

STALKING THE HUNTING DEBATE:
Trophy Hunting, Integrity and Ideology

Charl F. Badenhorst

*Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (Philosophy) at the University of Stellenbosch*



Supervisor: Prof. J.P. Hattingh

Department of Philosophy, University of Stellenbosch

December 2003

UNIV.STELLENBOSCH



300 783 4001

DECLARATION

I, Charl Frederic Badenhorst, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signature:



Date:

26.11.03

ABSTRACT

Trophy hunting remains a highly contentious issue within environmental spheres of debate. Whether it is morally justifiable for humans to kill other living creatures for recreation, even if by doing so generates revenue in aid of their conservation, is a contested issue that will not easily rest and on which there is as yet no clear ground for consensus between opposing viewpoints. Within environmental philosophy, the topic of the morality of sport hunting has been extensively discussed, with the focus shifting constantly between various moral and ethical theories; while in an African context, big game trophy hunting continues to be a vital source of income for wildlife conservation and rural communities amidst the contested meaning of its role and place. The phrase "the hunting debate" refers to the ongoing discourses that surround the contested meaning and morality of recreational hunting, while the groups involved in the debate are polarised along the lines of preservationist and conservationist viewpoints.

The lack of consensual ground between opposing viewpoints and the strength of the conviction of held beliefs and values result in a stalemate. In this thesis an attempt is made to map this stalemate by identifying the role players relevant to an African context, and the groups who stand in opposition to one another, namely those within the anti-hunting and pro-hunting communities. Points of contention are highlighted, and the various moral theories inherent in the debate are identified, with the crux of the stalemate being shown to be essentially between deontological moral assumptions regarding the wrongness of hunting, and utilitarian approaches that attempt to justify it morally according to an aggregation of benefits. The meaning of hunting for the Ethical Hunter is also clarified, as is the meaning of the hunting experience as a philosophical and historical symbolic construction.

The political nature of the debate is also explored against the backdrop of a postmodern description of culture and communities, as is the way in which certain symbols are employed as ideological tools within the debate, and how they serve to influence public opinion regarding the morality of hunting. The hunting experience is discussed in detail as a historical construct, and certain hunting narratives are briefly identified in this regard, as are the symbolisms of indigenous hunter-gatherer hunting practices. This is in order to identify similarities or differences in meaning of the hunting experience, and so doing reach a position to say what hunting with integrity may mean.

Integrity as a Virtue is promoted as the founding conceptual criterion around which discussions of trophy hunting may be based, and trophy hunting of the Big Five species in Africa is contextually explored with this notion in mind. While trophy hunting of the Big Five offers tangible and much needed instrumental benefits, it does not stand up well to a critique of “the hunting experience” as a historical construct and as a commodified package, as The Hunting Experience in this sense is seen to lack authenticity in terms of an idealised and primitivist notion of the meaning of Ethical Hunting. The paradox of Big Five trophy hunting is that it is very hard to justify, as it is seen to reinforce dualistic assumptions of nature, and objectify animals as a commodity; notwithstanding the moral uncertainty surrounding the act it can, however, be seen to offer benefits that are pragmatic and tangible, for ecosystems as well as humans. However, with the exception of strictly utilitarian approaches, the findings of this thesis suggest that instrumental economic benefits are not enough to justify trophy hunting of the Big Five in Africa from a moral philosophical perspective, although in keeping with the aims of the study no attempt is made to posit one moral position over another as to the morality of trophy hunting.

In conclusion, it is suggested that trophy hunting be de-emphasised as an inevitable and singularly viable wildlife management tool, and instead be understood in terms of a short-term strategic compromise, as doing so allows more room for the growth of ideas that may offer an acceptable alternative. Based upon the findings of this study, it is acknowledged that such a compromise is essentially and theoretically also a compromise of integrity, which may nevertheless within certain contexts be necessary in the short-term.

OPSOMMING

Trofeejag bly 'n hoogs kontensieuse kwessie in debatte binne die omgewingsfeer. Of dit moreel regverdigbaar vir mense is om ander lewende wesens vir ontspanning dood te maak, selfs al genereer dit die middele wat nodig is om hierdie wesens se bewaring te verseker, is 'n betwisbare kwessie wat nie maklik met rus gelaat sal word nie en waarvoor daar tans nog nie duidelike gronde vir konsensus tussen die twee opponerende gesigspunte bestaan nie. Binne die omgewingsfilosofie is die onderwerp rakende die moraliteit van sportjag reeds breedvoerig bespreek, met die fokus wat gedurigdeur wissel tussen die verskillende morele en etiese teorieë. Intussen gaan grootwildtrofeejag in 'n Afrika-konteks voort om 'n lewensbelangrike bron van inkomste te wees vir die bewaring van die natuurlewe en vir die landelike gemeenskappe, te midde van hierdie betwiste betekenis van die rol en plek daarvan. Die frase "die jagdebat" verwys na die voortgaande diskoerse wat die betwiste betekenis en moraliteit van ontspanningsjag omring terwyl die groepe wat by die debat betrokke is, gepolariseer is volgens die grense wat daar bestaan tussen die gesigspunte te make met preservasie en konservasie.

Die gebrek aan konsensuele gronde tussen die twee opponerende gesigspunte en die sterkte van die oortuigings en die waardesisteme van hierdie twee groepe lei tot 'n dooie punt. In hierdie tesis word gepoog om hierdie dooie punt op te klaar deur die verskillende rolspelers relevant vir die Afrika-konteks, en die groepe wat teenoor mekaar staan, naamlik diegene binne die anti-jag- en pro-jag-gemeenskappe, te identifiseer. Die twispunte word uitgelig, en die verskillende morele teorieë wat inherent aan die debat is, word geïdentifiseer. Die kern van die dooie punt word so uitgewys as te vinde te wees in die verskille tussen die deontologiese morele aannames aangaande die verkeerdheid van jag, en die utilitaristiese benaderings wat poog om dit moreel te regverdig na aanleiding van 'n opeenhoping van voordele. Die betekenis van jag vir die Etiese Jagter word ook duidelik uiteengesit, asook die betekenis van die jagervaring as 'n filosofiese en historiese simboliese konstruksie.

Die politieke aard van die debat word ook ondersoek teen die agtergrond van 'n postmoderne beskrywing van kultuur en gemeenskappe. Die manier waarop sekere simbole as ideologiese gereedskap binne die debat gebruik word, en hoe hulle dan dien om die publieke mening aangaande die moraliteit van jag te beïnvloed, kry ook aandag. Die jagervaring word in detail as 'n historiese maaksel bespreek, en sekere jagverhale word kortliks in hierdie verband

geïdentifiseer, asook die simboliek van die jagpraktyke van die inheemse jagter-opgaarder. Dit word gedoen om die ooreenkomste en die verskille in die betekenis van die jagondervinding te identifiseer en om daardeur uit te kom by 'n posisie vanwaar daar gesê kan word wat dit beteken om met integriteit te jag.

Integriteit as 'n Deug word voorgestel as die aanvanklike konsepuele kriterium waarop die bespreking van trofeejag gebaseer kan word, en trofeejag van die Groot Vyf in Afrika word kontekstueel ontgin met hierdie idee in gedagte. Terwyl die trofeejag van die Groot Vyf tasbare en broodnodige instrumentele voordele bied, hou dit nie goed stand teen 'n beoordeling van die "jagondervinding" as 'n historiese maaksel en as 'n gekommodifiseerde pakket nie; in hierdie sin word die Jagondervinding gesien as dat dit te kort skiet wat betref geloofwaardigheid as 'n geïdealiseerde en primitiwistiese idee van die betekenis van Etiese Jag. Die paradoks van Groot Vyf-trofeejag is dat dit baie moeilik is om te regverdig omdat dit gesien word as die versterking van die dualistiese aannames van die natuur en dat dit diere objektifiseer as kommoditeite. Nieteenstaande die morele onsekerheid wat die jagkwessie omring, kan daar egter gesien word dat dit voordele bied wat pragmaties en tasbaar is, vir beide ekosisteme en mense. Met die uitsondering van streng utilitaristiese benaderings, stel die bevindings van hierdie tesis egter voor dat die instrumentele ekonomiese voordele nie genoeg is om trofeejag van die Groot Vyf in Afrika te regverdig vanuit 'n morele filosofiese perspektief nie; in ooreenstemming met die doeleindes van die studie word geen poging egter aangewend om een morele posisie bo-oor 'n ander oor die moraliteit van trofeejag te postuleer nie.

Ten slotte word daar voorgestel dat trofeejag nie meer beklemtoon moet word as 'n onafwendbare en eenvoudig lewensvatbare natuurlewebestuursmeganisme nie en eerder verstaan moet word na aanleiding van 'n korttermyn strategiese kompromie. Dit sal ruimte laat vir die groei van idees wat 'n aanvaarbare alternatief kan bied. Gebaseer op die bevindinge van hierdie studie, word daar aanvaar dat sodanige kompromie essensieel en teoreties ook 'n kompromie met betrekking tot integriteit is, wat nogtans binne sekere kontekste in die korttermyn nodig kan wees.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would hereby like to acknowledge and extend my heartfelt thanks to:

- Professor Johann Hattingh for his jovial patience and expert and articulate guidance throughout the writing of this thesis, and also for encouraging and allowing the development of the thesis as it went along. Any mistakes, errors, or logical inconsistencies are entirely my own.
- Hendrik Venter for the renewed motivation and his generous encouragement.
- I'd also like to thank Kobus Jooste, Dr. Brian Reilly, Andre DeGeorges and Dr. Ian McCullam for openly sharing their thoughts with me, and for willingly engaging with some of the many difficult issues surrounding the hunting debate.
- And most importantly, my family for their unstinting support and encouragement without which this wouldn't have been possible, especially Andre, Judy and Adi, and my grandparents Sannie and Pat.

I ask myself, what the devil kind of occupation is this business of hunting?

- Ortega y Gasset

For Adeah

hearing a beautiful french whisper changed us, and left us dreaming...

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS	i
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
 SECTION A: DEFINITION OF ROLE PAYERS	
INTRODUCTION	23
 CHAPTER TWO: PRO-HUNTING ORGANISATIONS	 26
1. INTRODUCTION	26
2. "PRO-HUNTING" HUNTING ORGANISATIONS	27
2. 1. Safari Club International	28
2. 2. Professional Hunters' Association of South Africa	51
2. 3. East Cape Game Management Association	52
2. 4. Confederation of Hunters' Associations of South Africa	52
3. CONCLUSION	52
 CHAPTER THREE: SILENT PRO-HUNTING ROLE PLAYERS AND INTERESTED PARTIES	 54
1. INTRODUCTION	54
2. CONSERVATION NGOs	54
2. 1. World Wildlife Fund	55
2. 2. Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa	57
3. WORLD BODIES AND TREATIES	58
3. 1. World Conservation Union	59
3. 2. Convention on Biological Diversity	60
4. GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS	61
4. 1. South African National Parks	61
4. 2. Department of Wildlife and National Parks of Botswana	64
5. INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS AND THE HUNTING ECONOMY	69
5. 1. Game Farmers/Breeders, Outfitters and Professional Hunters	69
5. 2. Economic Sustainability and the Hunting Industry	71
6. ACADEMIC ROLE PLAYERS	76
7. CONCLUSION	79

**CHAPTER FOUR:
ANTI-HUNTING ROLE PLAYERS 80**

1. INTRODUCTION	80
2. INTERNATIONAL ANTI-HUNTING NGOs	81
2. 1. The Humane Society of the United States	81
2. 2. The Fund for Animals	86
2. 3. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals	89
3. MORAL PHILOSOPHY	91
4. CONCLUSION	97

**CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSION TO SECTION A – MAPPING THE STALEMATE 99**

1. INTRODUCTION	99
2. THE CONTOURS OF A STALEMATE	99
3. CLASHING WORLD VIEWS	109
4. CONCLUSION	115

***SECTION B: THE EMERGENCE OF THE HUNTING
EXPERIENCE***

INTRODUCTION 117

**CHAPTER SIX:
THE HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF TROPHY HUNTING AND ITS
PLACE IN AFRICA: A CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION 119**

1. INTRODUCTION	119
2. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE EMERGENCE OF HUNTING	119
2. 1. The Hunting Hypothesis and the Primitivist Defence: Ideological Foundations of Human Origins and Meat Eating	122
2. 2. The Historical Emergence of Trophy Hunting in Africa	127
3. THE CONCEPTION OF HUNTING	134
3. 1. Defining What Hunting "is not"	135
3. 2. Defining What Hunting "is": Various Forms and Categorical Types	140
3. 3. Trophy Hunting and "True Hunting"	148
4. CONCLUSION	153

CHAPTER SEVEN:	
THE POLITICS OF HUNTING AND THE RE-CONSTITUTION OF MEANING IN RELATION TO SAN HUNTING TALES, HEMINGWAY, AND ORTEGA Y GASSET	155
1. INTRODUCTION	155
2. THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THE HUNTING DEBATE	156
3. HUNTING AND CULTURE	163
4. THE HUNTING EXPERIENCE AS A HISTORICAL SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION	169
5. HEMINGWAY AND ORTEGA MEET NAESS	174
6. HUNTER-GATHERER SYMBOLISM	182
7. CONCLUSION	186
CHAPTER EIGHT:	
INTEGRITY AND THE HUNTING EXPERIENCE	187
1. INTRODUCTION	187
2. INTEGRITY AND THE TROPHY HUNTING EXPERIENCE	188
3. INTEGRITY AND ANTI-HUNTING POSITIONS	195
4. INTEGRITY AND TROPHY HUNTING OF THE BIG FIVE IN BOTSWANA AND SOUTH AFRICA	198
4. 1. Leopard Hunting: Hounds or Baiting?	199
4. 2. Lion Hunting: Wild Populations vs. Captive Breeding	202
4. 3. Elephant Hunting: The Moral Imperative of the Utilitarian Approach	208
4. 4. Rhino Hunting: Another Perspective on the Moral Imperative	210
4. 5. Buffalo Hunting: Closest to the Ideal	211
5. PONDERING THE CONCLUSION	212
BIBLIOGRAPHY	221

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAB	African Advisory Board
ALWG	African Lion Working Group
BWMA	Botswana Wildlife Management Association
CBD	The Convention on Biological Diversity
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resources Management
CF	Conservation Force
CHA	Controlled Hunting Areas
CHASA	Confederation of Hunters' Associations of South Africa
CITES	The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
DWNP	The Department of Wildlife and National Parks, Government of Botswana
ECGMA	East Cape Game Management Association
FFA	The Fund for Animals
GHOA	The Green Hills of Africa
GKG	Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Transfrontier Park.
HSUS	The Humane Society of the United States
IUCN	The International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. <i>Also known as</i> The World Conservation Union
JMB	Joint Management Board
KNP	Kruger National Park
LBAFS	Lion Breeders Association of the Free State
NCS	National Conservation Strategy
NEMA	National Environmental Management Act
NGO	non-governmental organisation

PAC	problem animal control
PETA	People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
PH	professional hunter
PHASA	Professional Hunters' Association of South Africa
SAGRO	The South African Game Ranchers' Organisation
SANP	South African National Parks
SCI	Safari Club International
TRAFFIC	The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network
WCS	World Conservation Strategy
WESSA	The Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa
WLTA	Wildlife Translocation Association of South Africa
WMA	Wildlife Management Areas
WWF	World Wildlife Fund, or World Wide Fund for Nature

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In few other environmental debates is the moral ambiguity surrounding choices of ethical responsibility toward nature and non-human beings more palpable than in the debate surrounding Trophy Hunting. An overview of this debate reveals the epicentre of environmental conflict between what are broadly defined as the main categories of *preservationism* and *conservationism*¹, and exposes the plurality of environmental values inherent in what is essentially a moral debate.

Arguments from a preservationist (also referred to as *protectionist*) perspective may be regarded as entailing elements through a spectrum from deep ecology to ecocentrism, which characteristically require a certain purist approach to preserving ecosystems and habitats, with minimal or no human interference.² Preservationism assumes a notion of intrinsic preciousness, fragility and eternity that needs to be preserved without disturbance, and assumes that the actions of humans have an intrinsically harmful effect for the environment if not curtailed in some way, by excluding certain areas or putting them off limits to human activity. It therefore implies a distinction, or dualism, between nature and man, purity and impurity.³

Conservationism, on the other hand, while similarly recognizing the harmful effects of human activity on the environment, argues from an anthropocentric perspective and assumes that the best way in which to safeguard the environment is to treat it as sustainably as possible given that humans are less likely to completely destroy ecosystems if they see them as a valuable resource which is able to bring immediate and practical benefits to them. It assumes that the best way to do so is through direct human action in the form of management and sustainable use of natural resources.

¹ MacLean (1993: 171-179) explores the moral aspects of the conflict between preservationism and conservationism. The types of environmental conflict I have in mind are those identified by Schmidtz (2000: 397-408). There are according to Schmidtz three kinds of environmental conflict, namely conflicts in *use*, *values*, and *priorities*. Accordingly, the conflict between preservationism and conservationism thus revolves essentially around conflicts in *use*, *values* and *priorities*.

² The degree of "purity" being dependent on the extent of human interference, i.e. the less interference, the "purer" the ecosystem/habitat/biosphere etc.

³ Stephens 2000: 267-269.

Within and under these two main categories, I identify sub-categories of views and theories from the perspectives of sustainable utilisation, animal rights, animal liberation, the natural sciences of biology and ecology, utilitarianism, economics, religion and sociology, all of which are expressed and used to justify or condemn hunting on a moral and/or ethical basis.

The motivation for writing a thesis on trophy hunting was born out of recognition of the validity, in context, of certain points and arguments on both sides of the hunting debate. I say in context because an argument in favour of trophy hunting based on projected economic benefits for the environment and local communities presupposes an acceptance of the utilitarian context within which the argument is put forward. As soon as one begins to question the basic assumption of the argument, namely that purely economic consequentialism (specifically profit maximisation as opposed to lesser lucrative options) is a priority when making decisions affecting wildlife, the force of the argument diminishes. This questioning leads to the idea that other values have an equal claim to consideration when making decisions affecting wildlife and our relation to the environment, at least on the theoretical level.

Similarly, an argument against trophy hunting on the grounds that it is morally objectionable to kill for recreation presupposes a uniform acceptance of a theory of natural rights (for example, one that is grounded in an ethical theory such as Humane Moralism)⁴ as the context within which the objection is made, as well as an assumption surrounding the motives behind trophy hunting. An exploration of the cultural significance and objectives of trophy hunting against the weight of human history reveals that while hunting in general has been for eons a vital, and necessary, component of human survival, there are varying types of hunting that take place today, some of which cannot be explained as a mere desire for recreation; nor should they be seen in isolation from their cultural emergence and significance. Therefore, blanket moral arguments against *all* forms of hunting either ignore certain aspects of what constitutes human cultural development, or they assume certain (morally objectionable) human psychological characteristics to be self-evident in all acts of trophy hunting.

This line of questioning is important and vital against the backdrop of increasing challenges facing conservation efforts and natural wildlife refuges in Africa today. Arguments against hunting based on strict preservationist views do not

⁴ Callicott 1995: 239; King 1991: 66.

adequately address the practical implications of what history and experience leads us to conclude is fallible human nature, with its destructive consequences for the environment. Preservationism as yet does not seem to offer an adequate and workable solution to environmental conflicts in Africa that takes the main human, ecological and economic factors into account (these are namely: poverty, hunger, education, ecosystemic integrity, ecological balance, sustainability of ecological processes in enclosed areas, exorbitant costs of preserving wildlife etc.). Proponents of hunting make a strong pragmatic case for it on the basis that it potentially offers a tangible solution to human/wildlife conflicts, as it offers an economic incentive for people, landowners and rural communities in particular, to protect wildlife.⁵ Sustainable utilisation of natural resources is fast becoming the norm in developing African countries, while regulated hunting practices are able to provide a vital boost to local economies and wildlife populations as a whole, particularly in countries where lack of infrastructure fetters potential income from tourism. By giving animals an economic value, regulated and sustainable hunting serves to make wildlife an attractive and economically viable resource to be protected, which may serve to cultivate cultural values in relation to wildlife as well.⁶ However, economic determinism is also largely the cause of environmental problems, which naturally causes a certain amount of caution and scepticism towards claims that an economic approach be used as the basis to solve environmental conflicts.

Habitat loss and hunting are generally accepted as being the two greatest threats today to wildlife populations,⁷ whilst illegal hunting remains a major source of income for poor rural communities adjacent to some national parks, such as the Serengeti National Park in Tanzania for example.⁸ As a sub-set of the arguments against hunting in general, arguments against **Trophy Hunting**, then, are fuelled both by concerns over the sustainability of ecological processes, as well as questions about the integrity of human action deemed to be detrimental to wildlife populations and the interests of individual animals and species. The long-term synopsis of continued unregulated hunting and exploitation of wildlife populations, if taken in context with an increasing human population and resultant pressure on

⁵ Baldus 1990: 362. I use the term "economic" in broad terms here, which is not confined to financial revenue alone, but includes all of the material benefits, such as employment, education, housing, land ownership, and food, which can arise out of the financial benefits hunting may provide.

⁶ DeGeorges 2001b.

⁷ Bennett, Milner-Gulland, Bakarr, Eves, Robinson and Wilkie 2002: 28-29. This includes all types of hunting, such as subsistence hunting or market hunting for the bushmeat trade etc. and not only tourist or recreational hunting.

⁸ Loibooki, Hofer, Kenneth, Campbell and East 2002: 394-397.

wildlife areas through habitat degradation, is one of small, restricted and increasingly fragile ecosystems less able to sustain and recover from detrimental human action. This is unless a determined course of beneficial human action is undertaken which negates the damage done. A central point of debate is whether Trophy Hunting is the most morally and ethically pragmatic method of offsetting harmful human action.⁹

In broad terms, humans and the consequences of human activity are pitted against the non-human natural world, living, non-living, plant and animal alike; but in essence, the environmental conflict has its seat between humans themselves. It is to be found in the disparate views and moral theory over “what is the right thing to do” as a human being. The environment cannot speak for itself nor voice its opposition to certain human activities – those who speak on behalf of the environment do this. Environmental conflict therefore lies in the disparaging views of people over “what is the right thing to do” concerning the environment, and is therefore in essence found to be between people with differing views over use, values and priorities.¹⁰ This is largely characteristic of the hunting debate, as those taking a fundamental stand for or against a conservationist or preservationist viewpoint differ extensively over values, priorities and use when the killing of animals for sport is concerned. This is particularly evident in the emphasis often placed by preservationist approaches on the rights of individual animals and species, as opposed to the more holistic approach of conservationism and its emphasis on ecosystems and ecological processes.

The debate over Trophy Hunting remains highly contentious in the *public domain* precisely because the opinions both for and against trophy hunting are held with such a depth of conviction that it becomes very difficult to acknowledge the validity of some of the other side’s claims. This may be for fear of relinquishing ground to these claims and compromising the strength of one’s own position, even though there may be a certain truth to the opposing claims.¹¹ These strongly

⁹ For example, utilitarian value theory is used to justify hunting on the basis of beneficial side effects: namely of increased numbers of game farms and animals, economic benefits to game parks and reserves, and economic empowerment of local communities thereby reducing the impact of poaching on wildlife populations. This cost/benefit approach entails accepting the killing of individual animals - a 'moral evil' - if it results in a 'moral good' for the greater number of animals and species.

¹⁰ Cf. Leopold (1970: 262) for the famous postulation of his land ethic: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” . List (1997: 405-416) offers an argument for hunting based upon the principles of Leopold’s Land Ethic in “Is Hunting a Right Thing?”

¹¹ Someone closely involved in the hunting industry, and who wished to remain anonymous, made this observation in a private correspondence. It is important to note that this observation is from an individual with an obvious personal interest at stake, and is enlightening in that it reveals an awareness of the contextual validity of arguments against his own position.

held views and opinions, on both sides of the debate, therefore seem at times to be propped up more by the person's absolute conviction that they are right than the absolute rational truth and validity of their claims. It is very clear that in everyday discussion of this topic certain arguments, both for and against hunting, are based upon rather shaky premises, many of which can be shown to be indefensible in certain contexts.¹² This may be because of individual/collective interests and agendas that may reinforce certain ideological stances, both on the part of those for and against hunting, with the result that these interests and agendas outweigh immediate moral and ethical concerns on certain levels. If those in the pro-hunting lobby had a different agenda to those in the anti-hunting lobby (which they undoubtedly do), then the obvious enquiry would be to try and discern what these respective agendas could be, and to what extent these agendas reinforce or negate the beliefs or ideological stance of the parties involved in the debate.

Concerns are therefore raised about the consistency in which personal values, reinforced by certain ideological stances and beliefs, are applied and adhered to in the argumentation of a position for or against hunting, as well as the consistency of theoretical arguments and moral positions themselves.

This serves as a basis for my questions about the arguments surrounding trophy hunting and integrity. As mentioned briefly, certain agendas and interests, influenced by belief and ideology, may outweigh immediate moral and ethical concerns on some levels, resulting in inconsistency and therefore a lack of integrity in terms of the holistic application of moral principles through action. Answers to questions about integrity and consistency may therefore help to bridge the gap between agenda, actions and interests on the one hand, and belief and ideology (influenced by culture) on the other in terms of the quality of the moral justifications of hunting.

The notion of integrity as applied in this argument is one that appeals to the manner in which an act is carried out. It entails certain presuppositions regarding the inherent moral quality of such an action. This moral quality is largely determined by desires and intentions, meaning intended consequences of such action. It also entails a measure of the manner in which moral views are integrated into a person's life – suggesting that a person's moral integrity is a measure of how consistently and sincerely a person applies moral principles in

¹² Curnutt 1996: 65-89.

his or her own life, in line with a sound judgement as to the moral worth of those principles.¹³ Noggle appeals to the concept of integrity as being a “psychological notion meant to answer psychological questions about ‘who one is as a person’, what her life is all about, what is important to her, and so on. Integrity involves the preservation of the personality, character, values and commitments that shape a human life and constitute a human self”.¹⁴

I also have in mind a consideration of Norton’s practical interpretation of integrity in Leopold’s “Land Ethic,” where Leopold’s declaration that: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise”,¹⁵ could be considered as a “... *practical* remark on the *proper focus of conservation management ...*”, rather than a philosophical statement about ultimate value in nature.¹⁶ This interpretation has a direct bearing on the management of game populations and ecosystems as far as hunting is concerned, because it entails the idea that by protecting the integrity of community processes (ecosystems) one is essentially protecting the plurality of values exemplified in nature. And it follows that by protecting the integrity of ecosystems, one also protects the animals and species that are sustained by them.¹⁷

This goes to the heart of the debate surrounding the sustainable utilisation of wildlife through activities such as hunting – especially where claims are made that trophy hunting is ecologically sustainable – as it recognises the inherent complexity of ecosystems and the fact that an integrated, systems approach to environmental management is required to address and manage these complex ecosystems,¹⁸ considering that species do not exist as separate units in isolation from one another but rather exist interdependently. Game management practices¹⁹ that are geared towards determining carrying capacities and appropriate levels of off-take for hunted animals are intended to be mindful of this

¹³ Honderich 1995: s.v. ‘integrity’; Levine, Cox and La Caze 1999: 520.

¹⁴ Noggle 1999: 315.

¹⁵ Leopold 1970: 262.

¹⁶ Norton 1996a: 117.

¹⁷ Norton 1996a: 117.

¹⁸ Norton 1996a: 117.

¹⁹ Also called “adaptive management” as practiced in South Africa, and as seen in Botswana in efforts to determine acceptable quotas of animal offtake for certain areas (as in Peake 1999, for example). Briefly, adaptive management entails a formal trial and error approach to conservation, in that the management of wildlife incorporates the complex relationships between ecology, sociology, and economics where the outcome of certain actions is uncertain. Wildlife managers therefore need to adapt (hence “adaptive management”) to these uncertainties (Adams and McShane 1992: 99).

consideration, as short-term financial considerations often take precedence over sustainability and wildlife concerns in instances where natural resources are exploited. The “shortsighted economic reasoning that ignores the scientific evidence that intensive management often leads to gradual decline in productive systems”,²⁰ has been symptomatic of many wildlife conflicts. Approaching environmental decision-making and management issues with the aim of preserving ecological integrity is thus intended to reduce the risk of this occurring.

An obvious response to this would be: firstly, how does one quantify integrity and what sort of indicators could be used to denote the integrity of ecosystems?²¹ The seasonal rainfall and climate of biospheres and ecosystems change, populations fluctuate, plant encroachment and succession takes place, all in line with the dynamic nature of complex ecosystems. Furthermore, human intervention or interference is inevitable in enclosed ecosystems, so a notion of integrity needs to include the human factor where the changes in the ecosystem are brought about by human action. This is admittedly difficult to answer, and Norton’s interpretation attempts to provide for one: namely, that the two concepts of “stability” and “beauty” be employed as additional criteria in the search for integrity.²²

However, as integrity, stability and beauty are themselves value-laden concepts open to interpretation, which in management approaches inevitably imports human preferences as to what is beautiful, stable etc.,²³ a second question arises: namely, does an emphasis on the notion of integrity in relation to the *management* of ecosystems need to take cognisance of other values and considerations, such as the notion of duties and obligations towards individual animals within the ecosystem, and how would such a cognisance influence the broader objectives of biodiversity preservation?

The hunting debate thus centres around the above considerations, as well as the separation of the notion of the rights of animals and species, through the emphasis on ecosystems and the biotic community, which is a common characteristic of most management approaches to conservation. I aim to therefore explore different notions of integrity and how they relate to each other

²⁰ Norton 1996b: 99.

²¹ This question is also raised by King (1991: 66-67).

²² Norton 1996a: 117.

²³ King 1991: 67.

within the broad issues which characterise the hunting debate, namely the integrity of moral action, ecosystemic integrity, the integrity of integration (i.e. the integration of moral views within human life), and the logical integrity of certain arguments themselves.

One of the main aims for both sides in the hunting debate is undoubtedly to win public support for their views. A large portion of the public can be considered uninformed, uninterested, or even ambivalent regarding the morality of hunting or killing for recreation.²⁴ Pro-hunting parties are therefore pitted against anti-hunting groups in a fierce battle over public opinion and sympathy for their agendas and interests. This is because the weight of public opinion will be an important factor in determining the future of trophy hunting, as enhanced public awareness about conservation issues inevitably brings a lot of pressure to bear on decision-making bodies in conservation.²⁵ Conservation organizations, governmental and non-governmental alike, whilst by no means contingent on public opinion for their decision making process, do need to be mindful of the interests of the public at large in the transparent nature of a developing democracy in South Africa particularly, and in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa²⁶ and environmental legislation.²⁷

No wonder, then, that the issue of trophy hunting has been so fiercely and vigorously contested between the two positions. For years, hunters have been under fire from what they termed were “naïve” and “hypocritical” “bunny-lovers”, “tree-huggers”, “greenies”, “bleeding hearts” etc.,²⁸ and had perhaps been reluctant to continually defend their views and lifestyle from what they may have perceived to be “intolerant extremists”. For example: *“The emotionally and ideologically founded attacks of the animals rights industry against the*

²⁴ Causey 1996: 81.

²⁵ Sowman, Fuggle and Preston 1995: 51-52. An example of this was when Cape Nature Conservation implemented the decision to cull the invasive Tahr species from the slopes of Table Mountain. A huge public outcry caused them to put the culling on hold, largely due to pressure from the interest group called “Friends of The Tahr” (Zintl 2003: 32-34). This was even after an exhaustive public consultative process was undertaken before the decision to cull was reached. Although Cape Town is a metropolitan centre and any environmental decisions are inevitably scrutinised more closely than in more remote areas, the example does serve to illustrate the potential influence of public opinion and emotion on environmental decision-making processes.

²⁶ Act 108 of 1996, as amended on 11 October 1996 (Cf. South Africa 1996).

²⁷ Particularly in line with the South African Bill of Rights, Chapter 2, section 24: “Everyone has the right a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; ii) promote conservation; and iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development”); and the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA), Act 107 of 1998, Chapter 1, section 4 b, c and d (as it appears in the *Government Gazette*, No. 19519, 27 November 1998, p. 12.). (South Africa 1998).

²⁸ Nel 1995: 31.

sustainable use of nature, and in particular against sustainable hunting practices is increasingly considered as interference in the sovereign rights of developing countries and as a subtle form of neo-colonialism ..."²⁹ In South Africa, some have even gone as far as calling for society to "purge itself of the social canker of animal rightism".³⁰

Similarly, anti-hunters condemned hunters for being "cold-blooded immoral killers", "brutish", "bloodthirsty", "arrogant" and "selfish". Hunters have also been labelled as "inhumane", "uncaring", "irresponsible" and "unjust" in their approach and activities towards wildlife.³¹ These moral judgements stem largely from sceptical assumptions surrounding hunters' motives and intentions (and their views towards wildlife), which is hinted at by generalised statements such as the following: "Killing for fun, status or profit is ethically unjustifiable and must be condemned by all responsible people."³²

On an implicit level, then, the integrity of the other side's argumentation has been questioned, as well as the integrity of the moral character of individuals as far as action is concerned. In very general terms then, there are elements of fundamentalism and relativism on both sides, either in responses to criticism, or in justifications of respective positions.

A common response by some hunters, when faced with criticism from anti-hunting groups, often took the form of a declaration that: "if you don't hunt, you don't know"; meaning that in order to understand hunting, you need to be a hunter, and once you are a hunter, you will know what I know and realize that I am right. Although this is not representative of most of the pro-hunting groups who were striving to put forward legitimate defences of hunting, it does serve to highlight the personal frustration that can be generated by discussions of the topic, as well as the unwillingness to abandon a particular position when faced with arguments to the contrary. This could also be because hunting holds considerable cultural value as "a way of life" to the people who practice it, and has contextual significance to them and their daily existence. Indeed, pro-hunters state that, "[Hunting] is more than our heritage and culture, it is our essence".³³ Decontextualised moral arguments against hunting by animal rights and liberation

²⁹ Damm 2001d.

³⁰ Thomson 2002: 27.

³¹ Nel 1995: 31; Horning 1999: 55; HSUS 2003d.

³² Steve Smit, spokesman for FALCON, as quoted in Nel 1995: 31.

³³ Conservation Force 2003d.

groups therefore do not always consider, as King says, that: "hunting is a sign of a particular way of looking at the nonhuman world".³⁴ Whilst it may be true that this way of life *itself* may be the object of moral inquiry,³⁵ it does not follow that decontextual moral arguments against the practice of hunting necessarily lead to an appraisal of the moral character of hunters, something which anti-hunters often do.

This fundamentalist response, though, such as the one mentioned above, removes the issue immediately from any common platform of rational discussion, as it entails a belief in the inherent righteousness of a position. Curiously, aligned with this is also an appeal to plurality, where hunters sometimes invoke individual rights, such as the right to bear arms or freedom of speech, etc., thereby making use of an argument that legitimises their position on the basis of a pluralistic society.

A good example of this line of arguing is the following statement: *"It is certainly within each person's individual freedom to rejecting [sic] hunting for religious, ethical or many other reasons. If such a person selects game viewing or participating in [a] darting operation for animals under proper supervision and not as the person actually pulling the dart gun trigger, it is perfectly acceptable. It is however within the unalienable [sic] rights of a person to hunt game in a sustainable way and such right[s] must be respected! The common denominator of both is the conservation of our natural heritage."*³⁶ This borders therefore on an appeal to ethical relativism.

Anti-hunters are similarly just as prone to adopting a fundamentalist stance in the surety of their beliefs and the condemnation of hunters as "morally deficient" individuals who disregard the inherent worth of animal life to satisfy "self-seeking desires". Stereotyping and righteous assumptions about their judgments of the moral character of hunters, and the beliefs of hunters, serve to fuel this fundamentalist trait in some of their positions. Moral conclusions about the character of hunters are jumped at, and these assumptions are used to bolster their arguments.

³⁴ King 1991: 70.

³⁵ King 1991: 70.

³⁶ Damm 2001b.

Both parties can be seen to adopt a particular ideological stance, which is then defended either with fundamentalist zeal, or with an appeal to plurality. There is thus a discernible tension between fundamentalism and relativism in these ideological stances of both sides in the debate. The implication of this is that no real debate is possible, since fundamentalism entails an absolute belief in the rightness of a position, leading to a stalemate and making any debate null and void; while relativism, denying any basis for any exchange of ideas, similarly renders debate impossible. In short, both parties have thus been stereotyped and demonised by the other leaving little room and "common ground" to serve as a basis for constructive debate.³⁷

In the past, anti-hunting groups have arguably been more successful than pro-hunting groups in winning over public opinion and garnering sympathy for their cause, largely because of the pro-active nature of their campaigning; whereas pro-hunting groups took a more reactive approach, only responding to criticisms when it felt it was necessary, and begrudgingly so.

This has changed in recent years, however, as pro-hunting groups have made a more concerted effort to offer an organized and collective response to the allegations and arguments against hunting. By collectively campaigning for greater understanding of their position and views, the pro-hunting groups have undertaken a pro-active position in the debate: "As tolerant citizens we have to live with these fringe movements, but we certainly do not have to suffer their attacks without reaction. As a matter of fact, the time of reactive play is past. Hunters and conservationists have finally woken up and are ready to put facts straight and to open the eyes of a sadly gullible public to the harsh realities of life in the new millennium."³⁸

The battle lines have been clearly drawn as it were, and the battle, generally speaking, is between two groups: people arguing from a preservationist perspective (anti-hunting), and those from a conservationist perspective (pro-hunting).

Reports, articles, books and papers dealing with the topic of the ethics and morality of hunting are numerous and varied in scope, with new publications appearing continuously. Within this body of literature, many attempts have been

³⁷ The only real point of agreement between both sides is the common objective of ensuring that wildlife continues to exist for future generations.

³⁸ Damm 2001a.

made to try and clearly posit the relevant problems inherent in taking a specific fundamental stand for or against hunting, and some of the arguments both for and against hunting have been shown to be far from infallible.³⁹ Moral arguments from the perspectives of animal rights,⁴⁰ animal liberation,⁴¹ utilitarian value theory,⁴² scientific ideology and ecology (ecosystem integrity)⁴³ are just some of the theories that are drawn on in the debate, and thrown into the mix as it were.

The plurality of values and viewpoints expressed seem to overlap and the line between sub-categories of conflicting values inherent in the debate is by no means clearly defined. As such, there is a distinct lack of consensus both within and between those groups for and against trophy hunting over criteria for establishing the moral and ethical validation of hunting. The result is that within the theoretical and philosophical sphere of debate surrounding the issue of hunting, there is a valid concern that the pluralism that is characteristic of the debate lapses further into an “indecisive form of relativism”.⁴⁴ The reason for this may be because, as Callicott points out, moral philosophy has always striven for theoretical unity, coherency, self-consistency and ultimately, closure;⁴⁵ to arrive at a unifying moral theory regarding the act of hunting which perfectly captures and considers all of the various competing interests and “incommensurable values” is therefore a very big task.⁴⁶

It is therefore not the aim of this thesis to attempt a further clarification of these ideas and theories in the form of a philosophical discourse, nor to attempt another move in the ping-pong debate between the pro- and anti-hunters, albeit from a philosophical position. The aim is rather to recognise from a meta-theoretical perspective that a stalemate exists between many opposing arguments in the debate, and that in order to overcome this stalemate it may be necessary to revert to a different level of analysis. I attempt to undertake such an analysis in this thesis.

³⁹ Notably by Bekoff and Jamieson (1991: 375-378); Curnutt (1996: 65-89); Loftin (1984: 241-250); and Moriarty and Woods (1997: 391-404).

⁴⁰ Regan, T. 1983. *The Case for Animal Rights*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

⁴¹ Singer, P. 1976. *Animal Liberation*. New York: Avon Books.

⁴² Gunn 2001: 68-95; Vitall 1990: 69-82.

⁴³ Wenz 1983: 183-197.

⁴⁴ Light and Katz 1996: 4.

⁴⁵ Callicott 1992: 250.

⁴⁶ To my knowledge at least, this has not yet been done.

AIMS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT:

Keeping King's maxim in mind that "A fully developed inquiry into the morality of sport hunting must ... address both the act and the context which constitutes the act, and understand the unavoidable relationship which links the two",⁴⁷ I hope to show that the concept of *integrity* is basic to the existence of this meta-theoretical stalemate, both in the spheres of theoretical argumentation and human activity. Whilst simultaneously recognising that further philosophical clarification and exploration is essential to advancing an understanding of the act of hunting, I feel that meta-theoretical enquiries alone are not sufficient to address the gap between strongly held belief systems and individual interests on the one hand, and moral theory and rational argument on the other. In identifying and recognising much of the substantial work and important ideas already achieved in this field, I offer a theoretically holistic and contextually sensitive alternative to *approaching* environmental decision-making and the hunting debate, with integrity as the founding conceptual criterion. In this approach, as such, I don't offer one moral theory, position or criteria over another, or seek to replace one certitude with another as far as the moral criteria for the validation of hunting is concerned, but rather to adopt a Foucaultian approach and "cultivate an attention to the conditions under which things become 'evident,' ceasing to be objects of our attention and therefore seemingly fixed, necessary, and unchangeable".⁴⁸ This is in order to help further an understanding of the contexts in which arguments for and against hunting function, as well as the role the act of hunting plays in societies.

King makes the important conclusion in reference to hunting that: "we cannot satisfactorily evaluate the individual acts of our moral lives without first understanding the contexts within which these acts are embedded".⁴⁹ An approach to the hunting debate that requires integrity as the founding conceptual criterion, necessarily then calls for a contextual awareness of forms of conduct in terms of its historical and social embeddedness. This is the motivation for undertaking an ideological critique of the hunting experience.

⁴⁷ King 1991: 62.

⁴⁸ Rabinow 1994: xix.

⁴⁹ King 1991: 85.

This ideological critique will entail identifying with John Thompson's understanding of ideology as "meaning in the service of power"⁵⁰ and as being an examination of the use and function of meaning in establishing or sustaining power relations, or as Thompson says: "to study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination".⁵¹ In the hunting debate, this entails studying certain ways in which meaning is constructed and conveyed through certain symbolic forms (whether through language, texts, etc.) by the opposing sides, and the way in which these forms are (or can be) used to create, encourage, reinforce, negate or sustain certain social relations.⁵² In the sense that: both sides seek to dominate discussion over rights issues and claim a right to define the role of hunting in modern society, or seek to exploit weaknesses in the opponent's position, or to silence opposing viewpoints, to safeguard and monopolise access to wildlife for their position, or legitimate certain assumptions about human nature as part of a strategy to strengthen or create a "moral high ground". For example, the meaning of "hunting", and what it means "to hunt", is employed by both pro- and anti-hunters to identify with certain virtues and ideas, or negate and marginalize others. What is relevant to the debate, and the act of hunting particularly, is that this study calls for an investigation of the social context within which these symbolic forms are employed, for only by "situating symbolic phenomena in the social-historical contexts within which these phenomena may, or may not, serve to establish and sustain relations of domination"⁵³ will we be able to discover their ideological "character". What is also pertinent is that the truth or falsity of the symbolic forms is not the focus of the study, but only their ideological function (given that symbolic phenomena are only ideological in the sense that they serve to maintain relations of domination). This is also relevant in keeping with the contextual focus of the thesis, and serves a non-prescriptive approach to the debate.

Some of the fundamental questions which I raise and attempt to answer are: What is it about the act of hunting, and the experience, that is so appealing to many people yet at the same time so abhorrent to so many others? What does hunting mean? What does it mean *to hunt*? How do the interpretations of these meanings affect the debate? How are these meanings reinforced in the debate, and how are certain notions emphasised, whilst others are marginalized? What

⁵⁰ Thompson 1990: 7.

⁵¹ Thompson 1990: 56.

⁵² Thompson 1990: 7.

⁵³ Thompson 1990: 56.

do the stories and rituals surrounding hunting, and ethical restraints imposed on organised trophy hunting reveal about the state of being of individual hunters vis-à-vis their motives, desires and intentions? How does the concept of integrity affect the way in which arguments for and against hunting could be viewed? How does an examination of the historical emergence of the concept "hunting experience" influence the way we see trophy hunting in present day terms?

Is hunting primarily a cognitive and sensory *experience* which enables those who practice it to "return" to the land and nature, being able to exercise a degree of individual autonomy and freedom in the experience of interacting with nature on a primal and equal footing? Or does *to hunt* mean an expression or exercise of domination over the natural world, as is evident in the *killing act* central to, and the culmination of, a hunt? What symbolic phenomena can be identified in the debate (i.e. theories, concepts, texts, narratives, statements etc.), how do these phenomena function as ideological "tools" within the debate, and to what purpose? What are the power relations within the debate, and what is at stake? How are relations of domination maintained, or created? How does the concept of the hunting experience function (as an ideological symbol) within the ideology of pro-hunting groups? What symbolic appeals are made by anti-hunters in their objections to trophy hunting, and how do they marginalize the beliefs of hunters, and vice versa?

METHODOLOGY:

There is a vast field of reference to consult before one is able to gain a clear idea of where the crux of the problem lies. This is by no means easy, and a fair amount of "conceptual unpacking" needs to be done before a coherent description of the moral and ethical problems inherent in the debate can be formulated which encapsulates them sufficiently. Central to this is an understanding of the meaning of hunting both as an individual experience, and as an ideological construct. It is important to understand the social, political, historical and economic contexts within which hunting originates and finds its expression. In line with this, the concepts of *integrity*, *hunting*, *experience*, *intention*, and *desire* will require further clarification.

Many justifications of hunting revolve around the meaning of the hunting experience to individuals. Moral theories about hunting, however, do not convey the meaning of the experience of hunting (and they are rightly not intended to either, nor can they). Moral philosophical theories are a reflective, objective discourse *about* the moral quality of actions resulting from ethical choices, and

are intended to semantically explore and clarify the rightness and wrongness of human action. An experience however is a singular, immediate, lived-through immersion in the present by an individual and is by nature highly subjective and impossible to empirically quantify.

With this in mind, namely that it is impossible to grasp *absolutely* the *essence* of an experience through language, it would help to examine the *articulation* of experience through narratives in order to overcome this. An examination of the hunting experience as related by individuals through hunting narratives (stories), the historical and cultural context of the emergence of these narratives, and the significance of their impact on individual ideological stances may serve to highlight different conceptions of what the hunting experience entails. If more than one essential kind of hunting experience can be shown to exist, then to what extent do they differ? How do these differences affect the moral justification of a hunting experience? Furthermore, by which criteria do we accept or reject the validity of a hunting experience – in terms of integrity?

An ideological critique of the hunting experience, therefore, may help to identify or clarify, firstly, the reasons why people are able to have such divergent views⁵⁴ and believe that they are right (an examination of intentionality); and secondly, to examine the essence of hunting and what it entails.

In undertaking an ideological critique of the hunting experience, the methodology used will be to briefly examine the hunting experience as it is revealed through different narrative perspectives. By taking examples of these hunting narratives, I aim to explore their ideological character, and how “the hunting experience” may function within the debate as a historical and symbolic construction, by analysing: (1) the historical context of the *emergence* of the narratives, (2) how they are *articulated*, (3) how they were *circulated* and received, and (4) their *effect* in terms of constituting the meaning of hunting.⁵⁵ This will be done after a discussion of the political climate surrounding the hunting debate, and will help to contextualise certain ideological notions of the hunting experience within the debate. The following specific texts and narratives will therefore briefly be examined with the above aim in mind: hunting narratives in the form of traditional San folklore and hunting tales, which may offer an insight into a pre-modern and perhaps authentic conception of the hunting experience of certain hunter-

⁵⁴ This may fall under the banner of Moral pluralism (Hinman 1997).

⁵⁵ Cf. Michel Foucault – Rabinow, P. 1994. *Michel Foucault: Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth*. London: Penguin Books; and Rabinow, P. (ed.). 1984. *The Foucault Reader*. London: Penguin Books.

gatherer communities; the writings of Ernest Hemingway,⁵⁶ which chronicle his big game hunting adventures in Africa and serve as a good example of a modernist perspective on the meaning of the hunting experience; and the hunting experience propounded by José Ortega y Gasset.

Hemingway's book, *The Green Hills of Africa*, chronicling his hunting trip to Africa, will be examined for the reason that (as Carlos Baker wrote): "Anyone interested in the methods by which patterns of experience are translated to the purpose of art should find abundant materials for study in the three stories – nonfiction and fiction – which grew out of Hemingway's African expedition."⁵⁷ The famous Spanish existentialist philosopher Ortega y Gasset, on the other hand, writes from a discernible postmodern perspective in his famous treatise *Meditations on Hunting*.⁵⁸ He states that: "Just as the leaping stag tempts the hunter, the topic of hunting has often tempted me as a writer. My intention is to try to clarify a little this occupation in which devoted hunters engage with such scrupulousness, constancy, and dedication", and: "I ask myself, what the devil kind of occupation is this business of hunting?"⁵⁹ *Meditations on Hunting* is also a landmark text in the philosophical explorations of the meaning of hunting, and because it is extensively quoted by pro-hunting groups, it would be useful to examine the role it plays in the pro-hunting debate.

Besides the above texts, I consulted the extensive body of philosophical literature dealing with the issue of hunting and animal rights, and also conducted interviews, formal and informal, with people on both sides of the debate. I found the Internet useful in reliably gleaning the various positions of the parties involved and their arguments as they present themselves publicly, in cases where I was not able to do so through interviews or private correspondence; it was also useful in getting an idea of the variety of arguments used by individuals not officially affiliated to the main groups in the debate, and to see how language is symbolically used to sustain certain ideological "truths". To a certain extent, the Internet offered an up to date and current reflection of the status of the debate, particularly in the informal public arena, which may have to do with the fact that the World Wide Web is a useful medium in disseminating information quickly, and serves to efficiently saturate the debate with a particular point of view. Other

⁵⁶ Hemingway, E. 1994. *The Green Hills of Africa*. London: Arrow Books.

⁵⁷ Baker 1956: 196.

⁵⁸ Ortega y Gasset, J. 1972. *Meditations on Hunting*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

⁵⁹ Ortega y Gasset 1972: 21-22.

forms of popular media, such as weekly/daily newspapers, and magazines served the same purpose, and are used extensively by both groups to enforce or affirm their viewpoints.

Furthermore, the focus in this thesis will primarily be on Trophy Hunting in Africa of the “Big Five” species (Lion, Leopard, Rhinoceros, Elephant, and Buffalo). Doing so will allow for the motives and desires which drive individuals to hunt, to be examined against a contextually sensitive ethical framework, as the hunting of each animal species respectively entails ethical considerations. This is because the different social structures and behaviour patterns of the respective species require varying methods of hunting them. For example, leopard are normally “baited” at night and shot from a concealed blind,⁶⁰ whilst buffalo are tracked on foot in daylight; each method therefore highlights various definitions of the Fair Chase Principle.⁶¹ Also, the fact that leopards and lions are themselves predators, and only kill or engage with other predators when threatened, due to territorial disputes, or over food,⁶² etc. raises ethical considerations regarding the nature of the animal being hunted and the motives behind it; namely, whether for food, conquest, competition, etc.

If this inquiry is regarded as appropriate and successful, then having an idea of what it means to hunt, and the essence of hunting may serve as a springboard for other arguments, defences and views. What I hope, therefore, to do is to deconstruct, through an ideological critique, some of the assumptions surrounding the hunting debate, and explore the hunting experience – both as a philosophical/psychological phenomenon and as an ideological construct – in addition to exploring what it may mean, firstly, to hunt with integrity, and secondly, to argue for and against hunting with integrity. By returning⁶³ to the meaning and intentionality of the hunting act, we will be in a position to comment on the integrity of such action (after looking at the relationship between intention and integrity), as well as efforts to justify or condemn such acts. From the remains of this we may be able to attempt to construct a suitable analysis of “what the right thing to do” would be concerning trophy hunting with integrity, or even if this is at all possible.

⁶⁰ Marsh 2001a: 46-48.

⁶¹ See Chapter 2 for a discussion of this principle, as well as the ethical Code of Conduct of hunting organisations.

⁶² Bothma and Le Richie 1984: 276.

⁶³ Husserl: “To the things themselves.”

STRUCTURE OF THESIS:

In order to achieve these aims and explore the work and questions posed above, the thesis has been divided into two sections. Section A is dedicated to discussing the various positions within the trophy hunting debate in order to map the stalemate between those arguing for and against hunting, while Section B is dedicated to a deeper discussion of the issues raised in Section A. Within each section chapters are dedicated to a specific sub-question or conceptual issue.

In Section A, Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I aim to identify the most prominent role players in the hunting debate, giving an overview of their respective positions regarding hunting in a Southern African context, in keeping with the focus of the essay. This is in order to, firstly, provide a detailed orientation to the debate as a whole; secondly, to clarify the levels of influence and links in the debate, and the manner in which certain positions are reinforced by other views and positions; and thirdly, to reveal and map the stalemate as it were.

In Chapter 5 I give a summary of the stalemate between the pro- and anti-hunting groups, explain some of the sources of it, and give preliminary pointers to overcoming it.

I begin Section B with an exploration of the act of hunting (Chapter 6), and aim to offer definitions of the different conceptions and forms of hunting, in seeking to conceptually clarify the usage of the term. I look at and examine certain common usages of the word in literature, and define certain categorical types. I also examine the historical origins of hunting from anthropological, cultural, traditional and economic perspectives. This overview of definitions will in many respects further illustrate and confirm many of the points made in Section A about the stalemate in the hunting debate.

Once we have an idea of the commonly accepted usages of the term hunting, its various definitions, and its historical emergence and significance, we will be in a position to examine the hunting experience as an ideological construct and as a philosophical and psychological phenomenon in Chapter 7. There I discuss the political climate within which the debate takes place, and the political characteristics of the debate itself. I examine hunting narratives relating an immediate hunting experience from a pre-modern, modern and postmodern perspective and explore their historical emergence, the way in which they were received and articulated, and their effect and influence. This will enable the clarification of different conceptions of what the hunting experience entails. If

differences or similarities may be found we will be in a position to comment on the extent to which they affect moral justifications of hunting. I hope to identify their influence and effect on the role players identified in Chapter 2, with the aim of looking at the manner in which certain ideologies are reinforced or negated.

Chapter 8 is devoted to a discussion of the concept of integrity and its importance as applicable to individual hunters (the hunting experience as a psychological/philosophical phenomenon) and the ideological construct of the hunting experience, with a final analysis of the relevance of the concept of integrity to modern day trophy hunting against the backdrop of ideology and experience.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY:

Trophy hunting in Africa is a human activity that directly affects lives of individual animals and species, as well as the complexity of ecosystems and biodiversity as a whole. It entails the killing of animals in situations where it is not absolutely necessary to do so in terms of survival for the individual hunters. However, trophy hunting has the potential to pragmatically effect positive change in the lives of rural African communities, and their cultural values towards wildlife. This obviously raises many concerns about the sustainability of the practice, and the ethical and moral basis of undertaking such an activity; and many arguments and rationales are put forward to justify or condemn the practice. The trophy hunting debate therefore offers a prime example of an environmental conflict that combines social, political, economic and ecological arguments relevant to concerns over the preservation of biodiversity, in line with the concerns expressed in landmark international treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity.

Against the backdrop of increasingly fragile and threatened ecosystems, habitat degradation, loss of biodiversity imposed by human pressures, and the increasing rate of anthropogenic extinction,⁶⁴ any human tendencies that further threaten the life sustaining natural processes of the planet need to be critically analysed and evaluated in order to minimise any risk of needless exploitation. The necessity of the activity of trophy hunting is therefore continually questioned against this backdrop, and the importance of this study lies in examining the role of contextual approaches to environmental issues, and particularly the

⁶⁴ Aitken 1998: 393-395.

development of certain arguments and justifications for the sustainable use of natural resources; as well as the manner in which these arguments are applied. By using integrity as a founding conceptual criterion, an appeal to a universal and moral virtue is made, one that is hopefully able to bridge the ideological stalemate inherent in the hunting debate.

Section A:

DEFINITION OF ROLE PLAYERS

SECTION A

Introduction

What follows in Section A is an overview of the various role players in the trophy hunting debate. By briefly identifying the different groups in the debate and summarizing their respective positions regarding trophy hunting I aim, firstly, to offer the reader a brief orientation to the relevant role players and stakeholders in the debate, as well as an overview and orientation to the debate as a whole; and secondly, to show the levels of influence, affiliation and correlation between the groups and their positions regarding policy, motive and agenda. This will help to map the stalemate as it were, and clarify areas where tensions arise between the various positions.

Section A is divided into 3 chapters, namely Chapters 2, 3 and 4. In Chapter 2 I identify the main pro-hunting organisations relevant to the African context of the debate today and who can be regarded as the most active in formally promoting, defending and sustaining trophy hunting in Africa, and discuss their respective positions and arguments in this regard. I also try to identify the context within which these arguments are presented, as well as some of the philosophical, ecological, religious, cultural and scientific bases for these arguments. The role players identified here stand in direct opposition to those identified in Chapter 4, and who argue against hunting. The organisations discussed and identified in Chapter 2 are Safari Club International (SCI), the Professional Hunters' Association of South Africa (PHASA), East Cape Game Management Association (ECGMA), and the Confederation of Hunters' Associations of South Africa (CHASA). I also make mention of the non-profit organisation Conservation Force, which is relevant as a spokesperson and interest group in the debate. Within this chapter, SCI is discussed in a fairly detailed manner, as the arguments used by SCI, and its positions regarding trophy hunting, are characteristic of those of the other organisations identified. Instead of repeating them, I indicate where these arguments and positions are similar or identical to SCI, and deem it sufficient to show the levels of correlation and correspondence between the groups.

In Chapter 3 I identify the various silent role players and interested parties in the debate, who on an informal or indirect basis can be seen as participating in the hunting debate from a pro-hunting perspective. The role they play is one of

legitimising, or lending potential credence to, trophy hunting from ecological, scientific, sustainable development, or conservation approaches. These include *conservation NGOs* such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA); *world bodies* such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, better known as the World Conservation Union (IUCN); *governmental conservation organisations* such as South African National Parks (SANP) and the Department of Wildlife and National Parks of Botswana (DWNP); *various industry stakeholders* such as game farmers and breeders, trophy hunting outfitters and professional hunters; and *academic proponents* of hunting such as philosophers, scientists and conservationists. International treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) are also included in the chapter, as this plays a fundamental role in legitimising many of the claims of the parties identified above from sustainable use and conservation oriented objectives.

Chapter 4 is devoted to a definition and description of the various international role players in the debate who adopt a decidedly anti-hunting position. The role players identified here stand in direct opposition to those I discuss in Chapter 2, and can be regarded as the most vocal and influential players who formally oppose the claims made by pro-hunting advocates, and trophy hunting in general. These groups fall under the banner of animal rights, animal liberation and animal welfare groups, and form the official mouthpiece of who can be collectively called the “anti’s” (i.e. the anti-hunters). When pro-hunters refer to the anti’s, greenies, etc. in their arguments or allegations or ascribe certain positions toward this collective pejorative (that is, pejorative from their perspective), they typically have in mind these organisations and the people who adopt or agree with the views of these groups. These role players are The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), The Fund for Animals (FFA), and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). Also included are moral philosophers such as Peter Singer, Tom Regan and Paul Taylor, whose texts inform the positions of the groups above. Their positions and arguments will be discussed, as well as identifying the context within which their arguments are used.

The aim of identifying and discussing all the relevant role players in the debate is to clarify the agendas, positions and disagreements in order to map the stalemate of the debate. Such a clarification will hopefully reveal the correlation in ideological stances of the parties, and show how language uses and certain symbolic phenomena (for example; texts, linguistic terms, phrases, or concepts.) function within the debate in order to reinforce, create, maintain, weaken, or

discredit a particular argument or position, and so doing monopolise and legitimise a position. In essence, it is in order to examine the power relations between the two sides in the debate.

CHAPTER 2

PRO-HUNTING ORGANISATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I aim to identify and discuss the main hunting organisations that argue in favour of trophy hunting based on conservationist grounds, or from a conservationist perspective. The focus is on the most prominent and active role players, and those who could be deemed spokespersons for a particular position, and who adopt a formal position within the debate. Certain organisations and groups are covered in more depth than others, due to the central role they play as far as advocating a certain position is concerned; and also because in outlining their views, most of the similar arguments and views of groups that are affiliated to them will be covered in the process. Furthermore, an organisation such as Safari Club International (SCI) warrants a comprehensive overview due to the hugely prominent role and influence it has on trophy hunting worldwide; it regards itself as the “world leader in protecting the freedom to hunt”¹ and many of the arguments and justifications for trophy hunting find resonance in the positions and statements of SCI. I therefore discuss their position and defences of hunting in some depth, in relation to the philosophical arguments of certain writers. Another organisation I would like to make mention of, is Conservation Force (CF), which is a non-profit organisation that is also aimed at providing pro-bono legal work on behalf of conservation initiatives.² CF has close ties to SCI, and will be discussed in the section dealing with SCI.

The pro-hunting groups identified have shown either through official policy or theory (philosophical, moral, economic, social or scientific) to be in favour of hunting in some form or another. Hunting is generally justified from utilitarian perspectives; namely, according to the principles of sustainable utilisation, biodiversity preservation or conservation through utilisation, provided it is practiced with ethical constraints and according to the principle of Fair Chase. The views expressed are characteristically conservationist as opposed to

¹ SCI 2003d.

² Conservation Force 2003b.

preservationist, while the main agendas are to conserve wildlife through its sustainable use, as well as to protect and advance the rights of hunters.

Furthermore, Horsthemke identifies three main categories of arguments that are used to vindicate hunting,³ which I hope to show are certainly applicable to the pro-hunting groups identified in this chapter. These categories are: 1) the evolutionary function and survival value of hunting (in various forms, also referred to as the “primitivist” arguments); 2) species preservation and wildlife management, or problem animal control; and 3) human recreation and gratification. Horsthemke includes “a quest for status” in the third category, although this may be taken rather as a causal explanation of the desire to hunt, as opposed to a moral justification, as a personal quest for status alone is not enough to justify hunting as an activity of moral worth in terms of utilitarian value theory.⁴

What follows then is a brief introduction to these groups and an outline of their position within the debate regarding policy and perspective.

2. “PRO-HUNTING” HUNTING ORGANISATIONS

The three hunting organisations identified, namely Safari Club International (SCI), the Professional Hunters’ Association of South Africa (PHASA) and the Confederation of Hunters’ Associations of South Africa (CHASA) are the ones regarded as most relevant to the African context of trophy hunting, through national and international influence on African conservation issues, as well as the number of local and international hunters they represent. Many other important hunting organisations and institutions locally and internationally are not discussed in as much depth in this thesis, for example the East Cape Game Management Association (ECGMA) and Rowland Ward. However, I believe that concentrating on the above three groups should give an adequate representation of the views of most local and international hunters. Characteristic of the above three organisations is their promotion of trophy hunting as a vital component in the conservation through utilisation approach, and their pro-active stance in protecting and promoting the rights of hunters.

³ Horsthemke 1993: 73.

⁴ That is, the personal utility gained from an increase in individual status because of a hunting achievement, is not enough on its own to outweigh the “bad” in terms of the killing of animals.

2. 1. Safari Club International (SCI)

It would be appropriate to begin with the largest and most vigorous pro-hunting organisation in the world today. Safari Club International⁵ (SCI) is an American based (Tucson, Arizona) international hunting organisation, with over 200 affiliated hunting chapters worldwide and in the USA itself.⁶ Founded by C.J. McElroy in 1971, SCI has a growing membership of 30 000 members and over one million affiliated members worldwide.⁷ It is the largest and most influential worldwide organisation dedicated exclusively to hunting, conservation and the issue of hunting rights.⁸ The organisation, whose motto is: "Conservation of Wildlife, Education, & Protection of the Hunter", is active in protecting, promoting and advancing the rights of hunters worldwide, through the provision of legislative advice and financial aid to members and hunters.⁹ Hunter education is also a priority, as is the contribution of extensive funds for projects conducting wildlife reintroduction, protection and research.

A random survey conducted in 1994 of 2000 SCI members revealed that typical members are generally married men over the age of 40 (only 4 percent of its members were women) who spend on average 36 days a year on hunting trips, while 47 percent had undertaken at least one hunting trip to Africa to hunt big game. SCI members in general "[aren't] interested in waterfowling, or even in hunting game birds or small game" (only 8 percent hunt small game, while only 15 percent hunt game birds), and "their love for big game hunting exceeds by far any other avocation". Whilst not all members are wealthy, in 1994 46 percent made over \$ 100 000 per year in average household income.¹⁰

An organisation with close ties to SCI is the non-profit NGO, Conservation Force (CF). Most of the directors of CF are either board members or members of SCI. The chairman and president of CF is John Jackson III, who is also a past president of SCI.¹¹ In addition, one of the directors of CF is Don Lindsay, who is a

⁵ Research regarding SCI entailed speaking to and corresponding with Gerhard Damm, (President, SCI Africa Chapter), Andre DeGeorges (Manager, SCI Africa Office), Brian Reilly (Department of Nature Conservation, Pretoria Technikon), and Kobus Jooste (Department of Nature Conservation, Stellenbosch University), amongst others.

⁶ SCI Foundation Wildlife Conservation Department 2001: 2.

⁷ SCI Foundation Wildlife Conservation Department 2001: 2.

⁸ SCI 2003a.

⁹ SCI advertisement: "Safari Club International Africa: An invitation to Join the world's most active hunting organization".

¹⁰ Roberts 1994: 136.

¹¹ Conservation Force 2003a.

past president of PHASA¹² and also a board member of SCI. I make mention of CF here because it shows the international links and levels of affiliation between the pro-hunting groups with respect to southern Africa. This has a bearing on the consistency of the arguments expressed, as most of the positions of SCI, PHASA, CHASA, and CF regarding hunting are similar if not identical.

MISSION AND OBJECTIVES:

The missions of SCI are: “the protection of the hunter, conservation of wildlife, and education of the public concerning hunting and its use as a conservation tool.”¹³ This is the broadly defined and open agenda of the SCI. All its activities and programmes are directed towards fulfilling this mission, which is expanded on in the stated purposes and objectives of the organisation, which are to:

A. PROTECT RIGHTS OF HUNTERS:

- *To advocate, preserve and protect the rights of all hunters;*

B. PROMOTE SPORT HUNTING:

- *To promote safe, legal and ethical sport hunting and related activities;*

C. ENGAGE IN ADVOCACY:

- *Within the limits imposed by law and regulation, to monitor, support, educate or otherwise take positions on local, national and international legislative, executive, judicial or organizational endeavours that foster and support these purposes and objectives;*

D. DISTRIBUTE EDUCATIONAL DATA REGARDING ANIMAL POPULATIONS:

- *To collect, organize and distribute educational information and data regarding the animal species and populations of the world;*

E. EDUCATE PUBLIC REGARDING SPORT HUNTING:

- *To inform and educate the public concerning sport hunting and related activities;*

F. ORGANIZE SCI CHAPTERS INTERNATIONALLY:

- *To organize chapters throughout the world to promote the purposes and objectives of SCI, with such chapters to regularly contribute funds necessary to*

¹² Professional Hunters' Association of South Africa

¹³ Bylaws of Safari Club International (SCI 2003f: 6).

conduct the scientific study and the educational and charitable purposes of SCI.¹⁴

SCI is committed to the principle of Conservation Through Utilisation, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity¹⁵ (CBD), and is thus vociferously opposed to strictly preservationist approaches to wildlife protection, which is viewed by many SCI members as being an inherently naïve approach to current wildlife issues.¹⁶ This is particularly so in an African context, where the urgent need to find solutions to poverty, unemployment and hunger is often seen as taking precedence over the need to preserve ecosystems at the expense of humans.¹⁷

Underlying this alignment with the aims of the CBD is an implied appeal to a sense of inter-generational justice¹⁸ for local communities, particularly those whose livelihood is coupled with the environment. Any attempts to preserve ecosystems or habitats, and the species within, at the expense of humans is implicitly regarded as being both unjust and misguided. Attempting to conserve wildlife through its utilisation is therefore regarded as being the most effective and just means of approaching environmental issues.

Because of its active stance in promoting trophy hunting and protecting the rights of hunters, SCI is faced with continual opposition and a barrage of criticism from a variety of animal rights and welfare organisations,¹⁹ whose main objection is the killing of animals for recreation and sport.²⁰

¹⁴ Bylaws of Safari Club International (SCI 2003f: 6).

¹⁵ The Convention on Biological Diversity as quoted by the SCI: "... it is the right of peoples to use and benefit from their wildlife and plant resources. The treaty requires that uses should be sustainable and that the benefits of use should be equitably shared." (SCI 2003e). The context of the preamble of the CBD is: "Recognizing the close and traditional dependence of many *indigenous* and *local communities* embodying traditional lifestyles on biological resources, and the desirability of sharing equitably benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices relevant to the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components". [Emphasis added]. (United Nations 1992: *Preamble*). The emphasis in the CBD seems to be on indigenous peoples and local communities having a claim to utilise their own resources; in other words, a certain "indigenous autonomy" is recognised in terms of how they choose to utilise resources available to them.

¹⁶ Damm 2001a.

¹⁷ Damm 2000.

¹⁸ The concept of inter-generational justice refers to the provision of "equitable access to the natural resources of the world for those living at present". (Hattingh 2000: 2).

¹⁹ Notably from organisations such as the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), The Fund for Animals (FFA) and People for The Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA).

²⁰ Telecky and Lin's 1995 publication *Big Game, Big Bucks: The Alarming Growth of the American Trophy Hunting Industry*, published by The Humane Society of the United States, details some of the most explicit objections to trophy hunting.

SCI puts the views of many anti-hunters down to the separation of rural and urban cultures, where urban communities are not familiarised with the environment, many young people do not know what a cow looks like or where their food comes from, and therefore are not acquainted with the unpleasant reality and basic principle that in nature, death is often required for life to flourish. SCI's answer to this is therefore that "hunting must be part of the restoration and conservation of functioning biomes"²¹ – even though it is deplorable to many people. Hunting to the SCI therefore has great value as a conservation tool. As Gerhard Damm, president of the SCI Africa Chapter, states: "Sport or trophy hunting as well as subsistence hunting presents conservationists with an uncomfortable dilemma. They do not like killing animals, and they do know that most people, who give money to conservation organizations, deplore hunting. At the same time, conservationists realize that hunting is a necessity in conservation."²² The reason for this necessity is because wildlife needs to pay for itself if it has any chance of surviving the combined threats of pollution, habitat loss, over-exploitation, and human encroachment; and trophy hunting is one of the most viable means – both economically and ecologically – of ensuring the sustainability of wildlife.²³ By ascribing economic value to certain wildlife resources local communities would be more inclined to protect the resource in the interests of sustainable utilisation, if they were able to benefit materially. As Schmidt states: "Wildlife will survive only if people can *afford* to share the land. If they cannot share, then they will not share, and the wildlife will die."²⁴ [Emphasis added]. This argument can be termed the "Conservation Through Sustainable Utilisation" or "Conservation Value" argument in favour of hunting.

This argument forms part of what is called the "Use It or Lose It" view, which presupposes that biodiversity and wildlife can only be conserved by making consumptive use of a part of it. The logical basis for this view is that revenues from the commercial and consumptive use of wildlife will provide an economic incentive for the sound management of wildlife populations.²⁵ This view is therefore essentially a management-based perspective. This view is the "If it Pays it Stays" view, and is often the catchphrase used when talking about

²¹ Damm 2000.

²² Damm 2001e.

²³ Damm 2003: 46; SCI Foundation Wildlife Conservation Department 2001: 2.

²⁴ Schmidt 2000: 408.

²⁵ Freese 1997a: 2.

sustainable utilisation in an African context, and sums up well the view of the SCI.²⁶

In the United States, hunting is often quoted as being necessary to maintain sustainable populations of game, and that hunters serve to keep animal numbers down and thereby prevent them from damaging their habitat, particularly in reference to white tailed deer, for example. In a southern African context this argument is not often used to promote hunting's ecological benefit, which may be because it largely does not apply to the region. Trophy hunting does not significantly affect population numbers,²⁷ particularly in the well-managed and fenced regions in South Africa, as the target is selective (males) and doesn't impact on the breeding rates. Arguments that trophy hunting is useful as a culling tool are therefore largely misguided.²⁸

SCI views trophy hunting, particularly in Africa, as an important source of revenue for wildlife departments and services,²⁹ through the collective totals accrued in the form of trophy fees, hunting licenses, daily rates, taxidermy, etc., and therefore plays a vital role in the Conservation Through Utilisation approach.³⁰ In what is probably the most coherent outline of pro-hunting arguments and justifications in public media at present, Gerhard Damm states in an article in *Africa Geographic* magazine that: "Trophy hunting is inseparably connected with preservation, conservation and the concept of sustainable use of wild natural resources. This ecological motivation is of critical importance for the credibility of hunters in modern society."³¹ This highlights the important notion for hunters of gaining or maintaining *credibility* through conservation initiatives.

²⁶ DeGeorges 2001a.

²⁷ This depends on the species though, and the numbers of game do not necessarily reflect the genetic diversity of the species. Unsustainable trophy hunting has in certain instances been seen to negatively impact lion populations, and the genetic diversity of buffalo (for example, where trophy quality in horns and boss size decreases, yet the population remains stable).

²⁸ Resource Africa [S.a.].

²⁹ "Sport hunting provides a major source of funding for wildlife conservation, stimulates local economies in remote rural locations in the United States and around the world, and provides an incentive for conservation for many species" (SCI 2003e).

³⁰ In 1999 hunting brought in total revenue of US\$ 20 million (gross) to Botswana alone, with US\$ 1,696,272 going directly to local communities in the form of land rental, quotas, wages, meat contributions, business grants and funeral assistance. Out of the 150-200 foreign hunters who visited Botswana that year, 75% were from the USA and 23% from Europe (Peake 1999). In 2000 more than half of the 7018 foreign hunters who visited the Eastern Cape alone were from the USA (Anon 2003a).

³¹ Damm 2003: 46.

Hunting therefore strongly claims to making an important and vital contribution to the common objective of biodiversity conservation,³² and is supported in this claim by conservation organisations and conventions, namely the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA),³³ the Endangered Wildlife Trust, The World Conservation Union (IUCN) and the Convention on Biological Diversity.³⁴

CODE OF ETHICS AND FAIR CHASE:

To promote hunting amongst its members, SCI has a system of awards and incentives in place, along with a Hunter's Code of Ethics to encourage and reinforce ethical hunting practices. All members of SCI are expected to abide by the code of ethics in all of their hunting practices, failure of which could lead to suspension or expulsion from the organisation by a specially appointed Ethics Committee.³⁵

The SCI Hunter's Code of Ethics states the following:

Recognizing my responsibilities to wildlife, habitat and future generations, I pledge:

- *To conduct myself in the field so as to make a positive contribution to wildlife and ecosystems*
- *To improve my skills as a woodsman and marksman to ensure humane harvesting of wildlife*
- *To comply with all game laws, in the spirit of Fair Chase, and to influence my companions accordingly*
- *To accept my responsibility to provide all possible assistance to game law enforcement officers*
- *To waste no opportunity to teach young people the full meaning of this code of ethics*

³² Damm 2003: 46, 47.

³³ WESSA 2001.

³⁴ See below for a discussion of these organisations and their respective positions regarding hunting.

³⁵ Bylaws of Safari Club International (SCI 2003f: 9, 12-18).

- *To reflect in word and behaviour only credit upon the fraternity of sportsmen, and to demonstrate abiding respect for game, habitat and property where I am privileged to hunt.*³⁶

Regarding the natural state of animals to be hunted, a Principle of Fair Chase outlines the conditions under which an ethical hunt may take place. For example, animals have to be free ranging, and exist as a naturally interacting individual of a wild sustainable population. The principle of Fair Chase adopted by the African Advisory Board³⁷ as part of the Code of Ethical Sport Hunting Conduct for Africa is:

*Every sport hunter shall pursue an animal only by engaging in **fair chase** of the quarry. Fair chase is defined as pursuit of a free ranging animal or enclosed ranging animal possessed of the natural behavioral [sic] inclination to escape from the hunter and be fully free to do so. A sport hunted animal should exist as a naturally interacting individual of a wild sustainable population, located in an area that meets both the spatial (territory and home range) and temporal (food, breeding and basic needs) requirements of the population of which that individual is a member. Sport hunted animals should, wherever possible, be sustained within an ecologically functional system.*

*Said animal is to be hunted without artificial light source, or motorised mode of transport and in an area that does not by human design concentrate animals for a specific purpose or at a specific time, such as artificial water-holes, salt licks or feeding stations. No ethical hunter whilst sport hunting shall take female animals with dependant young.*³⁸

This definition of hunting is critical to SCI's arguments in favour of trophy hunting. It is regarded as the only type of hunting that can be justified as the principle of Fair Chase entails a certain underlying consideration for the interests of animals as far as being able to avoid being hunted, and forms an integral part of what is considered to be "an ethical manner of hunting".

The SCI has self-regulatory measures in place to enforce this Code amongst its members. Any member of the SCI may file a complaint regarding any suspected

³⁶ DeGeorges 2001b.

³⁷ The African Advisory Board (AAB) is a loose coalition of stakeholders (government, safari operators, sport hunters, rural communities, NGOs, academics and researchers from Africa) that meet once a year, and inform on many hunting issues concerning SCI in Africa (DeGeorges 2001a).

³⁸ "Accepted and Recommended by the African Advisory Board, 1999" (DeGeorge, 2001b). The Principle of Fair Chase and the Code of Ethics may be amended by the different chapters to suite their individual requirements, for example, the SCI Africa Bowhunter's Chapter modified this code slightly to suit the practical requirements of bowhunting.

violations or transgressions of the Code in any form by another member, by filling in the "Complaint Form For Ethical And/Or Code Of Conduct Violation",³⁹ in which he outlines the nature of the complaint and the circumstances of the transgression which are deemed to be in violation of the Code of Ethics. Following a written, signed and sworn complaint, any alleged transgressions of this Code of Ethics by a member of SCI are to be investigated by a specially appointed Ethics Committee, made up of at least ten members, with at least two of whom serve on the executive committee, and two who have experience as hunting booking agents or outfitters.⁴⁰ A complaint is to be filed within a period not exceeding seven years from the occurrence of the event. Any complaint filed by a member of SCI against a non-member of SCI will not be considered as a valid complaint.⁴¹

Following consideration of the complaint, the Ethics Committee may decide to dismiss it if it is deemed to be without merit. If the complaint is not dismissed, however, the Ethics Committee shall make a recommendation to the Executive Committee regarding any proposed sanctions. These recommendations may be for expulsion, suspension of membership privileges for a time, or for "any appropriate lesser action".⁴² The Executive Committee in turn may "agree, disagree, or decide to propose action different from that recommended by the Ethics Committee". Any decision taken by the Executive Committee is to be by majority vote.

If the final action decided upon is an expulsion or suspension, the Executive Committee then puts the matter before the full Board of the SCI for ratification.⁴³ The Board may dismiss, agree with and ratify, or modify the action. If the Board wishes to reject or amend the sanctions proposed by the executive committee it may only do so following a super majority vote. Failure to obtain a super majority vote amounts to ratification of the sanctions determined by the Executive Committee.⁴⁴

³⁹ SCI Ethics and Code of Conduct Committee 2003.

⁴⁰ Bylaws of Safari Club International (SCI 2003f: 49).

⁴¹ Bylaws of Safari Club International (SCI 2003f: 15)

⁴² Bylaws of Safari Club International (SCI 2003f: 15).

⁴³ Bylaws of Safari Club International (SCI 2003f: 17).

⁴⁴ Bylaws of Safari Club International (SCI 2003f: 17).

THE ETHICAL HUNTER

Codes of Ethics have a relatively long tradition, and in the American hunting tradition they can be traced back to the 1870s, when the phrase “sportsman’s code” was already well established.⁴⁵ Both in South Africa and the United States, the emergence of these informal codes of conduct came about largely due to concerns over the devastating effects which market hunting had on the indigenous game populations, although they can both be traced back to the British sporting code that had evolved amongst the sporting elite (which were namely the country gentry, military officers, newly rich middle class industrialists, and civil servants serving in foreign postings).⁴⁶ Their official emergence is therefore closely tied to the realisation, contrary to what most early explorers believed at the time, that the supply of game in Africa and North America was not inexhaustible, and neither was the type of hunting commonly practiced in the 18th and 19th centuries sustainable. These hunting practices involved the large-scale slaughter of millions of animals, referred to as market hunting, which served to fund the expansionist policies and settler economies of the colonial powers of the time.⁴⁷ This realisation was therefore a reactionary one, and marks a change in the shift of thinking about what the hunting activity was or is meant to be.

Some of the hunting exploits of famous historical hunters such as Gordon Cumming, which fly in the face of Fair Chase principles, would today be regarded as inherently unethical,⁴⁸ but within the social and cultural context of the time, they were not generally considered as extremely barbaric or bloodthirsty, much less the sign of moral deprivation or worthy of moral condemnation. The excesses would have been put down to a rationalisation of frenzy, and of the “blood boiling” to the hunt, and merely shrugged off as a momentary lapse of control. However, there was a shift in awareness regarding the superior abilities of man, combined with vast improvements in firearms, in being able to succeed to the extreme in the contest of the hunt. This required a reappraisal of the contest, and coupled with a greater naturalist knowledge about the animals and habitat in which the hunt took place, resulted in a shift in attitude towards the objectives of hunting and what it meant.

⁴⁵ Altherr and Rieger 1995: 46.

⁴⁶ Hummel 1994: 13.

⁴⁷ Market hunting and its role in Africa will be discussed in Chapter 6 with the appropriate references.

⁴⁸ Cattrick 1959: 104-5.

Therefore, what the present day Code of Ethics, Principle of Fair Chase, and self regulatory measures such as SCI's serve to sustain and encourage is a particular attitude towards hunting and wildlife, as well as a certain type of hunting; namely what is regarded by pro-hunters as being "ethical hunting". In pro-hunting circles, and SCI in particular, this is the only form of recreational hunting that is defended.

In hunting terms, a code of ethics can be regarded as a barometer of ethical conduct. The "ethical hunter" is therefore someone who abides by the Code of Conduct and Fair Chase, in addition to observing regional game laws,⁴⁹ and in accordance with a respect for nature and wildlife. Ethical hunting assumes that the hunt is to be a fair (as far as possible) contest between the animal and the hunter, and as in any contest, rules and regulations are put in place to ensure that the contest is conducted in such a manner as to ensure that the objectives of the contest are met. Codes of Ethics and the Fair Chase Principle are therefore a "normative set of formal and informal rules, which impose upon the hunter certain restraints, by which personal and communal objectives to enhance and protect nature as a whole are safeguarded, and secondly by which the quality of the hunting experience of the individual hunter will be enhanced for the sake of personal excellence".⁵⁰ Ethical hunting is therefore the reflection of a deeper value system, which informs the voluntary adherence to these ethical rules, and which according to hunters has as much to do with the respect that the hunter has for wildlife as he has for himself: "Voluntary adherence to an ethical code elevates the self-respect of the sportsman, but it should not be forgotten that voluntary disregard of the code degenerates and depraves him."⁵¹

The Code of Ethics and Principle of Fair Chase also reveals a further implicit distinction, namely that only "ethical hunting" can be regarded as "true hunting" and only hunters who practice ethical hunting can be regarded as "true hunters", whilst unethical hunting practices reveal those who practice them to be "untrue hunters", and more so, not actual hunters at all, but rather killers or "shooters".

Hunting is variously defined as being the "pursuit of anything with the intent to possess it",⁵² or "the procurement of an animal through lethal means". As Damm states: "Hunting is the consumptive, i.e. lethal taking of individual animals if the

⁴⁹ Loftin 1984: 243.

⁵⁰ Damm 2001c.

⁵¹ Leopold 1970: 213.

⁵² From information booklet entitled "Placing Hunting in Perspective" (Anon 2000).

sustainable use of the species is guaranteed. Hunting, in particular trophy-hunting, is the *personal experience of a highly participatory interaction* with nature. Killing an animal is the natural conclusion but not the sole purpose of trophy hunting.⁵³ [Emphasis added]. What is suggested here is that the notion of sustainability is important in the practice of ethical hunting. Animals should come from species that are not threatened or endangered with extinction, and the populations should be sustainable, that is, the population's ability and capacity to reproduce normally should not be affected by the killing of individual members of the population. Furthermore, the term hunting cannot be applied to instances where the animals are pursued without the intent to kill, as in cases of darting or "green hunting", as the intent to kill is an inherent and essential feature of hunting.⁵⁴

In order to distinguish hunting from mere wanton killing or shooting, ethical hunting (through the Principle of Fair Chase and Code of Conduct) therefore holds certain considerations for the interests of animals. These considerations implicitly contain, firstly, certain acknowledgements of the capacities of animals to feel pain and suffer from stress and trauma; and secondly, the acknowledgement of certain basic interests of animals, namely to *live freely, not to suffer unnecessary pain and suffering* (hence the need to inflict a "clean kill", i.e. one that is quick and painless), etc. However, these considerations are not an acknowledgement that animals are sentient in the same way that humans are, and therefore it does not follow (as animal rights and liberationists argue) that the capacity to feel pain and suffering, and to have certain interests, implies that animals are *moral agents* and always have the same natural rights as humans (for example, the right to life, or the right to freedom from harm).⁵⁵ Hunters would argue that only humans can be regarded as being moral agents, having moral rights and therefore natural rights to life.⁵⁶ Formulated simplistically, this is

⁵³ Damm 2001b: 2. This is a paraphrase of Ortega y Gasset's statement that "One does not hunt in order to kill; on the contrary, one kills in order to have hunted." (1972: 96-97).

⁵⁴ Damm 2001b: 2. "Green Hunting" is essentially the non-lethal darting of an animal, where the animal is tracked and pursued as in a normal hunt, but instead of being killed with a lethal weapon it is darted, which allows for the "hunter" to take a few snapshots with the animal and perhaps obtain scientific data from it if it is deemed beneficial. The animal is then allowed to recover and continue its normal existence. The benefits of this are that the animal is not killed, but the "hunter" is still able to experience something akin to the hunting experience, i.e. the stalking and shooting of an animal, and valuable scientific data is obtained from the animal.

⁵⁵ The scope of this thesis entitles me to concentrate more on the content of the debate as opposed to giving a full description of all of the various moral theories in the debate regarding *rights, interests, obligations, sentience* etc. As much as it would be interesting to undertake an analysis of each philosophical position, a lot of substantial work has already been undertaken in this regard (e.g. King 1991; Loftin 1984; and Vitali 1990). With the space allowed I therefore concentrate on a philosophical discussion of the debate itself.

⁵⁶ As in the argument forwarded by Vitali, for example, where he argues that hunting does not violate the rights of animals, as they cannot be held to have rights in the first place as humans do (1990: 73-75).

because humans are uniquely regarded as sentient, based on the criteria of having self-awareness or self-consciousness, or being in possession of rational intelligence and autonomous will.⁵⁷ Callicott identifies this view as being part of an ethical theory he terms “Ethical Humanism”, which holds that animals may be treated as things or means (albeit humanely), based on the suppositions above, and not as persons or as ends.⁵⁸

For hunters, it is therefore obviously believed that in certain situations and for certain objectives (cultural, religious, ecological and otherwise),⁵⁹ it is morally permissible to kill animals where the death of the animal is not absolutely necessary for the basic survival of the person doing the killing. Killing an animal in cases such as these therefore forms part of a larger objective, above which the interests of the individual animal (to life, freedom, or not to suffer pain) do not *necessarily* need be placed.⁶⁰ According to pro-hunting arguments, hunting therefore finds its place among all three of the objectives named above (namely cultural, religious and ecological) for which the life of an individual animal may be taken.⁶¹ Based on this view, ethical hunters could therefore be regarded as being “ethical humanists”.⁶²

These considerations that ethical hunting implicitly hold, then, are that:

1. *Animals be wild, free ranging and occur in their natural habitat.* Free, wild animals have a far better quality of life than most farmed animals, and a quick and painless death by a well placed bullet is preferable to being butchered in an abattoir or facing an agonising death by natural predators or starvation and disease in the wild. Also, hunting a wild animal that possesses the highly developed and evolutionarily innate instinct to evade its predator is regarded as a more worthy challenge to a hunter than hunting an animal that is acquainted to humans. It also implies a respectful attitude towards, and

⁵⁷ Vitali 1990: 74.

⁵⁸ Callicott 1995: 239.

⁵⁹ One could also include utilitarian-based economic objectives here, although purely economic justifications *alone* for killing animals, such as in the fur trade, whale hunting, and the type of large scale market hunting that took place in southern Africa and North America in the 18th and 19th centuries is not regarded by many as a reasonable moral objective for the killing of animals by pro- and anti-hunters alike, although pro-hunters may feel that it could be justified if the resource (i.e. animals) formed part of a sustainable population.

⁶⁰ The point is often made by trophy hunters that having an animal in their sights does not necessarily mean that the trigger is pulled and the animal's life taken. The decision to pull the trigger comes at a specific moment when the hunter weighs up the life of the animal, its value to the hunter (in terms of trophy value, meat etc.), and the aims of the hunt to the individual. The argument is therefore that the objectives of a hunt may be fulfilled without killing the animal, and the decision to take an animal's life rests with the individual hunter.

⁶¹ The cultural, religious and ecological significance that hunting holds will be discussed further in this section.

⁶² Callicott 1995: 239.

recognition of, the evolutionary process, over a period of millions of years, which is manifested in the animal that is being hunted, and in the landscape on which the hunt takes place. If a certain sense or attitude of respect were not evident, hunters would not insist on this point, and it would not matter to them whether they were shooting a cow in a paddock, or a Kudu in the Chobe Enclave.⁶³ Hunting a free ranging, wild and naturally occurring animal may therefore also indicate a subconscious willingness to engage with eternal mystical questions about the human condition and existence – namely the nature of mortality, death and life as well as values such as freedom and free will – that are reflected in the mortal struggle between man and animal in the (perceived to be) natural, timeless landscape where the hunt takes place.

2. *Animals not be defenceless, and that they be offered a fair opportunity to escape and evade being hunted.* This requires that a restriction be imposed on the technology employed in hunting, as well as a prohibition on mechanized methods of pursuit; and that animals not be in confined areas, so as not to result in an unfair advantage for the hunter. This also suggests why trophy hunters characteristically pursue males of the species, as opposed to young animals or females (especially pregnant or with young), as males are typically the strongest, swiftest and considered to be the cleverest individuals, and therefore likely to be the most able in evading the hunter.
3. *Animals not suffer unnecessarily.* This entails trying to ensure a quick and painless kill, and to track down wounded animals so as not to leave them to die a lingering death. Hunter education programmes and improved weapons are geared towards equipping hunters with the necessary skill to minimise the pain and trauma of animals, as well as the skills necessary in being able to accurately and quickly track a wounded animal.

What SCI's Code of Ethics and Fair Chase and the above points combined do, is serve to indicate a consideration, and a certain respect, for the animals that are hunted. Brian Luke, though, offers a comprehensive analysis of what he terms "The Sportsman's Code", where he argues that hunters are in a paradoxical position as far as following such a code is concerned. He argues that the more stringently hunters follow the code (i.e. the Code of Ethics, and the Principle of Fair Chase) the more their behaviour exemplifies a respect for animals that

⁶³ I choose Kudu and the Chobe Enclave, which is situated in north eastern Botswana, as appropriate analogies because Chobe is an unfenced and largely unmanaged (i.e. no stocking takes place) natural wildlife area with naturally occurring game populations, which would offer the "true hunter" the greatest challenge, particularly as Kudu are referred to by hunters as the "Grey Ghost" (particularly in the eastern Cape) because of its ability to evade them (Ivins 1993: 108).

undermines the possibilities of justifying hunting altogether.⁶⁴ This inherent paradox and problematic question of maintaining respect for an animal whilst trying to kill it is acknowledged by hunters, and Ted Kerasote, himself a hunter, ponders this when he asks: “[Is] being mindful of death’s red flower – revering it, lamenting it, celebrating it – the necessary state of mind that makes the taking of animal life different from murder or the mere cropping of a ‘resource’?”⁶⁵ Hunters would probably argue that this type of mystical reverence definitely has a part to play in defining hunters motives as other than a mere desire to kill. But in order to understand why hunters feel that it is precisely this type of respect they afford to animals that justifies the motivations behind hunting, or at least explains them, one needs to discuss the relevance of motive and intention in relation to definitions of killing, murder and hunting.

Kerasote here seems to be touching on these important distinctions. Just as an act of murder by one human of another is differentiated from other acts of killing by reason of intent and motive (and some could argue, by the “greater objective” or “bigger picture”), such as manslaughter, deaths occurring in times of war, or self-defence, so too the distinction between acts of mere killing (of animals) and hunting lie in the motives and intent of individual hunters. But, as Swan states: “... nature hunters are a paradoxical mystery to many people. The nature hunter is someone whose deep, reverential feelings for nature are best described, ultimately, as love, and then they turn around and kill what they love”.⁶⁶

However, acts of hunting are largely recreational acts, which revolve around the death of living animals, whilst murder is a term applied only to humans, and, barring the exception of certain cases of serial killing, there is nothing recreational about murder.⁶⁷ Of course, killing humans for recreation is not tolerated or even seriously considered as morally justifiable, and it is on this point that animal liberationists such as Peter Singer oppose the recreational killing of animals.⁶⁸ For Singer, to apply the term murder only to acts where humans are killed by other humans, and not to cases where humans kill animals, especially for

⁶⁴ Luke 1997: 25-44.

⁶⁵ Kerasote 1993: [n.p.].

⁶⁶ Swan 1995: 19.

⁶⁷ Swan (1995: 19) makes an argument for why hunters who kill the animals they respect and even “love” cannot be regarded as showing signs of sadistic or psychopathological behaviour. Fromm (1973: 131) also discounts the idea that hunting is a sadistic activity: “The idea that hunting produces pleasure in torture is an unsubstantiated and most implausible statement. Hunters as a rule do not enjoy the suffering of the animal, and in fact a sadist who enjoys torture would make a poor hunter ...”.

⁶⁸ Singer 1976. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of Singer’s theory and arguments based on a philosophy of natural rights.

recreational objectives, is to be guilty of what he terms *speciesism*, a form of discrimination that cannot be justified according to his philosophy of sentience.⁶⁹ However, as mentioned before, Vitali argues that animals cannot be considered as having the same moral standing as humans,⁷⁰ which is a view upon which pro-hunting arguments rest and which they identify with. So it is given, in terms of pro-hunting theories, that if animals cannot be regarded as having the same moral status as humans, then the term “murder” cannot be applied to cases where an “ethical hunter” kills animals in a hunt.

Hunters argue, however, the fact that animals are not viewed as having the same moral status as humans, and therefore the same rights, does not imply a lack of respect for animals. Humans are biologically at the top of the food chain and there is a natural hierarchy in which all species have a certain place.⁷¹ Man has a natural role to play within this hierarchy, and has been playing it for millions of years, and hunting is just a normal expression of his place as a top predator in this hierarchical food chain. Hunting is therefore neither unnatural nor disrespectful. On the contrary, it is argued that an ethical hunter forms part of the “natural cycle of life and death”;⁷² and that: “At the deepest level he is stunned by the awareness that despite all appearances to the contrary he and the animal are essentially one, part of something far greater than themselves.”⁷³ It is because of this awareness and attitude towards nature that he shows almost mythical respect for the animals. This mysticism stems from the hunter’s relationship with his prey, which Scruton characterises as a “union of opposites”, in that hunters are opposed to and distinct from the individual animals they hunt, but are united with their kind through a “mystical identity of species”. This serves a distinct purpose, because by “pursuing the individual, and worshipping the species, the hunter guarantees the eternal recurrence of his prey”.⁷⁴

Hunting is therefore important in SCI’s view, as it is a “natural and honest” activity that makes hunters “feel alive and close to nature”.⁷⁵ It affirms our role in the

⁶⁹ The point of contention regarding *sentience* and *rights* as basis for moral standing is evidence of the conflict between the opposing ethical positions of “Ethical Humanism” and “Humane Moralism”; ethical hunters adopt a position of “ethical humanism” in this argument, whilst a position such as Singer’s is what is called “humane moralism”. Cf. Callicott (1995: 239-240) where he offers a brief outline and discussion of these conflicting views and the notion of sentience.

⁷⁰ Vitali 1990: 73-75.

⁷¹ Ortega y Gasset 1972: 48.

⁷² Eaton 2003.

⁷³ Eaton 2003.

⁷⁴ Scruton 1997: 474.

⁷⁵ Nel 1995: 31.

cycle of life and death, and is therefore "close to the philosophical centre of human life. It constantly contrasts two central mysteries: the nature of the animal and of death".⁷⁶ The importance of hunting is thus that, in King's words, it "restores the contemporary human to his essential place in the natural world"⁷⁷ and allows him to participate in nature, and reminds him of his evolutionary beginnings.⁷⁸ Leopold seems to be of the same opinion, and he states it in a slightly more systematic fashion. He relates the hunting experience and activity to having cultural value, in that it renews our contact with wild things and "reminds us of our distinctive national origins and evolution ..." and "... of our dependency on the soil-plant-animal-man food chain ...".⁷⁹ The (trophy) hunter is therefore in essence, "the caveman reborn".⁸⁰

This "religious respect" that hunters claim to show for the animals that they hunt is supported by a glance through the wealth of historical art and literature that documents the hunting act.⁸¹ This documentation spans the history of man, cutting across different cultures, ethnicities, religions and ages, whilst religious symbolism and romantic mysticism features strongly in these descriptions and depictions of hunting. The earliest artistic expressions of hunting are to be found in ancient cave and rock art, with most of them being among the first artistic expressions by man on record, ranging from the San rock paintings in southern Africa,⁸² to the discoveries of Palaeolithic cave paintings in Europe. They are mostly symbolic depictions of animals being hunted by humans, and the fact that this was the first artistic subject of choice for early man says something about the significance that animals and the hunt must have held for them. This aspect is also well depicted in various forms of more recent art and literature, such as in Greek, Roman and Christian mythology right through to the Renaissance.⁸³ As Scruton states: "From Homer to Sassoon the art and literature of hunting exhibits

⁷⁶ Shephard 1973: 146.

⁷⁷ King 1991: 73.

⁷⁸ This argument is incidentally based largely on what has been shown to be a mistaken belief surrounding the anthropological origins of hunting, and was reinforced largely by theories such as the Hunting Hypothesis (cf. Chapter 6), which argued that hunting enabled humans to evolve into the beings that we are. Conversely, it has been shown that the physiological and mental capabilities that make us human were already in place by the time humans began embarking on structured hunting (Horsthemke 1993: 73).

⁷⁹ Leopold 1970: 211-212.

⁸⁰ Leopold 1970: 293.

⁸¹ Matt Cartmill's book *A View to a Death in the Morning: Hunting and Nature through History* (1993. London: Harvard University Press) offers a detailed and chronicled account of hunting throughout the ages.

⁸² Lewis-Williams 1981.

⁸³ Cartmill 1993: 28-52; 1995: 773-777.

an almost religious respect for the quarry, and a devotion to its habits, its home and its habitat ...”⁸⁴

The religious significance of hunting is admitted to by pro-hunters (“the hunt is fundamentally a religious experience, one that reconnects us to the source”)⁸⁵ and for some it is “a sacred act with as much as or more meaning than participation in organized religion”.⁸⁶ When taken to the extreme, the religious respect afforded to the hunted animal takes on redemptive overtones, where the sacrificial life of the animal is considered to be a “blessed gift”. A pro-hunting activist forcefully indicates this redemptive aspect in the following statement: “The young hunter is ... keenly aware that the animal died for him, for his passage to manhood and for the sustenance of his body and spirit. It is a holy communion, the original sacrificial rite that opens a young man’s heart and fills him with empathy”.⁸⁷ In addition to the animal, the hunting experience itself is ritually symbolic of religious ceremony: “The hunt submerges us in the subtle realities of life. These include *the power of prayer*, envisioning what we want, tempered by ethical choice. *Every hunt is a prayer in motion*, and seasoned hunters know that *faith in the outcome* has much to do with success”.⁸⁸ [Emphasis added].

The paradoxical nature of ethical hunting is further affirmed by Ortega y Gasset, and he argues that it serves to lend the act of hunting a certain meaning as far as the objective is concerned. The type of hunting (ethical hunting) being defended is essentially one that is *necessarily* “problematic”⁸⁹ – that is, where the outcome is in no means certain. “Ethical hunters”, because of the self-imposed ethical restraints, are not guaranteed the kill of the animal they hunt. The objective of the hunt is therefore closely tied to the meaning it has to hunters because “one does not hunt in order to kill; on the contrary, one kills in order to have hunted”.⁹⁰ This phrase has become a certain type of catch phrase to many SCI members and pro-hunters in general when explaining the significance of hunting, as it allows for the desire to hunt to be defined in terms other than a mere desire to kill animals, and therefore sits more comfortably in a moral argument regarding justifications

⁸⁴ Scruton 2002: 564.

⁸⁵ Eaton 2003.

⁸⁶ Swan 1995: 19.

⁸⁷ Eaton 2003.

⁸⁸ Eaton 2003. The emphasized section indicates strong Christian theological undertones especially, as *prayer* and *faith* are often considered to be the cornerstones of a Christian life. Rowan (1991: 281) suggests that the religious use of the term “sacrifice” by hunters may indicate a “deep-seated and unexamined guilt”.

⁸⁹ Ortega y Gasset 1972: 58.

⁹⁰ Ortega y Gasset 1972: 111.

of hunting. Moreover, what belies this statement is the awareness that hunting is an act of predation, and reveals the real objective of hunting (i.e. the intention of ethical hunters), which is to resume man's natural and inevitable role as a predator. To be a predator, and therefore take part "in the natural cycle of life and death" is of more significance to ethical hunters than the act of killing. This is also referred to as the "primitivist defence" of hunting, and is expounded by Ortega y Gasset especially. However, since predation relies on killing to be successful, it is inevitable that in mimicking predation, the hunting act is essentially a killing act.⁹¹

Vitali argues further that this act of killing be judged within the context that it takes place, which is in this case as a natural act of predation. This is because "Killing ... is an ontic good or evil depending on the context or the perspective from which it is measured".⁹² It follows therefore that hunting is not an inherently evil act, especially so if by hunting one refers to "ethical hunting". Judged within the context of a Sportsman's Code, Principle of Fair Chase, and the religious respect and cultural significance that hunting holds, hunting acquires certain significant "goods" that reduce the "evil" of taking the individual animal's life.

Nevertheless, as Luke has illustrated, this position of adopting a "sportsmen's code" remains paradoxical, but is very much integral to the way SCI justifies trophy hunting.⁹³

The significance that hunting holds for individuals is therefore as important in understanding the debate, if not more so, than ecological justifications and arguments from conservation perspectives, because it addresses the primary motivations, desires and intentions of hunters, and is therefore the psychological basis of hunting. The reasons why hunting advocates defend hunting so vigorously can be found in their explanations as to *why they hunt*. People hunt for a variety of reasons, and these reasons are also the psychological objectives of hunting in a personal sense. However, the various reasons put forward by hunters often contradict those put forward by others, or are even self-contradictory,⁹⁴ so it is very difficult to make a generalisation as far as the reasons for hunting go. Curnutt divides the act of hunting into two components, namely *physical actions* (i.e. stalking, pursuing and killing) and *psychological*

⁹¹ Causey 1989: 332; Vitali 1990: 78.

⁹² Vitali 1990: 76.

⁹³ A further discussion of what trophy hunting means and an exploration of different forms of hunting will be undertaken in Chapter 6.

⁹⁴ Cartmill 1995: 781-782.

states (i.e. intending, planning, desiring, hoping, enjoying, feeling pride or pleasure). He also states that hunting should be understood in terms of the *causal explanations* (i.e. purposive basis) of the psychological states formed and physical actions undertaken.⁹⁵ This last point has bearing on the significance of hunting as a cultural activity, and may explain the different meanings hunting holds for different people, and also how these meanings influence the motives behind hunting.

It can be argued that the psychological states that Curnutt identifies can be further divided into immediate states (i.e. states that are experienced in the immediacy, for example, pleasure) and extended states (i.e. states that are experienced over a length of time, for example anticipation or desire).⁹⁶ Psychological objectives of hunting as put forward by pro-hunting advocates, are to bring about the gratification that is provided by the recreational hunting experience.⁹⁷ This gratification finds expression in the feelings (immediate states) experienced by a hunter during or following a hunt. It may also find expression in the feelings of anticipation and excitement preceding a hunt or in the planning of one (extended states). These immediate psychological states of being that a hunt produces in individuals, which may include joy, pleasure, pride, elation, relief, etc.,⁹⁸ may therefore be an extension of the anticipation or planning of a hunt, for example.

Hunters argue that hunting brings many benefits to the individuals as well as communities who hunt, and that it fosters, stimulates and encourages moral virtues, such as independence, self-sufficiency, patience, and endurance, and cultivates family values. Hunting also serves to fulfil certain survival, cultural and economic needs. The survival value of hunting can be found in the immediate benefits accrued, such as the meat/venison or skin from the animal that can be used for consumption, and thereby sustain human life. Economic needs may be simultaneously met by selling the meat, skins or trophies. As mentioned before, though, it is the cultural value of hunting today that is more important to recreational hunters, as there is less and less need to rely on hunting for its survival value or economic value. The social, personal and community values

⁹⁵ Curnutt 1996: 65.

⁹⁶ This is admittedly an inadequate distinction, and the argument against this will point out differences in definition of a "state" or "experience", i.e. perhaps one that is felt immediately, or one that is developed and sustained over time. I merely try to make a distinction to clarify the point.

⁹⁷ Horsthemke 1993: 73.

⁹⁸ Negative feelings may also be evident, such as sadness, guilt, shame, etc. but these are interpreted as a "good" if they serve to produce certain supplementary qualities in the hunter such as humility, respect, etc.

and virtues that hunting serves to promote and cultivate, and which form part of its cultural significance, are therefore placed above its survival value: "Hunting uniquely provides self actualization, completeness and expression which are complex, higher order needs deserving of protection. These are human needs higher on the needs scale than food, and security. It puts us in touch with our past and with ourselves."⁹⁹

It is important to recognise that the type of hunting being defended by SCI is a very specific one, namely what they refer to as ethical hunting. The qualities that make up the ethical hunter include, amongst others as shown above, a respect for the environment and animals that are hunted, an obligation to abide by rules (legal and ethical codes) governing hunting, an awareness that hunting is a re-enactment or mimicry of the predatory function within a natural cycle,¹⁰⁰ or even a belief that hunting *is* a natural predatory act, and the belief that hunting is a vital, necessary and invaluable conservation tool. A broad spectrum of sources and texts are relied upon to emphasise the beliefs and positions of SCI, from philosophers and conservationists to international treaties and conservation bodies. The SCI thus finds many of the moral arguments, especially for justifying hunting, in a variety of sources, one of the most prominent being Ortega y Gasset's *Meditations on Hunting*. This text and its significance as far as underlying influence in the debate will be discussed further in Chapter 7. Aldo Leopold's *A Sand County Almanac* is also often used to lend impetus to the ecological and cultural value arguments for hunting.

TROPHY HUNTING: GRAND SLAMS AND INNER CIRCLES

The awards and incentives SCI offers are in the form of trophy competitions and official awards to individual members.¹⁰¹ Trophies are judged according to various criteria depending on the species (for example; length and thickness of horns, width of boss, or circumference at the base of the horn). An official SCI scoring system is in place (The SCI Methods of Measurement) by which trophies are awarded a certain number of points according to these criteria by certified measuring officers. Persons who qualify as an SCI measurer must pass an official examination and certification procedure to prove their efficiency in scoring

⁹⁹ Conservation Force 2003d.

¹⁰⁰ Leopold likens hunting to a drama and an "aesthetic exercise" (1970: 283).

¹⁰¹ Cito 1996: 58-59 (in *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*. Safari magazine is the official bi-monthly publication of SCI, with the purpose of keeping members up to date about current SCI activities and relevant hunting topics. It features advertisements for hunting safari's, and relates members' hunting stories with photographs of hunts and trophies taken around the world.); SCI 1996c: 12; and Telecky and Lin 1995: 12.

accurately.¹⁰² Trophies with the highest scores are entered into the SCI annual record book, which records the highest scoring trophies shot over the years.¹⁰³

The awards system serves to stimulate a competitive spirit for trophies and promotes increased trophy hunting worldwide, whilst honouring members for their hunting achievements. Twenty-six categories of trophy competitions are divided into two general types: “Grand Slams” and “Inner Circles” (there are eleven grand slams and nineteen inner circles).¹⁰⁴ Examples of a Grand Slam are: *The Africa Big Five* (leopard, lion, elephant, buffalo, rhino), *Cats of the World* (lion, leopard, cougar, lynx, bobcat/small African cat), *Bears of the World* (Polar Bear, Alaska Brown Bear, Grizzly Bear, Eurasian Brown Bears – Asia and Europe, Mideastern Brown Bear), *North American Wild Sheep* and *North American Twenty-Nine* (all bears, bison, sheep, moose, caribou and deer).

Examples of Inner Circles include *Trophy Animals of Africa*, *Spiral-horned Animals of Africa*, *Antlered Animals of the World*, *Trophy Animals of the South Pacific*, *Wild Oxen of the World*, and *Trophy Animals of Asia*. A “Top Ten Award” is given to hunters whose trophies are big enough to make it into the top ten of the SCI Record book in any category. Awards are offered at five levels from lowest to highest (copper, bronze, silver, gold and diamond) depending on the number of trophies needed to qualify for the next level.

There is also a “Pinnacle of Achievement Award”, with four levels of pinnacles. In order to reach the first pinnacle, any six of twenty-five inner circles or grand slams must be achieved (taking at least 20 trophies, in other words having killed at least 20 animals of trophy size); to reach the last pinnacle three of sixteen inner circles or grand slams at the gold level and one at the diamond level must be achieved (29 trophies taken/animals killed). In honour of their achievement, the member receives an award, trophy or special engraved ring at the Annual SCI Convention.¹⁰⁵

The scoring system used by the SCI has in the past been suspected of directly contributing to a potential decrease in the gene pool (and therefore trophy quality) in certain species. One example of this is the case of Cape Buffalo and

¹⁰² Scorer Certification Seminar 1983: 59.

¹⁰³ SCI 1996b: 5.

¹⁰⁴ McElroy 1987: 672-674. The number of categories can change depending on regulations regarding the availability of certain species to trophy hunters, due to changes in the status of animals on the CITES Appendix of Endangered Animals or to local government regulation.

¹⁰⁵ SCI 1996a: 61.

Wildebeest, where the points awarded for SCI buffalo trophies is biased towards the shooting of males in their breeding prime.¹⁰⁶ This is because the highest points are given for younger males due to the combined circumference, curve, width, and length of their horns and boss. This is in contrast to the Rowland Ward system of scoring, which is biased towards older bulls past their breeding prime. This is one example where the trophy scheme and system record book entries may have a direct negative impact on biodiversity. To counteract this potential negative trend, SCI has a Trophy Quality Monitoring project in place, which aims to discern, over a period of time, potential decreases in trophy quality in certain species from specific areas. If any decrease is noticeable, it aims to study the causes of the decline, and establish whether the decline is related to the ecological (and economic) health of the population, and also if the decline is related to trophy hunting. If trophy quality is seen as consistently declining over a period of time, collaborative consultation efforts will be undertaken to address the issue.¹⁰⁷

THE TROPHY HUNTER

Trophy hunting is regarded as being the most exemplary form of ethical hunting, as the qualities deemed necessary in the ethical hunter are regarded as finding their ultimate expression in the make-up of the trophy hunter.¹⁰⁸ The demands imposed on the trophy hunter are much greater because he selectively targets the finest specimens, which he has to work harder to get. It is argued that to consistently accomplish a successful trophy hunt requires the greatest skill levels (for example, in marksmanship and tracking), patience, knowledge (about the animal and its habitat, game laws, and firearms), stamina, strength, and ingenuity. Because trophy hunting is an expensive activity and an international trophy hunting trip can cost a small fortune, the people who partake in it are generally people who have the ability to afford it. Generally speaking, trophy hunters are therefore people who hunt primarily for the trophy, are generally successful and wealthy, and their status and wealth are also often signs that they exhibit exemplary human qualities that helped them to attain their status and wealth, which is regarded as a further indication that trophy hunting is a worthy activity.

¹⁰⁶ Reilly 2001a, 2001b.

¹⁰⁷ Reilly 2001a, 2001b; SCI [S.a.: n.p.].

¹⁰⁸ Hagel 1992: 19-24, 112-114.

The general claim by trophy hunters is that they only target old specimens (normally males of the species) which are past their breeding prime and have had the opportunity of passing on their genes through mating. By hunting only old trophy animals (which, by virtue of their age, are supposed to have the largest – and therefore most desirable in terms of record points – horns, tusks, skulls, manes, etc.), it is argued that minimal interference is caused to the natural population, as trophy animals no longer have a meaningful contribution to make as far as the survival of the species is concerned – it is assumed that they have already fulfilled their biological function and what is more, have led a long life of good quality. In certain species, the social structure of the animals also necessitates that the dominant male(s) leave the herd or pride once they have been “deposed” by younger, stronger, and more virile competitors. In other species, where males do not characteristically form part of a breeding herd, but live in bachelor groups, the disturbance caused to the general population by the shooting of one of these males, is also considered as being minimal. In the case of lions or buffalo, it is generally considered that once they have been ousted from the security afforded by a pride or herd, they are more susceptible to being attacked by other predators (i.e. hyenas, leopards or other lions), and that their life will thus generally be shortened. In these cases, trophy hunters argue that shooting one of these animals does not negatively affect the ecosystem or population, or drastically impact on the quality or length of that animal’s life, as they would most probably die an agonising death at the hands of another animal, or through starvation and disease. It is therefore preferable that they die quickly and relatively painlessly from a quick clean kill that a skilled, ethical trophy hunter is able to provide. What’s more, the positive utility gained from the animal’s quick death, following a long healthy life, outweighs the negative, namely through the financial benefits to the park, ecosystem, or people, that revenue from the hunt is able to provide; from meat from the carcass; as well as the fact that a more painful and lingering death, that nature would have provided, is avoided.

These can be considered as the main arguments that are consistently put forward by SCI and its members in defence of trophy hunting. The essential aspects are the notion of the *ethical hunter*, of the role hunting plays in conservation, and of the trophy hunter as manifesting the exemplary qualities that characterise ethical hunting.

2. 2. Professional Hunters' Association of South Africa (PHASA)

The Professional Hunters' Association of South Africa (PHASA), established in 1978, is the official mouthpiece of the professional hunting industry in South Africa, and is closely affiliated to SCI.¹⁰⁹ The main aims of PHASA, outlined below, are:

- *To foster the conservation of South Africa's wildlife and flora resources*
- *To support proper wildlife management and utilization*
- *To assist and promote ethical hunting in South Africa*
- *To promote and market hunting in South Africa*
- *To promote high quality service and ethical standards among members.*¹¹⁰

PHASA established a Wildlife Conservation Fund in 1999, to "assist PHASA and the professional hunting industry in its efforts to promote and maintain the wise consumptive use of the natural resources of South Africa".¹¹¹ The fund is voluntarily supported by a levy implemented on each animal hunted by an overseas client (amount of US\$10 or €10). The objectives of the Fund are to:

- *Secure the future of professional hunting*
- *Fund projects and support key issues vitally important to the professional hunting industry*
- *Fund accredited research projects*
- *Assist with the funding of provincial nature conservation representatives in their task of regulating the professional hunting industry.*¹¹²

In addition PHASA has a Trophy Medal Programme based on the SCI measurement system "as a way to acknowledge the client's success in the form of a medal/certificate, which is issued according to the size of the trophy".¹¹³

PHASA is therefore closely affiliated to SCI in purpose, objective, and procedure. Whilst most of the hunting organisations in South Africa as well as professional hunters and outfitters are in turn affiliated to PHASA in some way (i.e. ECGMA¹¹⁴ and CHASA),¹¹⁵ PHASA nevertheless remains a completely independent body

¹⁰⁹ Gerhard Damm, President of the SCI Africa Chapter, is also on the executive committee of PHASA.

¹¹⁰ PHASA 2003.

¹¹¹ PHASA 2003.

¹¹² PHASA 2003.

¹¹³ PHASA 2003.

¹¹⁴ ECGMA 2003.

¹¹⁵ ECGMA refers to the East Cape Game Management Association, and CHASA the Confederation of Hunters' Associations of South Africa.

and is an effective representative in voicing the interests of hunting in a South African context.

2. 3. *East Cape Game Management Association (ECGMA)*

The East Cape Game Management Association (ECGMA) is also closely affiliated to SCI and PHASA, and was a founding member of the Confederation of Hunters' Associations of South Africa (CHASA).¹¹⁶ Its primary objective is the "conservation of the natural resources of the Eastern Cape, based on the principles of private enterprise", achieved amongst others, through conservation through utilisation. The ECGMA is mentioned briefly primarily because it represents an area, the Eastern Cape, where a significantly large percentage of the annual trophy hunting in SA takes place, and thus has an important influence as far as the trophy hunting industry is concerned.

2. 4. *Confederation of Hunters' Associations of South Africa (CHASA)*

CHASA is the umbrella body of all the hunting clubs and organisations in South Africa,¹¹⁷ and is mentioned here as an acknowledgement of their status as one of the main role players in South Africa, and as the "informal voice of the 200 000 South African hunters who do not belong to hunters' associations".¹¹⁸ As their position and agenda regarding hunting is identical to that of PHASA, I feel that it is enough to recognise them as such without repeating their stance on hunting.

3. CONCLUSION

Thus, from a pro-hunting perspective, SCI is the most active and influential non-governmental organisation in the hunting debate. Its influence in Africa is considerable, as many of the trophy hunters who hunt in Africa, besides those from America, are most likely either members of SCI, or affiliated to SCI, including

¹¹⁶ ECGMA 2003.

¹¹⁷ Van der Merwe 1995: 15.

¹¹⁸ Potgieter 2001: [n.p.].

hunters from Europe, Asia and other continents around the globe.¹¹⁹ SCI is also closely affiliated to many other prominent pro-hunting groups and conservation organisations.

To recap, the main arguments put forward by the SCI in favour of hunting and trophy hunting are: 1) that trophy hunting contributes to biodiversity conservation and the principles of sustainable utilisation as identified by the CBD; 2) that hunting emphasises the evolutionary status of humans and allows us to return to an authentic state of participation and interaction with nature; 3) that trophy hunting is an economically viable land use option for remote communities where photographic safaris and lodge based tourism is not an option; 4) that hunting serves to cultivate certain moral virtues and brings benefits to the individuals and communities that practice it; 5) that hunting is normal and natural; and 6) that hunting holds considerable cultural value that cannot be discounted. The SCI regards hunters as playing a vital role in increasing awareness about conservation issues. There is however a moral distinction made in SCI circles between “true hunters” and other types of hunters on the basis of ethical behaviour, respect for nature, fellow hunters and the animals they hunt, as well as depth of knowledge and awareness about conservation issues. Hunters who do not respect ethical standards and codes of hunting are not considered “true hunters”; nor are those who do not have a deep respect for and understanding of nature and conservation respectively.

The views of PHASA, ECGMA, and CHASA regarding the role of hunting in conservation can be regarded as closely aligned with the views expressed by SCI, and in many cases the official positions of the groups are similar if not identical. Also, having a sound grasp of the views and rational arguments as put forward by SCI and many of its members in defence of trophy hunting and the “hunting way of life”, is imperative to having an understanding of what hunting means to individuals. The historical and contextual emergence of these beliefs and arguments will be explored further in Chapter 6.

¹¹⁹ In Botswana during the 1999 hunting season, 75% of 150-200 foreign hunters were from the USA (Peake 1999). The figure for South Africa was 55% out of 3898. In Namibia, a former German colony, most of the foreign hunters were from Germany and Austria (56.8% and 12.6% respectively out of 3267). It can be assumed that many of these hunters are affiliated to or are members of SCI through various SCI hunting chapters (e.g. SCI Bavaria Chapter).

CHAPTER 3

SILENT PRO-HUNTING ROLE PLAYERS AND INTERESTED PARTIES

1. INTRODUCTION

Besides the organisations identified and discussed in Chapter 2, the pro-hunting lobby is made up of various other role players in many spheres of political, social, and private life. In Chapter 3 I identify the various governmental and non-governmental conservation organisations, world treaties, and local industry stakeholders that form part of the essential role players on the political and regional "stage". The conservation groups identified in this Chapter are not actively involved in or geared towards the advocacy of trophy hunting per se, but can rather be regarded as silent role players in the debate, whilst the stakeholders identified do have a vested interest in the trophy hunting industry. However, they differ from the organisations in Chapter 2 in that their concerns lie either within a broader global or regional perspective of wildlife issues in general, and are not focused exclusively on hunting, or they are not formally at the forefront of hunting advocacy.

2. CONSERVATION NGOS

The conservation organisations outlined in this section are in favour of hunting from a sustainable utilisation point of view. The main objective of these organisations is the conservation of wildlife areas and species, and although they hold reservations about specific forms of unsustainable hunting practices, in general they are supportive of hunting practices provided they contribute positively to sustainable utilisation of wildlife, and economic empowerment of local communities. The organisations discussed below can thus be considered as "compromisers" – as hunting is considered by them to be a necessary evil because it is able in some cases to contribute to the sustainability and protection of wildlife by giving it a financial value.¹

¹ Nel 1995: 32.

Their support of hunting is contingent on the positive contribution it can make as an industry to the common objective of biodiversity preservation and to sustainable development within environmentally sensitive frameworks. They are therefore not in favour of hunting per se, but only from a consequentialistic perspective according to the principle of sustainable utilisation, and as a tool to ensure the long-term survival of wildlife and wildlife areas. Characteristic of their positions is a reliance on a scientific world-view, with an emphasis on quantifiable scientific evidence as criteria for deciding on policies regarding hunting.

The organisations outlined below, namely the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA) are prominent NGOs involved in the debate, and can be regarded as authority figures in matters pertaining to wildlife and conservation. WESSA is one of the oldest organisations in South Africa dedicated to wildlife preservation issues, having played an instrumental role in the formation of the main national parks in South Africa,² whereas the WWF plays an authoritative role in wildlife issues in South Africa.

2. 1. World Wildlife Fund (WWF)

The WWF is an international wildlife organisation established in 1961 under the wing of the World Conservation Union (IUCN), and is dedicated to the conservation of wildlife in all its forms. Its mission statement is to: “stop the degradation of the planet's natural environment and to build a future in which humans live in harmony with nature”.³ With its panda bear logo, it is arguably one of the most recognized conservation organisations in the world today.

Although it recognises that trophy hunting in certain circumstances can make a contribution to conservation, it has expressed doubts over the reliability and lack of sound scientific evidence to verifiably ascertain this either way.⁴ TRAFFIC⁵ is quoted on their web page in line with these concerns: “The few and often contradictory facts and figures make it difficult to foresee the consequences of a

² Most notably the Kruger and Addo Elephant National Parks (See Section 2.2 for a discussion of WESSA).

³ WWF 2003.

⁴ Melisch and Sirola 2002.

⁵ TRAFFIC is a wildlife trade monitoring network, set up in the mid-1970s to assist with the implementation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Its primary role is to monitor the international trade in wildlife fauna and flora and their derivatives to ensure that such trade is legal and that it does not threaten the survival of species.

trophy hunting initiative within a conservation programme". They cite the risk of increased overexploitation of populations and illegal hunting and smuggling which trophy hunting may induce, and they acknowledge that the long term effects on habitats, natural populations of animals, and the gene pool of rare species has not been well studied, and as such there is a lack of sufficient scientific evidence pointing to the benefits of trophy hunting.⁶

In accordance with the aims of conserving wildlife, WWF has expressed its support of trophy hunting where it makes a positive contribution to conservation, provided it be sustainable and beneficial to local communities as well as wildlife. Its support for trophy hunting is therefore contingent on the perceived instrumental benefits that hunting may provide to conservation. Their main motive and agenda is the conservation of wildlife, and if hunting were able to contribute to this goal, they would be supportive of it. As such, they are not explicitly in favour or against hunting, but only in so far as it is able to contribute to conservation.

WWF understands that many people find trophy hunting ethically unacceptable, yet simultaneously recognises that it may provide substantial benefits to conservation, and states that: "... giving financial support to the management of the few threatened species targeted by trophy hunters could be beneficial to their conservation."⁷

This official position of the global parent body, which is characteristically cautionary in approach, differs from the more adamant position of its regional representative. Dr. John Hanks, while still head of WWF South Africa, came out more strongly in favour of the benefits which hunting could provide. Speaking to scientists at a symposium dealing with the issue of wildlife conservation at the University of Cape Town, he stated categorically that: "Consumptive use programmes, including hunting, with the benefits going back to local communities, are the only viable alternative for income generation to conserve Africa's biodiversity."⁸ He also described anti-hunting groups as a "threat to conservation in Africa", and stated that it was their activities in opposing hunting as a sustainable form of utilisation that threatened biodiversity conservation in

⁶ Melisch and Sirola 2002.

⁷ Melisch and Sirola 2002.

⁸ Threat to Conservation 1995: 29.

Africa, rather than the activity of hunting itself. Furthermore, he echoed the views of WESSA⁹ in urging scientists to be the “prophets of reason” to prevent “uninformed sentiment and emotion” from corrupting the international debate surrounding the hunting issue.

This is therefore an obvious criticism of anti-hunting groups, and implies that the arguments of the anti-hunting lobby are based largely upon dubious sentiments that hinder conservation efforts instead of aiding them. Dr. Hanks’ statements also serve to further highlight the dynamic nature of the debate, as well as the regional differences regarding matters of policy that may exist within an organisation.

2. 2. *Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA)*

The Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA) was formed in 1926 by hunters concerned about the depleting numbers of wildlife in southern Africa. The Society is the “oldest and largest non-governmental environmental organisation in the country”,¹⁰ and was instrumental in campaigning for the formation of the Kruger Park (1926) and the Addo Elephant Park (1931). It is concerned with the preservation of species, habitats, ecosystems, biomes and ecological processes, and adopts a discernibly enlightened anthropocentric approach towards conservation issues.

WESSA supports hunting and the consumptive use of wildlife if it is guided by the principles of biodiversity preservation and sustainable utilisation.¹¹ It states that “hunting is likely to promote rather than hinder the conservation of birds and mammals”,¹² and also stresses that trade-offs may need to be taken in order to preserve species and ecosystems, in that individual animals, if a threat to the welfare of an ecosystem, biosphere or species as a whole, may be culled in the long-term interests of sustainability. WESSA cautions against emotion as a guiding factor in environmental decision-making, whilst accepting and appreciating people who base their conservation on emotion. In order to minimise risk and uncertainty, WESSA advocates environmental decision-making based

⁹ See Section 2.2.

¹⁰ WESSA 2003a.

¹¹ WESSA 2001.

¹² WESSA 2003b.

upon sound scientific evidence and independent third-party review procedures, and strives to represent public opinion “based on scientific evidence in order to ensure consistency in its actions and credibility”.¹³ This is to ensure that scientific evidence is verified and not “misrepresented” by minority groups to further their own interests and agendas. It advocates that southern African states press for “science as the basis for determining appropriate and sustainable levels of take. [They] should strenuously oppose attempts to override this scientific basis when these are introduced for reasons of short-term gain, or when alleged scientific uncertainty arguments are presented purely as a surrogate for treating the species in question as fully protected.”¹⁴

In the interests of biodiversity preservation and sustainable utilisation, the society therefore supports ethical hunting practices according to the principle of Fair Chase, and is opposed to any form of “canned hunting”.¹⁵

3. WORLD BODIES AND TREATIES

The world bodies and treaty identified here provide the legal framework within which hunting is justified according to the international conservation and biodiversity preservation priorities agreed to by international consensus. They play a vital role in situating hunting within the broader priorities facing human and wildlife concerns; that is, amongst the broad sphere of environmental concerns that are brought about by human population growth, poverty, and habitat degradation through human exploitation of natural resources.¹⁶

¹³ WESSA 2003b.

¹⁴ WESSA 2003b. This may also be taken as an implied objection to appeals made to a Precautionary Principle approach, which objects to hunting on the basis of insufficient evidence that it is ecologically sustainable.

¹⁵ “Canned hunting” refers to the practice of hunting animals (which may in some cases be either tame, captive bred, zoo bred, or caged) in situations where it is impossible for them to escape. The Cooke Report in 1997 exposed this industry in South Africa, and Gareth Patterson’s book *Dying to be Free* (1998. London: Penguin Group) delved deeply into the issue.

¹⁶ There are also other bodies and treaties that have a direct influence on the role hunting plays in this regard, for example, the Convention on International Trade and Endangered Species (CITES). These are not discussed in detail in this section due to space constraints, although they play as important a role in situating hunting within global environmental priorities.

3. 1. World Conservation Union (IUCN)

The International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, better known as the World Conservation Union (IUCN), was founded in 1948 with the mission to “influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable”.¹⁷ In its own words, it is a unique global partnership (980 members in all) that brings together states, government agencies, and a range of NGOs over 140 countries.¹⁸ In accordance with their vision of a “just world that values and conserves nature” their main goals are to face the *extinction crisis* and the issue of *ecosystem integrity*, whereby “ecosystems are maintained and where necessary restored and any use of natural resources is sustainable and equitable”.¹⁹

The sustainable use of natural resources is endorsed and fully recognised by IUCN, as set out in the *World Conservation Strategy* (WCS), with one of the main aims of the strategy being “to ensure the sustainable utilisation of species and ecosystems”.²⁰ This serves as an endorsement of the “Use It or Lose It” and “If It Pays It Stays” views,²¹ which are generally the views adopted by pro-hunting advocates. The influence of IUCN and its WCS regarding hunting is described in *Hunting Africa: A Practical Guide* as “profound and [as having] a direct bearing on the success or failure of a hunt”.²² The WCS, along with its successor *Caring for the Earth*,²³ are therefore two of the main internationally recognised documents outlining global environmental priorities that are used by pro-hunting advocates to legitimise hunting within a sustainable utilisation framework, as well as to entrench the role of hunting as a vital conservation tool within this framework.

One of the accusations aimed at animal rights groups by pro-hunting advocates, is that: “... the philosophy of the animal rights movement ... is in direct conflict with the [World] Conservation Strategy of the IUCN”.²⁴ This obviously implies that

¹⁷ IUCN 2003.

¹⁸ IUCN 2003.

¹⁹ IUCN 2003.

²⁰ IUCN 1980: iv.

²¹ Cf. Chapter 2 (Freese 1997a: 2).

²² Swan, Smit and Botes 2000.

²³ *Caring for the Earth* was published a decade after the WCS, and was intended to improve on its predecessor in that it was prepared through a wider consultative process (IUCN 1991: 2).

²⁴ Anon 1999: 9; Thomson 2002: 25.

some pro-hunters regard anti-hunters as being opposed to sustainable utilisation practices and, by implication, of not being in touch with accepted global concerns and priorities regarding the environment.

Pro-hunters therefore draw legitimisation for their position from documents such as the WCS, as far as the role of hunting in conservation through sustainable utilisation is concerned. This lends considerable weight to their arguments, and as I hope to show is a key factor in efforts to justify hunting on pragmatic utilitarian grounds.

3. 2. *Convention on Biological Diversity*

The United Nations treaty, The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was signed in 1992 by the major participating nations of the Rio Conference. The objectives of the Convention are “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources”.²⁵

The CBD recognised the intrinsic value of biodiversity, and adopted the view that the “conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity is of critical importance for meeting the food, health and other needs of the growing world population, for which purpose access to and sharing of both genetic resources and technologies are essential”.²⁶

The Convention plays a significant role in providing a solid basis for arguments in favour of hunting based on sustainable utilisation benefits, as it provides a firm mandate for the acceptance of sustainable utilisation as a viable and justified conservation tool. It is therefore often quoted by hunting organisations in defence of hunting on this basis.²⁷

The South African government ratified the CBD in 1995, as did the Botswana government, and committed itself to the common objectives outlined in the CBD in respect to biodiversity conservation and sustainable utilisation of natural

²⁵ United Nations 1992: Article 1, p. 2.

²⁶ United Nations 1992: Preamble, p. 2.

²⁷ SCI, for example (Cf. Section 2.1).

resources.²⁸ One of the ways it aimed to achieve these objectives is through the establishment and maintenance of Protected Areas,²⁹ one of which is the already established and well-known Kruger National Park (KNP), and administered by the South African National Parks (see Section 4 below).

4. GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS

The governmental organisations identified here play a similar role as those identified in Section 3, with the difference being that they are regional representatives of government opinion and policy regarding conservation and wildlife concerns, and therefore offer an opportunity to contextually examine the place hunting has within their regional conservation priorities.

4.1. South African National Parks (SANP)

The South African National Parks (SANP) reflect the conservation policies and priorities of the South African government, and it is useful to look at their stance on hunting as it will be a fair reflection of the regional significance which hunting may have in the official conservation policies of South Africa.

SANP are principally opposed to hunting within its reserves at present. SANP does not, however, object to the sustainable killing of animals as an ecological management practice; it controversially practiced an annual culling of elephant numbers in the Kruger National Park (KNP), which is home to the greatest concentration of species in the world and is the largest reserve in South Africa, as part of its management policy to maintain a balanced ecosystem, which ended with a moratorium on elephant culling in 1994.³⁰ SANP also forms part of the South African delegation to CITES which is pushing for the resumption of a limited ivory trade, and an increase in the number of cheetah and leopard trophy export permits.³¹ The culling of elephants was stopped following international pressure and condemnation of the practice as an inappropriate strategy against

²⁸ South Africa 1997: 1.

²⁹ South Africa 1997: Chapter 3, Policy Objective 1.3: 1.

³⁰ Macleod 2001b: 14.

³¹ Macleod 2002b: 2.

the backdrop of decreasing elephant populations through the rest of Africa. The moratorium is currently under review following unsatisfactory attempts at relocation to other reserves as well as cost-prohibitive research into elephant contraception, funded incidentally by the Humane Society of the United States,³² although KNP is in the process of implementing a plan to relocate 1000 elephants to Mozambique as part of the new Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou (GKG) Transfrontier Park.

It has of late tried to find ways of privately funding the enormous costs of operating its parks and reserves, and recently underwent negotiations with the Humane Society of the United States for a fundraising project worth up to \$200 million in 2002.³³ Although the agreement doesn't stipulate that hunting is to be prohibited within its reserves as a condition, Paul Erwin, President and CEO of HSUS stated that: "There is an operating principle against hunting in South African National Parks, so we are in sync. But if hunting was ever introduced in the parks, it would become an issue".³⁴

As far as trophy hunting is concerned, although SANP doesn't permit its practice in its own reserves, it does recognise trophy hunting as a viable form of sustainable utilisation and conservation.

An example of this recognition can be found in the joint management model agreed to between the SANP and the Makuleke community.³⁵ In terms of the 1998 agreement, the Makuleke community, who reside adjacent to the northern part of the KNP, settled a land claim they instituted in 1996 for the Pafuri area in the northern part of the KNP, whereby the land was to be de-proclaimed as a Schedule 1 national park, re-proclaimed as a contractual national park, and managed jointly by the Makuleke community and the KNP.³⁶ Although the land forms part of the KNP, ownership of the land was returned to the community, subject to certain limitations as to the exercising of their rights in respect to the land. These limitations concerned the sale of the land and the use thereof, with the land being managed jointly by the community and KNP under a Joint

³² Boyd [S.a.: n.p.].

³³ Macleod 2002a: 27. The fundraising initiative, called "My Acre of Africa", aims to raise funds through the sale of individually inscribed bricks that will be laid in a miniature relief map of the Kruger Park. The proceeds of the trust will go towards priority conservation projects.

³⁴ Macleod 2002a: 27.

³⁵ De Villiers 1999: 3.

³⁶ De Villiers 1999: 59.

Management Board (JMB), which ensures that the developmental needs of the community are met without compromising the conservation objectives of the KNP.

The proclamation of the land as a contractual national park thus left the way open for the community to employ forms of sustainable use which are not allowed in Schedule 1 national parks, with the use of hunting as an option to raise revenue. This was undertaken in January 2000 with the signing of an agreement between the Makuleke community and Wayne Wagner Safaris for the hunting of two elephant and two buffalo, for which the community would receive an estimated R450 000.³⁷ Controlled hunting began in 2000, while in 2001 a small number of impala, eland, nyala and zebra were also hunted.³⁸

The new Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Transfrontier Park being formed according to the treaty signed between the governments of Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa, is to incorporate the Makuleke area,³⁹ and this stands to reason that trophy hunting, in effect and in principle, could thus occur within the boundaries of the new park as well. The Makuleke community has since then announced that it will not continue to pursue trophy hunting as an option, and has decided to phase out trophy hunting over the next year, and stop completely in 2004. The reasons for this are that they have the infrastructure and outside interest needed to allow them to pursue eco-tourism options exclusively.⁴⁰

Another notable connection between SANP and the HSUS is to be found in the issue surrounding KNP's stockpile of elephant ivory and rhino horn. In 2002, HSUS offered SANP \$250 000 for the thirty tons of ivory it had in its stockpile, with the intention of burning it at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, as part of a symbolic gesture akin to Richard Leakey's when he famously burned Kenya's ivory stockpile in 1988. The talks fell through, as SANP insisted that the stockpile was at least worth \$5 million on the international market.

³⁷ Elephants to be Hunted in Kruger? 2000.

³⁸ The Displaced Makulekes Recover Community Land and Wildlife Assets 2002: 49.

³⁹ Governments of South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe 2001 (*Treaty on the Establishment and Management of the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Transfrontier Park*. Second draft, 26th March 2001, Article 3.1.b.ii, p. 4).

⁴⁰ Anon 2003b.

The international animal welfare community, particularly organisations such as HSUS, can therefore be seen to have had a not insignificant influence on SANP conservation programmes; firstly through the pressure it brought to bear on SANP concerning its elephant culling policy, which eventually contributed to the moratorium on elephant culls in the park; and secondly through its joint sponsorship of initiatives such as the “My Acre of Africa” trust. The effect of this is that animal welfare organisations such as HSUS have started to assert a claim for legitimacy within management discussions over wildlife utilisation, and can be seen to directly influence decisions regarding the role of hunting in SANP reserves.

4. 2. Department of Wildlife and National Parks of Botswana (DWNP)

Botswana’s Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) has a very good record of balancing the needs of people with the needs of wildlife. Given that Botswana has a significant number of its citizens that still practice subsistence hunting, such as the San communities in the northeast of the country, and that trophy hunting and citizen hunting play an important role in the conservation economy (by effectively providing an economic incentive to protect wildlife), the country offers a good example where eco-tourism, trophy hunting, citizen hunting, and subsistence hunting are incorporated into a national strategy of conservation that seeks to maintain this balance.

Botswana has long been committed to the principle of sustainable development to ensure that “a) present generations consume no more than the annual output or yield of those natural resources which are renewable; and that thereby b) future generations have access to capital stocks of natural resources, at least similar to those presently available”.⁴¹ In order to ensure the sustainability of its natural resources, the government approved the National Conservation Strategy (NCS) in 1990. One of the two primary goals of the NCS was to “increase the effectiveness with which natural resources are used and managed, so that beneficial interactions are optimised and harmful environmental side effects are minimised”.⁴² In order to alleviate poverty in rural areas, the sustainable use of natural resources is encouraged by the NCS through Community Based Natural

⁴¹ Botswana 1990: Section 1.4, (a), (b).

⁴² Botswana 1990: Section 2.1, (a).

Resources Management (CBNRM) initiatives implemented in the 1990s.⁴³ To further this goal in terms of wildlife conservation, certain areas are designated Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs), which fall under the administration of the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) and cover approximately 22% of the country.

The mission statement of DWNP is to “effectively [conserve] the wildlife of Botswana in consultation with local, regional and international stakeholders for the benefit of the present and future generations”.⁴⁴ This can be regarded as an implicit recognition that wildlife in Botswana has an existence and preservation value for the government and people of Botswana, in that it is regarded as a precious heritage and resource;⁴⁵ and in line with the sustainable utilisation goal of NCS, a certain utilitarian view is also held towards the country’s wildlife as having instrumental value. Botswana attempts to incorporate these two equally important core values into its conservation strategy.

Sustainable hunting thus forms a vital part of this conservation strategy. The revenue associated with the trophy hunting industry is a vital boost to the country’s economy,⁴⁶ and while wildlife is regarded as a precious heritage to be protected and sustained, hunting is promoted through the issuing of citizen licenses and permits to overseas trophy hunters for species ranging from elephant to African wildcats,⁴⁷ according to an annually revised quota system.⁴⁸ The DWNP permits hunting in its reserves, but only within certain designated areas, called Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs). Within CHAs communities may lease land on a concession basis from the Tribal Land Board, provided they have formed a representative and accountable legal entity such as a trust, for a period of at least fifteen years to ensure the implementation of a sound and consistent management strategy suitable to the specific area.⁴⁹ They may in turn sub-lease

⁴³ Arntzen 2003: 7.

⁴⁴ Botswana Ministry of Trade, Industry, Wildlife and Tourism 2003.

⁴⁵ DWNP 1999a; 1999b. From *Controlled Hunting Areas and Wildlife Quotas* – Part of a series of information pamphlets entitled “Wildlife: Our Strongest Resource” published by Botswana’s Department of Wildlife and National Parks as part of the Natural Resource Management Project.

⁴⁶ MGM Environmental Solutions 1997: 24. In 1992/1993, the wildlife sector contributed 2.4% of the GDP, 4.1% of export earnings, and provided 7000 - 8000 jobs.

⁴⁷ Botswana Ministry of Trade, Industry, Wildlife and Tourism 2003. The website lists all the species available for hunting between 1 April and 3 September 2003, as well as the prices for the permits.

⁴⁸ DWNP 1999a; 1999b.

⁴⁹ Jones 2002: 10.

the land to a safari operator on a contractual basis.⁵⁰ These CHAs are often situated in areas less suitable to photographic safaris due to the low numbers of wildlife compared to the densely populated wildlife areas such as the Moremi, Chobe and Savuti game reserves. Photographic safaris and lodge based tourism occurs in these other areas which are more densely populated with wildlife and thus more suitable to this form of land use.

However, Botswana's free ranging wildlife is under continuous threat from human encroachment, particularly from the ecologically damaging effects of veterinary fences,⁵¹ as well as from over-hunting.⁵² The veterinary fences were constructed to prevent the spread of cattle disease affecting the beef industry, which is a major source of revenue for Botswana.⁵³ There is therefore an acceptance of the need to balance the interests of the cattle industry with those of wildlife, due to the significant role each plays in the economy and cultural landscape of Botswana. In accordance with the NCS then, Botswana strives to maintain efficiency in terms of land use, whilst trying to balance the interests of cattle ranching and the hunting industry respectively. Trophy hunting is therefore regarded as being an efficient form of land use in areas not conducive to cattle ranching or photographic safaris,⁵⁴ and wildlife utilisation in general is regarded as being potentially more advantageous than cattle farming in terms of the economic efficiency of land use.

In 2001 DWNP took the bold decision to place a ban on lion hunting in the country, following concerns expressed about the viability and sustainability of hunting lions.⁵⁵ This was seen as a particularly brave move by many considering the annual revenue associated with the trophy hunting of lions alone is estimated to be as much as \$5 million,⁵⁶ which would mean a substantial loss in revenue for DWNP, safari operators, and Botswana in general.

This decision elicited a variety of reactions from the different parties involved in the hunting debate, and the reactions that this event alone evoked highlight the

⁵⁰ Gujadhur 2001: 9.

⁵¹ Albertson 1998: 2-3.

⁵² MGM Environmental Solutions 1997: 25.

⁵³ MGM Environmental Solutions 1997: 24. Cattle play an important role in the rural life of Botswana; 70% of rural households depend on cattle for part of their income, and the cattle industry contributes 3.1% of Botswana's GDP.

⁵⁴ MGM Environmental Solutions 1997: 24

⁵⁵ Okavango Wildlife Society 2003.

⁵⁶ Macleod 2001a: 4.

complexity of interests involved in the debate surrounding trophy hunting in Africa. SCI for example, was quoted as lobbying for the ban to be lifted, and of pressuring the Botswana government by enlisting the former United States president, George Bush Snr., to head up the lobby group on behalf of SCI.⁵⁷ Included in the group were former vice-president Dan Quayle and General Norman Schwarzkopf. Others who opposed the ban were understandably those directly affected by it, such as safari operators and professional hunters who had an immediate vested interest in the hunting industry, and who stood to lose out financially. The Botswana Wildlife Management Association (BWMA)⁵⁸ also expressed concern over the impact the ban would have on the drier regions of Botswana, where the hunting of lions is often the only viable land use option that prevents the areas from being utilised for cattle ranching. A ban on lion hunting could therefore indirectly contribute to a loss of wildlife habitat,⁵⁹ and could precipitate a shift of the hunting of plains game onto game ranches, whereby remote communities would be adversely affected through loss of income. In addition, the BWMA stated that in 2001 the ban would contribute to an estimated loss of 22% of the 2000 turnover of BWP 60 million.⁶⁰ Sarel van der Merwe, Chairman of the African Lion Working Group (ALWG), wrote a letter to DWNP in which he stated that, although the ALWG supported the Botswana Government's approach to the conservation of lions, "... in some areas we agree that a ban may be justified, yet in others, particularly those devoted primarily to cattle, it is difficult to see what it will achieve other than to arouse an antagonism towards lions and by association all wildlife and also your Department".⁶¹

Many groups and individuals came out in favour of the ban, and applauded Botswana's firm stance in not bowing to pressure from pro-hunting groups to lift the ban; notably the HSUS, the Born Free Foundation,⁶² and wildlife experts such as Dereck Joubert, who studied lions in the Savuti region for several years. There were mixed reactions within the ALWG itself, as some members came out in unconditional favour of the ban, whilst others were strongly against it. Two

⁵⁷ Macleod 2001a: 4.

⁵⁸ BWMA is a voluntary association that is responsible for compiling the hunting quotas in Botswana and for monitoring the trophies taken by safari operators.

⁵⁹ Botswana Wildlife Management Association 2001: 37.

⁶⁰ Botswana Wildlife Management Association 2001: 36.

⁶¹ African Lion Working Group 2001: 5.

⁶² The Born Free Foundation is an organisation that campaigns for the preservation and conservation of animals in their natural habitat, and against the keeping of animals in zoos and captivity.

members even felt so strongly in favour of the ban, that they resigned from the group in protest over Van der Merwe's letter to DWNP.⁶³ This can also be taken as a sign of the conflicting views amongst scientific experts themselves regarding the trophy hunting of wild lions.

The arguments in favour of the ban were that trophy hunting of lion detrimentally affected the free ranging population in Botswana, and that lion numbers were on the decline. The ecological reasons given were that the lion gene pool was being decimated, and that for every dominant male lion shot, the mortality rate of the pride increased,⁶⁴ and female breeding cycles were disrupted. This ecological and scientific evidence for the unsustainability of the hunting of lion in Botswana no doubt served to underscore the reliance of groups such as SCI on the "trophy hunting as conservation" approach. The scientific evidence and observations regarding the status of lions in most of Botswana serve ultimately to cast doubt on the main arguments in favour of hunting; namely that it is ecologically sustainable and ensures the conservation of the species. This assertion cannot now be made with complete confidence with regards to the trophy hunting of free ranging lion populations in Botswana. This may have been why SCI chose to lobby for a lifting of the ban so strongly, as the ban casts doubt on its claims, in the case of lions, that hunting is a sustainable conservation tool.

Another reason for the implementation of the ban was because of pressure from local tribesmen, who objected to the fact that they weren't allowed to shoot lions that were killing their cattle, and were not entitled to compensation for lost livestock, yet a large number of lions are hunted under the pretext of being "problem animals" and as a form of Problem Animal Control (PAC),⁶⁵ and furthermore that safari operators were entitled (unfairly it was claimed) to the revenue they got from lion hunting.

The motivations for the lion ban were thus based on political and social issues as well as ecological, whilst arguments against the ban were in the main economic, and concerned with land use priorities and the detrimental affect the ban would

⁶³ African Lion Working Group 2001: 5.

⁶⁴ It was estimated that for every dominant male lion shot, the mortality rate of the cubs increased dramatically, as new male lions taking over the pride typically kill all cubs in the pride before mating with the females and begin forming their own pride. Trophy hunting of lion typically involves the killing of males, and in order to get the best possible specimen, dominant males and males in their prime are often shot.

⁶⁵ African Lion Working Group 2001: 5.

have on the hunting industry as well as remote communities. DWNP's refusal to lift the ban in the face of significant pressure, economic and otherwise, is a strong indication of its commitment to the principles of the NCS, the interests of its citizens, and the sustainability of its wildlife for future generations, whilst being mindful of the practical benefits of safari hunting to local communities and the preservation of wildlife areas.

DWNP in Botswana thus plays a vital role in balancing these conflicting needs and interests of local communities, wildlife in general and the safari hunting industry.

5. INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS AND THE HUNTING ECONOMY

The industry stakeholders I make mention of below are intricately involved in the day-to-day business of the trophy hunting industry. They make up the group of people that benefit directly from the industry financially, and drive the economy surrounding trophy hunting. The economic activity surrounding the hunting industry in South Africa has been well studied, as have the economic benefits provided by trophy hunting in various parts of Africa.⁶⁶ In this section the focus is primarily on the South African industry as it offers a relevant reflection of the potential organisational and economic levels of viability needed to sustain the industry, as well as identifying the role players.

5.1. *Game Farmers/Breeders, Outfitters and Professional Hunters*

The game farming industry in South Africa is at present one of the fastest growing agricultural sectors in the country, and is also one of the most lucrative as it offers a potentially high return in exchange for low yield land use.⁶⁷ In 2000 there were an estimated nine thousand (9 000) fenced commercial game farms in SA, totalling an approximate 17 million hectares.⁶⁸ Game farming is less intensive than livestock or other forms of agricultural land use, and is therefore an attractive land use option for many farmers, as it provides for complimentary

⁶⁶ For example: Arntzen 2003; Baldus 1990; Botswana Wildlife Management Association 2001; Gujadhur 2001; Radder, Van Niekerk and Nagel 2000.

⁶⁷ Up to four times as much compared to livestock farming (Baldus 1990: 362).

⁶⁸ The Game Industry: Delicately Poised 2000: 23; SA's wildlife industry is flourishing 2001.

forms of alternative utilisation. For example, biltong hunting, trophy hunting, meat supply and tourism may occur on the same farm.⁶⁹ The advantages lie especially in “mixed use” approaches, also referred to as “intermediate” forms of wildlife utilisation, where game and livestock are raised simultaneously, and which can result in greater species diversity and less habitat degradation than cattle ranching alone, for example.⁷⁰

Game ranching and captive breeding generally entail a greater degree of intervention and intensity than “mere wild harvesting” (i.e. hunting and culling, for example),⁷¹ as game farms require close management in order to control population numbers and to look after habitat.⁷² The benefits which intermediate forms of wildlife utilisation are said to provide are that ranching and captive breeding indirectly aid conservation by a) helping to increase the numbers of exploited species, and by b) diverting trade away from wild populations. They are also said to aid directly by conserving natural and diverse habitats.⁷³ These are some of the arguments put forward in defence of “Put and Take” types of hunting that generally occur in South Africa (i.e. animals are bred and “put” on the land, before being “taken” off by hunting).

Game farmers are represented by organisations such as The South African Game Ranchers’ Organisation (SAGRO), and are defined as landowners involved in the breeding, trade and cultivation of wildlife, whose primary source of income is from the profits associated with this industry. Game farmers may also offer animals to be hunted on their land by foreign or local hunters, and in this case may have facilities and equipment on their land to this purpose; these being accommodation, relaxation and dining areas, hunting and recovery vehicles, skinning, butchering and drying facilities, shooting ranges, etc. Game farmers and breeders therefore have a vested interest in the trophy hunting industry, as much of the industry is geared towards creating sustainable populations of good quality trophy game for hunting purposes.

⁶⁹ Du Plessis 2001: 9.

⁷⁰ Luxmoore and Swanson 1992: 180.

⁷¹ Luxmoore and Swanson 1992: 180.

⁷² Bigalke 1982: 17, 22.

⁷³ Luxmoore and Swanson 1992: 180. Luxmoore and Swanson make the point that commercially driven captive breeding generally involves genetic isolation from the wild stock and leads to selective breeding, whereby the wild is no longer suitable for inter-breeding with the captive, and thus leads to less incentive to conserve the wild stock. Game ranching though, depends on a wild population to function, as there is continuous interchange with the wild population which thereby discourages interbreeding (1992: 181).

In addition to game ranchers and breeders, the hunting industry supports outfitters, taxidermists, veterinarians and game relocation/catchment teams. Outfitters include those responsible for the organisation, marketing and selling of hunting trips and packages, and act as the intermediary between the client and the landowner on whose property the hunt will take place. Outfitters may be involved in booking flights, organising accommodation, hunting permits and licence/trophy fees, and organising the services of a professional hunter for a client, where the client is the person intending to hunt.

Taxidermists are responsible for mounting, stuffing, and shipping any trophies acquired by a hunter, which is an expensive activity. The game relocation teams are employed in the catchment and relocation of animals within the industry prior to and following a sale, whether private or through auction; or for the purposes of stocking game on another farm or reserve.

A professional hunter (PH) is someone qualified to act as a guide to a client. According to regulation, any overseas client hunting in South Africa is required to have a certified and qualified PH as a guide throughout the intended hunt. PHs are qualified according to a system of tests and evaluation at a number of hunting schools in the case of South Africa, or through a stringent apprenticeship and exam procedure in Botswana's case, lasting up to two years before qualifying as a PH.⁷⁴

The above groups all have a great deal of vested interest in the hunting industry, and being the main industry stakeholders whose very livelihood is dependent on the continuation and acceptance of the industry as a conservation tool, are along with individual hunters themselves the most vocal in their support and advocacy of hunting.

5. 2. *Economic Sustainability and the Hunting Industry*

These vested interests in the economic sustainability of the hunting industry on the part of the groups above raise questions concerning the extent to which purely economic concerns override ethical ones. As Falkena states: "Unfortunately, for some ranchers the philosophy of maximizing utility has resulted in an economic orientation in which morality no longer has a place and

⁷⁴ Stewart 1998: 27.

where their philosophy of life is restricted to the concept of 'profits'.⁷⁵ The concern is that the catch phrases "sustainable utilisation", "preservation of biodiversity", and "conservation through utilisation" (i.e. "If It Pays It Stays") are incorrectly applied and inappropriately used to justify an economic activity where the economic sustainability of the activity itself supersedes other priorities such as the ecological sustainability and integrity of ecosystems and the inevitable ethical implications that come with the industry. This is the reason anti-hunters describe conservation value arguments in favour of hunting as being "intellectual blabber".⁷⁶

The main difference between economic and ecological sustainability is that the economic is dependent on the ecological, but not necessarily the other way round. Ecological sustainability is more concerned with the complex nature of ecosystems and the interdependent and complimentary nature of co-existence amongst different animal and plant species while economic sustainability has to do with protecting a resource, and the means of production, as well as the means of delivery. It is reliant on a cost/benefit approach to economics, and is open to market failure and the fluctuations in world markets, based on supply and demand. Resources are found in the environment, and harvested, mined, cultivated, etc., before being packaged and sold as a product to a buyer at the greatest profit margin.

The economic sustainability of the trophy hunting industry is dependent on several factors: 1) the availability of trophy animals (i.e. the resource), 2) the availability of trophy hunters to come and shoot trophy animals (i.e. the buyer/client), 3) availability of suitable and sufficient land, reserves, game parks, habitat within which the hunt can take place and which can sustain the animals to be hunted, and the necessary people to fulfil the various roles that the industry requires, namely veterinarians, game catchment and relocation teams, game farmers, breeding programmes, or game auctions (i.e. the means of production), 4) and lastly, the infrastructure to provide the "hunting experience", which is made up of outfitters, professional hunters, arms manufacturers, trackers, skimmers, airlines, taxidermy and hospitality industries, etc. (i.e. the means of delivery). The economic sustainability of the hunting industry is governed by supply and demand, and the health or status of the industry can be gauged by

⁷⁵ Falkena 2003: ii. Falkena addresses many of the concerns and questions raised regarding the economics and ethics of game ranching.

⁷⁶ Williams 1990: 112-128.

looking at the one or more of the above factors in conjunction. For example, if prices consistently start reaching record levels at game auctions in South Africa, looked at in conjunction with increases in airline flights to hunting areas and increases in taxidermy and trophy exports, that would be a good indication that the demand for animals was high, perhaps due to a large number of satisfied hunters who kept coming back, and that the industry was in a healthy state.

Because the industry operates within an open market system, and supply is governed by demand, there are obvious concerns regarding the dangers of ethical abuses. There are estimates that the game farming industry in South Africa generates up to \$US 140 million (R10,3 billion per year).⁷⁷ As Hans Kooy, Chairman of the Wildlife Translocation Association of South Africa (WLTA) states: "The simple fact is that price and not ethics influences most decisions in the wildlife industry."⁷⁸ As such the hunting industry is no different in this regard to other capitalist based industries. However, the differentiating feature between ethical abuses within the wildlife industry, and ethical abuses in other industries, is that those that occur in the wildlife industry naturally revolve around and concern live animals. Furthermore, "The incentive to 'buy low and sell high' on every transaction may well improve economic efficiency, but such opportunistic behaviour will be at the cost of social efficiency and ultimately result in a totally amoral attitude to nature at large".⁷⁹

The value incentive behind the trophy industry itself, namely economic efficiency, functions apart from other value concerns regarding the environment, and specifically the inherent value of individual animals in and of themselves.

A notable example of the kind of abuses that can occur in the South African context can be found in the hunting and breeding of lions. The Lion Breeders Association of the Free State (LBAFS) in South Africa is one of the largest organisations to represent the interests of those exclusively involved in the breeding of lions. Because the issue of canned hunting is a central point of debate surrounding hunting in South Africa, and because those involved invariably come from the lion breeding industry, it would do well to briefly mention it here.

⁷⁷ DeGeorges 2001b.

⁷⁸ Kooy 2001: 29.

⁷⁹ Falkena 2003: ii.

Game breeders, as opposed to ranchers, are not allowed to permit the shooting of lion on their farms. Many of the lions bred at farms are therefore eventually sold off at auctions or through private sale for the purpose of hunting, often at extremely high prices,⁸⁰ as the demand for lions to be hunted for trophies is high. "... Hunters from overseas want to kill lions, no matter what the cost or circumstances. For them, it doesn't matter whether it is a captive bred animal or not, the story they tell back home is the same."⁸¹ The lion breeding industry is thus a highly lucrative one to those involved, as the majority of lions shot in South Africa through trophy hunting are lions bred specifically for this purpose. Although some lions are shot that are deemed problem animals, either having broken through national park boundaries or reserve fences, these are not always considered trophy lions.

In 1997 the now well known Cooke Report came out, that exposed a variety of abuses that took place within the lion breeding and trophy hunting industry. This exposé was the impetus for Gareth Patterson's book *Dying to be Free*, which deals extensively with the issue of canned hunting and ethical abuses within the South African hunting industry.⁸² The Cooke Report, after it was aired on television, led to the widespread and public condemnation of the practice known as "canned" hunting. There are few areas in South Africa where free ranging wild lions are available to trophy hunters. In contrast, prior to being shot, lions hunted in South Africa are most commonly released into a holding pen of a certain size for a certain amount of time (depending on the provincial regulations regarding hunting of lion) where they are then "hunted" by a client or foreign trophy hunter. These lions are generally not part of a self-sustaining free ranging population, nor are they offered the ability to escape according to the principle of fair chase; in some cases they have been known to have been drugged, hence the term "canned" hunting,⁸³ as the hunter is virtually guaranteed that he will shoot the lion. This practice is not necessarily illegal according to the legislation of the respective provinces where it takes place, but it does raise questions as to whether it is acceptable in an ethical sense. Most of the proponents of hunting that I discussed in this and the previous chapter would unequivocally say that it is not. This practice has thus served to tarnish the game breeding and hunting

⁸⁰ In some cases for as much as R250 000 per lion (Smith 2002: 30).

⁸¹ Kooy 2001: 29.

⁸² Cf. Patterson 1998.

⁸³ Matthews 2002: [n.p.].

industry in South Africa to such an extent that most conservation organisations, including major hunting organisations such as SCI, PHASA, and the WWF, WESSA, and SAGRO all unequivocally condemn the practice and distance themselves from it.⁸⁴

The profit motive is the main driving factor in the lion breeding industry, and is based upon the supply and demand of a commodity (i.e. lions). There is an obvious demand from people who wish to hunt lions in this way, or there wouldn't be the desire to provide hunters with an opportunity to do so. The concern, though, regards the lack of a coherent national policy regarding the breeding and hunting of lions, and although the different provinces in South Africa have their respective legislations in place, these are largely inconsistent with one another and leave too much room for abuse through loopholes.

As such, the lion breeding industry offers an example of the extreme and dark side of trophy hunting in South Africa, and has done much to discredit any justifications of trophy hunting in terms of its conservation value, as the breeding of lions for the purpose of hunting does little to conserve biodiversity and promote sustainable utilisation in ways that are meaningful and relevant to the principles of the CBD, to the species as a whole, and to the South African public in general. Moreover, the type of hunting which the Cooke Report exposed and the hunts described by Patterson⁸⁵ and in other publications⁸⁶ are not only morally reprehensible to a large portion of the public, but many hunters and conservationists also went to great lengths to condemn the practice. However, the breeding of lions in South Africa continues, as does the hunting of them for trophy purposes.

The game ranching industry, though, remains one of the pivotal forces in conservation efforts in South Africa, and has played a leading role in increasing wildlife numbers and habitat, and as such has had an enormously positive contribution to make to conservation, not least to the level of expertise and experience in fields such as veterinarian science and ecological research. At the

⁸⁴ Anon 2002: 29; Official Policy Statement of WESSA (WESSA 2001); SCI Position Statement, private correspondence (DeGeorges 2001b). SCI also subsequently removed all records of lions shot in South Africa from their record books as a result.

⁸⁵ Patterson 1998: 74-79, 81-87.

⁸⁶ Comrie-Greig (1984: 176-183) highlights a particularly horrific episode that occurred in Botswana in 1984, involving the indiscriminate slaughter of lions and other animals as part of a proposed "pro-hunting" film involving Dr. Chris Barnard, the well-known South African heart surgeon. After witnessing the slaughter, Barnard refused to participate further out of protest.

same time, it should be kept in mind that the economic market on which sustainable utilisation arguments and the wildlife industry rely, functions completely apart from and separate to conservation and preservation concerns about intrinsic value. Wildlife is strictly a commodity in economic terms, and in this respect a fundamental difference in approach can be seen between the industry itself and international environmental priorities, as the latter seek to balance other value claims, such as intrinsic value, with instrumental ones.

6. ACADEMIC ROLE PLAYERS

The positions of the various groups outlined above regarding hunting presuppose either a moral rights, utilitarian, or ecological approach as their basis of argumentation. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the origins and development of these theories are found in the individual thinkers and authors of texts, philosophical and otherwise. These academics (writers and thinkers) I refer to as the *silent* role players in the debate. Their only vested interest in hunting is often limited to the fact that in some cases they are hunters themselves, but this need not be so, as in Ortega y Gasset's case, who was a non-hunter. Nonetheless, their influence, texts and theories hover over and behind these different organisations outlined above, and I think permeate the substance of their arguments. Without the weight of landmark philosophical and scientific studies, the arguments for trophy hunting would not be as significant, as the assertability of claims are often substantiated by reference to these texts.

Academic proponents of hunting fall into a broad category of philosophers, scientists, and conservationists, and the various justifications therefore each have in mind a particular definition of hunting, one that is justified only according to a certain precept and condition under which the act takes place. Moral philosophy in the form of utilitarian value theory is often used to justify hunting, although also with the least success, whilst strong arguments are made from conservation and ecological points of view.

Firstly, hunting is justified from a cost/benefit analysis on the basis of a moral good that results to individuals through the hunting experience. These goods are often values such as independence, satisfaction, sense of freedom, escape (from

daily drudgery of work routine), and happiness.⁸⁷ According to a cost/benefit approach, the good resulting to the hunter outweighs the evil resulting from the killing of an individual animal on the basis of a theory of moral standing. Examples of philosophers arguing from this perspective are Ann Causey, Robert Loftin and Theodore Vitali.⁸⁸

Secondly, hunting is justified from ecological perspectives, where hunting is regarded as maximising utility and contributing to the greater good of ecosystems. Charles List and Holmes Rolston, III are writers who argue from this perspective,⁸⁹ although Holmes Rolston insists that hunting can only be justified if the intention to hunt was for the meat, and if the animal is eaten.⁹⁰

In pro-hunting arguments, reference is often made to Ortega y Gasset's philosophical exploration of what hunting means, entitled *Meditations on Hunting*.⁹¹ Ortega puts forward a primitivist defence of hunting, and an argument for the hunting experience as an affirmation of what it means to be human (of a "returning to nature") and centres on the desire and motive of people regarding hunting and what it means to individuals. He looks at hunting as an activity of leisure and happiness, and as a "vacation from the human condition", and evokes the significance of historical customs and rituals surrounding the hunting act. His line of thought and argumentation is influential, especially as he is often quoted in pro-hunting literature seeking to validate the moral character of hunters as humans. While Ortega's work itself contains many inconsistencies and contradictions, it is nevertheless an important reference for many hunters who wish to find a philosophical validation for their lifestyle.⁹² This is perhaps because in his writing they find the articulation of what they are unable to express – the significance of the hunting experience. While the contradictions in his work are

⁸⁷ Ortega y Gasset 1972: 27-36.

⁸⁸ Causey, A. 1989. On the Morality of Hunting. *Environmental Ethics*, 11: 327-43; Loftin, R. 1984. The Morality of Hunting. *Environmental Ethics*, 6(4): 241-250; and Vitali, T. 1990. Sport Hunting: Moral or Immoral? *Environmental Ethics*, 12: 69-82.

⁸⁹ List 1997: 405-416; Rolston, H. III 1988: 135-151; 1994: 123-126.

⁹⁰ Holmes Rolston, III argues that duties towards ecosystems are stronger than duties towards individual animals (1988: 132). It should be clarified though that he is opposed to many forms of recreational hunting, including trophy hunting (1994: 125-126). His justifications of hunting on the basis that the hunter eats what he kills, thereby participating in the food chain in which he evolved, is thus a "limited justification" (Moriarty and Woods 1997: 392).

⁹¹ Ortega y Gasset, J. 1972. *Meditations on Hunting*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

⁹² For two examples: he makes the simplistic and erroneous conclusions that the North American buffalo were decimated not exclusively by market hunting, but that they drowned themselves in the Mississippi River in the tens of thousands (1970: 81), and that barking is an unnatural act of dogs (1970: 93). He also relies exclusively on evolutionary Darwinian assumptions that presuppose a fixed hierarchical structure to the development of species (i.e. certain animal are higher than others, but still "subhuman").

often seemingly glanced over by pro-hunting advocates, hunters seem to identify strongly with the manner in which Ortega writes, as well as the points he articulates. Ortega's main points regarding the meaning of the hunting experience will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

Another writer who is often referred to in defences of hunting as a valid conservation tool is Aldo Leopold. His landmark book *A Sand County Almanac*⁹³ forms the basis for many defences of hunting from managerial policy perspectives, in that he advocated a certain ethical attitude towards the management of complex ecosystems and the natural world in general (a "Land Ethic"), which entails a holistic approach, or an attitude of "Thinking Like a Mountain".⁹⁴ This attitude changes the role of man from being one of dominion over nature and separateness from it, to one where he is a plain member of the "land-community", and is in a state of harmony with the land. His most famous remark is probably his: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise", and which forms the basis of his Land Ethic.⁹⁵ The principles inherent in the Land Ethic conform to many of the views expressed by pro-hunters when they explain the role of the hunter within the ecological landscape, and of hunting as a "returning to nature". It also emphasises a concern with the complex whole of the ecosystem or biotic community, of which individual animals and species form a part, rather than the preservation of individual species or animals themselves.

This may perhaps therefore form the basis for the views against preservationism expressed by pro-hunters, as preservationism is equated with a concern primarily for individual animals and species, as opposed to the broader biotic community of which they form an integral part.⁹⁶ This is also relevant in directing an inquiry towards the crux of the dispute between the opposing viewpoints of conservationism and preservationism as far as differences in use, values, and priorities are concerned, and therefore relevant to the heart of the debate between pro-hunters and anti-hunters. This is because the Land Ethic

⁹³ Leopold, A. 1970. *A Sand County Almanac*. New York: Ballantine Books.

⁹⁴ Leopold 1970: 137-141. Leopold relates an experience of shooting a wolf, which led him to the realisation that "... there lies a deeper meaning, known only to the mountain itself". The realisation is that timeless ecological processes cannot be managed or approached without an understanding of the inherent interdependency of the species with the landscape.

⁹⁵ Leopold 1995: 142-151.

⁹⁶ Cf. King (1991: 66-67) for a discussion of Callicot's argument that hunting highlights the differences between the Land Ethic and "humane moralism" (1995: 239-240), which is the basis of animal rights philosophies, and therefore relevant to the discussion concerning preservationism and Leopold's Land Ethic.

presupposes a certain value system in approaching nature, which will in turn direct certain priorities and the way in which natural resources, and wildlife in particular, are utilised. Humane moralism, on the other hand, with a value system (informed by theories such as Singer's) that emphasises the moral standing of individual species and animals will have a fundamentally different focus on priorities and use, for example. Leopold's influence within the debate therefore remains considerable, as far as informing the accepted views upon which conservationism is based, is concerned.

7. CONCLUSION

These writers thus form part of what can be termed the "silent role players" in the hunting debate. They are situated slightly outside of the debate, in that their interests are not as closely linked to the hunting industry, as are those of the other role players identified. Nevertheless they are central figures in the conflict; or rather their texts are, as these are most often used to support a particular stance or ideological position. The various theories mentioned above, as well as their rebuttals, will be further discussed in Chapter 6 in connection with the meaning of hunting, as I hope in this Chapter to have given a brief orientation to the different positions in favour of hunting of what I have called the silent role players in the trophy hunting debate; and to have shown the relation and influence between the different positions.

The main silent role players are the international environmental bodies and documents that validate the role of hunting within global environmental priorities; the stakeholders involved in the economic sustainability of the hunting industry; and the academics who argue in favour of utilitarian based approaches to wildlife conservation, as well as conservationists and scientists who emphasise a holistic approach to ecosystems as opposed to an emphasis on individual animal welfare.

In the next chapter focusing on groups arguing against hunting from a preservationist perspective, entitled Anti-hunting, I again offer a brief introduction to the relevant role players, and attempt to show the levels of influence and correlation between the groups.

CHAPTER 4

ANTI-HUNTING ROLE PLAYERS

1. INTRODUCTION

Following the discussion of groups arguing in favour of trophy hunting in Chapters 2 and 3, I now turn to those who argue against hunting in all of its recreational forms. Included in this chapter are those groups who take a position against hunting on preservationist grounds. Preservationists assume little or no human interference in natural ecosystems and wildlife areas, with the aim of protecting them from harmful human activity.¹ Furthermore, they assume the ability of the environment to regenerate itself if allowed to do so according to a natural balance. The positions include arguments from the perspectives of intrinsic value theory, ecocentrism, deep ecology, utilitarian value theory, ecofeminism, animal rights and animal liberation. The main aim of the following groups is to protect what is regarded as the rights of animals, and to preserve biodiversity for future generations. Like the main conservation organisations outlined in the previous sub-section, the conservation of wildlife and wild areas is also of a primary concern to these groups, yet the manner in which this must be achieved is regarded as being fundamentally different. In general, the consumptive use and exploitation of the environment is opposed, as is the killing of animals in any form. Hunting is opposed, and rejected as a valid conservation tool, as it is seen as a mere pretext to validate the desire to kill animals. In general, the value system which surrounds the hunting culture and on which it is based is questioned as being morally dubious, the moral arguments in favour of hunting are regarded as being inherently flawed, and those from conservation perspectives as either not universally applicable, or overstated.

There are also many individuals who oppose trophy hunting in their personal capacity, and who are not aligned with the groups discussed in this chapter. Gareth Patterson, for example, actively opposes trophy hunting yet is not officially affiliated to the main groups discussed here. His much publicised book, *Dying to Be Free: The Canned Lion Scandal and the Case for Ending Trophy Hunting in Africa*, is a prominent work in the South African context that articulates many of the concerns that the anti-hunting groups have. It focuses specifically on the

¹ Passmore 1974: 101.

issue of canned hunting in South Africa, and as such he could be included as an important role player within the southern African anti-hunting community.

2. INTERNATIONAL ANTI-HUNTING NGOs

The main international organisations involved in the hunting debate identified here are those who are most vocal against trophy hunting, and who offer the most vigorous arguments against the practice. They are therefore also the most influential in terms of lobbying against the practice, through their attempts to mobilise public sympathy to oppose what they regard as the exploitation of animals. The three organisations discussed in this section, namely People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), and The Fund for Animals (FFA), are international NGOs and are vehemently opposed to any forms of hunting, and particularly protest against SCI for example. They argue primarily from animal rights and animal liberation viewpoints. When SCI and other hunting organisations use the word “anti’s” and refer to anti-hunters and animal rights groups in general terms, they specifically have these three groups in mind.² Also, the groups identified here do not apportion differing degrees of morality or ethical justification to different categorical types of hunting, but ascribe equal moral condemnation to all forms of hunting that are recreational in origin. As such, they unilaterally condemn all recreational hunters no matter what categorical type of hunting they practice, and the concepts *hunter* or *hunters* are generally conceptualised in pejorative terms.

2.1. *The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS)*

Founded in 1954, the Humane Society of the United States is primarily an organisation dedicated to animal protectionism, and with over seven million members and constituents it claims to be the world’s largest.³ It was founded by the President of the American Bible Society, Coleman Burke, as a “religious ministry” for animals with the mission of “Promoting the Protection of all Animals”.⁴ As such, it ascribes to a stewardship view towards nature, whereby man is viewed as having a biblical mandate and obligation to protect and look

² The Humane Society, PETA, and The Fund for Animals are mentioned on the website of Conservation Force under the link “The Bad Guys” (Conservation Force 2003c).

³ HSUS 2003c.

⁴ Christensen 2001.

after the earth's creatures; and its stated goal is to ensure the "ethical stewardship of wildlife and its environment".⁵

HSUS began more as an animal welfare organisation than a strictly animal rights organisation, and although the lines aren't that clearly defined in their policy and documentation, it was more moderate in its views and less sensationalistic in its activism than groups like PETA,⁶ for example. In 1980, however, it began shifting its focus from animal welfare to animal rights, and John McArdle, one of HSUS's directors, is quoted as saying that they were "definitely shifting in the direction of animal rights faster than anyone would realise from our literature".⁷ The animal rights movement has therefore had a discernible influence on its policies, which is admitted to by one of its former presidents John Hoyt.⁸

The correlation between its philosophy and that of the Fund for Animals (FFA) could be regarded as very similar, as one of its co-founders is Cleveland Amory, who was the founder and president of the Fund for Animals, which is a decidedly animal rightist organisation.⁹

The Society is U.S. based, with affiliates worldwide, and has been officially recognised by the United Nations to negotiate for animals in global forums.¹⁰ The HSUS believes that humans have a moral obligation to protect the animals whose habitat we share, and to prevent the suffering inflicted on animals as a result of human activity and encroachment.¹¹ Their vision is of a world where "people satisfy the physical and emotional needs of domestic animals; protect wild animals and their environments; and change their relationships with all animals, evolving from exploitation and harm to respect and compassion". Compassion towards animals and a belief in their intrinsic value is a central principle, and as such they are vehemently opposed to any exploitation of them by humans.¹² Their work is broadly focused on a variety of animal issues such as over-population, exploitation, animal research, the consumptive use of animals, and wildlife. A variety of methods deemed to be the most effective in combating these practices are used, be it through investigation, rehabilitation, education,

⁵ The National Shooting Sports Foundation 2001: 8.

⁶ People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) is discussed in a sub-section below.

⁷ The Centre for Consumer Freedom 2003.

⁸ The Centre for Consumer Freedom 2003.

⁹ The Fund for Animals (FFA) is discussed in the next sub-section.

¹⁰ HSUS 2003c.

¹¹ The National Shooting Sports Foundation 2001: 8.

¹² HSUS 2003a.

political or consumer advocacy, or litigation. As the practice of sport hunting is a most obvious example of the consumptive use and exploitation of wildlife it has naturally come under extreme fire by the HSUS.

The reason for this is because HSUS regards animals as being sentient creatures with intrinsic value and moral standing, and regards humans as being responsible for preventing the infliction of pain, suffering and death on animals. As such, it is “strongly opposed to the hunting of any living creature for fun, trophy, or for sport” as doing so is *inhumane* because of the needless pain, suffering, death and trauma it causes to animals.¹³ Regardless of the methods used, HSUS views sport hunting¹⁴ as being “fundamentally at odds with the values of a humane, just and caring society”.¹⁵

Furthermore, the characterisation of wild animals as “game” is regarded as denying the intrinsic value and belittling the ecological importance of animals,¹⁶ and HSUS opposes the duplicity inherent in cases where wildlife is allegedly killed for management purposes, yet in reality is killed as “game” for recreational purposes.

They strongly object to the fact that wildlife areas in the United States are controlled and manipulated for the benefit of hunters; in that various policies, research, and management programmes are geared towards providing animals for hunters to shoot, at the expense of non-“game” species. They also argue that wildlife agencies receive a large proportion of revenue from hunters through hunting licenses, taxation on permits, rifles, ammunition, etc., and that this results in hunters having an influence on wildlife management policies which is disproportionate to their relatively small numbers in relation to the rest of the American public. The claim is made that were it not for the opportunity to kill animals, hunters would not be interested in conserving wildlife at all, and that their conservation efforts are motivated therefore purely out of self-interest.¹⁷

Given the view of HSUS, trophy hunting in particular has understandably been on the receiving end of some of the most passionate objection. With this in mind, the

¹³ The National Shooting Sports Foundation 2001: 9.

¹⁴ Namely, hunting for recreational purposes. HSUS does not oppose subsistence hunting provided it is not wasteful or entails the hunting of endangered or threatened animals; nor the culling of wildlife populations where there is a legitimate need to do so for managerial purposes, provided it is a last resort, and the methods used ensure a painless and quick death for the animal in a humane manner.

¹⁵ HSUS 2003d.

¹⁶ The National Shooting Sports Foundation 2001: 9.

¹⁷ HSUS 2003e.

Society published a comprehensive report in 1995 entitled *Big Game, Big Bucks: The Alarming Growth of the Trophy Hunting Industry*,¹⁸ through which HSUS attacked the trophy hunting industry and particularly SCI's role therein; and set HSUS up as one of the pre-eminent activist organisations opposed to trophy hunting. The report contains a broad analysis of what HSUS regards as the evils inherent in the trophy hunting industry, and makes extensive use of factual reports and statistics from a variety of sources to back up its arguments. A significant section of the report is dedicated to an analysis of the raw data obtained from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's Import/Export System from 1990-1993, in order to ascertain the number, species and origin of trophies imported to the U.S. over that period.¹⁹ Various conclusions are reached based on these statistics; the main one being that trophy imports, and by implication trophy hunting, increased by as much as 71% in only four years.²⁰ Based on estimates that 75% of all foreign trophy hunters in Africa were American,²¹ HSUS regarded this as an alarming trend with cause for concern over the risk of unregulated exploitation of animal species. Although there have been obvious criticisms of the report from pro-hunting sectors²² it is worth looking at some of the objections to trophy hunting which it contains.

HSUS attributes the rise in trophy imports and increased trophy hunting activity by American hunters to three factors: 1) leniency on the part of the U.S. government toward trophy hunting, resulting in increased trophy imports and government subsidies of trophy hunting; 2) aggressive promotion of trophy hunting by organisations such as SCI to poor African nations, who are willing to sell their wildlife to trophy hunters regardless of the effect on wildlife populations; and 3) the ascension of several trophy hunting advocates to positions of power in the U.S. congress.²³

¹⁸ Telecky and Lin 1995.

¹⁹ Telecky and Lin 1995: 3.

²⁰ Telecky and Lin 1995: 3.

²¹ Telecky and Lin 1995: 2.

²² These conclusions have been challenged in an article written by Simon Ward for the *International News for Campfire* (Ward 1996). In the article, Ward criticises HSUS for inflating some of the figures, namely the stated figure of 8002 crested porcupine "trophies" imported from Botswana, and the 6169 ostriches from South Africa and Botswana. In the first instance there was no record found of a single porcupine imported from Botswana, whilst in the second instance a legal unrestricted trade in ostriches exists between the U.S., Botswana and South Africa. Ward suggests that a more accurate interpretation would be to take the "Big Five" animals as a guide, with a combined total of 2 302 trophy imports for 1993, with 1 263 of those being buffalo. HSUS admits to the possibility of statistical errors in the raw data they examined, citing overworked staff at ports who may fill in an erroneous keystroke, and the problematic definition of "trophy", as many fish, insects, shells etc. were entered as trophies; in this case HSUS left all plants and invertebrates out of their analysis and concentrated on the imports of mammals (Telecky and Lin 1995: 17). Despite this valid criticism of the report, as a whole the report nevertheless goes a long way in articulating some of the concerns of the anti-hunting lobby regarding the trophy hunting industry.

²³ Telecky and Lin 1995: 1.

Besides the fact that they regard sport hunting in any form as being inhumane, a further basis for their concern is, firstly, the belief that there is strong evidence that trophy hunting is detrimental to the survival of species and ecosystems, while claims that it helps preserve biodiversity are unproven and inconclusive.²⁴

Secondly, they claim that most of the revenue created by the trophy hunting industry goes into the pockets of hunting outfitters based in the U.S. or other developed nations, and not to the indigenous communities where the hunting takes place. This therefore contradicts the claim by pro-hunters that trophy hunting is a valuable tool in creating an incentive for people to conserve wildlife, if they can benefit economically. Nor, it is argued, does the money go towards supporting programmes that enhance conservation of species.²⁵

Thirdly, they argue that SCI is central to the hub of the billion-dollar safari hunting industry, by facilitating contact between wealthy hunters and hunting outfitters. They claim that SCI's award competitions serve to induce hunters to pursue unethical hunting practices and illegal activities, in that the award competitions stimulate competition amongst members to kill more animals in order to get into the record books, and that this in turn provides financial benefits to the trophy hunting industry. Claims that hunters are ethical in their pursuit of animals are discounted, and it is argued that the Principle of Fair Chase is rendered meaningless by certain hunting practices, where economic reasoning and the desire for the trophy override any ethical concerns (for example, where hunters are "guaranteed" success by certain outfitters, which goes against the essential principles of being an ethical hunter; and by practices such as baiting, calling, camouflage, shooting from a vehicle, etc.).²⁶ HSUS also argue that certain hunting methods, which are recognised forms of trophy hunting, do not result in a quick kill and are therefore responsible for causing unnecessary pain and suffering to animals, as in bow hunting big game like elephant and buffalo for example.²⁷

HSUS's arguments imply that the interests of animals (to life, and to freedom from unnecessary pain and suffering etc.) which have an intrinsic value in and of themselves, cannot be supplanted by the non-essential interests of humans, especially when the humans concerned form a minority group (i.e. hunters). If the

²⁴ Telecky and Lin 1995: 1. It can be argued that HSUS in this regard also ascribes to following a "Precautionary Principle" approach.

²⁵ Telecky and Lin 1995: 9-10.

²⁶ Telecky and Lin 1995: 12-14.

²⁷ Telecky and Lin 1995: 13.

killing of animals is not essential to the survival of individual hunters, HSUS regards hunting as morally wrong considering the risk it carries of causing unnecessary pain and suffering to individual animals (through killing or maiming), and the collective disturbance it causes to ecosystems and populations.

Their arguments therefore question the ecological basis of trophy hunting, in that it does not contribute to biodiversity conservation, but on the contrary is ecologically unsustainable; as well as the moral basis, as it is seen as essentially an economic, profit making activity of a minority that perpetuates ethical abuses at the expense of animals and ecosystems, as well as those of indigenous communities. Furthermore, the desire to kill animals for the purpose of acquiring the trophy, and for recreation, is regarded as being morally suspect.

HSUS is thus at the forefront of campaigning against sport and trophy hunting, and has a considerable influence given the amount of resources it has at its disposal. As shown in Chapter 3, these resources have allowed it to become involved in the “My Acre of Africa” Trust Fund in collaboration with SANP,²⁸ and to sponsor various other conservation initiatives that do not include the consumptive use of wildlife, such as funding research into elephant contraception alternatives at Makalali in South Africa.²⁹ These efforts may serve to give it a certain political legitimacy and voice in areas of wildlife management and preservation, which have previously been dominated by hunting affiliates and consumptive based sustainable utilisation views.

2. 2. The Fund for Animals (FFA)

Cleveland Amory founded the Fund for Animals in 1967 as a non-profit animal protection organisation, in order to “speak for those who can’t”.³⁰ They are decidedly anti-hunting in any form, and regard hunting in America particularly as a “war on wildlife”.³¹

The publication of Cleveland Amory’s book *Mankind? Our Incredible War on Wildlife* established the FFA at the forefront of the campaign against sport hunting in America, as well as the practice of fur trapping and all forms of animal cruelty. The Fund believes that “every individual wild animal deserves protection

²⁸ Macleod 2002a: 27. See also Chapter 3, section 4.1.

²⁹ Grobler, Delsink and Lotter 2003: 7.

³⁰ Phelps 2000: 4.

³¹ Amory, C. 1974. *Mankind? Our Incredible War on Wildlife*. Harper and Row: New York.

from pain, suffering, and death – whether that animal's species is endangered or thriving".³² This seems to presuppose that animals have interests, which humans are obligated to protect.

The FFA puts forward several arguments against sport hunting as it is practiced in the U.S. that relate specifically to the unique social, economic and ecological context of hunting in that country, many of which I hope to show have a bearing on understanding the complexities of the justifications put forward for trophy hunting in Africa by leading American hunting organisations such as SCI.

The main reasons FFA opposes hunting are: firstly, that hunting inflicts pain, suffering and death on animals and is therefore an act of cruelty.³³ Secondly, FFA argues that the different activities practiced in the United States which fall under the label of hunting, and which are sanctioned by the hunting community, deny any real chance of escape for animals, and therefore make a mockery of the claim to a principle of Fair Chase and "hunting ethics" that hunters often use to justify their actions.³⁴ These methods include the use of sophisticated weaponry and equipment, camouflage etc., that greatly diminish the chances that the animal can escape; baiting of animals that attract animals to feeding stations where they are ambushed and shot from point blank range; "contest killing", whereby live animals are used as targets in a competition for money and prizes; "canned hunts", where tame, exotic and captive bred animals are shot in fenced-in reserves; and "hounding", whereby hunters employ the use of hounds fitted with radio collars to chase animals into trees, and after following the tracking signal of the dogs, the animal is found and shot from where it has been cornered.

Thirdly, hunting is regarded as an unnatural activity that is encouraged and instilled amongst children by family members and friends (called the "affiliative aspect" of hunting) in the misguided belief that it fosters "responsible wildlife management" and passes on family values.³⁵ In reality, hunters are seen as being indoctrinated into the practice at an early age whereby they are desensitised to the suffering and death of animals under the banner of "male bonding",³⁶ camaraderie, and the mutual encouragement from peers through Mentor Programmes or Apprentice Hunter Schemes.³⁷ They support this with the

³² The Fund for Animals 2003.

³³ The Fund for Animals 2000: 2.

³⁴ The Fund for Animals 2000: 2.

³⁵ Phelps 2001: 9.

³⁶ Phelps 2001: 14.

³⁷ Phelps 2001: 17.

claim that of all hunters in America, 54% began hunting before they were thirteen, 69% before they were sixteen, and 89% of all hunters began hunting before they had turned nineteen.³⁸ Because the practice of hunting is seen as on the decline overall in America,³⁹ women are being encouraged to take up the rifle, as mothers, grandmothers and aunts are regarded as being more likely to object to their children hunting than are fathers, grandfathers or uncles. FFA argues that by convincing women that it is ethically acceptable and safe to hunt, hunters hope that the decline in numbers of children taking up hunting will be reversed.⁴⁰ Hunting in this view is regarded as being instilled as part of a cultural set of norms and practices that is not defensible as an inevitability on the part of human nature.

The fourth major objection that FFA makes to sport hunting is the claim that hunting cannot be considered as making a necessary and direct contribution to wildlife conservation. In America, wildlife agencies are geared towards providing “game” species for hunters to shoot instead of protecting animals or biodiversity.⁴¹ Because hunting is a very lucrative industry⁴² and the agencies primarily get their funding from hunting licenses, they are more inclined to have as their first priority the economic and ecological sustainability of sport hunting as an activity – as opposed to the wildlife itself – through close management and manipulation of habitat by clear cutting of forests to maximise food supply, increase game populations, the building of roads to facilitate hunter access, and the enforcement of hunter regulations, all of which serve to provide a “hunter friendly” environment. This argument is therefore fuelled by concerns that the real motive behind the conservation efforts of hunters is one of self-interest, in that the conservation of wildlife is driven by the desire to control and monopolise access (to the wildlife resource) for the hunters’ own benefit.

According to FFA, there are approximately 14 million people who hunt in America, in contrast to the more than 62 million people who practice less consumptive activities such as bird watching, hiking, and photography. FFA therefore asserts that the funding spent on hunting by wildlife agencies is disproportionate to the large majority of people who don’t hunt, and argues that the money spent on the hunting industry should be put to better use, while the

³⁸ Phelps 2001: 14.

³⁹ The Fund for Animals 2000: 3. FFA claims that 10% of Americans purchased hunting licenses in 1975, compared with only 5.3% in 1997, meaning a decline of 4.7% in the number of people hunting over 22 years.

⁴⁰ Phelps 1999: 3-4.

⁴¹ The Fund for Animals 2000: 1.

⁴² In 1996, \$20.67 billion was generated in the American hunting industry (Phelps 2001: 9).

emphasis on managing wildlife areas for the benefit of hunting should be changed.⁴³ The argument seems to be that there is a danger that wildlife areas exist solely for instrumental reasons, and for the purpose of hunters and the activity of hunting, instead of for reasons of inherent value. This concern and argument is shared with FFA by the HSUS.

FFA is primarily focused on hunting issues within the United States. However, I consider them to be relevant to the African context of the debate as their arguments address the cultural context from which many of the American trophy hunters who come to southern Africa emerge. Its arguments also address the conservation tradition from which many of the sustainable utilisation arguments of pro-hunters are drawn, as well as the ethical practices of certain types of hunting in America that are also applicable to trophy hunting in Africa.

2. 3. *People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA)*

PETA is one of the largest and most widely known animal rights organisations in the world. After being inspired by Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation*, Ingrid Newkirk founded the organisation in 1980 in order to investigate, publicize and end cruelty to animals.⁴⁴ It is known for its extreme activism in opposing any form of animal exploitation, as well as its controversial advertising campaigns and confrontational tactics in tackling animals rights issues and individuals or companies which it regards as being party to the exploitation of animals. It has considerable influence on matters regarding the rights of animals, with a number of celebrities openly supporting PETA causes, and has convinced leading multinational companies such as McDonalds, Burger King, Safeway, General Motors and L'Oréal, to name a few, to change their policies regarding animals and adopt ones that guarantee their welfare.⁴⁵

PETA regards animals as having moral rights (i.e. moral standing) and as being sentient beings, on the basis that they are able to experience pain and suffering. As an activist organisation, PETA believes that animals have interests to be free from pain and suffering that cannot be traded or compromised if the reason for doing so is purely because it would benefit humans. PETA advocates a vegetarian lifestyle and is more radical in its approach and demands than HSUS,

⁴³ The Fund for Animals 2000a: 1.

⁴⁴ PETA 2003a.

⁴⁵ PETA 2003c.

for example, in that no compromise can be made between the interests of animals and the interests of humans – both are equally morally considerable. Any form of animal exploitation by humans is therefore opposed, from the consumption and use of animal products like leather, fur, and meat, to animal experimentation and the factory farming of chickens and livestock.

They are thus vociferously opposed to recreational hunting in any form, not least of all trophy hunting, which it suggests is a “blood-thirsty” “sport” bent on killing and which encourages a pathological mindset. Hunters who kill animals for recreation are implicitly likened to serial murderers as it sees the deliberate killing of animals for reasons other than necessity as pathologically abnormal.⁴⁶ PETA does not oppose the consumption of animals for subsistence purposes where this is deemed necessary for survival, but it nevertheless regards this issue as not being applicable to the vast majority of people in the world.⁴⁷ They therefore oppose all forms of recreational hunting, no matter what justifications are given for the practice.

Sport hunting is regarded as an unessential activity that needlessly inflicts stress, pain and suffering on animals, disrupts family groups, and disrupts breeding, feeding and migration patterns.⁴⁸ Hunters in America are regarded as pleasure seekers who actively seek out the healthiest and strongest members of a species, which results in an unnatural imbalance in the ecosystem, as the artificial reduction of populations stimulates breeding and leads to higher birth rates. The argument is that the problem of overpopulation should be left to nature, as natural predators inevitably target the weakest members of species, thereby keeping the species healthy. Furthermore, nature has a tendency to correct imbalances and starvation and disease are inevitable natural phenomena that contribute to keeping an ecosystem healthy in the long run.⁴⁹

Trophy hunting is accused of being a profit making enterprise that exploits animals for commercial gain, and is ecologically damaging.⁵⁰ It is argued that wildlife management practices are geared toward providing hunters with animals to shoot, whilst most of the funding for wildlife departments come from general tax revenues and not hunting fees, implying that the influence of hunting on

⁴⁶ PETA 2003d.

⁴⁷ PETA 2003d.

⁴⁸ PETA 2003e.

⁴⁹ Newkirk 1990: 95.

⁵⁰ PETA 2003e.

wildlife management is disproportionate to the funding it receives from the general public.⁵¹ They therefore seem to be in agreement with HSUS regarding the latter two arguments mentioned above.

Ingrid Newkirk, PETA's founder, argues that because animals are powerless to defend themselves, concerned citizens should take it upon themselves to become active on their behalf, and she advocates certain methods whereby people may thwart the attempts of hunters on the behalf of animals. These include denying land access to hunters, creating a hostile environment for hunting by distributing deer repellent, scaring game away from hunting areas, and encouraging strong anti-hunting sentiment amongst communities by writing letters to newspapers, or by lobbying municipalities. Newkirk also encourages people to go "hunt sabbing" (hunt sabotaging) or to support groups like The Fund for Animals who do.⁵²

HSUS, FFA, and PETA therefore seem to correlate in many of their views opposing hunting, and in some ways collaborate directly to achieve their aims. Whereas PETA and FFA seem to be the most extreme in their opposition to hunting, HSUS rely more exclusively on political lobbying and methods that do not include direct confrontation with hunters.

3. MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Most of the anti-hunting positions assume an animal rights, animal liberation, or a respect for nature view, or a blend of the three. As such, the landmark publications by three philosophers have had a major impact on articulating their positions in a rational, philosophically grounded manner. Tom Regan, Peter Singer and Paul Taylor have each respectively published landmark texts,⁵³ as has Bernhard Rollin,⁵⁴ which have had a resonating effect on not only articulating issues concerning animal welfare in general, but also in articulating clearly the

⁵¹ Newkirk 1990: 95.

⁵² Newkirk 1990: 96-97.

⁵³ Regan, T. 1983. *The Case for Animal Rights*. Berkeley: The University of California Press; Singer, P. 1976. *Animal Liberation*. New York: Avon Books; and Taylor, P. 1986. *Respect for Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁵⁴ Rollin, B. 1989. *The Unheeded Cry*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

moral arguments against hunting. Evelyn Pluhar⁵⁵ could also be included in this category.

The influence of the writers is broad concerning the impact their ideas have had on the hunting debate, as they have served to lay a philosophical basis for the debate concerning the treatment and exploitation of animals by humans, and served to promote ideas that the treatment of animals cannot be based exclusively upon their instrumental value to humans. The theories outlined in the works directly impact on and influence the positions of the anti-hunting groups outlined above,⁵⁶ and the standing of anti-hunting organisations in the public view can arguably be said to have been strengthened by their appeal to serious philosophical works such as the ones mentioned. The campaign against hunting on the part of anti-hunting organisations was thus based upon and advocated by the theories laid out in the above works, in that the works themselves served to articulate animal issues clearly in ways more accessible to the general public.

A notable example can be found in a project that HSUS has in place called "Animals and Society", which is geared towards expanding the number of college courses in America concerned with animal welfare, animal rights and animal ethics issues.⁵⁷ It maintains an active list of all the college courses in America related to these fields, and the list contains numerous references to the above authors, as well as prominently featuring a detailed outline of the courses offered by Rollin, Regan and Pluhar at their respective universities.⁵⁸ PETA offers works by Regan and Singer for sale through its website, and "highly recommends" *Animal Liberation* to anyone who is considering becoming an animal rights activist.⁵⁹ What follows, then, is a brief summary of the main arguments outlined in some of these works.

Animal Liberation was written by Singer in 1976 to provide a contemporary philosophical justification of the animal rights movement.⁶⁰ Singer's basis for argumentation is a utilitarian philosophy of natural rights that draws largely on the

⁵⁵ Pluhar, E. 1995. *Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals*. London: Duke University Press.

⁵⁶ An example of this is the founding of PETA in 1980, which was inspired by Singer's *Animal Liberation*, following its publication in 1976.

⁵⁷ HSUS 2003b.

⁵⁸ The respective courses offered by the writers are: Rollin (Colorado State University) – *Animal Ethics, Ethical Issues in Genetic Engineering, and Science and Ethics*; Regan (North Carolina State University) – *Contemporary Moral Issues*; and Pluhar (Penn State University) – *Ethics and Social Issues*.

⁵⁹ PETA 2003b.

⁶⁰ Tuohy and Ma 1992: 79.

work of utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham.⁶¹ Singer contends that animals and humans are to be considered equal on the basis that both share the characteristic of sentience, i.e. the ability to suffer. Furthermore, if they are equal, they possess a natural right to the equal consideration of their interests.⁶² The placing of human interests over the interests of animals is thus unjust, and what Singer terms *speciesism*, which is likened to racism. "Speciesism ... is a prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one's own species and against those members of other species."⁶³

This theory is the basis for the animal liberation movement, and as demonstrated is also the theoretical basis for PETA's stance towards animal issues and trophy hunting in particular.

Tom Regan in his book *The Case for Animal Rights* differs from Singer in that he argues from a basis of moral rights theory, as opposed to utilitarian theory, although he comes to practically the same conclusions regarding the treatment of animals as does Singer. Briefly, Regan argues that "individuals" have equal inherent value, while the definition of "individual" is of a being that has a welfare. Animals who have beliefs, desires and psychological identities over time have an experiential welfare and therefore an inherent value. They therefore have an equal moral right to be treated with respect. The courses conducted by Regan concerning moral issues are promoted by HSUS on their website.

In Paul Taylor's book *Respect for Nature*, he advances a theory of environmental ethics which he calls "Respect for Nature". This theory entails three main components, namely that to have a respect for nature, an autonomous, rational agent must adopt a moral attitude of respect for nature itself;⁶⁴ a biocentric outlook (i.e. the belief system on which an attitude of respect for nature depends);⁶⁵ and an ethical system of standards and rules that serves as a guide following the acceptance of an attitude of respect and of a biocentric outlook.⁶⁶

Taylor emphasises the importance of understanding the concepts of the "Good of a Being" and "Inherent Worth", and points out differences between the concepts

⁶¹ Bentham, J. 1789. *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. [S.l.:s.n.].

⁶² Singer 1976: 1-20.

⁶³ Singer 1976: 7.

⁶⁴ Taylor 1986: 59-98.

⁶⁵ Taylor 1986: 99-168.

⁶⁶ Taylor 1986: 169-218.

of intrinsic value, inherent value, and inherent worth.⁶⁷ Beings have an inherent worth if they are seen to have a good of their own, while beings have a good of their own only if something is good or bad for that being without reference to another entity; that is to say, the good of a being is not dependant on its instrumental value or likewise to another being or entity. In emphasising the good of a being and its inherent worth, Taylor offers a different approach to that of Singer and Regan, although he arrives at the same conclusions, namely that an acceptance of a theory of respect for nature necessarily leads one to the rejection of the idea that humans are superior to other animals; it is here where Taylor's theory converges with Singer's concept of speciesism, although the arguments which lead to that conclusion differ as Singer's main criterion is sentience, whereas Taylor's is inherent worth. The relevance of Taylor's work to anti-hunting groups within the hunting debate is not as easily defined as, say, Singer's is to PETA, although one can find remarkably similar sentiments to Taylor's theory in the objectives and mission of HSUS, which envisions the evolution of human behaviour from an attitude of exploitation to one of "compassion and respect" towards animals and nature.

Pluhar's stance on animal rights issues, as laid out in *Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals*, also deserves a brief overview. Interestingly, her views regarding the moral rights of wild animals seem to coincide with those of Henry Salt's (his book *Animals' Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress* is regarded as one of the founding works in animal rights theory),⁶⁸ and suggest a certain consistency regarding the validity of concerns about the rights of, or human obligations towards, wild animals.⁶⁹ This is particularly so as Salt's book was first published in 1892, at a time when animal rights issues could not be considered to be as mainstream as they are at present, nor was the issue surrounding the topic of recreational hunting the cause of much debate.

She regards herself as a "second generation" thinker who aims to advance the ideas put forward by Singer and Taylor especially.⁷⁰ Pluhar regards individual

⁶⁷ Taylor 1986: 72-75.

⁶⁸ Salt, H.S. 1980. *Animals' Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress*. Pennsylvania: Society for Animal Rights. The 1980 edition was published by the Society for Animal Rights, with a preface by Peter Singer, which further illustrates the correlation and flow of ideas between the animal rights and liberation groups.

⁶⁹ Salt 1980: 45-53. Cf. Chapter III, entitled "The Case of Wild Animals". The views that coincide with Pluhar's are: the fact that animals have rights that humans should respect; the notion of an obligation towards wild animals; that wild animals, in their natural free state, enjoy a sense of autonomy, and self-interest ("... an unowned creature has the same right as another to live his life unmolested and uninjured except when this is in some way inimical to human welfare"); and that it should only be acceptable to kill animals where absolutely necessary, as in acts of self-defence.

⁷⁰ Pluhar 1995: ix.

animals as being “fully morally significant” in that they are moral agents, and have moral rights (to life, freedom and well-being) which humans are obligated to respect. Humans, as moral agents, therefore acquire obligations and duties to animals in the same way that they do to other humans, when animals are removed from their natural environment. She argues that the lives of wild animals should not be tampered with in any way, whether by means of trapping them, putting them in zoos, or manipulating their habitat, as doing so violates their “preference autonomy” and strips them of their natural instincts and evolutionary abilities, as well as their “well being” and interests in terms of realising their purpose as they would do in a free natural environment.⁷¹ Humans therefore have an obligation of non-interference towards wild animals, and they should therefore not be tampered with in any way, as their lives are inextricably linked to the “morally neutral evolutionary processes” that form their natural and free environments, in which they exist as “consciously goal-seeking nonhuman animals”. Human animals, as she puts it, are not morally neutral, and therefore our actions need careful deliberation in circumstances where the lives of wild animals and our own intersect.⁷²

As far as hunting is concerned, besides the points raised above, her objection is that it causes injury, maiming, and death to morally significant non-human animals, as well as humans (i.e. through hunting accidents). She also discounts claims by hunters that they are acting in the best interests of wildlife by hunting them. She does not however believe that humans have the obligation to treat wild and domestic animals in the same way, even though they have the same moral standing, and that there are circumstances when the killing of animals is acceptable (i.e. in cases of self defence, or mercy killing).⁷³

Pluhar’s stance on animal rights is relevant to the hunting debate today because her views regarding human obligations towards wild animals in terms of our actions stand in direct contrast to the views expressed by philosophers such as Ortega y Gasset and Aldo Leopold.

Another significant source of anti-hunting sentiment relevant to moral philosophy can be found within ecofeminist (Ecological Feminism) literature. What is notable about an ecofeminist stance is that it emphasises the relationships between entities (i.e. humans, animals, etc.) that define “who one is”. As an ethic,

⁷¹ Pluhar 1995: 274. In terms of the reference to “preference autonomy”, Pluhar has Regan’s notion of the term in mind.

⁷² Pluhar 1995: 274-280.

⁷³ Pluhar 1995: 278-284.

ecofeminism therefore entails a shift from emphasising matters of rights, duties, and rules for determining moral standing etc. to a conception of ethics that grows out of “defining relationships”.⁷⁴ This also entails a shift from granting moral considerability to nonhumans exclusively on the basis of possessing notions like rationality, sentience, or rights, to a “highly contextual account to see what a human being is and what the nonhuman world might be, morally speaking, *for human beings*”.⁷⁵ Ecofeminism thereby voices certain other values, such as love, care, trust, and friendship, which may come about through human relationships to animals especially, and that are often overlooked within the hunting debate and often dismissed as overtly sentimental or naïve by pro-hunting groups. An ecofeminist perspective is relevant here because it provides a context for some of the concerns expressed within the debate regarding the relationships between man and nature, and provides a counter point to primitivist defences of hunting.

A common ecofeminist critique of hunting is that it is a violent “sport” which is a form of patriarchal domination over nature.⁷⁶ The roots of sexist oppression, as well as other forms of oppression such as racism, are seen as lying within “an oppressive patriarchal conceptual framework characterized by a logic of domination”.⁷⁷ Feminists therefore seek to end sexist oppression by ending all other forms of oppression, as they are all connected to this logic of domination. The domination of women is regarded as being inseparably linked to the domination and exploitation of nature, as seen by patriarchal attitudes that equate nature with femininity/women, and rationality/technology with men. The masculine sphere of life emphasised reason (technology/science) and freedom in distinctions between man and nature, and entailed a disconnectedness from and domination of nature, while the feminine sphere was assumed to represent passivity towards and connectedness with nature.⁷⁸ This patriarchal framework historically allowed for the objectification of women and nature, whereby they were “hunted, invaded, colonised, owned, consumed and forced to yield and produce”.⁷⁹ Women, nature and animals have therefore been kept in a state of inferiority and powerlessness by this patriarchal system. This is emphasised especially by cultural ecofeminism, in which all forms of oppression are reduced to the oppression of women, whereas social ecofeminism does not attempt such

⁷⁴ Warren 1995: 222.

⁷⁵ Cheney 1987: 144, as quoted in Warren 1995: 222.

⁷⁶ Glotfelty 1994.

⁷⁷ Warren 1995: 216.

⁷⁸ Plumwood 1992: 8-9.

⁷⁹ Glotfelty 1994.

a reduction, but rather regards the oppression of women as only one among many such forms of oppression, which are expressed in the patriarchal dualism of nature vs. reason.⁸⁰

Within the hunting act, there is also a discernible erotic relationship between the hunter and his prey,⁸¹ as the structures of certain hunting narratives resemble a sexual encounter.⁸² This affirms from an ecofeminist perspective, that hunting is an act of rape and violence towards nature that serves to justify a culture of brutality,⁸³ in that hunting is the brutal play-acting⁸⁴ of patriarchal domination over the non-human world. Whereas a primitivist defence excuses the violence inherent in the hunting act by an appeal to the inevitable predatory inclinations of humans due to the evolutionary process, ecofeminists regard this violence as inherently part of a system of domination, which is encouraged and reinforced by the patriarchal hunting culture.⁸⁵ The pro-hunting emphasis on reason and science, particularly in sustainable utilisation arguments, along with its rejection of many of the anti-hunting positions on the basis that they are overtly emotive, sentimental, irrational, or naïve would therefore seem to affirm for ecofeminists this patriarchal characteristic of the hunting culture.

4. CONCLUSION

The main organisational bodies within the debate that have officially expressed their opposition to all forms of recreational hunting, and trophy hunting in particular, can be seen to be prominent animal rights, animal liberation, and animal welfare groups, namely HSUS, PETA and FFA. An emphasis on the interests of individual animals serves as the main impetus for their opposition to recreational hunting, although not all of their arguments can be reduced to such a simplistic analysis. Holistic concerns over the ecological impact of hunting, as well as concerns over the purely instrumental value that animals are regarded as having in the economic arguments surrounding hunting, are also expressed by

⁸⁰ Plumwood 1992: 10.

⁸¹ Luke 1998: 627-655. Luke undertakes a fairly detailed analysis of the sexual and erotic relationship between the hunter and his prey as it is presented in various hunting literature. He discusses Ortega y Gasset in this regard, and which I will return to in Section B of this thesis.

⁸² Kheel 1996: 38.

⁸³ Collard 1989: 34.

⁸⁴ Play-acting in the sense that hunting mimics acts of war and political power struggles that characterise patriarchal domination in society.

⁸⁵ Although, within this "patriarchal" hunting culture, there are many women who hunt as well.

these groups. The intentions of hunters themselves are questioned as being self-serving against the backdrop of these concerns, which leads to the moral condemnation of recreational hunters in general. HSUS, in particular, stands in direct opposition to SCI and is most active in the attempts to draw attention to the perceived “evils” of trophy hunting, by striving to negate the various claims made by SCI as to the benefits of trophy hunting, and its relevance in modern society. In brief, HSUS, as well as the other groups, reiterate that trophy hunting should be regarded as a “cultural abnormality”, and reinforce, to a degree, the stereotype of hunters as being pathological.

The philosophical works by authors such as Regan, Singer and Taylor, amongst the others I have highlighted, are prominent amongst the general theories that inform the views of these groups pertaining to hunting, and in certain cases, such as PETA's, have had a direct influence on their establishment. These theories outlined above will be explored further in this thesis where applicable. In the following chapter (Chapter 5) I offer a brief conclusion regarding the nature of the stalemate following the discussion of the previous three chapters.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION TO SECTION A – MAPPING THE STALEMATE

1. INTRODUCTION

This section will attempt to outline the main positions of the two groups as they stand in opposition to one another. I hope to draw several inferences from the stated positions of the opposing groups in the debate, as discussed in the previous three chapters, and to detail various points of disagreement and issues of contention that make the debate necessarily come to a point of stalemate.

2. THE CONTOURS OF A STALEMATE

Section A began by outlining the positions of SCI, PHASA and CHASA regarding hunting in Chapter 2, and showed that they use similar arguments in order to justify hunting from sustainable utilisation, biodiversity preservation, conservation management, economic and evolutionary perspectives. These positions and arguments are strengthened by SCI's significant influence and standing internationally, largely through its passionate advocacy of hunting as a conservation tool, and as an activity of moral worth, and through its unofficial role as spokesperson for trophy hunting in international forums. A large percentage of the foreign trophy hunters who come to Africa are members of SCI, or affiliated to them in some way; and as such SCI has a certain influence on local hunting organisations, not least through the establishment of its various hunting chapters, e.g. the SCI African Hunting Chapter. Furthermore, the ethics codes of local hunting organisations are largely derivative of SCI's Code of Ethics.

The argument that carries the most weight in favour of trophy hunting from an ecological perspective is that it is a vital conservation tool and integral to conservation approaches that entail sustainable utilisation. In Chapter 3 I tried to show how trophy hunting is therefore inseparably linked by pro-hunting groups to the principle of "biodiversity preservation through sustainable utilisation", which finds its global significance in the framework of treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the World Conservation Strategy (WCS), and from which pro-hunting groups thus draw the political legitimisation for this

argument. Trophy hunting thus actively seeks, through the lobbying of pro-hunting groups, to establish itself within this global priority framework.

In turn, major conservation NGOs such as WWF and WESSA have the preservation of biodiversity (and the conservation of wildlife, habitats and species for future generations) as primary common goals and objectives, with an understanding that sustainable utilisation of natural resources is the best practical option to balance the needs of people and wildlife. Trophy hunting is accepted, only insofar as it is able to demonstrably contribute to these primary goals within the global framework of the CBD. That trophy hunting in general, in an African context, is ecologically sustainable and contributes to biodiversity preservation remains scientifically unsubstantiated,¹ and the WWF has been shown to express caution in this regard, as they, along with WESSA, recognise the need for a reliance on sound scientific evidence in respect to the ecological impact of trophy hunting.² Therefore, many questions regarding the ecological impact of trophy hunting on free ranging, naturally occurring species, and precisely how it contributes to biodiversity preservation in these habitat types remain unanswered, and considerable doubt remains as to the validity of arguments that justify hunting on these grounds alone.

Nevertheless, most of the energy expended by the pro-hunting groups in seeking to justify trophy hunting can be seen to be directed towards validating the activity in terms of sustainable utilisation and biodiversity preservation, as these are the arguments which are deemed to carry the most weight.

The central role that science plays within conservation organisations and initiatives is important, and deserves some discussion in relation to the groups mentioned above as to the scientific world-view that underscores many of the arguments. Traditional approaches to conservation management, characteristic of conservationism, which the above groups ascribe to, seek to balance the complex biological processes inherent in ecosystems and biospheres, and in general prioritise the health of the ecosystem or biotic community as a whole. The emphasis is thus on the whole, or sum of the parts of the ecosystem, as

¹ Particularly with regards to lions. The African Lion Working Group reported in 1999 that "there is a gap in knowledge about developing appropriate conservation-orientated hunting, including developing quotas that do not harm lion population viability". (African Lion Working Group 1999: 10).

² I have in mind specifically naturally occurring, free ranging species of animals in traditionally unfenced open wildlife areas, such as the Linyanti, Chobe, and other areas within Botswana, and the Luangwa Valley in Zambia, as opposed to the type of trophy hunting which occurs on highly managed, fenced farms that are stocked with selectively bred game, as is the majority of cases in a South African context. Determining the ecological sustainability of trophy hunting is also dependent on various factors, such as the species being hunted, the habitat within which hunting occurs, while the economic sustainability depends on the demographics of local communities affected, such as their economic, social and cultural needs, etc., and the role players within the industry itself.

opposed to the individual components that make up the whole.³ To a degree, individual organisms are valuable in themselves only insofar as they form part of the collective biotic community. If the balance is disturbed or threatened in various ways, such as an increase in vegetation biomass or in population numbers, an “adaptive management” approach is relied on to ascertain the variable threats and to address them accordingly, by tweaking the components of the ecosystem in order to redress the imbalance. This may involve removing individual organisms, or altering the population numbers of species. The lives of individual animals may be forfeited in the “interests” of the species or of the ecosystem,⁴ if doing so serves to benefit the biotic community.⁵ Utilitarianism therefore underlies traditional approaches to conservation, as the aggregate good of ecosystems or the biotic community is the benchmark used in management decisions regarding human intervention.

This approach necessarily entails a certain amount of risk and unpredictability, due to the complex interaction and interdependence of organisms within ecosystems. To minimise this risk and uncertainty surrounding any human intervention, and the unforeseeability of unintended results, adaptive management approaches therefore rely heavily on empirical and quantifiable scientific evidence in order to predict possible outcomes and consequences of intervening, and so determine appropriate courses of action, or even inaction. Modern conservation approaches therefore draw heavily on scientific research conducted in fields such as biology, zoology and botany, etc., and the empirical and quantifiable data that science is able to provide. Nature conservation itself, as a discipline and management strategy, is inherently a scientific exercise. As it is practiced or evoked by the main organisational bodies and as taught at university and college level, the focus is on finding answers to empirical questions, from which correct conclusions and predictions may be drawn. The assumption is that science is an objective and morally neutral discipline, and is able to provide certain universal and empirical truths, which are independent from subjective, changeable human values. Science is therefore the tool by which

³ Varner 1995: 297.

⁴ Assuming, of course, that species and ecosystems can have a notion of interests in a way that individual animals have, i.e. conscious and goal oriented interests of themselves; such as in consciously acquiring food, water, mating, defending territory, etc. Cahen (1995: 300-314) discusses the problem of ascribing interests to ecosystems in relation to the criteria of sentience, moral considerability, and goal directedness; and concludes that while a preservationist intuition (cf. footnote 15 in this chapter) may be justified towards ecosystems, it cannot be said that ecosystems have goal directed interests of themselves.

⁵ This approach is most noticeable in SANPs elephant culling programme, where elephants were previously culled when their population numbers reached the carrying capacity of the Kruger Park ecosystem. Briefly, reducing elephant numbers ensured that their activity did not negatively impact on the ecosystem and other species, as happened in Kenya's Tsavo National Park, for example, where the number of elephants exceeded the carrying capacity and as a result destroyed much of the vital vegetation which other species depended upon.

utilitarian approaches to conservation seek to ensure that morally neutral decisions regarding wildlife are reached. There is therefore an implicit faith in science and in a scientific world-view that informs and underlies such an instrumental approach.

The ecological significance of trophy hunting is therefore raised within this utilitarian context, and informed by scientific evidence. This is also a core of conservationism.

Ecological justifications for trophy hunting are often extolled in conjunction with its economic effects, as the economy of trophy hunting is seen to benefit wildlife as well as humans. Economic justifications of trophy hunting carry with them the assumption that economic benefits fulfil certain considerations towards other humans, in so far as the right to equitably benefit from natural resources is concerned. There is an underlying sense of “inter-generational justice” towards rural communities in Africa especially. There are studies which show that in certain areas trophy hunting does provide obvious tangible benefits to local communities, for example in Botswana⁶ and Zambia,⁷ which would indicate that from an economic perspective, the trophy hunting industry does have the capacity to fulfil the instrumental objective of the CBD in terms of facilitating the “equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources”.

Arguments that seek to validate trophy hunting also include the evolutionary function and survival value of hunting, where hunting is seen to affirm the role of humans in the life cycle of nature, and where hunting is seen as having played a vital role in contributing to our social, physical, intellectual and economic development as a species. This line of argument is also generally referred to as the “hunting hypothesis”, which forms a vital part in informing the primitivist defence of hunting, and is based on early anthropological evidence which suggested that our species, *homo sapiens*, evolved the specific mental, social and physical capacities that we have today due to the demands and requirements necessitated by our need to hunt for survival.⁸

Arguments regarding the cultural significance and value of the hunting act also form a core component of pro-hunting positions. The personal and cultural

⁶ Gujadhur 2001; Jones 2002; and Botswana Wildlife Management Association 2001.

⁷ Lewis and Alpert 1997: 59-68.

⁸ Incidentally, this anthropological basis for the hunting hypothesis has largely been shown to be inconclusive, as I will show in Chapter 6, following newer anthropological evidence to the contrary.

significance of the trophy⁹ itself to hunters and hunting communities throughout the ages reveals much about the psychological motives and intentions that drive the desire to hunt,¹⁰ and the significance level of the trophy within certain cultures may directly influence the external factors motivating a desire to hunt. Trophyism is also not confined to the hunting culture, but is endemic in many spheres of society today, regardless of culture or ethnic group.

Hunters themselves, though, find it difficult to express the meaning of the hunting experience and the at times overriding desire for a particular trophy, and there are numerous examples of personal explanations for the need and desire to hunt that differ from each other. Some explanations are based on internally motivated desires: for the personal satisfaction gained from challenging oneself to overcome the physical challenge of a gruelling hunt, to immersing oneself in the outdoors and participate in the natural landscape and rhythm of nature. The trophy thus becomes a deeply symbolic representation and token reminder of the experience and memory itself, and thereby an affirmation of the hunter's ability. Others are externally motivated desires: for the increased status, recognition and approval afforded by peers and by having an entry in trophy record books. These remain, though, merely an explanation of the desire to hunt, and is not a moral justification thereof, and may explain why so much energy is expended in defending hunting from other viewpoints such as sustainable utilisation and the conservation value of hunting, in that the effects of trophy hunting can more easily be empirically quantified in terms of ecological science, as well as through the obvious tangible social and economic benefits to communities that trophy hunting is seen to provide.

Although "true hunters", as defined by the SCI, have a deep respect for nature and the animals they hunt, there is an implicit, and sincerely held, belief that by hunting an individual animal, they contribute to the welfare of species and ecosystems, as well as local (human) communities. The life and interests of individual animals are therefore regarded as being subservient to the greater collective interests of species, ecosystems or human communities. The beliefs of hunters regarding the role of ethical hunting therefore stems from a certain philosophical assumption and perspective, namely one identified by Callicott as "Ethical Humanism",¹¹ the basic supposition being that individual animals cannot be regarded as having moral standing, as they are not regarded as being

⁹ An in depth discussion of the term "trophy" and its significance follows in Chapter 6.

¹⁰ To be discussed in Chapter 6.

¹¹ Cf. Chapter 2, p.39.

sentient, and that humans may in certain circumstances (humanely) treat individual animals as a means to an end.

Utilitarian theory is therefore a cornerstone of the pro-hunting community's arguments that seek to justify trophy hunting, both from the benefits that accrue hunters in the way of cultural values, and in that it benefits their interests in other ways, namely by fulfilling certain human needs, as well as benefiting the biotic community and biodiversity preservation. In Africa, the economic and ecological benefits of trophy hunting are forwarded as being a moral justification within this utilitarian or consequentialistic context. The moral value of trophy hunting especially is therefore generally determined according to the aggregate good of its consequences as an activity.¹² All factors taken into account, this approach then requires that in certain circumstances and contexts it may even be *morally imperative*, according to utilitarian theory, to conduct trophy hunting. This is seen to be particularly so in the African context when economic factors are emphasised in this account.

Plainly put, it is supposed that there is nothing inherently evil about killing animals for recreation, provided the aggregate consequences of doing so result in a net significant good for animals and humans. Secondly, it may be a moral imperative to do so in situations where the consequences will increase the net benefit, or where the consequences of not doing so will result in a decrease of net benefit, or in maintaining a negative status quo. According to this, responsibility for the infliction of pain and suffering is also then either: a) removed from the individual, as the greater moral imperative requires it, or b) it is absolved by revealing the greater good that came about because of it. This may go a way in explaining how hunters reconcile the pain, wounding and harming which is inevitably suffered by the animals being hunted, to their claim of being conservationists.

More importantly, it may offer hints as to the question of trophy hunting with integrity. If a sincere belief in such a moral imperative is evident on the part of hunters, or a sincere desire to act according to this imperative, one could argue that a requirement for hunting with integrity is met. On the other hand, if consequentialism is regarded as being deliberately manipulated or adopted to suit other desires and interests above this moral imperative, then one could say that in such a case the notion of trophy hunting with integrity is questionable.

¹² Cf. Horsthemke (1993: 168-187) for a discussion of utilitarianism and more specifically, preference utilitarianism, in this regard. Horsthemke discusses various "loopholes" in the utilitarian theory of philosophers like Singer and Regan as well as utilitarian theories that are used to defend the killing of animals and non-sentient beings.

In Chapter 4 I showed that most of the arguments from the anti-hunting groups are centred on varying notions of animal rights, and the human duties and obligations towards animals that stem from these notions, as well as a sense of respect for nature. The rights of individual animals are emphasised, and concern for the welfare of individual animals is expressed where these clash with trivial human interests. Utilitarian theory is often used to arrive at conclusions as to whether animals have rights or not, based on the criteria for sentience,¹³ but the arguments used to indicate the moral quality of actions are seemingly deontological as opposed to strictly utilitarian. Anti-hunting groups argue from within a distinctly different approach to moral theory, one in which the inherent morality of an action is not regarded as being dependent on aggregate goods or consequences. The moral quality of the act of killing an animal is therefore not dependent on its consequences, be they good or bad. Rather, as moral agents, humans are obliged, and have a certain responsibility, to refrain from acts that cause pain and suffering, and the moral quality of our actions is seen as being dependent on the extent that they do or don't. This is an attitude and view evident in most anti-hunting arguments, and is characteristic of what Callicott terms as being the ethical system of "Humane Moralism".¹⁴ This stands in direct contrast to Ethical Humanism, mentioned above in connection with pro-hunting views.

As such, HSUS, PETA, and FFA do not accept that the interests of individual animals can be subservient to the non-essential interests of humans, as in an interest in hunting for recreation, on the basis that animals are equally morally considerable as humans are, and that doing so violates their natural rights by causing them pain, suffering and trauma. Hunting is an act that causes pain and death, and pain and death are both an evil. Violating the rights of animals for a non-essential interest is therefore the deontological evil of recreational hunting, because, as humans – i.e. moral agents – we are further required and duty bound to promote good by our actions, and to reduce evil and pain, or at the very least to refrain from acts which result in pain and evil. The supposition is that good and evil, pain and pleasure, are the same for others as they are for us. The ability to feel pain is thus unrelated to the costs or benefits of a state of affairs. This argument can be seen in HSUS's campaign against SCI, considering that trophy hunting is a non-essential activity in terms of human survival, and where a main motivating factor for individual hunters is the recreation aspect. The deontological argument adopted by anti-hunting groups regarding the moral quality of the hunting act that follows this, is that killing animals for recreation is

¹³ As in Singer, for example.

¹⁴ Callicott 1995: 239-240.

morally unjustifiable, no matter what the consequences or perceived benefits. Furthermore, humans have less to lose, and animals more to gain, by refraining from participating in recreational hunting.

This fundamental difference in theory between pro- and anti-hunting groups is also what makes it so difficult for the two sides in general to approach any modicum of agreement regarding the morality of killing animals for recreation. On the one side, pro-hunters defend the moral quality of hunting as being determined or judged according to its consequences; therefore recreational hunting can be excused, as the pain and death suffered by individual animals forms part of a greater purpose. On the other side, anti-hunters argue that the consequences of killing animals are completely irrelevant in determining the morality of hunting, as our obligation is to reduce pain and suffering, and as such any acts that cause needless pain and suffering, such as recreational hunting, are morally wrong.

The anti-hunting groups mentioned in Chapter 4 also reject many of the other claims made by pro-hunters, and provide their own contrary evidence as grounds for rejecting these claims. The first is the pro-hunting claim that hunting is ecologically sustainable, and that hunting serves to protect biodiversity. Anti-hunters argue that this is not the case, and that trophy hunting negatively impacts on the gene pool, and causes disruption to the social structures, feeding habits, and breeding cycles of the animals being hunted. As such, it negatively impacts on animals, species and the biotic community and therefore arguments from biodiversity preservation standpoints are moot.

Anti-hunters further object to claims that hunters are conservationists in the true sense, in that the motives behind conservation initiatives by hunters are driven by self-interest.¹⁵ Many of the arguments of the anti-hunting lobby therefore revolve around the morally questionable desires, intentions and motives of hunters. Hunters readily acknowledge that in many cases conservation efforts are motivated in part by self-interest,¹⁶ but often point to examples where wildlife numbers would be in a dire position were this not the case. What anti-hunting groups such as PETA and HSUS object to, though, is that this is not a neutral starting point for preserving wildlife, and that the implications of approaching wildlife concerns from a position of self-interest is one that perpetuates anthropocentric attitudes to the detriment of wildlife in the long term. This is

¹⁵ This objection is therefore one that may have its roots in the *preservationist intuition*, which is identified by Cahen as being an: "ecological conscience that sees that preservation is a good thing in itself ... apart from any contribution it makes to human welfare" (1995: 300).

¹⁶ Damm, 2001e; 2003: 47.

because the value of the environment is implicitly reduced to an instrumental one. Conservation efforts motivated from self-interests therefore inevitably seek to control, maintain and manipulate the environment in a way that is unnatural; and the integrity of the ecosystems and biotic communities is therefore questioned where wildlife is conserved through self-interest. Conservation achievements of hunters are seen as being tainted by selfish interests and therefore inadequate as far as maintaining a "natural" environment is concerned. From a pro-hunting point of view, intentions and desires of hunters do not necessarily determine the morality of their actions, insofar as conservation is concerned, as "selfishness" is regarded as being inherently human and natural,¹⁷ and because their "dubious" motives nevertheless result in a state of affairs that is beneficial to wildlife and people in general. Another deontological characteristic of anti-hunting arguments can be seen in this regard, as they would insist that it is precisely the "dubiousness" of the motives that constitute the problem, and not whether or not beneficial states of affairs result from them. Thus, any economic and ecological benefits that may come about because of hunters' efforts are therefore irrelevant to the rightness of their acts, in the Kantian sense that: "As soon as a man does an action *because* he thinks he will improve his own interests thereby, he is acting not from a sense of its rightness but from self-interests".¹⁸

Anti-hunters can therefore be seen to object to the attitudes, intentions, or even the mindset that is supposedly characteristic of pro-hunters. The scientific and economic world-view that informs sustainable utilisation approaches to conservation, and the reasoning that goes with it, is regarded as flawed, as it serves to discount other equally important intrinsic values. Characteristic of this world-view is what Rollin regards as a "ritualistic obeisance to the ideology of science".¹⁹ Scientific approaches necessitate that science be separated from sentiment and other value judgements that may compromise the empirical quality of data. However, it is precisely this capacity to make value judgements, other than scientific ones alone, which makes us human. According to Rollin, this view does not intend to render science meaningless, but only to emphasise that as humans we depend on other value judgements to fulfil meaningful moral lives. It is argued therefore, that far from being an objective and neutral pursuit of truth, science subjectively and instrumentally seeks to control, through knowledge, in

¹⁷ Damm 2003: 47.

¹⁸ Ross 1989: 253. The foundation of this moral argument stems from Immanuel Kant's Second Proposition of Morality: "That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, *not from the purpose* which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the *principle of volition* by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire." (Kant 1989: 233-234).

¹⁹ Rollin 1989: 115.

order to manipulate, by rejecting other values from the outset. This criticism of Rollin's is therefore itself a sign of the increasing public scepticism towards science, and of the erosion of public trust in general. As Kane states:

No longer does the identification of science with human progress, forged in the Enlightenment and strengthened by the rise of industrial society, seem quite so self-evident to the public mind; no longer are the allegedly objective opinions of scientific 'experts' received with automatic reverence; the special status of scientific truth itself has been questioned, even mocked, by some; and there has been a marked decline in faith in 'scientific,' technocratic solutions to social and political problems.²⁰

Part of the objection to the economic and ecological claims of hunters is thus based on a general erosion of societal trust in science, and also the view that this economic reasoning and scientific world-view, or mindset,²¹ already starts out from a position of self interest, which leads to a misrepresentation of the scientific and economic facts, as those HSUS laid out in their 1995 report,²² in order to fit the conservationist framework and justify hunting according to global environmental priorities.

The claim that hunting is a natural human act, and fosters and encourages certain cultural values, is also dismissed by anti-hunters as an unfounded and mistaken belief, as was shown in Chapter 4 by FFA for example. The perpetuation of the hunting culture is regarded as being unnatural, and one where people are indoctrinated at a young age into a particular world-view regarding human/animal relationships. Part of this indoctrination involves the desensitisation towards the pain and moral standing of animals. Far from being a justification for the act, the cultural value that hunting holds to people, and the social and cultural attitudes that surround it, are regarded as being a manifestation of a social and cultural malaise towards the environment and animals. When speaking with regard to the British tradition of fox hunting, and which is certainly applicable to FFA's view of hunting as a cultural upbringing, Martin states that: "What happens is that upbringing and education, influences of the wrong kind, condition the mind to an acceptance of hunting and to an obstinate refusal to think about the nature of civilisation, the demands of religion or of culture. Habit can be dangerous."²³ In this respect, the cultural significance

²⁰ Kane 1998: 117.

²¹ For example, as illustrated by the following statement: "Emotional and blinkered opinions have no place in modern game management. The fact is that if a wild animal is not commercially viable, it will soon be replaced by cattle ... The unavoidable rule of modern Africa is: 'If it pays, it stays.'" (Elgin 1996: 87).

²² Cf. Telecky and Lin 1995.

²³ Martin 1959: 51.

of hunting is itself seen as the sign of a deeper social flaw, and attempts to validate the practice of hunting on these grounds are said to be misguided.

Thus, the economics of the safari hunting industry is regarded as perpetuating and encouraging the above cultural malaise, in that it serves to reduce the value of animals to a mere commodity. The economics of the hunting industry are said only to serve the interests of a minority, in that the majority of revenue generated does not return to poor rural communities in the case of Africa, and nor does it directly benefit the environment where the interests of hunters are not concerned. This is a refutation of pro-hunting claims to the contrary.

3. CLASHING WORLD VIEWS

Both sides in the hunting debate have the greater goal and agenda of ensuring that wildlife and ecosystems exist for future generations. In this sense both groups are environmentalist, as they share a concern for the environment over the dwindling numbers of species, habitats, and wild areas caused by human expansion. The stalemate surrounding the debate, though, is to be found in the conflicting belief systems and overlapping world-views that result in differing determinations as to the manner in which this is to be done. While anti-hunting groups may also argue from a utilitarian position, such as PETA for example, the world-view held by many PETA activists necessitates that they differ drastically from the priorities and values held by SCI members. These differences mean that consensus over issues pertaining to the perceived value of individual animals, the priorities to be adhered to which flow from this perception, and treatment at the hand of humans (according to the values and priorities deemed most urgent), is impossible to reach. On the pro-hunting side, ecosystems as opposed to individual animals are emphasised, and more weight is given to consequentialism in deciding the moral quality of hunting; as opposed to the anti-hunting positions which emphasise the interests and rights of individual animals, and regard the moral quality of human action to be determined by whether or not it results in pain or suffering to others.

The priorities that can be identified in pro-hunting positions are then: a) wildlife, but with an emphasis on ecosystems or species, b) other humans (i.e. rural communities), c) sustainable utilisation within a conservationist framework, d) the role of science in conservation, and e) the rights of hunters. Anti-hunters prioritise: a) wildlife as well, but with an emphasis on individual animal welfare

and the rights of animals, b) the moral desirability of acting out of non-self-interest with regards to wildlife, with the focus on intentions, desires, and motives, and c) the role of non-reducible values pertaining to wildlife.

The crux of the stalemate therefore seems to lie somewhere between the deontological position of anti-hunters, and the consequentialist/utilitarian position of pro-hunters, as far as efforts to justify or condemn the *moral quality* of the hunting act go.

Both parties seem to talk past each other to a certain extent, due largely to the incompatibility of the underlying complex of philosophical assumptions regarding the moral status of animals which inform their positions, and in some cases confuses them, as well as the differing criteria for ascertaining the moral quality of human action towards the environment. Where valid claims are made by one side, they are either rejected by the other side as being unfounded, or as based on false pretences. Subtle shifts in the philosophical assumptions of the two groups characterise the debate itself, as certain arguments on both sides can be seen to manifest themselves in different utilitarian guises. To say therefore that anti-hunters adopt a preservationist position, and pro-hunters adopt a conservationist one, is to say that they ascribe to a world-view that determines their actions in regard to the environment, although they may both be considered environmentalist in the sense that they express concern for the natural world.

To understand this it may help to clarify the concept of a world-view with regard to conservationism and preservationism, in order to see how the beliefs and values held by the various parties, as discussed above in this chapter, serve to identify an approach to hunting as being conservationist or preservationist.

Firstly, according to Norton, a world-view can be referred to as: "the constellation of beliefs, values, and concepts that give shape and meaning to the world a person experiences and acts within. A world-view is *not necessarily* a well-developed, systematic philosophy. It can be, but the world-views of most people remain sets of background assumptions, often not even recognised by those people, against which they understand the world and act in it. Individuals often act on unsystematised and incomplete conceptions, on fragments of world-views."²⁴ [Emphasis added].

²⁴ Norton 1991: 75.

A world-view is thus a guide to action, even though many of its “formative constituents” are often tacit and not explicitly expressed.²⁵ Hunters and pro-hunters alike may share certain beliefs, namely that the wanton exploitation of wildlife, in the form of turn of the century market hunting for example, is wrong and wasteful. What they do not agree on, however, is whether or not present day hunting activities are similarly wrong, wanton, wasteful or indeed exploitative of wildlife.

The terms conservationist and preservationist function as indicators of a loosely defined world-view. It is thus not a representation of a closed system of thought, whereby “sets of axioms and principles ... are accepted or rejected monolithically”.²⁶ In respect to the hunting debate, the term preservationist or conservationist may therefore rather be regarded as *heuristically useful* labels that denote an ideal type of belief system.²⁷ It thereby serves to identify an approach to human/environmental conflict. It is safe to say then, that a person’s actions, informed by certain values, beliefs and concepts, define within the hunting debate whether they ascribe to a conservationist or preservationist world-view.

In general the terms conservationist and preservationist have been distinguished along the lines of motives, in that conservationist motives for preserving habitats and species can be seen to be anthropocentric and rest on instrumental values (for example, that mountain ranges, parks, reserves, or wildlife areas be conserved essentially *for* the benefit of humans); while preservationist motives are seen as independent of human interests (for example, that ecosystems be saved *from* destruction, in that they have a “right to exist”).²⁸ To a certain extent, hunters admit that some of their conservation initiatives are motivated out of self-interest, while anti-hunting groups explicitly emphasise the rights of animals. This distinction would then seem to be applicable to the hunting debate, as confirmed by the arguments and viewpoints expressed by the respective groups.

However, collectively ascribing a preservationist world-view to all people who oppose hunting may be problematic, in that all who oppose hunting do not share an identical, fixed set of values, principles and beliefs that govern their actions in a way that is linear. Similarly for the term conservationist being applied to pro-

²⁵ Norton 1991: 75.

²⁶ Norton 1991: 68.

²⁷ Fox 1986: 7-9, as referenced in Norton 1991: 66.

²⁸ Passmore 1974: 173.

hunters. Anti-hunters form a mosaic of people who arrive at the personal conclusion that hunting is morally unjustifiable based on a variety of beliefs. While the groups identified in Chapter 4, namely HSUS, FFA and PETA, can be seen as fairly homogenous in their official views opposing hunting, individuals that fall under the banner of these organisations may hold value systems or certain beliefs and principles which diversify, and incorporate the varying labels that are generally applied to people who hold those principles. Some examples could be the labels of ecofeminist, deep ecologist, animal rightist, or weak anthropocentrist.²⁹ The fact that they oppose hunting may in certain cases be coincidental, and have little to do with complimentary value systems. I have in mind, for example, instances where anthropocentric concerns regarding the harmful effect of hunting to human interests are the basis for conclusions about the wrongness of hunting (namely, people who oppose hunting because it is degrading to the person, or that hunting is wrong because it causes accidents to humans). They share the conclusion that hunting is wrong with ecofeminists, for example, yet both arrive at the conclusion due to different intuitions, beliefs, values or ways of looking at and interpreting the world around them. This may also be why certain people only object to certain types of practices that are called hunting, whereas they don't object to others. People who practice hunting similarly do so from a variety of notions, beliefs, and value systems that inform utilitarianism and the anthropocentric emphasis in relationships between humans and nature.

Another example, which may illustrate well where certain intuitions can be shared by some hunters³⁰ and anti-hunters alike, could be found within *one* of Arne Naess's seven principles of the deep ecology movement, namely what he identifies as "biospherical egalitarianism".³¹ Naess explains an affinity that is held by "ecological field workers" towards the environment and other forms of life:

The ecological field-worker acquires a deep-seated respect, or even veneration, for ways and forms of life. He reaches an understanding from within, a kind of understanding others reserve for fellow men and for a narrow section of ways and forms of life. To the ecological field worker, the equal right to live and blossom is an

²⁹ Cf. Norton (1995: 183-184) for a discussion of how weak anthropocentrism allows space for a world-view emphasising the close relationship between human species and other living species, and "make[s] a case for ideals of human behaviour extolling harmony with nature"; and thereby serves as a basis for criticising the mere exploitation of nature.

³⁰ Particularly those who profess to be true ethical hunters, and that hunting is an act that leads to identification with the natural world. Hunters who profess to experience a profound sense of communion with nature through hunting sometimes seem to echo this sentiment.

³¹ Naess 1973: 95. Naess qualifies this by inserting an "in principle" clause, because some killing, exploitation and suppression is realistically unavoidable.

intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the quality of humans themselves. *This quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close partnership with other forms of life.* The attempt to ignore our dependence and to establish a master-slave role has contributed to the alienation of man from himself.³² [Emphasis added].

Besides the fact that “the equal right to live and blossom” is not an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom to hunters as far as the individual animals they hunt is concerned, hunters nevertheless do share a notion of affinity with the environment through their participation in the hunting experience that seems similar in a respect to Naess’s qualification of biospherical egalitarianism, in that a “deep pleasure and satisfaction” is often expressed by hunters by virtue of them being in the hunting field. This is most often evident in the often mystical and religious interpretation of a hunter’s experience,³³ and for the connectedness with nature hunters often claim to feel through hunting. In a respect, the hunter thus “works the ecological field” in his hunting pursuit, and is in this sense an “ecological field-worker”. Intuitions that form the basis of biospherical egalitarianism may be present according to the claims of the “ethical hunter” especially, although these intuitions do not necessarily lead to a moral truism that hunting, or killing for recreation, is wrong; whereas for deep ecologists this would.

This was just one of Naess’s seven principles though, and in formulating them, he was arguing against what he termed “shallow ecology”, which he contrasted to the deep ecology movement. Shallow ecology, says Naess, has as its main objective the interests of humans, particularly the “health and affluence of people in the developed countries”, while deep ecology emphasises the “man-in-environment” image, and a move away from anthropocentrism as a process of self-realisation.³⁴ Doing so entails a rejection of forms of exploitation, as exploitation of one by another necessarily affects the potentiality of self-realisation.³⁵ This would necessarily entail a rejection of the exploitation inherent in hunting. However, if one can regard an intuition on the part of some hunters to be reminiscent of an intuition of biospherical egalitarianism as described by Naess, in the form I identify above, then it is precisely this intuition that drives hunters to exploit the animals they hunt, as doing so is a prerequisite, in their own

³² Naess 1973: 95-96.

³³ Cf. Chapter 3 for the discussion of religious and mystical aspects of hunting.

³⁴ Naess 1973: 95.

³⁵ Naess 1973: 96.

explanation, for their own self-realisation as human beings (bearing in mind the primitivist defence of hunting).

In an individual sense, fulfilling self-realisation is in this example therefore a common denominator of what is regarded as being competing systems of thought, which are loosely incorporated under the respective labels of conservationism and preservationism. This may serve to highlight the lack of consensus inherent in the hunting debate both within and between the opposing groups. The polarisation of opposites along the lines of preservationist and conservationist actually serves to contribute to the lack of clarity, as it ignores the underlying complexity of values, beliefs, intuitions, interests, etc., that inform an individual stance for or against hunting by emphasising a “closed-systems-of-thought analysis” of the debate.³⁶ This polarisation leads to stereotyping (for example, “greenies/bleeding hearts” vs. “cold-blooded killers”) and a general lack of understanding, incentive or willingness to directly engage, on a political level, with the relevant concerns that characterise each position. There may be too much at stake in a political sense for groups such as PETA and SCI for example, as a re-evaluation of certain truisms held by each group may be necessitated that undermines their political positions and immediate and long-term objectives, interests and aims. Whilst it is understandable, and in cases necessary, that labels be applied to certain world-views to identify general sets of shared values and so doing reveal areas of contention, a rigid adherence to regarding world-views as closed systems nevertheless encourages the discussion surrounding hunting to move away from complexity and so doing embrace a simplistic, homogenised analysis. This inevitably leads to simplistic conclusions as to the rightness or wrongness of hunting, and which I regard as evident on both sides of the debate.

If the above line of reasoning stands as valid, then in addition to the deontological/utilitarian tension, the philosophical stalemate surrounding the debate over hunting lies within differing heuristic approaches on the one hand, and on the other within a human tendency to attempt to homogenise belief systems that results in polarisation, which is the political stalemate.

³⁶ Meaning, it emphasises the exclusivity of a world-view, in that it denotes a belief system that “monolithically” characterises well-defined groups (Norton 1991: 65-68).

4. CONCLUSION

I hope to have shown the various levels of correlation between the various anti-hunting groups, and the similarities in their particular positions regarding their opposition to trophy hunting. I also hope to have highlighted the valid claims made by both sides in the debate, which may contribute to an understanding of the complexities inherent in the debate. "Mapping the stalemate" has served mainly to identify the arguments and philosophical positions, and to see how they differ, in order to discern why no real debate is possible. It has not explored how these arguments are used or conveyed by the groups within the dynamic nature of the debate on various levels, and to what ends. For example, the open agenda of anti-hunters is to stop hunting, and certain political tactics, strategies and shifts in approach are employed to try and achieve this, whilst pro-hunters do the same in defending what they regard as their right to hunt.

In Section B I hope to show how this is done, by the use of certain symbolic formations, ideas, and concepts. Central to this is the concept of "hunting", and beginning in Chapter 6 I explore the different uses and definitions of the term that are applicable to the debate. To be more precise, I undertake an analysis of the different terms and definitions of hunting, specifically the way the concept is employed by the various groups in their arguments. A description of the various forms of hunting will be given as well in order to explore what the concept of hunting means, and what the "hunting experience" constitutes. With a view to explore the constitution of the "hunting experience" the indirect route of analysing pre-modern, modern and post-modern narratives about hunting will be followed in Chapter 7. This study will then be brought to a conclusion in Chapter 8 where I hope to clarify the notions of "hunting with integrity" and "arguing for or against hunting with integrity" with reference to the discussion of the meaning and politics of the hunting experience.

Section B:

**THE EMERGENCE OF THE HUNTING
EXPERIENCE**

SECTION B

Introduction

Having covered the arguments and positions of the main opposing groups in the hunting debate in the previous section, Section B is devoted to a critical discussion of the concept of hunting in its various forms that are applicable to trophy hunting in Africa, in line with concepts such as integrity and the hunting experience.

After examining the different conceptual notions of hunting, its historical emergence in Africa, and its use in literature relevant to the debate in Chapter 6, the discussion moves on to a more detailed analysis in Chapter 7 of the symbols that function within the debate, how they function, and to what purpose, with an eye on exploring the ways in which the hunting experience symbolically functions as a psychological and philosophical construct. A brief discussion regarding the political and sociological climate in which the hunting debate takes place will also be undertaken. At the end of the chapter I bring the notion of the hunting experience as an ideological construct into a brief discussion of certain narratives that relate the meaning of the hunting experience, examples of which are contained in Hemingway's characteristically modernist *Green Hills of Africa*, Ortega's postmodern *Meditations on Hunting*, and certain pre-modern San folklore and hunting tales. Arne Naess's principle of "biospherical egalitarianism" will also be discussed in relation to the hunting experience as a psychological phenomenon, and particularly in relation to the cognitive aspect of the experience itself. This will be in aid of analysing the notion of "the hunting experience" as an ideological construct in regard to its historical emergence, and its effect in terms of reinforcing certain views about the meaning of hunting and the expectations of trophy hunters in an African context. If differing meanings of the hunting experience may be seen as evident following this discussion, we will be in a position to say something about the differences themselves and what implications they may hold for the authenticity of certain hunting practices.

This will allow us in Chapter 8 to pay particular attention to the notion of integrity in relation to the hunting experience and how arguments for and against hunting may be analysed in terms of their coherence, consistency, and logical integrity. What it means to hunt with integrity will also be explored, keeping in mind

different conceptions of integrity, namely ecosystemic integrity, an idealised conception of Socratic integrity, and the logical integrity of arguments (i.e. the validity and soundness of logical statements).

CHAPTER 6

THE HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF TROPHY HUNTING AND ITS PLACE IN AFRICA: A CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

1. INTRODUCTION

In Section A, I discussed the various role players in the hunting debate and in conclusion attempted to map the stalemate between the two main groups. In Section B I aim to build on the conclusions reached in the previous section to explore the emergence of the hunting experience and examine the trophy hunting experience as an ideological construct. This entails evaluating various usages of the term "hunting", as well as examining the historical emergence of trophy hunting, particularly in an African context, in order to fulfil King's maxim highlighted in Chapter 1, that: "A fully developed inquiry into the morality of sport hunting must ... address both the act and the context which constitutes the act, and understand the unavoidable relationship which links the two."¹

In Chapter 6 I aim to move on and delve deeper into the concept at the heart of the debate, which is the problematic notion of "hunting". A discussion of this central concept will highlight the complexities involved in trying to define the term, and show that the difficulties involved contribute to the uncertainty surrounding the adoption of a particular fundamental stance for or against hunting.

2. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE EMERGENCE OF HUNTING

The concept and term "hunting" invokes a universally broad spectrum of definitions and connotations. It conjures different images and meanings for different people,² and a large feature of the debate surrounding hunting centres around efforts to define the term itself, or in trying to establish exactly what is meant when one talks about "hunting". For the purposes of this thesis, I concentrate on the activity in an African context, focusing particularly on what is generally referred to as "big game hunting", and more specifically on trophy

¹ King 1991: 62.

² Altherr and Rieger 1995: 39.

hunting of the Big Five animal species (namely rhino, lion, elephant, leopard and buffalo). Doing so allows for the activity to be explored within a contextually sensitive ethical and moral framework, for a number of reasons which I will briefly discuss below. These are namely that:

- i. It narrows the field of inquiry down to a specific type of hunting, and hopefully limits the moral and ethical confusion surrounding an inquiry into hunting in general. By concentrating on trophy hunting, one necessarily focuses on justifications of, and objections to, a particular kind of human act, namely one where humans kill animals not only in the name of sport or recreation, but more importantly for their value as trophies. This type of activity is distinct from other human activities entailing the killing of animals, such as subsistence killing, where there is a clearly defined purpose and motive behind the act, namely human survival, and different moral considerations. This includes the raising of livestock for the purpose of consumption – there is an unambiguous intent in doing so, and the loss of animal life serves a distinct purpose, which is to sustain human life.³ Subsistence hunting in general is similarly conducted with a clear intent and motive, with the main difference being that wild animals are pursued and killed (for survival) instead of domestically raised animals, and most commonly in situations where access to other food resources is restricted. Trophy hunting on the other hand entails the pursuit and killing of animals for reasons other than basic survival. It is also more particular in its pursuit than “plain” sport hunting, in that while recreation still remains a core feature of the activity, the target of the pursuit is defined by the unique physical attributes of the animal. Individual animals in general are objectified in terms of their value as trophies, superseding other values such as inherent value, and ecosystemic value.⁴ It is therefore a particular form, manifestation, or expression of sport or recreational hunting. Trophy hunting in Africa is also practiced by an elite group of people, most of them wealthy, and most of them foreigners, which allows for a more refined discussion of the demographics and motives behind trophy hunting.
- ii. Focusing on trophy hunting in Africa also allows for a discussion of the unique context within which it functions, and from which it emerged. Africa has a long hunting tradition, by both indigenous African peoples as well as the more recent European settlers, and the evolution of trophy hunting in Africa serves to

³ Whether this activity, or the purpose or intent, are morally justifiable or even a necessity is itself a huge topic of debate, and one that I will refrain from entering into in this thesis.

⁴ That is, their value and contribution as an active and important participant within the biotic community.

contrast the environmental values of indigenous African communities with the more recent imported values of western society. Africa is also a developing continent, with a unique political climate that still retains the residue of colonialism and imperialism, which can be seen in the state of its wildlife and the political borders of its countries, and in the fragmentation and disintegration of traditional African cultures and communities, as in southern and South Africa. From the decimation of wildlife through market hunting to the first game proclamations, wildlife issues in Africa carry with them a political baggage that goes hand in hand with current concerns over environmental sustainability, poverty and access rights to wildlife and wildlife areas.

iii. The “Big Five” animals, namely buffalo, elephant, rhino, lion and leopard, have achieved cult status as far as African animals go, and have a reputation for ferocity and fearlessness when being hunted. They are the “poster boys” of Africa and its wildlife and represent everything that the “dark continent” was made out to be by the long succession of adventure writers who travelled through Africa during the last three centuries; therefore, they are amongst the most desired of trophy animals in Africa and the world, so it is applicable that they be the focus of a discussion. A focus on the “Big Five” species entails a discussion of the differing hunting methods employed to kill them, as well the ethical peculiarities of the methods themselves. Whether baiting of leopards and lions is Fair Chase, or whether rhinos should be hunted at all given the immense effort and funding that was expended in halting the rampant poaching of the previous two decades, are some of the questions that are raised. The hunting of the different animal species also entails varying degrees of moral considerations, as far as the claim that hunting is a “natural and honest” act is concerned. Whether it is natural to hunt predators is one concern, another is the emotion surrounding the hunting of what have become icon species for conservation, elephants for example. Extensive research done on the different species has also resulted in a greater knowledge about the complex nature of their social structures, and the impact that hunting can have on reproductive cycles, etc. Another concern is whether the hunting of big game is a pantomime born out of a mythical and romanticised notion of Africa, which, whilst not necessarily true, still persists today.

The reasons above then, are the basis of a contextual inquiry into trophy hunting of the Big Five in Africa. Furthermore, a contextual approach to defining the activity should result in a certain degree of relevance to regional conservation issues. Before we delve into the heart of the debate, though, it would help to first offer a brief discussion of the historical role of hunting in human development and

in Africa, followed by a general introduction to the variety of conceptual notions of hunting.

2. 1. *The Hunting Hypothesis and the Primitivist Defence: Ideological Foundations of Human Origins and Meat Eating*

The emergence of western notions of trophy hunting in Africa is the result of a number of overlapping historical, cultural, political and economic influences that can be traced back to antiquity. Hunting is often spoken of as the oldest sport known to man, and its contribution to human existence is immense, permeating every facet of human life. Over time the value of hunting took on new forms and significance, and evolved from being a mere tool for survival, to fulfilling various cultural, social, political, religious and economic roles. Hunting therefore has varying degrees of values to different communities and cultures, all of which are uniquely steeped in historical significance.

The debate around trophy hunting is also greatly influenced by our perception of what human life was like before the advancement of technology and science enabled us to cope with the daily struggle for survival, namely for food, shelter and safety. Early technological advancements in terms of tools and weapons gave man the freedom and time to pursue other interests apart from the daily labour of procuring food, in that it increased the efficiency by which he was able to do so.⁵ Essentially, what is considered “natural” for man to do is influenced by the accepted theories of what man’s natural state of being is. It has to do with originality and authenticity in regard to man’s authentic state of being.⁶

The state and daily existence of early man was defined by his struggle for basic means of survival, in which hunting played an essential part. If the original state of existence of man was a hunting existence, it derives that his natural authentic state is that of a hunter. This obviously has an effect on the role hunting is perceived to play in present day human existence. This state of being, man’s “natural state of being”, is what is often evoked when those in favour of hunting speak of the natural origins of hunting. This view forms the backbone of what is called the “Primitivist Defence” of hunting. Man, in his natural state, needed to

⁵ Bronowski 1976: 40-45.

⁶ I use the masculine term “man” as opposed to human or “woman” more out of recognition of the historical embeddedness of the term in connection with human progress and the “advancement of civilisation”, as the masculine form is generally associated with the necessary invention of hunting tools and weapons, whilst acknowledging the feminist or ecofeminist perspective in relation to such usage.

hunt to guarantee his survival. If man's natural state of being is that of a hunter, then a part of the essence of being human is a hunting instinct; and, in practicing hunting, humans affirm the authentic nature of what is our essential "human-ness". Hence the pro-hunting claim that hunting is "natural and honest" and "makes hunters feel alive and close to nature".⁷

For a better understanding of the ancient origins of human hunting and the role which hunting has played throughout human history, one therefore needs to consider the debate surrounding the anthropological origins of hunting which has a direct bearing on the primitivist defence. The age-old questions of what makes us human, what differentiates us from the rest of the natural world, what is the essence of humanity, of being human? were questions that were for many academics and historians largely answered by the conclusions of the hypothesis put forward by Raymond Dart and later expanded by Robert Ardrey.

Ardrey poses the abiding question "Why is man man?"⁸ in the opening line of his much-publicized book, *The Hunting Hypothesis*. In it he seeks to explore and answer some of the questions surrounding the anthropological origins of hunting, and he answers his own question with the conclusion that: "Man is man, and not a chimpanzee, because for millions upon millions of evolving years we killed for a living".⁹

In his arguments Ardrey draws heavily from the writings and conclusions of Raymond Dart, a prominent anthropologist in pre- and post-World War II South Africa.¹⁰ In 1925 Dart identified a skull found at Taung in central South Africa as belonging to a new species of anthropoid, naming it *Australopithecus africanus* (the African Southern Ape).¹¹ Based on the fossil and bone remains found in the Taung breccias, Dart concluded that *Australopithecus* depended largely upon hunting for survival. Together with the fact that *Australopithecus* lived on a semi-arid plain in a harsh, barren environment, making it harder to subsist on edible plants, fruits, roots, etc., and were therefore more prone to include animal flesh in their diet for the sake of survival, Dart's line of deductive reasoning led him to construe that the fossil bone fragments found in the Taung deposit were leftovers

⁷ Nel 1995: 31.

⁸ Ardrey 1976: 3.

⁹ Ardrey 1976: 10.

¹⁰ Cartmill 1993: 13.

¹¹ Cartmill 1993: 4.

from *Australopithecus* meals, and that the femurs and jaw bones of animals were used as cutting and butchering tools by *Australopithecus*. Thus *Australopithecus africanus* was predominately a meat eater, who actively sought out and killed his quarry.¹²

Over the next few decades Dart refined and revised his ideas, disdainfully concluding in his 1953 essay "The Predatory Transition from Ape to Man" that the *Australopithecus* man-apes were "confirmed killers: carnivorous creatures, that seized living quarries by violence, battered them to death, tore apart their broken bodies, dismembered them limb from limb, slaking their ravenous thirst with the hot blood of victims and greedily devouring livid writhing flesh".¹³

What made Dart's assertion notable at the time is that he was among the first to scientifically posit the idea that our human ancestors were primarily hunters and meat eaters, and that this chosen method of survival was precisely what enabled man to evolve socially, mentally, intellectually and physically. Dart's discovery and subsequent writings thus marked a shift in anthropological thinking about the role of hunting in human evolution, and stands in stark contrast to the idea that early man was primarily vegetarian who scavenged occasionally to supplement his diet when opportunity arose (the *vegetarian* and *scavenging hypotheses*¹⁴).

Dart's ideas had a trickle down effect, which was not confined solely to anthropology. They found resonance in many areas of social life and influenced, albeit indirectly, western perceptions of human nature.¹⁵ Coming so soon after the horrors of the Second World War, and the development of mass weapons (particularly the atom bomb) his ideas made it easier for people to believe the image of early humans as savage, with an innate capacity and willingness to kill.

His ideas also hinted at possible explanations for the superior capabilities of humans over other animals, which were developed by other writers and anthropologists. Laughlin¹⁶ surmised that the hunting act affected every part of human social development. The hunting of big game required organisation and cooperation on the part of those hunting, namely the male australopithecine, as females would not have been physically capable of hunting large game animals.

¹² Dart and Craig 1959: 195.

¹³ Dart and Craig 1953: 201.

¹⁴ Ardrey 1976: 17-18.

¹⁵ Cartmill 1993: 13-14.

¹⁶ Laughlin 1968: 304-320.

This leads to the sexual division of labour. Furthermore, it was most likely that females had young to care for, as the weaning period would have been lengthy. Hunting efficiency freed females from the added responsibility of caring for young and foraging for food simultaneously, so that this intense mothering allowed offspring to stay dependent on their parents for longer, thereby enabling them to learn more about the skills necessary for survival. This also allowed the brains to grow and develop with the aid of the large amount of protein that the hunting diet provided in the form of meat. Laughlin therefore stated that: "Man's life as a hunter supplied all the other ingredients for achieving civilization: the genetic variability, the inventiveness, the systems of vocal communication, the coordination of social life."¹⁷

This hypothesis led Ardrey to conclude that: "If among all the members of our primate family the human being is unique, even in our noblest aspirations, it is because we alone through untold millions of years were continuously dependent on killing to survive".¹⁸ This identification with the notion of man as a natural hunter, who owes his capabilities and instincts, and very existence, to the fact that he hunted, forms a corner stone of pro-hunting views, and in particular the primitivist defence of hunting as a natural activity that "returns man to nature". This "returning to nature" is twofold: it is both a returning to the authentic "nature" of man, as well as a returning to "nature" in the sense that it entails renewing man's communion with the environment.

This particular defence that owes the unique behavioural and physical capabilities of humans to hunting is, however, no longer as valid as it once may have been. This follows newer discoveries and anthropological evidence to the contrary, which have shown the hunting hypothesis to be a fallible anthropological theory that is largely disregarded.¹⁹

The discoveries that led to this appraisal of the hunting hypothesis centred around evidence that organised and deliberate hunting of a single species did not occur in southern Africa until about 100 000 years ago,²⁰ and that the unique capabilities that make us human beings were already in place by the time the earliest systematic and structured hunting took place.²¹ The evidence does not

¹⁷ Laughlin: 1968: 320.

¹⁸ 1976: 11.

¹⁹ Cartmill 1993: 16-20; Horsthemke 1993: 73.

²⁰ Potts 1991: 52.

²¹ Horsthemke 1993: 73; Potts 1991: 52.

infer that hunting did *not* take place, in the form of random chance killing or scavenging, but rather that behavioural and anatomical specialisation in humans did not come about *through* hunting.

Furthermore, *Australopithecus*, upon which the hunting hypothesis was based, was shown to be the prey object of predators, in the same way that baboons, which are known to scavenge from animal carcasses, are the prey of leopards. There is no evidence that shows *Australopithecus* ever made tools or weapons, which would have been a requirement for evidence of structured hunting.²² Based on these discoveries, it is commonly accepted that meat was not a significant part of the australopithecine diet, least of all compared to the amount consumed by modern day hunter-gatherers,²³ and that there is no evidence at all that the early hominids hunted.²⁴ This evidence served to discredit the role of hunting in evolutionary behaviour, and the hunting hypothesis theory in general.

The Hunting Hypothesis itself has therefore been described as “a mixture of biological facts and evolutionary concepts entangled in the constricting threads of Western myth”.²⁵ One could therefore argue that this corner stone of pro-hunting views, upon which many assumptions and arguments are based, could in actual fact be a rather dubious foundation. As Potts says: “... the view that distinctive features of human life are biologically inevitable by virtue of millions of years of selection will have to be abandoned”.²⁶

The lingering effect of the emergence of the hunting hypothesis, is that many still hold facets of the hunting hypothesis to be true, even though it may no longer be so, largely because it has infiltrated western perceptions to such an extent that it is hard to expel. As a result many assumptions about human existence are based upon this theory, not least regarding the role which hunting should continue to play in modern life. It also serves to highlight the ideological foundations of pro-hunting arguments, and explains the basis for the conflicting worldviews between pro-hunters and animal rights groups, as animal rightists in general rely more on the scavenging hypothesis or vegetarian hypothesis as basis for their arguments and perception of man's evolutionary nature. Far from being an inevitable

²² Cartmill 1993: 16.

²³ Cartmill 1993: 17; Potts 1991: 53.

²⁴ Cartmill 1993: 17.

²⁵ Perper and Schrire 1977: 447-459.

²⁶ Potts 1991: 55.

evolutionary instinct, hunting is regarded by anti-hunters as being sustained and encouraged by a system of cultural norms and traditions.

Pro-hunting arguments from evolutionary perspectives would also seem to be incompatible with religious and ontological arguments such as the biblical based stewardship argument, as fundamentalist Christian doctrine especially, is incompatible with evolutionary based theory.²⁷ Furthermore, evolutionary-based arguments in favour of hunting do not necessarily explain the need for ethical restraints in regard to hunting – as opposed to the stewardship view, which holds that man has a moral duty and obligation, required of God, to care for the earth and its living creatures – as the need to survive would cancel out any ethical considerations toward animals' rights to life, if killing animals would ensure early man's continued existence. At the same time, anti-hunting arguments that insist the killing of other animals for consumption is wrong do seem to reinforce an unrealistic view towards ecosystems and the life-cycle processes that are inevitable in nature, by enforcing the anthropomorphic distinction itself between the "natural" and the "unnatural".

2. 2. *The Historical Emergence of Trophy Hunting in Africa*

In this thesis, it would be impossible to provide a thorough and detailed overview of the historical emergence of hunting and at the same time offer an honest appraisal of all of its political, cultural, economic, social and religious roles. Such an analysis would be beyond the scope of this study, and would be more at home in a discipline devoted to History. However, in addressing what is essentially a debate between two opposing ideologies regarding human attitudes towards the natural environment, namely conservationism and preservationism, it is necessary to have an awareness of the emergence of these two world views within the African context. This is particularly so in relation to hunting, as hunting is inextricably linked with the two approaches in Africa on all conceivable levels.

Hunting was an integral part of life for early European settlers. In the early days of exploration in Africa by white settlers there were seemingly unlimited numbers

²⁷ Arguments similar to those of Causey (1989: 327-343) or Eaton (2002; 2003), for example. That human evolution is incompatible, for many people, with a Biblical theory of Creation is generally accepted. Also, explaining the urge to hunt as an inherent human instinct, and thereby excusing the killing that follows as natural, borders on a type of hedonism that is generally rejected, although understood, by Christian theology. In other words, it confirms and excuses the "fallen nature" of humanity that Christianity seeks to rectify through an emphasis on "living according to the Spirit". Therefore, the phrase "the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak" seems an apt description for the moral turmoil hunters may find themselves in when faced with this apparently unavoidable conflict between "instinct" and "spirit".

of game animals. Lions, elephants, rhinoceros and hippo were amongst the multitude to be seen around the Cape, not to mention the vast herds of antelope and zebra.²⁸ Simon van der Stel also gives an account of an encounter with a rhinoceros near present day Piketberg in the transcript of his diary,²⁹ and he details some of the first recorded hunting within the interior of southern Africa. Arguably, his diary is the first of a long line of hunting documents that chronicle the steady decline of wildlife in Africa. Most of the early literature describes the sense of awe that confronted the first settlers when they first encountered the seemingly endless amount of game.³⁰ This no doubt served to convince them that no matter how much they hunted the game would always replenish itself. So from the time Europeans first settled at the Cape until 1822, when a closed season was introduced (which could not in any case be enforced along the borders of the colony),³¹ hunting continued all year round. This was largely because the settler economy was based upon hunting, and it supplied the meat, skins and raw materials necessary to barter and exchange not only at markets in the cities but also with indigenous Africans. Game was vital to the subsistence of the settlers on the outer areas of the colonies, and it also drew them further north and inwards, because as the game grew scarcer, people ventured after them.³² Hunting therefore not only sustained the settler expansion, but also drove it.

Initially, then, hunting was a root cause of the drastically declining numbers of game in Africa that necessitated the formation of parks and reserves, as the vast herds of game had been scattered and decimated to the extent that almost nothing remained, all in the relatively short space of 200 odd years. Large scale hunting in southern Africa had also directly led to the extinction of two species, the quagga and the bloubok.³³ In both cases, no one had even realised that they were in danger by the time they were wiped out, and it is doubtful it would have made much difference to their fate as government game laws and hunting prohibitions did nothing to stop the wanton slaughter that characterised much of the hunting at the time.³⁴ In other cases, hunting was the tool and mechanism by

²⁸ Pringle 1982: 18.

²⁹ *Simon van der Stel's Journey to Namaqualand in 1685* (Van der Stel 1979: 301-302).

³⁰ Cattrick describes the early accounts of mass springbok migrations, called "trekbokke", that numbered as much as 100 000 000 (100 million) animals, and stretched over "a space of country 138 miles by 13 miles" (1959: 26).

³¹ Cattrick 1959: 38.

³² Cattrick 1959: 39. Cattrick describes the extensive and wasteful slaughter of the vast herds of game in southern Africa, and gives accounts of bones and skulls "littering the horizon", thereby marking the gradual expansion of settlers and the corresponding decrease in game.

³³ Pringle 1982: 15, 30.

³⁴ Pringle 1982: 29.

which control was exerted over the landscape, particularly in the earlier settlement era in East Africa.³⁵ Hunting was conducted out of necessity and self-interest, increasingly so as the landscape became more agricultural, and competition between livestock and wildlife increased. The situation at the time was that the “ethics of conservation were a luxury reserved for a later generation”.³⁶ Later, particularly after most of the parks and reserves had been formed, this control was exercised within the park borders to maintain manageable numbers of game, control problem animals, and bring in revenue for the maintenance of the parks. The formation of the parks were intended initially for the protection of “game” species, hence the term *game* laws/proclamations, and *game* reserves, and were brought about by a concern on the part of hunters that soon they would have nothing to shoot if efforts to preserve game animals were not initiated.³⁷

Hunting was therefore a catalyst that led to the need to preserve certain habitats and animals for future generations (although in many cases, “future generations” implied “hunters”). Hunting had caused the destruction of game, but it was also the desire to continue hunting that led to the earliest preservation efforts. This attitude of preservation, characteristic of the early colonial era, eventually led to a shift in approach when merely preserving animals in their pristine environments at the expense of human concerns became problematic. This was because rogue animals that threatened neighbouring farmers and their crops had to be controlled, certain predator species classified as vermin needed to be “eradicated”, and poaching had to be monitored. This preservationist approach gradually made way for what is today called conservationist approaches, as human concerns played an increasing role in the management of reserves. Governments gradually began to realise that people would be willing to pay for the opportunity to visit parks and reserves for the opportunity to shoot big game,³⁸ which was previously available only to missionaries and explorers brave enough and, eventually, to the very wealthy.³⁹

The emergence of conservation as opposed to preservation is therefore closely tied to the emergence of early tourism, and the “Safari” hunting industry. Fuelled

³⁵ Steinhart 1989: 252.

³⁶ Pringle 1982: 26.

³⁷ Pringle 1982: 63.

³⁸ Baldus 2001: 75.

³⁹ Steinhart 1989: 253.

by romantic images of fearless hunters and explorers conquering a dark continent, Europeans began to show an interest in Africa. The books and hunting tales by famous explorers and missionaries such as Livingstone, Burton, Speke and Stanley, and early hunters like Selous⁴⁰ and Cumming,⁴¹ had a significant, if not integral, part to play in stimulating the awareness of Westerners to the wonders of Africa. The modern day hunting “safari” echoes the exploits of Theodore Roosevelt, who in turn sought to experience something akin to what the early explorers may have experienced. Nearly everyone who had an adventure in Africa returned to Europe or America and wrote about it, not necessarily truthfully, thus stimulating and reinforcing certain conceptions of Africa, many of which persist today. Hemingway and Ruark are some of the last authors of books in a long line of adventure writing set in Africa. Ruark was inspired by Hemingway’s stories,⁴² who was in turn inspired by Roosevelt, and so on,⁴³ until one comes to the greatest explorer, Livingstone. This legacy of writers, hunters and explorers also had a direct bearing on the founding of SCI. The emergence of Safari Club International can be traced back to this legacy, and especially to the figures of Selous and Roosevelt. C.J. McElroy, its founder, was undoubtedly influenced by these two men in his formative years, as many others must have been:

Their [i.e. Selous and Roosevelt] expedition records were fresh and new, popular current subjects, perhaps comparable to the astronaut memoirs and space exploration movies of today. And McElroy’s response to growing up in that context was this: He created Safari Club International – the greatest sportsmen’s organisation the world has known, and the continuing expression of the legacy of important hunters of yesteryear.⁴⁴

Naturally, the evolution of conservationism and the emergence of sport or safari hunting took place without much regard for indigenous African rights as far as hunting is concerned.⁴⁵ In terms of the colonial worldview, sport hunting was the consummate expression of a civilised culture, whilst traditional African hunting methods were regarded as being barbaric, unsophisticated and crude, and thus a confirmation of the “savage” and “uncivilised” nature of the indigenous cultures

⁴⁰ Selous 1970.

⁴¹ Cumming 1909.

⁴² Bittner 2002: 129.

⁴³ Roosevelt was a great admirer of Selous, who was in turn inspired by the written accounts of Gordon Cumming’s exploits (Selous 1970: 1).

⁴⁴ Antrobus 1996: 62.

⁴⁵ Mackenzie 1988: 300.

that western society was to redeem by spreading the gospel of (western) civilisation. The impetus for this was the development of technology in terms of hunting ability. New firearms and improved weapons enabled Europeans to kill more efficiently, and as such the “clean kill” became the standard by which “sporting” hunting practices were judged. The trapping, snaring, spearing, poisoning, and other forms of hunting practiced by Africans, such as bows and arrows (and also older technology in the form of flintlocks) were considered “unsporting” in that they did not conform to the standard of providing a quick, clean kill.⁴⁶ Land and animals, which had been hunted by tribes for generations, thus became off limits to them upon the creation of the game reserves,⁴⁷ as acts of hunting suddenly became crimes of poaching according to colonial laws and regulations, and hunting access to certain animals was restricted or denied completely on the basis that only “sporting” hunting methods could be employed or justified. Land rights were consolidated into the hands of a few, whereas land and wildlife had previously been held communally,⁴⁸ with the result that an issue of ownership thus arose, both over land and access rights to wildlife, between the colonial powers that made the reserves off limits and the indigenous communities that had been subsisting off the land and wildlife for centuries before.⁴⁹ Hunting was an activity vital to the survival of indigenous African communities and hunter-gatherer societies, and it was just as vital to the economy of the early settlers. However, once the numbers of game dwindled and there was no abundance of wildlife left to hunt both for indigenous Africans and settlers, restrictions were imposed on hunting. Following the formation of the parks, the only people allowed to hunt in them were the gamekeepers and those wealthy enough to afford licenses, and over a period of a few decades hunting went from being an “economic necessity to ethical luxury”.⁵⁰

In general then, western hunting practices in Africa find their origin in the dominant western cultural values and worldviews that characterised the colonial era. It is within this context of explorers, colonial settler expansionism, declining game numbers, formation of parks and reserves, introduction of colonial game keeping regulations, denial of access and traditional hunting rights to indigenous

⁴⁶ Mackenzie 1988: 300-301.

⁴⁷ Lee and Hitchcock 2001: 262.

⁴⁸ Lee and Hitchcock 2001: 259-260.

⁴⁹ The issue of ownership, both in terms of wildlife and land, remains a continued source of conflict in environmental issues throughout Africa.

⁵⁰ Mackenzie 1988: 161-164.

Africans, and the increasing Western curiosity about Africa, that modern day trophy hunting emerged.⁵¹

Trophy hunting as practiced in southern Africa today therefore cannot be disassociated from its colonial origins and the expansionist policies of European settlers in the 17th, 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly in countries such as present day South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Tanzania and Kenya.

The values that informed the colonial era and which provided the impetus for colonial expansionism could be regarded as those that formed part of the technocratic worldview, namely the Enlightenment and Christian values.⁵² Industrialisation was taking place in Europe, the French Revolution had passed, and a greater awareness was taking hold as regards to human rights following the abolition of slavery in England in the early 1800s. These values, however, did generally not yet include other values of wildlife, beyond its instrumental one, in respect to an approach that protected game in Africa from exploitation.

The dualistic and hierarchical thinking that characterised this technocratic approach to the world saw nature as apart from man, and self-realisation was seen to come about through rational control and progress, whilst the natural environment was seen as having an abundance of resources that could be exploited in the aims of progress and civilisation. Notions of animal rights or intrinsic value were therefore not yet strongly entrenched in this worldview,⁵³ as the reappraisal of western attitudes towards nature had not yet taken place; firstly, because there was no real need to do so. The seemingly inexhaustible abundance of game, wildlife and unexplored areas that characterised the early years of exploration did not yet seem to necessitate an appraisal of the possibility that natural resources were in fact not infinite and inexhaustible, and that the natural environment might not exist solely for the instrumental benefit of humans.

And secondly, because there was no cultural impetus or base to provide a framework within which such a reappraisal might take place. Darwinism was

⁵¹ Mackenzie 1988: 201.

⁵² The ideas expounded by thinkers such as Descartes, Newton, Hobbes and Locke for example, fuelled the zeal with which Europeans set out to conquer and civilize the rest of the world, while Protestant Christian beliefs provided the moral mandate for the conquest of nature (White 1994: 50), which was namely to: "Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground". (Genesis 1: 28).

⁵³ Although, as illustrated by Salt's book *Animals' Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress*, first published in 1892, questions surrounding the rights of animals were increasingly being asked and these questions gradually began to take a foothold within mainstream society. In direct relation to game protection, however, notions of rights or intrinsic value were not as strongly evident.

playing a major role in the desire for the scientific categorisation of African animals, as Darwin's ideas were pervasive in the new fields of biology, ecology and science that were being opened through the colonial exposure of European culture to an array of new African species,⁵⁴ and confirmed for many that the faith invested in the progressive mindset was grounded in a solid scientific footing,⁵⁵ which eased the accepted inherent duality of man vs. nature. This prompted the societal appetite for the display of animals (in museums, zoos, and as trophies) that promoted, and legitimised, their capture and killing for such purposes as science, public curiosity, and clues as to the evolutionary nature of humans. On the one hand, trophies were used in aid of this need for scientific categorisation, and on the other hand, they were a sign of triumph of the evolutionary superior technocratic (western) mind over the chaos of nature, whereby individuals, possessing the virtuous traits of western ideals of sportsmanship, were able to prove their bravery, fortitude, etc. This is most evident in the trip undertaken by Theodore Roosevelt in 1909, when he shot enormous numbers of game for museums and for himself, and in the emphasis on the "bags" of game shot by hunters such as Selous, Cumming and others.⁵⁶ Sensitivities towards animal suffering were also often excused, or "overlaid" by Darwinian concepts, whereby evolutionary ideas were incorporated into the "sportsmen's code" allowing for transgression of the "sporting" standard in respect to different species.⁵⁷

It was largely due to the hard lessons learnt through the realisation that the rapid and drastic decreases in wildlife in Africa and other parts of the world were the result of a certain human attitude towards nature, that opened the door for a reappraisal of the human relationship with the natural environment, and for a consideration of the limits that should be placed on the "superior" human abilities to alter the environment to suit human interests.

As a result of this process then, public attitudes towards hunting changed, because in conjunction with a technocratic attitude towards nature, it was historically seen to have a devastating effect on wildlife and the natural environment. It has therefore been asserted that: "many more citizens are

⁵⁴ Thompson 1990: 129.

⁵⁵ Cartmill 1993: 130.

⁵⁶ Cf. Selous 1970: 444-448.

⁵⁷ Mackenzie 1988: 301. For example, primates were not generally hunted because of their close anthropological resemblance to humans, whilst crocodiles were considered to represent an earlier stage of evolution and therefore their slaughter was permissible. Also, more highly evolved animals received greater consideration when hunting: lions and leopards were anthropomorphised as being "wary" and thus more difficult to hunt, whilst rhino were described as "witless", thereby excusing their extermination to an extent.

antihunter than are antihunting".⁵⁸ This might be because anti-hunting arguments often question the motives and intentions of present day hunters against this backdrop, as the concept of trophy hunting in their minds arguably cannot escape the inevitable association with concepts such as domination, exploitation, western imperialism, economic rationality, and the myriad of other pejorative connotations that may be projected onto hunting, due to the historical lessons learnt from the ecological consequences of a technocratic worldview towards the environment. Pro-hunters necessarily then find the need within the debate to engage with the hunting concept in order to re-contextualise its meaning and relevance against a weight of pejorative interpretations.

3. THE CONCEPTION OF HUNTING

To be more specific, the concepts of "hunting", and what it means "to hunt", seem to be continually re-contextualised in order to be meaningful in the highly politicised and dynamic nature of the debate at present. Hunting advocates find themselves continually defining and redefining what hunting is about and what it means in their justifications and defence of hunting as an activity of moral worth, or as an activity that at least does not deserve moral condemnation. This is because anti-hunting groups are vehemently and increasingly questioning the previous acceptance of hunting as a traditional right, as a way of life, and as an activity that is morally worthy. Therefore definitions and explanations of hunting, which may have sufficed in the past, are no longer seen as relevant or justifiable in the present political debate. Pro-hunters, therefore, require of themselves to find a means to justify and explain hunting to non-hunters in terms that are relevant and appropriate within this politicised nature of the debate, in order for the activity of hunting to continue. Hence the continual re-contextualisation of "hunting" as a concept in order to lend it meaning and relevance. This re-contextualisation, or "re-constitution", finds its ideal in the form of "ethical" hunting promoted by groups such as SCI, where its conservation value is touted as being relevant and vital to global environmental priorities. Hunters therefore seek to re-constitute the meaning of hunting, whilst anti-hunters simultaneously resist this attempt at re-constitution.

⁵⁸ Nelson 1996: 8-9.

In the next section, other forms of hunting are contrasted against the backdrop of ethical hunting, and an at times critical discussion of the concept in general is attempted, as the central theme in the hunting debate revolves around the question: what does it mean to hunt?

3. 1. *Defining What Hunting "is not"*

First of all, what is hunting "not"? This is a question that needs careful analysis because of the various layers that need to be unpacked and the various criteria that need to be clarified in order to evaluate what does not constitute an act of hunting. Hunting "is not" the indiscriminate shooting or mere killing of animals with a rifle or bow. For an act to be considered "hunting", it needs to entail certain ethical constraints on the part of those doing the killing. This is largely because the manner in which an animal is killed, and the method used to do so, determines the application of the term "hunting". Also, for an act to be defined as "hunting" there needs to be more, in terms of the intention, desires and motives on the part of those doing the killing, than a mere desire to kill.⁵⁹ So, we find that the motives, intentions and desires of the hunter defines his actions; that is, the methods (equipment, tools, technology etc.) he employs to kill an animal and the manner (whether through stalking, ambushing etc.) in which he does so is defined by his desires and intentions. This also serves to distinguish hunting from other forms of killing, for example culling.

Culling entails the killing of animals with a specific purpose in mind. Although the methods used to cull may in some cases be similar to the methods employed in hunting, for example shooting with a rifle, the main priority in culling is that the animal be killed quickly and with the minimal amount of pain, suffering and distress.⁶⁰ The efficiency of the kill takes priority over any other considerations, and the ability of the animal to escape is minimised, as this is precisely the objective of a cull; that the animals destined to be culled not be allowed to escape, as doing so defeats the objective, which is the death of the animal(s). Animals are generally culled as part of wildlife management strategies in order to

⁵⁹ We can take a further step and ask what forms and constitutes a person's desires? If desire is a yearning to satisfy a need, what need(s) does the hunter, consciously or subconsciously, seek to satisfy? Are these needs vital or trivial needs?

⁶⁰ Management decisions to cull an individual animal, particularly those deemed "problem animals", may allow for the enlistment of a paying trophy hunter to shoot the animal. This brings in revenue for the reserve or landowner, while the cull takes place under strict guidelines and observation. For all intents and purposes the animal is culled, yet for the individual trophy hunter who does the killing, it is a hunt. In America, hunters often refer to the need to cull game populations as a defensible reason to conduct hunting, as the revenue gained from hunting contributes to habitat preservation and conservation while keeping game numbers at sustainable levels.

reduce animal numbers when they threaten to exceed their carrying capacity, thereby maintaining a certain balance in an ecosystem, because the ecosystem in general is confined, and enclosed by fences, thereby necessitating human intervention. It is therefore a response to managing confined areas created largely by human pressures, and is “unnatural” in the sense that the “unnatural” existence of confined ecosystems requires it. Animals may also be culled when they are sick, diseased, or pose a threat to other animals or humans. The intention to cull is therefore motivated by external factors, such as holistic concerns about maintaining balanced ecosystems, or the need to maintain disease free populations of animals. It is also inevitably influenced by human preferences, and decisions to cull are thus normally taken at a management level, informed by scientific evidence, and reached collectively by those responsible for the management of a wildlife area.

The decision to hunt, however, is individualistic and internally motivated. The motives and intentions of the individual hunters may vary and differ from one another in degree, and may be influenced by a variety of sources. The objectives and purpose of hunting may therefore differ with respect to individual hunters, as people hunt for a variety of personal reasons. Many do not hunt for the pleasure of killing itself, and very few would arguably admit that they do. In contrast, the killing event, it is argued, while central to, and the culmination of the hunt, is not the purpose of the hunt. In Ortega y Gasset’s well-circulated words: “One does not hunt in order to kill; on the contrary, one kills in order to have hunted.”⁶¹ Yet killing is what lends the act its authenticity, argues Ortega y Gasset.

So there is much more that needs to be taken into account for an act to be considered hunting, as we can see that merely killing an animal with a rifle *is not* hunting. The intentions of a hunter therefore define to an extent whether or not he is merely shooting, culling, killing, or hunting. If it may be taken as given that the intentions of individuals define whether the shooting of an animal is hunting, or whether it is culling, it begs the question as to why the role of intentions, motives, and desires are also not qualified or equally emphasised within the debate by pro-hunters to the extent that the anti-hunting groups do?

This is particularly in reference to the conservation efforts proclaimed by hunters, as they can demonstrably be seen to contribute substantially and constructively in various ways and forms to conservation in general. Whilst the

⁶¹ Ortega y Gasset 1972: 110-111.

anthropocentrically based motives and intentions of hunters are fairly clear in defences of the hunting act itself, and acknowledged by hunters themselves, defences of their conservation initiatives seem to be circular, in that they refer to the need (based on a moral imperative) to hunt in order to conserve, but the desire to conserve stems from the desire to continue hunting. The difference between “need” and “desire” here is obvious, but they seem to be misconstrued at times within the debate. The difference here is between imperatives: hunting is regarded as a need in terms of conservation, but conservation initiatives of hunters according to this may be termed “the desire to hunt expressed”. This is also the criticism put forward in various forms by anti-hunting groups (particularly HSUS), although not necessarily in this formulation.

This is one re-appraisal which conservation-minded hunters still need to address, namely the explicit connection between their reasons for conservation and their desire to hunt, and the question is, in terms of consistency, would the benefits accruing to conservation still be forthcoming from hunters to the extent that it does today, if the perceived benefits to hunters themselves through hunting opportunities ceased to exist? If the answer is no, then conservation initiatives cannot be equated with a moral justification of hunting, as it is not consistent with their stated goals and intentions. If the answer is yes, then it may be a confirmation of consistency in regard to the ethical hunters’ stated aims, goals and attitude towards wildlife. In other words, there seems to be a lack of clarity over whether, for hunters, the right to hunt is itself a priority over wildlife, in the sense that they are hunters first, and conservationists second; or “right to hunt first, conservation second” as opposed to “conservation first, right to hunt second” hunters. This holds certain implications for hunting as being regarded as a moral imperative, as the hunter who is a “conservation first, right to hunt second” hunter might be morally obliged to hunt only if hunting *is* a necessity for the conservation of species. Put simply, if a person’s motivations, intentions and desires indicate whether they are a “true” hunter or mere shooter, etc., could the same analysis be applied to whether a person could be regarded as a “true” conservationist or not?⁶²

Fulfilling certain ethical constraints, though, may be regarded as one criterion that is to be fulfilled for an act to be considered as hunting. Practically, this finds expression in the various codes of conduct which hunting organisations outline,

⁶² This obviously necessitates an exploration of environmental attitudes with the eye on concepts such as “truth” or “purity” for example, and needs to be highly contextual to avoid unnecessary generalisation.

and also in the Principle of Fair Chase.⁶³ The mere killing of animals, constituted in an act that does not entail some sort of ethical restraint, *is not* hunting.

On the other hand those opposed to hunting based on concern for animal rights issues in general are more concerned with the fact that all forms of hunting involve killing and the taking of the life of a living being. For anti-hunters, there is no such thing as “ethical hunting”: all hunting by definition involves killing and is therefore unethical and immoral. Speaking on behalf of the Fund for Animals, Andrea Lococo states that: “... most hunters I meet profess to be ethical hunters. It matters little to the animals that it's killed by a poacher or by an ethical hunter. To us, the lives of individual animals are of the utmost importance”.⁶⁴ Regardless of the form it takes, hunting, as a term and concept, carries with it the assumption and understanding that it is an activity devoted to the pursuit and killing of animals, as “... the one element which stands out as truly essential to the authentic hunting experience is the kill”.⁶⁵ Therefore, as long as the killing element remains the fundamental component of hunting, hunting remains for animal rights activists (especially) morally unjustifiable no matter what definition or form it takes, or what causal justifications for the activity are given. South African animal rights groups also consistently echo these anti-hunting sentiments. Steve Smith, speaking on behalf of the Front for Animal Liberation and Conservation of Nature (FALCON), states that: “No matter what excuse the pro-hunting lobby puts forward, hunting remains the premeditated, cold-blooded killing of innocent animals by humans using a variety of weapons and even other animals.”⁶⁶

As mentioned before, anti-hunting activists thus often disregard descriptions of “ethical hunting” in conjunction with conservation objectives as merely “intellectual blather”.⁶⁷

There is an inescapable semantic connotation, and conceptual core, that is inherent in all efforts to define the activity of hunting. It is namely: an activity that involves a chase or stalk of a wild quarry, with the intention to procure the quarry through lethal means. Hunting can therefore be broadly defined as an intentional activity by an agent (human/predator) that is geared towards the procurement of

⁶³ Cf. Chapter 2.

⁶⁴ As quoted in Western, 1999.

⁶⁵ Causey 1989: 332.

⁶⁶ Nel 1995: 31.

⁶⁷ Namely activists such as Joy Williams (1990: 112-128).

a certain wild animal/quarry through lethal means. It is an activity and process, ongoing in the present. To hunt is to seek, pursue, in order to claim and possess, and “to lay ones hands” on the hunted.

However, the cultural, historical and traditional notions of the activity, whilst interlinked, differ extensively, as there are various differing forms and categories of activities that can be defined as the “procurement of an animal through lethal means” following a chase or stalk. Most of the differences in forms and categories of hunting revolve around the difference in the *means* employed to achieve procurement of the quarry, where procurement is defined as “taking possession of”.

For example, pursuing foxes with the assistance of hounds and horses would be termed “hunting” by a majority of people in rural England. On the snow-covered steppes of Eurasia, most local inhabitants would generally classify “hunting” as an activity that employs the services of an eagle or hawk to catch foxes, rabbits or fowls.⁶⁸ There are forms of hunting, however, that do not entail a chase or a stalk, but rather an ambush. For example, the American tradition (in certain areas) of shooting turkey or deer from a tree stand under camouflage, where animals are shot after being enticed to come to a particular area by calling, whistling or baiting. Even though there is no “chase”,⁶⁹ this type of shooting is still considered as hunting, and furthermore, also considered by hunters to be “fair”.

Historically, hunting was the pursuit of a very specific class and echelon of society throughout the middle ages and in more modern times, namely the dominant classes of royalty, nobleman and gentry. In Europe especially, the values and needs that informed the upper classes did not as a rule represent those of the “lower classes”, with the result that methods regarding hunting were refined in accordance with the peculiar cultural characteristic of the dominant social class. Historically speaking, the *cultural significance* of hunting as an activity therefore had a greater bearing on its definition as a universal concept than the *means employed* in the activity, particularly as hunting was hunting whether or not it was conducted by a king with a retinue of beaters and hounds, or a nobleman who practiced falconry. What is discernible was that the concept

⁶⁸ Space constraints do not permit me to do justice to an exploration of the important role other types of hunting played within medieval societies, such as fox and stag hunting, the royal hunts of kings, Asian hunting traditions, etc., as a discussion of trophy hunting in Africa itself entails a fair amount of work. There are several important works that do cover the subject though, such as Cartmill's *A View to a Death in the Morning*, and Martin's *The Case Against Hunting*, which deals exclusively with the history and tradition of fox hunting in Britain.

⁶⁹ Cf. Chapter 2, “Fair Chase Principle”.

of hunting referred to an activity that was practiced by a particular social class, and the significance of hunting lay in its symbolic representation of the values, norms, and beliefs regarding the world held by this particular section of society. This trend continues, as the concept of hunting today carries with it various symbolic interpretations and meanings that cannot be separated from sociological theories about culture in general.

Today, one may talk of job-hunting, or "hunting for keys", the meanings of which have no reference to the end result of human/animal interactions (i.e. the death of an animal), but rather to a method of seeking. To hunt for something that is not there yet, is not the same as seeing it and destroying or capturing it. It is rather the *process* that leads to the seeing, capturing or destroying. Similarly, the definition of hunting today in relation to human/animal interactions does not rest upon the mere killing upon seeing or finding of an animal. As Cartmill states: "The symbolic meaning that hunting has for us has a lot to do with our definitions of the term, which is curiously a restricted one. Hunting is not just about going out and killing any old animal; in fact very little animal-killing qualifies as hunting. A successful hunt ends in the killing of an animal, but it must be a special sort of animal that is killed in a specific way for a particular reason."⁷⁰

This brings us closer to an idea of what hunting "is not" or "cannot be", as opposed to what hunting "is", and will be developed further in the following section.

3. 2. *Defining What Hunting "is": Various Forms and Categorical Types*

What follows then is an attempt to define the main categorical forms that the activity of hunting assumes, in order to identify the areas where certain cultural, historical and traditional notions overlap and are interlinked, which should provide an idea of what hunting "is".

King states that: "To hunt is to perform an act, localized in time and space. Yet hunting is at the same time a social practice embedded in a broader social and political context which constitutes its meaning, its implications for nature, and the modes of belief which surround it".⁷¹ Therefore, when speaking of hunting it is

⁷⁰ 1993: 29.

⁷¹ 1991: 62

important that the activity is placed in its particular context, as the different forms and variations of hunting raise distinctive ethical and moral considerations.

I identify three categorical types of hunting, namely *sport* hunting, *subsistence* hunting and *trophy* hunting. As mentioned before, the differences between them are to be found in the intention and motive (desire) of the individual hunters, and in the semantic nuances of the word “sport”.

There are within these categories themselves differences in the manner in which the concept is applied. Sport and trophy hunting are often terms that are intermingled, as they are both characteristically recreational in purpose⁷² (i.e. sport = recreation). Many trophy hunters prefer to refer to themselves as sport hunters, whereas many people make a distinction between sport hunters (i.e. those who hunt mainly for the enjoyment of the experience itself, or for the meat, also often called biltong hunters) and trophy hunters, who are seen as hunting purely for the trophy. The definitions therefore, as stated, rely heavily on the motives and intentions of the individual hunters as well.

A further distinction can be made that is applicable to the three categories I identify above and which may serve to clarify them further. In 1978, Dr. Stephen Kellert undertook an important study to determine the attitudes of American hunters and which is still regarded as being applicable today.⁷³ He identified three categories of hunters; namely, 1) *utilitarian/meat eaters* (making up 43.8 percent of the sample); 2) *nature hunters* (17.8%); and 3) *dominionistic/sport hunters* (17.7%).

Utilitarian/meat eaters were those hunters who were primarily interested in hunting to obtain meat; they regarded animals from a perspective of their practical usefulness, and regarded hunting as an activity likened to harvesting a resource, as in wheat cropping for example.⁷⁴ They generally grew up in rural areas and were familiar with animals and a farming lifestyle. Most were above 65 years of age, and in the low-income bracket.

Nature hunters were mainly from a younger age group, well educated and financially well-off, generally more knowledgeable about animals and the

⁷² Curnutt 1996: 66.

⁷³ Kerasote 1996: 285. It is also applicable to the African hunting context, as mentioned before, due to the large proportion of foreign hunters that come from America.

⁷⁴ Kellert 1978: 413-414.

environment than dominionistic/sport hunters, and were more familiar with outdoor activities such as camping and birdwatching. They had as a primary reason for hunting to experience close contact with nature as an active participant, and indicated a strong concern and generalised affection for all animals.⁷⁵

Dominionistic/sport hunters revealed their main interest in hunting to lie in the competition and mastery over animals, which they did not reveal a strong affection for. They were most likely to live in cities, be unfamiliar with raising animals, and generally had a low knowledge about animals. The hunted animal was “valued largely for the opportunities it provided to engage in a sporting activity involving mastery, competition, shooting skill and expressions of prowess. ... They were not items of food but trophies, something to get and display to fellow hunters. For the dominionistic/sport hunter, hunting was appreciated more as a human social than as an animal-oriented activity.”⁷⁶

It therefore seems that when anti-hunters think of hunters they more than likely have the dominionistic/sport hunters in mind,⁷⁷ whereas pro-hunting groups in general try to defend the attitude towards hunting that nature hunters profess to have, as can be seen in the similarities between the “nature hunter” and the idea of the “ethical hunter” that SCI promotes. For the purpose of this thesis I assume that they are similar enough to warrant being included under the same banner as “ethical hunting”. The value of Kellert’s study lies in distinguishing the different attitudes amongst hunters towards the activity, and shows that the smaller percentage of hunters in his sample conformed to the ethical type of hunting being defended, although since his study was undertaken, it is more than likely that the percentage of nature hunters has increased in the meantime, due to hunter education programmes, and pressure from the public and anti-hunting groups.

Kellert’s distinction also serves to highlight the semantic nuances of the use of the word “sport” when referring to hunting, as many would regard sport hunters as being nature hunters/ethical hunters, and trophy hunters as falling into the dominionistic category. Trophy hunters and SCI themselves argue that they are nature hunters too, as the only type of hunting they defend is “ethical hunting”,

⁷⁵ Kellert 1978: 414-415.

⁷⁶ Kellert 1978: 416-417.

⁷⁷ Kerasote 1996: 285.

and that their attitude towards hunting is distinct from dominionistic hunter's. Once again, this shows the inherent difficulty in generalising a description of hunting. What may be relevant in terms of this thesis though is to discern how trophy hunters may avoid the label of being dominionistic, and how they could be deemed to conform to this label.

In an African context, and in particular the southern African countries of Botswana and South Africa, trophy hunting is one of the most prominent forms of hunting, along with citizen hunting⁷⁸ and recreational/biltong hunting; whilst subsistence hunting is still practiced to a fairly large extent.⁷⁹ Whether trophy hunting is also nature/ethical hunting, or whether it is a form of dominionistic hunting I hope to clarify a little through the rest of the thesis.

Subsistence hunting, then, refers to the hunting of animals for food and subsistence purposes, either for survival or to improve the quality of life of the people or community dependent on the hunting resource. Therefore the killing of animals is a means to an end to survive. Engaging in the act of subsistence hunting may therefore be a life necessity and essential to the survival of the individual or community. Examples of people who still practice subsistence hunting are certain San (Bushmen) communities in the Kalahari Desert in north-western Botswana and north-eastern Namibia; namely the Ju/'hoansi, G/wi, G//ana, !Xo and several other hunter-gatherer societies,⁸⁰ as well as certain Eskimo communities in the Arctic Circle and "forest peoples", or Pygmies, in Central Africa.⁸¹ In South Africa communities in KwaZulu Natal practice subsistence hunting to a large extent using dogs. Subsistence hunting may also be a cultural link with the past, whereby those who practice it express their cultural and historical ties to the land. Botswana has in place a quota system that allocates a certain number of licences to citizens for the purposes of hunting within designated controlled hunting areas (CHAs).⁸² This assures that local people benefit materially and culturally from the environment by being able to continue the age-old tradition of hunting for their food.

⁷⁸ Citizen hunting occurs mainly in Botswana as part of an official wildlife management policy and quota scheme (DWNP 1999a; 1999b. From *Controlled Hunting Areas and Wildlife Quotas*. Part of a series of information pamphlets entitled "Wildlife: Our Strongest Resource". Published by Botswana's Department of Wildlife and National Parks as part of the Natural Resource Management Project).

⁷⁹ Whilst trophy hunting is just as prominent an industry in the countries of Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique, I have chosen to concentrate specifically on South Africa and Botswana in further discussion of trophy hunting for pragmatic and contextual purposes.

⁸⁰ Hitchcock, Yellen, Gelburd, Osborn and Crowell 1996: 154.

⁸¹ Lee and Hitchcock 2001: 261.

⁸² Cf. Chapter 3.

In certain San societies in the Central Kalahari⁸³ the act of hunting functions as a strong link in the relationship between humans and animals, and holds symbolic importance in mythological explanations of their human origins. Where it is still practiced traditionally,⁸⁴ the life of the community revolves around hunting, and the societal bonds are strengthened by the symbolism it holds. For instance, it is said to play an important part in maintaining harmony and balance between family members, whereby men traditionally provide the food and women prepare it in a mutually beneficial and harmonious relationship, as there is a clear correlation between hunting prowess, male sexuality and the value a man holds for his wife. From finding the first signs of tracks, to the hunt itself, to working the skins and relating the experience of the hunt afterwards, every act related to hunting carries significant meaning for San communities.⁸⁵

Subsistence hunting in communities where there is a vital and basic need to hunt for survival is hard to condemn for anti-hunters. Most anti-hunting groups, including PETA and HSUS, acknowledge that subsistence hunting is vital to the survival needs of certain communities, and do not as such condemn it where it is still practiced today.⁸⁶ They do however argue that there is now less need globally to hunt for subsistence purposes given the advances in trade, agriculture and access to food. Communities that depend on subsistence hunting are in a minority and therefore cannot be used to justify other types of hunting, especially recreational forms of hunting.

Subsistence hunting as practiced by traditional hunter-gatherer societies nevertheless serves to fulfil the vital survival and cultural needs of the communities, and plays a defining role in their identities as people and their self-realisation. There are numerous examples where indigenous hunter-gatherer communities in southern Africa were marginalized and dispossessed of their identity through forced removal from ancestral lands. With the loss of hunting opportunities as a result of this, the societal structures that revolved around the hunting act necessarily took strain.⁸⁷ This is an indication of the strong role the

⁸³ The Kalahari Desert stretches between Namibia, Botswana, and the central-northern part of South Africa.

⁸⁴ Whether or not there are any "true" hunter-gatherer societies remaining is unclear (Cf. Lee and Hitchcock 2001: 267).

⁸⁵ Valiente-Noailles 1993: 59-62.

⁸⁶ PETA 2003d.

⁸⁷ Notably the Kagga Kamma San community in South Africa (Lee and Hitchcock 2001: 270). The community's forced removal to Kagga Kamma meant that there were no opportunities to hunt, in contrast to their previous area of residence.

land, wildlife, and hunting holds for the identity of certain communities and, in a sense, their self-realisation.

Sport hunting is generally defined as being the hunting of animals as a form of recreational past time, and though arguably no less satisfying or even enjoyable for subsistence hunters, it is largely distinct from subsistence hunting based on this criterion, as the notion of hunting for sport does not feature in hunter-gatherer societies. Sport hunting has a long and varied history in human civilisation, and it can be seen to encompass most hunting practices in the West at present. The traditional notion of hunting as a sport largely has its roots within European culture, and particular nationalities and countries have rich hunting traditions that stretch far back in history, each having developed and evolved over time with unique norms, institutions and characteristics. For example, the British hunting tradition has institutions such as the Rowland Ward Guild of Field Sportsmen,⁸⁸ whereas the American hunting tradition has historical institutions such as the Boone and Crocket Club.⁸⁹ The traditional notion of hunting as a noble sport, and of hunters as sportsmen, continues to be strongly espoused by institutions such as these. German, French and Spanish hunting traditions are equally as rich in their heritage.

In a southern African context, sport hunting is generally undertaken with a rifle and is widely practiced. In South Africa especially, the primary benefits for the hunter are the meat from the animal (for example venison or biltong)⁹⁰ and the primary motivations include being in the natural outdoors, for a respite from the stresses of daily life, to interact closely with game, for the social experience, to test hunting skills, and for the excitement offered by hunting.⁹¹ The opportunity to acquire meat/venison/biltong is high on the list of reasons for hunting. Sport hunters can therefore also be classified as “biltong” or “weekend” hunters. In this respect, my definition differs from Kellert’s, as he would describe these hunters as being predominantly utilitarian/meat hunters. However, many hunters in the South African context profess to hunt for the meat as much as to be in the

⁸⁸ Rowland Ward was a taxidermist in London in the 1800’s, and who gave his name to the club founded in 1880 (Rowland Ward 2003). It publishes an annual record book that is differentiated from SCI’s record book by its distinct scoring method.

⁸⁹ Theodore Roosevelt founded the Boone & Crocket Club in 1887 in order to form a coalition of concerned people to address the conservation issues affecting wildlife, wild habitat and hunting in America (Boone & Crocket 2003).

⁹⁰ “Biltong” is an Afrikaans word for a popular South African delicacy. It is namely meat/venison that has been seasoned with salt and herbs, and then hung and cured for later consumption.

⁹¹ Radder et al. (2000: 15). The research report by Radder et al. concentrated on hunting in the Eastern Cape, but the motivations expressed by hunters may be regarded as generally applicable to the majority.

outdoors,⁹² and are often referred to as biltong hunters as opposed to trophy hunters, implying that there is a general distinction within hunting circles as well.

Trophy hunting is often also referred to as sport hunting; however, for the purposes of this essay, I distinguish trophy hunting from a generalised notion of sport hunting, according to the definitions I outline in this section. The primary difference lies in the motivations of the hunt – trophy hunting is an activity geared exclusively toward the aim of taking the life of an animal in order to possess a part of its body in perpetuity. It is normally aimed at getting the best possible specimen of the species of animal being hunted, which is invariably a male of the species. Trophy hunting is thus a particular kind of sport hunting. The one is not necessarily completely exclusive of the other for the reasons I discuss below, yet there remains a sufficient ground to warrant such a distinction in many cases.

Central to any discussions of trophy hunting is the notion of the trophy itself. As pointed out by Eaton, who provides a detailed opinion on the value of trophy hunting, trophyism can be defined as a “love of trophies” and could be regarded as widespread in many societies.⁹³ The word trophy has many connotations in everyday usage and countless objects could be termed a “trophy” – from a trophy cup or award gained through athletic achievement, a cricket or rugby ball used in a particularly memorable match, a piece of jewellery acquired during travel, a wood carving, and even an academic paper printed in a journal. A trophy is generally a reminder of a particular experience or achievement, and thus can embody a physical token or manifestation of the intangible, almost in an attempt to crystallise a memory or experience in order to “make the intangible, tangible”. Jim Posewitz describes a hunting trophy as “... a reminder of the hunt and a way of extending the experience and of the animal”.⁹⁴ A trophy is also a communication of a hunter’s achievement,⁹⁵ in that different trophies point towards certain qualities that a hunter might possess in order to kill a particular animal. Certain animals are renowned for their ferocity, elusiveness, or rarity so in order to kill the animal the hunter must be equipped with certain abilities in order to do so.⁹⁶ According to Eaton, there is a “social esteem associated with the

⁹² In the study conducted in the Eastern Cape, Radder et al. (2000: 15) found that local hunters, biltong and trophy alike, ranked the reason, “to be in nature” at the top of a list of reasons for hunting. Number two was “for a biltong/venison hunt”, whilst for biltong hunters “for the trophy” ranked nine, and for local trophy hunters it ranked four (number three was “to test my hunting skills”).

⁹³ Eaton 2002.

⁹⁴ 1994: 99.

⁹⁵ Eaton 2002.

⁹⁶ Eaton 2002.

domination of predators”, and the qualities necessary in trophy hunting are those required of a warring society. Trophies may therefore symbolise certain qualities on the part of the hunter, such as power, perseverance, bravery, fitness, fortitude, patience, determination etc.; these are seen as the same qualities historically required by humans in order to survive in a hostile world. The trophy thus serves to communicate a confirmation of certain virtues to others regarding the hunter’s personhood, and depending on how the trophy is interpreted, accords him/her a certain status. Some hunters therefore defend trophy hunting on the basis that trophyism is endemic in many spheres of society, and that a recognition of trophyism is “fundamental to understanding human nature, and how, indeed, we gained dominion of the planet”.⁹⁷

A trophy is also said to be: “At the deepest level ... a personal statement about connection with life and a commitment to serve life with respect, the unspoken, common commandment of all true hunters. In an egoic sense, trophies do rank a man socially, but they also are a record of that man’s deep connections with the creatures he killed. A trophy is both an egoic statement and a spiritual symbol”.⁹⁸ Again, this is a cultural explanation of the value of the trophy, and not a moral justification of the desire to kill an animal for its trophy.

To return to the distinction between sport and trophy hunting, the subtle difference between the sport hunter and the trophy hunter lies in this: the sport hunter may choose to keep a part of the animal *after* the hunt as a reminder of the experience, but his primary motivations for hunting lie in the experience of the hunt and in the satisfaction gained of being able to provide for him or herself, and not merely the aim of possessing the body part of an animal as a trophy. A trophy hunter hunts primarily with the intention of killing an animal mainly for the body part, which is almost inevitably mounted and displayed.⁹⁹ It can be argued that certain modern trophy hunters value the trophy piece, the dead animal or part of it, higher than they do the living conscious animal itself.¹⁰⁰ SCI’s trophy award

⁹⁷ Eaton 2002. The similarities between this view and the technocratic worldview discussed earlier seem to lend credence to the ecofeminist critique and view of hunting as being an extension of a patriarchal system of domination and way of thinking. The virtues expressed are traditionally those associated with males, and the terms *dominion* and *domination*, together with the reference to “warring societies” hint at the rationality behind the proverb “*Homo homini lupus*” (Man to another is a wolf) used by Thomas Hobbes in his Theory of the Social Contract. Hobbes’s theory significantly influenced the values of the Enlightenment.

⁹⁸ Eaton 2002.

⁹⁹ This assertion is motivated by the large amounts of money people are willing to pay to shoot certain animals, whereas they could choose the less expensive option of hunting non-trophy animals. If the trophy weren’t a deciding factor in the decision to hunt a certain animal in a certain place, they would arguably not spend as much money on the activity.

¹⁰⁰ This assertion will no doubt be met with a vehement denial from some hunters, although I am convinced a large percentage would agree with it.

scheme serves to support this evaluation, as the prestige associated with having an entry in SCI's record book no doubt crystallizes a hunter's intention with respect to the focus of the hunt – namely, that the size of the trophy becomes the focal point.

Another important aspect that is commonly evident in the narratives of trophy hunters is a sense of competition with the animal being hunted. Particularly in descriptions of big game hunting, there is often talk of the animal or trophy hunter "outwitting", "outthinking", or "being smarter than" the other, with the survivor emerging as the victor, such as in the following: "So eager was I to *win* against these buffalo that I refused to shoot a lion that offered an easy shot."¹⁰¹ The trophy as well as the desire to outwit in competition, and so doing prove that one has the necessary skill in a difficult activity, are seemingly core features of big game trophy hunting.

3. 3. Trophy Hunting and "True Hunting"

This is where the issue of killing becomes a moral morass. Most hunters, whether they would call themselves trophy hunters or not, would agree that the ideal of hunting, and "true" hunting, is first and foremost about being in the wilderness, participating in the landscape and with nature ("... in the lifecycle of nature"),¹⁰² enjoying the outdoors, testing one's skill and patience in the age old activity of the hunt, and experiencing the true essence of what it "means to be human", by "returning to the state of being which man was in the beginning and which he has practiced since he first walked the earth". These are seen as morally worthy justifications of hunting from an anthropocentric perspective, as they result in a tangible good for people who hunt. They would also make the claim that most people do not hunt merely for the trophy, but that it is of a secondary concern to trophy hunters, as their main motivating factor is to be in the bush and experience the hunt. Therefore, they would claim that trophy hunters are also sport hunters who subscribe to the ideal that it is enough to be in the bush, and if they are successful in shooting an animal it is regarded as a boon to the experience of the hunt. In this sense then, the trophy doesn't matter.

¹⁰¹ White 1996: 73.

¹⁰² King 1991: 80.

However, not all forms of trophy hunting can conform to this ideal. Trophy hunting has become a hugely successful and burgeoning industry, particularly in southern Africa. With the increased amounts of money involved, competition for business invariably increases, and with it the desire of individuals to “better” themselves or their peers in shooting the largest trophy specimen they are able to. The desire for the trophy may increasingly replace the initial love of being in the outdoors, which supersedes other motivations as primary factor. Competition for trophy size erodes the initial purest desires of the naturalist hunter, and as already stated, this is one of HSUS’s main criticisms of SCI’s Trophy Award scheme.¹⁰³

The following passages from Ted Kerasote’s insightful book *Bloodties: Nature, Culture, and the Hunt* illustrate well the primary incentive that the trophy and SCI’s record books alone can hold for some trophy hunters. Here he relates certain conversations he had with some trophy hunters:

‘When I really started hunting ... my major goal was to hopefully collect all the major game animals of the world. And I’m almost done. These award programmes ... they didn’t exist then. Now McElroy [the founder of SCI] ... knew how to make a dollar.’ He gestures to some trophies on the shelf. ‘You have to buy these. They don’t give them to you. If I get three more species from Europe, I’ll have nineteen gold medals and a diamond one. But this would cost me sixteen thousand dollars to actually get one!’¹⁰⁴

‘Fame is a vapor,’ he says ... ‘But I love it.’¹⁰⁵ If it was three or four thousand dollars to get the trophies and be listed ... How many members are there in SCI? It’s a small group, only a few thousand, but in it you can be widely known.’¹⁰⁶

‘Once I had a couple of animals mounted life-size I was ruined completely. You can’t really appreciate them any other way.’ He pauses, then adds, ‘I think this will be the largest life-size collection in the world when it’s done. And you know, I couldn’t have done it any other way. I couldn’t have justified my trophy hunting without making it a public service.’¹⁰⁷

Contrary to some claims, therefore, the trophy does matter.¹⁰⁸ And I say that the issue of killing is a moral morass because no one that I have come across has

¹⁰³ Cf. Chapter 2: Safari Club International.

¹⁰⁴ Kerasote 1993: 161.

¹⁰⁵ Whether “it” refers to *trophy hunting*, or to *fame* is ambiguous here.

¹⁰⁶ Kerasote 1993: 161.

¹⁰⁷ Kerasote 1993: 154.

¹⁰⁸ Common sense, as well as many hunters, will say that this is so. In most cases where hunters admit that the trophy is of central importance, consequentialist arguments are again provided to morally substantiate it.

tried to defend trophy hunting on the grounds that it is acceptable to take the life of an animal purely for the sake of its body parts, without any other reasons or justifications.¹⁰⁹ Neither has anyone defended the killing act of trophy hunting solely on the basis that it is a pleasurable experience for the hunter. Therefore, trophy hunting needs to have a morally worthy justification in order to be morally acceptable as a recreational activity. Again, the morass concept comes in as various moral reasons and justifications are thrown in to the argument and overlap to an extent that it is not always clear or easy to distinguish the different moral issues from one another. There are always supplementary and peripheral arguments, which are used as justifications for trophy hunting. Some of these are the utilitarian-based sustainable use argument, and the arguments from ecosystem management perspectives: for example that sustainable utilisation is the only viable solution for conservation in Africa and that trophy hunting is an economically viable and beneficial form of sustainable utilisation based on utilitarian principles;¹¹⁰ that hunting is a viable management tool of confined game populations and ensures habitat preservation;¹¹¹ that trophy hunting is a key factor in the economic upliftment of rural African communities,¹¹² etc. However, beyond these consequentialist and economic based arguments, a defence of the individual morality of the act of killing an animal for its trophy remains conspicuous in its absence within the broad sphere of philosophical and, perhaps more telling, within pro-hunting literature. This is even more so in an African context when one considers trophy hunting of the Big Five, of the people in general who do the hunting, and their reasons for doing so, as a discussion of the intentions, motives, and desires of hunters are often peripheral or absent completely in defences and justifications of trophy hunting that are based on utilitarian grounds;¹¹³ or ascribed to instinct, and thereby discarded as being *amoral* and therefore lying outside the jurisdiction of morality.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ This is particularly with reference to more recent literature since the publication of Alistair Gunn's article "Environmental Ethics and Trophy Hunting" in 2001, in which he asserts that he could find no arguments defending "hunting for fun, for the enjoyment of killing, or for the acquisition of trophies ..." (Gunn 2001: 68).

¹¹⁰ Gunn 2001: 68-95. Gunn's conclusion, characteristically utilitarian, is that despite the moral deficiencies that may be inherent in the activity, trophy hunting is necessary in southern Africa as it protects both the interests of people (especially local African communities) and wildlife by integrating conservation and development.

¹¹¹ Loftin 1984: 241-250. Also utilitarian, Loftin's argument rests on the assumption that the killing of individual animals results in the protection of others (the "replaceability argument"), through habitat preservation and the financial contribution provided by hunters. Individual animals that are killed can thus be regarded as "martyrs".

¹¹² Lewis and Alpert 1997: 59-68.

¹¹³ That is, besides the broader goal-based desires and intentions to preserve wildlife in general that are expressed, the individual and primary desires and intentions of trophy hunters are often sidelined or not considered.

¹¹⁴ Causey's (1989: 338) assertion that the urge to kill *for sport* is instinctual and therefore not a moral issue, is shown to be fallible by Bekoff and Jamieson (1991: 375-378), who contend that such an analysis "smack[s] of *facile*

If the desire for the trophy is a central motivating factor in an individual's decision to hunt a specific animal, the question that could then be asked is, how does this affect the moral defence of trophy hunting based on utilitarian grounds? Does accepting the economic benefits that trophy hunting brings necessarily then suffice as a moral justification in the same way that an ideal notion of ethical hunting is argued to, without having to consider the desires and interests of hunters in doing so?

While a utilitarian defence rests upon the aggregate good gained through a particular action, and to a certain extent that a moral imperative is present in order to justify killing an animal for recreation, this does not imply that in cases where an animal is objectified as "a trophy", that trophy hunting necessarily then conforms to all of the ideals of ethical hunting, in so far as respect for the animal is concerned. This type of objectification would seem to deny animals a certain value, and the same value hunters claim to respect, namely that the animal is a living embodiment and manifestation of a timeless evolutionary process of which they are a part of. If this view is taken as correct, then an objectification of the animal in terms of its trophy reduces the value to an instrumental one whereby the body part of the animal, and not the animal itself, comes to represent an anthropic interpretation of events, cultural circumstances and relationships, and not a realistic or neutral representation of the value of the animal to the biotic community, for example. In other words, if the primary objective of trophy hunting is the trophy, an exploration is necessary of the desires and motives that lie behind trophy hunting in order to try and reconcile consequential utilitarian defences that characterise "normal" recreational hunting with defences of trophy hunting based on cultural values. This is because cultural values differ extensively from economic and ecological values in terms of justifying hunting, in that cultural values are specific in their orientation; that is, they originate exclusively within a select group of people and address their interests alone, in this case hunters. Economic and ecological values on the other hand can be said to be inclusive of other people and address the interests of the biotic community and indigenous communities in terms of the aggregate goods gained.

Within the broad categorical types of hunting that can be defined, there are varying forms of hunting as well. For example, within trophy hunting, where animals are shot and killed for the size of their horns, mane, or tusks, one may find bow hunting, rifle hunting and pistol hunting. There are also categories for

adaptationism or vulgar Darwinizing" because no evolutionary explanation, let alone defence, of sport hunting can be given.

muzzleloader shooting. There are various subtle differences between these disciplines. For example, different skills are required in bow hunting compared to hunting with a rifle. Bow hunters generally require a certain degree of strength, skill and practice to master the bow pulling technique. By necessity they generally need to get closer to the animals they hunt in order to increase the chances of accurate shot placement, as well as to ensure a good degree of penetration of the broad head into the body of the animal. In order to do so, various camouflage techniques are used. In the extreme, as evidenced in the American hunting tradition, camouflage and technology is used to such an advantage, that the concept of "fair chase" seems to be absent in a literal sense; animals are lured through the use of calling aids and baits/scents, and literally ambushed. Hence the option of certain bowhunting chapters to define the Code of Ethics and Principle of Fair Chase to suit their particular methods of hunting.¹¹⁵

The ethical problems which tend to arise within the different forms and variations of hunting are numerous and often poorly discerned by those participating in hunting.¹¹⁶ For example, to bow hunt from a tree stand over a salt lick with head to toe camouflage, using scent markings and calling devices to lure deer closer for a shot with a highly technical and sophisticated piece of bow equipment, heavily tilts the odds, until the chances of a fair chase for the deer are minimised and reduced to a greatly unfair percentage in favour of the hunter. Kerasote makes the point that: "too few hunters question the replacement of skill and intuition by gadgets".¹¹⁷ The ethical problems inherent in such a case are very different to a scenario where a person stalks a buffalo on foot for miles after coming upon its spoor, stalking quietly as close as possible to it coming downwind taking care not to let the buffalo know about your presence. This is because the technological advantages in terms of camouflage, materials and equipment can far outweigh any natural and instinctual defence the quarry has against its pursuer; and also because the degree of moral/ethical justifiability of hunting diminishes as the self-imposed restraints contained in codes of conduct are lessened. According to the ideal of the ethical hunter and the criteria laid down by pro-hunting groups for hunting to be considered ethical, it goes without saying that it is extremely hard to justify recreational hunting on moral grounds if one removes all ethical considerations and employs instead the most powerful technology available to kill an animal at all costs. Similarly, it is easier to justify

¹¹⁵ DeGeorges 2001b.

¹¹⁶ Kerasote 1996: 287-289; Kooy 2001: 29.

¹¹⁷ Kerasote 1996: 288.

recreational hunting on these grounds in cases where no artificial methods are employed, where technology is severely limited, and the wild animal lives as a free ranging, naturally occurring, and self-sustaining member of a healthy biotic community. Furthermore, where the hunter is seen to show an attitude akin to that of a nature or ethical hunter, without emphasising the value of the trophy above other reasons for hunting, he necessarily reveals an attitude that is more defensible according to pro-hunters' own conception and claims as to what a "true hunter" is.

4. CONCLUSION

A central question is therefore whether or not trophy hunting is "true hunting"? To attempt an answer one needs to return to the primitivist defence of hunting as a re-enactment of man's natural predatory function, where hunting is seen as a natural act of predation. According to this view, "true hunting" is a returning to nature, and thus a realisation of human potentiality in the sense that it returns man to a state of authenticity in relation to the natural world. The objective of "true hunters" is essentially one of self-realisation through the hunting act. It is assumed firstly, that human predation is natural; and secondly that hunting itself is an act of predation. It seems therefore that in order to qualify as being "true hunting", trophy hunting needs to prove itself as an act of *natural* predation.

In relation to this, one therefore also needs to consider these questions, namely: 1) Is human predation natural? 2) If it is, is human hunting then a form of natural predation? 3) If hunting is natural predation, then is trophy hunting, hunting?¹¹⁸

These questions I hope to refer back to in the two chapters that follow, although I will not seek a definitive answer over whether or not human hunting is predation, and furthermore natural predation, as much work has already been written in connection with this. Whether or not trophy hunting conforms to the idea of the ethical hunter as put forward by pro-hunting groups in terms of self-realisation remains unclear, though, and at present Kellert's distinction between dominionistic and nature hunters seems to be valid. This is because the

¹¹⁸ Whether hunting is predation, and whether human predation is natural are issues that have been discussed extensively within environmental ethics literature. Causey (1989: 327-343) argues that hunting is a natural instinct and therefore morally neutral; Hettinger (1994: 3-20) attempts to show that deontological arguments that hold human predation as being immoral need to explain why animal predation is good; while Bekoff and Jamieson (1991: 375-378) and Moriarty and Woods (1997: 391-404) argue that hunting is not predation or natural, but rather essentially a cultural activity that has little to do with predation in a natural sense.

objectification of animals in terms of their trophy value alone seems to negate the ecological value of individual members of species within the biotic community; and secondly, because the theoretical foundations of the primitivist defence of hunting, upon which trophy hunting depends to a large extent, is circumspect.

I hope, though, to have identified the varying notions of hunting in this chapter, and to have revealed briefly how trophy hunting fits into southern Africa in a historical context amidst the conceptual confusion surrounding the term. As was shown, the idea of hunting and what it means to hunt is therefore incredibly complex. Yet by breaking down certain types of hunting into categories, one can more easily define areas where certain types of hunting may be problematic, or at the least may not conform to the claims put forward by pro-hunters; or on the other hand may dispel some pejorative notions regarding hunting that anti-hunters hold.

Whether or not this is entirely successful will depend on reaching some sort of resolution concerning the matter of desires, intention, and motive within trophy hunting that thus far still escape us. I aim to tackle this problem in Chapter 8, and to bring the relevant discussion of motive, intention, and desire in relation to trophy hunting closer to the concept of integrity, after examining various hunting narratives in Chapter 7 in relation to the political climate in which they function.

CHAPTER 7

THE POLITICS OF HUNTING AND THE RE-CONSTITUTION OF MEANING IN RELATION TO SAN HUNTING TALES, HEMINGWAY, AND ORTEGA Y GASSET.

1. INTRODUCTION

As shown throughout the characteristic arguments of pro- and anti-hunting groups, various references are made to texts to support, substantiate or qualify their positions. A few texts in particular have attained a level of prominence within the debate, with Jose Ortega y Gasset's book *Meditations on Hunting* in particular being extensively quoted by pro-hunting advocates, both in formal justifications of hunting positions and informally in expressing agreement with the sentiments expressed by him. In this chapter the discussion moves to a review of certain hunting narratives and texts, including *Meditations on Hunting* and Hemingway's *Green Hills of Africa*, to examine the way in which these relate the notion of the hunting experience, and the way in which certain symbols function as ideological "tools" within the two groups.

The hunting debate can be regarded as essentially a political power struggle over the right to hunt, and the collective phrase "hunting debate" refers to this dynamic power play between those who oppose recreational hunting and those who defend it. The right to hunt is essentially what is at stake for pro-hunters, as the more public opinion swings against the practice, the less likely it is that their opportunities to do so will be as varied as they are today; while what is at stake for anti-hunters seems to be their conscience and peace of mind. Even though it was shown in Chapter 1 that the notion of debate is itself in a sense a misnomer due to the tension between fundamentalism and relativism that characterises this power struggle, the phrase "hunting debate" is nevertheless used as a reference to the political discourses that underlie the struggle for hunting "rights".¹ As such, it would help to provide certain conceptual tools with which a discussion surrounding culture, ideology, politics and power may be suitably oriented in reference to the nature of this power struggle.

¹ In the numerous references made to "the hunting debate" or "the debate" in this thesis the term is intended to refer to a generalised conception of the relevant arguments, theories and discourses, as well as their relations to each other, which encompass the morality of hunting.

As already discussed in Chapter 1, a focus on the texts and symbolic phenomena employed in the debate will enable an analysis of their ideological function, with the aim of interpreting the ideology of anti- and pro-hunting groups, whereby interpreting ideology means to “explicate the connection between the meaning mobilized by symbolic forms and the relations of domination which that meaning serves to maintain”.² In addition, having an idea of the type of politics that characterises the debate will be useful. In connection with this, Zygmunt Bauman provides a frame of reference that is relevant to the nature of the hunting debate in terms of a modernist and postmodernist interpretation.³ What follows is a brief attempt to summarise and interpret certain points Bauman makes in a way that may be applicable to the hunting debate, and which may further highlight some of the inherent differences between pro- and anti-hunters.

2. THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THE HUNTING DEBATE

Firstly, the debate has a postmodern quality to it. It is characterised by the emergence of imagined communities. Outside of the institutionalised modernist authority sought and claimed by official groups (for example, hunting organisations such as SCI, or animal rights organisations such as FFA), “hunters” and “anti-hunters” are also “imagined communities” in the sense that their self-appointed members share an “overwhelming affective commitment”⁴ to an ethical belief that recreational hunting is either right or wrong; a belief that itself seeks the institutionalisation, authorisation and direction that reason and the “modernist mind” has hitherto insufficiently or unconvincingly provided, bearing in mind that the modern society emerged out of a discovery that “human order is vulnerable, contingent and devoid of reliable foundations” and the response to this discovery was the attempt to “make order solid, obligatory and reliably founded. This response problematized contingency as an enemy and order as a task”.⁵

Where modernism and instrumental rationality is regarded as having failed to provide the reassurance of an ordered, universal, all-inclusive truth by its rejection of contingency (i.e. the right of individuals to hold pluralistic or differing views), the postmodern state of mind struggles with its own fears, which are

² Thompson 1990: 23.

³ Bauman sketches the historical emergence of imagined communities and the postmodern state of mind in his book, *Intimations of Postmodernity* (1992: xvii-xxiv), and his ideas are relevant in forming an understanding of the nature of the hunting debate.

⁴ Bauman 1992: xix.

⁵ Bauman 1992: xi.

privatised in the absence of a “licensing authority”, of the chaos and consequences that embracing contingency in the place of “universality-claiming truths” may bring. Thus, as Bauman states:

The ethical paradox of the postmodern condition is that it restores to agents the fullness of moral choice and responsibility while simultaneously depriving them of the comfort of the universal guidance that modern self-confidence once promised. Ethical tasks of individuals grow while the socially produced resources to fulfil them shrink. Moral responsibility comes together with the loneliness of moral choice. In a cacophony of moral voices, none of which is likely to silence the others, the individuals are thrown back on their own subjectivity as the only ultimate ethical authority.⁶

This is the political and social climate in which the hunting debate functions, and is characterised by individual uncertainty surrounding universal claims to truths amidst the desire for individual autonomy. The presence and existence, and therefore legitimacy, of the imagined communities in the absence of a legitimising authority (or “an authority with globalizing ambitions”)⁷ are therefore dependent on public attention, in the form of recognition. Thus:

Seeking an authority powerful enough to relieve them of their fears, individuals have no other means of reaching their aim except by trying to make the communities they imagine more authoritative than the communities imagined by others – and this by heaving them into the centre of public attention. ... Since no imagined community is alone in its struggle for public attention, a fierce competition results that forces upwards the stakes of the game.⁸

This aspect may be most noticeable through the attempts to garner support through rallies, public demonstrations of solidarity, and symbolic forms of protest that often occur. The mass protests and demonstrations in 2002 preceding and following the British Parliamentary vote on fox hunting by both those in favour and against fox hunting is one example. Another is the symbolic and often highly public protests of anti-hunters and the hunt sabotage tactics of FFA, which are intended to sensationalise and thereby increase their dramatic impact on the public conscience. These actions (protests, demonstrations, rallies, etc.) are therefore the symbolically manifested commitment of the members of imagined communities.⁹ The creation of official organisations (SCI, CF, HSUS, FFA, PETA,

⁶ Bauman 1992: xxii.

⁷ Bauman 1992: 201.

⁸ Bauman 1992: xx.

⁹ Bauman 1992: 198.

etc.) is thus a modernist response in an attempt to institutionalise these commitments.

However, the politics of the hunting debate can be seen to be characterised by certain types of postmodern politics similar to those identified by Bauman, namely *tribal politics*, *politics of desire*, *politics of fear*, and *politics of certainty*.¹⁰ These forms are not necessarily mutually exclusive though, as he points out, and some act at cross-purposes, which will be made evident in the discussion that follows.

Tribal politics refers to the practices aimed at the collectivisation of the efforts of tribal (community) members, thereby entailing the creation of the imagined communities themselves. In the absence of an authoritative rule system (“clearly codified rules to which submission could be demanded”),¹¹ allegiance is dependent on repetitive symbolic rituals, or composed of the “ritually manifested support for positive tribal tokens or equally symbolically demonstrated animosity to negative (anti-tribal) tokens”.¹² These rituals compete for public attention as the main resource for survival. In plainer terms, anti-hunters do not have a fixed code of rules, conduct or authoritative body to which they swear allegiance. Their allegiances instead are noticeable through their symbolic actions and protests, and in their support for anything that denies hunters a legitimising platform. The animosity towards the ritual of hunting and its symbolical importance to hunters can thus be explained by reference to this competition over public attention identified by Bauman as being characteristic of postmodern tribal politics.

Hunters, however, do have ritualised, codified sets of rules and norms at their disposal that guide their actions in the hunting field, explicit examples being the Codes of Ethics and Fair Chase principle. In this case SCI plays the role of a governing authority over its members, and has a certain executive power to enforce this code,¹³ as do other hunting institutions. Barring this institutionalised and characteristically modernist attempt to bring order and uniformity to the ethical problems inherent in hunting through written rules, norms and procedures that are intended to govern a hunter’s action, the collective term “hunters” nevertheless may still be regarded as referring to an imagined community in the sense that Bauman describes. This is because hunters are collectively engaged in a struggle for their right to hunt, but their membership of the community

¹⁰ Bauman 1992: 198-200.

¹¹ Bauman 1992: 198.

¹² Bauman 1992: 199.

¹³ Cf. Chapter 2 for the discussion of SCI’s Ethical Complaints Committee.

engaging in this struggle is not dependent on their institutionalised affiliation to an all-encompassing governing authority. Whether one is a biltong hunter in South Africa, takes part in weekend boar hunts in southern France, belongs to a regional hunting fraternity in America, is a bow-hunting member of PHASA, or a trophy hunting member of SCI, one remains a member of the hunting community regardless of demographics, geography, or cultural orientation through an affective allegiance to the defence of hunting. In the face of public and anti-hunting pressures that impose a restraining categorisation, or definition, of hunters that threatens to be unavoidably pejorative, hunters seek autonomy in being able to conceive a self-definition of hunting. Consider the following statement: "Hunting – for those who understand it – is, indeed, a fine sport. It can be easily abrogated, however, by people who have no respect for it, or by those who have no real interest in its maintenance in modern society. The way hunting is projected, therefore, is important. Publicity and casual exposure of hunting practices must be handled carefully and meticulously. Hunters, both professional and amateurs alike, carry this responsibility with them in their conduct of the 'fair chase'".¹⁴ This statement identifies an awareness that the hunting community is collectively (i.e. "professional and amateur alike") obligated to promote and defend hunting from pejorative interpretations in a way that wins the public trust.

Therefore, regardless of institutionalised (or formalised) affiliation, hunters in the broadest sense of community seek to reconstitute the meaning of hunting through the ritualised support of its symbolic function. Their efforts and actions whilst doing so identify them as a tribal, or imagined, community, particularly in the animosity expressed towards the actions of anti-hunters (in this sense, the concept "anti-hunter" is also a negative, anti-tribal token).

It is here where the *politics of desire*, which entail "actions aimed at establishing the relevance of certain types of conduct (tribal tokens) for the self-constitution of the agents",¹⁵ become relevant. Hunters actively promote and defend ethical hunting, and sustainable utilisation of wildlife. "Ethical hunting", coupled with the "Fair Chase" symbolic, is in a sense a tribal token, as the symbolic ideal of ethical hunting is "true hunting". The efforts to marry ethical hunting and sustainable utilisation, as discussed in Section A of this thesis, seek to establish hunting as an attractive and relevant option for conservation initiatives. Hunting is also forwarded as a natural activity that fulfils certain human needs, through which a person is able to pursue self-realisation. The efforts and actions of the hunting

¹⁴ Ivins 1993: 105.

¹⁵ Bauman 1992: 199.

community that seek to establish the relevance and desirability of hunting, through lobbying and the consolidation of their interests through the formation of representative institutions, would seem to qualify for categorisation as politics of desire. As Bauman states: "If the relevance [of certain types of conduct] is established, the promoted conduct grows in attractiveness, its declared purposes acquire *seductive* power, and the probability of their choice and active pursuit increases; promoted purposes turn into agents' needs."¹⁶ The imagined community of animal liberationists may similarly seek to establish the relevance of abstaining from eating meat, for example. "Vegetarianism" thus functions as a tribal token within the animal liberation community, and once its relevance is established it is extended, as its declared purposes acquire "seductive power" (i.e. that it is the healthiest, most natural diet for humans which doesn't result in the death of sentient beings, and therefore a morally superior alternative to meat eating). Vegetarianism is thus actively pursued (desired) because of its symbolic relevance to the self-constitution (self-realisation) of individuals who seek a lifestyle that does not contribute to evil in the world. Ethical hunting and vegetarianism function therefore as symbolic tokens which, if practiced, promise the fulfilment of self-realisation. They thus compete with one another for "the scarce resource of individual and collective dreams of the good life".¹⁷

Bauman's third category of postmodern politics is the *politics of fear*. It is simultaneously a complement and a counterweight to the politics of desire, aimed at limiting or "drawing boundaries to" heteronomy (i.e. the plurality of choice) and thus staving off its potentially harmful effects.¹⁸ It stems from the fear and uncertainty surrounding the soundness and reliability of advice offered through the politics of desire: "More often than not, diffuse fears crystallize in the form of a suspicion that the agencies promoting desire are (for the sake of self-interest) oblivious or negligent of the damaging effects of their proposals."¹⁹ If we continue with the example of vegetarianism mentioned above, hunters (who can safely be assumed to be meat eaters) view claims that vegetarianism is the most natural diet with considerable suspicion. This is not to say they doubt the dietary benefits of vegetarianism, for example that it may be beneficial in that it provides a low calorie intake. Rather, holding the view that vegetarianism is the most natural diet for humans is regarded as being fraught with danger, as it denies a sense of reality about the world, and denies a basic natural principle that in order for life to

¹⁶ Bauman 1992: 199.

¹⁷ Bauman 1992: 199.

¹⁸ Bauman 1992: 199.

¹⁹ Bauman 1992: 199.

flourish death is an unfortunate necessity; this denial enforces a separation from reality and nature that may hold dire consequences. This separation from reality and nature, and the consequences it holds for the self-realisation of individuals, itself forms the basis of the fears and suspicion. Similarly, the claim that ethical trophy hunting is the answer to wildlife problems in Africa, and that ethical hunting in general is an affirmation of the inevitable evolutionary nature of human beings, is viewed with suspicion by anti-hunters due to: the scientific uncertainty (and therefore mistrust) surrounding the ecological effects of trophy hunting; the view that in acting out of self-interest, hunters inevitably fail to acknowledge the harmful effects of their practices as doing so would work against these interests; and the fear that in embracing an unquestioned notion of evolutionary inevitability in respect to hunting would entail a return to the assumption that human nature is unalterable and the human mind unchangeable. The root of this fear is thus that it might entail a return to the state of mind that caused the environmental crisis in the first place, in that this state of mind relied on the unquestioned technocratic belief that man had an unalterable, predetermined place in the world, over and above nature, and that this belief sanctioned the economic determinism and exploitation of the environment that resulted in current environmental crises.

A consequence of this is that the politics of fear “strengthens the position of experts in the processes of self-constitution, while ostensibly questioning their competence. Each successive instance of the suspension of trust articulates a new area of the habitat as problematic and thus leads to a call for more experts and more expertise.”²⁰ This suspension of trust may be what leads to the dismissal by anti-hunters of the scientific and economic claims of hunters, and the rejection by hunters of other intrinsic value claims. As a result, economic, scientific, and philosophical experts are to be found in abundance within the debate, yet requests for further clarity regarding the morality of hunting, its economic and ecological effects, and its historical relevance continue.²¹

The fourth type of politics Bauman identifies is the *politics of certainty*, which entails “the vehement search for confirmation of choice, in the face of the irredeemable pluralism of the patterns on offer and acute awareness that each formula of self-constitution, however carefully selected and tightly embraced, is ultimately one of the many ...”.²² In the hunting debate, people are often faced with an overwhelming variety of choices to make regarding their moral position

²⁰ Bauman 1992: 200.

²¹ For example, Altherr and Rieger 1995: 39-56.

²² Bauman 1992: 200.

(or “formula of self-constitution”) in respect to hunting. The wide range of philosophical theories, economic factors, and scientific observations that vie for attention is testament to this. There is thus a search for certainty regarding the information or “pronouncements” provided by experts, as these can only be taken on a matter of trust. As such, the politics of certainty consists of the production and manipulation of trust, with the effect that trustworthiness becomes the major criteria by which “merchants of certainty” (experts, politicians, etc.) are “judged, approved or rejected”.²³ In this respect, the self-appointed merchants of certainty regarding the morality of hunting may be interpreted as the institutionalised pro- and anti-hunting groups themselves. Spokespersons for the official groups are concerned therefore with producing, eliciting and maintaining public trust, and also in manipulating the trust the public may hold in communities with whom they are in competition.²⁴ In accusing hunters of being selfish and acting purely out of self-interest, for example, anti-hunters therefore attempt to cast doubt on the trustworthiness of their opponents. Similarly, in describing anti-hunters as being naïve in relation to the ecological realities of conservation, pro-hunters attempt to monopolise a position of trust in respect to being the “merchants of certainty” in empirical and scientific spheres of the debate. According to Bauman, and this particular interpretation of his ideas in relation to the hunting debate, the extent to which agents (members of the public or individuals in general) respond to the offers and the choice provided by either group, relies upon the *perceived* superiority of the offer over their competitor’s. The greater the volume of allocated trust the more attractive an offer is, so that: “What is perceived as superiority ... is the visible amount of *public attention* the offer in question seems to enjoy.”²⁵

A further point to make in consideration of the battle over public trust and the question of public choice is the type of authority sought by pro- and anti-hunting groups in matters of science, ethics, morals, conservation, wildlife, etc. In this respect, the type of authority sought by the groups can be termed *derivative authority*, where authority is “generated from my reasons for thinking that your information, abilities, or circumstances put you in an especially good position to evaluate the claim”.²⁶ Derivative authority thus relies on the public’s choice to accept or reject a particular view, theory, opinion, or fact; which further explains the motives and agenda’s behind pro- and anti-hunting groups in their attempts to

²³ Bauman 1992: 200.

²⁴ The following excerpt taken from the one already discussed above (Ivins 1993: 105) highlights this: “The way hunting is *projected*, therefore, is important. Publicity and casual exposure of hunting practices *must be handled carefully and meticulously*”. [Emphasis added].

²⁵ Bauman 1992: 200.

²⁶ Jones 1998: 143.

sway public perceptions by eliciting, maintaining or destroying trust. This is often seen in the comments of the groups when they intend to “set the record straight” or “let the facts speak for themselves”.

If this interpretation is valid in relation to the hunting debate, it then explains the battle between pro- and anti-hunting groups for public attention, and achieves something in offering a contextual account of the debate itself that clarifies the stalemate in sociological terms. In addition to trust; fear, autonomy, desire, community, and attention are also seen to be core features of the debate in this respect.

3. HUNTING AND CULTURE

The concept of culture has specific relevance within this postmodern political climate, particularly in reference to Bauman's definition of communities and the way ritual tokens function. When one talks of “the hunting culture” or “the culture of animal rightism” one typically has in mind a *descriptive conception* of culture, by which certain values, norms, beliefs, customs and principles identify the respective (imagined) communities, which Thompson defines as: “... the array of beliefs, customs, ideas and values, as well as the material artefacts, objects and instruments, which are acquired by individuals as members of the group or society.”²⁷ What seems more appropriate though for a discussion of the way rituals and symbolic tokens function in terms of sustaining power relations within the debate is Thompson's own *structural conception* of culture, whereby symbolic forms (similar to Bauman's symbolic tokens) have certain characteristics, namely they have *intentional, conventional, structural, referential, and contextual aspects*,²⁸ and where the emphasis is on “*both* the symbolic character of cultural phenomena *and* the fact that such phenomena are always embedded in structured social contexts”.²⁹ This is relevant in keeping with the contextual focus of this thesis in order to examine the ideological function of symbolic phenomena as employed by both sides in the debate. The five aspects identified above are involved in the “constitution of symbolic forms”, so are useful tools in analysing the way the concept “hunting” is meaningfully reconstituted by the employment of symbolic phenomena. I will concentrate an analysis of the ideological

²⁷ Thompson 1990: 129.

²⁸ Thompson 1990: 137.

²⁹ Thompson 1990: 136.

characteristics of the hunting debate on some of these aspects, namely the *intentional*, *referential*, and *contextual* aspects of symbols, and attempt to clarify them further where necessary.³⁰

Generally speaking, beliefs and values may be instilled through upbringing, whilst others are reinforced and maintained through “repetitive symbolic rituals”. A belief system that upholds ethical hunting as “the good life” relies on the use of symbolic phenomena including language phrases, written texts, ideas, and rituals through which meaning is conveyed. Within the hunting culture, there is a sub-culture, and “sub-community”, namely one that can be termed the trophy hunting culture, the community of which is identified by a dedication to the pursuit of trophies above other “normal” forms of hunting. Many “purist” hunters (by which I mean Kellert’s classification of nature hunter as opposed to dominionistic hunter)³¹ do not agree with a notion of trophy hunting, but rather ascribe to the view held by Holmes Rolston, III, for example, that one should hunt out of necessity and only in cases where the primary purpose is for the meat of the animal.³² The Ethical Hunter for them is symbolic in that it signifies what they regard as a non-wasteful approach to hunting, while trophy hunting is regarded as the opposite. Wastefulness (in the sense that the animals are not killed with the intent to eat) may be equated with pointlessness in their interpretation of hunting for the sake of the trophy alone, whilst a trophy hunter may regard the hunting of trophy animals as being the supreme expression of the ideals of the Ethical Hunter. The trophy hunting “culture” therefore makes use of certain symbolisms that may generally be evident in the “normal” hunting culture, but which function in a way that constitutes the meaning of “the good life” differently.

How then do two hunters, who essentially practice the same activity, arrive at the different conclusions that one form of hunting is better or worse than the other, or more specifically, choose one type of hunting over another? In line with this, one may ask what sort of phenomena contribute to the interpretation of an act of hunting, and thereby constitute its meaning and relevance to an individual? An animal liberationist may agree with the purist hunter that trophy hunting is wrong, but disagree with him that all hunting is not wrong. Similarly the trophy hunter may agree with the purist hunter that hunting, practiced in the correct manner,

³⁰ The *conventional* aspect deals more with the linguistic codes or rules that govern the application of symbols themselves (Thompson 1990: 139-141), while the *structural* aspect entails an analysis of the articulated structure of symbols as they stand in relation to one another (1990: 141-143). An analysis of these two aspects may perhaps therefore be more suited to a field such as Literary Criticism.

³¹ Cf. Chapter 6 for the discussion of Kellert’s definitions of *nature* hunters, *utilitarian/meat* hunters, and *sport/dominionistic* hunters.

³² Differentiated of course from market type hunting by ascribing to the ideal of ethical hunting.

can lead to a sense of self-realisation, and in this regard hunting in general holds meaning and significance for them both. However, they may disagree over the meaning and relevance of trophy hunting. The answer to this does not seem to lie within a descriptive conception of culture alone, as the beliefs (that hunting for recreation is not immoral), values (anthropocentric), customs and ideas that define the hunting community in general may be applicable to them both, as do the material artefacts acquired by them (for example, the material acquisition of weapons that are a hunting necessity). The answer seems to lie rather in the way meaning is interpreted, and the manner in which meaning is conveyed through certain symbols.

The Media industry plays the important role of disseminating information and messages, by transmitting symbolic forms. The term “mass communication” refers to the dissemination of information and products (symbolic forms) by media industries in a way that makes them available to a *plurality of recipients*;³³ rather than merely to the fact that a certain number or proportion of people receive this information. Information that is produced and disseminated through popular media institutions such as daily newspapers, television and radio stations, and theatres is received by a diversity of people, and is generally a one-way communication. Mass communication differs from other forms of communication, such as a conversation or dialogue, where the recipient of the information has the opportunity to respond, and thus also has the potential to be a transmitter of information at the same time. The relevant point regarding the difference between mass communication and other forms of interactive ones, such as a conversation or dialogue, is that, in mass communication, “recipients have relatively little capacity to contribute to the course and content of the communicative process”.³⁴

Within the hunting debate, much of the information that is disseminated (and received by the recipients on the basis of trust) stems from the transmitters, or who can be regarded as the “merchants of certainty” (meaning the respective spokespersons for each group); and is furthermore often in the form of mass communication. This leaves little room for public participation and contribution within the debate, as the only form of contribution the recipients, or the public, can make is in the form of choice between the products offered by anti- and pro-hunters. This also gives some indicators to how mass communication entrenches and even imposes the views of pro- and anti-hunting groups in and on society, in that the lack of dialogue, or mutual exchange of information, means that the

³³ Thompson 1990: 218.

³⁴ Thompson 1990: 218-219.

information transmitted by the “agents of certainty” through forms of mass communication cannot be questioned; the relevance and meaning of symbols is conveyed in a way that situates them as pre-determined and already defined. In other words, the public in general (the “plural recipients of information”) are apt to an extent to accept the particular meaning and relevance of the symbolic forms as defined by the “merchants of certainty” depending on the amount of trust they hold, or in the amount of fear they have (for example, the fear of making the wrong choice, and of the consequences that may arise from this). Fear and trust therefore underlie the public response with respect to matters of choice regarding the morality of hunting. Significantly, pro- and anti-hunting groups, in a capacity as institutionalised “merchants of certainty”, may be seen to direct and manipulate trust and fear aspects within the debate. Anti-hunters, for example, are often accused by pro-hunters of “playing on the fears of the public”, and in this sense that would be a valid statement.

One of the most important mediums today through which the exchange of information and transmission of symbols takes place is the Internet, or World Wide Web, and is significant in that it allows for a certain amount of participation and response to messages, in a way that doesn’t reveal a fundamental break between the producer and receiver. People are able to put up their own web sites or forums in newsgroups thereby creating a platform for their own ideas and transmission of messages and information regarding hunting. The diversity of imagined communities is most evident within this medium, and the hunting and anti-hunting communities may be seen as having a strong presence. The efficiency and effortlessness of the dissemination of information that the Internet offers may also have had a direct effect on increasing solidarity within the pro-hunting and anti-hunting communities, and in contributing to a certain amount of consistency regarding the institutionalisation of their ideologies. At the same time, however, it may also have contributed to a greater public awareness surrounding the choices available in approaching questions surrounding the morality of hunting.

As can be seen in the ideological character of the debate, the following may function as some of the main symbolic phenomena, and here I concentrate on symbolic phenomena as they are employed in the debate itself.

The Code of Ethics and Principle of Fair Chase. These serve to bind hunters, voluntarily, to a ritualised manner of engagement with the animal being hunted. These are principle phenomena in the sense that they form the basis of the

Ethical Hunter, and uphold and strengthen the appeal and attractiveness that the ideal of the Ethical Hunter holds in terms of virtues such as fairness, restraint, self-denial, responsibility, etc. They function explicitly within the debate to hold hunters to a manner of hunting that is more acceptable to the public, and according to which their actions may be judged; and serve as a counterpoint to arguments by anti-hunters that hunting is cruel, wasteful, and unnecessary, by eliciting trust in the idea that hunting is governed by a set of rational, binding norms, thereby offering a certain amount of reassurance.

The Ethical Hunter. The ethical hunter is a symbolic ideal that represents all that is humanly good about hunting. It can combine notions as various as respect, fairness, humility, autonomy, restraint, perseverance, etc., all of which are appealing and attractive characteristics, and as already mentioned the idea of the Ethical Hunter can be seen as promising “the good life”, in that it is a symbolic lifestyle that can lead to the fulfilment of self-realisation. It thus serves as a counterpoint to the anti-hunting (specifically animal liberation) token of Vegetarianism, in that they both compete for public attention within the debate. Appeals to the symbolic idea of the ethical hunter within the debate also serve to insulate the pro-hunting community from criticism, and serve to distance them from sectors of the sub-community whose actions may diminish the level of public trust.

Sustainable Utilisation Through Conservation, Use It or Lose It, or If It Pays It Stays. These are phrases often used to symbolically convey the conservation value of hunting. They implicitly carry with them a rebuttal of preservationist or strictly protectionist approaches to wildlife, and are relied on in discussions to diminish or dismiss the validity of non-consumptive alternatives to hunting. The establishment of sustainable utilisation as a viable option within global environmental priorities (through its sanction by IUCN, WWF, or the CBD) is the prerequisite upon which these symbols depend, and identifies the theoretical assumptions of the hunting community as being characteristically utilitarian and consequentialistic. The emphasis on these symbols may be seen as an attempt to establish the validity of hunting within global environmental priorities; whilst at the same time allowing the problematic discussion of morality and hunting to bypass and more easily navigate the quagmire of rights, values and ethics in confrontations with anti-hunters.

The Anti-Hunter vs. Hunter. References are often made to those who stand in opposition to hunting as “Greenies”, “Bunny-huggers”, “Tree-huggers”, or

"Bleeding-hearts". To hunters, these are symbols that are imbued with pejorative meaning, and the collective symbol Anti-Hunter (or its plural version "The Anti's") is generally employed within the debate to refer to these symbols, and to all or some of those individuals who actively oppose and campaign against hunting. By using the collective symbol Anti-Hunter in its pejorative form within the debate, an attempt is made by pro-hunters to distinguish between The Non-Hunter (the general and neutral public), The Hunter, and those who actively oppose hunting, in which it is implicitly intended that The Anti-Hunter be represented as irrational, unscientific, emotive, unstable and uninformed; whilst the symbol The Hunter represents reason, stability, scientific certainty, and trustworthiness. The Anti-Hunter is an anti-tribal token for the hunting community in that it directly threatens the meaning and relevance of the existence of this community, by resisting the attempts of The Hunter to autonomously seek self-constitution, in that The Anti-Hunter actively resists and counteracts the re-constitution of the meaning of hunting. The Non-Hunter is neutral and to be "won over" by reason and science, but poses a potential threat to The Hunter in that it is vulnerable to the seduction of The Anti-Hunter by being "uninformed" or "ignorant". Similarly, the anti-hunting community employs the pejorative symbol of The Hunter within the debate as "cold-blooded", "selfish", "blood-thirsty", "cruel", etc., particularly in mass media communication in order to diminish the level of public trust in the pro-hunting community. The above symbolic forms have an intentional aspect, as well as a *referential* aspect to them, in that they are also "constructions which typically represent something, refer to something, say something about something".³⁵ When these terms are used in the debate they refer to specific individuals, groups or communities in a way that is intended to lend a specific meaning to them.

Man as Evolutionary Being: This symbol identifies the historical and anthropological origins of man as being embedded in an inevitable evolutionary process. It forms the basis of the Hunting Hypothesis, which is itself relied on to interpret hunting as "instinct", "natural", "authentic", etc., whilst a denial of this symbol is interpreted as "unnatural". Appeals to this symbol thereby serve to strengthen the perception of hunting as natural, and therefore completely human, being sustained by trust and faith.

The Ortega Maxim. "One does not hunt in order to kill, one kills in order to have hunted" is Ortega y Gasset's well-known maxim about the meaning of hunting. It incorporates the Man as Evolutionary Being as its prerequisite, in that "to have

³⁵ Thompson 1990: 143.

hunted” is the accomplishment of returning to authenticity, and to man’s authentic state. It is most evident in the debate as a form of mantra, whereby it is repeated and affirmed by hunters, and thereby understood and agreed upon. It embodies a mystical truth about the purpose of hunting and its meaning for hunters, and its employment within the debate establishes a general commonality between the varied communities of hunters as to why they hunt.

A central symbolism within the hunting debate is The Hunting Experience. Most people, including hunters, interpret what can be called “The Hunting Experience” differently, as it can be seen to fulfil various symbolic functions within the debate, some of which I hope to highlight through the following discussion.

I will attempt a discussion of this in terms of its *historical emergence, articulation, circulation, and effect* insofar as influencing is concerned (i.e. in silencing, reinforcing, stereotyping etc.). I will also employ the use of certain San³⁶ hunting tales, Ernest Hemingway’s *Green Hills of Africa*, and Ortega y Gasset’s *Meditations on Hunting* to briefly explicate certain narratives in which these symbols function.

4. THE HUNTING EXPERIENCE AS A HISTORICAL SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION

The Hunting Experience. The Hunting Experience has an obvious cognitive aspect to it – amongst hunters it is a highly personalised subjective immersion in the present, and any appeal to the meaning of its cognitive aspect is in reference to what may be called a psychological construct. The symbolic phenomena through which the meaning of The Hunting Experience is expressed, and by which it is interpreted, form this psychological construct. It is a highly subjective personal interpretation of the feelings or emotions elicited throughout a hunt, and a recollection of the experience is essentially a memory recall of these feelings and emotions that are typically expressed in terms of other symbolic phenomena, including the religious and mystical. This psychological construct may then refer to the specific symbols, religious, mystical or otherwise, by which hunters themselves interpret the cognitive aspect, and through which they aim to communicate its meaning to other hunters. When hunters talk of The Hunting

³⁶ The term San, or Bushmen, is generally used to refer collectively to a group of people who are hunter-gatherers, without recognising the differences between various groups (Kent 1996a: 4). It is used here merely as a general indication of southern African hunter-gatherer societies.

Experience in terms of its cognitive aspect, anti-hunters in general are excluded from the discussion, and most of the communication surrounding this aspect is not generally directed at anti-hunters but at hunters themselves. This is because anti-hunters may generally not have any referential basis for interpreting it. A common response by anti-hunters when they are excluded from such a discussion regarding the meaning of this cognitive aspect of The Hunting Experience typically reverts back to deontological foundations, in that they may respond by saying: "I do not need to *experience* killing in order to know that it is wrong".

Within the African context, The Hunting Experience also functions as a general symbolic appeal to stereotypical romanticisms about big game hunting, which have their origin in the stories told by hunters and writers such as Theodore Roosevelt, Selous, Cumming, Hemingway, Robert Ruark, Peter Hathaway Capstick, Rider Haggard and many others.³⁷ It has been commodified to an extent that the hunting experienced is packaged, staged, marketed, and sold to clients wishing to embark on a hunting adventure.³⁸ It is characteristically *intentional* in this form, in that symbolic forms are intentional when they: "are produced, constructed or employed by a subject who, in producing or employing such forms, is pursuing certain aims or purposes and is seeking to express himself or herself, what he or she 'means' or 'intends', in and by the forms thus produced".³⁹ The use of The Hunting Experience within the debate is thus intended to refer to a specific something, and it is also expected that it be understood as such by those receiving the message. This intentional aspect regarding the employment of symbols is particularly evident amongst hunters themselves when they appeal to a psychological construct of The Hunting Experience in its cognitive form, as only they can expect other hunters to understand the highly subjective, immersive nature of the meaning of this symbolic. Anti-hunters, "who do not hunt, therefore cannot understand", are therefore also not *expected* to understand, and justifies to an extent in pro-hunters' eyes their exclusion from the debate in this respect. This exclusion serves to sustain or establish the derivative authority of hunters as regards the meaning of the hunting experience.

³⁷ The books are namely: Theodore Roosevelt – *African Game Trails* (1910, Charles Scribner & Sons), Rider Haggard – *King Solomon's Mines* (2002, Modern Library. Originally published in 1885), (Hummel 1994: 153); Robert Ruark – *The Horn of the Hunter* (1953, Double Day), (Bittner 2002: 133), and Peter Capstick Hathaway – *Death in the Long Grass* (1989, St. Martin's Press). Hemingway, Selous and Cumming are listed in the bibliography of this thesis.

³⁸ Hummel 1994: 152-158.

³⁹ Thompson: 1990: 138.

The symbolic meaning of The Hunting Experience, however, is not restricted to the intended meaning of the producer-subject,⁴⁰ as what may be understood in a specific instance may not be what was intended due to the complex layers of symbolisms. Hence the cognitive aspect of the hunting experience being interpreted variously by hunters as religious experience, as going back to nature, as form of mystical reverence, etc., whilst a more general employment of The Hunting Experience as symbolic may be interpreted according to its historically constructed frame of reference, which is namely its *contextual* aspect; in that “symbolic forms are always embedded in specific social-historical contexts and processes within which, and by means of which, they are produced, transmitted and received”.⁴¹ This aspect of its symbolic form emerged out of the fragments of ideas, images and stories conveyed through the writings of the authors mentioned above, and which make up a significant portion of the constructed hunting experience and of what big game hunting is expected to entail. In this sense it is employed explicitly to promote hunting opportunities within the commercial market, by eliciting the expectation of being able to experience Africa in the way that the old hunters described.

Typically, The Hunting Experience as a “promotional package” conjures a romantic perception of the stereotypical “Safari” that harkens back to the days of these early explorers and hunters, and in this respect is similar to a notion of the complete “wilderness experience” that is marketed within non-consumptive eco-tourism. “Safari” itself is a symbol that is conjunctively employed and interconnected to these “promotional packages”.⁴²

Inferences to The Hunting Experience, though, conjure several symbolisms or characteristics. One is the notion of a close relationship between the client hunter and professional guide, or Professional Hunter (PH). The PH itself typically embodies the image of the White Hunter, the idea of which can be traced back to Haggard's immortalisation of Selous in the character of Alan Quatermain in *King Solomon's Mines*.⁴³ In this sense, the historic ideal of the White Hunter entails the psychological phenomenon called *positive projection*, in that positive qualities were/are typically projected onto the notion of The White Hunter, or even the trophy hunter himself, as being part of “a peculiar breed of men ... people

⁴⁰ The “producer-subject” is the person who produces, constructs or employs the symbolic form in the message.

⁴¹ Thompson 1990: 145.

⁴² Bundled up in this package is the romantic, symbolic image of the *Safari* – which hints at the rough outdoors, campfires, tents, Gin & Tonic in the evenings, the idea of Bwana or Memsahib – which was expounded and popularised by Hemingway, Ruark and others (Cf. Bull 1988).

⁴³ Bull 1988: 163-164.

possessing the rare assets of courage, intuition and skill ... the qualities we would most appreciate or value in ourselves".⁴⁴ This is confirmed to an extent by the view that modern trophy hunters are individuals who must necessarily be in possession of certain exemplary qualities by virtue of the fact that they are successful in hunting dangerous animals.⁴⁵ The relationship between client and PH is characteristically forged through shared hardship and is characterised by the possibility of respect and mutual admiration being earned by both parties through the shared participation of a hunting trip, as well as the excitement and danger that hunting dangerous animals in an exotic country brings. The rituals involved in the hunt itself are numerous, but obvious examples are the shaking of hands and congratulations between client hunter and PH that may take place after a successful stalk and killing of an animal, the ritual of measuring and scoring a trophy, as well as the posed photographs of the trophy hunter with his animals.

Another symbol is the notion of the White Hunter's close hunting companion in the way of a faithful servant, tracker, or gunbearer much in the form of Umslopogaas, the Swazi chief, who also became the prototype for this notion through the popularisation of Rider Haggard's novels,⁴⁶ while Philip Percival had M'Cola, Selous had April, and so on.⁴⁷

These are some of the core symbols that contribute to the interpretation of The Hunting Experience as a historical construct, in the sense that a range of personalities, traits, relationships, virtues, and events combine to lend it meaning and significance, and therefore desirability. The desirability itself lies in a yearning to return to a state where these symbols had significant meaning, and in the desire to escape from a state (such as the modern materialistic lifestyle) where their meaning is construed or less valued. The Hunting Experience thus promises a sense of fulfilment that the daily experience of a modern western lifestyle is unable to provide, and is actively promoted and "packaged" commercially with this understanding in mind (again, its intentional aspect).⁴⁸ People who embark

⁴⁴ McCullam 2000: 1.

⁴⁵ Cf. Eaton 2002: "... a successful hunter has to possess qualities desirable in a warring society. These are self-control, physical conditioning and stamina, patience, tenacity and wealth. It is no mere coincidence that disproportionate numbers of men with high status or great wealth in modern American society, business tycoons, military leaders and holders of high state office, are trophy hunters."

⁴⁶ Bull 1988: 265.

⁴⁷ Philip Percival had accompanied Roosevelt on some of his hunting expeditions in 1909, and was considered one of the finest professional hunters in Africa (Bull 1988: 175). He was later to be the professional hunter to Hemingway, and affectionately referred to in *Green Hills of Africa* as "Pop".

⁴⁸ One could ask whether the desire for The Hunting Experience itself is *primary*, or whether this desire stems out of the need to escape *from* a shallow materialistic lifestyle. The answer to this question holds implications regarding an alternative course of action that will provide fulfilment in the place of The Hunting Experience, and whether or not

on a trophy hunting trip to Africa inevitably expect fulfilment in all or some of these symbolic elements of The Hunting Experience.

The wild and romantic imagery evoked by The Hunting Experience in connection to hunting in Africa also carries with it the inevitable traits of *negative projection* in reference to the animals being hunted.⁴⁹ This is a legacy of Darwinian evolutionary theory and dualistic assumptions regarding man and nature that characterised modernist approaches to the environment, as well as the old hunters such as Cumming, Selous and others who typically saw the embodiment of various negative human traits in certain animals that they hunted. In other words: "... there are still many who believe, in a strange, lop-sided way, that wild animals in general, are the enemy. They are the killers; not us. They are the ones who lie in wait, slippery, cunning, ruthless, cowardly, destructive... lowly, dumb, dispensable ... all the qualities that we least accept in ourselves".⁵⁰ Roosevelt himself regarded the lives of animals as being "naturally a life of violence and iron cruelty",⁵¹ while Hemingway relates the various "humorous" ways in which hyenas die after being shot, describing them as being a "dirty joke", "stinking", "foul", and "self-eating devourers of the dead",⁵² which may explain the reason why 35 were shot on his 1933 hunting trip.⁵³ Some of these anthropomorphic descriptions unwittingly remain in evidence today, as in the following narrative by a young lady who comes to realise that hunting is not inherently evil in comparison to nature:

A pride of lions had brought down a beautiful, graceful giraffe in what seemed a cowardly, if clever, manoeuvre and voraciously began tearing at the soft underside of the poor animal – while it was still alive! Horrible and snivelling, cowardly, misshapen hyenas followed, slinking in the shadows, waiting until the lions were asleep to scavenge for leftovers. Mean, lazy, good-for-nothings! Not to mention the evil vultures who hung in the trees, waiting. So, nature was not perfect and most wonderful after all

⁵⁴
....

Although not as prevalent as it once was, the idea that in the hunting contest animals are objectified as the enemy still persists, particularly in respect to the

alternatives are available which satisfy the need to escape. Ortega y Gasset holds that hunting is the only possible diversion that is meaningful (1972: 129-134).

⁴⁹ McCullam 2001.

⁵⁰ McCullam 2001.

⁵¹ Bull 1988: 160.

⁵² Hemingway 1994: 26-27.

⁵³ Bull 1988: 281.

⁵⁴ Weaver 1994: 170.

hunting of predators, and the theme of the hunt as a form of combat is prevalent. This modernist type of outlook is also typical of what has been criticised as the “macho” tendencies of trophy hunters, and evident in the objectification of animals in terms of their trophy value (whereby they are “bagged”, “taken”, “dropped” by a shot, “stuffed”, etc.). In describing a lion hunt, Hemingway writes:

*But there he was, stretched out, on his belly, and, with the sun just over the top of the trees, and the grass very green, we walked up on him like a posse, or a gang of Black and Tans, guns ready and cocked, not knowing whether he was stunned or dead.*⁵⁵

This passage highlights the combative mode (“like a posse”, “guns ready and cocked”) some hunters enter into while hunting. However, negative projections are not necessarily a feature of trophy hunting per se or ethical hunting in general, as witnessed in the mystical respect with which animals are claimed to be imbued by hunters. The mystical and religious symbolism instead contribute to the ennoblement of hunting, in that it becomes a noble contest, much in the way modern sportsman are revered in fields such as rugby, American gridiron football or cricket.

5. HEMINGWAY AND ORTEGA MEET NAESS

Hemingway has long been regarded as the epitome of the modernist, macho big game hunter, and the animals he hunted were objectified to a fairly large extent in terms of their trophies, and it would be appropriate to introduce his work here. The way in which Hemingway presents The Hunting Experience through his stark narrative use of symbols and symbolic forms serve as good examples in respect to this discussion of the symbolic function of The Hunting Experience and its cognitive aspect in terms of the recollection and interpretation of memory. As Carlos Baker wrote: “Anyone interested in the methods by which *patterns of experience are translated to the purpose of art* should find abundant materials for study in the three stories – nonfiction and fiction – which grew out Hemingway’s African expedition.”⁵⁶ [Emphasis added].

One of these three stories is the book, *The Green Hills of Africa* (GHOA), which is Hemingway’s recollection of his 1933 hunting Safari to East Africa. It has been

⁵⁵ Hemingway 1994: 29.

⁵⁶ Baker 1963: 196, as quoted in Lounsbury 1983: 23.

variously interpreted as a “celebration of memory”,⁵⁷ as a revelation of trophy hunting as the constraint of manhood,⁵⁸ as a narrative of people symbolically hunting humans,⁵⁹ and also as an “indulgence” in the hunting experience.⁶⁰ Although the book was not well received critically⁶¹ it had a profound effect on inspiring author Robert Ruark, who undertook a hunting Safari to Africa in 1953 with the sole purpose of emulating Hemingway’s trip and experiences in order to write a book of the same genre as GHOA.⁶²

The effect of Hemingway’s writing is thus clearly demonstrated in Ruark’s fascination with him, and in the promotion of The Hunting Experience as meaningful, worthy of pursuit, and as re-constitution of the human self. Another of Hemingway’s hunting themed books, *The Snows of Kilimanjaro*, had huge popular appeal, and was turned into a film starring Gregory Peck as a hard drinking American writer who dies of gangrene in Africa while a hyena lurks around his tent.⁶³ Another of his short stories “The Short and Happy Life of Francis Macomber” was also turned into a film, with Gregory Peck again playing the leading role, this time as a White Hunter. His works and the films based on them therefore had a significant effect on influencing popular perceptions about Africa, hunting and the “wilderness experience”. Amongst trophy hunters today, Hemingway’s influence in directly stimulating a desire to hunt in Africa is tangible, as one SCI hunter states: “After reading *The Green Hills of Africa* as a teen-ager I was bitten by the African bug. Through the years, other books by Hemingway and Ruark were read, then read again, and I dreamed of exotic adventures. School, marriage and a career did their part in undermining my youthful enthusiasm and the African safari slowly became one of the many ‘coulda’s’ that often fill one’s life.”⁶⁴ In this particular case, SCI served as the catalyst whereby this hunter was able to realise his desire to hunt in Africa: “... my association with SCI brought me into contact with like-minded individuals, and my desire for an African adventure was reborn.”⁶⁵ An expectancy that a safari hunt in Africa will provide a

⁵⁷ Lounsberry 1983: 23-31.

⁵⁸ Strychacz 1993: 36-47.

⁵⁹ Brenner 1997: 35-50.

⁶⁰ Bull 1988: 175.

⁶¹ Lounsberry 1993: 36. Hemingway’s critics have labelled him, amongst others, a misogynist, a sexist, a warmonger, and a “simple” and “lazy writer” (Leighton 1932: 524). He remains, though, as being one of the iconic figures in American literature.

⁶² Bittner 2002: 129.

⁶³ Bull 1988: 280-281.

⁶⁴ Ford 1996: 53.

⁶⁵ Ford 1996: 53.

sense of fulfilment that would otherwise be lacking is clearly evident in this passage, and the desire for this fulfilment, in this example, clearly stems directly from Hemingway's writing, and from the influence of SCI.

The historical context of the emergence of GHOA served to underline Hemingway's own agenda and desire to respond to his critics' attack against his writing style and subject matter,⁶⁶ as much of the book has been described as a vitriol articulated against these critics, particularly Gertrude Stein.⁶⁷ However, Hemingway himself described the book as his attempt to "write an absolutely true book to see whether the shape of a country and the pattern of a month's action can, if truly presented, compete with a work of the imagination".⁶⁸

In his own words, GHOA therefore offers an attempt by a trophy hunter and one of the most accomplished authors to present The Hunting Experience ("the patterns of a month's action") in a way untinged by fiction, and in a way that may reveal its authenticity. What is relevant to this thesis is the type of hunting experience Hemingway reveals; and the questions as to whether his experiences of the Safari, his expectations of the hunt, his relationships with those around him, and his interpretation of the landscape reveal a historically conceived and constructed experience; or whether his expectations and relationships (towards other humans and animals) are uniquely uninfluenced by a notion of The Hunting Experience as a psychological construct, in terms of pre-defined symbols and rituals? I will address these questions rather briefly and simplistically given the space constraints, but intend that the questions themselves may offer an indication that different notions of The Hunting Experience exist. I will also examine the symbolic meaning of certain San hunting experiences and Ortega y Gasset's interpretation of The Hunting Experience in conjunction with Hemingway. The answer seems to be though that Hemingway's experiences were not original, in the sense that he was following in the direct footsteps of Selous and Roosevelt, whose own experiences and stories he strove to emulate, in the same way that Ruark strove to emulate him.⁶⁹ In this respect he inevitably had certain pre-conceived expectations as to what The Hunting Experience was meant to entail.

⁶⁶ Trogdon 1996: 2.

⁶⁷ Trogdon 1996: 1.

⁶⁸ Hemingway 1994: *Foreword*.

⁶⁹ Bull 1988: 276.

Certain symbols of the historically constructed Hunting Experience can be identified in GHOA. There is Hemingway himself, the trophy hunter and author; Philip Percival, the professional guide and White Hunter (referred to in the story as "Pop"), who was also one of Roosevelt's guides; M'Cola the gunbearer and tracker; his friend and hunting partner Charles Thompson (referred to as "Karl"); and Hemingway's second wife, Pauline (whom he refers to as "P.O.M." – Poor Old Mama). These people make up the core of Hemingway's hunting party, and can be identified as conforming to the role players or symbols that constitute part of The Hunting Experience, namely the trophy hunter, the PH or White Hunter, and the gun bearer or tracker.⁷⁰

All of the characters in the book, and their relationships with one another, serve as a backdrop to Hemingway's overriding obsession to shoot a trophy kudu bull, which he finds exceedingly difficult to accomplish, at one point saying in frustration: "I don't want a drink. I want a god-damned kudu."⁷¹ He eventually succeeds, but throughout the book engages in a fierce but polite rivalry with Karl in the quest for the largest and best trophy specimens, and reacts with despondency upon realising that Karl has shot a bigger rhino than the one he had been so happy about shooting:

There we were, the three of us, wanting to congratulate, waiting to be good sports about this rhino whose smaller horn was longer than our big one, this huge, tear-eyed marvel of a rhino, this dead, head-severed dream rhino, and instead we all spoke like people who were about to become seasick on a boat, or people who had suffered some heavy financial loss. We were ashamed and could do nothing about it. I wanted to say something pleasant and hearty, instead, 'How many times did you shoot him?' I asked.⁷²

I'd rather get [a kudu], a good one, than all the rest. I don't give a damn about these rhino outside of the fun of hunting them. But I'd like to get one that wouldn't look silly beside that dream rhino of his.⁷³

The intense desire for a particular trophy is evident, as is the sense of competition he engages in. He admits to being excessively proud and egoistic in hunting, preferring to shoot for an audience and seeks approval and validation

⁷⁰ There are legal and practical requirements, as well as procedures, to be adhered to in trophy hunting, namely that one is required by law to be accompanied by a PH, whilst the accompaniment of a tracker/gun bearer is practically beneficial. Identifying them as conforming to the symbols inherent in The Hunting Experience, means that they conform to the relationships one can expect to have in a trophy hunting trip.

⁷¹ 1994: 45.

⁷² 1994: 61.

⁷³ 1994: 63.

from Pop, P.O.M. and M'Cola for his hunting efforts. The intense desire and competition for trophies is not unlike that which is evident in many modern trophy hunters, and references to the measurement of trophies are noticeable, indicating that official scoring of trophies and record books were also important to him.⁷⁴ When he is successful in hunting, he admits to being more relaxed, and shows great humour and delight in his interactions with P.O.M. and Pop especially, with whom he has a cordial, relaxed relationship based on respect and admiration. When unsuccessful, he becomes sullen and irritable, and often treats the African trackers and gunbearers with scorn, yet at the same time seeks approval from them. He relates a particular hunt as follows:

M' Cola put the Springfield in my hand and I opened it to make sure I had solids. The rhino was out of sight now but I could see the shaking of the high grass. 'How far would you call it?'

'All of three hundred.'

'I'll bust the son of a bitch.'

I was watching, freezing myself deliberately inside, stopping the excitement as you close a valve, going into that impersonal state you shoot from.⁷⁵

Hemingway's references to animals range from admiration and awe, to contempt and disrespect. When engaged in the immediate act of hunting, about to shoot, with the animal before him and in his sights, or when the animals escape, they typically become objectified as "son of a bitch", "bastard", etc., whilst he often refers to a good trophy animal as "damn fine".

Hemingway found the experiences of his 1933 hunting trip, though, to be ultimately fulfilling:

This was the kind of hunting I liked. No riding in cars, the country broken up instead of the plains, and I was completely happy. I had been quite ill and had that pleasant feeling of getting stronger each day. I was underweight, had a great appetite for meat, and could eat all I wanted without feeling stuffy. Each day I sweated out whatever we drank sitting at the fire at night, and in the heat of the day, now, I lay in the shade with a breeze in the trees and read with no obligation and no compulsion to write, happy in knowing that at four o'clock we would be starting out to hunt again. I would not even write a letter. The only person I really cared about, except the children, was with me and I had no wish to share this life with anyone who was not there, only to live it, being completely happy and quite tired. I knew that I was shooting well and I had that feeling

⁷⁴ 1994: 169.

⁷⁵ 1994: 55.

*of well being and confidence that is so much more pleasant to have than to hear about.*⁷⁶

*Now, being in Africa, I was hungry for more of it, the changes of the seasons, the rains with no need to travel, the discomforts that you paid to make it real, the names of the trees, of the small animals, and all the birds, to know the language and have time to be in it and to move slowly.*⁷⁷

In relating the complete fulfilment and gratification that the hunting trip (or The Hunting Experience) produces in him, Hemingway highlights the sense of “completeness” that comes from a total immersion in the surrounding environment, from his appreciation of the terrain, his sense of isolation, the comfort provided by those around him, the slow pace of things, the physical benefits he feels, the absence of stress and the freedom from concerns about writing, while the only pressure on him is to “shoot well”. Moreover, the feeling of confidence and well being are “more pleasant to have than to hear about” indicating that he had preconceptions and expectations about the hunting trip and the experience itself that were more than fulfilled. An interpretation of Hemingway’s experiences also point towards Ortega y Gasset’s idea of “Hunting as Di-version”, which is an existential escape from modern existence, where Ortega states that:

*This is the reason men hunt. When you are fed up with the troublesome present, with being ‘very twentieth century,’ you take your gun, whistle for your dog, go out to the mountain, and, without further ado, give yourself the pleasure during a few hours or a few days of being ‘Paleolithic.’*⁷⁸

*When we leave the city and go up on the mountains it is astounding how naturally and rapidly we free ourselves from the worries, temper, and ways of the real person we were, and the savage man springs anew in us. Our life seems to lose weight and the fresh and fragrant atmosphere of an adolescence circulates through it. We feel ... submerged in Nature.*⁷⁹

Ortega’s theories regarding hunting, as laid out in *Meditations on Hunting*, are therefore essentially that hunting is the vehicle through which man returns to his true, authentic state – that of a hunter.⁸⁰ His narrative is distinctly phenomenological in approach, whereby he attempts to define the essence of

⁷⁶ Hemingway 1994: 40.

⁷⁷ Hemingway 1994: 53.

⁷⁸ 1972: 134.

⁷⁹ 1972: 136.

⁸⁰ 1972: 134.

hunting, and articulates his discourse in a romantic prose. He defines hunting as “diversion”,⁸¹ “happiness”⁸² and as a “contest or confrontation between two systems of instincts”.⁸³

It is only through the act of hunting that man is able to return to “something known before hand, where we might always have been”.⁸⁴ Through the willing immersion of the self in the landscape (“only by hunting can man *be in* the country”)⁸⁵ man attains the level of authenticity that is not possible through modern living. Hemingway indicates this same existential notion of escape *from* a state of confinement and worry, *to* a state of fulfilment; and, being fiercely independent, also shares Ortega’s dualistic view of the world.⁸⁶ He emphasises a deep self-awareness and individualisation (indicated in his passage quoted above through the repeated use of “I”) through being immersed in the expansive countryside in which he finds himself. This reveals a reflective existentialist perspective, which is similar to Ortega’s view that “objective reality emanates from selfconsciousness”.⁸⁷ The results of this perspective are notably expressed towards the end of the book, coming as a critical reflection on the meaning of colonialism and western industrialisation after his experiences and his immersion in the landscape, its animals, and its people:

*A continent ages quickly once we come. The natives live in harmony with it. But the foreigner destroys, cuts down the trees, drains the water ... The earth gets tired of being exploited. A country wears out quickly unless man puts in it all his residue and that of all his beasts. When he quits using beasts and uses machines, the earth defeats him quickly. The machine can't reproduce, nor does it fertilize the soil, and it eats what he cannot raise. A country was made to be as we found it. We are the intruders and after we are dead we may have ruined it but it will still be there ...*⁸⁸

Hemingway thus strives for authenticity, both in his intent in writing a book to express his experiences, and in the pursuit of happiness and self-fulfilment. The hunting experience that Ortega and Hemingway both proclaim is directed towards this state of authenticity. If this analysis is correct, then the authors share a notion of authenticity that cannot but be attained by virtue of being *in* the landscape,

⁸¹ 1972: 129-143.

⁸² 1972: 27-36.

⁸³ 1972: 59.

⁸⁴ 1972: 136.

⁸⁵ 1972: 140.

⁸⁶ According to Gonzalez (2002: 408), Ortega's thought is "wholly and intrinsically" dualistic.

⁸⁷ Gonzalez 2002: 408.

⁸⁸ 1994: 204.

suggesting that there is an essence to The Hunting Experience that is universal, in that its deeply symbolic relevance lies in providing fulfilment through the self-awareness of individualised existentialism. This reflective perspective, shown in Hemingway's passage above, comes about through being immersed in the ecological landscape, and is similar in notion to Naess's second principle of *biospherical egalitarianism*,⁸⁹ which is necessarily a product of the cognitive aspect of the experience itself:

The ecological field-worker acquires a deep-seated respect, or even veneration, for ways and forms of life. He reaches an understanding from within, a kind of understanding others reserve for fellow men and for a narrow section of ways and forms of life.⁹⁰

As Naess's second principle shows, though, this reflective perspective is not unique to hunting as "pursuit of the good life", to the Ethical Hunter, or to The Hunting Experience, hence the simplistic claims by certain parties that: "You don't need to hunt to enjoy nature". It is an aspect that is central, though, to the interpretation of hunting as symbolically meaningful, and is necessary to the idea of The Ethical Hunter. It is not, however, dependent on the ritual act of hunting. Combined with the historically constructed Hunting Experience, psychological phenomena such as positive projection, the politics of desire and individual fears about autonomy, the existential perspective of the cognitive aspect of The Hunting Experience brings about the interpretation of hunting as being uniquely the "path to the good life".

The most important symbol in which such an interpretation is embedded, and on which it is wholly and ultimately dependent upon, is Man as Evolutionary Being. This is a prerequisite for the interpretation of The Hunting Experience as uniquely authentic, and on which the meaning and relevance of such an interpretation itself depends. The authenticity of The Hunting Experience is therefore closely bound to the notion of a "returning to", and of a rejection, though temporary, of symbols of progressiveness and materialism that inhibit this "returning to", hence the acceptance of the ruggedness and "roughing it in the bush" as an acceptable and necessary part of the hunting act. It also supposes that there is a place to return to, and a place from which the returning originates, meaning that a distinction between states of existence is evident first and foremost, which is the obvious dualist assumption.

⁸⁹ Naess 1973: 95. Cf. Chapter 5 the discussion of deep ecology in relation to Naess's *biospherical egalitarianism*.

⁹⁰ Naess 1973: 95-96.

This brings us to the appropriate analogy between the meaning of the hunting experience to modern hunters, and the meaning of the hunting experience to hunter-gatherer communities. Where still practiced, the subsistence hunting of hunter-gatherer societies may justifiably be considered to be an expression of hunting that epitomises the authentic hunting lifestyle, which itself hints at the refined evolutionary ability of humans to adapt that is the core of the Hunting Hypothesis.

6. HUNTER-GATHERER SYMBOLISM

Indigenous hunter-gatherer societies represent, for modern hunters, this notion of a state of authenticity to which a returning to is necessary. It may be argued, though, that within hunter-gatherer societies the existential concerns that are characteristically expressed by pro-hunters in their desire to return to a state of authenticity are largely not evident. They are surrounded by nature and are intrinsically a part of the landscape and the biotic community in that they are directly dependent on the provisions that the land is able to provide. Their daily existence is thus an integration with biological processes – they are already immersed in the landscape. Beyond desires for the material benefits and luxuries that nature cannot provide, there is no need to return to nature, as the concept may hold no meaning in that it is irrelevant – they already are interconnected with every facet of the ecosystem.

Exposure to western influences, though, and the comparative state of poverty they are in, in terms of material goods, may prompt the desire to escape from a hunter-gatherer lifestyle and seek formal employment and education, for example. As such, whether there are any “true” hunter-gather communities remaining in southern Africa today is unclear, and there is some confusion over whether or not certain Basarwa populations in Botswana are twentieth-century hunter-gatherers or “impoverished agro-pastoralists”.⁹¹ For those communities that were traditionally dependent on a hunter-gatherer lifestyle, though, hunting remains an immensely important feature of their societies, although it is largely a practical pursuit that is necessary for the subsistence of the community when other food resources are limited. The importance of hunting is much the same as us picking up a fork to transfer food from the plate to our mouths. The act is vital for sustenance, but beyond this fact it is not imbued with the western notions of

⁹¹ Kent 1996b: 133.

recreation, self-realisation, domination, or otherwise. Hunting means food and survival, requiring a great deal of training and forward planning,⁹² and has a specific purpose. As such the convoluted meanings that characterise western recreational hunting are not evident.

There is a scarcity of narratives that directly attempt to relate the cognitive aspect of the experience of hunting within San communities. Stories and tales about hunting in the form of first person narratives are largely mythical in orientation, and have a fable quality to them, in that they are used to explain and interpret the world. Through these stories hunting can be seen to hold a deeply symbolic meaning for certain communities in that the cultural life of the community itself revolves around hunting. As Deacon states: "The beliefs and symbolic activities related to hunting were as essential as the weapons that were used and both were part of the 'world view' of the Bushman society."⁹³

As mentioned briefly before, for the Kua community hunting establishes a psychological link between men and animals and their surroundings, and plays a role in affirming their equality with nature.⁹⁴ It is also symbolic for the Kua in the way it functions in inter-personal relationships. A man's hunting ability is an indication of his sexual prowess, and the value of a man to his wife is also dependent on his ability to provide food,⁹⁵ and thereby plays a vital role in maintaining harmony and balance within this relationship. Hunting also represents an apprenticeship and the psychological training a son receives from his father.⁹⁶ Their relationship towards animals, and their integration and living in and with the land, can also be described as an indication of the ultimate expression of biospherical egalitarianism. Killing is only prompted by the need for survival, and is sustainable to the extreme,⁹⁷ while the symbolic importance of animals lies in their provision of life to the community. The rituals surrounding the uncertain outcome of hunting, and the methods and tools used, are closely linked to mystical beliefs about origin and creation, largely because "... hunting is a gamble and, to cope with the inherent unpredictability, Bushmen (and indeed all hunter-gatherers) rely not only on their knowledge of the environment, but on

⁹² Deacon 1992: 12.

⁹³ Deacon 1992: 13.

⁹⁴ Valiente-Noailles 1993: 59.

⁹⁵ Valiente-Noailles 1993: 62.

⁹⁶ Valiente-Noailles 1993: 61.

⁹⁷ Valiente-Noailles 1993: 69, 71.

supernatural power that they harness through a constellation of religious beliefs".⁹⁸

The methods used in hunting have changed little: "The Kua hunts as the lion, leopard, cheetah and the wild dog do: with traditional methods and as he has always done in the past."⁹⁹ The varying methods of hunting anticipate the uncertain outcome, and depending on the perceived chances of success up to four people may take part in a hunt. Bow and arrow hunting is also not practiced for several months of the year due to the unavailability of the pupae from which hunters get the poison. Depending on the species being hunted, or the availability of poison, hunters may therefore use spears, traps, or snares; or may attempt to run the animal down on foot, thereby forcing it to tire and stop, at which point it may be more easily killed.¹⁰⁰ If a hunt is successful, every part of the animal is consumed or utilised in some way, including the intestines, marrow, skin, bones, etc.

The arrow particularly holds enormous symbolic importance in the hunt and cultural life of certain communities, and which governs certain social interactions, in the sense that many of the cultural rituals and taboos surrounding the hunt itself were geared towards preventing the poison on the arrows from "going cold".¹⁰¹ The strong link between animal and hunter is also evident in these taboos, particularly after a hunter had shot an animal and was waiting for the poison to take effect; he was not allowed to run back to camp or speak of the animal that he had shot, lest the poison "cool" and not work properly.¹⁰² Furthermore, "... a good hunter would not eat or sleep with his wife before or during a hunt because this could make the poison on his arrows 'cold'".¹⁰³ This is largely because the outcome of a hunt is beyond the control of the hunter; even if he is able to successfully stalk an animal close enough to where he is able to shoot an arrow at it, he still has no guarantee that the poison will work, or that hyenas or lions wouldn't get to the animal before him. There are therefore various sets of customs related to the notion of *respect* for the animal, by which hunters are required to respect any animal they shoot, no matter what the species. These

⁹⁸ Deacon 1992: 13.

⁹⁹ Valiente-Noailles 1993: 69.

¹⁰⁰ Valiente-Noailles 1993: 66-67. Non-traditional methods are increasingly being used, including hunting with dogs and on horseback, although the latter is not always possible considering the difficulty and expense in sustaining horses in an arid environment.

¹⁰¹ Deacon 1992: 14-15.

¹⁰² Deacon 1992: 14.

¹⁰³ Deacon 1992: 14.

may be for practical reasons as well as out of recognition for the life the animal provides.¹⁰⁴ Certain species hold special significance, the eland being the most notable, as all the animals on earth are said to be made by the deity //gamá (or /Kaggen) from the rumen of an eland.¹⁰⁵ There are therefore various rituals associated with eland hunting, specifically first-kill rituals.¹⁰⁶

Underlying these rituals, taboos and customs of respect, is the belief that the lives of the hunter and of the animal he shoots are intrinsically linked during the time the hunter waits for the wounded animal to die.¹⁰⁷ In certain communities, such as the /Xam and !Kung, the hunter manifested this link by behaving as if he were dying as well: "The hunter avoided all manifestation of energy and vigour and behaved as if his life, too, were ebbing slowly. During the period of his inactivity the hunter's mind was fixed on the failing eland: he imagined its stumbling movements and transferred these movements to himself."¹⁰⁸

What is noticeable is that these symbolisms are the inevitable result of hunting as necessity, and of a belief system that is very different from western Enlightenment and dualistic approaches to the environment. There are, however, certain common traits and symbolisms that are evident in western hunting practices and rituals as well, particularly in the notion of ethical hunting, such as the expression of a mystical respect for animals, the apprenticeship between father and son, or the desire for an egalitarian interaction with nature.¹⁰⁹ The similarities between them in terms of cultural significance point towards the validity of pro-hunting arguments surrounding the value of hunting, in cultural terms, to hunters. That hunting has a similar cultural meaning in the same way that it does for certain San communities is an indication that ethical hunting, as practiced by the ideal Ethical Hunter, is a valid pursuit of authenticity, as the notion of the Ethical Hunter is perfectly embodied in the hunting practices of these communities. This may explain the appeal of a "returning to" a state of existence similar to that of hunter-gatherer societies; what is more evident though, is the appeal of returning to this state of mind, or attitude.

¹⁰⁴ Lewis-Williams 1981: 56.

¹⁰⁵ Valiente-Noailles 1993: 71.

¹⁰⁶ Lewis-Williams 1981: 55-64.

¹⁰⁷ Lewis-Williams 1981: 56; Valiente-Noailles 1993: 100.

¹⁰⁸ Lewis-Williams 1981: 56.

¹⁰⁹ Although this desire may itself be considered as a sign of the inevitable separation from nature that a modern western lifestyle enforces.

7. CONCLUSION

The experience of hunting has a definitive cognitive aspect, and allows humans to return to nature and re-acquaint themselves with the environment. This cognitive aspect is central to Ortega's theories, and also in a way similar to Naess's biospherical egalitarianism. The cognitive aspect itself though, is not dependent on hunting, nor is it unique to biospherical egalitarianism or deep ecology for that matter; rather, its interpretation according to a psychological construct of symbols leads to the conclusion that the sense of self-fulfilment or perspective which this aspect grants is embedded in hunting alone. The Hunting Experience as historical and symbolic construct plays a role in this interpretation, as it motivates an expectancy of the kind of fulfilment the cognitive may bring.

Within the postmodern tribal politics of the hunting debate, and in terms of the politics of desire, politics of fear, and politics of certainty, The Hunting Experience as meaningful is therefore misconstrued due to the battle between pro- and anti-hunting groups for authority. This battle, for public attention and trust, is conducted through various forms of communication, including mass media, which has an obvious implication for the choices available to people between one position or the other, and for the interpretation of meaning regarding the morality of hunting. The Hunting Experience is a definitive symbol around which this battle for re-constitution of meaning takes place, and each side can be seen to employ certain symbols, intentionally and unintentionally, to manipulate public trust and fear.

This leads to the remaining questions over the authenticity of Big Five trophy hunting in terms of enhancing or exceeding the fulfilment or perspective that the cognitive aspect of The Hunting Experience brings. In other words, questions remain over whether or not trophy hunting of the Big Five, as it is practiced today, meaningfully contributes, in a way that is better or exceeds, the fulfilment provided by The Hunting Experience of the ideal Ethical Hunter. I hope to tackle these questions in the following chapter, in the form of a discussion of the relationship between "integrity as a virtue" and The Hunting Experience, with a contextual comparison of Big Five trophy hunting in South Africa and Botswana.

CHAPTER 8

INTEGRITY AND THE HUNTING EXPERIENCE

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter serves as a conclusion to all of the various aspects covered in this thesis regarding the morality of hunting, by which an attempt will be made to bring them into a contextual discussion of the notion of integrity in relation to trophy hunting in Africa.

When speaking of *Integrity* in relation to the hunting debate we are necessarily concerned with an inescapably broad conception of the term, as an adequate and well-defined concept of integrity that is relevant and applicable to all aspects of the debate will itself require a work of its own. It is therefore difficult to pin down "Integrity" without being unnecessarily generalised.

The main point to make regarding integrity and hunting though is that integrity is generally conceptualised to be a virtue.¹ In the search for morality regarding the act of hunting and its conflicting meanings in society today, integrity as a virtue may be one of the few things that hunters and anti-hunters agree upon. Integrity is also the antithesis to *Corruption*,² something that both parties profess to actively oppose in respect to environmental issues. Having "Integrity as a Virtue" as a commonality may then provide a broad, though as yet undefined, basis for agreement in approaching the issue of hunting, and for a basis in evaluating the conflicts inherent in the debate itself. This is because a broad conception of Integrity still allows for its application to almost all of the conflicting issues that mark the debate, while at the same time leaving room for its contextualisation in regard to specific aspects or problems that, once identified, can be further clarified.

Integrity may therefore be applied in a way that is relevant to most, if not all, of the personal, political, ecological, philosophical and economic³ aspects of the

¹ Cf. Montefiore (1999: 9) for a discussion of the relationship between integrity and virtue, whereby integrity contributes to the "wholeness of virtue".

² Montefiore 1999: 8.

³ Insisting on integrity within the competitive hunting industry may be problematic and not a useful pragmatic option, although it seems a worthy ideal. This is because notions of honesty, fairness, obligations, personal values or moral

hunting debate, in that the integration of a person's values and beliefs in their daily lives, and the consistency with which they act according to these beliefs; the logical characteristics of philosophical arguments, and their consistency in terms of non-contradiction and validity; authenticity of certain hunting practices; and the health, stability and sustainability of ecosystems and wild species may be all discussed under the banner of Integrity as Virtue, so to speak. Perhaps more importantly, one could be more specific in the application of Integrity as Virtue to The Hunting Experience itself. This includes the cognitive aspect as well as the historically constructed and commercially packaged "hunting experience" that was discussed in Chapter 7. One then deals with integrity in the varied terms of authenticity, consistency, honesty, sincerity, fulfilment (of expectation), truth, or substance; and by so doing also deals with the notion of *arguing with integrity* for or against hunting, which is directly applicable to the politics of the debate discussed in the previous chapter.

Throughout this chapter, then, I will seek to identify various conceptions of Integrity that may be applied to specific problematic areas within the debate, by analysing some examples that may indicate inconsistencies, fallacies, manipulations, etc.; and others that may indicate authenticity, sincerity, coherence, etc. This assumes that consistency, truth, honesty, validity, coherence, sincerity and similar notions form part of the whole that is Integrity as a Virtue.

2. INTEGRITY AND THE TROPHY HUNTING EXPERIENCE

The first question that must be clarified is: What defines a trophy hunter? This has important implications insofar as it addresses the role of the ideal ethical hunter in Africa. Throughout this thesis, and for the reasons outlined at the beginning of Chapter 6, the notion of trophy hunter has generally been intended to refer to those hunters who choose to hunt the Big Five species in Africa. It is intended to refer to persons who pay for the opportunity of hunting lions, leopards, rhinos, elephants or buffalo. It does not refer to the normal biltong or venison hunter who chooses on occasion to hunt a trophy kudu because of its remarkable size or horns, as all hunters may be called trophy hunters in the sense that they would no doubt appreciate the remarkable size or trophy quality

duties are not necessary or at times desirable for the market to function (Ross 1999: 291), even though they may nevertheless contribute to its efficiency. A company or business that is seen to have integrity necessarily increases its appeal within the market, but is prone to fall behind its less-scrupulous competitors (Brown 1999: 281-282).

of an animal. It is an aesthetic thing to admire a beautiful animal, and if a hunter happens to shoot an animal that can be called a trophy he/she would not normally consider it a grievous matter. However, not all hunters hunt with the intent of shooting a trophy, even though trophy size is valued highly in the hunting of plains game. Also, some hunters may only partake in one trophy hunt in their lives, lasting only 21 days, having saved up for what is often regarded as a “dream” safari hunt in Africa,⁴ in which case they would nevertheless still be regarded as a trophy hunter. What is of concern in this chapter, though, is the consistency with which an Idea of the Ethical Hunter conforms to the actual practices of Big Five trophy hunters in Africa today, as well as the consistency with which anti-hunting arguments are applied to a specific African trophy hunting context.

Generally speaking then, if the primary difference between categorical types of hunting lies in the motives of individuals, then an examination of motive, intention and desire (in relation to integrity) is important if we seek to properly distinguish between subsistence, sport and trophy hunting. Doing so will reveal why anti-hunting groups condemn trophy hunting, whilst to a certain extent forgive subsistence hunting. The methods and equipment used in both types of hunting may be the same, the animal killed may be the same species, age, and size, and the hunt may take place in an identical habitat; yet the one act is condemned, whilst the other is accepted. It is safe to say then, that the criteria used to condemn or accept an act of hunting do not rest solely on the methods employed but in addition depend largely on the purpose of the hunt. This may explain in principle why anti-hunters so vehemently oppose sport and trophy hunting, in that they implicitly question the moral agenda of those who participate in the above activities, and more specifically question the desires of hunters.

The question of desires can be looked at in several ways in respect to hunting. One can say that hunters *believe* that the act of hunting, or more specifically The Hunting Experience, is a necessary component for their self-realisation or fulfilment. The desire to hunt therefore stems from the belief that hunting is essential to bring fulfilment. Anti-hunters therefore question the desires (that is, the desires to pursue fulfilment through hunting) of hunters, but when doing so also implicitly question the beliefs on which these desires are based, perhaps on the argument that “well-being does not consist of the satisfaction of desires that

⁴ The lengths of trophy hunts in Africa vary from 7 days to 21 days on average, depending on the budget of the client hunter, or the number and species he wishes to shoot.

are mistakenly based on false beliefs".⁵ They might also argue further that an act done in pursuit of a desire, which is itself based on a wrong belief, cannot be called an act of integrity. However, whether beliefs are true or not does not necessarily influence the sense of fulfilment one feels upon the satisfaction of desires, especially when one is not aware that one's beliefs may be wrong. In this respect anti-hunters would be wrong in questioning the validity of the sense of fulfilment that hunting brings, as it may not be dependent on the truth or falsity of beliefs. Also, hunters do not hunt only in the pursuit of fulfilment; people hunt simply for the meat, diversion, or communion (with nature and other people). Similarly, anti-hunters may argue against hunting based on the belief itself that eating meat is not natural for humans, or that all hunters really are pathological killers. Hunters may therefore also justifiably call these beliefs into question. The notion of integrity, however, addresses these problems by emphasising that the truth or falsity of beliefs, the satisfaction of desires, the individual personality traits, fulfilment or self-realisation, the ecological impacts, economic benefits, etc., all combine, or integrate, to lend an act of hunting its "wholeness".

Part of the difficulty inherent in reaching a definite defensible position as to the moral worth of a hunting act, though, lies in the difficulty of quantifying an individual's motives, intentions and desires, if it can be given that these combine to lend a hunting act its purpose. The truth or validity of beliefs may be determined more accurately, but only through a contextual analysis of the socio-historical and cultural contexts within which these beliefs function. Moral judgements as to the worth of a hunting act cannot therefore be attained by external analysis of method and consequence alone, although these are essential aspects to consider, but also need to consider the beliefs and desires that inform the act itself.

Equating integrity with morality is also problematic, as integrity alone is not sufficient for morality, as it does not always provide clear and straightforward direction.⁶ What can be discerned however, and deduced by external observation, is the consistency with which hunting acts fulfil certain objectives and theories regarding stated aims and intended results, and may fulfil the requirement for integrity in relation to the wholeness of The Hunting Experience itself. Emphasising integrity in conjunction with morality, therefore, addresses the contexts in which moral arguments are applied.

⁵ Noggle 1999: 304.

⁶ Benjamin 1990: 53.

An example of this may be a justification of trophy hunting that is merely based on economic consequentialism (for example, that hunting brings money to local communities, through trophy fees, taxidermy, employment of trackers, etc.). Hunters often state that they are conservationists as well as hunters, and that they hunt because doing so contributes to wildlife preservation. This is regarded as being a morally worthy contribution, and thus taken as a moral justification for hunting. However, even though this utilitarian defence has increasingly become the strongest form of argument for hunting advocates in general, it fails to justify the trophy hunting act from a moral perspective. This is because pro-hunters, and trophy hunters in particular, confuse the positive net result of their cost/benefit analysis as having a positive moral value.⁷

According to consistency principles, this would be inadequate as a moral justification, as it ignores the fact that these consequences are secondary and merely a by-product of the initial impulse (aim/intention) of trophy hunting. Arguably, many people do not hunt primarily out of altruistic beliefs to help poorer communities, nor do they hunt out of a sincere primary desire to preserve ecosystems and habitats for animals. These are, in this hypothetical example, secondary benefits apart from and exclusive to the primary intention, motivation or desire to hunt. Rather, the primary motive of the person intending to hunt, and which drives the desire to hunt, would more likely be the experience of the hunt in its entirety.

In a specifically African context (bearing in mind that we are dealing exclusively with the hunting of the Big Five), The Hunting Experience "in its entirety" which I refer to can be defined as the cognitive, psychological, emotional, sensory and physical stimulations and challenges offered by a hunt. It is not confined and limited to the act of stalking and killing an animal. It is rather an extended experience that begins when the client hunter is received by the outfitter or professional hunter (PH) organising his hunt, and ends when he leaves the hunting camp. Therefore, part of the experience is being in the natural environment and wilderness, viewing and interacting with animals on a primal footing, having a relationship with the PH akin to camaraderie for a limited time and on a certain level, testing one's skill in tracking and shooting animals, and

⁷ Causey 1989: 340.

perhaps being involved in an activity in which the ever-present possibility of the unexpected happening heightens awareness.⁸

Ann Causey⁹ takes this view a step further and states that the motive for sport hunting “boils down to the enjoyment of activities undertaken as part of the *quest for* and ultimately the achievement of the *kill*.”¹⁰ [Author’s own emphasis]. The initial desire to hunt is not motivated by the potential benefits that may accrue from the act; rather it is the thrill of the chase and ultimately of the kill that gets the hunter into the field: “In the final analysis, the hunter does not hunt to manage, harvest, control, cull, or thin herds of game; he hunts to *kill* ...”¹¹

Therefore, to posit beneficial consequences, which hunting indirectly brings to ecosystems and communities, as a moral justification thereof, is to ignore the fact that trophy hunting is motivated by a *personal desire* for the individual gratification which the hunting experience brings to the individual hunter. This desire and motive is not for the well being of ecosystems and communities *in itself*, though these may be secondary desires in so far as they serve as a means to an end, the end being a healthy ecosystem which ensures the continuation of the possibility of being able to *experience* a hunt in the future. This becomes even more problematic in cases where the desire for the trophy is above other considerations.

In short, a person may desire a healthy ecosystem, or may desire to help poor rural communities. However, this desire *in itself* is not the same desire that motivates the choice to hunt. This justification is peripheral to the desire, to the intention, to hunt, and more importantly is peripheral to the individual *satisfaction* gained from the hunting experience itself.

The fact that trophy hunting indirectly provides peripheral benefits to communities or ecosystems themselves is therefore not sufficient to justify it from a philosophical moral point of view in so far as integrity is concerned, as the consistency with which the moral imperative “to kill in order to conserve” is integrated with the desire for the gratification provided by a hunting experience is unsound. In other words, the arguments and stated aims of some hunters that

⁸ Ortega y Gasset: “The hunter knows that he does not know what is going to happen, and this is one of the greatest attractions of his occupation” (1972: 150).

⁹ 1989: 327-343.

¹⁰ Causey 1989: 336.

¹¹ Causey 1989: 336.

trophy hunting is *necessary* for conservation and the economic upliftment of rural communities, and therefore in utilitarian terms a moral imperative, presupposes that the economic upliftment of people and conservation are primary concerns, rather than the individualistic desire for gratification. The stated aims and objectives, and moral imperative to hunt are thereby confused, as in this example the claim that “I hunt in order to conserve” can in reality be seen to be a case of “I conserve in order to hunt”.

It follows that the integrity of justifying hunting according to these peripheral benefits, and the integrity of the hunting experience *itself*, is therefore brought into question, as hunting can only be regarded in this viewpoint as being an act of moral integrity if, and only if, the following criteria are fulfilled:

Firstly, only if peripheral benefits are essential and vital to the welfare of people and the environment, and therefore morally imperative.¹² This would imply that out of a duty and obligation to ensure that the net benefit of goods outweighs the bad in respect to people and the environment, hunters are principally duty bound to hunt. The greater good demands that they do so, and the primary desire of hunters in order to fulfil this moral imperative overrides the desire for individual gratification. Secondly, only if these peripheral benefits can be obtained through trophy hunting. That trophy hunting is able to provide economic upliftment to communities is clear. That the value of a lion, for example, in terms of its trophy value is worth more than its value to eco-tourism is not so clear.¹³

Hunting would therefore be morally justified in the sense that the desire for the obtainment of peripheral benefits for things other than the hunters themselves is the primary motivation (desire) in the decision to hunt.¹⁴

¹² This presupposes as a basis the acceptance of other moral theories; for e.g. that nature has intrinsic moral worth, yet that the value of the ecosystem supersedes in certain contexts the value of the life of an individual animal, where the death of the animal is seen to be beneficial to the long term survival of the ecosystem. This also presupposes that in this context, man is morally justified in killing the animal, as this is motivated by a sincere desire to preserve the ecosystem. Based on *utilitarian* arguments therefore, the peripheral benefits (i.e. income, food, jobs, etc.) provided by hunting may be utilised because it promotes the over-all good, both for ecosystems and nature, and humans.

¹³ African Lion Working Group 1999. There is a lot of debate about this issue, as mentioned in Chapter 3. That lions are more valuable in trophy terms within specific habitats and vegetation types that are not conducive to eco-tourism seems the general consensus within conservation circles. That they are more valuable *on the whole* in terms of their economic trophy value seems to be in doubt.

¹⁴ A distinction could also be made between the outfitters who supply the hunts (i.e. the means, land, equipment, etc.) and those who partake in the hunts (i.e. client, PH, etc.) so far as motives, intentions and desires are concerned. The client hunter does not have the same primary desire to hunt as the PH or outfitter – his is for the experience or trophy/meat, whereas the PH/outfitter is primarily concerned with the needs of clients, or for his passion for his profession.

These are therefore causal justifications of trophy hunting as opposed to primary ones. That is to say, they address the causal implications and not the inherent moral quality of the activity.¹⁵ If this line of questioning is correct, then it can be seen that consistency principles are not fully adhered to by hunters in the process of justifying trophy hunting of the Big Five on the basis of causal implications alone. If we take this further we can see that this approach of using utilitarian theory to justifying trophy hunting lacks a certain logical integrity, in that it doesn't justify it at all (i.e. it doesn't do what hunters claim it does) – it merely makes excuses for it.¹⁶

One could argue that the commercially packaged “trophy hunting experience” is therefore inconsistent with the hunting experience, and moral imperative to hunt, that the Ethical Hunter himself presupposes and claims. In certain cases in an African context, The Hunting Experience therefore lacks integrity according to this view. Although this offers pointers towards questions of morality, it does not impute conclusive moral judgement on the part of the trophy hunter, or on trophy hunting in general, and only allows for the conclusion that the *experience* lacks integrity, as do the attempts to justify the experience according to pure consequentialism.

As an aside, it is important to distinguish here between trophy hunting as an experience, and trophy hunting as a management tool. To say that the experience itself lacks integrity, does not imply that integrity is lacking in wildlife management appraisals in Africa that seek to establish trophy hunting as a viable alternative. In utilitarian terms alone, trophy hunting may be seen by wildlife managers as a necessity in certain cases, especially when one considers the status of the Big Five animals in certain parts of Africa. But to promote The Hunting Experience, in its commercially packaged form, as meaningful in this African context is a misnomer, as the meaning of The Hunting Experience to individual hunters is not contingent on ecological and ecosystemic realities.¹⁷ This also brings us to the irony of trophy hunting, and the paradoxical nature of its existence in Africa today. While the commercially packaged “hunting experience” is inconsistently employed in moral justifications of trophy hunting in Africa, the

¹⁵ Causey (1989: 341-342) supports this view, and says further that utilitarianism, while well intentioned, is an “impotent ethical defence” of hunting.

¹⁶ Causey 1989: 342.

¹⁷ Harmful ecological impacts, and the status of wildlife, may influence the sense of fulfilment sought by individual hunters, but these considerations do not necessarily impact on the interpretation of the symbolic meaning of The Hunting Experience.

instrumental benefits trophy hunting brings in specific cases may make it a short-term necessity in utilitarian terms. This is especially when one considers the lack of alternative and workable options to wildlife problems forthcoming from anti-hunting groups that are able to provide the same ecological and economic benefits. I will highlight this in the discussion that follows in Section 4, particularly in reference to the different species of Big Five animals.

3. INTEGRITY AND ANTI-HUNTING POSITIONS

Arguments against hunting similarly also often fail at the hurdle of logical integrity and consistency principles. This is especially so when arguments against hunting on the basis that it causes pain and suffering (to wild animals and game), fail to take into account the suffering of farm animals. Modern farming, despite the advances in technology and scientific methods, continues to have its critics as far as the ethical treatment of animals is concerned. In abattoirs, livestock and poultry farms worldwide the suffering of animals is well documented and remains a core focus of animal rights and liberation groups. Here it serves as a backdrop for drawing some conclusions as to the validity of utilitarian arguments against hunting on the basis that it causes suffering.

While it is well known that many anti-hunters and animal rights activists practice vegetarianism, and therefore most likely oppose the raising of livestock and poultry for slaughter in addition to their opposition to hunting, this does not hold true for everyone who opposes hunting. In the general debate, there are people with whom the notion of hunting does not sit comfortably, and who may even actively oppose it; yet, they may nevertheless continue to buy meat at butcher shops and supermarkets for consumption. The integrity of arguing against all forms of hunting, whilst continuing to buy meat from grocery stores for consumption, on the basis that it is cruel, unnecessary and inflicts pain and suffering can therefore be questioned as both erroneous and inconsistent. It does not take into account the free existence of the wild animals being hunted, or their superior quality of life, generally speaking, in comparison to domestic livestock. Also, the quick and painless death which an ethical hunter is able to inflict (provided it is quick and painless) is preferable to the mechanistic slaughter of large numbers of livestock that industry requires.

Those who oppose hunting, but accept that it is morally acceptable to eat animals, would have to be quite specific about the type of hunting that they

oppose, as I hope to show below. It is in a scenario such as this, where utilitarian theory, whilst not being particularly effective as a defence of hunting, may also show up flaws in certain arguments used by anti-hunters on the basis that hunting causes pain and suffering to animals.

Certain farming practices by unscrupulous farmers often result in unnecessary suffering to the animals concerned. Examples may be found in large-scale chicken farming, where battery hens are kept in cages with insufficient space for movement resulting in muscle atrophy and obesity. Another example is found in the transport and handling of livestock, which can result in stress, injury and in extreme cases death due to careless handling and lack of attention to animals' welfare. Undue suffering is thus caused through bad management practices driven by economic considerations and the desire to maximize profit. However, in these cases, many (justified) objections are raised solely against the suffering inflicted on the animals, and not against the assumption that it is morally acceptable to raise, transport and slaughter them for human consumption. It is the level of suffering which many object to, and not the fact that animals are exploited for food and other resources. As noted before, I obviously exclude many animal rights activists from this analogy, as many reject meat-eating practices and therefore would object to the suffering, as well as the fact that it would be morally unacceptable to raise animals for consumption.

The argument against hunting from certain quarters is therefore not necessarily that eating or shooting animals for food per se is morally wrong. It is rather an argument against the motives for shooting, and the manner in which animals are killed which is the important factor. It presupposes that hunting causes pain and suffering, and thereby contributes to an increase in aggregate "evil". However, to kill an animal quickly and painlessly - as happens in a successful hunt when the animal is shot cleanly and accurately being unaware that the hunter is near - for food is more easily justifiable, in terms of utilitarianism, than killing an animal purely for sport or its trophy, especially if the animal dies with a degree of suffering. This is because the utility gained from the meat together with the painless and quick death of an animal which has led a good life, having lived on a self sustaining basis in the wild, is greater than the utility gained from an animal shot for the trophy with a degree of suffering involved. Anti-hunters who apply blanket moral arguments to all types of hunting therefore may show inconsistency in their application of utilitarianism, especially in cases where they do not consider the differences between various categorical types and forms of hunting, the different animals being hunted, and the methods used. Utilitarian arguments

against hunting require that they be quite specific and contextual, therefore, to qualify for integrity in terms of their consistent application.

Poor hunting methods and techniques also invariably lead to suffering. Animals are often wounded without being recovered and are then left to die a slow death through blood loss or otherwise. Killing an animal in a way that causes suffering transgresses the bounds of utilitarian principles, in several ways. Firstly it denies the interests of the animals concerned. These are its interests as far as living a longer life is concerned, and in not experiencing a degree of suffering, the latter of which hunters generally strive to avoid. Secondly, it doesn't bring about an aggregate balance of good in the world in that the suffering of the animal negates to an extent the good gained from the meat and the enjoyable experience of the hunt. This is also recognised by hunters. For a hunt (that is, a hunt which ends in a kill)¹⁸ to be successful, utilitarianism requires that the kill be conducted quickly and painlessly, and that the meat be harvested. If no greater utility is gained from the hunt other than an enjoyable experience for the hunter, and if the hunter's motives for hunting are purely for the individual enjoyment gained while disregarding the suffering and interests of the animal, then, according to utilitarian theory, the aggregate good gained in the world would be in the negative. In this particular case, when applied consistently and contextually, utilitarianism is more able to offer an indication of whether a specific act of hunting is right or wrong.

Another interesting point to make regarding utilitarian arguments and hunting is Ted Kerasote's principle of energy analysis,¹⁹ which is a comparison of the "kilocalorie cost of different diets", namely between hunters and vegetarians. Briefly, his supposition is that the amount of energy required to provide a vegetarian diet may entail a greater cost than that of the death of one wild animal for its meat:

An elk shot near a hunter's home in the Rocky Mountains incurs a cost to planet Earth of about eighty thousand kilocalories. This includes the energy to produce the hunter's car, clothing, firearm, and to freeze the elk meat over a year. If the hunter chooses to replace the amount of calories he gets from 150 pounds of elk meat with rice and beans grown in California, the cost to Earth is nearly five hundred thousand calories, which includes the energy costs of irrigation, farm equipment, and transportation of the food inland from the coast. It does not include the cost to wildlife – songbirds, reptiles,

¹⁸ Bearing in mind that many hunters profess not to judge the success of a hunt by whether a kill was made or not.

¹⁹ 1993: 262-263; 1996: 292-294.

*and small mammals – killed as a by-product of agribusiness. Their deaths make the consumer of agribusiness foods a participant in the cull of wildlife to feed humans.*²⁰

Kerasote's analysis is highly contextual and specific (it requires the hunter to live in close proximity to his prey, and only includes cases where a vegetable diet is not home-grown), and indicates a level of consistency in integrating a multitude of factors into consideration. The point he makes is that the arguments levelled against hunters are also arguments that can be levelled against society at large, and most importantly at those who make the arguments themselves, as a utilitarian analysis of costs and benefits in terms of lifestyle incriminates them in the same way that they seek to incriminate hunters. This implies a certain lack of integrity in efforts to apply blanket moral arguments against hunting whilst participating in a similar cycle of events that contributes a greater cost to the world. According to this, to argue with complete integrity against hunting on utilitarian grounds necessitates that the person doing the arguing does not himself or herself contribute to a greater aggregate cost to the world than the death of one wild animal brings.

This may indicate another difference between the anti-hunter and pro-hunter approaches to evaluating the morality of hunting in terms of utilitarian theory, as pro-hunters emphasise the contextual application of arguments, as can be seen in their commitment to Codes of Conduct and the Fair Chase principle that evaluate the conduct of hunters in terms of specific cases; whereas the anti-hunting arguments based on utilitarian theory are more generalised in scope. An analysis of the integrity of arguing for or against hunting therefore depends significantly on a notion of consistency in terms of which the arguments are applied.

4. INTEGRITY AND TROPHY HUNTING OF THE BIG FIVE IN BOTSWANA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Arguments against Trophy Hunting in Africa are fuelled both by concerns over the sustainability of ecological processes, as well as deontological assumptions about the integrity of human action deemed to be detrimental to wildlife populations and the interests of individual animals and species. They are also concerned with the impact of human activity on the integrity of ecosystems.

²⁰ Kerasote 1996: 292.

Arguments in favour of Trophy Hunting rest on the assumption that giving animals an economic value, with sustainable utilisation in mind, provides an incentive for their conservation. The arguments also specifically presuppose that the economic value given to *individual* animals through their trophy appeal will benefit other animals of the *same species*, and therefore imply that a certain amount of faith (trust) in the economy surrounding the industry is evident. This is namely in the ability of the economy to deliver the economic benefits in a way that is tangible, and that the financial benefits translate into workable solutions to the challenges facing threatened and endangered species. For Y amount of money spent on a trophy hunt in Africa, X amount is presupposed to translate into improved efficiency, resources, management, research, or data regarding conservation, and perhaps Z amount into tangible welfare benefits to local indigenous communities. The appeal held by economic incentives is also supposed to encourage regional initiatives with the eye on improving conservation and stimulating private sector involvement in the form of game ranches and breeding programmes, for example. This naturally leads to greater hunting opportunities as well, and this feature can be seen in the development of the game farming and hunting industry in South Africa, with the increases in habitat and game numbers being a direct result of the economic incentive offered to farmers and the private sector in general. That sport hunting in general, and especially biltong hunting in South Africa, has directly contributed to the increased numbers, or stability of numbers, of small, medium and large antelope species like impala, kudu, duiker, steenbok, eland, hartebees and springbok, etc., is obvious. Whether trophy hunting of the Big Five species, especially of wild populations in Botswana, is also as much a contributing factor as general hunting of plains game is a question I would like to consider.

4. 1. Leopard Hunting: Hounds or Baiting?

Leopards, for example, are not listed as in danger of extinction and commonly occur outside the borders of parks and reserves, being known to be widespread in mountain ranges in South Africa particularly.²¹ The continued stability of the leopard population in general is not as proportional to the amount of land and habitat dedicated exclusively to its conservation, in the same manner that antelope species or lions are. By this I mean that leopards are highly elusive and solitary, and are able to exist in areas where lions are not, due to the fact that

²¹ Norton 1984: 193.

they are not as visible, their diet is varied, and they do not require water on a daily basis. They are thus able to sustain themselves in relatively remote areas without requiring the level of protection that antelope, lions, and other mega fauna require. This is not to say that they do not require protection, but only that the level of protection is not on the scale as that of other species to be *comparably* sustainable. With this in consideration, the question is then: is the trophy hunting of leopards then an ecological necessity for biodiversity preservation, particularly of leopards as a species?

One response to this is that trophy hunting of leopards is seen to have pragmatic benefits where matters of biodiversity preservation *per se* are not the primary concern, as it is often employed in removing “problem animals” when they endanger humans or livestock especially. Rural communities are thereby encouraged to tolerate the presence of leopards, knowing that they will receive some incentive in doing so. This is especially so in cases where leopards are deemed to be problem animals (i.e. they threaten livestock, or humans),²² with the end result that they will be poisoned, painfully trapped or shot indiscriminately anyway, whether or not a trophy hunter is present. The argument is that allowing someone to hunt a problem leopard that will inevitably be killed means that the animal does not die needlessly, as rural stock farmers benefit economically and also directly by the removal of the leopard that threatens their livestock, and leopards are safeguarded from indiscriminate poisoning, trapping, or killing.²³ A particular form of leopard hunting employing hounds, which is practiced in countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, is one example where the hunting of problem leopards is done efficiently, in that it ensures that the “correct” problem animal is targeted and not leopards that may happen to pass through an area at the time. This is because hounds are able to follow the scent of a particular animal and track it in daylight, which is exceedingly difficult to do for humans on their own, before it is cornered and shot by the paying trophy hunter.²⁴ Hunting with hounds therefore ensures that the hunt is highly selective, in that a specific individual is targeted, namely one that directly threatens the livelihood of a rural community.²⁵ Another point made in reference to leopard

²² The killing of livestock by leopards usually involves the slaughter of as many cattle or sheep the leopard can get hold of, in a sort of killing frenzy, and which rural communities who are dependent on their livestock can ill afford. In this sense the competition between leopard that are deemed problem animals and humans is one of survival (Marsh 2001b: 22).

²³ Filmer 2001: 23; York 2001a.

²⁴ Marsh 2001b: 22.

²⁵ York 2001b.

hunting with hounds, is that old males who are past their breeding prime, and therefore have little to offer in the way of contribution to the gene pool, can be selectively targeted with confidence,²⁶ in that the specific animal which is the target of the hunt is pursued. This stands opposed to other “ethically dubious” forms of leopard hunting (such as baiting and shooting a leopard from a blind at night), where it is often hard to discern the age or sex of the animal before having to fire a shot.²⁷ Trophy hunters are also more prone to miss or wound a leopard in bad light than a lion, partly due to the huge excitement and real danger that a leopard hunt offers.²⁸

In this scenario, where a leopard is confirmed as being a direct threat to the survival needs of a community, the hunting of it by hounds will be more consistently justified according to utilitarian theory (that is, the good gained by killing the leopard outweighs the bad) than baiting and shooting a leopard from a blind at night. While the Principle of Fair Chase is technically lacking in the latter, and suspect in the former, it does not detract from the greater utility gained in terms of the benefit to the stock farmer that hunting “problem” leopards with hounds brings. While hunting with hounds may seem a more cruel and barbaric hunting method, when used to kill “problem leopards” it can be seen to be more justifiable according to utilitarian theory than hunting from a blind.²⁹ What is more, in terms of consistency, intention and objective, it is more an act of integrity than hunting leopards from a blind is.³⁰ The fact remains, though, that the attraction leopard hunting holds lies in its ability to offer one of the most exhilarating and dangerous experiences for a trophy hunter.³¹ Also, due to the natural behaviour and inclination of leopards, hunting them without using a blind or baiting them is impractical, as the relatively short duration of a trophy hunt does not allow the outfitter or professional hunter to devote too much time to finding a leopard for his client hunter. This is particularly when the client has other species on his quota, all of which must be hunted within the time period of the hunt, which may last

²⁶ York 2001b.

²⁷ Filmer (2001: 24) and Marsh (2001b: 23) both raise the question about the ethical problematic of hunting leopards by baiting them and shooting from a blind at night, often using a spotlight, in comparison with hunting leopards with hounds, and seem to imply that hunting with hounds requires more skill than the other. Also, the point is made that one cannot condone hunting from a blind at night, and at the same time condemn hunting with hounds.

²⁸ Hoffman 1997: 58.

²⁹ The term “problem animal” is wholly an anthropocentric phrase, as most cases involving problem animals are the result of animals acting out of instinct and natural behaviour.

³⁰ I have not discussed instances of leopard hunting with hounds in cases where they are not deemed problem animals. The argument I have used to illustrate a contextual utilitarian position is dependent on the fact that the animals directly threaten the livelihood of stock farmers, that they would be killed in any event, and that aggregate benefits accrue to the stock farmer and hunter.

³¹ Hoffman 1997: 269.

anything from a few days to three weeks. If the hunt is a short one, and the client had paid specifically for a leopard hunting package, there is an inevitable amount of pressure to ensure that the hunt is successful and the client gets what he paid for. The commodification aspect of hunting leopards is clear, and some outfitters even advertise a "99.99% success" rate in leopard hunting.³²

4.2. *Lion Hunting: Wild Populations vs. Captive Breeding*

Trophy hunting in closely managed areas where game is continually restocked is different to trophy hunting in natural wildlife areas where animal populations have not been managed and controlled. One of the reasons is that proponents of trophy hunting frequently extol the virtue of the skill required to hunt a wild animal in its natural habitat, and of the benefits of being close to nature and the eternal, timeless rhythms of the natural world from which we as humans so often remove ourselves. If hunting is the return to an authentic state, and a vehicle for self-realisation, then this self-realisation is dependent on returning to a landscape that itself requires authenticity. The contradiction here is that in closely managed and controlled wildlife areas, the idea of being close to the natural world and through this closeness returning to a sense of the primeval, and therefore pure, human condition, rests largely upon a fallacy, as the "natural" systems are by no means natural as the continuity of eternal ecological processes is broken and altered by the close management of game populations. That the land be authentic in this sense is a major prerequisite for Ortega y Gasset, as the authenticity of hunting is inexorably linked with the authenticity of the "countryside".³³

Trophy hunting in areas such as the Okavango Delta in Botswana, on the other hand, offers a more authentic idea of returning to nature in respect to the claims of the ethical hunter, as the wildlife populations as a whole are not managed and altered, through restocking and breeding, as is necessitated in the smaller reserves and game ranches.³⁴ The landscape itself (barring the introduction of cattle fences) has not been manipulated or altered to a great extent, and the integrity of the Delta, if one can put it this way, is not presently as compromised *in*

³² Expeditions advertisement 1987: 50 (this was an advertisement for safari hunting of leopards by the outfitting company called "Expeditions").

³³ Ortega y Gasset 1972: 140.

³⁴ The main human impact on the biotic community in Botswana is found in the veterinary fences that obstruct the natural migration and ranges of fauna (Cf. Albertson 1998), but this nevertheless does not confine the free-ranging ability of animals in the way that fenced farms in South Africa do, mainly due to its vast size, although the fences themselves are devastating to the animals that attempt to cross them; as such the movement of game and their numbers are severely compromised compared to a few decades ago.

the same way as are highly managed farms in game ranching.³⁵ Hunting a buffalo, for example, which comes from the same population that has occurred naturally in the area for hundreds of years, is vastly different from hunting an introduced buffalo in a confined area, which has been introduced primarily for the purpose of hunting. This is because the animal being hunted is a product of the natural landscape itself, and its very existence and visibility in the hunter's sights is not contingent on human preferences. That it is within the hunter's sights at all is due to luck, skill on the part of the trackers, or sometimes the hunter himself, and because its natural inclination, habit and social behaviour necessarily result in it being there. A hunter may prefer to have an animal in his sights, but the animal being there is not dependent on or influenced by these human preferences. On stocked game farms, human preferences inevitably lead to a certain amount of manipulation, whether it be through selective breeding or culling, feeding, or bush clearing that provides the most suitable habitat for certain animals, and the fact that an animal is in a hunter's sights is because of the direct preferences of human activity.

Yet the Okavango itself, as with most wildlife areas in the world at present, is under increasing pressure through habitat loss and human encroachment. Therefore the ecosystem and its ability to sustain wildlife populations as it has for thousands of years is being increasingly threatened. This leads to the questioning of the integrity of human activity which is detrimental to wildlife populations and ecosystems, be it through eco-tourism or hunting safaris, and which purport to strive for the ultimate betterment of the ecosystem as a whole. Faced with the knowledge that wildlife areas are at great risk, ultimately as a consequence of human presence and activity, the ethical imperative would then be to minimize this risk by reducing or stopping human activity that threatens the long-term sustainability and existence of these areas. While trophy hunting in areas such as the Okavango Delta is more authentic in terms of the self-realisation of ethical hunters than trophy hunting on a fenced farm,³⁶ it is also the least ecologically sustainable in terms of its impact on the Big Five. The impact of selective trophy hunting of males of the species of lion, buffalo, leopard, and elephant (there are

³⁵ It is being compromised by increasing human expansion, the introduction of cattle fences, illegal hunting and poaching, and the non-consumptive activities of humans that place them in close proximity to animals, such as eco-tourism. Eco-tourism, as well as certain methods employed in the research of animals, does intrude on the natural inclinations, behaviour patterns and movement of animals. For example, a game-drive vehicle following a lion may affect the outcome of a kill, while research methods may involve darting or artificially interfering in the daily behavioural patterns of animals. These are externalities that affect the "integrity" of the delta, whereas in game farms, the internal requirements of the ecosystem necessitate intervention (i.e. population increases, water shortage, disease, etc.).

³⁶ "Canned hunting" being here the extreme.

no rhino to hunt in the Okavango) do have an impact on the genetic diversity of the species over time.³⁷ In the case of lions, trophy hunting does have a detrimental impact on specific large wild populations (specifically in areas such as Luangwa, Zambia, and Mashwa, Tanzania).³⁸ There is data that suggests it is disruptive to the lion social system, and whether nomadic males, which are often the targets of trophy hunting, are “spare” animals or not, and whether they play an as yet “undiscovered role” remains unconfirmed. As such there is a question mark over the trophy hunting of lions in wild populations as a legitimate management tool, as well as whether or not eco-tourism is more effective/useful in the conservation of lions.³⁹ The legitimacy of the option of using trophy hunting as a management tool, of which the ethical hunter would have to be convinced, therefore rests upon scientific data and research that is as yet unable to offer reassurance. The trophy hunting of lions in wild populations is therefore at present, according to the consequentialist requirements of hunters themselves, an “immoral” act (i.e. if the morality of the act depends on utilitarian assumptions) of hunting, and lacking in integrity, in the sense that it has not been proved to demonstrably contribute to biodiversity preservation, with the result that the ethical hunter can not in good faith take part in trophy hunting of wild lions. If they do so it seems to be in breach of the ideals of the ethical hunter as put forward by pro-hunting groups themselves. What it does do is contribute to the economy of hunting, local communities, and in fulfilling the needs of the hunter, yet only fulfilling these last three requirements would mean that trophy hunting in this sense is merely a form of the market hunting condemned by ethical hunters themselves in the first place.

On the other hand, the only inherent ecologically sustainable option, strictly speaking, for trophy hunting of lions lies within the breeding and stocking of smaller reserves. The lions then come from a sustainable captive population (i.e. because they are bred for the purpose of hunting, there is no shortage)⁴⁰ and the trophy hunting of lions in these cases is not detrimental to the gene pool of the captive stock, as the genetic diversity of these populations are monitored and

³⁷ The scientific names of the Big Five are: lion – *Panthera leo*, cape buffalo – *Syncerus caffer*, leopard – *Panthera pardus*, elephant – *Loxodonta africana*, black rhino – *Diceros bicornis* and white rhino – *Ceratotherium simum*.

³⁸ African Lion Working Group 1999.

³⁹ African Lion Working Group 1999.

⁴⁰ Sustainable here refers to the captive stock of lions, and not in reference to wild populations. The concept of sustainability as applied to wild populations carries with it different requirements as to the ability, capacity or inclination of lions to breed and move freely, in a way that does not affect their population numbers adversely, etc. Sustainability of captive populations does not necessarily need to consider *self-sustaining* capacities of lions, rather merely that the stock is sufficiently capable of producing lions at a rate equivalent to that which are taken from the stock.

essentially manipulated, improved or balanced through selective breeding. Trophy hunting of lions in these cases fulfils the sustainability requirements and economic consequentialist criteria of ethical hunters, but not the biodiversity requirements (as selective breeding of confined populations does not contribute to the biodiversity of wild lion populations in general).⁴¹

Most importantly, it does not fulfil the requirements for self-realisation of the ethical hunter. The hunting occurs in an artificial environment, both in an ecological and psychological sense. The hunter is not actually returning to a state of authenticity, but rather participating in a re-presentation, and manipulation, of the natural. The obvious extremes are the instances of canned hunting that take place, although I have more in mind the less obvious, and more frequent, types of hunting that take place in confined areas, with introduced animals that are different to canned hunting only in the technical and logistical nature of the hunt (i.e. the enclosures may meet minimum legal requirements, the animals may have been introduced within the minimum time frame allowed, etc.). In an enclosed, managed farm, one knows how many lions there are on the property if they have been introduced, and the pre-determined inevitability of the hunt ending in the death of a pre-selected individual lion is inescapable, or at the very least highly probable. The re-presentation of the *hunting experience* thus serves as a mimicry of the predatory function, but without any discernible substance as to the reality of returning to a state of authenticity is concerned. The economic benefits remain though, as do the instrumental benefits gained by the hunter in terms of the trophy and status the trophy affords, and the hunter may take part in such a hunt safe in the knowledge that his actions will not have a *direct* and detrimental effect on wild populations *per se*.⁴² Whether this type of trophy hunting is “true hunting” according to a conception of the ideal ethical hunter is doubtful, though.⁴³

⁴¹ Cf. Luxmoore and Swanson 1992: 180-181.

⁴² Breeding programmes do require occasional genetic input from wild populations, and breeders have also been known to lure wild lions onto their properties from reserves. The implication is that the spin-off effects of the industry itself may indirectly affect wild populations through supply and demand. This observation is from personal working experience in the Timbavati Game Reserve, where lions were confirmed to have been lured onto neighbouring game farms; in one notable instance a double fence was erected between the reserve and one particular neighbouring property to prevent this from re-occurring.

⁴³ As mentioned before, all records of lion hunts in South Africa were removed from SCI's record book, demonstrating a commitment on their part to this ideal. However, lion hunts in South Africa continue, and the numbers of lion bred in captivity do not match up to the figures of lions being introduced into the wild, being supplied to zoos, etc. This would indicate that captive bred lions are still being hunted in South Africa, and that certain hunters still feel this is acceptable, or hunt them unwittingly.

In terms of this line of argumentation, therefore, it will be difficult for the ethical hunter, according to the definition put forward by SCI and other pro-hunters, to undertake a lion hunt in an enclosed area (such as a private game ranch), where the lion is not part of a naturally occurring population, and where the lion is artificially introduced. This argument rules out *any* form of lion hunting then where lions are introduced for hunting purposes through human preference, no matter what the legalistic requirements as to enclosure size, etc., as the hunting landscape is essentially an artificial construct; the consequence is that any claims as to the authenticity of such a hunt in terms of returning man to “nature” must necessarily be based on fallacious reasoning. What is significant is that this argument relies not on economic or ecological consequentialism, notions of rights, or intrinsic value, but on the arguments put forward by pro-hunters themselves in defence of ethical trophy hunting as form of self-realisation.

Furthermore, it would seem that the ethical hunter, in good conscience and in integrity, cannot justify to himself the hunting of wild lions in certain areas of Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania, due to the evidence referred to above regarding the harmful impact trophy hunting has on wild lion populations. The paradox is that the most sustainable, but least justifiable, type of lion hunting that can take place, can only occur under circumstances that prohibit the ethical hunter from seeking an authentic notion of self-realisation; whilst the most justifiable type in terms of “a returning to nature,” and therefore authenticity, must essentially take place within an ecosystem that cannot sustain the effects of trophy hunting.

A critical discussion of big game trophy hunting would also need to address the question whether the hunting of predators is natural. This is often justified by hunters in reference to the hunting rituals, initiation rites, or rites of passage of indigenous African tribes, particularly in reference to the Masai in Kenya, who were renowned for hunting lions.⁴⁴ Whether these hunts were themselves merely a formalised response to the threat and competition that lions posed to their cattle, or whether it is similar in substance to western trophy hunting is unclear. Western trophy hunting in Africa, though, has a distinct historical legacy and, as shown in the discussion in Chapter 6, there is a certain technocratic and modernist trait to modern trophy hunting that cannot be separated from its colonial origins, or from the domination and separation from nature that was a feature of prevailing Enlightenment attitudes during the time. The conventions

⁴⁴ Bull 1988: 189.

and codes that inform trophy hunting, particularly of the Big Five, emerged from within the cultural norms of the last two centuries. If one were to equate modern trophy hunting with indigenous traditions of hunting big game, such as lions, one would have to offer a socio-historical clarification of any similarities in the symbolic relevance hunting lions holds for communities and for modern trophy hunters alike. This equation would necessitate a comparison of hunting methods, tools, techniques, as well as an explanation of the highly commercial nature of the western trophy hunting industry. If a notion of trophy hunting did exist amongst indigenous African peoples it would also have to be shown that this was not merely a cultural construct, but that they share the evolutionarily inevitable propensity towards trophyism that western trophy hunters claim is innate.

Whether it is natural to hunt predators seems doubtful, as the only historical and anthropological explanation for the killing of predators is in the form of self-defence, or out of competition for meat. Both of these aspects are lacking in the modern trophy hunter who comes to Africa, as he willingly chooses to partake in the confrontation and contest with a predator who would otherwise not choose to engage with him. By willingly putting himself in opposition to a lion or leopard, the only arguments open to him to justify the hunting act lie in the desire to improve his hunting skill, the desire to challenge himself and test certain personality traits such as bravery, or the desire for the trophy. Against the backdrop of the historically constructed Hunting Experience, all of these arguments would conform to the idea of hunting as domination, egoism, and exploitation, which necessarily contradicts the idea of the ethical hunter.

While the hunter may keep strictly to the principle of Fair Chase and Codes of Conduct in a legal sense, the idea of ethical hunting, namely a returning to nature, mystical respect for the animal, contributing to conservation, etc., is meaningfully absent in the hunting of predators, especially when dubious methods such as baiting or luring predators out of reserves is concerned, or where trophy hunting negatively impacts on wild populations. The only option to hunt predators with a sense of integrity seems to be in situations where it is used as a genuine form of problem animal control (PAC), and where the animal would be killed in any event.

4. 3. *Elephant Hunting: The Moral Imperative of the Utilitarian Approach*

Elephants, along with lions, are the most important trophy animals, and elephant hunting is described as “the ultimate experience for all serious hunters”.⁴⁵ In Botswana their availability to trophy hunters has an enormous spin-off effect, and they contribute substantially to the value of the annual hunting quota in Botswana, as safari companies are more inclined to buy licenses for plains game species if elephants are included. The revenue associated with elephant hunting offsets costs for a range of community initiatives and conservation management programmes,⁴⁶ and elephant hunting is regarded as critical to CBNRM initiatives.⁴⁷ The numbers of elephants in Botswana and South Africa have drastically increased over the last decade to a point where their numbers threaten the stability of ecosystems. Their activities have changed the vegetation structure to such an extent that forage for other animals has decreased substantially,⁴⁸ while they have also had a negative impact on rural agricultural communities.⁴⁹ Faced with the potentially damaging effects of dense concentrations of elephants, and the substantial benefits that hunting is able to bring, trophy hunting is regarded as vital to the conservation needs of wildlife and people in Botswana. In South Africa the ban on elephant culling in the KNP has led to the same problems, with the elephants exceeding the carrying capacity of the ecosystem. Alternatives to culling, such as contraception and translocation, have proved too costly and ineffective to adequately offer a solution as yet.

Trophy hunting does not significantly reduce elephant numbers, nor is it seen to be “conveniently” effective in PAC, such as rogue elephants or crop raiders.⁵⁰ Safari hunting of elephants cannot therefore be a substitute to culling, and attempts by hunters to justify it on this basis will not be supported by professional wildlife managers.⁵¹ Trophy hunting is recommended, though, as an option to use in conjunction with culling and PAC to reduce numbers: “In this way culprit elephants are removed, benefits from hunting revenues and meat are returned to

⁴⁵ Thompson 1996: 89.

⁴⁶ IUCN 2002: 5.

⁴⁷ Botswana Wildlife Management Association 2001: 15.

⁴⁸ IUCN 2002: 4.

⁴⁹ MGM Environmental Solutions 1997: 60.

⁵⁰ Hamilton 2000: 2.

⁵¹ Thompson 1996: 93.

the affected community, and the level of offtake from the elephant population is minimised by combining problem animal control with trophy hunting.”⁵²

Elephants are in abundance, and no longer as threatened as they were a decade ago. Unlike lions, the impact of trophy hunting on the numbers or reproductive rate of elephants is not significant, nor has it been shown to impact negatively on biodiversity. The methods used to hunt elephants are not generally as compromised by accusations of unethical practices as are the hunting of lions and leopards – which may or may not be acceptably baited according to the norms of trophy hunting – as they are normally hunted on foot once a spoor is found, and in most cases this hunting would satisfy Fair Chase principles.

Most importantly, their increasing numbers demonstrably pose a potential negative threat to biodiversity, to humans and to other species of fauna and flora. In conjunction with culling and PAC, trophy hunting may therefore actually directly contribute to the preservation of biodiversity by protecting other species and plants. That a reduction in their numbers is desirable for ecosystems, other species and humans is therefore understandable, and at present perhaps even morally imperative, notwithstanding the obvious emotion that elephant hunting brings, as, along with the rhino, they have long been an icon species for conservation in Africa, and their being hunted is inevitably disagreeable to many. The main concerns regarding trophy hunting of elephants are the impacts on genetic diversity within certain areas. Trophy hunting usually targets elephants that carry the biggest tusks, and the selective hunting of big tuskers over time may have a negative impact on average tusk size.

Within the present context, then, due to the threat their numbers pose to other species and humans, and the critical benefits the hunting of them may provide, for the Ethical Hunter it would be more justifiable, and more an act of integrity, to hunt wild elephants than it would be to hunt wild lions. This is because large elephant populations are not sustainable on small reserves, and most of the elephant hunting occurs in Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in Botswana, which are more authentic in terms of The Hunting Experience.

⁵² Dublin and Taylor 1996: 16.

4. 4. Rhino Hunting: Another Perspective on the Moral Imperative

Rhino, on the other hand, are still threatened by illegal poaching, their numbers in Africa are not as widespread as elephant, and there have also been accusations of canned hunting practices involving tame rhino in South Africa. Given the widespread media attention the species received over the last two decades because of their declining numbers due to poaching, and the large amounts of funding and effort that went into their rehabilitation, it may be slightly ironic that they now be hunted by paying clients. Although not currently present in the northern parts of Botswana, as the attempts to relocate some into the Moremi game reserve were largely unsuccessful, both the white (*Ceratotherium simum*) and black (*Diceros bicornis*) rhino populations in South Africa are stable and increasing. While the black rhino is still listed as critically endangered, there are indications that the hunting of white rhino in particular is sustainable, especially in Namibia and South Africa.⁵³

The natural behaviour and species characteristics of rhinos mean that the methods used to hunt them do not pose the same ethical problems that the baiting of cats does. Rhino are generally acknowledged as having poor eyesight and hearing, but a good sense of smell, and normally occur singly or in pairs, as males are territorial. This would enable the ethical hunter to approach closely in order to ensure a quick, clean kill. However, due to their unavailability in Botswana, and their precarious status in other African countries, rhino hunting would arguably be most sustainable in South Africa. So being, the most authentic type of hunting for the ethical hunter would ideally take place in the official parks in South Africa such as the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi and Kruger National Parks. As hunting is prohibited in these areas, however, most hunting would necessarily occur on private reserves and game ranches. The role the Hluhluwe-Umfolozi Park played and continues to play in the rehabilitation of rhino populations, both black and white, is immense, and any funds it indirectly receives through the hunting and game ranching industry is vital to the continued stability of rhino populations in southern Africa. The sale of live rhinos from Hluhluwe-Umfolozi contributed a substantial portion of funds to the running costs of the Park,⁵⁴ with some of these rhinos no doubt destined for trophy hunting. Notwithstanding the inevitable emotion surrounding the hunting of what is a flagship species for conservation, trophy hunting in this case may be seen to indirectly aid the vital

⁵³ Emslie and Brooks 1999: 70.

⁵⁴ Emslie and Brooks 1999: 30.

conservation needs of rhinos in southern Africa. For the Ethical Hunter, there is a limited moral imperative inherent in the trophy hunting of rhinos, in the sense that vital funds are continuously generated for the running costs of rhino conservation. The same amount of funds cannot be accrued through the sale of rhinos to zoos and other game parks alone, as there is a limited demand for rhinos in this regard. The demand for trophy hunting of rhinos on the other hand is not as restricted, as any rhinos that are hunted will need to be replaced, whereas rhinos sold to zoos are generally once-off affairs. The notion of a moral imperative in this regard differs from that in respect to elephants, as the imperative in rhino hunting is inherently positive in orientation. The hunter contributes in some way to an increase in population numbers, while the imperative inherent in elephant hunting is negative to a degree in that it entails contributing to a reduction in elephant numbers. The limited hunting of white rhinos, again in comparison to the hunting of lions and leopards, is therefore in this respect more an act of integrity for the Ethical Hunter. The moral questions surrounding a hunter's desire for The Hunting Experience remain at the forefront, though, when rhino hunting is included as part of the commodified hunting package.

4.5. Buffalo Hunting: Closest to the Ideal

The potential negative aspects of hunting buffalo were mentioned in Chapter 2 as regards the specific impact trophy hunting, and SCI's scoring method, have on their genetic diversity, which would raise doubts over claims that trophy hunting contributes to biodiversity preservation. While trophy hunting is not detrimental to the population numbers of buffalo, it does, therefore, negatively affect the genetic diversity of specific populations. However, SCI's response to this in the form of a Trophy Quality Monitoring project may serve to alleviate this concern. Furthermore, buffalo are not endangered or threatened with extinction, although there are concerns over the status of buffalo in Kruger National Park following outbreaks of the bovine tuberculosis disease. There are thus ongoing initiatives to breed disease free buffalo, and these fetch high prices at game auctions.

The hunting of buffalo on foot is considered to be extremely dangerous, and thus highly exhilarating. The idea of an equal contest between hunter and hunted comes closest to its ideal in the hunting of buffalo, as there is a realistic chance of the buffalo inflicting serious harm on its pursuer. The trophy hunter has to work hard to be in a position to shoot, and in many cases may have to see many buffalo escape before he is able to fire a shot, particularly in heavily wooded areas or marshy swamps such as in the Okavango. The hunter also has to

contend with the whole herd in cases where males are not in bachelor groups. Most cases of injury to humans occur after the buffalo has been wounded, though, so the risk of real injury increases once the hunter has selected and directly engaged with the buffalo being hunted.

Comparatively speaking, of all the Big Five species, the idea of the Ethical Hunter is most embodied in the hunting of buffalo. The hunt generally occurs on foot in an authentic landscape, and if we accept the evolutionary need to hunt for survival, the hunting of buffalo is seen as fulfilling the subsistence role. It is therefore the least contentious in terms of integrity, outside of the critique of The Hunting Experience as commodity.

5. PONDERING THE CONCLUSION

To summarise the main points highlighted in this thesis and this chapter regarding the integrity of hunting the Big Five in southern Africa:

The trophy hunting of predators, except in aid of PAC, does not sufficiently conform to most of the arguments put forward by pro-hunting groups in terms of integrity. It may conform in a legal sense to the practices of the Ethical Hunter, in that the Codes of Conduct are strictly followed, but not in the “spirit” of what hunting is proclaimed to be, by hunters and proponents of hunting such as Ortega y Gasset, in terms of authenticity and self-realisation. The commercial nature of the industry surrounding trophy hunting, and the desire for external approval and prestige that goes with SCI's awards system, serve to undermine this authenticity, by shifting the interpretation of the meaning of hunting to a mere fulfilment of egocentric expectation, which is an expectation that is itself constructed. In Africa, The Hunting Experience as a historical construction is based on certain stories and romantic images that were themselves a product of technocratic attitudes to nature, and of hunters who themselves did not conform to the standards proclaimed by hunters today by virtue of the fact that they had only a Darwinian frame of reference by which to interpret the natural world. This frame of reference was inherently dualist and strove to enforce the distinction between man and nature. Informed by Enlightenment values, the old hunters felt they were completely entitled and obligated to conquer the African game animals, whereas today's postmodern hunters are not restricted in that they have the capacity to interpret the natural world according to a wealth of ecological, scientific, and philosophical knowledge. No matter that from a personal

perspective one may admire some of them greatly, it can be argued that hunting lions and leopards in the same way that Selous, Hemingway, Roosevelt, and others did, necessitates one to pick up the cloak, as it were, of modernist thinking and enter into a state of in-authenticity, in that it becomes an act of imitation, through which one hopes to seek fulfilment of the expectations that The Hunting Experience promises.

This is largely because the historically constructed Hunting Experience is sold and packaged. Within the politics of the debate, a desire for this package is created, sustained and promoted through various media forms, and through various symbols, with the result that it becomes a consumer item. Consumers choose the item on the basis of trust, and on the basis of expectation of the fulfilment of desires. Where trophy hunting is seductively promoted as the ideal form of hunting, the expectancy is created that the hunting of lions and leopards is one of the ideal hunts. In the absence of the relevant arguments that are applicable to game hunting in general, namely that hunting is a natural, human form of predation, through which one returns to and communes with nature, participates in the landscape, and is able to provide subsistence for oneself, the only arguments left to sustain lion and leopard hunting are ecological/biodiversity arguments, economic arguments, and personal preference arguments substantiating the desire for the trophy. That ecological/biodiversity arguments do not universally apply to lions has been shown, and to a certain extent leopards too. The purely economic rationalisation of hunting, however, would reduce the act to that of market hunting and pure exploitation, which is rejected by hunters in general; whilst hunting for the trophy alone, without any other justification, is not supported in the general literature or more importantly the pro-hunting groups.

Several factors come into play in this evaluation. One is the direct ecological impact trophy hunting has on wild populations, and in the case of lions this can be seen to be detrimental in certain areas. A second is the contribution it makes to the preservation of biodiversity, and as in the first consideration this is also not substantiated. Third, are the arguments of hunters themselves, regarding the meaning of hunting, the ecological justifications, and their rejection of the purely economic reasoning that underlies market hunting. Fourth, is the question as to whether the trophy hunting of predators is natural predation; this remains unclear, as the question over whether human hunting itself is natural predation remains unsubstantiated. This is because the evolutionary foundations on which primitivist defences of hunting rest, are exceedingly compromised by the denunciation of the empirical validity of the Hunting Hypothesis. And fifth, whether *competition*

with (predators) is a *communion with*, or *participation in* nature, which is a facet necessary for the idea of The Ethical Hunter, remains doubtful. All of these factors combine to suggest that the trophy hunting of lions and leopards in southern Africa is not an act of integrity for the Ethical Hunter, especially when considered against the critique of the commodification of The Hunting Experience. Rather, it confirms the view that hunting is an expression of a desire to dominate, and of the pure reduction of animals to a commodity.

The trophy hunting of elephants conforms to the consistency principles in various ways, and in some cases it may be a moral imperative for the Ethical Hunter to pay to trophy hunt elephants, due to the direct impact their numbers are having on ecosystems and on the species with which they co-exist. Trophy hunting does not impact adversely on their population numbers, and when used in conjunction with PAC and culling may be appropriate in reducing elephant numbers. This cost to their lives does not come in vain, as the spin-off effects can demonstrably be seen to go directly back into efforts to enhance wildlife management, as well as to rural communities. The economic benefits that come from elephant hunting are high, as is the threat the increasing density of their population poses to ecosystems and species around them.

As an icon species, elephants are high on the list of the most valued trophies. They are integral to the commodification of The Hunting Experience, and anyone who has read Cumming or Selous, or heard of the early elephant hunters' adventures, no doubt conjures images of Selous crouching under a kneeling elephant when he envisages The Hunting Experience. The discussion of this aspect applies to elephants in the same way that it applies to lions as discussed above. There are a few differences though, as the trophy hunting of elephants may be argued in favour of the following considerations: elephants can be eaten, and have been for centuries. The Ethical Hunter hunting as a "return to" nature and subsistence hunter, is thus able to be a provider,⁵⁵ and in a sense fulfil the evolutionary role that he is claimed to have. But this does not stand up favourably against the critique of The Hunting Experience "as package" though, when one takes into consideration all of the various personality traits of the various people who might take part in elephant hunting. It does leave the way open, though, for the Ethical Hunter, at least, to take part in elephant hunting with more integrity than lion hunting.

⁵⁵ Most of the meat from elephant carcasses is shared amongst rural communities in the hunting area. In this sense the trophy hunter indirectly "provides" for the subsistence of these communities.

The hunting of rhino restricts the Ethical Hunter a little more, due to the restricted range of their distribution, their continued vulnerability to poaching, and the relatively low population density and numbers in comparison to elephants, for example. The Ethical Hunter may still, however, be able to undertake hunting with integrity in respect to rhinos, and may even be morally compelled to do so, according to a strictly utilitarian approach, where the funds go directly back to parks such as Hluhluwe-Umfolozi.

Buffalo are not endangered although their distribution is shrinking. Trophy hunting also does not impact on population numbers, although the main concern for the Ethical Hunter when hunting buffalo for a trophy would be the scoring method used to evaluate the trophy. At the time of writing, SCI's scoring system for buffalo was still biased towards buffalo in their prime,⁵⁶ indicating that buffalos targeted by trophy hunters who used this system would be contributing to the loss of genetic diversity, whereas the Rowland Ward system was biased towards older buffalo who had already had the opportunity to pass on their genes. Besides the critique of The Hunting Experience "as package" which may be applied to buffalo as it does to the trophy hunting of all Big Five species, buffalo conform to the Ethical Hunter's idea of hunting with integrity.

The hunting of the different Big Five species can in context be seen to entail differing degrees of particular conceptions of integrity. One conception is the consistency with which beliefs about the meaning of hunting in general are realistically expressed in Big Five hunting, which influences the integrity of The Hunting Experience. The meaning of hunting a lion is vastly different to the meaning of hunting an antelope for subsistence, or for a returning to nature and man's evolutionary beginnings, so consistency with which the Ethical Hunter applies his beliefs about hunting to the hunting of predators is deficient. Another is the way in which anti-hunters argue against all forms of hunting without taking into consideration the consistent application of their own utilitarian approach to minimising "evil" in the world. In doing so, the positive role limited trophy hunting can play in certain contexts is neglected. Faced with the dearth of environmental problems, anti-hunting groups, beyond the attempts of groups such as HSUS to implement practical initiatives, have also not as yet offered a plausible alternative to the consumptive use of wild animals in areas where eco-tourism is not viable. Specific forms of Big Five trophy hunting in certain areas are the most desirable

⁵⁶ Cf. Chapter 2 for a discussion of this.

short-term solutions to the urgent socio-economic and ecological problems facing wildlife and rural African communities.

Another notion is the integrity of ecosystems. This entails the analysis of detrimental or positive impacts of trophy hunting on the community processes, and which affect the “stability” and “beauty” of the biotic community as a whole. In certain cases integrity is compromised by trophy hunting, whilst in other areas, such as intensely managed ecosystems, the integrity of the ecosystem is interpreted according to human preferences and the scientific approach of adaptive management. As such, the negative or positive value of trophy hunting, and the integrity thereof, is defined by its value in economic and scientific terms.

The notion of personal integrity also features strongly in questions about trophy hunting and the desire for gratification over and above other considerations. One could question the integrity of approaching wildlife issues in purely hedonistic utilitarian terms, where the primary benefits to, and needs of, individuals are emphasised at the exclusion of equally prominent value assumptions, such as the intrinsic value of ecosystems and wildlife. While the hunter may be someone who possesses a great deal of personal integrity in his private life, it does not follow that this same notion of integrity is carried over into the practice of big game hunting, although the manner in which a hunt is conducted will no doubt be influenced by a person’s personal integrity. Professional hunters themselves are often regarded as men of personal integrity, in the sense that they are honest, extremely hard working, and dedicated to a profession that demands a lot of personal sacrifice in comparison to many other professions. The personal commitment and sincerity shown by hunters to conservation issues, and the concern expressed for the environment, is also a sign of personal integrity in that a steadfast and sincere commitment to moral principles is itself a token of integrity. Many of the hunters spoken to in the course of the writing of this thesis are also people who can be considered to possess personal integrity, denoted by the sincerity and commitment with which they hold fast to the belief that trophy hunting is a morally worthy pursuit, and that it is practically able to alleviate certain environmental and socio-economic problems. Personal integrity is not enough, though, to mitigate the desire to dominate, as is evident in lion hunting for example. The sincerity and consistency of steadfastly holding to a commitment to protect and conserve species is broken by the desire for gratification that a hedonistic utilitarian approach allows.

One of the most important notions of integrity in relation to this study, and which incorporates most of the other considerations regarding integrity and Big Five trophy hunting, is the integrity of The Hunting Experience. The notion of authenticity plays a defining role in determining the integrity of The Hunting Experience, and this aspect is seriously compromised in the realistic practices of Big Five trophy hunting in South Africa especially. The commercially packaged symbolic construction of The Hunting Experience serves to promote inauthenticity by virtue of the fact that it is inherently an imitation, and mimicry, of an era that is past, and of people who could not have morally justified their practices. But it is exactly on this model that modern day trophy hunting is based. This is because a sign of integrity is the ability to act as oneself, "rather than unconsciously or thoughtlessly mixing in with oneself the attitudes or habits of others, [thereby] imitating others without a sense of self-loss".⁵⁷ This is not to condemn the early hunters, but merely highlights the fact that a notion of the wholeness of integrity also requires the integration of authenticity. Moreover, integrity also includes the willingness and capacity to question one's own moral beliefs and principles⁵⁸ given the obvious lessons that history provides. The integrity of steadfastly committing oneself to a belief in the inherent authenticity of Big Five trophy hunting, and to the perceived inevitable role it plays in conservation, is called into question, as this commitment does not take into account the historical lessons learnt as a result of the environmental crises in Africa, which were caused by purely technocratic and dualistic approaches to nature.

I realise that this view is highly disagreeable to trophy hunters, and to many of the people who were interviewed during the course of writing this thesis. However, this appraisal is not excessively condemnatory in the sense that it is not a fixed reflection of a state of affairs that is devoid of virtue. The hunting debate is dynamic, and with new work being done continuously in this field, and with the sincere exchange of ideas and information, positive steps are being taken. The willingness and openness of many pro-hunters to engage with these issues is a sign of further integrity in that they are able to question their own beliefs as being not necessarily fixed and unchangeable. Some groups were not as willing to be approached, although these were in the minority.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Kateb 1998: 77.

⁵⁸ Levine, Cox and La Caze 1999: 521.

⁵⁹ One of the official pro-hunting groups in particular. Overall, hunters and regional representatives of groups such as SCI were open and willing to discuss the difficult issues surrounding trophy hunting.

What are the implications for this conclusion, then, if it is seen to be valid in any way? If the historically constructed and commercially packaged Hunting Experience is in essence lacking in integrity, how does one reconcile the much needed utilitarian benefits that trophy hunting is able to provide, with the view that the individuals who partake in Big Five trophy hunting may be unwittingly compromising their own moral beliefs and principles? What implications does this hold for anti-hunters if, as has been highlighted, the integrity of their utilitarian positions in arguing against all forms of hunting is compromised by their own unwitting participation in harmful processes, processes that themselves produce more "evil" to the world than the death of one wild animal? Also, what solutions would anti-hunters be able to provide as an alternative to trophy hunting, if trophy hunting may be regarded as a moral compromise in the short-term interests of species conservation? These are not easy questions to answer, and in attempting to do so one is inevitably aware of the immense amount of effort that has already gone into attempts to do so, in all of the fields such as philosophy, science, economics, ecology, and sociology.

One practical response is for groups such as SCI to de-emphasise the awards and incentives offered for the hunting of animals.⁶⁰ The realistic and practical consequence of these awards is that they do serve to objectify animals in a way that denies any inherent value, and reduces the value of wildlife, although subliminally, to that of a mere commodity that is explained according to evolutionary explanations of trophyism. That trophyism is endemic and to an extent natural in humans is clear. However, the reasons for trophyism are more important than its manifestation, as this natural propensity for tokenism is not exclusive or reducible to evolutionary explanations of the role of hunting in human culture. De-emphasising the value of the trophy would also be less contradictory for hunters, and the commercial aspect that drives the trophy hunting industry will not be as open to accusations of pure exploitationism.

Also, emphasising trophy hunting as a short-term option to be used in a specific context, will still allow for the obvious economic and social benefits without entrenching an inescapable technocratic and purely instrumental approach to wildlife management. However, any such compromise as to the short-term necessity of trophy hunting of the Big Five will necessarily be made with the awareness that it is inevitably also a compromise of integrity. The key here is to

⁶⁰ This is an idealistic appeal, and would be rejected by SCI outright. Nevertheless, it has a lot of merit that many hunters would no doubt support.

emphasise the short-term value of trophy hunting, as opposed to emphasising the inevitability of trophy hunting as the *only* alternative to wildlife problems. This will in a sense be a moral compromise, but if used in specific instances, such as genuine problem animal control, the utilitarian requirements of hunters and anti-hunters may be met simultaneously, as well as meeting the needs of wildlife managers and benefiting ecosystems and species. Anti-hunters, and wildlife managers and environmentalists in general, would be required by such an emphasis on the short-term compromise of trophy hunting to seek and promote alternative pragmatic means of reconciling the interests of humans with those of wildlife and threatened species. This is something which anti-hunters have thus far failed to achieve. By shifting away from a fixed belief in the inevitability of trophy hunting, one out of necessity opens the possibility for other options to come to fruition. The Reformation taught western civilisation one very important lesson: that one first needs to believe in the existence of other possibilities and potentialities, before being able to pursue them. These alternative options may not offer the economic benefits in a way that is comparable to trophy hunting, although the precedent that this may set may spill over into other reappraisals regarding the meaning of materialism, or the lack thereof, upon which the highly consumptive and environmentally damaging economies of developed countries are based. This promotes the idea of self-fulfilment beyond a materialistic view of the world.

Another response is to highlight some of the areas that need to be emphasised in relation to discussions surrounding trophy hunting, such as the need for an empirical basis upon which wildlife management decisions may confidently be taken in determining the long term effects of trophy hunting. The other areas that deserve more study are the value systems that inform trophy hunting and strictly vegetarian positions. They are two poles in extreme opposition to one another, and on either side of a spectrum in which the majority of people are in the middle. To posit one extreme over the other denies the fact that most people live their lives in relative fulfilment without regard to either side's claims to the contrary.⁶¹ An exploration into the implications for the environment and confined ecosystems, brought about by individual actions and beliefs, is also necessary if one wants to clarify what may happen if purely conservationist approaches were followed as opposed to preservationist, and vice versa.

⁶¹ An explanation could be that this is out of ignorance or a case of not knowing better.

The value of this study lies, though, in attempting to clarify why the debate between preservationists and conservations, and anti-hunters and hunters, is so contested and seemingly devoid of common ground. This is because people, to an extent, act out of mistrust and fear in adopting a particular lifestyle, and choose according to what they deem are the most appealing and attractive options in their own search for fulfilment, by which fear and mistrust may be banished on the attainment of self-fulfilment. This is particularly in regard to the debate surrounding trophy hunting. Any choices one takes in this regard also inevitably impacts on the environment.

This study has hopefully highlighted the importance of Integrity as Virtue. If pursued with Socratic zeal, one necessarily focuses on ideal notions of *truth* and *wisdom* in relation to trophy hunting.⁶² By focusing an approach to trophy hunting – and environmental management approaches in general – around an ideal conception of Socratic integrity, one also concentrates on moral integrity,⁶³ in the sense that one would necessarily strive to avoid acts that can demonstrably be shown to be *corrupt*, in the sense that corruption is the opposite of integrity. This entails the pursuit of justice and purity in one's actions towards others, including the environment. As it is easier to avoid demonstrably corrupt acts of hunting than it is to settle on one all-encompassing definition of integrity that should be strived for, one is more able to avoid injustice, say, by arguing for or against hunting in a way that promotes truth. The promotion of truth and the striving for justice inevitably leads to a banishment of fear, anxiety, and mistrust in our choices in regard to the environment, and a greater clarity and purity in decision-making processes. Idealistic to be sure, but a reasoned approach to the integrity of trophy hunting can only lead to good things for ecosystems, wildlife and humans.

⁶² Kateb 1998: 79.

⁶³ Kateb 1998: 79-80.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, J.S. and McShane, T.O. 1992. *The Myth of Wild Africa*. London: Norton.
- African Lion Working Group. 1999. *Lion Working Group Report*. CBSG Annual Meeting, Warmbaths, South Africa, 15-17 October.
- African Lion Working Group. 2001. Hunting Ban in Botswana. *African Lion News*, 3: 5.
- Aitken, G.M. 1998. Extinction. *Biology and Philosophy*, 13: 393-411.
- Albertson, A. 1998. *Northern Botswana Veterinary Fences: Critical Ecological Impacts*. Ojai, CL: The Wild Foundation.
- Altherr, T.L. and Rieger, J.F. 1995. Academic Historians and Hunting: A Call for More and Better Scholarship. *Environmental History Review*, 19(3): 39-56.
- Amory, C. 1974. *Mankind? Our Incredible War on Wildlife*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Anon. 1999. SPCA's and the game industry. *SA Wild & Jag*, 5(10): 9.
- Anon. 2000. *Placing Hunting in Perspective*. Information Booklet. Minnesota: Kids for Pheasants.
- Anon. 2002. Lion Breeding. *Game & Hunt*, 8(7), July: 28-29, 42.
- Anon. 2003a. *Best Hunting in South Africa* [Online]. Available: http://www.news24.com/Regional_Papers/Components/Category_Article_Text_Template/0,2430,568_899358~E,00.html [2003, May 12].
- Anon. 2003b. Hunt is Off in Kruger. *Mail & Guardian*, 1 September: [n.p.].
- Antrobus, S. 1996. Vision, conviction and steel: The legacy of C.J. McElroy. *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, July/August: 61-63, 118-124.
- Ardrey, R. 1976. *The Hunting Hypothesis: A Personal Conclusion Concerning the Evolutionary Nature of Man*. London: Collins.
- Arntzen, J.W. 2003. *An Economic View on Wildlife Management Areas in Botswana*. Gaborone, IUCN/SNV CBNRM Support Programme.

- Baker, C. 1956. *Hemingway: The Writer as Artist*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Baldus, R.D. 1990. The Economics of Safari Hunting. *Internationales Afrikaforum*, 26(4): 361-366.
- Baldus, R.D. 2001. Wildlife Conservation in Tanganyika under German Colonial Rule. *Internationales Afrikaforum*, 37(1): 73-78.
- Bauman, Z. 1992. *Intimations of Postmodernity*. London: Routledge.
- Bekoff, M. and Jamieson, D. 1991. Sport Hunting as an Instinct: Another Evolutionary 'Just-so-story'? *Environmental Ethics*, 13(4): 375-378.
- Benjamin, M. 1990. *Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Bennett, E.L., Milner-Gulland, E.J., Bakarr, M., Eves, H.E., Robinson J.G. and Wilkie, S.L. 2002. Hunting the World's Wildlife To Extinction. *Oryx*, 36(4), October: 328-329.
- Bentham, J. 1789. *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. [S.l.:s.n.].
- Bigalke, R.C. 1982. Some Economic Aspects of Using Game. *Pelea*, 1: 13-22.
- Bittner, J.R. 2002. Hemingway's Influence on the Life and Writings of Robert Ruark. *The Hemingway Review*, 21(2): 129-144.
- Boone & Crocket. 2003. *Boone & Crocket Club*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.boone-crockett.org> [2003, August 21].
- Bothma, J. Du P. and Le Richie, E.A.N. 1984. Aspects of the Ecology and the Behaviour of the Leopard *Panthera Pardus* in the Kalahari Desert. *Koedoe*, Supplement: 259-279.
- Botswana Ministry of Trade, Industry, Wildlife and Tourism. 2003. *Department of Wildlife* [Online]. Available: http://www.gov.bw/government/ministry_of_trade_industry_wildlife_and_tourism.html#wildlife [2003, June 03].
- Botswana Wildlife Management Association. 2001. *Economic Analysis of Commercial Consumptive Use of Wildlife in Botswana*. ULG Northumbrian.
- Botswana. 1990. *Botswana National Conservation Strategy*. Government Paper No. 1 of 1990. Gaborone, Government Printer: Section 1.4, (a), (b).

- Boyd, M. [S.a.]. *Culling Row – The For and Against*. Unpublished.
- Brenner, G. 1997. (S)Talking Game: Dialogically Hunting Hemingway's Domestic Hunters. *The Hemingway Review*, 16 (2): 35-50.
- Bronowski, J. 1976. *The Ascent of Man*. London: Joseph Causton.
- Brown, R. 1999. Integrity in business: A real or illusory decline? in A. Montefiore and D. Vines (eds.). *Integrity in the Public and Private Domains*. London: Routledge: 281-289.
- Bull, B. 1988. *Safari: A Chronicle of Adventure*. London: Penguin.
- Cahen, H. 1995. Against the Moral Considerability of Ecosystems, in C. Pierce and D. VanDeVeer (eds.). *People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees*. 2nd edition. London: Wadsworth: 300-314.
- Callicott, J.B. 1992. Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again, in E.C. Hargrove (ed.). *The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective*. Albany: State University of New York Press: 249-261.
- Callicott, J.B. 1995. Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair, in C. Pierce and D. VanDeVeer (eds.). *People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees*. 2nd edition. London: Wadsworth: 237-254.
- Cartmill, M. 1993. *A View to a Death in the Morning: Hunting and Nature through History*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Cartmill, M. 1995. Hunting and Humanity in Western Thought. *Social Research*, 62(3): 773-785.
- Cattrick, A. 1959. *Spoor of Blood*. Cape Town: Howard Timmins.
- Causey, A.S. 1989. On the Morality of Hunting. *Environmental Ethics*, 11:327-343.
- Causey, A.S. 1996. Is Hunting Ethical? in D. Peterson (ed.). *The Hunter's Heart: Honest Essays on Blood Sport*. New York: Henry Holt: 80-89.
- Cheney, J. 1987. Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology. *Environmental Ethics*, 9:115-145.
- Christensen, J. 2001. *NGO Profile On: The Humane Society of the United States*. International Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources [Online], May 26. Available: <http://pub50.ezboard.com/ftnusaofwashingtonfrm1.showNextMessage?topicID=25.topic> [2003, June 11]

- Cito, A. 1996. Great Participation in SCI Awards Presentation at Reno Convention. *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, March/April: 58-59.
- Collard, A. 1989. *Rape of the Wild: Man's Violence against Animals and the Earth*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Comrie-Greig, J. 1984. The Law of the Jungle: A Sordid Safari in Botswana. *African Wildlife*, 38(5): 176-183.
- Conservation Force. 2003a. *Directors and Officers* [Online]. Available: <http://www.conservationforce.org/organization/directors.cfm> [2003, August 06]
- Conservation Force. 2003b. *History* [Online]. Available: <http://www.conservationforce.org/organization/history.cfm> [2003, August 06]
- Conservation Force. 2003c. *The Bad Guys* [Online]. Available: http://www.conservationforce.org/links/bad_guys.cfm [2003, August 06].
- Conservation Force. 2003d. *Why We Hunt* [Online]. Available: <http://www.conservationforce.org/wwh/index.cfm> [2003, August 06]
- Cumming, R.G. 1909. *The Lion Hunter of South Africa: Five Years Adventures in the Far Interior of South Africa, with Notices of the Native Tribes and Savage Animals*. London: John Murray.
- Curnutt, J. 1996. How to Argue For and Against Sport Hunting. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 27(2): 65-89.
- Damm, G. 2000. *Hunting 2000 – A Vision and a Mission*, Email to Charl Badenhorst [Online], 8 October. Available Email: muskwa@ibi.co.za [2001, October 8].
- Damm, G. 2001a. *Conservation Through Utilisation*, Email to Charl Badenhorst [Online], 8 October. Available Email: muskwa@ibi.co.za [2001, October 8].
- Damm, G. 2001b. *Darting – A Viable Alternative to Hunting?* Email to Charl Badenhorst [Online], 8 October. Available Email: muskwa@ibi.co.za [2001, October 8].
- Damm, G. 2001c. *Fair Chase*, Email to Charl Badenhorst [Online], 8 October. Available Email: muskwa@ibi.co.za [2001, October 8].
- Damm, G. 2001d. *Position Paper on Hunting Abroad*, Email to Charl Badenhorst [Online], 8 October. Available Email: muskwa@ibi.co.za [2001, October 8].
- Damm, G. 2001e. *Sport or Trophy Hunting*, Email to Charl Badenhorst [Online], 8 October. Available Email: muskwa@ibi.co.za [2001, October 8].

- Damm, G. 2003. Hunters & Conservationists are Natural Partners. *Africa Geographic*, February: 46-49.
- Dart, R. A. and Craig, D. 1953. The Predatory Transition from Ape to Man. *International Anthropological and Linguistic Review*, 1: 201-217.
- Dart, R. A. and Craig, D. 1959. *Adventures in the Missing Link*. New York: Harper.
- Deacon, J. 1992. *Arrows as agents of belief amongst the /Xam bushmen*. Cape Town: National Monuments Council.
- DeGeorges, A. 2001a. *Hunting Ethics*, Email to Charl Badenhorst [Online], 26 September. Available Email: andred@global.co.za [2001, September 26].
- DeGeorges, A. 2001b. *Re: Hunting Ethics*, Email to Charl Badenhorst [Online], 26 September. Available Email: andred@global.co.za [2001, September 26].
- De Villiers, B. 1999. *Land Claims and National Parks – The Makuleke Experience*. Human Sciences Research Council.
- Du Plessis. P. 2001. Good Behaviour – Good Relationships. *SA Wild & Jag*, 7(7): 9.
- Dublin, H.T. and Taylor, R.D. 1996. Making Management Decisions from Data, in K. Kangwana (ed.). 1996. *Studying Elephants*. Nairobi: African Wildlife Foundation: 10-17.
- DWNP. 1999a. *Controlled Hunting Areas*. Information pamphlet, series "Wildlife: Our Strongest Resource". Department of Wildlife and National Parks, Botswana.
- DWNP. 1999b. *Wildlife Quotas*. Information pamphlet, series "Wildlife: Our Strongest Resource". Department of Wildlife and National Parks, Botswana.
- Eaton, R.L. 2002. *Understanding Trophy Hunting: A Powerful Conservation Tool* [Online]. Available: http://www.conservationforce.org/wwh/get_articles.cfm?id=30 [2003, August 06].
- Eaton, R.L. 2003. *Why Hunting is Good Medicine for Youth, Society and the Environment* [Online]. Available: http://www.conservationforce.org/wwh/get_articles.cfm?id=31 [2003, August 06]
- ECGMA. 2003. *Mission Statement* [Online]. Available: <http://www.ecgma.co.za/Mission/mission.htm> [2003, May 08].
- Editorial Comment. 1999. *SA Wild & Jag*, 5(10): 9.

- Elephants to be Hunted in Kruger? 2000. *Mail & Guardian*, 21 January: [n.p.].
- Elgin, C. 1996. Why Don't You Ask The Bunnies? *Man Magnum*, 21(2): 86-87.
- Emslie, R. and Brooks, M. 1999. *African Rhino*. Status survey and Conservation Action Plan: IUCN/SSC African Rhino Specialist Group.
- Expeditions advertisement. 1987. 99.99% Success (on over 200 hunts). *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, July/August: 50.
- Falkena, H.B. 2003. *Profit and Honour in Game Ranching*. Rivonia: SA Financial Sector Forum.
- Filmer, T.J. 2001. Why not with Hounds? *Man Magnum*, September: 23-24.
- Ford, T.J. 1996. One father plus two sons equals Africa. *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, July/August: 53-54, 109-111.
- Fox, W. 1986. Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan's Critique of Deep Ecology. *Environmental Studies, Occasional Paper # 20*, Australia: University of Tasmania.
- Freese, C.H. 1997a. The "Use It or Lose It" Debate: Issues of a Conservation Paradox, in C.H. Freese, (ed.). 1997. *Harvesting Wild Species: Implications for Biodiversity Conservation*. London: John Hopkins: 1-48.
- Fromm, E. 1973. *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Genesis. 1984. *Holy Bible, New International Version*. International Bible Society: Zondervan Publishing House.
- Gillroy, J.M. (ed.). 1993. *Environmental Risk, Environmental Values, and Political Choices: Beyond Efficiency Trade-offs in Public Policy Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Glotfelty, C. 1994. Hunting the Wild: Primitivists and Ecofeminists Up in Arms. *Weber Studies* [Online], 11(3), Fall. Available: <http://weberstudies.weber.edu/archive/archive%20B%20Vol.%201116.1/Vol.%2011.3/11.3Glotfelty.htm> [2002, June 11].
- Gonzalez, P.B. 2002. Biographical Life and Ratio-Vitalism in the Thought of Ortega y Gasset. *Philosophy Today*, 46(4): 406-418.
- Governments of South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 2001. *Treaty on the Establishment and Management of the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Transfrontier Park*. Second draft, 26th March: Article 3(1)(b)(ii).

- Grobler, D., Delsink, A. and Lotter, H. 2003. Putting Jumbos on the Pill Does the Trick. *The Sunday Independent*, 21 September: 7.
- Gujadhur, T. 2001. *Joint Venture Options for Communities and Safari Operators in Botswana*. Gaborone, IUCN/SNV CBNRM Support Programme.
- Gunn, A. S. 2001. Environmental Ethics and Trophy Hunting. *Ethics and the Environment*, 6(1): 68-95.
- Hagel, B. 1992. Trophy Hunting – Commentary. *Hunting Horizons*, Premier issue: 19-24, 112-114.
- Hamilton, B. 2000. *Elephants – Some Possible Fallacies*. Davis: University of California, Department of Environmental Science and Policy.
- Hargrove, E.C. (ed.). 1992. *The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Hattingh, J. 2000. A History of Sustainable Development. *Report from the Unit for Environmental Ethics*, 1(1). Stellenbosch, University of Stellenbosch: 1-3.
- Hemingway, E. 1994. *The Green Hills of Africa*. London: Arrow Books
- Hettinger, N. 1994. Valuing Predation in Rolston's Environmental Ethics: Bambi Lovers versus Tree Huggers. *Environmental Ethics*, 16(1): 3-20.
- Hinman, L.M. 1997. *Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory*. Fort Worth: Harcourt, Brace.
- Hitchcock, R.K., Yellen, J.E., Gelburd, D.J., Osborn, A.J. and Crowell, A.L. 1996. Subsistence Hunting and Resource Management Among the Ju/'hoansi of North-western Botswana. *African Study Monographs*, 17(4): 153-220.
- Hoffman, G. 1997. Leopard tales. *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, January/February: 58-59, 262-269.
- Holden, M. 2001. Phenomenology versus Pragmatism: Seeking a Restoration Environmental Ethic. *Environmental Ethics*, 22: 37-56.
- Honderich, T. (ed.). 1995. *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Horning, G. 1999. Should Children Hunt? *Femina*, April: 54-59.

- Horsthemke, K.A. 1993. *The Moral Status of Animals*. PhD. Dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
- HSUS. 2003a. *About Us* [Online]. Available: <http://www.hsus.org/ace/11681> [2003, June 10].
- HSUS. 2003b. *Animals and Society: An Annotated List of Courses* [Online]. Available: <http://www.hsus.org/ace/11317> [2003, June 10].
- HSUS. 2003c. *History* [Online]. Available: <http://www.hsus.org/ace/12552> [2003, June 10].
- HSUS. 2003d. *Hunting* [Online]. Available: <http://www.hsus.org/ace/12035> [2003, June 10].
- HSUS. 2003e. *State Wildlife Management: The Pervasive Influence of Hunters, Hunting, Culture, and Money* [Online]. Available: <http://www.hsus.org/ace/12071> [2003, June 10].
- Hummel, R. 1994. *Hunting and Fishing for Sport: Commerce, Controversy, Popular Culture*. Bowling Green: Bowling Green University Popular Press.
- IUCN. 1980. *World Conservation Strategy: Living Resources for Sustainable Development*. Gland, Switzerland: World Conservation Union.
- IUCN. 1991. *Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living*. Gland, Switzerland: World Conservation Union.
- IUCN. 2002. *The Botswana Elephant Paradox*. Gaborone, CBNRM Support Programme.
- IUCN. 2003. *What Does IUCN Do?* [Online]. Available: <http://www.iucn.org/about/index.htm#goals> [2003, June 02].
- Ivins, T. 1993. "Ethics" and the Professional Hunter Today: A Message to Professional Hunters. *Pelea*, 12: 105-109.
- Jones, B.T.B. 2002. *Chobe Enclave, Botswana – Lessons learnt from a CBNRM Project 1993-2002*. Gaborone, IUCN/SNV CBNRM Support Programme.
- Jones, K. 1998. Trust in Science and Scientists: A Response to Kane, in I. Shapiro and R. Adams (eds.). *Integrity and Conscience*. New York: New York University Press: 139-153.

- Kane, J. 1998. Integrity, Conscience, and Science, in I. Shapiro and R. Adams (eds.). *Integrity and Conscience*. New York: New York University Press: 115-138.
- Kangwana, K. (ed.). 1996. *Studying Elephants*. Nairobi: African Wildlife Foundation.
- Kant, I. 1989. The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, in L.P. Pojman (ed.). *Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth: 229-253.
- Kateb, G. I. 1998. Socratic Integrity, in I. Shapiro and R. Adams (eds.). *Integrity and Conscience*. New York: New York University Press: 77-112.
- Kellert, S. 1978. *Attitudes and Characteristics of Hunters and Antihunters*. Transactions of the Forty-third North American Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference, 1978: 412-423.
- Kent, S. (ed.). 1996. *Cultural diversity among twentieth-century foragers: An African Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kent, S. 1996a. Cultural diversity among African foragers: causes and implications, in S. Kent (ed.). *Cultural diversity among twentieth-century foragers: An African Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-18.
- Kent, S. 1996b. Hunting variability at a recently sedentary Kalahari village, in S. Kent (ed.). *Cultural diversity among twentieth-century foragers: An African Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 125-156.
- Kerasote, T. 1993. *Bloodties: Nature, Culture, and the Hunt*. New York: Kodansha.
- Kerasote, T. 1996. Restoring the Older Knowledge, in D. Peterson (ed.). *The Hunter's Heart: Honest Essays on Blood Sport*. New York: Henry Holt: 284-294.
- Kheel, M. 1996. The Killing Game: An Ecofeminist Critique of Hunting. *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, 23: 30-44.
- King, R.J.H. 1991. Environmental Ethics and the Case for Hunting. *Environmental Ethics*, 13(1): 59-85.
- Kooy, H. 2001. Licensing the Industry. *SA Wild & Jag*, 7(7): 29.
- Laughlin, W.S. 1968. Hunting: An Integrating Biobehavior System and Its Evolutionary Importance, in R. B. Lee and I. DeVore (eds.). *Man the Hunter*. Aldine: Chicago: 304-320.

- Leahy, M.P.T. 1991. *Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective*. London: Routledge.
- Lee, R.B. and Hitchcock, R.K. 2001. African Hunter-Gatherers: Survival, History, and the Politics of Identity. *African Study Monographs*, Supplementary Issue, 26: 257-280.
- Leighton, L. 1932. An Autopsy and a Prescription. *Hound & Horn*, 5: 520-39.
- Leopold, A. 1970. *A Sand County Almanac*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Leopold, A. 1995. The Land Ethic, in C. Pierce and D. VanDeVeer (eds.). *People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees*. 2nd edition. London: Wadsworth: 142-151.
- Levine, M.P., Cox, D. and La Caze, M. 1999. Should we strive for Integrity? *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 33: 519-530.
- Lewis, D.M. and Alpert, P. 1997. Trophy Hunting and Wildlife Conservation in Zambia. *Conservation Biology*, 11(1): 59-68.
- Lewis-Williams, J.D. 1981. *Believing and Seeing: Symbolic Meanings in Southern San Rock Paintings*. London: Academic Press.
- Light, A. and Katz, E. (eds.). 1996. *Environmental Pragmatism*. London: Routledge.
- List, C.J. 1997. Is Hunting a Right Thing? *Environmental Ethics*, 19(4): 405-416.
- Loftin, R.W. 1984. The Morality of Hunting. *Environmental Ethics*, 6(4), 241-250.
- Loibooki, M., Hofer, H., Kenneth, L.I., Campbell, K.L.I. and East, M.L. 2002. Bushmeat Hunting by Communities Adjacent to the Serengeti National Park, Tanzania: the Importance of Livestock Ownership and Alternative Sources of Protein and Income. *Environmental Conservation*, 29(3): 391-398.
- Lounsberry, B. 1983. 'Green Hills of Africa': Hemingway's Celebration of Memory. *The Hemingway Review*, 2(2): 23-31.
- Lounsberry, B. 1993. The Holograph Manuscript of 'Green Hills of Africa'. *The Hemingway Review*, 12(2): 36-45.
- Luke, B. 1997. A Critical Analysis of Hunters' Ethics. *Environmental Ethics*, 19(1): 25-44.
- Luke, B. 1998. Violent Love: Hunting, Heterosexuality, and the Erotics of Men's Predation. *Feminist Studies*, 24(3): 627-655.

- Luxmoore, R. and Swanson, T. 1992. Wildlife and Wildland Utilization and Conservation, in T.M. Swanson and E.B. Barbier (eds.). *Economics for the Wilds: Wildlife, Wildlands, Diversity and Development*. London: Earthscan: 170-194.
- Mackenzie, J.M. 1988. *The Empire of Nature*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- MacLean, D. 1993. Epilogue: Environmental Values and Economic Trade-offs – Conflict and Compromise, in J. M. Gillroy (ed.). *Environmental Risk, Environmental Values, and Political Choices: Beyond Efficiency Trade-offs in Public Policy Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press: 171-179.
- Macleod, F. 2001a. Bush Guns for Botswana lion Hunt. *Mail & Guardian*, 26 April: 4.
- Macleod, F. 2001b. Relocation Saves Kruger's Elephants. *Mail & Guardian*, 4 May: 14.
- Macleod, F. 2002a. Building a Future for Wildlife. *Mail & Guardian*, 1 February: 27.
- Macleod, F. 2002b. SA Seeks Trade in White Rhino Horn. *Mail & Guardian*, 8 February: 2.
- Marsh, B. 2001a. How to Hunt Leopards. *Man Magnum*, 26(8), August: 46-48.
- Marsh, B. 2001b. Leopard Hunting with Hounds? *Man Magnum*, September: 22-23.
- Martin, E.W. 1959. *The Case Against Hunting*. London: Dennis Dobson.
- Matthews, M. 2002. Canned Hunting. *SL Magazine*, August: [n.p.].
- McCullam, I. 2000. Living Trophies: Animals ... Projections ... and Poetry. Private Correspondence, 30 September, Cape Town.
- McCullam, I. 2001. Personal Interview, 28 September, Cape Town.
- McElroy, C.J. (ed.). 1987. *SCI Record Book of Trophy Animals: Africa Field Edition VI, Volume 1*. Tucson: Safari Club International.
- Melisch, R. and Sirola, M. 2002. *Does trophy hunting bring conservation benefits?* [Online] Available: http://www.panda.org/news_facts/newsroom/news.cfm?uNewsId=2608&uLangId=1 [2002, July 05].
- MGM Environmental Solutions. 1997. *Wildlife Conservation in Northern Botswana*, Vol. 1. July: [s.n.].
- Miller, H.B. and Williams, W.H. 1983. *Ethics and Animals*. New Jersey: Humana Press.

- Montefiore, A. 1999. Integrity: A philosopher's introduction, in A. Montefiore and D. Vines (eds.). 1999. *Integrity in the Public and Private Domains*. London: Routledge: 3-18.
- Montefiore, A. and Vines, D. (eds.). 1999. *Integrity in the Public and Private Domains*. London: Routledge.
- Moriarty, P.V. and Woods, M. 1997. Hunting ≠ Predation. *Environmental Ethics*, 18(4): 391-404.
- Naess, A. 1973. The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary. *Inquiry*, 16(1): 95-100.
- Nel, M. 1995. Hunting and Conservation: Legitimate Partners or a Contradiction in Terms? *Africa – Environment & Wildlife*, 3(5): 31-34.
- Nelson, R.K. 1996. Introduction: Finding Common Ground, in D. Peterson (ed.). *The Hunter's Heart: Honest Essays on Blood Sport*. New York: Henry Holt: 1-10.
- Newkirk, I. 1990. *Save the Animals: 100 Easy Things You Can Do*. New York: Warner Books.
- Noggle, R. 1999. Integrity, The Self, and Desire-Based Accounts of the Good. *Philosophical Studies*, 96: 303-331.
- Norton, B.G. 1991. *Towards Unity Among Environmentalists*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Norton, B.G. 1995. Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism, in C. Pierce and D. VanDeVeer (eds.). *People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees*. 2nd edition. London: Wadsworth: 182-192.
- Norton, B.G. 1996a. Integration or Reduction: Two Approaches to Environmental Values, in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.). 1996. *Environmental Pragmatism*. London: Routledge: 105-138.
- Norton, B.G. 1996b. The Constancy of Leopold's Land Ethic, in A. Light and E. Katz (eds.). 1996. *Environmental Pragmatism*. London: Routledge: 84-102.
- Norton, P. 1984. Leopard Conservation in South Africa. *African Wildlife*, 38(5): 192- 196.
- Okavango Wildlife Society. 2003. *OWLS Special: The Makgadikgadi Lion Research Project* [Online]. Available: <http://lions.moremi.org/>. [2003, June 02]
- Ortega y Gasset, J. 1972. *Meditations on Hunting*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

- Passmore, J. 1974. *Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Patterson, G. 1998. *Dying to Be Free: The Canned Lion Scandal and the Case for Ending Trophy Hunting in Africa*. Parktown: Viking Penguin.
- Peake, D. 1999. Quick Facts: Botswana Hunting Facts and Figures from 1999 Season. Maun, Botswana Wildlife Management Association.
- Perper, T. and Schrire, C. 1977. The Nimrod Connection: Myth and Science in the Hunting Model, in M.R. Kare and O. Maller (eds.). *The Chemical Senses and Nutrition*. New York: Academic Press. 447-459.
- PETA. 2003a. *Biography: Ingrid Newkirk* [Online]. Available: <http://ingridnewkirk.com/i-bio.html> [2003, June 04].
- PETA. 2003b. *General Animal Rights* [Online]. Available: <http://www.petamail.com/books/> [2003, June 04].
- PETA. 2003c. *Historic Victories* [Online]. Available: <http://www.peta.org/about/milestones.html> [2003, June 04].
- PETA. 2003d. *Hunting: Frequently asked Questions* [Online]. Available: <http://www.petauk.org/cmp/actguide15hunt.html> [2003, June 04].
- PETA. 2003e. *Hunting: Unfair Game* [Online]. Available: <http://www.petapsa.com/facts/fswild1.html> [2003, June 04].
- Peterson, D. (ed.). 1996. *The Hunter's Heart: Honest Essays on Blood Sport*. New York: Henry Holt.
- PHASA. 2003. *About PHASA* [Online]. Available: <http://www.professionalthunters.co.za/about.html> [2003, May 08].
- Phelps, N. 1999. *Money, Motherhood, and the Nineteenth Amendment: The Hunting Industry's Open Season on Women*. New York: Fund for Animals.
- Phelps, N. 2000. *Body Count: The Death Toll in America's War on Wildlife*. New York: The Fund for Animals.
- Phelps, N. 2001. *Children in the Crosshairs*. New York: The Fund for Animals.
- Pierce, C. and VanDeVeer, D. (eds.). 1995. *People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees*. 2nd edition. London: Wadsworth.

- Placing Hunting in Perspective. 2000. Information Booklet, Kids for Pheasants: Minnesota.
- Plastrik, P. (ed.). 2002. *Sustainable Solutions*. Ford Foundation: Colahan Saunders.
- Pluhar, E. 1995. *Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals*. London: Duke University Press.
- Plumwood, V. 1992. Feminism and Ecofeminism: Beyond the Dualistic Assumptions of Women, Men and Nature. *The Ecologist*, 22(1): 8-13.
- Pojman, L.P. (ed.). 1989. *Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Posewitz, J. 1994. *Beyond Fair Chase: The Ethic and Tradition of Hunting*. Montana: Falcon Publishing.
- Potgieter, A. 2001. The game rancher and the hunter. *SA Wild & Jag*, 7(6), June: [n.p.].
- Potts, R. 1991. Untying the Knot, in M. H. Robinson and L. Tiger (eds.). *Man and Beast Revisited*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press: [n.p.].
- Pringle, J. 1982. *The Conservationists and the Killers: The Story of Game Protection and the Wildlife Society of Southern Africa*. Cape Town: Books of Africa.
- Rabinow, P. (ed.). 1984. *The Foucault Reader*. London: Penguin Books.
- Rabinow, P. 1994. *Michel Foucault: Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth*. London: Penguin Books.
- Radder, L., Van Niekerk, P. and Nagel, A. 2000. Matching the Hunting Experience Staged by Selected Farmers in the Eastern Cape to the Value Expectations of Hunters. Research Report; Department of Marketing, Port Elizabeth Technikon.
- Regan, T. 1983. *The Case for Animal Rights*. Berkeley: The University of California Press.
- Reilly, B. 2001a. *Hunting*, Email to Charl Badenhorst [Online], 2 October, Available Email: reillyb@techpta.ac.za [2001, October 2].
- Reilly, B. 2001b. Telephone Interview. 2 October 2001, Stellenbosch.
- Resource Africa. [S.a.]. Safari Hunting in Southern Africa, Fact Sheet No. 10. Resource Africa, Parklands, South Africa

- Roberts, B. 1994. The world of hunting. *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, March/April: 136.
- Robinson, M. H. and Tiger, L. (eds.) 1991. *Man and Beast Revisited*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Rollin, B. 1989. *The Unheeded Cry*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rolston, H. III. 1988. *Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Rolston, H. III. 1994. *Conserving Natural Value*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ross, A.C. 1999. Morality and the market, in A. Montefiore and D. Vines (eds.). *Integrity in the Public and Private Domains*. London: Routledge: 290-301.
- Ross, W.D. 1989. What Makes Right Acts Right? in L.P. Pojman (ed.). *Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth: 253-261.
- Rowan, A.N. 1991. The Human-Animal Interface: Chasm or Continuum? in M. H. Robinson and L. Tiger (eds.) *Man and Beast Revisited*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Rowland Ward. 2003. *Rowland Ward Publications* [Online]. Available: <http://www.rowlandward.com> [2003, August 21].
- SA's Wildlife Industry is Flourishing [Online]. 2001. Available: <http://wildnetafrica.com/wildlifeneews/2001/04/1229.html> [2001, August 13].
- Salt, H.S. 1980 edition. *Animals' Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress*. Pennsylvania: Society for Animal Rights.
- Schmidtz, D. 2000. Natural Enemies: An Anatomy of Environmental Conflict. *Environmental Ethics*, 22(4): 397-408.
- SCI Ethics and Code of Conduct Committee. 2003. *Complaint Form for Ethical and/or Code of Conduct Violation*. Herndon, Virginia: SCI Ethics and Code of Conduct Committee.
- SCI Foundation Wildlife Conservation Department. 2001. *The Conservation Story of Safari Club International and Safari Club International Foundation*. Herndon, Safari Club International Foundation Wildlife Conservation Department.
- SCI. [S.a.]. *Trophy Quality Monitoring as a Tool in Sustainable Management in Sub-Saharan Africa*. SCI information pamphlet. [S.I.:s.n.].

- SCI. 1996a. SCI Pinnacle of Achievement Award: setting goals for the worldwide hunter. *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, June: 61.
- SCI. 1996b. SCI Record Book of Trophy Animals: a history of big game hunting in our time. *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, June: 5.
- SCI. 1996c. SCI World Hunting Awards program. *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, June: 12.
- SCI. 2003a. *Advocate for 45 Million Hunters and Wildlife Conservation Worldwide* [Online]. Available: <http://www.safariclub.org> [2003, May 28].
- SCI. 2003b. *Chapter Information* [Online]. Available: <http://www.scifirstforhunters.org/chapter/index> [2003, August 14].
- SCI. 2003c. *Conservation* [Online]. Available: <http://www.scifirstforhunters.org/content/website/about/conservation/> [2003, August 14].
- SCI. 2003d. *SCI – First for Hunters* [Online]. Available: <http://www.scifirstforhunters.org/> [2003, August 14].
- SCI. 2003e. *Sustainable Use Conservation* [Online]. Available: http://www.scidc.org/pages/conservation/sustainable_use.cfm [2003, May 28].
- SCI. 2003f. *Bylaws Of Safari Club International*. As amended on January 30. Tucson: Safari Club International.
- Scorer Certification Seminar. 1983. *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, July/August: 59.
- Scruton, R. 1997. From a View to a Death: Culture, Nature and the Huntsman's Art. *Environmental Values*, 6: 471-481.
- Scruton, R. 2002. Ethics and Welfare: the Case of Hunting. *Philosophy*, 77(302), October: 543-564.
- Selous, F.C. 1970. *A Hunter's Wanderings in Africa*. Bulawayo: Books of Rhodesia.
- Shapiro, I. and Adams R. (eds.). 1998. *Integrity and Conscience*. New York: New York University Press.
- Shephard, P. 1973. *The Tender Carnivore and the Sacred Game*. New York: Scribner's Sons.

- Singer, P. 1976. *Animal Liberation*. New York: Avon Books.
- Smith, M. 2002. Canning the Game Industry? *Farmer's Weekly*, 9 August: 30.
- South Africa. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996). As amended on 11 October 1996.
- South Africa. 1997. *White Paper on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of South Africa's Biological Diversity*. Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. Draft for Discussion, May.
- South Africa. 1998. National Environmental Management Act (Act 107 of 1998). *Government Gazette*, No. 19519, 27 November.
- Sowman, M., Fuggle, R. and Preston, G. 1995. A Review of the Evolution of Environmental Evaluation Procedures in South Africa. *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, 15: 45-67.
- Steinhart, E.I. 1989. Hunters, Poachers and Gamekeepers: Towards a Social History of Hunting in Colonial Kenya. *Journal of African History*, 30: 247-264.
- Stephens, P.H.G. 2000. Nature, Purity, Ontology. *Environmental Values*, 9: 267-294.
- Stewart, J. 1998. Hunting Courses and WESSA's Policies. *African Wildlife*, 52(5): 27.
- Strychacz, T. 1993. Trophy-Hunting as a Trope of Manhood in Ernest Hemingway's 'Green Hills of Africa'. *The Hemingway Review*, 13(1): 36-47.
- Swan, G., Smit, P. and Botes, D. 2000. *Hunting Africa: A Practical Guide*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Swan, J.A. 1995. *In Defense of Hunting*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Swanson, T.M. and Barbier E.B. (eds.). 1992. *Economics for the Wilds: Wildlife, Wildlands, Diversity and Development*. London: Earthscan.
- Taylor, P.W. 1986. *Respect for Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Telecky, T.M. and Lin, D. 1995. *Big Game, Big Bucks: The Alarming Growth of the American Trophy Hunting Industry*. S.I.: The Humane Society of the United States and Humane Society International.

- The Centre for Consumer Freedom. 2003. *Humane Society of the United States*. [Online]. Available: http://www.consumerfreedom.com/activistcash/org_detail.cfm?ORG_ID=136 [2003, September 12]
- The Displaced Makulekes Recover Community Land and Wildlife Assets. 2002, in P. Plastrik (ed.). *Sustainable Solutions*. S.l.: Ford Foundation, Colahan Saunders: 46-51.
- The Fund For Animals. 2000. *An Overview of Killing for Sport*. Information pamphlet, series "Hunting Fact Sheet", # 1. The Fund for Animals, New York.
- The Fund For Animals. 2000a. *State Wildlife Agencies: A Century-Old Experiment in Mismanagement*. Information pamphlet, series "Hunting Fact Sheet", # 3. The Fund for Animals, New York.
- The Fund For Animals. 2003. *We Speak for Those Who Can't* [Online]. Available: http://www.fund.org/about/n5_mission.asp [2003, June 05].
- The Game Industry: Delicately Poised. 2000. *SA Wild & Jag*, 6(6), June: 23.
- The National Shooting Sports Foundation. 2001. *What They Say About Hunting: Position Statements on Hunting by Major Conservation or Preservation Organizations*. Newton: The National Shooting Sports Foundation.
- Thompson, J.B. 1990. *Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Thompson, R. 1996. The future for elephant hunting in Africa: A wildlife manager's perspective. *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, July/August: 89-93.
- Thomson, R. 2002. The South African Wildlife Industry: Identifying Friend and Foe. *Game & Hunt*, August: 25-27.
- Threat to Conservation. 1995. *Farmer's Weekly*, 19 May: 29.
- Trogdon, R.W. 1996. Forms of Combat: Hemingway, The Critics, and 'Green Hills of Africa'. *The Hemingway Review*, 15(2): 1-14.
- Tuohey, J. and Ma, T.P. 1992. Fifteen Years After 'Animal Liberation': Has the Animal Rights Movement Achieved Philosophical Legitimacy? *The Journal of Medical Humanities*, 13(2): 79-89.
- United Nations. 1992. *Convention on Biological Diversity*. Rio de Janeiro, 5 June.

- Valiente-Noailles, C. 1993. *The Kua: Life and Soul of the Central Kalahari Bushmen*. Rotterdam: Balkema.
- Van der Merwe, L. 1995. CHASA – Ontstaan en Werkzaamhede. *SA Wild & Jag*, 1(4): 15.
- Van der Stel, S. 1979. *Simon van der Stel's Journey to Namaqualand in 1685*. Cape Town: Human & Rousseau.
- VanDeVeer, D. and Pierce, C. (eds.). 1994. *The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book: Philosophy, Ecology, Economics*. London: Wadsworth.
- Varner G.E. 1995. Biological Functions and Biological Interests, in C. Pierce and D. VanDeVeer (eds.). *People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees*. 2nd edition. London: Wadsworth: 288-299.
- Vitali, T. 1990. Sport Hunting: Moral or Immoral? *Environmental Ethics*, 12(1): 69-82.
- Ward, S. 1996. *HSUS Touts Bogus 'Trophy Figures'*. International News for Campfire [Online], April. Available: <http://website.lineone.net/~s.ward/ART/%20496/3.html> [2003, March 05].
- Warren, K.J. 1995. The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism, in C. Pierce and D. VanDeVeer (eds.). *People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees*. 2nd edition. London: Wadsworth: 213-227.
- Weaver, K.E. 1994. What, me hunt? *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, November/December: 70-71, 168-170.
- Wenz, P.S. 1983. Ecology, Morality and Hunting, in H.B. Miller and W.H. Williams. 1983. *Ethics and Animals*. New Jersey: Humana Press: 183-197.
- WESSA. 2001. General Position Statement. Keith Cooper: private fax correspondence, 5 September, Cape Town.
- WESSA. 2003a. *The Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa* [Online]. Available: <http://www.wildlifesociety.org.za/organisation.htm> [2003, August 11].
- WESSA. 2003b. *Policy on Wildlife – Sustainable Utilization of Indigenous Fauna* [Online]. Available: http://www.wildlifesociety.org.za/conpol_wildlife.htm [2003, August 11].
- Western, S. 1999. Ethical Hunting: Is There Such a Thing? *E/The Environmental Magazine* [Online], Thursday, August 19. Available: http://www.enn.com/features/1999/08/081999/hunting_5089.asp [2003, August 18]

- White, L. 1994. The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, in D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (eds.). *The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book: Philosophy, Ecology, Economics*. London: Wadsworth: 45-51.
- White, S.E. 1996. Hunting buffalo in the land of footprints. *Safari: The Journal of Big Game Hunting*, May/June: 65, 70-74.
- Williams, J. 1990. The Killing Game. *Esquire*, October: 112-128.
- WWF. 2003. *Taking Action for a Living Planet* [Online]. Available: http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/ [2003, June 15].
- York, B. 2001a. I am proud that we hunt and do not destroy. *The Citizen*, 20 July, Friday.
- York, B. 2001b. Telephone Interview, 10 October 2001, Stellenbosch.
- Zintl, P. 2003. A Bloody Duel. *Earthy*, 2: 32-34.
-