


# **Warlords in Africa: A comparative study of Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aided**

Marvin Sylvester Lawack



Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of  
Arts (International Studies) at Stellenbosch University

Supervisor: Dr CJ Steenkamp  
December 2008

## **Declaration**

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof ( unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Date:...26 November 2008

**Copyright © Stellenbosch University  
All rights reserved**

## **Abstract**

The African continent has been riddled with conflict for many years. Angola and Somalia are prime examples of countries having experienced protracted wars. During those wars, warlords have played a definite role in perpetuating the fighting. The thesis investigates warlordism in Africa. Specifically, it is a comparative analysis of Jonas Savimbi of Angola and Farah Aideed of Somalia.

The thesis investigates the concept of warlords and uses the examples of Aideed and Savimbi to illustrate the impact of warlords on the respective countries. The examples of Aideed and Savimbi are further used to show that there are different ways to becoming ultimately labelled as a warlord. The role of state weakness and ethnicity will be investigated in the two cases. The discussion will highlight the points that state weakness (i.e. lack of governmental functionality) and the use of ethnicity play a profound role in the rise and survival of warlords. The case studies of Aideed and Savimbi will emphasise the influence of state weakness and ethnicity in their formation as warlords.

The concept of state weakness is defined and the thesis illustrates that there are different levels of state weakness. The thesis compares Angola and Somalia, and shows that Savimbi and Aideed acted under vastly different conditions as warlords. Ethnicity is defined and linked to the idea that the effects of colonialism played a profound role in creating ethnic divisions, enabling warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi to use their ethnic backgrounds to mobilise followers to wage war. The thesis investigates how Aideed and Savimbi maintained their military organisations. Their ability to do so is related to both state weakness and ethnicity. State weakness and ethnicity create conditions which are conducive to the emergence of warlords.

## Opsomming

Konflik is 'n algemene verskynsel op die vasteland van Afrika. Angola en Somalië is klassieke voorbeelde van Afrika-state wat deur uitgerekte oorloë en konflik geteister is. Vir die doel van hierdie studie word daar gefokus op 'n verskynsel wat wyd in Afrika voorkom. Hierdie konflik kan tot 'n groot mate voor die deur van krygshere (warlords) gelê word. Hierdie tesis het dus ten doel om ondersoek in te stel na hierdie verskynsel op die vasteland van Afrika, met Jonas Savimbi van Angola en Farah Aided van Somalië as voorbeelde van krygshere.

Die tesis ondersoek die konsep van krygshere en gebruik die voorbeelde van Aided en Savimbi om die effek van krygshere te illustreer in hulle onderskeidelike lande. Die voorbeelde van Aided en Savimbi bewys verder dat daar verskillende maniere is om as 'n krygshere te klassifiseer te word. Die rol van swak state en etnisiteit word ook ondersoek in die twee studies. Die gesprek sal bewys dat swak state (verminderde regerings doeltreffendheid) en die gebruik van etnisiteit 'n deurdringende rol speel in die mag en die oorlewing van krygshere. Die voorbeelde van Aided en Savimbi sal die invloed van swak staatsbestel en etnisiteit bewys in hul formasie as krygshere.

Die konsep swak state is gedefinieer en die tesis bewys dat daar verskillende vlakke van swak state bestaan. Die tesis vergelyk Angola en Somalië en bewys dat Savimbi en Aided onder verskillende toestande gewerk het as krygshere. Etnisiteit is gedefinieer en is gekoppel aan die idee dat kolonialisme 'n grootskaalse rol gespeel het in etniese verdeling, wat krygshere soos Aided en Savimbi gehelp om ondersteuners te lok om oorloë te begin. Die tesis ondersoek hoe Aided en Savimbi hulle militêre organisasies aan die gang gehou het. Hulle vermoëns om dit te doen is verbind aan swak state en etnisiteit. Swak state en etnisiteit bevorder goedgeunstige toestande vir die krygshere.

## **Acknowledgments**

- First and foremost, to my supervisor, Dr Chrissie Steenkamp. Your drive and high standards have pushed me all the way. I am grateful I had the opportunity to work with you. It was indeed a pleasure. Thank you for everything.
- My parents. Thank you for all your support and love while I was completing the thesis.
- My siblings and their spouses. Thank you for just being there.
- A big thank you to Graeme Callister and Prof. Vivienne Lawack-Davids for proofreading and editing. Thank you so much.
- Mrs Magda van Niekerk. My mother in Stellenbosch. Thank you for all the support and plentiful conversations. You are a star.
- My special friends, Michael Ferendinos and Stuart Kearsey. Your support will never be forgotten.
- Lastly, My Saviour Jesus Christ. This would not have been done without your love and guidance.

## **Abbreviations**

FNLA – National Front for the Liberation of Angola

MPLA – Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

UNITA – National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

USC – United Somali Congress

# Contents

<b>Chapter 1-The research problem</b>	<b>1</b>
Introduction	1
1.1 Problem statement and rationale	2
1.2 Literature review and theoretical framework	3
1.3 Research questions and aims	6
1.4 Background section	7
1.5 Conceptualisation	9
1.6 Research methods	12
1.7 Structure of the thesis	12
Conclusion	13
<b>Chapter 2-Investigating Savimbi and Aided</b>	<b>14</b>
Introduction	14
2.1 Jonas Savimbi – the statesman that never was	15
2.1.1 Savimbi’s shift from nationalism to warlordism	17
2.2 Farah Aided – rejecting all insults	20
2.2.1 Aided’s final passage to warlordism	22
2.3 Savimbi versus Aided	24
2.3.1 Different leadership styles	24
2.3.2 Using diamonds and food for survival	27
2.3.3 The use of child soldiers	28
2.3.4 American influence and its legacy	30
Conclusion	33
<b>Chapter 3-Investigating state weakness</b>	<b>35</b>
Introduction	35
3.1 What is state weakness?	36
3.2 The shadow state and its link to state weakness	40
3.3 Lack of human security	43
3.4 Distinguishing between state failure and state collapse	46

3.5 The role that warlords play in creating a weak state	50
3.6 Benefits for leaders and non-state actors	53
Conclusion	55
<b>Chapter 4- Investigating ethnicity</b>	<b>56</b>
Introduction	56
4.1 Defining ethnicity	57
4.1.1 The meaning/definition of ethnicity	58
4.2 Colonialism and its effects on Angola and Somalia	61
4.2.1 The formation of ethnicity in Somalia	63
4.2.2 Ethnic background in Angola	65
4.3 Primordialism versus Instrumentalism	68
4.4 How warlords manipulate the ethnic question	70
4.5 The relevance of nationalism	73
Conclusion	77
<b>Chapter 5- Reviewing the thesis</b>	<b>78</b>
Introduction	78
5.1 Short overview of the various chapters	79
5.2 The research question revisited	80
5.3 Implications for the study of warlords	81
5.4 Implications for the study of Aideed and Savimbi	84
5.5 Comparing Aideed and Savimbi	85
Conclusion	87
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>89</b>

## **Chapter 1- The research problem**

### **Introduction**

“...violence has become a norm within social and political behaviour... and that violence and warfare have become self-reproducing, with no prospect that they can be brought to an end” – Chris Allen (1999)

Chris Allen’s point about violence in society is an accurate description of the world of politics in much of Africa. The world of warlordism in Africa, in particular, thrives on violence. Allen (1999) mentions that these actors evolve around a central figure characterised by violence, resulting in a highly destructive society. Africa has numerous examples of warlords, such as Foday Sankoh of Sierra Leone and Charles Taylor of Liberia, to mention only two. But what do we know of Jonas Savimbi of Angola and Farah Aideed of Somalia? Furthermore, what role did state weakness and ethnicity play in the rise and survival of Savimbi and Aideed as warlords? State weakness and ethnicity are two important factors to show how these actors operate.

These two actors have been chosen as case studies to highlight the complexity of the phenomenon of warlordism. Rich (1999: 4) mentions that warlord activities in Africa (most notably in the Sub-Saharan region) have been the result of relatively weak empirical statehood and strong ethnic and tribal attachments. This comment has an important bearing on this thesis. Thus, the main questions of the thesis concern state weakness (i.e. lack of bureaucracy) and ethnicity, and their importance for warlords. Ethnicity is an important aspect of how state weakness manifests and the emphasis will thus be on the influence of state weakness and ethnicity on the rise and the survival of warlords in Africa. Warlords thrive in a certain kind of environment and the thesis will explore whether state weakness creates the necessary vacuum for the warlords to operate in. The study will show how the actors use favourable conditions created through state weakness and ethnicity for their own wellbeing. By establishing this, a conclusion could be drawn about which of the actors (i.e. Aideed or Savimbi) worked best under these circumstances.

This thesis will attempt to highlight the importance of the factors mentioned above. The first chapter will first provide a background to the topic, then outline the theoretical framework for this study; and finally the aims of this thesis will be stated. Importantly, the key concepts will be identified and defined in this introductory chapter. It concludes with the layout of the thesis.

## **1.1 Problem statement and rationale**

Both Angola and Somalia have had a protracted history of violence. The common denominator is that both countries to this day still struggle with the consequences of their civil wars. The death of Jonas Savimbi in early 2002 was seen as the breakthrough for peace and democracy in Angola. The Angolan population only recently (September 2008) had an election for the first time since 1992.. A similar situation arose in Somalia, because hopes for peace were renewed when Aideed was killed in 1996. Angola is well off economically thanks to its oil and diamond trade, but socially (and politically) it has remained a poor country, while Somalia is to this day still a major conflict zone.

The aim of this work is not to demonstrate the nature of warlordism. This thesis will rather consider the hypothesis that state weakness and ethnicity created a favourable background for Aideed and Savimbi to operate in. Mackinley (2000) mentions that warlords operate in what are deemed “weak states” (implying that there is no central government or limited functioning of government in the country). Operating in this particular sphere leads to a situation where regionalism (i.e. an active pursuit of a strategy aimed at the establishment of a regional system within a specific geographical area) and transnationalisation (social and economic interaction across national borders by and between non-state actors) occur more frequently (Bøås, 2003). Reliance on institutions such as the African Union or the Southern African Development Community is occurring more and more, despite the fact that, as Kaldor (2003) mentions, the state is becoming increasingly disintegrated. These so-called non-state actors include warlords who increasingly have an impact on the daily livelihood of the people of their respective countries. Through the phenomenon of states being weak, actors such as warlords fill the void left by the state actors (although one has to question whether warlords have the same agenda as state

officials). Although Kaldor mentions the concept of New Wars (i.e. the increasing influence of globalisation on the political scene) explicitly, it is more important to focus on the concept of state weakness, because state weakness creates areas for new wars to work from. Jackson (2002) does mention that state weakness creates an external vulnerability which international actors and forces exploit. By narrowing the scope of the investigation, a more focused investigation can be done on the nature of warlordism.

The fascinating world of warlords in Africa always warrants further investigation, and state weakness and ethnicity allow one to explore further the rise and ultimate demise of our chosen actors. Africa has a long history of political turmoil – from at least the time of Idi Amin in Uganda to Taylor in Liberia, violence prevails in the majority of African states. Amin is not considered a warlord, however, because violence – as Kaldor (2003) notes – comes from outside the ‘legitimate’ use of forces by the state. Thus many non-state actors are the reason for the violent upsurge. The cases of Angola and Somalia are particularly interesting, seeing that Angola is a more prominent country and during the Cold War Savimbi was seen as the “Key to Africa”. Savimbi also had multiple facets as a leader. He was a guerrilla leader turned insurgent turned warlord. As for Somalia, not a lot has been written on Farah Aideed, despite his being a major player in the conflict there. Most of the literature focuses on the dictator of Somalia, Siad Barre, or else on the self-proclaimed President Ali Mahdi Mohammed. Aideed is seen as the common enemy, but not a lot is known about him. This definitely warrants further investigation.

## 1.2 Literature review and theoretical framework

“Violence becomes the prime means of political action (politics is violence) as in evident in the emergence of warlordism...”- Chris Allen <sup>1</sup>

What is a warlord? According to Mackinley (2000), a **warlord** can act financially and politically in the international system without interference from the state. Thus the warlord is deemed highly militarised because there are no fixed boundaries within

---

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in “Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa” in *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol 81: 367-384.

which he operates (Rich, 1999: 4). In classical terms a military commander is subject to the state, but a warlord, according to Mackinley and Rich, operates independently. They correctly add, however, that where a warlord operates, human disaster and civil war occur (Angola and Somalia being prime examples). A warlord is truly a type of “hyena” which, according to Mackinley (2000), lacks the courage or long-term commitment to confront the government of the day. Duyvesteyn (2005a: 66) mentions that the warlords are in control over a piece of territory and have a monopoly over the sources of power. This corresponds with Bøås’ (2003) notion that a warlord controls a specific territory in a failed state. It has to be determined through the case studies which areas Savimbi and Aideed used to their advantage and how they used them.

Reno (1999) sums up the nature of a warlord when he states that warlordism is about building new political authority by assembling and controlling resources and converting them to the warlord’s own political advantage. The fascinating aspect of Aideed and Savimbi is that one actor (Savimbi) had control of the diamonds in Angola, while the other (Aideed) did not have these resources but had to loot food to create a stranglehold on the population. Thus Reno’s definition would have to include destroying or withholding resources from the general public. Most importantly and very correctly notes is that warlordism is about “I”, and nobody else. It is a personal protection of power and assets, and warlords use their private militias to control the population (territory is essential for warlords). Commanders such as Savimbi and Taylor in Liberia used the warlord phenomenon purely for self-enrichment (Allen, 1999). Samatar (2006) mentions that because of Aideed’s stranglehold on the population, life expectancy in Somalia dropped considerably. Thus, warlords war for can be seen as a way to generate profit and of exploiting the marketplace (Mackinley, 2000). For the warlords to operate in an arena, a condition of state weakness has to prevail.

**State weakness** in essence implies that no central government exists in the country. According to Jackson (2002), countries deemed weak states have very low levels of democracy (in fact, it may be non-existent or completely unconsolidated). Because there is no democracy, weak states lack both the effective bureaucracies and control mechanisms of certain designated territories (Bøås 2003). Importantly, what Bøås (2003) mentions and which is highly relevant for this study, non-state actors such as

warlords becoming increasingly more important by creating illegal flows of trade, income and services. The warlord phenomenon thus revolves around a so-called ruling elite within which one leader is normally looked up to. In this case, Savimbi and Aideed fall into that category. The relevance for this study is the fact that the relationship between the state and the society at large consists mostly of mutual avoidance or resource extraction such as looting. Allen (1999) and Herbst (1990) mention that a rapid economic decline occurs because of a weak state, leading in the end to a major loss in state revenue and the establishment of a “second” economy via illegal trade or criminal activities. The warlords flourish so successfully in such an environment that there are very few incentives to return to the old order (Herbst, 2004) and one can see why. Why return to a system that did not work to your advantage? Langford (1999) makes a valid point when she states: “Somalia is the quintessential case of state failure: a fractured society with weak and often no connections to the body politic suffering under authoritarian rule, finally losing all semblance of a central government when its authoritarian ruler is toppled by a popular uprising leading to clan war breaking out”. In essence, what this leads to is the population affiliating rather with an ethnic group or a religious group (Langford, 1999). The point about ethnicity is of the utmost importance to this study, but what is it about ethnicity that plays such an important role for the warlords?

**Ethnicity** is arguably one of the most important factors in warlordism. According to Horowitz (2000) ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by colour or language; thus ethnicity incorporates tribes, races, nationalities and castes. According to Horowitz, many indicators make up the concept of ethnicity. Few states are homogenous and many are deeply divided. Ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon and the continent of Africa truly epitomises the notion that ethnicity plays an important role in society (Horowitz, 2000: 3). More to the point, as Horowitz (2000: 5) mentions, is that for the African states the ethnic connotation creates added impetus. Most African countries since independence have had trouble in terms of ethnicity. In Horowitz’s words, “the independence rally gave way to the ethnic riot” (Horowitz, 2000: 5). The interesting fact, however, as Duyvesteyn (2005b: 37) mentions, is that Somalia has a common ethnic identity, common language and common religion, but no common consciousness.

This is truly an interesting point of departure in comparing Angola and Somalia. In the end the ethnic issue can lead to a contentious scenario where mutual trust is non-existent between the different factions involved. Warlords may use the ethnic question to create an extension of the conflict to serve their own ambitions (Duyvesteyn, 2005b: 3; Posen, 1993). Many societies throughout the world affiliate in terms of their ethnicity rather than their country. Many societies state their loyalties rather to their sub-national identities (Jackson, 2002). An obvious example is Spain, with the Catalans and Basques not wanting to be affiliated with the Spaniards as such. It is the same in many African countries. The ethnic divide is of such a nature that they have a stronger connection with their tribes than with the nation (Horowitz, 2000: 6). Whether this is the case for the relevant countries in the thesis warrants investigation.

Horowitz raises a valid point by asking whether the ethnic conflicts today derive from old rivalries or whether they are new creations (i.e. via the process of modernisation) (Horowitz, 2000: 97-99). A glance at the history books will reveal that the conflicts originated centuries ago, although, as Horowitz mentions, “many groups encountered each other for the first time during the colonial rule. Their relationship, obviously, is the product of this relatively recent encounter” (Horowitz, 2000: 98). Ethnicity is inextricably bound to culture. According to Kaplan (1994), conflict over culture will become a regular occurrence seeing that the differences among civilisations include history, language and religion. Ethnically-driven conflict thus needs to be taken into account, but it is necessary to determine how Savimbi and Aideed used ethnicity to their advantage.

### **1.3 Research questions and aims**

The thesis aims first and foremost to investigate the phenomenon of warlords. The case studies of Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aideed are perfect instances to describe warlords. The following questions are thus the crux of the thesis:

- What is the impact of state weakness in the rise and strength of warlords?
- What is the impact of ethnicity in the rise and strength of warlords?

The aim of the thesis is also to show the correlation between warlords, state weakness and ethnicity, and to account for the way that the concepts are intertwined in the complex world which is African politics. Importantly, the thesis aims to show the impact of the factors chosen, but intends to determine whether they were used differently by the actors and how. The comparative analysis of Aided and Savimbi will illustrate the effects of both state weakness and ethnicity on the actors mentioned and what the end results were.

#### **1.4 Background section**

The two case studies, as mentioned already, concern Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aided. The relevance of these two warlords is that both took different routes to become warlords. It thus becomes relevant to highlight the differentiation amongst warlords.

Jonas Savimbi was born into the Ovimbundu tribe, which is the largest tribe in Angola (Abbey & Harris, 1997: 151; Economist 2002; Rushner, 2002: 9). His early education would play a pivotal role in his life. Although he had studied the works of Karl Marx and Marcus Garvey, it was the work of Mao that had a profound influence on Savimbi. In 1966 Savimbi formed a rebel movement called the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA). He would be the leader of this rebel movement until his death in 2002. UNITA was not only engaged in a struggle with the Portuguese rule of the day, but also with the opposition party called the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) (Abbey & Harris, 1997: 155). However, Savimbi and his movement changed their focus when Angola gained independence in 1975. The MPLA was henceforth seen as the only enemy.

The fact that Savimbi was seen as a fighter for democracy helped considerably, seeing that substantial support was granted from the United States government and apartheid South Africa. (It should be noted that only the South African government deemed itself as 'democratic' (Simpson, 2002).) Unfortunately for Savimbi, these two countries would play a profound role in his personal make-up and that of his rebel movement. The end of apartheid and, more importantly, the end of the Cold War accelerated the decline of UNITA and the demise of Savimbi. With his allies no

longer supporting him, Savimbi became more and more of a warlord. He was truly seen as a warlord when he failed to accept the outcome of the 1992 elections. He decided to restart the civil war and went back to the bush. To keep his organisation going, he decided to keep trading in diamonds and to that purpose he smuggled diamonds in and out the country to feed his soldiers (Hodges, 2001: 152).

Farah Aideed of Somalia was by birth a member of the Habr Gedir kinship group, which is a sub-clan of the Hawiye tribe. A devout Muslim by nature, he studied in Moscow in the old Soviet Union, where he developed an understanding of the socialist movement. Upon his return to Somalia, his political career escalated quickly and he was appointed a minister in the government of President Siad Barre. The latter however, became very suspicious of Aideed because of his ever-growing support among the Somalian population. Barre later had Aideed arrested on suspicion of planning a coup d'etat. Aideed spent six years in jail and, according to sources, it had a profound effect on him, and he developed an intense hatred for Barre (Abbey & Harris, 1997: 14)

Aideed would get the better of Barre in the late 1980s when Aideed's military wing, the United Somali Congress (USC), overthrew Barre's regime. At this time Aideed acquired a lot of weapons from his ally, the Somali National Movement, and with their support he and the USC were able to overthrow Barre's regime (Cornwell, 2004). In fact, William Reno (1997) makes the point that political entrepreneurs such as Aideed take advantage of easy access to weapons and easily recruited young unemployed men to consolidate their own position. Unfortunately, widespread violence continued in Somalia. Historical rivalries between the different clans began to take their toll.

The man who replaced Barre as Aideed's new rival, Ali Mahdi Mohammed, was the leader of the Abgal clan, the sub-clan of the Hawiye. Aideed was the leader of the Habr Gedir, also sub-clan of the Hawiye. These two clans fought viciously against one another for the control of Mogadishu, the 'Mecca' for warlords in Somalia. According to Barise and Elmi (2006), Mogadishu was the key for the warlords. The capital was the location of key ports or airports, important checkpoints, resource-rich regions, banknotes, foreign aid, all of which the militias fought over. Also, it has to be

remembered that Madhi at that period of time declared himself President of Somalia. Because of the fighting between Madhi and Aideed, the humanitarian situation took a turn for the worse. In fact, the combatants used famine as a tactic. According to Adibe (1995: 18), food equalled power and money. The merchants stole food from the population, while the warlords in turn stole the food from the merchants to feed the armies. Thus part of the looting was nothing other than a violent and dangerous redistribution tactic.

The United Nations Security Council at that time decided to send relief workers to Somalia. When the UN intervened, some 70 percent of the country's livestock had been lost and the farming areas had been destroyed, meaning that a lot of Somalis took refuge in neighbouring countries. According to Adebajo (2003), Aideed had no choice but to allow the peacekeepers into the country, although according to him (Aideed) they were depriving him of his presidency (although Somalia was never recognised internationally as a state). He was outraged that the peacekeepers tried to disarm the Somali population and organise the many clan leaders in the country into the governing committee (Abbey & Harris, 1997: 15).

The relationship between Aideed, the United Nations and the United States became so bad that the United States government put out a bounty of \$25,000 for the capture or killing of Aideed (Abbey & Harris, 1997:16; Hamrick, 1993). The United States government definitely wanted to become involved in the conflict in Somalia, but they quickly withdrew when 18 American soldiers were killed and an American body was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by Aideed supporters, to great propaganda effect.

### **1.5 Conceptualisation**

Certain concepts are used to describe the actors. However, one cannot move forward without defining what a warlord truly means. According to Mackinley (2000), a **warlord** refers to the leader of an armed band, which possibly increases up to several thousand strongmen who can hold the territory locally and simultaneously act independently without interference from the state. Thus, a warlord in essence, according to Mackinley (2000), confronts the national government, plunders its

resources, moves and exterminates uncooperative populations, ignores international relief and development (actually destroys it) and derails peace processes. We can thus emphatically state that the warlord is about “me”, where his own independence has a higher priority than any other authority and, furthermore, he controls that authority via his personal army, which responds only to him (Giustozzi, 2005). Thus his military wing is used in an extremely narrow or self-centred manner (Mackinley, 2000). The warlord uses the military as what Rich (1999: 1) would call it the informal military conduct who only responds to him.

**State weakness** occurs when the government of the day becomes non-functional. Thus an unstable political situation prevails, leading to government crises or coups. Weak states lack cohesive national identities, meaning that primary loyalties are mostly expressed in sub-national terms. The state becomes weaker or fails when it can no longer perform the functions normally attributed to it. Thus a scenario is created whereby laws are not made and order is not preserved, leading to a non-functioning social meaning and social identity (Jackson, 2002; Langford, 1999). State weakness further implies international legitimacy but little or no domestic legitimacy, where the leaders use their power for the enrichment of themselves and a small coterie of clients, often defined by tribal or ethnic affinity (Hentz, 2004).

Kauffmann (1996) mentions **ethnic conflicts** as a type of dispute between communities which see themselves as having distinct heritages. In a way they are about the power relationships between the communities. Physical control over territories is of the utmost importance in ethnic conflicts. Ideological conflicts are contests between factions within the same community over how that community should be governed (Kauffmann, 1996). In ideological conflicts, according to Kauffman (1996), population control depends on persuasion and coercion. The question thus arises: How do the conflicts of Angola and Somalia fit these two concepts? The answer to this question will emerge clearly when dealing with the actors.

An **insurgent**, much like a guerrilla leader, is the head of an army whose main focus is on slowly sapping away the enemy’s strength and morale via ambushes, raids and withdrawals, and cutting the communication and supply line (Wickham-Crowley,

1992: 3). An insurgent will generally do everything in his power to make the population side with him. It is important here to mention insurgency/guerrilla leaders, because Jonas Savimbi was an insurgent before he became a warlord. His instinct for insurgency came to the fore when he fought against Portuguese rule. It is important to mention and to define the concept at this point, because it is necessary to illustrate Savimbi's make-up prior to his becoming a warlord. Savimbi was a revolutionary during the fight against Portuguese rule and a guerrilla leader in the fight against the MPLA. A question that needs to be asked and answered is whether a warlord can be something else at the same time.

**Bandits**, according to the historian Eric Hobsbawm, are peasants “whom the lord and the state regard as criminals, but who remain within the peasant society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case as men to be admired, helped and supported” (Hobsbawm, 1972: 17). Thus, a bandit is anyone who belongs to a criminal group that attacks and robs through violent means. Banditry is common in an economic crisis and bandits flourish in remote areas such as forests and mountains, and they are also common along major highways (Hobsbawm, 1972: 21-22). Bandits prefer to operate in circumstances of total insecurity and an absence of law enforcement (Duyvesteyn, 2005a: 66). Classical examples of banditry include looting, robbing and plundering. The reason that banditry is conceptualised in this study is that Farah Aideed and the United Somali Congress during the famine crisis were seen as bandits looting food from international aid workers, preventing it from reaching the majority of the population. This is another case of showing the different types of actions undertaken before an individual becomes a true warlord. The abovementioned terms are important because the two actors relevant to this study fall under these banners.

Breytenbach (2003) conceptualises conflict as a “triangle” leading to the tripartite divide between rulers, rebels and mercantilists; this is an interesting framework for the analysis of the two leaders. Farah Aideed especially was seen as a bandit and a warlord simultaneously. Savimbi was also for a brief period of time seen as a part-ruler in the transition to independence, and the same can be said of Aideed after the overthrowing of Barre. A better example is Charles Taylor. He was a rebel and a

mercantilist when he manpowered RUF ranks for the early 1990s offensive. To understand an actor such as Savimbi as a warlord, one essentially needs to understand how he became one, having initially been an insurgent, and why he changed to being a warlord.

## **1.6 Research methods**

The research methods will mostly rely on secondary materials. Older theoretical concepts are mostly available in books; however, the main sources will mostly be journals and articles. The reason for relying heavily on journals is that they are up to date for this very important study. Not a lot of books have been written about Farah Aideed and Jonas Savimbi, and if books have been written, they are largely outdated for the purposes of this study. However, authors such as Donald Horowitz are very important. His book *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* is an important base to start from, considering it creates a theoretical foundation to work from. A wide variety of journals gives one a broader scope to work within. For the theoretical part of the thesis, authors renowned in the fields of state weakness (such as William Reno and Jeffrey Herbst) and ethnicity (such as Horowitz) will be relied upon to create a rigorous theoretical framework. This is in essence a comparative study, meaning that similarities (or agreements) and differences must be identified. This fits with the overall picture of showing that the selected factors had a different or similar effect on the two actors chosen.

## **1.7 Structure of the thesis**

The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 focuses on Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aideed. It is a comparative background analysis. The analysis investigates their early life, their start in politics and their route to becoming warlords. The emphasis, however, will be on their activities as warlord. The background information is important in showing the different routes to their ultimately becoming warlords in their respective countries. The second half of the chapter compares Aideed and Savimbi in terms of various factors.

Chapter 3 analyses the concept of state weakness. The crux of the chapter will investigate the impact that state weakness had for Aideed and Savimbi. What is state weakness and how did it create the right conditions for the warlords to work in? Were they successful in using these conditions?

Chapter 4 focuses primarily on the concept of ethnicity. The chapter will determine the impact that ethnicity had in the rise of the warlords. Ethnicity as a topic will be defined and investigated. How did Aideed and Savimbi use their ethnicity and what were the ultimate consequences (if any)?

The concluding Chapter 5 is a summary of what we have investigated during the whole thesis. A summary will be provided of what warlordism is and, importantly, whether there is a correlation between the factors identified in the exploratory research.

## **Conclusion**

The first chapter has established precisely what the thesis is about. Warlords are complex in nature and by examining the lives of Farah Aideed and Jonas Savimbi, one can establish a coherent picture of what a warlord truly is. Warlordism needs further analysis because it is common knowledge that it has dire effects on the countries concerned. However, what needs to be established is what the various factors are that influence warlords, and what different routes to warlordism are possible. Chapter 2 focuses on the different routes to becoming a warlord. The case studies of Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aideed will be analysed to ascertain whether different routes to warlordism do occur.

## **Chapter 2- Investigating Savimbi and Aideed**

### **Introduction**

During the last hundred years or so, and especially during the post-colonial era, African leaders have been very prominent on the world stage. Leadership implies further analysis when it is regarded as being functional in a structural environment. Assuming that leadership is highly regarded on the continent, or there exists what Chabal and Daloz (1999) calls the individualisation of politics, the field of warlordism has taken on even greater emphasis. A warlord is a non-state actor and so operates without any interference from the state (implying that the state is relatively weak); warlordism is also a highly militarised condition. It also has its constituency and in that small vacuum it creates a work area. A warlord has military legitimacy but little political legitimacy. However, the notion of warlordism does not have positive connotations and the examples of Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aideed are vivid instances of leadership styles that had dire consequences not only for their respective organisations but also for the overall population. By comparing these two actors, one can establish which of Antonio Giustozzi's (2005) typology describes them most accurately. He mentions titles such as clan-based military political entrepreneurs (implying modern political or military actors who seize control of tribal or clan structures) and non-clan-based military-political entrepreneurs (those who control political groups or ideologies to mobilise support). These titles will determine what types of actors Aideed and Savimbi were.

This chapter will compare the worlds of Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aideed. The chapter is divided firstly into a narrative part focusing purely on the two warlord actors. Aideed's life will be analysed from the time of his upbringing to his rise and demise under the United Somali Congress. The study on Savimbi will primarily focus on the later period of his life (i.e. his warlord activities) and the period of his life he led as a rebel. The reason for establishing the different biographical frameworks for the actors is that, for Aideed, his whole environmental context has to be taken into consideration, because his life story plays such an important role in his makeup not only as a person, but also in his final route towards becoming a warlord. Although Savimbi's upbringing must not be ignored, one does not want to be repetitive as there

is already a vast amount of literature on the subject by various academic scholars.<sup>2</sup> More importantly, what will be shown is that the influences on Savimbi come much later in his life and his development from being an insurgent to a warlord is much more swift and dramatic. The second part of the chapter uses the narrative literature, meaning more concrete analysis could be drawn from it. The two actors will be compared in terms of the following aspects: (1) their different leadership styles; (2) the use of diamonds and food as survival tactics; (3) the use of child soldiers, investigating whether they used child soldiers and, if so, how precisely did they use them; and lastly (3) the United States and its linkage with these two actors. An examination of the similarities and differences with certain variables will highlight the complexity of the two actors.

## **2.1 Jonas Savimbi - the statesman that never was**

“If you are a drowning man in a crocodile-filled river and you’ve just gone under the third time, you don’t question who is pulling you to the bank until you’re safely on it”

Jonas Savimbi, 14 November 1975 (Bridgland, 1986: 137)

Jonas Malheiro Savimbi was one of the most complex but fascinating political actors on the African continent for many years (especially after Angola gained independence in 1975 until his demise in 2002). Understanding him simply as a by-product of the Cold War and post-Cold War era falls well short of giving an accurate description of the man once recognised as the ‘key to Africa’. It is important to highlight where he came from. Giustozzi (2005) states that Savimbi is a perfect example of a warlord, because having been a Cold War warrior until 1992, he suddenly became a warlord as Cuban and Soviet support for the Angolan government ceased, without any obvious evidence what changed him to becoming a warlord.

Born in 1934, Savimbi was brought up with high expectations, along with the belief that hard work would bear dividends in the long run. A truly hardworking and

---

<sup>2</sup> Scholars such as Bridgland, Dietrich, Heywood and Malaquias have done extensive research on Savimbi and UNITA. Refer to bibliography for full details.

football-loving young man, the son of Luth Savimbi was able to break through the stringent educational barriers for the black population under Portuguese rule. Young Jonas completed his basic studies at an American Protestant Missionary school and eventually found his way to Lausanne, Switzerland. Although studying medicine, it was Savimbi's dream to further his studies in law and international politics. By the time he completed his studies in Europe, Savimbi had become deeply immersed in the struggle against Portuguese rule in Angola. Moreover, Savimbi showed from a young age that he had people skills, seeing that he cultivated an array of influential contacts ranging from African nationalists, to Cold War brokers (on both the Soviet and American sides), to Chinese Maoists. These actors would have a profound influence on Savimbi and his movement, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) through various training methods and training camps, and more importantly, they would influence Savimbi's views on how to wage guerrilla warfare. Lastly, these influences determined the politico-military strategy of the movement from the early days until he and UNITA returned to the bush.

The influence of the revolution against Portuguese domination in Angola changed Savimbi's views initially to the extent that he saw the revolution from the perspective of Angolan nationalism rather than the ideas of Western liberalism or Marxism. With this, Savimbi became increasingly convinced that he was a man of his country and a man of the people. He spoke seven languages, but in none of them was he more articulate than in the traditional form of Umbundu, the language of Ovimbundu – the ethnic group to which he belonged, which is the largest in Angola, constituting around 35 percent of the population (EON 2007). Linda Heywood's thorough exploration of ideology in Africa illustrates the connectivity between Savimbi and witchcraft. The instances of Savimbi approving live burials and witch burning would ultimately open the doors to a realm of politics which would last until his last days. Thus, it can be concluded that Savimbi's pre- and post-Cold War actions have to be put into context to understand the environment in which he lived, because he was regarded as having powers to "fly and perform other feats" (Heywood, 1998: 164).

Some part of Savimbi's make-up could be deemed as having some "magic power" over his constituency. Savimbi in essence built up a reputation around him of balancing between the hunter king (autocratic rule) and the blacksmith king (provider,

consensus-generating rule) (Heywood, 1998: 152). This reliance (perhaps even over-reliance) on ancestry and political traditions goes a long way to explain the longevity of the political support from the Ovimbundu constituencies, and his survival through successive political crises. Although most of the events surrounding Savimbi's and UNITA's survival have focused on the external geo-strategic placing in the first phase (i.e. South African and American support during the late 1970s) and on the warlord political economy after 1992, the close bond between himself and his peers played a significant role throughout this period and must never be underestimated. It highlights why he was so highly regarded within his ethnic domain and well as by the rebel movements.

### **2.1.1 Savimbi's shift from nationalism to warlordism**

Savimbi was one of Africa's multifaceted political actors. He was seen as a peacemaker and was a highly effective negotiator during the process of independence, but a personal loss coincided with his dramatic (and ultimately tragic) personal transformation. His son's death in 1975 came at the moment of his greatest popularity as he toured Luanda and called for fair elections to be held. However, his participation in the government and his first-hand experiences of early violent FNLA and MPLA scuffles in the environs of Luanda were enough for Savimbi to permanently dissociate himself from the government. From then on the Cold War would play a profound role in Angola. Savimbi was seen a warrior (his leadership skills had a positive connotation thus far) during the 1980s – and especially during the Reagan administration in the United States – and he was to remain a warrior until 1992 as part of the American and South African fight against Soviet Communism.

He was seen by the West as a good anti-communist bulwark – half of Africa and the Eastern Bloc saw him as a stooge of capitalism and a plaything of the racist apartheid government. With the election defeat in 1992 coinciding with the withdrawal of American and South African military and political support, alternative financing had to be obtained to sustain the movement, so Savimbi and UNITA began to rely on the diamond and ivory trades (Le Billon, 2001). From being connected to the state-based struggle of the Cold War, Savimbi was now in unknown territory, being supported by the stateless international economy of illicit trade to fight an MPLA government,

which was now recognised as a legitimate government by the rest of the world, and especially the superpower (the United States of America). In short, Savimbi's last semblance of legitimacy on an international level was gone – a legitimacy that Savimbi had maintained at the local level “possibly developed only for opportunistic reasons but was nonetheless real” (Giustozzi, 2005). From 1992 Savimbi would be a warlord fighting the government and financing his operations via the diamond trade.

Savimbi's followers had many diverse demographic characteristics, ranging from child soldiers (which numbered over 2000 in the latter phases of Savimbi's insurgency), rural workers to adults (PANGAE, 1997). The end of the Cold War had raised the possibility that peace could be the order of the day in Angola. In 1994 it was thought by both sides that an end to the conflict would always be the result of political (via the Bicesse Peace Accord) and not military means. This was proven comprehensively wrong eight years later at the time of his death. However, the results of the peace accord could be seen much earlier, considering that Savimbi and UNITA went back to the bush and made no conscious effort to create a peaceful situation. The MPLA virtually won the war, set the terms for peace and a central government exists in Angola to this day. The cracks in the UNITA armoury began to show in 1994 when the MPLA captured Andulo and Bailundo (the latter was seen as the cradle of Ovimbundu nationalism), forcing UNITA to move to unconnected regions where they could not retain a conventional military posture (Malaquias, 2006: 106).

The linkage between Savimbi and his Ovimbundu constituency ignored the notion that war and violence must be portrayed as irrational. This was clearly seen when Savimbi gave up his ambitions for assuming office in Luanda in 1992 to become a “full-time manager” of the Ovimbundu troops fighting the MPLA troops. Zollman and De Decker were the two companies that helped Savimbi turn what was a relatively low-budget exploitation of Angola's natural resources (especially during the 1970s, considering that the country was an agricultural economy at first) into a profitable industry (the agricultural sector is almost non-existent today in Angola compared to its pre-independence glory days). There is a large agricultural sector in Africa, but its value has massively diminished. Cash crops aren't worth as much anymore, and with more land passing into the ownership of indigenous smallholders, there has been something of a return to subsistence farming. Exploration in the very

important Cuango valley was very centralised and very profitable (around 1997), but as MPLA gained terrain, Savimbi began decentralising his industry and focused on the northern regions of Angola stretching all the way into the southern Congo (Dietrich, 2000: 5). Sanctions by the United Nations in 1998 started to create difficulties for Savimbi, but this did not prevent UNITA from having sales of up to \$800 000 million in 1999 (Dietrich, 2000: 5). Overall, the illegal diamond trade provided the rebels with about \$400 million to \$600 million per year in income (Malaquias, 2006: 109-110). UNITA's weapons came mainly from the suppliers of the independence days, Cold War sponsors and appropriations from the MPLA. Thus, rather than contribute to national reconciliation via the Bicesse Peace Accord, UNITA purchased weapons from countries such as Bulgaria and the Ukraine (with the illegal diamond trade money) to continue the war against MPLA. In Malaquias's words, "Places like Angola became irresistible markets for arm traders" (Malaquias, 2006: 110).

Fifteen bullets through the head of Jonas Savimbi brought the war in Angola to an end in 2002. After years of battle the MPLA defeated Savimbi and UNITA. Looking back at the dramatic and often regrettable conflict, violence is rarely rational and unfounded. How should one thus place Savimbi in terms of warlordism? Taking into consideration Giustozzi's typology of contemporary military political actors, Savimbi can be seen in the initial phase as a combination of the nationalistic non-clan based political entrepreneur (someone who seizes control of political groups or ideologies to mobilise support) and of the traditional local ruler (a leader who mobilises support from within his own clan or tribe) who began practising warlordism after the Cold War and when governing the state became a practical impossibility after losing the 1992 multi-party and legislative elections (Giustozzi, 2005). Before 1992 he had been fighting a government that had no popular endorsement, had seized power and kept it without recourse to public opinion, and had failed to improve the country outside of Luanda. In other words, at that time he had a 'legitimate' grievance.

After 1992 the population rejected him and yet he refused to accept this and wished to impose himself as ruler against the popular will and so lost legitimacy. His appropriation of diamonds and ivory began in order to finance UNITA, but where did all the money go? One cannot assume that it went only into UNITA's banks accounts.

Early altruism turned later into self-serving greed, and this is probably the moment where Savimbi turns from being a popular warrior to being a patriarchal warlord. Lastly, after his return to the bush, he had little coherent strategy; previously his strategy had been to eventually take power and to that end he maintained his UNITA forces and defended the south of the country. After 1992 it was fairly obvious that this wasn't going to happen and yet he persisted with his armed struggle without a likely or coherent outcome in mind.

## **2.2 Farah Aideed - rejecting all insults**

Mohamed Farah Hassan "Aideed" was born in the countryside of Somalia around 1930, and although the actual date of his birth is not known, he adopted 15 December 1934 as his "official" birthday (Greenfield, 1996). Young Mohammed was the fifth child of thirteen, and he was a member of the Habr Gedir kinship group, which is a sub-clan of the Hawiye tribe (Greenfield, 1996; Abbey & Harris, 1997: 9-10). It is tradition that Somali children be given nicknames from a young age and, although Siad Barre later became president of Somalia, he could not shake off the nickname "big mouth". Aideed in essence implies "one who rejects insults" and this nickname is attributed to the reaction of his mother when a neighbour commented that her child was of a darker complexion than she was (Greenfield, 1996).

As a youngster Farah was taught by his parents Farah and Fatuma to look after the family camels, sheep and goats, before they encouraged him to walk across the unmarked border into the Ethiopian Ogaden to seek instruction in the Koran (Greenfield, 1996). The lessons that his parents taught him would be invaluable in the make-up of Farah Aideed. He would use his knowledge of the countryside to perfection in his later political activities. The Koran became of great importance to Aideed, because after two years of learning the morals and verses by rote, he returned to Somalia with a burning ambition to acquire further education. A sense of fearlessness and independence was beginning to develop. After comprehensively trying to improve his command of the English language, Aideed enrolled into the Italian Gendarmerie, the police force that upheld the law in what was then Italian Somaliland (Abbey & Harris, 1997: 12; Economist, 1996).

The military training he received not only provided scope for improving his Italian, but also sufficient financial security to marry his first wife. Aideed was in the fortunate position that the Italian authorities were looking for a cadre to take over the administration of the nearly independent Somalia. Thus Aideed was sent to the Nato Infantry School in Rome. Aideed was already obsessed with the notion of learning and whilst in Rome he bought the Italian version of the Koran to improve his proficiency.

Having a foot in the door via the Infantry School created an opening for Aideed to further his political career. By 1958 he was the Chief of Police in the Somali capital, Mogadishu. When Somalia gained independence in 1960, Aideed became an officer in the army, and he was sent to the Soviet Union for further military training. Later Aideed would admit that “the military knowledge I gained there was beautiful” (Abbey & Harris, 1997: 12-13). All the military training Aideed received he would use to great effect in the military wing of the United Somali Congress (USC).

Politics in Somalia is of such a nature that the unexpected can happen at any time. Aideed returned to Somalia from his training in Moscow unprepared for what was about to happen. Upon Barre’s *coup d’etat* in 1969, Aideed was arrested on suspicion of planning a coup against him, as Barre thought Aideed posed a major threat to his power. Aideed spent a total of six years in prison and in that time of imprisonment developed an intense hatred towards Barre and what he fought for and believed in. Aideed was later released to serve in the Somali army during the war against Ethiopia. Barre, being politically astute, sent Aideed overseas as a military attaché on diplomatic postings as a tactic of getting his rivals away from Somalia (Duyvesteyn, 2005b: 41).

The animosity between Barre and Aideed escalated during the later 1980s and naturally something had to give. After the war started around 1988, Aideed returned from India as Somali Ambassador. However, the hunted became now the hunter. In 1989 the military wing of the USC was established by Aideed. The USC consisted mostly out of members of the Hawiye clan (who were mostly exiled Somalis), united in their opposition to Barre. Aideed, knowing the countryside intimately from his youth, started recruiting fighters in the rural areas. These were mainly cattle herders

who knew how to handle guns, because of their traditional right to bear arms. These bush boys, who had no formal education, were given a gun to fight with. Aideed created a 'Mad Max' scenario for his followers, as their weaponry consisted of small arms and jeeps transformed into all-terrain cars with the roofs sawn off and with anti-tank cannons mounted on top (Duyvesteyn, 2005b: 41). As widespread violence erupted in Somalia, Barre realised that he could not hold onto power for much longer.

Finally, in 1991 Barre was overthrown by Aideed and the USC (Abbey & Harris, 1997: 14). As with Savimbi, it is already evident that the constituencies played a profound role in determining how the actors would turn out ultimately. However, this was a different scenario to the one where diverse factions fought against each other (as in Angola), as in Somalia factions within factions were fighting each other, leading ultimately to Aideed changing into a warlord.

### **2.2.1 Aideed's final passage to warlordism**

Aideed thought that since he and his faction of the USC had defeated the autocratic regime of Barre, he would automatically be the choice to oversee the country. He even described his ideas about the future of the Somali state where he wanted to see a democratic Somalia with none of the clans dominating the political landscape (Duyvesteyn, 2005b: 42). That, in essence, was the whole problem. No clan was strong enough to gain control of Somalia and, at that time, historical rivalries caused severe tensions. Adebajo (2003) mentions that because the central government collapsed, a myriad of warlords fought for control of local fiefdoms. As mentioned, warlords thrive when no state exists and the situation in Somalia is a prime example. Ali Madhi Mohammed, who was the leader of the Abgal kin, which is a sub-clan of the Hawiye clan, was appointed interim president-elect in 1991. It should also be noted that Madhi was also a leader of a faction of the United Somali Congress.

The fighting between Madhi and Aideed would in the end have severe consequences for the country and for Aideed as a political actor. Although heavy fighting occurred around the Mogadishu area especially, it was the same countryside that provided the bedrock of support for Aideed that really felt the consequences of the war. A serious

famine occurred because of the drought and the continuation of the war exacerbated an already dire situation.

Aideed had to look after his men and the only way to do that was to starve the population to death. The looting of food was strategically essential for Aideed, because food supplies arrived at the Mogadishu harbour and it was imperative to withhold food from opponents. It was also an opportunity to get as much of it for oneself as possible as a form of currency (Duyvesteyn, 2005b: 48).

Just as Savimbi used the illicit diamond trade as a financial buttress, Aideed used the looting of food to sustain his military organisation. Food in this scenario equates to power and money. Although there were relief workers in the country, they were merely easy targets, and thus in 1992 the United Nations decided to send peacekeepers to protect the relief workers and to help deal with the terrible food shortage which occurred. At this stage, however, Aideed was a military-political entrepreneur who had only military legitimacy and no political legitimacy – legitimacy only in the view of his constituencies (i.e. his fighters) but no legitimacy in terms of the government (Giustozzi, 2005).

Legitimacy in the eyes of the West as a last resort evaporated for Aideed after the incident in June 1993, when Aideed's forces ambushed a group of Pakistani peacekeepers and killed them. In this particular incident 24 peacekeepers were killed and 56 civilians were wounded. The violence escalated, especially because Aideed began using women and children as human shields against the soldiers. The United States government thus offered a reward of \$25 000 for the capturing or killing of Aideed (Hamrick, 1993). The US Rangers and Delta Force were sent to remove Aideed one way or another, and tried hard to find Aideed at his so-called cabinet in the Olympic Hotel. However, in an incident that has become notorious through the book and Hollywood film *Black Hawk Down*, the warlord's men cut off all the exit routes and 18 American soldiers died (although less known today is that about 1000 Somalis also lost their lives) in the subsequent fighting, leading to the American government withdrawing its troops to avoid further embarrassment.

Farah Aideed, however, did not live long to celebrate his victory as he was gunned down on 1 August 1996. His legacy of ruthlessness is still felt by his fellow citizens. Aideed, within the typology of Giustozzi (2005), could be categorised as a clan-based military-political entrepreneur, seeing that the only legitimacy he truly had was within his own clan. Aideed used the resources at his disposal (i.e. his clan and his knowledge of his country) to the best of his abilities.

### **2.3 Savimbi versus Aideed**

The chapter thus far has shown the different routes that Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aideed followed to becoming warlords. Their life stories reflect that there is not one particular path to becoming a warlord. Rather the conditions around you influence the route you would ultimately follow. The following sections will compare various aspects of these two actors. The first is their different leadership styles.

#### **2.3.1 Different leadership styles**

Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aideed have so been used to illustrate the different spheres of warlordism. What the chapter also tries to highlight is that warlordism as an entity is a fluid notion, and that the typology of a warlord is not all about one sphere, but should rather be considered as a complex concept with several interwoven aspects. What we can safely state, as Giustozzi (2005) notes, it is that the warlord as a non-state politico-military actor has mostly only military legitimacy, but little or very limited political legitimacy. In comparing Savimbi and Aideed on legitimacy, Giustozzi's analysis can be seen to be accurate, seeing that both actors ended up not only as warlords, but warlords who only had military authority within UNITA and the USC respectively. Within this rationale, however, although they both ended up with the same label (i.e. warlord), Aideed can also be classified as a clan-based military political entrepreneur.

This last mentioned concept implies a modern political or military actor who seizes control of a tribal or clan structure (Giustozzi, 2005). The fascinating factor about Somali politics is that fighting did not occur between different ethnicities as such, but rather between sub-clans within a clan. Somalia has a common ethnicity and a

common language, but Angola has different ethnicities, a fact that an actor such as Savimbi used to his advantage.

Somalia historically did not have a strong tradition of chieftains or individual leadership. A patriarchal system was clearly in place, with the elders making the decisive decisions. The USC clearly relied on the power of the old elite. A look at the background of the elites that led the armed factions shows that they had very strong ties with the top of the patron-client network in Somalia (Duyvesteyn, 2005b: 62-63). What makes this hierarchical society within a faction even more fascinating is that Aideed came from within the system. Aideed clearly possessed important military expertise. He was also defence minister during Barre's reign, so he knew how the government operated and, importantly, this helped him to create networks. These skills helped him to occupy top positions within the faction. Because the faction had a very authoritarian structure, the individual role of the leader gained more and more prominence (Giustozzi, 2005).

Savimbi, on the other hand, *was* UNITA; the movement started with him and in a way died with him. Savimbi can thus be classified, then, as a non-clan-based military political entrepreneur. Such a person is a political or military actor who seizes control of a political group or ideologies to mobilise support (Giustozzi, 2005). However, as mentioned previously in the chapter, Savimbi was not only a non-clan-based entrepreneur, but also a leader using ethnicity as a base to work from. By ideology in this case one implies the teachings of Mao, and the way to put into practice the teachings of Mao would be insurgency, which Savimbi and UNITA carried out for some years.

Analysing the two actors, the words democracy and political legitimacy are largely inconsequential. Aideed at one stage (probably in an effort to mobilise his constituency) did proclaim that he wanted to see a democratic Somalia with none of the clans dominating the political landscape. His vision around 1991-1992 was thus about introducing some kind of democracy in which people would have a very direct say in political affairs. Unfortunately, and as history has shown, his aims did not materialise (Duyvesteyn, 2005b: 42). Adebajo (2003) describes Aideed as a

charismatic, intelligent and media-savvy leader who was unsure of an electoral victory and preferred to guarantee victory through the bullet.

Savimbi, on the other hand, at least in his own mind, was destined to be the leader of the Angolan population. However, the 1992 elections did not go according to plan, as far as he was concerned. The problem was not the defeat as such, but rather that Savimbi and UNITA did not provide a concrete alternative to the MPLA. According to Malaquias (2006: 104), UNITA did not show the initiative to bring a more effective and inclusive form of governance to Angola. The biggest problem in the movement was Savimbi himself. The organisation truly revolved around him and thus only limited individualism could be allowed. UNITA was therefore simply not flexible enough to meet the demands domestically and internationally. Given his military demeanour and that of UNITA, any kind of deviation from his position was not allowed, and one can argue that any dissident individuals did not serve for too long in the organisation.

Aideed, on the other hand, was a mere role player within the faction, implying that although he was responsible for a lot of atrocities, he was not, like Savimbi, the be all and end all of the movement. Aideed's fight was about clan supremacy and political control in that it was just a means to an end, so the movement could change course and take an entirely different approach, if necessary. Savimbi's fight was all about gaining a certain type of political control, so even when he died, his movement couldn't change course without compromising on its aims. Because of the patronage structure in Somalia, the USC is still functional today, while the UNITA movement is basically a different version of what it used to be under Savimbi.

The common denominator between these actors, however, remains politics. If one considers the definition of a warlord as one who "acts financially and politically in the international system without interference from the state in which he is based" (Duffield, 1997), one is implying that this "character" retains the characteristics of politicians, soldiers and businesspeople alike. As actors who do not seek political office, they attempt to retain their power by carefully maintaining relations with important political actors of the environment they operate. This is clearly highlighted with Savimbi's actions against MPLA even after the elections, while Aideed kept

fighting with the elected interim president of Somalia. Both actors also had to finance their militias and the following section will investigate how Aideed and Savimbi did this in their respective countries.

### 2.3.2 Using diamonds and food for survival

Post-Cold War politics changed a lot in the political spectrum and Angola and Somalia are no exceptions, as will be seen when investigating the two actors. The major global and regional changes that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, such as the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the minority regime in South Africa, relegated UNITA to pure irrelevance at the international and regional levels, and possibly even domestically. All the support which the UNITA rebels had was truly gone, and they could no longer count on the generosity of external benefactors to ensure their survival. Thus, an alternative form of financing had to be found and diamonds proved to be the most readily available source. Somalia, on the other hand, had acquired its weapons during the Cold War from the Soviet Union and the United States governments.

However, just as in Angola, post-Cold War politics also compelled Aideed to find additional sources of finances. Thus, to feed his troops Aideed had to find alternative resources, in this case he resorted to looting goods. Both actors found a way to finance their expenditure and to feed and equip their soldiers. To again illustrate the importance of the illicit diamond trade, UNITA raised \$ 3, 7 billion through diamond sales between 1992 and 1997. The annual income thus would lie between \$400 million and \$600 million dollars (Malaquias, 2001). Aideed's profiteering, however, cannot be calculated in such numerical terms, but it is evident that food aid became an economic asset that could be then sold for profit. These profits are in a way used to keep the fighters loyal. One can argue this applies to the supporters of both Savimbi and Aideed (Duyvesteyn, 2005b: 52).

Savimbi was clever enough to realise that Angola had an abundance of rich natural resources, and that his movement controlled most of the important areas which contain diamonds. Aideed used the dire scenario of the humanitarian crisis (i.e. famine) to create wealth for his faction (Adebajo, 2003), which illustrates his acute

leadership style. What this really illustrates for both actors is that war was always at the front of their minds. As soldiers they primarily cared about the survival of their organisation and themselves, meaning that the strategy of war was always at the top of their agenda. Additionally, as warlords, this dimension is usually their identifying facet. What they clearly do not have as office-seeking politicians, they make up as warlords with a connection to the illegal economy.

More compelling to the illegality of their actions is the political system within which they operated was vastly different. The MPLA set up a strongly centralised system in the areas where it operated and Angola was firmly divided into two spheres of influence: the MPLA state and its army, mainly financed through the oil revenues, and Savimbi's UNITA-controlled areas financed by its strategic diamond and ivory-rich areas. What this illustrates is that, on the one hand, the network of influence allowed the MPLA to try very hard to centralise its power and it was reasonably successful in this. On the other hand, their influence outside Luanda was sometimes limited and its de facto governance of the territory was never quite a reality.

Conversely, Somalia was a completely weak state and there was never a clan that had the upper hand or an overarching network of power. This was a situation that clearly enabled Aideed to exploit the in-fighting within the broader Hawiye clan. The issue of who should rule the country after Barre created severe rifts between the allies and divisions within the factions. Ultimately, these divisions prolonged the war (Duyvesteyn, 2005b: 52). And because of this intra-state war, the 'strongmen' asserted and consolidated their position. The readily available pool of weapons (via the illegal small arms) had an adverse impact on society (Tshitereke, 2003). Just as for Savimbi, so the control of some areas became paramount to finance the movement. Mogadishu, unlike Luanda, became the hub for Aideed for the looting of goods.

### 2.3.3 The use of child soldiers

"The presence of children is a fact of warfare. They serve in approximately 40% of the world's armed forces, rebel groups, and terrorist organisations and fight in almost 75% of the world's conflicts. Roughly 30% of the armed forces that employ child

soldiers also include girl soldiers; underage girls have been present in the armed forces in 55 countries” P.W. Singer (2003).

This staggering information provided by Singer highlights the seriousness of the situation concerning child soldiers. One is truly stunned when the International Labour Organisation made concrete efforts to eradicate child labour. According to Becker (2003), member states of the Labour Organisation acted to prohibit the forced recruitment of children under the age of 18 for use in armed conflict as part of the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (Convention 182). In May 2000 the United Nations adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, establishing 18 as the minimum age for participation in armed conflict, for compulsory or forced recruitment, and for any recruitment by non-governmental armed groups (Becker, 2003). With these policies implemented, one would hope or expect that the situation in Angola and Somalia would become more tolerable. However, it does not help when the government of the day in Angola denies that child soldiers were ever used in the civil war (PANGAE, 1997). In effect, what they are doing is abandoning the children. This does not imply that only the government of Angola has been playing the denial card. Savimbi and UNITA consistently denied the involvement of child soldiers in the organisation. However, as mentioned before, in Savimbi’s later years the demographic characteristics of his movement showed soldiers ranging from children (over 2000) to adults (Malan, 2000).

Both the MPLA and UNITA made use of child soldiers but these did not define the essence of the relations between the members of the organisation per se. There is some doubt that Savimbi, with his Maoist principles, actually wanted to use children, because Maoists believe that the constituents are the essence of the movement (Malan, 2000). However, his deep faith in Maoist principles did not prevent him from under-reporting the number of children he employed as soldiers. By 1995 both sides reported to Graça Machel that they had 1500 former child soldiers demobilised (Malan, 2000). Initial reports in 1996, however, show that Savimbi was still covering up the number of child soldiers, because of his political ambitions, it was believed.

The situation in Somalia, however, was very different and the USC took advantage of the situation. The various factions’ attitudes have always been to either to join the

rebel forces or to be seen as an enemy. Aideed's love of war meant that families fled and in the process children inevitably became separated from their parents; parents were killed and families broke down. It has to be mentioned, though, that just as in Angola, the child soldiering was not as excessive as in countries such as Sierra Leone or Liberia. Although there is a view that children were preferred as fighters because they could be manipulated and they would be more obedient to orders, it is difficult to believe that Aideed would entirely ignore his clan traditions. These traditions would not normally encourage children and women being involved in the conflicts between the clans. However, at the other end of the spectrum one cannot see that Aideed would not use such an "advantageous" situation for his benefit.

The youngsters were often dissatisfied with society, were barely literate and provided fertile recruiting ground for rebel movements. They were deemed to harbour the most important, and indeed the only, revolutionary potential on the African continent. These factions, including Aideed's faction, obviously used this potential to their advantage (Duyvesteyn, 2005b: 58). One would imagine that the "Mad Max"-type cars would be filled with children. Whichever way one looks at it, whether Aideed or Savimbi (despite his "strong beliefs" against child soldiers), used children in the wars or not, it was becoming increasingly difficult to integrate these children back into society. It is truly irrelevant to look at figures about the reduction of child soldiers in wars; the fact remains that child soldiers are being mentally scarred for life and it takes a number of years to at least rehabilitate the children back into normal everyday life.

#### 2.3.4 American influence and its legacy

The influence of the United States government since the Second World War has been immense. The ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union not only redefined course of the world, but also the direction African countries in particular would take. It is apparent in all the literature on the subject that the US government played a profound role in Angola and Somalia. Closer to home, it strongly influenced the lives of Savimbi and Aideed. Savimbi was highly involved with the US government during the Cold War, while Aideed was mostly famous for his tussles with the US government during the early to mid-nineties. One can actually

state that the geo-political shift not only influenced the outcome of the Cold War, but also the direction that African countries were taking. This is especially the case if one considers the structural adjustment programmes which were implemented during the late 1980s. Although the United States has had a protracted history of engagement with the Angolan population, it is to this very day famous for its long history of support for the UNITA rebel movement and more importantly, Savimbi.

Savimbi, being an eloquent speaker and intelligent leader, used all his guile to influence the Americans to help his cause to become leader of Angola. It must be stated that the roles could easily have been reversed if the Soviet Union had decided not to invest in the MPLA. However, with that said, the Reagan doctrine which was implemented in the early 1980s was a godsend for Savimbi. He truly had substantial backing, because as long as the Soviet Union supported the MPLA, the US government would support him because the Reagan doctrine implied that the United States would assist any anti-communist forces in their struggles against the Soviet threat (Tvedten, 1992).

Nevertheless, as is well known, the United States would only ally itself with countries (or organisations of countries) where its own interests could be served. Thus the end of bipolarity shaped the world and implies many actors' direction would be altered. Unfortunately, what this meant for Savimbi was obviously no more financial assistance from the Western superpower. What has to be mentioned is that, for the most part, Savimbi's relations with the United States were fruitful. However, his illicit diamond trading after 1992 saw him fall out of favour with the United States and one can probably infer that this major shift caused him to fully embrace warlordism. The true breakdown of his relations with America can be seen in the embargoes placed on UNITA by the United Nations during the mid-1990s.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, Aideed's relations with the American government were never fruitful. In fact, it would not be inaccurate to describe the relations as highly volatile. Unlike Savimbi, who maintained good relations with the US, Aideed was one of very few actors who successfully confronted American power. Aideed truly made the "good cop" of the world look like a bad cop. American imperialism, as such, has to be classified as being more self-interested than ever

before, and the United States government has even stated that “overall, we decided that fighting legitimacy battles was a waste of time and that, as a superpower, we did not have to worry about offending anybody” (Biel, 2003). Thus we can see through the efforts of Somalia in the early 1990s that the channels of multilateralism were issued as a way to show that some countries are, in a way, not that important to the American cause. One could deem it ‘selective partnership’ (Biel, 2003).

Although Beil (2003) mentions that some leaders who are deprived of sufficient accumulation of capital to fund effective development resort to political manoeuvring and plunder, Aideed used his looting to personal and strategic advantage. He saw a market where he could work from to finance his whole operation. The American influence (after the Aideed days, unlike in Angola) is on the upsurge for what the West deems states which would help terrorist organisations since September 11. What it shows is that Somalia is truly regarded as a foe in the light of the theory that weak states are productive areas for terrorists to work from.

Comparing Savimbi and Aideed, one can safely say that for the majority of the time Savimbi had a very good relationship with the United States government, and being associated with them produced some sort of dividends. However, the new force of multilateralism, meaning the end of bipolarity, changed Savimbi and his organisation into something else, and more specifically, prompted his shift to becoming a warlord. Aideed was, however, never deemed to be in the “good books” of the United States government. Aideed proved himself to be a great military tactician. Realising that he could not defeat the United States militarily, he forced it into a costly urban guerrilla war and used his better knowledge of the terrain to inflict casualties on the United States and rally the support of Somalis to his cause (Adebajo, 2003).

Unlike Savimbi, who sometimes acted naively as a guerrilla leader, Aideed had a tactical awareness about him and he used it to perfection when the American troops tried to kill him at the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu. The common denominator between the two actors (even after their deaths) is that United States government is still involved in the legacy of their politics, although only within the framework of multilateral institutions. Tshitereke (2003) states that the West bears some moral responsibility for most of the civil wars that have ravaged the African continent.

## Conclusion

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* (1852).

Understanding the worlds of Savimbi and Aideed means grasping their actions; however, understanding the nature of their actions implies understanding their environment in relation to the internal or external changes in the political environment, as the quotation from Marx above illustrates. A comparative historical approach is highly important, especially when one has an actor such as Savimbi, who changed from being an insurgent to a warlord, but still retained elements of being a rebel. Savimbi was always known to be the key ingredient in the UNITA recipe and after his death the movement came to a standstill in more ways than one. In fact, one could state that the movement came to a crossroads when he died.

Aideed, like Savimbi, was the soul of the organisation; however, the organisation is still involved in Somali politics today. The father figure which Savimbi symbolised created the sense that these men would go to tremendous length to serve the ‘cause’. Through a comparative analysis one can establish the many nuances of the label warlord, illustrating its complexity, as even in different environments similar results will appear. It is important to establish the similarities and differences between these two actors; yet this chapter attempts to show whatever differences and similarities there may be, they ended up with the same title: warlord. Most important – and this has been the overwhelming theme of this chapter – is the personalities of the actors themselves. They are the most important ingredient and by focusing on them one can establish a basic framework to move forward from.

This comparative chapter is important in that it provides the background to an understanding of the two examples. Since we have established the actors as warlords, the next chapter will highlight the impact of state weakness in the rise and strength of warlords. The chapters following will be purely theoretical, and thus Chapter 3 is very important to back up the theoretical component. The concept of state weakness will be

explored as well of related concepts. The important issue will be to determine how state weakness created a favourable environment for the warlords to work in. As mentioned before, the absence of a state is an ideal condition for warlords to flourish; the following chapter will highlight the impact of this condition not only on society but also on the warlords.

## **Chapter 3- Investigating state weakness**

### **Introduction**

Large-scale conflict on the African continent has been evident since the post-colonial days. To understand the severity of the conflict, one has to investigate the social conditions in which warlords operate. It has to be recalled that warlords are non-state actors who operate in an independent manner away from state influence. Warlords are also highly militarised as seen through the activities of Savimbi and Aideed. Although they act in an independent manner, warlords fight the state. However, the comparison of Aideed and Savimbi is interesting as one (Savimbi) fought against the government of Angola, whilst Aideed fought within a country where there was no government. Aideed fought against rival clans for supremacy in Mogadishu. The lack of proper structures within these countries led to them continuing the war, causing the citizens to suffer from the war. We should recall what warlords are and Le Billon (2001) mentions that they are strongmen who control an area with an ability to wage war; the warlord's power and his ability to keep weak central authorities and competing groups at bay largely depends on his ability to organise a war economy, which often includes external commercial activities. The mention of external commercial activities is highly relevant for this chapter, as they both had to find alternative ways of funding or rather looking after their organisations.

State weakness as a phenomenon is very important for warlords. It creates a so-called working environment to operate within and, importantly, to wage war against the enemy. This chapter will focus on state weakness and its influence on warlords in creating favourable conditions for them. The aim of the chapter is two-fold. The first part of the chapter will highlight that the state structures within countries such as Angola and Somalia were incapable of rendering good services to the citizens. As Williams (2007) mentions, the Westphalian ideal of statehood has not been manifested on the African continent, because local conditions were inhospitable to state building. The incapacitated state structures, which are a signature of state weakness, create room for the warlords to operate. This implies that the warlords play an increasing role in these weakly structured countries.

However, the chapter will also argue that, although incapacitated state structures have a role to play in state weakness, warlords' actions lead to further weakening of the state. Thus a section of the chapter will argue that state weakness is also aggravated by the actions of the warlords, implying that warlords had a part to play in the dire situations created in countries such as Angola and Somalia.

The conceptualisation of state weakness is very important because it establishes what state weakness truly is and what it entails. Secondly, the difference between weak, failed and collapsed states will be investigated. A short section on human security will also be included, because a basic premise for a functioning state is creating human security, and if the state can't provide this for its constituency, the warlords will exploit the weakness. Williams (2007) mentions that the fundamental tasks of statehood are mainly the provision of security, welfare and representation. There are different levels of a weakened state, and by establishing the relevant level in Angola and Somalia, one can determine how Savimbi and Aideed operated. The concluding sections of the chapter investigate the role that warlords play in making the state weak and also how they benefit from a weak state.

The works of Robert Rotberg (2004), William Reno (1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2006 and 2007) and Jeffrey Herbst (1990, 2000 and 2004) will provide the core of the argument. The work of Rotberg is of special importance, because he provides an excellent framework for the discussion of state weakness and for distinguishing between the different forms of state weakness. With all that has been said in the introduction, do we know what state weakness means? The following section will attempt to establish that.

### **3.1 What is state weakness?**

When one mentions the term **weak states**, one of the first notions that arises is poor government. In essence that is what state weakness is all about. It revolves around a lack of government capability in serving the citizens of the country. A lack of a functioning bureaucracy is a common factor within a weak state. Governmental structures are lacking, meaning that poor services are rendered (if they are ever rendered). Multiple dynamics within a country play against each other, leading to

citizens being ignored as the most important entity. Instead, within a weak state non-state actors such as warlords and patron-client networks are more important than the greater good of the country. The social services in a weak state are seen as an irritation not only to the warlords but also the government, because the government would rather serve itself and the people around it.

The section is important because it establishes that in a weak state the government works within a structure that is not suitable for rendering basic services, implying that the governance of the state is severely hampered. However, it should be mentioned that the governments of Angola (via the centralised government of the MPLA) and the dictatorship of Siad Barre in Somalia helped in creating a weaker state in their respective countries because of their personalised rule. Barre centralised the Somalian government and excluded rival clans from the political system, while Angola had a centralised government since it came in power in 1975. In fact, if one compares Aideed and Savimbi, the marginalising of their followers by the powers in charge weakened the two states to a condition from which they have never fully recovered. Savimbi, however, was more concerned with UNITA's constituency than with the majority of the citizens of Angola; the same could be said of Aideed. He became more concerned with looking after his following within the United Somali Congress. This became more apparent after Barre was overthrown and heavy violence erupted in the Capital of Mogadishu in the early 1990s.

Rotberg (2004: 4) mentions that weak states are inherently weak because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism or external attacks. The already fragile state structures are thus further weakened by these characteristics. Weak states do not put an emphasis on the wellbeing of the citizens of the country; rather there is a notion that the ruling elite look only after themselves. Weak states are further divided by various ethnic, religious, linguistic or other inter-communal tensions that have not yet become overtly violent. Overall, the ability to provide adequate measures of other political goods (such as free and fair elections) is diminished or is faltering. This means that basic services such as schools and hospitals are ignored or show the effects of negligence. Jackson (2002) mentions that economic underdevelopment is the order of the day where heavy debt and low/negative growth rates are prevalent. This is confusing as huge debts are incurred in a country such as Angola despite the fact that

they are well-off in natural resources. Somalia is does not have abundant natural resources, which means that a pastoral economy prevails. The rendering of social welfare therefore falls short in weak states and it illustrates that those in power use government resources to their own benefit. Corruption is a big problem on the African continent and it is clearly seen in a weak state.

Herbst (1990) goes even further by stating that government revenue is a major problem in many African countries, in that African countries do not use government revenue for the right purposes (i.e. the wellbeing of the citizens). The Angolan government makes a lot of profit (around US\$3 billion in annual revenue) in the oil sector; however, it does not seem that the money is used for the benefit of the citizens. Le Billon (2001) mentions that majority of the Angolan population are suffering because of economic mismanagement and a lack of employment opportunities. This is evident, as Reno (2002) illustrates, when states are short of revenue to fund even minimal state services (such as paying nurses' salaries or buying books for schools). The regime of Barre received a lot of financial support from the American government (as will be shown later), but most of the money was used to continue the civil war in Somalia. The consequence is not only loss of life, but the rule of law within the territorial boundary collapses. Roe (1999: 185) mentions that because of rule of law have become non-functional, citizens turn to other actors but not the state to looking after their welfare. Thus, with these faultlines in place, warlords have room to operate within.

Tshitereke (2003) makes an important point in his assessment that many states in Africa never had an opportunity to become fully institutionalised. The state structures were never given the opportunity to be consolidated properly. The modern process of globalisation, characterised by economic deregulation and the growing influence of markets, have reduced the power and the legitimacy of the state. In essence, factors outside the control of the state have played a definite role in the lack of state consolidation. It has marginalised the limited power of the state to such an extent that actors other than the government play an increasingly important role because of the lack of service delivery from the state (Tshitereke, 2003). This comment is important because it highlights the lack of government capability; this lack of government capacity meant that vultures such as Savimbi and Aideed saw an opportunity to wage

war. The difference in the political environments of Savimbi and Aideed, however, is that, although they both played a role in weakening the state, one country still had a government (i.e. Angola) to render minimal services, while the other (i.e. Somalia) did not. Non-state actors such as Aideed would obviously play an increasing role in Somalia, if a government did not exist. Neither Angola nor Somalia was anywhere close to being considered strong states.

Strong states in essence imply “the willingness of a state to maintain social control, ensure societal compliance with the official laws, act decisively, make effective policies, preserve stability and cohesion, encourage societal participation in state institutions, provide basic services, manage and control the national economy and retain legitimacy” (Dauvergne, 1998:2). Rotberg mentions that normally factors or indicators such as the UNDP Human Development Index and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index are good indicators to determine whether states are deemed strong or weak. Unfortunately for Somalia and Angola, they do not appear high on the list when these indicators were released to the general public. The 2007/2008 Human Development Index lists Angola as number 162 out of 177 countries in terms of human development. Somalia is not even listed (UNHDR, 2008).

The index shows that in the aftermath of Savimbi’s war, the Angolan government is more effective (but only a little) in looking after its citizens. The same cannot be said for, however, and this further highlights the bigger problems that the nation has, if one considers that Aideed died in 1996 and not only is there still no government, but the reconciliation process in the country is almost non-existent. Importantly, what the HD Index also illustrates is that Angola and Somalia have different levels of state weakness, an important factor for this chapter. The Index also illustrates that the legacies of Aideed and Savimbi are still being felt to this day in their respective countries.

The obsolete structures within weak states coinciding with selfish rule have created the scenario that non-state actors, such as warlords, become more prominent in weak states. Non-state actors create illegal flows of trade, capital and services that cross national boundaries (Bøås, 2003). Quite clearly in weak states the rule of law is

fragile or absent. We have seen that already with regard to the diamond trade of Savimbi in Angola and the looting by Aideed in Somalia, leading to trans-national attempts trying to restore what a state should do. Jackson (2002) calls this the 'external vulnerability' to international actors and forces, which is the direct result of the internal instability in the country. The chances for warlords to be effective in strong states would be minimal, unlike in weak states.

Rulers of weak states allow their loyal subjects access to economic opportunities such as trading in illicit goods (mostly in natural resources). Rulers can destroy their own states (as can be seen in the dictatorship of Barre in post-independent Somalia), at least its formal institutions, and replace them with political networks that are rooted in pervasive and self-serving patron-client networks. Political isolation became the norm during the rule of Barre. It thus came as no surprise that Aideed was defence minister during Barre's regime, because it would have been detrimental for his aspirations to be isolated from the political arena. Savimbi, on the other hand, could live in isolation because UNITA was part of a weak state and could generate around US\$500 million a year to keep its war against the government of Angola going throughout the 1990s (Le Billon, 2001).

We have investigated what state weakness is and, importantly, what it entails. It has been clearly highlighted that the weak or fragile state structures that were present in Angola and Somalia were seen as a signal for the warlords to create further havoc in their regions which were already chaotic, to say the least. The following section further conceptualises the weak state to illustrate the possible scenarios within this condition.

### **3.2 The shadow state and its link to state weakness**

With the abovementioned in mind (and trying to highlight the role of lack of proper state structures in creating weak states), Reno (2000b) brings an interesting concept to the fore: **a shadow state**. According to Reno (2000b), a shadow state is a form of personal rule where the authority is based upon the decisions and interests of an individual, not a set of written laws and procedures, even though these formal aspects of government may exist. This means that the limited governmental structures which

are in place are completely ignored by the leader. One can actually claim that this is not a leader but rather a dictator. The shadow state is an example of what the state turns into once it becomes totally ineffectual. An actor such as Siad Barre is a prime example of misusing the state structures completely. Scholars such as Jones (2008) credit him with creating the weak features in Somalia, and his reign created opportunities for Aideed to seize on. The president of Angola, Jose dos Santos, has his own NGO called *Fundacao Eduardo dos Santos* (FESA), which is highly profitable. The ruling elite in Angola thus create a bigger gap between rich and poor, showing that the state structures are almost useless (Malaquias, 2000).

Thus the shadow state is rooted in the abilities of the leader to manipulate the access to markets, whether in the formal and informal sector. In that way the formal and informal sectors dictate the extent of the power of the leader. Everything revolves around the leader in both Somalia and Angola. This shows the extent to which economic interests appear to dominate, virtually crowding out (or isolating) the last ideologically motivated mass reforms and revolutionary movements. The last bit of public order is destroyed when tremendously high levels of corruption occur, meaning that the state institutions are close to being destroyed.

With state structures within countries such as Angola and Somalia being ignored, Tilly mentions that the state is the primary source of violence (Musah, 2002). This can be explained largely by noting that the first generation of African leadership in the post-colonial period was responsible for most of the failures of many African countries. Angola and Somalia are classic examples of cases where only handful leaders have been in charge of their countries. To make things worse, if they were not in control (such as Aideed and Savimbi), they would gladly wage war to assert themselves.

Gros (1996) implies correctly that a country such as Angola never achieved state consolidation after the government fought UNITA from 1975. It was so helped by the notion that UNITA was influenced by external support such as South Africa and The United States. Siad Barre in Somalia did not attempt to consolidate state formation in Somalia as a result of his authoritarian rule (Jones, 2008). Aideed and Savimbi have showed that they are crafty in manipulating external sources. Savimbi manipulated

South Africa and the United States in waging the war, while Aideed manipulated the United States to such an extent that they left Mogadishu humiliated. His knowledge of the local conditions in Somalia was used to the optimum extent, and although thousands of Somalians perished in the violence, the 18 American soldiers killed in 1993 (with one body being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu) forced the Clinton administration to withdraw from Somalia immediately. According to Reno (2000a), the events which took place in Somalia led to changes in American foreign policy so that the US did not invest heavily in African conflicts anymore. The direct assistance to African states dropped from \$2,5 billion in 1994 to \$1,7 billion in 1997 (Reno, 2000a).

In these Talian states, the ruler is obliged to rely on a clique of sectional/regional political heavyweights, which are usually selected on the basis of personal loyalty and ethnic affiliations, leading to personal and regional security, as well as securing a coercive security over its subjects (Musah, 2002). Aideed and Savimbi made sure that the USC and UNITA respectively were well looked after in their looting and diamond exploits respectively. It also comes as no surprise that Aideed and Savimbi had good support because of their ethnic backgrounds. Aideed was well supported by the Habr Gedir kinship group, a sub-clan of the Hawiye clan, while Savimbi and UNITA were supported mostly by constituents of the Ovimbundu ethnic group.

These Talian states are marked by variables such as repression, internal fractionalisation, manipulation and institutional incompetence. Countries such as Angola and Somalia, as Musah (2002) mentions, are caught up in a vacuum where no serious attempt is made to develop economic infrastructure, or health or educational facilities, leaving large sections of the population without any livelihood. The result is that the struggle for power is left in the hands of a narrow political elite and expressed through warlords (such as Aideed and Savimbi) and the military (Musah, 2002). Aideed and Savimbi had no ideal of serving the majority as they just wanted to continue making war. According to Grosse-Kettler (2004: 5), “the warlords have neither an ideology nor a political agenda. Their actions are solely driven by the pursuit of illicit enrichment and war booty. The individual fiefdoms they have carved out are used as a base for the exploitation of confiscated properties, plantations, ports and airports, as well as for drug trafficking...”

The Tilian model indicates that the globalised world of today has exposed weak states to the maximum by exposing the inadequacies of governance and has also catalysed the violent empowerment of sub-state actors such as warlords. More importantly, it shows there is a lack of state structures in these countries, and it seems that these structures cannot be restored for the greater good of the citizens. What this section has illustrated is that individual actors such as Barre and the MPLA have aggravated the fragile government structures. However, the warlords add to these frail structures by wanting to prolong the war.

The Tilian model and the concept of the shadow state have illustrated that violence is the main rationale. Moreover, the leaders in control use the government structures for their own benefit rather than for the good of the country. With this selfish notion in place, security becomes totally undermined. There are, however, different kinds of insecurities; Blimes (2006: 537) states that when a central government is unable to provide credible guarantees for future security for groups within a state, a condition of anarchy exists at the international level and thus groups take it upon themselves to provide security. The following section will investigate the influence of a lack of security.

### **3.3 Lack of human security**

Thus far the concept of state weakness and the absence of proper government structures that go with it have been examined. One of the most important aspects that need to be taken into consideration within strong structures is the creation of security for the citizens. Here the emphasis is on human security. One is not talking simply about the realist notion of traditional security (implying that the security of the state is paramount); the importance of human security within a country needs to be taken into a consideration. Why is it so important? If human security cannot be provided by the government, the warlords can exploit the situation as there is a lack of protection and poor living conditions prevail.

Importantly, using state weakness as a basis for investigation into human security allows us to examine the extent to which a state is able (or willing) to function in a

way that is conducive to the wellbeing of the majority of the population (Bøås and Jennings, 2005). Human security implies that the state is not concerned with weapons; rather it is a matter of human life and dignity. Human security is people centred: firstly, there is safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression; and secondly, there is protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life, whether in homes, jobs or communities (Bøås and Jennings, 2005). These two authors sum up well the involvement of the state in providing human security by mentioning that “we would contend that a state can harm its own citizens not just through traditional security measures, but also through active or benign neglect of the basic human rights and services which humans cannot truly function” (Bøås and Jennings, 2005).

Williams (2007) mentions that there is a failure to promote human wellbeing in African countries because the leaders of these countries fail to provide public goods to their entire population. Rather they concentrate only on a segment of the population. The MPLA did this by looking after the Mbundu region. Barre only looked after those who supported him and eliminated the rest if need be. And in the post-Barre regime Aided did precisely the same with his supporters. As mentioned by Grosse-Kettler (2004:16), Aided spent over \$40 000 per week making sure that his militia kept functioning. In the process human security disappeared.

With that in mind, the question arises whether the government in Angola and the non-government in Somalia provide the necessary protection for civilians? This seems highly unlikely, if one considers the civil wars which have ravaged the respective countries. Joel Migdal observed that the rulers within the weak state are trapped in a “politics of survival” in which the need for stability and security undermines the pursuit of legitimacy through the promotion of economic development (Reno, 1999: 35). When the social contract between the state and the citizens fails, war becomes inevitable.

People accept the state’s authority as long as the state delivers services and provides reasonable economic conditions such as the possibilities for employment and earning an income. When this social contract is broken, usually as a result of factors such as ineffective structures and the legacy of late colonialism, the violence and social

disorder are the outcomes (Tshitereke, 2003). The connection between the state and the citizens has been sundered, leaving actors such as warlords ready to pounce. This goes against the principle signed at the World Summit in 2005, when African countries in the United Nations General Assembly accepted the responsibility to protect idea. It states that “every individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (Williams, 2007).

The infiltration of non-state actors into these respective countries also illustrates that the leaders cannot guarantee human security. It was mentioned above that intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations have played important roles in Somalia and Angola during their civil wars and post-civil war eras. Unfortunately security cannot be provided as the state rather invests in waging war. A plethora of weapons has landed on the African continent for fighting not in inter-state wars, but rather intra-state wars. The weapons industry in South Africa and Eastern and Central Europe has become these states’ main competitive enterprises in the post-Cold War global economy. Many new and surplus weapons have ended up in private hands, from where they find their way into conflict zones, adding to the huge Cold War stockpiles.

A lack of governance plays not only into the hands of those in government, but also into the hands of those sub-state actors such as warlords (Musah, 2002). Warlords thrive in conditions where the state as such cannot provide the necessary good conditions for its people to live in. The lack of human security illustrates that a government *per se* does not have the necessary capacity to look after the citizens. If they do have limited capacities, they are used for different purposes than serving the nation. The long histories of the civil wars in Angola and Somalia confirm that. The lack of security, whether traditional or human, illustrates that the government and non-state actors such as warlords have other agendas, namely those having to satisfying personal greed and constantly wanting to wage war. However, waging war in Somalia and Angola doesn’t occur in the same social conditions and the following section, drawing on Robert Rotberg’s (2004) typology, will illustrate that Angola and Somalia have different levels of state weakness.

### 3.4 Distinguishing between state failure and state collapse<sup>3</sup>

Rotberg's typology (2004: 1-24) differentiates between weak, failed and collapse states. It is essential to understand these concepts to be able to make a sound assessment of the categories that apply to Angola and Somalia. According to the World Bank's *Governance Matters* data of 2005 (the report ranks countries according to accountability, political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and control of corruption), Africa has five of the ten weakest states in the world, with Somalia being the weakest (Williams, 2007). That has not changed since then, as the Brookings Institution (2008) ranks Somalia as the number one weak state in the world. Angola is ranked 11<sup>th</sup> in the report. These reports clearly show that there are different levels of state weakness and, importantly, that, as two weakened states, Angola and Somalia are not on the same level. Furthermore, it is also important to determine which framework Savimbi and Aideed operated within.

**Failed** states are tense, deeply conflicted and contested bitterly by warring factions. In general the government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Such a scenario existed between the MPLA government and Savimbi's UNITA (Rotberg, 2004: 5). Rotberg stresses that it is not the absolute intensity of violence that identifies a failed state. Rather, it is the enduring character of that violence (as in Angola and Somalia). The fact that much of the violence is directed against the existing government or regimes, and the inflamed character of the political or geographical demands for shared power or autonomy, are what rationalise or justify that violence in the minds of the main insurgents (Rotberg, 2004: 5). Angola qualifies perfectly as a failed state in that it was Savimbi who fought against the MPLA government for 27 years.

But one has to disagree with Rotberg about a warlord such as Savimbi, who was fighting for shared power. Savimbi fought for himself and never for the greater good of Angolan population. That certainly was his stance after losing the general elections

---

<sup>3</sup> The two concepts are mentioned not only to differentiate them, but also to establish that weak states are the basic premise and resulting from this are failed and collapse states. With that, one can investigate how far Angola and Somalia have moved away from the basic condition has.

in 1992. He was more concerned with the Ovimbundu region than the rest of Angola. The same can also be said of Aideed after the fall of Barre and his later struggles against Madhi. Thus the civil wars which are the main characteristic of failed states revolve around ethnic, religious or other inter-communal differences (Rotberg, 2004: 5). Civil wars are an enduring characteristic for both warlords in that they enhance their power over their constituency, and in the process further weaken the already fragile state structures which existed.

Failed states are of such a nature that all the characteristics which have been mentioned under the heading of weak states are exacerbated. Therefore, although we use state weakness as the basic benchmark, countries such as Angola and Somalia are in reality much worse off than this notion implies. Flawed institutions and lawlessness are the order of the day. As in weak states, pervasive criminal activities are common in failed states and, more important, failed states offer unparalleled economic opportunities, not for the majority, but for a privileged few. Angola has gradually eroded its state structures by investing heavily in the oil sector and not using the money to improve the livelihood of the country. It would be easy to blame the government alone, but Savimbi further aggravated the failed state with his heavy investment in illegal diamond trading. According to Reno (2000a), the commercial transactions between UNITA and clandestine diamond buyers created up to \$700 million in revenues over several years in the mid 1990s.

Ford (2000) mentions the pressure that has been placed on foreign companies to become more active in ensuring that government revenue, such as the Angolan government's oil revenue, is used for the benefit of the people. Herbst (2000) calls this the economies of war, where the rebels must live off the land and sometimes become addicted to looting. Savimbi and UNITA's mining of diamonds perfectly illustrates this. The same scenario exists in Somalia where, because of the disintegration of the government (and specifically sub-clans rivalries), Aideed and the clan of supporters had to find alternative means to keep the organisation going.

Looting was the biggest alternative, considering that Somalia, unlike Angola, does not have a wealth of natural resources. Thus the looting rebels need never defeat the government (or clan in Somalia), because their aims are met as long as they can

continue to steal from the local population and exploit the mineral resources that they have captured. Savimbi's rationale changed from being a 'people's fighter' to being a person only concerned with continuing a war and looking after his own constituency. Warlords such as Savimbi and Aided thrive in situations where they can create a situation of permanent violence and chaos for their own non-political gain, rather than aiming to restore peace (Giustozzi, 2005). According to Sabrina Grosse-Kettler (2004: 15-16), Aided was able to finance his militia through the export of bananas. In fact, according to Grosse-Kettler (2004: 16), Aided had agreements with the American company Dole to provide security during the period that was called the 'banana war'. As mentioned before, it is estimated that Aided had to loot so much because he had to spend around \$40, 000 per week to maintain his militia (Grosse-Kettler, 2004: 16).

The nation-state's responsibility to maximise the wellbeing and personal prosperity of all of its citizens is totally absent, if it ever existed. The situation exists, especially in Angola, that the government invests so heavily in oil today (and is established as one of the major oil producers in Africa) that the rest of the economic sectors within the country are almost non-functional. Before the civil war started in 1975, Angola was one of the biggest agricultural producers on the African continent, but the reality today is that this sector is now a fraction of what it was. According to Reno (2000a), oil revenue at one stage topped close to \$3, 3 billion. A general election was recently held (September 2008) for the first time since 1992, with the MPLA government winning convincingly. The reality of the situation is that Angola has a government in place, but a very weak one to say the least.

Somalia, on the other hand, is different in that it is not deemed a country *per se*, seeing that no national government exists and that the affairs of the country are left in the hands of sub-state actors, with warlords such as Aided having fought for power. However, does a country such as Somalia fall under the category of a failed state? This is doubtful because, unlike Angola, it does not have a central government to operate from. Rotberg (2004: 9-11) makes the assessment that it falls under the category of a collapse state.

According to Robert Rotberg (2004: 9), a **collapsed state** is a very rare version of a failed state. Political goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means, because the

government is either very weak or irrelevant. Security is equated with the rule of the strong, and when the collapse eventually occurs, sub-state actors take over. The precise scenario occurred within the Somali region when Siad Barre was overthrown and local factions fought over control of the country. This implies that the warlords (i.e. Aideed and other rival factions) gained control over the regions and sub-regions of what had been a nation-state, built up their own local security forces, and sanctioned markets and other trading arrangements. Aideed was very reluctant to allow outside interference from, for example, the United Nations peacekeepers, because the warlords in Somalia (including Aideed himself) felt that the peacekeepers deployed would deprive him of the presidency (Adebajo, 2003). In return Aideed decided to loot the available food. According to estimates, between 10 and 80 percent of all international supplies were looted in October 1992. To the various factions in Somalia, international aid was an additional source of income. The available resources provided by the relief organisations created new economic niches. Robbery, blackmail and setting up of roadblocks became more lucrative with the influx of international aid (Grosse-Kettler, 2004: 11).

Gros (1996) mentions, accurately, that Somalia is an anarchic state. The reality of the situation in Somalia is that there is no central government in place, implying that the armed groups of the warlords are in control of a non-existent state. The reality is that Angola is a form of a failed state, because it has at least a central government, but a fragile one to say the least. However, as mentioned before, state formation was never truly consolidated because of the civil war. The dictatorship of Barre excluding other political parties (especially the Hawiye clan) during his regime meant that, when he was overthrown, no one had a strong enough claim to being in power. Aideed, like Savimbi, did not have the ideal of compromise in mind at all. It was all or nothing, in his mind.

The patronage networks in Somalia are highly relevant, when one considers that nearly all the warlords in Somalia held high office that they later attacked, and that they had developed important commercial connections as part of their positions in old patronage networks. Aideed was no different, because he was a defence minister under Barre, acquiring arms clandestinely from abroad for his boss prior to Somalia's civil war (Reno, 2002). Reno (2002) mentions that "these commercial connections,

developed in corrupt, patronage-based pre-conflict regimes, become central political and material resources for leaders who use armed youths, often from the plethora of the corrupt regime's paramilitary and army units, to fight their way to power.”

This briefly sums up the Somali situation and explains why many Somali citizens fled to countries such as South Africa, where they tried to create a better life for themselves. According to the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP), there are over 6,000 Somali refugees and over 17,000 Somali asylum seekers in South Africa (SAMP, 2006). According to Allie (2006), there are roughly 6,000 refugees from Angola in South Africa. Unfortunately the well-being of the citizens in a country such as Somalia is not priority, as has become evident through activities such as looting, which Aideed did effectively with the dire consequence of starving the different clans within the country. Pirating activities have also been on the rise in Somalia as pirates appeared off the coast of Somalia and Sierra Leone and government soldiers are accused of attacking foreign ships (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1997).

We have seen thus far that state weakness is a sign for warlords to wage war and create personal wealth. The fragile state structures are so weak that there are very few constraints in weak states. We have also seen that the weak governmental structures are worse off in various countries, as highlighted in Angola and Somalia. The argument is thus that the weak governments create favourable conditions for warlords to operate in, as the previous sections have illustrated. However, the warlords create favourable conditions for themselves within a weak state. The following section will highlight this.

### **3.5 The role that warlords play in creating a weak state**

Thus far the weakened state has been highlighted as rationale for warlords to act. Factors such as mismanagement of funds and lack of social services have led to a lack of human security within the population. However, it would be easy to blame only the governmental structures (or the lack thereof) for the dire situation in countries such as Angola and Somalia. Warlords also play a significant role in creating a weak state. The following section will highlight how warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi contribute to the creation of a weak state.

*Militarism* played a very big part in the civil wars in Angola and Somalia. Barre was a military dictator, while the wars in Angola consisted firstly of a liberation struggle which later shifted to becoming a civil war. This should come as no surprise as Aideed and Savimbi are trained military men. According to Gros (1996), the military is perhaps the biggest threat to stability and nation-building in the developing world today. Men such as Aideed and Savimbi, being militarily oriented, do not place an emphasis on civil society; rather they are more interested in acquiring weapons for their men; Aideed acquiring weapons from Eastern Europe, while Savimbi also received weapons from the same regions via his diamond trading. This has led to a formation of patron-client relations and a strong sense of personal rule based purely on personal authority and coercion (Carment, 2003).

Militarism also implies the most basic criterion for statism, which is physical control over territory and population (Clapham, 1998). Williams (2007) implies that the emphasis on weapons by Aideed and Savimbi makes it difficult for governments to control all of the territory or protect all of the citizens. The situation was not helped by the fact that Aideed spent over \$40 000 per week to continue, while Savimbi made millions in diamond exchanges which he used not only to support UNITA but to get weapons. The territories played a big part because their military organisations could operate within a geographical area, implying that the state is weakened further because it did not have complete control of the territory. This means that the security dilemma is thus aggravated. In Somalia's case the security dilemma arose particularly around the Mogadishu area.

Both actors had an *authoritarian* style of control. Authoritarianism led to further weakening of the state. This is highly relevant with regard to the previous paragraph on the territorial control. Savimbi was the leader of UNITA, which in essence implies he was the leader of the ethnic group, the Ovimbundu. The same can be stated of Aideed, seeing that he was in control of the Habr Gedir sub-clan, which was the backbone of his support against the other sub-clans in Somalia. In Somalia and for Aideed it created a safeguard; because of the Somali pastoral economy, control of the whole country was not essential, but only the territory where your constituents come from. More importantly, the nature of the military in Angola and Somalia led to them

to take control of the informal markets (diamonds and looting respectively). Aided's and Savimbi's authoritarian rule led to greater emphasis on a security dilemma. Both Aided and Savimbi stated to their followers that the opposition could not be trusted and everything in their power should be done to eliminate the enemy. The followers in UNITA and the USC believed what their leaders said. Their authoritarian style meant that only their followers were looked after. Thus it was not citizens fighting against each other, but rather factions fighting against each other, with civilians perishing in the process. During rule of Savimbi and Aided innocent civilians lost their lives, which further weakened the country as a whole.

The consequence was that there was economic malperformance in countries such as Angola and Somalia (Gros, 1996). It would be easy to blame the state in this regard; however, the revenue that Aided and Savimbi made from looting and diamonds respectively did not end up in the hands of the majority of the people. Rather, it ended up in the hands of those who were continuing the war. Williams (2007) importantly mentions that, although the warlords differ from case to case, the common claim is that they pursue violent strategies in order to accumulate wealth through the control of formal and informal markets. This economic malperformance of warlords is further aggravated by the fact that they became dependent on external support. Savimbi was still backed by the United States government as late as 1986 (Clapham, 1998), with the same government investing in Somalia's fragile system. By 1980 the United States had invested \$40 million in military assistance for the Somali government. The money was not used to enhance state structures; rather it was used to continue the protracted wars in the countries. If the money was used to develop social infrastructure, then both cases would have turned out different socially. However, that was not the case.

Because of the patrimonial network within warlord circles, the warlords made sure that no middle class existed in their country. Gros (1996) emphasises that the middle class is the one that holds society together. There is such a big gap between the wealthy (the ruling elite) and the poor, implying that the middle class is obsolete. According to Gros (1996), the middle class gives the poor hope that with hard work and a bit of luck, they could move up in life. Lastly, Aided and Savimbi caused large-scale displacement within their respective countries (if one considers the

territorial bases they operated from). According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), there are close to 207,000 refugees in Angola and close to 464,000 refugees in Somalia (UNHCR, 2007). Moving into enemy areas would be fatal. Ethnic nationalism is considered more prominent than civic nationalism in countries such as Angola and Somalia.

What this section covers is the notion that warlords play a definite role in the weakening of the state. It shows that through their militaristic and authoritarian style of leadership, adverse consequences do occur in weak states. The lack of government structures within the countries means that these militaristic actions destroy the middle class and large-scale displacement occurs within the country. The question thus arises: would warlords try and create a situation of peaceful transformation? Would they benefit from trying to create a stronger state? The concluding section investigates the benefits of a weak state for warlords.

### **3.6 Benefits for leaders and non-state actors**

There are major benefits for the leaders and actors such as warlords in operating in a weakened state. Firstly, *there may be few incentives for local actors to re-establish the old order*. As mentioned above, for actors such as Aideed and Savimbi there are powerful advantages – especially economic benefits – that flow from their looting and banditry. The resurrection of an even nominally capable national political order may interfere with the patronage opportunities of some actors (Herbst, 2004: 310). Weak states have an abundance of “haves” and “have-nots”, and some of the states contain an array of ethnic, religious and linguistic interests. It would therefore be more beneficial for the leaders or rulers within a weak state to continue the status quo to the benefit not only of themselves but also for their constituency. Rulers in weak states are clever enough to prey on their own constituents. Being driven by ethnic or other inter-communal conflict, or by the government’s inability to create a favourable situation, such rulers victimise their own citizens (Rotberg, 2004). The weak government structures of countries such as Angola and Somalia had no sound old order anyway.

Secondly, *there are strong pressures for power to continue to fracture in weak states*. The world has become accustomed to the fact that smaller units (i.e. countries by its geographical size) function better and the international system does not seem to be willing to adjust boundaries according to how power is actually expressed and to the fact that weak states have a tendency to fracture into smaller factions of rebel groups. Aideed's actions are a prime example of this, as could be seen when he confronted the US/UN forces in Somalia. They were able to control an area and establish commercial activities within it, while keeping weak central authorities at bay through armed resistance. Warlords manage to arm themselves and further aggravate the already intolerable situation without accountability to the domestic population or actors in the peace process (Tshitereke, 2003). The weak governmental structures do not allow for stringent checks and balances. Because of being in control of small units in Angola, UNITA's diamonds not only allowed the rebel movement to buy arms, but also to gain diplomatic and logistical support from regional political leaders whose friendship with Savimbi was based on business interests (Le Billon, 2001).

Herbst (2004: 310) makes a good point in this regard. *States fail within their existing boundaries*. Unlike in most of Europe throughout its history, even weak states today are safe from formal takeover by their neighbours. These neighbours may intervene to affect the so-called balance of power or take advantage of the economic opportunities presented by weakening or failing states, but the formal boundaries of the state will continue to be recognised by all concerned. The international community has little power to withdraw recognition from a state once it has received independence from its colonial power (Herbst, 2004: 309). This is an advantage for warlords, as weak states struggle to control their borders. States lose authority over sections of territory and this plays right into the hands of the warlord. The warlord would thus ask why he should surrender his control of this territory. It is interesting to compare Aideed and Savimbi in this respect. Aideed never had control of Mogadishu because of the many sub-clans fighting with each other, but Savimbi was always in control of the bush. It must be mentioned, however, that the MPLA made inroads into the areas that UNITA controlled before Savimbi's death.

The faltering state's weakness becomes apparent as rebel groups threaten the residents of central cities and overwhelm demoralised government contingents (Rotberg, 2004:

8). Lawlessness develops as citizens turn to non-state actors such as warlords for protection, and this causes an incentive for warlords to change as they are creating a bigger base to operate from. Security is a priority for citizens, but the government cannot supply it as the state is faltering and they are constantly fighting the rebels as in Angola or dealing with the infighting between different factions as in Somalia.

## **Conclusion**

The weakening of the state created a vacuum for warlords such as Savimbi and Aideed to operate in. From their perspective, there is little incentive to change the status quo because the current situation is highly favourable for them. The illegal trade in diamonds and looting are the prime examples of activities within these two weakened states. This chapter examined Savimbi and Aideed as warlords. It argues that (1) the signature of state structures in countries such as Angola and Somalia is largely responsible for creating a weakened state, meaning that non-state actors such as warlords have favourable conditions to work in; and (2) warlords also play a significant role in the weakening of the state.

The chapter is important in the overall picture of the thesis. It puts forward the notion that state weakness is highly favourable for warlords; in fact, this condition strengthened warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi. Weak government structures as in Angola and Somalia created an opportunity for Savimbi and Aideed respectively in unleashing a plethora of violence for which they are not accountable to all. That is what a warlord does best. He acts because there are limited constraints in place.

The weakening of the state implies the state as an entity is divided. One part of that entity which is common on the African continent is ethnicity. The next chapter will deal with the impact of ethnicity in the rise and strength of warlords. Ethnicity also creates favourable conditions for warlords. The chapter will illustrate what ethnicity entails but, more importantly, the influence that ethnicity has had on societies such as Angola and Somalia. By establishing that, one could investigate the importance of ethnicity to Savimbi and Aideed.

## **Chapter 4- Investigating ethnicity**

### **Introduction**

Few conflicts on the African continent are inter-state wars. They tend rather to be intra-state struggles, which are a regular occurrence in many African countries. Breytenbach (2003) mentions correctly that these conflicts are largely civil wars which are characterised by internal rebellion against rulers. The warlords, whom he mentions, act only when the state has become weak and they can thus continue without interference from the state. The minimal governmental structures in countries such as Angola and Somalia mean that there are minimal constraints. Patrimonialism has a protracted history on African soil in this regard. This was highlighted in the previous chapter, which addressed the concept of state weakness.

A weakening of the state brings with it a multitude of tensions – few more serious than ethnic tensions. This can be illustrated by the examples of Angola and Somalia with their long protracted ethnic wars. Importantly for the thesis, the issue of ethnicity has been used by Savimbi and Aideed in fighting the opposition. This chapter focuses on the influence that ethnicity has in the strength of warlords.

The argument of the chapter is that colonialism created widespread ethnic divisions and so warlords (given the fact that state weakness has created tensions already) can benefit greatly from it, creating a base to work from. However, the argument is also that the primordialist card should not be overused and that an instrumentalist approach must also be adopted in analysing ethnicity. This means that, although the ethnic divisions are remnants of Africa's colonial past, actors such as warlords can manipulate the ethnic question to their own advantage.

Aideed and Savimbi used their ethnicity backgrounds to their own benefit. The USC of which Aideed was chairman, consisted mainly of the Habr Gedir sub-clan of the Hawiye clan. Savimbi's UNITA consisted mainly of the Ovimbundu tribe, and it is this tribe that gave Savimbi plentiful backing in the period of the civil war and the fighting in the bush. It is also interesting to note when comparing the two actors that one used the ethnic background completely distant from the capital (i.e. Savimbi), while

Aideed's ethnic tribe was situated close to Mogadishu. Savimbi saw no reason for operating close to the Angolan capital Luanda, because his power lay in the bush area (the Ovimbundu). Aideed, on the other hand, was always fighting in Mogadishu, because the Hawiye clan was from that area.

The chapter will determine what ethnicity means, what the influence of colonialism is on ethnicity, and composition of the ethnic divisions in Angola and Somalia. This will lead to an investigation of how warlords can mobilise their supporters under these conditions. Lastly, these ethnic divisions in these countries lead to civic nationalism as the basis for the struggle within torn countries. The term nationalism also needs to be investigated because, by highlighting it, it can be shown that there is a lack of nationalism in countries such as Angola and Somalia, because the different ethnic groups are constantly fighting. The term is even more relevant if one considers that Somalia has a common ethnic group, but it remains so conflict-ridden. Angola, on the other hand, has different ethnic groups, but the result is the same: large-scale violence.

#### **4.1 Defining ethnicity**

The focus in African politics has changed from its colonial days. More concretely, the common threat of colonial power has vanished. Indeed, following the independence of Angola and Somalia, the context and the issues have changed. The struggle is no longer against external powers, but rather with forces within the borders of the country. Colonial domination is not an issue any longer; however, its legacy remains undiminished. The colonial boundaries have not led to inter-state wars, but rather the phenomenon of intra-state warfare between the different ethnic divisions. This has led to conflict surrounding issues of ownership of the new states and, consequently, animosity on the basis of ethnicity (Horowitz, 2000: 4).

However, the argument against Horowitz's point is that colonialism has had a lasting effect on the African continent. It has created ethnic divisions. These colonial borders drawn on the premise of ethnicity have created havoc on the African continent and, in particular, in countries such as Angola and Somalia. The ethnic question is even more relevant if one considers that Aideed and Savimbi derived their power from their ethnic background. What is even more compelling is that sub-clans within a clan are

fighting within Somalia. In Angola it was overall ethnic groups who were the cause of the large-scale violence. The question therefore arises as to what exactly ethnicity entails.

#### **4.1.1 The meaning/definition of ethnicity**

Ethnicity implies having a common linkage with the people within your surroundings. You share common traits with them that won't be taken away because one can almost state that "one is born with it". Horowitz mentions that ethnic groups are defined by ascriptive difference, whether it is colour, language, religion or some other indicator of common origin (Hanlon, 2006: 95). In fact, ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated on the basis of their colour, language and religion; it covers "tribes", "races", "nationalities" and "castes" (Horowitz, 2000: 53). Well-known scholar Ted Gurr (as quoted in Hanlon, 2006: 95) states that the ethnic criteria used by groups to define themselves usually include common descent, shared historical experiences and valued cultural traits. Aideed and Savimbi were clever enough to realise that they could create a substantial following easily because they understood their constituency. In Savimbi's case, it was a situation of the Ovimbundu group being excluded from political office, while Aideed's Habr Gedir was mainly excluded from political life during the Barre regime.

Ethnicity is an important social and political force that must be understood with other related notions such as the nation-state. Richard Schermerhorn (as quoted in Malaquias, 2000) defines an ethnic group as having a common historical linkage and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the quintessential elements of peoplehood. These symbolic elements include examples such as kinship, religious affiliation, nationality or physical contiguity (Malaquias, 2000). The common denominator concerning ethnicity is, therefore, historical connection. This is evident in Somalia and Angola in the case studies of Aideed and Savimbi. The historical connection plus the political exclusion were utilised by both actors.

It is thus closely linked to a primordialist stance in that your ethnic background is determined by birth and your cultural traits are predetermined for the individual. It is important to note that ethno-political groups such as those in Somalia and Angola

organise around their shared identity and seek gains for members of their group (Hanlon, 2006: 95). Importantly, what the cultural traits illustrate is a sense of loyalty from a historical perspective. The individuals within the ethnic groups are very loyal to their superiors because of the cultural heritage. However, Hansen (2003) argues that the subjects from the ethnic groups will only remain loyal if the leader of the pack can create security for them. Savimbi and Aideed did that through their activities of diamond trading and looting respectively. The instrumentalist notion points to the fact that it is the ability of the ruling elite to manipulate cultural differences for their own wellbeing. Kivimaki (2001) and Conversi (2007) mention that with the theory of instrumentalism one can identify actors such as Aideed and Savimbi manipulating public feelings only for the purpose of holding on to power.

The topic of ethnicity has become such an important one today in the sense that different reasons are given for the use of ethnicity as a political tool. This leads to ethnicity becoming a tool for analysis of societies such as Angola and Somalia in their totality, because it embraces everyone. Moreover, ethnicity creates room to operate, especially for warlords who seek opportunities in pursuit of particular goals which can be achieved through maximizing ethnic identities (Fenton, 2005). Reno (2006) mentions that the ethnicity played right into the hands of leaders of the ethnic networks. Warlords such as Savimbi and Aideed see themselves as ethnic champions, because their constituents place them on a pedestal. Savimbi was seen within the Ovimbundu tribe as a supernatural person, while Aideed was seen as a people's champion within the Habr Gedir kin.

To highlight the impact of ethnicity on the African continent, the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) reports that, for the 13-year period of 1990-2002, there were 58 major armed conflicts in the world. On closer examination, ethnic-related conflicts constituted a considerable number of them, with regional distribution in Africa being the most dense, with 19 conflicts (Jinadu, 2007). Conflicts imply a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and at the same time neutralise, injure and eliminate rivals (Horowitz, 2000: 95). Ethnic wars are primarily about military struggles (and the actions of Savimbi and Aideed through their organisations are no different) in which the victory depends greatly on the physical control of territories and resources and not on appeals to members of the other group. As mentioned before, Aideed and

Savimbi acquired considerable wealth by being in control of certain areas. The Ovimbundu region has a plethora of diamond-mining activities, while Mogadishu is the perfect location for large-scale looting. Territory for warlords creates power and that territory is very closely linked to the ethnic background of such warlords (Kauffmann, 1996).

Carment (2003) rightly mentions that the consequence of the military struggles was the formation of the patron-client relations and the development of personal rule. The political system became structured not by institutions, but rather by politicised ethnically-based patronage networks. One would think that class would be the overwhelming factor in African conflict considering the horrific history of periods such as colonialism and slavery in the African conflict. However, it is the ethnic background that has destroyed many countries because, according to Fenton (2005), ethnicity has become a governmental principle for allocating resources. Fenton has a valid point if one considers the fact that the MPLA in Angola mostly uses its ethnic stronghold to create wealth via its oil production; precisely the same can be said of UNITA and its exploitation of diamonds.

The same cannot be said of the Somali question, if one considers that their plethora of clans is converging on scraps to create a so-called power hold over the rival clans. Madhi and Aideed's back and forth fighting relates to the point. Although Madhi and Aideed were from the same clan, namely the Hawiye clan, they could not see eye to eye because they were from different sub-clans (Aideed being from the Habr Gedir kin, and Madhi from the Abgal kin).

One can already establish the historical importance of ethnicity on the African continent, with the case studies of Angola and Somalia highlighting this. It must be mentioned, however, that this is not the Hobbesian interpretation of conflict. Mueller (2000) correctly mentions that the ethnic wars in Angola and Somalia are not every citizen against each other; rather they are small factions from different ethnic groups in conflict with one another. He actually labels them "thugs". This is highly important because the USC mostly consisted of supporters of the Habr Gedir kinship group, while UNITA rebels mostly came from the Ovimbundu tribe. The stance is not every

citizen fighting against each other, but rather fighter groups fighting against the citizens.

The ethnic question is even more interesting when comparing Angola and Somalia. Somalia is one of most ethnically homogenous countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, while Angola is an ethnically heterogeneous country, but both ended up fighting protracted civil wars (Gros, 1996). One would think that an ethnically diverse country would be more prone to conflict (as in the case of Angola); however, ethnically homogenous countries such as Somalia are also susceptible to war. It is the manipulation of both Aideed and Savimbi that created violence. Colonialism as the argument of creating ethnic advantage for warlords created a potential time bomb which was destined to blow up in our faces. To have a better understanding of the influence of ethnicity on warlords, one has to establish the influence of colonialism in the way Angola and Somalia have been shaped and what role it played in the make-up for warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi.

#### **4.2 Colonialism and the effect on Angola and Somalia**

Colonialism is highly important in the argument of this chapter on ethnicity. Ethnic wars on the African continent would not have been so fierce if it weren't for the colonial factor. Carment (2003) mentions that colonialism had such a lasting legacy that "he finds that Africa's weak states and subsequent failures were a result of the way African states were formed: colonialism brought people of different ethnic, political and religious affiliations together to form a state and forge a common sense of citizenship". However, the forging of the different ethnic backgrounds tend not to be that easy if one looks at the record of ethnic wars on the African continent.

The system of Westphalia has been successful on various parts of the world; however, the attempts by the European colonialists to implement the principles in Africa have failed if one considers that many African countries are struggling for domestic survival and, importantly, being relevant in the international sphere (Malaquias, 2000). The only reason Angola as a whole is still important is because of its oil production and diamond refinery, while Somalia is not even deemed important at all because of its status of being a collapsed state. Somalia, however, has received

renewed attention since the September 11 attacks, with the United States government stating that there are terrorist networks in Somalia.

A strong sense of kinship exists on the African continent. Pre-colonial Africa consisted out of hundreds of societies ranging from small bands of hunters to large agriculture-based communities with highly sophisticated and centralised politically dominated structures and kings. A patrimonial system is thus highly relevant, with respect granted to superiors within such a system. Coinciding with the patrimonial system was a patronage system. The instrumentalist viewpoint states that, with the respect to the elders, a patron had to distribute gifts and services to his clients to ensure their loyalty (Hansen, 2003).

Numerous changes occurred once the colonial powers arrived on the African continent. Malaquias (2000) sums this up perfectly:

The departing colonial powers bequeathed to the leaders of 'independent' Africa a virtual ethnic time bomb. The boundaries of the new African states reflected colonial, not cultural or national divisions. During the hastily arranged decolonisation process, and given the personal ambitions of the would-be leaders of the new states, little or no time was available for a sober assessment of the costs and benefits of building the post-colonial state according to an essentially unaltered colonial blueprint. Predictably, independence did not usher in a new era of freedom, peace and prosperity. Instead, secessions and demands for regional self-determination dominated the agenda of nearly all newly independent African states. It was no longer anti-colonial but anti-state. Its instrument of choice was no longer a liberation war but inter-ethnic strife and sometimes genocide.

This sums up very succinctly the lasting legacy of the colonial powers which was consequently accompanied in several African countries by armed ethno-political conflicts between the majority or the so-called favoured groups, which wanted to maintain control of the inherited state, and the disadvantaged (or rather the group that lost out for control of the state) groups, which wanted to capture or reconstitute the inherited state on more favourable terms. Somalia and Angola are prime examples;

however, the ethnic divisions in the respective countries meant the bigger picture (i.e. the greater good of the country) was being ignored. The bad leader exploiting ethnic power has meant that hope for a better future for the countries was low.

The African tendency of centralising the government (and favouring one group) in post-colonial Africa has led to hardened ethnic suspicions. A country such as Angola is a key example, since the MPLA has centralised the government, ruling out basic power-sharing with the ethnic group of UNITA. This leaves a warlord such as Savimbi with the option to use his ethnic basis in continuing in the civil war. A similar situation occurred in Somalia as Barre excluded the powerful Hawiye clan from major political power during his authoritarian rule. After his overthrow, the result was fighting within the Hawiye clan over who gets to be in control of Somalia.

#### **4.2.1 The formation of ethnicity in Somalia**

Somalia is a prime example of a collapsed state; however it should not be one if one considers that it is a society with a shared culture, language, religion and sense of nationalism. Rotberg (2004) suggests that there are many possible explanations, but destructive leadership predominates – specifically, destructive leadership by the Barre regime and the aftermath of that particular regime (i.e. warlord rivalries). There is one over-riding aspect in Somali culture which has been defining: clanism. Somalia consists of a number of clans and sub-clans. An inherent tendency to animosity between the clans exists. The rivalry between Madhi and Aideed from the same clan is a prime example of such animosity. Individuals belonging to these clans are loyal towards it, implying that a primordial outlook is applied (Jones, 2008).

Somalia consists ethnically of Somalis who constitute 85% of the population of the country. The main branches of the Somali lineage system are four pastoral clan-families namely the Dir, Daarood, Isaaq and the Hawiye and two agricultural ones, the Digil and Rahanwayan. The tribe relevant to this thesis is the Hawiye clan, which is located in central and southern Somalia. It is the most famous clan in Somalia (around 25% of the population belongs to the Hawiye). The United Somali Congress is situated within the region where the Hawiye clan is located. Within the Hawiye clan are multiple sub-clans, with the relevant tribe of the Habr Gedir clan of Aideed

being an example while the Abgal clan of Madhi also falls within the Hawiye (McGregor, 2007; Hansen, 2003; Photius, 2004). Although Somalia has an overriding ethnic group, it is within the ethnic group that fighting occurs to this day. Loyalty to a clan is much more important than loyalty to the ethnic group.

The reasoning for this so-called inherent animosity stems from colonial rule, because prior to colonial rule there was no set structure that ruled the country. Agricultural economy was the way of life. The pastoral economy created social and political order. According to Jones (2008), a number of political institutions existed, from the *Jilib* to the highest level of the clan, which would normally consist of a number of different lineages. Historically, the most consistent unit was the *Jilib*, which consisted of number of families connected on the basis of their security needs, maintained through a pledge of mutual support and co-operation. The decision-making body of the *Jilib* was the *Shir*, which consisted of all adult males, with lineage heads and skilled elders serving as spokesmen. This way of life included a forum for discussion, decision-making and dispute resolution, meeting as the need arose with no permanent office-holders, chiefs or committees (Jones, 2008). One can thus already establish that respect was of importance in Somalia and loyalty was also not an issue at all. In addition to that, the values of Islam constituted a supra-clan locus of authority in leadership.

The landscape, however, completely changed once colonial powers set foot on Somali soil. According to Jones (2008), there were vast differences in the colonial experiences of Somaliland under the British and under the Italians, which created a pattern of highly unequal development socially and economically between the northern and southern regions of the country. Somalia for the British Empire was more about strategic positioning rather than putting a lot of effort into the country. This was evident from the fact that there was an almost complete lack of investment of capital or development of productive enterprises. The Italian regime was vastly different in that it set out an ambitious plan for economic transformation. This led to greater appropriation of lands for the population and the establishment of a plantation economy (Jones, 2008). Agriculture was also the backbone of Somali society, but the different colonial influences created uneven wealth distribution.

Against this background, the different sub-clans failed to co-exist in the country. This is clearly seen in the fact that most of the support for Aideed within the United Somali Congress came from the Habr Gedir kinship group. This is surprising when evaluating the Somalian conflict. If one considers that the Hawiye clan is the most prominent clan in Somalia, one would think they would make a better effort to work together in the aftermath of the Barre regime. However, the personal ambitions of Aideed took over and violence broke out. Aideed mobilised supporters, mostly poor young men from the Habr Gedir and created the vicious Mad Max scenarios within the streets of Mogadishu. If one adopts the instrumentalist viewpoint, Aideed was clever in using his clan (which was excluded during the Barre regime) as a powerbase in the fighting against the rest of the Hawiye clan, but also the clans of the rest of the country. Finally, the fighting between the sub-clans illustrate that clanism is highly regarded in Somalia. In this country the other ethnic groups almost became irrelevant, meaning that the sub-groups are more important in this country. That played right into Aideed's hands as he was very well respected within the Habr Gedir kinship group, and it was thus easy to recruit supporters.

According to Grosse-Kettler (2004: 5), the different clans swarmed into Mogadishu. According to her, the number of warlords increased to 15. In fact, in Mogadishu alone "there are no less than six warlords, each controlling a different section of the city and its rural hinterland" (Grosse-Kettler, 2004: 5). The support of the sub-clans is important because the warlords can wage war on that basis, and violence is seen as generating business.

#### **4.2.2 Ethnic background in Angola**

The civil war in Angola has been labelled a resource war as well as an ethnic war. Angola's tragedy lies in the fact that there is a reluctance among the politico-military forces to share power and wealth within an inclusive multi-ethnic and multi-racial political system. This has clearly been shown through the liberation war from 1961 to 1974. These cleavages, as Malaquias (2000) states, were only partly the result of deep animosities caused by differences (class or racial) reflecting colonial society. The national groups were created mainly by ethnic differences predating colonialism.

The two main ethnic groups that this chapter will focus on are the Mbundu (in the MPLA stronghold) and the Ovimbundu (UNITA's main constituents). The Mbundu represent roughly 25% of the population and occupy the areas surrounding the capital Luanda. A distinct ethnic subgroup has developed within the larger Mbundu region. According to Malaquias (2000), the impact of the colonial presence in the areas around Luanda brought people from all Angolan ethnic groups to the region. Over time they constituted a group which was unique in the sense that it is heavily influenced by the language and customs of the colonial power which means they can more accurately be described as *Luandas*.

The Ovimbundu ethnic group is the largest ethno-linguistic group in Angola. They represent between 35 to 40% of the Angolan population and dominate the areas with the highest population density in the country – the central plateau provinces of Benguela, Bie and Huambo (Malaquias, 2000). The Portuguese were able to impose colonial rule because the anti-colonial resistance was fractured. There was never a united front in Angola if one takes into account the ethnic background, and that is still relevant today in their politics. It is behind this rhetoric that UNITA was formed under Savimbi. In fact the main rationale for creating UNITA was primarily ethnic. The Ovimbundu (and Savimbi) believed that as the major ethnic group in Angola, they should have their own liberation movement, given that other ethnic groups are represented by liberation movements such as the MPLA. Savimbi and UNITA were in essence not looking to create a multi-ethnic and multi-racial state, but rather to satisfy the aspirations of the Ovimbundu (Hanlon, 2006: 96). Right until the end Savimbi used his ethnic background to the fullest capacity trying to ensure that they were well looked after.

The struggles between the MPLA and UNITA had a very strong ethnic linkage because ethnicity played such an important part in the MPLA's successful eviction of its competition from Luanda and the consolidation of its rule around the capital, Luanda, if not elsewhere in the vast rural expanses of Angola (Malaquias, 2000). This reflects the scenario in Angola today if one considers that the Mbundu ethnic group has maintained the MPLA in power for over 25 years regardless of poor governance. The Mbundu group unsurprisingly are the primary beneficiaries of the patron-client

networks that have emerged to distribute the vast oil wealth. The Ovimbundu have only limited access to state power or the wealth of controlling state.

Savimbi and the Ovimbundu saw themselves as the legitimate representatives of the majority of the population; however, this was miscalculation on the part of Savimbi as he thought that, through being the leader of the largest ethnic group, he was destined to being the leader of the country after the 1992 elections. On the contrary, it led to his downfall in that he thought that his own people would support him. Savimbi's limited aspect of primordial aspirations moved over to instrumentalist aspirations. The obvious disappointment of not winning the elections led him to return to the bushes of the Ovimbundu, and thus continuing the ethnic and resource war against the MPLA government.

He used the vast area to his advantage, seeing that the Ovimbundu areas are rich in diamonds. These resources funded Savimbi and his UNITA rebels in their fight against the MPLA government. He could therefore use this ethnic stranglehold to finance his rebel movement. However, it was this over-reliance on the ethnic group that led to his political downfall and adopting the path of warlordism. Political participation in the areas controlled by UNITA was highly restrictive in the sense that, although UNITA portrayed itself as a democratic organisation, its political orientation and practice were clearly based on the will of Savimbi and his Maoist beliefs. Savimbi thus created a lot of centralised structures, both at political and military levels. The military lineage was as such that no civilian was allowed to hold leadership positions (Malaquias, 2000).

When applying the instrumentalist angle to an analysis of Savimbi and UNITA, it becomes clear that – unlike Aideed, who wanted to stay close to the capital – Savimbi didn't need to remain close to Luanda. The Ovimbundu ethnic group brought him considerable wealth and he used that to continue the civil war in the country. Savimbi was seen as a supernatural person among the Ovimbundu and, when he spoke, his ethnic group listened. He was seen as a god among the Ovimbundu, because in their eyes he could do things that no normal human being could do. It is important to mention that, as just in the case of the Hawiye clan in Somalia, there are also sub-groups within the Ovimbundu. Within the ethnic group there are the Bieno, Bailundo

and Uambo sub-groups. Savimbi was the leader of the Bieno, who also controlled UNITA. Comparing Aideed and Savimbi, one notices the effectiveness of sub-groups varied in the two case studies.

In Savimbi's case it should be noted that he was truly the over-riding leader of the Ovimbundu, seeing that he was also the leader of the controlling sub-group. Savimbi was very clever as he created very centralised structures at both political and military levels, meaning that no civilians within the structures of UNITA had any real chance of obtaining a dominating leadership position. In Somalia the situation reveals that Aideed was clearly not the overall leader within the Hawiye clan. Rather, he had only the committed support of the Habr Gedir. What is illustrated for this thesis is that sub-groups in Somalia within an ethnic group cannot get along because of primordial tensions; however, that has been overtaken by the instrumentalist stance of leaders such as Aideed and Madhi not being willing to compromise in the post-Barre era. This shows that Savimbi had a superior way of operating within the overall ethnic group than Aideed did. The tensions in both countries were exploited because violence brought them wealth.

### **4.3 Primordialism versus Instrumentalism**

The previous sections illustrated scenarios within the respective countries and emphasised the importance of ethnicity in Angola and Somalia. They showed how different the ethnic make-up is in Angola and Somalia. In Angola it was different ethnic groups pitted against each other, while in Somalia it was different sub-clans within a common ethnic group fighting against each other. Moreover, it emphasised the importance of ethnicity to warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi in creating a basis to work from. What is important to note is that the influence of colonialism should be not be under-estimated. Colonial rule brought about a pattern of economic underdevelopment and the class basis of the postcolonial state produced a structural tendency towards factional rivalry among elites (Jones, 2008). It should not be denied that the colonial borders brought unevenness to the African continent.

The primordialists view ethnicity as an exceptionally strong affiliation which is often linked to ancient conflicts, age-old hatreds and past atrocities (Bowen, 1996). These

identities change very little over time which leads to the notion that there are irreconcilable differences between ethnic groups, and that the violent clashes are inevitable (Hanlon, 2006: 97).

Though that stance is taken into consideration, it would be more helpful here to consider the instrumentalist argument, which is influenced by social systems, leaders and circumstances. Identity changes rapidly over time and, because of this, the instrumentalists focus on elites and their leaders such as Aideed and Savimbi, and the way they manipulate ethnic, religious and class identity (Hanlon, 2006: 98). In essence, the boundaries and the contents of these countries are subject to change historically, politically or economically. The changes are enhanced by the warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi, who are summed up by Brown (2001) as 'bad leaders'. He mentions that "Many ethnic and internal conflicts are triggered by self-obsessed leaders who will do anything to get and keep power. They often incite ethnic violence of the most horrific kind for their own political ends...Conflicts triggered by power struggles between opportunistic and desperate politicians are common" (Brown, 2001).

The effect of the instrumentalist theory is that it highlights that collective identities change over period in time, and more importantly, it is not about the deep hatred that the primordialists are concerned with. Instrumentalism shows that ethnicity can be used by leaders such as Aideed and Savimbi for other reasons besides their historical associations. Importantly, it lays claim more concretely to actors and not actions, as primordialists would do. Aideed and Savimbi can clearly be examined better under the instrumentalist lens. The instrumentalist theory lays better claim that the nation as a whole in ethnicity is being overplayed, meaning that primordialism sees the nation-state as the alpha and omega. What the instrumentalist theory has shown that is highly applicable to this study is that civic nationalism is struggling in the respective countries and that ethnic nationalism is more important for a lot of citizens. Ethnic groups and sub-groups are more relevant to them than the overall nation (Conversi, 2007). Overall, there is a lack of implementing or consolidating ethnic nationalism properly.

The point of departure which instrumentalism clearly shows is that these ethnic conflicts, created along the colonial faultlines, have changed over time. Identities are socially constructed (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). However, individuals of groups within the Ovimbundu and the Habr Gedir clan of Aideed are used as pawns or are products of discourses that exist when political elites construct antagonistic ethnic identities in order to strengthen their hold on power. Blimes (2006: 537) states that instrumentalists see ethnicity merely as a tool that an individual or group uses to achieve an end. Brubaker and Laitin (1998) sum it up well when they state that ethnicity is not the ultimate source of violent conflict in many cases. Rather the conflicts that are driven by struggles for power between challengers and incumbents are newly ethnicised and newly framed in ethnic terms. The constant struggle between the faction of Aideed and the faction of Madhi within the same clan, and the fighting between Dos Santos's MPLA and Savimbi's UNITA, highlights the constant power struggles with the ethnically diverse Angolan population.

#### **4.4 How warlords manipulate the ethnic question**

With all that has been stated above about the influence of ethnicity and its use by warlords, how do the warlords get it right to convince their people to do criminal deeds for them? According to Bowen (1996), "fear from the top" is a telling factor explaining why they will do almost anything for the warlord. Warlords have been portrayed as larger than life characters. In this case it is obvious in the work of Savimbi and the Ovimbundu ethnic group and Aideed of the Habir Gedir Kin from the Hawiye tribe. As they are military men, fear and hate are generated from the top and they finally push people to commit acts of violence. People may come to fear or resent another group for a variety of reasons, especially when changes (social or economic) seem to favour the other group. And yet such competition and resentment usually does not lead to inter-group violence without an intervening push from the top (Bowen, 1996).

With hindsight we can see the easy part would be to manipulate followers because, firstly, both actors were brought up in their respective ethnic tribes, thus they knew the local conditions so well. More importantly, they knew how the people operated considering that they grew up with the same problems. As mentioned before, the

difference between Aideed and Savimbi is that the latter had better control over the ethnic group as such. Aideed, on the other hand, was merely a sub-clan leader, and would have been as powerful as Savimbi had he had the whole support of the Hawiye clan. However, the differences within the sub-clans in the Hawiye were just too great for concession to occur.

Secondly, this leads to an elitist aspect within the ethnic group relying heavily on a patrimonial network that has worked well for the warlords. Within their ethnic group they could persuade young men to work for them by promising to create a better life for them via illicit activities such as looting and smuggling diamonds. Rawlinson (2003) states that citizens have a deep-seated allegiance to traditional and cultural leaders – the “tribal” chiefs – who often as a result are also the political, social and economic elites. A strong sense of loyalty because of the historical past is evident and this works to the benefit of warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi because they have a large following and a base to work from (if one considers that they are in charge of a vast territorial area). This link works both ways: political, social and economic leaders who are savvy in acknowledging themselves as “tribal chiefs” even if their claims are dubious to say the least. Poor individuals become dependent on warlords’ greed, as the war economy is the only economic prospect (Grosse-Kettler, 2004: 6). Using close to \$40, 000 a week to keeping the militia going is reason enough for subjects to look up to Aideed as a father figure.

Brubaker and Laitin (1998) mention that most ethnic leaders are well educated and from middle-class backgrounds, while the rank-and-file members of such organisations are more often poorly educated and from lower or working-class backgrounds. Aideed and Savimbi were both very well educated and understood their ethnic backgrounds very well, and they used that knowledge to create an image of ‘prosperous living’ under them. We have seen this frequently in activities of Aideed creating Mad Max vehicles filled with young men operating them. The motion picture *Blood Diamond* is a reflection of how warlords use young men and boys to create wealth. Indeed local knowledge is the key to inducing the local population or information about who is doing what at the village level (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

Another important factor which has to be taken into account is the notion that their respective ethnic groups are excluded from political life and power. This is important when one considers that the Mbundu ethnic group in Angola was in control, while the Abgal kin and not the Habr Gedir kin were controlling the minimal political life in Somalia after the overthrow of the Barre regime. Thus, the warlords use their ethnic background because there is a collective fear of the future (Lake and Rothchild, 1996). In this case one is uncertain how the other ethnic groups would react, and that is why we have seen the warlords (including Aideed) acting as vultures in the aftermath of the Barre regime. After the 1992 election Savimbi must have thought “what now?”, because he had miscalculated his ethnic backing. It also showed that Savimbi had no “Plan B” because he resorted to igniting the war again with the backing of UNITA (i.e. Ovimbundu support).

More importantly, the warlords create a scenario where no-one from other ethnic groups can be trusted. This aligns with the notion of a security dilemma, whereby there is an inability to know what the other group is up to, and thus you arm yourself. Groups are likely to view one another as threatening. These perceived threats may create incentives for pre-emptive attacks (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998; Posen, 1993). By having a scenario of not trusting the other ethnic clans or groups, infantry armies can thus be organised. With the MPLA in power since 1975, it has to be sceptical what UNITA would do if it were to get a bigger slice of the pie. The social antagonisms in Somalia have completely prevented the Habr Gedir and Abgal kinship groups from co-operating (the Ovimbundu sub-groups worked better together because Savimbi was the undisputed leader).

A mutual distrust is the order of the day and it is important for actors such as Aideed and also Savimbi to prey on that. Savimbi was more successful than Aideed in gathering support from the sub-groups, leading to the creation of a large following. This is reflected in the long time that Savimbi was involved in the Angolan civil war. The military legitimacy can only be based on ethnicity. The lack of political legitimacy implies that nationalism as a concept is irrelevant in countries such as Angola and Somalia, if one considers the intra-state warfare.

The ethnic divisions within the different ethnic groups and clans have been instrumental in the demise of nationalism in Angola and Somalia. The argument is that because of the colonial period, and the subsequent use of the ethnic divisions by Aided and Savimbi, nationalism has become obsolete. The following section will focus on the idea that nationalism, specifically civic nationalism, is struggling to be consolidated while ethnic nationalism is preferred.

#### **4.5 The relevance of nationalism**

“Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive goods to their inhabitants. Their government loses legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens”- Robert Rotberg (2004:1).

The above comment by Rotberg sums up the scenario concerning the majority of the states in Africa. Importantly, the nation-state as a whole seems to be non-functional, and thus leaves the citizens (the most important factor) being irrelevant. The reason nationalism is examined is highlighted by the instrumentalist theory. According to Conversi (2007), the category ‘nation’ does not correspond to any objective reality. It postulates a sharp fracture between political-economic sphere and their followers, seeing the latter as passively manipulated by the former (Conversi, 2007). In essence, nationalism as a concept seen through the instrumentalist viewpoint is becoming irrelevant for warlords such as Aided and Savimbi. They are more concerned with their small constituency, which they can control, rather than with the bigger picture (which primordialism draws on).

The concepts of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism are, however, important for this study. Ignatieff (1993: 2) mentions that civic nationalism maintains the nation which should be composed of race, colour, language or ethnicity. In other words, Ignatieff (1993: 2) states that this nationalism is called civic because it envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values. Thus, the country as a whole is seen as the most important entity. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism claims that the individual’s deepest attachments are inherited and not chosen. In essence this implies

that people affiliate with certain parties or, in this case, military organisations because of a sense of belonging (Ignatieff, 1993: 3). The importance of ethnicity implies that ethnic nationalism is preferred in countries such as Angola and Somalia.

It is important to discuss civic and ethnic nationalism, because civic nationalism means loyalty to the state, while ethnic nationalism means there is loyalty to the ethnic group. Warlords want to prevent the building up of civic nationalism and rather stimulate ethnic nationalism, because it entrenches their position of power. Ignatieff (1993: 3) does mention that ethnic nationalism has an authoritarian quality to it, while civic nationalism has a democratic character. Thus, the argument is that civic nationalism is not consolidated at all in countries such as Angola and Somalia, because Savimbi and Aideed respectively put emphasis on ethnic nationalism to mobilise support.

The phenomenon of nationalism seems to be diminishing as a concrete factor within African politics. Nationalism during the Cold War period was seen as an important factor. During this ideologically charged period it was used as an expression in domestic policies of economic self-sufficiency and externally in the diplomacy of non-alignment. This would have been accompanied with state support for policies promoting prosperity, increasing revenues and more capable government administration (Reno, 2002). Herbst (2000) calls for the 'friendly international system' for Africa, which ensured at least that rulers would not face the threat of invasion from neighbours or extinction of their state, if they adopted inefficient or unsuccessful policies.

However, unfortunately, internal strife began to appear during the post-colonial period. By 2002 military rulers had supplanted civilian governments in more than half of Africa's states. According to Reno, from 1970 to 1990 rulers faced a 72% chance that they would leave office under violent circumstances (Reno, 2002). This is very obvious when considering that Barre left when his regime was overthrown in 1991; however, the same cannot be stated of the Angolan government, considering that Savimbi's great rival Dos Santos is still in power, even after the death of Savimbi.

War has in essence been a way to create stronger nationalism. Tilly states that “war made the state, and the state made war” (Herbst, 1990). War has been seen as creating a “feel good” factor in harnessing different cultures to promote warfare. This was seen in the United States after Pearl Harbour in 1941, and also after the 11 September attacks. National pride was elevated to a new level, bringing the different states together, enhancing patriotism as a whole. External threats have such an effect on nationalism because people realise that they are under threat because of who they are as a nation. Giddens (1985) states regarding World War 1: “The War canalized the development of states’ sovereignty, tying this to citizenship and to nationalism in such a profound way that any other scenario came to appear as little more than idle fantasy”. It should be mentioned at this juncture that nationalism as a concept is much stronger in the European context than the African context. African wars are not between countries *per se* but rather between factions within a country, whereas the European wars were mainly interstate wars. The concept of nationalism becomes more interesting in this context when one compares Angola and Somalia.

Angola has different ethnic groups, as mentioned before, and that plays a significant role in accounting for the absence of nationalism. Nationalism as a concept is also weak in Somalia, despite the fact that in Somalia there are minimal differences between the groups (shared culture, language, religion). The fact that the country is a very weak state suggests that the commonalities in the country are irrelevant if clans are constantly fighting (Jones, 2008). If one had to compare the two countries, one could argue that Somalia has a better chance of creating a feeling of national unity than Angola because of the shared ethnicity. Thus, nationalism as a concept in creating a strong state is collapsing because of internal strains and not because of neighbours wanting to formally annex parts of their territories. In actual fact, as has been mentioned before, it is rather the security dilemmas between various ethnic groups and clans that have created an uncomfortable situation. They have led to ethnic wars, dividing the country up into territories and that is highly important for warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi. It is not argued that neighbours do not play a role in weakened states, but the pattern of failure is overwhelmingly towards the devolution of power to actors controlling smaller pieces of territory.

Herbst (2004: 305) makes a valid point by stating that states today (especially African states) are no longer compelled to expand their territorial reach to get rich. Instead, the common strategy is rather to expand the amount of the formal territory under the control of the leader who seeks to enrich himself and his colleagues, and not the country. It is apparent that nationalism in countries is absent when one considers that countries such as Angola and Somalia seem to be divided between territorial parts, and that there are large economic benefits for warlords such as Savimbi and Aideed for being in control of smaller parts of the country than the whole entity. According to Herbst, “there is considerable attractiveness to being small; countries now produce for the world economy rather than for domestic markets” (Herbst, 2004: 305). African entrepreneurs such as Aideed and Savimbi have always been closely connected to the informal economy, which served their purposes very well.

The instrumentalisation of violence and crime at the local levels readily finds international channels which made possible the trade on which wealth was built. The notion that nationalism creates a stronger state is in the back of the minds of these leaders, because of the vast informal international economy which provides them with more opportunities than those provided by the national economic opportunities. Leaders at the national level or challengers (such as Savimbi and Aideed) at the sub-national level may not be particularly interested in increasing the amount of territory that they formally control, because they can survive on an individual basis through informal networks of commerce and finance (Herbst, 2004: 306). The ethnically-controlled areas create wealth for them and their constituents and thus there is no reason to resort to the wider politics, which is implied by nationalism.

Civic nationalism has not been consolidated. In fact, African countries have struggled to build up a civic nationalism thereby leading to a weaker state. Both Aideed and Savimbi viewed nationalism as counter-productive to their objectives. Ethnic nationalism was for them an easy way to generate followers, and also both of them did not care about the majority of the country. Because of that attitude, civic nationalism is still struggling today in those countries. With regards to civic nationalism, there is an absence of a strong popular identity with the state (accounted for by the divisions of ethnicity and warlords not wanting to create a national identity). The lack of a popular consensus over national purpose both aggravates the

state's clumsy efforts to extract resources and is itself exacerbated by an insecure, authoritarian elite. The current picture is one of African societies widely accepted as trying to escape the clutches of the state, but rather becoming more involved in it (Herbst, 1990).

## **Conclusion**

The lack of civic nationalism reaffirms the argument of the impact of ethnicity on the lives of not only the citizens, but also on the strength of the warlords. Colonialism had created large-scale ethnic divisions leading to actors such as warlords exploiting this condition to create a base to work from, not only in terms of a territorial base but also having constituents who would do anything for the warlord. What the chapter aimed to highlight is that, although a primordialist approach to ethnicity is relevant, more effective analysis of ethnicity is possible through an instrumentalist viewpoint. The instrumentalist theory has also highlighted that the concept of a nation-state in countries such as Angola and Somalia is irrelevant when one has actors such as Savimbi and Aideed respectively.

It shows also that the warlords can manipulate their ethnic backgrounds to their advantage, as seen with the sub-clan of Aideed and the ethnic group of Savimbi. This chapter has tried to highlight the importance of ethnicity by illustrating that one actor had more success controlling an ethnic group (i.e. Savimbi), while the other (i.e. Aideed) struggled to control an ethnic group because of deep divisions within the group. Overall, what the chapter has shown is the importance of ethnicity for both actors in their respective countries. In their respective cases, ethnicity has strengthened them as warlords.

## **Chapter 5- Reviewing the thesis**

### **Introduction**

Africa has proved to be a continent of strife and wars. Violent flare-ups and long-standing wars are not new to the shores of Africa. Countries such as Angola and Somalia are making headlines, but unfortunately for the wrong reasons. Both countries with their protracted violence are excellent case studies for the topic of warlords. In fact, Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aideed have thrived on the violence in their respective countries.

Warlordism had a profound impact on the citizens of Somalia and Angola and its legacy is still being felt to this very day. Within both societies there is a strong tendency towards state weakness, but this differs on various levels. Warlords thrive on state weakness in creating personal wealth for themselves and their followers. Few constraints exist in a country with poor governmental structures, and it is expedient for the warlords to take advantage of this. The same scenario applies with ethnicity. The ethnic backgrounds of Aideed and Savimbi have led to their imposing a stranglehold, and in doing so they have power to work with. That can be seen in the background information of the United Somali Congress and UNITA respectively, which are structured on the basis of ethnicity.

The final chapter is an overview of what the thesis has illustrated. What the overview of the thesis highlights are the key factors of warlordism, state weakness and ethnicity. This can be done successfully only by examining the lives of Savimbi and Aideed, who are the relevant examples of warlordism. By recalling the history of these two actors, one can illustrate the hypothesis of the thesis, namely that state weakness and ethnicity have a profound impact on the rise and survival of warlords in Africa. To start off this chapter, we look at a short overview of the chapters of the thesis.

## **5.1 Short overview of the various chapters**

Chapter 1 introduced us to what the thesis is about. It is an investigation of warlords in Africa. It is also a comparative study between Jonas Savimbi of Angola and Farah Aideed of Somalia. The chapter mentioned what will be investigated, namely warlordism and the effect that state weakness and ethnicity have on warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi. These two actors are the relevant case studies investigated in detail in the thesis.

Importantly, two research questions were posed: (1) what is the impact of state weakness on the rise and survival of the warlords; and (2) what is the impact of ethnicity on the rise and survival of the warlords? These answers to these two questions are what the thesis revolves around.

Chapter 2 explored the lives of Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aideed. Their history was told from their humble beginnings to their deaths. The chapter tried to establish their different routes to being ultimately becoming warlords. The second half of the chapter compared the two warlords in terms of different variables: (1) their different leadership styles; (2) their use of diamonds and looting as a strategy for survival; and (3) their use of child soldiers; and (4) the American influence on both actors. The chapter deduced that the two leaders took different paths to ultimately becoming warlords. The second part of the chapter showed that the two actors are different in their approaches when they were compared with the different criteria.

Chapter 3 investigated state weakness as a concept. The chapter looked at state weakness and the influence it had in the strength of warlords. The chapter defined what state weakness is (with reference to the excellent works of Robert Rotberg, William Reno and Jeffrey Herbst). The chapter implies that poor governmental structures (a key symptom of state weakness) within the respective countries assisted the warlords in creating a bigger powerbase to operate from. Also, the chapter argues that the warlords themselves further weaken the state. The chapter explored what Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aideed did to weaken the state, and also how they benefited from the poor governmental structures.

Chapter 4 investigated the concept of ethnicity. The concept of ethnicity was defined, and the chapter established that the process of colonialism had an adverse effect on the African continent. Because of these faultlines, ethnic divisions were created or exacerbated, leading to tensions. The instrumentalist theory was used to illustrate that the divisions played right into the hands of Aideed and Savimbi. The chapter explained the different ethnic scenarios in Angola and Somalia and how they were utilised by warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi. The chapter concluded with the notion that because of these divisions, warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi lay more emphasis on ethnic nationalism than civic nationalism, which further undermines the chances of the countries becoming reconciled internally.

## **5.2 The research question revisited**

The crux of the thesis is the research question: What is the impact of state weakness and ethnicity on the rise and survival of warlords? The thesis has illustrated the nature of warlordism. The lives of Jonas Savimbi and Farah Aideed are prime examples of this phenomenon in Africa. State weakness and ethnicity have cemented their power within their respective countries. In fact, their power has been enhanced by the two independent variables to such an extent that the consequences are still being felt in these countries. The protracted wars in Angola and Somalia left Savimbi and Aideed with tarnished reputations.

Chapters 3 and 4 comprehensively show the factors (i.e. state weakness and ethnicity) important to warlordism and how Aideed and Savimbi took advantage of these circumstances. Importantly, the thesis depicts the different levels of state weakness which Aideed and Savimbi have operated under. Failed states and collapsed states have enhanced the military operations of the warlords, and operating under these circumstances Aideed and Savimbi have benefited economically through looting and diamond smuggling respectively.

The second part of the research question was answered by highlighting how Aideed used the Habr Gedir sub-clan and how Savimbi used the Ovimbundu ethnic group to serve their interests. Their ethnic backgrounds created a support base from which they could operate. It is important to mention that their ethnic backgrounds brought them

wealth. It has been mentioned especially in Chapter 4 that the Ovimbundu area had a huge deposit of diamonds which Savimbi used to finance his UNITA fighters. The same could be said of Aideed because the Habr Gedir kin, sub-clan of the Hawiye clan, was situated in central and southern Somalia, which was meant they were close to Mogadishu. By being so close to the capital of Somalia, Aideed and his militia, the United Somali Congress, could loot profusely. As mentioned in the Chapter 3, Aideed made huge profits by selling bananas.

The research question is answered by demonstrating that warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi benefited greatly from the absence of governmental structures as well as from their ethnic backgrounds. Answering the research question illustrates that actors such as Aideed and Savimbi can easily manipulate variables such as state weakness and ethnicity, if the state is relatively weak (as in the case of Angola) or non-existent (as in Somalia). Answering the research question also illustrates that removing the warlords from the political scene is not the single solution for a prosperous future life. On the contrary, the examples of Angola and Somalia have shown there is no pre-emptive to creating a life of prosperity for the citizens.

The Angolan government is very centralised and excelling in oil production, but socially the country is still backward, largely as a result of the civil war. Removing Aideed from the political scene in Somalia definitely did not bring peace to that country. Unfortunately, Mogadishu has a plethora of warlords, and ridding the city of one simply allows someone else to fill his place. That is what happened in Somalia when Farah Aideed's son, Hussein, became the leader of the United Somali Congress.

### **5.3 Implications for the study of warlords**

Kimberley Marten (2007) best sums up characteristics of warlordism. Firstly, she mentions that they are trained, armed men who take advantage of the disintegration of the central authority to seize control over relatively small slices of territory. These strongmen are military men who act independently, meaning that they act in whatever manner they choose, without any interference from the state. Aideed and Savimbi are prime examples. The power of Aideed and Savimbi did not diminish, even when the government forces took action. What can be concluded is that Aideed is a better

example of a warlord than Savimbi, if one takes into consideration Marten's (2007) characteristic because (1) there was no state to fight against, but multiple clans; and (2) Savimbi only became a properly-defined warlord once he lost the election in 1992.

Secondly, Marten (2007) mentions that their actions are based on self-interest, not ideology. Both actors are prime examples of this characteristic. In Angola Savimbi was UNITA. Everything, be it decision-making or money, revolved around him. The same can be said of Aideed, in that every decision had to go through him. This leads perfectly to what Marten (2007) mentions when she states that their authority is based on charisma and patronage ties to their followers. This is clearly shown with the manipulation of their ethnic background. Savimbi and Aideed clearly had the ability to convince citizens, more often than not young men, to fight for their cause. They also knew how to manipulate the media to an extent (especially Savimbi during the period when he had the backing of the South African and United States governments) and could thus be very convincing.

Lastly, Marten (2007) mentions that this personalistic rule leads to the fragmentation of political and economic arrangements across the country, disrupting the free flow of trade and making commerce and investment unpredictable. This is true if one investigates the activities of Savimbi in the diamond trade. The money was not used for the benefit of the Angolan population, but was rather used to bankroll UNITA and the rebels in the continuing the war against the MPLA government. The same can be said of Aideed. His looting activities had dire consequences for the Somalian population, especially during the period when the drought and a severe famine struck Somalia.

What can be deduced about warlordism on the African continent is that there is not a specific way of becoming a warlord. The actions of Aideed and Savimbi are prime examples of there not being one particular route to becoming a warlord. The article by Antonio Giustozzi (2005) used in Chapter 2 is excellent in illustrating that the actors are different in their approach, but still end up with the same label. According to Giustozzi (2005), Savimbi can be classified as a non-clan military political entrepreneur, where such an actor is a political or military actor who seizes control of a political group or ideologies to mobilise support. According to Giustozzi's (2005)

typology, Aideed can be classified as clan-based military political entrepreneur. This implies that the actor is a modern political or military actor who seizes control of a tribal or clan structure. Using this excellent typology, one can conclude that Aideed and Savimbi are radically different in their approach, but still end up as being classified by the world as warlords.

What emerged in the study was that warlords operate at various levels when it comes to state weakness. This became apparent under Rotberg's (2004) typology by differentiating weak, failed and collapsed states. By using his work, one could establish under what regime Aideed and Savimbi operated. They might be operating under different circumstances, but the results are still the same. Marten (2007) states that there are regular battles with the result that public services such as education and health care are non-existent in many regions. The same result can be seen in the cases of both Aideed and Savimbi in that havoc was created while they were active in the political life within their countries.

We can also conclude that the term anarchy is closely linked to warlordism. That can be seen in the investigation of ethnicity and its importance to actors such as Aideed and Savimbi. Both had territorial control and because of that created a 'bubble' where they could operate from. They did not need to move out of that bubble because that particular space (Mogadishu and the Ovimbundu region) created wealth and security for warlords. In that case, they created anarchy by living in their own space and not being answerable to anybody but themselves.

This is convincing if one compares the two actors. In Somalia all the fighting occurred around the capital Mogadishu. The reason for this was because Mogadishu had major infrastructure which could be used for potential looting. This was seen by the rival clans as a way of making profit. The situation in Angola was radically different in that Savimbi never needed to be in control of the capital Luanda, because more than enough wealth was created in the Ovimbundu region through diamond trading. Anarchy was thus created within different parts of the country.

#### **5.4 Implications for the study of Aideed and Savimbi**

The two case studies are indeed very revealing. As mentioned early in Chapter 1, the world knows a lot about Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor when it comes to being warlords. A lot is known about Jonas Savimbi, but not as much is known about Farah Aideed. In fact, Aideed rose to virtual stardom during the *Black Hawk Down* episode involving the American military.

The strength of these two actors are thus that they are radically different. As mentioned before, they took different routes to becoming warlords. This is extensively showed in the chapter where the warlords' history is illustrated. The thesis would have been limited in scope if the case studies had been primarily the same. This comparative strength spills over to the concept of state weakness. The thesis is strengthened by the fact that Savimbi and Aideed worked under different types of state weakness. Comparing the two case studies one realises they might have operated under varying degrees of state weakness, but the result is the same in that they created personal wealth while the citizens suffered under the atrocious conditions.

A further strength has been the fact that their ethnic background is vastly different. On the one hand one has Savimbi who was in control of an ethnic group the Ovimbundu, while Aideed was only in control of a sub-clan, namely the Habr Gedir sub-clan. The comparative analysis is interesting in that in Angola it was ethnic groups fighting against each other while in Somalia there was fighting within a clan.

What has been a strength but could turn into a weakness was the study of Farah Aideed. Unfortunately, limited literature is available when it comes to the chairman of the United Somali Congress. Most of the literature consulted for this study focuses on the authoritarian rule of Siad Barre. This weakness can definitely be looked at for further analysis. However, there is room for comparing the two case studies more explicitly. The following section will attempt to do so.

## 5.5 Comparing Aideed and Savimbi

The radical differences between these two cases raise numerous points for comparison. The first comparison is pre- and post-Cold War politics. What is meant here is the importance of Aideed and Savimbi, and also their countries, during the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. Savimbi was famous worldwide during the Cold War as a fighter for democracy, with the United States government of especially Ronald Reagan supporting him. However, as soon as the bipolarity of the world ended, so did Savimbi's reputation as a bulwark against communism. The end of the Cold War signalled the start of his route to warlordism.

Aideed, however, was never as famous as Savimbi during the Cold War. However, this changed in the post-Cold War because one can state that the end of the Cold War exposed the weak states of the world. It thus clearly highlighted the actions of the multiple warlords acting like hyenas in Mogadishu. Currently, Angola is only important to powerful economic countries because of its oil production, while Somalia has regained significance after 11 September 2001 because of its purported links with terrorist networks. This leads to the second comparative point.

The actions of Aideed and Savimbi had different effects on American policy *per se*. Aideed is one of the political actors that managed to get the better of the American government. It rarely happens that the United States military leaves a country embarrassed. The Americans see Aideed as an enemy and that was explicitly shown in the motion picture *Black Hawk Down*. The movie shows the Somalians as bloodthirsty people. Savimbi, on the other hand, was at a time a hero in the eyes of the Americans, but as soon as he lost his 'destiny' (i.e. the presidency) the American viewpoint gradually began to change.

Comparing the two actors with respect to their military organisation is very interesting. More importantly, they used different tactics to keep their organisations going. Savimbi had the fortunate situation of being in control of a vast wealth of diamonds within the Ovimbundu region. That created great wealth for himself and his rebels. Aideed, on the other hand, had to loot food in huge amounts to keep his militia happy. While Savimbi was considered a rebel turned warlord, Aideed was a bandit

and warlord. Breytenbach (2003) conceptualises conflict as a “triangle”, leading to the tripartite divide between rulers, rebels and mercantilists, which provides an interesting framework for the analysis of the two leaders. Farah Aideed, as mentioned before, was seen as a bandit and a warlord simultaneously.

Savimbi was also for a brief period of time seen as a part-ruler in the transition to independence, and the same can be said of Aideed after the overthrow of Barre. This particular study tries to show how these three categories should be understood as fluid, overlapping and interchangeable, and it would be wrong to box leaders into pre-conceived roles. By understanding the overlapping processes, a better understanding of the political actors can be created.

What is interesting when comparing the two case studies is the legacy the two warlords have left for their organisations. When Savimbi was killed, UNITA died with him, because he made sure everything revolved around him personally. The United Somali Congress is still functioning and it is still in the hands of an Aideed. Hussein Aideed, a former US Marine, is now its leader. We can thus summarise that Savimbi should not have created a centralised structure as he did, because the possibility was always that, if he died prematurely, there would be nobody to take over. The same conclusion cannot be drawn about the United Somali Congress. The death of Aideed did not mean the death of the organisation. What we can deduce is that the clan structure within Somalia would not allow actors such as Aideed to embody the organisation.

Comparing the two case studies, one notes the fact that Aideed and Savimbi were fighting completely different opposition forces. In fact, if one compares them, both were initially fighting very centralised political systems. Aideed fought the system of Barre, which excluded the other clans from political life. Savimbi fought the centralised government of the MPLA until his death. Eventually, it was only Savimbi who fought a formal government, as Aideed was fighting rival clans for control of Somalia. Bowen (1996) makes the important point that the political choices one makes can decide social peace or social conflict. In both cases, the decision to create centralised systems created institutions which were frail, to say the least. It is only in Angola that the political choice which was made in 1975 is still in place, namely a

centralised government. The conclusion is thus that ridding the country of a warlord does not necessarily imply that the structure in place would also change. Socially both countries are very poor.

A final comparison is that both actors relied heavily on ethnic nationalism. This can be clearly seen by their ethnic backgrounds. The conclusion thus is that their heavy reliance on ethnic nationalism minimises the notion of civic nationalism, which authors such as Ignatieff (1993, 1-7) discuss. What one can conclude is that civic nationalism in countries such as Angola and Somalia will never be taken seriously. War and violence are what is important, and that derives from ethnic nationalism and not civic nationalism. It also shows that the legacy of warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi have to do with war first and the country second, a condition which is still prevalent in these war-torn countries.

What does that say about conflict in the African countries? The consequences of actions such as those of Aideed and Savimbi cannot be erased easily. This is not helped by the fact that democracy has never been truly consolidated within these two countries. Many countries on the African continent have struggled with the consolidation of civic nationalism. Conflict in Africa remains unpredictable, even if civic nationalism is adopted. The Kenyan model is a prime example. A few years ago no one would have thought Kenya would have seen large-scale fighting; however, everyone was proven wrong following the elections in late 2007. No concrete effort is made to create an environment for reconciliation and, if an effort is made, the result often breaks down because of parties not trusting each other. Somalia and Angola have made efforts to reconcile, but the scars are just too deep.

## **Conclusion**

In conflict studies the question always arises “Who benefits?” It is safe to say that very few actors actually benefit in what would be deemed absolute terms, except private military companies such as Sandline and Executive Outcomes, which participate in numerous wars on the African continent. At times, though, the elites of the organisations did benefit and it would be wrong and simplistic to state that

Savimbi and Aideed and their respective entourages did not benefit from the conflict. However, one can say that they benefited only in relative terms.

The notion of Aideed creating a scenario manipulating young men into joining his USC faction which would benefit their lives still attempts to answer: who benefits? Despite the death of Aideed, no one really benefited from the war, definitely not the majority of the country. The case of warlord Savimbi fighting against the MPLA and his ultimate defeat meant that those on the side of the MPLA did ultimately benefit from the war, in relative terms that is, when considering the old entourage left behind after his death. The bigger picture illustrates that, as Dos Santos strengthened his political grip by centralising the government, very few people have actually benefited from the war. Warlordism in relative terms implies that those who benefit are only a handful, and the examples of Farah Aideed and Jonas Savimbi confirm that.

## Bibliography

Abbey, C & Harris, L.L(eds).1997. *Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders: Modern African Leaders*, Detroit: Omnigraphics Inc.

Adebajo, A. 2003. "In Search of Warlords: Hegemonic Peacekeeping in Liberia and Somalia" in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 10(4), pages 62-81.

Adibe, C. 1995. "Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia" in *United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*. Geneva: United Nations.

Allen, C. 1999. "Warfare, Endemic Violence & State Collapse in Africa" in *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 81, pages 367-384.

Allie, M 2006. "Somali's under siege in South Africa". *BBC* (online edition) 20 October 2006<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6066240.stm>> (11 August 2008)

Barise, A & Elmi, A.A. 2006. "The Somali Conflict: Root causes, obstacles, and peace-building strategies" in *Africa Security Review*, Vol. 15 (1).

Becker, J. 2003. "Children as Weapons of War" 2003  
<<http://www.hrw.org/wrzk4/downloads/11.pdf>> (17 February 2008)

Beil, R.2003. "Imperialism and International Governance: The Case of US Policy towards Africa" in *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 30 (95), pages 77-88.

Blimes, R. 2006. "The Indirect Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on the Likelihood of Civil War Onset" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 50 (4), pages 536-547.

Bøås, M and Jennings, K. 2005. "Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the Failed State" in *The European Journal of Development Research*, Vol. 17 (3), pages 385-395.

Bøås, M. 2003. 'Weak states, strong regimes: towards a 'real' political economy of African regionalization', in J.A. Grant & F. Söderbaum (eds). *The New Regionalism in Africa*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Bowen, J. 1996. "The Myth of Ethnic Conflict" in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol 7 (4).

Breytenbach, W.J. 2003. "Rulers, rebels & mercantilists. Explanation for resource wars in *Africa Insight*, Vol. 32(2).

Bridgland, F. 1986. *Jonas Savimbi: A key to Africa*. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing.

Brooking Institution 2008. "Index of State Weakness in the Developing World". *Brooking Institution* (online edition) 2008  
<[http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02\\_weak\\_states\\_index.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx)> (12 August 2008)

Brown, M. 2001. "Ethnic and internal conflicts: cause and implications" in Crocker, C; Hampson, F and Aall, P (eds) *Turbulent Peace*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace.

Brubaker, R and Laitin, D. 1998. "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence" in *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol 24, pages 423-252.

Chabal, P & Daloz , J.P. 1999. *Africa Works: The Political Instrumentalization of Disorder*. Indiana University Press.

Carment, D. 2003. "Assessing state failure" implications for theory and policy" in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (3), pages 407-427.

Clapham, C. 1998. "Degrees of statehood" in *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, pages 143-157.

Conversi, D 2007. "Mapping the field: theories of nationalism and ethnosymbolic approach". *Easyweb* (online edition) 2007

<<http://www.easyweb.easynet.co.uk/conversi.mapping.pdf>> (2 August 2008)

Cornwell, R. 2004. "Somalia: Fourteenth time lucky?" in *Institute for Security Studies*, Paper 87.

Dauvergne, P. 1998. "Weak States, Strong States: A State-in-Society Perspective" in Dauvergne, P (ed) *Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies*. Australia: Allen and Unwin.

Dietrich, C. 2000 "UNITA's diamond mining and export capacity" *Institute for Security Studies* (online edition)

<<http://www.issafrika.org/BOOKS/Angola/14Dietrich.pdf>> (16 April 2007)

Duffield, M. 1998. "Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection" in *Civil Wars*, Vol. 1 (1).

Duffield, M. 1997. *Post-modern conflict, Aid Policy and Humanitarian Conditionality*, Birmingham: University of Birmingham.

Duyvesteyn, I. 2005a. "The concept of conventional war and armed conflict in collapsed states in Angstrom, J and Duyvesteyn, I (eds). *The Rethinking of War*. London: Frank Cass.

Duyvesteyn, I. 2005b. *Clausewitz and African War: Politics and strategy in Liberia and Somalia*. London: Frank Cass.

Economist. 2005 'Somalia: A State of Utter Failure', 14 December.

Economist. 2002: "Jonas Savimbi", *Economist*, Vol. 362(8262).

Economist Intelligence Unit. 1997. *Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia* (4<sup>th</sup> quarter, page 15).

Economist. 1996. "General Aideed", *Economist*, Vol. 340(7978).

EON (Encyclopedia of the nations) 2007 Angola Ethnic Groups.

Fearon, J and Laitin, D. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War" in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97 (1), pages 75-90.

Fearon, J and Laitin, D. 2000. "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity" in *International Organization*, Vol. 54 (4).

Fenton, S 2005. "Key Points in the Ethnicity Literature". *Polity* (online edition) 2005 <<http://www.polity.co.uk/keyconcepts/fenton-ethnicity.asp>> (2 October 2007)

Ford, N. 2000. "Oil: Ethics vs Profits" in *African Business*, Vol. 259, page 26.

Giddens, A. 1985. *The Nation-State and Violence* (Vol. 2) of *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Giustozzi, A. 2005. "The debate on warlordism: the importance of military legitimacy" Crisis States Research Centre London: Development Research Centre.

Giustozzi, A 2003. "Respectable warlords? The transition from war of all against all to peaceful competition in Afghanistan". *Crisis states* (online edition) 29 January <<http://www.crisisstates.com/download/others/SeminarAG2902003.pdf>> (21 February 2007)

Greenfield.1996. "Brig-Gen Mohamed Farah Aideed: Obituary" in *The Independent* (online edition) 3 August 1996 <[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qn4158/is\\_19960803](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_19960803)> (2 February 2008)

Gros, J-G. 1996. "Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti" in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 17 (3), pages 455-471.

Grosse-Kettler, S 2004. "External actors in stateless Somalia. A war economy and its promoters". *Bonn International Center for Conversion* (online edition) 2004  
<<http://www.bicc.de>> (11 August 2008)

Hamrick, S.J. 1993. "Aided it my way", *New Republic*, Vol. 209(6).

Hanlon, J. 2006. "Ethnicity and Identity" in Hanlon, J and Yanacopulos, H (eds) *Civil War, Civil Peace*. Oxford: Bath Press.

Hansen S.J 2003. "Warlords and Peace Strategies: The Case of Somalia". *Journal of Conflict Studies* (online edition) 2003  
<<http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/Fall03/Hansen.pdf>> (3 August 2008)

Hentz, J.J. 2004. "State Collapse and Regional Contagion in Sub-Sahara Africa: Lessons for Zimbabwe" in *Scientia Militaria*, July 2004.

Heywood, L. 1998. "Towards an understanding of modern political ideology in Africa: the case of the Ovimbundo of Angola" in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol 36 (1).

Herbst, J. 2004. "Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice" in Rotberg, R.I (ed) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Herbst, J. 2000. "Economies Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa" in *Journal of African Economies*, Vol. 9 (3), pages 270-294.

Herbst, J. 1990. "War and the State in Africa" in *International Security*, Vol. 14 (4), pages 117-139.

Hobsbawm, E.J. 1972. *Bandits*. Ringwood: Penguin Books.

- Hodges, T. 2001. *African Issues: Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism*, Oxford: James Currey.
- Horowitz, D. 2000. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ingatjeff, M. 1993. *From Blood and Belonging*. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Jackson, R. 2002. "Violent Internal Conflict and African State: Towards a framework for analysis" in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 20 (1), pages 29-52.
- Jones, B.G. 2008. "The global political economy of social crisis" Towards a critique of the 'failed state' ideology" in *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 15 (2), pages 180-205.
- Jinadu, LA 2007. "Explaining and Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa". *Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala* (online edition) 2007  
<[http://www.pcr.uw.se/publications/claude\\_ake?CAMP1.jinadu.pdf](http://www.pcr.uw.se/publications/claude_ake?CAMP1.jinadu.pdf)> (1 July 2008)
- Kaldor, M. 2003. *Global Civil Society. An Answer to War*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing.
- Kaplan, R.D. 1994. "The Coming Anarchy" in *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 273 (2).
- Kauffmann, C. 1996. "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars" in *International Security*, Vol 20 (4), pages 136-175.
- Kivimaki, T 2001. "Exploring Violence in Somalia". *Conflict Transform* (online edition) 2001< <http://www.conflicttransform.net/Somalia%20report.pdf>> (9 August 2008)
- Lake, D and Rothchild, D. 1996. "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict" in *International Security*, Vol 21 (2), pages 41-75.

Langford, T. 1999. "Things Fall Apart: State Failure and the Politics of Intervention" in *International Studies Review*, Vol. 1 (1), pages 59-79.

Le Billon, P. 2001. "Angola's political economy of war: the role of oil and diamonds" in *African Affairs* PART 398 London: Royal African Society.

Mackinley, J 2000: "Defining Warlords" in *Institute for Security Studies* (online edition), February 2000

<<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Defining.html>> (8 March 2007)

Malan, M. 2000. "Disarming and demobilising child soldiers: The underlying challenges" in *African Security Review*, Vol. 9 (5/6).

Malaquias, A. 2006. *Rebels and Robbers. Violence in Post-Colonial Angola*. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab.

Malaquias, A. 2001. "Diamonds are a guerilla's best friend: the impact of illicit wealth on insurgency strategy" in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22 (3), pages 311-325.

Malaquias, A 2000. "Ethnicity and conflict in Angola: prospects for reconciliation". *Institute for Security Studies* (online edition) 2000

<<http://www.iss.co.za/Books/Angola/6Malaquias.pdf>> (1 July 2008)

Marten, K. 2007. "Warlordism in Comparative Perspective" in *International Security*, Vol 31 (3), pages 41-73.

Marx, K. 1907. *The eighteenth brumaire of Louis Napoleon*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co.

McGregor, A. 2007. "Somalia" in *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 5 (8).

Mueller, J. 2000. "Banality of ethnic war" in *International Security*, Vol. 25 (2), pages 42-70.

Musah, A-B. 2002. "Privatization of Security, Arms Proliferation and the Process of State Collapse in Africa" in *Development and Change*, Vol. 33 (5), pages 911-933.

PANGAE 1997. "Government and army demobilizes child soldiers" 30th of January <[http://www.pangaea.org/street\\_children/africa/ango3.htm](http://www.pangaea.org/street_children/africa/ango3.htm)> (16 April 2007)

Photius 2004. "Somalia Society". *Photius* (online edition) 2004 <[http://www.photius.com/countries/somalia/society/somalia\\_society\\_the\\_segmentary\\_socia~1596.html](http://www.photius.com/countries/somalia/society/somalia_society_the_segmentary_socia~1596.html)> (10 August 2008)

Posen, B.R.1993. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" in *Survival*, Vol. 35 (1), Spring.

Rawlinson, A 2003. "The political manipulation of ethnicity in Africa". *Initiatives et Solidarite Etudiants Nord-Sud* (online edition) January 2003 <<http://home.sandiego.edu/~barber/globalethics/rawlinsonethnicity.pdf>> (1 July 2008)

Reno, W. 2006. "Congo: from state collapse to 'absolutism', to state failure" in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27 (1), pages 43-56.

Reno,W. 2002. "The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States" in *Development and Change*, Vol. 33 (5), pages 837-858.

Reno, W 2000a." The real (war) economy of Angola". *Institute for Security Studies* (online edition) 2000 <<http://www.iss.co.za/PUBS/Angola/11Reno.pdf>> (3 June 2008)

Reno, W. 2000b. "Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa" in *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 53 (2), pages 433-459.

Reno, W. 1999. *Warlords Politics and African States*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Reno, W. 1997. "Arms trafficking and the local political economy of conflict" in Ddulo, M (ed) *Security, Reconstruction and Reconciliation. When the wars end*. New York: University College London Press.

Rich, P. 1999 (ed). *Warlords in International Relations*. Hampshire: Macmillan Press.

Rotberg, R.I . 2004. "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators" in Rotberg, R.I (ed) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rushner, W. 2002: "In Memory of Our Man in Angola", *Human Events*, Vol. 58(9).

Samatar, A 2006: "Warlord Terrorism and Devil's Pact in Somalia" on *hiiraan* (online edition)  
<[http://www.hiiraan.com/op/2006/may/Abdi\\_Ismail\\_Samatar140506.aspx](http://www.hiiraan.com/op/2006/may/Abdi_Ismail_Samatar140506.aspx)> (8 March 2007)

Simpson, C. 2002: "Obituary: Jonas Savimbi, Unita's local boy". *BBC News* (online edition) 25 February 2002<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/264094.stm>> (21 February 2007)

Singer, P.W 2003. "Addressing the Global Challenge of Child Soldiers" 2003  
<<http://www.dcaf.ch/docs/Yearbook2003/Chapter6.pdf>> (19 February 2008)

Southern African Migration Project 2006. "Somalia refugees". *SAMP* (online edition) November 2006  
<[http://www.queensu.ca/samp/migrationnews/article.php?Mig\\_News\\_ID=4154&Mig\\_News\\_Issue=23&](http://www.queensu.ca/samp/migrationnews/article.php?Mig_News_ID=4154&Mig_News_Issue=23&)> (11 August 2008)

Tshitereke, C. 2003. "On the origins of war in Africa" in *African Security Review*, Vol. 12 (2), pages 81-89.

Tvedten, I. 1992. "U.S. Policy towards Angola since 1975" in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 30 (1), pages 31-52.

United Nations Human Development Index 2008. “Human Development Reports”.  
*UNDP* (online edition) 2008 <<http://hdr.undp.org/statistics>> (5 July 2008)

UNHCR 2007. “Country Profile: Angola”. *UNHCR* (online edition) 2007  
<<http://www.unhcr.org/country/ago.html>> (9 August 2008)

Wickham-Cowley, T.P, 1992: *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America. A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Williams, P 2007. “State Failure in Africa: Causes, Consequences, and Responses”.  
*Europaworld* (online edition) 2007 <<http://www.europaworld.com>> (9 August 2008)



