


A Coxian analysis of key trends in Sub-Saharan Africa's political economy, 2000-2011

by

Vicky Hamblin



*Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (International Studies) at the University of Stellenbosch*

Supervisor: Professor Scarlett Cornelissen

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

Department of Political Science

March 2012

Declaration

By submitting this thesis/dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

March 2012

Abstract

This is a theoretical study that appraises the nature and dimensions of sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA's) political economy and the forces that underpin them, using a Coxian framework of analysis. Since 2000 the nature of SSA's political economy has been changing. Emergent trends and shifts in the region's political economy, including strong economic growth performances and increasing South-South cooperation, appear in contradiction to a dependent and conflict ridden depiction portrayed by most literature on SSA. From a Coxian perspective, it is contended in this study that these changes in SSA's political economy have arisen because of systemic changes occurring in the international system. At the same time, the study acknowledges that SSA's political economy is infused with dependence that can be identified through exploring the historical context of the twentieth century that shaped it.

The majority of scholarly literature written on SSA has focused on humanitarian crises, poverty, war, corruption and conflict. In addition, mainstream International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) theory largely overlook SSA. The majority of those that explore SSA's place in world politics have failed to contextualise SSA's position within the context of structural changes occurring in the international system. This has resulted in mainstream IR and IPE paradigms being inadequate to provide explanations for emergent trends in SSA's political economy.

Exploration and analysis of mainstream IR and IPE theories and Africa's epistemological and ontological requirements directed the study towards selecting a narrowed Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) framework to further explore SSA's political economy. Using the CCT theoretical tools of „historical structures“ and „hegemony“ in the international system, the study explores: *What have been the key trends prevalent in SSA's political economy from 2000-2011 and how have these been shaped by structural changes in the international system? Does the nature of SSA's political economy between 2000 and 2011 give scope for SSA's conditions of dependence to alter?*

A historicised approach in line with CCT allows for exploration of SSA's conditions of dependence through identifying the key ideas, institutions and material capabilities pertinent to SSA's political economy in the twentieth century. The main trends of SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011 include: a resilient economic and political performance in the face of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010; increasing engagement with emerging powers resulting in being typified as the „swing continent“; and different ideas and new approaches with regards to development thinking and the

role and nature of institutions. These trends have been highly influenced by the structural change in relative material capabilities from traditional to emerging powers during this decade.

The specific use of CCT as a framework has provided the means to analyse the fluid interactions between the key forces in SSA's political economy and the international system, allowing analysis of the possibility of SSA's conditions of dependency to alter. However, this is contingent on factors such as the desire of African leaders and policymakers to end the conditions of dependence. The study identifies the scope and limitations of Coxian analysis for understanding trajectories in SSA's political economy.

Opsomming

Hierdie is 'n teoretiese studie wat die aard en die omvang van sub-Sahara Afrika (SSA) se politieke ekonomie en die kragte wat dit beïnvloed ondersoek, deur gebruik te maak van 'n Coxiaanse (Coxian) ontledingsraamwerk. Sedert die jaar 2000 het die aard van SSA se politieke ekonomie begin verander. Verskuiwings en tendense in die streek se politieke ekonomie, insluitende sterk ekonomiese groeisyfers en 'n toename in Suid-Suid samewerking, strook nie met die beeld van 'n afhanklike en geweld geteisterde gebied wat dikwels in die literatuur oor SSA verskyn nie. Hierdie studie voer aan, vanuit 'n Coxiaanse oogpunt, dat sulke veranderinge in SSA se politieke ekonomie hul oorsprong het in sistemiese verskuiwinge in die internasionale bestel. Terselfdertyd, word dit aanvaar dat SSA se politieke ekonomie wel aspekte van afhanklikheid toon, veral wanneer die 20ste eeu in oënskou geneem word.

Meeste akademiese literatuur oor SSA plaas die fokus op humanitêre krisis, armoede, oorlog, korrupsie en konflik. Daarbenewens het hoofstroom Internasionale Betrekinge (IB) en Internasionale Politieke Ekonomie (IPE) hoofsaaklik SSA oor die hoof gesien, terwyl dié wat SSA se plek in die internasionale sisteem ondersoek, dikwels daarin faal om SSA se posisie in die konteks van strukturele veranderinge in die internasionale stelsel te ontleed. Dit het IB en IPE paradigmas tot gevolg wat onvoldoende is om ontluikende tendense in SSA te verklaar.

Daar is dus tekortkominge in hoofstroom IB en IPE teorieë. Terselfdertyd stel ontleding van SSA epistemologiese en ontologiese vereistes. Derhalwe gebruik hierdie studie 'n nouCoxiaanse Kritiese Teoretiese (CKT) raamwerk om SSA se politieke ekonomie dieper te ondersoek. Deur gebruik te maak van CKT se teoretiese gereedskap, historiese strukture en hegemonie in die internasionale stelsel, ondersoek die studie die volgende vraag: *Wat is die belangrikste tendense wat voorkom in SSA se politieke ekonomie vanaf 2000-2011 en hoe is hierdie tendense gevorm deur die strukturele veranderinge in die internasionale stelsel? Ook, bied die aard van SSA se politieke ekonomie tussen 2000 en 2011 ruimte vir SSA se omstandighede van afhanklikheid om te verander?*

'n Gehistoriseerde aanslag in lyn met CKT maak voorsiening vir die verkenning van SSA se omstandighede van afhanklikheid deur die identifisering van die belangrikste idees, instellings en materiële vermoëns wat betrekking het op SSA se politieke ekonomie in die twintigste eeu. Van die hoof tendense in SSA se politieke ekonomie tussen 2000 tot 2011 sluit in: sterk ekonomiese en politieke prestasie ten spyte van die finansiële krisis van 2007-2010; toenemende betrokkenheid deur opkomende magte wat daartoe lei tot Afrika bekend te staan as die „swaai kontinent;“ en,

nuwe begrippe en idees oor ontwikkeling, sowel as oor die rol en aard van instellings. Hierdie tendense is sterk beïnvloed deur strukturele veranderinge die afgelope decade in die relatiewe én materiële bevoegdhede van tradisionele en ontluikende magte.

Die gebruik van CKT laat ontleding van die wisselwerking tussen sleutelmagte in SSA se politieke ekonomie toe, wat gevolglik ook analise van potensiële verandering in SSA se afhanklikheid moontlik maak. Of afhanklikheid wel beëindig sal word, hang onder meer af van die bereidheid van Afrika-leiers en beleidmakers om daad by die woord te voeg. Die studie bepaal die bydrae en beperkinge van Coxiaanse analise vir 'n begrip van die trajek wat SSA se politieke ekonomie inneem.

Acknowledgments

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Professor Scarlett Cornelissen for acting as my supervisor for the study. Her guidance and insights were invaluable in helping me formulate my ideas and ensuring that I fulfilled the study to my highest capabilities, for which I am grateful.

I would like to thank my parents and sisters for their unwavering love and support over the years and for always encouraging me to challenge myself. Thank you for all your assistance and encouragement throughout this Masters. A particular thanks to Nic and Gill Hamblin for their dedication to proof-reading and boosting my moral when needed during this process.

My wonderful housemates at Helderzicht, Delphinium and Croxteth. I have enjoyed your company so much over this last two years and your dedication to the Zombie Room, lemon cake and laughter has helped me through challenging times with a smile on my face. Thank you.

I would also like to thank the staff at the Department of Political Science at Stellenbosch University and Bjorknes College who have helped make my Masters so enjoyable and interesting.

Thank you to Harrie Esterhuyse and Scarlett Cornelissen for their help with translating my Abstract.

Lastly but not least, thank you to Jane and Pete Barber. Your help and support managed to keep me motivated through the tricky end stages.

Table of Contents

Abstract	i
Opsomming	iii
Acknowledgments	v
Table of Contents	vi
List of figures.....	ix
List of acronyms	x
1. Introduction.....	1
1.1 Background to the study.....	1
1.2 Literature review.....	3
1.2.1 The marginalisation of SSA in IR and IPE theory	3
1.2.2 The misleading notion of SSA’s marginalisation in the international system	5
1.3 Rationale and research questions	6
1.4 Research design and methodology.....	9
1.4.1 Using SSA as a unit of analysis	10
1.5 Limitations and delimitations	11
1.6 Outline of research study.....	13
2. Theoretical framework	14
2.1 Introduction	14
2.2 IR and IPE theoretical tools.....	14
2.2.1 The realist paradigm.....	15
2.2.2 The liberal paradigm.....	16
2.2.3 The critical paradigm.....	17
2.3 The transatlantic divide	19
2.3.1 American IPE.....	19
2.3.2 British IPE	20
2.4 Reflection on the use of these IR and IPE theoretical tools for Africa	20
2.5 Assessing the use of CCT to serve the international system’s and Africa’s epistemological and ontological concerns	22
2.5.1 The historical structure	23
2.5.2 Hegemony	25
2.5.3 Key critiques of CCT.....	26

2.5.4 Exploring the empirical application of CCT to Africa	29
2.6 Identifying a narrowed version of CCT as a theoretical framework	31
2.7 Conclusion.....	32

3. The nature of the international system and SSA’s political economy in the twentieth century 33

3.1 Introduction	33
3.2 The nature of the international system in the twentieth century	33
3.2.1 Material capabilities	33
3.2.2 Ideas	37
3.2.3 Institutions	41
3.3 The nature of SSA’s political economy in the twentieth century	44
3.3.1 Material capabilities	44
3.3.2 Ideas	49
3.3.3 Institutions	53
3.4 Conclusion.....	55

4. Key trends in SSA’s political economy from 2000 to 2011 in the context of structural changes occurring in the international system..... 58

4.1 Introduction	58
4.2 The rise in relative material capabilities of emerging powers in the international system from 2000 to 2011	59
4.2.1 The financial crisis of 2007 to 2010	60
4.2.2 Undermining of trust in the neoliberal notion of market efficiency	60
4.2.3 Ramifications for the neoliberal developmental model	62
4.2.4 Revaluation of the role and nature of IFIs	63
4.2.5 Reappraisal of global governance	64
4.2.6 Challenging the hegemon?.....	65
4.2.7 Ramifications of this shift in the international system	67
4.3 Key trends and forces in SSA’s political economy from 2000 to 2011	67
4.3.1 SSA’s economic performance and its societal implications	67
4.3.2 SSA’s political and societal resilience.....	71
4.3.3 Africa as the „swing continent“	72
4.3.4 SSA’s engagement with emerging powers: friends or foes?	73
4.3.5 Exploring different ideas and new approaches to developmental thinking	76
4.3.6 SSA’s increasing use of diplomacy and political activity in institutions	78
4.4 Conclusion.....	81

5. Conclusion	85
5.1 Introduction	85
5.2 Theoretical framing.....	86
5.3 Major themes	87
5.3.1 Material capabilities	87
5.3.2. Ideas.....	89
5.3.3 Institutions	90
5.4 Reflections on SSA's conditions of dependence	91
5.5 Scope for future research.....	93
5.6 Conclusion of Study.....	94
References.....	95

List of figures

Figure 1.	Historical structure framework.....	23
Figure 2.	Levels of analysis.....	24

List of acronyms

AU	African Union
CCT	Coxian Critical Theory
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
G20	Group of Twenty
G8	Group of Eight
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries Scheme
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
LDCs	Least developed countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MNCs	Multinational corporations
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SAPs	Structural adjustment policies
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War

1. Introduction

1.1 Background to the study

Sub-Saharan Africa¹ (SSA) is routinely depicted as „the limbo of the international system, existing only at the outer limits of the planet which we inhabit,“ with the vast majority of academic literature reproducing the notion of the region’s marginalisation from the rest of the world (Bayart 2000, p.217). Indeed, the bulk of scholarly work written on SSA appears to have focused on how the region is in „crisis“, or succumbing to war, poverty, militarism, natural catastrophes, famine, corruption, conflict, environmental degradation, disease, crisis of governance and criminality (Taylor and Williams 2004, pp.1-2). There is minimal focus on SSA’s political economy within International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) literature (with exceptions including Taylor and Williams 2004; Cornelissen 2009 and 2011) that has resulted in a lack of theoretical analysis exploring the nature of SSA’s political economy. This focus on conflict has contributed to an understanding that „Africa does not have meaningful politics only humanitarian disasters“ (Dunn and Shaw 2001, p.1). Consequently, there is a lack of scholarly work analysing SSA’s political economy, with focus instead on SSA’s developmental discourse largely amounting to „saving the continent“ from „the scourge of human poverty and deprivation“ (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.1).

However, emergent trends in SSA’s political economy appear contrary to this depiction. Since the turn of the century, analysts, policy makers and corporations across the world have cast the region in a much more positive light (Cornelissen 2011, p.5). This shift has been succinctly portrayed by the change in international discourse on Africa. For example, the Economist’s description of Africa changed from „The Hopeless Continent“ in 2001 to „a more hopeful continent“ in 2011 (Economist 2011). This rhetoric swing occurred after identifying SSA as one of the world’s fastest growing regions from 2001 to 2010, due to „the lion kings“ of Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda all featuring in the global top ten fastest growing economies (Economist 2011). SSA’s encouraging economic growth and increasingly attractive appearance as a destination of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) during this past decade is further highlighted by the World Bank, the

¹ For the rest of the thesis, „SSA“ will be used to denote „Sub-Saharan Africa“. The countries included in the study’s analysis are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo DRC (Zaire), Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Sudan is not included in the study because it is based on events up until March 2011 (as discussed further in the limitations section of this chapter) and South Sudan was recognised as a sovereign state after this date.

World Economic Forum and the African Development Bank in their jointly commissioned publication, *The Africa Competitiveness Report 2011*. This publication identified Africa's „economic resurgence“ by illustrating the region's recovery from the global financial crisis, which was faster than many other areas of the world (The Africa Competitiveness Report 2011, p.v).

The promising economic growth among a number of developing countries over the past decade has resulted in a shift in material capabilities of key players in the international system, due to the rise in importance of emerging powers in the international system (Cornelissen 2009; Naidu *et al.* 2009; Scott 2010; Shaw *et al.* 2009). Despite the fact that many SSA countries are Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Africa appears as the „swing continent“, caught up in „a fluid period of transition in the global balance of power and the international state system characterised by traditional and emerging powers“ which has led to the region playing a more prominent role in the international arena (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.171). This has presented SSA countries with the opportunity to pursue deeper multilateralism with emerging and „Southern“ powers aimed at the reduction of international disparities, whilst traditional and „Northern“ powers have also pursued closer engagement with the continent through means such as international development and aid campaigns (Cornelissen 2009, p.6). Hence this shift in the international system has implications for SSA's political economy in terms of identifying how the region can benefit from alliances and representation with either or both groups of powers.

International institutions are also being impacted by this structural shift in the material capabilities of key players in the international system, as emerging powers are „giving rise to the reordering of actual global relations and highlighting the need to rethink definitions and practices of global governance“ such as allowing a wider group of countries to shape the agenda of international institutions (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.29). From 2000 to 2011 SSA has become an increasingly prominent actor in international politics, and its governments and non-state actors have responded to the shift in material capabilities in the international system „with renewed diplomatic and political activity on world and regional stages“ (BISA Africa - African Agency in International Politics 2011).

This change in relative material capabilities of the United States of America (US) as the hegemonic power and the rise of emerging powers material capabilities was hastened the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010. This shift in the relative material capabilities of powers in the international system had knock on implications for the hegemonic neoliberal notion of market efficiency, which in the wake of the financial crisis is „now subject to extensive challenge on both theoretical and empirical

grounds" (The Turner Review 2009, p.39). Furthermore, this change holds implications for the prevalence of neoliberal thinking across the world, as different ideas and new approaches in terms of developmental thinking gained prominence. This ideational shift contributed to Africa's economic resurgence, as countries turned to emerging powers and different developmental models as „once the worst of the crisis began to wear off, it became apparent that as a group emerging economies [they] had weathered the global recession better than advanced economies," (Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7). This raised important questions regarding how different developmental models can impact the future growth paths of SSA economies.

As mainstream IR and IPE theory largely overlook SSA, they appear inadequate to provide explanations for these emergent trends in SSA's political economy. The study maintains that shifts in SSA's political economy have arisen partly as a manifestation of changes occurring in the international system. Consequently, the study asserts that analysis of the nature of the international system needs to be undertaken in order to identify key shifts that may have implications for the nature of, and forces within, SSA's political economy. A number of studies exploring Africa's place in world politics have failed to position Africa within the context of structural changes occurring in the international system, resulting in the majority of studies telling „only part of an admittedly complex tale" (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.3). Subsequently, the study aims to identify and explore the trends that have been prevalent in SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011 and how these have been shaped by structural changes in the international system.

1.2 Literature review

1.2.1 The marginalisation of SSA in IR and IPE theory

Broadly speaking, IR and IPE theoretical scholarship has reiterated Western „assumption and experiences [being] passed off as „normal" and [has] enabled definitions and concepts that have privileged this narrow segment of the world's population to become accepted as the norm" within theory (Dunn, as cited in Schouten 2008 p.3). Since integral IR and IPE concepts such as sovereignty and the state „do not easily apply to African reality" as they appear „incomprehensible in that context," mainstream IR and IPE theoretical scholarship have systematically marginalised Africa and studies of its political economy (Dunn 2001, p.6).

Hence, the close link between questions of state formation in SSA and the region's external affairs „also relates to the manner in which the predominant tone of post-independence politics on the continent has posed some major challenges to a number of treasured principles of the international

system“ and subsequently IR and IPE theory (Cornelissen 2009, p.7). Dunn and Shaw (2001) determine the ambiguity of the African „sovereign state“ leads to the main existing IR theory, and consequently its close relative IPE, being inappropriate for the African political context, as it does not take the „uniqueness“ of the African continent into account.

One of the solutions put forward has been to create new IR and IPE theories, specific to the particularities of the region of Africa (Dunn 2000). Yet this approach carries the risk of highlighting and continuing Africa’s marginalisation in these disciplines, and could lead to the „dangers inherent in emphasising Africa’s differences to the extent that the continent becomes essentialised“ (Smith 2009, p.273). The thesis supports this view and aims to identify a theoretical framework that can facilitate exploration of the nature of SSA’s political economy in the context of structural changes taking place in the international system. Despite recognising the difficulties in applying such key concepts of IR and IPE in an African context, the problematic issues in IR and IPE theory „do not simply appear when one moves one’s focus to Africa, they are there to begin with“ (Brown 2006, p.119). It is important to take note of the varied nature of the African state, however such concepts have been debated and challenged throughout the discourse of IR and IPE, and it is important to note that the difficulties associated with their definition are not unique to the application of IR or IPE to Africa (Brown, 2006). In order to mitigate this difficulty, the current study shall undertake a theoretical overview of mainstream IR and IPE, assessing the use and limitations of these various theoretical paradigms and key concepts in furthering understanding on SSA’s political economy. The study shall contextualise the nature of the African state and other key concepts through exploration of their nature in the twentieth century in order to present the current study with a strong historical grounding.

Examination of the IR and IPE based theoretical discussions of SSA’s place in the international system highlight that studies have largely employed state-centric theoretical frameworks that have failed to take into account the integral role played by non-state actors, such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and international financial institutions (IFIs) (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.3). Moreover, studies exploring SSA’s place in world politics have concentrated on evaluating policies adopted by countries in SSA towards the outside world, as opposed to analysing the policies external powers have undertaken towards SSA and the subsequent effects this has had on the region (such as Harbeson and Rothchild 1995).

Dunn (2000, pp.61-62) puts forward that „the dominant IR theories [are] not adequate in explaining what [is] actually happening on the African continent,“ which in turn has implications for the

traditional orthodoxy in IPE. It has been suggested that the broad lack of understanding of the SSA experience is a product of the inadequacies of dominant tools of social scientific analysis, which in turn renders „much of what happens in Africa invisible to outsiders“ (Bayart 2000, p.229). The thesis assents that William Brown’s (2006) recommendation that it is important not to generalise and claim all theory is irrelevant to Africa is pertinent. Therefore, the current study will aim to fill this gap in IR and IPE literature on Africa by identifying a theoretical framework that can facilitate exploration of the nature of SSA’s political economy in the context of structural changes taking place in the international system.

1.2.2 The misleading notion of SSA’s marginalisation in the international system

The theoretical study of SSA’s political economy and its position within the international system has been marginalised, yet this is not the case in practice (Bayart 2000, p.218). This stance does not contest that African societies have only entered the capitalist world economy to a limited degree. This is consequent of the historical process of plundering resources by colonial powers contributing to the fact that there is limited primary accumulation in African societies (Bayart 2000, p.241). However, Africa „has never ceased to exchange both ideas and goods with Europe and Asia, and later with the Americas“ via trade down the Atlantic Coast and the commercial and cultural highway of the Sahara desert (Bayart 2000, p.218). SSA remains a part of the international system through: its export of primary resources and other commodities; importing goods and services; FDI invested in the region by external actors and abroad by African actors; its debt (a significant proportion of which is owed to foreign countries and companies); remittances; and the private and public aid it receives, to name the most prominent means (Bayart 2000, p.238). The region has not been „relegated to the fringes“ of the international system, as the notion of marginalisation indicates: it has been involved in various forms of political and economic engagement for centuries (Harrison 2010, p.1).

SSA’s position in the international system is a result of the manner in which the region has been inserted into the global system, as described by the formation and nature of African states. As opposed to marginalisation, in practice SSA’s political economy is infused with dependence. In contrast with dependency theorists’ argument that dependence is persistent due to its structural premise (as Andre Gunder Frank and Fernando Henrique Cardoso would suggest), the thesis consents with Bayart (2000, p.234) that dependence is „a historical process, a matrix of action“, reliant on the historical context that has shaped it. This allows for the possibility of dependence to alter, depending on the dynamics and structure making up the nature of SSA’s political economy in the context of structural changes taking place in the international system.

1.3 Rationale and research questions

The rationale for the study is threefold. Firstly, it draws upon Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) in its understanding that inherent contradictions in the international system itself eventually lead to change; resulting in such shifts being systemic² in nature (Cox 1987). Analysis of the international system from 2000 to 2011 indicates that the rise in emerging powers' material capabilities is an observable structural shift that has taken place. This shift appears systemic in nature, as it is based on a change in material capability related structures that are integral to the formation of the international system (Cox 1987). This structural change has had knock on implications for the predominant ideas concerning developmental thinking and the previously hegemonic neoliberal notion of market efficiency, in addition to highlighting the need to rethink definitions and practices of key international institutions.

Secondly, as shown, mainstream IR and IPE literature largely overlooks the African continent, resulting in a lack of theoretical analysis exploring the nature of SSA's political economy. Thirdly, SSA has experienced a number of changes over the past decade, including: strong economic growth performances; different ideas and approaches to developmental thinking; experiencing various options with regards to multilateralism with the global South and developmental partnerships with the global North; and gaining prominence in international institutions and arenas. These shifts in SSA's political economy have been influenced by the rise in emerging powers' material capabilities in the international system.

Thus, the purpose of the study is to fill a gap in IR and IPE literature on Africa by identifying a theoretical framework that facilitates exploration of the nature of SSA's political economy in the context of structural changes taking place in the international system. The study is important because the twenty-first century „represents the opportunity to redefine African identity in international politics“, and there is the need for „a revision on how Africa should be interpreted in the theoretical assumptions of international relations“ (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.1). The study will identify and explore the shifts in SSA's political economy, taking the implications of the changing nature of the international system into account and draw insights from CCT in order to undertake contextualised analysis to answer the following main research question:

² The study asserts a systemic change to be one that „refers to the overall governance of the system, the number of great powers in it, and the shift in identity of the predominant powers, usually after a systemic was involving challenges to, and attempts to maintain, the existing distribution of power“ (Smith 2005, p.19). It is beyond the scope of the current study but for a discussion on systemic shifts in the international system see Cox (1987).

What have been the key trends prevalent in SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011 and how have these been shaped by structural changes in the international system?

With the following supporting research question:

Does the nature of SSA's political economy between 2000 and 2011 give scope for SSA's condition of dependence to alter?

Within the thesis 'SSA' will be conceptualised as „Sub-Saharan Africa“, as previously noted. 'Political economy' is conceptualised as „the reciprocal and dynamic interaction in international relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power“ (Gilpin 1975, p.43). Subsequently, „SSA's political economy' is taken to mean „the combined pursuit of economic and political power of all states in the region of SSA“. Additionally, specific examples from sub-regions and individual countries within SSA may serve to illustrate a specific line of reasoning. The 'international system' is conceptualised as the „global political economy“ and is taken to mean „the international arena in which the pursuit of economic and political power takes place“. „Condition of dependence' refers to the dependent nature of SSA on external actors in the twentieth century.

'Trends' will be measured through analysing the key forces that make up SSA's political economy. Thus, the study will draw insights from theorist Robert W. Cox in CCT and place focus on the key forces within the systematic themes of „ideas,“ „institutions“ and „material capabilities“ in order to analyse the key trends in SSA's political economy. 'Ideas' refer to „intersubjective meanings,“ referring to the shared perceptions people have of institutions and/or practices, combined with „collective images of social order,“ which can differ and stand in opposition to one another and can subsequently give rise to the emergence of „an alternative structure“ (Cox 1981, p.99). 'Material capabilities' are „determined by, and are the result of technology, industry, organisational capacity, and wealth,“ and can be presented in a „destructive“ form (such as military capacity) and a „productive“ form (Leysens 2008, p.48). Lastly, „institutions' can take the form of hegemonic or non-hegemonic institutions, yet their role is to maintain the prevailing power relations, which are often reflected in their intrinsic structure favouring the dominant state and economic classes (Leysens 2008, p.49).

In CCT, the framework in which action takes place is identified as the „historical structure.“ A historical structure is made up of the interactions between ideas, material capabilities and institutions that determine the parameters within which social forces are able to act in any given

historical structure (Leysens 2008, p.48). CCT recognised the fluid nature of historical structures presenting „a theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but a continuing process of historical change“ (Cox 1981, p.89). CCT therefore places importance on using historical context as a tool to further understand the processes that go on in the world, as opposed to just focusing on history as what has happened in the past. In lieu of SSA’s dependence arising as a result of a historical process, the possibility of its dependence altering is reliant on the dynamics and structure making up the nature of SSA’s political economy in the context of structural changes taking place in the international system (Bayart 2000, p.234). Thus, the study will utilise the CCT concept of historical structures as a theoretical tool as a systematic means to explore the SSA’s conditions of dependence prevalent in the twentieth century, through exploring the key trends in both the international system and SSA during this period. Furthermore, through exploring the key forces making up the nature of SSA’s political economy between 2000 and 2011, it shall assess whether there is scope for SSA’s conditions of dependence to alter.

Additionally, the key CCT concept of „*hegemony*“ in the international system will be utilised in the study. In this context, hegemony refers to an arrangement of material power, a widespread image of world order, and institutions that are perceived to govern in the broader interest rather than at the behest of a dominant state resulting in stability in the international system (Cox 1981, p.103). Recognition of the possibility of counter-hegemonic challenges is also integral to the study, as it will facilitate understanding of whether changes have taken place, or are likely to occur, in the international system.

In order to best provide a contextualisation of SSA’s political economy, the study contests that both structure and agency need to be taken into account. Structure is important because states in SSA are acted upon by the international system, yet SSA states also have the agency to (re)constitute SSA’s political economy and that of the international system. Use of these CCT key concepts will facilitate analysis of exploration of the nature of SSA’s political economy in the context of structural changes taking place in the international system, highlighting the power relations that make up opportunities and constraints for individuals and social groupings. It also offers a historicised pluralistic framework that recognises the ontological importance of both structure and agency and so will offer beneficial insights for the study.

1.4 Research design and methodology

As has been outlined, mainstream IR and IPE literature present significant shortcomings when assisting theoretical analysis of Africa's political economy. However, the study assents with Brown (2006) that not all theory is irrelevant to Africa and will undertake a qualitative, inductive and explorative approach in its analysis.

A qualitative approach will be utilised as it offers a fluid methodology that „emphasises discovering novel or unanticipated findings and the possibility of altering research plans in response to such serendipitous occurrences“ (Bryman 1984, p.78). This flexible approach appears more useful for the current study than a quantitative approach, which is „underpinned by a distinctive theory of what should pass as warrantable knowledge“ from the onset of analysis (Bryman 1984, p.77). The positivist outlook placing key focus on operational definitions, statistics, replicability, causality and objectivity in a quantitative study is not integral to the study (Bryman 1984, pp.77-78). Instead, the study places emphasis on a contextualised approach using the region of SSA as a case study. This will allow for a „detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events,“ which a quantitative approach fails to capture (George and Bennett 2005, p.5).

An inductive approach is most pertinent to the study, as the point of departure is from the specific observation of identifying structural shifts that have occurred in the international system. From this the notion, possible implications of changes in the international system on SSA's political economy arise, moving towards identifying a narrower version of CCT that can act as a theoretical framework to assist identifying the key trends of analysis within the study. This is in contrast to a deductive method that would involve initiating from a set theoretical perspective shaping a certain hypothesis, before moving to an observation to confirm the proposition. Thus, this inductive approach allows for the most pertinent theoretical framework to be identified in Chapter Two as a result of the information gained from the data-collection process of exploring the key aspects of mainstream IR and IPE theories and their ability to meet Africa's ontological and epistemological requirements (Babbie and Mouton 2001, p.273).

The study will use a narrower version of CCT to guide the structure of the study, allowing for exploration of SSA's dependence arising as a historical process. This theoretical perspective will help limit the scope of the study through offering a systematic approach to gathering evidence within the themes of ideas, institutions and material capabilities. Chapters Three and Four will adopt an inductive approach in order to explore the nature of SSA's political economy in the

context of structural changes occurring in the international system. It will be driven, predominantly, by explorative analysis, although explorative-descriptive analysis will also be incorporated in its analysis of SSA's political economy and the international system in the twentieth century in order to contextualise the study. This approach will assist in determining what are the key trends within SSA's political economy and how they have been shaped by shifts in the international system.

Secondary data will be used, relying on published material in the form of academic literature, policy reports and documents, press statements and newspaper articles as textual data sources (Babbie and Mouton 2001, p.76). Policy reports and documents will be predominantly accessed online from the African Union (AU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other organisations deemed reliable sources of information. The study will carry out a snowball sampling methodological approach, utilising a literature searches in libraries and online databases in order to gain relevant and sufficient literature on the topic, stopping once the point of saturation has been reached.

1.4.1 Using SSA as a unit of analysis

At the onset of the thesis it should be noted that despite there being a number of common economic, socio-cultural, political and historical features that pertain to SSA, it would be misleading to speak of a singular account of African international relations or SSA as a coherent historical social entity (Cornelissen 2009, p.7; Harrison 2010, p.15). For example, the homogenising effects of colonialism were reduced by the varied templates embarked upon by different colonial powers, such as Britain, France, and Portugal, and the pre-existing diversities across the region that persisted in spite of the colonial interlude (Bayart 1991).

However, Loxley and Sackey (2008, pp.163-164) assert that although „diverse structures exist among African countries, there are sufficient basic features common to the countries in the continent to make a macroeconomic study involving all of them.“ Despite not elaborating on these common features, they argue that these commonalities specifically allow analysis of the political economy to take place (Loxley and Sackey 2008). Moreover, Mamdani (1995) puts forward that Africa appears as a „unity“ due to its politically constructed nature, which in turn has resulted in the discursive deployment of Africa as a category. Thus, to a certain extent, Africa has been constructed negatively through processes of „othering“, as „Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and continues to serve, as a polemic argument for the West's desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world“ (Mbembe 2001, p.2). Yet, Africa has also been

constructed positively through identifying the notion of a politics and culture specific to African ideas and sociability (Asante 2007).

Furthermore, SSA is often regarded as having a specific set of developmental issues, and hence solutions, which has shaped the discourse on development and assistance in the region (Williams 2008, p.69). Additionally the United Nations' (UN) ministries and departments, the World Bank, academics, think-tanks and consultants often rely upon this cognitive geography of SSA (Harrison 2010, p.17). There is consequently a shared perception of SSA's unity which is constructed transnationally through „collective images of social order“ (Cox 1981, p.99). For the purpose of the thesis SSA will be used as the unit of analysis with specific examples given from countries and localities within the region.

1.5 Limitations and delimitations

Conducting the study with SSA as the unit of analysis holds limitations since it does not allow for the same depth of study as a single country/sub-country case study and could result in a generalisation of findings. However, qualitative research „is often dismissed because it is not possible to generalise the findings from a study that confines itself to a small number of people or a particular setting“ (Devine 2002, p.207). Through combining SSA countries as a singular unit of analysis, the current study aims to overcome this drawback of qualitative research.

Performing a study which deems necessary the exploration of the international system and SSA's political economy in both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is an ambitious project. In order to cover the scope of this research topic, there is the inherent danger of providing an overview of a large number of events at the expense of analytical depth. The thesis will aim to mitigate this problematic issue through using a narrowed version of CCT as a theoretical framework that allows for analysis of certain themes within the international system and SSA's political economy. Prominence of analysis will be placed on the forces of ideas, institutions and material capabilities, facilitating the exploration of key trends pertinent to SSA's political economy and the international system. This is further complicated by this area of study being relatively unexplored in current theoretical literature.

A further delimitation is achieved through the conceptualisation of the „twenty-first century“ being understood to mean „from January 2000 to March 2011“. This is due to the constraint of the year of

writing and not wishing to predict future events. Thus, information collated and utilised in the thesis is based on events up until March 2011 and gathered from sources written before September 2011.

The thesis recognises that CCT is predominantly concerned with „forms of state and how these change under pressure from forces from above (world order) and from below (civil society)“ (Cox and Sinclair 1996). Despite Cox always starting his detailed accounts of transformation from the bottom, his work asserts that the relationship between these three levels is not unilinear and the process can be reversed, „with world orders effecting changes in the forms of state, forcing modes of social relations of production to change“ (Smith 2005, p.17). The current study’s focus will be predominantly based on forces from above (world order). Exploration of other literature utilising CCT in an African context showed that this method used to delimit a CCT approach has been used in other studies, with Leysens (2006), Sibanda (2010) and Solli (2009) all predominantly focusing their work on the social forces acting from below.

Leysens (2006, p.34) explored whether the economically marginalised underclass in southern Africa have the potential to act as a force of transformation of their state form, and hence did not analyse the international system within his study. Sibanda (2010, p.95) used CCT to conduct a comparative study of the politics of land reform in Zimbabwe and South Africa, exploring the structural dynamics embedded in these countries’ politics of land and social construction. Thus, CCT was of use in this African case study context through analysing how a state form evolves in response to the way in which social forces relate to production, rather than its relation to the international system. Solli (2009) undertook a critical theory approach, proposing and utilising a synthesis of CCT together and the work of Mahmood Mamdani in order to put forward an alternative way to theorise states, using the case study of Angola. The study highlighted CCT’s promising approach to investigate Africa’s role in the international system and its key limitation of applying CCT to an African context being its conceptualisation of the „third world“ as a singular entity, and its subsequent lack of attention to power struggles in periphery countries (Solli 2009, p.56).

The small number of studies applying CCT to an African context highlighted the extent to which this is an underdeveloped research area. These studies noted the benefits of using CCT as a pertinent tool to gain further understanding on African case studies, which the current study also advocates. However, these studies predominantly focused on the relationships between social forces and states, most likely because the numerous „all-important issues“ CCT identifies are extremely difficult to form into an appropriate methodology (Grugel 2005, p.210). Thus, as a means to

mitigate this difficulty the current study will focus predominantly on forces from above (the international system).

1.6 Outline of research study

Chapter One has introduced the research study, providing a background to the study and conceptualised key terms. The research questions and aims have been identified, with further explanation on the research design and methodology.

Chapter Two expands on mainstream IR and IPE theory outlined in Chapter One, by undertaking a theoretical overview of mainstream IR and IPE and looking at the use and limitations of these various theoretical paradigms in furthering understanding of SSA's political economy. In order to facilitate exploration of the nature of SSA's political economy in the context of structural changes taking place in the international system, a narrowed version of CCT is put forward as a theoretical framework.

Chapter Three contextualises the study through assessing the nature of the international system and SSA's political economy during the twentieth century. It is systematically structured through exploring the forces of ideas, institutions and material capabilities in order to identify key trends in SSA's political economy, and subsequently identifies SSA's conditions of dependence.

Chapter Four analyses the more recent time period of 2000 to 2011, exploring the nature of the international system and identifies structural changes that have taken place during this period. Critical analysis is undertaken, exploring the prevalent trends in SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011. This chapter addresses the main research question of what have been the key trends prevalent in SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011 and how have these been shaped by structural changes in the international system? Additionally, the chapter reflects upon the findings of its supporting research question of whether the nature of SSA's political economy between 2000 and 2011 gives scope for SSA's condition of dependence to alter.

Chapter Five concludes and reflects on the current study's key theoretical findings and themes, identifying the trends in material capabilities, ideas and institutions in SSA's political economy from the twentieth century to 2011. The chapter identifies the scope and limitations of Coxian analysis for understanding trajectories in SSA's political economy.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the relatively recent emergence of IPE as a discipline in order to establish a narrower version of CCT as a theoretical framework to support the empirical analysis of the thesis. This chapter initially explores the relationship between IR and IPE, recognising the significance of key IR concepts on the IPE field. The key elements and claims making up the mainstream paradigms of realism, liberalism and critical theory are explored. Following, this chapter identifies the outflow of these traditional streams portrayed in the development of an American and British school of thought in IPE.

The chapter reflects on the use and limitations of these mainstream IR and IPE theoretical tools for exploring of the nature of SSA's political economy in the context of structural changes occurring in the international system. It is put forward that a historical pluralistic framework, which recognises the ontological importance of both structure and agency, offers beneficial insights for the thesis. Subsequently, CCT's concepts of „historical structures“ and „hegemony“ are explored in more depth as well as key critiques of CCT's epistemology, ontology and methodology. The emphasis CCT places on using historical context as a tool to further understand the processes that go on in the world, as opposed to solely what have happened in the past, lend itself to the study's analysis of whether the nature of SSA's political economy between 2000 and 2011 gives scope for SSA's conditions of dependence to alter.

This is followed by a brief synopsis of scholarly work utilising a CCT framework within an African context. The chapter concludes by recognising the ambitious nature of CCT, and presents a narrower CCT theoretical framework to facilitate its analysis. This framework primarily makes use of the CCT key concepts of historical frameworks and hegemony. These concepts are utilised as theoretical tools that guide the structure of the study, allowing for exploration of the nature of SSA's political economy in the context of structural changes taking place in the international system.

2.2 IR and IPE theoretical tools

The discipline of IPE emerged in the mid-1970s as a branch of IR, yet the last four decades has seen the scope, nature and key focus of IPE contested on numerous fronts (O'Brian and Williams 2004).

Questions have been raised concerning the relationship between IPE and IR; certain approaches and concepts integral to IR have been incorporated into IPE analysis, yet the discipline also appears to have strong linkages with other comparative approaches, such as Comparative Political Economy and the Political Economy of Development. Thus, debate has arisen whether IPE is a sub-discipline of IR, or a distinct school in its own right. Regardless of this uncertainty, the field appears open, dynamic and evolutionary. The chapter will first explore the origins of IPE through its emergence as a sub-field of IR.

The traditional orthodoxy in IPE is highly dependent on IR (Blyth 2009). IR is split between three main schools of thought as a base from which to conduct analysis in order to render the world less complex and more readily understandable: realism, liberalism and Marxism (Frieden and Lake 1991, p.5). These three ideologies were used by Robert Gilpin (1987) in his textbook of IPE, *The Political Economy of International Relations*. The majority of textbooks written on this field continue to use this holy troika approach as a template to study the political economy, yet with the Marxism perspective widened to contain critical perspectives. These three approaches within IR have mostly followed the trajectory of general IR theory, as shown by the influence of positivist debates of the 1970s influencing the methodologies of both IR and IPE (Cohen 2007). The broad strands of realism and liberalism are identified within mainstream IPE discourse, with more critical approaches being situated on the periphery of IPE (Murphy and Nelson 2001; Underhill 2000; Cohen 2007 and 2009). The assumptions upon which these three perspectives are based directs individuals to view the political economy of the world in very different ways. As Cox (1981, p.87) contends, „theory is always for someone and for some purpose,“ meaning that the choice of using a particular theory is subjective in nature and guided by one’s own normative assumptions. Ultimately, the choice of theory will direct analysis to specific aspects of the international system, and the selection of which aspects is shaped by the historical conditions in which a theory is propounded (Cox, as cited in Schouten 2010, p.5).

2.2.1 The realist paradigm

The writing of Greek historian Thucydides, Italian humanist Niccoló Machiavelli and English philosopher Thomas Hobbes are considered to be early accounts and demonstrations of the realist perspective. This outlook fell in popularity with the rise of liberalism in the nineteenth century, yet rose in prominence once again following the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Cold War geopolitical situation concluding in the early 1990s (O’Brian and Williams 2004, pp.106-107). The link between politics and economics is assumed to be innate; politics determines economics through nation-states pursuing power and thus shaping the economy via the means of political power. The

key aspects of realism in IR and IPE are interlocking in nature: firstly, both perspectives subscribe to the notion that nation-states are the most important and dominant actors within an anarchical international system, and hence the unit of analysis (Gilpin 2000, p.14). Secondly, realists assume that politics is a zero-sum game, as in order for one nation-state to win power, it is at the expense of another losing some. Realists suppose anarchy in the international system to be pre-existing, which sets parameters for state interaction as power maximisers. Thirdly, nation-states are assumed to be rational actors, in the sense that they will analyse the cost-benefits of certain scenarios and then embark on that which results in them gaining the greatest amount of power (Frieden and Lake 1991, p.10).

With specific regards to the international system, realists contend that political power is prioritised and can come at the expense of economic considerations. Looking to the realist presumption that IR is conceived as a struggle for power, IPE is understood to be the struggle for power and wealth (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.16). However, stress must be placed on the fact that realist political economy „is primarily concerned with how changes in the distribution of international power affect the form and type of international economy,“ indicating that politics underlies economics (Frieden and Lake 1991, p.11).

2.2.2 The liberal paradigm

The liberal perspectives in IR and IPE both ascribe to the ideals that arose in the Enlightenment period. However, the liberal IPE standpoint is drawn primarily from the field of economics in the sense that key focus is placed upon the writings of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, as opposed to the political aspirations of Woodrow Wilson. Frieden and Lake (1991, p.6) have argued that there are three points central to the liberalist approach to IPE. Firstly, liberals assume that since all social action can be traced back to individuals, they are thus the key actors within the political economy and hence the most appropriate unit of analysis. Secondly, liberals assume that individuals are rational, utility maximising actors. This implies that individuals make cost-benefit calculations based on an assessment of their possible options, and then continue to select the option which provides the highest level of subjective satisficing. Thirdly, liberals assume that individuals maximise utility through making trade-offs, thus exchanging goods with one another in order to increase their own utility.

When applied to the economy, this IPE perspective implies that there is no foundation for conflict in the marketplace „because market exchanges are voluntary, and if there are no impediments to trade among individuals... everyone can be made as well off as possible given existing stocks of

goods and services" (Frieden and Lake 1991, p.6). Subsequently, all participants in the market will be acting at their highest possible level of utility. It is for this reason that liberals believe that the economic role of a government should be limited, as intervention in the economy ultimately restricts the market, creating obstacles to the most rewarding trades taking place. Liberal IPE is also heavily concerned with the concepts of multilateralism, transnational cooperation and international institutions, with key contributors of this paradigm including Joseph Nye, Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane, amongst others.

2.2.3 The critical paradigm

In the nineteenth century, Marxism arose as a critical response to the spread of liberalism. Its origin can be traced to the writings of political economist Karl Marx who, in contrast to liberals, understood the market and capitalism to create extremes of wealth for the elite and increased poverty for workers. For Marxists, capitalism appears as a highly contradictory system: it leads to a few capitalists expanding their wealth more quickly than other individuals, resulting in a rising wealth gap between members of society (Linklater 2005). Looking to the three essential elements of the Marxist approach to IPE, firstly, within this theoretical paradigm it is understood that classes are the dominant actors in the political economy and thus the necessary unit of analysis. The two prominent classes for Marxists can be explained as the capitalists (the owners of the means of production), and the workers (as the means of production). Secondly, it is assumed that each class acts specifically to maximise the economic benefits for its entire class, in contrast to the individual rational actor proposition by liberals. Lastly, Marxists „assume that the basis of the capitalist economy is the exploitation of labour by capital" which leads to the „antagonistic" relationship between capitalists and workers (Frieden and Lake 1991, p.8). This is based on the „zero-sum" notion that any profit made on goods belongs to the capitalist class and at the expense of the workers; thus conflict will ultimately arise as an effect of this exploitation.

There are two predominant concerns of Marxists studying IPE in the present age. The first is concerned with „the fate of labour in a world of increasingly internationalised capital," in response to the rise of the multinational corporations (MNCs) and financial markets becoming increasingly globally integrated (Frieden and Lake 1991, p.9). This matter is of key significance as it appears the political and economic power of workers has reduced with the rising flexibility and mobility of capital; „the centralisation and concentration of capital visible in the form of TNCs [transnational corporations] are a key feature of imperialism whereby dominance is expressed in the global political economy" (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.22). Secondly, a Marxist approach to IPE focuses on the continued underdevelopment of the third world, linking the „core" of the „First

World“ with exploitation of the „periphery“ of the „Third World“. The „dependency theory“ advocated by the likes of Andre Gunder Frank and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, for instance, puts forward that poor countries are hindered by developed states via economic exploitation resulting in the persistent poverty of many poor states (So 1990).

In the 1980s and 1990s, Marxist IPE was critically renovated with renewed interest from scholars who drew upon work from Antonio Gramsci. The key focus was shifted somewhat, with emphasis being placed upon the role of social forces combined with the function of ideology in liberalising and globalising economic relations by scholars such as Cox (1981; 1983; 1987) with his historical materialist framework, and Stephen Gill (1991) with his work on the Trilateral Commission NGO, highlighting how a historical bloc of liberal ideas, institutions and elites helped promote the globalisation of capitalism and reassert the US“s hegemony in the 1980s. A modified version of hegemony was put forward, broadening the definition to include ideological dominance as opposed to solely being based on material capabilities (Cox 1987; Gill 1991).

Despite Marxism being the most prominent critical theory, other strands arose in the mid twentieth century, such as constructivism. Constructivism is sometimes referred to as critical IR or IPE theory, yet key constructivist scholar John Ruggie (1998, pp.879-880) contends that „...constructivism is not itself a theory of international relations... but a theoretically informed approach to the study of international relations.“ It is best approached as a critical methodological tool because it „does not offer general explanations for things“ as a theory offers (Onuf 1998, pp.60-61). The defining feature of constructivism is „a focus on the social construction of social reality, specifically the intersubjective aspect of this construction“ (Smith 2005, p.25). Consequently a constructivist lens can offer insight on situations in the international system yet this is mostly after change has occurred, resulting in it lacking its own research agenda (Smith 2005, p.26).

Such critical perspectives moved away from focusing on individuals and the states to consider other units of analysis and to question the way the world is organised (O“Brian and Williams 2004, p.21). The critical paradigm is ‘not concerned only with understanding and explaining the existing realities of world politics, it also intends to criticize in order to transform them. It is an attempt to comprehend essential social processes for the purpose of inaugurating change, or at least knowing whether change is possible‘ (Devetak 2005, p.145). Thus, critical analysis is „not merely an expression for the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions“ (Hoffman 1987, p.233). Critical IPE theory aims to „broaden the scope of inquiry

by analysing the forces favouring or opposing changing patterns of behaviour“ as opposed to undertaking analysis focused on maintaining the status quo (Cox, as cited in Schouten 2010, p.6).

2.3 The transatlantic divide

An outflow of these traditional streams has been the development of both an American and British school of thought in IPE, differentiated by the key approaches and issues prioritised in each school. This has led to the notion of where you stand determines what you think about IPE, with strongholds of each school of thought based on different sides of the Atlantic (Cerny 2009). The thesis will now touch upon the key aspects of American IPE and British IPE, highlighting their significant differences concerning questions of epistemology and ontology, before reflecting on the use of these IPE theoretical tools for analysis of both the international system and SSA’s political economy.

2.3.1 American IPE

In the late 1960s and early 1970s scholars engaged with both the IR and economics disciplines, and the American school of IPE was launched as a branch of IR (Cohen 2009, p.23). The American IPE school of thought aims to espouse „a consensus on theories, methods, analytical frameworks, and important questions“ (Frieden and Martin 2003, p.19). American IPE is primarily influenced by realism and liberalism, with analysis largely focused on the ontological viewpoint of the state or individual as the key unit of analysis (O’Brian and Williams 2004, pp.15-21). American IPE is largely based on a state-centric, reductionist and positivist outlook, with causal explanations predominantly accounted for in a quantitative manner (Cohen 2007, pp.201-207).

This approach gained predominance in the 1980s in line with the behaviouralist revolution, as American (and some European) social sciences turned to quantitative analysis and model stimulation in order to gain the ability to control and duplicate findings, with the aim to make the research more „objective“ and „scientific“. Thus, American IPE contends that these principles „hold that knowledge is best accumulated through an appeal to objective observation and systematic testing“ through mid-level theorising and hard science models (Cohen 2007, p.198). However, this move towards the economising of this discipline seems to have led to the „growing inattention to the “big questions” in the global political economy“ as ideational dynamics and structures are left out of the debate in favour of empirical data (Phillips 2009, p.91).

2.3.2 British IPE

In contrast to the American school of thought, British IPE tends to view pluralism, intellectual diversity and transdisciplinary study as positive aspects, using such multiplicity as a means to study and contest the boundaries of IPE (Higgott and Watson, 2008). Moreover, the British approach appears post-positive in nature, granting considerable attention to normative issues, such as ideas, norms and values (Cohen 2007, pp.207-216). The British approach „does not start from an assumed ontology but, rather, from the perspective that ontology is something to be explained and questioned,“ showing how scholars challenge the prevalent dominant (American) orthodoxies of epistemology and ontology within the discipline (Cameron and Palan 2009, p.119).

This reflexive and historical approach epitomises the lineage of British IPE being granted status as its own field based on contributions across multiple disciplines in the early 1970s. Key emphasis is placed upon the relationship between structure and agency in the world system, drawing insights from the main IR and IPE theories (Cerny 2009). Ben Clift and Ben Rosamond (2009, pp.101-107) have put forward that the historical cast of analysis in British IPE can be linked to the long tradition of scholarship concerning the political economy of British imperialism. Theoretical plurality is sought, serving the empirical purpose of not limiting analysis with any one set of theoretical lenses, but through using a combination in order to critically challenge the core assumptions held by realist and liberal perspectives concerning the relationship between individuals, societies, states and markets. This heuristic approach allows for numerous levels of analysis, and moves away from the dangers inherent in and epitomised by the „Cinderella syndrome“: the attempts of reductionist theorists to squeeze an ugly and oversized world into a beautiful theoretical glass shoe (Reus-Smit, in Schouten 2009, p.5).

2.4 Reflection on the use of these IR and IPE theoretical tools for Africa

It is suggested in the current study that American IR and IPE, with its positivist focus on realism and liberalism, is limited in its ability to assist further understanding on SSA's political economy. The epistemological nature of American IR and IPE results in it being focused on searching for recurrent themes and identifying universally valid laws. However, the current study asserts that a historical approach focused on a set time period needs to be undertaken in order to facilitate exploration of the nature of SSA's political economy in the context of structural changes occurring in the international system. This can be illustrated by recognising that institutional and agency

structures have adapted significantly within the region over the past fifty years, with subsequent implications for SSA's political economy (Harrison 2010, pp.14-15).

Additionally, the ontological nature of American IR and IPE sees key emphasis placed on „great powers“, which results in the analysis of Africa being largely dismissed as inconsequential in the international system (Engel and Olsen 2005, p.1). Within American IR and IPE discourse, there is a privileged „set of assumptions which emerge from the distinctive political economies and experiences of core economies, states and regions, and from their specific context of early industrialisation“ (Phillips, 2005a, p.1). Minimal consideration has been granted to historical events, practices, or political theory from developing regions of the world, resulting in the „historical monopoly“ of American IR and IPE theory being predominantly shaped by issues concerning the West (La Monica 2007, p.47). The study recognises the importance of taking ideological values into consideration in addition to military power, which is the force predominantly emphasised in American IR and IPE. This is not unique to the evaluation of SSA's political economy, yet as SSA contains a wide variety of languages, customs and religions within its 48 states, it is important that ideational explanations of African policymakers, leaders and structure are also taken into account within the current study's theoretical framework (Puchala 1998, p.150).

Taking the state as the key unit of analysis proves problematic because in SSA, as elsewhere, „the role of the state as the sole or at least the over-whelming predominant actor in international relations has increasingly given way to a much more complex reality in which states and other actors interrelate and jostle for influence within a globalised political arena“ (Clapham 2005, p.33). Thus, SSA's political economy cannot solely be determined by structural circumstances, as presupposed by the realist and neorealist notions of states acting as fixed „units“, but instead states are heavily influenced by the agency of both internal and external state actors (Engel and Olsen 2005, p.13). Realist focus on the state does not facilitate analysis of the social and political forces prevalent in SSA at national and sub-national levels, nor the concurrent global activity. Analysis of interactions at and between these levels is necessary in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of SSA's political economy and its position in the international system.

Moreover, focusing predominantly on the individual as the key unit of analysis, as liberalism does, appears limiting in furthering understanding of SSA's political economy. This is not a problem unique to the application of liberal theory to Africa. However it is highlighted due to the prominence of international organisations and institutions, such as NGOs and the IMF, influencing the structure of SSA's political economy in addition to various state and non-state actors (Harrison

2010). For example, the IMF has played a unique role in SSA, as the fragility of newly independent African states and their institutional structures in the 1980s and 1990s created an „unprecedented opportunity for external regulatory intervention“ (Harrison 2010, p.89). In general, it appears there is a distinct lack of IR and IPE theoretical studies of Africa (Lavelle 2005). In this sense, mainstream IPE theory has subsequently served to reinforce Africa’s theoretical marginalisation from the international system.

Realism places significant focus on the importance of structure to the detriment of agency, whereas liberalism places emphasis on the importance of agency to the detriment of structure. In order to best provide a contextualisation of SSA’s political economy, the current study contests that both structure and agency need to be taken into account. Structure is important because SSA states are acted upon by the international system yet SSA states have the capacity to (re)constitute the international system, through means such as utilising their agency to become increasingly assertive in international institutions. Additionally, in lieu of Africa’s dependence arising as a result of „a historical process“, the study recognises the need for a historical approach to be supported by the theoretical structure it selects (Bayart 2000, p.234). Thus, in line with the British school of thought, it is put forward that a historical pluralistic framework that recognises the ontological importance of both structure and agency will offer beneficial insights for the study.

2.5 Assessing the use of CCT to serve the international system’s and Africa’s epistemological and ontological concerns

The study asserts it is worthwhile to narrow focus further to explore the work of Robert W. Cox. Falling within the British school of IR and IPE, Cox’s CCT places importance on using historical context as a tool to further understanding of the ongoing processes in the world, as opposed to just focusing on history as what has happened in the past. History should not be seen as a linear, finite process, moving in a set direction with deterministic economic processes - a viewpoint characteristic of the Enlightenment period and, argued by Cox, still prominent in American thought today. Francis Fukuyama’s notion of „the end of history“ introduced in 1989 epitomised this interpretation of history and set precedent for this understanding of power relations within the international system (Cox, as cited in Schouten 2010). CCT utilises the concept of historical structures, which consists of ideas, material capabilities and institutions, within which social actions unfold. The notion of global hegemony, not merely through coercion but also consensus, combined with recognition of the possibility of counter-hegemonic challenges, is also integral to this

framework. This chapter will now explore these elements of CCT in order to gain inspiration for its own critical theoretical framework.³

2.5.1 The historical structure

In CCT the framework within which „action“ takes place is the historical structure, made up of „a particular configuration of forces“ that „determine the dynamics within any given historical structure“ (Leysens 2008, p.48). This notion has been shaped from Fernand Braudel’s (1972) three forms of historical narratives: *la longue durée*; the narrative of the conjuncture; and event-time. Braudel’s (1972) perspective has contributed to Cox’s (1987) viewpoint that certain structures in society have a longer life than others which appear more short-lived. Applying this perspective to the international system, it can be seen that dominant structures can appear to be fixed, yet inherent contradictions in the system itself eventually will lead to a change as a new historical structure arises. This can be illustrated by the domination of the British Empire for almost a century from 1815, yet its overarching power was eroded significantly in the early twentieth century. Thus, Cox’s (1981, p.89) recognition of the fluid nature of historical structures presents „a theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but a continuing process of historical change.“

Analysing an historical structure allows one to analyse the power relations that make up the opportunities and constraints for individuals and social groupings. Thus, the way in which ideas, material capabilities and institutions mutually influence one another as the key elements of any given historical structure needs to be understood in order to view the parameters within which social forces are able to act. „No one way determinism need be assumed among these three...“ as their dynamics are intrinsically linked (Cox 1981, p.98). Ideas refer to „intersubjective meanings,“ referring to the shared perceptions people have of institutions and/or practices, combined with „collective images of social order“ which can differ and stand in opposition to one another, subsequently giving rise to the emergence of „an alternative structure“ (Cox 1981, p.99). Thus ideas are of key significance to the dynamic nature of the international system as they are integral to explaining and demonstrating the failure of rival ideas leading to shifts in the international (Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.15). Material capabilities are „determined by, and are the result of technology, industry, organisational capacity, and wealth,“ and can be presented in a „destructive“ form (such as military capacity) and a „productive“ form (Leysens 2008, p.48). Lastly, institutions can take the form of hegemonic or non-hegemonic institutions, yet their role is to maintain the

³ The thesis recognises that these elements of analysis do not reflect the full scope of CCT, yet deem these to be the key aspects of CCT necessary to explore for the purpose of the study.

prevailing power relations, which are often reflected in their intrinsic structure favouring the dominant state and economic classes (Leysens 2008, p.49).

These three crucial forces can represent the three points of a triangle, connected with lines showing their reciprocal influence on one another, as is shown in Figure 1 and 2 below:




Figure 1. Historical structure framework, adapted from Cox (1981, pp.98-99).

By breaking down analysis to these dynamic forces, it allows one to recognise the historicity of structures in the international system. It also draws attention to the agency of humans. As any given historical structure is comprised of the dynamics between the above three forces, it is reflective of „collective human activities,“ and thus there is always scope for them to be changed by human action (Cox 1987, p.4).

Despite the above framework representing historical structures, Cox (1981) argues this only presents part of the situation, resulting in a need for the contextualisation of a historical situation. Moreover, this historical structure framework needs to be applied to three points of entry in order to „open up the possibilities of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world“ (Cox 1981, pp.87-88). These three points of entry concern the relations between social forces (centred on forms of production); the forms of states (taking note of the particular state-society complex), and world orders (which is thus made up out of, and can be described as, the interactions between states and social forces) (Leysens 2008, pp.50-53). An alternate structure can arise „under pressure from forces from above (world order) and from below (civil society)“ (Cox and Sinclair 1996).

As with the forces comprising historical structures, these three points of entry can be illustrated through three points of a triangle showing mutual interaction and influence, as is shown below:




Figure 2. Levels of analysis, adapted from Cox (1981, pp.100-101).

Cox (1981, pp.100-101) explains how each of these points of entry, which he also refers to as „levels“ of analysis, reflect a specific arrangement of ideas, material capabilities and institutions. Analysis of the state „cannot be separated... from the social classes that sustain it,“ and the nature of the form of states impacts the world order, showing how these different levels of analysis are intrinsically interlinked (Cox 1987, p.409). The dynamic interaction between these three levels is discussed in depth in Cox (1987) with reference to three historical structures – *pax britannica*, rival imperialisms, and *pax americana* – and the notion of hegemony.

2.5.2 Hegemony

Cox’s conceptualisation of hegemony is also influenced by the work of Gramsci: „the exercise of power depends on a combination of material aspects and ideas/ideology“ and thus requires us to think of power in terms of material capacity and ideology (Leysens 2008, p.26). However, Cox’s definition becomes distinct when moving to apply the concept of hegemony at the world order level, such as when analysing the international system, as this was not Gramsci’s intention. For Cox, the notion of hegemony is intrinsically associated with stability at the world order level. Moreover, coercive dominance (through material capabilities) of a state is not enough to equate to being a hegemon, as „it also depends on whether there is a “fit” between an arrangement of material power, a widespread image of world order, and institutions which are perceived to manage in the broader interest rather than at the behest of a dominant state“ (Leysens 2008, p.52). Thus, understanding of whether hegemony is prevalent at world order level can be illustrative of stability and a „fit“ between ideas, material capabilities and institutions:

Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of international social relationships which connect the social classes of the different countries. *World hegemony can be described as a social structure, an economic structure, and a*

political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but it must be all three. World hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general rule of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries, rules which support the dominant mode of production (Cox 1987, p.137, emphasis author's own).

Thus, at world order level, it can be seen that hegemony usually derives from powerful states (yet hegemony is not only state-based), whereby a dominant class has succeeded in implementing it at the national (state-civil society) level with a broad level of consent from subordinate countries. However, this can only occur after the state has experienced significant socio-economic changes (Leysens 2008). Therefore, it is through analysing the aforementioned dynamics of forces that change and evolution can be explained. From an abstract perspective, hegemony can be envisaged to be a facet of power, in addition to a strategy to retain power by dominant groups. With regards to the international system, it describes the ability to determine, and thus adapt, commonsensical notions of the most prevalent ideas, actions and the nature of institutions in the international system. Cox asserts that third world societies are void of exerting hegemony (Solli 2009, p.61). Thus, due to the thesis' focus on SSA, Cox's assertion should be taken to mean that „third world“ African states are shaped by external imposition of commonsensical, hegemonic ideas and actions concerning the political economy. Whilst recognised to hold „third world“ status, African states themselves will not hold hegemonic power. This highlights the importance of analysing the external imposition of hegemonic ideas concerning how forces at the level of the international system can have implications for SSA's political economy. However, Cox's recognition of the importance of agency in shaping ideas, institutions and material capabilities means SSA is no passive actor; African agency can be used as a means to help shape and adapt the historical, and thus hegemonic, structure (Cox 1987, p.4).

2.5.3 Key critiques of CCT

CCT has met both praise and criticism from a wide variety of social and political schools of thought. Generally, Cox is recognised as a major figure in IR and IPE, even by his critics (Schechter 2002). Below is an outline of the key criticisms levelled against CCT in relation to its epistemology, ontology and methodology. Despite recognising the following critiques, the thesis stresses the substantive focus of these critiques „is wholly unreflective of the commentary in the vast literature that refers to Cox's published work“ and that there are many advocates of the CCT theoretical framework (Schechter 2002, p.2).

2.5.3.1 Criticisms of CCT's epistemology

CCT is criticised for „failing to adhere to one of the cardinal rules of social science, i.e. searching for recurrent themes in a quest for identifying general or universally valid laws by doing valid and replicable research,“ which has given rise to the notion that it lacks „the essential ingredients“ for cumulative research in this field (Schechter 2002, p.5). This criticism is directed towards CCT's knowledge of theory and how it can be gathered, and hence appears epistemological in nature. The thesis puts forward that despite CCT not searching for recurrent themes, as epitomised by the American school of IPE, this does not make it any less valid but in contrast appears as a strength. Due to its historical approach, a quintessential quality of the British school of IPE, CCT provides scope for contextualised analysis that can be focused on a region or specific point in time if so desired. This presents the opportunity for CCT to provide assistance when analysing SSA as a developing region, despite the majority of more orthodox IPE theories being Eurocentric in outlook.

Criticism has also been directed towards CCT as a result of scholars categorising CCT within the Marxist, Gramscian and Frankfurt School of thought. From this labelling, criticism has arisen because CCT appears to deviate from the key elements that make up these theoretical perspectives. For example, there is little doubt that CCT was heavily influenced by work previously undertaken by both Marx and Gramsci. However, CCT's definition of production and hegemony differ somewhat from the equivalent put forward by these two significant scholars, due to CCT drawing on aspects from a variety of theories, as opposed to falling neatly into an established theoretical category. Despite the fact that „much ink has been spilled on trying to classify Cox's work,“ Cox understood and labelled himself to be a historical materialist, recognising that his approach cannot not be pigeonholed into a single school of thought previously established (Schechter 2002, p.3). Thus, Cox's interpretation of production and hegemony, for example, are grounded in this theory of knowledge and so are projected from a historical materialist epistemological standpoint. A similar epistemological criticism is directed at CCT because some „simply see the world as evolving in ways Cox has not anticipated when he wrote or they simply see the world differently than he does“ (Schechter 2002, p.8).

2.5.3.2 Criticisms of CCT's ontology

CCT has been critiqued with regards to its ontological key areas of focus within its historical materialist framework. In particular, feminists and ecological theorists have criticised CCT for not directing attention to integral issues for them, such as environmental degradation and the predicament of minorities in the world order. However, in rebuke of this criticism the thesis consents with Brown (2006) that in some cases there must be a lower expectation of what theories

can do. Steven Lamy (2004, p.221) states the limitations of theories in that „every theory leaves something out. No theories can claim to offer a picture of the world that is complete.“ The study contends the CCT framework provides a structure that gains context and specificity when applied to a particular historical and geographical circumstance, as opposed to a methodological straightjacket.

A further criticism of CCT’s ontology arises out of its treatment of the „Third World“ as a singular entity, highlighting the difference between „core“ and „periphery“ countries yet at the expense of internal differences between poorer countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa (Samatar and Samatar 1987). Despite this criticism, contrasting praise is granted from Jean Grugel (2005, p.209) to CCT due to its recognition that „global power is played out very differently in the different geographical and productive arenas of the world order.“ This enables it to be „attuned to realities of the developing world as well as to those of advanced capitalist societies,“ in addition to focus being placed on how states can change as a result from pressure from above (the international system) and from below (social forces) (Grugel 2005, p.209).

2.5.3.3 Criticisms of CCT’s empirical application

A key area of CCT’s epistemological understanding comes from the basis that change can occur in the structure of the international system. However, Cox’s empirical application and approach to this possibility of change has met with a significant amount of contradicting critique. For example, CCT has been criticised for its perceived pessimism towards agents of change in the contemporary world order, especially in its jaundiced view and lack of faith in international institutions (Gareau 1996; Nel *et al.* 2000). However, others have taken from this work an overtly utopian and optimistic evaluation of the likelihood for change in the international system, arguing CCT appears a misleading generalisation (Waltz 1986; Osler Hampson 1997). Roger D. Spegele (1997, p.224) further criticises CCT’s apparent optimism, focusing on the notion that Cox has stripped structural change in the international system of its emancipatory goal and in doing so has lost „all purchase on providing a basis for a belief in the movement from a condition of alienation to a condition in which things are radically better.“

Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum (2006) have criticised Cox for prioritising the material power-institution side of the trialectic historical structure at the expense of ideational factors. This can be seen as a criticism of Cox’s own empirical application of historical materialism, as opposed to the CCT framework itself. Indeed, Cox has recognised that in his initial work, he placed key emphasis on material conditions when analysing global power relations, yet in recent years has stated that now he „would put more critical emphasis on the „ideas“ point of the triangle“ (Cox 2007, p.517).

The fact that this criticism has been met by Cox himself shows its pertinence. Subsequently, the current study will aim to place key emphasis on analysing the dynamics of, and between, ideas, institutions and material capabilities, as opposed to prioritising a particular force within it.

The thesis recognises the criticism put towards CCT that the state remains the key unit of analysis in the broad sense; yet to borrow Cox's (2002, pp.32-33) own words, the current study assents „it is more complicated than that.“ One must take into account both sub-state and super-state phenomena, in the form of social and international forces, as a CCT theoretical framework advocates. For example, one cannot merely open the black box of the state in order to determine whether evolution has taken place within the international system, as the prevalence of hegemonic ideas is a notion that bypasses the nation state, implicating global institutions and in turn the material capabilities of different actors. Thus, even if Cox's empirical application can be seen to be flawed in its key focus on the state level of analysis, the CCT framework is valuable for the current study „as it permits a means of charting that precarious middle course between the twin priorities of, first, developing theoretical frameworks that can say something general and broadly significant about the nature of contemporary states... and, second, achieving appropriate recognition of specificity and contingency“ (Phillips 2005b, pp.110-111).

2.5.4 Exploring the empirical application of CCT to Africa

The study will briefly outline the scholarly work undertaken using a CCT framework applied to an African context. Despite none of these three works applying CCT to Africa in relation to the international system, each presents findings of use to take on board for the current study as detailed individually below.

As a scholar who has embarked on using CCT in an African setting, Anthony Leysens (2006) has used CCT in order to focus on whether the marginalised act as a source of social instability in seven countries in southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Leysens (2006) has used empirical data from the Afrobarometer (Round 1, 1999-2000) as a means to investigate whether Cox's macro-theory of change, relating to the marginalised acting as a social force that could bring about political economic transformation from below, is substantiated when applied to certain southern African states. Thus, Leysens (2006, p.34) utilised CCT in order to assess whether the economically marginalised in southern African as the vast underclass „have the potential to act as a force for the transformation of state forms, and how do they view the state?“ This research was carried out whilst taking into account Eric Hobsbawm's (1962, p.249 as cited in Leysens 2006, p.34) observations concerning the poor in England during

the industrial revolution: „[i]t is no accident that the least skilled, least educated, least organized and therefore the least hopeful of the poor, then as later, were the most apathetic.“ This undertaking is of significance for the current study as Leysens (2006) recognises the applicability of CCT to analyse Africa, with Leysen’s study acting as an empirical case whereby CCT has shaped the hypotheses of the study that has focused on a number of countries in southern Africa. However, Leysen’s findings are limited for aiding the current study due to it being based on a limited number of countries in southern Africa, with its key focus being placed on the social forces level of analysis as opposed to that of the international system.

Nkanyiso Sibanda (2010) used CCT in a comparative study of the politics of land reform in Zimbabwe and South Africa, exploring the similarities and differences that exist with regards to their respective politics of land reform. Sibanda (2010) recognised the need to explore the structural dynamics embedded in these countries’ politics of land and social construction, and thus utilised the critical approach of Cox. The „capacity of social forces to influence people’s behaviour by shaping the environment in which they operate“ illustrated in CCT was drawn upon as a base from which to investigate these two case studies as state-society complexes, which appears a useful means to investigate the interlinked nature of the state and society in South Africa and Zimbabwe (Sibanda 2010, p.13-15). This theoretical approach was deemed to be of use as „a characteristic feature of the economies of both countries is the exclusion of the majority of poor people from the processes and modes of production“ and it can be seen to aid the understanding of social change (Sibanda 2010, p.95). Thus, CCT was of use in this African context through analysing how a state form evolves in response to the way in which social forces relate to production, rather than its relation to the international system.

Solli (2009) undertook a critical theory approach, proposing and utilising a synthesis of CCT together with the work of Mahmood Mamdani, in order to put forward an alternative way to theorise states using the case study of Angola. Solli (2009, p.47) recognised the face value benefits of applying CCT to Africa, as the crux of this perspective is „to ask critical questions about the system of international order as a way to create a more just and egalitarian world“ and in lieu of the current economic marginalisation of the region in the international system. Solli (2009, p.56) identified the main shortcoming of solely using CCT in an African context to be CCT’s conceptualisation of the „third world“ as a singular entity. This results in CCT not paying sufficient attention to power struggles in periphery countries, a concern also addressed in the current study’s evaluation of criticisms levied at CCT. There is consensus between the study and Solli (2009, p.56) that at present CCT appears „theoretically sound but empirically weak,“ in that it „offers a promising

approach to investigate African state / society complexes as well as the continent's role in the world order," yet there is minimal empirical application of CCT to the African setting.

Having provided an overview of the scholars who have applied CCT to assist the analysis of African states, it is clear that this is a highly marginalised research area. Despite Cox and CCT being widely renowned as offering integral contributions to the development of IR and IPE, there are limited scholarly applications of this work in an African context. There is no apparent reason as to why this void in the literature has occurred, other than for criticisms and concerns raised with the applicability of CCT to Africa as previously discussed.

2.6 Identifying a narrowed version of CCT as a theoretical framework

Having explored the key characteristics of prominent IR and IPE paradigms, the thesis identifies that a critical theoretical framework based upon the CCT concepts of historical structures and hegemony would suit the epistemological and ontological requirements for undertaking analysis of SSA's political economy. This approach recognises that African states are shaped by external impositions of commonsensical, hegemonic ideas and actions concerning its political economy, and hence highlights the importance of analysing how change in the structure of the international system can have implications for SSA's political economy. Additionally CCT's recognition of the importance of agency in shaping ideas, institutions and material capabilities takes into account that SSA is no passive actor, and allows scope for the study's analysis to take into consideration that agency can be used as a means to help shape and adapt the historical (and hegemonic) structure (Cox 1987, p.4).

The „*prima facie* assumption of Cox's thought... that global power is played out very differently in the different geographical and productive arenas of the world order" is evident through the design of the CCT analytical framework of historical structures, which allows for the specificities of a particular location to be taken into consideration (Grugel 2005, p.209). Thus, the CCT concept of historical structures will be used in order to undertake analysis of the international system (the world order level) and on the specific region of SSA. This chapter has recognised that the CCT agenda is „[a]n extremely ambitious and far reaching programme... [that] requires a sense of the big picture combined with sensitivity to very different and changing local realities and the capacity to make linkages between the two," and has identified how it will provide a useful theoretical base for the current study (Grugel 2005, p.210).

CCT is consciously historical in its approach (Cox and Sinclair 1996). This is useful for the current study because analysis and exploration of the historical context of SSA's political economy will provide further understanding of the dependence of SSA on external actors and how it has been shaped by shifts in the international system (Callaghy 2008, p.38). This historicised understanding of SSA's dependence will assist the study's analysis of whether the nature of Africa's political economy from 2000 to 2011 gives scope for SSA's conditions of dependence to alter. The CCT notion of hegemony will also be drawn upon in order to advance understanding of any shifts in the international system and subsequent implications for SSA's political economy in the twenty-first century.

2.7 Conclusion

Having assessed the various shortcomings of IPE theoretical tools for Africa, this chapter concludes that a historical pluralistic approach offered by a narrowed version of CCT will serve as a useful theoretical framework that can enhance understanding of both the international system and SSA's political economy. The key epistemological, ontological and empirical application criticisms levied towards CCT have been explored. The lack of empirical applications of CCT to Africa has been highlighted.

This chapter has presented a narrowed version of CCT as a theoretical framework to aid its analysis. It primarily makes use of the CCT key concepts of historical frameworks and hegemony. These concepts will be utilised as theoretical tools as a means to guide the structure of the study, allowing for exploration of SSA's dependence arising as a historical process and whether the nature of SSA's political economy between 2000 and 2011 gives scope for SSA's conditions of dependence to alter. This theoretical perspective will help limit the scope of the study through offering a systematic approach to gathering evidence within the themes of ideas, institutions and material capabilities. The pluralistic nature of this approach will aim to highlight the significance of both structure and agency, in addition to ensuring numerous units and levels of analysis are being taken into consideration when exploring the nature of SSA's political economy in the context of structural changes taking place in the international system.

3. The nature of the international system and SSA's political economy in the twentieth century

3.1 Introduction

This chapter contextualises the study by assessing the nature of the international system and SSA's political economy during the twentieth century. It is systematically structured through exploring and identifying the key trends through exploring the forces of ideas, institutions and material capabilities in line with the study's narrower version of CCT as a theoretical framework. Exploration of the main trends related to the material capabilities of the international system leads to identification of the prominent historical structure(s) of the twentieth century. The chapter then proceeds to explore the key trends of the Cold War and the process of decolonisation. During this period the prevalent ideas entrenched in the international system included the prominence of the nation-state as the significant actor in the international system, the process of capitalism and the process of globalisation. The chapter explores the main roles of the UN, IFIs and corporate and civil associations (including both for-profit and not-for-profit sectors) that made up the key institutions of the international system in the twentieth century.

The chapter then explores the nature of SSA's political economy, taking the ramifications of these key processes and shifts in international system for SSA's political economy into account. The impact of colonialism and decolonisation is analysed, in the form of shaping key ideas and institutions prevalent in SSA's political economy and influencing conditions of dependence. The nature of the African state, key ideas and the implications of globalisation for SSA's political economy are explored. The subsequent impact of these prevalent ideas on development in SSA is considered, alongside influence of institutions on SSA's political economy over the twentieth century contributing to SSA's conditions of dependence.

3.2 The nature of the international system in the twentieth century

3.2.1 Material capabilities

At the beginning of the twentieth century *pax britannica* was the historical structure in the international system due to its combination of hegemonic material capabilities (entrenched through industrial, naval, imperial, economic and political power), ideas (liberal norms identifying the

separation of politics and economics) and institutions (a liberal trading and financial system helped enforce its material capabilities based on the prominent liberal ideas) (Cox 1987, pp.123-147).

3.2.1.1 A shift in historical structure

The beginning of the twentieth century saw the world experience the First World War (WWI), the Second World War (WWII) and inter-war economic collapse. This had a profound impact on the material capabilities of *pax britannica* and various states around the globe, resulting in a change of historical structure and hence the nature of the international system. WWI and WWII substantially weakened the material capabilities of Western Europe in the international system, resulting in a shift away from the hegemonic liberal and imperial policies, and led to the creation of new forms of state in Europe and other continents (O'Brian and Williams 2004, pp.104-105). International trade was also affected at the beginning of the twentieth century. WWI and WWII resulted in a change in the direction of trade as countries altered their trading partners and European powers largely changed their focus from export production to war production in order to meet national demands. This had the effect of stimulating other countries to increase their own domestic production, or to look towards alternative trading partners, leading to an acceleration of industrialisation in other regions of the world (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.105).

During the inter-war years, „Britain no longer exercised the same degree of dominance and the United States (US) was unwilling to commit itself to system maintenance. While the US had the power, it lacked the will“ to become the global hegemon in this period (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.112). WWII saw the US establish political and economic supremacy by accounting for more than half of the world's manufacturing output in addition to acting as the key creditor to the Allied powers, resulting in significant growth in its economy (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.107). However, in the wake of WWII the US „assumed a role as major international power and leader of the western bloc“ leading to the era of *pax americana* (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.113). The US increased its active role in the international system in order to maintain stability through establishing more robust security arrangements and formulating a global economic system facilitated and enforced through international institutions. Thus, following *pax britannica's* demise as the prominent structure of the world order, *pax americana* rose as the hegemonic historical structure in the mid twentieth century.

3.2.1.2 The Cold War

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) represented a threat to *pax americana* throughout the Cold War from 1947-1991. The US and its allies engineered a temporary alliance with the USSR during the WWII in order to overcome their common enemies of Germany and Japan. However, significant tension and rivalry remained in place at the end of the war and their lukewarm relationship turned into a cold war (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.114).

The Cold War period is often simplified and described as being „composed of three worlds“ (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.114). The First World was made up of the US and its allies in Western Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and later Japan. The Second World contained the USSR and the communist states of Eastern Europe. The Third World was the term used to describe the rest of the world's states that were occupied with the process of development (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.114). The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was created to bolster the material capabilities of the First World, with the threat of it having nuclear capability being used to deter USSR aggression in Europe. However, the Second World increased the USSR's material capabilities through also developing nuclear weapons, which led to the period of Mutual Assured Destruction. Thus the First World undertook political, economic and military competition against the Second World, resulting in periods of relative calm followed by ones of significant tension. Despite never engaging in battle on either of their own soils, conflict occurred through the means of military coalitions, proxy wars, espionage, nuclear arms races and the extensive use of propaganda, with the result of devastation and destruction across parts of the Third World, specifically in Southern Africa, Central America and Indo-china (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.114-115).

The end of the Cold War had a significant impact on the nature of the international system as the demise of the USSR (known at this point as the Soviet Union) saw a shift in material capabilities across the globe. The US asserted its position as the global hegemon and the end of this communist regime resulted in post-Soviet states experiencing a period of transition, as they were able to explore different economic and political systems (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.131). Moreover, the end of the 1970s had seen China start to open to foreign investment, resulting in a more open international system than previously in the century (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.115).

This shift in material capabilities also had implications for the nature of the international system in terms of conflict and security. The end of the Cold War saw the Soviet Union and the US largely withdraw from regions across the world where they had been implicated in supporting opposing regimes and proxy wars, resulting in a lack of financing for the continuation of conflict. „Some

regional confrontations were moderated by the ending of superpower confrontation and UN peacekeeping was bolstered" but new conflicts emerged largely within states" own borders, as ethnic tensions and rivalries remained from previously supported opposing guerrilla groups and regimes (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.115).

3.2.1.3 The process of decolonisation and financial liberalisation of the international system towards the end of the twentieth century

The collapse of Soviet power resulted in the „disappearance“ of the categorisation of the Second World, which in turn had implications for the ambiguous categorisation of the Third World (Burnell and Randall 2008, p.3). The historical process of decolonisation, which was ongoing throughout the Cold War period, contributed to the general trend of rephrasing post-colonial states and other developing countries as „the developing world“ (Burnell and Randall 2008, p.3). The majority of colonies gained independence during the Cold War as the European empires" material capabilities were substantially weakened in the wake of the two world wars. The process of decolonisation varied by each colonial empire and from state to state, but largely involved activism from local populations and a realisation of a lack of capacity, and in some cases will, of colonialists to continue to exert control (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.119). The US also made use of its hegemonic material capabilities to support calls for decolonisation, based on the notion that a decolonised world would be in its own interests (Hobden 2008b, p.73). This shift in material capabilities of the major powers in the international system resulted in a large number of states establishing independence, which had implications for the balance of power in international institutions (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.120).

The latter half of the twentieth century saw significant increases in the levels of international trade. The increasingly popular processes of neoliberal capitalism and globalisation indicated that through mutual advantage all countries would benefit from participating in increased levels of trading. However, the benefits of this increase appeared skewed, as many countries in the developing world did not appear to reap many benefits; the majority of countries in Africa and Latin America saw their proportion of the world"s exports actually decline during this period (Hobden 2008a, p.62). What was particularly distinctive about this period was FDI"s rapid growth, which resulted from increased global competition heightened by the neoliberal notion of free markets gaining prominence (Moosa 2002, p.3). FDI became a major component of the international system, with the bulk of investment occurring in developed countries but with developing countries receiving an increasing proportion as the 1980s and 1990s progressed (Hobden 2008a, p.64). During the late 1980s and 1990s many countries in the developing world were encouraged to adopt financial

liberalisation policies in order to increase the volume of unrestricted capital flows within the international system. Many of these countries experienced severe financial disruption during this transition and adapted their own political economies to the rapid movement of capital that characterised the international system towards the end of the twentieth century (Hobden 2008a, pp.66-67).

The 1980s and 1990s saw the rapid industrialisation of emerging markets; specifically in East Asia and Latin America, culminating in a shift in the international system as the arena became more competitive. This period saw China emerge as the „manufacturing workshop of the world“ due to its ability to produce goods at approximately half the cost of rival producers, often through undertaking policies at odds with the hegemonic neoliberal principles (Wade 2008, p.36). This shift resulted in significant increases in international financial flows, trade and MNCs across the globe, integrating more state economies into the capitalist international system at the end of the twentieth century (Gilpin 2000, p.7).

3.2.2 Ideas

The shift in material capabilities from *pax britannica* to *pax americana* in the international system was implicated by and had implications for the most prevalent commonsensical notions making up the international system.

3.2.2.1 The prominence and varied nature of the modern state

The modern state arose as a distinctive type of polity in Europe during the sixteenth century, yet slowly evolved over the next four centuries to become the political system that is established today (Leftwich 2008, pp.212-213). The modern state has emerged as a process of evolution, with key characteristics including its sovereignty and hegemony, its public institutions, its monopoly of legitimate coercion (violence) and its (theoretically) impartial bureaucracy (Leftwich 2008, p.216). This modern state was predominantly „carried outwards by European imperialism and colonialism, and imposed on diverse societies or adopted and adapted by them“ in the twentieth century (Leftwich 2008, p.213). This had implications for the international system as many of the prominent ideas, borders and key institutions in developing countries were shaped, if not imposed, by external colonial actors. Despite the variation between different colonial empires, the purpose and nature of colonial rule ensured that state institutions implemented practices that suited the needs of colonial powers. Thus, the mentality towards colonies was largely extractive rather than developmental, which resulted in the paradox of having strong despotic power alongside weak

infrastructural capacities within developing states later in the century (Leftwich 2008, p.221). The nature of the modern state became entrenched in the twentieth century as despite all states being different, enough common patterns to determine certain structural characteristics were established (Leftwich 2008, p.222).

As the twentieth century progressed and the notion of independence rose in prominence, the idea of maintaining an empire became less favoured and accepted, resulting in the process of decolonisation (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.119). However prominent ideas entrenched through colonial ties have been a key factor in shaping and influencing the particular form of political economy of many post-colonial countries (Leftwich 2008, p.213). The colonial premise of building and maintaining patron-client relationships has shaped the post-colonial state as the notion of patronage has combined with the formal institutions of the state, resulting in their characterisation as a neo-patrimonial state with varying levels of corruption (Leftwich 2008, p.222). Moreover, the idea and practice of colonial actors imposing territorial boundaries has contributed to the post-colonial state's struggle in the latter half of the twentieth century to maintain hegemony within its own borders, to achieve a monopoly of violence and to protect its sovereignty. This „weakness“ of post-colonial states has had the knock on effect of increasing their dependency on international institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, and sources of private investment, due to it limiting their own bargaining capacity. As donors applied increasingly stringent conditions to their aid and loans in the 1980s and 1990s, SSA leaders dependent on foreign aid inflows forming a significant part of their overall government expenditure found their de facto sovereignty substantially reduced (Leftwich 2008, pp.222-224).

3.2.2.2 Organising the political economy of states

Communism rose in significance during and after WWI as an alternative to the economic liberal state, primarily in the USSR. The communist form of organisation was popular among the lower working class who had largely been excluded from the benefits derived from capitalist production. Communism was based on the notion of a command economy whereby products were produced according to specific targets that were government issued (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.110). This alternative vision for the political economy of society put forward by the Soviet communist model was prominent until the end of the Cold War in 1989 (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.131).

However, it is the concept of capitalism that has been the prevalent hegemonic idea for how to organise domestic political economies in the international system over the past century in two distinct ways. Briefly, the popularity of Keynesian demand management, advocating the need for

government intervention in struggling economies, rose in Western states in the wake of the 1929 crisis and the Great Depression (Gilpin 2000). This idea, and subsequently practice, saw governments take a larger role in managing their own political economy and providing a form of welfare for their citizens when business had lost confidence in the economy (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.111). Thus, focus was placed on individual states „cushioning economic turbulence within their borders“ (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.121).

However, in the 1970s Keynesian demand management was perceived to have failed, allowing the neoliberal notion of free markets to become increasingly influential in the international system (Gilpin 2000). Neoliberal capitalism is based on the assumption that there should be no external interference in markets, as they are fundamentally stable and self-correcting, thus offering the most efficient allocation of resources (Gilpin 2000). Since the early 1980s, key policies and predominant notions emerged in the international system based on ideas of economic liberalism, with the market being free from political control (Harrison 2010, p.26). During the latter stages of the Cold War, the US and its allies denounced the communist ideology, with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher coining the slogan „There Is No Alternative“ to describe the notion that there was no alternative to the neoliberal political economy that was rapidly asserted around the globe, bar in communist states. The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet empire saw the power of financial capital „unleashed by the deregulatory moves“ and the „imposition of free trade rules on the rest of the world,“ as the US and its allies strongly promoted a liberal world order and the „benefits of capitalism“ (Gamble 2009, p.122).

It is the inherent nature of capitalism that the international system is „inevitably driven by major upheavals, unpredictable change, and sometimes, rapid swings in fortune“ (Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.37). This is because it holds the ability to foster substantial wealth creation and higher living standards, yet the implication of winners and losers leads to a tendency towards inequality in the system, making it unstable (Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.31). The last decade of the twentieth century saw neoliberal capitalism become the most prevalent notion of how to organise the political economy, yet with fluctuation over what specifics were the most appropriate in order to stem its inherently volatile nature. This can be seen by the end of the century giving rise to liberal Anglo-American political economic systems, European arrangements that appeared more welfare centred, and Asian neoliberal capitalism which focused predominantly on more corporate practices that combine business with government and place less emphasis on the role of labour organisations (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.131).

3.2.2.3 Globalisation and the impact on development

The idea of global production for global markets became more prominent in the US after WWII. Thus, the US, as the hegemonic country in *pax americana*, used its significant material capabilities to develop this idea through shaping the prevalent historical structure in the international system to suit its own needs (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.117). This period saw an increase in technology available and technological capabilities, combined with the notion of FDI increasingly implemented by state institutions and a rise in MNCs (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.113). This resulted in an internationalisation of production with a labour oriented focus, enhanced by the US's prominent state-society relationship that led to the state agreeing to achieve high employment levels and introduce a minimum wage. The modern state was further internationalised during this period, following the growing prominence of a degree of protectionism within the US. The US was able to project these ideas upon the international trade system through key international institutions, making use of its hegemonic status and being the only country to hold veto power in the IMF.

These neoliberal moves towards the internationalisation of production and the state combined with the end of the Cold War resulted in the idea and practice of globalisation gaining prominence (Leftwich 2008, p.227). The overall definition of the concept and means for how to measure the process of globalisation is debated, yet broadly speaking it is „an uneven process, whereby the barrier of time and space are reduced, new social relations between distant people are fostered and new centres of authority are created“ (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.132). Globalisation is „a multifaceted process which affects different countries and different social groups within countries differently“ through the dissemination of knowledge and key ideas (Hobden 2008a, p.55). The twentieth century has highlighted how not all states are impacted evenly by globalisation, nor make an equal contribution to its momentum. Globalisation entails both costs and benefits for all in the globe, yet the nature and extent of which are varied among states and at the sub-state level (Burnell 2008, p.292).

Globalisation represents an increasingly integrated international system with increased trade, investment flows and technology transfer „powered by an almost universal tendency to adopt neoliberal economic prescriptions and practices“ (Burnell 2008, p.294). This notion of there being no alternative to neoliberalism has acted as „a differentiated project to maintain a global system of core and periphery,“ acting as an „effective way of intervening and dominating post-colonial and post-Communist countries“ (Harrison 2010, pp.22-23). This critique has arisen from awareness of neoliberalism's predominantly Western origins, with subsequent arguments suggesting this has brought about a globalised double standard of open, free markets in the non-West, whilst more protectionist policies are undertaken in the West (Harvey 2007).

This has had implications for developmental thinking. As the twentieth century progressed the neoliberal developmental model's essence was universally agreed upon as a commonsensical notion (Hay 2004, p.502). The end of the Cold War had withdrawn the choice of ideology and model of development, as the hegemonic status of neoliberal capitalism saw options to default from this system reduced (Hobden 2008b, p.77). This had significant repercussions for many developing countries, as neoliberal policy and institutional conditions associated with international institutions and aid donors' assistance become more prominent. The 1980s saw structural adjustment policies offered to states experiencing financial crisis, which demanded the liberalising and opening up of states' economies in order to gain assistance from such sources of finance (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.124). The 1990s saw „good governance“ considerations being added as a form of conditionality for states receiving financial support and developmental aid, such as embodying ideas of human rights and democratic reform (Burnell 2008, p.296).

3.2.3 Institutions

A „striking feature of the international system has been the rise in international organisations in the second half of the twentieth century“ and the increasing importance placed upon such institutions in managing the international system (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.123). *Pax americana* has maintained its support for renewed and invigorated multilateralism throughout the twentieth century despite the ideational shifts in economic policy that have occurred (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.125). These structural shifts can be illustrated through the changing nature of roles and approaches of the UN, IFIs, corporate and civic associations in the international system.

3.2.3.1 The UN

The UN was created in 1945 as a successor to the League of Nations. Its significance for the international system is predominantly channelled through its specialised agencies and its Security Council. The UN specialised agencies promote specific issues and cooperation whilst attempting to „cope with the casualties of the global political economy,“ for example through the World Health Organisation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.124). However, the Security Council is the chief element of this international institution and holds a position of great importance in the international system due to its ability to make binding international resolutions to which states are compelled to adhere. It is composed of five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US) who hold veto power over proposals passing through the Security Council, and ten rotating members, who are each elected in

two year terms. The composition of the permanent members of the Security Council is representative of the victors of the WWII, and it exerts the most influence over the global security structure and economic sanctions against states. Another significant body within the UN is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which was established in 1964 in response to the shift in ideas adjoined to the process of decolonisation. UNCTAD was created to promote „the development-friendly integration of developing countries into the world economy“ in lieu of the increasing number of new states and those gaining independence (About UNCTAD 2002).

3.2.3.2 International Financial Institutions

From the 1980s onwards a substantial number of IFIs have taken on enlarged roles in the international system. The IMF and the World Bank appear the most visible IFIs, with the World Trade Organisation, the Group of Eight⁴ (G8) and the Group of Twenty⁵ (G20) all rising in importance towards the end of the twentieth century alongside regional groupings, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Southern African Development Community.

The IMF and World Bank served to „give a voice“ to the universal norms of this hegemonic world order, as IFIs were put forward to „serve the whole“ through „uphold[ing] the rules that underpin the idea of a liberal world economy“ and hence advance the key idea of neoliberal capitalism (Leysens 2008, p.49). This increase of structural power in global finance has allowed US agency to shape the international system, through exerting influence on other states“ economic practices. This has resulted in a high degree of conformity with the liberal US concept and practice of global capitalism, with states „adopting a common way of thinking about economic matters“ at the world order level (Cox 2004, p.312-313).

The output of IFIs is displayed through „providing advice on economic policy, demanding policy change in return for financing or settling economic disputes between actors“ (O‘Brian and Williams 2004, p.124). As these institutions have taken on increasing roles in the international system, their significance and relative power has also increased. This can be seen through an increasing number of states adopting various structural adjustment policies (SAPs) in return for financial assistance from the IMF and World Bank when experiencing a critical financial situation in the 1980s and 1990s (O‘Brian and Williams 2004, p.124). SAPs can be best understood as a template comprised

⁴ The G8 is made up of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US.

⁵ The G20 includes the G8 countries plus the prominent developing countries of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey and the regional grouping of the EU.

of programmes of economic liberalisation, such as: the removal of price controls and public marketing institutions; the removal of exchange rate controls (hence preventing devaluation); increased rates of interest; further plans to open the economy to FDI; and forms of privatisation, which would be attached to a few country specific policies (Harvey 1991, p.121). SAPs were introduced following the World Bank's Berg Report of 1981, which identified the post-colonial state as bloated with rent-seeking institutions that distorted price mechanisms in order to line the pockets of political elites, and put forward the solution of, in simplistic terms, less state and more market (Harrison 2010, p.89). A critical view is that SAPs effectively served to „buttress the political aspirations of dominant groups and reduce inherently political questions of social inequality and the role of the state to technical, bureaucratic procedures“ (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.5).

The instability and social resistance that arose in response to the implementation of SAPs in developing countries led to the need of modification of key programmes. The World Bank (2000, p.38) identified that „market driven development could not succeed without a strong social and institutional infrastructure, including a strong state“ and hence from the late 1980s SAPs were characterised by significant neoliberal reforms. The Highly Indebted Poor Countries Scheme (HIPC) was thus introduced in 1996, and further „enhanced“ in 1999, aiming „to provide debt sustainability that would help to remove a major constraint on investment and growth and to be a spur to further adjustment, in part by galvanizing increased private external investment“ (Callaghy 2008, p.52). Also in 1999, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was introduced to replace SAPs and form the prerequisite for HIPC status; the PRSP defines a multitude of programmatic reforms and projects to implement a pro-poor development strategy (Harrison 2010, p.45). This template put forward had greater emphasis on government ownership, as opposed to World Bank or IMF intervention, and on social expenditure, with less attention granted to policy conditionality. The introduction of HIPCs and PRSP was significant as it „iterated attempts to recodify the neoliberal world-view of market, state and self into different procedures and institutions“ and despite maintaining some forms of policy conditions, it represented a shift in neoliberal policy in the international system (Harrison 2010, p.42).

3.2.3.3 Corporate and civil associations

Corporate and civil associations have become increasingly active in forming and consolidating international organisations both for-profit and not-for-profit at the societal level towards the end of the twentieth century. The change in material capabilities across the globe at the end of the Cold War provided the opportunity for industrialised democratic states to actively promote the spread of

political systems similar to their own, triggering a wave of states undertaking democratic transitions during the 1990s (Ottaway 2008, p.166). Thus, influential states in the international system „devised democracy promotions strategies“ and „focused much effort on promoting citizen participation and activism“ within developing countries (Ottaway 2008, p.166). A simultaneous process was ongoing within established democracies, whereby disenchantment with the performance of state institutions, corruption and inefficiency of governments „prompted international development agencies to rethink the assumption that development required state intervention“ and instead sought ways to bypass governments, through implementing development projects and programmes through NGOs as civil associations (Ottaway 2008, p.167).

NGOs became increasingly prominent as a means for society to lobby governments and international organisations, as well as implementing developmental projects and distributing aid (Sklias 1999). The formation of transnational advocacy networks by NGOs combined with the increased ease (and low cost) of maintaining communication through technology has resulted in society having enhanced opportunities to lobby states, IFIs and transnational corporations. This has enabled NGOs and other members of society to influence both the ideational and institutional structures of the international system through influencing government decisions to develop domestic policies, increasingly participating in international political processes and acting as a representative for those bound by common values, knowledge, and interests related to a specific issue (O’Brian and Williams 2004, p.126).

3.3 The nature of SSA’s political economy in the twentieth century

Having undertaken systematic analysis of the key trends and the forces within the international system, this section shall now explore the nature of SSA’s political economy in the twentieth century.

3.3.1 Material capabilities

SSA’s political economy in the twentieth century was shaped by internal and external actors“ material capabilities.

3.3.1.1 The impact of colonialism and its lasting legacy

As a result of European colonial powers effectively slicing up the African region at the Berlin Conference in 1884, at the onset of the twentieth century all African states were part of a European empire (Rotberg 2003). Different colonialisms „expressed their distinctive experience of statehood,“

yet „colonial powers also borrowed and learned from each other“ enhancing the ability to discern certain common features across the colonial world (Chiriyankandath 2008, p.41). Colonial rule in the first half of the twentieth century had far-reaching consequences for SSA, as this „cultural project of control“ „objectified“ the colonised, before reconstructing and transforming both hegemonic ideas and institutions in the region through the development of a colonial source of knowledge that outlived decolonisation (Dirks 2004, p.1).

The historical process of decolonisation was a rapid transformation that saw a number of African countries granted independence following the end of WWII. This change for SSA’s political economy arose due to the shift in material capabilities that was occurring in the international system with the significant weakening of the European powers following the world wars and the increase in tension between the US and the Soviet Union, as both competed to win over anti-colonial nationalists to their respective cause (Chiriyankandath 2008, pp.44-45).

Following the process of decolonisation and consolidation in SSA, the 1960s and 1970s were met with optimism for the newly independent SSA states. Independence led to „strong proclamations of a sense of self, as independent nations mingled with the nascent international ideology of Third World solidarity of the time“ (Cornelissen 2009, p.8). However, SSA states emerged entrenched in Western-centred political economy through their key political and economic institutions and linkages with previous colonial powers (Clapham 1996). Since the primary notion of anti-colonial nationalism was the independence of nation-states, this resulted in African anti-colonialists seeking political economic autonomy finding themselves with little option other than to continue to operate within this international system based on the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, with the key object being the sovereign state (Chiriyankandath 2008, p.47). Thus, the impact of colonialism and decolonisation „has been transformative rather than transitory,“ with lasting implications including the dependent nature of SSA’s political economy on external actors (Chiriyankandath 2008, p.36).

3.3.1.2 The instability of independence and actions of external actors deepen internal crises

The independence of African states from colonial rule presented a formidable challenge. The process itself was „marred by the hurried transfer of administrative responsibilities, belated and unsustainable political compromises, economic dependence, and largely untested legislatures and governments,“ making for a troubled transition period (Chiriyankandath 2008, p.45). The multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of most post-colonial states in SSA saw emerging leaders struggle to gain acceptance as the legitimate leader by their population. Moreover, as opposed to

being the guarantor of the well-being of its citizens, states in SSA have frequently enacted significant threats to their populations through means such as military regimes and human rights violations. The young partially democratic regimes experienced weak coercive powers and instability, enhancing their likelihood of civil conflict as „[p]olitical change deconsolidates political institutions and heightens the risk of civil war“ (Fearon and Laitin 2003, p.34). African states, „rather than being the key actor, [have] had to compete with numerous other powerful actors, such as warlords, guerrilla groups, and drug cartels, which in some places appear to threaten its very existence“ and heighten insecurity (Hobden 2008b, p.72). Moreover, „the continent“s domestic politics became increasingly settled around incumbents who, having turned out victors in hard-fought internal battles for power, had established themselves as long-term leaders,“ which weakened SSA“s economic and political leverage and in some cases led to crises of government (Cornelissen 2009, p.8).

Despite having gained independence, SSA“s political economy was directly impacted by the proxy wars taking place during the Cold War period. The 1960s to 1980s was fundamentally suited to the needs of the generally small, poor, weak and artificially created African states, as paradoxically the level of insecurity generated by the Cold War enabled SSA states to develop and practice ideologies within their political economy that corresponded closely with their needs (Clapham 2005, p.20). The conflict provided SSA countries with an option „concerning the operation of social and economic systems and goals and modalities of development“ through deciding which superpower to align too (Hobden 2008b, p.75). Initially SSA states were able to gain economic and political support from aligning with one of the sides as the region rose in geostrategic value, but as the Cold War progressed numerous states in SSA were caught up in proxy wars of this major power conflict. Thus, external powers supported governments and insurgency movements in SSA in order to undermine the opposing capitalist or communist power.

These alliances of convenience resulted in a steady flow of resources for ally SSA countries, however „little attention was paid to the ways in which these resources helped fuel corruption, patrimonialism and militaristic systems of governance“ (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.6). The Cold War contributed to SSA leaders becoming shrouded in neopatrimonial tendencies, with despotic leaders undermining the legitimacy of their state and societal cohesion, resulting in knock-on implications for the wider region. Some SSA states rejected this pressure to align with one or the other and joined the Non-Aligned Movement, yet the majority accepted economic and political incentives that were put forward by both sides in order to increase their own material capabilities at the risk of becoming involved in a proxy war (Hobden 2008b, p.74-75). The availability of specific

natural resources often influenced the location of the proxy war arena, with weak unstable governments propped up by external actors" financial resources (O'Brian and Williams 2004, pp.114-115). „[T]he bulk of the continent appeared to sink into general obsolescence" as these external actors and proxy wars heightened internal crises and conflict in the region (Cornelissen 2009, p.8).

This combination of the instability of independence and the impact of external actors led to a deepening of internal crises across the region. This significant level of insecurity heightened by weak material capabilities saw an increasing number of SSA countries turn towards international institutions for assistance through SAPs. By the end of the 1980s, 36 African states had undertaken 243 separate SAPs with the World Bank and IMF due to economic turmoil (Chazan *et al.* 1999, p.337). This rise in prominence of SAPs resulted in external powers (re)gaining increasing power over the running of society in SSA, through demanding neoliberal criteria was met in order to proffer financial assistance (Hobden 2008b, p.72). The material capability of SSA's political economy in the 1980s and 1990s was further weakened by the increasing consolidation and influence of IFIs that culminated in rising external dependence. This resulted in the various moves away from colonial predecessors becoming overshadowed by the overarching external control still enforced on SSA states through international trade agreements and development finance programs (Harrison 2010, p.12-13). Thus, this period saw the deepening of SSA states" internal crises and increasing dependence on external actors (Cornelissen 2009, p.8).

3.3.1.3 Implications of end of the Cold War for SSA

The end of the Cold War brought with it a sense of optimism for the stability of SSA's political economy that would help bolster its weakened material capabilities. Proxy wars and the ongoing jostling between the US and the Soviet Union had enhanced instability in the region, and with its end a number of regional conflicts were resolved, such as in Mozambique and Namibia (Hobden 2008b, p.75). Moreover, a number of corrupt regimes that had been supported by these opposing sides were replaced by more democratic regimes.

However, this optimism was short lived as areas within SSA experienced genocide, famine, renewed conflict and upheaval (Hobden 2008b, pp.75-76). Some states in the region did experience greater levels of stability, yet despite the formal end to proxy wars in the SSA region, the end of the Cold War brought with it increased insecurity for many African citizens. Looking specifically to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), it can be seen that conflict within the country affected the nearby region as neighbouring countries intervened on opposing sides. This had a hugely

destabilising effect on SSA's political economy as numerous countries within the region formed alliances against one another and effectively undermined the region's material capabilities (Hobden 2008b, p.76). In the 1990s SSA was „the most conflict ridden region of the world and the only region in which the number of armed conflicts [was] on the increase“ (SIPRI 1999, p.20). Between 1990 and 1999, SSA witnessed 39.5%⁶ of the total number of civil war cases that occurred across the globe during the 1990s (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Thus, SSA experienced a higher number of cases of civil war from 1990 to 1999 than any other region in the world.

The 1990s saw the majority of SSA states experience high levels of political economic vulnerability due to a combination of high levels of conflict, external debt, fragile economies, and a material dependence on external actors for aid and financial credit (Harrison 2010, p.109). SSA was treated as a „salvage operation“ by IFIs and external actors, as the combination of civil war, human insecurity and political arbitrariness in the region was reinforced by infrastructural, administrative and economic inefficiency that undermined its overall material capabilities (Callaghy 2008, p.42). This approach was reflective of „a new foreign policy rationale by Western industrial democracies“ that took place in the 1990s that resulted in „economic conditionality [being] joined by forms of political conditionality, under the assumption that economic and political liberalization must go hand in hand“ (Callaghy 2008, p.42).

SSA's geopolitical significance and material capabilities declined at the end of the Cold War, as major world powers were no longer driven to provide economic and political support to African actors to continue proxy wars based on ideological differences. Additionally, SSA's main commodities were being more effectively produced by other developing nations, which further decreased SSA's material capabilities as the region become less important to global investors and IFIs (Callaghy 2008, p.40). Combined, this saw SSA's significance in the international system decline, with interest largely only remaining in investing in the mineral and oil sectors. The extent of the weakness of SSA's material capabilities during this period is more apparent when compared with other developing regions. Looking to South Asia, during this period the region's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rose slowly, whereas SSA's dramatically declined. Additionally, South Asia's population growth rate fell, whereas SSA's continued to increase (Callaghy 2008, pp.40-41). Looking to the levels of investment, it can be seen that the 1980s saw SSA's investment as a percentage of GDP decline, in comparison to South Asia's increasing. South Asia's economic policies exceeded SSA's in terms of creating an advantageous business environment, through

⁶ This percentage was calculated from data presented in Fearon and Laitin (2003) and rounded to three significant figures.

achieving a more favourable politico-administrative and socioeconomic context for investment (Callaghy 2008, p.41). Investors perceived SSA to have become „a voracious sinkhole that swallowed their money with little or no long-term return“ due to the high levels of political risks resulting in weak states and weak markets (Callaghy 2008, p.41).

Thus, at the end of the twentieth century, SSA was viewed to have weak material capabilities due to the combination of conflict, crises of government and lack of financial capabilities that characterised the region and culminated in it appearing as a switched off place in the international system.

3.3.2 Ideas

Key ideas in the international system had subsequent implications for the prevalent ideas in SSA’s political economy, as shall now be explored in more depth.

3.3.2.1 The nature of the African state

The historical context of the state-society relationship from a statist perspective is based on the premise of „nation-building“, describing the movement of political integration from sub-national identities, which were based on notions of community and kinship, towards a focus on constructing a state (Ferguson 2006, p.94). Success of the state is measured by the construction of a base of authority established on nation-state citizenship, yet the African state did not experience such a transition. The notion of the modern African state was created for European imperial purposes, imposed on the populations of the region by external actors in order to serve colonising empires (Clapham 1996). This saw African state boundaries effectively drawn up overnight by European colonial powers at the Berlin Conference in 1884, with little consideration granted to the current ruling structures, and neither ethnic nor cultural distinctions (Rotberg 2003).

The process of independence in SSA saw little option for anti-colonists other than to maintain the sovereign state as the key political and economic unit, as was prevalent and entrenched within the international system (Cooper 2003, p.67). Subsequently, decolonisation in the mid twentieth century resulted in newly independent SSA states emerging entrenched in a Western-centred political economy, without a shared feeling of national unity among its citizens due to the socially constructed nature of the African state and the endurance of pre-existing social dynamics (Clapham 1996). Agency in SSA post-colonial states largely undertook diverse political trajectories away from previous colonial templates, resulting in significant differences in terms of political practices,

infrastructure and ambitions developing within these „new“ African states (Young 2004). State formation in SSA had a specific effect on SSA’s position in the international system, as related internal processes became interlinked with conditions and developments occurring in the wider global arena (Cornelissen 2009, p.7). Additionally, the last couple of decades in the twentieth century saw elements of the African state modified, and in some cases significantly revised, by the hegemonic notion of neoliberalism that trickled down through the international system (Harrison 2010, p.97). Thus, the shaping of the African state was highly influenced and contingent upon the changing nature of the international political economy throughout the twentieth century (Clapham 1996; Young 2004).

The nature of the global political economy during this period of African independence combined with „the idea of state sovereignty enabled African governments to maximize international support for their continued tenure of power“ despite not meeting the (outdated) Weberian criteria of a state, essentially absolving them from many of the demands set originally in the doctrine of sovereignty (Clapham 2005, p.20). This has contributed to the „low capacity and/or low political will of state institutions to provide all citizens with minimum levels of security and well-being,“ a key determinant of the Weberian classification of the state (Mentan 2004, p.20).

Robert Jackson (1990) typified the African states as „quasi-statehood“, due to their being treated as though they were fully sovereign by other members of the international order despite falling short of the Weberian criteria in practice. This consensual acknowledgement of new African states by leading states in the world order resulted in a form of protection for SSA states, guaranteeing their territorial, external and, in some cases, internal security (Clapham 2005, p.21). However, developments that occurred in the international order combined with the internal political and economic problems experienced by many African states „stripped away much of the protection with which they had previously been provided“ resulting in them being „dangerously exposed to a new world that challenged many of the assumptions on which Africa’s international relations had previously been based“ (Clapham 2005, p.20). Many African states have struggled with, and in a few cases failed to, function as a sovereign nation-state providing security for its citizens (Rotberg 2003). In the late 1980s and 1990s it appeared that Africa was made up of „despotic and overbearing state[s] that monopolizes political and economic space, stifling both democracy and economic growth“ with the state appearing as the chief obstacle to development in the region (Ferguson 2006, p.95). The reality is that the majority of African states could be typified as only reaching „quasi-statehood“ during the twentieth century (Jackson 1990). Despite the initial optimism that came with the idea of independence and that, in theory, the post-colonial African

state has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty, in reality SSA's political economy was directed from outside due to its dependence on neoliberal ideas prevalent in the international system.

3.3.2.2 Key ideas in SSA's political economy

Neoliberal reform in SSA states has appeared as a form of „scientific capitalism“, as externally led processes have driven the neoliberal agenda (Ferguson 1995). As capitalism became the hegemonic principle in SSA's political economy, its generic aspects of combined and uneven development has led to „modern forms of economic fragility and spatial differentiation, the disintegrative effects of which are mediated through the regulative processes of the state system, albeit one structured by massive inequalities of power“ (Harrison 2010, p.6). Economic fragility in the region is enhanced by numerous SSA states relying on a limited number of primary commodities making up the majority of their GDP, leaving their economy unstable as the peaks and falls in the price of these key exports have a profound effect on SSA countries' overall GDP (Gibbon and Ponte 2005). This has resulted in the „lumpy“ nature of investment in SSA, where the extraction of a commodity is the driving aim of business, as opposed to embarking on broader engagement with the host market (Cooper 2001). Subsequently, resources found in the region such as oil, minerals and agricultural crops all offer unstable prices that entrench the continuation of low wages and low technology used in agrarian livelihoods across SSA (Harrison 2010, p.7). Moreover, there is a tendency for such key commodities to be processed outside of their SSA country of origin, whereby their added value is gained and reaped. This has resulted in SSA largely being made up of small and vulnerable economies that are heavily affected by changes in the international system whilst exerting minimal reciprocal influence (Harrison 2010, pp.7-8).

The independence of SSA countries was highly influenced by the occurrence of the Cold War. This is because major powers in WWI and WWII offered foreign resources that could be used by SSA leaders as a means to maintain, or gain, control of their state. Thus, rather than seeking legitimacy from their citizens through representative democracy, many SSA leaders during this period enforced the notion of patrimonialism, extortion and authoritarian rule using this external support, further deepening SSA's dependence on external actors (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.8). This form of control over SSA's political economy was at odds with the idea of a neoliberal international system that was gaining prominence in the international arena.

The demise of the Cold War saw many of these resources taken away from SSA leaders. Such notions of corruption and nepotism were seen to hinder the modernising of the state, and these

strategies became more difficult to maintain without looking for alternative sources of external support (Ferguson 2006, p.94). As SSA leaders looked for means to gain access to much needed resources from the early 1980s to the late 1990s, levels of external debt in SSA rose dramatically (Clapham 1996, pp.166-167). The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a wave of democratisation across SSA, which can be partially explained by African policymakers and leaders adapting key elements within the structure of their political economy in order to gain resources from external actors (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.8). This idea of why this process occurred helps to explain why the notion of multi-party neoliberal democracy „has failed to incorporate, either economically or ideologically, precisely the most alienated segments of many African societies, namely youth, rural communities and women“ (Taylor and Williams 2004).

Thus, structural changes that occurred in the international system combined with the implications of the end of the Cold War resulted in SSA appearing „virtually invisible in economic terms but highly visible as a region suffering from violent conflict, famine, disease, poverty, environmental degradation and corruption“ (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.9). This prevalent negative perspective of SSA’s political economy developed further with it being identified as „the hopeless continent“ at the end of the twentieth century (Economist 2000).

3.3.2.3 Globalisation and development

The majority of theoretical and empirical „studies of globalisation often ignore, or provide only passing coverage of, Africa“ (Moore 2001, p.909). Indeed, passing references to SSA deem it to be a „switched off“ place in the international system, yet the region has been implicated in political and economic engagement throughout the twentieth century (Harrison 2010, p.1). There has been repetitive rhetoric posed by the IMF suggesting that SSA is not fully globalised or that globalisation is passing SSA by, yet this is at key odds with the neoliberal integrative processes that have claimed to have taken place globally since the late 1980s (Harrison 2010, p.4). SSA represents an arena whereby significant and protracted neoliberal engineering has taken place. As a key facet of globalisation is the „rolling out“ of neoliberalism, one can identify that in the twentieth century SSA has both experienced and been impacted by globalisation (Peck and Ticknell 2002). However, counter to the „liberal notions of convergence, positive-sum outcomes, and the beneficial effects of competition,“ analysis of the nature of SSA’s political economy in the twentieth century shows that the continent „represents and exemplifies the salience of the radically uneven and unequal contours of globalisation“ (Harrison 2010, p.9).

The concept of development was frequently used by post-colonial leaders in an attempt to attract popular support. The notion of a „developmental state“ was supported by colonial powers who aimed to show a shift from a primary exploitative approach to one of preservation towards African states (Chiriyankandath 2008, p.46). Neoliberal macroeconomic thinking was the key driver behind these developmental conditionalities of the 1980s that were similar for all states (Campbell and Loxley 1989). Not all SAPs were exactly the same, yet they can be best understood to follow a specific template. Core programmes of economic liberalisation included: the removal of price controls and public marketing institutions; the removal of exchange rate controls (and hence preventing devaluation); increased rates of interest; further plans to open the economy to FDI; and forms of privatisation, which would be attached to a few country specific policies (Harvey 1991, p.121). The prevalence of neoliberalism „virtually abolishe[d] the idea of development as a specific concern in favour of a universal set of prescriptions applied to developed and developing economies alike“ (Cammack 2002, p.159). Broadly speaking, this led to IFIs adopting a one-model-fits-all approach with regards to development in SSA, regardless of the variety of political and economic differences in the post-colonial states. The end of the twentieth century saw the process of neoliberal structural adjustment become in effect „the development orthodoxy for the continent“ (Harrison 2010, p.39).

3.3.3 Institutions

This section will explore key institutions for SSA’s political economy in the twentieth century, highlighting the key implications for states and societies in SSA.

3.3.3.1 The UN, decolonisation and the Cold War

The UN General Assembly became a key forum for issues that were a priority for the developing world and was a significant forum for voicing calls for decolonisation. Resolution 1514 was passed in 1960, which officially condemned the continuation of colonialism and in the following decade 33 African states gained their independence (Hobden 2008b, p.80). Once independent, African states took a seat in the General Assembly as a mark of sovereignty and independence. Thus, decolonisation of African states also transformed the workings of the UN itself, as the high number of independent African states contributed to the significant increase in UN member states from the original 51 in 1945 to 188 members in 1999 (UN membership growth 2011).

From 1990 to 1999, approximately 26 member states joined the UN (UN membership growth 2011). This dramatic increase was largely due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which saw many

former republics apply for membership. Only two of these „new“ members were African countries (Eritrea and Namibia), and these developments affected both the size and the influence of voting blocs within the UN systems (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.7). This effectively led to Africa losing one-third of the numerical advantage that it had previously enjoyed, and reflected a shift in the priorities of major powers in the international system away from Africa and towards Eastern Europe and Asia (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.7).

3.3.3.2 The imposing nature of IFIs

Throughout the 1980s, SSA states were „subject to pervasive compulsion“ by IFIs (Harrison 2010, p.46). As the hegemonic idea, neoliberalism appeared as the global architecture of commonsensical ideas and material capabilities, with the IFIs enforcing international regulation (Soederberg 2002). SSA states that were experiencing financial crisis, such as those on the brink of insolvency, were forced to turn to IFIs in order to gain further credit and organise debt rescheduling. In return, IFIs would state a number of economic conditionalities that governments would have to implement in order to gain access to these services. This situation was context specific as the fragility of newly independent SSA states and their own institutional structures in the 1980s and 1990s created an „unprecedented opportunity for external regulatory intervention“ (Harrison 2010, p.89). Thus, neoliberalism was imposed on SSA’s political economy through IFIs; it was not an indigenously conceived project but one advocated by key players in the international system who were driving this hegemonic way of thinking (Harrison 2010, p.38). This dominant mode of thought „set the parameters within which debates about how the major external powers should interact with Africa have been conducted“ for the later decades of the twentieth century (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.4).

It can be seen that „[t]he reform programmes that many African countries initiated in the mid-1980s – with the support of the IMF and World Bank and other donors – reflected a new paradigm. The reforms attempted to reduce the state’s role in production and in regulating economic activity... they placed more emphasis on maintaining macroeconomic stability and avoiding overvalued exchange rates... this new paradigm became known as structural adjustment“ (World Bank 1994, p.34). This form of „scientific capitalism“ drove the neoliberal agenda forward in SSA, increasing the influence of external actors (Ferguson 1995). These neoliberal conditionalities often resulted in economic turbulence and recession, which meant that states often had to impose this developmental approach against bouts of social protest and rebellion (Harrison 2010, p.46). Only a selective list of SSA countries were chosen to be granted HIPC status by the end of the twentieth century, with Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique being the first SSA states to be gain HIPC status. This is

because „the key criterion for accession to HIPC is a country’s previous performance in World Bank and Fund [IMF] adjustment policies“ and is shaped by the fact that HIPC status can only be granted to states that borrow exclusively from the World Bank’s lending body, the International Development Association (IDA), which limited those applicable (Harrison 2010, p.43).

Despite IFIs claiming to focus on pro-poor growth and helping to build lasting democracy in SSA, it can be seen that at the end of the twentieth century SSA states had virtually no significant voice within their decision making processes. IFIs have consistently ignored calls for structural reform on the topic of representation and instead interpreted such complaints to focus on developing more sensitive listening skills (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.6). Moreover, due to the nature of IFIs, African states have effectively had no say in the design or implementation of SAPs, resulting in African states not meaningfully „owning“ their key national development strategies. This presented the opportunity for IFIs to continue to advocate the implementation of neoliberal economic principles despite there being overwhelming evidence of their negative social, political and even economic consequences in the lead up to the end of the twentieth century (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.17). Thus, at the end of the twentieth century, IFIs imposed highly centralised and statist programmes on SSA „with little consideration as to how reforms might impact upon the complex and diverse societies that collectively make up most post-colonial African nations“ (Harrison 2010, p.119).

3.4 Conclusion

At the onset of the twentieth century territorial boundaries of states in SSA had been imposed by external colonial powers, taking little note of diverse ethnic groups or cultures (Rotberg 2003). Key institutions and prevalent ideas were shaped by external actors, as patronage, coercion and authoritarian practices ensured colonial regimes maintained power (Chiriyankandath 2008). Upon independence, newly independent leaders struggled to maintain control over the ethnic and cultural diversity (Hobden 2008b, p.72). This made democratic rule difficult, and numerous African policymakers and leaders fell back on authoritative practices undertaken during colonial rule in order to maintain power, resulting in the impact of colonialism appearing transformative rather than transitory for SSA’s political economy (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.8).

External powers’ support for conflicting states in SSA during the Cold War period was tied to the interest of building and strengthening ideological alliances to support the US or the Soviet Union (Hobden 2008b, p.75). This financial and military support was granted to a SSA leader in power or

a rebel group against them, and in some cases both, with little or no benefit for the wider population. The nature of the African state was effectively enforced and tailored by the material capabilities and ideas prominent in the international system (Harrison 2010, p.6). This period saw the deepening of SSA states' internal crises and increasing dependence on external actors (Cornelissen 2009, p.8). The end of the Cold War brought with it a sense of optimism as with its end a number of regional conflicts were resolved (Hobden 2008b, p.75). However, this optimism was short lived as areas within SSA experienced renewed conflict and upheaval and in the 1990s SSA became „the most conflict ridden region of the world“ (SIPRI 1999, p.20).

Capitalism became the prevalent hegemonic idea for how to organise domestic political economies in the international system over the past century, and subsequently neoliberal reforms of Africa's political economy were mainly imposed and driven through externally led processes from the 1980s in the form of scientific capitalism (Ferguson 1995). The twentieth century highlighted the inherently volatile nature of capitalism; it provided the terms for substantial wealth creation, yet the prospect of winners and losers results in inequality in the system that leads to it being relatively unstable (Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.31). Neoliberal capitalism became the hegemonic principle in the African political economy, resulting in generic aspects of and approaches to development having uneven effects, furthering unbalanced distributions of power (Cammack 2002, p.159). The end of the twentieth century saw the process of neoliberal structural adjustment effectively become the development orthodoxy for the continent (Harrison 2010, p.39). The extent of SSA's dependency was apparent through IFIs ability to continue to advocate the implementation of neoliberal economic principles in the lead up to the end of the twentieth century, despite there being overwhelming evidence of their negative social, political and even economic consequences across the region (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.17).

International organisations have significantly risen in importance over the twentieth century, with the UN holding the key position of managing the international system (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.123). The UN General Assembly acted as a significant forum for voicing calls for decolonisation and this process also transformed the workings of the UN itself, with the high number of independent African states contributing to the significant increase in member states over the century (Hobden 2008b, p.80). Renewed and invigorated multilateralism in the second half of the century reflected the hegemonic ideas in the international system, and IFIs contributed to impose prevalent ideas and practices in the international system onto Africa (Harrison 2010, p.38).

Through exploring the key trends and forces prevalent in the international system and SSA's political economy over the twentieth century, the chapter has identified how SSA's conditions of dependence on external actors have arisen. At the end of the twentieth century, SSA was dependent on IFIs for determining the key ideas and approach with regards to SSA countries' development models and governance. Additionally SSA countries were dependent on the material capabilities of external actors at the end of the twentieth century. The study shall now use this knowledge to explore whether there is the scope for these conditions of dependence to alter through exploring the key trends formulating the dynamics and structure of SSA's political economy in the context of structural changes taking place in the international system between 2000 and 2011 in Chapter Four (Bayart 2000, p.234).

4. Key trends in SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011 in the context of structural changes occurring in the international system

4.1 Introduction

Over the past decade the nature of SSA's political economy has changed (Cornelissen 2011; African Development Bank *et al.* 2011). The region has experienced strong economic growth performances, which have contributed to the more positive rhetoric used by analysts, policy makers and corporations across the world to describe the region (Cornelissen 2011, p.5; Economist 2011; The Africa Competitiveness Report 2011, p.v). In addition, there has been a movement away from the previously hegemonic ideational notion of there being no alternative to neoliberalism towards exploring different ideas and new approaches to governance and developmental thinking, such as supporting greater regionalism, economic integration and FDI (Cargill 2010, p.24; Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7). SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011 has been characterised by increasing cooperation with a variety of partners, mainly in the form of multilateralism with the global South and developmental partnerships with the global North (Cargill 2010; Cornelissen 2009, p.6). SSA appears as the „swing continent“ caught up in the transition of material capabilities from traditional to emerging powers in the international system (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.171). Moreover, the material capabilities and political activity of SSA in international institutions is increasing, responding to the shift in material capabilities in the international system and supporting the need to rethink the predominant definitions and practices of global governance (BISA Africa - African Agency in International Politics 2011; Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.29). This chapter explores and analyses the extent to which the shift of relative material capabilities from traditional to emerging powers in the international system has contributed to this change in the nature of SSA's political economy.

The chapter first identifies the key trends and forces in the international system from 2000 to 2011. Having set this context, the chapter analyses the key trends and forces prevalent in SSA's political economy during this same period. It explores how have these been shaped by structural changes in the international system and subsequently analyses whether this change in the nature of SSA's political economy provides the scope for SSA's conditions of dependence to alter. It is suggested that the rise in emerging powers' economic and political prowess in the international system from 2000 to 2011 is the most determining trend for SSA's political economy during this period. This

process has had implications for the nature of SSA's political economy in an ideational, material capability and institutional capacity.

4.2 The rise in relative material capabilities of emerging powers in the international system from 2000 to 2011

The global power dynamics in the international system at the beginning of the twentieth-first century is „undergoing a cumulative reordering process,“ whereby emerging powers, such as Brazil, China, India and Russia, are occupying increasingly prominent roles in the international system (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.27). This structural shift in relative material capabilities from traditional to emerging powers appears systemic in nature, as it is based on a change in material capability related structures that are integral to the formation of the international system (Cox 1987).⁷ There are six key characteristics that typify an emerging power: 1) economic size; 2) the ability to influence „contemporary trajectories of the world economy“; 3) the desire to forge deeper diplomatic linkages with smaller nations in the South, in order to enhance the South-South solidarity for political means and exploit „economic and trade compatibilities“; 4) be a geographical location outside of the „sphere of North Atlantic industrial capitalism“; 5) the „consolidation of state strength“, epitomised by the aptitude to create the conditions for economic fortitude and the ideation of cohesion; and 6) the way in which their „shifting balance of influence confronts and forces adjustment to the established patterns of world hegemony“ and „the very constitutive character of the international system“ (Cornelissen 2009, pp.12-14). In comparison, an „emerging economy“ satisfies two criteria: firstly, government policies favouring economic liberalisation and the adoption of a free-market system, and secondly, one that has a rapid pace of economic development (Hoskisson *et al.* 2000, p.249). The study is focused on the relative rise of emerging powers“ material capabilities in the international system between 2000 and 2011.

This rise of emerging powers“ political and economic capabilities in the world „has to be read as both a shift in the balance of economic forces in the wider international system – a process which is underpinned by several interrelated factors – and as a political process, marked by a reorientation toward the nature and purpose of power, which is effecting exchanges in the international system in some significant ways“ (Cornelissen 2009, pp.11-12). This shift was hastened by the financial crisis of 2007-2010⁸, and has had knock on effects and implications for the predominant ideas concerning

⁷ CCT can be of use in identifying what has led to this structural shift, which in itself is a contested topic. The study is aware that the reasons for this structural shift is an important area of investigation but is beyond the key focus of the current study.

⁸ The phrase „financial crisis“ refers to the financial crisis ongoing from 2007 to 2010 for the remainder of the study.

developmental thinking and the previously hegemonic neoliberal notion of market efficiency (Kirman 2010, p.19; Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.9), in addition to highlighting the need to rethink definitions and practices of key international institutions (Cornelissen 2009, p.11; Scott 2010, p.4; Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.29).

4.2.1 The financial crisis of 2007 to 2010

The financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 arose due to an unbalancing of global finance and global production; with finance being understood as „the economic form of power over the (political) modes of social relations of production“ (Leysens 2008, p.55). Cox (1992, pp.180-181) identifies global production to make up the „real economy“ and global finance the „symbolic economy“, with the two concepts being interlinked. „[W]hen credit at the top behaves in unpredictable and unstable ways, feeding on itself rather than nourishing the real economy,“ the symbolic economy delinks from the real economy and productive capacity is reduced, with dangerous results (Cox 1992, p.181). This was evident in the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US that led to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 as shall now be summarised.

The sub-prime mortgage crisis arose due to „excessive debt leverage“ and „imprudent lending“ of financial houses, the majority of which being in the US, resulting in a „tipping point“ being reached (Wade 2008, p.27). This was reflected in the high default risk on a significant number of financial packages, resulting in an increase in anxiety amongst financial institutions. This high level of anxiety led to a lack of trust between banks and other financial houses. Consequently, „[w]hat started out as an unexpected default by some of the largest financial institutions in the global north soon mutated from a banking into a general and widespread malaise, affecting international commodity prices, extractive industries, the availability of domestic credit, economic growth prospects, labour markets and, ultimately, livelihoods“ (Cornelissen 2011, p.6). The financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 resulted in a highly destabilising force affecting the international system, with subsequent impacts differing in timing and substance across varying countries and regions of the world (Nesvetailova and Palan 2008, p.167). Broadly speaking, the financial crisis hastened a change in the economic tide from West to East (Quah 2010).

4.2.2 Undermining of trust in the neoliberal notion of market efficiency

The financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 raised the concern that „the whole intellectual framework that was being used to understand the economy was flawed“ as the „current economic predicament powerfully suggests that neoliberal economic thinking has run its course“ (Lent and Lockwood

2010, p.9). When the costs of trusting market efficiency theory became too high, states dismissed the neoliberal notion that no regulation was necessary to improve the performance of markets and intervened in the market, for example through the nationalisation of the Northern Rock bank in Britain (Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.11). The instability brought about by this financial crisis appeared in sharp contrast with the neoliberal ideal of a „perfectly competitive market with many small, independent companies,“ as the size and interconnected nature of the banks meant each was „too big to fail,“ thus contradicting the supposed efficiency of the market (Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.11).

States most badly affected by the financial crisis were those whose macroeconomic policy appeared in line with neoliberal market efficiency principles (Wade 2008, p.36). As a group, emerging powers appeared to weather the contraction of the global economy more effectively than advanced economies, and reliance was placed on emerging players to provide capital injections in order to stabilise the global economy (Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7). Thus, this financial crisis „has brought with it a crisis of ideas and, in particular, a crisis for the neoliberal worldview which holds that markets are inherently stable, self correcting, and able to form prices that correctly reflect all relevant information about supply, demand and risk“ (Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.11). When speaking of market efficiency in front of US Congress in 2008, Alan Greenspan, the former head of the US Federal Reserve, remarked that „the whole intellectual edifice collapsed in the summer of last year“ (as cited in Kirman 2010, p.19).

The financial crisis has raised awareness of the ethics of financial accountability and state regulation, and this criticism of neoliberalism has largely been directed towards the management of the global economy, as opposed to the purpose of neoliberalism (Cornelissen 2011, p.11). Thus despite the „end of neoliberalism“ rhetoric, in practice a distinct change in terms of governance or developmental practice has not occurred; the problem solving approach is focused on maintaining the status quo (Cox, as cited in Schouten 2010, p.5). For example, Chakravartty and Schiller (2010, p.685) argue that in reality an unreformed IMF and World Bank „continue their emphasis on neoliberal austerity, the policy that helped to foster the crisis in the first place,“ as they appear to focus on putting the broken pieces back together. However, the discussion surrounding the best way to manage governance and developmental models towards the end of the decade is significant, as it means neoliberalism is no longer the hegemonic ideational force in the international system in terms of CCT’s understanding, as it is not widely accepted as a collective image of social order (Cox1981, p.99).

Civil society has also expressed discontent and lack of trust in the financial system in the wake of the financial crisis. The upheaval from 2007 consolidated the growing international civil mobilisation demanding the democratisation of international politics. This growing „anti-globalisation movement“ expressed its presence through international events and summits, such as the vocal opposition and protests staged at the G8 Summit in 2008. Following the „(admittedly brief) period of consensus and ideological harmonisation after the end of the Cold War, consolidated around a seeming collective orientation towards the politics of neoliberal economics,“ the first decade of the twenty-first century appears to be the return of conflicting ideology in the international system (Cornelissen 2009, p.11).

4.2.3 Ramifications for the neoliberal developmental model

Despite neoliberalism being the hegemonic idea in the international system over the past decade, in practice its implementation through governance and developmental models has been wide-ranging (Cornelissen 2011, p.8). Neoliberalism has appeared varied in institutional form and its impact in different geographical settings around the world. For example, the neoliberal American developmental model differs slightly from the more welfare-centred European approach, and more substantially from the „Asian corporate practices which integrate business, government and subordinate labour organizations“ (O’Brian and Williams 2004, p.130). Despite the economic prowess of China, few of its beneficiaries around the globe to date are showing inclination to explicitly copy the Chinese model (Cox 2010, p.26). Thus, it can be seen that „[i]n its diffusion and institutionalism, the principles of neoliberalism have become refracted and are transformed through various institutional layers of governance and the preferences and interactions of different economic and social interest groups, leading to its variegated character“ (Cornelissen 2011, p.8).

In the aftermath of the financial crisis significant rhetoric has arisen discussing the decline of neoliberalism and its use as a developmental model (Kirman 2010, p.19; Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.9). For example, *The Turner Review* (2009, p.39), a report initiated by the British government on the root causes of the crisis, claimed that neoliberal market efficiency’s main assumptions are „now subject to extensive challenge on both theoretical and empirical grounds.“ Emerging powers appeared to weather the global recession better than traditional powers, due to a combination of policy choices made by emerging powers and underlying structural changes in their economies. These included macroeconomic policies that were successful in bringing inflation under control, greater trade and financial linkages among emerging economies (thus increasing their resilience as a group), and diversification of production and export patterns (Kose and Prasad 2010, pp.8-9). This raised important questions of how different governance and developmental models can impact the

future growth paths of economies around the world (Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7). Subsequently, recognition of how different effects of the financial crisis could be partially accounted for by a state's predominant ideological policy has also had the knock-on effect of highlighting different ideas and new approaches concerning governance and developmental models.

Exploration of different developmental models and engagement with SSA countries over the past decade has shown that framing relations predominantly on developmental issues with a country can be counterproductive to developmental goals as it „is implacably clientelist, i.e. it institutionalizes an unequal power relationship between donor and recipient“ which can result in resentment for donor countries (Cargill 2010, p.24). There is consensus that the current global aid system „suffers from a series of chronic structural problems which have been repeatedly shown to reduce the effectiveness of aid“ and other negative unintended consequences (Barder 2009, p.4). However, there are contesting views on whether aid can contribute to improving the lives of individuals and societies in developing countries, through means such as accelerating development (such as Collier 2007; Sachs 2005; Whitfield 2009). The majority of emerging powers attribute their rise in relative material capabilities to „processes and factors that do not conform strongly to the patterns of industrialisation of the traditional powers“ which has contributed to them placing less emphasis on development issues than traditional powers (Cornelissen 2009, p.14).

4.2.4 Revaluation of the role and nature of IFIs

In addition to having knock on effects for the predominant ideas concerning developmental thinking and the previously hegemonic neoliberal notion of market efficiency, this shift in the international system has highlighted the need to rethink the role and nature of IFIs (Subacchi and Pickford 2011, p.2). IFIs' mandates of dealing with aid, governance structure and responses to the financial crisis appeared ineffective in facing up to significant challenges presented from 2000 (European Parliament Briefing Paper 2009). Since 2000, civil society groups have expressed increasing concern with the increase in power of IFIs, questioning the relevance and legitimacy of these institutions wielding such significant power (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.125; Wade 2008, pp.43-44). The need for reform of the governance, mandate and financial structure of key IFIs was discussed at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a means to identify how to enhance such institutions' effectiveness, relevance and legitimacy, yet the debates appeared stagnant by 2007 (European Parliament Briefing Paper 2009, p.4). The onset of the financial crisis reinvigorated discussion on the need to reform IFIs in lieu of the frustration felt towards governments' and institutions' seeming inability to limit the effects of the financial crisis. States, financial groups and civil society looked towards IFIs as a means to determine what went wrong, make proposals for the

future and reform the representation of the developing world within these arenas (Wade 2008, pp.43-44).

A key critique of the IMF is its one-size-fits-all approach when granting assistance to countries. However, since the early 2000s the IMF has repeatedly expressed the aspiration to streamline conditionality, resulting in more tailored conditions for the specific circumstances of member states. Subsequently, the IMF has „pledged to eliminate “hard” structural conditionality, in the first instance through the discontinuation of structural performance criteria (including for low-income countries) as of May 2009“ and has demonstrated a clear difference in its treatment of varying countries with regards to the financial crisis (European Parliament Briefing Paper 2009, p.10). With regards to the World Bank, reforms to increase the influence of developing countries were agreed in October 2008 at the World Bank Group’s Annual Meeting. This first phase of reforms created an additional Chair at the World Bank Board for SSA, meaning developing countries now have the majority of the seats on the World Bank Board. Moreover this added voice for low income countries, bringing the voting power of developing countries to 44 per cent overall (World Bank Press Release 2009).

4.2.5 Reappraisal of global governance

Ideational shifts and the increasing prominence of emerging players in the international system between 2000 and 2011 have re-energised discussion surrounding the „self-appointed right“ of the US and G8 to dominate global governance (Wade 2008, p.25). Emerging powers have increased their economic relevance and political influence from 2000 through using „a strategy of both reinventing South-South political and economic cooperation and using their stronger global position to change the conventional practices and procedures“ of the established institutions of global governance (Scott 2010, p.4). This is illustrated by emerging powers increasingly lobbying IFIs for increased representation since 2000, culminating in a rise in IMF quota shares for emerging powers agreed in November 2010. Although it will only take effect from 2012, the reforms ensured that China will receive the third largest amount of votes (6.39 per cent of the quotas), and Brazil (2.31 per cent), India (2.75 per cent) and Russia (2.70 per cent) will join the IMF’s top ten shareholders (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.134). Emerging powers are „giving rise to the reordering of actual global relations and highlighting the need to rethink definitions and practices of global governance“ such as allowing a wider group of countries to shape the agenda of international institutions (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.29).

Emerging powers have been seeking a larger voice in international institutions not only through IFIs but also through membership of the G20 (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.122). Since 2000 there has been a shift in prominence from the G8 to the G20. As the G20 steadily gained mandate and authority „it became obvious that the old Western economic establishment of the G8 could no longer claim control or ascendancy over the international system and needed to engage more fully with the emerging powers in the G20“ (Cargill 2010, p.2). Formalised recognition of the importance of developing states in the political economy was established in 2007, when the G8 introduced the roles of „outreach partners“ for Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa as „equal and enduring partnerships“ (Cornelissen 2009, p.11). Focus was also granted to an expanded agenda including peace-building, climate change, the global environment and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This expansion of the G8’s membership and agenda „represents a fundamental altering of one of the most important constituents of the international political architecture painstakingly fashioned following the end of the second world war“ (Cornelissen 2009, pp.10-11). However, it has been contested that this „determination on the part of powerful states to strengthen multilateral institutions“ may just be a „last gasp of an old-fashioned concert of great powers“ seeking new compromises with emerging powers (Woods 2010, pp.59-60).

4.2.6 Challenging the hegemon?

According to CCT, a hegemonic world order ends based on the inherent contradictions that exist within it. Thus, the world order „generates global inequalities which eventually lead to feelings of frustration, alienation, and opposition“ that then result in the hegemon losing its legitimacy (Smith 2005, p.121). This results in the hegemon having to resort to coercive forms of dominance, which paradoxically accelerates its decline, and Cox (1996, p.518) identifies four alternative scenarios for what could follow. Firstly, the continuation of the key principles of the declining hegemony is maintained through cooperation with a group of other powerful states. Secondly, another powerful state could found a new hegemony. Thirdly, the declining hegemony could result in a non-hegemonic order, without effective universal principles of order culminating in the interplay of rival powerful states. Lastly, a counter-hegemonic order could arise, made up of a number of collective forces, reaching a degree of agreement of universal principles without dominance or dependence making up the alternative order (Cox 1996, p.518).

It is contested as to whether there is a counter-hegemonic challenge to *pax americana*, in the shape of individual rising emerging powers or as a group seeking multipolarity in the international system (Cornelissen 2009, p.15; Cox 2010, p.26; Ferguson 2010, p.24; Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.1; Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.27; Westad 2010, p.22). Looking to the country with the second largest GDP, it is apparent

that China is „determined to use its own economic strength to help it achieve a stronger international position, in terms of finance, export markets, and raw materials“ for its own national interests, yet China „does not have a grand strategy for a new world order“ (Cox 2010; Ferguson 2010, p.24; Westad 2010, p.22). Michael Cox (2010, p.26) argues that for China „it would be nigh on catastrophic to make any move to counter-balance the power of the US or to act globally in a way that challenged a world order that has underwritten 35 years of domestic stability and record economic growth“ for itself. A counter-hegemonic challenge by China could damage its relations with market democratic states in the region, such as Japan and Taiwan, as well as presenting an opportunity for the West to unite against China (Cox 2010, p.26).

It has been argued that China is increasing its soft power through its numerous activities abroad such as trade, extensive commodity extractions and infrastructure investments significantly in frontier markets in Africa and South America, yet it is not part of a counter-hegemonic historical structure (Ferguson 2010, p.24). Instead, China, and the region of East Asia at large, is contributing to an increasingly multipolar world with their emerging power status (Cox 2010, p.26). However, Shaw *et al.* (2009, p.27) assert that this new power dynamic of the rise of emerging powers marks the end of American hegemony, as the rapid and steady intrusion and recognition of emerging powers is „challenging the established order, wrenching global relations into a flux.“

Despite contrasting views on whether emerging powers are challenging the established (un)hegemonic international system, it is clear that the growth in relative material capabilities of these emerging powers reflects not only the „reconfiguring of power relations between the North-South but also a level of South-South developmental engagements that are challenging the existing orthodoxy of the “Washington Consensus”“ (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.1). From 2000 emerging powers have increasingly used multilateral forums as a means to change not only the „rules“, but the essence of the „game“ (Cornelissen 2009, p.15). Scarlett Cornelissen (2009, pp.14-15) furthers this notion, identifying that by the sheer size of their recent expansion, since 2000 emerging powers have unsettled the world’s economic epicentre(s) and their experiences are now often considered to offer alternative models of development. Additionally, the diplomatic and political activities of emerging powers, combined with the motives behind these acts, can have ramifications for the international system through „encroach[ing] upon the realms of neo-colonial influence of the North“ by drawing smaller states from the South under their sphere of influence and effecting the „established bonds of custodianship between developing countries and their formal imperial powers“ (Cornelissen 2009, p.15).

4.2.7 Ramifications of this shift in the international system

The rise in the relative material capabilities of emerging powers has been the most prominent process and driving force in the international system between 2000 and 2011: „emerging powers have ramifications for the ways in which central processes in world politics unfold“ (Cornelissen 2009, p.15). This structural change in the international system was hastened by the financial crisis. Combined, these processes have had ramifications for the reappraisal of key ideas and the nature of international institutions that were prominent at the onset of the decade. This can be seen by traditional powers relying on emerging players to provide capital injections in order to stabilise the global economy (Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7) and the rise in IMF quota shares agreed in 2010 for emerging powers in order to better reflect the make-up of the global economy (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.134). The capability of emerging powers to weather the repercussions of the financial crisis better than traditional powers raised questions concerning how different governance and developmental models can impact the future growth paths of economies around the world (Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7). Additionally, discussions on future economic cooperation were decided to be led by the G20 rather than the G8 in 2009 in order to best respond to the challenges brought on by the financial crisis (Cargill 2010, p.12). This rise in prominence in the international area has led to emerging powers using their stronger global position to change the conventional practices and procedures of the established institutions of global governance (Scott 2010, p.4). This change in the international system has significant implications for SSA’s political economy, as is now explored in more depth.

4.3 Key trends and forces in SSA’s political economy from 2000 to 2011

4.3.1 SSA’s economic performance and its societal implications

The beginning of the twenty-first century saw a significant increase of FDI into SSA, driven by increased international desire of access to oil, minerals and markets in the region (Southall and Comminos 2009, p.357). Recognition of SSA’s status as a relatively under-explored important source of natural resources saw a surge in FDI based around natural resource exploration activity; for example SSA is believed to hold approximately 30 per cent of the world’s mineral reserves (Prichard 2009, p.240). Moreover, an increase in global mineral and metal prices „spurred investment in the resource-rich regions of Africa“ as investors turned towards more under-explored markets, „provoking comparisons with the imperial scramble for Africa at the end of the nineteenth century“ (Hönke 2009, p.274).

This discussion surrounding the „scramble“ for SSA’s natural resources in the twenty-first century „is very much located in a global context of resource scarcity and international competition reaching into hitherto marginalised or bypassed areas“ (Southall 2009:10). Increased global demand for fossil fuels, spiked by China and India’s (amongst other emerging economies“) fast-growing oil consumption levels combined with traditional powers“ desire to decrease reliance on the Middle East (which holds approximately 66 per cent of known oil reserves), has resulted in SSA oil producing countries rising in strategic importance in the twenty-first century as traditional and emerging powers alike seek to secure access to oil (Southall 2009, p.13).

However, this investment boom at the onset of the twenty-first century has been distinguished by the emergence of emerging powers as investors in the region (Prichard 2009, p.254). Since 2000, emerging powers have been keen to encourage and consolidate trade and investment linkages with SSA (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.2). Despite the majority of FDI to the region still coming from traditional powers, the speed with which FDI is increasing from emerging powers to the region is significant (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.19). Africa is the source of approximately 40 per cent of the raw materials, fresh water, energy and agriculture needed in order to sustain global growth and its total population makes up one billion potential consumers (Cargill 2010, p.vii). Renewed and invigorated interest in SSA by emerging powers is driven by recognition of the opportunities that could be gained from investing in the region (Cargill 2010, p.vii). This increased desire for international access to natural resources combined with emerging powers“ increasing engagement with the region contributed to SSA’s strong average annual growth rate standing at approximately six per cent between 2002 and 2008 (Okonjo-Iweala 2010, p.37).

However, when the repercussions of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 became apparent, there were fears that SSA’s integral economic growth gains that had been established over the previous decade would be significantly affected (Cornelissen 2011, p.6). Trade had been one of the major drivers of SSA’s growth surge, the sustainability of which was threatened by the financial crisis as African exports faced a contracting market (African Development Bank – Policy Brief 2009, pp.1-2). Others believed that SSA would be spared the more serious repercussions of the financial crisis as SSA banks had little access to US-originated securities and because increasing engagement between SSA and emerging economies may have reduced SSA’s economic reliance on the US and Europe (Fosu and Naudé 2009, p.4). A number of SSA countries proved to be surprisingly resilient to the financial crisis, supported by a number of African central banks coordinating action to cut interest rates and stimulate demand successfully, which helped reassure national citizens and

foreign investors alike (Cargill 2010, p.23). This resilience can be demonstrated by 50 per cent of countries in the region achieving growth rates of above four per cent in 2010⁹, and approximately seven per cent of economies had growth rates below two per cent¹⁰ (World dataBank – African Development Indicators 2010)

However, in terms of the „real“ economy, countries in SSA were impacted in different magnitudes and temporal dimensions by the financial crisis. Largely speaking, countries that were more closely integrated into the global economy were at higher risk of experiencing significant economic shocks than those whose economies were not as aligned and were effectively shielded from the worst effects of the financial crisis (Cornelissen 2011, p.6). Countries that were less diversified and highly dependent on oil and minerals, such as Angola and Equatorial Guinea, were significantly affected by the financial crisis (Mutenyo 2011, p.29). SSA countries that were more diversified tended to be more resilient during the 2007 to 2010 financial crisis, such as Ghana, Senegal, and Tanzania, or recover faster, such as Kenya, Mauritius and South Africa (Mutenyo 2011, p.29). Oil-exporting countries in the region were amongst the first to feel the implications of the financial crisis, hit by falling commodity prices and the reduced world demand for fuel. Oil-importing countries had to navigate volatile fuel prices, capital flight and lowered investor confidence. Additionally, in early 2009, countries in the region reported large scale cuts to its labour force in the mining, automotive, resource extraction and tourism industry sectors (Cornelissen 2011, pp.6-7). The financial crisis came „on the heels of already sky-high fuel, food and fertilizer prices that had led to civil unrest in several African countries,“ which contributed to implications for SSA’s „real“ economy being widely felt (Cargill 2010, p.23). The 2008 food crisis had highlighted what could go wrong if food is substituted by biofuels production. Despite SSA having enough resources to feed its population as well as meeting global demand for food and agricultural products, this was not managed or monitored correctly and between 2003 and 2007 „two-thirds of the global increase in corn output went to bio-fuels, mostly to meet demands in the United States“ (Okonjo-Iweala 2010, p.39). This ill-management of corn contributed to the food crisis of 2008, which was exacerbated further by the financial crisis (World Bank – Africa’s Pulse 2011, p.7).

In latter half of the decade it was projected that an average annual growth rate of seven per cent was needed in SSA in order to meet the MDG of halving the number of people living on less than one

⁹ Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo DRC (Zaire), Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

¹⁰ Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Madagascar, Swaziland. It is worth noting that the 2010 GDP growth figures of Djibouti, Sao Tome and Principe and Somalia could not be ascertained by the World Bank and hence are not included in this calculation.

dollar a day (Fosu and Naudé 2009, p.13). This rate was not achieved in the lead up to the financial crisis (averaging just below five per cent annual growth between 2000 and 2008) and in 2009 it decreased further to 1.7 per cent (World Bank – Africa’s Pulse 2011, p.3). Markets in SSA have recovered better than those in most other parts of the world from the global downturn, with projections of economic growth of 4.5 per cent in 2011 (Okonjo-Iweala 2010, p.37). Despite the impressive resurgence, this reduction in growth as a result of the financial crisis is likely to include „higher unemployment and poverty, increases in infant mortality, and adverse coping with long-lasting impacts such as higher school dropout rates, reductions in healthcare and environmental degradation“ impacting societies in SSA (Fosu and Naudé 2009, p.13). Thus, the financial crisis significantly affected citizens’ livelihoods, particularly amongst the poorest parts of the region that were severely hit by the rise in world food prices in 2008 (Cornelissen 2011, p.8).

The Africa Competitiveness Report 2011 (2011, p.v) illustrated the region’s recovery from the global financial crisis was faster than many other areas of the world. The resurgence of SSA economies largely driven by natural resource commodities can be partially explained by traditional and emerging powers’ renewed emphasis on their search for energy security, as has been a key driver of FDI increase in SSA since 2000 (Southall 2009, p.13). In line with Africa’s promising economic growth, analysts, policy makers and corporations across the world have typified the region in a more positive light as the decade has progressed (Cornelissen 2011, p.5). This shift has been succinctly portrayed by the change in international discourse on Africa. For example, the Economist’s description of Africa has changed from „The Hopeless Continent“ in 2000 to „a more hopeful continent“ in 2011 (Economist 2011). This rhetoric swing occurred after identifying Africa as one of the world’s fastest growing regions from 2001 to 2010, with the „the lion kings“ of SSA (Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda) all featuring in the global top ten fastest growing economies (Economist, 2011). This rapid growth has arisen due to a combination of factors including: low GDP growth rates in prior years (presenting more potential for significant levels of catch-up growth); better economic management; significant inflows of FDI; and rising incomes fuelling faster growth in domestic demand (Economist, 2011). This strong performance by these „lion kings“ highlight that „[w]hile parts of Africa remain significantly challenged in terms of sustaining economic growth and social development and managing conflict, other parts of Africa have experienced significant progress“ with increased economic capabilities since the start of the twenty-first century (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.32).

4.3.2 SSA's political and societal resilience

Since 2000, a number of states in SSA have experienced political turbulence, such as South Africa, Kenya and Ghana amongst others, yet societies have largely used the political system in place to assert their claims (Lewis 2010, p.193). „The prevalence of elected governments, and societies“ broader scope for civil action, have provided outlets for popular grievances and demands“ and despite further hardships occurring due to the food, fuel and financial crisis in the last decade, popular reactions to the economic downturn have „not broadly unsettled the region“s regimes“ (Lewis 2010, p.193). Repercussions of the economic turmoil in the international system for SSA have included unemployment, a reduction in remittances income, a return to poverty for several millions of people, lower returns on agriculture, reduced returns on goods and commodities, and strains on the already weak government services across the region (Lewis 2010, p.194).

UNCTAD has forecasted that there will be 12 to 16 million additional poor people in SSA as a result of the financial crisis. Additionally, the World Bank (*Averting a Human Crisis* 2009, p.2) has warned that the poverty created is likely to have a female face, with women making up the majority of agricultural and textile employees who are the most likely to face cutbacks. Additionally, there is a historical tendency for African families to pull girls out of school as opposed to boys when family income falls, which could have significant implications for recent progress made in gender equality (World Bank – *Averting a Human Crisis* 2009, p.2). Linking this with the economic effects of the financial crisis, it can be seen that as food prices rose in the region, employment opportunities have fallen (Cramer *et al.* 2010, p.651). Governments „need to expand safety nets and pro-poor spending to address rising poverty levels“ and be aware of how a reduction in aid flows could have further implications for society (IMF – *Fiscal Policy in SSA* 2009, p.5).

This decade of economic growth has benefited from SSA countries involved in conflicts in the 1990s having moved from economic stagnation and decline towards economic growth, such as Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Uganda (Suruma 2011, p.6). There is considerable evidence that the resolution of conflicts in SSA is a fundamental pre-requisite for sustainable economic growth and development, yet between 2000 and 2011 there were still countries experiencing severe violence within the region, such as Somalia, those containing significant internal conflict, such as the DRC, and those with varied outbursts of violence, such as Kenya (Suruma 2011, p.6). The „ultimate resolution of conflicts in Africa requires political leadership that skilfully adopts formulas that suit the peculiar conditions of these African states“, highlighting the need for strong African leadership in order to maintain peace and reap the rewards

of economic growth (Suruma 2011, p.7). This movement shows how between 2000 and 2011 SSA displayed political resilience in addition to economic buoyancy (Lewis 2010, p.193).

4.3.3 Africa as the ‘swing continent’

Africa appears as the „swing continent“, caught up in „a fluid period of transition in the global balance of power and the international state system characterised by traditional and emerging powers“ which has led to the region playing a more prominent role in the international arena (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.171). This shift in the international system has implications for SSA’s political economy through providing the scope for partnerships with either and/or both groups of powers. Subsequently, between 2000 and 2011 traditional and „Northern“ powers have pursued closer engagement with SSA, through means such as international development and aid campaigns, while SSA countries have found themselves with the opportunity of pursuing deeper multilateralism with emerging and „Southern“ powers, aiming to reduce international disparities (Cornelissen 2009, p.6).

There has been increased engagement between the global North and SSA between 2000 and 2011, demonstrated through a number of initiatives, programmes and policies initiated through Northern-led institutions of finance and power that have placed renewed focus on the questions of poverty, development and good governance in SSA (Cargill 2010; Cornelissen 2009, p.15). This focus of traditional powers is relatively recent; in 1990, 82 per cent of Official Development Assistance (ODA) was allocated to agriculture, economic infrastructure, the financial sector and industry (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.108). However, by 2004 agriculture and industry saw their share halved, whilst those allocated for education, health and governance more than doubled in the same period (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.108). This increasing engagement and focus on development and good governance since 2000 has been characterised by conditionalities set by the North, thus reinforcing the unequal relationship that has been a prerequisite of engagement in the past (Cornelissen 2009, p.15). Since 2000, some fresh synergies have been observed between aid and official flows from traditional powers to promote developing countries access to long-term finance and can be linked to the rise of emerging powers“ engagement (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.113). As the decade has progressed rural development, agriculture and infrastructure are featuring more prominently in traditional powers portfolios with the SSA region (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.113).

From 2000 to 2011 increasing focus has been placed on the intensive pace of emerging powers“ engagement with SSA (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.19). SSA is of key geo-strategic significance to

emerging powers that seek to expand and modernise their industrial output and meet their ambitious growth objectives due to its relatively underexplored market and natural resources (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.2). Since 2000 emerging powers have increasing „invaded Africa with money, goods, ideas, and drilling and mining equipment“ as opposed to arms (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.19). An Indian academic noted that „[w]e need Africa not only for the oil but for political power too... But we do not have the money of the Chinese or the military might of the Americans. Therefore we have to rely on cooperating with African nations... where we have something to give“ (Ajay Dubey, quoted in *The Guardian* 9 April 2008, as cited in Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.32). The rise in emerging powers“ economic, and increasingly political, prowess between 2000 and 2011 has resulted in their increasing ability to offer business and development options to SSA countries, with South-South multilateralism being advocated as an alternative agenda to aiming to reduce international disparities (Cornelissen 2009, p.6). Emerging powers engagement with SSA during this period has placed emphasis on improving infrastructure and removing structural bottlenecks that are integral for SSA“s development, notably the issues less prioritised by traditional powers since 2000 (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.108).

Subsequently, SSA has „never been in such a strong bargaining position“ than at present with its increasing numbers of „suitors“ (Cargill 2010, p.viii). Thus, when analysing the levels of engagement between SSA and the global North and South, it is integral to note that „the significance of emerging powers should be measured not in the latter“s eclipse of the powers of the North, but in the political interplay between emerging and established powers and how this determines the broad tenor of international relations“ (Cornelissen 2009, p.15).

4.3.4 SSA’s engagement with emerging powers: friends or foes?

Despite the fact that many SSA countries fall into the LDCs category within the class system of state power in international politics and no state in SSA has been acknowledged as an emerging power, this ascent of emerging players nonetheless affects the region“s present and future in the international system (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.27). Academic scholarship on the changing nature of Africa“s relationship with emerging powers from 2000 to 2011 appears divided between two contrasting schools of thought. Firstly, that emerging powers“ engagement with African countries is purely exploitive, a form of neo-colonialism and destructive. Secondly, that emerging powers“ increasing engagement with Africa is benign and the relationship will not hamper Africa“s developmental objectives. Both of these interpretations of the complex phenomenon appear rigid and oversimplified, serving to „mask the nuances inherent in how these actors behave and interact

with economies on the African continent and whether they are refuelling Africa's development prospects" (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.2).

Firstly, it is important to remember that despite exploring SSA's engagement with emerging powers as a region, there are „multiple African realities“ that play a role in shaping emerging powers' engagement with African countries (Cornelissen 2011, p.11). Similarly, despite the fact that these emerging powers are all increasing their political and economic engagement with SSA, the varying diplomatic connections and degrees of interaction emerging powers are forging with Africa „demonstrate that the make-up of the new global governors is not homogenous and focused on necessarily the same interests“ (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.31). Subsequently, the increased presence of emerging powers in SSA has brought with it both benefits and potential negatives (Prichard 2009, p.254).

The diversity of emerging and traditional partners offers a „tremendous opportunity“ that increases SSA's material capabilities as each country brings with it an array of capital goods, developmental experience, products and technology as well as new opportunities to trade goods, knowledge and models (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.105). Benefits of increasing engagement between SSA and emerging powers since 2000 include creating and connecting markets in addition to improvements in regional infrastructure (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20; Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.2). For example, the lack of existing infrastructure in many SSA countries has meant that both companies and SSA host states have been forced to make major investments in order to facilitate business, particularly concerning the resource extraction industry (Prichard 2009, p.263). Additionally, increasing trade with and investment from emerging powers, in particular China and India, is reducing traditional powers' political leverage and economic dominance over the region (Southall 2009, p.31). It is likely to „increase the negotiating power enjoyed by governments seeking to maximise local benefits“ providing increased leverage for SSA states to improve their terms of engagement with investing firms (Prichard 2009, p.254). Shaw *et al.* (2009, pp.32-33) present examples of how South African corporations in more sophisticated sectors undertaking business in the region, such as service and retail suppliers, could benefit and gain new opportunities through increased Chinese mineral demands.

Despite there being „some evidence of the growth of a new generation of African entrepreneurs displaying an awareness of pan-African trading and business opportunities“, a concern remains that on the whole African capitalism is currently too weak and underdeveloped to fully participate and benefit from the region's resource boom much beyond existing niches in domestically-orientated

manufacturing (Southall and Comminos 2009, p.380). Shaw *et al.* (2009, p.33) also highlight how the niche national industry sectors of textiles and shoes in South Africa may be weakened by the prominence of Chinese imports. There is also concern surrounding emerging powers' commitment to upholding environmental and labour standards in addition to the risk of firms becoming involved in the financing of investments within conflict areas; these are issues China has been widely chastised for in its engagement with SSA (Prichard 2009, p.254). There is further concern that increasing access to natural resources could expand the potential for corruption in the allocation of exploration and extracting rights (Prichard 2009, p.254).

Looking at the state level of analysis, it can be seen that government leaders in SSA, both from authoritarian and more developmental regimes, broadly welcome Chinese investment and engagement (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.34). For example, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe has been proactive about adopting a „Look East“ policy since 2005 when he signed an aid deal with China, who offered a loan yet promised not to interfere in Zimbabwe's internal affairs (BBC – Mugabe signs aid deal with China 2005). Additionally, in 2008 President Festus Mogae of Botswana publically endorsed the increasing engagements between China and Africa, noting that the relationship ensured Africans were treated as partners as opposed to subjects, as perceived in the European model (*The Monitor* 25 April 2008, as cited in Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.34). There is the worry that emerging powers' seeming lack of concern with SSA policymakers' and leaders' corruption may be contributing to the survival of unaccountable regimes (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20).

Increasing interactions between SSA and emerging powers since 2000 have highlighted that SSA is unquestionably the weaker partner (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.32). The notion of emerging powers appearing as a dominant neo-colonial power in SSA in academic literature has largely been raised in the context of China's increasing involvement with the region (Alden *et al.* 2008). For example, the actions of and ventures undertaken by China's national oil companies in SSA appear largely driven by Chinese strategic interests to gain access to fuel resources in the region (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.34). Emerging powers' focus on securing natural resources from SSA has heightened debate concerning how much this increased engagement is based on solely achieving emerging powers' self interests as opposed to offering developmental benefits (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.3). This distinction is difficult to unravel because emerging powers' developmental assistance appears intrinsically linked to their national interest. For example, in 2008 India announced the formal agreement of 131 projects to Africa estimated to be worth \$10 billion, a new \$500 million development grant for African states and \$5 billion in financial credit to the African continent (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.35). However, these agreements have a „highly resource-supply oriented nature, either directly or

through infrastructure development“ and it is estimated that India imports eleven per cent of its oil from Nigeria (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.35). This example highlights that recent attention of emerging powers towards SSA „is not based on an altruistic goal to improve the economic well-being of Africans“ but instead emerging powers are „trying to maximise their own strategic economic and political interests by engaging with African countries“ (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20).

4.3.5 Exploring different ideas and new approaches to developmental thinking

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Shaw and Nyang‘oro (2000, p.25) asserted that „[a]fter a period of unprecedented decline, Africa’s developmental prospects now appear brighter than at any time since the decade of independence.“ The increasing economic importance of emerging powers since 2000 has highlighted different successful forms of economic models, which has „found hope among African countries wishing to chart a similar trajectory“ (Naidu *et al.* 2009, pp.1-2). This was reinforced by the fact that as a group, emerging powers weathered the ramifications of the financial crisis better than traditional powers, raising important questions regarding how different developmental models can impact the future growth paths of SSA economies (Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7).

In terms of offering new developmental models, the principles of „Asian values“, with its origins in the „Singapore school“ and the key works of Kishore Mahbubani, has attracted interest from SSA countries (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.33). Academic scholarship has offered variations of the „Asian rise“ thesis, with counter-arguments in place advocating the need for open and pragmatic government that engages with the global economy (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.33). However key interest appears to lie in non-aid related tools „such as the encouragement of foreign direct investment and support for greater regionalization and economic integration, which are essential for developmental goals across Africa [and] can generally be much more easily encouraged and pursued at a diplomatic and trade level than through development channels“ (Cargill 2010, p.24). This has become increasingly important since 2007, as foreign aid is „being squeezed“ due to government budget cuts in the wake of the financial crisis (Taiwo 2011, p.16). This shift in relative material capabilities in the international system has led to emerging powers being able to offer such forms of developmental assistance, which may be able to renew the drive for socio-economic development in SSA (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.2).

Despite much rhetoric from emerging countries citing „South-South solidarity“ and a „win win“ situation (Cargill 2010, p.vii), it appears unclear as to whether emerging powers are interested in furthering SSA’s developmental priorities or if they are just seeking to exploit the last relatively

unexplored region in order to gain natural resources necessary for their own national interests (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.3). This movement towards looking at different approaches and new ideas concerning developmental thinking could lessen SSA's dependence on IFIs setting certain conditionalities, yet developmental assistance from emerging powers must also „be balanced with respect and support for a regulatory and governance framework that ensures such investments deliver long-term benefits to all“ (Cargill 2010, p.vii). There is a concern about the lack of transparency between emerging powers and SSA policymakers and leaders in the signing of FDI and developmental contracts, especially to do with environmental standards and working conditions (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20). This is where the importance of agency arises, as SSA policymakers and leaders need to invest more time and money into the contracting process in order to establish it is more transparent (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20).

Between 2000 and 2011 the discoveries of oil and gas deposits in some SSA countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, São Tomé and Príncipe and Uganda, have presented new opportunities to chart a development path that facilitates poverty reduction (Aryeetey and Ashmah 2011, p.22). Despite these findings differing in size, there „are growing expectations among the citizens of these new oil economies of the immediate upswings in their livelihoods and improvements in quality of life“ as is expected that the economic benefits will be used to deliver significant economic, infrastructure and social improvements in these SSA countries (Aryeetey and Ashmah 2011, p.22). However, many of these countries have „failed to leverage their natural resource wealth to build strong and stable states“ as the findings have instead been associated with high poverty rates, corruption and weak institutions (Aryeetey and Ashmah 2011, p.23). According to Transparency International's 2010 *Corruption Perceptions Index*, Africa is the most corrupt region of the world, and the prevalence of corruption is one of the region's most difficult obstacles for development (Transparency International – Corruption Perceptions Index 2010). From 2000 to 2011 it has become more widely recognised that the quality of a country's governance institution is a crucial determinant of a country's development and economic growth (Kimenyi and Mbaku 2011, p.30). There have been significant improvements in governance over the past decade, yet the prevalence of corruption still remains a key challenge to development (Kimenyi and Mbaku 2011, p.30). Corruption is problematic because it deprives society of access to public goods and services that could assist their ability to rise out of poverty (Kimenyi and Mbaku 2011, p.30). Although most SSA countries „have set up elaborate anticorruption units, these bodies are largely ineffective and some have even been compromised by the appointing authorities“ (Kimenyi and Mbaku 2011, p.31). There is increasing recognition of the practices that need to be put into place in order to avoid the „resource curse“, with Botswana being an example SSA country that has managed its natural resources in order to advance

development, yet on the whole the region still suffers from a high level of corruption (Aryeetey and Ashmah 2011, p.23).

4.3.6 SSA's increasing use of diplomacy and political activity in institutions

Since 2000, SSA countries have played a more strategic role in international affairs, which has been assisted through their increasing use of diplomacy and political activity in a number of international institutions and with emerging powers (Cargill 2010, p.vii). Invigorated diplomacy has been initiated by emerging powers towards SSA over this past decade (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.29). Looking specifically to the increasing interaction of SSA with China, India and Brazil as examples of emerging powers, it can be seen that a number of summits, institutions and bilateral agreements have been set up in order to foster a strong relationship between them and SSA.

China initiated the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. FOCAC has gained increasing recognition of its diplomatic importance, with 43 African heads of state or government leaders attending the third FOCAC summit in 2006 (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.29). The Declaration of Sharm el-Sheikh and the Sharm el-Sheik Action Plan (2010-2012) were adopted by an assembly of African and Chinese leaders at the fourth FOCAC summit in 2009. The Declaration reflects the views of China and Africa on key global and regional issues and provides guiding principles for broadening and strengthening China-Africa cooperation. The Action Plan (2010-2012) highlights the priority areas for China-Africa cooperation, such as promoting regional peace and co-ordination in addressing global trade and financial issues, setting out guidelines and plans in order to help meet these objectives (FOCAC 2009).

India followed suit and initiated the India-Africa Forum Summit in 2008, whereby 14 African leaders selected by the AU met with prominent Indian leaders (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.30). The second India-Africa Forum Summit was held in 2011 and discussed the Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation and the scope for future partnership (AU 2nd Africa-India Forum Summit 2011). To date India-Africa cooperation has predominantly come in the form of technical training and private sector investment (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.130).

Brazil's President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has been one of the most vocal supporters of Africa's advancement on the international stage from 2000 to 2011, developing numerous bi-lateral relationships and undertaking visits to the SSA region (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.130). In July 2010, Brazil and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held a special Summit of Heads of State in Sal, Cape Verde, which further consolidated Brazil's

commitment to the region. The prominence granted to these frameworks, summits and action plans can be seen as institutional affirmation of the growing relationship between SSA and emerging powers.

Since 2000 the IMF has been discussing reform of its voting structure in order to „better reflect the make-up of the global economy rather than the world as it was when the IMF was set up“ at the end of WWII (Elliot 2006). Thus the IMF proposed that emerging powers would be granted increasing weighting in IMF voting structure. SSA countries „reacted furiously“ to such proposals on the basis that it would give priority to emerging countries „while delaying action to give the world’s poorest countries greater influence over the body that often dictates their economic policies“ leaving them in an even weaker and more dependent position (Elliot 2006). Since the proposal of emerging powers to increase their IMF quota share was passed in 2010 and will be implemented from 2012, the implications of this shift for SSA has yet to be seen (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.134). Looking to the World Bank and the other key IFIs, in October 2008 at the World Bank Group’s Annual Meeting reforms were agreed that created an additional Chair at the World Bank Board for SSA (World Bank Press Release 2009). This was seen to be a highly positive move for SSA countries, yet in April 2010 the World Bank issued further reforms which saw 18 of SSA’s (at the time) 47 countries lose quota share, with 60 per cent staying the same and only one (Sudan) gaining (World Bank 2010). Despite this loss of quota shares, as a region SSA has become „increasingly assertive in international forums and aware of its influence“ as a region making up nearly 25 per cent of the world’s countries, and subsequently as a large bloc in international institutions (Cargill 2010, p.43). Thus, as emerging and traditional powers are both keen to gain support and secure votes from the region, SSA’s material capabilities in international institutions have increased with the region’s increasing use of diplomacy and political activity.

Emerging powers“ desire to invoke a reordering of global relations and a rethink of key definitions and practices of global governance has been supported by SSA, which has focused on gaining more representation for the region in both IFIs and global governance institutions (BISA Africa - African Agency in International Politics 2011; World Bank Press Release 2009). However, there appears to be ambiguity about who speaks for SSA in these international forums and to what extent it is possible and desirable to present a common African position (Cargill 2010, p.43). The AU appears „the most constitutionally sound articulation of continent wide positions, yet its capacity is limited“ (Cargill 2010, p.43). The AU does not have a coherent strategy for managing the continent’s multi-bilateral relationships. The continent is marked by „fragile institutions that struggle to advance continental and regional governance against traditional notions of state sovereignty; notions that

reinforce Africa's colonial inherited fragmentation and, as a result, vulnerability to more powerful external state and regional actors" (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.189). The AU faces the challenge of increasing its ability to manage the inter-African system in a way that maximises the continent's interests in the wake of emerging powers' rising interests, in order to lessen its current weakness benefitting „the parochial vested interests of predatory elite impunity under the guise of state sovereignty" and instead help gain tangible benefits for the region as a whole (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.189).

Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal skilfully lobbied the G8 leaders in 2000 and 2001 to commit to appointing an African Personal Representative to work out an African Action Plan, which was launched in 2002 (Cargill 2010, pp.3-4). The G8 African Action Plan was drawn up based on the key aims and commitments set out in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Cargill 2010, p.6). NEPAD was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (the predecessor to the AU) in July 2001, with the aims to eradicate poverty; halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process; enhance Africa's full and beneficial integration into the global economy; accelerate the empowerment of women; change the systemic defects in Africa's political systems; and place African countries on a path of sustainable growth and development (Cargill 2010, pp.4-5; Cornelissen 2011, p.10). NEPAD represented the „determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world" (NEPAD 2001, p.1). NEPAD „set the stage for a new era of aid relations between Africa and the North, which, on the one hand, involved changes in the modalities and goals of Northern assistance to the continent and, on the other hand, the establishment of new, multilateral institutions of "partnership" " (Cornelissen 2011, p.10). Subsequently, the key implication of NEPAD is that it represented collective acceptance by Africa's leadership of the notion of „good governance" and encouraged the move for relationships with the North to be based on partnership, as opposed to conditionalities and dependence (Cornelissen 2011, p.10). Thus, the G8 „has played a valuable role in clarifying and anchoring a more strategic, coordinated and consultative approach to Africa's development needs among most Western countries," yet the latter years of this decade of analysis saw the G8's progress on Africa slow (Cargill 2010, p.vii).

In 2005, NEPAD began to „unravel" as the „African side of the push for international reform had run its course" (Cargill 2010, p.10). Since 2005, Africa has remained on the G8 agenda, yet the focus placed on aid at the detriment of business and private-sector linkages has resulted in the G8 diminishing in importance for SSA, echoing the shift in relative material capabilities that occurred

in the international system between 2000 and 2011 (Cargill 2010, pp.vii-viii). Criticism has been levied towards the G8's commitment to its African engagement, with G8 processes appearing little more than symbolic gestures in the light of a very small proportion of the pledged assistance actually being paid out (Cornelissen 2009, p.17).

The movement in the prominence of global governance from the G8 to the G20 has implications for SSA. The fact that many of the G20 countries are developing countries appears to strengthen its broad commitments to improve „fuel, food and finance to the world's poor“ through measures targeting issues such as food security, microfinance access and reducing the impact of climate change on the poor, which is highly beneficial for SSA countries (G20 - Pittsburgh Summit 2009). Moreover, prominence being placed on the G20 has increased the presence of emerging and developing powers at discussions of global governance, granting scope for more rounded discussions on development ideas and models within this forum (Cargill 2010, p.13). However, South Africa is the only SSA country represented in the G20, despite calls for inclusion by other SSA states, and it is limited in its ability to focus the G20 on issues the most pertinent to SSA (Cargill 2010, p.14). Subsequently, other SSA states, such as Angola, Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda, are focusing efforts on the G77 and other forums as a means to push African issues onto the agenda in the international system (Cargill 2010, p.14).

4.4 Conclusion

Having explored the key trends in Africa's political economy between 2000 and 2011, it can be seen that the nature of SSA's political economy has changed in this last decade from the conditions of dependence identified in the twentieth century (Cornelissen 2011; African Development Bank *et al.* 2011). The main trends of SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011 include a resilient economic and political performance in the face of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010, increasing engagement with emerging powers resulting in being typified as the „swing continent,“ and different ideas and new approaches with regards to developmental thinking and the role and nature of institutions. Through exploring the key trends and forces prevalent in SSA's political economy in the context of structural changes ongoing in the international system, it has become apparent that the nature of SSA's political economy has been highly influenced by the shift in relative capabilities from traditional powers to emerging powers in the international system that occurred during this decade (Cargill 2010; Cornelissen 2009; Kornegay and Landsberg 2009).

The financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 had significant repercussions in the international system as it hastened the shift in material capabilities from traditional to emerging powers. The rise in IMF quota shares agreed in 2010 for emerging powers and the reliance on emerging players to provide capital injections in order to stabilise the global economy depicts this (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.134; Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7). The move from the G8 to the G20 in 2009 as the key international institution to discuss future economic cooperation was decided to be the best means to best respond to the challenges brought on by the financial crisis (Cargill 2010:12). It was the capability of emerging powers to weather the repercussions of the financial crisis better than traditional powers that raised questions concerning how different governance and developmental models can impact the future growth paths of economies around the world (Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7). As the decade progressed, emerging powers used their stronger global position to try and change the conventional ideas, practices and procedures of the established institutions of global governance (Scott 2010, p.4).

At the end of the twentieth century, SSA was dependent on IFIs determining key ideas and approaches to SSA countries' development models and governance. However, emerging powers' rise in material capabilities through different factors and processes to traditional powers' own patterns of industrialisation gave rise to the notion that there are alternative models of development to neoliberalism (Cornelissen 2009, p.14). This shift in relative material capabilities in the international system during the first decade of the twenty-first century has resulted in emerging powers increasingly being able to offer different forms of developmental assistance based on non-aid-related tools to SSA, with the scope to help renew the drive for socio-economic development in the region (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.2). The option of different approaches and new ideas concerning developmental thinking, such as supporting greater regionalism, economic integration and encouraging FDI, could lessen SSA's dependence on IFIs setting certain conditionalities (Cargill 2010, p.vii). However, concern has been raised regarding emerging powers' lack of developmental contracts dealing with environmental standards and working conditions (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20). This raises the need for SSA policymakers and leaders to invest more time and money into the contracting process in order to make it more transparent and not hinder development in the region (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20). As Africa was ranked the most corrupt region of the world in 2010 (Transparency International – Corruption Perceptions Index 2010), there is the worry that emerging powers' seeming lack of concern with SSA policymakers' and leaders' corruption that it may even be contributing to the survival of unaccountable regimes (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20). Developmental assistance from emerging powers must also „be balanced with respect and

support for a regulatory and governance framework that ensures such investments deliver long-term benefits to all" (Cargill 2010, p.vii).

SSA countries were dependent on the material capabilities of external actors for managing the key policies and elements of their political economy at the end of the twentieth century. However, when looking at the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 as one of the key trends in both the international system and SSA's political economy between 2000 and 2011, it can be seen that SSA weathered the crisis, albeit with ongoing effects. SSA countries that were more diversified tended to be more resilient than those that were highly dependent on a few commodities (Mutenyo 2011, p.29). Despite SSA economies fronting an impressive resurgence in their „symbolic“ economy, the impact on the „real“ economy was heightened by the overlap with the 2008 food crisis (Cargill 2010, p.23). SSA citizens' livelihoods are likely to be impacted in years to come through higher levels of unemployment, poverty and child mortality rates, with reduced rates on goods and commodities resulting in strains on the already weak government services across the region because of the financial crisis (Fosu and Naudé 2009, p.13; Lewis 2010, p.194). SSA countries have also displayed political resilience, as popular grievances and demands from civil society in the wake of the food, fuel and financial crises have not predominantly unsettled the regimes. The increased number of democratic governments has allowed scope for civil dissatisfaction without challenging the regimes in place (Lewis 2010, p.193).

Additionally, since 2000 SSA states have embarked on invigorated diplomacy with emerging powers, utilising the rhetoric of partnership and solidarity between the global South (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.29). This rise in emerging powers' engagement with SSA has had the positive influence of highlighting the need for traditional powers to fund and promote access to rural development, agriculture, long-term finance and infrastructure projects for developing countries (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.113). In contrast, exploration of the key trends in SSA's political economy has shown that traditional powers have placed renewed focus on the issues of poverty, development and good governance, with the engagement often characterised by set conditionalities that appear in continuation of an unequal relationship (Cornelissen 2009, p.15).

The emphasis placed by emerging powers on improving infrastructure and other structural bottlenecks since 2000 has been beneficial for SSA, as these were issues less prioritised by traditional powers at the turn of the century and are integral to SSA's development (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.108). The diversity of emerging and traditional partners wanting to increase their engagement with SSA countries offers a „tremendous opportunity,“ as the array of

developmental experience, products and technology as well as new opportunities to trade goods, knowledge and models presents SSA with opportunities and lessens the likelihood of future conditions of dependence (African Development Bank *et al.* 2011, p.105).

The significant increase in and nature of engagement between SSA and emerging powers has led to discussions of whether emerging powers' increasing engagement with SSA countries is purely exploitive or benign are rigid and oversimplified stances that do not suffice to help understand the complex phenomenon (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.2). The concern of developing countries maintaining very low standards of corporate social responsibility has been raised, alongside the worry that increasing competition for access to mineral rights will result in increased corruption and politicisation of access, which could be detrimental to citizens and the democratic governance of SSA states (Prichard 2009, p.254). It is important to raise the question of whether emerging powers are trying to forge a relationship with SSA that could ultimately lead to conditions of dependence. It would be naïve to assume that emerging powers' increasing engagement with SSA is based on an altruistic goal to improve the economic well-being in SSA. It is important to remember that emerging powers have increased this engagement in order to achieve their own strategic economic and political goals (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20). Exploration of the nature of the increasing interactions between SSA and emerging powers between 2000 and 2011 indicates that at present SSA is the weaker partner (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.32).

Thus, this chapter has carried out an exploration of the key trends in SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011. It has shown how the structural shift in relative material capabilities in the international arena from traditional to emerging powers has highly shaped the nature of SSA's political economy during this period. There has been a heightened desire of traditional and emerging powers to engage with SSA, coupled with the increased capability of emerging powers to do so. Combined with increased diplomatic opportunities for the region, these trends show there is an opportunity for SSA to enhance its independence. To fully exploit the opportunity, SSA leaders must work cohesively, improve governance and issues of corruption, and resist moves by emerging powers to encourage conditions of dependence.

5. Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

The study has aimed to increase understanding of the nature of SSA's political economy. The majority of scholarly literature written on SSA has focused on humanitarian crises, poverty, war, corruption and conflict (Dunn and Shaw 2001; Taylor and Williams 2004). The study suggests that mainstream IR and IPE theory largely overlook SSA, and consequently mainstream IR and IPE literature is inadequate to provide explanations for emergent trends in SSA's political economy. Academic scholarship on SSA's place in world politics largely focuses on evaluating policies adopted by African states towards the outside world, as opposed to analysing the policies external powers have undertaken towards SSA and the subsequent effects this has had on the region (such as Harbeson and Rothchild 1995). For the above reasons, a number of studies exploring SSA's place in world politics have failed to evaluate SSA's position within the context of structural changes occurring in the international system (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.3).

SSA's political economy is infused with dependence that can be identified through exploring the historical context of the twentieth century that shaped it. Since dependence is „a historical process, a matrix of action,“ this allows for the possibility of dependence to alter as a result of a change in the dynamics and structure making up the international system and the key trends within SSA's political economy (Bayart 2000, p.234). Emergent trends and shifts in SSA's political economy, including strong economic growth performances and increasing South-South cooperation, appear to contradict a dependent and conflict ridden depiction (Cornelissen 2011, p.5). The thesis identifies that these changes in SSA's political economy have arisen because of systemic changes occurring in the international system.

These points have formed the rationale of the study, shaping the main and supporting research questions: *What have been the key trends prevalent in SSA's political economy from 2000-2011 and how have these been shaped by structural changes in the international system? Does the nature of SSA's political economy between 2000 and 2011 give scope for SSA's conditions of dependence to alter?* This chapter shall now explore the main theoretical and empirical themes in order to answer and reflect on the research questions, before discussing the scope for future research.

5.2 Theoretical framing

The study has recognised that there is a need for „a revision on how Africa should be interpreted in the theoretical assumptions of international relations“ (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.1). The study has systematically explored the key attributes of mainstream IR and IPE theories, highlighting their shortcomings in furthering understanding of the nature of SSA’s political economy. Subsequently, the study highlighted key epistemological and ontological aspects that should be taken into consideration when exploring the nature of SSA’s political economy. The importance of history, the need for various units and levels of analysis, the influence of internal and external agency, and the importance of identifying ideational and institutional strength in addition to military power, led to the identification of the need for a historicised pluralist framework that recognised the importance of both structure and agency.

This exploration and analysis of the mainstream IR and IPE theories and Africa’s epistemological and ontological requirements directed the study towards selecting CCT as a critical framework to facilitate exploration of SSA’s political economy. Through identifying CCT’s concept of hegemony in the international system and the historical structure, the heuristic approach of studying the prevalent forces concerning material capabilities, ideas and institutions at different levels of analysis appeared a useful lens of analysis. The ambitious nature of both CCT and the study combined with practical constraints, such as time and word limitations, ensured that predominant focus was placed on „forces from above“ using the framework of analysis.

The key criticisms levelled towards CCT’s epistemology, ontology and empirical application were explored, with counter arguments presented when founded. Criticisms ranged from CCT not searching for recurrent themes (Schechter 2002, p.5) to its treatment of the „Third World“ as a singular entity, highlighting the difference between „core“ and „periphery“ countries yet overlooking the differences between countries categorised as periphery (Samatar and Samatar 1987). Exploration of CCT has highlighted the limited number of scholarly applications of this theoretical approach in an African context. The criticisms and concerns highlighted have undoubtedly influenced this scholarly distancing of applying CCT to analysis of SSA.

Recognition of these various weaknesses has influenced the study’s decision to narrow focus to the CCT concepts of hegemony in the international system and historical structures. It has highlighted the key benefits of this lens of analysis through its applicability and use when applied to exploring both the international system and SSA’s political economy. The study has used this historicised critical approach in order to „broaden the scope of inquiry by analysing forces favouring or

opposing changing patterns of behaviour," thus allowing for the systematic exploration of shifts and key trends in SSA's political economy within the context of structural changes occurring in the international system (Cox, as cited in Schouten 2010, p.6).

5.3 Major themes

Exploration of the key trends prevalent in SSA's political economy in the context of the nature of the international system highlighted how SSA's political economy was infused with dependence in the twentieth century. The key ideas and institutions prevalent in SSA's political economy in the twentieth century were heavily influenced by the respective significant ideas and institutions in the international system. This historical context shows that even since independence, SSA countries have been dependent upon external requirements and resources as a result of both external and internal actors' actions. However, since 2000 the nature of SSA's political economy has changed. The key trends prevalent in SSA's political economy continue to be highly shaped by the nature of the international system, with the structural shift in relative material capabilities from traditional to emerging powers in the international system having significant implications for SSA's political economy. The main trends of SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011 include increasing engagement with emerging powers; different ideas and new approaches with regards to development thinking and the role and nature of international institutions; and a resilient economic and political performance in the face of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010. This historicised approach has enabled the study to explore whether the nature of SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011 provides scope for SSA's conditions of dependence to alter.

These trends have been made up of the interactions between the key forces of ideas, institutions and material capabilities. The chapter now highlights the dynamics of these key forces in SSA's political economy in both the twentieth and early twenty-first century.

5.3.1 Material capabilities

The twentieth century saw a shift in historical structure from *pax britannica* to *pax americana* and the US remained the hegemon at the end of the century. SSA was highly shaped by *pax britannica*, with a number of SSA states having been colonised by the UK. The 1960s and 1970s were met with optimism by and for the newly independent SSA states following the relatively smooth processes of decolonisation and consolidation (Cornelissen 2009, p.8). However, SSA states emerged entrenched in Western-centred political economy, due to their key political and economic institutions forming strong linkages with previous colonial powers (Clapham 1996). Subsequently, decolonisation

further facilitated SSA's condition of dependence on the same external actors that had been utilised in colonialism (Chiriyankandath 2008, p.36). SSA leaders and policymakers found their capabilities weakened by the number of powerful actors with whom they had to compete in order to maintain control of the state (Hobden 2008b, p.72).

SSA's political economy was further impacted by external actors throughout the Cold War, as proxy wars and actions of external actors deepened internal crises across the region (Cornelissen 2009, p.8; Hobden 2008b, pp.74-75). In order to gain economic resources and political support, a number of SSA leaders embarked on alliances of convenience with either the US or the USSR and their respective allies in the Cold War, resulting in neopatrimonial tendencies becoming prevalent and undermining the legitimacy of states and societal cohesion in the region (Hobden 2008b, p.75). Instability in SSA was increased by proxy wars in states or their neighbouring countries. This heightened political instability and weak economic capabilities led states to increasingly turn to IFIs for financial support (Chazan *et al.* 1999, p.337). Neoliberal ideational criteria had to be met by SSA states in order to gain financial assistance, which resulted in IFIs gaining external control of SSA states' political economies through means such as SAPs (Harrison 2010, pp.12-13). The end of the Cold War brought with it renewed insecurities for a number of SSA countries, as conflict within states had implications for neighbouring countries (Hobden 2008b, p.76). SSA's main commodities were being more effectively produced by other developing nations, which further decreased SSA's material capabilities as the region became less important to global investors and IFIs (Callaghy 2008, p.40).

However, the structural shift in the international system that has occurred since 2000 has seen a move in relative material capabilities from traditional powers to emerging powers (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.27). This structural shift has resulted in Africa becoming the „swing continent“ caught up in the global transition of power, which has increased its material capabilities (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.171). Countries from both the global North and South have pursued closer engagement with SSA since the beginning of 2000. However the nature of the partnerships offered contrast, with Northern powers focusing on aid and development and the emerging Southern powers focusing on reducing international disparities and FDI (Cornelissen 2009, p.6). As the decade progressed, emerging powers used their stronger global position to try to change the conventional ideas, practices and procedures of the established institutions of global governance, which benefited the African agenda of seeking more representation in global governance and IFIs (Scott 2010, p.4). SSA weathered the effects of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 better than most regions, with its „symbolic“ economy gathering impressive growth rates in its wake (Cargill 2010,

p.23). The implications for the „real“ economy were heightened by the 2008 food crisis, and there is the ongoing danger of citizens“ livelihoods experiencing higher levels of unemployment, poverty and child mortality rates as a result of the financial crisis (Fosu and Naudé 2009, p.13). SSA demonstrated significant political capabilities, as despite the disruptions caused by the food, fuel and financial crisis, civil dissatisfaction has been expressed by societies without largely challenging the governing regimes in place (Lewis 2010, p.193).

5.3.2. Ideas

The key ideas concerning SSA“s political economy in the twentieth century were effectively enforced by external actors and infused conditions of dependence on SSA countries. The process of independence in SSA presented anti-colonists with little option other than to maintain the sovereign state as the key political and economic unit, as was prevalent and entrenched within the international system during this period (Cooper 2003, p.67). Subsequently, newly independent SSA states emerged entrenched in a Western-centred political economy, without a shared feeling of national unity among its citizens, due to the socially constructed nature of the African state and the endurance of pre-existing social dynamics following independence (Clapham 1996). Additionally, the notion of capitalism was the key idea for how to organise both domestic and international political economies, albeit in different forms as the century progressed (Gilpin 2000). Neoliberal capitalism rose in prevalence and became the hegemonic idea in the international system in the 1980s (Gilpin 2000). This had knock on implications for SSA, as neoliberal reforms of SSA“s political economy were imposed and largely driven through externally led processes as a form of „scientific capitalism“ (Ferguson 1995). This resulted in the process of neoliberal structural adjustment effectively becoming the developmental orthodoxy for the continent (Harrison 2010, p.39).

This rise in emerging powers“ economic, and increasingly political, prowess has resulted in their increasing ability to offer business and developmental options to SSA countries between 2000 and 2011 (Naidu *et al.* 2009, pp.1-2). Additionally, the ability of emerging powers to weather the financial crisis more effectively than traditional powers has seen SSA countries express more interest in emerging powers“ developmental models. The option of different approaches and new ideas concerning developmental thinking could lessen SSA“s dependence on IFIs setting certain conditionalities (Cargill 2010, p.vii). African countries looking towards different ideas and new approaches to governance and developmental models represent an ideological shift away from a collective orientation towards the politics of neoliberal economics towards more contrasting

ideology in terms of developmental thinking and global markets in the international system (Cornelissen 2009, p.11).

5.3.3 Institutions

International organisations rose in strategic importance over the twentieth century, with the UN holding the key position of managing the international system (O'Brian and Williams 2004, p.123). The nature of SSA's political economy was impacted by the UN General Assembly's advocating the process of decolonisation and the high number of independent African states contributed to the significant increase in member states of the UN over the century (Hobden 2008b, p.80). Renewed and invigorated institutional multilateralism in the second half of the century reflected the hegemonic ideas in the international system, and IFIs imposed prevalent ideas and practices in the international system onto SSA (Harrison 2010, p.38).

Between 2000 and 2011, emerging powers have highlighted the need for the reordering of global relations and advocated rethinking definitions and practices of global governance, such as allowing a wider group of countries to shape the agenda of international institutions (Shaw *et al.* 2009, p.29). This shift has been favourable for SSA's political economy, which has historically been underrepresented in IFIs and global governance institutions despite being highly influenced by decisions generated by such institutions. Since 2000 African countries have increased their use of diplomacy and political activity in IFIs, resulting in the region playing a more strategic role in international affairs as the decade progressed (Cargill 2010, p.vii). Emerging powers have placed increased prominence on frameworks, summits and action plans with African as a region, such as FOCAC and the Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation. These appear as an institutional affirmation of the growing relationship between SSA and emerging powers. Reforms of the IMF and World Bank can be seen as favourable to SSA because they represent a move away from traditional powers' monopoly of the institutions to a weighting that more closely represents the make-up of the global economy (World Bank 2010). However, in reality these reforms grant little improvement to SSA's marginal influence in these IFIs.

In the twentieth century SSA was predominantly acted upon by international governance and financial institutions, with conditionalities being set for SSA's own national institutions. However, the start of the twenty-first century shows the region has become increasingly assertive in international forums and aware of its influence, making up nearly 25 per cent of the world's countries and a substantial bloc in international institutions (Cargill 2010, p.43). From 2000, the G8 has played a significant role in „clarifying and anchoring a more strategic, coordinated and

consultative approach to Africa's development needs among most Western countries," yet the latter years of this decade of analysis saw the G8's progress on Africa slow (Cargill 2010, p.vii). Criticism has been directed towards the G8 for its processes appearing little more than symbolic gestures, as a very small proportion of the pledged assistance has actually been paid out (Cornelissen 2009, p.17). The movement in prominence from the G8 to the G20 in the international system presents the opportunity for issues more pertinent to developing countries to be discussed in this arena, yet as South Africa is the only SSA country represented in the G20 it is limited in its ability to focus the G20 on issues most pertinent to SSA and effectively represent the region (Cargill 2010, p.14).

5.4 Reflections on SSA's conditions of dependence

Through undertaking analysis of the nature of the international system and SSA's political economy in the twentieth century, the nature of SSA's conditions of dependence on external powers and institutions has been identified. Exploration of the key trends prevalent in SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011 has shown a shift in relative material capabilities from traditional powers to emerging powers to be the key trend and process during this period. The study consents with Bayart's (2000, p.234) understanding of dependence being a historical process and hence reliant on the dynamics and structure making up the international system. Additionally, the study acknowledges Cox's (1981) determination that an alternative structure in the international system can arise under pressure from forces from above as well as those from below. Thus, since the period of 2000 to 2011 has seen a structural change occur in the international system, does this give rise to different dynamics between the key ideas, institutions and material capabilities in the international system and SSA's political economy that could alleviate this dependence?

Exploration of the ramifications of this rise in emerging powers' material capabilities indicated that there were both benefits and downfalls for SSA and its political economy. Despite much rhetoric from emerging countries citing „South-South solidarity“ and a „win win“ situation (Cargill 2010, p.vii), it appears unclear as to whether emerging powers are interested in furthering SSA's developmental priorities or if they are just seeking to exploit the last relatively unexplored region in order to gain natural resources necessary for their own national interests (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.3). However, emerging powers' increase in economic capabilities has enabled them to offer new forms of developmental assistance to countries in SSA which offers a different path to that imposed by IFIs, to whom the majority of SSA countries are already in significant debt (Naidu *et al.* 2009, pp.1-2). This movement towards looking at different approaches and new ideas concerning

developmental thinking could lessen SSA's dependence on IFIs that set certain conditionalities, yet developmental assistance from emerging powers must also „be balanced with respect and support for a regulatory and governance framework that ensures such investments deliver long-term benefits to all“ (Cargill 2010, p.vii).

The increased engagement of emerging powers with SSA should not be measured as the demise of traditional power's engagement (Cornelissen 2009, p.15). Since 2000, traditional powers have also pursued closer engagement with the African continent, yet through means such as international development and aid campaigns as opposed to emerging powers' focus on pursuing deeper multilateralism and FDI (Cornelissen 2009, p.6). SSA's material capabilities have increased as both emerging and traditional powers are keen to gain support from SSA in international institutions. SSA has „never been in such a strong bargaining position“ than at present with its increasing numbers of „suits“, yet African leadership appears „insufficient and the activism and vision that characterized the first few years of the twenty-first century are less in evidence now“ (Cargill 2010, p.viii).

In order for SSA countries to gain the benefits of working with a myriad of traditional and emerging powers, the region's leaders are best placed to mitigate the possible problematic issues that may arise (Cargill 2010, p.viii). African policymakers and leaders must consider to what extent these economic powerhouses can represent the global South's and Africa-specific issues in international forums. Moreover, what SSA wants to gain and stands to gain from South-South and Southern-driven multilateral alliances must be identified (Cornelissen 2009, p.6). At present it is not clear whether SSA is effectively managing these partnerships. SSA needs to strengthen the AU and its other inter-African bodies in order to ensure that neither the global North or South „carve out relationships with the AU (or indeed, bypass it) that will facilitate external national interest agendas that are as much self interested as in Africa's interest and not necessarily entirely on African terms“ (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.188).

The level of agency attributed to African leaders and policymakers themselves is a highly underexplored aspect of SSA's political economy and international relations (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.3), yet one that needs to be further explored in order to ascertain whether the emerging dynamics in the international system and SSA's political economy could alleviate SSA's dependence on external powers and institutions. Numerous challenges will continue to arise for SSA in effectively guiding increasing engagements with emerging powers, yet „how Africa comes to grips with the

challenges will, in many respects, determine and define the opportunities“ of alleviating its historical dependence (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.172).

5.5 Scope for future research

The study was an ambitious yet illuminating project. Using SSA as the unit of analysis was challenging, as it resulted in a macro study of key forces within the region falling under the themes of ideas, institutions and material capabilities. However the rationale for this unit of analysis is strong, as there is a shared perception of Africa’s unity that is constructed transnationally through collective images of social order. Also, this is a key unit of analysis used in both academic and policy literature which has not been explored from this theoretical framework before. The lack of scholarly literature exploring SSA’s political economy means that the current study and future studies utilising CCT in this manner will contribute to further understanding on the nature of SSA’s political economy.

The study has contributed to both IR and IPE literature through identifying how a narrowed version of CCT can facilitate analysis of SSA’s political economy in the context of structural changes taking place in the international system. This highlights to IR and IPE scholars that if one broadens the scope of explorative tools beyond the main paradigms, CCT provides a useful theoretical framework to analyse African issues. Moreover, because of CCT’s flexibility in proving a useful lens of analysis to also facilitate the exploration of the international system, as shown in the study, advocating the application of CCT to Africa does not run the risk of continuing Africa’s marginalisation in IR and IPE or „essentialise“ the continent (Smith 2009, p.273).

The study puts forward that CCT would be a useful tool when undertaking analysis of the political economy of other developing regions that have struggled to be explained using the more traditional IR and IPE paradigms. Moreover, analysis of a sub-region of Africa, such as the Great Lakes or a regional economic community, would be interesting for further study. A study utilising a narrowed version of CCT to explore a smaller unit of analysis would provide scope for more focus to be placed on the dynamics of state-society complex as agents of change.

Despite CCT offering scope for the analysis of both structure and agency, through exploring the dynamics between the key forces prevalent in the historical structure of the international system and SSA’s political economy this study has predominantly been grounded in structural analysis. This limited the study’s exploration of agency in SSA’s political economy, which was further

complicated by the level of agency attributed to African leaders and policymakers being a highly underexplored area (Naidu *et al.* 2009, p.3). Further analysis of the level of agency attributed to African leaders and policymakers would help ascertain whether there is the desire amongst political leadership to alleviate Africa's dependence on external powers and institutions.

5.6 Conclusion of Study

The study has appraised the nature and dimensions of SSA's political economy and the forces that underpin them, using a narrowed CCT framework of analysis. The study has aimed to fill a gap in the current literature on SSA's political economy through identifying a framework that would assist the exploration of key forces and trends ongoing between 2000 and 2011. It has highlighted the need to position studies of SSA within the context of structural changes occurring in the international system, as shifts in SSA's political economy have arisen partly as a manifestation of changes occurring in the international system. Through utilising a narrowed version of CCT, it has explored Africa's dependence on external actors as a result of a historical process. The study has identified how key ideas, institutions and material capabilities in the international system highly influenced the key trends within SSA's political economy in the twentieth century and from 2000 to 2011. The specific use of CCT as a framework has provided the means to analyse the fluid interactions between the key forces in SSA's political economy and the international system, allowing analysis of the possibility of SSA's conditions of dependence to alter. The study has shown how the shift in relative material capabilities from traditional to emerging powers has had the most significant ramifications for the nature of SSA's political economy, giving scope for SSA's dependence on external actors and institutions to alter if African leaders and policymakers desire it to.

References

African Partnership Forum, 2009. *The crisis of Africa: Monitoring the global response*. Rome, Italy 10 June 2009.

African Union, 2011. *2nd Africa-India Forum Summit*. [online] African Union. Available at: <<http://www.au.int/en/summit/AfricaIndia>> [Accessed 15 July 2011].

Alden, C., Large, D. and Soares de Oliveira, R., eds, 2008. *China returns to Africa: a rising power and a continent embrace*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Aryeetey, E. and Asmah, E., 2011. Africa's new oil economies: Managing expectations. In: Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, 2011. *Foresight Africa: The continent's greatest challenges and opportunities for 2011*. [pdf] New York: Brookings. Available at: <http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/01_africa_economy_agi.aspx> [Accessed 12 June 2011].

Asante, M. K., 2007. *An Afrocentric Manifesto: Toward an African Renaissance*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Babbie E., and Mouton, J., 2001. *The practice of social research*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Barder, O., 2009. *Beyond planning: Markets and networks for better aid*. [online] Centre for Global Development: Working Paper 185. Available at: <<http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1422971/>> [Accessed 10 August].

Bayart, J. F., 1991. Finishing with the Idea of the Third World: The Concept of the Political Trajectory. In: J. Manor, ed. 1991. *Rethinking Third World Politics*. London: Longman, pp.51-71.

Bayart, J. F., 2000. Africa in the world: A history of extraversion. *African Affairs*, 99, pp. 217-267.

BBC News, 2005. *Mugabe signs aid deal with China*. BBC News [online], 26 July 2005, 15:01 GMT 16:01 UK. Available at: <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4713961.stm>> [Accessed 15 July 2011].

BISA Africa, 2011. *African Agency in International Politics – Seminar Series*. [online] BISA Africa. Available at: <<http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/bisa-africa/african-agency/>> [Accessed 15 July 2011].

Blyth, M., 2009. Introduction: IPE as a global conversation. In: M. Blyth, ed. 2009. *Routledge handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a global conversation*. New York: Routledge, pp.1-20.

Braudel, F., 1972. History and the Social Sciences: The Long View. In: P. Burke, ed. 1972. *Economy and Society in Early Modern Europe*. New York: Harper and Row, pp.11-42.

Brown, W., 2006. Africa and International Relation: a comment on IR theory, anarchy and statehood. *Review of International Studies*, 32(1), pp.119-142.

Bryman, A., 1984. The debate about quantitative and qualitative research: A question of method or epistemology?, *The British Journal of Sociology*, XXXV(1).

Burnell, P. and Randall, V., 2008. Introduction. In: P. Burnell and V. Randall, eds. 2008. *Politics in the developing world (Second edition)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.1-11.

Burnell, P., 2008. Governance and conditionality in a globalising world. In: P. Burnell and V. Randall, eds. 2008. *Politics in the developing world (Second edition)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.291-311.

Callaghy, T. M., 2008. Africa and the world political economy: Still caught between a rock and a hard place? In: Rothchild, D. and Harbeson, J. W., eds. 2008. *Africa in world politics: Reforming political order*. Boulder: Westview Press, pp.39-71.

Cameron, A. and Palan, R., 2009. Empiricism and objectivity: Reflex theory construction in a complex world. In: M. Blyth, ed. 2009. *Routledge handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a global conversation*. New York: Routledge, pp.112-125.

Cammack, P., 2002. Neoliberalism, the World Bank and the new politics of development. In: U. Kothari and M. Minogue, eds. 2002. *Development theory and practice: critical perspectives*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp.157-78.

Campbell, B. K. and Loxley, J., 1989. *Structural adjustment in Africa*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Cargill, T., 2011. *Our common strategic interests. Africa's role in the post-G8 world*. London: Chatham House (Royal Institute of International Affairs).

Cerny, P., 2009. Bridging the transatlantic divide? Toward a structural approach to International Political Economy. In: M. Blyth, ed. 2009. *Routledge handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a global conversation*. New York: Routledge, pp.140-159.

Chakravartty, P. and Schiller, D., 2010. Neoliberal Newspeak and Digital Capitalism in Crisis. *International Journal of Communication*, 4, pp. 670-692.

Chazan, N., Lewis, P., Mortimer, R., Rothchild, D. and Stedman, S. J., 1999. *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. pp.337-350.

Chiriyankandath, J., 2008. Colonialism and post-colonial development. In: P. Burnell and V. Randall, eds. 2008. *Politics in the developing world (Second edition)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.35-52.

Clapham, C., 1996. *Africa and the International System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clapham, C., 2005. The evolution of Africa's International Relations. In: U. Engel, and G. R. Olsen., eds. 2005. *Africa and the North: Between globalisation and marginalisation*. Oxon: Routledge, pp.20-37.

Clift, B. and Rosamond, B., 2009. Lineages of British International Political Economy. In: M. Blyth, ed. 2009. *Routledge handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a global conversation*. New York: Routledge, pp.95-111.

Cohen, B., 2007. The transatlantic divide: Why are British and American IPE so different? *Review of International Political Economy*, 14(2), pp.197-219.

Cohen, B., 2009. The multiple traditions of American IPE. In: M. Blyth, ed. 2009. *Routledge handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a global conversation*. New York: Routledge, pp.23-35.

Collier, P., 2007. *The Bottom Billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cornelissen, S., 2009. Awkward embraces: Emerging and established powers and the shifting fortunes of Africa's international relations in the twenty-first century. *Politikon*, 36(1), pp. 5-26.

Cornelissen, S., 2011. *The start of history? The promises and limitations of emerging vectors in Africa's political economy*. [online] Inaugural lecture delivered at the University of Stellenbosch. Available at: <<http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/16329?show=full>> [Accessed 12 September 2011].

Cox, M., 2010. Don't count the West out yet, *LSE Research Magazine*, 2. [online] Available at: <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/LSEResearchMagazine/RM_2.aspx> [Accessed 10 August].

Cox, R. W., 1981. Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond International Relations theory, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10(2), pp.126-55. Reprinted in Cox, R. W. and Sinclair, T. J., 1996. *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R. W., 1983. Gramsci, hegemony and International Relations: An essay in method. *Millennium*, 12(2), pp.162-75.

Cox, R. W., 1987. *Production, power and world order: Social forces in the making of history*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Cox, R. W., 1992. Towards posthegemonic conceptualization of world order: reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun. In: J. N. Rosenau and E. O. Czernpiel, eds. 1992. *Governance without government: Order and change in world politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, R. W., 2002. *The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization*. London: Routledge.

Cox, R. W., 2007. „The International“ in Evolution. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 35(3), pp.513-527.

Cox, R. W. and Sinclair, T. J., 1996. *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cramer, C., Johnston D., and Oya, C., 2009. Africa and the credit crunch: From crisis to opportunity? *African Affairs*, 108/433, pp. 643-654.

Devetak, R., 2005. Critical Theory. In: S. Burchill et al., eds. 2005. *Theories of International Relations (Third edition)*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.137-160.

Devine, F., 2002. Qualitative Methods. In: D. Marsh and G. Stoker, eds. *Theory and Method in Political Science*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002, pp.197-215.

Dirks, N., 2004. Colonial and postcolonial histories: Comparative reflections on the legacies of empire, *Cultural liberty in today's diverse world*. Global Background Paper for United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report.

Dunn, K.C., 2000. Tales from the dark side: Africa's challenge to International Relations Theory. *Journal of Third World Studies*, 17(1), pp.61-91.h

Dunn, K. C., 2001. Introduction: Africa and International Relations Theory. In K. C. Dunn and T. M. Shaw, eds. 2001. *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp.1-8.

Dunn, K. C. and Shaw, T. M., eds., 2001. *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Economist, 2011. A more hopeful continent, the lion kings?, *The Economist.*, [online], Available at: <<http://www.economist.com/node/17853324>> [Accessed 15 July 2011].

Elliot, L., 2006. *Africa calls on Brown to block IMF reforms*. The Guardian, [online], 31 August 2006. Available at:

<<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/aug/31/politics.internationalaidanddevelopment>>

[Accessed 15 July 2011].

Engel, U. and Olsen. G. R., 2005. Global politics and Africa – and Africa in International Relations Theory. In: U. Engel and G. R. Olsen, eds. 2005. *Africa and the North: Between Globalisation and Marginalisation*. Oxon: Routledge, pp.1-19.

European Parliament Briefing Paper, 2009. *The international response to the global crisis and the reform of the international financial and aid architecture* [pdf], Brussels: European Parliament. Available at: <<http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/Woods-EU-briefing-International-Response-to-the-Financial-Crisis.pdf>> [Accessed 15 July 2011].

European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, Policy Department, 2009. *The international response of the global crisis and the reform of the international financial and aid architecture*. Brussels: European Parliament.

Fearon, J. D., and Laitin, D. D., 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War, *American Political Science Review*, 97(1), pp. 75-90.

Ferguson, J., 1995. From African socialism to scientific capitalism: Reflections on the legitimization crisis in IMF-ruled Africa. In: D. Moore and G. Schmitz, eds. 1995. *Debating development discourse*. Houndsmills: Palgrave, pp.129-49.

Ferguson, N., 2010. Imperial dreams, imperial nightmares, *LSE Research Magazine*, 2. [online] Available at: <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/LSEResearchMagazine/RM_2.aspx> [Accessed 10 August].

FOCAC, 2009. *Forum on China-Africa cooperation Sharm el Sheikh action plan (2010-2012)*. [online] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China. Available at: <<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm>> [Accessed 15 July 2011].

Fosu, A. and Naudé, W., 2009. *The global economic crisis: Towards a syndrome-free recovery for Africa*. [Online] UNU-WIDER. Discussion Paper No.2009/03. Available at: <http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/newsletter/articles/en_GB/09-06-2009/> [Accessed 12 June 2011].

Frieden, J. and Lake, D., 1991. Introduction. In: R. Frieden and D. Lake, eds. 1991. *International Political Economy*. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp.1-15.

Frieden, J. and Martin, J., 2003. International Political Economy: Global and domestic interactions. In: I. Katznelson and H. Milner, eds. 2003. *Political Science: The state of the discipline*, New York: W. W. Norton, pp.118-146.

G20, 2009. *Pittsburgh Summit*. [pdf] G20 Publications. Available at:
<http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx> [Accessed 15 July 2011].

Gamble, A., 2009. *Spectre at the Feast: Capital Crisis and the Politics of Recession*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gareau, F. H., 1996. International Institutions and the Gramscian Legacy: Its Modification, Expansion, and Reaffirmation. *The Social Science Journal*, 33(2), pp.223-253.

George, A. and Bennet, A., 2005. *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Cambridge and London: MIT Press.

Gibbon, P., and Ponte, S., 2005. *Trading down: Africa, value chains and the global economy*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Gill, S., 1991. *American hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gilpin, R., 1987. *The political economy of International Relations*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gilpin, R., 2000. *The challenge of global capitalism: The world economy in the 21st century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gilpin, R., 2001. *Global Political Economy: Understanding the international economic order*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Grugel, J., 2008. Democratization and the realm of politics in International Political Economy. In: N. Phillips, ed. 2008. *Globalising International Political Economy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.193-220
- Harbeson, J. W. and Rothchild, S., 1995. *Africa in world politics: Post-Cold War challenges*. Boulder: Westview Press
- Harrison, G., 2010. *Neoliberal Africa: The impact of global social engineering*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Harvey, C., 1991. Recovery from macroeconomic disaster in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: C. Colclough and J. Manor, eds. *States or markets? Neoliberalism and the development policy debate*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.121-47.
- Harvey, D., 2007. Neoliberalism as creative destruction. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 610(1), pp.21-44.
- Hay, C., 2004. The Normalising role of rationalist assumptions in the institutional embedding of neoliberalism. *Economy and Society*, 33(4), pp.500-27.
- Higgott, R. and Watson, M., 2008. All at sea in a barbed wire canoe: Professor Cohen's transatlantic voyage in IPE. *Review of International Political Economy*. 51(1), pp.1-17.
- Hobden, S., 2008a. The developing world in the global economy. In: P. Burnell and V. Randall, eds. 2008. *Politics in the developing world (Second edition)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.53-70.
- Hobden, S., 2008b. The developing world in international politics. In: P. Burnell and V. Randall, eds. 2008. *Politics in the developing world (Second edition)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.71-87.
- Hoffman, M., 1987. Critical theory and the inter-paradigm debate. *Millenium*, 16(2), pp.231-249.
- Hönke, J., 2009. Extractive Orders: Transnational Mining Companies in the Nineteenth and Twenty-First Centuries in the Central African Copperbelt. In: R. Southall and H. Melber, eds. 2009. *A New*

Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp.274-298.

Hoskisson, R. E., Eden, L. Ming Lau, C. and M. Wright, M., 2000. Strategy in emerging economies, *The Academy of Management Journal*, 43(3), pp.248-267.

International Monetary Fund, 2009. *Fiscal policy in Sub-Saharan Africa in response to the impact of the global crisis*. [online] The International Monetary Fund: Staff Position Note. Available at: <<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0910.pdf>> [Accessed 8 August].

Jackson, R. H., 1990. *Sovereignty, International relations and the Third World*. Cambridge MA: Basil Blackwell.

Jessop, B. and Sum, N. L., 2006. *Beyond the Regulation Approach. Putting Capitalist Economies in Their Place*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Kimenyi, M. S. and Lewis, Z., 2011. The BRICs and the new scramble for Africa. In: Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, 2011. *Foresight Africa: The continent's greatest challenges and opportunities for 2011*. [pdf] New York: Brookings. Available at: <http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/01_africa_economy_agi.aspx> [Accessed 12 June 2011].

Kirman, A., 2010. The Economic Crisis is a Crisis for Economic Theory. In: CESifo (Centre for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute), *CESifo Economic Studies Conference on 'What's Wrong with Modern Macroeconomics?'* Munich, Germany 6-7 November 2009, updated version September 2010. Munich, CESifo.

Kornegay, F.A., and Landsberg, C., 2009. Engaging emerging powers: Africa's search for a „common position“. *Politikon*, 36(1), pp. 171-191.

Kose, M. A. and Prasad, E. S., 2010. Emerging markets come of age. *Finance and development*, December 2010, pp.7-10.

LaMonica, C., 2007. African Political Thought and International Relations: Challenges and Prospects. *Australasian Review of African Studies*, 28(1), pp.34-73.

- Lamy, S., 2004. Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism. In J. Baylis and S. Smith, eds. 2004. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.205-225.
- Lavelle, K.C., 2005. Moving in from the periphery: Africa and the study of international political economy. *Review of International Political Economy*, 12(2), pp. 364-379.
- Leftwich, A., 2008. Theorising the state. In: P. Burnell and V. Randall, eds. 2008. *Politics in the developing world (Second edition)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.211-28.
- Lent, A. and Lockwood, M., 2010. *Creative destruction: Placing innovation at the heart of progressive economics*. [online] The Institute for Public Policy Research. Available at: <<http://www.ippr.org/publications/55/1815/creative-destruction-placing-innovation-at-the-heart-of-progressive-economics> > [Accessed 13 August].
- Lewis, P. M., 2010. African economies new resilience. *Current History*, May 2010, pp.193-199.
- Leysens, A. J., 2006. Social forces in Southern Africa: Transformation from below?, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 44(1), pp.31-58.
- Leysens, A. J., 2008. *The Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox: Fugitive or Guru?*, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Linklater, A., 2005. Marxism. In S. Burchill, A. Linklater, R. Devetak, J. Donnelly, M. Paterson, C. Reus-Smit and J. True. 2005. *Theories of International Relations*. 3rd ed. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.110-136.
- Loxley, J. and Sackey, H., 2008. Aid Effectiveness in Africa. *African Development Review*, 20(2), pp.163-99.
- Mamdani, M., 1995. Democratization and Marketization. In: K. Mengisteab and B. Logan, eds. 1995. *Beyond Economic Liberalization in Africa*. London: Zed Books, pp.17-21.
- Mbembe, A., 2001. *On the Postcolony*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mentan, T., 2004. Conceptual Framework. In T. Mentan, ed. *Dilemmas of Weak States: Africa and Transnational Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. pp.19-48.

Moore, D., 2001. Neoliberal Globalisation and the Triple Crisis of „Modernisation“ in Africa: Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa, *Third World Quarterly*, 22(6), pp.909-29.

Moosa, I. A., 2002. *Foreign Direct Investment; Theory, Evidence and Practice*. [pdf] p.3. Palgrave.

Available at:

<http://www.petrigashi.000space.com/Fakulteti%20Filologjik,%20UP/Master/Mbi%20Investimet%20e%20Jashtme%20Direkte/FDI_Theory%20evidence%20and%20practice_kapituj%20te%20zgjedhur.pdf> [Accessed 15 July 2011].

Murphy, C. N. and Nelson. D., 2001. International Political Economy: A tale of two heterodoxies. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 3(3), pp.393-412.

Mutenyo, J., 2011. Driving Africa’s growth through expanding exports. In: Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, 2011. *Foresight Africa: The continent’s greatest challenges and opportunities for 2011*. [pdf] New York: Brookings. Available at:

<http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/01_africa_economy_agi.aspx> [Accessed 12 June 2011].

Naidu, S., Corkin, L., and Herman, H., 2009. Introduction. *Politikon*, 36(1), pp. 1-4.

Nel, P., Taylor I. and van de Westhuizen, J., 2000. Multilateralism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for a Critical Rationale. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 6(1), pp.43-60.

NEPAD, 2001. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development. [online] Available at: <<http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/nepadEngversion.pdf>> [Accessed 15 July 2011].

Nesvetailova, A. and Palan, R., 2008. A Very North Atlantic Credit Crunch: Geopolitical Implications of the Global Liquidity Crisis. *Journal of International Affairs*, 62(1), pp.165-185.

O’Brian, R. and Williams, M., 2004. *Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Okonjo-Iweala, N., 2010. Fulfilling the promise of sub-Saharan Africa. In: McKinsey&Company, 2010. *McKinsey on Africa: A continent on the move*. [online] Available at: <<http://mckinseysociety.com/mckinsey-on-africa>> [Accessed 15 July 2011].
- Onuf, N., 1998. Constructivism: A user's manual. In: V. Kubálková, N. Onuf and P. Kowert, eds. 1998. *International Relations in a constructed world*. Armond, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Ottaway, M., 2008. Civil Society. In: P. Burnell and V. Randall, eds. 2008. *Politics in the developing world (Second edition)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.166-85.
- Osler Hampson, F., 1997. Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World. *International Journal*, 52(4), pp.735-748.
- Peck, J., and Tickell, A., 2002. Neoliberalising Space, *Antipode*, 34(3), pp.380-404.
- Phillips, N., 2005a. Globalising the study of International Relations. In N. Phillips, ed. *Globalising International Political Economy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.1-19.
- Phillips, N., 2005b. State Debates in International Political Economy. In: N. Phillips, ed. *Globalising International Political Economy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.82-115.
- Phillips, N., 2009. The slow death of pluralism. *Review of International Political Economy*, 16(1), pp.85-94.
- Prichard, W., 2009. The Mining Boom in Sub-Saharan Africa: Continuity, Change and Policy Implications. In: R. Southall and H. Melber, eds. 2009. *A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp.240-273.
- Puchala, D. J., 1998. Third world thinking and contemporary International Relations. In S. Neuman, ed. 1998. *International Relations Theory and the Third World*. Basingstoke: Macmillan. pp.133-159.

Quah, D., 2010. From West to East, *LSE Research Magazine*, 2. [online] Available at: <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/LSEResearchMagazine/RM_2.aspx > [Accessed 10 August].

Richmond, J., 2005. *Customer expectations in the world of electronic banking: a case study of the Bank of Britain*. Ph. D. Anglia Ruskin University.

Rotberg, R. J., 2003. Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators. In R. J.

Rotberg, ed. 2003. *State Failure and State Weaknesses in a Time of Terror*. Washington DC: Brookings Institutional Press. pp.1-29.

Ruggie, J. G., 1998. What makes the world hang together?, Neo-Utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge. *International Organization*, 52(4), pp.855-85.

Sachs, J., 2005. *The end of poverty: economic possibilities for our time*. Allen Lane.

Schechter, M. G., 2002. Critiques of Coxian theory: Background to a conversation. In: Cox, R. W. ed. 2002. *The political economy of a plural world: Critical reflections on power, morals and civilisation*. London: Routledge: pp.1-18.

Schouten, P., 2008. Theory Talk #22: Kevin Dunn on Identity in International relation, the African Challenge to IT Theory and the White-male Bias of the Field, *Theory Talks*. [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/10/theory-talk-22>> [Accessed 7 January 2011].

Schouten, P., 2009. Theory Talk #27: Christian Reus-Smit on IR Cultures, Re-thinking IR and Bridging the Normative-Empirical Divide, *Theory Talks*. [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/03/theory-talk-27.html>> [Accessed 7 January 2011].

Schouten, P., 2010. Theory Talk #37: Robert Cox on world orders, historical change, and the purpose of theory in International Relations, *Theory Talks*. [Online]. Available at: <<http://www.theory-talks.org/2010/03/theory-talk-37.html>> [Accessed 7 January 2011].

Scott, J., 2010. *South-South trade and North-South politics: Emerging powers and the reconfiguration of global governance*. [Online] BWIP working paper. Available at:

<<http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/resources/Working-Papers/bwpi-wp-13110.pdf>> [Accessed 12 June 2011].

Shaw, T.M., Cooper, A.F., and Chin G.T., 2009. Emerging powers and Africa: Implications for/from global governance? *Politikon*, 36(1), pp. 27-44.

Shaw, T. M. and Nyang'oro, J. E., 2000. African renaissance in the new millennium? From anarchy to emerging markets?, *African Journal of Political Science*, 5(1), pp.14-28.

Sibanda, N., 2010. *Where Zimbabwe got it wrong - lessons for South Africa :A comparative analysis of the politics of land reform in Zimbabwe and South Africa*. Masters. University of Stellenbosch.

Sklias, P., 1999. *Non-governmental organisations and the international political economy, with special reference to the European Union's development policy*. Athens: Nubis.

Smith, K., 2005. *Conceptions of global political transformation: A critical exploration of ideational and normative approaches*. Ph.D. University of Stellenbosch.

Smith, K., 2009. Has Africa got anything to say?, African contributions to the theoretical development of International Relations. *The Round Table*, 98(402), pp.269-284.

So, A. Y., 1990. *Social change and development: modernization, dependency and world-systems theories*. London: Sage Publications Limited.

Soederberg, S., 2002. The New International Financial Architecture: Imposed leadership and "Emerging Markets". In: L. Panitch and C. Leys, eds. 2002. *Socialist Register: A World of Contradictions*, London: Merlin Press, pp.175-92.

Solli, A., 2009. *Theorising African states: The case of Angola from a Critical Theory perspective*. Masters. University of Stellenbosch.

Southall, R., 2009. Scrambling for Africa? Continuities and Discontinuities with Formal Imperialism. In: R. Southall and H. Melber, eds. 2009. *A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp.1-34.

Southall, R. and Comninos, A., 2009. The Scramble for Africa and the Marginalisation of African Capitalism. In: R. Southall and H. Melber, eds. 2009. *A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp.357-385.

Southall, R. and Melber, H., 2009. Conclusion: Towards a Response. In: R. Southall and H. Melber, eds. 2009. *A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp.404-427.

Southall, R. and Melber, H., eds., 2009. *A New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Spegele, R. D., 1997. Is Robust Globalism a Mistake?, *Review of International Studies*, 23(2), pp.211-239.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1999. *Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmaments*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Subacchi, P., and Pickford, S., 2011. *Legitimacy vs effectiveness for the G20: A dynamic approach to global political governance*. London: Chatham House.

Suruma, E. S., 2011. Conflicts and prospects for economic growth. In: Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, 2011. *Foresight Africa: The continent's greatest challenges and opportunities for 2011*. [pdf] New York: Brookings. Available at:
<http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/01_africa_economy_agi.aspx> [Accessed 12 June 2011].

Taiwo, O., 2011. Improving aid effectiveness for Africa's economic growth. In: Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings, 2011. *Foresight Africa: The continent's greatest challenges and opportunities for 2011*. [pdf] New York: Brookings. Available at:
<http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2011/01_africa_economy_agi.aspx> [Accessed 12 June 2011].

Taylor, I. and Williams, P., 2004. Introduction. In: Taylor, I. and P. Williams, eds. 2004. *Africa in international politics: external involvement on the continent*. London: Routledge, pp.1-20.

- Transparency International, 2010. *Corruptions Perceptions Index 2010 Results*. [online] Transparency International. Available at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results [Accessed 15 July 2011].
- The Turner Review, 2009. *The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis*. London, UK: The Financial Services Authority.
- UNCTAD, 2002. *About UNCTAD*. [online] UNCTAD. Available at: <http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1530&lang=>> [Accessed 15 July 2011].
- United Nations, 2011. *Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present*. United Nations, Membership Growth. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml> [Accessed 15 July 2011].
- Underhill, G. R. D., 2000. State, market and Global Political Economy: Geneology of an (inter-?) discipline. *International Affairs*, 46(2), pp.791-810.
- Wade, R., 2008. The First-World Debt crisis of 2007-2010 in Global Perspective. *Challenge*, 51(4), pp.23-54.
- Waltz, K. N., 1986. Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics. In R. O. Keohane, ed. 1986. *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press. pp.322-345.
- Westad, A., 2010. The new New World Order, *LSE Research Magazine*, 2. [online] Available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/LSEResearchMagazine/RM_2.aspx > [Accessed 10 August].
- Williams, D., 2008. *The World Bank and Social Transformation in International Politics: Liberalism, Governance and Sovereignty*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Whitfield, L., ed., 2009. *The politics of aid: African strategies for dealing with donors*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Woods, N., 2010. Global Governance after the Financial Crisis: A New Multilateralism or the Last Gasp of the Great Powers? *Global Policy*, 1(1), pp.51-63.

World Bank, 1994. *Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead*, Oxford University Press, New York.

World Bank, 2000. *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?*, The World Bank, Washington DC.

World Bank – Averting a Human Crisis, 2009. *Averting a human crisis during the global downturn: Policy options from the World Bank's Human Development Network*. [online] The World Bank: Conference Edition. Available at:

<<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/AvertingTheHumanCrisis.pdf>> [Accessed 10 April].

World Bank, 2009. *World Bank Governors Approve Governance Reforms, Adding Board Seat for Africa* [press release], 11 February 2009, Available at:

<<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22066796~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html>> [Accessed 15 July 2011].

World Bank – Africa's Pulse, 2011. *An analysis of issues shaping Africa's economic future*. [pdf] Vol3, The World Bank. Available at:

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/Africas-Pulse-brochure_Vol3.pdf> [Accessed 14 September 2011].

World dataBank – African Development Indicators, 2010. *Sub-Saharan Africa Data*. [online] Available at: <<http://data.worldbank.org/region/SSA>> [Accessed 15 February 2012].

World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the African Development Bank, 2011. *The Africa Competitiveness Report 2011*. [online] Available at:

<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GCR_Africa_Report_2011.pdf> [Accessed 13 September 2011].

Young, C., 2004. The end of the postcolonial state in Africa? Reflections on changing African political dynamics, *African Affairs*, 103(410), pp.23-51.