CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

1.1. Purpose and aim of study

The purpose and aim of the study is to investigate the expression of emotion metaphors in Tshivenda. Emphasis will be on the following types of emotion categories:

- Anger
- Fear
- Lust
- Pride
- Love
- Happiness
- Friendship

1.2. Theoretical framework

In order to achieve the above purpose and aim, the study will adopt the lexical semantic theory as framework. Emotion categories are of vital importance because they are used and expressed on a daily basis. The Tshivenda language includes numerous emotion categories. Apart from dwelling on the semantic significance of emotion categories the study will also analyse linguistic features that underpin emotion categories as they apply to Tshivenda.

Literature survey will be divided into three sections:
The first part will deal with words and emotions, where the most general function and organization of emotion – related vocabulary will be discussed and attention focused on a large but neglected group of emotion terms. The second part will deal with the meaning and emotion where a distinction will be made between

expression and descriptive words. Some words express emotion. For example, *Yowee*! expresses sadness in Tshivenda. The third one will be an issue that inevitably arises in the study of the everyday conception of emotion.

1.3. Methodology

In this study the following research methods will be used:

1.3.1. Data collection method

Data collection techniques will be used in gathering expressions of emotion in Tshivenda. The following methods will be used:

1.3.1.1. The textual method

Textual analysis will be used in order to reveal expressions of emotions in Tshivenda from different situations.

1.3.1.2. Primary research method

This is a method where first-hand information is obtained from consultation with lecturers, teachers, and other people who will be interviewed. This method is more flexible and allows the researcher to analyse what the respondent really believes about empirical data.

1.3.1.3. Secondary research method

Library books, articles from journals and dissertations will be used to gather information from a variety of scholars' studies and emotion verbs in other languages of the world.

1.4. Organisation of the study

The thesis will be structured as follows:

Chapter one will focus on an introductory preview to the study, which covers the aims, theoretical framework, research methodology and organisation of the study

Chapter two will review literature on emotion categories.

Chapter three focuses on the classification of metaphors expressing emotions in Tshivenda.

Chapter four examines the force in emotion metaphors in Tshivenda.

Chapter five concludes the study and summarises the main findings of the study.

CHAPTER   2

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON BASIC EMOTIONS

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Language is one of the media or channels for the expression of emotions. Something that is important in our responses to other people. Emotion concepts have been studied for a long time. The main aim of this chapter is to give an overview of literature on basic emotions. A large number of scholars have provided some different views on how they understand these emotion concepts. These scholars include Le Doux (1998), Johnsons-Laird and Oatley (1992), Plutchick (1980), Tomkins (1962), Izard (1971), Goddard (1998), Kövecses (1989) and Kövecses (2000).

2.2. PSYCHOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF BASIC EMOTIONS

2.2.1. Le Doux (1998)

According to Le Doux, there are several themes about the nature of emotions which will emerge and recur. He argues that there are several psychological overviews of emotions which could be described as an analysis of a psychological function and the level at which it is represented in the brain. It is in general, a way of talking about aspects of the brain and mind. The first point, according to Le Doux, is that the proper level of analysis of a psychological function is the level at which that function is represented in the brain. The system that we use to defend against danger, differs from the one we use in procreation, and the feelings which result from activating these systems like fear and sexual pleasure have no common origin. Le Doux further contends that there is no "emotion" faculty and there is no single brain system that is dedicated to this phantom function. We have to focus on specific classes of emotions if we are

interested in understanding the various phenomena that we use the term "emotion" to refer to.

Le Doux states that the second way we can use to describe emotions is one that relates to how the brain system generates emotional behaviour. When these systems function in an animal they show a capacity for conscious awareness and then conscious emotional feelings occur. Thirdly, Le Doux proposes that emotions can also be illustrated as that function in a person connected to feelings, whether they be feelings of fear which occur as a part of the overall reaction to danger. These are effects caused by the activity of this system. This, for example, is the first system in the body to react before a person knows he or she is in danger.

The fourth point advanced by Le Doux is that if, indeed, emotional feelings and emotional responses are effects caused by the activity of a common underlying system, one can then use the measurable emotional responses to investigate the underlying mechanism, and illuminate the system that is primarily responsible for the generation of conscious feelings.

The fifth point, according to Le Doux, which can explain emotions is that once emotions occur, they become powerful motivations of future behaviour. It is difficult for us to understand emotions in humans as people's personalities differ and because of the way they react emotionally to things they come across. People have little direct control them over their emotional reactions. Most people often let their emotions control to an extent that they end up doing things they later regret.

The sixth point observed by Le Doux is that emotions are things that happen. Emotions can flood consciousness the conscious control thereof is weak. Mental health is maintained by emotional hygiene and mental problem.

Emotions are generally feelings. Le Doux contends that much of what the brain does during an emotional experience occurs outside the conscious awareness. An emotional experience, a feeling of being afraid, results when we become consciously aware that an emotion system of the brain, namely the defence system, is active. The seventh point suggested by Le Doux is that emotions are things that happen to us rather than things that are still to occur. Events are simply arranged so that the stimuli that automatically trigger emotions will be present. We have little direct control over our emotional reactions.

Le Doux further maintains that emotions can flood consciousness while conscious control over emotions is weak. This is so, he argues, because the wiring of the brain, at this point in our evolutionary history, is such that connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive system are stronger than the connections from the cognitive systems to the emotional systems. Finally, Le Doux argues that once emotions occur, they become powerful motivators of future behaviour. They chart the course of moment to moment actions as well as set the souls towards long-term achievements. He further contends that when fear becomes anxiety, desire gives way to greed, or annoyance turns to anger, anger to hatred, friendship to envy, love to obsession, or pleasure to addiction, our emotions start working against us. Le Doux maintains that mental health is maintained by emotional hygiene and mental problems, to a large extent, reflect a breakdown of emotional order.

2.2.2. PLUTCHICK (1980)

Plutchick argues that there are eight prototype functional patterns of behaviour which are the functional bases for all emotions recognised in human beings and animals. A number of structural models which will describe the relations among the primary emotions is presented. Primary emotions vary in their degree of similarity to one another.

2.2.2.1. The structural model.

According to Plutchick the ideas that have been presented can be represented by means of a three-dimensional model. The model shows eight basic emotional dimensions arranged somewhat like the sections of half an orange, with the terms that designate each emotion at maximum intensity at the top. Plutchick maintains that the vertical dimension represents intensity, or level of arousal, and ranges from a maximum state of excitement to a state of deep sleep at the bottom. The shape implies that the emotions become less distinguishable at lower intensities.

If we imagine taking successive cross sections, we keep duplicating the emotion circle with progressive milder version of each of the primaries.

2.2.2.2. The mixing of the primary emotions.

The cross section of the emotion solid.

With this model as the starting point, Plutchick states that many interesting implications follow. Plutchick says we might be considering that the various ways of the primary emotions may be mixed in order to synthesize complex emotions. From the above figure Plutchick argues that it is evident that any adjacent pair of primaries could be combined to form an intermediate mixed emotion, just as any two adjacent colours on the colour circle form an intermediate. Plutchick further states that a mixture of any two primaries may be called dyad and three primaries a triad. These dyads and triads may be formed in different ways. If two adjacent primaries are mixed, the resulting combination may be called primary dyad. Plutchick further explains that mixtures of two primary emotions that are once removed on the circle may be called secondary dyads, while mixtures of two primaries that are removed on the circle may be called tertiary dyads. He addresses the question of how we name the emotions that result from various mixtures. The fact that it is not always easy to name all of the combinations of

emotions may be due to one or more reasons. Certain combinations may not occur at all in human experience, just as chemical compounds can be formed only in certain limited ways.

2.2.2.3. The naming of emotions mixtures.

With the concept of standard observers as a basis, according to Plutchick (1980) there are at least three possible approaches to the process of naming emotion mixtures.

a. Present a group of judges with all possible pairs of primary emotions and ask them to suggest an appropriate name for the resulting mixture.
b. Present a group of judges with a long list of emotion-names taken from our language and ask them to indicate which of the primaries are present.
c. Utilize the information from 1 and 2 above and, in addition, consider the need for internal consistency, for example, that dyads which are opposite on the emotion circle should have opposing characteristics.

According to Plutchick the second procedure was utilized and a group of 34 judges were asked to examine a long list of emotion terms and to indicate which two or three of the primaries are components. This list of tentative names for the primary, secondary, and tertiary dyads reveals several interesting things. It was possible to find emotion names for each of the mixtures of primary dyads, but not for one pair of the secondary dyads and not for two pairs of the tertiary dyads, Plutchick says. He suggests that mixtures of emotions that are more widely separated on the emotion circle are harder to imagine or less likely to be experienced than those that are closer. The empty spaces in secondary and tertiary dyads may be considered as rare mixtures whose properties can still be estimated and may yet be discovered or produced.

Plutchick states that just as opposite colours, when mixed in equal intensity, act to neutralize one another to produce grey, so too do opposite emotions when occurring simultaneously in equal intensity act to inhibit or neutralize each other. The combination of emotions that are nearly opposite leads to greater conflict and immobilization than combinations of adjacent emotions. This implies that the tertiary dyads involve mixtures with more conflict than other types of dyads. The primary dyads refer mostly to normal emotions of everyday life, while tertiary dyads refer much more to clinical or pathological emotions as illustrated in the following table which has been modified somewhat from the earlier listing of dyads with maximum internal consistency:

Plutchick presents the following table of judgement of emotion components of primary, secondary and tertiary dyads.

primary Dyads (mixture of two adjacent emotions)

Joy + acceptance = love, friendliness

Acceptance + fear = submission.

Fear + surprise = alarm, awe

Surprise + sadness = embarrassment, disappointment

Sadness + disgust = misery, remorse

Disgust + anger = scorn, indignation, contempt, hate, resentment, hostility

Anger + anticipation = aggression, stubbornness

Anticipation + joy = optimism, courage

Secondary Dyads (mixture of two emotions, one removed)

Joy + fear =guilt

Acceptance + surprise = curiosity

Fear + sadness = despair

Surprise + disgust =

Sadness + anger = envy, sullenness

Disgust + anticipation = cynicism

Anger = joy = pride

Anticipation +acceptance = fatacism

Tertiary Dyads (mixture of two emotions, twice removed)

Joy + surprise = delight

Acceptance + sadness = resignation, sentimentality

Fear = disgust =shame, prudishness

Surprise + anger = outrage

Sadness + anticipation = pessimism

Disgust = joy = morbid ness

Anger + acceptance = dominance

Anticipation + fear = anxiety, caution, dread, cowardliness.

An examination of the list of tentative names for the primary, secondary and tertiary dyads reveals, according to Plutchick, several interesting things. First, Plutchick suggests it is possible to find emotions names for each of the mixtures of primary dyads, but not for one pair of the secondary dyads and not unequivocally for two pairs of the tertiary dyads. This suggests that mixtures of emotions that are more widely separated on the emotion circle are harder to imagine or less likely to be experienced than those that are closer.

2.2.3. TOMKINS (1962)

Tomkins acknowledges the fact that there is no general agreement on what the primary affects of emotions are, what we should call them and how they are, as well as what their biological and psychological functions are:

The following affects as distinguished by Tomkins:

Positive:

a. Interest-excitement: Eyebrows down, track, look, listen.
b. Enjoyment-joy: smile, lips widened up and out.

Resting:

c. Surprise-startle: Eyebrows up, eye blink

Negative

d. Distress-anguish: Cry, arched eyebrow, mouth down, tears, rhythmic sobbing.
e. Fear-Terror: Eye frozen open, place, cold, sweaty, factual, trembling with hair erect.
f. Shame-humiliation: Eyes down, head down
g. Contempt-disgust: smear, upper lip up.
h. Anger-rage: frown, clenched jaw, red face

2.2.4. Johnson – Laird and Oatley (1992)

As a contribution to emotions, Johnson *et al* maintain that there are sets of basic emotions which many theorists have proposed. They note the following sets of basic emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and perhaps desire.

a. Happiness with a perception of improving progress towards a goal.
b. Sadness with a perception of improving when a goal is lost.
c. Anger when a plan is blocked.
d. Fear when a goal conflicts or threat to self- preservation occurs.
e. Disgust with a perception of something to reject.
f. Desire with a perception of something to approach.

These emotions are viewed as basic.

Johnson-Laird and Oatley argue that the status of basic emotions is corroborated in five ways:

Firstly, each of them appears to have universal concomitants such as facial expression. Secondly each has a bodily or phenomenal component that can be experienced without the individual's knowledge of the cause. Thirdly, the semantics of large emotional vocabulary of English can be explicated without having to appeal to any other emotions. Fourthly, each term, comprising a basic emotion, is primitive in the sense that it is semantically unanalysable. Fifthly, the apparent complexity of human emotional experience comes from the diverse cognitive evaluations that can elicit and accompany the basic emotions and that can differ from one culture to emotive culture.

2.2.5. Izard (1971)

According to Izard (1971), the fundamental emotions are important to the individuals and species as each adds its own special quality to consciousness.

A complete emotion process requires the following:

a. A specific innately determined neural substrate.
b. A characteristic facial expression.
c. A distinct subjective.

All these three are emotion components because a complete emotion process requires all these three. In addition to the three principal components of an emotion, there are a number of other organs and systems that become involved during emotion.

According to Izard there are also a number of other organs and systems that become involved during emotion of the cardiovascular, a respiratory system of

the homeostatic network. However, such indices actually signify only arousal changes in functions of the autonomic nervous system.

a. Interest – excitement

Interest is the most frequently experienced positive emotion which provides much of the motivation for learning, the development of skills and competencies, and for creative endeavour. Izard maintains that interest results from an increase in neural stimulation usually brought about by change or novelty. In the state of interest a person shows signs of attentiveness, curiosity, and fascination. One feels caught up by the object of interest, Izard argues.

b. Joy

According to Izard, joy is a highly desirable emotion, though not necessarily a state to be desired continually. Tomkins (1962) sees joy as a result from a sharp reduction in the gradient of neural stimulation. Joy, together with interest, shows that human beings are social creatures, explains Izard. The smile of one person eliciting the smile of another is a reciprocal pattern that is observed in an infant mother relationship and throughout life.

c. Surprise

Izard contends that surprise has some of the characteristics of an emotion, but it is not an emotion in the same sense as the others. He further argues that surprise has some of the characteristics of an emotion. Unlike other emotions, surprise is always a transient state which results from a sharp increase in neural stimulation, typically brought about by a sudden unexpected event. Surprise, Izard further explains, serves as a function of clearing the nervous system of ongoing emotions and cognition so that the individual can respond appropriately to the stimulus, situations and the sudden change experienced.

d. Distress

Izard maintains that life separation remains a common and profound cause of distress or sadness. In distress, a person feels sad, downhearted, discouraged, lonely, out of touch with people and miserable. Distress serves a highly useful function by communicating to the self and others that all is not well, and by motivating the person to do what is necessary to reduce the distress. Izard further states that distress makes one responsive to one's own problem and to the problem of the world.

e. Anger

Anger often results from physical or psychological restrain, or from interference with goal-oriented activity Izard argues. In anger the blood "boils" and the face becomes red. Rapidly mobilized energy tenses the muscles and provides a feeling of power, a sense of courage or confidence, and an impulse to strike out, but the emotion of anger should be distinguished from acts of aggression, Izard contends. Although anger served useful functions in the evolution of human beings, its positive functions have become less conspicuous. According to Izard, anger, expressed in words with enough talk to keep from angering the other person or cutting off communication with him, may facilitate a needed defence of personal integrity and improve a relationship.

f. Disgust

Izard states that disgust often occurs with anger but has distinct motivational-experiential features of its own. Physical or psychological deterioration (anything spalled) tends to elicit disgust. When disgusted one feels as though one has a bad taste in one's mouth, and in intense disgust one may feel as if one is sick in the stomach, says Izard. Disgust combined with anger may motivate destructive behaviour, since anger can motivate "attack" and disgust the desire to get rid of.

However, disgust with pollution, the defacing of wilderness, and the want on waste of natural resources, may help provide motivation for a healthier atmosphere and ecology.

g. Contempt

Izard claims that contempt often occurs with anger or disgust or with both. These three have been termed the hostility triad. Contempt may have evolved as a vehicle for preparing the individual or group to face a dangerous adversary. Still today the situation in which the individual has a need to feel superior may lead to some degree of contempt, explains Izard. One of the dangers of contempt is that it is a "cold" emotion, one that tends to depersonalize the individual or group held in contempt, hence it may help motive cold blooded killing. Izard further says that it is difficult to find any useful or productive function for contempt in contemporary life, unless one considers it appropriate to express it towards conditions that foster waste, oppression crime or war.

h. Fear

Fear, according to Izard, affects every individual and, thus tends to lock into the memory unforgettable experiences that can be re-lowed through active recall or through dreams. Fear has a great toxicity. It can frighten one to death. Izard maintains that fear is activated by a rather rapid increase in the density of neural stimulation brought about by real or imagined danger. The feeling of lack of safety or impending disaster accompanies strong fear. This emotion mobilizes energy and provides motivation for escape from danger. By anticipating danger and acting appropriately, the individual often avoids intense fear except for the rare and extreme fear that can paralyses, Izard further explains.

i. Shame

According to Izard, shame occurs typically, if not always, in the context of an emotional relationship. Shame motivates the desire to hide, to disappear. Shame can also produce a feeling of ineptness, incapability, and a sense of not belonging. Shame can be a powerful force for conformity, but if the individual's ties are to "out groups" the shame can lead to rebellion, argues Izard. While strong and chronic shame can shutter human integrity, this emotion often stands as a guardian of self-respect. Izard states that an individual can go to great lengths to develop self-respect, self-esteem and hence a self-concept that is less vulnerable to shame. Shame avoidance can foster immediate self-corrective behaviour as well as a sustained programme of self-improvement.

j. Guilt

Izard argues that guilt is closely related to shame. While shame may result from any misdoing, guilt results from wrongdoing of a moral, ethical or religious nature. Guilt occurs in a situation where one feels personally responsible and comes from one's own acts and from within one's self. He further says that in guilt people have strong feelings of not being right with the person or persons they have wronged. Guilt stimulates thought and cognitive pre occupation with wrong doing. Intense and Chronic guilt can cripple the individual psychologically, states Izard. But guilt may also be the basis for personal- social responsibility and the motive to avoid guilt may heighten ones sense of personal responsibility.

2.2.6. GODDARD (1998)

Semantic analysis

Goddard argues that, we are studying emotions and colours because they highlight and sharpen theoretical and methodological conflicts in semantics, and

because they illustrate how the study of linguistic semantics is influenced by other human science disciplines.

2.2.6.1. Theories of the emotions

According to Goddard (1998) emotions are a subject which seems to interest most people. In the last decade or so, Goddard contends the nature of emotions and the meaning of emotions terms have been much discussed in anthropology, psychology as well as in semantics.

2.2.7. Jameslan 'physicalism'

William James advocated a physicalist theory of emotion (i.e. bodily) in nature. James maintained that *fear*, for instance more or less consisted of the bodily symptoms of trembling, excitement, and so on, together with our awareness of them. Objections to this theory are that there are some emotions, such as *happiness*, that do not seem to have any characteristics (or prototypical) bodily signs associated with them, and that it is also hard to imagine that physical descriptions alone could capture distinctions as fine as those between *distressed*, *downhearted*, *and despondent*.

Many psychologists according to James, believe that there are some basic emotions which are inbuilt as part of our neuro-physiological make-up. *Anger*, *fear*, *surprise*, *sadness*, *joy*, *disgust* are the most widely accepted candidates. Other emotions are explained as amalgams of these, e.g. *delight = joy + surprise*. Proponents usually place great reliance on the proposition that each is linked to a specific facial expression, and these facial expressions can be accurately identified (that is, matched with the appropriate emotion) across language and culture barriers, argues James.

James further contends that the basic emotion position is now under intense criticism within psychology itself. It has also been assailed by anthropologists, who have been investigating the emotional lives of people in other cultures, and discovering a surprising degree of variation and diversity.

2.2.7.1. Alternative approaches

According to Goddard (1998) there are two main rivals to the basic emotions theory. The so-called cognitive approach to emotions holds that emotions depend in large part on mental processes; specifically that when we say someone is *proud*, *angry*, *lonesome* for instance, what we are doing is describing the kind of reaction that person has to something they are thinking, or to something they want or do not want to happen. Being angry, for instance, can be described as one's reaction to thinking that one has been wronged, and feeling an urge to retaliate. Goddard further maintains that the point of view known as social constructivism stresses the cultural aspect of emotions, that social judgements, cultural values and other cultural practices actually shape and create emotions and that emotions are cultural artefacts embodying shared understandings of human nature and social interaction.

2.2.7.2. Comparisons between some emotions studied for English.

This approach deals with some English emotions words and later some words from other languages.

Happy and related words
Goddard argues that *happy* is self-oriented or personal and it contains components making it akin in some way to *contentedness*. One could propose the following explication:

X feels happy =
Sometimes a person feels something like this:

> Something good happened to me
>
> I wanted this
>
> I don't want other things now

Because of this, this person feels something good

X feels like this

This depicts *happy* as implying a perspective that is at once 'personal', and past perfective ('something good happened to me', as well as implying an absence of further desires (I don't want other things now') Goddard explains.

Goddard further says these components can be contrasted with *joy*, with its unspecified and exuberant prototypical thought which could apply to something other than oneself and which has a distinctly 'present' perspective:

X feels joy =

Sometimes a person thinks like this:

> Something very good is happening now
>
> I want this

Because of this, this person feels something very good

X feels like this

Goddard states that the meaning of pleased and contented embodies different combinations of similar components to those we have just seen. Pleased suggests that something has happened which one has been waiting for, to happen, for some time:

X feels pleased =

Sometimes a person thinks something like this:

> Something good happened.
>
> I wanted this, explains Goddard.

Because of this, this person feels something good

X feels like this

It must as well be observed argues Goddard, that the comparatively muted quality of the English words is consistent with the traditional Anglo-Saxon distaste for extreme emotions.

2.2.7.3. Sad and related words

According to Goddard there is a difference between sad and unhappy. This difference can be captured in the explications below. Sad contains components suggesting an unaccepting and potentially active response as illustrated thus:

X feels sad =

Sometimes a person thinks something like this:

      I know something bad happened

      If I could, I would do something

      I know I can't do anything

Because of this, this person feels something bad

X feels like this

Unhappy contains components suggesting an unaccepting and potentially active response:

X feels unhappy =

Sometimes a person feels something like this:

   Something bad happened to me

      I don't want this

      If I could, I would do something

Because of this, this person feels something bad

X feels like this

Depressed differs from the other 'sad' words in including a judgement, quasi-clinical perspective ('it is not good for someone too feel like this').

2.2.8. KÖVECSES

The phenomenon under investigation is the study of the language used, about the emotions and what language tells us about emotion concepts. Kövecses (1989) divides the survey into three sections:

a. words and emotions.
b. meaning and emotions.
c. some issues that inevitably arise in the study of everyday conceptions of emotions.

2.2.8.1. Word and emotion

Kövecses discusses general functions and organization of emotion-related vocabulary and then focuses attention on a large but neglected group of emotion terms.

2.2.8.2 Expression and description

Kövecses argues that a distinction has to be made between expressive and descriptive words. Some emotion words can express emotions. Examples include shit! when angry, wow! when enthusiastic or impressed, yuk! when disgusted, and many more. It is an open question whether all emotions can be expressed in these ways, and which are the ones that cannot and why. According to Kövecses, emotion words can also describe or name the emotions that they are about. Words like anger, and angry, joy and happy, sadness and depressed are assumed to be used in such a way. We should note that under certain circumstances descriptive emotion terms can also "express" particular emotions. An example is "I love you!" where the descriptive emotion word love is used both to describe and express the emotion of love.

2.2.8.3. Basic emotional terms

Within the category of descriptive emotional words, the terms can be seen as more or less basic: speakers of a given language appear to feel that some of the emotional words are more basic than others. More basic ones include anger, sadness, fear, joy and love. Less basic ones include annoyance, wrath, rage, indignation for anger and terror, fright, horror for fear. "Basicness" can mean words which occupy a middle-level in a vertical hierarchy of concepts, e.g. anger is a more basic emotion than annoyance. It is indicated by Kövecses that anger is between the subordinate category of annoyance and the superordinate. Anger is a "basic-level" emotion category as indicated by Kövecses. The other point of "basicness" is that an emotion category can be judged to be a better example of the emotion category than another on a single horizon level. For example, anger is more basic than hope or pride, which are on the same basic level as anger. These basic emotion categories include happiness, love, fear, sadness, and anger.

Kövecses argues that expressions and words may indicate various aspects of emotion concepts like cause, control intensity etc. they can be metonymical and metamorphic. The metamorphic expressions are manifestations of conceptual metaphors. "Boiling with anger" is a linguistic example of the very productive conceptual metaphor **"anger is a hot fluid".** To be on "**cloud nine"** is an example of "**happiness is up"** and "**burning with love is**" an example of "**love is fire".**   Emotional meaning may be characterised by prototype. By specifying the content and structure of the best example of any of these emotion categories, we are working within the 'prototype' view. Lakoff and Kovecses (1987) define anger as a sequence of stages of events namely:

Retribution

Anger exists

Cause of anger

Loss of control over anger

Attempt at controlling anger

Fehr and Russell (1984:482) characterize fear in the following way:

A dangerous situation occurs suddenly. You are startled, and you scream. You try to focus all your attention on the danger, try to figure a way out, but you feel your heart pounding and your limbs trembling. Thoughts race through your mind. Your palms feel cold and wet. There are butterflies in your stomach. You turn and run.

Kövecses points out that the particular sequence of events make up the structure of the prototypical concept of any given emotion such as fear while the particular events which participate in the sequence make up the content of the concepts.

Kövecses discusses the importance and possible contribution of conceptual metaphors and metonymies to the conceptualisation of emotional experience. Kövecses further suggests that many emotions like fear, happiness, and love have several prototypical cognitive models joined with them. Some issues which are important in the study of emotion concepts and emotional meaning will be mentioned:

2.2.8.4. The validity issue

The most important issue is that there are no reliable criteria for a psychological representation of emotion concepts. Kövecses (1990) states that cognitive science suggests that prototypical cognitive models are the best candidates. The greatest explanatory power for many aspects of emotional meaning seem according to Kövecses, to be offered by "prototype" views.

2.2.8.5. The universality of emotion prototypes

A number of psychologists and anthropologists pointed out that focal colours seem to be universal. It is suggested that for emotion W in language P is not a prototype in other languages as well. Wierzbicka (1990) argues that emotion prototypes are different cross-culturally while the semantic primitives with in which these differences are expressed are universal. It is also suggested that what is universal are structures within the emotions field corresponding to an "unspecified positive emotion", to an "unspecified negative emotion", to an "emotion of strong affection", an "emotion of threat", and an anger-like range. Focal or prototypical members of the basic emotion categories in different languages tend to be different to varying degrees. It is stated that in emotion the "focal" members of basic emotion categories in different languages differ from each other to varying degrees despite the fact that the same general basic emotion categories exist in possibly all cultures and languages. Kovecses (1990) did make suggestions concerning some of the details of cross-cultural differences and similarities.

2.2.8.6. The universality of conceptual tools

The conceptual tools utilized by scholars included semantic primitives, connotative properties, scripts or scenarios, conceptual metaphors and metonymies and dimensions of meaning. Authors however disagree about the universality of these conceptual elements. Lakoff (1987) argues that what is universal are certain basic image schemes since they arise from certain fundamental bodily experiences.

2.2.8.7. Metaphor and metonymy

Lakoff & Johnson (1980) point out that many metaphors are conceptual in nature and can create cultural, social and psychological realities for us. Quinn (1991)

proposed that the conceptual metaphor constituting the cultural models simply reflects them, while Kövecses differs with him by saying that on the basis of the prevalent "container" metaphor for anger, that conceptual metaphors, together with other factors, can give the constitution of the emotion concept such as anger. Holland (1982) points out that this "either/or" view of the role of the metaphor may not be the best way of looking at the issue. It is further indicated that some metaphors have no capacity to create while others do.

Emotion-related terms have a large third group where the words and expressions do not "name" particular emotions and the issue is not how basic or prototypical the word or expression is.

Words and expressions belonging to this group denote various aspects of emotional concepts, such as intensity, cause and control. They can be metaphorical and metonymical. Metaphorical expressions are manifestations of conceptional metaphors. For example, "boiling with anger" is a linguistic example of a very productive conceptual metaphor. Anger is a hot fluid. "Burning with love" is an example of love. All the examples indicate the intensity of the emotion concerned. The linguistic expression that belongs in this large group can also be metonymical. For example, upset for anger and have cold feet for fear. The first is the conceptual metonymy physical agitation stand for anger while second is an example of the conceptual metonymy "drop in body temperature" stands for fear.

2.2.8.8. Meaning and Emotion

There are several distinct views that have been offered in an attempt to characterize emotional meaning.

2.2.8.8.1. The label view

Kövecses states that the label view of emotional meaning maintains that the meaning of emotions terms is simply an association between a label, like the

words anger and fear plus some real emotional phenomenon like physiological processes and behaviour. This view is the simplest layview of emotional meaning. It is based on the folk theory of the meaning in general according to which meaning is merely an association between sounds and things explains Kövecses.

2.2.8.8.2. The core meaning view.

Kövecses argues that the core meaning is characterised by a small number of properties, or components that are taken to define a category in an adequate manner. He further points out that this means that the core meaning should be capable of minimally distinguishing between the meaning of any two words; that is, by virtue of the smallest possible number of components. In this view, Kövecses argues, the core meaning is thought of as important kind of meaning, while peripheral meaning is viewed as less important in giving the meaning of words and expressions. Pheripherical meaning or connotation, according to Kövecses, is usually seen as being made up of various social, situational, affective and other properties that are not taken to contribute to the cognitive content of words in a significant way.

Kövecses maintains that the core meaning of emotion categories typically assumes the idea that emotional meaning is composed of universal semantic primitives. A leading proponent of this view is Wierzbicka. One of her major approach is that it is a mistake to think of emotion words in a particular language, such as English, as being universal. Universals, according to Wierzbicka, are the semantic primitive that make up the conceptual content of particular emotion words in a particular language.

2.2.8.8.3. The dimensional view.

Kövecses states that, emotional meaning is also viewed as being constituted by a fixed set of dimensions of meaning. He refers to Solomon, who identifies thirteen dimensions that are sufficient to describe any emotion, while Frijda distinguishes twenty-six dimensions. Kövecses further says that the core meaning of dimensional views are not always easy to distinguish. Thus, according to Frijda, the dimensions that apply to a given emotion provide a "component profile" that uniquely characterises an emotion. Researchers working in the dimensional approach attempt to eliminate a major alleged pitfall of the core meaning view in general: the large gap between emotional meaning and emotional experience, explains Kövecses.

2.2.8.8.4. The implicational view

According to Shweder core meaning and dimensional views are based on core meaning in general, the implicational view takes the connotative meaning as its main point of departure. To study what something means is to study what it entails, implies, or suggests to those who understand it, Shweder avers. Meaning is connotative meaning, not denotative meaning. It is the periphery, rather than the core, that counts in this view of meaning. Connotative meaning, and in particular emotional meaning, varies considerably from culture to culture.

2.2.8.8.5. The prototype view

It was previously mentioned that emotion words are basic, or prototypical than others. When we try to specify the structure and content of the best example of any of the lower-level categories (anger, fear and love), we are working within the "prototype" view of emotional meaning as it relates to individual basic-level categories. Many researchers see the structure of emotion as a script, scenario, or model. For example, Lakoff and Kövecses describe *anger* as a sequence of

stages of events. The particular *sequence* of events makes up the structure of the prototypical concept of any given emotion, like fear, while the particular *events* that participate in the sequence make up the content of the concepts. Sometimes the prototype approach is combined with some other view of emotional meaning (core meaning).

2.2.9. WIERZBICKA (1989)

Wierzbicka points out that if we study something we must have ways of delimiting and identifying the object of what we are investigating. She indicates that if we want to study "emotions", we must know what we mean by "emotions". Wierzbicka states that emotion is an English word, which does not have accurate equivalents in many other languages of the world. In all languages we also find the universal human contacts which are lexically embodied. The set of the universal concept fall into a number of different categories:

Tables of semantic primitives

[substantives]- I, you, someone, something, people

[determiners]- This , the same, other, one, two, some, much, many, all.

[mental predicate] - know, want, think, feel. see, hear.

[speech] – say

[action, event, movement] do, happen, move.

[existence, life] –there is, live

[evaluators] – good, bad

[descriptors] – big, small

[space] – where, side, inside, far, near, under, above, here

[time] – when, after, before, a long time, a short time, now

[taxonomy, partonomy] – kind of, part of

[intensifier, augmentor] – very, more

[similarity] – like

[clause linkers] – if , if......would, because

[clause operators]- not, maybe

[meta- predicate] – can

In the set of the universal concepts "feel" is indeed a universal human concept but "emotion" is not a universal human concept. Phrases such as "psychology or emotions" form the impression that "emotion" is an objectively existing category and that a concept of "emotion" carves nature in its joints. In German, a word for "emotion" is not there. The word Gefühl is used as a equivalent translation of the English word emotion, and it makes no distinction between physical and mental feelings.

Wierzbicka suggests that while the concept of "feeling" is universal and can be safely used in the investigation of human experience and human nature, the concept of "emotion" cannot be relied on as it is culture-bound. It is said that the English objective emotional shows the perspective very clearly, but the noun emotion does the same because it links the idea of "feelings" with the idea of "bodily events"

Wierzbicka agrees with Spiro's basic tenet because she does not believe that there is any evidence pointing in the opposite direction. It is indicated that by accepting the semantic evidence which shows the language – specific character of concepts like anxiety or anger does not lead to the conclusion that Wierzbicka's own group aside, everything human is alien to him.

Wierzbicka indicated that Spiro (1992-1998) does not distinguish between emotion and the conceptualisation of emotions and he accuses "cultural constructionists" of denying the existence of not named emotion by saying that. Wierzbicka agrees that the absence of an emotion term does not prove the absence of emotions. He says that it is quite natural to imagine that words like sadness or anger, must stand for something real. He indicates that one could still hold on the view that there are some basic human emotions but not to the view

that such human emotions can be identified by means of English words like "anger".

Wierzbicka maintains that an emotion concept expressed in one language by means of a word, can often be expressed in another by means of a location. The speakers of English habitually think of emotion in terms of concept encoded in their native language in single words like – anger, sadness, anxiety and so on. It is indicated that Spiro relies on words such as anxiety, anger, sadness and so on to identify "universal human emotions". Spiro says that universal emotion can be identified by means of concepts, which happen to be expressed in a single word in English even if in some other languages they could only be expressed by means of complex phrases.

"Psychic unity of human kind" by affirming the existence of such universals and demonstrating their reality through cross-linguistic investigations while at the same time helping to protect the anthropology, philosophy and psychology of "emotions" from the ever present threat of ethnocentric dilutions.

2.2.10. FRIJDA (1986)

Frijda (1986) maintains that the relationship between emotions and emotional words can be viewed in two different ways. Firstly one can assume that there exist words that dictate the way things are seen, secondly one can assume there exist things (emotions) that are given names and these have words assigned to them. Through viewpoint Frijda maintains, we assert that there exists a thing to be seen, collectively labelled by laymen and investigators. In many languages and emotions or some close equivalent and these things are given names various emotional words like anger.

Frijda further contends that emotions are not things in any strict sense as they do not form a natural class. There is no distinct collection of things that can be set apart and tagged as emotions. That however, does not do away with the fact

there that there are phenomena for which the word 'emotion' has been invented, which phenomena existed prior to the word having been invented. According to Frijda emotion words are dictated by phenomena existing independently of language or may seem to be contradicted by the diversity among the different emotion lexicon. Anthropological emotion literature is concerned with that diversity and with the fact that there are so many emotion words in a given language that cannot be neatly mapped on to the emotion words in other language.

Frijda states that, psychological literature too is concerned with this fact. On the other hand, different lexicon may still be based upon independently existing emotional phenomena if these phenomena show cultural diversity, or if these phenomena similar phenomena differently, we came back to that. On the other hand we think that the dissimilarity between emotion lexicons should not obscure the fact that very considerable similarity between those lexicons also exists.
The similarity is such that it can hardly be explained otherwise by assuming a general of emotional experience that is a cause and not a consequence of language.

2.2.10.1. Emotional phenomena.

According to Frijda, the existence of sets of emotional phenomena underlying emotion words and that are indepute of language does not preclude that there still one good grounds for lexical diversity. These ground are that the sets of phenomena that the word 'emotion' designates do not consist of simple, unanalyzable state, presumed elementary feeling states- but of complex patterns of phenomena. What we call emotions are multi-componental phenomena. These phenomena exist without such naming. To exist they do not need words (that is , nouns or adjectives) to designate them.

Frijda argues that, the multi-component nature of the emotional phenomena favours all sorts of different ways to label one and the same sort of phenomena. The responses to personally significant event primarily consist of changes in the interaction between an individual and his or her environment. Frijda argues that those interactions involve a number of the following distinct elements.

a. The eliciting event.
b. The individual's appraisal of that event, his or her perception of its personal meaning or its cultural meaning in as far as he or she shares it.
c. The ensuing, affective evaluation, the pleasure or pain.
d. The resulting changes in action readiness and bodily involvement, emotional impulses or loss of impulse, and physiological arousal.
e. The behaviour that may spring from that change in readiness.
f. The subjective experience, the emotional feeling, that embodies the awareness of any or all of these elements.
g. The individual's evaluation of the total reaction, or any of its elements, in general or under the given circumstances.

2.2.10.2. The structure of emotions

According to Frijda the hypothesis is that emotion words reflect emotion structures that exist independently from those words. He goes on to say that these emotion structures can be described in terms of the element mentioned. A discussion of some element of emotion structures follows.

First, the types of *eliciting event*. According to Frijda emotions are elicited, first of all, by basic and recurrent themes in the relations between individuals and their environment, the kind of thing that Lazarus has named "core relational themes". Frijda argues that the vast majority of emotion-arousing events can be seen as instantiations of a small number of such basic themes. Some of the examples of these themes are: "threat", "social rejection", "infringement", "obstruction".

Appraisal refers to the perception of properties in the event that constitutes its personal meaning. An event instantiating a given core relational theme is emotionally effective only to the extent that it is indeed appraised as representing such themes, in a personally or socially relevant manner. "Something pleasant". "something evil" and "finality" are some example of the kind of properties that appraisal is about. A person is not usually, or necessarily, aware of the process of appraisal; often, all he or she knows is what the event looks like.

Frijda mentions that according to the emotion theory, particular patterns of appraisal define the different emotions or, at least, what the major emotions in Western emotion taxonomies are. Current research has identified a particular set of appraisal dimensions that constitute these patterns, and thus define these emotions. These dimensions contribute importantly to differentiating emotions in widely different cultures, and perhaps everywhere, says Frijda. Major appraisal dimensions include the positive or negative valence of the emotion-eliciting event, its conduciveness to the individual's desire, aims or goals, its expectedness or unexpectedness, its controllability or agency, or responsibility, of someone else or the person him/herself.

According to Frijda, *action readiness* refers to changes in the state of readiness for relational behaviour. Emotional action readiness pertains to readiness or unreadiness for establishing particular kinds of relationship with an object in the environment Frijda argues that action readiness changes may or may not lead to changes in actual behaviour. States of action readiness may differ more subtly than in terms of the modes listed in the questionnaire research, in a number of parameters such as the degree of vehemence they are readiness for, their tonicity, the degree of control over their expression, or one's certainty about the success of ensuing behaviour.

2.2.11. KÖVECSES (2000)

Kövecses investigates what the language tells us about emotion concepts. The survey is divided into three sections: (1) words and emotion, (2) meaning and emotion, and (3) some issues that inevitably arise in the study of everyday conception of emotion.

2.2.11.1. Words and emotion

The most general functions and organization of emotion – related vocabulary will be discussed and then attention will be focused on a large but neglected group of emotion terms.

2.2.11.1.1. Expression and description

According to Kövecses (2000) a distinction has to be made between expression and descriptive words, some emotion words can express emotions, example include *shit*! When *angry*, *wow*! When enthusiastic or impressed *yuk*! When disgusted, and many more. It is an open question whether all emotions can be expressed in this way, and which are the ones that cannot and why. Emotion words can also describe or name the emotions that "they are about". Words like *anger* and *joy*, *happy*, *sadness* and *depressed* are assumed to be used in such a way. We should note that under certain circumstances descriptive emotion can also "express" particular emotions. An example is "I love you!" Where the descriptive emotion word love is used both to describe and express the emotion of love.

2.2.11.1.2. Basic emotion terms

Kövecses states that within the category of descriptive emotion words, the terms can be seen as more or less basic. Speakers of a given language appear to feel

that some of the emotion words are more basic than others. Basicness can mean two things. One is that these word occupy a middle – level in a vertical hierarchy of concept. In this sense, say anger is more basic than, for example annoyance or emotion. Anger because it is a "basic – level" emotion category, lies between the super-ordinate level category emotion and the subordinate – level category of annoyance argues Kövecses.

The other sense of basicness is that a particular emotion category can be judged to be more prototyped of emotion than another at the same horizontal level. According to Kövecses the horizontal level coincides with the basic level of the vertical organization of concepts. For example anger is more basic in this sense than, say, hope or pride, which in the previous sense, are on the same level.

2.2.11.1.3. Metaphor and metonymy

According to Kövecses the words and emotion that belong in this group denote various aspects of emotion concepts, such as intensity, cause, control and so forth. The metaphorical expressions are manifestations of conceptual metaphors. Kövecses states that conceptual metaphors bring two distant domains into correspondence with each other. One of the domain is typically or physical or concrete than the other. For example boiling with anger is a linguistic example of the very productive conceptual metaphor **anger is a hot fluid** explains Kövecses. The linguistic expressions that belong in this large group can also be metonymical. The purpose of metonymy is to provide mental access to a domain through another part in the same domain. This, metonymy unlike metaphor is a "stand-for" relation within a single domain.

For instance, one part or element of the domain of anger is to be upset, and one part or element of the domain of fear is to be upset, and one part or element of the domain of fear is an assumed drop in body temperature explains Kövecses. Examples include upset for anger and to have cold feet for fear. The first, in an

instance of the conceptual metonymy **physical agitation stands for anger,** while the second is an example of the conceptual metonymy **drop in body temperature stands for fear** argues Kövecses. A special case of emotion metonymies involves a situation in which an emotion concept B is part of another emotion concept A. In cases like this, B can metonymically stand for A.

Kövecses comments on the three-groups identified above. The first thing he notes is that group three is by far the largest of the three, and yet it has received the least attention in the study of the language used about the emotions states Kövecses. Those expressions are deemed completely uninteresting and irrelevant by the most researchers, who tend to see the expressions as epiphenomena, fancier ways of saying some things that could be said in literal, simple ways. Further, Kövecses notes that the expressions in group one are usually considered literal. Given this, we can understand why the expressions in group three received scant attention explains Kövecses.

2.2.11.1.4. Meaning and Emotion

According to Kövecses (2000) several distinct views were offered in an attempt to characterise emotional meaning.

The "Label" view

The label view of emotional meaning maintains that the meaning of emotion terms is simply an association between a label, like the words anger and fear, plus some real emotional phenomenon, like physiological processes and behaviour. This view is according to Kövecses, the simplest lay view of emotional meaning. It is based on the folk theory of meaning in general according to which, meaning is merely an association between sounds and things. The understanding of meaning in general also forms the basis of a scientific theory of emotion. Schacter and Singer proposed a view which is an improvement on the

simplest lay view in that emotion involves three things: a label, plus something real, plus a situation. However, they both exclude the possibility that emotion terms can have much conceptual content and organisation, but several studies have shown that emotion terms have a great deal of conceptual content and structure states Kövecses.

The "Core Meaning " view

According to Kövecses, a distinction between core and peripheral meaning must be made. Core meaning is characterised by a small number of properties, or components that are taken to define a category in an adequate manner. This means that core meanings should be capable of minimally distinguishing between the meanings of any two words; that is, by virtue of the smallest possible number of components. In this views the core meaning is thought of as the more important kind of meaning, while peripheral meaning is viewed as less important in giving the meaning of words and expressions. Kövecses explains that peripheral meaning or connotation is usually seen as being made up of various social, situational, affective, and other properties – properties that are not taken to contribute to the cognitive content of words in a significant way. Connotations are assumed to vary from person to person and from culture and according to some researchers like Osgood, certain connotations are universal explains Kövecses.

Kövecses maintains that the core meaning of emotion categories typically assumes the idea that emotional meaning is composed of universal semantic primitives. A leading proponent of this view is Wierzbicka. One of her major approach is that it is a mistake to think of emotion words in particular languages, such as English, as being universal. Universals, according to Wierzbicka, are the semantic primitives that make up the conceptual content of particular emotion words in a particular languages. Kövecses refers to another example of core

meaning view, namely Davitz who characterizes the meaning of the English emotion word anger as being composed of Hyper activation, moving against, tension and inadequacy.

The "Dimensional" view

According to Kövecses emotional meaning is also viewed as being constituted by a fixed set of dimensions of meaning. Solomon postulates thirteen dimensions that are sufficient of describe any emotion. The definitions of emotion concepts make use of all or some of these dimensions state Kövecses. The core meaning and dimensional views are not always easy to distinguish. Thus according to Fridja, the dimension that apply to a given emotion provide a "components profile" that uniquely characterises an emotion explains Kövecses. Researchers working in the dimensional approach attempt to eliminate a major alleged pitfall of the core meaning view in general the large gap between emotional and emotional experience. Fridja distinguish twenty-six dimensions.

The "Implicational" view

According to Shweder core meaning and dimensional views are based on core meaning in general, the implicational view takes the connotative meaning at its main point of departure. To study what something means is to study what it entails, implies or suggests to those who understand it, Shweder avers. Meaning is connotative meaning, not denotative meaning. It is the periphery, rather than the core, that counts in this view of meaning connotative meaning and in particular emotional meaning, varies considerably from culture to culture.

The "Prototype" view

It was previously mentioned that some emotion words are more prototypical than others. When we try to specify the structure and content of the best example of

any of the lower-level categories (anger, fear, love) we are working within the "prototype" view of emotional meaning as it relates to individual basic-level categories. The structure of emotion concepts is seen by many researchers as a script, scenario, or model. For example Lakoff and Kövecses describe anger as a sequence of stages of events: (1) cause of anger, (2) anger exists, (2) attempt at controlling anger, (4) loss of control over anger, (5) retribution. That is, anger is viewed as being conceptualized as a five-stage scenario. The particular sequence of events makes up the structure of the prototypical concept of any given emotion, like fear, while the particular events that participate in the sequence make up the content of the concepts.

Kövecses states that, in the prototype approach, there were two kinds of views, which can be distinguished: the literal and the non-literal conceptions of emotion. Other researchers believe that metaphorical and metonymical understanding play a role while some of these researchers disagree. Despite the disagreements, many believe that metaphors are important and discuss the role and possible contribution of conceptual metaphors and metonymies to the conceptualisation of emotional experience. Finally, Kövecses suggested that many emotions, such as love, fear, and happiness have not just one, but several prototypical cognitive models associated with them. That is the proposal is that several members can acquire the status of "best example" within an emotion category. This is because, given a category within several members, one member can be typical, another can be salient, a third can be ideal, and so on.

The "Social – Contractionist" view

Kövecses points out that several scholars take emotion concepts to be social constructions. The model given by Lutz of song in Ifaluk is considerably different from the one associated with the English word anger. To account for the differences, Lutz claims that this model of Ifaluk song is a cultural construction whose properties depend on particular aspects of Ifaluk society and culture. The

socio-constructionist view of emotion concepts is also based, at least in the work of its leading proponents on the notion of prototype. According to Kövecses the structure of most emotion concepts is seen as a highly conventionalised script from which deviations are recognised and linguistically marked in any given culture where the explicitly social-constructionist views differ from other prototype based concepts.

The embodied Cultural Prototype" view

Lakoff and Kövecses claim that to the degree that the metaphors that constitute anger are motivated by physiological functioning, the concept will be motivated by human body, rather than being completely arbitrary, being just a social-cultural product. Kövecses goes beyond the view that the concept of anger is simply motivated by human physiology and the view that is simply a social construction. It is suggested that it is both motivated by the human body and produced by a particular social and cultural environment. That is, an attempt is made to reconcile the two apparently contradictory views. In this way, social construction are given bodily basis and bodily motivation is given social-cultural substance.

2.2.11.1.5. Some Issues

There are several issues according to Kövecses (2000) that are important in the study of emotion concepts and emotional meaning.

The "Validity" issue

One of the most important issues that arises is: which one of the views above really or best represents our everyday conceptions of emotion?
Whether it be the "label" view or, the "core" meaning is a tough question, as it seems that at the present time we have no reliable criteria to decide which of the

views listed above is the one that can be considered a psychologically valid representation of emotion concepts. Although we have no direct answer, work in cognitive science in general suggests that prototypical cognitive models are our best candidates. "Prototype" views seem to offer the greatest explanatory power for many aspects of emotional meaning.

2.2.11.1.6. The Universality of Emotion Prototypes

According to Kövecses several anthropologists and psychologists have argued focal colours appear to be universal. Are emotion prototypes universal? That is, is the prototype (the central member) for emotion X in language Y a prototype (a central member) in other languages as well? Evidence that we have so far seems to suggest that it is not the case. Kövecses observes that some constructionists argue that it is only natural that it is not the case, while others argue that prototypical scripts, or at least large portions of them, are the same across languages and cultures. He refers to Wierzbicka who maintains that the emotion prototypes are different cross-culturally, but the semantics primitives with which these differences are expressed can be and are universal.

It can also be suggested that what is universal are some general structures within the emotion domain, corresponding, as Fridja puts it, to an "unspecified positive emotion" (the happy/joy range) to an "unspecified negative emotion" (the sadness range), to "an emotion of strong affection" (the love range), "an emotional of threat" (the fear range), and an anger-like range. In emotion the "focal" members of basic emotion categories in different languages differ from each other to varying degrees-despite the fact that the same general basic emotion categories exist in possibly all languages and cultures.

2.2.11.1.7. The universality of conceptual tools

According to Kövecses a variety of conceptual tools or elements that scholars utilize in their attempts to provide a cognitive representation of emotional meaning have been seen. These include semantic primitives, connotative properties, dimensions of meaning, scripts or scenarios, and conceptual metaphors and metonymies. Which of these conceptual elements are universal? Kövecses refers to Lakoff and Johnson who suggest that what is universal are certain basic image schemes, as these arise from certain fundamental bodily experiences, and Wierzbicka who suggests that there is a small set of universal semantic primitives with the help of which all concepts, in all languages can be adequately described.

2.2.11.1.8. The role of metaphor and metonymy

Lakoff and Johnson argue that many everyday metaphors are conceptual in nature and can actually create social, cultural, psychological realities for us. Are the conceptual metaphors constitutive of the cultural models associated with emotions or do they simply reflect them? Quinn, as discussed by Kövecses, proposes that the latter is the case. Kövecses takes the opposite view and argues, on the basis of the prevalent container metaphor for anger, that conceptual metaphors, together with other factors, can contribute to how an emotion concept, like anger, is constituted. He refers to Holland and suggests that this either/or view might not be the best way of looking at the issue. Moreover, Kövecses states, it seems closer to the truth to believe that some metaphors have the capacity to reality, while others do not. Which one do and which ones do not can only be decided on the basis of detailed future research.

2.2.11.1.9. "Lay Views" versus "Scientific Theories"

Kövecses poses the question: What is the relationship between everyday emotion (as revealed in conventional language use) and scientific conception of emotion? That is, how are lay and scientific theories of emotion related? This is the issue that Parrot, as discussed by Kövecses, addresses in relation to the lay "heart-head" and the corresponding expert "emotion-cognition" distinctions. To arrive at conclusive findings concerning the exact nature of the relationship between folk and scientific theories, we have to do more intensive research on particular lay and expert theories, and in the process, we have to take into account specific cultural-historical evidence.

2.2.11.1.10. Metaphors of Emotion

Kövecses reviews the research that has been done on metaphorical aspects of emotion concepts. The emotion concepts that have received attention from a variety of scholars in this tradition include anger, fear, happiness, sadness, love, lust, pride, shame and surprise. He states that many of them are prototypical emotion concepts and occur on most lists of "basic emotions" (e.g. anger, fear, happiness, sadness) and some of them such as love and surprise, represent at least arguable cases of basic emotions. With regard to their cognitive status as linguistic categories in a vertical hierarchy of concepts, Kövecses observes that they are all basic-level categories. Several questions arises in connection with the use of such metaphorical language. The survey has been made in order to see some of the directions in which the study of metaphorical language can lead us. These are as follows:

Anger Metaphors

Anger is the most studied emotion concept from a cognitive semantic point of view. With reference to the previous study of Kövecses (1986) Lakoff and

Kövecses (1987) Kövecses (2000) found a number of metaphorical source domain that characterise anger and further by adding some source domains, such as an **angry person is a functioning machine, and anger is a social superior**. Below Kövecses provides a list of main metaphorical source domain.

Anger is a hot fluid in a container: She is *boiling with* anger.

Anger is fire: He's doing a *slow burn*. His anger is *smouldering*.

Anger is insanity: The man was *insane with* rage.

Anger is an opponent in a struggle: I was *struggling with* my anger.

Anger is a captive animal: He *unleashed* his anger.

Anger is a burden: He carries his anger *around* with him.

Anger behaviour is aggressive animal behaviour: Don't *snarl at* me!

The cause of anger is trespassing: Here I *draw the line*.

The cause of anger is physical annoyance: He's a *pain in the neck*.

Anger is a natural force: It was a *stormy* meeting.

An angry person is a functioning machine: That really *got* him *going*.

Anger is a social superior: His actions were completely *governed* by anger.

These metaphorical source domain address various aspects of the concept of anger for example, the functioning machine metaphor focuses on the angry person, **physical annoyance and trespassing** on the cause of anger, **aggressive animal behaviour** on the angry behaviour and so forth. According to Kövecses the conceptual metaphor seems to be the central one for anger is **anger is a hot fluid in a container**. This container metaphor captures many different aspects of the concept anger.

Fear Metaphor

In discussing emotions metaphors of fear, Kövecses (2000) refers to the previous studies of Kövecses (1990) and gives the following examples for fear emotion.

Fear is a fluid in a container: The sight *filled* her *with* fear.

Fear is a hidden enemy: Fear slowly *crept up on him*. He was *hounded by* the fear that the business would fail. The thought continued to *prey on* her mind.

Fear is a tormentor: My mother was *tormented* by fear.

Fear is a supernatural being: He was *haunted* by fear.

Fear is an illness: Jill was *sick with* fright.

Fear is insanity: Jack was *insane with* fear.

The subject of fear is a divided self: I was *beside* myself with fear.

Fear is an opponent in a struggle: Fear *took hold of* me.

Fear is a burden: Fear *weighed heavily* on them.

Fear is a natural force: She was *engulfed* by panic.

Fear is a social superior: His actions were *dictated* by fear.

According to Kövecses fear appears to be characterized by both very general emotion metaphors such as fluid in a container, **opponent, burden**. This also includes hidden enemy and supernatural being. The **fluid container** was not the central way to understand fear, **drop in body temperature, physical agitation, increase in** heart rate was also considered. Kövecses further describes the source domain characterizing fear thus: This divided self as a metaphorical source domain suggests that the self that is normally inside the body container moves outside it. This happens when the person loses control, over his or her own emotions.

Happiness Metaphors

Kövecses discusses some very general metaphorical source domains in happiness metaphors, the domains such as **captive animal, opponent, insanity** and etc. The concept of happiness is also characterized by a number of some limited source domain including **up, light, rapture**. There are also specific ones as well, such as **an animal that lives well and pleasurable physical sensation** which, according to Kövecses are as follows:

Happy is up: We had to cheer him *up.*

Happiness is being off the ground: I am *six feet off the ground.* I was so happy *my feet barely touched the ground.*

Happiness is being in heaven: That was *heaven on earth.*

Happy is light: She *brightened* up at the news.

Happiness is vitality: He was *alive* with joy.

Happy is warm: That *warmed* my spirits.

Happiness is health: It made me *feel great.*

A happy person is an animal that lives well: He was happy as *a pig in shit.* He looks like *the cat that got the cream.*

Happiness is a pleasurable physical sensation: I was *tickled pink.*

Happiness is a fluid in a container: He was *overflowing with* joy.

Happiness is a captive animal: His feelings of happiness *broke loose.* She couldn't *hold back* her feelings of happiness.

Happiness is an opponent in a struggle: He was *knocked out*! She was *overcome* by joy.

Happiness is a rapture/high: I was *drunk with* joy.

Happiness is insanity: They were *crazy with* happiness.

Happiness is a natural force: He was *swept off his* feet.

Sadness Metaphors

In discussing sadness metaphors Kövecses (2002) refers to the previous studies by Barcelona (1986), He identified the following source domains:

Sad is down: He *brought* me *down* with his remarks.

Sad is dark: He is in a *dark* mood.

Sadness is a lack of heat: Losing his father *put his fire out*; he's been depressed for two years.

Sadness is a lack of vitality: This was *disheartening* news.

Sadness is a fluid in a container: I am *filled with* sorrow.

Sadness is a physical force: That was a *terrible* blow.

Sadness is a natural force: Waves of depression *came over him*.

Sadness is an illness: She was *heart-sick*. time *heals* all sorrow.

Sadness is insanity: He was *insane with* grief.

Sadness is a burden: He *staggered under* the pain.

**Sadness is a living organism:** He *drowned* his sorrow in drink.

Sadness is a captive animal: His feelings of misery *got out of hand*.

Sadness is an opponent: He was *seized by* a fit of depression

Sadness is a social superior: She was *ruled* by sorrow.

Love Metaphors

Kövecses avers that love is considered as the highly metaphorized emotion concept. This is because love is not only an emotion but a relationship as well. It also partakes of metaphorical source domains that typically characterize human relationship. According to Kövecses, the central idea, and hence the central metaphor in the love system is the notion of unity, this is because love is **a unity of two complementary parts.**

Love is a nutrient: I am *starved for* love.

Love is a journey: It's been *a long, bumpy road*.

Love is a unity of parts: We're as one. they're *breaking up*. we're *inseparable*. we *fused together*.

Love is closeness: They're very *close*.

Love is a bond: There is a close *tie* between them.

Love is a fluid in a container: She was *overflowing with* love.

Love is fire: I am *burning* with love.

Love is an economic exchange: I'm *putting more into* this than you are.

Love is a natural force: She *swept* me *off my feet*.

Love is a physical force: I was *magnetically drawn* to her.

Love is an opponent: She tried to *fight* her feelings of love.

Love is a captive animal: She *let go of* her feelings.

Love is war: She *conquered* him.

Love is sport/a game: He *made a play for* her.

Love is a disease/an illness: I am *heart-sick.*

Love is magic: He was *enchanted.*

Love is insanity: I am *crazy about* you.

Love is a social superior: She is completely *ruled* by love.

Love is rapture/a high: I have been *high on* love for weeks.

The object of love is appetizing food: Hi, *sweetie-pie.*

The object of love is a small child: Well, *baby*, what are we gonna do?

The object of love is a deity: Don't *put* her on a *pedestal*. he *worships* her.

The object of love is a valuable object: You're my *treasure*!

Lust Metaphors

Kövecses and Lakoff collected some examples of metaphors of lust. In their discovery Kövecses (2000) refers to the process study of Lakoff (1987) and the metaphors include:

Lust is hunger: She's sex-starved.

Lust is a vicious animal: You bring out the beast in me.

Lust is heat: I've got the hots for her.

Lust is pressure inside a container: Her whole body exploded in passion.

Lust is insanity: You're driving me insane.

A lustful person is a functioning machine: She turned me on.

Lust is a game: I couldn't get to first base with her.

Lust is war: She was his latest conquest.

Lust is a physical force: She knocked me off my feet.

Lust is a natural force: There were waves of passion.

Lust is a social superior: He's completely ruled by lust.

Shame Metaphors

In presenting the major metaphorical source domain for shame, Kövecses (2000) refers to the work done by Holland and Kipnis (1995) and Pape (1995) in which the following source domains were included:

A shameful person is a person having no clothes on: I felt so *naked*; so *exposed*. I was *caught with my pants down*.

Shame is a fluid in a container: The memory *filled* him with shame.

Shame is an illness: He *suffered* much embarrassment in his youth.

Shame is a decrease in size: I felt *this big*.

Shame is hiding away from the world: I wanted to *bury my head in the sand*. I wished the *ground would just swallow me up*.

A shameful person is a divided self: I tried to *regain my composure*.

A shameful person is a worthless object: I felt like *two cents waiting for change*.

Shame is physical damage: I was *shattered*.

Shame is a burden: Guilt was *weighing him down*.

According to Holland and Kipnis (1995) the central metaphor for shame is **having no clothes on**. This is a clearly understanding for shame.

Surprise Metaphors

Kövecses (2000) refers to the study by Kendrick Murdock (1994) where results indicate that most of the understanding of surprise comes from three metaphorical source domains which are **surprise is a physical force, a surprised person is a burst container** and **a surprise is a natural force.** Obviously the **burst container metaphor** is a very important aspects of surprise in that the surprised person temporarily loses control over himself or herself.

Emotion Metaphors

The general issues that Kövecses wishes to raise relate to whether there are any metaphorical source domains that are specific, or unique to emotions. He further poses the question of whether we understand emotions in a unique way or whether we understand them through source concepts that are shared by other non-emotional domains in the conceptualizative. Kövecses focuses on what he calls the scope of metaphor. He suggests that this notion is intended to capture an aspect of conceptual metaphor, which is the idea that the source domains of conceptual metaphors do not have unlimited applications. That is, particular source domains seem to apply to a clearly identifiable range of target concepts. This notion will be used in relation to emotion states by Kövecses.

Kövecses argues that when we ask if the source domain of emotion are specific to domain of emotion, we are actually asking four questions (1) if the metaphorical source domains of emotions are specific to one emotion (2) whether they are specific to a subset of emotions (3) whether they are specific to all emotions or extend beyond the domain of emotions. To answer all these questions we would have to examine all metaphors of all emotion concepts and this examination has not yet been done. I will take years for any interested scholars to produce results, argues Kövecses.

Kövecses maintains that these questions will be answered in a tentative manner. The nine emotion concepts and the metaphorical source domain are anger, fear, happiness, sadness, love, lust (sexual desire), pride, shame and surprise, maintains Kövecses. In response to the questions, Kövecses claims that most source domains associated with emotions concepts are not specific to emotion concepts, rather they have a wider application. Kövecses argues that there are some metaphorical source domains associated with the emotion concepts mentioned above that do appear to be specific to emotions.

## 2.2.11.1.11. SOURCE DOMAINS AND THE EMOTIONS TO WHICH THEY APPLY.

In this analysis, according to Kövecses, we have to take each of the source domain that was found and check with which target emotion concept they occur.

Source domains that apply to all emotion concepts

These are metaphors such as the **existence of emotion is presence here** (all feelings are gone). **Existence of emotion is being in a bounded space.** (she was in ecstasy) and **existence of emotion is possession of an object** (she has a lot of pride). **Emotion is a living organism metaphor** (His fear grew) states Kövecses.

Source domains that apply to most emotion concepts

These tend also to be more specific in their metaphorical imagery than those that apply to all, states Kövecses.

Container

This is the major metaphorical source domain of emotion, states Kövecses. He says it seems to occur with all emotions looked at above. This image defines "an inside-outside" perspective for the human body states Kövecses. This conceptualisation can be found in many unrelated languages in the world, states Kövecses. Emotions are seen as occurrences inside the body by many cultures world-wide.

Natural force and physical force

According to Kövecses the idea and image of Natural Force (like wind, storm, flood) seems to be present in the conceptualization of many emotion. When a person is in an emotional state, we describe this as being overwhelmed, engulfed, swept off our feet and etc. Kövecses maintains that physical forces also take various forms. These include phenomena such as heat, attraction of bodies, abrupt physical contract between bodies and the like.

Social superior

The aspects of social superiority appears to apply to most of the emotions under consideration. "Social superior" is understood here as the social equivalent of physical-natural force, argues Kövecses. In his survey he claims that it has not been found with happiness, sadness, shame and lust but is easily conceivable with these emotions as well.

Opponent, *Captive Animal*, *Insanity*

According to Kövecses these aspects are shared by roughly the same concepts as social superior. Of the nine emotion concepts only three do not seem to take these metaphorical images: pride, shame and surprise.

Divided self

The 'divided self' applies to happiness and anger (He was beside himself with happiness/anger, states Kövecses.

Burden

Emotion concepts that take burden as a metaphorical image are anger, fear, sadness and shame, says Kövecses. He goes on to say that the ones that do not seem to take it are happiness, pride and surprise.

Illness

Illness source domain applies to emotions that are considered "negative" these concepts include fear, sadness, love and shame, argues Kövecses.

Source domains that apply to some emotions

Kövecses states that the source domains associated with this emotion concept are less general and they do not apply to most emotions but apply to at least two.

Heat/fire

This image (hot) can be found in anger, (romantic) love, and lust, argues Kövecses. He states that this image may be applicable to shame (she was burning with shame/embarrassment), however, the fully conventionalized expression for shame "my cheeks were burning" is a metonymy on which a metaphor is built. Heat/fire does not seem to occur as a source domain with happiness, sadness, pride and the suppress, argues Kövecses. He draws a distinction between "heat-cold" and "warm-cold" as metaphorical source domains of emotions. He further says that the element of heat can be combined with **container** image to yield the composite image of **hot fluid in a container.**

Warm-cold, light-dark, up-down, vitality-lack of vitality.

This metaphorical source domain seems to behave in a uniform way in that they apply to happiness and sadness only, claims Kövecses. He gives an example in

Australian English were one can be dark at someone. He says this relates to the assumed darkening of the face in anger and so it is a metonymy,

Economic value

According to Kövecses this source domain applies to pride and shame. In pride the subject of the emotion may assign either a high or low value whereas in shame the value is low.

Nutrient/food, war and game

Their application seems to be limited to love and lust.

Rapture/high and hidden object

These concepts are used to understand the emotion of happiness and love.

Magic, unity, journey

This metaphorical domain characterized love and lust. Love and lust can according to Kövecses take magic and unity as their source. The journey metaphor is extremely productive in love.

Physical damage

According to Kövecses physical damage is used in the conceptualization of pride and shame. Physical damage is intended here in the sense of visible damage as a result of one physical object knocking into another.

Source domains that apply to one emotion

These are source domains that do not apply to most emotions, but they apply to at least two.

Heat/fire

Kövecses claims that the image of heat/fire can be found in anger, love and lust. It may be applicable to shame as well. The element of heat can be combined with the container image. Warm-cold, light-dark, up-down, vitality-lack of vitality seem to behave in a uniform way, they apply to happiness and sadness only.

Economic value

According to Kövecses, this source domain applies to pride and shame. In pride the subject of the emotion may assign either a high or low value whereas in shame the value is low.

Nutrient/food, war and game

The application of these aspects seems to be limited to love and lust.

Source domains that apply to one emotion

According to Kövecses the following metaphorical domains occur with only a single emotion concept.
- Trespassing, physical annoyance = Anger
- Hidden enemy, supernatural being = Fear
- Being off the ground, being in heaven, an animal that lives well, pleasurable physical sensation = Happiness
- Having no clothes on, decrease in size, blocking out the world = Shame

2.2.11.1.12 Aspects of emotion concepts

Most source domains are, according to Kövecses, specific to a particular emotion concepts. In order to see this, certain aspects of emotion concepts were examined.

a. **Existence**

There are metaphors whose task is to express whether an emotion exists or does not exist. The major conceptual metaphor with this function include:

Existence of emotion is presence here

Existence of emotion is being in a bounded space

Existence of emotion is possession of an object

The existence of emotion is the function of a machine.

The first three metaphors applies to all emotion concepts, the function metaphor has limited application to anger and lust. These metaphors clearly extend beyond the domain of emotion. They are part of what Lakoff (1993) calls the "**event structure**" metaphor and they are general in our conceptual system.

b. **Intensity**

Intensity is an aspects of emotion concept that is highlighted by several metaphors. The metaphorical source domains that focus on this aspects include **container, heat/fire, living organism and natural/physical force.** Given that, we get general metaphors such as:

Intensity of emotion is amount quality

Intensity of emotion is heat

Increase in the intensity of emotion is growth

Intensity of emotion is strength of effect (force)

e.g. To be full of emotion indicates more intensity of emotion.

We can present general knowledge in the following way.

- Intensity is amount. (a very much amount)
- To <u>blaze away</u> at something (heat/fire)
- The sudden growth of the economy
- The country was <u>hit hard</u> by the flood (effect)

c. **Passivity**

Passivity of emotion is a kind of passive experience. The word passion originally means "suffering". This reflected in the metaphor of:

The passivity of emotional experience is physical of natural/physical forces.

According to Kövecses the main use of this metaphor is in a situation where there is an entity that is conceptualized as being affected by another force in a unidirectional manner.

d. **Control**

Kövecses argues that control is a complex notion, and it can be broken down into 3 stages that is; (1) attempt at control (2) loss of control and (3) lack of control. Given this stages, the source domains tend to focus on different stages.

Focus on attempt of control:
- **Attempt at emotional control is** trying to overcome an opponent.
- **Attempt at emotional control is** trying to hold back a captive animal.
- **Attempt at emotional control is** trying to suppress fluid in a container.
- **Attempt at emotional control is** trying to keep complete object together.

Focus on loss of control:

Loss of emotional control is loss of control over a strong force.

Focus on lack of control.

- Lack of emotional control is insanity.

- Lack of emotional control is magic.

- Lack of emotional control is rapture/high.

- Lack of emotional control is superior.

- Lack of emotional control is divided self.

Control includes natural/physical force, opponent, capture animal, fluid in a container, insanity, magic, superior, incomplete object, rapture/high.

In the source domain above argues Kövecses that, we have literal forces like a captured animal, hot fluid in a container, superior, that are metaphorically conceptualized as forces. The more general "control-related" metaphors would be as follows:

- **Attempt of control** is loss of control over force.

- **Lack of control** is lack of control over force.

- A person in control is a canonical person.

- A person out of control is a divided self.

e. **Positive negative evaluation**

According to Kövecses emotion can be positive or negative. The negative ones are understood as **illness** metaphor. One can talk of a sick or healthy relationship. This suggests that the sense of "negativity" may arise and it is understood as illness/health outside the domain of emotion.

These are other source domain that focus on this aspects of emotion concepts: up-down, light-dark, warm-cold, valuable-non valuable. These source domains according to Kövecses, apply to happiness, sadness, pride-shame metaphors. Good things are metaphorically **up**, **light**, **warm**, and **valuable** while bad things are **down**, **dark**, **cold** and **non valuable**.

f. **Difficulty**

Kövecses argues that difficulty includes anger, fear, sadness and shame. These kinds of emotion concepts focus on the source domain of burden.

Desire/need

Kövecses claims that desire appears to apply in two ways, firstly where the action is "spurred", this is where we find anger and lust. Secondly is where the desire consists of having emotion; thus we hunger for love.

Harm

The source domain of physical damage applies in two emotion concepts: pride and shame.
It can be anger and love. **Emotional harm can be seen as a physical damage.** One kind of this harm is understood in terms of physical damage.

2.2.11.1.13 THE FORCE OF EMOTION

Metaphor causes are, according to Kövecses, forces, it is natural to conceptualize emotion as forces that bring about certain effects. Force metaphors can be found in several cultures as well. There are two points that Kövecses discuses. One is that most of the well-known metaphors of emotion seem to be instantiations of single underlying "master metaphor": Emotion is

force. The other is that these metaphors instantiate the generic-level metaphor in very different ways, capturing very different aspects of emotional experience.

The force schema

Emotions are forces metaphors and, has its source domain the force schema. This schema, according to Kövecses, is one of the basic schema that structures the conceptual system. Kövecses quotes Leonard Talmy who studied the most characterized schema. Based on this characterization, Talmy isolates the following factors in the force schema.

Force entities
Agonist
Antagonist
Intrinsic force tendency
toward action
toward rest
Resultant of the force interaction
action
rest
Balance of strengths
the stronger entity
the weaker entity

Kövecses states that if he applies these factors to the concept of emotion, we get the following generic-level mappings.

Force Agonist – Emotion Agonist
Force Antogist – Emotion Antagonist
F Ant's force tendency – Em Ant's force tendency
F Ago's force tendency – Am Ago's force tendency

A Ago's resultant state – Em Ago's resultant state

Kövecses points out that the force tendency towards inaction was taken as Agonist, whereas the exerts force on the Agonist and typically overcomes to be the Antagonist. He states that there are numerous ways in which the force schema can be applied to the concept of emotion. According to Kövecses that specific level of the generic – level can be found in emotion is force metaphor as emotion is internal pressure, emotion is natural force, emotion is fire and emotion is a burden.

Specific – level metaphors focusing on emotion

Emotion is internal pressure inside a container

According to Kövecses, the generic – level force schema can be found in more specific version of pressure. The internal pressure metaphors assumes two further metaphors; **people are container and emotion is a substance in a container**. The specific container for a human emotion is the human body and the specific substance is typically a fluid or a gas.

Given the instantiations, Kövecses explains the source to target mapping between the force and emotion domains in the following way: He says the emotion substance may go up inside the container, if it does the substance creates perceivable pressure in the container, the pressure may increase to the point that the substance goes out of the container. In other words when there is a very little emotion substance in the container, the pressure is low and thus is at a low intensity. Kövecses states that when the substance rises, this corresponds to an increase in emotional intensity. The pressure itself corresponds to the emotion causing the self to respond, the pressure bringing about an effect correspond to the emotion's leading to a response, and the substance going out of the container corresponding to some external behaviour by the self.

Kövecses points out that due to the casual relationship between the emotion and action response, emotions are seen as motivations relative to the action response. In this scheme the emotion is seen as an internal motivation for action to respond. He maintains that the motivation is conceptualized as an internal force, while the action produced is viewed as the external effect of this internal force. The greater the intensity of internal pressure, the greater is the degree of motivation to respond emotionally.

Kövecses maintains that if the intensity of internal pressure increases beyond a point, this brings about an effect on the body-container, that is, an emotional response is carried out. The effect (the action) may be prevented by not letting the substance go out of the body – container. In other words: attempting to control the emotional response – attempting to keep the substance inside. Kövecses explains that the self is unable to keep the substance inside the container, the external effect on the container takes place: either by the container overflowing or by the container exploding.

The two call for a refinement in Talmy's system in that we have to recognize two kinds of action on the Agonist's part. Kövecses states that when the container overflows, we get uncontrolled but non violent emotional responses, when it explodes, we get uncontrolled violent responses such as in the case of anger.

- Overflowing of the container – uncontrolled non violent response
- The explosion of the container – uncontrolled violent response

Kövecses observes that the "middle" or romantic, emotion (like affection and sadness) are conceptualized as overflowing "the container" whereas the move "violent" emotions are viewed as "exploding" out of the body container. This only applies in the typical cases, sometimes a violent emotion may be conceptualized as producing a non violent response. e.g. He was overflowing with rage.

A "non-violent" emotion may also be seen as leading to a relatively violent response. (e.g. she felt like she was going to burst with joy).

Emotion is an opponent

Kövecses mentions that emotions are also conceptualized as opponents in a struggle. The struggle takes place between the self and an emotion as opponents. The self first is in control of the emotion, but then the emotion causes the self to respond, that is to be lose control. There are two outcomes of the struggle: winning and losing

Emotion is a wild animal.

According to Kövecses this is a special case of the opponent metaphor and this inherits most of its mappings. In the wild metaphor, the struggle is between master and an animal that tries to get away from the master.

The master and the animal are "opponents".

**Emotion is a mental force.**

Kövecses explains that this metaphor comes in several versions. The mental force may be a force coming from a human or a drug. If it comes from a human source, it's **emotion is a magician** and **emotion is a deceiver**.

Kövecses states that the magician metaphor is probably limited to romantic love. The trickster metaphor seems to be much more general, its application may extend to any emotion. A person in an emotional state is commonly seen as incapable of higher mental functioning. In this metaphor the normal person is identified with the rational self that as a result of the trickstar – emotions tricks becomes irrational. Kövecses further maintains that the emotions force tendency

is to make the rational self see the world in a distorted way, while the rational self's tendency is to remain rational. Eventually the trickstar deceives its victim and correspondingly, the emotion makes the rational self-irrational. In other words, the self who is in an emotional state is depicted by this metaphor as being irrational.

2.12. SUMMARY

Different scholars examined different views about emotions. The brain was seen as the part that generates emotional behaviour. Emotion was also illustrated as a function in a person connecting to feelings, whether it can be a feeling of fear or even anger. Eight prototype of functional patterns of behaviour were reviewed, including the structural model that represents the relationship among the primary emotions, sadness, anger, happiness, anger, and disgust are seen as sets of basic emotions. Some words are more basic than others. The emotions that are more basic are anger, sadness, fear, joy and love.

CHAPTER   3

METAPHORS OF EMOTIONS

3.1. Aim

The aim of this chapter is to examine the classification of metaphors of emotion in Tshivenda.

3.2. Purpose

The purpose of the chapter is to investigate whether the classification of emotion metaphors is expressed in Tshivenda the same way as in Kövecses examples.

3.3. Organisation

In order to achieve the above mentioned, this chapter will focus on the following:

- Definitions of metaphors
- Types of metaphors of emotions in Tshivenda
- Tshivenda examples

3.4. Definition of metaphor

Kövecses defines a metaphor as a way of describing something by saying that it is something else which has the qualities that you are trying to describe. Kövecses states that metaphors are viewed as a matter of special or extraordinary language – a set of deviant linguistic expressions whose meaning is reducible to some set of literal propositions viewed such as a figure of speech. Lakoff (1986) argues that a metaphor entails not just a way of naming, but also a way of thinking, it is a figure of thought as well as a figure of speech. In his view, a metaphor is a process of through we understand and structure the domain of

experience in terms of another domain of a different kind. Johnson (1987:15) argues that the study of metaphor is central not only to rhetoric but also of language and cognition in general. Metaphor is one of the most important features in language that reflects cognitive vision and optimises cultural context.

Muller (1982:197) shows that a metaphor is more condensed or implicit and, therefore, works with greater force.

Gray (1984:189) describes metaphors as follows:

> Metaphor merges the two things being compared into a
> new non-literal conceptual compound.

Lakoff and Johnson define the essence of metaphor as understanding and experiencing one thing in terms of another (1980:55)

Milubi (1997:26) shows that in a metaphor a comparison is implied, unlike in a simile where the comparison is explicit.

    (a) Inwi ni tou vha nguluvhe

      (You are just a pig)

The metaphor expression in (a) is comparing the addressee's manner of eating like that of a pig. The pig is regarded as an animal associated with filth and it carries a sense of rejection. In Tshivenda culture, if someone is regarded as a pig, the addressee will feel very unimportant and useless. Also consider the following example:

    (b) Matodzi ndi mmbwa

      (Matodzi is a dog)

In the above example we realize that Matodzi is not literally a dog but the meaning is figurative in the sense that he is compared to a dog. His behaviour is like that of a dog.

3.5. TYPES OF METAPHORS

3.5.1. Metaphors of Lust

3.5.1.1. Definition of Lust

Collins Cobuild Dictionary (2003:861) defines lust as a feeling of strong sexual desire for someone. Lust is a complex concept which is understood via a system of conceptual metaphors.

(a) **Lust is hunger**, **the object of lust is food**.

(i)   U na ndala ya musadzi.
       He has hunger for a woman.
       (He is sex starved)

(ii)   O khalea
       He is longing
       (He is longing for sex)

(iii) Ndi na dora
       I am thirsty
       (I am thirsty)

(iv)   U na nyemulo
       He has lust
       (He is lustfull)

(v)   U na tsindi
   He has traditional underwear
       (He loves sex/women)

(b) **Lust is heat**

(i)   U khou swa ngae

He is burning by her

(I am burning with desire)

(ii)   Idani ni ndudedze

Come and warm me

(Come and warm me up)

(iii)   U a fhisa

She is hot

(She performs well in love-making)

(c) **Lust is insanity**

(i)   Ndi a dada ngae

I am crazy by her

(I am crazy about her)

(ii)   Ndi a penga ngae

I am mad by her

(I am madly in love with her)

(iii)   U funesa tshitanda

She loves stick

(She is a nymphomaniac)

(iv)   U funesa shedo

He love skirt

(He is obsssesed by women)

(d) **Lust is a game**

(i)   Vhusiku ha namusi i do kora

       Night of today it will score

       (I am going to have sex tonight)

(ii)   Idani ri tambe tshiswate/bune

       Come let's play hide and seek

       (Where they also indulge in non-penetrative sex)

(e) **Lust is an animal**

(i)   Litshani u nwaya-nwaya

       Stop me pawing-pawing

       (Stop pawing me)

(ii)   No tou ndisela phukha

       You bring beast

       (You bring out the beast in me)

From the above examples, there are source domains that Kövecses mentioned about the collection of metaphors used to understand lust. In Tshivenda culture the source domain overlaps considerably with the source domain of metaphors of anger. As the above examples indicate, anger is also understood in terms of heat/fire, wild animals and insanity as well as the reaction to an external force, sexual ones can have smoldering anger. One can be consumed with desire and consumed with anger. One can be insane with lust and insane with anger. Lakoff supported that lust, as well as anger, can get out of hand. The connection between the conception of lust and the conception of anger is by no means accidental and has important social consequences.

The metaphorical expressions that are used to describe lust are not mere words. They are expression of metaphorical concepts that we use to understand lust. According to Kövecses (2000:29) The domain that are used for comprehending lust are **hunger, animals, heat, insanity, machines, games, war and physical forces.**

3.5.2. Metaphors of fear

3.5.2.1. Definition of fear

Collins Cobuild Dictionary (2003:523) defines fear as an unpleasant feeling you have when you think that you are in danger. There are a large number of metaphorical expressions that we use to talk about fear. Kövecses points out that the metaphor **fear is a fluid in a container** which is a special case of the very general metaphor, Kövecses suggests the underlined metaphorical source domains. Consider the following Tshivenda examples.

      (a) **Fear is a fluid in a container**

    (i)   Nyofho dzo vha dzo hulela khae
              Fear was big in him
              (Fear was growing in him)

    (ii)   O vha o dala nyofho
              He was full of fear
              (He was full of fear)

In this case the fluid correspond to the emotion and the container to the body of the person who is in the emotional state. Kövecses suggests that fear exists as an independent mass entity inside the self.

(b) **Fear is an illness**

(i) Tendani u lwala nyofho

Tendani is sick of fright

(He is a coward)

Kövecses claims that the illness metaphor seems to be that either fear is an illness or it can cause illness in the self. Given that fear is conceptualised as an entity that can threaten our lives and cause great physical or mental suffering, it is only natural that it is also viewed as an **opponent** that we have to defeat. The **opponent** metaphor, claims Kövecses, is a very productive one in the case of fear. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(c) **Fear is an opponent**

(i)   O farwa nga nyofho

He was gripped by fear

(He was gripped by fear)

(ii)   Ndi tambudzwa nga nyofho

I struggled with fear

(I was struggling with fear)

(iii)   U vhaiswa nga nyofho

He is troubled by fear

(He is hurt by fear)

The ontological correspondences of the metaphor are obvious. The opponent is fear. Kövecses argues that the physical struggle between the self and the opponent corresponds to the psychological struggle for emotional control. Defeating the opponent is understood as controlling fear and losing to the

opponent as fear controlling the self. This examples reflect the psychological reality. The following are the container metaphor.

(d) **Fear is a burden**

(i)   Ndo tou vhofholowa musi khombo yo fhira.

I was relieved when danger had passed

(I was relieved when the danger was over)

According to Kövecses, when the burden metaphor is used in connection with the target domain, it indicates that the domain in question is considered unpleasant or bad. This, fear and the metanymically related concept of danger are portrayed by metaphor as unpleasant. Kövecses further states that the cessation of fear (danger) is pleasant, that is, it provides a relief. Another metaphor commonly employed in the conceptualization of emotions is the **natural force** metaphor.

(e) **Fear is a natural force (wind, storm, flood, etc.)**

(i)   O vha o tangwa nga nyofho

She was surrounded by fear

(She was surrounded by fear)

(ii)   Nwana o tibwa nga nyofho

Baby was covered by fear

(Baby is engulfed by panic)

According to Kövecses, the main focus of the natural force metaphor seems to be that the self is passive in relation to the emotion, that the emotion affects us while we passively undergo its effects. Kövecses further explains that, not only do we passively undergo the effects of various natural forces but our emotions also force us to perform certain actions. This way of understanding the emotions

emerges from the **superior** metaphors. This metaphors suggests that the self is an inferior who obeys the commands of the superior. The particular version of fear can be exemplified as follows:

(f) **Fear is a superior**

    (i)   Nyofho dzawe dzo mu thivhela u dzhena nduni
            Fear   her   prevented   enter   house
            (Her fear prevented her from going into the house)

    (ii)   O vha a tshi khou vhuswa nga nyofho
            She   was   being   ruled   by   fear
            (She was ruled by fear)

    (iii)   U langwa nga nyofho
            She is led by fear
            (She is led by fear)

    (iv)   U laulwa nga nyofho
            She is controlled by fear
   (She is controlled by fear)

The above metaphors illustrate that fear is something that can prevent us from doing certain things, that can cause us to perform certain actions, and that in general it is something that can dominate our behaviour.

3.5.3. METAPHORS OF PRIDE

3.5.3.1. Definition of pride

Collins Cobuild Dictionary (2003:1133) defines pride as a feeling of satisfaction which you have because, you or people close to you have done something good or possess something good. Pride also has its version of **the emotions are fluid in a container** metaphor. Kövecses states that pride is a fluid in a container metaphor is partially motivated by the **body is a container for the emotions** metaphor. Kövecses suggests that an experimental basis of these metaphor pride is a fluid in a container seems to be provided by the physiological effects **increases heart rate** (involving the heart as a container with blood in it) and behavioral reaction **chest out** (involving chest as a container).

3.5.3.2. **Pride is a fluid in a container**.

(i)   Matodzi u a dikukumusa

Matodzi makes herself raise

(Matodzi is filled with pride)

(ii)   Nwana u a dihudza

Child makes herself big

(Child is filled with pride)

In the above metaphor the container is the body. The fluid in a container metaphor is constituted by the following ontological correspondences:

- The container is the body
- The fluid in the container is pride
- For the container to be full of pride is for pride to be intense (more up).
- For the fluid to appear is for pride to begin to exist.

When a container is filled up with a fluid, the container may swell. Kövecses explains that the word swell indicates the aspects of pride. The swelling of the container has been mentioned in connection with **heart** metaphor as well as the metonymies **chest out**. These metaphors are based on the notion of increase in physical size "Is that it seems to form the basis for the notion of "enhancement" that is often given as part of the definition of pride. It is also considered a major part of pride. According to Kövecses (1980:93) the notion of enhancement covers a variety of experiences, including strength, power and confidence. Three concepts of strength, power and confidence are all related to the bigness of the container in the container metaphor

3.5.3.3. SELF–ESTEEM

According to Kövecses there is a form of pride that comes about as an immediate response to a state of affairs that is perceived as an achievement. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(a) **Pride is superior**:

(i)   U a dipfa
        She listens to herself
        (She listens to herself)

(ii)   Ditsitseni
        Put yourself down
        (Swallow your pride)

(iii)   U a dihudza
        She takes herself big
        (She has pride)

(iv)   U divhonela ntha

She sees herself up

(She has pride)

3.5.3.4. Self-esteem is an economic value

(i)   U didzhiela ntha

She takes herself up

(She values herself highly)

(ii)   U a didzhiela fhasi

She takes herself down

(She underestimates herself)

The above examples enable us to see self-esteem as something that can be represented on a scale. It can be low, it can be high, the person is proud of himself. Again the word dignity could be a natural replacement for pride in the expression keeping pride and losing pride: The appropriate metaphor for dignity is the following.

3.5.3.5. Dignity is an object

(i)   U a dikutela

He holds himself

(He preserved his dignity)

(ii)   U bva tshirunzi

He got out the shadow

(He lost all his dignity)

(iii)   U a difara

He holds himself

(He holds himself)

(iv)   O balangana

He is scattered

(He lost his dignity)

Pride is an object metaphor, dignity is seen as something which if s (source) has it, prevents s (source) from doing certain things and if he does not do otherwise.

3.5.4. METAPHORS OF LOVE

3.5.4.1. Definition of love

Collins Cobuild Dictionary (2003:855) defines love as a very strong feeling of affection towards someone whom you are romantically or sexually attracted to.

The object of love and related concepts.

Kövecses views the object of love by means of a variety of conceptual metaphors. Kövecses further states that the study of these metaphors is important because the various metaphors bring to light other emotions and attitudes that, in the idealized version of romantic love, we find inseparable from it. Beginning with the metaphor that shows that love is a need, one of the most important need is food. It is not surprising that we see the object of love in terms of food.

3.5.4.2. THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS FOOD

(i)   Ni tou vha mutoli

You are honey

(She is my honey)

(ii)   Ni dipidipi langa

You sugar mine

(He is my sweetheart)

The fact that we conceptualize the object of love as food does not only link love with needs but also with liking and sexual desire. Kövecses suggests the following example, when we eat food we want to satisfy hunger, that is to satisfy a need. We eat because we enjoy it. For something to be pleasant to the taste it only one kind of liking. This gives us the most pervasive belief about love.

3.5.4.3. THE OBJECT OF LOVE IS BEAUTIFUL

(i)   Ni tou vha murunwa

You are an angel

(You are my angel)

(ii)   Ni thase yanga

You spike of fire of mine

(You are my beautiful partner)

(iii)   Tendani ndi dzuvha

Tendani is flower

(Tendani is very beautiful)

(iv)   Ni tou vha naledzi

You are a star

(You are very beautiful)

The object of love is always considered beautiful and it always depends on the choice of a person. This is supported by Kövecses (1990:130) when he says "It is important to note that the object of love is always considered beautiful, for it is always the lover who defines who is beautiful for him or her".

The concept of beauty is important because it helps us to understand more about the nature of the concept of liking. Let us consider the following metaphor for beauty.

3.5.4.4. Beauty is a force (Physical and psychological): Liking is a reaction to force:

(i)   O ambara lwa u vhulaya

She dresses to kill

(She's dressed to kill)

(ii)   Ndi musadzi wa gai ula a kungaho?

What women of where that is inviting?

(Who is that inviting attractive woman over there?)

(iii)   Vhonani thase ya musidzana afha

Look star of girl here

(Look at this glamourous girl here)

In this metaphor the forces takes a variety form. It can be a magnetic force (attractive) or a mechanical force (knock off, bowl over) but what is common to them is that the beauty is viewed as a force that produces some effect on the self (the person who observes it). This effect or action corresponds in this metaphor,

to liking. According to Kövecses, the metaphor beauty is something that we experience in a way that it is happening to us, that affects us, without the self being actively involved as an agent in the process. Sexual desire is also conceptual as **appetizing food**. Let me give you the following examples.

3.5.4.5. The object of sexual desire is (appetizing) food; sexual desire is HUNGER.

(i)   Ndi ndalani

I am in hunger

(I am starved for sex)

(ii)   Ndi na sakha

I have a craving

(I need sex)

(iii)   Ndi na mufaro wavhudi

She holder nicely

(She is quiet a dish)

(iv)   Ndi na dora la musadzi

I have thirst of women

(I am desirous of sex)

(v)   Ndo homelwa

I am throat dry

(I need sex)

The above examples indicate that love and sexual desire are related concepts in our conceptual system. Kövecses indicates that the use of "she's" quite a dish does not necessarily want to say that he or she is in love with the person referred

to. The person using these sentence is more likely to imply a liking of the other person and a willingness to have sexual intercourse with her. This would seem to mean that there is only a remote and indirect conceptual relationship between love and sexual desire. The other metaphor of love is **lovers are birds.** Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

3.5.4.6. The lovers are birds (DOVES)

(i)   Avha vhathu ndi zwiivha
        These people are doves
        (These people are always together, they are very close)

(ii)   Tendani na Takie ndi khii na ganzhe
        Tendani and Takie are key and padlock
        (Tendani and Takie are always together)

(iii)   Avha ndi marema na mukhoro
        They are Marema and Mukhoro
        (They are always together)

This metaphor emphasizes the presence of affection and kindness in the conceptual network of love. This is supported by Kövecses (1990:133) when he says:

> "Doves are viewed as symbols of peace, love and gentleness. The gentleness of the doves is the gentleness of love. Gentleness invites care, or caring".

This gives us a further related concept: Care, if we love each other, we want to take care of each other. The link between love and care/caring enables us to use expressions from domain care which shows love.

Another metaphor that we use for conceptualizing love is **the object of love is a valuable object.**

3.5.4.7. The object of love is a valuable object

(i)   Wanga, kha ri tuwe

Mine, let us go

(My dear, let us go)

(ii)   Ni tou vha dinga la mbilu yanga

You are a brick of heart mine

(You are the love of my life)

(iii)   Ni dzuvha la mbilu yanga

You are the rose of my heart

(You are the love of my life)

We treasure and want to keep possession of a valuable object, we are attached to the person we love. According to Kövecses, this metaphor brings attachment. The attachment is really a concept related to love. The valuable object metaphors makes it appropriate to mention another related concept. This is pride, if I am in love, I am not only attached to the object of the love but also proud of her because I value her highly. Let us consider the following examples:

(i)   Ndi a dipfa ngae

I is hear by her

(I am proud of her)

(ii)   Ngae ndi dipfa ndi muthu

Her I hear I person

(Because of him I am who I am)

3.5.4.8. Love is a fluid in a container

(i)   Mashudu o dala nga lufuno

        Mashudu is full of love

        (Mashudu is full of love)

(ii)   Londi u khou tevhukana nga lufuno

        Londi is overflowing with love

        (Londi is overflowing with love)

3.5.4.9. Love is fire

(i)   Muthannga u khou swa nga nwananyana

        Guy is burning because of a baby

        (The guy is burning with the love that he has for his girlfriend)

3.5.4.10. Love is journey

(i)   A ri tsha ya murahu

        We cannot go back

        (We cannot turn back)

(ii)   Ri nga fhi?

        We are where?

        (Where are we?)

(iii)   Vhonani ro no vha kule hani

        Look we far how

        (Look how far we've come)

(iv)   A thi vhoni uri izwi zwi khou ya fhethu

        I don't see where it is going

   (I don't think this relationship is going anywhere)

3.5.5. METAPHORS OF HAPPINESS

3.5.5.1. Definition of happiness

Collins Cobuild Dictionary (2003:661) defines happiness as a feeling or condition of being happy.

3.5.5.1.1. "Light" and "up" metaphors

According to Kövecses a major conceptual metaphor of happiness **is up**. Consider the following Tshivenda examples.

(i)   Tshifhatuwo tsho tsha nga dakalo

        Face is morning by joy

        (Her face brightens with up happiness)

(ii)   Ni tshedza tsha vhutshilo hanga

        You light up life of mine

        (You are the sunshine in my life)

(iii)   U tou penyelela

        He is gleaming

        (He is gleaming)

The above examples show that happiness implies a positive outlook on the world as in "bright side", "light up". A happy person is characterized by a great deal of energy, the light appears to desire from a internal heat energy. As the "hear"

energy can spread from one object to another, so happiness can spread from one person to another.

Being happy is being off the Ground

  (i)   Ndo vha ndi tshi tou fhufha
          I was fly
          (I was flying)

  (ii)   Ro vha ri makoleni
          We were in clouds
          (We were in the clouds)

It may be of some significance that this metaphor is in part concerned with birds. Kövecses states that birds are often viewed as symbols of freedom and the connection between freedom and happiness is that freedom is one possible source of happiness. In Tshivenda culture the belief holds that when we are free, we are happy. Another conceptual metaphor that suggests an upward orientation for the concept is "**being happy is being in heaven**" is illustrated by the following example.

  (i)   Ndi pfa ndi makoleni
          I feel I am in cloud
          (I feel like in heaven)

  (ii)   Ndi tou vha paradisoni
   I am in paradise
          (It was paradise)

Kövecses suggests another and intuitively more appealing, motivation for conceptualizing happiness as upward orientation that is associated with

happiness and joy is the behavioral response "**jumping (up and down).** Let us consider the following Tshivenda examples:

    (i)   U tou fhufha-fhufha nga dakalo

           She jumps-jumps of joy

           (She jumped for joy)

Kövecses claims that the upward orientation of the action of jumping (up and down) may ground these metaphors in experience commonly associated with happiness (joy). Beliefs can also play an important role in the metaphor of happiness. In the Tshivenda religious belief system heaven is also oriented upward. We imagine heaven to be somewhere up in the sky. This idea, according to Kövecses (1991:33), provides some cultural basis for the "**light**" metaphor. Kövecses associates heaven with bright light and hell with darkness. Because heaven is bright and happiness is being in heaven, happiness can also be understood as bright. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

    (i)   Ndi tou vha makoleni

           I am in clouds

           (I am over joyed)

Kövecses points out that the physical activity of jumping (up and down) is often comprehended as an expression of extra energy. Kövecses views happiness as a highly energized state, characterized by a high activity level. This view is shown by additional behavioural reactions assumed to accompany happiness "**Dancing**". Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

    (i)   Ro vha ri tshi tshina nga dakalo

           We were dancing with joy

           (We were dancing with joy)

"SINGING"

(ii)   Ro vha ri khou imbelela nga dakalo

We were singing with joy

(We were singing with joy)

In addition happiness as a highly energized state shows a close connection between happiness and festive occasions.

3.5.5.2. HAPPINESS IS VITALITY

(i)   O vha o vuwa nga dakalo

He was awake with joy

(He was alive with joy)

(ii)   U kha limudi li tshilaho namusi

He is mood which lives today

(He is in a lively mood today)

The main emphasis that Kövecses places on the "**vitality**" metaphor is that a happy person is energetic, active, he or she is full of life. The metaphors renders happiness. Kövecses further claims that vitality metaphor is also associated with "**warmth**". The reason why "**warmth**" can motivate the "**vitality**" metaphor is that life is commonly conceptualized as warm and death as cold.

3.5.5.3. The "container" metaphor

This is one of the major metaphors conceptualizing happiness. In this metaphor, the container corresponds to the body, here are some examples for the metaphor "**Happiness/joy is a fluid in a container**"

(i)   Ro vha ro dala dakalo

We were full of joy

(We were full of joy)

(ii)   Ha ngo kona u difara nga dakalo

He could not hold himself with joy

(He could not contain his joy any longer)

(iii)   O vha a tshi tou tevhukana nga dakalo

He was overflowing with joy

(He was overflowing with joy)

We also have some Biblical expressions

(iv)   Tshinwelo tshanga tsho dala

Cup mine is full

(My cup runneth over) (indicates a large amount of happiness)

According to Kövecses the "**container**" metaphor reveals a further interesting property of happiness. This has to do with the nature of the "**container**" metaphor as it implies to joy. In a previous study Kövecses (1990) he identifies two types of container metaphors of which one is conceived as the heat of fluid inside a closed container. In other words we have the image of a container with a fluid inside.

The second version that Kövecses points out appears in two varieties. One is where the image is of an open container, where in the case of too much emotion, the fluid may overflow. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(i)   O vha a khou tevhukana nga zwiseo

He was overflowing with laughter

(He was overflowing with laughter)

(ii)   O vha a tshi sokou tevhukana

He was just overflowing

(He was overflowing with joy)

The image in the above example is that of a closed container where the fluid exerts a large amount of pressure on the side of the container.

What is interesting about this variety of the "container" metaphor is that it portrays what happens in the container as an event of "bursting" and not as an event of "explosion". In anger the explosion is harmful both to the container and the people but in joy there is no indication that this is harmful to others.

3.5.5.4. SOME COMMON EMOTION METAPHOR IN HAPPINESS

3.5.5.4.1. Happiness is a captive animal

(i)   Ndo balelwa u difara

I failed to hold myself

(I could not keep my happiness to myself)

According to Kövecses this metaphor captures two aspects of the concept of happiness, giving up the attempt to control the emotion and the need to communicate one's feeling to others. Kövecses suggests that the "container" captive animal metaphor also suggests that it is not acceptable to communicate one's joy freely. The emotion is viewed as an opponent that has to be kept under control.

3.5.5.4.2. Joy is rapture/high

According to Kövecses, the rapture or high is associated with energetic behavior. A high often goes together with celebrations. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

     (i)   Ndi wa ntha
               I am high
               (I am on high life)

     (ii)   Ndo kangwa nga dakalo
               I drunk with joy
               (I am drunk with joy)

Another aspect that Kövecses points out is that pleasure can be derived from joy. The concepts also denotes excessiveness and loss of control. If one is drunk with joy, one often does irresponsible things. In addition to the metaphors, the idea of loss of control is picked up, **joy is insanity** was considered. Consider the following Tshivenda example:

     (iii)   U penga nga dakalo
               She is mad with joy
               (She was mad with joy)

Insanity is a complete lack of control. The insanity metaphor suggests an even greater lack of control than the "**rapture**" metaphor.

3.5.6. METAPHORS OF ANGER

3.5.6.1. Definition of anger

Collins Cobuild Dictionary (2003:47) defines anger as the strong emotion that you feel when you think that someone has behaved in an unfair, cruel or unacceptable way.

3.5.6.2. The conceptualization of anger

According to Lakoff and Kövecses (1987:197) the cultural model of physiological effects, especially the part that emphasis heat, forms the basis of the most general metaphor for anger: **anger is heat**. Kövecses suggests that this central metaphor has two versions: one in which heat is applied to solid and the other in which it is applied to fluid. When anger is applied to solids, the version of metaphor is **anger is fire**. Under this metaphorical concept. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(i)   Nda ni vhona malofha anga a a vhila

    When I see you blood of mine boils

    (Seeing you makes my blood boil)

(ii)   Tendani o vhila vhukuma

    Tendani is boil really

    (Tendani is reaching a boiling point)

(iii)   Musidzana ndi khou swa

    Girl, I am burning

    (Girl, I am burning up)

The boiling point indicates anger

The above expressions have two images of a container. The first image, as Kövecses points out, is that the body of the angry person is the container and there is a fire burning inside. In the second one, Kövecses adds, the fire is burning outside the body, the container, heating it and raising the temperature inside. This second one is closely related to the second version of the **anger is heat** metaphor: **anger is a hot fluid in a container.**

According to Kövecses, the **heat of fluid in a container** can be replied as source domain of the central metaphor, to anger as a target domain. One thing we know about hot fluids is that when they start boil, the fluid goes upward. This gives rise to the entailment.

3.5.6.2.1. When the, intensity of anger increases, the fluid rises.

    (i)   Mbiti dzanga dzi khou fhatela dzi tshiya

            Anger mine is building continuously

            (My anger is building up inside me)

    (ii)   Mbiti dzawe dzi a hulela

            Anger his is growing

            (His anger rises)

Intense heat also provides steam and creates pressure in the container. This notion yields the metaphorical entailments.

3.5.6.2.2. Intense anger produces pressure in the container

    (i)   O tou thuthuba nga mbiti

            He bursts with anger

            (He was bursting with anger)

    (ii)   Thi tsha kona u zwi fara

               I cannot it hold

               (I cannot keep it anymore)

When the pressure on the container becomes too high, the container explodes. This notion yields the entailment.

WHEN ANGER BECOMES TOO INTENSE, THE PERSON EXPLODES

    (i)   O ri u zwi pfa a tou thuthuba

               When he hear he exploded

               (When he heard about it, he just exploded)

Kövecses suggests that the emotion of anger can be mapped into gas. Therefore, it can be received or pumped into a container. It has its volume and it can be expanded. This will increase pressure to the container. Kövecses further states that the force of the contained gas can be very strong. When it increases the internal pressure the gas has to exhaust some outlet or it may lead to explosion. Although gas and fluid are very different source domains, they share, according to Kövecses, some basic metaphorical entailments which are carned from the source domain to the target domain.

WHEN A PERSON EXPLODES, PARTS OF HIM GOES UP IN THE AIR

    (i)   Tendani o vha a thangani

               Tendani was on ceiling

               (Tendani was seriously angry)

The notion of anger can be elaborated in terms of animals giving birth, where something that was inside causes pressure and bursts out.

(ii)   Ndo wana ndou i tshi dzwala

         I find elephant giving birth

         (His anger was uncontrollable)

The cultural model also maintains that agitation is an important effect. Agitation is also an important part of our cultural theory of insanity. According to Kövecses, people who are insane are unduly agitated, they are wild, start raving, wave their arms, foam at the mouth and so on. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

3.5.6.2.3. ANGER IS INSANITY

(iii)   Ndo ri u amba nae a penga

         When I talked to him he mad

         (When I talked to him, he went crazy)

(iv)   O sinyuwa, u bva ngonani

         He got angry, he was out of his mind

         (When he is angry, his is out of control)

Again anger is understood as a form of crazy. According to Tshivenda cultural understanding, when enough input energy is applied to a body, the body begins to produce output energy. Kövecses further claims that the cause of anger is an input energy that produces internal heat. The internal heat can function as input energy, producing various forms of output energy: steam, pressure, externally radiating heat and agitation. Kövecses sees angry behaviour as dangerous to others. In the insanity metaphor, insanity is understood as a highly energized state, with insane behaviour as a form of energy output. In all, anger is understood as a negative emotion.

3.5.6.2.4. ANGER IS AN OPPONENT

    (i)   O tou itiswa nga mbiti

             He was caused by anger

             (Anger took control over him)

    (ii)   Ndo itiswa nga mbiti

             I caused by anger

             (I was overcome by anger)

Kövecses further states that the **opponent** metaphor focuses on the issue of control and the danger of loss of control to the angry person himself.

3.5.7. METAPHORS OF FRIENDSHIP

3.4.7.1. Definition of a friendship

Collins Cobuild Dictionary (2003:581) defines friendship as a relationship between two or more friends. We use friendship to refer in a general way to the state of being friends, or the feelings that friends have for each other. The analysis of friendship in the present study is based on the following systems.

3.5.7.2. The communication system

According to Kövecses (2000:88) friendship involves a great deal of communication, and communication appears to be a basic property of friendship. Communication between friends is a special case of communication in general.

In this section Kövecses mentions three interrelated metaphors; **experiences are objects, communication is sharing (experience) objects, and people are containers (for experience objects).**

3.5.7.2.1. Experiences as objects

Kövecses identifies sharing as a feature in friendships that frequently occurs. An important element for friendship is "sharing". Friendship is sharing happiness, sadness, deep, dark secrets. A best friend almost has to be going through what you are going through at the same time. Sharing of ideas is also mentioned: "A friend is someone that you share your ideas with". In support of this statement consider the following Tshivenda example:

(i)   U somolana zwa hanwani

To toothpick each other's mouths

(Sharing deep ideas/secrets)

In the above example "hanwani" is referring to something which is private and comes deep from the heart.

In place of the general conceptual metaphor **experiences are objects**, we get the more specific **sharing experiences is sharing objects** that applies to friendship. Consider the following Tshivenda example:

(ii)   U hutana mutana

To scrub back

(To scratch each other's backs) meaning sitting and sharing closest ideas.

3.5.7.1.2. The conduct metaphor

Kövecses states that experiences can be shared either directly or indirectly. When they are shared directly all events will, metaphorically speaking, cause people to have the same experience object in them. In the case of indirect sharing, one person will transfer his or her experience objects to other, as a

result of which they will share the relevant experience. This sharing of communication is based on Reddy's (1979) description of communication when he says " **the mind is a container, meanings are objects and communication is sending**. That communication is sending objects from one container to another along a conduit. The mind and the person, Kövecses argues further, are both containers, meaning and experiences are both objects, and communication and sharing both involve the transfer of objects from one container to another. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(i)   U somolana zwa hanwani

To toothpick each other's mouth

(Sharing deep ideas)

(ii)   U sevhela mafhungo

To dish out news

(To tell news)

We can take sharing to be a metaphorical consequences of the conduit metaphor.

3.5.7.1.3. Person as containers

Kövecses suggests that a special kind of communication in friendship is confiding, for many people, "a friend is one who I can confide in". Confiding seems to be based on the metaphor 'A person is a container'. A person has a deep part and a superficial part. The most important part of a person is the deepest part of a person, that is where the real person "resides". Here Kövecses points out that the container metaphor for a person is combined with the **important is central** metaphor. According to Kövecses, what the container metaphor assumes is that a person has two selves: that is a true self, corresponding to the deepest part, and a superficial self, corresponding to the

superficial part. A friend is someone you can share your ideas with and know that you can be at peace with. There are no facades, no masks. A friend does not have to "wear a **mask"**, so that they can be real true friends.

Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

    (i)   Vha tou vha Marema na Mukhoro

              They are they Marema (noun) and Mukhoro (noun)

              (These are true friends)

    (ii)   Vha tou vha khii na ganzhe

              They are just like a padlock and a key

              (They are always together)

In the above examples the meaning is that these are true friends who cannot be separated; in example (b) a key and a padlock are mentioned. If we separates a key from a padlock, the padlock cannot be unlocked. So, for them to work they must be together. Kövecses claims that the mask can be regarded as a version of the container metaphor, where it is the outermost layer of a person that covers the most significant of the self. Furthermore, Kövecses claims that, when the deepest, innermost experiences are shared, the real true self is shared. This is based on the metaphorical idea that **the real self is one's innermost (experience) objects.** Kövecses bases the concept of intimacy and openness on the person **as container** metaphor.

Friendship involves intimacy and openness. According to Kövecses, what intimacy and openness mean in the language of the container metaphor is that the container that holds experiences can be opened. If it is open, one can look inside, and the more one opens it, the more one can see. One can see the content that we could not see before it was open, that is truth, the real self. It is the real self that becomes shared by means of communication between friends. Consider the following Tshivenda example:

U somolana zwa hanwani

To toothpick each other's mouths

(Sharing deep ideas)

In other words, key metaphors for friendship as regards communicating experiences in friendship is communicating between friends **is sharing one's innermost objects.**

Kövecses leads us to another metaphor; **friends are containers** (That can open up to each other). That is, friendship is 'sharing ones' real self with another person. Friendship assumes all the major metaphor for communication, people and experiences: the conduit metaphor and the metaphors people are containers and sharing experiences is sharing objects. Given all this it is not surprising that metaphors that are conventionally associated with communication in general will apply to friendship. Another metaphor that Kövecses points out is friendship is closeness which is a special case of the full conventionalized and very general metaphor **intimacy is closeness**.

The phrase that is used above is "Closer friends". the word close points to the metaphorical distance between two friends. The closeness metaphor occurs with great frequency in the data for friendship which indicates the important of intimacy of friendship. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(i)   Ro farana vhukuma

We hold each other very much

(We were tight as glue)

(ii)   Ndi khii na ganzhe

Its key and lock

(They are inseparable)

(iii)   Ndi Marema na Mukhoro

         Its Marema and Mukhoro

         (They are inseparable)

3.5.7.2. The state metaphor system

According to Kövecses, to be friends with somebody is to be in a permanent state. It shows up conceptualization of friendship as an **object**, state in general are metaphorical objects. We attribute friendship to others and ourselves. Attributed states are metaphorically viewed as possessed objects.

3.5.7.2.1. Friendship as a possessed object

Friendship is often conceptualized as a possessed object. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(i)   Vhutama hanga nae ho fara minwaha minzhi

         Our friendship me with her holds years many

         (The friendship that we have is long-lasting)

(ii)   Takie na nne ro farana vhukuma

         Takie and me we hold each other very much

         (Takie and I carry our friendship through our correspondence)

(iii)   Ri dzula ro farana misi yothe

         We sit we hold each other all the time

         (We always carry our friendship all the time)

(iv)   U fhambana hanga nae zwinga lufu

         The departing me her is like death

   (The loss of friendship is like a little part of dying off)

(v)   Vhathu vhane vha dzulela u lwa zwi a konda u farana

People who are sitting they fight is difficult to hold each other

(People who have trouble making friends have a hard time keeping

friendship)

The above examples assume the following mapping:

- possessing the object is the existence of the friendship.

- the people possessing the object are the friends.

- keeping the object is keeping/continuation of friendship.

3.5.7.2.2. Friendship is a bond

A common way to comprehend relationships is through the source domain of physical links or connection. Kövecses supports this when he says: "Friendship is also a relationship and as such it is conceptualized as a **strong (physical) bond** between two people (2000:94), meaning that real friendship, one way or the other, makes the other person feel that the connection is what you have in common.

The emotional bond between the two people is something that guarantees the stability, the endurance of the friendship.

3.5.7.2.3. Friendship as an economic exchange

In friendship, the two friends are related and they do interact in many ways. Friendship is to give and take. In economic exchange it includes paying the money and handling over the commodity. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(i)   Zwanda zwi a tanzwana

Hands they wash each other

(Hands clean each other)

(ii)   A dzimana u la malombe, mukosi a ya phalala

If stingy you eat friends, scream is help

(Friends help each other always)

In that the profit gained from the exchange is the benefit gained from the interaction. There is important knowledge about friendship that is based on the **economic exchange** metaphor.

S(ourse): Economic exchange are reciprocal

T(arget): Friendship relationship are reciprocal

The above means that all friendship are rooted in reciprocity. Friendship is a give and take relationship.

S: Economic exchange are typically based on equality.

T: Friendship relationship are typically based on equality.

Being reciprocal is good in friendship.

The concept here appears to be beneficial interaction, interactions that are performed for the benefit of the participants are metaphorically understood as economic exchanges that produce profit.

3.5.8. CONCLUSION

The chapter focuses on metaphors in Tshivenda. In the analysis of the metaphors discussed above, the dissertation determines what Kövecses says is possible in Tshivenda. The metaphors discussed are based on source domains from Kövecses. Metaphors of anger, fear, lust, pride, love, happiness and friendship are examined to show that there are source domains which are

common in all metaphors. The human body is seen as an ideal source domain, internal organs are used e.g. lungs, gall. The domain of health and illness as used by Kövecses which are also applicable to Tshivenda are discussed e.g. we talk about the sick mind and a healthy society. The domain on animals is also dealt with in this chapter.

In this chapter, anger and happiness are shown to be characterized as container metaphors. The conceptualization of anger and happiness as a fluid in a container leads to the differentiation of anger and happiness from other emotions. In both these concepts one can explode with anger whereas one can explode with happiness which leads to an uncontrolled action or situation. In the case of Pride, we see another version of container metaphors. In terms of this a proud person can burst with pride. In love metaphors, the object is seen as a unique metaphor. Concepts like affection or friendship are used. As Kövecses points out one major form of love is that love is a unity, so indeed this metaphor is unique proving that Kövecses' contentions are indeed applicable to Tshivenda.

CHAPTER 4

FORCE IN EMOTION METAPHORS

4.1. Aim

The aim of this chapter is to examine the role that force in emotion metaphors plays in Tshivenda.

4.2. Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether the force of emotion metaphor is expressed in Tshivenda the same way as in Kövecses model.

4.3. Organisation

In order to achieve the above mentioned, this chapter will focus on the following:

- Specific level metaphors focusing on "Emotion-Response"
- Metaphors focusing on both Parts of the Emotion of the Emotion Schema.
- Metaphors mainly focusing on the "cause of Emotion"

4.4. Introduction

According to Kövecses emotions are described as the causes that lead to certain behavioural responses in human beings. Kövecses conceptualizes emotions as forces that bring about certain responses or effects. The force metaphor can be found in Tshivenda as well. Kövecses further states that this is a metaphor that applies to all basic (and non basic) emotions and because of all these reasons, it plays a very important role in how people think about emotions in Tshivenda.

There are two points Kövecses states and stresses in this discussion. One is that, most of the well-know metaphors of emotion, such as **fire**, **opponent**, **natural force** seem to be instantiations of a single underlying "master metaphor" **Emotions is force**. The second point that Kövecses states is that these metaphors instantiate the generic-level metaphor in very different ways, capturing over different aspects of emotional experience. As Kövecses argues, both these points are significant for the study of emotion language because, given the first, we can see a degree of coherence in the conceptual organization of the emotion domain that has not been pointed out so far.

This underlying coherence behind the conceptual metaphor makes it possible for us to see the precise ways in which the emotion domain is conceptualized in a systematically different way from other "neighbouring" generic-level domains, such as rational thought. When looking at the second claim, one can get an idea of the details and richness of the conceptualization of emotion, without losing sight of its deep underlying coherence.

The **emotions are forces** metaphor has as its source domain the **force** schema. According to Kövecses the schema can be characterized as follows:

> "The primary distinction that language marks here is a role difference between the two entities exerting the forces. One force-exerting entity is: singled out for focal attention - the salient issue in the interaction is whether this entity is able to manifest its force tendency or, on the contrary, is overcome. The second force entity, correlatively, is considered for the effect that it has on the first, effectively overcoming it or not".

The following factors in the force schema can be isolated:

Force entities:

    Agonist

    Antagonist

Intrinsic force tendency:

    toward action

    toward rest (inaction)

Resultant of the force interaction:

    action

    rest (inaction)

Balance of strengths:

    the stronger entity

    the weaker entity

If one applies these factors to the concept of emotion, one gets the following generic-level mappings:

    Force Agonist (FAgo) → Emotion Agonist (EmAgo)

    Force Antagonist (FAnt) → Emotion Antagonist (EmAnt)

    FAnt's force tendency → EmAnt's force tendency

    FAgo's force tendency → EmAgo's force tendency

    FAgo's resultant state → EmAgo's resultant state

Kövecses argues that the entity that manifests a force tendency towards inaction is known to be Agonist and the entity that exerts force on the Agonist and typically overcomes is known as Antagonist. As a result of the interaction, the Agonist will typically cease to be inactive and will produce a response. Typically, though not exclusively, the Agonist is instantiated by the rational self that is or will be emotional, while the Antagonist is instantiated by the cause of emotion or the emotion itself. Kövecses further maintains that the Agonist's typical force tendency in the emotion domain is to remain unaffected by the Antagonist, whereas the Antagonist's force tendency is to cause the Agonist to change. As

we will shortly see in Table 4.1 below, however, there are some significant exceptions to these generalizations.

The question that immediately arises is, "Does the set of mappings above apply to the emotion domain? As pointed out there are numerous ways in which this abstract force schema can apply to the concept of emotion.

Table 4.1. The Agonist and Antagonist in Emotion Metaphors

Source Domains	Agonist	Antagonist
I.		
INTERNAL PRESSURE	self	emotion
OPPONENT	self	emotion
WILD ANIMAL	self	emotion
SOCIAL SUPERIOR	self	emotion
NATURAL FORCE	self	emotion
TRICKSTER	self	emotion
INSANITY	self	emotion
FIRE	self	emotion
II.		
HUNGER1	self	desire for emotion
HUNGER2	emotional self	insatiable desire
PHYSICAL AGITATION1	self	cause of emotion
PHYSICAL AGITATION2	body	emotion
BURDEN	self	emotional stress
III.		
PHYSICAL FORCE	self	cause of emotion

We can get such specific-level instantiations of the generic-level **emotion** is **force** metaphor as **emotion** is **internal pressure, emotion is a natural force, emotion is fire, emotion is a burden**, and so forth.

To give some structure to the discussion, Kövecses points out specific metaphors that focus on two parts of the most general notion of the Western folk theory of emotion:

(1) a cause leads to emotion and (2) emotion leads to some response.

According to Kövecses, some metaphors are to do with the part "cause-emotion" while others with the part "emotion-response". Not only can emotion be described as a cause that produces certain responses, but also the cause of emotion, the event or object that leads to emotion in the first place. Kövecses states that the cause of emotion is thought of as a cause than emotion itself. Moreover, some metaphors will be shown to play some role in the conceptualization of *both* parts of the skeletal emotion scenario just sketched.

Table 4.1 shows how two factors of abstract force schema, the Agonist and the Antagonist, are instantiated in the many specific-level metaphors of emotion. Group "I" indicates that the metaphorical source domains focus on the "emotion-response" part of the scenario; group "II " indicates that the source domains can take either "emotion-response" or "cause-emotion" as their focus; and group "III" indicates that the focus is on the "cause-emotion" part. Kövecses first observes the analysis with specific-level metaphors that are used to conceptualize the second part of the scenario. He then looks at those that seem to focus on both parts and finally pays his attention on the first part of the of the skeletal emotion scenario. However, it should be kept in mind that this structure is meant only to give some order to the discussion of the metaphors.

In other words, as Kövecses argues, one can account for a large portion of the conceptualization of emotion in a coherent way if one assume the existence of the general-level **emotion** is **force** metaphor. Just as important, however, Kövecses suggests also that all of the specific-level metaphors instantiates the generic-level in a different way, addressing several distinct aspects of emotion. This one could have an extremely rich understanding of the concept of emotion in the language-based folk model.

## 4.5. Specific-Level Metaphors Focusing on "Emotion-Response"

Here Kövecses points out the survey and the analysis of specific-level emotion metaphors with, perhaps, the best known and most studied metaphor for the emotion; "**emotion** is **pressure inside a container"** in Tshivenda.

4.5.1. Emotion Is Internal Pressure Inside a Container.

In the case of the emotions, the generic-level **force** schema can be found in the more specific version of **pressure**. The "internal pressure" metaphor assumes two further metaphors; "**people are containers for the emotions** and **emotion** is **a substance in a container"**. The specific container for emotion is the human body and the specific substance is typically a fluid or a gas.

Kövecses also shows how the generic-level EMOTION is FORCE metaphor is instantiated in this complex special case in Tshivenda:

Source: INTERNAL PRESSURE

1. Agonist: the container-entity that is affected by the pressure.
2. Antagonist: the substance with pressure inside the container.
3. The intrinsic force tendency of the Antagonist: substance-pressure on the container.
4. The intrinsic force tendency of Agonist: the container-entity resists the pressure.
5a. The resultant action due to a stronger Antagonist's force: the substance goes out of the container.
5b. The resultant inaction due to a stronger Agonist's resistance: the substance does not go out of the container.

Target: EMOTION

1. Agonist: the rational self.

2. Antagonist: the emotion.

3. The intrinsic force tendency of the Antagonist: the emotion causing the self to respond.

4. The intrinsic-force tendency of the Agonist: the rational self attempts not to respond.

5a. The resultant action due to 'the emotion's force: the self responds.

5b. The resultant inaction, due to Agonist's resistance: the self does not respond.

Now that the instantiations have been indicated, Kövecses explains the source-to-target mappings between the FORCE and EMOTION domains in the following way:

Kövecses points out that in this metaphor complex, the level of the emotion substance may go up inside the container; if it does, the substance creates perceivable pressure on the container; the pressure may increase to the point that the substance goes out of the container. Kövecses further states that, when there is very little substance in the container, the pressure is low and thus emotion is at a low intensity when the substance rises. This corresponds with an increase in emotional intensity; the pressure itself corresponds to the emotion causing the self to respond; the pressure's bringing about an effect corresponds to the emotion's leading to a response; and the substance going out of the container corresponds to some external behaviour correspond by the self, or, alternatively, the substance not going out of the container corresponds to the lack of response.

To make the above explanation clear, Kövecses lays out the mappings for this specific-level metaphor as follows:

the substance with pressure —> the emotion

the pressure on the container —> the emotion causing the self to respond

the intensity of the pressure —> the intensity of the emotion

the container-entity affected —> the self affected by the emotion

the substance going out of the container —> the response of the self caused by the emotion

the substance not going out of the container —> lack of response by the self

Kövecses suggests that the causal relationship between the emotion and the response, makes emotions to be seen as motivations relative to the response. In this scheme, the emotion is seen as an internal motivation for action. This motivation is seen as an internal force. Kövecses further claims that, the greater the intensity of internal pressure, the greater the degree of motivation to respond emotionally. Kövecses adds the following to the mapping above:

internal pressure —> motivation for pressure

external effect of the force —> action (response) caused by the emotion

the intensity of the internal pressure to bring about an effect —>the intensity of the motivation to respond emotionally

Kövecses further points out that if the intensity of internal pressure increases beyond a point it brings about an effect on the body-container; that is, an emotional response is carried out. The effect which is the action may be prevented by not letting the substance go out of the body-container.

When the self can't keep the substance inside the container, the external effect on the container takes place and an emotional response is performed. This may take place in two ways: either by the container overflowing or by the container exploding.

According to Kövecses when the container overflows, one gets uncontrolled but nonviolent emotional responses; when it explodes, one also gets uncontrolled violent responses, such as in the case of anger:

the overflowing of the container —> uncontrolled non-violent response

the explosion of the container —> uncontrolled violent response

Kövecses also states that the "milder," or romantic, emotions are conceptualized as "overflowing" the container, whereas the more "violent" emotions are viewed as "exploding" out of the body-container. However, this only applies in the typical cases; sometimes a "violent" emotion may be conceptualized as producing a non-violent response "**O vha o dala nga mbiti"** (he was overflowing with rage) and a "non-violent" emotion may be seen as leading to a relatively violent response "**O pfa a tshi nga a sa thuthuba nga dakalo"** (She felt like bursting out with joy).

However, it would be strange, at least in Tshivenda, to talk about someone exploding with joy, where explosion is associated with deliberately causing damage to others in a violent way. The damage to the container and/or things/people nearby that is caused by the explosion is the social, psychological damage caused by the uncontrolled violent behavior to the self and/or other people who are involved in the situation:

the damage caused by the explosion —> the social damage caused by the violent response by the violent response

A crucial aspect of this metaphorical reasoning, as observed by Kövecses, is the "point beyond which" emotional control cannot be maintained. This point on the intensity scale of the container-entity's resistance to internal pressure corresponds to the notion of "emotional tolerance," that is, the self's emotionality or disposition to emotional behaviour. Kövecses, however, doesn't claim that all external emotional responses are internally motivated. When this is the case, one does not have the conceptualization of emotions as internal forces but simply as

substances in the body-container. Thus the container may have a little or a lot of a substance in it or it may be empty or full, but the emotional responses of the self will not be seen as "caused" by an internal force. This is characteristic of the less prototypical, weaker emotions, such as respect or less intense forms of otherwise "stronger" emotions.

4.5.2. Emotion is an Opponent

Emotions are also conceptualized as opponents in a struggle. Kövecses lists a number of linguistic examples to illustrate this:

Table 4. 2. EMOTION is AN OPPONENT

Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	Opponent 1 opponent 1's attempt to resist opponent 2	Opponent 2 opponent 2's attempt to cause opponent 1 to give in to his force	either opponent 2 wins or opponent 1 wins
Target	Rational self self's attempt to try to maintain control	Emotion the emotion causing the self to lose control	self either loses or maintains control

Kövecses also suggests that the struggle takes place between the self and an emotion as opponents. The self first is in control of the emotion, but then the emotion causes the self to respond, that is, to lose control. The self attempts to maintain control over the emotion. Thus the struggle is an attempt for emotional

control. Kövecses points out two outcomes to the struggle: winning or losing. Table 4.2 shows the instantiation of the generic **emotion** is **force** metaphor through the concept of opponent. In this metaphor it is assumed that it is better to maintain rational control than to give in to the emotions. This is why the rational self applies a counterforce in an attempt to control the causal force of the emotion. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(a) **Fear is an opponent**

    (i)   O farwa nga nyofho

             (He is gripped by fear)

    (ii)   Ndi tambudzwa nga nyofho

             (I am struggling with fear)

    (iii)   Ndi vhuswa nga nyofho

             (I am controlled by fear)

(b) **Anger is an opponent**

    (i)   O tou itiswa nga mbiti

             (Anger took control over him)

    (ii)   Ndo itiswa nga mbiti

             (I was overcome by anger)

4.5.3. Emotion Is a Wild Animal

According to Kövecses; the **wild animal** metaphor is a special case of the **opponent** metaphor and thus inherits most of its mappings. In the **wild animal** metaphor the struggle is between a master and an animal that tries to get away from the master. It is in this sense that the master and the animal are "opponents," as shown by the examples:

(a) **Happiness is a captured animal**

(i)   Ndo balelwa u difara

(I could not contain my happiness)

Table 4.3. EMOTION IS A WILD ANIMAL

Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	*Master* to hold animal back	*Animal* to get away from master	either animal gets away or master holds it back
Target	*Rational self* to try to maintain emotional control	*Emotion* to exert force on self to lose control	self either loses control or maintains it

Source: Opponent in a struggle.
Target: Emotion.

In Table 4.3 Kövecses shows some shared mappings. The struggle between the master and the animal corresponds to the struggle for emotional control. The animal is trying to get away but is held back by the master. In attempting to get away, it exerts a force on the master. Corresponding to this force is the emotion's force to cause the self to lose emotional control. The effect of the animal's force can be the performance of an unintended emotional response on the part of the self, which is metaphorically conceptualized as **unintended action is other-propelled motion.** This is based on the metaphor **events are movements** in **event structure**

4.5.4. Emotion Is a Social Force

Kövecses also views emotions as social forces. Of these, the most commonly used version is **emotion is a social superior** metaphor. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(a) Fear is superior

    (i)   Nyofho dzawe dzo mu thivhela u dzhena nduni

        (Her fear prevented her from going into the house)

    (ii)   O vha a khou vhuswa nga nyofho

        (She was being ruled by fear)

    (iii)   U laulwa nga nyofho

        (She is controlled by fear)

    (iv)   U langwa nga nyofho

        (She is led by fear)

Kövecses avers that according to this metaphor, the emotion, that is, the social superior, has control over the rational self. The social force of the superior corresponds to the control that the emotion has over the self. The social effect of the superior on the self is the emotional effect of the emotion on the self.

Table 4.4. EMOTION IS A SOCIAL FORCE

Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	Social inferior	Social superior	inferior does what superior wants him to do
Target	Irrational self	Emotion	self has no control and acts according to emotion

Source: Social superior.
Target: Emotion.

In this case of the application of force dynamics, Kövecses points out that there is no longer any struggle between the superior and the inferior forces. This is

shown in the table by leaving empty the boxes that correspond to the Antagonist's and the Agonist's force tendencies. The superior social force, that is, the emotion, controls the inferior one, that is, the irrational self. The overall result is that this metaphor primarily applies to a person whose behaviour is controlled by emotion, not by reason. Kövecses further points out the idea that this particular metaphor adds to the conception of emotion that it is a way of conceptualizing habitual tendencies, or dispositions, not so much momentary states or actions. A superior has long-term control over an inferior, whose behaviour is determined by the superior over a long period of time. Thus the metaphor predominantly describes a certain kind of emotional person rather than an emotional event, as most of the **force** metaphors we have seen so far do.

4.5.5. Emotion Is a Natural Force

Kövecses states that natural forces like floods, wind, and so forth, are viewed as extremely forceful and as affecting physical objects with a great impact. Physical things can't help but undergo their effects. Here are some linguistic examples that reflect this conceptualization for the domain of emotion:

Table 4.5. EMOTION is A NATURAL FORCE

Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	Physical object to keep being the same	Natural force to cause an effect in physical object	physical object undergoes effect in a passive way
Target	Rational self to continue to behave as before the emotion	Emotion to cause the self to respond to emotion	self responds to the emotion in a passive way

Source: Natural force.
Target: Emotion.

(a) Fear is a natural force

    (i)   O vha o tingwa nga nyofho
             (She was surrounded by fear)

    (ii)   Nwana o tibwa nga nyofho
             (Baby is engulfed by fear)

In this second example, Kövecses indicates that one of the effects of a natural force on an entity may be that it moves the entity from one location to another. The instantiation of the metaphor can be seen in Table 4.5. Obviously, only the passions or very intense forms of other emotions are conceptualized this way. By "inertia" the self's tendency is to continue to behave in the same way; that is, to continue not to get under the influence of the emotion force.

Kövecses argues that the object affected by the natural force can't help but undergo the impact of the force; in the same way, a person experiences emotion in a passive and helpless way. This is the single most important property of emotion in the folk theory.

## 4.5.6. Emotion Is a Mental Force

This sixth metaphor comes in several versions. The mental force may be a force coming from a human or a drug. Kövecses suggests that if it comes from a human source, it is **emotion** is **a magician** arid **emotion** is **a trickster** or **deceiver**. Both these are capable of deceiving a person; that is, they have the intellectual power to change one's beliefs about the world - either by magic or by a trick.

Table 4.6. EMOTION is A MENTAL FORCE

Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	Normal person to continue to be undeceived	Trickster to attempt to deceive a person	trickster deceives normal person
Target	Rational self to continue to be rational	Emotion to make the rational self irrational	emotion makes self irrational

Source: Trickster (deceiver).
Target: Emotion.

The **trickster** metaphor seems to be much more general, in that its application may extend to any emotion. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(i)   Vhudipfi ho ndaedza
        (My emotions fooled me)

(ii)   Vhudipfi hanga ho mphura
        (My emotions deceived me)

(iii)   Vhudipfi hanga ho nkhedza
        (My emotions misled me)

In addition, Kövecses states that a person in an emotional state is commonly seen as incapable of "higher" mental functioning. This can be expressed by sentences such as "His emotions clouded his judgment." Language use such as tills assumes the instantiation and mappings shown in Table 4.6.

Kövecses suggests that the normal person is identified with the rational self, that as a result of the trickster-emotion's tricks becomes irrational. The emotion's force tendency is to make the rational self see the world in a distorted way, while the rational self's tendency is to remain rational. Eventually, however, the trickster deceives its victim, and correspondingly the emotion makes the rational self irrational. In other words, the self who is in an emotional state is depicted by this metaphor as being irrational.

4.5.7. Emotion Is Insanity

Let's analyse the element of irrationality in the **insanity** metaphor:

U khou penga nga lutamo. (He is mad with desire) / Ndi khou penga nga zwipfi (I was crazy with emotion)

The examples indicate, that intense emotion is a state of the ultimate lack of control. While in the case of the **trickster/deceiver** metaphor the rational self becomes irrational in a limited situation in the case of the **insanity** metaphor .the rational self is completely incapacitated cognitively as well as in terms of behaviour. In the **insanity** metaphor, Kövecses points out that emotion is an unspecified intense psychological force that can produce insanity. In the source domain of the metaphor, a normal person becomes insane as a result of this intense psychological force. Consequently, it would be more precise to restate the **emotion is insanity** metaphor as **the effect of an intense emotional state is insanity.** In table 4.7, Kövecses offers a more formal description of the **insanity** metaphor. Another major difference between the **trickster** and the **insanity** metaphors is that the latter applies only to very intense emotions while the former can apply to any emotion.

The irrationality resulting from intense emotions needs not be as intense as suggested by the **insanity** metaphor. A milder form of irrationality can be found

in the metaphor **emotion** is **rapture**, as exemplified by expressions like "drunk with emotion". Here emotion is viewed as some kind of alcoholic beverage capable of adversely affecting a person's intellectual abilities.

Table 4.7. EMOTION is INSANITY

Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	Normal person to remain normal	Intense psychological force to cause insanity in normal person	normal person becomes insane
Target	Rational self to remain rational	Emotion to cause self to become irrational (i.e., to lose all control)	rational self becomes irrational

Source: Insanity.
Target: Emotion.

As stated by Kövecses, this metaphor shares the mappings of the **insanity** metaphor, but it also adds something to it. Many emotional states are viewed not only as irrational but also as "pleasant" states, a metaphorical projection that comes from conceptualizing emotions as an intoxicating beverage.

Kövecses suggests this additional mapping:

the assumed pleasantness of —> the pleasantness of the
being drunk   emotional state

Obviously, this mapping only applies to "positive" emotions, such as love or happiness, and can account for examples like "being high on love" or "having a delirious feeling."

In general Kövecses views emotions as mentally incapacitating phenomena. The specific "mental incapacities" involve, in addition to the ones above, **inability to speak** and **inability to think**. Kövecses takes these to be special cases of the very general metonymy, according to which **mental incapacities stand for emotion.** Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(a) **Lust is insanity**

      (i)   Ndi a dada ngae

             (I am crazy about her)

      (ii)   Ndi a penga ngae

             (I am mad with her)

      (iii)   Ha nndadzi

             (I do not sleep)

      (iv)   Ndi a mu fela

             (I die for her)

(b) **Joy is insanity**

      (i)   O vha a tshi penga nga dakalo

             (She was mad with joy)

(c) **Anger is insanity**

      (i)   Ndo ri u amba nae a penga

             (When I talked to him, he went crazy)

      (ii)   A sinyuwa, u bva ngonani

             (When angry, he goes out of his mind)

4.5.8. Emotion Is Fire/Heat

This specific-level force metaphor can be illustrated by the following examples in Tshivenda:

(a) Lust is heat

   (i)   U khou swa ngae

             (He is burning with her)

             (He is crazy over her)

(b) Love is fire

     (i)   Houla muthannga u khou swa nga nwananyana

             (That guy is crazy with the love that he has for his girlfriend)

(c) Anger is fire

     (i)   Nda ni vhona malofha anga aya fula

             (When I see you, my blood boils)

     (ii)   Tendani o vhila vhukuma

             (Tendani has reached boiling point)

     (iii)   Musidzana ndi khou swa

             (Girl, I am going crazy over you)

It is the preposition (*nga) with* that indicates the *causal* link between certain emotional responses and emotion as fire responses are seen as being caused by emotion itself. The **fire** metaphor "straddles across" both parts of the emotion schema; that is, both "emotion-response" and "cause of emotion-emotion." The expression kindle has to do with the latter. However, most of the examples above have to do with the "emotion-response" aspect of the concept of emotion. To

account for them, Kövecses considers how the source and target domains of this metaphor instantiates the generic-level force metaphor for emotion.

Table 4.8 EMOTION IS FIRE/HEAT

Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	Thing burning to remain unchanged by fire	Fire to cause thing to undergo effects of fire	thing burning is changed by fire
Target	Person in emotional state to remain unchanged by emotion	Emotion to cause person to undergo effects of emotion	person's behavior changed by emotion

Source: Fire.
Target: Emotion.

The usual resultant action is that the person in an emotional state does change, that is, becomes energized, becomes dysfunctional, and so forth.

The "hot" emotions include anger, romantic love, desire, sexual desire. Thus, one can be hot with anger, romantic love, and sexual desire. These emotions are seen as very intense and energized states.

A mapping not shown above as indicated by Kövecses, is that various degrees of heat correspond with various degrees of the intensity of emotion and lack of heat corresponds with lack of emotion. Given the latter, the mappings also account for the "opposites" of emotions, such as emotional calmness, indifference, lack of desire, et cetera. In addition, the mappings indicate that the emotions characterized here include both the "passions" and the "milder" kinds of emotion, such as affection, sadness, and the like. Kövecses conceptualises these emotions at a lower level of heat and hence are not seen as forces. Correspondingly, it is by virtue of being conceptualized as "hot" that certain forms

of anger, romantic love, and sexual desire are conceived of as passions. But there are other reasons as well.

Kövecses maintains that the heat can make the object hot. As pointed out previously, the physical force, here, the heat-force, corresponds to the emotion. The question is; "What specifically is the intrinsic force tendency of the heat-force in the source domain and what is the force tendency of the emotion in the target?" High degrees of heat ("hotness") produce an energized state in the object-person. The "hot" emotions are all viewed as being very intense states, in which the self is highly energized, that is, is in a state of readiness to act in intense ways. Kövecses gives us this example; when we say that a person is *hot to trot*, *where to trot*, a motion verb, indicates intense activity, a meaning that derives from, or is motivated by, the **event structure** metaphor, in which **actions are self-propelled movements.**

But the particular effect of the heat-force may also be damage to the thing burning, that is, damage to the self. In the same way as the object becomes dysfunctional as a result of exposure to uncontrolled fire or high degrees of heat, so does the self as a result of uncontrolled intense emotion. Kövecses points out expressions like "be burned", "be consumed", and so forth, where the intense physical response of the thing corresponds to the damage to the self, where the damage results from the self's inability to control the emotion.

Another characteristic of the **fire** metaphor that Kövecses points out is that the fire may cause damage to the object on fire but also to another object. This can happen when the fire is intentionally directed at a target by the self. The fire in this case is inside the object-container.

Kövecses further states that when the **fire** and the **people as container** metaphors are combined, the fire inside the person is a container that directs it to another. Damage to another object is the damage to the other person.

Kövecses states an example of breathing fire based on a mapping that is inherited from a more general mapping in the **fluid in a container** metaphor: "externalization of the internal force is the response taking place". This response constitutes deliberate aggressive behaviour.

## 4.6. Metaphors Focusing on Both Parts of the Emotion Schema

According to Kövecses, metaphors discussed in this section have a double focus; they can instantiate both the initial and the final parts of the emotion scenario.

4.6.1. Emotion Is a Physiological Force

Physiological forces come in several kinds: hunger, thirst, illness, and agitation.

(a) Beauty is a force (physical and physiological force)

(i)   O ambara lwa u vhulaya
       (She is dressed to kill)

(ii)   Ndi musadzi wa gai ula a kungaho?
       (Who is this attractive woman over here?)

(iii)   Vhonani thase ya musidzana afha
       (Look at that glamarous girl over there?)

The hunger for food corresponds to the desire for either the emotion (e.g., affection) or the action associated with the emotion (e.g., an act of retribution in anger). The version in which an emotion is "insatiable" usually forms a part of the **emotion** is **a wild animal** metaphor. In this metaphor, the animal's responses may be motivated by the physiological force of hunger.

Kövecses shows that the **desire** is **hunger** metaphor thus instantiates the general **force** schema in two different ways. Looking in the details of the difference between "desire for emotion" and "desire for emotional action", the food corresponds to emotion in the former version. When this is the case, the person who is hungry is the person who would like to but does not have the emotion. When the food corresponds to action in the latter, the wild animal that is (insatiably) hungry is the emotion itself that causes the self to perform an action. In other words, the two versions of the **hunger** metaphor are structured by the mappings in Table 4.6. Kövecses suggests this set of mappings that reflects an

Table 4.6.1. EMOTION is A PHYSIOLOGICAL FORCE (version one)

| Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	*Person* for the (non-hungry) person not to want food	*Hunger (for food)* to cause the person to want food	hunger makes person go get food
Target	*Self* for the (desireless) self not to want emotion	*Desire (for emotion)* to cause self to want to have emotion	desire causes self to have emotion

Source: Hunger.
Target: Emotion.

Table 4.6.2. EMOTION is A PHYSIOLOGICAL FORCE (version two)

Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	*Wild animal* animal (without insatiable appetite) eats "just enough"	*Insatiable appetite (for food)* insatiable appetite makes animal keep eating food	animal with insatiable appetite keeps eating
Target	*Emotional self* emotion (without insatiable desire) does not cause self to keep acting on emotion	*Insatiable emotional desire* insatiable emotional desire causing self to keep acting on emotion	self with insatiable emotional desire keeps acting on emotion

Source: Hunger.
Target: Emotion.

instantiation of the generic-level force schema that is very different from the instantiations we have seen so far. The major difference that Kövecses argues seems to be that the emotion instantiates neither the Agonist nor the Antagonist. What is at issue is the desire for emotion.

Kövecses further claims that naturally, this version only applies to "positive emotions" like affection and love. However, in the other application of the schema the concept of emotion does instantiate. Take a look at the details in Table 4.6.2. The correspondence that is new relative to the instantiations given above is

      "the food　　→ the action response."

This is because "food" does not instantiate either the Agonist or the Antagonist. However, it is clearly a part of the elements that get mapped onto the emotion domain, although outside the **force** schema as limited to the five elements that we are working with here. Since most emotions, both "positive" and "negative,"

are associated with particular actions, version 2 of the metaphor can apply to most emotions.

In this general **force** schema, Kövecses points out that one of the elements of the schema is "the effect of the force" on the entity affected by it. Now one can ask how this is realized in the **hunger** metaphor. Kövecses further states that in version 2 it seems to be the gratification of the animal's hunger, corresponding to the performance of some action associated with the emotion whereas in version 1 it is also the gratification of one's hunger, corresponding to having the desired emotion. Kövecses also stresses that in sum, the same general **force** schema is employed differently in the case of the **hunger** metaphor, but at the same time the generic structure of the schema is preserved in both versions.

4.6.2. Emotion Is Physical Agitation.

Similar to the **hunger** metaphor, Kövecses states that this metaphor also comes in two versions. Version 1 has as its scope the "cause-emotion" part of the emotion scenario, while version 2 has the part "emotion-response." Some linguistic examples for version include (Kövecses: 1990):

Table 4.5.2.1. EMOTION is PHYSICAL AGITATION (version one)

Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	Object in state of calm to remain calm	External cause that can create agitation in object to cause physical agitation in object	object is physically agitated
Target	Rational self to remain emotionally calm	Cause of emotion to produce emotional disturbance in self	self is emotionally disturbed

Source: Physical agitation.
Target: Emotion.

According Kövecses, the application of metaphors, emotion is a disturbed state of mind that arises from some cause. What is the conceptual relationship among **emotional disturbance, physical agitation, and emotion?** In this case, **emotional disturbance** is metaphorically understood as **physical agitation. However, emotional disturbance** stands metonymically for **emotion.** To put it more simply, Kövecses sees emotions as being denned by (emotional) disturbance, and the disturbed state of mind is used to stand for emotions as a whole.

Version 2 presents a different situation both regarding scope and conceptual organization. Consider the following Tshivenda examples:

(i)   Ndo dalelwa
         (I am overworked)

(ii)   Ni songo nyanyuwa
         (Don't get too excited)

(iii)   No sinyutshelani?
         (Why are you upset?)

These examples suggest bodily agitation that arises from some emotion not a disturbed state of mind. Table 4.6.2. shows the instantiations and mappings. The verbs *tremble*, *quiver*, *shiver*, *quake* above are all examples of this last mapping that is concerned with the "resultant action" part of the force schema.

Unlike in version 1, here we have to do with the "emotion-response" part of the emotion scenario, where the response is agitation arising from another.

**Table 4.6.2.2. EMOTION is PHYSICAL AGITATION (version two)**

Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	*Physical object* to remain physically calm	*Force that can cause physical agitation in object* to cause physical agitation in object	object is physically agitated
Target	*Person's body* to remain bodily calm	*Emotion* to cause bodily agitation in body	person is bodily agitated

Source: Physical agitation.
Target: Emotion.

Moreover, Kövecses states that **physical agitation** stands metonymically for **emotion**; that is, physical agitation is used to conceptualize emotion in a more direct way. Agitation is a kind of incapacity, bodily or mental incapacity. When it happens, the self is unable to act normally. This fits the general metonymy in which **the incapacitating effects of emotion stand for the emotion.**

4.6.3. Emotion Is a Burden

According to Kövecses, a metaphor that focuses on the general evaluation of emotions is **emotion** is **a burden**:

(a) **Fear is a burden**

(i)　　Ndo tou vhofholowa musi khombo yo fhira
　　　(I was relieved when the danger was over)

According to Kövecses, the external pressure caused by the burden on the body-container corresponds to the stress or difficulty caused by the emotion on the self. Kövecses calls this "emotional stress or difficulty." In this metaphor, emotional stress or difficulty causes the self to function abnormally, while the

Agonist's force tendency can be identified as the self's tendency to function normally. In Table 4.6.3 Kövecses shows what mappings are involved.

Kövecses points out that the Antagonist's force tendency in the source domain includes "pressure on person" while in the target it is "stress in self".

Table 4.6.3. EMOTION is A BURDEN

Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	*Person* to hold the burden	*Burden* to cause physical pressure on person	person experiences physical difficulty
Target	*Self* to withstand emotional stress	*Emotion* to cause emotional stress in self	self experiences emotional difficulty

Source: Burden.
Target: Emotion.

The change indicates that there is an additional metaphor underlying the mapping: namely, **internal** is **external**, according to which internal states are comprehended as external events.

Kövecses further claims that the **burden** metaphor may entail physical movement and, consequently, difficulty in action. This implication comes from the **event structure metaphor.** In **event structure** movement corresponds to action.

Finally, it can be seen that the **burden** exerts a steady or constant pressure on the self. This is in contrast to the internal force in the **pressurized** CONTAINER metaphor, where the internal pressure is typically momentary or lasts a short

time. Correspondingly, the intrinsic force tendency of emotion will be momentary in the **internal pressure**, while steady, or longer-lasting, in the **burden** metaphor.

4.7. Metaphors Mainly Focusing on the "Cause of Emotion"

4.7.1. Emotion Is a Physical Force

Here are some examples for the specific-level metaphors that belong to this group:

Emotion is a mechanical force; emotional effect is physical contact.

(i)   Ndo ri u zwipfa zwa nthwa lu vhavhaho

         (When I heard about it, it hit me hard)

(ii)   Lufu lwa khotsi anga lwo nkhokhomedza

         (The death of my father was a terrible blow)

(iii)   Ndo fashwa ngae

         (I was magnetically drawn to her)

(iv)   Ndo kungea ngae

         (I am attracted to her)

As the instantiations of the generic-level **force** schema and its mappings in Table 4.7.1. indicate, these metaphors have to do with the way emotions arise.

Table 4.7.1. EMOTION is A PHYSICAL FORCE

Metaphorical Mapping	Agonist's Force Tendency	Antagonist's Force Tendency	Resultant Action
Source	*Physical object* to remain unaffected by force	*Physical force* to produce effect in object	object undergoes effect
Target	*Self* to remain unemotional	*Cause of emotion* to cause self to become emotional	self is emotional

Source: Physical force.
Target: Emotion.

Through observation Kövecses notices that these mappings can be applied to completely different parts of our emotion scenario in the folk theory of emotion than the ones we have dealt with previously. In the cases above, we had the following picture: Emotion as Antagonist has a force tendency; the force tendency manifests itself in the self as Agonist; the result is some emotional effect on the part of the self. Schematically:

self has emotion - force tendency of emotion/self - self has emotion
 - resultant emotional effect

With the **physical force** metaphor, however, there is a different one: It is the cause of emotion that has the Antagonist's force tendency; the force tendency manifests itself in the self as Agonist; as a result, the self has the emotion. Schematically again:

cause of emotion - force tendency of cause of emotion => self has emotion

While the first chain is a description of what happens after an emotion has come into being, the second captures what it takes for it to come into being. The two causal chains complement each other, in that one captures what happens before

an emotion comes into being, and the other captures what happens afterward. Thus, one can put them together in the following way to get a complete picture of the skeletal scenario that forms the basis of the most pervasive folk theory of emotion coded into English:

(1) cause of emotion - force tendency of the cause of emotion => (2) self has emotion - force tendency of emotion => (3) resultant effect

What is missing from this is the control-related aspects of emotion discussed above that can be placed between (2) and (3). If we place this information in the schema, we get:

(1) cause of emotion - force tendency of the cause of emotion => (2) self has emotion - force tendency of emotion => (3) self's force tendency <—> emotion's force tendency => (4) resultant effect.

This skeletal but now complete schema reveals that our basic understanding of emotion rests upon our understanding of how various forces interact with each other. Most important, the schema shows that even our most basic understanding of emotion as "cause => emotion => response" is metaphorical through and through.

4.8. CONCLUSION

In this chapter the researcher discusses force in emotion metaphors. Kövecses highlights several kinds of forces such as natural forces, physical forces and so forth. Kövecses also discusses the struggle that is found in a person. He further discusses the master and an animal. Ultimately it becomes obvious that Kövecses contentions are applicable in Tshivenda as a language particularly. When a substance (self) is in a container and has over flown: the response either explodes or burst. When it has exploded we indeed find anger whilst when an

emotion viewed as joy has bursted e.g. when someone is overflowing with rage or overwhelmed with joy, he feels like he is going to burst.

When a person has exploded, the struggle takes place between the self and an emotion as an opponent. Then the self controls the emotion. But then the self causes the emotion to respond. This means that when someone burst with joy, the self loses control to contain the joy inside the body. Kövecses also discusses wild animals where we find the struggle between the master and the animal. The animal is trying to get away from the master, whilst the master tries to hold back the animal so if the master loses, the animal gets away.

In this chapter, emotions are examined as social forces. Social forces deal with the control that the emotion has over the self. In Tshivenda there are examples like: U langwa nga nyofho, meaning, she's controlled by fear. This metaphor primarily applies to a person whose behaviour is controlled by emotion. There's another type of force which is natural and physical. This force affects one in many ways and also takes many shapes in the physical world, storm, wind, fire and other things. In natural force a person experiences emotion in a passive and helpless way, but the main thing is that the internal force is taken as a container metaphor. This chapter interrogates Kövecses contention on the force that is contained by a person, which a person either looses or controls. What Kövecses' findings in his study are also found to be applicable in Tshivenda.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The first chapter of this research delineated the purpose and aims of the study as well as presenting the general theoretical framework and the organisation of the study.

Chapter two focused on the overview of basic emotions. This was done by way of reviewing views of different scholars with the sole purpose of understanding the various aspects that are central to basic emotions: Consequently it was found that in order to understand how emotions function in language a study thereof should be divided into the following:

- Psychological overview in which we find the emotional brain, basic emotions, folk theory, affect imagery and emotion and human emotions.
- Linguistic overview wherein different scholars expound on words and expressions that may indicate various aspects of emotions.

Chapter three presented a study of metaphors of emotion in Tshivenda taking into consideration emotion categories such as lust, fear, pride, love, happiness, anger and friendship. This presentation was largely, predicated on Kövecses theoretical foundation of metaphorical domains on which the analysis was based. It was found out that there are source domains which apply to all emotion concepts. According to Kövecses these domains are so general for example:

(a) The existence of emotion is possession of an object.

U a dipfa nga maanda
(She has a lot of pride)

(b) Existence of Emotion is presence here

A thina zwipfi na luthihi

(All my feelings are gone)

The container for example was seen as a source domain that applies to most if not all emotion concepts. This container image defines an inside-outside perspective of a human body. Each human being is a container with a boundry surface and an in-out orientation. For example Anger and its counterparts are viewed in all of the cases as some kind of substance (fluid or gas) inside the closed container that is the human body. The metaphor characterises Anger as a hot fluid in a container. This container metaphors applies to anger, pride and love. Natural forces (wind, storm, flood) seem to present the conceptualisation of many emotions such as love, lust, fear and anger as human beings tend to describe themselves and others as being overwhelmed, engulfed and swept off our feet.

Chapter four dealt with force in emotion metaphors in Tshivenda. Emotions were described as causes that lead to certain behavioural responses in human beings. Kövecses stresses two points. The first one is that metaphors of emotion such as fire, opponent, natural force seem to be instantiations of a single underlying "master metaphor" Emotion is force. The second point was that these metaphors instantiate the generic level metaphor in very different ways, capturing over different aspects of emotional experience.

The intensity of pressure which brings about an effect on the body temperature was discussed. According to Kövecses this takes place into two ways. Eeither the container overflows or explode. Romantic emotions were conceptualised as overflowing whereas the more violent emotion are viewed as exploding out of the body-container. Emotions were also viewed as social forces. According to this metaphor, emotions such as the social superior, have control over the rational

self. The social force of the superior corresponds with the control that the emotion has over the self.

Kövecses also points out some metaphors focusing on both parts of the emotion schema in which the emotion was seen as a physiological force. This comes in several kinds such as in hunger, thirst, illness and agitation.

Finally, this chapter dealt with the metaphors mainly focusing on the "Cause of Emotion".

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