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.

What are the “goods internal to that form of activity”? I argue that “goods internal to the activity” are those goods for which the activity or practice is valued. These goods, I contend, are constitutive of the practice – what Peters (1998: 30) refers to as “grasping the principle” (logically necessary conditions), or for Taylor (1985: 34) is constitutive rules. Fay (1984: 74) in this regard explains that “constitutive meanings underlie social practices in the same way that practices underlie actions”. “Goods internal to the practice” does not answer the question “what a man’s purpose is in doing something or what his motive for it may be”, suggests Peters (1970: 29), for these are questions that relate to the extrinsic ends of education (a practice) which I argued leads to an instrumental justification of the critical outcomes of OBE. “For things like housing and carpentry can be practised and passed on both for their own intrinsic value and because of the contribution which they make to extrinsic ends such as productivity, housing, and health. But in so far as they are regarded as part of someone’s education they are regarded ipso facto as having value, and therefore as having reasons for doing them built into them” (Peters, 1970: 29). I use in this sense “goods internal to the practice” in arguing for a non-instrumental justification of the critical outcomes of OBE. Pring (2000: 27) refers to practice as “a collection of different activities that are united in some common purpose, embody certain values and make each of the component activities intelligible”. For Waghid (2003: 12) practices involve the possibility of giving reasons or
searching for logically necessary conditions why certain actions are performed, that is, looking at the general principles which constitute certain actions and being able to justify such. For me, when one is involved in giving reasons why certain actions are performed, one is in some way justifying the practice or activity. Necessarily (I use the concept intentionally) present in the justification of practices are reasons why such practices are valued for “it implies that something worthwhile is being or has been intentionally transmitted in a morally acceptable manner” (Peters: 1970: 25).

In referring to values that are internal goods of a practice, I think that one is thinking about virtues. Carr (2003: 188) conceptualises virtues as not being theoretical as when someone thinks about something but rather as a doing action. In support he states that Aristotle viewed moral deliberation as practical and not theoretical, that therefore such reasoning was to pursue moral goodness, specifically the qualities of character called virtues. Carr then makes a move by stating that “Virtues are practical dispositions rather than intellectual capacities, and we recognise virtue in what people do rather than what they know”. Carr’s move is commensurate with my contention that practices are forms of “doing action” (Carr, 1998: 178). If we recognise virtue in what people do, the virtue is in the practice for the practice is what they do. Put differently, in doing the practice the possibility of engendering virtuous citizens are fostered. Thus my contention is that the practice of democratic citizenship may encourage virtuous citizens if the virtues are encapsulated in the critical outcomes of OBE (practice). MacIntyre (1981: 178) defines a virtue as “an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods”. Thus, if MacIntyre is interpreted correctly, a community or an individual that focuses on the external goods of a practice, are not able to achieve goods internal to the practice for lack of virtue. Peters (1998: 212) posits that it is not easy to explain what is meant by a non-instrumental attitude, but concedes that it involves a regard for, respect, or love for the intrinsic (internal) features of activities. Consequently, if one has a non-instrumental or intrinsic attitude (value for its own sake) towards education, democracy and citizenship, you would have a regard, respect, or love for those meanings that are intrinsic to such practices.
For these practices such meanings may include virtues such as respect for people and knowledge, and a love for sharing and communication. A lack of such virtue leads to a thin conception of democracy and citizenship. Regard, respect and love for activities intrinsic to an activity are exemplified in three ways, asserts Peters (1998: 212). Firstly, a non-instrumental attitude includes “doing things for reasons that are reasons for doing this sort of thing rather than for reasons that can be artificially tacked onto almost anything that can be done ...reasons which are internal to the conception of the activity”. Secondly, the features of the means matter. The manner in which democracy, citizenship and education are practised should be reflected upon. The end should not be the only focus as in “Has the outcome been reached” or “What can I profit”? It is within the process that the conceptual space for reflection becomes possible – where deliberation about the opinions of others, values, imagination and creativity, compassion and caring can flourish. Thirdly, certain activities “have standards which are constitutive of performing them well”. What this means is that an agent does an activity because the agent cares about the point of the activity and as a result the agent will care about the standards related to the activity. In this regard MacIntyre (1981: 177) states that practices involve “standards of excellence” and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods. It is not what engaging in the activity can bring profit wise (extrinsically), but what it may potentially mean for the person in terms of personal growth (intrinsic worth) and because she cares and has respect for the activity. The reasons “for doing some things arise for the pleasure or satisfaction that they give, this is at least to say that they are done in a non-instrumental way” (Peters, 1998: 213). In explaining “goods internal to a practice” MacIntyre (1981: 175) refers to the game of chess. If a child plays chess because of the promise of candy, it is an external motivation and does not suffice as a practice. If and when the child plays chess for the analytical skill that can be developed by playing the game, it qualifies as a good internal to the practice of playing chess. When such goods are achieved it is to the benefit of the whole community for all participate in the practice. In this way there is a relation to others who participate in the practice for the good is not an individual good but one that is shared. Taylor (1985: 96) refers to such theory as the “theory of shared goods”. “A part of what makes it a good is precisely that it is shared, that is, sought after and cherished in common...and their common appreciation is constitutive of
them”. Convergent goods, on the other hand, focus on utility value for the individual and the community may only have a common interest in the good. Convergent goods have a contingent rather than a conceptual relationship vis-à-vis the community.

For me the social practices of education and democratic citizenship are in the main about “the seeking of something worthwhile” within the practices themselves. Hence, I argue that democratic citizenship is able to frame the critical outcomes of OBE differently – in a way that may engender a spirit of “deep” democracy. I shall now discuss democratic citizenship.

3.4 A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP

Democratic citizenship can be conceptually divided into two: democracy and citizenship. Democratic citizenship as a social practice is engendered and sustained by the practice of education, such that to engage in the practice of democratic citizenship is to engage in a practice of education, that is, engaging in a doing action that can seemingly foster deep democracy. Put differently, democratic citizenship is an educative practice that can transform, empower and emancipate. In this way democratic citizenship could possibly foster deep democracy. In Chapter One I gave a detailed exegesis of conceptual analysis. At this time I shall recapitulate briefly.

Conceptual analysis concerns itself with the making clear of the meaning of concepts of which education serves as instance. Such analysis can be done by looking at the meaning of other concepts in relation to the concept education and through investigating meanings that concepts have for people in their daily life. One would need to look at concepts such as teaching, learning, teacher, student and school. But a clearer understanding of the concept can also be gained by looking at what the concept education is not. “Hence, in order to establish what democracy is we must establish what democracy is not, that is, what is the opposite of democracy” (Sartori, 1987: 182). Thus, a closer look at stealing, indoctrination, murder and gambling may reveal that these concepts do not fit into the conceptual meaning (logically necessary conditions) of the concept education. In this regard I may add (as mentioned
before) that Taylor (1985: 34) speaks of constitutive rules, Peters (1998: 30) of logically
necessary conditions and Fay (1984: 74) speaks of constitutive meanings. So, to understand
what the meaning of a concept is also involves what it is not. Although I indicated that I shall
do a conceptual analysis of democracy and citizenship, I do so only in relation to notions that
may enhance my argument. As such, the history and different models or notions of
democracy are not discussed in detail but only those models which were identified as
pertinent to this investigation, instances being the aggregative and deliberative models of
democracy. The same applies to the discussion of citizenship. I shall now proceed to the
concept democracy.

Giroux (1988: 28) contends that “democracy is a site of struggle and as a social practice is
informed by competing ideological conceptions of power, politics and community”. The
concept of democracy has many forms, that is, there are different types of democracy and
democracy means different things to different people. Because of this, Cunningham (2002: 3)
suggests that democracy, like “justice” or “freedom” is what some call a “contested” concept
embedded within rival theories. Stromberg (1996: 3) asserts that democracy is a “fuzzy
term”.

Whilst we are confronted by democracy in many ways in our daily lives it is difficult to pin it
down (Should we, in fact, do so?). At times it seems easier to recognise and explain what it is
not. In its most elementary form I venture to explain democracy as “rule by the people”. But
in doing this I would be doing an injustice to the concept for it promises much more. In this
way the question can be raised about “the people”. Who are they? How are they constituted?
Are they all citizens? How are the decisions made? What does “rule” mean? “Politicians
typically mouth the word democracy when (as is often the case) they can think of nothing
the criteria for the democratic process, the constitutive meanings may become clearer. Dahl
(1998: 37) posits that there are five criteria that a process of governance would have to satisfy
in order to meet the requirement that all members of an association are equal in the sense that
they can participate equally in processes about decisions. These requirements are effective
participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of agenda and inclusion of adults. Why these five criteria? The answer is that “each is necessary if the members are to be politically equal in determining the policies of the association. To put it in another way, to the extent that any of the requirements is violated, the members will not be politically equal” (Dahl, 1998: 38). From the reading of Dahl it seems that a constitutive meaning of democracy for him is equality, that those participating in the process of democracy should be political equals. Macpherson (1966: 35) describes the original notion of “democracy as rule by and for the poor and oppressed, a notion that had nothing liberal about it”. He supports the notion of a Western liberal democracy that he claims was brought into being to serve the capitalist market society. For him, different models are marked by stark differences. Yet somehow, Macpherson (1966: 36-37) observes,

They have one thing in common: their ultimate goal is the same – to provide the conditions for the full and free development of the essential human capacities of all the members of the society. They differ in their views as to what conditions are needed, and as to how they must move to achieve those conditions. And those who live in one system commonly judge that the other systems are going about it in an impossible way, or are not going about it at all. These differences of judgements about means commonly obscure the fact that they share the same ultimate moral end.

What comes to light is that, as with Dahl, the emphasis of democratic procedure seems to be on equality. Most other meanings, including that which cannot be classed as democratic, seem to be “measured against” the condition of equality. Such then are equality before the law, citizenship, property rights, freedom of speech and so on. Undemocratic procedures would include tyranny, dictatorship, censorship – procedures that by their very nature are undemocratic and not open to equality.

Cohen (in Elster, 1998: 185) differentiates between two conceptions of democracy that he asserts is distinguished by the manner in which they interpret the fundamental idea of

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21 My use of words is circumspect. I do not want to associate “measurement” with a technicist discourse.
collective decision: the aggregative and deliberative. For an aggregative conception of democracy “decisions are collective when they arise from arrangements of binding collective choice that give equal consideration to - more generically, are positively responsive to - the interests of each person bound by the decisions”. Its focus seems on the “interests of each person”. For the deliberative conception a decision is collective in case it emerges from arrangements of binding collective choice that establish conditions of free public reasoning among equals who are governed by the decisions (Cohen, 1998: 186). In the second notion the emphasis seems to rest on, firstly, public reasoning that, secondly, occurs among equals, who thirdly, are governed by the decisions. Cohen suggests two models of democracy that are seemingly dichotomous: the individualist as opposed to the communitarian.

Young (2000: 18) also distinguishes between two contemporary models of democracy and like Cohen (in Elster, 1999: 185) identifies these as the aggregative and the deliberative models. Both models of democracy, she claims, share a basic framework expected from democratic models: obedience to a rule of law, voting as a means of decision-making when consensus is not possible or at times too costly, that for a process to be democratic it requires forms of freedom of speech, assembly, association and the like – also constitutive meanings of democracy. For Young (2000: 18) the aggregative model of democracy concerns itself with democracy as a process of uniting the preferences of citizens particularly for the purpose of election of public officials and policies. Young describes the procedure in this model of democracy as one where individuals have their own desires about the labours of government institutions. They (individuals as voters) also know that there are other individuals that share the same preferences and yet others have different preferences. These are then competing preferences and in this way “democracy is a competitive process in which political parties and candidates offer their platforms and attempt to satisfy the largest number of people’s preferences” (Young, 2000: 19). This notion of democracy hinges on public representation by elected officials and is akin to the liberal-democratic theory as espoused by J.S. Mill (1894) with its primacy of representation. For a representative or aggregative model of democracy, a constitutive meaning is representation in a way that aspires to satisfy preferences of individuals. For Dewey the aggregative model may not be acceptable as being perhaps the
only model of democracy for he remarks that “... there is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (Dewey: 1916, 101). Young would agree with Dewey when he claims that democracy is about “associated living”, “about conjoint communicated experience” for she distinguishes four problems, that I shall discuss shortly, associated with the aggregative model that, I think, supports an impoverished notion of democracy that leads to instrumental reasoning and makes it implausible to justify the practice of education in this way. She argues for a model of deliberative democracy and this investigation supports the notion of deliberation. Benhabib (1996: 68) thinks of democracy as “a model for organising the collective and public exercise of power in the main institutions of a society on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting the well-being of a collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as moral and political equals”. Thinking about democracy in the way that Benhabib does certainly includes more than aggregation. Foremost seems to be the “free and reasoned deliberation among individuals as moral and political equals”. What seems to come through is that not only does she view democracy in a way that includes more than a process of voting and election of officials, but for this study the way in which she depicts the citizen in the democratic process as deliberative, moral and political equals, are most noteworthy.

The four problems that Young (2000: 20) identifies that are associated with the aggregative model seemingly underscore why the deliberative model may be more preferable (for this investigation) in fostering a “deep” democracy that is transformative. Importantly also, in discussing the four problems that Young puts forward, the discussion also revolves around what deliberative democracy is not.

First, the preference of the individual is accepted as given. There is no way of discovering why individuals did what they did (voted) – why they voted in a particular manner. Their preference may be purely motivated by self-interest or a sense of fairplay. Yet there may be other reasons. The views and preferences so expressed are considered by this model only for their extrinsic value – that they make up a part of the general voting procedure and can be
counted. If at any moment an individual decided to bring forth a preference because of an intrinsic worth, it does not matter. Preferences are considered to be extraneous to the political process and no one can say how preferences may change as a result of communicative action (talking to others) or political participation.

Secondly, Young states that there is no political co-ordination or cooperation. Individuals do not have to leave the realm of the private to interact with others to share ideas. The result is that a democratic public in a communitarian sense cannot emerge from this model. I will discuss the communitarian model in the following section.

Third, the model seems to engender “a thin and individualistic” type of rationality. As individuals acting in their best interest, the democratic process becomes reasoning about the best means to obtain an end. Any result forthcoming from this type of instrumental reasoning cannot simply be held as a process of reasoning or rational at all. An aggregation of preferences may or may not be rational in sum but whether the process was rational is contestable.

Fourthly, the model does not use the opportunity of assessing the moral legitimacy of the nature of the decisions. It is not interested in such. The model has a subjectivist interpretation of normative statements, with the result that use of moral language is nothing but one preference over another, being no more rational (objective) than another. In this way the model is a form of thin democracy or as Young (2000: 21) aptly states, “such a model offers only a weak motivational basis for normatively evaluating the substance of the result”. I shall now look at what democracy cannot be. In looking at what democracy is by showing what it cannot be, I shall use the ideas as set forth by Sartori (1987).

Democracy, being in some way a search after freedom (liberty), being authoritarian or authoritarianism cannot pass the test for democracy for in its nature authoritarianism is an excess and an abuse of authority, it is oppressive and overpowers liberty. Moreover, authority is usually linked to power. But a type of power that oppresses cannot transform in a way that
democracy does. The type of authority that is congruent with democracy has been
democratically bestowed on institutions (which carries the will of the people), an instance
being authority of elected officials. In this way power is utilised to conform to the wishes of
the people (I admit that “the will of the people” is a contested concept). Moreover,
democracy cannot be totalitarian, for totalitarianism is marked by an official ideology, a
single mass party, government monopoly, a terrorist police system and a centrally directed
economy – meanings that are anti-democratic. A democratic system cannot be associated
with a dictator for “dictatorship is a non-constitutional rule, either because the rulers make a
sham of a pre-existing constitution or because they write a constitution that empowers them,
in practice, to do as they wish” (Sartori, 1987: 205). In sum then, the constitutive meanings of
democracy cannot include instances which are authoritarian, totalitarian or dictatorial in
nature, for these are conceptually anti-democratic. I shall now discuss citizenship.

Citizenship, Stokes (2002: 24) posits, is traditionally recognised in two ways: the legal or
administrative and as normative concept or theory. These conceptions involve the
understanding of a specific civic identity and political practices. The legal is associated with
rights and obligations and the legal qualifications of citizenship. The latter is concerned with
normative concepts that are inferred from democratic political theory. When the normatively
embedded question “What is a good citizen?” is posed, Stokes (2002: 24) claims that it is
framed within another question that reads “What is the good citizen in a democracy?”
“Citizenship” declares Enslin and White, “is a legal status conferred by the state. As such it
transforms people” (2003: 111). It is against this understanding of the relationship between
democracy and citizenship that I proffer the following discussion of citizenship. However, I
should point out that there are opinions such as those of Pateman that hold that citizenship is
not synonymous with democracy (in Torres, 1998: 425). Traditional theories of citizenship
are challenged by different forms of social theory, Torres claims (1998: 425). Thus it
becomes possible to be a citizen in a dictatorship. It is the nature of such citizenship that one
must interrogate. Also, some may be excluded from citizenship on, what for some may seem
quite undemocratic grounds (women, ethnic groups, blacks and so on).
As with democracy, the notion of a citizen and citizenship are disputed. This is evident since the time of Aristotle for he remarks,

But since a city-state is a composite, one that is a whole and, like any other whole, constituted out of many parts, it is clear that we must first enquire into citizens. For a city-state is a multitude of citizens. Hence we must investigate who should be called a citizen, and who a citizen is. For there is often dispute about the citizen as well, since not everyone agrees that the same person is a citizen. For the sort of person who is a citizen in a democracy is often not one in an oligarchy (Aristotle in Reeve, 1998: 65).

Pivotal to a discussion of the notion of citizenship are the ideas of T.H. Marshall (1950: 173). He divided the notion of citizenship into three components: civil, political and social. Civil rights are those that enquire after individual freedom (property, speech and justice) and the political busied itself with the electoral process (the right to vote, to elect and be elected). The social aspect of citizenship included what is necessary for individuals to live a full life which meant “To share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society”. Miller (2000: 44) refers to this conception of citizenship of Marshall as the liberal conception. Kymlicka and Norman (1994: 354) sum up Marshall’s ideas on citizenship by declaring that for Marshall citizenship required a liberal democratic state, as a welfare state “ensures that every member of society feels like a full member of society, able to participate in and enjoy the common life of society. Where any of these rights are withheld or violated, people will be marginalised and unable to participate”. This notion of citizenship is known as “passive” or “private” citizenship with its focus on the citizen as individual and accruing benefits such as security, prosperity, and freedom for the individual (Macedo, 1990: 39). I contend that this is a “thin” form of citizenship that reminds one of the aggregative and representative models of democracy that seemingly engender individualism and instrumental reasoning instead of public spiritness that deliberative democracy requires. The notion of citizenship can also be participatory as opposed to being “passive”. In this instance participatory requires an emphasis on the intrinsic value of participation – that participation in political life surpasses the pleasures of the private sphere.
such as family, neighbourhood and profession. The political is thus central to life. With regard to the merits of this model Kymlicka and Norman (1994: 362) remark that it “is markedly at odds with the way most people in the modern world understand both citizenship and the good life”.

Miller (2000: 82-83) favours a republican conception of citizenship and posits that those advocating global and transnational forms of citizenship also seem to favour the republic conception. He draws a contrast between the republican and the liberal conception of citizenship. For him republican citizenship consists of four main components. First, the citizen enjoys equal rights in terms of free speech and ownership of property. Second, rights are followed by obligations in terms of respect for law, payment of taxes and so on. Third, the citizen is called upon to defend the rights of fellow citizens to promote common interests. Fourth, citizens need to be active in political decision-making such as participating in debate. Miller boldly admits that the notion of republican citizenship as has been described is one that most citizens fall short of (Miller, 2000: 84).

The liberal virtue theory advances the argument that citizenship is about virtues required for responsible citizenship. Galston (1991: 221-224) distinguishes four groups of virtues: general virtues (courage, law-abidingness, loyalty), social virtues (independence, open-mindedness), economic virtues (work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change) and political virtues (capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to demand only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public discourse. Kymlicka and Norman (1994: 365-366) claim that public discourse in a democracy should be free and open. But more pertinent are the observations of Galston (1991: 227) in noting that the virtues of public discourse include the willingness to listen seriously to a range of views which, given the diversity of liberal societies, will include ideas the listener is bound to find strange and even obnoxious. The virtue of political discourse also includes the willingness to set forth
one’s own views intelligibly and candidly as the basis for a politics of persuasion rather than manipulation or coercion.

This model of citizenship requires that citizens should not just make demands or issue threats but reasons should be forwarded to justify demands. Such reasons should be able to persuade people who have different faiths and nationalities. Demands must be justified in ways that equals can understand and accept (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 366). The question that interests this investigation at this juncture is “What is a good citizen for a deliberative democracy?” because it is a notion of democratic citizenship framed against a deliberative democratic framework that will engender deep democracy, I charge. Stokes (2002: 42) espouses that deliberation as concept includes understandings of dialogue and communication. Citizens would be required to persuade those who differ from them through deliberation. The greater good becomes the framework for negotiation and instrumental drive for individual interest and benefit becomes unacceptable. The abilities of critique and self-reflection, good listening skills and the ability to be open to new and other ideas, also the revision of former ideas are non-negotiable. Such citizens should also have the capacity to discern between the person and the argument and perceive that a rejection of argument is not a rejection of the person.

I shall now briefly discuss how the prevalence of globalisation has impacted upon the notion of citizenship. I think it useful to do now as an introduction to the discussion that will be developed later concerning the change in the conception of democratic citizenship. First, a more recent development with regard to the conception of citizenship is the contention that the notion of citizenship has changed as it relates to state identity. Vandenberg (2000: 4) posits that just like democracy, citizenship has become a contested concept. Muetzelfeldt (in Vandenberg, 2000: 78) points out that the manner in which a state changes the “use of market mechanisms in politics, public administration and policy-making is transforming the state. This changes the notions of citizenship and democracy that are associated in state practices”. Citizens become clients who buy commodities from the state and this states Muetzelfeldt (in Vandenberg, 2000: 79) is a “market-based notion of citizenship stands in contrast to the
citizenship of rights and obligations that was expressed in the bureaucratic welfare state...As notions of citizenship change so does what counts as democratic access and influence”. Of importance to this investigation is Muetzelfeldt’s charge (in Vandenberg, 2000: 77) that reducing citizens to market-orientated customers is an anti-democratic shift. What this means is that citizenship, if framed in terms of the goals of globalisation, display anti-democratic tendencies, supporting my contention that the critical outcomes of OBE if framed by globalisation leads to thin democracy. The above is an instance of change in the notion of citizenship enforced by globalisation for across the world nation-states have been gently coerced to change the thinking around economic systems (also social, political and cultural) in line with the goals of globalisation which, as discussed earlier, has a penchant towards individualism that market-economies tend to encourage.

Moreover, citizens have in a sense become world citizens. In this regard, Nussbaum, drawing on Stoicism, develops an argument for “the citizen of the world”. For Stoics, “a good citizen is a citizen of the world. They hold that thinking about humanity as it is realised in the whole world is valuable for self-knowledge: we see ourselves and our customs more clearly when we see our own ways in relation to those of other reasonable people” (Nussbaum, 1997: 59). Nussbaum’s (1997: 59) world citizen is thus one that focuses on multiculturalism – a citizen that is sensitive to different cultures and the concerns and interests of ethnic, racial and religious minorities, whether near or afar.

In sum, Stokes (2002: 23) argues that different notions of democracy each lay a different claim as to what constitutes a good citizen. What he seems to claim is that there is a conceptual relationship between notions of democracy and the citizens they engender, and I concur. In this way we have seen that the aggregative, representative and communitarian models as instances of democracy each engender a different notion of citizenship that is congruent with its constitutive meanings. Also, we have noticed (with concern) how neoliberalist political thought, seemingly the current hegemonic force, has influenced models of democracy in various ways and at times compelling notions of citizenship and democracy to change (at times contrary to its nature). For a political system to be accepted as a democratic
system there are constitutive meanings of democracy that must be recognisable in such a system, examples being a notion of consensus and absence of tyranny before a political system can claim to be democratic.

3.5 EXPLORING MEANINGS OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

I shall introduce this section by clarifying what the background to my discussion on democratic citizenship is. I also admit that in discussing democratic citizenship I shall touch upon many concepts that have been discussed under democracy and citizenship in the earlier discussion on conceptual analysis. Democratic citizenship as a practice does not take place in a neutral environment. It is part of political life and is under normal circumstances actively promoted by a government through education\textsuperscript{22} that promotes and sustains democratic citizenship. Because of this, critics claim that fostering democratic citizenship in schools is an instance of instrumentalism. For its survival democracy depends on the practice of democratic citizenship. And the goods that make for democracy are not goods with which citizens are born. White (in Turner and Richardson, 2000: 901) recognises seven characteristics of a democratic character: hope and confidence; courage; self-respect and self-esteem; friendship; trust; honesty; and decency. Galston (1998: 46-47) remarks that “Devotion to human dignity and freedom, to equal rights, to social and economic justice, to the rule of law, to civility and truth, to tolerance of diversity, to mutual assistance, to personal and civic responsibility, to self-restraint and self-respect – all these must be taught and learned”. These are virtues (constitutive meanings)\textsuperscript{23} of democratic citizenship.

Giroux (1988: 4-5) states that,

\begin{quote}
Citizenship, like democracy itself, is part of a historical tradition that represents a terrain of struggle over forms of knowledge, social practices, and values that constitute the critical elements of that tradition. However, it is not a term that has any
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{22} The advocacy of democratic citizenship also takes place at work and in civic organisations such as sports clubs and churches. In the main schools promote and sustain it.

\textsuperscript{23} In this sense I conflate constitutive meanings and virtues for the meaning is of something (perhaps a practice) that has value. Thus, it is handed down for it is “valuable, sought after and cherished”.

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transcendental significance outside the lived experiences and social practices of individuals who make up diverse forms of public life. Once we acknowledge the concept of citizenship as a socially constructed historical practice, it becomes all the more imperative to recognise that categories like citizenship and democracy need to be problematised and reconstructed for each generation.

For Giroux each generation has to “problematisate and reconstruct” conceptions of meaning, in this case democratic citizenship. Also, meaning comes from within a tradition that is handed down. MacIntyre posits that “Stories are lived because human activity is inherently narratiival in character and form: in acting we “we knit the past and the future together” (1981: 197). For South Africa this would also include a change in tradition as the tradition (apartheid education as instance) was rejected and is in the process of reconstruction. Moreover, I gather from Giroux that the process of reconstruction is an ongoing “doing practice” along the lines of an Aristotelian notion of practice (praxis). Therefore, OBE as a conceptually different education system to that of apartheid education, needs to be interrogated all the while by this generation of citizens as part of a process of establishing a different practice (democratic citizenship) that will generate new conceptions of meaning of democratic citizenship for the tradition. At this point I wish to state that I recognise that democratic citizenship is sustained and promoted by educational practices, and that democratic citizenship itself is an educative practice. The practice of democratic citizenship is educative in the sense that it generates citizens who are able to live in a democratic society. Democratic citizenship thus nurtures the democratic ideal through creating “democratic agents”. I concur with Morrow (1989: 149) when he states that “One of the central aims of education is to generate ‘democratic agents’. This aim is expressed in the views that education aims to contribute to people’s autonomy, to their capacity for critical thinking, to the discovery of what is in their interests, to the development of their moral and political sensibility, and so on, and these capacities and commitments are precisely those of a ‘democratic agent’”. These aims seem to be the aims of democratic citizenship as well. But all of this discussion presupposes the existence of “something worthwhile” so that a society chooses to educate their young for democratic citizenship. Alternately, educating the young for democratic
citizenship presupposes the existence of goods internal to a practice of democratic citizenship that are valued by society, goods that are internal to the practice (intrinsic) that make the practice what it is (constitutive meanings). Put differently, what are the internal goods of the practice of democratic citizenship that may frame the critical outcomes in a way that it can engender transformation in the sense of “deep” democracy? It is to this end that I shall now turn my attention.

3.6 GOODS INTERNAL TO THE PRACTICE OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

Democratic citizenship is not a concept I think that should be discussed in isolation of the model of democracy that informs it. This seems superfluous, but I would emphasise that the conception of democratic citizenship differs for different models of democracy. A liberal and communitarian conception of citizenship would be different and, therefore, respective notions of democratic citizenship. It is important to note that different models of democratic theory that inform citizenship are grounded in differing normative conceptions. Instances are individualism for a liberal democratic theory and community for communitarianism. The upshot is that when Morrow and Galston describe the goods that make for democracy and the aims of education as “contributing to people’s autonomy, to their capacity for critical thinking, to the discovery of what is in their interests, to the development of their moral and political sensibility, and so on, …capacities and commitments…of a ‘democratic agent’” (Morrow, 1989: 149), and “devotion to human dignity and freedom, to equal rights, to social and economic justice, to the rule of law, to civility and truth, to tolerance of diversity, to mutual assistance, to personal and civic responsibility, to self-restraint and self-respect” (Galston, 1998: 46-47), these aims and goods find meaning in specific ways in specific communities that depend on the specific social democratic theory that is fostered in that community. What this means for this investigation is that if the aim of the critical outcomes in South Africa is to engender critical citizens for a deep (transformative) democracy, then the need arises to question what model of democracy is most suited to engender deep transformation. I have argued that a liberal notion of democracy that is commensurate with a capitalist market system (globalisation) can best encourage a spirit of individualism that is embedded in instrumental
reason. This I claimed is pernicious and surreptitious and can only lead to thin democracy. Callan and White (2003: 95) posit that “the basis of communitarian philosophy is the idea that liberal political principles rest on too thin a view of good lives and the good society ... At stake are rival understandings of what makes human lives and the societies in which they unfold both good and just, and derivatively, competing conceptions of the education needed for individual and social betterment”.

Democratic citizenship should have the nature of being inclusive rather than exclusive. If not, doubts would be raised as to the authenticity of such democratic citizenship. Inclusion is what should make the practice democratic for a deliberative democracy. What has occurred over time in the name of democratic citizenship is that certain groupings in society had been excluded from democratic citizenship. Instances of such groups were women (especially black women), certain ethnic groups and blacks. Although viewed as citizens, they were regarded as citizens in a “thin” sense. This group was recognised as citizens in terms of national identity (birth) but in a “deeper” democratic sense, were often denied citizen rights such as universal suffrage. In this way there was no difference between women and children, for even children are regarded as citizens in a “thin” sense but are not allowed to participate in the activities of political life, such as voting. In post-modern society this notion of “democratic” citizenship is interrogated, unacceptable and unbearable to certain groups. Currently, the world over, there is a drive towards inclusion rather than exclusion in terms of democratic citizenship and the clamour for inclusion shows that there is something in democratic citizenship (internal goods) that is worth striving for. It also has something to do with equality – what I claimed is a constitutive meaning of democracy. Now questions arise about the nature of inclusion and the notion of equality. These questions will be addressed when deliberative democracy is discussed, since in these conceptions lie the possibility of transformative practices.

Although citizenship is a legal status conferred by the state (Enslin & White, 2003: 111) it differs from democratic citizenship for as a status conferred by the state it does not necessarily qualify as being democratic. Citizens in other political systems (an instance being citizens in a dictatorship) are referred to as citizens but not as citizens engaged in the practice of
democratic citizenship. Democratic citizenship busies itself with a particular notion of citizen rights and obligations and a specific notion of a good citizen. For Enslin and White (2003: 111) this means that “rather than seeing citizenship as something to be earned, an alternative view is that it should be seen as the granting of a status which all in the democratic polity share, an embodiment of the democratic ideal of political equality”. They (2003: 112) refer to “the dual nature of citizenship” – a status shared by all in the polity on the one hand, and citizenship as containing certain norms on the other. It is the latter notion of citizenship that concerns this investigation for within the internal goods (norms) required for a non-instrumental justification of the critical outcomes, rests the possibility that can foster “deep” democracy.

The discussion seems to project a notion that the ideal of democratic citizenship hinges on the conferral of such by the state. But democratic citizenship, other than citizenship that is so conferred, contains considerably more than citizenship. Citizenship can be conferred but democratic citizenship must be acquired and nurtured though an educative process. Democratic citizens are also bearers of responsibilities (obligations). Moreover, the relationship between state and citizens in a democratic polity is dialogical. Kymlicka and Norman (1994: 360) assert that “public policy relies on personal lifestyle decisions”. In this way “attempts to create a fairer society will flounder if citizens are chronically intolerant of difference and generally lacking in what Rawls calls a sense of justice” (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994: 360). Without cooperation and self restraint in these areas it becomes increasingly problematic for society to function successfully. Citizens need to have virtues that nurture the practice of democratic citizenship. Adherence to and adoption of these virtues are actively encouraged by the state through state mechanisms such as schools, for without citizens that have a sense of virtue about the democratic ideal, attempts by the state to sustain a democratic polity will be difficult.

My claim is that a deliberative model of democracy seems to be most suited to encouraging the “public spiritedness” (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994: 360) and the internal goods needed for deep democracy. I think that a deliberative model best fosters the virtues needed for a society
that claims to be inclusive in a deeper sense. In arguing in favour of a deliberative model of democracy that favours community rather than the individual and individual rights for its own sake, I am not disclaiming that the individual has a role as an agent that constructs meaning in a community. Put in another way, I see the relationship between the individual and community as dialogical – in the sense that the one finds meaning for itself whilst engaging with the other. What I consider to be a seminal remark concerning democracy is by Barber, that “democratic citizenship entails an argument about who democratic citizenship includes” (Barber, 1996: 355). One of the principles (constitutive meanings) on which a deliberative democracy rests is the notion of inclusion (and exclusion) in the political procedure and that the argument in favour of deliberative democracy depends. I shall now discuss what a deliberative model of democracy entails – especially the goods internal to such a model that makes it valuable for a community.

In deliberating about the merits of deliberative democracy, Enslin and White (2003: 117) posit,

> Apart from the potential that deliberative democracy poses for expanding citizenship, it also requires and promises to develop a set of democratic capacities and virtues. As well as the deliberative skills of presenting arguments to others and being able to judge which argument carries the greatest force, deliberation requires a disposition to reciprocity, a willingness to recognise others as free and equal participants in deliberation.

Deliberative democracy as argued for by Enslin and White requires particular skills for democratic citizens in that polity. The emphasis is deliberation, a virtue of deliberative democracy that in itself requires certain conditions. Conditions that should perhaps be given primacy for the presence of deliberative democracy are an attitude of reciprocity, that one should be prepared to give and take in deliberation. Also, reciprocity requires the willingness to respect the other as equals in deliberation – a sense of openness and fairness. Importantly, deliberation requires that one has the ability to judge points of view as being more appropriate or more reasonable. For this there is an assumption that one has the capacity to
put aside own points of view in favour of the more reasonable argument. Reciprocity, openness, a sense of fairness and judging points of view are constitutive of deliberation. But in order to achieve all of this it becomes necessary to place one’s argument (point of view) in the public domain – unlike the claims of a social theory based on individualism. Enslin, Pendlebury and Tjiattas (2001: 116) mention that:

The qualities of deliberative democracy include the ability to make reasoned argument, written or oral, as well as the abilities to co-operate with others, to appreciate perspectives and experience and to tolerate other points of view. Talk is obviously fundamental to active citizenship...Deliberative democracy proposes models of participation committed to the public deliberative processes that are essential to the rationality of collective decision-making in diverse societies grappling with problems of the public good.

Deliberative democracy intends to include rather than exclude. If the critical outcomes are framed in a manner that befits a deliberative democracy, in terms of the internal goods of deliberation, then the outcomes of OBE may be transformative in a manner that fosters a critical community in a communitarian sense. But different models of deliberative democracy exist, each with its own merits. Three models that I think link up with the argument, that of Habermas, Benhabib and Young will be discussed in Chapter Four to point to the implications of these models for a deep democracy.

My intention in this chapter was to conceptually analyse democratic citizenship. By exploring meanings of democracy and citizenship respectively and thereafter democratic citizenship, the intention was to explore the internal goods of democratic citizenship. Democratic citizenship, as a social practice, is constituted in the main by those features of which deliberation is the core. These features include reasoned argument, the capacity to cooperate with others, tolerance of different views, the undertaking to respect others as free and equal in deliberation, in short, democratic competence and virtues. My claim was that democratic citizenship because of its emphasis on inclusion that is engendered by a spirit of
communitarianism is able to undermine individualism associated with globalisation. The agenda of globalisation that emphasises individualism seems intent on marginalising and broadening spaces between wealthy and poor, advantaged and oppressed. However, the drive in communities globally in terms of women, blacks, ethnic groupings, poor and the oppressed seems to be for greater inclusion in democratic society rather than on exclusion that individualism fosters. Thus, the inherent inclusive nature of democratic citizenship undermines individualism. However, after a reading of globalisation as expounded the impression may have been created that all that globalisation offers is harmful. This is not the intention. Globalisation has many advantages. Amongst others there is the advancement in information technology (computers, cell phones, video equipment and so on) and the rapid spread of knowledge. What I am advocating is that although globalisation has advantages the disadvantages should not be ignored. To do so would be unwise.

In Chapter Two I showed the genesis of OBE in South Africa and the implications for education if the outcomes are framed in terms of a globalised agenda. In Chapter Three I started off by discussing what seems wrong if a globalised agenda encourages a spirit of individualism and instrumental reasoning and argued that the outcomes of OBE should rather be framed in terms of the internal goods of a deliberative notion of democratic citizenship that will encourage a spirit of communitarianism. If the critical outcomes are couched in the language of communitarianism the outcomes may engender a deep democracy that is transformative. In Chapter Four I shall argue how outcomes framed in a deliberative manner can lead to deep transformation.
CHAPTER 4

CRITICAL OUTCOMES AS CONCEPTUALISED BY DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I claim that democratic citizenship (political practice), guided by the norms of deliberative democracy, can deepen democracy to make it more inclusive of pluralist claims and perspectives and empowering for less privileged participants. Thus democratic citizenship that is more inclusive and more empowering holds the promise of deepening democracy. This is also the idea that Young espouses when she makes an argument to go beyond the deliberative democracy that Benhabib (1996) offers, claiming that Benhabib’s notion of deliberative democracy is not inclusive enough (Young, 2000: 35). Put differently, if the critical outcomes of OBE are framed according to some of the tenets of democratic citizenship that is embedded in deliberative democracy, then the outcomes will seemingly engender critical citizens for a deep democracy to flourish and in this way bring about transformative classroom practices in schools.

At first I shall explore to which extent, if at all, the manner in which the critical outcomes of Outcomes-based education are framed currently, are able to foster critical citizens. Thereafter, I shall defend my contention that communitarianism is more plausible than individualism in arguing for deep democracy framed in democratic citizenship which has the potential to be transformative. My contention is, that as framed currently, the critical outcomes seemingly engender a type of individuality that is exclusive and therefore undermine rather than enhance the critical framework that education in South Africa is supposed to engender. Put differently, to cultivate a critical mass the outcomes have to be framed in a spirit of democratic citizenship that is fostered by deep democracy. Such a notion of democratic citizenship conceptualises the individual as part of a community (that is inclusive) in terms of which the individual self-defines and establishes inter-subjective meanings rather than individualism as propagated by neo-liberalism that is seemingly
exclusive and where the individual has tendencies to withdraw from the community and become reclusive. The community is only joined by individuals when there is some utilitarian value to be gained. Also, the critical outcomes as currently framed in terms of the agenda of globalisation shows tenets of an instrumental justification of education. The upshot is that the critical outcomes (education) engender citizens and workers as demanded by globalisation and neo-liberalism.

It is by no means clear that the aim of education is to pander to the needs of market forces. This type of rationality seemingly leads to manipulation and can easily be translated into a type of social engineering where citizens are in the main valued as human capital, that is, in which way citizens can be productive as workers to address the economic needs of the country and the state. In this regard Fay (1984: 58) posits that “It is in the context of an industrial society that one finds the idea that there must be the conscious manipulation of social relationships according to some set of laws and established procedures in order to maximise political and economic efficiency”.

4.2 EXPLORING CURRENT NOTIONS OF THE CRITICAL OUTCOMES OF OUTCOMES-BASED EDUCATION

The South African Government and its national Department of Education state in several of its documents (as an instance, Western Cape Education Department (WCED) 1997:1) that the intention with the introduction of the new education system is to transform education and society. Moreover, such intention to transform is informed by principles that underpin the transformation system. Instances of such principles are equity and redress, non-discrimination, access, justice and democracy(Western Cape Education Department, 1997: 1).

The intention to implement and actively encourage the education system informed by principles as set out, seems admirable. Important for this study is the nature of the transformation that such principles seek to engender however lofty the principles may seem. There seems to be a link between the principles and the critical outcomes. That is, the principles of democratic participation, access, equity and redress as instances are the
principles that should inform a transformed democratic society in South Africa and that the critical outcomes (as seemingly advocating democratic education) are the vehicle through which the transformation toward a democratic society will be driven. If this is indeed the case, then the connection between the principles and the critical outcomes cannot be incommensurate. Put differently, the critical outcomes must be able to engender a transformed democratic society as envisaged by the democratic South African government through its principles of transformation. I contend that the connection between the principles of transformation and the critical outcomes are contingent and not conceptual, since the outcomes cannot engender the type of critical citizens that the principles of transformation want to foster for a transformed South African community unless the critical outcomes are reconceptualised. I shall now argue for this contention.

I agree with Taylor (1985: 36) when he states that “The meanings and norms implicit in these practices are not just in the minds of the actors but are out there in the practices themselves, practices which cannot be conceived as a set of individual actions, but which are essentially modes of social relation, of mutual action”. Put differently, the principles gain meaning not as policy, but when policy becomes practice, when policy becomes “doing action” and in this way becomes meaningful. Thus, the principles of equity and redress, quality, efficiency, democratic participation, sustainability and relevance become meaningful as practices. For this investigation it means that the critical outcomes of Outcomes-based education need to be interrogated in the same manner. That is, not as policy but as practices that are forms of “doing action” for agents (facilitators and learners). For instance, the critical outcome that requires “critical and creative thinking” needs to be interrogated as a practice (doing action) so that it becomes meaningful for agents within a field of meaning. Put differently, I claim that the critical outcomes of OBE should not be viewed as policy only (in a narrow sense) but that outcomes acquire meaning as practices. It is as practices that the outcomes will be explored in this chapter.

In summary then, the principles that are spelled out in several documents as policy (access, redress, equity, as instances) find meaning as practices in a community. Also, the critical outcomes find meaning when they become the social action (teaching practice as instance) of
a community (educational institution such as a school) and the community involves itself in the practices for the practices have value for them. It is the value attached to the practice that I shall explore now.

We need to ask why principles (I prefer practices) such as equity and redress, access, quality, efficiency, democratic participation, sustainability and relevance are sought after. These principles seemingly are also constitutive meanings of democracy and deliberation. Virtues, Carr (2003: 188) argues, “Are practical dispositions rather than intellectual capacities, and we recognise virtue in what people do rather in what they know”. It is in the action of people that virtue is recognised. “Doing” and “knowing” are not separate but integral to the practice of virtue. Virtue has to do with the internal goods of the practice. What are the internal goods\(^2\) of the critical outcomes as practices? I argued in Chapter Three that equality and inclusion are constitutive meanings of deliberation that can foster deep democracy. The principles (practices) need to gain meaning in terms of its constitutive meanings. The norms of the practice which are encapsulated in the constitutive meanings give the practice its value. In this manner, as doing action, the practices can be interrogated and can one possibly investigate who is included or excluded or what is the nature of equality in terms of access or democratic participation as practices, for then the practices of access and democratic participation has meaning for agents within a field. These concepts have value for the South African community – especially in terms of South Africa’s apartheid heritage it so desperately needs to break from but I think that these principles are also of value because there is a need for greater justice and equality that these principles can possibly promote.

The values internal to the principles seemingly involve the internal goods of the concepts. But concepts or principles are not out there in theory. The virtue in the concepts (that is why it is valuable) as practices is recognised in the doing thereof. Action concepts are “doing” actions. It is in the doing that the virtue is recognised. In this way, what the South African Government intended doing was to establish practices (new ways of doing) of equity and redress, access, quality, efficiency, democratic participation, sustainability, and relevance.

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\(^2\) Internal goods, as argued in Chapter Three, are those things for which the practice is valued. An internal good is an end in itself and not a means to an end (extrinsic goods) that is normally associated with instrumental reasoning and profit.
These practices are encapsulated (given shape/meaning to) in the form of the critical outcomes of Outcomes-based education. I shall now explore the background against which meanings that promote transformation (principles) are conceptualised. This is important, for the critical outcomes, conceptualised to encourage transformation through democratic education, are framed against this background. I claim that there is a conceptual connection between the background (globalisation) and the critical outcomes. The influence of globalisation is so pernicious that it disturbs the supposedly conceptual connection between the principles of transformation and the critical outcomes in such a way that the relationship between the outcomes and the principles become incommensurate or contingent in its efforts to foster a “deeply” transformed democratic society. The upshot is that, under the coercive influence of globalisation, the critical outcomes now informed by individualism and an aggregative community (under the influence of globalisation), foster critical citizens and a community in a “weak” or “thin” democratic sense, I contend. I argue that critical outcomes that want to foster democratic citizenship should be conceptualised along the lines of a continuum, as argued for by McLaughlin (1992: 237). I shall briefly expand.

McLaughlin (1992: 236) argues that the obscurity of meaning associated with the concept of citizenship can be represented in terms of minimal and maximal notions thereof. Put differently, understandings of the meaning of citizenship lead to either or positions, that is, one position is taken to the exclusion of another. Viewed in this way, citizenship is seen in a minimalist or maximalist way – that leads to the following seemingly contrasting or dichotomous positions, namely, form/substance; private/public; passive/active; closed/open. McLaughlin (1992: 237) cogently argues that notions of citizenship should rather be conceptualised in terms of a continuum. This means that the practice of citizenship is one that fluctuates and is dynamic. Citizens are not in a maximalist or minimalist mode at any one time necessarily, but depending on circumstances citizens move along a continuum that lends (to my mind) a freedom and realistic credence to notions of citizenship and life in a democratic society. Citizenship, as a practice, should be guided by “doing actions” and citizens are not necessarily in modes that represent a set of distinct conceptions most of the

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25 I contend that these are constitutive meanings of transformation following Van Wyk’s (2004), unpublished doctoral thesis.
time but rather modes that can be interpreted differently at different times (McLaughlin, 1992: 237). But what do the minimalist and maximalist positions represent? I shall briefly discuss maximalist and minimalist notions of citizenship as these have implications for the manner in which the critical outcomes are to be reconceptualised.

McLaughlin (1992: 236) distinguishes four features of democratic citizenship in terms of which he discusses minimalist and maximalist notions of democratic citizenship. These features are identity (conferred on the individual), virtues required of citizens, political involvement of the individual and social prerequisites for effective citizenship. These features are viewed against maximalist and minimalist notions. Among those advocating a minimalist view is Dieltiens (2004). Minimalist accounts of democratic citizenship would have it that citizenship is described or conceptualised in terms that are closely allied to that of the aggregative or representative notion of citizenship. The maximalist notion is aligned with the associative or participatory notions of democracy and citizenship that have been outlined earlier in this investigation. Amongst those advocating a maximalist approach are Divala (2004) and Mathebula (2004). Enslin and White (2003: 112) point out that “Sometimes the citizen/good citizen distinction is marked by versions of the minimal/maximal and passive/active distinction but … this can be too rough and ready a distinction to catch all the important possibilities”.

Minimalist conceptions of citizenship refer to formal, legal and juridical status that reminds of aggregative forms of democracy. Maximalist notions requires of the citizen “a consciousness as a member of a living community with a shared democratic culture involving obligations and responsibilities as well as rights, a sense of common good, fraternity and so on” (McLaughlin, 1992: 236). Thus, a maximalist notion reminds of associative notions of democracy. But more importantly for education and thus for this study is the impact of minimalist and maximalist conceptions of democratic citizenship for educational practice. For this study a crucial question to ask is the degree of critical understanding and questioning that is required of citizenship. In this regard McLaughlin (1992: 237) posits that a maximal understanding requires insight into “democratic principles, values and procedures on the part

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26 The aggregative and associative notions of citizenship were discussed in Chapter Three.
of the citizen, together with the dispositions and capacities required for participation in democratic citizenship”. Critical outcomes that are reconceptualised along the lines of a continuum that favours a leaning toward a maximalist notion of democratic citizenship may be able to foster critical citizens for a deep democracy. Thus, this study argues for a leaning toward a maximalist understanding of democratic citizenship as viewed on a continuum if a break from past apartheid education is to be made and if the individualist and instrumental tendencies of neo-liberalism is to be tempered.27

Whenever the national Department of Education makes a reference to the critical outcomes of OBE it is in most cases seemingly done against a background that spells out the importance of education for the economic welfare of South Africa. In this way the Department of Education acknowledges a connection between education and the economy. Aronowitz and Giroux (2000: 336) remark that it seems that higher education has a “role in increasing worker productivity and enhancing economic growth”. At this point I need to give instances of how this is realised in policy documents as this will give credence to my claim concerning the connection between education and a globalised South African economy. The Government Gazette (1997: 7-10) lists under purposes, vision and challenges that higher education should,

Address the development needs of society and provide the labour market, in a knowledge-driven and knowledge-dependent society, with ever-changing high level competencies and expertise necessary for the growth and prosperity of modern economy and contribute to the socialisation of enlightened, responsible and constructively critical citizens (DOE, 1997: 1).

This term (globalisation) refers to multiple, inter-related changes in social, cultural and economic relations, linked to the widespread impact of the information and communications revolution, the growth of trans-national scholarly and scientific networks, the accelerating integration of the world economy and intense competition among nations for markets (DOE, 1997: 9).

27 I have previously argued that globalisation is pernicious and seemingly leads to excessive individualism.
Against this backdrop higher education must provide education and training to develop the skills and innovations necessary for national development and successful participation in the global economy. In addition, higher education has to be internally restructured to face the challenge of globalisation, in particular, the breaking down of national and institutional boundaries which remove the spatial and geographic barriers to access (DOE, 1997: 9).

The above extracts, an instance being that "higher education must provide education and training to develop the skills and innovations necessary for national development and successful participation in the global economy", and there are more instances, highlight the connection between education and the South African economy on the one hand, and the connection between education and the influence of neo-liberalism and globalisation on the other hand. Neo-liberalism is that stream of political thought that favours the market place as central to political life. An inherent danger in neo-liberalist thought is an instrumentalism which seemingly leads to social engineering, normally associated with industrialised society. The ideals of neo-liberalism are driven by globalisation, seen as a vehicle for expansion of multi-national corporations that have the consequence that a few individuals control the world market and nation states. It has an emphasis on individual rights that at times are at the expense of the community and the common good. This, for Taylor (1985: 22), is a field within which meaning takes place. In reading the extracts and the connections that seemingly arise, one gains the impression that the state’s involvement in forging closer links between education and the economy is instrumental in nature and therefore seemingly concentrated on external goods that the practice of education promises such as profit that an upsurge in the economy may render. Put differently, that the state is not in the first place concerned about the education of its citizens for what it may mean to them as democratic citizens in a deep democracy, but rather the emphasis is on providing a specific kind of education in order to produce a specific citizen and worker that needs to fit the labour-market as prescribed by neo-

28 Neo-liberalism and its vehicle, globalisation, have been discussed in Chapter Three.
29 The conceptual connection between education and a globalised economy.
liberalism and globalisation and for the investment possibilities that such education may bring.

Policy emphasises that the South African economy is not insular and that the effect of global trends have to be considered. Now I concede that South Africa has to take cognisance of what is happening in the rest of the world economically, socially and culturally. But it is the manner in which globalisation impinges upon education and the manner in which the South African Government seems to lend credence to the inevitability thesis that concerns this study. As a result of the credence given to globalisation (as it emerges in policy documents), one gains the feeling that the only manner in which the critical outcomes could be framed was against a background of globalisation. There are seven critical outcomes as proposed by the South African Qualifications Authority (WECD, 1997: 5). I shall at this point have a closer look at the critical outcomes in order to show how, when the critical outcomes are influenced by the agenda of globalisation, they seemingly engender a "thin" individualist conception of democracy and democratic citizenship. "Thin" democracy in this sense refers to the aggregative or representative forms of democracy that favours formal, legal and juridical status conferred on citizens by the state. "Thin" democracy requires of the citizen a passive or minimal involvement in the affairs of the state (knowing your rights) such as voting when required to do so legally. Citizenship is concerned with individual gain and is associated with a minimalist notion of citizenship. "Deep" democracy requires that the citizen is interested and participates in issues that concern the common good, a citizen that is active in political affairs and has concern for others as part of a community. Such a democracy is concerned with inclusion, especially those that were historically excluded such as women, children, certain ethnic groups, the mentally and physically challenged, gays, lesbians, those affected by the HIV pandemic and so on.

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30 Investment by transnational corporates such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that drive global efforts.
31 The inevitability thesis claims that globalisation is inevitable, that there is no way in which the influence of globalisation can be avoided or minimized.
With regard to students, the critical outcomes state that first, students must identify and solve problems in which responses display that responsible decisions using critical and creative thinking have been made. Second, students should be able to work effectively with others as members of a team, group, organisation or community. Third, students should be able to organise and manage themselves and their activities responsibly and effectively. Fourth, students should be able to collect, analyse, organise and critically evaluate information. Fifth, students should be able to communicate effectively using visual, mathematical and/or language skills in the modes of oral and/or written presentation. Sixth, students should use science and technology effectively and critically, showing responsibility towards the environment and health of others. Seventh, students should demonstrate an understanding of the world as a set of related systems by recognising that problem-solving contexts do not exist in isolation.

I claim that if the critical outcomes of South African OBE are framed in a spirit of neo-liberalism that encourages globalisation, such outcomes can only foster a spirit of individualism that encourages exclusion rather than inclusion. Critical outcomes framed in this way cannot foster a critical community of the type that one finds in a deep democracy, a democracy that seeks to include in a maximalist sense as advocated by McLaughlin’s (1992: 237) continuum. At the same time I tend to give the South African government the benefit of the doubt as I do not believe that this was the spirit that they intended the critical outcomes to engender, but that forces beyond their control shaped the meanings of the critical outcomes in a particular way that leads to thin transformation, that is, transformation that does not lead to “deep” democracy.

Since the critical outcomes seem to be framed in terms of individualism that a neo-liberal agenda encourages there seems to be little room for the ideals of deliberation that I claim frame outcomes in a conceptually different manner to enable community spiritedness needed for the fostering of a critical mass. In this regard Young (2000: 20) remarks that a democratic

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32 Western Cape Education Department (WECO) Curriculum 2005, 1997: 5).
33 A student in this context refers to anyone who engages in education and schooling. Thus, it includes learners as well, irrespective of age and gender.
model based on individualism “lacks any distinct idea of a public formed from the interaction of democratic citizens and their motivation to reach some decision. Thus there is no account of the possibility of political co-ordination and co-operation”. Macedo (1990: 14) in commenting on liberal individuality remarks,

Liberal individuality has loosened the bonds between citizens that come from ‘common allegiance to and a common pursuit of goods’ and has put nothing in their place. We have no understanding of, let alone any devotion to, a common set of virtues that would give meaning and direction to our lives and make our polity a moral community. For communitarians like MacIntyre, diversity and individuality alienate men (women) from inherited standards, shared norms, and one another. Aimless, arbitrary, isolated, manipulated … all that keeps liberal individuals from plunging into a war of all against all is an imposed ‘bureaucratised unity’ (My italics).

The unity that is referred to is of a conceptually different kind to the one offered by communitarians – a unity based on preferences that is, in turn, based on individual gain. Also, I claimed that deliberation so important to communitarianism can best be nurtured by the practice of democratic citizenship in classroom practices. I shall now discuss the critical outcomes. My aim in doing so is to establish legitimacy for my claim that the critical outcomes, framed in terms of the ideals of neo-liberalism engender a community conceptually different to that of communitarianism – a democratic community in a “thin” aggregative sense – one that cannot engender democratic citizens for a deliberative democracy to flourish.

Critical outcomes that refer to practices34 of “critical and creative thinking” can only foster such practices in a narrow sense, I claim. My claim is based on the critical outcomes of OBE being predetermined. In view of this there are claims that such outcomes are manipulative and tend to stunt efforts toward creativity and critical thinking. In this regard Jansen (1999: 150)

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34 In terms of my argument earlier in this chapter, I refer to concepts such as “critical and creative thinking” as practices for it is in the doing that they find meaning, that is, within the practice.
remarks that “specifying outcomes in advance may be anti-democratic. It is sufficient to argue that this policy offers an instrumentalist view of knowledge”.

If outcomes are preset, learners are stunted in terms of thinking beyond the outcomes. In fact, learners have very little reason to think beyond outcomes that serve as benchmarks for there is no challenge to move beyond. For once the benchmarks (outcomes) have been attained learners have demonstrated their competence in terms of which success is measured. Critical and creative thinking takes place only within the boundaries of the set outcomes and in this way seemingly manipulates learning. Learners are not challenged to think beyond the preset outcomes for the satisfaction (success) is in achieving the outcome. Also, in setting an outcome in advance the thinking of learners is guided in a certain way to attain the specified outcome. Waghid (2002: 10) concedes that the outcomes can be logically connected to critical inquiry and I agree. For me the question is rather whether the relation between the outcomes and critical and creative thinking is conceptual rather than logical, for if so, one can inquire after the internal goods of critical and creative thinking as practices. If not, a logical relationship seems to be contingent and as such one would then have to enquire after the external goods that such a relation holds. The question for Waghid (2002: 10) is whether the outcomes are incommensurate with rational reflection and imagination. Rational reflection and imagination are internal goods in terms of which education can be justified. This question will be looked at when this study reconceptualises the outcomes in terms of democratic citizenship. I contend that outcomes that are preset are incommensurate with a deliberative practice that deems to foster democratic citizens for the reason that a constitutive meaning of deliberation is that it is open-ended. “Critical inquiry requires more than “mastering” a set of predictable, uniform, standardised and certain outcomes at the same time” (Waghid, 2000: 10). Critical outcomes framed in terms of globalisation lead to stunted critical and creative thinking for neo-liberalism favours the market, is driven primarily by profit considerations and is instrumental in nature in that a certain type of worker/citizen is required by industry that has skills needed by the economy. Thus, neo-liberalism is driven by an urge to control the world, to render it subject to prediction and technical solutions that can be easily fixed.
The critical outcomes also require learners to be able to “work effectively with others as a member of a team, group, organisation or community”. The notion of a group for neo-liberalism needs to be interrogated for “Liberal humanism treats each person as an individual, ignoring differences of race, sex, religion, and ethnicity. Each person should be evaluated only according to her or his individual efforts and achievements”, states Young (1990: 166). Neo-liberalism can logically be associated with group, organisation and community formation. An instance of such group formation is when individuals participate in voting in the polity. A group of people (as represented by their votes), being a majority in a specific matter of preference, may vote for a specific representative. But this group may not have anything in common other than their voting for a specific official to represent them. Individuals in such a group may not even know each other for their forming a group in the above manner is contingent with satisfaction of self interest. This cannot be a group in a communitarian sense for there is not necessarily collective decision making based on deliberation.\(^{35}\) Moreover, motivation for voting for a specific official is based on instrumentalism and is extrinsic in that it is about the external goods\(^ {36}\) of the democratic process of election. In this way voting becomes a means to an end.\(^ {37}\)

Another instance of such community formation is our modern day suburbs where people are supposedly a community, but relations go no further than the occasional greeting or accidental meeting at the shopping centre. It may be more apposite to speak of such people as persons (individuals) residing in the same vicinity rather than being a group in a deliberative sense. When learners in a classroom situation are required to form groups, it does not necessarily mean that they form groups in a way that democratic citizenship requires. They may be lumped together to complete a specific task and may even speak to each other and yet be individuals that participate in the group for their own interest. They may not even care for each other and trust may be lacking. In this way one is never sure of the sincerity of individuals as they may hold back on information that may benefit the group as individualism encourages competition.

\(^{35}\) Collective decision making and deliberation are constitutive of communitarian communities.

\(^{36}\) In which way can this action profit me?

\(^{37}\) I am not saying that the extrinsic and the intrinsic cannot be in a complementary relationship as “good” education may require. What I am saying is that the one should not be at the expense of the other.
A feature of globalisation is technological advancement. I doubt whether people will deny that the advances made in the technological age did not at least hold some benefit for mankind. The global explosion of knowledge as provided by the Internet serves as reminder. The downside of such technological advances are that people become less attached to communities “in the real sense” as they engage more and more with others via chatrooms and become more private and tend to lose a sense of belonging. In this way individuals advance studies by doing online courses, do their shopping (home delivery), their banking and even attend “church” and so on. Barber (1998: 21) remarks that the individual as consumer is,

autonomous, solitary, and egoistic – likely to venture into the social sector only to get something from a service-station state whose compass of activities must be kept minimal, the libertarian model of civil society can envision only a rudimentary form of social relations that remains shallowly instrumental: the citizen as client, the voter as customer, the democratic participant as consumer.

Although these individuals are part of a group when they engage in certain activities the groups are constituted in a radically different way to the traditional notion of groups where people engage because they are social beings, not for personal gain only. A group in a communitarian sense requires more.

Outcomes also require of a learner to be able to “organise and manage oneself and one’s activities responsibly and effectively”. Concepts such as “organise and manage” and “responsibly and effectively” are conceptualised differently by neo-liberalism and globalisation. Managing oneself and one’s activities refer to the individual that operates outside of the community. Such individuals do not identify and conceptualise meanings intersubjectively in a community but are bent on self-gain and self-satisfaction. “Organise and manage” and “responsibly and effectively” in a globalised environment has to do with extrinsic motivation – with capital gain in mind. To participate in practices of organising and managing implies effectiveness and responsibility (accountability). To complete a task effectively means doing whatever is necessary. When capital gain is the motive people
normally “get hurt” but this does not concern globalisation as is evidenced in worldwide poverty and the growing divide between rich and poor. Problems that occur in these practices are technical matters that merely require technical solutions. Moreover, the concepts effectiveness, managerialism and accountability are part of a globalised discourse that is employed in the corporate world. Such concepts imply particular practices that are bent on instrumentalism, the external goods of practices and technological solutions. I posit that education is a different activity to that of business because of radically different constitutive meanings. Education is about “something worthwhile” not exclusively bent on capital gain such as is the focus of business. Education, I think, deserves more and better. Education cannot simply be an instrument in the hands of neo-liberalism intent on manipulating education for its own benefits such as coercing education to prepare learners for a specific job market that requires specific skills to engender profit.

The outcomes envisage that learners should “communicate effectively”. Thoughts around this have been addressed in part when I discussed the notion of groups. Communication is a constitutive meaning of groups in a deliberative sense. The claim that people are social beings means that they interact with others and partly defines in terms of such others, as part of a group. Part of interacting with others must surely include talking, negotiating, persuading and so on, on a face to face level and not in a way that is advanced by modern technology of which the Internet is an instance. But what does it mean if one is to communicate “effectively”? For globalisation it means “to get the job done”. This means that communication is goal-oriented, that the emphasis is not on socialisation, but based on time constraints. Often one hears the phrase “Time is money”. It is not necessarily the most persuasive argument that prevails in these circumstances. To do so is to waste time. All that is needed is to find the best means in the shortest time available to attain an end – normally profit-related and related to instrumental reasoning. Rather, the effect of non-communication (based on individualism) that globalisation advances seems to be all pervasive in our society, giving less credence to group formation and communication in a deliberative communitarian sense. The human element in association with the world is getting “thinner”. People are identified in terms of data, graphs and numbers. No one cares about you unless you can prove
yourself to be who you are in terms of your number. Instances are banking accounts, Automatic teller machines (ATM’s), identity numbers, student numbers, address numbers, grave numbers, the list goes on. No one will also deny the benefits that the introduction of technology such as computers and the Internet has had for education. To deny such would be foolish. But at the same time computers in school has had the effect that learners interact less with each other and with the facilitator (teacher) leaving less space for reasoned argument. I shall dispute claims that engaging with others via the Internet and receiving lessons via a computer is an adequate substitute for interaction (communication) with one’s fellow travellers (facilitators and learners at school). For Taylor (1991: 8) this signifies a loss of freedom – where institutional structures38 are imposed upon humankind.

“To use science and technology effectively and critically and with responsibility towards the environment” sounds laudable. However, under the influence of neo-liberalism and globalisation “using science and technology” could also refer to external benefits such as profit. As discussed, this could lead to instrumental reasoning that is not necessarily to the benefit of humankind but could be advanced for individual gain.39 Waghid (2001: 461) argues that at higher institution level “course offerings in humanities and social sciences integrated with those of science, mathematics and technology in the first two years could be best suited to promote critical thought”. Waghid (2001: 461) reasons that “This would deepen the capacities of students to understand and practise values of democracy, such as freedom, identity, citizenship, rights, diversity, tolerance and racism – all those values necessary to pursue democratic citizenship in a new South Africa”. These thoughts could be incorporated into the critical outcomes of education for reasons as given by Waghid. At the same time the outcome requires responsibility toward the environment and the health of others. This is paradoxical for individuals in a neo-liberal sense have responsibility and accountability toward self rather than the other and more, such individuals are inclined toward individual gain and gain for one is at the expense of the other. Evidence of greed and destruction is all around us. Futile attempts are being made in some quarters to stop the devastation of the

38 In this case the influence of modern technology as represented by computerisation of society.
39 In this sense multi-national corporations and donor agencies are also considered as individuals that can advance the agenda of globalisation.
environment and the negative effects on health generally. There is still the question of the United States of America’s invasion of an independent nation, supposedly in its effort to safeguard humankind against the threat of nuclear weapons. The AIDS pandemic threatens, excluded groups (instances are women, gays and lesbians) are clamouring for inclusion for they sense that under the influence (onslaught?) of globalisation they may be relegated to further exclusion rather than the inclusion and acceptance that a communitarian community may offer.

The outcomes also require learners to understand the world as “a set of related systems”. In this regard one just needs to think of the inter-relatedness of economic systems, so that a rise in the price of crude oil is felt all over the world. Globalisation has had the effect that the world has become smaller. Communication across the world is possible all the time and is instantaneous. The boundaries between nations are in a constant state of erosion as citizenship takes on different forms. There is now a sense of people as global citizens, which in itself has positive and negative connotations. On the downside there seems to be more and more a loss of identity as people crisscross the world physically and by means of the television, Internet, video-conferencing, video and digital technology and so on. This in itself can also be positive. On the upside there is also the wealth of information that learners are exposed to, if they are fortunate enough to attend a school where technology is available. Unfortunately in South Africa the former disadvantaged schools still have a huge backlog. There are many schools that still operate from inadequate structures (or none as in the open veld) where there may be a lack of electricity and skilled facilitators. For one cannot learn to “demonstrate an understanding” of the modern world if you are excluded in certain ways. In this way the claim that globalisation exacerbates the cleavage between rich and poor (most notably in terms of schooling) is underscored. Globalisation loses sight of human

40 In this regard the think of efforts of the WWF, Greenpeace, efforts at decreasing the effects on the ozone layer and so on.

41 The work of Nussbaum (1997) is informative on this subject. She refers to “World Citizens”. This for Nussbaum this means that “we should work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, showing respect for the human wherever it occurs, and allowing that respect to constrain our national or local politics” (1997: 60-61).

42 Taylor (1991) and Barber (1998) have similar ideas in this regard.
situatedness. The world is not egalitarian in the sense that all have the necessary resources, abilities or access. The critical outcomes of OBE do not take the non-egalitarian nature of society into consideration and outcomes are formulated as if all things are equal and this is for me a serious conceptual flaw. South African society is not an egalitarian society and with the emphasis on human capital gaining ascendancy the divide between rich and poor (historically advantaged and historically disadvantaged schools) is gaining momentum rather than decreasing in terms of attending to transformation principles such as equity and redress.

In sum, the critical outcomes of South African Outcomes-based education seem to engender an individualism and instrumentalism that is required by a neo-liberal and globalised agenda that is intent on capital gain. In this way the outcomes are formulated to lend credence to the external goods of education that can only justify education in an instrumental manner. I claim that the outcomes should be framed in also in terms of the internal goods of education that lend credence to a non-instrumental justification of education. This becomes possible if the outcomes are framed in terms of the internal goods of democratic citizenship that can engender critical citizens for a deep democracy.

My claim up till now was that the outcomes of OBE on the agenda of globalisation cannot lead to transformation as required for a deep democracy. Outcomes need to be framed differently, not in terms of globalisation and neo-liberalism as this seemingly leads to a “thin” or “weak” conception of democracy that is based on instrumentalism and gain for the individual, seemingly at the expense of notions of communitarianism that has constitutive meanings of inclusion and equality – necessary for democratic citizenship. My argument, then, favoured a communitarian notion of democracy that seemingly has the potential to engender democratic citizenship that is transformative. At this time I need to briefly explore tenets of communitarianism that can enhance this study. This I need to do to explore to which extent, if any, meanings of communitarianism, that I so fervently argued for, can engender deep democracy. I shall discuss deep democracy in the following section.
4.3 COMMUNITARIANISM: A TENET OF DEEP DEMOCRACY

A potential critic like Miller (2000: 98) may level the accusation at me that “communitarianism as an umbrella term is politically amorphous”. To underscore his claim Miller notes the existence of at least three forms of communitarianism: an authoritarian communitarian version (of the right), an egalitarian notion (of the left) and a liberal version. I do not deem it necessary for this study to elaborate on the three versions and what separates them. Though, I shall briefly look at the egalitarian notion of communitarianism that I think enhances my argument in terms of the constitutive meanings of a community for a deep democracy. Miller (2000: 99) claims that what the three forms of communitarianism have in common is “a thesis about the social constitution of the self: the self cannot be understood apart from the social relations in which it is embedded. Putting this in different terms, the thesis is that we cannot understand human beings except against the background of social institutions, practices, forms of life which give them concrete identities”. Communitarianism is contrasted with individualism. This has been my line of argument thus far; that perhaps communitarianism offers a model that justifies democracy in a more acceptable way than individualism seems to offer. This is then the reason why I argued that the critical outcomes should rather be framed in terms of a spirit of communitarianism than the individualism that neo-liberalism offers, for communitarianism seems more inclusive and holds the hope of engendering virtues of democratic citizenship. I shall now explore the egalitarian notion of communitarianism for I need to explore what it has to offer a deeply democratic community, that is, whether critical outcomes for democratic citizenship can be framed in a spirit of egalitarian communitarianism to foster a deep democracy.

Egalitarian communitarianism, also known as left communitarianism, “is perhaps best expressed through a doctrine of strong citizenship: this says that though people may choose to relate to one another in many different ways, their most basic form of association must be as equal citizens engaged in collective self-determination” posits Miller (2000: 105). There are two features that distinguish egalitarian communitarianism. First, the emphasis is on equality, that each citizen enjoys a status equal to any other. But as citizens there is also the admission
(perhaps acceptance) that they are not equal in all respects; that as individuals within a community each also has talents and skills that define them as individuals, qualities for which they are valued as human beings in general, and as individuals in particular. They are thus equal in respect of each having qualities that the other may not have. Second, the notion of community is open, that is, the members that constitute such a community can collaboratively deliberate about issues that affect them without being tied down by notions of tradition that are seemingly sanctified and thus not open to deliberation. This is strong citizenship in a deliberative democracy for Miller (2000: 105). Waghid’s (2003b: 53) concern with “a political community which unites members as equal persons is the view that people need to engage in collective deliberation”. The above notions of communitarianism emphasise equality, that is, equality is a constitutive meaning of communitarianism. However, the concept of equality has a particular meaning within a communitarian society as explained above. Also, the notion of openness is emphasised, that deliberation in such a community is approached in a spirit that leaves room to be persuaded otherwise and to come to different understandings concerning matters that concern the community. Matters concerning the community are matters that concern the common good. What makes them such is that they are to the benefit of all and are thus pursued collectively. Thus said, if pursued by the community it must have value for the community, making this a community in pursuit of the internal goods. Now internal goods are goods for the sake of which something (normally a practice) is done, that is, it is valued for its own sake. Collective deliberation and decision making is a practice of a communitarian community that is highly valued. Waghid (2003b: 60) posits that MacIntyre refers to communitarianism as “practical reasoning”. This is a practice of a sharing together of ideas in an atmosphere of deliberative engagement, that can emerge at all levels in such a community, instances are the school classroom, families, social clubs and so on. It is this community-spiritedness that I contend needs to be fostered in the classroom (in terms of outcomes) if a deeply democratic society is to be fostered.

What troubled this investigation about individualism was that it engaged in community activity mostly for utilitarian purposes. In this way the constitutive meanings (what makes a community a community) of a community seemed unjustifiable in terms of calls (justifiable)
for inclusion and equality (in a thick sense). This is why my argument favoured a “thicker” sense of community such as offered by communitarianism. I posit that the egalitarian notion of communitarianism will enhance this study.

4.4 EXPLORING MEANINGS OF DEEP DEMOCRACY

I shall explore meanings of deep democracy that has bearing on this investigation, meanings that can enhance reasons for critical outcomes to be framed in order to foster a deep democracy. The preceding discussion centred on a defence of my contention in favour of communitarianism rather than individualism. In doing so, my defence was also one that argued for a communitarian spirit that is needed for a democracy in a deeper sense.

Central to any democracy, I think, is its citizens. It is to the extent that citizens exercise their democratic rights that a democracy will be judged. In a neo-liberal sense “Citizenship is not valued for its own sake; we are citizens only because we demand goods that require public provision. The citizen, to put it briefly, is a rational consumer of public goods. As far as possible his activities as a citizen should be modelled on his behaviour in the economic market, taken to be a paradigm of rationality” (Miller, 2000: 50). This brings forth the question of virtues that citizens should be imbued with, virtues that are internal goods of practices of democratic citizenship. My contention is that the virtues needed for democratic citizenship are also those needed for a deep democracy, a democracy in an associative sense. Democratic citizenship requires more from the citizen than citizenship in an aggregative sense. Democratic citizenship is not about a coming together for a show of individual preferences that may even include a measure of competition, for the emphasis here is on selecting public officials (as representatives) in a competition about aggregation of preferences, about a community (and individuals therein) that establishes itself contingently for a specific end. Rather, democratic citizens gather (in a communitarian sense) to deliberate about common goods, with an agenda that is open to persuasion by the better argument. Ends in this sense, are not pre-determined such as when an official announces his/her manifesto at public meetings, but “aims and purposes” are collectively discussed and deliberated. In this
regard Miller (2000: 105) remarks that “people flourish best when they associate together on the basis of equality, and have a deep interest in shaping their physical and social environment collectively”. A constitutive meaning of a community is that it has to include in a deep sense. That is after all what makes a community a community. The degree of inclusion\(^\text{43}\), however, defines the type of community. Young posits that one norm often invoked by those seeking to widen and deepen democratic practices is inclusion (Young, 2000: 5). For Young (2000: 6), a deep democracy is encapsulated in a model of deliberative democracy that implies,

A strong meaning of inclusion and political equality which, when implemented increases the likelihood that democratic decision-making processes will promote justice. On a deliberative understanding of democratic practice, democracy is not only a means through which the citizens can promote interests and hold the power of rulers in check. It is also a means of collective problem-solving which depends for its legitimacy and wisdom on the expression and criticism of diverse opinions of all members of society. Inclusive democratic practice is likely to promote the most just results because people aim to, persuade one another of the justice and wisdom of their claims, and are open to having their own opinions and understandings of their interests change in the process.

Deep democracy is concerned with being sensitive about each others needs, about changing the lived experiences of people. Green (1999: xiv) posits that deep democracy “will equip people to expect, to understand, and to value diversity and change while preserving and projecting both democratically humane cultural values and interactively sustainable environmental values in a dynamic, responsive way”. Green (1999: xiv) is of the opinion that a deep democracy is able to transform the “democratically deficient world societies”. I view South Africa’s attempts at transformation as unique but also as deficient in many ways. Crime, hi-jacking, unemployment, abuse (of various kinds), poverty, hunger, AIDS and high illiteracy rates are not conducive of a deliberative democracy that Young and Green refer to.

\(^{43}\) The nature of engagement is also important.
Exclusion of women, gays, lesbians and the physically and mentally impaired are still in evidence. To this extent people are not treated as equals, nor is equal access guaranteed in society (instances are schools and universities). For many citizens little has changed since the inception of the democratic government in 1994. The above scenario of wider society is not the seedbed for deliberative democracy and the nurturing of democratic citizens. Moreover, the effects of globalisation that can be seen in retrenchments, managerialism, performativity, efficiency and effectiveness (as instances) in both private and public sectors, increase the chances of promoting a thin democracy. I contend that the way to foster a deliberative democracy that is based on democratic citizenship that will lead to deep democracy is through conceptualising the critical outcomes of OBE in terms of democratic citizenship. Put in another way, education has to conceptualise its critical outcomes differently, in a way that makes a critical mass possible – a mass in a critical pragmatic sense. I shall now reconceptualise the critical outcomes of Outcomes-based education in a framework of democratic citizenship.

4.5 CRITICAL OUTCOMES OF OBE RECONCEPTUALISED IN TERMS OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

At the start of this chapter I argued that the critical outcomes should not be framed in terms of a neo-liberal agenda that leads to individualism and exclusion that is commensurate with instrumental reasoning. I contend that the critical outcomes be informed by a critical pragmatism\(^4\) that is critical in nature, always in a state of becoming, has as meaning intelligent choice and does not advocate finality. Outcomes are to be seen as practices framed in this way. In an Aristotelian sense, the outcomes are forms of “doing action”. As such critical outcomes are practices that are practised by teachers and learners alike (in a collective manner), in search of the internal goods (virtues) of practices. In this way then the critical outcomes can be justified in a non-instrumental way because they contain “something worthwhile”. Put differently, framing outcomes in terms of democratic citizenship is to claim that the practice of democratic citizenship has internal goods that a community cherishes and

\(^4\) In Chapter One I proposed that the investigation be conceptualised within a critical theory that is informed by pragmatism.
which education must nurture in their young. It is the internal goods of the critical outcomes so framed that will now be explored. I shall reconceptualise each outcome as discussed in the beginning of this chapter. At this point I must clarify that reconceptualisation of the critical outcomes does not necessarily mean that each outcome should be rewritten. Rather, what it does mean is that the meaning of the concepts should be reconceptualised in a different framework. At first the outcomes were seen as means to an end (satisfying neo-liberalism) and now to be reconceptualised as practices of education in a non-instrumental way without losing sight of the impingement of neo-liberalism. I concur with Benhabib (1996: 70) when she states that “a theory of democracy, as opposed to a general moral theory, would have to be concerned with the question of institutional specifications and practical feasibility”. For me “practical feasibility” in some sense means taking heed of the perils of globalisation. Put differently, learners must also be prepared for their social stations in life, not to do so would be foolish, for a stable democracy is also one where citizens are able to look after themselves and where they are part of and contribute to the economy in a responsible way.

What I am proposing then, is that though the outcomes will be framed in a manner that fosters democratic citizenship, each critical outcome so framed has to take into consideration the pernicious influence that globalisation has on the practices of communities. I am not arguing for a complementary relationship between globalisation and democratic citizenship. Globalisation has the potential to reduce the social, cultural and political domains of society to mere places for individual gain, competition, and a rootlessness of spirit. Learners should be shown the danger of globalisation for a democratic community and be given skills to cope with it whilst being aware that they cannot ignore globalisation.

*To identify and solve problems in which responses display that responsible decisions using critical and creative thinking have been made.*

I claimed at the beginning to Chapter Three that the critical outcomes are predetermined and instrumental. My reasoning was that the outcomes are set in a manner that the learner is guided toward a particular outcome or result. All effort is concentrated in achieving a pre-
specified measure that indicates success. What remains for the learner with the aid of his/her teacher/facilitator is to find the route to the end. “The major focus is and will be on technical or “coping” skills. Whether the students are rich or poor, privileged or deprived, the orientation has been to accommodation, to fitting into existing social and economic structures, to what is given, to what is inescapably there” (Greene, 1988: 12). Everyone engaged in the activity\(^{45}\) knows what is expected. There is seldom if any chance for the unexpected, for something to happen that both the learner and the facilitator did not imagine. Is not this the epitome of education? Is this not about the internal goods for which the practise is cherished? Is this not how humankind makes wonderful discoveries – when able to imagine beyond the box? To what extent can one be creative when a cap is placed on your head? Burbules (1997: 74) remarks that “critical thought is to help students think differently ... At a deeper level, learning to think differently means standing outside a particular set of assumptions, categories, and values to consider the possibility of how the world is, given a different set of them. It is a disproof at the level of practice of radical incommensurability, to the extent that we and our students can entertain the possibility that the paradigms we happen to take for granted do not define the horizons of the universe.” Boostrom (1997: 57) remarks that “a student may learn a lesson the teacher never intended, and this outcome may be as highly valued as any that was planned”. But more than that, I think that Greene (1988: 9) in discussing freedom aptly sums up that “When people cannot name alternatives, imagine a better state of things, share with others a project of change, they are likely to remain anchored or submerged, even as they proudly assert their autonomy”. For Greene outcomes that are specified in advance are indicative of a loss of freedom; learners are robbed of a freedom to explore, to imagine and to be creative. Specified outcomes stifle imagination – for Greene the key to education. “To tap into imagination is to become able to break with what is supposedly fixed and finished, objectively and independently real. It is to see beyond what the imaginer has called normal or “common-sensible” and to carve out new orders in experience. Doing so, a person may become freed to glimpse what may be, to form notions of what should be and what is not yet” (Greene, 1995: 19).

\(^{45}\) “Activity”, for me this is not a practice as argued.
The type of educational freedom (encapsulated in reconceptualised critical outcomes) that will engender a critical mass for democratic citizenship is the freedom espoused by Greene, Burbules and Boostrom above. Citizens who are free in this way are able to come up with different reasons, are not set in their thinking about what concerns the common good or a thick communitarianism. In this way learners gain a freedom in the classroom that encourages them to go beyond the expected, to come up with novel ways of thinking about things – ways which adults/facilitators have long since abandoned or were too fearful to explore as they are caught up in their isolated security of individualism. Greene (1988: 14) posits that children who have been provoked to reach beyond themselves, to wonder, to imagine, to pose their own questions are the ones most likely to learn to learn”. Boostrom (1997: 49) asserts that “the key element of transformation may lie in the emphasis that we find in Socratic or Christlike teachers. Jackson calls transformative instruction philosophical because it involves, he says, the use of “discussion, demonstration, and argumentation”; it has to do with asking questions; and it means “doing one’s own thinking.”

Added to the above critique, responsible decisions mean that decisions are taken in recognition of a framework that already exists. It speaks of a particular set of values in terms of which decisions will be judged as responsible or not. If the outcomes are trapped in instrumentality, I think that there is little chance of decisions being judged in terms of a new framework, of thinking outside of the box. In fact, novel ways of thinking and thinking about things differently may even be penalised in a classroom practice that specifies not only the outcomes but all the units along the way and in this way disempowers thinking of learners, pointing to ways that rather stifle critical and creative thinking. Rather, responsible decision-making should be related to a spirit of communitarianism and deliberation, where decisions affect the common good. In this way learners should in doing their practice of learning and thinking for themselves engage with what is in the interest not only of themselves as individuals but as individuals that are part of a community, in this instance the class or the school as community. Critical and creative thinking should be linked to the imagination, to that which is not determinable in advance. Critical outcomes in the above sense will lead to the fostering of democratic citizenship.
Work effectively with others as a member of a team, group, organisation, community.

For Gutmann (1987: 90) a participatory approach to education “gives priority to cultivating self-esteem and social commitment over humility and order, a priority presumed by the democratic goal of educating citizens willing and able to participate in politics”. A participatory approach to education is also a communitarian approach (which this study favours). Communitarianism necessarily implies participation in one form or another. However, participation may also logically be linked to individualism – it is not this type of participation that is implied here.

Enslin and White (2003: 124) emphasise that the school as a community should be the seedbed for learners’ first encounter with democracy and democratic procedure. I concur with them when they share the following remarks about the school as a community. They state that,

As an institution the school like any other institution in the society will be expected to be organised and run on democratic lines. In this sense the ethos in all schools, however old or young their students, will be democratic and the arrangements, characteristic ways of doing things, and the attitudes of staff and students will, thus indirectly, mutually encourage in the members of the school the qualities required for living in a democratic community. It will include an education in civic virtue, covering virtues like justice, tolerance, trust, and distrust, honesty, hope, decency, gratitude, loyalty, mercy, and so on.

For most teachers, when one mentions Outcomes-based education some form of group work is conjured up in their minds. My concern is that the practice of group work is rarely interrogated. Questions about the nature of a group in a sense that it explores the virtues of a democratic community espoused above are seldom asked. There seems to be an acceptance (assumption) that when individual pupils are asked to sit around a table in order to complete
some task or other, that they constitute a group in a deliberative democratic manner. But a group is more than a set of individuals who are contingently in close proximity – for that is what learners many times are. A group in a communitarian sense requires more. To nurture a group in a democratic sense would require that the constitutive meanings of inclusion and equality be present. Many a time learners are excluded whilst sitting in the group. They are in the group but not a constitutive part of the group. There are factors that militate against inclusion. Instances are language, articulation, ethnicity, religion, culture, age, physical and mental challenges and sex. As far as language is concerned, those who communicate in their first language normally have an advantage in a group situation. They are better able to articulate their preferences or objections and in this way are able to convince others to their vantage point, not necessarily for the better argument but because no one dares to challenge their eloquence. The type of conversation that should be encouraged is where conversation is open-ended and encourages deliberation in a reasoned and reflexive manner. This type of conversation creates space for minority points of view and becomes inclusive in this way. It is the task of the facilitator to create spaces for the inclusion of others on an equal basis, but the facilitator must first become aware of the inequalities that abound. Depending on numbers in a group males or females may exert dominance. At other times the topic that needs to be interrogated may include or exclude in terms of sex, experience, language and so on. Also, what needs to be communicated for a democratic spirit is that the group is not there for individual gain only. One may find that individuals, because of competition, withhold information and tend to glean information from others. Facilitators should explain that groups are there for the benefit of all and competitive urges that lead to selfishness should be discouraged. There should be a certain allegiance to the group as the individual finds meaning (self-identity) through the group, whether this is the class, a group in the class, the school, the family or other groups in the community.

"To work effectively" is part of the neo-liberal discourse. Greene (1988: 12) reminds us that the dominant watchwords of globalisation remain “effectiveness”, “proficiency”, “efficiency”, and an ill-defined, one-dimensional “excellence”. To work “effectively” in a communitarian sense would rather refer to how one relates to others in a group situation.
This means that there is a measure of trust and sincerity in such a group as it points to different participants being responsible for different aspects if working on a project. This would be “effective” organisation but the emphasis would be on co-operation, inclusion and equality in the group and not on personal gain, competition and necessarily on time constraints. Working with others then, is important if we wish to reconceptualise the critical outcomes so that it engenders democratic citizenship. The communitarian spirit is a constitutive meaning of democratic citizenship for within it is encapsulated equality and inclusion.

The critical outcomes also need to take cognisance of the concept of “world citizens” for this refers to groups and working with others in another sense, not local but across national boundaries. Nussbaum (1997: 68-69) advocates a curriculum for world citizenship. Citizens (as a local group) need the skills to work with and understand other groups (internationally). This has implications for cultural, language, racial, ethnic and religious differences. Nussbaum (1997: 69) further remarks that the curriculum for world citizenship should be for all students so that “as judges, as legislators, as citizens in whatever role, they will learn to deal with one another with respect and understanding. And this understanding and respect entail recognising not only difference but also, at the same time, commonality, not only a unique history but also common rights and aspirations and problems”. The critical outcomes should therefore be framed in such a way so that it encourages and nurtures a communitarian spirit in relation to the international polis as well.

Organise and manage oneself and one’s activities responsibly and effectively.

“Human consciousness, moreover, is always situated; and the situated person, inevitably engaged with others, reaches out and grasps the phenomena surrounding him/her from a particular vantage point and against a particular background consciousness”, Greene (1988: 21) reminds us. The critical outcome seems to allude to individualism with its emphasis on the “self”. In the earlier part of this chapter I noted this investigation’s misgivings about individualism of a liberal kind. The kind of individualism referred to here is one as nurtured
by neo-liberalism that conceives of the self as insular and the rest of the world as utilitarian space where motivation is toward the market and individual gain. The type of individual space that a spirit of communitarianism wishes to espouse is of the type that does not negate individual space. This type of individualism recognises that there is an identity outside that of the community. However, the identity that is cultivated by this individual is not cultivated in a vacuum. Earlier I referred to Greene (1988: 21) where she asserted that humankind is bound in “situatedness”, a background against which meaning is gained or conceptualised. The kind of individualism that should be encapsulated within the critical outcomes is one that finds identity in relation to a community. Practices that confer and cultivate meaning cannot be practices of individuals. Practices are essentially of a community. The practice of democratic citizenship required is that which resides on the minimalist – maximalist continuum, where space is created for an understanding of both the individual and the community. In this sense the individual finds identity in the community without having to abandon all sense of individualism to the community. Individualism of the sort that neo-liberalism encourages leads to competition and a spirit of selfishness – essentially undemocratic occupations that critical outcomes should not engender.

“To organise and manage oneself responsibly and effectively”. For globalisation the self is insular. There is no one other than the self, like a community, that one is responsible (accountable) to. Decisions are made in terms of own preferences. A measure of responsibility that resides outside of the self is one in relation to work. In this instance “organising” and “managing” is time and money related as it concerns profit margins. In this sense one is accountable for hours as against output that relates to gain. What the critical outcomes should advocate is a sense of responsibility toward the group - that the emphasis is on self-growth toward responsible civic virtues. Kymlicka and Norman (1994: 361) assert that participation does not necessarily imply responsibility which they assert is public-spirited rather than self interested. For democratic citizenship this would mean that the citizen/learner is able to manage time in a way that is advantageous to him/her and the group, instances being when the individual has to complete an activity for the group. “Effectively” does not necessarily relate to money spent, but would relate to the quality of the work done
in relation to the task set. A communitarian spirit in the classroom or at work does not lose sight of people and their contributions. They value what is shared in common in their deliberation and the virtues of caring and justice have importance.

**Collect, analyse, organise and critically evaluate information**

Enslin and White (2003: 117) concur that “as deliberation is conducted more and more through electronic media, citizens will need to acquire and exercise knowledge of information and communications technology”. Nussbaum's citizens of the world operate across spaces in time and place. Computers, the Internet, satellite installation, video-conferencing, cell phones, in short, the technological age, pose different challenges for democratic citizenship. Collecting, organising and analysing information has to take place in a different way and in ways that need to be investigated on an ongoing basis as technology changes. This indicates that the critical outcomes need to take into consideration the need for citizens that are flexible, able to adjust to the advances of technology and in so doing contribute to the knowledge of the community and a trans-national community. Such outcomes will encourage technological studies for knowledge of technological advancement is an enablement toward an inclusive society. In this regard one only need think of those in our community who cannot read and write – this leaves them isolated in a world of signs (directions), ATMs, car licences, SMSs, and so on. They are effectively excluded from society and are left with little self-esteem and less able to function as democratic citizens in a deliberative way.

The above critical outcome engages with the way people find meaning. One can not analyse, collect, organise and evaluate in a critical fashion unless one is empowered to do so. For Giroux (1988: 189) “empowerment” means the “process whereby students acquire the means to critically appropriate knowledge existing outside their immediate experience in order to broaden their understanding of themselves, the world, and the possibilities for transforming the taken-for-granted assumptions about the way we live”. What a deliberative democracy requires are citizens that engage in reflective thought. When learners engage in the practices
of analysis, critique and collection of information they should be able to see beyond their immediate location. It is not enough to be critical in your job only in that you are able to adjust when a problem occurs. Critical citizens should be able to use “the imagination not to resolve, not to point the way, not to improve. It is to awaken, to disclose the ordinarily unseen, unheard, and unexpected”, notes Greene (1995: 28). Critical citizens should be able to see how and where they fit into the greater scheme of things and have the necessary resolve to make changes if dissatisfied. An acceptance of the status quo is not evidence of the reflective mind of a democratic citizen. Reflection and the ability to give reasons are constitutive of deliberation – qualities that critical outcomes need to encapsulate.

**Communicate effectively using visual, mathematical, and/or language skills in the modes of oral and/or written presentation.**

“Communicating effectively” should not mean that those who have a better command of the language (first language as instance) should control the discussion. Also, it does not mean that those who are most eloquent should dominate, neither should those who are able to communicate in a reasoned and composed manner leaving aside flowery or halting speech. What it does mean is that there is a sense of shared understanding among the participants of the discussion. It means that each participant is afforded the opportunity to tell his/her story, to relate their narratives in a way that is comfortable to them and in a way that the listeners as participants can understand. There is an assumption that a measure of compassion is present when stories are so related. It does mean that the virtue of inclusivity is what determines the success of the communication and that the virtue of equality is prized highly. In this way “effective communication” that leads to a deep democracy is able to include marginalised groups. Greene (1988: 14) is rather disparaging in relation to the above outcome. For her these outcomes refer only to the ability to cope in the immediate oppressive circumstances that a marketplace orientation generates in the workplace. She remarks that “Little attention is paid to the de-skilling that may take place on a wide scale, as technology develops further; few, if any, proactive questions are posed as to the kind of technologies that may make the workplace more challenging and humane” (Greene, 1988: 14). For Greene dialogue opens
new spaces for communication. In the pursuit of mutual projects new perspectives open. “Language opens possibilities of seeing, hearing, understanding” (Greene, 1988: 21), “dialogue cannot be carried on in a climate of hopelessness. People trying to be more fully human must not only engage in critical thinking but must be able to imagine something coming of their hopes; their silence must be overcome by their search (Greene, 1995: 25). For Nussbaum (1997: 86) the written word (literature) is able to stir the imagination. Visual technology was discussed earlier when I discussed communication across boundaries (global citizens). I shall include mathematical skills in the following outcome.

**Use science and technology effectively and critically, showing responsibility towards the environment and health of others.**

There seems to be an overemphasis in our daily lives on the importance of mathematics and science. Recently the premier of the Western Cape announced that all learners in the province will have to take mathematics as a subject from 2006. This type of rationality has no interest in people and their abilities or leanings. If the economy demands such, then so be it. But Nussbaum (1997: 85) holds out another story. She asserts that arts play a vital role – a role that is negated because the immediate benefit to the economy cannot be seen. She claims that the arts play a role in cultivating powers of imagination that are essential to citizenship. “The arts cultivate capacities of judgment and sensitivity that can and should be expressed in the choices a citizen makes. To some extent this is true of all the arts. Music, dance, painting and sculpture, architecture – all have a role in shaping our understanding of the people around us”. An emphasis on mathematics and science has led to the erosion of the worth that the arts had for humankind. All in life should not be reduced to “What will it benefit me” in monetary terms. Critical outcomes should include the arts, because education is about “something worthwhile”, about the internal goods (the virtues) of practices such as music, dance, and sculpture.

No one can deny the importance of mathematics, science and technology. To do so would be foolish and a denial of the good that these activities brought and still promise. Instances are
space exploration, medical advances, advances in transportation and the like. But at times there seems to be an exuberance that needs to be tempered. These activities can also work against the interest of humankind and to use them “effectively and critically” should not only mean in an instrumental way. Science and technology should concern itself with how mathematics, science and technology can be employed for preservation rather than exploitation purposes, how research in these areas can lead to the eradication of poverty and suffering, in finding a cure for AIDS, preservation of the planet, preservation and protection of fauna and flora and so on. Framed in this way the critical outcomes will engender democratic citizens who care for things of common good rather than focus on the greed that individual gain may bring to a corporate world.

*Demonstrate an understanding of the world as a set of related systems by recognising that problem-solving contexts do not exist in isolation.*

Outcomes should not only relate to the economic system. What the outcomes seem to suggest is that one recognises how the economic systems of the world are interwoven and dependant upon each other. The outcomes seem to suggest that this is the only system that should be recognised. But even if this is the case, and I do not think it is, the outcomes seem to corroborate the “inevitability” thesis connected to globalisation. This thesis espouses the opinion that globalisation cannot be avoided, that it is inevitable. This type of reasoning is what the neo-liberalists would encourage for it would be to their advantage if there is no opposition. What is imperative for the younger generation to realise is that although globalisation and its influence cannot be wished away, one is not left helpless in its wake. A critical mass such as that which a democratic citizenship education wishes to foster, must be critically aware of ills that globalisation pose, and as critical citizens take advantage of the benefits that may accrue not only for the individual but for society at large. Also, a critical stance toward globalisation will enable critical citizens to take the necessary measures to protect the community against exigencies of such demands. In addition, learners need to be aware that the economic, social, cultural and political as systems do not exist in isolation;
that what happens in one sphere alters and influences what happens in the others. Moreover, there is the need for them to understand how globalisation impacts on education and society.

In summary, if the critical outcomes are also framed in the ways suggested, that is, in terms of the internal goods that make for democratic citizenship and not only in terms of extrinsic notions advanced by neo-liberalism, the outcomes hold the possibility of engendering deep democracy that is transformative. Outcomes framed in this way include notions of both an instrumental as well as a non-instrumental justification and by implication may lead to good education. In the following chapter I shall look at the implications that critical outcomes framed in this way hold for teaching and learning in schools.
CHAPTER 5

THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECONCEPTUALISED OUTCOMES FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING

We who are teachers would have to accommodate ourselves to lives as clerks or functionaries if we did not have in mind a quest for a better state of things for those we teach and for the world we all share. It is simply not enough for us to reproduce the way things are (Greene, 1995: 1).

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter I indicated how the idea of democratic citizenship education can engender a reconceptualised notion of outcomes. In this chapter I shall show how a framework of democratic citizenship with its emphasis on deliberation, imagination, inconclusiveness and reasonableness can potentially cultivate outcomes which break with the apparent instrumental outcomes prescribed by an OBE system. Finally, as a conclusion in this thesis, I shall suggest that we need to respond to teaching and learning as a pedagogy of the unknowing – thinking about education in a way that makes teachers and learners the unknowable in an act of embracing the other in their otherness.

I argue firstly, that deliberation can bring about more interactive partnerships; secondly, imagination can make outcomes open up possibilities to encounter the other; thirdly, inconclusiveness can ensure that no finality is attained in teaching and learning; and finally, reasonableness can bring about high levels of objectivity, fallibilism, pragmatism and the exercise of judgement – all aspects necessary to bring about authentic learning and teaching.

Notwithstanding the above, I approach this chapter with a strange feeling of not knowing what to expect. As an educator this arouses strange feelings within me. Yet, I am nervously

46 I do not think that the concept “conclusion” is apt for it relates to “finality” in too definite a manner, as if I shall be forwarding “the answer”. This is not the intention. All I am proposing is a different way (there may be many others no one has thought about) of responding and attending to teaching and learning.
excited about what I may discover or uncover. It brings forth a measure of very real uncertainty, for as a teacher I have become accustomed to planning and anticipating desired results that for me were evidence of good teaching practice. I think that I am still being partly influenced by a particular teaching practice, one that gave credence to transmission learning that viewed life in terms of right and wrong, in terms of final and correct answers to problems, of unquestioningly accepting the status quo, educational or otherwise. In this chapter I shall attempt to reconceptualise teaching and learning – to rethink my teaching practice. This is not easy. Burbules and Hansen (1997: 1) explain that a predicament “is a problematic state of affairs that admits of no easy resolution”. My predicament exists in that what I would like to suggest, that is, thinking about teaching and learning differently, cannot be posited in a way that makes it possible to conceptualise these matters in a manner that separates them. Put differently, in this chapter I think it cogent to discuss ideas around deliberation, imagination, inconclusiveness and reasonableness that I contend are virtues of democratic citizenship education. However, these practices (for I contend that they are such) cannot be separated as these issues are somehow interconnected and interrelated. Thus, my predicament is that in thinking about one of these, it raises questions about others. All that I have done is to identify issues that for this study may change the way in which I, and perhaps others, have been thinking about teaching and learning. I shall therefore attempt a discussion in a way that is unplanned and has no final answers. In this way I hope that I can journey through this chapter expecting the unexpected, thinking about teaching and learning in ways that I have not done before and in this way grow in my own teaching practice in more challenging ways.

I contend that engagement is a constitutive feature of teaching and learning as a practice. To put this in another way, “doing” teaching and learning is “doing” a practice that is essentially of humans and a practice that more often than not involves more than one person. But engagement can also mean studying a particular text from which learning may emerge that

47 Usually such feelings of uncertainty brings within me the notion of being unprepared for my lesson. Preparedness, also interpreted as knowing what to expect (or being in control), meant being a “good” teacher.
48 I suspect that this is still the modernist influence of my school education and professional teaching education.
49 I argued previously that virtues are practices for the virtue is recognised in what humans do. Virtue is thus a “doing” practice.
50 This notion I suspect is to be part of my “awakening” to post-modern thought.
may include (or exclude?) one or more persons. For most of the time teaching and learning can be conceptualised as a practice(s) of engagement. For this study the implications of outcomes reconceptualised in terms of democratic citizenship should be approached from a specific practice of engagement that fosters democracy and education. Teaching and learning as a practice that includes people (teachers and learners), is a practice engaging with the other. To engage with the other means that there should be concern for the other – a concern that seriously takes into consideration the virtues of citizenship and democracy. And so we can engage with others and our circumstances in various ways; in deliberative ways, imaginative ways, in ways that respond to reasonableness and ways that do not expect finality. This is how I shall be thinking about teaching and learning for I view teaching as “fundamentally a social and political practice; its purpose is to engender a space of appearances in the classroom within which students’ lives can be illuminated” (Greene in Wilson, 2003: 219). When teaching is conceptualised in this way, teaching and learning could be a “space” where teachers and learners can appear and disappear, be heard or be silent, merely accept what is or imagine what could be. To think differently about ourselves (teachers and learners) we need to think about who we are now and where we could be. Put differently, we need to interrogate our democracy and the citizens that government wishes to foster for that democracy through the critical outcomes – whether such outcomes can be transformative. Thus I shall next discuss ways in which democratic citizenship and the agents (citizens/teachers/learners) in such social realm may be changed to become transformative agents.

5.2 EXPLORING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

I contend that the manner in which democratic citizenship is conceptualised in policy documents needs to be interrogated and reconceptualised. I think it is necessary to reconceptualise democratic citizenship education, for it serves as background in which all practices in school take place. Put differently, thinking about teaching and learning does not take place in isolation and the context in which it does take place (school) influences the
manner in which a practice of teaching and learning takes place.\textsuperscript{51} For this reason I think it apposite to first explore the implications that a reconceptualised practice of democratic citizenship holds for teaching and learning before exploring the implications of the reconceptualised outcomes for teaching and learning.

Policy documents boldly declare that one of the aims of education is to prepare learners to participate in a democratic society. Why do we want to prepare learners to participate in democratic practices in future? If this line of thought is followed one gains the impression that preparation is of a theoretical nature where a teacher has all the knowledge concerning democratic citizenship and that this knowledge is then transmitted to learners. Learners somehow internalise the facts about democratic citizenship and perhaps a test is given on the subject. Alternatively, methods of deliberation can be employed in the classroom where learners are actively involved in discussion. The question arises whether those learners that pass the test or those that are involved in discussion about the practice will one day become democratic citizens with all the attributes thereof as taught or discussed. On reflection we should recall the Aristotelian notion of a practice, for democratic citizenship is a practice, I contend. Virtues are recognised in what persons “do”. In this way a virtuous man/woman is virtuous in that he/she acts virtuously, i.e. leads his/her life in a virtuous way and not by how well he/she knows (memorises/remembers) virtues. We need to pose the question whether schools establish the conditions for democratic practices to occur. Put differently, are learners enabled to practice democratic citizenship at school? This question holds major challenges for teaching and learning.\textsuperscript{52} Schools should be organised in such a way so that the conditions for nurturing democratic values are enabled. This means that teaching and learning as practices need to be reconceptualised along democratic lines in order that democratic values can be practised more and preached less. Thus such a reconceptualisation affects learners and teachers

\textsuperscript{51} I should mention at this point that I do not always see teaching and learning as two separate practices but at times prefer to refer to a practice of teaching and learning. For me there are two mutually influencing actions within a practice of teaching and learning when both occur at the same time. At other times teaching may take place, but learning may not have taken place, or takes place at a later time. I advocate a practice of teaching and learning for I wish to break away from the idea that a teacher teaches and a learner learns. In this way the idea is set forth of two separate practices engaged in by two different agents. I prefer to think of one practice engaged in by two agents and that the actions of teaching and learning are not set in that a teacher teaches and a learner learns. Depending on the situation actions can be swopped.

\textsuperscript{52} Teaching and learning will be discussed later in this chapter.
(facilitators) as democratic agents.\textsuperscript{53} Such a change in practices immediately has implications for notions of authority.\textsuperscript{54} The notion of teachers and learners as democratic agents calls into being the notion of equality. I think it apposite at this point to explain this study’s view on equality between teacher and learner by invoking the opinion of Waghid\textsuperscript{55} with which I concur:

Of course, teachers have pedagogical authority over students, since they are supposed to have more knowledge and perhaps more informed perspectives on education – teachers are more experienced, more articulate and well-informed. But this does not mean that they have the sole voice on what counts as good and not-so-good education. To suggest that teachers are the sole owners and interpreters of knowledge is to question the very assumption that teaching is a practice.

Thus as humans, teachers and learners are equals and are afforded the same democratic rights by the Constitution. However, when teaching as a practice is considered the relationship between teacher and learner is not one of equality in terms of knowledge, as learners would then not require teachers if their knowledge bases are equal. Having said this, acknowledging that teachers should have more knowledge than pupils to make the educational engagement (practice of teaching and learning) possible, is not an admission that teachers are experts or know everything. At the same time, as Waghid mentions, it is the pedagogical authority of the teacher that makes the teaching-learning practice possible. Burbules (1997: 67) posits that the authority of the teacher needs to be challenged at all times. Teachers need to encourage learners to challenge, and question their authority for it can nurture valuable learning. However, only someone in authority such as the teacher can do so. This type of authority does not seek to impose but encourages learners to become independent thinkers and knowledge constructors. Yet, for the reconceptualised outcomes this means that teaching and learning as practice is established by two types of democratic agents that are not equal. It is to the notion of agency in a practice of democratic citizenship that I shall now turn my attention.

\textsuperscript{53} I refer to teachers and learners as agents when they are involved in “doing” democratic practices.

\textsuperscript{54} Authority will be discussed later. The question that troubles me is whether teachers and learners are equals in a democratic teaching – learning environment.

To explain agency in a democratic society I shall draw on the ideas of Biesta (2004c) in his effort to come to a different understanding of democratic education, an understanding with which I concur, for I posit that thinking about democratic citizenship in the way that Biesta contends would enable the critical outcomes to become transformative for a deep democracy. For me the question of agency or subjectivity is crucial to the teaching-learning practice for how the notion of subjectivity is conceptualised will underscore the way in which teaching and learning is practised. Agency forms the basis of every action that involves education and informs how both teacher and learner act as subjects. To explain how he understands democratic agency, Biesta questions how agency comes about. He questions whether democracy is an educational problem or a problem for education. Also, instead of human agency Biesta (2004c: 5) prefers to refer to human subjectivity. He (Biesta, 2004c: 5) posits that there is a tradition that claims that the ultimate purpose of education is “to support, promote, develop, care for, and elicit subjectivity; to help, in other words, children to become subjects, that is, authors of their own actions”. Biesta (2004c: 3) also refers to Carr and Hartnett (1996: 192) who declare that the aim of education for democracy is “to ensure that all future citizens are equipped with the knowledge, values and skills of deliberative reasoning minimally necessary for their participation in the democratic life of their society”. But how does this come about? How are people “equipped with knowledge”? According to Biesta (2004c: 4) there are two traditions that relate education to democracy. The first, a Kantian notion as mentioned above, sets out to prepare learners for a democratic society. The emphasis falls on preparation for a practice, democratic citizenship being an instance of a practice that learners will enter one day (preparation for the future). In this instance schools do not necessarily operate along democratic principles. Learners are instructed in the principles of democratic citizenship, principles that they should “memorise” and put into action one day when they enter the “real world” of adults. An alternative way of thinking...
about the relation of education to democracy, and one that Biesta and this study advocate\textsuperscript{58}, is one that emphasises education through democracy, seeing education as a space for engagement in democratic activity and in this way not becoming a subject but being a subject along Arendtian lines. Important for this study is that to see subjectivity along Arendtian lines in relation to democracy makes of democratic citizenship a “doing” practice, an experiential activity. It is not about “preparing”, “making” or “becoming” democratic citizens, but about “being” or being involved in “doing” the virtues by which a democratic citizen may be recognised. Such a reconceptualisation of teachers and learners as subjects in a practice of teaching and learning holds exciting possibilities. Practices require action on the part of agents/subjects, participatory action. In this way teachers teach and learners learn in action and in acting with the other. It is this different notion of how subjectivity in relation to democracy is conceptualised by Biesta that excites me, since it holds the possibility of conceptualising democratic citizenship education in ways that have not been thought about\textsuperscript{59}. Learners and teachers are conceived of as participating in the practice of democratic citizenship together – learners not being prepared for democratic citizenship in an instrumental manner where the virtues of a good citizen have been predetermined and all that remains is for learners to come to know and like “automatons” go through the motions of being prepared for citizenship where preparation for citizenship seemingly becomes a means to an end and where the intrinsic value of citizenship may be lost. Also, thinking about learners as democratic citizens who are “doing” democratic life opens the way for learners as subjects to imagine life in a democracy in different ways.

The question that follows a type of democratic citizenship for which Biesta argues, is whether space for such activity is possible within schools and to what extent can democratic practices be acted out within schools? From this it seems that the task of the school is to create the conditions for teachers and learners to “be” democratic citizens. In this way democratic citizenship becomes a practice that is a way of life. “What schools can do – or at least try to

\textsuperscript{58}I find it necessary to explicate Biesta’s conception of a subject in relation to democratic citizenship for it has major implications for the way in which teaching and learning can be approached. In the case of South Africa especially, Biesta’s thoughts signify a complete break from the way learners were viewed traditionally (as empty vessels) and offer a different way of conceptualising democratic citizenship.

\textsuperscript{59}I have not thought about democratic agency in the way that Biesta advocates.
do – is to make action possible, and hence create conditions for children and students to be subjects, to experience what it is and means to be a subject. The learning related to this is not something that comes before democratic subjectivity, it is not a learning that has to produce democratic citizens; the learning that is at stake is a learning that follows from having been or, as I have also suggested, from having not been a subject”, posits Biesta (2004c: 15). The above is an approach that conceptualises teachers and learners engaged in teaching-learning activities differently, conceptualises conditions schools should create in order to enable teachers and learners to empower themselves so that teaching and learning becomes a transformative action that nurtures democratic citizenship by teachers and learners “being” subjects. Greene (1995: 39) posits that “democracy ... is marked by an emerging solidarity, a sharing of certain beliefs, and a dialogue about others, it must remain open to newcomers, those too long thrust aside. This can happen in the local spaces of classrooms, particularly when students are encouraged to find their voices and their images”.

But what does it mean for schools to create conditions where subjects can be democratic citizens? Surely conditions in this sense do not refer to material conditions, but rather to conditions that affect social relationships. Such social relationships in a teaching and learning practice are educational relationships that, as mentioned earlier, are seemingly unequal relationships in terms of authority. Learners should come to know in their “being” that such unequal relationships are not peculiar to schooling, but are part of a democratic social reality that exists outside. In the social realm citizens are regarded as equals in the sense that they are all human beings and are afforded the same rights, but in other ways humans are unequal. Examples are skills such as games (tennis, soccer, chess) or capacities for mathematics or learning and so on. But differences such as these should be regarded as strengths, pluralities that the school should not try to even out in the sense of trying to make all learners the same (homogenous), but should recognise as the very soil for democracy and inclusion. Put differently, the school should make every effort to create the conditions where the plurality of learners can be acted out, for learners can only “be” subjects within their plurality. Plurality

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60 My emphasis.
61 The use of the word “outside” is contentious as there is no inside and outside of school. There should only be a lived reality in which subjects can “be” democratic citizens. The thinking that divides school and the world has caused the “problem” of schooling for democracy and schooling through democracy in the first place.
calls for a teaching and learning practice of reasonableness and inconclusiveness of
deliberation where the other is recognised in its otherness, where the space to challenge and
respond to the other is created and encouraged. In almost all aspects of life human beings are
different, different in the way that they think, their abilities, experiences and so on. The list of
differences seems endless. But Arendt (in Biesta, 2004c: 14) claims that it is our very
differences (plurality) that enable humans to act. Through plurality and difference action is
possible. Plurality and difference are posited as conditions for subjectivity, that is, conditions
for action. What this means for teaching and learning is that the conditions should be created
that all (teachers and learners) can be given the opportunity to “be”, in and through
recognition of their difference. The other becomes a condition of my being able to “be”.

I wish to extend somewhat the idea of education through and not for democratic citizenship
of Biesta. Concerning teacher authority in a teaching-learning practice, Biesta and Waghid’s
seem to assume that teachers necessarily know more and that in this way teachers find
pedagogical authority. I concur that this may normally be the case when referring to subject
knowledge. However, in South Africa we have the scenario where many teachers were
trained in a system (school and professional training) that was everything but democratic. The
dilemma that suddenly emerges is that perhaps teachers do not know how to “be” democratic
citizens. That they may not have adequate prior knowledge about democratic citizenship, is
unlike the notion that Waghid posits. Unlike other practices then, it may be that both teachers
and learners have to be “subjects” in coming to “be” democratic citizens. But if this is the
case then the relationship is seemingly one of “being” democratic citizens in an “equal”
relationship, for the knowledge of teachers and learners in the practice are seemingly
“equally” impoverished. Most teachers in South Africa, because of our history, were not
citizens in a democracy before 1994 and that “being” citizens in a way that Biesta proposes
does not happen overnight. It is rather a process in which subjects are always participating (a
participatory practice) in their daily “being” and “being together” in a practice of teaching
and learning that has no finite ends or predetermined virtues of democratic citizenship that

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Schools need to “foster an understanding of the fragile conditions under which human beings – both we and others, who are not like us – can be a subject, can come into the world” (Biesta, 2004c: 15).

Having explained how this study conceptualises teachers and learners as agents through a democracy I shall now discuss the outcomes as reconceptualised through deliberation, imagination, inconclusiveness and reasonableness.

5.3 OUTCOMES RECONCEPTUALISED THROUGH DELIBERATION, IMAGINATION, INCONCLUSIVENESS AND REASONABLENESS

5.3.1 OUTCOMES RECONCEPTUALISED THROUGH DELIBERATION

Deliberation is a way of communication or dialogue – dialogue that is a virtue of democracy. Other virtues of a democratic society include justice, tolerance, trust and distrust, honesty, hope, decency, gratitude, loyalty, mercy, and so on. The practice of these virtues depend to a large degree on dialogue as engagement. But the point of dialogue in a democratic society is to deliberate about matters concerning the common good in trying to reach consensus. In Chapter Three I argued for a communitarian (associative) notion of democracy rather than an aggregative notion for the reason that the communitarian notion is open to deliberation. Matters of common concern are discussed among citizens who are agents in the sense that they act – act in this sense includes a form of deliberation. Deliberation in a democratic society means that discussions take place that are open-ended. This means that those participating are considered to be equals as citizens. However, those who were traditionally excluded should be included. In this regard the inclusion of lesbians, gays, women, the physically challenged and certain ethnic groups are important. When deliberation is conceptualised in this manner it paves the way for more inclusive deliberation, but more than this, it also considers ways in which the stories of others can be heard. By creating spaces for story-telling and tradition deliberation becomes more interactive. Deliberation then enables

63 I refer here to the changing conceptions of citizenship; how citizenship has changed from Athenian citizens to that advocated by Nussbaum (1997) where she refers to world citizens.
spaces to be opened for the inclusion of the voices of the other in ways not thought of before. In this way it becomes possible to listen to the stories of the other and for the other to listen to the stories of others. Deliberation also enables agents to listen to their own stories as they relate these to the other. Deliberation becomes a way to widen and deepen democratic practices through becoming more inclusive without becoming prescriptive and threatening – possibilities that could lead to violence.

5.3.2 OUTCOMES RECONCEPTUALISED THROUGH IMAGINATION

Outcomes framed in imagination is about releasing and connecting with the other. Through deliberation it becomes possible to connect with the other. Deliberation in a democratic sense that is more inclusive leads to ways in which voices not often heard or heard at all before can be given spaces to respond to the other. The other in this sense does not only refer to persons, but to life itself. Life (the act of “being”) should be experienced as a “risk”, that life has no guarantees but that it is a challenge to encounter the risk of life. Teachers should teach in ways that encourage learners to take risks. If learners are able to take risks they will have the courage to think beyond what is known and to be excited and not fearful of the unexpected and the unknown. Teachers often teach what the curriculum prescribes, for what seems to be for them (teachers) safe spaces in terms of “having done” their work. But it is these very safe spaces that stifle the imagination for imagination is a way to reach beyond the knowable and acceptable. Imagination opens up vistas and windows upon life that were shut. Many learners are confined to desperate situations such as poverty, abuse, crime, hunger and AIDS. Imagination shows them that it is possible to think of the world as if it could be otherwise. It becomes possible to dream dreams that lift them from their desperate confinement, and it frees learners to encounter the other.

When outcomes are conceptualised through imagination “a certain level of creativity, innovation, thrill and amazement” become possible (Epstein-Jannai, 2001: 229-230). Outcomes that are preset cannot engender the same type of teaching and learning, for each step is methodically worked out in advance which leaves no room for any deviation.
Outcomes framed through imagination are more critical in nature since it looks at things as if they can be otherwise and do not accept what is given. The problem is that deviation in any form is conceived of as a hindrance in attaining the preset outcome and may even be penalised. Preset outcomes manipulate the way in which pupils are to attain the outcome (to reach success). Success is defined and prescriptive and in this way stifling and unchallenging to learners who would want to reach beyond – perhaps see a world and life different from the known and given in a quest to encounter the other. In the words of Greene (1995: 57) “to understand how children themselves reach out for meanings, go beyond conventional limits (once doors are ajar), to seek coherence and explanations is to be better able to provoke and release rather than to impose and control. Young people have the capacity to construct multiple realities”.

5.3.3 OUTCOMES RECONCEPTUALISED THROUGH INCONCLUSIVENESS

Modernism often stands accused of looking for finality, for the right answer and for searching for the calculable – that which can be defined. In this regard Biesta (2001: 33) asserts that a central insight into the writing of Levinas is the inability of Western philosophy to recognise the alterity of the other. Modern philosophy understands the other as the ego or subject, as the origin of all knowledge and meaning. Through this understanding the other appears as an object of knowledge. When knowledge is thought of in this way, knowledge becomes knowable. This means that it becomes possible to know everything that there is to know and in this way the means are opened up for people to become experts in their field. They can then claim to know all. Everything becomes calculable, objects as well as humans. More than that, people also become objects – herein lies the danger – that humans, like the objects of the natural world, can be manipulated and controlled. Teachers easily claim that they know their learners, that is, what learners are capable or incapable of. The danger in this is that the other becomes calculable. It becomes possible for teachers to make dangerous assumptions about the abilities of learners. For modernist thinking it becomes possible to know people as a generalised group. This means that when one encounters others as the other, there is a

64 That is, in terms of modernist thinking.
preconceived notion of what people as the other are able or unable to achieve for modernism has all the knowledge of humans and the natural world. Modernists posit that through knowledge it becomes possible to manipulate and control the world.

However, there is a different way to encounter or to attend to others and that is in a way that conceives of attending to the other as a new experience in that such encounter has never existed before and that the other is to be experienced in a way that cannot be related to any previous experience – to experience the other in its unique otherness. Outcomes that are reconceptualised in terms of inconclusiveness create spaces for deliberation, for the persuasion of reasoned argument, for the unpredictable and the unexpected – teaching and learning activity that conclusive outcomes cannot engender. Non-conclusive outcomes create space for inclusivity that a deliberative democracy requires for participation of the other. Inconclusive outcomes are also able to accommodate the imagination, because imagination needs space for freedom; freedom of thought, to imagine what things can be like, to imagine the other in its otherness. To imagine in ways like these are not possible if one constantly looks for conclusion or through social engineering such as conceptualising teaching and learning in terms of human and social capital. An instance of such thinking is the WCED, Education 2020: Human Capital Development Strategy that boldly advocates that education has to respond to the needs of the province by providing a strong general education. The type of thinking that I am arguing against is encapsulated in the following excerpt from the document: “If our strategy for human capital development is to succeed, then we need to be clear on what the context is that we will be operating in, what the enablers are for successful strategy, and what specific support we will require in the implementation of the strategy” (WCED, Education 2002: 13).

Thus far I have shown that deliberation, imagination and inconclusive outcomes are ways of thinking differently about teaching and learning. I also contend that if outcomes are framed in terms of reasonableness that can bring about high levels of objectivity, fallibilism, pragmatism and the exercise of judgement, such outcomes have the potential to engender
authentic teaching and learning that can be transformative. I shall now discuss reasonableness.

5.3.4 OUTCOMES FRAMED THROUGH REASONABLENESS

I shall draw from the ideas of Burbules (1993) in showing that outcomes that are framed in terms of reasonableness can lead to authentic teaching and learning. One is often called on to "be reasonable", which is a request to act in line with certain existing standards. What is seldom interrogated is who decides upon the standards. Standards are traditionally ways in which to measure action. But standards are set by people who see life in a particular way. Standards may also change over the course of time. Standards that account for the reasonableness of an action or not have to be viewed against a particular framework of thinking that informs the standards. Another framework may have different standards or may value the same standard differently. The main reason that I want to argue against this type of rationality is that it presumes to be neutral and universally valid along the lines proposed by Western cultures that espouse a particular kind of rationality as if it is the only kind of rationality capable of “conclusions that will be compelling or true across all circumstances” and capable of “ineluctable truths” (Burbules, 1993: 2). Burbules’ argument against this type of rationality is that it does not recognise that “reasoning is a situated human achievement”. As such, when communities arrive at what seems to be rationality of the same kind it should not be assumed to be a case for universalism. It may just be that human groups come to similar conclusions when inquiring similar problems. In this way overlap and agreement may be possible without being universally valid and becoming general laws.

But what are the virtues a person should have before being recognised as reasonable? There are two dimensions to reasonableness. First, reasonableness relates to people with certain virtues who are in a certain relation to one another. In Burbules’s own words (1993: 3) “a person who is reasonable wants to make sense, wants to be fair to alternative points of view, wants to be careful and prudent in the adoption of important positions in life, is willing to admit when he or she has made a mistake, and so on; these qualities are not exhibited simply
by following certain formal rules of reasoning”. Second, reasonableness requires a faculty that enables persons to enter into communication with others, to inquire, disagree, adjudicate, explain, or argue in the search for a reasonable outcome – an outcome agreed upon by reasonable people. Reasonableness, therefore, is the outcome of communication – an attending and responding to the other in their otherness starting with an openness that can lead to unexpected and unintended consequences. Burbules (1993: 4) identifies four characteristics of reasonableness that I shall discuss briefly. These are objectivity, fallibilism, pragmatism and judgement.

Objectivity for positivists means a form of neutrality that suggests that one is not biased in any way toward a particular situation - that one is neither for nor against. Objectivity for reasonableness is a different activity, one in which not a certain detachment is required but engagement with other points of view. Engagement means that one attends or responds to the other with a measure of tolerance, that is “being able to recognise one’s own biases, acknowledging the limits of your capacity, to appreciate fully the viewpoints of others, or caring enough about others to exert the effort necessary to hear and comprehend what they are saying” (Burbules, 1993: 4). Objectivity in this sense means that one has listened and responded to a range of views with tolerance. This creates space for the plurality of the views of the other where participants engage in inclusive deliberation where views are adopted for their merits.

Fallibilism as a virtue has three features. First fallibilism involves the taking of risks. Openness is required from a participant in conversation with the other. To err is part of the process of reasonableness. To err in favour of teaching and learning becomes a virtue. Reasonableness is not about avoiding error or seeking to conform. Moreover, learning through reasonableness means that one can own up to “failure”. That one can make mistakes becomes a trait of fallibility where one is required not only to admit to one’s own mistake but more than that, to admit, in the presence of the other, that one has made a mistake. This is also an admission and acceptance that one is capable of error and accepts error as important for teaching and learning. Herein lies the emancipation of fallibility, that one reflects on
mistakes in the presence of others, seeking reasons for fallibility so that “intelligent”
decisions can be made in future, that is, one has learned from the experience.

Pragmatism does not look for certainty, for guaranteed results. Rather, when decisions have
to be made in inquiry or negotiation, pragmatism calls for intelligent decision-making that is
based on reflection of past action in order to make more intelligent decisions in future.
Pragmatism does not seek “correct” decisions and the possibility of space for error means that
one has to learn from mistakes, a process not towards “the truth” but one that lessens the
possibility of error in future. For Burbules (1993: 6) the reasonable person that displays traits
of pragmatism is one that can approach problems with an open mind, a willingness and
capacity to adapt, and persistence in the face of initial failure or confusion. Pragmatism of
this sort encourages one in failure where normally discouragement is the norm when
confronted by failure and error. As a result a fear to risk emerges.

Lastly, reasonableness includes the exercise of judgement. This requires that people know
when to exercise prudence and moderation. This points to an acceptance of our own fallibility
and that of others. At times it is prudent not to work things out in a rational way. This calls
for an exercise of judgement. Also, reasonableness is a matter of degree. In this way we are
not as reasonable all the time or we may be more or less reasonable in the company or in the
absence of others. More importantly, “those whom we respect as reasonable are judicious
about when and how they follow the dictates of argument in the strict sense of the term, and
they are receptive to the influence of other kinds of persuasion as well” (Burbules, 1993: 7).

I have argued that reasonableness holds the possibility to conceptualise outcomes differently
– in ways that break from an instrumentalist rationality; that reasonableness with its traits of
objectivity, fallibilism, pragmatism and exercise of judgement are able to bring about
authentic transformative teaching and learning. I shall now turn to the implications that a
reconceptualisation of outcomes have for teaching and learning.
5.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECONCEPTUALISED OUTCOMES FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING

Having explored a different conception of democratic citizenship and how it will affect the notion of subjects (teachers and learners) within a teaching-learning practice I shall now briefly look at current notions of teaching and learning before exploring the implications of reconceptualised outcomes for the teaching-learning practice.

I shall not refer to traditional notions of teaching and learning, such as those of Hirst and Peters (1970) that are well known. I shall also defer from outlining the teaching-learning practice prior to 1994. At present educational policy in South Africa seems to be very much driven by forces outside of education that severely impinge upon the way education is conceptualised. An instance is the ideals of neo-liberalism that claim that education should prepare workers for a specific type of job-market. This notion of the aim of education seems to be contrary to the traditional or intrinsic notion that education should be “done” for its own sake rather than for a seemingly extrinsic motivation such as financial prosperity. More and more education and schooling seem to be about the abilities that are inculcated during life at school. There is an extraordinary emphasis on skills rather than the type of people education can enable learners and teachers to become. Subjects such as mathematics and the sciences are given priority. In relation to American education Greene (1995: 17) posits that “the familiar paradigms seem still to be in use; the need for alternative possibilities in the face of economic and demographic changes is repressed and ignored”. These words also ring true in South Africa.

From 2006 it will be compulsory for all learners to take mathematics in the Western Cape irrespective of ability levels and implications for learners and society at large. There is an emphasis on natural sciences in South Africa. In America it is declared that “All students in the academic disciplines should meet world-class standards and rank ‘first in the world in science and math achievement’” (Greene, 1995: 17). At the same time subjects such as
music, art and physical education\textsuperscript{65} have been downplayed to a large extent. Some of these subjects have disappeared from the curriculum; other subjects only exist as learning areas where parents pay for the teaching of these as separate learning areas and this occurs mostly in the more advantaged schools where there is a greater pool of resources as well as wealth. It seems that those learning areas to which aesthetics of life seem to be attached, are valued as being less important currently. Appreciation for “the finer side of life” or the “finer things in life” seems to be interpreted as a waste and a misguided effort at education and reserved for those who can afford it. Those who are disadvantaged seem to be getting the message that they need to get on with skilling themselves for the job market and that includes skills that the market demands and expect schools to provide. Schooling, in this view, is about utility value and should thus have an instrumental bent to it to achieve that aim. This seems to be the current rationality about and in education, also called technical rationality. I shall briefly discuss technical rationality for it impacts upon education in a specific way which has implications for a teaching and learning practice.

Technical rationality is about finding the best means to an end. This shows that the thinking behind technical rationality is of a special kind in terms of education. As soon as the end goal has been determined all that is left is to determine the best means to that end. Problems in education become technical matters that can be fixed technically. Principals of schools become managers and manage problems and are judged in terms of performativity. Outcomes in education are conceptualised in terms of efficiency and responsibility and this, in real terms, means cost saving measures and success measured in terms of outputs that include results that can be measured.

Education seemingly becomes service related where the learner becomes a customer and the school a site of service delivery. This type of rationality has many “uneducational”\textsuperscript{66} consequences for education. Biesta (2004b: 74) asserts that “the learner is the (potential) consumer, the one who has certain needs, in which the teacher, the educator, or the

\textsuperscript{65} I shall expand on these subjects later in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{66} This is a claim that I make in terms of the way that I view education. This will become clearer later in this chapter.
educational institution becomes the provider, that is, the one who is there to meet the needs of the learner, and where education itself becomes a commodity to be provided or delivered by the teacher or educational institution and to be consumed by the learner". Customers have needs that should be satisfied. Customers can also demand results which in this case would be marked by success in grades. The customer-provider relationship is a very different relationship to that which normally exists between teacher and learner and which is normally driven by reasons primarily but not exclusively internal (intrinsic) to the teacher-learning practice. Current notions concerning education conceive of teaching as a commodity that is ready packaged. Ready assembled packages exist; all that the consumer has to do is to make an appropriate selection based on individual needs. This type of rationality points to a contractual relationship of a kind resembling that which exists in the realm of business. Also, unlike the notion of Biesta and Arendt that teachers and learners are subjects in a practice where both act in their “being”, teaching and learning seem to be take place separately and at different times. Teacher and learner may not even know each other or ever speak to each other, for teaching may take place by means of pre-prepared computer packages or through Internet chatrooms. The offshoot is that learning becomes an individualistic activity. The encouragement of government toward privatisation has seen the proliferation of a host of private colleges where the focus is on payment and performance. These colleges are, for survival purposes, run along business lines and seem far remote from the rationality traditionally linked to teaching and learning. What seems to be lost is the type of people learners become. Education should, I think, also be relevant to what society finds worthwhile in transferring to the next generation. As soon as one thinks about education in this way it includes what is valuable, that is the virtues that democratic citizens should practice in a democratic society. When we think about education in this way education appropriates an ethical function that seems to be absent when thinking about education in a technical-instrumentalist manner. Without the virtues of democratic citizenship a technical-instrumentalist rationale of teaching and learning seems rather impoverished and cannot, I claim, foster critical citizens for a democracy.

67 I shall return later in this chapter to this function of education which I consider to be very important and an integral part of the teaching-learning practice.
Biesta (2004b: 71) makes a claim that there is the need “to reclaim a language of education for education”. He (2004b: 71) claims that in the post-modern era there is a different concept of “learning” and a decline in the concept of “education”. For him “teaching has, for example, become redefined as supporting or facilitating learning, just as education is now often described as the provision of learning opportunities or learning experiences”. Thinking about teaching and learning in this way breaks down a relationship of trust and responsibility that is found in educational relationships. Teaching and learning, however, should be conceptualised somewhat differently if the hope is to foster critical citizens. If teachers and learners are to be conceptualised as subjects in a teaching-learning practice it implies action; that is, that as critical learners they would be able to take initiative, be able to imagine what the future would be like, look for openings, inquire about possibilities, about moving in search and in pursuit of without requiring guarantees (Greene, 1995: 15).

5.5 EXPLORING TEACHERS AND LEARNERS AS SUBJECTS IN A TEACHING – LEARNING PRACTICE

My discussion in this section covers teachers, learners and the teaching-learning practice. I shall not necessarily discuss the participants in the teaching-learning practice separately as this creates for me a predicament. Teaching and learning is not viewed in this study as separate acts. Both teachers and learners are on a journey of discovery where the outcome is not known. In this way, teachers can be learners and learners can be teachers in a teaching-learning practice. I do admit that teachers should have more subject knowledge than learners, but when engaged in their “being subjects” in teaching-learning practice both teachers and learners should expect the unexpected – outcomes that have not been thought about before or imagined. Greene (1995: 14) posits that “Teaching and learning are matters of breaking through barriers – of expectation, of boredom, of predefinition”. To be able to and to enable breakthroughs as mentioned by Greene requires teachers who can make leaps themselves. As a teacher it is difficult to encourage learners to think differently, to think of what may be and what has not been if you are not able to change your lenses, that is, to look at teaching and learning in ways that could be different.
The advent of Outcomes-based education in South Africa gave a different meaning to the space that the teacher occupied in the teacher-learning practice. Instead of being transmitters of knowledge teachers “became” facilitators. This meant that teachers were to act as guides to enable the learning of their charges. What it meant in practice was that teachers concentrated on group work for most of the time and learners had to “discover” by means of what the facilitator provided and with the aid of fellow learners. I do not think that this is what OBE calls for (group work to a large extent) but this is what takes place in practice. The lessons are aimed at particular set outcomes that for most of the time should be achieved at the end of the lesson or at times postponed until sometime later. The outcomes that are predetermined place a ceiling for learning. Put differently, there seems to be a strong possibility that predetermined outcomes that are determined neither by the teacher or the learner do not give the teacher or learner the space to think beyond the outcome that sets the limits for success. Such predetermined outcomes seem to be manipulative and instrumental as the teacher and learner are directed into thinking along particular paths particular ways toward predetermined goals that set limits or boundaries for the teaching-learning practice. Outcomes that are fixed beforehand stunt what Greene (1995: 19) calls an “imaginative capacity, an ability to look at things as if they could be otherwise”.

In contrast to an instrumentalist line of thinking Biesta (2004b: 77) remarks that learning outcomes that are known in advance “is a gross misrepresentation of what education is about”. Epstein-Jannai (2001: 223) claims the teacher’s place as a space in which the act of teaching exists as a specific kind of speech (use of language) that has a transformative effect on students. She further claims that teaching and learning has a subjective dimension “which is depicted as striving toward creative teaching, in which the teacher’s unique practice – devoid of rules or frameworks – will determine pedagogical activities”. The teacher as a subject in the practice of teaching and learning should not be stifled in the act of “being”. Outcomes that are predetermined and that manipulate action in minute detail belong to a different framework, one that does not encourage creativity and imagination beyond the
given. Greene (1995: 14) posits that teachers who engage with learners, who are trying to learn how to learn, need imagination. In the words of Epstein-Jannai (2001: 229-230),

For the act of teaching (or alternatively the act of learning), as in the artistic act, a certain level of creativity, innovation, thrill, and amazement should be expressed. These characteristics denote the teaching-learning act as a unique event and not an activity planned in minute detail. Moreover, there is a momentary surprise, a changeable situation whose treasured qualities are not fixed. Something that did not previously exist is suddenly revealed to the student. A certain kind of truth regarding knowledge is uncovered. The appearance of knowledge is unexpected, and therefore surprising and confusing, interrupting the familiar order, and therefore words seem to disappear. In the moment of discovery, one cannot find the appropriate sentences to explain it.

Epstein-Jannai sums up what this study envisages as being transformative teaching – a teaching practice that has the space for teachers and learners to be subjects; a practice (a doing action) that changes or transforms the way teachers and learners think about themselves and the world in ways that they have not thought about before and that is not manipulated in any way. “Teaching happens when a person begins learning (on his own) how to do certain things. It happens when that person freely chooses to extend him/herself in order to find answers to questions he/she poses for him/herself, when he/she acts to move beyond what he/she has learned by rote … Teaching happens when a student begins to understand what he/she is doing, when he/she becomes capable of giving reasons and seeing connections within his/her experience, when he/she recognises the errors he/she or someone else is making and can propose what should be done to set things straight” (Greene, 1973: 172).

Greene interprets the act of teaching in a particular manner. For her it seems that teaching and learning are not two different acts where the one (teaching) leads to the other in a causal way. Teachers can teach but whether teaching has taken place depends on the learner. If and when the learner “does” something, begins to understand, begins to question, challenge and so on,
in short, when the learner is a subject in a way that Biesta advocates can one say that teaching has taken place. Put differently, when the learner acts in a certain way he/she has learned, but teaching has not taken place in isolation and if the learner does not act, the question arises whether teaching has taken place at all. Teaching and learning are acts by subjects in the teaching-learning practice, acts that cannot necessarily be separated. Boostrom (1997: 57) posits that the transformative teacher may present, organise and demonstrate, but ultimately the learner has to decide to construct knowledge. Teachers create conditions for knowledge construction. “A student may learn a lesson that the teacher never intended, and this outcome may be as highly valued as is any that was planned” (Boostrom, 1997: 57). In sum, I agree with Block (1998: 15) when he posits that: “The teacher who is not challenged cannot learn; the student who will not challenge needs no teacher. In a classroom in which all is prescribed and known – in which it is declared what a teacher should teach and a student should learn – there can be no teachers and no students. In such a place we would not be strangers but unseen”.

I shall now briefly look at learning whilst keeping my predicament in mind. “Learning is viewed as an ethical practice of inquiry vis-à-vis the chain of life contingencies. It is an attempt to look at the world in a new way. Each time, the possibility of learning and striving in order to construct some “real” knowledge gives rise to wonder and amazement ... learning is always based on the concrete mind of the student, which introduces in the teaching situation a very subjective and mutable component”, claims Epstein-Jannai (2001: 230). Learning in an Outcomes-based environment is very different to that described by Epstein-Jannai. Learning is aimed at predetermined outcomes, which removes the components of wonder and amazement at discovery, for what has to be learnt is known beforehand. This has the effect that learners do not think outside the familiar and the known. What is discovered does not leave teacher and learner with a sense of amazement and wonder but rather a sense of disappointment if learners do not achieve the intended outcomes.

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68 I stated earlier that I find it difficult to distinguish between teaching and learning as separate acts in a teaching-learning practice.
If learning takes place in this way, learners can only come to know the world in a way as known and claimed by others. Such learners cannot be subjects in a process of being but rather products in the making. The difference is that learners as subjects are free to explore who they are in conjunction with others as subjects and together may come to know the other in their plurality; products in the making are guided into a specific direction that reminds of instrumentalism.

5.6 TEACHING AND LEARNING AS A RELATIONSHIP OF RISK

For Biesta (2004b: 77) all learning involves an element of risk. “Not only is there the risk that you won’t learn what you wanted to learn. There is also the risk that you will learn things that you couldn’t have imagined that you would have wanted to learn. And there is the risk that you will learn something that you rather didn’t want to learn, something about yourself, for example. To engage in learning always entails the risk that learning may have an impact on you”. This type of learning differs markedly from Outcomes-based education where the element of risk has been removed as everything is seemingly planned ahead and the learner enters a space that is safe yet uneventful, dull and bereft of intellectual challenge. Yet, outcomes of OBE aim at fostering critical and creative thinking. How many times have we not heard a learner lamenting that school is boring? However, I contend that for teachers and learners to engage in a relationship of risk presupposes a relationship of trust. This call for outcomes that are inconclusive, for if everything is worked out beforehand, there is no need for risk. Thus, in a school the conditions should be such that the teacher is enabled to put in place those conditions in which relationships of trust are nurtured. If the school is run along the principles of democratic citizenship where learners are subjects through a school that respects democracy, the conditions for democracy such as consensus, inclusion, deliberation and reasonableness should be in place. If such conditions prevail learners and teachers should be able to trust each other and enabled to “be” subjects through a democracy. Trust would be engendered by including the voices of others, those that were traditionally excluded in South
Africa such as blacks, women, the physically\textsuperscript{69} challenged, gays, lesbians, and certain ethnic groups. Inclusion would also entail ensuring conditions for those voices to be heard. Perhaps one would do well to remember that inclusion, no matter how well it is meant, always means exclusion in some form. Nothing can be absolute and permanent. Deliberation may exclude the other as some learners may have the advantage of being taught in their mother tongue, others in a second or even third language. Some learners are naturally good orators and thus very articulate and learners of lesser speaking ability may feel insecure about their oral ability and may be or feel excluded. But for teaching and learning the value of deliberation lies therein that it can engender more interactive relationships that would try to obviate situations that may exclude.

Teachers can assist by introducing different ways for voices to be heard such as story telling and tradition. Greene (1995: 16) poignantly states that “The invisibility of too many students has somehow to be broken through. There are geographies and landscapes still to be explored by those of us hoping that we do not all have to be strangers to each other in our schools”. I must admit that I have never thought about teaching and learning in this way; that perhaps some of my learners live in worlds that I do not know, have never thought of and did not care that it exists. Perhaps I was scared of venturing into their world, a world that I did not know because I was scared to risk. Yet there were/are real people (agents/subjects) who try to “come into presence”\textsuperscript{70} every day at school who come “through”\textsuperscript{71} this world who remain strangers. Teachers talk, propose, recite, are angered, frustrated without asking “Why”? Teachers teach too easily from the only world that they know, their world; a world that may be in stark opposition to the lived and very real worlds of learners. In fact, learners may even think that what teachers propose do not make sense from their (learners) place in the world. Yet if challenged by learners engaging in the act of learning, such teachers do not always “explore the geographies and landscapes” that present themselves on a daily basis in

\textsuperscript{69} In certain instances the mentally challenged may be excluded, the exercise of the franchise serves as example. However they do have equal rights except in those instances where they are challenged.

\textsuperscript{70} I expand upon this notion in the following paragraph.

\textsuperscript{71} I use “through” and not “from” as it gives a greater sense of agency or subjectivity. “Through” leaves a sense that nothing is permanent, that there is constant movement, change, a non-permanence but also an active involvement.
classrooms. It requires reasonableness and "It demands imaginative action many times for teachers to realise that youngsters who see different (who have been reared in poverty or come from distant places) have something to say about the way things might be if they were otherwise", Greene (1995: 34) remarks.

When conditions of trust, reasonableness and deliberation that encourage interactive partnerships have been established it becomes possible for learners to risk, knowing that their voices will be included, heard and importantly, respected. Risk speaks of opening up, of giving of oneself what the other does not know. But it is in this space where the learner and teacher can open themselves to reasonableness that they can be subjects, that they can discover the other and themselves in ways not thought about before or imagined, a type of learning that Biesta (2004b: 78) calls "coming into presence" – a coming into presence in the world in a social way, a world intersubjectively and interactively shared with others that differ from us. Risk speaks to a fallibilism that both teachers and learners need to respond to, a risk to encounter the uncertain without guarantees and fear of failure. Biesta (2004b: 77) asserts that trust is without ground for if trust could be grounded it would be possible to know what would happen or how the person trusted would behave and respond. If this is the case, trust would not be needed but would be replaced by calculation. Trust is about situations of risk, not about creating safe spaces. In such cases the reaction of others could not be trusted if it is agreed beforehand to react in certain ways, an instance being to agree not to criticise, question or challenge. But to do so, that is not challenging, would be a sign of disrespect. Greene relates to trust and risk in the following way; that learning takes place almost as if jumping into places unknown, questioning, challenging as we go along. "All depends upon a breaking free, a leap, and then a question. I would like to claim that this is how learning happens and that the educative task is to create situations in which the young are moved to begin to ask, in all the tones of voice there are, “Why?”" (Greene, 1995: 6). The virtue of reasonableness in the other gives one the courage to respond to new situations. I contend that just by asking the question “Why” invites a situation of risk as one may be confronted with answers and counter questions that one did not expect, questions that may frustrate, hurt or excite. It may open roads not yet taken, start searches that are ongoing, moving towards ends
that can never be quite known (Greene, 1995: 15). This speaks of the pragmatism of
reasonableness where problems are encountered with an open mind, without certainty of
results, a capacity that enables the unexpected to happen.

5.7 EXPLORING A TEACHING-LEARNING PRACTICE AS A PRACTICE OF
ETHICAL ENGAGEMENT: POSSIBILITIES FOR TEACHING-LEARNING
ENCOUNTERS

"Learning is viewed as an ethical practice of inquiry vis-à-vis the chain of life contingencies
(Epstein-Jannai, 2001: 230). I posit that not only learning, but that the teaching-learning
practice is an ethical practice. When Greene (1995: 35) looks at society she seems to notice a
type of social paralysis. It seems that people are accepting what is “served” to them by the
various social institutions such as schools, as something that is given, to be accepted, a social
reality that cannot be changed. In this acceptance a hopelessness and helplessness seems to
surface. People seem resigned to live lives that are robotic, mechanical and conformist,
caught in technical rationality. This seems to be the case with regard to globalisation. There
are those in society that posit that globalisation is here to stay, that there is nothing that can
be done to change the course that globalisation seems to demarcate (manipulate) for society
– a course where the rules of the market hold sway, where social capital has replaced
colonialism – exploitation by another name. This type of thinking is known as the
inevitability thesis; society feels as if there is no alternative – that as people they cannot
change the course of their lives. Greene (1995) exhorts that something should be done to
change the situation “in the name of what is decent and humane”. Society can change their
paralysis if they utilise an idea of imagination and reasonableness that bring an ethical
concern to the fore. If one claims that society is democratic then the values of democracy
should be evident in such a community. Democratic virtues speak of tolerance, deliberation,
reasonableness, imagination and inclusion. People in such a democracy are agents when they
are subjects, that is, when they “live” the democratic values. A society, as described by
Greene (1995: 35) that is resigned to thoughtlessness, passivity and lassitude, is not a
community driven by democratic values. It is a society that knows of democratic values, but
are not subjects through a democracy. Subjects in a democracy should believe that they can make a difference, that they hold the political ability to change their situation, perhaps in ways that they have never thought of before. This means that teachers should engage learners in ways that make them critically aware of the world in which they live. Learners should not accept that what they see, hear, feel and encounter is final, that it cannot be changed or challenged. The everyday day accepted ways of doing things, the commonsense way of going about our daily lives are the very things that need to be questioned; questioned in a way that interrogates its continued validity and not accepted for always having been done in a particular way. This type of rationality should be challenged by objectivity as espoused earlier. The fostering of a critical and creative type of teaching-learning practice demands teachers to conceptualise teaching and learning differently. The traditional way of teaching admitted transmission knowledge where the teacher was the “know-all” and learners receivers of knowledge. Transmission knowledge allows teachers to pose as experts. Commitment to teaching that can transform lives requires thinking differently about teaching and learning that includes a sense of the tragic. Burbules (1997: 65) conceptualises the tragic perspective as arguing,

Against a hope that is utopian, against a belief in personal or social perfectability, against the idea that our educational endeavour always does good and never harm. The tragic perspective discourages a focus on minimal, incremental improvements, instead encouraging reflection on the conflicted aims and values inherent in any educational activity. For me, the tragic view of education provides a positive, constructive way to think about teaching and what it can and cannot accomplish.

Burbules raises a point that I contend is seldom thought about in teaching and learning: that educational activity is not necessarily beneficial, that teachers can do a great deal of harm to their learners. Ways that readily come to mind are teachers undermining the personal knowledge that learners bring to the classroom; not giving learners opportunities to tell their stories or reacting to their stories in ways that deter them from taking such risks in future; telling learners that they do not have the ability to do certain subjects (mathematics and
science are instances); the insistence of teachers that learners should attain preset outcomes holds the potential to harm in that it curbs the encouragement to imagine beyond the outcomes. This could potentially happen when outcomes are predetermined. For outcomes to be transformative we need to think differently about teaching and learning. Burbules (1997: 73) mentions six ways that the sense of the tragic can help teachers to approach their teaching differently and which I think can lead to transformative teaching and learning. These six ways or approaches also foster a release of the imagination and a spirit of reasonableness for both learners and teachers. I shall briefly mention the six approaches for they do also emerge throughout this chapter in different ways. First, teachers should not think of themselves as experts for it can lead to manipulation and learners who seemingly are unable to be critical and creative. Knowledge is given and to be accepted. Teachers should be “open” to criticism, to a fallibility that admits to not having all the answers and that it is acceptable to make mistakes; that there is not only one answer in many cases but one should appeal to a sense of reasonableness. This leads to “openness” for different views, to inclusion rather than exclusion of opinions, to deliberation. Such exploration and explosion of opinion often lead to frustration and puzzlement but moments such as these offer fresh opportunities to see things differently, enable teachers and learners to break from the familiar, from the tried and tested that do not encourage people to think about things as if they could be otherwise. It encourages a spirit of objectivity. Burbules (1997: 3) calls for a state of aporia, a state of confusion, a state that brings a feeling of being lost but he asserts that this moment is an under explored teaching-learning moment. “The tragic sense helps us maintain a humble respect for such experiences and accept them as a condition of life rather than as something to be transcended, avoided, or explained away” (Burbules, 1997: 73). Preset outcomes are not able, I contend, to foster thinking about teaching and learning in ways such as these that are transformative. Teachers who utilise the above approaches empower learners to think differently. What this means for teaching is to move away from the accepted, the expected, to move away from expected assumptions so that learners are awakened to paradigms that “are taken for granted do not define the horizons of the universe”, according to Burbules (1997: 74). He continues by stating that thinking about the world and giving meaning to it in this

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72 This is the type of teaching and learning that preset outcomes foster.
way, opens the way for imagination, though there will be limits in our capacity to imagine a way of life utterly foreign to us, but the tragic sense prepares us for such limits, even as we push against them (1997: 74). For teachers abandoning a method of transmission knowledge should open them to engage in and with several methods. This calls for outcomes that are inconclusive. Teachers should adopt different methods as the needs of learners change from time to time or within a lesson. This implies that from time to time errors are to be made but this should not be a problem, for to teach and learn is a way of giving meaning in ways that give no guarantees. The concept of method itself should be abandoned, since it is misleading. Method implies a technically correct way of doing things, a means to a given end. Instead teachers should rather refer to a way of teaching that likens teaching to paths to be discovered or directions to be taken (Burbules, 1997: 74-75).

But who are these learners and who are these teachers to whom I refer as if they are all the same (homogenous)? I contend that there seems to be a tendency to see groups, such as class groups, as homogeneous and in doing so teachers see themselves and learners as if equals and more than that, the manner in which knowledge is “unveiled” together seems to drive in a direction where all should aspire to the same ideals and values. Put differently, even when we acknowledge plurality, teachers still may want learners to imagine the same things in the same way. Learners should be awakened to plurality at school and in the community. Plurality should encourage a spirit of objectivity. Learners become conscious about what happens in the community through engagement in their own way. They are exposed to a range of differences in their community and at school. They question the poverty that is seen all over. Questions are raised as to the reasons for high unemployment rates. Learners become aware of suffering, of abuse in all its forms, the abuse of drugs, rape, high jacking, murder, robbery, incest, and so on. In this way they learn the exercise of judgement. They learn when to question. Engagement means challenging issues around lack of facilities, such as poor sanitation or the lack of running water in informal settlements, why wealth seems to be spread unevenly, why some are getting richer and others poorer, why there is no cure for AIDS. Becoming aware is a means of becoming engaged, starting to think about these

73 Infallibility emerges when errors are made.
societal issues and why there are no answers. Becoming critical does not only mean to be able to find reasoned solutions to problems in terms of your job but being able to engage beyond that space. When learners are “opened” in this way and are able to break from their bonds of hopelessness, perhaps they can dream of solutions – be empowered to think that things can be otherwise; that drugs and abuse (so rife in society) are not natural human behaviour, that they can “escape” these seemingly overpowering conditions if they “live” their dreams. Preset outcomes teaches learners to accept what exists, does not encourage learners to question beyond the other. In short, the preset outcomes may be critical, but the question is whether it is critical enough to “awaken” learners and teachers to things being otherwise. But before one can dream of things otherwise, one needs to be “awakened” to things that can be otherwise. Such awakening brings or instils a measure of hope where none existed before. To be awakened that things can be different may also restore faith in life itself. A “wide-awakeness” concerning the community that we live in brings with it a concern for the other, a concern that the preset outcomes under the influence of globalisation seek to avoid as it encourages an instrumentalism that leads to individualism. People are able to question their place in the greater scheme of things and are not resigned to what is, and what is unbearable when they are “awakened”, when they are engaged in teaching-learning practices that foster a spirit of deliberation, inconclusive outcomes, imagination and reasonableness. Why was there an invasion of certain countries and not others? What gives rise to the increase in the price of crude oil? Why is Africa war-ravaged? These are the questions that “wide-awake” learners will begin to ask as a concern for themselves and as concern for the other. Learners who show a critical consciousness as described are citizens that engage in a democratic community; learners in whom a sense of social responsibility has been awakened. They become learners who have a capacity for reasonableness. Such learners can not be passive and unresponsive to the joys and ills within the community. Learners become aware of inequalities in society but also aware of inequalities in the classroom. They become aware that all learners are not equal but that it need not be a factor that divides. Rather, it could be a factor that brings them together in their concern for the other. Their very plurality, before perhaps a divisive factor, is what brings them together and puts them “in the
shoes of the other”; helps them to imagine what it is like for the other and perhaps awaken a sense of justice.

Through imagination people become aware of what it means to be in the world, wide-awake to what surrounds them. Engagement in the way described is to be in dialogue; in deliberation with self, the other and circumstances. And this is the task of the teacher. Teachers cannot leave learners with a sense of hopelessness. To do so is to forsake the moral function that is inherent in the teaching-learning practice. “Imagination is as important in the lives of teachers as it is in the lives of their students, in part because teachers incapable of thinking imaginatively or of releasing students to encounter works of literature and other forms of art are probably also unable to communicate to the young what the use of imagination signifies” (Greene, 1995: 36). I contend that it is the task of the teacher to aid the learner to release his/her imagination or to facilitate the release of the imagination. I think that Greene purposely employs the concept “release” rather than “use” for locked into “use” there seems to be a manipulation, a hint of instrumentality perhaps. On the contrary, to “release” means that something was there that is now set free; an imagination set free “to open perspectives and move the young to look and listen, to overcome the taken-for-granted and the routine” (Greene, 1995: 36) – this is the task of a teacher who is capable of the same, to foster the capacities of deliberation, imagination, inconclusiveness and reasonableness. But how can the school foster these capacities?

The current outcomes form learning areas such as mathematics and science. As mentioned before, all learners in the Western Cape will have to do mathematics in some form or other from 2006 for this is seemingly what industry demands – that learners are equipped with certain skills. However, the enthusiasm linked to natural sciences is linked to a decline in other subjects, such as art, music, literature and physical education. Prevailing thought around education seems to indicate that these learning areas (or subjects as they were known) are seemingly not essential when evaluating or preparing learners in terms of job skills74. No one will dispute the importance and validity that the natural sciences can claim for inclusion in

74 Whether it is the task of the school to prepare learners for the job market is an issue around which there is much discussion. I do not wish to engage in that debate at present.
the curriculum. However, whether the natural sciences can lay claim to having more valid claims for inclusion in the curriculum is a moot point. How validity is claimed is a matter of value-judgement and not a matter of right and wrong which is possibly a different activity. The subjects that have been excluded should possibly be valued by means of different criteria. Art, music and literature, as examples, are generally appreciated for their aesthetic value and are valued quite differently from natural sciences. A type of engagement becomes possible in these areas to which the natural sciences will have difficulty to lay claim. Involvement (action) in these areas are twofold – the bringing into existence of what has not existed before and the experience when appreciating an artwork or performing a musical score.

Natural sciences have a bent for the truth, the answer, right and wrong and what can be proven. Aesthetic appreciation is a different activity – one that calls for the imagination; it is an activity that brings forth what has not existed, perhaps what was never thought of in that way, a way to think about things as if they could be otherwise. It is to open windows of thought that were shut, ways to visit landscapes and vistas unseen and unheard of. Also, subjects such as art, literature and music need a spirit of openness, an objectivity and pragmatism to experience the subjects. Through imagination, deliberation and reasonableness learners gain hope in their hopelessness – are able to imagine that the school (education) can lead to changed circumstances. But to live or experience in this way requires an engagement that calls for more than presence, for one can be in the presence without noticing or appreciating worth. Experiences of an aesthetic nature require active participation, an awakening of what is there, for outcomes that are inconclusive (Greene, 1995: 125). Appreciation is never isolated. People (learners and teachers) are always situated. They come from and live their lives through society. This brings with it baggage that they cannot escape from and appreciation takes place from within this lived world. We appreciate from a perspective – one that is entirely our own for our perspective is a personal one, one that differs because of our plurality. Plurality opens us up to a multiplicity of perspectives. In our plurality we should seek objectivity. To coerce learners into subjects such as mathematics and

75 In the presence could mean listening to music, looking at a work of art, observing drama, watching a movie and so on.
science is to infringe upon their freedom. It does not foster objectivity for it propagates a particular view that is not the result of a multiplicity of views that have been shared. It is a violation of personal freedom in favour of the demands of the market. It also points to a lack of freedom on the part of policy makers for to take away the freedom of others is also to take away one's own freedom. In this instance, having bowed to the demands of external forces (market), policy makers have disrespected citizens. “What does it mean to be a citizen of the free world? What does it mean to think forward into the future? To dream? To reach beyond?” asks Maxine Greene (1988: 3).

One can argue that to recognise the plurality of the other is to recognise a freedom of and for the other. I contend that to include the other is to recognise that the other has something to say, that the other has a voice that needs to be heard and in listening to that voice my voice is enriched. Enriched in this sense does not necessarily mean that “something” is added which was not there before. Enriched may mean a “giving up”, realising a “sense of loss” that Burbules calls the tragic. But listening to the voices of others and giving vent to one’s own voice are acts of engagement or encounters of deliberation - acts that can and do lead to a release of the imagination and the fostering of interactive partnerships. Kazepides (2004: 173) captures what for me seems to be some of the prominent ideas around dialogue as a form of engagement:

Genuine dialogue presupposes that all of us are committed to the standards immanent in language games, to the rules of sound reasoning and the principles of moral living, especially those of freedom, truth telling and respect for others. Our freedom can be limited only by our obligation to tell the truth and to respect others as autonomous and equal agents. Our respect for others means that we care about other people and their views, are willing to listen to their points of view in order to understand them, that we are open to alternative perspectives and are prepared to modify our views accordingly.

I shall now turn to Kazepides’s (2004: 173) notion of freedom as a part of moral living. If one carefully reads Kazepides he asserts that our freedom depends not only on others, but on
ourselves as well. Learners normally conceptualise that their being free depends on others. Perhaps this is true to an extent but the freedom referred to here is one that extends beyond the mere physical. The kind of freedom that teachers should encourage learners to engage in is a freedom of imagination - a freedom of the mind that can lead to reasonableness. This type of freedom does not necessarily depend on others. Once “awakened” in a way that Greene (1995) advocates, it is difficult to remain in the fetters of oppression and exclusion, to wallow in hopelessness for through the imagination another world can be lived, a world that has no boundaries, a world that has different landscapes, a world that can be challenged. Freedom is enacted through action, from being a subject. In this sense freedom does not only depend on the other. Greene remarks that “The person choosing breaks the chain of causes and effects, of probabilities, in which he/she normally feels him/herself to be entangled. He/she breaks it in part by asking “Why?” by perceiving the habitual itself to be an obstacle to his growing, his pursuit of meaning, his interpreting and naming his/her world” (Kohli, 1998: 18).

It is the freedom that imagination and reasonableness allow that enable both teachers and learners to break from what seems for some to be the inevitable bonds of neo-liberalism. Freedom does not necessarily relate well to market oriented ideas that seem to confine rather than free learners. Freedom for Maxine Greene (Kohli, 1998: 17) is connected to human agency, “an agency of individuals and the possibility for freedom that comes through choosing and acting in the world as one recognises and confronts the reality posed by external conditions”. The agency Greene refers to requires a “being conscious of” the world. Freedom gives hope – to both teachers and learners for teachers are also “unfree”. Teachers are caught in the prescription of policy documents, held captive by outcomes that limit the way in which they can educate (share knowledge) learners. Deliberation, imagination, inconclusive outcomes and reasonableness allow for a freedom that does not manipulate or constrain. OBE with its predetermined outcomes has the potential to limit deliberation, imagination, inconclusive outcomes and reasonableness for the limits of success are determined beforehand and leave teachers and learners with no or little incentive to imagine beyond. In this sense, if the freedom of learners and teachers are impinged upon, then
Kazepides (2004: 173) will argue, as I do, that one of the principles of moral living – freedom – has been limited in some way.

Education is a moral act. It cannot limit morality. If it does so in some way, such educational action becomes suspect. It is crucially missed at times that not listening to the voices of others, muting their stories or excluding others in some way or other is not only to curtail their freedom and immoral, but a sign of disrespect. Excluding the voices of others is a way of disrespecting ourselves for we are excluding not only the voice of others to be heard, but excluding ourselves from hearing the other and depriving ourselves of being enriched by their stories and extending our freedom. It is unpragmatic, because it denies others the opportunity of inquiry and negotiation. Teachers and learners exclude each other in this way daily. To do so is to be guilty of undemocratic and unethical action, yet exclusion is seldom questioned at school. Many practices still exist that teachers and learners are not even proud of but unquestioningly participate in. Instances of unethical (undemocratic) practices are prefect systems\(^{76}\), sporting codes reserved for certain sexes, tasks in the classroom reserved for certain sexes, exclusion of girls who are pregnant, yet boys who become fathers are allowed to remain, female teachers who have to make tea or who may only sit in specified places in the staffroom and so on. Many schools would lay claim to being democratic, yet would allow practices such as the above to prevail. The reasonableness or not of such practices need to be questioned. In addition, those who enact educational policy are also guilty of the same immoral acts when they exclude the voices of stakeholders and role-players. Human freedom is the capacity to surpass the given and look at things as if they could be otherwise. Teachers and learners must, as agents, not allow others to negate their freedom. They must inspire in each other a sense of hope, that no matter what, things can be imagined otherwise even if circumstances seem how distressing.

In this chapter I discussed the implications of outcomes reconceptualised through deliberation, imagination, inconclusive outcomes and deliberation for teaching and learning. I

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\(^{76}\) Learners traditionally have no input into prefect systems. Currently they are able to voice preferences in the choice of representative learners' councils (RCL). There are also schools where both the prefect system and RCL are existing alongside each other.
discussed an alternative way of conceptualising democratic citizenship, an approach that focuses on teachers and learners as subjects. I endeavoured to think differently about teaching and learning, in ways that may enable teachers and learners to think about life as if it can be otherwise by looking at teaching and learning as an engagement of risk and as an ethical engagement. In engaging with teaching and learning in the way that I have in this chapter it has dawned that teaching and learning cannot be about anything finite, about the answer, about right and wrong, about the ideas that modernism seem to espouse. To be such would be an indictment on the practice of teaching and learning. Life is about change, about plurality, about attending and responding to others in their otherness in ways that have not been explored or experienced before. This is what deliberative interaction, in conclusive outcomes, imagination and reasonableness is about. I now realise, that it is about “unknowability” that seems to be present when one conceptualises teaching and learning in a transformative way. Outcomes framed in “unknowability” seems to be the break from the pernicious instrumental and manipulative outcomes that is required for teaching and learning to foster a critical mass for a deep democracy. I shall explore “unknowability” now.

Throughout this chapter I have discussed teaching and learning as an engagement with the other. I posited that teachers and learners can engage with each other through deliberative interaction, through inconclusive outcomes, imagination and reasonableness. All of these were ways of “getting to know” the other in its otherness. What was not explored was that perhaps the other cannot be known. In this way a sense of “unknowability” is present in the teaching learning practice that needs to be explored. “Unknowability” emerges as a result of the differences of and among others. We all have different experiences of life; we feel, believe, think and act differently. When one thinks of the other in this way it becomes clear that the other can never be “fully” understood. It is for reasons such as these that Ellsworth (in Zembylas, 2005: 139) advocates education “as a practice grounded in the unknowable”. The other in teaching and learning, for the purposes of this study, refers to teachers and learners.

Teaching and learning should be a practice that approaches the other (teachers and learners) in a spirit of ignorance. Ignorance allows us to be open to learning from the other. We should
abandon the sense of knowing or wanting to know (it all) that modernism advocates. To enter into an engagement with a sense of knowing could be a disrespecting the other, for it seems to point to a kind of calculability of the other. A sense of ignorance, on the other hand enables us to attend to the other in ways that we can learn from the other. Ignorance allows us to realise that we are not able to understand the other in its “fullness”. This differs from ignorance where one purposefully refuses to come to know. Approaching the other in this way allows the other to respond to us in our otherness and allows the other to “enter” into our presence. In entering each others presence in this way allows us to explore the other and each other knowing that we are unknowable to each other. This is a way of respecting each other in our otherness, to become “witnesses” of unknowability in teaching and learning” (Zembylas, 2005: 140). Conclusive outcomes cannot engage in teaching and learning in this way as it depends on the known, that which can be controlled and manipulated. The other cannot be known. Ignorance allows us to realise that we are not able to understand the other in a comprehensive way. To be able for the other to become unknown is to “empty” ourselves of what we know, that is, unlearning what is known in order to become ignorant in allowing the other to come into presence.

Notwithstanding efforts of coming to know, the other is unknowable. For as soon as the other is known, it cannot be other but become like you. It is not possible to know fellow teachers and learners in ways that we thought we could come to know them. There is much more to the other than that which we are able to see and experience. To claim that what we see and experience is the other is to disrespect and insult the other. Thinking about teaching and learning in this way is far removed from outcomes that seem intent on forcing learners and teachers to attain the same result, in some way attempting to make all the same (homogenous), coming to know. However, inconclusive outcomes hold the potential of attending and responding to the learner and for learners responding and attending to the teacher as the other in its “unknowability”, a relationship shrouded in mystery where it becomes possible for the unintended and the unexpected to emerge, where deliberation can take place as interactive partnerships in a spirit fostered by reasonableness.
Deliberation as a means of dialogue is not conceived as an effort of coming to know. Often teachers ask learners to tell the teacher more about themselves. These are efforts at coming to know and with each encounter the teacher thinks that he/she is coming to know the learner "better". Zembylas (2005: 149) posits that the teacher-student relationship should start with the recognition of the "impossibility" of knowing. Zembylas (2005: 150) exhorts that "impossibility" does not refer to what is not possible as Biesta argues for such a conception is too finite. Rather "impossibility" refers to that which does not seem possible. Communication should be about not being able to come to know. The other cannot be known for this would presuppose that at some point the communication can end when I know the other. There should be openness in communication and "an attention to the particularity of the other".

The other has to be experienced. This implies that the one that attends or responds to the other (teacher or learner) needs to free themselves of any "knowing". If not, the other cannot be experienced in their otherness but through prior knowledge that existed before the other came into presence. Often learners are treated as if they are known on the basis of what was heard from other teachers who had taught learners before or had encountered other experiences with them. On this basis learners and teachers have a sense of knowing each other that give rise to preconceived notions of the other.\(^77\) To experience the other means that we (teachers and learners) do not think of ourselves as knowing all, as experts for this would be a denial of the other.

If teachers are able to give up their position of knowing, it becomes possible for teachers to "pay an infinite attention to the other". This means that teachers are always prepared to respond to and attend to the (learners). This Zembylas (2005: 151) refers to as the ethical responsibility of teachers; that teachers will respond to learners "by stimulating and inspiring students’ reflections in new directions; directions that will enable them to develop their capacities in discovering the meaning of ethics within a rapidly changing cultural environment". Teachers should encourage learners to share their experiences (stories). In this

\(^{77}\) As instances learners and teachers may be expected to achieve or behave in some way, be rude, clever, good at netball or teachers that are strict, lazy or too expectant.
way sharing with the other is a sharing of experiences, sharing what you have endured or enjoyed. Through stories the other comes into each others’ presence, a way of witnessing to the other, what is referred to “as feeling, seeing and acting differently”. Moreover, witnessing is about conceiving the other differently, of the becoming witnesses to each other in each others presence. That is, engaging with each other when the other “stirs” you through its presence and its stories. Thus one is vigilant in attending and responding to the other, become humble in the presence of the other in your unknowability of the other. Teachers would do well to become humble in coming into the presence of learners. A certain pride and arrogance, I think, is accompanied by a sense of knowing, of being an expert in a specific field for teachers. Rather being vigilant means being infinitely attentive in listening, hearing and responding to learners.

Seeing learners as the other, points to an unknowability by teachers to know their learners. This, in turn, points to some inadequacy on the part of teachers that should not be seen as weakness, but as the point for the engagement of teaching and learning. Otherness cannot be known. But it is the search for the known that cannot be “which energises one’s desire and keeps it moving and searching” (Zembylas, 2005: 156). A pedagogy of unknowing is about establishing relations with each other in an otherness that appears not possible to come to know. Thus learning becomes possible in relations with each other, “a relation that cultivates attitudes of ‘seeking, desiring and questioning,’ all of which embrace the unknowable” (Zembylas, 2005: 157).

This discussion on teaching and learning continues in seeking and questioning the other. I thus do not wish to end it, but to posit some ideas to think about in my own unknowing. I think that if teaching and learning is attended and responded to in ways as suggested, through “a pedagogy of unknowing”, the critical outcomes hold a significant potential for teaching and learning to be transformative in engendering a critical mass for a deep democracy.
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