

**CONFLICT AND PEACE IN BURUNDI: EXPLORING THE CAUSE(S) AND
NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE**



**This thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Military Science
(Security and Africa Studies (MII.)) at Stellenbosch University**

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously, in its entirety or in part, submitted it at any university for any degree.

Signature: B. Mokoena

Date: 31/10/2005

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to investigate the cause(s), the nature, and characteristics of the conflict in Burundi, and to explore the conditions for sustainable peace and prospects for peace. The study is intended as a descriptive analysis of conflict and peace in a case study of Burundi. Since independence in 1962, intermittent conflict has characterised the state of Burundi. There are various accounts of the conflict, of which a popular, but superficial, relates an 'ethnic' conflict between Hutus and Tutsis. Equally disparate, is the prescription of solutions, the most dominant of which is power sharing based on ethnic quotas. The conflict is played out in the context of a failing state with sharp structural weaknesses. In addition, Burundi is mired in the wider instabilities of the Great Lakes region and the communicable effects thereof.

The study breaks away from the tendency to analyse only the current (since 1993) bout of conflict. It is proposed that the various incidences of conflict mark different phases in the life cycle of a single conflict. The study also breaks away from the tendency to view the conflict as only opposing Hutus and Tutsis. These two tendencies in analysis generate serious distortions and omissions and may account for the wrong conclusions regarding the conflict in Burundi. Another contribution of the study resides with the proposal of the necessary and sufficient conditions for peace in Burundi. The contention brought forward by this study is that *exclusion* would appear to be the strongest theoretical approach to understand and describe the conflict in Burundi. In this regard, one particular contentious issue has remained constant throughout all the incidences of conflict involving different groups. The central issue has been about the political economy of Burundi that has systematically denied social mobility for the 'other'. The Burundian state is a repository of political, economic and social security where the 'other', defined in ethnic, intra-ethnic, clanic, regional, elitist (and historically dynastic) terms, is excluded and subordinated. Exclusion (and the consequent inequalities and injustices) is a source of acute grievance and motivation for collective violence. The resultant conflict has manifested in a struggle for the control of the state. *Inter alia*, the conflict has been pernicious, genocidal, protracted and intractable.

The notion of institutionalised power sharing, based on ethnic quotas, has been put forward by the actors in the peace process as the fundamental principle guiding the search for a solution to the conflict in Burundi. The study concludes that power sharing may be necessary, as a confidence building measure, however, power sharing in itself is not a sufficient condition for sustainable peace, and may well in future prove to be the weakest link in the peace process. *Inter alia*, the conditions in Burundi are not amenable to institutionalised power sharing as such, e.g. the presence of an overwhelming majority, and deep socio-economic inequality along ethnic lines. Further, the current power sharing structure in Burundi tilts the democratic framework in favour of Tutsi participation and security, awards the Tutsi with a *de facto* veto power, fixes the ethnic balance of power, and thus perpetuates conflict generating Tutsi domination of the political economy of Burundi. This study proposes the reconstruction of the state (state building) as a necessary precondition for peace. It is concluded that political representation, economic opportunity and social mobility, must transcend social categories in Burundi. The continuing instabilities in the Great Lakes region are also a point of concern. Thus, peace in Burundi is also contingent upon greater efforts to curb the communicable conflicts in this region.

OPSOMMING

Die doel van dié studie is om die oorsaak (of oorsake), aard en kenmerke van die konflik in Burundi te ondersoek, en om die voorwaardes vir volhoubare vrede en vooruitsigte op vrede te eksploreer. Die studie berus op 'n beskrywende ontleding van konflik en vrede in Burundi. Sedert onafhanklikwording in 1962 het voortslepende konflik die staat Burundi gekenmerk. Verskeie verslae oor die konflik het reeds die lig gesien, waarin 'n populêre, maar oppervlakkige taksering dui op 'n 'etniese' konflik tussen Hutus en Tutsis. Ewe bevreemtelik is die voorskrytelikheid van oplossings wat aan die hand gedoen word, waarvan die mees prominente neerkom op magsdeling op grond van etniese kwotas. Die konflik speel egter af in die konteks van 'n mislukte staat met besondere strukturele swakhede. Voorts is Burundi vasgevang in die wyer onstabiliteit van die Groot Mere gebied en die oorspoelgevolge wat daarmee verband hou.

Die studie stuur weg van die neiging om die konflik slegs in sy huidige vorm (sedert 1993) te analiseer. Daar word geoordeel dat die onderskeie manifestasies van konflikte eintlik verskeie fases in die verloop van 'n enkelvoudige konflik is. Die studie breek ook weg van die neiging om die konflik te beskou as bloot een van vyandskap tussen Hutus en Tutsis. Dié twee ontledingsbenaderings veroorsaak ernstige verwrings en onvolledigheid en kan lei tot ongeldige gevolgtrekkings oor die konflik in Burundi. 'n Verdere bydrae van die studie lê in die voorwaardes vir vrede in Burundi. Die betoog in hierdie studie is dat *uitsluiting* kom voor as die kragtagste teoretiese benadering om die konflik in Burundi te verstaan en beskrywe. Dit het betrekking op een spesifieke netelige saak wat deurgaans voorkom in al die manifestasies van konflik waarby die verskillende groepe ter sprake was. Die kern hiervan is dat die politieke ekonomie van Burundi van so 'n aard is dat daar 'n stelselmatige uitsluiting van die 'ander' party was. Die staat Burundi is 'n geval van politieke, ekonomiese en sosiale veiligheid waar die 'ander' party, soos uitgedruk in etniese, intra-etniese, stam, streeks- en elitistiese terme, aan uitsluiting en ondergeskiktheid onderwerp is. Uitsluiting (en gevolglike ongelikheid en ongeregtheid) skep 'n bron van intense gegriefdheid en motivering vir kollektiewe geweld. Die konflik wat op grond hiervan gemanifesteer het, kom neer op 'n stryd om die beheer van die staat. Dit was 'n konflik wat onder andere 'n skadelike, massamoorddadige, langdurige en hardnekkige gestalte aangeneem het.

Die gedagte van geïstitutionaliseerde magsdeling, gebaseer op etniese kwotas, is deur die rolspelers in die vredesproses voorgestel as 'n fundamentele beginsel in die soeke na 'n oplossing vir die konflik in Burundi. Die onderhawige studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat magsdeling nodig mag wees as 'n vertroueskeppende meganisme, maar nie 'n voldoende grondslag vir blywende vrede is nie en selfs in die toekoms die swakste skakel in die vredesproses mag wees. Vanweë die teenwoordigheid van 'n oorweldigende meerderheid en diep sosio-ekonomiese ongelikheid langs etniese lyne is die omstandighede in Burundi ook nie juis ontvanklik vir geïstitutionaliseerde magsdeling nie. Verder is die huidige magsdelingsmodel in Burundi sodanig dat dit die demokratiese raamwerk in die guns van Tutsi deelname en veiligheid swaai, 'n de facto vetoreg aan die Tutsi toeken, 'n spesifieke etniese magsbalans daarstel, en daarmee 'n voortsetting bring van die konflik-genererende oorheersing van die politieke ekonomie in Burundi. Die onderhawige studie stel die herkonstruksie van die staat (staatsbou) voor as 'n noodsaaklike voorwaarde vir vrede. Daar word tot die slotsom gekom dat politieke verteenwoordiging, ekonomiese geleenthede en sosiale mobiliteit sosiale stratifikasie moet oorspan. Die voortslepende onstabiliteit in die Groot Mere gebied is 'n verdere bron van kommer. Vrede in Burundi sal afhang van doelgerigte pogings om die streekskonflik en sy uitkringende effek die hoof te bied.

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A NOTE TO THE READER

The anglicised reference to Bahutu, Batutsi, Batwa, Baganwa, Umwami, and Barundi, is used throughout this study (unless otherwise indicated and directly cited from the original source). The following terms are used: Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, Ganwa, Mwami, and Burundian (and their anglicised plurals). The reason is simply a matter of convenience as the sources consulted are in the English language and these sources utilise these anglicised references. It is also common currency for an English audience/readership, for which this study is intended, to use these terms. Barundi refer to themselves in the Kirundi language as such:

Singular	Plural
Muhutu	Bahutu
Mututsi	Batutsi
Mutwa	Batwa
Muganwa	Baganwa
Murundi	Barundi

BURUNDI POLITICAL PARTIES AND ARMED MOVEMENTS *

Predominately Hutu Political Parties (G-7)

FRODEBU - Front for Democracy in Burundi
CNDD - National Council for the Defence of Democracy
PP – People's Party
PL - Liberal Party
RPB - Rally for the People of Burundi
PALIPEHUTU - Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
FROLINA - National Liberation Front

Predominately Tutsi Political Parties (G-10)

UPRONA – Union for National Progress
PARENA – National Recovery Party
PRP - Party for the Reconciliation of the People
PSD - Socialist Democratic Party
ABASA – Burundo-African Alliance for Salvation
INKINZO - The Shield
RADES - Rally for Democracy, Social and Economic Development
AV-INTWARI - Alliance of the Valliant
ANADDE - National Alliance for Rights and Development
PIT - Independent Labour Party

Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs)

PALIPEHUTU - Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
FNL - National Liberation Forces (led by Alain Mugabarabona)
FNL - National Liberation Forces (led by Agathon Rwasa)
FROLINA - National Liberation Front
CNDD - National Council for the Defence of Democracy
FDD - Forces for the Defence of Democracy (led by Jean-Basco Ndayikengurukiye)
FDD - Forces for the Defence of Democracy (led by Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza)

* The above are French acronyms. The G-7 and the G-10 formed blocs within the Arusha negotiations process. The APPMs are the seven Hutu parties and movements that have fighting forces, and include the three G-7 parties plus the four armed-factions (the four factions were not party to the Arusha Agreement of August 2000). Sources: Alusala (2005:9); International Crisis Group (2002:16, 2003:28-29); Bentley and Southall (2005:xviii, 73, 79, 82, 84, 88, 92, 199).

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
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
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MAP 1: A MAP OF BURUNDI WITH PROVINCES



Source: Burundi Realities, www.burundirealite.org/cartel01_e.html

MAP 2: A MAP OF THE GREAT LAKES REGION



CONFLICT AND PEACE IN BURUNDI: EXPLORING THE CAUSE(S) AND NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Contained in Central Africa's Great Lakes region, are some of the most protracted, intractable and pernicious conflicts in the world. The countries in the region share trans-border insurgencies, economic linkages, ethnic ties and fault lines, historical linkages, proximity and porous borders, making conflicts mutually communicable. Nestled between Rwanda and Uganda in the north, Tanzania in the east and south, the vastness of Lake Tanganyika and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the west, is the Republic of Burundi. Most significantly characterised by a crisis of governance and a precarious economic base, Burundi is a failing state. Since independence from Belgium in 1962, to date, intermittent conflict has engulfed this tiny state in the heart of Africa. The conflict has proved not only protracted but also genocidal. Peace efforts have struggled to bring the conflict to its logical conclusion, not the least, in reflection of the particularly intractable nature of this conflict and the issues involved.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

A review of the literature concerning the cause(s) of the conflict in Burundi reveals divergent pictures of a single reality. These accounts and theoretical approaches range from tales of *an ethnic conflict* (informed by ethnocentrism?) contained in much of the literature and the mass media¹, to Reyntjens (2000) and the Arusha Agreement's (2000:16) account of *a struggle by a political class for the control of the state*.² Further on, there is Homer-Dixon (1991, 1998), Homer-Dixon *et al* (1993), and England's (2003a, 2003b) account of *environmental scarcity*, to Collier and Hoeffler (2000, 2001) and Collier's (2000) account of *a large-scale predation of productive economic activities*, to Lemarchand's (1997, 2000a, 2000b) account of *exclusion*.

Informed by the view that the way people understand issues and conditions shapes how they act in response to them, it is imperative, in view of the peace process, that a sound and accurate understanding of the conflict in Burundi is engendered. Thus, the pertinent questions to ask in this regard include the following: What is/are the cause(s) of the conflict? Are there different theoretical approaches in understanding and describing the conflict, if so, which of these approaches has a 'stronger claim' in accounting for the conflict? What factors account for the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict? What are the trigger factors? At this stage, it should be appreciated that an accurate understanding of the cause(s) of a conflict is the first step towards conflict resolution and subsequent peace building.

Equally disparate, is the prescription of solutions for the conflict in Burundi. These 'solutions' range from 'spatial designs for peace', exemplified by Griggs (1997) and Kaufmann (1996, 1999), which prescribe geographical

¹ Exemplified by the August 1988 assertion by *The Economist*, "People as different as Finns and Sicilians", (cited in Chrétien, 2003:73), to refer to the Hutu and Tutsi, implying that ethnic difference in itself is a cause of conflict.

² *The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi*, dated 28 August 2000, referred to as the Arusha Agreement throughout this study.

separation of the ethnic groups and/or the reconfiguration of national boundaries, to a 'military solution' as typified by Yoweri Museveni's assertions.³ Further, there is 'power-sharing' as represented by the Arusha and Pretoria peace processes. The last solution proposed is that of 'state building'. In this regard, Helman and Ratner, (cited in Kaufmann, 1996:157-158) outline that in failed states and in modernising societies (like Burundi), state building and political order require strong political institutions (strengthening the state apparatus) to deal with multi-ethnic societies and challenges associated with failed states. These challenges include, *inter alia*, issues related to the legitimacy of the government and the distribution of national resources.

In reflection of the above-mentioned proposed solutions, one is drawn to ask: Does ethnic enmity lie at the heart of this conflict to the extent that the ethnic groups need to be separated to allow for peace? Is the conflict even 'ethnic', or is it between classes, or political elites, or about one province's (Bururi) monopoly of power, or are there other conflict generating fault lines in Burundi? The wisdom of a military solution should also be interrogated. Is the conflict in Burundi a 'military conflict' with 'military objectives' that require a 'military solution'? The notion of power sharing is also problematic. Who represent Hutu and Twa aspirations or Tutsi (and Ganwa) interests, and should thus share this power? How will this power be distributed? Is power sharing not a travesty of democracy and electoral choice? Will power sharing ensure proportional, or even equal, group *influence*? Are the conditions in Burundi even amenable to institutionalised power sharing as such?

In addition to the above, there is the matter of the failure of the state in Burundi. *Inter alia*, Burundi has a crisis of governance, a weak economy and an acutely low human development. Regarding the latter, Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world, and even in Africa. In 2003 and 2004, Burundi ranked a low 173 out of 177 countries assessed on the Human Development Index (HDI) with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of only \$100 (US).⁴ Will state building allow for a more equitable share of the 'national cake', i.e. ensure meaningful political participation and economic opportunity, socially inclusive communities and security for all, factors that sustainable peace may be contingent upon? Yet in addition, Burundi is located in an unstable region with communicable conflicts. Can Burundi achieve peace without marked improvements being made in the rest of the Great Lakes region?

What is certain is the intractable, protracted, pernicious and genocidal nature of this cyclical low-intensity conflict and its impact on Burundian society. For example, the International Crisis Group (1998:19) maintains that the current conflict is between 'moving fronts', there are no 'liberated areas', direct 'contact situations' between the Burundian army and the armed opposition rarely occur, and massacres among the population abound, committed by both sides. Resultantly, Burundi has many refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to a report of the UN Secretary General (cited in International Crisis Group, 2003:4), by 2002 the estimated number of both refugees and IDPs was 1.2 million. Nyang'oro (2001:ii) states that since independence in 1962, Burundi has experiences at least four major clashes (1965, 1972, 1988, 1993 to date) with fatalities of almost one million people. Van Eck (2001:8) points out as well that for more than three decades there has been the most brutal bloodletting in Burundi, committed by both Tutsis and Hutus. Who are

³ Reported in BBC News Online, www.news.bbc.co.uk. In Bentley and Southall (2005:103), Yoweri Museveni argues for the intervention of a regional force in Burundi, "... a military solution to defend the Burundi peace agreement...".

⁴ The Human Development Index measures life expectancy, educational achievement and adjusted real income. For the indicators and statistics on Burundi see, for example, the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) *Human Development Report 2004* at www.hdr.undp.org/2004, and the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) *Burundi: Facts at a Glance*, at www.acdi-cida.gc.ca.

the victims, and who are the perpetrators in this conflict? Given the history of massacres and genocide, is sustainable peace even likely?

At this stage, it is important to note that the belligerents and the conflict itself cannot be properly understood without a grasp of the complex factors (briefly introduced in the preceding paragraphs) that provide the setting to this conflict. These factors have implications for conflict resolution. In this regard and pursuant to the resolution of the conflict in Burundi, peace plans have been initiated, including the Arusha and Pretoria processes. However, starting officially in Mwanza (Tanzania) in 1996, the peace process has struggled to bring the conflict to its logical conclusion. In reflection, Nhema (2004:14) underlines that there is a "...prevailing notion that most attempts to deal with conflicts in Africa are not yielding significant results. The failure of these effects is attributable to a lack of authentic data regarding the nature and sources of the conflicts". As indicated (above) by the disparate accounts of the conflict and prescribed solutions, this fluidity in analysis and understanding is reflected in regard of the conflict in Burundi. Given this fluidity, how does one then go about to prescribe and implement appropriate conflict resolution measures in Burundi? One such effort has been made.

On August 6, 2004, a number of Burundian parties signed a power sharing deal in Pretoria.⁵ This agreement envisages a 60 percent Hutu and a 40 percent Tutsi breakdown both in the Council of Ministers (Ministers and Vice-Ministers) and in the National Assembly (Deputies). The Senate will be an equal 50 percent Hutu and 50 percent Tutsi breakdown. The National Assembly and the Senate will also include, respectively, three members of the Twa, and respectively have 30 percent female representation (Ganwa representation is also envisaged). According to the Communiqué of the 22nd Summit of the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi⁶, the deal is endorsed as an appropriate compromise to ensure ethnic balance in the spirit of the Arusha Agreement. It is also stipulated that its provisions should be included in the new constitution of Burundi. Is this agreement a sufficient, or even appropriate, remedy, based on a sound and accurate diagnosis of the Burundi ailment? At this early stage, one can already detect warning signals. The rigid ethnic quotas envisaged by the power sharing agreement do not reflect the actual demography in Burundi, widely considered as 85 percent Hutu, 14 percent Tutsi, and one percent Twa.⁷ Is this deal not perpetuating the politicisation of ethnicity (at the expense of nationalism) that is so characteristic of this conflict?

The research question is formulated against the backdrop of the various accounts of the conflict, the disparate prescribed solutions, the nature and characteristics of the conflict, indications of state failure, and the failure of previous power sharing arrangements and other attempts at peace in Burundi, including the wider instabilities of the Great Lakes region and the contagion effect thereof.⁸ The research question is stated as follows: *What is/are the cause(s), the nature, and characteristics of the conflict in Burundi? What are the solutions that have been tabled in the resolution of the conflict? What are the prospects for peace?* The cause(s), the nature, and characteristics of the conflict, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for peace, form the conceptual demarcation of the problem statement. In terms of geographical demarcation, the research will be confined to

⁵ Available at www.iss.org.za.

⁶ Available at www.iss.co.za.

⁷ These percentages should not be taken at face value as Herisse (2002:3) cautions, "...there are no records of a bona fide census ever having been conducted in Burundi, this data is unreliable. Ethnic identification in Burundi seems to happen fairly haphazardly but it is always based on the father's identity". The author is also not aware of any reliable census conducted. However, it can be safely deduced that the Hutu form the majority and the Tutsi the minority, and that the quotas in the power sharing agreement do not reflect this.

⁸ See chapters 3 and 4 for the failure of previous power-sharing agreements and attempts at peace in Burundi.

the geographical space of Burundi, except where neighbouring countries in the Great Lakes region have a direct link with the conflict (for example, Rwanda). Historical factors (pre-colonial and colonial) will be considered when these factors have a direct bearing on the conflict and research problem. However, the temporal demarcation of the research relates to contemporary Burundi, the period between independence in July 1962 and the end of the term of the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) in April 2005. Thus, the study is written from the perspective of around April 2005.⁹

Regarding literature and data analysis, seminal studies on Burundi include René Lemarchand (1970, 1989, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000a, 2000b), and Filip Reyntjens (1993, 1995, 2000, 2001). There are also various Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), with extensive operations in Burundi, that periodically publish reports. These NGOs include International Alert (1996), International Crisis Group (1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003), and Survivors Rights International (2003). There are also various reports from the Institute for Security Studies (and its publication, the African Security Review), including those by Cornwell and De Beer (1999), Van Eck (2003, 2004), Boshoff (2003, 2004a, 2004b), Boshoff and Francis (2003), Gasana and Boshoff (2003), Tshitereke (2003), Jooma (2005) and Alusala (2005). The basis for the analysis of economic factors will be Collier (2000) and Collier and Hoeffler (2000, 2001). On environmental scarcity, the sources will subsume Homer-Dixon (1991, 1998), Homer-Dixon *et al* (1993), and England (2003a, 2003b). On state weakness/failure/collapse, the following sources will form the basis: Migdal (1988), Zartman (1995a, 1995b), and Rotberg (2002).

There are also various sources on Burundi and on conflict and conflict resolution, including the following: Chrétien (1996, 2003), Horowitz (1985, 1993), Albin (1991), Kaufmann (1996, 1999), Griggs (1997), Lijphart (1991), King (1997), Lake and Rothchild (1998), Sandole (1999, 2002), Scherrer (2002), Ndikumana (2000, 2004), Oketch and Polzer (2002), Tony Jackson (2000), Stephen Jackson (2002), Buckley-Zistel (2003), Nkurunziza (2002), Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2000, 2005), Herisse (2002), Nafziger and Auvinen (2001), and Bunting *et al* (1999). Bentley and Southall (2005) have added a recent study, commissioned by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, on Burundi. These sources and others that will be consulted in this study are not exhaustive, more so because there are various studies and primary sources on Burundi that are in Kirundi and French (languages spoken in Burundi) that will be inaccessible to the author. Therefore, only English sources will be consulted. These English sources are adequate to make the study viable.

1.3 PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

The purpose of this study is to investigate the cause(s), the nature, and characteristics of the conflict in Burundi, and to explore the conditions for sustainable peace and prospects for peace. The resolution of this conflict is of particular significance for South Africa. The South African government has heavily invested in the peace process, individually, and collectively with the international community. In keeping with the South African foreign policy outlook, former President Nelson Mandela and former Deputy President Jacob Zuma have played a leading role as mediators (facilitators) in the peace process in Burundi.¹⁰ The South African National Defence

⁹ The term of the Transitional Government was to end on October 2004 in accordance with the provisions of the Arusha Agreement; it was extended to April 2005, and has since been extended again to August 2005 (see chapter 4). The temporal demarcation, however, will remain as stated above.

¹⁰ *Inter alia*, the South African foreign policy is an active policy founded upon the principles of democracy and human rights; peace, security, stability and the rule of law; economic growth and development; and multilateralism. See, for example, le Pere and van Nieuwkerk's (2002) article titled *The Evolution of South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1994-2000*.

Force (SANDF) has also sent a contingent in the peace effort (since 2001 to date), initially as a protection force for the returnees and the transitional government, and thereafter as part of the African Union (AU), and subsequently, the United Nations (UN), peace missions.

Since the initial and official active involvement of Tanzania in 1995, by way of Julius Nyerere, and South Africa in 1999, by way of Nelson Mandela, the ten years peace process has been associated with particularly slow progress and various hiccups. What factors account for these hiccups and slow progress? Are the issues involved accurately diagnosed and adequately addressed? This necessitates a re-evaluation of the cause(s), the nature, and characteristics of the conflict, and the peace process. In addition, the peace mission in Burundi is a costly endeavour. Boshoff and Francis (2003:43) state that the costs of the AU's *African Mission in Burundi* (AMIB) were estimated at \$165 million (US) for a period of one year. According to UNNews (2004:1), the costs over the same period for the *United Nations Operation in Burundi* (ONUB) were estimated at \$418 million (US). Surely, the spending of such sums of money should be based on a sound analysis. Otherwise, the peace effort will be another window of opportunity missed, yet again scarce resources squandered.

Inter alia, this study will address these foregoing issues and concerns. The study breaks away from the tendency to analyse only the current (since 1993) bout of conflict. It is proposed that the various incidences of conflict since independence form one single conflict at various phases, including the phases of escalation, de-escalation and negotiations. The study also breaks away from the tendency to view the conflict as only opposing Hutus and Tutsis. As will be illustrated in chapter 2 and chapter 3, the reality in Burundi is more complex than this general analysis. Viewing the conflict as opposing only Hutus and Tutsis generates serious distortions and omissions and may account for the wrong conclusions regarding the conflict in Burundi. Another contribution of the study resides with the proposal of the necessary and sufficient conditions for peace in Burundi. In this regard, it is noted that the peace process (thus far) largely affects the actors and symptoms of the conflict. It must be realised that peace will remain fragile unless equitable solutions are found to the *underlying conditions* of the conflict. Lastly, the study is intended to contribute to the body of knowledge relating specifically to conflict and conflict resolution in Burundi, and conflict and conflict resolution in general.

1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study will not offer an exhaustive explanatory account of the conflict in Burundi as this would require further empirical research and fieldwork in Burundi (in fact, an explanatory account falls beyond the scope and intention of this study). The study will be approached primarily from a descriptive analysis based on a literature study and factual data sources. The literature study includes an overview of the theoretical approaches/accounts of the conflict in Burundi. The research is intended to be a single-state case study. Therefore, the main unit of analysis will be the state of Burundi. The level of analysis will be state-centric, except where the region (Great Lakes) or provinces (Burundi's Bururi province) play a distinct and defined role. The study will be primarily a qualitative analysis, although quantitative data will be made use of to support the analysis. Mainly secondary sources will be used, but primary sources will also be utilised as far as possible. The study will not be based on fieldwork or questionnaires. However, interviews have been undertaken with conflict analysts who are knowledgeable regarding the conflict in Burundi. They include Jan van Eck from the Institute for Security Studies and Joseph Topangu of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.

The study has limitations. The first relates to language constraints. There are various studies and primary sources on Burundi that are in Kirundi and French (languages spoken in Burundi), which have been inaccessible to the author. However, (as already pointed out above when discussing literature and data analysis) the English sources are adequate to make the study viable. In addition, the conflict in Burundi presents the challenge in analysis regarding the particularly vexing question of how to make peace in a weak state and how to resolve intrastate conflicts with non-state actors. The other challenge relates to the leadership crisis and fractionalisation of armed groups, the role of external interests and actors, and the related problem of enforcing agreements. This study does not furnish ready-made answers in regard of these aforementioned challenges in analysis.

The other themes for future research in Burundi include economic data and population census, the nature of the identity groups, and the history of Burundi. Because of the lack of accurate data in Burundi, it was impossible, categorically, to illustrate economic group dominance, for example, by indicating per capita income and occupational activity by ethnic group or province. In addition, there are differences concerning the status of the identity groups in Burundi, even among Burundians themselves. Are the Ganwa a Tutsi dynastic clan or a separate ethnic group? Are the identity groups in Burundi ethnic groups, socio-economic classes, or even different races? The history of Burundi is also contested where mythico-histories and political discourses have fuelled conflict. There is thus a need for an accurate history of Burundi, *inter alia*, relating to the earliest inhabitants of Burundi; the nature of the pre-colonial political and economic systems, and social relations; the impact of colonialism on conflict, socio-economic relations, and ethnicity; and most importantly, the nature of the post-colonial state. All these factors are significant in a study of group relations and conflict. A further study of these aforementioned phenomena and limitations of this study is necessary.

1.5 CONTENTS DESIGN, KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

The key terms and concepts contained in this section are important for a proper understanding and a thorough analysis of a study of this kind. These terms and concepts are divided in terms of the second, third and fourth chapters of this study respectively, namely: the cause(s) of the conflict, the nature and characteristics of the conflict, and the peace process and prospects for peace in Burundi. The fifth and last chapter will contain the summary and conclusions of the study.

1.5.1 The Cause(s) of the Conflict in Burundi

The starting point is the concept of conflict. Horowitz (1985:95) and Nicholson (1970:2) hold that most definitions of conflict embody an element of struggle, strife or collision, distinguishing conflict from competition. This struggle, strife or collision, takes place in the context of mutually exclusive rewards or the use of incompatible means to a goal. Justino (2002:1) provides a general definition of conflict as encompassing a whole range of activities (strikes, riots, crime, war, coup d'état, civil wars and so forth) that disrupt normal productive and social activities. Coser (1956:8) and Sandole (1999:16) define conflict as a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralise, injure, or eliminate rivals. However, it should be noted that conflict does not necessarily denote violence. It is proposed here that conflict is translated into violent action when there is an absence of adequate recourse for engagement, negotiation and resolution. Conflict can also be conceptualised as a process with phases encompassing the clear markers of beginning and

end. Sandole (1999:16) distinguishes between five phases of conflict, i.e. initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement, and termination or resolution. In addition to these phases, and as the last phase, International Alert (1996:12) adds a further phase of reconstruction and reconciliation.

What causes conflicts? According to International Alert (1996:6-10) there are historically four general issues involved in conflicts:

- *Resources*, relates to access and control over territory, material, economic and natural resources;
- *Governance*, relating to the way society is governed, the distribution of authority and resources, and the legitimacy of such governance in society;
- *Ideology and Religion*, particularly because they contain fundamental beliefs, are exclusive, and can become motivation for political action; and
- *Identity*, this basic condition of existence is often described in terms of ethnicity, religion, ideology, language and/or geographical location.

Alternatively, Tshitereke (2003:85-87) advances the following three issues as major causes of disagreement relating to conflicts in Africa: Identity, ethnicity and inequality; natural resources; and, greed and grievance. Tshitereke explains his first two issues similarly to International Alert. On the issue of greed and grievance, Tshitereke (2003:88) advances that conflicts stem from "...the greedy behaviour of those with control over resources and the grievances of marginalised communities who seek justice". In contrast to Tshitereke, Collier (2000:3-4) maintains that "(r)ebellion is large-scale predation of productive economic activities", i.e. the defining motivation for conflict is not grievance, but the opportunity for economic gain (i.e. greed). Notwithstanding differences in interpretation, all the above issues (excluding religion) have been points of contention in Burundi.¹¹

The next concept is borrowed from Samuel P. Huntington. In *The Clash of Civilisations?*, Huntington (1993) presents a proposition that the next pattern of conflict in the world will be along cultural fault lines. Huntington refers to fault lines, explicitly, implicitly and *inter alia*, as a history of antagonism, historical grievances, cultural differences, imposition and dominance, economic disparities, an area of contention, and the 'us-versus-them' syndrome. According to Huntington (1993:29), flowing from these fault lines, conflict takes place at two levels. At the macro-level, the conflict will be between states, and at the micro-level, the conflict will be between groups along these fault lines. For the purposes of this study, Huntington's concept of fault lines is used as a conceptual and analytical tool in relation to the identity groups in Burundi. In Burundi the clash and fault lines are not between civilisations (Burundi has a mono-cultural society), but between identity groups that are excluded vis-à-vis those included in what Rotberg (2002:87) calls the state's deliverance of 'political goods', i.e. security, economic opportunity, meaningful political participation, and so on.

The next set of concepts relate to the accounts/theoretical approaches of conflict in Burundi. One of these is the thesis developed by Homer-Dixon *et al.* Homer-Dixon (1991, 1998) and Homer-Dixon *et al* (1993) provide an outline of the nexus between environmental scarcity and violent conflict. The thesis these studies bring forward is that environmental scarcity, resulting from the decrease and degradation of renewable resources, can

¹¹ This study proposes that the Burundi conflict stems from grievances rather than greed. See chapters 2 and 3.

lead to violent conflict. These studies identify renewable resources as agricultural land, forests and the species they contain, and water and water resources (especially fisheries). Homer-Dixon (1998:503) asserts that those major environmental changes resulting in the depletion and degradation of these aforementioned resources will contribute more to social turmoil in coming decades than will climate change or ozone depletion. Environmental change, however, is not the only source of environmental scarcity. Homer-Dixon (1998:504) identifies the sources of scarcity of renewable resources as environmental change, population growth and unequal social distribution of resources, all interacting and resulting in environmental scarcity.

René Lemarchand has probably made the most authoritative analysis of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region, and he provides a concept that is integral to this study. In his analysis, Lemarchand (2000b:326) concludes that *exclusion* is the cause of the conflict in Burundi. Lemarchand (2000a) identifies three dimensions of exclusion, namely: political, economic and social exclusion. Lemarchand (2000a:5) defines political exclusion as "...the denial of political rights to specific ethnic or ethno-regional communities, most notably the right to vote, organise political parties, freely contest elections and thus become full participants in the political life of their country".

In terms of economic exclusion, Lemarchand (2000a:6) states that, essentially, this refers to the denial of traditional rights to land, and further explains that "(g)iven that land is the principal economic resource of peasant communities denial of access to land use inevitably implies economic impoverishment, or worse". This is significant, as Oketch and Polzer (2002:106) relate, peasant communities constitute over 90 percent of Burundi's population. Lemarchand (2000a:6) also points out that although environmental degradation and rising population density are fundamental aspects of the land issue, access to land is more acute when the land is inequitably distributed. With regards to social exclusion, Lemarchand (2000a:6) explains that this dimension "...goes hand in hand with the erosion of traditional social networks and the collapse of the safety nets that once supported the traditional social order of peasant communities". The net result of social exclusion is marginalisation and alienation from society and the state. Lemarchand also explains that these three forms of exclusion are relative and that one of them does not presuppose the existence of the other. However, the processes that give rise to these forms of exclusion are interconnected.

The next concept that needs elucidating is state weakness/failure/collapse. There have been various labels attached to such states as Burundi, including 'lame Leviathan', 'decaying', and so on, to indicate a continuum that starts from strong – weak – failing – to, collapsed. According to Migdal (1988:4, 15), a strong state has the authority, ability and capacity (including but not limited) to "...*penetrate* society, *regulate* social relationships, *extract* resources, and *appropriate* or use resources in determined ways".¹² At the end of the continuum, Zartman (1995a:5) explains that states fail or collapse "(b)ecause they can no longer perform the functions required for them to pass as states". In concert, Rotberg (2002:87) asserts that states exist to deliver political goods to their citizens. Thus, the extent of the inability of such states to deliver these goods or perform these functions, would qualify them as weak, failing or collapsed. Zartman (1995a:5) points out, however, that it is difficult to establish an absolute threshold (of weak/failing/collapsed) as the functions of the state are intertwined; a weakening of one function impacts on the others. According to Zartman (1995a:1), state failure/collapse is a deeper phenomenon than rebellion, coup d'état, or riot. Rather, it is a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order, of the state, have fallen apart and need to be

¹² Emphasis in original.

reconstructed in an old or new form. There is not necessarily complete anarchy; there is some semblance of order.

Various authors use different functions of the state (and indicators) to illustrate this continuum from strong to collapsed states. Rotberg (2002:87) identifies security, education, health services, economic opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it, and fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications facilities. Nafziger and Auvinen (2001:2) identify authority and legitimacy, making laws, preserving order, and providing basic social services. On the other hand, Zartman (1995a:5) include, a decision-making centre of government, a symbol of identity, a security providing sovereign territory, authoritative political institutions, and a system of socio-economic organisation. Osaghae (1999:184-185) includes legitimacy, national integration, governance and management, penetration (i.e. the ability of the state to effectively establish or extend its authority over large parts of the country), the extent of economic weakness and poverty, and the level of dependency on industrialised countries.

In addition to the foregoing, there are four concepts that are related to state failure and the conflict in Burundi, namely: ethno-politics, distributive justice, predatory state, and patronage politics. Akwetey (1996:104) refers to ethno-politics as the activation of ethnic identity and its use for the purpose of political mobilisation. In Burundi, ethno-politics have taken place in the context of exclusionary politics. As a direct consequence of the resultant exclusive national spaces, the state in Burundi has failed as an agent of distributive justice. Osaghae (1999:190) advances that the state, as an agent of distributive justice, is expected to distribute, fairly and equitably, public goods, resources and benefits. A related concept, the predatory state, is defined in McGowan and Nel (2002:355) as a form of state in which rulers and government officials use their state offices to enrich themselves by illegal and corrupt means, as contrasted with a developmental state, which seeks to maximise the welfare of all its citizens. In such circumstances, national wealth is used for private purposes in a patronage system. In Burundi, this system is based on personal, ethnic, clan and regional links, which play a key role in defining identity group relations as they relate to the conflict. Chazan *et al* (1999:112) define patronage as a personalised and reciprocal relationship between a client and a patron who command unequal resources. To illustrate these networks in Burundi, for example, the International Crisis Group (1998:13) points out that the southern province of Bururi has historically provided most of the oligarchy and officers that have governed Burundi since independence.

Lastly, in addition to being a failing state, Burundi is also caught up in the wider instabilities of the Great Lakes region and the contagion effect of the conflicts contained in this region. An analytical tool in this regard is borrowed from Samuel P. Huntington's concept of the 'kin-country syndrome' (cited in Lemarchand, 1997:5, 2000a:16). This concept refers to the existence and manifestation of cross-border ethnic affinity (kin solidarity) in group relations and conflicts. As Lemarchand (1997:5) explains, "...where ethnic fault lines cut across national boundaries, conflict tends to spill-over from one national arena to the next, transforming kin-solidarities into a powerful vector of trans-national violence". The concept of the kin-country syndrome is insightful when one considers the presence of both Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi and Rwanda, and both Hutu and Tutsi Diasporas in the countries in the Great Lakes region (especially eastern DRC, western Tanzania and southern Uganda). Lemarchand (2000b:330) concludes that "(i)n the mobilisation of ethnic fault lines across boundaries lies one of the keys to an understanding of the dynamics of violence in the Great Lakes".

1.5.2 The Nature and Characteristics of the Conflict in Burundi

The first concept regarding the nature and characteristics of the conflict in Burundi is low intensity conflict, as opposed to medium or high intensity conflict. 'Low intensity' in this study refers to the amount of resources that are devoted to security functions (by the government and the armed groups) in the prosecution of the conflict, and the 'intensity' of actual combat. Intensity of actual combat refers, *inter alia*, to the number of forces employed, the amount of firepower utilised, the duration of actual combat, and the number of contact situations. However, a point has to be made that despite its 'low-intensity', the conflict has been immensely disruptive and destructive for the people of Burundi with great loss of human life, infrastructural damage and destruction, and high development costs. It should be noted that there are differences in conceptualisation. For example, Gray (1999:274) prefers 'scale' instead of 'intensity', and asserts that 'war does not vary in intensity'. However, this is because Colin S. Gray equates intensity with the level of exposure to death/injury/violence, which is not the intention here.

The second concept is that of ethnicity. The conflict in Burundi is often portrayed as 'ethnic', i.e. the conflict being informed by ethnic notions and pitting two rival ethnic groups, Hutus versus Tutsis. Sandole (2002:10) defines ethnicity as "...a sense of shared culture, race, language, worldview, history, traditions. 'Ethnicity' is a component of *identity* shared with, in each case, members of an *identity group*".¹³ According to England (2003a:4), ethnic differentiation in Burundi revolves around perceived physical differences between groups. Tutsi are described as 'tall, thin, beautiful people, descendants of a Northern Hamitic population of pastoralists' and the Hutu are described as 'darker, shorter, Bantu stock, traditionally agriculturists'. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2001:62-63) holds that the Twa are often described as 'pygmoid people and hunter gatherers' who have always occupied the lowest position on the social pyramid in Burundi.

Another take on the conflict holds that the conflict is between ethno-classes, or simply different classes. As alluded to above, in pre-colonial times the identity groups in Burundi were occupationally defined, rather than ethnically defined. Survivors Rights International (2003:1) contends that "(t)hose who cultivated the land called themselves Hutu, and those who were pastoralists called themselves Tutsi. Movement between these two classes existed. Hutus who accumulated enough wealth could become Tutsis¹⁴, and Tutsis who lost considerable wealth could become Hutus.... In addition to the Tutsi and Hutu...[there are Twa, the hunter-gatherers]. The Twa...[were] always considered by the Tutsi and the Hutu to be third-class citizens". Cornwell and De Beer (1999:1) submit that yet in addition to these three groups, there were the Ganwa (princes of royal blood). At this time, Burundi was a kingdom ruled by a king (Mwami). Oketch and Polzer (2002:91) also submit that traditional Burundi society was divided between royals and commoners. In view of the apparent hierarchical structure of Burundian society, could this be the making of a class conflict?

Most saliently there has been communal violence between the (however defined) Hutu and Tutsi, and the conflict has pitted the Tutsi-dominated government and army against the Hutu-dominated Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs). However, this is a partial analysis of the Burundi conflict. In reality, the conflict has pitted, at various points in its life cycle, dynastic, ethnic, intra-ethnic, clanic, and regional identity

¹³ Emphasis in original.

¹⁴ Ndikumana (2004:4) and Chrétien (2003:79) explain that this process was called *Kwihutura* - literally meaning to lose one's Hutu identity.

groups.¹⁵ Moving away from the actors in the conflict, the ethnic and genocidal ideology that would seem to (partially) inform this conflict can be highlighted as the probable vector that may account for the intractable (difficult to resolve) and protracted (drawn-out) nature of this conflict. In this sense, ethnocentrism is another key concept to the research. Sandole (2002:1) defines ethnocentrism as "...a deep and violently aggressive sense of the '[o]ther', resulting from the apparent tendency of people across time and cultural space to subdivide others into 'them' and 'us' ". This 'deep and violently aggressive sense of the other' has often served as motivation and justification for the 'final solution' to the question of the 'other', be it Jewish, Serb, or Croat (in this case Hutu or Tutsi?).

Indeed, history illustrates that ethnocentrism and genocide are concomitant. The Jewish Holocaust, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda, are cases in point. Article II of the 1948 UN *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (cited in Reyntjens, 2000:2), defines genocide as "...any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such as:

- (a) Killing members of the group.
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part....".

In outlining the nature and characteristics of the conflict in Burundi, one is drawn to ask: When and where did it all begin? In the case of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict, ethnic differentiation can already be traced in the colonial period. As Wohlgemuth (2000:4) and Herisse (2002:3-4) point out, the manner and nature of colonial rule distinguished Hutu from Tutsi, and favoured Tutsi over Hutu.¹⁶ In the post-colonial period, Lemarchand (2000b:331) insists that the conflict in Burundi began with the Rwandan 'Social Revolution' (1959-1962). According to Lemarchand (2000b:332), "(e)very single event of importance recorded during those thirty-two years [between independence in 1962 and the Rwanda genocide in 1994] is in one way or another traceable to the Rwanda revolution...". Amongst these events in Burundi, Lemarchand includes the demise of the monarchy in 1966, the assassination of Hutu leaders, including Melchior Ndadaye in 1993, the 1972 Hutu uprising whose subsequent repression led to the Hutu genocide, and the Tutsi-led coups d'état in 1966, 1976, 1987 and 1996.

1.5.3 The Peace Process and Prospects for Peace in Burundi

On the subject of peace, Scherrer (2002:116) rightly contends that "(p)eaace is far more than the 'absence' of war or [violent] conflict". Scherrer explains that peace "...embraces social justice and harmony, and the opportunity for each and every person to develop his or her abilities and put them to use in the development of society as a whole - or, in less ambitious terms: the right to a life of dignity and in conditions that make it worth living". One can identify the concepts of negative peace and positive peace as implied by Scherrer. Sandole (2002:1) refers to negative peace as the absence of war and violent conflict, and points out that positive peace on the other hand not only encompasses the absence of war and violent conflict, but also includes the

¹⁵ The actors (and issues) in the conflict will be dealt with, more in detail, in forthcoming chapters.

¹⁶ The role of colonial rule in reinforcing ethnic awareness and an exclusive governance system, and the appropriation of such form of governance by subsequent Burundi governments after independence, will be dealt with in greater detail in chapter two under the accounts of the conflict, *Ethnic Conflict* and *Lemarchand's Exclusion Thesis*, respectively.

significant achievement of social justice and the reduction or elimination of the underlying conditions of violent conflict. Accordingly, it could be stated that positive peace, and not negative peace, is the desired end-state of conflict resolution. It follows then, that positive peace should be the end-state of the peace process in Burundi.

Various actors from the international community have been involved in the peace process in Burundi. According to Bentley and Southall (2005:28), the official UN involvement in Burundi came in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwanda genocide through the UN humanitarian relief organisations. Subsequently the UN has sent observer missions, passed various Security Council resolutions, and since June 2004 (to date), has maintained a peace mission in Burundi, the *United Nations Operation in Burundi* (ONUB). Gambari (1995:231) states that the (now defunct, replaced by AU) Organisation of African Unity (OAU) also sent an observer mission to Burundi in 1994 with monitoring functions. In October 2001, the SANDF sent a contingent (the South African Protection Support Detachment) that served as a protection force for the transitional power-sharing government. In April 2003, an enlarged force (merged with Ethiopian and Mozambique forces) was transformed into the AU's *African Mission in Burundi* (AMIB). Since June 2004, AMIB was enlarged and transformed into ONUB.

In addition to the above-mentioned actors, there is also the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi (Regional Initiative), constituted by Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa. The Regional Initiative is charged by the AU, with a UN mandate, to resolve the conflict in Burundi. On the side of the former colonial master, Belgium, it would seem that its involvement in Burundi has been largely limited to multilateral aid and diplomatic and financial support for the peace process.¹⁷ The first mediator (facilitator) in the Burundi peace process was Julius Nyerere. Following Nyerere's death in 1999, Nelson Mandela took over, and in August 2000 oversaw the signing of the Arusha Agreement, a document that remains the premise in the peace process. Subsequent to the signing of the Arusha Agreement, Jacob Zuma took over (to date) as the mediator in the Burundi peace process. (The actors and issues in the peace process will be dealt with in greater detail in chapter 4).

In spite of the best efforts of the actors in the peace process, the process remains fraught with challenges. As Alusala (2005:1-2) points out, some of these challenges relate to the implementation of various agreements that buttress the peace process. These relate, *inter alia*, to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and the composition of the new Burundi armed forces, issues related to power sharing, the reintegration of refugees and IDPs, the continuing ethnic factionalism, and the thorny issue of Agathon Rwasa's FNL that continues to wage war in Burundi. These issues, and others, will have to be amicably resolved in order to ensure a peaceful transition. Only then will the real work begin to start resolving the underlying conditions of the conflict. In this regard, it should be underlined that sustainable peace is contingent upon the adequate resolution of the underlying conditions of the conflict, and not the symptoms alone.

1.6 EVALUATIONS

Before concluding this first chapter, perhaps it will be helpful (to the reader) to give a brief outline of the next chapters of this study. The second chapter titled *The Cause(s) of the Conflict in Burundi* will contain an exploration of the various accounts/theoretical approaches regarding the cause(s) of the conflict in Burundi as

¹⁷ According to Hough (2000:175), Belgium has intervened militarily in central Africa only five times since 1960. This was in the DRC in 1960, 1964, 1978, and 1991 and in Rwanda in 1990. In all these cases (some in conjunction with France), the intervention was limited to the evacuation of Belgian and European nationals.

provided in the literature and by actors in the conflict. This chapter also includes an examination of the nature of the state in Burundi and the context of the Great Lakes region as they relate to the conflict. The third chapter titled *The Nature and Characteristics of the Conflict in Burundi* will contain an investigation of the nature and characteristics of the conflict as outlined in the literature. The aim of both these chapters is to engender, respectively, an understanding of the cause(s), and the nature and characteristics, of the conflict. The fourth chapter titled *The Peace Process and Prospects for Peace in Burundi* will contain an exploration of the peace process and the solutions to the conflict as provided in the literature and by actors in the peace process. This chapter will also propose conditions for peace and explore the prospects for peace in Burundi. The fifth and last chapter will subsume the summary and conclusions of the study.

Regarding the cause(s) of the conflict in Burundi, Lemarchand's *exclusion* thesis (as an account/theoretical approach to the conflict) will be utilised as a point of departure. This approach allows for a far-reaching and for a more holistic and non-exclusionary analysis of the probable (and historical) conflict generating fissures and conditions within Burundian society. On the peace process, it must be stated that great strides have already been made from the pre-talks in 1995, the official negotiations starting at Mwanza and Arusha (Tanzania) in 1996, the All-Party-Talks from 1998, the Arusha Agreement in 2000, the Global Ceasefire Agreement in November 2003, and the institution of an electoral calendar in April 2005. However, many hurdles still lie ahead.

CHAPTER 2: THE CAUSE(S) OF THE CONFLICT IN BURUNDI

2.1 INTRODUCTION

It is always difficult to identify, authoritatively without potential refutation, the cause(s) of any given conflict, not the least, because of the fluidity of human behaviour and the fluidity of the motivation for, and interpretation of, that behaviour. As Bunting *et al* (1999:7-8) accentuate, groups that have different political, economic and other interests, are unlikely to ever 'objectively' analyse their history. Bunting *et al* point out that during the Arusha negotiations it became clear that expecting consensus on the cause(s) of the conflict from Burundi parties was fruitless. This variability came out particularly in committee I, which had to deal with the nature of the Burundi conflict and problems of genocide and exclusion and their solutions.¹⁸ In reflection, Van Eck holds that "Burundi (and Rwanda) remains the ultimate challenge to search for the 'truth', whatever that may mean" (interview with the author, October 6, 2003). This fluidity is acknowledged in the Arusha Agreement (2000:16), which makes provision for the establishment of an International Judicial Commission of Inquiry and a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission to, *inter alia*, shed light on the cause(s) of the conflict.

In reflection of the above, Suganami (cited in Buckley-Zistel, 2003:123) contends that "...in relation to the origins of war, causation, explanation and narration are inextricably intertwined: we only understand what caused a war when we comprehend the story we are told by way of explanation". Suganami concludes that "(t)he best we can do by identifying the origins of any given war, then, is to construct a coherent and convincing narrative on the basis of available knowledge and evidence we have of the world". Buckley-Zistel (2003:123) thus asserts that "(o)nly the structure of a particular narrative renders an event coherent, not the coherence of the event itself". In illustration of this 'incoherence of the event' (in the case of the peace process), Bentley and Southall (2005:xv) point to the challenge of keeping up with the twists and turns of the Burundi peace process, and liken the attempt to understand the peace process to an attempt to hit a moving target.

In view of the preceding, the purpose of this chapter is to 'construct a coherent and convincing narrative' i.e. to engender an understanding of what this study concludes to be the strongest theoretical approach in recounting the conflict in Burundi. Granted, more than one account is possible. Nevertheless, such a concession of variability must appreciate that the strength of any given account is open to investigation. In this regard, this chapter encloses an exploration of the various accounts of the conflict and asserts an account appropriated in this study. The various accounts of the conflict relate, respectively, *an ethnic conflict*, *a large-scale predation of productive economic activities*, *a struggle by a political class for the control of the state*, and the link between *environmental scarcity* and conflict. An account appropriated and asserted in this study, is that exclusion (political, economic and social exclusion) would appear to be the strongest theoretical approach to understand and describe the conflict in Burundi. (Although exclusion is considered the 'strongest' theoretical approach, the intention, and the purpose, is *not* to establish a primary underlying cause of the conflict). Included in this chapter as well, is an examination of the political economy of the state of Burundi and the context of the Great Lakes region in relation to the conflict. The conflict in Burundi cannot be fully comprehended without an understanding of the nature of the Burundi state and the context of the Great Lakes region.

¹⁸ There were five committees in total established during the Arusha negotiations process, dealing with different, but related, aspects of the peace process. These committees, and the peace process, will be dealt with in greater detail in chapter 4.

2.2 ETHNIC CONFLICT

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has experienced a surge of what has been tagged 'ethnic conflicts' (this phenomenon, of course, predates the Cold War). These conflicts, fought along ethnic lines, have been particularly violent and pernicious. Notable amongst these conflicts (some terminated, others latent, de-escalated or still raging), are those conflicts that have occurred in Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan, Rwanda, the DRC, East Timor, Sri Lanka, Kosovo and Spain. Does the label 'ethnic' in these conflicts refer to the cause of the conflict or simply to an identity component of the opposed belligerents, a characteristic of the conflict?

Examples of analysis that have tagged the conflict in Burundi 'ethnic' include Jooma (2005:2) who holds that the conflict is broadly about 'ethnic rivalry' between Hutus and Tutsis. Alusala (2005:1) also sum up the conflict as 'ethnic strife'. The Economist (2004:2), in analysing the roots of the conflict, speaks of 'the roots of (ethnic) hatred'. Leoncé Ndarubagiye (2001:2), a spokesperson for the CNDD, attests that much of the world media has held that the conflict involves 'some backward and primitive tribes', which are 'exterminating each other for no apparent reason other than their tribe affiliations'. Such analysis abound. For example, Kaplan (1994:28) concludes that "(p)hysical aggression is a part of being human. Only when people attain a certain economic, educational, and cultural standard is this trait tranquilised". Citing Martin van Creveld, Kaplan (1994:27) asserts that "(j)ust as it makes no sense to ask 'why people eat' or 'what they sleep for' ... so fighting in many ways is not a means but an end". Again citing Van Creveld, Kaplan (1994:29) speaks of future armed conflict resembling 'struggles of primitive tribes'.¹⁹

Is the conflict in Burundi 'ethnic'? Certainly, indications of differentiation along ethnic lines can be traced in the colonial period. Between 1899 and 1916, Burundi was ruled by Germany, and by Belgium, between 1916 and 1962. Whilst Burundi (including Rwanda and Tanzania) was a German colony, part of German East Africa, strictly speaking Burundi was not a Belgian colony as such. As Lemarchand (1970:1) and Mthembu-Salter (2002:1) point out, the Belgians administered Burundi (with Rwanda and the then Congo, now DRC) as a League of Nations Mandate (after WWI), a United Nations Trust Territory (after WWII), and granted Burundi internal self-rule from 1959 until independence in 1962. Wohlgemuth (2000:4) argues that colonial rule and the choice of governance by colonial powers created a leadership class based on a theoretical framework of the so-called Hamitic thesis. The colonialists also allocated identity cards indicating ethnic origins to the population, distinguishing ethnic groups. This 'deadly ethnic divide', argues Wohlgemuth, prevails today. Herisse (2002:4-5) also asserts that the colonialists introduced the myth of race and the notion of ethnicity in Burundi. With this myth and notion, came ethnocentrism, an ideology of ethnic superiority. Herisse concludes that this ideology breeds conflict.

Historical accounts of this ethnic differentiation abound. For example, one John Hanning Speke (an explorer with the Royal Geographic Society) wrote in 1861: "In an instant we both felt and saw we were in the company of men who were as unlike as they could be to the common order of the natives of the surrounding districts. They had fine oval faces, large eyes, and high noses, denoting the best of Abyssinia" (in Chrétien, 2003:70, 203). Nearly a century later in 1948, Jules Sasserath (a Belgian doctor) wrote the following: "One calls them

¹⁹ Robert Kaplan's *The Coming Anarchy*. Kaplan bills this 1994 article as a prognosis and synopsis of the political character of the 21st century.

Batutsi. In reality, they are Hamites, probably of Semitic origin.... In reality, they form a race of lords. The Hamites are 1.9 meters high. They are slender. They possess straight noses, high foreheads, thin lips.... One discerns in them a sense of treachery, masked by a certain refinement.... The rest of the population is Bantu. They are the Bahutu, Negroes who possess all the typical characteristics: flat nose, thick lips, low forehead, and brachycephalic heads. They have a childlike character, both timid and lazy.... They are the class of serfs" (in Chrétien, 2003:72).

These stereotypes have since been discredited. For example, Jean Hiernaux holds: "Classificatory mania, which is peculiar to the human spirit and maybe especially so to European culture in recent centuries, for years obsessed anthropologists, who are only now beginning to extricate themselves from it" (in Chrétien, 2003:76).²⁰ However, it should be stated that although preconceived ethnic notions were imposed on social categories during colonialism, the role of the colonialists should not be over-emphasised. Burundi did have ethnically differentiated social categories before colonialism, albeit fluid and politically not definitive. As Lemarchand (1996:34) argues, the social categories 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are not mere figments of the colonial imagination.

Reflective of the above, Ngenge (1999:1-2) argues that the colonialists, through the policy of divide-and-rule, almost always favoured minority groups (Tutsi in this case) over the majority, and to avert and stifle opposition, perpetuated antagonism between ethnic groups. Ngenge further explains that since colonialism ethnic groups began to perceive themselves as potential power brokers, and were systematically politicised to serve their group interests, rather than the national interest. The Arusha Agreement (2000:14-15) draws similar conclusions regarding the consequences of the colonialists' historical presence in Burundi. In addition to perpetuating ethnic differentiation and antagonism, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2001:64) and Herisse (2002:3-4) contend that colonialism ended the 'internal dynamic of social equilibrium' in Burundi, in the process destroying the institutional foundations of Burundian society that held the ethnic groups in social cohesion. According to Herisse these institutional foundations were:

- *Mwami* (king), who was the source of life and unity for the nation;
- *Imana*, God and Creator of all;
- *Mupfumu and Kiranga*, intermediaries between Burundians and *Imana*;
- *Bashingantahe*, who were the guardians and protectors of peace and justice, selected by the local population on the basis of their wisdom;²¹ and
- *Twiyungungaye*, referring to a common faith and destiny, communal work, and collective needs; responding to one *Mwami* on earth while honouring one *Imana* in the heavens.

In reflection of the notion of an ethnic conflict, it should be pointed out that ethnic differences in Burundi are not as clear-cut as generally purported. As Reyntjens (2000:5) argues, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa do not even qualify as separate 'ethnic groups' in the anthropological sense of the word. Cornwell and De Beer (1999:84), Reyntjens (2000:5) and Nyang'oro (2001:2), point out that the three 'ethnic groups' share a common language (Kirundi), a

²⁰ Specifically, the idea of Burundi being constituted by economic classes (lords and serfs) has also been largely discredited. See the section *Lemarchand's Exclusion Thesis*, under *Exclusion Along Ethnic Lines*.

²¹ *Bashingantahe* were divided between: (1) *Bashingantahe bo ku mugina* – who settled disputes among families or individuals on the hill; (2) *Bashingantahe bo ku nama* – were at the Ganwa level and settled disputes for which local remedies proved of no avail; and (3) *Bashingantahe bo mu rulumbi* – who were attached to the royal Court. See Lemarchand (1970:28).

monotheistic religion (based on the principle of one Imana-creator of all), social background, customs and culture, and there is intermarriage. Concerning physical differences, England (2003a:4) attests that many Burundians are mistakenly killed when violence erupts because many do not fit the stereotypes of their ethnicity. This lack of empirical differentiation has prompted Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:1) to speak of 'imagined identities' in Burundi. In addition, Chrétien (2003:82) points out that historically "(e)ven the denomination Muhutu was ambiguous because, in a clientage relationship, it indicated the dependent, even if he was a Mututsi". Lemarchand (1996:10) explains that in Kirundi the word 'Hutu' has two separate meanings. The first is derived from cultural/ethnic underpinnings, and the second meaning has a social connotation, denoting 'social subordinate'. Thus, both Tutsi and Hutu, even Ganwa, in relation to someone higher up in the pecking order (e.g. Mwami), could be considered 'Hutu'.

The 'ethnic groups' also have a long history of cohabitation. As Reyntjens (2000:5) points out, there is no 'Hutuland' or 'Tutsiland'; the groups are intermingled in the same geographical areas. In this regard, Cornwell and De Beer (1999:84) point out that unlike many other African states, Burundi is not an artificial creation of the colonial era. The state was an established kingdom from the 17th century, long before being absorbed into the German empire in the late 19th century (and later Belgium).²² Lemarchand (2000b:332) also holds that historically ethnic fault lines were not salient in Burundi, and explains that at the time of independence (in 1962) the principal lines of cleavage were not between Hutu and Tutsi but between Bezi and Batare, two Ganwa factions from distinct dynastic lineages. Herisse (2002:3) also argues that Burundi's pre-colonial history bears no evidence of (violent) ethnic conflict. Herisse holds that when conflicts did take place, there were cultural traditions and mechanisms to bring the system back to normalcy. As outlined above, these 'cultural traditions and mechanisms' were destroyed by colonialism.

Chazan *et al* (1999:108) caution against the appropriation of ethnic accounts and argue that people have multiple identities, and that the salience and assertion of any identity is environmentally determined. Chazan *et al* (1999:107) further illuminate that the assertion of identities in Africa, a point that is squarely pertinent to Burundi, has largely been in the context of unequal access to political and economic resources, patronage, persecution and repression of different groups. In concert, Nafziger and Auvinen (2001:17) assert that "(e)thnic identity is not a primordial given...[it is] socially constructed, highly malleable, and situationally defined". Abrams (in International Alert, 1996:10) contends that the Burundi conflict took an increasingly ethnic hue because political leaders actively exploited and exacerbated latent identities and animosities, and distorted Burundi's history for present political purposes. In complement, Lemarchand (1996:77) argues that "(t)he crystallisation of group identities [in Burundi] is not a random occurrence; it is traceable to specific strategies, pursued by ethnic entrepreneurs centrally concerned with the mobilisation of group loyalties on behalf of collective interests defined in terms of kinship, region, or ethnicity". As Ndarubagiye (2001:2) also points out, there has always been both Hutu and Tutsi in government, as well as in the armed struggle (albeit disproportionately so). According to Ndarubagiye, the conflict is about democracy versus dictatorship.

From the foregoing emanates the contention brought forward in this study that notwithstanding the fact that the current (since 1993) conflict is largely articulated in ethnic terms, ethnicity, in itself, does not equal conflict.

²² Whilst Cornwell and De Beer suggest that pre-colonial boundaries have remained relatively intact, Griggs (1997:2) states that the Berlin Conference (1884-5) and subsequent boundary adjustments reduced the size of the traditional kingdom of Burundi (and Rwanda), and left the state landlocked and without sufficient resources.

Viewing the conflict as opposing only Hutus against Tutsis generates serious distortions and omissions. For example, other incidences of conflict in Burundi have not followed ethnic lines, but dynastic, intra-ethnic, clanic, and regional lines. There is also consensus from authoritative sources like Collier (2000), Collier and Hoeffler (2000, 2001), Reyntjens (2000), and Lemarchand (2000b), that the conflict is not 'ethnic'. The only 'ethnic' issue in Burundi appears to be the distribution of power and national resources as they relate to social categories i.e. grievances of marginalised groups in society that seek social justice. Thus, it would appear that ethnicity is used as a tool for mass political mobilisation, as an instrument for conflict, and constructed in the definition of the 'self' and the 'other'.²³ The belligerents in the conflict prey on ethnic affinities and aspirations, insecurities and fault lines, and (false) notions of superiority and inferiority. *Ethnicity is characteristic of the conflict.* Given the foregoing, it can thus be argued that the ethnic account has a weaker claim as a theoretical approach to understand and describe the conflict in Burundi.

2.3 COLLIER'S OPPORTUNITY THESIS

The other account of the conflict in Burundi is encapsulated in Paul Collier's opportunity thesis. The opportunity thesis is, in essence, an economic interpretation of conflict. Naidoo (2000:2) explains that an economic interpretation holds that intra-state conflicts are more a result of rebel groups competing with national governments for the control of natural resources and primary commodities, rather than emanating from any political, ideological, ethnic or religious grievances. This is the position brought forward by Paul Collier. In a study of 78 civil conflicts that occurred between 1960 and 1999, including Burundi, Collier and Hoeffler (2001) uses an econometric model that predicts the outbreak of civil conflict. In this study of the integrated greed-grievance model, Collier and Hoeffler (2001:2) find that it is the circumstances in which people are able to rebel that account for conflict. In another study, Collier and Hoeffler (2000:2) again maintain that, "...what differentiates peaceful from conflict-ridden societies is not the incidence of grievance but the capacity of rebel groups to finance escalated violence". In the same vein, Collier (2000:3-4) concludes that "(r)ebellion is large-scale predation of productive economic activities".

It would appear that there are indications of conflict related opportunities for economic gain in Burundi. For example, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:29) assert that the "(t)he ultimate aim of political factions...is to control public institutions which have become the centre of a system of rent sharing". Finding resonance with this view, is Reno's (2001:3) assertion that conflicts emanating from collapsed states (or failing states, of which Burundi is one) are more intractable because of the rise of insurgent groups that fail to articulate clear ideological alternatives. Reno (2002:585) asserts that instead "(t)heir primary goal is to force their way into the system from which they are excluded, not overthrow it". International Crisis Group (1998:14) also point out that many combatants in Burundi are living directly and indirectly from the war. Van Eck (1999:6) further contends that "(o)ne of Burundi's biggest problems has always been the fact that everybody wants and needs a job within the Government and State institutions due to lack of alternative employment in the small and declining private sector". In resonance, Herisse (2002:6) holds that the conflict in Burundi is largely about a fight for good jobs, administrative control and economic advantage.

²³ There are three approaches in the 'ethnic' analysis of conflicts, which hold that ethnicity can be primordialist, instrumentalist, or constructivist. Although it is not the intention of this study to empirically validate or invalidate the three approaches in the case of Burundi, it would appear that the first approach would have limited utility, as the history of Burundi reveals no evidence of primordial conflict between the ethnic groups.

Is the conflict in Burundi about economic gain, i.e. greed? Significantly, Collier (2000:4) concedes that "(p)redatory behaviour during the conflict may not be the objective of the rebel organisation, but it is its means of financing the conflict". Collier and Hoeffler (2001:2) also concede that "(w)hether such extortion directly motivates rebellion, or simply makes viable the violent pursuit of other objectives is beyond the scope of our research". The positions presented in these studies are contradictory and conflictual, as Naidoo (2000:4) also outlines, and therefore, at that level, detract from this account. At another level of criticism, Nafziger and Auvinen's (2001:9) research yield the results that both greed and grievance are at play in conflicts. In contrast, Justino (2002:3) out-rightly discredits the opportunity thesis, and argues that the integrated greed-grievance model shows that ethnic dominance (grievance) is statistically significant in accounting for the outbreak of conflict, not opportunity for economic gain (greed).

It is proposed here that grievance, not greed, accounts for the conflict in Burundi. Granted that economic factors may have played an enabling role for conflict (the ability to finance escalated violence), and that once the conflict has emerged it can derive dynamics of its own (e.g. predatory behaviour), it is the contention here that these are not the underlying conditions for conflict. It is conceivable as well that the opposition elites, at some level, might be motivated by aspirations for power, having probably concluded that the system cannot be reformed and therefore must be toppled. However, as Smith (2001:11) correctly concludes in the case of the former Yugoslavia, "(t)hat Milosevic...was greedy for power, for example, does not in itself mean that ordinary Serbs...[felt] no grievance". Similarly, the failure of insurgent groups to articulate clear ideological alternatives does not mean that Burundians do not seek 'an alternative', i.e. a different and better life.

Most importantly, there are no natural resources and primary commodities to exploit in Burundi, except agricultural land that the insurgents appear to have not attempted to control. As the International Crisis Group (1998:19) maintains, there are no 'liberated areas' in Burundi. Oketch and Polzer (2002:86, 88) also point out that Burundi's main source of natural wealth is coffee, accounting for 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings. This commodity does not lend itself to the same patterns of violent control or smuggling as, for example, diamonds. Oketch and Polzer (2002:88) further submit that the exploitation of the coffee industry and agricultural production in general has funded the government's capacity for escalate violence, not the armed groups. External interests, the Hutu Diaspora, and external smuggling networks (mostly from the DRC), have largely financed the armed groups. In reflection of the foregoing, it can be concluded that Collier's thesis can only account for the manifestation, dynamics, and sustainability of the conflict, and thus would have a weaker claim as an approach to understand and describe the conflict in Burundi.

2.4 A STRUGGLE BY THE POLITICAL CLASS FOR THE CONTROL OF THE STATE

A 'political' account of the conflict in Burundi has also been advanced. In this regard, Reyntjens (2000:5) holds that "(w)hile strife has generally been interpreted as 'ethnic', it is in fact political, aimed at maintaining or capturing power". In concert, Burundi parties maintain in the Arusha Agreement (2000:16) that "(t)he conflict is fundamentally political...[i]t stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power".²⁴

²⁴ It is noted in the Agreement that the conflict has "... extremely important ethnic dimensions".


Nyang'oro (2001:1) also argues that "...the central problem in Burundi is the classic problem in political struggles: the determination of who gets what, when, and how".

The conflict in Burundi is indeed a political conflict. However, it is a political conflict that is centrally concerned with the rules and regulations that govern society, including the distribution of power and national resources as they relate to social categories. Thus, Nyang'oro probably comes closest to providing the answer. In this regard, it is argued here that 'who gets what, when and how', is informed and defined by the exclusion of the 'other' in national resources. In the same vein, the struggle to accede to and/or remain in power is motivated by the objective fact and subjective perception, stated or un-stated, and the fear, real or imagined, of exclusion (and one can add, extermination). It follows then, that the struggle for the control of the state is symptomatic of the underlying conditions created by an exclusive governance system. Not the least, as the state in Burundi is a repository of political, economic and social security, from which the 'other', defined in ethnic, intra-ethnic, clanic, regional, and elitist terms (historically also including dynastic terms), is excluded. Thus, the nature of the state in Burundi is instructive in illuminating how the conflict has manifested in a struggle for the control of the state (see the section *The Failure of the State in Burundi* in this regard).

2.5 HOMER-DIXON'S ENVIRONMENTAL SCARCITY

Thomas F. Homer-Dixon's thesis on environmental scarcity contains another account of the conflict in Burundi. As outlined in chapter I, Homer-Dixon (1991, 1998), and Homer-Dixon *et al* (1993) advance that the decrease and degradation of renewable resources (environmental scarcity) can lead to violent conflict. The authors identify renewable resources as agricultural land, forests and the species they contain, water and water resources (especially fisheries). Homer-Dixon (1998:504) identifies the sources of scarcity of renewable resources as environmental change, population growth and unequal social distribution of resources. The following graph illustrates the nexus between environmental scarcity and conflict:

Graph 1: Some Sources and Consequences of Environmental Scarcity



Source: Adapted from Homer-Dixon (1998:527).

In an analysis of this nexus in the case of Burundi, in regard of renewable resources, England (2003a:7, 2003b:4) states that water resources (e.g. rainfall, rivers, and Lake Tanganyika) are not scarce and generally

meet personal and agricultural needs. Reliance on fisheries is minute and account for less than one percent of food production or diet. Although forests cover less than two percent of the total land area, the variation in access to forest resources is low and has remained relatively constant since independence. England concludes, thus, that it would seem that only access to land and population growth may have played a role in environmental scarcity and the conflict in Burundi. It would appear that acutely so, as Reyntjens (2000:5) and Bentley and Southall (2005:21) point out, Burundi is a tiny landlocked country of a mere 27 834 sq km. Given the land area and population growth, Nkurunziza (2002:2) points out that Burundi is the second highest populated country in Africa (on the mainland, after Rwanda), with a population density of 236 per sq km. According to England (2003a:3), if arable land alone (accounting for only 43% of total land) is taken into consideration this number jumps to 551 people per sq km. Clover (2003:1) puts these figures, respectively, at 240 and 766 people per sq km.²⁵

Reflective of the above, it would appear that agricultural land might be central to Burundi politics, as rural peasant communities largely constitute the population. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:1) explain that Burundi has an urbanisation rate of only seven percent. Thus, it can be agreed that land scarcity and population growth may have limited livelihood sources and contributed to high poverty levels. However, can scarcity and poverty resulting from population growth and land pressures alone account for violent conflict at such proportions as in Burundi? If that was the case, Bangladesh with a population density of 1002 per sq km would be at war with itself, so would Mauritius with a population density of 603 per sq km.²⁶ It is also significant to note that 'scarcity wars' have not occurred in Burundi, e.g. conflicts over food shortages. Perhaps, the answer lies with the structural weaknesses of the Burundi economy (refer to the section *The Failure of the State in Burundi*).

It is the contention here that scarcity or poverty resulting from the asymmetrical distribution of national resources and the systematic exclusion of the 'other' from livelihood sources (including agricultural land), not scarcity or poverty per sé, is a more accurate diagnosis of the conflict in Burundi. This is what Homer-Dixon (1998:522) refers to as the "...aggrieved actors' subjective 'blame system', which consists of their beliefs about who or what is responsible for their plight". Homer-Dixon (1998:505) points out that "(e)mpirical evidence suggests...[that environmental change and population growth] are more pernicious when they interact with unequal resource distribution [i.e. exclusion]". In defining economic exclusion in the case of Burundi and the Great Lakes region, Lemarchand agrees (as indicated in chapter I). Lemarchand (2000a:6, 1996:152) contends that agricultural land is the principal economic resource of peasant communities, and land distribution remains a major source of ethnic tensions in the rural areas. Lemarchand points out as well that although environmental degradation and rising population density are fundamental aspects of the land problem, the problem is more acute when the land is inequitably distributed.

In conjunction with unequal land distribution, there is the issue of outright land expropriation in Burundi. It would seem that there has not been an official policy of expropriating Hutu land, however there has been incidences of what is tantamount to officially encouraged, actively or passively, land expropriation. The Hutu-dominated Imbo region, with fertile land adjacent to Lake Tanganyika, provides an example. As Lemarchand (1996:150-152)

²⁵ The Canadian International Development Agency's calculations put the figures at land area 28 000 sq km, population 7.1 million, and population density at 253 per sq km (CIDA, 2005:1). Reyntjens' (2000:5) calculations are land area 27 834 sq km, population 6.5 million, and population density at 230 per sq km.

²⁶ See, for example, *Wikipedia*, www.wikipedia.org, for a list of countries by population density.

relates, in 1963 rains flooded Hutu owned land in this region. After reclamation, a local Tutsi official, Gaspard Niragira (a director of a government institution dealing with rural development), appropriated the land and parcelled it out to six Tutsis: four civil servants and two army officers. About 200 previously land-owning Hutu were reduced to landless peasants. Not until 1990, was the land returned to its rightful owners. FRODEBU has also documented and published a number of incidences of expropriation of Hutu lands by Tutsi army officers and politicians, including in the provinces of Bururi, Bujumbura, Cibitoke and Bubanza. As a result, for example, Kadoyi, a Minister of Interior in the Third Republic, owned several hectares of land in Ryansoro commune, dozens of hectares in Cankuzo province, and 50 hectares in the Imbo plain.

Land expropriation has intensified the acuteness of inequitable patterns of land ownership and access to livelihood sources, and inflamed group relations. As James Scott has concluded, "...every public act of appropriation is, figuratively, a ritual of subordination" (cited in Lemarchand, 1996:151). In turn, subordination and exclusion are concomitant and mutually reinforcing. Thus, land expropriation, land distribution, and access to livelihood sources (including agricultural land), should be viewed within the context of the broader political economy of systematic exclusion and subordination in Burundi.

2.6 LEMARCHAND'S EXCLUSION THESIS

Exclusion, as outlined by René Lemarchand (1997, 2000a, 2000b), is appropriated and asserted in this study as the strongest theoretical approach to understand and describe the conflict in Burundi. Lemarchand identifies three dimensions of exclusion, namely: economic, political and social exclusion. Lemarchand (2000b:326) argues that contrary to conventional wisdom (i.e. 'atavistic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi'), "(e)xclusion...is the key to an understanding of the crisis in the Great Lakes: [In the case of Burundi, it is] (t)he exclusion of the Hutu elements from a meaningful share of power...". Ethnic exclusion, however, is not the only form of actual or potential conflict-generating exclusion in Burundi. This study identifies four patterns of exclusion. The first, relates to the Bezi-Batare exclusion, and the second refers to exclusion along ethnic lines. The third pattern of exclusion stems from Tutsi-Hima hegemony, and the last, originates from elitist and personalised rule in Burundi. These patterns of exclusion have not been successive or linear, as the structure of the narrative would seemingly suggest. Except for the Bezi-Batare exclusion, which ended with the demise of the monarchy in 1966, the other patterns of exclusion have overlapped, *inter alia*, reflecting the changing societal power relations initiated by changes in government. However, Tutsi rule has remained constant throughout, albeit with different incumbents.

2.6.1 Bezi-Batare Exclusion

At the time of independence in 1962, the foremost lines of cleavage in Burundi were those between the two Ganwa lineages, Bezi and Batare (Lemarchand, 2000b:332). Lemarchand (1996:37) explains that this struggle started during the reign of Ntare II (1795-1852). Ntare entrusted newly acquired territories to his older sons, Batare. With the accession of Ntare's youngest son to the throne, Mwezi Kisabo (1852-1908), a struggle ensued between him and his older brothers. From about 1860 until his death in 1908, Mwezi attempted to evict his Batare brothers and nephews from their domains and replace them with his own sons, Bezi. Lemarchand (1970:23, 324) expounds that Mwezi Kisabo's actions were in accordance with rules of royal succession, which dictated that descendents of a reigning king were to hold office as Ganwa until the reign of the next king with the

same dynastic name. These rules were never firmly institutionalised, with the result that the ascension of a new king released new opportunities for conflict, because either the incumbent Ganwa were disinclined to vacate office, or their powers became entrenched to the extent of challenging the monarchical authority. Notable among the battles that ensued was the 1860 battle of Nkoondo, near the traditional capital of Muramvya. By 1900, Mwezi Kisabo ruled only half his kingdom. The other half was controlled by Batare who asserted their independence from the crown in rebellion of the rules of royal succession.

In the latter part of colonialism, the territory of Burundi was now firmly under the control of the monarchy and colonial administration. The Bezi began to assert themselves as the sole legitimate heirs to the crown (and the spoils of office) to the exclusion of the Batare.²⁷ The following table illustrates the Bezi ascendancy to power:

Table 1: Distribution of Ganwa Chiefdoms, Batare and Bezi, 1929-1945

Year	Batare		Bezi		Ganwa Chiefdoms Combined		Total Number of Chiefdoms ²⁸	
	number	(%)	number	(%)	number	(%)	number	(%)
1929	41	(54)	35	(46)	76	(57)	133	(100)
1933	16	(44)	20	(56)	36	(78)	46	(100)
1937	15	(43)	20	(57)	35	(80)	44	(100)
1945	8	(32)	17	(68)	25	(71)	35	(100)

Source: Adapted from Lemarchand (1996:44).

As the table above illustrates, following the reform of territorial administration by the Belgians from 1929, the Ganwa still wielded relatively considerable power, controlling the majority of chiefdoms (and attendant resources). However, within the Ganwa, power came to be considerably tilted towards the Bezi. As this table illustrates, from controlling 54 percent of chiefdoms allocated to Ganwa in 1929, the Batare only had 32 percent control in 1945. On the other hand, from 46 percent in 1929, by 1945, the Bezi had 68 percent control of chiefdoms allocated to Ganwa. This dominance was to grow. Lemarchand (1970:317-318) holds that by 1959 the Bezi controlled 17 (46%) of all chiefdoms, out of 37 (100%), and the Batare only nine (24%). More significantly, the total area controlled by the Bezi was more than twice the size of that held by the Batare. In addition, a number of chiefs and sub-chiefs whose origins were neither Bezi nor Batare were in fact committed to the Bezi cause. By 1960, all the Ganwa had lost all power wielded through the control of chiefdoms. Lemarchand (1970:339) explains that in September 1960 the Belgian Residency abolished the 37 chiefdoms and replaced them with 18 provinces each headed by a provincial administrator appointed by the Belgian administration. Mwami, although with curtailed powers, became the only remaining symbol of authority outside of the Belgian administration.

In the period leading to independence in 1962, political parties in Burundi were also formed around, and reflected, the Bezi-Batare dichotomy. Lemarchand (1970:324) states that at the beginning of independence,

²⁷ There were four Ganwa lineages in Burundi. Rules of royal succession and tradition determined that the kings' titles would be (in this order), Ntare, Mwezi, Mutaga, and Mwambutsa. Thus the descendents of the polygamous kings would be (same order), Batare, Bezi, Bataga, and Bambutsa. The apparent absence of Bataga and Bambutsa from the conflict was because Bataga and Bambutsa were not adequately important in terms of their numbers and influence. Thus, Mwambutsa II (1916-1966), although from the Bataga lineage (the son of Mutaga II, 1908-1916), aligned himself with Bezi as they were much closer to him in terms of parental relationships than Batare. Mwambutsa II also needed Bezi support to solidify his rule. In addition, the Batare were considered pro-Belgian, and therefore undesirable in the nationalist milieu of the time. See Lemarchand (1970:22-23, 318, 323, 501).

²⁸ The rest of the chiefdoms were distributed between Hutu and Tutsi, see Table 2.

Burundi politics were dominated by the struggle between the political parties, UPRONA that was aligned with Bezi, and PDC²⁹, which was aligned with Batare. The end of the Bezi-Batare struggle was signalled by the assassination of the UPRONA leader Prince Louis Rwagasore (Mwami Mwambutsa's eldest son) in October 1961. Lemarchand (1970:328, 335, 341-342) states that although Rwagasore was from the Bambutsa lineage (Mwambutsa II's descendant), like his father, he was seen to represent the Bezi. After independence, five PDC leaders were sentenced to death for their role in the assassination of Rwagasore. By 1966, political competition came to a standstill when Michel Micombero's government outlawed political parties, abolished the monarchy, and removed all the Ganwa from positions of authority, marking the end of the Bezi-Batare struggle.³⁰

2.6.2 Exclusion Along Ethnic Lines

In the period following independence, there was a crystallisation of ethnicity, and concomitantly, the transformation of conflict from Bezi versus Batare, to Hutu versus Tutsi (see Chapter 3). This is the second and most salient pattern of exclusion identified. International Alert (cited in Wohlgemuth, 2000:5) delivers the following succinct verdict in this regard: "On the majority side of the equation (Hutu) there is a profound sense of grievance at their long-standing exclusion and a determination that this must be corrected - on the minority side (Tutsi) there is a profound fear of exclusion/extermination and a determination to guard against it - all leading to a deadly competition for political power". According to Ndikumana (2004:2), the turning point regarding the role of ethnicity in politics and disequilibrium in the ethnic balance of power was initiated by the Belgian reorganisation of territorial administration in Burundi, starting in 1929. The following table is illustrative:

Table 2: Ethnic Distribution of Chiefdoms in Burundi, 1929-1945

Year	Ganwa (Batare and Bezi)		Tutsi		Hutu		Total Number of Chiefdoms	
	number	(%)	number	(%)	number	(%)	number	(%)
1929	76	(57)	30	(23)	27	(20)	133	(100)
1933	36	(78)	7	(15)	3	(7)	46	(100)
1937	35	(80)	8	(18)	1	(2)	44	(100)
1945	25	(71)	10	(29)	0	(0)	35	(100)

Sources: Adapted from Lemarchand (1996:44), Ndikumana (2004:2), and Chrétien (2003:268).

Thus, in 1929, 27 Hutu chiefs (controlling 20% of total chiefdoms and attendant resources) ruled Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in their chiefdoms. However, as the table illustrates, there were no Hutu chiefs by 1945 in the administration. This table also illustrates that the Twa have been the most excluded, without a single representation. On the other hand, from 23 percent control in 1929, by 1945 the Tutsi controlled all the chiefdoms outside of the control of the Ganwa. As already established, by 1960 the control of the chiefdoms was not a point of contention anymore as the Belgian administration replaced chiefdoms with provinces each headed by a Belgian-appointed provincial administrator. Ndikumana (2004:2) holds that this administration reform marked the beginning of the Tutsi domination of the political system and the exclusion of the Hutu. In complement, Chrétien (2003:272) holds that these reforms and the general hardening of social relations aroused prophetic-style revolts between 1927 and 1930 against Tutsi chiefs deemed responsible for these new constraints.

²⁹ Christian Democratic Party (Parti Démocrate Chrétien).

³⁰ These and other events leading to independence and immediately after independence are discussed in chapter 3 as prelude and context to the first wide-scale violence beginning in 1965.

Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:4) hold that although Tutsi enjoyed relatively more economic and political privileges before colonialism, Hutu exclusion became institutionalised during colonialism. In complement, Ndikumana (2004:5) explains that the key reason for the absence of conflict before colonialism was because not only did the monarchy and Mwami serve as unifying elements, but also that the system had hitherto allowed social mobility for the Hutu. As Lemarchand (1996:10) maintains, status, not ethnic identity, was the key determinant of rank and privilege. For example, Lemarchand (1970:25, 28-29) points out that a high proportion of Hutu chiefs were in control of royal domains (*ivyivare*). These chiefs were directly accountable to Mwami and not Ganwa, and thus after the Belgian reorganisation of territorial administration, many Ganwa were unable to command obedience from the newly incorporated local population. Another example is that of Bashingantahe who had judicial functions but wielded considerable political power. The selection of Bashingantahe was based on individual merit, and therefore Hutu could qualify and achieve higher status than many ordinary Tutsi, or even Ganwa. The Twa, however, were excluded from being Bashingantahe. Thus, the argument that Burundi is made up of ethnically defined economic classes or castes, lords and serfs (as outlined in chapter I and stated at the beginning of this chapter), does not hold water. As Lemarchand (1970:5) holds, a caste system not only implies that there is inequality of status, but also, the absence of vertical mobility between the various strata.

As it has been argued at the beginning of this chapter, in the case of ethnic differentiation, the role of the colonialists should not be over-emphasised, if only because not only were these 'colonially hardened' stratified social relations allowed to fester after independence, but they were also actively pursued and expanded. The case of the Twa, dating from pre-colonial times, has been the most acute. As Reyntjens (2000:20-21) points out, despite being the earliest known inhabitants of Burundi, the Twa suffer social, cultural, economic and political exclusion in Burundi. Reyntjens holds that Hutu and Tutsi will generally not share a meal or beer with Twa. This is confirmed by Van Eck (interview with the author, October 31, 2003), who holds that "(b)oth Hutu and Tutsi look down upon the Twa, their way of life, their physical closeness to the soil (being potters)...". Therefore, exclusion along ethnic lines continued after independence. In this regard, Lemarchand (1970:355, 528, 1996:65) states that a commission was set up, in September 1964, to enquire into the origins of 'racial' divisions in Burundi, following UPRONA's 'summit conference'. This conference was prompted by accusations of 'racial' discrimination in the distribution of government posts. The commission, in a report published on October 7, 1964, found the following evidence of inequity in the government and the administration:

Table 3: Ethnic Distribution of Senior Government Posts in 1964

Post Designation	Hutu	Tutsi	Twa
Ministers	5	8	0
Ministerial Cabinet Directors	3	7	0
Directors General	4	9	0
Directors	8	34	0
Provincial Governors	2	6	0
Police Commissioners of Districts	3	15	0
Directors of Public Corporations	0	13	0
Prosecutors	2	unknown	
Magistrates in Courts of Province	0	11	0
Magistrates in Courts of Residence	3	66	0
Diplomatic Corps	5	22	0

Source: Adapted from Lemarchand (1970:355).

The above table illustrates the monopoly of state power as wielded by Tutsis throughout the modern history of Burundi. As Ndikumana (2004:5) relates, in post independence and republican Burundi (post-1966), "(e)thnic identity became a crucial determinant of one's social mobility and ethnic exclusion became the foundation of the political system, which generated political instability and eventually led to conflict". Survivors Rights International (2003:1) assert that the Tutsi's exclusion of the Hutu (and Twa) has been acutely felt in regard of their denial of education opportunities, which meant that most government positions were filled by Tutsi, and by means of a 'girth by height' requirement, effectively denying Hutu (and Twa) entry into the armed forces. Ndikumana (2004:13) concurs that the education system and military service are two of the main dimensions that formed the foundation of the politics of exclusion, and served as tools of maintaining Tutsi dominance.

Regarding the education system, Ndikumana (2000:452) states that although in the post-independence period ethnicity was not recorded on identification cards or published records, for many years the ministry of education and the national intelligence services kept secret lists that identified the ethnic origins of schoolchildren. These lists were used to restrict the entry of Hutu (and Twa) to high school and university. This differential access to education dates back to colonial times. Griggs (1997:3) and Nzongola-Ntalaja (2001:64) relate that colonial powers favoured Tutsi with educational opportunities and positions in the administration. The 1999 report by the UN Development Programme and the Ministry for Planning highlights the nature of the education system in Burundi. This report (cited in Jackson, 2000:3) concludes: "...the non-access to education and training constitutes a factor of exclusion from information, and may be the principal source of other forms of exclusion". This, Jackson (2000:2) points out, in a society and economy where state employment is practically the only alternative to peasant agriculture, and education is the only path to such advancement. In concert, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:17) and Lemarchand (1996:65) hold that given the centrality of acquired education to prospects for employment and differences in levels of wages, the legacy of differential access to education has resulted in not only Tutsi domination of bureaucratic posts, but actually, social inequality.

Flowing from the preceding, the grievances emanating from exclusion along ethnic lines can perhaps be gleaned from a letter by Second Lieutenant Martin Ndayahoze (Hutu). Ndayahoze served on the 17 member (army officers) National Revolutionary Council (NRC), which became the foremost institution of government after Michel Micombero abolished Parliament and the monarchy in 1966. Ndayahoze was killed in the 1972 purge, following accusations laid against him for allegedly being a key conspirator in the 1972 Hutu-led insurgency (Lemarchand, 1996:63, 79, 96). In April of 1968, then Minister of Information, Ndayahoze wrote the following to President Micombero (cited in Lemarchand, 1996:85-86):

On the Hutu side one finds theoreticians of a true democracy; they note that the administrative structure down to the lower echelons is in Tutsi hands.... In addition, they take strong exception to the tyrannies and injustices which this strong ethnic homogeneity tends to foster within the administration of the state.... They have reached the conclusion that the Tutsi have invented the thesis of 'a struggle for survival in the face of a Hutu peril' as a pretext to torture the Hutu and prolong or perpetuate their domination over them.... In my opinion,...the Hutu only want to live in peace and be treated with justice. As for the rights they wish to recover, I believe that they are all willing to entrust this mission to the play of history...in a context of loyal competition.

These grievances were never resolved, and the political and economic space was never expanded until the 1988 reforms leading to the 1993 elections, and then only to be violently constricted again three years later in

the 1996 coup (see Chapter 3). Thus, the successive Tutsi government's exclusion of the Hutu continued unabated and the exclusion of the Twa continued to be the most acute. The education system also continued to be an instrument of group domination. The consequences of both the direct ethnic selection and the indirect exclusionary access in the education system are evidenced in the following patterns of public employment:

Table 4: Ethnic Distribution of Civil Service Posts In 1987

Post Designation	Hutu	Tutsi	Twa
Office of the President	1	98	0
Central Committee of Single Party (UPRONA)	2	50	0
Administration of Single Party	3	52	0
Ministers	5	13	0
Ministerial Cabinet Directors	1	17	0
Ministry Permanent Secretaries	0	40	0
Province Governors	2	13	0
Ambassadors	1	21	0
Embassy Diplomats	0	88	0
Army Barrack Commanders	0	20	0
Army High Ranking Officers	2	398	0
Army Sergeants and Privates	30	11970	0
State Owned Company Directors	5	252	0
Hospital Directors	1	19	0
University Lecturers	10	80	0
Secondary School Directors and Inspectors	6	89	0
Prosecutors	0	66	0
Magistrates	5	92	0
High Court Presidents	1	7	0
Judiciary Police Officers and Inspectors	0	400	0

Source: Adapted from Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:46).

In reflection, Nhema (2004:11) has argued that the sources of conflicts in Africa, a point squarely applicable to Burundi, have included economic inequality and exclusive governance systems. Economic inequality and the exclusive governance system in Burundi have resulted in the relative deprivation of the Hutu and Twa. Nafziger and Auvinen (2001:3) state that relative deprivation results from vertical (class) or horizontal (regional or communal) inequality. Relative deprivation refers to the discrepancy between expected goods and conditions and those received or kept. This discrepancy is particularly pertinent and acute in the case of the Hutu as they are regarded to make up to 85 percent of the population. Given this figure, the result is more than just marginalisation, but the exclusion of the Hutu, even though this exclusion is dispassionately not total, as tables 2 - 5 illustrate. Exclusion for the Twa, however, has been total.

As Reyntjens (2000:6) points out, despite being a numerical majority, the Hutu are a political (and socio-economic) minority in Burundi. According to Ted Gurr (in Nafziger and Auvinen, 2001:4) "(r)elative deprivation spurs social discontent, which provides motivation for collective violence". In reflection, in the case of Burundi, Lemarchand (2000b:326) contends that, "...exclusion leads to insurrection, insurrection to repression, and repression to the exodus of tens of thousands of refugees across boundaries, which in turn become vehicles of further violence in their countries of asylum". (See the section *The Unstable Great Lakes Region* for a more detailed account of the impact of refugees and cross border ethnic affinities as vectors of conflict).

2.6.3 Exclusion Emanating from Tutsi-Hima Hegemony

The third pattern of exclusion in Burundi is that between Tutsi-Hima and other groups in society. The following table illustrates the dominance of Tutsi-Hima in one of Burundi's state institutions, and again, the table illustrates that the Twa are the most excluded within Burundi society:

Table 5: Ethnic and Regional Distribution of Managers of Public Corporations, 2001 (%)

Region of Origin	Ethnic Group			Total
	Hutu	Tutsi	Twa	
Bururi Province	3	60	0	63
Remaining 14 Provinces ³¹	8	29	0	37
Total	11	89	0	100

Sources: Nkurunziza (2002:6) and Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:46)

The domination of Tutsi-Hima was consolidated during the republican period. In this regard, the International Crisis Group (1999:4-6) and Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:24-25) point out that Michel Micombero, who ousted the monarchy in 1966, initiated the rule of an ethnic and regional oligarchy from the Bururi province, which has remained over-represented and continue to occupy key posts in the administration, the army and the economy. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:25) conclude that "(w)hat is called 'Regionalism' in Burundi was born with the 1966 coup". In a further illustration of the dominance depicted on the table above, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:47) state that Bururi's per capita income in 1998 was 444 (Burundi Francs), however its per capita tax in 1999 was only 268 (Burundi Francs). In terms of the tax figure, Bururi ranked 14 out of 15 provinces. However, in terms of the income figure, Bururi ranked second out of 15 provinces. In the absence of any natural resources in Bururi, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:34) conclude that "(t)he province benefits from large transfers, both directly from central government and from remittances of Bururi natives running the country from Bujumbura and the rest of the country".

The education system and military service have also been used to prop up Tutsi-Hima power. In this regard, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:25) hold that Bururi Tutsis were offered privileged access to primary, secondary and university education, and overseas scholarships. Tony Jackson (cited in Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2005:25-26) holds that in the 1980s Bururi alone received about 60 percent of donor aid for education. Jackson further outlines that out of a total of 114 communes nationwide, a single commune of Bururi, Mugamba, alone accounted for 15 percent of 6000 students of the national university, the University of Bujumbura (2001 figures). As Jackson (2000:21, 32) further expounds, until 1999, the University of Bujumbura was the only institution of higher learning in Burundi. The other university, the University of Ngozi, was only established in October 1999. The University of Bujumbura is state-run and fully financed by the government, including the payment of tuition fees.

Given these facts, and the fact that the labour market is dominated by public employment, which requires a level of education and competence in French (only taught in schools), Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:25-26)

³¹ Since then another province was created adding the total number from 15 to 16. The division of the land area subsume Muramvya in the north and Mwaro province in the south. See International Crisis Group (2000:i) and (2003:20), and the map on page x of this study.

conclude that the consequences were tantamount to economic and political 'marginalisation'. With the introduction of 'Kirundization' in 1973, differential access to education was taken to new heights. Jackson (2000:12) and Lemarchand (1996:109) state that Kirundi became the only medium of instruction in government schools. This had the result of restricted access (to wealthier and ruling Tutsi) to the language of the elites, government, and commerce (French), with even lesser enrolment of Hutu in post-primary education. This restricted access was even more acute since many educated Hutu who could speak French were killed in the 1972 genocide. In addition, Jackson (2000:14-15) relates, there was a process of the 'Ruralisation' of the education system, "...to make education more relevant for children, specifically to prepare them more effectively for the rural society in which the vast majority would spend their lives". The consequences are clear: further exclusion and subordination.

Concerning the military and military service, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:27-28) state, for example, that public expenditure for the army rose by more than 100 percent between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. In addition, the 2001 figures show that all the 37 highest command posts in the army were held by Tutsis, 27 (73%) of them from Bururi alone. The extent of Bururi Tutsi domination is also illustrated when one considers the three military leaders of the four successful coups that have taken place in Burundi. These three leaders have ruled Burundi for over three decades. In this regard, Nyang'oro (2001:3) and the International Crisis Group (2003:6) point out that Michel Micombero (1966-1976), Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (1976-1987), and Pierre Buyoya (1987-1993 and 1996-2003)³², are all Tutsi-Hima from a single commune, Rotovu, and a single province, Bururi.

The International Crisis Group (1999:5) goes so far as to state that Burundi functions within networks that go beyond Hutu and Tutsi ethnic categories, and point out that as recipients of patronage, the Bururi Hutu have acquired relatively better access to education resources, and are thus generally better educated. Ndikumana (2004:13) also emphasises that the Hutu from the south accounted for a disproportionate number of Hutu in the governments of the First, Second, and Third Republics. The majority of the Hutu in the army are also from the south. The International Crisis Group (1998:13, 2000:19) also point out that 80 percent of the people that negotiated the Arusha Agreement, are from the south. At the time this led to the claim that the Bururi lobby, including both Hutu and Tutsi leaders, colluded to protect the interests of that region. In this regard, it is noteworthy that many of the Hutu leaders are from Bururi, including Léonard Nyangoma (CNDD), Jean-Basco Ndayikengurukiye (FDD) and Kossan Kabura (FNL). In reflection of the foregoing, Jackson (2000:3) asserts that if Burundi had not gone to war along ethnic lines, it might have done so along (strict) regional lines.

The pattern of exclusion by Tutsi-Hima is reflected in relation to other Tutsi. The International Crisis Group (2000:24) relates incidences of power struggles between the Bururi Tutsis and the Tutsis from the other regions in Burundi, in particular the centre and the 'great North'. Bentley and Southall (2005:43, 47) point out that Tutsis are divided between Tutsi-Hima and Tutsi-Banyaruguru. In 1971, Tutsi-Banyaruguru officers orchestrated a coup in an attempt to usurp power from Tutsi-Hima hegemony. This failed coup thus demonstrated intra-ethnic as well as regional/provincial nuances. As Lemarchand (1970:24) explains, Banyaruguru literally means 'the people from above'. This group had hitherto enjoyed a higher social status vis-à-vis Hima. Lemarchand

³² From 2001 to 2003, Pierre Buyoya ruled in the context of the Transitional Government in accordance with the Arusha Agreement. See chapter 4.

(1996:82) also explains that from the period of the First Republic (1966-1976), Banyaruguru were no longer the privileged recipients of wealth, status, and power in Burundi.³³

Tutsi-Hima exclusion also reflects intra-clanic nuances. The 1989 Bayanzi abortive coup provides an example. As Lemarchand (1996:134, 139-140) explains, Bayanzi and Bashingo are Tutsi-Hima clans. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza is from the Bayanzi clan, whilst Pierre Buyoya and Michel Micombero are from the Bashingo clan. Thus the Bayanzi's attempted coup in 1989, during the Third Republic under Buyoya, was seen as an attempt to restore Bayanzi hegemony initiated under Bagaza. In the Second Republic under Bagaza, Bayanzi became the privileged recipients of wealth and power, in and outside of government. For example, Isidore Nyaboya, Minister of Public Works under Bagaza, became a very wealthy man in Burundi. On March 10 and 15, 1989, 19 conspirators of the attempted coup were arrested. All 19 (five civilians and 14 army officers) were from the Bayanzi clan, including Isidore Nyaboya, who was considered the key conspirator. They were never brought to trial and were released in August 1990. However, all Bayanzi were purged in positions of authority, in the army, public administration and private sector. As Lemarchand (1996:77) states, since 1962 to date, the Burundi conflict has revealed the movement from ethnicity to clan, from clan to region, and from region back to ethnicity.

2.6.4 Exclusion Emanating from Elitist and Personalised Rule

The fourth and last pattern of exclusion identified in this study relates to, and is brought about by, elitism and personalised rule in Burundi. In this regard, Reyntjens (2000:6) states that the vast majority of Burundian Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, share poverty and lack access to health services and education (i.e. social services). Nyang'oro (2001:4) has gone so far as to assert that a small and largely self-appointed and self-serving elite have perpetrated the cyclical violence in Burundi, supposedly acting in the name of the two main ethnic communities. Nyang'oro further states that these elites have been able to manipulate public opinion because:

- *The political economy of Burundi*, as characterised by pervasive poverty, make it easy for the populace to believe elites who claim to be fighting for the common good;
- *Myth making* – the genocidal ideology espoused by both sides where the 'other' is demonised and vilified, makes it easy to believe that the 'other' is bent on the total annihilation of the 'self';
- *Dialogue* – because of the lack of dialogue, perceptions and misperceptions persist on both sides; and
- *Civil Society* – Burundi does not have a strong civil society to act as the 'middle' between government and society.

Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:1-2) relate that the ruling elite, through their hold on political power, have ensured control of the economy and its rents by appropriating part of foreign aid and international borrowing, and have allocated public employment and public investment for the benefit of their group. In addition, the taxation of the domestic economy and the organisation of markets have also been shaped to generate rents for those in power. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:33-34) further point to the incidence of capital flight whilst many Burundians live in poverty and bear the brunt of the conflict. The authors point out that between 1985 and 1992,

³³ Banyaruguru are mostly from the province of Muramvya (not all Banyaruguru are from Muramvya, likewise not all Hima are from Bururi). Banyaruguru have been traditionally identified with the monarchy because of their status and because Muramvya, the provincial capital, was the ancient monarchical capital. It is at this ancient capital that Ntare III's coronation was to take place in 1966. See, Lemarchand (1996:74, 81-82).

capital flight represented 30 percent of total state revenue. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko propose that capital flight could be a possible explanation why Burundi's political elite 'do not seem to care' about political stability and economic efficiency.

Indeed, elitist and personalised rule has been a hallmark of the Burundian state. In this regard, Jean-François Bayart's *Politics of the Belly*, describing the political economy of the privatised post-colonial African state, provides a glimpse of the Burundian reality. Like many African states, the conquest and exercise of government power in Burundi has been with the express aspiration to accumulate wealth for a select minority and to exclude the vast majority. According to Bayart (1993:xvii), this phenomenon is embodied in the Cameroonian expression: 'the goat eats where it is tethered'. As Bayart points out, those in power intend to 'eat'. Regrettably, the elite have been 'eating' at the cost of the vast majority of Burundians.

A popular peasant revolt has not occurred (yet) in response to this elitist and personalised rule in Burundi. However in view of the foregoing, and given the acutely low human development, the political economy of the state of Burundi (see the next section), and just as Jackson (above) has argued in the case of exclusion along regional lines, the objective material conditions in Burundi make a popular uprising against the elite, highly likely. This likelihood is, of course, dependent upon the absence of intervention, and if narrow ethnic, clanic or regional interests and hindrances are overcome, and a subjective 'blame system' developed and mobilised around common issues. This is an area of concern for the future of Burundi.

2.7 THE FAILURE OF THE STATE IN BURUNDI

The state in Burundi is the context in which the conflict is played out. A study of the political economy of Burundi exposes a failing state with sharp structural weaknesses. The nature of the state is instructive in explaining how the conflict has manifested in the struggle for the control of the state, as opposed to a struggle for the reconfiguration of the state. In this regard, Rotberg (2002:90-91) submits that since the 1990s there are at least seven countries in the world that fulfil the criteria of state failure, and points out that Burundi is one of them.³⁴ The state in Burundi has failed as an agent of distributive justice, and instead, has become a predatory state. As Ndikumana (2004:7) holds, "...the Burundian state has failed to perform its usual functions of enforcing the rule of law, protecting individual and property rights, enforcing the rules of fair social exchange, administering justice for all, and redistributing national wealth". In reflection, Lake and Rothchild (1998:294) assert that state weakness (or failure) is a necessary precondition for the eruption of violent conflict.

Two salient and acute structural weaknesses of the state in Burundi are highlighted here. These structural weaknesses relate to the nature of the political and economic systems. These two structural weaknesses, have given rise to the failure of the state in Burundi. However, the source of state failure is not only the structural weaknesses of the state, but also the crisis that emanate from such weakness. As Deng (1995:207) explains, it is also the lack or loss of capacity to cope with the crisis that leads to state failure/collapse. Ottaway (1995:235) further explains that the initial nature of the state is the 'ultimate cause' (i.e. underlying cause) and the failure to continue imposing control (in the face of the resultant crisis) is the proximate cause of state failure/collapse. These views finds resonance with Nkurunziza and Ngaruko's (2005:21) assertion that one of the factors

³⁴ According to Rotberg, the other failing states are Angola, the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Afghanistan, with Somalia at the end of the continuum, that of a collapsed state.

contributing to the poor economic performance in Burundi (in addition to economic inefficiency), is the inability of the government to sustain long-term peace, which serves as one of the most important deterrents for investment.

The first weakness of the state relates to the exclusive governance system and issues surrounding legitimacy, i.e. a crisis of governance. The state in Burundi has historically become an adjunct of Tutsi political and socio-economic domination, to the exclusion of the majority. In this regard, on August 22, 1988, 27 leading Hutu intellectuals wrote an open letter to President Buyoya. The letter was subsequently denounced as 'subversive, deceitful, and tribalist'. Sanctions swiftly followed. Six of its signatories were promptly thrown in jail. They were never brought to trial. Nine of them fled to Rwanda to avoid a similar fate (Lemarchand, 1996:133-134). The letter highlights the issues of exclusion and scarcity in Burundi: "Social injustices and inequalities are a reality which has been legitimised by the authorities. Power in Burundi remains...regional, clanic, and above all tribal, but in the meantime, unfortunately, the pie is getting smaller and smaller everyday.... He who is born Hutu...are no longer under any illusions" (cited in Lemarchand, 1996:133). It is the scarcity resulting from the structure of the economy, the aforementioned 'pie', which this narration will now illuminate.³⁵

The exclusive governance system is more acute when one considers the second salient structural weakness, the precarious nature of the economy. Burundi is a tiny, landlocked, resource-poor country, with a high population density. For example, because of its landlocked status, it is estimated that transport costs increase the costs of imports and exports by an additional 30 to 40 percent. The nearest ports, Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Mombassa (Kenya), are 1 428 and 2 273 kilometres, respectively, away from Burundi (Arusha Agreement, 2000:132; OCHA, 2003:3). These factors have contributed to poor economic performance in Burundi. However these, and similar factors, are given. What makes poor economic performance acute, and severely contribute to the failure of the state, are human induced factors, which are the focus here.

As OCHA (2003:3) and Oketch and Polzer (2002:86, 103, 105) point out, the economy is mainly agricultural with roughly 90 percent the population dependent on subsistence agriculture. Burundi's economy is based on the sale of coffee, tea and cotton, which account for 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings. Coffee alone, accounts for 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings. The ability to pay for imports, thus, rests largely on the caprice of the climate and the fluctuating international coffee market. According to Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:23-24) the government has forced farmers to produce tea, cotton and coffee to the detriment of the food market, and even though households are better off producing staple crops. Government agents even regularly monitored the farmers for compliance! The authors state that following the 1993 democratic elections, in some regions, farmers destroyed their coffee stands in demonstration of their discontent with previous regimes. This act (destroying coffee stands) was traditionally punishable by a long prison sentence. Oketch and Polzer (2002:141) state that the authorities interpreted this act as economic subversion and treason. The only logical motivation one can deduce from this untenable 'forced specialisation' (as Nkurunziza and Ngaruko call it), is the opportunity for economic rents that accrue from the sale of tea, cotton and coffee (as opposed to staple crops) for those in power. This 'forced specialisation' dates from colonial times. As Griggs (1997:3) holds, land scarcity, soil exhaustion, and limited food supply, were already noted in pre-colonial times. However, through

³⁵ For reasons of brevity and avoidance of unnecessary repetition, the exclusive political system is not discussed in any detail here as it has already been dealt with (particularly under *Lemarchand's Exclusion Thesis*).

various forms of taxation, colonial powers destroyed subsistence farming and communal land ownership to force the population into coffee production to support the export market.

In response to the nature of the economy, many Burundians have withdrawn to subsistence farming. As Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:23) point out, peasant communities in Burundi consume on average 64 percent of their own food produce. In regions where climatic conditions permit diversified production, this average is as high as 80 percent. Thus, the state in Burundi has failed to realise the expectations of the populace as would have been typically created by the prospect of modernity after independence i.e. social mobility, opportunities and participation associated with modern efficient economies and democratic political systems. René Lemarchand's definition of social exclusion in Burundi has resonance. Lemarchand (2000a:6) explains that social exclusion "...goes hand in hand with the erosion of traditional social networks and the collapse of the safety nets that once supported the traditional social order of peasant communities". With the traditional social order dislocated, *inter alia*, by colonialism, many Burundians would have found the alternative modern economy outside of their reach. It can be construed then, that with the net effect of social, economic and political exclusion, many Burundians would be on the fringes of society, alienated from the state.

From independence to date, poor economic performance has been characteristic of the state in Burundi. In this regard, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:7-8) divide Burundi's political economy into three periods: 1960-1972 being a period of 'institutional instability and economic decline'; 1972-1988, a period of 'political repression and expansion of the basis for rents', and 1988-to date, as a period of 'war and economic decline'. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko hold that the first period was characterised by sluggish growth, which was lower than the African average. In the second period, although there was growth, this was achieved with massive borrowing and wide budget deficits, necessitating the adoption of a structural adjustment programme in 1986. The coffee boom of the 1970s and increased investment was accompanied by increased economic rents for elites through increased state corporations and subsidies. In the third period, with a total economic embargo imposed in 1996, Burundi experienced the criminalisation of the economy (mostly through imports and exports circumventing the embargo), and unprecedented rates of inflation and poverty levels. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:9) point out that throughout the post-independence period, investment was generally allocated based on non-economic objectives such as rent seeking, regionalism, nepotism and patronage. Thus, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:6) conclude that the defining characteristics of the political economy of the state in Burundi have been predatory politics and short-term economic gain.

Burundi also has dismal social indicators, symptomatic of the weakness of the state as an economic entity. As already established (in chapter I), Burundi ranked a low 173 out of 177 countries assessed in 2003 and 2004 on the HDI, with a GNI per capita of only \$100 (US). In illustration of this low human development, Nkurunziza (2002:2) states that 1995 figures show that Burundi had an adult illiteracy rate of 65 percent, and in 1998, 60 percent of Burundians lived below the monetary poverty line, and between 1993 and 1996, Burundi's economy revealed negative growth rates. Reyntjens (1995:27) holds that 1992 figures indicated life expectancy at 48.2 years with infant mortality rate of 106 per 1000 births and a ratio of one doctor to 14 000 persons. In addition, it is mentioned in the Arusha Agreement (2000:131) that 1999 figures showed that about 450 000 people received food aid every month, with nutrition centres feeding 32 000 people everyday. The UN World Food Programme's food aid to Burundi totalled \$24 million (US) in 1999 alone. Macro-economic indicators are as dismal as these social indicators. For example, Reyntjens (2000:5) holds that Burundi has a large trade deficit. The 1998

figures indicate that export earnings were about \$49 million (US), contrasted with \$102 million (US) worth of imports. There is also a large budget deficit. In the same year, foreign debt amounted to \$1.1 billion (US), with debt servicing costing over 58 percent of export earnings. These imbalances are sustained by international aid, amounting to \$315 million (US) in 1992, equalling one quarter of Burundi's GNP.

One can also look at other factors to illustrate the weakness of the state of Burundi as an economic entity. One of these factors relate to the poor infrastructure to support the economy. To illustrate, there are only three mainlines per 1000 persons, mostly concentrated in urban areas, the lowest telephone density in Africa. In addition, less than two percent of the population have access to electricity (Arusha Agreement, 2000:130; Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2005:22-23). Other factors relate to the over-bloated and elitist public sector. In highlighting the elitist public sector, Nkurunziza (2002:2-3) submits that the economy is state controlled and privatised. Nkurunziza points out that public employment accounts for 80 percent of full-time employment in the modern sector, and that, on average, the salary of a civil servant is equivalent to 15 times the country's per capita income. In complement, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:29) point out that the average of the total income of civil servants falls within bracket income of the richest six percent of the population, that is, if other 'rents to power' that government employment provides, are discounted. Oketch and Polzer (2002:106) assert that clearly this wage structure, accounting for more than 20 percent of total government expenditure, is shaped to serve the needs of a select minority. This is clearly untenable!

In relation to the over-bloated public sector, Ndikumana (2004:7) relates that the 1996 figures show that the assets of the 37 fully state controlled firms accounted for 48 percent of Burundi's GDP, and that for all parastatals combined, the percentage was 77 percent. In illustration, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:12, 14) holds that three parastatals controlled almost 100 percent of the total export of goods, and that for much of the post-independence period the financial sector was dominated by two commercial banks partially owned by the state. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:30) further hold that between 1977 and 1982, about 100 state corporations were created. This structure and distortions of the economy would have benefited Tutsi the most. However, as Lemarchand (1996:163) points out, the absence of (accurate and maintained) statistical data on the ethnic distribution of income and occupational activities in Burundi make it difficult to illustrate economic dominance. In reflection of the aforesaid, Nnoli (2001:3) concludes that the nature of the state and its extensive intervention in economic and social life makes the state a strategic instrument for power and wealth. Lemarchand (1996:77) also argues that when the state is an instrument of group domination, access to the state becomes a source of potential rewards for some groups and of deprivation for others. These views find resonance with Reyntjens' (2000:5) assertion that in a poor country like Burundi, controlling the state is of major essence as it is the main avenue for the accumulation and reproduction of a dominant class.

In addition to the abovementioned, Johan Galtung (cited in International Alert, 1996:5) holds that unequal, unjust and unrepresentative social structures are inherently violent. Johan Galtung extends the definition of violence to include not only direct physical harm, but also a situation where "...the actual somatic and mental realisations of human beings are below their potential realisation". This structural violence of the state is often resisted with an ethnic response. Nnoli (2001:1) proposes that "...the undemocratic nature of the state means that in extending political authority throughout the country and organising economic and social activities in the society those who control the state often inflict direct or structural violence on peoples and communities". Regarding the ethnic response, Nnoli (2001:3-4) holds that the preference for primary identities emanates from

the generalised and cultural nature of the threat of structural violence. Such a threat, Nnoli argues, demands nothing less than 'the crystallisation of the self holistically'. Nnoli concludes that the ethnic response is reinforced by the mono-ethnic (Tutsi) composition of the political incumbents in charge of state power. In addition, the state has been party to the conflict in Burundi. As Obioha (1999:7) correctly points out, the state is itself a focal point for competition and an actor in the conflict.

How has this untenable system remained relatively so intact for so long? Nkurunziza and Ngaruko propose answers in this regard. Regarding the economic system, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:32-33) advance that when the ruling elite is small and unaccountable, there are large payoffs even with limited economic resources as the excluded groups bare the brunt of economic distortions. Regarding the political system, the authors hold that "(i)n countries where a selectorate, that is a small group of citizens such as the army in Burundi, enjoys monopoly power to change governments, a bad leader may remain in power unchallenged for a long time.... In Burundi, the selectorate or the Bururi elite has no incentive to remove a leader from power when he satisfies their needs. Instead, the army is used to quell any opposition to the selectorate's policies". The government is accountable and responsive to no one!

2.8 THE UNSTABLE GREAT LAKES REGION

In addition to the nature of the state, Burundi is also mired in the wider instabilities of the Great Lakes region and the communicable conflicts contained within this region. At the very least, these conflicts can be construed to have exacerbated, if not triggered, the conflict in Burundi. Chrétien (2003:23) explains that the region is defined by the circle of lakes that form around the main flow of the White Nile River. The lakes include Lake Victoria, Lakes Albert and Edward, and Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika. The countries contained in the region are: Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and the DRC.³⁶

Inter alia, the presence of both Hutu and Tutsi in all the countries in the Great Lakes region has made conflicts mutually communicable. In reflection, Griggs (1997:2) points out that colonial boundaries not only left the traditional kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi reduced in size, but also left these countries landlocked and resource poor, with lucrative mineral deposits on the side of the DRC. In addition, Lemarchand (2000b:327) and Griggs (1997:2) emphasise that colonial boundaries (and later border adjustments and population movements) left a substantial number of Tutsis and Hutus as minorities in southern Uganda, western Tanzania and the North and South Kivu provinces of eastern DRC. For example, in North Kivu, about half of the population of 3.5 million (1993 figure), speak Kinyarwanda (Rwandan language). About 80 percent of them are Hutu and 20 percent Tutsi (collectively referred to as Banyarwanda). In addition, thousands of Hutu from Burundi live in the Ruzizi valley of South Kivu. Added to these groups are some 15 to 20 thousand Tutsi from Rwanda who live south of Uvira, in and around Mulenge, in South Kivu (referred to as Banyamulenge). In the case of Tanzania, between 750 000 and one million Hutus are found on the Tanzanian boundary with Rwanda

³⁶ Chrétien (2003:22-23) explains that the term was coined in the nineteenth century by Anglo-Saxon explorers (which explains the naming of the lakes) in search of the sources of the proverbial River Nile. According to Chrétien, late-nineteenth century geography was inclined to revolve around finding and mapping water, explaining how the lakes came to define the region. A representation of these lakes and countries is provided on page xi of this study. It is noted that demarcation may vary, for example, Ndarubagiye (2001:1) includes Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia, as part of the Great Lakes region.

and Burundi. In addition, tens of thousands of both Hutus and Tutsis reside along the Rwanda/Uganda border, consequent to the British-negotiated 1910 cession of the Kisoro sub-district to Uganda.

The effect of the foregoing is that ethnic fault lines and ethnic affinity cut-across physical boundaries. Samuel P. Huntington (cited in Lemarchand, 1997:5, 2000a:16) refers to this occurrence of ethnic affinity across boundaries as the 'kin-country syndrome'. The presence of both Hutu and Tutsi in these countries has contributed in destabilising these countries bordering Rwanda and Burundi, and the conflicts in these countries in turn have contributed to the destabilisation of Burundi and Rwanda. Hutus have also used their kinsmen, through smuggling networks (especially in the DRC), to partially finance the conflict in Burundi (and Rwanda).³⁷ Lemarchand (2000a:2) provides the following insightful glimpse of the complex crisis in the Great Lakes:

No other region has experienced a more deadly combination of external aggression, foreign-linked factionalism, interstate violence, factional strife, and ethnic rivalries. Nowhere else in Africa has genocide exacted a more horrendous price in human lives lost, economic and financial resources squandered, developmental opportunities wasted.... No other crisis in the continent seems more resistant to conflict resolution.

In reflection, Prendergast and Smock (in Nyang'oro, 2001:11) assert that the conflicts in the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi (one can include Uganda) are inextricably linked through cross-border insurgencies, ethnic linkages, and economic ties and that the legacy of genocide (the 1972 Burundi genocide and the 1994 Rwanda genocide) 'hangs heavily over the Great Lakes region'. In illustrating the linkages of the conflicts in this region, Van Eck (2000:2) points out that Laurent Kabila's DRC had a hard line disposition towards what was called the 'Tutsi regimes' of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, drawing many countries in the region into pro-Hutu (i.e. Bantu) and pro-Tutsi (i.e. non-Bantu) camps. This disposition ignited a regional conflagration and conflict in the DRC starting in August 1998. As Matthee (2000:267) and Moyroud and Katunga (2002:162) hold, the resultant conflict included armed forces from Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, the Central African Republic, Sudan and Chad, and a myriad number of foreign sponsored armed groups in the DRC.

As alluded in the foregoing, the Hutu-Tutsi divide in the context of the Great Lakes region takes the form of the 'Bantu' (Hutu) – 'Hamite' (Tutsi) - divide. As Reyntjens (2001:23) points out, there is no 'scientific' basis for this division. The subjective existence of this division however, is undeniable. The continuing fractionalisation illustrates, however, that these groups are not monolithic. For example, elements of the Rwandan former army (ex-FAR), 'monarchists' and Banyamulenge were based in Uganda, fighting the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government. On March 6, 2001, Uganda included its former ally Rwanda, on the list of 'nations hostile to Uganda'. At the beginning of April 2001, Rwanda and Uganda accused each other of supporting their respective armed groups, and deployed troops on both sides of their mutual border. This was 'uncharacteristic'. Griggs (1997:5) and Nsongola-Ntalaja (2001:68) point out that Yoweri Museveni is of Tutsi descent. Paul Kagame, also of Tutsi descent, is a former head of the military intelligence of Uganda. Tutsis from Rwanda were principal components of the National Resistance Movement that defeated Milton Obote's government and brought Museveni to power in Uganda in January 1986. In turn, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), under Paul Kagame, launched a military offensive in 1990 and assumed power in Rwanda in 1994 with Ugandan support.

³⁷ See, for example, Oketch and Polzer (2002:88).

The foregoing illustrates the complexity of the Great Lakes region, a complexity that is also revealed in the case of Tanzania. Tanzania houses many of the refugees from Burundi, and Burundi armed groups have operated from the refugee camps in Tanzania. As the International Crisis Group (1998:5) and Van Eck (1999:4) hold, the Burundian government has accused Tanzania of allowing these groups to get supplies and carry out training within Tanzanian territory. At the beginning of 1998, Tanzanian and Burundian armed forces were involved in an armed incident near Lake Tanganyika. Previously, in November 1996, Griggs (1997:6) holds, Tanzanian officials had threatened to invade Burundi to 'sort things out'. This was in response to Hutu refugee leaders who called on the Tanzanian government to 'annex' Burundi. However, in all the countries in the region, Rwanda has arguably had the most profound impact on the conflict in Burundi. Cornwell and De Beer (1999:84) point out that in colonial times, Belgium administered both countries as a single territory called Ruanda-Urundi. Further, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:5) point out that Burundi has the same ethnic constitution as Rwanda. Before 1994 in Rwanda, in contrast with Burundi, the Hutu held political power. Similarly to Burundi, although in reverse, Mudo (1999:4) points out, political resources were monopolised by the Hutu-led government to the exclusion of Tutsi and Twa. As Chrétien (1996:206) concludes, "...the fate of the two countries has been parallel, as in a game of mirrors in which each reflects the fantasies of the other".

In reflection of the aforesaid, Nkurunziza (2002:2) and England (2003a:8) assert that Rwanda has always been an important variable in Burundian politics. The Rwanda Revolution of 1959-1962 ushered a Hutu government in Kigali and this demonstrated a similar potential for Bujumbura. The Hutu looked favourably upon the prospect of a Hutu dominated government in Bujumbura. Decidedly, the Tutsi feared such a prospect, and they sought to guard against it. In complement, Bentley and Southall (2005:41) inform that the Hutu revolution in Rwanda led to "...a Hutu ethnocracy...that excluded the 'Tutsi race' from the political order.... Many survivors of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda today regard the Hutu revolution of 1959 as having provided the foundation for that tragedy by having defined Tutsi as second-class citizens.... In the meantime an increasingly Tutsi-dominated army in Burundi had come to the conclusion that majoritarian democracy represented an immediate threat to minority survival". On the side of the Hutu, Lemarchand (2000b:332) also holds, "...many were the Hutu who looked to republican Rwanda as the model polity for Burundi".³⁸ Under these circumstances, the stage was set for a major confrontation in Burundi, which finally took place in 1965.

In illustration of the 'kin-country syndrome', the conflicts in both countries have also fed off each other. As Lemarchand (2000b:331, 1996:60) holds, in the aftermath of the Rwanda revolution, Tutsi refugees from Rwanda, who numbered about 50 000 by 1965, became a major vehicle of conflict in Burundi, and in reverse, in the aftermath of the 1972 genocide of Hutu in Burundi, Hutu refugees from Burundi also became major vectors of conflict in Rwanda. Lemarchand (1996:30) also states that the 1972 genocide generated a major outbreak of Rwandan Hutu's anti-Tutsi violence in Rwanda. Reyntjens (1993:583, 1995:20, 2000:5) also holds that the assassination of Burundi President Melchior Ndadaye (Hutu) by a Tutsi-dominated army in October 1993, adversely affected the Rwandan Arusha negotiations and the Arusha Accord. The Arusha Accord was signed the previous month on August 4, 1993 between the (then) Rwandan Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), under Paul Kagame (current President of Rwanda). In addition, about 200 000 Hutu from Burundi fled to Rwanda following the army's pacification campaign unleashed by the violence emanating from Ndadaye's death.

³⁸ Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:5), Nyang'oro (2001:3) and Wohlgemuth (2000:4) hold similar views regarding the impact of the Rwanda revolution, and the general impact of Rwanda, on the conflict in Burundi.

On April 6, 1994, a violent act occurred that was to have a profound impact on the history of both Rwanda and Burundi, and was to have grave ramifications for Hutu-Tutsi relations in the Great Lakes region. In this regard, Alusala (2005:1), Nyang'oro (2001:1) and Gambari (1995:231) point out that the rocket attack that crashed the plane over Kigali airport with the Rwandan President, Juvenal Habyarimana on board, was the trigger factor of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. What is more significant about this fact is that the Burundian President, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was also on board and perished in the very same plane crash. Both Presidents were Hutu. The plane crash was attributed to Tutsi extremists.³⁹ Reyntjens (1995:18, 20, 2000:5) holds that the resultant genocide in Rwanda radicalised Burundi Tutsis and handicapped the search for peaceful solutions in Burundi. Thus, when about 200 000 Hutu refugees from Rwanda (and some of the 200 000 additional Burundi Hutu who fled to Rwanda in 1993) started arriving in Burundi in 1994, fleeing the Tutsi-dominated RPF advancing from their bases in Uganda, hundreds were killed by the Burundian army and Tutsi militias, especially in the northern provinces of Kirundo and Ngozi. On several occasions in October 1994, the RPF (now in government in Rwanda) also conducted raids on Rwandan Hutu refugee camps in Burundi, with the complicity of the Burundian Tutsi-dominated government and army.

Another point that also illustrates the 'kin-country syndrome' is the collaboration between the Hutu armed groups of both Rwanda and Burundi. Van Eck (1999:3, 2000:3) and the International Crisis Group (2000:30) point out that Burundi's armed groups, with the Rwandan former army (ex-FAR) and the interahamwe militia (purported to be the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda), have used bases in eastern DRC as launching pads for attacks on Burundi and Rwanda, and as safe havens for training and when retreating. According to the International Crisis Group (2002:13), "(t)he link between the rebellion and the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide frightens Burundi's Tutsi minority".

2.9 EVALUATIONS

In reflection of the factors highlighted in this chapter, it should be underlined that an accurate diagnosis of a conflict is a *sine qua non* for successful conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building. An incorrect or inadequate diagnosis will result in incorrect or inadequate remedies, and peace will remain elusive for the Burundi people. In this regard, it is concluded that the other accounts/theoretical approaches to the conflict in Burundi, i.e. 'ethnic' conflict, the predation of productive economic activities, the struggle for the control of the state, and the nexus between environmental scarcity and violent conflict, have a 'weaker claim' in describing and accounting for the conflict in Burundi.

It would thus seem that the strongest theoretical approach to understand and describe the conflict in Burundi is exclusion. Political and economic exclusion has been a defining feature of the governance system and a determinant of social mobility. In the period leading to, and immediately after, independence, Burundi saw the ascendancy of the Bezi to power and the increasing exclusion of the Batare. In the republican period following the demise of the monarchy in 1966, exclusion followed ethnic lines with the increasing marginalisation and subsequent exclusion of the Hutu and Twa, by the Tutsi in general, and by the Tutsi-Hima in particular.

³⁹ In contrast, Chrétien (2003:329-330) suggests that the attack is attributable to Hutu extremists that seized power in Rwanda days after the assassination of Juvenal Habyarimana. These Hutu extremists were apparently opposed to the 1993 Arusha Accord.

Although there is incidence of exclusion following regional, intra-ethnic and clanic lines, as well as exclusion emanating from elitist and personalised governance, the exclusive governance system has largely resulted in horizontal inequalities between Tutsi on the one hand, and Hutu and Twa on the other. Exclusion (and the consequent discrepancies) is a source of acute grievance and motivation for collective violence. Although there has not been a popular uprising against elitist and personalised governance, given the nature of the political economy, this is an area of concern for the future of Burundi.

Traces of political, economic, and social exclusion can be found during the colonial period. It can also be generally agreed that ethnic identity and stratified social relations were 'hardened' during colonialism. However, Burundi did have stratified social categories before colonialism, albeit fluid and not playing a definitive political role. In the postcolonial period, ethnic, clanic, elitist, and regional exclusion became the basis of the political economy of Burundi. Identity, defined in these terms, became an essential determinant of social organisation and mobility. Thus, the role of the colonialists should not receive undue significance. The fact of the matter is that for decades, long after the colonialists had left, Burundian excluded, discriminated, repressed, vilified, demonised, and slaughtered Burundian in Burundi. In addition, the salience of the ethnic character of the conflict has added to the complexity of this conflict. This factor, the political economy of Burundi and the complexities in the Great Lakes region, have impact on the nature and prosecution of the conflict, and have ramifications for conflict resolution and subsequent post-conflict peace building. All these factors will be revisited in the context of chapters 3 and 4. The likely solutions to the different patterns and dimensions of exclusion, as identified in this chapter, will be revisited in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 3: THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONFLICT IN BURUNDI

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Nowhere else in Africa has so much violence killed so many people on so many occasions in so small a space as in Burundi during the years following independence.... Seldom have human rights been violated on a more massive scale, and with more brutal consistency, anywhere else on the continent. - René Lemarchand (1996:xxv).

When did all this carnage (cited above) begin, and how has it carried on for this length of time? Who are the actors and what are the issues involved? What factors account for the pernicious and intractable nature of this conflict? What are the trigger factors? These, and other pertinent questions, form the structure of this chapter. There have been revolts, riots, political assassinations, and various forms of violence in Burundi. This chapter will not chronicle all these events. The focus, rather, is on large-scale conflict involving (more or less) organised groups. Thus the focus is on armed political parties and movements, the government and the army (as actors in the conflict), and large-scale communal violence. The focus is also on the four major incidences of violence in 1965, 1972, 1988, and 1993-to date. However, to avoid omissions and distortions, the other incidences of conflict and political persecution, including those in 1962, 1966, 1969, 1971, 1989 and 1991, will also be narrated, albeit with less detail.

In regard of the abovementioned, there are a number of events leading to, and immediately after, independence that form the prelude and context to the first wide-scale violence beginning in 1965. Without an understanding of these events, the 1965 conflict and subsequent bouts of conflict cannot be fully comprehended. Thus, the narration will first go into some detail in recounting these events. At this stage it can be reiterated that Burundi is a failing state with a complex society in transition that is also mired in the wider instabilities of the Great Lakes region (especially Rwanda), adding to the complexity of the conflict.

3.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE ADVENT OF INDEPENDENCE⁴⁰

At the dawn of independence on July 1, 1962, Burundi was transformed from a kingdom to a constitutional monarchy under Mwambutsa II (1916-1966), and subsequently his son Ntare III (08 July-28 November 1966).⁴¹ André Muhirwa (1961-1963), from the Batware lineage, served as the first Prime Minister of independent Burundi (Lemarchand, 1970:366, 438). In the short-lived period of the constitutional monarchy (July 1962-November 1966), Burundi was troubled with political instability as indicated by the irregular and rapid turnover of government as illustrated on the table below:

⁴⁰ This part of the study borrows extensively from Lemarchand (1970 and 1996). This 'bias' is unavoidable as the other sources that were consulted in this study also refer to the two sources. Thus, the search for other sources with similar clarity and authority proved futile.

⁴¹ The following are the names of the kings of Burundi and the dates of their ascension to the throne: Ntare Rushatsi (1675), Mwezi I (1705), Mutaga I Seenyamuiiza (1735), Mwambutsa I (1765), Ntare II Rugaamba (1795), Mwezi II Kisabo (1852), Mutaga II (1908), Mwambutsa II (1916), and Ntare III Ndizeye (1966). See Lemarchand (1970:501).

Table 6: Government Instability in Burundi, 1962 - 1966⁴²

Duration of Government	Prime Minister/Ethnic Origins/Fate	Cabinet Composition	
		Hutu	Tutsi
Sep-Oct, 1961 - two weeks	Louis Rwagasore (Ganwa, Bambutsa lineage) - assassinated	----	----
Oct, 1961-June, 1963 - 18 months	André Muhirwa (Ganwa, Batare lineage) - resigned	4(37%)	7(63%)
June, 1963-March 1964 - 9 months	Pierre Ngendandumwe (Hutu) - resigned	6(46%)	7(54%)
March, 1964-Jan, 1965 - 9 months	Albin Nyamoya (Tutsi) - resigned	5(38%)	8(62%)
Jan, 1965 - one week	Pierre Ngendandumwe (Hutu) - assassinated	6(40%)	9(60%)
Jan-Sept, 1965 - 8 months	Joseph Bamina (Hutu) - executed	6(40%)	9(60%)
Sep, 1965-July 1966 - 10 months	Léopold Bihumugani (Biha), (Ganwa, Bezi lineage) - dismissed in the July dynastic coup	6(60%)	4(40%)
July-Nov, 1966 - 4 months	Michel Micombero (Tutsi) - deposed the monarchy, became President. Ousted in the 1976 coup by Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (Tutsi)	5(36%) - Dec, 1966 appointments	9(64%)

Sources: Adapted from Ndikumana (2004:3) and Lemarchand (1970:332, 364, 366, 385, 387, 400, 413, 428).

At the heart of this rapid turnover of government was a crisis of legitimacy surrounding governmental institutions vis-à-vis monarchical institutions. Lemarchand (1970:437) concludes that the tug-of-war between monarchical and government institutions stands out as the dominant feature of Burundi politics until the proclamation of the republic in 1966. This crisis of legitimacy was the first crisis that led to the polarisation of ethnic sentiments in this period. However, many Hutu still had a positive disposition towards the crown, and they remained in support of UPRONA as a party most aligned with the monarchy. In addition, the crown had a policy of finding ethnic balance. Hutu and Tutsi were never totally and permanently 'in' or 'out' of government as the table above illustrates. The table above also illustrates the attempt at ethnic balancing and the appeasement of the demands for ethnic representation in this period (Lemarchand, 1970:346, 353, 1996:59).

Monarchist versus republican legitimacy did not take place until after independence, and only came to the fore when the monarchy exhibited tendencies towards royal despotism. After independence, it was generally agreed that Mwami's position on the political system should be that of a constitutional monarch. However, with the continuing ethnic tensions, the position of the Mwami shifted from that of an impartial arbiter to an active participant to the point of virtually eliminating all traces of government autonomy. Because of the interference from Mwami Mwambutsa, Muhirwa handed his resignation on June 7, 1963. After the dismissal of Muhirwa's

⁴² Louis Rwagasore was elected Prime Minister designate but he was assassinated in October 1961 before independence and before forming a government. Léopold Bihumugani is sometimes referred to in the literature as Biha instead of Bihumugani. Regarding André Muhirwa, he achieved this post, a leading position within the inner circles of UPRONA and was reinstated in the chiefdom of his ancestors (Batare), by paying allegiance to the Royal Court through marrying Mwami's daughter. Thus, despite the long-standing Bezi-Batare conflict, these groups cannot be regarded as monolithic. The same can be said of other groups in society, including Hutu and Tutsi, thereby reinforcing the position that the conflict is between those included vis-à-vis those excluded, from political goods. Regarding the status of Ganwa, there are differences. In the Arusha Agreement (2000:161), it is stated that "(a)fter exhaustive debate, no agreement could be reached on whether the Baganwa are a separate... [ethnic group] or a dynastic clan". According to PALIPEHUTU (cited in Lemarchand, 1996:146) Ganwa are not a separate ethnic entity, but part of Tutsi power. Oketch and Polzer (2002:91) state that there are Ganwa-Tutsi (i.e. dynastic clan) and non-royal Tutsi. Cornwell and De Beer (1999:84) state that "...though of Tutsi origin, [Ganwa] came to be seen as a separate ethnic group". Lemarchand (1996:6) also insists that the Ganwa have an identity distinct from both Hutu and Tutsi. In view of this fluidity, the position appropriated from Cornwell and De Beer and Lemarchand, though considered the most likely, is a tentative one.

government, all government appointments, and the initiation and execution of legislation, came from the Royal Court, which was dominated by members of the Bezi lineage (Lemarchand, 1970:29-30, 67-68, 364, 445).

Following the October 1965 Hutu-instigated coup attempt and the subsequent flight of Mwambutsa to Europe, Prince Charles Ndizeye came to power under the protection of the army. Charles Ndizeye acceded to the throne on July 8, 1966, under the dynastic name Ntare III at the ancient capital of Muramvya. Ntare's rule was characterised by conflict between government and monarchical institutions, in essence, a re-enactment of events that led to Mwambutsa's fall. However, there was a significant difference; the government now, had the full backing of the army, which was part of a dual military-civilian government (Lemarchand, 1996:74-75). To appraise the role of the monarchy one can perhaps use Samuel P. Huntington's concept of the 'king's dilemma'. According to Huntington, the dilemma is "...whether to merely reign and do nothing to prevent society from tearing itself apart, or to reign and rule and invite the overthrow of monarchic institutions..." (cited in Lemarchand, 1996:60). By choosing the latter, Mwambutsa's actions led to his own demise, but as Lemarchand (1996:60) argues, had he chosen the former, there is no indication that his rule would have endured. A similar argument can be made in the case of Ntare.

The polarisation of ethnicity also took place in the context of competition by political parties. At the beginning of independence, Burundi had 23 political parties that were officially registered in June of 1961. Within these parties was the PP, a pro-Hutu party. However, in this period the struggle between the political parties UPRONA, which was aligned with Bezi, and PDC, which was aligned with Batare, dominated Burundi politics (Lemarchand, 1970:324). Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:5-6) explain that UPRONA was a nationalist party built on democratic values and included both Hutu and Tutsi in its leadership structures. As Lemarchand (1970:292) states, the motto of UPRONA was 'One God, one Mwami, one Country', indicating the party's attachment to the monarchy. In the legislative elections of September 18, 1961, UPRONA won 80 percent of the votes cast, with 58 seats out of 64 in the Legislative Assembly. This was a comeback from the losses of the communal election the previous year. In the communal elections of November 1960, PDC had won 942 seats out of 2 876, and UPRONA won only 545 (the rest won by other parties). Lemarchand attributes this defeat to 'the role Rwagasore played in the fortunes of his party', as he was placed under house arrest by the Belgian administration at the time. It is within the context of this struggle for the control of the state between Bezi and Batare that Rwagasore was assassinated (Lemarchand, 1970:338, 340, 1996:53).

Thus, the second crisis that led to the polarisation of ethnic sentiments was brought about by the assassination of Prince Louis Rwagasore and the consequences of his death. Rwagasore was Mwami Mwambutsa's oldest son and a charismatic leader of UPRONA.⁴³ Louis Rwagasore personified a growing attachment to the crown in response to the humiliation of colonial rule and the chiefs who were deemed to have acted as agents of the Belgian administration, especially Batare. A Greek gunman, Jean Kageorgis, assassinated Rwagasore on October 13, 1961. Five PDC leaders, as well as members of the Belgian administration, were implicated in his death. After independence, these PDC leaders, including PDC President Joseph Biroli and his brother Jean

⁴³ Because of his princely status, Rwagasore was barred by the Belgian administration from holding a formal leadership position in UPRONA. This was in accordance with an August 1960 resolution taken in a meeting in Brussels (probably emanating from pressure by the Belgians) by 13 Burundi parties, including UPRONA. This resolution held that "(r)elatives and connections of the mwami, within two degrees of relationship, may not receive an electoral mandate, hold political office or take part in any political activity". See Lemarchand (1970:328, 334).

Ntitendereza, from the Batware lineage, were tried and sentenced to death for their role in the assassination of Rwagasore. They were publicly hanged on January 15, 1963, in Gitega, before an estimated crowd of 10 000 people. The death of Rwagasore had grave political ramifications for Burundi. Rwagasore's death unravelled the ethnic cohesion he had achieved. His death also meant the loss of leadership for UPRONA. This loss resulted in a leadership crisis and the division of UPRONA along Hutu-Tutsi lines (Lemarchand, 1970:294, 335, 340-342, 1996:50, 56; Chrétien, 1996:206). Nzongola-Ntalaja (2001:71) asserts that "(i)f there is one leader who embodied national unity, and who had the credibility needed to steer Burundi away from the Rwanda model, it was Prince Rwagasore".

The third crisis relates to the resultant struggle for the heart of UPRONA following Rwagasore's demise, largely characterised by Paul Mirerenko (Hutu) versus André Muhirwa. This leadership crisis found effect on August 26, 1962. On this day, the Hutu leader of UPRONA, Paul Mirerenko, called a meeting of the rank and file of UPRONA at Rwagasore stadium in Bujumbura. Mirerenko accused Muhirwa (now Burundi's Prime Minister and President of UPRONA) of ethnic favouritism and nepotism, and of betraying the dream of independence as held by Rwagasore. An audience of about 2000 became uneasy. Zénon Nicayenzi, the Minister of Defence, ordered several detachments of the gendarmerie to the stadium to arrest Mirerenko and disperse the gathering. Instead, about 60 (mostly Hutu) gendarmerie rallied around Mirerenko. UPRONA became polarised between Hutu and Tutsi factions. To diffuse the situation, Mwambutsa called for the election of a new executive committee of UPRONA. With the September 1962 results of the elections, Joseph Bamina (Hutu) was elected President, with three Vice-Presidents, Mirerenko, Muhirwa, and Thaddée Siryuyumunsi (Tutsi-Hima). Ethnic tensions spread to the parliamentary and administrative organs of state. For example, the National Assembly was now divided in the middle between the Monrovia (Hutu) and Casablanca (Tutsi) groups. 'Casablanca' and 'Monrovia' did not have reference to the African alignments of the 1960s, but merely served as handy descriptions for Hutu and Tutsi (Lemarchand, 1970:343, 1996:64-65).

The fourth crisis was unleashed by the Rwandan Revolution (1959-1962) and the contagion effects thereof (i.e. the upsurge of ethnic solidarity and the contagion effect of republican ideas). The contagion effect of republican ideas was especially forceful with Hutu elites educated in Catholic missions who saw the benefits of democracy as illustrated by the case of Rwanda. In turn, certain Tutsi personalities invited Tutsi refugees from Rwanda to Burundi to act as 'a guarantee against a possible Hutu uprising'. Amongst these refugees, was the militia, *Inyenzi* (also known as the Red Battalion), which were 500 strong under the leadership of a China-trained Joseph Mudandi (Tutsi). This militia arrived in Burundi from the DRC (then Congo) in December of 1965, accompanied by 30 Cuban 'technical advisors'. This group, violently uprooted from Rwanda during the revolution, having strong anti-Hutu sentiments and planning for a triumphant return to Rwanda, was to be a major vector of conflict in Burundi in the period following independence (Lemarchand, 1970:344-345, 388, 435).

Because of these four crises, a polarisation of ethnic sentiments occurred, what Lemarchand (1970:343) calls a 'Hutu awakening', "...a sudden manifestation of ethnic enmity where none had seemed to exist previously...". Concomitant to these crises, several related factors can be highlighted in accounting for this polarisation of ethnicity. At the general level, this polarisation of ethnicity can be explained by the characteristic of multiethnic societies that tend to experience a rapid politicisation of residual ethnic ties at the approach of independence. This is what occurred in Burundi. At a specific level, two main elements can be highlighted. The first element can be explained by the concept of 'anticipated reactions'. With anticipated reactions, the experiences and

estimates of the Rwandese situation (the coming to power of the Hutu majority) were projected into the context of Burundi politics. Some Belgian functionaries now became actively involved in the promotion of Hutu interests. For example, the Belgian Resident, De Fays, actively supported the PP. The PP, founded in December of 1959, by 1961, was the most outspoken of the pro-Hutu parties (Lemarchand, 1970:344-345, 1996:61). Nzongola-Ntalaja (2001:65) holds that the Belgian ideologues that had created the myth of Tutsi superiority, now suddenly found it expedient to portray the Tutsi as an aristocracy of alien origins that should relinquish power to the oppressed Hutu indigenous majority.

The second element can be explained by the concept of 'a self-fulfilling prophesy'. Hutu politicians ascribed intentions that Burundi Tutsi, at first did not possess, but to which they eventually gave credence, fulfilling malevolent Hutu expectations of Tutsi. These motives included the close association of Burundi Tutsi with Rwandan Tutsi refugees. According to official statistics, by early 1965, there were 72 977 refugees in Burundi (many from the then Congo, now DRC), about 52 000 of them from Rwanda, the majority being Tutsi. These Tutsi expatriates had strong ethnic affinity with Burundian Tutsi. The Tutsi refugees had concluded that it was only through a Tutsi-government in Burundi that Tutsi rule could be restored in Rwanda. There was also a deterioration of diplomatic relations between Rwanda and Burundi in this period. For example, there were 'border incidents' in 1963-1964 involving the armed forces of both countries. This deterioration of diplomatic relations was as much a symptom as a cause of worsening Hutu-Tutsi relations in Burundi (Lemarchand, 1970:344, 384, 1996:61, 66).

The self-fulfilling prophesy was also given credence through the actions of the *Jeunesse Nationaliste Rwagasore* (JNR), later renamed the *Jeunesse Révolutionnaire Rwagasore* (JRR). The JRR was UPRONA's youth movement. This movement, made up of secondary and university students, school dropouts and unemployed youth, had an 'anti-Hutu orientation' and was a 'violence prone organisation'. The JRR is purported to be responsible for many of the Hutu killings in the Kamenge riots of January 1962 and the Hutu genocide of 1972. In January 1962, in Kamenge, this group carried out armed raids against local Hutu trade unionists and members of the PP. In one of these incidents, Jean Nduwabike, the National Secretary of PP, was stoned to death. This surge of ethnic violence had grave reverberations between Hutu and Tutsi leaders of UPRONA (Lemarchand, 1996:62-63). These aforementioned issues and events were to have immense reverberations in conflict formation and identity group relations in post independence Burundi. A synopsis of the life cycle of the conflict in Burundi is provided below.


3.3 THE PHASES OF THE CONFLICT

The conflict in Burundi can be conceptualised and depicted in terms of phases, with each phase indicating a particular point in the life cycle of the conflict. From independence in 1962, one can see a transformation from latent and incipient conflict to the emergence of violent conflict, with the first large-scale violence in 1965. The four major clashes in 1965, 1972, 1988, and 1993 to date (including other incidences of violence), would reflect both the phases of escalation and de-escalation, with official and formal negotiations only occurring in the current bout of conflict (1993 to date). It can also be deduced that the phase of hurting stalemate was only reached with the current bout of conflict, as the Burundi army was able to suppress previous insurrections. The current peace process can be seen to reflect a point at the beginning of a fragile dispute settlement, which can

degenerate to maintaining the stalemate, or further, to renewed escalation of violence. Alternatively, the peace process can move towards the adequate resolution of the conflict and the phase of post-conflict peace building.

It should thus be stated that despite the signing of the Arusha Agreement and ceasefire agreements, and the institution of an agreed-upon electoral calendar, the phases of *satisfactory* dispute settlement (or resolution) and post-conflict peace building have arguably not yet been reached in Burundi. Some key issues, including the complete demobilisation and reintegration of the armed groups, and the reform of the armed forces, remain outstanding. Acts of violence have also not ceased, and Agathon Rwasa's FNL, now considered a terrorist organisation, remain active in Burundi. Most importantly, the conflict generating conditions emanating from the structure of the political economy and social organisation have yet to be addressed (see chapter 4). The following can be used as a graphical representation of the preceding:

Graph 2: Phases of Conflict



Source: Beyond Intractability, www.beyondintractability.org/m/conflict_stages.jsp.

As alluded to in the foregoing, it should be noted that many conflicts, including the conflict in Burundi, do not follow the linear progression as depicted above. In addition, it must be noted that identifying a particular phase of a conflict is in many cases a subjective inference and not an objective fact, not the least, because of differences in the collation and interpretation of facts, be it from actors in, or analysts of, the conflict. At this stage it can be stated that the conflict is intermittent (largely flaring up at points of political transition), intra-state, includes a whole range of activities (structural and direct violence, political and pseudo-legal persecution, mass arrests, strikes, riots, communal violence, assassinations, massacres, coups d'état and attempted coups, and insurgency), and of low intensity. The conflict is most saliently but not exclusively articulated in ethnic terms; the conflict has also pitted (historically) dynastic, intra-ethnic, clanic, and regional identity groups. The conflict is also pernicious and genocidal, protracted and intractable, and has most profoundly affected the civilian population. The four major clashes and other incidences of conflict, indicating the different phases of the conflict, and the actors and issues involved in each phase, are dealt with in more detail below.

3.3.1 The 1965 Conflict

As Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:7) hold, the year 1965 marked the first large-scale political violence in Burundi. This violence, articulated in ethnic terms, *inter alia* reflected the influence of Tutsi refugees and their Chinese sponsors following the Rwandan Revolution (1959-1962). The Chinese received diplomatic recognition in Burundi in December 1963 and used the embassy as a channel for the transfer of arms to *Armée de*

Libération Nationale (ANL) fighting the then government of Zaire (now DRC). Within the ANL were Tutsi refugees from Rwanda (the *inyenzi* militia) whose strategic objective was to use Burundi as a safe haven to launch attacks against Rwanda. To do this, they cooperated with the Casablanca faction (Tutsi) in their struggle against the Hutu and the monarchy. It was within this context of the cooperation with the Casablanca group that a Tutsi refugee from Rwanda, who was employed by the US Embassy, assassinated Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe (Hutu) on January 18, 1965. The appointment and subsequent assassination of Ngendandumwe came a few days after Mwami Mwambutsa forced the resignation of Prime Minister Albin Nyamoya (Tutsi) because of his government's 'tilt' toward the Chinese and the ANL. In January 1965, Mwambutsa severed diplomatic ties with China for their alleged involvement in Ngendandumwe's death. The Chinese ambassador and his staff were given 24 hours to leave Burundi.⁴⁴

With the Legislative election of May 1965, Hutu candidates received 23 seats (out of 33) in the National Assembly. Given this result, Hutu deputies expected the appointment of a Hutu prime minister. This was not to be. Mwami Mwambutsa appointed Léopold Bihumugani (Biha), a Ganwa from the Bezi lineage, instead of the Hutu candidate, Gervais Nyangoma, as Prime Minister. This and various decisions of the monarchy were seen as undermining the constitution and aimed at concentrating power at the Royal Court. In addition to continuing ethnic tensions and the assassination of Hutu leaders, including Ngendandumwe, by late 1965, Hutu elites had concluded that the monarchy's policies were not only despotic but also influenced by ethnic favouritism (Lemarchand, 1970:296-297, 412, 414-415, 1996:68-70, 136; International Crisis Group, 2002:5-6).

On October 18, 1965, Hutu army and gendarmerie officers launched an attempted coup against the king and monarchy. That night, there was also an attempted assassination of Prime Minister Bihumugani outside his residence by the gendarmerie. Mwami fled to Uvira (in then Congo, now DRC), bringing the process of government to a standstill. On November 2, 1965, Mwambutsa left for Europe never to return to Burundi. Mwambutsa died in Switzerland in 1977. Concomitant to the coup attempt, 'roving bands of Hutu terrorists' began to attack Tutsi families in the countryside, mostly in Muramvya province (Lemarchand, 1970:297, 416-417, 1996:70-72; Chrétien, 1996:206, 2003:314). An estimated 500 Tutsi were killed in Muramvya alone. A brutal army repression by loyal troops under Captain Michel Micombero followed. Many Hutu officers were purged from the army. Estimates range between 2500 and 5000 Hutu killed, accompanied by mass arrests. Many Hutu leaders were also summarily executed, including Paul Mirerenko and Gervais Nyangoma. Because of this purge, the main power structures, including the army, and what was at this stage the *de facto* single party UPRONA, became the exclusive domain of Tutsi (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:95-96; Lemarchand, 1970:418-419).

On March 24, 1966, Mwami Mwambutsa issued a royal decree from Geneva (Switzerland) entrusting Prince Charles Ndizeye with special powers to coordinate and lead the activities of government. This was not an abdication. However, when Charles Ndizeye acceded to the throne on July 8, 1966, under the dynastic name Ntare III, he came to power under the protection of the army. Essentially, Ntare effected a dynastic coup against his father. Ntare dismissed Léopold Bihumugani's government and on July 12, 1966, appointed Michel

⁴⁴ Michel Micombero's government (1966-1976) also faced opposition from the Tutsi left, who had hoped for a socialist state after the demise of the monarchy. Through a series of events, including: purges, arrests, government dismissals, and formation of new cabinets, Micombero finally clamped down on this opposition. These factors fall within the ambit of Cold War politics and proxy wars, and therefore fall outside of the scope of this study. See Lemarchand (1970:383-401, 450-455), for a discussion of the role of Communist China, North Korea, and general Cold War politics, as they relate to Burundi and the Great Lakes region in this period.

Micombero as the new Prime Minister. However, like his father, Ntare wanted to reign *and rule*. The kingmakers, including Tutsi army officers and politicians, decided to remove him from power. On November 28, 1966, whilst Ntare was in the DRC (then Zaire), attending Mobutu Sese Seko's first anniversary of his military takeover, a similar military takeover was underway in Burundi. The First Republic and a predominantly Tutsi government under Michel Micombero was proclaimed. Following this coup, what emerged was not a 'legal-rational polity', but a 'republican-kinship', a 'neo-patrimonial polity' built around a loosely knit group of personal, kinship, and ethno-regional ties. Just like the constitutional monarchy, the First Republic was characterised by the weakness of the state institutions, and in addition, a new dimension of illegitimacy. Parliament was abolished and new institutions of government instituted, the foremost being the 17 member (army officers) National Revolutionary Council headed by Micombero. Micombero became President and Prime Minister of Burundi, Minister of Defence, and President of the now *de jure* single-party, UPRONA (Lemarchand, 1970:421, 428, 1996:60, 72, 74-75, 77-79).

Thus, the events in 1965 and 1966 broadly reflected the conflict between monarchists and republicans. These events also reflected the conflict between Hutu and Tutsi. In addition, these events reflected the first incidence of the intervention of the military in Burundi's politics. The possibility of such intervention was to be a constant threat lasting the whole period of post-independence Burundi. The following table provides a synopsis of the events in 1965 and 1966:

Table 7: Typology of Military Interventions in Burundi, 1965-66

Date	Origins	Target	Character	Outcome
Oct. 18, 1965	Hutu army and gendarmerie officers	King and monarchy	Abortive coup	Limited, indirect military rule
July 8, 1966	Predominantly Tutsi army officers and politicians	King and government	Dynastic-governmental coup	Dual civilian-military rule
Nov. 28, 1966	Predominantly Tutsi army officers	King and monarchy	Revolutionary coup	Direct military rule, quasi-civilianised

Source: Lemarchand (1970:438).

In the October 1965 coup, a primarily Tutsi loyalist army faction intervened to protect the monarchy under Mwambutsa II. This coup signalled the defeat of the Hutu as a political force, and the triumph of the Tutsi faction. In the July 1966 coup, the army intervened to install a new king. Ntare III acceded to the throne under the protection of the army and government who were opposed to the Bezi ruling group at the Royal Court. The decline of the Bezi lineage, and the rise of a new Tutsi elite, was thus confirmed. The November 1966 coup was aimed at protecting a predominantly Tutsi government against what was perceived as a monarchical conspiracy to undermine government institutions. This coup eliminated the aristocracy from all dynastic lineages, signalled the triumph of republicanism vis-à-vis the monarchy, and consolidated the position of a predominantly Tutsi army as a dominant partner and civilians as subservient partners in government (Lemarchand, 1970:435, 437, 444-445). Hereafter, Burundi was to be ruled by military governments until 1993.

The 1966 coup also led to the 'Tutsification' of the army and the 'Bururification' of the officer corps. However, like Mwami Mwambutsa, Micombero sought ethnic balance in the executive of government. The cabinet appointed on November 14, 1967, had five Hutus, five Tutsis and two members of Ganwa origins. However, with the new elite in power the fundamental societal changes associated with revolutions from below did not

materialise. Power continued to gravitate to Tutsi. It is in these conditions that the 1969 Hutu abortive coup occurred. A public disclosure alleged that the coup was planned for the night of September 16-17, 1969. About 30 Hutu elites, in the army and government, including government ministers, were arrested. Twenty of those arrested were sentenced to death on December 18, 1969, and executed by firing squad two days later. This was followed by the imprisonment and execution of a number of Hutu soldiers. An estimated 100 executions took place in December alone. Although there were still a number of Hutu in positions of authority, the trend pointed towards Tutsi supremacy (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:96; Lemarchand, 1970:459-460, 463, 1996:86-87).

Following the Hutu purge, on July 1971, charges of conspiracy were laid against Muramvya personalities, including Tutsi-Banyaruguru and Ganwa. On January 14, 1972, a military tribunal issued nine death sentences (four officers and five civilians) and seven life sentences. On February 4, 1972, baulking under international and national pressure, the government commuted the death sentences to life sentences, and released five of the seven defendants. Because of these two purges, seven out of 12 ministries were now in Tutsi hands, including the key ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, and Interior. Six out of eight provincial governors were Tutsi. At the University of Bujumbura, enrolment figures indicated that the majority of students were of Tutsi origin. The officers and enlisted men were now largely of Tutsi origin and army recruits were almost exclusively Tutsi. These two purges not only signalled the triumph of Tutsi over Hutu, but also Tutsi-Hima over Tutsi-Banyaruguru, and Bururi province over Muramvya province. It is around this time that Hutu elites concluded that the only meaningful alternative to Tutsi hegemony was armed rebellion (Lemarchand, 1970:463, 1996:87-88). Burundi was bracing up for the second large-scale violence, beginning in April 1972, whose proportions and viciousness gave new meaning to bloodletting.

3.3.2 The 1972 Insurgency

On April 29, 1972, a Hutu-led insurgency began in the lakeside (Tanganyika) towns of Nyanza-Lac and Rumonge in Makamba province (bordering Tanzania and Bururi province). This insurgency was also accompanied by an attempted coup by Hutu politicians and army officers. The choice of a springboard for the insurgency was calculated. Hutu and a mixture of 'Wabwari', native Congolese from the Kabwari peninsula, dominated the area. On this day, what became known as 'Mulelist Hutus', entering Burundi from Tanzania, supported by some Hutus in the army, started attacks on Tutsi communities (and a number of Hutu who refused to join the rebellion) in the towns of Nyanza-Lac and Rumonge.⁴⁵ This was followed by attacks on government installations in Nyanza-Lac and Rumonge, including the seizure of armouries and military bases in Bururi. Simultaneous attacks were also launched in the provinces of Cankuzo and Bujumbura, including an unsuccessful attack on a radio station in Bujumbura (capital city). On the day of April 29, there was a meeting of provincial administrators in Rumonge. This meeting was attacked and many administrators were killed. Among those who survived the attack was Albert Shibura, the Minister of Justice and Interior (Lemarchand, 1996:29, 89-91; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:97).

According to Weinstein and Schrire (cited in Lemarchand, 1996:91-92), after this attack Shibura drove to Bujumbura, then to Gitega, where he personally shot the ex-king, Ntare III, fearing that he would rally the

⁴⁵ As Lemarchand (1996:90) holds, the term 'Mulelist' was actually a misnomer. The so-called 'Mulelists' were named after Pierre Mulele, a leading figure in the 1964-5 Kwilu rebellion in (then) Zaire. Hutu were never actively involved in this rebellion (perhaps it was in reference to the Congolese elements in this group).

insurgents to his cause. Ntare had returned to Burundi on March 30, 1972. The details of Ntare's return to Burundi remain sketchy. However, according to Manirakiza (cited in Lemarchand, 1996:92), Ntare's plane, which was headed for Kabare, Uganda, was hijacked by Burundian and Ugandan soldiers, with Idi Amin's complicity, and flown to Bujumbura, where a helicopter flew him to Gitega, where he was placed under house arrest. It would appear that this abduction was motivated by Micombero's fears that Ntare was planning to overthrow his government. According to Oketch and Polzer (2002:97), between 2000 and 3000 Tutsis were killed during the insurgency.

The response by the government and the army was almost predictable. However, the viciousness of the repression gained genocidal proportions previously unknown in Burundi. As Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:7) holds, "(m)ost Hutus able to exercise any political, administrative, or economic power were physically eliminated". Highlighting this point, Survivors Rights International (2003:4-5) contends that the actions of the Tutsi dominated government and its security agencies against the Hutu, constitute genocide as defined in the UN *Genocide Convention*. According to Chalk and Jonassohn (cited in Lemarchand, 1996:100), states and empires have historically performed genocide for the following purposes:

- To eliminate a real or perceived threat;
- To terrorise a real or imagined enemy; and
- To acquire economic resources owned by others that could not be looted.

Lemarchand (1996:100) contends that all three of these reasons were present in Burundi in 1972, with the first two carrying a determining weight. A glimpse of the 1972 carnage will suffice (for the purpose of this study). On May 30, while counterattacks were launched against the insurgents, elements of the armed forces and JRR began attacks on all Hutu suspected of having taken part in the uprising. Martial law was proclaimed and a dawn-to-dusk curfew enforced. Government radio broadcasts urged Tutsis to 'hunt down the python in the grass'. Army units rounded-up educated Hutus down to secondary and in some cases even primary school children. Tutsi children prepared lists of their Hutu classmates to make identification easier. In the provinces of Bujumbura, Gitega, and Ngozi, Hutu local administrators, chauffeurs, clerks and skilled workers were rounded-up, jailed, shot, or beaten to death. In Bujumbura alone, an estimated 4000 Hutu were loaded in trucks and killed. These scenes were repeated at the University of Bujumbura, secondary and technical schools, and Catholic and Protestant confessional schools. By early June, 12 Hutu priests had been killed, and thousands of Protestant pastors, school directors and teachers, met a similar fate. This was accompanied by a purge of the army. On May 22, 150 Hutu soldiers were executed. On May 27, 41 more were also executed. Now, only one Hutu grandparent was enough to classify soldiers as Hutu. Using this classification, on May 23, there were only 100 Hutus in the army. On June 5, three trucks were discovered with 100 bodies each, destined for mass graves near Bujumbura airport. This 'repression' continued until August 1972 (Lemarchand, 1996:96-99).

As Oketch and Polzer (2002:97) point out, the government's response was not only directed against the south where the insurgency originated, but against Hutu all over the country. Estimates of Hutu killed range from the conservative 80 000 to 100 000, to estimates ranging between 150 000 to 200 000. About 300 000 Burundians, mostly Hutu, were forced to flee to neighbouring countries. These refugees mostly found refuge in Tanzania, Rwanda and the DRC. Violently uprooted from their homes, the Hutu refugees were to play a central role in future conflicts in Burundi and in their host countries. Lemarchand (1996:104-105, 144) holds that this refugee

community remained active, on occasion launching raids across the border from Tanzania. In 1973, the Burundi army bombarded some of the refugee camps in retaliatory attacks. It was in one of these camps in Mishamo (Tanzania) in April 1980, that Rémi Gahutu established Burundi's oldest surviving armed movement, PALIPEHUTU. Oketch and Polzer (2002:98) and the International Crisis Group (2002:5-6, 16) relate that FROLINA was also established in one of these refugee camps in 1989. During 1972, the perceived existence of a government plan for 'a final solution to the Hutu problem', in the form of the *Simbananiye Plan*, surfaced.⁴⁶ As Lemarchand (1996:26) states, the overriding objective of the Simbananiye Plan was said to be to kill enough Hutu so as to achieve ethnic parity in Burundi. It remains unclear whether such a plan in reality existed or not. However, as Lemarchand (1996:27-28) points out, "...the plan has become part of the mythico-history that to this day informs Hutu perceptions of Tutsi behaviour and mentality".

On November 1, 1976, Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza ousted Micombero's government in a coup, ushering the period of the Second Republic (1976-1987). The Second Republic was characterised by relative peace with institutional coherence and organisation of government. The period was also characterised by increased government control, however national integration did not take place. Tutsi hegemony was also solidified and rationalised. For example, the Supreme Military Council (the foremost institution of governance), constituted by 30 military officers, was made up entirely of Tutsi. Between 1976 and 1979, there were only three Hutu cabinet ministers. In 1982, all the eight provincial governors were Tutsi. In the same year, there were 15 Hutus in the Legislative Assembly (out of 65). By 1978, this number was reduced to only seven (Lemarchand, 1996:107-108). In addition, Lemarchand (1996:108) and Uvin (1999:259) point out, like the First Republic, the Second Republic denied the role of ethnicity in Burundi. The official position claimed that there were no ethnic groups in Burundi, but Burundians. References to 'Hutu' or 'Tutsi' were outlawed in both public and private life. Such references could be grounds for charges of incitement to 'racial hatred'. The slaughter of 1972 was reduced to 'events' attributed to 'unspecified extremists'. The denial of ethnic differences was made with the specific intention to mask Tutsi dominance. As Lemarchand (1996:164) points out, to speak of a Tutsi monopoly (or exclusion) makes no sense in a society where ethnic differences are not supposed to exist.

3.3.3 The 1988 Insurrection

On September 3, 1987, as Bagaza was attending a summit meeting of the Francophone countries in Quebec, Canada, a coup was underway in Burundi. Major Pierre Buyoya emerged as the leader of the coup. A ruling council, the Military Committee of National Salvation (CMSN), was established. This body was made up entirely of Tutsi, mostly from Bururi province. On September 9, 1987, Pierre Buyoya was formerly appointed President and the Third Republic was inaugurated. There was no major departure from the Second Republic. For example, only a few civil servants lost their jobs, and the communal and provincial exercise of government power continued in the hands of the same administrators. However, with this continuity, there was some change (Lemarchand, 1996:116-117). For example, hundreds of Hutu political prisoners were released, and on

⁴⁶ The Simbananiye Plan was named after Artémon Simbananiye (Tutsi from Bururi). Simbananiye was the Minister of Justice in one of Micombero's cabinets, and as a result he was apportioned a large share of responsibility for the arrests and executions of Hutu leaders in 1965. Simbananiye's fortunes fluctuated. On November 4, 1967, he was dismissed as a minister and arrested for plotting a coup against the government. He was released from Ngozi prison in June 1968. From 1969 (and in 1972) Simbananiye was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Simbananiye is considered to have played a key role in the 1972 genocide, and he remains one of the most infamous of the Tutsi leaders. See Lemarchand (1970:453, 455, 1996:26, 82, 84, 88, 101-102).

December 5, 1987, the CMSN, in a radio broadcast, announced the government's commitment to "...bringing to an end the numerous forms of division that have undermined concord and harmony among all the ethnic, regional, and clan components of the Burundi nation" (cited in Lemarchand, 1996:119). However, the created sense of relative optimism was followed by the realisation that these hopes were about to be defeated as little was done to adjust policies to expectations (Lemarchand, 1996:117-118, 120). The lid on the bottled-up conflict during Bagaza's regime had been lifted!

Ethnic incidents occurred from early 1988. For example, there were a number of student strikes in various secondary schools and several students (mostly Hutu) were expelled. A number of 'subversive tracts' circulated in the provinces of Ngozi and Kirundo, followed by clandestine meetings, and a number of Hutu fleeing to Rwanda in anticipation of sanctions. It is at this time that Bernard Bududira (Tutsi), the Catholic Bishop of Bururi, issued a prophetic warning. In a letter made public on May 10, 1988, the Bishop pointed to the 'deliberate injustices in the distribution of positions of authority in favour of Tutsi elements', and warned of the 'extremely acute problem of national unity'. A few months after the Bishop's warning, in August 1988, violence erupted in the northern communes of Ntega (Kirundo province) and Marangara (Ngozi province) on the border with Rwanda (Lemarchand, 1996:119-121).

This border area was home to many Rwandan Tutsis since the Rwandan Hutu Revolution. This Tutsi refugee community had strong anti-Hutu sentiments. The area, as a confluence between Rwanda and Burundi, had many population movements that were accompanied by the smuggling of Burundi coffee into Rwanda and was open to propaganda from exiled Hutu politicians living in Rwanda. Although the area was relatively wealthy from the sale of coffee (the majority of farmers being Hutu), there was a general lack of social services. This lack of social services intensified ethnic competition. Under these conditions, in 1986, the Ministry of Education issued a directive requiring schools to provide reports of the ethnic breakdown of school enrolments. This directive was interpreted as an intention to use ethnic origins as criterion for admission to schools. In April of 1988, the elections of section committees of UPRONA were held in Ntega and Marangara communes. Hutu candidates won 84 percent of seats in Ntega, only to realise that the centrally appointed communal administrator had absolute control over decision-making. Electoral victory had no effect (Lemarchand, 1996:121-123; Chrétien, 1996:207; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:98).

It is in this aforementioned context and related events that ethnic tensions mounted on August 5, 1988. Units of the gendarmerie were dispatched from Ngozi to patrol the area. In turn, Hutus organised in self-defence. On the nights of August 5-6 and 6-7, several bridges were destroyed. Units of the 4th Infantry Battalion were dispatched to Maranga, presumably to repair bridges. To the 'Hutu mind', it was 1972 all over again. Fear and mistrust permeated ethnic relations and Hutu quickly interpreted any government actions as the beginning of ethnic attacks. On the night of August 14-15, a local Tutsi official (known to have been involved in the 1972 carnage), Réverien Harushingoro, was confronted after being seen showing the way around the communes to army and UPRONA officials. He was killed together with his family. In anticipation of reprisals, Hutus began killing and burning the homes of Tutsis in Ntega and Marangara, in pre-emptive attacks. For example, over 300 Tutsis who had found refuge in a Catholic mission were killed on the night of August 14-15. As in 1972, the army's response to what was essentially communal violence, in armoured vehicles and helicopters, was swift and devastating (Lemarchand, 1996:124-126; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:98).

In August and September 1988, 48 Hutus who were suspected of having participated in the events in Ntega and Marangara, were arrested. They were never brought to trial. Many of them were tortured and two died in detention. Only on August 29, 1990, were they released. Nothing was done to prosecute Tutsis for the Ntega and Marangara repression. In the aftermath of this violence, an estimated 500 to 3000 Tutsis were reportedly killed. Some 20 000 Hutus were also reportedly killed, a further 60 000 fled to Rwanda. Scores of Hutu houses were burnt and women and children were killed. Amnesty International concluded at the time that the army's actions were not aimed at restoring law and order, but were reprisals aimed at all Hutus in these communes, and carried out to 'punish and eliminate'. However, in 1988, for the first time, there was an international outcry and pressure to institute reforms brought to bear upon the government (Reyntjens, 1993:563, 2000:8; Lemarchand, 1996:126, 133; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:99; Uvin, 1999:259).

Before discussing these reforms, the narration will briefly outline the two incidences of conflict in 1989 and 1991. The 1989 incidence of conflict was unleashed by an attempted coup in March 1989 by Tutsi army officers, pitting the two Tutsi-Hima clans, Bayanzi and Bashingo. This attempted coup was seen as an attempt to restore Bayanzi hegemony initiated under Bagaza. In the Second Republic under Bagaza, Bayanzi became the privileged recipients of wealth and power, in and outside of government. On March 10 and 15, 1989, 19 conspirators of the attempted coup were arrested. All 19 (five civilians and 14 army officers) were from the Bayanzi clan, including Isidore Nyaboya, Minister of Public Works under Bagaza. Nyaboya was considered the key conspirator. However, they were never brought to trial and were released in August 1990, together with the Hutus who were suspected of having participated in the events in Ntega and Marangara in 1988. Thus, the presumed involvement of Libya, where Bagaza was in exile at the time, was never proven. However, the Libyan Embassy staff was given 48 hours to leave Burundi, followed by a purge of all Bayanzi in positions of authority, inside and outside of government (Lemarchand, 1996:134, 139-140).

The 1991 Hutu abortive uprising and attempted coup took place against the backdrop of the Rwanda Patriotic Front's (RPF) invasion of Rwanda from bases in Uganda. The RPF's invasion, launched on October 1, 1990, unleashed massacres of hundreds of Tutsi civilians in Rwanda. In turn, the Burundi government was seen to encourage Tutsi refugees from Rwanda to join the RPF. Rwanda, in turn, actively supported PALIPEHUTU members in Rwanda. Tensions in Hutu-Tutsi relations in Burundi were intensified. These tensions led to numerous acts of violence, including the June 27, 1991 strike in Bujumbura by taxi drivers and transport workers. This strike resulted in scores of arrests. This period also saw the return of thousands of Hutu refugees from Tanzania. In August 1991, some of these Hutu refugees attacked a military camp in Mabanda, Makamba province. From November 1991, Cibitoke and Bubanza provinces became 'a political space of dissidence', infiltrated by Hutu armed groups, especially PALIPEHUTU, which staged hit-and-run attacks. On November 23 and 24, 1991, there were coordinated attacks by small groups of Hutu activists against military and police installations, including attacks on Tutsi civilians, in Bubanza, Cibitoke and Bujumbura provinces. In November 1991, scores of PALIPEHUTU leaders were arrested for an attempted coup. In the aftermath of this abortive uprising and attempted coup, Hutu killed were estimated at such disparate figures as 551, 1000 and 3000 (Lemarchand, 1996:141-142, 153-155).

In response to the international and national pressure exerted from the 1988 conflict, Buyoya's government introduced reforms towards democratisation and power sharing. These reforms included the formation of the

*National Commission to Study the Question of National Unity*⁴⁷, the reshuffling of cabinet, and the reform of the central committee of UPRONA. An equal number of Hutu and Tutsi now constituted all these institutions. Adrien Sibomana (Hutu) was appointed as the Prime Minister. A significant number of Hutus were also given administrative positions in government institutions, including the posts of governors and mayors. The factors contributing to differential access to education were reduced, leading to an increase of Hutu enrolment in schools. However, the army, mainly Tutsi in constitution since 1965, resisted change leading to coup attempts in February 1989 and March 1992 (Reyntjens, 1993:564-565, 2000:8; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:99; Uvin, 1999:261; Chrétien, 1996:207). The report of the Commission on National Unity, published in May 1989, resulted in the *Charter of National Unity*, approved by referendum in February 1991. This report also resulted in the establishment of the *Constitutional Commission*, which was set up to draft a new constitution. The political reforms initiated in 1988 culminated in the adoption of the 1992 constitution and the multi-party elections of 1993. The constitution was approved by referendum in March 1992. The new constitution made provision for free elections and a multi-party political system (Reyntjens, 1993:564, 2000:8; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:97).

These reforms represented a window of opportunity to finally deal with issues of political, economic, and social exclusion. This window of opportunity was however missed. Lemarchand (1996:135) concludes that the report of the Commission on National Unity is "...an extraordinary mélange of truths and half-truths, of exhortations and warnings, of historical facts and glaring omissions". Thus, although for the first time in the history of post independence an official statement recognised the Hutu-Tutsi problem, the report was not a dispassionate or scientific enquiry. For example, the report concludes that the roots of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict lie exclusively in the legacy of the colonial state. In the post independence period, it is said that 'selfish and self-serving politicians' who took advantage of colonial stereotypes to undermine the age-old unity of the Burundian people undermined national unity. The report concludes that the view of the Hutu as a group with interests was to be discouraged to avoid the confusion between 'political majority' with 'ethnic majority'. This 'confusion', it is concluded, is tantamount to 'a denial of the Burundian nation and a misconception of democracy'.

In addition, no mention is made that Pierre Ngendandumwe was assassinated (in 1965) by a Tutsi from Rwanda, only that 'the circumstances of his disappearance remain obscure'. It is not said that in the legislative elections of 1965 Hutu candidates won 23 seats (out of 33), only that 'the elections were won by UPRONA party' while the pro-Hutu PP 'engaged in propaganda'. It is not said that the abortive Hutu coup of 1965 was in response to Mwami Mwambutsa's denial of the Hutu fruits of electoral victory when he appointed Léopold Bihumugani instead of the Hutu candidate, Gervais Nyangoma, as Prime Minister. It is only said that 'the climax of these divisions was the attempted coup of October 1965, which had a catastrophic effect on national unity'. The 1972 carnage is recounted, but nowhere acknowledged that it had its origins in the inability of Hutu to gain meaningful political participation. The 1988 killings are ascribed to 'outside agitators'. No mention is made of the arrests of scores of Hutus prior to the uprising, or the differential access to schools in Kirundo. It is then concluded that 'the truth is that there is no discrimination within the army' (Lemarchand, 1989:685-690, 1996:136-139). Clearly, national reconciliation requires a certain measure of the 'truth'!

Despite the setback provided by the Commission on National Unity, presidential elections took place on June 1, 1993. Melchior Ndadaye (Hutu, from FRODEBU) won 65 percent of the votes, Pierre Buyoya (of UPRONA) 32

⁴⁷ Henceforth referred to as the Commission on National Unity.

percent, and Pierre-Claver Sendegeya (representing the PRP) 1.44 percent (the remaining ballot papers were either unmarked or void). Melchior Ndadaye's FRODEBU won 71.4 percent of votes in the subsequent legislative elections. Although the voting patterns did not indicate strict ethnic lines, the outcomes of both elections were tagged 'a Hutu victory' by the foreign press, a dangerous assertion in such a deeply divided society. Hence, following the elections there were protests by Tutsi students and civil servants to what was termed 'an ethnic inventory of Burundi'. However, a more serious threat came from the military in the form of two coup attempts on the nights of June 16-17 and July 2-3, 1993. Despite these threats, Melchior Ndadaye and the new government was inaugurated on July 10, 1993. In this period of political reforms, Hutu participation was increased. However, there was no retribution for past killings, and the Tutsi domination of the army was not changed (Reyntjens, 1993:564, 569, 1995:10-12, 2000:12; Oketch and Polzer, 2002:97, 99). That is, until Melchior Ndadaye's government began with sweeping reforms.

3.3.4 The 1993 Insurgency

Melchior Ndadaye's government continued the power sharing approach and he appointed Sylvie Kinigi (Tutsi) as the Prime Minister. Nine other Tutsi ministers were also appointed in a 23-member cabinet of a government of national unity. FRODEBU, despite a landslide electoral victory, only held 13 portfolios in cabinet (Bentley and Southall, 2005:46; Chrétien, 1996:208; Reyntjens, 1995:12, 2000:12). These attempts at peace were however short-lived. As the International Crisis Group (2002:5-6) holds, the assassination of the country's first democratically elected President on October 21, 1993, provided the trigger factor for the current bout of conflict since 1993.⁴⁸ Reyntjens (1995:13, 2000:13) proposes four factors that brought about the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye by the army. These factors are:

- The government's plan to reduce bid bonds by 80 percent to allow small business (including many Hutu businesses) to benefit from the privatisation of state corporations;
- The attempt to reconsider the contract of Affimet (Belgian firm) to refine and export gold;
- The attempt to resettle Hutu returnees (some of whose lands were now in 'powerful hands'); and,
- The government's intention to reform the army.

Reyntjens (2000:14) concludes that in view of the benefits they stood to lose, the Burundi civilian and military oligarchy felt most threatened by these measures. As Oketch and Polzer (2002:100) holds, Ndadaye's assassination, together with the speaker and deputy speaker of the National Assembly, triggered the longest war in Burundian history. Hutus killed thousands of Tutsis in reprisals, including Hutu members of UPRONA. In *quid pro quo*, the army and individual Tutsis retaliated against Hutus and FRODEBU. Uvin (1999:262) estimates that in the three months following the assassination of Ndadaye, 50 000 to 100 000 people were killed, one million fled the country, and hundreds of thousands were internally displaced. As Bentley and Southall (2005:50) hold, government authority became restricted to the remnants of government ministers under Prime Minister Kinigi, who could only exercise power behind the protection of French soldiers.

⁴⁸ See Reyntjens (1995:14-15) for an hourly recreation of the day leading to, and immediately after, the assassination of Melchoir Ndadaye.

From October 1993 to July 1996, followed what Reyntjens (2000:14) calls a 'creeping coup'. Following the death of Melchior Ndadaye, the National Assembly was reconstituted with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sylvestre Ntibantungana (Hutu), as its head. In January 1994, the National Assembly elected Cyprian Ntaryamira (Hutu) as the new President. A new coalition government was formed between UPRONA and FRODEBU in February. However, following the death of Cyprian Ntaryamira in April 1994 with the Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana in a plane crash, a new power vacuum was created. Sylvestre Ntibantungana, as the speaker of the National Assembly, constitutionally became the new President. As the genocide in Rwanda unfolded from April, Hutu influence in Burundi weakened, leading to FRODEBU surrendering more power to UPRONA. What followed was persistent political infighting and communal violence. This communal violence was characterised by what was called *dead city days*, organised by opposition parties and Tutsi youth, for the purposes of 'ethnic purification'. In the meantime, Sylvestre Ntibantungana had sought international assistance to intervene in Burundi. The army responded by threatening to 'confront any expeditionary corps, regardless of its humanitarian or military label' (Oketch and Polzer, 2002:101; Chrétien 1996:209; Mthembu-Salter, 2002:2; Bentley and Southall, 2005:56).

It is under the foregoing conditions that the January 19, 1994 *Kigobe Accord*, the February 4, 1994 *Kajaga Agreement*, and the September 10, 1994 *Convention of Government*, were negotiated. For example, the *Kigobe Accord* led to the appointment of a new Prime Minister, Anatole Kanyenkiko (Tutsi from UPRONA), and Tutsi ministers who now made up 40 percent of the new cabinet. Major posts in national intelligence, police and information, were also apportioned to UPRONA. Similarly, with the other two agreements Tutsi power was reinstated. Thus, these agreements undid the 1992 constitution, the 1993 elections, and all the reforms undertaken since 1988. The President and the National Assembly were put under the auspices of the 'National Security Council', an extra-constitutional body that was under the control of Tutsi parties and had *de facto* control over government decisions. As Sylvestre Ntibantungana was holed up at the US Embassy, unable to execute the function of government, a *coup de grâce* to the process started by the 1993 attempted coup came in the form of the July 1996 coup by Pierre Buyoya (Reyntjens, 1995:19, 2000:15-16; Ndikumana, 2000:457).

It is under the aforementioned conditions of appeasing Tutsi that the CNDD was created. Leoncé Ndarubagiye, a spokesperson for the CNDD, holds that the CNDD was formed with the specific aim of restoring democracy and the outcome of the 1993 elections, through an armed struggle of resistance (Ndarubagiye, 2001:2). The CNDD, led by Léonard Nyangoma, split from FRODEBU, and created the military wing, the FDD. Thus, the CNDD largely reflected those members of FRODEBU who concluded that a political solution to the Burundian standoff was unlikely (International Crisis Group, 2002:7; Uvin, 1999:262; Chrétien, 1996:210). In response to the 1996 coup by Pierre Buyoya, nine governments in the region imposed economic sanctions on Burundi, lasting from July 1996 to January 1999. These sanctions had the effect, *inter alia*, of suspending international cooperation and aid, thus compounding the humanitarian emergency in Burundi, and suspending the peace process, thus reigniting the conflict (International Crisis Group, 1998:3; Arusha Agreement, 2000:129).

From June 1998, there was an upsurge of violent incidents and confrontations involving the army and the armed groups, especially Jean-Basco Ndayikengurukiye's FDD, in the provinces of Makamba, Bubanza, Kayanza and Kirundo (International Crisis Group, 1998:7). Between 2000 and 2001, there was again renewed violence. The provinces that were most affected were those bordering Tanzania where the refugee camps served as springboards for attacks, and bases for retreat. Affected areas also included the provinces bordering the Kibira

forest. For example, in February 2001, the FNL succeeded in holding the Kinama area of Bujumbura for almost two weeks. In these two weeks, several hundreds civilians were killed and tens of thousands were displaced. April also saw violent fighting between the army and the FDD around Gitega (Reyntjens, 2001:16, 19).⁴⁹

The massacres committed by the army also continued. As Human Rights Watch (2002:1, 2003:1-2) holds, on September 9, 2002, the army massacred more than 174 civilians at Itaba commune in the province of Gitega. On January 19, 2003, the army killed between 32 and 80 civilians at Gisuru commune in the province of Ruyigi, and others in the communes of Kinyinya and Nyabitsinda. In addition, the army burnt some 420 houses and pillaged more than 1000 others in these communes. The army also continued to be a threat to the peace process. Reyntjens (2001:10) points towards the coup attempt on April 18, 2000, against Buyoya's government. On April 21, Lieutenant Ntakarutimana and forty enlisted men, including members of PARENA (led by former President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza), were arrested. This was followed by further arrests within the military and PARENA. As Reyntjens (2001:10) warns, "...the blackmail of coups d'état continues to loom over Burundi".

The conflict in Burundi has subsided, however acts of violence continue. Agathon Rwasa's FNL has notoriously maintained operations, especially around the capital Bujumbura. The group has also claimed responsibility for the recent, and infamous, August 13, 2004 massacre of 160 Banyamulenge (ethnic Tutsi from the DRC) at the UN Gatumba refugee camp in Burundi. There were also claims that two Rwandan groups, the Rwandan former army (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe militia, including the Mayi-Mayi (armed group from the DRC), were also involved in the attack. Immediately in the aftermath of the attack, Rwanda and Burundi threatened to invade the DRC to pursue these groups. In August 2004, the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi declared the FNL a terrorist organisation and requested the AU and the UN Security Council to support this view (Bentley and Southall, 2005:199; MONUC, ONUB and OHCHR, 2004:4, 13; Alusala, 2005:3).⁵⁰ Despite signing a ceasefire agreement, the FNL continues to wage war in Burundi (see chapter 4). As the International Crisis Group (2000) has succinctly pointed out, the conditions in Burundi remain 'neither war nor peace'. The current conflict has been the longest in Burundi, currently in its twelfth year. In terms of casualties, the current conflict has also been unprecedented. According to Oketch and Polzer (2002:100), by 2002 an estimated number of deaths was 200 000 to 250 000. Jooma (2005:2) estimates the current figure at over 300 000.

3.4 THE CURRENT ACTORS IN THE CONFLICT

The Twa, who form one percent of the population, although being the most excluded as illustrated in chapter 2, have not formed any armed opposition in the conflict in Burundi. With the current bout of conflict (1993 to date), the conflict has pitted the Tutsi-dominated government and army, against the seven Hutu-dominated Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs). The APPMs are the CNDD, which was created in 1994, and the two CNDD factions: the FDD (created in 1998) led by Jean-Basco Ndayikengurukiye and the FDD (created in 2001) led by Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza. In addition, there are the two PALIPEHUTU factions: the FNL (created in 1992) led by Alain Mugabarabona (previously led by Kossan Kabura) and the FNL (created in 2001) led by Agathon

⁴⁹ Both the FNL and the FDD fragmented in 2001 into two separate factions each. See under *The Current Actors in the Conflict*.

⁵⁰ See the joint report by MONUC, ONUB and OHCHR (2004) for a full account of the Gatumba massacre. The report includes the background, the massacre and its aftermath, and recommendations, as well as a graphical recreation of the Gatumba camp and the attack.

Rwasa. PALIPEHUTU, which was created in 1980, is the oldest of the APPMs. Lastly, there is FROLINA, which was created in 1989 (Alusala, 2005:4, 9; International Crisis Group, 2002:16).

The actors in the conflict also include child soldiers. This aspect of the conflict, evoking images of Sierra Leone and Liberia, has been endemic and characteristic of many of the conflicts in Africa. According to Bentley and Southall (2005:26, 160-161), although forced recruitment of child soldiers has not been as endemic in Burundi, as opposed to, for example, up to 50 percent of combatants being child soldiers in the Lords Resistance Army of Uganda, many hundreds have been abducted and recruited by the opposition groups. Notably, the Adventist churches in Burundi, in addition to providing funding, are alleged to have recruited child soldiers for Agathon Rwasa's FNL. The use of child soldiers is not only limited to the FNL. In December 2002, the UN Secretary General listed Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza's FDD as well as the army among the groups that recruit child soldiers. There is an estimated 6000 to 7000 child soldiers in Burundi (Human Rights Watch, 2002:11-12, 2003:7; USAID, 2004:2).

3.5 THE FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT

Several related issues have served as points of contention in Burundi. To provide a synopsis: the general issues involved in conflicts (resources, governance, ideology, identity, inequality, and greed and grievance) as outlined by International Alert (1996:6-10) and Tshitereke (2003:85-87), have all been present in Burundi.⁵¹ On the side of the Hutu, their grievances stem from an exclusive governance system and the greedy behaviour of those who hold sectorial state power, and resultantly, their denial of access to national resources on the basis of their identity. This exclusion has resulted in acute horizontal inequalities. As Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:2) accentuate, the ruling Tutsi's greed and poor governance have spawned conflict-generating grievances in Burundi. The same factors as the foregoing, would apply to the other groups that have been and/or felt excluded in Burundi. However, such application will be *mutatis mutandis*. For example, whilst Hutu response has included coup attempts and (because of their numbers?) a full-scale insurgency, Twa, despite being the most excluded, have not responded in any collective or overt violent action. On the other hand, the response of Banyaruguru and Bayanzi has included coup attempts, but not insurgency.

⁵¹ International Alert adds religion as an issue in conflicts. This however has not been the case in Burundi (in the sense of two or more opposed religious groups, or conflict with religious underpinnings). However, State-Church relations have been strained with the Catholic Church, in particular, being persecuted. Under Micombero's government, for example, a letter from the Catholic Church dated December 13, 1967, lays complaint to 'repeated attacks against the Church made in the course of political meetings', and 'the uncertainty and insecurity facing the Burundi clergy as a result of the regime's wilful defiance of the fundamental rights of men'. Under Bagaza, for example, in 1979 and 1987 respectively, about 80 and 550 foreign missionaries were expelled from Burundi. There were various reasons for these strained relations, mostly relating to the perception of the role played by the Church. For example, the Church was accused of what was called the 'emancipation' of Rwandan Hutu; in the latter part of colonialism, the clergy passively and actively supported the Hutu cause in Rwanda, at home and abroad. Under Bagaza's government, the Church had literacy classes which attracted the majority of Hutu children, and this was seen, according to Lemarchand, as "...raising the spectre of another generation of church-educated schoolchildren who might in time challenge Tutsi supremacy", with the resultant transfer of primary and secondary education from the Church to government schools. The Church also organised *inama sahwaniya* ('encounters') to encourage participation in the affairs of local communities and this was "...viewed as training grounds for aspiring Hutu leaders". These and other activities of the Church were viewed with great suspicion. It was not until the Third Republic, under Buyoya, that conciliatory overtures were made, for example, many of the missionaries that were expelled in 1979 and 1987 were allowed to return to Burundi. See Lemarchand (1970:106-108, 459, 1996:112-114, 117, 119). According to the UN Burundi Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2003:3), the religious groups in Burundi are: Catholic 62%, Indigenous Beliefs 32%, Protestant 5%, and Muslim 1%.

On the side of the Tutsi, it is the fear of what would happen, as Lemarchand (1996:xxvi) puts it, and as it is perceived, "...should the Hutu be allowed to exercise the tyranny of their majority". This would relate to the fear of exclusion as envisioned under majoritarian democracy (seen to equal Hutu power). Real, incorrectly imagined, or actively invented as pretext to justify and maintain privileges, Hutu actions in Burundi and Rwanda have given some credence to this fear.⁵² In addition, the fear of genocide is a constant on both sides. The Hutu grievances and Tutsi fears have manifested in the struggle for the control of the government as virtually the sole accumulator and distributor of resources. These issues have already been dealt with in chapter 2, and thus do not need further elucidation here. What this narration will now illuminate, are three factors in the nature of the conflict in Burundi. These factors are: identity, history and conflict; the pernicious and genocidal nature of the conflict; and, the intractable and protracted nature of the conflict.

3.5.1 Identity, History and Conflict

The issue of identity has been salient in the conflict in Burundi. So has the role of identity in collective recollection. As Herisse (2002:2) points out, the ethnocide (mass killings based on ethnic identity) that occurs at every point of political transition in Burundi is fuelled by ethnic concepts and misconceptions. Jackson (2002:3) also points out to the perpetuation of 'mythico-histories' in Burundi that narrate to Hutu extremists, centuries of dispossession and subjugation by alien invaders (Tutsi), or, by contrast, speak of natural supremacy and primacy to Tutsi ideologues. A 1988 example of this 'mythico-history' from *Le Point* goes: "The Tutsi shepherds, slender and graceful, warriors of Nilotic origin, arrived in Burundi sometime around the thirteen century, according to some historians, and later according to others. They rapidly reduced the Hutu agriculturists, a population of Bantu stock, to servitude and installed a feudal-like system where the venerated cow served to guarantee serf contracts" (cited in Chrétien, 2003:73).⁵³ Such mythico-histories serve to fuel conflict and further inflame group relations. In this regard, Lemarchand (1970:33) narrates *The Story of Origins*, a Rwandan dynastic poem, which recounts the myth of a divinely ordained social structure:

...the history of Rwanda begins with the reign of Kigwa, who descended from heaven and sired three sons- Gatwa, Gahutu and Gatutsi. To choose his successor Kigwa decided to entrust each of his sons with a pot of milk to watch over during the night. When dawn came it turned out that Gatwa had drunk the milk; Gahutu had gone to sleep and spilt his milk; only the watchful Gatutsi had stayed up through the night to keep guard over his milk. To Kigwa this was conclusive evidence that Gatutsi should be his successor and be forever free of menial tasks. Gahutu was to be his serf. As for Gatwa, who showed himself to be utterly unreliable, his station in society was to be that of a pariah.

Lemarchand (1970:34) holds that none of the constituent parts of Rwandan mythology are peculiar to Rwanda, and suggests that a variation of this Rwandan mythology exist in Burundi. The impact of such mythology on group relations and conflict is self-evident, so is its openness to manipulation by political entrepreneurs centrally concerned with the mobilisation of group loyalties. Some scholars have added 'scientific' legitimacy to such mythico-histories. In 1931, Diedrich Westerman's 'scientific enquiry' revealed the following: "The Hamites are

⁵² The impact of Rwanda on Burundian politics and conflict cannot be factored out of the equation without serious omissions and distortions in analysis or narration of the conflict in Burundi.

⁵³ This sub-section is limited in scope. See Liisa Malkki (1995) for a more detailed and illuminating case study on 'mythico-histories' and Hutu refugees in Tanzania.

light skinned, with a straight nose, thin lips, narrow face, soft, often wavy or even straight hair, without prognathism.... Owing to their racial superiority they have gained leading positions and have become the founders of many of the larger states of Africa" (cited in Lemarchand, 1999:7-8).

Reflective of the aforementioned, Lemarchand (1999:10-11) points out that what Europeans perceived as a superior brand of humanity, Hutu saw as the worst of human nature, i.e. cruelty and cunning, conquest and oppression. Where Hamitic/Semitic origins were cited as a source of racial superiority, Hutu saw as proof of foreignness. As Jackson (2002:9) holds, in the DRC conflict that started in August 1998, Robert Mugabe justified Zimbabwe's intervention as an effort to prevent the 'rebirth of a 19th century Tutsi-Hima Empire'. Similarly, Agathon Rwaso of the FNL has argued that "Tutsi rulers of the region share amongst themselves the same hegemonic vision, all dreaming of the same Hima/Nilotic Empire in Central and East Africa, which they intend to realise through sundry plans"(cited in Jackson, 2002:14). Whether in reality such aspirations for a Tutsi Empire exist or not, the power of such beliefs and their manipulation by ethnic entrepreneurs would have a profound impact on group relations and in fuelling conflict. Thus, although the conflict is not interpreted here as 'ethnic' i.e. *'primitive tribes' fighting for no apparent reason other than their tribal affiliations*, identity has been used as an instrument for conflict and in mass political mobilisation.

In reflection of the aforesaid, Uvin (1999:254) points out that there is little scholarly consensus, or even consensus from Burundians themselves, on the history of Burundi. For example, there is disagreement on the nature of the distinction between Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa (one can include Ganwa as illustrated at the beginning of this chapter). Are they ethnic groups, even races, or socio-economic groups? There is also disagreement regarding the nature of the pre-colonial political system. Was the Burundi kingdom highly centralised and inegalitarian, or was the influence of Mwami restricted to the capital? What was the role of lineages, and to what extent did the system allow upward mobility for Hutu? In addition, what was the impact of colonialism? Did colonialism turn fluid socio-economic stratification into 'hardened' ethnicity, or did colonialism simply codify already existing unequal and differential social relations? Did colonialism 'liberate' the Hutu by providing education and organising elections? As Lemarchand (1996:34) concludes, "(t)he difficulties involved in separating historical fact from fiction are nowhere more daunting than in Burundi". Uvin (1999:254) holds that excluding distortions and the unreliability associated with oral history and colonial history, the main obstacle in reaching consensus on the history of Burundi is the contemporary political importance of such history, i.e. different interpretations of history provide the basis of building collective identities and justification of current behaviour. This current behaviour has been pernicious and genocidal.

3.5.2 Pernicious and Genocidal Conflict

Nnoli (2001:4) affirms that a violent conflict articulated on ethnic lines "...has a more pernicious character than other forms of violence. It is a messy and no-holds-barred affair in which human lives are greatly devalued. Between 1945 and 1990, for example, ethnic violence caused greater loss of lives world-wide than all other forms of deadly conflicts combined". Indeed, historical accounts furnish us with numerous examples of pogroms of ethnic communities that have taken place in the prosecution of these conflicts. Burundi's 'twin sister' Rwanda, provides a prime example in the form of the 1994 genocide. For example, Griggs (1997:7-8) holds that extremist Hutus employ a long-standing philosophy known as 'Hutuism', whose basic tenet is 'to kill every member of every Tutsi generation'. 'Hutuism' depicts Tutsis as 'immigrants' or 'Ethiopians' who enslaved Hutus,

took their land, and killed them without justification. In turn, Griggs argues, Tutsis have engaged in selective extermination of Hutu (the leaders, the educated, and the elite). In addition to Griggs' assessment, it can be construed that the structural violence of the state has stunted the human development of those excluded.

As a result of the pernicious and genocidal conflict in Burundi, Nyang'oro (2001:ii) estimates that the number of conflict related deaths from 1965 to 2001 is almost one million people. According to a 2002 report of the UN Secretary General (cited in International Crisis Group, 2003:4) the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) is estimated at 1 281 000 (693 000, in neighbouring countries, 388 000 in government regroupment camps, and 200 000 in other villages or homes). Jooma (2005:3) states that the purpose of regroupment camps was to allow the military to conduct operations aimed at flushing out armed groups and regain control of territory. Typically, the civilian population was given a deadline, and after the expiry of such deadline, anyone who remained outside of the regroupment site was considered a legitimate military target. Regarding the death toll since 1965, it will be difficult to ascertain accurate figures. As Ndikumana (2000:438) points out, for example, the media has been censored and restricted from killing fields by the government. In addition, Ndikumana holds, there is no record of the number of bodies dumped in lakes, rivers, swamps, mass graves, and so on. Similarly, as held in the Arusha Agreement (2000:108), the number of refugees and IDPs will also be difficult to ascertain because of their high degree of mobility. The only known figures are those refugees and IDPs who choose to make use of the resettlement process of the UN humanitarian organisations.

The history of massacres and genocide has added a complex dimension to the conflict in Burundi. This brings to the fold the understanding of violence as a rational, vis-à-vis, an irrational means of conflict. Buckley-Zistel (2003:124-125) argues that most of conflict analysis is informed by the paradigm that violence is a universally applicable and rational tool, a means that can be deployed as necessity dictates i.e. an antisocial act that is sporadic and exceptional, and not a cultural expression. This however is to miss a significant dimension of violence, being, the culture of violence, argues Buckley-Zistel. Over time, individuals and communities that are exposed to violence and the trauma emanating from such violence, develop cultural traits as a historical process and as a response to such exposure. Therefore, Buckley-Zistel argues, an analysis of violence should be considered in its social context as a form of social interaction. Thus, the culture of violence should form the basis of analysis, separate from the rational tool of the use of violence.

Nafziger and Auvinen's (2001:17) postulation have similar resonance as the above. They assert that a culture of violence is indicative of the legitimacy of political violence. That countries such as Burundi, that have a cultural experience of violence and a history of mass political mobilisation for conflict, are more susceptible to violent conflict than historically more peaceful countries. Sandole (2002:11) calls this 'conflict-as-start-up-conditions', as opposed to 'conflict-as-process', where the nature of the conflict itself sow seeds for further conflict, a self-generating and self-perpetuating condition, one might say. Van Eck (2001:8) refers to this state of affairs, as 'a common legacy of blood' between Hutus and Tutsis. These views are telling, more so when one takes into account that in Burundi, exclusion and its effects, i.e. inequality, dichotomous relationships, animosity, and so on, will linger long after the cessation of military action, and thus creating conditions ripe for further conflict. Reflective of the above, Sandole (2002:11) points out that among the perceived primary causes of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, are historical memories of atrocities committed by members of certain ethnic groups

against members of other ethnic groups. This pernicious and genocidal conflict, including the issues involved, largely accounts for the intractable and protracted nature of the conflict.⁵⁴

3.5.3 Intractable and Protracted Conflict

In regard of the issues involved in the conflict, Nnoli (2001:5) advances that "...some of the key issues...are not about material resources that can be negotiated. They often involve status, culture and identity. However, identity and beliefs are non-negotiable. They involve symbolic, cultural and moral values that are not amenable to compromise". What Nnoli is referring to, is the *indivisible* nature of the issues involved. Albin (1991:47) defines 'indivisibles' as "...goods that cannot be split physically into parts, and concerns that cannot be compromised on, without losing much of their intrinsic or perceived value". In the case of Burundi, the physical unity of the goods would be the state, which is tangible, and the intangible concerns that cannot be compromised on will include basic human needs like identity, security, recognition, and social justice, and the fact and fear of exclusion and extermination.

The nature of the crisis in Burundi presents another challenge for conflict analysis. As Buckley-Zistel (2003:121) postulates, conflict assessment is based on, and informed by, a structural perception of the world in which the parties to a conflict are divided between the strong and the weak. This is not necessarily the case in Burundi. As Reyntjens (2000:6) point out, on the surface it would appear that the Tutsi and the Twa are minorities in need of protection. Whilst this may be true for the Twa, Reyntjens holds, it is not the case for the Tutsi as they have dominated Burundi's politics and economy, despite being a numerical minority. The Hutu on the other hand, despite being a numerical majority, are a political and socio-economic minority in Burundi. Therefore, all groups, in one form or the other, qualify as minorities in need of protection. In Burundi, it is also often difficult to separate the villains from the heroes, the perpetrators from the victims. As Van Eck (2001:8) contends, the conflict "...is not merely 'just another civil war about the need for oppressed people to be liberated from inequality and oppression'...". Van Eck explains that "...[for more than three decades] *both Hutu and Tutsi* have indulged in the most brutal, indiscriminate and systematic mass slaughter of members of the other ethnic groups imaginable".⁵⁵ In consequence, Van Eck concludes that "(n)either Hutu nor Tutsi can claim to have the moral high ground". A question thus arises: Whose case is more legitimate?

Adding to the complexity of the conflict in Burundi is the fact that the state has neither been neutral nor an arbiter, but an active and biased participant in the conflict. As Reyntjens (2000:14) illustrates, in the immediate aftermath of the 1993 conflict there were two kinds of internal population flows in Burundi. There were 'displaced persons', i.e. Tutsi gathered in military installations, health units and administration centres, under the protection of the military, and 'dispersed persons', i.e. Hutu who hid in the bush and swamps, fearing reprisals by the military. The state in Burundi, as a failing state, has also failed to cope with the crisis. In this regard, Allen (1999:368-369) points out that state failure/collapse has transformed patterns of violence and warfare. The 'new' war, *inter alia*, has become heightened in intensity and scope, violence has become pervasive and

⁵⁴ There are various acts of pernicious violence and human rights abuses in Burundi, committed by both the army and the armed opposition. These acts include pillaging, sexual violence, destruction of property, forced displacement and murder. These issues are beyond the scope of this study. However, the Human Rights Watch (including 2002 and 2003) will be a useful start, as they list these acts and abuses, including individual accounts and testimonies.

⁵⁵ Emphasis in original.

endemic, there has been dramatic increase in the risk of interpersonal violence, community-level violence has become more intense and destructive, and conflict has become more durable and resistant to resolution.

3.6 EVALUATIONS

Intractable, protracted, pernicious, genocidal, and cyclical low-intensity conflict has characterised the state in Burundi since independence in 1962. The conflict has included various activities: structural violence, political and pseudo-legal persecution, mass arrests, strikes, riots, communal violence, assassinations, massacres, coups and coup attempts, and insurgency. The conflict has also had tremendous impact on Burundian society. For example, because of these cyclical conflicts, Burundi has over one million refugees and IDPs, with over one million conflict related fatalities since 1962. Indeed Burundi, a nation at war with itself, represents an example of the most brutal bloodletting that has ever taken place on the African continent. This bloodletting is only matched by the case of Rwanda. Most saliently, there has been communal violence between the Hutu and Tutsi identity groups, and the conflict has pitted the Tutsi-dominated government and army against the Hutu-dominated Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs). This, however, is a partial analysis of the Burundi conflict. In reality, the conflict has pitted, at various points in its life cycle, dynastic, ethnic, intra-ethnic, clanic, and regional, identity groups. At the heart of this intermittent conflict, largely flaring up at points of political transitions, are grievances emanating from political, economic and social exclusion that has defined the political economy of Burundi. These patterns of exclusion, institutionalised during colonialism, were consolidated in the post-independence period leading to the conflict in Burundi that has manifested in the struggle for the control of the state. This political conflict in Burundi is centrally concerned with the rules and regulations that govern society, including the distribution of power and national resources, as they relate to social categories. Thus, grievances, not greed, would seem to inform the conflict in Burundi.

In the period leading to, and following independence, the struggle was between dynastic lineages. The lines of cleavage were formed around the Bezi versus Batare dynastic groups. In the year of independence in 1962, there was communal violence between Hutus and Tutsis, largely reflected by the Kamenge riots. The first large-scale violence along ethnic lines took place following the October 1965 attempted coup by Hutu army and gendarmerie officers. The coup, *inter alia*, took place against the backdrop of the 1959-1962 Rwandan Revolution and what was perceived as monarchical absolutism and ethnic favouritism. This attempted coup was directed against the king and the monarchy. There was also communal violence between Hutus and Tutsis. The July 1966 dynastic-military coup was directed against the king and a government that was dominated by the Bezi lineage. This coup resulted in the decline of the Bezi domination of the political system. The November 1966 coup was directed against the king and the monarchy. The aftermath of this coup saw the triumph of republicanism over monarchism and the rise of a new Tutsi elite from Bururi province, led by Michel Micombero. The November 1966 coup, with the monarchy abolished and all the aristocracy removed from positions of authority, ended the incidence of conflict articulated along dynastic lines.

The 1969 conflict was unleashed by the attempted coup by Hutu army officers and politicians. This coup was directed against a Tutsi-dominated government. In the aftermath, Tutsi rule was further consolidated. In 1971, there was an attempted coup by Tutsi-Banyaruguru against Tutsi-Hima hegemony. This coup attempt was repressed leading to the triumph of Tutsi-Hima, who now dominated the government, over Banyaruguru and Hutu. The 1972 incidence of conflict was initiated by a Hutu insurgency and attempted coup by Hutu army

officers and politicians. There was also communal violence between Hutus and Tutsis. The 1972 conflict started in Nyanza-Lac and Rumonge towns (in Makamba province) and spread almost to the rest of the country. The 1972 conflict is largely characterised by the Hutu genocide. The aftermath of this bout of conflict saw the establishment of the oldest surviving Hutu armed movements, PALIPEHUTU in 1980 and FROLINA in 1989.

The November 1976 coup by Jean-Baptiste Bagaza further consolidated the rule of Tutsi-Hima. However, a new dimension was added. This coup saw the rise of the Bayanzi (Tutsi-Hima clan), who came to dominate structures of authority, in and outside of government. In the Second Republic (1976-1987) initiated by Bagaza, there was no incidence of violent conflict. The September 1987 coup by Pierre Buyoya again saw the further consolidation of Tutsi-Hima rule. Thus, there was continuity in the patterns of governance in Burundi. With this continuity, however, some reforms were initiated. Nonetheless, the created expectations of change remained unfulfilled leading to the 1988 conflict. From early 1988, there were various incidences of violence articulated along Hutu-Tutsi lines. The large-scale conflict occurred in August 1988. The 1988 conflict was characterised by communal violence between Hutus and Tutsis, largely taking place in the communes of Ntega (Kirundo province) and Marangara (Ngozi province).

On the other hand, the 1989 conflict reflected the cleavage between the two Tutsi-Hima clans, Bayanzi and Bashingo. This conflict was initiated by the March 1989 attempted coup by members of the Bayanzi clan. This attempted coup was followed by the purge of all Bayanzi in and outside of government. The 1991 conflict pitted Hutu armed groups against a Tutsi-dominated government. The Hutu abortive uprising and attempted coup unleashed this conflict. The 1991 conflict took place against the backdrop of the Rwandan Patriotic Front's invasion of Rwanda from their bases in Uganda. This invasion exacerbated Hutu-Tutsi tensions in Burundi. Various incidents occurred, including the strike by Bujumbura taxi drivers and transport workers that ended in scores of arrests. The uprising started in the provinces of Makamba (bordering Tanzania) and Cibitoke and Bubanza (bordering Rwanda). Both Rwanda and Tanzania were used as springboards to launch attacks on Burundian soil.

The reforms that were initiated following the 1988 conflict, culminated in the 1993 democratic elections. However, the military, mainly Tutsi in composition and enjoying the monopoly to change governments since 1965, continued to be a threat to the democratic process in Burundi. This is evidenced by the 1989 and 1992 coup attempts by the military. The current bout of conflict, since 1993, was triggered by the assassination of Burundi's first democratically elected President, Melchior Ndadaye, in October 1993. This conflict pitted the Tutsi-dominated military against the Hutu armed movements and political parties, unleashing the longest bout of conflict in Burundi, currently in its twelfth year. This conflict has also pitted Hutus and Tutsis in communal violence. From 1993 to 1996, there was a 'creeping coup' in Burundi, starting from the 1993 attempted coup and ending with the coup of July 1996 by Pierre Buyoya. In this period, with the Rwandan genocide taking place in 1994, the position of the Hutu and FRODEBU was considerably weakened. The resultant Tutsi appeasement, through the 1994 *Kigobe Accord*, *Kajaga Agreement* and *Convention of Government*, undermined the reforms since 1988, and confirmed the status quo, as it existed prior to the 1993 elections.

The *coup de grâce* to the 1993-initiated 'creeping coup' finally came in the form of the July 1996 coup by Pierre Buyoya. Nine regional governments immediately imposed economic sanctions on Burundi lasting until January 1999. These sanctions, *inter alia*, had the effect of suspending the peace process that was started by Julius

Nyerere in 1995 (see next chapter). The military continued to be a threat to the democratic process as evidenced by the April 2000 attempted coup against Buyoya's government. The Hutu armed groups also continued waging war against Buyoya and the now Tutsi-dominated government. Military actions have subsided in Burundi. However, the last Hutu armed group, Agathon Rwasa's FNL, continues with acts of violence in Burundi.

CHAPTER 4: THE PEACE PROCESS AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN BURUNDI

4.1 INTRODUCTION

After cultivating an understanding of the conflict in Burundi, a natural progression and logical conclusion is to ask and answer the question: What is the *sine qua non* for conflict resolution and sustainable peace in Burundi? In answering this question, it must be appreciated that the solution to the conflict lies with the adequate resolution of the underlying conditions of the conflict, and not the symptoms alone. With the foregoing in mind, it is self-evident that the key to sustainable peace lies with the transformation of the conflict generating conditions and practices in Burundi, namely: transforming the patterns and dimensions of exclusion, reversing the consequences thereof, and addressing the issues relating to the nature and characteristics of the conflict.

In answering the question asked above, this chapter starts out by tracing the road already travelled in the peace process, explores the solutions to the conflict as provided in the literature and by actors in the peace process, and ends with an investigation of the prospects for peace in Burundi, which also proposes peace imperatives. The purpose of this chapter is not to reproduce the Arusha Agreement and the various agreements that buttress the peace process, or to recount the whole Burundi peace process, but to highlight those factors pertinent to, and within the parameters of, the purpose of this study. Thus the exploration of the peace process and the proposed solutions to the conflict, the proposal of peace imperatives and the investigation of the prospects for sustainable peace, are made with the specific backdrop of the preceding chapters of this study.

4.2 THE ACTORS AND ISSUES IN THE PEACE PROCESS

The official and formal peace process following the 1993 conflict in Burundi started in 1996. The various efforts at peace since the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993 to Pierre Buyoya's coup in July 1996, including the *Kigobe Accord*, the *Kajaga Agreement*, and the *Convention of Government*, are not considered part of the peace process in this study, but the manifestations of a 'creeping coup' (as Filip Reyntjens describes this period). As already indicated in chapter 3, these efforts, despite the best intentions, or calculated to bring about a desired outcome, merely resulted in the negation of the results of, and confirmed the status quo as it existed prior to, the 1993 elections.

4.2.1 The Arusha Negotiations: From Julius Nyerere to Nelson Mandela, 1995-2000

As Bunting *et al* (1999:1-12)⁵⁶ and Bentley and Southall (2005:56-57, 63) outline, the former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, was the first mediator in the Burundi peace process. Already in 1995, Julius Nyerere was in preparation of the peace process and in pre-talks with Burundi parties. The first official and formal talks Julius Nyerere held with Burundi parties were in Mwanza (Tanzania) in April and May 1996. The series of meetings are known, collectively and respectively, as Mwanza I and Mwanza II. In June 1996, these talks were moved to Arusha (Tanzania). The talks included only UPRONA and FRODEBU. The talks broke down necessitating further negotiations. In June 1996, a regional summit concluded that the negotiations must include all parties to the conflict. However, such attempts were thwarted the following month in July 1996 by

⁵⁶ Bunting *et al* (1999) provides a good summary of the peace process from 1995 to the death of Julius Nyerere in 1999. However much of the detail recounted is beyond the purpose and scope of this study.

Pierre Buyoya's coup and the subsequent economic sanctions imposed on Burundi by regional governments between 1996 and 1999. Negotiations came to a standstill and hostilities were renewed. It was not until 1998 that the June 1996 resolution of the regional summit was implemented when the All-Party-Talks started in June of 1998, culminating in the Arusha Agreement of August 2000. There are differences in the literature regarding the naming of the many meetings held in Arusha. This study appropriates the position taken by Bentley and Southall (2005:62) that the various meetings before June 1998 are collectively referred to as Arusha I and subsequent meetings from June 1998, which culminated in the Arusha Agreement, as Arusha II.

Since 1995, the peace process has had various hiccups, not the least, as Van Eck (1999:5) holds, relating to the challenge of being equally sympathetic to the justifiable frustrations of the majority and the equally justifiable fears and insecurities of the minority. Julius Nyerere described the situation in 1996 as such: "The biggest obstacle at present is that those who are in power, the minority, are like one riding on the back of a tiger. And they really want almost a watertight assurance before they get off the back of the tiger because they feel that if they get off the back of the tiger it will eat them" (cited in Ndikumana, 2000:436). As Kitevu and Lind (2001:2) and Van Eck (2000:2-3) point out, following the death of Julius Nyerere in October 1999, many of the parties involved in Arusha reverted to armed conflict. Thus the appointment of Nelson Mandela as the new mediator in November 1999, and his first meeting with Burundi parties in Arusha on January 16, 2000, provided a new impetus to the peace process.⁵⁷

During the Arusha process, five committees were set up and the themes were formulated on which each committee would negotiate. The International Crisis Group (1998:2) lists these committees:

- Committee I, dealing with the nature of the conflict and the problems of genocide and exclusion and their solutions;
- Committee II, on democracy and good governance, dealing with the transitional institutions: the institutional, judicial and administrative systems, and questions regarding justice and impunity;
- Committee III, dealing with peace and security, the cessation of hostilities, the terms of a permanent ceasefire and the question of the security forces;
- Committee IV, concerned with reconstruction and economic development, refugees and IDPs; and,
- Committee V, dealing with the guarantees for the application of the peace agreement.

The work of these committees resulted in the five protocols and five annexes as contained in the final Arusha Agreement, dealing with the themes as stated above. On August 28, 2000, albeit some with reservations, Burundi groups signed the Arusha Agreement, overseen by Nelson Mandela. These groups included 19 groups: 17 political parties (the G-7 and the G-10)⁵⁸, the government, and the National Assembly. On the 28th, only 13 of the 19 parties signed the agreement, the six recalcitrant Tutsi parties signed later (Reyntjens, 2001:18). However, as Alusala (2005:1) points out, the Arusha Agreement did not include a ceasefire agreement (the conspicuously blank Annex III), as the armed groups were not part of negotiations, necessitating

⁵⁷ Although the scope of Bentley and Southall (2005) goes beyond Nelson Mandela's role in the peace process, one of the central themes of the book (which was commissioned by the Nelson Mandela Foundation) is Mandela's role as a mediator in Burundi. Thus similar to Bunting *et al*, this book provides a good starting point regarding the formal role Nelson Mandela played from 1999 to 2000.

⁵⁸ See page viii for a complete list of these groups.

further ceasefire negotiations. This was seen as one of the greatest flaws of the agreement. Van Eck (2000:6, 2001:2) thus concluded that the failure of the Arusha process to include the two armed groups would remain its fatal shortcoming and would continue to challenge its legitimacy. These groups were the two armed wings of PALIPEHUTU and CNDD. Since then, the two armed groups fragmented into four. This brings to the fold the problems of fractionalisation and the leadership crisis within the armed groups that marred the Arusha negotiations process and hindered the implementation of agreements.

As the International Crisis Group (1998:5-6, 7-8, 2000:16) points out, divisions existed within almost all the parties involved in Arusha, to the extent that it became difficult to identify legitimate leaders. What complicated matters as well, was the fact that the representatives of the political parties, since June 1993, were not sanctioned through elections because of the conflict. For example, FRODEBU was represented by Leoncé Ngendakumana in Arusha (then also President of the National Assembly), and its representatives in exile, led by party President Jean Minani, denounced the agreement. The case of the CNDD provides another example. Léonard Nyangoma (the leader of the CNDD), on June 21, 1998, signed the Joint Declaration calling for the suspension of hostilities with effect from July 20, 1998. However, his signature presented a limitation to the impact of the Joint Declaration as the (then) military component of the CNDD, the FDD, pointed out that it was not tied by the declaration, and replaced Nyangoma with Jean-Basco Ndayikengurukiye, who was in charge of military operations. This military wing continued to wage war, and severed its ties with the political wing under Nyangoma. This military wing also fragmented into two independent factions in 2001. The FNL, which severed its ties with PALIPEHUTU in 1992, also fragmented into two separate factions in 2001. Thus, these events threatened to invalidate the agreements and presented the possibility of never-ending negotiations.

The most worrying aspect of the Arusha Agreement and the peace process however, is the failure to clearly articulate and engage with the underlying conditions of the conflict. This failure is not new. The 1989 Commission on National Unity provides another example in this regard (see Chapter 3). For example, the Arusha Agreement (2000:16-17) mentions 'massive and deliberate killings', 'widespread violence' and 'the struggle by a political class to accede to and/or remain in power' amongst 'a number of constant phenomena which have given rise to the conflict'. These are conflict symptoms and manifestations! It is also stated in the Arusha Agreement (2000:16) that "(v)iewers differ as to the interpretation of these phenomena and their influence on the current political, economic and socio-cultural situation in Burundi, as well as of their impact on the conflict". Bunting *et al* (1999:7) point out as well that it proved fruitless during the Arusha negotiations to expect consensus from Burundi parties on the cause(s) of the conflict. As King (1997:40, 42) points out, reaching a clear agreement on the cause(s) of a conflict is the *first step* towards conflict settlement and the resolution process. To reiterate a point made in chapter 2, an accurate diagnosis of the conflict is a *sine qua non* for successful conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building. An incorrect or inadequate diagnosis will result in incorrect or inadequate remedies, and peace will remain elusive for the Burundi people. This fundamental and self-evident fact cannot be overemphasised!

4.2.2 The TGoB, AMIB, ONUB, the Regional Initiative, and the Role of Jacob Zuma, 2001-2005

Despite the aforementioned challenges, November 1, 2001, marked the inception of the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB). In accordance with the power sharing arrangement agreed to in the Arusha Agreement and the provisions of the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi (Regional Initiative),

UPRONA's Pierre Buyoya (Tutsi) became President for the first 18 months (November 2001-April 2003), followed by FRODEBU's Domitien Ndayizeye (Hutu), for the second 18 months (May 2003-October 2004). The Regional Initiative is led by Uganda, Tanzania, and South Africa, and is charged by the AU, with a UN mandate, to resolve the conflict in Burundi. Uganda chairs the Regional Initiative on Burundi. In the context of the mandate from the UN and the AU, on three occasions a summit of the Regional Initiative extended the three-year transitional period (November 2001-October 2004) that was to end in October 2004, to April 2005, and finally to August 2005. The Regional Initiative also extended the elections from November 2004, to April 2005, and finally provided for a phased out electoral process from June to August 2005, thus ending the period of the TGoB (Alusala, 2005:1-2, 7; Arusha Agreement, 2000:5; Gasana and Boshoff, 2003:2; USAID, 2004:1; Annan, 2004:3; Bentley and Southall, 2005:5, 8).

Following the groundwork by Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela, the implementation of the Arusha Agreement and subsequent agreements was left to the current mediator, Jacob Zuma. After a series of ceasefire negotiations between Jacob Zuma and the TGoB with the armed groups, ceasefire agreements were signed with three of the four remaining armed groups. Between October 2002 and January 2003, the TGoB signed ceasefire agreements and memorandums of understanding with the two factions of CNDD: the FDD led by Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza and the other FDD led by Jean-Basco Ndayikengurukiye, including the FNL led by Alain Mugabarabona. The signing of the ceasefire agreements gave a new impetus to the peace process as the absence of a ceasefire was used to justify the lack of implementing the provisions of the Arusha Agreement (International Crisis Group, 2003:i; Human Rights Watch, 2003:4; Reyntjens, 2001:18; Annan, 2004:2; Boshoff, 2003:1-2, 2004a:3).

It was not until May 2005 that a cease-fire was signed with the last of the armed groups, the FNL faction led by Agathon Rwasa. However as EURAC (2005b:4) reports, the army violated the ceasefire the day after the signature, by attacking FNL positions. Despite signing a ceasefire agreement, the FNL remains active in Burundi. This is not new. As the Human Rights Watch (2003:1, 9) points out, after the December 2, 2002 ceasefire agreement between Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza's FDD and the TGoB, both sides immediately violated the ceasefire. The FDD continued waging war, necessitating further negotiations. As the Burundian saying goes: *uwasinye niwe asinyura* (he who signs can also 'unsign'). This apparent lack of commitment in implementing the agreements, has served as one of the major setbacks in the peace process.

The period of the TGoB was dominated by quarrels over posts and positions. This had the effect of reducing the scope of discussions and resulted in the failure to adequately address the underlying conditions of the conflict. As Reyntjens (2001:19) holds, from November 2000, the choice of the president in the TGoB became a bone of contention. The implementation committee of the Arusha Agreement was left paralysed. According to Reyntjens (2001:19), "...[this] demonstrates, once again, that for the majority of the negotiators, the distribution of posts and functions is more important than the future of the country". Oketch and Polzer (2002:115) also point out that the peace process became an extension of the conflict, another arena for Burundi's elite to obtain or retain wealth and power through the control of the state. These quarrels over posts and positions are also evidenced by *The Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi*. This agreement represents Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza's FDD's 'demands' for taking part in the transitional government. The following table is illustrative (indicating only the defence and security part of the agreement):

Table 8: Agreement on Composition of Security Forces, October 8, 2003

	Ethnic Balance (%)		TGoB	FDD Balance (%)
	Tutsi	Hutu	TGoB	FDD
Military	50	50	60	40
Police	50	50	65	35
Intelligence Services	50	50	65	35

Sources: Adapted from Ndikumana (2004:23) and *the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi*.⁵⁹

According to this agreement, the current members of the gendarmerie are considered part of the military. However, it is envisaged that elements of the gendarmerie and the FDD will be integrated in the new police force, depending on the needs and affordability after the transitional period. The gendarmerie, estimated at 7000, will be abolished and some of its members will be demobilised (Annan, 2004:4; Van Eck, 2003:4). The *Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi* and the *Technical Forces Agreement*, both dated 02 November 2003⁶⁰, between Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza's FDD and the TGoB, reaffirmed the FDD's commitment to the December 2, 2002 ceasefire agreement and confirmed the composition of the security forces as stated on the table above. On November 16, 2003, the TGoB signed the *Global Ceasefire Agreement* with the FDD.⁶¹ As Van Eck (2003:7) holds, these agreements incorporated the second last of the armed groups in the TGoB. These agreements represent milestones in the peace process, as Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza's FDD was the largest of the armed groups. However, these agreements did not include Agathon Rwaswa's FNL, which remained outside of the TGoB. Thus, the envisaged prospect of ending the conflict through the inclusion of the largest of the armed groups in the TGoB and reaching an agreement on the reform of the security forces (one of the major issues in the peace process) was thwarted.

In October 2001, the SANDF sent a contingent (the South African Protection Support Detachment) that served as a protection force for the transitional power-sharing government. In April 2003, an enlarged force (merged with Ethiopian and Mozambique forces) was transformed into the AU's *African Mission in Burundi* (AMIB), with South Africa as the lead nation. The mandate of AMIB was to supervise, observe, monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreements in order to consolidate the peace process, and the cantonment and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of forces. The mandate, however, did not include enforcement measures. After the conclusion of this mandate, minus the involvement of the FNL, it was left for the UN to take over the peace mission in Burundi (Boshoff, 2003:3-5, Boshoff and Francis, 2003:41, 43).

In June 2004 (to date), AMIB was transformed into the *United Nations Operation in Burundi* (ONUB). The deployment of ONUB followed the May 21, 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1545 that authorised this operation under chapter VII (peace enforcement) of the UN Charter. The mandate of ONUB includes the monitoring and implementation of ceasefire agreements, the DDR of forces, to create the necessary security conditions, and to contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process. In terms of the Security Council resolution, ONUB is authorised to carry out its mandate in close cooperation with MONUC (UN operation in the DRC). This cooperation includes the monitoring and prevention of movements of combatants across the border between Burundi and the DRC, as well as the implementation of the disarmament and

⁵⁹ Available at www.iss.co.za.

⁶⁰ Both available at www.iss.org.

⁶¹ Available at www.reliefweb.int.

demobilisation programmes in both countries (UNSC, 2004:3-6; Annan, 2004:13; Boshoff, 2004b:57-58). This resolution gave another impetus to the peace process, especially relating to the proliferation of arms and the difficulties of providing security because of the porous border between Burundi and the DRC. Challenges regarding the mandate of ONUB and the peace mission in Burundi however remain.

As the International Crisis Group (2003:i) point out, the end of the conflict will require the demobilisation and reintegration of about 70 000 combatants. In 2003, the World Bank estimated that this would require costs of about \$90 million (US). A report of the UN Secretary General estimates the number of combatants as between 66 000 and 80 000. The number of combatants belonging to the armed groups is estimated at 35 000, with Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza's FDD considered the largest of the groups with an estimated strength of 25 000. As of March 2004, these groups (excluding Agathon Rwasa's FNL) were already in assembly areas. The Burundi Armed Forces are estimated at 45 000. As the Secretary General's report points out, these numbers are not affordable. It is thus envisaged that the estimated 80 000 who are eligible will be integrated into the new defence force and later demobilised at a rate of 14 000 per year over four years, eventually to reach the affordable number of some 25 000 (Annan, 2004:3-4, 10). In addition, the disarmament and reintegration (into society) of the 'Guardians of Peace', a government supported youth militia recruited as a village self-defence organisation, remain to be completed (Alusala, 2005:6, 10).

The foregoing issues will require careful handling. As Alusala (2005:1-2) holds, the DDR of ex-combatants and the composition of the new Burundi armed forces, including the matter of Agathon Rwasa's FNL, remain thorny issues. As table eight above illustrates, in principle, the matter of the composition of the new defence force has been agreed upon. What remains a thorny issue is the matter of eligibility. According to the Arusha Agreement (2000:64) "(m)embers of the Burundian armed forces found guilty of acts of genocide, *coups d'état*, violation of the Constitution and human rights and war crimes shall be excluded from the national defence force. Combatants of the political parties and movements found guilty of the same offences shall also not be accepted into the national defence force". Whether this provision will prove to be a future bone of contention remains an open question at this stage. However, given the widespread allegations of involvement in massacres and human rights violations by all belligerents in Burundi, the potential of this provision to create conflict is clear. As of April 2004 an estimated 1 171 child soldiers have been demobilised through the TGoB national child demobilisation programme started since January 2004. International aid agencies have supported this programme, including the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). Approximately 3000 child soldiers were registered to demobilise by May 2004, out of an estimated 6000 to 7000 child soldiers in Burundi (USAID, 2004:2). However, as already pointed out, the whole DDR process will only be completed in the post-transitional period.

Linked to the foregoing is another key outstanding issue in the peace process, relating to the full implementation of the Arusha Agreement and subsequent agreements. Alusala (2005:3-4) states that the key institution in this regard is the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC). The IMC was established on November 28, 2000, and vested with the responsibility to monitor, follow-up, supervise, and co-ordinate the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. The sub-committees of the IMC include the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC), *inter alia*, charged with overseeing ceasefire agreements, monitoring DDR, and overseeing the reform of the security forces. The key frameworks of the JCC are the Joint Operations Plan (JOP) and the Forces Technical Agreement (FTA), both adopted by the JCC on June 17, 2004. The main purpose of the JOP is to provide procedures and mechanisms for DDR, whereas the TFA has as its main objective, to provide a policy

framework for military integration activities. The importance of the work of the IMC and its sub-committees cannot be overemphasised. The success of the peace process is dependent upon the successful functioning and funding of these committees. However one of the key challenges that remain, as Alusala (2005:3, 6, 8) holds, is to meaningfully reintegrate ex-combatants who will not be taken up into the security forces, into social and economic life in order to dissuade them from being future peace spoilers. In addition, all other agreements that buttress the peace process will have to be implemented in the post-transitional period, in spirit and to the letter, to avoid the derailment of the peace process.

In August 2004, Jacob Zuma oversaw the signing, by Burundi parties, of one of the key agreements in the peace process, the Pretoria *Burundi Power-Sharing Agreement*, dated 06 August 2004. As already established in chapter I, this agreement envisages a 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi breakdown in the Council of Ministers (Ministers and Vice-Ministers) and the National Assembly (Deputies). The Senate will be a 50 percent Hutu and a 50 percent Tutsi breakdown. The National Assembly and the Senate will also include, respectively, three members of the Twa, and respectively have 30 percent female representation (Ganwa representation is also envisaged). This agreement also confirmed a provision of the Arusha Agreement (2000:33), namely: 'In addition to the President, there shall be two Vice-Presidents from different ethnic groups and political parties'. This 'ethnic arithmetic', as Lemarchand (1970:296) would call it, has since been incorporated in the new interim constitution of Burundi. On February 28, 2005, Burundians held a referendum on this new constitution with ethnic quotas. As Jooma (2005:1) relates, 91 percent of registered voters voted in favour of the constitution. This referendum and the subsequent passing of an electoral code, prepared the way for the holding of elections.

The Arusha Agreement (2000:32-33, 48-49) makes provision for a phased out electoral process in the transitional period. The Arusha Agreement also stipulates that the President, for the first elections only, shall be elected by parliament from the majority party, and thereafter with subsequent elections taking place every five years, the President will be directly elected by universal suffrage. In accordance with these provisions, on April 25, 2005, Paul Ngarambe, the chairperson of Burundi's Independent Electoral Commission, announced the electoral calendar for Burundi beginning in June and ending in August 2005, with the new President and government sworn in on August 26, 2005, ending the period of the transitional government (IRINNews, 2005:1). The following elections timetable was announced:

- Communal elections on June 3;
- National Assembly elections on July 4;
- Senate elections on July 29;
- Presidential elections on August 19; and
- *Collines* (communal zones, 'hills') elections on September 23.

However, it appears that a number of hurdles need to be overcome before a successful transition and an electoral process can take place. For example, following the announcement of the electoral calendar, it was immediately denounced as 'unconstitutional' by 20 of the 35 officially registered political parties, pointing out that the new constitution stipulates that the elections for the *collines* would occur first (EURAC, 2005a:4). Be that as it may, with the electoral calendar now in place, what are the prospects for sustainable peace in Burundi? The answer to this question is contingent upon a number of factors that need to be considered. These factors relate to the proposed solutions to the conflict, which will now be explored.

4.3 EXPLORING THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE CONFLICT

As already established in chapter I, the idea of a 'military solution' has been considered in the peace process in Burundi. However it is the contention here that the conflict in Burundi is not a 'military conflict' with 'military objectives' that require a 'military solution', but a political conflict that is centrally concerned with the rules and regulations that govern society, including the distribution of power and national resources as they relate to social categories. It is also the contention that a 'military solution' will merely result in the suppression of aspirations that in future will flare up at the first opportunity as illustrated by the history of Burundi. Because of the limited utility of this route in resolving the conflict, it is discounted from consideration in this study. What this section will explore, are the notions of spatial designs for peace and power sharing as proposed solutions to the conflict. This study identifies the reconstruction of the state (state building) as a peace imperative for Burundi. Thus, this peace imperative will be discussed under *The Prospects for Peace in Burundi*.

4.3.1 Spatial Designs for Peace

Griggs (1997) and Kaufmann (1996, 1999) have proposed 'spatial designs for peace' as solutions to conflicts articulated along ethnic lines. These designs prescribe geographical separation of the ethnic groups and/or the redrawing of national boundaries. As Lemarchand (1996:130, 164-5) holds, former US ambassador to Burundi, Thomas P. Melady, suggested the idea of state partitioning and ethnic separation as a solution to the conflict in Burundi in 1988. During the 1972 carnage in Burundi, Melady still occupied this post. According to Griggs (1997:11), another former US ambassador, Herman J. Cohen, reiterated a similar position in 1996. Cohen suggested that Rwanda and Burundi should be partitioned into a Hutuland and a Tutsiland. In this regard, Kaufmann (1996:137), arguing on humanitarian grounds and not on grounds of self-determination, contends that the partitioning of the state is the only feasible solution to ethnic conflicts. This position is reflective of the point of view held by Lake and Rothchild (1998:293) that there is no final solution to ethnic conflicts (except separation), they can only be contained and managed. In concert, Keller (2002:6-8) asserts that historical experience demonstrates that permanent solutions to ethnic conflicts are near impossible. Keller thus concludes that success is most likely in prevention and management options like preventative diplomacy and trust building.

In a data set of ethnic wars between 1944 and 1994 compiled by Ted Robert Gurr, Kaufmann (1996:159) points out that of the 27 ethnic wars that have been resolved, only eight have been ended by an agreement that did not partition the state. Kaufmann (1996:137) argues that in ethnic wars both 'hypernationalist mobilisation rhetoric' and the real atrocities harden ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals are unlikely to be made and even less likely to be heard. Kaufmann further argues that intermingled population settlement patterns create real security dilemmas that intensify violence, motivate ethnic 'cleansing', and prevent de-escalation unless the groups are separated. Kaufmann (1996:137, 150) also argues that whilst ethnic separation does not guarantee peace, it allows it by reducing both incentives and opportunities for further conflict. Kaufmann correctly points out that there has been no war in Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, after the population exchanges of the 1920s. However, it should also be pointed out that over two decades later (from 1947), ethnic separation in the case of India and Pakistan did not end the conflict, rather, the intra-state conflict was transformed to the inter-state level (refer below for Kaufmann's counter-argument to this point).

In an article aptly titled *When All Else Fails*, Kaufmann (1999:222-3) argues that state building, power sharing and identity reconstruction, cannot work because they do not reduce the security dilemma. Kaufmann argues that in conflicts fought along ethnic lines, ethnic communities (especially when they are intermingled) cannot rely on a strong and impartial central government for their protection, and thus these communities mobilise in self-defence. However, this creates a security dilemma since each group cannot provide for its own security without threatening the security of other groups. The solution to the security dilemma, Kaufmann argues, is to *completely* separate the groups into defensible enclaves. With the rest of the article, Kaufmann assesses four cases that have been used as evidence against partition or ethnic separation. These cases are Ireland, India, Palestine and Cyprus. As Kaufmann (1999:223) holds, the criticism against partition or separation is based on the following three points:

- Partition and population transfers cause violence.
- They generate new conflicts (often transforming intra-state conflicts into inter-state conflicts).
- Partition creates undemocratic rump states.

In reflection of these three points of criticism in regard of all the four cases, Kaufmann (1999:222, 249) finds that violence was reduced. In cases where violence increased, Kaufmann argues, this was not because of partition or separation, but because state partition did not result in the *complete* separation of the ethnic groups, which created security dilemmas, thus reignited violence (e.g. Northern Ireland, Punjab and Kashmir, and the Jewish settlements in Palestine). In reflection of the second point, Kaufmann finds again that new conflicts occurred because the un-mixing of ethnic groups was not complete. Regarding the third point, Kaufmann (1999:224, 246) argues that the successor states are no less democratic than their predecessors or neighbours. Kaufmann (1999:248) thus concludes that the criticism based on the above three points is unfounded.

In reflection of Kaufmann's assertions, Lijphart (1991:493-4) holds that in the majority of cases, state partition and ethnic separation are not practical solutions. Lijphart points out that geographically mixed ethnic groups, the economic and human costs of large population exchanges, and the question of the fair division of land and national resources, makes this option unfeasible. Griggs (1997:12) also holds that the existence of intermarriage and the Hutu majority (85%) makes this option impractical. In addition, Griggs holds, population exchanges will be as destabilising as the current crisis, and partition might offer land reform, however it will not change productivity because there would be no increase in land. Yet in addition, Griggs argues, the chances of increased decentralisation (democratisation) owing to the removal of ethnic tensions or increased centralisation (autocracy) as tensions heighten at an inter-state level, are even. Lemarchand (1996:165) also concludes that state partition and population transfers are politically objectionable, and thus do not deserve serious consideration.

Griggs (1997) also advocates spatial designs for peace as the solution to the conflict in Burundi. Unlike Kaufmann however, Griggs does not advocate state partition and ethnic separation, but 'softer' borders and/or the redrawing of national boundaries.⁶² Griggs (1997:8-12) lists eight proposed solutions and utilises a scale of

⁶² Griggs applies his model in the context of the whole of the Great Lakes. Thus he applies broad strokes which might over-emphasise spatial designs as influenced by factors in cases outside of Burundi. Granted however, the Burundi conflict cannot be studied outside of the context of the Great Lakes, so is the case with any peace proposals.

zero to five to evaluate each of them, each according to seven factors. Thus, a perfect score for each solution would be 35 (i.e. 5 points X 7 factors). The seven factors identified as requirements for an effective resolution of the conflict are: (1) transparency and consensus, (2) a regional approach, (3) decentralised political structures, (4) reduced export dependency, (5) land reform, (6) intervention into conflict-producing discursive practices; and (7) 'softer' boundaries. Griggs assesses the eight proposed solutions according to these seven factors, and lists the proposed solutions as: (1) peace-keeping forces, (2) peace-building forces, (3) council of elders, (4) power sharing, (5) protectorate, (6) partition, (7) Berlin II conference, and (8) confederation. Confederation receives the highest points with 29 points out of a possible perfect score of 35, followed by Berlin II conference with 21 points. The notion of peace-building forces receives 11 points, followed by the council of elders at nine points and partitioning at seven points. The other solutions receive points ranging from six to one. Thus, the two proposals that address the problem of ill-fitting political boundaries (confederation and Berlin II conference) earn the highest overall scores than proposals that rely on force or the new distribution of power within the existing territorial confines of the state.⁶³

Griggs (1997:12) holds that a confederation will result in 'softer' boundaries and a geography of autonomous and loosely aligned states, regions and city-states. However, Griggs concedes that entrenched power relations might be an obstacle to finding such consensus. Regarding the Berlin II conference, Griggs holds that this will entail renegotiating boundaries between states in order to rationalise the sizes of the states, distribute resources more intelligibly, align cultural and political boundaries, and eliminate the land-locked status of states. Yet again however, Griggs concedes that this may be a highly contentious matter. It is the contention here that these two proposals may be desirable, and if applied may end the conflict, however they are impractical and may result in destabilisation and crises greater than the presently experienced. This is the reason why the former OAU and the current AU have advocated against changing these colonially inherited boundaries, despite their artificial nature and the hardships they impose on many African states.

In reflection of Kaufmann and Griggs' proposals, it would appear that Burundi parties have not put forward spatial designs for peace as considerations. Jan Van Eck (interview with author, October 31, 2003) holds that in this sense Burundians are contradictory. Van Eck points out that whilst the history of Burundi promotes a strengthening of ethnic loyalty, Burundians themselves have a strong sense of nationalism and deep pride and commitment to the country Burundi. Van Eck holds that this commitment is always expressed, especially when outsiders suggest creating a Hutu-stan and a Tutsi-stan. It is also emphasised in the Arusha Agreement (2000:161) that "(a)ll parties agreed that Burundi is one Nation". Given this position then, other solutions that leave the state and ethnic groups intact, will have to be considered.

4.3.2 Power Sharing

The notion of power sharing as the solution to the conflict has been the most dominant in the peace process in Burundi. The Arusha peace process and its outcome the Arusha Agreement, which remains the premise in the peace process, and the Pretoria peace process, and one of its outcomes, the Burundi Power-Sharing Agreement, including the new interim constitution, all champion the power sharing approach to peace. In his

⁶³ Refer to Griggs (1997:8-12) for an explanation of the eight proposed solutions, and the seven factors identified as requirements for an effective resolution of the conflict.

book *Mission Possible*, former Burundi President Pierre Buyoya has also maintained that "(p)ower sharing is inevitable because it is the only way of guaranteeing a peaceful future for the country and thus protection for the Tutsi minority" (cited in International Crisis Group, 1998:12). Lijphart (1991:493) also contends that besides partition or secession, power sharing is the only feasible solution to conflicts articulated along ethnic terms. In support of this view, Zartman (1995b:271) holds that national-unity governments and power sharing arrangements contribute to peace by harnessing all factions with responsibility and fostering the notion that electoral losers still have a stake in government. In contrast, as a report of the UN Secretary-General states, on a number of occasions Agathon Rwasa's FNL have rejected the Arusha Agreement on the basis that it is a power sharing deal between political elites that neither addresses the plight of the disenfranchised nor brings them into the peace process (Annan, 2004:2).

In reflection of the foregoing, it should be kept in mind that there has been previous power sharing agreements and attempts at peace in Burundi. One can cite as an example, the failure of the 1994 *Convention of Government* brokered by Ould Abdalla, the onetime UN special envoy to Burundi. As Bentley and Southall (2005:28) explain, this agreement provided for power sharing between the two (then) dominant Burundi political parties, the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA and Hutu-dominated FRODEBU. Bentley and Southall (2005:xi) further correctly point out that the history of Burundi is punctuated by a number of failed attempts at peace, ceasefires and broken agreements. In addition, power sharing *has* been a hallmark of Burundi politics since independence as outlined in chapter 3. Conflicts erupted despite such arrangements. Mwami Mwambutsa, Michel Micombero, Pierre Buyoya, and Melchior Ndadaye, have all delved into power sharing governments. Even Jean-Baptiste Bagaza's government had Hutu in cabinet and Parliament, albeit proportionally less than previous and subsequent governments in Burundi. What would make the current power sharing deal succeed where others have failed? A number of factors need to be considered to answer this question. In this regard, Lijphart (1991:494-5) lists four key components of power sharing:

- Joint exercise of government, especially executive, power.
- Group autonomy on ethnic issues.
- Proportionality in political representation, distribution of government funds, and public employment.
- Minority veto on issues of vital importance.

Regarding the joint exercise of power, Lijphart states that this can take the form of a coalition cabinet, or the distribution of the presidency and other high offices between the ethnic groups. Group autonomy on the other hand can take the form of federalism if the ethnic groups are concentrated, if not, group autonomy can take non-territorial forms. In addition, proportionality affords fair distribution of national resources. Minority veto, on the other hand, serves as the ultimate protection for minorities in cases where they are outvoted or overruled. Lijphart however warns that there is a danger if the veto is overused. Thus he prescribes that veto power should not be used frequently, and should be used only in matters of vital interest.

A number of Burundi's previous governments have (somewhat) fulfilled the first requirement of the joint exercise of executive government power. Political, economic and military power, however, have always been tilted in favour of Tutsi. With the current agreement, Tutsi will yet again be overrepresented, with 40% representation both in the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly, and 50% representation both in the Senate and the security forces. In addition, because the political incumbents did not have electoral mandate (i.e. the

governments of Michel Micombero, 1966-1976, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, 1976-1987, and Pierre Buyoya, 1987-1993 and 1996-2001)⁶⁴, it is unlikely that power was exercised jointly in representation of the ethnic groups. The likely scenario is that Hutu incumbents were co-opted in what were essentially Tutsi governments. Hence, the distribution of government funds, public employment, and political representation, has always been largely the private domain of Tutsi, especially after the demise of the monarchy in 1966. To correct this, the Arusha Agreement and the Power Sharing Agreement make provision for more proportional distribution of representation and national resources. However, as stated above, the Tutsi will still be overrepresented.

In addition to the foregoing, there is no evidence to suggest that the other two components have ever been fulfilled in Burundi. In fact, for many years, Burundi governments have argued that there are no Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa in Burundi, only Burundians. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza's government even made such ethnic references illegal. Will the current power sharing arrangement fulfil all these requirements? Clearly, the Arusha Agreement and the Power Sharing Agreement, whose provisions are included in the new constitution, do not make provision for autonomy on ethnic issues and a minority veto on issues of vital importance. Do these half-hearted attempts at power sharing account for the previous failures, and will they result in the failure of the present arrangement? Clearly, Lijphart (1991:503) states that the four components of power sharing are not complete unless all four are included, i.e. the components are inseparable and will lend themselves to optimal utility if all four are present.

However, it would seem that autonomy on ethnic issues might not be a necessary condition for peace in the case of Burundi. As Joseph Topangu points out (interview with author, September 12, 2005), autonomy on ethnic issues "...would mean that the different components of the population have freedom to deal with aspects of life that are specific to their group as a particular entity.... Unfortunately, this does not apply to Burundi where distinction between 'ethnic groups' is only based on body morphology. The various components of the Burundian society (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa and Ganwa) share the same culture, language, food and land. They DO NOT have cultural ceremonies whatsoever that concerns one of the groups while keeping away the others. The only 'ethnic issue' in Burundi is the one about power and wealth sharing". Regarding minority veto, Joseph Topangu holds that the issue "...is not explicitly mentioned in the Burundian legislation. The legislation requires decisions to be taken by consensus or when the 2/3 of the institutions give their approval. Since they represent between 40% and 50% of the institutions (50% in the Senate, 40% in the Assembly and the Government) the Tutsi have a 'de facto' minority veto but this is not written as such in the Law". This is even more disquieting. Given the history of Burundi, this 'de facto' veto and the continuing disproportional representation of the Tutsi may have the undesired effect of perpetuating Tutsi dominance. It is also significant to note that the Twa, despite being the most excluded, do not have this 'de facto' veto.

In addition to the arrangement not fulfilling all the requirements of power sharing, the conditions in Burundi may not be favourable to power sharing as such. According to Lijphart (1991:497-8), the following factors are favourable conditions for power sharing. The first two conditions are the most important:

- The absence of a majority ethnic group;

⁶⁴ From 2001 to 2003, Pierre Buyoya ruled in the context of the Transitional Government in accordance with the Arusha Agreement. See the above section titled *The Actors and Issues in the Peace Process* and chapter 2.

- The absence of large socio-economic inequity;
- The ethnic groups must be roughly of equal size, to provide 'balance';
- There should not be too many groups, complicating negotiations;
- The total population must be relatively small, to mitigate complex decision-making;
- The presence of external dangers, to promote internal unity;
- Overarching loyalties, reducing particularistic ethnic loyalties;
- Geographical concentration of ethnic groups;
- Prior traditions of compromise and accommodation.

From the foregoing clearly, the conditions in Burundi are not favourable for power sharing. The Hutu form an overwhelming majority and thus 'balance' cannot be achieved. The power sharing arrangement envisages 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi in the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly and an even 50 percent in the Senate and Security Forces. Thus, the glaring flaw of the power sharing arrangement is that the rigid ethnic quotas envisaged are not proportional to the actual demography in Burundi, widely considered as 85 percent Hutu, 14 percent Tutsi, and one percent Twa. To fulfil the requirement of 'proportionality' with these demographics, two options are possible: the minority would perpetually be at the mercy of the majority, or to avoid this, the minority will have undue overrepresentation. The second option was chosen in the case of Burundi, tilting the 'balance' in favour of Tutsi. Lijphart (1991:500) also states that the solutions to the question of the existence of a majority ethnic group are: (1) majority under-representation and minority overrepresentation, (2) or the far reaching form, parity in representation for all ethnic groups.

Concerning Lijphart's other conditions, there is large socio-economic inequity between the ethnic groups in Burundi. In addition, there are no external dangers threatening the integrity of the state that would promote internal unity, the nation is at war with itself. It is also doubtful whether an overarching Burundi identity is strong enough to mitigate ethnic loyalties, especially when the political and socio-economic conditions that inspired these ethnic loyalties in the first place persist. Yet again, the ethnic groups are intermingled in the same geographical areas and thus the conflict mitigating effect of federalism or local autonomy cannot be achieved (except non-territorial forms of group autonomy). Yet in addition, the history of Burundi indicates that for every example of compromise, there are a number of examples of confrontation, and the incidence of accommodation is only exceeded by the incidence of exclusion. There are only two favourable conditions as set out by Lijphart, namely: a relatively small population (estimated between 6 and 7 million), and not too many groups (Burundi has, essentially, three 'ethnic' groups).

It is conceded in the Arusha Agreement (2000:159) that "(t)he question has arisen whether the proposals are 'balanced'. The proposals certainly tilt the democratic framework in favour of Tutsi participation and security.... The real question for the Bureau was not whether such a proposal was undemocratic, or even whether there was any precedent elsewhere for such an arrangement. It was whether the Burundi, given the circumstances and history of Burundi, would support it". It would appear that 'given the circumstances and history of Burundi', the Hutu majority have made the required concessions. In support of such concessions, Lijphart (1991:499) states that there should be a distinction between power sharing as normative theory, and power sharing as empirical theory. Power sharing as empirical theory has as its object, the objective explanation and prediction of the likelihood or unlikelihood of success from observable cases. On the other hand power sharing as normative theory, advocate power sharing in multi-ethnic societies because it is the optimal, if not the only

solution, regardless of favourable or unfavourable conditions. In addition, Lijphart (cited in Lemarchand, 1996:161) holds that power sharing need not be any particular institutional arrangement. It can be a principle guiding overarching cooperation at the elite level in ethnically (or culturally) fragmented societies.

In support of the foregoing, Joseph Topangu (interview with author, September 12, 2005) also holds that “(w)hile in the past the exercise of power was noticeably dominated by Tutsis, the present...institutions are much more ethnically balanced not only between Hutus and Tutsis, but also including Twa and Ganwa.... The ‘60/40’ power sharing quota in Burundi between Hutus and Tutsis is regarded by many observers as being unbalanced.... One might think that this unbalanced quota was dictated by the Tutsi lobby in order to retain as much power and advantages as they can for their ethnic group”. However, Joseph Topangu asks the question, “(a)fter forty years of...[differential access to education] the result is that today roughly 80% of educated Burundians are Tutsi with the majority Hutus representing only about 20%. The question is: As a neutral observer in the Burundian situation, would one realistically advise drawing 85% of staff in the state administration, the army, police and business from a group that represents 20% of the country’s brains and reserve 14% of the positions to a group that represents 80% of the educated people”?⁶⁵

There is no easy answer to the dilemma pointed out by Joseph Topangu. In the final analysis however, a question needs to be asked in view of the foregoing, namely: To what extent is this ethnic balancing resolving conflict-generating conditions in Burundi? The quotas may be useful as an interim confidence building measure. However, in the long term, the system of quotas without adequately addressing the underlying conditions of the conflict will detract from any condition of achieved peace. Griggs (1997:11) also contends that power sharing fails because it achieves a compromise between the actors but does little to address underlying structural problems. Thus, simply getting the numbers right, using whichever formula, might in future prove to be the weakest link in the peace process. As Jooma (2005:1) warns, “...a narrow focus on the ‘ethnic’ composition of Burundi’s state institutions may mask deeply embedded structural causes of conflict, most notably the unequal distribution of, and access to resources”, relating to what has been called patterns and dimensions of exclusion in this study. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:34-5) also warns that the internal dynamics of the political economy of Burundi are still relatively intact, and point out that this ‘irrational’ system was put in place in the 1960s and survived four large-scale onslaughts. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko conclude that external factors destabilised the system in Burundi. The system did not implode.⁶⁶ Given the foregoing, what are the prospects for peace in Burundi?

4.4 PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN BURUNDI

It must be made possible for the people of Burundi to materially distinguish between the destructiveness of conflict and the benefits of peace. - Nelson Mandela⁶⁷

The above citation goes to the heart of the position as appropriated in this study, namely: peace is more than the absence of war or violent conflict. The end state of conflict resolution in Burundi must be positive peace,

⁶⁵ Joseph Topangu gives all these percentages as rough estimates. The 85% and 14% are derived from the actual demography in Burundi, believed to be 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa.

⁶⁶ Nkurunziza and Ngaruko mention the ‘wave of democracy that swept the continent in the early 1990s’, the genocide in Rwanda, and the war in the DRC, as examples of these external factors.

⁶⁷ Cited in International Crisis Group (2003:9).

including the adequate attainment of equality and social justice. Given this position, what then, are the prospects for sustainable positive peace in Burundi? Before answering this question, conceptual clarity between conflict settlement and conflict resolution is necessary. As International Alert (1996:16) point out, conflict settlement refers to an agreement about a particular aspect of the conflict, but not the conflict as a whole. Thus, conflict settlement may result in latent conflict from which a new cycle of violence may occur, because it addresses the interests of the parties, but does not fully address the underlying conditions for conflict. Arguable, with the various agreements and the institutions of an electoral calendar, this is the stage where the conflict in Burundi is at. Conflict resolution on the other hand, is a comprehensive outcome where the underlying conditions and residual elements of the conflict are adequately removed. International Alert identifies (1996:16) seven dimensions of conflict resolution:

- *Completeness – the issues in the conflict have disappeared or cease to be important.*
- *Acceptability – the outcome is acceptable to all parties, not just to one or to their elites.*
- *Self-supporting – there is no necessity for third party sanctions to maintain the agreement.*
- *Satisfactory – all parties perceive the outcome as just according to their value system.*
- *Uncompromising – no goals have been sacrificed in the form of compromised solutions.*
- *Innovative – the solution establishes new, positive and legitimate relations between parties.*
- *Uncoerced – the agreement was arrived at without imposition by an outside force.*

Conceived in these terms, clearly the conflict in Burundi has not been resolved yet. However, as International Alert (1996:17) concedes, "(t)hese criteria are extremely demanding and few conflicts can be said to have ended so completely. A satisfactory settlement is often the best that can be attained". In the case of Burundi then, what will constitute a 'satisfactory settlement'? The answers in this regard, are proposed below.

4.4.1 Reconstructing the State

As outlined in chapter 2, clearly the nature of the state in Burundi, in its current form, cannot sustain any achieved condition of peace. The state has failed to fulfil the functions required of it to pass as a state, including the ability to provide for: national integration; law, order and justice; physical security; social services; economic opportunity and political representation; and legitimate government. The state has also become an instrument of group domination; a repository of wealth, privilege and power (security) where many are excluded. As Zartman (1995b) and Mbaku (1999) pose the question, how then, can the state be reconstructed and made relevant for the rest of society? Is this even achievable? This study identifies the reconstruction of the state (used in a similar sense as 'state-building') as a peace imperative for Burundi. In this regard, the following factors are proposed as necessary preconditions for peace.

4.4.1.1 Political Reconstruction

What is wrong with the current peace process, and how do the peace plans measure up to the reality on the ground? In essence, the main fault is that the power-sharing agreement reflects compromises, affect only the actors, and address the symptoms of the conflict, without adequately addressing the underlying conditions of the conflict, which include the exclusion of the 'other' from meaningful political participation. Thus, it is only through politics of inclusion that provide meaningful political participation for all, and a legitimate and broad-

based representative government, which stands for the values and aspirations of the majority, that lasting peace can be ensured. This majority, of course, cannot be solely defined in ethnic terms. In this regard, it is also noted in the Arusha Agreement (2000:158) that "(i)n the longer term all parties have agreed that Burundi is required to develop a political party system founded on the aggregation of political rather than [ethnic] group interests". This is as yet lacking. Alusala (2005:2) points out that currently none of the political parties appears to have moved out of the confines of their ethnic enclaves.

In reflection of the foregoing, as Lake and Rothchild (1998:310) perceptively point out, power sharing is inevitably fragile and by necessity a transitional arrangement. Lake and Rothchild point out that ethnic balance of power is constantly evolving. In addition, ethnic balancing does not, in itself, guarantee proportional group *influence*. Thus by fixing the balance of power, power sharing perpetuates group domination. Despite power sharing arrangements, the objective reality and subjective perception of disproportional group influence may prove to be a bone of contention in future, and will most likely reignite conflict. Regarding this disproportionate group influence, Lemarchand (1996:164) also concludes that power sharing will not survive the strains and stresses generated by the profound socio-economic inequalities between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi.

Reflective of Lake and Rothchild and Lemarchand's assertions, the power sharing approach treats Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, as monolithic entities. The patterns of exclusion in Burundi indicate that this is not the case. As Ndikumana (2004:12) reiterates a point made in chapter 2, the patterns of exclusion have pitted Tutsi from the south and Hutu from the rest of the country (including those from Muramvya), Hutu from the south and Hutu from the rest of the country, and Twa. The patterns of exclusion have also historically, pitted different dynastic groups. In addition, as again illustrated in chapter 2, there is a historically dichotomous relationship between Banyaruguru and Hima (Tutsi groups), and between Bayanzi and Bashingo (Hima clans). Thus fractionalisation in Burundi is more fluid and dynamic than fixed into two or three poles, as purported under power sharing. Melchior Ndadaye also concluded in 1991 that "(t)here is no rationale whatsoever behind the 50/50 rule in cabinet appointments..." (cited in Lemarchand, 1996:166).

By fixing fractionalisation into two or three poles, the power sharing approach limits the incentives for political parties to move out of their ethnic enclaves and to reinvent themselves into inclusive and attractive mass-popular movements. There is no incentive to form political values, norms, and practices that would be equally shared and respected. Clearly two or three 'Burundis' cannot co-exist within the territorial confines of a single state. In this regard, a similar position was held by the CNDD-FDD before the 2001 break up, and the apparent change of heart. As Bentley and Southall (2005:80) state, in September 2000 this group issued a 12-point position paper denouncing the 'Arusha segregationists', and the apparent drive towards 'separate development'. This position paper concluded that 'no (lasting) solution could be found which embedded ethnic quotas'. Notwithstanding possible reservations about the tone or motivation of these statements, what is clear is that dichotomy cannot be the basis of a unitary state's political system.

Zartman (1995b:271) has argued that power sharing contributes to peace by harnessing all factions with responsibility and fostering the notion that electoral losers still have a stake in government. Zartman's observations are valid to a point. However, perhaps the answer lies with an electoral system based on proportional representation in a multiparty system, not power sharing arrangements as such. In a proportional representation and a multiparty system where parties, formed around political issues (not ethnicity), get power

relative to votes received, the same results as envisaged by Zartman can be achieved, and more. The system not only fosters inclusiveness and harnessing all parties with responsibility, but also allows and provides incentives for groups to adjust to the evolving balance of power and to seek ways of accommodation and compromise. The system also lends the incumbent with legitimacy emanating from a direct electoral mandate. It should be realised that it is only through an electoral mandate that political parties can be meaningfully held accountable, and are most likely to become responsive to the electorate. In a power sharing arrangement, the electorate has no power over who represents them, and the political incumbents do not have an incentive to be accountable and responsive because they can access power notwithstanding any electoral choice. Thus, notwithstanding who is in power, as long as the government is not responsive and is unaccountable, the crisis of governance in Burundi will remain a conflict-generating condition. In the final analysis, political parties that are unable to garner the necessary electoral support have simply no business in government.

It should however be noted that proportional representation has its own pitfalls. For example, dominant political parties may still marginalise smaller parties in the exercise of power, and political representation may still follow exclusive ethnic lines. Thus, this study does not prescribe proportional representation as a constitutional device to end the conflict in Burundi. Rather, proportional representation is proposed as the most likely system that can reverse the conflict-generating conditions in Burundi as created by the history of exclusive governance. Proportional representation is also proposed in the context of advancing a variety of factors that are put forward as 'the necessary and sufficient conditions for sustainable peace'.⁶⁸ Thus, the key to sustainable peace in Burundi does not lie with who governs (Tutsi or Hutu). Sustainable peace is contingent upon *how* Burundi is governed. An alternative to a Tutsi oligarchy and the zero-sum game that have characterised Burundi politics under Tutsi rule is not only necessary but also a fundamental condition for peace. The alternative cannot merely be the Hutu turn 'to eat', to use the words of Jean-François Bayart (1993). As Horowitz (1993:18-9) points out, the danger in deeply divided societies is that democracy can provide clear lines of inclusion and exclusion in relation to access to power and privileges. Therefore, Horowitz argues, democracy in ethnically divided societies has a special obligation that goes beyond the usual democratic problem of assuring decent treatment of the opposition.

In support of Arend Lijphart's view (cited above), Horowitz's 'special obligation' should not take the form of an institutional power sharing arrangement as such. Rather, it should be a guiding principle of governance, a system of governance based on inclusiveness, sensitivity and responsiveness to divergent group interests. Thus, it is the contention here that, in essence, the alternative to the Tutsi oligarchy means a transformation of the patterns of governance in Burundi. Hutu power should not equal Tutsi exclusion, or worse, elimination, and vice versa. If not, democracy would mean the replacement of an exclusive minority Tutsi power with an exclusive majority Hutu power. Proportional representation should not have the purpose of guaranteeing ethnically defined majoritarian democracy, but to guarantee individual rights based on individual choice.

The foregoing is not only an ideal but also a peace imperative, which is by no means unachievable. Burundi does have a prior history of accommodation. The historically recent example of the 1993 elections results illustrates this. As Reyntjens (1993:574) points out, in the Presidential elections of 1993 Pierre Buyoya (Tutsi)

⁶⁸ The discussion on proportional representation in this study is limited in scope. Since it is not the intention to prescribe proportional representation as a 'stand-alone' solution to the conflict, proportional representation is not discussed in any detail. Horowitz (1985, 1991, 1993) and Reilly (1997) may be useful sources for a study on proportional representation.

received 32 percent of the votes, indicating that a sizable number of Hutu voted for him. It should also be added that Buyoya received these votes despite the dictatorial and exclusive nature of his previous government. Reyntjens also points out that it was well known that Melchior Ndadaye (Hutu) enjoyed some Tutsi support. Reyntjens (1993:569-570) further holds that Pierre Buyoya even lost in his home province of Bururi. Melchior Ndadaye received over 50 percent of the votes in Bururi. A province that was considered an UPRONA and Tutsi stronghold. A province that has accounted for the largest number of Tutsi leaders, in and outside of government, since 1965. Clearly voting patterns did not reflect strict ethnic lines. In addition, Melchior Ndadaye's government, despite winning the majority of votes in elections, was inclusive of the ethnic groups in Burundi. Hutu and Tutsi are not monolithic entities.

In reflection of the aforementioned, Lemarchand (1996:137) agrees that in theory the preservation of national unity implies the rejection of majorities based on ethnic ties. This is the position that was brought forward by the 1989 Commission on National Unity: "On the basis of the fact that the Hutu are more numerous than the other ethnic groups, the divisionists would have people believe that this group should hold power in proportion to their numbers, thus purely and simply confusing political majority with demographic majority. This theory is based on two fundamental errors, namely the denial of the Burundian nation and a misconception of democracy" (cited in Lemarchand (1989:689). However as Lemarchand (1996:138) points out, "(i)t is one thing...to recognise the merits of political, as distinct from demographic, majorities and quite another to ask Hutu voters to forget their collective identities". Lemarchand concludes that Hutus have shared experiences as members of a 'martyred' community, and continue to have grievances regarding what is perceived as 'intolerable denials of their human and political rights'.

The history of Burundi would also point that ethno-politics, what Lemarchand (1996:137) terms 'mobilised ethnicity', will continue and persist to define group relations in Burundi. Thus, in such cases as in Burundi, 'the slate simply cannot be wiped clean'; the past will inevitably always creep up in political discourse and decision-making. However, Lemarchand (1996:137) points out, mobilised ethnicity presupposes the existence of social and political conditions that make the ethnic group as a whole identify with the destinies of its individual members. It follows then, that as these social and political conditions persist, so would mobilised ethnicity/ethno-politics. *The point then is to transform these social and political conditions!* Thus, given the historical crisis of meaningful political participation and the general correlation between ethnic origin and socio-economic status in Burundi, it also follows that politics in general, and voting patterns in particular, may reflect this historical crisis of political participation and this correlation between ethnicity and socio-economic status. The general correlation between ethnic origin and socio-economic status, favouring Tutsis, will also continue for some time despite any present or future intervention. This is the trade-off, the burden formed by the history of Burundi of which Tutsis played no small part. It is a burden and the price of peace that all Burundians, in the interim, must be called upon to bear and pay.

4.4.1.2 *Reconstructing Social Relations*

It is ironic that the solution to a conflict largely articulated in exclusive ethnic terms, is itself conceptualised, articulated, and operationalised in the same exclusive ethnic terms. The dangers are clear: two or three poles of social categories constantly opposed to each other. These centres will not only solidify ethnic categories, but will also limit the incentive to adjust values, interests and views, and will stifle the search for cross-ethnic

accommodation. Ethnic groups have no incentives to modify negative perceptions of each other and to form a unified nation. In this regard, social programmes are needed to reconstruct social relations in Burundi. The point is not to obliterate ethnicity. Even if this was desirable or possible, the history of Burundi and the nature of the conflict have made this near impossible. Rather, the point is to reduce the acute conditions that inform the incidence of conflict articulated in ethnic terms. Ethnic difference need not equal conflict, or antagonism. As Clifford Geertz points out, "(t)he is a difference between a difference and a dichotomy. The first is a comparison and it relates; the second is a severance, and it isolates" (cited in Jackson, 2002:1).

In addition to the foregoing, it should be stated that the emphasis of the power sharing approach on the protection of the numerical minority is misplaced. As illustrated in chapters 2 and 3, whilst Tutsi are a numerical minority, they have always been, for conservatively a period of more than three decades, a political and socio-economic majority in Burundi. The Hutu, despite being a numerical majority, they have always been a political and socio-economic minority. Twa, on the other hand, are not only a numerical minority, but they are also a political and socio-economic minority. Thus, the notion that Tutsis need protection as a minority applies equally, if not more, as forcefully to Hutu and Twa. Thus, social programmes should not only be aimed at protecting the numerical minority, but correcting acute and human-induced imbalances. In essence, eradicating socio-economic stratification based on ethnic lines. With a ranking of 173 out of 177 countries (2003 and 2004 figures) on the HDI, the state in Burundi has not only failed as an economic entity but also as a form of social organisation. Thus in addition to reversing ethnic imbalances, Burundi needs to meet the basic human needs of the vast majority of its populace.

Social programmes should also be aimed at the conflict fuelling political discourses and mythico-histories in Burundi. *Inter alia*, relating to the earliest inhabitants of Burundi; the nature of the pre-colonial political and socio-economic system and social relations; the impact of colonialism on conflict, socio-economic relations, and ethnicity; and most importantly, the nature of the post-colonial state. These issues cannot be addressed in the same terms as characterised by the half-truths and distortions of the 1989 report of the Commission on National Unity (discussed in chapter 3). Solutions to such discourses and mythico-histories are imperative for peace. Van Eck (interview with the author, October 31, 2003) confirms this position: "If it is true that having a common history is a fundamental requirement for being a nation, then Hutu and Tutsi belong to two different nations. Virtually every Hutu and Tutsi I know (mostly the leadership) have a totally different interpretation of their collective history". The need for national coherence is also recognised in the Arusha Agreement (2000:121) which envisages a national reconciliation programme that will include a historical study that will lead to a common (and hopefully less conflictual) interpretation of the history of Burundi.

Social categories in Burundi must be reconstructed into more inclusive civic identities. Thus, ethnic loyalties should not supersede national interests. However, it would seem that this is as yet lacking. As Jooma (2005:13) ponders this point, clearly lacking, is a sense of common purpose or 'national vision'. Jooma states that "(t)he lack of clarity on what should be the basis of building a new state leaves several questions unanswered". Probably this is because politics in Burundi, and the negotiations process, have been largely elitist. Griggs (1997:9) holds that the members of civil society must be brought to the fold, and points out that many of them have been united against violence but consistently ignored because they lack a militia. Van Eck (2001:6) also points out that the 'gap' between the political class and ordinary Burundians need to be bridged.

In the same vein, Van Eck (2004:2) argues, the perception that the peace process only benefits elites (on both sides) needs to be addressed.

Clearly, Burundians need to formulate a vision of what consensus will consider a 'just society'. This is the only way that different ethnic groups can harmoniously co-exist within a single state. This is not unachievable. As indicated in chapter 2, dichotomous social relations were largely constructed they are not primordial. They were constructed in the context of unequal access to political and economic resources, patronage, persecution and repression of different groups. It follows then that this context must be eradicated. It also follows that if there is political will, these exclusive social categories can be deconstructed and reconstructed into inclusive social categories. Succinctly stated, a new contract of social relations is a peace imperative for Burundi.

4.4.1.3 Economic Reconstruction

The economy of Burundi has largely reflected the 'politics of the belly' where the aspiration and exercise of government power has been with the express intention to accumulate wealth for a select minority and to exclude the vast majority. This dimension of exclusion has also contributed to the failure of the state in Burundi. Clearly, the state, as an economic entity that has failed to provide meaningful economic opportunity for the vast majority, needs to be reconstructed. The persistence of such failure will detract from any achieved condition of peace. Ziyad Limam's perceptive observation has relevance in this regard: "With nothing to eat, the right to vote is derisible!" (cited in Lemarchand, 1992:99-100). Thus, as long as the minimal standards of economic well-being are not met, democracy will remain a distant objective. Jooma's (2005) article, *We Can't Eat the Constitution*, speaks squarely on this view. According to Jooma (2005:1), durable peace in Burundi is contingent upon the implementation of Protocol IV of the Arusha Agreement, which deals with reconstruction, economic development, refugees and IDPs. It is also acknowledged in the Arusha Agreement (2000:143) that "...lasting peace is impossible so long as a definitive solution is not found to the problem of refugees and *Sinistrés* [i.e. IDPs]. Likewise, peace is impossible so long as the country's wealth is not shared equitably".

There are however challenges relating to the reinsertion and reintegration of the refugees and IDPs. One of the key agencies in this regard is the Ministry of Reintegration and Resettlement of Displaced and Repatriated Refugees (MRRDR), which was created in 1994. In addition, the Arusha Agreement has created the National Commission for the rehabilitation of *Sinistrés* (IDPs), the CNRS. There is also a sub-committee of the CNRS (established in 2003), which deals specifically with issues relating to land, and a National Fund for *Sinistrés*. There are, however, challenges relating to the functioning of all these agencies and the lack of funds for the implementation of their mandates. Of the \$62.3 million (US) needed for the 2005 repatriation programme, donors have so far provided only \$8.4 million (US), representing only 14 percent of the required funds (Jooma, 2005:3-4, 6; Oketch and Huggins, 2004:2; Clover, 2004:73). This lack of funding will also constrain efforts to compensate people who cannot be resettled, or who opt for compensation.

In addition, Jooma (2005:8-9, 13) and Oketch and Huggins (2004:2, 4) indicate that there is a legal and regulatory vacuum regarding land tenure in Burundi. Land tenure is defined by the number of years that a person occupies land. The most recent update on the Land Code, published as a draft in May 2004, reduces the number of years, as stipulated in the 1986 Land Code, from 30 to 15 years. This means that the people whose land has been occupied as early as 1988 would not qualify to reclaim their land. This also includes

about 40 000 refugee families who lost their land in 1972. The people who lost their land in 1993 will also be hard-pressed to process their claims before the deadline. These issues need to be addressed. As Oketch and Huggins (2004:1) points out, the land disputes relating to the return of refugees in 1993 is seen as one of the factors that led to the deterioration of the political situation that culminated in the 1993 coup attempt and the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye.

There are also challenges regarding the distribution of the country's wealth in the context of the current structure of the economy in Burundi. In this regard, the dependency on primary commodities is clearly not sustainable in an economy that depends on coffee, tea and cotton to earn over 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. In addition, over 90 percent of the population is involved in subsistence agriculture. A report of the UN Secretary General estimates the population at 6.9 million (2004 figure), with only 0.8 hectares of land available per family (Annan, 2004:6). Clearly, the structure of the economy does not lend itself to the creation of wealth and livelihood sources. As mentioned in the Arusha Agreement (2000:132), the diversification of the economy was one of the objectives of the structural adjustment programme starting in 1986. This objective was never achieved.

In addition, a government controlled economy and an over-bloated and ineffective public sector are both unsustainable and unaffordable. Burundi needs to diversify its economy and build the private sector in order to create wealth. In reflection, International Crisis Group (1999:ii) and Van Eck (1999:6) contend that Burundi needs a growing economy that can offer alternative (i.e. non-governmental) job opportunities and social mobility to reduce the struggle for political power. Ndikumana (2000:432) also argues that the economy needs to liberalise to limit the role of government as virtually the sole accumulator of wealth and to eradicate ethno-regional economic monopolies. However, Ndikumana is against the emphasis on free markets and reduced government involvement. In a country with a low-income (\$100 (US) GNI per capita) and facing high levels of poverty and inequality, Ndikumana argues, economic policy must go beyond the dogma of market-led growth to embrace economic justice through state-led egalitarian development.

In addition to all the economic challenges associated with the nature of the state in Burundi, there is also the challenge of rehabilitating the economy to its pre-1993 levels. As Jooma (2005:5) points out, the 2004 UN Consolidated Appeal received only 45 percent of the funds required. Of all the four donor roundtable on Burundi (2000, 2001, 2002, and 2004), and the recent meeting in Brussels, some \$1 billion (US) was pledged. However as Jooma points out, there is little to suggest that even 25 percent of this amount will materialise. Jooma (2005:6) also points out that as of March 2005, two million people require food aid in the northern provinces that are traditionally considered Burundi's food basket. In contrast, Kitevu and Lind (2001:1) hold, to the 1980s when Burundi was self-sufficient in food production. In this regard, the Arusha Agreement (2000:116) envisages reconstruction as the "...restoration of the living conditions of the population to their best [1993] previous level". It should be stated that it was under these same conditions that the conflict erupted. The envisaged results are clearly not enough. As Keen (1998:64-5, 67) points out, the end of Sudan's first civil war in 1972 did not lead to a more inclusive economic (and political) policy that addressed the problems of the underdeveloped south. Thus, the conditions that caused the war remained intact and eventually led to the next war. Keen thus argues that if reconstruction is aimed merely at recreating the political economy when the conflict began, it is unlikely to remedy the reasons why people took up arms to begin with.

Reflective of the aforementioned, Kaufmann (1996:158) argues that state building requires 'strengthening the state apparatus' so that the state can be able to accommodate varying interests and reduce the sources of conflict, i.e. adequately resourced government agencies that are responsive to all the populace. Similarly, Zartman (1995b:271-2) sees state reconstruction as requiring the restoration of the capacity of the state to extract resources and state ability to allocate resources. Zartman points out that in the interim, new resources are extensively reliant on foreign sources. However, this reliance must be limited; otherwise, the state will develop a habit on external reliance. On the other hand, Herbst (1992:108) has gone so far as to assert that micro-states like Burundi are not viable, and no matter what set of economic policies are adopted, might not develop. The reality, however, is that Burundians have to make do with the lack of natural resources and the size of the state as it is.

Given the size and land-locked status of the state, low human development, and lack of natural resources, a regional approach should be followed in development strategies. As Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2005:18) hold, "(w)ith 6 million people who are among the poorest in the world, Burundi is one of the smallest economies in Africa. In this light, it is difficult to envisage a development strategy based on the domestic markets". Kitevu and Lind (2001:4) also point out that, a small market, high transaction costs and lack of sufficient communication links, are some of the factors that limit the increased economic capacity of Burundi. Thus, Kitevu and Lind argue, closer economic ties with the countries in the region, through the East African Community (EAC), would create wealth for Burundi within an expanded Eastern Africa market. These views thus emphasise the need to achieve peace in the whole of the Great Lakes region.

4.4.1.4 *Reconstructing Other Dimensions of Exclusion*

It has already been established in chapter 2 that the education system and military service are two of the main dimensions that formed the foundation of the politics of exclusion, and served as tools of maintaining Tutsi dominance. Without the reconstruction of these two instruments of group dominance, there cannot be lasting peace in Burundi. Regarding the education system, Lemarchand (1996:138) points out that the legacy of decades of discrimination in the education system has produced a social pyramid in which the top positions within and outside the government are largely the monopoly of Tutsi elements. Jackson (2000:3) also points out that, *inter alia*, the changes in the army and its officer corps and changes in the justice system will ultimately depend on more Hutu being afforded educational opportunities. To remedy the education system two approaches are imperative: a regional approach and an ethnic approach.

Jackson (2000:3, 25) holds that in addition to Bururi province and the capital Bujumbura, the other favoured provinces are Makamba in the south, and Gitega, Mwaro and Muramvya in the centre, with Bubanza as the most deprived of education provisions. (Differential excess to educational opportunities in terms of ethnic groups and particularly the exclusion of the Hutu have already been outlined in chapter 2). In addition, Jackson (2000:30) emphasises that the Twa are even more marginalised in the education system and thus need special attention. In addition to provincial and ethnical exclusionary educational provisions, the education system in Burundi is in shambles. Jackson (2000:5, 10) holds that the education system has been described as 'catastrophic' and in 'a general crisis'. There is also the worrying phenomenon of the 'Balkanisation' of schools

where, since 1993, pupils only go to those schools where they feel secure.⁶⁹ In the Arusha Agreement (2000:118), it is mentioned that due to the costs of rehabilitating the education sector, it will be a major effort to bring the crude enrolment rates back to its pre-1993 levels, let alone exceed them. This is clearly not enough to reverse the effects of the history of differential access to education in Burundi. All these issues need serious reconsideration.

In view of the abovementioned, Jackson (2000:3-4) warns that changes in the education system should not benefit one group and in turn be seen to threaten the interests of others, i.e. there should not be a reduction in the quantity or quality of educational provision that is going to the currently favoured provinces or ethnic group. Jackson (2000:32-33) points out that the government already allocates about 21 percent of its budget to education. This is a high figure and there appears to be little room for its increase. For example, in primary education, 95 percent of this budget goes to the payment of salaries alone. Given the levels of income in Burundi, it is also unlikely that parents can cover the costs of education. A 1999 Education Ministry report states the following: "In fact, the average per capita income does not allow the great majority of Burundians to pay the cost of educating their children" (cited in Jackson, 2000:33). Thus, it is not only the rehabilitation of the education system that is required, but also a general increase in the quantity and quality of educational provisions. In view of the unlikelihood of such funds and provisions being generated in Burundi, Jackson (2000:4) contends that the only possible source of these new resources is the international donor community. In conclusion, Jackson (2000:5) warns that "(i)f access to education remains unequal for Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, and if the glaring disparities in education provision between different provinces persist, the exclusion that is at the root of Burundi's conflict will remain and any peace agreement will be short-lived".

The second main dimension that formed the foundation of the politics of exclusion in Burundi relate to the military and military service. The intervention of the military in Burundi's politics dates from 1965 and since then the military have effectively had a monopoly on the change of governments. Burundi needs clearly defined civil-military relations, where the military is subservient to the political order and can truly fulfil the function it was meant for, namely: *an instrument of policy*. As Ndikumana (2000:443) points out, the events in 1993 have revealed that winning the elections does not guarantee political power. A military dominated by one ethnic group, serving as an instrument of group domination, and having a monopoly on the change of government, cannot be politically neutral. Ndikumana further invalidates the claim that the military is an 'insurance policy' for the Tutsi. Clearly, this is only valid for the Tutsi elite, Ndikumana argues, and points out that the military has not guaranteed the safety of the vast majority of Tutsi. Ndikumana (2004:22) further contends that the military should be reformed to reflect not only the ethnic makeup of the country, but also the regional imbalances. The foregoing is provided for in the Arusha Agreement. However, what remains is implementation. Thus, these provisions will have to be implemented in the post-transitional period, in spirit and to the letter, to avoid the derailment of the peace process.

Closely related to military service is the culture of impunity and the partiality of the judiciary in Burundi. In this regard, the eradication of the culture of impunity by security forces and armed groups is also a peace imperative in Burundi. Reyntjens (2001:16) points out that there is a long list of massacres of civilians attributed equally to the armed groups and the army. According to Reyntjens, this subsumes the illegal arrests and detention in a

⁶⁹ The state of the education system and the impact of the conflict on education in Burundi are beyond the scope of this study. However, Jackson (2000) is a useful start for anyone interested in the education system of Burundi.

situation where the soldiers and gendarmes have become a law unto themselves. Thus, a resultant lack of trust in the ability or impartiality of the security apparatus of the state will lead to ethnically intermingled communities mobilising in self-defence. This is exactly the warning issued by Kaufmann (1996, 1999). Kaufmann points out that when a group arms in self-defence this creates a security dilemma since each group cannot provide for its own security without threatening the security of other groups. In an atmosphere of mistrust, this leads to pre-emptive attacks. A November 2004 UN Development Programme study (cited in Jooma, 2005:1) indicates that Burundi is confronted with new forms of insecurity and violence, separate from the armed conflict. These include high levels of banditry and urban criminality. The study also finds that about 80 percent of households in the capital and larger provinces possess small arms. The people interviewed expressed disinclination to civilian disarmament, and support arms as a means for self-defence.

In addition to the foregoing, Uvin (1999:263-4) also points out that the prevalent motivation for communal violence is fear. When ethnic groups are afraid of being attacked, they attack first to avoid the fate that they think awaits them. On the side of the Hutu are memories of 1972, and on the Tutsi side are memories of 1993 and the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In addition, Uvin argues, communal violence is motivated by the desire for revenge. This need not be collective ethnic hatred. It would likely be revenge against one or more persons who are perceived as having committed crimes against individuals or the entire ethnic group. In this regard, revenge is closely tied with impunity. The impunity in Burundi, Uvin argues, that allows the well connected to siphon-off public funds without sanctions, impunity that allows the military, police and mobs to kill without fear. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2000:379) also argue that this impunity and the history of indiscriminate repression in Burundi have resulted in a 'conflict trap' where subsequent episodes of violence have its roots in the previous.

Emphasising the foregoing views, King (1997:43-44) argues that the derivative grievances from the way the conflict has been waged can even be subordinated to the cause(s) of the conflict. Van Eck (2003:3) thus holds that for the government to gain credibility, it must be seen to be dealing with issues of justice, truth, impunity and reconciliation. However, the omni-present issue of funding crops up again. As Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2000:402) holds, obtaining proof in cases of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, is a costly endeavour. For example, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko point out, from 1994 to 1999, the International Court of Justice for Rwanda charged 49 people, with only five condemnations, at a cost of \$120 million (US). It is doubtful whether such finances will be forthcoming from the donor community. Clearly, Burundi does not have such means.

Reflective of the foregoing, it must be underlined that the need for reconciliation must be balanced with the need for justice. This will be the responsibility of the envisaged International Judicial Commission of Inquiry and the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission. However, problems are still encountered with the constitution and mandate of these institutions. According to Jooma (2005:10), the commissioners for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission were only nominated in January 2004, and this body remains at an embryonic stage. In this regard, the UN Secretary General has recommended the establishment of a 'non-judicial truth commission', and a special chamber within Burundi's court system. The latter would deal with judicial matters regarding genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, Jooma argues, the partiality and impunity that characterises the legal system in Burundi creates doubts regarding the potential effectiveness of this recommendation. A UN Secretary General report also indicates that there are only 60 defence attorneys in Burundi, primarily located in the capital Bujumbura (Annan, 2004:8). Thus, there is also the need to reform the

judiciary not only to be ethnically representative, but also to increase its capacity and to inculcate a new ethos that will reflect the values of a new Burundi.

4.4.2 Peace In the Great Lakes Region

It has already been established that Burundi is located in an unstable region with trans-border ethnic fault lines and communicable conflicts. A number of analysts have also concluded, including Wohlgemuth (2000:4) and Van Eck (1999:4, 2000:2), that none of the conflicts in the region can be resolved without major improvements being made in the rest of the region. In this regard, it is encouraging to see that there is cooperation between the two UN operations in the DRC and Burundi. However, the countries in the region continue to destabilise each other. For example, EURAC (2005a:2) reports that the DRC has filed a complaint against Uganda and Rwanda with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and legal proceeding were begun on April 11, 2005. Amongst the points of contention, the DRC accuses both countries of invading its territory and violating international law, killing civilians and violating human rights, and maintaining a gunrunning network and warlords that continue to plunder natural resources in the DRC. In turn, the DRC stands accused of providing a safe haven for the Hutu FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). The FDLR is composed of the Rwandan former army (ex-FAR) and the interahamwe militia, who are purported to be the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.⁷⁰

Rwandan President, Paul Kagame (Tutsi), has had a hard-line attitude towards the FDLR. EURAC (2005a:4) reports that Kagame has refused to negotiate with the FDLR, instead has called for their unconditional surrender. The Tutsi-dominated government of Rwanda has also vowed to arrest members of the FDLR who are suspected of involvement in the 1994 genocide upon their return to Rwanda. The government has also estimated some 800 000 people, one in 10 inhabitants, to be guilty of genocide in Rwanda. Thus since March 31, 2005, over 4000 Hutus have fled Rwanda, mostly to Burundi and Uganda, fearing arbitrary and general accusations against all Hutu. In addition, Kitevu and Lind (2001:1) hold that the proliferation of arms in the Great Lakes region has undermined peace-building efforts in the region. Griggs (1997:9) also points out that several countries in the region are used as bases, sources of rebel funds and arms, or for diplomatic and various forms of activities that affect the conflicts in the region. Griggs holds that the peace process must subsume inclusive negotiations based on the needs of the entire region. Indeed, cross-border social, economic, and physical linkages dictate the need for such a regional approach. The presence of both Hutu and Tutsi in all the countries in the Great Lakes emphasises this need even more. If the reader can recall Samuel P. Huntington's 'kin-country syndrome' (discussed in chapters 1 and 2), such ethnic maps that overlap state boundaries are profound vectors of cross-border violence.

If the truism that a budding democracy needs favourable international conditions in the form of the presence of other democracies in the region, then this is an area of concern regarding the potential for Burundi to build democratic institutions. As Ndikumana (2000:445) points out, the Burundian leadership is surrounded by unreliable role models (dictatorial one-party states) in the form of the 'new breed of leaders' like Paul Kagame and Yoweri Museveni. The economic development of Burundi is also dependent on the attainment of peace in the Great Lakes, a condition that is as yet elusive. Despite these challenges facing Burundi and the Great

⁷⁰ The FDLR is also known as the Army for Rwanda's Liberation (ALiR). See International Crisis Group (2002:13).

Lakes region, there is room for optimism. However as this chapter illustrates, these challenges remain. Thus, greater efforts remain to be made to bring peace to the entire Great Lakes region. As the Burundi proverb goes: "It is easy to light a fire, but difficult to extinguish it" (cited in Jooma, 2005:1).

4.5 EVALUATIONS

Despite the many challenges associated with the peace process, Burundi has navigated the treacherous waters to a transitional government and the institution of a largely agreed upon electoral calendar that will end the period of transition. This is a critical period. As Jooma (2005:6) points out, the history of Burundi indicates that the post-election period is the most vulnerable to violence; conflicts have always followed periods of political transition. It should also be underlined that there is no foolproof blueprint for peace as indicated by the peace process and the transitional period in Burundi that remain fraught with challenges. However given an understanding of the conflict as cultivated in this study, the conditions for peace as contained in this chapter are proposed as the most likely to result in lasting peace in Burundi. Conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building must reflect these conditions. However, the success of all these conditions hinges upon visionary leadership and political will. There must be a genuine desire and a conscious decision to end the conflict and to attain peace. There must also be genuine actions on both sides towards accommodation and conciliation, what Robert Hislope calls 'a generosity moment' (cited in Bentley and Southall, 2005:143).

Sustainable peace in Burundi is contingent upon meaningful political participation, economic opportunity, socially inclusive communities, and security for all. In this regard, the commitment of the actors in the peace process, especially external intervention, should not waver. The various agreements that buttress the peace process must be implemented. As Zartman (1995b:272) states, "(e)ternal intervention should be available as long as it must, but it should leave as soon as it can". Quick fixes will have limited utility; the challenge and the aim should be long-term change in social and power relations, patterns of governance, and resource accumulation and distribution. The issue of Agathon Rwasa's FNL also needs a resolution. Simply designating the group as a terrorist organisation is counter-productive in the end. Burundi cannot afford a further derailment of the peace process. As Nelson Mandela, a former mediator in the peace process, has recently cautioned (in the foreword to Bentley and Southall, 2005:x), "(t)he peace process remains fragile, and it could yet unravel".

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

5.1 SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to investigate the cause(s), the nature, and characteristics of the conflict in Burundi, and to explore the conditions for sustainable peace and prospects for peace. The purpose of the study stems from the following basic question, namely: What is the conflict in Burundi all about and what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for its resolution? In this regard, and one of the most striking factors concerning a study of 'conflict and peace' in the case of Burundi, is the fluidity in understanding and analysis concerning the cause(s) of the conflict and the conditions for sustainable peace. This fluidity is apparent not only from the literature, but also from the actors in the conflict, and the actors in the peace process.

In reflection of the foregoing, the study breaks away from the tendency to analyse only the current (since 1993) bout of conflict. It is proposed that the various incidences of conflict since independence form one single conflict at various phases, including the phases of escalation, de-escalation and negotiations. The study also breaks away from the tendency to view the conflict as only opposing Hutus and Tutsis. As illustrated in chapter 2 and chapter 3, the reality in Burundi is more complex than this general analysis. Viewing the conflict as opposing only Hutus and Tutsis and analysing only the current bout of conflict generates serious distortions and omissions and may account for the wrong conclusions regarding the conflict in Burundi. Another contribution of the study resides with the proposal of the necessary and sufficient conditions for peace in Burundi. The study thus is intended to contribute to the body of knowledge relating specifically to conflict and conflict resolution in Burundi, and conflict and conflict resolution in general.

Against the backdrop of the various accounts of the conflict, the disparate prescribed solutions, the nature and characteristics of the conflict, indications of state failure, and the failure of previous power sharing arrangements and other attempts at peace in Burundi, including the wider instabilities of the Great Lakes region and the contagion effect thereof, the research question is formulated. The research question is stated as follows: *What is/are the cause(s), the nature, and characteristics of the conflict in Burundi? What are the solutions that have been tabled in the resolution of the conflict? What are the prospects for peace?* The cause(s), the nature, and characteristics of the conflict, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for peace, form the conceptual demarcation of the problem statement. In terms of geographical demarcation, the research is confined to the geographical space of Burundi, except where neighbouring countries in the Great Lakes region have a direct link with the conflict (for example, Rwanda). Historical factors (pre-colonial and colonial) have been considered when these factors have a direct bearing on the conflict and research problem. However, the temporal demarcation of the research relates to contemporary Burundi, the period between independence in July 1962 and the end of the term of the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) in April 2005. (The period of the TGoB was extended and ended in August 2005. This latter period is not covered in the study. Thus, the study is written from the perspective of around April 2005).

Regarding research methodology, the study is primarily a descriptive analysis based on a literature study and factual data sources. The study does not purport to identify and assess a single underlying (root) cause of the conflict. Rather, the literature study includes an overview of the various accounts of, and theoretical approaches to, the conflict. Thus, the study has not offered an exhaustive explanatory account of the conflict in Burundi as

this would have required further empirical research and fieldwork in Burundi (in fact, an explanatory account falls beyond the scope and intention of this study). The research was intended as a single-state case study. Therefore, the main unit of analysis is the state of Burundi. The level of analysis is state-centric, except where the region (Great Lakes) or provinces (Burundi's Bururi province) play a distinct and defined role. The study is primarily a qualitative analysis, although quantitative data have been made use of to support the analysis. Mainly secondary sources are used, but primary sources are also utilised as far as possible. Interviews have also been undertaken with conflict analysts who are knowledgeable regarding the conflict in Burundi. Emanating from the foregoing and the analysis contained in this study, particular conclusions can be made regarding the conflict, the peace process, and prospects for peace, in Burundi. The conclusions are made in the context of the contents design of the study, namely: *The Cause(s) of the Conflict in Burundi*, *The Nature and Characteristics of the Conflict in Burundi*, and *The Peace Process and Prospects for Peace in Burundi*.

5.2 CONCLUSIONS

The Cause(s) of the Conflict in Burundi

In identifying the cause(s) of the conflict, this study attempted to construct a coherent and convincing narrative on the basis of available knowledge and evidence regarding the conflict in Burundi. This available knowledge reveals various accounts of the conflict in Burundi. The first of these accounts, popular in the literature and the mass media, holds that the cause of the conflict in Burundi is ethnic differences and enmity, i.e. an 'ethnic' conflict. This account holds that ethnic difference, in itself, is a cause of conflict i.e. 'primitive tribes' fighting for no apparent reason other than their tribe affiliations. This account highlights the history of ethnic differentiation in Burundi and the ideology of ethnocentrism as conflict generating. The account holds that ethnic notions pitting two ethnic groups, Hutus versus Tutsis, inform the conflict. This account also underlines the colonialists' policy of divide-and-rule that favoured Tutsis as preferred rulers, and the role of politicised ethnicity in group relations and conflict formation.

Given the foregoing, the study finds that the 'ethnic groups' in Burundi do not even qualify as separate ethnic groups in the anthropological sense of the word. The various components of Burundian society (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa and Ganwa) share, for example, a common language, common culture and customs, and have a monotheistic religion. The basis of ethnic differentiation is body morphology, which is not always distinctive, and there is intermarriage. The groups have a long history of cohabitation dating from pre-colonial times, and throughout the history of Burundi, the groups have lived intermingled in the same geographical areas. In pre-colonial times, status, not ethnic identity, was the key determinant of rank and privilege. Pre-colonial history provides no evidence of violent conflict between the groups. Conflict along ethnic lines occurred only in the period following independence in 1962. In addition, the salience and assertion of identity has taken place within the context of unequal access to political and economic resources, patronage, persecution and repression of different groups. Thus, the only 'ethnic issue' in Burundi is the one about the distribution of power and wealth, and about social justice. The other incidences of conflict in Burundi have not always followed ethnic lines, but dynastic, intra-ethnic, clanic, and regional lines. Given the foregoing, and similar factors, the study thus concludes that the 'ethnic' account of the conflict has a weak claim as a theoretical approach to understand and describe the conflict.

The second account of the conflict is encapsulated in Paul Collier's opportunity thesis. This account, in essence an economic interpretation of conflict, holds that the rebel groups compete with the national government for the control of national resources and primary commodities. The account highlights that the insurgents do not have ideological alternatives, but are motivated by aspirations for power and opportunity for economic rents. The account further holds that the conflict stems from greed, the capacity to finance, and opportunity for, escalated violence. Thus, this account concludes that rebellion is a large-scale predation of productive economic activities.

The study finds that there are no natural resources or primary commodities to exploit in Burundi, except coffee, which accounts for 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings. However, coffee does not lend itself to the same patterns of violent control or smuggling as, for example, diamonds. The coffee industry (and agricultural production in general) has funded the government's ability for escalated violence, not the armed groups. *Inter alia*, external smuggling networks, mostly from the DRC, have financed the armed groups. There are no 'liberated areas' in Burundi, and it would appear that the insurgents have not attempted to control agricultural land. The study concludes that the ability to finance escalated violence has served as an enabling factor, not a cause. Predatory behaviour only occurred during the conflict, thus it is only a factor in conflict dynamics. It is conceded that the opposition elites, at some level, might be motivated by aspirations for power, however, the majority of Burundians do have grievances. Similarly, the failure of the insurgents to articulate clear ideological alternatives does not mean that Burundians do not seek a different and better life. It is also concluded that there are real and justifiable political, economic and social grievances in Burundi and that the conflict stems from these grievances. Thus, similarly to the 'ethnic' account, the opportunity thesis has a weak claim as a theoretical approach to understand and describe the conflict.

The third account holds that the conflict is a struggle by the political class for the control of the state. This account, put forward as one of the causes by the actors in the conflict (in the Arusha Agreement), holds that the conflict stems from, and is aimed at, acceding to, or maintaining, power. This account confuses 'cause' with 'symptom' and 'objective'. This study concludes that the 'struggle' in Burundi is symptomatic of the underlying conditions created by an exclusive governance system. The Burundian state is a repository of political, economic and social security where the 'other', is excluded and subordinated. It is in response to the exclusive governance system that the conflict has manifested in an armed struggle whose objective is to usurp power in order to gain access to the attendant national resources from which the 'other' is excluded. Thus, the conflict stems from the grievances of communities on the margins of society who seek equality and social justice, which would otherwise not be granted by peaceful means.

Thomas Homer-Dixon's thesis on environmental scarcity contains the fourth account of the conflict in Burundi. This thesis advances that the decrease and degradation of renewable resources (environmental scarcity) can lead to violent conflict. Renewable resources are identified as agricultural land, forests and the species they contain, water and water resources (especially fisheries). The sources of scarcity of renewable resources are identified as environmental change, population growth and unequal social distribution of resources. In the case of Burundi, this study finds that water resources are not scarce and generally meet personal and agricultural needs. Reliance on fisheries is minute and account for less than one percent of food production or diet. Although forests cover less than two percent of the total land area, the variation in access to forest resources is low and has remained relatively constant since independence. It would seem that only access to land and

population growth may well have played a role in environmental scarcity and the conflict in Burundi. Burundi is a tiny landlocked country with a high population density, the second highest (after Rwanda) on mainland Africa. Peasant communities make up over 90 percent of the total population. Agricultural production (i.e. the sale of coffee, tea and cotton) account for over 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings in Burundi.

Since agricultural land is the principal economic resource of peasant communities, it can thus be agreed that land scarcity and population growth may have limited livelihood sources and contributed to high poverty levels. The study however concludes that scarcity and poverty resulting from population growth and land pressures alone, does not account for violent conflict in the case of Burundi. It is concluded that scarcity or poverty resulting from the asymmetrical distribution of national resources and the systematic exclusion of the 'other' from livelihood sources, including agricultural land, is a more accurate diagnosis of the conflict in Burundi. Granted that environmental degradation and rising population density are important aspects of land scarcity, the scarcity is more acute when the land is inequitably distributed. Significantly, 'scarcity wars' have not occurred in Burundi, e.g. conflict over food shortages. There are also incidences of land expropriation by government officials in Burundi, and this has intensified the acute and inequitable patterns of land ownership and access to livelihood sources. This study concludes that the patterns of land ownership and access to livelihood sources reflect the exclusive governance system in Burundi. Thus, land expropriation, land distribution, and access to livelihood sources, including agricultural land, should be viewed within the context of the broader political economy of systematic exclusion and subordination in Burundi.

Given, and reflective of, the factors highlighted in this study, it is concluded that the exclusion thesis would seem to be the strongest theoretical approach to understand and describe the conflict in Burundi. Three dimensions of exclusion are identified, namely: political, economic, and social exclusion. In this regard, one particular contentious issue has remained constant throughout all the incidences of conflict involving different groups in Burundi. The central issue has been the exclusive distribution of power and resources relating to social categories. Exclusion (and the consequent inequities and injustices) has been a source of acute grievance and motivation for collective violence. Exclusion has led to insurrection, and insurrection in turn, has resulted in the repression of different groups in society, fuelling further conflict. The three dimensions of exclusion have manifested in four patterns of actual and potential conflict generating exclusion in Burundi, namely: Bezi-Batare exclusion, exclusion along ethnic lines, exclusion emanating from Tutsi-Hima hegemony, and exclusion emanating from elitist and personalised rule.

The first pattern identified, relating to Bezi-Batare exclusion, occurred from pre-colonial times when Burundi was a kingdom, during colonialism, and in the period of the constitutional monarchy between 1962 and 1966. At this time, Burundian society was largely divided between royals and commoners. In traditional Burundian society, ethnic fault lines were not salient, but the principal lines of cleavage were between two princely factions, the Ganwa dynastic lineages, Bezi and Batare. The Bezi-Batare conflict centred on the control of the royal court where the Bezi asserted their exclusive claim to the crown and the spoils of office. At the time of independence in Burundi, the Bezi-Batare dichotomy was the foremost fault line. This dichotomy dates from pre-colonial and colonial times when these two Ganwa groups fought battles over the control of territory. In the colonial period, the conflict between these two groups centred on the control of chiefdoms and attendant resources. In the period of the constitutional monarchy, the conflict centred on the control of the state in the context of party-political competition. Although other political parties were formed along different lines, Burundi politics and the

political system was dominated by parties that were formed around, and reflected the Bezi-Batare dichotomy. The Bezi-Batare conflict ended in 1966 with the declaration of the Republic, and the removal of all the Ganwa in positions of authority in Burundi.

Following the demise of the monarchy in 1966, exclusion following ethnic lines became salient with the increasing marginalisation and subsequent exclusion of the Hutu and Twa by the Tutsi in general, and by the Tutsi-Hima in particular. Exclusion along ethnic lines, the second pattern of exclusion identified, has been the most salient in the conflict in Burundi. This relates to the fact that although there is incidence of exclusion following regional, intra-ethnic and clan lines, as well as exclusion emanating from elitist and personalised governance, the exclusive governance system in Burundi has largely resulted in horizontal inequalities between Tutsi on the one hand, and Hutu and Twa on the other. Although ethnic exclusion became salient only in the republican period, traces of ethnic exclusion and conflict can be found in the colonial period. In this period the conflict centred on the control of chiefdoms and attendant resources. For example, in 1929 Hutu chiefs controlled 20 percent of all chiefdoms in Burundi. Stemming from the Belgian reorganisation of territorial administration, from 1945 there were no Hutu chiefs in the administration. All chiefdoms outside of the control of the Ganwa were allocated to Tutsis. Revolts occurred in the 1920s and 1930s against Tutsi chiefs deemed to be responsible for these new constraints. These, and other related events, introduced the role of ethnicity in politics and resulted in disequilibrium in the ethnic balance of power.

After the declaration of the Republic, ethnic identity became a key determinant of social mobility, and ethnic exclusion became the foundation of the political system. The education system and military service (and general public employment), became the two pillars of the politics of exclusion and served as tools of Tutsi power in general, and Tutsi-Hima in particular. Hutu and Twa entry into high school and university became restricted. Public employment, virtually the only alternative to peasant agriculture, became the exclusive domain of Tutsis. Given the centrality of acquired education to prospects for employment and differences in wages, differential access to education and the direct ethnic selection in public employment, led to horizontal social inequalities in Burundi. In this regard, the case of the Twa deserves special attention. Despite being the earliest known inhabitants of Burundi, the Twa suffer the most acute political and socio-economic exclusion, subordinated by both Hutus and Tutsis. This subordination dates from pre-colonial times. For example, and even though Bashingantahe were chosen on personal merit, the Twa were the only group excluded from this institution. However, the Twa have been largely removed from the overt violent conflict in Burundi.

The third pattern of exclusion identified emanates from Tutsi-Hima hegemony. For more than thirty years, since 1966, Burundi was ruled by a Tutsi-Hima regional oligarchy from Bururi province, accounting for the regional dimension of the conflict. Grievances emanating from this rule, have manifested in conflict pitting Hutu groups against Tutsi-Hima exclusive governance, and have opposed Tutsi-Hima against Tutsi-Banyaruguru, and Tutsi-Hima clans, Bayanzi against Bashingo. Tutsi-Hima occupied and dominated key posts in the administration, the army, and the economy. Tutsi-Hima were also apportioned privileged access to education, and overseas scholarships. The military leaders of the four successful coups that have taken place in Burundi, Michel Micombero (1966-1976), Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (1976-1987), and Pierre Buyoya (1987-1993, 1996-2003), are all Tutsi-Hima from Bururi province. Since the 1966 coup the Bururi lobby, represented by a Tutsi-Hima dominated government and army, have been an exclusive 'selectorate', enjoying monopoly power to change governments. In the context of this dominance from Bururi, Hutus from this region have also enjoyed relatively

better access to education resources, accounted for a disproportionate number of Hutus in the First, Second and Third Republics, and in the army.

It is also in the context of this Bururi dominance that there has been power struggles between Tutsi-Hima and Tutsis from other regions, especially the North and the Centre. For example, in 1971, Tutsi-Banyaruguru (mostly from Muramvya, the seat of the ancient monarchical capital), challenged to usurp power in an attempted coup. Under the monarchy, Tutsi-Banyaruguru had enjoyed a higher social status vis-à-vis Tutsi-Hima. From the First republic, Tutsi-Banyaruguru suffered political and socio-economic exclusion. In the aftermath of the 1971 attempted coup, Tutsi-Banyaruguru were purged, inside and outside of government. Tutsi-Hima dominance also reveals clanic nuances. In the Second Republic, under Bagaza (from the Bayanzi clan), Bayanzi became the privileged recipients of wealth, status, and power, inside and outside of government. Thus, the 1989 attempted coup by Bayanzi against Pierre Buyoya's government (like Micombero, from the Bashingo clan) can be construed as an attempt to restore Bayanzi power initiated under Bagaza's government. Following this attempted coup, all Bayanzi were purged inside and outside of government.

The fourth and last pattern of exclusion identified, emanates from elitist and personalised rule. Ranking 173 out of 177 countries on the HDI, with a GNI per capita of only \$100 (US), and other equally dismal social and macro-economic indicators, the exclusive governance system in Burundi has relegated the vast majority of Burundians to the margins of society. In this regard, the vast majority of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, share poverty and lack access to social services. Public employment and investment, the taxation and organisation of the domestic economy, have been allocated and shaped for the benefit of the elite and their own groups through patronage networks. Indeed, a hallmark of the political economy of Burundi has been the 'politics of the belly' where the conquest and exercise of power has been with the express aspiration to accumulate wealth for a select minority to the exclusion of the vast majority. Although there has not been a popular uprising against elitist and personalised governance, given the nature of the political economy, this is an area of concern for the future of Burundi, and may well be the next pattern of conflict. This likelihood is, of course, dependent upon the absence of intervention, if narrow ethnic, clanic and regional interests and hindrances are overcome, and if a 'subjective-blame-system' is developed around common issues.

The conflict in Burundi cannot be fully comprehended without an understanding of the nature of the Burundi state and the context of the Great Lakes region. Regarding the nature of the state, Burundi is a tiny, landlocked, resource poor state. These, and other related factors, have contributed to poor economic performance. However, the factors that have acutely contributed to conflict and the failure of the state as characterised by sharp structural weaknesses, are human-induced. Emanating from these weaknesses, relating to the nature of the political system and the structure of the economy, the state has been unable to deliver the political goods required to pass as a state. The state has failed to enforce the rule of law and protect individual and property rights; enforce the rules of fair social exchange and redistribute national wealth as an agent of distributive justice; and, administer justice and ensure meaningful political participation for all. Instead, the state has meted structural and direct violence against its population, and became an adjunct of Tutsi political and socio-economic domination. These factors have led to social inequalities and injustices. In turn, inequalities and injustices have led to a crisis of governance; *inter alia*, concerned with government legitimacy and accountability.

In addition to the foregoing, the state in Burundi is privatised and the economy is state controlled. The state has forced the specialisation in coffee, tea and cotton, accounting for over 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings. The state also has an over-bloated public sector whereby, on average, the salary of a public servant falls within the bracket income of the richest six percent of the population. The aforementioned forced specialisation and this wage structure, resulting in economic distortions, have been designed to support an exclusive political system whose express intent is to provide for the needs of a select minority. As a result, the excluded groups in society have borne the brunt of these economic distortions. These issues elucidate how the conflict has manifested in a struggle for the control of the state as the nature of the state, its extensive intervention in economic and social life, makes the state an instrument of group domination, and a strategic tool for wealth and power, which would otherwise not be availed to other groups.

Burundi is also situated in an unstable region. Trans-border insurgencies, economic linkages, ethnic ties and fault lines, historical linkages, proximity and porous borders, have made the conflicts in the Great Lakes region mutually communicable. These conflicts have been protracted, intractable, and pernicious. At the very least, these conflicts can be construed to have exacerbated, if not triggered, the conflict in Burundi. In turn, instability in Burundi has contributed to instability in the region. Because of the presence of both Hutu and Tutsi Diasporas in the DRC, Tanzania, and Uganda, the kin-country syndrome, emanating from cross-border ethnic fault lines, has been a major vector of trans-national conflict in the Great Lakes. In all the countries in the region, Rwanda has had the most profound impact on the conflict in Burundi. Since Rwanda has the same ethnic make-up as Burundi, the kin-country syndrome has played an even more pronounced role in the case of both countries. Resultantly, the conflicts in both countries have fed-off each other. Further, in the period between the Hutu Revolution (1959-1962) and the 1994 genocide of Rwandan Tutsi, the Hutu held political power in Rwanda. This Hutu power relegated the Tutsi and the Twa to second-class citizens. These events may account for the Burundian Tutsi fear of a 'Hutu peril' and the fear of 'the tyranny of a Hutu majority'. Real, incorrectly imagined, or actively invented as pretext to justify and maintain privileges, Hutu actions in Rwanda and Burundi have given some credence to these fears. *Inter alia*, the Tutsi have justified their hold on power as a 'guarantee' against what they saw happen to their kin in Rwanda at the hands of Hutu governments.

The Nature and Characteristics of the Conflict in Burundi

The following conclusions can be made regarding the nature and characteristics of the conflict in Burundi. The conflict is a political conflict that is centrally concerned with the rules and regulations that govern society, including the distribution of power and national resources as they relate to social categories. The conflict is most saliently but not exclusively articulated in ethnic terms. The conflict has pitted an assortment of identity groups at various points in its life cycle, namely: dynastic (Bezi versus Batare), ethnic (Hutu against Tutsi), intra-ethnic (Tutsi-Hima versus Tutsi-Banyaruguru), clan (Tutsi-Hima clans, Bayanzi in opposition to Bashingo), and regional (groups from Bururi province versus groups from Muramvya province and the rest of the country). The conflict has manifested in a struggle for the control of the state and attendant national resources.

In addition, the conflict is intermittent (largely flaring up at points of political transition), intra-state, includes a whole range of activities (structural and direct violence against the population by the government and the military, political and pseudo-legal persecution, mass arrests, strikes, riots, communal violence, assassinations, massacres, coups d'état and attempted coups, and insurgency), and of low intensity. The conflict is also

pernicious, genocidal, protracted, and intractable. Since independence in 1962, Burundi has experienced at least four major clashes, i.e. 1965, 1972, 1988, and 1993 to date. Other incidences of conflict were in 1962, 1966, 1969, 1971, 1989 and 1991. These conflicts have resulted in over one million conflict related deaths, and over one million refugees and IDPs. The conflict has also been destructive with huge development costs, and has disrupted productive and social activities. The extent of these latter factors is yet to be fully ascertained.

The Peace Process and Prospects for Peace in Burundi

Particular conclusions can also be made regarding the peace process and prospects for peace in Burundi. The ten years peace process, from 1995 to 2005, has struggled to bring the conflict to its logical conclusion. This 'struggle' to resolve the conflict can be ascribed, *inter alia*, but significantly, to the failure in the peace process to accurately identify, and adequately address, the underlying conditions of the conflict. Instead, the peace process was largely dominated by concerns over the allocation of posts and positions, thereby restricting the scope of discussions. This failure is not only apparent in the Arusha Agreement. Throughout the history of Burundi, exemplified by the outlawing of ethnic references during the Second Republic and the 1989 report of the Commission on National Unity, ethnic, clan and regional exclusion, has never been categorically identified as a cause of the conflict. It should be underlined that the accurate identification and understanding of the cause(s) of a conflict is the first step towards conflict resolution and peace building. Arguably, this step has not been adequately undertaken in Burundi.

Various solutions to the conflict in Burundi have been put forward in the literature and by actors in the peace process. Some actors have put forward the notion of a military solution. However, it is the contention in this study that the Burundi conflict is not a 'military conflict' with 'military objectives' that require a 'military solution'. The history of Burundi also reveals that military repression has only resulted in conflicts flaring up at the first opportunity. Given the limited utility of a 'military solution', this option has been discounted from consideration in this study. Spatial designs for peace have been put forward as another approach in the search for a solution to the conflict. These designs have advocated state partitioning and ethnic separation (within Burundi, or between Burundi and Rwanda), and others have prescribed the reconfiguration of national boundaries and/or a confederation (in the context of the whole Great Lakes region). These spatial designs may not be practical solutions (e.g. because of economic and human costs, entrenched power relations, and so on), and may even result in crises greater than the presently experienced. Burundian actors in the peace process have also discounted these considerations.

The notion of institutionalised power sharing, based on ethnic quotas, has been put forward by actors in the peace process as the fundamental principle guiding the search for a solution to the conflict in Burundi. The Arusha and Pretoria peace processes, the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative, the UN and the AU, have all supported this view. It is ironic that the solution to a conflict largely articulated in exclusive ethnic terms, is itself conceptualised, articulated, and operationalised in the same exclusive ethnic terms. It is the conclusion of this study that power sharing may be necessary, as a confidence building measure, however, power sharing in itself is not a sufficient condition for sustainable peace. The very notion of power sharing is designed to protect minorities. This is not necessarily the case in Burundi. Whereas the Tutsi are a numerical minority, for a conservative period of more than forty years, they have been a political and socio-economic majority in Burundi. Hutus, despite being a numerical majority, have been excluded and subordinated within Burundi society. Only

the Twa are a numerical, political, and socio-economic minority. Thus, the argument that the Tutsi are a minority in need of protection applies to Hutu and Twa as well, if not more.

In addition to the foregoing, power sharing achieves a compromise between the actors but does not resolve the underlying conditions of conflict in Burundi. Because of continual changes in the balance of power, institutionalised power sharing is inevitably fragile and by necessity must be a transitional arrangement. *Inter alia*, power sharing perpetuates dichotomous group relations, and limits the incentives for groups to move out of their ethnic enclaves. There are no incentives to form political values, norms, and practices that would be equally shared and respected by all actors. In addition, the conditions in Burundi are not even amenable to institutionalised power sharing as such, e.g. the presence of an overwhelming majority, and deep socio-economic inequality along ethnic lines. The current power sharing arrangement tilts the democratic framework in favour of Tutsi participation and security, awards the Tutsi with a *de facto* veto power, and thus fixes the balance of power and perpetuates conflict generating Tutsi domination of the political economy of Burundi. Thus, the current framework does not guarantee proportional, or even equal, group influence. Given these factors, this study concludes that the very notion of institutionalised power sharing may, in future, prove to be the weakest link in the whole of the Burundi peace process.

Given an understanding of the conflict as cultivated in this study, it is proposed that the reconstruction of the state (state building) is a necessary precondition for sustainable peace in Burundi. The state in its current form, cannot sustain any achieved condition of peace. Thus, the state needs to be reconstructed into a new form. From a predatory state, exclusionary ethno-politics, and patronage politics, to a developmental state that provides government legitimacy, distributive justice and economic opportunity, law and order, national integration, and basic social services. Thus, peace is contingent upon the adequate achievement of a democratic system providing meaningful political representation and participation, economic opportunity, social mobility, and security, transcending ethnic categories in Burundi. This fundamental principle is indivisible, and should be the guiding principle for conflict resolution and peace building. Granted, in a deeply divided society with an overwhelming majority, democracy can also provide clear lines of inclusion and exclusion in relations to access to power and privileges. In this regard, democracy in deeply divided societies has a special obligation to provide a system of governance based on inclusiveness, sensitivity and responsiveness to divergent group interests, to avoid replacing an exclusive minority power with an exclusive majority power. This 'special obligation', need not take the form of institutionalised power sharing as such. Rather, it should be a fundamental and over-arching guiding principle of governance. This 'special obligation' can be accomplished in a multi-party system based on proportional representation where parties receive seats and posts relative to acquired votes.

In addition to the challenges of institutionalised power sharing, various factors will hinder the prospects for peace in Burundi. These factors include the continuing instability in the Great Lakes region, the continuing refusal of Agathon Rwasa's FNL to lay down arms and join the peace process, and if the failure to provide meaningful economic opportunity, and patronage networks, persist. Other factors subsume reconstruction, economic development, the reintegration and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, the satisfactory conclusion of the demobilisation and reintegration of forces, and the full implementation of all the agreements that buttress the peace process. There is also the apparent lack of a 'national vision' on what should be the basis of building a new state, and what consensus will consider a 'just society'. Given the

pernicious and genocidal manner in which the conflict has been prosecuted, issues relating to justice, truth, impunity and reconciliation, also need to be addressed for Burundi to extricate itself from the conflict trap and break the cycle of violence. These, and related factors, need to be satisfactorily resolved in order to consolidate and sustain peace.

Great strides have already been made in the peace process since the initial negotiation in 1995. However, if peace is defined as more than the absence of violence, but the significant achievement of social justice, and the substantial reduction or elimination of the underlying conditions that gave rise to conflict, then the situation in Burundi remains 'neither war nor peace'. The objective conditions for conflict remain. In this regard, and unless the possibility 'to materially distinguish between the destructiveness of conflict and the benefits of peace' is created, peace will remain fragile in Burundi. However, despite the many challenges, what is clear is that for the first time in the entire post-independence period, Burundi would seem to be as close as it has ever been to achieving lasting peace.

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