**Warlords in Africa's "New Wars"**

Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor compared

by

Chantelle Kok

Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (International Studies) at Stellenbosch University

Supervisor: Prof WJ Breytenbach

Date: March 2010

Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the authorship owner thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Date: 2 February 2010

Summary

The purpose of this study was to describe the factors that led to the creation of warlords in Angola and Sierra Leone so as to better understand the dynamics and origins of warlord politics. The two warlords that were focused on, and compared, were Jonas Savimbi (Angola) and Charles Taylor (Liberia and Sierra Leone).

Authors like Mary Kaldor (2006), William Reno (1995, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2007) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) contributed toward the base of this study. Their work captured the issues contributing toward the warlord phenomenon and generated thought surrounding the context in which these warlords arose. John Mackinlay (2000) was used to describe and analyse the origins of warlordism and how the warlord phenomenon has changed with the onset of new wars, especially in the late 20th and 21st centuries (Kaldor, 2006). Furthermore, the work of Thomas H. Greene (1984) was used in guiding this thesis into a systematic study, focusing mainly on the leadership, following, organization, techniques and external support of both Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor as examples of contemporary warlords.

Through utilizing the contributions of the above authors on this topic, the similarities and differences between the two warlords were explored. The study found that while Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor emerged from different eras and contexts (Savimbi out of the Cold War and Taylor as a result of globalization), they both became typical warlords. Savimbi only became a warlord after 1992. Before, Savimbi used Maoist ideology while an insurgent against Portugal, whereafter he became a rebel in the Angolan civil war. Taylor was a warlord in diamond-rich neighbouring Sierra Leone. Both used identity politics to gather a following while Taylor used brute force and the manipulation of the youth. They both manipulated illicit criminal networking and operated internationally, smuggling diamonds. The main difference, however, is that Taylor was an insurgent in Liberia where he seized power in 1990 and became president in 1997, while a warlord in neighbouring Sierra Leone. Savimbi, on the other hand, never attained presidential power even though he participated in the 1992 Angolan elections which he lost, whereafter he ceased to be a revolutionary, and became a real warlord without the external support he

previously had. Savimbi was assassinated in 2002 and Taylor abdicated in 2003, currently standing trial in the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. He stands trial for the human right atrocities committed in Sierra Leone. Their legacies live on.

Opsomming

Die doel van hierdie studie was om die faktore te beskryf wat gely het tot die ontstaan van krygshere ("warlords")in Angola en Sierra Leone, en om die dinamika van krygsheerpolitiek beter te verstaan. Die twee krygshere waarop gefokus en vergelyk was, is Jonas Savimbi (Angola) en Charles Taylor (Liberië en Sierra Leone). Die denke van skrywers soos Mary Kaldor (2006), William Reno (1995, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2007) en Collier & Hoeffler (2004) het bygedra tot die basis van hierdie studie. Hulle werk het ingesluit die aspekte wat bygedra het tot die krygsheer fenomeen, en het besinning aangemoedig oor die agtergrondsfaktore waaruit hierdie twee krygshere ontstaan het.

John Mackinlay (2000) se werk is gebruik om die oorsprong van krygsheerpolitiek te beskryf, asook hoe die krygsheerfenomeen verander het met die uitbreek van *"nuwe oorloë"* (Kaldor, 2006), veral aan die einde van die 20ste en 21ste eeue. Verder is die werk van Thomas H. Greene (1984) gebruik om hierdie tesis 'n sistematiese struktuur te gee wat gefokus is op die leierskap, volgelinge, organisasie, tegnieke en eksterne ondersteuning van Jonas Savimbi en Charles Taylor. Hierdie twee persone is albei voorbeelde van kontemporêre krygshere in die jongste verlede.

'n Vergelykende studie verg dat ooreenkomste en verskille tussen die twee krygshere verken word deur gebruik te maak van die bydraes van bogenoemde skrywers. In die studie is bevind dat alhoewel Jonas Savimbi en Charles Taylor uit verskillende eras en agtergrond kom (Savimbi uit die Koue Oorlog en Taylor as gevolg van globalisasie), albei tipiese krygshere geword het. Savimbi het Maoïstiese ideologie gebruik terwyl hy 'n insurgent teen Portugal was. Daarná het hy 'n rebel in die Angolese burgeroorlog geword. Hy het eers na 1992 'n krygsheer geword nadat hy die verkiesing verloor het en sy buitelandse steun verloor het. Taylor, aan die ander kant, was 'n krygsheer in die diamantryke buurland, Sierra Leone. Altwee krygshere het identiteitspolitiek gebruik om volgelinge te kry, terwyl Taylor ook brutale krag en die manipulasie van die jeug gebruik het. Hulle het beide internasionale diamante gesmokkel deur kriminele netwerke te gebruik. Die groot

verskil is egter dat terwyl Taylor 'n krygsheer in Sierra Leone was, was hy ook 'n insurgent in Liberië, waar hy in 1990 mag gekry het en in 1997 president geword het.

Savimbi, aan die ander kant, het nooit presidensiële mag verkry nie, alhoewel hy deelgeneem het aan die 1992 Angolese verkiesing. Hy het daarna opgehou om 'n revolusionêr en 'n rebel te wees en het 'n ware krygsheer geword (sonder die eksterne ondersteuning wat hy voorheen gehad het). Savimbi is in 2002 vermoor en Taylor het in 2003 abdikeer. Taylor is tans onder verhoor in Den Haag waar hy tereg staan by die Internasionale Strafhof vir oorlogsmisdade en menseregteskendings in Sierra Leone. Beide hierdie krygshere se nalatenskap leef egter voort.

Abbreviations

AAPSO	-	Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
APC	-	All People's Congress
APC	-	African, Pacific and Caribbean Nations
AU	-	African Union
CIA	-	Central Intelligence Agency
DDR	-	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
ECOMOG	-	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EO	-	Executive Outcomes
EU	-	European Union
FAA	-	Angolan Armed Forces
FNLA	-	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
ICC	-	International Criminal Court
IFI	-	International Financial Institution
LURD	-	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MPLA	-	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPFL	-	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	-	Organization of African Unity
PLA	-	People's Liberation Army
PMC	-	Private Military Company
RENAMO	-	Mozambique National Resistance Movement
RUF	-	Revolutionary United Front
SADF	-	South African Defence Force
UN	-	United Nations
UNAMSIL	-	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNITA	-	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USA	-	United States of America
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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1. Introduction

1.1. Problem Statement

Mary Kaldor in her work on "*New and Old Wars*" (Kaldor, 2006:15-110) describes how war has changed from a Clausewitzian "*Trinitarian*" type of war to a more basic, ruthless and lawless type of war in the 21st century. Her *New War* theory uses Van Creveld's work on "*The Transformation of War*" (Van Creveld, 1991:40). Kaldor delves into the idea of a "*war economy*" and describes how warlords and other 'strong men' feed on the war environment. This is also where Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) argument on "*greed and grievance*" provides further explanation for the reasons for civil war in Africa. Reno (2001:3) argues that looting and personal profiteering is not new. However what is new is the increasingly greater role economic interests play in internal wars, especially in Africa.

Clausewitz pointed out that war is a "*social activity*" (Kaldor, 2006:15). According to Kaldor, war has passed through several stages since the fifteenth century. It is therefore a phenomenon that "*was intimately bound up with the evolution of the modern state*" (Kaldor, 2006:15).

1.1.1. Kaldor on "New Wars"

Kaldor describes how mercenary armies were created through the support by monarchs in the early stages of European state formation after 1648. The centralization of state power meant that a firm economic base to support these mercenary armies was created through taxation, bourgeoisie support and custom duties (Kaldor, 2006:18).

However, these mercenary armies tended to be unreliable and were often released from their duties as soon as the war was over. This meant that in their "*off season*" mercenaries would find "*less savory*" ways of making a living (Kaldor, 2006:19). The solution was to create "*standing armies*" that could be relied upon and which were professional and trained. A new type of organization emerged with the formation of standing armies. Uniforms were introduced and the separation between civilian and soldier was established. Standing armies were thus under the control of the state.

Hence, state interest became the legitimate justification for war (Kaldor, 2006:19).

According to Clausewitz the traditional form of war was fought between state against state and army against army. It was therefore governments and not people who made and declared war. Armies acted as organizations that served governments. Soldiers were therefore given a "*licence*" to kill; they were regulated, controlled and marked in order for the authorities to inhibit atrocities from being committed outside of the law (Van Creveld, 1991:40).

The standing armies brought about numerous changes within the economy. Financing for the armies derived from taxation and borrowing (Kaldor, 2006:20). This in turn led to banking systems in order for the king's finances to be separated from the state's finances.

Clausewitz states that war is a rational decision made by the state. However Van Creveld and Kaldor argue that there must be more "*emotive*" causes for men to go to war (Kaldor, 2006:21). The evolving of war from the Middle Ages toward the end of the 18th century witnessed the emergence of the state, after the Peace of Westphalia. A number of distinctions emerged with this new organization. A distinction between public and private, economics and politics, internal and external activity of the state, and civilian and soldier, was established (Kaldor, 2006:22).

Clausewitz further argues in his work 'Vom Kriege' that war is "*an act of violence carried to its utmost bounds*" (Van Creveld, 1991:63). It is absolute with the use of extreme force between two opponents. Hence war was a discrete event including friction and force and the overwhelming use of force, the application of force and the mobilization of force. Hence Clausewitzian Trinitarianism argues that "*war is a means to an end*" (Van Creveld, 1991:124). He argued that politicians used war as a means to an end, using "bullets" as their grammar (Van Creveld, 1991:124). In other words, war is subject to politics and exists to serve the will of the politician.

In reality, wars evolved from the rule of the papal authority to standing armies

where rules, organization and discipline were key to serve the purpose of the politician, and since 1648, the state.

The late 20th century saw a new type of warfare emerge. According to Kaldor, this new concept and its development went hand in hand with the increasing globalizing of society: Kaldor refers to this new phenomenon as "*new wars*", characterised by new factors. According to Kaldor this new type of warfare has to be understood in line with globalization. Globalization is breaking up the "*cultural and socio-economic divisions that define the patterns of politics which characterize the modern period*" (Kaldor, 2006:73).

"*New forms of power struggle may take the guise of traditional nationalism, tribalism or religious fundamentalism, but they are, nevertheless, contemporary phenomena arising from contemporary causes and displaying new characteristics*" (Kaldor, 2006:73).

Similar to Van Creveld, Kaldor argues that the role of the state is changing as these new social movements arise. Non-governmental organizations are beginning to play a much greater role than the state in the globalized world. Van Creveld argues that the future of war will be much like the past (i.e. pre 1648). The Clausewitzian model of distinction between state, government and the people is and will no longer be applicable to future warfare. The rise of low intensity conflict is predicted to destroy the state as we know it. It is argued that the state will be replaced by organizations other than the state. The state as a war phenomenon is on its way out because "*its ability to fight organizations similar to itself is increasingly in doubt, and because there is not much point being loyal to an organization that does not, cannot and will not fight*" (Van Creveld, 1991:194).

In the same breath Kaldor speaks about horizontal and vertical cultures (Kaldor, 2006:75). In other words two types of cultures exist, vertically organized cultures and the new phenomenon replacing the latter, horizontal cultures. Horizontal structures evolve out of transnational networking. These structures are focused

mostly around the English language. There are thus new identities forming while old 'ancient' identities fade.

Furthermore, Kaldor argues that globalization involves "*globalization and localization*" (Kaldor, 2006:75). On the one hand, new transnational global networks are evolving which have great potential; while on the other hand, a large majority of the world is excluded and remains localized and marginalized. Great economic change has also been brought about by globalization including the capitalist economy, and on the negative side, the opening up of infant industries in the developing world to the global market tides. The establishment of new social classes, within old identities worldwide, has meant a greater disparity between rich and poor within the same nation. Globalization has meant a variety of changes within politics and economics, as well as the relationship between the two.

A new kind of politics thus emerged because of the process of globalization and identity politics. This can be seen as a form of political mobilization because of the "*growing impotence of the modern state*" (Kaldor, 2006:79). According to Kaldor, identity politics is;

"*...the movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power*" (Kaldor, 2006:80).

Identity according to Kaldor is a given. It is a birthright. She draws a contrast between "*labels*" and "*identity*", arguing that people or groups of people are often afraid of what is "*foreign*" or different, in other words "*different labels*" (Kaldor, 2006:81). Identity can be based on a certain group's heroic history, famous battles and memories of injustice (Kaldor, 2006:81). Identity acquires meaning through insecurity, fear and historic enemies (Kaldor, 2006:81). Identity politics also generates a minority and at best identity politics involves psychological discrimination against those labelled differently and at worst it leads to genocide, as was the case in Rwanda, according to Kaldor (2006:81).

The new type of identity politics is a result of the disintegration of the modern state and can be a direct result of authoritarian regimes (Kaldor, 2006:82). Therefore, new identity politics stems from two places. It can be a reaction against the declining legitimacy of the established political classes or it is a reaction towards the fears created through globalization (Kaldor, 2006:82). Kaldor also focuses on what can be described as the "*parallel economy*" (Kaldor, 2006:82). The parallel economy is the new form of "*black market*" economy that has evolved out of the unequal consequences of globalization. In this parallel economy new types of illegal characters evolve. This could be in the form of warlords, drug lords and other 'shadowy' forms of activity (Kaldor, 2006:82). This "*parallel economy*" is one source of the rising warlord phenomenon and was a consequence of the end of the Cold War and African independence from colonial rule.

States in Africa have had a difficult time coping with their independence. Along with this, the end of the Cold War meant a sudden extraction of immense foreign support by the USA and the Soviet Union:

"*States in Africa had to cope with the disillusion of post independence hopes, the failure of the development project to overcome poverty and inequality, the insecurity of rapid urbanization and the breakup of traditional rural communities, as well as the impact of SAPs and policies of stabilization, liberalization and deregulation*" (Kaldor,2006:84).

National identity is different to other identities previously discussed. It is somehow "*pure and unattained*" (Kaldor, 2006:84). As soon as most African states became apprehensive after independence, many states started to focus on "*particularistic tendencies*" (Kaldor, 2006:85). The weaker the administration of the state, the greater the tendencies toward authoritarian regimes. Some African countries which were labelled predatory states (Sudan and Nigeria among others) developed a system where wealth was given to specific tribes and religions. These states had strong interventionist policies. However, with the extraction of foreign support, the states soon fell into debt and heavy borrowing. This resulted in the introduction of

Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Most African states could not implement SAPs because of their weak beaurocracies and inadequate infrastructure. Slowly, state revenues declined and controversy over resources increased as everyone tried to make their last profit. In other words, the end of the Cold War only brought about the effects of the debt problem earlier in Africa. Increased pressure from the West for Africa's democratization meant that leaders in power had to try a different angle to stay in power, hence the introduction of identity politics based on race, ethnicity and religion.

The policies imposed on Africa by the West IFIs created even greater disparities since Africa's infrastructure could not cope with the demands. Urbanization and the parallel economy brought about insecurity within identity politics (Kaldor, 2006:87). The new economy, including Neo-liberal policies and liberalization speeded up unemployment, privatization and deregulation (Kaldor, 2006:87). These Western policies led to further criminalization and the creation of the "*shadow economy*". Since African states had a mostly interventionist policy, the state prior to the end of the Cold War had a heavy hand within the market. The extraction of foreign support and the effects of globalization meant that 'shady businessmen' were evolving out of this deal. Hence, a new era emerged where these local strong men used identity politics to gain support and to sustain their businesses. These men often have transnational networks and were vibrant in the illegal trades. In Kaldor's words: "*These groups feed like vultures on the disintegrating state and the poor and vulnerable*" (Kaldor, 2006:87).

The new identity politics as a result of the end of the Cold War and the extraction of support, meant that leaders faced an uncertain future. In order to stay in power, these leaders made connections with shady characters on the periphery of society. This in turn led to the misuse of identity politics based on ethnicity to gain support to stay in power. In other words: "*The greater the sense of insecurity the greater the polarization of society*" (Kaldor, 2006:88).

In line with Van Creveld's argument on *new wars*, new identity politics is often

regarded as a return to the past, a *"return to pre-modern identities temporarily displaced or suppressed by modernizing ideologies"* (Kaldor, 2006:88). Kaldor argues that what really matters in new identity politics is globalization and the recent past. She argues that Diasporas are playing an increasingly important role in supporting these local shady leaders. Diaspora groups provide resources, arms and money. They may include foreign mercenaries, dealers or investors (Kaldor, 2006:88). Similar support is also found among new transnational social groups transcending geographical boundaries because of technology. In this sense, religious groups, such as Islamic groups can be connected through technology.

It is important to now turn attention to the *"war economy"*. The new types of wars as mentioned previously are globalized and they prey on the disintegration of the modern state. Violence is mostly directed toward civilians and cooperation between these parties in war is vivid. The survival of the parties involved is dependent on the success of the war economy (Kaldor, 2006:95). Many states within Africa have become so disintegrated that the term *"failed state"* comes to mind.

There are various arguments about *"failed states"*. Normally failed states would describe *"countries with weak or non-existent central authority"* (Kaldor, 2006:96). Jeffrey Herbst argues that *"many African states never enjoyed state sovereignty in the modern sense"* (Kaldor, 2006:97). William Reno (1995:110) on the other hand argues that instead of seeing Africa as a cluster of failed states, these states are actually in the transition to a non-bureaucratic form of state building which generates a different type of political authority. This political authority is often based on patronage. Rulers therefore govern through non-bureaucratic elite networks, generating political and economic support, while having no regard for *"conventional institutional notions"* and formal politics.

According to Kaldor (2006:97), one key characteristic of a failed state is the *"disintegration of the state itself and the failure of the state to take control over physical coercion"*. However, the opposite occurs in this sense of state formation, instead of building the state in a cycle of sets, a chain reaction is sustained through

disintegrating the state. In other words, the failure of the state to function is a result of the economic base slowly deteriorating since no taxes or revenues are available for collection. This in turn leads to personalistic rule and local strong men creating more illegal ways to finance their economies. Kaldor (2006:97) also draws a comparison between the state formation of 18th century in Europe and unreliable tax collection through hired private firms in the 21st century.

The vicious cycle continues with the loss of state legitimacy and the incompetence of the state to protect its citizens. New forces emerge to claim "*protection money*" which leads to foreign pressure to cut government spending. This then results in loss of control over military units. Outside assistance has too many conditions which Africans states cannot commit too, hence foreign demands are not met. In sum;

"*A downward spiral of loss of revenue and legitimacy, growing disorder, and military fragmentation creates the context in which the new wars take place. Effectively, the 'failure' of the state is accompanied by a growing privatization of violence*" (Kaldor, 2006:97).

As mentioned previously "*new wars*" are global and go hand in hand with the disintegration of the state. Kaldor identifies a multiplicity of the types of fighting units:

"*...regular armed forces or remnants thereof, paramilitary groups, self defence units, foreign mercenaries, and finally, regular foreign troops, generally under international auspices*" (Kaldor, 2006:97).

The state's disintegration and lack of legitimacy has led to the decay of regular armed forces. This is because the state can no longer provide legitimate financial support for the army. The soldiers therefore do not receive an income and have to find other illegal means to an end. This further leads to fragmentation within the army which spirals into fragmentation within society (Kaldor, 2006:98). The former regular armed forces therefore lose their credibility as soldiers along with the state,

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since the state can no longer provide protection for their citizens. This leads to former armies evolving into private paramilitary groups (Kaldor, 2006:98). These groups are most common and usually revolve around one leader. These factions lack legitimacy, order and hierarchy and are often unorganized. This often leads to rebellion within the army as well as within society.

1.1.2. Collier and Hoeffler on "Greed and Grievance"
"*Rebellion needs both motive and opportunity*" (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:563).

Grossman in Collier and Hoeffler (2004:564) argues from the basis of an economic theory, and states that rebellion is an "*industry*" which uses illegal ways for profit, looting among others, to feed its greed. Therefore, if the opportunity for profit through rebellion presents itself, it will not be passed up. On the other hand, motive cannot be measured, hence the focus on opportunity and rebellion. In other words, it is the "*atypical circumstances*" that bring about the opportunity for rebellion which further leads to profit and greed.

There are certain groups within society that sustain conflict (Nitzschke & Studdard, 2005:223). These groups benefit from the opportunities presented through conflict and rebellion. They usually include government elite, military elite and local businessmen.

Angola fits this description. There was an anti-Portuguese revolution fought by three sets of insurgents. Savimbi's UNITA was one of them. However, when the liberation war was over (1974-1975), Savimbi turned into a rebel, sustaining his fighting through diamonds and ivory. This is where greed manifested strongly. As the Cold War ended, Savimbi's American supporters saw Angola's peace as a passport to Angolan oil. Savimbi was discarded after he lost the presidential elections in 2002.The rebel turned into a warlord until his death in 2002.

Collier and Hoeffler (2004:588) found that a factor influencing the opportunity for rebellion is the availability of finance. Resources and the "*primary commodity*

exports" increase the risk of conflict. In Angola, diamonds and ivory were the main resources while in West Africa, it was only diamonds. This joins in with the argument that when the opportunity for economic gain presents itself, greed steps in. Another explanation is that primary commodity dependence worsens governance and so generates stronger grievances (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:588). Grievance is about exploitation, inequality, poverty and deprivation. Poor nations, with rich resources, become victims of these struggles.

The risk of conflict goes hand in hand with the growth of the population. As the population increases so do grievances and heterogeneity (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:588). Diasporas play a large role in sustaining this economy, neglecting the poor. Diasporas *"support the opportunity interpretation"* (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:589).

1.1.3.   William Reno on West Africa

William Reno (2001) highlights factors making for weak states and conflicts within those states that are mainly about scarce resource. He focuses on Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Special units arose in the dire political and economic conditions in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. The aim of these units was to distribute weapons and military training within their immediate societies. Within this context of a fragmented military and disintegrated state, warlords arose as described by Kaldor (2006) and more specifically by Mackinlay (2000).

Mackinlay (2000:1) writes that warlords emerged in China after the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Warlords were former military commanders that tried to hold their own territory but seldom tried to capture state power. This was made possible through them operating through weak states, *"power vacuums"*, where they acted without interference from the state. Their purpose was to control their territories, and profit from conflict. They became the *"hyenas of the conflict zone"* (Mackinlay, 2000:3), not relying on popular loyalties, but often on manipulation and fear. William

Reno (2001) describes and analyses warlords in West Africa. For Reno, warlordism is about vague nationalism, the manipulation of markets, armed youths, commercial networks and the role of scarce resources, especially diamonds, in West Africa. It is concentrated on the politics of patronage, without administration and ideology, focusing only on illicit capital.

 "*The ruler increasingly operates like a racketeer, selling exemption from prosecution or using his control over the state to help his business partners*" (Reno, 2001:4).

Faulty international businesses often look for such rulers, since norms, rules and laws do not apply. According to Reno, "*patronage-based regimes are based on wholly different objectives and structures*" (Reno, 2001:4). The main aim of this type of regime is to create division among the opposition and to reward loyal supporters accordingly. The disintegration of society is inhibiting any form of self-sufficiency, such as privatization of benefits among the population. The population is kept under a watchful eye, not allowing any form of freedom.

"*Nearly all the 'warlords' in Somalia, Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, and Liberia once held high positions in the governments they later attacked, and had developed important commercial connections as part of an old patronage network*" (Reno, 2001:4).

These connections are extremely valuable, acting as "*raw materials*" for these leaders in their search for power and money.

The ruthless leaders often attract "*young, economically vulnerable men who seek economic opportunity via association with insurgents*" (Reno, 2001:5). Young men often join these groups in search of a way to better their socio-economic situation. For some men, joining these armed bands is a way of escape and a hope for a better future after the war. Willing and impoverished men recruit unavailable child soldiers, often through brutality and intimidation.

Those with the best developed international and commercial contacts turn out to be the best insurgents and rebels. Weapons are easily accessed because of international contacts and business. In addition, weapons are easier to distribute because of commercial contacts. Reno states that a successful insurgent must use "*extreme violence*" as to intimidate their rivals using commercial resources, while also generating a following through fear (Reno, 2001:6).Hence;

"*...the most typical followers of warlords are young men (and some young women) who use warfare as an opportunity to enrich themselves*" (Reno, 2001:6).

Most of these followers are from minority groups, often in collapsing societies and economies. Hence, warlords create economic opportunity out of the deteriorating situation. Similar to Collier and Hoeffler, Reno argues that grievance plays an important role in the men's motivation to join these groups. This could be as a result of their weak socio-economic condition and their hatred for the government. There are some insurgent groups who have to prey on their societies for support and then there are others who need the support of their communities to reign. A core characteristic of an insurgent group is therefore:

"*...their ability to get and use superior weaponry, and their capacity to cause disorder, manipulating international mediation*" (Reno, 2001:6).

According to Chabal (2000) there are three important elements to Reno's theory, namely the distinction between private and public interest that has ceased to exist, the fact that inhabitants of a given territory no longer 'enjoy' security by right of membership in a state, and the situation that politics has become "*commercialized*" (Chabal, 2000:409). Reno analyses what has happened in a number of African countries where the state has ceased to function. He develops a model of how politics can function informally without operating within and through the context of a legitimate bureaucracy.

Moreover, instead of seeing Africa as a cluster of failed states, it is argued that these states are actually in the transition from a non-bureaucratic form of state into a different type of political authority. Rulers therefore govern through non-bureaucratic elite networks, generating political and economic support, while having no regard for "*conventional institutional notions*" (Reno, 1995:110). Reno focuses on Sierra Leone and Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and his ally, Charles Taylor. Taylor, at one time, became President of Liberia, but in Sierra Leone, Taylor acted as a warlord.

1.2. Purpose and Significance

The purpose of this thesis is to describe the factors that led to the creation of warlords in Angola and Sierra Leone so as to better understand the dynamics and origins of warlord politics. In both cases "*new wars*" evolved, while at the same time these two countries posed as good examples of weak states. The rich resources created a chain reaction leading to resource wars over scarce and lucrative commodities such as diamonds in both Angola and Sierra Leone, and ivory as well in the case of Angola. Actors involved were almost always driven by greed or grievance. This included organised crime networks, mercenaries, profiteering politicians, and warlords. Thomas H. Greene and his work "*Comparative revolutionary movements: Search for theory and justice*" published by Prentice Hall in 1984, will be used as a tool in comparing Taylor and Savimbi as warlords.

Although this was published long before the emergence of warlordism in Africa, the significance of this study is that the criteria used remain valid for an in-depth comparative assessment of the similarities and especially of the differences between Savimbi and Taylor, as leaders of their respective organizations, UNITA and the RUF/NPFL. These criteria can be applied to other case studies as well. Savimbi himself was a revolutionary before he became a rebel in the Angolan civil war while Taylor also underwent training as a revolutionary. Are they typical revolutionaries, or will they be remembered for what they turned out to be: greedy warlords?

1.3. Research Methods

The study focuses on two warlords (Savimbi and Taylor), their backgrounds, similarities and differences. Hence, it is a comparative literature study. No empirical research in the form of questionnaires or fieldwork was used. It is a qualitative study through the use of historical analysis. The study focused on warlordism through comparing Charles Taylor, a more contemporary warlord, and Jonas Savimbi a former revolutionary and rebel. Warlordism and the actors which play a role in informal politics, and illicit economics, were analysed through the use of Mary Kaldor's (2006) work on "*new wars*", Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) work on "*greed and grievance*" and Reno's theory on informal politics in West Africa (2001) and Chabal (2000). While Mackinlay (2000) set a framework in which the origins of warlordism was described, the work of Thomas H. Greene was useful on the dynamics of revolutionary movements. His characteristics were used to set the criteria for a thorough comparison and analysis of these two warlords.

2. "New Wars", with special reference to Angola and Sierra Leone/Liberia

2.1. Factors

2.1.1. Criteria for analysis

Kaldor (2006) describes how war changed from "*old*" to "*new*" wars with the onset of the 21st century. She focuses on the changing role of the state and the increasing power of the war economy, in the context of globalization. The focus is placed on other actors taking over the role of the state. The inability to take control of physical coercion is a result of the failed state (Kaldor, 2006:97). Culture also changes. She shows that new cultures are overtaking "*old*" ones and therefore new identities are forming. This causes the disintegration of the typical state.

William Reno focuses on a different aspect of Kaldor's "*new war*" theory (Reno, 1995:110). He delves into the idea of the "*failed state*" and argues that supposed "*failed states*" create different forms of political authority, including warlords. In support of Kaldor, Reno agrees that the war economy and globalization could lead to the breakdown of the state. The war economy is dependent on the decreasing role and power of the state as a functioning legitimate body. Extreme violence executed through private militias and gangs are important features of the new war economy. This enables fear to rule the lives of civilians, creating an opportunity for warlords in a weak state to seize valuable resources.

Reno also emphasises elite networks, whereas Kaldor provides more of a framework in which these networks operate. These authors thus emphasise the war economy and the consequential vicious cycle that follows, namely, the breakdown and loss of legitimacy of the state. They agree that the distinction between private and public, between soldier and civilian, has become blurred with the onset of "*new wars*". More specifically, Reno (2001) focuses on vague nationalism, the manipulation of markets, armed youth and commercial conflict.

Collier and Hoeffler (2004:564) also focus on the main concept of the war economy. However they take a different approach towards this phenomenon. They point

toward greed and grievance, stating that if the economic opportunity presents itself in a degenerating and collapsing society, greed arises. On the other hand, grievance is experienced by the masses, mainly in the form of wide-spread poverty and exclusion. Apart from greed and grievance, they also focus on the role of primary commodities, low education levels, demographics and economic decline in these weak states.

Paul Collier's work is about "*rethinking conflict*" rather than "*thinking new conflicts*" (Marchal, 2004:1). Rebellions according to Collier are "*predatory and criminal*". Marchal (2004:3) argues that Collier views rebellion "*as a large scale predation of productive economic activities*". Collier in Marchal (2004:4) thus emphasizes the relationship between the government and insurgency groups. He refers to this as "*legalized predation*" where the government heavily taxes primary commodities, in order to finance government elite (Marchal, 2004:4). For him, rebel groups are the catalysts that lead to civil war. For civil wars to take place, scarce resources, the necessity for rebellion to finance itself, and greed, have to be present. The state is therefore never the instigator of a civil war, but merely reacts to rebels (Marchal, 2004:5).

Reno (2006:28) explores the reason why rulers intentionally undermine their own state agencies, the reason being that many post-colonial rulers thus adopted a "*vague nationalist*" agenda. As many African rulers did not know how to govern an African state in the post-colonial era, they simply adopted an agenda that would please foreign aid donors and other alliances. This agenda proposed a framework of economic self-sufficiency and non-alignment (Reno, 2006:29). The post-Cold War era brought about this kind of change in policy. In the 1980s, outsiders withdrew their support, while the new free-market strategy did not address many of the problems facing African states. African states could therefore not hold their weakly institutionalized states together (Reno, 2006:29).

Strong patronage networks started to play an increasingly important role in the context of the fragmentation of the state's control over law and order. Patronage-networks ensured that the elite and their assets stayed in their control. This personal

power base "*undermines the state capacity to provide services to the wider population*" (Reno, 2006:30). Reform becomes extremely difficult once patronage networks have infiltrated the system. The political section that provides reform is poisoned by a patronage network providing only for the elite. The state then feared that in focusing capital on service delivery, and not on managing local strongmen, they may lose the power to control (Reno, 2006:30). Moreover, such rulers manipulated markets to manage clients and to deny resources to their opposition (Reno, 2006:31). The rulers used their personal networks in the place of state institutions. In this way, rulers manipulate their authority to declare illegal activities, legal. Reno further states that it is not the presence of resources that causes predation, but rather the patronage-based political system that fragments the coercion of the state in order to protect itself (Reno, 2006:32).

Bøås and Dunn in "*African Guerrillas*" (2007:1), take a more holistic approach to guerrilla movements and insurgencies in Africa. They provide a different approach to the "*greed based*" argument, stating that insurgencies and guerrilla movements are historically grounded. Therefore, the authors state that Collier and Hoeffler's focus on greed and grievance is too narrow and does not take into account the "*long historical trends, diverse social forces, political motivations, and regional dimensions*" that make up African conflicts (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:9).

Violent non-state actors and insurgencies have occupied the centre stage of conflict in Africa (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:9). Historically, however, African insurgencies have had a poor success rate, even though they have been abundant in Africa since the Cold War.

They disagree that all conflicts in Africa are "*resource wars*" and argue that this "*greed kills*" argument is too narrow in explaining the complexity of African wars (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:10). The "*greed kills*" argument states that wars in Africa are fought for profit and not for political gain. The argument therefore lacks depth since it assumes that "*theft and predation are the reasons for the guerrilla struggle*" (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:11). It does not explain how the conflict originated but explains why

it continues. The authors argue that the "*resource war*" in Sierra Leone, for example, only became a 'resource war' once the conflict was well underway. It was therefore not the source of the conflict. Furthermore, the "*greed kills*" argument does not explain the conflict in full. For this to occur, a shift in focus on the "*political, cultural, and historical factors in addition to the economic dimensions of conflict*" has to occur (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:11). Solely greed arguments are considered to be "*one sided*" according to Bøås and Dunn.

The authors disagree as well, to an extent, with Kaldor on her theory on "*new wars*". She stated that changes in the global economy have given rise to "*new wars*" (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:10). However, the authors agree with Kaldor that changes in the global environment have provided a greater variety of opportunities to insurgencies. This has given insurgents the ability to connect to transnational actors and establish networks in order to exploit regional "*economic markets*" (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:10).

All these authors touch on the relationship between power and population. Power equals greed and population equals grievance. An increasing population thus stimulates heterogeneity which increases grievance, eventually contributing to the war economy. Moreover, it is argued that rebellion is an industry and there are elite groups that sustain the conflict. The authors agree that Diasporas help to sustain the conflict: they may be part of the smuggling networks and sustain actors at home through remittances. They therefore point to the role of outside markets and criminal networks in sustaining African conflicts.

2.1.2. "New War" zones in Angola: the factors

The rule of the Portuguese stripped Angola of many of its people, sending them as slaves to Brazil. Resources such as oil, coffee, diamonds and ivory were major commodities in colonial Angola. Three factions emerged out of the colonial struggle, based around three different ethnic groups. This created conflict between the FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola), MPLA (Popular Liberation Movement of Angola), UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and the colonial administration since the 1960s. After 1975, the MPLA, with Cuban and Soviet support, took power (Jackson, 1995:405). UNITA continued fighting in a civil

war, lasting for almost 3 decades, during which Savimbi was an insurgent (1960-1975), rebel (1975-1992) and eventually turned warlord (1992-2002). Identity politics, defined by Kaldor, thus had a strong influence on Angolan politics, especially under Savimbi's UNITA. UNITA had the support of the Ovimbundu; the MPLA had the support of the Mbundu; and the FNLA the Bakongo (Munslow, 1999:558). Marcum refers to this as politics based on "*ethnic tripolarity*" (Munslow, 1999:558).

After the struggle for independence against the Portuguese, civil war continued for 27 years between the MPLA and UNITA. The dynamics within UNITA changed. UNITA's idealism with regard to paternalism was lost in pursuit of wealth (McIntyre, 2004:49). UNITA no longer focused on the traditional family structures it had created for the Ovimbundu soldiers and people, instead, UNITA focused on diamonds. UNITA was thus maintained "*by its own internal logic of insatiable power*" through the exploitation of diamonds (McIntyre, 2004:48). UNITA's failure during the 1992 elections, for Savimbi, meant that UNITA had to generate its own economic sustenance (McIntyre, 2004:58). The informalization of the economy played a major role in this regard. Diamonds were used to 'support' Savimbi's UNITA, in its quest for political power. Hence, power and wealth played an increasingly greater role in the context of the civil war. The acquired wealth was used to finance weapons acquisition, while also generating further wealth for Jonas Savimbi, the warlord.

The factions and their support base accounted for three-quarters of the total population. The FNLA failed in comparison to the MPLA and UNITA which dominated the political sphere. The long war in Angola, the anti-Portuguese revolutions since 1960, the civil war since 1975, and Savimbi's warlord activities since 1992, debilitated the economy. It was a classical "*war economy*" with rich resources in a poor economy. Since 1975, elite networks in the ruling MPLA, benefitted from petro-dollar wealth, and became extremely rich; and

 "*…international corporations and foreign powers, for a long time sheltered from the direct impact of the conflict and the ethical dimension of their involvement, played an enabling role in the strategy of the belligerents*" (Le Billon, 2001:55).

Foreign business, mostly resource based (oil and diamonds), placed specific rents on the local resource industry. In other words, only local strongmen and business elite benefitted from resource contracts (Le Billon, 2001:56). UNITA had international contacts, as a liberation movement. However, international support ended after the Cold War. China also supported UNITA. Savimbi's aim was at first purely political, from 1966 after he trained in China, to 1992 (Meredith, 2005:314). As an anti-Portuguese revolutionary, his strategy was based on Maoist conceptions of guerrilla warfare. The civil war and Savimbi's political dream from 1960-1974 turned into an international conflict, drawing support from South Africa and the Americans (Meredith, 2005:316). In 1975, the MPLA were successful in attaining power in Luanda, while UNITA retreated to the rural areas to establish a "*self-sufficient*" force. After 1975, UNITA acquired a conventional army. Between 1975 and 1985, Savimbi's UNITA fought the Cubans and the Angolan army, while being supported by the Reagan administration and South Africa (Meredith, 2005:316). The foreign troops made it extremely difficult for Angola's government to reach a compromise between the three groups. The three factions and the clashes between them, further sustained the conflict.

Nevertheless, the MPLA, with Cuban support crushed this capacity by 1985 (Ross, 2003: 30). Ross explains that the end of the Cold War meant that UNITA no longer had American external support. As a result, UNITA relied more heavily on diamond revenues and regional actors to support them. Throughout the 1990s, UNITA sold "*hundreds of millions perhaps even several billion-dollar worth of diamonds*" (Ross, 2003:31). Savimbi again turned toward guerrilla warfare, and pursued this type of warfare until his death. Mercenary support from a South African based firm, "*Executive Outcomes*" (EO), helped train UNITA soldiers (Parsons, 2004:52). But after the civil war, Savimbi turned warlord in 1992, after failing to attain power in the first democratic elections of Angola (Parsons, 2004:52). After refusing to accept the MPLA victory in the 1992 elections and the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, UNITA finally surrendered after Savimbi's death in 2002 (Simon, 1998:496).

Bannon and Collier (2003:5) introduces the term "*booty futures*". This term explains the recent activity of rebel organizations that sell rights to mineral extraction in advance. Organizations often sell the resources they 'intend' on controlling, in other words, selling in advance that which is not theirs (Bannon & Collier, 2003:5). Hence, the rebel organization gains funds through selling natural resources beforehand should the rebellion succeed (Bannon & Collier, 2003:14). "*Booty futures*" operates only in Africa and includes a small number of actors (Ross, 2003:32). The rebel organization in this situation (UNITA) may be in a weaker position since it does not 'own' the resources but receives the income. Booty futures were present in Angola, and have been a core catalyst in initiating and prolonging the conflict (Ross, 2003:33).

Malaquias (2000:95) states that Angola was not solely a "*resource war*". The leaders of the MPLA and UNITA used the resources to further their political and economic careers, but there were deeply entrenched reasons for the ongoing conflict in Angola. Malaquias (2000:95) states that ethnic division among the major factions, dating back to pre-colonial times, have had a major impact on the continuity of war. Hence, class, racial and ideological differences were factors contributing to the animosity between the three factions. These factors also sustained Jonas Savimbi, the warlord.

2.1.3. "New War" zones in Liberia & Sierra Leone

Charles Taylor returned from the USA in 1985, creating a rebellion against the American supported regime of Samuel Doe in Liberia (Meredith, 2005:557). He gathered support from Libya in the form of weapons and training. He created his own militia called the NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) (Bhoke, 2006:3). The initial stages of his warlord activities in Sierra Leone started with the meeting of his future partner in crime, Foday Sankoh.

In 1988, prior to being in the Sierra Leonean army, Foday Sankoh came into contact with radical Sierra Leoneans and left for Libya to undergo guerrilla training (Bhoke, 2006:3). This is where he met Taylor. In 1971, Siaka Stevens had become the President of Sierra Leone, banning all other political parties, whereafter an internal

security unit was established to safeguard the President and oppress opposition (Issafrica, 2009). In 1985, Stevens handed over Presidency to Momoh who continued with the brutal dictatorship. This was a catalyst for events that were to come.

Sankoh supported Taylor in attacking the capital of Liberia in 1989. In Liberia, Taylor overthrew the military government of Samuel Doe in 1990. Doe's capture in 1990 initiated a spark that started a civil war, lasting 13 years (Weiss, 2005:22). In return for Sankoh's help, Taylor supported Sankoh and his RUF (Revolutionary United Front) in the invasion of Sierra Leone in 1991 (Bhoke, 2006:30). In 1992, the new military government of Sierra Leone and the RUF attempted to pursue a peace agreement. The attempt did not last and fighting continued. In 1993, the RUF had to retreat into the Gola forest establishing "*hit and run*" bases all over the area (Issafrica, 2009).

In 1996, elections took place in Sierra Leone in which Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah took power. Another peace negotiation was initiated in Sierra Leone, but peace was short lived. Meanwhile, Executive Outcomes and the Kamajors assisted the elected government. The Kamajors were local government trained soldiers. The army revolted a year later and the Kabbah government fled to Guinea (Issafrica, 2009). This is the same year (1997) that Taylor achieved Presidency in his own country of Liberia. The RUF wanted to seize power in the capital of Freetown, providing them with the access to control diamonds. The war continued in Sierra Leone till 1998.

Both Sierra Leone and Liberia had abundant natural resources, diamonds in the case of Sierra Leone and rubber in the case of Liberia (Aning & McIntyre, 2004:67). Albeit, a "*rubber war*" did not occur in Liberia, while a diamond war did arise in Sierra Leone. Alluvial diamonds have been the leading resource sector in Sierra Leone since the 1930s (Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005:581). This war was a typical "*resource war*", especially focused on diamonds (Le Billon, 2005:238). *"Booty futures"* (Bannon & Collier, 2003:5) – as in Savimbi's Angola, was also present in the

Liberian and Sierra Leonean examples, furthering the cause for civil conflict and resource wars.

Through using revolutionary sentiment in Sierra Leone, Sankoh created a good base to attract the poor and especially young men. These men formed groups called the "*rarray boys*" and the "*san-san*" (Murphy, 2003:65). Similar to Taylor in Liberia, Sankoh promised a "*meal ticket and protection*" (Meredith, 2005:563). Young, easily manipulated, children were recruited into the RUF. Brainwashed and drugged, the RUF seized Sierra Leone, with the slogan "*OPERATION KILL EVERYTHING*" (Hough, 2007:12). His partner in these crimes was Charles Taylor.

Maximum terror and brutality was the key tactic to make sure no one would survive or want to return to Sierra Leone. The civilian population was destroyed through looting, raping and plundering (Zack-Williams, 1999:154). Trademark tactics were developed, in order to infuse terror into the people. This was in the form of chopping off hands with machetes (Lwanda, 2003:23).

Manipulation, drugs and alcohol were also used to hype up the soldiers, in order to impose maximum terror. Children with AK47's were used to do the 'dirty' work, because they were young, easily influenced and manipulated. The soldiers were drugged into a "*blur*" (Zack-Williams, 1999:154). Over a period of 11 years, 50 000 died, 20 000 were mutilated and more than ¾ of the population were displaced (Meredith, 2005:572).

Taylor was concerned with the wealth of the neighbouring diamond rich Sierra Leone. The diamond rich *Kono* region was the target (Thusi & Meek, 2003:30). To a greater degree, fear and intimidation played a more prominent role in Taylor's support base. The criminal case against Taylor supports this point (Bhoke, 2006:1). Although the civil war between the Krahn and NPFL created hardships in Liberia the RUF's aim was to overthrow the 24 year rule of President Momoh's government, and take control of their diamond assets as well as the surrounding diamond mines (Aning & McIntyre, 2004:69).

As mentioned, Taylor was first an insurgent in Liberia, where he seized power, but turned a warlord in Sierra Leone. Taylor seized the 'opportunity' as a middle man between the diamond mines operated by the RUF in Sierra Leone, and the international diamond firms. Through international contacts, and as a contestant in the war economy in Sierra Leone, Taylor gathered great wealth and support.

A war economy in Sierra Leone based on diamonds, operating through Liberia, was thus created. In both countries, the state ceased to function, with only a few elite ("*warlords*") controlling the bulk of wealth in both nations. The state could no longer protect its citizens, creating grievance among the populations of both Sierra Leone and Liberia. Taylor acquired political power through fear and intimidation in Liberia. In Sierra Leone, brutality was key to controlling the aggrieved population, including child soldiers. This was essential in order to keep control of the diamond mines and hush any opposition.

Taylor was in partnership with Foday Sankoh and his rebel movement, the RUF since 1991 (Reno, 1995:112). The RUF used revolutionary sentiments to gain support for its illegal diamond smuggling activities. Without international networking and support, the war could not have continued as long as it did.

The two civil wars in Liberia, the first civil war (1990-1997) and the second civil war (1997-2003) ended with Charles Taylor's exile to Nigeria in 2003 (Meredith, 2005:573). Only after 2000, the RUF (in Sierra Leone) started to disarm and in 2004 the DDR (Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration) program was officially declared over (Issafrica, 2009).

The natural resources in Sierra Leone and Liberia were therefore used to the economic benefit of warlords and rulers in these weak states. In this way, these actors have fuelled civil conflict, which could have been settled otherwise (Weiss, 2005:10). The informal trading of diamonds allegedly enriched other militant groups such as Al Qaeda (Weiss, 2005:10). Diamonds presented a non-traceable liquid

asset (Weiss, 2005:10). Diamonds were easily smuggled and have financed not only marginal leaders in West Africa, but also played an intricate role in the greater picture of global networking and military deals (Weiss, 2005:10).

2.2. Actors in "New War" zones

2.2.1. What the authors are saying

The end of the Cold War, created two regional conflict zones within Africa, one in West Africa and one in East Africa (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:2). The first conflict zone, the western zone, included states such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. This zone was the result of conflicts surrounding the Mano River basin.

The second conflict zone, the eastern zone, was created with the fall of Mobutu's rule in Zaire, creating the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This conflict drew in a number of surrounding nations, namely, Angola, Namibia, Uganda and Zimbabwe, among others (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:2).

The end of the Cold War saw a quick emergence of armed insurgents evolving out of the "*international geopolitical reorganization, the crises of the neopatrimonial state, and the emergence of two fully developed conflict zones*" (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:2). Christopher Clapham (1998) in Bøås and Dunn (2007:3) suggests that there are four categories of insurgents in Africa, "*liberation insurgencies, separatist insurgencies, reform insurgencies, and warlord insurgencies*". Taylor and Sankoh belong to the "*warlord insurgency*" category while Savimbi firstly belongs to the "*liberation insurgency*" and secondly to the "*warlord insurgency*". Nevertheless, Bøås and Dunn (2007:4) argue that African insurgencies "*are best understood as rational responses to the composition of African states and their polities*".

Kaldor (2006:95) refers to the new war economy in the context of "*globalized wars*". Unlike the total wars of the 20th century, new wars involve the fragmentation and decentralization of the state. Participation in new wars is low relative to the population, because of the lack of pay (Kaldor, 2006:95). The state's domestic production stagnates resulting in the warring parties becoming dependent on

external support. The state fails to sustain physical coercion over the territory, eventually losing its ability to collect taxes. The weakening revenue base follows into a vicious cycle of corruption and personalistic rule (Kaldor, 2006:97). In this atmosphere of illegitimacy of the state, private agencies are employed which often result in tax evasion. New actors evolve out of this environment, claiming "*protection money*" (Kaldor, 2006:97). In sum, a vicious cycle of "*loss of revenue and legitimacy, growing disorder, and military fragmentation*" *create* the context in which new wars take place (Kaldor, 2006:97). This is strongly accompanied by the "*privatization of violence*" (Kaldor, 2006:97).

Nitzschke and Studdard (2005:223) state that certain groups in civil war engage in activities that sustain the conflict. Kaldor identifies five types of fighting units that are present within a new war context; "*regular armed forces, paramilitary groups, self-defense units, foreign mercenaries and regular foreign troops under international auspices*" (Kaldor, 2006:97).

Soldiers are often unpaid and untrained, leading to soldiers seeking other 'unsavory' means of making a living (Kaldor, 2006:98). This contributes to the cycle of ill discipline and the breakdown of the military hierarchy, often leading to commanders acting as local warlords. Kaldor (2006:98) states that "*regular armed forces lose their character as the legitimate bearers of arms and become increasingly difficult to distinguish from private paramilitary groups*".

The "*paramilitary group*" includes independent men fighting for and around one leader. The group can include ex-soldiers, criminals or whole groups of breakaway soldiers (Kaldor, 2006:99). Underemployed men are often recruited and in some cases men are released from jail for the purpose of fighting in these units (Kaldor, 2006:99). Formal military uniforms are uncommon; however, they often wear distinctive clothing such as Ray-Ban sunglasses and Adidas shoes (Kaldor, 2006:99). These groups are the most common in the new war context. Paramilitary groups are often associated with an extremist party or political faction (Kaldor, 2006:98). These

groups are often established by governments "*to distance themselves from the more extreme manifestations of violence*" (Kaldor, 2006:98).

Regular foreign troops have also made an appearance in new wars. The groups usually operate under the auspices of Intergovernmental organisations such as UN, NATO and ECOMOG (Kaldor, 2006:101). These groups are often not directly involved in the war; however, their presence is vital. In the Liberian and Sierra Leonean example, ECOMOG troops were involved in the fighting after taking over from "*Executive Outcomes*".

In sum Kaldor states that the above mentioned fighting units lack "*hierarchy, order and vertical command*" in comparison to guerrilla warfare (Kaldor, 2006:101). These units appear to be armies; however, they are often breakaway units of the military. The units rarely use heavy weapons. Instead "*light weapons*" in the form of "*rifles, machine guns, hand-grenades and short range rockets*" are used because of their manoeuvrability (Kaldor, 2006:102). In conclusion, Kaldor (2006:102) states that the end of the Cold War increased the availability of surplus weapons. In other words, the new wars can be seen as a form of "*military waste disposal*", where unwanted and surplus weaponry are utilized by the new units (Kaldor, 2006:102). This was specifically evident in Angola, after the Cold War.

Reno (1997:165) focuses on commercial alliances and the impact that these networks have on the weak African state. The elements that are included in Reno's (1997) commercial alliances are the rulers of the weak states, foreign firms and creditors. The post-Cold War era meant that rulers, or weak states, had to find new ways of funding through the use of external support (Reno, 1997:165). During the Cold War, external assistance aided the rulers of the weak states to "*manage domestic threats*" (Reno, 1997:166). Weak state rulers intentionally sabotaged their own bureaucracies in order to receive external aid and deny local rivalries. External support furthered patron-client relationships.

Creditors play an important role in commercial alliances that has a continual presence in Africa. Africa has to attract *Foreign Direct Investment* according to the creditor's prescription. African states have to obey creditors demands in order to provide further opportunities for clients to "*generate foreign exchange while continuing to make loan payments*" (Reno, 1997:168). Creditors use this argument to impose further conditions on loans and aid. Nevertheless, the failure to accommodate the 'rules' are not the main reason for the lack of investment, and economic decline, in Africa. Patron-client relationships pose a major threat to the investment climate. Reno (1997:169) states that "*Even reform-minded rulers find it difficult to force these strongmen to pay their bills to the state*". A result is the accumulation of more debt. A cycle develops, Reno (1997:169) explains;

"*Creditors thus become increasingly tied to the survival of weak states' rulers against the threatening power of old Cold War patronage networks. The weak state ruler can exploit his internal vulnerability, presenting himself as most worthy of outside support against his anti-reform rivals lodged in the state-bureaucracy*".

Old Cold War patronage networks are therefore responsible for the ongoing debt and the policy failure within the African state.

Mercenary firms, and PMCs, often act as a stable mechanism in weak states. In the example of the South African mercenary firm "*Executive Outcomes*", involved in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola, stability was the outcome. This satisfies the creditors. In weak states with weak institutions "*foreign firms are best able to exercise effective control over commerce and revenues*" (Reno, 1997:183). The presence of foreign firms helps discipline local strongmen and brings resources under "*exclusive regime control*" (Reno, 1997:183). There were no mercenaries in any of the above, only PMCs.

Similar to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Reno (2006:26) states that "*greed and opportunity*" play an important role in the motivation of actors to fight. Furthermore, wars that occur away from central economic and political centres are considered to

be in a special category of conflict. Pre-war patronage networks are one of the main catalysts causing conflict in Africa. These networks create major obstacles in building "*mass protest movements*" (Reno, 2006:26). The rent-seeking economies and close connections to criminal networks are stated to be the main reasons for predation but not predatory conflict (Reno, 2006:26). Reno (2006:26) thus argues that the main features of predatory conflict are corruption within a patronage based system, in which rulers have dispersed their coercion over the state, and violently oppose any form of opposition.

Armed youths are a key characteristic of collapsing states (Reno, 2006:27). The youth often serve the interest of the elite. They try and enforce their presence through the exploitation of the existing political structures, furthermore, enforcing their presence in a social system from which they were excluded (Reno, 2006:26). There exists a close relationship between local elites, pre-conflict rulers and predatory behaviour among armed groups prior to conflict within a nation (Reno, 2006:27). Hence, elites who were excluded from previous civil wars and conflicts are less likely to create violent armed groups in an upcoming conflict. Ignoring community demands becomes easier with the influx of "*non-indigenous fighters, foreign military intervention, charitable aid, or commercial networks*" (Reno, 2006:28). This is because these actors take over the civil role of the state. This further results in a 'shadow' state, controlled by warlords.

2.2.2. History of warlordism

Warlordism became prominent within China through a series of civil wars after the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Local and provincial rulers seized control over their own territory. This "*warlord period*" occurred between 1911 and 1937, which created considerable change within China (Mackinlay, 2000:1). Decentralisation occurred during this period, transferring power from the centre to the provincial level. Mackinlay (2000:2) argues that China's 20th century warlord began their career as "*provincial military commanders*". The Qing dynasty could not retain control over their military. They believed that a "*dispersal of interest*" would stop a widespread military revolution that may provide the provincial rulers with more time and power, to attain influence. Hence, the provincial leaders created an empire for themselves.

Chinese society became a place of looting and plundering. War and poverty forced peasants to join the criminal bands. For the poor, the military provided protection, status and income. Mackinlay (2000:2) states that "*guns*" showed power within society. It provided Chinese men with status and power. During this time of plundering and vandalism, much of China's social and cultural heritage was destroyed.

Historical Chinese analysts justified these actions through arguing that the members were of a lower class. They argued that the poor's "*intellect*" was inferior and therefore they were oblivious to the atrocities committed. Lary in Mackinlay (2000:2) argues that the brutality shown within Chinese military derives from a historical cause. The degrading historical relationship between soldier and officer, through continuous beating, created the indifference within the army culture. In other words:

"*The Chinese military world of the warlord was too new and too fragmented to have established formal standards of behaviour. Soldiers learned how to behave in an ad hoc fashion. They became predatory towards the civilian world, not as a matter of policy, but in imitation of the way their commanders treated them...*" (Mackinlay, 2000:2)

Mackinlay (2000:2) distinguishes between the warlord and the insurgent in China's civil war. The warlord already attained support because of his military past, while Mao Zedong, the insurgent, had to gain popular support from different groups in order to be successful. Therefore, Mao's soldiers had to be cautious while campaigning for support. The warlord, on the other hand, did not change his terror tactics. His focus was purely on the war economy and not the support of the people. The insurgent wants to seize national power, while the warlord only wants to retain local control.

Similar to the rise of warlords in China, Liberia and Angola also first experienced a weak or collapsing state. This weak state gave way to an "*opportunity*" for rebellion, through the availability of resources. In Sierra Leone it was diamonds and in Angola

it was diamonds and ivory. Although Angola is oil rich, oil was never a commodity within the control of warlords, only petro-dollar corruption existed among the state elite.

Taylor and Savimbi created 'empires' for themselves, similar to the Chinese warlord. Taylor created a "*Greater Liberia*" where his forces controlled "*significant portions of Old Liberia and at times, the eastern periphery of Sierra Leone*" (Reno, 1995:112). Savimbi controlled the highlands of the Ovimbundu land. Both Savimbi and Taylor therefore occupied a certain area which can be seen as "*quasi-states*" or "*insurgencies*" (Clapham, 1998:150). These insurgencies scavenge on illegal activity creating any means of economic gain. Insurgencies not only engage in shadow economic activities but also in international transactions (Clapham, 1998:151). Angola and Sierra Leone are classic examples of regionalised insurgencies operating internationally without international recognition of 'statehood'. In the NPFL example under Taylor, his creation and occupation of Greater Liberia established him as an international business man;

"*...the NPFL entered into concession agreements with major international companies, for the export of iron ore, rubber, and tropical timber, royalties on which were paid to the NPFL*" (Clapham, 1998:151).

In Angola, UNITA worked through similar tactics, only operating through shady middlemen, often with South African firms (Clapham, 1998:151). Savimbi operated through and from the Cuango Valley, near his capital Jamba in the south-east (Meredith, 2005:314). Parallel to the Chinese situation, the gangs or special units used force and violence to control the aggrieved population. In accordance with Maoism, UNITA provided the population with safety, food and an identity. However, through civil war and brutality, Sankoh and Taylor had a continuous flow of recruits for their special units. Savimbi was therefore a warlord with a difference, avoiding brutality and relying on loyalty. Nevertheless, as a warlord he relied on patronage.

The brutality in the initiation shown to the soldiers within the NPFL, resulted in the soldiers using that same brutality toward the civilian population. These were similar tactics that the commander used toward the soldier within Chinese armies. The soldier separated himself from society and civilian life through brutality and force.

In line with Kaldor's view on "*new wars*", Mackinlay (2000) states that the new kind of warlord manifested himself after the Cold War to adapt to the changing international environment. The absence of interest from Russia and the USA had grave effects on Africa in particular. This absence created a vacuum of power, when this power gap was not filled, many African states collapsed into extreme poverty and broken bureaucracies.

It was in this area filled with poverty and weak states that the new warlord made his appearance;

"*The 1990 warlord was responding to a new field of global pressures, opportunities and stresses. Broadly speaking, his traditionally negative role in society remained largely unchanged, he was still the hyena of the conflict zone, lacking courage or the long term commitment to confront the strong and, instead preying off the weak and sickly, ensuring his survival by living within a territory that he could secure in a military sense. But in his new environment, he could no longer ignore the attractions of global compression and its tendency to reach into the sanctuary of his territory*" (Mackinlay, 2000:3).

A highlighted characteristic of the new conflict zone was the increased involvement of international emergency relief and long term development programmes (Mackinlay, 2000:4). Warlords did not respect international agencies but often did not stop relief from entering. Warlords, in the horn of Africa, organized some of their sub groups to "*interface*" with the aid, including the Red Cross and the UN (Mackinlay, 2000:4). In other words, the warlord had now involved the agencies in the problem instead of the solution. For example, for the purpose of patronage, by stealing food aid and redistributing it to supporters.

Warlord military, unlike the Chinese example where European tactics of warfare was adapted, evolved into an unorganized form of military. Post Cold War forces do not have "*uniformly developed warfare capabilities*" (Mackinlay, 2000:4). New warlords and their combat are largely symbolic and frightening. A warlord would often not engage in combat, because of the mutual recognition of territory. However Taylor's campaign against ECOMOG troops in Liberia proved that, in some cases, "*warlords were capable of concerted military action against intervention forces*" (Mackinlay, 2000:4).

One striking similarity between the new warlord and the Chinese warlord is that "*the gang culture was not vastly different*" (Mackinlay, 2000:4):"*The faction fighters had the same predatory lifestyle, preying on the weak so long as there could be no threat or reprisal*" (Mackinlay, 2000:4).

It is argued that the same brutality that manifested in China between the leaders and their 'soldiers' was present in the indoctrination of new soldiers within the NPFL in Liberia. In this situation the "*brutality of their superiors licensed the young recruits' own brutality towards civilians*" (Mackinlay, 2000:4). The process of indoctrination expected of soldiers to deny their own families and commit atrocities. Prospective soldiers had to change their names and adopt new warrior names. This resulted in more effective and less sensitive soldiers. Similar actions, rape, vandalism and pillage were performed by Chinese warlords and "*new zone*" warlords.

The creation of the new warlord is therefore the result of global market changes and the end of the Cold War. Warlords should not be confused with insurgents. Insurgents have similar characteristics, however an insurgent will return to a "*political endgame in which he will have to submit himself to the electorate*" (Mackinlay, 2000:5). The main motivation of a warlord remains the war economy.

2.3. Assessment

Kaldor (2006) has highlighted a number of actors in "*globalized wars*". Reno (1995) argues that politics in Africa does not comply with regular formal rules but works through informal non-bureaucratic practices. This form of politics consists of patron-

client relationships, meaning that personalised power is central within African politics. Neo-patrimonialism focuses on the relationship between formal and informal politics. Reno (1997:2006) further emphasises the dominance of patron-based networks in a post-Cold War era. He focuses on the role of foreign actors within the African state. Collier (2004) focuses on a more economic approach toward civil war, emphasising the legitimacy of the state and the revolt of the rebels. Bøås and Dunn (2007) on the other hand, take a more holistic approach toward guerrilla movements, arguing that Kaldor's and Collier's arguments on war in Africa are too narrow.

The case studies presented of Savimbi's UNITA, Taylor's NPFL and Sankoh's RUF, have major similarities but are also distinctly different. Savimbi and Taylor traded in alluvial diamonds and occupied a certain area. In Savimbi's case it was the Cuango valley (south-eastern Angola) (Meredith, 2005:314) and in Taylor and Sankoh's situation it was the *Kono* region (Thusi & Meek, 2003:30). The difference however is that Taylor simply joined the bandwagon of the RUF in exploiting diamonds. Savimbi started focusing on exploiting diamonds to support UNITA later in his career, especially in the post Cold War era. He revealed that he was trading diamonds in his first visit to the United States in 1979 (Potgieter, 1999:260). However, after the failure to attain power in the 1992 elections, Savimbi's UNITA became more dependent on diamond revenue. UNITA was more a war based on "*ethnic*" division and ideology than resources.

Taylor was a warlord from the beginning in 1991, while Savimbi was an insurgent and only later became a warlord after he lost the Angolan elections in 1992 (McIntyre, 2004:58).

The post-Cold War era saw Savimbi turn into a warlord and return to the bush. He established a self-sufficient and sustainable UNITA in the rural areas of Angola (Potgieter, 1999:259). Sierra Leone was a pure resource war, with no ethnic tribal base supporting the RUF. In Angola, ethnicity was relevant. Zack-Williams (1999:148) states that the political emergencies in Sierra Leone did not "*assume the*

ethnic or religious dimensions" compared to other civil wars. The "*movement"* did not start off as a revolutionary struggle unlike UNITA. Unlike the situation in Sierra Leone and Liberia, UNITA had three factions, each with its own tribal base and own ideology. This resulted in a civil war between the MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA (Munslow, 1999:558).

Angola felt the pressure of the end of the Cold War more than Sierra Leone and Liberia. This is because Angola was a major focal point of the major powers during the Cold War. However, old Cold War patronage networks continued to fuel the war economy in Angola because of the patron-client relationships established during the Cold War. However, the end of the Cold War did not mean an end to external support (Potgieter, 1999:267). Regional actors, in the form of Zaire, Congo and Zambia, continued their support for their chosen liberation faction (Potgieter, 1999:265). Liberia and Sierra Leone on the other hand, were not so much dependent on direct external aid from the major powers. Instead, they created their own transnational networks, operating through informal transnational smuggling channels. There is thus a major difference between the civil war and liberation struggle in Angola compared to the resource war in Sierra Leone. The war in Angola, stretching over four decades, created a platform for Cold War powers to exert their influence and power through supporting the various factions. China, also played a major role in this regard. Angola was therefore a "*pawn in the Cold War"* (Meredith, 2005:313). While Taylor used revenue from his rubber exploitation and support from Libya to support his political campaign in Liberia, his involvement in Sierra Leone was purely for economic reasons.

Both Angola and Sierra Leone had a South African influence in the form of "*Executive Outcomes"*. In Sierra Leone, EO was hired to evacuate Freetown of rebels and to train the "*Kamajors"* (Hough, 2007:11), while in Angola; EO was hired to train UNITA soldiers. Also, De Beers, a South African mining giant was involved in both Sierra Leone and Angola (Simon, 1998:495). Angola and Sierra Leone had what Ross (Bannon & Collier, 2003:5) terms, "*booty futures"*. Various actors were involved

in both nations. *"Localities"* in the form of the *"rarray boys"*, the *"san-san"* were present in Sierra Leone (Murphy, 2003:65).

Only Savimbi used Maoist revolutionary sentiment to gain support. His Maoist strategy was key in gathering support from China (Jackson, 1995:396). He built identity through loyalty, similar to Mao, not brutality like Sankoh and Taylor. However, strategy and ideology changed after the Cold War, showing that the Maoist ideology was a tactic to gather support from China (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:17).

In Sierra Leone and Angola there was a significant decay in regular armed forces. In Sierra Leone, the SLA (Sierra Leonean Army) could not defend Freetown without outside assistance (Hough, 2007:13). While in Angola, post 1988, the government forces could not defend itself against UNITA. PMCs in the form of EO helped create stability in Angola and Sierra Leone. Foreign troops were especially introduced in Sierra Leone, ECOMOG and later UNAMSIL (Hough, 2007:13). In Angola, South African, American, Soviet and Cuban influences were present, during the liberation struggle and the consequential civil wars. In Sierra Leone and Angola, the quest to conquer the capital was the aim at that stage. In Sierra Leone it was more of an economic aim while in Angola Savimbi's aim was at first purely political. But as a warlord, Savimbi only wanted to defend his territory and his capital, Jamba.

Neither faction wanted a *"multi-racial"* government. Malaquias (2000:103) states that the organizations were *"sub-national"* organizations since they wanted a *"pure"* ethnic government. In the three cases presented in this chapter, there was a significant deterioration of the state. All these cases were characterized by greed. The elite and their cronies soon became dependent on the war economy. War and internal strife became a necessity for the elite and their special units to survive. The states no longer catered for their people. A state based on client-patron relationships replaced formal state institutions. The population became the target for the elite in West Africa and their economic aims, leading to a destabilised, lawless and deprived civil society. This further encouraged the poor and deprived to join the special units, following into a vicious cycle.

3.   Jonas Savimbi in Angola

3.1. Introduction

Portugal's President Dr Antonio Salazar ruled over Angola and Mozambique with an iron fist since 1932 until Angola's independence in the early 1970's (Meredith, 2005:134). Portuguese colonies were viewed as "*overseas provinces*" and Portugal enjoyed the rich natural resources and prosperity they presented (Meredith, 2005:134). Angola became prosperous with a growing investment and industry sector. However, underlying this prosperity was great discontent among the Angolan people. Grievances mounted as Portugal did not de-colonize after WWII. Hence, an anti-colonial revolution was inevitable that lasted 13 years from 1961 to 1974 (Malaquias, 2000:102).

Within the context of Portuguese rule, three liberation movements were created by three different men, with different backgrounds. Leadership made a significant impact on the armed organizations (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:29): Holden Roberto in the north, Agostinho Neto in the central regions and Jonas Savimbi in the south.

The first movement that was created was the MPLA, established in 1956 by a group of Angolan intellectuals mostly *mesticos* (mixed race) (Meredith, 2005:135). Some of its leaders were white, or mixed race, with links to the Angolan Communist Party. The MPLA became an exile organization, continually moving its headquarters from Paris, to Guinea and later to the Congo (Meredith, 2005:135). The leader, Agostinho Neto, a former medical doctor, was supported by the Soviet Union. With Soviet and Cuban support, the MPLA became the ruling party after Angolan independence in 1975. Dos Santos took over the MPLA leadership, from Neto, in 1979. At that stage, the MPLA fought against Savimbi's UNITA, supported by South Africa. South Africa withdrew in 1975, returning in 1976 only to withdraw again in 1988, after Cuito Cuanavale, leaving UNITA alone (Windrich, 2008:202). Savimbi continued the civil war after the 1992 elections, then acted as a warlord until his death in 2002.

UNITA was formally launched as a breakaway group from Roberto's FNLA, in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi (Meredith, 2005:314). It started as an Ovimbundu insurgency supported by China in the mid-1960's (Malaquias, 2007:200). Savimbi, a nationalist leader during the war, gained a huge following because he remained with his guerrilla forces during the war. He could rely on the loyalty of his followers (Meredith, 2005:314). He was trained in China and applied Maoist principles of rural guerrilla warfare. Later he controlled much of the diamond mines of the north and eastern interior (Munslow, 1999:551). The heartlands of diamonds were Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul (Munslow, 1999:553). Through his guerrilla movement, Savimbi was able to control rural areas, enabling him to foster agricultural production for his soldiers to survive (Munslow, 1999:551). Half of the production of diamonds came from the Cuango Valley, which UNITA controlled until 1998 (Munslow, 1999:553). From 1981, Savimbi's UNITA was also supported by the USA. Chester Crocker states in Meredith (2005:600) that; "*It was difficult not to be impressed by this Angolan, who combined qualities of warlord, paramount chief, demagogue and statesman*". Savimbi spoke seven languages, three African and four European. He is stated to have had a "*world class strategic mind*" and was even invited to the White House in 1986, heralding him as the "*champion of democracy*" (Meredith, 2005:601). Anstee states that Savimbi "*exuded charisma*" (Meredith, 2005:605).

Other were of the opinion that Savimbi "*was a ruthless dictator, with a messianic sense of destiny, insistent on total control and intolerant of dissent and criticism from anyone in his movement*" (Meredith, 2005:603). Savimbi presented himself as an anti-communist with strong western values (Meredith, 2005:604). He cherished his image as a heroic guerrilla hero among western allies. However, similar to the MPLA, he used security apparatus to rule in fear and keep control (Meredith, 2005:604). He utilized ideology to further his motive and action. He, allegedly, purged UNITA rivals and critics (Meredith, 2005:604). Savimbi's image was damaged after a rumour surfaced of him killing two prominent officials. This not only dented his image in the west, but also damaged his reputation with the 1992 elections (Meredith, 2005:604).

Both Savimbi and Dos Santos followed a highly centralised and personalised form of rule (Munslow, 1999:551). The MPLA was considered "*robbers*" and UNITA "*assassins*" by popular street culture in Luanda, prior to the 1992 elections (Munslow, 1999:552). The wealth of Angola, diamonds and oil, dominated by the two warring factions, empowered them to be immune to outside and internal pressure (Munslow, 1999:552). Although Savimbi had access to the diamonds and ivory, the MPLA remained in control of the oil fields in Cabinda, northern Angola. The international interest in Angola's wealth probably led to the conflict continuing longer than it should have since many international firms, like Chevron, had invested in Angola since 1997 (Munslow, 1999:552). Dos Santos won and Savimbi lost the 1992 elections. Savimbi then returned to the bush, and continued the civil war. The new American president, Bill Clinton, decided that since the Cold War was over, Washington had to recognize Luanda after 1992. Without American support, Savimbi became a warlord.

3.2. Following

Savimbi parted from Holden Roberto's FNLA to form UNITA in 1966 (Jackson, 1995:392). In line with Maoist training, it was a peasant-based organization, although Angolan whites also started to support UNITA. It remained hostile toward the *mesticos* and *assimilados* in the cities. UNITA's support base remained the Ovimbundu in the central and southern regions, Ngangela and Chokwe (Jackson, 1995:392). The Ovimbundu is the largest ethno-linguistic group and occupy 35-40% of Angola's population, dominating the areas with the highest population density (Malaquias, 2000:102). According to Malaquias (2000:102) they have been regarded as a "*nation*" rather than a tribe.

At the start of the civil war, UNITA had a small guerrilla army but was ideologically well integrated and had popular support in Ovimbunduland. Their advantage was that they controlled the Benguela railway through Central Angola. Firstly based in Zambia, UNITA's base moved to Egypt in 1989 but returned to Angola, staying there till 2002 (Jackson, 1995:392).

Savimbi supposedly represented the "*African*" people of Angola, at least from the rural areas of the central and southern Angola, while the MPLA was partially dominated by whites and *mesticos* in Luanda (Meredith, 2005:603). Ironically, UNITA survived for long through the assistance of white minority rule in South Africa. For example, Savimbi's headquarters in Jamba (south-east of Angola) had been protected by South African forces for 13 years (Meredith, 2005:603).

With Ovimbundu support, Savimbi manipulated symbolic elements such as "*tribal affiliation and kinship patterns*" (Malaquias, 2000:97). His home town and base in Bailundo, was also the historical seat of the senior Ovimbundu king. The roots went deep, Munslow (1999:558) states;

"*Ovimbundu rulers seemed to rely on the hunter imagery to support their claims to leadership. Moreover, members of civil society had also internalized these traditions, expecting their rulers to act autocratically*".

In other words, in times of crisis, autocratic rule as well as the hunter-king image became useful (Munslow, 1999:558). Moreover, in line with Maoist principles, UNITA succeeded in winning the "*hearts and minds*" of the Ovimbundu people, mainly by identifying with their grievances and symbols (Potgieter, 1999:258).

3.3. Ideology and Organization

Although, post-independent Angola was depicted as a "*resource war*", this categorization does not take into account the deep cultural, ideological and ethnic factors underlying the long civil war. Malaquias (2000:95) argues that Angola's civil war was not just a resource war, but a war consisting of dominant politico-military forces striving for power but each with deep ethnic and ideological differences. The divisions between the three main nationalist groups have therefore contributed greatly to the ongoing war, stating that "*the divisions between the nationalist groups were caused mainly by ethnic differences predating colonialism*" (Malaquias, 2000:95). In fact, the differences between these three factions were so severe, that they could not join forces against their common enemy, the Portuguese. Race and

class thus feature prominently as factors contributing to the war (Malaquias, 2000:96).

Ideology may be termed as a "*shared belief*" of a group of people. It is argued that these groups often 'faked' their ideological preference in order to gain aid or support from external powers. This can be seen by the "*rapidity*" at which many armed groups dropped their ideological aspirations at the end of the Cold War (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:17). Jonas Savimbi is a good example of this. Hence, after the Cold War, ideology no longer played such an important part in the guerrilla movements. Greed and looting became more prominent as Savimbi began to behave less like a revolutionary and more like a warlord. Instead these groups adopted "*contemporary sounding generic labels*" (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:17), revealing the capacity of these movements to adapt to a changing global environment. This is best shown in the "*pattern of alliance during the Cold War as it changed to the global connections of business and crime in the globalized post Cold War*" era (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:17).

Savimbi's organization of UNITA was influenced by Maoist thinking. Savimbi himself went for a strategic course in rural guerrilla warfare at the Nanjing Military College in 1975, China. UNITA, first trained in China in 1966 (Malaquias, 2007:202). In 1976, UNITA became the only organization mentioned in the Chinese press. This served them well as UNITA claimed that it was following a Maoist strategy of rural guerrilla warfare since 1966 "'*actively building base areas, relying on the broad masses, using Chinese army discipline regulations*" (Jackson, 1995:397). This also included praise for Mao Zedong and the Chinese struggle as well as condemning the Americans, Soviets and Portuguese imperialism. Maoist ideology believed that victory could not be built on military strength alone but most importantly on popular support (Potgieter, 1999:259). Maoism thought that "*people are to the army what water is to the fish*", implying winning the "*hearts and minds*" of the local population. Even as a warlord, post 1992, Savimbi seldom brutalized the locals. Savimbi was probably never as ruthless as Foday Sankoh or Charles Taylor in West Africa.

The Chinese press during the 1960s and the mid 1970s portrayed the struggles in Angola as similar to the Chinese Communist revolution; building on,

"...large base areas, relying on the masses, peasants heartily supporting guerrillas, guerrillas growing their own crops, guerrillas using Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) discipline regulations and "speak bitterness" meetings in villages all were written up in Remin ribao (Peoples' daily) and other Chinese media sources" (Jackson, 1995:393).

After Angola's independence in 1975, UNITA and China parted ways. Then the South Africans and Americans became UNITA's major supporters. The Maoist principles of rural guerrilla warfare were replaced by attempts to change UNITA's organization from a guerrilla army to a conventional army. This was less successful.

UNITA assisted the SADF (South African Defence Force) in its invasion of Angola in 1975, forming UNITA as a quasi-conventional force (Malaquias, 2007:220). In 1976, however, UNITA returned to its guerrilla tactics after losing the battle for Luanda. This time Savimbi was more focused on building a "sustainable state and parallel hierarchies into official structures" within south-east Angola (Potgieter, 1999:259). Parallel hierarchies became imminent within UNITA's structures, portraying an image that UNITA served the people and their interest, further accumulating popular support. UNITA's parallel hierarchies were thus created within the context of the "absence of functioning governmental administration" (Potgieter, 1999:259).

By the mid 1990s, UNITA was successful in establishing a state within a state with a socio-economic infrastructure (Potgieter, 1999:262). Schools, health services and clinics were established. Students were often sent overseas to get a tertiary education.

The education focus areas were specifically chosen in sectors that would help UNITA sustain itself, namely engineering, medicine and agricultural education. Farms were established that served as "protective hamlets" , creating safe havens in moving

populations out of warring zones and producing and storing food (Potgieter, 1999: 262).

3.4. Techniques

Guerrilla movements are not a new phenomenon. Many of them have been fuelled by liberation movements fighting colonialism and outside powers, using Africa as a part of their "*zero sum game*" (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:2). The liberation struggle, and later the civil war in Angola, fits this description. According to Potgieter (1999: 255) there are three strategies used by insurgent groups to obtain their political goals, the Maoist, the Marxist-Leninist and the Cuban models. UNITA followed the Maoist model which focuses on "*popular support, organization, environment, and self reliance*" (Potgieter, 1999:255).

This strategy consists of several stages, the stages being interdependent. This includes the "*political organization phase, guerrilla warfare phase, and the mobile warfare phase*" (Potgieter, 1999:255). All three stages are discernible in UNITA's history, with the "*mobile phase*" only practiced during the civil war when UNITA was actively supported by the South African Defence Force until 1988.

During the first phase, political organization, groups are formed to build political propaganda for popular support. Guerrilla teams are organized to attack selected targets (Potgieter, 1999:256). Parallel hierarchies begin to form, providing social services that would otherwise have been provided by the government. The objective being to mobilize support and to show that the organization is better than the government, while also building *self reliance* (Potgieter, 1999:256).

In the guerrilla phase, small guerrilla units are deployed in rural areas where government control is weak. The result is that the population is detached from the central government, providing a gap for parallel hierarchies to operate fully. The parallel hierarchy is core to the Maoist strategy. This is because it shows the weakness of the government in providing for their own citizens, implanting the rebel organization and displacing the government. Ideology is stressed in this phase

(Potgieter, 1999:256). UNITA implemented such a strategy from 1966, until South Africa's first withdrawal in 1976 (Malaquias, 2007:201-202).

The final phase is the conventional warfare phase, meaning mobile according to the Maoist strategy. This is when cities had to be encircled, something UNITA never achieved in Angola. Before 1988, UNITA became a conventional army with President Reagan's (1981-1988) as well as South African support. After 1988, and after the elections of 1992, UNITA tried to capture the towns of Bailundo and Andulo, without success.

Because of trouble supplying weapons from China via Zambia, UNITA, as an anti-Portuguese guerrilla army, were not well supplied in their first clash with the Portuguese (Potgieter, 1999:257). As Mao's model implied "*the best source of arms is from the enemy*" (Potgieter, 1999:257). UNITA looted the rifles that the Portuguese gave to the village chiefs to protect themselves. However, after careful rethinking of the attacks, they realized that Maoist principles were not strictly applied. This was a turning point in UNITA's strategy, where they vowed to strictly stick to Maoist ideology and tactics, hence the saying:

"*We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the entire people*" (Potgieter, 1999:257).

The two failed attacks on the Portuguese colonial power in 1966 damaged UNITA's reputation. There was an upside to the embarrassing failure of the 1966 attacks. It spread UNITA's reputation toward its neighbours, enabling support from Egypt and further support from Zambia (Potgieter, 1999:257).

In 1988, with the New York Accord, South Africa and America withdrew from Angola (Malaquias, 2007:207). This withdrawal affected Savimbi and his UNITA severely and would eventually lead to its destruction. Savimbi started operating through

installing fear into the population, living under government control. He was now a typical warlord (Malaquias, 2007:208-209).

3.5. External Support

The FNLA and UNITA were supported by the United States during the Cold War (Malaquias, 2000:113). China supported both factions at a point and South Africa helped the FNLA in the fight over the capital in 1975, along with UNITA. The FNLA and UNITA, although different factions, were interlinked at some stages in the war, either through direct contact or international actors.

China had a very significant role, in an ideological sense as well as acting as a support structure, especially with regard to UNITA. The Reagan Administration's foreign policy (1981-1988) "treated *all problems in the world as the result of the Soviet Union*" while China wanted to increase Chinese prestige and influence in the OAU and the AAPSO (Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization) (Jackson, 1995: 389). China wanted to be able to 'compete' with the Russians and the Soviet bloc (Jackson, 1995:389). This meant supporting the liberation movements that opposed the Russians. These movements were also utilized to spread pro-Chinese propaganda of which Savimbi was an adamant supporter.

After the battle for independence in 1975 (in which the MPLA took control over the capital), the civil war turned into an international conflict (Meredith, 2005:315). The United States and South Africa were involved to keep the Soviet backed MPLA from gaining power. South Africa was an ally of UNITA since 1976. The SADF supported and retrained UNITA's soldiers (Malaquias, 2007:220). South Africa had their own agenda. South Africa was able to carry out a "*secret war in Angola for more than a decade*" because of US policy and their support against Communism (Windrich, 2008: 195). They saw Cuban and Soviet involvement as part of a conspiracy to dominate Southern Africa (Meredith, 2005:317). South Africa wanted a "*moderate pro-Western*" government in Luanda (Meredith, 2005:317). Angola created a stage for South Africa to show its anti-communist loyalty to the Americans. South Africa agreed to supply the FNLA and UNITA with arms and training, covering it up as

mercenary operations (Meredith, 2005:317). The greater South African interest had a spill-over effect for other actors involved, Cuba increased its troops and China had to rethink its policy toward Angola. This is because China supported the same factions as South Africa (Jackson,1995:388). Chinese forces (PLA) left in 1975, after the South African intervention (Jackson, 1995:408).

The Americans were increasingly involved, especially after the failure of the Vietnam War in 1975 (Meredith, 2005:316). US policy toward UNITA was "*constructive engagement*" (Potgieter, 1999:260). This further enabled South Africa to provide for UNITA. America had to show the world that it had not lost its influence and power. One way to do this was through defeating the Soviet hold in Angola through focusing on the Angolan conflict. Through supporting UNITA and the FNLA, the Americans wanted to halt the Soviet hold on Angola, operating through the MPLA (Meredith, 2005:316).

In 1976, the FNLA stronghold "*Sao Salvador*" fell and Huambo was captured forcing Savimbi east (Meredith, 2005:319). A civil war continued for over two decades.

By 1976, UNITA had raised $18 billion, mainly deriving from Arab, Iran and French interest (Potgieter, 1999:260). Financial and material support originated from Gabon, Senegal, Sudan, Egypt and Morocco (Potgieter, 1999:260). Nevertheless, South Africa was the main support pillar for UNITA. South Africa provided military assistance and acted as a "*conduit*" for natural resources, diamonds, ivory and timber to the outside world (Potgieter, 1999:260). By 1979 with American and South African support, UNITA gained strategic control over Mavinga, Cuito Cuanavale, and eventually its headquarters and capital, Jamba (Malaquias, 2007:220). The MPLA and Cuba could never capture Jamba (Windrich, 2008:196). This was the prelude to the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987/1988, which was situated en route from central Angola to Jamba. South Africa was supporting UNITA by the 1980s with an annual budget of $200 million. This derived from tax payer's pockets in South Africa.

After South African withdrawal, prior to Namibian independence, American and Russian officials gathered to try and solve Angola's civil strife. Months later in 1991, Savimbi and Dos Santos agreed to bring an end to the 16 year war (Meredith, 2005:601). The end of the Cold War was achieved in 1991, and preparations were made for the 1992 democratic elections (Meredith, 2005:602).

The end of the Cold War meant that UNITA, the MPLA and the FNLA no longer had major external lifelines, hence, new strategy had to be formulated. It can be argued that UNITA's dependence on natural resources to fund the war and compensate their allies, had a significant role in shaping Savimbi as a warlord, post 1992. UNITA lost its capacity to wage conventional warfare after 1992, and used guerrilla tactics, thus "*destabilizing large parts of rural Angola and exerting a severe regime over the civilians living under them*" (Clover, 2002:1). This is said to have been UNITA's downfall since it disrupted their relationship with the local population (Malaquias, 2007:217). UNITA's decision to remain stationary in order to "*secure physical control over valuable resources* " created a shift in tactics within the organization (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:34). UNITA became stationary after wanting to control the diamond extraction industry. The SADF apparently wanted compensation from UNITA, for their support during the 1980s. This made UNITA more dependent on diamond trade, ivory and timber revenues (Windrich, 2008:196), laying the foundation for the making of Savimbi, the warlord.

Post 1992, UNITA tried to re-establish its conventional capabilities again, without success. The MPLA, at this time, presented a hurdle in UNITA's future success. The MPLA, was now officially recognized by Washington, and wanted Savimbi indicted as a "*war criminal*" in 1996 (Malaquias, 2007:213). UNITA's revenue through illicit diamond smuggling meant that they could afford weapons and retrieve weapons with ease (Malaquias, 2007:216). During this time, however, UNITA deviated from Maoist principles of "*local support in rural guerrilla warfare*". Maoist ideology, was no longer the core within UNITA's structures.

Savimbi lost the elections in 1992 against the MPLA (Meredith, 2005:608). UNITA gained 32% of the seats while the MPLA gained 59% (Munslow, 1999:559). This was another beginning of Jonas Savimbi as a warlord. War erupted again and UNITA took over large parts of the Lunda region (Northeast Angola) and controlled the diamond mines. UNITA tried to occupy the palace in Huambo. Luanda was in shambles, a "*wholesale butchery*" (Meredith, 2005:609).

"*Government ninjas and armed vigilantes from the musseques hunted down UNITA supporters in a 'cleansing operation' -limpenza- intended to eliminate them from Luanda* (Meredith, 2005:609-610).

This time however, the Cold War powers were not present and there were no major powers involved. It was a pure struggle between individuals striving for individual power. The "*war of the cities*" lasted for two years, causing widespread destruction (Meredith, 2005:610).

Savimbi was able to capture strategic towns throughout the 1980s (Malaquias, 2007:220). By then the MPLA and UNITA planted millions of landmines, leaving a new generation of "*mutilados*" (Meredith, 2005:610). Savimbi, no longer supported by Cold War patrons, was now supported by Zaire's President Mobutu enabling him to trade diamonds and arms (Meredith, 2005:611). Savimbi in his warlord phase, paid for himself with conflict diamonds. UNITA earned $300-500 million annually and this gave Savimbi great leverage. Mobutu also provided Savimbi with "*end-user certificates for arms deals and allowed him to stockpile weapons in Zaire, in return for diamonds and cash*" (Meredith, 2005:611). Congo and Togo supported Savimbi while President Eyade'ma from Togo gave Savimbi's children a sanctuary. Flush with money, Savimbi focused on strengthening UNITA's conventional capabilities (Malaquias, 2007:212). He aimed to capture Bailundo (the seat of the Ovimbundu) and the town of Andulo (his birthplace). But he overestimated his power, and failed. By 1994, Savimbi's hold on his territory disintegrated. UNITA lost ground against the newly formed and organized government forces.

In 1997, after Mobutu's fall, UNITA shifted its entry-port to Congo-Brazzaville. Soon afterward President Lissouba of Congo was faced with the same situation as Mobutu by Denis Sassou-Nguesso with the help of the FAA.

In March 1997, 50% of Angola's territory was claimed to still be under UNITA rule, while 80% of the population was living in government-held areas (Simon, 1998:497). This compelled Savimbi to move forward with the Lusaka Protocol in 1998 (Simon, 1998:496). Angolan government forces had already supported Laurent Kabila's campaign against Mobutu. The aim of the government was to cut off Savimbi's base in Zaire (Simon, 1998:496). Arms were still delivered through a network of dealers by Mobutu in the Congo to UNITA (Juma, 2007:1). After Mobutu, only President Lissouba from Congo-Brazzaville supported UNITA (Simon, 1998:496).

After 1992, sanctions were imposed on UNITA, banning international travel and closing their offices abroad (Meredith, 2005:612). In 1998, the Security Council banned the purchase of Angolan diamonds "blood diamond" without official certificates (Meredith, 2005:612). Splits in UNITA occurred (Munslow, 1999:559). UNITA's bank accounts were frozen. But the collapse of the Mobutu regime was fateful to the existence of UNITA.

Savimbi tried to be victorious one more time (Meredith, 2005:612). Dos Santos declared that if Savimbi did not comply with the Protocol, war would be the only solution. The Lusaka Protocol broke down in 1998, while the international community blamed Savimbi for his lack of responsiveness in a pursuit of peace (Munslow, 1999:555). According to Munslow (1999:556) the Protocol had a major flaw. It was more concerned with international involvement and focused on the latter's presence to make it work, rather than gaining a real commitment from UNITA (Munslow, 1999:556). In 1998, the UN declared that UNITA had demobilized, however, soon after, UNITA mobilized its soldiers again in the rural areas (Munslow, 1999:556). Savimbi regrouped and moved toward Zaire, before it became the DRC (Simon, 1998:496).

Another war erupted and lasted for three years (Meredith, 2005:612). Savimbi eventually lost control over Bailundo and moved further east to Moxico. The government changed its tactics to "*scorch earth*", meaning that rural populations were forcibly removed and their crops were burned (Meredith, 2005:613). Savimbi was eventually trapped and killed in 2002, near the Zambian border. UNITA eventually pursued peace (Clover, 2002:1).

3.6. Assessment

Jonas Savimbi initially started as an insurgent in the anti-Portuguese revolution, leading UNITA, as a liberation movement against the colonial power. Then the insurgent turned rebel during the civil war that lasted from 1974-1992. Savimbi never joined a government army. He was always loyal to his guerrilla movement throughout the revolution and civil war, remaining with them in the bush.

Savimbi's failure in the 1992 elections resulted in him recommitting to warfare, where he acted as a typical warlord. He was a *local strongman* and looted and traded in ivory and diamonds. In the absence of Chinese, South African and American support, his lifeline was looting.

Unlike revolutionaries, warlords want to only control "*rich*" areas, where there is profit and support. Revolutionaries want to control the whole of the state. Unlike a typical warlord, Savimbi was not nearly as brutal in his tactics. Instead he relied for long on Maoist principles and built UNITA on the importance of local popular support. However, post 1992, UNITA's relationship with the local population did take strain. This was because of UNITA's trade in diamonds and ivory and relying more on coercion and less on loyalty, for military survival.

As a warlord, the greed factor must have played a role because Savimbi gained great profit through the looting and trading of Angola's diamonds. This profit was used to sustain UNITA and to 'pay back' some of UNITA's allies that helped them during the civil war. He utilized Zambia and Zaire as trading posts and collaborated with De Beers in trading illicit diamonds. Diamond smuggling routes in Angola were diverse (Dietrich, 2000:317). UNITA's diamond export capacity depended upon

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interaction with foreign dealers. Hence, Savimbi had to have a good business sense in order to make profit. But little was invested in development, as mush had to line the pockets of illicit dealers, and of course, the acquisition of arms.

UNITA had access to the international market and represented one of the world's largest diamond smuggling operations, attracting legitimate *diamantaires* and criminal elements alike (Dietrich, 2000:318). He also utilised "*booty futures".* The routes through which diamonds were smuggled created a link between the *product and the buyer*. UNITA's primary allies in West Africa were Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Togo, but there existed numerous other secretive routes (Dietrich, 2000:321).

With Savimbi's assassination in 2002, UNITA became "*headless"* (Malaquias, 2007:218). UNITA was no longer a rebel movement or an insurgency. Similar to other warlord outfits in Africa, the removal of UNITA's leadership meant the end of war. The Angolan war ended "*with the quietest of whimpers"* (Malaquias, 2007:218).

4. Taylor as an insurgent in Liberia and as a warlord in Sierra Leone.

4.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on Charles Taylor (former president of Liberia), as a warlord in Sierra Leone, and in addition how he extended his criminal activities into the diamond trade of Sierra Leone. The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, more than others in Africa, were characterized by widespread violence and "*gross abuse of human rights*" (Aning & McIntyre, 2004:69). Taylor was leader of the NPFL that toppled Samuel Doe in 1990. It is argued that the origin of the extreme violence was a result of the involvement of the "*lumpen*" youth (Aning & McIntyre, 2004:72). "*Lumpen youths*" were considered to be the youth from the lowest socio-economic margin in Sierra Leone and Liberia. They were often associated with street life, violence and crime. Sierra Leone and Liberia set the stage for the warlord activities that Sankoh (leader of the RUF in Sierra Leone), but especially Taylor, committed through their respective movements. The Special Court of Sierra Leone was created in 2004 for the human rights atrocities committed by the NPFL-RUF alliance against civilians (Malan, 2003:142). This civil war therefore "*constituted grave breaches of international humanitarian law*" (Malan, 2003:142). Murphy (2003:68) states;

"*Warlord politics represents a new and harsher form of patrimonial politics, now based on the military capture and domination of economically valuable human and natural resources of the country*".

The networks that Taylor accumulated through Sankoh, in Sierra Leone, enabled him to control informal diamond markets and "*clandestine economic operations*" (Murphy, 2003:68). The corruption that infiltrated society was built on a patronage system, exploiting the unemployed youth and their poor socio-economic conditions, many of whom were recruited as followers (Murphy, 2003:69). Charles Taylor's history begins in Liberia.

Historically, Liberia has been the victim of client-patron politics. Liberia was formed by the descendants of three hundred black settler families from America in 1847

(Weiss, 2005:22). It was a family affair, with the Barclays, the Kings, or the Tubman family ruling over Liberia as the ruling elite (Weiss, 2005:22). The last of them was William Tolbert who was toppled by Sergeant Samuel Doe in a coup in 1980 (Weiss, 2005:22). These Americo-Liberian elites had a different class identity, disconnected from the locals whose language they hardly spoke. It is argued that Liberia's civil war was deeply entrenched in its history and its American influence in the 18th century. Thus the civil war "*can best be understood as a violent expression of the tendencies, organization, and attitudes toward identity, society, and class that have underpinned Liberia since its formation as a state*" (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:12). To be sure, there were two civil wars lasting 14 years (Weiss, 2005:23), the first from 1989-1996 and the second from 1999-2003. In 2003, Taylor abdicated.

The Americo-Liberians were the elite of Liberia and regarded their American heritage as unique. They constructed a settler-type system in which they ruled with a heavy hand over the indigenous population, regarding them as a "*lower*" race. Wealth was therefore concentrated in the hands of the privileged few, the Americo-Liberians. Although they spoke English, and were an upper class, they never claimed an ethnic identity. They were also known as *creoles.*

At the height of African independence, during the 1960s, Liberia remained very much under elitist rule with foreign surnames such as Tubman and Tolbert. Taylor fits this picture. Only Liberian property owners had the right to vote, leaving out the majority of the population (Issafrica, 2002). The 1970s brought about little change, while Liberia remained an "*oligarchic democracy*" (Issafrica, 2002).

William Tolbert ruled till 1980, the last of the Americo-Liberian presidents. He was the first President, after independence, to allow an opposition party to enter the Liberian political arena (the Progressive Alliance of Liberia). However, with the economic development of the 1970s, personal enrichment was still the main aim of the elite (Issafrica, 2002).

Rubber, initially, brought in the main revenue for the ruling class. Firestone launched investment in Liberia, catering for American demand (Meredith, 2005:547). After 1979, an uprising occurred as a result of the rising price of rice. Tolbert ordered to open fire on the demonstrators, killing dozens (Dennis, 2006:3). At that time, the state was weak with law and order disintegrating, creating a space for the military to step in.

In 1980, sergeant Samuel Doe (not of American descent), along with dissident soldiers, overthrew the Tolbert regime (Issafrica, 2002). His tribe, the Krahn, would play a core role in the future of Liberian politics. This was not necessarily a revolution but simply a rebellion of grievances over "*poor living conditions in army barracks*", while state and society deteriorated (Meredith, 2005:549).

In next-door Sierra Leone, Joseph Momoh took over civilian power in the one party state from Siaka Stevens. It was during Momoh's rule (1985-1992) that Foday Sankoh and his RUF, assisted by Charles Taylor, began with their uprising. Diamonds were controlled by private entrepreneurs and the government received little profit. This in turn created protest among civil servants receiving no or little income from the government. Disenfranchised men and unemployed youths in the form of the "*rarray boys*" evolved, looting and vandalizing Freetown in the name of the RUF (Hough, 2007:10).

In Liberia, Americo-Liberians, and their business connections, remained in place, despite Doe's promises of a fairer country. Doe's regime was an example of centralized rule that exploited the state and its resources to the bone, while corruption reigned: "*Murder, rape, and other kinds of human rights abuses became the accepted order*" (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:26). The result of this was that people started looking for answers in magic and secret societies in Liberia. The conflict increasingly started to revolve around ethnicity and had a grave effect on the continuing civil war (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:26). By the late 1980s, Doe was vulnerable to opposition, and as indicated above, was eventually overthrown by Charles Taylor

and his NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia). Charles Taylor was also an Americo-Liberian and considered himself part of the elite.

The Liberian civil war (1989-2003) soon spread into neighbouring Sierra Leone. Taylor utilized Liberian territory to support Sankoh's RUF to invade Sierra Leone in 1991. Bad governance and deteriorating economic conditions, as a consequence of resource extraction, remained a characteristic of Sierra Leonean politics (McIntyre, 2002:2). Diamonds, for over three decades, had provided the government in Freetown with "*more than half of its revenue*" (Meredith, 2005:561).

Hence, Charles Taylor had a dual role in West Africa: President of Liberia while being warlord in Sierra Leone. He pursued diamonds in Sierra Leone, seldom controlled by the weak state. Sierra Leonean diamonds had been under the control of "*warlords, foreign traders and mercenaries*" (Malan & Meek, 2003:127). Included in this network were Lebanese, Mandinka (or Mandingo) and Liberian traders. The Mandinka people are one of the largest tribes in West Africa, however, they do not form the largest ethnic group in any one country (except Gambia).

While President in Liberia, Taylor focused on precious resources such as gold, diamonds, timber and rubber. At the height of the Liberian civil war (1989-2003), Taylor controlled ninety percent of the country, while the actual President, Doe controlled only Monrovia, the capital (Murphy, 2003:71). Taylor, even though he was not yet the President (only became President in 1997), he was the main economic actor, having trade relations with major multinational corporations. He operated through extensive commercial ties, acting as the sovereign head of state, even though he wasn't. At one point he was getting paid "*$10 million a month for selling stockpiled iron ore to a consortium of European Community, United States and Japan*" (Murphy, 2003:71). This in turn enabled Taylor to fund his war activities during the early nineties in next door Sierra Leone. Even before the civil war started in Sierra Leone, diamonds were the main prize and fuelled patronage politics.

Taylor wanted revenge. He was aggrieved at ECOMOG because they inhibited his taking power of the Liberian capital during the Liberian civil war, after Doe was killed in 1990. Also, Taylor was angry at Sierra Leone for its double role "*as peacemaker while at the same time allowing ECOMOG to use its airport to bomb territories controlled by Taylor's faction*" (Zack-Williams, 1999:147). He wanted to do "*a RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance Movement) on Sierra Leone*" (Zack-Williams, 1999:147). At that stage, Taylor the warlord was mainly interested in the alluvial diamond fields of the Kono region of neighbouring Sierra Leone. During this time he joined with Sankoh to make more money in Sierra Leone.

4.2. Leadership

Taylor was regarded by his peers and foreign traders as elegant and magnetic (Olonisakin, 2008:72). He considered himself a Liberian elite and an intellectual. Although he was born in 1948 in an Americo-Liberian settlement, Arlington in Monrovia, he became an exile. He was educated in Boston, USA where he attained a degree in Economics; he stayed there for almost nine years and then later returned to Liberia where he got a job as "*head of the General Services Agency*" in Doe's government, which lasted from 1980-1990 (Dennis, 2006:10). He soon fell out of favour because of his embezzlement activities. He fled to the USA where he was sentenced, and went to prison for sixteen months. He escaped through the use of bribery in 1985 to West Africa where he drifted around for a year gaining support to overthrow Doe as President in 1990. Although Taylor achieved Presidency, through elections in 1997, he was unable to make the shift from a rebel to a "*statesman*" (Adebajo, 2002:236):

"*Having himself led an ultimately successful rebellion into Liberia based on the exploitation of ethnic grievances, and having witnessed Doe's grisly end, Taylor is deeply aware of his own vulnerability in Liberia's political cesspit*" (Adebajo, 2002:236).

Taylor's partner in crime was Foday Sankoh, who led the RUF. Sankoh was not an intellectual. Taylor and Sankoh met in a training camp in Libya. Sankoh had spent seven years in prison with charges against him for attempting a coup against Siaka

Stevens in 1971 (Little, 2007:284). He had worked as a photographer before going to Libya. The RUF had a vaguely populist agenda. They claimed to be fighting against the corrupt dictatorship of Stevens and Momoh who ruled over Sierra Leone's resources. Hence, the RUF had to overthrow the Momoh regime in order to gain territory over the diamond fields in the Kono region (Meredith, 2005:563). They succeeded in capturing parts of Sierra Leone, and Sankoh was declared "*governor of Sierra Leone*" (Meredith, 2005:563). But this was just propaganda as Momoh was nominally in charge, and captain Valentine Strasser took over in a coup in 1992 (Cornwell, 1998:1). It was he who contracted PMCs to defend the capital, Freetown from being captured by RUF rebels in 1995.

In many ways Taylor and Sankoh shared a similar history. They were both dissidents in West Africa, gathering support from Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi (Olonisakin, 2008:72). They met in Ghana in 1987 and they received training at the Benghazi camp in Libya. Their common purpose: to remove their governments from power and to exploit their region. These two factors combined the two in an alliance.

Their alliance was beneficial to both of them, but Taylor's ambitions went further than Liberia's borders (Olonisakin, 2008:73). He wanted to dominate the Mano River Basin. If the RUF could capture Freetown, and Sankoh attain power in Sierra Leone (which he never did), it would aid Taylor in achieving his goal that is to profit from diamonds next door (Olonisakin, 2008:73). In doing so, he was ruthless.

4.3. Following

The NPFL used coercion and force to gain a following in Liberia: "*If you didn't join, they wouldn't feed you. If you left, the rebels would kill you*" (Murphy, 2003:73). Most members of the NPFL joined as a direct result of the violence targeted toward them under Doe's regime. Fear was a major factor in the recruitment of NPFL followers. Taylor's force included dissidents from Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ghana and Gambia. The NPFL had no ideology, no objectives and no real strategy, but only to maintain power. Doe therefore "*ethnicized*" the security forces. For example, the Mandingo were recruited before Doe was overthrown in 1990 (Weiss, 2005:23).

The RUF, as well as the NPFL, focused on attracting armed young men who had either previously joined militias and private armies, or who sought "*personal opportunity and safety*" alongside the RUF or NPFL (Reno, 2002:843). These youths were considered "*lumpen*" and consisted of the *rarray boys*, the *san-san* (illicit diamond diggers) and the *Mende* (ethnic group) (Murphy, 2003:65). The Mende were used by Momoh to fight against the RUF. They were also known as the "*Kamajors*" (Cornwell, 1998:2). The RUF quickly became a multi-ethnic and religious band *of* "*poor young men who sustained themselves by looting the countryside*" (Little, 2007:285). It is estimated that 50 000 civilians died, and 250 000 fled into exile (Little, 2007:285).

In contravention to the Geneva convention, both sought to recruit followers among children whom they used as child soldiers. Their methods of recruitment were abduction and intimidation. This included cutting off limbs.

The main targets for support in the Liberian civil war were non-combatants. Civilians were convinced that the Liberian government wanted to rid the country of the Gio and Mano tribes (Alao, Mackinlay, Olonisakin, 1999:20). The brutal rule of Doe and his Krahn led to civilian support (or raw recruits) for the rebel faction, the NPFL. People came in wanting to kill because of Doe's unleashing of terror on civilians in the Nimba County (North-central Liberia). Taylor initially provided these children with training, food, shelter and 'family'. He created a "*small boys unit*" and opened up prisons to unleash inmates and organize them into factions. The NPFL in turn terrorized the Doe supporters, mostly Krahn and Mandingo. The use of child fighters contributed toward the war. The greatest obstacle to peace was "*warlordism and the proliferation of factions*" (Alao, Mackinlay, Olonisakin, 1999:21). The NPFL's rapid success and popularity, because of the brutality of Doe, consequentially gave them mass support and they quickly moved toward Monrovia, the capital (Alao, Mackinlay, Olonisakin, 1999:22).

The Liberian civil war, unlike the Sierra Leonean civil war, had its roots deeply entrenched in ethnicity. Doe's military officers were of the Krahn ethnic group and

they focused on looting the Gio and Mano ethnic tribes (Ellis, 1995:2). The Krahn was considered to be at the bottom of the social hierarchy in Liberia and made up 5% of the total population (Young, 1999:6). This group was the NPFL's main opposition targets. They were from the south-east of Liberia, close to the Ivory Coast border, representing the "*one-at-a time cigarette sellers, prostitutes and enlisted men*" (Meredith, 2005:548). Ethnic groups, other than the Krahn, such as the Gio and Mano tribes, supported the NPFL (Ellis, 1995:2).

In Sierra Leone, mining had brought profit, however the revenue was located toward the elite and not the ordinary citizen. Politicians, chiefs and the Lebanese traders were the beneficiaries of the diamonds (Zack-Williams, 1999:148). Hence, the RUF targeted the "*declassed*" citizen and to exploit the deeds of the elite in order to gain support, in Sierra Leone. They targeted farmers, chiefs, students, elders and armed forces students who were willing to fight against the APC in Sierra Leone (Zack-Williams, 1999:148). In this respect, the war in Sierra Leone did not take the ethnic character as in many other wars in Africa, and especially in Liberia.

Child soldiers, especially in Charles Taylor's NPFL and Sankoh's RUF, were a common phenomenon. They were not natural followers. Children were often recruited out of their homes and orphanages, trained to kill. The children, as young as eight years old, were recruited from the streets of Freetown (Kaldor, 2006:99). Their recruitment included a meal ticket, shelter and revenge killing. Through the use of child soldiers and terror tactics, Sankoh won large parts of the diamond mines, arguing that:

"*They are good in ambush situations, one of the main combat tactics and - separated by war from their kin - are fiercely loyal to their bra (Krio for "big brother"), the officer responsible for recruiting and training them*" (Meredith, 2005:563).

Because of the patron-client dynamic within the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, children involved experienced a breakdown in their traditional "*kinship*

security" (Murphy, 2003:62). Children may therefore become followers only in return for a certain type of security they now found in the hands of the militias, commanders and chiefs. They were introduced in a non-traditional, militia type family. Their identity and safety was now found in the guns they carried (Murphy, 2003:63).

4.4. Ideology

The core weakness in Taylor's association with the RUF was "*its reliance on interests, not ideology*" (Reno, 2007:79). Alao, Mackinlay and Olonisakin (1999:24) state that "*Most of the Americo-Liberian politicians had an impression of Taylor as a Machiavellian tactician who placed his own ambition and self-interest before any group solidarity*".

In the initiating stages of the 1991 invasion from "*Greater Liberia*", the RUF had a vague populist agenda. However, this was short lived. The RUF ruled through fear and brutality, looting and plundering. They had no ideology and no political strategy (Hough, 2007:17). They therefore had little support from the masses. Their only tactic and ideology was money and brute force. The Sierra Leonean influence in the rebel force of 1991, alongside Taylor and Sankoh, did not come from a particular ethnic group and was rooted in economically and politically excluded individuals (Zack-Williams, 1999:147).

The RUF and NPFL did little to "*advertise a particular ideological plan to local people*" (Reno, 2002:843). The two rebel movements did not have formal civil or military administrations in the areas that they occupied. There was thus no broad popular support for either the RUF or the NPFL, since the population mostly fled to government-held areas, away from the rebel-occupied areas (Reno, 2002:843). The goal for the RUF and NPFL, was to battle local rivals in order to gain more precious territory. This was done while acquiring an abundance of wealth, increasing their criminal networking (Reno, 2002:843). There was little pretence of any ideology.

Sankoh's justification for fighting was not to revolutionize Sierra Leone for the benefit of the masses, but to replace an "*old patronage network*" with his own

personal set-up (Reno, 2002:853). He never wanted to rebuild the government or the state, he was simply intrigued with personal well being and wealth:

"*We in the RUF believe in wealth, arms and power in the hands of the people...we're not going to give up diamonds or our guns to anybody*" (Reno, 2002:853).

4.5. Organization

Charles Taylor NPFL, and Sankoh's RUF, fall under Clapham's "*warlord insurgencies*" (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:15). According to Clapham (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:17), modern armed guerrillas no longer brand themselves according to Cold War ideology. Their networks were lacking in structure and organisation.

Ellis in Bøås and Dunn (2007:27) argue that the actors in the Liberian war used cultural resources to 'control' their following. The RUF's world of controlling and sustaining a following was based around "*a degree of practical Green Book egalitarianism*" (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:27). The RUF attracted many of those "*who were victims of the crisis of the postcolonial mode of accumulation: those who failed to find jobs after their elementary, secondary and even university education*" (Zack-Williams, 1999:147). The RUF is argued to have been *revolutionaries* "*who were inspired by the notion of a THIRD WAY as advocated in Gadaffi's Green Book and trained in guerrilla warfare in Benghazi*" (Zack-Williams, 1999:147). But unlike the revolutionaries, the NPFL and RUF never bothered about winning the "*hearts and minds*", or subscribing to any "*ism*" of any kind. They did not bother with organisation either, except for selling resources that were looted.

In 1990, several hundred of Taylor's fighters broke away to form INPFL (Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia), which also occupied part of Monrovia, lead by Yomie Johnson (Ellis, 1995:3). Monrovia was divided into three zones, each occupied by a separate group. An attepmt at peace through the Cotonou Agreement (partnership agreement between the EU and African, Pacific and Caribbean states) failed. Instead numerous ethnic militias arose in the dire situation (Ellis, 1995:6). Hence, the NPFL had to fight a war on at least two fronts (Alao, Mackinlay, Olonisakin, 1999:23).

Taylor initially waged war from the countryside against Doe (Alao, Mackinlay, Olonisakin, 1999:22). The NPFL had small numbers and poor equipment. Marauding gangs swept through the countryside, attacking the Krahn. Drugs, alcohol and rape played a large role in Taylor's gangs. They often used symbolism of painted faces and women's wigs believing that they had superpowers. The young fighters wore women's clothing, shower caps or women's wigs and human bones (Ellis, 1995:1). Ellis (1995:1) states that the Liberian civil war "*topped and surpassed all other wars, in form of character, in intensity, in depravity, in savagery, in barbarism and in horror*".

The RUF and the NPFL had a close relationship. Taylor supported the RUF since the invasion of Sierra Leone in 1991 (Momoh, 2000:4). From the onset of the civil war in Sierra Leone in 1991, Liberia acted as "*banker, trainer and mentor to the RUF, although the Liberian connection was hardly new*" (Smillie, Gberie, Hazleton, 2000:6). Taylor played an intricate role in the RUF's support base and introduced the RUF to a number of influential players, namely Libya's Muammar Ghaddafi. It's alleged that he sponsored the training of Sankoh and his soldiers. Sankoh not only fought for the NPFL prior to the inception of the RUF but also followed the NPFL's horrific methods and tactics of recruiting child soldiers. The aim of the RUF-NPFL alliance was to control the diamond mines of the Kono region and the greater Sierra Leone. But first the APC government (of Joseph Momoh) had to first be overthrown. Many of the recruits in the RUF were unemployed, urban youth, namely the "*rarray boys*". They were easily recruited because of their poor socio-economic backgrounds (Momoh, 2000:4).

The children were promoted through atrocities they committed. Monrovia soon became under siege, and starvation was vivid. This led to the Krahn rebelling (Meredith, 2005:558). "*Hacking off hands and feet*" became a brutal trademark to instill fear in the population within the RUF (Meredith, 2005:564). Boys were used as "*mules to transport illicit goods across the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia*" (Weiss, 2005:41). Looting was an everyday occurrence and the RUF took through force whatever they wanted (Meredith, 2005:564). Their tactic was brute force.

Sexual violence, especially targeted at women and girls became a tactic of the RUF. They strived to dominate women in all aspects of society. Women were abducted and subjected to sexual violence as well as forced to do "*housework, farm work and serve as a military porters*" (Little, 2007:285). The RUF's tactic of coercion became even more prominent once the Sierra Leonean civil war was at its height, and socio-economic conditions of civilians at its lowest. Forced recruitment and abduction of soldiers, especially child soldiers, became more common (McIntyre, 2004:74).

Their organization was not hierarchical. Sankoh was considered the "*Pa*" of the movement and Taylor the "*godfather*", because most soldiers were abducted and removed from their original traditional structures of authority (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:29). Soldiers gladly accepted Sankoh as their leader even though most of them never saw him since he was in exile most of the time. The RUF followed a "*roam in the bush*" strategy of warfare and it is argued that these factions usually are less interested in capturing the state (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:34). Whereas, the NPFL in Liberia followed a "*main road*" approach, wanting more central control, "*road running*" rebels "*are usually engaged in a struggle to capture state power (either regionally or nationally), tend to fight in more conventional - style battles, and are hierarchically organized. Bush-oath rebel groups, such as the LRA and RUF (during part of its existence), tend to be less interested in immediate takeover of the central government, tend to employ no conventional tactics (such as ambushes), and are less hierarchically organized*" (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:34). Children were often tattooed to show the allegiance to the rebel movement (Murphy, 2003:76).

Taylor, as warlord, had his own regime outside of Monrovia called the "*Greater Liberia*" setting up commercial empires trading gold, timber, ore and diamonds from Sierra Leone (Meredith, 2005:561). He had arrangements with Firestone and other foreign companies; his largest timber export market was France. For example: A "*British firm paid Taylor $10 million a month for permission to ship out stockpiled iron ore through the deepwater port of Buchanan*" (Meredith, 2005:561). But Taylor as a warlord in Sierra Leone generated $200 million a year (Meredith, 2005:561). His

activities stretched far into Sierra Leone where the most valuable assets were diamonds.

Liberia served as the main transit point for Sierra Leonean diamonds. The RUF-NPFL relationship was therefore interdependent, with the success of the RUF in Sierra Leone being tied to the victory over its diamond regions close to the border of Liberia (Murphy, 2003:72).

Political victory in Liberia, in 1997, launched Taylor's warlord antics in Sierra Leone. This lasted till 2003 when he abdicated. It did give him extended support in the areas of the military and politics.

The British and the United Nations came to Sierra Leone as peacekeepers. Taylor, with the RUF attacks in 2000, could assess if the British and UN forces were willing to fight back, and he knew that the RUF struggled because they had a serious leadership problem (Reno, 2007:75). The resurgence of the RUF in 1998, deleted Sierra Leone as a possible base to invade Liberia (Reno, 2007:76). LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) eventually drove deeper into Liberia, overwhelming the NPFL control. It is said that the US and Britain backed LURD to get rid of Taylor (Reno, 2007:78). But Taylor failed to help the RUF into power in Sierra Leone in 2002.

Taylor abdicated and finally left Liberia for exile in Nigeria in 2003. He accepted a bargain with an international contact group that offered him no prosecution for war crimes in Sierra Leone (Reno, 2007:79). However, Taylor was already charged with war crimes in Sierra Leone in secret prior to this. The trials in The Hague commenced in July 2009. Taylor was easy to defeat with LURD forces and guidance from external forces. However, because LURD was similar to the NPFL, the British and US diplomats introduced a President not directly involved with the previous conflicts (Reno, 2007:79). This shows the importance of external assistance in closing the war. LURD was simply utilized as a tool to get rid of Taylor.

4.6. External Support

Small arms were easily accessed on the international market in the post-Cold War era because of the excess of weapons not being used anymore . Rebel factions such as the NPFL and the RUF took advantage of this access and used their resource wealth to tap into these armed sources. New technological innovations have also helped armed groups, with access to the internet and mobile phones (Bøås & Dunn, 2007:18).

It is stated that the Liberian civil war would not have resulted in such anarchy if the Cold War powers were still present in Africa. Liberia was therefore a result of the end of the Cold War and the vacuum of power left by the USA and USSR (Alao, Mackinlay, Olonisakin, 1999:24).

Prior to the inception of the Liberian civil war in 1989, Taylor did receive support from two West African leaders, Cote d'Ivoire's Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Burkina Faso's Blaise Compaore (Akinyemi, 2004:3). This was because Taylor entered Northern Liberia through Burkina Faso in 1989, the start of the Liberian civil war. However, he did not receive external support as a warlord (1991-2003), except through organized crime. Sankoh and the RUF relied on Liberian trade routes for reaching diamond markets abroad.

Nevertheless, Taylor supported himself through his criminal networking and through controlling Sierra Leone's diamond regions. He simply aided Sankoh in the control over the diamond regions in Sierra Leone.

Sankoh mined diamonds and harboured his international networking while travelling overseas, even in the face of economic sanctions. After Sankoh became Vice President in 1999 under the Lome peace agreement, signed between the RUF and the Sierra Leonean government, he still controlled the diamond regions (Reno, 2002:853). This was made possible with the substantial support from Taylor and his NPFL. Sankoh died in detention in 2003, and Taylor abdicated in the same year.

4.7. Assessment

The civil war in Liberia had a spill-over effect into Sierra Leone (and vice versa), resulting in the war having a trans-boundary character. The role that Taylor played as the leader of the NPFL, and as 'mentor' of Sankoh, had a major impact on the eventual resolution of the conflict in both nations. Taylor's interest in Sierra Leone was purely economic, as a warlord, while he acted as an insurgent in Liberia toppling Doe's military government, and eventually became President of his own country.

Charles Taylor can be said to be an economic insurgent: "...*economic insurgents accordingly find they can convince outsiders of their claim to power, provided they can capture the country's capital, or convince outsiders that they should be included in a power-sharing arrangement*" (Reno, 2001:6).

Taylor, especially for Liberia, was able to utilize his position as president to manipulate sovereignty and gain even further access to international business and markets. His presidency equipped him with the international recognition, which enabled Taylor to remove his political rivals from the political arena (Reno, 2002:855). It permitted Taylor to sign agreements with major international firms, namely, Malaysian timber corporations, converting the rainforests into his own personal bank (Reno, 2002:855). From the revenue of these expeditions, he used to buy guns, fend off his rivals and further extend his control over precious territory in Sierra Leone (Reno, 2002:855).

He was able to create a "*Greater Liberia*", a state within a state, for his criminal activity. Taylor's territory boasted its own currency and banking system, television and radio network, airfields, and until 1993 a deepwater port (Reno, 1995:113). He pioneered a network of foreign firms to exploit and market resources, to finance military conquest and to control economically useful territory (Reno, 1995:113).

The revenue from Sierra Leone was used for Taylor's purpose of becoming President in 1997, and aiding the civil war in Sierra Leone. Taylor used his diamond revenue to assist the RUF and also supported his former political connections (Reno, 2007:71).

Taylor ruled Liberia through his own ideals under a false image of "*statehood*". He was able to "*control his subordinates' access to markets*" (Reno, 2007:71). He had the authority and ability to issue passports and manipulated the image of a sovereign state at his own dispense.

Taylor thus began as an insurgent in his own country and eventually became President. But he ended as a warlord in another. It can be argued that Sankoh was simply a 'puppet' used by Taylor to achieve his personal enrichment and goals. Taylor only aided Sankoh in Sierra Leone to overthrow the APC government because it would help Taylor achieve his own goal in Liberia. However, Sankoh never achieved Presidency or complete control in Freetown. Sankoh died at the same time that Taylor abdicated. Today, Taylor stands trial for human rights violations in Sierra Leone.

5. Comparison between Savimbi and Taylor

5.1. Overview

This is a comparative study describing, analysing and comparing Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor as warlords and in the context of their areas of activity in Angola and Liberia/Sierra Leone respectively.

The context of this study revolves around Mary Kaldor's (2006) notion of *"new wars"* with special reference to the thinking of Collier and Reno. They emphasise factors and actors such as globalization, identity, resource wars, greed and grievance, (vague) nationalism, manipulation of markets, the role of armed youths and warlord activities, including illicit looting of scarce resources (in both cases), mainly diamonds.

The work of John Mackinlay (2000) was of great use in understanding the warlord phenomenon. Mackinlay sketches a framework of the origins of warlordism and how this phenomenon has changed over the last century. Warlordism originated in China, after the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 (Mackinlay, 2000:1). The vulnerable state seen in China during the early 20th century is similar to the conditions of weak states observed in Africa at the start of the 21st century. It is within this context of weak central governance that the warlord has made his appearance on the fringes of the state where the warlord does not necessarily want to capture the state, but through terrorising the local population, wants to loot resources. Mackinlay (2000:1) defines a *"warlord"* as;

"...the leader of an armed band, possibly numbering up to several thousand fighters, who can hold territory locally and, at the same time, act financially and politically in the international system without interference from the state in which he is based" .

Mackinlay (2000) makes a distinction between the Chinese warlord and the warlord of the 21st century (examples include Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor). The new kind of warlord manifested itself after the Cold War to adapt to the changing

international environment. The absence of interest from Russia and the USA had grave effects on Africa in particular. This lack of interest created a vacuum of power to be filled, and when this power gap was not filled, many African states collapsed into weak states, extreme poverty and broken bureaucracies. Conflicts ensued within these areas of civil war and deteriorated societies. Warlordism flourished. A warlord's survival is guaranteed through seeking "*refuge in crisis zones and the lack of international commitment to take effective action together*" (Mackinlay, 2000:1). The warlord thus creates his own economy where his economic survival is based on international business ties and local illicit looting of scarce resources. There thus exists a link between the warlord and the "*failed state*" (Mackinlay, 2000:1). Mackinlay (2000) further argues that warlordism predates the 21th century and suggests that the international community must take a more determined and aggressive stance toward dealing with these corrupt individuals.

It is therefore important to distinguish between the warlord of the early 20th century and the warlord operating in the 21st century. Globalization had created and opened a new range of possibilities for warlordism to flourish and sustain itself in the 21st century (often through criminal networks). Electronics and inventive measures have meant that warlords can sustain themselves through international business and organizations, while still keeping control over their local areas which they defend ruthlessly. There is also the development of a global business culture and a movement away from ethnicity (Mackinlay, 2000:3). However, in Savimbi and Taylor's cases, we see an ethnic element present in both civil wars, but ethnicity was stronger in Savimbi's case.

Both Savimbi and Taylor were more than the typical warlord. Both began their fighting careers as insurgents: Taylor against the Doe regime in Liberia and Savimbi against a colonial power, the Portuguese. Taylor became the President of his own country (Liberia) while being warlord in another (Sierra Leone). Savimbi, on the other hand, had a long career as an insurgent and a rebel in Angola (1960-1992), before becoming warlord in his last decade (1992-2002). On the other hand, there are also many differences between these two warlords.

For a better understanding of Savimbi and Taylor, this study compared them in terms of Thomas H. Greene's typology of revolutionary movements and especially their leaderships, following, ideology, organisation, techniques and external support. This, together with the thinking of Kaldor, Collier, Reno and Mackinlay, provide the background against which two African warlords – Savimbi and Taylor, can be better understood.

5.2. Similarities of factors and actors

With regard to similarities between Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone, authors have pointed toward the civil wars in these nations as having characteristics of new wars generally, and resource wars specifically. Both were characterised by global crime networking.

These networks are highly criminalized and usually link into "*transcontinental smuggling and other grey commercial networks to satisfy their special requirements*" (Duffield, 2000:14). In other words, for Taylor and Savimbi to have created their extensive networks, and to have survived as long as they did, they had to act locally but "*think globally*" (Duffield, 2000:14). Liberia and Angola also experienced a considerable breakdown in state legitimacy as a result of patrimonialism and corruption – rubber in Liberia and oil and diamonds in Angola. But the state had lost its ability to function properly, creating a power gap left to fill. Shadowy actors emerged to fill this space. The distinction between "*private and public, soldier and civilian*" has become blurred with the onset of these "*new wars*" (Kaldor, 2006:97).

Savimbi and Taylor have imparted their own personal networks in the place of legitimate state institutions. In both cases, their careers ended abruptly. Savimbi was assassinated in 2002 and Taylor abdicated in 2003, only to later stand trial in the ICC for human rights violations in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, the wars in Liberia/Sierra Leone and Angola cannot simply be defined as "*resource wars*" only. Bøås and Dunn (2007:1) state that these wars are historically grounded, defined by factors unique to themselves.

"The usual definition of a resource war is that of an armed conflict waged to control valuable natural resources. While resource control may be the main factor driving a conflict, wars are too complex to be attributed to a single motivation" (Le Billon, 2000:22).

In Liberia one complex factor was the role of Americo-Liberian rulers in the exploitation of resources, while in Angola the anti-Portuguese revolution had a lasting impact on complexities there. In Sierra Leone, adjacent to Liberia, a resource war over diamonds raged.

Paul Collier in Reno (2000:221) notes that *"poor states that are very dependent on natural resource exports are most vulnerable to civil wars"*. Violence is an intricate part of resource exploitation and the political economy of it. As mentioned, the role of outside markets and criminal networks played a major role in the ongoing civil wars in Liberia/Sierra Leone and Angola. Whether a resource is scarce or abundant, is irrelevant (Le Billon, 2000:26). In Angola, there is an abundance of oil and diamonds and whether they are scarce or abundant, they still represent a *"value"* (Le Billon, 2000:26). Hence, there is a correlation between *"value and violence"* (Le Billon, 2000:26). This applied to resource wars of West Africa as well. Collier (Reno, 2000:221) also makes the point that the situation in Angola was less about *"grievances"* and more about *"predation"*. In other words, diamonds made UNITA so rich that nothing anybody could offer could compare. Hence, further 'predation' offered more reward (Reno, 2000:221).

UNITA never benefited from oil, only from diamonds and ivory. The MPLA ruling elite benefited from oil. In Angola, it was oil and diamonds that contributed considerably to the ongoing civil war (Reno, 2000:219). Over the time of Angola's existence as a state, violence has had a direct link with its abundance of these natural resources (Le Billon, 2000:21). The role that raw materials played in the Angolan civil war, on both fronts, show that resources had an undeniable contribution to the longevity of the war itself. Diamonds, for UNITA, attracted private military companies using *"industrial security"* as a smokescreen for illegal activity (Reno, 2000:220). The

external powers' main focus was to make foreign policy towards Angola that benefits from resources such as oil in Cabinda.

Angola became more heavily dependent on revenue from such resources, further interlinking firms, financial institutions, Angolan state officials and foreign state officials (Reno, 2000:220). This resulted in Angola's government unable to build an efficient state. Political networking therefore increased due to the easy access from export revenues, further fuelling patronage politics and corruption (Reno, 2000:221). Paul Collier in Reno (2000:221) notes that "*corruption is integral to the political systems, such as in Angola, since these regimes find that they can build loyal political networks and buy compliance through the distribution of patronage to key individuals*". In other words "*the more riches, the more war, and the more suffering for the people*" (Le Billon, 2000:21). Warlordism thus became an accident that had to happen.

Liberia and Sierra Leone paint a similar picture with regard to "*value and violence*". In Liberia, Charles Taylor attained Presidency in 1997, through, firstly controlling resource rich regions of the country. In Liberia he controlled the rubber, timber, iron ore regions, and in Sierra Leone the diamond fields (Le Billon, 2000:27). In this specific case, controlling the state provides a direct link to controlling the natural resources.

Le Billon (2000:28) offers an explanation of "*warlords and geographical importance*". Warlords, like Charles Taylor and Jonas Savimbi, controll a certain area through waging war. They do not obey higher authority and their ability to maintain and operate a warlord economy, is the key to success (Le Billon, 2000:28). This keeps competing groups at bay. The key to being a successful warlord, according to Mackinlay's (2000:1) definition, is that the actor is able to create a war economy. In sum, the abuse of natural resources for the personal gain of warlords and local strongmen has fuelled a conflict that would otherwise have been exhausted (because of a lack of funding) (Weiss, 2005:10). In Liberia and Sierra Leone, however, resources became a pawn over which local strongmen and warlords fought

over and over to "*seize control over small, economically valuable pieces of territory and use them as bases from which to compete with one another for control over what remains of these states*" (Reno, 2000:223).

Kaldor's (2006) "*new war*" theory is certainly appropriate in the two cases presented. Globalization according to Kaldor has played an important role in the creation of the African state. New actors have emerged out of this context including "*new supranational, international and local actors*" (Duffield, 2000:5). Hence, "*polyarchical networks*" have replaced "*hierarchical networks*" replacing "*government*" with "*governance*", even that of the warlord's networks (Duffield, 2000:5).

Kaldorian "*new wars*", contrary to "*old wars*" is where the state is extremely weak, has no monopoly of power, and is thwarted by private armies, militias and criminal bands. Violence is predatory and the distinction between civilian and soldier is blurred. There are no rules, no uniforms and the breaking down of the state leads to the breaking down of society as a whole (Mackinlay, 2000:3). War is therefore no longer a "*rational state activity*", but greed is undeniable for all parties to such conflicts (Kaldor, 2006:20).

Assessing Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor as actors, it is apparent that they emerged as a result of the global political and economic conditions as a consequence of globalization, the end of the Cold War, and illicit economics in which greed played bigger roles than grievance, at least as far as the élites are concerned. Grievance is only for the masses.

In Angola, the state was under an authoritarian type of colonial rule. When the Portuguese left in 1976, the three liberation movements (MPLA, FNLA and UNITA), entered a struggle for power that lasted 27 years. There was therefore never a stable state to begin with. The FNLA, UNITA and the MPLA, had their own private militias, occupying different regions within the weak state with each faction

gathering a different ethnic following. UNITA operated in the diamond regions as well and this prolonged the war.

In Liberia, Taylor opposed the pro-American Doe regime. The Doe regime was an oligarchy, comprised of a "*minority*", the Krahn ethnic group. The state was highly centralised but weak and corrupt. A coup occurred in 1990, when Samuel Doe was ousted by Charles Taylor as grievances mounted. Violence became central in controlling the population and occupying certain resource rich regions of Liberia. And as he became richer after 1990, Taylor set his sights on the diamonds of neighbouring Sierra Leone.

In Angola, the three liberation movements revolved around three different ethnic groups. Identity politics was more prominent in Angola and contributed to the animosity among the three factions. Savimbi's UNITA consisted of the largest ethnic group in Angola, the Ovimbundu, fighting mainly the Mbunda and Mulattos. Although leadership was intellectual, the three movements had rural ethnic support bases. Savimbi's UNITA focused on Mao Zedong's guerrilla warfare, and winning *"the hearts and minds"* of the Ovimbundu people. On the other hand, Charles Taylor considered himself an intellectual and elite. However, the ethnic violence present in Liberia differed from that in Angola. Ethnic violence in Liberia was more a result of grievances against the Krahn in government, and therefore other ethnic groups simply reacted through violence. Liberia's war was thus a result of the government excluding key groups from power (Adebajo, 2004:2). Unemployed youths from a low socio-economic background became the "*fodder for the sub region's warlords, perpetuating horrendous crimes against innocent civilians*" (Adebajo, 2004:2). Savimbi as an anti-Portuguese insurgent also fought for power just like Taylor wanted to seize power in Liberia. But Savimbi as warlord fought less for the seizure of power than for personal enrichment, just as Taylor was after Sierra Leone's diamonds, not power in that state.

As actors, Savimbi and Taylor started their wars as a result of grievances their supporters had against their respective governments. Taylor had grievances against

the pro-American Samuel Doe regime in Liberia, while Savimbi firstly had grievances against the colonial Portuguese that later shifted toward the ruling MPLA regime. However, eventually, both actors became greedy. Savimbi looted diamonds and ivory while Taylor allied with Foday Sankoh's RUF, in eventual pursuit of occupying the greater Mano River Basin as well as diamonds. His tactics were brutal and he was charged by the ICC for human rights violations in 2004. The court case opened in 2009. Savimbi was less brutal than Taylor. Both Savimbi and Taylor had therefore begun their leadership roles as revolutionaries of the left: Savimbi as Maoist, and Taylor as a protégé of Gaddafi, whose doctrine lacked guerrilla strategies. Thereafter they became opportunistic warlords.

Another important similarity between Savimbi and Taylor as warlords was their ability to manoeuvre economic markets toward their liking. UNITA, until the 1980s, was reliant on Cold War support. However, with the end of the Cold War, external support in the form of the superpowers was no longer available. UNITA survived through adapting and shifting its international and local trans-border linkages with powerful actors (Duffield, 2000:7). Since 1992 "*UNITA has consistently controlled around 60-70% of Angola's diamond production. To date (in 2000), this is estimated to have generated US $ 3.7 billion in revenue*" (Duffield, 2000:13).

In similar fashion, Charles Taylor of Liberia utilized trans-border-trade to keep afloat his NPFL and attain political power in Liberia in 1990 through a successful coup and in 1997 through the ballot box: "*Between 1992 and 1996, Charles Taylor is estimated to have made between U.S. $400 million and $450 million per year from the conflict in Liberia*" (Duffield, 2000:13). Hence, trans-border trade has contributed considerably to the influence that these two actors had on their regions and states.

They both occupied certain "*resource rich*" regions. Taylor, through Sankoh, occupied the Kono diamond region in Sierra Leone, and Savimbi occupied the Cuango Valley on the Angolan highlands where ivory and diamonds were plentiful. Savimbi as well as Taylor created "*a state within a state*". Savimbi created "*protective hamlets*" for his people, with headquarters in Jamba, with its own

'economy' and sustainability while Taylor created "*Greater Liberia*" with its own currency and water port, while exercising influence in Kono. The difference here however is that Savimbi won local support under Maoist ideology, while Taylor ruled through fear and brute force.

Both used diamond revenues to support their respective factions. They traded weapons for diamonds and further fuelled the war. They were the godfathers of "*blood diamonds*". Both were charismatic leaders, Savimbi more so than Taylor. Both manipulated the youth and made use of child soldiers. Both presented a new "*family*", with Taylor and Savimbi as the "*fathers*" of their respective movements. Guns represented power in the hands of children although Savimbi did have a guerrilla and semi-conventional army with reasonably well-trained fighters.

Even though UNITA generally avoided the forcible recruitment of children, they did implement a "*tax system*" whereby traditional chiefs (*sobas*) in areas controlled by UNITA would have to "*provide (primarily young) people to be drafted into JURA (a form of ritual celebration adopted by UNITA) for service*" (McIntyre, 2004:53). This however changed in the 1990s, as UNITA became less focused on Maoist ideology and more fixed on profit. During this time UNITA slowly departed from its 'responsibility' toward its rural support, resulting in recruitment being more forced with the use of intimidation (McIntyre, 2004:53). *Sobas* were used to intimidate families to 'give up' their children, as well as hijackings and abduction (McIntyre, 2004:53).

Finally, both had foreign education: Savimbi in Switzerland, and Taylor in the USA. Then there were also many differences between them.

5.3. Differences of factors and actors

There are a number of differences with regard to the factors in the context of Liberia/Sierra Leone and Angola. Firstly, Charles Taylor emerged as a typical warlord in the post-Cold War era, while Savimbi was firstly part of a liberation movement and cooperated personally and directly with the Cold War powers during the Cold War era. Savimbi only became a typical warlord, after 1992, when he lost the

Angolan elections. Although Taylor was more a product of globalization, Savimbi was a product of the Cold War, but his undoing came in 2002 when he was assassinated allegedly because he had no Cold War support anymore.

Taylor and Sankoh used unemployed youths in West Africa, while Savimbi's UNITA was a peasant based organization. He relied mainly on the mass support of the Ovimbundu ethnic group because of Savimbi's loyalty during the colonial war. His initial aim was to attain political power in Angola, which is what Taylor accomplished in Liberia. He was therefore an insurgent and guerrilla fighter before he became a warlord. In line with his Maoist training, Savimbi's faction was based on loyalty of the local population. He was able to foster agricultural production and provide (to an extent) for 'his' people. He was considered a "*champion of democracy*" in the beginning of the civil war. But like Taylor he ended as *"a ruthless dictator"* towards the end of the war (Meredith, 2005:603-505). But he lacked Taylor's brutality.

Charles Taylor was thus a more ruthless warlord. He did not follow a specific strategy or ideology. He simply wanted economic power through the manipulation of the diamond fields in Sierra Leone after he attained power in Liberia. He was therefore, an insurgent in Liberia against Doe's government and a warlord in Sierra Leone as an ally of Foday Sankoh's RUF. Taylor's NPFL had no particular ethnic group following except that it fought the Krahn. However, during his successful coup against the Doe regime in Liberia (1990), Taylor (for a short period) gained a following of the Gio and Mano tribes of Liberia.

Unlike Angola where the initial conflict was revolutionary, the war in Liberia was a war born out of "*restless youth, economically marginalized by a failing post-colonial patronage system and spurred on by a spurious identification with TV heroes such as Rambo"* (Parsons, 2004:49). Angola did have characteristics of youth involvement, but this was more in the form of students and intellectuals revolutionizing against the Portuguese colonial regime. Savimbi seldom had such a support base. The ideology of the war, however, changed after 1975 in Angola when the anti-Portuguese revolution turned into an Angolan civil war with Savimbi still an

important actor. The war increasingly became a war revolving around the three respective revolutionary leaders and their ethnic factions, Neto's FNLA, Dos Santos' MPLA and Savimbi's UNITA (Parsons, 2004:49). The MPLA took power after the departure of the Portuguese, while Savimbi kept on fighting.

Savimbi's ideology was based on Mao Zedong's rural guerrilla warfare, winning the "*hearts and minds*" of the people. Unlike Taylor, he did not use terror as a tactic. Similar to Chinese history of Maoism, Savimbi had to capture the support of the 'masses' and through this, attain political dominance. However, Savimbi, post 1992, turned into a typical warlord. His ideology and tactic wavered during this time until his death. During this time, UNITA traded in diamonds and ivory and focused more on coercion and less on loyalty. He also had no external support anymore.

Savimbi's strategy and ideology went much deeper than Taylor's. Taylor, on the other hand, never had an ideology. His tactic was brute force, and he never wanted to cater for the masses. He was thus a more typical warlord, especially after joining forces with Foday Sankoh's RUF. These two allies became hungry for attaining personal profit and political power. His main aim was not political transformation but economic domination of the Mano River Basin and the Kono diamond region in Sierra Leone.

Taylor never wanted to revolutionize Liberia, he simply wanted to establish his own patron-client networking within government. While Savimbi genuinely fought in the colonial struggle against the Portuguese, Taylor had no such credentials. After staging a successful coup in 1990, Taylor achieved Presidency in his home of Liberia in 1997, while Savimbi never gained presidential power in Angola.

Unlike Taylor, Savimbi had a good external support base during the Angolan civil war. He had the support of the Americans, South Africans, Zambia and Zaire. However, after the Cold War, these networks had to be reworked and without the support of the South Africans and Americans, Savimbi turned warlord after he had lost the elections of 1992.

Taylor did not receive external support as a warlord. He created his own personal international networks to support his political and economic aims. He only received training in Libya, along with Sankoh and had some support prior to the invasion of Liberia from Burkina Faso.

Savimbi, as an insurgent had received training in China, this is where he picked up his Maoist strategy and principles. Savimbi's UNITA became a semi-conventional force, while Taylor's NPFL was simply a group of "*lumpen youths*" without ideology or vision and fighting civilians brutally. They were therefore more brutal than UNITA's soldiers. Taylor's NPFL looted and plundered, hacking off hands of innocent civilians and forcing children to join, while Savimbi sought the support of the masses, using revolutionary sentiment as his force. Savimbi's training, organization and ideology of UNITA were therefore much more organized and coherent than Taylor's rebel group, the NPFL. Savimbi also had a secure military base in Jamba, while Taylor had no permanent military base anywhere, except as President of Liberia, which had a very weak army.

The main difference between Savimbi and Taylor as warlords was thus that Savimbi was an insurgent and a guerrilla fighter who ultimately turned into a warlord. Taylor began as an insurgent but turned into a warlord in a different country, Sierra Leone. They were both affected by the end of the Cold War and had considerable influence within their regions and internationally.

Finally, Savimbi participated in only one election in 1992, and lost, whereafter he became warlord. Taylor also participated in only one election, in 1997, and won. However, he was a warlord in a different country. Savimbi was assassinated whereas Taylor stands trial for warlord activities in Sierra Leone.

5.4.   Conclusion

The purpose and significance of this study was to evaluate the factors that led to the creation of warlords in Angola and Liberia. The study has established that *new wars* developed out of the situations in both Liberia and Angola. Actors involved were

driven by grievance (followers) and eventually greed (leaders). Bøås and Dunn (2007) have argued that guerrilla movements are historically grounded and that the "*new wars and resource wars*" are too narrow in explaining this phenomenon. Hence, these civil wars not only fell into these two categories, but other underlying social elements also contributed. The wars in Angola and Liberia both started with leaders having grievances against their respective governments (Savimbi against the Salazar regime in Angola and Taylor against the Samuel Doe regime in Liberia). Only later, greed stepped in with the involvement of illicit diamond smuggling, and warmaking adding characteristics of resource wars. Resources paved the way for the development of typical war economies in both Angola and Liberia/Sierra Leone. This further supported criminal networking and patronage politics in both cases.

The study has been specifically interesting since the two warlords (Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor) originated out of different eras, Savimbi out of the Cold War era and Taylor out of globalization and greed. This factor has shown a significant difference in their paths to becoming warlords, their leadership skills and the organization of their factions. They both fall under Clapham's (2000) warlord insurgencies and Mackinlay's (2000) characteristics. They both created a different form of political authority within their areas of activity and were capable of running extensive criminal networking but without explicit external support. As Kaldor (2006) argues, Taylor was a result of globalization, but Savimbi was more a result of the end of the Cold War and Angola's role as a "*pawn*" in the Cold War. Identity politics also played a role in both Liberia and Angola, but Savimbi used ethnicity to a greater extent. Taylor was more brutal, and therefore more of a typical warlord than Savimbi. They were both interested in personal enrichment. They both made use of the weapons acquired on the international market, trading diamonds for arms.

Thomas H. Greene's typology (1984) directed the structure of this study. Even-though he focuses more on revolutionary movements, his structure was applicable to both Savimbi and Taylor. It was useful in guiding the study with the construction of similarities and differences between the two warlords.

Savimbi based his leadership skills on his authority and the weight that this carried throughout his faction, UNITA since the 1960s. Taylor was a typical strongman. Savimbi's UNITA had a rural peasant following, mostly comprised of the Ovimbundu ethnic group, while Taylor's followers were unemployed urban youths. Savimbi used nationalist and Maoist ideology, while Taylor utilized greed and power to his advantage. Savimbi's organization of UNITA was more hierarchical and structured politically and militarily than that of Taylor's NPFL. However, the organization of UNITA also changed into organized looting. Since Savimbi's becoming warlord after 1992, the techniques of the two warlords therefore differed. Savimbi used guerrilla warfare that later developed into conventional attacks against the MPLA. Taylor's faction, on the other hand, committed extreme brutalities without a strategy. Savimbi had various external supporters during the Cold War, while Taylor did not receive any external support during his time as a warlord.

Mackinlay (2000) has highlighted the differences and similarities between the warlord of the early 20th century and the more contemporary warlord. He has also imparted greater understanding of the surrounding factors that contribute to the creation of the warlord.

Future research can be conducted on the next 'phase' of warlord politics, in other words, how the weak African state will further evolve within the changing global context and the role that warlords and rebels will play in this new context. How will their networks and environment change with the increasing role of the global civil society, international conduct and the punishment of warlords. Will warlord politics fade in Africa or is there hope for a more stable Africa? Is there a possibility of 'other' wars developing like piracy? How can the international arena tackle the issues that breed in such states? How can criminals be held accountable and how can international criminal networking be controlled and monitored? Can the international community conduct itself in such a way as to inhibit or contribute to the development of warlord politics worldwide? Should diplomats engage with warlords? Questions surrounding the ICC (International Criminal Court) and its jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in trying warlords like Charles

Taylor may be explored. Furthermore, the question on how the ICC as a global body of justice can gain further authority over governments committing crimes against their own people? How the ICC will evolve to tackle the issue of nations that won't comply with the Rome Statute in order to harbour criminals.

In sum, both Charles Taylor and Jonas Savimbi had different paths to their destruction. The loss of human life traded for profit had caught up with the two warlords. Eventually, Charles Taylor abdicated (2003) and Savimbi was assassinated (2002). But their legacies live on.

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