


Human security as an influence on Japan's contemporary Africa policy: principles, patterns and implications.

Hesté van Wyk

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Supervisor: Prof Scarlett Cornelissen

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this research assignment/thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signature:.....

Date:.....

ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War, marked by the shift from a bipolar to multipolar security order, prompted a significant change in Japan's relations with Africa. New political and economic challenges, which are accelerated by the process of globalisation, have forced Japan to adjust its foreign policies accordingly- especially in the African context. The primary goal of this study is to analyse how the concept of human security has influenced Japan's foreign policy towards Africa since 1998. This research question focuses on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and peacekeeping through the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. The methodological nature of this study is qualitative. Secondary sources are mainly used. This study makes use of the two contending theoretical perspectives in the security paradigm, namely Neo- Realism and the Human Security Approach.

An important part of the analysis is Japan's middlepowership and why it has chosen human security as its niche diplomacy in the new security order. The findings of this study suggest that the reasons for this are, firstly that Japan has had to justify its continuing ODA cuts to Africa over the last decade, as well as its pacifist stance on peacekeeping, which sees it refraining from directly intervening in conflict situations. Other key findings of this study are that Japan's motives for providing ODA to Africa prior to 1989 were mainly economic in nature and that diplomatic relations were limited. What also emerged from this study is that Japan's most prominent foreign policy goals include a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, establishing itself as a prominent global player both in political and economic realms, and securing favourable relations with states whose resources are vital to its expanding economy. Japan's more recent relations with Africa can also be characterised by its multilateral approach, particularly through organisations such as the United Nations and the African Union. Important initiatives such as the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) have also played an important role in promoting African development. However, its future success will depend on coordinating TICAD and The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) policies, with human security as a common goal.

The implications of the findings of this study are that Japan will have to formulate a more coherent foreign policy on security, especially towards Africa. Secondly, since Japan is no longer the ODA giant that it used to be, it will have to find new ways of defining its relationship with Africa, particularly in terms of TICAD and the G8. Future research could expand the analysis to an investigation of Japan's ODA disbursements to all Africa countries. Additional attention should also be given to Japan's foreign policy in terms of peacebuilding, and how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is formulating these policies. Lastly, more research can be conducted on human security in general, and other aspects of it that are promoted through Japan's foreign policy.

OPSOMMING

Die einde van die Koue Oorlog het belangrike veranderinge teweeg gebring in Japan se bande met Afrika. Dit is meestal as gevolg van die skuif van 'n bipolêre na 'n multipolêre sekuriteitsorde. Die gevolg hiervan is dat Japan, deels weens globalisering, verskeie nuwe politieke en ekonomiese uitdagings in die gesig staar. Japan moes ook sy buitelandse beleid daarvolgens aanpas – veral teenoor Afrika. Die primêre doel van die studie is om die invloed van die konsep menslike veiligheid op Japan se buitelandse beleid sedert 1998 te analiseer. Dié navorsingsvraag sal hoofsaaklik fokus op Japan se amptelike regeringshulp, of ODA (Official Development Assistance) en vredesmagte wat deur middel van die Verenigde Nasies in Afrika ontplooi word. Die metodologie van die studie is hoofsaaklik kwalitatief, en sekondêre bronne word gebruik. Twee van die belangrikste teorieë in die debat rondom sekuriteit, Neo-Realisme en die Menslike Veiligheids Benadering word in die konteks van die studie bespreek.

Japan as 'n middelmoondheid word bespreek, en hoekom die land menslike veiligheid gekies het as primêre fokus vir sy buitelandse beleid. Die bevindinge van die studie impliseer dat Japan se motiewe vir sy bande met Afrika voor 1989 hoofsaaklik ekonomies van aard was, al was diplomatieke kontak beperk. In die nuwe multipolêre orde het Japan se fokus egter geskuif na sy politieke belange. Dit sluit 'n permanente posisie in die Veiligheids Raad van die Verenigde Nasies in, om die land as 'n politieke en ekonomiese gesag te vestig in die globale politieke ekonomie, en laastens om goeie verhoudings te handhaaf met lande wat oor natuurlike bronne beskik wat van uiterste belang is vir Japan se groeiende ekonomie. Japan se meer onlangse bande met Afrika kan ook as multilateraal van aard beskryf word, veral deur organisasies soos die Verenigde Nasies en die Afrika Unie. Initiatiewe soos die Tokyo Internasionale Konferensie oor Afrika Ontwikkeling (TICAD) het tot dusvêr ook 'n belangrike rol gespeel om ontwikkeling in Afrika te bevorder. TICAD se toekomstige sukses sal egter bepaal word deur of TICAD en die Nuwe Ekonomiese Vennootskap oor Afrika se Ontwikkeling (NEPAD) se beleide gekoördineer kan word met menslike veiligheid as oorkoepelende doel.

Die implikasies van die bevindinge van die studie is dat Japan sy buitelandse beleid sal moet herformuleer om dit minder teenstrydig te maak aangaande kwessies rakende sekuriteit. Tweedens, aangesien Japan nie meer die ODA - reus is wat dit 'n paar jaar gelede was nie, sal die land nuwe maniere moet vind om sy verhouding met Afrika te definieër, veral in die konteks van TICAD en die G8. Toekomstige navorsing wat meer uitbrei oor Japan se ODA na alle Afrika lande kan bydrae tot bestaande literatuur. Daar is ook 'n vraag na navorsing oor hoe die Ministerie van Buitelandse Betrekkinge (MOFA) sy buitelandse beleid aangaande vredesbou operasies formuleer. Laastens, meer navorsing kan ook gedoen word oor menslike veiligheid in die algemeen, asook ander aspekte daarvan wat bevorder word deur Japan se buitelandse beleid.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-----------|--|
| AIDS | Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| ASEAN | Southeast Asian Nations |
| AU | African Union |
| BEGIN | Basic Education for Growth Initiative |
| ECOWAS | The Economic Community of West African States |
| EU | European Union |
| FRELIMO | Mozambique Liberation Movement |
| GATT | General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs |
| G8 | Group of Eight |
| GCA | Global Coalition for Africa |
| HIV | Human Immunodeficiency Virus |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IO | International Organisation |
| IR | International Relations |
| JAAC | Japanese Anti Apartheid Committee |
| JEM | Justice and Equality Movement |
| JIBC | Japan Bank for International Cooperation |
| JICA | Japan International Cooperation Agency |
| MITI | Ministry of International Trade and Industry |
| MNC | Multi National Corporation |
| MOFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NEPAD | The New Partnership for Africa's Development |
| NERICA | New Rice for Africa |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OAU | Organisation for African Unity |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| OECC | Overseas Economic Cooperation Council |
| OECD | Organisations for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| ONUMOZ | United Nations Mission in Mozambique |
| PKO | Peacekeeping Operation |
| RENAMO | The Mozambican National Resistance |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SAP | Structural Adjustment Programme |
| SDF | Self-Defence Force |
| SPLM/SPLA | Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement and Army |
| TAA | Tokyo Agenda for Action |
| TICAD | Tokyo International Conference on African Development |
| UN | United Nations |

| | |
|--------|--|
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNMIS | United Nations Mission in Sudan |
| UNOSAA | United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa |
| UNSAS | United Nations Stand-by Arrangement |
| US | United States |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WTO | World Trade Organisation |

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

1.1 Introduction to research problem

A fundamental change has taken place in the debate on international security since the end of the Cold War. The traditional concept of security has been generally viewed in the context of national, state-centric security in international relations. The end of the Cold War and the proliferation inter alia of civil wars and new forms of insecurity have brought forth the most prominent transformation of the concept of security. The state is no longer considered the guarantor of security to its people, and is now viewed as a possible security threat, most notably in developing countries (McCormack, 2005: 3). During the 21st century, the challenges that security poses to states have also become more complex. This is visible in how poverty and conflict in developing countries have been defined as important issues of international security and how the emphasis has shifted from state to human security (*Human Security Now*, 2003: 2).

According to the influential 1994 United Nations Human Development Report¹, in which the broad concept of human security was first articulated, human security consists of two main elements. Firstly, it refers to safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression. Secondly, human security refers to protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life (UNDP Development Report, 1994: 23, 24). The following definition from the *Human Security Now* (2003: 4) report will be used:

“Human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhances human freedoms and human fulfilment”

The challenges that human security has brought forth have had a large impact on how states conduct their foreign policies. This is due to the fact that foreign aid and peacekeeping assistance can be considered as diplomatic tools used toward developing countries, as well as the means to pursue economic interests. Human security, and

¹ According to several authors (e.g McCormack, 2005; Paris, 2001 and Thomas, 1999) the UNDP report of 1994 initiated the intellectual interest in the concept of human security.

especially foreign aid or Official Development Assistance (ODA) influence countries' foreign policies. This is either with reference to how a developing country is affected by poverty and conflict as in the case of many African states, or whether a developed country such as Japan is in the position to provide assistance to improve the human security of the population of a country (or in the case of this study, a continent). Given this, the broad research question of this study is in what ways has human security, both as a concept and principle, influenced Japan's foreign policy towards Africa since 1998?

The accelerating forces of globalisation², which have made borders more porous to the movement of humans and goods, have brought forth new challenges, particularly as far as human security issues are concerned. These challenges include people facing for example economic and political insecurities with much greater intensity. Although affecting all countries, developing countries such as South Africa experience these challenges with much greater intensity. Globalisation has also had an immense impact on how countries conduct their foreign relations, since they have to respond to the changing nature of international relations and security parameters in a new security paradigm which has impacted decision making. The foreign policy of one country towards another or region is also an expression of the needs and self-interest of the country, and how a country wants to achieve political or economic goals. The following statement by Thomas (1999: 1) summarises this problem involving globalisation, human security and development appropriately:

“In the current context of globalization, the inter-connections between the evolving global economy, the state as intermediary and the human experience of security are important. The relationship between development and human security is central.”

In comparison to Japan's relationship with other world regions, the political relationship between Africa, especially South Africa and Japan is relatively young. It gained new-found significance with the end of Apartheid and the increase in South - East political

² Although globalisation is not discussed in detail in this study, it is necessary to put it in the context of human security and development since globalisation is a phenomenon that constantly influences the international political economy.

economic ties and initiatives focusing on development, for example TICAD. As Japan's economic power increased and the range of its political concerns widened, Japan's relationship with Africa gained new value (Kazuo, 2003: 58). The nature of the relationship between Japan and Africa has been primarily centered on development and aid programs such as ODA and the Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD) (2003: 60). Japan is currently the third largest provider of ODA in the world, since it slipped from second place in 2006, only five years after being replaced by the US as the world's largest aid donor (Masaki, 2007). Problems such as internal wars, poverty and uprisings (which are usually considered as "African problems") have been exacerbated by the progressive globalisation of the world's economy and the end of the Cold War. Issues concerning human security have thus been exceptionally significant in Japan's relations with Africa, since Japan has used South Africa as an instrument to achieve better human security on the continent as well as on its own home front (Kazuo, 2003: 60).

Thus far in the field of international relations, our knowledge of the influence that the concept of human security has on the foreign policies of countries is limited. This is partly due to the fact that it is still a relatively new concept and is considered as ambiguous. Many studies also only focus on the different components of a country's foreign policy in terms of human security, and the various aspects that address problems related to human insecurity.

1.2 Research objectives and goals

This study firstly aims to explain how the concept of human security has influenced Japan's foreign policy towards Africa. Although there are various elements of human security present in Japan's foreign policy, this study will specifically focus on Japanese ODA and peacekeeping in Africa. An important research goal is to establish what influence Japanese ODA has had on promoting human security on the African continent, and to evaluate the goals and ambitions of TICAD since the first conference was held in 1993. In terms of Japanese peacekeeping in African countries, this study also aims to

establish the significance of human security goals in Japan's foreign policy, and how this has influenced peacekeeping missions to Africa. In conjunction with this, an important aim is to analyse how Japan has adjusted to its new security role, because of the pacifist nature of its security policies in the past. A next important aim is to investigate how human security as a political principle and goal of Japan's foreign policy has affected the relations between itself and Africa, and special attention will also be given to South Africa.

An integral part of Japan's ODA is for peacekeeping and peacebuilding in conflict ridden countries such as Sudan, for which Japan granted a significant amount of aid in March 2007 for conflict prevention (UNDP, 2007). A chapter is devoted to Japanese peacekeeping assistance in Africa, since it can be considered a key method of promoting the principles of human security. Proof that Japan has been an advocate of human security and that it is a vital part of its foreign policy can also be found in Japan's official *Diplomatic Bluebook* of 2006. It states that "Japan promotes diplomacy with an emphasis on the perspective of 'human security'" (*Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2006: 183).

1.3 Literature review

Human Security

The literature on human security has grown considerably since the UNDP published the *Human Development Report* in 1994. This report included the various components that human security consists of, for example political and economic components. Although important in promoting further debate on human security, this report lacked a concrete working definition for human security. Tuchman Mathews (1989) sensed the need for redefining security in a post-Cold war era of politics, and argued that global developments require a broader definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues. Paris (2001) followed a more critical approach towards the conceptualisation of human security as a fixed definition and a paradigm shift in national security. He argued that human security needs to be redefined in order to

be useful in research and policymaking, since scholars and analysts are not able to find consensus on exactly what human security entails.

The most complete recent document on the issue of human security is the *Human Security Now* report (2003) issued by the United Nations Commission on Human Security. This report addressed the most prominent human security issues such as poverty, disease and violent conflict which are relevant in the context of African development. In this report many African case studies are also presented. The argument of this report is that immediate actions need to be taken in order to promote human security across the globe in developing countries, where people are facing severe insecurities in their daily lives. Muloongo, Kibasomba and Kariri (2005) provide case studies of seven countries in Southern Africa in which human security issues such as violent conflict and poverty have a tremendous negative impact on the development of these seven Southern African states. A point of departure of this book is that human security is gathering momentum as a new measure of global security. The key argument is that in the context of the seven different case studies, human insecurity takes on many forms and influences countries in different ways. Thomas and Wilkins (1999) provide a useful introduction to the concept of human security and its role in the global economy as well as the challenges that globalisation brings to developing countries. They argue that security should be explored from a human perspective. The theoretical framework that this book is based upon is the Human Security Approach. It also analyses the meaning of human security in the African context by referring to African states such as Sierra Leone and Rwanda. Although not from neo-Realist perspective, in the Southern African context Solomon (1996, 2003) has contributed to the literature on human security with the emphasis on poverty and conflict.

Japan-Africa Relations

Since South Africa's democratisation in 1994, as well as the decolonisation of the last dependent African states such as Namibia, the international community was forced to restructure their foreign policies towards Africa. This was done in order to improve

political and diplomatic ties and to pursue economic interests. This has given rise to a significant growth in literature on Japan's foreign policy towards Africa. In the contribution of Morikawa (1997) a useful background is provided on the nature of Japan's foreign policy towards Africa, and also sheds some light on its diplomatic relations with South Africa. The main arguments of this book on the relations between Japan and Africa, is that Japan's foreign policy serves its economic interests in Africa, since it was the largest ODA donor on the continent for a number of years.

Sono (1993) provided a historical background on the ties between Japan and Africa. The book examines the nature of African - Japanese contacts from the mid-16th century until 1993 with the focus on trade, aid, and diplomacy. Ampiah (1997) focused specifically on Japan's relations with South Africa as well as investment and aid to countries such as Nigeria and Tanzania. The book is an empirical analysis of the political, economic and diplomatic factors influencing Japan's relations with African countries. An important argument of this book is that Japan has used South Africa as a strategic diplomatic tool to broaden its economic horizons in Africa. Alden and Hirano (2003) have contributed to the more recent literature on the economic and political relations between South Africa and Japan, and what implications these hold for their respective regions. The book also illustrates the challenges facing the partnership between Japan and Africa, and the influence of ODA and investment in Africa. However, there is no mention of human security and very little on issues concerning development, which is a fundamental part of Japan's foreign policy towards Africa, and more specifically South Africa.

The present study can contribute to an understudied aspect of the relations between Japan and Africa, by assessing the influence of human security on Japan's foreign policy towards Africa.

1.4 Theoretical Framework: Realism in international relations and the Human Security Approach

Within international relations (IR), the concept of human security has mostly been developed from the vantage of two main theoretical perspectives. The first is an approach based on a Neo-Realist framework as in the work of Barry Buzan, which maintains an emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualisation of human security. It is often referred to as the “new security thinking”. The critical Human Security Approach as in the work of Ken Booth (1994) which is rooted within the pluralist theory of international politics represents the other end in this discourse. This approach is based on a set of assumptions that attempt to dislodge the state as the primary referent of security, and places more emphasis on non-state actors (Naidoo, 2001). Booth also argues that redefining security requires that the concept should be broadened both “horizontally and vertically” (Solomon & Cilliers, 1996). In order to be able to discuss the complete security discourse, both Realism and the Human Security Approach have been selected for this study. Both theoretical approaches have been selected to provide a more complete discussion on the new security debate. Firstly an overview of the most important contending theoretical frameworks in IR is necessary.

Two main theoretical perspectives in IR that challenge Realism, are Liberalism and Marxism. Liberalism is also sometimes referred to as Idealism. Whereas Realists are sceptical about human nature, and therefore believe conflict is inevitable, Liberalists in contrast believe that people by nature tend to strive for improvement and continuous learning. In short, Liberalists believe in the progressive nature of humans, therefore strive for perfection and thus live in harmony with one another. Liberalists do not rely on the breakdown of the balance of power when interpreting international conflict (Nel, 2006: 31-34).

A second contending perspective is Marxism, an influential school of thought initiated by Karl Marx, a German political economist in the nineteenth century. Marxists agrees with Realists that the structure of the international system is a relevant factor to consider in

order to understand IR. A second important distinction is that Marxists also consider power as an important factor in international affairs. Nevertheless, Marxists place the emphasis on the unequal distribution of wealth. Thirdly, Marxists also share the Realist critical attitude towards the role of morality in the international system. Marxists view morality as an ideological excuse that actors use to hide their economic interests. Marxists, do, however hold the assumption that the capitalist world is an unjust place, and that transformations should take place. A fourth characteristic of the Marxist school of thought is that it rejects the Realist preoccupation with the state. Actors are viewed in terms of unequal class structures in society that are exploitive and oppressive towards the poor. The last assumption that the Marxist perspective is based on, lies between the Realist and Liberalist assumptions on the continuity of IR. Like the Realists, Marxists believe continuity does exist. However, for Marxists this continuity lies in the fact that throughout the course of history, certain groups or classes in society controlled production, and this led to them being privileged (Nel, 2006: 42-43).

Realism has been selected to better comprehend the complex foreign policies and relations between Japan and Africa. Although there are many versions of Realism in IR, they all share the following basic characteristics: firstly, the main actors in Realism are states who want to secure their own survival and security. Secondly, the nature of the system in which states find themselves are anarchical, thus there is no central government that can control states. Thirdly, the 'power security' principle is the leading mode of interaction. Fourthly, although for some states defensive security is a primary goal, other states will become predators and force concessions from a weaker power. Lastly, internal politics and external politics are considered to be separate (Nicholson, 1998: 67, 68).

There is general consensus that the work of Kenneth Waltz has been the most influential work in the Neo-Realism spectrum. He introduced the notion of the 'structure of the international system'. This is based on the assumption that states' desire for security is bound by the anarchic structure of the international system (Brown & Ainly, 2005: 44, 45). Structural Realism which was originally developed by Waltz and further developed by Barry Buzan, Richard Little and Charles Jones, who are all respected authors in IR.

According to Buzan *et al* (1993: 10-13) there are three important elements that signifies Structural Realism as an extension of the Realist tradition. Firstly, there is a continued insistence on the dominance of the political sphere. Secondly, the state is still considered as the most important actor in the international system. It must be emphasised that this does not close the theory to other units or actors, which is important for the context of this study. Other actors, for example, organisations such as the UN are also considered important. Lastly, the close linkage between units and structure not only defines the continuity between Structural Realism and the traditional Realist assumptions, but opens the way to a much more multisectoral system than that offered by Neorealism. Buzan also argues that the militaristic approach to security that dominated the security discourse during the Cold War was ‘simple minded’ and led to the underdevelopment of the concept. Buzan includes political, economic and social perspectives of the international system, the state and the individual. Buzan’s analysis provides the most extensive contemporary examination of human security from a state-combined perspective (Naidoo, 2001).

In order to gain a better understanding of human security in the African continent and how this has influenced Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa, the Human Security Approach has also been selected. It involves a fundamental departure from the orthodox security analysis, in which the state is the primary object (Thomas, 1999: 1, 2). The primary focus of the Human Security Approach is human beings. This approach has two strands: firstly, it makes the argument that since the end of the Cold War there has been a range of different security threats, which cannot be dealt with militarily by sovereign states. Secondly, it involves a normative argument which suggests that the end of superpower conflict has allowed the international community and states to adjust their policies in order to ensure a better life for the individual. The Human Security Approach also redefines the relationship between the state and its citizens. Sovereignty is redefined from the inherent right of a state, since it is something that is granted by the international community on behalf of the citizens of that state (McCormack, 2005: 4, 16). An important argument of the Human Security Approach is that the security discourse must

be understood as part of the capitalist global economy as well as associated global structures. This is because it has an immensely important impact on how states conduct their foreign policies, since human security threats come from the global political economy, and must thus be addressed therein as well (Thomas, 1999: 1, 2). States are mainly viewed in as the problem in terms of not providing sufficient human security to its citizens. Nevertheless, states are the primary actors who are able to improve human security within its borders. The reason why both The Human Security Approach and Realism will be used in this study is to have a more balanced theoretical framework since each has its strengths and shortcomings.

1.5 Conceptualisations

1.5.1 Human Security

The concept of human security is relatively new and is characterised by its ambiguity. No fixed definition exists. The first influential conceptualisation of human security was published in the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report*, an annual publication of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Paris, 2001: 89).

Human security can be understood as a state of existence, in which the primary material needs are met, and therefore meaningful contribution and participation in social life and communities can be realised. However, human security cannot solely be understood as meeting just physical needs. Freedom from predatory power structures, whether they are global, national or local is also essential for human security (Thomas, 1999: 3). Mlambo (2005: 230) also argues that state security is no longer adequate to ensure human security and development. Thus, instead of focusing on the relations between states to obtain security, human security rather refers to the daily struggles that people have to face which include crime, health problems and income insecurity (Thomas, 1999: 5). The 1994 UNDP Report identified the following components of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (UNDP, 1994: 24, 25).

This definition has been qualified by The United Nations Commission on Human Security which argues that human security refers to more than the mere absence of violent conflict. It also includes human rights, access to education, health care, good governance, and lastly that people must be able to fulfil their own potential (*Human Security Now*, 2003: 4). Since the influence of the concept human security on Japan's foreign policy is the research problem of this study, it is relevant to mention the Japanese government's official definition: "The concept of human security comprehensively covers all the measures that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity" (Paris, 2001: 90).

1.5.2 Globalisation

Although globalisation is not a key variable in this study, it is important to conceptualise the term since it is important in the context of human security and reference to it will be made in the course of this study. In modern politics, the term 'globalisation' is without a doubt one of the most contested concepts: from when it started, and exactly what it entails. Thus, the need exists for the conceptualisation of globalisation in the context of foreign policy and human security. The following definition by Mittelman (1996: 3) has been selected for this study:

"A worldwide phenomenon, globalization is a coalescence of varied transnational processes and domestic structures, allowing the economy, politics, culture and ideology of one country to penetrate another."

This definition can be qualified by Jan Aart Scholte (2005: 59) who argues that we need to view globalisation as a transplanetary shift of space, and that there are supraterritorial links between people across the globe. Thus, territoriality has lost some significance, for example the borders of states. This in part means that pandemics such as HIV/AIDS can spread easier as well as conflict from one state to another. Scholte (2005: 84) also highlights in his book that many people confuse the concept of globalisation with the definitions of internationalization, universalization, westernization and lastly

liberalization. Although globalisation is related with these concepts, it does not have the exact same meaning since globalisation is firstly a much more modern concept which owes its meaning to “globalism”. Although globalisation cannot be solely blamed for the increase in human insecurity, it most definitely has a negative impact on issues such as poverty, health and political instability (2005: 279).

1.6 Methodology

The nature of this study is mainly exploratory and qualitative, and is based on primary and secondary sources of information. Research questions that are descriptive and evaluative, are central to a qualitative paradigm, accompanied by inductive reasoning (Mouton, 2006: 162). However, in some parts of this study a quantitative analysis is done, for example data on the size and direction of Japan’s ODA disbursements and the type of projects ODA is disbursed for toward peacebuilding in African countries. A mix of qualitative and quantitative methods aids this study in being more complete, since each paradigm has a contribution to make in the security debate.

Whilst secondary sources are mainly used and analysed, primary sources such as official diplomatic publications of the Japanese government, as well as speeches of the ministry of foreign affairs (MOFA) have been analysed. Secondary sources mainly consist of academic journal articles, publications, books, media reports and statistics derived from studies conducted by respected authors in the field of IR.

1.7 Limitations and delimitations of study

First important limitations are time and space, since this study has to be completed within a certain time span and it is limited to a certain length. This research project is also limited since not all aspects of human security can be covered in the scope of this study within different political and economic contexts, for example all countries within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Another important limitation is the fact that only Japan’s foreign policy to Africa will be analysed in terms of how human

security has influenced it. A further limitation is that not all African states that receive ODA from Japan can be discussed. Since the concept of human security is relatively new, the literature on the subject is relatively limited, in comparison to other areas of studies in IR, where a fuller body of knowledge exists. A further important limitation is the fact that some literature is only available in Japanese and not English, which is the primary language in which this study is conducted.

In terms of delimitations, the analytical component of this study will only focus on Japan's foreign policy on human security since 1998 until recently, since the concept was only then recognised by the MOFA. The focus of the study will also solely be on Japan's foreign policy, and will not include a discussion of other influential Asian countries, for example, China which is a major political and economic role player in Africa.

1.8 Outline of remaining chapters

The remaining part of this study is divided into four chapters. Chapter 2 examines the history of Japan's Africa relations. Japan's position in international politics after the Cold War is also discussed. Special attention is given to the influence of the decolonisation of African states in Japan's involvement in Africa, as well as the end of Apartheid in South Africa, since this marked the beginning of an important political and economic relationship these two countries. The main focus of this chapter is to highlight the most relevant political and economic aspects of the earlier relations between Japan and Africa.

Chapter 3 deals with Japanese ODA to Africa and the influence of human security on Japan's foreign policy in this context. In this chapter the nature and structure of ODA is discussed in detail. An important element of this chapter is to outline the TICAD initiative, its goals in terms of promoting security and development and whether it has reached these objectives since it was launched in 1993. Lastly, Japan's involvement in multilateral initiatives such as the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the UNDP is discussed in order to evaluate the role that Japan plays to promote African development in multilateral forums.

Chapter 4 analyses Japan's involvement in peacekeeping missions in conflict ridden African countries. The nature of Japan's foreign policies in terms of peacekeeping missions will be discussed, and how Japan has regulated its foreign policy on security issues since the end of the Cold War.

Chapter 5 provides the conclusion, where the key findings of the study are discussed and outlined. The implications of these finding for both Japan and Africa will also be discussed in order to draw conclusions on the influence of human security on Japan's foreign policy towards Africa and the prognosis. Recommendations for future research on human security, ODA and peacebuilding are also made.

CHAPTER 2: JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1 Introduction

According to several scholars (e.g. Ampiah, 1997; Adem, 2001; Morikawa, 1997; Sono, 1993 and Alden & Hirano, 2003), historically there was little interaction between Japan and Africa. However, Aircardi de Saint Paul (2002) argues that Japanese and African relations date back to 1510 when the Portuguese first introduced black slaves in Japan. Japan has only emerged since the 1960s as an important trading partner and it became a relevant player in African political affairs during the 1980s (Morikawa, 1997: 1). The significant shift of the security debate after the end of the Cold War from state to human security also had an immense effect on Japan's foreign policy towards developing countries, since the end of the Cold War brought with it a new kind of war – the plight of civilians in developing countries. Thus, Japan later sought to provide ODA to poor African countries in exchange for access to their markets (Edström, 2003: 209).

The end of the Cold War is not the only important contributing factor leading to an increase in political and economic relations between Japan and Africa. In this chapter an overview of the influence of the decolonisation of African states on Japan's foreign policy towards Africa, as well as the significance of the end of Apartheid in terms of relations between Japan and South Africa will be discussed. A brief overview of the much earlier ties between Japan and Africa in terms of diplomatic and economic relations is also provided in order to understand the context of the development of these relations. The aim of this chapter is to provide a background for the following chapters on Japanese ODA and peacekeeping in Africa, and towards the end of this study to explain how this relates back to the importance of human security in Japan's foreign policy.

2.2 First contacts and Japan's earlier ties with Africa: an overview

2.2.1 Political and diplomatic relations

Historical interaction between the Japanese and the African continent is a unique phenomenon that originated in the 1500s when slaves from Africa were carried by ship to Nagasaki. Between 1547 and 1885, Japanese and Africans were experiencing contacts of extraordinary dimensions since trade increased because of the dramatic increase in maritime expeditions. These relations continued for approximately 100 years, but the anti-Christian and anti-Western attitude of the shoguns led to a decrease in the number of foreigners. From 1868 to 1912, which is known as the Meiji era, slaves of African origin were brought back to Africa by North American vessels (Sono, 1993: 14).

The Japanese set foot on the African continent only in 1586, during their maritime journeys towards Europe. According to Aicardi de Saint Paul (2002) it was only from the 17th century that truly significant relations developed between the Empire of the Rising Sun, and the "Distant Continent". Jan van Riebeeck, the founder of the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, was based in Nagasaki under the flag of the Dutch East India Company and was Japan's partner in Africa. Since the Cape of Good Hope became a regular stop-over for the Japanese whilst sailing to Europe or South America, the African continent became a unique destination for Japanese traders (Aicardi de Saint Paul, 2002).

Japan's more recent Africa policy resides in its political economy of growth and economic recovery in the post-war period after World War II. Although Japan only regained its independence in 1952, its post-war Africa diplomacy dates back to September 1951, when it signed a peace treaty with the Allied Nations of the Western bloc. These states included South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia. A security treaty was also concluded with the United States (US) (Morikawa, 1997: 52). The *Yoshida Doctrine*, named after the former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, opened the door for Japan's economic development and the start of its economic diplomacy (Alden, 2002: 366). Japan's relations with Africa followed the pattern of changes of the hegemonic powers, first Britain and then the US's power shift in global politics (Ampiah, 1997: 34).

Japan's diplomacy was formally declared by its foreign office in 1957. Japan's main diplomatic goals were to promote its prosperity, to ensure the country's security and to become the world's leading economic power. In Japan's 1957 *Blue Paper*, later called the *Diplomatic Bluebook*, the Japanese government declared the following basic principles of its diplomacy which formed the core of Japan's global diplomatic pacifism and international cooperation:

- i) adherence to the principles of the United Nations;
- ii) close cooperation with the Western countries (especially the US); and
- iii) solidarity with the Afro-Asian nations.

(Sono, 1993: 108)

As Japan's economic power grew and its political concerns widened, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) came to grasp the importance of its diplomatic relations with Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa. Japan also realised the power and importance of the UN in a post-war international arena, and that African votes carried a significant weight in the UN (Kazuo, 2003: 58). However, it is important to note that Japan was never formally involved in the search for African colonies, only for raw materials. A significant historical weakness of Africa-Japan diplomatic ties has been the absence of a broad framework for Tokyo and Africa within which they could conduct diplomatic relations (Sono, 1993: 14, 127). Thus, it can be argued that Japan's earlier ties with Africa were much more based on economic interests than any political gains or influence on the continent.

2.2.2 Economic ties: imports and exports

The inter-war period in Africa was a time when Japan attempted to take a niche for itself from a region where it was politically excluded from, but one which was increasingly becoming a lifeline for the country's weakened economy. In the 1930s, the term "economic diplomacy" was first used within government documents and the Japanese media to describe the process by which Japan wanted to gain greater access to European dominated markets in Africa (Kitagawa, 2003: 39).

Prior to the 1960s, Japan's trade relationship with Africa was extremely limited because of distance, lack of historical ties and a perceived cultural gap. When trade between Japan and South Africa commenced, Japan's exports consisted mainly of textiles, especially silk and cotton fabrics. It later evolved to diversified products such as buttons, potteries and porcelains. One of the main contributing factors that led to an increase in trade between Japan and Africa was when the Japanese government established the Yawatu Iron and Steel Works, which began production in 1901. Although it was at first established for military purposes, the Yatawu in time played a significant role in Africa. Two years after the establishment of the company, trade between Africa and Japan dramatically increased: the first decade of the 18th century saw Japanese imports from Africa increase with 26,8% and the country's exports to Africa for the same period increased with 33%. Although these facts are important, Japan's contact with Africa was still limited in the context of international trade, because Africa was under European rule (Sono, 1993:80).

Japan's imports from Africa began moderately with raw essential materials such as cotton, cotton seed and wool, but by 1930, imports diversified and products such as caustic soda and soda ash were also imported. Most of the trade before the 1960s was textiles that were exported to "Black Africa", thus Southern Africa was not considered as important. During the 1960s there was more involvement because of yen loans to countries in West and East Africa (Sharp, 2003:103).

During the 1960s Japan faced two problems in its attempts to promote exports to "Black Africa". The first was the serious trade imbalance in its own favour with its main African trading partners, Nigeria and Kenya. The second hurdle was the application of Article 35 of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) that imposed tariffs on Japanese goods in "Black Africa" and in particular in the Francophone countries. The only country in which Japan did not encounter trade problems was in Zambia because of the massive importation of copper from the country. However, elsewhere in Africa the trade imbalance was a serious issue. As a result, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda imposed tough

import restrictions on Japanese goods (Morikawa, 1997: 64, 65). Nevertheless, it was not until the 1970s, particularly with the 1973 oil crisis that Japan's interest in Africa, in particular Southern Africa began to develop. This was mainly due to Japan lacking energy resources (Alden, 2002: 367).

Since Japan was South Africa's leading trading partner in Africa for numerous years, especially during Apartheid, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the trade relationship between the two countries. This relationship was plagued with difficulties, as will be explained in a later section. Nevertheless, both countries realised that the other presented an economic lifeline: Japan desperately needed South Africa's raw materials and South Africa required a market to export to because of the numerous economic sanctions against the country as well as its international isolation due to its Apartheid policies. The two way trade between the two countries was worth US\$ 762.9 million in 1972, by 1979 it reached US\$ 2.3 billion. By 1980, it had grown to US\$ 3.5 billion. At this stage, Japan was South Africa's fourth largest trading partner after the US, Britain and Germany, and in 1981 it was already South Africa's second largest trading partner. In 1987 Japan emerged as South Africa's leading trading partner, and also faced the difficulty of the sanctions debate (Ampiah, 1997: 67, 68).

2.3 Influence of African decolonisation on Japan's foreign policy towards Africa

The fact that Japan was occupied by the Allied Forces from the end of World War II until the end of the 1950s resulted in Japan being heavily influenced by US policies on African decolonisation. The US was against the struggle of Africans against European colonial powers. Japan only regained its own independence from the Allied Forces in 1952 (Ampiah, 1997: 44). Before World War II, only Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia were independent states in Africa. At the end of World War II in 1945, colonial powers in Africa also regarded African independence only in the very distant future. Japan however, was content to simply reconstruct its war-damaged economy upon the natural resource base of Africa (Sono, 1993: 94, 95, 115). Japan's attitude towards the process of decolonisation in Africa has to be understood within the earlier US-African foreign

policy framework, because of the Asian country's close relationship with the US. However, from 1960 onwards, when a mutual security treaty was obtained with the US, it became less constrained in its foreign policy in terms of the decolonisation in Africa (Ampiah, 1997: 44). Of all the independent African states Japan only recognised Ethiopia in 1955 as an independent state. The Ethiopian president at that stage, Haile Selassie was also the first African head of state to make an official tour of Japan (Sono, 1993: 115-117). In November 1952, Tokyo opened its first consulate generals in South Africa as well as the former Rhodesia (Morikawa, 1997: 52, 53).

Japan's relationship with Africa as a whole, especially during Apartheid, is characterised by its duality in terms of a "White Africa" and "Black Africa" policy. Japan's privileged relations with "White Africa" resulted in Japan mainly doing business with Rhodesia as well as the Apartheid government (Aicardi de Saint Paul, 2002). The period from 1975 until 1989 can be considered as the time when Japan focused most of its attention in Africa on the white minority regimes and supported it, although Japan's "Black Africa" policy was consolidated and advanced simultaneously. The first important objective of the "White Africa" policy was to show support for the white minority regimes. The second goal was to secure a constant supply of rare metals such as chrome and platinum. Lastly, an important goal was to maintain and expand export markets (Morikawa, 1997: 11, 12, 69, 70).

Between 1960 and 1975, the Japanese government formulated the organisation of its African diplomacy while establishing diplomatic relations with the newly-born states of "Black Africa". The goals of Japan's "Black Africa" policy present a stark contrast to those of the "White Africa" policy. Firstly, Japan wanted to establish and promote friendly and cooperative relations with pro-Western countries as well as non-aligned nations and forces. A second goal was to maintain a policy of confrontation and dialogue with countries generally regarded as pro-Eastern. Lastly, Japan wanted to secure natural resources such as copper, iron and uranium (Morikawa, 1997: 62, 63).

In terms of the “Black Africa” policy, Japan sought for political and economic reasons to improve and strengthen its relations with the independent black African countries, for example Angola and Mozambique. Japan’s “diplomacy of resources” was aimed at assuring the second world economy with a regular supply of raw materials (Aicardi de Saint Paul, 2002). Japan also applied the approach of ODA to countries it wanted to trade with in “Black Africa”, as it also did with Latin America and other Asian countries. Providing ODA was a joint approach in which Japanese industries would provide direct investment and related technology and help with natural resources development projects (Morikawa, 1997: 70). Japanese ODA will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

Without a doubt, Japan’s entry into the UN in 1956 also played a very important role in its autonomy. However, policy makers in Japan were not truly aware and sensitive to the new developments in Africa. For example, at the independence celebrations of Ghana in 1956, which was the first sub-Saharan state to be liberated from colonial rule in the post-war period, Japan was only represented by its Ambassador to Ghana. Japan’s conservative leaders supported self-determination in principle although they also made their loathing clear of the application of revolutionary means to achieve it. It is important to mention that Japan had to prevent political chaos on the African continent since it would prohibit the flow of resources from Africa to Japan. It is therefore no surprise that the report of the ‘Heiwa modai kenkyūkai’ on Japan’s comprehensive national security expressed concern on the political and racial problems in Southern Africa (Ampiah, 1997: 45, 46).

By the early 1960s Japan’s economic interests started dictating the pace of its foreign policy objectives. Japan also substituted economics for politics as the determining factor of its foreign relations. By the late 1970s Japan assumed a pro-African position: however, it still did not commit itself to the complex political economy of the African landscape (Ampiah, 1997: 50). Japan had re-established diplomatic relations with countries that controlled the “White Triangle” area of Africa before 1960, specifically focusing on South Africa as a strategic partner. Japan also increased commercial relations with the continent by privileging English-speaking states. During the struggle for independence of

Portuguese colonies such as Angola, Japan was insensitive to the demands of nationalists. Aware of this mistake, Japanese authorities were later the first to recognise the independence of Angola (Aicardi de Saint Paul, 2002). Nonetheless, Japan ultimately failed to contribute significant material and moral support for the liberation of the African people under colonial rule. This is partly due to the fact that the country tended to sympathise with the colonialists when Africa and many Asian countries were denouncing colonialism in the southern cone of the continent (Sono, 1993: 124).

The time span between 1960 and 1975 witnessed the Japanese government formulating the organisation of its African diplomacy whilst establishing diplomatic relations and expanding economic relations with new states on the continent. From 1975 until 1989 Japan's main objective in terms of its African foreign policy was to improve diplomatic relations and to soften African criticisms of Japan. Japan adopted the following tactics: firstly, it showed more sympathy towards African national liberation movements and also showed more interest in African international politics in general. Secondly, it aimed to improve its 'African image' by providing African countries with aid for development and emergency relief (Morikawa, 1997: 63, 81, 82, 83).

The beginning of the Cold War ushered a new concept of spheres of influence, as was directed by the ideological positions of the US on the one hand and Moscow on the other. Both superpowers saw the end of colonialism in Africa as crucial to their economic, political and strategic decisions (Ampiah, 1997: 37). During the colonial period, Japan took advantage of the situation to develop its relations with Africa, since it used Africa as a tool to promote its comeback to the international scene after its own independence. The process of Africa's balkanisation into about fifty states, most of which were part of the General Assembly of the UN was carried political significance for Japan: this was an opportunity for Japan to fulfil its Security Council ambitions (Aicardi de Saint Paul, 2002). Japan also began to support some African resolutions in the UN even if the country tended to abstain more often than casting votes in support. Virtually all the resolutions were pacifist of nature and intent but focused on African criticism of colonialism, racism and South African Apartheid. As African unity grew, Japan gradually

and systematically began to vote with the Africans in the UN. Many critics dismiss this support as Japan doing anything in its power to obtain the following: a seat on the Security Council and access to Africa's natural resources (Sono, 1993: 121).

Japan's security policy, as defined within its constitution and the framework of the US-Japan Security Treaty, proved to be static when confronted with the most serious crisis to have come from the decolonisation process in sub-Saharan Africa: the crisis in the Congo in 1960 brought Japan's security policy and its policy towards political problems into serious question. On the issue of whether Japan should contribute to UN forces in the Congo, Japanese policymakers argued that Article IX of the constitution prohibited it to deploy armed forces. However, as more countries became independent, momentum was gained for action against colonial rule in Africa (Ampiah, 1997: 44-48).

2.4 Japan in a post-Cold War era of international relations

The year 1989, is not only significant since it is the year the Cold War ended officially, it also marks the date that Japan achieved the status as the world's leading ODA donor. This was the country's *grande* entrance back into the international political arena (Hook & Zhang, 1998: 1051). Japan's commitment was also demonstrated in launching the TICAD process in 1993, thus shifting the international community's attention back to Africa in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War shifted global focus elsewhere (UNDP, 2003).

The two realities that impacted Japan's foreign policy towards Africa after the Cold War the most, was firstly the confrontation between the US and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and secondly Apartheid - which will be discussed in more detail in the next section. The significance of the US and USSR standoff was that both sides purposefully interjected the East-West confrontation into Africa, resulting in many of the conflicts that can be seen in the context of the Cold War. Japan was therefore unable to detach its foreign policy towards Africa from that frame of reference (Kazuo, 2003: 57).

The developments in world politics from the end of World War II led to two Cold Wars: the conflict between the US and USSR on the one hand and the struggle of the Afro-Asian countries to free themselves from colonial domination (Ampiah, 2003: 23).

According to Adem (2001), Japan's post-Cold War Africa policy should be understood as a function of the interplay between economic power and asymmetric interdependence on the one hand, and culture and diplomacy on the other. Before the end of the Cold War, Japan was often attentive to the overall geopolitical implication of its economic and political interactions with the Third World. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War caught Japan unprepared for the changes it would bring to international affairs and what its new role in it would be (Tsuneo, 2000: 178).

In terms of Japan's security role in regional and international affairs, it experienced a significant shift from that which it used to play during the Cold War when Japan followed an isolationist regional approach of one-country pacifism. This particular strategy rested on the following two pillars: firstly, Japan pursued its economic diplomacy while it avoided a political role in international security affairs. Secondly, Japan entrusted its stake in regional security to the US. However, Japan realised it could not continue to follow this approach in the post- Cold War era since its passivity to security issues came under severe attack (Singh, 2002). Until recently, Japan has failed to see its relationship with Russia and other former countries belonging to the Soviet Union in a broader and global context, having focused for years on a bilateral territorial dispute (Tsuneo, 2000: 178). The end of the Cold War also saw the rise of "soft" security issues which includes human security which have initiated a debate over new and old forms of security becoming a battle between visionaries and traditionalists.

Japan's defence policies faced several challenges between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Some of the reasons for this include that Western democracies lost their common military threat, the Soviet Union. However, the Japanese "bubble" economy came to be perceived as a new threat to the Western democracies, especially to the US. When the Cold War ended, the American perception of the economic disadvantages in its relationship with Japan outweighed the political advantages (Jitsuo, 2000: 146).

In a post-Cold War international political arena, international relations were characterised by a multipolar world which replaced the bipolar order. The waning of the Cold War and the emergence of Japan as the world's second largest economy meant that Tokyo had to reconsider its role in international politics. In this new multipolar order, because of Japan's newly attained economic strength, it emerged as one of the poles of power (Fukushima, 1999: 5). The apparent decline of the US, which also emphasised the limitations of militarism over that of economic dominance, led to Japan adopting a new international political role to correspond with its economic standing. Multilateralism, which was a key feature of Japan's post-war foreign policy, played an important role in shaping the country's international relations. In this context, Africa occupied a unique position for Japan since it was not part of the troublesome legacy politics of war-time militarism (Alden, 2003: 9).

2.5 The role of Apartheid in relations between Japan and South Africa

Japan's relationship with South Africa has been more intimate than with other African countries, but also accompanied by much greater obstacles (Cornelissen, 2004: 122). Within the framework of Japan's Africa policy, South Africa has played an important role because of the country's pre-eminence, which was underscored by both countries' close trading relationship and the outsider political relationship during Apartheid (Alden, 2002: 365). Since both Japan and South Africa have historically and geographically been remote, relations between the two countries hardly ever attracted any attention until Japan's trade with the Apartheid regime became prominent enough to encourage international condemnation in the 1960s. It was also at this time that South Africa's international isolation which began in the 1940s became increasingly evident (Osada, 2003: 45). The relationship between Japan and South Africa during and after Apartheid can be characterised by Japan's dependency on South Africa's mineral resources and South Africa's dependency on Japan which exported heavy industrial products. Thus, they can be considered as one another's most strategic trading partners during Apartheid.

The National Party, which was the ruling party during Apartheid, sought to diversify its international relations because of the increasing criticism against its racist Apartheid policies. For Japan, who supported the West's struggle against communism, closer economic ties with South Africa meant that it was part of the struggle in South Africa against communism. By 1979, Japan was dependent on several minerals which it imported from South Africa. However, in its relations with South Africa, Japan had to follow a foreign policy of the separation of politics and economics, since it condemned the practices of the Apartheid regime, yet it still traded on a large scale with the country (Ampiah, 1997: 56, 57). Japan most definitely followed a "best of both worlds policy" since they were a frontrunner of sanctions against the Apartheid regime since 1985. Japan thought that it could claim moral leadership in the anti-Apartheid crusade, although it was raking in billions of dollars from South Africa's natural resources (Sono, 1993: 328).

Because the relationship between South Africa and Japan was deepening, the Apartheid government had to alter its racial policies in order to smooth the path for trade with an Asian nation. In April 1961, a decree was passed which meant that Japanese had to be classified as white. Thus, the Japanese continued trade with South Africa since they would be considered as "honorary whites", although there was widespread criticism against South Africa from the Japanese public, who argued that the "honorary white" label was extremely racist. Attempts like these to accommodate the Japanese were an indication of the importance of foreign trade for South Africa, in particular with Japan. It was also an indication of the importance of South Africa to Japanese economic security. Thus the two countries complemented each other because of their individual comparative advantage in the international system (Ampiah, 1997: 70).

Japan's trade with South Africa also harmed its Security Council ambitions: Japan nearly lost a non-permanent seat on the Council in 1965 because of African nation's criticism of Japan's trade relations with the Apartheid regime. Since Japan wanted to run for another seat on the Security Council in 1969, they needed to demonstrate their tough attitude to South Africa in order to secure a seat (Alden, 2003: 46). Japan decided in 1974 that diplomatic relations would only be conducted at a consulate level, and that all cultural,

sport and educational exchanges to Japan by South Africans were denied as well as tourist visas. Nevertheless, business visas were issued to influential stakeholders in business and politics. At the same time the volume of Japan's trade with South Africa quadrupled between 1974 and 1987. This meant that Japan was South Africa's number one trading partner, much to the embarrassment of the MOFA (Ampiah, 1997: 56, 57).

When Japan became South Africa's leading trade partner in 1987, the Japanese government was frantic. Many nations shared the perception that Japan was a racist, chauvinist state. Because of severe international criticism, especially from the UN and US against Japan's trade relationship with South Africa, meant that becoming the second largest trading partner of South Africa in the next two years to alleviate criticism was a key goal for Japan. The Japanese government also started to take concrete actions in order to demonstrate its anti-Apartheid stance: the government introduced economic sanctions, provided bursaries to black university students as well as financial assistance to the social upliftment of black people. Several black political leaders and businessmen were also invited to Japan (Alden, 2003: 56). Despite the economic ties with South Africa, the MOFA officials categorically rejected Apartheid and were led by the following diplomatic stance: Japan strongly opposed Apartheid, and was constantly exploring views and ways of encouraging peaceful change in South Africa. Lastly, the MOFA stated that it would cooperate with other international organisations and countries in looking for solutions to put political pressure on the South African government (Sono, 1993: 329).

During the 1980s there was once again increasing pressure on Japan to minimise its dealings with South Africa. In response, the Japanese government prohibited the sale of computers to the South African defence and police services. There was also a government proposed law that all Japanese companies doing business in South Africa should give equal employment opportunities to its employees, irrespective of their race (Ampiah, 1997: 56, 57). It should be noted that Japan's trade with South Africa was never excessive. It fluctuated only slightly and never exceeded 2% of its total trade. When Japan became South Africa's leading trading partner in 1987, trade with South Africa

was only 1,1 % of Japan's total trade (Alden, 2003: 56). When trade began to fall drastically in 1988, it fell until 1991 to US\$ 3,3 billion, a decrease of 20% (Sono, 1993: 312).

The Japanese Anti Apartheid Committee (JAAC) was the centre of anti-Apartheid activity in Japan. The JAAC was not a single organisation, but rather a federation of smaller regional groups across the country. The organisation established friendly ties with the African National Congress (ANC), including key figures such as Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo. It is often argued that the organisation was initiated to soften international criticisms of Japan's policy towards South Africa in terms of trade, as well as to secure a place for Japan in the post-Apartheid era with a new government (Morikawa, 1997: 191, 194). When Apartheid was starting to come to an end, after the election of F.W de Klerk, bilateral relations normalised gradually, which led to the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1992 (Aicardi de Saint Paul, 2002).

Reconstructing the relationship between Japan and South Africa after Apartheid was more difficult than any of the two countries could imagine. Reinventing this relationship with its bureaucratic-institutional, state and non-state complexities was an exercise in finding a new basis for relations grounded in North-South exigencies and normalising these relations (Alden, 2002: 385). The most significant obstacle was that Japan had followed a dual approach. In order to improve relations with the new ANC government, the Japanese government presented, in 1994, the largest foreign assistance package, in the form of ODA that any donor has ever offered South Africa. From 1996 onwards, Japanese investment in the South African motor industry also started to intensify. The three leading companies were Nissan, Toyota and Bridgestone. In 1996 alone, R1,2 billion was spent in the South African economy (Cornelissen, 2004: 125). The current commercial level still reflects the contours of the past: South Africa providing raw materials and a market for Japanese goods, though most importantly providing Japan with a springboard for business interests in the rest of the continent. Reinventing the post-Apartheid relationship between Japan and South Africa has been a difficult political and economic process for both countries governments (Alden, 2003: 16-21).

2.6 Conclusion

By discussing the evolution of the ties between Africa and Japan, it is clear that Japan's interest in Africa was much more economic than political in nature, although their Security Council ambitions did play an important role. This chapter has also shown that although Japan was dependent on Africa for a stable supply of raw materials and natural resources for its economic expansion, South Africa was equally dependent on Japan because of its international isolation during Apartheid. Although Japan gradually built up an economic relationship with the continent, it never really had a strong diplomatic and emotional bond with Africa. This was mainly because it did not support the liberation movements during colonisation, and then also continued trade with South Africa whilst the rest of the world was condemning the country because of its racist policies. The main problem with Japan's earlier Africa policy is the fact that the economic superpower was extremely slow to project a more human face in its diplomacy (Sono, 1993: 104). In terms of the end of the Cold War, security increasingly became more relevant for Japan since the bipolar security paradigm shifted, and in its search for economic security Africa was imperative for Japan. However, Japan's role in providing ODA to African countries in order to promote human security brought along a shift in its African diplomacy, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3: JAPANESE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) TO AFRICA AND HUMAN SECURITY

3.1 Introduction

Official development assistance (ODA) is a key feature of Japan's foreign policy to the developing world. However, the significance of Japanese ODA to African countries has been neglected by scholars³ in the past, since most of the emphasis has been placed on ODA to Asian countries. Over the last decade, Japan's ODA policies have caused much controversy because of increasing aid cuts and domestic pressures for the transparency and effectiveness of ODA. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the importance of ODA as a Japanese foreign policy tool, and more importantly how human security issues are addressed in Africa through the provision of ODA. Since the TICAD process provides a structural framework for development aid to Africa, the significance of all three TICAD meetings and the general role TICAD plays in African development will be discussed. Lastly, an overview will be given of Japan's role in other multilateral organisations and initiatives such as the UN and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The future direction of Japan's ODA will also be discussed in order to comprehend how Japan has planned to implement the policies of TICAD.

3.2 The historical foundations of Japanese ODA

Over the last six decades, Japan has not only been a significant provider of aid, but also a recipient of foreign assistance. The country's first involvement with aid was when it received aid after its economy had nearly collapsed following World War II (Akiko, 2000: 153). Sato (2005) argues that Japanese ODA can be divided into five stages for a historical framework: the beginning of the Japanese aid diplomacy up to the first oil crisis (1954-1973); from the first oil crisis until 1980; the rapid expansion of Japanese aid (1981-1988); the period when Japan became a prime donor (1989-2000); and the last stage – the period when the Japanese government faced a fundamental shift in aid policy. These five stages will be discussed briefly:

³ These scholars include Orr (1990); Rix (1993) and Akira & Yasutami (1998).

According to Akira and Yasutami (1998: 141, 142) the origins of Japanese aid can be traced back to the country's membership in the Colombo Plan in 1954 which was a system of regional cooperation to promote economic and social development in South and Southeast Asia among member countries of the British Commonwealth. Following the Colombo Plan, Japan initiated its technical cooperation programme. The focus with respect to economic cooperation was on export credits and reparations, thus the ODA component was rather weak (MOFA, 2006). The fact that ODA was almost exclusively directed at Asian countries is equally important (Sato, 2005). Japan's ODA gradually increased during the 1960s, and by the 1970s it accelerated. During the oil crisis in the 1970s, structural adjustment loans became the global trend for aid activities (MOFA, 2006).

In 1989, Japan achieved the status as the world's leading donor of ODA, and this continued throughout the 1990s. Japanese leaders also pledged to become better "aid citizens" by not only supporting economic development, but also social and political reforms in developing countries, including African countries. This was a significant foreign policy strategy of Japan to accentuate itself as an emerging middlepower. Japan's new approach to aid was also welcomed by the members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), since Japanese aid aligned with the normative principles and qualitative standards of the OECD. The Japanese government only adopted a formal policy on developmental aid in June 1992, emphasising human rights and democratisation (Hook & Zhang, 1998: 1051).

Cornelissen (2004: 118) argues that the expansion of Japan's aid programme can be understood as the consequence of two factors: firstly, Japan's rising economic importance was influenced by the immense pressure from the US for international burden sharing, and Japan used its aid programmes in such a manner to withstand this pressure from the US. Secondly, aid was a key element of Japan's middlepowership which was increasing rapidly at that stage, along with the country's heightened activism in multilateral organisations.

A significant difference that has to be noted between ODA to Asian countries and ODA to Africa is that other than the Asian ODA which was in most part politically motivated, ODA to Africa was partly provided to serve Japan's economic interests (Ampiah, 1997: 56). However, Japan's policies towards Africa were systematically adjusted as it adopted the human security approach and humanitarian concerns also played a more decisive role. These adjustments will be highlighted in the course of this chapter.

3.3 Japan's African ODA policy

3.3.1 What is ODA?

Many forms of economic assistance to developing countries exist. What distinguishes ODA from other forms of aid is that its commitments are undertaken by governments with concessionary elements with much lower interest rates along with an extended repayment period for recipients. ODA is distinguished by the "grant element", which is 100% in the case of ODA, whilst it is 0% in the case of a commercial loan with an interest rate. Aid cannot be labelled ODA unless the grant element is over 25% (Akiko, 2000: 153).

In sum, ODA can be classified in two ways: firstly, it can be classified as a grant or loan. This depends on whether it involves the repayment of the principal and paying interest. ODA can also be classified as being on a "multilateral basis" or "bilateral basis". This depends on whether the flow of the funds is directed to a specific country or to an international organisation (Akira & Yasutami, 1998: 163). In the case of Japan's ODA to Africa, it has mostly been bilateral. Akira and Yasutami (1998: 85, 86) provide the requirements for ODA which further distinguishes it from other forms of aid and official flows to recipients:

- i) ODA must be administered by a government or government agency;
- ii) it has the main objective of promoting the economic development and welfare of the developing world (military aid is not included); and

- iii) ODA has conditions that do not impose an extensive repayment burden on developing countries.

Akira and Yasutami (1998: 165) also identified the three different forms of ODA namely grant aid, technical cooperation as well as government loans (yen loans). In the African context, Japanese ODA has mostly taken the form of grant aid and yen loans.


3.3.2 Japan's ODA policy for African development

Throughout its aid policy Japan has emphasised agricultural, rural and human resources development. Japan's has contributed to these different spectrums of development through technical assistance, emergency aid and crisis relief (Sono, 1993: 198). However, as argued in the previous chapter, Japan's Cold War aid policy to Africa was mainly to serve its economic interests. In the late 1980s, Japan began to focus on poverty alleviation and meeting basic human needs in African countries, in conjunction with using aid as a strategic economic policy instrument. Thus, humanitarian concerns were carrying some weight in Japan's foreign policy objectives. Japan also began to use aid to encourage recipient countries to adopt positive approaches to democracy and good governance which promotes the concept of human security (Eyinla, 1999:413).

The MOFA announced its intention to revise the ODA Charter in December 2002. There were two principal reasons for this: firstly to reshape Japan's ODA mandate to incorporate new ideas in terms of development since there were new challenges concerning global politics and economics following the end of the Cold War. Secondly, the government had to respond to domestic demands for a more solid ODA framework. A prominent feature of the new ODA policy making process was that several stakeholders such as political parties, intellectuals, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), business people and donor countries were included in dialogue. In August 2003, the Japanese government officially announced the reform of the ODA Charter. The main objective of the revised Charter is to "contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity". The Charter

stated that the human security approach should be followed to address issues such as threats of conflict, natural disasters and infectious diseases (MOFA, 2006). The following diagram illustrates the importance of the different ODA policies and related projects:

Figure 3.1 Japan's ODA Policy Framework



Source: *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2006: 200

The main function of the ODA Charter as the top-level policy is to clarify the philosophies and principles of Japan's ODA. Second is the Medium-Term Policy on ODA, which is the guideline that lasts for three to five years. Next are the Country Assistance Programmes, which provide the guidelines for implementing assistance for some recipient countries. Lastly, individual projects are used in order to ensure the efficient and effective implementation of ODA (*Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2006: 200).

3.3.3 ODA to African countries: changing patterns and current initiatives

Aid to Africa commenced in 1966 when the first government loan was made to Uganda (Sono, 1993: 1999). Aid payments followed shortly thereafter to Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania. Until the late 1960s Africa still received only 1% of Japan's total aid and at the beginning of the 1970s less than 2% of all Japanese aid disbursements were directed to Africa. Nevertheless, ODA to Africa increased significantly from 1974 onwards. By 1980 10% of Japan's ODA budget was direct towards African countries (Cornelissen, 2004: 118).

When the Japanese Foreign Minister toured Ghana, Nigeria and Zaire in 1974, he announced that Tokyo would double African aid to 5, 2% of its total aid. Japanese aid to Africa rose steadily to 18, 9% in 1980 (Nester, 1991). From 1970 - 1980, bilateral aid to Africa increased nominally 27,5 times, whilst Japan's national budget increased nominally only 5, 3 times (Sato, 2005). Between 1983 and 1987 Japanese ODA doubled to Africa from US\$ 286 million to US\$ 593 million. How did Tokyo determine whom to provide ODA to up until the late 1980s? As its aid became increasingly united during this time, Japan's economic interests, especially natural resources played an important role in terms of where ODA was directed (Nester, 1991).

During the Cold War period, Japan's aid policy towards Africa was wholly devoted to three objectives as identified by Eyinla (1999: 413):

- i) to complement and reinforce the United States's geo-strategic and ideological framework of the US/Japan cooperative strategic aid policy;
- ii) this strategic aid policy served as an instrument for access to raw and mineral sources and for expanding export markets; and
- iii) in the late 1980s, aid became a strategic diplomatic tool for pacifying African states who criticised Japan for being South Africa's largest trading partner during Apartheid.

Thus, it can also be argued that during the 1980s Japan's aid policy (specifically to sub-Saharan Africa) was directed exclusively towards serving two main foreign policy objectives. Firstly, Tokyo wanted to promote positive political ties both within the context of the Cold War and to increase bilateral relations. A second important foreign policy goal was to repair relations with sub-Saharan Africa (Eyinla, 1999: 422). The following table illustrates Japanese ODA flows to the top ten African recipients until the late 1980s:

Table 3.2 Top 10 African recipients of Japanese ODA cumulative to 1988

(Unit: US\$ Million)

| | |
|------------|--------|
| Kenya | 140, 2 |
| Tanzania | 94, 2 |
| Zambia | 87, 0 |
| Nigeria | 81, 4 |
| Ghana | 75, 9 |
| Zaire | 61, 9 |
| Madagascar | 45, 8 |
| Senegal | 37, 1 |
| Malawi | 30, 3 |
| Niger | 27, 0 |

Source: Morikawa, 1997: 85

Among OECD donors⁴, Japan has played a highly significant role in Africa, especially if the figures above are considered, since Japan made large ODA disbursements cumulative to 1988: between 1984 and 1998 the cumulative growth in net ODA disbursements from Japan was more than any other OECD country (Tuman & Ayoub, 2004: 44). By the 1990s, Japan's ODA to Africa had risen to US\$ 580 million, 15, 2% of its total aid disbursements, and the launch of the new ODA Charter also had an important impact on

⁴ According to Masaki (2007) there are currently 22 major aid donors in the world, Japan ranks third.

ODA to the continent (Alden, 2002: 367, 368). One of the most significant aid grants that was made in the 1990s was Japan's aid package of US\$ 1, 3 billion to South Africa in 1994 after the Apartheid era ended (Cornelissen, 2004: 123).

The 1990s proved to contain more difficulties for Japanese foreign policy makers considering ODA. Firstly, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 led to significant aid reductions by Japan, and secondly Tokyo had to start to punish aid recipients for neglecting conditionalities (Cornelissen, 2004: 118). Japan's ODA to Africa in the 1990s was characterised by a "carrot-and-stick" approach, in terms of the aid recipient's adherence to the principles of the ODA Charter (Eyinla, 1999: 424). In 1993 and 1994, Sierra Leone, Zaire, Kenya, Malawi and Nigeria were identified as violators of the ODA principles. Equally important, towards the end of the 1990s, Japan faced increasing domestic economic difficulties, and in 1996 its aid disbursement were cut by 35%. In 2001, disbursements were again cut by 27% over the previous year, and in 2002 again reduced by 10%. These reductions were due to an ODA policy review by a committee appointed by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (*Africa Recovery*, 1997). Thus, it can be argued that Japan's aid approach has taken a significant turn from the 1980s where the focus was on increasing amounts of aid. Due to domestic pressure the focus is rather now on the effectiveness of aid (Cornelissen, 2004:124). Table 2.3 illustrates the flow of ODA to African countries from 1979-1998. Those countries in bold are the top 10 recipients for this period:

Table 3.3: Mean levels of Net Japanese ODA to Africa 1979-1998

(Mean: US\$ Million)

| | |
|-------------------|--------------|
| Algeria | 0,5 |
| Benin | 9,4 |
| Botswana | 5,4 |
| Burkina Faso | 5,6 |
| Burundi | 5,3 |
| Cameroon | 4,4 |
| CAR | 11,3 |
| Chad | 0,1 |
| Congo | 0,6 |
| Egypt | 150,6 |
| Gabon | 0,3 |
| Gambia | 3,2 |
| Ghana | 60,1 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 3,6 |
| Ivory Coast | 21,9 |
| Kenya | 86,2 |
| Lesotho | 1,5 |
| Madagascar | 25,3 |
| Malawi | 29 |
| Mali | 14,5 |
| Mauritania | 14,4 |
| Mauritius | 3,5 |
| Morocco | 29,6 |
| Niger | 16,8 |
| Nigeria | 20,5 |
| Rwanda | 8,1 |
| Senegal | 34,5 |
| Sierra Leone | 4,4 |
| South Africa | 3,8 |
| Sudan | 26,8 |
| Swaziland | 2,7 |
| Togo | 7,5 |
| Tunisia | 11,5 |
| Zambia | 51,1 |
| Zimbabwe | 22,8 |

Source: Tuman & Ayoub, 2004:47

As discussed, a constant and sufficient supply of natural resources is vital to Japan's economy. Taking the trends of Japanese ODA disbursements discussed so far into account, it can be argued that Japan disbursed ODA to African countries in the past with the most natural resources. If this is a valid claim one can expect Japan to regenerate their ODA to African oil exporters, for example Angola⁵ in the very near future (Tuman & Ayoub, 2004: 45). In a study on Japanese ODA to Africa in the period 1979- 1998, Tuman & Ayoub (2004: 43) have found that humanitarian interests as measured by human rights, democracy and food insecurity were main determinants in Japan's aid strategy and decisions. Their study tested for the effects of these new variables, which has not been examined previously in quantitative aid literature on ODA to Africa. Their study forms a strong contrast to the argument of this chapter and various other studies that Japanese national interests are a key determining factor of Japanese ODA disbursements. Although humanitarian concerns do play an important role in Japan's ODA foreign policy, it is not the only decisive factor. Economic and diplomatic interests still also have an immense influence.

Japan has achieved the status of the world's largest bilateral ODA provider from 1991 up until 2000, and is currently the third largest provider of aid in the world (Kawai & Takagi, 2004: 257). In terms of the current ODA trends in Africa, Tanzania is one of the main recipients of Japanese aid. Since 2001 Japan has increased ODA to the country by nearly 500%. The main projects that were funded with aid were power sectors, infrastructure developments, agriculture and education (*Business Times Tanzania*, 2004: 2).

Currently, the following initiatives have also been made possible in Japan's top ODA recipients: the "One Village One Product" programme which has been sponsored in conjunction with the UNDP in Malawi and Ghana. The programme promotes products unique to a specific region and aims to encourage people to use local resources and traditional techniques, thus revitalising the region. In Kenya, Japan has provided support for enhancing the Forest Bureau's capability to promote the use of community forestry as

⁵ Angola is the second largest oil-exporter in Africa after Nigeria.

part of Japan supporting the “Green Revolution” to promote human security by funding projects that are essential to the economy. In Uganda, the New Rice for Africa (NERICA) programme has been initiated which places emphasis on increasing rice production and rice cultivation technology in sub-Saharan African countries (MOFA, 2006). In terms of other Japanese aid related activities, the role of the Japan Overseas Cooperation is particularly salient in Africa (Sato, 2005). These activities indicate that Japan is focusing on promoting human security, since it is addressing humanitarian issues, which forms a strong contrast to its Africa policies during the Cold War.


3.3.4 Human security as an important element of Japan’s foreign policy through ODA

The Japanese government has been confronted with a number of different approaches to broaden the concept of human security in its foreign policy since the 1950s. The MOFA first adopted an explicitly UN centred diplomacy and later Japan participated in the Bandung Conference which promoted the concept of humanity in conditions of a bipolar struggle. Finally, Japan attempted to introduce the concept of “comprehensive security” by providing ODA and diplomatic moderation in its relations with states through the Middle East and Asia. In the African context, Japan has been relatively successful in terms of placing more emphasis on the concept of human security through its financial grants and technical assistance to several African countries (Gilson & Purvis, 2003: 193). Japan’s security policy is also firmly based on its security cooperation with the US, and has formulated its foreign policy goals according to the US example (Edström, 2003: 220). In terms of Japan’s objectives concerning ODA as an important part of its foreign policy, the ODA Charter specifies the objectives clearly in the first section. It restates the government’s commitment to support social and economic infrastructure development, human resource development, institution building in developing countries as well as addressing global issues such as HIV/AIDS, famine and poverty (Sunaga, 2004: 8).

Hook and Zhang (1998: 1052) argue that in terms of economic and political motives, two Japanese aid policy discourses can be identified, namely the MOFA and the MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry). These two discourses in Japan’s ODA administration can be summarised as follows: the MOFAs prominent goals in terms of

ODA is the promotion of Japan's international diplomacy, the improvement of economic and social conditions in poor nations, implementing agencies such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JIBC) through ODA loans, and lastly to have jurisdiction over UN agencies. In contrast to this, the MITI is focused on the promotion of Japan's economic interest through the expansion of trade and investment and to assist the development of environmental industries and implementing agencies such as JICA (Kawai & Takagi, 2004: 261). In the context of post-Cold War politics, and Japan shortly becoming the world largest aid donor thereafter, the MOFA discourse has proved more successful in Japanese policy making concerning ODA. The key reason for this is that its emphasis on promoting the concept of human security and promoting development in developing countries, proved more relevant. This is because Japan has been under increasing pressure for the reform of its aid policies. A second reason why the MOFA discourse is more appropriate is because Japan's recent foreign policy strategy in terms of providing ODA, also have important political goals in conjunction with economic interests. Thus, Japan's aspiring new role in global politics has also acquired the MOFA approach.

States have had different approaches in addressing the concept of human security through their foreign policies, because of its ambiguity. It was only in 1998 in a speech by former Prime Minister Obuchi in Hanoi that human security was established as a key element of Japan's foreign policy (Edström, 2003: 212). There is a clear contrast between the Japanese and Canadian governments (both are considered as middle powers) understanding of the concept. Their foreign developmental initiatives have thus also differed as a result of this. Human security can also be considered as a political *leitmotif*, which has provided a coherent normative framework for Japan's foreign policy (Werthes & Boshold, 2006: 22, 24). The following diagram illustrates the interconnection and the Japanese and Canadian discourses:

Figure 3.4 The Range of Human Security Concepts

Source: Werthes & Boshold, 2006

As a counter argument of where Japan is located in the spectrum of human security, Gilson and Purvis (2003: 200) argues that Japan can be criticized for abusing the human security agenda by adopting a pragmatic political approach, whilst it has to face up to domestic and external pressures. Adopting the concept of human security as central to their foreign policy, has been a strategy since the mid - 1990s, as well as the domestic pressure for the more efficient implementation of ODA.

In terms of explaining Japan's foreign policy behaviour in the context of providing ODA with the emphasis on human security, Neo-Realists have claimed that states do not only seek power, but also national economic interests which are important for both their domestic and global security. In the case of Japan, Neo-Realists have argued that Japan employs its foreign aid policy as an instrument to strengthen its national economy. An example would be that ODA to Africa has been used to create export opportunities for Japanese MNCs, since it commenced in the 1960s (Tuman & Ayoub, 2004: 45).

However, the Neo-Realist perspective only explains one of Japan's motives for providing

ODA, since humanitarian concerns also play an important role as explained by the Human Security Approach.

3.4 The role of TICAD in promoting human security and development in Africa as part of Japan's foreign policy

3.4.1 The inception of TICAD and its main objectives

The three Tokyo International Conferences on African Development (TICAD) have been instrumental in Japan's Africa policy in promoting development through the concept of human security by encouraging trade and investment to the continent. The significance of TICAD for the purpose of this study is that it has been a complementary process to ODA for African countries. The TICAD process was launched in 1993 to promote policy dialogue on development between African leaders and development partners and is based on two dual principles: the "ownership" of African leaders in conjunction with international "partnership" (UNDP, 2003). The different approaches adopted to deal with the key issues at the three TICAD conferences have been South-south cooperation, human security and respect for African diversity (*Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2006: 123). In terms of TICAD and Japan's Africa foreign policy, Lehman (2005: 423) notes that since the early 1990s, Japan has been the only developed country to consistently hold major international conferences focused on African development. This is significant since Japan only provides 10% of its ODA to Africa. It can thus be argued Japan's strategy is to implement the new ODA Charter policies through TICAD in order to direct a new way forward for ODA to Africa, but also to secure its diplomatic and economic interests.

3.4.2 The TICAD process: goals for human development focusing on human security

TICAD I

At TICAD I, the "Tokyo Declaration on African development" was adopted and the importance of economic development was affirmed by all stakeholders. The conference in Tokyo was attended by 48 African representatives. The aim of the first conference was to illustrate the international community's interest and commitment to African self-help

efforts for economic reconstruction (Morikawa, 1997: 203). In terms of the results of the conference, for the African side, it had more symbolism than economic substance because TICAD I only illustrated the donor countries intentions. They avoided any large-scale pledge of aid and emphasised the self-help principle and recommended SAPs for the rebuilding of African economies. Japan obtained direct diplomatic results from TICAD I - it displayed to the international community its willingness to play an important role in Africa. Although Japan would never admit to it, the conference created a positive climate for the country's campaign for a permanent seat on the Security Council (Morikawa, 1997: 204-206).

TICAD II

TICAD II was held in 1998, where the “Tokyo Agenda for Action” (TAA), a comprehensive implementation agenda was adopted. The period between TICAD I and II represented a different financial and geo-strategic environment since the end of the Cold War presented new issues to countries that provided ODA, as well as the demands of the East Asian crisis, which is significant in the case of Japan (Lehman, 2005: 430). The prioritised areas for this conference were the following:

- i) social development: education, health, gender equity;
- ii) economic development: agriculture, industry, support for the private sector;
and
- iii) foundations for development: good governance and conflict prevention.
(MOFA, 2003)

In terms of the successful implementation of the TICAD II goals, the emphasis was on realising human-centred development based on the concept of human security. A plan was agreed at this conference to implement US\$ 750 million over a five year period to be able to meet the goals of the conference. Since the first goal of TICAD II was social development, it was also decided that US\$ 2 billion would be disbursed to education sectors in low-income countries. The “Basic Education for Growth Initiative” (BEGIN)

was then started for the education sectors of identified African countries. Various other initiatives in Africa were also emphasised which was funded by the Trust Fund for Human Security through the UN and also received financial support from the Japanese Government (MOFA, 1998). TICAD II was also important for Japan's foreign policy because it provided the country with the confidence to initiate foreign policy endeavours or partnerships with other governments. In the African context, what made TICAD II significant for Africa is the fact that NEPAD was also brought into consideration and recognised for the first time by the MOFA (Lehman, 2005: 434). The most significant outcome of TICAD II was that the importance of human security was acknowledged in African development, and as a fundamental part of Japan's foreign policy.

TICAD III

TICAD III was held in 2003 and the main agenda was peace and conflict resolution with the emphasis on human security. Other important themes that were discussed were governance, agricultural development, private sector development, infrastructure and human resources development focusing on education and health. Equally important, an explicit commitment was made to support NEPAD. The following extract of a speech by former Prime Minister Koizumi at the TICAD III conference illustrates Japan's position on human security through the TICAD process:

“Japan wishes to further dialogue with its African partners in order to address the question of how the people of Africa can become free from various threats against lives and human dignity including poverty, conflict and infectious diseases, in other words how Japan can contribute to ‘human security’ and realize a society in which people can live with hope” (TICAD, 2003).

Whilst TICAD II put forward the proposition of the important role of the state, at TICAD III, Japan wanted to show to the international community that human security was indeed a possible rule of the game in achieving development in Africa (Horiuchi, 2005: 478). A political statement, the TICAD 10th Anniversary Declaration was adopted which emphasised the commitment of leaders for African development (MOFA, 2003). TICAD

III was also a benchmark since 23 African heads of state attended, whereas in 1993 at the first conference only three attended (Katzenellenbogen, 2003: 3). Prime Minister Koizumi opened the conference by pledging US\$ 1 billion to African countries which would be in the form of grant aid over five years (*Inside Asia*, 2003: 2). However, TICAD III was characterised by African delegates severely criticising developed countries, especially Japan. This was because of earlier aid cuts to Africa. The developed world was also accused of lacking the political will to provide aid to Africa (Cornish, 2003: 1). South Africa played an important role at TICAD III, since President Thabo Mbeki courted for Japanese aid for Africa, as well as investment opportunities for Japanese businesses on the continent through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (DFA, 2002). TICAD IV will be held in Tokyo in 2008.

3.4.3 Successes and shortcomings of the TICAD process

The TICAD process has without a doubt contributed immensely in highlighting partnerships with African countries, and focusing on African development. As discussed, TICAD has been an important part of Japanese diplomacy to establish itself as a global player since the end of the Cold War. Many promises have been made, and the importance of the contributions of the TICAD process has been acknowledged by the international community, although its progress can be criticised.

In terms of promoting trade and investment to African countries, TICAD has contributed significantly to increased economic ties between Africa and Asia. For example, the amount of African exports to Asia has doubled from 1993 to 2003. Private funds have also far exceeded the amount of ODA to Africa in the form of trade and investment (MOFA, 2003). The World Bank has also reported that African exports to Asia are still relatively small, but has shown growth since 1993. Of the total export earnings estimated at about US\$ 134 billion per year (2001-2003 average), 15% come from sales to Asia. The rate at which the export values have increased to Asia, at 10% per year has also been higher if compared to the EU or US (UNDP, 2005).

During the various TICAD processes, continuous emphasis was placed on increasing aid as well as cancelling debt to African countries. Since TICAD I, Japan has implemented assistance through ODA amounting to US\$ 12 billion to the continent. From 1993 until 2003, the Japanese government accepted more than 10 000 trainees from African countries and 7000 Japanese experts were dispatched to Africa (TICAD, 2003: 1). In 2003, President Mbeki praised Japan for its contributions and delivering on its promises to contribute to promoting human security in the areas of health, agriculture and education through the Human Security Fund (Mbeki, 2003: 22).

However, TICAD can also be criticised. Horiuchi (2005: 471) identifies the following shortcomings in TICAD I in the Tokyo declaration which had a direct negative spill-over to the following two conferences:

- i) agricultural development was only mentioned in connection with environmental and population issues;
- ii) the issue of economic dependency of African countries on the developed world – this issue was especially neglected by African representatives;
- iii) to encourage political reforms is not sufficient: corruption, poor governance and slow reform should have also been addressed; and
- iv) although Africa was encouraged to diversify exports, it remains the supplier of primary goods, and trade tariffs of the developed world were not adequately discussed.

Another important criticism in terms of development projects that were initiated by the various TICAD processes is that it has not contributed to the overall development of Africa. Cornelissen (2004: 122) argues that although Japan claims to have adopted the Asian model in the African context, the low levels of Japanese investment and trade with Africa indicates otherwise. Equally important, because Japan's earlier ties with Africa have been limited, the government does not have an adequate framework of the African economic and political contexts. Thus, many decisions following the three TICAD conferences have been based on the Asian experience.

Lehman (2005: 441-442) also argues that after more than a decade the TICAD process has revealed a pattern of shortcomings: the goals of the various conferences have been very ambitious and broad, and it remained ambiguous and unclear of how it would be implemented. A second important shortcoming has been the absence of financial commitments, especially since all three conferences were purposefully non-pledging activities. Lastly, TICAD III was held during the beginning of the Iraq war, and the focus of the developed world was on the Middle East. Because of the lack of attention and commitment experienced during the last conference, concern exists that the relative success of TICAD III might not be enough to lead TICAD IV in 2008.

Although the TICAD progress can rightfully be criticised, it has been highly successful in accomplishing the following foreign policy goals for the MOFA. Firstly, TICAD has been an important Japanese foreign policy tool for making a “comeback” after the Cold War period, and establishing economic ties with strategic African nations. Since Japan is now considered as a leader in promoting African development, TICAD has greatly contributed to the country’s image that was severely damaged by its significant trade with South Africa during Apartheid and significant aid cuts in the late 1990s. Lastly, whether all the promises have been delivered on or not, no other country has contributed as immensely as Japan in promoting Africa in terms of investment and aid, and thus the TICAD process has been of immeasurable value in that respect.

3.4.4 NEPAD and TICAD as complementary initiatives for African development

NEPAD was initiated in July 2001, when the 37th summit of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU) adopted the NEPAD strategic framework document. The following objectives are central to NEPAD:

- i) the eradication of poverty;
- ii) to promote sustainable growth and development for African countries individually and collectively; and

- iii) to stop the marginalization of Africa in the process of globalization and to fully integrate Africa into the global economy.
(Snoddy, 2005:1)

The inception of NEPAD through the AU had a positive effect on the Japanese ODA process by formalising Africa's willingness to assume ownership, governance and partnership over ODA. President Thabo Mbeki also referred to NEPAD as the "New Paradigm Shift of Africa". This forms a strong contrast to previous SAPs, which were externally imposed on African countries – whilst NEPAD is based on the "self-help principle" (Lehman, 2005: 436). In terms of cooperation between Japan and African states, there has been a cooperative spirit, especially between South Africa and Japan. The TICAD and NEPAD partnership is a good example of a confluence of interests between two states regarding both initiatives for transforming the African continent through market orientated approaches that promote investment to encourage African development. The resemblance between NEPAD and TICAD is striking - both approaches emphasise African ownership and the responsibility of the process in the context of faith in market-orientated solutions for developmental issues whilst focusing on infrastructure development, privatisation and technological innovation as possible solutions (Alden, 2002: 383-385). The Peer Review Mechanism is an important component of NEPAD in which African countries can "rate" one another in terms of good governance, which has also been supported by TICAD III. This oversight function is expected to build a democratic system accompanied by transparency and accountability in Africa (Horiuchi, 2005: 477). The following extract from a speech from former Prime Minister Koizumi at the opening of TICAD III, reaffirms Japan's support for NEPAD:

"If to summarize the most important theme of TICAD III in a few words, I would say that it is to bring together knowledge and experiences of the international community in African development in Support of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)". (TICAD, 2003)

3.5 Future direction of Japan's ODA

3.5.1 The G8 summits

The various G8⁶ summits (previously the G7), have provided an important platform for Japan to put African development on the global agenda where eight of the world's most powerful nations meet annually to discuss political economic issues. Japan has been considered the leader in promoting Africa's issues in terms of debt cancellation and providing assistance in the form of grant aid for development. The G8 summits have also formed an important partnership with the TICAD process and NEPAD in pursuing mutual goals for African development. Among the former G7 creditors, Japan has provided the largest amount of bilateral loans to the 40 most heavily indebted countries, although its view on debt cancellation has differed from the other members of the G7 (Lehman, 2005: 434). At the Gleneagles Summit in July 2005, the leaders of the G8 agreed to increase aid for developing countries by US\$ 50 billion. Prime Minister Koizumi also pledged to boost US\$ 10 billion of Japanese aid between 2005 and 2009. Although the G8 leaders initially agreed to the full debt cancellation for 14 African countries, Japan argued that cancellation would bring about moral hazards among recipient countries. After much discussion, Japan later compromised with the other member states. The debt debate reflects the confrontation over the method of development preferred by key donors (Sato, 2005).

The 2007 G8 summit has been held in Germany with African development as a key issue on the agenda (Rwamutega, 2007). Nishikawa (2007) argues that Japan, acting as the chair have been expected to ensure that African issues receive adequate attention. However, the 2007 summit has been met with widespread criticism for being a forum to promote capitalism to the benefit of developed countries. For the 2008 G8 summit and TICAD IV to be more successful, it is imperative that Japan combines its efforts with joint objectives for African development at the G8 summit in 2008. An increased emphasis should be on promoting the concept of human security for more coherence in its own foreign policy.

⁶ The G8 includes the US, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy, France, China and Canada.

3.5.2 Japanese ODA at crossroads

Since the turn of the century, Japan has been facing challenges both internally and externally since the government no longer enjoys public support to maintain high levels of ODA. One of the most important external influences has been the process of globalisation, which has changed the types of global issues that Japan has to respond to, especially in Africa. Internationally Japan has been criticised severely for only lending too infrastructure development and its hesitation to participate in a more multilateral framework. One of the most important issues that Japan will have to deal with currently and in the future is the emergence of China, who as an increasingly important global economic player and possible military threat to Japan. This has also led to decreased support from the public for an increase in ODA (Kawai & Takagi, 2004: 274-275). The MOFA has also recognised the need to adapt its ODA policies in the “new international milieu” which is characterised by the rise of other prominent new global players such as Brazil, Russia and India (MOFA, 2006).

Sunaga (2004: 26-29) has identified four measures that the Japanese government should strive for in the future for the more effective implementation of ODA policies:

- i) increased coherence in policymaking;
- ii) strengthening policy dialogue with developing countries;
- iii) increased collaboration with aid-related entities; and
- iv) improved ODA procedures.

The MOFA has realised that the above challenges have to be addressed considering the new role of ODA, and various discussions have been held considering ODA reforms. As a result of these discussions, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Council (OECC) was established in April 2006 to serve as headquarters to examine important issues concerning ODA. In August 2006, the International Cooperation Bureau was also established under the MOFA which will play the core role in coordinating ODA planning and the formulation of ODA policies. The MOFA has also decided that in order to

improve the effectiveness of ODA through enhanced coordination between instruments such as yen loans, technical assistance and grant aid, JICA and the JIBC will be integrated in October 2008 (MOFA, 2006). Sunaga (2004: 30) rightfully argues that policy objectives are easily set, however seldom fulfilled. Nevertheless, the revised 2003 ODA Charter has provided the foundation for reshaping ODA to respond more effectively to the needs of the developing world, and it also clearly indicates the direction of ODA in the future. Partnership and decentralisation are the most likely approaches to make out the dynamics of Japan's future ODA.

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter human security as an important element of Japanese ODA to Africa was discussed in the context of Japan's foreign policy goals. The various bilateral and multilateral initiatives, of which Japan has been part of, were assessed in terms of their role in promoting development in Africa. Attention was given to the TICAD process, and its significance in terms of ODA and human security since it indicated the most significant shift in Japan's ODA policies, prior to the revision of the ODA Charter in 2003. What has been derived from this chapter by assessing the Japanese ODA patterns in the African context is that it was mostly influenced by economic interests and diplomatic considerations for a permanent seat on the Security Council, as well as to address its controversial trade relationship with South Africa. Japan has followed a different approach than other developed countries, by focusing on human security in order to promote development in Africa. At the turn of the millennium the visit of Prime Minister Mori indicated that the Japanese ODA discourse has shifted, and that Japan has adopted new ODA reform policies to its foreign policy to Africa. In sum, the current focus of Japan's ODA is rather on quality than quantity based on the concept of human security. In the next chapter, peacekeeping and peacebuilding will be discussed as a part of Japan's foreign policy to Africa, as well as how the concept of human security has influenced Japan's approach.

CHAPTER 4: JAPANESE PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA AND PROMOTING HUMAN SECURITY

4.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, the importance of the concept of human security in Japan's foreign policy towards Africa in the context of ODA was put forth and analysed. In this chapter, the importance and nature of Japanese peacekeeping in Africa in order to promote human security will be discussed. Together with ODA, peacekeeping has been one of the most important pillars of Japan's Africa policy to promote human security on the continent. ODA and peacekeeping also go hand in hand since most peacekeeping operations for humanitarian and technical assistance are funded by ODA. The reason for this is that peacekeeping has become increasingly important to Japan's policy towards developing countries. This is mainly due to the fact that the post-Cold War era has brought new types of conflicts which pose threats to human security. This has thus brought along a significant shift in Japan's foreign policy towards peacekeeping. This chapter also aims to explore and explain how the government intends to promote human security through United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions and how it seeks to meet diplomatic goals in this regard.

Although there are other examples⁷ worth discussing, the focus will be on Japanese assistance to Mozambique and the more recent ongoing civil war in Darfur, Sudan. The rationale for focusing specifically on these two countries, is firstly because Mozambique is considered by the international community as a relative success in terms of peacekeeping, and secondly because the more recent conflict in Sudan has resulted in a humanitarian crisis and a peacekeeping failure. The nature of Japan's contributions to these countries also varies. The contribution of Japan's peacekeeping assistance in these two countries will be assessed in terms of improving different aspects of human security and Japan's foreign policy strategy. Japan's role in multilateral organisations such as the UN and AU

⁷ According to the *Diplomatic Bluebook* (2006: 154) Angola (1991-1995) and Rwanda (1994) have been the only other countries where Japan has participated in UN PKOs.

will also be analysed. Lastly, the future direction of Japan's peacekeeping assistance in the African context will be discussed and proposals will be made.

4.2 Brief overview of conflict in Africa

The argument made by Edström (2003: 209) that the end of the Cold War brought with it a new kind of war - the plight of civilians, as mentioned in the first chapter, is also of particular relevance here. Thomas (1999: 9) argues that Africa's history is essential to understanding the causes of human insecurity on the African continent, since Europe severely underdeveloped Africa through colonisation. The main African colonial powers – Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, Italy and Germany played crucial roles in the penetration and exploitation of the African continent. Africa's post-colonial history, which has been characterised by violent conflicts and civil wars, was shaped in part by the manner through which the colonial powers occupied the continent and the political and economic institutions that were part of their imperial purposes. In many African countries, for example Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the legacies of these processes continue with their built-in tension that often explodes into inter-state and intra-state conflicts (Selassie, 2001: 3, 4). Towards the end of the Cold War, and when Apartheid later came to an end in South Africa, hopes were high that Africa's wars would also be resolved. However, the 1990s saw even more wars in African countries, mainly because of military entrepreneurs who initiated these wars (de Waal, 2000: 24, 51).

In the context of post-colonial politics in Africa where states are going through nation building, different ethnic groups were left to fend for themselves within artificial borders. Ever since, it has been an onward struggle for most African states to forge a nation state which consists out of culturally diverse groups. Briefly, issues of personal rivalry, ethnic hostility, factional feuds and ideological rifts began to spill over into civil wars. Because of the corruption of many African governments, there was also an increasing alienation from the rest of society and the idea of "us versus them" (Selassie, 2001: 4, 5). Corrupt governments have meant that many African states today only represent the "shell" of the territorial state where national security is only equal to the governing elite. In most cases

the governing elite only “govern” for their own self-interest and do not take human security issues and development into consideration. Such states are often referred to as shadow or quasi-states, where the regime “feeds of the state carcass for its own survival” (Cilliers, 2004: 16). Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also argued in 2000 that “states are sometimes the principal perpetrator of violence against the very citizens that humanitarian law requires them to protect” (Annan in Edström, 2003: 209). The following argument by Solomon (2003: 2) which parallels that of Annan, summarises Africa’s conflict crises appropriately:

“As Africa burns, its leaderships hold summits, proudly congratulating themselves on yet another talk-shop successfully concluded. It is blatantly obvious that there can be no African Renaissance, no talk of the 21st century being an African century, as long as conflict continues to be the bane of the ordinary African man, woman and child”

It is not only in Africa where there has been a dramatic increase in conflicts which threaten human security: globally, wars and conflict have surged between 1990 and 2001, with 57 major armed conflicts in 45 countries. In 2001, there were 24 armed conflicts, most of which were in Africa, and 11 of these have lasted for at least eight years (*Human Security Now*, 2003: 21). The upsurge of these violent wars throughout the African continent has led to a direct attack on all the aspects of human security of African people. Although there is currently no, or very little past colonial influence in African states, the continent as a whole is being marginalised by the global system of capitalism of which it is not reaping the benefits, and which is constantly being reinforced by the process of globalisation. Thus the need exists for external assistance in the form of peacekeeping and peacebuilding to aid African countries to bring these wars to an end. For Japan, which has benefited from trading with Africa, and often pronounces its commitment to the development of the continent, this in part means an increase in its efforts to assist Africa via the UN.

4.3 The relationship between human security, peacekeeping and peacebuilding

Rose (2000: 123) defines peacekeeping as “activities that ensure international peace and security”. Sato (2005) argues that the concept of “peacebuilding” only became widely known with the publication of two related reports, the “Agenda for Peace” in 1992 and a report by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Both these concepts have a direct relationship with the concept of human security in that if international peace and security is threatened in any way, there will be an increase in human insecurity, whether in a certain region, continent or globally. During civil wars and conflict situations in African countries, very little human security exists for citizens since they are deprived from all the components that make up human security as defined by the 1994 UNDP report: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. Thus the argument can be made that there is an important relationship between peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and promoting the human security of the people of a specific country.

Failed⁸ African states which have suffered because of ongoing conflict, as noted by Solomon (2003: 1), have lost their ability to successfully govern, and in many instances have become a serious threat to regional and global peace and stability. Ethnic conflicts, poverty and conflict over economic benefits, and the lack of governing functions to solve these issues, have formed the basis of many African conflicts. Thus, humanitarian aid in support of development, reconstruction and democratisation through ODA as provided by Japan in the cases of Mozambique and Sudan can play an important role in resolving these conflicts. This can be done in addition to military and political methods employed by the UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) in conjunction with peace mediation and preventative diplomacy (MOFA, 2006). The importance of ODA in peacekeeping operations can be explained by the Human Security Approach, since it argues that the state is not the sole provider of security to its citizens, and that other actors can contribute to improve human security issues on foreign territory, for example NGOs. According to

⁸ According to Dugard (2005: 109) a failed state is a recognised state that has descended into anarchy and lawlessness to such an extent that it ceases to meet the requirements of statehood. Although it retains its territory and population, it lacks a central and effective government, which is in many cases are controlled by warlords.

the Human Security Approach it is also important to understand other issues that threaten human security, as in the case of this chapter: conflict.

The *Human Security Now* (2003: 33) report proposes the following policy measures to be followed by the international community when intervening in conflicts and contributing to peacekeeping operations in order to increase the human security of the civilians involved:

- i) human security should be mainstreamed in the agenda's of international, regional and national security;
- ii) respect for the principles guiding humanitarian action is essential when developing comprehensive strategies linking the political, military and humanitarian dimensions of protecting people in conflict;
- iii) upholding human rights and humanitarian law is essential in protecting and empowering people in conflict;
- iv) concerted efforts are required to disarm people and fight crime;
- v) violent conflict must be prevented and mitigated in collapsed states and contested territories, while fully upholding all rights; and
- vi) the right of each person to a nationality should be respected, and measures are needed to ensure effective citizenship, a condition for attaining human security.

These measures indicate the importance of the relationship between peacekeeping and upholding certain principles in order to promote human security. It also signifies the subsequent awakening and realisation on the part of civil society and the international community of the importance of non-state security threats that civilians face in conflict situations.

4.4 Japan's foreign policy on peacekeeping: the shift from pacifism to an advocate of human security

When the Diet passed the International Peacekeeping Law in 1992, Japanese forces, or so called Self-Defence Forces (SDFs) were allowed for the first time since 1945, to embark on foreign missions due to the fact that the 1952 law (Article 9 of its Constitution) prohibited this. It also stipulated that Japan was not allowed to have military forces, which was interwoven within the fundamental anti-militarism political culture of Japan following the bloodshed of World War II (Zisk, 2001: 21, 22). Japan's foreign policy in terms of peacekeeping missions had been characterised by pacifism following World War II. However, the last fifteen years have seen a significant shift from pacifism to an increase in partaking in humanitarian operations, mostly in the form of technical assistance and logistical support.

The first important controversy since 1945 concerning Japan's military role in the international community came during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, when President George Bush Sr. recognised Japan's constitutional constraints, especially in terms of its 'non-bloodshed' policy towards conflict. Soeya (2005: 104) also argues that Japan's steady progress to increase participation in international and human security issues, has to be understood in the context of the US-Japan alliance. Nevertheless, Japan's quest for a more significant role in global affairs led to a consensus developing among the public and politicians, that Japan should play a more active role in maintaining international peace and security (Ishizuka, 2005: 67, 68). Akiyama (2004: 6) also argues that the Japanese government needed to adjust its foreign policy architecture in order to respond to and take advantage of emerging issues and new threats in the post-Cold War period. In this regard, African conflict has provided an important diplomatic opportunity for the Japanese to promote human security.

Since the International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted in 1992, Japan has been increasingly more active and cooperating in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian relief operations and election monitoring activities through the UN (MOFA, 2005). This law

was a result of the increasing international criticism of Japan's security policy during the 1991 Gulf War. Consequently the argument can be made that the Gulf War had a profound impact on Japan's foreign policy in terms of peacekeeping, and steered it into a new direction. An important question can be raised of Japan's shift in roles from passive observer to a more active contributor to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations since the Gulf War. Ishizuka (2005: 67) argues that the answer lies in a Liberalist paradigm, in terms of Japan being an advocate of human security. One can also argue that the MOFAs decision to not only make financial contributions to peacekeeping missions, but also a human contribution, with the focus on human security, can be explained by the Human Security Approach. This is due to the fact that Japan made the shift to recognising that civilians have human security needs during conflict. However, most importantly that conflict is one of the single most prominent threats to human security (Ishizuka, 2005: 67, 70).

The International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992 included the five principles for the participation of a Japanese contingent in peacekeeping missions. These principles have been the centre of controversy in Japan's peacekeeping role via the UN, due to its restrictive nature:

- i) agreement on the ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to conflict;
- ii) the parties to the conflict, including the territorial states, shall have given their consent to deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan's participation in the force;
- iii) the peacekeeping force shall maintain strict impartiality, not favouring any party to the conflict;
- iv) should any of the above requirements cease to satisfy the Government of Japan, it may withdraw from the contingent; and
- v) use of weaponry shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel etc.

(Ishizuka, 2005: 69)

In the context of African conflicts, these principles are not appropriate in their entirety: in terms of the first principle, it is usually only when a conflict nears the end when parties agree on a ceasefire, thus Japan's contribution would be minimal during the peacekeeping process. In many African conflicts, it is often the government and a liberation movement which are at war, therefore the likelihood of all the parties giving their consent to the deployment of forces within their borders are extremely small. Principle five is the most restrictive principle since weapons are exclusively used to protect personnel. The implication of this is that the SDF can never partake in any real peacekeeping force. An example of this restrictive nature will be provided in the case of Mozambique in the next section.

Japan is considered a middlepower in international relations because it is a wealthy country that exercises regional influence. Although it boasts the second largest economy in the world after the US, it lacks the military power and diplomatic influence to be a true global power, and consequently its policies on peacekeeping are particularly interesting (Zisk, 2001: 22). Until the mid-1990s, Japan's involvement in Africa's conflicts was limited to humanitarian assistance, mostly through the UN and the sharing of the financial burden of UN activities on the continent. A key reason for Japan not initiating any diplomatic measures for conflict prevention and resolution, is that firstly, Japan did not have any vital interests in Africa, and secondly because it is not allowed to use military forces in international relations (Ochiai, 2001: 42). To compensate for this, Soni (1999) argues that Japan has chosen to follow the strategy of "niche diplomacy", often employed by middlepowers. Niche diplomacy takes into consideration factors such as national interest and financial constraints. Middlepowers such as Japan then advocate that countries should concentrate their resources in a specific area, in order to best generate returns, rather than trying to cover the entire field. In this context the concept of human security is relevant, since it is Japan's chosen strategy of niche diplomacy and it does not involve partaking militarily in any UN missions. In spite of this, Japan is still allowed to partake in humanitarian projects, which is also unique to its foreign policy since no other country has advocated the concept of human security as much as Japan has over the last

decade. From a Structural Realism point of view, where the state is viewed as the primary provider of human security, Japan's behaviour is explained by its need to secure a powerful position in global politics, by being a provider of security, in national, regional and international terms.

In the *Diplomatic Bluebook* of 2006, the MOFA states that Japan currently follows a "comprehensive approach" to conflicts. This is due to the fact that Japan believes that in order to resolve conflicts permanently and to lead affected regions and countries to sustainable reconstruction, it is necessary for the international community to unite in order to promote efforts at a "consolidation of peace" approach. This approach is composed of the following three stages:

- i) promotion of peace processes;
- ii) securing of domestic stability and security; and
- iii) the restoration of the peaceful lives of people.

Taking these three stages into account, it is clear that Japan still chooses to follow a 'non-bloodshed' approach by focusing on different aspects of human security, such as political and economic stability in order for people to live in a secure environment. In order to support these principles, Japan has used diplomatic means such as ODA to put forth efforts in conjunction with organisations such as the UN, other member states and NGOs (*Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2006: 151). These initiatives in the cases of Mozambique and Sudan will be discussed in more depth in the following section.

On the MOFAs website, its official foreign policy on peacekeeping is stipulated as follows:

"Japan's policy is to actively contribute to realizing the peace and stability of the international community. Based on past experiences and achievements, Japan will continue to coordinate with international organizations, other donor countries, the

domestic private sector and NGO's to develop human resources who will be able to perform on the ground". (MOFA, 2006)

During recent years, the international community has recognised the importance of comprehensive “conflict prevention” and “peacebuilding”. These two terms do not only refer to “conflict resolution” and ending conflicts as such. It also includes the process of eliminating the causes of conflict, preventing it from worsening, promoting their early resolution, and avoiding their recurrence through achieving social stabilisation and restoration following the conclusion of the peace agreement. Japan has thus far actively supported the “consolidation of peace” and nation building in various African countries (*Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2006: 152). The following diagram illustrates Japan’s assistance aiming toward “consolidation of peace” principles:

Figure 4. 1: “The Consolidation of Peace”

Japan’s assistance that aims toward “consolidation of peace” consists of the following three pillars:

| | | |
|--|---|--|
| | | |
| <p>Promotion of peace process</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Through arbitration and mediation • Assistance for elections | <p>Securing of domestic stability and security</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Through UN PKO • Establish domestic security system • Disposal of anti-personnel landmines • Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration | <p>Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assistance for the repatriation and resettlement of refugee’s and internally displaced persons • Restoration of lifelines (basic infrastructure) |

Source: *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2006: 152

The idea of “consolidation of peace” was announced in 2002 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which is based as illustrated above on the peace process of security, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. Based on this concept, Japan has provided

support during conflicts for election preparations, media support, the reconstruction of local communities and infrastructure development (MOFA, 2006). The three pillars of the “consolidation of peace” that have been identified are first and foremostly to assist the process from conflict to reconstruction: this would include implementing measures such as assistance to refugees, de-mining and electoral assistance. Subsequently, the conflict settlement functions of African regional organisations are to be enhanced. (This will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.) The third and last step is conflict prevention at grass-roots level by promoting the efforts for broad-based conflict prevention through regional and civil society (MOFA, 1998).

If one considers the three pillars, the emphasis is placed on human security, especially on issues that people who live in war-affected countries face in their daily lives. For example, under pillar two the focus is on establishing a domestic security system, the disposal of landmines and under pillar three, projects include assistance to refugee’s and the restoration of lifelines. Although in pillar one, the promotion of the peace process is emphasised in terms of the parties that govern it and those who were at war, the focus remains on promoting human security.

In an attempt by the MOFA to create and maintain solidarity between Japan and Africa, and to implement the three pillars of the “consolidation of peace”, two central initiatives have been identified. Firstly, to enhance synergy between the NEPAD and TICAD processes as discussed in Chapter 3, and secondly to promote efforts to ensure steps so that peace would not regress during conflict prevention and the “consolidation of peace”. The recent trends in Japanese foreign military deployment (for example Iraq) illustrates that Japan’s foreign policy towards international security has come to include not only participation in the traditional UN peacekeeping missions, but also in coalition-type missions (Isozaki, 2005). The September 11 terrorist attacks have also without a doubt brought on policy changes for the Japanese. This is because the global security structure experienced the most important shift since the end of the Cold War and US security policy changes have impacted the US-Japan security alliance.

4.5 Japanese peacekeeping involvement in African conflicts

4.5.1 Mozambique

Mozambique as a state became independent from Portugal in 1975, after a prolonged divisive anti-colonial war fought by the Mozambique Liberation Movement (Frelimo). One of the core reasons for Mozambique's conflict is the fact that when Portugal granted Mozambique its independence, no provision was made for democratic elections. In 1977, the opposition party, RENAMO was born and its leader proclaimed the "Second War of Liberation" which initiated the civil war (Thomashausen, 2003: 273, 276, 277). The UN intervened only in December 1992 with the peacekeeping operation ONUMOZ that lasted until December 1994 (*Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2006: 154-155). However, the simultaneous dismantling of guerrilla and government forces and the creating of a single army severely compromised the peace process. The 1992 Rome Peace Accord envisaged a 30 000 man strong national army which would be drawn from both former guerrilla fighters and government troops. This was nevertheless viewed with suspicion by all parties involved (Albrecht, 2000: 131).

Following the Cold War, within Southern Africa, Mozambique was one of the countries for which Japan had to renew its foreign policy due to the significant change that took place within the global security structure (Alden, 2003: 113). From 1984 onwards, three major historical events in Mozambique attracted Japan's attention:

- i) the Famine campaign from 1984- 1985 caused by RENAMO in which 100 000 people died;
- ii) the Anti-Apartheid movement since 1988: the Apartheid government's policies towards Mozambique; and
- iii) the participation of ONUMOZ dispatching SDFs in 1993.

(Sato, 1994:105)

In May 1993, six soldiers of the Japanese Self-defence force (SDF) arrived in Maputo to participate in ONUMOZ, and this marked Japan's third participation in an UN peacekeeping mission (MOFA, 1996). What is the significance of all of this? Firstly, these soldiers were the first contingent of a group of 53 members to be dispatched to Mozambique, and secondly it was the first military force in Japan's history ever stationed in Africa. However, the MOFA has been criticised for its lack of understanding of the context of the Mozambican war, especially because as explained in Chapter 2, Japan viewed the African continent as distant and unfamiliar. Japan's assistance to Mozambique was also seated in the self-help principle, which is an important characteristic of its ODA to Africa (Sato, 1994: 105-106). The MOFA viewed the dispatch of SDFs to Mozambique as an opportunity to demonstrate its initiative through its policy of a "contribution to the international community", and equally important to show that it was worthy of a permanent seat on the Security Council (Ochiai, 2001: 41, 42).

Between May 1993 and January 1995, Japan contributed to ONUMOZ by dispatching five people for headquarters service, forty eight for transportation and coordination services and nineteen for election verification services over a period of eighteen months. In financial terms, Japan also contributed through the UNDP a total of US\$ 1.6 million in 1999, this included the assistance given to the Mine Clearance Project in the Gaza Province. The total cumulative cultural grant from 1975 until 2004 totalled at 120.2 million yen (MOFA, 2005). In terms of peacebuilding and the focus on promoting human security, three teams of more than forty five people were sent to the Golan Heights for road repairs, transportation and other administrative duties between February 1996 and August 1998 (Rose, 2000: 128).

Several practical difficulties were experienced by the SDF in ONUMOZ because of the fifth principle under Japan's Peacekeeping Law, due to the fact that weapons were only allowed to be used for self-defence. In one instance, the UN command feared that the political situation in the ONUMOZ mission could break down, and it was decided to prepare an emergency evacuation plan. According to the plan, the Japanese unit was

ordered to take its turn in guarding the retreat. The SDF was forced to decline the order, because of the fifth principle. The entire plan had to be rewritten, much to the embarrassment of the supervising Japanese officers (Zisk, 2001: 28).

From a Structural Realism point of view, it can be argued that the Japanese did not send the SDF out of deep consideration or out of sympathy for the Mozambican people but rather because Japan was more concerned with its strategic position in the post–Cold War order, as well as its UN ambitions in terms of the Security Council (Sato, 1994: 100). An important criticism against Japan is the fact that its activities were mostly confined to logistics such as transport (*Reliefweb*, 2005). Nevertheless, Japan’s peacekeeping assistance to ONUMOZ is highly significant because of the shift that it indicated in the MOFAs foreign policy towards peacekeeping.

4.5.2 Sudan

Identity disputes and religion lies at the heart of Sudan’s ongoing civil war between the North and the South. Since its independence in 1956, the country has been caught up in a conflict in which more than 200 000 people have died, and more than 2 million have been displaced (*Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2006: 156, *Sudan Tribune*, 2007). Nantulya (2003: 105) argues that the complexity of the conflict situation in Sudan has contributed to the regional and international neglect of one of Africa’s longest and most devastating wars. The main protagonists in this conflict are the successive Northern ruling elites and the Southern resistance forces. The key liberation movements are the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/SPLA), as well as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The Northern elite mainly view themselves as Arabic/Islamic, whilst those in the South are mainly Christians (2003: 105). According to the report *Human Security Now*, (2003: 29) in 2000 approximately only 60% of Sudan’s humanitarian needs were met by plights for humanitarian assistance to the international community.

The UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was dispatched in March 2005, since no former peace accords were successful (*Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2006: 155-156). A draft resolution

called for a 10 000 strong peace force to back the peace accord (*Reliefweb*, 2005). The UN urged Japan to further participation in international peacekeeping operations, and requested that Japan take part in UNMIS. This was because of its continued ODA cuts to developing countries, in particular to Africa (*Kyodo News International*, 2005). Sudan, as in the case of Mozambique, has proven to be problematic for Japan's foreign policy makers in the MOFA because it renounced the use of force after World War II. It has chosen to rather follow a path of technical assistance through ODA as discussed in the previous chapter on Japanese ODA (*ReliefWeb*, 2005). In order to evade the pressures from the UN for participation in UNMIS and the sending of SDFs in April 2005, Japan announced that it would provide financial support for the consolidation of peace in Sudan. US\$ 100 million was promised, and so far US\$ 88 million has been disbursed. In addition, US\$ 10 million additional humanitarian assistance was promised. The following table illustrates Japan's ODA disbursements to Sudan, based on the idea of consolidation of peace without partaking in the conflict, or sending SDFs:

Table 4.2: Japan's ODA to Sudan peacekeeping from 2005-2006

| Date obligated | Project | Amount approx. (US million) |
|-----------------------|--|------------------------------------|
| April 2005 | • Mine/UXO Survey, clearance, mine risk education | 7.00 |
| | • Assistance to small-scale subsistence fishery | 1.02 |
| | • Emergency Survey, Limited Mine Clearance and Explosive Ordnance Disposal in Darfur | 0.3 |
| July 2005 | • Food aid for returning displaced persons to South Sudan and receiving local communities | 4.95 |
| | • Emergency provision of starter packs to returnees and vulnerable host communities in South Sudan | 0.93 |
| | • Infectious diseases protection for children through UNICEF | 5.31 |
| September 2005 | • Emergency road repair and mine clearance in South Sudan | 9.99 |
| | • Return and reintegration of Sudanese refugees to Southern Sudan | 5.89 |
| | • Humanitarian assistance for Sudanese IDP's and Returnees in West Darfur | 3.04 |
| | • Project for expansion of primary education in Southern Sudan | 8.60 |
| | • Facilitating sustainable return of IDP's in Sudan | 4.63 |
| October/November 2005 | • Food aid for displaced persons from Darfur in Sudan and Chad | 4.49 |
| | • Grant aid for interim disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program | 7.14 |
| February 2006 | • Emergency assistance for Hospital care programme in Juba | 2.0 |
| May 2006 | • Emergency assistance for supporting the AU's initiatives concerning Darfur | 8.67 |

Source: MOFA, 2006

What the above table clearly illustrates is that through the principle of the “consolidation of peace”, Japan has truly implemented the three pillars as discussed earlier. This indicates a clear focus on human security, particularly if one considers that most of the initiatives in the above table are in the form of humanitarian assistance, specifically in terms of health care and food aid. The projects in table 4.2 also imply that although Japan now focuses on promoting humanitarian issues such as health and refugee replacements through the concept of human security, the largest disbursements are still for projects involving technical assistance and infrastructure repair. Lastly, although Japan did contribute significantly in financial terms, it mostly worked through various NGOs. This includes UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP) and international organisations such as the UN and the AU to do the groundwork in Sudan.

In July 2007, Japan announced that it was considering the possibility of dispatching SDFs to Darfur. This would be done in line with the planned launch of a joint peacekeeping operation by the UN and the AU. One of the key reasons why Japan changed its view on sending SDFs is due to the fact that it will be hosting the G8 summit in 2008, and its Security Council ambitions still have to be taken into account. Another reason why the Japanese have been hesitant to dispatch SDFs is because the conflict in Sudan does not meet Japan’s five principles for partaking in peacekeeping operations in foreign countries, in particular the principle of “a cease-fire agreement by parties concerned” (*Sudan Tribune*, 2007).

4.6 Role of Japan in multilateral organisations to promote peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa

4.6.1 United Nations

The fact that Japan only gained UN membership in 1956 means that up until the 1980s, Japan played a very low-key role in the organisation (Rose, 2000: 122-124). This is very contradictory to the fact that Japan often proclaimed its adoption of “UN-centered policy” since it joined the UN (Ishizuka, 2005: 67). While becoming an economic power, and now with the second largest economy in the world, Japan has been a major financial contributor to the UN even though its participation and representation until the mid-

1990s was extremely limited. Japan's contribution to the UN's peacekeeping efforts is a representation of its role in the organisation as a whole: although Japan's membership to the UN implies that it partakes and assists in peacekeeping, Japan's contributions have remained financial in nature for mainly humanitarian assistance rather than deploying physical forces, as discussed in a previous section (Rose, 2000:122-124).

Japan's direct role in UN peacekeeping missions has been extremely limited, and the international community has continuously over the last decade called for Japan to expand this role through the UN. However, Japan has contributed immensely in advancing the concept of human security through the UN by promoting and establishing the UN Trust Fund for Human Security. This added significant strength to the capacity of the UN as a policy implementation system in order to advocate human security. The UNDP has also been an important forum through which Japan has contributed to development in peacekeeping operations, funded by multilateral ODA. It portrays Japan's willingness to exercise active diplomacy via multilateral organisations for promoting its niche diplomacy, through the concept of human security (Akiyama, 2004: 13). A key reason why Japan's human security approach has coordinated well with the UN as an organisation, particularly in the context of peacekeeping is that the concept of human security has been an integral part of positive peace and especially provided peace movements in the 1980s with new direction. *An Agenda for Peace* by Boutros Boutros-Ghali furthered new thinking on human security, which also gained immense support from the MOFA (Peou, 2002: 51). More recently, in June 2007, Japan was elected chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (MOFA, 2007). This is a clear indication that Japan still wishes to focus on peacebuilding rather than peacekeeping. Although it can be criticised for still not expanding its role in peacekeeping, Japan has at least adopted a leading role in UN peacebuilding.

Japan's participation in peacekeeping operations through the UN in Africa, has served its three most important foreign policy goals in a post-Cold War security structure:

- i) establishing itself as a global power, both in political and economic terms;

- ii) promoting its Security Council ambitions; and
- iii) creating its own niche diplomacy through promoting the concept of human security through its ODA to peacekeeping operations.


4.6 2 African Union

A fundamental part of Japan's foreign policy, under the principle of "the consolidation of peace" is its cooperation with international organisations to promote global peace and security. As discussed, Japan's foreign policy is also multilateral in nature, especially in the context of its policies on peacekeeping. Although Japan has been participating in global conflict peace operations mainly through the UN, it has collaborated with the AU as a key partner whilst dealing with conflicts in Africa. The collaboration between the AU and Japan is a direct result of the TICAD process, which promotes partnership between Japan and Africa.

The AU has been the first recipient of Japanese assistance towards the efforts of African regional as well as sub-regional organisations for conflict response. Although the AU has been the main regional organisation that Japan has supported in Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also been a key player under the flag of the AU. Japan has assisted the efforts of the AU for conflict response in terms of financial and intellectual contributions. In 1994, Japan provided US\$ 10 million to the AU through the UNDP which was Japan's first financial contribution to AU's efforts for conflict response (Ochiai, 2001: 43, 44). Japan has also more recently provided the AU with US\$ 19 million for efforts against the civil war in Darfur. UNMIS was high on the priority list of the AU's peacekeeping projects (*Reuters*, 2006). An example of Japan's second type of assistance in terms of intellectual support was to host a "high level symposium" on peace and conflict issues in order for the AU to exchange information and to further discussions on the topic with other regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC (Ochiai, 2001: 43, 44).

The following graph illustrates the relationship between Japan and the AU in the context of conflict resolution and peacekeeping:

Figure 4.3: Japan-AU High-level Policy Dialogue: Its Background and Significance



Source: MOFA, 2004

The above table reaffirms the fact that the AU has been the key African organisation with which Japan has collaborated, mostly through policy dialogue. This was to promote


peacekeeping on the African continent, based on the principles of the TICAD process. If one considers Japan's policy approach as discussed above, it can be argued that one of Japan's key contributions is of an intellectual nature due to the emphasis being placed on policy dialogue. It is also interesting to note that Japan is in no manner diplomatic regarding its Security Council ambitions in the above policy outline. As a result it could be argued that the AU is a mechanism through which Japan can pursue its foreign policy goals in the context of peacekeeping in Africa.

Although Japan's relationship with the AU is significant in Africa-Japan relations, Ochiai (2001: 44) argues that its assistance remains moderate compared to other donor countries, especially the US and the UK. One of the key reasons for this is the continuous cuts in its ODA budget. The reason why the relationship in the context of peacekeeping with the AU has been so comfortable for Japan is because the AU regards conflict prevention as more significant than conflict resolution. Japan has therefore never had to provide direct technical assistance to the AU. This suits Japan's pacifist approach to peacekeeping, although Japan has without a doubt contributed immensely to the AU in financial and intellectual terms. However, in order to promote peace and security on the continent Africa's capacity for conflict resolution has to be drastically advanced.

4.7 Proposals for the future direction of Japan's role in African peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions

As argued in this chapter, Japan chooses to rather focus on peacebuilding than peacekeeping, due to the nature of its foreign policy. The following graph illustrates its future peacebuilding efforts:

Figure 4.4: Japan’s Future Efforts for Peace Building



Source: MOFA, 2007

Ishizuka (2005: 81) argues that in order for Japan to improve its role as contributor to UN peacekeeping, three measures should be taken: firstly, the multifunctional trend in peacekeeping should encourage Japan to increase the number of personnel it dispatches to UN peacekeeping. Secondly, the revised PKO law enables the SDF to join infantry battalions for UN peacekeeping, which does not suggest that Japan should entirely shift its missions from logistical to military support. Lastly, Japan should consider joining a UN Stand-by Arrangement (UNSAS), which is a key pillar of the reform of UN peacekeeping operations. By joining UNSAS, certain elements of the SDF selected would have rapid-reaction capabilities, whilst obtaining special skills for UN peacekeeping missions.

As discussed in this chapter, Japan's foreign policy approach has been a mix between a pacifist approach and more recent bold moves. An example would be Japan considering sending SDFs to Darfur because of the continued pressure from the international community, especially the UN. In contrast to Ishizuka's argument, Hernandez (2005: 98) proposes that Japan should rather build its security role by focusing on non-traditional fields. This would include combating transnational crime, including armed robbery at sea before partaking in traditional security activities.

Soni (1999) supports this argument by stating that the international community has much to gain from Japan's participation in peacekeeping operations, and rather than criticising Japan for 'doing too little to late', the international community should welcome its collective security efforts and accept the fact that its 'helmet will be a lighter shade of blue'. Although this would be perfectly suitable, taking Japan's foreign policy towards peacekeeping into consideration, it would harm diplomatic relations since Japan can in no way be a global player if it does not partake in traditional security activities. Particularly if one takes the pressure from the international community to expand its peacekeeping role into account. For Japan to expand its peacekeeping role in the near future, Isozaki (2005) proposes that the following points should be addressed in the ongoing government review process of Japan's peacekeeping policies:

- i) re-establishing basic principles: the constraints of the current Five Principles have allowed Japan only to participate after the formal termination of a conflict. Thus, in order to be able to expand its peacekeeping through the UN (which mostly target civil wars), new principles need to be established;
- ii) building a more effective SDF: increased professional engagement is needed in international peace efforts;
- iii) increased dispatches of civilian police: security sector reform is important in UN missions, yet the Japanese government should implement an improved system of providing training, logistic and financial support for police officers;
- iv) enhancing dispatch of non-governmental experts: there is an increasing need for this, since peace missions require civilian expertise;

- v) strategic use of ODA for international security: importance of cooperation of Japanese bureaucracies should be highlighted;
- vi) GHQ of peace operations in the cabinet: general headquarters for peacekeeping that directs governmental agencies should be established at the cabinet level; and
- vii) having a real national contingent commander: the Japanese contingent commander must have authority over the battlefield to effectively deal with crises.

These proposals are indeed relevant for Japan's changing security policy, and given that Soeya (2005: 114) argues that "some elements of pacifism have found new forms articulating their values and beliefs", it can be argued that Japan still lacks a coherent foreign policy on peace and security, especially considering peacekeeping in African countries.

4.8 Conclusion

In this chapter the important relationship between the concept of human security and peacekeeping was discussed, in the context of African conflict. Japan's foreign policy on peacekeeping was analysed, as many changes have taken place when it first deployed SDF forces in 1992. Since Japan's foreign policy is multilateral of nature, its role in key international organisations such as the UN and the AU was discussed in order to understand Japan's true contributions and constraints because of its often pacifist stance on peacekeeping. Emerging from this chapter is the fact that Japan's foreign policy on peacekeeping is often inconsistent, and that these policies are not in line in terms of what the international community expects from it as a middlepower in global politics.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary of study

The main aspect under investigation in this study was in which ways human security, both as a concept and principle, has influenced Japan's foreign policy towards Africa since 1998. Key research goals included how the concept of human security has influenced foreign policy elements such as ODA and peacekeeping. The study also focused on how human security as a political principle and goal of Japan's foreign policy has affected the relations between itself and Africa.

In Chapter Two a historical overview was given of Japan's relationship with Africa and in particular with South Africa, because of the large trade between the countries. The main purpose of this chapter was to provide the context for the current political and economic relations between Japan and Africa. In Chapter Three the importance of ODA in Japan's foreign policy towards Africa was discussed. It was also shown that the concept of human security subsequently influenced Japan's foreign policy concerning ODA following the end of the Cold War. Data was also provided to support the argument that Japan's motives for providing ODA to Africa, has been mainly economic in nature. The initiation of the TICAD altered this to some degree. Chapter Four provided an analysis of how human security has influenced Japan's changing security role after the Cold War in its participation in United Nations-led peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The purpose of this chapter was to analyse a specific Japanese activity in the "new security paradigm" where the state is no longer considered as the sole provider of security for its people. Equally important was to discern how Japan has adjusted to a new security approach since the International Peacekeeping Law was passed by the Diet in 1992.

5.2 Key findings

In Chapter Two the following aspects were highlighted concerning the history of Japan's relations with Africa: the end of the Cold War encouraged a new political relationship

between Japan and Africa. This was due to the shift from a bipolar to multipolar security order which presented Japan with new diplomatic challenges. Although prior to this noteworthy economic relations had existed for more than three decades, economic activity between Japan and Africa was still limited. Japan's trade relationship with South Africa also formed the core of its relationship with Africa. Adem (2001) summarised Japan's post-Cold War policy towards Africa appropriately when he argues that it should be understood as a function of interplay between economic power and asymmetric interdependence on the one hand and culture and diplomacy on the other. The latter aspect, in particular, has posed many difficulties for the two key policymaking ministries of the Japanese government in terms of presenting a coherent foreign policy towards peacekeeping. This has been largely due to the fact that the MOFA and the MITI have different economic and diplomatic interests at heart.

Key findings of Chapter Three are firstly the most significant events that indicated a shift in Japan's foreign policy by introducing the concept of human security: firstly, the 1994 UNDP report had an immense influence on the MOFA, since Japan recognised the importance of human insecurities being addressed. The second TICAD meeting in 1998 is also relevant since the concept of human security was officially acknowledged as being central to African development. The revision of the ODA Charter in 2003 also indicated a significant policy shift, and human security was much more accentuated and accepted by the various government departments. The MOFA had the greatest influence in creating policies to promote human security.

In terms of the trends that can be derived from Japan's ODA patterns from the 1960s until the late 1980s, Japanese ODA disbursements were primarily directed to African countries where Japan had the most economic interests. For example Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia which are rich in natural resources vital to the Japanese economy tended to receive larger volumes of aid. Concerning ODA patterns in the 1990s, it is clear that diplomatic concerns such as its Security Council ambitions, and creating its own niche diplomacy as a middlepower in the new multipolar security order have been key foreign policy goals. Although Japan has been one of the main contributors of ODA to Africa

following the Cold War, the fact that it made out only a small percentage of its ODA budget, implies that it only provided enough in order to serve certain economic and diplomatic interests as mentioned, and not purely out of humanitarian concerns. Nevertheless, this currently plays a larger role because of the MOFAs focus on human security. Since the late 1990s, with the inception of human security as part of Japan's African foreign policy, Japan has directed its ODA for humanitarian projects to address human insecurities such as poverty, health, conflict and education.

As a middlepower, it is clear from analysing Japan's foreign policy that it has selected human security for its "niche diplomacy" in the security realm. What has also emerged throughout this study is that the overriding diplomatic concern for Japan has been its Security Council ambitions: a key reason why much political interest has been shown to Africa is because the African bloc carries such a large vote in the UN.

Since the purpose of this study was to analyse the impact of the concept of human security on Japan's foreign policy, Japan's role in PKOs in Africa was discussed in Chapter Four. The fact that Japan has adopted a human security approach towards conflict, in order to make up for the pacifist nature of its foreign policy towards PKO's since World War II supports the argument that human security is central to its Africa policy. This is mainly due to the fact that it suits Japan's "non-violence" approach. This has also formed part of Japan's niche diplomacy, since it is addressing some of Africa's most prominent problems in a manner distinct from other developed countries (for example the United States of America). A second aspect that has emerged is that the key reason for Japan adopting the "consolidation of peace" policy to conflict was in order to avoid directly partaking in peacekeeping, and rather to contribute to peacebuilding. The latter, it was contended, suits Japan's current foreign policy on security, which is without a doubt characterised by pacifism, as was illustrated through the Sudan case study. Through an analysis of Japan's relationship with multilateral organisations such as the African Union and the United Nations, and their role in peacekeeping in Africa, it was shown that Japan exhibits a hesitance to directly partake in peacekeeping. No conclusive findings were reached on Japan's foreign policy on human security policies globally,

since only African case studies were used. A study, in which international peacekeeping operations globally are assessed and how efforts to promote human security have influenced Japan's foreign policy, would be more complete in this regard. This was beyond the scope of this study.

The two theoretical perspectives of the new security paradigm, Structural Realism (based on Neo-Realism) and the Human Security Approach have been discussed in the context of this study. Both proved useful in explaining Japan's rationale for providing ODA to Africa, as well as why human security has formed such an important part of the country's foreign policy. Structural Realism has provided the framework for explaining Japan disbursing ODA to African countries where it had the greatest economic interests, as well as its more current diplomatic ventures. An example of this would be former Prime Minister Mori's tour of Africa in 2001 when only a selected few African states were visited – those most important to Japan in economic and diplomatic terms. On the other side of the spectrum, the Human Security Approach aided this study in analysing Japan's humanitarian approach in terms of the type of projects where ODA is directed as well as the funding of peacebuilding initiatives. However, Structural Realism has seemed to prove more relevant in explaining Japan's motives for providing ODA, and more specifically to which countries it has been disbursed to. On the other hand, the Human Security Approach has been more useful in explaining the importance of human security in Japan's approach to developing countries. In this study both theoretical perspectives have therefore proved equally useful in understanding different trends and patterns in Japan's African foreign policy.

5.3 Policy recommendations

5.3.1 Improving the efficiency of ODA to Africa

In Chapter Three it has been argued that the effectiveness of Japanese ODA to Africa has improved over the last four years, mostly because of the revised Charter in 2003 with the new focus on the quality of ODA rather than the quantity. However, because of domestic pressures from the public on the MOFA, resulting in political tension between this

ministry and the MITI, the continued successful drafting and implementing of ODA policies to Africa has been hampered. Under these two ministries, a first recommendation is that organisations central to ODA policymaking such as the Japanese Overseas Cooperation, the International Cooperation Bureau, JICA and the JIBC, and their efforts should be coordinated and integrated for more coherent ODA policymaking and implementation in Africa. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that ODA is disbursed to African countries where ODA is needed most, for example health care, more intensive country specific research should be conducted on the specific needs of certain African countries which do receive ODA from all the organisations.

5.3.2 A more coherent foreign policy for peacekeeping and peacebuilding

As argued in Chapter Four, Japan's chosen policy of "the consolidation of peace" has directed all the focus to peacebuilding activities, rather than peacekeeping. Although this approach has proven to be successful, it has not erased all the criticisms from the international community, calling for Japan to develop a more active approach to peacekeeping. Thus, although Japan has been avoiding this at all costs, it will need to develop a more coherent foreign policy on peacekeeping that fits into the context of its renewed security role, whilst promoting the concept of human security. This concept can be used in all its foreign policies for increased consistency, especially concerning security and issues of conflict.

5.3.3 Increasing the promotion of human security through TICAD

Although the TICAD process has emphasised the importance of human security as part of its policies for African development, there is room for improvement. More attention should be given to promoting human security through the various initiatives that are undertaken by TICAD. One measure that can be embarked on is to enhance the cooperation between TICAD and NEPAD with human security as a common goal. As discussed, there are various criticisms against the past three TICAD conferences in terms of its effectiveness. In order for Japan to make a success of TICAD IV to be held in

Tokyo in 2008, aid donors, African recipients, and civil society should play a more active role in creating measures to promote African development.

5.4 Aspects for further research and conclusion

A further investigation of the trends of Japan's current ODA disbursements to Africa would be feasible, in order to be able to conduct a more complete study of all the African countries that receive ODA. Additional attention could also be given to Japan's foreign policy in terms of peacebuilding, and how the MOFA is formulating these policies. To make such a study more complete, more African countries that receive ODA for peacebuilding from Japan should be analysed since there was only focused on two in this study. A comparative study of TICAD and NEPAD, and the feasibility of coordinating these two programmes policies for African development can contribute to scholarship on African development. Lastly, more research can be conducted on human security, and other aspects of it that are promoted through Japan's foreign policy. Such studies would be feasible since this study has shown that Japan can indeed make a contribution to African development by promoting human security through its foreign policy.

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