

XENOPHOBIA CONFLICT IN DE DOORNS; A DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION CHALLENGE FOR DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT

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Mini research report presented in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Philosophy (Journalism).
at the University of Stellenbosch

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Declaration

By submitting this research report electronically, I, Johannes Rudolf Botha, declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

JR Botha

February 2012

Acknowledgements

Thank you very much:

- My supervisor, Mr Josh Ogada for his invaluable guidance and patience.
- My wife Greetje and sons Rudolf, Bernard and Roald for their motivation, patience and support
- De Doorns Reintegration Task Team
- Breede Valley Municipality

Come senators, Congressmen

Please heed the call

Don't block at the doorway

Don't block up the hall

For he that gets hurt

Will be he that has stalled

There's a battle outside

And it's ragin'

It'll soon shake your windows

and rattle your walls

For the times they are a – changing

Bob Dylan – from his song, “The times they are a – changing”

Abstract

Xenophobic hostility is not an unfamiliar concept – it is practiced all over the world, also in South Africa. Defined by the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) as *a deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state*, it constitutes a violation of the human rights of a targeted group, threatening the very principals upon which the young democracy is modelled on. What distinguishes xenophobia in South Africa from the rest of the world is its violent manifestation. In this country xenophobia is more than just an attitude, it is a violent practise, fuelled by racism, intolerance, ignorance and incapacity to deliver on developmental expectations.

The 2008 xenophobic attacks in major centres in South Africa stunned the local and international communities, causing researchers to rush in search of answers. Just as the furore turned into complacency, on 17 November 2009, 3000 Zimbabwean citizens living in the rural community of De Doorns in the Western Cape were displaced as a result of xenophobic violence. Reasons for the attacks vary, with some blaming the contestation for scarce resources, others attribute it to the country's violent past, inadequate service delivery and the influence of micro politics in townships.

In assessing the reasons for the attacks the study claims that the third tier of government in terms of its Constitutional developmental mandate fails to properly engage with communities on their basic needs; that its inability to live up to post-apartheid expectations triggers frustration into violent xenophobic action. The De Doorns case offers valuable insight into the nature and scope of the phenomenon in rural areas, highlighting local government's community participation efforts in exercising its developmental responsibility and dealing with the issue of xenophobia.

Opsomming

Xenofobie is nie 'n onbekende verskynsel nie, dit kom reg oor die wêreld, ook in Suid-Afrika voor. Gedefinieer deur die Suid Afrikaanse Menseregte Kommissie *as 'n diep gesetelde afkeur aan vreemdelinge deur die inwoners van 'n gasheer land*, verteenwoordig dit 'n skending van menseregte en hou dit 'n bedreiging vir die jong demokrasie in. Xenofobie in Suid-Afrika word gekenmerk deur die gewelddadige aard daarvan. Hier verteenwoordig dit meer as 'n ingesteltheid, dit is 'n gewelddadige uiting van gevoelens, aangespoor deur, rassisme, onverdraagsaamheid, onverskilligheid en die onvermoë om aan ontwikkelings-verwagtinge te voldoen.

Die 2008 xenofobiese aanvalle in die stedelike gebiede van Suid-Afrika het die land en die wêreld diep geraak en 'n soeke na oplossings ontketen. Op 14 November 2009 word die gerustheid na die 2008 woede erg versteur toe 3 000 Zimbabwiërs in De Doorns in die Wes-Kaap deur xenofobiese geweld onthoem is. Redes wat aangevoer word wissel vanaf mededinging vir werkseleenthede tot die land se gewelddadige verlede, onvoldoende dienslewering en die invloed van mikro politiek in woonbuurte.

Met die oorweging van redes vir die aanvalle maak die studie daarop aanspraak dat die derde vlak van regering in terme van sy Konstitusionele ontwikkelings-mandaad gefaal het om na behore met die gemeenskappe rondom hul behoeftes te skakel, dat die regering se onvermoë om aan die post-apartheid verwagtinge te voldoen frustrasie in xenofobiese geweld laat oorgaan het. Die De Doorns geval bied waardevolle insig in die aard en omvang van xenofobiese geweld in landelike gebiede en lê klem die plaaslike regering se hantering van openbare deelname in terme van sy ontwikkelings verpligtinge.

Table of contents

| | |
|---|------------|
| Declaration | ii |
| Acknowledgements | iii |
| Abstract | v |
| Opsomming | vi |
| CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| 1.1 INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| 1.2 RATIONALE | 3 |
| 1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM | 3 |
| 1.4 THEORETICAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION | 5 |
| 1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY | 8 |
| 1.6 THESIS OUTLINE | 9 |
| 1.7 CONCLUSION | 9 |
| CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW | 11 |
| 2.1 INTRODUCTION | 11 |
| 2.2 DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION – A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE | 11 |
| 2.2.1 Introduction | 11 |
| 2.2.2 Key terminology | 11 |
| 2.2.3 Development communication – a historical perspective | 13 |
| 2.2.4 Theoretical underpinnings of development communication | 15 |
| 2.2.5 Media | 18 |
| 2.2.6 Methodological framework for development communication programmes | 18 |
| 2.2.7 Conclusion | 18 |
| 2.2 KEY CONCEPTS | 19 |
| 2.3 XENOPHOBIA | 19 |
| 2.3.1 Introduction | 19 |
| 2.3.2 Definition | 20 |
| 2.3.3 Theories of prejudice | 21 |
| 2.3.4 Xenophobia in the South African context | 24 |
| 2.3.5 Conclusion | 29 |
| 2.4 DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION | 29 |
| 2.4.1 Development | 29 |
| 2.4.2 Community participation – a South African perspective | 31 |
| 2.4.3 Conclusion | 33 |
| CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY | 35 |
| 3.1 INTRODUCTION | 35 |
| 3.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH | 36 |
| 3.2.1 Documents | 37 |

| | | |
|--|--|------------|
| 3.2.2 | Field research | 38 |
| 3.2.3 | Key research participants | 39 |
| 3.3 | CONCLUSION | 40 |
| CHAPTER 4 DE DOORNS CASE STUDY | | 41 |
| 4.1 | BACKGROUND | 41 |
| 4.2 | THE VIOLENCE - FIELD OF NIGHTMARES | 43 |
| 4.3 | EARLY WARNING SIGNS | 44 |
| 4.4 | THE CRIME SCENE: THE NATURE AND PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE | 46 |
| 4.5 | CAUSES FOR THE OUTBREAK OF XENOPHOBIA IN DE DOORNS | 48 |
| 4.5.1 | Competition for limited resources | 49 |
| 4.5.2 | Employment and labour practices. | 53 |
| 4.5.3 | Farm labour – then and now | 54 |
| 4.5.4 | Contractors | 55 |
| 4.6 | HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE | 61 |
| 4.6.1 | Initial phase – emergency assistance | 61 |
| 4.6.2 | Core phase – providing shelter and welfare assistance | 64 |
| 4.6.3 | Final phase – closing-down and reintegration | 65 |
| 4.7 | REINTEGRATION PRESSURES | 71 |
| 4.8 | CONCLUSION | 74 |
| CHAPTER 5 MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS | | 76 |
| 5.1 | MAIN FINDINGS | 76 |
| 5.1.1 | XENOPHOBIA | 76 |
| 5.1.2 | PREJUDICE | 76 |
| 5.1.3 | LABOUR AND SERVICE DELIVERY ISSUES | 77 |
| 5.1.4 | HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE | 78 |
| 5.1.5 | COMMUNICATION | 78 |
| 5.1.6 | EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES | 79 |
| 5.2 | RECOMMENDATIONS | 82 |
| CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION | | 86 |
| 6.1 | CONCLUSION | 86 |
| REFERENCES | | 88 |
| APPENDIX A | | 98 |
| APPENDIX B | | 102 |
| APPENDIX C | | 107 |
| APPENDIX D | | 110 |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa in May 2008, leaving 60 people dead and thousands displaced in its wake, sent shock waves through the country, Africa and across the globe. For almost 15 years, since the birth of democracy, South Africa was hailed as an example of racial reconciliation – a beacon of hope for many of its own as well as those who supported the country through its struggle for freedom. Fellow Africans were stunned - how was it possible that the very people who accommodated and cared for South Africans during the dark years of apartheid could all of a sudden become the enemy?

South Africa is not new to xenophobia. It is a characteristic of global society where people migrate all over the world to flee from persecution or in search for a better life. While outbreaks of xenophobic violence on foreigners occurred repeatedly since the early 1990s, the May 2008 attacks were especially alarming, not only for their intensity and spread over the country but also for the attention the attacks attracted.

Just as normality returned to the townships, on 14 November 2009 disaster struck, leaving 3000 Zimbabwean migrants living in the rural community of De Doorns in the Western Cape Province of South Africa displaced and forlorn. Hope has turned into despair for thousands of Africans who came to South Africa in search of a better life. It seems that “Ubuntu” (togetherness), one of the country’s main branding initiatives, projecting South Africans as a caring, peace-loving nation is nothing more than a public relations ploy to boost the “Rainbow Nation” concept. Reactions were strong with newspaper headlines evoking sympathy, disappointment and disgust. The *Argus* “Hate rocks Cape dorp” (2009: 1), *Cape Times* “My heart is bleeding” (2009: 1), *Die Burger* “Xenofobie-sweer bars” (2009: 1) painted a grim picture of prejudice, intolerance and ignorance.

While the attacks of May 2008 were restricted to urban areas, the November 2009 attacks took place in rural Hex Valley, a major table grape producing area in the Western Cape Province of South Africa. In comparison to well-resourced urban areas, the attacks had a devastating effect on the De Doorns community in terms of scope, capacity and resources. The question now arises whether this shift in location, from urban to rural, signals the beginning of a new trend that can lead to an increase in xenophobic activity. The fact that violence continues to date, is reason for great concern that warrants urgent investigation. It is evident that initial research, focussing on material and socio-economic conditions did not adequately explain the violence. According to a research report by the Forced Migration Studies Programme titled, *May 2008*

violence against foreign nationals in South Africa: Understanding causes and evaluating responses.” early analyses of the xenophobic attacks failed to account for many historical and socio-political underlying causes as well as specific factors that triggered the violence in some areas and not in others”. The country struggles with the question why dislike and frustration turned into violence. What are the conditions and factors that caused xenophobic attitudes to translate into violent attacks in urban and now in rural South Africa?

This study seeks to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on causes of xenophobia in South Africa, focusing on the De Doorns case – its unique circumstances and approach to the challenge. To understand the reasons that triggered the attacks and the excessive violence that accompanied the attacks, it is necessary to understand the specific nature of xenophobia in South Africa.

The manifestation of Xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa is characterised by its violent nature. Despite a miracle transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, prejudice, intolerance and violence continue to plague contemporary South Africa. Xenophobic violence is so intense in South Africa and part of the country’s “culture of violence” that it is framed as pathology by Bronwyn Harris, former Project Manager at the *Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation* (2002: 169). Stimulated by a host of unresolved tensions stemming from a legacy of racial division, a challenging transition process and socio-economic hardship, xenophobia poses a real threat to democracy, making a mockery of one of the most progressive constitutions in the world.

Hypotheses of xenophobia provide insight into the drivers of frustration but do not explain what actually transform this frustration into violent action. In the South African context, research has identified a lack of political will by government to address the issue, and negative profiling of foreigners as the main contributors, while also blaming service delivery issues and local political infighting as aggravating influences that fuel xenophobic violence.

In terms of the Constitution, local government has a developmental responsibility, meaning that the basic needs of the community must enjoy priority (RSA, 1996). The Local Government White Paper defines developmental local government as, “local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives” (RSA, 1998a). Developmental responsibility goes hand in hand with community participation, which in terms of the Constitution and other legislation such as the Municipal Systems Act, 2000 is an essential element of developmental local government. Communicating with communities as equals or partners in governance is the corner stone of developmental local government.

With xenophobia alive and well in post-apartheid South Africa, challenging the country's constitutional values, threatening peace and stability, the question now arises whether the manner in which government exercises its developmental mandate creates an enabling environment for xenophobic tendencies to turn into violence. Extreme poverty, feelings of deprivation, service delivery protests and unbridled corruption can be an indication that local government is failing in its developmental responsibility. One can argue that government in neglecting its developmental responsibility (communicating to the community and improving their lives) provides the necessary catalyst for frustrated communities to resort to xenophobic violence.

1.2 RATIONALE

27 April 1994 signalled the end of oppression and the dawn of a new era of hope for South Africa and the Continent. Democracy replaced apartheid, modernisation made place for a new developmental path, based on the participation of communities in governance. Government opted for a bottom-up approach with local government, the tier of government closest to the people, now legally mandated in terms of the Constitution to promote social and economic development.

While the root causes of xenophobia are complex and varied, research identifies the role of government as vital in any effort to find a sustainable solution. Government has a legal, moral and developmental obligation to combat xenophobia. Although black foreigners are profiled as a threat, the real issue is one of economic deprivation and communication, of the poorest of the poor being left out in the cold and kept in the dark by local government's dismal performance in practising developmental local government. This exploratory study examines government's contribution to xenophobia, focusing on local government's developmental responsibility, with specific reference to the November 2009 attacks in De Doorns. It argues that communication, being the very heart of participatory practises associated with developmental local government, plays a crucial role in stimulating xenophobic tendencies and in managing xenophobic situations. Government, especially local government has been accused of not effectively communicating and engaging with residents on a variety of issues ranging from service delivery to sensitising locals about foreigners. Government communication is invariably part of the problem but also part of the solution..

1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM

Although prosperous from a production point of view, the scenic Hex River Valley is plagued with typical developmental problems such as poverty (income inequality), HIV/AIDS, TB and unemployment. Survival is an on-going struggle for 90% of the population. Aggravating the

plight of the local people is an influx of thousands of foreign nationals from Zimbabwe, increasing pressure on scarce resources. Adding to the complexity of the situation is the involvement of labour brokers who act as intermediaries between the farm labourers and producers (farmers) who control the production process.

Local government has a developmental responsibility to engage with local communities. This engagement should not only entail the delivery of basic services and addressing of specific issues, but the establishment of a conducive environment for interaction with local stakeholders – by building trust, assessing situations, conducting dialogue, disseminating information and fostering change.

Although the majority of research on the violence of May 2008 implicated local government – and especially service delivery failures - in contributing towards the xenophobic attacks, little research is available on local government communicating to local communities in terms of its developmental mandate and the occurrence of xenophobic violence.

This study will discuss communication interventions before, during and after the xenophobic incidents, focusing on the BVM's approach to development communication and the application of strategies and principles thereof. Local government is legally obliged to follow a developmental approach in dealing with communities and encouraging people's participation in decisions and activities that affect their lives. The study will also address the role of media in development communication and the local media's involvement in the De Doorns case.

The xenophobic crisis in De Doorns in the Western Cape in 2009 posed a development communication challenge for local government. Although the threat of xenophobia is a serious one with major consequences for the country, the goal of the study is not so much to explain the phenomenon, but rather to focus on how xenophobia is communicated in a developmental context. It is argued that local government exercising its developmental responsibility, in communicating with communities, can influence the outcome of development issues such as the humanitarian crisis in De Doorns. In view of the above, the research question can be formulated as: "Does government in its response to the xenophobic crisis communicate effectively in terms of its developmental mandate."

The following section will be devoted to the theoretical approach to development communication employed in the study – explaining the major communication directions in the development field. A theoretical framework anchored in development communication and theoretical perspectives in xenophobia will be discussed in Chapter 2.

1.4 THEORETICAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION

Since reality in an academic sense is informed by theory, this section will concentrate on the main theoretical approaches that guide development communication in the modern era. The different theoretical models and methodologies associated with development communication will also be discussed in Chapter 2.

It is necessary within the context of this study to differentiate between the various types of communication. For the effective application of development communication, it is essential to identify the different areas of communication. Different types of communication require different bodies of knowledge, tools and skills. This can involve one or a combination of communication approaches. Mefalopulos (2008: 83) identifies the following common types of communication in a development set-up:

- Corporate communication
- Internal communication
- Advocacy communication
- Development communication

Although these different types of communication belong to the same family, each requires its own skills and set of knowledge. Since development communication is central to the study, the rest of this section presents an overview of the concept – its origins, meaning and the main development paradigms associated with the discipline - modernisation, dependency theory and participation communication.

Development in its original sense referred to an emancipatory process - freeing the developing world from the shackles of poverty: low literacy rates, unemployment, insufficient health care and the like, to become more like Western, developed societies in terms of government systems, economic growth and educational and social levels. Development was synonymous with democracy and productivity. The assumption was that underdeveloped communities should follow suit (Mefalopulos, 2008: 6).

Development communication has its origins in the post Second World War international aid programs to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. President Truman in his January 1949 inaugural speech captured the essence of the modern understanding of development when he said: “We must embark on a whole new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.” (Mefalopulos, 2008: 43) The period also marked the establishment of the major Bretton Woods institutions, particularly the World Bank and the IMF, signalling the formal beginning of development aid to the Third World as a worldwide priority (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 47). According to Waisbord development theories have their roots in mid-century optimism about the

prospects that large parts of post-colonial Third World countries could become politically, socially and economically westernised. With the demise of colonialism, the question was how to address the disparities between the developed and underdeveloped world (2001: 1).

There are two core development communication approaches. The dominant paradigm of behaviour change model seeks to resolve development problems by modernising underdeveloped communities, urging them to follow in the footsteps of affluent Western countries. According to the modernisation theory, which underpins the dominant paradigm, underdevelopment is due to a lack of information. Culture is viewed as a potential obstacle to social change. By transmitting information via the mass media from a sender to a receiver, through a vertical one-way (monologic) linear process of sender-message-channel-receiver, western values were transmitted and ideas changed, resulting in changed behaviour on the part of the receiver (2001: 1)

Communication was associated with the dissemination of messages and information aimed at persuading audiences to change. Based on this, Everett Rogers introduced the influential *diffusion of innovations* theory of behaviour change through media centric approaches and campaigns. The theory entails five stages: awareness, knowledge and interest, decision, trial and adoption - through which an individual adopts innovations.

According to Rogers (as cited in Waisbord, 2001: 4) development communication is a “process by which an idea is transferred from a source to a receiver with the intent to change his behaviour. Usually the source wants to alter the receiver’s knowledge of some idea, create or change his attitude towards the idea, or persuade him to adopt the idea as part of his regular behaviour”.

Although Rogers, deriving from the media-centrism and *magic bullet* (strong effects of mass communication messages) school of thought, acknowledged the importance of media in creating awareness, he conceded that interpersonal relations were crucial in shaping opinion (Waisbord, 2001: 4). This view incorporated elements of the *two-step flow model of communications effects* according to which information and influence flow from the media to opinion leaders through interpersonal channels to the masses. Media audiences, according to the model, rely on the opinions of opinion leaders rather than solely on the mass media (Du Plooy, 1997: 8).

Following this insight the conception of the media as having a strong and direct influence on mass audiences started to decline. Diffusion studies maintained that both exposure to mass media and face-to-face interaction were crucial to effective change. From studies on how farmers adopted new methods, Rogers concluded that, that which motivates change is not economics, but communication and culture (Waisbord, 2001: 5).

Strong critique of the modernisation theories led to the emergence of the dependency theory. The theory is informed by Marxist and critical approaches that place the blame for the problems of the Third World on capitalist development. Dependency theorists maintained that underdevelopment was not an internal problem but that it was forced on developing states by external factors, therefore stating that problems of underdevelopment in the Third World were political rather than through the lack of information. Social and economic factors, namely the dominant position Western countries had in the global order, kept the Third World countries underdeveloped and politically and culturally dependent. Urban and powerful interests controlled the media, which were only interested in profit and transmitting entertainment and trivial information rather than social change. Therefore, the dissemination of information through mass media is not advisable, and efforts such as the development of national communication policies to address the social causes of poverty and marginalisation are recommended. Dependency theorists blamed the behaviourist, positivist and empiricist approaches of modernisation for focussing interventions on behavioural changes at the individual level rather than the social causes of poverty and marginalisation (Waisbord, 2001: 16).

With the dependency theorists failing to provide a successful alternative for modernisation, a different approach emerged that is less orientated on the political-economic model and more rooted in the cultural realities of development, focussing on people's participation. This new participatory model emphasises that participation is a value in itself, and not just a means to an end. The focus of development has shifted from economic growth to people's participation and sustainability. In the new participation paradigm, residents are no longer mere passive targets, but are actively involved in development issues and activities (2001:18). The approach encourages the inclusion of the community into the planning and implementation of development projects, thus accepting ownership of the project. Communities are invited, upon completion of a project, to evaluate the project – analyse its success or failure, and to give their inputs on possible improvements. Participants are also part of decision-making and are beneficiaries of projects (Smith, 2003:17).

Meaningful participation however cannot happen without communication. According to Mefalopulos many development programmes, while paying attention to participation, neglect communication, intended as the professional use of dialogic methods and tools to promote change. "To be truly significant and meaningful, participation needs to be based on the application of genuine two-way communication principles and practices" (2008:7).

A horizontal, two-way model, which favours people's direct and active interaction through consultation and dialogue, replaced the top-down, information dissemination through the mass media approach of development communication. This new horizontal two-way (dialogic) approach seeks to engage stakeholders' knowledge and perceptions in assessing the situation

and in defining priorities leading to change. Although the new approach shifts the emphasis from information dissemination to situation analysis, from persuasion to participation, informing people and promoting change remain key functions of development communication. Participatory theories considered a redefinition of development communication necessary. Based on the above principles, the following definition formulated at the First World Congress of Communication for Development held in Rome in October 2006, captures the essence of development communication in the participation era:

“...a social process based on dialog using a broad range of tools and methods. It is also about seeking change at different levels, including listening, building trust, sharing knowledge and skills, building policies, debating, and learning for sustained and meaningful change.”

According to Waisbord, “communication means a process of creating and stimulating understanding as the basis for development rather than information transmission”. He maintains that “people should not be forced to adopt new practices no matter how beneficial they seem in the eyes of agencies and governments. Instead, people need to be encouraged to participate rather than adopt new practices based on information” (2001: 18).

Communication in the developmental sense is not public relations or corporate communication; it is about participation and the empowerment of people. Participatory communication encourages participation, stimulates critical thinking, view communication as a process, rather than specific outcomes associated with modernisation as the main task of development communication.

1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The study employs a qualitative approach to research because of its analytic and interpretative strength. In addition to content analysis, extracting meaning from books, newspapers, reports, minutes and official documents, the research strongly relies on fundamental field research techniques such as in-depth interviews, unstructured interviews and participant observation. Field research or participant observation allows the researcher to study the subtle nuances of attitudes and behaviours as well as social processes over time (Du Plooy, 1997: 105). This inductive approach allows the researcher to gain a close understanding of the research context and the meanings participants attach to events (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2003: 89).

Since the essence of the research is to study government’s response, specifically local government’s involvement in xenophobic situations, it is essential that the views of key role-players in government be captured. In-depth interviews, also referred to as a, “conversation with a purpose (Marshall & Rossman, 1989: 82) allow participants to elaborate freely from a position of choice, on a very sensitive issue.

The fieldwork was conducted over a period of eleven months. During this time literature was consulted, data was captured, documents such as minutes, policy documents, strategies and correspondence were located and organised, events were organised according to a road map, tracking the course of activities from day one, rapport was established with participants, the necessary permission to observe proceedings was obtained, interviews were held with key role-players from government, content was evaluated, analysed and written down.

A detailed explanation of the methodology utilised in addressing the research problem will be discussed in Chapter 4.

1.6 THESIS OUTLINE

Chapter 1 introduces the theme of the study, the reasons and research objectives. Chapter 2 is the literature review – a discussion of the key literary sources. It examines the current literature on xenophobia, providing an overview of the violent manifestation of the phenomenon in South Africa. The theory section explains the various xenophobia hypotheses and prejudice theories. To explain local government's important developmental role and the effect it has on xenophobia, literature on the evolution of development communication and community participation in the African and South African context were also referred to. In illustrating the impact of external factors in stimulating xenophobic violence, attention was given to the role of the media and government in influencing attitudes. Legislation reflecting on Government's obligation to communicate with communities and create a culture of public participation was also consulted.

In chapter 3, the methodological approach is discussed. It explains the rationale for an analytic and interpretative research method, utilising fundamental field research techniques. Chapters 4 and 5 are the body and main findings of the research. Chapter 4 is a detailed narrative, explaining the background, reasons, attacks and humanitarian response with regard to the 14 and 17 November 2009 attacks on Zimbabweans in De Doorns. Of special significance is local government's role in creating an enabling environment for xenophobic behaviour and its performance in managing the situation and addressing post- xenophobic challenges. Chapter 6 is the conclusion and recommendations based on the findings.

1.7 CONCLUSION

The majority of studies on reasons for xenophobia in South Africa, in addition to psychological explanations, focus on socio-economic aspects. Government is blamed for not addressing critical issues such as service delivery failures, but relatively few studies focus on government communicating xenophobia in a developmental context. The rationale for this study is the lack

of academic research produced on local government's contribution towards the problem in terms of its performance in communicating to communities in a developmental environment.

The study will attempt to complement theory on the subject, contributing to the existing body of knowledge, explaining the nature and causes of the problem and providing guidelines for practical interventions. The methodological approach is qualitative in the positivist tradition because of its analytical and interpretative advantages. It allows the researcher to study the subtle nuances of attitudes and behaviours and examining social processes over time, contributing to a deeper understanding. It is also flexible in the sense that the research design can be modified (Babbie, 1998: 303).

Development communication in the modern context has moved from a diffusion perspective to participation. In practical terms it means that stakeholders' needs and rights to be informed about development issues are extended to play an active part in decision-making that affects their lives. From a developmental local government perspective, it means that government must actively engage with communities on issues that affect their lives.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The literary review is organised according to the main themes emanating from the research problem. It forms the foundation of the research in the sense that it assists in developing a better understanding and insight into existing research and the trends that have emerged. The literature review includes both primary and secondary sources. In addition to academic sources (theses, studies and articles), popular sources – internet websites, books, newspapers, journals, NGO reports and government documentation were extensively explored.

An explanation of the relevant theories, methodologies and strategies in development communication that assist in an analysis of the main focus of the thesis, constitutes the first part of the literature review. The content will include a discussion of key terminology, historical background, theoretical underpinnings of development, the role of media and the methodological process associated with development communication. The second part of the literature review consists of:

- A discussion of theories explaining the phenomenon, definitions and hypotheses of xenophobia. The violent manifestation of the phenomenon in South Africa, its root causes and structural and historical factors such as the legacy of apartheid, nationalism and institutional discrimination are also contained in the literature study.
- A discussion of the third tier of government's new developmental role in democratic South Africa.

2.2 DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION – A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.2.1 Introduction

The following section provides an overview of the main theoretical frameworks on the role of communication in the development context - key terminology, historical perspective, modes and models of development communication, theoretical underpinnings, practical implications and the methodological process are discussed.

Although the study relied on the work done by various authors, the literary contributions of Melkote and Steeves, Waisbord and Mefalopulos are of special significance for their theoretical insights and practical applications.

2.2.2 Key terminology

This section provides some basic definitions of terms frequently used in development communication.

Information and communication – Although the two concepts are closely related, information is not communication, rather one of the outputs of the latter. While communication is an open process where people can communicate with each other, information uses messages to change attitudes, behaviour and knowledge. The difference between the two concepts is not only a matter of theoretical models – one-way vertical flow versus two-way horizontal flow but also of scope with individuals who are receivers and transmitters at the same time in the communication models. (Mefalopulos, 2008: 41).

Participation – Participation can vary from passive participation where people are only informed on matters to self-mobilisation where people form part of the process. The World Bank identified the following types of participation: information sharing, consultation, collaboration and empowerment. Participation is about sharing and an exchange capable of influencing decisions. For the best results it is desirable that dialog between sender and receiver(s) take place from the assessment phase of a project. Participation means that people have a right to have their voices heard and to play an active part in the decision-making process (Mefalopulos, 2008: 41).

Consultation – Although closely related to participation and communication, consultation is not an even process, since control of decision-making rests with the few that is in charge of the consultation. Though the main scope of consultation is listening, information does not flow freely from stakeholders, but is rather conceived as a feedback on predefined topics intended for experts. The nature of consultation is to inform stakeholders on new information. It does not intend to change specific behaviour at the outset (Mefalopulos, 2008: 41).

Capacity building – Capacity building is associated with developmental communication aspects such as training, education, participation and empowerment. The purpose is to enhance knowledge and skills, both at an individual and organisational level. Knowledge transfer and formal training is not the only means to build capacity. It can also be achieved through learning-by-doing and dialog (Mefalopulos, 2008:41).

Empowerment – Dialogue is the means to achieve empowerment. Participation through dialogic two-way development facilitates the exchange of knowledge, empowering people to participate actively in actions and decisions that affect their lives. By engaging marginalised stakeholders in decision-making development communication not only reduces poor people's capacity deprivation but also empower them. Empowerments is only possible if community members through participatory interventions critically reflect on their experiences and understand the reasons for success and failure (Mefalopulos, 2008: 42).

Dialog – According to Mefalopulos, "Dialog, in the context of development communication, should be considered as the professional application of interactive methods and techniques to engage stakeholders in exploring the situation and uncovering risks and opportunities that can

benefit the development initiative and make it more successful and sustainable” (2008: 43). Dialogic approaches guarantee that stakeholders have their voices heard and that project priorities are aligned with people priorities (2008:42).

2.2.3 Development communication – a historical perspective

In order to place the De Doorns crisis in the right context, key aspects of the three theoretical approaches that dominate the field of development communication – modernisation paradigm, dependency theory and the participatory paradigm - were discussed in chapter 1. This section offers a more in-depth view on the historical evolution of development communication from modernisation to participatory communication, focussing on the dominant paradigm. The research relied on the works of Melcote and Steeves, Du Plooy, Sparks and Smith.

The origins, principles and applications of modernisation should be viewed within the historical context of the post-war (Second World War) years, also known as the Cold War period. This period saw the political emancipation of most of the third world countries from colonisation, and the establishment of the major Bretton Woods institutions, signalling the formal beginning of development aid to the Third World as a worldwide priority (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 47). United States President Truman, a driving force behind the Marshall Plan to help reconstruct war-torn Europe after the Second World War, also proposed the 1949 Point Four program of assistance to Third World countries. The Plan aimed to alleviate suffering via capital investment (Melkote & Steeves, 2003:51). Unfortunately, Western scholars, who persuaded Third World countries to adopt them without adapting them to their specific socio-cultural circumstances, branded the earlier views on development and development communication as universally applicable.

The period directly after the Second World War was concerned with the effects of propaganda. The influence of the mass media on audiences was seen as direct and strong (Du Plooy, 1997:7). People concerned with propaganda recognised the media’s developmental role in fostering modern attitudes and believe for significant change. This was the period during which the dominant paradigm of development communication (modernisation), grounded in the neo-classical economic theory, promoting capitalist economic development, came into being (Sparks, 2007:3).

The hierarchical top-down dominant paradigm considers industrialisation the main route to successful economic growth as practiced in North America and Western Europe. Third world countries were encouraged to invest in industrialisation. Deriving from the positivist tradition, development performance was measured by quantitative indicators such as gross national product and per capita income. Communication from a modernisation perspective was viewed as a persuasive tool to sell development ideas and associated technologies to target audiences

(Melkote & Steeves, 2003:38). Qualitative empirical science was accepted as the dominant scientific methodology (Melkote & Steeves, 2003:100).

Notwithstanding the positive effect of the critical perspective, the theory and practice of development communication are still being influenced by the modernisation-orientated biases of the period termed the First Development Decade of the 1960s. The function of the United Nations agencies during this period, in promoting technological transfer from the developed North to the Third World, was also instrumental in underdeveloped countries discarding their traditional ways in favour of the proven success of western technological innovation. This orientation with its top-down approach is referred to as the pro-innovation bias (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 54). To achieve these development goals the transfer of capital and technology were not enough, it had to be complemented by the communication of knowledge and skill. The Third World had to be persuaded and motivated by communication programs to let go of their traditional ways of doing things and adopt the new way. The pro-persuasion bias was necessary because the Third World was not inclined to submit to radical change (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 54). To strengthen the pro-persuasion bias, two new biases, the pro-mass media bias and related pro-literacy bias were introduced to create a climate of acceptance of change in the Third World. Advocates of this model believed that literacy and mass media could be utilized to smooth out the negative effects of traditionalism on change. The models were aimed at creating widespread awareness by the mass media, and interest in the innovations promoted by the development agencies. It was believed that these two biases would lead to the passing of traditional society (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 58). The in-the head psychological constraints to development bias goes a step further in persuading hard –headed opponents of innovations in the Third World to relinquish their resistance against innovations. The psychological blocks of the peasantry must be overcome by the radical modification of a traditional mind-set as a precondition of conversion to accepting good innovations. In this sense development communication under the modernisation framework is often viewed as a process of persuasive marketing (Melkote & Steeves, 2003:60).

After realizing that many of earlier development projects had not given enough attention to the communication constraint, scholars of development communication during the 1970s began to focus factors that could make projects more relevant to the needs of vulnerable groups. This resulted in the conceptualisation of communication as a dynamic support to projects and activities. This view, termed *development support communication* is utilized to bridge the gap between technical expertise and the recipients of knowledge (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 62).

The modernisation perspective of development was followed by a critical phase (dependency) when international communication structures were criticised for the continued subordination of developing countries to the benefit of developed countries. Whilst a modernisation perspective

for instance assumes that a Western model of economic growth is universally desirable, critical perspectives challenge the economic and cultural expansionism and imperialism of modernization and advocates political and economic restructuring to produce a more even distribution of awards in society (Melkote & Steeves, 2003:34). During this period the media served the interests of imperialism, giving rise to the imperialism paradigm. The dominant paradigm was criticised for its top down approach, which was motivated by the assumption that the experts (western countries) know what is best and designed communication programs to transmit their knowledge to the people to be developed. The critical alternative rejects marketing models that aim to spread Western technologies and values arguing for political and economic restructuring. This view of accommodating the needs of communities is known as the participatory paradigm. Liberation theology supports this view, stating the purpose of development as liberation from oppression. People have the ability to determine their own destiny and capacity to develop themselves, but are restricted by internal and external pressures to do so. Liberation from oppression through development differs from the modernisation and critical perspectives in that its goals are primarily spiritual and not economic, although material realities are not ignored (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 35).

The participatory approach in development communication is a relatively new (dating back from the early 1970s) and innovative means to achieve development in communities (Smith, 2003:14). It differs from the traditional in that it practices a horizontal approach to communication and assumes that the communities that are targeted for development knows best what their needs are (Smith, 2003:17).

2.2.4 Theoretical underpinnings of development communication

Mefalopulos categorises development communication into two broad families: diffusion and participation. The diffusion model rooted in the modernization paradigm uses communication media and methods to persuade people to change. The participatory approach is based on the two-way communication model that involves and empowers people in the assessment, design and implementation of development initiatives (2008: 58). To assist in understanding the applications of the two models it is necessary to be familiar with the theory that informs the models.

Diffusion approaches believe that by inducing change in individuals' attitudes and behaviours, progress can be achieved. Ontologically the assumption is that by using scientific methods reality will be revealed. Epistemologically, the researcher is expected to detach himself or herself from the object of the study, ensuring objectivity. Methodologically quantitative methods in line with the positivist/scientific dogma are preferred to get to the truth. A consequence of this approach is that if one party has the truth, all other parties with different perspectives must be wrong.

Participatory approaches acknowledge that there can be different constructions of the same reality. No single party has the ultimate truth; rather there are a number of realities that often need to be reconciled through communication. Ontologically reality is socially constructed based on agreement among individuals or groups of individuals through dialog. There is not necessarily one true reality, but several constructions/interpretations of a specific reality. In a dynamic situation such as De Doorns during the crisis, farmers for instance perceived reality differently from farm labourers. Different views need to be reconciled and the focus shifted to the specific problem. Epistemologically the researcher is not divorced from the issue investigated. For the best results, the researcher should be part of the context in which the investigation takes place (Mefalopulos, 2008:58). In the De Doorns case, local government in its developmental capacity should have been an active actor, through consultation and dialog in the communication process. From a methodological point of view, a number of qualitative and quantitative methods can be applied according to the required needs.

The differentiation between diffusion and participation is more than a theoretical exercise; it implies a number of practical consequences in the daily operations of development projects. The explanation addresses two basic factors that should be present in any development initiative, namely stakeholders' needs and rights to be informed and to have their voices heard and play an active role in initiatives and decision-making. Mefalopulos defines and contrasts diffusion and participation according to their scope, with diffusion identified with monologic communication and participation with dialogic communication (2008: 64).

The monologic mode is a one-way communication mode based on the transmission model and has two applications: communication to inform and communication to persuade. Communication to inform is a linear transmission of information from a sender to many receivers. It is used to raise awareness and provide knowledge on specific issues. In communication to persuade the dissemination of information is regarded a temporary stage to be reached in a longer process aimed at achieving behavioural changes. A communication approach closely associated with the persuasion approach, is strategic communication (2008: 65).

The dialogic mode is associated with the participatory paradigm of horizontal two-way communication aimed at creating a constructive environment for stakeholders to participate in activities that impact on their lives. It has two applications: communication to access and communication to empower. Communication to access serves as a research and analytical tool to investigate issues of a wide variety. Dialogic communication stimulates participation in identifying, exploring and assessing key issues, opportunities and risks of both technical and political nature in communities. Communication to empower is the use of the dialogic feature of communication to build the capacities of groups, in particular the most marginalised, and address issues of poverty and social and economic backlogs. Dialogic communication is more

than an effective problem-solving tool. It can create stability, build confidence and address issues related to poverty by engaging the poorest of the poor. Mefalopulos refer to Nobel laureate Amartya Sen who highlights how poverty goes beyond lacking sufficient income to address basic needs, claiming that poverty is also about capabilities, deprivation and social exclusion. By including the poor in the assessment of problems and engaging them in processes, the dialogic mode can address and reduce a key element of poverty namely social exclusion (2008: 55).

Although the dominant paradigm in the 1970s lost some of its appeal, the notion that the diffusion of information and innovations could solve problems of underdevelopment still prevailed. Approaches such as social marketing, health promotion and health education and entertainment education carried forward the premises of diffusion of innovation and behavioural change models.

Participatory, media advocacy and social mobilisation approaches criticized the modernisation paradigm because it promoted a top-down ethnocentric and paternalistic view of development. Because of their participatory characteristics, media advocacy and social mobilisation warrants further discussion.

Media advocacy, defined as the strategic use of mass media to advance social or public policy issues, stimulates debate and promote responsible coverage of health issues (Waisbord, 2001: 34). Advocacy requires the mobilisation of resources and people in support of specific issues and policies to influence public opinion and decisions. It entails the organisation of information for dissemination through interpersonal and media channels in order to gain political and social acceptance of certain issues. In the participation tradition media advocacy focuses on the needs of communities to gain control to transform their environments. This approach is not solely concerned with media issues but also mobilises grassroots and media actions to address power inequalities, which give rise to health problems. Advocacy consists of a large number of information activities such as lobbying with decision makers; holding seminars, rallies and news-making events; ensuring regular media coverage and obtaining endorsement from known people (2001: 25).

Social mobilisation is defined as a process through which community members become aware of a problem identify it as a high priority for community action and decide on steps to take action (Waisbord, 2001: 26). It starts with problem assessment and analysis at community level and takes action on chosen courses. Strategic allies at all levels representing a wide range of support activities are involved in the process. Communities are empowered by interventions in the sense that they take direct control over their lives and environment.

2.2.5 Media

There can be little doubt that the media are instrumental in increasing knowledge and influencing attitudes and behaviour. However, in the new horizontal two-way flow model of development communication, people are part of the process leading to change. In this perspective media are no longer the central element in development communication, but one of the tools to use according to circumstances. Although the one-way linear model lost part of its pervasive dominance, it is complemented by a model where the sender is at the same time the receiver and vice versa. The focus now shifts from media to people and persuasion to participation.

Mefalopulos distinguishes between two levels of media: mass media that uses print media, radio and television campaigns to influence behaviours and bring about change, and community media, mainly using radio and theatre to give voice to communities (2008: 60). In a local context, community radio with its hands-on approach and knowledge of the environment is often more empowering and influential than television and other forms of the commercial media. Notwithstanding the growing popularity of television and information and communication technologies, community radio remains a useful medium to enhance meaningful civic engagement in especially poor and marginalised communities such as De Doorns in the Breede Valley of the Western Cape.

2.2.6 Methodological framework for development communication programmes

Backed by extensive experience in the development field, Mefalopulos, a World Bank official with a profound knowledge of communication in operations, proposes a four phase methodological process to guide communication programmes. The first phase is the research phase and consists of a communication-based assessment. It identifies and analyse stakeholders' risk, opportunities and needs. The second phase, strategy design select and design communication approaches, messages and learning systems. The third phase is implementation. Communication activities such as training, media design and production, and information dissemination are prepared and executed according to the agreed strategy namely and plan of action. The fourth phase is monitoring and evaluation (2008: 29).

2.2.7 Conclusion

It is clear that the two dominant approaches in development communication, diffusion and participation, although different from an ontological, epistemological and methodological perspective, are not in opposition to each other, and that elements of both can be integrated to include more interactive ways of communicating.

In a developmental environment such as De Doorns, participatory approaches will be best suited to gain the confidence and address the specific communication needs of the largely marginalised community. After the initial assessment phase, other models can be combined with it.

Since the body and the major part of this study, concentrates on the De Doorns experience the author searched for similar studies. Although various research was done on the 2008 incidents of xenophobia, only two reliable studies that address some aspects of the De Doorns case could be found. A background brief by Jean Pierre Misago of the Forced Migration Studies Program at the University of the Witwatersrand titled *Violence, labour and displacement of Zimbabweans in De Doorns, Western Cape* and report titled *Sour grapes* by Jan Theron offered valuable information on the subject of study. Monitor reports by *Black Sash* on humanitarian aspects also contributed to the study. Case studies on collective violence titled, *The smoke that calls: Insurgent citizenship, collective violence and the struggle for a place in the new South Africa* produced by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and the Society, Work and Development Institute as well as a research report titled, *May 2008 Violence against foreign nationals in South Africa: understanding causes and evaluating responses* by FMSP and CoRMSA served as major sources to obtain a background on the subject. However, although case studies offer valuable information, the problem with consulting case studies is that it tends to influence later research. Each case has its own unique characteristics and dynamics.

2.2 KEY CONCEPTS

To understand local government's involvement in xenophobia, it is necessary to explain the key concepts that impact on- and influence government performance and decisions. What is xenophobia? What is the nature of xenophobia in South Africa? Does it differ in its manifestation from xenophobia elsewhere in the world? It is necessary to understand local government's developmental role in post- apartheid South Africa to explain the high level of frustration in communities. Explaining the concepts xenophobia, development, developmental local government and community/ public participation will place the research in the right context.

2.3 XENOPHOBIA

2.3.1 Introduction

This section starts with defining the concept. It then explores some of the theories of prejudice that give rise to xenophobia and ends with an explanation of the phenomenon in the South African context, focussing on the different hypotheses and the violent nature of xenophobia in terms of its representation by the media and the mechanisms of nationalism ("post apartheid project").

2.3.2 Definition

Xenophobia, also described as “new racism” or “cultural racism” must not be confused with racism, it differs from the latter in that cultural rather than racial differences become the basis of exclusion (Crush & Ramachandran) The term “xenophobia” is defined as, “a strong feeling of dislike or fear of people from other countries” (Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, 2006). According to the *Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary* xenophobia is a “fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that is strange or foreign” (1993). The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) in a joint statement with civil society, defined the phenomenon as the “deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state” (South African Human Rights Commission 1998). In the definitions the words, dislike, fear and hatred projects a negative attitude towards foreigners.

For Crush, xenophobia represents highly negative perceptions and discriminatory practises against foreigners (non citizens) on the basis of their foreign nationality (2009: 6). Although this behaviour affects all categories of foreigners, different migrant groups may have different experiences, depending on their status and the degree of thread they present to the in-group. It is not a natural response by native populations to the presence of foreigners, rather a social and political phenomenon that contributes to the marginalisation of migrant groups in social and national settings. The phenomenon is what Crush terms “crucially linked,” to nation-building and nationalism, in particular its aggressive form (2009:6).

According to Harris xenophobia in South Africa is more than a fear or dislike of foreigners, it is rather violent activity brought on by intense tension (Hook & Eagle, 2002: 170). Valji concurs with Harris’ view that xenophobia is more than the usual explanations and states that, “patterns of xenophobic hostility thus constitute a violation of the human rights of a targeted and identifiable group that undermines the very values upon which this new democracy is premised” (2003: 1). In the light of the violent practise associated with xenophobia in South Africa, Harris argues that the dictionary definition of xenophobia be reframed to incorporate practise. Xenophobia is more than a fear for foreigners, “it is a violent practise that results in bodily harm and damage” (2002: 170). Xenophobic sentiments are certainly not unique to South Africa, it is practised all over the world. The distinctiveness of xenophobia in the country however, rests on the high levels of intolerance and the widespread hostility in attitudes.

The demise of apartheid and the rise of the “New South Africa” as a global role player of note have seriously influenced migration patterns in the Continent and focused the attention on contentious issues such as development, nation building, nationalism and the country’s culture of violence. This new developments attracted the attention of prominent scholars (e.g. Harris, 2000; Palmary; 2002; Valji, 2003; Neocosmos, 2006). These xenophobic related issues are also

discussed in popular literature and the media and will form part of the assessment since they reflect the opinion of non-academics and ordinary citizens.

The two authors Bronwyn Harris (*Xenophobia: a new pathology for a new South Africa*) and Nahla Valji (*Creating the nation: the rise of violent xenophobia in the New South Africa – unpublished masters thesis*) produced ground-breaking research on the manifestation of the phenomenon in South Africa. Both these authors, cited regularly by researchers in the humanities, have done research for the *Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation*, gaining invaluable experience in the field of xenophobia. Before further exploring the contributions of Harris and Valji it is necessary to review some of the more general theories of prejudice as background to the various hypotheses and violent manifestation of the phenomenon in South Africa. Xenophobia is not only explained in terms of social and economic factors, a psychological explanation for instance, that supplements the sociological approach, was introduced by Tshitereke (Harris, 2002: 171).

2.3.3 Theories of prejudice

Central to theories of prejudice is the identification with groups and the influence of group membership on the identity of the individual. Social psychologist Henri Tajfel, principal proponent of the social identity theory, argues that people build their identities from their own group membership. People have an inbuilt tendency to categorise themselves into one or more in-groups, developing a part of their identity on the basis of membership of that specific group and enforcing boundaries with other groups (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971: 149-178). Social identity theory suggests that people relate to groups in such a way as to maximise positive distinctiveness with groups, offering both identity and self-esteem. Positive social identity can be achieved by comparing the in-group with a relevant out-group. This will lead to a derogation of the out-group. The theory assumes that inter-group comparisons are related to the degree of someone's in-group identification – the higher the importance of the in-group for the members, the stronger the inter-group differentiation will be (Tajfel *et al.*, 1971).

Dimensions of social identity commonly experienced, such as class, gender, political affiliation and ethnicity also presents “psychosocial fault lines” as is evident in contemporary political discourse on inequality and diversity (Hook & Eagle, 2002: 139). The theory provides a persuasive psychopathological explanation for the manifestation of social groups and the nature of relations between them (Hook & Eagle, 2002: 139). Based on a series of experimental studies Tajfel concludes that in-group chauvinism reflects intrinsic individual needs for positive self-identity, claiming that categorisation alone, even when allocated arbitrarily, may be sufficient to create awareness of membership in separate and distinct groups (1978: 35). According to Ellison and de Wet the psychopathological manifestation of social identity depends

upon the, “essentialisation of in-group chauvinism, ethnicised conflict and unbridled competition evident in the authentication of social identities as racialised ethnic categories” (Hook & Eagle, 2002: 147).

Tajfel and others have shown support for the idea that people are willing to see their group as better in some way than other groups. Tajfel replicated his experiment with a variation to prove that his findings were reliable. The theory also helps to explain a wide range of social phenomena such as the role of patriotism (manifested for instance as chauvinism) as a predictor of xenophobia. Not all forms of patriotism necessarily lead to out-group derogation. People can also gain a positive social identity (Mummendey, Klink & Brown, 2001: 160). The social identity theory, although a major contributor to understanding group dynamics, does not take into account other factors that might be influencing behaviour. The theory doesn't explain why there are individual differences in the level of prejudices shown.

Lincoln Quillian argues that the focus on individual characteristics and relations omits an important source of dominant-group prejudice namely the perception by the dominant group that an outside group threatens their group's prerogatives (1995: 586). This view is an expansion on Blumer's description of prejudice as a response to threats to established group privileges, which are not necessarily linked to the individual interests of group members (1958: 3-7). Quillian proposes that collective threat is a function of the numerical size of the subordinate group in relation to the dominant group and economic circumstances. From a group threat point of view prejudice is conceptualised as a largely collective phenomenon in which inter-group relations affect individual attitudes.

Theories of racial prejudice are characterised by their individual and group affiliation. Literature on individual-level theories of racial prejudice distinguishes between: social-psychological approaches, studies of individual correlates of prejudice and self-interest based theories (Quillian, 1995: 587). According to Quillian none of these theories provide a complete explanation of prejudice. They actually do little to explain the variations in prejudice across different regions and time periods (1995: 588). Prejudice causes the most damage when a dominant national or racial group institutionalises discrimination. This reasoning is evident in the works of Harris and Valji, where in the South African context, the manifestation of prejudice into nationalism and nation building give rise to institutionalised discrimination against perceived threat from “the other”.

A core assumption of the social identity theory is that people generally view themselves and the groups to which they belong in a positive light (Tajfel & Turner, 1986: 7 – 24). Since national belongingness can contribute to a person's identity, it can be assumed that if people identify as a member of their nation they attempt to evaluate favourably the nation to which they belong.

Positive feelings towards one's in-group, when expressed as nationalism may directly contribute to out-group rejection, even hostility. Rupert Brown in an article titled *Nationalism and patriotism: National identification and out-group rejection*, asks the question whether positive feelings towards one's own nation is acceptable or whether they should be regarded as harmful and avoidable (2001:160). He attempts to address the question by investigating the social psychological background of an association between a positive evaluation of one's own nation and rejection of foreigners.

To understand the desirability of a positive feeling towards one's own nation on the one hand and the derogation of foreigners as a consequence of this feeling on the other hand, it is necessary to distinguish between the concepts nationalism and patriotism – or good patriotism and bad patriotism (nationalism). The works of Schatz, Staub and Lavine offers a contemporary view of this phenomenon. The authors differentiate between blind and constructive patriotism. Blind patriotism is defined as “an attachment to country characterised by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance and intolerance of criticism” (Schatz, Staub & Levine, 1999:151). Constructive patriotism on the other hand is defined as “an attachment to country characterised by support for questioning and criticism of current group practices that are intended to result in positive change” (Schatz et al., 1999). Blind patriotism has a negative connotation evident in political disengagement, nationalism, perceptions of foreign threat, superiority attitudes and chauvinism whilst constructive patriotism is associated with political involvement – efficiency and knowledge. Nationalism, the bad manifestation of patriotism, is inherently related to out-group derogation, whereas patriotism relates positively to own group, independent of out-group derogation, implying feelings of belongingness, responsibility and pride (Brown, 2001: 160).

Schatz, Staub and Lavine offer valuable insight into inter-group relations and the development of patriotic feelings and nationalist tendencies. However, the research also has some limitations. Although the samples in their research covered the target area and included a variety of ethnic groups, all participants were college students. The inclusion of non-student samples in future research will increase the external validity of the present findings. It will also be useful if the study can be replicated in other countries than the United States. Additional research to generalise more broadly from the present findings and to examine the origins of patriotic orientations will enrich the field of study (Schatz et al., 170). Nevertheless, the work of authors Schatz, Staub, Lavine and Brown contributes significantly to understanding the violent manifestation of xenophobia in South Africa, why Harris termed the phenomenon as pathology.

The preceding review of theories and hypotheses that influence xenophobic behaviour provides background for investigating the phenomenon in the South African context, serving as a theoretical framework for the works of contemporary authors such as Harris, Valji, Crush and others.

2.3.4 Xenophobia in the South African context

Hypotheses of xenophobia

Harris describes xenophobia based on three hypotheses, namely, the “scapegoating hypothesis”, the “isolation hypothesis”, and “the biocultural hypothesis” (2002:170).

Scapegoating hypothesis

The scapegoat hypothesis, emerging through sociological theory, locates xenophobia within the context of South Africa’s transition from an authoritarian state to a democracy (Harris, 2002: 171). Heightened expectations are linked to limited resources, unequal distribution of wealth and increasing poverty. Expectations are not realised, leaving people disillusioned and frustrated. This is ideal circumstance for xenophobia to prosper and for people to create a “frustration scapegoat” to blame for their on-going deprivation and poverty (Tshitereke, 1999: 4). Tshitereke supplements the sociological interpretation of xenophobia with a psychological level of explanation, conceptualising xenophobia in terms of frustration and relative deprivation. Relative deprivation can be described as a general sense of feeling deprived of something to which a person or groups feels entitled to. This in turn leads to feelings of frustration and resentment (Pillay, 2008: 12). There is a close link between the relative deprivation and the social identity theory in the sense that both theories rest on social comparison. This inevitably leads to the derogation of the out-group, which in this thesis represents the Zimbabweans at De Doorns in the Western Cape Province of South Africa.

Isolation hypothesis

The isolation hypothesis has “foreignness” at the heart of hostility towards people from foreign countries. It views xenophobia as a consequence of the country’s seclusion from the international community, brought on by apartheid (Harris, 2002:172). During the isolation period foreigners represented the unknown to South Africans. With the opening of the country’s borders during the transition period, South Africans were brought in direct contact with foreigners – the unknown. This interaction between South Africans and the unknown creates space for possible hostility. According to Morris, “when a group has no history of incorporating strangers it may find it difficult to be welcoming” (1998: 1125). His research with Congolese and Nigerians reveals that inadequate education and the isolation of South Africans during apartheid explains the hostility towards foreigners. Intolerance towards foreigners is ascribed to the creation of strict boundaries between citizens as well as between South Africans and other countries.

According to Barbali the isolation hypothesis is flawed in that it assumes that South Africans did not have contact with the unknown. She states:

This hypothesis is arguably flawed in that it assumes that South Africans did not have contact with people of different races or ethnicities until 1994, creating the idea of absolute enslaving by the colonial and apartheid governments. My research participants explained xenophobia in South Africa as being caused by the isolation of the apartheid period. Apartheid did however create powerful ideologies of difference and promoted stereotypes and it is possible that this has encouraged a biased/ stereotyped perception of foreigners as criminals and carriers of disease. The particular model of Mouride migration found among Senegalese migrants in Port Elizabeth, which emphasises tolerance and cosmopolitanism, has meant that Senegalese have not been the targets of migrant stereotyping by local people who generally perceive Senegalese migrants positively (Barbali, 2009: 21).

It must also be acknowledged that the isolation hypothesis does not explain why the unknown produces anxiety and why this automatically results in aggression (Harris, 2000: 173).

Biocultural hypothesis

The biocultural hypothesis explains xenophobia in terms of the visible “otherness” of foreigners. Physical biological characteristics and cultural differences such as bearing, skin colour, clothing styles and inability to speak an indigenous language are markers that promote xenophobia between nationals and foreigners, indicating whom to target (Harris, 2000:173). Even the contrast in skin colour serves to categorise people in South Africa, with persons with a lighter skin associated with socio-economic privilege and a darker skin with criminality and poverty (Valji, 2003: 16). According to Barbali, Senegalese dress in casual western style clothing which makes them not visibly different, contributing to their positive experiences as migrants in Port Elizabeth (2009: 21).

Although these theories and hypotheses provide insight into xenophobia they do not explain why black foreigners as the out-group excite violence and hatred in South Africa. For Harris the answer lays in the manner in which the phenomenon is represented by social institutions such as the media and in the mechanisms of nationalism (2002: 175).

Media representation of xenophobia

The revival of democracy since the mid 1990s and consequent liberation- and expansion of media influence in Africa led to an increase of journalism and its potential to play a democratic role on the Continent. Professionalism, development- and civic journalism approaches of the media all describe the democratic role of journalists in a different way. Earlier theories however, possess some limitations in relation to their application (with some elements catering for first

world- and others for third world circumstances) and rapidly changing technology. A theory, relevant to South Africa in a Third World milieu – to suit the new democratic challenges, was needed. Berger filled the gap with a theory of four ideal roles of democratic journalism that incorporates most of the political – democratic functions found in the other theories (Berger, 2000: 81-99).

In their *liberal role*, journalists act as protectors of citizen rights and as watchdog over government. Journalists, in their *social democratic role* fulfil a guide-dog function as neutral educators instead of political agents. In this role journalists encourage the public to be informed and knowledgeable. This role links with development journalism in the sense that it provides educational information to redirect social backwardness and promote development goals (Barratt, 2006: 44). The *neo-liberal role* involves the journalist as neutral referee or mirror of society with a democratic duty to diversity and pluralism. Journalists challenge prejudice and offer alternatives to their audiences (Barratt, 2006: 45). In exercising their *participatory role* journalists encourage the participation of civil society, also embracing the non-elite and the uninformed (Barratt, 2006: 44-45).

With regard to reporting on the xenophobic attacks in South Africa the question can be asked whether journalists are neutral, unbiased, informative and unprejudiced?

According to Crush current media discourse contributes to the set of stereotypes of foreigners in the country (2000; 109). The media do not only disseminate information to the public but also reproduce ideologies and discourses that support specific relations of power, creating and informing perceptions in the process (Smith, 2010: 2). Important is the manner in which perceptions are created. The way in which information is framed and presented to the public is of paramount significance. Various newspaper reports quoted by Harris (2002:175) represent the Continent and African people in a derogatory and negative manner, divorcing South Africa from the rest of Africa and linking Africans to chaos, disorder and criminality. Media articles are crafted in such a way that the African foreigner is profiled as a disease, threatening the South African society. According to Crush (as cited in Smith 2010:2), “several research studies have shown how the media has actually reproduced xenophobic language and statements, time and time again. The media has certainly been complicit in encouraging xenophobic attitudes among the nation”. A research report by the Forced Migration Studies Program at the University of the Witwatersrand titled, *May 2008 violence against foreign nationals in South Africa: Understanding causes and evaluating responses*, states that the media played an important, if unintentional role in triggering/ influencing violence in areas such as Masiphumelele, Du Noon and Diepsloot. Respondents in these affected areas believe that the violence was triggered by what people learned in the media about attacks in other areas (Misago, Monson & Polzer, 2010: 175). Media coverage of xenophobia and xenophobic violence in the post-2008 period will be

discussed in Chapter 4. The analysis will focus on media coverage of the De Doorns case as well as the perceived 2010 World Cup violence. With regard to De Doorns, regional newspapers such as Cape Times, *Argus*, *Die Burger*, local community newspapers – Worcester Standard and *Valleier* and the reporting of community radio station, Valley FM were studied.

In a country where racist language is considered illegal, xenophobic stereotyping and imagery produced by the media seem perfectly acceptable. Media analyses is a critical first step to address the problem but needs to be followed up with systematic and coordinated education for journalists and editors (Crush, 2009: 82). Although journalists are confronted by complex challenges in a new democracy, irresponsible reporting damages the media's attempts to advance the democracy in terms of Berger's four ideal roles of democratic journalism and put media freedom at risk. It also strengthens the case of proponents of the dreaded secrecy bill. It can also be argued that the effect of the post-apartheid project is clouding journalists' judgement and serves as reason for not performing their democratic role to the fullest extent.

Xenophobia as pathology

Although the hypotheses identified by Harris provide reasons for xenophobia they do not interrogate the term itself. To better understand the phenomenon it is also necessary to consider the social relations and identities that are reproduced in the term itself (Harris, 2002: 177). The way xenophobia is represented in the media is important. In media headlines quoted by Harris two striking features emerged. Firstly xenophobia is presented as something negative and unwanted that must be eradicated from South African society. Secondly the term is described with the same language and images that are used to describe foreigners in xenophobic language (Harris, 2002: 178). Just as the media derogates African foreigners, xenophobia is projected as a contaminant in the South African society. Pathologised by metaphors of "disease", "floods" and "laager mentality" in the media, xenophobia is portrayed as something abnormal and unhealthy, separate from the normal, healthy South Africa. Harris states:

By pathologising xenophobia, the phenomenon is effectively quarantined from the healthy New South Africa; it is isolated from the ideals that comprise the discourse. Similarly, the pathologising of xenophobia serves the African Renaissance discourse. This discourse underplays nationalism and does not allow for hostility towards African foreigners. As pathology, xenophobia is neatly separated from the healthy objectives of the African Renaissance.

Xenophobia is represented as pathology and something to be cured to guarantee the harmonious co-existence of the New South Africa and the South African Renaissance.

Culture of violence

Since xenophobic behaviour is not unique to South Africa, what then distinguishes such practices? To understand the complexities around the manifestation of xenophobia in South Africa, the country's "culture of violence" offers some insight. During the years of apartheid social interaction was governed through violent means. In an authoritarian situation where political rights were suppressed, resistance was met with violent retribution. This practice resulted in the "legitimisation" of violence in the country and although violence is no longer of a political nature in contemporary South Africa, the legacy of apartheid according to Harris, normalised the phenomenon (2000: 180). In South Africa a situation developed where the use of violence has become almost normal behaviour instead of deviant, where violence is regarded as an acceptable response in managing conflict and achieving justice and material goals (Valji, 2003:15). Apartheid has set the course for a culture of violence in South Africa and although the form of violence may have changed from political to criminal, violence is still practised as the dominant means to solve problems in South Africa and as such has been normalised as a legacy of apartheid (Harris, 2002:180). It is against this background of violence that xenophobia in South Africa must be conceptualised.

However, it must be mentioned that at the time of this research (De Doorns case study) the country already celebrated 17 years of apartheid free democracy. Model C (former white racial group) schools in the Breede Valley Region for instance are almost totally integrated. In De Doorns where the youth were confronted about their allegiance towards countries that harboured and supported South Africans during the apartheid years, it was clear that not even the mention of what apartheid did to people could persuade them to welcome the displaced Zimbabweans back into their communities. Although the isolation caused by apartheid definitely contributed towards creating "the other," after 17 years of democracy the question can be asked, to what extent the phenomenon can be held responsible for the present-day culture of violence? Since the end of apartheid there have been numerous opportunities where South Africans associated with foreign nationals from Africa on a wide variety of issues, at different levels of society. Another possible consequence of apartheid, contributing to a culture of violence is the effect that the *struggle* left on the psyche of people. Young people were confronted by issues such as liberation before education and forced into civil disobedience, even violence by desperation and the promise of a free South Africa. For many, liberation did not result in a better life and the struggle for economic survival continues. It can be argued that people, even today, are plagued by their violent protest that was forced on them by apartheid and are enticed into using violence means to serve their purpose. It can be argued that the system corrupted both the oppressor, who exerted power and violence to maintain apartheid and the oppressed that were forced to use civil disobedience and violence to defeat apartheid.

Both mechanisms of fostering the nation-building concept prioritising According to Valji the myth of the “Rainbow Nation” (with violence conveniently side-lined) has a top-down approach, presenting a myth of peace that attempts to reconcile the in-group while setting them up against the “other.” Valji quotes Gronin as writing that:

“Allowing ourselves to sink into a smug rainbowism will prove to be a terrible betrayal of the possibilities of real transformation, real reconciliation and real national unity that are still at play in our contemporary South African reality.”

2.3.5 Conclusion

In this section xenophobia is defined and explained in terms of what is generally understood by the phenomenon as well as its violent manifestation in the South African context. Since xenophobia is sensitive to group dynamics and the harbouring of feelings of prejudice, a theoretical explanation of the different theories of prejudice that impact on the phenomenon followed the definition. The different hypotheses of xenophobia, grouped by Harris into the scapegoating hypothesis, the isolation hypothesis and the biocultural hypothesis offer different levels of explanation of xenophobia within contemporary South Africa.

Xenophobia in South Africa cannot be fully comprehended without referring to its violent nature. To understand why African people are targeted and explain the violent expression of xenophobia it is necessary to refer to what is termed the post-apartheid project, explaining xenophobia as pathology in terms of the “New South Africa” and “Renaissance” discourses.

2.4 DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION

The research problem focused the research on literature that explain the concept of development (communication), its evolution and application in the present South African context. First development is defined and explained in terms of its process and outcomes, followed by a historical snapshot of community communication – the move away from modernisation, to embrace participatory communication, with specific reference to the role of local government.

2.4.1 Development

The concept of development has undergone significant change since the end of the Second World War. The works of scholars such as Melkote, Steeves, Kingsbury, Remenyi, McKay and Hunt were consulted in gaining a background and explaining the paths by which development has come to be understood as a people-centred process, intimately linked to governance issues. This review focuses on the evolution of development based on the principal that people seek a better life. In this regard according to Kingsbury et al. development has a service role to ensure that the importance of good governance and human rights issues be maintained and

utilised to entrench poverty alleviation on the development agenda (2004: 22). This service role of development is central in the current xenophobia discourse in South Africa where government is accused of failing communities in service delivery, giving rise to frustration that boils over in xenophobic behaviour.

Considering the central role of people in contemporary development thinking, the concept can be defined as, “a process of growth towards self-reliance and contentment by which individuals, groups and communities obtain the means to be responsible for their own livelihoods, welfare and future” (Kingsbury et al., 2004:25). Although development means different things to different people and relatively few studies of development communication bother to define the concept, Melkote and Steeves support the notion that development means improving the living conditions of society (2003: 34). Development as a vehicle to improve the lives of people at grassroots level however, was not acknowledged by modernisation and its investment driven development strategies. In Africa economic thought was moulded along the concept that every person had a right to food, shelter, clothing and protection. It was rooted in the norm that “what happens to one, happens to all.” The work of society as Africans understood it was organised to be done jointly. According to Mutharika this practise still forms the foundation of the African civil society today and should constitute the basis of development initiatives (1995: 9). Colonialism and its modernisation ally maintained that Africans are incapable of ruling themselves and could therefore not develop any economic thought. For Mutharika the answer for Africa’s underdevelopment lies in, “the theory of collective self-reliance through economic co-operation on a regional basis (1995: 14). The establishment of democracy in South Africa in 1994 placed great emphasis on development, with initiatives such as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) catering for the basic needs of people at grassroots level.

Development (empowerment) of third world countries in the post-Second World War period up to the 1970s was viewed as synonymous with economic development. The welfare of the people of recipient states was neglected in favour of economic growth, arising from the transfer of technology from advanced areas to technologically and economically underdeveloped areas (Kingsbury et al., 2004: 25). The focus on basic needs in development planning resulted in renewed emphasis being given to programmes providing basic needs to the poor in rural communities. Unfortunately increased priority to basic needs in development planning deteriorated into the rhetoric of welfare (defining the needs of the poor in welfare terms) which diverted the attention from boosting the productivity of impoverished communities. Policies directed at the poor portrayed a paternalistic attitude, obscuring the truth, confusing charity with development assistance, education with knowledge and poverty with ignorance (Kingsbury, 2004: 33). At the beginning of the development decade of the 1970s development was still

paternalistic and elitist orientated, side-lining poor people from the process that was supposed to benefit them – reducing them to second-class citizens in their own countries of birth.

During the 13 years Robert McNamara served as president of the World Bank, 1968-1981 the importance of placing poverty reduction at centre stage in development gained some momentum (Kingsbury, 2004:31). It is only since 1980 that the link between poverty and development received the explicit attention of development practitioners and mainstream academic literature. Role players now realise the value of participatory development in planning, problem solving and program implementation (Kingsbury, 2004:26).

2.4.3 Community participation – a South African perspective

Since the thesis focuses on the link between development communication and xenophobia in the South African context the following section will briefly discuss the different phases of the development of community participation in South Africa on the basis of relative literature.

A largely dormant pre - 1976 period was followed by an active 1977-1983 period, with the death of political activist Steve Biko in September 1977, signalling the need for community organisation and mobilisation at grassroots level as well as community control with the emphasis on “power to the people.” During this period the United Democratic Front (UDF) was established to mobilise the community against the apartheid regime – giving a voice to the people (Williams, 2006:199).

During the 1984-1989 period, the involvement of communities in the struggle against “apartheid” gained momentum with international cultural and sports boycotts contributing to accelerated change. Media such as Bush Radio in Cape Town also contributed to the struggle putting pressure on government. This pressure on government by civil society activism during the 1980s (Horwitz, 2001:4) led to the legalisation of liberation movements and the beginning of consensual politics of negotiation during the period 1990-1994. These negotiations resulted in the drafting of the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) in 1994 and the 1996 Constitution of South Africa. The former was the result of community participation and the latter entrenched the public’s right to participate in local government planning (Williams, 2006:199).

The 1996-2000 period and beyond is characterised by the establishment of various types of development partnerships and the promulgation of legislature that promote public participation, emphasising local government’s role as implementing agent.

Since the establishment of democracy in South Africa local government has undergone far reaching change. The country’s second democratic election held on 5 December 2000 has ended the transition phase of post-apartheid local government and initiated a new era in municipal governance, generally referred to as developmental local government. Local

authorities are now expected to play an increasingly prominent role in growth and political emancipation in South Africa. The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 recognises local government as the “key site of delivery and development” which is central to the “entire transformative project of *post-apartheid* South Africa” (RSA, 2005).

Since a case study offers a new (fresh) perspective on a subject and because of the restricted scope of a 50% thesis an extended account of the development of community participation in the local government context is not feasible. However, it is important to explain local government’s developmental obligation in terms of the relevant legislation that regulates community participation, the cornerstone of developmental local government.

The essence of the new democracy is the right of the citizenry to participate in governance. The Constitution of South Africa provides for democratic and accountable government for local communities and encourages the involvement of communities and community organisations in matters of local government (RSA, 1996). In terms of Section 152(1) of the Constitution local government must strive towards achieving the following objectives:

- To provide democratic and accountable government for local communities
- To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner
- To promote social and economic development
- To promote a safe and healthy environment, and
- To encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government

From the above discussion it is clear that meaningful developmental local government cannot be achieved in the absence of community participation.

Complementing the constitutional obligations, the Municipal Systems Act (Section 16 (1)) stipulates that municipalities “must develop a culture of municipal governance that complements former representative government with a system of participatory governance” (RSA, 2000). Communities, according to the Act have the right to contribute to the municipality’s decision-making processes. Section 6 (2a) guarantees that the administration of a municipality must, “be responsive to the needs of the local community” (RSA, 2000). Article 17 of the Act allows for local communities to participate in the affairs of the municipality (RSA, 2000). The White Paper on Local Government provides for municipalities to develop mechanisms to ensure citizen participation. It stipulates that citizens must participate in the development of policy and the monitoring and evaluation of decision-making and its implementation (RSA, 1998a). Of special significance is the provision in the Systems Act that makes it compulsory for communities to participate in the formulation of Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). Section 23 (1) (b) stipulates that municipalities must undertake developmentally orientated planning to give effect

to its developmental duties as required by section 153 of the Constitution (RSA, 2000). Other legislation such as the Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 and the Municipal Property Rates Act, 2004 also make provision for local authorities to consult with communities.

The above legal framework does not only guide and protect the right of communities to participate in local government. It also makes provision for the involvement of local communities in the development, implementation and review of the municipalities' Performance Management System. The Municipal Systems Act highlights the importance of communities to be involved in the development of the municipalities' key performance areas and to assist in the setting of performance targets for municipalities. The foregoing explanation illustrates local government's pivotal role in the advancement of participatory governance, highlighting the importance of community participation in realising developmental goals.

In explaining xenophobia, its meaning and reasons for its violent manifestation, popular sources complimented academic sources. Media reports, articles in journals, research reports and case studies were explored for their contemporary value. Case studies assisted with the how and why of the xenophobic attacks, offering an in depth view of the causes, triggers and relations associated with the violent manifestation of the phenomenon in South Africa. It also informs the present discourse on violence in the country offering practical insight into the problem. Eleven case studies on the conditions and causes of the 2008 violence conducted by the Forced Migration Studies Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand were reviewed (2010: 48-164). The case studies also include sites that were not affected by the violence. The following case studies were analysed: Itireleng and Atteridgeville in Pretoria, Diepsloot and Sectors 11 and V of Alexandra in Johannesburg, Ramaphosa and Madelakufa 1 and 11 in Ekurhuleni, Masiphumelele and Du Noon in the Western Cape and Motherwell in the Eastern Cape. The Atlantic Philanthropies Report: South African Civil Society and Xenophobia, analysed 14 case studies written by some of South Africa's leading social and political scientist as well as civil society activists offering a balanced view of the phenomenon (2010).

2.4.4 Conclusion

In this section development communication, its evolution and application in the South African context is explained. A historical perspective is offered, tracing the stages of development communication from modernisation, the critical aspects of development, the First Development Decade with its persuasion biases (communicating innovations by destroying traditional life in the Third World countries), to participatory communication involving beneficiaries in decision taking. It also offers insight into the development of community participation in South Africa and profile the most important legislation that impact on community participation.

After attaining democracy government opted for a developmental path for South Africa to redress the imbalances of the past. The third tier of government was entrusted with the responsibility to champion economic and social development in South Africa in partnership with communities, civil society and business, to improve service delivery and address the real needs of communities. To fully appreciate the participatory approach to development communication and local government's role as implementing agent it is important to trace the evolution of development communication from its the modernistic top-down approach of industrialisation to participatory communication that embrace people, consult them, make them part of governance.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Living in South Africa and working for local government can be a rewarding but bitter-sweet experience. Progressing from the dark days of apartheid where the oppression of the majority and a total disregard of human rights were the order of the day, South African society has entered an era of hope with high expectations of a better life for all. Local government, champion of delivery in the New South Africa, has the challenging task to transform expectations into feasible outcomes.

Although political liberation of the masses was obtained, the social and economic realities of apartheid continue to haunt South Africans with many still living under the poverty line. According to Gordon, economic uncertainties give rise to internal struggles in society, “over the rights of access and the processes of redistribution of economic resources” (2010: 5). Limited access to economic resources creates frustration which in turn, due to unfulfilled expectations following the political emancipation of South Africa, triggers xenophobic violence. The above is in line with Tshitereke’s view that,

In the post-apartheid epoch, while people’s expectations have been heightened, a realisation that delivery is not immediate has meant that discontent and indignation are at their peak. People are more conscious of their deprivation than ever before... This is the ideal situation for a phenomenon like xenophobia to take root and flourish. South Africa’s political transition to democracy has exposed the unequal distribution of resources and wealth in the country (1999: 4).

This statement, made in 1999, even today captures the essence of the problem, namely the creation of expectations and an inability to deliver. Local government in terms of policy and legislation is at the coalface of development, entrusted with the responsibility to turn around the plight of the poor through participatory communication (involving communities in governance) and the implementation of development and service delivery programmes. Literature on reasons for xenophobia identifies local government as key to resolving the matter. In order to complement the existing body of knowledge on the reasons for xenophobic violence and to determine local government’s possible share in triggering xenophobia, the author opted to research the case of De Doorns in the Western Cape of South Africa. The De Doorns case is unique in terms of locality and scope in relation to the 2008 attacks which occurred mostly in the urban areas of the country. In this sense, the study may also contribute to the identification of new trends. In comparison with Alexandra in Johannesburg where 300 people were displaced in

2008, 3 000 of an estimated 8 000 Zimbabweans living in the small rural community of De Doorns were displaced during the attacks on 14 and 17 November 2009. In a small rural town with a permanent population of approximately 13 000 the magnitude of the problem can be appreciated.

Of significance is the local municipality's approach to its developmental mandate, the impact of the phenomenon on the finances and infrastructure of the area, the interplay between government institutions, and government and community, the effect of NGOs on the reintegration process, the presence of labour brokers and the reaction of the local community, especially the principal employer in the area, namely the Hex Valley Table Grape Association, as well as the sports fraternity and the *Stofland, Ekuphumleni and Hasie Square* communities from where the violence originated.

Although there are some similarities between the De Doorns case and the country-wide outbreak of xenophobia in 2008, like the violent nature of the attacks and the state of poverty in affected areas, there are also wide-ranging differences. The setting of the attacks, in the rural community of De Doorns, is vastly different from the incidents during May 2008, which predominantly took place in urban areas. While the impact of the violence in urban areas was restricted to a specific neighbourhood, the violence experienced in *Stofland* in De Doorns affected the whole of civil society in De Doorns. Although the extent of the violence in De Doorns compared favourably with many of the bigger settlements in the metros during the 2008 xenophobia, the Breede Valley Municipality had to cope with far less resources, which added to the pressures facing the local government.

3.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The research problem and units of analysis determined the methodology and the appropriate mode of observation. Traditionally evaluation methods have been divided into two broad families – quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative, following the scientific method is rooted in the positivist tradition. It favours quantitative analysis to measure the results of an intervention accurately and scientifically. The qualitative mode argues that human nature is too complex and unpredictable to be measured in strict quantitative terms. It is therefore grounded in a different epistemological perspective based on an approach that values the social construction of reality. According to the qualitative perspective, social change needs to be measured from the individual's perception and point of view, rather than from the numbers of project outputs, which are often incapable of accounting for the richness and complexity of social dimensions such as empowerment, freedom and happiness. According to Leedy the methodology is quantitative if the data is numerical and qualitative if the data is verbal (Du ploooy, 1997: 33). Although according to Babbie the difference between the two types of research is measurement and

interpretation, Leedy points out that the nature of the data and the problem for research dictate the research methodology (1997: 33). The creative and open-ended nature of qualitative research makes it harder to be as precise about how to gather and interpret as quantitative research allows. In qualitative research, there are fewer strict rules to determine whether its being done appropriately or whether the data are being interpreted correctly (Babbie, 1998:299).

The study adopted qualitative research methodology for its analytic and interpretive advantages in an attempt to determine to what extent local government exercised its developmental mandate in dealing with the civil unrest in the De Doorns case. The study set out to determine local government's performance against the backdrop of a specific case, namely the De Doorns case in the Breede Valley Region of the Western Cape.

According to Yin, a case study is an empirical inquiry using multiple sources of evidence to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context (1989: 23-25). A case study differs from other studies in the sense that the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. In the De Doorns case, data collecting techniques included the study of documents, in-depth interviews, unstructured interviews and direct observation.

3.2.1 Documents

The study of documents provided background on the focus area, highlighting the current reality with regard to demographics, social trends, employment trends, basic service provision, housing, employment opportunities and levels of poverty. Documents such as council minutes, the integrated development plan (IDP), Reintegration Task Committee minutes and internal communications (mostly e-mail) assisted in building a picture of the events leading up to the attacks, the causes of the outburst, local government involvement in the humanitarian response and the reintegration process. From this information a roadmap was constructed that displays the course of events in chronological order. Research, monitoring and media reports provided valuable information on a variety of aspects such as leading causes and triggers of xenophobic attacks, conditions in the camp and the role of labour brokers and NGOs. The study *Sour Grapes* by labour practitioner Jan Theron on indirect employment in the Hex River Valley served as a valuable source for the research. A research report by Jean Pierre Misago of the Forced Migration Studies Programme (RMSP) titled *Violence, Labour and the Displacement of Zimbabweans in De Doorns, Western Cape* shed valuable light on the causes for the attacks. Monitor reports by a team from the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa, Black Sash and Oxfam also lent valuable insight into the humanitarian response to the violence in De Doorns.

Permission to access internal resources was obtained from the municipal manager, Mr Allen Paulse.

3.2.2 Field research

Observation

Field research is a social research method that involves the direct observation of social phenomena in their natural settings (Babbie, 1998:305). In conducting the research, observation and in-depth and unstructured interviews were adopted as field research methods. The author was involved in the process from the outbreak of the xenophobic violence on 14 November 2009 to the closing of the safety camp on 17 October 2010, initially in the role of observer-as-participant and later as participant-as-observer in attending Reintegration Task Team (RTT) meetings. During community meetings and visits to the safety camp and affected areas he assumed the role of onlooker as observer.

Although the author was familiar with the BVM representative on the Reintegration Task Team, the presence of representatives from various other government institutions and role players warranted that rapport be established with the latter. The author was introduced to the Task Team by the BVM representative, Mr. Manfred van Rooyen, and the necessary permission was gained to observe the activities of the Committee. In his role as observer, the author observed the following activities:

- Meetings of the first multi-sector Xenophobia Crisis Committee established directly after the xenophobic incidents
- Meetings of the multi-sector RTT which replaced the Xenophobia Task Team
- Meetings of the Reintegration Committee that replaced the Reintegration Task Team
- Meetings of the Breede Valley Municipal Council
- Stofland ward committee meeting
- Stofland community meeting
- Members (producers / farmers) of the Hex Valley Table Grape Association
- Meeting of Labour Minister Membathisi Mdladlana and De Doorns community
- Meetings with the Board of Directors of the Hex Valley Table Grape Association (HTA)
- Meetings of Operation Check-Out
- Meetings with the Zimbabwean camp committee.

In addition to attending and observing meetings, permission was gained from the Reintegration Task Team to visit the camp site where the activities of the displaced and the mood in the camp as well as the security and camp conditions were observed.

Interviews

Interviews are qualitative tools to gain knowledge or to probe specific issues. The value of the methodological tool is that it can be structured in different ways. It can be in the form of free discussions around a specific topic. It can be in-depth discussions with specialists in their fields of knowledge or it can be semi-structured discussions with a pre-determined list of questions for open –ended and closed ended questions providing answers that are easier to analyse, compare and contrast. Since the study focuses on local government’s developmental responsibility and its performance in managing xenophobic situations it was decided to concentrate the fieldwork on the contributions of government officials who spearheaded the De Doorns case. It was decided not to re-invent the wheel by conducting surveys and focus group discussions on the reasons for xenophobia but rather to observe developments and obtain the views of key individuals who were not only involved in managing the xenophobic situation at De Doorns, but who also distinguished themselves in community work. In addition to observing the process (attending meetings and visiting the safety sight and affected communities) and reviewing correspondence, minutes of meetings and reports compiled by various organisations, semi-structured in-depth interviews as well as unstructured interviews were adopted in the De Doorns study which stretched over a period of eleven months.

The interviewing process guided by Babbie’s description (1998: 292), included the following stages: First the purpose of the interviews and the concepts: xenophobia, developmental local government and development communication, to be explored, were clarified. The process to accomplish the purpose of the interviews, including ethical considerations was then finalised, followed by the actual interviews. The interviews were tape-recorded and the data transcribed. The information was then analysed, determining its meaning in relation to the purpose of the study. The reliability and validity of the information were checked by comparing the content of the different interviews and by cross-checking it against municipal documentation, minutes of the Reintegration Task Team and notes made during the interviews and observations.

3.2.3 Key research participants

Since the purpose of the study was to evaluate local government’s performance in exercising its developmental mandate with regard to the De Doorns case, it was decided to focus the research on the contributions of government officials serving on the Reintegration Task Committee. The participants in the in-depth interviews were from various spheres of government representing the Breede Valley Municipality, the Department of Social Development and Provincial Community Development Workers. The following key participants were identified for the interviews:

- Manfred van Rooyen – Manager: Performance Management System at the BVM. Mr. Van Rooyen also served as IDP (Integrated Development Plan) manager at the Breede Valley Municipality. At the time of the interview, he was the convenor of the Reintegration Task Team.
- Caesar Sauls – Deputy Director at the Department of Social Development in Worcester. Mr. Sauls is an experienced development practitioner who represented the Department at the safety sight in De Doorns.
- Ashraf Kafaar – CDW coordinator for the Cape Winelands District. Mr. Kafaar headed the CDW presence at the camp.
- Elsa Jordaan – Councillor at the BVM and Executive Director of the Hex Valley Table Grape Association. Cllr. Jordaan represented the HTA on the Reintegration Task Team.

All forms of social research raise a wide range of ethical issues. The author informed all participants on the purpose of the interviews and that he intended to use the information for his *Masters degee*. The participants gave their permission and agreed that the interviews be recorded. Transcriptions of the recordings have been made and discussed with the participants. A copy of the recordings is in the possession of the author.

3.3 CONCLUSION

A case study, although informed by a theoretical framework in terms of a literary study, is predominantly the discovery of exciting new phenomena within their real-life context. Although there is sufficient material on the theory of xenophobia, namely the nature, origin, different hypotheses and various case studies on the phenomenon in an urban context, relatively little research has been done on xenophobic violence in rural communities, especially key agricultural areas. Since most of the case studies focus on the perceptions and experiences of perpetrators and victims, it was felt that the views from government officials and observations of government activities during the humanitarian response to the attacks would provide valuable information. Monitor reports of the situation also offered valuable insight.

CHAPTER 4

DE DOORNS CASE STUDY

4.1 BACKGROUND

The most striking feature of De Doorns in the Breede Valley of the Western Cape is its scenic beauty. Majestic mountains, fertile valleys, vineyards and well-cultivated farms with stately Cape Dutch style homesteads captivate the soul.

De Doorns forms part of the Breede Valley Municipal (BVM) area consisting of the towns of Worcester, De Doorns, Rawsonville, Touws River and the Matroosberg rural area. The town lies at the centre of the Hex River Valley, geographically bounded by mountains on either side of the Hex River, approximately one and a half hours' drive from Cape Town, just off the N1 and 35 kilometres from Worcester, the commercial centre of the Breede Valley. The Hex River Valley is a self-contained area devoted to the production of a single product, namely table grapes.

De Doorns, with an estimated population of 13 000 souls, is the biggest producer of table grapes (17 million cartons per annum) in the Southern Hemisphere (South African Fruit, 2007), offering an estimated 8 000 employment opportunities in peak season. During November, preparations for the season begin. December, or *groendruiwetyd* as it is popularly referred to by the locals, is the beginning of the season. This is the most labour-intensive part of the production process and entails the removal of underdeveloped berries from the bunch. This is done over a period of six weeks. The grapes are then picked and packed over a period of three months, finishing towards the end of May. The vineyards are pruned in July/August, making the Hex River Valley season one of the longest in the Breede Valley area (Jordaan, 2010). The table grape industry and agriculture-related activities are the main economic drivers in the Hex Valley area. The HTA (Hex Valley Table Grape Association) represents the farmers in the area. All exporters of table grapes are compelled to register with the South African Table Grape Industry (SATI) (South African Table). Bordering on De Doorns are three informal settlements, namely Ekuphumleni, Stofland and Hasie Square, located in Ward 2 of the BVM.

The tranquil rural town is a hive of activity during the harvesting season with thousands of farm labourers in the vineyards and on the farms – picking, sorting and packing the juicy berries for the export market. However, this idyllic appearance belies a more sinister side of the area and its people – a side in sharp contrast with the Municipality's vision of "a unique and caring Valley of service excellence, opportunity and growth". Poverty, unemployment, political tension, class formation and labour inequalities contributed to unbearable frustration which manifested itself in xenophobic violence on 14 and 17 November 2009.

The population in the area is mixed. Traditionally, it comprised of white farmers and Coloured farm workers. Lately, there is also a strong presence of Xhosas and migrants from Lesotho, staying in a settlement known as Maseru, as well as a large contingent of Zimbabwean foreign nationals. Respondents related that prior to 2007, apart from minor individual conflicts, there were no major tension among the different population groups (Jordaan, 2011). The influx of Zimbabweans, however, put pressure on the population composition in the area. In addition to threatening the dominance of the Coloured and Xhosa population groups, the increase in numbers also put employment opportunities under pressure and intensified the struggle for scarce resources and housing.

Stofland, Ekuphumleni and Hasie Square, from where approximately 3000 Zimbabweans were displaced, accommodate the poorest of the poor in this “rich” agricultural region. Initially, the cause for the outbreak of the violence was identified as employment related and later service delivery shortcomings. The reasons, however, are more complex and the incident cannot be attributed to only one or two reasons.

De Doorns represents the first large-scale displacement of foreign nationals since May 2008. The context in which the De Doorns case happened is unique in terms of the 2008 outbreak of xenophobia. In contrast to mainly densely populated black urban areas the outbreak of xenophobic violence in De Doorns spent itself in rural surroundings with a mixed population composition. The incidents occurred within three kilometres of the predominantly white town. The Zimbabweans work on farms owned by white farmers, alongside predominantly permanent and seasonal Coloured workers. After the incident, the internally displaced Zimbabweans were accommodated in a safety camp located on a sports field in the town, utilised by mainly Coloured and white sportsmen. In contrast to the May 2008 violence, which only subsided after two weeks, the unrest in De Doorns took place over a four-day period. The physical attacks were launched on two separate days.

In the De Doorns case, the perpetrators were mainly Xhosas and the victims almost 100% Zimbabweans who work as labourers in the agricultural industry, whereas the 2008 attacks were directed at all foreign nationals regardless of their nationality, age, gender and categories of employment. It is also safe to say that the conflict in De Doorns was not influenced by incidents elsewhere. The attacks, informed by its own unique set of dynamics, occurred 18 months after the 2008 violence.

Considering the size and capacity of De Doorns, the impact of the violence on resources, infrastructure and the economy of the community percentage wise outweighs many of the incidents that occurred in the urban areas during the 2008 outbreak. The economies of rural farming areas are much more vulnerable to xenophobic activity than those of urban centres. In

De Doorns, where labour plays such an important role, labour unrest can severely disrupt the local economy and lead to job losses. The capacity of the local government also came under severe pressure. The potential economic, social and political effect of protest on municipalities cannot be underestimated.

One aspect that the De Doorns case shares with the others is the violent manifestation of protest and xenophobia. The case study explores the circumstances and reasons that encouraged the outbreak of xenophobic violence on 14 and 17 November 2009. It focuses on the role of the Reintegration Task Team (RTT), the commitment of leadership and local government's developmental obligation to encourage public participation by involving the community in governance and the effectiveness thereof.

4.2 THE VIOLENCE - FIELD OF NIGHTMARES

The media's controversial coverage of the 2008 xenophobic attacks and portrayal of foreign nationals was severely criticised for being unbalanced and anti-immigrant, even for fuelling xenophobia. In an appraisal of contemporary research on the media's coverage of xenophobia and xenophobic violence prior to and including May 2008, Matthew J. Smith (2010: 2) finds that the studies have shown that the media has uncritically reproduced xenophobic language and statements that encouraged xenophobic attitudes among the population. Tabloid newspapers such as the *Daily Sun* constantly labelled foreign nationals as aliens and repeatedly flagged the violence in headlines as war on aliens, fuelling racist prejudices in the process (Harber, 2008: 1). Media coverage of the violence of communities lashing out at suspected criminals often stops just short of celebration (Wasserman, 2008: 1).

Media reports at the break of the xenophobic attacks in De Doorns, in contrast to 2008, provided a balanced view of the events. The word aliens never featured, the victims were referred to as Zimbabweans, displaced people, refugees and foreign nationals in a sympathetic, unbiased way. The headlines impress upon the reader the horror of the attacks and evoke feelings of disgust towards the perpetrators and sympathy for the victims.

According to a research report produced by the Forced Migration Studies Programme, the media played a significant role in influencing violence in townships during the 2008 attacks. People tend to react to what they see and read in the media about attacks in other areas (Landau, Misago & Polzer, 2010: 176). Since the attacks in De Doorns were launched approximately 18 months after the 2008 xenophobic violence, the possible influence of media reports can be regarded as minimal or none. Coverage of xenophobic violence in the local media during the period May 2008 to November 2009 was almost non-existent. Articles in the local community newspaper, *Standard*, appeared on 22 May 2008 (Smit, 2008), 5 June 2008 (Schröder, 2008: 2) and 14 August 2008 (Schröder, 2008: 2).

Headlines such as “Hate rocks Cape *dorp*” (Prince, 2009: 1), “Bid for peace as 2 500 refugees forced out of homes” (Prince, 2009: 2) and “My heart is bleeding” (Mjekula, 2009: 1) depict the heartbreak, disappointment, lost, hopelessness and extreme violence that characterised the incident.

The caption with a picture in the *Argus* of 18 November 2009 says “Field of nightmares”, brilliantly depicting the gloomy mood of the Zimbabweans in the safety sight at a sports field hours after the second attack.

4.3 EARLY WARNING SIGNS

“Come Senators, Congressmen

Please heed the call

Don’t block at the doorway

Don’t block up the hall

For he that gets hurt

Will be he that has stalled

There’s a battle outside

And it’s ragin’”

With the words of his 1960’s protest song, “The times they are a-changing”, folk singer Bob Dylan urges the political elite to listen to the people. Did the Breede Valley heed the call? Were there any warning indicators pointing to the possible eruption of xenophobic violence in the Hex Valley? De Doorns is not an island; what happens in Worcester, the commercial centre of the Breede Valley, will eventually filter down to the Hex Valley and De Doorns area. To answer this question, it is necessary to search wider for signs and to include Worcester and the two other towns of the BVM, Rawsonville and Touws River, as well as the Matroosberg rural area. With regard to Rawsonville and Touws River, no evidence of any service delivery or xenophobia related incidents that might have encouraged the De Doorns xenophobic violence, could be found.

In Worcester in the residential areas of Zweletemba and Roodewal, incidents of violence against Somali businessmen were recorded. In Roodewal, a Somali shop was ransacked and looted in February 2008. On 7 March the same year in the predominantly black township of Zweletemba, furious residents vented their anger on Somali shopkeepers. Local SAPS spokesperson Captain Mzikayise Moloji passed the incidents off as crime related (Smit, 2008: 2). In De Doorns, according to Elsa Jordaan, Executive Chairperson of the HTA, minor incidents of prejudice against foreigners was detected as early as 2007. During November 2007, a blockade of the N1 might easily have spilled over in violence against foreign nationals. Theron

quoted a community leader saying that, “Tonight someone has just to say ‘I’ve had enough of these Zimbabweans’. A Zimbabwean living here told me ‘We are afraid’” (2009:20). An incident in February 2009, when the ex-boyfriend of a Xhosa girl burned down the shack where her Zimbabwean lover took refuge, killing eight people, sparked robust police action against “illegal” Zimbabweans (Jordaan, 2011). The BVM representative on the RTT, Manfred van Rooyen, viewed the incident as a case of social conflict rather than xenophobia related (Van Rooyen, 2011). There were also incidents of people from Stofland complaining about the housing shortages in the informal settlement (Maritz, 2008: 2). On 18 November 2008 protesters from Stofland complaining about service delivery blocked the N1 at De Doorns (Fula, 2011). According to Misago, it was a known fact that tensions were building up and that meetings were held to plan the attacks. However, councillors and the police did not intervene to prevent an escalation of the tension into violence (2009).

Although these indicators did not necessarily trigger the xenophobic attacks in November 2009, it can be argued that the Municipality’s failure to address these concerns encouraged the residents of the informal settlements to take matters into their own hands. Although the executive mayor of the BVM at the time, Cllr. Charles Ntsomi, served for a couple of meetings on a forum established in the aftermath of the May 2008 attacks, the BVM failed to react proactively on the warning signs (Schröder, 2008: 2). With the exception of some discussions with other role players on the issue of xenophobia in the period following the 2008 outbreak (Smit, 2008: 2), the research revealed no proof (minutes, programmes, media statements) of any action initiated by the Municipality since mid-2008 to publicly denounce xenophobia or to sensitise the public around aspects of this phenomenon. Council also failed to implement contingency plans to cater specifically for xenophobic violence. Of significance is the station commander of SAPS in De Doorns, Supt. Desmond van der Westhuizen’s remark in the media that the outbreak of xenophobia was not a once-off incident, but an annual occurrence. He was quoted on saying that “it’s a thing with a history” (Xenophobia attack, 2011). This was also the case with the attack in 2008. Investigations showed that the violence was not as spontaneous as originally thought. It was rather the culmination of a long festering unease and impatience with the increasing number of foreigners competing with locals for the same scarce resources. The social unrest in De Doorns is not a sudden and unexpected crisis - the signs have been there for some time. Even though the local government has been referring to the current problems in the Hex River Valley as unexpected, the truth is that it could easily have been foreseen.

Government did not heed the call.

4.4 THE CRIME SCENE: THE NATURE AND PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE

On Saturday 14 November 2009, the small rural community of De Doorns in the beautiful Hex River Valley was stunned by the eruption of xenophobic violence. Attacks in Ekuphumleni displaced 68 Zimbabwean nationals – 60 adults and eight children (Gerber, 2009: 1). According to Mr Stalin Mkombo, a leader figure in the Zimbabwean community, the trouble began in the early hours of Saturday when people who had been drinking at a shebeen (pub) stoned the homes of Zimbabweans (Mjekula, 2009: 1).

On Tuesday, 17 November 2009, the next offensive by locals from the informal settlements Stofland and Hasie Square displaced approximately 3 000 Zimbabweans. People were forced from their homes and prevented from going to work (Robertson, 2009: 1). The displaced initially sought protection at the De Doorns police station and a nearby municipal building. On 18 November they were moved to a sports field as their numbers increased.

The attacks in Ekuphumleni were brutal, with residents armed with sticks and stones racing through the informal settlement, tearing down shacks as police fired rubber bullets and used stun grenades to disperse the crowd (Prince, 2009: 1). On 17 November, scores of locals drove out an estimated 3 000 Zimbabweans from Stofland and Hasie Square, accusing them of stealing their jobs. Many women with small children were seen walking from Stofland to a municipal hall about a kilometre away. “My heart is bleeding”, cried one of the mothers whose children had nothing to eat since early that morning (Mjekula, 2011: 1). The attacks on 17 November was not so severe but resulted in wide-scale disruption, robbing Zimbabweans of a home and opportunity to earn a living. At a community meeting held on 23 November 2009, the displacement of foreign nationals on Tuesday, 17 November 2009 was viewed as justifiable eviction from property that belong to community members, rather than a criminal act (Igglesden, 2009: 6).

In a migration policy brief prepared for the Forced Migration Studies Programme, Jean Pierre Misago relates that, “inconsistent and indecisive responses by the police are another reason why many observers, particularly the victims, believe in the complicity of the local authority” (2009: 10). According to witnesses, the police acted swiftly and decisively to curb the violence in Ekuphumleni on 14 November. Yet, their response on 17 November was ineffective. Apparently, the police turned a blind eye to the destruction and looting of property and encouraged perpetrators to chase the Zimbabweans away but not to beat anyone (2009).

Braam Hanekom of the refugee rights organisation PASSOP (People Against Suffering, Suppression, Oppression and Poverty) is of the opinion that the police acted too slowly and that they could have prevented the eviction of thousands of Zimbabweans by raising their profile

over the weekend. Manfred van Rooyen, BVM representative on the RTT, quoting police reports, said:

“It was a peaceful march of Zimbabweans taking their belongings from Stofland. There were only 12 structures demolished, not burned down or violently taken down. The Zimbabweans with the police monitoring them, walked towards available transport almost peacefully leaving the area” (2011).

This view is in sharp contrast with that of PASSOP and the observations of journalists. However, to the credit of the police it must be said that no deaths, rapes and cases of serious injury were reported.

The attacks targeted only the Zimbabwean section of the community notwithstanding the fact that people from the Sotho and Coloured racial groups also reside in the affected areas. Two shops managed by Congolese and Cameroonian nationals had been closed during the unrest but were not looted (Igglesden, 2009: 3). This supports findings that the attacks were targeted. Only one case of mistaken identity was reported. Prince Mongwe, a South African citizen from Shangaan descent, said he was told that he looks like a Zimbabwean and should leave the area. His girlfriend, who speaks Xhosa, probably saved his life but he lost all his possessions in the process (Prince, 2009: 1). According to Ashraf Kafaar, Regional Coordinator of the Provincial CDW Programme in the Breede Valley and member of the RTT, the reason why Sothos were not attacked can be attributed to the fact that the Zimbabweans compete in the same market as the locals and are therefore regarded as soft targets (2011). Although some of the Sothos also work on the farms their numbers make them less conspicuous. Van Rooyen agrees with the view that the contestation for job opportunities is one of the main reasons why members of other population groups were not attacked. That is also why he is of the opinion that the De Doorns case is not classical xenophobia (2011). While the South Africans deny that the evictions are xenophobic, the Zimbabweans insist that xenophobia is the motive (Mjekula, 2009).

This section, up to now, identified the scene of the violence, described the intensity of the attacks, explained the racial complexity and alluded to the possible complicity of authorities. But who are the perpetrators and what do they look like?

A community meeting held at the Hex Valley People's Centre on Tuesday, 12 January 2009 provided valuable insight on the profile of the perpetrators. The meeting was convened to persuade the residents of Stofland to allow the Zimbabweans back into the informal settlement. At the meeting, for the first time since the outbreak of the violence, another reason other than the contestation for scarce resources emerged. After hearing from the floor that the violence was also prompted by service delivery issues, Executive Mayor Charles Ntsomi announced

certain service delivery interventions in Stofland. A contractor had been appointed to install taps and sewerage for 577 plots to be financed from a R25 million provincial grant. People from Hasie Square and Ekuphumleni who have been living below the flood line for years will now be moved to Stofland (Mjekula, 2009: 4).

At that stage the councillor for Ward 2, Mpumelelo Lubisi, followed by a large contingent of predominantly young people, entered the hall. Although chairs were still available, they remained as a group at the back. When Cllr. Lubisi walked to the podium, from the cheers at the back, it was clear who his supporters were. The mood of the meeting then changed. Everything Lubisi said was cheered and when the Mayor, a Home Affairs official and Ms. Monique Ekoko, Senior Regional Officer of UNHCR, responded they were heckled and shouted down. There was no doubt that this group opposed the reintegration of the Zimbabweans. Ekoko tried to impress upon them the moral obligation South Africans have towards Africans who supported the country during its struggle for freedom. She was shouted down and the meeting dispersed in chaos (Meeting with *Stofland* community on the reintegration of displaced Zimbabweans, 2009. Personal observations during meeting of 12 January, Hex Valley People's Centre). Ekoko later remarked that it was significant that the greatest opposition against reintegration came from the youth. She said that there is a need for better education on the country's historic connection with African countries (Robertson, 2010: 2).

Eye witness reports confirm that there was a noticeable presence of youth among the mob that chased the Zimbabweans out of the township. Among the 25 people arrested and charged for public violence was a 17-year-old boy (Mjekula, 2009). The women led trade union Sikhula Sonke whose members were intimidated by young people while staying over in Stofland (Pekeur, 2010) also confirmed the involvement of youths in the attacks on 14 and 17 November 2009. The participation of the youth in leading attacks, engaging with the police, threatening people and destroying property is not a new phenomenon but nevertheless a worrisome one. Research has shown that many of the youth participating in collective violence are unemployed, poor and see no prospect of a change in their circumstances (Von Holdt *et al.*, 2011: 2). Stofland, Ekuphumleni and Hasie Square are certainly no exceptions.

4.5 CAUSES FOR THE OUTBREAK OF XENOPHOBIA IN DE DOORNS

South Africa, and De Doorns, is not unique when it comes to harbouring xenophobic feelings. Even Switzerland experienced a bout of xenophobia in the 1970s. At the time Swiss psychologist Carl Jung put it down to geography. "Mountains tend to restrict the horizons of the mind" he once told *Time Magazine* ("Switzerland, a bout of xenophobia", 1974).

According to research there is a clear distinction between discriminatory attitudes against foreign nationals, which is a common phenomenon throughout the country, and instances of

collective violence, occurring only in specific locations. Although attitudes created by historical factors, such as the legacy of apartheid, may inform actions to a certain extent, they do not explain why dislike turns into xenophobic violence in certain places at certain times (Misago, Monson & Polzer, 2010: 9). This section of the research will focus on the distinctive circumstances of De Doorns in determining the causes that prompted discriminatory perceptions and attitudes into full-scale collective violence.

From the onset it is clear that the violence that happened cannot be understood independently of the poverty and unemployment in the informal settlements of Ekuphumleni, Stofland and Hasie Square. The presence of large-scale poverty and unemployment in these areas generates dissatisfaction among the locals, some of who are prepared to do anything, even resort to crime and violence to ensure their own survival.

Poverty and unemployment are not unique to De Doorns. In various case studies these characteristics seem to have placed significant emphasis on people's origins – also in the case of De Doorns. According to research conducted by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and the Society, Work and Development Institute:

“In a context where significant numbers of people have to compete for jobs and opportunities, knowing where one's competitors come from has become important. This is because knowing where one's competitors come from allows for the creation of a polarity between insiders and outsiders, which then serves to provide grounds for discrimination” (Von Holdt *et al.*, 2011: 93).

From all the reasons produced as justification for the violence two main themes emerged. According to Van Rooyen, “the main issues are the economic contestation for job opportunities during season and the opportunistic element that exploits the issue to further their own aims and to contest the 2011 local government elections” (2010). Important aspects to consider under contestation for scarce resources is the competition between groups of labour brokers operating in the Hex River Valley area and claims of poor service delivery.

4.5.1 Competition for limited resources

These sections deals with the claims of South Africans living in the affected communities that Zimbabweans steal their jobs and are paid lower wages. Labour practices in the Hex Valley, specifically the role of labour brokers in fostering collective violence against Zimbabweans, are also addressed.

Zimbabweans are accused of stealing jobs, working for lower wages and not participating in struggles for better working conditions. Most of the media reports reflect on these accusations (Mjekula, 2009: 1; Prince, 2009: 2; Gerber, 2009: 1; Robertson, 2009: 1). In responding to the claims from local people that there are no jobs, Van Rooyen stated:

“Six thousand people, mostly South Africans, are ordinarily employed permanently on the farms outside the season. With the commencement of the season 9000 positions become available on the farms. In De Doorns the unemployment figure during off season is 40%. The figure for the whole of the Breede Valley area varies between 18% and 21%. The new season creates expectations of work for these poor people” (2010).

However, farmers deny claims that there are no job opportunities for locals, maintaining that there is enough work for everyone who wants to work during peak season when 17 000 jobs are available. It should be noted that in the early and later phases of the season less work is available (Jordaan, 2010). According to Agri Western Cape, the 125 plus farms in the Hex Valley need about 14 000 workers during peak season (Misago, 2009: 8). With an estimated population of 13000, De Doorns can only offer work to a working-age population of less than 6 000, meaning that the locals are not able to satisfy the demand for labour. Farmers are obliged to recruit workers from neighbouring towns Worcester and Touws River during harvest time. According to Agri Western Cape’s statistics of seasonal workers, far more locals are currently employed on farms in the Hex River Valley than Zimbabweans. The figures are as follows: South Africans from the De Doorns area – 5701; South Africans from surrounding towns – 849; Zimbabweans – 1558; and Sothos – 630. A total of 5 337 predominantly South African permanent workers (Misago, 2009: 8) also work in the Hex Valley.

However, despite the employment statistics, the number of Zimbabweans in the Hex River Valley by far exceeds 1 558. Unofficial estimates put the number at 8 000 (Sauls, 2010; Gerber, 2009: 1). The number of Zimbabweans displaced by the attacks alone is quoted by sources as between 2 500 and 3 500 (Gerber, 2009: 1; Prince, 2009: 2; Mjekula: 1; Misago, 2009: 2). This and the practice of farmers to pick up truck loads of Zimbabweans in the informal settlements to work on the farms can create the illusion among locals of being swamped by an influx of foreigners, bound on stealing their jobs and wives (Sauls, 2010). Although these feelings were also recorded during the 2008 countrywide outbreak of xenophobia, research conducted by the Forced Migration Studies Programme could not find any substantive evidence that a mass influx of migrants triggered the violence (Misago, Monson & Polzer, 2010: 168). However, the situation in De Doorns, being a small rural community, is somewhat different than that in the bigger urban centres. According to Van Rooyen, “In a small geographic space it is a fairly high number of foreign nationals. This is a huge presence in a small rural community. It is in your face on a daily basis” (2010).

If only 1 558 Zimbabweans are employed on the farms where do the rest come from? The large number of Zimbabweans is attributed to a demand for labourers and farmers assisting migrants to obtain asylum papers from a Home Affairs satellite office in De Doorns. Ms. Jordaan explained:

“Farmers who wanted to register (get asylum papers) their illegal Zimbabwean workers in the Cape Town office of Home Affairs could not take them by bus since it is illegal to transport Zimbabweans without their asylum papers. The farmers at that stage were faced with a dilemma since the demand for workers exceeded the supply due to the following reasons: the negative effect of AIDS on the supply of local workers, urbanisation, increased production (from 2000 boxes per hectare in a season a few years ago to the present 6 000 boxes) and an increase of serviced agricultural land, from 2 500 hectares to 4 000 hectares. To address the problem and to avoid employing illegal workers the HTA reached an agreement with Home Affairs that Zimbabwean workers be registered locally, first by means of a mobile office, later via an office based at the Hex River Post Office. The process included the following: Farmers bring their workers to the HTA office in town where they get a letter of support which they take to the office of Home Affairs where the registration process takes place. At some stage it was brought to Association’s attention that the process is being manipulated and that others who do not work on farms were also receiving their asylum papers at the Office. The arrangement was then made that only when the farmer himself or his foreman accompany the Zimbabwean workers, a permit will be issued. But even this arrangement could not prevent others from also registering. When some of the local labour brokers approached the HTA with a plea to employ local people, the HTA immediately called for the closure of the Home Affairs office (2010).”

Although Manfred van Rooyen, the BVM representative on the RTT, acknowledges that Zimbabweans have to apply for asylum papers at a Home Affairs office, he criticises the presence of Home Affairs in De Doorns, blaming the HTA for not consulting with the authorities. He said:

“Zimbabweans are part of a special dispensation as asylum seekers. They cannot be repatriated. There is an international agreement which states that if Zimbabweans are caught without the necessary papers they have 30 days to go to the nearest Home Affairs office where they can apply for the necessary documentation. The Municipality has no involvement in this sudden influx of foreign nationals to the region. The HTA should have had the foresight to discuss this issue with the Municipality, Department of Labour and the Department of Home Affairs before the start of the season. The HTA on its own applied for a point in the Valley where Zimbabweans could apply for asylum papers. That also contributed to the greater numbers who went there to register” (2010).

Contributing to fears with regard to the influx of Zimbabwean migrants is the large number of family members that accompany the workers. This trend can intensify feelings of prejudice and

in geographically congested areas such as Stofland, Ekuphumleni and Hasie Square put additional pressure on municipal infrastructure and services. This needs to be investigated (Sauls, 2009). This development can be interpreted as a move to permanently settle in the area. Normally in the past, labourers at the end of the season returned to Zimbabwe to visit their families.

While statistics indicate that Zimbabwean farm workers are by far in the minority compared to South Africans, the claims of locals that the Zimbabweans steal their jobs may have some merit. Apart from seasonal work, casual work on farms during the December school holidays provided income for the working-age youth of the area. The increase of Zimbabweans has severely affected this traditional source of income for households in the Hex River Valley (Robertson, 2009: 1; Sauls, 2009; Igglesden, 2009: 5). Although this aspect was not highlighted in previous research on the attacks, it can be argued that the threat triggered a disillusioned youth's participation in the violence. This situation, it can be argued, also offered opportunity for others to exploit the youth's anger to enhance their own course. The fact that the attacks took place about two weeks before the commencement of the school holidays supports this point as a possible contributing factor to the violence.

The reason why so many Zimbabweans are employed in De Doorns is really simple – there is a demand for seasonal labour. But then, why are Zimbabweans preferred to the locals for employment in the vineyards? According to Misago, the reasons offered “reflect prevailing stereotypes about South Africans versus foreign workers, specifically that South African workers lack the dedication required for long and physically strenuous work during the harvest season” (2009: 8). The Executive Mayor for the Breede Valley, councillor Charles Ntsomi, comments as follows, “The farmers say that South African workers do not go to work on Monday. On payday they do not work because they are getting their grant” (Mjekula, 2009). The remark about workers not going to work on Mondays alludes to absence from work due to ill discipline and problems with alcohol abuse. Although farmers complain about this alleged practice they are to a great extent responsible for this situation. For decades the so-called *dop* system of payment of alcohol to farm workers as part of their conditions of service was practised by farmers in the Hex Valley and neighbouring areas (Falletisch, 2008: 55). According to Sauls, safety nets for workers with alcohol-related problems is in place. Farmers must consult with the Departments of Social Services and Health on these matters (2009). In addition to being highly educated compared to the locals, the Zimbabweans are also regarded as good workers (Theron *et al.*, 2009:26). In view of the above, according to Theron it is hardly surprising that Zimbabweans are resented as taking away jobs from the local community (2009: 27). Case studies on the May 2008 violence revealed that some employers prefer hiring foreign nationals because they are more skilled, more hardworking and less troublesome (Misago *et al.*, 2010: 166).

There is also a belief among locals that Zimbabweans are preferred because they work for lower wages. The locals maintain that this undermines demands for higher wages and as a result farmers hire Zimbabweans at the expense of South Africans. This claim that Zimbabweans are working for lower wages is denied by the HTA (Jordaan, 2010). This aspect will form part of the discussion on labour practices.

In their response to why Zimbabweans were attacked rather than locals engaging with employers to address their labour concerns, South African labour brokers replied that Zimbabweans were attacked because they did not want to participate in a strike on 17 November 2009 to demand wage increases from farmers (Misago, 2010: 9). Zimbabweans denied any knowledge of the strike plans.

4.5.2 Employment and labour practices.

The first reports after the attacks alluded to illegal labour practices by farmers and labour brokers. Farmers were accused outright of paying lower wages to Zimbabweans. The accusations are based on locals claiming that foreign nationals are accepting lower wages. The accusations were made notwithstanding confirmation by farmers as well as Zimbabweans that all seasonal workers are paid the same wages (Jordaan, 2010; Misago, 2009: 9).

Home Affairs Deputy Minister Malusi Gigaba at a press briefing following the outbreak of the violence in De Doorns said that the incident was not motivated by xenophobia but that the violence was caused by a contravention of the Basic Employment Act by certain farmers in the area. He maintained that when foreign nationals are exploited by their employers they become vulnerable to attacks by the local people (Gabara, 2009).

Membathisi Mdladlana, Minister of Labour, was also quick to accuse farmers of underpaying workers. He said on SABC News that farmers allegedly prefer to hire Zimbabweans because they are willing to work for less (Mdladlana visits De Doorns, 2009). Mdladlana, after investigations could not produce any evidence that farmers exploited migrant workers, changed his tune, stating that the violence was an “unintentional consequence” of Section 198 of the Labour Relations Act which does not clearly define temporary employment, giving labour brokers an opportunity to exploit it (Mjekula, 2010: 6).

In his response, HTA Chairman De Villiers Graaff challenged the Department of Labour to investigate allegations about payment discrepancies. He was quoted in the media saying that, “any farmer or contractor found guilty of charging different rates must expect to face the full brunt of the law as far as that is concerned” (Prince, 2009: 2).

Elsa Jordaan, Executive Chairperson of HTA, denied claims that farmers pay Zimbabweans lower rates. She said that Zimbabweans are paid the same rate as any other worker (Mjekula,

2009; Jordaan, 2009). On accusations related to employer-employee relations and working conditions on farms as well as a general lack of interest in the problems, Jordaan said that as an export industry, HTA needs to maintain a positive international image. As such it is in their best interest to address conflict in the Valley to avoid negative international reaction. On the contrary, HTA is very much involved in the community. To illustrate this point she referred to various community projects such as supporting crèches, skills training programmes for farm workers, improving clinics, contributing to bursary funds and programmes to combat HIV and substance abuse among farm workers. HTA has also initiated a very successful Farm Worker of the Year competition spearheaded by Ms. Jordaan (2010).

Government's stand on the underpayment of Zimbabwean labourers by Hex Valley farmers, accusing them of not paying workers the stipulated minimum wages and of not knowing how much their workers earn, was refuted by labour lawyer and coordinator of the Labour and Enterprising Policy Research Group at the University of Cape Town, Mr Jan Theron (Zimbabwean, 2009). Theron, in his report, substantiates HTA's claim that Zimbabweans are not paid lesser wages. He said no proof of farmers failing to pay the minimum wage to workers could be found. An official from the Department of Labour confirmed this. The only complaints of underpayment of workers concerned workers employed by contractors (2009: 12).

The wage issue focused the attention on the employment practices of farmers in the Valley and the role of labour brokers in providing labour for the table grape industry.

Despite the increase in cultivated agricultural land in the Hex River Valley the number of jobs has fallen by 30% over a 30-year period (Theron, 2009: 3). In contrast to the decline in employment opportunities, informal settlements experienced rapid growth. Theron attributes this trend to a growth of indirect employment. This "occurs where employment has been externalised and workers are employed by intermediaries who in turn provide them to a user or a client" (2009: 3). Intermediaries have now become an integral part of the agricultural industry.

4.5.3 Farm labour – then and now

Although the labour process as described above has not changed much over the past 30 years, the manner in which labour is utilised showed significant changes. Traditionally, there are permanent workers who are employed full-time on a contract basis and seasonal workers who are employed on a seasonal basis. Permanent workers are accommodated on the farms. Seasonal workers who stayed on the farms were mostly the spouses or family members of male farm workers. However, seasonal workers must not be confused with casual workers who are employed for not more than three days in a week (Theron, 2009: 10). Whether the seasonal workers lived on or off the farm, the employer was the farmer. With the exception of the six-week thinning season when additional workers were recruited from Worcester and Touws River,

the seasonal workers who stayed on the farms far outnumbered workers from elsewhere. This position has changed. In recent times the majority of seasonal workers do not stay on the farms. This is the case throughout the year. The present-day off-farm seasonal workers are engaged and transported to work by intermediaries. This practice put municipal infrastructure under severe pressure.

4.5.4 Contractors

Intermediaries are referred to as contractors or labour brokers in the area. Although contractors are supposedly more involved in supervising the activities of workers provided to a client, the two concepts are basically the same (Theron, 2009: 11). Labour brokers in post-1994 labour legislation are referred to as a temporary employment service. Ironically, labour legislation itself, in recognising labour brokers as the employer of the workers they procure to an employer, has created the legal space employers (farmers) needed to restructure the employment relationship by externalisation (2009: 11). Pressure is mounting on government to close down this legal space employers have utilised in their favour.

Indirect employment is huge, not only in the number of contractors operating in the Valley but also in its influence in the community. According to sources there were at the time of the unrest in 2009 about 50 contractors registered as employers with the Department of Labour and Compensation Fund in the Valley (Theron, 2009: 16; Jordaan, 2009). This figure, provided by the Hex River Valley Agricultural Contractors Association, was however questioned by a Department of Labour official who claims that it is an exaggeration (Theron, 2009: 16). The Hex River Valley Agricultural Contractors Association is an umbrella body for contractors to regulate the activities of contractors in the Valley. According to the Executive Director of the HTA in an effort to streamline employment of local labourers an agreement was entered into with registered labour brokers. She commented:

“An organisation, Hex Valley Contractors, was then established and a code of conduct approved. But the performance of these contractors, catering for the local labour market, were not up to standard and they were told that as long as people do not turn up for work, farmers will have to rely on Zimbabweans to do the work. The contractors could however not reach agreement on the code of conduct. At that stage only 16 of the original 50 registered at the HTA remained. The effort was then abandoned” (Jordaan, 2009).

The number of between 60 and 80 contractors quoted by Misago can be attributed to the inclusion of unregistered contractors (Misago, 2009: 4). After the collapse of the association, with no regulatory body in place, the door opened for unregistered contractors who encroach upon the business of registered contractors, providing the same service at lower cost.

Apparently new efforts to revive the Association have been initiated (Jordaan, 2009). With the collapse of the Association most of the registered contractors were without work. This diminished the bargaining power of local contractors, putting them at risk in terms of competition from migrants, especially Zimbabwean contractors.

Modus operandi of contractors

As intermediaries, contractors liaise with both employers (farmers) and workers. As suppliers of labour they contact the farmers and offer their services. Contractors have their own teams of workers who are registered at the Department of Labour. Each team has a supervisor whose job it is to assemble the workers when needed. Farmers pay contractors a once-off placement fee of R25 and a daily rate of R5 per day per worker. The fee is for administrative expenses incurred with the employment and remuneration of workers as well as their transport to and from the farms (Theron, 2009: 17; Jordaan, 2009).

Although farmers have their own supervisors, contractors from time to time also place a Zimbabwean on site to supervise workers. The mode of payment for workers is cash and no contracts are signed with the contractor (Jordaan, 2009). In his research Theron concludes that all the Zimbabwean workers were paid the going daily rate for off-farm labour of R60 (2009: 15). This amount is higher than the R50 per day minimum wage a permanent worker living on the farm is paid. A probable reason is that seasonal workers have to pay for accommodation (Theron, 2009). On the matter of accommodation Van Rooyen is of the opinion that:

“Local people used their accommodation to raise income. Names have been listed of Zimbabweans who had a number of stands/plots which they obtained mainly illegally. They have no proof of ownership. It is municipal land earmarked for housing projects and it cannot be sold. Locals also provided accommodation at R20 to R40 per person per week to the foreign nationals” (2009).

The fact that Zimbabweans occupied some property, though illegally, could have contributed to feelings of prejudice.

According to Kafaar, the so-called “hotels” in Stofland where locals sub-let accommodation to Zimbabweans would not have led to xenophobia because the local people benefit from it. These “hotels” are a source of income for locals during the off-season (2009).

From the research it emerged that the contestation for limited resources between South African and Zimbabwean workers, though a contributory factor, not necessary incited the violence, but rather competition between groups of contractors. Due to the fact that local farmers favour Zimbabwean workers, Zimbabwean contractors have recently been more successful than other contractors. This situation results in income losses for South African contractors who claim that

when they are affected, their communities also struggle. It is reported that contractors used their influence as employers and in some cases their positions as ward committee members to mobilise the attacks against the Zimbabweans (Misago, 2009: 5). Their influence in the community and backing from their teams of workers suggest that contractors could easily have manipulated community members and even local politicians to chase the Zimbabweans from the informal settlements. Although no conclusive evidence of incitement to violence could be found, it is suggested that the direct involvement of contractors in inciting the violence be investigated.

Service delivery failures

Although claims of poor service delivery is a common phenomenon across impoverished communities such as Ekuphumleni, Stofland and Hasie Square, a comparison of affected versus unaffected areas shows that serious service delivery problems may be worse in areas where violence did not break out (Masego, 2009: 172). Claims of poor service delivery, almost two months after the attacks, were made at a meeting between government stakeholders and affected communities held on 12 January 2009 at the Hex Valley People's Centre, De Doorns.

Although Misago in his brief did not mention service delivery as a possible contributor to the violence, monitor reports of Black Sash identify poor service delivery and socio-economic conditions in especially Stofland as a major contributor to discontent in the community. From complaints of residents and observations of the monitoring team the following service delivery concerns were identified in the informal settlements:

- Insufficient toilet facilities - up to 10 shacks (60 to 80 people) share a single toilet
- Lack of electricity
- Short supply of taps – four households share one tap
- No schools and recreational services in Stofland.
- Lack of accommodation
- Lack of water in Maseru

There were also other complaints relating to education, health and social services.

The main reason for discontent however relates to residential plots and services in Stofland. This was evident at the community meeting held on 12 January at the Hex Valley People's Centre. Sauls remarked that claims of poor service delivery at Stofland was refuted by Mayor Ntsomi at a meeting with the interim representatives of the Breede Valley Organisation and at the said community meeting held on 12 January 2010. A scorecard of service delivery projects in the area distributed by the Municipality also proved the accusations wrong (2010).

According to Xolile Fula, Manager: Housing at the BVM, claims of poor service delivery and unsatisfactory housing delivery at Stofland are not justified. He stated that Stofland was established in 2006 to accommodate the people of Maseru and adjacent areas who lived on the northern side of the N1 national road opposite Stofland under dangerous circumstances against a hill and in a riverbed. Five hundred serviced plots were developed in 2007. A further 577 plots followed in 2008. The majority of the people who were moved were from Lesotho and the Eastern Cape.

Although some people complained that it was just a case of moving shacks from one side of the N1 to the other, living conditions in Stofland are much safer and less congested. There were also complaints because people from the so-called danger zone were receiving priority over other areas. This was addressed to a great extent with the commencement of the Stofland Housing Project. The project makes provision for the building of 1482 houses. The first phase of 200 houses was completed during August 2011. People on the De Doorns housing waiting list are beneficiaries in this project. The project, including top structures and services, amounts to approximately R100 million (Fula, 2010). Notwithstanding the BVM's efforts, Van Rooyen believes that certain locals will continue to use service delivery to oppose reintegration (Van Rooyen, 2010).

Fula is of the opinion that residents used the service delivery issue in Stofland as a scapegoat to justify their involvement in the xenophobic attacks. The fact that the attacks only targeted Zimbabweans supports the opinion that service delivery was not the real issue – it was only utilised to prevent reintegration.

Involvement of local authority

Authorities in general have been criticised for their role in the May 2008 xenophobic violence. The 2010 FMSP (Forced Migration Studies Programme) in its evaluation of 11 case studies found that in the most affected areas during the 2008 incidents, attacks on foreign nationals were led and organised by local leaders (Misago *et al.*, 2010: 165). The report was critical of local leaders and authorities, stating that they did nothing to stop the violence. Some were even directly involved in the violence while others were reluctant to help foreigners for fear of losing their legitimacy or position (Karrim, 2009: 1). Considering these findings it seems that De Doorns is a classic case of the involvement of micro politics in xenophobic violence.

Two prominent politicians of the BVM, Mayor Charles Ntsomi and Councillor Mpumelelo Poyi Lubisi (Ward 2), according to Misago's research, were allegedly either directly involved in organising the violence or at least tolerated or indirectly supported it (2009: 6). Various other parties also maintain this view. The *City Press* reported about a councillor wearing an ANC T-shirt who encouraged violence in De Doorns by inciting the community to destroy the homes of

Zimbabwean nationals. The councillor apparently told local residents not to physically harm the Zimbabweans (ANC behind xenophobic, 2009). Councillor Lubisi's alleged involvement in the violence was covered locally and in the national press. The *Mail & Guardian* for instance reported that Councillor Lubisi was investigated for inciting a mob to attack immigrants based in De Doorns in the Western Cape and for allegedly blaming them publicly for the lack of service delivery by the municipality (Rawoot, 2011: 16). On 21 February 2010, ANC Provincial Task Team Coordinator Mandla Dlamini said the ANC was still investigating claims from PASSOP that an ANC politician and a senior municipal official were involved in, or directly responsible for, the attacks on Zimbabweans (Mjekula, 2010: 3). The detainees, arrested after the incidents, also alleged that a councillor was informed of the decision to take down the structures of Zimbabweans prior to the action (Igglesden, 2009: 5). The persistency of political interference is illustrated by the actions of ANC members who, three months after the initial attacks, planned a march to the refugee camp. Sikhula Sonke, a trade union representing women working on farms, said they were shocked when they heard local ANC members called on the residents of Stofland to march to the camp on Tuesday 23 February 2010 to demand that the Zimbabweans leave the camp (Pekeur, 2010; Mjekula, 2010: 3).

It is believed that meetings held on 13 and 16 November 2009 with South African residents, the BVM (including the Mayor and Ward Councillor Lubisi), police and representatives of the HTA triggered the attacks on the Zimbabweans, which followed immediately after the meetings on 14 and 17 November 2009. During the meetings some residents expressed their intention to attack the Zimbabweans. Although Councillor Lubisi admitted that the issue of the Zimbabweans were raised he apparently warned against violence (Misago, 2009: 5). Although there is not necessarily a link between the meetings and the attacks, the close proximity of the two created the impression that the authorities exploited the mood at the meetings to sanction the attacks. According to Jordaan the mood at the meetings were really ugly (Jordaan, 2010). Two possibilities are offered for the involvement of the councillor and ward committee members:

In order to protect his position during the April 2011 local government elections, the councillor apparently gave in to the demands of contractors. It is also alleged that some ward committee members have interests in protecting their jobs as contractors. Van Rooyen alluded to possible councillor involvement when he said:

“As the term of office of the current council is coming to a close opportunistic elements took the issue of the presence of foreign nationals and under the guise of xenophobia raised service delivery issues in De Doorns. There are elements in De Doorns who have political agendas, who want to use the xenophobia to highlight their campaigns – they want to contest for positions at the coming elections.” (2010).

Respondents accused the Mayor of complicity by omission, mainly because he learned at the meetings of the attacks and did nothing to stop them (Misago, 2009: 6).

Although these allegations do not constitute evidence of misconduct, it is proof of widespread mistrust of officials and councillors and the need for more effective oversight and control measures. The key question remains why the Mayor and councillor, even if they were not involved at all in instigating action against the Zimbabweans, with their prior knowledge of the planned expulsions, did not respond to the threat of possible violence.

The fact that the municipality did not intervene to prevent or resolve labour-related issues in the Hex River Valley can be perceived as a lack of power and legitimacy (Misago, 2009: 7). This perception can severely affect the residents' confidence in the Municipality's ability to govern and perform its developmental coordinating function in the region. It can also constitute a lack of political will on the part of local government to address long-standing tensions between the BVM and commercial farmers in the area (2009: 7). The establishment of a temporary Department of Home Affairs satellite office on a farm in De Doorns without the knowledge of the BVM is one example of a lack of municipal control.

In an area devoted to the production of a single product, namely table grapes, by far the largest employer in the area and the economic lifeline of the Hex River Valley, the local authority's incapability and unwillingness to address critical labour issues and consulting the community left the door open to collective violence and mob justice, putting the livelihood of thousands at risk. However, in assessing the BVM's performance with regard to development the knife cuts even deeper. Since the institution of developmental local government only one local economic development (LED) project has been launched in the Hex River Valley. The essential oils project provided work for 30 people for some years. Also, public participation in terms of ward committees at the time of the attacks was almost non-existent. No minutes of meetings, after various requests, could be produced by the BVM. A public participation policy was only drafted in 2011. Xenophobia is also not covered or even mentioned in any ward committee minutes or the IDP of the Breede Valley Municipality. With regard to the involvement of ward committees during the humanitarian assistance phase of the crisis, Sauls remarked:

“What is very worrisome is the absence of ward committees and councillors to help resolve the issue. In discussions with the Interim Representatives of the Breede Valley Committee the lack of knowledge on local government activity in the area was evident, which pointed to the ineffectiveness of the communication structures of the politicians. Right in the beginning of the crisis the presence of councillors was noticeable at the steering committee meetings, but all of a sudden they were nowhere. It is almost as if they were told to back off and let the officials do the job” (2010).

Kafaar also encountered a lack of cooperation from the authorities. According to him:

“Commitment to the problem and a lack of political will to get involved are also matters of concern. For instance, a sports event to bring the foreign nationals and community closer together to create a platform for dialog was arranged to take place on Reconciliation Day, 16 December 2009. It was quite disappointing when the organisers were told a day before the event that most of the role players were away on holiday. We were in the middle of a crisis with 2000 people displaced. It was important to create a sense of normality. Again, the political will was absent. Only the Departments of Social Development and Health were still involved in the camp at that stage” (2011).

Although the political indifference encountered during the humanitarian assistance phase did not contribute towards the crisis, it strengthens arguments that the local authority failed in its developmental role.

On national level the state is also to blame for a lack of control. The Deputy Home Affairs Minister, Malusi Gigaba, and the Minister of Labour, Membathisi Mdladlana, who initially accused the farmers of provoking the violence, were later forced to admit the involvement of their departments in the illegal temporary satellite Home Affairs office in De Doorns (Robertson, 2010: 2).

4.6 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

The humanitarian response to the displacement caused by the attacks on 14 and 17 November 2009 can be divided into three phases:

- An initial phase of stabilising the situation and rendering emergency assistance.
- A core phase of aiding the internally displaced, providing structured shelter and welfare and health services.
- A closing-down or reintegration phase.

4.6.1 Initial phase – emergency assistance

The initial response after the first attack on 14 November 2009 was to accommodate the displaced at a municipal building on the outskirts of the town. The conditions got too congested after the second attack when approximately 3 000 people were chased from Stofland. The displaced were then moved to the Hex Valley sports field less than a kilometre from the central business area of De Doorns.

The decision to move the Zimbabweans to the best equipped and maintained sports field in the area was heavily criticised. The critique was based on the following:

The sports field is located adjacent to a residential neighbourhood and a school. A little stream that flows into the Hex River, a major water source for the sensitive table grape industry, is bordering on the northern perimeter of the field. The export of table grapes is subject to strict regulations and the farmers feared that the close proximity of the stream to the camp could pollute the water with *E. coli* or other bacteria that may affect the quality of the grapes. Water from the showers was flowing into the stream. Camp residents were also washing their clothes in the stream.

At the time of the incident the rugby players were preparing for the new season. In addition to a rugby field, the terrain also accommodates tennis courts and the town's only squash court. In a small rural community sport is a very important form of recreation and social interaction. The local sports bodies felt betrayed and requested that the camp be moved to another terrain.

From a humanitarian and safety point of view the sports field was perhaps the best choice for a safety camp at the time. The terrain is three kilometres away from the Stofland, Ekuphumleni and Hasie Square informal settlements, one and a half kilometre from the police station and within walking distance from the shops, municipality and banks. It is fenced off with only one entrance to the terrain, which made access control much easier. Water and electricity connections were also available.

From the onset, there was opposition to the location of the camp from the sports fraternity, the local ratepayers' association and the Hex Valley High School. These organisations formed a pressure group that demanded early reintegration or the relocation of the camp to another sight.

Although some politicians as stated allegedly had prior knowledge of the planned attacks, this knowledge did not filter through to the management and emergency services of the Breede Valley Municipality. As a result, the first attack on 14 November came as a total surprise. Fortunately, the emergency services of the Breede Valley Municipality and the Cape Winelands District Municipality had some time to recover before the main onslaught on 17 November that left 3 000 people displaced. At the time of the second attack, a working relationship had already been established between the emergency services of the Municipality, District Municipality and the Provincial Disaster Management Team. Although the current Disaster Management Act and Framework do not specifically cater for displacement and humanitarian needs caused by civil unrest and violence, the local emergency services seemingly experienced fewer problems with regard to inter-governmental coordination than was the case during May 2008 (Misago *et al.*, 2010: 189). Local emergency services also had the advantage of lessons learned from May 2008 and the experience of the UNHCR, which rendered invaluable support from the start.

The initial stages of the humanitarian response can be compared with the gold rush during the late 1800s on the Witwatersrand. Dozens of people representing a wide range of interest

groups converged on De Doorns. The following organisations were represented at the second meeting of the Crisis Committee held on 26 November 2009: Breede Valley Municipality, Cape Winelands District Municipality, Provincial Disaster Management, Office of the Premier of the Western Cape, Department of Labour, Department of Home Affairs, Department of Housing, Department of Social Development, South African Police Services, Community services, Government Communication and Information System, Community Development Workers, Hex Valley Table Grape Association, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, South African Human Rights Commission, People Against Suffering, Suppression, Oppression and Poverty, United Nations Children's Fund, Doctors without Borders, Black Sash, South African Red Cross, Local Ward Committee, and Women on Farms.

During the emergency assistance stage the vast majority of the internally displaced at the safety site were Zimbabweans. A monitoring report of Black Sash mentioned that there were also six Zambians, two Ghanaians and one Burundian staying at the safety site (Igglesden, 2009: 1). On 26 November 2009 there were 1 200 registered IDPs in the camp (minutes of the Crisis Committee meeting held on 26 November 2009). Initially, the internally displaced were accommodated in three marquee tents. These tents were dismantled on 26 November and replaced by 182 UNHCR family tents. The tents were erected by the Fire and Rescue Services of BVM in a record time. The BVM Fire and Rescue Services withdrew from the site on 15 December 2009 based on:

- The non-existence of an emergency situation. The Chief Fire Officer said,
- "The situation is deemed to be in a recovery phase and is now wholly dependent on a situation not related to the mandate of the Department."
- The nature of emergency response deployment that occurred over the summer holiday period and the balance that has to be achieved with the Department's emergency services resources (P.D. Govender, internal BVM e-mail dated 15 December 2009).

An emergency response presence was still maintained at the camp. Mr Shaun Minnies from the CWDM emergency services operated as camp manager from a mobile command centre on the camp site.

Although the unexpectedness of the violence caught everyone off guard, emergency services were quick to respond. Observations of activities in the camp at that early stage confirmed that with the exception of some minor complaints, water, refuse and sanitation services were provided to a satisfactory standard. With regard to the security at the site concerns were raised about underlying tensions between Shona and Ndebele speaking Zimbabweans. An accreditation system to guarantee privacy and avoid possible exploitation of the displaced was also implemented. In general, government's efforts to stabilise the situation at the emergency

assistance phase was met with approval. The UNHCR made mention of the rapid humanitarian response of the local authorities and the fact that water, portable toilets and a mobile health clinic were provided within hours (*South Africa UNHCR, 2009*).

Civil society organisations, representing a wide range of sectors and expertise, contributed to the emergency response. Problems experienced during May 2008, such as inexperience and coordination hiccups due to fragmentation, also plagued civil society response in the De Doorns case. Contributions were at first not well coordinated, resulting in an oversupply of consumer items. For instance, two groups – PASSOP and ADRA SA – both donated a total of almost 3 000 blankets.

4.6.2 Core phase – providing shelter and welfare assistance

The core phase of the humanitarian response in many respects presents a communication challenge. Initially, communication was somewhat chaotic between the NGOs, UNHCR and NGOs and government and NGOs. Due to the unexpectedness of the attacks and inexperience, the RTT encountered some teething problems with regard to communicating with each other, representatives of the State and NGOs. Van Rooyen responded as follows:

“Xenophobia did not feature in our communication plan at the time of the attacks. It has taken us all by surprise. It took us some time to understand the severity and complexity of the situation before we could respond appropriately. The communication response of NGOs was far more tuned in at the time. From the third day after the attacks we were more prepared. There were a communication person on site and steadily we began to roll out communication around the issue – liaison, pamphlets and so on. It was an inter-departmental approach involving the BVM’s communication unit, CWDM media component, GCIS, Office of the Premier and the media sections of other state departments” (Van Rooyen).

According to Kafaar, the work of the Reintegration Task Team, which replaced the Crisis Committee as management committee for the camp, was hampered by a lack of decision taking powers. He said that:

“The RTT was well represented and integrated. The communication within the team and with the municipality and even the provincial government was very good. However, the RTT should have more decision taking powers. Important decisions such as obtaining legal opinions were first referred to the municipality and the provincial government. In that sense, due to protocol, the RTT was sometimes slow in responding. The RTT should be more proactive – the trends should tell the team what to expect and they should react instead of waiting for the crisis to develop. Even with

the establishment of the camp notwithstanding the benefit of trends, we were slow in responding. The amount of work done on xenophobia in this region is limited.”

It must also be borne in mind that the committees’ efforts focused on the camp situation as well as the hostile environment outside the camp.

The first step was to establish a committee to take charge of the process. A representative committee called the Crisis Committee and Reintegration Secretariat consisting of representatives of the SAHRC, Department of the Premier of the Western Cape and the BVM were established at the initial stages of the humanitarian response. The Reintegration Secretariat was established to lead the December 11 reintegration effort. It was later replaced by a smaller management committee to cater for the conditions in the camp and to prepare the environment for the successful reintegration of the displaced Zimbabweans. Provincial government, local government, non-governmental organisations, United Nations agencies, farmers, internally displaced persons, the police and trade unions were represented on the management committee (M. Van Rooyen, internal BVM e-mail dated 25 November 2009). The management committee was then replaced by the RTT (consisting of government officials) to negotiate the final stage, the closing of the camp and the reintegration of the displaced people.

The core phase was characterised by good communication and cooperation between the representatives on the RTT who previously served together on the Crisis and Management Committees. The RTT was committed to its task. Bearing in mind that the representatives are also full-time senior officials in government, the team’s commitment really deserves mentioning. Van Rooyen related as follows:

“When you look at the performance of the RTT one must bear in mind that the members were all inexperienced in dealing with xenophobia prior to the November 2009 incident. Remember, our primary focus is municipal service delivery and the task that was thrust on you had to be taken alongside your normal work. Your normal work suffered in the process. We succeeded in creating a platform where we could meet regularly” (2010).

4.6.3 Final phase – closing-down and reintegration

Reintegration options – local reintegration, voluntary repatriation and resettlement – although aimed at finalising the process, were part of the humanitarian response from the beginning. Most of the issues experienced during the core phase of the De Doorns process were also encountered during the final phase.

The following is a chronological synopsis of events leading up to the violence, the attacks and the activities that have relevance to the stabilisation of the volatile situation, the humanitarian response and the push for the reintegration and closing of the camp:

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| 2008 | Somali business in Roodewal residential area of Worcester attacked. |
| March | Somali shop owners in Zweletemba near Worcester attacked. |
| May | Seven Zimbabweans killed in an attack in the informal residential area of Stofland near De Doorns. |
| May | Establishment of xenophobia forum to monitor xenophobia activity. |
| Aug | Media breakfast hosted by the communication unit of the Breede Valley Municipality to inform GCIS and local media on xenophobia activity in the Breede Valley. |
| 2009 | |
| Nov 12 | 60 Zimbabweans were attacked and chased from their homes in the Ekuphumleni informal settlement, De Doorns (weekend 12 to 15 November). The displaced were temporarily accommodated in the municipal store in the town. |
| Nov 17 | The violence intensified, spreading to the Stofland and Hasie Square informal settlements where a further 3 000 Zimbabweans were displaced. The displaced were accommodated on the Voortrekker Sports Field in De Doorns. MECs for Social Development and Safety, Ivan Meyer and Lennit Max, visited the scene to assess the situation. |
| Nov 18 | A combined Breede Valley Municipality and Cape Winelands District Municipality rescue services command post was established on the sports field and tents, supplied by the UNHCR, were erected. Task team (Crisis Committee) consisting of representatives from the BVM, Cape Winelands District Municipality and the Provincial Government of the Western Cape met with role players such as HNHCR, Red Cross, PASSOP and the Human Rights Commission. Visit by Provincial Police Commissioner, Mzwandile Petros. |
| Nov 19 | Visit by Ms. Helen Zille, Premier of the Western Cape. Visit by Mr Ivan Meyer, MEC: Social Development, Western Cape. Visit by Mr Lennit Max, MEC: Community Services. |
| Nov 26 | Meeting to discuss reintegration. |
| Nov 27 | RTT meet with stakeholders in De Doorns. Meeting with local ward committees. |
| Nov 28 | Meeting with the Displaced Committee (Zimbabweans). BVM Executive Mayor, Cllr. Charles Ntsomi addresses displaced Zimbabweans. |
| Nov 29 | Mass inter-faith prayer service, De Doorns East. Poorly attended. |
| Nov 30 | Bail application hearing of arrested locals - De Doorns Magistrate Court. Protest march by De Doorns East community. RTT meeting with farming community (HTA members) on labour-related matters and possible assistance by farmers with the temporary accommodation of Zimbabwean workers. |

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| Dec 1 | Community meeting at De Doorns East. |
| Dec 3 | Public meeting with local community at De Doorns East. |
| Dec 4 | BVM Communication Unit meets with Stofland Ward Committee. |
| Dec 6 | Inter-faith prayer service on De Doorns East sports field. |
| Des 13 | Walkabout – Executive Mayor and members of Executive Committee accompanied by community leaders and NGOs. Task team meeting. |
| Dec 14 | Terrain committee meeting. Task team meeting. |
| Dec 15 | BVM rescue services withdraw from the safety camp due to the non-existence of an emergency situation. |
| Dec 16 | Task team meeting. |
| Dec 18 | Task team meeting. |
| Dec 20 | Meeting with displacement committee. |
| 2010 | |
| Jan 7 | Meeting – RTT and stakeholders with De Doorns Crisis Committee. |
| Jan 12 | Meeting with Stofland community in Hex Valley People’s Centre. |
| Jan 13 | Press conference to announce reintegration date postponed. |
| Jan 25 | National Minister of Labour, Mr Membathisi Mdladlana, meets with stakeholders in Worcester and environs. |
| Jan 26 | Imbizo – Minister Mdladlana addresses community meeting at De Doorns. |
| Jan 27 | Stakeholder seminar to establish a reintegration strategy for the social conflict in De Doorns, presented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution at Nekkies Meer Chalets resort near Worcester. Task team meeting. |
| Feb 3 | Interview in Worcester with Ms. Monique Ekoko, Senior UNHCR Project Officer assigned to the De Doorns case. Visit to De Doorns by the Provincial Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements Western Cape. |
| Feb 4 | Visit to De Doorns by the South African Council of Churches and the South African Catholic Bishops Conference. |
| Feb 6 | Visit to De Doorns by the USA Department of Immigration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. |
| Feb 3-5 | Human rights training by the Counter Xenophobia Unit, Immigration Services Department: Home Affairs. |
| Feb 8-10 | Human rights training by the Counter Xenophobia Unit, Immigration Services Department: Home Affairs. |
| Feb 11 | Visit to De Doorns by the Regional Representative of the UNHCF from Pretoria. |
| Feb 17 | Meeting (RTT) at the Provincial Disaster Management Centre in Cape Town to develop a social conflict emergency plan. |
| Feb 23 | Meeting / interview (Chairperson of Task Team and PRO of the Breede Valley Municipality) with Mr Michael Laubscher of the HTA. |
| Mar 1 | Stakeholder meeting – RTT, Police, local sport clubs, community crisis committee. |
| Mar 23 | Meeting in Worcester – RTT Chairperson with Black Sash and NGOs. |

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| Mar 31 | Meeting at BVM Civic Centre – RTT with government role players to discuss reintegration and the removal of toilets and security services from safety camp. |
| Apr 15 | RTT meets with Mr Anton Bredell, MEC: Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape in Cape Town on the reintegration and closing of the camp. |
| Apr 22 | RTT meets with Mr Shahied Esau, Speaker of the Western Cape Provincial Parliament. UNHCR Mr Patrick Male Kawuma visits De Doorns. |
| Apr 23 | District Communicators Forum meeting in Worcester to inform government communicators on the reintegration process and to obtain their cooperation. |
| April 28 | RTT meeting in De Doorns. |
| Apr 29 | Communication representatives from CWDM, BVM and GCIS meet in Paarl to discuss strategies to inform the refugees and community of De Doorns on reintegration process. |
| May 3 | Communication officers meet in Stellenbosch to work on pamphlet and press release. RTT meets with the displaced community in De Doorns. |
| May 5 | Meeting with camp representatives. |
| May 7 | Press conference in the office of MEC Bredell in Cape Town to announce the closing of the safety sight at De Doorns. |
| May 8,9 | Verification of the displaced at the sports field. Meeting with the displaced at the sports field. |
| May 11 | Interview with local radio station Valley FM at Worcester. |
| May 12 | RTT meeting at De Doorns. |
| May 13 | Chairperson of RTT meets with PASSOP in Cape Town. |
| May 14 | Chairperson of RTT, Provincial Officials (Dr. Hildegard Fast) meet with PASSOP in Cape Town. |
| May 16 | Distribution of pamphlets at safety site. 41 people leave camp to go back to Zimbabwe. Taking down tents of Zimbabweans that left and removal of some of the mobile toilets. |
| May 19 | RTT meeting at De Doorns. |
| May 20 | Procurement of busses to take Zimbabweans to Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg and Beitbrug border post in Limpopo Province. |
| May 25 | Legal notice served on BVM and others on behalf of PASSOP and the displaced community at the sports field prohibiting the closing of the camp. |
| May 27 | Stakeholder meeting to prepare for the evening's meeting with the Stofland community. Community meeting to discuss reintegration options. |
| June 1 | RTT strategy meeting in Paarl. |
| June 2 | RTT high-level meeting with Dr. Hildegard Fast, Director of the Western Cape Provincial Disaster Management Centre in Worcester. Distribution of pamphlets in camp, reiterating the closing of the camp, offering assistance and informing community that no monetary assistance will be rendered. |
| June 3 | Meeting with all reintegration volunteers (CDWs, Ukuthwalana Youth Group, social workers) at Hex Valley Peoples Centre, De Doorns East. |
| June 9 | RTT meeting at Worcester. Meeting – RTT with HTA Board of Directors on the issue of the continued employment of Zimbabweans with the view to convince farmers to accommodate the workers they employ. |
| June 14 | Meeting at Stellenbosch (CWDM, BVM, RTT, provincial officials) on progress and |

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| | challenges to the reintegration process. |
| June 18 | Meeting with Mr Sifiso Mbuyisa, Director: Social Dialogue and Human Right, Department of the Premier. RTT meeting. Meeting – RTT with HTA Board and IOM on funding of reintegration. |
| June 30 | Meeting – RTT Chairperson with IOM and UNHCR on support for reintegration. |
| July 5 | Meeting – RTT at Worcester to discuss the attempted invasion of the camp by Zimbabweans not affected by the displacement. |
| July 14 | Meeting – RTT with Andre Topps of De Doorns Wine Cellar on the rehabilitation of the Voortrekker sports field after reintegration. |
| July 16 | Mediators (Equillore) appointed by Province start working with the Zimbabweans and local community. |
| July 24 | Meeting – role players with mediators at Golden Valley Casino, Worcester, on progress made with process. |
| July 31 | Mediation session between RTT, De Doorns Displacement Committee (Zimbabweans) and Mr Braam Hanekom of PASSOP. |
| Aug 1 | Mediation continues – mediated agreement signed subject to ratification by Municipal Manager and Council. |
| Aug 2 | Meeting – BVM delegation (Municipal Manager, Manager: Housing and RTT Convenor) with Dr. Hildegard Fast and Sifiso Mbuyisa in Cape Town on progress with reintegration process and critical funding constraints. |
| Aug 5 | Meeting – RTT and Department of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning in Cape Town to discuss the funding of the continued operations of the De Doorns camp and reintegration expenditure. |
| Aug 17 | RTT meeting at De Doorns. |
| Aug 19 | Mediated agreement ratified at special council meeting of BVM. Date of closing of camp 6 September 2010. |
| Aug 30 | Meeting – Convenor of RTT with chief mediator, Mr Stef Snel of Equillore. Meeting with MEC Lennit Max, Gen. Mathebula (SAPS Area Commander, Boland), Col. Van der Westhuizen (SAPS Station Commander, De Doorns), Jacqueline Pandaram (Director: Provincial Disaster Management Centre), HTA, Department Social Development (Caesar Sauls), Department of Local Government (Ashraf Kafaar) to lobby for political support for SAPS involvement in reintegration process. RTT Convenor addresses AGM of HTA on progress and challenges of reintegration. |
| Aug 31 | Meeting – RTT with Equillore and PASSOP (Braam Hanekom) to discuss challenges with mediated agreement and funding. Meeting – RTT with Displaced Committee (Zimbabweans) on a request to postpone closing of camp by six weeks. |
| Sept 1 | Meeting – RTT Convenor with Municipal Manager of BVM to obtain mandate for the extension request from the Displacement Committee. Provisional extension of one week granted pending council approval at special council meeting. New provisional closing date – 13 September 2010. |
| Sept 2 | Joint operation with SAPS at camp – distribution of notices that camp closes on 6 September. |
| Sept 3 | Trespassing at camp addressed following advice to SAPS. Director Richard Sikakane of the Maitland Refugee Centre: Home Affairs visits safety camp. He is briefed by Convenor of RTT on the reintegration process. |
| Sept 4 | Operation to move Zimbabweans that indicated voluntary relocation to local community. |

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| | Planned raid at camp by the Department of Home Affairs postponed. |
| Sept 6 | Closing of camp postponed to 13 September. Convenor of RTT meet with Captain May of SAPS Worcester on resources required to assist reintegration process. RTT meeting at De Doorns. |
| Sept 7 | Meeting - RTT with Board of Directors of the De Doorns Wine Cellars on the Task Team's request for assistance to finance the reintegration process. The request was declined by the Cellar. Comments from Provincial Treasury on funding of reintegration. |
| Sept 30 | RTT meeting at De Doorns to discuss the logistics for the closing of the camp. Comments from Provincial Treasury on funding of reintegration. |
| Oct 1 | Resignation of Convenor of RTT. |
| Oct 12 | Start of the final closing-down process – Operation Check Out. |
| Oct 17 | Final closure of the De Doorns camp. |

Right from the start of the crisis, government pushed for reintegration. In his reaction to Mayor Ntsoni's comments that authorities were contemplating the reintegration of the foreign nationals into the community as soon as possible, PASSOP maintained that, "No community forcefully displaced can possibly reintegrate successfully in such a short time without a proper process of healing, counselling and negotiations" (Accusations fly over xenophobia, 2009). Notwithstanding the concerns of PASSOP, government officials at a meeting on 1 December 2009 stated that the crisis had now moved from the emergency assistance phase to the recovery or stabilising phase and that the reintegration process will commence on 11 December 2009. At the time, only four weeks after 3 000 Zimbabweans were violently chased from the informal settlements, strong feelings of anger and resentment persisted against foreign nationals in the community. The mood in the affected communities at that stage was totally against reintegration. There were also practical obstacles to consider, such as the fact that the structures where the displaced lived before the violence, in some cases up to 40 people in a unit, were totally demolished. Reintegration at that early stage would have constituted a human rights violation. Motivations offered by government for such an early start with the reintegration process included the possible accommodation of the displaced workers on the farms of their employers and escalating costs to maintain the camp. The BVM was of the opinion that the expenditure on the camp could be utilised for community projects. The request to accommodate Zimbabwean farm workers on farms was addressed to members of the HTA at a meeting held on 30 November 2009.

In addition to the early reintegration and closing-down attempt on 11 December 2009 there were also attempts to close down the camp on 13 May 2010, September 2010 and October 2010.

4.7 REINTEGRATION PRESSURES

A xenophobic situation constitutes an abnormality. The violent attacks in De Doorns not only tainted the image of the community but also seriously challenged order and the agricultural-based economy of the area. It was in the best interest of the BVM to restore normality as soon as possible. In addition to the broader challenges the situation also impacted on municipal resources and budget.

The HTA also pushed for early reintegration. At a meeting held on 30 November, attended by 200 farmers and government representatives, HTA pledged its support for the reintegration effort on 11 December 2009 (M. van Rooyen, internal BVM e-mail dated 2 December 2009). It was peak season and the sensitive table grape industry could not afford any labour unrest. Prominent Hex River Valley farmer, Mr Michael Laubscher, concurred with this view and proposed that Zimbabweans be reintegrated into the community as a matter of urgency, with the South African National Defence Force monitoring the process (Interview dated 23 February 2010).

Pressure also came from the Hex Valley Ratepayers' Association who claimed that their rights and privileges had been violated by the establishment of the camp at the Voortrekker Sports Field without proper community consultation beforehand (N.L. Greeff, letter to BVM dated 4 February 2010). The Ratepayers' Association proposed that the camp immediately be moved to a more suitable terrain. Their claim was also based on the conditions in camp, especially the flow of effluent water from the showers into the stream bordering on the northern side of the camp. This view was shared by the Hex Valley High School who claimed that the water that flows from the camp into the stream is contaminated and poses a health risk for the learners of the school (T.A. Scheepers, letter to CWDM dated 19 January 2010).

The sports sector, supported by the Hex Valley Ratepayers' Association, claimed their sports facility back, demanding a quick reintegration or alternatively that the camp be moved to a more appropriate terrain.

The mere presence of the camp in the once harmonious, sleepy little town served as a constant reminder to the people of the Hex Valley that something went terribly wrong – something that branded them as perpetrators of violence and seriously challenged their moral fibre.

Pressures to prolong the reintegration process and not to reintegrate respectively came from PASSOP and the De Doorns Crisis Committee (not to be confused with the "Crisis Committee" concerned with the early management of the camp) who claimed to represent the communities of Ekuphomleni, Hasie Square and Stofland.

Notwithstanding numerous assurances from the BVM that basic services in Stofland will be improved the community representatives remained adamant not to allow reintegration before they receive the services. According to Van Rooyen, local residents were not appeased with the Municipality's efforts because certain individuals use local service delivery issues to fuel hostility and oppose reintegration. He said:

“The current impasse with our reintegration efforts can by and large be ascribed to a very successful and popular agitation and mobilisation campaign by the pseudo-leadership as represented by the De Doorns Crisis Committee. While this standoff continues we as the local municipality are bleeding resources at an alarming pace. Meanwhile pressures from local tax payers, the sports fraternity and various other role players in De Doorns are mounting against the municipality to vacate the rugby field so that the process to rehabilitate the pitch can start” (M. Van Rooyen, e-mail to RTT dated 24 February 2010).

According to Van Rooyen the Zimbabweans were willing to reintegrate on condition that their safety and security be guaranteed. He asked the RTT to facilitate either the establishment of a satellite police station at Stofland for a three to six month period and/or the employment of the South African National Defence Force to the informal settlement. This will allow the reintegration to proceed with daily monitoring by either the police or army.

Since service delivery as a possible reason for the attacks only publicly emerged for the first time during the controversial community meeting held on 12 January at the Hex Valley People's Centre, a strong suspicion exists among especially government representatives that the situation was exploited by local leaders with political motives. Reintegration became a bargaining chip for acquiring services from the BVM.

The advocacy and service group PASSOP, from all the civil society organisations involved with the humanitarian crisis in De Doorns, was the most vocal and active campaigners for the rights of the Zimbabweans in the safety camp. From the beginning the BVM and PASSOP were locked in battle with the former pushing for reintegration and the latter opposing it. The animosity between Mayor Ntsohi and Braam Hanekom, founder of PASSOP, came down to a screaming match at the safety sight on 17 November 2009. This troubled relationship was also evident at the first meetings of the Crisis Committee and continued until the closure of the camp on 17 October 2010. Hanekom, for not adhering to the code of conduct for the camp, adopted by the Crisis Committee at their meeting held on 26 November 2009, was barred from entering the camp. Other organisations with the permission of the camp management could still enter the camp. The new Reintegration Committee that was elected on 15 April 2010 resolved to keep all third parties, including NGOs, off the site while trying to put the process in action (Black Sash

monitoring report 8, 1010: 5). The expulsion from the camp of Hanekom, a key stakeholder in the negotiations for reintegration, was perhaps not the best strategy at the time.

PASSOP in a media statement said it was, “alarmed and insulted” by a remark of BVM Mayor Charles Ntsomi that authorities were considering the reintegration of the displaced as soon as possible. He also accused the Provincial Government of the Western Cape of advocating reintegration in order to avoid further embarrassment (Sapa, 2009: 1).

The Organisation accused the UNHCR of xenophobia for not treating Zimbabweans the same as other refugees in the country. According to Hanekom, Zimbabweans are victims of a form of selective assistance by organisations associated with the UNHCR, which refused to help Zimbabweans who they accuse of being opportunistic (Bell, 2010). Hanekom said that because Zimbabweans are regarded as economic migrants they are not afforded the same rights as other refugees and that such prejudice is “just another form of xenophobia”. He accused the UNHCR of prejudiced behaviour against the Zimbabweans at the safety sight in De Doorns. According to a report from the FMSP at the University of the Witwatersrand, Zimbabweans are neither refugees nor economic migrants. The fact that Zimbabweans crossing the border do not even bother to apply for refugee status disqualifies them as refugees. Given the dire economic situation in their home country Zimbabweans are not considered as voluntary economic migrants either. The report suggests that this category of migrants be referred to as forced humanitarian migrants who moved for basic survival (Bell, 2010).

The UNHCR faced similar criticism in 2008 from the Aide Law Project that accused the Organisation of standing by while the rights of people who sought its protection had been violated (Dunlop, 2008). This was not the case in De Doorns. No mention of any unprofessional behaviour by the UNHCR was made in any of the monitoring reports of Black Sash for instance. This was also the view of the interviewees. Ms. Monique Ekoko, Senior Regional Project Officer of the UNHCR, during an interview also expressed her satisfaction with the cooperation of the RTT (2010).

Hanekom rebuked members of the RTT and the camp manager for trying to alienate him from the process. The feud between Hanekom and Van Rooyen turned personal and almost derailed the reintegration process. On 1 October 2010, barely two weeks before the final closure of the camp site, in an internal communication to the Acting Municipal Manager of the BVM, Van Rooyen resigned from the RTT. He stated the unbearable provocation from Hanekom and the interference from councillors and/or officials who collude with Hanekom “giving him an edge when we go into discussions with the Zimbabweans” as reasons for his resignation (M. Van Rooyen, internal BVM e-mail dated 1 October 2010). A few days later, Van Rooyen withdrew his resignation. With regard to Hanekom, Sauls maintained:

It must be said that although he is difficult in a sense and delayed the process it is understandable. As a pressure group PASSOP had the best interest of the Zimbabweans at heart. He should have been managed but unfortunately by confronting him openly the Task Team played into his hands. The Breede Valley Municipality was on the right track to resolve the situation in camp but the intervening and obstruction to the process by Hanekom hampered the operation (2010).

Although it is entirely appropriate for PASSOP to speak out against the possible violation of human rights of Zimbabweans in the camp, its critique in the De Doorns case was often unbalanced, provocative and sometimes even unfounded. His delaying tactics and uncompromising attitude cost the Zimbabweans dearly in sympathy. However, his resolve in advocating the plight of the displaced Zimbabweans is commendable.

PASSOP's resolve against hasty reintegration was based on its desire to bargain for the best options for the displaced Zimbabweans. The volatile feelings in the relevant communities and the fact that the displaced did not have a physical location to return to formed the basis of PASSOP's arguments against reintegration (Hanekom, 2011). The Zimbabweans also felt that they should be compensated in the form of a relocation/reintegration grant.

Fortunately for PASSOP, in its fight for the rights of the displaced Zimbabweans and resistance to early reintegration, the Organisation's efforts were boosted by the community's resistance to reintegration. It afforded them the opportunity to bargain for better concessions from government.

The reintegration efforts and process has been covered in the chronological synopsis of events.

4.8 CONCLUSION

The research focused on government's involvement in creating an environment conducive to social conflict and its efforts to manage the humanitarian and reintegration processes. Reasons for the attacks and the interaction between stakeholders – government, the displaced foreign nationals, the community, HTA and NGOs received attention.

Although the De Doorns case shares similarities with other case studies on xenophobic violence it is unique in the sense that the attacks were planned and targeted against a specific category of foreign nationals, namely Zimbabweans employed as seasonal workers on farms in the area. It is also significant that, in comparison to the 2008 incidents, the attacks in De Doorns affected the community in its entirety.

Research on the De Doorns case added a new dimension to reasons for xenophobic violence, namely indirect employment. This is the situation where employment is externalised and workers employed as intermediaries who in turn are offered to the farmers as labourers.

Competition between local and Zimbabwean labour brokers fuelled the contestation for scarce resources in the informal communities.

Although cases of xenophobic violence were reported in other rural settings in the Western Cape, such as Riversdale, it is insignificant compared to the scope of the violence and displacement experienced in the De Doorns case. The study also illustrates the vulnerability of the table grape industry and the potential of labour unrest to upset the equilibrium in employer-employee relationships. This publicity-sensitive and labour-intensive industry, the main employer in the area, cannot afford social conflict on its doorstep.

Since the aim of the study is to evaluate the BVM's performance in exercising its developmental mandate, Council's reaction with regard to early warning signs, its involvement in the community and its role in managing the reintegration process were investigated. Research results indicate that the local government did not heed early warning signs, failed in communicating with the communities and was even allegedly involved in instigating the violence. This will be discussed in more detail in the chapter dealing with the findings. The section dealing with the Municipality's involvement with the humanitarian response and reintegration efforts also produced valuable findings. The De Doorns case, in terms of its uniqueness and approach (from a government perspective), makes a valuable contribution towards the existing body of knowledge with regard to government's developmental responsibility to involve the community in governance, the involvement of micro politics in instigating xenophobic violence, and the management of xenophobic situations.

CHAPTER 5

MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 MAIN FINDINGS

5.1.1 XENOPHOBIA

In terms of its definition, observations during the humanitarian response and opinions of researchers and interviewees, the De Doorns case did not constitute xenophobia in the classical sense. The author agrees with the view of Theron that the term xenophobia in the De Doorns case has little explanatory value. According to Theron, referring to the description of phobia as an irrational fear, there is nothing irrational about the competition between strata of the working class for scarce job opportunities. Theron, who views the case from a labour perspective, maintains that in the absence of organised labour to serve the course of farm workers in the area, the potential for labour related conflict remains a threat. Van Rooyen concurs with Theron that the conflict is rather competition between the different groups for job opportunities and maintains that the incidents are not classical xenophobia, rather social conflict. The deliberate planning of the attacks, targeting a selected group of people, supports the above views.

On-going observations during the humanitarian phase, with the exception of the initial verbal threats shortly after the incidents, detected no harmful behaviour directed at foreign nationals. The fact that most of the internally displaced during their stay in the camp continued with their work on the farms alongside locals and after hours socialised with the people of the informal settlements, is a further indication that elements of fear and hatred for foreigners were less obvious in the case of De Doorns. In essence, it was not fear and hatred for foreign nationals per se that caused feelings of discontent. Negative feelings against Zimbabweans were based on their perceived threat in the struggle for scarce resources. Labour brokers and community leaders used the Zimbabweans as scapegoats in pursuance of self-interest. Even the community's opposition towards reintegration was more than anything else, a battle for government's attention to address service delivery shortcomings in the communities.

5.1.2 PREJUDICE

In essence, it was not the fear of foreigners that triggered the violence. From the De Doorns case, it emerged that even in the absence of strong feelings of fear and hatred, foreigners are still prone to collective violence.

Feelings of prejudice and discontent were stimulated by the following factors:

- Inequalities in the community. There are few places in the country where inequalities are so conspicuous than the Hex River Valley. The affluent white community with their

beautiful farms and stately homesteads is in sharp contrast with the struggling informal settlements where feelings of deprivation reign supreme. Visits to the informal settlements Ekupumleni, Hasie Square and Stofland revealed extreme poverty and hardship.

- The large number of Zimbabweans in De Doorns, estimated at between 8 000 and 9 000 is a worrisome development in terms of contestation for scarce resources – jobs and housing.
- The presence of a Home Affairs satellite office in De Doorns that attracted foreign nationals to the area.
- The preference of foreign workers by local farmers and the belief by community members that Zimbabweans steal their jobs.
- The belief by South African residents that Zimbabweans work for lower wages.
- Service delivery issues.

5.1.3 LABOUR AND SERVICE DELIVERY ISSUES

Evidence produced by the study refuted the claims from community members that Zimbabweans work for lower wages. Claims by the local community that Zimbabweans steal their jobs have also been proved wrong. What is more credible is that the competition between labour brokers may have been a contributory cause for the community's xenophobic conduct. Labour brokers are influential figures in the community with their own teams of workers depending on them to provide work. These "loyal" workers can be easily mobilised, even for selfish political reasons.

Although service delivery and socio-economic conditions did not feature as reasons for discontent at first, it was later during the humanitarian response phase, used as a bargaining chip for service delivery in *Stofland* in exchange for allowing the Zimbabweans to reintegrate into the community.

While these matters could have contributed towards feelings of prejudice, it did not trigger the attacks. The research identified interference from labour brokers and micro politics as the main contributing factors in fuelling tensions and triggering violence by inciting local communities. There was no official response from the authorities with regard to reports on the alleged involvement of local political actors. Although observations, allegations and perceptions do not constitute evidence, they indicate that there are wide mistrust of councillors and officials.

5.1.4 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

In general the humanitarian response can be regarded as reasonably successful, especially in the light of the unexpectedness of the attacks and inexperience of the responsible officials. The following challenges in managing the process can benefit similar situations in future:

- Disaster management. Although the BVMs performance in this regard was laudable, clear guidelines from the national government is necessary.
- Responsibility. The reintegration process was held back by the lack of clear guidelines on who is responsible for managing the situation, national, provincial or local government.
- NGO presence. The consistent battles between members of the RTT and a NGO nearly derailed the reintegration process. Guidelines to manage the relationship between officials and NGOs should be developed,
- Camp security. Insufficient camp security caused organizational problems and delays.
- Leadership. The absence of political leadership during the humanitarian and reintegration phases was a great concern. The performance of delegated official and progress was severely compromised by the absence of leadership. In the absence of political leadership, service delivery demands from the informal settlements were addressed to the RTT who did not have the authority to deal with it on a political level.
- Budget. The fact that no provision was made on the Municipality's budget for expenditure with regard to social conflict also compromised the process.
- Mediators. The appointment of mediators to assist in the process was a positive step. They delivered invaluable support to the RTT, especially in negotiating the closure of the camp and in preparing communities for the return and reintegration of the displaced foreign nationals.

5.1.5 COMMUNICATION

In terms of the BVM's response to early warning signs, the threat- and outbreak of violence in De Doorns, the study shows that the local state indeed failed in its developmental mandate to create an environment for public participation on issues that impact on communities. Of special significance are:

- BVM's reluctance and failure to act on the early warning signs.
- BVM's failure to address the labour related tensions that fueled the violence. Communication initiatives in the past neglected a very important actor in the Hex River Valley namely the commercial farmer, the major employer and creator of wealth in the community. The establishment of a Home Affairs office in De Doorns without consulting the BVM, alludes to a lack of confidence in the local government's ability to address labour related issues in the agricultural sector. The Municipality's "absence" and apparent

lack of political will to involve the farming community in governance, created a vacuum that allowed the HTA to bypass the local authority in its decision to issue asylum papers to Zimbabweans in De Doorns.

- BVM's failure to engage with the communities in De Doorns. Ward Committees are an important means of achieving proper community participation. According to the National Policy Framework for Public Participation, ward committees are seen as a vehicle for deepening local democracy and an instrument for establishing a vibrant and involved citizenry. Ward committees have a crucial role as interface between government and the community. At the time of the attacks, no minutes of any ward committee meetings in Ward 2 could be produced. No public participation policy could be produced. No one at the Municipality could produce the names of the committee members. A CDW working at the Municipality said that he was aware of only one official meeting that was held by the relevant committee. From discussions with the De Doorns Crisis Committee and community members, the lack of knowledge on government activity in the affected areas was obvious, which pointed to ineffective communication. The absence of ward committees (3 in De Doorns) and councillors to help resolve the crisis was a worrisome feature of the reintegration process. The Municipality was accused by the affected communities of not consulting with them on their service delivery needs.

5.1.6 EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES DURING THE CRISES

- A major contributory factor to the xenophobic incident was the absence of a comprehensive communication strategy to deal with the various developmental challenges that faced De Doorns at the time of the crisis. In terms of developmental local government, communities must be engaged in governance and consulted on issues that affect their lives – they must be part of decision-making. Issues such as the plight of farm labourers, living conditions and farm evictions, labour practices, the large number of foreign workers and the relations between farmers and the local government and farmers and farm labourers should be vigorously debated. Communication in the developmental sense is more than a linearly one-way dissemination of information. It is a dialogic process based on participation. A communication-based assessment should identify the issues in the community that need to be communicated. If that was done, say three years prior to the attacks, the De Doorns crisis could have been avoided.
- Participation of the community in governance prior to the attacks was restricted to an IDP meeting once a year. There is no evidence of communication between the HTA and BVM on matters related to labour brokers, the conditions on the farms and the influx of foreign nationals, prior to the crisis. Stakeholder engagement in communication actions in the modern paradigm is of the utmost importance. There is no record of any efforts to engage

communities in communicating with local government, other than the IDP meetings. It must be stressed that meaningful participation cannot happen without communication. To be truly significant and meaningful, participation needs to be based on the application of two-way communication principles and practices. All indications are there that the local state must still make the paradigm shift towards employing development communication in dealing with communities.

- Communication initiatives at the time of the attacks, and humanitarian and reintegration phases included the following:

MEDIA

- The attacks on November, 17th were covered in detail by the regional dailies, *Die Burger*, *Cape Times*, *Argus* and the local community newspapers *Standard* and *Valleier*. The articles informed the public of the attacks, criticising the attackers and sympathising with the Zimbabweans. Although the reports in general were unbiased, some of the RTT members have expressed the opinion that the articles of the *Cape Times* favoured the views of NGOs. It must be mentioned that the BVM at no stage utilised the print media to address xenophobia, in either sensitising or educating the public on the issue. In general, reporting by the major regional newspapers was informative but lacked an in-depth analysis of the causes giving rise to the attacks. It is felt that the *Standard* as leading community newspaper in the region, could have done much more in terms of stimulating debate and in sensitising and educating the public on xenophobia. During the eleven months of the biggest humanitarian crisis ever in the history of the Breede Valley, the *Standard* carried only five brief articles on the incident.
- The value of community radio as a means to give a voice to local communities, especially the most marginalised ones, and involve them in providing inputs on decisions affecting their lives, cannot be underestimated. Although the local community radio Valley FM is fully committed to accommodate community issues, a large part of De Doorns falls outside its broadcast range. Notwithstanding this restriction, two recordings were made in the safety camp and broadcasted. The chairperson of the RTT was also interviewed in the studio. Since many people from De Doorns commute on a daily basis to Worcester where they listen to Valley FM in taxis, shops and at the workplace, the effect of the broadcasts was not a total loss. The television channel e.tv visited De Doorns on two occasions. A news conference on the closing of the safety sight held at the provincial legislature in Cape Town, offered opportunity for journalists to ask probing questions on the issue.
- Although the media informed the public on aspects of the crisis – the attacks and conditions in the safety camp - it contributed very little towards explaining the phenomenon and offering solutions.

COMMUNITY MEETINGS

- Four community meetings, initiated by the RTT and an imbizo, organised by the Department of Labour, were held in the affected communities of Stofland, Hasie Square and Ekuphumleni. The meetings were held to inform the communities on aspects of the crisis, to explain service delivery issues and to negotiate the safe reintegration of the Zimbabweans into Stofland. Although the interaction did not involve dialog in the true participatory sense, there was some response from the community, though mostly negative and disruptive. Because the issues were not communicated properly to the affected communities beforehand, they felt divorced from the process. The meetings and imbizo were conducted in a one-way communication approach aimed at increasing knowledge and changing attitudes and behaviour.

STAKEHOLDER MEETINGS

- Stakeholder meetings is another mode of communication that was used to consult with the locals. The RTT and officials of BVM met on three occasions with the HTA – once with the members and twice with the board of directors. All three meetings allowed full participation. Although reintegration and accommodation for Zimbabwean workers were discussed, BVM at no stage confronted HTA with burning issues on the farms. Meetings were also held with the sport groups, the crisis committee representing the affected communities and with the committees representing the displaced people in the safety camp. The aim of the meetings was to inform the stakeholders on issues and to get their cooperation.

COMMUNICATION PRODUCTS

- At the beginning of the crisis, pamphlets were distributed by community development workers in the affected areas to sensitise people on the issue of xenophobia. Pamphlets were also distributed on two occasions to communicate the closing of the safety camp. The pamphlets were developed by the Communication Committee of the RTT consisting of communication practitioners from BVM, CWDM and GCIS. The Communication Committee also developed a communication strategy, prepared media statements and a service delivery scorecard that was distributed in the affected areas. Pamphlets to inform and persuade stakeholders to change their behaviour are a form of one-way communication. It is however very difficult to measure the success of the pamphlets. The fact that the pamphlets were only distributed in the affected areas minimised their effectiveness and potential to persuade a wider audience to eradicate xenophobic behaviour.

WALKABOUT

- A walkabout of stakeholders was held a month after the attacks. This form of grass-roots communication offered the Executive Mayor and councillors an opportunity to meet with other stakeholders such as NGO's, community leaders and ordinary citizens living in the affected areas. This can be a very effective form of communication to build trust, achieve mutual understanding and involve the community in decision-making. The walkabout involved only a fraction of the affected communities. To be effective this direct form of communication should be sustainable, well planned and focused.

INTER-FAITH PRAYER MEETINGS

- Two inter-faith prayer meetings were held. It was however poorly attended.

Although the Communication Committee played a significant role in the dissemination of information and in liaising with the media, it was totally underutilised with regard to building trust among stakeholders, assessing the situation, exploring options and seeking broad consensus for sustainable change. The committee should have been active from the start. A communication strategy was only developed in July 2010, almost seven months after the attacks. Instead of a sub-committee, communication should have been represented on the RTT from the beginning of the crisis.

From a communication perspective, the mayor represents the "face" of a municipality. With the exception of the walkabout and three community meetings, the mayor and his committee were not involved in any dialogue with the affected communities. Council also failed to utilise tools such as the media, especially the local community newspaper and radio, to communicate with the broader community on the issues leading to the attacks. From the research, interviews and observations, it is clear that council demonstrated an unwillingness to get involved in the De Doorns crisis.

The community development workers liaised closely with the Department of Social Development, rendering a support service. In terms of communication, the CDWS disseminated information and were involved in needs assessments in the safety camp. They also arranged a sports event in an effort to build trust between the Zimbabweans and the local community. The event, however failed because of a lack of interest by the government institutions.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

The situation in De Doorns demands immediate attention. The conditions on farms in the Hex Valley over the years have become unbearable with farm workers, contributing to the success of the lucrative table grape industry, among the most vulnerable people in South Africa. Earning a wage of R60.00 per day, living in harsh conditions on farms and in informal settlements with no

union representation, these unfortunate workers now face the threat of losing their jobs to foreign nationals from Zimbabwe. Tragically, farm workers cannot even rely on the protection of government, who for many years avoided contact with farmers and labour brokers. The problems that farm workers face are not unknown to government and farmers. Farm workers however, are not the only people affected by government's "diplomacy of silence." Government, in not addressing the problems facing the industry, is allowing frustration to build up against farmers. If left unattended the status quo will eventually erupt in another bout of violent protest.

It is recommended that a communication programme based on the World Bank's widely accepted four-phase methodological framework of research, strategy design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation be implemented in De Doorns. Since the framework is underpinned by the dialogic mode of development communication, programmes, specifically the research phase or communication-based assessment, should be guided by the basic principles of development communication. The communication-based assessment should be dialogic, inclusive, heuristic, analytical, participatory and persuasive.

The first phase is research and includes a review of secondary sources and a communication-based assessment to engage stakeholders in the analyses of key issues, in the assessment of risks and opportunities and in the definition of priorities facilitating behavioural and social change. By involving all relevant stakeholders, the community-based assessment addresses the "what", "who" and "why" of the situation that is being investigated. Although using a number of qualitative methods, community-based assessment also includes quantitative methods such as surveys and baseline studies to quantify the extent of the initial findings. Qualitative tools such as interviews, focus group discussions and the review of secondary sources are used to gain knowledge in the community-based assessment phase (Mefalopoulos, 2008: 105). Other useful tools are questionnaires and opinion polls. Participatory rural communication appraisal is used in rural areas. Due to its strong participatory connotation it is ideal for community driven development projects

In the communication-based assessment the first part of the analyses focuses on the "why" of a situation using qualitative techniques such as interviews and focus groups. The second part addresses the "what" and the "how much" of the circumstances in order to triangulate the initial findings and to quantify them.

The second phase of the approach is strategy design for achieving specific objectives, as identified in the research phase. A successful communication strategy design is based on a successful analysis of the specific situation. During this phase a strategy and action plan is identified that will determine the budget and time, communication approach and related media and messages identified for each audience. This phase defines the type of change required and

select the most appropriate communication approach for each initiative. These approaches can include advocacy, social marketing, diffusion of information or capacity building (Mefalopulos, 2008: 120). The different approaches can stand alone or can be used in a combination of each other.

The third phase concerns the implementation of the approaches and activities selected in the strategy. This phase includes an action plan of activities required to produce the results of the strategic design. Actions can include activities such as training, the writing of radio scripts and the design of communication materials.

The fourth phase: This is monitoring and evaluation. Evaluation is the process of determining whether and to what extent a certain intervention has produced the intended result (Mefalopulos, 2008: 135). For the success of a project, it is necessary that relevant indicators and related measurements be defined at the beginning of the intervention. The effects on the impact of diffusion approaches are felt after the implementation phases, whereas in the case of participatory approaches the effects can be felt from the beginning. Evaluating the impact of diffusion interventions is therefore easier, since there can be a pre- and post-assessment of the situation. The difference between these two assessments determines the impact of the communication. In the case of participatory assessment, the results are not easily measurable due to the explorative scope of the dialogic mode, which implies amongst others a measurement of trust, mutual understanding, empowerment and consensus building. Measuring the difference between the starting point and the finish is often the only way to measure the impact of communication (2008: 144)..

Based on the aforementioned, it is recommended:

- That the BVM takes full responsibility for a communication intervention process in De Doorns in accordance with the four-phased methodological framework as explained above.
- That the municipality commence with a communication-based assessment as a matter of urgency.
- That CDW's be utilised to their fullest potential in the communication-based assessment and monitoring of processes in the communities.
- That ward committees be actively involved in the dissemination of information and early detection of problems in their wards; that the Speaker of the BVM closely monitor their performance.
- That a development forum linked to the IDP, representing all relevant stakeholders in the community, be established to assist the BVM in the assessment of communication needs and the identification of project and communication objectives.

- That councillors familiarise themselves with issues in the community, analyse situations properly and understand all of the crucial issues and perceptions of the various stakeholders.
- That community media be utilised on a much larger scale in the dissemination of message, education and analyses of issues in the community.

With regard to the conflict in the community, the following is recommended:

- That a series of workshops involving stakeholders such as BVM, HTA, ward committees, the Hex Valley Rate Payers Association and the Departments of Agriculture, Labour, Home Affairs and Social Development be held to discuss issues of conflict in the agricultural sector and the implications of agricultural labour processes on local development planning and service delivery.
- That policies be developed to regulate labour broking and to respond to the influx of foreign nationals.
- That foreign nationals be encouraged to serve on ward committees and forums in the community such as the community policing forums.
- That the inclusion of social conflict issues be a standing item on the agenda of BVM council meetings.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 CONCLUSION

The Breede Valley Municipality for the past couple of years received unqualified audit opinions from the Auditor General. The Municipality, also in terms of an IQ evaluation report in 2010 was highly rated for creating an environment for development. Notwithstanding these achievements, the Municipality failed to prevent a human catastrophe. Notwithstanding a history of labour unrest in the table grape industry, protest action and rumours of planned attacks, the Municipality failed to take action. The Municipality failed to communicate with the agriculture sector on long-standing labour related tensions. Although the Municipality engaged with the relevant communities in terms of the IDP and facilitated development in *Stofland*, it failed to make the people part of the process and to gain their trust. It must be mentioned that at the time of the incident the ANC in the Western Cape was divided on a leadership issue. This might have contributed to the turmoil in the informal settlements and distracted the ward councillors' attention from the job at hand. In short, critical issues in a labour intensive area, affecting a labour sensitive industry that provides employment to thousands of people were neglected by the sphere of government closest to the people, creating an environment for community protest and xenophobic attacks.

The table grape industry, competing in a very competitive export market cannot afford bad publicity and labour unrest. The potential economic, political and social impact of the violence on the industry cannot be underestimated. Given the interrelated nature of the global economy, negative sentiments on the table grape export market has the potential to discourage investment. It is almost two years after the attacks and nothing has really changed. The Zimbabweans are still in De Doorns, labour brokers are still active and even the sports field is still unused.

The outbreak of xenophobia in De Doorns points to an unwillingness on the part of local government to address pressing developmental issues in the Hex Valley.

Two years after the incident there is still no development communication programmes implemented. Problems that exist for longer than a decade are still unsolved. The community of De Doorns expressed their dissatisfaction by attacking foreign nationals on 11 and 17 November 2009. Unless local government heed the call and involve the people of De Doorns in decision-making, they will find other ways to vent their anger. Given the history of discontent; the standoff between the local government and producers (farmers), the friction between Zimbabweans and locals, housing shortages, poverty and unemployment, the possibility of a

repetition of 2009 is not far fetched; even actions such as the illegal occupation of farms, cannot be ruled out.

The outbreak of xenophobia in De Doorns is largely poverty related. In addressing poverty, many developmental problems can be avoided. Poverty is not only about the deprivation of basic material needs. It is not simply an income issue. For Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, poverty is also about capabilities deprivation and social exclusion. By involving the poor in the assessment process of communication interventions and engaging them in decision-making, development communication not only can reduce a key element of poverty, namely social exclusion, but can also facilitate the process of empowerment. According to Mefalopoulos :

“Using dialog to engage stakeholders in probing and assessing the situation can help break the broader vicious circle of poverty, where income cannot be earned without a proper level of individual capabilities and individual capabilities cannot be improved while the individual remains in conditions of poverty” (2008:56).

In participation communication, the BVM has the tool to reduce poverty and at the same time empower marginalised communities to take charge of aspects that influence their lives. While government tends to look at economic solutions to address poverty, dialog unlocks poverty by reducing social exclusion. In neglecting its developmental responsibility by not addressing burning issues and communicating with stakeholders, local government is in fact encouraging poverty.

With the exception of some initiatives by the Department of Social Development and an initiative by GCIS to sensitise schoolchildren about xenophobia, nothing has been done in terms of conflict resolution mechanisms and the early detection of problems that can lead to xenophobic attacks. With the attacks of 14 and 17 November 2009 still fresh in the mind, another potential conflict situation is brooding just a few kilometres west of *Stofland* on the N1 national road at the informal settlement named GG Camp. Although in this case it is not labour related, social conflict has the tendency to develop very quickly into something much more sinister, such as xenophobia. There are also no visible signs of an increase in councillor involvement in the community. With regard to ward committees, a new system has been implemented following the local government elections during May 2011.

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X, Fula to mm group. Information from Black Sash, dated 28 January 2010

APPENDIX A

XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE DE DOORNS NOVEMBER 2009: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW WITH THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE HEX VALLEY TABLE GRAPE ASSOCIATION MS ELSA JORDAAN – 22 JULY 2009

Key objective

To obtain the participant's views on:

- the reasons for the attack, the process that was followed in managing the xenophobic situation and the reintegration of the displaced
- accusations that the Hex Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) contributed to the violence by underpaying Zimbabweans
- the communication process that was followed in managing the xenophobic situation
- the conditions in the camp.

Methodology

An open-ended interview that allows the participant to express her views freely. Permission to conduct the interview and to use a tape recorder was obtained in advance. The date, time and place of the interview were cleared with the interviewee.

Profile of interviewee

Ms. Elsa Jordaan is the Executive Director of the Hex Valley Table Grape Association based in De Doorns in the Breede Valley. She is also a DA councilor at the Breede Valley Municipality.

Questions

1. Various reasons are given for the xenophobic violence against foreign nationals in De Doorns such as poverty and unemployment, labour practices, political agendas, etc. What in your opinion triggered the violence/ serve as stimulus for the violence?
2. Politicians are accused in the media and research reports of a lack of political will and indifference in dealing with xenophobia. Is it also the case in De Doorns?
3. Incidents of xenophobia are not uncommon to the Breede Valley. Do you think enough was done in terms of public participation/ communication to address the issue?
4. With regard to the present situation in De Doorns, how do you rate the communication process in terms of consultation with various role players – the Stofland community, displaced Zimbabweans, HTA, NGO'S, media, government and the residents of De Doorns?
5. How do you rate the performance of the Reintegration Task Team?
6. In your opinion who is in charge of the reintegration process?

Synopses of the interview

The interviewer introduces himself and explains the purpose of the interview.

According to Ms. Jordaan minor **incidents of prejudice** against foreigners in the De Doorns area occurred as early as 2007. An incident in 2008 when the ex-boyfriend of a Xhosa girl burned down the shack of her Zimbabwean lover, sparked robust police action against “illegal” Zimbabweans. Ms. Jordaan describes the actions of the police as “very sad.”

Farmers who wanted to **register** (get asylum papers) their illegal Zimbabwean workers in the Cape Town office of **Home Affairs** could not take them by bus since it is illegal to transport Zimbabweans without their asylum papers. The farmers at that stage were faced with a dilemma since the **demand** for workers **exceeded the supply** due to the following reasons:

The negative effect of AIDS on the supply of local workers, urbanization, increased production (from 2000 boxes per hectare in a season a view years back to the present 6 000 boxes) and an increase of serviced agricultural land. To address the problem and to avoid employing illegal workers the **HTA** reach an agreement with Home Affairs that Zimbabwean workers be registered locally, first by means of a **mobile office**, later via an office based at the **Hex River Post Office**. The following process was followed:

Farmers bring their workers to the HTA office in town where they get a letter of support which they take to the office of Home Affairs where the registration process takes place. At some stage it came to Association’s knowledge that the process is being manipulated and that others who do not work on farms are also receiving their asylum papers at the Office. The arrangement was then made that only when the farmer himself or his foreman bring the Zimbabwean workers a permit will be issued. But even this arrangement could not prevent that others were also registered. When some of the local **labour brokers** approached the HTA with a plea to employ local people, HTA immediately called for the closure of the Home Affairs office.

To streamline the employment of local labourers an agreement was entered into with the labour brokers whose papers were in order. An organization, Hex Valley **Contractors** was then established and a code of conduct approved. But the performance of these contactors, catering for the local labour market, were not up to standard and they were told that as long as people do not turn up for work, farmers will have to rely on Zimbabweans to do the work. The contractors could however not reach agreement on the code of conduct. At that stage only 16 of the original 50 registered at the HTA remained. The effort was then abandoned and the status quo continued. Apparently new efforts to revive the Association have been initiated.

Local **Cllr. Poyi Lubisi**, as also confirmed by media reports, is believed to be an instigator of the violence. Apparently Cllr. Lubisi promised a section of the community that they will receive

electrification. When that didn't materialise his political career was in jeopardy. It is believed that when locals complained about unemployment he seized the opportunity to mobilize the community against the Zimbabweans. Attacks on Zimbabweans followed almost immediately after meetings (which councillor Lubisi also attended) with the community. The majority of the aggressors were mainly **youth** from Xhosa origin. People from Lesotho were not attacked because they were prepared to defend themselves. After the attacks the Zimbabweans were at first accommodated at the municipal store and later moved to the sports-grounds. The police presence during the attacks was disappointing – no provision for extra manpower was made and the police stood idly watching as the drama unfolds.

The HTA took a decision that all **media liaison**, including press statements be dealt with by Agri Western Cape. Ms. Jordaan referred to accusations of illegal labour practices by Labour Minister Membathisi Mdladlana – of farmers underpaying their Zimbabwean workers. She says there is no truth in these accusations and invited Western Cape Members of Parliament, Meyer, Van Rensburg and Max who assisted her on this matter. HTA attended the Reintegration Task Team meetings on a regular basis. The Mayor, Deputy Mayor and others of the BVM for **political reasons** refused to accept HTA'S explanation that workers are not underpaid – that they are in fact paid more than the minimum wage. This attitude was detrimental to employer/employee relations and with the assistance of the Speaker of BVM and Task Team a meeting between members of HTA and government representatives was held. When the Mayor, Deputy and other politicians persisted with their attitude she asked the Municipal Manager to intervene in the matter, which he did with positive results. After that there was a better understanding of the HTA'S position. An **investigation** by the Department of Labour into the wage matter could not proof underpayment by the producers (farmers). The focus then shifted to the labour brokers and the temporary office of Home Affairs in De Doorns. Ms Jordaan maintains that the office was opened by the ANC not the DA. They (HTA) insisted that the office be closed. She explains the wage issue as follows:

The farmer pays the labour broker **R60.00 per day** for the worker and an additional R5.00 fee for administrative costs. What happens is that Zimbabweans is willing to work for less than the locals and labour brokers exploit their vulnerability by offering employment for less than the farmers paid them. This is the cause of all the trouble.

Ms. Jordaan feels that **media reports was unfair** and discredited the HTA and farmers unnecessary. She is also of the opinion that Agri Western-Cape could have been more aggressive in their response to media allegations.

With regard to their participation in the process HTA was involved from the start on. The directors attended the meetings and offered their **fullest cooperation**. In contrast, the BVM

councillors, with the exception of Cllr. Jordaan, played a very low-key role, causing a **leadership vacuum**. This absent leadership has a negative influence on the proceedings and put pressure on the officials dealing with the issue. She agrees that in the De Doorns case there is also a **lack of political will**.

The **communication** process is not effective enough, especially with regard to the Stofland community. The officials of the Municipality are doing their best but their efforts lack the backing of their councillors. Although there was confusion regarding, **who is in charge** of the process, Ms. Jordaan is of the opinion that the BVM is in charge. In defence of the Municipality it must be said that nobody really knew what to do.

APPENDIX B

XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE DE DOORNS NOVEMBER 2009: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW WITH MR ASHRAF KAFAAR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT WORKER COORDINATOR FOR THE CAPE WINELAND DISTRICT – 27 JULY 2010

Key objective

To obtain the participant's views on:

- the reasons for the attack, the process that was followed in managing the xenophobic situation and the reintegration of the displaced
- accusations that the Hex Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) contributed to the violence by underpaying Zimbabweans
- the communication process that was followed in managing the xenophobic situation
- the conditions in the camp.

Methodology

An open-ended interview that allows the participant to express her views freely. Permission to conduct the interview and to use a tape recorder was obtained in advance. The date, time and place of the interview were cleared with the interviewee.

Profile of interviewee

Mr Ashraf Kafaar is the Provincial Coordinator of the Community Worker Program for the Cape Winelands District in the Western Cape. He coordinates the CDW presence at the De Doorns refugee camp which includes monitoring of camp activity and logistics.

Questions

1. Various reasons are given for the xenophobic violence against foreign nationals in De Doorns such as poverty and unemployment, labour practices, political agendas, etc. What in your opinion triggered the violence/ serve as stimulus for the violence?
2. Politicians are accused in the media and research reports of a lack of political will and indifference in dealing with xenophobia. Is it also the case in De Doorns?
3. Incidents of xenophobia are not uncommon to the Breede Valley. Do you think enough was done in terms of public participation/ communication to address the issue?
4. With regard to the present situation in De Doorns, how do you rate the communication process in terms of consultation with various role players – the Stofland community, displaced Zimbabweans, HTA, NGO'S, media, government and the residents of De Doorns?
5. How do you rate the performance of the Reintegration Task Team?

6. In your opinion who is in charge of the reintegration process?

Synopses of the interview

The interviewer introduces himself and explains the purpose of the interview to Mr Kafaar. The interviewee responded as follows on the questions (not necessary in the sequence the questions were asked).

The interviewee identifies a **lack of knowledge** as one of the main contributory factors leading to xenophobic behaviour. The community do not understand the cultural practices of the Zimbabweans and why they are here. Because locals do not know them they fear them and feel inferior to them, constantly measuring them against the foreign nationals.

Political interference may have played a role but in the case of the De Doorns discussions about the growing number of foreign nationals surfaced long before November 2009. Traditionally over the December period most of the people, including youth that finished school, worked on the farms for an extra income. Now this opportunity must be shared with 5000 foreign nationals. This created a platform for locals to manoeuvre against the Zimbabweans.

There is a perception that the only way to get government's attention is to **create a crisis**. The same can be said of service delivery protests. These actions don't just happen – the lack of communication created a vacuum. Locally and nationally not much has been done by government to communicate xenophobia.

Commitment to the problem and a lack of **political will** to get involved are also matters of concern. For instance, a sport event to bring the foreign nationals and community closer together, to create a platform for dialog was arranged to take place on Reconciliation Day, 16 December 2009. It was quite disappointing when the organisers were told a day before the event that most of the role-players were away on holiday. We were in the middle of a crisis with 2000 people displaced. It was important to create a sense of normality. Again the political will was absent. Only the Departments of Social Development and Health were still involved in the camp at that stage.

Initially it was said that the Zimbabweans take the work of locals because they were **paid less** by the farmers. However, an inquiry into the labour practices of farmers, ordered by the Minister of Labour, revealed that the farmers meet the basic conditions of employment.

With regard to service delivery it can be said that the RTT (Reintegration Task Team) took too long to present the Stofland community with a **scorecard** of services rendered to the community by the local municipality.

With regard to **crime** there is no evidence that there is a drop in criminal activity since the displacement of the Zimbabweans.

In a situation like this, **perceptions** play an important role – the challenge is how to rectify these perceptions in the community, how do you address the perceptions. To a great extent the same reasons for xenophobia identified in 2008 – economy, crime, housing, resources, were also identified in 2009.

In De Doorns there are also **Sothos** and they were not attacked. A possible reason is that the Zimbabweans compete in the same labour market as the locals. They were seen as a softer target as the Sothos. You will also find that Nigerians for instance live in the suburbs, not in townships.

It is difficult to get to the root of the problem. There are accusations such as the involvement of politicians, but it is difficult to prove. In the townships there exists a culture of not **splitting** on each other. This is the kind of things we must start to address in programs if you want to speak to xenophobia.

When it comes to housing there is no evidence that a Zimbabwean owns property in Stofland. The so-called “**hotels**” in Stofland where locals sub-let accommodation to Zimbabweans also cannot be a reason for xenophobia because the local people benefit from it. These hotels are a source of income for locals during the off-season.

The **large number** of Zimbabweans is a cause for concern but it can't be controlled by the municipality. It rests with the national government to manage influx control – to regulate our borders. Unofficially it can be done. There is for instance a township in a neighbouring municipality who had a zero population growth over the past few years due to informally and unofficially controlling the flow of incoming people. They realise the importance of catering only for this amount of people on this piece of land. In this specific case there was a continuous communication between local leaders and the community.

Although the **farmers** were cleared of blame it can be argued that the local registration of Zimbabweans on their request to work on the farms can be viewed as an insult to the local labourers. Also the fact that the farmers presently do not enter Stofland but instead pick up and drop their workers at the safety camp is cause for concern. Even though many of them work on citrus farms in Ceres, HTA committed them to take responsibility for the farmers' actions and can't shed this responsibility by saying the specific farmers is not from De Doorns. The RTT was slow to communicate this matter to HTA. At the end of the season the farmers drop their Zimbabwean workers at the camp. The farmers are part of the problem and should make provision for their workers.

Dialog is a very important part of the reintegration process, dialog with all role-players. In all the deliberations one of the major stakeholders, the **community** was neglected. All our energy and resources were focused on the safety camp.

The RTT was well represented and integrated. The **communication** within the team and to the municipality and even the provincial government was very good. However the RTT should have more decision taking powers. Important decisions such as obtaining legal opinions were first referred to the municipality and the provincial government. In that sense, due to protocol the RTT was sometimes slow in responding. The RTT should be more proactive – the trends should tell the team what to expect and they should react instead of waiting for the crisis to develop. Even with the establishment of the camp notwithstanding the benefits of trends, we were slow in responding. The amount of work done on Xenophobia in this region is limited.

We should make the fight against xenophobia **inclusive**. We have a ward committee system and should involve foreign nationals on this forum. They can contribute to sub-committees such as business and youth. In De Doorns the most resistance came from the f section where the young men were accommodated. There is no difference between the Zimbabwean youth in the camp and our own youth. The history of apartheid is not important for our youth – they want jobs, a car, they want a taste of the better life.

It is important that we make the foreign nationals part of our system. We need to involve them in our **ward committees**. For example in Zwelethemba township in Worcester there is a close relationship between the CPF (Community Policing Forum) and the foreign nationals. In 2008 before the outbreak of the countrywide xenophobia there were already rumours in Zwelethemba that it was going to happen. The CPF was proactive in that sense. In 2008 with the outbreak of the xenophobic violence Zwelethemba experienced no incidents of violence against foreigners. Yet, pre 2008 two cases of violence were recorded in Worcester, one in Zwelethemba and one in Roodewal. Considering this history it was expected that Zwelethemba would have been a hot spot. The ward committees will also provide a platform to discuss these and other issues concerning foreign nationals.

Leonardo Goosen of the Human Rights Commission was the first Chairperson of the Committee. Sifiso was the next Chairperson. Because the Committee at that stage operated **reactively** there was not a **coordinated** approach. Many gaps occurred. PASSOP for instance donated 3000 blankets. At the end of the day, although Province played a facilitating role, the buck always stop with the local municipality. Municipalities should have units that deal with matters of conflict such as xenophobia and service delivery protests. The unit must process information they receive from CDW'S and other sources. The big challenge is we do not prepare ourselves, we are too reactionary.

The difference between the attacks of 2008 and 2010 is that it is now more sporadic and targeted, aimed for instance against shop owners, which makes it very difficult to monitor.

APPENDIX C

XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE DE DOORNS NOVEMBER 2009: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW WITH MR CAESAR SAULS DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT – 27 JULY 2010

Key objective

To obtain the participant's views on:

- the reasons for the attack, the process that was followed in managing the xenophobic situation and the reintegration of the displaced
- accusations that the Hex Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) contributed to the violence by underpaying Zimbabweans
- the communication process that was followed in managing the xenophobic situation
- the conditions in the camp.

Methodology

An open-ended interview that allows the participant to express her views freely. Permission to conduct the interview and to use a tape recorder was obtained in advance. The date, time and place of the interview were cleared with the interviewee.

Profile of interviewee

Mr Caesar Sauls is a Deputy Director at the Department of Social Development in Worcester. He represents the Department on the Reintegration Task Team at De Doorns.

Questions

1. Various reasons are given for the xenophobic violence against foreign nationals in De Doorns such as poverty and unemployment, labour practices, political agendas, etc. What in your opinion triggered the violence/ serve as stimulus for the violence?
2. Politicians are accused in the media and research reports of a lack of political will and indifference in dealing with xenophobia. Is it also the case in De Doorns?
3. Incidents of xenophobia are not uncommon to the Breede Valley. Do you think enough was done in terms of public participation/ communication to address the issue?
4. With regard to the present situation in De Doorns, how do you rate the communication process in terms of consultation with various role players – the Stofland community, displaced Zimbabweans, HTA, NGO'S, media, government and the residents of De Doorns?
5. How do you rate the performance of the Reintegration Task Team?
6. In your opinion who is in charge of the reintegration process?

Synopses of the interview

The interviewer introduces himself and explains the purpose of the interview to Mr Sauls. The interviewee responded as follows on the questions (not necessary in the sequence the questions were asked).

The interviewee offered the following reasons for the xenophobic violence at De Doorns:

- The Zimbabweans are **favoured** when it comes to **work opportunities**.
- The Zimbabweans pose a threat to work opportunities for **school children** who traditionally work on the farms during the school holidays for an additional income for their families.
- **Service delivery issues** – the focus shifted from employment opportunities to service delivery short comings by the Breede Valley Municipality. This was refuted at a meeting between Mayor Ntsomi and the Interim Representatives of the Breede Valley Organisation. Also at a community meeting held at the Hex Valley Community Centre. A scorecard of service delivery projects in the area distributed by the Municipality also proved the accusations wrong.
- The **fears** of the local people – the Zimbabweans may be criminals.
- The Zimbabweans are here to **take the women** of the local men.
- The rumours that a **politician** (s) incited the violence is a possibility but difficult to proof.
- The **preference** of Zimbabweans by farmers can contribute to scapegoating.
- Numbers – the fear of being swamped by the numbers of the Zimbabweans.

What is very worrisome is the absence of **ward committees** and councillors to help resolve the issue. In discussions with the Interim Representatives of the Breede Valley Committee the lack of knowledge on local government activity in the area was evident which pointed to the ineffectiveness of the communication structures of the politicians. Right in the beginning of the crisis the presence of councillors was obvious at the steering committee meetings but all a sudden they were nowhere. It is almost as if they were told to back off and let the officials do the job.

With regard to **Braam Hanekom** it must be said that although he is difficult in a sense and delayed the process it is understandable. As a pressure group PASSOP had the best interest of the Zimbabweans at heart. He should have been managed but unfortunately by confronting him openly the Task Team played into his hands. BVM (Breede Valley Municipality) was on the right track to resolve the situation in camp but the intervening and obstruction to the process by Hanekom hampered the operation.

The **large number** of Zimbabweans in the Valley – some estimates put it at 8000, is reason for concern. Influx control can help to solve this problem. Informants said that prior to the attack there was a **warning** out in the community that the Zimbabweans will be attacked in two weeks time. This might have reduced the number of Zimbabweans to a certain extent. Fear of the numbers of the Zimbabweans, of being swamped by the numbers is real.

Policy aspects are challenged. One is labour – local versus migrant labour, another influx control. There is a relaxation for Zimbabweans in our immigration policies of which South Africans, especially the local people do not approve of. The Valley can offer only so much job opportunities and if most of them are taken up by Zimbabweans you can expect problems. Our demography informs us that the area can cater only for a certain amount of jobs. A proposal must go to **HTA** (Hex Valley Table Grape Association) to consider absorbing the local labour market first, the percentage positions left must then be offered to Zimbabweans in the camp. The farmers must also accommodate these seasonal workers on the farm till the end of the season. HTA should also be requested to help monitor the influx of Zimbabweans and provide the statistics to BVM. The fact that some come with their families intensifies the situation and must also be addressed. If farmers experience alcohol related problems from local workers there are safety nets, they must report it to Social Services and the Health Department.

Initiatives to communicate xenophobia:

- Early warning signs workshop for fieldworkers.
- Provincial framework that explains the role of the different departments regarding xenophobia
- Initiatives of the Social Development

It is important that an understanding of these matters be impressed on **scholars**, especially at primary level. Local churches can also play a more active role in sensitising their members on matters of xenophobia. We must make the foreigners part of our community, include them in community activities. The RTT should also be more flexible in its approach. Instead of just wanting to get rid of the foreign nationals as quickly as possible, try to work on a relationship with them.

It is my dream that when the sports field is fully rehabilitated a soccer match between the locals and the Zimbabweans be hosted.

With regard to the **RTT** it must be said that communication was open, information shared, no hidden agendas and no gate keeping experienced.

APPENDIX D

XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE DE DOORNS NOVEMBER 2009: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW WITH MR MANFRED VAN ROOYEN CHAIRPERSON OF THE DE DOORNS REINTEGRATION TASK TEAM – 11 AUGUST 2010

Key objective

To obtain the participant's views on:

- the reasons for the attack, the process that was followed in managing the xenophobic situation and the reintegration of the displaced
- accusations that the Hex Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) contributed to the violence by underpaying Zimbabweans
- the communication process that was followed in managing the xenophobic situation
- the conditions in the camp.

Methodology

An open-ended interview that allows the participant to express her views freely. Permission to conduct the interview and to use a tape recorder was obtained in advance. The date, time and place of the interview were cleared with the interviewee.

Profile of interviewee

Mr Manfred van Rooyen represents the Breede Valley Municipality on the RTT (Reintegration Task Team). He is the current Chairperson of the RTT.

Questions

1. Various reasons are given for the xenophobic violence against foreign nationals in De Doorns such as poverty and unemployment, labour practices, political agendas, etc. What in your opinion triggered the violence/ serve as stimulus for the violence?
2. Politicians are accused in the media and research reports of a lack of political will and indifference in dealing with xenophobia. Is it also the case in De Doorns?
3. Incidents of xenophobia are not uncommon to the Breede Valley. Do you think enough was done in terms of public participation/ communication to address the issue?
4. With regard to the present situation in De Doorns, how do you rate the communication process in terms of consultation with various role players – the Stofland community, displaced Zimbabweans, HTA, NGO'S, media, government and the residents of De Doorns?
5. How do you rate the performance of the Reintegration Task Team?
6. In your opinion who is in charge of the reintegration process?

Synopses of the interview

The interviewer introduces himself and explains the purpose of the interview to Mr van Rooyen. The interviewee responded as follows on the questions (not necessary in the sequence the questions were asked).

In my view there is not **one single reason** that triggered the violence. The following are all reasons/triggers:

- The contestation for **scarce resources** during the harvest season in De Doorns. Six thousand people, mostly South Africans are ordinarily employed permanently on the farms outside the season. With the commencement of the season 9000 positions become available on the farms. In De Doorns the unemployment figure during off-season is 40%. The figure for the Breede Valley area varies between 18% and 21%. The new season creates expectations of work for these poor people. What happens in De Doorns is that there are labour brokers who deliberately recruit Zimbabweans for the farms. They also provide them with accommodation in the local Townships of Hasie Square, Ekuphumleni and Stofland.
- As the term of office of the current council is coming to a close (2011 is local government elections) **opportunistic elements** took the issue of the presence of foreign nationals and under the guise of xenophobia raised service delivery issues in De Doorns. There are elements in De Doorns who have political agendas who want to use the xenophobia to highlight their campaigns – they want to contest for positions at the coming elections.
- **Labour brokers.** Zimbabweans are part of a special dispensation as asylum seekers. They can not be repatriated. There is an international agreement which states that if a Zimbabwean is caught without the necessary papers they have 30 days to go to the nearest Home Affairs office where they can apply for the necessary documentation. The Municipality has no involvement in this sudden influx of foreign nationals to the region. The HTA (Hex Valley Table Grape Association) should have had the foresight to discuss this issue with the Municipality, Department of Labour and the Department of Home Affairs before the start of the season. The HTA on their own applied (facilitated) for a point in the Valley where Zimbabweans could apply for asylum papers. That also created to the greater numbers who went there to register.
- Local people used their **accommodation** to raise income. Names have been listed of Zimbabweans who had a number of stands/plots which they obtained mainly illegally. They have no proof of ownership. It is municipal land earmarked for housing projects and it cannot be sold. Locals also provided accommodation at R20 to R40 per person per week to the foreign nationals.

- In a **small geographic space** it is a fairly high number of foreign nationals. This is a huge presence in a small rural community. It is in your face on a daily basis.
- The main issues are the **economic contestation** for job opportunities during season and the opportunistic element that exploits the issue to further their own aims and to contest the 2011 local government elections. That is why I say it is not classical xenophobia – other foreign nationals were left untouched. It was focused primarily against Zimbabweans. If you look at the police reports it was a peaceful march of Zimbabweans taking their belongings. There were only 12 structures demolished and not burned down, not violently taken down. The Zimbabweans with the police monitoring them walked towards available transport – almost peacefully leaving the area.
- The case in 2008 when a shack was burned down by locals, killing eight Zimbabweans, is not Xenophobia related. It is more a case of social conflict. Two people were chased by a group. They took refuge in a shack that was occupied by Zimbabweans. The shack was then set alight by the people that chased the two men. Nov 2009 was the other violence. A case was opened for public violence and malicious damage to property.
- I do not think there is **political indifference**. I think politicians have understood and correctly analysed the question and then correctly left it to the administration and other government role-players to manage the process. The MEC for Local Government in the Province (Bredell) was quite involved. In March when we met in Cape Town to discuss matters concerning the newly created Task Team the MEC and other politicians showed leadership in their support. It is politicians outside normal government business, who is not in Council, that has been campaigning around this issue. There has been regular visits by local politicians to the site.
- With regard to **communication** around issues of xenophobia I think more needs to be done about educating the community. There is also room for a popular campaign around human rights.
- Xenophobia did not feature in our communication plan at the time of the attacks. It has taken us all by surprise. It took us some time to understand the severity and complexity of the situation before we could respond appropriately. The communication response of the NGOs were far more tuned in at the time. From the third day after the attacks we were more prepared. There were a communication person on site and steadily we began to roll out communication around the issue – liaison, pamphlets and so on. It was an inter-departmental approach involving the BVM'S communication unit, Cape Winelands' media component, GCIS, Office of the Premier and the media sections of other departments. We now need to build in xenophobia and human rights issues into our IDP, communication policy and strategies so that we can proactively address matters. GCIS has already

started to roll out a program at schools. The young people do not understand the historical connection. It is the **young people** who are more at fore front, the more militant around this issue. Communication must focus on the young people. Our communication successes have been met with counter mobilisation and counter communication from these political opportunists. Particularly with our public engagement where we tried to have prayer meetings , walkabouts and public meetings, these counter activities tried to derail our efforts. For instance these people were driving around and threaten people over public address systems if they go the meetings. They were very strong counter mobilisation to our communication messages.

- Braam Hanekom is **Passop**. Clearly he has very good media connections such as Cape Times and the Argus. I always maintained that we are not opposed to NGO'S that is part of the process, subject to them agreeing that this is a government program and adhere to the camp's code of conduct as well as the code of conduct for sexual contact we took from UNISEF. PASSOP made a lot of noise. Rather than contributing towards peace and playing a supportive role PASSOP played more a lobbyist and advocacy role. We represent separate constituencies. Our mandate is a legal mandate that is informed by the Constitution and by applicable legislation. In resent times with the mediation that has being going on to bring a final solution to the issue we met and had discussions. He represents the Zimbabwean De Doorns Committee. It is almost a marriage of convenience scenario. He has been very difficult.
- With regard to the possible inclusion of **SANCO** as an important stakeholder on the RTT it must be stressed that SANCO was not operational when the violence broke out. SANCO was formed two/three months after the attacks. SANCO also has a different campaign. The organisation focused on service delivery and on creating a platform to contest the local government elections. We should have involved the churches on the RTT. Another oversight is not to speak to the trade unions as well as the farm worker structures that exist. There is value in it to be as inclusive as possible.
- When you look at the performance of the **RTT** one must bear in mind that the members were all inexperienced in dealing with xenophobia prior to the November 2009 incident. Remember our primary focus is municipal service delivery and the task that was thrust on you had to be taken alongside your normal work. Your normal work suffered in the process. We succeeded in creating a platform where we meet regularly. I am still struggling with the question of who is ultimately the responsible party. There is no reference at all in the Constitution to a municipality's mandate but in a broader developmental definition of a municipality of course there is a role. However in the first weeks from a disaster management legislative perspective I think there is a role for municipalities. Home Affairs in processing applications has a role. Foreign Affairs who

negotiated the special dispensation with Home Affairs with regard to the Zimbabweans has a role. There is also a responsibility at provincial level. In our Province the Office of the Premier has a *Social Dialog and Human Rights* section. I think it resides there. I think the Municipality is the default participant from the perspective that we deliver services and also that the land they occupy belongs to the municipality. But primarily I would argue, simply from a legal perspective, in terms of the White Paper on Local Government and the broader developmental local government definition of course there is always a role a municipality must play. Therefore we should now include the issue of human rights in our IDP to make provisions for expenditure in this regard. If it is not in the IDP it will not be entertained in the budget and you won't be able to spend. Therefore we were obliged to bring a item to council to condone all irregular unforeseen expenditure that arise from this issue since November 2009. Because we may run the risk in future, unless there is approval by council, that any expenditure in this regard may be seen as fruitless expenditure which will have consequences for the Municipal Manager and officials.

- The **media attention** to this issue captured firmly in the public eye. I think the media reported fairly on these issues. From the RTT'S point of view I think the media gave more attention to the rights of the foreign nationals than the government's response and the complexity of the situation. It could have been more balanced in that regard.
- I think we have done very well as a local municipality. If think of the physical violence meted out in other municipalities in 2008 and elsewhere. The liaison with other role-players – UNHCR, IOM, Black Sash Schalebrini and others were good with the exception of PASSOP.