

**The Changing Levels of Diffuse and Specific Support for Democracy in South
Africa amongst ANC Supporters: A Longitudinal Study**



**Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Philosophy (MPhil Political Management) at the University of Stellenbosch**

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

During the so-called third wave of democratisation, South Africa experienced a transition from authoritarian rule to democratic rule in 1994. This transition was coupled with a transformation process, which saw the establishment and introduction of democratic principles and norms, as well as democratic institutions. All these make South Africa a democracy in theory but do not necessarily mean that it is a democracy in practice. Moreover, democracy, unlike authoritarian rule, depends on the support of the populace. Lack of support for democratic rule renders the regime illegitimate, since it does not have enough support to continue as the authority of the country.

Against the theoretical point of departure (i.e. support for democracy is closely tied to legitimacy of the authority), it is imperative to evaluate these types of support for democracy as well as their changing levels in the country. This will shed some light on whether the populace in the country embrace democracy as a form of governance – that is, whether the populace perceive democracy as a political regime that is entrenched not only in theory, but also in practice. This will be highlighted by their level of support, which determines whether the regime is perceived as legitimate or illegitimate. It will further shed some light on the degree or level of support for the political system governing the country.

Support for democracy may be evaluated by using two models or types of support, i.e. diffuse and specific support. Diffuse support consists of three levels of support, namely, political community, regime principles and regime performance, whilst specific support consists of two levels of support, namely regime institutions and political actors.

For this study, these models and levels of support are evaluated amongst the supporters of the ruling party, namely the ANC. For comparative purposes, however, support patterns for democracy, as measured in the World Values Surveys from 1995 to 2006, amongst the ANC supporters will be evaluated in relation to non-ANC supporters. These patterns are crucial, since they will highlight whether support for democracy is support for democratic rules and norms, i.e. democracy per se, or whether support for democracy is closely tied to party support and position.

The study reveals that there are relatively high levels of support for political community, regime principles and regime performance amongst both the ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters, when compared to levels of support for regime institutions and political actors, meaning that there are high levels of diffuse support when compared to specific support. Moreover, the ANC supporters have higher levels of both diffuse and specific support for democracy when compared to non-ANC supporters.

OPSOMMING

In die 1990's gedurende die derde golf van demokratisering in die wêreld, het Suid Afrika ook 'n transformasie van 'n outoritêre stelsel na 'n demokrasie ondergaan. Hierdie transformasie het op die vestiging van demokratiese beginsels en norme sowel as demokratiese instellings uitgeloop. Hoewel dit Suid-Afrika 'n demokrasie in teorie gemaak het, het dit die stelsel nie noodwendig 'n demokrasie in die praktyk gemaak nie. Dit is belangrik om in ag te neem dat 'n demokrasie, anders as 'n outokrasie, die ondersteuning van die bevolking moet geniet. 'n Gebrek aan genoegsame steun kan daartoe lei dat 'n regering gesag op 'n onlegitieme wyse uitoefen.

Teen hierdie teoretiese agtergrond is dit dus belangrik om die tipes sowel as die veranderende vlakke van ondersteuning vir demokrasie te evalueer. Sodoende word 'n insig verkry of die bevolking demokrasie as 'n vorm van regering nie net in teorie aanvaar nie, maar ook in die praktyk. Die vlak van ondersteuning sal bepaal of die regime as legitiem of onlegitiem beskou word. Dit kan ook verder lig werp op die vlak van ondersteuning vir die politieke selsel wat in plek is.

Ondersteuning vir demokrasie kan bepaal word deur gebruik te maak van twee modelle of tipes van ondersteuning, naamlik, verspreide ("diffuse") en spesifieke ("specific") ondersteuning. Verspreide ondersteuning bestaan uit drie vlakke van ondersteuning, naamlik, steun vir die politieke gemeenskap, regime beginsels en regime optrede. Spesifieke ondersteuning in teenstelling, bestaan uit twee vlakke van ondersteuning, naamlik steun vir regime instellings en vir die politieke akteurs.

Vir hierdie studie is die modelle en vlakke van ondersteuning ge-evalueer met spesifieke verwysing na die ondersteuners van die ANC - die regerende party. Vir 'n vergelykingsbasis is hierdie ondersteuningspatrone met die nie-ANC ondersteuners soos dit voorkom in die World Values opnames van 1995 tot 2006 gebruik. Hierdie patrone is van kardinale belang omdat dit vir ons 'n aanduiding gee of ondersteuning vir demokrasie ook die ondersteuning vir demokratiese reëls en norme behels.

Die bevindinge dui op relatiewe hoër vlakke van ondersteuning vir die politieke gemeenskap, regime beginsels en regime werkverrigting onder ANC ondersteuners sowel as nie-ondersteuners as dit vergelyk word met vlakke van ondersteuning vir regime instellings en politieke akteurs. Dit beteken dat daar hoër vlakke van verspreide ondersteuning bestaan in vergelyking met spesifieke ondersteuning. Verder is bevind dat ANC ondersteuners hoër vlakke van verspreide sowel as spesifiek ondersteuning vir demokrasie vertoon in vergelyking met nie-ondersteuners van die ANC.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration	i
Abstract	ii
Opsomming	iii
Acknowledgments	iv
List of Tables and Figures	vii
Chapter One: Historical Context and Outline	
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Rationale of the study	4
1.3 Historical Context	4
1.3.1 The Nature of South African Segregation	4
1.3.2 Negotiations	12
1.4 A Democratic South Africa	17
1.4.1 Elections	17
1.4.2 Dominant Party System	20
1.5 Problem Statement	23
1.6 Proposition to be investigated	23
1.7 Research Design and Methodology	24
1.7.1 Limitations and Delimitations	26
1.8 Chapter Outline	26
Chapter Two: Theoretical Context, Conceptualisation and Operationalisation	
2.1 Introduction	27
2.2 Theoretical Context	27
2.2.1 Democracy	27
2.2.2 Support	31
2.2.3 Support for Democracy	32
2.3 Conceptualisation: Diffuse and Specific Support	37
2.3.1 Diffuse Support	37
2.3.1.1 The Political Community	41
2.3.1.2 Regime Principles	42
2.3.1.3 Regime Performance	42
2.3.2 Specific Support	43
2.3.2.1 Regime Institutions	44
2.3.2.2 Political Actors	44
2.4 Operationalisation: Diffuse and Specific Support	46
2.4.1 Diffuse Support	46
2.4.1.1 Political Community	46
2.4.1.2 Regime Principles	47
2.4.1.3 Regime Performance	47
2.4.2 Specific Support	48
2.4.2.1 Regime Institutions	48
2.4.2.2 Political Actors	48
2.5 Conclusion	49

Chapter Three: Data, Measurement, Findings and Discussion	
3.1 Introduction	51
3.2 Strategy of Inquiry	51
3.2.1 World Values Survey	51
3.2.2 Methodology	52
3.2.3 Some Demographic Attributes of the Sample	53
3.2.3.1 Population group	54
3.2.3.2 Gender	54
3.2.3.3 Language	55
3.2.3.4 Level of Education	56
3.2.3.5 Party Support	57
3.3 Findings	59
3.3.1 Constructing Support for Democracy Indices	59
3.3.1.1 Diffuse Support Index	59
3.3.1.2 Specific Support Index	60
3.3.2 Measuring Support for Democracy amongst ANC and Non-ANC Supporters	60
3.3.2.1 Measuring Diffuse Support amongst ANC and Non-ANC Supporters	60
3.3.2.1.1 Support for Political Community	60
3.3.2.1.2 Support for Regime Principles	62
3.3.2.1.3 Support for Regime Performance	64
3.3.2.2 Measuring Specific Support amongst ANC and Non-ANC Supporters	66
3.3.2.2.1 Support for Regime Institutions	66
3.3.2.2.2 Support for Political Actors	67
3.3.3 Measuring Support for Democracy amongst the ANC Supporters	71
3.3.4 Comparing Support for Democracy amongst the ANC and Non-ANC Supporters	74
3.3.5 Difference in Support for Democracy and Some Independent Variables	76
3.3.5.1 Independent Variables: Age	78
3.3.5.1.1 Diffuse Support: Age	78
3.3.5.1.2 Specific Support: Age	79
3.3.5.2 Independent Variables: Level of Education	81
3.3.5.2.1 Diffuse Support: Education	81
3.3.5.2.2 Specific Support: Education	82
3.4 Conclusion	83
Chapter Four: Summary, Implications, Recommendations and Conclusion	
4.1 Introduction	85
4.2 The Concept of Support for Democracy	86
4.3 Measurement	86
4.4 Summary of Findings and Implications	87
4.5 Suggestions for Further Research	93
4.6 Concluding Remarks	93
Bibliography	95

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

Table 1: Election Results	17
Table 2: Operationalisation of Support for Democracy	50
Table 3: Population Group of Entire Sample and ANC Supporters	54
Table 4: Gender Distribution of Entire Sample and the ANC Supporters	55
Table 5: Language Distribution of Entire Sample and ANC Supporters	55
Table 6: Levels of Education of the Entire Sample and the ANC Supporters	56
Table 7: Comparing Percentages between the National Elections and the WVS	58

Figures

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework	38
Figure 2: Support for Political Community	61
Figure 3: Support for Regime Principles	63
Figure 4: Support for Regime Performance	65
Figure 5: Support for Regime Institutions	67
Figure 6: Support for Political Actors	68
Figure 7: Support for Democracy	70
Figure 8: Support amongst the ANC Supporters	71
Figure 9: Percentage of Changes in Diffuse Support: 1995-2006	72
Figure 10: Percentage of Changes in Specific Support: 1995-2006	73
Figure 11: Diffuse and Specific Support amongst the ANC Supporters and Non-ANC Supporters	75
Figure 12: Diffuse Support amongst the ANC Supporters by Age	79
Figure 13: Specific Support amongst the ANC Supporters by Age	80
Figure 14: Diffuse Support amongst the ANC Supporters by Level of Education	81
Figure 15: Diffuse Support amongst the ANC Supporters by Level of Education	83

CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND OUTLINE

1.1 Introduction

South Africa was formerly subjected to authoritarian rule and, like most developing countries, it democratised during the third wave of democracy that swept the world in the 1990s (Huntington, 1993:21, Parry and Moran, 1994:9). According to Corkin (2004: 4), there are misperceptions about democracies, especially in the developing world. Firstly, there is a notion that democracy becomes firmly entrenched after the holding of national elections; secondly, that democracy promises a “better life for all”.¹ Nevertheless, the truth is that elections, transformation processes as well as the establishment and introduction of democratic norms and democratic institutions do not necessarily convert a country from authoritarian rule to one of democratic rule, and may not necessarily improve the lives of the citizens. Nonetheless, it is important that democracy not only be entrenched in theory, but that the country adopts it in practice. The evaluation of support for democracy – diffuse and specific – would go a long way towards determining whether South Africa is in fact a democracy in theory and/or practice.

The transition was a crucial step in the democratisation process of South Africa and it is important to establish the level of support for democracy and, as Easton (1965:161) argues, determine whether a democratic regime would garner sufficient support as the source of authority in a society. Inglehart (1990:17) and Bratton and Mattes (2001a) postulate that, unlike authoritarian regimes, a democratic regime is dependent on the support of the populace in order for the regime to be perceived as politically legitimate.

The issue of legitimacy is of great importance in the evaluation of support since there is a close correlation between democratic support and the legitimacy of the government. According to Max Weber (1918), noted in (Lord, 2008:3), legitimacy can be both substantive (i.e. what the government achieves) and procedural (i.e. how the government achieves it). Fritz Scharpf (1997), according to Lord (2008:3) agrees with Weber and argues that legitimacy can either be won or lost depending on the outputs and inputs of the authorities; thereby suggesting that legitimacy can be secured by the public’s approval of political actors and institutions (specific support) as well as performance of democracy, meeting public needs and respecting their values (diffuse support). David Beetham (1991), also noted in Lord (2008:3), mentions performance of institutions, respecting democratic values, and political

¹ “A better life for all” was the slogan used by the ANC in their 1994, 1999 and 2004 election campaigns (Corkin, 2004:4).

identity² (diffuse support), amongst other things as core components of legitimacy in a liberal democracy. Thus, legitimacy is of great importance to the study of political support since it concerns the acceptability of a democratic rule, which translates to support for democracy or not.

In short, the historic 1994 national election in South Africa played a crucial role in transforming the country from authoritarian rule into a democracy by introducing democratic principles and institutions. However, is this democracy entrenched in both theory and reality? If so, does the population support it? Moreover, what type of support do they have and is it enough to sustain democratic rule in the country? Lastly, what are the implications of the findings of this study for democracy and its consolidation?

The study relies on Easton's theory and conceptual framework of democratic support, and support for democracy will therefore be evaluated by using two contrasting measures, specific and diffuse support. According to Easton (1975: 438-445),³ specific support can only occur in societies where the authorities are accountable to the public for their actions and the consequences thereof. Its basis relies on perceived outcomes, benefits and satisfaction, and the support fluctuates according to the availability of these benefits. Diffuse support, on the other hand, is more durable than specific support, as its basis relies on the general meaning assigned to a political object and a *reservoir* of favourable attitudes. It is also more resistant to perceived benefits and performance and is favourable to the needs of the society rather than their wants. These concepts are extensively defined in Chapter Two.

Diffuse and specific support for democracy will be evaluated amongst African National Congress (ANC) supporters, because the ANC has enjoyed the status of being the dominant and majority political party in South Africa since 1994. This can be interpreted as popular support for the political regime, which is the essence of its consolidation⁴ and may be equated to legitimacy. Investigating this populace support amongst the ANC supporters is important

² Beetham's (1991) Political Identity equates to Political Community.

³ See also Diamond and Plattner, 1996: xi, and Torcal and Brusattin, 2001:2-3

⁴ By democratic consolidation one means a process by which political actors regard democracy as "the only game in town", meaning that democracy is consolidated when citizens and incumbents alike see no alternative form of governance but democratic rule (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:447). Diamond *et al.* (1995:53) add to Bratton and Mattes' definition and argue that "Consolidation is a process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate and so habitually practiced and observed that it is very unlikely to break down". According to Linz and Stepan (1998:49), democratic consolidation is signalled by three interrelated changes: firstly, behavioural (no actor uses a country's resources in an effort to achieve his or her objectives by creating an undemocratic regime); secondly, attitudinal (a majority hold the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collectively); lastly, there should be a constitutional resolution of conflict within the framework of specific laws, procedures and institutions.

since it would shed some light on how valid the perception that a continued ANC majority is likely to be a threat to democracy. It is, however, also important to evaluate political support amongst the ANC supporters in relation to non-ANC supporters, without losing focus on the crux of the study. This distinction based on a brief comparative analysis is significant because evaluating support amongst the ANC supporters alone only does not tell us much about the nature and the degree of their support within a relative context. The fact that the study distinguishes between ANC and non-ANC supporters might be viewed as limited in the sense that it fails to give a general evaluation of political support in the country. However, the decision to evaluate support for democracy amongst ANC supporters was taken because I aim to investigate whether democratic support is closely tied to party support or not and the implications this holds for democracy and its consolidation.

Moreover, determining the type of support amongst the ANC supporters (and non-ANC supports) is important, especially given the crucial differences between diffuse and specific support. Diffuse support is important because every system requires members who are willing to support it by sacrificing present goods for future rewards (Easton, 1965:273). Specific support, on the other hand, is conditional, i.e. the support stems from the perceived performance of the current authorities and their ability to satisfy demands (Easton, 1975: 436-446). In the words of Easton (1965) “no regime or community could gain general acceptance and no set of authorities could expect to hold power if they had to depend exclusively or even largely on outputs to general support as a return for specific an identifiable benefit” (Easton, 1965:269). Thus, a dominant party ought to have higher diffuse support rather than specific support. The opposite would result in a threat to democracy, where ANC supporters, for example, would demand that their grievances be addressed and their demands met, regardless of whether they are at the expense of non-ANC supporters.

This chapter is established by the rationale behind the study, after which it provides a historical background to South Africa from the apartheid era to the current political dispensation; investigates trends in the 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections; and it tries to determine whether the ANC’s political dominance will result in a one-party dominant state and, if so, the implications of this dominance for democracy. Furthermore, in this chapter the problem statement is formulated; the propositions under investigation are identified; and there is an account of the research design and any limitations/delimitations to the study.

1.2 Rationale of the study

The decision to embark on this study stems from the fact that it is important to explore democracies and support for democracy in the developing world in order to understand democratic rule and highlight its vulnerabilities. Investigating this is important, since democratic regimes in the developing world, such as Latin America, have already shown a decline in support for democracy (Corkin, 2004:4). Findings will indicate vulnerabilities, and levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with democracy and its processes, which is important for policy-making.

Moreover, democracy and its consolidation are important for South Africa, particularly given its history of racial segregation, brutality, authoritarian rule and political instability. Continued support for democratic values is important for ensuring that authoritarian rule, such as that experienced in the past, does not take root again as the system of governance in the country. Thus, monitoring the changing trends in support for democracy serves as a precautionary measure against undemocratic rule.

Support for democracy is also evaluated because support contributes to the strengthening of democratic principles and thus to the consolidation of that democracy. Although there is a tautological problem here, as many would argue that democratic consolidation itself leads to support for democracy, suggesting a circular relationship, it is sufficient for my study to be able to assume a positive relationship between support for democracy and democratic consolidation (Corkin, 2004:11).

Lastly, the decision to embark on this study stems from the fact that a large number⁵ of studies on democratisation in the world and in South Africa have been conducted, yet few, if any at all, have evaluated support for democracy amongst the supporters of the ruling party, or rather a dominant party.

1.3 Historical Context

1.3.1 The Nature of South African Segregation

The struggle of the black majority for full political participation in South Africa has its roots in the policy of segregation. Deegan (2001:4-5) notes that there are different debates about the origin of segregation in South Africa. Firstly, some authors assert that the origins of

⁵ Corkin (2004:17), however, maintains that there is a paucity of research on support for democracy as it manifests in the developing world and this could be because democracy is a new phenomenon in the developing world.

segregation in South Africa date back to British colonial history and the nineteenth century. Under the British occupation of the country, local authority for Africans⁶ was delegated to the African Chiefs, who maintained order, albeit in conjunction with the colonial policies. Secondly, according to Legassick (quoted in Deegan, 2001: 5), another debate maintains that the origins of segregation date back to the South African war of 1899-1902 between the British and the Afrikaners. Bouckaert (2008:239-240) argues that this war and other ancient conflicts about dominance and survival between various groups in the country had an impact on how racial groups within the country related to one another. The Africans were often defeated and their land seized, making them aliens in the country, whilst the Afrikaners felt threatened by other racial groups and as a result developed a strong desire for survival.

South Africa experienced great economic progress after the Great Depression and cheap labour was in high demand, and it was here that the government decided to enforce strict influx control that would regulate access to this cheap labour. This influx control provoked the black opposition, which was becoming stronger and bolder, and started to threaten the white working class. This influx control proved difficult to sustain, as the white government found it challenging to regulate the influx of desperate and impoverished rural blacks. On the other hand, the tendency of black people to stay in urban areas did nothing to ease the whites' insecurities (Joyce, 2007:84-85).

The Fagan Commission was convened as a result of these insecurities and it found that influx control was impractical, because black reserves could no longer cope. Thus the influx was recognised as inevitable and irresistible, and as a result blacks became a large part of industrialised South Africa (Joyce, 2007:85). This further threatened white nationalism and *forced* the National Party (NP), which came to power in 1948, to legally entrench a system of segregation, "rooting it in an ideology of apartheid" (Deegan, 2001:23). Although segregation was not a completely new concept when the NP came to power, it became legally entrenched only after 1948 (Deegan, 2001:23).

In short, the forceful entrenchment of segregation of racial groups came about when African influx into areas designated for whites by the British colonial policies started to threaten Afrikaner nationalism. This form of segregation was a "territorial and residential separation of

⁶ At the outset it is necessary to clarify two points. Firstly, the use of the terms "Coloured", "Black", "White" and "Indian" does not signify our approval of the categorisation of people into racial groups. Race, along with language and religion, however, is an important source of social and political divisions in South Africa. It is in this context that the above-mentioned terms are applied.

people based on the idea that black and white communities have different wants and requirements in the field of social, cultural and political policy” (Deegan, 2001:3-4). Thus, in the words of Kotzé and Du Toit (2006:259), apartheid was a “policy intended to build racially distinct communities, separated by spatial, social and political distance, each insulated from the other, and with the white sector in overall dominance”.

This was a form of social engineering, since the state identified and classified people according to categories in order to make the process of separate development easier. Legislation passed by the apartheid regime facilitated this identification and classification. Deegan (2001:24), Kotzé and Du Toit (2006:259-260), and Du Toit (1995:300-301) mention a few of the Acts:

- Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949: prohibited multiracial marriages;
- Immorality Act of 1950: prohibited sexual contact across racial barriers;
- The Group Areas Act of 1950: provided exclusive occupation of the land designated to each racial group: White, Coloured, Asian and Black. This was instrumental in dividing the country according to race. Africans were removed from white areas and contained in their own areas, where they were divided according to their linguistic divisions. They were furthermore segregated into reserves or microstates known as ‘bantustans’ or ‘homelands’. It is argued that Africans were stripped of their civil rights and denied access to public goods. Indians and Coloured were also spatially removed to their own townships; however, these townships were mainly located just outside town borders;
- Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953: facilitated social segregation in all public amenities, such as cinemas, restaurants and transport;
- The Bantu Education Act of 1955: phased out self-sufficient missionary schools and imposed curricula that prepared Blacks for manual labour.

This segregation, to paraphrase Du Toit (1995:345-346),⁷ did not go unchallenged, especially given the fact that those who were oppressed were the majority group. Blacks were the main oppositions to the system of apartheid throughout the years, but it was only in the early 1990s that they were able to gain full political rights, with the ANC playing a prominent role in the organised resistance against apartheid. For instance, the ANC decided at its annual conference

⁷ See also Friedman, 1995:537; Johnson, 2004:148; and see also the biography of Nelson Mandela on the ANC’s website .Biography of Nelson Mandela. 2008. “Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela” in African National Congress Website (Online edition) <<http://www.anc.org.za/people/mandela.html>>>

on 17 February 1949 to replace its moderate tactics such as petitions and deputations with a Programme of Action characterised by tactics such as boycotts, strikes, defiance, stay-at-homes, and a variety of civil disobedience and non-cooperation measures. This new official policy was designed to make the apartheid system impractical. Its youth league, the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), inspired this new tactic, which was unanimously adopted on June 26, 1950.

The ANC also recognised the strength in joining hands with other organisations in order to fully intensify its 'Disobedience Campaign'. For this reason the ANC leaders formed a Joint Planning Council with the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and later the South African Coloured People's Organisation (SACPO). All these groups, together with the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), formed the Congress Alliance (Deegan, 2001: 27-28).

In November 1951 the Joint Planning Council called on the government to repeal all unjust laws by February 1952 or face 'defiance campaigns' that were to start on 6 April 1952 (Van Riebeeck Day) or 26 June 1952 (Lodge, 1985:40).⁸ This defiance campaign was adopted as a strategy to challenge apartheid laws through civil disobedience (Du Toit, 1995: 346) and to demonstrate the collective willingness to cooperate in the fight against apartheid (Lodge, 1985:38). It called for "national freedom and political independence from white domination" (Deegan, 2001:27). Thousands of ordinary South Africans took part in the march that marked the beginning of the defiance campaign on Van Riebeeck Day (Lodge, 1985:43).

The strategy of a passive resistance campaign was inspired by Mahatma Gandhi's early resistance campaign (Johnson, 2004: 149) that was peaceful but instrumental in liberating India (Joyce, 2007:93-94). The government challenged this and responded by banning prominent leaders of these campaigns and passing laws to stop civil disobedience, i.e. to deal with those who were disrupting order (Deegan, 2001:27).

Lodge (1985) contends that it was decided in 1952 that an organisation that would include all races, especially the whites, should be formed. As a result, whites who had identified with those who were engaged in the defiance campaigns formed the South African Congress of Democrats (SACOD), which played an important role in the 1950s, since its members were educated and affluent. Moreover, some individuals controlled a newspaper and several

⁸ See also Byrnes, 1996.

journals, which contributed to their proficiency in both politics and trade union organisations (Lodge, 1985: 69).

In March 1954 the Congress of the People was formed by the ANC, SACOD, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the South African Coloured People's Organisation (SACPO), and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) (Johns and Davis, 1991:27).⁹ The formation of the Congress of the People led to the drawing up of the Freedom Charter, which was adopted in 1955. The freedom charter was born after volunteers travelled throughout the entire country collecting, from ordinary people, their demands and their vision for the new South Africa. The Freedom Charter was officially adopted during a meeting of the Congress of the People on 25 and 26 June 1955 and documented the ideals and objectives for freedom and an inclusive South Africa, as well as basic human rights (The Age of Hope, 2006: 36).¹⁰

In response to the Freedom Charter and intensifying organised resistance, 42 ANC members were banned, with some ordered to give up their ANC membership and leave office in 1955. This ban affected 11 of the 27 members of the national executive. Forty SACOD members and 19 SAIC members were similarly restricted. In 1956 a total of 156 prominent leaders of the opposition (105 Blacks, 21 Indians, 23 Whites and 7 Coloureds) were accused of treason in the Treason Trial and the punishment was to be death if they were found guilty (The Age of Hope, 2006: 37). For the next five years the state sought to prove that the Congress Alliance wanted to overthrow the government using communist-inspired strategies (Lodge, 1985:76). The government dragged the trial on in an effort to drain the resources and energy of the accused. This was effective, as it made the Congress Alliance weak because prominent leaders were in custody and had to be replaced (Lodge, 1985:76). The trial was divided into two phases, the preparatory examination and the trial itself. Charges against 61 of the 156 were eventually dropped, while those who were still accused were to face charges in the Supreme Court. The number of accused continued to decrease and eventually only 28 remained accused, but none were convicted and the charges were dropped (The Age of Hope, 2006:37-40).

Although the freedom charter that was adopted in 1955 continued to be an important document within the ANC, some Africanists within the party rejected it, because they

⁹ See also Lodge, 1985:69

¹⁰ See also Johnson, 2004:150 and Lodge, 1985:71.

disagreed with the idea of an inclusive South Africa (Joyce, 2007:107-108). As a result, they split from the ANC in 1959 to form the Pan African Congress (PAC) under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe (Friedman, 1995:537).¹¹ The PAC adopted the Africanists' values of the ANCYL as its programme (Johnson, 2004:151) and rejected co-operation with other racial groups within South Africa, especially the whites (Joyce, 1990:38). The PAC became the ANC's rival because of their different stance on an inclusive South Africa (Du Toit, 1995:346). This rivalry became evident when the ANC planned to host a mass protest on 31 March 1960, but the PAC decided to host it ten days earlier, on 21 March 1960. The PAC's plan was successful and on 21 March protestors gathered at strategic points across the country and the protest began (Joyce, 2007:108-109).

The most notable moment of the protest was the Sharpeville incident and its tragic end. According to Joyce (2007:109),¹² in Sharpeville roads were blocked and cars were stoned in an effort to stop workers from going to work. By lunchtime 20 000 protestors confronted the occupants of the Sharpeville police station. The tension between protestors and the police intensified, and as a result the police opened fire on the demonstrators. They continued firing at the dispersing protestors, killing 69 and wounding 186. This marked the end of non-violence strategies in the liberation struggle, as it became clear that liberation could not be achieved peacefully. The opposition adopted a new tactic of violence to counter the violence from the authorities.

To summarise Johns and Davis (1991: 89-90), the period between 1960 and 1964 was a short and chaotic one. This period began with the banning of the ANC and the PAC (Du Toit, 1995: 347) and the government's declaration of the State of Emergency. These were attempts by the government to close all avenues of legal mobilisation within the country (Friedman, 1995:537), forcing the ANC and the PAC to develop new strategies. One strategy, according to Johns and Davis (1991:90) was to establish organisational structures in exile and for some leaders, such as Mandela, to go underground. The other strategy, according to Du Toit (1995: 347), was to mobilise the international community to isolate the country culturally, politically and most importantly economically. Lastly, they had to continue mass mobilisation and intensify guerrilla warfare and sabotage (Kotzé and Greyling, 1994:53).

¹¹ See also Kotzé and Greyling, 1994: 53.

¹² See also Lodge, 1985: 201-226, Johnson, 2004:151-152

The ANC and the PAC established their respective military wings, namely Umkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), also known as MK, and Poqo (Africans Alone) in 1961 (Kotzé and Greyling, 1994: 53). This marked the beginning of the armed struggle and direct confrontations with the state began (Du Toit, 1995:347). According to Johnson (2004: 168-169),¹³ Oliver Tambo, one of the prominent leaders of the ANC, played an instrumental role in exile. As a result the ANC held its first meeting in exile in October 1962 in Lobalse, Bechuanaland and their first headquarters in exile were established in Tanzania. The PAC also established its own organisation in exile and attempted to form an alliance with the ANC in Tanzania, but it failed. It was banned in 1968, under the new leadership of Potlako Leballo, who announced that white women and children should be killed.

The MK carried out acts of sabotage against state infrastructure and Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, the then Prime Minister of the country, approached John Voster, the then Minister of Justice to assist in curbing the revolutionary challenges. Voster and Hendrik van den Berg, the head of the security police, worked diligently to challenge resistance. They announced a 180-day detention without trial and this could be extended to an unlimited period, if authorised by the judge. This meant that the police were entitled to do whatever they saw as appropriate (Joyce, 2007:120-124 and Joyce, 1990:44-60) and suspicious deaths under suspicious circumstances in police custody began to rise as a result (Du Toit, 1995:358).

The targets of these detentions were MK and Poqo, and on 11 July 11 1963 a squad of detectives raided a Liliesleaf farmhouse in the Northern Johannesburg suburb of Rivonia and arrested 17 senior activists of the ANC. This farmhouse was a base of operations and a convenient hideaway bought by the ANC two years earlier. Mandela had already been incarcerated for incitement and for leaving the country illegally. He was, however, implicated in the Rivonia trial since his diaries, notes on guerrilla warfare and information on his tours were found during the raid. This trial started in October 1963 and lasted for 7 months in the Pretoria High Court. The accused were sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964, resulting in 27 years detention for Mandela (Joyce, 2007:120-124 and 1990:44-60).

To summarise Joyce (2007: 125), the end of the Rivonia trial marked the end of active resistance. The strategies used by the government to suppress the opposition were successful. According to Johnson (2004: 158),¹⁴ Verwoerd was succeeding in his tactics of challenging

¹³ See also Joyce, 2007: 120

¹⁴ See also Joyce, 1990:64.

resistance. However, in September 1966 Dimitri Tsafendas assassinated Verwoerd. The strategies of challenging resistance did not stop, however. A new intelligence service, the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), was set up in 1968. This powerful institution broadened spying on the liberation movements and their key leaders and infiltrating them, leading to a disappearance of the opposition because of fear and intimidation by the security apparatus.

The renewal of resistance, however, came from young black intellectuals. They formed the South African Students Organisation (SASO) in 1969 under the philosophy of Black Consciousness (BC). Steve Biko, the most prominent figure in BC, articulated this philosophy and stressed black assertiveness, unity and self-reliance. A set of BC organisations emerged in the 1970s, helping to shape the cause of resistance (Friedman, 1995:538). Resistance intensified, leading to the student protest in 1976 against Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in secondary schools. This protest spread throughout the country and Biko was detained. He later died in police custody in 1978. His death led to the formation of resistance associations that further intensified opposition (Joyce, 1990:72-73).

To paraphrase Kotzé and Du Toit (2006), the intensified opposition (Peoples' War) against the government was met with an intensified response from the government (the policy of Total Strategy against Total Onslaught, which was established in 1978 and ended in 1984). Thus the country was characterised by military confrontations between the opposing sides. These confrontations had severe implications for the South African social fabric. The distinction between civilians and soldiers was often blurred, since fighters were civilian and the conflict did not have a distinct battlefield. Moreover, the engagement between opposing forces was often with an intention to murder, with deadly results and far-reaching consequences. Gross human rights violations occurred during that period, such as necklacing,¹⁵ which were revealed during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings¹⁶ (Kotzé and Du Toit, 2006:261-263).¹⁷ The struggle was soon characterised by incarceration of prominent leaders of opposing organisations, death sentences, subjections to house arrests, whippings, beatings, heavy fines, police surveillance, harassments and torture (Deegan, 2001:30-31).

¹⁵ Necklacing involved burning people by placing a rubber tyre filled with gasoline around the victim's neck and setting it on fire.

¹⁶ TRC - the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established to provide public acknowledgement of and compensation for the victims of gross human rights violations. Amnesty would then be granted to perpetrators of these gross human rights violations; for more details see Deegan, 2001, Chapter 7.

¹⁷ See also Betowt, 2003:191.

Intensifying challenges led the state to reform apartheid laws in the 1970s and early 1980s. Du Toit (1995) maintains that the general consensus amongst analysts was that “these regime modifications were intended as vehicles of co-option, drawing subject populations into the formal decision-making process, but still leaving them unable decisively to affect the outcome of the policy-making process” (Du Toit, 1995: 348). He further explains that these reforms included relaxation of control methods, deracialisation of public facilities, dropping of colour bars and access to apprenticeship, amongst others (Du Toit, 1995: 349-350).

P. W Botha resigned as the president of the country in 1989 and F. W de Klerk assumed the leadership position in September 1989, after the NP won the general elections (Deegan, 2001: 67-69). De Klerk was faced with many difficult challenges at the beginning of his presidential term and persisting instability, especially violence, prompted him to announce that the NP had to make changes in the country. He announced, “The season of violence is over” (Deegan, 2001:67) in his first parliamentary address at the opening of parliament on 2 February 1990. He announced that the bans on the ANC, the PAC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were to be lifted and political prisoners would be released (Southall, 1994: 630).¹⁸ He further announced the demobilisation of the military as a strategy of dealing with blacks’ demands and the employment of a political strategy in addressing their demands. In addition, obstacles to negotiations were to be removed in an effort to accommodate everyone in the country (Deegan, 2001: 69).¹⁹

1.3.2 Negotiations

Negotiations began on 2 February 1990, with the lifting of the bans on the ANC, PAC, SACP and 33 other organisations. This also coincided with the De Klerk releasing Mandela from prison after 27 years (Du Toit, 1995:378).²⁰ The government’s decision to open negotiations with the ANC was, however, surprising. What pressing conditions forced the main contenders to choose negotiations and why at that particular time? Du Toit (1995) maintains that a position of “mutually hurting stalemate had set in” (Du Toit, 1995: 363).

Firstly, to paraphrase Giliomee (1995), from 1700 to 1960 whites were able to operate all political, economic and administrative systems of the country, doing almost all the skilled and semi-skilled work and had rights to nearly all the land. The country never needed to produce the intermediate class, especially in the economy. Nevertheless, the number of whites within

¹⁸ See also Bouckaert, 2008:238.

¹⁹ See also Joyce, 2007:180-181.

²⁰ See also Sisk, 1995:56.

the country started to shrink. The proportion of whites fell from 20% in 1960 to 15% in 1985 and the government had to counter this by increasing the number of its white staff members, especially those who were directly engaged in the implementation and maintenance of the apartheid system and apartheid laws. In the process, however, the government overspent and overreached its administrative capacity. Consequently, the government was unable to control the influx of the Africans into urban areas.²¹ It was also difficult to deal with Africans who were educated and skilled. The higher their level of education, the higher the dissatisfaction with the political situation and the more pressing their political and status demands. The government was unable to deal with the mounting pressures and the survival of the Afrikaners depended on the acceptance of a new inclusive rule for the majority. The white government stood a better chance of striking a bargain than if it waited for a longer period of time (Giliomee, 1995:86-88).²²

Secondly, domestic economic constraints, aggravated by international sanctions and popular resistance, played a defining role in influencing negotiations. The impact of sanctions fell into three broad categories: shrinking and lack of investment, restrictions on trade, and restrictions on long-term credit. Moreover, Chase Manhattan and other international banks' refusal to extend loans to the country in 1985 (Giliomee, 1995:88) worsened the financial constraints and investment fell from 20% in 1983 to 16% in 1991 (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999:7). Economic sanctions and domestic pressures created pessimism about business, with investors losing confidence in the country. One of the main outcomes was that the economy stagnated. Thus, negotiating for a stable framework that would be attractive to new investors was the only way of redressing these economic pressures. In addition, addressing these economic pressures also meant redressing the unemployment crisis among the black population (Giliomee, 1995:89). Negotiations were an option because they would bring opponents together in an effort to discuss a strategy of jointly leading the country from apartheid to democracy. The hope was that the new regime would reinstate capitalist profitability and political stability (Marais 1998:67-69).

²¹ The high rate of urbanisation evident after the collapse of influx control for black people might be attributed to the push-pull factors of migration. This urbanisation is usually a response to the hardships faced in the rural area, such as poverty, unemployment or the gap between the rewards of labour [not sure what this means], civil conflicts, religious persecution, environmental problems and land scarcity (push factors). Then there were the perceived comparative advantages of moving to the urban areas, i.e. the pull factors, such as better standard of living, higher wages, labour demands as well as political and religious freedom (Tacoli, 2008:9-10; Path Finder Science, 2008; and De Haan, 1999:25-27).

²² See also Giliomee and Simkins, 1999:7 in the "Awkward Embrace: One-party domination and Democracy; and Giliomee, 1998:130).

Thirdly, the decision to negotiate was a result of the weakening of the NP as a result of corruption, “dirty tricks” (Du Toit, 1995:358) of the state, such as death of political prisoners (e.g. Steve Biko) and the confession that it had funded the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in 1991. Resistance, such as civil disobedience and refusal to pay taxes, as well as tolerance of private armies and paramilitary forces, indicated a weakening of the state. Moreover, people’s courts, armed confrontations, collapse of the Black Local Authorities (BLAs) and rising crime in 1990 contributed to the weakening of the state; thus, the decision to negotiate was taken (Du Toit, 1995: 357-363).

On the other hand, to summarise Marais (1998), the ANC decided to negotiate since the state was subjugating it. Moreover, there were organisational and strategic dysfunctions within the organisation itself because of its weakened power. Thus, the organisation realised that its idea of overthrowing the government was unrealistic: its armed struggle never gained sufficient power to oppose and threaten white rule militarily, Eastern Europe had collapsed, and the USSR decided to refrain from the use of military force, especially in its confrontation with the West. The result was a weakening the ANC’s armed struggle, since it was highly dependent on military support from the USSR (Marais, 1998: 69).

A multilateral Convention for the Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was initiated in December 1991. Nineteen political organisations and teams of advisors set out to negotiate the future of the country. The CODESA I accord was sealed with the Groote Schuur Minute, a pledge of commitment to peaceful resolutions (Joyce, 2007:183). The Conservative Party (CP), the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) and the IFP refused to participate in the negotiations. The CP maintained that the settlement was hostile to the whites, while the IFP demanded a degree of Zulu autonomy and representation of Zulu interest by three delegations (the IFP, the Zulu Royal house and the homeland of Kwa-Zulu) instead of only one delegate (Joyce, 2007:184).²³ The PAC was to abstain from participation, but decided to participate in alliance with the ANC. Nevertheless, this alliance was short-lived and the PAC withdrew from the negotiations because of a failure to comprehend the role of whites in the future dispensation (Sisk, 1995:203-204), the very same reason that caused it to split from the ANC in 1959. The trade unions and civic organisations did not take part in the convention, since they were not considered as organisations (Deegan, 2001:79).

²³ See also Friedman, 1995:544-545.

CODESA I came to a halt six months later because of the ANC's desperation for a quick resolution and progress, while the NP was in no hurry to reach a consensus. These obstacles, together with the refusal to participate by certain parties, acts of violence, failure to compromise and distrust between opponents, were signs of the fragility of the first plenary sessions of negotiations (Deegan, 2001:78-80). Du Toit (1995:387)²⁴ argues that failure to compromise could be attributed to the fact that the main candidates expected to win and as a result lacked strategic realism. Moreover, according to Johnson (2004:205), the distrust between opponents was inevitable, given the decades of intense struggle, which created reluctance and suspicions about the intentions of the opposing side. It was especially hard to believe that the NP was willing to compromise its power without any catch.

These obstacles were inevitable and hard to resolve with the result that CODESA I ended when De Klerk accused the ANC of retaining arms and private armies, generally perceiving it as negotiating in bad faith (Joyce, 2007:184). The closing of CODESA I was significant as it still managed to produce two crucial successes. Firstly, a Declaration of Intent was signed and delegates pledged to create a new South Africa by consensus, meaning that decisions within the convention were to be taken based on a majority vote. This was a precautionary measure against obstruction of the decision-making process by extreme groupings and compromising of the smaller groups. In addition, the concepts of an independent judiciary, a Bill of Rights and inclusive elections were embraced (Joyce, 2007:183).²⁵ Secondly, CODESA I was to be an institution with five working groups that were to facilitate negotiations on issues such as the structure of the new constitution, peaceful political participation, transitional and interim government, the constitutional future of the four homelands, and the implementation of a negotiated agreement (Sisk, 1995:205).²⁶

CODESA I had already decided to hold the second plenary of the convention on 15-16 May 1992 when it ended. Thus, CODESA II started on May 15 as initiated by the first convention. The IFP, PAC and the CP suspended their reservations and participated in the negotiations, even though they were still dissatisfied with the settlement terms. The CP maintained its first reservation that the settlement terms did not accommodate the whites, and the PAC continued to argue that an inclusive South Africa is impractical. The IFP demanded the completion of the final constitution before the general elections and failure to have this demand met resulted in its withdrawal from the negotiations (Joyce, 2007:188).

²⁴ See also Friedman, 1995:549.

²⁵ For more on what was agreed upon, see Sisk, 1995:204.

²⁶ See also Joyce, 2007:183 and Du Toit, 1995:380.

Nevertheless, Deegan (2001) argued that CODESA II initially failed to reach a settlement and talks were suspended when the IFP supporters murdered ANC-aligned squatters in Boipatong in June 1992. The ANC members believed that these killings were initiated by a third-force military campaign being operated by the security services and they further alleged that this was done with police complicity. This massacre and violence around the country compelled the ANC to suspend talks, maintaining that the NP government failed to control the violence and that the government continued its total strategy despite the commencement of negotiations. The tension between the NP and the ANC led the international community to pressurise them to resume negotiations, since failure to negotiate would fuel more violence. The ANC and NP signed a Minute of Understanding on 26 September 1992 as a result. The signing of this document ended De Klerk (police and third force) and Mangosuthu Buthelezi's (IFP) coalition (Deegan, 2001:80-81).²⁷

The Multi-Party Negotiation Process (MPNP) was initiated on 1 April 1992 following the failure of the second plenary of CODESA and continued where CODESA left off (Sisk, 1995:225-226). Johnson (2004) argues that the MPNP was also faced with its own challenges. Firstly, Janus Walusz and Clive Derby Lewis, a right-winged MP, assassinated Chris Hani, a prominent politician and leader of MK on 10 April 1993. This created turmoil, but talks resumed regardless of the frustrations of the opposition masses. Secondly, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)²⁸ attempted to derail negotiations by invading the negotiation building, but they did not succeed. Lastly, the PAC carried out a series of illegal acts such as attacking a praying congregation in Cape Town. These incidents highlighted their feelings of exclusion from the ANC-NP pact (Johnson, 2004:207). They failed to derail the negotiations, however, which soon came to a successful completion, with Mandela and De Klerk sharing the Nobel Peace Prize two months later (Joyce, 2007:187-188). Despite all the obstacles, some consensus was reached.

Compromise-seeking mechanisms were used in an effort to deal with issues that were left unresolved by CODESA (Deegan, 2001:81). Giliomee (1995:97) lists a number of compromises made by the ANC and the government by the end of 1992. The ANC's demand for the holding of elections for a Constituent Assembly (CA)²⁹ was accepted. In addition,

²⁷ See also Marais, 1998:89; Joyce, 2007:186; Du Toit, 1995:380-381; and Sisk, 1995:219

²⁸ An organisation formed by Eugene Terreblanche in 1973 (Johnson, 2004:207 and Joyce, 2007:187-188).

²⁹ The interim Constitution governed South Africa following the 1994 elections; however, a permanent constitution was to be adopted later. As a result, a Constitutional Assembly was established to draft and approve a permanent constitution by May 9, 1996. It consisted of 400 members of the National Assembly and the 90 members of the Senate. This assembly held intense negotiations concerning the final constitution. Thus, the permanent constitution was revised by the assembly, reviewed and certified by the Constitutional Court on 2 December 1996. President Mandela signed the new constitution on 10 December

however, all parties that received more than 5% of the vote in the elections would get proportional seats in parliament under the Bill of Rights and the interim constitution³⁰ demanded by the NP. Those elected were to serve as an interim government and there would be a sharing of power³¹ for five years under the Government of National Unity (GNU).³² Both parties further agreed that the government would continue to be the highest authority between the periods of formally adopting the constitution and holding of elections (Giliomee, 1995:97). According to Deegan (2001:82), the negotiating council agreed to hold the first inclusive, non-racial elections in 1994.

A settlement was finally reached when the formal negotiations ended in late 1993 (Marais, 1998: 89-90). The country was to have a liberal-democratic system and the final Constitution was completed and adopted in 1996. The political system was to be based on the separation of powers, multiparty elections were to take place every five years, and power was to be progressively delegated to local government. The Bill of Rights formed part of the Constitution and Parliament was to consist of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces.³³ Parastatal bodies such as the Human Rights Commission, a Commission on Gender Equality, the Electoral Commission, the Independent Broadcasting Authority, the Auditor-General, the Cultural Commission and the Protector's Office were established (Marais, 1998:90-91).

1.4 A Democratic South Africa

1.4.1 Elections

One could argue that free and fair elections are the basic elements of democracy, although not sufficient on their own. This section will focus on the electoral competitiveness and performance of the political parties that have contested the elections in South Africa since 1994.

1996 and it came into effect on 3 February 1997 (see South African Constitution in UNFPA, 2008 and Constitution, Government and Legislation in Jurist Law Intelligence. 2008. "Constitution, Government & Legislation" in Jurist Law Intelligence (online edition) << <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/sa.htm> >> (9 April 2008).

³⁰ The interim Constitution of the country contained thirty-four principles that sought to "protect democratic norms and prevent their being overruled by a subsequent dominant party government. This means that the majority government has no right to change or re-write the constitution to its own advantage. Rule of laws, freedom and equality, independence of the judiciary amongst other things, were to be the basic principles of liberal democratic constitution of 1993. The constitutional court would be the highest legal authority in the country and each province had regional head of government (the premier), own legislation and executive council comprising of not more than ten people. These principles were to ensure that democratic principles are upheld (Deegan, 201:89-93).

³¹ According to Giliomee (1995:104), demands for power-sharing by the NP were meant to protect groups' interests and values.

³² The Government of National Unity was a power-sharing agreement that was meant to last for five years. It was a response to the demands for power-sharing that would enable the former government to have a dignified exit from power. It was a compromise (Deegan, 2001:91-92).

³³ The National Assembly consists of 400 members and the National Council of Provinces consists of 90 delegates that are drawn from the nine provinces of the country (Marais, 1998:90).

The first inclusive elections that took place on 27 April 1994 was awaited with great anticipation and ushered in the beginning of a peaceful transition. The second and the third elections, in contrast to the first, were less historic and momentous, since the return of the ANC to office was fairly predictable (Southall, 1999:9).³⁴

Table 1 below, compiled from the official election results of the Independent Electoral Commission, illustrates the percentage of votes and number of seats won by each political party in a national election since 1994. Similar to the ANC, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) have all managed to increase their electoral votes with every passing election, with the DA receiving the highest increase at 7.86% in 1999, followed by the ANC and then the ACDP. The ACDP increased its votes slightly from 1999 to 2004, but did not increase the number of the seats in parliament. AZAPO has also managed to increase its support slightly from 1999 to 2004, but it did not contest in the 1994 elections, making it difficult to rank it with parties that increase their votes with every passing election. The DA's increase in votes was significant, given the fact that it is the official opposition party. AZAPO's and ACDP's increases in votes is of less significance because of the increase is so slight.

The support of the New National Party (NNP), formerly the NP, and the IFP declined with every passing national election, as suggested by Table 1. The United Democratic Front (UDM) and the United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) recorded a decline in their support from the 1999 elections to the 2004 elections, while they never contested in the first elections. The number of votes received by the Freedom Front (FF) and the PAC has been increasing and decreasing considerably, making it difficult to state whether there has been growth in their support or not. What can be noted however, is that the increasing and decreasing changes in the number of votes received has been very insignificant and therefore does not have any major implication. There is, however, a definite significance as far as the ANC is concerned.

³⁴ See also Shubane and Stack, 1999:3 and Letsholo, 2005:11.

Table 1: Election Results

PARTIES	1994		1999			2004			
	%	Seats	%	Seat	Change	%	Seats	Change 1994	Change 1999
ANC	62.2	252	66.3	266	4.1	69.6	279	4.15	3.3
NP/NNP	20.4	82	6.8	28	-13.5	1.7	7	-13.5	-5.1
IFP	10.5	43	8.5	34	-1.9	6.9	28	-1.9	-1.6
FF	2.17	9	0.8	3	-1.3	0.8	4	-1.3	0.0
DP/DA	1.7	7	9.5	38	7.8	12.3	50	7.8	2.8
PAC	1.2	5	0.7	3	-0.4	0.7	3	-0.49	0.0
ACDP	0.5	2	1.4	6	0.9	1.6	6	0.9	0.1
UDM	-	-	3.4	14	-	2.2	9	-	-1.1
UCDP	-	-	0.7	3	-	0.7	3	-	-0.0
FA	-	-	0.5	2	-	-	-	-	-
MF	-	-	0.3	1	-	0.3	2	-	0.0
AZAPO	-	-	0.1	1	-	0.2	2	-	0.0
ID	-	-	-	-	-	1.7	7	-	-
AEB	-	-	0.2	1	-	-	-	-	-

Source: IEC website (www.elections.org.za)

The 1999 and 2004 elections reinforce trends set in the 1994 elections. Firstly, the ANC does not only return to office, but it does so with an increased majority (Letshole, 2005:11 and Shubane and Stack, 1999:3). This suggests that it progressively extends its majority lead, setting it ahead of its nearest opposition (Letshole, 2005:11), which has “been unable to maintain its share of the votes, so that the largest opposition party in Parliament in 2004 (DA, with 50 seats) has over one-third fewer seats than the largest opposition party held in 1994 (the NP, which held 82 seats)” (Piombo, 2004:3).³⁵ This is a much better performance than the 1999 election, when the largest opposition, the Democratic Party (DP), formerly the DA, received less than 10% (9.55%) of national votes, giving it only 38 seats in parliament (Prudhomme, 2004:17). This suggests that the opposition is weak, as the ANC received votes that are many times higher than that of its official opposition party (Prudhomme, 2004:13-23).

The ANC has also managed to win the majority of the provinces. It won seven provinces in the first two elections, losing only in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). This highlights how the Western Cape and KZN have always eluded ANC control. However, this changed in the 2004 elections, when the ANC gained enough votes to control all the provinces, including the Western Cape and KZN, but the Western Cape province was co-governed since there was a coalition between the DP, NNP and ACDP there (Letsholo,

³⁵ See also Prudhomme, 2004:14 and 20.

2005:9).³⁶ This brings us to the next section, i.e. whether the trends suggest that the ANC is a dominant party.

1.4.2 Dominant Party System³⁷

This section will briefly discuss parties that received the majority of votes during elections as well as the characteristics that suggest that they are dominant. How true is the argument that the ANC's majority status has turned it into a dominant party, making the country a one-party dominant state?

Parties are characterised as being dominant when they, firstly, enjoy dominance in the formation of government; secondly, when they have established an overwhelming electoral dominance for an uninterrupted and extended period of time; and thirdly, as the consequence of the above characteristics, dominate and shape the public agenda (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999: xvi). This is what Giliomee and Simkins (1999) refer to as developing a “virtuous cycle of dominance”³⁸ (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999: xvi).³⁹

Friedman (1999) argues that a one-party dominant system can also be found in democracies with regular elections, where the opposition can organise and contest in free and fair elections, and where civil liberties are upheld. This suggests that a dominant party does not have to operate in an undemocratic way, but rather gets to dominate power. In most cases, the dominant party came to power through electoral victory, rather than through force or fraud (Friedman, 1999:99-100). Duverger, according to Friedman (1999:100), categorises a dominant party as a party which is identified with a certain period (democratisation, new South Africa liberation), i.e. an epoch. In addition, the party has the ability to establish and position itself as the natural party of government during a certain period and is able to convince both its supporters and opponents that it is naturally meant to be dominant.

Based on the above characteristics of a dominant party given by Friedman (1999), and Giliomee and Simkins (1999), as well as the realities of the trend of the three past elections, the ANC is developing or it has already developed into a dominant party. It has managed to shape and dominate government and power, consequently shaping the public agenda. The

³⁶ See also Shubane & Stark, 1999:4

³⁷ The issue of dominance is an important part of the political landscape in the country in my opinion and therefore cannot be excluded from the discussion of political support, especially where the ANC is concerned.

³⁸ Giliomee and Simkins maintain that the “virtuous cycle of dominance” occurs when a party's political supremacy and successful execution of the past project generate even more dominance.

³⁹ See also Friedman, 1999:101.

country has had regular and open electoral contest, with the opposition being able to organise freely. It came to power through electoral victory and had overwhelming electoral dominance for an interrupted and prolonged period, from 1994-2004. It is identified with the epoch and is seen as a natural part of government, especially by previously oppressed Africans.

Furthermore, its dominance was asserted when it realised its “parliamentary hope” (Piombo, 2004:3) by receiving two-thirds majority in the 2004 elections. The two-thirds majority issue is of great significance, because it can transform the ANC from an “ordinary majority party to a strong dominant party” (Shubane and Stack, 1999:2). In theory, the two-thirds majority allows the ANC to amend the Constitution unilaterally, albeit in accord and with the already entrenched constitutional principles (Southall, 1994:638).

According to Giliomee and Simkins’ (1999) argument, based on articles by Arian and Barnes, a dominant system has two benefits. A dominant party serves as a stabilising mechanism (i.e. it alleviates conflict between conflicting parties) better than fragile parties. Furthermore, a dominant party system that acknowledges political opposition and civil liberties has a chance of serving as a necessary “platform for a durable democratic system” (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999:3).

The first proposition holds true in the South African context, because the establishment of democracy in South Africa was doomed if African politics were fractured (Giliomee, 1998:130), i.e. if Africans were not unified and the ANC did not dominate the transition process in the country. It is argued that the country, at that time, needed a dominant party that would “preserve stability, consolidate democracy, spur socioeconomic development, narrow class cleavages, and contain populist pressures” (Giliomee, 1998:132).

The second proposition may also be accepted as being true. The NP and the ANC successfully led the country from one-party rule to an inclusive democratic rule. They both compromised their positions and they showed some level of respect towards political competition and civil liberties (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999:3).

From these propositions, it is true that the dominance of the ANC was valuable for creating a platform for democratic rule in the country. However, is the dominance of the ANC still needed in a country that has been democratically ruled for more than a decade, or is this

dominance a threat to democratic consolidation? This brings us to the disadvantages of having a dominant party.

The dominance of the ANC raises concerns about democracy and its consolidation. Firstly, as the history of the country shows, the dominance of one party, i.e. the NP, led to an authoritarian rule. Therefore the dominance of the ANC, like the NP of the apartheid era, raises the danger of the rise of another period of undemocratic rule (Shubane and Stark, 1999:7).⁴⁰

Secondly, it is argued that dominance of one party often blurs the distinction between the state and the party itself (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999: xv), making it more susceptible to corruption and suppression of opposition. Moreover, democratic competition becomes fragile (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999: xv). In the words of Southall (1994), “transition to authoritarianism under ANC hegemony constitutes a possibility of replaying the past political behaviour of the NP nationally ... which blurred the distinction between party and state within the domain” (Southall, 1994:654).

Thirdly, “majority rule might mean majority tyranny” (Sisk, 2003) because majority rule that follow after identity conflicts are ill suited to consolidate democracy. This is because parties opposing the majority party usually have perceptions that the majority party will not respect the rights and interest of the minorities (Giliomee, 1998:129). This closely correlates with the perception that the ANC supporters are likely to demand that their grievances be addressed, regardless of whether this is done at the expense of the minorities or non-supporters of the ANC.

Fourthly, there is a perception that parties should work hard to please the electorate for they want to be voted into office. Concerns therefore arise when the opposition parties are too weak to challenge the main party, which is likely to return to office. This gives the majority too much power, and it is likely that the electorally unchallenged party might impose its will, overlooking the interests of the minority parties. This increases the likelihood of a weak democracy and jeopardises its consolidation. This led some authors to conclude that the dominance of one party threatens democracy (Shubane and Stark, 1999:7).⁴¹

⁴⁰ See also Southall, 1994:654.

⁴¹ Southall (1994:654) agrees with this argument, but asserts that concluding that ANC dominance is a threat is rather premature, since it overlooks the country’s ability to merge the ANC’s dominance with maintenance of democracy. The dominant status provides the party with the will to accept challenges as lawful rather than as threat to its existence. Additionally, the transition process was beneficial: there were legitimate elections; avoidance of civil war; the catering for

Lastly, the dominance of one party is a threat to democracy, since those who support other parties often lose faith in democracy and its processes, since there is no hope that the electoral outcome will change (Giliomee, 1998:129).

In conclusion, it appears as the dominance of the ANC was valuable during the transition period and that it played a crucial role in the path towards democratic consolidation. However, the assessment of the disadvantages of a dominant party in a country suggests that the very same dominance that was crucial during the transition to democracy is now likely to be a threat to democracy and its consolidation. This is, however, a perception that is based on the literature and theory and, in the South African case, not based upon credible evidence. Moreover, it is important to note that this conclusion is based on a theoretical orientation. Acknowledgement should be given to the fact that there are alternative theoretical orientations about what constitutes a dominant party. This orientation was chosen solely because it made it practically uncomplicated to analyse the elements of a dominant party in the South African context.

1.5 Problem Statement

The extensive historical background provides a clear indication of the struggles endured under the undemocratic rule of the past. It also indicates the sacrifices that had to be made in order for transition to a democratic rule to be made possible. The second part highlighted that the ANC's majority can be interpreted as dominant. Now that we have shown that the ANC's majority equates to dominance, there is still a need to evaluate changing trends in support for democracy amongst the supporters of this dominant party. This, we hope, will shed more light on the implications that dominance has on support for democracy.

In order to give the study a point of focus, the proposition is drawn from the literature that deals with diffuse and specific support. The following section deals with the proposition to be investigated and how it was formulated.

1.6 Proposition to be investigated

With reference to diffuse support, democracy is understood to mean collective freedom. To paraphrase Mattes *et al.* (2000), personal freedom and rights are less valued. Reference to elements of procedural democracy such as rights, freedom, equality and justice could be

minority parties by the electoral system as well as entrenchment of human rights, making the emergence of authoritarian rule possible but unlikely.

attributed to the fact that the majority of South Africans were deprived of all these self-expression values during the apartheid regime (Mattes *et al.*, 2000:9-10). Additionally, South Africans' support for democracy is lukewarm, according to the public opinion polls administered by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA). Sixty percent of South Africans believe that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. They are likely to reject authoritarian rule and support liberal democracy. However, satisfaction with economic and political performance is on the decline (Mattes, 2002:29-31).

With reference to specific support, South Africans are increasingly becoming pessimistic about the political institutions. The July-August 2000 IDASA survey recorded the lowest level of trust in political institutions and officials' job performance (Mattes, 2002:31). Moreover, 38% would opt for an unelected leader (Mattes *et al.*, 2000:5). This could be attributed to the fact that attainment of materialistic wealth is increasingly becoming important to South Africans. This is so since people have a tendency to see democracy as an expedient for equalising social and economic outcomes, and that democratic procedures such as a Constitution and multiparty elections are merely official procedures that facilitate these outcomes (Mattes *et al.*, 2000:7-10). It is therefore not surprising that support for democracy has been modest in the country, since delivery of these social and economic outcomes or goods has been very slow (Mattes, 2002: 29-33). Therefore, against this background, the contention is that:

ANC supporters have a higher level of diffuse support than specific support.

This stems from the fact that specific support depends on one's satisfaction with certain benefits, as cited by the studies above. There is a growing apathy about the ability of the government to provide these benefits, especially with the perception that service delivery of socio-economic benefits is slow. Hence, there is declining trust in regime institutions and political officials.

1.7 Research Design and Methodology

The study is dependent on the use of three waves (1995, 2001 and 2006) of previously administered surveys, namely the World Values Survey (WVS),⁴² thus relying on the secondary data analysis. The decision to use three waves of the WVS in evaluating changing levels of support for democracy between 1995 and 2006 stems from the fact that South Africa

⁴² See <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org> for more details on the World Values Survey

became a democracy only in 1994, meaning that there are no appropriate items in the WVS to evaluate democracy in South Africa prior to this date. These waves would give a chronological assessment of support for democracy, highlighting trends and changes over time, thus making the research a longitudinal trend study. This study explores the changing levels of support for democracy amongst the ANC members and is thus an exploratory study.

Probability samples were drawn, making it theoretically probable to select anyone who is 16 years of age and older. The market research company, Markinor, was responsible for the collection of data by conducting face-to-face interviews with respondents, which is highly appropriate in South Africa, because of the low levels of literacy. Respondents were drawn from constructed homogenous sub-groups of the total population, thus meaning that the sample was stratified, improving the representativeness of the sample.⁴³

Support will be measured across specific and diffuse levels for democracy. Support for democracy is therefore the main variable that will be conceptualised and operationalised using Easton and Norris's theoretical framework. The unit of analysis is individual respondents. The focus, however, will be on those who maintain that they would vote for the ANC if elections were to be held. They are referred to as ANC supporters in the study. A potential criticism of the study is that maintaining that the ANC supporters are those that claim that they would vote for the ANC if elections are held is limiting. This limits supporters of the ANC, because some respondents may refuse to name, or be hesitant about naming, the party they would vote for. The respondents' decision to reveal this information might be highly dependent on who is administering the interview. This is so since respondents fear to be judged, especially given the fact that the majority of voters still identify with parties that historically represented their ethnicity or race. However, this does not render the study invalid, since research conducted in a form of face-to-face interviews is likely to encounter such problems.

The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), a computer program, will be used in re-analyses of data. This computer program is appropriate for this study, since it allows presentation of results with tabular and graphic output, making it easy to reveal facts and trends. The analysis will be both qualitative and quantitative.

⁴³ See <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org> for more details on the World Values Survey

1.7.1 Limitations and Delimitations

Longitudinal trend studies have both advantages and disadvantages. For instance, investigating specific and diffuse support for democracy over an extended period is of great importance. The results will highlight shifts in attitude and perceptions about democracy since democratisation. Moreover, trend studies are also useful during political changes in a country, because they help to make predictions based on the patterns observed. These advantages are, however, coupled with disadvantages such as finance and time constraints (Babbie and Mouton, 2003:93-95). The disadvantages, however, are insignificant in our case since this study relies on secondary data.

The use of secondary data analysis has its own limitations. The validity of the findings is questionable, since there is no assurance that the secondary information used is appropriate for this particular research. Secondly, questions in the surveys were not designed with this particular study in mind. Thirdly, separate survey waves are slightly different at times, posing operationalisation and methodology challenges. Fourthly, as Heaton (1998) argues, problems that might have occurred when the original (primary) data were collected are unknown. Lastly, some of the indicators had to be dropped from the study, since they are not present across all the waves of the WVS used in this study. However, an advantage is that there a lot of appropriate indicators for measuring political support across all three waves, thus rendering this limitation invalid. Moreover, the WVS has been used extensively to measure political support, and these past studies were helpful in providing a reference point for my study. The ability to deal with these limitations proves that problems are not insoluble; they just necessitate caution when conclusions are drawn.

1.8 Chapter Outline

The introduction to the study focused on the historical contextualisation and the questions principally addressed in the study. It further focused on the research design and methodology, as well as their limitations. Chapter 2 is concerned with the theoretical framework, conceptual context and the operationalisation of the phenomenon of political support. The focus of Chapter 3 is mainly graphic and descriptive presentation of findings. It builds upon Chapter 2 and highlight how indices were constructed. The strategy of inquiry provides a brief summary of the WVS, methodology used and demographic attributes of the sample. The last chapter summarises the findings and assesses them in order to infer possible implications. Recommendations for further research and concluding remarks are also made.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL CONTEXT, CONCEPTUALISATION & OPERATIONALISATION

2.1 Introduction

There is a decline in support for democracy in many developed Western democracies as citizens are progressively becoming critical of authority, institutions and democratic systems. This decline may be attributed to deteriorating trust in incumbents, as well as citizens who do not identify with political parties, let alone express confidence in them and their institutions. They tend to be dissatisfied with how democracy performs. National pride in the political community and support for democratic principles of government remain stable, but there is a declining trust in political actors, a declining confidence in regime institutions and a declining satisfaction with regime performance (Newton, 2006: 846).

This declining support for democracy is a concern for developing countries, since Western democracies are well established and serve as models for developing nations. Therefore, it is important to assess the following factors in South Africa's democracy, these being the level and type of support for democracy in the country. This will shed some light on how people feel about democracy and whether it is likely to consolidate. This is so because democracy in any country is unlikely to survive without the support of the majority (Miller, 1974a:951). This chapter will provide a theoretical framework for the study and conceptualisation of democracy. It also operationalises political support for democracy.

2.2 Theoretical Context

The first part of this section provides a theoretical framework and conceptual context for the concept of democracy. The second part of the section introduces the concept of support. The theoretical framework and conceptual analysis of both democracy and support are provided separately. This separation puts these concepts in a better position to be understood as a phenomenon of *support for democracy*, which is the primary concern of this study.

2.2.1 Democracy

A wave of democratisation is a wave of transition from an undemocratic rule to democratic one that took place in many countries all at once and in a specific period, i.e. having a cluster of countries democratising during a certain period. A wave typically consists of incomplete democratisations or liberations in political systems that are prone to resist full democratisation. Three waves of democratisation have transpired in the modern world (Huntington, 1991: 15), with the modern era constituting the third wave of democratisation.

This last wave was recorded between 1974 and the 1990s, when at least 30 countries made the transition to democracy (Huntington, 1996: 3). South Africa is part of the third wave of democratisation, since its transition from authoritarian rule to democracy took place in the early 1990s (Diamond *et al.*, 1995:1).

According to Huntington (1996:3), the modern world experienced its first wave of democratisation during the 1820s, with the second wave occurring during World War II. The first wave of democratisation saw at least 29 transitions from undemocratic to democratic rule, but was followed by a reverse wave that began in 1922. This reverse wave was triggered when Mussolini came to power in Italy, resulting in the collapse of 17 democracies and the reduction of democratic countries to 12 by 1942. This was, however, transformed when the democratisation of 36 countries occurred during the second wave of democratisation. Nonetheless, and like the first wave, the second wave was followed by a second reverse wave between 1960 and 1975, reducing the number of democracies to 30.

The above trajectory of democracy is important to note in a study of democracy, because it gives us a clear understanding of the current landscape of democracy. However, what is this democracy, how is it defined and what are its characteristics and shortcomings?

Although democracy, like most concepts in social science, is a highly disputed term (Bratton and Mattes, 2001b:451). The literature offers multi-dimensional definitions and no consensus has been reached with regard to an acceptable meaning of the concept (Bratton and Mattes, 2001b:451). But it is possible to summarise its main aspects where there is some consensus.

According to Heywood (2002:68), the concept of democracy dates back to ancient Greece, where it was derived from *demos* and *kratos*, with *demos* meaning the *people* and *kratos* meaning *power* or *rule*. Abraham Lincoln later defined it as “*government of the people, by the people, and for the people*” (Heywood, 2002:68). This suggests that there is some form of link between the government and the people. However, this is ambiguous as it is not clear who these people are, in what sense they should rule and to what degree this rule should extend. ‘The people’ are now accepted as all adult citizens or a “single, cohesive body, bound together by a common or collective interest ... in this sense people are one and indivisible” (Heywood, 2002: 69). These people are to rule through participation in any political form that will structure their lives. Their participation involves referendums, mass meetings and involvement in decision-making mechanisms. Voting is nevertheless the most common

instrument that people use to participate in democracy. The extent of the rule is highly dependent on the relationship between those who are governed and those who govern. Thus the common limits are based on a framework of laws within which individual affairs are conducted and private interests pursued. This indicates that democracy is commonly restricted to matters relating to the entire community rather than to private affairs (Heywood, 2002: 69-71).

There is no disputing the fact that the concept of democracy dates back to ancient Greek philosophers, as Heywood has stated.⁴⁴ However, according to Huntington (1991: 6), the modern use of the concept of democracy dates back to the eighteenth century, with three approaches to democratic studies emerging in the twentieth century. Firstly, democracy was defined as a basic power to govern. The second approach notes democracy in terms of the service delivery by the institution of government. According to Dalton *et al* (2007:144), this is defining democracy in accordance with outcomes that are achieved through democratic institutions. Finally, Huntington (1991:6) notes that democracy is defined in terms of procedures instigated for the government that rules the regime. The first two approaches raise problems of ambiguity. For instance, it is not clear what the basic power means, since people come to be seen as leaders through different ways, such as kinship, wealth, violence, education, appointment and so forth. I believe that this is a potential source of conflict within a ruling system in view of the fact that it is unclear who has the basic power to rule. For this reason, the definition of democracy that is based on governing procedures is widely employed.

The procedural⁴⁵ definition of democracy contains a number of measures that indicate to what extent a political system is democratised. These benchmarks include democratic principles such as effective citizen control over policy, responsible government, honest and open politics, equal participation and power, and civic virtues (Huntington, 1991: 8-9). Inglehart (2003:51) adds to this, maintaining that self-expression values or principles such as liberty, aspiration, tolerance of other groups, political participation, interpersonal trust, civil rights and well-being are crucial measures for democratic rule. According to Dalton *et al.* (2007), Larry Diamond (1999) argued that political liberties, equal rights for women, equality before the law and rights that extend all citizens are the four core self-expression values (Dalton *et*

⁴⁴ See also Fuchs, 2003: 3-4 and Robinson, 2004:1

⁴⁵ 'Procedural definition' means defining democracy in terms of the processes of government (Dalton *et al.*, 2007:143). This is based on the idea that decisions made by citizens are democratically legitimate simply because they are produced democratically by the masses participating in procedures of government (Brettscheider, 2006:262). In sum, procedural democracy is based on the will of the majority.

al., 2007:144). These values are of great importance and ought to be upheld by citizens, since they are the key conditions for a stable and enduring democracy (Ekman & Linde, 2004: 39).⁴⁶

Another important aspect of democracy is citizens' ability to vote for a leader during elections. This is, however, not without its own shortcomings. For one, leaders who are chosen through democratic rule offer no guarantee that they will rule in accordance with principles of democracy (Huntington, 1996:11-12). The above point made by Huntington is vital, especially given rapid globalisation, migration and changes to nature as a consequence of technological advancement.

Parry and Moran (1994: 10-11) note their own problems with democracy and democratisation. They maintain that numerous problems arise during democratisation, but three in particular have caught their attention. Firstly, they argue that conditions under which democratisation ought to take place in are not clear; it is unclear how a democratic political system should be created and sustained. Secondly, the practical realisation of democracy is problematic and often differs from the ideal democracy. Thirdly, democratisation is a challenge to those countries that are ready to democratise, since established democracies continue to experience highly complex and substantial political changes. This third shortcoming closely correlates with the fact that democracies are susceptible to collapse in the event of social or economic turmoil. These democracies, according to Diamond *et al.* (1995:9),⁴⁷ are more prone to collapse if the regime lacks legitimacy, i.e. if there is a widespread belief that the regime is not legal or lawful. For this reason, popular support for a democratic regime by those who are governed is crucial, if a regime is to achieve stability and remain so during economic, social or political chaos.

It is clear that the ambiguity of democracy is highly problematic, especially in the African context. As Ake (1996: 138) maintains, democracy is sometimes perceived in economic and instrumental terms, meaning that it is sometimes perceived as a matter of survival and social improvement of people's lives. In short, democracy is valued and supported in conjunction with what it has to offer (specific) as opposed to what it entails in principle (diffuse). Dalton *et al.* (2007:144), maintain that it is frequently argued that there is a connection between democracy and service delivery in developing countries as democracy is identified with

⁴⁶ See also Claassen & Mattes, 2007:1-3.

⁴⁷ See Also Miller, 1974:951; Mishler and Rose; 2001:303; and Dalton, 1988:229.

affluent and industrialised developed countries. The decision to support democracy is therefore likely to be driven by the desire to achieve the economic prosperity that is seemingly attached to the regime, as opposed to the appeal of the political values attached to having a democratic regime. Bratton and Mattes (2001b: 452), however, see a weakness in this argument. The argument is disputed on the grounds that people are complex and therefore their support for democracy cannot be driven by material accessibility and deprivation alone.

What does Ake mean, then, when arguing that democracy is valued and supported for what it has to offer as opposed to what it entails? Moreover, what does support mean and how is it related to democracy? These questions regarding support for democracy are crucial in this study and need to be contextualised as well, bringing us to the next part of this section.

2.2.2 Support

Easton (1965: 159 -61) divides support into two types - overt and covert support. Overt support is the observable support for democracy, which means an active and direct participation in a political system. This type of support includes taking part in demonstrations, signing of petitions, joining the army out of one's own free will and so forth. In contrast, covert support is indirect and inactive, and it is invested in the attitudes and sentiments that a person holds towards a political system. Covert support is not easily revealed, because it is constituted of a loyal frame of mind, patriotic feelings, dedication to a particular cause, and a moral sense as well as a form of ethical responsibility. In the abstract, overt support is showing support by active and direct actions of support for a goal, idea, cause, initiative or persons, while covert support is embodied in inactive attitudes and sentiments that a person holds towards a goal, idea, cause and so forth.

Thus, support is an act of promoting something, an interest or cause. Attitudes are of prime importance in understanding support. They should be favourable towards an interest or cause before support is declared, meaning that criticism or lack of support is a direct result of negative attitudes. Support is therefore based on attitudes that have been orientated to be favourable or unfavourable towards an object, in this case, political objects. It can be summarised as referring to "a way in which a person evaluatively orients himself to some object through either his attitude or his behaviour" (Easton (1975: 436).

Both these forms of support that Easton writes about are vital for democracy, since declining support for a political regime is likely to lead to its demise. It is, however, impossible to state

the precise level of support that a country needs to sustain a regime. This can be attributed to the fact that “the levels of popular support needed to sustain a democracy are both contingent and relative” (Mishler and Rose, 1999: 78). This brings us to the relationship between support and democracy.

2.2.3 Support for Democracy

Political support for democracy is a multidimensional phenomenon. David Easton contributed significantly to the study of support for democracy in 1965. Easton (1965, 1975) distinguishes between models and levels of support for democracy. His models include diffuse and specific support and his levels include the *political community, regime and political authorities*. The political community is a cultural entity, the regime consists of principles, procedures and formal institutions, and authorities are the officials occupying governmental posts (Klingemann, 1999:33).⁴⁸

Easton (1975) further linked the political system of government to its environment and identified two types of support, diffuse and specific support. Diffuse support is based on the *reservoir* of attitudes that help to sustain support for the regime in the event that demands are not met. Specific support, in contrast, is conditional and is based on the capabilities of the authorities to deliver outcomes (Easton, 1975: 436-446). In short, “Diffuse and specific support are two different modes of orientation with respect to the objects of the political system (authorities, regime and community)” (Fuchs, 1992:3).

Like any other conceptualisation and contextualisation, support for democracy is not without shortcomings. Kornberg and Clarke (1992:20) maintain that Easton’s formulation of specific and diffuse support generated numerous methodological, conceptual and theoretical criticisms. Kornberg and Clarke (1992) list the criticisms of Loewenberg (1971), Miller (1974a, 1974b), Citrin (1974), Rogowski (1974), Wright (1976) and Zimmerman (1979), among others.

Loewenberg (1971), quoted in Easton (1975:443), and Muller and Jukam (1977:1563)⁴⁹ argue that the distinction that Easton (1965) makes between specific and diffuse support poses a challenge when these types of support have to be measured. The argument is that there are close correlations between the indicators used to measure these types of support, resulting in

⁴⁸See also Norris, 1999: 9; Dalton, 1988: 228; Dalton, 2006:247-248; and Ekman and Linde, 2004:40.

⁴⁹ See also Zimmerman (1979), quoted in Kornberg and Clarke, 1992:20.

unstable results. For instance, including trust and legitimacy as dynamics of diffuse support is a contradiction, since they closely correlate with performance and output, meaning specific support. Trust is treated as an instrument of acquiring expected outputs, i.e. authorities are trusted to bring perceived outputs (Easton, 1975: 447).

Miller (1974) and Citrin (1974), quoted in Kornberg and Clarke (1992:20), add to this and argue that there is a close correlation between the perceptions people have about the authority and legitimacy they give to the regime, and it therefore difficult to separate the two when support for democracy is measured. This conceptual inconsistency results in confusion and ambiguity. However, Easton (1975:443) comes to his own defence and points out that “whether the best indicators have been devised is always a debatable point in the evolution of research”.

According to Fuchs (1992:4-5), the distinction that Easton (1975:444) makes about diffuse and specific support is not altogether convincing. The main difference between diffuse and specific support is that diffuse support does not have tangible outputs and performance of the authorities. There are, however, weaknesses that stem from this distinction. Specific support is applied to both incumbents and institutions. This raises problems since, according to Easton (1975) himself, both incumbents and institutions can be held accountable to the public (specific support). This is a contradiction, because institutions are treated as components of a regime while incumbents are the authority. However, Easton (1975:438) noticed this problem and attempted to treat incumbents and institutions as belonging to a similar level in his 1975 article. This further contradicted the analytical distinction that he frequently stressed between the incumbents and the institutions.

Fuchs (1992:4) maintains that the confusion that arises from distinguishing diffuse and specific support is not a result of indicators that are constructed inadequately, but rather the conceptual insufficiency of Easton’s distinction. For Fuchs, the problem arises when researchers fail to detach indicators of diffuse support from indicators of specific support. This argument is accepted, since the fact that indicators are not distinguished with ease means that the concepts were ambiguous and researchers are unable to grasp what concepts mean, and as a result were unable to say which indicators ought to be used to measure which model of support.

Furthermore, according to Rogowski (1974), quoted in Kornberg and Clarke (1992:20),⁵⁰ the main problem with specific support is the assumption that citizens are aware of the political situation and are able to make the connection between their demands and outputs from the political system, irrespective of a high degree of literacy and participation. This argument is, however, disputed by Easton in his 1975 article on the grounds that “even if it were to turn out that members are incapable of asserting demands and relating them to the outputs of the authority, this need not undermine the validity of the idea of specific support. Support of this type does not depend exclusively on the capacity of members to identify each output of policy action of individual authorities” (Easton, 1975:441).

Wright (1976), quoted in Kornberg and Clarke (1992:20), focuses on the theoretical use of diffuse support and disputes the fact that democratic regimes are prone to collapse in the absence of the much-needed diffuse support, since there is evidence that systems remain operational even in the absence of this type of support. I, however, argue that Wright (1976) might have a point, but that it does not take into account the fact that it is likely that a low level of diffuse support instead of specific support is a source of potential collapse of the democratic regime. This could be attributed to the fact that diffuse support is unconditional, whilst specific support is conditional.

For instance, as Easton (1965) notes, citizens entrust the government with the job of distributing scarce resources in order to meet demands; however, it is impossible to fulfil all these demands. This is because the government might have the means and resources to deliver services, but it becomes impossible to satisfy all the demands due to their variety and conflicting nature. This in turn means that not all citizens will be satisfied, resulting in low levels of specific support. In contrast, diffuse support plays an important role in fostering tolerance and acceptance of democratic procedures of government inherent in a political system. Therefore, diffuse support is a *reservoir* of support, with the ability to sustain support for political system even when public demands are not fulfilled. Specific support, on the other hand, is threatened since support is conditional, meaning that demands ought to be satisfied in exchange for support for democracy (Easton, 1965:273-276). Democracy will only prove unsustainable in the long run if there has been an absence of much-needed specific support over a long period, but is prone to collapse faster in the absence of much-needed diffuse support.

⁵⁰ See also Easton, 1975:438-439.

There seems to be a great deal of criticism against Easton's (1965, 1975) work on support for democracy, as illustrated by the above selection of authors on the subject. The methodological, conceptual and theoretical problems posed by Easton (1965, 1975) have prompted some scholars to seek alternatives to the study and conceptualisation of support for democracy. Fuchs (1992:6), for instance, proposed the replacement of diffuse and specific support with a taxonomy⁵¹ of support and a hypothesis of political support. Fuchs (1992), however, retained Easton's (1965, 1975) concepts of authorities, regime and political community, but replaced the distinction between specific and diffuse support with the idea of orientation towards an object, based on Parsons's (1951:581) use of objects. According to Fuchs (1992), Parsons (1951) argues that orientation to an object depends on the meaning that a person attaches to that object, i.e. what an object means to an individual. This orientation towards an object is explained by expressive, instrumental and the moral modes of evaluation (Fuchs, 1992:6).

Kornberg and Clarke (1992) dealt with the shortcomings in a way similar to that of Fuchs (1992). They maintained that political support should be understood and treated as an orientation towards both the object and political processes, as opposed to an object alone. In summary, they decided to deal with problems posed by Easton's elements and levels of support by focusing "*on what is supported and not whether it is specific and diffuse in nature*" (Kornberg and Clarke, 1992:21). Their main argument is that citizens' choice to support or reject a democracy draws on two sources, namely (1) socialisation and re-socialisation, and (2) citizens weighing up what they would lose and gain if they decide to be supportive, i.e. a cost-benefit calculation (Kornberg and Clarke, 1992: 20-21).

Muller and Jukam (1977) explored the distinction between incumbents and the regime in political support. This distinction is empirically essential. It explains political behaviour more clearly than if incumbents and the regime were treated as a single entity (Muller and Jukam, 1977:1589). The political system (regime), for instance, is more stable than incumbents are and its virtue is unlikely to be threatened by declining support for the political actors, as long as support for it is positive. However, a decline in support for a political system threatens the stability of the regime (Muller and Jukam, 1977:1564).

⁵¹Taxonomy means defining how support is formed or develops rather than differentiating what it is, and the hypothesis would explain how attitudes towards a political system are generated (Fuchs, 1992:6).

Other authors decided to compare support with other political concepts. Support is compared to concepts such as “political efficacy, trust, cynicism, alienation and legitimacy” (Kornberg and Clarke, 1992:20). Miller (1974a) argues that support is comparable to cynicism, meaning that support is comparable to the extent of pessimistic judgment of the government. The more that people are cynical about the government, the more they would not be supportive of it. This cynicism is closely tied to individual expectations and evaluation of whether their demands are processed and achieved in a desired way. Efficacy, on the other hand, means individual perceptions of whether their support will influence the running of government and bring about change or not (Miller, 1974a:952).

Norris (1999: 1 & 9-12), in a very important contribution to the debate, saw the need to expand on Easton’s (1965,1975) conceptual framework of support to form five levels of support as opposed to Easton’s three levels of support. Norris (1999) divided support into support for (1) Political Community, (2) Regime Principles, (3) Regime Performance, (4) Regime Institutions and (5) Political Actors. She did not modify Easton’s (1965, 1975) *Political Community*, but she expanded his *Regime* into *Regime Principles and Regime Performance* and called them diffuse support. She further modified Easton’s *Authorities* to *Regime Institutions and Political Actors* and called them specific support (Norris, 1995:9-11).⁵²

The five levels of support developed by Norris (1999) are essential for clearing the ambiguity and confusion that arose from Easton’s three levels of support (Norris, 1999:1). Failure by Easton to distinguish between these three levels or expand them resulted in inconsistency and confusion (Dalton, 1999:58-59), and dissimilar results as different indicators are used to measure the same indicator (Mishler and Rose, 2001:305-306). Thus, differentiating between the levels of support for democracy over time makes it easier to clearly highlight the divergent trends in support for democracy across these levels (Norris, 1999:13).

The use of a fivefold conceptual framework is effective, since factor analysis of longitudinal data suggests that citizens are capable of making the distinction between different levels of support for democracy (Norris, 1995:13) and that there is a growing perception of viewing democracy as an ideal form of government rather than how it functions in reality (Norris, 1999:9). For instance, Norris’s (1999) expansion of Easton’s *Regime* into two levels, namely *Regime Principles and Regime Performance*, is of great importance. Easton’s (1965,1975)

⁵² See also Ekman and Linde, 2004:41-43 and Claassen & Mattes, 2007:2.

regime is a basic form of government, i.e. a political system, but it fails to acknowledge that citizens might support the ideal form of democracy or regime principles without necessarily being supportive of how the regime performs in reality (Norris, 1999:9 and Mishler and Rose, 2001:303).⁵³ This phenomenon is called “Dissatisfied Democrats” (Dalton, 2006:260).⁵⁴ Moreover, Easton’s *Authorities* is comprised of officials of government. Nevertheless, who exactly are these *Authorities* – institutions or office-holders? This is ambiguous and for that reason Norris (1999) saw fit to clearly state that the level of *Authorities* is comprised of two distinct levels and therefore need to be divided into these two levels, namely the regime institutions and political actors. These levels are more appropriate, especially in the event of the public being critical of the police officers (political actors), but fully supportive of the police service, an institution they serve under (Norris, 1999:9).

It is quite clear that using the five levels of support is the best alternative for dealing with Easton’s shortcomings. Thus, Norris’s five levels of support and two models (diffuse and specific) of support will be used for the study. Norris’s (1999) five levels are used, since distinct levels of support for democracy help to predict likely changes that might occur in connection with a specific level. For instance, as Norris (1999:2) perceived, failure of democratic performance is likely to produce a negative perspective about democracy itself, i.e. democratic principles. This suggests that knowing the type of support on a particular level helps to understand how it is going to affect another level, further contributing to better explanations of the political behaviour and the support associated with it.

2.3 Conceptualisation: Diffuse and Specific Support

The previous section introduced the concepts of ‘democracy’, ‘support’ and ‘support for democracy’. This section will conceptualise⁵⁵ the two types of support, diffuse and specific support, primarily using the conceptualise framework provided in Figure 1.

2.3.1 Diffuse Support

Norris (1999:9-10) divided diffuse support for democracy into three levels, namely the political community, the regime principles and regime performance. Diffuse support is the more durable type of support, meaning that it is resistant to change as it becomes difficult to strengthen when it is weak and, conversely, difficult to weaken when strong. Moreover,


⁵³ See also Ekman and Linde, 2004:42.

⁵⁴ See also Klingemann, 1999:54.

⁵⁵ By conceptualisation, we mean analysing and clarifying or specifying the meaning of the concepts and variables to be investigated (Mouton, 2002:109, Babbie and Mouton, 2003:99).

diffuse support is not based on support for authorities, but rather on the type of political system governing the country (Easton, 1975: 444-445). Therefore, diffuse support for a political system consists of a *reservoir* of favourable attitudes that assist members of the political system to be tolerant to outputs of the regime regardless of whether it is satisfying their demands or not. In short, outputs are beneficial as performance may increase or decline while diffuse support continues. Therefore, it will not be easily removed because of dissatisfaction (Easton, 1975:444-445).⁵⁶

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



There are two main sources of diffuse support: socialisation (childhood socialisation and adult socialisation) and direct experience (Easton, 1975:446). Kornberg and Clarke (1992) called these socialisation and re-socialisation experiences (Kornberg and Clarke, 1992: 21). Socialisation means that whatever is learned during childhood is carried over to adulthood, and such socialisation has a bearing on the level of support (Easton, 1975: 446). It can further

⁵⁶ See also Ekman and Linde, 2004:41.

be conceptualised as “process by which values, cognitions and norms are learned, internalised and used to guides action” (Sigel and Hoskin, 1977:291).

Thus, established democracies benefit more from this type of support, since citizens have been socialised to support the regime since childhood. This is because support for the regime is often learned unconsciously, suggesting that it is learned or forced upon individuals during childhood. Despite the fact that these principles are learned, willingly or not, the individuals tend to believe that democracy is an ideal form of government and that there is no alternative regime suitable enough to be the authority of the country. This contrasts with citizens in the new democracies who were not socialised to support democracy since childhood, but were rather brought up in a different political order. The regime is therefore unfamiliar and thus susceptible to scepticism and questions from citizens in new democracies (Mishler and Rose, 1999:80).

However, it does not matter how well the process of preparing and socialising children to hold certain political positions is, since no form of socialisation is adequate enough to deal with the changing environment (Hyman, 1959: 46). The primary agent of socialisation, the family, plays a declining role in socialisation as children gradually develop with age. These children start to engage with other socialisation agents, such as social mobility, geographical mobility, rebellion and the attenuation of parental influence,⁵⁷ amongst others (Hyman, 1959:72-115). Thus, socialisation is a life-long process (Chaffee *et al*, 1977: 251).

To paraphrase Sigel and Hoskin (1977:189), socialisation is a never-ending process because the ever changing environment requires socialisation and re-socialisation of people to new political values and behaviours. This process is inevitable and occurs not because values, orientations and actions learned during childhood are rejected, but because they become irrelevant and inadequate for the adulthood functions and roles that have to be carried out. This is a form of an inevitable adjustment in the life-long process of socialisation. In short, “adult socialization occurs when adults want or are forced to learn new, different or additional ways of thinking, feeling and behaving politically in order to cope with new demands (Sigel and Hoskin, 1977: 189).

⁵⁷ The family, intra-family and parents’ correlations are the primary socialisation agents during childhood. Parents are likely transmitters of political attitudes. They are, however, not the only agents of such socialisation. Social mobility occurs when social structures influence political attitude (Prewitt, 1975: 109) and individuals have to deal with social groups and experiences different from their own parents. Geographical mobility occurs when the movement into higher strata than their parents have an influence on the children and they tend to break away from the political tradition of their parents. Rebellion and attenuation of parental influence means that, with growth, children tend to detach themselves from their parents/family and adopt complex political attitudes from other groups (Hyman, 1959:72-115).

In addition, the world is complex and it is inevitable that new issues will constantly emerge. Some of these issues would fit satisfactorily into socialisation or political ideological positions assumed earlier, but other issues would be completely new and would have to be dealt with without any prior preparation or socialisation. Children's socialisation, however, shapes how they would connect and deal with new issues that arise in a political scene when they are adults (Hyman, 1979:46).

Thus, in short, political orientation among adults originates from experiences and earlier stages of development (Hyman, 1959: 46), and gradual change with age (Prewitt, 1975: 108). However, those childhood political values persist throughout life and cannot be easily altered; in fact, they are likely to strengthen with time (Prewitt, 1975: 108). In the words of Hooghe (2004), "Primary socialization experiences tend to produce persistent effects, which are only marginally influenced by later socialization experiences" (Hooghe, 2004:334). In short, the orientation of children to adulthood is shaped by experience in childhood that leaves a mark and tends to influence, in part, adult patterns (Hyman, 1959:29).⁵⁸

Experience, on the other hand, rests on the fact that members of a political system do not support a political system based on what they learned from others, but rather from their own direct experience, which determines the level of satisfaction with the political system (Easton, 1975: 446). For instance, citizens are likely to be dissatisfied with a political regime if they have negative feelings attached to the type of regime governing the country. The assumption in the South African context is that those who were dissatisfied with the apartheid regime have now attached a negative feeling towards its past authoritarian rule.

Diffuse support is expressed through perceived legitimacy of the political system. This means that diffuse support is unlikely if citizens fail to accept and obey the political regime as well as abide by the rules of that regime. This type of support stems from the sentiments that citizens hold towards a regime and may be directed to the political community, regime principles and regime performance (Easton, 1975: 450-451).⁵⁹

As noted above, there are three levels of diffuse support, namely the political community, the regime principles and regime performance.

⁵⁸ See also Prewitt, 1975: 112.

⁵⁹ See also Dalton, 1999: 58.

2.3.1.1 The Political Community

According to Easton (1965), political community is the most elementary level of support. A political community is a populace, in a political system, “bound together by a political division of labour” (Easton, 1965:177).

This bond suggests a plurality of relations and linkages within the political system (Easton, 1965:177). This is essential since a need for some sort of attachment and cooperation before problems can be pursued in a collective manner. This cooperation takes place within clearly defined limits, such as social trust and civic engagement (Norris, 1999: 10-11).⁶⁰

There should be some form of linkages, as suggested before. These linkages are some attachment to a nation or anything that binds the nation together. This might be some form of nationalism or patriotism, belonging to a certain nationality, national identity and national pride. Common languages, common history, common geographic space, class, identity and religion support the linkages further (Norris, 1999:10-11; Ekman and Linde, 2004: 41).

It is unclear, however, who belongs to which category and what criteria are used to assign members to different categories. This stems from the fact that the political system has different levels, which are both dependent and independent, and may be explained in a form of a hierarchy. For instance, the international system is the highest level in the hierarchy and it is therefore independent. The continent is likely to be the next level in the hierarchy, followed by a region, then a state, a province, a municipality and voluntary organisations, making all of them dependent on the level above them. For instance, a province might be treated as a subsystem of a state and a state as a subsystem of a continent or region.

Easton (1965) must have perceived the kind of problem that can be raised by the ambiguity of who belongs where and how, thus suggesting that each system is to provide its own membership credentials. In terms of Easton’s idea (1965), these credentials might be based on legal procedures, kith and kin, acquaintances, political affiliation, geographic location and so forth. Furthermore, the scope of a political community varies according to the system level; it can be recognised in its local entity or international entity (Easton, 1965:179-181). Accordingly, this level of scope ought to be determined when dealing with political community because in South Africa, as in most countries, there is a vast heterogeneous community that is based on minority and majority status, a local community or municipalities

⁶⁰ See also Ekman and Linde, 2004:42, Dalton, 1988:227 and Dalton, 2006:248.

and the national category. However, this does not mean that citizens cannot belong to multiple levels. In fact, the entire human population belongs to more than one category.

As noted before, political community is the fundamental level of support and lack of development of this political system is likely to make the system vulnerable and might eventually lead to collapse (Easton, 1965:187) through revolution, civil war or the loss of democracy itself (Dalton, 1999:59).

2.3.1.2 Regime Principles

Regime principles are values and procedures that regulate the relationship between the governors and the governed. In short, they regulate political relationships within a system and this is done through laws that ought to be abided by. Procedures are a form of fostering a process of demands and outputs within the political system. These norms foster political behaviour and are a way of allowing authorities to implement policies. In short, regime principles are based on rules within the political system and citizens' acceptance of, and willingness to abide by, such rules (Easton, 1965:191-192).

These values can also be seen as democratic benchmarks. According to Norris (1999:11), these values include liberty, participation, tolerance, moderation, respect for legal institutions, civil rights and the rule of law (i.e. the constitution). Easton (1965:194-5) argues that these regime principles include the "will of the Volk, the general will" (Easton, 1965:195), popular consent and premises that guide action in a particular political system. Dalton *et al.* (2007:142) go a step further and maintain that people are increasingly starting to think of democracy in terms of self-expression values. These values are the main source of perceiving democracy as an ideal form of government.

Moreover, regime principles incorporate the preferences of citizens, i.e. democracy is an ideal form of government and it would, therefore, be supported unconditionally. Thus, indicators of regime principles include the approval of democracy as the "best form of government and a good way of governing" (Norris, 1999:17).⁶¹

2.3.1.3 Regime Performance

This is the third and last level of diffuse support. Ekman and Linde (2004:42) maintain that regime performance is the practical functioning of a regime, i.e. how democracy functions in

⁶¹ See also Ekman and Linde, 2004:42.

reality as opposed to the ideal form of democracy. Regime performance is the execution of the regime, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the regime itself. Regime performance can be measured using an indicator that evaluates how satisfied the citizens are with democratic performance and comparative measurement of the old and the new regime, rather than comparing the new with the ideal regime or democracy (Norris, 1999: 11). According to my interpretation, this suggests that it is desirable to have a comparative basis so that the current regime can be assessed in comparison to the past regime. For instance, South Africa's democracy can be compared to the authoritarian rule of the past and evaluated in terms of whether the apartheid regime worked better in practice as compared to the current form of democracy. Mishler and Rose (1999:79) might have had the same thoughts in mind when they argued that regime performance is crucial in new regimes, since regimes are evaluated on their performance and the satisfaction they bring or do not bring.

It is therefore important to assess the level or type of support in South Africa, since citizens' satisfaction or dissatisfaction with it might lead to the collapse of the regime. As Ekman and Linde (2004:41) point out, widespread dissatisfaction with political systems are likely to wear down support.

There are some benchmarks that citizens might use to assess the performance of the new regime. Citizens are likely to approve of regime performance and support it if they perceive the regime as free and fair, stable and durable, as respecting and protecting their interests and civil liberties, as well as in terms of policy (Newton, 2006: 847).

2.3.2 Specific Support

Specific support is the more naturally accepted concept. It is based on the government's ability to fulfil specific and immediate demands and wants of the populace. This specific support is narrow and directed at the authorities, i.e. the regime institutions and political actors of the regime, since they are the ones who fulfil the needs and demands of the population. Moreover, they are the ones who are generally concerned with carrying out specific policies (Easton, 1965: 268).

This assumes that citizens, whether correct or not, are able to place responsibility for the running of political systems in the hands of the authorities and hold them accountable for their actions. Hence they are able to associate their perceived demands with the deliverables by the authorities and in the process attribute blame to authorities if these demands are not met. The

demands might be anticipated or perceived decisions, policies, actions or the general leadership style of authorities and so forth (Easton, 1975, 438-439).⁶²

The political authorities are evaluated on what they do and how they do it (Easton, 1975:437). It is, however, possible for members of the political system to oppose political actors but retain respect for regime institutions (office). Accordingly, specific support is based on the perceived outcomes such as the policies, actions, reforms and leadership style of the authorities (Dalton, 2006:248). In short, “specific support is object-specific” (Easton, 1975: 437). In the words of Dalton (2006, 1988), “It is object-specific in two senses. Firstly, it normally applies to evaluation of political authorities; it is less relevant to support for the regime and the political community. Second, specific support is based on the actual policies and governing style of political authorities” (Dalton, 2006:248 and Dalton, 1988:228).

2.3.2.1 Regime Institutions

Regime institutions constitute the fourth level of support and the first of the two levels of specific support. This level evaluates the roles of the institutions in a political system; they are important since they are directly involved in satisfying public demands. Such institutions may include parliament, the executive, the state bureaucracy, military, independent judiciary, etc. This means that government institutions are distinguished from incumbents; however, this can be difficult to do in practice. For instance, regime institution is concerned with the constitutional functions of the presidency rather than the president (Norris, 1999:11).⁶³

These institutions, however, need not be seen in holistic terms. Lack of confidence in the parliament does not equate to lack of confidence, for instance, in the bureaucracy or the courts (Ekman & Linde, 2004:42). However impractical one deems this in analysis of the data, institutions might be evaluated separately, but the conclusion ought to be based on the number of institutions assessed in holistic way.

2.3.2.2 Political Actors

Norris’s (1999:9) *Political Actors* are similar to Easton’s (1965) *Authorities*, but exclude the *Regime Institutions* that these *Political Actors* function within. Political actors are the last level of support and it is based on support for the incumbents or office-holders. Political actors are current public officials or office-holders such as legislators, judges, administrators,

⁶² See also Diamond and Plattner, 1996: xi.

⁶³ See also Ekman and Linde, 2004:42).

clerks, police officers, chief executives and so forth (Dalton, 1999: 59). Norris (1999:12) includes politicians, prime ministers and the president.

This level of support is important, since these political actors are a link between the government structures and the populace, and their accessibility is important to the public. Nevertheless, they are the ones mostly attacked by critics. Despite all the criticisms, political actors are of great importance, since demands would not be acknowledged and satisfied, if there were no form of correspondence between the public and political actors (Easton, 1975:438). Members of a political system may criticise political actors because of their policies, or dissatisfaction with life in general. This might, as a result, create opportunities for ejecting these political actors from office, leading to fundamental social and political change (Easton, 1975: 436).

In summary, diffuse support is support that is based on the political system or the regime governing the country, i.e. democracy, while specific support is based on evaluating the current administrators of the regime, i.e. evaluating the performance of those who are hired or elected to serve the democratic regime. As Norris (1999:12) explains, diffuse support is the support for the system as a whole, and specific support is support for the current office-holders. Furthermore, in the words of Dalton (1988: 229), “A stable and well functioning democratic polity normally presumes a supportive public. Specific political support is important for the maintenance of the present government, diffuse support is essential for the maintenance of the political system”.

Bratton and Mattes (2001*b*: 448) define these types of support for democracy as intrinsic and instrumental. Intrinsic support is based on what Norris (1999:9) terms regime principles, i.e. political freedom and equal rights. This is the type of support for democracy for *better or worse* and has the forbearance of remaining firm even in the face of dissatisfaction. It is therefore closely linked to diffuse support. Instrumental support, on the other hand, is based on conditions of receiving benefits in order to rectify material inequalities (Bratton and Mattes, 2001*b*:448), and can be closely linked to what Norris (1999:9) and Easton (1975:436-446) define as specific support. These definitions by Bratton and Mattes (2001*b*: 448) suggest that specific support for democracy is closely related to economic welfare. A high level of specific support, rather than diffuse support would pose a challenge in the South African context. This is so, since the majority of the population is relatively poor and the country has

one of the world's largest Gini Coefficients.⁶⁴ This means that having a higher level of specific support is problematic, since it is conditional and the government is not in a position to meet these conditions. This would consistently lead to dissatisfaction and low levels of support for democracy in general.

2.4 Operationalisation: Diffuse and Specific Support

The operationalisation⁶⁵ of the concept of support for democracy mentioned in the preceding section is dependent on the World Value Surveys (WVS). This study uses three waves (1995, 2001 and 2006) of the South African leg of the WVS to measure support for democracy. The use of the three waves of the WVS permits a comparative and analytical assessment of the five levels of diffuse and specific support for democracy. There is, however, a limitation to the use of the WVS. Some of the seemingly significant indicators for the study are not available across all three waves of the WVS. This is a challenge to a substantive comparison, which requires the use of similar indicators across all three waves. The shortcomings of using the WVS do not render the measurement of political support impossible, however. Operationalisation or measurements to be used in this study are summarised in Table 3.

2.4.1 Diffuse Support⁶⁶

2.4.1.1 Political Community

Political community is based on a certain attachment to the nation and the indicators used to measure it focus on national identity and pride, as well as patriotism. One indicator to be used in the study evaluates the will to serve one's own country in military service, and the second indicator evaluates pride in the country.

The questions were asked as follows:

- *“Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country”*
 - The item was coded as “yes”, “no” and “don't know”
- *“How proud are you to be South African?”*
 - The item was coded as “very proud”, “quite proud”, “not very proud”, “not at all proud”, “I am not South African” and “don't know”

⁶⁴ A Gini Coefficient is a measure of income inequality within a population shown by a Lorenz curve, ranging from zero if incomes within a population are distributed perfectly equally. The Gini Coefficient is one if income is distributed unequally, i.e. perfect inequality (Mohr, 2000: 113).

⁶⁵ By operationalisation we mean the method that will be used to measure the concepts and variables being studied, i.e. the measurement techniques or operations. A measurement instrument used in this study to measure the phenomenon of support for democracy is a questionnaire/survey (Mouton, 2002: 66).

⁶⁶ Operationalisation of diffuse support for democracy is based on Klingeman's work (1999: 38).

2.4.1.2 Regime Principles

Regime principles closely correlate to legitimacy of the regime itself, thus making it crucial to ask the respondents about what they perceive to be the most appropriate form of government for their country (Ekman and Linde, 2004:43). In short, support for regime principles determines the acceptance of a type of regime governing the country, and how important it is to the public.

The following questions were used to measure whether democracy is supported as an ideal form of government or not:

- *“I’m going to describe various types of political system and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. Having a democratic political system”*⁶⁷
 - The item was coded as “very good”, “fairly good”, “fairly bad” or “very bad”
- *“Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government”*⁶⁸
 - The item was coded as “strongly agree”, “agree”, “disagree”, “strongly disagree” and “don’t know”

2.4.1.3 Regime Performance

A more substantive indicator of support for the regime performance ought to evaluate satisfaction with the past, present and future regime. Regime performance may also include evaluating performance of the institutions and actors, i.e. satisfaction and confidence in them.

The following questions are used to measure regime performance:

- *“People have different views about the system for governing this country, here is a scale for rating how well things are going, on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 means very bad and 10 means very good. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?”*⁶⁹
- *“How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country’s affairs?”*

⁶⁷ Other items which are not included in this study asked respondents to give their opinions on: *Having the army rule, Having a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections, Having experts rather than government making decisions according to what they think is best for the country.* These items are excluded because they do not measure democratic principles.

⁶⁸ Other items in battery are: *“In democracy, the economy runs badly, Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling, and Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order”* These items are appropriate for the measurement of support for regime performance, but they could not be used since they are unavailable in the 2006 wave of the WVS.

⁶⁹ Other indicators that are not included, but formed part of the battery are: *Where on this scale would you put the political system as it was under apartheid regime and Where on this scale would you put the political system as you expect it will be ten years from now?* The first indicator is not used because people tend to be subjective when answering such questions because of the history of the country, thus the decision to exclude this question. The question, however, has the potential to offer a comparative evaluation of the past regime to the current one. But the risk of having subjective answers is high and might not reflect the true feelings that people might have about the apartheid regime as compared to the current regime. The last item is not used because it is not present in the 2001 leg of the WVS.

- The items were coded as “*very satisfied*”, “*fairly satisfied*”, “*fairly dissatisfied*” and “*very dissatisfied*”.
- “*How much confidence to you have in 1) the South African Government and 2) the Parliament?*”
 - The item was coded as “*a great deal*”, “*quite a lot*”, “*not very much*” and “*none at all*”

2.4.2 Specific Support

2.4.2.1 Regime Institutions

Countries consist of different types of institutions – private institutions, public institutions and so forth. Regime institution is taken to mean public or institutions of democracy, i.e. institutions that are concerned with the management of government.

The following item asked the respondents how much confidence they have in a list of organisations provided. The question is as follows:

- “*How much confidence do you have in the following organisations? The armed forces, the police, the Parliament, the civil service, and the courts?*”⁷⁰
 - The item was coded as “*a great deal*”, “*quite a lot*”, “*not very much*” and “*none at all*”

2.4.2.2 Political Actors

The level of political actors is concerned with evaluating the office-holders. That is the trust that citizens place in them. Thus, the most appropriate measure of support for political actors was asking respondents to indicate the level of trust they place in their authorities.

For the purpose of this study, political parties are treated as political actors rather than institutions. Measuring political parties as actors rather than institutions seems to be valid only on the condition that political parties are viewed as single entities rather than as a whole. This means that political parties are treated as separate from each other, that is, the African National Congress (ANC), Democratic Alliance (DA) and so forth. These parties are, for instance office-holders, since they are political actors in government. They are represented in parliament as opposed to those political parties that do not have enough votes to be represented in parliament. This is permissible, as Dalton (1988:225) argues; citizens

⁷⁰ Respondents were given a list of 20 institutions from which a factor analysis compiled a “state institutions” factor where these five institutions are factored together. The Alpha scores for each year are as follows: 1995 – 0.771; 2001 – 0.737; 2006 – 0.799.

progressively support parties based on their performance in government. The argument suggests that support is conditional and depends on the outputs of the party, as opposed to party attachment. Moreover, Dalton (1988) argues that “assessing confidence in social and political institutions might be interpreted as evaluation of the present leadership of these institutions” (Dalton, 1988:236).

The indicators that are used to measure support for the political actors read as follows:

- *“How much confidence do you have in political parties?”*
 - The item was coded as *“a great deal”*, *“quite a lot”*, *“not very much”* and *“none at all”*
- *“How much confidence do you have in the President?”*
 - The item was coded as *“a great deal”*, *“quite a lot”*, *“not very much”* and *“none at all”*

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter addressed the most fundamental and important aspects of this thesis, i.e. the theoretical context, the concept and the measurement of support for democracy. Understanding the theoretical background of support for democracy is of great importance in clarifying what support for democracy is. The justifications and criticisms of different approaches to political support provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon and explain why Norris’s fivefold conceptual framework is used in the study. The conceptualisation and operationalisation laid a fundamental foundation for the study, leading to the next chapter, which will be concerned with data presentation, analysis and interpretation.

The next chapter deals with data presentation, measurement and the findings of the study. The chapter outlines a strategy of inquiry for the study, i.e. it provides an overview of the WVS and the methodology it uses, further clarifying the composition of the samples to be used in the measurement of support for democracy. It further presents the findings graphically and descriptively, as well as suggesting possible explanations of the changing trends of support.

Table 2: Operationalisation of Support for Democracy

TYPE	LEVEL	INDICATOR
DIFFUSE	POLITICAL COMMUNITY	<p>1) “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country” and the item was coded as “yes, no and don’t know”.</p> <p>2) “How proud are you to be South African?” are you “very proud, quite proud, not very proud, not at all proud, I am not South African and don’t know”</p>
	REGIME PRINCIPLES	<p>1) “I’m going to describe various types of political system and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each, would you say that it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?”-Having a democratic rule.</p> <p>2) “I m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly”-Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government”.</p>
	REGIME PERFORMANCE	<p>1) “People have different views about the system for governing this country, here is a scale for rating how well things are going, on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 means very bad and 10 means very good”-Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?</p> <p>2) “How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country’s affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied, very dissatisfied”</p> <p>3) “How much confidence to you have in the organisations listed above?: Do you have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, no confidence or don’t you know”: in the following institutions” The South African Government (Government in Pretoria), -The Parliament</p>
SPECIFIC	REGIME INSTITUTIONS	<p>“How much confidence to you have in the organisations listed above?: Do you have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, no confidence or don’t you know”: in the following institutions”, -The Armed Force, -The Police, -The Parliament, -The Civil Service and the -The Court</p>
	POLITICAL ACTORS	<p>1) “How much confidence do you have in political parties; is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or not at all?”</p> <p>2) “How much confidence do you have in “the president”; is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or not at all”</p>

CHAPTER THREE: DATA, MEASUREMENT, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter builds upon the theoretical contextualisation discussed in the previous chapter and makes use of the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the discussed concepts in order to measure the changes, if any, in both specific and diffuse support for democracy amongst ANC supporters. The chapter starts by providing a brief overview of the World Values Survey (WVS) – the main data source of this study – the methodology employed, as well as some of the main demographic attributes of the samples.

The second section of the chapter presents the data graphically and describes the findings of the study. More specifically, this section describes how the indices for diffuse and specific support were constructed and it measures longitudinal support for democracy amongst the ANC supporters in comparison to non-supporters of the ANC across the five levels of support for democracy. These include political community, regime principles and regime performance, which are the three levels of diffuse support, and regime institutions and regime actors, which are the two levels of specific support. It further measures support for democracy amongst ANC supporters and then compares and contrasts the changing levels of support for democracy amongst ANC and non-ANC supporters.

The last section of the chapter will attempt to explain the changing trends in support for democracy by using two explaining or independent variables,⁷¹ namely the age and the levels of education amongst ANC supporters.

3.2 Strategy of Inquiry

This section provides a background to the World Values Survey, an overview of the methodology used as well as some of the demographic attributes that are deemed essential for the study.

3.2.1 World Values Survey

This study is dependent on the data collected from the World Values Survey (WVS). The global WVS initiative currently covers over 80% of the world's population and has provided an invaluable resource to assess social and cultural change around the globe since 1981. The

⁷¹ An independent variable is “the assumed cause” (De Vaus, 1996: 27-28), meaning that it is the variable that caused something to happen.

WVS primarily investigates, but is not limited to, socio-cultural and political changes, as well as the examination of values relating to gender, family, work, politics, economics, religion and leisure time. Implementation of this research around the world allows for global cross-cultural analysis.⁷²

The Centre for International and Comparative Politics (CICP) at the University of Stellenbosch, in partnership with IPSOS-Markinor, administered the South African waves of the WVS. In South Africa the WVS was conducted in 1981, 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2006, offering the opportunity to assess changing values over this period.

This study makes use of the 1995, 2001 and 2006 South African waves of the WVS. The choice to use the last three waves was based on the fact that South Africa became a democracy only in 1994.

3.2.2 Methodology

For all three waves probability samples⁷³ were drawn from the South African population 16 years and older and they included all adults living in residential homes in South Africa. Squatters were included in the sample; however, domestic workers and hostel dwellers were excluded from the study. The surveys also made use of stratified samples⁷⁴ drawn from homogeneously constructed sub-groups, defined by province, gender, population group and community size of the total population.

The sample was representative of both the urban and the rural areas. The distribution of the sample was roughly 60% for metropolitan areas, i.e. large cities with a population of more than 250 000 and 40% for non-metropolitan areas, i.e. small cities, large and small towns, villages and rural areas. The urban sample included populations greater than 500, while the rural sample included populations of less than 500 residents.

Finally, the sample was statistically weighted to represent the universe. The representativeness of the samples is within a statistical margin of error of less than 2% at 95%

⁷² For more information, see <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>.

⁷³ A probability sample is a sample that is selected in such a way that sets of elements from a population accurately correlate with the total population from which the sample was selected from. This involves random selection, giving each element an equal opportunity of participate in the study (Babbie and Mouton, 2003: 175; and Rudas, 2004: 1).

⁷⁴ A stratified sample involves the process of stratification, i.e. grouping units composing a population into identical groups or strata so that the sample can be representative of the total population and decrease the probability of sample error. For instance, Female/Male is 50/50 (Babbie and Mouton, 2003: 191).

confidence level⁷⁵ and weighted to the full population. Thus, all the samples are representative of the adult population of South Africa.⁷⁶

The sample sizes (N) for the three waves were as follows:

- 2899 respondents in 1995
- 3000 respondents in 2001
- 3000 respondents in 2006.

IPSOS-Markinor administered all three waves of the WVS by means of face-to-face interviews, and the questionnaires were translated into English, Afrikaans, Zulu, Sotho, Tswana and Xhosa.

There is consistency in the sampling procedures and mode of data collection throughout the waves of the surveys. Moreover, all the samples were subjected to a standard form of sampling instructions with the aim of ensuring uniformity.

The quality of the data is commendable since the WVS is conducted by social scientists from leading research universities throughout the world, covering at least 90 percent of the world's population. Moreover, the collectors of the data are highly trained professionals and agencies dealing solely with survey-based research.

The coder's work is also back-checked to ensure consistency in interpretations, whilst any errors that emerge are corrected automatically and individually. The surveys are pre-tested (piloted) and country specific questions are included in the survey. The supporting documentation of the surveys provides extensive information about variables, labels, question text, categories, as well as equivalent name in the different wave (World Value Surveys, 2008).

3.2.3 Some Demographic Attributes of the Sample⁷⁷

It is important for a sample to be demographically representative of the total population. This embodies all aspects of the diverse South African populations and cultures, and also

⁷⁵ Statistical margin of error is the degree of error that occurred when sampling. This is closely linked to "p" value, meaning the probability value. The probability value should be less than 0.05.

⁷⁶ The sampling procedures were gleaned from the statistical report provided by Markinor.

⁷⁷ It is important to note that the sole use of demographic attributes to measure support for democracy is rather limited. However, we should also bear in mind that the WVS was not constructed with the aim of measuring political support. I felt, however, that party support is a basic political variable needed to evaluate political support since the study is based on party supporters

minimises bias. Moreover, demographics shape attitude and political orientation, hence they are useful in understand and interpreting the findings of the study and its implications. The following section will look at some of the main demographic attributes of all three samples as well as the ANC supporters within those samples by means of population group, gender, language and level of education.⁷⁸

3.2.3.1 Population group

The breakdown of the population groups⁷⁹ between 1995 and 2006 remained fairly constant. The majority of the respondents were black in both the entire sample and amongst ANC supporters. Whites represent the second biggest population group in South Africa (whilst also comprising one third of the country’s minority population groups); however, they remain marginal amongst ANC supporters. Coloureds and Indians represent the other two minority population groups in South Africa and also remain marginal amongst ANC supporters.

Table 3: Population Group of Entire Sample and ANC Supporters in percentages

Population Group: 1995, 2001 and 2006						
	1995		2001		2006	
	Sample	ANC	Sample	ANC	Sample	ANC
Black	73.3	93.7	72.5	94.4	80.3	95.2
White	15.8	0.7	13.7	0.2	10.8	0.9
Coloured	8.4	4.2	10.4	4.4	6.9	3.4
Indian	2.6	1.4	3.5	1	2	0.6

The ANC was instrumental as the liberation movement during the apartheid period and as such drew a lot of support from the black population. In many cases it is regarded as a party of great historical significance for the black population. Thus, and not surprisingly, the ANC draws the majority of its support from the black population – in fact, Table 3 shows that support amongst the black population for the ANC has increased steadily from 1995 to 2001 as well as from 2001 to 2006.

3.2.3.2 Gender

Just like the population group demographic, the gender⁸⁰ split between the samples and ANC supporters is very similar. In 1995 the gender split of the entire sample and that of ANC supporters was almost identical. In 2001 there were slightly more males than females in the

⁷⁸ All the demographic attributes of the entire sample used in this study are weighted.

⁷⁹ Respondents’ ethnic groups were coded by observation. The categories were: Black, White, Coloured and Indian.

⁸⁰ Gender was stratified as a 50/50 split in all the surveys and the gender of the respondents was coded by observation.

entire sample, but a near 50/50 gender split among ANC supporters. There was an equal gender split in the sample of 2006, which was closely paralleled by the ANC supporters.

Table 4: Gender Distribution of Entire Sample and the ANC Supporters in percentages

Gender Distribution: 1995, 2001 and 2006						
Gender	1995		2001		2006	
	Sample	ANC	Sample	ANC	Sample	ANC
Male	47.6	47.3	52.0	49.8	50.0	50.2
Female	52.4	52.7	48.0	50.2	50.0	49.8

3.2.3.3 Language

The diversity of the South African population led to the coining of the phrase “rainbow nation” and, with the recognition of eleven official languages⁸¹ in the Constitution, the language situation is no different. It is expected that the mother tongue of most respondents, from both the entire sample and within the ANC supporters, will be indigenous South African languages, seeing that the black population is the “majority” population group within the samples as well as amongst the ANC supporters.

The three most widely spoken languages in the sample in 1995 are, in rank order, Zulu, Xhosa and Afrikaans. In 2001 the most widely spoken languages were Zulu, Afrikaans and English, whilst in 2006 it reverted to Zulu, Xhosa and Afrikaans.

Table 5: Language Distribution of Entire Sample and ANC Supporters in percentages

Language Distribution: 1995, 2001 and 2006						
	1995		2001		2006	
	Sample	ANC	Sample	ANC	Sample	ANC
English	10.7	2.5	12.4	2.6	10.0	2.9
Afrikaans	16.0	4.1	15.3	3.5	11.0	3.4
Zulu	23.2	22.4	25.0	30.7	25.0	22.2
Xhosa	16.8	26.6	10.5	14.6	17.8	24.4
North Sotho/ Pedi	8.6	12.4	7.8	9.9	9.5	12.5
South Sotho/ Sesotho	6.5	8.5	12.0	14.2	8.0	10.2
Tswana	10.1	13.3	11.4	16.2	9.2	12.0
Tsonga/ Shangaan	3.5	4.3	1.6	2.0	3.7	4.6
Venda	1.1	1.5	2.4	4.0	2.5	3.5
Swazi	1.9	2.5	0.6	0.9	1.9	2.4
Ndebele	1.3	1.8	0.8	1.2	1.0	1.4
Other	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.4

⁸¹ The item used to measure the language of the respondents asked them: *What language do you mainly speak at home?* And the response categories were: *English, Afrikaans, Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, South Sotho/Sesotho, North Sotho/ Sepedi, Venda, Tsonga/Shangaan, Ndebele, Swazi, Indian language and others.* The Indian language was not included in the 2001 and 2006 sample, while the “other European language” was included in the 1995 sample of the entire population.

The most widely spoken languages amongst the ANC supporters in 1995 were, in rank order, Xhosa, Zulu and Tswana. The same three applied in 2001 but in a different order, namely Zulu, Tswana and Xhosa, whilst in 2006 they were Xhosa, Zulu and Pedi, followed by Tswana. It seems, therefore, that the most widely spoken languages amongst the ANC supporters are Xhosa, Zulu and Tswana, and that the languages spoken amongst ANC supporters have remained fairly constant throughout the years.

There is a correlation between the most widely spoken languages in both the samples and amongst the ANC supporters. Zulu and Xhosa appear to be the most widely spoken languages in South Africa and amongst ANC supporters. Although Afrikaans and English appear to be spoken widely across the population, they are relatively marginal amongst ANC supporters.

3.2.3.4 Level of Education

The levels of education⁸² for the entire samples show some degree of variance from 1995 to 2006. In 1995 just less than half of the respondents had some, or completed, high school education, whilst just less than a third had some, or completed, primary school education. In 2001 and 2006 however, the majority of respondents had either some, or completed, high school education.

The levels of education amongst the ANC supporters appear to parallel that of the entire sample across all three surveys: just less than half of ANC supporters had either some, or completed, high school education in 1995, whilst little more than a third had some, or completed, primary school education. Similar to that of the whole series of samples, the majority of ANC supporters had some, or completed, high school education in 2001 and 2006.

Table 6: Levels of Education of the Entire Sample and the ANC Supporters in percentages

Levels of Education: 1995, 2001 and 2006						
Education	1995		2001		2006	
	Sample	ANC	Sample	ANC	Sample	ANC
No Schooling	11.0	13.4	3.0	2.6	8.0	8.7
Primary School ⁸³	30.5	36.1	16.8	21.0	10.3	23.6
High School ⁸⁴	48.8	45.9	63.1	61.0	58.8	60.1
Post-Matric	10.7	4.5	17.1	13.9	12.5	7.4

⁸² The item used to measure the level of education of the respondents asked: *What is the highest level of education attained?*

⁸³ Primary school is recoded from “some primary school” and “primary school completed”.

⁸⁴ High School is recoded from “some high school/high school incomplete” and “high school completed/matric”.

⁸⁵ Post-Matric Qualifications were recoded from “*artisan’s certificate, secretarial, technical/technikon diploma/degree completed, some university/without degree, university degree completed, professional, postgraduate and other post-matric*”.

One notable change in the levels of education amongst the ANC supporters is that there was a substantial increase (of 15.1%) in the number of respondents who had some/completed high school education from 1995 to 2001. This increase might be attributed to the increase in education expenditure, redistribution of teaching resources and investment in infrastructure, whereby R1.3 billion was allocated for construction and repairing of schools through the national school-building project of 1994-1996 (Van der Berg and Burger, 2005:214-215). Furthermore, the government introduced programmes in 1998 which aimed at improving the quality and relevance of provision of students from Grade 10 to the matric year (Ministry of Education, 1998:15).

Another interesting observation is found when one compares the highest and lowest levels of education amongst the samples and that of ANC supporters. The number of ANC supporters with post-matric qualifications is consistently lower than the samples as a whole; whilst the number of ANC supporters who have no formal schooling at all is slightly higher (with the exception of 2001) than the whole series of samples between 1995 and 2006.

In summary, ANC supporters have slightly lower levels of education than the samples; however, there has been a marked increase since 1995. Any incongruence in the levels of education can easily be attributed to the legacy of apartheid and the high levels of poverty.

3.2.3.5 Party Support

Party support⁸⁶ in South Africa is dominated by the ANC, which, as suggested in the first chapter, has not only managed to maintain power with every national election since 1994, but has done so with an increasing majority.

The majority of the votes received by the ANC in every national election, especially in comparison to opposition parties, suggest that South Africa is a one-party-dominant state. This dominance is also reflected in the WVS of 1995, 2001 and 2006. South Africa can be regarded as a one-party-dominant state, according to Friedman (1999) and Giliomee and

⁸⁶ The item used to measure party support asked the respondents: *If there are national elections tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote?* And the response categories were: *ANC (African National Congress), AZAPO (Azanian People's Organisation), CP (Conservative Party), FF (Freedom Front), IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party), NP (National Party), PAC (Pan African Congress), SACP (South African Communist Party), CRM (Coloured Resistance Movement), ACDP (African Christian Democratic Party)*. The 2001 sample included AMP (African Muslim Party), AEB (Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging), DA/DP (Democratic Alliance/Party), MF (Minority Front), UCDP (United Christian Democratic Party) and UDM (United Democratic Front) to the list and excluded CRM, CP and NP. The 2006 sample included NLP (New Labour Party), NNP (New National Party), NA (Nasionale Aksie) and ID (Independent Democrats) and excluded CP and AEB.

Simkins (1999), because the ANC is developing or it has already developed into a dominant party. It has managed to shape and dominate government and power, consequently shaping the public agenda; it has had overwhelming electoral dominance for an interrupted and prolonged period from 1994-2004 (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999: xvi). The country has had regular and open electoral contests, with the opposition being able to organise freely; it came to power through an electoral victory; it is identified with the epoch and is seen as a natural part of government, especially by previously oppressed Africans (Friedman, 99-100). Moreover, it is dominant because it is unlikely that it could lose national and perhaps provincial elections in the near future (Southall, 2001:5).

This brings us to another interesting analysis, i.e. comparing party votes during the national elections and party support in the WVS. Similar to the outcome of the past three national elections, the majority of respondents from the WVS from 1995 to 2006 indicated that they would vote for the ANC, if national elections were to be held tomorrow.

Table 7: Comparing Percentages between the National Elections and the World Values Survey

PARTIES	1994 Election	1995 WVS	1999 Election	2001 WVS	2004 Election	2006 WVS
ANC	62.2	59.9	66.3	59.8	69.6	67.2
NP/NNP	20.4	13.9	6.8	--	1.7	0.7
IFP	10.5	3.2	8.5	1.8	6.9	4.5
FF	2.1	1.7	0.8	0.5	0.8	0.3
DP/DA	1.7	2.6	9.5	16.3	12.3	8.4
PAC	1.2	1.1	0.7	1.5	0.7	0.3
ACDP	0.5	0.1	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.0
UDM	--	--	3.4	0.8	2.2	0.4
UCDP	--	--	0.7	1.2	0.7	0.3
FA	--	--	0.5	--	--	--
MF	--	--	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
AZAPO	--	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4
ID	--	--	--	--	1.7	1.4
AEB	--	--	0.2	0.2	--	--
AMP	--	-	--	1.4	--	0.2
SACP	--	--	--	--	--	0.2
CR	0.0	--	--	--	--	--
NLP	--	--	--	--	--	0.0
NA	--	--	--	--	--	0.1

Source: IEC website (www.elections.org.za) and WVS questionnaires

The percentages of respondents in the WVS(s) are slightly lower than the number of actual votes during the national elections. The differences in percentages are noticeable and could be

attributed to the enthusiasm and hype during elections. In other words, although some people claimed that they would not vote if an election were held tomorrow, it could be that the excitement surrounding the national elections was likely to change this orientation (Simon, 2006: 148).

3.3 Findings

The aim of the first part of the section is to provide the construction of diffuse and specific support indices. The second part analyses the frequencies or trends over time between the ANC supporters and the entire sample. The third section provides an analysis of support for democracy by a few independent variables in an attempt to explain some of the differences that occur over time.

3.3.1 Constructing Support for Democracy Indices

3.3.1.1 Diffuse Support Index

The three levels of diffuse support, namely political community, regime principles and regime performance, underlie the construction of three indices, one for each level. These indices were constructed as follows:⁸⁷

- (1) Support for Political Community: The variables ‘fight for country’ (0/1) and ‘national pride’ (recoded 1, 2=0; 3, 4=1) are added to form a three-point scale of support for the political community: 0=low support, 1=medium support, and 2=high support. The proportions of citizens with high support for political community are displayed in the respective tables. The Alpha score⁸⁸ of this index is 0.173.
- (2) Regime Principles; The variables ‘democracy best form of government’ (1-4) and ‘democracy good way of governing’ (1-4) are added to form a seven-point scale, ranging from 2=low support to 8= high support. Proportion of citizens with scale values 6-8 are displayed in the respective tables. The Alpha score of this index is 0.385.
- (3) Performance of the Regime: The variables ‘performance of the system governing’ (recoded 1-3=1; 4-5=2; 6-7=3, 8-10=4), ‘performance of people in national office’ (1-4), ‘confidence in parliament’ (1-4) and ‘confidence in government’ (1-4) are added to form a 13-point scale: 4=low performance to 16=high performance. Proportion of

⁸⁷ The construction of the diffuse support index is based on the work by Klingemann (1999: 38).

⁸⁸ The Alpha score is the measure that is loosely equivalent to splitting data in two in every possible way and computing the correlation coefficient for each split. The average of these values is equivalent to Cronbach’s Alpha – Alpha score – and is the most common measure of scale reliability.

citizens with scale values 11-16 are displayed in the respective tables. The Alpha score of this index is 0.841.

3.3.1.2 Specific Support Index

The two levels of specific support, namely regime institutions and political actors, underlie the construction of two indices, one for each level. These indices were constructed as follows:

(1) Support for Regime Institutions: The variables ‘confidence in armed force’ (1-4), ‘confidence in police’ (1-4), ‘confidence in civil service’ (1-4), ‘confidence in parliament’ (1-4), and ‘confidence in the courts’ (1-4) were added to form a 16-point scale: 5=low performance to 20=high performance. Proportion of citizens with scale values 15-20 are displayed in the respective tables. The Alpha score of this index is 0.799.

(2) Support for Political Actors: The variables ‘confidence in political parties’ (1-4) and ‘confidence in the president’ (1-4) were added together to form a 7-point scale, ranging from 2=low support to 8= high support. Proportion of citizens with scale values 6-8 are displayed in the respective tables. The Alpha score for this index is 0.563.

3.3.2 Measuring Support for Democracy amongst ANC and Non-ANC Supporters

The study is concerned with investigating the changing levels of support amongst the ANC supporters. These changing trends will be especially interesting when compared to support amongst non-ANC supporters. For the purpose of this study, then, the changing levels in support for democracy amongst the ANC supporters are evaluated relative to those of non-ANC supporters. The following analysis presents the percentages of ‘high support’ for democracy.


3.3.2.1 Measuring Diffuse Support amongst ANC and Non-ANC Supporters

3.3.2.1.1 Support for Political Community

The level of support for the political community for both ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters declined between 1995 and 2001, as presented in Figure 2. This decline could be attributed to the fact that the apartheid regime imposed racial identities upon citizens, with or without their consent. These identities categorised people into different socially constructed clusters, which were instrumental in defining the rights and duties of each population group, such as determining and organising access to schooling, jobs and use of public facilities.

The apartheid regime ended in 1994 and the new government saw it necessary to encourage national unity. The heterogeneous nature of the country made national unity crucial, just as it was to suppress or contain subgroup identities, which it was feared might provoke inter-group hostilities. However, suppression of subgroups, as history proves, according to Klandermans *et al.* (2001:91-92), produces an opposite effect, i.e. it reinforces subgroup identities rather than contain them. This was evident in South Africa, when the policy of the British to suppress Afrikaner identity reinforced rather than suppressed it. The support for the political community (between 1995 and 2001), showed that respondents appeared to be unwilling to identify with the nation at the expense of their subgroup identities, probably because subgroups are their primary source of strength and belonging.

Figure 2: Support for Political Community



Secondly, the population groups within the country have always seen each other as being different, and it will take time before citizens fully embrace the notion of national unity. Thus, the high levels of support in 1995 could be attributed to the fact that the country had just held its first national and inclusive elections in 1994 and therefore most respondents, especially the ANC supporters, were excited about the fact that they would be treated equally and that they were now recognised as citizens of the country.

The level of support for the political community amongst the ANC supporters increased slightly between 2001 and 2006, whilst support amongst non-ANC supporters continued to decrease during the same period. The rise in support for political community amongst the

ANC supporters could be attributed to the process of healing the wounds of the past and the willingness of the victims to forgive and be part of a national unity. The continued decline in support for the political community amongst the non-ANC supporters could be attributed to the fact that the ANC won the 1999 elections with an increased majority, further threatening the identities of non-ANC supporters and possibly their positions in the process of nation building and national unity.

ANC supporters, in general, have a higher level of support for the political community than non-ANC supporters. One explanation for this is that the ANC is the ruling party and it is inevitable that support for democracy would be higher amongst its supporters in comparison to those who support the opposition.⁸⁹

3.3.2.1.2 Support for Regime Principles

The longitudinal trend in support for regime principles is interesting amongst both ANC and non-ANC supporters from 1995 to 2006, where support was once again higher amongst the ANC supporters than non-ANC supporters, as is evident in Figure 3, despite a decrease in 2001.

The level of support for the principles of democracy declined amongst the ANC supporters between 1995 and 2001; a possible explanation is that the wounds of apartheid were still relatively fresh and the black population felt that the perpetrators of the apartheid regime needed to be punished for the atrocities committed during apartheid. However, the government, in the spirit of a *rainbow nation* and *ubuntu*, protected and treated every citizen equally.


Secondly, the TRC,⁹⁰ which was effective between 1995 and 2001, made it difficult for citizens, especially those who were victimised, to embrace the principles of democracy whole-heartedly. Testimonies were heard and they brought back memories of the atrocities committed against the people, especially the blacks, who are relatively speaking the most seriously affected victims of apartheid.

⁸⁹ It should be noted that the WVS has many indicators for political community and that only a few were used. It is probable that the use of more indicators or different indicators to those used could have yield different findings.

⁹⁰ TRC – the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established to provide public acknowledgement of, and compensation for, the victims of gross human rights violations. Amnesty would then be granted to perpetrators of these gross human rights violations; for more details, see Deegan (2001, Chapter 7)

Thirdly, economic inequalities threaten support for the regime principles. Poor citizens, especially in an unequal society, are concerned with meeting their daily basic needs and do not see the need to concern themselves with democratic principles and democratic consolidation. Moreover, they do not have the will nor the time and energy to worry about a democracy that fails to improve their daily living (Mattes and Thiel, 1998: 108).

Figure 3: Support for Regime Principles



The level of support for regime principles amongst the non-ANC supporters steadily increased from 1995 to 2006. The increasing support for regime principles could be accredited to the solid process of regular, free and fair elections as the 1999 elections marked the end of the first term of democratic rule, thus further curbing their fears and reinforcing their support for the principles of the regime (Klandermands *et al.*, 2001:141).

Secondly, the level of support amongst non-ANC supporters is likely to increase over time as citizens are prone to seek more protection from the state and the assurance that the ruling party would respect minority rights. They are therefore likely to continue to support democratic principles, because through these principles the ruling party is expected to extend services, rights and protection to every citizen and not only to ANC supporters.

3.3.2.1.3 Support for Regime Performance


The level of support for regime performance is, once again, higher amongst ANC supporters than non-ANC supporters, as is evident in Figure 4. One possible explanation for the significant difference is that the ANC is the ruling party and thus its party supporters are likely to be more satisfied or claim to be more satisfied with the way the regime performs.

Secondly, it could be argued that ANC supporters' evaluation of regime performance is likely to be based on the assessment of the current regime against that of apartheid's authoritarian rule. Thus, ANC supporters may have grievances about the current regime or be dissatisfied with its performance; however, when compared to the apartheid regime, they feel that they are better off. And lastly, general dissatisfaction with the performance of the regime could have nothing to do with the ANC as a ruling party, but rather failure of the regime to satisfy the needs of its populace.

The low level of support amongst the non-ANC supporters might be because they are unlikely to compare the state to the previous regime. Some respondents might feel the need to let go of the past and focus on the future, hence they evaluate performance based on the present situation. Secondly, those who are sceptical of the ANC, regardless of race, are likely to rate the regime performance under the ANC as worse when compared to the past regime performance. This therefore suggests that the findings are inclined to remain similar in the event that regime performance is evaluated in comparison to the past regime or not. Thirdly, the huge differences in support for the regime performance propose that there might be different perceptions about how democracy is perceived and should perform in reality.

The low level of support for regime performance amongst both the ANC supporter and non-ANC supporters in 1995 could be attributed to the fact that the 1995 wave of the WVS was conducted a year after the first democratic elections. Thus, a lot was expected of the new government. It is also possible that at that time most citizens were not sure what to expect from the government, let alone how the government ought to perform. Secondly, based on Deegan (2001), this could be attributed to criticism of the 1994 government. It was criticised for insufficient progress in delivering services and improving the standards of living of the poor. Government was perceived as being a "traitor to the cause of equality" (Deegan, 2001: 203). This might be a direct result of the unrealistic expectations the population had about democracy and the changes it would bring about.

Figure 4: Support for Regime Performance



There was an increase in support for regime performance for both the ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters in 2001. Support for regime performance more than doubled between 1995 and 2001 (from 28.9% to 67.6%) and could be attributed to the change in black respondents' attitude. In other words, the NP began losing considerable power, giving black respondents a greater sense of control, especially after the ANC took control of the Government of National Unity (GNU) and won the 1994 and 1999 elections and its supporters accordingly felt that the government would represent them efficiently. Secondly, the ANC supporters felt that they could now influence the government.

The low levels of support amongst the non-ANC supporters, on the other hand, could be attributed to concerns over the degree of influence that these minority groups would have on the government and to what extent their rights would be protected. In short, they were still sceptical of the new government and its intentions (Klandermans *et al.*, 2001:140).

The level of support amongst both ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters increased between 2001 and 2006, albeit not as extensively as from 1995 to 2001. The more gradual increase could be a result of the fact that the optimistic atmosphere of the 1990s was starting to wane and citizens were becoming more informed about the government and its flaws and hence more ready to criticise it openly.⁹¹

⁹¹ As mentioned earlier, items most appropriate for the measurement of support for regime performance, could not be used since they are unavailable in the 2006 wave of the WVS. This is a limitation to the findings since the use of those items could

3.3.2.2 Measuring Specific Support amongst ANC and Non-ANC Supporters

3.3.2.2.1 Support for Regime Institutions

Support for regime institutions is relatively higher amongst the ANC supporters, when compared to that of non-ANC supporters; however, the longitudinal trend shows a gradual increase in support amongst non-ANC supporters in comparison to a gradual decrease in support amongst ANC supporters, as presented in Figure 5.


Support for the regime institutions declined amongst the ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters between 1995 and 2001, by 4.3% and 4.7% respectively. This trend continued amongst ANC supporters, with a further decrease (of 2.8%) between 2001 and 2006. This decline in support could be attributed to the fact that the regime institutions were relatively new and under new leadership, since most of these institutions became fully operational for the benefit of the entire country only after the 1994 elections. The institutions may have been struggling to assess and meet the demands of the population most effectively, especially given the fact that there was a great amount of pressure on these institutions to prove that they could operate effectively and efficiently.

The legitimacy of state institutions was called into question, especially by non-ANC supporters, and could explain the low levels of confidence in regime institutions, despite an increasing longitudinal trend. The slight increase in support, albeit from a very low level, amongst the non-ANC supporters between 2001 and 2006 could be attributed to the perceived improvement that regime institutions were making, especially in ensuring that the Constitution protects citizens equally.

The effect of crime and corruption, which erodes confidence in democratic institutions, could be another possible explanation for the low levels of support amongst non-ANC supporters and the decreasing longitudinal trend of ANC supporters' support. According to Morin (1994), the widespread mistrust of state institutions, such as the army, the police and the courts, also plays a role in the declining confidence in regime institutions, especially since attempts to fight crime failed to materialise (Morin, 1999: 4). This dissatisfaction led to the phenomenon of *mob justice*, especially in the townships, where many South Africans believe there is no need to abide by the rules of the law, and that the rules should be broken if they fail to produce anticipated outcomes (Morin, 1999: 30).

have possibly affected the findings. Moreover some indicators with a potential to offer a comparative evaluation of the past regime to the current one were excluded from the measurement of regime performance since they run the risk of having subjective answers.

Figure 5: Support for Regime Institutions



3.3.2.2.2 Support for Political Actors

The level of support for political actors amongst the ANC supporters is again higher than amongst the non-ANC supporters, as represented in Figure 6. This could, again, be attributed to the fact that the ANC is the ruling party and that most of its supporters are likely to be more positive about the performance of political actors. Moreover, the ANC holds the majority of seats in Parliament, and thus high levels of confidence in regime institutions and political actors could be expected amongst ANC supporters.

The trajectory of support for political actors is very similar between the ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters; however, the levels of support differ substantially. Overall, support for political actors increased by 9.0% amongst ANC supporters between 1995 and 2006 and by 10.8% amongst non-ANC supporters during the same period. It seems as if the levels of support parallel each other, since there is a modest increase in support for political actors. This suggests that the evaluation of this type of support was affected by similar events and not whether the respondents supported the ANC or not.


The low level of support in 1995 for both the ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters can be closely connected to the support for regime institutions. The government that came to power in 1994 consisted mostly of freedom fighters who had never before held leadership positions in national institutions. This obviously had an impact on the level of confidence that

citizens afforded them. It is therefore not surprising that little more than half of the ANC supporters had high levels of support for political actors, in comparison to only 14.6% of non-ANC supporters.

The increase in support for political actors amongst both the ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters between 2001 and 2006 could be attributed to the perceived improvement in the way that these political actors were performing their duties. Thabo Mbeki’s inauguration as the new president of the country in 1999 reaffirmed the ANC’s foothold as the majority party and offered some form of political stability.

Furthermore, the excitement and euphoria that swept the nation in 1994 was slowly beginning to wane and was being replaced by calls for service delivery. The government became increasingly evaluated on its capacity to deliver upon these demands, especially with regard to the promises of the RDP (Deegan, 2001:174). These evaluations were fairly favourable and thus could explain the increase in support for political actors.

Figure 6: Support for Political Actors



There is an interesting finding in the evaluation of support for the political actors amongst the ANC supporters. Their support for the political actors closely correlates with their support for the regime institutions. A possible explanation for this is the fact that there is no precise distinction between the regime institutions and political actors, although the theory of support

makes this distinction. This might be because political actors administer the regime institutions, thus blurring the distinction between these two levels in rational terms.⁹²

In summarising the five levels of political support, ANC supporters have higher levels of support for democracy when compared to non-ANC supporters. In addition, there is higher support for the three levels of diffuse support than the two levels of specific support amongst both the ANC and non-ANC supporters.

A comprehensive graphic presentation of the five levels of democratic support is given in Figure 7. The figure clearly illustrates that the ANC supporters have higher levels of both diffuse and specific support for democracy, namely the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors.


As is evident in Figure 7, both the ANC and non-ANC supporters have the highest level of support for the regime principles. This suggests that democracy is perceived as an ideal form of governance for the country, whilst the second highest level of support is for the political community, followed by the regime performance – all three levels of diffuse support for democracy.

When evaluating the two levels of specific support, one notes that ANC supporters have slightly more confidence in political actors than in regime institutions, whilst non-ANC supporters have more support for regime institutions than political actors.

This section has allowed us to measure the five levels of support for democracy in South Africa amongst ANC supporters since 1995. The findings were compared and contrasted to those of non-ANC supporters for the sole purpose of placing the results in a relative context. The next section, however, will measure diffuse and specific support for democracy (as two indices constructed from the five levels discussed above) amongst the ANC supporters alone.

⁹² For the purpose of this study, political parties are treated as actors rather than institutions. Although this action is rationalized, the findings could have been different if they were measured regime institutions rather than political actors.

Figure 7: Support for Democracy




3.3.3 Measuring Support for Democracy amongst the ANC Supporters

The crux of the study is measuring the changing levels of diffuse and specific support for democracy amongst the ANC supporters. Diffuse support and specific support indices were constructed as follows:⁹³

- (1) Diffuse Support Index: The variables ‘support for political community’ (1-3), ‘support for regime principles’ (1-3), and ‘support for regime performance’ (1-3) were added together to form a 7-point scale, ranging from 3=low support to 9=high support. Proportion of citizens with scale values 7-9 are displayed in the respective tables. The Alpha score for this index is 0.274.
- (2) Specific Support Index: The variable ‘support for regime institutions’ (1-3) and ‘support for political actors’ (1-3) were added together to form a 5-point scale, where 2=low support to 6=high support. Proportion of citizens with scale values 5-6 are displayed in the respective tables. The Alpha score for this index is 0.710.

The findings of the changing levels of diffuse and specific support are represented in Figure 8, with Figures 9 and 10 summarising the difference in changes from 1995 to 2006.

Figure 8: Support amongst the ANC Supporters




⁹³ Factor Analysis for both diffuse and specific support is not included since the indices are adopted from Klingemann’s work (1999).

As is evident in Figure 8, diffuse support amongst the ANC supporters increased between 1995 and 2006, a favourable longitudinal trend. Diffuse support increased from 73.2% in 1995 to 83.2% in 2001 (an increase of 10%) and to 94.5% in 2006 (an increase of 11.3%). Thus, levels of diffuse support for democracy are relatively high amongst ANC supporters with an overall increase of 21.3% between 1995 and 2006.


Specific support, on the other hand, decreased from 65.3% in 1995 to 63.6% in 2001 (a decrease of 1.7%). This was followed by an increase of 4.7% between 2001 and 2006, where specific support amongst ANC supporters enjoyed its highest level since 1995 at 68.3%. Overall, specific support has remained fairly constant amongst ANC supporters; however, this has occurred at a lower level when compared to diffuse support for democracy.

Figure 9: Percentage of Change in Diffuse Support: 1995-2006



The increases in diffuse support could be attributed to commitment to the regime, especially given the fact that the ANC is in power. This stems from the fact that diffuse support is not conditional, i.e. there is a “reservoir” of support, regardless of whether citizens are satisfied or dissatisfied with the processes of a democratic political system.

Figure 10: Percentage of Change in Specific Support: 1995-2006



The decline in specific support from 1995 to 2001 could be attributed to the fact that Nelson Mandela, the first democratically elected president of the country in 1994, stepped down as the president of the country. His successor, Thabo Mbeki, did not have the same high profile as Mandela and there was some speculation about his ability to lead the country. This may have influenced the levels of satisfaction and confidence in political actors and state institutions around 1999 and 2000.

Secondly, the decrease in specific support between 1995 and 2001 could be attributed to the perception that government was not fully grasping the demands of its citizens and there seemed to be some confusion with regards to government prioritisation. For example, although the 2001 budget allocated R4,6 billion to poverty alleviation and job creation, a total of R15.1 billion was allocated to weapon purchases (Development Update, 2003: iv). The majority of the citizens, especially the poor who might not have fully grasped and understood the need to purchase weaponry, might have viewed this in a negative light, given their lack of everyday social security.

Thirdly, the rand depreciated in dramatic fashion in 2001, resulting in increased cost of imported goods. Although the rand recovered in late 2002, the subsequent rising prices in the cost of basic foods had a major impact on those who could not afford basic goods, especially the poorest of the poor (Development Update, 2003: iv).

According to Di Palma (1970: 30), quoted in Anduiza *et al.* (2008), decline in support for democracy might be attributed to “a subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism, and lack of confidence in the political process, the institutions and the politicians, but with no questioning of the political regime” (Anduiza *et al.*, 2008:474). This explains why there is

high diffuse support, but low specific support, i.e. high support for regime performance and low support for the institutions and the office-holders.

The increase in specific support (by 4.7%) between 2001 and 2006 could be attributed to the increasing support for Thabo Mbeki and the institutions of government. As mentioned in the evaluations of the five levels of political support, legitimacy of the authorities is likely to increase over time, provided that it is not affected by the performance of the regime.

There is, however, a need to get a holistic view of the trends in support for democracy that occurred from 1995 until 2006. This is important, because it would shed some light on the changes that have occurred over time. This brings us to the next section – evaluating the changing levels of support for democracy amongst the ANC supporters as opposed non-ANC supporters.

3.3.4 Comparing Support for Democracy amongst the ANC and Non-ANC Supporters


Diffuse support amongst the ANC supporters steadily increased from 1995 to 2006, whilst diffuse support amongst the non-ANC supporters was very low in 1995, more than doubled between 1995 and 2001, and then remained fairly constant between 2001 and 2006. The change in support amongst the non-ANC supporters from 1995 to 2001 is noticeable and significant.

The level of specific support amongst both the ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters remained fairly constant between 1995 and 2006. However, specific support amongst non-ANC supporters is far lower than that of ANC supporters. Specific support amongst ANC supporters remained almost unchanged between 1995 and 2001, followed by an increase of 8.2% between 2001 and 2006.

Low levels of specific support amongst both the ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters might be to the result of declining satisfaction with the governing style of the authorities and state institutions, their policies and the inability to meet pressing demands. Secondly, the low levels of specific support are possibly the result of low levels of trust for incumbents and their institutions because of scandals, corruptions, fraud and political stance, rather than being evaluated on their capabilities to satisfy the demands of the populace. Individual political actors are increasingly being seen as corrupt, scandal-ridden and engaged in other illegal activities. The respondents in a study undertaken by Klandermans *et al.* (2001: 145) believed

that corruption was a significant problem in government. For instance, the government was criticised for not following proper procedures when a tender of R14.7 million for the AIDS education project, *Sarafina 2*, was awarded in 1999. However, the low support for the regime institutions stems from the association of these incumbents with the institutions they serve.

Figure 11: Diffuse and Specific Support amongst the ANC Supporters and Non-Supporters



The higher levels of both diffuse and specific support amongst the ANC supporters when compared to non-ANC supporters could be attributed to the fact that, as mentioned previously, the ANC is the ruling party and therefore its supporters are more likely to support democracy in general. Non-ANC supporters, on the other hand, might be more sceptical because they feel that they are not being represented or represented adequately in Parliament and they may disapprove of the way the ANC is governing the country. What is encouraging is that the commitment to democratic principles, political community and regime performance is garnering high levels of support amongst both ANC and non-ANC supporters.

Support for democracy amongst the ANC supporters is likely to be altered negatively in the event whereby another political party assumes power in South Africa. This suggests that party support in the context of South Africa plays a crucial role in determining democratic support. It is unlikely that the post-Polokwane friction between the upper echelons of the ANC membership would have a significant bearing on the support of democracy amongst its supporters; as long as the ANC remains the ruling party. Moreover, in my speculation, the

events that resulted from the ANC conference in Polokwane in 2008⁹⁴ are likely to have an effect on the differences in support for democracy amongst the ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters.

The split within the ANC (between Mbeki and Zuma loyalists) has raised concerns about stability of the country and democratic consolidation. Thus, non-ANC supporters are likely to push for more democratic principles, such as transparency and accountability and are likely to use the split within the ruling party to interrogate issues of democracy.

Thus, both the ANC and non-ANC supporters have higher levels of diffuse support than they do specific support for democracy. In order to determine the possible explanations for this trend, I have used a couple of explanatory variables to try to ascertain their influence on ANC supporters when it comes to diffuse and specific support.

3.3.5 Difference in Support for Democracy and Some Independent Variables

This section deals with a couple of explanatory variables that I have selected, namely age and level of education. These variables were selected given their weight in understanding specific phenomenon and their place in the socialisation process. As mentioned in Chapter 2, age is useful in social science research, as socialisation theory indicates that whatever is learned during childhood is to some extent carried over to adulthood. The support for a regime is learned unconsciously during socialisation. Citizens who grew up under a certain regime are likely to be critical of another form of rule. This is in contrast to citizens of new democracies who were not socialised to support democracy and were brought up under a different type of rule. Citizens who are unfamiliar with the new form are, therefore, likely to be sceptical of the new form of governing (Mishler and Rose, 1999: 79-80).⁹⁵ Socialisation is thus closely linked to experience. Citizens tend to evaluate and support democracy based on their own experience and not what they were told by others (Easton, 1975: 446).

The reason age is chosen as an independent or explanatory variable of support for democracy is thus based on socialisation theory. It will be interesting to find out whether the younger generation or older generation supports democracy more. The expectation, in general, is that the older generation will be more sceptical of democracy, because they were not socialised to

⁹⁴ Post-Polokwane refers to the period after the ANC's 52 national conference held in Polokwane in December of 2007. The conference brought an end to the succession battle between Jacob Zuma and the president of the country. Jacob Zuma was voted the president of the ANC, while Thabo Mbeki remained the president of the country. This had an effect on the political landscape of the country since the president of the country was not the president of the party in power (Taljaard, 2008:1).

⁹⁵ See also Kornberg & Clarke, 1992: 21 and Easton, 1975: 444-445.

support this type of regime. However, the fact that the study looks at support amongst ANC supporters changes the equation. The expectation of support amongst the ANC supporters is that the older generations will be as supportive of democracy as the new generation, or even more so. This stems from the fact that most of the ANC supporters are black and they were oppressed under authoritarian rule. They have lived through the hardships of oppression and they are likely to be supportive of democracy, which has brought them freedom and afforded them economic prosperity.

The second independent variable to be used in explaining changes in support for democracy is the level of education of the respondents. This variable is used mainly because it is important to highlight whether people who support democracy know what it means and whether they understand the role it has to play in the country. The assessment of democracy using levels of education is important, because with education comes a better understanding of the concept of democracy and concrete reasons to be supportive of it. As Evans and Rose (2007) argue, the attainment of high education positively leads to support for democracy in developed democracies. Educated citizens do not only support democracy, but they can justify why they are supporting it (Evans and Rose, 2007: 916). The World Bank (2001:8), quoted in Evans and Rose (2007), mentioned this positive relationship between education and democracy by arguing that “broad and equitable access to education is thus essential for sustained progress toward democracy, civic participation, and better governance” (Evans and Rose, 2007:904).

This is, however, not the case according to Bratton and Mattes (2001a), who argue that it is true that the attainment of high education helps Africans understand and be aware of democracy; however, it does not mean that increased attainment of education in Africa leads to support for democracy. In fact, the conclusion drawn was that, “unlike in the West, education does not build support for democracy in Africa” (Bratton and Mattes, 2001a:117). The conclusion implies that educated citizens in Africa are sceptical about democracy because it gives illiterate citizens political rights, which are likely to be used “un-reflectively and irresponsibly”. In addition, they postulate that educated people in Africa seem to be more sceptical and dissatisfied with the way democracy performs in their countries; some even argue that there is no real democracy in their respective countries (Bratton and Mattes, 2001a:117).⁹⁶

⁹⁶ See also Bratton *et al.*, 2005:205 and Evans and Rose, 2007: 905.

From this assessment the expectation in using education as an independent variable is that support for democracy declines with attainment of higher education. In addition, the demographic attributes mentioned in 3.2.3 suggest that, while most of the ANC supporters in the survey have either some, or completed, high school education, the percentage of those ANC supporters with some form of post-matric qualification is substantially lower.

There is a close correlation between education and income in South Africa and for that reason only one of these independent variables was used. Education and income have an effect on the way citizens' evaluate the five levels of support for democracy (Mc Donough, 1981:18). The decision to use education instead of income stems from the fact that higher levels of education are a likely source of a higher income; however, high incomes do not necessarily imply attainment of higher education.


In summary, the expectation in using these explaining variables is that the older generation of ANC supporters will be more supportive of democracy because of their direct experience of apartheid and because of the fact that most of them are less educated when compared to the younger generation.

3.3.5.1 Independent Variables: Age

3.3.5.1.1 Diffuse Support: Age

There were no clear differences in terms of age amongst ANC supporters for diffuse support of democracy in 1995. There is, however, a noticeable increase in both the middle-aged group (30-49 years) and the older generation (50 years and older) by about 20% each in 2001, whilst diffuse support amongst the younger generation (16-30 years) remained almost unchanged during the same period. The outlook in 2006 reverts to the pattern of 1995, in which no clear differentiation between the three age groups is possible. Thus, diffuse support amongst the younger generation of ANC supporters increased by almost 20% between 2001 and 2006 to reach similar levels of diffuse support amongst the middle-aged and older generations. There was an increase in diffuse support amongst all three age groups of ANC supporters between 2001 and 2006.

Figure 12: Diffuse Support amongst the ANC Supporters by Age




In summary, there are no significant differences in diffuse support across the three age groups. One noticeable change is that the percentage of support among the younger generation did not increase from 1995 to 2001, while in the other two groups it did. However, diffuse support managed to increase and parallel the percentages of the middle-aged generation and the older generation by 2006. Thus, although my initial expectation was not met – namely that the older generation of ANC supporters would have more diffuse support than the younger generation – I am able to ascertain that the older generation reached higher levels of diffuse support before the younger generation, who subsequently “caught up”.

3.3.5.1.2 Specific Support: Age

As was the case with diffuse support, there is relative congruence amongst the three age groups of ANC supporters with regards to specific support for democracy in 1995. There are, however, a few noticeable differences in 2001: specific support amongst the younger generation decreased by 10.6%; specific support increased slightly (by 4.2%) amongst the middle-aged generation; and specific support amongst the older generation of ANC supporters increased by 12.1%. Figure 13 below provides a good illustration of the differences in specific support amongst the three age groups in 2001. Although specific support was once again fairly congruent between the three age groups in 2006, there were some notable changes: there was a 13.6% increase in specific support amongst the younger

generation; there was a slight (1.5%) decrease in middle-age support; and an 8.0% decrease in specific support amongst the older generation in 2006.

Figure 13: Specific Support amongst the ANC Supporters by Age



From this assessment, it can be argued that the older generation of ANC supporters have higher levels of specific support for democracy than the middle-aged group and the younger generation. The older generation had consistently more support than the other two groups throughout the period studied. These findings – that the older generation expresses more specific support than the younger generation – affirms my expectation.


In summary, I expected that the older generation of ANC supporters would have higher levels of diffuse and specific support than the younger generation. Although the patterns were fairly similar in 1995 and 2006 amongst the age groups, the changes between 1995 and 2001 and then again between 2001 and 2006 mean that I can deduce that the middle-aged and older generations have higher levels of diffuse support than the younger generation, and the older generation has higher levels of specific support than the younger generation.

3.3.5.2 Independent Variables: Level of Education

3.3.5.2.1 Diffuse Support: Education

Diffuse support amongst ANC supporters and their level of education reveals an interesting pattern in 1995, that is to say that ANC supporters with low levels (some, or completed, primary school education) or no education at all, have higher levels of diffuse support than those with some, or completed, high school education and those with tertiary education, as illustrated in Figure 14 below.

Figure 14: Diffuse Support amongst the ANC Supporters by Level of Education



The outlook for 2001 is vastly different where those with no, low (some, or completed, primary school education) and those with some/completed high school education have high levels of diffuse support, whilst those with tertiary education are far more critical. In fact, diffuse support increased by 13.7% amongst those with no formal schooling; 14.7% amongst those with some/completed primary school; and 24.7% amongst those with some/completed high school education. Diffuse support amongst those with tertiary education almost halved between 1995 and 2001.

The period between 2001 and 2006 also witnessed some interesting changes in that diffuse support amongst all four levels of education was very high, with percentages in the low and

mid-nineties. The most noteworthy change was the increase in diffuse support amongst those ANC supporters with tertiary education – by an overwhelming 60%.

Thus, although diffuse support is high and relatively congruent amongst the four levels of education in 2006, it is clear that there are higher levels of diffuse support from those with either no formal schooling or those with low levels of education (some/completed primary school education).

In my opinion, those with higher levels of education are generally prone to be exposed to knowledge about different aspects of everyday life when compared to those with lower levels of education. Their level of education puts them in a better position to analyse information, read with understanding, grasp the concepts better and criticize more effectively, regardless of whether the knowledge is about democracy or not. In this sense, education extends beyond the classroom, meaning it is irrelevant whether the respondents are exposed to democratic education or non-democratic education. Thus, one explanation for higher levels of diffuse support amongst those with no formal education or lower level of education might be that they are generally less critical about issues because of their level of understanding and knowledge. Those with higher education are generally critical.

3.3.5.2.2 Specific Support: Education

Specific support is fairly congruent and higher amongst those with no, little (some/completed primary school) education and some (some/completed high school) education than it is for those ANC supporters with tertiary education.


The situation is similar in 2001, when specific support increased amongst those with no, little (some/completed primary school) education and some (some/completed high school) education and nearly halved for those with tertiary education.

In stark contrast to 2001, the pattern in specific support in 2006 saw a decrease amongst those ANC supporters with no, little (some/completed primary school) education and some (some/completed high school) education, whereas as specific support more than doubled amongst those with tertiary education.

From Figure 15 I am able to ascertain that levels of specific support are higher amongst those ANC supporters with either no formal schooling or with some/completed primary school

education. Specific support amongst those with some/completed high school education remained fairly constant between 1995 and 2006. Although the longitudinal pattern of specific support amongst those ANC supporters with tertiary education increased between 1995 and 2006, it is still significantly lower than those with lower levels of education.

Figure 15: Specific Support amongst the ANC Supporters by Level of Education



The low levels of support for democracy amongst the more educated respondents could be attributed to the fact that education provides citizens with knowledge about rights and democratic norms and greater access to information. Thus, with increased knowledge, higher levels of criticism are likely, reflected in lower levels of support amongst the educated. The findings presented confirm my initial expectation that education would have an influence on diffuse and specific support for democracy and that those with higher levels of education would have lower levels of support.

3.4 Conclusion

The chapter started by giving a brief overview of the strategy of inquiry, including an overview of the WVS, the methodology employed and some of the demographic attributes, namely population group, gender, language, level of education, religious denomination and party support, of both the sample and the ANC supporters. The chapter also gave a comprehensive description of the findings of the study.

The study is concerned with determining the changing levels of diffuse and specific support amongst ANC supporters; however, interesting trends are revealed when support amongst the ANC supporters is compared to changes in support amongst the non-ANC supporters.

- ANC supporters have higher levels of support for regime principles, political community and regime performance than non-ANC supporters.
- Similarly, ANC supporters have higher levels of support for regime institutions and political actors than non-ANC supporters.
- Both ANC and non-ANC supporters have higher levels of diffuse support than specific support for democracy.

The focus on the changing levels of support amongst the ANC supporters can be summarised as follows:

- Diffuse support increased by 10% between 1995 and 2001 and by a further 11.3% between 2001 and 2006;
- Specific support decreased by 1.7% between 1995 and 2001, and increased by 4.7% between 2001 and 2006;
- The longitudinal pattern of support for democracy suggests that there are high and increasing levels of diffuse support, and more “moderate” and fluctuating levels of specific support.

Two independent variables, namely age and level of education, were introduced as possible explanations for the changes in diffuse and specific support. The findings can be summarised as follows:

- The older generation amongst ANC supporters have higher levels of diffuse and specific support for democracy than the younger generations; and
- ANC supporters with no formal schooling or some/completed primary school education have higher levels of diffuse and specific support for democracy than those with higher levels of education (tertiary education);
- The findings confirm the argument put forward by Bratton and Mattes (2001a:117) and my expectations, stated earlier.

The final chapter provides a summary of the findings and addresses their implications, as well as making recommendations and suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER FOUR: SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

4.1 Introduction

South Africa's transition to democracy transformed the country into a democracy in theory, but not necessarily in practice. Moreover, the fact that the country is a democracy does not necessarily mean that its citizens support democracy. Even if the current regime has the support of the population, one needs to question the type of support it is - diffuse or specific. And how likely is it that this support for democracy will endure and lead to democratic consolidation?

For these reasons it is important to evaluate the level and nature of the support for democracy in the country. The study attempted to evaluate whether democracy is perceived as working, both in theory and in reality. Moreover, the study evaluated the existence, the type and strength of support for democracy. It further analyzed the impact of all this on democracy and its consolidation.

Support for democracy was evaluated amongst the ANC supporters from 1995 to 2006. The evaluation of the ANC support is significant, since the ANC is the dominant political party in South Africa. It is thus important to find out whether this dominance of the ANC support within the political system is likely to threaten democratic rule, especially given the fact that a dominant party ought to have higher diffuse rather than specific support, as the opposite could jeopardise democracy. This stems from the fact that supporters of the ANC are likely to demand that their grievances be addressed and demands satisfied, regardless of whether this is done at the expense of the non-supporters of the ruling party.

The study is valuable because support for democracy amongst the ANC supporters is compared to non-ANC supporters. This sheds some light on whether the ANC supporters support democracy because the ANC is the ruling party and whether non-ANC supporters have less support for democracy because they do not support the party in power. In short, this would highlight whether democratic support is dependent on party support. This is important, because it has implications for political support, the dominance of the ANC, as well as the likely threat to democratic consolidation. This brings us to the concept of political support.

4.2 The Concept of Support for Democracy

The theory of political support highlights two concepts, i.e. diffuse and specific support for democracy. Diffuse support is a *reservoir* of favourable attitudes towards a political system even in the event of political and economic distress. Specific support, however, is conditional, i.e. the support depends on perceived outcomes and the performance of the authority in delivering these outcomes (Easton, 1965, 1975).

Easton (1965, 1975) distinguishes between three levels of support, namely political community, regime and authorities. Theories are prone to critique, however, and Easton's model of political support is not immune from such criticisms. The gap in Easton's theory, as previously discussed, prompted Pippa Norris (1999) to expand on Easton's theory of political support. Norris expanded Easton's three level of political support to five levels of support, namely political community, regime principles, regime performance, which she categorised as diffuse support, and regime institutions and political actors, which she categorised as specific support. Thus, given the level of criticism against Easton's model of political theory, Norris's model proved valuable and appropriate for this study. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of political support used in this study, therefore, drew from Norris's expanded version of the model of political support.

4.3 Measurement

The best possible way for me to measure support for democracy was to use the WVS. The WVS is suitable mainly because of the availability of indicators that are concerned with measuring the five levels of support for democracy. Consequently, the 1995, 2001 and 2006 South African waves of the WVS were used. The use of these three waves was adopted because South Africa became a democracy only in 1994, thus rendering waves administered prior to 1994 less relevant for the study of democracy.

There was a need to construct indices for both diffuse and specific support for democracy using the five levels of support for democracy. An index for diffuse support for democracy was constructed using indicators that measure the three levels constituted in this type of support, whilst a specific support index was constructed using indicators that measure the two levels of this type of support. The construction of the indices is significant, because the indices are able to compress the five levels of support efficiently into the two models, namely diffuse and specific support. This saved already limited space for data presentation. The indices further provide an orderly presentation of findings.

With the use of these indices, the study evaluates support for democracy across the five levels of political support, amongst the ANC and non-ANC supporters; it evaluates changes in diffuse and specific support for democracy amongst the ANC, and then compares the changes to those among the non-supporters of the ANC. It further used independent variables, namely age and education, in an attempt to make sense of the changing levels in support amongst the ANC supporters.

This summary brings us to the most important part of the study, i.e. what the study reveals about political support in the country.

4.4 Summary of Findings and Implications

Measuring support for democracy across the five levels of political support revealed some interesting patterns. Firstly, support for political community amongst ANC supporters decreased from 1995 to 2001, but increased from 2001 to 2006, whilst support amongst non-supporters decreased slightly from 1995 to 2006. The high level of support for the political community is a vital element for political support in South Africa.

As Norris (1999:10-11) argues, high support for political community means that collective actions can be pursued. This collective action is likely to strengthen civic engagement and social trust, which are crucial for democratic consolidation. The findings suggest that there is high support for political community, and that differences exist between how those who support the ruling party and non-ANC supporters view themselves and their identities in the country.

The level of support for the political community in this study suggests that the regime would not be vulnerable and collapse as a result of a lack of support for political community, as suggested by Easton (1965: 187).

Secondly, support for regime principles amongst ANC supporters decreased between 1995 and 2001, but increased between 2001 and 2006. Support amongst non-ANC supporters, on the other hand, continued to increase throughout the years. There are high levels of support for regime principles, despite the decrease amongst ANC supporters between 1995 and 2001. This suggests that citizens are starting to think of democracy in terms of self-expression values, which are the main source of perceiving democracy as an ideal form of government, a point also argued by Dalton *et al.* (2007:142). Other forms of governance are therefore likely

to be rejected, suggesting that democracy is entrenched in theory. This is crucial for democratic consolidation.

Thirdly, support for regime performance amongst ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters increased throughout the years studied. There was a significant increase amongst ANC supporters between 1995 and 2001, followed by a moderate increase between 2001 and 2006, whereas support for regime performance increased amongst non-ANC supporters throughout the years studied. The low levels of support for regime performance in 1995 are alarming; however, there was an increase from that year onwards. As Morin (1999) argues, “scholars *also* suggest that positive performance by a government deepens commitment to democracy. Some even argue that the belief in the legitimacy of democracy is shaped more by political than economic performance” (Morin, 1999:11), meaning that the democratic government must produce positive policy outputs. This suggests that there is deepening commitment to democracy amongst ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters, since support for regime performance has been on the increase from 1995 to 2006. However, the lower level of support for regime performance amongst the non-ANC supporters may indicate that they are less satisfied with the way democracy performs.

Fourthly,⁹⁷ the data reveal that support for regime institutions amongst ANC supporters is higher than among non-ANC supporters. This is despite the fact that support amongst both the supporters and non-supporters of the ANC decreased in 2001. Interestingly, support for regime institutions increased amongst non-ANC supporters in 2006, while it continued to decrease amongst the ANC supporters in the same period.

Lastly, the measurement of support for political actors also revealed that the level of support for the political actors amongst ANC supporters is higher than support amongst non-supporters of the ANC. Support for political actors amongst non-ANC supporters has, however, increased over the years studied.

It can be said, however, that support for regime institutions and political actors has been constant throughout the years, since there have been fairly insignificant increases and decreases in support for democracy. Moreover, support for these two levels (specific support) is low when compared to the three levels of diffuse support. This is alarming; according to

⁹⁷ Please note that the last two levels are not separated. This is because they are likely to have the same implications for support for democracy.

Dalton (2006: 252), this could be attributed to growing scepticism about the authorities, mistrust and declining confidence. Moreover, policy failures and political scandals contribute to the low levels of support for the regime authorities and may have repercussions for democracy and its processes as they lead to broader criticism of the political process.

However, Citrin (1974, quoted in Dalton, 2006:253-254) argues that this conclusion exaggerates the problem. He argues that a decline in support for the regime authorities⁹⁸ does not necessarily lead to criticism of the entire political process, but rather dissatisfaction with the authorities. Citrin (1974) explains that political systems can be compared to a baseball team, or any other team. Every baseball team wins some games, but also loses some. This, however, is the nature of the game and fans do not stop supporting the team because it lost in that season, but they might be dissatisfied with the performance of the players on the line-up. Thus dissatisfaction with the authorities does not mean decline in support for the political system as a whole. As Dalton puts it, “given a few new stars or a few winning streaks, the decline in public confidence would be reversed” (Dalton, 2006:253-254). I agree with Citrin, since that is evident in the evaluation of both regime institutions and political actors in South Africa. There is disenchantment with the incumbents and their institutions, but there are still significant levels of support for the political process, i.e. high support for regime principles and regime performance.

Moreover, low levels of support for both regime institutions and political actors “is a sign of the vitality of democracy, or of an objective reading of contemporary politics by the public” (Dalton, 2006: 256). This suggests that the low levels of support for regime institutions and political actors are alarming for democracy, but are unlikely to result in the demise of democratic rule or its consolidation. However, Dalton (2006: 256) argues that this is only as long as these low levels of support do not generalise to the democratic regime and its principles and performance, and the discontent does not last for a long period. As Miller (1974a:951) argues, continued discontent and low trust in government increase the likelihood of a radical change in authorities. This radical change may mean the collapse of democratic rule and its consolidation. Moreover, low trust and political cynicism over an extended period may lead to criticism of the government’s legitimacy.

⁹⁸ Refer to both regime institutions and political actors in this context.

In summary, the ANC supporters express higher levels of support for democracy across all five levels of support than non-ANC supporters do. These findings were comprehensively summarised in Figure 7.

The crux of the study entails measuring support for democracy amongst the ANC supporters. The proposition stated in Chapter One with regards to support for democracy amongst the ANC supporters is that ANC supporters would have a higher level of diffuse support and lower level of specific support.

According to the findings, diffuse support increased between 1995 and 2006. There was an increase of 10% from 1995 to 2001, and a further 11.3% from 2001 to 2006. The changes in levels of diffuse support amongst ANC supporters from 1995 to 2001 and from 2001 to 2006 are significant. Overall, there was a 21.3% increase in diffuse support from 1995 to 2006 amongst ANC supporters. Measuring levels of specific support amongst ANC-supporters reveals that there was a slight decline (of 1.7%) in support between 1995 and 2001, and then an increase (of 4.7%) from 2001 to 2006. Overall, the levels of support amongst ANC supporters for specific support have remained fairly constant between 1995 and 2006. The findings thus indicate higher levels of diffuse support and lower levels of specific support amongst ANC supporters. These results support my initial expectations and bring us to the implications of these results.

High levels of diffuse support mean that the political system in the country is seen as legitimate; this is because diffuse support is unlikely if citizens fail to accept and obey the political regime and abide by the rules of the regime (Easton, 1975:450-451).⁹⁹ The policies in the country are therefore likely to be seen as legitimate, increasing the possibility of democratic endurance and possibly consolidation. Secondly, high levels of diffuse support means that democratic consolidation is likely since support for democracy is unconditional, and as Easton (1965,1975) argued, there is a *reservoir* of attitudes that help foster tolerance for the opponents of democracy and its processes. Moreover, this suggests that the regime has the support needed to continue as the authority and that democracy is entrenched both in theory and practice.

The fact that the ANC supporters have higher levels of diffuse and specific support compared to non-ANC supporters has implications for the policies of the country. This is so since high

⁹⁹ See also Dalton, 1999:58.

support for democracy amongst ANC supporters might possibly be because the ANC is a ruling party, rather than a true reflection of the respondents' opinions. This has direct implications for policies, because they are prone to changes in the event of the ANC forfeiting power. Support for democracy seems to depend on who is doing the supporting and who is in power. However, such loss of power seems unlikely in the near future, because it is unlikely that the ANC would lose its dominance any time soon.¹⁰⁰

Secondly, higher levels of support for democracy amongst ANC supporters when compared to non-ANC supporters are a potential problem for policy or policy making, especially if the populace support democracy only because they support the ANC, which they believe will bring about social change. This is a challenge, because failure to meet the expected socio-economic changes would erode support for democracy and jeopardise consolidation (Mottair, 2002:6).

The dominance of the ANC is thus problematic in this context as support for democracy is closely tied to support for the ANC. This suggests that there is a blurring of the line between support for the ANC and support for democracy, as well as support for the ANC and support for the government.

The finding brings us to the evaluation of political support amongst ANC supporters when using independent variables. Two independent variables were used, namely age and level of education. The expectation was that the older generation would have higher levels of both diffuse and specific support for democracy, when compared to the younger generation.

In summarizing both diffuse and specific support, there is no noticeable difference in the age groups. The difference is so insignificant that it cannot be concluded that this expectation was correct or incorrect. This does not have important implications for policy, since the difference in support is insignificant. However, when considering the slight changes, it can be argued that the older generation is slightly more supportive of both diffuse and specific support for democracy, when compared to the younger generation.

As Hyman (1959:61-62) argues, citizens become better integrated with age and there is usually a "progressive development of positive political orientations" (Hyman, 1959:63) as

¹⁰⁰ Given the recent formation of a "breakaway" political party – Congress of the People (COPE) – of many former Mbeki loyalists, ANC dominance may be challenged. At the time of writing this thesis, the new political party had just been formed and not enough is known about them to offer an informed opinion.

individuals grow. This means that less support for democracy amongst the younger generation does not necessarily mean that democratic endurance is unlikely because the “leaders of tomorrow” seem to have a lower level of political support for democracy, but rather that their views are likely to change with age.¹⁰¹ This is supported by the theory of adult socialisation.

On the other hand, the education variable reveals complex trends about support for democracy. A larger percentage of ANC supporters with diffuse support have either no schooling or some/completed primary school. Specific support, on the other hand, drew the most support from those that had some/completed high school education in 1995, followed by those with no schooling or some/completed primary school in 2001 and 2006. In summary, most supporters of democracy amongst the ANC supporters have low levels of education, namely no schooling or some/completed primary school. These findings confirm what was expected.

These low levels of education amongst the ANC supporters should be seen as a reflection of the country’s legacy of apartheid. The fact that most of the ANC supporters with the lowest levels of education support democracy more than those with higher education is unlikely to pose a threat to democratic consolidation. Rather, it means that those with higher levels of education are becoming more sceptical, since they are likely to have access to information about democracy and the democratic and political process. This scepticism about democracy might be viewed in a positive light as it leads to the questioning and monitoring of government policies, thus leading to increased accountability from the government and the ruling party.

Norris (1999), however, argues that the fact that the highest levels of support for democracy come from those with low levels of education is worrisome and suggests that they are not “critical citizens”. This does not imply that their support is not valued, but rather that their limited access to information about democracy explains why they are less critical when compared to the better-educated supporters of the ANC. Their support is more likely based on their perception and expectations about the future and less on democracy and what it entails.

¹⁰¹ This study is limited, however, since it fails to allow a comparison between the current younger cohorts as compared to the earlier younger cohort. This would confirm that age is not necessarily a threat to democracy, since the older the younger generation becomes, the more likely their attitudes and values about democracy become integrated and the more positive their political orientation becomes.

4.5 Suggestions for further research

This study can be extended by evaluating the same respondents throughout the years, i.e. a longitudinal trend study. It would be valuable to see how the perceptions of the same cluster of people change throughout the years, especially given the changes in their environments and demographic attributes, such as party support, education, occupation change, generation/age, life improvements and social delivery. This can incorporate the study of political support and socialisation, i.e. a trend study of political socialisation in the country.

4.6 Concluding remarks

In conclusion, as mentioned in Chapter Two, both forms of support are vital and it is sometimes impossible to identify an absolute level of support for democracy that will sustain a regime. In my opinion, it is possible to infer from the findings presented in this study that democratic endurance is possible in the country. The regime seems to have enough support to continue as a legitimate governing authority. However, the low levels of specific support could become problematic should they begin to decline and might have a grave implication for democratic consolidation, if they persist for an extended period.

The findings of the assessment of political support suggest that democracy, as in many countries, cannot gain complete support of the populace, especially given the fact that different levels of support closely correlate with demographic attributes. These include different social, political and economic environments within which citizens of the same country find themselves.

There is a distinct pattern in political support between the ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters. Although the distinction is not very large, it is however still noticeable that diffuse support and specific support are higher amongst ANC supporters than non-ANC supporters. This suggests that support for democracy is likely to be based on party support and party status, rather than on approval of democracy per se. This is likely to have an impact on democracy; however, the differences in support do not provide enough evidence to confirm the perception that the ANC majority is likely to threaten democracy. The dominance of the ANC results in lower levels of support for democracy amongst non-ANC supporters, possibly because they are pessimistic about the future, especially with the unlikelihood that the ANC will lose its hold on the electorate in the foreseeable future, resulting in less multiparty competitiveness and support for democracy.

It should be mentioned that the problems associated with dominance should not be overlooked. If one loses sight of the distinction between party and state and, if left unchecked, this blurring of the state and party line is likely to involve a slide down the slippery slope to total hegemony and party control of "all the levers of power" in society. The sustained democratic rule thus far suggests that democracy is likely to consolidate, making the return to authoritarian rule unlikely, especially given the constitutional protections enjoyed and extended to "all"¹⁰² citizens.

¹⁰² This is more in terms of theory rather than in practice. However, it must be argued that grievances about citizens' protection and rights exist in most, if not all democracies, including established democracy.

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